The Nazi Holocaust: Volume 3 9783110968682, 9783598215643

Table of contents :
Part Four: The Soviet Union
The Jews in the Soviet Annexed Territories 1939–41
Soviet Media on the Fate of Jews in Nazi-Occupied Territory (1939–1941)
Jewish Refugees in Soviet Poland 1939–1941
Jews in General Anders’ Army in the Soviet Union
The Attitude of the Soviet Union to the Rescue of Jews
Part Five: Neutrals
The International Red Cross and Its Policy Vis-á-Vis the Jews in Ghettos and Concentration Camps in Nazi-Occupied Europe
Sweden’s Attempt to Aid Jews, 1939–1945
Part Six: Churches
(i) Catholics
History and Rolf Hochhuth’s The Deputy
The Vatican and the Jews: Cynicism and Indifference
Records and Documents of the Holy See Relating to the Second World War
Catholicism and the Jews during the Nazi Period and After
Weizsäcker, the Vatican, and the Jews of Rome
French Churches and the Persecution of Jews in France, 1940–1944
Vatican Policy and the “Jewish Problem” in “Independent” Slovakia (1939–1945)
The Vatican’s Endeavors on Behalf of Rumanian Jewry during the Second World War
(ii) Protestants
German Protestantism and the Jews in the Third Reich
Theological Myth, German Antisemitism and the Holocaust: The Case of Martin Niemoeller
Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Jews: Thoughts and Actions, 1933–1945
The Dutch Protestants, the Third Reich and the Persecution of the Jews
APPENDIX
Jewish Emigration from Germany: Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses (II)
Footnotes for: Some Aspects of the Yishuv Leadership’s Activities during the Holocaust
Copyright Information
Index

Citation preview

THE NAZI HOLOCAUST

THE NAZI HOLOCAUST Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews

Edited by Michael R. Marrus Series ISBN 0-88736-266-4 1. Perspectives on the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-252-4 2. The Origins of the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-253-2 3. The "Final Solution": The Implementation of Mass Murder ISBN 0-88736-255-9 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-256-7 vol. 2 4. The "Final Solution" Outside Germany ISBN 0-88736-257-5 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-258-3 vol. 2 5. Public Opinion and Relations to the Jews in Nazi Europe ISBN 0-88736-259-1 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-254-0 vol. 2 6. The Victims of the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-260-5 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-261-3 vol. 2 7. Jewish Resistance to the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-262-1 8. Bystanders to the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-263-X vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-264-8 vol. 2 ISBN 0-88736-268-0 vol. 3 9. The End of the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-265-6

THE NAZI HOLOCAUST Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews

8

Bystanders to the •

Holocaust

Volume 3

Edited with an Introduction by

Michael R. Marrus University of Toronto

Meckler Westport · London

Publisher's Note The articles and chapters which comprise this collection originally appeared in a wide variety of publications and are reproduced here in facsimilefromthe highest quality offprints and photocopies available. The reader will notice some occasional marginal shading and text-curl common to photocopying from tightly bound volumes. Every attempt has been made to correct or minimize this effect The publisher wishes to acknowledge all the individuals and institutions that provided permission to reprint from their publications. Special thanks are due to the Yad Vashem Institute, Jerusalem, the YTVO Institute for Jewish Research, New York, and the Leo Baeck Institute, New York, for their untiring assistance in providing materials from their publications and collections for use in this series. Library of Congress Cataloglng-ln-Publkation Data Bystanders to the Holocaust / edited by Michael R. Μarrus. p. cm. — (The Nazi Holocaust; v. 8) Includes index. ISBN 0-88736-263-X (v. 1 : alk. paper): $ (set) 1. Holocaust, Jewish (1939-1945) — Public opinion. 2. Refugees, Jewish. 3. Jews — Palestine — Politics and government 4. Jews — United States — Politics and goverment. I. Marrus, Michael Robert. Π. Series. D804.3.N39 vol. 8 940.53Ί8 s—dc20 [940.53Ί8] 89-12247 CIP British Library Cataloging in Publication Data Bystanders to the Holocaust. - (The Nazi Holocaust; v.8). 1. Jews, Genocide, 1939-1945 I. Marrus, Michael R. (Michael Robert) Π. Series 940.53Ί5Ό3924 ISBN 0-88736-263-X v.l ISBN 0-88736-264-8 v.2 ISBN 0-88736-268-0 v 3 ISBN 0-88736-266-4 set Copyright information for articles reproduced in this collection appears at the end of this volume. Introductions and selection copyright © 1989 Meckler Corporation. All rights reserved. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form by any means without prior written permission of the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in review. Meckler Corporation, 11 Ferry Lane West, Westport, CT 06880. Meckler Ltd., Grosvenor Gardens House, Grosvenor Gardens, London SW1W 0BS, U.K. Printed on acid free paper. Printed in the United States of America.

Contents Series Preface Introduction

xi xiii

Part One: Perceptions of the Holocaust Did the Zionist Leadership Foresee the Holocaust? ANITA SHAPIRA The Holocaust in National-Socialist Rhetoric and Writings: Some Evidence against the Thesis That before 1945 Nothing Was Known about the "Final Solution" HANS-HEINRICH WILHELM When Did They Know? YEHUDA Β AUER Hitler's Holocaust: Who Knew What, When, and How? WALTER LAQUEUR Auschwitz and the Archives RICHARD BREITMAN Pious Sympathies and Sincere Regrets: The American News Media and the Holocaust from Krystalnacht to Bermuda, 1938-1943 DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT

3

19 52 60 80

99

Part Two: Unwanted Refugees Who Shall Bear Guilt for the Holocaust: The Human Dilemma HENRY L. FEINGOLD Exodus 1933-1939: A Survey of Jewish Emigration from Germany WERNER ROSENSTOCK Jewish Emigration from Germany: Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses (I) HERBERT A. STRAUSS The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai, 1938-1945 DAVID KRANZLER 'The Line Must Be Drawn Somewhere': Canada and Jewish Refugees, 1933-9 IRVING ABELLA and HAROLD TROPER Rescue Operations through Vilna YEHUDA BAUER Roosevelt and the Resettlement Question HENRY L. FEINGOLD

121 143 161 210

230 262 271

Churchill and the Jews: The Holocaust MICHAEL J. COHEN British Government Policy towards Jewish Refugees (November 1938September 1939) MARTIN GILBERT The British Government and the German Immigration 1933-1945 BERNARD WASSERSTEIN The Bermuda Conference and Its Aftermath: An Allied Quest for "Refuge" during the Holocaust MONTY N. PENKOWER

330 353 394 413

Part Three: Jewish Communities (i) General Jewish Denial and the Holocaust WALTER LAQUEUR Jewish Foreign Policy during the Holocaust YEHUDA BAUER

435 467

VOLUME TWO

(ii) Palestinian Jewry The Reactions of the Zionist Movement and the Yishuv to the Nazis' Rise to Power YOAV GELBER Zionist Policy and the Fate of European Jewry (1939-1942) YOAV GELBER Some Aspects of the Yishuv Leadership's Activities during the Holocaust BELAVAGO Palestinian Jewry and the Jewish Agency: Public Response to the Holocaust DINAPORAT The Activities of the Jewish Agency Delegation in Istanbul in 1943 DALIA OFER Ben-Gurion and the Holocaust of European Jewry 1939-1945: A Stereotype Reexamined TUVIA FRIELING Al-domi: Palestinian Intellectuals and the Holocaust, 1943-1945 DINAPORAT

477 538 580 601 629 658 692

(iii) American Jewry The American Jewish Leadership and the Holocaust DAVID S. WYMAN Stephen Wise and the Holocaust HENRY L. FEINGOLD "Courage First and Intelligence Second": The American Jewish Secular Elite, Roosevelt and the Failure to Rescue HENRY L. FEINGOLD Activism versus Moderation: The Conflict between Abba Hillel Silver and Stephen Wise during the 1940s ZVIGANIN In Dramatic Dissent: The Bergson Boys MONTY NOAM PENKOWER American Jewish Unity during the Holocaust—The Joint Emergency Committee, 1943 EDWARD PINSKY The Campaign for an American Response to the Nazi Holocaust, 1943-1945 SARAH E. PECK Jewish Organizations and the Creation of the U.S. War Refugee Board MONTY N. PENKOWER What American Jews Did during the Holocaust MARIE SYRKIN The Goldberg Report YEHUDA BAUER

723 750

762

799 824

853

871 905 923 942

(iv) Other Jewish Communities Iraqi Jews during World War Π HAROLD PAUL LUKS Patterns of Jewish Leadership in Great Britain during the Nazi Era BERNARD WASSERSTEIN Switzerland and the Leadership of Its Jewish Community during the Second World War GERHART M. RIEGNER

953 973

988

VOLUME THREE

Part Four: The Soviet Union The Jews in the Soviet Annexed Territories 1939-41 SHIMON REDLICH Soviet Media on the Fate of Jews in Nazi-Occupied Territory (1939-1941) BEN-CION PINCHUK Jewish Refugees in Soviet Poland 1939-1941 BEN-CION PINCHUK Jews in General Anders' Army in the Soviet Union YISRAEL GUTMAN The Attitude of the Soviet Union to the Rescue of Jews DOV LEVIN

1009

1021 1034 1052 1118

Part Five: Neutrals The International Red Cross and Its Policy Vis-ä-Vis the Jews in Ghettos and Concentration Camps in Nazi-Occupied Europe MEIR DWORZECKI Sweden's Attempt to Aid Jews, 1939-1945 STEVEN KOBLIK

1133 1173

Part Six: Churches (i) Catholics History and Rolf Hochhuth's The Deputy LEONIDAS Ε. HILL The Vatican and the Jews: Cynicism and Indifference JUDAH L. GRAUBART Records and Documents of the Holy See Relating to the Second World War JOHN S. CONWAY Catholicism and the Jews during the Nazi Period and Aft«1 JOHN S. CONWAY Weizsäcker, the Vatican, and the Jews of Rome OWEN CHADWICK French Churches and the Persecution of Jews in France, 1940-1944 MICHAEL R. MARRUS

1201 1214

1227 1246 1263 1284

Vatican Policy and the "Jewish Problem" in "Independent" Slovakia (1939-1945) LIVIA ROTHKIRCHEN The Vatican's Endeavors on Behalf of Rumanian Jewry during the Second World War THEODORE LAVI

1306

1333

(ii) Protestants German Protestantism and the Jews in the Third Reich RICHARD GUTTERIDGE Theological Myth, German Antisemitism and the Holocaust: The Case of Martin Niemoeller ROBERT MICHAEL Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Jews: Thoughts and Actions, 1933-1945 RUTH ZERNER The Dutch Protestants, the Third Reich and the Persecution of the Jews GERVANROON

1349

1372 1390 1406

APPENDIX Jewish Emigration from Germany: Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses (II) HERBERT A. STRAUSS 1415 Footnotes for: Some Aspects of the Yishuv Leadership's Activities during the Holocaust BEL A VAGO 1483 Copyright Information

1489

Index

1495

Series Preface The Holocaust, the murder of close to six million Jews by the Nazis during the Second World War, stands as a dreadful monument to mankind's inhumanity to man. As such, it will continue to be pondered for as long as people care about the past and seek to use it as a guide to the present. In the last two decades, historical investigation of this massacre has been unusually productive, both in the sense of extending our understanding of what happened and in integrating the Holocaust into the general stream of historical consciousness. This series, a collection of English-language historical articles on the Holocaust reproduced in facsimile form, is intended to sample therichvariety of this literature, with particular emphasis on the most recent currents of historical scholarship. However assessed, historians acknowledge a special aura about the Nazis' massacre of European Jewry, that has generally come to be recognized as one of the watershed events of recorded history. What was singular about this catastrophe was not only the gigantic scale of the killing, but also the systematic, machine-like effort to murder an entire people — including every available Jew — simply for the crime of being Jewish. In theory, no one was to escape — neither the old, nor the infirm, nor even tiny infants. Nothing quite like this had happened before, at least in modern times. By any standard, therefore, the Holocaust stands out. While Jews had known periodic violence in their past, it seems in retrospect that the rise of radical anti-Jewish ideology, centered on race, set the stage for eventual mass murder. As well, Europeans became inured to death on a mass scale during the colossal bloodletting of the Rrst World War. That conflict provided cover for the slaughter of many hundreds of thousands of Armenians in Turkey, a massacre that Hitler himself seems to have thought a precursor of what he would do in the conquest of the German Lebensraum, or living space, in conquered Europe. Still, the extermination of every living person on the basis of who they were, was something new. For both perpetrators and victims, therefore, decisions taken for what the Nazis called the "Final Solution" began a voyage into the unknown. As the Israeli historian Jacob Katz puts iL "This was an absolute novum, unassimilable in any vocabulary at the disposal of the generation that experienced it" For more than a decade after the war, writing on the Holocaust may be seen in general as part of the process of mourning for the victims — dominated by the urge to bear witness to what had occurred, to commemorate those who had been murdered, and to convey a warning to those who had escaped. Given the horror and the unprecedented character of these events, it is not surprising that it has taken writers some time to present a coherent, balanced assessment The early 1960s were a turning point The appearance of Raul Hilberg's monumental work, The Destruction of the European Jews, and the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 stimulated debate and investigation. From Israel, the important periodical published by the Yad Vashem Institute [Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority], Yad Vashem Studies, made serious research

available to scholars in English. German and American scholars set to work. Numerous academic conferences and publications in the following decade, sometimes utilizing evidence from trials of war criminals then underway, extended knowledge considerably. As a result, we now have an immense volume of historical writing, a significant sample of which is presented in this series. A glance at the topics covered underscores the vast scale of this history. Investigators have traced the Nazi persecution of the Jews before the implementation of the "Final Solution," showing links both to Nazi ideology and antisemitic tradition. They have indicated how the Germans coordinated their anti-Jewish activities on a European-wide scale in the wake of their territorial conquests, drawing upon their own bureaucracy and those of their allies, enlisting collaborators and various helpers in defeated countries. They have also devoted attention to the victims — whether in East European ghettos or forests, in Central or Western Europe, or in the various concentration and death camps run by the 55. Finally, they have also written extensively on the bystanders — the countries arrayed against the Hitlerian Reich, neutrals, various Christian denominations, and the Jews outside Nazi-dominated Europe. The volumes in this series permit thereaderto sample thericharray of scholarship on the history of the Holocaust, and to assess some of the conflicting interpretations. They also testify to a deeper, more sophisticated, and more balanced appreciation than was possible in the immediate wake of these horrifying events. The literature offered here can be studied as historiography — scholars addressing problems of historical interpretation — or, on the deepest level, as a grappling with the most familiar but intractable of questions: How was such a thing possible? *

*

*

I want to express my warm appreciation to all those who helped me in the preparation of these volumes. My principal debt, of course, is to the scholars whose work is represented in these pages. To them, and to the publications in which their essays first appeared, I am grateful not only for permission to reproduce their articles but also for their forbearance in dealing with a necessarily remote editor. I appreciate as well the assistance of the following, who commented on lists of articles that I assembled, helping to make this project an educational experience not only for my readers but also for myself: Yehuda Bau«*, Rudolph Binion, Christopher Browning, Saul Friedländer, Henry Friedlander, Raul Hilberg, Jacques Romberg, Walter Laqueur, Franklin Littell, Hubert Locke, Zeev Mankowitz, Sybil Milton, George Mosse, and David Wyman. To be sure, I have sometimes been an obstreperous student, and I have not always accepted the advice that has been kindly proffered. I am alone responsible for the choices here, and for the lacunae that undoubtedly exist Special thanks go to Ralph Carlson, who persuaded me to undertake this project and who took charge of many technical aspects of iL Thanks also to Anthony Abbott of Meckler Corporation who saw the work through to completion. Finally, as so often in the past, I record my lasting debt to my wife, Carol Randi Mamis, without whom I would have been engulfed by this and other projects. Toronto, July 1989

Michael R. Marrus

Introduction Any discussion of the reactions of those outside Nazi Europe to the persecution and murder of European Jewry must begin with the question of "Who knew what, when, and how?" As will be seen, there is no simple answer that can be given to this question. Circumstances varied in Europe and North America, of course. Some channels of information were better than others. As numerous scholars have demonstrated, information about the fate of European Jews flowed steadily to the West, dispatched from many sources, notably the Polish Home Army. Such news attained a considerable degree of volume and accuracy in the second half of 1942. But there were wide variations in how this information was received. One historian wisely distinguished between "information" and "knowledge" — emphasizing that people did not always absorb the news they received from Nazi occupied Europe and indeed that they frequently tended to suppress such information, being either incapable or unwilling to accept the facts that were presented to them. This section goes on to portray a wide variety of responses — or non-responses — to the Jews' plight For the period before the outbreak of war in 1939 the issue of Jewish refugees is obviously a central concern, and various essays outline and explain the restrictionist policies of Western countries and, to a much lesser degree, the Soviet Union. These articles set restrictionism in both national and international contexts, examining the basic circumstances that help condition subsequent responses, after the outbreak of fighting in 1939. Wartime attitudes and policies are also examined, notably those of the American and British governments. Other bystanders are also discussed, including Jewish communities in the West, the Jews of Palestine, and Christian churches.

Part Four

The Soviet Union

THE SOVIET UNION

1009

The Jews in the Soviet Annexed Territories 1939-41* by Shimon Redlich

In the years 1939-1940 large areas were annexed by the Soviet Union beyond her western borders. About 2 million Jews inhabited these territories which included the Baltic states, eastern Poland and parts of Romania. The Jews, as part of the general population, underwent the various phases of Sovietization. However, for them there were certain differences in this process, both in terms of Soviet attitudes towards them and in their adjustment to the Soviet realities. One should also take into account such preconditions as the status of the Jewish national minorities in the above territories before annexation, and their economic and social structure. The majority of the new Soviet Jewish population consisted of Polish Jews; the others were former citizens of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania. The Jewish minority groups in these states had been subject to discriminatory policies by the governments and suffered from hostile attitudes on the part of the non-Jewish population. Economic discrimination against Jews was also apparent. It is no wonder therefore that some expected their situation to improve as a result of the change in regime. The fact that Soviet reality was only partially known outside the USSR at that time, contributed considerably to these expectations. Such hopes for the most part proved unfounded. Jewish cultural activities in the USSR had become increasingly limited in the prewar period. Many of those active in Soviet Yiddish culture were purged in the late thirties. The policy of unofficial discrimination against Jews in the sphere of Party and government appointments became discernible. The Jews of the newly acquired territories became a part of the Soviet Jewish population at a time when the national status of the * I should like to thank the staff of the Y a d Vashcm Archives in Jerusalem for the help extended to me during the preparation of this study. It was first published in Behinot

(Tel-Aviv) no. 1, 1970, and has been translated from the Hebrew b y J u d i t h T . Redlich —S.R.

1010

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

Soviet Jew had begun to deteriorate. However, the Soviet authorities had to use Yiddish as a medium of education, communication and propaganda in the new territories, at least in the initial period after their incorporation into the USSR. Thus, a somewhat strange situation evolved. Whereas Soviet Yiddish cultural activities within the former boundaries of the USSR were being curtailed, they were encouraged by the regime in the annexed territories. The annexations The annexations took place in two phases. Eastern Poland was annexed in September 1939; the Baltic states and parts of Romania in the summer of 1940. The entrance of the Soviet army into the Polish territories was accompanied by a clamorous and intensive propaganda campaign aimed to justify the annexation as an act of national liberation. Starting from mid-September 1939 official announcements and leading articles in the Soviet press pointed out the sufferings of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian minorities under the disintegrating Polish rule. At the same time the existence of a considerable Jewish national minority in these territories was almost completely ignored. In the first stages of the annexation the Soviet administration was primarily a military one. In eastern Poland it was headed by Marshal S. Timoshenko, commander of the Ukrainian Front Among those active in establishing Soviet rule in eastern Poland were also N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and I. Serov, head of the Soviet secret police in the Ukraine. The Political Department of the Ukrainian Front was used for administration and propaganda purposes. Its officers were given the assignment of organising propaganda meetings for the local population and establishing temporary administrative committees which were generally composed of representatives of the military and of local sympathizers. In Kiev a special committee to deal with the nationalities of the annexed territories was set up under the auspices of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. Gradually the participation of the military in local government diminished, and the role of the Party apparatus increased. Elections for local national assemblies were held in western Ukraine and western Byelorussia at the end of 1939, and requests for incorporating these territories into the Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics were submitted. The inhabitants of western Ukraine and western Byelorussia officially became Soviet citizens by a decree of the Supreme Soviet of 29 November 1939. The annexation of eastern Poland resulted in the addition of such centres of Jewish population as Pihsk, Bialystok, Grodno and Baranovichi to the Byelorussian republic, and such centres as Lvov, Ternopol, Rovno, Chortkov and Stanislav to Soviet Ukraine (the names are transliterated from their Soviet form). The annexation of the Baltic states was carried out almost a year later. During the period of October 1939-June 1940, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia enjoyed the status of independent states although Soviet army units were stationed there. Vilna and vicinity, being a part of Poland until the outbreak of World War II, were incorporated in Lithuania as a result of Soviet pressure. Sovietization of the Baltic states was

THE SOVIET UNION

1011

completed in the summer of 1940. It was supervised by V. G. Dekanozov, one of the top men of the Soviet secret police, A. Y. Vyshinsky, the Prosecutor at the Moscow purge trials, and A. A. Zhdanov, the future adviser of Stalin in Russia's postwar conservative policies. The lessons learned in the Sovietization of the Polish territories were efficiently applied in the Baltic states, and the secret police apparatus was extensively used in the process. By the beginning of August 1940 all three Baltic states officially became Soviet republics. They comprised stich Jewish population centres as Vilna, Kovno and Riga. Palts of Romania (Bessarabia and northern Bukovina) were annexed by the 'Soviet Union in July 1940, and Soviet propaganda in this case also stressed the 'liberation' of local nationalities. The Romanian territories were incorporated in the Soviet Ukraine and in the newly created Moldavian republic. The ex-Romanian territories had such Jewish centres as Kishinev in Bessarabia and Chernovtsy in northern Bukovina. Jewish

populations

It is difficult to ascertain the precise number of Jews inhabiting the Soviet annexed territories. No population censuses had been taken there in the immediate prewar period. Another factor to be considered is the extensive population movement, mainly of refugees, which took place in the above areas beginning in September 1939. The estimated size of the local Jewish population is about 2 million. According to an estimate published in 1941 by the Institute of Jewish Affairs in New York, 1,270,000 Jews lived in the regions of eastern Poland, 330,000 in Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, 250,000 in Lithuania (the number of Lithuanian Jews before the outbreak of the war was about 150,000 and it increased by about 100,000 after the inclusion of Vilna and vicinity in Lithuania), 95,000 in Latvia and 5,000 in Estonia.1 The majority of the Jewish population in the annexed territories was urban. For example, about 100,000 Jews lived in Lvov, more than 70,000 in Kishinev, more than 50,000 in Vilna, about 40,000 in Chernovtsy, Bialystok and Riga, and about 30,000 in Kovno. In the ex-Polish and ex-Romanian territories the Jews comprised about 10 per cent of the general population and in certain cities they were more than 50 per cent. The urban Jewish population swelled considerably as a result of the continuous inflow of Jewish refugees from central and western Poland. The Jewish population of Lvov reached 180,000, that of Vilna 70-80,000 and of Bialystok about 70,000.2 It seems that the overall number of Jewish refugees who reached the new Soviet territories from German-occupied Poland 3was approximately 300-350,000, although some estimates are much higher. Refugees and

deportees

The tribulations of the Jewish refugees who reached the annexed territories and most of whom were deported into the USSR constitute a separate chapter and will not be dealt with in this article. However, it should be pointed out that the presence of the refugees had some

1012

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

impact upon the local Jews, and significant contacts were established between them. Since a great number of public figures, writers, artists and intellectuals were to be found among the refugees, it was only natural that they contributed to the Jewish cultural life in the Soviet annexed territories. Polish Jewish refugees also played a significant role in illegal Jewish activities, especially in the various Zionist movements. The Soviet authorities undoubtedly regarded the Jewish refugees with more suspicion than the local Jews. Most of them had left relatives in the German-occupied territories and tried to maintain contact in various ways. Thousands of refugees expressed their desire to return to their homes, when lists for this purpose were drawn up by a mixed GermanSoviet committee in the spring of 1940. Most of the refugees also refused to accept Soviet citizenship. Such attitudes and behaviour by the refugees made them a security risk in the eyes of the NKVD. and resulted in mass deportations which started in the winter of 1940 and continued until the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. Whereas the deportation of the refugees was almost total, the imprisonment and deportation of local Jews was limited. The majority of the local deportees were public figures and leaders of Zionist movements and the Bund. It seems that the number of Jews from the Baltic st&tes deported into the remote regions of the USSR proportionately exceeded that of the ex-Romanian and ex-Polish Jewish deportees. In June 1941, just before the German attack on the USSR, about 10,000 Latvian and 6-7,000 Lithuanian Jews were imprisoned by the Soviet security organs.4 The arrests were generally carried out in accordance with prepared lists of people. Forms for this purpose used by the NKVD in Lithuania listed such a category as 'The National Jewish Counterrevolution' which included names of leaders and activists of various Zionist groupings and the Bund. It is difficult to determine the extent to which Soviet attitudes to the Jewish refugees influenced the official behaviour towards the local Jewish population. However, it is very likely that their being part of the same national group and their having contacts with the refugees aroused Soviet suspicion.3 In spite of the difficulties and dangers, the local Jewish population supported the refugees in various ways. Jewish families living in the vicinity of the Soviet-German frontier lodged refugees and 4 aided them in their eastward flight. Synagogues were utilized as centres for aid and contact.7 Local Jews8 also helped Jewish deportees by donating money, food and medicines. Nevertheless, when everyday life became harder, possibilities and willingness to help decreased. Attitude to Soviet authorities The attitude of the Jewish population in the annexed territories to the Soviet army and administration was somewhat ambivalent. Most of the testimonies and memoirs tend to differentiate between different periods and various groups within the Jewish population. The overall impression is that the attitude of the 'shtetT Jews was more positive than that of the Jews living in large cities. The 'shtetl' Jew was generally poor, even before Soviet annexation, whereas in the large urban centres certain strata of the Jewish population were particularly

THE SOVIET UNION

1013

hurt by the new regime. Among them were enterprise owners, merchants, professionals and community leaders. At the same time, some of the Jewish youth supported the regime since it provided them with educational and occupational possibilities from which they had previously been barred. The intensive political, social and recreational activities also had a certain appeal. In some places the arrival of Soviet units actually prevented anti-Jewish rioting, and those Jews who were aware of the Nazi Jewish policies saw their salvation in their incorporation into the USSR. In the first phases of the annexation, before the full instalment of the Soviet Party and administrative apparatus, all available local sympathizers were mobilised to aid the Soviets in local government. No national criteria were yet applied. In some of the townlets of eastern Poland, Jews participated in the temporary administration committees established by the Soviet military. Jews also entered local militia.* There were even cases of local Soviet authorities accepting the assistance of Zionists and Bundists. Jewish officers and soldiers of the Red Army units stationed in the annexed territories were utilized for spreading Soviet propaganda among local Jews. Yiddish was often used in such cases. In the townlet of Gliniana, for example, a Soviet captain spoke at a gathering of the local Jews and promised them a glorious future under Stalin's rule.10 Even old religious Jews were impressed to hear Yiddish-speaking Soviet officers. There were also* cases of close contact between Soviet Jewish soldiers and local Jewish families. Visits to Jewish homes on Saturdays and holidays were not uncommon. Representation As time passed the Soviet policy of stressing the Ukrainian and Byelorussian character of the ex-Polish territories became obvious. The Poles and Jews were not given their proportional share in the representative and administrative organs. In the national assembly of western Ukraine which totalled 1,495 members there were only 20 Jews.11 Among the 922 representatives of the national assembly of western Byelorussia there were 72 Jews, a ratio which did not reflect the real proportion of Jews among thfe general population.1- In the lists of those elected to the Supreme Soviet and to the Soviet of Nationalities from western Ukraine and western Byelorussia in March 1940, no Jewish names can be identified. The city council of Lvov, which comprised 476 members, included only 76 Jews although the Jewish population of that city composed almost a third of its inhabitants. The relative percentage of Jews in the state organs of Soviet Lithuania was somewhat bigger than in eastern Poland. In the Soviet Lithuanian government there were two Jewish deputy ministers and a few Jews could be found in the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party.13 Economic

and communal life

The changes in the economy had a crucial impact on the Jewish population. Many Jews were either employers or employees in medium and

1014

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

small enterprises. Enterprises of this size were allowed to exist during the first few weeks after the annexation. Then, most of the medium-size enterprises were nationalized and heavy taxes were imposed on the smaller ones. The result was that even the smaller enterprises were unable to survive. Among 1,593 enterprises nationalized in Soviet Lithuania, 1,320 were owned by14: Jews. Out of 370 enterprises nationalized in Vilna, 265 were Jewish. The wide scale nationalization and the sharp decline in money values caused many Jews illegally to hide their merchandise and to trade on the black market. Those caught by the authorities were brought to trial and were portrayed as bourgeois parasites. As a result of the extreme economic changes and the flow of refugees, unemployment increased. The Soviet authorities tried to solve the problem by transferring the unemployed to the interior of the USSR. A propaganda campaign to this effect was initiated in western Ukraine and Byelorussia in the winter of 1940. The central and local press were extensively used for this purpose.13 According to information published in the Soviet Yiddish press, about 30,000 volunteered for jobs inside the Soviet Union, out of which 13,500 were transferred to the Donbas mining region.1" However, most of the volunteers returned to the west, deeply disappointed by the extremely difficult employment conditions.17 In 1940, an attempt was also made to mobilise volunteers for settlement in Birobidjan. In spite of the generally difficult employment situation, certain professions were in demand. The organization of Soviet public health services in the new territories caused a growing demand for medical personnel. Because of the reorganization and expansion of the education network, many teachers were needed. Jews also found employment in various cooperatives, especially as accountants. There were also18 instances of Jews being promoted to leading positions in their work. The annexation resulted in far-reaching changes in Jewish communal life. Most of the Jewish activities came to an end. The Soviet attitude to Jewish religious activities reflected the general Soviet policy in the religious sphere. The anti-religious periodical Bezbozhnik emphasized the need to eradicate religious feelings and beliefs ingrained within the population of the new territories.13 An anti-religious conference to discuss atheistic propaganda in the western territories of the USSR was convened in Kiev in January 1940. In spite of the obvious anti-religious intentions and policies, no extreme measures were applied in order not to antagonize the local population. The same held true for the Soviet policies concerning the Jewish religion. There were few cases of synagogues being closed down by the Soviet authorities. At the same time, however, more subtle measures were employed to limit religious practices. Personal pressure was applied to rabbis and other religious personnel to leave their posts, and high taxes were imposed on synagogues.20 It is interesting to note that the synagogue assumed a special role, being the only legal remnant of the former Jewish communal network. The synagogue became the. only public meeting place of the Jewish community. It was there that the Jewish refugees could find room and board. The

THE SOVIET UNION

1015

synagogues were used by Zionist youth on their way to such centres as Vilna, from where there were chances to leave for Palestine. Zionist

bodies

The various Zionist organizations were viewed by the Soviets as centres of anti-regime activity. They were disbanded, and many of their leading members were imprisoned. It was particularly the Soviet Youth League (Komsomol) which waged a continuous propaganda campaign against Zionist youth movements. The secretary of the Komsomol in the Lvov district complained that 'These Zionist organizations have ceased to exist; however, their miserable remnants try even now to interfere with our work.'*1 He also suggested that the Komsomol should make sure not to admit ex-Zionists to its ranks. At the same time Komsomol leaders in Lithuania turned directly to Zionist youth in order to persuade them to join the Komsomol.-2 Even more unusual was a request of the Soviet authorities in Chernovtsy that the 'Hashomer Hatzair' should supply its members for service in the local civilian force.23 Thus Soviet attitudes to Zionist youth differed at times, according to circumstances and the needs of the regime. Even though the Zionist movements ceased to function officially, most of them continued some sort of activity illegally. Among the most active was the 'Hashomer Hatzair'. Its delegates met in Rovno (western Ukraine) in December 1939 and decided to set up an organizational framework for activities within western Ukraine and western Byelorussia. The movement was to be organized in small groups which would function under strict discipline and complete secrecy. These decisions were published in a mimeographed newsletter entitled 'Mimaamakim' (From the Depths) in January 1940. An additional meeting of 'Hashomer Hatzair* activists took place in Lvov in March 1940, and a second edition of the newsletter was issued. Its contents clearly showed that it had been decided to extend the movement's activities beyond the big urban centres, and also to initiate contacts with Soviet Jewish youth. It was also recommended to use the framework of Soviet Yiddish education for this purpose. These plans however did not materialize. Many of the 'Hashomer Hatzair' leaders were arrested in Lvov in October 1940 and sentenced at a public trial. Illegal Zionist activities were initiated also by such youth movements as 'Gordonia' and 'Hfechalutz Hatzair'. Their joint activities started in February 1940 and lasted until the beginning of June 1941, when most of their leaders were arrested in Lutsk, in western Ukraine.24 Some of the Zionist agricultural farms succeeded in surviving after the annexation. One such farm, run by the 'Hashomer Hatzair*, existed near Lvov. Other farms. functioned in the vicinity of Vilna until March 1941.23 The most typical organizational structure of Zionist youth remained the 'cell' system. The 'Bnei Akiva' agricultural training centre in Vilna split into groups of 6-7 members.2« The 'Hanoar Hatzioni' youth movement acted similarly. A letter sent by its leaders to Palestine stated: 'The leaders of the centres [of Hanoar Hatzioni] deemed it necessary to organize

1016

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

the activities in a new manner, in small groups of five or six members, which would meet in private homes'.27 The ex-Polish leadership of the 'Hanoar Hatzioni' gathered in Vilna and from there maintained contacts both with friends who remained in German-occupied Poland and with those living in the Soviet-annexed territories.28 From the existing evidence one may conclude that Vilna and vicinity served as the centre of Zionist activities in Eastern Europe in the years 1939-1941. In the period between October 1939 and June 1940 members of various Zionist groups found refuge there. They arrived in Vilna from both Nazi-occupied Poland and the new Soviet territories. A central point of departure for those who illegally crossed the Soviet-Lithuanian border was the town of Lida in western Byelorussia. Representatives of Zionist movements located in Lida assisted them and acted as guides. Several thousand Jews succeeded in leaving Vilna for the Far East before Lithuania's incorporation in the USSR. Even after the Soviet annexation more than 2,000 Jews, most of them members of Zionist movements, left Vilna for Palestine. This unique exodus of Zionists from the annexed territories probably resulted from pressures applied by Jewish organizations in the United States, Britain and Palestine, as well as from Soviet monetary considerations. The Soviet travel agency Intourist collected the travel fees in US currency for the transfer from Vilna to Odessa and from there to Turkey.2» Cultural

Life

Intensive Jewish cultural life existed on the eve of the war iq the territories annexed by the Soviet Union. Soviet cultural policies caused far-reaching changes in both scope and content. Jewish culture suffered even more than the non-Jewish local national cultures, since the Soviet authorities considered Jewish cultural activities less significant than those of the other ethnic groups. The Jewish educational system was completely reorganized. The only Jewish schools allowed to function were those whose language of instruction was Yiddish, and their curriculum was adapted to Soviet standards. Such subjects as Hebrew and Jewish History were completely eliminated. In western Ukraine 103 Jewish schools were functioning in the beginning of 1940.30 At the same time about 1,000 Polish and more than 5,000 Ukrainian schools existed there. The Jewish population of western Ukraine constituted about 10% of the total population, while the percentages of the Ukrainian and Polish populations were 40% and 35% respectively. Thus, whereas the Ukrainian schools totalled 81.9% of the overall number, the Polish schools reached 16.3% and the Jewish ones only 1.7%. During the first months after the annexation local teachers and principals remained in the Jewish schools. However, in time they were gradually replaced by personnel arriving from the interior of the USSR. In some of the schools the language of instruction was changed from Yiddish to Ukrainian.31 The process of Sovietization in the Jewish schools was not always smooth. Some

THE SOVIET UNION

1017

of the students insisted on observing the Sabbath and Jewish holidays. There were also instances of illegal Zionist groups being formed by students and teachers. 32 Soviet Jewish schools started in western Byelorussia in December 1939. They totalled between 150 and 160.33 In the Teachers' Seminary at Bialystok a department for training teachers of Yiddish was opened, and special courses for the same purpose were planned in Pinsk for the school year 1941-1942.34 It seems that the highest percentage of Jewish schools in the annexed territories existed in Soviet Lithuania. In 1941 about 20,000 students studied in 160 elementary schools and about 4,500 in secondary schools.33 Four Jewish high schools, with an average student body of 500 in each, functioned in Vilna. Jewish high schools existed also in Kovno, Shavli and Vilkomir. The difficulties facing the Jewish schools in Lithuania, such as language problems and lack of textbooks, were brought up in a conference of teachers in Yiddish high schools, which took place in Vilna at the end of 1940.3· The Vilna University was the only institute of higher education in the annexed territories to establish a department of Yiddish language and literature. Noah Prylutski, the well-known Yiddishist, was appointed head of the department, which had an enrollment of 35 students. 37 The Soviet Jewish school administration in Lithuania, as in western Ukraine, faced the problem of non-attendance on Jewish holidays. In some schools the majority of students shunned political activity. Among 300 students of the Yiddish High School in Shavli, only 35 joined the Soviet Youth League.38 Jewish journalism underwent extreme changes. A great number of Jewish newspapers and periodicals of wide prewar circulation was replaced by a few Soviet Yiddish publications. In all of western Ukraine only one Yiddish daily began to appear as late as June 1941.39 The only Yiddish newspaper in western Byelorussia was the Bialystoker Shtern, with a circulation of approximately 5,000 copies. In Lithuania the Vilner Emes, the Emes of Kovno and a youth weekly of the Komsomol, Shtraln, were published. In Latvia a literary-political monthly Ufboy and a publication entitled Kamf appeared. Even the limited activities in the field of Yiddish periodical publications faced manifold difficulties. The Soviet Yiddish writer Dovid Hofshteyn stated, while visiting Jewish journalists and writers in Lvov: 'Lvov will be a Ukrainian city, there is no need for a Yiddish newspaper here.'40 The editor of the Yiddish supplement to a local newspaper in Brest stated: Ί will not continue to publish the Jewish page for long, the Jews have to learn Byelorussian.'41 Soviet Yiddish writers were mobilized for cultural propaganda among the new Jewish population. They arrived in the annexed territories and initiated contacts with local Jewish intellectuals. The number of Jewish writers, journalists and actors in the new territories swelled considerably as a result of the refugee influx. For example, among the 170 members of the Writers' Club in Lvov, 34 were Jews.« Itsik Fefer, a central figure among the Soviet Yiddish writers in the Ukraine, visited many places in the new territories. He toured western Ukraine in the spring of 1940 and was sent on a cultural mission to

1018

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

Bessarabia and northern Bukovina shortly after their incorporation in the USSR. Jewish writers from the annexed territories were invited to visit such centres of Soviet Jewish culture as Minsk, Kiev and Moscow. It seemed that the Soviet Yiddish writers were interested in assisting Jewish culture in the new territories, and hoped that such activity would help in maintaining Yiddish culture in the USSR. At a joint meeting of Russian and Yiddish writers in Moscow in the winter of 1941, the famous Soviet Yiddish poet Perets Markish insisted that more attention be given to the work of Yiddish writers in the new territories. 43 It is also probable that the conference of Yiddish writers, which took place in Moscow in April 1941, dealt with Jewish cultural activities in those territories. The poet Zelig Akselrod was one of the few Soviet Yiddish writers who openly pointed out the dangers facing the survival of Jewish culture under the Soviet regime. He tried to encourage Jewish writers in Lithuania and western Byelorussia in their adjustment to the new reality. Akselrod also planned to intervene with the Soviet authorities in order to prevent the closing of the Vilner Emes** In spite of the difficulties, attempts were made to continue Jewish cultural activities on the eve of the German attack on the Soviet Union. Publication of a Yiddish literary monthly was planned in Kovno in May 1941 and a Yiddish literary almanac was planned in Lvov.43 The annexation of new territories with a substantial Jewish population had an impact on the scope of Soviet Yiddish publications. The printing of children's literature in Yiddish increased, as did the editions of Soviet Yiddish literary journals. Books written by Jewish writers from the annexed territories began to be published by Soviet publishing houses. A number of Jewish theatres were active in the new territories. A Yiddish theatre existed in Lvov. Its literary adviser was Alter Katsizne and among its actors was Ida Kaminska. Theatrical troupes existed in several western Ukrainian cities. In western Byelorussia the Theatre of Miniature' under the direction of M. Broderson was organized. Its most famous members were the comedians Dzhigan and Shumakher. Four Yiddish theatres were active in Lithuania. Yiddish theatres performed in Riga and in Chernovtsy. The German invasion A most controversial topic pertaining to the period under discussion is the flight and evacuation of the Jewish inhabitants of the new Soviet territories, following the German attack on the USSR. When examining this problem, several factors should be taken into consideration. The annexed territories were occupied by the Germans within a number of weeks. The retreat of the Soviet military and the evacuation of the civilian population were sudden and highly disorganized. Furthermore, the Jewish population was not fully aware of the German policies concerning Jews, which were shunned by the Soviet communications media, especially during the period starting in August 1939. Most of the memoirs and testimonials examined by the author indicate that the Jewish population of the annexed territories was

1019

THE SOVIET UNION

far from reaching a decision to abandon its homes and seek refuge in the interior of Russia. Only a few thousand Jews left such a centre of Jewish population as Lvov. The number of Jewish families which left Chortkov did not exceed twenty, according to one testimonial. About 300 Jews escaped from Stryj.4® The reasons for such behaviour varied. The dominant ones were the lack of information about the situation of Jews under German rule, the suddenness of events, doubts about life under the Soviet regime, and the misfortunes of the Jewish refugees from central and western Poland. Local Jews who did escape with the Soviets usually belonged to one of the following groups: a. Soviet administrative personnel, Party members and sympathizers; b. members of the Komsomol and university students; c. certain professionals, mainly medical personnel; d. those mobilized into the Red Army/ 7 The years 1939-1941 were a period of extreme changes in all spheres of life of the Jewish population in the annexed territories. The overall balance was distinctly negative. At the same time, however, the new Soviet Jewish population served in a way as a national stimulant for Soviet Jewry as a whole. Compared with the rest of Soviet Jews, who during more than twenty years had undergone a process of increasing assimilation, the Jews of the acquired territories constituted a reservoir of Jewish national and religious consciousness. One may presume that such a meaningful change in the quality of Soviet Jewry might have had an important influence. The war and the holocaust rendered such a conjecture somewhat hypothetical. 1 Jewish Affairs, New York, vol. 1, ao. 1, August 1941. For somewhat different estimate« *ce: Solomon M. Schwarz, The Jem in the Soviet Union, Syracuse University Press, 19S1, pp. 219-220. Peter Meyer et al., The

12 Jewish

versity Press, 1953, pp. 331, SOS. 2 Philip Friedman, "Hurban Yehudei Lvov",

Shtern, Kiev, February 22, 1940. 17 Testimonial 03/1555. 18 Testimonial 03/1078.

Jews

in the Soviet

Entstklopedya

Satellites,

shel

Syracuse

galuyot-Lvov,

Uni-

vol.

Jerusalem-Tel Aviv, 1956, pp. 601-602. Kaczerginski, Tsvishn

homer

1,

Sz.

un serp,

Paris,

Jewish

Record,

1949, p. 21. D. Grodner, "In Soviet Poland

and L i t h u a n i a " , Contemporary

vol. 4, April 1941, p. 139. 3 For example: A. Pechen ik, Yidn un yiddishkeyl

in Sovel

Russland,

New

York,

1943,

pp. 59-60. A more realistic estimate is that in J. G. Gliksman, Jewish Exiles in Soviet Russia (manuscript in the possession of the American Jewish Committee Libraiy, N e w York) and in The Jews

in the

Soviet

Satellites, ibid., p. 330. 4 Binyamin West (ed.), Naftulei dor, vol. 2, Tel Aviv, 195S,J>. 87. J. Gar, Azoy is es geshen

in Lite,

T e l Aviv, 1965, p . 136.

5 An article published in Bialystoker Shtern on February 2, 1940, condemned those who wished to return to the German-occupied territories. 6 Testimonial 2519/2656, Yad Vas hem Archives, Jerusalem. All testimonials in the Yad Vashem Archives if not otherwise indicated. 7 Testimonial 03/2145. 8 Seier Stri, Tel Aviv, 1962, pp. 103-164. 9 Hayta ayara, H a i f a , 1961, p p . 45-47.

Rokiina,

Tel Aviv, 1967, pp. 237-242. Sefer Sni, pp. 161-163. Testimonial 1982/1801. 10 Mettles Glint, New York, 1950, pp. 219-223.

11 Jewish Telegraphic

1940.

Agency News,

February 25,

Chronicle,

N o v e m b e r 24, 1939.

13 J. Gar, ibid, (see note 4), pp. 76, 87. 14 Ibid.,

p.

115.

15 For example: Pravda, February 9, 1940, and Bialystaker 16 Bialystoker

Shtem, Shtern,

19 Bezbozhnik,

February 4 , 1940. February 2 , 1940, and Der

no. 7-8, 1940, p. 17.

20 Y. Levin, Aliti mCSpetria, Tel Aviv, 1947, p . 30 and Sefer

zikaron

IPIuhilat

Sarni,

Aviv. 1961, pp. 266-269. 21 Der Shtern, Kiev, May 14, 1940. 22 Testimonials 03/2854 , 03/1321. 23 Sefer

Hashomer

25 Sefer

Η as homer

Halzair,

Merhaoya,

Tel

1956-

1964, vol. 2, p. 219. 24 D. Semen, "Esrim shana le'hisul ha'mahteret he'halutsit be'maarav ukraina", Nie ha'koutsa, December, 1961, pp. 715-716. 26 27 28 29

Hamm,

vol· 1» p . 457 tnrf

vol. 2, p. 226. Testimonial 03/2302. The letter was dated September 30, 1940. Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, File no. Z25/ 1935. Yehoshua A. Gilboa, Lishtnor Icfnetsah, Tel Aviv, n.d., pp. 21, 25. Interview no. 619, The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Oral History Division, Catalogue no. 3, Jerusalem, 1970, p. 173. See also: H. Barlas, "Mivtsa aliyat Lha", Dapim le'heker

ha'shoa

veha'mered,

1970, p p . 246-

255. 30 Der Shtern, Kiev. March 24, 1940.

31 T . Fuks, A vanderung

iber

okupirte

Buenos Aires, 1947, pp. 92-93. 03/1823.

gebitn,

Testimonial

1020

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

32 Der Shtem, Kiev, December 8, 1940. Y. Levin, Alili mTSpetsia, p p . 39-41. 33 Ufboy, no. 6, March, 1941, p. 17. 34 Ufboy, no. 4-5, 1941, p. 24. 35 Emes, Kovno, January 8, 1941, and Ufboy, no. 6, 1941, p. 21. 36 Emes, Kovno, January 8, 1941. 37 Emes, Kovno, April 11, 1941. 38 Shtrabi, January 30, 1941. 39 A Yiddish daily Der Royter Shtem appeared in early June, 1941, according to Ufboy, no. 11, June, 1941, p. 16. 40 D. Grodner, ibid., p. 144. 41 L. Leneman, "Perets Markish un der NKVD redactor Rabinovich", Di goldene keyi, no. 43, 1962, p. 138. 42 Bialystoker Shtem, February 6, 1940. 43 Ufboy, no. 6, 1941, p. 17. 44 Ch. Szmeruk, "Yiddish Publications in the USSR. From the Late Thirties to 1948", Υad Vethem Studies, voL 4, 1960, pp. 16-17. See also: Sz. Kaczerginski, ibid., pp. 24-25. According to several testimonies Z. Akselrod was executed by the N K V D . 45 Shtraht, May 31, 1941. Emes, Kovno, May 27, 1941. Ufboy, no. 10, 1941, p. 16. 46 Philip Friedman, "Hurban Yehudei Lvov", ibid., pp. 601-602. Sefer Chortkov, Tel Aviv, 1967, pp. 340-342. Sefer Stri, pp. 164-165. See also: Pinkos Kolomei, New York, 1957, pp. 376-379. Sefer Ziharon li'kehilal Sarni, pp. 266-269. 47 Testimonials 03/678, 03/1792, 03/3128.

THE SOVIET UNION

Soviet Media on the Fate of Jews in Nazi-Occupied Territory (1939Ί941)

BEN-CION

PINCHUK

22, 1941 the German armies attacked the Soviet Union. By the end of 1940, and perhaps even earlier, Hitler had resolved to turn eastward, and his agreement of August 1939 with Stalin did not constitute a deterrent to this course of action. The deterioration of Russo-German relations was a complex process; however, it was certainly not the Russians who initiated the steps which led to war. On the contrary, Stalin did his best to prevent war and even ignored unequivocal warnings of an impending German attack. The Soviet Union fulfilled the letter as well as the spirit of the agreement if not more. The effort to preserve normal and even friendly relations with Nazi Germany, which indirectly affected the rescue of the Jews in Soviet territory, involved the deliberate overlooking by the Soviet media of the Nazis' persecution of the Jews. In theory, the Soviet Union should have adopted a different policy vis-ä-vis Nazi anti-Semitism. From its inception, Nazi propaganda had stressed the connection between Jews and Communism: "Communism in the twentieth century is in fact nothing but an attempt by Judaism to take over the whole world," Hitler himself wrote in Mein Kampf. Alfred Rosenberg translated thiconcept into a very simple and effective formula: "Russias Bolshevism-Judaism."1 The Soviets were well aware of the means O N JUNE

ι

See A. Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941-1945, London, 1957, pp. 8-9.

1021

1022

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST BEN-CION P1NCHUK

by which the Nazis used anti-Semitism to promote their interests both in Germany and abroad. Thus in reference to the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, Vasili Grossman wrote: "Never before in the course of human history has the connection between reaction and antiSemitism been so evident and unequivocal. It was never so clear that the anti-Semitic campaign was being used as a cover for a general attack on the rights of the German working class."2 In this context, Grossman quotes an interview by the American Jewish News Agency with Stalin held on January 12, 1931. Speaking of the Nazis' racist policy, the Soviet leader claimed that "nationalist and racist chauvinism is but a vestige of characteristics, which are hostile to humanity and are typical of the period of cannibalism. Anti-Semitism, in its extreme form of racist chauvinism, is the most dangerous remnant of cannibalism. Anti-Semitism serves the exploiters; it deflects the blow of the workers from capitalism... it diverts them from the right path and leads them to the jungle. The Communists, who are consistent internationalists, cannot help but be the resolute and uncompromising enemies of antiSemitism. In the Soviet Union, anti-Semitism is punished extremely severely as it is a phenomenon which seriously harms the Soviet edifice. Active anti-Semites are sentenced to death according to the laws of the Soviet Union." 3 Until the time of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet media made little mention of Nazi anti-Semitism, although it cannot be said that the Soviets completely disregarded the persecution of the Jews in Germany, as was claimed by Salo Baron who asserted that "the Soviet propagandists avoid any reference to anti-Jewish aspects, mentioning only German barbarism against socialists,

2

3

Introduction by V. Grossman to the "Black Book," which deals with the destruction of Soviet Jewry. The book was prepared by the Jewish AntiFascist Committee in the U.S.S.R., but was never published in Russia. The manuscript is in the Yad Vashem Archives. The quotation is from page 21 of the manuscript. Ibid., p. 17.

THE SOVIET UNION

SOVIET MEDIA ON THE FATE OF JEWS

liberals and other opponents." 4 While the publications in Yiddish had a very limited circulation, they contained a large amount of material on Nazi anti-Semitism. In addition, during the years 1938-1939 the Soviet film "Dr. Mameluk," which severely denounced the persecution of Jews in Germany, was widely distributed. These few examples indicate that the Russians did not systematically silence the press on matters concerning the policies adopted vis-ä-vis the Jews during the period prior to August 23, 1939. The change came about as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and was only one of the manifestations of the transformation in Soviet policy. It soon became apparent that the agreement was not to be limited to the division of the territories of Eastern Europe, but would necessarily lead to a change in the public references of the Communists to the Nazi regime and its leaders. On August 24, the day after the signature of the pact, Pravda explained to its readers, in an editorial, that "the proper conditions for the development and flourishing of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Germany must be created . . . Political and ideological differences must not constitute an obstacle to the establishment of good neighborly relations between the two countries." The implications, of course, were first of all the discontinuation of the propaganda directed not only against Germany but also against Nazi ideology. There was a change of tone in Germany as soon as the possibility arose of an alliance between the two powers. The Ministry of Propaganda headed by Goebbels issued precise instructions to the press to stop the anti-Soviet campaign: "The consolidation of the cooperation between Berlin and Moscow has caused a considerable thawing of our attitude towards the Soviet Union." 5 The German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Pact, signed on September 28, 1939 upon the liquidation of independent Poland, * 3

S.W. Baron, The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets, New York, 1965, p. 291. A.B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, Oxford, 1973 (2nd edition), p. 106.

1023

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

1024

BEN-CION PINCHUK

was a milestone in the improvement of relations between the two countries. Officially Russia continued to pursue a neutral stance vis-ä-vis the conflict between Germany and the Western democracies, but there were hints of a certain tendency to charge the West with responsibility for the continuation of the hostilities. In a joint communique, issued the day after the signing of the treaty, it was said that "the end of the state of war, between Germany on the one hand and Britain and France on the other, would be for the good of all nations. Yet if despite this fact the efforts of the two governments fail, it will be proof that the responsibility for the continuation of the war must rest with Britain and France." 6 The Boundary and Friendship Pact also marked the turnabout in the attitude of the Soviets towards Nazi ideology. The "friendly" atmosphere which existed during the meetings between the representatives of the two powers obligated the discontinuation of the Soviet attacks on the Nazis. "The war against Hitlerism should not be supported, because war cannot be supported purely because of hatred of an ideology. This would plunge us back into the dark period of the Middle Ages," stated Izvestia on October 9, 1939. The Soviet press was full of attacks on the West. A typical article, whose author, incidentally, was Jewish (D. Zaslawsky), was that published by Pravda on October 17 in reference to the establishment of the Polish government-in-exile in Paris: "In all seriousness, though it could barely conceal its smiles, the French press presented the world with a shocking news item. In Paris, on such and such street, a new Polish government was established, headed by General Sikorski. It would appear that the territory at the disposal of this new government extends over six rooms, a washroom and a bathroom. In comparison, Monaco is an enormous empire. At the Great Synagogue of Paris, Sikorski addressed the Jewish Parisian bankers. The synagogue was decorated with the flag of the white eagle, duly approved by the Chief Rabbi, as this bird is generally not eaten by observant Jews. In the past Polish Jews used to be 6

Pravda, September, 29, 1939.

THE SOVIET UNION

1Q25

SOVIET MEDIA ON THE FATE OF JEWS

deathly afraid of the Polish aristocracy and the pogroms. Now, however, it appears that Jewish bankers in Paris have nothing to fear from General Sikorski."7 The author does not mention or even hint at the fate of his brethren under Nazi rule in Poland. Molotov's speech in the Supreme Soviet, on October 31, 1939, marked the climax of Soviet-German "solidarity and friendship." The Soviet Prime Minister not only gave his blessings to the elimination of Poland, "the monster brought into the world by the Versailles Treaty," but even explicitly blamed France and Great Britain for advocating the continuation of the war while, according to him, Germany symbolized peace. "The protagonists have changed roles," the Prime Minister explained to his listeners, "the British Government declares that its goal is nothing less than the defeat of Hitlerism. In other words, this is an ideological war, a sort of holy war like those waged during the Middle Ages." Only two months after Germany was described as a monster, and Nazism depicted as an enemy of mankind which must be opposed, the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union declares, in front of the highest organ of the State, that, "One can sympathize with Hitlerism or be disgusted by it, but all intelligent men must realize that an ideology cannot be eliminated by war. A war 'for the destruction of Hitlerism,' under the false slogan of a struggle for democracy, is therefore nonsense and even criminal."8 Hitler soon became an honorable figure, and Nazism a legitimate ideology, against which it was forbidden to fight. The Soviet regime stopped issuing anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist publications; the Communist parties throughout the world hastened to adopt the new policy, as did the Jewish community in the Soviet Union. A similar trend is also apparent in Soviet literature; it was forbidden to express or publish material denouncing Fascism9 ^ 8

9

Ibid., October, 17, 1939. Jzvestia, November, 1, 1939. Y. Gilboa, The Black Years of Soviet Jewry, 1939-1953, Boston, 1971, pp. 18-19. The author presents a large number of testimonies on the change in

1026

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST BEN-CION PINCHUK

The desire not to arouse the suspicion of the new ally resulted in a strange course of action — censure of the Western democracies, presentation of Germany as a country defending itself against aggression, and even betrayal of German Communists to the Gestapo.10 "To our generation the twenty-two months between the signature of the non-agression treaty with Hitler and the beginning of the [Soviet-German] war were strange and incomprehensible . . . A large portion seemed inexplicable, unbelievable, unnatural," thus wrote in his memoirs M. Galai, a Jew, who was one of the best Russian pilots in the Second World War: "What raised our doubts was not the treaty itself: it was obvious to everyone that under those conditions there was no alternative. Most of us accepted the pact as a bitter medicine — disgusting but necessary. Afterwards, however, some completely inexplicable things happened; the Fascists were no longer called Fascists. In newspapers, lectures and official speeches one could no longer find that word. What we had been trained to regard since our Komsomol days and even since we had been in the pioneers as something hostile, evil and dangerous, suddenly became neutral. This change was not necessarily expressed directly but it penetrated our souls from the many pictures of Hitler at Molotov's side, the news of Soviet oil and grains streaming to Fascist Germany, even through the 'Prussian goose-step* which was instituted at that time." 11

The new atmosphere created in the wake of the pact caused not only a lessening of the awareness of the Jews to the dangers in store for them but also the spread of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. A good example of this trend was an article published by Bezbozhnik, a magazine devoted to the struggle against religion. the policy vis-ä-vis Fascism as reflected in Soviet literature; most of the publications cited were published after Stalin's death. 10 For details concerning this activity, which was limited in scope, see Appendix 3 of the article by J. Litvak, "Ha'shilton ha'sovieti ve'hatzalat yehudim polaniyim ve'maaraviyim (Iyunim ba'mediniyut ha'sovietit be'tekufat ha'shoah)," Behinot, No. 2-3, Tel-Aviv, 1972, p. 80. 11 M. Galai, "We Won the First Battle (From the Notes of a Test Pilot),"

Novyi Mir, No. 9, September, 1966, p. 24.

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The author noted that one of the Third Reich's major achievements was its systematic fight against the Jewish religion and urged its readers to support their new ally in its struggle against religion.12 The Soviets were undoubtedly aware of the Nazis' particular sensitivity to the Jewish problem. Thus although Litvinov's dismissal from his post as Foreign Minister on the eve of the proGerman reversal of Soviet foreign policy stemmed from other considerations, it was an indication that the Soviets took this factor into consideration.13 In their dealings with the Nazis, Soviet officials repeatedly emphasized that the fact that several Jews held key posts in the Soviet Union did not have to be an obstacle to friendship between the two countries.14 There is no proof that the Soviets ever discussed with the Nazis the question of their attitude to the Jews, in spite of the fact that following the annexations approximately five million Jews lived in Soviet territory. On the contrary, every effort was made to ensure that the issue would not hamper good relations. Thus, for example, none of the reports on events in Nazi-occupied Europe were presented in a hostile way. This silence was also a product of the regard for the attitude prevalent among large segments of the Soviet population, and stemmed from the Kremlin's desire to win the support of the population in the territories annexed after August 1939, where anti-Semitism was very deeply rooted. 12 Bezbozhnik, May 5, 1940. Quoted by B.Z. Goldberg, The Jewish Problem in the Soviet Union, New York, 1961, p. 306. 13 There are different interpretations concerning Litvinov's replacement by Molotov on May 3, 1939. There are those who consider the change an indication that Stalin had abandoned the idea of "collective security" and that it constituted a shift towards a pro-German policy. Others attributed the dismissal to an internal struggle within the Kremlin. On the different interpretations see: M. Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 19291941, Oxford (reprinted in 1966), Vol. 2, pp. 239-240; A. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, New York, 1968, p. 272. 14 See M. Michaelis, "Stalin, Ribbentrop and the Jews," Bulletin of Soviet and East-European Jewish Affairs, London, No. 5, May 1970, pp. 91-93.

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The subject was not mentioned in the Yiddish publications intended for the Jewish population. At this time the Jews of the annexed territories were undergoing a process of educational and cultural Sovietization—a systematic attempt to erase their uniquely Jewish national characteristics, their culture and tradition. Jewish writers and intellectuals were forced to keep silent on one of the most important topics in the life of their people during that period. The Jews who had fled eastward from the territories occupied by the Germans were also forced to hide what they knew. Moshe Broderzon, a Jewish refugee living in Bialystok, completely stopped his literary activities in reaction to the policy of silence. His wife relates that he was compelled to write about "socialist competition" and to be silent about the murder of Jews by the Germans. "It was forbidden to write or even speak about it. They secretly told of the mass execution of Jews by shooting, of the mass murders committed by the German allies of the Soviet Union." In the Jewish paper Bialystoker Shtern, "not a single line, not a word appears on the horrible plight of the Jews across the border."15 M. Grossman, who lived in Bialystok at the time, tells of the tales and testimonies, emanating from the Nazi-occupied territories, on the suppression and murder of Jews. The refugees carried with them the yellow star which they had been forced to wear. One of them gave the writer his patch, saying: "Here! Take this greeting from the Jews on that side, take it and shake the world up, do it so that the world will know." When Grossman showed the star to the editor of the Bialystoker Shtern, he was asked to write about the matter, but the article never appeared. In reply to Grossman's inquiries, he was told by the government-appointed "editor": "The supreme authorities did not permit its publication, that is the current policy; it is the overriding necessity."16 is

S.M. Broderzon, Mein leidns-veg mit Moshe Broderzon, Buenos Aires, 1960, p. 31. 16 M. Grossman, In farkhishuftn land fun legendern Dzhugashvili, Paris, 1950, Vol. 1, pp. 35-36.

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SOVIET MEDIA ON THE FATE OF JEWS

When the Yiddish theater was being established in Bialystok, the repertoire committee was very careful to avoid selecting works which had anything to do with politics. David Lederman, one of the members of the theater, wrote: "We had hoped that now, on Soviet territory, we would be able to present anti-Nazi plays. We claimed that in Poland we had always been permitted to produce anti-Nazi topics, and that should certainly be the policy here. Nothing helped, however, and the answer was: it's forbidden — here it's forbidden."! 7

Even when the apparent friendship between Stalin and Hitler began to cool off, when the radio broadcasts from the West began to warn the Soviet people that a German attack on the Soviet Union was imminent, there was no change in the situation. Neither the Jews nor the general population were warned of the seriousness of the danger. "Day after day they would lecture us on war; but in all the lectures they always emphasized that the threat of war is from Great Britain and from the United States. Not a single word was uttered about Nazi Germany!" 18 related one of the survivors. The Soviet authorities were aware of the fate of the Jews in the Nazi-occupied territories. As proof of this contention, Y. Gilboa points to a number of publications on the aims of the Nazis, which were published for the Jews in Russia and abroad immediately after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. He also discovered that in 1941 the Der Emes publishing house had distributed a pamphlet (translated from the Russian) by A. Golubiev, entitled "The -Hitlerite Butchery in Poland." The pamphlet was submitted for publication on August 11, 1941, about seven weeks after the German invasion; thus it appears that the pamphlet was written immediately after June 22. Golubiev writes that "immediately after the entry of the German forces into Poland, there began a bloody massacre of innocent citizens — helpless old men, women and children... The deportation of the Jews is being 17

D. Lederman, Fun yener zeit forhang, Buenos Aires, 1960, pp. 101-102. »8 M. Reznik, "Me"kibush le'kibush," Sefer Lida, Tel-Aviv, 1970, p. 277.

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BEN-CION PINCHUK carried out with special ferocity. They are not only deported from western Poland, but are being exterminated." During the very first days of the occupation of Poland "Jews were shot in masses." Gilboa emphasizes that detailed information on Nazi horrors in the countries conquered before June 22 was to be found in many Soviet publications shortly after the German invasion of Soviet territory. 19 Soviet Jewry was not aware of the fate of their brethren in Nazi Europe, and this ignorance increased in direct proportion to the distance from the border areas, where the Jews often came into direct contact with the refugees, who continued to arrive from the areas under Nazi occupation. Thus we read, with astonishment, the July 12, 1941 report of a German intelligence official on the conditions in White Russia: "To an amazing extent, the Jews are remarkably ill-informed about our attitude toward them. They do not know how Jews are treated in Germany, or for that matter in Warsaw, which after all is not so far away. Otherwise their questions as to whether we in Germany make any distinctions between Jews and other citizens would be superfluous. Even if they do not think that under German administration they will have equal rights with the Russians, they believe, nevertheless, that we shall leave them in peace if they mind their own business and work diligently.'^ Even after the outbreak of the hostilities, the Soviet mass media failed to emphasize the persecution of the Jews despite the German radio broadcasts, in which the Nazis openly stated their intention of eliminating the Communists and the Jews. Boris der Paniker i'

Gilboa, op. cit., 27-28. It should be noted that the evidence produced by Gilboa to a large extent refutes S. Schwartz's unequivocal assertion that the Soviet authorities continued to maintain their silence regarding the fate of the Jews under Nazi rule during the first few months following the German invasion. See: S. Schwartz, Antisemitizm ν Sovietskom Soiuze, New York, 1952, p. 169. 20 Quoted from a German report, August 4,1941, in R. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, Chicago, 1967, p. 207.

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(the panicmonger) was the nickname given to a Jew from Kiev, who tried to urge his fellow Jews to flee on the basis of German broadcasts. "If what you say were true, the press would have reported it, and we would have been the first to be evacuated," they replied.21 Had the Soviet media informed the public of the Nazi crimes, the witness claims, masses of Jews would undoubtedly have fled, despite all the difficulties. Indeed, in the very same city, when the Jews reported for deportation to Babi Yar, Kuznetsov relates in his book that: "When the order was first published nine Jews out of every ten had never heard a word about any Nazi atrocities against the Jews. Right up to the outbreak of war Soviet newspapers had been doing nothing but praising and glorifying Hitler as the Soviet Union's best friend and had said nothing about the position of the Jews in Germany and Poland — The older men used to tell stories about the Germans in the Ukraine in 1918; how they hadn't touched the Jews then, but on the contrary had treated them very decently, because their language was very similar and so forth."**

A Soviet officer, reporting on the massacre of the Crimean Jews, writes: "It is amazing that not only we, but the Jews themselves, did not know what the Nazis had done in the course of their progress at the front. Many of them asked me what to do, and I, naively, advised them to stay, and not to be a f r a i d . . . After all you are neither Communists nor officials — so why should they harm you? This is what I told them, for this is what I believed," the writer adds.23 Even after the Soviet media began to publicize details on the atrocities committed by the Nazis against the Jews in the occupied territories, many Jews continued to view the news with reservations, and remained incredulous, a phenomenon characteristic of regimes 21 Yad Vashem Archives, testimony F-12-151. 22 A. Kuznetsov, Babi Yar, London, 1967, p. 103. 23 Quoted from the Sotsialisticheskii Vestrtik, February 28, 1948 by B. West (ed.), Be'hevlei klayah: yehudel Russiyah ba'shoah ha'natzit, 1941-1943, Tel-Aviv, 1963, p. 138.

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in which the media are used for propaganda purposes and often absolutely distort the truth. Thus Kuznetsov's report of the conversations among Jews on the eve of the German conquest of Kiev is quite illuminating. In the chaos that had spread throughout the town, the confusion among the Jews was conspicuous: "All right so they say the Jews have to get away, but what for? Did we ever hear anything bad about the Germans before the war? Now they are putting stories around, but why do we have to believe rumors?... Now the papers say that the Germans will hang yellow stars around our necks and send us off laboring. All right, so we shall work. Whät else have we seen but work up till now? Only trouble. The Germans are bound to understand that. We are not aristocrats and we're not rich, we're just poor people, we've been working hard all our lives and things can't be any worse. We've decided to stay where we are."24 Adding his personal impression Kuznetsov continues: "It was true that until the war started only good things were written about Hitler, and nobody had heard he treated the Jews badly. So let the party officials and secret police and factory managers run for it, but what had poor people to run away from? As for the yellow star it was obvious that they were lying, and so were the stories about the Germans maltreating the Jews — that was all newspaper lies. If not why had they not written about it before?25

The "Black Book," published by the Russians on the destruction of Soviet Jewry, unwittingly provides incriminating evidence against the Soviet authorities. He lists the methods used by the Nazis in the execution of their plans, and specifies that "in eastern regions of the Soviet-occupied territories, where the murders were carried out immediately after the entry of the occupiers, the Nazi deception tactics were most successful. The thought that they were all doomed never occurred to them so sudden was the onslaught, so horrible the acts, that they were totally unable to 24

«

Kuznetsov, op. cit., p. 144. Ibid.

THE SOVIET UNION SOVIET MEDIA ON THE FATE OF JEWS

resist the aggressor. Such was the case in Kiev, in Dnepropetrovsk, in Mariopol and in a large number of communities in the west side of the Ukraine." 26 While it is difficult to determine precisely the effect of the media upon public opinion and behavior during this period, it undoubtedly had a significant influence on the unwillingness of the Jews to flee the advancing German armies while there was still time to do so.

26 The "Black Book," pp. 29-30.

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Jewish Refugees in Soviet Poland 1939-1941 by Ben-Cion Pinchuk Hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees sought homes free from Nazi persecution during the period between 1933 and 1941 preceding the extermination of millions. Hitler's rise to power in Germany and the extension of Nazi rule over large parts of Europe were accompanied by sharp increases in the number of Jewish refugees to non-Nazi countries. Prior to the period of the Nazi-Soviet War in June 1941, German authorities allowed and even forced the Jews living within their borders to leave. The real tragedy was that most of the other countries either closed their doors or sharply limited the numbers which they were prepared to accept. A general international apathy concerning the fate of the Jewish refugees from Nazi-occupied territories prevailed among most of the member governments of the League of Nations and outside that body. 1 The policy of the League amounted to a refusal to deal with the problem, despite the fact that a High Commissioner (James G. McDonald) was appointed to take care of refugees, Jewish and others, coming from Germany. However, the Commission did not receive its budget from the League, and its achievements were very limited. "The victims of Nazism met with resistance almost everywhere. Many countries stiffened their immigration requirements in order to prevent the entry of those doomed people into the Western hemisphere." 2 A conference was convened in Evian, France in July 1938; representatives from thirty countries who responded to President Roosevelt's initiative participated, but affected no real changes in the policies adopted by the non-Nazi countries. 3 In a way, the policy of appeasement applied to Germany during the 1930s was transferred to the Jewish refugee problem. There are no exact figures concerning the number of Jewish refugees who were able to find temporary or permanent homes outside the Nazi territories. Jacques Vemant estimates that by May 1939 the number of Jewish refugees from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia was 401,000, of whom 194,000 immigrated to countries overseas and 207,000 found refuge in Europe. 4 Arieh Tartakower and Kurt R. Grossman maintain that during the years 1938 to 1942 the number of Jews who were able to leave for countries overseas was about 213,000. They could not, however, ascertain the total of refugees leaving before or after the outbreak of the war. 5 Taking into account the general background of the refugee problem as

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well as previous Soviet policy on the subject, the presence of several hundred thousand Jewish refugees in Soviet-occupied Poland after September 1939 created something of a paradox and deserves more attention than it has hitherto been given.6 About 10 per cent of the largest Jewish community in Europe found refuge in Soviet territory by leaving those parts of Poland which were occupied by the Nazis. This group thus became the largest remnant of European Jewry during the Holocaust. Owing to its size and its special problems during the existence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, this group is a subject of particular importance for historical research. Even though the Soviet constitution included a special article which offered asylum to foreign citizens who were persecuted for political reasons,7 the USSR was not among those countries which absorbed any meaningful number of refugees from Nazi territories. The Soviet government did not cooperate with the High Commission established by the League of Nations and, together with Germany, tried to curtail the Commission's activities. The Soviet government was afraid that the High Commission would support antiSoviet refugees. 8 In addition, internal developments such as collectivization, rapid industrialization and the purges of the mid-thirties did not create a favorable environment for the acceptance of or attraction for the victims of nazism. The Kremlin viewed the Evian Conference as a "plot to encourage the sabotage activities of the Trotskyist emigres" and, therefore, refused to send its representatives or to participate in the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees which the Conference established. 9 Only after the occupation of eastern Poland did the Soviet government directly encounter the Jewish refugee problem and on a massive scale as well. Two major waves of Jewish refugees in flight from Nazi occupation reached eastern Poland: the first started before 17 September 1939, when the Red Army crossed Poland's eastern border, and lasted until the official incorporation of eastern Poland into the USSR; the second wave started after 30 October when the borders between the German and Soviet zones were officially closed, and almost lasted until the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union. The first group of refugees, who arrived in eastern Poland without encountering difficulties in crossing the border, did so both before and after the demarcation of the new Soviet-German border line. Among them were those who were part of the occupied population as well as those who were admitted by the Soviet authorities. This distinction is of importance when dealing with the problem of Soviet policy toward those Jews seeking refuge from nazism. Most of the refugees found in eastern Poland at the time that the Soviet troops entered, had come there as a direct result of the GermanPolish War. The systematic attacks on purely civilian targets, particularly

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large cities, were an integral part of the Blitzkrieg tactics, intended to destroy the morale of both the civilian population and the Polish army. The fact that the cities contained a relatively high proportion of Jews, made the Jewish community more vulnerable to Nazi intentions. That, however, was not the major reason for the massive flight of Jews to the East. German atrocities perpetrated against the Jewish population in the towns of Czestochowa, Krasnoshelts, Vishkov and others deeply affected the Jewish community, and tens of thousands of Jewish men left Warsaw and Lodz. 1 0 The flight from Warsaw was accelerated after 7 September when an official decree was published ordering all m e n eligible for military service to move to the eastern provinces where a new army and line of defense would be established. The Polish government itself was retreating from the capital to Lublin and organizing special convoys for selected groups. 1 1 It should be noted that a very high percentage of those fleeing East were men and women without families. "There were among the younger people those who intended to cross the Soviet border in case of a total German victory. Members of the Zionist organizations fled to towns close to the Rumanian border, hoping to reach Palestine via Rumania." 1 2 The final borders between the USSR and Germany were drawn on 28 September; until that date no clear-cut delineation between the two had existed. The Soviet authorities, therefore, inherited the Jewish refugees remaining in eastern Poland as part of the local population. It hardly required a policy of generosity toward victims of nazism to let the refugees stay where they were found. More complicated is the matter of Soviet policy toward those Jews who crossed the border without hindrance, mainly in October 1939. Should this be considered as a policy designed to rescue Jews from Nazi persecution? The evidence available does not warrant such a conclusion. Soviet policy was determined by general considerations that had very little to do with the fate of the J e w s in Nazi Poland. Moscow insisted on maintaining the fiction that the Soviet Union came to "rescue and liberate the oppressed Byelorussian and Ukrainian population." In line with this policy, the Soviet authorities in Poland organized elections to constitutional assemblies which decided, unanimously, to join the USSR. 13 During the period of preparing the elections, the Soviets had every reason to be liberal in order to prove that n o t only the local population but also the people from German Poland, preferred to live under Soviet rule. 1 4 During the month of October, the Soviet authorities did n o t object to the German practice of forcing entire Jewish communities to cross into Soviet Poland. Thus the J e w s of Sokal, close to the new border on the Bug, witnessed the arrival of many J e w s from Belz, Kristiampole, and Varzh. Among them was also the famous Rabbi of Belz. l s All the Jewish inhabitants

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of Ostrolenka were forced to cross the border at the same time. When they reached the first Soviet outpost " t h e Russians received us cordially, offered us cigarettes and candies," 1 6 related one of the refugees. Przemysl, in Galicia, thus became a major center for entire Jewish communities who were forced to cross to the Soviet side during the m o n t h of October. 1 7 The Soviets were still ready to accept thousands of Jewish refugees, either those who h a d been expelled or were fleeing on their own. The second wave of Jewish refugees started reaching Soviet territory after the official incorporation of eastern Poland into the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics, at the beginning of November 1939. This wave lasted, albeit in drastically reduced numbers, almost until 21 J u n e 1941. The refugees were now fleeing from territories where the massacre had already begun to a country that promised to be at least a refuge. The Soviet authorities required special permits from people trying to enter their territory, or those qualifying according to the population exchange agreements with the German government on 16 November 1939. The crossing of the border without mutual consent, involved great hardship arid the risk of death. The local German authorities continued their practice of forcing entire Jewish communities to cross the Soviet border, b u t n o w the Soviet guards refused to admit the victims of persecution. Those caught were shipped back to the Nazi border. German guards in turn fired at anyone trying to reenter. Thus, quite frequently, thousands of refugees had to stay for days in the no-man'sland along the border. 1 8 A rather bizarre episode was the a t t e m p t by the Germans t o use the agreement with the Soviet Union of 16 November 1939 to "legally" transfer Polish Jews across the Soviet border. According to that, the undersigned parties had agreed to the exchange of Ukrainians and White Russians living in German territory for Germans (the so-called Volks-Deutsche) living on 19 Soviet territory. The German authorities tried to register Jews as "Ukrainians of the Mosaic faith." 2 0 The Soviets refused to accept that arrangement. Moscow tried to stop the flood of expelled refugees by requesting the direct intervention of the German Foreign Ministry. Violators of the prohibition to cross the frontier were threatened with three years' imprisonment. On 15 November the Soviets officially protested Germany's action to force J e w s to cross their borders. 2 1 State Secretary Weizsäcker reported the complaint of Colonel General Keitel, in a memorandum dated 5 December 1939, stating that the Jews expelled across the Russian border were being forced back by Soviet commanders. Keitel asked the Foreign Ministry to take up t h e matter with the governor general of Poland in order to prevent possible f u t u r e friction. 2 2 In response to Soviet objections as well as to changes in the policy toward the J e w s in the Nazi territories, the practice of expelling thousands of J e w s across the Soviet frontier ceased in the beginning of 1940.

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Despite the dangers involved, the stream of Jewish refugees continued throughout the winter of 1939-1940. Thousands fled from towns and villages close to the border. Here, entire families, including children and the elderly, attempted to reach the Soviet side. Many were killed in the no-man'sland and some, who succeeded in crossing the border, were tried for espionage. Nevertheless, one has the impression that the Soviet border was not yet tightly sealed to those seeking refuge. 23 The attitude of the Soviet guards differed from place to place. Occasionally hundreds and even thousands were allowed to cross the border. 2 4 The number of Jewish refugees decreased in the spring of 1940 and ceased almost completely during that summer. The difficulties in crossing the Soviet frontier prevented many from even attempting the venture. At the time when increasing numbers of Polish Jews were drawn into ghettos in the summer of 1940, the Soviet border became even more difficult to cross. The reasons for the closure of the Soviet borders to Nazi victims, just as their accessibility in the preceding months, had little to do with Soviet policy concerning the fate of the Jews under German occupation. The summer of 1940 saw a general tightening of the Soviet policies in the newly annexed territories. The free movement of people across the borders created a genuine security risk, and it was too complicated to control every crossing. Beginning with the summer of 1940, the border between the "friendly" countries became a fortified line. Not only Nazi collaborators but also Nazi victims had to be prevented from crossing the frontier. The exact number of Jews from Nazi occupied Poland who found refuge on Soviet territory is not known; nor do we have reliable data concerning the proportions among the various waves. One may doubt whether the absolute figures of refugees under Soviet jurisdiction could be found even in the Soviet archives. The chaos that reigned in the area for quite a while after the entrance of the Soviet troops and the transfer of many refugees across the borders and within the boundaries of eastern Poland complicated the problem of census taking. The speedy collapse of Soviet rule after the outbreak of the war in Germany probably destroyed much of the available material. Those studying the problem from outside the Soviet Union must rely on secondary sources, and, therefore, their statistics amount to rough estimates, at best. The range of differences in estimates might give us an idea of the problem's complexity. Thus, Avraham Pechenik estimated the number of refugees as 1,000,000, 2S while the journal, Jewish Affairs, maintained that their number did not surpass 200,000. 26 Bernard D. Weinryb, using a variety of sources and testimonies tends to accept 300,000 as the approximate number of Jews who found refuge in Soviet Poland. 27 Other investigators of the period tend to accept Weinryb's estimates. 28 Refugees constituted about 20 per cent of the Jewish population of Soviet

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Poland; therefore, sheer numbers of refugees alone created an important problem for the Soviet authorities in eastern Poland. The occupation and formal transformation of eastern Poland into the western provinces of the Soviet Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics were only the first steps in the process of fully integrating the annexed territories into the USSR. The Soviet authorities changed the economic and social life of the area. The previous social and political structures and organizations were abolished while an attempt was made to eliminate the various former elites by imprisonment and deportation. The changes introduced in the various spheres of societal activity were designed to provide effective control over the annexed territories. One of the most problematic groups in adaptation to the Soviet way of life were the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees. They were difficult to direct, and eastern Poland lacked the economic capacity to absorb them. For the Soviet authorities, the refugees also became a political, administrative, and economic problem. The authorities had very little regard for the refugees' unique situation, particularly in its human aspects. A contradiction existed between the goals and attitudes of the Soviet authorities and those of the Jewish refugees. Their mutual relations went through several phases reflecting changes in Soviet policy toward the local population and also the differing reactions of the refugees themselves. During the first stage, which began after the Soviet army had entered eastern Poland, and which lasted until the formal incorporation of the area into the USSR, the local authorities exhibited a rather liberal attitude toward the refugees. At this stage, the victims of war and Nazi persecution were allowed to adapt and to find their way in the new system with little interference and with some help from the authorities. The local Jewish communities, themselves experiencing the painful process of adaptation to the new regime, their autonomous organizations dismembered, tried their best to offer help to their brethren. One gets the impression that the smaller communities showed greater concern and devoted more energy to helping the refugees. Thus in Sokal, a special committee was established to take care of the refugees. The entire community contributed to the establishment of a public kitchen, while private homes, synagogues, and schools were used to provide housing.29 "Almost every Jewish family housed some refugees from Nazi Poland," 30 relates an inhabitant of Derechin, a town in Byelorussia. The Jewish community of Ianovo, near Pinsk, mobilized all its resources to provide first aid to the refugees: " A f t e r a short while all the refugees found housing with local families. All of us felt a moral obligation to offer help to our destitute brothers," 31 recalled a survivor from that little town. In Lutsk, "every Jewish home had at least

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one refugee. The hospitality was spontaneous and natural. . . . It amounted to a huge effort to provide first aid to hundreds of homeless Jews." 3 2 This is just a sample illustrating the generous behavior of the shtetl toward Jewry in time of need. Refugees with special skills were able to find employment in both the smaller towns and the larger centers. Teachers, engineers, technicians, accountants and physicians were in great demand. 3 3 On the other hand, the situation was particularly acute in the larger cities. The Jewish population of Lwow(Lvov) and Bialystok was almost doubled, adding tens of thousands of newcomers. 3 4 Within a very short time all houses and rooms were rented. New arrivals were forced to use schools, synagogues, theaters, railway stations and parks. Those who were lucky enough to find a vacancy needed a special permit from the local authorities. 3 5 The Soviet administration was reluctant to provide housing for the refugees, since it needed the limited housing facilities for its personnel arriving from the USSR. One finds numerous, identical descriptions of misery and the problems of housing and employment which afflicted thousands of refugees in eastern Poland. The local authorities opened some public kitchens in the major cities to provide food for the refugees, but the food was poor and the number of kitchens insufficient. 3 6 During the first months of Soviet authority, existing Jewish relief institutions were not abolished, but could not handle the situation. Later, the Soviets simply let them run out of funds. In Bialystok and Kovel, the J o i n t Distribution Committee (JDC) was able to offer some aid. 37 In Lwow(Lvov), " f o o d relief was organized as long as the financial resources lasted. When the money ran out the Soviet authorities made it clear that they were against philanthropy," reported one of the Jewish community leaders. 3 8 When the J D C sent 150,000 zloty for relief work in Lwow(Lvov), the Soviet authorities refused to permit the opening of public kitchens. 3 9 A f t e r 1 January 1940, the Polish zloty was no longer legal currency in eastern Poland. This regulation affected those refugees who had not exchanged their savings in time and who, therefore, became penniless overnight. 40 Finding a job was one of the major concerns of the refugees. The local Jewish community could n o t take care of a problem of such magnitude even in normal times. As mentioned earlier, some refugees found employment in the professions, in local institutions, factories, cooperatives, and in the expanding educational system. A small, but important group, which attracted the attention of the Soviet authorities, was that of Jewish intellectualspoets, novelists, journalists, and artists—who found refuge in Lwow(Lvov) and Bialystok. The Soviet authorities paid special attention to the "reeducation" and indoctrination of the new citizens of the Soviet state. The relatively large

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group of Jewish intellectuals assembled in Bialystok could potentially serve that purpose well, provided, of course, that due elimination had been made of those with an ideologically suspicious past. The rest had to adapt themselves to the offical thought and style. During the first few weeks after the occupation, the authorities provided a special home for refugee journalists and writers. 41 Those who had or were suspected of having had some past connection with either the Bund or the Zionist movement stood no chance of being accepted, and looked instead for safer occupations. 42 Others, who could not force themselves to follow the official line, and to remain silent in face of the tragedy of their brothers in the Nazi territories, stopped writing. 43 Dozens of poets and novelists, who were ready to serve the regime, "produced" poetry according to the prevailing Stalinist style. The pages of the Bialystoker Shtern, the Minsker Oktiaber, Kiiever Shtern, and other Yiddish papers were filled with their literary "products." With the passage of time, special branches of the Soviet Union of Writers were established in Bialystok and Lwow(Lvov). 44 Thus, in January 1941, the Ofboi, a monthly published in Latvia, could print an article entitled "Broad Jewish Cultural Activity in Western Byelorussia." 45 The paper reported that "in Bialystok there are many Jewish writers who previously lived in Warsaw. In Bialystok, as in the entire area formerly under the rule of the Polish Pans, where any cultural activity could barely exist, intensive creative cultural activity is now going on. . . . The cultural production of the Jewish writers has increased tremendously." 46 The same paper reported that David Bergelson, the famous Soviet Yiddish writer, had met with the editorial board of the papers Shtern and Oktiaber. During that meeting, Zelik Akselrod, a member of the Shtern board, talked about the publication of a series of books by the refugee writers. 47 The Yiddish writers from the Soviet Union played an important role in "reeducating" the refugee writers. Their frequent visits to the new territories were designed to influence the Jewish masses and to enforce the official line on the newcomers. Yitzhak Feffer from Kiev was particularly active in the western Ukraine, while western Byelorussia was visited by two special "Writers' Brigades" with Peretz Markish and David Bergelson heading the one and Leib Kvitko and Yehezkel Dobrushin the other. 4 8 The more complex question about the interaction between the Yiddish writers from the Soviet Union and the Jewish Polish writers deserves a more detailed analysis that would be beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say, that the influence was by no means one-sided. 49 The Soviet authorities employed some refugee writers and actors in the Jewish state theaters that they formed in the annexed territories. The Jewish Drama State Theater was established in Lwow(Lvov). Its literary manager was Alter Katsizne, and its most important actress was Ida Kaminska. s 0

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Bialystok was even more active. A Jewish Drama State Theater, whose members were mostly actors from Warsaw, performed mainly in Bialystok and the major cities of western Byelorussia. A "Wandering Theater" was organized to cover the smaller towns and to "provide culture to the large Jewish masses in the provinces of Western Byelorussia." 5 1 Yet the most "illustrious" contribution was the Jewish Miniatures State Theater under the literary direction of Moshe Broderzon, with Shimon Dzhigan and Shumacher serving as art directors. It was formed in November 1939 and took extended trips throughout the Soviet state. Its repertoire consisted mainly of short satirical sketches. 5 2 Only a small fraction of the refugees could find suitable employment in eastern Poland. For the vast majority, the authorities found another solution: they were offered jobs in the U S S R , itself. Special employment offices, "labor departments" in western Byelorussia and "labor bourses" in western Ukraine tried to persuade those seeking employment to accept jobs in the interior of R u s s i a . " The registration for work in Russia had already begun during the months of September and October 5 4 after the final demarcation of the borders. There are reports of pressure being put upon the refugees to accept the jobs offered in the interior of Russia as early as October 19 3 9. 5 5 Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Urals, and the Donbas were among the places offered to the refugees who were looking for jobs. Those who agreed to go were immediately given free transportation, advance payment, and tempting conditions. While the majority refused, there were thousands who stood in line for registration. 5 6 "Many wanted to leave Bialystok, where they find it increasingly difficult to get housing, food, fuel. . . . They register to go to the Caucasus, the Urals, to sunny Tashkent," 5 7 recalled Moishe Grossman, who lived in Bialystok at that time. The exact number of refugees actually leaving is unknown. D. Grodner maintains that: "In Bialystok alone 20,000 registered in one week; in Brest-Litovsk, ΙΟ,ΟΟΟ."58 The Soviet press in Yiddish carried frequent reports on thousands of refugees being sent to various parts of the Soviet Union for work. 5 9 Representatives from different Soviet enterprises visited the major refugee concentrations in an effort to attract them for work. 6 0 Those who registered for work left with great fanfare—flags, orchestras and patriotic speeches accompanied the outgoing trains. The receptions were equally enthusiastic and were confirmed by letters from the registrants, some of which were published in the local press. 6 1 Yet, the honeymoon was a rather short one. Most of the refugees were unskilled and therefore employed as simple laborers. The work was hard, housing conditions inadequate, and the pay very low, compared to the accustomed standards of the refugees. 6 2 Many tried to go back to eastern Poland, and quite a number reap-

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peared in Bialystok and other towns after a few months. 6 3 Through placards on the walls and newspaper advertisements, those who returned were invited to register for free food and work. The returnees who came to register were immediately arrested. 64 The Soviet attempt to provide employment and to "productivize" the people (a term used by the Soviet Yiddish press to describe the registrants) was a complete failure. Only a small proportion of the refugees did register, and quite a few among them came back. What might have been considered by the Soviet authorities to be a generous offer of conditions equal to their own citizens was believed by the refugees to be hard labor that they were not accustomed to performing. The Soviet failure to transfer a sizable part of the refugees who were concentrated in the larger cities posed the question of the refugees' status in eastern Poland even more acutely. The presence of many thousands of jobless persons reluctant to adapt to the new regime was a problem that the Soviet authorities could not tolerate. They would try to resolve it together with the problem of the refugees' legal status. On 29 November 1939, the Soviet Citizenship Law was extended to eastern Poland. According to that law, all Polish citizens who were living in the territory when it was incorporated into the U S S R (on 1 and 2 November 1939) automatically became Soviet citizens. The same status was given to persons who came to the Soviet Union in accordance with the population exchange agreement with Germany of 16 November. Automatic Soviet citizenship was also granted to people who left Vilna, which was transferred to Lithuania on 10 October 1939. 6 S People living in eastern Poland not included in the abovementioned categories could become Soviet citizens because of the existing naturalization law of 1938. 6 6 There is no doubt that the Soviet government intended to convert the Jewish refugees into Soviet citizens. It should be added that certain limitations were included, as will be shown later, in the citizens' status offered to the refugees. It would be wrong to attribute this policy merely to humanitarian considerations. General imperatives of control and sovietization of eastern Poland were the more dominant motivations. Whatever the rationale behind the Soviet policy was, it received a negative response from the vast majority of the Jewish refugees. Most of them considered their stay under Soviet rule as temporary. They thought that the war would be short and hoped to return to their former homes. There were those who tried to immigrate to the United States, Palestine, or other overseas countries. Some simply refused to become citizens of a regime they hated. 6 7 Many refugees refused to accept Soviet citizenship considering it to be an act formally and finally severing their connections with their families living in Nazi Poland:

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"Most of the refugees left their wives, children, closest family on the other side; how could they accept Soviet citizenship, an acceptance that would mean remaining in the Soviet Union forever!! To say farewell to home, to the dearest forever?!" That was the cruel dilemma that faced the majority of the unfortunate, as it was eloquently posed by one of them. 6 8 The fact that the refugees received Soviet passports containing the so called "paragraph 11," contributed its share to their reluctance to become Soviet citizens. "Paragraph 11" imposed certain restrictions on residence and freedom of movement: only small towns and villages located no less than 100 kilometers from the border were open to people carrying such passports. They needed special permits to leave their place of residence. For most refugees it meant leaving the larger cities, where they at least had some chance of finding employment. Sometime during the spring of 1940, the Soviet authorities decided to take drastic steps to either force the refugees to accept Soviet citizenship or to resolve the problem by other means. While we have no direct evidence concerning such a decision, the events that followed make it abundantly clear that such a decision had been taken as part of the general hardening of Soviet attitudes toward the local population. Special commissions of the NKVD were established in April-May 1940 to register the refugees. The registrants were faced with two alternatives—either to become Soviet citizens or to declare that they were ready to return to their former homes, now under Nazi occupation. 6 9 Most available sources deny that any pressure was put on the refugees to register one way or another. 7 0 The vast majority decided to register their intent to return. Among them were people holding jobs and those who were aware that Jews were being driven into ghettos in Nazi Poland. The registration, considered a test of loyalty by the Soviet authorities, had dire consequences for the refugees. A strange and rather tragic episode occurred about the same time. Jewish refugees tried to register to return to Nazi Poland with German commissions that operated in the Soviet territory. A certain misunderstanding of that episode exists in the scholarly literature on the subject. Thus, Weinryb maintains that, in conjunction with the general registration, "those who registered with the N K V D had to register again with a German commission operating in Soviet-occupied Poland in April-May 1940, in accordance with the Russian-German agreement of April 1940 on exchanges of population. But only a few Jews were admitted by the German commission." 7 1 Solomon M. Schwarz contends that Weinryb and Grodner are wrong: he finds no documentary evidence that any population exchange agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Germany in April 1940. "However, some kind of a new agreement was signed. . . . This is confirmed by many testimonies

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of the operation, on the basis of a Soviet-German agreement, of commissions to register refugees to return to their former homes." Schwarz concludes: "Probably the agreement dealt not with population exchange but only with the repatriation of refugees." 72 Yosef Litvak tends to dismiss the entire matter as "an episode around which rumors and gossip . . . abound," 73 a fabrication without foundation. On the basis of the available evidence, several conclusions can be drawn concerning the issue. Throughout the period covered by this article, there were Jewish refugees who tried, and some who even succeeded, to return to their former homes in Nazi Poland. 74 Economic conditions in Soviet Poland, fears of imprisonment and deportation, family connections, ignorance of the real situation and dangers facing the Jews in the Nazi territory, all contributed to the fact that refugees tried to return. There are no doubts about the operation of German commissions on Soviet territory at the time, April-May 1941. These commissions were invariably designated as the "commissions of population exchange," 75 and registered those who wanted to be repatriated. An interesting confirmation about the entire episode is found in Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs. Recalling some of the events of the time, Khrushchev, then in charge of the Ukraine, writes that there "was an exchange agreement whereby people on German-occupied territory who wanted to return to their homes in the former Polish territory now occupied by Soviet troops were allowed to do so; and likewise, anyone in the Ukrainian population on Soviet territory who wanted to return to German-occupied Poland could do that." 76 The commissions operated in several cities such as Bialystok, Lwow (Lvov), and Brisk. The last location served also as the place of departure for those returning to German territory. There is little evidence to justify Weinryb's assertion that those who registered with the NKVD, "had to register again with the German commission." Most of the evidence seems to indicate that the two commissions operated separately and that quite a few Jews wanted to register with the German commissions without any Soviet order to do so. In Bialystok, many Jewish refugees waited for hours to register with the German commission. 77 The refugees did not know the exact nature of the agreement between the states, but they had learned very quickly that the Germans refused to register Jewish refugees. Some tried to bribe the German representatives for a chance to be reunited with their families. 78 Lwow(Lvov) was one of the major centers for registration, and many refugees had to wait for days to reach the commission. 79 Khrushchev also relates "that most of the people standing in line for registration were Jews." 80 The Soviet authorities interpreted the efforts to register with the German commission as an overt act of disloyalty. The attempts of many

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Jews to cross the border and their willingness to live under a regime that publicly announced its hatred toward J e w s was considered, rightfully, as dangerous to the prestige of the Soviet government. Thousands of Jews who assembled in Brisk, hoping to sneak aboard the trains moving West, were arrested by special N K V D units. 81 T h e following authentic story demonstrates, better than any analytical exposition, the tragedy of Polish Jewry living o n both sides of the border. At Biala, Podlaska, the first station on the German side of the border, the train carrying refugees East encountered the train moving West. "When the Jews coming from Brisk saw Jews going there, they shouted: 'You are insane, where are you going?' Those coming from Warsaw answered with equal astonishment: 'You are insane, where are y o u going!!!' " 8 2 T h e Jewish refugees in eastern Poland presented a problem for the Soviet authorities which they were neither able nor willing to solve in a way satisfactory to both sides. The Soviets considered the refugees to be a security risk since they showed a particular interest in developments in the German area, had family connections across the border, had made repeated attempts to sneak through the frontier to visit relatives, and had often expressed the desire to emigrate overseas. This increased Soviet distrust and the refugees were considered as likely candidates for espionage. The refusal of most to accept Soviet citizenship coupled with their overt declaration to return to German-occupied Poland, drove the Soviet authorities to a radical resolution of the problem—massive deportation of the refugees. During the spring of 1940, there were signs that the Soviet authorities were prepared to institute this plan as the answer to the refugee problem. It was part of a general shift toward a policy of removing entire social groups from eastern Poland. It replaced the more selective and individual character which the imprisonment deportations had had before. 8 3 T h e first to be deported were refugees without families who had registered to return, refusing to become Soviet citizens. " T h e first arrests did n o t create any panic among the refugees. At worst, thought some, they will be sent to the interior regions of the USSR, where they could get employment and wait until the war would end," 8 4 recalled a witness from Pinsk. It soon became obvious that those were mere illusions; the deportations extended to the entire refugee population in eastern Poland, and the destination of the trains moving East were to the labor camps of northern Russia and Siberia. During the second half of J u n e 1940, most Jewish refugees were removed from eastern Poland. The operation itself lasted only several days. The secret police were assisted by the entire Soviet governmental apparatus and the members of the Communist party in the area. The deportees were told, at least during the first stage of the operation, that their refusal to

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become Soviet citizens and registration to return to German territory was the reason for their deportation. 8S The refugees were "picked up" by the NKVD, which used its lists of those who had expressed their wish to return. When the refugees started to hide and to change their places of residence, "they were simply kidnapped while walking in the street, dragged from their homes, separated from their families," 86 recalled a witness from Pinsk. In Lwow(Lvov), the entire operation lasted only four days and nights. It involved the total mobilization of the secret police, party members, and higher administrative personnel. 87 It was evident that every detail was planned in advance: trucks were waiting in the intersections; from certain concentration points, the deportees were transferred to long trains moving East; the disinformation section of the NKVD was very active in preparing and executing the deportation. The victims had to be unprepared, taken by surprise, and led to believe that nothing bad would happen to them. False announcements, deceptive rumors and misleading information were among the methods used. 88 In Lwow(Lvov), the police shifted its focus of attention from individuals to families. When the latter began to hide, those without families thought that the danger had passed and started returning to their homes. They were immediately picked up. The result was that each group in its turn was caught unaware. 89 The drivers mobilized for the operation in Bialystok were told that they would have to "collect" arrested prostitutes—only later did they learn that the wives and children of those who had already been deported were their cargo. 90 After some initial success, the police found it increasingly difficult to trap their victims. The disinformation section was reactivated. Rumors were spread that people were being sent to nearby places: that at Minsk, the capital of Byelorussia, for instance, the families were being reunited. When asked the destination of those deported, the police replied that Kiev would become the refugees' permanent home. There they would receive profitable employment and nice housing. Others were told that they were going to be transferred to the Nazi zone. 91 The Soviet deportation machine was well prepared for its job. Years of experience in uprooting and hunting down thousands of helpless victims during the periods of collectivization, the great purges, and even before, bore fruit. Acting in accordance with General Serov's detailed instructions, 92 most of the refugees were deported in June 1940. Among the deportees were also people employed in Soviet institutions and even some who had accepted Soviet citizenship. The deportations continued after June 1940, although on a much smaller scale. The last large convoys of refugees left Pinsk on 20 June 1940, a day before the outbreak of war with Germany. 93 Trains with deportees crossed Lida on 21 June 1941. 9 4

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While it is impossible to ascertain the exact number of the deported refugees, there is no doubt that the vast majority of them were exiled. An inherent incompatibility between the Jewish refugees and the Soviet authorities in eastern Poland existed. The refugees could not sever their ties with the past, their families, and their hopes. They did not adapt to the Soviet way of life. A complex human problem became an administrative question for the Soviet government. They resolved it by using a method with which they were familiar—mass deportation. The deportees were victims of Hitlerism, as they were victims of Stalinism. The majority of the refugees saved their lives after eastern Poland was conquered by Germany when they were deported into the Soviet Union. It was the ultimate irony of history. NOTES 1. J o h n G. Stoessinger. The Refugee and the World Community (Minneapolis, Minn., 1956), p p . 35-41. 2. Ibid., p . 38. 3. See Henry L. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue (New Brunswick, N.J., 1970). 4. Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post War World (New Haven, Conn., 1953), p. 60. 5. Arieh Tartakower and Kurt R. Grossmann, The Jewish Refugee (New York, 1944), p. 343. 6. Except for general and rather sketchy references, the following devote more space to the subject: Yosef Litvak, "Ha-Shilton ha-Sovieti ve-hatshalat Yehudim 4Polaniim u-Maaraviim' " [The Soviet Government and the Rescue of "Western Polish" Jews] , Behinot, 2-3(1972), 47-80; Solomon M. Schwarz, Evrei υ Sovetskom Soiuzhe [Jews in the Soviet Union] (New York, 1965); and Bernard D. Weinryb, "Polish Jews under Soviet Rule," in Peter Meyer, Bernard D. Weinryb, Eugene Duschinsky and Nicholas Sylvain, The Jews in the Soviet Satellites (Syracuse, N.Y., 1953), p p . 329-69. 7. Leonard B. Schapiro, The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union (New York, 1967) p. 92. 8. Norman Bentwich, Wanderer Between Two Worlds (London, 1941), p. 268. 9. Feingold, Rescue, p . 27. The Soviet Union joined the intergovernmental Committee for Refugees only in 1943. See Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post War World: Preliminary Report of a Survey (Geneva, 1951), p . 27. 10. Moshe Prager, Yeven Metsulah he-hadash [The New Disaster] (Tel Aviv, 1941), p p . 28-29. 11. Zusman Segalovitch, Gebrente Trit [Walking in Fire] (Buenos Aires, 1947), p p . 40-57. 12. Shoat Yehudei Polin [The Holocaust of Poland's J e w r y ] (Tel Aviv, 1940), p. 47. (Henceforth to be called Shoat Polin). 13. Nicholas P. Vakar, Byelorussia (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), pp. 157-58. 14. Sheine M. Broderzon, Main laidns veg mit Moshe Broderzon [My Road of Suffering with Moshe Broderzon] (Buenos Aires, 1960), p . 17; Yitzhak Zigelman, ed., Sefer Radzyn [The Book of Radzyn] (Tel Aviv, 1957), p p . 218-19. These are detailed descriptions of the friendly attitudes shown by Soviet soldiers on the border. 15. Avraham Khomet, ed., Sefer Sokal [The Book of Sokal] (Tel Aviv, 1968), p p . 278-79. 16. Yitzhak Ivri, ed., Sefer Kehtlat Ostrolenka [The Book of Kehilat Ostrolenka] (Tel Aviv, 1963), p . 358.

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17. Shoat Polin, p. 63. 18. See D. Grodner, "In Soviet Poland and Lithuania," Contemporary Jewish Record, 4 (1941) 137-38 and David Lederman, Fun yener zait forhang [From the Other Side of the Curtain] (Buenos Aires, 1960), pp. 68-74; Sefer Sokal, pp. 278-79; all carried numerous reports on the sufferings of those who tried to cross the Soviet border at the time. 19. Izvestia, 20 November 1939, n.p. 20. Prager, Yeven Metsulah, pp. 35-36. 21. The protest note was handed to Count von Schulenburg, the German ambassador to Moscow. See Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution (London, 1953), p. 49. 22. Raymond J . Sontag and James S. Beddie, eds., Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941 (Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1948), p. 128. 23. See Yad Vashem, testimonial, (henceforth to be called Υ. V.), K-l 16-1324; A. Pinsker, Ud Mutsal [A Remnant] (Tel Aviv, 1957), pp. 18-20; and Prager, Yeven Metsulah, p. 32. 24. Jewish Telegraphic Agency News, 6, no. 122. 25. Avraham Pechenik, Yidn un Yidishkait in Soviet Rusland [Jews and Judaism in Soviet Russia] (New York, 1943), pp. 59-60. 26. Jewish Affairs, (New York, August 1941). 27. Weinryb, "Polish Jews," p. 342. 28. See Schwarz, Evrei, p. 33. Litvak, "Ha-Shilton," p. 56 estimates the number of refugees to have been between 300,000 and 400,000. 29. Sefer Sokal, p. 278. 30. Derechiner Societies in Israel and the United States, ed., Sefer Derechin [The Book of Derechin] (Tel Aviv, n.d.), p. 248. 31. Morchai Nadav, ed., Ianovo al Yad Pinsk. Sefer Zikaron [Ianovo near Pinsk. Memorial Book] (Jerusalem, 1969), p. 264. 32. Υ. V., SH-191-2131. 33. In Lubach, according to a census taken in September 1940, there were thirtyfive Jewish refugees in the different professions; see Geven a mol a yidish shtetl Lubakh [There was a Jewish Shtetl Named Lubach] (Tel Aviv, 1971) pp. 33-35. Similar data come from such places as Kletsk; see E. S. Stein, ed., Pinkas Kletsk [The Book of Kletsk] (Tel Aviv, 1959), pp. 63 andpoiiim; Lomze; see Ivri, Ostrolenka, pp. 358-59; and Dubno; see Yaakov Adini, ed., Dubno: Sefer Zikaron [Dubno: Memorial Book] (Tel Aviv, 1969), pp. 648-52 and Prager, Yeven Metsulah, pp. 33-35. 34. The Minsker Oktiaber of 4 January 1940 reported that the population of Bialystok had increased from 105,000 to 200,000 since its annexation. Lwow (Lvov), too, had almost doubled its Jewish population. See Shoat Polin, p. 43. 35. On the acute housing problem see Tania Fuks, Vanderung Iber Okupirte Gebitn [Wandering in Occupied Lands] (Buenos Aires, 1947), pp. 49 and passim-, Fride Zerubavel, Na Vanad [Wanderer] (Buenos Aires, 1947), pp. 65 and partim; and Lederman, Yener Zait, pp. 74-99. The three represent a small sample of memoirs published by Jewish journalists, authors and artists, who fled to the Soviet part of Poland. They similarly describe in detail the fate of the Jewish refugees between 1939 and 1941, and served, with others, as an important source for this article. 36. Grodner, "In Soviet Poland," p. 138. 37. Ibid. 38. Shoat Polin, p. 43. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid., p. 63. 41. See Broderzon, Laidns veg, pp. 18-20 and also Moishe Grossman, In farkisheftn land fun legendern Dzhugoshvili [In the Enchanted Land of the Legendary Dzhugoshvili] 2 vols. (Paris, 1950), I,passim. 42. Grossman, ibid., p. 27.

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43. Ibid., pp. 35-36. The author recalls the refusal of the Bialystoker Shtern to publish anything about the fate of the Jews in Nazi Poland. See also Broderzon, Laidns veg, p. 31. 44. Thirty-four of the 170 members of the Writers' Union were Jews. See Bialystoker Shtern, 6 February 1940. 45. Ofboi, issue 3 (January 1941) 98. 46. Ibid. 47. Ofboi, issue 9 (May 1941) 12-13. 48. Bialystoker Shtern, 2 February 1940. 49. See Broderzon, Laidns veg, pp. 26-27 on the "nationalistic deviation" of Zelik Akselrod, and Lederman, Yener Zait for a description of a meeting with P. Markish. 50. Vilner Ernes. 12 November 1940. 51. Ibid. 52. Vilner Ernes, 8 December 1940, carried Moshe Broderzon's article, "On Our Trip Through the Soviet Union." After describing the "enthusiastic" receptions, the author admits that " t h e press drew to our attention that we have to adopt a Soviet repertoire." The author promises to do so. Yet, several months later, the Kiiever Shtern, on 15 February 1941, reported that the theater collective had promised to prepare two performances which would "reflect its absorption in their country, and adapt it to Soviet reality." 53. Grodner, "In Soviet Poland." p. 140. 54. Weinryb, "Polish Jews," p. 344 maintains that "in the last month of 1939 registration for work in Russia commenced." Yet, a report from a Mr. Helman, the Hehaluts representative in eastern Galicia, describes registration for work occurring as early as the end of September. See Shoat Polin, p p . 24-25. 55. Ibid., p. 63. 56. A witness from Radzyn recalls his departure from Brisk in Zigelman, Radzyn. p. 219. 57. Grossman, Dzhugoshvili, p. 30. 58. Grodner, "In Soviet Poland," p. 140. 59. The Minsker Oktiaber of 20 January 1940 reported that seven trains with over 11,000 people left Bialystok recently for work in Soviet enterprises. The Bialystoker Shtern of 2 February 1940 in a polemical article with the Forverts, maintained that 30,(700 refugees left for the interior in the last m o n t h . 60. The Bialystoker Shtern carried an article on 13 February 1940 which reports the arrival of a representative from Magnitogorsk to register 1,500 refugees for work in its building industry. 61. A suggestive article, entitled "The Found Homeland," containing letters of registrants from the Urals, appeared in the 28 January 1940 Bialystoker Shtern. 62. Lederman, Yener Zait, pp. 119-20. 63. Υ. V., SH-71-262; Lederman, ibid., pp. 126-27. 64. Grossman, Dzhugoshvili, p. 84. 65. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations. 1939-1945 (London, 1961), I, 92. 66. Ibid., p. 541. Article 3 of the Soviet Citizenship and Naturalization Laws of 19 August 1938 stated that: "Aliens of any nationality or race could become Soviet citizens by their own request and the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. or the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic where they reside." 67. Υ. V., A-74-1203; G-13-705; and SH-71-762. 68. Grossman, Dzhugoshvili, p. 84. 69. Lederman, Yener Zait, pp. 126-30; Grossman, ibid., p p . 94-96; Adini, Dubno, p . 654; and Mordchai V. Bershtein, ed., Yizkor Bukh fun Pulav [Memorial Book of Pulav] (New York, 1969), p. 345. This is just a small selection of testimonials coming from different parts of eastern Poland. Basically, they all repeat the same story. 70. At Pinsk, attempts were made to persuade the refugees to register to return. See

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Zeev Rabinovich and Nahman Tamir, Sefer Edut ve-Zikaron li-kehilat Pinsk-Karlin [A Testimonial and Memorial Book of the Kehillah of Pinsk-Karlin] (Tel Aviv, 1969), I, 313. 71. Weinryb, "Polish J e w s , " p. 346; Grodner, "In Soviet Poland," p. 141 served as Weinryb's source for these assertions. 72. Schwarz, Evrei, pp. 36-37. 73. Litvak, "Ha-Shihon," pp. 64-65. 74. Lederman, Yener Zait, pp. 121-26; Shoat Polin, p. 38, contains a report of Jews from eastern Galicia crossing the border to the Nazi area. 75. See Yitzhak Bergles, Sefer Strizov ve-ha-sevivah [The Book of Strizov and Vicinity] (Tel Aviv, 1969), p. 330; Michael Riak. Hurban Globak-Sharkvistsene [The Destruction of Globak Sharkvistsene] (Buenos Aires, 1956), p . 38 and Lederman, ibid., p. 130. 76. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, with the Introduction by E. Crankshaw (Boston, 1970), p. 141. 77. Grossman, Dzhugoshvili, p. 93. 78. Lederman, Yener Zait, pp. 130-31. 79. Fuks, Vanderung, pp. 79-80. 80. Khrushchev Remembers, p. 141. 81. Grossman, Dzhugoshvili, p. 94. Fuks, who personally witnessed the registration in Lwow (Lvov), relates in Vanderung on p . 80 that the Soviet officials questioned, "is our regime that distasteful to the Jews that they* want to return to Hitler? If that is the case then certainly they should be regarded as an hostile element, and we better get rid of them." 82. Grossman, Dzhugoshvili, p. 94. The author heard the story from the actor Schumacher's wife, who was among the refugees coming from the Nazi side. 83. Schwarz, Evrei, p. 35. 84. Nadav, Ianovo, p. 313. 85. Y.V., B-56-756. 86. Nadav, ibid., p. 369. 87. Υ. V., SH-71-762. 88. Grossman, Dzhugoshvili, p. 76. 89. Fuks, Vanderung, p. 81. 90. Grossman, Dzhugoshvili, p. 50. 91. Lederman, Yener Zait, pp. 135-42; Grossman, ibid., p p . 99-101. 92. For the text of Serov's detailed instructions on " t h e procedure for carrying out the deportation of anti-Soviet elements," see Bronis J . Kaslas, ed., The U.S.S.R.-German Aggression Against Lithuania (New York, 1973) pp. 327-34. 93. Tamir, Pinsk-Karlin, p. 320. (See note 70). 94. Aleksander Manor, ed., Sefer Lida [The Book of Lida] (Tel Aviv, 1970), p . 278.

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Jews in General Anders' Army in the Soviet Union YISRAEL

GUTMAN

1. The Organizational Phase Mustering of the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union (Polskie Siiy Zbrojne w ZSSR), known as "Anders' Anny," began during the latter half of 1941. Until the end of July 1941, the Polish Government-in-Exile in London had not maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, condemning her as an invader who had conspired with Nazi Germany to seize the eastern portions of Poland during the invasion of 1939. Even the dramatic volte-face in the wake of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union on July 22, 1941 did not bring about an immediate thaw in Polish-Soviet relations. The Polish Prime Minister in Exile, Wladyslaw Sikorski, maintained that Poland should seek avenues of consultation with the Soviet Union and that she should join the new alignment of forces arising out of the Soviet Union's entering the anti-Nazi camp. The Poles did insist however that any agreement with the Soviet Union be conditional upon an unequivocal Soviet commitment that the Polish state to be reconstituted after the war have its former eastern borders reinstated — that is, the Soviet Union was to rescind its annexation of Western Byelorussia, the Western Ukraine and the Vilna district. The Soviets refused to undertake any such commitment while the tense and exhausting deliberations on the issue resulted in a split amongst the Poles. The radical

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faction among the Polish exiles — the Endeks* the last of the Sanacja** supporters of Piisudski and also a minority of the socialists — would not agree to any formulation that did not set out in detail the eastern Polish boundaries. However, a majority in the Polish Government-in-Exile was inclined to accept a compromise formula1 that deferred drawing the map of the eastern sector to a later date. The official agreement, signed by representatives of Poland and the Soviet Union in London on July 30, 1941 contained a clause stating that "The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 relative to territorial changes in Poland have lost their validity."2 A prime consideration for Sikorski in seeking an agreement with the Soviet Union was the anticipation of establishing in the Soviet Union a Polish contingent which would be subordinate to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London. The forces that the Poles had managed to muster in the West after the debacle of September 1939, had been almost completely lost in the campaign in France. The Poles attached much importance to a substantial Polish force taking its place alongside the Allied forces in the struggle against Hitler. *

Members of the Narodowa Demokracja — N D — The right-wing National-Democratic Party, of an extreme anti-Semitic character. ** Sanacja (regenerative purge) — the name given to the regime that took power under the leadership of Piisudski after the coup d'etat of May 1926. It remained in power until the outbreak of WWII. 1 Concerning this, see the position taken by Sikorski's opponents, in Wladyslaw Pobög-Malinowski, Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski, 1864-1945, Vol. 3, London, 1960-1967, pp. 150-197. Kot identifies with Sikorski's position in his book. See the Polish edition, Stanislaw Kot, Listy ζ Rosji do Gen. Sikorskiego, London, 1955, pp. 1 ΟΣΟ; English edition: Conversations with the Kremlin and Dispatches from Russia, London, 1963. 2 See the English text of the agreement in Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, 1939-1945, Vol. 1, London, 1961, pp. 141-142 (hereafter — Documents).

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In the wake of the debacle, masses of Polish citizens had reached the interior of the Soviet Union, some as prisoners-of-war, some as refugees who had fled before the Germans and some as exiles deported by the Soviet authorities; their number is estimated to have reached a million to a million and a half.3 A large proportion of these, perhaps even the majority, were interned in Soviet prison camps, where they suffered greatly from degradation, intense hardship and harsh weather. The agreement which was signed in July 1941 stated that "The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expresses its consent to the formation on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of a Polish Army under a commander appointed by the Government of the Republic of Poland, in agreement with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Polish Army on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be subordinate in operational matters to the Supreme Command of the USSR on which there will be a representative of the Polish Army."4 In a separate protocol appended to the general agreement, the Soviet Government undertook, immediately upon the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, to "grant amnesty to all Polish citizens who are at present deprived of their freedom on the territory of the USSR either as prisoners-of-war or on other adequate grounds."3 It is estimated that the number of Jews among the Polish exiles in the Soviet Union reached 400,000,® about a third of the 8

* « •

We do not have reliable statistics of the Polish exiles in the Soviet Union during World War H. The Polish sources give a figure of between one and two millions. The Soviets reported that 350,000450,000 individuals were transported from Poland to the Soviet Union; see Pobog-Malinowski, op. cit., p. 197. Kot states that the number of Poles brought to the Soviet Union was over a million and a half; Kot, op. cit., p. 107. Documents, p. 141. Ibid., p. 142. See Kot, op. cit., p. 163.

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total number. Their proportion among the exiles was thus more than triple their proportion among the population of the independent Polish State in the years between the wars. It was only natural that the persecuted Jews should seek refuge in the Soviet State; their numbers would have been even greater had it not been for the obstacles preventing mass evacuation and flight in the first weeks after the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union.7 Many of the Jewish exiles were banished and imprisoned under cruel conditions in Soviet prisons and labor camps. Thanks to the accord reached between Poland and the Soviet Union and the subsequent military agreement,8 masses of tortured, frail and infirm Polish citizens, Jews among them, were released from the prisons and the camps; recruiting of Polish military units and the armed struggle of the Poles became possible. The first Polish units — two divisions plus a support force— were concentrated in army camps in the Saratov region of the Volga. (Staff headquarters were set up at Buzuluk, over 100 km. from Kuybishev; one division was at Tatishtyevo and the other at Tock.) General Wladyslaw Anders was given command. With the opening of the Polish Embassy in Kuybishev, diplomatic relations between the two countries were normalized. The first Polish Ambassador to the Soviet Union during the war years, Professor Stanislaw Kot, was, until his appointment to this post, a senior minister in the Government-in-Exile, and was regarded as a close friend and confidant of Sikorski's. Kot and his staff showed much initiative and ingenuity in organizing a system of consular offices, locating Polish citizens in the far corners of the Soviet Union and offering speedy assistance to those in need. T

8

On this see Dov Levin, "The Attitude of the Soviet Union to the Rescue of Jews," Rescue Attempts During the Holocaust, Jerusalem, 1977, pp. 225-236. The text of the military agreement can be found in Documents, pp. 149-150.

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In the network of "delegations" which spread their protective presence over the exiles in the Districts and Republics throughout the Soviet Union, Jews were also assigned positions, albeit at subordinate levels. Despite numerous inequities it is only fitting to point out that a large number of Jews did benefit from the substantive aid offered by the Polish welfare program, which received assistance in the form of shipments from the free countries.9 Even in the preliminary organizational stages of the Polish military force, differences arose between the Polish command and the Soviet authorities. The Soviets initially restricted conscription to 30,000 men, while the Poles asked for far more and spoke of an army of 150,000. Thousands of Polish officers among the prisoners-of-war could not be located,10 while the Poles demanded that they be released to serve as the professional and command cadre essential for the army in formation. There were also differences of opinion as to military and strategic matters: The Soviets sought to accelerate and curtail the training period of the recruits, and to send separate divisions to the front, while the Poles demanded that the recruits be given thorough training and be committed to battle only as a consolidated unit. These differences arising out of deep-seated mutual distrust and variance in goals, marked the beginning of the break which ultimately led to the transferring of the Armed Forces of General Anders outside of the Soviet Union and, after the revelations concerning the Katyn Massacre, to 9 10

For details on the welfare program see Kot, op. tit., pp. 24-26. The fate of thousands of Polish officers became known when the Germans announced in mid-April 1943 that mass graves had been discovered in the Katyn Forest, near Smolensk, containing the bodies of slain Polish officers. The announcement marked the beginning of the crisis and the controversy over Katyn. See The Katyn Forest Massacre — Hearings before the select committee to conduct an investigation of the facts, evidence and circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, Washington, 1952.

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the severing of diplomatic relations and to far-reaching developments affecting the Polish nation and the Polish state. From the very beginning of the recruiting, thousands of released Jewish prisoners and exiles flocked to the collection points, acting either on their own initiative or on the basis of orders. For the majority, mobilization signified a guarantee of day-today existence and a relative sense of permanence, given the war situation. Official directives set out the criteria of preference and eligibility for service in the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union: a) officers and N.C.O.'s formerly on active service; b) enlisted men who had been on active service; c) volunteers who underwent pre-military training and were found eligible by the recruiting committees.11 The first units set up had a very large number of Jews; according to Anders the Jews at times constituted sixty per cent, and according to Kot, forty per cent. The surge of Jews to the ranks of the Polish Armed Forces aroused suspicion and dismay. In Polish sources one finds complaints to the effect that the Russians intentionally released the Jews from the camps before all others so as to flood the Polish Armed Forces with the "Jewish element." In a letter to the Polish Foreign Minister in London on November 8, 1941, Kot writes that "the Soviets delayed by various means the release of the Polish element who were in better health and spirits, sending instead the handicapped and the Jews."12 Another complaint was incessantly voiced by the Poles in the matter of the "national reckoning" which they had with the Jews. Anders himself would begin every meeting with Jewish representatives and delegations, and the orders he issued relat11

12

Concerning this, see Anders' order of the day, November 14, 1941. A copy of the document is in the Frizner Collection, Yad Vashem Archives (hereafter — YVA). See, for example, Kot's letter of November 8, 1941 to Polish Foreign Minister, Kot, op. cit., p. 154.

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ing to Jews, with the "reminder" that the Poles bore the Jews a severe grievance for their disloyal behavior during the occupation and internment in the prisons and camps.13 In his book, An Army in Exile, describing the Polish Armed Forces organized in the Soviet Union, Anders begins the chapter on "The Jews in the Armed Forces" with these words: "I was greatly disturbed when, in the beginning, large numbers from among the national minorities, and first and foremost Jews, began streaming to enlist. As I have already mentioned, some of the Jews had warmly welcomed the Soviet armies that invaded Poland in 1939..."14 In documents that were not intended for publication or for public consumption, General Anders' style is much harsher.15 Kot, too, writes in his report to the Foreign Minister in London, that "the Poles feel very bitter towards the Jews for their behavior during the Soviet occupation — their enthusiastic welcome of the Red Army, the insults which they directed towards the Polish officers and men who were under Soviet arrest, offering their services to the Soviets, in-

13 14

15

Ibid.; on this matter, see also Kot, p. 163. From Anders' Work Calendar of February 4, 1943, Sikorski Archives, General Sikorski Historical Institute, London (Instytut Historyczny Imienia Generala Sikorskiego, hereafter — IHGS), Anders' File (hereafter — KGA/24); Minutes of the meeting in Tel Aviv between the "Representation" and General Anders, September 1943, in "Report of the Activities of the Representation of Polish Jewry for the years 1940-1945" (in Polish), Central Zionist Archives (hereafter—CZA), J25/54/VI, p. 134; Wiadyslaw Anders, Bez ostatniego rozdzialu; wspomnienia ζ lat 1939-1946, Wydanie drugie, Newton, 1950, p. 99; English edition: An Army in Exile. The Story of The Second Polish Corps, London, 1949. In the Anders' File, IHGS, KGA/24, there is a report bearing the title "The Jewish Problem" containing many complaints against Jews — the recurring complaint about the behavior of the Jews during the Soviet occupation, complaints about acts of cowardice, escapes and crimes, phrases such as the "Judaization of the Embassy," "unwillingness of the Jews to work" and others.

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forming on Poles, and other acts of the sort."16 This one-sided accounting, listing only injuries to Poles and reminding Jews of them — injuries for which the Jews were collectively blamed — and the total disregard for Poland's anti-Semitism and antiJewish policy between the wars, in particular the violence and organized persecution of the late thirties was but the first in a whole series of claims invoked to "justify" discrimination against Jews serving in the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union. Another claim that recurs in the Polish sources is that the Jews, by and large, are physically inferior and are not suited for active military service. This is what Kot wrote: "The liberation of Polish citizens in accordance with the agreement was greeted by the Jews with great enthusiasm. The decent ones among them rejoiced at Poland's achievement, while the inferior element sought to cover up their past behavior by vociferous identification with Poland. It was from this element that large numbers streamed to enlist in the Armed Forces. Not knowing what to do with themselves, they decided that it was obligatory to join the Armed Forces, and once having joined they almost always became a burden. They were found unfit for military service or they were deferred for a time, and meanwhile they would noisily demand that the relief work be continued."17

The claim that the Jews were "unfit for military service" undoubtedly had much deeper roots. Amongst the Poles, and in particular amongst the professional soldiers, the opinion was commonly held that the Jews were cowards by nature and were not suited for military service or useful on the battle-field. The testimonies of Jews who served in the Armed Forces of General Anders and of those who tried to enlist are replete with accounts of many who were rejected because of their Jewish an1β

«

Kot, op. cit., p. 163. Kot notes in the margin that the text is drawn from the report of the army staff, however in his survey written during the war he did not refer to this fact. Ibid., p. 164.

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cestry, and tell of crude injustices done to others who were permitted to serve but denied promotion. These very testimonies reveal the existence of two stages in the recruitment process. During the first stage, which extended from the granting of pardons and the beginning of the organization of the Armed Forces until the end of 1941, a large number of Jews were accepted and they constituted a sizable proportion of the units being formed. However, those Jews who were accepted and remained in the ranks throughout the duration of the war, relate that Jews were often transferred to the support units and to the kolkhozes in the wake of deliberate "inspections" and re-examinations, or were simply cashiered from the service. During the second stage, when the recruiting was carried out at several centers in Soviet Central Asia, disqualification of Jews, according to these testimonies, was automatic: Jews would try a second and a third time to enlist, and each time they would meet with a flat rejection. Their physical fitness had no bearing on the decision; they were disqualified just because they were Jews. These disqualifications, according to the testimonies, were only rarely based on restrictions or prohibitions imposed by the Soviet authorities; the principle of collective disqualification was, however, applied not only to Jews but to Ukrainians and Byelorussians as well. Henryk Dankiewicz, a student of the Warsaw Polytechnic, with an assimilated background, was among the first to present himself for recruiting. He was accepted and sent to officers' training school. In January 1942, the commander of the school singled out "twelve Jews, and one Pole for the sake of appearances" and informed them that they were being expelled from the course since they were not suitable officer material. Some time later, they were transported to a different place and again brought before a recruiting committee. This committee assigned to each of them, without exception, type Ε classification which meant absolute disqualification. Dankiewicz tried his luck one

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more time in the city of Tzezar in Uzbekistan, and there too the scene repeated itself: all the Poles, without exception, were accepted and the Jews, Ukrainians and Byelorussians were rejected. Dankiewicz finally enlisted in the army organized by the Polish pro-Communists in the Soviet Union; he was given officer's rank and fought later in the Kosciuszko division.18 Another Jew, Michael Licht, a gymnastics and sports teacher by profession, who had served as N.C.O. in the battle over Poland at the outset of World War II, also presented himself at the recruiting center together with several other Jews who were, in his words, "strong as oaks;" all of them were disqualified, having been found physically unfit. Licht tried to enlist a second time, and was accepted, making him feel as if he had "finally made it." However, ten days later he was expelled from the service together with all the other Jews. According to his testimony, only Jewish physicians were kept on, or those who paid a hundred-dollar bribe to the Polish officers. He also claims that the taking of bribes by the Polish officers was done quite openly.19 Another witness, Felix Davidson, an engineer by profession, relates that he did not encounter any particular difficulty on enlisting in the Armed Forces of General Anders. He credits this fact to his profession. He did however have problems in the course of his service: "I asked to be allowed to take a mechanics course, but was rejected because I was a Jew. AntiSemitism was a very open feature of the Armed Forces of General Anders."20 Simon Perl, an electrician by profession, was also disqualified. He relates how in the city of Fregana, in Uzbekistan, thousands of Jews, Poles and Ukrainians sought to enlist: "The scenes familiar from Poland before the war were here reenacted. The Poles were automatically included among the " " 20

YVA, 03/1298. YVA, 03/1294. YVA, 03/1365.

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ranks of the army; the Jews were graded type " D " — unfit for active military service — and even those who had already been accepted were expelled for trivial reasons. Finally, my turn arrived to appear before the committee; appearing together with me was Richtennan, a swimming champion. Both of us were graded type "D"..."

Perl did finally manage to make his way into the ranks of the army with the assistance of a Polish officer whom he had known for many years.21 Meir Lustgarten, the son of farmers from Western Galicia, relates: "I was accepted into the army without any difficulty. During the first stage of organization many Jews presented themselves for enlistment; in the beginning they were accepted without any difficulties and there was in fact a Jewish majority in the army. This naturally did not please the Poles who sought ways of getting rid of the Jews, or at the very least of limiting the percentage of Jews accepted into the army. The Polish Command thus ordered all soldiers to appear before a medical board. During the examination most of the Jews were marked grade " D " for physical fitness and were released from the service. This occurred at the outset of the winter of 1941-42. Men were freezing from the cold and nevertheless they were released. The Polish Army remained free of Jews — judenrein as the Germans put it. From then on, Jews were not accepted into the Polish Army; only Poles were accepted." 22

Dozens of testimonies checked by the author of this article all present a uniform picture. The directives which ostensibly determined the acceptance of personnel into the Polish Army were not applied to Jews and to the members of the other minorities. At any rate, during the later stages of the recruiting no objective criteria whatsover were applied. It is a fact that during these later stages the Soviets forbade the recruiting of some of the minorities, including Jews. However, it will be seen that this prohibition was not strictly enforced; being open to 21 22

YVA, 03/1554. YVA, 03/702.

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varying interpretations it served the Poles as a pretext for closing the door to Jews. In any case, all agree that the restrictions imposed by the Soviet authorities did not apply to those Jews who had already been recruited and were serving in the army. Yet, the facts show that not only were new Jewish soldiers not accepted, but also that Jews already serving were systematically and deliberately expelled. In his letter to General Z. Bohusz-Szyszko of April 30, 1942, Kot wrote: "...complaints are again being voiced by Jews that a purge is being carried out in the ranks of the army so as to reduce their numbers, and that those who are healthiest are being released as sick. Is this necessary and does it serve our interests at this time...? "23

Who then were the Jews who were nevertheless accepted into the army in 1942 or who succeeded in remaining in the army despite the obstacles placed in their way and despite the purges? The impression is that physicians and those trained in the professions in demand were accepted, as well as individuals enjoying the backing of influential Poles. The Jews who remained in the army were those who were protected by their superiors or those who simply could not be expelled because of their excellent service record. The dominant influence underlying the relationship of the army command to Jews was undoubtedly the anti-Semitism so deeply imbedded in the souls of many Poles. This antagonistic attitude was particularly prevalent among the officer class, and it thus found expression in army life. In a letter sent from Moscow to General Sikorski on September 5, 1941, Kot wrote (it was only a few days after his arrival in the Soviet Union): "...I discussed with General Anders the matter of the Jews. They are generally accepted into the Army when they apply; after I explained to him the importance [of recruiting Jews] vis-ä-vis America and others, he promised to stress the necessity 28

Kot, op. tit., p. 313.

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of maintaining a friendly relationship with them..."24 Kot often reiterated the political significance of the conscription of Jews. In a letter to Mikolajczyk25 on October 11, 1941, he wrote: "...in the future, when we will be dealing with the eastern borders, this stream of Jewish recruits will be of considerable political weight, particularly when the Ukrainians' systematic hatred of anything Polish is taken into account..."

In that very same letter he notes that "our men in the Armed Forces, particularly those types like Pstrokonski,26 are already anxious to institute a numerus clausus in the military institutions."27 A discriminatory attitude towards Jews and a desire to block their entry into the Armed Forces was by no means characteristic of only a certain "type" of officer. This line was set and determined by the men at the top of both the political and the military hierarchies. J. Klimkowski, General Anders' Personnel Officer, described in his memoirs a high-level meeting of senior Soviet officers and leaders of the Polish Armed Forces, including General Anders, in which the matter of the Jews was raised. The meeting took place at the General Headquarters of the Polish Armed Forces in Buzuluk, during January 1942.28 Klimkowski writes: 2* Ibid., p. 82. 25 Stanislaw Mikolajczyk was one of the leaders of the Polish Peasants' Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe) in the London circle of exiles and Kot's political ally. He was appointed Prime Minister in Exile after Sikorski's tragic death in 1943. 2β Pstrokonski was close to the men in power in Poland in the 1930's and in Kot's eyes was politically unfit. 27 Kot, op. tit., p. 136. 28 Documents, pp. 201-202, minutes of the meeting in Buzuluk of the men who had been appointed by Klimkowski. The date recorded is November 11, 1941 and the contents as reported by Klimkowski are appr^riate to that date. The minutes bear no reference to Jewish matters, but since they are incomplete one cannot conclude that the question was not raised.

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"The matter of the recruiting was raised and on this point General Anders made the strange request that members of the minorities, first and foremost the Jews but also the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians, not be taken into the Army. Jewsiegniejew pointed out that they were Polish citizens, and the PolishSoviet Agreement stipulated that all citizens of the Polish Republic be accepted into the Army. General Anders then remarked: 'There are so many Jews that they will judaize the Army and their flocking to the Army will radically alter its entire character.' " 29

Of even greater significance was the conversation between Sikorski and Stalin which took place in the Kremlin on December 3, 1941. For the Polish side, both Anders and Kot also attended, and representing the Russians was Foreign Minister Molotov. The discussion was the high point of Sikorski's muchheralded visit to the Soviet Union and it was devoted almost entirely to the problems of organization of the Polish Armed Forces and their future. When Anders dwelt at length upon the difficult conditions under which the organization was being carried out, and a suggestion was made to transfer the operation to Persia where more conducive conditions prevailed, Stalin angrily retorted: "If the Poles don't want to fight, they should leave." To this Sikorski replied: "Mr. President, when you say that one of our soldiers does not want to fight, you insult me." Further on in the discussion, Anders submitted details about the size of the force and its distribution at the various collection points: "...I am counting on 150,000 people, that is eight divisions together with the army's maintenance forces. Perhaps there are even more of our people, but among them there is also a great number of Jews who do not want to serve in the army. Stalin: Jews are poor warriors. Gen. S.: Many of the Jews who reported are speculators or have been punished for dealing in contraband; they never will make good soldiers. These I don't need in the 29

Jerzy Klimkowski, Byiem adiutantem Gert. Andersa, Warsaw, 1959, p. 218.

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Polish Army. 30 Gen. Α.: Two hundred Jews deserted from Buzuluk upon hearing the false report on the bombing of Kuybishev More than sixty deserted from the 5th Division a day before the distribution of arms to the soldiers was made public. Stalin: Yes, Jews are bad warriors." 31

It seems that these three persons found a common denominator in their assessment -of Jews as soldiers. There is also no doubt that Sikorski and Anders carefully weighed everything they said during the course of their discussion with Stalin and they realized the full significance of their words. The very fact that the Poles were given permission to set up an autonomous army within the Soviet Union conferred preferential status and the power of authority. (For many, the chance to be recruited while in the Soviet Union was virtually their salvation.)32 The Poles realized immediately that they had 30

The versions of the conversation between Sikorski and Stalin, as recorded by Kot, Sikorski and in Documents, are generally identical. However in Kot's version Sikorski's comments about Jews in the Armed Forces are attributed to Anders. It seems clear that Kot, a friend of Sikorski's who thought highly of him as a statesman, sought to clear him of the responsibility for a statement charged with anti-Semitic connotations representing a gross political blunder by means of a "slightly imprecise" recording of what actually happened. The version in Anders and in Documents are identical, with Sikorski appearing as having taking part in the discussion on the Jews. Documents, published by the Sikorski Institute, is an official and authoritative publication, thus leaving no doubt that Sikorski actually said what is attributed to him. In this context it is worth pointing out the charges lodged by the Soviets against the Polish officers. Thus, Kot, for example, records on November 7, 1941 that Wolkowysky complained to him that Polish officers who had arrived from London were trading in watches, silk stockings, toothpaste and other such things, and that many officers infected with venereal disease were exploiting the goodwill of Soviet women, see Kot, op. cit., pp. 150-151.

31

The minutes were published in the following sources: Kot, op. cit., pp. 191-208; Anders, op. cit., pp. 105-123; Documents, pp. 231-243. Many testimonies emphasize the fact that the Armed Forces meant

32

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been granted a position of power and this recognition enhanced their feeling of security and mastery. They did not at first dare to make full use of their freedom fearing that any step contrary to Soviet law and accepted custom would have repercussions. It may be assumed that this was what prevented them from blocking from the very beginning the stream of Jews who sought to enlist in the Army. In discussions with Soviet officers, and in particular in the discussion with Stalin, the Poles sought to sound out the Soviet reaction to imposing restriction on the recruiting of Jews and other minorities. The Poles knew full well that official discrimination against Jews was not acceptable at that time in the Soviet Union. Many surmised — as did the rightist forces in Europe — that a secret pact existed between the Jews and the government and the men in power in the Soviet Union. Stalin's concurring with Anders' and Sikorski's evaluation of the Jews and their ability as soldiers removed any doubt from the hearts of the Poles. The Soviet leader in his turn also knew how to exploit the Poles' frankness to his own advantage, as we shall later see. 2. The Significance of the Soviet Restrictions on the Recruiting of Jews Just a short while after the talks with Stalin and after operative consultations at the military level, Soviet liaison officers informed the Polish Armed Forces authorities in late December that recruiting for General Anders' Army would encompass all Polish nationals of Polish descent, with the exception of Jews, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, who on November 29, 1939 were resident in the territories annexed by the Soviet Union and declared Soviet citizens. On December 30, Anders sent a telegram to Kot in Kuybia haven for many who had been released from the camps and had neither home nor employment in the Soviet Union, at a time of war and extreme stress.

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shev reporting that two days earlier he had been told by Colonel Woikowysky, a senior Soviet liaison officer, that "of all the Polish citizens living in the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, only ethnic Poles may be recruited for our Armed Forces."33 On February 21, 1942 Anders cabled Sikorski stating that the Soviets authorized recruiting of all Polish citizens; from the territories held by the Soviets in 1939, only ethnic Poles were to be recruited.34 On February 25 Kot asked Anders to clarify the recruitment rights of non-ethnic Polish citizens— whether it was intended to exclude those who were born in the territory taken over in 1939 or was referring to any individual who was a permanent resident of these territories prior to the outbreak of the war? 35 To this Anders replied: "The Soviet authorities have officially informed me that recruiting encompasses all Polish citizens who until November 29 (1939) were residents of the territories occupied by the Germans [formerly held by the Soviets]."36 As we have already noted, the heads of the Polish Armed Forces and the central political leadership were both interested in excluding the Jews, or at the very least in limiting as much as possible the number of Jews in their army. The Soviet initiative directed towards preventing the Jewish citizens of Poland from enlisting should have helped the Poles to achieve their goal, for it gave them a ready-made answer for the free world: the discrimination was a result of a Soviet coercion and pressure. However, the matter was not so simple. At first glance it seems that the Soviet restriction applied only to the members of the other ethnic groups resident in the annexed territories on the date that Soviet citizenship was conferred on all the residents of these territories; as for the Poles in the annexed territories, they too had become Soviet citizens but the Soviets 33 IHGS, KGA/24. 34 Ibid. as ibid. 3β Ibid., cable of 2 March 1942 to Kuybishev.

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claimed that they were showing exceptional lenience and making an extraordinary gesture in allowing them to be recruited for the Polish Armed Forces. Consent to this restriction was tantamount to indirect recognition of the Soviet annexation of Polish territory, and to this the Poles were, of course, vociferously opposed. The Soviet-imposed restriction thus put the Poles in a quandary, and it is against this background that one should view the anxious questioning by the various Polish authorities concerning the precise meaning of the restriction. It was perhaps not by chance that the Soviets chose the matter of the recruiting for the Polish Armed Forces as a means to undermine the jurisdiction of the Poles over certain categories of Polish citizens living in the occupied territories. It is reasonable to assume that the idea of excluding Jews and other minority groups was broached only after Sikorski and Anders had voiced their anti-Jewish comments in the presence of Stalin and after they had revealed their intentions of disqualifying the Jews as being unfit for "our Army." An episode that occurred the day after the conversation with Stalin, at a dinner given by Stalin at the Kremlin in honor of Sikorski and his aides, is most revealing. Sikorski again raised the issue of the release of prisoners-of-war from Soviet "labour divisions" and complained that the process was too slow and not sufficiently comprehensive. Anders then remarked that he had been officially informed that Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Jews would not be released at all. "Were they not Polish citizens?" he asked in anger. "They have never ceased in fact to be Polish citizens, because your agreements with Germany have been annulled." Stalin then replied, all the while ignoring the basic question that Anders had raised: "What do you need Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Jews for? It is Poles you need, they are the best soldiers."37 There was another fundamental question of great concern which became a subject of dispute between the Soviet and Pol37

Documents,

Vol. II, Doc. N o . 160, p. 244.

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ish authorities. In the eyes of Soviet law, the residents of the annexed territories were regarded as Soviet citizens, but according to the agreement signed between the Soviets and the Poles these residents were Polish citizens. This ambiguity led of necessity to friction. On November 10, 1941, Kot lodged a complaint with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs that attempts had been made in Kazakhstan to conscript Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Jews into the Red Army, despite the fact that they were Polish citizens and not subject to conscription; he also complained that Polish citizens who were not ethnic Poles were being prevented from reaching the recruiting centers of the Polish Armed Forces.38 In the Ministry's response of December 1, the Soviets attempted to present their interpretation of the Soviet-Polish Agreements in a manner which would not seem to run counter to the legislation turning residents of the annexed territories into Soviet citizens. The recognition of the Polish citizenship of ethnic Poles residing in the eastern territories "shows the good will and readiness to compromise of the Soviet Government, but can in no case serve as a basis for the analogous recognition as Polish citizens of persons of other nationalities, in particular, Ukrainian, White Russian and Jewish." The response did not however refer in any way to the right of the ethnic groups in the eastern territories to enlist in the Polish Armed Forces.89 Naturally, the status assigned to Jewish nationality or religion in this context raises pointed questions concerning the attitudes of the Soviet regime and Communist ideology; however, as in so many other cases, here too pragmatic political interests took precedence over ideological principles. The Polish Embassy rejected both the claim and the interpretation of the agreement as made by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Kot explained that from the Polish standpoint all citizens, regardless of ethnic 38

Ibid.,

«

Ibid.,

Doc. No. 143, pp. 200-201. Doc. No. 157, pp. 227-228.

THE SOVIET UNION YISRAEL GUTMAN

origin or race, enjoyed equal rights, and this equality applied both to the amnesty being granted and to the privilege of enlisting in the Polish Armed Forces. Polish law did not discriminate among its citizens, and the military agreement granted every Polish citizen the right to enlist in the Polish Armed Forces.40 On January 5, 1942, the Soviet Foreign Ministry replied that after studying the arguments put forward by the Polish Embassy with regard to the different categories of citizens, it saw no reason to modify its position. It continued in a lengthy paragraph "explaining" the distinction between "occupation" and the "entry" of Soviet soldiers into the eastern territories of Poland; the gist of the claim was that the annexation of the territories was carried out "as the result of the freely expressed will of the population of those districts."41 This correspondence between the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Polish Embassy was preceded by an announcement by military circles to the effect that certain categories of citizens were not to be recruited; no protest is known to have been lodged either by military or civilian elements in the Polish camp against the Soviet restrictions imposed in the military sector. Kot emphazises that in the discussion with Stalin of March 18, 1942, Anders did not even hint at the issue of the restrictions on the recruiting of the national minorities.42 The documentary evidence and eye-witness accounts indicate that the Soviet authorities did not as a general rule actively interfere in the recruiting process, and they did not enforce rigid adherence to the regulations stipulating rejection of certain of the national minorities. Soviet representatives did sit on the recruiting committees, but only on very rare occasions would they investigate the ethnic background of the potential recruit;

« « «

Ibid., Doc. No. 163, pp. 250-251. Ibid., Doc. No. 167, p. 259. Cable to Sikorski of 22 March 1942, Kot, op. tit., p. 291.

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for the most part they refrained from taking an active role in the work of the committees. One phenomenon which did concern the Russians to the extent of an angry response, forced the Poles to act cautiously. The only relevant document registering a Soviet complaint about the infringement of their directives, is a letter addressed to Anders from General Panfilov, the Associate Chief of Staff of the Red Army. The letter opens with these words: "According to Paragraph 4 of the decision of the Governmental Committee for the Defence of the Soviet Union, of December 22, 1941, citizens of Polish extraction who until 1939 were residents of the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia may be recruited for the Polish Armed Forces. Citizens of any other ethnic origin who lived in these territories are not to be recruited."

Further on in the letter, General Panfilov claims that the above paragraph of the Soviet decision had been contravened by the recruitment of "escaped Soviet citizens." Following a severely worded protest he then proceeds to list by name ten such "escapees" and demands that they be handed over. Seven of the names are unquestionably Jewish and the three others are Byelorussian or Ukrainian. Panfilov closes with the request that he be informed as soon as possible of the hand-over so that these men may be brought to trial.43 The letter apparently refers to individuals who had fled from the "work units." Residents of the "western territories" (zapadniki), particularly Ukrainians, were considered to be too unreliable an element to be posted to the front, and they were therefore chanelled to conscripted work units. We indeed know of Jews escaping from these units, which were subject to the harshest of conditions, and fleeing to recruiting centers of the Polish Armed Forces.4* The individuals in question had had Soviet citizenship imposed 43 44

IHGS, KGA/24. YVA, 03/1683.

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on them, but in accordance with the terms of the Polish-Soviet agreement, were still regarded as Polish citizens, and could in theory enlist in General Anders Armed Forces. The Soviets, however, regarded them as deserters from conscripted Soviet units, to be treated as such. However, as already noted, the Soviets did not generally insist that the recruiting for the Polish Armed Forces be strictly in line with their directives. Numerous testimonies from Jewish candidates for enlistment and from individuals who actually served in General Anders' Armed Forces do not intimate that anyone was rejected on the Soviet representative's intervention or because he was a resident of the annexed territories. Moreover, no difference whatsoever can be discerned in the treatment of the "legitimate" recruits from the western provinces as opposed to treatment of those who, according to Soviet directives, should have been rejected. We have in our possession a list of recruits, both Poles and Jews, drawn up by the military some time between 12-20 of August 1942, that is a short while before the second stage of the evacuation from Russia. This list, unique among the papers found in Anders' files, reveals that of a total of 88 Jews presenting themselves for enlistment, 65 were disqualified and 23 were found fit for service; in contrast, out of a total of 75 Poles, 56 were listed as fit for service. The list also states the grounds for disqualification, but in no case does it note that the Soviet directives were the reason.45 A memorandum sent on November 10, 1942, by the Bundists Y. Glicksman and Feinsilber, evacuated with Anders' Army, to comrades in the United States and England, mentions the Soviet prohibition and the attitude of the Polish Armed Forces. A fierce anti-Soviet stance coupled with loyalty to the Polish Government in London were characteristic of the Polish Bundists at that time. In their memorandum Glicksman and Feinsilber state that: «

IHGS, KGA/24.

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"The position taken by the Soviet authorities with regard to citizenship has paved the way for discrimination against Jews on the part of Polish anti-Semitic elements. This was most blatant in the matter of recruiting for the Polish Armed Forces. The fact is that the position adopted by the Soviet authorities was instrumental in the exclusion of thousands of Jewish youth who were fit to serve, from the ranks of the Armed Forces. However, a large share of the responsibility for this state of affairs devolves upon Polish military elements."46

Ambassador Kot who, as we have seen, attached political significance to demonstrations of concern for Jews, did show a degree of goodwill towards Jews despite his numerous contradictory statements on the subject, and frequently dealt with questions relating to Polish Jews living in the Soviet Union. In a cable to Sikorski of April 10, 1942, he wrote: "...4. It should be brought to General Anders' attention that the systematic anti-Semitic policy pursued by the General Staff — a policy at which certain officers on the recruiting committees excelled — unwittingly serves the interests of the Soviets, who are seeking to distinguish between Jews and Poles so as to create a precedent which would enable them to take over the territories in the east..."

Here Kot makes no mention of the Soviet prohibition nor does he claim that it is tying the hands of the Poles; quite the contrary — he emphasizes that Polish officers are cooperating with the Soviets and are carrying out their wishes by getting rid of the Jews.47 It is clear, therefore, that the Soviet directives did not have a decisive influence upon the policies and practices of the Poles with regard to the recruiting. The Soviet directives actually gave the Poles a free hand and served as a ready pretext which was later used to justify to the outside world the low percentage of Jews in the Polish Armed Forces. From a political point « «

IHGS, KOL 25/24. Kot, op. cit., p. 305.

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of view, the aims of the Poles and the Soviets were diametrically opposed. The Russians sought to emphasize the basic political principle of distinguishing between segments of the population in the east and the other parts of Poland, thus creating a precedent for the future. Whether the Poles were carrying out the order in practice, and preventing Jews from enlisting did not particularly concern the Soviet authorities, although they did fear the possibility of desertion from conscripted units of their own and escape from camps. The Russians attached no importance to the recruiting of Jews from the eastern provinces — the fact is that at a later stage the Soviet authorities placed no restrictions upon Jews from the various pre-1939 Polish provinces who wished to join the ranks of the Berling Polish Army, which was set up by the Communist-influenced League of Polish Patriots {Zwiqzek Patriotow Polskich). The Poles, in contrast, sought to base their relations with the Soviets on mutual agreements; in the recruiting process they abstained from any decision that would be of political significance vis-a-vis the future of the territories. They were however definitely interested in rejecting the majority of the Jews who sought to enlist in their ranks and in reducing the number of Jews already accepted. In this clash between the two approaches and the two sides, the Jews were always the losers. The rights of Polish citizenship were denied to some, as were the possibilities of receiving Polish papers, material aid, exit visas from the Soviet Union and the legitimate right to enlist in the Armed Forces. Although in Polish military circles there was some difference of opinion concerning the political significance of the Soviet directives, they most willingly adopted the selectivity which was their key feature, adding to it their own brand of discrimination and rejection. 3. The "Jewish Legion" and the "Jewish Unit in Koltubanka" For a while the concept of a separate "Jewish Legion" within General Anders' Armed Forces in the Soviet Union drew the

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consideration and the attention of Polish and Jewish sources alike. The idea was independently raised at one and the same time by two individuals active in the Zionist-Revisionist Movement in Poland between the wars — Mark Kahan, a lawyer, and Miron Sheskin, an engineer. Both had been imprisoned in Soviet camps, had been released following the PolishSoviet Agreement, and had managed to reach the first recruiting centers of the Polish Armed Forces. Only after they met did they band together to try to put their idea into action. Mark Kahan was sent to the Tock concentration center.48 He found there that relations between the Poles and the Jews were unstable and at times violent fights would erupt. It was this situation which, he says, brought home the need for separating the Jewish from the Polish soldiers; this in turn led to the idea of establishing a "Jewish Legion" within General Anders' Armed Forces. He brought his proposal before General Michal Tokarzewski-Karasiewicz, the commander of the force in Tock and an acquaintance of his from the pre-war days of independent Poland. According to Kahan, Tokarzewski showed interest in the idea of establishing a Jewish unit and promised to take up the matter with Anders. Kahan was subsequently summoned to army headquarters in Buzuluk, where he met Sheskin who told him of his meeting with Anders that had been arranged on his own initiative to discuss the possibility of setting up a Jewish unit in the Armed Forces now organizing. We do not have material in our possession that could shed light on Sheskin's motives for making the proposal.49 After the war, both Kahan and Sheskin claimed that in the forefront of their « 48

See Mark Kahan's testimony, YVA, 03/2863. The great quantity of material on Sheskin in the Anders' File in the Sikorski Archives — a short biography, reports he sent to staff headquarters about the mood in Eretz Israel and in the Hebrew press, particularly in the extreme leftist factions — does not deal with his activities on behalf of the "Legion" and his motivations for undertaking these activities. See IHGS, KGA/24.

THE SOVIET UNION YISRAEL GUTMAN

minds was the potential role that a Jewish military force might play in the envisaged battle for Eretz Israel. Kot notes that the two advocates of the idea regarded the planned unit as a force that would eventually reach the battle theater there.50 It is indeed quite conceivable that Kahan and Sheskin, both of whom had been active in Zionist-nationalist affairs, did in fact hope that the unit would eventually have a role to play in a Jewish national struggle, even though the immediate stimulus for establishing a Jewish unit arose from the troubled relationships prevailing among the Jews and the Poles within the ranks of the army in formation. We do not have the written material that Kahan and Sheskin presented nor do we know the precise date of their joint initiative. From Kahan's testimony and the comments of Rabbi Rozen-Szczekacz,51 a chaplain in the Armed Forces of General Anders who was a close friend of both Kahan and Sheskin, one culls the impression that their plan called for concentrating all the Jews already recruited and those seeking to enlist into one separate unit; all the enlisted personnel and officers of the unit would be Jews, while only the senior military and command positions would be manned by Poles. Since the discussions on the establishment of this separate unit took place some time before Sikorski's trip to Moscow, and on the basis of other indications as well, one may assume that the idea was first broached during the months of September-October 1941. After Kahan's arrival in Buzuluk, Anders summoned Sheskin for an additional discussion during which he made it clear that he regarded the "Jewish Legion" plan as essentially political in nature and therefore falling within the purview of Ambassador Kot.52 Kahan and Sheskin thereupon proceeded so

si »

Letter to the Polish Foreign Minister of 5 January 1942, Kot, op. cit., p. 249. See Leon S. Rozen, Cry in the Wilderness, New York—Tel Aviv, 1966. See YVA, 03/2863.

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to Kuybishev to meet with Kot. The Ambassador put off deciding on the matter pending Sikorski's arrival, apparently because he wished to discuss the matter with him. Some time later Kot returned a categorically negative answer. The Poles utterly rejected the proposal to establish a separate Jewish unit within their Armed Forces in the Soviet Union. Kahan surmises that the matter of the "Legion" was raised during Sikorski's discussions with Stalin, and that it was at this level that it was rejected. He also assumes that the opposition came from Stalin and that Kot did not dare to defend the proposal in the face of Stalin's nyet.53 However, these assumptions have no basis in actual fact. One can hardly imagine that the Poles attached such importance to the proposal that they saw fit to raise the issue during the summit meeting with Stalin. From the information at hand we can conclude that the Poles were not in the habit of discussing with the Soviets matters relating to the composition and internal structure of their armed forces — this matter was exclusively for Polish determination. The full minutes in our possession of the discussions between the Poles and Stalin and his aides, reveal not a single trace of the proposal to establish a Jewish unit within the Polish Armed Forces. One does find references indicating that certain Poles — among whom were Anders and Kot — took note of the proposal to set up a separate Jewish unit, but nowhere is there any indication that the Soviets had formed an opinion on the matter or that Soviet considerations had any bearing whatsoever upon the decision of the Poles. It is clear, therefore, that the negative decision was taken by the Polish authorities. Kahan claims that some of the senior military staff, including Anders, were in favor of the idea, and that the rejection came from Kot; this version is only partially confirmed. It is apparently true that certain officers in General Anders' Armed Forces did support the idea — for a combina"

Ibid.

THE SOVIET UNION YISRAEL GUTMAN

tion of conflicting reasons. However, Anders and Kot saw eye to eye on the matter, and both were instrumental in its rejection. Kot relates that on October 24, 1941 a discussion was held on the subject at the Embassy in Kuybishev, with the participation of Jewish representatives (of the Bund, undoubtedly including Ludwig Seidman, the Embassy's adviser on Jewish affairs). Anders also took part in this discussion and it was he who blocked the establishment of the separate Jewish unit.54 On the other hand, Kahan's assertion that there existed a broad front of Jewish opposition to the plan is substantially correct. According to Kahan55 the Jews of Buzuluk belonged to what had been the affluent class in independent Poland and they feared that the establishment of the "Legion" would endanger their rights to Polish citizenship and perhaps also prevent them from recovering their property after the war. It appears that there was a large proportion of formerly wealthy and assimilated Jews in Buzuluk who for personal reasons were not in favor of the idea of separation. The Bundists, who wielded considerable influence in Embassy circles, adopted a position of emphatic opposition to the plan. On October 16, 1941 one of the senior Bundists who chanced to be in the Soviet Union, Lucjan Blit, sent a memorandum to General Anders "concerning the plan to raise military units manned by Jewish citizens of Poland residing in the Soviet Union."58 Blit notes that he was informed by the army staff that the number of Jewish recruits was above nine percent, that is, it exceeded the percentage of Jews in the population of pre-war Poland. "This fact, which should have given satisfaction to every true patriot, seems to have led to a number of problems of a psychological nature among the organizers and commanders of the various units of our Armed Forces in the territory of the Soviet Union," Kot, op. at., p. 436. 55 YVA, 03/2863. 58 Lucjan Blit, who now lives in London, gave the author a copy of the memorandum from his private collection.

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complained Blit. "The cause would seem to be the anti-Semitic feelings which prevail in various degrees among Polish personnel." Blit claimed that staff officers sought to channel overflow Jewish volunteers into the work units or to establish separate Jewish units in an effort to provide a safety valve for these anti-Semitic feelings. He was informed that these tendencies had gained the support of several Jewish communal leaders who belonged to the extreme nationalist faction. Blit, however, claimed that because the Nazi regime which was enslaving Poland was eager to see a division of the population along ethnic and national lines, the establishment of separate Jewish units would necessarily be interpreted as a political and moral victory for Nazism. The Polish command would be undertaking a heavy responsibility for which it would be answerable to the whole world should it decide in favor of such units. The Jewish nationalists sought to create a "Jewish ghetto within the Polish Armed Forces," but to do so would run contrary to the interests of the Polish Government and to the sincere aspirations to live together in harmony "which beat in the hearts of the masses of Jewish workers of Poland." Kot, as was his custom, was here as well guided by diplomatic considerations. He believed that the establishment of a separate unit would serve the Soviet goal of fragmentation and at the same time create an unfavorable stir in the free countries, particularly in the United States. Kot noted that among the initiators and supporters of the idea were "representatives of the Revisionists-Jabotinskyites, the lawyer K. from Warsaw and the engineer S. from Vilna and... officers who are known to be anti-Semites are said to be actively supporting the idea of establishing separate Jewish units."57 According to Rabbi Rozen, three types of supporters of the idea of a "Jewish Legion" can be distinguished within the Armed Forces of General Anders: 1) Real friends, who sought 57

Kot, op. tit., pp. 164-165.

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to assist and aid Jewish national aspirations; 2) A group of officers who supported the old regime and resented Sikorski and Anders; they hoped to win the support of Jewish circles abroad by favoring the creation of the "Legion"; 3) Plain anti-Semites who wanted to rid the Armed Forces of Jews through the medium of the "Jewish Legion."58 Anders refers on two occasions to the proposal to establish separate Jewish units. In his book he wrote: "...a series of Jewish communal activists wanted to point up Jewish particularity. The two foremost representatives of Polish Jewry, Alter and Ehrlich, approached me on the matter. After numerous discussions they admitted that their proposal was unrealistic, for it meant that I would also have to set up Ukrainian or Byelorussian units. I took the position that if we were to continue with the forming of the Polish Army, all citizens without religious or ethnic distinctions could be included."59

Anders goes on to quote at length from a letter he received from Alter and Ehrlich, who were the leaders of the Bund. The letter is dated October 31, 1941, and in it, according to Anders' version, the authors advocate one sole unified military organization in which Jews and Poles alike would be assigned positions on the basis of equal rights. "The primary function of this army must be the waging of the armed struggle on behalf of a free and democratic Poland, the common homeland of all her citizens..."60 Anders interprets this letter as a retreat from the position the authors had formerly held and an acceptance of his viewpoint. The second time Anders dealt with this issue was at a 1967 press conference with Polish journalists. He said: "While we were still in the Soviet Union, several Jewish leaders approached me with the request that separate Jewish units be established. I refused, because in order to be consistent I would 88 59 80

Rozen, op. at., pp. 79-80. Anders, op. at., p. 99. Ibid., pp. 99-100.

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have had to establish separate Ukrainian and Byelorussian units too, and this was most undesirable in the Soviet Union. Doing su would have demonstrated the presence of Jews, Ukrainians and Byelorussians in the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union, and the Soviets had tried to prevent that from happening."01

There is no basis, of course, for Anders' claim that Alter and Ehrlich had originated the idea of separate Jewish units and that under his influence had been induced to abandon the proposal. Kot in his book deliberately points out every false step made by his rival Anders; in this respect he notes that the General's comments on Alter and Ehrlich "do not, of course, conform to the truth."62 There are however no grounds for assuming that Anders was wilfully misleading; he was probably just mistaken. Totally lacking as he was in understanding of the postures and ideological variations among the main blocs in Jewish public life in Poland, he could easily have attributed to the Bund leaders a stance that was actually quite unthinkable for them. We can however safely assume that Anders' claim that he had contact with Alter and Ehrlich was not pure fabrication. In his book Anders praises the leaders of the Bund as loyal patriots of the Polish homeland, while in a note not meant for publication, he prides himself on having thrown these two leaders out of his office.®3 It seems that Alter and Ehrlich were trying to have tension between the Jews and the Poles in the Armed Forces reduced, and in this connection offered several proposals for Anders' consideration. Anders must have confused this intercession with the proposal to set up a a separate unit, and it was thus that he came to pen the incorrect version of the facts quoted above. 61 2

β

83

General Anders — tycie i chwala, London, 1970, p. 63. Kot, op. at., p. 164. IHGS, KGA/24. Anders reports that Alter and Ehrlich asked for the appointment of Jewish commanders. It is more conceivable that they did ask that Jews be put in charge of separate cultural activities, as this would be in line with the ideological conceptions of the Bund.

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At a later stage, Kahan was forced to disavow his own proposal. On March 29, 1942 he sent a note to Anders stating that political developments had made it necessary to revise the proposal with regard to the separate Jewish units submitted by Sheskin and himself. "It is not fitting to give priority to specific Jewish interests" he wrote, "since the policies of the Soviets which seek to deprive the Jews of their Polish citizenship and prevent their enlisting in the Polish Armed Forces, also seek to undermine the territorial integrity of the Polish State; this is a situation which calls for greater, not lesser unity." In concluding his declaration Kahan noted that he had sent a similar letter to Professor Kot in Kuybishev. And in fact, Kot did mention in a cable he sent to the Polish Foreign Office in London on March 25, 1942, that Kahan had informed him in writing that he was revoking his proposal concerning the establishment of separate Jewish units "because the Soviets are now forbidding the Jews to enlist in the Polish Armed Forces and they are likely to take advantage of the Revisionists' position and use it to buttress their claim."64 In his detailed testimony, Kahan does not mention the letter he sent to Anders and the declaration he transmitted to Kot. On the other hand, in the postcript he wrote for Rabbi Rozen's book, Cry in the Wilderness, which was published in 1966, he «* Rozen relates that when he was in Israel in July 1963, he met with Dr. Kahan and asked whether he had written Kot informing him that he had rescinded his proposal concerning the creation of a "Jewish Legion." According to Rozen, Kahan emphatically denied Kot's contention in this matter. He said that "he had never written such a letter to Kot or to anyone else and he rejected the possibility of having even thought of doing so. He never expressed any doubts about the plan for a Legion." However, there exists a letter in Dr. Kahan's handwriting and signed by him in which he rescinded the proposal, since under the prevailing circumstances he did not believe that there was place for the creation of a Legion. He also noted that a similar letter was sent to Professor Kot. See IHGS, KGA/24.

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stated about the "Jewish Legion": "...would this attempt successfully be accomplished, it would change the whole of Jewish history."®5 This statement is a gross exaggeration which bears no resemblance to a realistic evaluation. Kot, on the other hand, in a letter he sent to Rabbi Rozen in 1951, claimed: "The problem of the unrealized Jewish Legion I knew closer, and today I am of the opinion, that it would have been completely drowned in the Soviet camps and that none of it would have reached Poland or Palestine."8® Apart from the attempt to create a general "Jewish Legion," there were several local, temporary arrangements in existence whereby Jews were concentrated in special units. D. Katz, a highly experienced electrical technician, relates in his testimony that he chanced upon a reserve unit of this sort which was made up of members of liberal professions (doctors, engineers, lawyers, etc.).®7 He volunteered for enlistment in Yangi-Yul, and in May 1942 he appeared before a medical committee; he was disqualified because he was a Jew, while "maimed, crooked, hunchbacked and one-eyed Poles" were assigned fitness grades that qualified them for military service. However, since he was a qualified engineer he was not rejected outright, and was assigned to a company of civilian experts which operated under military cover.88 Katz's description of the conditions prevailing in the unit is exceedingly bleak. The unit numbered some sixty men, "all of whom were top-notch and dependable both as to age and profession" while most of the officers were coarse Poles who unceasingly demonstrated their deliberate and insulting antiSemitism. The unit was not issued an adequate supply of food and the men suffered constantly from hunger pangs. They received no blankets, clothing or serviceable tents, and they lite65

Rozen, op. cit., p. 236. «« Ibid., p. 231. 87 YVA, M-2/D-11. es ibid.

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rally had to sleep on the ground. No one was at all concerned that they be equipped at least to the extent that regular soldiers were. And no one knew what was planned for the unit: when one of the men asked a senior officer of the division, he was told, according to Katz, that "tests will have to be run, the diplomas checked out, some will be released, and for the rest we'll put up two tents and let them slowly waste away from hunger." Katz noted, with bitterness, that the unit was set up on the assumption that the "army must protect the intelligentsia" particularly in light of the fact that the Nazis were systematically liquidating the intelligentsia of the occupied territory; this "protection," however, was tantamount to torture. At the end of June 1942 the unit was disbanded. Ten or twelve were accepted into the ranks of the army and the rest — "indigent, exhausted men who had been imprisoned in camps and jails on account of their loyalty to Poland and who caught at the army as drowning men at a straw, were scattered to the wind." The Jewish unit which did achieve a certain renown was the Jewish battalion stationed at Koltubanka (a village located not far from Tock, which was the recruiting centre for professional units, such as the men of the armored corps). Kahan claims that the Koltubanka unit was established to serve as a model — or as a small-scale local precursor — for the broader plan for a "Jewish Legion."69 Kahan says that he was approached by Colonel Leopold Okulicki with the suggestion that a battalion composed of Jewish soldiers already inducted into the army be set up; he was told that if this experiment proved successful it would be possible to set up additional units. A special meeting was held to explain the reason for creation of the unit, and Colonel Jan Gaiadyk, a Polish officer and devoted friend of the Jews, volunteered to assume command of the Jewish unit. Kahan adds that this offer constituted an unusual gesture on Galadyk's part, since the command of a battalion was generally 89

YVA, 03/2863.

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given to an officer with the lower rank of major. Kahan also claims that relations between the Jews and the Poles within the unit were proper. However, even according to him this idyllic picture was muddied somewhat by the fact that prior to the transfer from Tock to Koltubanka, the Jewish soldiers were stripped of their uniforms and were sent to Koltubanka in rags and without equipment. Kahan tends to view this as an isolated episode, the result of ill-will on the part of one particular Polish officer, an apostate Jew who sought in this fashion to demonstrate his antagonism towards Jews; he does not view this as proof of the existence of a definite policy set up by the Polish military command. Kahan argues that the opposite was true, that the Koltubanka experiment was successful and that Kot bore responsibility70 for the fact that there was no follow-up to Koltubanka as had been planned. Kahan's description is, however, contradicted on all scores by Rabbi Rozen's description of the general circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Battalion and the conditions in Koltubanka.71 It will be recalled that Rabbi Rozen had close ties with the original advocates of the "Legion" proposal and he had given his blessing and support to the plan. It also should be noted that Dr. Kahan publicly expressed his agreement with Rabbi Rozen in the postcript he wrote for his book. And yet, according to Rabbi Rozen, the Jewish Battalion was established and sent to Koltubanka at the end of October 1941, i.e. considerably prior to the date when it was decided not to adopt the proposal of establishing a Jewish Legion. According to Rabbi Rozen, before the Battalion was set up the Jewish soldiers in Tock were summarily dismissed from the army in a manner that clearly demonstrated the anti-Semitism of the Poles. All the soldiers were assembled and then officers who in the au70 71

ibid. See the chapter "A Ghetto for the Jews in Totzkoye," Rozen, op. cit., pp. 82-99.

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thor's words had themselves just been released from Soviet camps, gave orders to "all those of the Mosaic faith" to step forward. This method of expelling the Jews from Tock came to Kot's attention and he complains about it in one of his reports.72 According to Rabbi Rozen, the way in which the Battalion was set up resembled nothing more than ghettoization. When Rabbi Rozen protested to Colonel Galadyk of this degrading attitude — an act which placed the Rabbi in personal danger — Galadyk justified the actions by claiming that the Jews "might live happier in ghetto barracks rather than dwell together with anti-Semites and Hitlerites."73 In the wake of the protest the officers attempted to justify the system. According to Rabbi Rozen the Jewish soldiers were made miserable preceding the transfer to Koltubanka. They were, for example, issued with boots that were too small and many of the soldiers had to go barefoot as a result. And Koltubanka itself, after Tock, in Rabbi Rozen's words, was merely the exchange of a small ghetto (Tock) for a "larger ghetto" numbering some 1,000 men.74 In the light of the alarming news from Koltubanka, Okulicki sent Rabbi Rozen "to straighten out matters... there." According to Rabbi Rozen, Okulicki regarded whatever was happening there as matters among the Jews, and not as a matter of anti-Semitism in the army.75 Rabbi Rozen found the Jewish unit in a very low state of morale and fitness. The Jewish soldiers had been forced to dig their own underground dugouts in the rock-hard earth, with the temperature at 40 degrees C. below zero. His first task was to bury the large number of Jewish personnel who had died there. The military kitchen, which was supervised by Poles, often "forgot" or sim" ™ " "

Kot, op. cit., p. 436. Rozen, op. cit., p. 87. Ibid., p. 88. Ibid., p. 92.

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ply refused to issue regular rations to the Jewish soldiers. The officers in the unit were all Jews, but an anti-Semitic Polish captain had command of the Battalion. Colonel Galadyk was in fact stationed at Koltubanka, but as overall commander of the military base and not of the Jewish unit. Rabbi Rozen confirms the fact that Galadyk evinced good will towards the Jews. He had however not come to Koltubanka of his own free will; as a follower of Pilsudski he had been "exiled" to Koltubanka by Sikorski's men. The Jews suffered constantly at the hands of their Polish "comrades-in-arms": "Jewish soldiers were prohibited from passing through the streets where the Polish soldiers camped... If a Jewish soldier from Koltubanka did appear there... he met with both physical and moral degradation in the worst anti-Semitic manner possible."76 According to Rabbi Rozen, the name "Koltubanka" became synonymous with a "Jewish ghetto" — at army headquarters the mere mention of Koltubanka would elicit cynical smiles, while among Jews it was viewed as a confirmation of their abasement. News about Koltubanka did reach foreign countries.77 Rabbi Rozen states that the information was published in the free countries, but he does not indicate how the news was transmitted or when it appeared. But we do know of repercussions arising from the publication of information on Koltubanka, from a cable sent from London by Sikorski to the staff headquarters of the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union, on March 19, 1942. General Anders was asked if a "Jewish Legion had ever been established or was in existence at that time" within the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union; reply was requested by return cable.78 The answer, sent on March 22 under the signature of General Bohusz-Szyszko, read: "Report »· "

"

Ibid., p. 93. According to Rozen, it was the Polish journalist of Jewish extraction, Bernard Singer, who transmitted the report on Koltubanka abroad. See Rozen, op. cit., p. 151. IHGS, KGA/24.

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that in the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union there never was nor is there now a Jewish Legion." 79 Kot's version of the Koltubanka story was included in the report he sent Sikorski for the period September 1941—July 13, 1942. In this report he complains of the army's refusal to accept any suggestions made by the Embassy ostensibly because the Embassy was guided by political considerations and that it was the army's duty to stay clear of politics. In fact, claims Kot, the army provided ample opportunity for very dubious political initiatives, all the while under the guise of being apolitical: "In exceedingly severe fashion, the politics of anti-Semitism [has been adopted] and applied first and foremost in Tock, the home base of the Sixth Division and the center of reserves. After discussions with several Revisionists who had dreamed of a Jewish Legion and who were popular and influential in army circles back in the homeland, it was decided to separate the Jews and group them in special units. This was carried out arbitrarily on October 7 — upon the order given by a young officer: 'Jews, step out of line." Jewish personnel were then sent to Koltubanka and put under the command of an officer who was known to be an anti-Semite. Jews were subsequently removed from other formations as well, segregated, or discharged en masse, no distinction being made between unreliable elements and those whose discharge would provoke a storm of protest that could only be harmful to Polish diplomacy. One of the senior officers at general headquarters 80 vigorously advocated this system which merged the interests of the anti-Semites with the ambitions of the Revisionists."81 There is no doubt that Kot's underscoring the collaboration *» Ibid. 80 The reference is undoubtedly to Colonel Okulicki who was parachuted into Poland after the abortive Polish uprising in Warsaw in 1944 and who became military commander of the Polish underground (Armia Krajowa) subordinate to the Government-in-Exile in London. After the war, Okulicki was taken prisoner, tried by the Soviets and executed. 81 Kot, op. cit., p. 436.

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of the Revisionists with the anti-Semites was not just fortuitous. Kot believed that the Revisionists had won the support and the assistance of the Sanacja regime and this regime indeed was anathema to him. As a result, he exploited every opportunity to connect the Revisionists with the anti-Semites who were to be found, in his opinion, largely among the supporters of the Sanacja. However even if we choose to ignore Kot's tendencious commentary we must still reject Kahan's apologetic claims. The description of Koltubanka as a partial, or first-stage, realization of the larger plan for a Jewish Legion is not valid; it bears no resemblance whatsoever to the true picture of the harsh reality as revealed in Rabbi Rozen's book and in the testimonies of others.82 One question remains to be answered: what eventually happened to the Jewish Battalion in Koltubanka? Rabbi Rozen claims that when the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union were transferred to Central Asia, in May and June 1942, "the Koltubanka Ghetto was automatically liquidated" and the majority of the Jews as well as Jewish personnel in other units, were discharged from the Army. However, a small number did manage to remain with the Force in Soviet Asia until August 1942 when they were evacuated with the rest of the Army [to Iran]. Rabbi Rozen does not mention how many of the Jews from Koltubanka managed to remain with the Army nor does he indicate with what unit they served in Central Asia.83 However, we have in our possession an additional testimony concerning the final stages of the Jewish Battalion in Koltubanka.84 Meir Lustgarten (whose testimony was cited earlier) relates: "Towards the end of the winter of 1942, we all left the camp and were transferred by train to the city of Gusar on the Af«2 YVA, 03/702. 83 Rozen, op. tit., p. 216. M YVA, 03/702.

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ghanistan border of Uzbekistan. Several weeks after our arrival, the battalion of Jewish soldiers from the village of Koltubanka also arrived. When the Jewish soldiers were removed from the ranks of the Polish Army in Tock, the Polish commanders thought that they had rid the army of Jews, that they would disappear. They could not possibly have expected that these wretched Jews, who had been expelled from the army, would attain a level higher than that of the Poles in the service. The Poles were astounded on seeing Jews in the uniform of the Polish Armed Forces parading smartly and in unison, all looking fit and well dressed and marching to the songs on their lips."

It seems that the situation of the Jewish Battalion in Koltubanka improved considerably with the passing of the time. The change for the better probably came about together with a general improvement in the state of the Polish Armed Forces in 1942; it also resulted from the dismissal of its anti-Semitic commander and the intervention of civilian factors. With the improvement in material conditions, the desire of the Jewish soldiers to demonstrate their ability also grew, and a sort of "Jewish unit patriotism" came into being. (It is here that the positive potential of Jewish units with the capacity for independent development within the Polish Armed Forces, came to the fore.) Lustgarien's testimony shows that Rabbi Rozen's contention that the Battalion was liquidated prior to the evacuation to Central Asia has no basis in fact. One cannot however determine from Lustgarten's testimony whether or not a purge of the Battalion was carried out in Koltubanka, as was the case in other units of the Polish Armed Forces. Lustgarten relates that even in Gusar attempts were made to injure the Battalion, but by this time the Jewish unit had hardened into a cohesive body and knew how to fend for itself. Lustgarten further relates: "Shortly after the Jewish Battalion arrived in Gusar, I was also sent there as an instructor — and I felt strange. Around me I saw long-nosed faces, Semitic types; the soldiers openly conversed in Yiddish and in the evenings they gathered together

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and sang Yiddish folk songs — and all this in the context of a Polish Army. These were not the Jews I had known from the Jewish streets of the Diaspora countries. When I inspected them closely I understood that the Jewish Diaspora characteristics of fear and apprehension were not necessarily characteristic of Jews in general. It was then that I began to believe that Jews would be good soldiers when they felt themselves to be a free nation." According to Lustgarten, the Jewish Battalion was evacuated by train to Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea. From there the soldiers sailed to the port of Pahlevi, Persia, arriving a short time before Passover of 1942. In Iran, the Jewish Battalion was disbanded, for the British refused to transfer a separate Jewish unit to Eretz Israel. 85 Kot for his part relates that he does not know the ultimate fate of the Jewish Battalion in Koltubanka. 86 4. Anders' Orders of the Day Concerning Jews Further on in his description of the intentions of the military command to create a "Jewish Legion" and separate Jewish units, Kot wrote: "General Anders put a stop to this harmful trend after the discussion at the Embassy on October 24 (1941) with the participation of representatives of various blocs in the Jewish community. On November 14 he issued a very astute order on the treatment of Jews in the Armed Forces. However, in Tock he met with very strong opposition; he then issued a follow-up order which contained several paragraphs that are politically touchy. His declaration about 'reckoning' with the Jews in the homeland immediately became widely known in the free countries and the commander of the Polish Armed Forces came to be regarded as an enemy of the Jews."87 The two orders of the day to which Kot refers are in our archives. The first was issued in Buzuluk on November 14 and ss 86 87

ibid. Kot's letter to Rabbi Rozen. See Rozen, op. cit., p. 231. Kot, op. cit., p. 436.

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the second, also from Buzuluk, dates from November 30, 1941.88 Anders' first order gave a decisive definition of the position of the Jews in the Armed Forces and how they were to be treated. The general directives contained in the order were to be obeyed and followed strictly; a "clear, consistent, unambiguous line" was to be pursued in dealing with Jews, on the part of both commanding officers and soldiers in the ranks. He similarly asked that there be an "end to the rumors and the false charges that spring up behind our backs concerning alleged anti-Semitism in the army," rumors that, Anders claimed, originated from foreign sources. In the body of the order, Anders explicitly stated that Jews had the same rights and obligations vis-a-vis military service as all other Polish citizens. Within the Armed Forces, they were to be dealt with "as sincerely and with the same degree of warmth" as all other soldiers and they were to be granted "the same measure of confidence" as everyone else. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, he spelled out the principal directives governing recruitment of soldiers for active service in the Armed Forces. According to these directives, the following were to be recruited forthwith: officers, sub-officers with professional skills, men in the ranks who had seen active service and volunteers who underwent pre-military training and were found fit by the recruiting committee. All others were to be sent to the southern republics of the Soviet Union where the registration of reserve forces would take place. He spelled all this out in refutation of the libel that Jews were encountering difficulty in being accepted into the army. "I order all my subordinate commanding officers to fight relentlessly against any

88

Copies of the two orders of the day can be found in the Frizner Collection of the Yad Vashem Archives. The text of the second order is reproduced in Kot's book, pp. 465-466. The text of the second order is also recorded in the "Report of the Activities of the Representation of Polish Jewry for the Years 1940-1945," CZA, J25/54/VI, pp. 118-119.

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did not care to have misinterpreted by his subordinates. "I well understand the reasons underlying anti-Semitic manifestations in the ranks of the Armed Forces;" these were reactions to the disloyal, and at times hostile, behavior of Polish Jews between 1939-1940. "I am consequently not surprised that our soldiers, those ardent patriots, regard the matter so seriously, particularly since they suspect that our Government and Armed Forces intend to overlook the experiences of the past. When viewed from this vantage point, our defence of the Jews might seem incomprehensible or historically unjustified and even anomalous." However, explained Anders, the current policy of the Polish Government, tied as it was to the policy of Great Britain, made it imperative to treat the Jews favorably, since the Jews wielded considerable influence in the Anglo-Saxon world. The soldiers must understand that in the interests of the Polish Government, the Jews must not be provoked, for any antiSemitism was likely to bring about harsh repercussions. "I therefore recommend that our position be explained to the units in a suitably discreet manner and that the hot-heads and the quick-tempered should be particularly warned" that from then on any expression of the struggle against the Jews was totally forbidden and whoever was found guilty of such would be severely punished. "However, after the battle is over and we are again our own masters, we will settle the Jewish matter in a fashion that the exalted status and sovereignty of the homeland and simple human justice require."92 The differences, indeed the polar distinctions, between the two orders are so pronounced that it is extremely difficult to understand how one man was capable of issuing both documents within the short space of two weeks. The contradictions and vacillations in Anders' orders do however become more comprehensible on comparing Anders' public statements with those he made in closed sessions with Stalin or wrote for inclu·»

See Note No. 88.

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manifestation of racial anti-Semitism." It must also be explained to the soldiers that Poland has always adhered to the principles of democracy and tolerance and any divergence from these principles cannot be countenanced. The Jew will benefit from the same laws that apply to all Poles; drastic action is to be taken against him only "when he does not know how to wear with pride the uniform of a soldier of the Polish Republic and he forgets that he is a Polish citizen."89 This order, embodying as it did a clear and forceful enunciation of Anders' position on a whole series of key questions, would undoubtedly have had a decisive impact on recruiting procedure and on relationships within the Armed Forces. It is clear, from Kot's comments on the subject and from the wording of the original order, that it was Anders who issued the order and not Sikorski, as has been claimed by the Palestine Haganah Weekly that published Anders' second order.90 Unfortunately, this authoritative and clear-cut order did not long remain the sole pronouncement that the Commanding Officer of the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union would make on the matter. Some two weeks later, a second order was issued; the wording of this order and its general tenor virtually cancelled out all that was positive in the first order of the day. The second order of the day opens with a reference to the previous order.91 The first had officially presented the supreme commander's political credo on the Jewish question, which he 89 80

91

YVA, Frizner Collection, L.dz. 1730. See the text in Eshnab, the underground weekly of the Haganah, from June 28, 1943. The second order opens with the following sentence: "With reference to my attached order, L.dz. 1730, from the office of the general staff, November 14, 1941, pertaining to the role of the Jews in the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union, I bring the following to the attention of all subordinate commanders." See Kot, op. cit., p. 465.

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sion in his own personal files.93 Kot claimed, as we have already noted, that Anders' retrenchment from the first order and its general orientation was due to pressure applied by the command staff of the Sixth Division located in Tock. We cannot be certain of the validity of this version, for we know that Kot tended to be suspicious of the Tock command which he regarded as a collection of political rivals composed of Filsudskiites. There can however be no doubt that the sharp aboutface in the wording and content of Anders' orders was prompted by the criticisms voiced by friends and subordinates in his army. There is also no doubt as to which version reveals Anders' real feelings and opinions.94 In the first order Anders claimed that anti-Semitism was nonexistent in the Armed Forces and that hostile forces had maliciously charged the Poles with hatred of the Jews; for this reason the Poles should be wary and be responsible in their behavior. From the second order, it evolves that there actually was anti-Semitism and the Supreme Commander understood its causes. He did not demand this time that every manifestation of anti-Semitism be unequivocally opposed, but only asked that the hot-heads be held in check and prevented from doing acts of violence. In the first order, the rejection of anti-Semitism was a function of a basic attitude stemming from the constitutional and ideological foundations of the Polish State, while in the second, opposition to anti-Semitism was but a political strategem necessitated by momentary circumstances and the true reckoning by the Poles would have its day when they would be free to act as they pleased in their liberated homeland. 93

The reference is to Anders' report "The Jewish Problem," IHGS, KGA/24. 9 * It is worth noting that even before the war Anders' name was associated with circles close to the National Democratic Party. Anders was present at an assembly where an attempt was made to bring these circles closer to Sanacja. See Jerzy Janusz Terej, Rzeczywistosc i polityka, Warsaw, 1971, pp. 50-51.

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Kot noted that Anders' second order found its way abroad and gave the Supreme Commander a bad name. However, the fact that Anders' first order was so radically altered under the influence of friends and military subordinates indicates that hostility towards Jews was not the exclusive attribute of the Supreme Commander. The opposite is true: many military personnel would not have taken a position in defence of the Jews even for reasons of expediency. The truth of the matter is that anti-Semitism was general and widespread throughout the Armed Forces and all the Jewish witnesses, no matter what their outlook, education or position testify to the fact; that proves that even the hypocritical approach of the second order remained a dead letter and was not adopted by the Armed Forces. Thus, some of the testimonies tell of attempts to check anti-Semitism "from above," but these attempts were futile.95 M. Kahan notes in his testimony that the anti-Semitic manifestations increased as the self-confidence and the sense of mastery of the Poles grew,96 with the consolidation of forces, the acquisition of equipment and the improvement in conditions. This means that not only did anti-Semitism in the Armed Forces not decrease, but it actually became progressively worse. One of the witnesses, a doctor, states that "anti-Semitism was expressed in acts of degradation and physical injury."97 Another witness states that the anti-Semitic treatment of Jews took the form, among other ways, "of frequent and unjustified demands to do physical labor, of insults, and of the fact that Jewish complaints were not investigated and rectified and no steps were initiated against the parties."98 However, it is only just to note that there were commanders and officers in various units who did try to protect the Jews under their command, and who, despite the 9

5 YVA, 03/2502. · · YVA, 03/2863. 87 YVA, 03/2502. 88 YVA, 03/2506.

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difficulties involved, did adopt an attitude of decency and comradeship towards Jews. The Haganah Weekly Eshnab, edited in Palestine by Liebenstein, (Eliezer Livne), published Anders' second order of the day in its issue of June 28, 1943." At that time, elements of General Anders' Armed Forces were stationed in Eretz Israel, and the publication of the order provoked a sharp response from the Jewish community. The "Representation of Polish Jewry" (Reprezentacja zydostwa polskiego), with its office in Palestine, was composed of representatives of all the Zionist parties (excluding the Revisionists) and of Agudat Israel. They regarded Anders' order of the day as a declaration that "would necessarily give rise to an intensification of anti-Semitic trends and not to their weakening" and approached the Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, Sikorski, on the matter. The "Representation" pointed out that the order stood in direct contradiction to formal and binding declarations made by the Polish Government in London and asked whether the Government intended taking any steps and what conclusions it proposed to draw in the face of the order.100 The letter to Sikorski was sent on July 5, 1943, the very day on which Sikorski was killed in a plane crash near Gibraltar. Towards the end of June 1943, Jan Stanczyk, a leader of the Polish Socialist Party and a minister in the Government-inExile in London, visited Eretz Israel, and on July 1st he met in Tel Aviv, with a delegation of the "Representation."101 At the meeting, the secretary of the "Representation," Dr. Abraham Stupp, raised the matter of Anders' order: ".. .1 must speak about something very painful. I have before me a paper issued by General Anders in which he explains his position on the anti-Semitic feelings in the Armed Forces." At this point, 99

«ο

A copy can also be found in the Frizner Collection, Report of the "Representation," CZA, J25/54/VI, pp. 118-120. Ibid., pp. 107-117.

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Stariczyk interrupted Stupp and said: "I am familiar with the contents." Dr. Stupp continued, giving his interpretation of the order's significance. Stanczyk then replied: "Anders' motives in issuing the order were possibly not as bad as they appear. Given the prevailing mood, he sought to explain a position that had encountered opposition. He did it in an unsatisfactory manner. Anders is merely a soldier, not a politician. A politician would have done it differently and better. There is no cause to turn this into an international issue. I know that when this will become known abroad there will be an outcry about anti-Semitism in the Polish Armed Forces, and this in turn might bring about an even more severe reaction on the part of the Poles..."

Later on, in response to a question, Stanczyk saiid: "I do not want to deny, and I admit, that an anti-Semitic mood prevails among the population that returned from Russia and in the Armed Forces. I note this in pain, but the fact cannot be changed by decree..."102 On July 12, 1943, that is less than two weeks after the meeting between Stanczyk and the delegation from the "Representation," the "Representation" received a letter from the Polish Consulate in Tel Aviv. The letter stated that in the course of a conversation between Minister Stanczyk and General Anders, the General had denied outright the existence of any such order and "claimed that the text was forged." Staiiczyk added for his own part: "I am convinced that this is a product of hostile propaganda which aims at disrupting relations between Poles and Jews."103 Among the documents Kot included in his book published in London in 1955, was, as we have seen, Anders' second order.104 Although it is true that Kot was at that time waging a battle 102 Ibid. Ibid., p. 120. 104 The text of the order, which was published in the Polish edition of Kot's book, was not included in the English edition.

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against the General, it is inconceivable that he would have included a spurious document in his book. It is worth pointing out that Anders, in his book, chose to make no mention of the order, although in meetings with Jews he continued to claim that it was a forgery. A meeting was held on September 19, 1943 between Anders and a delegation from the "Representation" at the home of the Polish Consul General in Tel Aviv, Dr. H. Rozmaryn. During the discussion, the engineer Anschel Reiss hinted that "the Armed Forces had been warned not to engage in anti-Semitic tricks, while it had been emphasized that the accounting with the Jews would take place after returning to the homeland." Anders interrupted him at this point and said: "I know that some sort of rag published an order, allegedly coming from me, expressing what you just said. I do not even want to discuss the matter. It is a forgery, no order of this sort ever existed."105 Polish sources continued to be concerned over the criticism stirred up by the publication of the order. The Polish Consul General in a report dispatched to the Foreign Minister in London (no date indicated) noted that owing to the commotion that the publication in Eshnab had provoked, he had seen fit to arrange a meeting between his deputy, Weber, and Yitzhak Griinbaum. At the meeting Weber reiterated the claim that the order had never been issued and Grünbaum was asked to help quiet the excitement. After consulting with the other officials of the Jewish Agency, Grünbaum agreed to take steps in keeping with the Consul General's request. At the same time, he asked Dr. Rosmaryn to write him a letter confirming that "the document which was published by Eshnab and about which he (Grünbaum) had heard a half-year earlier, was never issued."10® An additional reverberation sounded at a meeting held in London on January 13,1944 between Sikorski's successor as Prime 105 100

CZA, J25/54/VI, pp. 136-137. IHGS, A.11.755/2, no date.

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Minister, Stanislaw Mdkoiajczyk, and two Jewish representatives, Dr. Schwarzbart, a member of the National Council in London, and Dr. Tartakower of the World Jewish Congress. At the meeting, Schwarzbart spoke of what was taking place in the Armed Forces and he cited Anders' order of the day. Mikolajczyk pointed out to him that Anders had explicitly stated that the order was a forgery. To this Schwarzbart replied: "Yes, I know. However, there are witnesses, among them ministers, who fought against the order when it was issued. We know that one of the cables referred to the order as a forgery. I have no objection against making such a claim for external consumption, but on the inside, no one should expect me to believe that it was a forgery."

The Prime Minister remained silent and after a while said: "I will deal with this matter also."107 It is clear that anti-Semitism was a general feature of the Polish Armed Forces; it had its roots in traditions of the past and in the ideology and political conceptions of Poland in the period between the wars. The various strata in Polish society were not sufficiently perspicacious to study their own history with a critical eye, nor were they able to perceive just how destructive a role anti-Semitism played in the internal life of the Polish republic and how it had served as a vehicle for the penetration of destructive Nazi influences under the guise of anti-Semitism. In the Soviet Union during the Second World War, Jews and Poles came into contact to a much greater extent than in Poland proper where the Jews had been separated from the local population by the walls of the ghetto; in the immigration centers such as London, there was only a handful of Jews and relations there were generally based upon formal attempts at communication, lacking in the elements of spontaneity and frankness. The political leadership, however, was sensitive to the harmιοτ YVA, M-2/754.

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ful ramifications of anti-Semitism and it did show an understandable degree of awareness to the negative reactions to the Polish hatred of Jews, by public opinion in the free countries and by influential Jewish circles in the West. However, since their attitude to the issue was ambivalent and was dictated by a whole array of tactical considerations, it is not surprising that periodic "cracks" in their behavior and pronouncements showed up their true feelings. It should also not be forgotten that the Endeks, who enjoyed a position of respect within the broadbased coalition in London, held Jew-hatred as one of the fundamental elements in their ideological and political outlook. And as we have also seen, anti-Semitism was particularly rampant among the officers of the Armed Forces, and this attitude undoubtedly had its reverberations within the ranks as well. 5. The Evacuation of the Armed Forces of General Anders from the Soviet Union The total evacuation of General Anders' Armed Forces from the Soviet Union was the outcome of the tensions and suspicions that accompanied all dealings between the Poles and the Soviet authorities. The evacuation was also in no small part a product of the differences of opinion and the rivalries that existed among the Poles themselves. According to the operative agreement signed by both the Polish and the Soviet generals, the Poles were to train the recruits in stages, send them into action in units no smaller than a division, and be subordinate to the Supreme Soviet Command.108 The Polish generals were possibly not fully aware of the significance of the commitments inherent in the agreement. At any rate, the various political and military echelons of the Polish leadership sought to raise a large army to be sent into battle as one cohesive unit in a state of full battle preparedness for they believed that the decision to commit their forces should be made only after all factors had io8 j n this connection see Kot, op. cit., pp. 38-40.

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been weighed from the point of view of Polish political interests. Towards the end of 1941, the Soviets demanded that part of the Polish force be sent to the front. The Poles countered with the claim that they had not yet completed battle training. As was their wont, the Soviets then applied a very material form of pressure: they issued orders limiting the rations and equipment to be supplied to General Anders' Armed Forces, and they also made it abundantly clear to the Poles that they would not tolerate for any length of time the continued existence on Soviet territory of a non-combatant army. An untenable situation was thus created, and both sides were constrained to find a solution. Within the Armed Forces the exiles and those who had been released from the camps did, in fact, require a certain period of time to recuperate and undergo military training before going on active service. During the initial stages, the soldiers suffered much from the harsh climatic conditions in the temporary camps in the Volga region. During Sikorski's visit to Moscow the Poles asked Stalin for permission to transfer the troops to a more temperate area. Uzbekistan was then chosen as the major new location. However, the sudden change-over to a warm climate and to an area ridden with disease touched off massive epidemics among the recruits. Uzbekistan was also far removed from general headquarters and from the centers of political decisionmaking. The suggestion to evacuate part of the Force from the Soviet Union was first raised by Sikorski during his discussion with Stalin. Stalin's reaction was most severe, but ultimately he gave his assent for the evacuation of 25,000 men as reinforcements for the Polish troops in the West. Nevertheless, Sikorski opposed evacuating all the troops from the Soviet Union; his basic conception was that Polish soldiers should take part in the battle for the liberation of Poland on all fronts and from all directions. He considered the Soviet front to be of prime im-

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portance particularly since the fact that Poles had fought alongside the Soviets would be a trump card in the inevitable bargaining over the eastern borders. The British, for their part, pressed for a full-scale evacuation so that the Polish Armed Forces could reinforce their own points of weakness. There is no doubt that the Soviets were not unaware of these considerations; with deliberate cunning they bypassed the Polish political levels and established direct contact with Anders and his officers, exploiting thereby the commander's extreme ambitiousness. In the course of time, Anders achieved a position of independence in both his military and political activity. Anders flaunted this independence before Kot in Russia; he also apparently had the support of the Polish opposition in London, who saw him as a potential rival of Sikorski's. The Soviets finally decided to rid themselves of the Polish Armed Forces which they now regarded as a political nuisance. They planned to establish another Polish army in its place, this time under the auspices of the Polish Communists in the U.S.S.R.; this army would become a firm support for the Soviets not only in solving the problems of the borders but also in assuring the form of rule for Poland in the future. It is not entirely clear which side actually raised the idea of a total evacuation, Anders or the Soviets. At any rate, Anders accepted the proposal without waiting for government confirmation from London.109 Anders had his own reasons. One may assume that he feared for the physical existence of his army in the conditions under which they were operating in the Soviet Union and he viewed evacuation as a means of salvation and as an opportunity to obtain an extensive military installation. It may also be assumed that he did not want to see the force broken up into small units for a large and unified force served as a guarantee of his own personal standing. A far from negligible factor in his con109

Ibid., pp. 45-53. See also Edward J. Rozck, Wartime New York, 1958, p. 112.

Diplomacy,

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siderations apparently was his mistaken estimation that the Soviet Union would not be able to repulse the might of the Nazis, and removing his men from the Soviet Union meant taking them out of an area that he believed was destined to be overrun. Attempts were made to procure Soviet permission for continued recruiting even after the evacuation on the basis of signed agreements with the Polish Government in London, but the Soviets flatly refused. The evacuation allowed the Soviets to shut down the welfare activities that had been carried on by the Embassy, and to proceed to build up a Polish political and military force on Soviet soil based upon a handful of Polish Communists and their sympathizers. The Poles in London and Anders' men apparently believed that the Soviets would never succeed in attracting Poles to their cause, and that a Polish force that served the interests of the Soviets could not be created, just as no quisling or traitor had raised his head in Poland under the German conquest. In time it became clear that they had erred badly and their error had fateful consequences for the future of Poland. During the two stages of the evacuation, some 114,000 Poles, soldiers and civilians, left the Soviet Union; the Soviet authorities agreed to allow the families of the soldiers and certain groups among the civilian population, such as children, to be evacuated together with the soldiers. In the first transfer, in March-April 1942, some 44,000 (31,500 soldiers and 12,500 civilians) were evacuated; in the second stage of the evacuation, during the months of August-September 1942, more than 70,000 military personnel and civilians left the Soviet Union (close to 45,000 military personnel and over 25,000 civilians).110 As has already been noted, the transports made their way by train to the port of Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea, and from there they sailed to Pahlevi, Iran. Thus there came to an end the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union which had been est110

Pobog-Malinowski, op. cit., pp. 229-230.

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ablished by and under orders from the Polish Goverament-inExile in London. The Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union never reached the dimensions envisaged by the Poles. Hindering growth were obstacles placed in the way by the Soviets, such as reduction in equipment and supplies, and adverse climatic and sanitary conditions. Evidently the Poles themselves prevented members of ethnic minorities from joining the army. The force which numbered 34,000 men in December 1941, grew to 66,000 men in March 1942.111 During the very last stages, just prior to the evacuation, there was an additional, hasty recruitment. In sum total, 72,000 men of General Anders' Armed Forces were evacuated from the Soviet Union.112 The amnesty and the conscription enabled many to rise from the status of prisoners to free soldiers, from conditions of neglect and extreme hardship to a framework which provided their basic necessities; the evacuation meant a chance for salvation and escape to the free world. When it became known that civilians and relatives of army personnel would be permitted to join the evacuation, a great stream of people moved from the farthest corners of the Soviet Union to the exit points in the south. We will now review the numbers of Jews among the evacuees and the attitude of the Poles and their treatment of Jews during the various stages of the evacuation. According to Jewish sources, some 6,000 Jews were among them, one source giving some 3,500 soldiers and 2,500 civilians.113 Close to a thousand Jewish children known as Yaldei Teheran (Children of Teheran) were 111

According to Pobög-Malinowski, in the first stage 43,254 individuals left, of whom 30,799 were soldiers, and in the second stage, 70,289 left of whom 44,832 were soldiers. Altogether 70,292 — strictly military personnel (p. 241). uz According to Rozek, 77,000. See Rozek, op. at., p. 112. us Anders spoke of 4,000 Jewish soldiers having been evacuated, CZA, J25/54/VI, p. 38.

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transferred together with a large camp of evacuated children. In total Jews accounted for about five per cent of the soldiers evacuated (five per cent of the enlisted men and one per cent of the officers) and about seven per cent of the civilians.114 During the first stage of the evacuation some 700 Jewish civilians reached Iran. 115 The Polish authorities claimed that the Soviets made certain that no one to whom the Soviet law of citizenship applied could leave, and emigration of a much larger number of Jews was thus blocked. Yet it seems that in at least one case the N.K.V.D. which supervised the transports, forced the Poles to take with them a group of Jews whom they had refused to allow to enlist. During the journey, and even after arriving in Iran, these Jews were subjected to physical and mental maltreatment by the Polish officers in charge, who stood firm in their resolve not to allow them to enlist. The episode became known in the free countries and Yitzhak Schwarzbart queried it in London. Shapiro, a U.P. reporter, reported the incident to the press of the United States, and in the wake of the publications an investigation was held. The senior officer in charge of the transport, Lt. Col. Pstrokonski, described the way in which the Jewish group was added to the transport: "...21 on the way, if my memory serves me right, it was March 25, 1942, we discovered that the Soviet authorities had added to our transport five cars of civilians, almost all Jews. According to my lists, there were 330 people, including several children. We were not informed about the coupling on of these wagons. What happened was that at one of the stations we realized that the cars had been attached and that they were travelling with us..."116

By contrast, Captain Dowiaglo, who was directly responsible for these Jews and against whom most of the charges were levelled, states that there were 300 people in the additional 114

"3

Ibid., p. 35. Ibid., p. 37. IHGS, K G A / 2 4 .

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cars, ninety per cent of whom were Jews. Among them, he claimed, were young children (of pre-enlistment age) and also those advanced in age, but the majority were young men.117 A Jewish source describes the episode thus: "Before the first units of the Polish Army left Russia, that is on the 22nd of March 1942, 300 Jews of A classification who had been examined by a Russian health board since the Polish committee was no longer functioning, were sent by the voyenkomat [the Soviet War Office] to the place where the division was stationed. However, [the Poles] ordered them to return to their points of departure. Some of the Jews requested N.K.V.D. intervention and this in turn asked the Polish authorities why these men were not being issued with uniforms and why they were being sent back. The Polish authorities replied that they did not have enough railroad cars to transport them. The N.K.V.D. immediately supplied cars, and faced with this fact [the Poles] took them to Persia but did not provide them with uniforms. At the port of Pahlevi, all the Jews not in uniform were told that they were free to go. Several Jews then approached the British authorities and asked them to intervene, and it was only by command of the British authorities that they all were issued uniforms and inducted into the army."118

Anders himself and General Bohusz-Szyszko, his deputy, took an interest in the evacuation of the Jews. On July 31, Anders and Bohusz-Szyszko and a Soviet representative, General Zhukov, signed a protocol setting forth which Jews were eligible for inclusion among the evacuees.119 Paragraph 1 of that document states that relatives of soldiers who were residents of the Ukraine and Byelorussia holding other than Polish citizenship would be allowed to leave only if they could prove a close family relationship with soldiers in the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union. Paragraph 2 stated that separate lists had to be submitted of family members who were residents of the Ukraine and Byelorussia and who were not Poles, and a certii" «β 118

Ibid. CZA, J25/54/VI, p. 34. IHGS, KG A/24.

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fication of the authenticity of the lists had to be supplied by the military command. Paragraph 3 spoke of the prohibition against evacuating Soviet citizens even if they had married Polish soldiers while in the Soviet Union. Naturally, the very fact that Anders agreed to sign such a document raises questions. In practice, however, Anders went even further than the wording of the document required. At a meeting with several rabbis and Jewish communal workers, and in a note he sent to London, Anders claimed that the Soviet Government "agreed to the evacuation of the close relatives only of those Jews who were serving in the units now stationed in the Soviet Union."120 In other words: Anders blocked the evacuation of the relatives of those soldiers who had left during the first stage, claiming this was in accordance with Soviet desire. Anders similarly ignored the fact that Jews who were residents of the western provinces and who had not had Soviet citizenship thrust upon them were eligible, from the Soviet point of view, to leave just like any other Polish citizen. In his meetings with Jews and in the reports he sent to London, Anders continued to claim that any attempt to circumvent the Soviet directives would jeopardize the whole evacuation project. On the other hand, he did declare that he had no reason to oppose attempts on the part of Jews to obtain exit permits from the Soviets and that these permits would be honored by the Poles.121 A group of Bund activists who had obtained Kot's recommendation for evacuation, met with Anders and asked to be declared Poles for purposes of the evacuation. Anders "categorically rejected" their request. The Bund members related that all those who had stated that they were of Jewish faith were dropped 120

121

Ibid., Anders' cable from August 8, 1942. See also the letters of the Bundists Glicksman and Feinsilber, IHGS, KOL 25/24. The declarations of the group of rabbis and the letters of the Bundists, IHGS, KGA/24, KOL 25/24.

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from the transport roster of August 9, 1942. On the other hand, those Jews who declared themselves to be Roman Catholics did leave.122 By way of an aside, it is of interest to point out that the Jewish Agency intervened with the Polish authorities to allow these "Marranos" to resume their Jewish identity even while they were in Iran.123 In a good many cases, Soviet officers forcibly intervened and claimed that they would have no part in the Polish discrimination policy. One N.K.V.D. officer stated that he was prepared to authorize the evacuation of any Jew who could produce two witnesses to testify that he did not fall into the category of those upon whom Soviet citizenship had been imposed.124 Thanks to the intensive efforts of several Jews, a meeting was arranged between General Zhukov and Bohusz-Szyszko to clarify Soviet restrictions on the evacuation of Jews. According to a Jewish source, Zhukov complained to Bohusz-Szyszko: "General, why do you tell the Jews that we are making it difficult for them to leave? D o you not know that we in fact do not check the lists, that we close one eye to what is going on, and that from our point of view it makes no difference who goes, Ivan, Peter or Rabinovitch?"

At the meeting Zhukov also produced the protocol mentioned above and demonstrated that the Polish interpretation of Jewish family relationships did not coincide with the stipulations of the signed document.125 In a letter to Kot, Bohusz-Szyszko described the clash with Zhukov and claimed that Zhukov agreed to the arrangement IHGS, KOL 25/24. In his response to the petition of the Jewish Agency Representative from November 2, 1942, the Polish Representative stated that in his opinion changing one's name and religion should be viewed as an "utmost necessity" that should not have led to any repercussions for those involved, ibid. 124 See General Bohusz-Szyszko's review of 19 September, 1942, ibid. "5 Ibid., pp. 42-43.

123

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whereby two witnesses would certify that a given individual was a Polish citizen, but he made the Polish commanders responsible for the authenticity of the declaration.126 The Bundists relate in their memorandum that Bohusz-Szyszko after giving some other arguments admitted to them that the Poles knew that a maximum of 70,000 individuals could be evacuated and thus feared that Jews might occupy places required for Poles and consequently tried to reject Jews by every possible means.127 Preserved in Professor Kot's files are reports and surveys of observers and liaison officers sent by the Embassy to the evacuation centers in the various divisions. Jacob Hoffman, the liaison officer attached to the Sixth Division, wrote in his summary: "The atmosphere at the time the evacuation lists were drawn up was such that even after it was explained to the Jews who bore responsibility for the harsh directives and why they were issued, they still did not believe the explanation. The mood prevailing not only among the men but also among the officers of certain types was near rejoicing over the prohibition to include members of the national minorities."

Hoffman also reports that he was told about one commanding officer who took pride in the fact that he did not include even one Jew in the list of evacuees he had prepared.128 The liaison officer who was in charge of the evacuation of the Fifth Division, Witold Misztowt-Czyz, submitted a detailed and angry report of his battle to manage the evacuation of a group of Jews. According to the report, he put together a list of relatives of soldiers who were eligible for evacuation, according to the directives, but Lt. Col. Dudzinski, who was 126

127

128

Bohusz-Szyszko's letter and analysis of December 2, 1942 addressed to Kot, IHGS. Glicksman and Feinsilber's declarations of October 6 and October 10, 1942, IGHS, KOL 25/24. See Jacob Hoffman's report from Teheran, September 17, 1942, ibid.

1111

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in charge of the evacuation of the unit, removed from the list of Polish citizens, members of the following minority groups: 1) who were by nationality Tatars and Moslems by religion; 2) Jewish apostates who represented themselves as Catholics and as Poles; 3) assimilated Jews who were listed in the census as Poles; 4) a small group of Jews who declared themselves to be Jewish by nationality. The author of the report claimed that the majority belonged to the working intelligentsia and included army veterans, orphans of military personnel, handicapped soldiers and Polish industrialists; "many of them could claim rights earned by their efforts for the Polish cause." MisztowtCzyz requested the intervention of the army staff. The problem of the Tatars was immediately settled: they were reinstated on the list. What remained to be solved was the problem of the apostates and the Jews, who numbered 52 families (122 souls in all). General Bohusz-Szyszko favored including them all in the list of evacuees. Bishop Josef Gawlina, the highest ranking religious authority in the armed forces, issued a declaration on behalf of the apostates in which he noted that racial conceptions were foreign to the Roman Catholic Church. Nevertheless, Lt. Col. Dudzmski stood his ground and refused to put the names back on the list. Misztowt-Czyz also charges that this same Dudzmski removed fifty Jews from the evacuation train even though they had every right to be in the convoy. Misztowt-Czyz concludes that an injustice had been done to Polish citizens who were fully entitled to leave for Iran."129 The liaison officer at staff headquarters, the engineer Andrzej Jenicz, drew up a comprehensive summary of the situation in which he included several suggestions of a political nature. He noted the fact that a large number of Jews could be found at those places where the lists of evacuees were being drawn up and where the potential evacuees had gathered. These Jews were incensed at the fact that their rights to be evacuated were being 129

See Misztowt-Czyz's report from Teheran, September 16, 1942, ibid.

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ignored while others were being brought from afar and included in the evacuation; Polish soldiers, on the other hand, were angry over the fact that the Jews seemed to be nearby while their own families were far away. Jenicz pointed out in his report that "the behavior of certain army personnel, who acted in an anti-Semitic fashion during the evacuation, contributed to the creation of an ugly atmosphere;" he also pointed out that many of the Jews demonstrated "an aggressive and hostile" attitude. Jenicz described his efforts to have Jews included in the lists, and reported that in several cases he received support from non-military elements. However, his activities brought but meager results. Jenicz states clearly that "the evacuation of Jews from the Soviet Union was unpopular with the Polish public and army and was restricted to the barest minimum, in line with the position taken by the Soviet authorities." Jenicz concluded his summary with the following comments: "Circles in international Jewry will, of course, act upon the advice of our Jews who are embittered because so few were allowed to leave, and will put all the blame upon the Poles. As far as Polish state interests are concerned it is immaterial whether the blame is laid upon the civilian or the military — the Embassy, general headquarters or division staff. It is quite likely that the Soviet authorities will endeavour to portray the matter in a fashion unfavorable to Polish interests, and that they will do so in the context of the clash over the eastern territories. Soviet propaganda will claim that the Polish authorities did not want to take the Jews, and they will supply the Jews with the appropriate propaganda materials. It won't be difficult for them to obtain such. I shall cite as an example the cable which the [Soviet] Commissar for Evacuation Matters attached to the Fifth Division, sent to Bishop Gawlina in Yangi-Yul, stating that the Armed Forces 'were employing racial tactics.' For this reason I advise that the only [correct] approach would be the adoption of a unified front by all elements directly involved in the evacuation and the briefing of all those who must know about the evacuation with one version only, namely that restrictions were applied to the departure of Jews only because of the absolute prohibition imposed by the Soviet Government.

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If need be, we will be able to produce appropriate material to confirm this claim. All reports giving unfavorable details of the evacuation campaign should be treated as top secret, lest they fall into the wrong hands. The anti-Semitic behavior of certain officers — which has been blown up to maximal proportions — should be explained as acts of isolated individuals for whom those in charge of the evacuation cannot be held responsible."130

It is abundantly clear that the composition of the evacuation lists, the treatment of Jews during the evacuation and the small numbers of Jewish soldiers and civilians among the evacuees all helped to reveal to the free world the anti-Jewish discrimination and the extreme anti-Semitism practiced by many Poles. According to a Jewish estimate, 3,500 Jewish soldiers were evacuated; according to Anders, 4,000. Even if we accept the Polish figure as the correct one, we are led to an instructive conclusion. Until the end of 1941, the Soviets placed no obstacles before the recruiting of Jews; in fact, according to Polish sources just the opposite occurred — the Soviets deliberately channelled large numbers of Jews to the recruiting centers, and as a result they made up forty per cent of the initial recruits, and some say even more than that. If we may assume that the Polish Armed Forces numbered some 40,000 men till the end of 1941, then the number of Jews was at least 10,000. When the Russians began to place restrictions on recruiting from among the minorities, they also tried, according to Anders, to have the restrictions applied to parts of the force already in existence. Anders claims that he bitterly opposed the Russians on this point, arguing that a law cannot take effect retroactively, and the Russians were forced to accept his position. If all this is true, the question then arises: where did all the Jews, who by all accounts were allowed to remain in the army, disappear? There can be no doubt of the answer: in addition to the restrictions of the Soviets and the disqualifications by

i3o

see Jenicz's 16-page report, September 22, 1942, ibid.

THE SOVIET UNION YISRAEL GUTMAN

the Poles of new recruits, a drastic purge of existing units must have taken place. There is no reason to attribute to isolated officers the policy of discrimination in the drawing up of the evacuation lists. The Embassy sought to mitigate the extremism of the Armed Forces and to include a larger number of Jews in the lists, in particular the more recognized Jewish leaders. As we have seen, the Embassy's efforts had disappointing results with the open rivalry between the Armed Forces and die political elements131 serving as at least a partial cause. Some officers chose to behave in a brutally anti-Semitic manner, making the situation in fact harsher even than the stated policy, and only a few spoke out openly against the discrimination and sought to intervene to whatever extent they could. It is very possible that the N.K.V.D., wanting to embroil the Poles, sought to utilize for their own propaganda purposes the unrestrained anti-Semitism which was rampant among them. However, we may also assume that even had those circumstances had no connection with the Soviet restrictive regulations, the Russians would hardly have allowed the Poles to carry out their machinations while attributing them to the Soviet authorities. Naturally, as in the earlier stages, those who suffered and were injured in all cases were the Jews. Brief mention should be made at this point of the "desertion" of Jews from General Anders' Armed Forces, even though this is not the concern of this article and the topic merits a separate and independent study. While the force was stationed in Eretz Israel desertion from the ranks reached massive propertions. According to Anders, 3,000 out of 4,000 men deserted.132 We may assume that a prime motivation was the strong de131

132

This was emphasized in Glicksman's and Feinsilber's letters from the Bund. Anders' comments on the desertions, see his book, p. 201; see also General Anders, tycie i chwaiz., p. 63.

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sire to become a part of the new Jewish community in Eretz Israel after the bitter experiences in the Soviet Union and in full awareness of events in occupied Poland. Furthermore, the anti-Semitism and discrimination in Anders' army during recruitment and later during service also had their bearing on the decision to desert. We cannot determine the individual weight of each factor in the final decision nor can we know what ultimately tipped the balance, but it is reasonable to assume that both factors played a role and prompted many to decide on desertion. In his memoirs, and in declarations made elsewhere, Anders claimed to understand the motivations of those Jews who wanted to remain in Eretz Israel. For that reason he did not want to employ force in recovering deserters and did not even mount searches for them. This contention put forward by Anders years after the fact, while basically true, is not the whole truth. Anders claimed at meetings with Jewish representatives in Eretz Israel that the desertion of Jews was not significantly damaging to the Force since he was bound to lose at least an equal number in battle. However, he did feel that this type of flight would most likely influence future relations between Poles and Jews.133 Anders sought to stem the wave of desertions by using various means of persuasion; certain Jewish elements also opposed the mass desertion of Jewish soldiers, out of a concern for the future welfare of the Jews of Poland after the war.134 It is worth pointing out that Anders emphasized that the thousand Jewish soldiers who remained in the Force fought bravely and no less gallantly than all the other soldiers who travelled the lengthy route from the Soviet Union through the Middle East iss

l3i

gee Anders' meeting with the men of the "Representation," in Tel Aviv, September 19, 1943, CZA, J25/54/VI, pp. 134ff. The same tone reappears in other conversations between Anders and Jews, see IHGS, KGA/24. Schwarzbart often gives expression to this position in his writings and it is also emphasized in the report to the "Representation."

THE SOVIET UNION YISRAEL GUTMAN

and along battle-torn Italy, to the bitter struggle over Monte Cassino. A significant percentage of the deserters joined the underground in Eretz Israel or enlisted in the Palestinian Brigade, and thus continued their struggle.

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THE ATTITUDE

OF THE SOVIET

UNION

TO THE RESCUE OF JEWS

DOV LEVIN

THE FACT THAT a

large number of the Jews who perished in the Holocaust lived along the western borders of the Soviet Union and in its western republics, and the extensive political and military involvement of the Soviets in a wide geographic area, as a neutral state until June 1941, and afterwards as a combatant nation, have focused particular attention on the role of that country in the rescue of Jews during the Second World War. The topic has been dealt with extensively in Jewish historiography, both in works on the Holocaust as well as in studies dealing with the Soviet Union, and ever since World War II, has been the subject of heated controversy, often with political and ideological overtones. The focal point of the controversy concerns the nature of the efforts to rescue Jews by, and within, the Soviet Union. 1) Was it the planned policy of the Soviet Government or other Soviet institutions to save Jews from the Nazis? If so, in what ways was this policy implemented? 2) Regardless of whether or not such a policy did in fact exist, how many Jews were saved by, and in, the Soviet Union? During the war, a number of partial, and at times vague, answers were published in response to the first question. In a pamphlet intended for world Jewry, for example, the Soviet Jewish author David Bergelson praises the Red Army which "evacuated the weakest elements of the local population first, among them the weakest members of the Jewish population so that they would not fall into the hands of the Nazi thieves and butchers."1 Statements of this sort, as well as others which were more explicit and detailed, were disseminated by the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee 1

David Bergelson, Idn un die Milhome mit Hitlerit, Moscow, 1941, p. 20.

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throughout its existence. The information served as basic source material for Jewish journalists and writers throughout the world. Salomon Itzhaki, for example, wrote in Congress Weekly in 1943 that, "no less than 70 % of the Jews were saved from the clutches of the Nazis by the Soviet authorities. In tens of cities and towns, especially in the Ukraine and Bessarabia, the Jews were the first to be evacuated." 2 After the war as well, a number of Western scholars, among them Eugen Kulisher, noted that during the Nazi invasion the mass evacuation of Jews was given high priority by the Soviet authorities.3 A most one-sided version of the Soviets' preferential policy was published by the writer Moshe Kahanovich (Kaganovich) in his book, which was published in Rome in 1948. Kahanovich writes that, "By the end of 1941, an 'ukase' [order] signed by Kalinin [Chairman of the Supreme Soviet] and G orkin [Secretary of the Supreme Soviet] had been issued which said that, 'In view of the fact that the enemy relates to Soviet citizens of the Jewish nationality in a beastly, barbaric manner and totally annihilates them, we hereby order that they be the first to be evacuated to distant regions of the Soviet Union. All means of transport and railways must be prepared to execute this task." 4 It should be noted that in subsequent editions of this book (1954, 1955), Kahanovich somewhat modified this version and pointed out that: 1) " N o document has been found to confirm the facts" (of the existence of such an ukase); 2) "The truth is that without giving the Jewish population any preference, the Soviet government ordered the evacuation of the entire civilian population together with the factories so that only 'scorched earth' would be left in the hands of the Germans." 5 It is surprising that ten years later, in 1965, Kahanovich's version of 1948, which he later modified, was cited as evidence in Jews in the 2 3

4

5

Salomon Itzhaki, "Jews in Soviet Russia," Congress Weekly, October 30, 1943, p. 12. Eugen Kulisher, Europe on the More, War and Population Congress 1917-1947, New York, 1948, p. 260. Moshe Kahanovich (Kaganovich), Der Yidisher Onteil in der Partizaner Bavegung fun Soviet Rusland, Rome, 1948, p. 188. Idem, Milhemet ha-Partizanim ha-Ychudim be-Mizrah Eiropah, Tel Aviv, 1954, p. 202 (Di Milhome fun Yidishe Partizaner in Mizrah Eirope, Buenos Aires, 1956, pp. 369-370). In a second interview which I held with Mr. Kahanovich on April 1, 1965, he recounted that he had heard about the existence of the order attributed to Kalinin from Jews and Russians, and had read about it in the memoirs of the leaders of the partisans.

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U.S.S.R., a propaganda pamphlet published by the Novosty Press Agency.6 In view of the lack of evidence to substantiate the existence of the ukase, and of the fact that this Soviet publication is among the only ones published after the war that deal with this question, one can conclude that Soviet historiography has nothing to add on the subject. Moreover, we see from the above that it is almost certain that there was no official preference given to Jews and certainly no such order was ever issued.7 In his book on Soviet Jewry (published in 1951), the late Sovietologist Solomon Schwartz absolutely refutes the Russian claims. He asserts that the Jews were evacuated en masse only from the Jewish kolkhozes in the Crimea. 8 The historian Salo Baron, Shalom Goldlman, and others deny that Jews received any preferential treatment from the Soviet Government. 9 Moreover, they claim that along the Soviet border there was direct interference with efforts to rescue Jews, and that due to political considerations, the anti-Semitic character of the Nazi regime was kept secret from Soviet Jewry until 1941, a fact which reduced the number of escape attempts. The second question, "How many Jews were saved?", is no less problematic and controversial. Unfortunately, the optimistic estimates of the number of Jews who were saved by fleeing to remote and relatively safe areas of the Soviet Union were already proven false in the course of the war. Thus, for example, in 1943, Joseph Schechtman refuted David Bergelson's assessment that 80% of Belorussian Jewry had been saved, 10 and during the same year, the jurist and noted public 6 7

8 9

10

Solomon Rabinovich, Jews in the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1965, pp. 13-14. For the re-emergence of this controversy after some time, see: B. Dov, "Zehirut be Analogiyot," Hdaretz, December 23,1973 (letter to the editor), where it is noted that "during the first days of the war an order was issued by the Kremlin to enable the evacuation of the Jewish residents." Joseph Litvak, in a letter of response which appeared in this newspaper, entitled "Ha-Russim Lo Hitzilu Yehudim," absolutely denies any possibility that such an order existed. Solomon M. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union, Syracuse, 1951, pp. 197-198. Salo W. Baron, The Russian Jews under Tsars and Soviets, New York, 1964, p. 297; Shalom Goldlman, Coral ha-Yahadut bi-Berit ha-Mo' atzot, 1917-1957, Jerusalem, 1958, pp. 53-55. Joseph Schechtman, Ten Years War against the Jews, New York, 1943, pp. 186— 187; cf. Philip Friedman, "Umkum fun Vitebsker Yidn," Vitebsk Amol, New York, 1956, pp. 611-613.

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figure, Dr. Jacob Robinson, published his estimate that approximately 1,600,000 Jews had been evacuated by the Soviet Government from Eastern Poland and occupied Soviet territory to the Russian interior.1! The average of these and subsequent estimates yields a figure of approximately one million Jews rescued. In addition to the technical difficulty involved in arriving at an accurate figure, one is faced with basic problems such as: Should those Jews who found refuge in the Soviet Union upon their own initiative, with or without the help of the Soviet authorities, be included? Should those of the approximately 400,000 Jews (a figure which is also the subject of controversy) who were exiled to Siberia and the Arctic Circle and survived be included in the number of those rescued? We have presented the principal conclusions of the dispute in Jewish historiography concerning the two aspects of the rescue of Jews by the Soviet Union in order to point out the enormous difficulties involved in the study of the subject and to delineate a number of crucial problems. To date there have been no startling discoveries which have immediately solved all the controversies and unclear episodes related to this subject. Nonetheless, the amount of primary and secondary source material (the product of intensive research, monographs, and the recording of testimony) on the events of the war along the western border of the Soviet Union — including the annexed territories from Estonia to Bessarabia — has been growing steadily. Thus the picture which emerges from an examination of those aspects of this material which relate to the rescue of Jews is fairly clear. Moreover, it has become possible to arrive at a number of conclusions which may contribute to a better understanding of the subject in question. The facts will be presented schematically from a chronological and topical standpoint, and will be divided into two periods: 1939-1941 and 1941-1945. With the outbreak of World War II, and during and after the division of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union, approximately 350,000 Jews (mostly males)12 fled from Warsaw and 11 Jacob Robinson, "Uprooted Jews in the Intermediate Postwar World," International Conciliation, N o . 389, April 1943, p. 292. Three months later, at a public banquet in New York honoring Itzik Fefer and Salomon Mikhoels, the representatives of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in Moscow, the President of the American Jewish Congress quoted from this article. See: Morgn Freiheit, July 7, 1943. 12

For the different assessments of the number of Jewish refugees, which ranged from

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BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST SOVIET POLICY TOWARD RESCUE

other places in Western Poland. These refugees concentrated in the eastern part of Poland, which had in the meantime been annexed to the Soviet Union, as for about a month and a half (until late October 1939), the border between Russian and German-occupied territory was open, and refugees streamed across it unmolested. We even know of several instances afterwards when Soviet border guards allowed Jews to pass (albeit not always without difficulties) into Soviet-occupied territory.13 On the other hand, we know of many cases in which refugees were refused entry to Soviet territory, and some of those who had fled were even extradited to the other side of the border.14 Nonetheless, we must not ignore the possibility that the increased stringency of Soviet policy was to a certain extent the result of attempts by the German to get rid of the masses of Jews in their territory by forcing them to cross into Soviet territory, a policy which was the cause of quite a few military and diplomatic incidents.15 Many of the Jews who found refuge in Soviet-occupied territory, especially those who, for family and other reasons, expressed a desire to return to their homes in Nazi-occupied Poland,16 as well as many of the Jewish residents of Eastern Poland, who were considered politically unreliable, were arrested and exiled to remote areas of the Soviet Union

13

14

15

16

300,000 to 400,000, see: Davar, October 27, 1939; Peter Meyer et. al., The Jews in Soviet Satellites, Syracuse, 1953, p. 330; Stanislaw Kot, Conversations with the Kremlin and Dispatches from Russia, New York, 1963, p. XII; Filip (Philip) Friedman, Zaglada iydow Polskich w okresie okupacji niemieckiej 1939-1945, Munich. 1947, pp. 5-6; Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution, London, 1953, p. 50. For a description of the aid rendered by Soviet border authorities in transferring Jewish refugees on December 25, 1939, see Michael Pomerantz, "Kovel Erev haKibbush ha-Germani," Yalkut Moreshet, No. 17, 1974, pp. 74-76. For a case of extradition to the other side of the border, see the testimony of Zyi Pahter, Eiduyot, Vol. 1, Jerusalem, 1963, p. 153 (testimony at the Eichmann Trial). For a reference to the tension which existed between the two sides due to the expulsion of Jews across the Soviet border, see two memorandums of May 12, 1939, from the secretary of the German Foreign Office: R.J. Sontag and J.S. Beddie (eds.), Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941, Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, Washington D.C., 1948, No. 949-950, pp. 128-129. While all the residents of Eastern Poland automatically acquired Soviet citizenship, according to a decree of November 29,1939, the refugees from Western Poland faced a difficult dilemma — to accept Soviet citizenship or to return to their homes in the German-occupied zone.

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in the course of the mass deportations in 1940-1941.17 If we add the Jews deported from the Baltic states and those parts of Rumania, which had in the meantime been annexed to the Soviet Union, one reaches a figure of approximately 400,000 Jews exiled to the interior.18 Despite the tragic and cruel aspects of the deportations and the demise of tens of thousands in Soviet labor camps from starvation, cold, epidemics, and accidents, many of those exiled survived. Many Polish Jews were granted amnesty as a result of the Sikorski-Stalin agreement19 17

The majority of the refugees who did not accept Soviet citizenship were exiled to remote areas of the U.S.S.R. While there were mass roundups and individual arrests as early as the spring and summer of 1940, most of the deportations and expulsions of the local populace in the areas annexed to the U.S.S.R. (from Estonia to Bessarabia), were carried out during the last weeks before the German invasion, i.e., the night of June 13-14, 1941, under the supervision of Deputy Commissar Ivan Serov. For details on his instructions, which were included in the secret message transmitted to those in charge of the operation several hours before it began see: Warren B. Walsh, Readings in Russian History, Syracuse, 1959, pp. 634638. 18 In a report issued by the central institutions of the Jewish community of Eretz Israel in 1942, the number of Polish Jewish refugees in the U.S.S.R. was estimated at 350,000-500,000; E. Dobkin, Ha-Aliyah ve-ha-Hatzalah bi-Shenot ha-Sho'ah, Jerusalem, 1946, p. 28. In an address to the Smaller Zionist Actions Committee on January 18, 1943, their number was estimated at 400,000, ibid., p. 42. During the Fourth Zionist Conference on December 29, 1944 it was stated: "There are still 200,000-250,000 Jewish refugees from Poland in Russia," ibid., p. 82. According to the report of the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R., the Jews constituted 30% of the 1,000,000 prisoners deported and expelled from Eastern Poland during World War II. This figure (300,000) supposedly included both refugees (see note 16) and local inhabitants (see note 17). Report on the Relief Accorded to Polish Citizens by the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R. Final Report to the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R., compiled in Teheran in August 1943. According to another Polish source the total number of deportees (of all categories) was estimated at 1,500,000, of whom about 30% were Jews. See "Sprawozdanie ο deportacjach ziem wschodnich Ambasady Rzeczpospolitej w Kujbijszewie dla MSW w, Londynie, liepec 1942," Archives of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk; according to Roman Buczek, "Dzialalnosc opiekuncza Ambasady RP w ZSSR w Latach 1941-1943," Zeszyty Historyczne, No. 29, 1974, pp. 49-50. For a reference to 400,000 Polish Jews who were deported or escaped to the U.S.S.R., see: Malcolm J. Proudfoot, European Refugees 1939-1952, London, 1957, p. 40. About 25,000 Jews were expelled from the annexed territories of Rumania and the Baltic States (Bessarabia — about 8,000; Northern Bukovina — about 3,000; Lithuania — about 7,000; Latvia — about 6,000; Estonia — about 500). 19 The amnesty was announced by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on August

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and others were freed many years later. It is particularly noteworthy that hundreds of thousands of East European Jews who were considered to be hostile toward the Soviet Union were saved from the Nazi Holocaust as a direct result of an organized operation by the Soviet Government. Although this is paradoxical,20 it is important for our understanding of the topic, and gives us good insight into the subject. Among other things, it hints at what happened later in the course of the war, when official Soviet policy coincided at times with the actual rescue of Jews. In order to complete the picture, three additional phenomena which affected various sectors of the population and which contributed to the rescue of Jews should be noted. They are: 1) the permission granted to residents of the East European countries annexed to the Soviet Union, who for various reasons had been living abroad (political emigres,21 those who fought in Spain, students stranded in occupied France), to return to their countries of origin; 2) exit visas granted (in return for dollars!) to Jewish refugees from Poland who were in Lithuania on their way to Palestine and other destinations via Odessa, Persia, and Vladi12, 1941, and in effect related to all Poles, including those who had automatically received Soviet citizenship according to the decree of November 29,1939 (see note 16), as well as part of the Jews of Vilna (in the meantime the region in which Vilna was located had become Soviet Lithuania). 20 There is not always a clear distinction, even in Jewish historiography, between the deportees and those evacuated to the U.S.S.R. Thus, for example, List A of Bessarabian refugees in Russia, Letter of the Committee for Aid to the Jews of Bessarabia, Tel Aviv, 1973, (hereafter—"Letter"), pp. 5-7, includes both deportees and those exiled and their families. It was not accidental that American Jewish publications also applied the word "deportees" to Jews. Thus, for example, Rabbi Mordechai Dubin and Rabbi Mordechai Nurok (who, in fact, were transferred to the U.S.S.R. as political prisoners) are included among those who "left in time" from Soviet Latvia to the U.S.S.R., Amerikaner, June 26, 1942, p. 2. Another publication stated: "Several thousand Jews who had been evacuated by the Soviet authorities before the German invasion were settled in farms in Soviet Mongolia and Eastern Siberia," Morgn Journal, September 16, 1941. A report based on the sources of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the U.S.S.R., which was published in a newspaper in Eretz Israel, speaks about Jews from Lithuania who were evacuated by the Soviet authorities before the retreat of the Red Army and transferred to Asiatic Russia. Ha-Tzofe, April 2, 1943, p. 1. 21 For an account of a group of Jewish political emigrants who were permitted to return to Soviet Latvia, see: "Tsurigekert zikh Neie Grupe Politishe Emigranten," Kam/, July 2, 1940.

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vostok;22 3) the encouragement (mainly for economic reasons) given to residents of the territories annexed to the Soviet Union, as well as to the refugees in those areas, to move to the Russian interior — to the Donbas region of the Ukraine, for example. The "Electrict" factory was moved from Vilna to Minsk,23 and there are other examples of similar transfers. Thus by the time the Nazis launched their surprise invasion of Russia in June 1941, a substantial number of Jews from the areas annexed to the Soviet Union had already been moved to the Russian interior. In addition, some Jews from the annexed areas were visiting in the interior at the time and others were there for business or other reasons (military men, officials, students, vacationers, artists, etc.). The suddenness of the intensive German attack along a front which stretched from Estonia to Bessarabia not only brought about the collapse of the Soviet forces, but also caused terrible chaos on all levels of government, especially in the western areas. In view of this fact, one can understand the confusion and impotence of the Soviet authorities, who on the one hand calmed the populace and warned against flight, and on the other hand encouraged them to engage in rear-guard actions and leave only "scorched earth" in the hands of the advancing enemy. The same confusion existed regarding border crossings. While the flow of refugees (most of whom were Jews) was stopped at some points by sentries who refused to let the refugees continue eastward, thousands of refugees crossed the border with no difficulty at other points. We know that flight from the Baltic countries was obstructed, yet in the Western 22

23

Thus, for example, the following left Soviet Lithuania: 1,200 people via Odessa to Turkey; 2,200 via Siberia to Japan; 350 via Vladivostok to Shanghai. For the agreement of the Soviet authorities to enable refugees from Vilna (yeshivah students) to leave for Eretz Israel via Odessa, see the contents of a telegram sent by Maisky, the Soviet ambassador in London, to Rabbi Herzog, the Chief Rabbi of Eretz Israel, on April 28, 1940 in Ha-Tzofe, August 2, 1940. The "Electrit" radio factory was transferred by the Soviets from Vilna to Minsk, together with about 400 of its workers (primarily Jews), during their brief period of rule in Vilna (September-October 1939). In addition, during those few weeks and a little later, a very large number of young Jews (both local residents and refugees) moved to Western Belorussia, with the encouragement of the Soviet authorities, due to ideological and economic reasons. At that time, the number of those leaving for Russia was estimated at less than 3,000. Y. Zhofer, "Vilner Aktualitetn," Di Idishe Shtime, November 13, 1939, p. 6.

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Ukraine, and especially in Bessarabia, the Dniester crossings were wide open, and tens of thousands of Jews fled eastward with the encouragement of the authorities. Even under these chaotic conditions, however, families of officers and members of the internal security network, government and local officials, as well as Communist Party and Komsomol activists were given preferential treatment in the use of the means of transport available for flight. Thus it was no accident that even in Lithuania, a country occupied by the Germans in three days, 2,553 members of the Communist Party (55.2% of the party membership) succeeded in fleeing.24 Since many Jews were members of the Communist Party, one can assume that the proportion of Jews among those evacuated was greater than their percentage of the population, especially since in many instances their families accompanied them. The same applies to other groups whose members received preferential treatment. The "masses" fled on foot, on bicycles, and in wagons, but there was also a limited number of trains which set out from Kovno, Riga, Tallin, and other places, and which provided free transportation for the local population. Indeed it was natural for the Jews to exhaust every possible means of transport and evacuation to a greater extent than the rest of the population. The Soviet Government and the Communist Party decided upon the "evacuation of the population, and objects of industrial and material worth" 25 only five days after the invasion. Jews had begun to flee eastward long before the decision was made. These refugees are referred to as "evacuees" ( E v a h i y z o \ a n n i y e ) in Soviet historiography. The truth is, however, that many decided by themselves to flee, and did so by their own means. Yet it should be pointed out that even those who fled by themselves were transported hundreds of kilometers in military vehicles. Moreover, upon reaching the Soviet Union, they were helped at aid stations ( . E v a k i f a t s i o n n i y e i pitateVnige Punkty) set up along the railroads up to the Ural Mountains26 or at the kipyatok which prov24 25

26

K. Varaiinskas, Karo Sükuriuose, Vilna, 1970, p. 40 (hereafter-VaraSinskas). Istoriya Vetikoy Otechestvenoy yoiny Sovietskovo Soyuzal941-1945, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 143. The evacuation directive applied to eight Soviet republics (Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Karelia, and parts of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic). It was to be carried out by a national committee consisting of: N.M. Shvernik (chairman). A.I. Mikoyan, and A.N. Kosygin. By the end of August 1941, 128 evacuation points and 100 aid stations were

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ided hot water at every railroad station, and especially in the kolkhozes which served either as a preliminary base or a temporary haven for the duration of the war. There generally was a direct relationship between the number of Jews saved in a region, and the length of time which elapsed before the retreat of the Red Army from that area. Lithuania, which was occupied by the Germans in three days, is an outstanding example. Six to seven percent of Lithuanian Jewry escaped,27 whereas in Estonia, which was occupied a month later, at least half of the Jewish population managed to flee,28 and in Bessarabia a quarter of the Jews escaped.29

27

28

29

already functioning near railway stations and major railroad intersections, ibid., p. 542. Since there were approximately 250,000 Jews in Lithuania on the eve of the Nazi invasion, the number of those who fled to the U.S.S.R. was about 15,000. This assessment is indirectly corroborated by the May 25, 1943 census of Lithuanian civilian refugees in the U.S.S.R., according to which the Jews constituted about 65% of the total number of refugees. VarasioSkas, op. tit., p. 38. According to this source, there were many more than 20,000 Lithuanian refugees in the U.S.S.R., (p. 39, note 28a). On the eve of the war, Estonian Jewry numbered about 4,500. About 3,000 Estonian Jews managed to escape to the U.S.S.R. before Estonia was captured by the Nazis. Y. Gar, "Baltishe Lender," Algemeinde Entsikopediye, Vol. I, New York, 1964, p. 398. Another Jewish source estimates the number of those who escaped at 4,000. Ella Amitan-Wilenski, "Estonian Jewry — A Historical Summary," The Jews in Latvia, Tel Aviv, 1971, p. 347. The October 12, 1942, report by the Nazi security police in Ostland states that almost half of the 4,500 Jews living in Estonia left at the beginning of the war "due to the cooperation with the Soviet institutions." In addition, this report states that "during the occupation there were supposed to be in Estonia about one thousand" only. Operational Situation Report U.d.S.S.R. No. I l l , October 12, 1941, Document NO-3155 Nuremburg Trials. Cf. document PS-2773 of the Nuremberg Trials. On the eve of the Nazi occupation, there were more than 300,000 Jews in Bessarabia. The estimate that about 100,000 Bessarabian Jews managed to escape before the Nazi occupation is indirectly supported by data of the Rumanian Army. Gerald Reitlinger, Die Endlösung, Berlin, 1956, pp. 457, 467. Another source records as 30,000 the number of Jews who fled from Kishinev alone. Yitzhak Koren, Yehudei Kishinev, Tel Aviv, 1950, pp. 227-228. According to the sources of Bessarabian emigrants in Israel, the number of Bessarabian refugees in the U.S.S.R. during World War II was 70,000-80,000, and over 200,000 Jews remained in Bessarabia under the occupation regime. "Letter," p. 2. It should be noted that many of these escapees were captured by the German and Rumanian armies on the other side of the Dniester, and their fate was similar to that of the local Ukrainian Jews.

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In any case, many Jews managed to escape from the interior of the Soviet Union and from the Ukraine, because in these areas the government evacuation mechanism was operating more efficiently, and the Jewish residents were much more aware of the danger posed to them by the Nazis. There is, therefore, a reasonable basis for the estimates that 70-90 % (or even more) of the Jews in the Central and Eastern Ukraine escaped, and the same is true for the region between Smolensk and M o s c o w . 30 Thus it seems reasonable to accept the estimate that the total number of Jews who escaped Soviet-occupied territory was between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000. Indeed, many Jews would not have been saved if not for the help provided by the authorities, but the government's policy and the resources it channeled into rescue work were always applied in a general framework which did not emphasize the plight of the Jews, and whose general, guiding principles were the political, military, and economic interests of the Soviet Union at that moment. As a concrete example, we can point to the attitude of the command of the Soviet partisans to the Jews who escaped extermination. Indeed a few of these survivors were accepted into partisan units, and there were even cases where partisans offered individual Jews in the ghettos an opportunity to join their ranks. Family camps existed under the protection of, or at least were tolerated by, the partisan command. We also know of Jews who were saved by crossing the battle lines with the help of partisans. These cases, however, depended to a certain extent on the personality and attitude of the local commanding officer, and unfortunately they were the exception rather than the rule. These crucial matters, which decided the fate of many Jews, were usually determined according to general considerations, be they political, strategic, or military.31 Under these circumstances, we are able to understand the 30

31

These facts were included in the September 12 and October 15 reports of the Einsatzgruppen, whose function was the systematic destruction of Soviet Jewry. They also note that in Dnepropetrovsk (formerly Yekaterinoslav) only 30,000 of the 100,000 Jews who had previously lived there were still in the city when the Nazis occupied it; in Melitopol, about 2,000 out of 11,000; in Chernigov, 309 out of about 10,000, etc. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, Chicago, 1967, p. 192. Thus, for example, the order of the day on the jubilee of the October Revolution, on November 7, 1943, included a special section referring to partisans, in which they were enjoined "to save Soviet citizens from murder and deportation for labor

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disbanding of Jewish units, the plotting against family camps, and the blatant discrimination against Jews in the acceptance of unarmed men to partisan units. There are many well-known examples.32 The same applies to the service of Jews in the national divisions of the Red Army. In this context, I would like to bring a brief but very illuminating example of how the subject of the rescue of Jews from the ghettos to the forests has been distorted. About three years ago, Genia Zimanas,* a senior partisan commander known for his stubborn refusal to allow Jews to join the ranks of the partisans, told the following to a reporter from the magazine Soviet Life: "We proposed the evacuation of all the Jews, including the women, children, and elderly people, to Elkes and Gens,** but both adamantly refused." Therefore, Ziman continued, "I consider the Zionists responsible for the death of thousands of Lithuanian Jews."33 This is not the place to clarify this malicious distortion.34 Suffice it to say that even according to the accepted standards of contemporary Soviet historiography, this contemptuous accusation is exceptional. In summation, we may state that thanks to the Soviet Union, tens of thousands of Jews were saved by various and strange means (including deporation) from the fate of Auschwitz, Treblinka, and Ponar. The truth is, however, that to the extent that the rescue mechanism was dependent on the Soviet authorities, it operated according to all sorts of factors and considerations, among which the humanitarian component and the desire to save Jews were insignificant. The same applies to the attitude of the Soviet authorities to rescue. Their policy vis-ä-vis the Jews, as well as toward the rest of the population, was purely self-serving. in Germany." Soviet War Documents, Washington D.C., December 1943, p. 73. For examples on this matter in relation to the Jews of Soviet Lithuania, see Dov Levin, "Ha-Gorem ha-Le'umi ba-Lehimah shel Yehudei Lita neged ha-Natzim beMilhemet ha-Olam ha-Sheniyah," Behinot, 2-3, 1973, pp. 86-91. * G. Zimanas, a veteran Communist leader in Lithuania. In 1940-1941 he headed the campaign to liquidate Jewish culture there. During World War II, he was among the leaders of the Lithuanian partisans, was parachuted to the Lithuanian forests, and commanded the m i l i t a r y and political activity in Southern Lithuania. ** Dr. Elkes was Chairman of the Ältestenrat in the Kovno Ghetto; Gens headed the Judenrat in the Vilna Ghetto. Each of them, during certain periods of his life, was involved in one way or another in Zionist activity. 33 K. Telyatnikov, "Mingle with the People," Soviet Life, 8 (179), August 1971, p. 63. 34 For an analysis and refutation of Zimanas' distortions, see Dov Levin, "Fact and Fiction" Yad Yashem News, No. 4, 1973, pp. 22-23. 32

Part Five

Neutrals

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THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND ITS POLICY VIS-Ä-VIS THE JEWS IN GHETTOS AND CONCENTRATION CAMPS IN NAZI-OCCUPIED EUROPE

MEIR DWORZECKI*

on World War II and the Nazi era must examine the activities and failures of international organizations during this period. A number of years ago, the presentation of the play "The Deputy," aroused an international controversy. The entire world was confronted with the question of what the Pope did in response to the extermination of the Jewish people? How can his failure to act be explained? Arthur Morse's 'book, While Six Million Died, which appeared in many languages including Hebrew, shocked many people in the United States. Using official government documents, he revealed the indifference of the American authorities to the persecution of the Jews in Europe throughout the era of Nazi rule. I have undertaken to conduct an objective and comprehensive study of the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross during the fateful days of World War II. HISTORICAL RESEARCH

The International Red Cross Faces the Historical Test of World War II During World War II, the International Red Cross was confronted with tasks of unprecedented responsibility in its efforts to alleviate the plight of the suffering population in Nazi-occupied territory. The German authorities opposed all relief and rescue programs designed to help the local population, and especially the Jews. Their aim was to biologically weaken the population of the occupied countries, and to totally annihilate the Jewish people. The authorities of the Third * Dr. Meir Dworzecki passed away shortly after submitting this paper, which is his last research on the subject of the Holocaust.

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BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST THE POLICY OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS

work prepared to extend aid or of the millions of letters which were sent. They did not know about the work being done, sometimes secretly; they only saw what was not done — the relief and rescue for which they waited in vain. They knew only one thing — that they almost never saw representatives of the Red Cross in the ghettos and concentration camps — not while they were being selected for deportation, nor while they were suffering so terribly in the camps. Thus for those in distress in Nazi-occupied Europe, the very institution which for eighty-five years—until World War II—had symbolized both relief for the suffering and the struggle against injustice, evil, and death, became a non-existent institution which denied its own past. The masses of sufferers realized that the Germans were not permitting the Red Cross to see what was occurring in the ghettos, camps, and crematoria. Yet they did not understand why the International Red Cross remained silent in the wake of their unprecedented suffering. It never dawned upon them that the International Red Cross was unaware of the situation, and therefore they could not comprehend why that organization did not publicize the facts over the radio and in the press. Why didn't the Red Cross arouse public opinion in the Free World? After World War II, many books were published, primarily in French and English, concerning the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Of particular note is the comprehensive "Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on its Activities During the Second World War," (3 volumes) published in French. 2 'Problems Requiring Further Research The following problems require further comprehensive and objective research: — What did the International Committee do to aid the Jews in the ghettos and concentration camps in Nazi-occupied Europe? How did this aid reach the Jews in Nazi-occupied territory? When was * Rapport du Comite international de la Croix ιRouge sur son activite pendant la seconde guerre mondiale (ler septembre 1939 — 30 juin 1947), Geneva, 1948.

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MEIR DWORZECKI

Reich denied the Red Cross access to the ghettos and labor and extermination camps, on the grounds that there was no convention which obligated them to protect the civilian population in times of war. Under no circumstances were the Germans willing to take any steps which might lead to the revelation throughout the world of their murder campaign, in which millions of people in the occupied countries, and especially Jews, were exterminated. At the same time, however, the Reich was very anxious that the International Red Cross extend its protection to German prisoners of war and German civilians who were being held in the countries fighting against Nazi Germany ("civilian internees"). Therefore, during World War II, the Germans allowed the International Red Cross to protect the prisoners of war they held, as well as to distribute food, medicine, and clothing in specified quantities to the population of the occupied countries. (In Poland, it was agreed that the Jews would receive 16-17% of the commodities sent by the Red Cross, but the relief organization was not given an opportunity to intervene on behalf of the Jews.) Packages sent by the International Red Cross for the Jews in the General Government continued to arrive even after 90-95% of the Jewish community had already been exterminated. Thus a strange paradox was created. During the war, the Nazi authorities allowed aid, in the form of food and medical supplies, to be sent to people who were either already dead or would soon be sent en masse to the death camps.1 The aid distributed by the International Red Cross to the civilians in Nazi-occupied territory — hundreds of millions of persecuted persons who were in a state of acute malnutrition — was microscopic in relation -to the needs of the population. The World War II era has been engraved in the hearts and minds of the inhabitants of the ghettos and concentration camps as the "period of bitter disappointment with the Red Cross." Those interned in the impermeable world of the concentration camps had no knowledge whatsoever of the numerous appeals to various countries made by the International Red Cross in its efforts to provide relief to those in distress. They knew nothing of the extensive net1

Many people in Poland did not consider this phenomenon a paradox, but rather part of a Nazi plot.

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B Y S T A N D E R S T O THE H O L O C A U S T

MEIR DWORZECKI the relief begun, who supported it, and when was it stopped? The terms "aid" and "relief' include the provision of food, medical supplies, clothing, etc. — What rescue attempts were undertaken on behalf of those being murdered and those whose lives were in danger? The term "rescue attempts" includes all activities to save the lives of persecuted Jews, for example: appealing to the authorities of the Reich and other satellite states to prevent deportations; informing the public throughout the world of the mass murder of the Jews; calling for the intervention of governments, international organizations, and public opinion on behalf of those being persecuted and exterminated; extending the official protection of the Red Cross to groups of Jews, to ghettos, camps, hospitals, children's homes, etc.; distributing certificates of protection to those being persecuted, etc.; visiting the ghettos and concentration camps in order to verify the facts. In the wake of the above questions, additional queries must be dealt with: — When did the International Committee of the Red Cross demand from the German authorities 'that they stop the extermination of the Jews? When did it present such an appeal to the Nazi satellites? What were the official replies and what action was subsequently taken by the International Committee of the Red Cross? — When did the International Red Cross receive information regarding the extermination operations carried out by the Einsatzgruppen and the mass murder in the death camps? Why did the R e d Cross believe that it was not its duty to alert the world on this matter? What considerations prevented the organization from doing so? What did it have to lose? What is our opinion today on this "policy of silence"? — When and why did the International Committee change its policy vis-ä-vis the rescue of Jews, a change which led to its active intervention in some countries, such as Hungary, during the final stages of the war? These are the questions which I hope to deal with in the research I am conducting on the International Committee of the R e d Cross and its policy vis-ä-vis the Jews in the countries occupied by the Nazis. This study is based on documents from: the International Com-

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mittee of the Red Cross and the International League of the Red Cross, World Jewish Congress, the Central Zionist Archives, Yad Vashem Archives, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) Oeuvre de Secours aux Enfants (OSE), the Ecumenical Committee of Christian Churches, Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (Paris), etc. The International Committee of the Red Cross attempted to extend aid in many occupied countries: Poland, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Holland, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, the Baltic countries, etc. The International Committee also maintained contact with the national societies of the Red Cross in Germany, Britain, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, the United States, etc. as well as with many national and international organizations whose purpose was to aid refugees, women, and children. Due to the abundance of material, within the framework of this short lecture I shall only be able to deal with the major problems regarding the policy of the Red Cross during World War II, the activities it attempted, and its major failures. The International Committee, the League, the Mixed Commission, and the Geneva Convention Within the organization known as the International Red Cross one must distinguish between the International Committee of the Red Cross (Comite International de la Croix Rouge) and the International League of Red Cross Societies (Ligue des Societes de la Croix-Rouge). The former is arnon-govemmental institution composed of 20-25 members, all of whom are Swiss citizens, mostly from the canton of Geneva. Membership in the International Committee is an honorary position. The members are usually scions of distinguished families of considerable means, who are able to work without remuneration. Members of the International Committee are not elected; when a position is vacated, a new member is co-opted by general approval. Despite its name, the International Committee is a Swiss institution which assumed the task of protecting wounded soldiers and prisoners of war, and eventually realized that it should also extend its protection to civilians suffering from famine, disease, and discrimination

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in times of war or distress. The Committee is a private and independent body. It traditionally operates solely in accordance with the authority vested in it by the Geneva Convention, and does not follow the directives of any government. The seat of the International Committee is in Geneva. The principle that only Swiss citizens serve on the International Committee is based on the fact that Switzerland maintains its neutrality in every war. The International League of the Red Cross constitutes an international union of all the national societies of the Red Cross. The task of the League is to ensure international cooperation in the areas of relief and welfare, especially in times of natural disasters, plagues, earthquakes, etc. The staff of the League is composed of representatives from various countries; its seat was originally in Paris, but during the war it was moved to Geneva. In times of war, the League cannot deal direotly with all the abovementioned areas of activity; it can only operate through the International Committee. During World War II, neither the Jewish Agency nor the Magen David Adorn were members of the International League. The interests of Eretz Israel, then under the British Mandate, were represented by the British Government and the National Society of the British Red Cross. (Incidentally, to this day Israel is not an official member of the Red Cross, but this is not the place to list the reasons for this situation.) The governments, which have signed or are about to sign the Geneva Convention, are invited by the Swiss Government to participate in diplomatic conferences which are held at infrequent intervals. The purpose of these diplomatic conferences is to draft and ratify new international treaties concerning the Red Cross and to introduce changes in existing conventions. The last diplomatic conference before World War II was held in 1929. In times of war, all the activities of the International Red Cross are carried out by the International Committee in Geneva and the representatives it dispatches to belligerent and non-belligerent countries. In July 1941, when it became clear that the matter of extending relief to the civilian population constituted an urgent and weighty problem, the Mixed Relief Commission of the International Red Cross

CCommission Mixte de Secours de la Croix-Rouge International) was

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founded upon the initiative of the International Committee and with the aid of the League; it was composed of representatives of both organizations. The task of the Commission was to carry out relief operations for the civilian population, and especially for women and children. Its duties included determining the needs of the population in belligerent countries, obtaining import licenses from the authorities, sending consignments of commodities, and ensuring their arrival. The Commission was composed of two representatives of the International Committee, two representatives of the League, and one representative appointed jointly by both institutions. Max Huber, one of the world's foremost international jurists, who had previously served as the Swiss representative to the International Court of Justice and had represented Switzerland at various international conferences, served as the President of the International Committee until December 4, 1944. He was followed by Professor Carl J. Burckhardt, 3 who simultaneously served as President of the Mixed Commission and had until then been a member of the International Committee. Prisoners

of War

Most of the concrete, beneficial activities carried out by the International Committee during World War II were on behalf of prisoners of war. Approximately two million prisoners of war benefitted from this assistance; about four hundred million packages valued at close to three billion Swiss francs4 were dispatched, while tens of millions of letters and messages were exchanged between prisoners of war and their relatives. At first, it seemed that the assistance was one-sided, since most of those aided were from armies fighting against the Third Reich. The German military authorities, however, apparently appreciated the fact that one can never tell what the future may bring. Indeed, by the end of the war, most of the prisoners being aided were from the German Army. It should be noted that even with regard to the treatment of prisoners of war, Germany only honored certain aspects of the Geneva Con« Ibid., p. 75. * Ibid., p. 49.

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vention. Thus, for example, they divided the prisoners of war into the following categories: 1) British and American (including the Jewish soldiers in the armies of these countries) — They benefitted from all the rights and privileges granted to prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention because their countries had not been conquered by the Third Reich. In the prisoners' world they were known as "privileged prisoners" (prisonniers privilegies)·, 2) French — after the Germans signed a special agreement on the matter with the Vichy government; 3) Norwegians — perhaps because they were considered Aryans; 4) Belgians and Dutch; 5) Greeks and Yugoslavs; 6) Poles; 7) Jewish prisoners of war who had served in the armies of the occupied countries and especially the Polish Army — they were subjected to all sorts of 'tortures and were badly mistreated. Of the 420,000 Polish soldiers captured by the Germans in September 1939, about 61,000 (15%) were Jewish.3 The majority were initially transferred to camps called Stammlagern in Eastern Prussia and Pomerania. They received smaller food rations than the Poles, and their living conditions were far worse. In one of the camps, the Jewish soldiers were forced to wear a special triangle on their backs.® During the early months of 1940, the Germans released the Jewish prisoners of war from these camps. The prisoners were returned to the General Government, where they had to take off their military uniforms and once again become "common Jews." In this manner they lost their rights and privileges as prisoners of war (who were protected by the Geneva Convention), and thus had to share the fate of the Jewish community—persecution, expulsion, ghettoization, deportation to concentration camps, and eventually extermination.7 After their "release," many Jewish prisoners were cruelly and mercilessly deported. In February 1940, in extremely cold weather, approximately 700 Jewish prisoners from various parts of Eastern Poland were de5 6 T

Israel Cohen, The Jews in the War, second edition, London, 1943. Ringelblum Archives, Section I, No. 94. Ringelblum Archives, Section I, No. 4-117, 1392.

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ported to Lublin and then forced to march through Piaski and Lubartow. Hundreds were shot en route by the Germans.8 Jewish prisoners from Eastern Poland who had arrived in Lublin were interned in the prison camp at 7 Lipova Street. These soldiers were liquidated in November 1943 during the infamous "Erntefest" 9 operation. On the other hand, Jewish officers in the Polish army remained together with their fellow Polish officers in camps called Of flag.10 Nonetheless, there were instances in which Jewish officers were taken from these camps (Offlag XIA, XIIA, IID, and IIE) and exterminated. In other camps, they were forced to live in ghettos which were established for them. To this day, it is not clear whether the International Red Cross knew about the "release" of the Polish Jewish prisoners of war, which led to the murder of the 700 men who marched from Lublin and those who were interned at 7 Lipova Street in that city. Furthermore, did the Red Cross know about the execution of the Jewish officers who were removed from the three prisoner of war camps? Did the protection of the International Red Cross extend to them as well? 8) Soviet prisoners of war — their position was the worst of all. The Germans refused to acknowledge their status, claiming that the U.S.S.R. had not signed the Geneva Convention. Thus the Reich authorities refused to allow the International Committee to extend its protection to Soviet prisoners of war. According to Soviet statistics, of the two million prisoners of war who were captured by the Germans, half died of famine, hard labor, disease, and torture. In all concentrations of Soviet prisoners, the "political commissars" (Politruks) were separated from the rest of the soldiers and were executed on the spot. A similar fate befell Soviet Jewish prisoners; they too were immediately murdered. Aside from those who were able to pose as 8

9

10

Moshe Yoseph Feigenbaum, Podlashe In Umkum, Munich, 1948, p. 13; Nachman Blumental, "Le-Korot ha-Shoa Shel Lublin," Enziklopedia Shel Galuyot, Vol. 5 (Lublin), Jerusalem, 5716 (1956), pp. 671-676. Nachman Blumental and Joseph Kermish, "Yehudim be-Ma'avak ha-Mezuyan ha-Anti-Nazi," Mool ha-Oyev ha-Nazi, Tel-Aviv, 1961, p. 18. 1961, p. 18. Polish Charges Against German War Criminals, submitted to the United Nations War Crimes Commission by Dr. Marian Muszkat, Warsaw, 1948, p. 114.

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Russians and hide their Jewish identity, there were no Jews in any of the camps set up in the Third Reich and its satellites for Soviet prisoners of war. Most of the official reports of the International Committee naturally are devoted to the successes of the Committee in its activities on behalf of prisoners of war. The German Red Cross The assistance provided by the International-Red Cross in the occupied countries should have been given through the German Red Cross (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz — D.R.K.). This organization was headed, however, by members of the S.S. whose main intention was not only to defeat the enemy, but to destroy him.11 Aiding the civilian population of the occupied territories, and especially the Jews, was obviously contrary to their philosophy. S.S. Brigadeführer Dr. Robert Grawitz, served as the Chairman of the German Red Cross during World War II. Since 1939, he had headed the Reichsarzt S.S. (S.S. Health Services), a post he held until the end of World War II when, with the Allied forces approaching Berlin, he committed suicide. Grawitz was considered ex officio responsible for all the medical atrocities and criminal experiments performed by the S.S. doctors, and this was the reason for his suicide. He epitomized the moral treachery of the Nazi doctors. A large staff of Allgemeine-S.S. and Waffen-S.S. doctors were at his disposal. Grawitz was also in charge of the health services in the concentration camps, which were entrusted to the murderer, Dr. Eno Lolling.12 Grawitz's successor as Chairman of the German Red Cross was Professor Karl Gebhardt, Heinrich Himmlers' personal physician. He was sentenced to death by hanging for the medical crimes he com11

12

In October 1941, Dr. Adolf Pokorny wrote to Himmler, "I was guided by the thought that we must not only defeat the enemy but destroy him as well." Document N0-035, Nuremberg Documents, Blue Series, XXXVIII, pp. 221-223. For details on the criminal medical activities of Dr. Grawitz and Prof. Gebhardt, the heads of the German Red Cross, see Francois Bayle, Croix

Gammee Contre Caducee, Neustadt, 1950.

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mitted against defenseless camp inmates at the Doctors' Trial held on August 27, 1947. The sentence was carried out in 1948. The actions of the leaders of the German Red Cross represented the very antithesis of the humanitarian principles of the International Red Cross. The administrative Chairman of the German Red Cross was Dr. Grawitz, while the "representative" Chairman was Count Von Coburg. S.S. Obersturmbannführer Dr. Berning, was in charge of the Führungsabteilung (Administrative Department). We know nothing of any opposition on their part to Grawitz's activities. In mid-1943, Hitler intended to withdraw the German Red Cross from the International Red Cross. Needless to say 'the abovementioned leaders of 'the German Red Cross agreed to the proposed move. Friedrich Forrer writes that Hartmann, who was in charge of the Office of External Affairs of the German Red Cross in Geneva, met with Ernst Von Weizsäcker, who served as Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office until 1943, and influenced him to persuade the authorities that, for considerations of efficiency, they should support the continued affiliation of the German Red Cross with the International Red Cross. 13 Hitler agreed therefore to allow the German Red Cross to remain a member of the international organization. Lack of Information Regarding the Activities of the German Red Cross We do not know many details about the activities of the German Red Cross during the war. It is obvious, however, that its position was difficult and quite anomalous. How could they, as members of the Red Cross, bring aid and relief to the civilian population in the occupied countries, among whom there were Jews, at the same time that they, as Nazis, desired the extermination of these people by disease, famine, and deportation to the gas chambers? Surely a contradiction in terms ! ! We know of no intervention on the part of the German Red Cross on behalf of the Jews being persecuted. Nor do we know of any 13

Friedrich Forrer, "Hundert Jahre Rotes Kreux," Der Monat, October 1963, pp. 44-50 (hereafter — Forrer).

No. 181,

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member of the German Red Cross who took a risk in order to aid those being deported to death. The activities of the German Red Cross were therefore vague and inefficient. The members of the organization who had good intentions merely delivered the "gifts" from abroad as long as the parcels continued to arrive and the civilians remained where they were and were not yet executed. Yet it seems that the members of the German Red Cross engaged in deceiving the public both in Europe and abroad. A document concerning the concentration camp at Theresienstadt will prove this point.14 The Limitations of Swiss Neutrality During World War II It is a known fact that the Swiss Government always, and especially during wartime, saw to it that the head of the International Committee would not take any steps liable to harm the vital interests of Switzerland, and especially its neutrality, which ensured the country's independence and tranquillity. During World War Π, the Swiss security situation was completely different than it had been during World War I, when Switzerland found itself between the two belligerent camps. During the Second World War, it was surrounded on all sides by only one combattant bloc — the Third Reich and its satellites. It had no alternative, therefore, but to conduct most of its commerce with Axis-controlled areas. From the economic standpoint, Switzerland became one enormous factory to supply Germany and Italy and their satellites. There were approximately 200,000 Italian and German citizens in Switzerland, some of whom were Nazis or fascists. In addition, there were Nazi and pro-fascist political parties in Switzerland, whose members were Swiss citizens. The influence of these groups upon Swiss public opinion should be researched. Switzerland, which was known throughout the world as a country with a tradition of extending refuge to all those seeking political asylum, did not excel in this respect vis-ä-vis the Jews. The initial indi14

In his book Theresienstadt, 1941-1945; das Antlitz einer Zwangsgemeinschaft, Tubingen, 1960 (hereafter—Adler), Η. G. Adler cites the November 8, 1943 reply of the German Red Cross to the enquiry of the Danish Red Cross regarding the fate of the Danish Jews deported to Theresienstadt.

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cations of this 'tendency were already evident for several years prior to the outbreak of World War II. The case of Dr. Heinrich Rothmund is well-known. Rothmund, the Swiss delegate to the Evian Conference in July 1938, threatened that his country, with the aid of the Vienna police, would take steps to prevent itself from being inundated by Jews. (At the time, there were 10,000 refugees in Switzerland.) His name was also affiliated with the initiative to stamp the passports of German Jews with the letter "J" (for Jude). The cruel behavior of the Swiss border police toward the Jewish refugees from France, who crossed the Swiss border illegally in order to save themselves, aroused the wrath of the Swiss press as well as local public opinion. It should be noted, however, that from 1940 to 1944, Switzerland lived in constant fear of an invasion by the Germans. There were times, especially during the initial stage of the war, when the Swiss expected an immediate German invasion. (At that time, the World Jewish Congress in Geneva burned its archives, and therefore few documents exist from the period from 1939 to the beginning of 1941.) Thus, Swiss neutrality during World War II was not as strict and absolute as it had been during World War I. Jewish Hopes Regarding the Relief and Rescue Activities of the Red Cross Without being acquainted with the details of the international treaties and the internal structure of the organization, the peoples of all nations viewed the International Red Cross as the protector of prisoners. They considered the Red Cross an international, humanitarian institution which protected the imprisoned, the wounded, and the civilian population in times of famine, plague, and persecution. The Red Cross was considered an anchor of rescue for all those suffering and persecuted, and the Jews, of course, pinned special hopes on this institution. The masses of camp inmates, as well as the Jews in the Free World and in Nazi-occupied territory, hoped that the International Red Cross and its various institutions would protect them, in accordance with the humanitarian laws, whose standard-bearer the Red Cross had been at all times, and especially during periods of war and distress. For this reason, the Internationa! Committee received so many ap-

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peals from Jewish institutions and personages during the .course of the war. For this reason, there has been so much interest in the role played by the International Committee — interest not only in its success in helping the prisoners of war of many nations (thereby earning the admiration of the entire world), but also regarding its failures — what it was prevented from doing either due to lack of opportunity or mistaken calculations, and its policy regarding the struggle to save the lives of those interned in the ghettos and camps.

The Various Stages of the Activities and Policy of the International Committee There were several different stages in the policy and activities of the International Committee vis-ä-vis camp inmates of all nations and Jews during the period of the deportations and exterminations. Thus World War II can be divided as follows: 1) From September 1939 until June 22, 1941 — the period of the "mild terror campaign" conducted by the Germans throughout the occupied countries. During this period, the International Committee was of the opinion that it must accept the German position that it had no authority to intervene in matters concerning ghetto and camp inmates, who constituted a threat to the security of the Reich. The only thing it could do was, from time to time, to send food packages to the occupied countries, which were distributed in accordance with the directives of the German Red Cross. 2) From summer 1941 until summer 1944 — the period of mass deportations and the mass extermination of Jews in the death camps. During this period, international and Jewish institutions demanded that the International Committee publicly protest the mass exterminations and publicly intervene on behalf of those being murdered. The International Committee was certain, however, that public intervention on behalf of camp and ghetto inmates was liable to worsen their situation. At the same time, it tried, to the 'best of its ability, to send food packages to those camp prisoners whose addresses it possessed. 3) The latter half of 1944 — the period of intervention by the International Committee. In July 1944, following the intervention of Pope Pius XII, President Roosevelt, the King of Sweden, etc., the International Committee finally intervened by appealing to Horthy to

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stop the deportation of Jews from Hungary. It was during this period that the Red Cross made its tragic and grotesque visit to Theresienstadt (June 23, 1944). 4) From January 1945 until the end of the war — the chaotic period of the "death marches" and the German retreat. During this period, the International Committee vigorously and emphatically demanded that it be allowed to visit concentration camps. In addition, Professor Burckhardt appealed to Tiso on January 2, 1945, and met with Kaltenbrunner on March 12, 1945, a meeting which led to a turnabout. During this period, Count Bernadotte contacted members of the S.S. and several energetic, but belated, attempts were made to save the remnants of the camps. Accusations Levelled Against the International

Committee

The inmates of the camps and ghettos realized that the German authorities were not only preventing the International Committee from protecting them, as well as the rest of the civilian population, but were also most certainly, refusing to allow representatives of the Committee to visit the ghettos and camps. Nonetheless, the question arises: If the Germans were preventing the International Committee from protecting the population in Nazi-occupied countries, why did the Committee not reciprocate and threaten to retaliate by refusing to extend aid to the German population living in the countries fighting against the Third Reich? At the beginning of the war, there already was a measure of anxiety in the Free World, and even in Switzerland, that to a certain extent the International Committee was ignoring the destruction of European Jewry.15 15

Thus, for example, the following document of November 10, 1940: On November 9, 1940, Mrs. Carola Kaufman, the representative of WIZO in Basel heard a lecture by Mrs. Spoerri, a representative of the International Committee, on its activities during the war. In a letter which she wrote to the speaker, Mrs. Kaufman claims emphatically that, "You did not even mention the fate of the persecuted Jews. Are you of the opinion that the International Committee of the Red Cross should not deal with the fate of the Jews?" In addition, she notes that as early as 1939, on the eve of the war, she demanded that the International Committee do something to alle-

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We have many reports of appeals for relief and rescue which were submitted by Jewish institutions — both national and international — to the International Committee. There are also many replies from the International Committee regarding the packages sent to Jews in the occupied countries, dates of dispatch, lists of contents, etc. The replies regarding rescue, however, are very reserved, they do not even allude to operations designed to rescue those being exterminated. There was a great deal of tension and many disagreements between international Jewish organizations, such as the World Jewish Congress, and the International Committee. Let us mention, for example, the sharp letter on this matter which Professor Aryeh Tartakower and Dr. Aryeh Kubovy, the American representatives of the World Jewish Congress, sent on December 10, 1943 to Dr. Marc Peter, the representative of the International Red Cross. On January 5, 1944, a dramatic discussion took place between Dr. Kubovy and Dr. Peter. (A report on the discussion was transmitted on that same day to the Executive of the World Jewish Congress.) "Dr. Peter: What can we do with great power which is determined to exterminate a race? . . . What are we able to accomplish if a government decides; these are my enemies, I want to arrest them, they are my prisoners, you will not see them, you will not assist them? . . . We cannot tell the German government: 'If you don't behave we will withdraw our protection and our assistance from the prisoners of war and civilian internees belonging to your nationality.' "10

In this case, the International Committee of the Red Cross adopted principles which though seemingly justified were really highly questionable from the point of view of morality. "The International Committee cannot threaten sanctions," and it certainly "does not implement sanctions. It helps whomever it can, without preconditions." Why did the International Committee not arouse the entire world regarding the systematic murder of the Jews? When did the International Committee become aware of the mass exterminations? After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 and

10

viate the plight of the persecuted Jews. Out a sense of anxiety regarding the future she asks, "What is the fate of Jewish women in Germany, Poland, Austria, Belgium, Holland and France?" Aryeh L. Kubovy, "The Silence of Pope Pius XII and the Beginnings of the «Jewish Document,'" Yad Vashem Studies, Vol. 6, 1967, pp. 9-10.

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the beginning of the murderous activities of the Einsatzgruppen throughout Russia, vague reports on mass murders of Jews in the cities and towns occupied by the Nazis began to spread throughout the world. At the same time, however, exaggerated reports on the evacuation of Jews from the battle zones to the Russian interior reached the Free World. According to a rumor which was published in the Jewish press in Anglo-Saxon countries, almost two million Jews were thus saved by the Soviets from extermination. In fact, the Chief Rabbi of the British Empire publically thanked the Soviet authorities for their efforts. These rumors weakened the impression made by the news of the mass murders. It seems that the public believed that most of the Jews of the Ukraine, White Russia, Bessarabia, and the Baltic countries had been evacuated by the Soviets, and in this manner had been saved. Soon afterwards, the rest of the world began to receive vague reports on mass murder in Eastern Galiria and mass deportations of Polish Jews to concentration camps. At that time, it was difficult for those in the Free World to believe that the extermination of millions was being systematically organized in death camps established for that very purpose. It was very difficult to distinguish between rumors and the truth. There are differences of opinion regarding the date when the facts regarding the mass extermination of Jews were finally confirmed. In the occupied countries, there was already a deep-seated feeling among various sectors of the Jewish population regarding the mass exterminations during the first months following the German occupation. A proclamation published in the Vilna Ghetto on January 1, 1942, stated: "Hitler is plotting to exterminate all the Jews of Europe. It has befallen us to be the first in line." Another example is the letter which the rabbis of Slovakia wrote on March 6, 1942 to Monsignor Tiso, the President of the Slovak Republic, concerning the impending deportation of Slovak Jewry to the East: "Under the existing circumstances, the meaning of this fact [the deportations] is the physical destruction of the Jews of Slovakia." News of the mass exterminations was circulated throughout the world and especially in Geneva, the seat of the International Committee. On May 22, 1942, the report of the Bund reached London. The report stated that, 'The Nazis have begun the physical extermination

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MEIR DWORZECKI of the Jewish population on Polish soil." On June 2, 1942, a summary of the report was broadcast by the B.B.C. On June 6, in a broadcast to 'the Allies, Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile, asserted that, "The extermination of the Jews is being carried out on an unbelievable scale." On June 9, in a broadcast over B.B.C. Sikorski stated that, "The Jewish population in Poland has been sentenced to death." On June 10, upon the initiative of its two Jewish members, Dr. Ignacy Schwarzbart and Szmul Zygielbojm, the Polish National Council in London issued a declaration to all the parliaments of the Free World which contäined the information on the atrocities committed by the Nazis which had reached the Polish Government. On June 26, in a broadcast to Europe over B.B.C., Zygielbojm presented a summary of the report of the Bund. On July 8, the Polish Government-in-Exile in London reiterated the plea it had issued in June, adding that it now had new material proving the planned slaughter of the entire Jewish population of Poland. On July 21, President Roosevelt sent the following announcement to the mass rally held in New York, "The perpetrators of these crimes.. will be punished on the day of reckoning." On August 5, John G. Winant, the American Ambassador to England, dispatched a personal report to President Roosevelt on Nazi atrocities. By May 1942, vague accounts about the use of gas vans had already reached Geneva. At the end of July and beginning of August, news of the mass extermination of Jews in different countries reached the World Jewish Congress. In August 1942, Gabriel Zivian, a Jewish refugee, arrived in Geneva. (He had been transferred from Malines, Belgium to the Stalingrad area, but later escaped to Paris in a freight car and eventually reached Switzerland.) He brought with him a report on the large-scale massacres which had been carried out nine months previously in Riga during the winter of 1941. At the end of July and beginning of August 1942, reports were received in Geneva of the mass deportations being carried out all over Western Europe (France, Holland, and Belgium) and of the increase in deportations from the Protektorat, Berlin, Vienna, etc. At the same time, Isaac Sternbuch, head of HIJEFS (Schweize-

rischer Hilfsverein für Jüdische Flüchtlinge im Ausland) in Montreux, and the Swiss representative of the Vaad ha-Hatzala

founded by the

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Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada, sent information to the World Jewish Congress in Geneva on the mass deportations from the Warsaw Ghetto. When did reliable reports on the mass extermination — news based not merely on rumors but on information received from German sources — begin to reach the Free World? Such news was certainly also received from other sources, such as German soldiers returning home on leave, wounded German soldiers who were hospitalized, and Jews who had escaped from freight cars and extermination camps. Eventually all this news reached Switzerland. Jewish groups in Switzerland, and especially the World Jewish Congress, brought the abovementioned news to the attention of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Moreover, we have reason to believe that the International Committee also received reliable information from non-Jewish sources. (We shall endeavor to prove this in our comprehensive research.)" Public opinion throughout the world, and also among Jews, was 17

Arthur Morse, in his book While Six Million Died, New York, 1968, relates that on August 8, 1942, Gerhardt Riegner, the representative of the World Jewish Congress in Geneva, relayed the news of the extermination of the Jews to Howard Elting Jr., the American vice consul in Geneva and requested that the information be cabled to Rabbi Stephen Wise in New York and to the American Government. The cable begins as follows: "Received alarming report that in Führer's headquarters plan discussed and under consideration according to which all Jews in countries occupied or controlled Germany... should after deportation and concentration in East be exterminated..." Riegner related in his testimony that he knew as early as the end of July that the Germans had begun the systematic mass extermination of the Jews. According to this information, the "deportations" meant extermination, which was apparently being carried out by means of prussic acid. In late July, a German, who owned an ammunition factory which employed 30,000 workers and who therefore had entree to Hitler's headquarters, arrived in Berne. In order to "ease his conscience" he gave the information to a Jewish acquaintance, who was a well-known merchant in Berne. The latter informed Dr. Benjamin Segalowitz, Director of the Press Office of the Association of Jewish Communities in Switzerland, who in turn told Dr. Riegner. Riegner related in his testimony that he feared that the Americans would not relay the information to Stephen Wise so he turned to the British Embassy and asked to transmit the cable to Sydney Silverman, head of the British Section

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skeptical about the news of the annihilation of the Jews which appeared in the press in the Free World. (They feared that the reports contained exaggerations, lies, and false rumors, which were fabricated to be used as atrocity propaganda against the Nazis.) There is no doubt that had the International Committee, the most reliable of public institutions, publicized this information as a form of protest against the mass exterminations and called upon the governments of the world and the Vatican to aid those being murdered, it would have led to a turnabout in the policies of the Allies as well as that of the Vatican — both of whom ignored the destruction of- the Jews in Nazi-occupied territory or tended not to believe the news and even questioned the veracity of the reports from Jewish sources. The International Committee and its Reaction to the Criticism of its Policy Toward the Inmates of the Camps and its Silence Regarding the Extermination of the Jews The International Committee is aware of the widespread criticism of its policies during World War II. of the World Jewish Congress, with the request that the latter relay the message to Wise. Indeed, the Americans did not pass the cable on to Wise, but Silverman did. Wise turned to the Protestant priest Holmes who was about to go to Geneva to participate in the Ecumenical Council of Churches and asked him to check the details of the message. Following a discussion with Riegner, Holmes cabled Wise that the deportations meant extermination. In the November 1968 issue of the Swiss Zionist monthly, Das Neue Israel, Dr. Riegner confirms in a letter to the editor that the German industrialist gave the secret information to Dr. Segalowitz. Shlomo Derech presents a different version of the events in his introduction to the Hebrew edition of Morse's book (Ve-ha-Olam Shatak Eit Nispu Shisha Millionim, Tel-Aviv, 1972). According to Derech, Dr. Posner [Pazner] of the Jewish Agency received the news on the implementation of the extermination from the noted Swiss professor Edgar Sallin who had been so informed by Artur Sommer, a member of the German delegation which had come to Switzerland to conduct economic negotiations. Posner gave the information to V.C. Farrell, head of the British Office for Consular Supervision in Geneva (who also served at that time as the director of British Intelligence in Switzerland) and he sent the news to England. According to Sallin, the information was transmitted to Washington via the direct telephone line of the American ambassador. Posner relayed the same information orally and in writing to Jewish organizations and personages in Switzerland and Istanbul who were in charge of relief and rescue activities.

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In 1947, the International Committee published a book entitled Inter Arma Caritas, which contains a survey of the activities of the International Committee during World War II and includes a polemic aimed at the critics of the Committee's policy. The book 'begins with the following paragraph which is typical of its contents: "Eight thousand visits to prisoners of war, and internee camps. 36,000,000 parcels transported and distributed in the camps. 23,500,000 personal letters, 120,000,000 messages transmitted between prisoners of war and their families . . . " Y e s . . . but what about the Soviet prisoners of war? The inmates of concentration camps? What did you do for them?" (p. 7)

Furthermore: "Did the International Committee really do everything it could have done? Did it not fail in the fulfillment of certain duties? How should we judge it — by its achievements or by its failures?" (p. 7)

With regard to the concentration camp internees: "The International Committee wanted to come to the aid of these prisoners. We were told, however, that they were not civilian internees, but suspects arrested for 'security reasons'... Under the guise of 'security measures' wide-scale arrests of entire populations were carried out. Who could have possibly prevented this?" (p. 69)

Regarding the Jews: "She [Germany] placed all those belonging to the Jewish race in a new category, that of second-class human beings. Just as the general laws did not pertain to dogs, cats, or sheep, so they did not pertain to the Jews . . . Therefore, concerning oneself with a Jew, for whatever reason, meant concerning oneself with the entire Jewish problem, that is to say, with the laws and internal policy of a sovereign state. "There are those who feel that under such conditions the best way to act is to bang on the table and stir up a scandal." (p. 73)

The book comments on this in the following manner: "Stirring up a scandal over the Jewish problem would have endangered everyone, without saving a single Jew." (p. 74)

Why did the International Committee not protest publicly against what was occurring? The book returns to this question in the chapter entitled "Difficulties," and presents its case as follows:

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"There are those who say, 'In the face of certain blatant violations of humanitarian laws, you should have, at least, protested and appealed to world opinion!* "To publicly protest? To publicly condemn? For what purpose? What protests and threats have ever changed criminal methods? "Everyone has his mission, and that of the Red Cross is to dress wounds in accordance with its own means. To publicly protest means not only to deviate from its duty, but to prevent the future fulfillment of its duties and cause an immediate severance of relations with the country involved in the matter." (pp. 84-85).

The author of the book asks the reader: "Why is the International Committee accused of failing? Why are there those who state: 'If you were so powerless and helpless, then you are superfluous!'" (p. 100).

A year later, in 1948, the International Committee published the comprehensive three-volume report which we have already referred to above (whose first chapter was written by Max Η über). The report contains comprehensive answers to questions regarding the Committee's methods and policy, why it protested so infrequently, and why it accepted the prohibition on visits to camps and ghettos. Let us briefly summarize these answers. At the beginning of World War II, the International Committee of the Red Cross intended to expand its activities, and to extend its services to civilians. However, the legal principles which enabled the International Committee to protect soldiers were lacking in this case. The International Committee therefore drew up an outline for a convention entitled the "Tokyo Project," which was ratified at the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross in Tokyo in 1934. The charter had to be ratified by a diplomatic conference which was regularly convened by the Swiss Government. The countries involved, however, did not consider such" a conference to be urgent, and therefore the date for the conference was not decided upon until 1939, when it .was agreed that it would be held some time during the following year. The Tokyo Charter was to guarantee legal protection and the right to receive packages to all civilians in enemy hands, in accordance with the already-existent procedures for prisoners of war. The outbreak of the war prevented the convening of the diplomatic conference, and thus the "Tokyo Project" was not ratified. Had the convention been adopted in time, it would have ensured the civilian

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population of the same rights enjoyed by soldiers, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. By September 4, 1939, the International Committee had already put forth a proposal based on the 'Tokyo Project" to help the civilian population. According to its terms, the governments of belligerent nations would determine a "general status" for civilians of belligerents who found themselves in enemy territory in the course of the hostilities. Most countries agreed to grant prisoner of war status to civilians who, upon the outbreak of war, found themselves in enemy territory. These civilians were called "civilian internees." On the basis of this agreement, the International Committee was able to grant these civilians the same treatment it accorded prisoners of war. Thus, during the war, approximately 160,000 civilians, the nationals of fifty countries, enjoyed this special legal status. The belligerent countries, however, did not reach an agreement regarding the status of the civilians living in occupied territories. Thus millions of civilians were deprived of legal protection, and many were deported to concentration camps, where they were exterminated. Many of them, especially the Jews, were considered Schutzhäftlinge, persons on whose behalf no external intervention was possible. The authorities of the Third Reich had unequivocally decided that the fate of these people was an internal matter of the Reich. This issue was the focal point of the controversy between the Jewish organizations and the International Committee. The former demanded that the Red Cross officially declare that it considered the Jews in the ghettos and camps civilian internees, entitled to all the rights accorded by the Geneva Convention, and that it was prepared to assist them according to its provisions. The Jewish institutions hoped that if the civilian internees and the Jewish inmates of the ghettos and camps were given the status of civilian prisoners of war, it would enable the International Committee to supervise the places of internment. This would alleviate the suffering of hundreds of thousands. Years elapsed after Jewish organizations made these demands, but only in July 1944, after the major stages of the extermination process had already been carried out and hundreds of thousands of Jews from

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Hungary had been deported to the death camps, did the International Committee finally take any concrete steps. It was not until October 2, 1944, by which time it was obvious that Germany was going to lose the war, that the International Committee of the Red Cross officially demanded from the German Foreign Minister that the Reich grant the status of civilian prisoners of war to all aliens imprisoned in Germany and the occupied countries. By then, however, it was extremely late. Germany was already in a state of chaos, and the horrible, speedy evacuations of the camps (the infamous death marches), in the course of which tens of'thousands died, had already begun. Difficulties in the Relief Operations Carried Out by the International Committee Our study will encompass the relief operations carried out by the International Committee in each and every country. Of special note was the enormous project to aid those starving in Greece. The International Committee faced several problem in implementing its relief operations: 1) lack of means; 2) lack of channels of communications; 3) the economic warfare between the two belligerent blocs, which prevented the transmission of foodstuffs for prolonged periods of time, and which necessitated a lengthy struggle by the International Committee against the blockade; 4) the Germans' lack of willingness to enable the orderly distribution of the aid in a manner that would ensure that it would indeed reach the camp internees. Hence the quantity of the aid, which was distributed to the civilian population in occupied Europe, was indeed meager in relation to the famine and terrible malnutrition from which the people of those countries suffered. According to Weichert, during the years 1941-1944, the civilian population received parcels of food and medicines worth approximately 150,000,000 Swiss francs from the Mixed Commission of the Red Cross. This aid was distributed to at most four million prisoners of war, whereas the civilian population numbered over one hundred

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million persons. Thus we see how inadequate was the aid sent to the civilian population.

Jewish Institutions Which Aided the Relief Operations of the International Committee Various Jewish organizations contributed funds for the relief operations of the International Committee. The main contributors were: the JDC, World Jewish Congress, the Geneva branch of O.S.E., the Committee for Needy Jews in Poland (Zurich), HIJEFS, "Relico" (Geneva), Agudat Yisrael, the Organization of Polish Jews in Argentina, Bikur Cholim (St. Gallen, Switzerland), and the Committee for the Aid of European Jewry (Stockholm). It is noteworthy that individual Jews also contributed considerable sums toward relief operations, especially in Rumania. *

*

*

We shall devote a few words to the situation in Poland, which had the largest Jewish community in occupied Europe. A general organization called Naizelna Roda Opiekuncza (N.R.O.) was designated the recipient of the Liebesgaben Pakete—relief parcels received from abroad through Red Cross channels. The N.R.O. was made up of five Poles, a Ukranian, and a Jew. The Jews were affiliated with the N.R.O. through the Zydowska Samopomoc Spozleczna (Jewish Organization for Self-Help), headed by Dr. Michael Weichert. Weichert dedicated his memoirs, published in Tel Aviv in Yiddish, to this Jewish committee which received approximately 16% of the aid distributed by the N.R.O. The last period of the organization's activities aroused considerable controversy. Did not the existence of this committee, at a time when Polish Jewry was rapidly being wiped off the face of the earth, lend support to the Germans' claim that there were still Jews in Poland — the proof being that there was a Jewish institution to deal with their material needs? In any event, Weichert's books contain a great deal of material on the activities of this committee, both during the time when its work was appreciated by the Jews in occupied Poland as well as during the period when opinion was divided as to its right to exist.

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Rescue Efforts at the Theresienstadt Camp in the Protektorat — the "Potemkin-Theresienstadt" Presentation Staged for the Representatives of the International Red Cross Czechoslovakia lost its independence on March 15, 1939. One day later, Hitler issued a special order whereby what remained of Czechoslovakia became the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. At the outbreak of the war, there were 92,000 Jews in the Protectorate.18 According to the Nazi statistician ICorherr, by the end of 1942, 69,779 Jews had 'been deported. Most of them were first sent to Theresienstadt and later to the extermination camps in the East, mainly to Auschwitz. According to general estimates, 71,000 Jews from the Protectorate lost their lives during World War II.19 The Theresienstadt camp (the "model camp," camp for "distinguished," and "privileged," individuals, the camp for "West European Jewry") was established in the Protectorate. The International Red Cross devoted a great deal of effort to clarifying the situation of the inmates in this camp. At Theresienstadt, the Nazis staged a fraudulent presentation in order to convince the International Red Cross that the internees were living in some kind of paradise. From June 1943 on, following the receipt of information regarding the difficult situation of those interned at Theresienstadt, the International Red Cross made vigorous efforts to visit the camp. Walter Hartmann, head of the Office of External Affairs (Auslandsamt) of •the German Red Cross, visited Theresienstadt in June 1943.20 He reported his shock at the conditions there to de Pilar, his Swiss colleague on the Joint Relief Committee of the International Red Cross,21 who in tum transmitted the information to Geneva, where the Red Cross began to deal with the problem of helping the inmates of Theresienstadt.22 is Joseph Tenenbaum, Malchut ha-Geza ve-ha-Resha, Jerusalem, 1961, pp. 552-553 (hereafter — Tenenbaum). (The Hebrew edition of Race and Reich, New York, 1956.) 10 Gregory Frumkin, Population Changes in Europe Since 1939, New York, 1951, pp. 47-48. 20 Forrer, p. 47. According to Adler, op. cit., p. 691, the Red Cross delegation arrived in Theresienstadt in August 1943. 21 Forrer, p. 48. 22 Ibid., p. 47.

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Professor Burckardt, the President of the International Red Cross, who had previously been the League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig, strove to enable the German Red Cross to visit Theresienstadt. One of the aims of such a visit would be to ascertain whether the inmates were going to remain in Theresienstadt or eventually be deported to other camps.23 The Reich authorities promised to allow a delegation to visit the camp in July 1944, i.e. after nine months of camp beautification. One of the factors which enabled the visit of the Red Cross delegation to Theresienstadt was the deportation of Danish Jews to this camp. In October 1943, three transports, which contained a total of more than 450 Danish Jews, arrived in Theresienstadt.24 The Danish authorities were very interested in the plight of these Jews, and the Danish Red Cross demanded permission to visit the camp.25 This motivated the authorities at Theresienstadt to carry out the infamous, tragic, and grotesque project of the beautification (Verschönerungsaktion) of Theresienstadt. The purpose of this project was to deceive the delegation by giving them the image of a camp in which life proceeded quietly, normally, and in which the inmates were employed and were taken care of in other respects as well. The person responsible for the beautification project was a Jew named Murmelstein, one of the three members of the Theresienstadt Council of Elders. The roads were cleaned, flowers were planted, a music pavillion was erected, benches were put up in the square, and both a playground (Kinderpavilion) and a recreation hall (Vergnügunsplatz) were set up. Hebrew signs were hung on the morgue. The name « Ibid., p. 48. 21 Letter of the German Red Cross to the Danish Red Cross, November 8, 1943, found in the Arolson International Tracing Service. 23 Adler, op. at., p. 41: Bilag til beretning til folketinget XI, Copenhagen, 1951, (documents 735-745, 754) XIII/3. According to these documents, as early as October 15, 1943, the German Red Cross notified its Danish counterpart that the latter's request to visit Theresienstadt had been presented to the authorities. The request was not rejected, but its implementation would only be possible in a while. On November 19, 1943, Best, the German representative in Denmark, notified the German Foreign Office that the Danish Red Cross had asked the German Red Cross for permission to visit Theresienstadt, "Such a visit will have a calming effect in Denmark."

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"ghetto" was changed to "Jewish settlement area" (Jüdisches Siedlungsgebiet).26 Preparations for the deceitful display continued for nine months. In concentration camp literature, this project was known as "Potemkin-Theresienstadt," after the fake villages set up in Russia by General Potemkin in order to impress Catherine II. Even while the beautification of the camp was taking place, Jews were being deported from Theresienstadt. During this period, the following transports were sent to Auschwitz: 1) May 15, 1944 — 2,503 persons, 119 of whom remained alive; 2) May 16, 1944 — 2,500 Jews, 5 of whom remained alive; 3) May 18, 1944 — 2,500 Jews, 261 of whom remained alive. Moreover, Jacob Edelstein, the Chairman of the Council of Elders, perished in Auschwitz on June 20, 1943, three days before the arrival of the delegation. The visit took place on June 23, 1944." The delegation was composed of Frants Hvass, head of the Political Department of the Danish Foreign Office; Dr. Juel Henningsen, representative of the Danish Red Cross; and Dr. Rossel, representative of the International Red Cross. Representatives of the S.S., among them the two Günther brothers, Von Thadden, representative of the German Foreign Office, and Dr. Heidenkampf, representative of the German Red Cross, also participated in the visit of the delegation. The only Jew accompanying the delegation was a member of the Council of Elders named Eppstein. He wore a top hat (in his role as Bürgermeister) and an automobile and chauffeur were put at his disposal. The chauffeur, who raised his cap "in honor of the Bürgermeister," was an S.S. man dressed in civilian clothes. The building which housed the Council of Elders was renamed Haus der Jüdischen Selbstverwaltung, and its interior was covered with beautiful carpets. There, Eppstein delivered a report on the life of the Jews in Theresienstadt (prepared by the S.S. commanders of the camp), which contained such information as: "The daily ration of every Jew in Theresienstadt is 2,400 calories . . ."28 μ Ibid. For a detailed description of the visit see Adler, op. cit., pp. 161-175. 28 Ibid., p. 693. 27

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Dr. Rossel was permitted to take photographs of Theresienstadt. Hvass and Henningsen sent reports to Denmark on what they had seen and heard in the camp.29 Dr. Rossel presented a report to the International Red Cross which praised Theresienstadt, its independent Jewish administration, the ample supply of food, and the good living conditions. The report also stated that the camp was an Endlager, a final camp from which there were no deportations.30 The cautiously-worded reports of the Danes and the positive reports by Dr. Rossel aroused a wave of protests by Jewish organizations throughout the world. They demanded that another delegation of the International Red Cross be allowed to visit the camp. Such a visit was not permitted until April 6, 1945, when Himmler sought to establish contact with the Allies. Müller and Eichmann took revenge for the grotesque spectacle of June 23, 1944. Eppstein was shot in Theresienstadt on September 27, 1944, and on the following day, 'the deportations from Theresienstadt resumed and were continued for exactly one month. During this period 18,402 people were deported from the camp, leaving only 10,077 Jews in Theresienstadt.31 Appeals and Proposals by the International Red Cross Concerning the Jews of Rumania and Transylvania The International Committee of the Red Cross, together with other international organizations, participated in the following initiatives on behalf of Rumanian Jewry: 20

30

31

Hrass F. Besog in Theresienstadt den 23 Juni 1944, Copenhagen, 1944. According to Adler, ibid., p. 714, this report concludes with admiration for the Jews who under their own self-administration succeeded "in creating such relatively good conditions for their coreligionists and instilled courage and confidence in them to continue living." It ends with the hope that "their stay in Theresienstadt will only be temporary." Adler writes in the 1955 edition of his book, that as far as he knows Dr. Rossell's report was not published and "it is very surprising that the publications of the International Red Cross also do not mention this visit." According to Forrer, however, Dr. Rossel's report was published in 1958, and he related its contents. Adler, op. tit., pp. 693-694.

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1) appeals to the Rumanian Government to cancel the deportation of Rumanian Jews to the Lublin Ghetto; 2) the December 1942 proposal of the Rumanian Government to transfer 70,000 Rumanian Jews to Eretz Israel (a proposal which was never realized); 3) the June 1, 1943 proposal to take the Jews out of Transylvania and transport them in the ships of the International Red Cross (a proposal which was never realized); 4) the proposal by Dr. Charles Kolb, representative of the Red Cross, to take 7,000 Jewish children out of Transnistria. 1. Following the establishment of a concentration point for Jews in Transnistria (approximately 200,000 Jews were sent there), the Reich authorities began to pressure the Rumanian Government to quickly and systematically deport the Jewish population of Rumania to the East. The deportations were due to begin on September 10, 1942, "for the purpose of transferring the Jews to the Lublin Ghetto."32 Some of these would be put to work, while the rest would be given "special treatment." At the same time, vigorous appeals were made to the Antonescus, and especially to the Foreign Minister, Mikhail Antonescu, to cancel these deportations. The active efforts of the following should also be noted: Andrea Cassulo, the Papal Nuncio; M. de Weeks, the Swiss representative; de Rentenswärd, the Swedish representative; and Sefbrad Itiniell, the Turkish representative. Among those who also made appeals on behalf of the Jews were Kolb and Setiger, the representatives of the International Red Cross. These numerous protests and the activities of Rumanian Jewry helped prevent the deportations to the Lublin Ghetto. It may be assumed that the news of German military defeats also had a significant effect on the situation. 32 33

34

Nuremberg Documents, NG—3558-3559. See the article by Dr. Alexander Safran, the Chief Rabbi of Rumania, who was able to influence the Papal Nuncio "LOeuvre de Sauvetage de la Population Juive," in Les Juifs en Europe 1939-1945, Paris, 1949, pp. 208213; Tenenbaum, op. cit., pp. 313-321. Cable of Manfred Killinger, the German Ambassador in Bucharest to the Reich Ministry, December 12, 1942, Nuremberg Trials, Trial No. 11, Document NG—3986.

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2. On December 12, 194233 (after the Rumanian Government had rejected the Germans' suggestion to deport the Jews of Rumania to Lublin), following an appeal by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Marshal Antonescu submitted a proposal whereby 70,00080,000 Rumanian Jews would be transferred to Palestine and Syria,34 on the condition that the Rumanian Government be paid 200,000 lei for every Jew leaving Rumania; in other words, a sum total of approximately sixteen billion lei. In this manner, Antonescu sought to rid himself of a considerable number of Jews, at the same time, receive a huge sum of money. This later led to the proposal for the emigration of 7,000 Jewish children. The Germans did not agree to the proposal, and on June 1, 1943, after six months of correspondence, Manfred Killinger,31 the representative of the Reich in Rumania, was ordered to persuade the Rumanian Government to prevent the emigration of Jews from Rumania, "even if the International Red Cross provides all the necessary ships." However, "The Reich would willingly accept all Jews considered undesirable by the Rumanian Government and deport them to work in the East."30 3. On June 1, 1943, the International Committee of the Red Cross appealed to Antonescu to permit the Jews to leave Transnistria on Red Cross ships. Antonescu replied that he was dissatisfied with the concentrations of Jews in Transnistria and would be very pleased to be rid of them. Killinger, however, met with Marshal Antonescu and ordered him to reject the proposal.37 4. Charles Kolb, the representative of the International Red Cross, who visited Transnistria from December 11 to December 23, 1943, submitted a proposal designed to save 7,000 Jewish children. In April 1944, Antonescu proposed to sell two ships — the "Transylvania" and the "Bessarabia" — to the International Red Cross, so that the latter could transport the Jews to Eretz Israel under its own flag. The belligerent parties, however, refused to grant navigation permits.38 33

Killinger committed suicide on September 2, 1944, following the Soviet occupation of Bucharest. 30 Nuremberg Trials, Green Series, Vol. 14, p. 514. 37 Tenenbaum, op. tit., p. 319. 38 Ibid., p. 320.

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Of all the various rescue proposals — whose scope ranged from 70,000 persons to 7,000 children — only very small operations were actually carried out. Three hundred refugees from Transnistria reached Palestine in March 1944, and another 904 arrived there a month later. The Efforts of the International Red Cross to Aid the Jews of Hungary

We know of the following attempts made by the International Red Cross to stop the deportations from Hungary to the death camps: 1. the appeeal by Professor Huber, representative of the International Red Cross, to Regent Horthy regarding the postponement of the deportations (July 6, 1944); 2. the appeal by Alfred Zollinger, the representative of the International Red Cross in the United States, regarding entry visas to the United States for Hungarian Jews; 3. the extention of International Red Cross protection to children and, afterwards, to the ghettos (October-November 1944); 4. the legendary activities of the Swede, Raoul Wallenberg, to save Hungarian Jewry; to a small extent, he was helped by the Red Cross. 1. By June 17, 1944, 326,000 Jews had been deported from Hungary to Auschwitz (four trains a day, each of which had 45 freight cars and contained an average of 4,000 persons). By the end of 1944, many countries had appealed to the Hungarian Government to allow the departure of certain groups of Jews. (The Swiss requested 10,000 children accompanied by 1,000 adults.) The American War Refugee Board demanded that exit permits be given to all children below the age of ten, so that they could go to Eretz Israel. On June 26, President Roosevelt publicly warned Horthy regarding the mass deportations of Jews. Cordell Hull made two broadcasts (on June 27 and again on July 4) condemning the Hungarian Government for sacrificing half of Hungarian Jewry. The Pope wrote to Horthy on June 25, and on June 30, King Gustav V of Sweden sent Horthy a sharp letter. The International Red Cross joined in these appeals, and on July 6, 1944, its representative, Professor Max Huber, relayed an urgent appeal to Horthy to take the necessary steps "in order to

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refute the rumors and accusations" and to prevent the repetition of the events which gave rise to such terrible rumors.39 On June 30, 1944, Horthy stopped the deportations to Auschwitz (apparently six days before the appeal by the International Red Cross).40 He officially announced the cessation of the deportations in a declaration to the International Committee of the Red Cross on July 18, 1944. The deportations and the death marches resumed after Hungary was overrun by the Nazis. 2. On July 15, 1944, by which time the world already knew of the mass deportations from Hungary and when it seemed apparent that Horthy was inclined to make concessions, Zollinger, the representative of the Red Cross in the United States, delivered an official letter from the International Red Cross in Geneva, which stated that, "the Hungarian Government had announced its readiness to enable the emigration of certain categories of Jews and has announced its readiness to assist in this matter." The Red Cross requested the appropriate number of entry visas to the United States, but weeks passed before the organization received a reply from the State Department. Apparently, one of the reasons for the delay was Britain's refusal to participate in a positive declaration. On August 12, 1944, Undersecretary of State Edward Stettinius Jr. sent American diplomats abroad a cautiously-worded questionnaire requesting them to appeal to the local government in the country in which they were serving to obtain their fundamental consent to receive children from Hungary and France." This document indirectly led to certain positive results. The Swiss Legation issued 7,800 temporary visas for potential immigrants, the Swedish Legation issued 4,500 certificates of protection, and Spain issued 300 passports and 2,000 protective documents. The Papal Nuncio extended the protection of the church to all Jews who had converted (the validity and date of the conversion were interpreted very liberally).« 3. In May 1944, Friedrich Born, a representative of the Interna39

40 41 42

Ibid.., p. 337; Documents sur l'activite du Comite international de la Croix Rouge, en faveur des civils detenus dans les camps de concentration en Allemagne, Geneva, 1947, pp. 60-61 (hereafter — CIRC Documents). Nuremberg Trials, Green Series, Vol. 13, p. 505. Archives of the World Jewish Congress. Tenenbaum, op. cit., p. 346.

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tional Red Cross, arrived in Budapest. Since Spain had announced that it was prepared to admit 800 children to Tangier, and Switzerland had announced that it too was prepared to -allow the entry of children, the Red Cross was requested to take the youngsters under its protection until transit visas through Germany could be obtained. Several houses were rented in order to accommodate the children under the flag of the International Red Cross, and a special department of the Red Cross was established for this purpose. During October and November 1944, the protection of the Red Cross was extended to the more than 30,000 bearers of "certificates of protectibn" — whether legal or forged — in the international ghetto. The International Red Cross granted similar protection to the 90,000 Jews in the ghetto set up in November by the Szalasi regime." Thus we see that during the latter half of 1944, the International Red Cross played a significant role in the efforts to rescue Hungarian Jewry. This was due to the fact that its inordinate neutrality, strict adherence to the rules, and its reservations concerning intervention on behalf of the Jews began to lessen, and the results were positive. 4. We shall not deal here with the rescue activities of Raoul Wallenberg, the Swede whose dangerous diplomatic mission had such significant results and ended so tragically. During the death marches, Wallenberg and the representatives of various legations and members of the Red Cross accompanied the marchers with trucks full of food, medicine, and warm clothes in order to ease their suffering. (Those who possessed certificates of protection were removed from the ranks and thereby rescued.)44 The Rescue Efforts of the International Red Cross in Slovakia We know of efforts made by the International Red Cross on behalf of Slovak Jewry at the end of 1944. George Dunand, a representative of the International Red Cross, arrived in Slovakia from Switzerland at the end of October 1944. Armed with instructions and money from the JDC, he tried to persuade the German and Slovak rulers of the necessity of observing the Ibid. " Ibid.

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elementary rules of humanitarianism with regards to the Jews (and the rebels in Slovakia).45 He met with Dr. Witiska, head of Einzatsgruppe Έ , " and with Brunner, the representative of the Reich Security Main Office {Reichssicherheitshauptamt — R.S.H.A.), who was responsible for the deportation of the Jews from Vienna, France, and Greece. Dunand's initial meetings and his requests to refrain from deporting children who had converted and were residing in monasteries were unsuccessful. His appeal to set up a shelter for Jewish children was rejected by the German Embassy in Slovakia on the grounds that every such refuge would become a center of resistance.40 On January 2, 1945, Dunand relayed an appeal from Professor Burckhardt to President Tiso47 of Slovakia to stop the deportation of the Jews. Monsignor Tiso replied that he was unable to stop the trains and mentioned the "humanitarian principles" which his government had applied in its treatment of the Jews. Thus Dunand's intervention did not succeed in cancelling the deportations.48 The Red Cross was nevertheless able to accomplish something. It helped those Jews from Bratislava who had chosen to go into hiding rather than report for deportation to the camp at Sered. The priests of the neighbouring villages took part in these aid and relief operations. (The inmates of Sered were deported to Theresienstadt; the last of these transports was on March 30, 1945). The First Months of 1945 — Efforts to Save the Survivors of the Camps The initial months of 1945 were the final months of World War II. The fall of the Third Reich was imminent. These were months during which the International Red Cross made great efforts to aid and protect the survivors of the concentration camps during the retreat 45

46

47 48

For details on his activities, see the book he wrote on the Red Cross mission to Slovakia, George Dunand, Ne perdez pas leur trace, Neuchätel, 1950. Documents of the German Foreign Office, Inland Π, Geheim 57/5, K213009, Yad Vashem Archives, AA-K 327. Tiso was sentenced to death in April 1945, and was later executed. Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on its activities during the Second World War (September 1, 1939—June 30, 1947), Vol. I, Geneva, 1948, pp. 646-647.

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of the German Army. During the last months of the war, twelve main concentration camps and approximately one hundred small, affiliated camps (Nebenlagern) were still in operation. It is estimated that these camps held 900,000 Jews and 500,000 non-Jews (the number of people deported to concentration camps is estimated at approximately eight million).49 Despite the fact that during the last months of the war there were indications that Heinrich Himmler was willing to allow the Jews to survive (and thus save his own life), Kaltenbrunner, Heydrich's successor as head of the R.S.H.A., continued the extermination of the camp inmates until the last days of the war. At the end of January 1945, Professor Burckhardt contacted the Foreign Office in Berlin. At that time, the survivors of the camps in Silesia were being forced to go on "death marches" — despite the terrible cold — to Western Germany.50 Professor Burckhardt was assured that the International Red Cross would be permitted to extend aid and relief to the camps. On February 2, 1945, a meeting was held between two representatives of the International Red Cross and those in charge of the "Inspectorate" of the Oranienburg concentration camp: Dr. Lolling, head of health services in the camp, Hoess, the former commandant of Auschwitz, and Berndorf. (The latter two were the deputies of General Inspector Glücks.) The representatives of the Red Cross, however, were not permitted to visit the Oranienburg camp.51 Count Folke Bemadotte, cousin of the Swedish King and ViceChairman of the Swedish Red Cross, was granted a meeting with Himmler on February 17, 1945. He requested the release of the Danes and Norwegians imprisoned in concentration camps.52 Kaltenbrunner, however, sabotaged this modest proposal as well, and it was never implemented.

49

80 51 82

Egon Kogon, Der SS. Staat, Berlin, 1947 (second edition). The estimated number of Jews is exaggerated and is several times larger than the actual number of Jewish prisoners in the camps at that time. Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution, New York, 1953, p. 462. CIRC Documents, pp. 22-23, 94. Graf. Bemadotte, The Curtain Falls, New York, 1945, pp. 43-47, 65-66 (hereafter — Bemadotte).

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THE POLICY OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS

Shortly thereafter, Kaltenbrunner began to initiate his own negotiations with the International Red Cross. On March 12, 1945, he received Professor Burckhardt and announced that he was granting permission to the International Red Cross to send representatives to all the concentration camps in order to help the inmates. Kaltenbrunner expressed his willingness to exchange French and Belgian prisoners for Germans, and Burckhardt was also assured that all the Jewish inmates of Theresienstadt would be returned to their homes." One week later, on March 23, 1945, Müller, the head of the Gestapo, informed Professor Burckhardt that Bergen-Belsen would be handed over intact to the Allies, and that all the Jews in Germany would be concentrated in one place, to which aid from abroad could be sent.54 Until that time, no representatives of the International Red Cross had been permitted to enter any of the concentration camps (with the exception of Theresienstadt). Müller raised the possibility of an additional visit by a delegation to Theresienstadt "in order to put an end to the lies and hostile propaganda." In the meantime, on April 3, 1945, Himmler decided to contact Bernadotte regarding negotiations between himself and General Eisenhower. Bernadette arrived at the Neuengamme camp near Hamburg35 to discuss the matter, and at the same time, members of the International Red Cross also arrived at Neuengamme. On April 6, Eichmann showed the Theresienstadt Ghetto to George Dunand, the representative of the International Red Cross,56 and assured him that no more Jews would be sent there. Dunand felt, however, that due to the advance of the Allied forces, the members of the S.S. were preparing to murder all the inmates of Theresienstadt, and therefore he went to Müller to thwart the plan.87 On April 15, 1945, the promise made to Bernadotte was fulfilled, and 423 Danish Jews were returned to Denmark from Theresienstadt. From May 2 to May 12, 1945, Theresienstadt was under the protection of the International Red Cross. 83 84 55 58 87

CIRC Documents, pp. 22-23. Ibid., pp. 97. Bernadotte, pp. 81, 87. CIRC Documents, p. 599. Ibid., p. 506.

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The Exchange of Jews jor Germans:

"IMPA"

The following matters concerning rescue efforts require special research: 1) the exchange of Jews for Germans; 2)

"IMPA," the special service affiliated with the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In 1942, negotiations were initiated between Germany and Britain, through the mediation of Switzerland, regarding the plan for the exchange of certain Jews for Germans from Eretz Israel. According to a report of the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency, presented to the twenty-second Zionist Congress, 180 Palestinian residents or citizens and the members of their families were exchanged for 320 German citizens who had been living in Palestine. The Germans promised to make up the difference in the next exchange. At the beginning of 1943, the German Foreign Office once again discussed the possibility of exchanging Jews for Germans from the United States, Latin America, and Eretz Israel.58 One month after the first exchange, which took place in early 1943, the second exchange was carried out; 860 Jews, among them 612 from Italy and 222 from Bergen-Belsen, were exchanged for Germans. The Palestine Office in Geneva believed that in order to expand the exchange program and to exploit it, first and foremost, in order to postpone the deportation of Jews, a joint operation should be planned and implemented by the Jewish Agency in Palestine, the Agency delegation in Istanbul, and the Palestine Office in Geneva. Representatives of the Agency in Istanbul and Geneva sent many letters to Jews in various countries such as Holland, Belgium, Hungary, France, and Germany. Most of these letters stated that the recipient had been approved for immigration and would be provided with a certificate. It is known that these letters from the Palestine Office, together with similar letters from the International Committee (IMPA service), en»8 Nathan Eck, "Yehudim Temurat Germanim," Dappim le-Heker ve-ha-Mered, Second Series, Vol. 2, 1973, pp. 23-49.

ha-Shoa

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THE POLICY OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS

abled many Jews to escape deportation time and again. In this way, a number of people survived the war. The offices of the International Committee, which enabled the transmission of information regarding the certificates, which were distributed — whether in reality or merely for appearances sake — according to the instructions of the Palestine Offices, contributed — directly or indirectly — to the rescue of several hundred Jews and the hope for the rescue of many more. Conclusion In this article, we have outlined the activities, achievements, and failures of the International Committee of the Red Cross. We have established a clear distinction between the terms "relief' and "rescue." We noted that the aid and relief sent to prisoners of war was a positive project of which the International Committee can be proud. We also noted that, despite the difficulties created by the war and the blockade, the International Committee, with the aid of the Mixed Commission and various national and international relief organizations, did a great deal to extend aid in the form of food parcels, medicines, and clothing to those in distress in Nazi-occupied territory. In view of the fact, however, that hundreds of millions of civilians required assistance, and that the abovementioned aid only reached a minority, it seems to us that the help extended by the Red Cross was absolutely inadequate when measured in terms of the needs at that time. As far as rescue is concerned, i.e. the rescue of the lives of millions from extermination (the International Committee was already aware of the extermination in the summer of 1942), we must answer the following basic questions: 1. Despite the fact that the German authorities prevented the International Committee from inspecting the concentration camps until mid-1944, did the Committee do everything in its power to gain access to the camps and ghettos? Did it arouse public opinion in the Free World on this matter? 2. Did the International Committee not commit a fatal error by

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refraining from publicizing the atrocities in the concentration camps (of which it was fully aware), and not publicly protesting against the mass extermination? 3. Was not the International Committee's "conspiracy of silence" regarding the extermination of millions, the historical failure of the Red Cross, which to some extent overshadows and obscures its achievements with regard to prisoners of war?

1173

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SWEDEN'S A T T E M P T S TO AID JEWS,

1939-1945*

STEVEN KOBLIK

Pomona College is limited by its size and location in its ability to maintain an independent domestic and foreign policy. In the late thirties, Sweden found itself caught between two aggressive totalitarian states. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939 confirmed the worst fears of Swedes who worried that their country might be cut off from the democratic West. Soviet aggression against Finland in 1939-1940 and the German occupation of Norway and Denmark in April 1940 completed Sweden's isolation. As Foreign Minister Christian Günther wrote in February 1940, Sweden's primary desire was to remain a noncombatant:

S

WEDEN

Sweden's primary goal must be to avoid entanglement in the World War, and all questions must be regarded with that overriding consideration in mind.1 Sweden's determination "to avoid entanglement" in the war led to a flexible neutrality. 2 Policy makers aware of their country's exposed position opted for policies that were least likely to offend any threatening great power. Russia—Sweden's traditional great power nemesis—and Germany presented the greatest danger. The acute fear of a German attack remained throughout the period 1940—1943 and occasionally resurfaced even during the later stages of the war. All international issues, and many domestic issues, were linked directly to the question, "what response will this policy likely produce in Germany?" When faced with important questions—such as aid to its Scandinavian neighbors or continuation of its"humanitarian"efforts to aid distressed peoples—Sweden weighed the potential benefits against potential liabilities. This process sometimes led to inaction or passivity rather than adoption of policies perceived to carry considerable risk. Sweden's response to Germany's policy of extermination of Europe's Jews after 1941 reflects both horror at Germany's action and the caution seemingly demanded by the situation. *This article is based upon research conducted in archives in Sweden, Great Britain, and the United States, and funded by a grant from the Thanks to Scandinavia Foundation of New York, whose purpose is to commemorate the services of the Scandinavian peoples in saving persons of the Jewish faith from the holocaust.

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Germany's decision to murder Europe's Jews systematically came at the end of seven years of well-publicized persecution of Jews in Germanheld territories. Initially Hitler's policies were aimed at excluding Jews from German life and forcing them to emigrate to other—preferably non-European—countries. Only after German successes in the war did Hitler and his closest advisers conclude that a policy of extermination— euphemistically called "the Final Solution"—was desirable and possible. In the summer and fall of 1941, various options for killing the Jews were tried and initial planning completed. By January of 1942, virtually the entire bureaucratic structure found itself entrusted with the task of fulfilling its master's wish. Within months, despite the regular demands of the war effort, a reasonably efficient and merciless organization had been created and put into operation to kill Europe's Jews. For two years, this organization was able to operate with few domestic or international constraints. After the war, when the horror of the Final Solution was visible to all, people expressed indignation at German action and claimed prior ignorance of Germany's policies. In the decades after the war, Jews, scholars, and "average citizens" have repeatedly asked how this holocaust could occur. Scholarly studies presented us first with a clearer understanding of events in Germany and Poland. Recently a spate of studies has examined the response of other countries, especially France, Great Britain, and the United States.3 Despite all the work, much of what happened remains unclear. Claims of ignorance are no longer acceptable however; not only was German policy monitored by governments and the press, but individuals and some countries actively tried to aid the Jews. Attempts to aid Jews certainly represent the brightest spot in the darkness of persecution and murder. 4 The fascination with the tragic experience of Anne Frank, the rescue of Denmark's Jewry, and the heroic effort by Raoul Wallenberg in Hungary attest to a wish to honor those who risked their own lives to aid others. Among those who tried to help, Swedes and the Swedish government figured prominently. Without the offer of a home for Denmark's 8,000 Jews, their rescue would not have been possible. Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat, saved approximately 10,000 Jews in Budapest in 1944. (He is credited with indirectly aiding as many as 40,000.) Another Swede in Budapest, the less well-known Valdemar Langlet, rescued a similar number. Folke Bernadotte, vice chairman of the Swedish Red Cross, led a mammoth rescue operation onto German soil itself in the last weeks of the war and brought back to Sweden perhaps as many as 10,000 Jews who were on the verge of death from disease and starvation.

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Sweden's efforts are only partially known, since no one has attempted to provide a complete description of Sweden's activities. Indeed, most interpretations of Sweden's wartime experience suggest that Sweden had no "policy" on the "Jewish question." This view is incorrect, for the Swedish government was well aware of the "Jewish question" after Hitler's accession to power. 5 The "Jewish question" was subordinate to numerous other issues, but its secondary importance should not be confused with absence of policy. Policy existed, even if it was not always consistent or glorious. Until 1938, Sweden's involvement was quite limited. Few Jews sought refuge there. Sweden could little affect German domestic policy. Nonetheless, the Swedes contributed to international efforts under the auspices of the League of Nations to find a "broad solution." Of course none was found. After 1938, the situation changed radically. Increasing numbers of Jews sought a home in Sweden. Immigration policy became a sensitive domestic issue. When Denmark and Norway were occupied in April 1940, helping Europe's Jews had the added implication of threatening Sweden's security. In the late fall of 1942, aware of the Final Solution, Sweden had to decide whether or not, and how, to help Norway's Jews. The Norwegian crisis marked the beginning of a new policy on the Jewish question. It evolved slowly, but by 1944 Sweden was actively engaged on the Continent in helping Jews. What follows is an attempt to describe Sweden's policy toward Jews between 1939-1945. Because the "Jewish problem" did not begin in 1939, it is necessary to examine briefly pre-war policy. Swedish scholars and a Swedish parliamentary study have already documented the lack of charity in Sweden's immigration policy. 6 The gradual change toward an active, humanitarian effort represents a significant shift in Swedish policy. No country consistently aided the Jews; few countries did as much as they could have done. Like everyone else's, Sweden's record is mixed. An understanding of the development of Sweden's policy provides an important chapter in the history of the holocaust. "The Jewish problem," as it was called in Swedish documents after January 1933, was a direct product of the Nazis'assumption of power. The Swedish government closely monitored the treatment of Jews f r o m the beginning of the Nazi era. Prominent Swedes, often men with well-known pro-German sympathies, such as King Gustav V and Fredrick Böök, warned Hitler personally as early as the spring of 1933 that anti-semitic acts on the part of the Nazis would lead to German isolation. Swedish Foreign Office archives contain many lengthy and

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detailed reports on the position of Jews in nearly all the Continental states. Almost without exception these reports portrayed "the Jewish problem" as fundamentally a racial one, by which was meant that Jews were a foreign element within the central European states and that a solution could be sought only through some form of international action. It is not difficult to read between the lines of these reports and instructions emanating from the Foreign Office that the Swedish government believed that the only long term solution to "the Jewish problem" was a "non-European" one, i.e., the settlement of European Jews outside Europe—perhaps, but not necessarily, in Palestine. Swedish policy, especially as it developed within the confines of refugee policy of the League of Nations, was cautious but concerned. Sweden wanted to help the persecuted Jews of Germany but not "in Sweden" and not unilaterally. 7 Pressure on Sweden to permit large numbers of Jewish immigrants to enter the country was negligible until 1938. From March 1938 until the fall of 1940, however, increasing numbers of Continental Jews sought refuge in Sweden. Swedish policy became more restrictive, and few Jews were permitted to enter the country. Prior to 1940, for example, only 3,000 Jews had been granted permission to remain. A contemporary British comparison with other European countries indicated the relative niggardliness of Swedish policy: 8 POPULATION

Great Britain France Belgium Netherlands Denmark Norway Sweden

4.7 4.2 8.4 8.6 3.7 2.9 6.3

million million million million million million million

REFUGEES

74,000 42,000 20,000 23,000 "A few hundreds"

0.16% 0.10% 0.24% 0.27% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%

Sweden's own estimate of refugees as a percent of total population as of 1940 was 0.045%, a fifth of the figure for Belgium or Holland. Why had Sweden been so restrictive at this critical juncture when Germany was encouraging Jewish emigration? Sweden's unwillingness to adopt a liberal policy on Jewish immigration prior to 1940 stemmed almost exclusively from domestic considerations. Few Swedes, and virtually no Swedish organizations, argued for a policy that would

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permit large-scale Jewish immigration. Part of the hesitancy was based upon economic fears. Although Sweden suffered comparatively little from the depression, its ramifications were close at hand, and institutions such as trade unions that might be expected to support a liberal refugee policy were often hostile. Most importantly, professional groups voiced loud protests in 1938-1939 because of their fear of a flood of Jewish doctors, lawyers, academics, and other professionals. So, too, a widespread anti-semitism contributed to Sweden's policies. Even Jewish groups, especially the influential Stockholm Temple, favored a policy of limited immigration. They reasoned that a rapid increase in the numbers of Jews in Sweden (approximately 7,000 at that time) would lead to increased outbreaks of anti-semitism and the likelihood of more fascist organizations. As late as 1939, one can find speeches in the Swedish parliament that are openly anti-semitic. There were a few—both Christian and Jew— who pleaded for a more liberal policy, but their voices were lost. Unlike Holland, Sweden would not consider a potential Jewish immigrant as a "political refugee" because of his religion or race, and that meant that few Jews were eligible for immigration. It was a deliberate policy that weighed heavily on the conscience of sympathetic but "pragmatic" politicians such as Sigfrid Hansson, brother of the prime minister, and Gustav Möller, both of whom were responsible for Sweden's immigration policy. Indeed, Möller found himself under attack in 1939 by his fellow Social Democratic members of the parliament for the restrictive character of the policy. "Pragmatism" held, however, that a liberal policy would damage the Social Democrats politically. Prior to 1940, Sweden provided little protection for persecuted Jews. Little change in Swedish immigration policy occurred before Germany stopped the issuance of exit permits for Jews in 1941. Of some consequence is the fact that Swedish policy after the fall of 1941 was to provide a refuge for any Jew who reached the country's borders, but this cannot balance the ramifications of previous policies. The parliamentary commission established after the war to investigate Swedish policy gives many examples of rejected applications that should have—in their view—received positive consideration. The commission's conclusion was "too little, too late." 9 If Sweden's pre-war immigration policy was hardly a bright spot, it varied little in effect from those of other countries. Jewish refugees found the doors of most countries closed. Influential Jewish leaders often hesitated to push their governments to accept greater numbers of

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Jewish refugees. The Nazi implementation of the Final Solution depended to a considerable extent on the failure of countries to respond to the plight of German-held Jews. The policies of these countries, as of Sweden, were based upon a combination of domestic concerns: economic interest, practical politics, and anti-semitism. The important efforts of Sweden to aid Jews began in earnest in late 1942. By that time, Swedish policy makers were less concerned about the possibility of a German attack than they had been for the previous two years. Actually it should be noted that some efforts were made to aid Jews even in the period 1940-1942. For example, Swedish diplomatic officials in Berlin tried to protect Dutch Jews held at the Mauthausen concentration camp. They acted as the representatives of Dutch interests in Germany. Indeed, the role of neutrals such as Sweden to serve as representatives of belligerent interests in warring countries offered Sweden some diplomatic leverage which was of great import in the Hungarian experience in 1944. In 1941-42, Germany rejected all Swedish efforts as "unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of the Third Reich" and refused to cooperate. Swedish diplomats became more pessimistic as an awareness spread of the direction of German policy toward the Jews. By the time heads of German bureaucracies met at Wannsee outside Berlin in J a n u a r y of 1942 to coordinate the "Final Solution," well over one million Jews had already been executed by roving bands of SS death squads. How much did Sweden know about treatment of the Jews and how did that knowledge affect Swedish policy? The Swedish government and the Swedish state church knew a great deal. While specific information about the Wannsee meeting has not been discovered, pertinent Swedish archives are full of careful, accurate reports of German treatment of the Jews. Embassy officials, businessmen, and journalists stationed in central and eastern Europe sent a steady stream of information to Sweden about brutal treatment of the "captive peoples," especially the Jews. By the late summer of 1942, little doubt existed among leading Foreign Office officials, the prime minister, and leading churchmen that Germany had already initiated a systematic campaign to exterminate Europe's Jews. 10 As long as Sweden feared a German attack, this knowledge represented a security risk. In November 1942, however, Sweden found itself faced with an uncomfortable choice: remain silent and witness the destruction of Norway's Jews, or seek to help them and risk German disfavor.

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The case of the Norwegian Jews was a pivotal point for Swedish policy. It was the beginning of a learning process stretching into October 1943, during which time Sweden discovered that it had the possibility to help Jews in ways heretofore believed impossible. The arrest, detention, and transportation of Norway's Jews in November 1942 caught Swedes unprepared, but it caused a massive public protest." The departure of the ship that carried half of Norway's Jews (approximately 700 people) to Poland and their death was reported in all Swedish newspapers and on the radio. Public meetings were held to show solidarity for Norway's Jews. Many pastors gave sermons condemning Germany's policy toward the Jews, and all the bishops of Sweden issued a joint declaration protesting Germany's racial activities. A Gallup poll taken in midDecember indicated that 25% of the respondents named persecution of the Jews in Norway as the evenfthey would most remember from 1942. Stalingrad was a distant second at 12%.12 Pressure from individuals and interest groups, especially the Swedish church, mounted upon the government to take some action to aid the Jews. Per Albin Hansson, the prime minister, wanted to make some effort to help the Norwegians. Although he had previously opposed any Swedish activities that might endanger Sweden's nonbelligerency, he and his top advisers recognized that Stalingrad, El Alamein, and the American landings in North Africa represented a turning point in the war. His willingness to initiate a more openly anti-German policy increased slowly but perceptibly after November 1942—as long as it did not drag Sweden into the war. Hansson's dilemma was how to find a method that would be effective and that would not prompt a preemptive action on the part of Germany. The Swedish government had no preconceived plan. It made two parallel attempts. Diplomatically, Foreign Minister Christian Günther instructed the Swedish minister in Berlin, Arvid Richert, to inquire at the German Foreign office if Germany would permit Sweden to offer the remaining Norwegian Jews (approximately 750) residence in Sweden. Simultaneously the government asked Prince Carl, head of the Swedish Red Cross, to ask his counterpart in Norway if Norway would release the Jews to Sweden. The former approach received a quick and decisive negative response. Throughout the war, Richert and his staff were to remain critical of this type of diplomatic activity and pessimistic about its likely outcome. The Norwegians were apparently caught unprepared by the Swedish request and their negative response was slower in coming. Most importantly, although both approaches received negative

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replies, Sweden was in fact able to provide refuge for most of Norway's remaining Jews—over half the pre-war population. The Norwegian Jews were saved by the same method as other Norwegian refugees who had found a haven in Sweden. Sweden accepted all Norwegians who got across the border. The border is extremely long and unguarded over much of that length. Equally critical was the fact that the Swedish government deliberately kept quiet about their activities. Swedish newspapers that knew what had happened were encouraged not to print stories. As late as 1976, a Swedish secret police official who played an important role in saving Danish Jews in 1943 wrote in his autobiography of the war years that most of the Norwegian Jews perished. 13 The partial success of Sweden's policies concerning Norwegians may have contributed to an expanding willingness to intervene on the Continent to aid Jews. During the first months of 1943, international pressure, particularly in Great Britain and the United States, built for some sort of effort to aid Jews. The Allies had given official credence to the existence of Germany's extermination policies in December 1942, and later the following spring a special conference was held in Bermuda. No specific agendum for action was agreed upon, but calls were frequently made for the neutrals, particularly Switzerland and Sweden, to take the lead in helping the Jews. Sweden, for its own part, was anxious to restore balance in its neutrality policy and wanted to demonstrate to the Western powers that Swedish neutrality had value to the Allied cause. A more active humanitarian policy was an important element in demonstrating the value of Sweden's position. During the first half of 1943, Sweden showed itself willing to try. A Jewish Agency suggestion supported by Great Britain led to a Swedish attempt to transport 20,000 Jewish children from Belgium and France to Sweden. Considerable time and work went into this scheme, but it eventually foundered on Germany's refusal to free "adequate transport." Less spectacular Swedish efforts in Berlin to liberate 30-40 Swedish Jews met with almost total failure. These Jews had been living in Germany at the outset of the war and had not left in time to avoid detention. Some were "mischling"—of mixed Christian-Jewish ancestry— who mistakenly believed that the anti-semitic policies would not be applied to them. Germany's discovery that Sweden had naturalized some Jews without proper procedures only reinforced official German policy. There were, however, a few cases where individual Jews escaped from

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the Continent to Sweden. In at least one case, powerful Swedish businessmen intervened directly in Germany to help a Jewish counterpart without using the offices of the Swedish Government. Sweden's Berlin embassy spent many fruitless hours trying to accomplish similar tasks. The second m a j o r crisis for Sweden came with the declaration in Denmark on August 27, 1943 of martial law and the resignation of the Danish government. Swedish officials immediately understood that application of the Final Solution to Denmark was now only a matter of time. Denmark had been a "model protectorate." The Danes had for the most part cooperated with the Germans on the understanding that Danish law would be maintained. Any action against Denmark's 8,000 Jews, the German authorities had been told, would lead to an immediate rise in the Resistance movement. 1 4 Nonetheless, no plans had been made to get Danish Jews to Sweden in case the Germans changed their policies. The first three weeks after August 27 witnessed an increasing number of Danish Jews applying at the Swedish mission in Copenhagen for permission to move to Sweden. Sweden was willing to take all Danish Jews, but records of the Foreign Office indicated a continued pessimism about Sweden's ability to do anything for those Jews who had no direct connection with Sweden. Therefore, the warning from the second ranking German civilian authority in D e n m a r k on September 25 that a r o u n d u p of all Danish Jews was scheduled for the night of October 1 - 2 only caused further gloom in the government and brought a b o u t a determination to try again to change German policy. Instructions f r o m Stockholm to Ambassador Richert stated that Richert was to make a formal demarche (the Norwegian case had been handled informally) to the effect that Sweden was willing to receive all Danish Jews and that Sweden would intern them for the length of the war so that they would cause no discomfiture to Germany. Richert responded by saying that the effort was doomed to failure and that Stockholm would be well advised to cancel these instructions. The Government held firm; the demarche was delivered. The Germans did not answer it. Events in Denmark outran the diplomatic efforts. The German r o u n d u p failed. Hours before the Germans struck, Danish Jews went underground and were protected by their fellow Danes. On October 3, Sweden announced publicly that all Danish Jews were welcome in Sweden—no mention was made of detention camps. 1 5

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A trickle of refugees soon became a flood. Nearly 7,500 of the 8,000 Danish Jews made the hazardous journey across the sound. The Swedish government, individuals, and private institutions provided food and housing and encouraged the refugees to find employment. The success of the rescue operation surprised the Swedish government, which concluded that the critical factor for success was the willingness of German officials in Denmark to let "Jews slip through their fingers."1« The Danish episode showed Swedish officials that German authorities were not uniformly willing to enforce the Final Solution. Furthermore it demonstrated that at least in 1943, not even Hitler would threaten Swedish security when Sweden acted in favor of the Jews—as long as Sweden remained relatively silent about what it was doing. The experience also gave Sweden much good will in the west. Jewish organizations lionized the Swedish action, western governments commended Sweden, and Sweden's value as a non-belligerent was further illustrated. 17 The Swedish government sought new areas for a more active foreign policy. Most important among Sweden's efforts were the attempts to establish peace between the Finns and Russia. Sweden constantly sought ways to remove Finland from the war. The Swedes hoped to have an independent and democratic Finland. But the longer Finland participated in a war against the USSR, the more the Swedes feared an extension of Soviet authority. The Swedes, or rather individual Swedes, also offered their services in mediation attempts with Germany. While humanitarian efforts, including aid to Jews, were of less import, they still remained a part of a coherent policy to remain outside the conflict. The Swedes saw less reason to hide their Western biases, even if they still demonstrated great self-restraint. As for aid to Jews, by 1944 much of Europe's Jewry had already been destroyed. The one major concentration of Jews in German hands was in Hungary. Nearly 800,000 Jews remained in Hungary in the early spring of 1944. World attention focused on the plight of the Hungarian Jews in a way that it had not when the Jewish populations of Germany, the Low Countries, France, Austria, and Poland were sent to death. Even the American government had finally committed itself to aiding the Jews. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau was responsible for the establishment of the War Refugee Board—an institution that was to circumvent the normal bureaucratic morass in Washington and try to help refugees, particularly Jews. Special agents, such as Iver Olsen, a

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treasury official attached to the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm, were appointed to initiate action. The WRB was probably more important as a signal to other nations than for the work it actually carried out. Its activities were always hamstrung by an administration that put "winning the war" above saving Jews—an understandable, if tragic, policy from a Jewish perspective. Those authors who suggest Sweden's activities in Hungary were the direct product of WRB policy or international Jewish pressure are incorrect.18 Swedish policy depended primarily on Swedish initiatives and changing circumstances in Hungary. The Swedish government followed events there with a grim fascination, and when opportunities arose, Swedish representatives in Budapest were quick to act. An activist Swedish policy was in effect long before Raoul Wallenberg set foot in Hungary. The pattern of developments in Hungary was too complex to be covered fully here. A simple outline of the chronology of events should underscore the three critical periods in 1944-1945: M a r c h - J u n e ; July-October 15; and October 15-January. In the first period, the Final Solution under Adolph Eichmann's direction was ruthlessly applied to Hungary. The second period witnessed a brief interlude when Hungary, under the leadership of Admiral Horthy, stopped the deportations. The third period began with a coup engineered by a Fascist group, the Arrow Cross, and ended with the liberation of Budapest by the Soviet Army. In each case, treatment of the remaining Jews of Budapest became a central issue. The end of the horrors of 1944 for Hungary's Jews came only with the liberation of Hungary by the Soviet armies. Additionally, as the year progressed, normal order and procedure was replaced by growing chaos.19 It was during the chaos of the fall that Raoul Wallenberg demonstrated his remarkable courage. Swedish policy, however, began to operate in May. News of Eichmann's activities spread quickly around the world. The question was what to do to stop him. Few countries were capable of direct military intervention. Those who were—the United States and the Soviet Union—refused to commit needed manpower and materials. Roosevelt, for example, would not bomb the rail networks and facilities at Auschwitz despite complete intelligence on the role of the camp. In the first ten weeks of Eichmann's campaign, in April, May, and June, 600,000 Jews perished, mostly at Auschwitz. Alternatives to military intervention were unclear. Could outside pressure be brought to bear on the Hungarian government?

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BYSTANDERS T O THE HOLOCAUST

The Swedish Foreign Office records contain extensive details of events in Hungary. Of equal significance, both the prime minister and the king read most of the important dispatches. Their " m a r k s " can be found on nearly all the critical documents. The collection also indicates that the initiative for Swedish policy in Hungary was primarily, but not exclusively, in Budapest. Mission officials and a Swedish academic, Valdemar Langlet, tended to respond to conditions and opportunities as they found them. The Foreign Office served to approve and encourage their activities. In a couple of cases the government in Stockholm took its own initiative. At the end of the year, the Foreign Office refused one important request of Minister Ivan Danielsson, who was head of the Swedish legation in Budapest. Ivan Danielsson deserves far more credit for Swedish policy in Hungary during 1944 than he has received. He was responsible for carrying out policy on the spot. He apparently conceived of the idea of trying to offer persecuted Jews some form of Swedish diplomatic protection. "Protective passes" and immigration visas were but two documents Danielsson attempted to use in limited numbers as early as June. He requested additional legation help, a request that led eventually to the appointment of Raoul Wallenberg. He oversaw and protected Wallenberg's activities after Wallenberg arrived in Budapest in July. He coordinated the work of Langlet, head of the Swedish Red Cross delegation in Hungary and something of an unguided missile, with the rest of Swedish activities. He also had the often unpleasant task of negotiating with the Hungarian governments, which would have tested the mettle of any diplomat. Finally, he had to deal with his colleagues in Stockholm who, though courteous, were often out-of-date and supportive of impractical ideas. Without an effective and sympathetic head of mission, Swedish policies would likely have had little success in Hungary. In the first period, Swedish policy took two different directions: experiments in devising documents to protect individual Jews; and initiation of a joint neutral rescue effort. This latter activity began as early as the first part of May. The initiative came f r o m Budapest, but it also received strong support in Stockholm and other Western capitals. Likewise, the World Jewish Congress and other Jewish organizations encouraged all constructive efforts. The pace of action was terribly slow and hundreds of thousands of Jews died. By mid-June little concrete action had been taken. International

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activity had focused on the Hungarian government and the hope that it could be encouraged to stop the German atrocities. With the government's approval, King Gustav sent a personal telegram to Admiral Horthy in late June pleading with him to stop the persecutions. The king's action apparently stemmed from a reading of the now-famous "Auschwitz Protocols," which reached him on June 28. In early July, the Hungarian government halted the destruction of the Hungarian Jews. Most scholars have credited Gustav's telegram as of considerable importance in encouraging a change in Hungarian policy. 20 When one considers the warnings on the part of the U.S. and other belligerents to the Hungarian government, one wonders why the appeal of a relatively powerless and aged king would have any effect. The primary leverage that Sweden had in Hungary was the fact that Sweden represented Hungarian interests in many areas of the world during the war. Sweden had also helped Hungary in similar fashion in the Great War of 1914-1918. Relations between the two countries had often been intimate, and Hungary placed considerable weight on maintaining a good relationship. Furthermore, Gustav had prestige a m o n g oldfashioned, conservative Europeans. Horthy appreciated Gustav's appeal to a higher morality. There seems little d o u b t that Horthy, while no lover of Jews, repudiated German policy personally and wanted to maintain Hungarian independence in the face of increasing pressure both f r o m Germany and Russia. He took a great risk in stopping the persecutions. By July, only the approximately 200,000 Jews of Budapest remained in the country. In July and August, the attitude of the Hungarian government offered the neutrals—Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and the South American neutrals—an opportunity t o act. The Hungarians indicated a willingness to respect virtually any document that purported to be a foreign passport or statement of responsibility. Under these conditions, pressure quickly mounted to inflate the number of such documents. The Swedish experience is probably not dissimilar to the experience of the Swiss and other neutrals. The Swedes took the lead in most cases. The Swedish archives d o not give the picture of a conscious policy slowly being put into place. Instead, the beginnings were quite exploratory. Mission officials first offered documents to individual applicants with identifiable connections, usually through family, with Sweden. Each application was sent to Stockholm for confirmation. Additionally, lists of individuals were being sent f r o m Stockholm—

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often originating from Swedish citizens. The process was slow and ineffectual given the circumstances. The mission requested and was given permission to offer immigration visas and protective passes to certain categories of applicants. Later the categories were extended. By August, Stockholm officials worried primarily about the total number of documents. They believed that overly zealous activity to aid the Jews would lead to devaluation of the Swedish documents. Langlet had also designed his own documents and was busy helping people. 21 The legation, after the fact, had to confirm the legitimacy of his papers. In addition, as conditions deteriorated, special houses were established under Swedish "protection" to house Jews. Neither in the cases of the documents nor the protected houses did Sweden have any idea if its acts would be respected. A change in government in late August seemed to Swedish diplomats a threat to all of Sweden's (and the other neutrals') work. For a few days, even Wallenberg feared his work would be undone. Raoul Wallenberg arrived in Budapest on July 9, 1944. His appointment was the product of the combined activities of the W R B , some key people in Stockholm, and the commitment of the Foreign Office and the government, to give the Budapest mission new help. What he provided was remarkable knowledge of Hungary, complete dedication, and a willingness to try almost anything if the situation demanded it. Wallenberg spoke Hungarian and German and had been active in business in the area. Educated in the United States, he belonged to Sweden's most influential banking family. When Wallenberg arrived in Budapest, the Swedes were already deeply involved in aid activities. He designed a more official-looking protective document, but most important, he provided renewed vigor and determination. He established a section of the consular division that became legendary in Budapest. Most of his immediate aides were volunteer Hungarian Jews. His first goal was to awaken the Jews to the possibilities of rescue and to break their lethargy, a task that he felt he had accomplished by late August. Who paid for Wallenberg's activities? In the postwar period, suggestions that he was an American agent were used to explain Soviet behavior in the Wallenberg affair. The W R B did provide money for some of his activities. Private American-Jewish sources also sent considerable sums to him. This financial support was sent to Budapest via Stockholm and Switzerland. The attempt to launder the money might have led the Russians to be suspicious. The bulk of Wallenberg's resources appeared to be Swedish, however. Langlet, too, received

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support via the Swedish Red Cross from various international sources, as well as f r o m Hungarian and Hungarian-Jewish circles. Nonetheless, the majority of financial resources for all Swedish activity in Hungary came from the same source: the Swedish government. No indication has been found of fiscal limitations placed on Swedish officials in Hungary. The main problems were the political turmoil in Hungary and the determination of the Germans and their Hungarian supporters to complete the j o b started by Eichmann in the spring. A change in government in late August seemed to endanger all Budapest Jews, regardless of whether they carried a foreign document or lived in a "protected " house. The new government initially refused to recognize either the documents or the right of neutral missions to extend their territoriality. Both practices, incidentally, have little basis in international law. Danielsson proved to be an effective negotiator with the new government. One of the main goals of the new Hungarian government was international recognition. The willingness of the neutrals, and especially Sweden, to recognize the new government was a key to the establishment of their credibility. Danielsson advised Stockholm not to recognize Hungary if it did not promise to accept the validity of all Swedish documents issued to Jews in Hungary. Stockholm concurred and Danielsson was able to get the new government to promise, in exchange for Swedish recognition, to leave "Swedish Jews" untouched. This agreement made it possible for Wallenberg and Langlet to operate effectively. It did not guarantee the safety of the Jews under Swedish protection, who by this time numbered close to 20,000, but it gave them hope. After a reasonably quiet September, the situation once again deteriorated substantially. The Iron Cross organization staged a coup, seized power, and tried to meet the demands of Germany to complete the Final Solution in Hungary. By this time Soviet troops were nearing Budapest and the whole situation was a race against time. Danielsson hoped to manage the same policy that he had pursued in August, i.e., an exchange of recognition for protection of "Swedish J e w s . " T h e Foreign Office refused, however, to give him permission to recognize the new government. In fact, it indicated that it would not recognize the Iron Cross regime. The situation f o r the mission in Budapest was f u r t h e r complicated by the Hungarian demand to move the mission as the Russian troops neared the city. Stockholm issued instructions to Danielsson that the mission was to refuse to leave Budapest, that

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Sweden would not recognize the Hungarian government, and that Danielsson and his staff were to do everything in their power to help the Jews. At first glance, the Stockholm instructions appear to be an exercise in futility. How could the mission protect its Jews if it had nothing to bargain with? The Foreign Office believed, however, that the term of the new regime would be brief, that it would be eager enough to deal with mission officials on a semi-official basis, and that it would not violate Sweden's diplomatic immunity. The policy perhaps made sense politically and intellectually, but mission members had to deal with the growing violence against "Swedish Jews." Bands of Hungarian thugs and German officials began to round up Jews for shipment to Auschwitz. The struggle to protect them was carried on at two levels: diplomatically and in the streets. In the streets Wallenberg demonstrated his mettle. Numerous incidents occurred where he bluffed various groups out of taking Jews away. He also traveled to places where Jews were being detained, and in some cases to the actual railway cars, to save the "Swedish Jews." He was remarkably successful in his brazen acts and undoubtedly encouraged others to protect "their" Jews. Rumor had it that Eichmann ordered Wallenberg's assassination. Danielsson's hands were tied but the members of the mission, and Wallenberg in particular, continued to function effectively. Wallenberg's most spectacular contributions came in November and December. He succeeded in rescuing Jews already in the clutches of the Iron Cross and the Germans. He also established contact with the new regime and attempted to impress upon it that the world would judge it on how it treated its Jews. The Swedes succeeded in the main in protecting their Jews until the Russians liberated Budapest in J a n u a r y 1945. Some 20,000 Jews were directly under Swedish protection—half, approximately, carrying papers issued by Wallenberg's operation at the mission, and half under Swedish Red Cross auspices, led by Langlet and Asta Nilsson. Probably tens of thousands of other Jews were saved by Swedish action. As the Hungarian episode ground to its conclusion, a new effort began that was to lead to the rescue of thousands of Jews held in German concentration camps. 2 2 This effort has been known as the Bernadotte Mission, and it is the subject of much controversy. Swedes view Folke Bernadotte, who was the king's nephew and vice chairman of the

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Swedish Red Cross, as a bona fide war hero who saved thousands of Jewish lives, only to be assassinated by members of the Stern gang in 1947 during his efforts to mediate the Middle East crisis for the UN. The British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper suggested that Bernadotte deserves none of the credit for the rescue of the Jews in 1945. Trevor-Roper argues that Felix Kersten, Himmler's masseur, deserved primary credit.23 Bernadotte is accused of being a bureaucratic nonentity and an anti-semite, uninterested in the fate of Jews. Obviously, attempts to understand the Bernadotte Mission have been complicated by the history of Israel and a confusing welter of documents that surfaced in the fifties. No single person deserved the credit for the success of the Bernadotte Mission. It was the product of the efforts of many forces, not the least of which were the driving ambitions of the Norwegian representative in Stockholm, Niels Christian Ditleff. The fate of the Bernadotte Mission in 1945 began in the late summer of 1944 in Stockholm. The Norwegian legation under Ditleffs leadership gathered accurate lists of names and addresses of Norwegian and Danish prisoners in German hands. Ditleffs concern was the rescue of Norwegians, as the Danish legation worried about Danes, regardless of their religion. The Swedish foreign minister, Günther, took great interest in Ditleffs activities and gave all the help he could. As the idea of a Red Cross mission formed during the fall, Bernadotte was the natural choice as a leader. Its purpose was to rescue Scandinavians—preferably to bring them to Sweden until the end of the war, or, failing that, to intern them in a special camp in Germany near the Danish border. The overriding problem was diplomatic: how could Germany be convinced to allow such an action to occur? Diplomats such as Swedish Ambassador in Berlin, Arvid Richert, viewed it as a pipe dream. Richert's attitude was understandable. Traditional diplomatic efforts had managed virtually nothing of this kind. Even attempts to aid Swedish citizens had failed. Richert also knew that the power of the German Foreign Office had declined relative to the growing authority of Hitler's lieutenants, especially Himmler and Bormann. Pro-Swedish figures, such as Goring, also seemed to be losing their influence. They had proved of little value in any case. The key to the success of any rescue mission was to get the support of Heinrich Himmler. Only he, beside Hitler, had the authority and power to circumvent an increasingly isolated Führer. Why would Himmler be interested in helping the Scandinavians?

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By the late summer of 1944, Himmler apparently had concluded that Hitler no longer could win the war on his own terms. There must be a fresh approach to concluding the war in the best possible fashion for Germany. As Hitler's health was declining rapidly and he refused to consider any policy other than total victory, Himmler judged himself as the person most likely to succeed in establishing a new policy and saving as much of the Third Reich as possible. He wanted to destroy the alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. If he could achieve a separate peace, he believed that he could turn the tide of war once again. But the Western powers showed no interest in various peace feelers, some of which were carried by Swedish citizens. Himmler hoped that some demonstrations of good faith might soften the attitude of Britain and the United States. Under these circumstances, Himmler, in the fall of 1944, released Swedish businessmen tried, convicted, and sentenced for spying. The person who played the key role in the release of the Swedes was Himmler's masseur, Felix Kersten. Kersten was a Bait with Finnish citizenship who had lived in Stockholm. He had cared for Himmler and other prominent Germans for many years. Himmler seemed to believe that only Kersten could relieve the abdominal pains from which he suffered. Kersten, after consultation with Günther, contacted Himmler about releasing the Swedish businessmen. The success of this effort led Kersten to offer his services for further efforts to aid German-held prisoners, especially Jews. Kersten claimed in his English memoirs, published nearly a decade after the war, that by December 1944 Himmler and he had agreed on an arrangement whereby a relatively large number of Jews would be released to Sweden. Trevor-Roper suggested that this arrangement provided the basis for the subsequent success of the Bernadotte Mission. Bernadotte, according to Trevor-Roper, only carried out what Kersten had arranged. 24 The weakness of this interpretation is both that it ignores the circumstances of the Bernadotte Mission itself and depends too greatly on after-the-fact documentation created by Kersten. Kersten's reports of 1944-45, found in the Swedish Foreign Office archives, offer a considerably different picture of the sequence of events. Furthermore, there are other contemporary documents that clarify quite specifically what occurred in February and March of 1945. Kersten manufactured documents in the late forties and fifties to embellish his own part in the events. At least two reasons for his distortion of the historical record were his disappointment at not being

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mentioned by Folke Bernadotte in Bernadotte's own account of his mission, Slutet, published in the summer of 1945,25 and by the refusal of the Swedish government to grant him citizenship until the early fifties. Kersten was bitter about the failure of Bernadotte and the Swedish government to recognize his contributions. Bernadotte's accounts were incomplete and on the verge of being misleading. The leading Foreign Office officials tried to get citizenship for Kersten, but they were rejected by the postwar Social Democratic government eager to avoid any connection with the Nazi experience. Kersten was of little importance in the Bernadotte Mission until late January 1945. Ditleff, Günther, and Bernadotte were the chief figures in the initial planning. From the outset the mission's exclusive purpose was to rescue Scandinavians in German concentration camps. No mention of the rescue of Jews prior to late January has been found by this author. Of course, some of the Scandinavians held in Germany were Jews, but they represented less than 10%. The expansion of the mission and its remarkable success depended upon the peculiar circumstances of the last months of the war. Kersten, Bernadotte, Gillel Storch, Norbert Masur and Walter Schellenberg all contributed to the mission's accomplishments. Most important was Himmler's desire to make visible gestures to the Western world. Yet he was circumspect in his activities for fear of reprisal from Hitler. Hence, a deal negotiated between Himmler and former Swiss president Musy was cancelled in February 1945 when Hitler learned of the agreement via the international press. Apparently, a number of Jews were nevertheless released into Swiss hands. Additionally, as domestic chaos increased in the face of advancing Allied armies, orders issued from Berlin might or might not be followed to the letter. Reports from the Bernadotte Mission testify to the many opportunities that presented themselves, simply because Swedish Red Cross officials visited many camps in significant numbers and with the possibility of immediate transport and care for large numbers of internees. Agreements struck one day could be voided; camp commanders could reject or release as many prisoners as they wished. The initiative to focus part of the Bernadotte Mission on Jews from various countries came from the World Jewish Congress. The WJC had been active in trying to move countries to intercede on behalf of Jews since 1942.26 Their activities increased as the full story of the Final Solution became known. During 1944 they had been particularly active

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in the case of Hungary and in trying to get the Germans to stop the executions and keep the concentration camps in operation. The WJC feared that Hitler and Himmler would make a last desperate effort to kill the remaining Jews in their hands and destroy the evidence of their misdeeds. Himmler promised in the fall of 1944 to stop the executions and maintain the camps, but his promise was hardly credible. As late as February 1945, Bernadotte, in direct negotiations with Himmler, tried to get reassurances that the Final Solution apparatus had been stopped. In the vortex of the collapse of the Third Reich, safety was certain only when the rescued were out of German hands. To understand why the Bernadotte Mission took the form and shape that it did, it is necessary to follow parallel developments. One main effort—primarily a product of Norwegian initiative and Swedish Foreign Office efforts—was to rescue Scandinavians. The other development—led by the WJC representative in Stockholm, Gillel Storch, and through the offices first of Felix Kersten and then of Bernadotte—was directed toward helping Jews. Both activities had to have the full support of the Swedish government. Both were finally dependent on the effectiveness of the Swedish Red Cross and specifically on the abilities of Folke Bernadotte. The priority given to the Scandinavian project by the Swedish government and the Swedish Red Cross should not be seen as a lack of interest or concern about Jews, but simply for what it was—a sense of priorities. Sweden had continuously placed the interests of its Scandinavian brethren second after Swedish security concerns in its foreign policy priorities. Sweden cared for large numbers of Scandinavian refugees. In April 1945, 128,288 of the 185,000 refugees in Sweden were Scandinavians. 27 The refugee population was nearly 3% of the total population. For the Bernadotte Mission what was critical was Sweden's willingness to act with dispatch and with men and materials. The risks were not small. When it became apparent that Himmler would permit a Swedish Red Cross mission to enter Germany, two serious risks had to be evaluated: the possibility that Himmler's order would be countermanded and endanger the rescuers; and the likelihood that the mission would come under direct Allied fire. The Swedish government asked the British and American embassies in Stockholm for assurances that Allied planes would not bomb or strafe Red Cross vehicles. The Western powers did not give these assurances. During the rescue operations Swedish vehicles were hit and lives were lost.

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Both Kersten and Bernadotte traveled to Berlin during February to negotiate with Himmler. The two negotiations complemented one another and continued attempts were made to coordinate them. Evidence in Swedish archives suggests that Himmler responded to the variety of the Swedish requests and their apparent urgency with everexpanding concessions. Also, Himmler grew more bold, less afraid of Hitler's retaliation, as Allied armies continued their progress into Germany. Initially, agreements with Bernadotte to allow the collection of all Scandinavian inmates in one camp in Germany and with Kersten to release 1,000 Jews were changed to permit their transhipment to Sweden in unspecified numbers. The exact total of Jews rescued and sent to Sweden is yet to be tallied. Many of these people would have died had they not received the care provided by the Swedes. These latter changes, which were responsible for the largest portion of rescued Jews, were almost exclusively the product of Bernadotte's negotiations and the chaotic conditions at the camps when the Red Cross mission arrived. One additional effort should be noted. In late April, Norbert Masur, a Swedish Jew, flew to Germany accompanied by Kersten to negotiate with Himmler on behalf of the W J C and specifically to reaffirm Himmler's earlier promises. The meeting, quite dramatic in itself, provided little new, but it certainly must have encouraged Himmler to make concessions. 28 One other person contributed to the success of the Bernadotte Mission: Walter Schellenberg, Himmler's top aide. Schellenberg handled the organizational details on the German side of the rescue attempts. One need not condone Schellenberg's role in Nazi Germany, but to ignore the importance of his work in the face of active attempts within the SS to sabotage the mission would be to underestimate the practical difficulties that blocked realization of the project. Bernadotte's gratitude to Schellenberg went so far that he provided Schellenberg with shelter in Sweden immediately after the war and testified on his behalf at his trial in Nuremberg. Many have tried to take these latter activities on Schellenberg's behalf as proof of Bernadotte's anti-semitism. Reasons for his behavior were to be found in the help Schellenberg provided under precarious circumstances. The success of the Bernadotte Mission stands alongside the Swedish activities in Hungary and the rescue of the Danish Jews as the most significant effort of the Swedish government to aid Jews during the war. There were other efforts of a less spectacular nature that deserve mention. Under the leadership of Gillel Storch, large quantities of food were sent to Jewish inmates in German camps beginning in 1944. Some Finnish and Baltic Jews f o u n d asylum in Sweden during the war.

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Private Swedish institutions, most significantly the Swedish Lutheran Church, tried various ways to aid Jews. 29 The various Jewish congregations also lent considerable aid to their co-religionists. The total number of Jews helped by Sweden can be estimated at approximately 45,000. There were undoubtedly more who were indirectly aided, especially in Hungary. The figure can be seen as either an impressively large one or a pitifully small one. Prior to the war Sweden ignored, or even actively rejected, the possibilities of taking in significant numbers of Jewish refugees. Only after 1942 did Sweden seriously begin to seek ways to help Jews. It was late—very late. Many factors contributed to a more active Swedish policy. It was partially a question of responding to the values upon which the Swedish state rested, partially a desire to help fellow Scandinavians, and partially an attempt to justify Sweden's non-belligerency to the Western powers by providing "useful services." Swedes knew what had happened. They were not sympathetic toward Nazi Germany and they abhorred the Final Solution. But Sweden was a small country and its leadership and its traditions did not encourage it to play an active role in the politics of the war. There was a built-in conservatism in their policies. Risk-taking was minimized. Only slowly did Sweden develop a policy for actively aiding Scandinavian and European Jews. The success of this policy once in operation illustrated both that Sweden cared and that something could be done.

1

Christian Günther to Macmillan (London), 23 February 1940, in Wilhelm Carlgren, Svensk Utrikespolitik 1939-1945 (Stockholm: Allmänna forlaget, 1973), pp. 86-87. 2 Literature on Swedish foreign policy during World War II is extensive. Carlgren's study is the best single volume. Other works of particular interest are those of Krister Wahlbäck and Per Andreen. Scandinavia during the Second World War. ed. Henrik Nissen (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. 1983) has an excellent bibliographical section and introduces the reader to the general foreign policy dilemmas of the four Scandinavian states. 3 The classic study of the holocaust remains Raul Hilberg. The Destruction of the European Jewry (Chicago: Quadrangle. 1961). More recent studies include Christopher Browning, The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978); Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret {Boston: Little Brown, 1980); Yehuda Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust: the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1939-1945 (Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1981); Randolph Braham, The Politics of Genocide (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1981); Martin Gilbert. Auschwitz and the Allies (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1981); and Robert Paxton and Michael Marrus, Vichy France and the Jews (New York: Basic Books, 1981).

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Literatureon the various forms of rescue effort continues to grow. Leni Yahil, The Rescue of Danish Jewry (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969) is one of the few scholarly studies of Scandinavian experiences. She also published a broader article, "Scandinavian Countries to the Rescue of Concentration Camp Prisoners," Yad Vashem Studies, 6 (1967), 181-220. Both are excellent works despite limited access to Swedish materials. I Ca rig re η refers to the Jewish question only in the context of "humanitarian efforts." Only Hans Lindberg, Svensk flyktningpolitik under internationellt tryck 1936-1941 (Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, 1973) examines Swedish policy toward the Jews. Erik Boheman, Pi Vakt (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1963) suggests in his memoir about the wartime years that the "humanitarian efforts" deserve attention on their own merit (p. 9). Boheman claims not to have been involved in such matters. He was the highest ranking member of the government who would have been liable to persecution under Nazi race laws. He was sometimes referred to by colleagues as a "quarter Jew." Boheman's private archive was destroyed in a fire. ' See Lindberg, as well as Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU). Parliamentariska Undersökningskommissionen Angäende Flykiningsärenden och Säkerhetstjanst, Vol. 1, Flyktningars Behandling (Stockholm: Beckmans, 1946), and Vol. 2, Utlämnande av Uppgißer om Flyktningar (Stockholm: Beckmans, 1947). 7 This article is based upon research in the Swedish and British Foreign Office archives, the British War Cabinet papers, the Swedish Red Cross archive, and the private archives of King Gustav V, Per Albin Hansson, Gösta Bagge, Sven Grafström, Ernst Wigforss, Archbishop Erling Eidem, Archbishop William Tejnple, Eli Heckscher, Bishop George Bell, Bishop Gustaf Aulen, K.C. Westman, Herman Eriksson, Arvid Richert, Svenska Israelsmissionen, and Nordiska Ekumeniska Institutet, among others. « Riksarkivet, Swedish Foreign Office archive (UD). 19i0drs, Ρ 50, Swedish Embassy (London) to Swedish Foreign Office, 23 February 1940. » SOU, Flyktningars Behandling. p. 325. 10 Much has been written about the accidental meeting between Swedish diplomat Goran von Otter and an SS officer, Kurt Gerstein, in August 1942, pertaining to explicit knowledge of the Final Solution. Laqueur, pp. 48-49, claims to make the definitive interpretation. His interpretation is factually wrong on a number of points. Saul Friedlander, Kurt Gerstein: The Ambiguity of Good (New York: Knopf, 1969) isa better, if not wholly complete account. Sweden's knowledge of the specifics of the Final Solution did not depend upon the Gerstein materials. Both general and detailed reports of a systematic campaign against Jews came from a variety of sources. Most explicit was a report from the Swedish Consul General in Stettin sent via Berlin on August 20, 1942— two days before the von Otter-Gerstein meeting. UD. 1920 irs, HP 324, Vendel Memorandum, 20 August 1942. II Fora penetrating account of the Norwegian response to the persecution of its Jews, see Samuel Abrahamsen, "The Holocaust in Norway," in Contemporary Views of the Holocaust, ed. Randolph Braham (Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff. 1983). 12 Dagens Nyheter, 31 December 1942, p. 1. 13 Göte Friberg, Stormcentrum öresund. 2nd ed. (Boris: Centraltryckier, 1978), p. 202. Friberg makes many questionable statements despite his important role in the rescue of Denmark's Jews. 14 See Yahil, and Nissen. 15 Yahil claims that Sweden had "no intention of taking any further steps" (beyond

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inquiring in Berlin) until Niels Bohr and Ebbe Munck pressed King Gustav V and the Swedish government for a public offer of refuge (p. 330). Swedish archival materials confirm Yahil's view that no specific Swedish policy had been designed in advance of events during the first week of October. 1943. Heretofore this author has found no information that would affirm or refute the interpretation that it was the intervention of the Danes that led to the pronouncement of October 3. Gustav V's archive does not provide a definitive answer to the question. Bohr's visit in early October is not identified either in the official audience book or in the King's private secretary's own calendar. Evidence does exist that influential Swedes such as Tor Bonnier tried to influence the Swedish government before Bohr's arrival; see Jarl Torbacke, Dagens Nyheter och demokratins kris 1937-1946 (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1972), p. 364. The primary figures in the making of Swedish foreign policy—Günther, Hansson, and Boheman—were still prone to the view in September-October 1943 that Sweden could do little to change German policies. They were surprised and encouraged by the results of the Danish episode. 16 UD, 1920 4rs, 1056, Söderblom to Dardel, 4 October 1943. 17 UD. 1920 irs, 1056, Boström to Swedish Foreign Office, 4 October 1943; Nowogrodsky (American Representative of General Jewish Workers of Poland) to P.A. Hansson, 5 October 1943; also. Public Records Office, FO 371,42752, Selbourne to Prytz, 19 January 1944. ιβ For example, see John Bierman, Righteous Gentile (New York: Viking. 1981). 14 See Braham for a full account of events in Hungary. 20 Braham. pp. 714-15. 21 Valdemar Langlet, Verk och Dagar i Budapest (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 1946); Nina Langlet, Kaos i Budapest (Vällingby: Harriers, 1982). 22 At this juncture, this author cannot definitely fix the exact number of Jews rescued by the Red Cross mission. The most accurate statistics on those rescued were kept by the mission itself. The 20,937 prisoners rescued in March-April 1945 were divided into the following nationalities: Danes and Norwegians, 8,000; Poles, 5.911; French. 2.629; stateless Jews, 1,615; Germans. 1,124; Belgians, 632; Dutch, 386; Hungarians. 290; Baits, 191; Luxembourgers, 79; Slovaks, 28; British, 14; Americans, 9; Roumanians, 6; Finns, 5; Italians, 4; Spanish, 3; and others, 9. Riksarkivet, Swedish Red Cross archive. 11:1, v. 506. Lists of those rescued are extant and can be correlated by religion with great effort. 2} Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Kersten, Himmler, and Count Bernadotte," The Atlantic. 44 (February 1953). See also Felix Kersten, The Kersten Memoirs. 1940-1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1956), pp. 14-16. Trevor-Roper wrote the introduction to these memoirs. There are major differences between this edition of the memoirs and the earlier German and Swedish versions. 24 Kersten, p. 16. 25 Folke Bernadotte, Siutet (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1945). 26 Hillel Storch, "Insatser av WJC:S Sektion," Judisk Krönika, 31 (1962), 136-37; Hugo Vallentin, "Rescue and Relief Activities in Behalf of Jewish Victims of Nazism in Scandinavia," YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science. 8 (1953), 224-51; and Yahil. 27 Flyktingars behandling, p. 33. 21 The complexities of the negotiations with Himmler are best covered in published form in 1945ärs Svenska hjälpexpedition till Tyskland(Stockholm: Norstedts, 1956). The most accurate version of Kersten's activities can be found in his memorandum of 12 June 1945 in UD. 1920 4rs, HP 1050. See also Norbert Masur, En jude talar med Himmler (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1945), and the very questionable memoir, Walter Schellenberg,

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The Labyrinth (New York: Harpers, 1956). A more reliable account of Schellenberg's own version of the last days of Hitler can be found in UD. 1920 ärs, HP 1050, Trosa Memorandum, June 1945. M The Swedish Church in Berlin successfully hid a handful of Jews in the church basement during the last years of the war. See Leonard Gross, The Last Jews in Berlin (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). There is much in this study that is doubtful.

Part Six

Churches i Catholics

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History and RolfHochhuth's The Deputy

B y LEONIDAS Ε . H I L L

Historical drama is once again flourishing, due particularly to two playwrights: Peter Weiss, whose Marat-Sade and The Investigation will apparently soon be followed by a play on Vietnam; and Rolf Hochhuth, now preparing a second drama for the stage. The controversy over Hochhuth's newest work, The Soldiers, concerning Churchill and the bombing of Dresden, may supersede The Storm over "The Deputy"x which has by no means ended, especially since the Vatican has already published four volumes of documents J

See The Storm over "The Deputy," ed. Eric Bentley (New York, 1964), a very useful collection of essays discussing the play, for which all references are made from the translation by Richard and Clara Winston (New York, 1964). All references are to the pocket book edition of The Persecution and Assassination of Jean-Paul Marat, trans. Geoffrey Skelton (New York, 1966).

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pertaining to the Pope's role in the Second World War. This constitutes an extraordinary response to a play, where Hochhuth argued that Pius XII, Christ's deputy on earth, was well-informed about the Nazi extermination of the Jews, and that by a forthright condemnation he could have terminated this genocide, but instead remained silent for reasons of state, among which was concern for Catholic investments in various countries imperilled by the war. Cold, fastidious, calculating, the Pope would not publicly protest even when Jews were seized for deportation almost under his window in Rome. A young Jesuit, Riccardo Fontana, considering this silence criminal, resolved that he would be a true deputy. Hence he wore a Jewish star and joined the deportees from Auschwitz. Hochhuth made the young priest the hero of his play; his sacrifice stands in stark contrast to the Pope's rhetorical reluctance. The main events of The Deputy were carefully based on the historical materials which appear as an appendix to the published version, studded with useful quotations and footnotes. Historians as well as drama and literary critics have respected the moral argument of the play, and have been as grateful as the general reader for the lengthy historical appendix—while differing about the strength of the play's historical pretensions. The playwright's position toward his own researches is ambiguous. On the one hand he has declared that "as far as possible I adhered to the facts" and "allowed my imagination free play only to the extent that I had to transform the existing raw material of history into drama. Reality was respected throughout, but much of its slag had to be removed." But he has also acknowledged that "the truth, the symbolic meaning" of the infinite number of discrepant events can only be discovered if the artist declares "war on naturalism in art" and idealizes his work "in all its parts." He denies having written a scholarly treatise, and proclaims the importance of intuition in his work: "the writer must hold fast to his freedom, which alone empowers him to give form to the matter" (Deputy, 287-88). Thus the historian's criticisms of Hochhuth's exposition of the historical events behind his play are blunted at the beginning. But if the reality Hochhuth has undoubtedly tried to respect is partly false, then how does such misrepresentation affect "the truth, the symbolic meaning" of the whole complex of events he has treated? The answer is, very little, because a close reading reveals that the author's "symbolic meaning" is not dependent on the main events of the play, but has much to do with theology and significance of the destruction of the Jews. Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine four important historical deficiencies concerning the nature of the Third Reich, the role of secular and ecclesiastical institutions, the nature of the Church, and the portrayal of various characters. The first of these deficiencies is Hochhuth's misunderstanding of the nature of the Third Reich. He has asked " w h a t . . . Hitler's measures for the annihilation of an entire race in Europe [had] to do with the Second World War?" The true answer is "everything," but Hochhuth's answer is "nothing." Having provided this answer he can argue that "a protest against the extermination of the Jews [could not have b e e n ] . . . considered as a partisan intervention in the events of the war" (Deputy, 329-30). Historians have

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recently shown that Hitler's aims were indissoluble, so that the Nazi regime considered any intervention unjustified. The Nazi revolution synthesized a large number of unworthy objectives and ideas, among which were paganism, racism, and expansionism. The Nazis intended ultimately to root out Christianity and replace it by their own fantastic beliefs and rites. Hence all of the Christian churches suffered from Nazi attacks throughout the National Socialist period, and would have suffered even more if Germany had been victorious in 1945. Similarly Nazi racism presupposed the legislation against the Jews, the pogroms such as broke out in November 1938, and even the "final solution" of the war years. Eradication of the Jews was an essential Nazi objective; Germany was also to have been made strong at their expense and at the expense of other supposedly "inferior races," chief among them the Slavs. Thus racism was coupled with "germanization" and the conquest of Lebensraum, which encompassed far more than the desire of the revisionists who sought the territories held prior to the First World War. Lebensraum was much more than a catchword; lack of clarity about its boundaries only made clearer the megalomania of the Nazis. The megalomania required war. Hitler lusted for war. His generals were quite ready to fight if they could win; for years they did. In victory the Nazis carried their attacks on the churches and the Jews much further. Confiscation of church properties, dissolution of religious organizations, and incarceration of pastors and priests in concentration camps in large numbers were now carried out in the occupied territories. The paradigm for these procedures and for the fate of the Jews was Poland. All interventions by international branches of the Protestant and Catholic churches in Poland on behalf of their persecuted members were rejected by Nazi administrators. Established agencies in Berlin, such as the Foreign Office and Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs, were excluded from authority over the occupied territories. The SS under Himmler and the Party Chancellory under Martin Bormann would not accept direct inquiries; they denied the legal claims of international authorities to intervene, and stated that authority for these territories rested with the Gauleiters. Heady with his triumphs, Hitler extended the war, notably against the Soviet Union, and had no pity for those ground up in his machinery of destruction. Hochhuth may not have appreciated how essential these objectives of dechristianization, extermination, germanization, and conquest were to the Third Reich, or how mechanical and implacable its administration and system of terror were. Protests about any of these matters hit at Hitler's indissoluble objectives of annihilation and aggression. A movement built on hate and myths, an empire sustained by destruction and exploitation, could not and would not tolerate such protests. Even in the early years of the war the Nazis were angered by the "negative attitude of the German clergy," by any signs of unwillingness on the part of clergy or citizens "to comply strictly with their civil obligations," and by "provocative statements" of the Catholic clergy which the Nazis wanted the Vatican to "openly disavow."2 Statements which Hochhuth believed too vague to have been taken seriously, instead were 2

This and the following quotations from unpublished Nuremberg trial document, NG-4603, Ernst von Weizsäcker to Diego von Bergen, January 25, 1940.

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taken very seriously indeed. On January 25, 1940, State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker wrote to Ambassador Diego von Bergen that Pope Pius XII has made stinging references to us in various utterances, particularly in the Encyclical Summi Pontificatus and in his Christmas address.... If the Vatican describes these demonstrations as general and not directed against anyone in particular, we are of the opinion that this is correct in form only. The Vatican, it is true, used general terms but it is quite clear who was meant on each occasion.

If the Vatican would attend to Germany's complaints, the State Secretary added, Germany hoped "to avoid creating new points of friction and gradually to improve relations by attending to certain individual complaints." But, as emerged in another memorandum, after the end of the war "the upshot will probably be that we will break off the concordat and regulate the legal position of the Catholic Church in Germany ourselves." After the abrogation of the concordat the Nazis would attack the Church in Germany, as they were doing during the war years in some occupied territories. Large numbers of Polish priests died in concentration camps and the Church hardly functioned in the Warthegau. Hochhuth has barely acknowledged the Nazi objective of eradicating the churches, and has asserted that Hitler treated the Church gently (Deputy, 304-12), which was not true in Germany, and even less elsewhere. The second major deficiency of the play is the insufficient attention paid to the powerful secular and ecclesiastical institutions through which actions on both sides were effected. Many characters in the play were members of these strictly controlled German and Catholic organizations, but they have been given a freedom which is not in accord with the controls exerted upon them by their own institutions and environments. The nature of these pressures and controls has hardly been suggested, nor is there any examination of why some characters, such as Gerstein and Riccardo, escaped the mold and exercised so much freedom, nor why the Germans tolerated or encouraged such monstrous actions and the Italians did not. While the play does imply the presence of these institutions and of abstract, historically engendered forces such as national character, the central moral argument of the play ignores them. Large institutions, however, usually defeat moral arguments just as they usually defeat individuals. In the instances when they do not, why not? Admittedly a play cannot be written about a bureaucracy, nor can the dialogue of the bureaucrats portray an image of their institutions, unless one completely transforms reality in Kafkaesque fashion. Hochhuth has not attempted this, and his characters have not been given the impossible task of representing the institutions and forces which he is unable to bring to the stage, except by cursory reference. No doubt audiences will always be more responsive to characters than to institutions, whose dry, technical work and concentrated, massive power are not susceptible of dramatization though they can be given a very different kind of life in the monographs of the historian and political scientist. Whether individual characters represent the "banality of evil" as does the Eichmann of Hannah Arendt's portrait, or appear as monsters, devils in flesh, they capture all attention, to the exclusion of their institutional background. The problem of evil remains limited to the individual rather than the institution.

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The third flaw, the shallow treatment of the papacy and the Church, is particularly dependent on the excessively prominent place given to personal ties, and on the absence of perspective. Hochhuth judges papacy and Church by too high a standard. His sense of outrage with the papacy is a function of his high expectations, and he insists that these derive from the Church's pronouncements on its own role in the world. Yet surely the actual history of the Church and of the papacy is a better test of their intentions and performance than their mere arid pronouncements. The Church should be viewed from at least four vantage points: the theological, historical, legal-constitutional, and institutional, in order to obtain a truer perspective on its role in the world. The theology of the Church lays far less emphasis on saving lives than on saving souls through the consolations of religion. During a radio interview in New York City, Hochhuth told of a lengthy conversation with a Jesuit who denied that man can be the measure of all things and said "Man is excrement, at least in the aspect of eternity." This priest acknowledged the frightfulness of what was done to the Jews and to the fifty-six million others consumed in the Second World War, but said "then again it is not so frightful, because all of them are with G o d . . . . No soul is lost, not even that of Hitler or Himmler. Before God this will someday become unsubstantial and forgiven." These horrifyingly complacent remarks were preliminary to his argument that the thesis of The Deputy was undermined by an example from the Bible, where "Jesus did not lift a finger to have St. John the Baptist rescued from Herod's prison, for obviously Jesus must have felt that this man had fulfilled his mission on earth" (Storm, 60-1). Hochhuth later noted that because priests "are not permitted to have a life of their own . . . life itself, the life of other people, is not of the same consequence to them as life is for those to whom that is all there is." Thus the Church thinks not "of the happiness of the living but of generations and generations to come—that eventually things will become better." One generation may suffer and it is God's will, but the true end remains reunion with God, the source and destiny of creation. During mortal life the Church brings the message and wisdom of God to mankind and is the mediator for God on all the crucial ceremonial occasions, with the objective of saving Catholic souls for the life hereafter. But the power of the institutional Church, the saver of souls, has been greatly diminished during the last two centuries. Mainly on the defensive against the state, nationalism, secularism, and socialism, always preoccupied with the preservation of its remaining rights, little could be expected from the Church in the age of genocide. The structure of the Church ossified as Rome tried to retain rigid administrative control, while formulations of doctrine embodied a rejection of the modern world. At the same time national states brought the branches of the Church under stricter control, and nationalism increased hostility between the branches. In this stiuation it was increasingly difficult to maintain unity. Consequently the Church was an extremely weak constitutional entity. Against the fissiparous effects of the new age it concentrated upon its most traditional and formal ceremonials, in the confessional and at mass, at birth,

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baptism, confirmation, marriage, death, and upon its large teaching and preaching, pastoral functions. But these occasions do not constitute the essence of the religious life, and lives touched only by these measures are no more than superficially Christian. The Church's role, as Carl Amery has shrewdly pointed out, was thus reduced to little more than shamanism; it catered almost entirely to its more secular, peripheral supporters, not the "true believers," who indeed might comprehend and receive some of God's grace (Storm, 149-57). What the secular Catholics allow to the Church in their lives is approximately what most modern states allow to the Church in the concordats which regulate their relationships. The concordats set legal limits upon the Church's work, such as maintenance of seminaries and schools, Catholic organizations and churches, conduct of services and religious rites, limitations on taxation, and the rights of states to induct priests and seminarians for military service. Survival of the Church is dependent on preservation of these rights in many countries, and this primarily defensive work was the chief preoccupation of the higher clerical bureaucracy. Claims touching on the texts of these treaties were the very stuff of relations between the Vatican and various states. General principles were not as important as the practical matters of the Church's existence and its formal ministrations to the faithful. Furthermore, although the Church might attack the general principles of a movement such as Nazism before it came into power, it was much more hesitant and accommodating toward governments in power, including that of the National Socialists. Hannah Arendt has correctly pointed out that Church condemnation of some Nazi beliefs was much stronger before 1933 than in the often cited encyclical Mit brennender Sorge of 1937 (Storm, 90-2). The Nazis were surprised by this encyclical, though they could not prevent its proclamation; they confiscated copies and hindered circulation as much as possible in Germany. The Church retrenched and fell back upon endlessly reiterated, sterile defences of the rights and privileges defined in the concordats, and these expressions were kept quite separate from those statements on the broad principles of Christianity and humanity which seemed mere rhetoric to an appalled Hochhuth (Deputy, 215-17, 330, 332). The purveyors of the religious rites and services and their institutions, not the whole body of Catholics, were first in the line of the Church's defence. The war increased these difficulties greatly because, as Pius XII pointed out at the time, the Vatican had to worry about the existence and cohesiveness of the Church as a whole.3 Nations at war carrying their aroused populations into battle also carried with them the national branches of their churches. The clergy of the various states committed God to partisan participation on the side of their states. Had the Pope clarified God's position and excluded one side from His grace, the Church might have broken apart. Some of the higher clergy in Germany might have declined to proclaim a papal condemnation of the regime, because they were usually patriotic and feared any 3 Pius XII to the Bishop of Berlin, 21 March 1944, Document No. 123, in Pierre Biet, Angelo Martini, Burkhart Schneider (eds.), Lettres de Pie XII aux Eveques AUemands 1939-1944 ["Actes et documents du Saint Siige relatifs ä la seconde guerre mondiale," vol. 2] (Vatican, 1966), p. 377.

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accusation of defeatism. The loss of their aii loo patriotic parishioners would probably have complemented the harassment of the police. Thus papal neutrality was less important for the diplomatic purposes of mediation between the opposing sides (Deputy, 98, 213, 304) than for the preservation of the Catholic Church, and it was this that concerned the Pope more than any other problem. The Vatican was also greatly worried about the possible destruction of the Church by the Nazis, not so much in Germany, although that was clearly only being postponed until the end of the war ( D e p u t y , 298), but even more in Poland. Any condemnation of Nazi Germany on behalf of the Church in Poland might not have helped and could possibly Ijave also jeopardized Catholics in Germany. The Vatican was naturally disposed to accept the advice of its higher officials in Poland, who seem to have feared frightful Nazi reprisals in response to a papal protest. So strong was this fear that the Pope's draft of such a condemnation was apparently burnt by the Polish archbishop who received it. 4 From all of these perspectives, the theological, historical, legal-constitutional, and institutional the Catholic Church appears to have had objectives which Hochhuth has insufficiently emphasized. But, given these objectives and conditions in the Church, plus the others which the playwright has put forcefully and clearly in the foreground, why would anyone expect the Church to condemn the extermination of the Jews in anything but the vaguest of terms? The expectation credits the Church with too much integrity, with too much devotion to the heart of Christianity, and presses upon the deputy a role he has not played in modern times. The papacy and the Church did not merit Hochhuth's accusations. Finally, a number of characters such as the papal Nuncio, Archbishop Cesare Orsenigo, the German State Secretary and then Ambassador to the Vatican, Ernst von Weizsäcker, and Pope Pius XII have been given moral burdens without sufficient consideration of their personal attributes and roles in the institutions which themselves are not to be found in the play. The Nuncio was probably a fascist in his political proclivities, but as a professional diplomat was little more than the messenger for innumerable papal complaints to the German Foreign Office about matters treated in the concordats, cases of priests confined in concentration camps and higher clergy under house arrest, and individuals of various nationalities about whom the Vatican had

*Luigi Castiglione, Pio XII e il nazimo (Turin, 1965), pp. 244-47. This hagiographical but useful biography contains excerpts from the accounts of two priests about this incident. Neither the incident nor the condemnation are mentioned in the most recent volumes of Vatican documents, Le Saint Siege et la situation religieuse en Pologne et dans les Pays Baltes, 1939-1945 [series as in n. 3] (Vatican, 1967), vol. 3, in two parts. However, several Polish bishops requested a public papal statement of condolences to Polish Catholics (ibid., 38-55, docs. 287, 314, 323); the Vatican argued that the Pope had already said enough (ibid., docs. 302, 325, 329); and an especially strong statement by the Bishop of Cracow on the ferocity of the German occupation was burnt because of fear that the Gestapo might obtain it (ibid., doc. 357). Perhaps further research will confirm whether and when Orsenigo unsuccessfully intervened with Hitler in favor of the Jews. See Paul Rassinier, L'operation "Vicaire." Le role de Pie XII devant I'Histoire (Paris, 1965) p. 60.

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received inquiries.5 The plight of the civilian populations in Europe was hardly touched upon except insofar as their access to the amenities of religion had been limited by the Nazis, and the Jews were briefly mentioned on but very few occasions throughout these years. The Nuncio was not personally responsible for the restraint exercised by the Vatican; he would hardly have improved matters if he had been less cordial to State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker of the German Foreign Office. The Nuncio in fact believed that Weizsäcker was trying to help, and there is indeed some strong evidence to support his belief." Nevertheless, only in very minor matters was the Vatican to receive any satisfaction. Exceedingly restrained and disciplined in temperament, a diplomat who always said less than he meant and hoped for more thin he knew he could get, Weizsäcker tried to secure information in answer to inquiries, to ameliorate the treatment of the Church, to permit the Nuncio visiting rights in concentration camps, to permit mass for prisoners, and to obtain diplomatic competence for the occupied areas. His efforts were frustrated by the rules laid down by Hitler and by the resistance of other Nazi organizations, such as the Party Chancellory under Bormann, the SS under Himmler, Martin Luther's Department Deutschland, and the staffs of various Gauleiters, all of whom had a hand in the treatment of the Church in these areas. In June 1942 the Foreign Office itself was excluded from these issues and forbidden to receive the Nuncio's notes touching on areas proclaimed off-limits to the Vatican. Weizsäcker became ambassador to the Vatican in May 1943, an appointment that was merely a consequence of a squalid bureaucratic struggle which toppled Martin Luther, an upstart challenger to Ribbentrop. Hochhuth's suppositions that Weizsäcker had a commission to improve relations with the Vatican, to initiate peace moves in Rome, and that the Vatican thereby had a means of applying pressure on Germany, are groundless. In Rome, the new ambassador's efforts ranged much further than has been admitted in the play, where the central episode about the deportation of the Jews from Rome is flawed by a number of errors. 7 The portrait of the Pope is also markedly deficient. According to many who knew him, his was a deep and reflective personality, whose interest in 5

Deputy, 297 refers to "predominately lame protests about purely ecclesiastical affairs," which is not an adequate description. A number of articles and books have treated this problem, but not definitively. All of these rely upon the Nuremberg documents, mainly the NG- series, or the more complete reels of microfilm, both of which I have read. For selections from these documents see Saul Friedländer, Pius XII und das Dritte Reich (Hamburg, 1965). A trenchant criticism of the Church's role may be found in Klaus Epstein, ' T h e Pope, the Church, and the Nazis," Modern Age, 9 (Winter 1964-5), 83-94, and a sprawling, sometimes uncritical rehabilitation in Pinchas E. Lapide, Three Popes and the Jews (New York, 1967). «The evidence comes from the affidavits for Weizsäckers trial from two priests who assisted Orsenigo in Berlin. See the statement of Mgr. Raphael Forni in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, under Control Council Law No. 10 (Washington, 1950), XII, p. 912, and the unpublished Weizsäcker Document 138, Father Edward Gehrmann affidavit, "Weizsäcker Document Book 3," National Archives, Washington, D.C. 'See my article, "The Vatican Embassy of Ernst von Weizsäcker, 1943-1945," Journal of Modern History, XXXIX (June 1967), 138-159. On the Pope's role in Rome at the time of the massacre in the caves of Ardeatine, see Robert Katz, Death in Rome (New York, 1967), pp. 34-36, 101-104, 141-144, 171, 288.

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the Church's stocks and bonds as alleged in the play is the grossest caricature. He was aristocratic in bearing and attitudes, restrained and resigned in temperament. And he did more, as well as less, than the dramatist has allowed. For instance, the Pope did intervene on behalf of priests in concentration camps, and especially in the case of Lichtenberg who had preached in favor of the Jews and then joined them. 8 In Hochhuth's drama, Pius strives for neutrality in order to be able to mediate between opposing sides in the war; but in reality, he considered his neutrality important so as to preserve the unity of the Church, and said he would not mediate unless he were asked. When asked by the Germans late in 1944 to promote a combined Allied and German defence against Russia, he put this down as folly and refused. 9 Even though the Pope had considerable powers of decision, he was the captive of more than considerations of raison d'etat as ascribed to him by Hochhuth (102). He had to rely upon the reports of his clergy in other nations and— always a conservative himself, especially in diplomacy—he was further restrained by the very conservative institutions of the Church, which denied the compulsion of any categorical imperative for action. Sorrow over the plight of the Church and its laity dominated his thoughts, though not to the complete exclusion of the Jews.10 Yet rolling phrases were inadequate and could not be claimed as supposedly major references to the "final solution"; the Pope should quite rightly be measured by them, even if inadequately measured as in The Deputy. However, none of the major deficiencies in the play's treatment of the historical events detract greatly from its central thesis. Usually this is said to be that if the Pope had spoken out, he could have saved the Jews. Certainly Hochhuth has confirmed this interpretation on many occasions. But he has also accepted the judgment of an old Jesuit that the arguments about the actions of an individual pope are less important than the references to God in the play's fifth act (Storm, 172). In fact, the whole drama may be construed as an argument about the existence or purposes of God and the meaning of the extermination of the Jews. The reasons for the Pope's silence loom large in the play, and have been much disputed; but this silence, and the extermination of the Jews, do not require proof. The Pope was silent; six million Jews did die the most degrading death possible. Hochhuth has asked what one can make of a world in which such things can happen, and he has answered that they either refute the existence of God or prove that He has malevolent purposes. The silence of the Pope, Christ's "deputy," is necessarily both a personal failure and a failure of God. The reasons why Pius XII was silent have been 8 Deputy, 99, 209, 218 refers to the priests abandoned by the Vatican, and ibid., 296 (appendix to the play) insists that the Pope did not lift a finger on behalf of various German priests. But idid., 306 admits the contrary. The papal interventions were in fact numerous, as is revealed by the microfilms of the German documents on relations with the Vatican. See Pius XII to the Bishop of Berlin, April 30, 1943, Doc. 105, in Lettres de Pie Xll, 323 for the Pope's mention of Lichtenberg, and the documents in the two parts of volume 3 of Le Saint Siege et la situation religieuse en Pologne... for frequent mention of the plight of various priests. 9 Deputy, 98, 213, 194, 205, 219, 303, 320. See the author's article cited in n. 7. ioLettres de Pie Xll, 210, 326.

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elaborated only in order to demonstrate the enormity of his conscious refusal to speak out, and to heighten one's sense that a categorical imperative required a papal condemnation of Hitler (Storm, 124-25) Furthermore, the young Italian priest, Riccardo, fails in his attempt to replace the Pope and die as the Deputy's deputy. He seeks martyrdom in the concentration camp; but instead the satanic Doctor who represents the powers operating the camp, compels him to labor in the crematorium there, where his faith is shaken precisely as the Doctor had anticipated. The slaughter is so appalling, so apparently meaningless, that Riccardo cannot help but doubt the existence of God And with every human body that I burn a portion of my faith burns also. God burns. Corpses—a conveyor belt of corpses. History is a highway paved with carrion . . . If I knew that He looks o n — I would have to—hate Him (270).

At the end of the play he even seizes a pistol and attempts to shoot the Doctor, but instead is himself gunned down by a guard. The priest is only barely saved from committing murder, the ultimate violation of his priestly vows, and his death is thus robbed of the demonstrative, sacrificial significance he had originally envisaged. Nevertheless, he had redeemed himself as a man, and gave substance to an irreligious, thoroughly humanist ethic, one admitting outrage, revulsion, violent action. The man is even stronger than the priest. The play thereby carries Riccardo a step beyond his own models in real life, the German priests Kolbe and Lichtenberg, to whom Hochhuth dedicated his drama. The Pope and the Church remain unredeemed in the play, nor is there any redemption for the Jews. Trapped in the extermination machinery, they believe that not only has God forsaken them but also that He imposed this fate upon them Untrammeled God—is man most like you At his most untrammeled? Is he Such a pit of depravity, because You Have created him in Your own image (224)?

Their doubts even raise the question of whether God exists, which Hochhuth does not answer. The Pope's responsibility for not saving them is thus connected with the argument that God has rejected them. The connivance of God in the Devil's work is given further credence by the pact between the Pope and the Germans in Rome, and the apparent pact between the Pope and Hitler to resist the Bolsheviks. Thus God and the Devil work hand in hand in higher politics, or the Devil has the field to himself. Either way, there can be no redemption for the deportees, whose utterly meaningless deaths remain utterly meaningless. The play, then, is a series of reflections on a world gone mad—indulging in unbridled pillage and murder, in which the best, such as Riccardo and Gerstein, are so weak that they cannot affect the holocaust, but can and should nevertheless do what they must as men.

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The theological question about the nature or existence of God is partly made dependent on the meaning of the exterminations. Without God there can be no meaning to this slaughter, and the slaughter demonstrates the non-existence or implacable hostility of God. But only a very close reading of the play reveals this pessimistic theology and the somewhat ambiguous implications of Riccardo's actions. These usually remain concealed, and it is the more obvious "symbolic meaning" sought by the author that is the more heartening and clearer. Riccardo appears as undeniably admirable, his commitment to action exemplary, his gesture important, and his death meaningful despite his own doubting. He is an engaged hero who appears to refute the Doctor's statement that he can die in Auschwitz like a snail crushed under an auto tire— die as the heroes of today do die, namelessly, snuffed out by powers they have never known, let alone can fight. In other words, meaningless ( 2 4 5 ) .

Similarly, in the other historical play which has aroused much discussion, Peter Weiss's Sade proclaims that "there's no singular personal death to be had / only an anonymous cheapened death." In response, Gerstein and Riccardo would probably echo Marat Against Nature's silence I use action In the vast indifference I invent a meaning I don't watch unmoved I intervene and say that this and this are wrong and I work to alter and improve them The important thing is to pull yourself up by your own hair to turn yourself inside out and see the whole world with fresh eyes (Marat-Sade, 4 6 ) .

But Weiss's commitment emerges out of an ideology which is evident throughout his play, with its catchy and ribald cliches about the ruling classes indulging in "happy mutual robbery" (56) and "up to their eyeballs in franc notes," while the masses are "up to [their] noses in crap" (66), of pillage and wars "run for the benefit of profiteers" (69), of the covetous bourgeoisie preserving "the holy right of property" (56), and fat, vapid priests rejecting action and arguing the necessity to "Pray for those who torture you / for prayer and blessing are the only stairways / which you can climb to Paradise" (48). Hochhuth shares this outlook up to a point, for he obviously condemns a supine church, profiteering industrialists and participants in the inhuman machinery of extermination, but his condemnation is impelled less by ideology than by a somewhat old-fashioned morality. Strong without the sanction of religion in Gerstein, strong out of religious commitment in Riccardo, this morality hardly requires proof. But the other elements of every situation must be established before their reconstruction: hence Hochhuth's seriousness about reality, his dependence on history and elaborate proof. Weiss took much of his interpretation of reality from ideology when dealing with the

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distant past in Marat-Sade. The distance permitted cynicism and scepticism, Brechtian comedy and cunning as well as verse and song. In contrast to Weiss's rich and evocative idiom Hochhuth's language seems flat and didactic, descriptive but colorless. When Weiss, in his turn, portrayed the concentration camps in his last drama The Investigation, he used the testimony of witnesses at the recent Auschwitz trial, as though he believed that only the clinically descriptive, unemotional words of survivors could suffice for a reality so horrible. No more than in The Deputy could this performance communicate the mentality of guards and prisoners or the fantastic scale of the "final solution." Amorality, a ruthless struggle for survival, incredible brutality, these are evident; but neither Weiss nor Hochhuth has yet brought to the stage the psychological insights implied by Sade when he intones In a criminal society I dug the criminal out of myself so I could understand him and so understand the times we live in (Marat-Sade, 7 2 ) .

From this vantage point Hochhuth's arch-criminal, the Doctor, sceptical and philosophical—insisting that "Auschwitz refutes / creator, creation, and the creature" (248)—seems an embarrassing parody of the kind of man who carried out genocide. Nor have these dramatists made us share the sense that We few survivors walk over a quaking bog of corpses always under our feet every step we take rolled bones ashes matted hair under our feet broken teeth skulls split open (Marat-Sade, 53).

Thus the problems have been posed. Historical dramas certainly should lay bare the core of man, and can define our legacy from the most horrifying events of this century. But perhaps only more straightforward history can give a full portrait of the concentration camp state, of large and powerful institutions at work, and of the full dimensions of historical characters. Instead, Hochhuth's achievement is to have examined the dilemmas of those in power, to have treated them as extremely fallible men never conscious enough of the human fates in their hands; and to have contrasted their spiritual corruption with the powerful, less muddled, more spontaneous and virtuous impulses of men who would either change the world, or at least demonstrate their humanity. Creation of a situation in which these confrontations generate dramatic tension is much more important than reconstruction of a reality which the historian will accept. Despite the flaws, most historians would agree that Hochhuth's history is remarkably accurate and full.—Perhaps too full: he might have taken more of the freedom that he quite rightly claimed for the writer. His didactic intent sometimes submerges his most important theatrical purpose, which must be to realize characters with whom audiences and readers can feel empathy, and in situations which

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ring true, it is curious that Marat and Sade seem more fully realized than Riccardo and Pius XII, that the tension is greater in the play within a play of Weiss's drama, than in Hochhuth's much more crowded work which merited editing in print as well as in performance. But both achievements are impressively dramatic in subject, development, and character, especially in the activism of Marat and Riccardo. Their passionate commitment will have momentarily transformed many viewers, whose experience of dramatic truths will encourage and complement rather than exclude an understanding of the historical truth.

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The Vatican and the Jews: Cynicism and Indifference JUDAH

L.

GRAUBART THERE ARE FEW ISSUES IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY

of the Holocaust that are colored by more emotion and based on less knowledge than the Vatican's response to "the final solution to the Jewish question." In part, these circumstances are attributable to a general historical indifference towards the Jewish fate in World War II. As Gerd Korman has noted, "For most historians World War II cast so narrow a shadow, they almost missed the destruction of European Jewry" (Societas, Spring 1973, p. 1 of mss. in writer's possession). But to dismiss the paucity of historiography on Pius and the Jews as stemming only from scholarly indifference is to avoid confrontation with a more profound set of questions. First among them is, why have historians "missed the destruction of European Jewry?" Second, (as a corollary of the first question), why have many students of the Vatican been indifferent to the issue of Pius XII and the "final solution?" Third, regarding the minority of Vatican historians who have written about the Pope and the Jews, what are the implications of their analyses? T h e answers to these questions do not lie solely within the historical community. Rather, they are to be found in the community at large. For historians' perceptions are not evolved in a vacuum; rather, they are the outgrowth and, hence, a reflection of the society in which they live. Therefore, to understand what the historical community has said, why it has said it, one must understand the societal attitudes that conditioned its perceptions. With regard to the historians' apathy towards the Holocaust then, we must first ask: what has been the societal perception of it? Quite logically, the answer may be summed u p in one word: apathy. For, as Glock, Selznick and Spaeth observed in The Apathetic Majority (1965), Americans were indifferent to Nazi persecutions when they took place, "and remained so after the war " (p. 169). But, as noted, societal indifference affected not only historians of World War II, but students of the Vatican as well. Thus, beginning with Camillo Cianfarra's initial study, The Vatican and the War (1944), which was the only exception, it was not until 1962 that any such commentators so much as considered Pius XII and the Jews. Indeed, Cianfarra, in his sole reference to the Vatican and German genocide, merely observes that in response to the JUDAH L. GRAUBART

is a student of Holocaust

historiography.

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. . . ruthless policy of . . . extermination which the Germans are pursuing against the Poles, Czechs, and Yugoslavs . . . (Pius) . . . advocated the preservation of the four national rights of minorities . . . culture, language, economic capacity and fecundity (p. 319). It is pertinent to note that, in wartime America, Cianfarra's book was extraordinarily well received. It was reviewed by no less than thirtyeight Catholic and secular publications, among them Commonweal, America, Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, The American Political Science Review, and others. Most reviews agreed with the one in Foreign Affairs, which described The Vatican and the War as "well informed (and) temperate." This reaction to Cianfarra's book is important as it illustrates the tone that was subsequently to dominate post-war Vatican analyses of Pius' relations with, and attitudes towards, the fascists. T h a t is, there was, with only few exceptions, general acceptance of the idea that the Vatican, (as Cianfarra suggests) was totally committed to the allied cause, an attitude which Pius feared manifesting (once more, according to Cianfarra) lest there be Mussolini-directed retaliation. In point of fact, this analysis was extremely wide of the mark. As noted elsewhere in this paper, Pius was (a) not in complete harmony with the allies, opposing their demand for unconditional Axis surrender; (b) was attempting negotiations to extricate Italy from the war in 1943, hence the need for neutrality; and (c) feared German, not Italian, retaliation for anti-Axis or pro-ally statements. In 1945, two other biographies of Pius were published, neither of which was of great significance. T h e first was Charles H. Doyle's The Life of Pope Pius XII, which concentrated on Pius' spiritual evolution both as priest and, later, as Pope. In 1945, a brief (130 pages) compendium of wartime Papal messages was released. £dited by Father Reginald F. Walker, it was titled, Pius of Peace: A Study of the Pacific Works of His Holiness Pope Pius XII in the World War, 1939-1945. In 1949, a sensationalist volume, The Vatican World of Politics, was published by an author named Avro Manhattan. Devoting only part of his volume to the role of Pius during the war, Manhattan, unlike Cianfarra, suggested that, during the war, Pius had actually been sitting on the fence. Further, the author claimed that the Pope favored a German victory against the Soviets due to the greater freedom which fascism afforded Catholicism.

The book was reviewed by seven Catholic and secular publications (among them, The New York Times, Catholic World, Saturday Review of Literature), and was roundly condemned. Catholic publications viewed it as a vitriolic and bigoted attack on the Church. For its part, the secular press was critical of Manhattan's scholarship and lack of interpretive ability. But, despite Manhattan's very real shortcomings, he did sue-

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ceed in asking a question that historians a decade hence would consider. That is, what was the true nature of the Papacy's attitude towards German fascism and Soviet communism? In November of 1950, Leon Poliakov, a French Jewish historian, published his analysis of Pius and the Jews titled " T h e Vatican and the Jewish Question" in Commentary. Praising Pius XII's predecessor, Pius XI as " . . . the courageous Pope . . . who severely condemned nazism in his famous encyclical Mit brennender Sorge of 1937 . . (p. 440) the historian noted that Pius XII adopted "a less forthright policy towards the Nazis." As to the Pope's motivation, Poliakov suggested that "one can only guess; few secrets have been so well kept as those of the diplomacy of the Holy See." In his strongest criticism of Pius, Poliakov states, It is painful . . . that . . . (though) gas chambers and crematoria were operating day and night, the high spiritual authority of the Vatican did not . . . protest (p. 443).

Related to his disappointment at the Vatican's silence was Poliakov's judgment that theological anti-Semitism was a factor in the shaping of Papal policy. In effect, he suggested that such attitudes may have motivated Pius to remain silent on discriminatory measures which culminated in the "final solution." (The same point was subsequently made by Gunter Lewy in his study, The Catholic Churh and the Third Reich.) But despite these two negative judgments, Poliakov's article was, on the whole, favorable towards the Vatican. He suggested that if the Papacy was "less (than) forthright" in its private actions, it was far more direct. So "there is no doubt that secret instructions went out from the Vatican urging the national churches to intervene in favor of the Jews by every possible means . . . " (p. 441). Poliakov also states that, while there are no statistics on Papal help to Jews, " . . . it is certain that a great many of the Jewish survivors of the Nazi occupation benefitted from its aid . . . " (p. 443). It was not until 1959 that the issue of the Vatican during the Nazi era would be broached by a gentile historian; and, then, only in a very indirect sense. In that year, Father Robert Graham published his scholarly study titled Vatican Diplomacy. T h e essential nature of Graham's inquiry dealt with how the Vatican State had functioned over the centuries as a secular diplomatic force. And while the study ignored Pius XII and the "final solution," it suggested an interpretation which would be subsequently crucial to Vatican historiography. Thus, Graham posited that . . . it is true that the Catholic Church is the only religious body which engages in direct relations with the various states. It is also true that papal diplomacy has cut its own course serenely and independently, leaving at more than one point the well marked road that civil diplomacy is wont

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to follow. Nevertheless, in its broad outlines and . . . essential function (it) conforms closely to the genius of diplomacy in general (p. 7).

A year later, in the fall of 1960, Gordon Zahn published an important essay in Cross Currents entitled, "The German Catholic Press and Hitler's Wars." This critique bears consideration, not only for its scholarship but, also, for its tone. Zahn was one of the first serious students to adopt a critical-attitude towards the German Catholic hierarchy visa-vis the Nazis. And, in doing so, Zahn, likewise, became one of the first Catholic historians to suggest, albeit indirectly, Vatican complicity regarding persecution of the Jews. In his essay, which was subsequently expanded into a book, German Catholics and Hitler's War (1962), Zahn concludes that the pre-war and wartime German Catholic press had, in effect, sanctioned Nazi fascism. He further states that the press had supported wars of aggression which could not be characterized as "just" wars according to church doctrine. Even before the war the Catholic periodicals . . . placed ever growing emphasis on the patriotism and loyalty of the German Catholic population . . . After the German attack on Poland . . . the German Catholic who turned to his diocesan paper . . . as to the justice or injustice of Hitler's aggressive wars or the nature and extent of his obligation to support them would find no equivocation or reticence . . . (p. 343).

In 1962, Rolf Hochhuth's play, The Deputy, was published, thus marking another watershed in Vatican historiography. For, while Poliakov was guardedly critical of Pius, and Zahn of the German Catholic establishment, Hochhuth went much further. For the first time a frontal attack was made on the Pope, directly accusing him of moral cowardice regarding the "final solution." Viewing Hochhuth's drama as a historical document, we find two primary theses posited in the text. The first is the author's condemnation of the Pope for his refusal to protest the genocide of the Jews. Thus, in the concluding lines of Act II, Pius is told by the young priest-protagonist, Ricardo Fontana, that the Pontiff's silence " . . . grants Hitler unrestricted license to go on treating the Jews as he has always done." The Pope limits himself to replying that " . . . the Jews must wait, praying and trusting that the hour of heavenly comfort will come . . . " As to the second, and, from the historian's standpoint, a more important theme, the question of the motivation for Pius' silence, the playwright develops three basic factors which he feels were responsible for the decision to remain silent. (These factors were to be explored by scholars in subsequent works.) They are (a) an affinity for the German people, based on his days as Papal nuncio to Bavaria; (b) his abhorrence of Bolshevism above that of Nazism (hence, his fear that criticism of Germany might possibly strengthen the Soviets); (c) his belief that, as head of the Vatican State, he must remain completely neutral in order to serve as a diplomatic negotiator between the warring powers.

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The Deputy elicited strong and diverse reactions from both the historical and the religious communities. As to the former, it is interesting to note that Hochhuth's interpretation either motivated or coincided with a change in the attitudes of Leon Poliakov on this question. Thus, writing in the April 1964 issue of the Jewish Frontier, Poliakov stated, in sharp contrast with his earlier assessment that: At this most tragic moment of modern history, Christianity's highest spiritual authority . . . kept . . . silent . . . what worse could have happened to the Jews . . . (had Pious protested?) . . . Nothing more than what they were already suffering. Not to understand this was to cover one's eyes... (p. 443). As to other reactions, they were so numerous that, in the space of one year, from the time the drama opened on Broadway in February, 1963, until a year later, in February, 1964, nearly 450 English language reviews and articles were published. The Vatican's response was enunciated by Cardinal Giovanni Montini in the form of an article in the London Catholic weekly, The Tablet (June 29, 1964). Though drafted by Montini prior to his election to the Papacy as Paul VI, it was released after his elevation, thus making it an official Vatican pronouncement. Montini defended Pius' silence because "an attitude of protest. . . and condemnation would not only have been futile, but also harmful; and that is the long and the short of the matter" (as quoted in E. Bentley, ed., The Storm Over the Deputy, p. 68). Other Vatican apologists assumed a similar line of reasoning, arguing that had Pius spoken out, his statements would have been ineffective in mobilizing the world's 300 million Catholics, as well as the rest of the church hierarchy. Finally, they claimed that, as a neutral, the Church was obligated, as Hannah Arendt caustically put it, "to bless both sides." Only two years after the publication of The Deputy, and a year after its release in America, Gunther Lewy published his study, The Catholic Church and the Third. Reich, part of which was adapted into a pre-publication article, "Pius XII, the Jews and T h e German Catholic Church," (Commentary, Feb. 1964). Commenting on The Deputy, Lewy indicated a general agreement with Hochhuth's conclusions. But, though agreeing, he also felt that there were deeper causes for the Pope's silence. . . . we must remember that the Nazi assault upon the Jews of Europe took place in a climate of opinion conditioned by centuries of hostility to Jews and Judaism . . . (also) . . . given the indifference of the German population towards the fate of the Jews, and the highly ambivalent attitude of the hierarchy towards Nazi anti-Semitism, a forceful stand by the Pontiff on the Jewish question might well have led to large scale desertion from the church (Commentary, Feb. 1964, p. 33). Lewy also notes that, within the Vatican, there was a tradition of

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"moderate anti-Semitism" which caused the Vatican to view the Jewish plight with no " . . . sense of moral outrage" (p. 33). However, while distinguishing himself from Hodihuth in these respects, the historian's conclusions were similar to the playwright's in others. Thus, Lewy suggests the Pope was unwilling to risk reducing his status as a neutral by condemning the atrocities. He also says that, since Pius abhorred Bolshevism over National Socialism, the Pontiff did not wish to undermine " . . . Germany's struggle against Russia" (p. 33). And finally, both Lewy and Hochhuth agree in their assessment of the Pope's personality, which subsequent historians were to assess as a major factor in the formulation of the Vatican's response. Pius was " . . . unemotional and dispassionate as well as a master of diplomatic ambiguity" (p. 33). Succeeding Lewy's were two more studies which concentrated exclusively on the role and the motivations of Pius in the Second World War period. The first of these, Pius XII and the Third Reich, by Saul Friedlander, was published in France in 1964, and in the United States in 1966. In his work, Friedlander bases most of his scholarship on documents of the German Foreign Ministry. However, unlike his historical progenitors, he stops short of any judgments of the Pope's action that might be construed as moral condemnations. But, while avoiding any such judgment about Pius' diplomacy, the author does suggest what he believed were the most probable reasons for the Vatican's silence. Drawing upon Papal statements, correspondence and other records, Friedlander says that the reasons were: (a) the Pope's belief that an evenhanded policy towards atrocities must be maintained, for to denounce German war crimes without simultaneously protesting Soviet atrocities, which he knew were taking place, would weaken Vatican credibility; (b) the Pontiff's belief that an attempt to influence German leadership would only be futile; (c) the hope that Papal restraint would save the German Catholic community—as well as other religious groups—from suffering an even more severe fate than had been theirs up to that point. Three years after the publication of Friedlander's book, The Silence of Pius XII by Carlo Falconi was released. Based on the documents of the puppet governments of Croatia and Poland, and on correspondence between the Nazis and the Holy See, it is the most definitive study, to date, of the Vatican's wartime silence. Falconi is the first historian to expand the perspective of Pius' silence beyond the rubric of the "final solution of the Jewish question" to the issue of the genocide of Catholics in occupied countries as well. In so doing, he arrives at conclusions which are quite different from those offered by Cianfarra in his wartime survey of the Vatican. Falconi suggests that Pius' statements were about the Polish Catholics and the Orthodox Serbs of Croatia and were, actually, quite weak. Indeed, Falconi claims (as does Friedlander) that Pius deliberately avoided

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strong rhetoric for fear that such protests might result in Nazi reprisals against Catholics in occupied countries. However, in evaluating this latter factor, Falconi criticizes the Pope, noting that German statements to the Vatican from the occupied countries were "cautious." Thus, while Pius' fears may be understandable, "this type of fear hardly increases our respect for the disinterestedness of (his) silence" (p. 268). Falconi further maintains that even if Pius (and the former Cardinal Montini) were correct, i.e., that protests would have been futile, the Pope should have spoken out anyway, for " . . . the Gospels . . . have ruthlessly and explicitly condemned silence in the fact of moral evil whatever justifications may be found" (p. 268). Beyond these judgments, Falconi believed that the Pope's silence was based on the following factors: (a) the unreadiness of Catholics, especially German Catholics, to accept a Papal denunciation of the war crimes; (b) the fear that protests might somehow weaken the Church's position in the post-War European world; and, to Falconi, the most important factor of all, (c) " . . . Pius' inability to shed his professional training as a diplomat." This aspect of his personality was the "truest and innermost reason . . . his piety while permeating his ideal conception of existence and his main field of activity, was also "conditioned and restructured by these" (p. 93). Against this background, the most recent study of the Papacy and the fascists, Anthony Rhodes' The Vatican and the Age of Dictators (19221945), can be considered. As its title implies, the study encompasses not only the reign of Pius XII, but, also, that of his predecessor, Pius XI. In this respect, its importance for the historiography of the Vatican's wartime policies is immediately apparent. For it is Rhodes' initial thesis that one cannot fully understand the policies executed by Pius XII without first examining those of his predecessor of seventeen years. Hence, in his brief review of what prior scholars have said about these questions, he observes that All these writers examine the relations of the Vatican with Nazi Germany without referring to other aspects of Vatican diplomacy in the inter-war years. In this book, an attempt has been made . . . to show that its attitude towards Nazi Germany was the logical sequence of the new foreign policy inaugurated by Pius XI immediately after the First World War (p. 12).

In so expanding the scope of the historiographic debate about Pius XII, Rhodes also makes a second point, which is posited on two interrelated theses. The first is that . . . the goals of the Vatican are not those of a lay State; they are transcendental, not imminent. Its aim is to save souls . . . (p. 354).

Yet, in having such "transcendental" goals, the Vatican cannot help but conduct itself as a "lay State." Thus, " . . . the Pope's Power over the Church and its 300 million faithful is such that his actions and pro-

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nouncements must inevitably produce political consequences" (p. 14). In view o£ this intertwining of the spiritual and the temporal, Rhodes asserts that one cannot apply moralistic viewpoints to Papal policies (as do Hochhuth, Falconi, et al) and still have an accurate perception of what occurred. Rather, one must take into account the fact that Vatican policies were based, first and foremost, not on universal humanitarian concerns, but on the best interests of the Holy See, interests which sometimes required the Vatican to conduct itself much like a secular state. Having laid this basis for his study, Rhodes begins with an exploration of the policies of Pius XI, who ascended to the Papacy in 1922 and began a ". . . new era of Papal politics." A "new era," but, at the same time, one which he believed would maintain " . . . permanent (Rhode's emphasis) Catholic interests, secure from the whim of transient political systems" (p. 14). To maintain the "permanent Catholic interests" the Pope formulated definite policies towards both the nascent Soviet Bolshevist and the Italian fascist regimes; policies which were to have very definite bearing on his successors. Hence, in relation to the Communists, the Vatican attitude was one of strong and untempered hostility. Towards Mussolini, its modus operandi was one of accommodation rather than condemnation. The reason for this quantitative difference of opposition was that, while the Pope held no brief for fascism, the Vatican had, of course, much more in common with the Fascist State than with the earlier Liberal regimes. Both Catholicism and Fascism were autocratic, ruled by one man; both were absolutist, admitting no question of their creeds; both insisted on the submission of the individual to the system; both attached importance to external ceremonies and mass psychology . . . (p. 30).

With such a modus operandi then, the Holy See, under the direction of Pius XI, pursued its interests, " . . . resisting on the one hand the disruptive influence of Bolshevism and on the other hand attempting to moderate the fanatical new nationalism in Germany and Italy" (p. 21). During the period of Pius' reign there was issued what would eventually prove to be the most important Vatican response to German fascism, Mit brennender Sorge. The chronicling of this matter, occupying a full chapter in Rhodes' study, deserves careful scrutiny in terms of understanding the author's realpolitik approach to Vatican policies. The encyclical was a damning indictment issued by Pius X I in March 1937. In it, he speaks of anti-Catholic persecution that is "illegal as it is inhuman," while denouncing the Nazi pressures on Catholics to abandon their faith as "base, illegal and inhuman." Though most historians have interpreted the encyclical as a moral denunciation of German fascism, Rhodes brings in an additional factor, seeing it as having arisen

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from temporal, political concerns. For the encyclical was issued only after it became clear to t'he Vatican that there was no " . . . chance of agreement with Germany . . . on a common front against (the) Communist . . . " backing of the Republican forces in the Spanish Civil War (p. 202). Thus, Mit brennender Sorge was, most assuredly, a courageous denunciation of moral evil; but it was a courageous denunciation which, had political circumstances been different, might never have been issued. Two years after the publication of Mit brennender Sorge, Pius XI died. He was succeeded by the man he had all but literally ordained as his successor, the Vatican Secretary of State, Eugenio Pacelli. As Rhodes observes, by making clear his desire for Pacelli to succeed him, Pius was providing for the continuation of his own policies. Given Pacelli's political views and his diplomatic experience, he was, indeed, the man who could, as the aged Pope believed, best maintain the Vatican's interests in the turbulent future. With Italy's entry into the war on the side of the Axis in 1940, Pius XII was called upon to utilize all of his diplomatic skill to protect the Vatican interests. However, in so doing he caused " . . . the high . . . prestige (of the) Papacy (to) decline, (as) . . . its sentiments were . . . discreetly adjusted to the exigencies of an anxious neutrality . . . " But it was not only considerations of neutrality that motivated Papal policy. For, as Rhodes notes, the Pope blended the temporal and the spiritual and envisioned himself, like Innocent XI, as a unifier of the nations of the "Christian West against the Infidel . . . " (p. 261); i.e., the Bolshevists. Yet, it was only later that Pius came to expect that he would fulfill this unifying post-war role against communism. It was his initial hope that the conflict would result, first, in the destruction of Soviet communism and then in the destruction of German fascism. The rationale for the chronology of this scenario was that, while both forces were pernicious to the Vatican, it was still essential that, regarding the final outcome, Russia not be accorded a part in the victory. If it were, then the Pope believed that such a victory would be of the communist system. Hence, the early hope for a destruction of Russia (ergo communism) by Germany, and then the elimination of German fascism by the Allies. But such expectations, as the Pope soon learned, were not to be fulfilled. In September, 1942, Presidential envoy Myron Taylor secredy informed Pius that it was the allied intention totally to eradicate Nazism. Moreover, Taylor explained, since the United States and Great Britain then enjoyed a close relationship with the USSR, the Soviets would exercise a major voice in the shaping of the post-war world order. As Rhodes observes, "this was hardly welcome news . . . Msgr. Tardini" (the Vatican Secretary of State) " . . . notes about the conversation with Mr. Tay-

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lor, 'the Americans are preparing to reorganize Europe . . . and (they) may cause tremendous damage . . " p. 267). Faced with what the events seemed to confirm as an eventual fait accompli of an allied-Soviet victory, the Vatican's wartime "neutrality" became less pronounced. Thus, in his Christmas 1942 broadcast, "perhaps the most important made by the Pope during the war," Pius was unprecedented!y forthright in his condemnation of totalitarianism. Further, as Rhodes states, "the most important part of his address concerned 'the hundreds of thousands who . . . have been condemned to death a clear enough reference to the Jews . . . " In commenting on Pius' Christmas broadcast, and in subsequent analyses of Papal statements on the Jews, Rhodes again posits a unique and very important interpretation. H e suggests that, although the Pope frequently protested on behalf of the Jews, because of his diplomatic training and because of temporal exigencies, his wording was such that, in retrospect, the protests appear inadequate. Yet their meaning, as Rhodes notes, was not lost upon the Germans. As stated in a report by Reinhard Heydrich, Himmler's deputy, on the Papal broadcast of December, 1942, the Pope was " . . . virtually accusing the German people of injustice towards the Jews, and makes himself the mouthpiece of the Jewish war criminals" (p. 272). In attempting to butress further the strength of Pius' response, Rhodes rites others who paid tribute to Papal rescue efforts on behalf of the Jews. But, in so doing, he also exposes certain weaknesses in both his scholarship and his logic. Thus, he quotes at length from Pinchas Lapide who, in his 1972 volume, Three Popes and the Jews, maintains that " . . . the Catholic Church under the Pontificate of Pius XII was instrumental in saving probably as many as 860,000 Jews from . . . death at Nazi hands" (p. 269). Lapide, however, is an unconvincing source. Though maintaining that his conclusions are based on material in Yad Vashem, the Zionist Central Archives, and interviews with Holocaust survivors, he offers no documentation for them. Moreover, his arguments in defense of Pius merely restate those of previous Vatican apologists. Besides citing an inadequate study, Rhodes' other "documentation" of effective Papal action in behalf of Jews is similarly weak. His brief citation of two private statements praising Pius read more like testimonials than factual reports on Papal efforts. But, in the final analysis, when viewed as a contribution to the still embryonic field of Vatican historiography, The Vatican and the Age of Dictators does have importance. Indeed, it is an importance that relates both to the student.of history and to the student of society. Historically, the book is important because it offers a new avenue of approach to the either/or dilemma of Pius XII and the Jews; i.e., either Pius was a si-

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lent assenter to the murder of six million Jews, or he was their silent saviour. Rather, Rhodes suggests (as does Robert Graham) the Vatican was neither. It was a spiritual state acting in a secular vein. However, Rhodes further maintains that the Pope, as the Vicar of Christ, is the head of a transcendental state, whose aim " . . . is to 'save souls' . . . (and) . . . to obtain the best conditions for achieving this in the various states, of whatever political colour . . . " (p. 354) (my italics). As the head of that transcendental State, the Pope took whatever steps were politically and diplomatically feasible (my italics) to ameliorate the plight of the Jews. As to whether those measures (or lack of them) were morally sound, is, for Rhodes, not the issue. What is the issue is that since the Pope is as political as he is transcendental, he cannot achieve the latter ultimate goal without first engaging in the former penultimate condition. In establishing this amoral, power-politics basis for evaluating Pius' policies, Rhodes raises some extremely important questions as to society's (and perhaps even contemporary Catholicism's) attitudes towards the Holocaust. For, just as previous students of Vatican policies manifested their era's perceptions of Jewish suffering, so, too, Rhodes' study of this question manifests present day attitudes. T o understand how, a brief review of previously outlined historiography is required. As noted earlier, because initial historians of the Vatican in World War II were apathetic toward the Holocaust, they said next to nothing about Pius and the "final solution." But, beyond their apathy, another factor tempered their perceptions (or lack of them) regarding the Pope and the Jews. That was that their researches took place during what might be called the post-war era of idealization, which extended into the early 1960's, and which saw Western man perceive his society's institutions in a highly idealized form. And, among the most idealized of those were the Church and the Pope. This is a perception that is clearly maintained by Cianfarra in his extremely inaccurate portrayal of Pius XII (a study which, it will be recalled, was quite well received). Hence, given this tenor of idealization, it would have been unthinktable for anyone seriously to question Papal policy towards the Jews (if, indeed, anyone cared). T o do so would have been to call into question the righteousness and morality of one of Western society's most basic institutions. In the early 1960's, however, Western man's faith in his post-war societal institutions began to crumble. And, as it did, the issue of the Jewish experience in the war became, for the first time, confrontable. If political leaders could be assassinated, if democratic governments could wage unjustified wars (e.g., Viet Nam), and if fundamental church dogmas could be challenged, then, surely, Papal policies towards the Jews could be viewed with some skepticism. Thus, throughout this era of upheaval, the excoriation of the Pope by men such as Hochhuth and Falconi followed quite naturally. If this was an era of institutional blame

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and mea culpa, then what greater institutional blame could there be than of Pius and his policies · towards the Jews? But in the 1970's, as Rhodes clearly demonstrates, we have entered a new era, an era of cynicism concerning churches and institutions, and of indifference towards humanity and suffering. An era of cynicism and indifference which states that the Vatican, exactly like temporal societal institutions, has every right to an amoral function. Even though it is led by the Vicar of Christ and is the fount of his teachings, its errors and aberrations are merely matters of political course. Therefore, in terms of the Vatican and the age of dictators, whether or not the Holy See did all it could for the Jews is not the principal issue. Rather (according to Rhodes), the issue is simply the Vatican's temporal pursuit of its "transcendental" self-interest regardless of what the consequences of that pursuit might have been for Europe's Jews. If, indeed, Vatican pursuit of transcendental, but, nonetheless, selfinterest is the logical conclusion of Rhodes' historiography, one must inquire as to its significance in relation to the contemporary turns of Papal policies towards the Jews. Specifically, how is one to apply the conclusions of this aforementioned study to the recently published "Guidelines of the Vatican Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews"? While Jewish spokesmen have praised many of the document's statements as "constructive and timely," such individuals have likewise raised questions about the Guidelines' intent. As Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum, Co-Secretary of the International Jewish Committee on Interreligious Consultation, has observed, the promulgation of a "conversionary approach to the Jewish people" suggests "that the election of Israel as a covenanted people has somehow been terminated," and raises "doubts about the motivation of the entire program" (N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1975). Thus, one cannot avoid the conclusion that if such "doubts" are realized (and one would hope they would not be), they will fulfill the historiography which suggests that the Vatican's theology is a theology of statecraft. Yet, if the Vatican does re-emerge as a spiritual power in pursuit of temporal interests, that would not prove unexpected, in the light of contemporary world circumstances. Throughout all elements of modern society there is a willingness to regard the service of humanitarian interests as only an adjunct of national interests. Witness: a world conference of hunger and famine which produced verbose resolutions but few concrete efforts designed to ameliorate the very problem which was its raison d'etre; the spectacle of an international organization dedicated to world peace and understanding according unprecedented prestige to terrorist leaders; and even the United States, a government based upon principles of "equality and justice for all," appearing to negate the very concept of those hallowed words.

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In the final analysis, the apparent impossibility of reconciling the secular pursuits of a purely religious state may be resolved by viewing that dilemma in the context of the society at large whence that dilemma rises. It was Western society's cynical indifference to Jewish suffering which forced the Vatican into a position of having to choose between its own best interests and a total dedication to the saving of Jewish lives (but not souls). Today that societal cynicism and indifference, originally demonstrated towards a suffering Jewish population, has returned, with its specter of all-engulfing political and human deprivation, to haunt Western man.

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Records and Documents of the Holy see Relating to the Second World War* John S. C o n w a y

I.

Le Saint Siege et la Guerre en Europe, Mars 1939-Aout 1940. 1965. II. Lettres de Pie XII aux Eveques Allemands, 1939-1944. 1966. III. Le Saint Siege et la Situation Religieuse en Poiogne et dans les Pays Baltes, 1939-1945. 2 Vols. 1967. IV. Le Saint Siege et la Guerre en Europe, Juin 1940-Juin 1941. 1967. V. Le Saint Siege et la Guerre mondiale, Juillet 1941-Octobre 1942. 1969. VI. Le Saint Siege et les Victimes de la Guerre, Mars 1939-Decembre 1940. 1972. VII. Le Saint Siege et la Guerre mondiale, Novembre 1942-Decembre 1943. 1973. VIII. Le Saint Siege et les victimes de la Guerre, Janvier 1941 — Decembre 1942. 1974.

* Actes et Documents du Saint Siege relatifs a la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, edites par Pierre Biet, Robert A. Graham, Angelo Martini, Burkhart Schneider, 11 Vols., Cittä del Vaticano, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1965-1981.

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IX. X. XI.

Le Saint Siege et les victimes de la Guerre, Janvier 1943-Decembre 1943. 1975. Le Saint Siege et les victimes de la Guerre, Janvier 1944— Juillet 1945. 1980. Le Saint Siege et la Guerre mondiale, Janvier 1944-Mai 1945. 1981.

Twenty-five years after the end of his reign in 1958, Pope Pius XII remains the most controversial figure in the history of the modern Papacy. At the time of his death, he was esteemed and revered as the upholder of the traditional Catholic magisterium and the successful defender of the Church's position against the nihilistic and atheistic attacks both of German Fascism and of Soviet Communism. Under his leadership the Catholic community, like Rome itself, had emerged relatively unscathed from the fires of the Second World War and had resumed its worldwide mission — to proclaim the Catholic faith — with its traditional apparatus of ecclesiastical and diplomatic hierarchies intact. Only a few years later, however, Pius XII's reputation suffered severe criticism for his alleged failure, during the war, to mobilize the whole Catholic Church, and particularly the resources of its central offices in the Curia of the Vatican, in defense of human rights and freedoms, especially at the time of the brutal events which resulted in the mass killings of European Jewry. Sparked by the production of a polemical drama, Der Stellvertreter,1 written by a young iconoclastic German playwright, Rolf Hochhuth, a sharp debate arose which focused closer attention on the actual policies followed by the Pope and his advisers during the critical wartime years. These critics sought to show that by his silence and refusal to condemn unequivocally the Nazi atrocities against the

1

Rolf Hochhuth, Der Stellvertreter, Hamburg, 1962; English edition The Representative, London, 1963; American edition The Deputy, New York, 1964; see also ed. E. Bentley, The Storm over the Deputy, New York, 1964.

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Jews, Pope Pius had made of the Church an accomplice in the most terrible crimes of this century. The storm aroused by Hochhuth's play in the early 1960s came at an historically favorable moment. On the one hand, the Catholic Church was undertaking a large-scale reexamination of its place in the world through the lively debates of the Second Vatican Council. On the other hand, the revelations of the Eichmann Trial in Jerusalem had suggested to a much larger public that the Nazi crimes of aggression and extermination could have been thwarted if more resolute opposition had been expressed by those by-standers only indirectly involved. In the subsequent years, the criticisms of the Vatican and its leaders were supported by more intensive research by scholars of many nations. While Hochhuth's own "historical sidelights," which sought to depict Pius XII as a superficial and ivory-towered opportunist, were admittedly of little historical reliability,2 Saul Friedländer used the captured records of the German Foreign Ministry to attribute Pius's silence to his supposed pro-German tendencies.3 Guenter Lewy relied on the archives of the German Catholic dioceses to draw up an indictment in The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany.4 The Italian scholar Carlo Falconi likewise found evidence of the Vatican's unwillingness to condemn the persecutions of the Jews, despite being fully informed of the facts, at least by 1943.5 Other critics have documented the reluctant hesitations of Catholic hierarchies in various countries in providing aid or support to the vic-

2

3

4 5

Op. cit., pp. 270 f; also John S. Conway, "The Silence of Pius XII," ed. C. Delzell, The Papacy and Totalitarianism between the Two World Wars, New York, 1974, pp. 79-108. Saul Friedländer. Pius XII and the Third Reich. A Documentation, trans. C. Fullmann, New York, 1966. Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, New York, 1964. Carlo Falconi, The Silence of Pius XII, trans. B. Wall, New York, 1 '»70.

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tims of the Nazi annihilation process,6 while Helen Fein in her book Accounting for Genocide attempted to give a comparative statistical account of "how the actual behavior of the Churches as social organizations was related to the life chances of Jews in extreme peril."7 Most recently, the same criticism has been voiced within the Catholic Church itself, with the publication of an initial overall survey of the Vatican's policies toward the Jews by an American priest, Fr. John F. Morley, who concluded that: Vatican diplomacy failed the Jews during the Holocaust by not doing all that it was possible for it to do on their behalf. It also failed itself because in neglecting the needs of the Jews, and pursuing a goal of reserve rather than humanitarian concern, it betrayed the ideals it had set for itself. The nuncios, the Secretary of State, and most of all, the Pope share the responsibility for this dual failure.*

The response of the Vatican to these indictments was unprecedented. On the orders of Pope Paul VI, who himself had been chief of the section for Ordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs in the Secretariat of State throughout the war years, the decision was made to publish a large-scale series of documentary volumes covering the entire period from the accession of Pius XII to the Papal throne in March 1939 to the end of hostilities in August 1945. This decision was all the more remarkable in view of the centuries-long resistance of the Papal Curia to any opening of its archives. (Only in the 1890s were the first moves authorized by Pope Leo XIII to allow scholars access to the

4

For example, R.L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary, 2 Vols.. New York, 1980; R. Paxton and M. Marrus, Vichy France and the Jews, New York, 1981; L. Rothkirchen, "Vatican Policy and the 'Jewish Problem' in Independent Slovakia," Yad Vashem Studies, Vol. VI, Jerusalem, 1966; E. Paris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia 1941-1945: A Record of Racial and Religious Persecutions and Massacres, Chicago, 1961. 7 Helen Fein, Account for Genocide. National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust, New York, 1979, pp. 93-120. * John F. Morley, Vatican Diplomacy and the Jews during the Holocaust 1939-1943. New York, 1980, p. 209.

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rich historical records, acting on the noble motto, let nothing untrue be said and nothing true be unsaid.) The waiver of the mandatory seventy-five year delay, and the access granted to the editors of this series to consult all relevant documents for the period of the pontificate of Pius XII marked not only an important innovation in the archival policy of the Vatican but offered another token of the aggiornamento of the Roman Catholic Church. This vast editorial task was entrusted to a team of four Jesuit scholars resident in Rome, a Frenchman, an American, a German and an Italian, who were asked to undertake the collation and publication of the most important and illustrative documents from the Secretariat of State on a scale sufficient to demonstrate the main outlines of the policies pursued by the Pope and his advisers. The result has been this careful and scholarly edition of eleven volumes, each comprising several hundred pages. The documents are reproduced in the original language of composition, mostly Italian but with some in French, German, English and Latin. In several volumes, by way of illustration, photostatic reprints are included, showing the numerous handwritten corrections or annotations by the Pope himself. Each volume begins with a lengthy introduction, in French, and the critical apparatus is most skillfully and meticulously put together. Every evidence of scholarly integrity is provided. On the other hand, the hesitations felt by critics who feared that an apologetic character would inevitably be reflected in the selection of documents have not been entirely silenced.9 The fact that the primary sources have been made available to the editors only means that before all the files are opened to public scrutiny not all scholars will be satisfied. Had this evidence been available twenty years ago when the controversy was at its height, the debate might have been conducted with more insight into the considerations which influenced Pius XII's con9

For example see W. Laqueur, The Terrible Secret, London, 1980, p. 57.

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duct of Vatican diplomacy. But the slow appearance of these documents over so protracted a period of time has come about too late. The general public has lost interest. And since little new direct information is revealed on the motives of the Pontiff himself, it is improbable that either the Pope's critics or his defenders will have cause to change their minds. The controversy has largely moved to the speculative ground of what might have happened, rather than what did. The most that can be hoped for with this new documentation is that some of the more extravagant statements on either side will be subjected to the discipline of historical fact. On the other hand, the light these documents shed, not only on Vatican policies, but on many other aspects of the Second World War, adds valuable new and often unexpected perspectives on the political realities of those strife-torn years. These eleven volumes contain the despatches and telegrams exchanged between the Vatican Secretariat of State and its worldwide network of diplomatic representatives, the nuncios and apostolic delegates, as well as the notes and memoranda composed by the staff in Rome. The editors decided to publish the documents mainly in a chronological rather than a thematic sequence, around the two chief areas of Vatican concern, namely the attempts to tackle the issues of the war itself, and the efforts to provide relief for the victims of the hostilities. Thus Volumes I, IV, V, VII and XI cover the diplomatic issues of the war-time period for approximately twelve to eighteen months each, while Volumes VI, VIII, IX and X concentrate on the measures designed to alleviate the plight of the victims, for roughly the same periods. Two thematic volumes, II and III, are composed respectively of a selection of letters from Pope Pius XII to the German bishops, and a full account, in two parts, of the Vatican's involvement in the religious situation in Poland and the Baltic states. The sharp debate aroused by Hochhuth's polemic was focused not only on the policies pursued by Pius ΧΠ, but also on the methods used to achieve his aims, particularly on the almost exclusive use of

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diplomatic negotiations. Hostile critics have long been attacking the Roman Catholic Church's unique possession of the Vatican corps of strategically placed diplomats, and have accused the Papacy of using it to foster self-interested or more often reactionary policies. Other critics, like Fr. Morley, while accepting the desirability of this worldwide network, believed it could have constituted an effective means to demonstrate humanitarian compassion for the Jewish victims of Nazism, but that this purpose was sacrificed to the overriding concern for the preservation of relations with various nations, particularly Germany, at almost any cost. For this reason, Morley claims: to avoid offending Germany, and to maintain prudent reserve, the Vatican had to act, or neglect to act, in ways that ignored the depth of suffering that was so widespread among Christians and Jews.10

A close study of the many thousands of documents published in these volumes lends but little support to the thesis that ecclesiastical self-preservation was the main motive behind the attitudes of the Vatican diplomats. Rather, the picture that emerges is one of a group of intelligent and conscientious men, seeking to pursue the paths of peace and justice, at a time when these ideals were ruthlessly being rendered irrelevant in a world of "total war." Whether means other than diplomacy would have been more effective remains a hypothetical question. They were never tried. But what comes through clearly are the exaggerated hopes that Pius XII placed in his own and the Vatican's diplomatic skills at the beginning of his term of office, and the consequent sense of frustration, disillusionment and failure which came to haunt the Curia during the final cataclysmic years of the world conflagration. In March 1939 premonitions of war were everywhere. The heated rantings of nationalist politicians, and the naked appeal to racist sen-

10

Ibid.. pp. 209-209.

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timents, alarmed all those whose memories of the 1914-18 war impelled them to believe that the only hope of preventing a further outbreak of hostilities lay in the step-by-step resolution of conflict. The failure of the League of Nations led many men to hope for more effective action from the Catholic Church. It was hardly surprising that Eugenio Pacelli, with his unrivalled diplomatic skills, his grasp of the political realities, his knowledge of seven languages and his lengthy term of service as Cardinal Secretary of State, should have been chosen to lead the Church at such a crucial juncture. Pius XII regarded the vital need to promote peace as his own personal mission. He had personally selected and trained the corps of Vatican diplomats, whose services would now, he believed, be more needed than ever. From the first days of his reign, the Pope threw himself into the struggle to prevent the plunge into war. As is well known, these efforts failed. The subsequent outbreak of hostilities in September 1939 did not, however, lead to the abandonment of this Papal strategy. Rather, the Pope deliberately adopted a position of neutrality in the belief that a scrupulous avoidance of partiality would still enable the Vatican to bring the conflict to an end, or at the very least, to limit it. The destruction of the hitherto stable landmarks of European civilization through the notorious alliance of German Nazism and Soviet Communism disturbed him deeply. He was profoundly moved by the sufferings of the Catholic people of Poland. But he still believed that the senselessness of war would lead to a revulsion against such brutalities and a call for a neutral peacemaker. For this reason, in the winter of 1939 he encouraged secret negotiations with members of the German resistance movement, and openly supported those who opposed Mussolini's misguided intentions to bring Italy into the war. He welcomed the United States' neutrality as a valuable ally in this cause. The defeat of these endeavors by the summer of 1940 grieved the Pope immensely. The flow of reports from the Vatican's representatives in the belligerent capitals yielded a thoroughly depressing pic-

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ture of the irreconcilable forces which militated against peace negotiations. The extension of the area of hostilities in 1941, first into eastern Europe, and then into eastern Asia, reduced to vanishing point the hope that the interventions of the Vatican could lead to success. It was both a personal and political defeat for Pius XII. With sorrow he was obliged to recognize that the influence of the Church, both as a moral and spiritual power for the individual, and as a supernational agency for peace, was steadily declining. The very far-reaching reserve which these events induced in Pius's statements and utterances was but strengthened by his determination not to allow the Catholic Church to be enlisted as an involuntary ally by either side, nor to give hostages to future fortune by any moves which could be exploited for propagandist^ purposes. Most particularly, the silence of the Papacy when apprised of the vast atrocities of the war-mongers was a deliberate policy aimed at preserving future opportunities for reconciliation, and at forestalling the kind of spiritual compromises which had so damaged the Churches' reputations during the First World War. Furthermore, Pius was increasingly forced to face the dangerous repercussions which could result from any outspoken declarations or denunciations. It was no idle fear that Papal support could lead to retaliatory vengeance against those he most wanted to assist.11 For these reasons, he consistently resisted the pressures brought to bear upon the Vatican to denounce specific war crimes, or individual acts of aggression. Pius was to be much grieved that his stance on this issue led to increasingly bitter and seemingly deliberate misunderstandings and misrepresentations expressed by both sides, as they assailed the Papacy's refusal to endorse the justice of their respective 11

For example, the protest issued by the Dutch Catholic bishops in July 1942 led directly to intensified Gestapo measures against Catholic Jews in Holland, and their deportation to Auschwitz, including the well-known Carmelite nun, Dr. Edith Stein. See Actes et Documents, Vol. VIII, no. 506, p. 678: The Pro-Nuncio in the Netherlands, Giobbe, to Cardinal Maglione, 9 October, 1942.

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crusades. The Vatican's impartiality was violently attacked: the Germans accused the Vatican radio of broadcasting pro-Ally reports; the British demanded the withdrawal of Papal representatives who were of German or Italian extraction; the Italian press launched a campaign of provocation against the Church's higher dignitaries. It was with deep feeling that in June 1943 Pius declared to the College of Cardinals: Every word which we have sent to the respective authorities about such matters, and each of Our public pronouncements must be the object of long and thoughtful deliberation in the interests of the suffering peoples themselves, lest involuntarily their position should be made even worse, more difficult and unbearable.12

Pius XII's silence was not the outcome of ignorance or indifference; it was a deliberate choice of far-reaching reserve, seeking to prevent any escalation of violence against those who were most at risk. At the time, hostile critics saw this only as faint-hearted pusillanimity. As one exasperated high official of the British Foreign Office noted in November 1940: I am glad to see us trying to stir up not one of the worst but of the feeblest Popes ever. He has thrown away every opportunity of leadership and can only whinny about the possible bombing of Rome.... He cannot even say a word about Italy's latest aggression I against Greece].15

Prompted by such feelings of animosity, the British Government consistently rejected the Vatican's appeals for moderation, most particularly over the issue of safeguarding Rome by declaring it an "open city," a call issued on the very day Mussolini gratuitously declared war.14 No less repelling was the transparent hypocrisy of 12

Quoted in W. Bussmann, "Der Papst und die Diktatur," in Monat, 176, May 1963, p. 18. This passage is not included in the extract published in Actes et Documents. Vol. VII, no. 225, pp. 396-400. 13 Public Record Office, London. Foreign Office General Correspondence, F.O. 371/24421, p. 395. Minute of Sir Orme Sargent, November 1940. 14 See the relevant and full documentation, Actes et Documents, Vols. VII and XI.

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the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, during his visit to the Vatican in March 194015 with promises of improved relations; these were contradicted by the absolute refusal met by every Vatican appeal in subsequent years. The dispatches of the Nuncio in Berlin, Orsenigo, make for especially depressing reading as he recorded the systematic rejection of the Vatican's requests.16 The Pope was to be deeply grieved by the evident failure of those Germans he most respected to halt the suicidal fanaticism of their Nazi rulers, but no less so by the capitulation in 1942 to an unbridled war mentality by the American leaders on whom he had counted so much. Roosevelt's adoption in 1943 of the demand for unconditional surrender by the Axis powers was seen in Rome as an unmitigated disaster. And the refusal of either side to seek any moderation of their war aims came to be regarded as a portent of incalculable danger, all the more since the Vatican was effectively debarred from any part in the making of peace. The Vatican documents reveal, albeit involuntarily, a growing sense of isolation, frustration and despair. By the end of 1943, when German troops encircled the tiny Vatican territory on all sides, a feeling of impotent claustrophobia tinged the panic-filled atmosphere. Surrounded, and even infiltrated, by informants and espionage agents, the Vatican diplomats were obliged to be sceptical of the honesty of every contact, and to suspect the political motives which lay behind even the most supposedly pacific gesture. All Pius XII's worst forebodings about the catastrophic destructive capacities of war seemed to be coming true. His pessimistic assessment of the future and the seeming ineffectiveness of the Christian faith in such a world were heavy tribulations indeed. 15

Ibid., Vol. I. nos. 257-259, pp. 384-393; also Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D. Vol. VIII, no. 668. 16 "Up to now." Pius told the Bishop of Berlin in September 1941, "not a single answer has been vouchsafed to the protests of the Holy See," ibid.. Vol. II, no. 76, p. 231; for a more critical view, see S. Friedländer, op.cit.

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The almost daily reports of further outrages and sufferings from all parts of Europe were matched by an increasing realization of the Vatican's impotence to take any significant steps to bring such disasters to an end. All the Pope's speeches, his letters and the instructions given to his diplomats make it clear that the weighing up of the alternatives, the careful balancing of one factor against another, the countervailing demands of his spiritual and of his temporal roles, the need to take some action and the impossibility of predicting which action would best serve the cause of the Church, were his daily preoccupation. In February 1941, Pius wrote to the Bishop of Würzburg: At the present moment, we are assailed by countervailing forces; on the one side there are the overwhelming events of the secular field toward which the Pope desires to maintain a reserved attitude in accordance with his unimpaired impartiality; on the other side, the troubles and obligations of the Church impel him to intervene. The pressures run counter to each other so frequently and so ominously, more ominously indeed than in the former World War, that the successor of Peter can well apply to himself the words of Our Lord to the first Pope: 'another shall gird thee and carry thee whither thou wouldest not' — St. John 21, 18."

These then were the factors which conditioned the parameters within which the Vatican sought to bring relief to the victims of the war. In this task the Papacy was to encounter only repeated rebuffs and mistrust. The Germans refused to allow a Papal relief team into Poland in the winter of 1939. The Russian Government brusquely turned aside all interventions on behalf of residents in the territories seized by the Red Army. The United States Government refused to increase the quotas set for European refugees. From the summer of 1940, the British Government would not agree to lift its blockade to admit foodstuffs into unoccupied France or Belgium, or later into Greece. If the provision of relief supplies was virtually blocked, more hope 17

Ibid., Vol. II, no. 66, p. 201.

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was initially entertained with regard to evacuation of endangered refugees. It was in this connection that the plight of the Jews was first brought to the Vatican's attention. The climate was markedly inauspicious for such efforts. Even before war broke out, the failure of the Evian Conference in July 1938 had made it 0lear that refugees were unwanted. The Pope's attempt to obtain 3,000 entry visas from Brazil was only with difficulty and grudgingly granted. Other Latin American Catholic countries bluntly refused to admit any Jewish refugees — even if baptized. In short, the Papacy's influence was far too slight to overcome the universal failure to remove national barriers to any significant emigration scheme. It was hardly surprising that the Vatican was obliged to pour cold water on even more ambitious projects for "solving" the Jewish refugee problem, such as proposals for large-scale resettlement in Ecuador, Australia or Alaska.18 At the same time, it was equally true that the Vatican's own resources to deal with this issue were woefully inadequate. The Secretariat of State was overwhelmed by individual refugee appeals — no less than 29 boxes of them flowed in for the first year of the war alone. No arrangements had been made for the coordination of Catholic agencies with each other, still less with similar endeavors by Protestant or secular agencies, such as those based in Geneva. In brief, the dimensions of the problem had not been grasped, and there was no full-scale commitment to the massive relief efforts which events dictated. The Vatican had long held the view that the refugee migrations could best be halted by the removal of discriminatory legislation imposed by governments, which impelled these unfortunate victims to flee from their homes in the first place. But the spread of racial persecution, often prompted by Nazi pressures, or imposed after the Nazi conquests, rapidly made the situation much worse. Diplomatic 18

Ibid., Vol. VI, nos. 252, 330, 355, pp. 3 5 6 , 4 2 9 , 455.

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protests were sent to the governments of Italy, Hungary, Slovakia and Rumania but without effect. The possibility of persuading the German Government to abandon its anti-Semitic policies was judged to be entirely unfeasible, and likely only to exacerbate relations. A defense of the Jews would indeed have been a direct attack on the whole ideology of Nazism. The experience of previous years left no room for optimism in this regard. Pius also knew that the German Catholics were deeply divided on the issue of anti-Semitism to the point where they would have refused to understand, let alone to respond to, any interventions from the Pope, even if these had been tried. Without a systematic preparation of the Church's case, the danger of providing the Nazis with even greater propaganda material was too great. By the beginning of 1941, the Vatican was warned that the Nazis' intentions were becoming even more sinister. The Cardinal Archbishop of Vienna, Innitzer, alerted his superiors in Rome to the fact that, with emigration virtually at a standstill, all Vienna's Jews, irrespective of age or religious affiliation, were threatened with deportation to the newly created ghettos in Poland. Heartrending scenes take place before my own eyes in the office for the nonAryan Catholics which I have established in my own house. I am sending your Holiness the urgent appeal in the last hour for these brothers and sisters whose only hope now is the Bishop.1*

During the following months, the situation grew still more ominous. In June 1941, the Nazi authorities summarily closed down the emigration centers in Hamburg and Vienna. In September, all German Jews were ordered to wear the "Yellow Star" as a badge of shame. In October, Himmler ordered all further emigration to stop. At the same time, the American Government heartlessly ordered its consular offices not to issue any more visas, thus closing this last remaining loophole. Deportations of Jews to "unknown destinations '* Ibid.. Vol. VIII. no. 14, p. 91: Cardinal Innitzer to Pope Pius XII, 4 February, 1941.

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in the East" began to take place from all over Nazi-held Europe and on an ever-larger scale. No one knew what their fate was to be. During 1942, the disappearance of so many Jews and the impossibility of ascertaining what happened to them led to a spate of rumors and speculations which in turn reached the Vatican from various sources. Asked for specific information, the Nuncio in Berlin could only reply in July 1942: As can easily be imagined, the suppression of news leaves the door open to the most macabre suppositions about the fate of the non-Aryans. Unfortunately, rumors are rife, which are difficult to verify, about catastrophic journeys and even of large-scale massacres of the Jews. 20

At the end of September, President Roosevelt's personal representative, Myron Taylor, was able to visit the Vatican and presented a report — largely based on Jewish sources — about the horrendous mass slaughter of Jews proceeding in the concentration camps in Poland, and called for an outright condemnation. The response was extremely cautious. Not until May 1943 did the Cardinal Secretary of State, Maglione, accept the awfulness of the situation: Jews. Horrendous situation. 4.5 million Jews in Poland before the war, plus many deported there from other occupied territories.... There can be no doubt that the majority have already been liquidated. Special death camps at Lublin (Treblinka) and near Brest Litovsk. ... Transported there in cattle trucks, hermetically sealed.21

But even then conclusive evidence was lacking. Not until the end of 1944 did the Vatican receive an eyewitness account of the Holocaust in Auschwitz.22 Like their counterparts in other 20

Ibid., Vol. VIII, no. 438, p. 608: Nuncio Orsenigo to Msgr. Montini, 28 July, 1942. 11 Ibid., Vol. IX, no. 174, p. 174: Notes of the Secretariat of State, 5 May, 1943. 22 It is referred to, but not printed in ibid., Vol. X, no. 204, p. 381; for the full text, as received in the Vatican, see ed. J.S. Conway, "Der Auschwitz Bericht von April 1944." in Zeitgeschichte, Vienna, Vol. 8, no. 11/12 (August / September 1981), pp. 413-443.

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diplomatic chancelleries, the Vatican officials were trained to be sceptical of atrocity propaganda. The full extent of the horror was never realized, in part because it was simply unimaginable. Some of the Papal representatives, however, closer to the scene, had fewer doubts. The charge d'affaires in Slovakia, Msgr. Burzio, was the first to raise the alarm in March 1942, when the Slovakian Government proposed to complement its anti-Semitic legislation by deporting all its Jews to Poland. Burzio was sure that deportation meant death, and told the Vatican so. Prompted by the fact the President of the newly created state, Josef Tiso, was a Catholic priest, the Pope immediately sent instructions to protest against the legislation and the expulsions. But these representations were not enough to prevent the transports from leaving, nor to hinder their subsequent legalization by the Slovakian Parliament, when none of the clergy voted against. The evidence of Slovakian anti-Semitism, from President to people, aroused feelings not merely of frustration, but of betrayal. As Msgr. Tardini, one of the senior Vatican staff members, bitterly commented in July 1942: It is a great misfortune that the President of Slovakia is a priest. Everyone knows that the Holy See cannot bring Hitler to heel. But who will understand that we can't even control a priest? 23

Two years later, the same pattern was repeated in Hungary. Here too, the energetic Papal Nuncio, Msgr. Rotta, intervened with the government in an appeal against the ready collusion of the Hungarian authorities in the Germans' murderously successful and swift deportation of several hundred thousand Jews to Auschwitz and other extermination centers in Poland. In June 1944, the Pope spoke out in a direct message to the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Horthy; this message was one of the factors leading to the temporary suspension of the persecution of Hungarian Jewry in July. Likewise in Rumania, the representations of the Nuncio successfully induced 23

Ibid.. Vol. VIII. no. 426, p. 598: Notes of Msgr. Tardini, 13 July, 1942.

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the wavering dictator, Antonescu, to moderate his regime's policies toward the unfortunate Jewish minority. In other parts of Europe, the picture was even less encouraging. In Germany the total refusal of the Nazis to be deflected from their hateful policies, and the silence of the German Catholic bishops on this issue, were compounded by the weakness of Nuncio Orsenigo. In France, the Vatican's position was not forcefully enough presented to overcome Laval's subservient compliance with the German demands. The French Catholic hierarchy was openly divided, especially over the issue of what support should be given, or denied, to the foreign Jews who had sought asylum on French territory. In Yugoslavia, the lack of specific Papal condemnation of the Catholic Church's collusion with the Croatian Ustacha regime and its brutal persecution of both Jews and Orthodox Serbs, was hardly compensated by the Holy See's refusal to grant official recognition to the upstart regime. In short, the published record in these documents confirms the picture already drawn by such Jewish authors as Livia Rothkirchen and Pinchas Lapide.24 Where the Nuncios were alert, and the governments susceptible to Papal remonstrances, then the interventions succeeded in delaying or reducing, though not preventing, the deportations and other acts of persecution against the Jews. It has of course been easy for critics to tabulate in retrospect the instances where the Vatican's powerlessness or failure to act precluded relief. Speculation about what might have happened if the Pope had been a different kind of leader, if the Vatican Curia had been composed of men capable of living up to the exalted ideals it set itself, if the Catholic hierarchies had acted with more courage, or if the Catholic populations had been less indoctrinated with the remnants of a traditional anti-Judaism, are in the end bound to be inconclusive. The 24

L. Rothkirchen, op. cit. (see note 6); P. Lapide, The Last Three Popes and the Jews. New York. 1967.

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documents certainly show that more could have been done. It is not true, however, that nothing was done. A more realistic basis for criticism would be to study more closely the documentary evidence here recorded in order to observe not only the parameters within which the Vatican was forced to operate, but also the priorities set by the Pope's deliberate choices. To take one example: a comparison of the efforts made throughout 1943 and the first half of 1944 to prevent Rome from being devastated by aerial bombardment or by the ravages of the battles fought by the approaching armies, with those made on behalf of the Jewish victims of Nazism, could possibly lead to the conclusion that the preservation of the monuments of Christian civilization would appear to have ranked higher in the Holy See's policies than the preservation of nonChristian lives in the ghettos and concentration camps of far-away Poland. It may, of course, be argued that the Papal initiatives in the former instance, such as the continuous appeals to London, Berlin and Washington, the encouragement given to friendly governments, such as those of Spain and Eire, to protest against the ruthless arguments of "military necessity," and the mobilization of the Catholic hierarchies in Allied countries, especially in North and South America, were all predicated on the likelihood of eventual success. In the end, Rome was spared. But less favorable interpretations could also be drawn. No one who has undertaken a close study of this significant corpus of documents can doubt the reality of Pius XII's spiritual travail as he bore the awful responsibilities of his office. One of the more revealing glimpses of his thinking was contained in a private letter to the Bishop of Berlin, written in April 1943: Seldom has the Holy See had to undergo such trials as at the present time. Our honest attempt has been to meet all the terrible conflicts which are engulfing the powers of the world with complete neutrality and yet at the same time to defend carefully the needs of the Church. And, as you rightly

CHURCHES DOCUMENTS OF THE HOLY SEE said, this trial is only made more difficult by the terrible atrocities and sins which the war has brought about. The seemingly limitless cruelty of the war machines makes the thought of a long drawn-out period of mutual slaughter unbearable. And what we have heard, day in and day out, of atrocities which are far beyond anything which could be ascribed to the necessities of war, is even more horrifying and shocking.25

Sympathy for the man, or awareness of the appalling circumstances in which he was called upon to exercise his pontifical ministry has been, and will doubtless continue to be, matched by other more sharply hostile evaluations of the conduct and policies of Pius XII and his subordinates. But, with the amount of evidence now available in these eleven important volumes, a more certain and balanced judgment may be reached about the subtle and complex diplomacy in which the Vatican was involved as the storms of war beat over Europe and engulfed the world in untold misery and tragedy.

" Actes et Documents, Vol. II, no. 105, pp. 310-320: Pope Pius XII to Bishop Preysing, 30 April, 1943.

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Catholicism and the Jews during the Nazi Period and After John S. Conway

The numerous excellent lectures we have already heard on the various national churches' attitudes to the Jewish people during the Nazi era suggest that I should attempt in this paper to place the focus of my remarks upon the central organs of the Catholic Church, in particular the Vatican. In a very brief survey, I can only hope to outline a few salient features, from the point of view of an interested observer of the subtle intermingling of the theological and political perspectives which have characterized Vatican policy during this period. The French scholar, Jules Isaac, was the first, I believe, to coin the phrase "the teaching of contempt" which typified Catholic attitudes towards the Jewish people for so many centuries.1 In his view, traditional Christian anti-Judaism was based on deeply entrenched dogmatic hostilities between the two communities of faith, which from the fourth century onwards saw a deliberate and systematic attempt to denigrate Jews and to teach Christians to despise and reject them. Nourished by prejudice and exaggerated by political, social and other factors, this teaching of contempt led to the situation when, in Franklin Littell's phrase, Christians "over centuries looked at the Jewish people from a sound-proof room installed with one-way windows." The Christian indoctrination of popular religious hatred against the Jewish people was characterized by elements which clearly differed from the outbursts of anti-Judaism which existed before the Christian era or in non-Christian countries. First, there was the coherence, or theological consistency, based on the need to validate Christian claims and to discredit the Jewish adversary. Secondly, there was the continuity of easily transferable prejudice which recurred again and again to reinforce a variety of widely differing economic and social circumstances, but

1

Jules Isaac, Jesus et Israel (Paris, 1948); also shorter English version, Has Antisemitism Roots in Christianity? (New York, 1961). It is noteworthy that the lone Anglican scholar, James Parkes, put forward similar views as early as 1935, in his book The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue: A Study in the Origins of Antisemitism (London, 1935).

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led to the continuing denigration of the Jewish people. The most popular feature of this persecution, the accusation of ritual murder, continued to flourish in central Europe, even to the present century. And the religious sanctions against "contamination" by Jewish "unbelief were zealously preached from pulpits, especially of the Roman Catholic community, for century after century. It is hardly surprising that, in view of this history, the Holocaust of the Nazi era could be regarded by such scholars as James Parkes 2 and Rosemary Ruether 3 as the culmination of sixteen centuries of Christian intolerance. The debate which has raged in recent years is over how far such endemic prejudices were influential or significant in the Nazi period. Some scholars have argued that Nazi racism owed little, or nothing, to the Christian anti-Judaism of the past. The chief adherents of antisemitic racism, such as the Hamburg journalist Wilhelm Marr, the coiner of the term "anti-semitism," were not only antiJewish but also anti-Christian. The paganism of the Nazi ersatz religion was based on a hatred of both Christianity and Judaism, with its ideology grounded in the alleged validity of Blood and Soil. The Nazi persecution of the Churches, while less disastrous, was no less implacable than the persecution of the Jews. In short, a definite dividing line should be drawn between the horrors of the Nazi era and the preceding attitudes of the Christian past. The truth is more complex. As Uriel Tal has convincingly shown, 4 the two currents of Christian anti-Judaism and anti-Christian racism existed side by side since the late nineteenth century, often blending with each other despite their apparent contradictions. In the period after 1918, the radical elements among the antisemites did not reject the traditional concepts of Christianity; rather the meanings were changed by using a pseudo-scientific jargon, and the vocabulary of the teaching of contempt was subtly altered so that the patterns of prejudice took on an increasingly völkisch tone. There are numerous examples of how much Catholicism, especially in Germany, but also elsewhere, accepted without protest this conflation of old and new. We may then readily agree that Catholic anti-Judaism was a contributing factor to Nazi antisemitism, though doubting whether such teachings were a necessary precondition for the Holocaust.5

2 3 4 5

James Parkes, The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue, and numerous other books in subsequent years. Rosemary R. Ruether, Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Antisemitism (New York, 1974). Uriel Tal, Christians and Jews in Germany: Religion, Politics and Ideology in the Second Reich 1870-1914, trans. N.J. Jacobs (Ithaca, New York, 1975). Byron L. Shewin, "Ideological Antecedents of the Holocaust" in B.L. Shewin and S.G. Ament.eds., Encountering the Holocaust: An Introductory Survey (Chicago, 1979), p. 34.

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The sudden rise to power of the Nazis was, as we know, greeted with enthusiasm by the majority of German Catholics, who saw in Hitler and his minions their best defense against Bolshevism. Even though some prophetic voices were raised against the cult of racism, and received explicit Papal support in the 1937 encyclical Mit brennender Sorge, the evidence is that the German Catholic bishops were not willing to challenge the Nazi Party's infamous practices against the Jewish people. Their silence at the time of the notorious Crystal Night pogroms of November 1938 was complete. As the Canadian scholar, Alan Davies, rightly asked: Had centuries of religious anti-Judaism, installed in succeeding generations, so poisoned the consciences of the ordinary Christian as to blunt his capacity to recognise simple cruelty, even when the plain evidences of the senses cried out otherwise?*

There is even less evidence that these events impelled any far-reaching attempt to rethink traditional Catholic doctrines on this issue. It is notable that the heated controversy which arose in the early 1960s over the so-called silence of Pope Pius XII toward the sufferings of the Jews concentrated on the alleged diplomatic and political shortcomings of Vatican policy rather than on the theological presuppositions which may have guided the Curia's attitudes toward the persecution of the Jews. The caricature of Pope Pius' character, as displayed in Rolf Hochhuth's play, The Representative,7 ignored the fact that the real indictment lay in the erosion of Christian values in the life of the Church as a whole, rather than in the policies of one man. The result of these attacks was, at least, of benefit to historians as it led to the unprecedented publication of an extensive and voluminous documentary series of Vatican papers for the period of the Second World War. Between 1967 and 1982, no less than eleven large volumes have been produced, describing the exchanges of telegrams and notes between the Vatican Secretariat of State and its emissaries around the world. 8 These serve to give a much fuller picture of the Catholic position in world affairs, and in particular its response to the Holocaust. Had this evidence been available at the time when the controversy was at its height, the debate might have been conducted with more insight into the considerations which influenced Pope Pius XII's conduct of Vatican diplomacy. By now, when the general public has lost interest in the subject, these records are chiefly of value to the historians in subjecting some of the more extreme speculations of the disputants to the discipline of historical fact. This 6 7 8

Alan T. Davies, Antisemitism and the Christian Mind (New York, 1969), p. 39. Rolf Hochhuth, The Representative, trans. R.D. Macdonald (London, 1963). Actes et documents du Saint Siege relatifs ά la seconde guerre mondiale, eds., P. Biet, R. Graham, A. Martini and B. Schneider, 11 vols. (Vatican City, 1967-1982).

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documentation is, however, unlikely to change the contours of the controversy. Both the prosecution and the defense have stated their positions strongly and publicly, and in essence they are separated by widely divergent views on the possibilities or limitations for effective action. Particularly by reiterating their speculative charges that much more should have been done, the critics tend to ignore the realities of the political context in which the Pope and his advisors had to operate. 9 On the other hand, too little has perhaps been said about the theological context which guided their thoughts. The historian can only hope to describe the particular circumstances in the light of this newly available evidence both as to what was done and what was omitted in the Vatican's policies. The reign of Pope Pius XII began in March 1939 under highly inauspicious circumstances. His first months were devoted to resolute attempts to prevent the outbreak of war. The failure of these moves led the Pope to adopt his well-known, but much disputed, stance of neutrality, in the hope that the Vatican could still play a significant role of peace-maker if circumstances made such an approach possible. In particular he welcomed the initiatives of President Roosevelt and threw the Vatican's influence strongly but in vain against Italy's participation in the war. At the same time, the Vatican openly proclaimed its desire to be of service to the victims of the war, and pledged its full collaboration with other humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross. As far as the Jews of central Europe were concerned, the major events of 1938, with the failure of the Evian Conference to produce new offers of asylum, and the Crystal Night's evidence of the Nazis' envenomed brutality, along with Mussolini's introduction of new racial laws in Italy, produced an entirely unfavorable climate for Vatican initiatives. The outbreak of war in 1939 only exacerbated the situation. It also became rapidly apparent that the Vatican lacked any effective machinery for dealing with the thousands of individual appeals for help which soon flooded into Vatican City. Rather, the Pope relied on diplomatic efforts, such as the attempt to procure entry visas for Catholic non-Aryans from the Catholic states supposedly sympathetic, such as Brazil or Eire. The lack of enthusiastic response from even these governments frustrated the Secretariat of State's officials, who were obliged to curtail their plans to more realistic levels. The charge has often been made that these efforts by the Vatican were specifically for families of Jewish background who had converted to Catholicism, and that others were neglected or passed over. Such preference was in fact 9

Among the most recent critics, for example, see, Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide: Victims - and Survivors - of the Holocaust (New York, 1979), chap. 4; Yehuda Bauer, TheHolocaust in Historical Perspective {Seattle, 1978); Leon Papeleux, Les Silences de Pie XII (Brussels, 1980); John F. Morley, Vatican Diplomacy and the Jews during the Holocaust 1939-43 (New York, 1980).

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given, for two reasons. First because their situation was particularly acute: the Germans considered them Jews, and the Jews considered them renegades. 10 Secondly, the minimal response to such appeals for Catholic non-Aryans made it clear that any wider appeal would be still less successful. On the other hand, the dimensions of the problem had not been realized and there was no full-scale commitment to the massive relief efforts which events dictated. If it is true that the Vatican lacked both the will and the resources to mount a worldwide relief campaign on behalf of the Jewish victims of Nazism, it is equally true that all the combatant governments, not just the Germans, frustrated the Vatican's humanitarian moves. A proposed Papal relief team to Poland w a s refused. The Russian government brusquely turned aside all interventions on behalf of the residents in the territories seized by the Red Army. The United States government refused to increase its quotas allotted to European refugees. The British government would not agree to lift the blockade to admit foodstuffs into unoccupied France or Belgium. And the number of Latin American countries which bluntly declined to admit any Jewish refugees - even if baptized - was depressingly large. In short, the Pope's influence w a s far too slight to overcome the universal failure to take effective measures in time to rescue the Jews. Pius XII and his advisors were obliged to recognize that these setbacks were part of the hostile environment which increasingly circumscribed the Vatican's initiatives. And Pius XII w a s too shrewd and prudent a diplomat not to realize the facts of the situation, however unpalatable these might be to one with his spiritual aspirations. On the other hand, there is little indication that he w a s led to reflect how far such a loss of influence was due to the deficiencies of Catholic teachings of earlier years. By the end of 1941, when the w a r took on a worldwide dimension, the Pope was obliged to recognize that his peace initiatives were doomed to failure. He found it particularly painful when President Roosevelt, with whom he had hoped to collaborate in saving the world from further bloodshed, now began to press the Vatican for unequivocal and one-sided support for the Allied w a r aims. He had guarded his neutrality against all attempts to enlist the Papacy on one side or the other, but his prudence was not rewarded. Instead he w a s to be accused of a cowardly silence. The constant demands for a condemnation of Nazi crimes, particularly from the Polish government in exile, were met by the reiterated response that the Pope was doing what he could. But it is clear that such action was confined to the diplomatic channels still open to the Vatican. The belief still prevailed that such measures could and would be more effective than the abandonment of impartial neutrality or the much more problematical and perilous advocacy of protest.

10

Actes et documents, vol. 8, no. 33. Cardinal Innitzer, Vienna, to Pope Pius ΧΠ, February 28, 1941.

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By the end of 1941 the Vatican was made aware of the increasing persecution faced by the Jews under Nazi control. The prohibition of all further emigration from Germany and Austria in October had been matched by the first forcible deportations to unknown destinations in the east. Reports reaching Rome of conditions in Poland and the Ukraine grew steadily darker. At the same time, the Papal Nuncio in Berlin was informed that his sphere of responsibility was to be limited on Hitler's orders to the confines of Germany itself. His numerous interventions were sidetracked or insolently rejected, and it was clear that no possible alleviation was to be expected from the Nazi rulers. 11 The Vatican was forced to the conclusion that the only effective pressure which could be achieved was in those satellite countries where the Papal Nuncios still exercised influence on the semi-autonomous governments. Slovakia may be cited as one instance where the Vatican intervention on behalf of the Jewish population was intense. 12 When, in September 1941, anti-Jewish racial legislation was passed, the Papal Charge d'Affaires, Msgr. Burzio, was ordered to protest immediately, and a few weeks later, the Secretary of State, Cardinal Maglione, personally summoned the Slovakian representative and expressed his "lively sorrow" that such laws had been passed directly opposed to Catholic principles. Nevertheless the Slovak government proceeded with its plans to deport its Jewish citizens into German hands. Thanks to the alertness of Msgr. Burzio these schemes were communicated to the Vatican sooner and in more detail than in other countries. As early as March 1942, he reported with alarm his view that the proposed deportation of 80,000 Jews would condemn the great majority to certain death. 13 At the same time, similar reports were sent by the Nuncios in Budapest and Berne at the instigation of Jewish sources calling for Papal intervention. 14 Five days later, on March 14 and again on March 24, Cardinal Maglione firmly expressed to the Slovakian

11

12

13 14

Actes et documents, vol. 8, no. 438. Nuncio Orsenigo, Berlin, to Cardinal Maglione, July 28, 1942; for a complete documentation of the exchanges between the Nuncio and the Reich Government, see, Dieter Albrecht, ed.. Der Notenwechsel zwischen der Heiligen Stuhl und der deutschen Reichsregierung, vol. 3 (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte), Reihe A, Bd. 29 (Mainz, 1980). Livia Rothkirchen, "Vatican Policy and the 'Jewish Problem' in 'Independent' Slovakia" in Yad Vashem Studies on the European Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance, vol. 6 (Jerusalem, 1966), pp. 27-45; Pinchas Lapide, The Last Three Popes and the Jews (London, 1967), pp. 138-149; John S. Conway, "The Churches, the Slovak State and the Jews 1939-1945," in Slavonic and East European Review 52, no. 126 (January 1964): 85-12. Actes et documents, vol. 8, no. 298. Msgr. Burzio to Cardinal Maglione, March 9,1942. Ibid., no. 314. Msgr. Bernadino, Berne, to Cardinal Maglione, March 19,1942; see also Lapide, The Last Three Popes and the Jews, pp. 139-140.

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Minister, his hope that such plans would not be carried out. Msgr. Burzio was instructed to make an official protest and to intervene directly with President Tiso "making appeal to his sentiments as a priest." 15 But these representations were insufficient to overcome the prevarications of President Tiso and the radical measures taken by his subordinates. On March 26 the first transport left Slovakia for an unknown destination. The Vatican's lack of influence was further displayed in May when the Slovakian parliament legalized the deportations, without a single clerical member voting against. The evidence of Slovakian antisemitism, from President to people, aroused feelings not merely of frustration, but of betrayal. As Msgr. Tardini, one of the senior staff members of the Papal Secretariat of State, bitterly commented in July 1942: It is a great misfortune that the President of Slovakia is a priest. Everyone knows that the Holy See cannot bring Hitler to heel. But who will understand that we can't even control a priest? 16

Nevertheless the Vatican's protest did play some part in strengthening popular resistance to the deportations, which were halted in July 1942. Further protests were isssued by the Vatican in 1943 and may be credited with some role in the temporary alleviation. In 1944, however, when the the Germans took over direct control of Slovakia, equally sharp protests against the roundup of the remaining Jews failed to prevent the final tragedy. 17 Very similar circumstances applied in Hungary. The German seizure of power in March 1934 led to immediate steps being taken to implement the listing, segregation, and deportation of the largest surviving group of Jews in central Europe, approximately 750,000 in all. The Hungarian authorities showed themselves eager to help. Early in April, the energetic and compassionate Nuncio, Msgr. Rotta, reported to the Vatican that he had already intervened with the new government, now under the leadership of the pro-Nazi Dome Sztojay, in order to seek mitigations of the decrees passed against the Jews."'8 In reply, the Hungarians promised only certain modifications of the regulations in favor of the baptized Jews. 19 This appeal by the Nuncio was the first of many which were to meet with prevarication and delay. More significantly perhaps, the Nuncio also had to face skepticism and caution from the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy. The majority of the Hungarian Catholic bishops, led by the Cardinal Primate, Seredi, were conservative nationalists who shared with many of their country-

15 16 17 18

19

Ibid., no. 332. Cardinal Maglione to Msgr. Burzio, March 27, 1942. Ibid., no. 426. Notes of Msgr. Tardini, July 13, 1942. See Lapide, The Last Three Popes..., pp. 146-148. See Jeno Levai, Hungarian Jewry and the Papacy, trans. J.R. Foster (London, 1968), p. 18; Randolph L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary (New York, 1980), vol. 2. pp. 1067 ff. Actes et documents, vol. 10, no. 137. Msgr. Rotta to Cardinal Maglione, April 7,1944.

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men a marked antipathy to the unassimilated Jews, and had supported the prewar legislation against the "threat" to the national interests of Christian Hungary, supposedly to be found in the "undesirable" characteristics and influence of the Jewish population. As a result, Seredi's reaction to the new anti-Jewish measures imposed by the Nazis, was vehement but limited. His protests were mainly concerned with the protection of the converted Jews. For his part, the Nuncio was disappointed. As he reported to Rome: Many of the ecclesiastical authorities have adopted an attitude of excessive prudence which does not correspond to the real situation. Certainly a more direct and solicitous action...would not be ineffectual.20

During May, the roundup of Jews in eastern Hungary proceeded with terrifying rapidity. The Nuncio presented a series of protests against these deportations when, as he told the Prime Minister, "everyone knows what deportation means in practice." 21 He demanded that all Jews should be treated humanely and urged the cessation of abuses. By mid-June, the Vatican's alarm was raised. Msgr. Rotta confirmed that at least 350,000 persons had already been deported. His own protests and those of the Cardinal had been ignored. In view of the imminent threat to the Jews of Budapest, direct intervention by the Holy See would now be useful, not to say necessary. On June 25, the Pope personally spoke out. He sent an open telegram to the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Horthy, calling for an end to the sufferings of the Jews, and on the same say demanded a public intervention by the Bishops on behalf of Christian principles for those "urgently afflicted by the racial regulations." 22 Despite his skepticism as to its effectiveness, Cardinal Seredi complied by preparing a Pastoral Letter to be read in all churches. 23 The government's strong reaction, threatening reprisals, however, led him to retreat. More significantly, the Regent on July 6 personally intervened to halt the deportations of Jews. Undoubtedly, the Pope's telegram was one of the factors in his decision and was highly opportune, as the Nuncio reported to Rome. On the other hand, the Nuncio was dismayed at the Cardinal's capitulation since he believed that the treatment of the Jews was abominable

20 21

22

23

Ibid., no. 172. Msgr. Rotta to Cardinal Maglione, April 28,1944. Ibid., no. 207. Msgr. Rotta to Cardinal Maglione, May 23, 1944, enclosing copy of protest from Msgr. Rotta to Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 15,1944; also ibid., no. 227. Msgr. Rotta to Cardinal Maglione, June 10, 1944; Levai, Hungarian Jewry and the Papacy, pp. 19-20; Braham, The Politics of Genocide, p. 1068. Actes et documents, vol. 10, p. 243. Pope Pius ΧΠ to Regent Nicholas Horthy (original in French), June 25, 1944; Levai, Hungarian Jewry and the Papacy, pp. 26 and 68; Braham, The Politics of Genocide, pp. 1070-1071. Levai, Hungarian Jewry and the Papacy, pp. 69-72; Braham, The Politics of Genocide, pp. 1035-1038.

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and that' 'it was the right of the Church to raise her voice in all matters contrary to Christian morality."24 There was only a temporary respite. But in mid-August the Nuncio convened the remaining diplomats from neutral countries to make a joint demarche against any possible resumption of anti-Jewish measures. In October, Horthy was overthrown and the even more violently antisemitic regime of the Arrow Cross took power. The Vatican immediately called for new interventions and urged Cardinal Seredi to rally support. But, as in Slovakia, these protests met with no success. The response of the population was disappointing. The intimidation by the Arrow Cross supporters, the fears for their own safety, and the approach of the Soviet armies, all impeded courageous action. For his part, Nuncio Rotta continued to join his neutral colleagues inenergetic protests, even though he too could no longer expect practical results "given the mentality made up of religious ignorance and fanatical hatred against the Jews to be found in the members of the Arrow Cross."25 More positive assistance was provided in the form of uncompleted letters of safe-conduct signed by the Nuncio in advance, which were handed out to many of those Jews compelled to start a forced march to the German border. Similar blank safe-conduct letters were provided to the Jews of Budapest, and Catholic organizations and houses were instructed to give asylum where possible. The Vatican noted with satisfaction that more than 13,000 such letters of protection were provided.26 As late as December 11, when the Soviet armies had almost encircled Budapest, Msgr. Rotta was still protesting the inhuman treatment of the Arrow Cross forces, especially affecting the children of the imprisoned ghetto. The Vatican once again appealed to its Nuncio in Berlin to intercede, but nothing more could be achieved. The circumstances in the former territories of Yugoslavia after the German invasion of March 1941 were among the most violent in all the occupied countries. The puppet regime in Croatia, led by the brutal Pavelic, launched a vicious campaign against all its enemies, and the resulting civil anarchy left the Catholic Church in a highly equivocal position. Although Pavelic sought to gain the same Papal recognition as had been granted to Tiso in Slovakia, this was denied. An Apostolic Visitor, Marcone, was, however, sent to Zagreb, and his reports on the conditions of the Jews were revealing. Those who were able to flee to the Italian-occupied zones enjoyed a relative security. But in Croatia, German demands for deportation and Ustacha intimidations inflicted great cruelties.

24 25 26

Quoted in Lapide, The Last Three Popes, p. 154; Braham, The Politics of Genocide, p. 1072. Actes et documents, vol. 10, no. 408. Msgr. Rotta to Cardinal Maglione, November 27, 1944. Braham, The Poütics of Genocide, p. 1075 states that more than 15,000 were in circulation.

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Interestingly, both the Chief Rabbi and the Chief of Police of Zagreb collaborated with the Vatican representative to urge the Pope to protest. In fact, official demands were made to Pavelic in October 1942 and March 1943, and Marcone sought repeatedly to intervene behind the scenes, without much result. Even the friendly Chief of Police deplored the excesses committed against the Jews but could do nothing more than delay their eventual expulsion. The lack of any specific Papal condemnation of these atrocities and the equally murderous vendetta against the Orthodox peasantry, as well as the collaboration given by the Croatian church to the Ustacha regime, was to create a situation of enormous tension in Yugoslavia in the postwar years. Much has been made of the Vatican's supposed indifference to the antisemi tic laws passed by Vichy France in July 1941. According to the Vichy Ambassador to the Vatican, Berard, whose opinion has been widely quoted, no objections would be forthcoming. 27 The Vatican Nuncio was in fact instructed to clarify and correct this misapprehension, but evidently, as Michael Marrus has shown, did so with insufficient energy. I also agree with Marrus' view that the Catholic hierarchy was split on the issue of the deportations of the Jews, when, as was the case with so many of their colleagues elsewhere, the divided loyalties meant that French Catholicism did not speak with a single voice, particularly on behalf of those most in need, the foreign Jews, whom even the French Jewish community failed to save. It was, however, symptomatic that when the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris, Suhard, protested to Laval about these enormities, he was accused of trying to hamper good relations between Germany and France, because the Holy See was allegedly playing Italy's game for its own ends. 28 The Vatican documents also throw new light on what has been seen by some as the most flagrant evidence of Papal hardheartedness in the face of Jewish sufferings, namely the arrest of more than a thousand Jews in the city of Rome itself in October 1943. In fact, Vatican interventions earlier had successfully strengthened Italian reluctance to obey the German demands for wholesale deportation. Despite the prewar Italian racial legislation, the Jewish communities were left unharmed until after the fall of Mussolini and the seizure of most of the country by the Germans. Thereafter the alarm was much greater. Hundreds of Jews fled from the Italian-occupied zone of France to Rome, believing themselves safer there. The Vatican encouraged them to seek refuge in monasteries and convents throughout the city. When the Germans entered Rome, rumors were rife that the city would be bombed to bits, or that the Pope would be carried off captive to Germany. In response to pleas for help, the

27 28

See Saul Friedländer, Pius ΧΠ and the Third Reich (London, 1968), pp. 92 ff; Fein, Accounting for Genocide, pp. 111-112. Actes et documents, vol. 8, no. 449. Nuncio Valeri to Cardinal Maglione, August 14, 1942.

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Vatican Secretariat of State considered how to prevent measures being taken against the Jews, and responded quickly to the Jews' urgent request for an immediate loan of gold in order to satisfy the Nazi demands for ransom. The razzia of October 16 did not produce any striking denunciation from the Pope. The documents show that it was not indifference but a calculated diplomatic maneuver which led the Vatican to maintain its public silence even at this juncture. A letter was dispatched to the German military commander urging him to put an end to such measures, lest a strong Papal protest follow. To the diplomatic mind, in a paradoxical way, the threat of a Vatican protest seemed to be more efficacious than a protest itself. In the event no more such deportations took place. If Pinchas Lapide's figures are correct, at least 40,000 Jews were saved by hiding in various Church establishments. 29 But even these facts will hardly convince those who believe that some more personal and dramatic gesture at the time might have saved many more lives, had the fate of the Jewish victims been made known and more positive resistance called for. How much did the Vatican know? How much could it believe of the reports reaching it, already in 1941, of the terrible persecutions proceeding in Poland and elsewhere? No one now defends the view that the Vatican was ignorant about the existence of concentration camps or the killings of Jews on an unprecedented scale. Information supplied from Jewish sources was confirmed by reports from the Nuncios in Slovakia, Turkey, and Switzerland, and from Church leaders in the Ukraine and Lithuania. In Rome itself, by May 1943, Cardinal Maglione was sure enough of his ground to record in a memorandum: Jews. Horrendous situation. 4V2 million Jews in Poland before the war, plus many deported there from other occupied countries...There can be no doubt that the majority have already been liquidated. Special death camps at Lublin [Treblinka] and near Brest Litovsk. Transported there in cattle trucks, hermetically sealed.30

But even then, sure proof was lacking. Not until late 1944 did the Vatican receive incontrovertible evidence of the Holocuast in Auschwitz. As with the Protestant World Council of Churches in Geneva, and even the Jewish organizations in non-Nazi Europe, the difficulty of distinguishing between sure fact and wildly-exaggerated wartime propaganda continued. Rumors of atrocities and mass murder of Jews were frequently reported. People might guess at numbers, or methods, or intentions. But in the increasingly claustrophobic atmosphere of the Vatican, the full extent of the horror was never acknowledged. There is no evidence to suggest that the Vatican officials were more percipient than others in realizing the deliberate intent of the Nazi genocide of European Jewry, still less the implications for Christianity and the Church which this Holocaust brought with it. 29 30

Lapide, The Last Three Popes, p. 134. Actes et documents, vol. 9, no. 174. Notes of the Secretariat of State, May 5, 1943.

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The newly available documentation, then, confirms the picture already drawn by Pinchas Lapide and Livia Rothkirchen. Where the Nuncios were alert, and the government susceptible to Papal remonstrances, such as in Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, then* the interventions succceeded in delaying or reducing, though not preventing, the deportations and other acts of persecution against the Jews. The picture is also confirmed of the Vatican's powerlessness and frustration in the areas directly controlled by the Germans. Nothing, or almost nothing, could be done about the deportations and executions in Germany, Austria, Holland or Poland itself. But the intimidation and control by the Gestapo or the SS is not in itself a sufficient cause to explain the striking lack of protests, nor, even when they were made, their ineffectiveness. Rather, it is necessary to realize the impact of traditional anti-Judaic attitudes which obviously conditioned the hesitant approach of the Catholic hierarchies even when prompted by the Vatican to do more. Undoubtedly the conservative elitism of the church leaders was a significant factor in determining how to meet the Nazi challenge. To some, their objections were solely to the means employed, rather than to the policy of expulsion and deportation itself. Others sought to defend the good name of their nations, of which they saw themselves as the spiritual guardians. As Helen Fein has pointed out, to some, the Jews were possible future Christians; to others, the Christians were former Jews. 31 Protests against racism were therefore made more to safeguard the traditional respect for Catholic nationalism or to identify the Church with the victims of brutal treatment than from any conscious rejection of antisemitic ideologies in the name of Christian theological insights. No one can now say what might have happened if the Vatican and its local representatives had adopted other policies. Speculation about the possible assistance which the Jews of Nazi-held Europe might have obtained is often colored by the frustrated expectations of survivors, or those Catholics now, too late, affected by guilt feelings. It is necessary, however, to warn against any exaggeration of the potential influence of the Churches, as has been expressed by some Catholic critics of the Vatican's policies during this period. 32 The evidence on this point is clear. Ecclesiastical sanctions were well known to be outdated and of singularly little value. The Pope and the majority of Church leaders were confronted by governments who strikingly failed to recognize the traditional position of the Churches or were actively using their powers to remove all vestiges of the Churches' political and social roles in the Community. The singularly meagre results of diplomatic protests sent through the Vatican's network of Nuncios demonstrates the rapid diminution of Papal influence during these years of war and terror.

31 32

Fein, Accounting for Genocide, p. 119. For example, see J.F. Morley, Vatican Diplomacy and the Jews.

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The criticism that the Church hierarchies should have relied less on political representations and more on moral protests looks at first to be more attractive. Public denunciations of the treatment of the Jews would, it is claimed, have resulted in a greater sympathy with their plight. But it should be remembered that moral influence is not a renewable resource. The Church hierarchies had frequently and eloquently pleaded in favor of peace. They were ignored. The Vatican was well aware that, on the sensitive issue of antisemitism, the opinions of Catholics were strongly divided. The risk of losing still further the support of their congregations, through passive or even active disobedience, deterred the Church leaders from exposing their weakness to the world. On the one hand, it can be claimed that silence amounted to complicity with iniquity and was unredeemed by multiple acts of charity toward the victims which were inevitably too little and too late.33 On the other hand, it is clear that the Vatican and other Church leaders were prudently striving to preserve their influence in circumstances where it was being rapidly eroded. The deterrent effects of Church protests on moral grounds is continually incalculable, but the loss of credibility, if obedience is not forthcoming, can be extremely damaging, as later instances prove. In the circumstances of the Second World War, in the midst of atrocities and barbarisms on an unprecedented scale, the reactions of the Church leaders may be judged timorous, or with the advantage of hindsight, condemned as guilty of complicity. But there is insufficient evidence to show that churchmen at the time were prepared to follow a more courageous stance on behalf of the persecuted victims of Nazi racial fantasies. How far this apostasy can be attributable to the undermining of the Churches' credibility and influence, or how far it was due, on the other side, to the failure to counter the indoctrinated "teaching of contempt" for Jews, is now a matter of great debate and controversy. The successful extermination of European Jewry was made possible, as Helen Fein has argued,34 by the widespread acceptance of the Nazi-propagated myth that the Jews represented a threat to the continued political and ideological existence of the nation states. The incidence of Jewish victimization can be directly related to the prevalence of prewar antisemitic and xenophobic movements, and the legitimation they received from governments and peoples. Church protests, when they were made, formed part of, and were dependent on, the wider resistance to Nazi goals. But the powerful desire to promote national self-preservation at the expense of unwanted alien minorities led to the ineffectiveness of the churches in most European countries. To suggest that the power of the Churches was sufficient to produce a significantly different situation is to exaggerate their potential influence and to ignore the virulence of

33 34

C. Falconi, The Silence oj Pius XII, trans. Bernard Wall (Boston, 1970), p. 72. Fein, Accounting for Genocide, p. 8.

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the ideological hatreds of an inflamed nationalism, certainly strengthened by centuries of antipathy. On the other hand, the evidence that the Papacy's traditional attitudes had been little changed by the horrifying demonstrations of genocide going on around them is also to be seen in the Vatican documents, particularly in respect to the place of Palestine in Catholic thought. By the middle of the war, Europe had become a charnel house for the Jews. The last possible escape route appeared to lie through the Balkans, and the only secure haven where they would find refuge seemed to be Palestine, as the small minority of Zionists had proclaimed all along. But such efforts found little favor in Papal circles. In March 1943, the Vatican noted: "The Holy See has never approved the plan to make Palestine a Jewish homeland." 35 Nor was the Vatican any more enthusiastic about Zionist proposals than were the British Mandatory authorities. In May 1943, Cardinal Maglione reminded the Apostolic Delegate in London that Roman Catholics had special historic rights in the Holy Places and venerated the Holy Land: Therefore the Catholics' religious feelings would be injured and they would justly feel for their rights if Palestine belonged exclusively to the Jews. 36

In the same month, despite the evident failure of the ill-fated Bermuda Conference to respond to the Jewish sufferings by opening up new havens around the world, the Cardinal could still assert: If the Jews wanted a homeland, it does not seem difficult to find other territories which would be more suitable. If Palestine fell under the power of the Jews it would create new and grave international problems, upset all the Catholics in the whole world, provoke the justified complaints of the Holy See, and be a poor reply to the charitable concern which the Holy See has shown and is showing toward the non-Aryans.37

It may perhaps be argued that, in 1943, the full realization of what the Holocaust meant to the Jewish people - and to the Christians - was not yet apparent. Clearly its impact had not affected the Cardinal's attitude of paternalist condescension, nor dented the Vatican's long-held idee fixe that Christian claims to the Holy Land had a moral value superior to Jewish rights to their own homeland, Israel. Subsequent events were to show how pertinaciously the Vatican clung to this view.

35 36

37

Actes et documents, vol. 9, no. 94. Notes of Msgr. Tardini, March 13, 1943. Ibid., no. 171. Cardinal Maglione to the Apostolic Delegate, Godfrey, May 4,1943; for earlier attitudes, see D. Carpi, "The Catholic Church and Italian Jewry," in Yad Vashem Studies, vol. 4 (Jerusalem, 1960), pp. 46-47. Ibid., no. 191. Cardinal Maglione to the Apostolic Delegate in Washington, Cicognani, May 18, 1943.

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The postwar conflicts in Palestine were watched by the Vatican with apprehension, while the establishment of the State of Israel was deliberately ignored.38 For over thirty years, the Vatican has consistently refused to recognize even its de facto existence. Instead, in 1948, and again in 1949, Pope Pius ΧΠ issued two encyclicals calling for the territorial internationalization of the Holy Places. The Vatican's campaign for this result continued for many years and indeed was abandoned only in 1974. Pope Paul VI demonstrated his personal involvement by making Palestine the scene of one of his first "pilgrimages" in January 1964. Jerusalem - then still divided-with its massive security precautions, its barbed-wire entanglements, and its threatening lines of tanks, was for him an abhorrent contradiction of all that the "city of peace" should be. He resolved to throw his influence behind the idea of bringing all three religious traditions together to safeguard the future of the city in an international condominium, and made numerous plans to have this scheme considered in subsequent negotiations at the United Nations and elsewhere. Paul's hope that his mission would be seen as a harbinger of peace, in both the ecclesiastical and political spheres, and his well-considered words of reconciliation and tolerance directed to the Church authorities in Jerusalem, were exaggerated hopes for the Vatican's influence, took too little account of the accumulated and interwoven antagonisms which for centuries have made this city so great a prize. The subsequent frustrations of Vatican diplomacy only increased Paul VTs sense of disillusionment at the apparent failure of his leadership in this area. It was hardly surprising that the Israeli government then or since should have regarded that Vatican's policies with suspicion. The reunification of the city of Jerusalem in 1967, and the proclamation of its indivisibility, still further reduced the chances of the Vatican's plans being realized. If, at the present time, resentment at Israel's assertiveness probably weighs more in the Vatican's considerations than the lingering prejudices of former years, Israeli suspicions can hardly be considered unjustified. The fact remains that the continued preference to the sensitivities of the Arab Catholics and refugees has limited the effectiveness of Vatican diplomacy in the search for peace in the Holy Land over the past thirty years. In the years since 1945, there have, however, been striking challenges to the received notions about the Jewish people among Catholics. The realization has grown with increasing force that the Holocaust was not something which affected the Jewish people alone, but raised real and indeed excruciating questions about the complicity of Christians, and hence about the credibility of Christianity itself. As Franklin Littell has stated: "Christianity itself has been

38

See Lapide, The Last Three Popes, pp. 269 ff.

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'put to the question' - by the apostasy of millions of the baptised, by being willing or silent accomplices in the murder of most of the European Jews." Among those who shared this view was Pope John XXIII, undoubtedly influenced by his period of service as the Vatican representative in Ankara during the war, when he was closely and sympathetically involved in assisting rescue efforts for Jews who found asylum in Turkey. It was at his initiative that, in September 1960, Cardinal Bea was personally commissioned to prepare a draft declaration on the inner relations between the Church and the people of Israel, which later became the focal point of one of the major documents produced by the Second Vatican Council. Space will not allow here for a full discussion of the origins or treatment of this Declaration during the intense debates which took place at the Council. But it may be said that the attempt to rethink the traditional dogmas of the Church has now begun. Even though to some, the Declaration did not go far enough, or was too timid in its final form, the process of remolding Catholic attitudes has started. The various instructions issued by national conferences of bishops in subsequent years, such as those of France, have emphasized the significance of this task of renewal. On the other hand, it is also clear that the abandonment of deeply-entrenched views is a slow development. As the parallel stages in the Protestant churches, particularly in Germany, now make clear the way, theologically speaking, is open for a far-reaching reassessment of the relationship between Christianity and the Jewish people. The awareness of the Christian complicity in the Holocaust now exercises the minds of sensitive Christians, and has produced a large body of valuable discussion of what may be called post-Holocaust Christian theology. It has certainly made it impossible for the churches to repeat the unreflected and uncaring condemnations of former years. The impact of Holocaust literature can also be seen in the theological revisions of such Catholic theologians as Clemens Thoma, Gregory Baum, John Oesterreicher or Rosemary Ruether. The controversy which their reformulations and revisions of traditional doctrines has aroused is still in process. And undoubtedly such theologizing will continue to be influenced by the political and social developments of contemporary events, not least in the Middle East. In more recent years, the Vatican's attention has, it will be admitted, been focussed primarily elsewhere. But the common awareness that both church and synagogue are threatened institutions, and that the moral forces which both seek to represent are no longer the dominant ethical motivations in modern society, has brought with it a recognition of the need for greater sensitivity. In an age when whole populations are manipulated for ideological purposes to serve the demands of state power, the defenders of a common Judaeo-Christian heritage have a joint responsibility to resist the "divinization" of nationalism or racism or the dehumanization attendant on so many facets of modern life. The problem of how to take up arms against injustice and violence in an increasingly stressful world is still unanswered. The Holocaust stands as an awful warning both to the potentialities for genocide,

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and to the failure of the Churches. Nothing in the history since the fall of Nazism can lead us to assume that the capacity or temptation for such misuse of political and ideological power has been repudiated. The grim prospect is that such excesses could still happen again. The Roman Catholic community has shown itself capable of renewal in recent years. The Vatican, to the suprise of many, still exercises a significant, if diminished, influence. If the shadow of Auschwitz still falls over the mistaken triumphalism of the past, there are now welcome signs of Catholic readiness to enter the post-Holocaust world with a more adequate theology and ethical stance. While many Catholics have greeted these efforts warmly, others still offer rearguard resistance. But if John XXin's heartfelt initiative can be maintained, we may hope for the start of a new era in the fateful and frequently tragic relationship between Catholicism and the Jewish people.

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Weizsäcker, the Vatican, and the Jews of Rome by O W E N

CHADWICK

Regius Professor o f Modern History and Master of Selwyn College, Cambridge

T

he ninth volume of the papal documents 1 reaches the most tense moment o f the Curia's experience in war time. N o t just vague or disquieting or horrible rumours from nuncios in the Balkans, with evidence based only o n hearsay and guesswork, reached Rome. They received news which they could not doubt. O n 3 March 1943 the Berlin nuncio Orsenigo reported a violent speech by Hitler against the Jews (it was the Munich speech of 24 February at the party anniversary), and the deportations from Berlin on 28 February and 1 March (Ί went to complain once again at the Foreign Office, and express the disagreeable (ingrata) impression made o n all Catholics—they listened to me, but I am aware that n o one in the Foreign O f f i c e can resist the physical and unbridled force of the so-called Gestapo, now (since the murder of Rinaldo [sic] Heydrich) led by a brutal Viennese' (Orsenigo meant Kaltenbrunner). Three days later bishop Preysing of Berlin reported the same deportations, hinting at the probable fate of the deported, and asked the pope to make another attempt to do what he could. A Berlin doctor named Gerhard Lehfeldt went to consult cardinal Faulhaber o f Munich and suggested that they might persuade Mussolini to intervene with the German government in favour o f the Jews of mixed descent. Faulhaber said to him that only the pope had a chance of moving Mussolini thus to act. We have here a m e m o r a n d u m on the plan from an unknown member of the Secretary o f State's office—who in this private note was clear that deportation meant certain death. It was a time when the Italian government was obstructing the

1 Actes et Documents du Saint Siege relatifs ά la seconde guerre mondiale, 9: Le Saint Siege et le: victimes de la guerre, janvier-decembre 1943. E d i t e d b y P i e r r e B i e t a n d o t h e r s . P p . x x v i i i 4 690. V a t i c a n C i t y : L i b r e r i a E d i t r i c e V a t i c a n a , 1 9 7 5 . n. p.

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deportation of Jews from France and other areas occupied by Italian troops, and the anonymous adviser asked gently whether it was, therefore, an altogether propitious moment to try to persuade Mussolini. Cardinal Maglione added to the memorandum a single line dated 10 April 1943: 'For the moment, at least, we can do nothing'. Occasionally even the Vatican received a shock from its own people. The bishop of Timisoara in Rumania wrote (in Latin) that 78 per cent of his people were German and were angry at the way in which the Vatican news media backed the Jews, who were enemies o f the German people, and that many more hand-outs might provoke trouble. Still, no one in the Vatican now doubted what was happening in Poland. They might guess at numbers, or methods, or intentions. But they had no more doubt that Jews were killed. A memorandum o f the secretariat dated 5 May 1943 analysed the situation as they then believed. '47 million Jews in Poland before the war, plus many deported there from other countries. Number of Jews now in Poland 100,000. Warsaw had a ghetto o f 650,000—now 20-25,000. . . . The disappearance of so many is only explicable by death. . . . There are death-camps at Lublin (Treblinka) and near Brest Litovsk. It is said that they are put by hundreds in gas-chambers. Transported there in cattle wagons sealed hermetically'. No evidence is here as to how the news came. The informant still knew nothing of Auschwitz and Birkenau, and the gas-chambers were still hearsay. O n 15 July 1943 an excellent informant reported work-camps at Auschwitz and Birkenau where 'the morale is generally high and the inmates are confident about the future'. In the autumn of 1943 Jewish organisations were generally concerned about the cold which their compatriots in Poland would suffer through the lack of warm clothes. But many had no doubt. When Franz von Papen talked to Roncaili in Istanbul about the massacre of thousands of Polish officers at Katyn, Roncaili replied 'with a sad smile that he had better first forget the millions of Jews sent to Poland and liquidated'. This leads to the most important of the documents in this volume, concerning the nub of the charge made by Rolf Hochhuth in his play The Representative: the fate of the Jews in Rome during October 1943 and the silence of the pope while they suffered. On 25 July 1943 Mussolini was arrested. On 19 July, foreseeing what might happen, the Secretary of the World Jewish Congress wrote (via the apostolic delegate in London) begging the p o p e to get the Italian government to move the Jews from camps in north Italy and camps in Yugoslavia to camps in South Italy (unlucky misprint here £407), for interment camps read internment camps). Cardinal Maglione passed it on, and received the information that there were no such camps in north Italy. Cicognani, the apostolic delegate in Washington (20 August), passed on a message from the World Congress of Jews begging that Jews in France and North Italy might be allowed into Central and Southern Italy. At precisely the same time the

CHURCHES 1265 German government was demanding, conversely, that British prisoners of war be transferred from South Italy to North Italy. No one was very surprised when on 8 September the Italians surrendered to the Allies, and on 10-11 September the German army occupied Rome. The new German ambassador to the Vatican was Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, Ribbentrop's former under secretary at the Foreign Office. Since Weizsäcker's reports to Berlin made the damning information on which Pius XII was judged for his silence in October 1943, the character of Weizsäcker, and his relations with the pope and the Secretary of State, cardinal Maglione, are key pieces of evidence in understanding the conduct and attitude of the Vatican in this the worst of its modern crises. Ever since Lewis Namier wrote a tremendous indictment in The Times Literary Supplement (reprinted in, In the Nazi Era ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 63—83), in part ever since he was condemned by Nuremberg to seven years imprisonment for war crimes (commuted on appeal to five years but given release after only eighteen months), Weizsäcker has remained the most controversial case of 'the good man who served Hitler'. Was he a man who did what he could for the pope and the Vatican and the Jews and what he could against Hitler? Or was he a man who simply followed the career open to him, and asked no questions about villainy for which he was not responsible, and could not stop, and to which he preferred to close his eyes? Weizsäcker hardly helped the verdict of posterity by publishing his Memoirs (English translation, 1 9 5 1 ) . The original drafts for these Memoirs were written while he was ambassador to the Vatican. They were put into final form while he served his sentence. He published them against the advice of close friends, and for the sake of getting money for his family. They did not clear his reputation. The chapter on the Vatican 1943—45 is silent on much that the historian most wishes to know. Historians are sometimes granted unusual pieces of good fortune. By one of these chances, we are given both sides of the experience simultaneously. This ninth volume of the Actes portrays the relationship with Weizsäcker through the eyes of the responsible members of the Curia. Almost simultaneously we have been given a very informative and excellently edited volume from Weizsäckers private papers, by Leonidas Hill (Die Weizsäcker-Papiere 1933—1950, Propyläen-Verlag, 1 9 7 6 ) . Hill had already written a useful article on Weizsäckers Vatican mission in the Journal of Modern History, 3 9 ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 1 3 8 - 1 5 9 . Evidently he is preparing a biography of Weizsäcker which looks like being of the first importance to the understanding of the Nazi system of government. These Weizsäcker papers cast a brilliant light on the atmosphere inside the Vatican during the autumn of 1943. Thus the historian sees simultaneously how Weizsäcker saw the cardinals and how the cardinals saw Weizsäcker. On 5 July 1943 Weizsäcker presented his letters of credence to cardinal Maglione. He was fetched from the German embassy in a good papal car, which for the first time flew two flags, the papal and the swastika 'in

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peaceable harmony'. He had wondered whether to go in uniform and decided it would hardly give a right picture of the new Germany. He was very unimpressed by the drill of the Swiss guards as he entered. He was also unimpressed that the protocol for the ceremony took 16 sides of paper. His letters of credence are printed in Actes et Documents, vii, no. 277, and claimed that the gigantic German struggle against Bolshevism was serving the whole civilised world, and how through the present crisis a new order of stability would grow. They reminded the pope how when nuncio in Germany he showed so deep an understanding of the German people. Cardinal Maglione handed back these sentiments beforehand, asking Weizsäcker not to speak them to the pope, 'given the difficulty of the times, and the delicacy of the relations between the Holy See and Germany'. The Osservatore Romano reported only that Weizsäcker presented his letters of credence and was received in the throne room. The same day, Pius XII replied in a formal letter (Actes et Documents, vii, no. 278), recalling his unforgettable experiences on German soil, and declaring that he cared much for the true welfare o f the German people, and that he supported every effort for the freedom of Catholic religion in Germany. Weizsäckers papers show that beneath these formal exchanges the interview was more interesting. First, at the formal reception (where the pope talked German so well that Weizsäcker felt the use of any other language to be discourteous), pope Pius XII spoke without notes and with great earnestness, obviously to show his large retinue that pleasure was not his only feeling at receiving a representative of the Third Reich. After the ritual occasion, the pope drew him aside into a private study and sat at a desk. Weizsäcker fetched a chair from a corner and was pleased to find that he had the advantage of the light at his back while the pope had the light on his eyes. Since his private letters to Germany were subjected to censorship, he gave no content of the conversation. But he found the pope easy, felt that he himself was encouraged to talk almost too much, saw how the pope had happy memories o f Germany, occasionally succeeded in making the pope laugh, but thought him a care-worn man, much more serious than when they met in Berlin fifteen years before: cf. Actes et Documents, vii, 476-7. He saw the pope as a realist, especially 'in the monstrous difficulty of doing anvthing practical to get peace and stop the European plunge to suicide'. My general impression was that I met more a man of religious devotion than a politician—yet he is a politician to a high degree'. Weizsäcker soliloquised afterwards, Ί should enjoy my j o b more if the pope was a bit less ascetic and of a less frail disposition*, 'He is first a very faithful Catholic priest, and second a practical man. These are only my first impressions' 1 O n 11 July he and his wife went to a private audience. It was the day His official report of 5 July to Berlin (Friedländer, a different tone. 1

Pie XII et le III' Reich,

169-70) had

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after the Allies landed in Sicily, but the subject was hardly mentioned. They talked o f religion—of the text in the Sermon on the Mount about not resisting the wicked (a fascinating text for the pope to discuss with Hitler's new representative), and then of immorality and how to harmonise faith with knowledge. On 25 July Mussolini was arrested, and Weizsäcker was telephoned in the night. He did not believe that Marshal Badoglio could keep the Italians in the war. H e formally asked cardinal Maglione about Italian and Vatican intentions: Actes et Documents, vii, no. 316. Maglione replied that the Vatican wanted a just peace but could not offer itself as mediator unless it was invited; and Weizsäcker approved the attitude. (Official report to Berlin in Friedländer, 174-5.) During the whole o f August they could think o f almost nothing else but how to prevent the destruction o f the city o f Rome as the Allied forces advanced northward. When, on 14 August 1943, the Italian government declared Rome an open city, the Roman people sighed with relief and gratitude. Weizsäcker noted the acclaim for the pope in St. Peter's Square, and how no one thought about the king of Italy. l At the moment the Pope is morally King of Rome. T o create a Papal State under his rule would be as easy as it would be hard to keep it going' (Hill, 347). On 27 August cardinal Maglione made notes of a conversation with Weizsäcker (Actes et Documents, vii. no. 372), though Weizsäcker recorded nothing. Weizsäcker said that there were reports of the Holy See joining in a common action o f neutral powers for peace. Maglione said that to want peace was the pope's right and duty, but that the Holy See had not tried to concert a c o m m o n plan for peace. H e repeated that Rome could not try to mediate between two belligerent powers unless invited. He said that the Vatican, even if its heads were to have the impression that the Axis could not win the war, would not show this impression publicly, because they know that the issue o f war is in the hand of God. It is clear that Weizsäcker had the impression that the fall o f Mussolini was less agreeable to the Vatican than to the city of Rome. Naturally, for the sake of harmony between the Vatican and Berlin, Weizsäcker emphasised this belief in his telegrams to Berlin. But his private papers show that he was not throwing dust in Berlin's eyes. It was also his private opinion. Mussolini had done much for the Catholic Church; and the still uncertain, more democratic regime which might follow must open the d o o r to an element of left-wing anti-clericalism. But now a new and more sinister note begins to creep into the papers—was there a German plan to kidnap the pope before the Allies arrived in Rome? For practice in Italian conversation Weizsäcker used a lawyer from Trieste, recommended by Monsignor Giuseppe di Meglio as a man o f very g o o d Catholic sentiments: Actes et Documents, vii, 476. The lawyer told the Secretariat o f a conversation during the evening of 30 August:

1268 BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST Weizsäcker said: 'In all my life I've never been so depressed'. The lawyer asked whether he was talking a b o u t the danger f r o m communism 'which was his perpetual topic of conversation'. ' N o ' , he said, 'it's something else, that'll happen before communism'. Weizsäcker did not enlarge. Almost simultaneously cardinal Sibilia said that some G e r m a n officials told him that if the Germans kidnapped the pope, they would not co-operate but would ask for protection from the Vatican. In the Secretary of State's office they wondered whether this r u m o u r of kidnapping was the cause of Weizsäcker's melancholy. T h e r u m o u r persisted throughout the rime that Weizsäcker served at the Vatican legation. When the p o p e gave an audience to Weizsäcker on 9 October, he raised the question and said laughingly that h e would remain in Rome {Journal of Modem History, 39 (1967), 150) unless h e were taken by force. O n 3 September Weizsäcker sent Berlin a telegram o n the political attitude of the Vatican (Friedländer, 180). H e described a fear of bolshevism in the Curia. Ά diplomat in close relations with the Vatican, told m e yesterday that the p o p e condemned all plans which wanted to weaken the Reich. A bishop w h o is a m e m b e r of the Curia, said to m e today that in the pope's o p i n i o n a strong Germany was absolutely essential to the Catholic Church. In a confidential text of an Italian journalist, I learned that when the p o p e was asked, 'What d o you think of the Germ a n people?', he replied 'It is a great people, which in its fight against bolshevism, sacrificed itself not only for its friends, b u t for its present enemies'. T h e report confronts the historian with the very n u b of the problem. Was Weizsäcker truly representing what the p o p e said o r t h o u g h t ? O r was he exaggerating, sending what his lieutenant Kessel was afterwards to call tactical lies, to protect the p o p e by persuading Berlin that the pope's heart was s o u n d ? The contrast between the official r e p o r t and the private papers points rather to the second of these theories. For the private papers d o n o t show this attitude^ Weizsäcker was in close personal touch with Maglione and Montini and in quite close touch with the p o p e himself. Yet he reported to Berlin hearsay from m e n w h o knew less than he—'a diplomat', 'a bishop in the Curia', ' a n Italian j o u r nalist'—as though their opinions were weightier than his private information. H e found a Vatican still grateful to Mussolini a n d not inclined to crow over his fall; a Vatican afraid of communism in E u r o p e if Germany were destroyed, a n d nervous of rising anti-clericalism in a future antifascist Italy—and to these real fragments he a d d e d the hearsay and created a report which h e knew to b e exaggerated. N o r should we forget the evidence of the language-instructor that his pupil was always talking about communism. O n 8 September Badoglio surrendered to the Allies. The Vatican realised that G e r m a n forces would instandy seize Rome, a n d was anx-

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ious that they were uncommitted to any agreement with the Vatican and would have no reason to respect the Vatican State and its neutrality. The desperate Italians were simultaneously trying to persuade the pope either to hurry the arrival of the Allied army or to appeal to the German high command. Weizsäcker appeared at the Vatican on two successive days. On 9 September he came into the Secretary of State's office about the sensational report in the Popolo d'ltalia implying important papal negotiations with the Allies in the days before Badoglio's surrender. Weizsäcker must persuade Berlin that the pope was guiltless o f any unneutral act that might hurt the Germans. But he did not have to ask for a dementi, because the Curia had already arranged a denial (which appeared 10 September) in the Osseruatore Romano (cf. Actes et Documents, vii, no. 390 with Hill, Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, 34S-9: T h e y didn't need my intervention to issue the necessary denial'). O n the next day cardinal Maglione invited him again to secure an assurance that the marching Germans would respect the Vatican. Weizsäcker said that he had no chance of speaking to Field Marshal Kesselring, who was at Frascati. In the afternoon he telegraphed Berlin with Maglione's request and asked that German commanders might get in touch with him when they arrived in Rome: Actes et Documents, vii, no. 392. 'Exciting times ahead', recorded Weizsäcker that day (Hill, 350). H e did not expect that his invading forces could at once be kept out of the Vatican City, and was pleased when all began well. He sent his secondin-command, Albrecht von Kessel, into the Vatican to speak with any German officers whose troops might penetrate. The Curia was pleased to see Kessel. By 8 p.m. that evening Weizsäcker had got an assurance from Kesselring that Vatican City would be respected. He telephoned Monsignor Montini with the pleasant news. On 13 September Weizsäcker again went to cardinal Maglione's office, and Montini recorded notes of the conversation: Actes et Documents, vii, no. 401. During the previous night the German ambassador to Italy (Rudolf Rahn) had mentioned the rumours that the Vatican played a part in arranging the Italian armistice; and although Weizsäcker said that Rahn was a man of good will, he could not hide the fact that these rumours were dangerous. Maglione said that he had told the representatives of England and the United States that the allied threat to bomb Italy till they drove out the Germans was unjust to Italy because Italy had not the power; that he had continually told the diplomats how the Holy See could do nothing for peace unless invited by one o f the belligerents. Otherwise the conversation concerned only the freedom o f movement in Rome for citizens of Vatican City, or the control o f visitors to Vatican City. On 16 September Weizsäcker arrived to see Montini with an envelope of money to compensate for the damage to St. Paul's-outside-the-walls during the fighting between Germans and Italians. Montini tried to

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refuse. Weizsäcker insisted—'pour les pauvres', he said: Actes et Documents, vii, no. 406, Montini's notes. He said that the German commander in Rome, General Rainer Stahel (an Old Catholic by faith) wanted to visit the Vatican as a token of respect, but that he (Weizsäcker) had discouraged him lest the visit give men ideas. He took up with Montini the question of Englishmen who had fled to the Vatican. Montini suggested an exchange between six Englishmen and six German prisoners, and Weizsäcker did not think that it would be difficult. Weizsäcker talked of the representatives to the Vatican of powers which in German eyes no longer existed—Lithuania, Belgium, Yugoslavia. Weizsäcker made an ominous remark—that it was difficult to know whether Germany was bound by the Lateran treaty by which Mussolini recognised the Vatican as a State. Montini's last note of the conversation ran, Tono molto gentile. On the day after this interview Montini and Tardini made notes for the first time on the terrible thing that might lie ahead. They headed it: Measures against the Jews of Italy feared, and reported only rumour and anxiety. 'The only possibility seems to be a plea to the Embassy in favour of all the civilian population of whatever race, specially for the infirm'. They suggested that Weizsäcker be approached next time he came to the Vatican. The Jews of Rome were not molested till 26 September 1943. Already on 18 September the Vatican Secretariat made notes on their fears: Actes et Documents, ix, no. 338. For, on 17 September, under the recommendation of the Swiss Legation, a Jewish lawyer (probably Ugo Foä the Fascist president of the Jewish community) came to the Secretariat to say that a lot of foreign Jews had lately fled into Rome, and were afraid. Many had already left the city for the south or the mountains. About 150 of these foreign Jews remained (mostly French and Polish) and feared that they would easily be identified because they could not speak Italian. At the moment they were lodged at the Scuola Israelitica, where they would be found immediately. He asked the Vatican .if in small groups they could be given lodging in various religious houses. The Secretariat said that they would not be safe there and advised flight to the Abruzzi or the Marches. These are the first occasions when the Jews of Rome are mentioned in these documents. But six days before the earlier of them, that is on 1 1 September, Weizsäcker summoned his chief attache Albrecht von Kessel. These two discussed how they could help the Jews. They expected and feared the worst. They must warn the Jews to get out of Rome. But they dared not trust any Italian with such a message. Kessel went the same evening to the Swiss Secretary of the Institute of International Private Law, Alfred Fahrener, whom he knew already. The Swiss said he knew some of the leading Jews in Rome. Kessel asked him to ask them to get out of their homes as soon as possible and go to ground; best if they

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went into the countryside. T h e Swiss agreed. Kessel and Weizsäcker were happier. 1 O n 20 September Mussolini's ambassador (Mussolini was now restored to 'power' in the north) came to say that the Germans made a demand for 6,000 hostages in return for 6 soldiers killed at a hospital; and the Vatican believed that n o such men had been killed. Monsignor Montini approached Weizsäcker, who said Ί could not make any official representation in Berlin (or rather at headquarters) because I am continually trying to keep the Holy See out of such questions' (Montini here added a note o f exclamation to his minute of the conversation). 'At headquarters', said Weizsäcker, 'they are not thinking about the Holy See, and I am afraid that to talk about hostages in the name o f the Holy See would provoke grave repercussions against the Holy See': Actes et Documents, vii, no. 410. Ί said forcibly' recorded Montini 'that I could not accept this manner of thinking. The right o f the Holy See to interfere in such a matter cannot be denied. The pope is the common father o f the faithful, he can intervene to defend them at any time and in any way. He is also the bishop of Rome, and therefore has a special duty to plead for the members of his diocese'. Montini was sad that an official request of Rome might be counter-productive. He had to be content with an assurance from Weizsäcker that he would privately do all that he could. 'He (Weizsäcker) is a man with a heart, and knows that we must make every effort to dam the flood of hate that threatens to drown the peoples'. The Germans abandoned the plan (it did not really exist) for 6,000 hostages. But Weizsäcker, in a worried way, told cardinal Maglione and Montini that this would not be the only case of this kind: Actes et Documents, vii, no. 410 appendix. O n 26 September Ugo Foa and Almansi, another prominent member o f the Jewish community were suddenly summoned by the chief o f police, SS Major Kappler. Kappler said that though they had Italian citizenship Germans considered Jews as their enemies. But 'we will not deprive you o f your lives if y o u do what you are asked. With your gold we want to equip new armies for the Fatherland. Within 36 hours you must provide 50 kilogramms o f gold'. If the money were not forthcoming, he threatened that 200 Jews would be deported to the Russian front. 2

Kessel's evidence, in Summa Injuria: oder durfte der Papst schweigen? (1963), 168-9; and for further treatment of Kessel, see R. Katz, Black Sabbath, L o n d o n 1969, 27 ff.; a book with the vividness derived from consulting participants, but also with the measure o f unreliability inevitable in relying o n such later testimony; for Kessel's evidence to the Nuremberg War Crimes tribunal see Mimstnes case, iii, 408 (Harvard Law Library). 1

IFoa's

455·

Relatione,

in R. de Felice,

Stona degli ebrei italiani sotto ilfascismo,

2nd ed., 1972,

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST 1272 They protested in vain. They asked whether 'Jews' meant only those listed in the Jewish community or also the baptised and the 'mixed'. Kappler said drily Ί don't distinguish between Jew and Jew. ... Anyone who carries a drop of Jewish blood, it doesn' t matter to me. They are all enemies'. He conceded that sterling and dollars were permissible but not lire—Ί could print as many of them as I like'. Foä and Almansi went to die Italian police, then to the Office of Demography of Race. None of the Italians wanted to- intercede. The Jews began to collect money—getting the news to as many Jews as possible, spreading the story through the city. One of them, Renzo Levi, went to the prior of the Convent of the Sacred Heart, Father Borsarelli, to ask if—supposing they could not collect the gold in time—the Holy See would lend the rest. The news of this levy was brought to the Vatican by the Secretary of the Congregation for the Eastern Orthodox Church: Ades et Documents, ix, no. 349. Though the consent does not appear in the documents of the Secretary of State, because not primarily his business, the Vatican agreed to make the necessary money available and told the Jews not to be anxious about early repayment. But the Vatican's help was not needed. The Jewish community collected, not 50 kilograms but 80.1 A pile of rings and necklaces was delivered on 28 September at the Via Tasso. The next morning German police searched Jewish apartments and carried off more than two million lire and a mass of documents^ they went on, daily trying to find wealth, and looking into the possible riches of the library which on 13 October they impounded. On one of the days after 29 September, Weizsäcker discovered that the Jews were not fleeing from Rome in accordance with the understanding. They believed themselves to have received from Kappler a guarantee of security in return for the payment of the gold. They also expected Allied armies to arrive in Rome within a few days. Kessel again sought out the Swiss, and received the answer that the Germans were behaving correcdy, i.e. in accordance with the bargain. He thought this a naivete possibly only to a man who never experienced a reign of terror. He said, 'If the Jews don't at once evaporate, they'll be deported. ... If they are destroyed their blood will be on me and my friends—and we haven't deserved that. I beg you, take my warning seriously. Do everything you can to get the Jews out of Rome'. Meanwhile, Weizsäcker (Hill, Die Weizsäcker Papiere, 3 5 1 , ap. 2 October 1943) could not but agree that the behaviour of the German troops in Rome was on the whole excellent. But simultaneously the Secretary of State's men were making private notes on further rumours of a plan that when the Allied forces arrived General Stahel should enter the Vatican and kidnap the pope: Actes et Documents, ix, no. 355; perhaps 1

The surplus was given after the war to the new State of Israel: Felice, op. cit., 456.

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with the pretext that the pope would not be safe in a no-man's-land. On the same day (1 October) Monsignor Mondni heard of a Jewish family (man, woman, niece, old servant) w h o m the Oblate Sisters on the Janiculum were wondering whether to take in as refugees. The Sisters were inclined to take the woman in, aged 76, but not the man aged 84. Yet he was ill and needed his wife. Montini decided to act in their favour. On 7 October cardinal Maglione invited Weizsäcker to the Secretariat. He wanted to stop Rome becoming a batdefield as the Allies advanced, and handed the same request, later that day, to the British and American ministers. Weizsäcker was discouraging. He said that it was not the Germans but the British and Americans who were bringing the battle towards Rome, and demanded to know whether the British and American ministers had received the same note. He suggested that the pope could 'follow the excellent example of pope Leo the Great and go to meet the English at Frascati as pope Leo went out to stop Attila and the Huns': Hill, 352; Actes et Documents, vii, no. 426; Weizsäckers long telegram to Berlin of that day partly in Friedländer, 182—4. But Tardini's notes of the interview suggest a more friendly talk than these cold-sounding comments. For negotiations of high import were in train. Weizsäcker, wanting Hitler not to order the occupation of the Vatican, delicately tried over the weeks to extract from the German government a declaration that they would respect the neutrality of the Vatican. As tool to extract this declaration, he easily persuaded Ribbentrop of the need to counter President Roosevelt's utterance that the Germans held the pope a prisoner, and that the Anglo-American advance was a crusade. Secondly, he hoped to extract from the Curia a counter-declaration praising the behaviour of the German army in Rome towards the Vatican and tempt the German government with the chance to secure this useful piece of propaganda. O n 7 October Ribbentrop approved the draft declaration of respect for Vatican neutrality and on 9 October Weizsäcker visited the pope to deliver the formal message (text in Actes et Documents, vii, no. 430). He did not persuade the pope to issue an independent commendation of the German army's behaviour, but the pope was willing to make the commendation as part of his gratitude for the declaration of neutrality. The text of the commendation was not agreed between Weizsäcker and Maglione till shortly before 29 October, when it was published in the Osservatore Romano. Maglione wanted the draft to commit the Holy See rather than the pope, and to make it clear that the initiative lay with the German government, and to ensure that it underlined the German pledge for the future as well as in the present: Actes et Documents, ix, no. 449. For three weeks Weizsäcker had worked at this goal and was very pleased. Ί am veiy happy' he wrote (Hill, 356), 'that at this moment when German soldiers are masters o f Rome, the Curia shows itself to some extent arm-in-arm with us in public'.

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M e a n w h i l e nastier events occurred to make such a declaration more anxious. O n 6 O c t o b e r the police chief Kappler received the order to prepare f o r the seizure o f the 8,000 Jews in R o m e and their deportation to the north. D u r i n g the next few days, u n k n o w n to the Vatican, Germ a n officials in R o m e , the Consul Moellhausen, General Stahel, Kapp l e r himself, Field Marshal Kesselring did what could be d o n e to get the o r d e r changed. O n 9 O c t o b e r Berlin sent the f a m o u s telegram ordering t h e m not to interfere b u t to leave matters to the SS. T h e first faint hints were noted in the Vatican o n 11 October. An Italian w h o h a d a friend o n the staff o f the Secretariat, b r o u g h t a report that Kesselring had asked Rommel f o r 3,000 SS as squads to search houses in R o m e . T h e operation would begin o n 18 O c t o b e r . C o u l d the V a t i c a n intervene? (Actes et Documents, ix, no. 363). This report d i d not mention Jews, and was wildly w r o n g about Kesselring a n d R o m m e l . But the date was almost right; and it was right that the operation was not entrusted to Kappler, b u t to special squads o f SS b r o u g h t in for the purpose, under o n e o f Eichmann's men, Captain T h e o d o r Dannecker. Real information had leaked, and the Vatican was uneasily aware that something vile was planned. A b o u t 5.30 a.m. on 16 O c t o b e r the SS squads, 365 men in all, b e g a n to r o u n d up victims. T h e i r w o r k continued till a b o u t 2 p . m . that day. W e k n o w h o w the p o p e was informed. T h a t m o r n i n g the princess Enza Pignatelli A r a g o n a Cortes was woken early b y an insistent telephone. 1 A l a d y w h o lived near the T i b e r r a n g to say that Germans w e r e taking Jews f r o m the ghetto and she must tell the p o p e to see if anything could b e done. She had n o car. So she r a n g the G e r m a n embassy to the V a t i c a n and persuaded o n e o f Weizsäcker's attaches, Karl Gustav W o l l e n w e b e r , to come round with his car. T h e y m a d e a detour to verify w h a t was happening, and then, with their C D plates, entered the Cortile o f S. D a m a s o . T h e Maestro di Camera was non-plussed at this impetuous litde w o m a n demanding to see the p o p e , b u t put her in the p o p e ' s private library. H e had just finished celebrating mass; and w h e n he came, she told her story with vehemence and begged him to intervene. T h e p o p e was obviously surprised. H e said that the Germans promised that they w o u l d not hurt the Jews, and k n e w a b o u t the 50 kilograms o f g o l d , and o f the Vatican's undertaking o f the deficit. B e f o r e she left h e was already on the telephone. Cardinal Maglione asked Weizsäcker to c o m e to the Vatican. M a g l i o n e m a d e notes o n the interview {Actes et Documents, ix, no. 368): Ί talked to h i m as well as I c o u l d , in the n a m e o f humanity and o f Christian charity'. T h e ambassador already knew o f the arrests. H e was n o t sure that they specially c o n c e r n e d Jews. H e said in a sincere and m o v e d way, ' I ' m always expect i n g p e o p l e to ask me, w h y do you stay in y o u r j o b ? ' I said ' N o , A m 1 Her evidence is described in Graham's article, 'La strana condotta di E. von Weizsäcker ambasciatore del Reich in Vatican*, Civ. Cattolica, 1970, 455-471.

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bassador, ! don't ask such a question and will not ask. I simply say, Excellency, you have a tender good heart, see if you can save innocent people. It is a grief to the pope, a grief, specially grievous that in Rome, under the eyes of the Holy Father, so many people suffer solely because they belong to a particular race. . The Ambassador thought for a few moments. Then he asked: 'What will the Holy See do if it goes on?' I replied: The Holy See would not want to be forced to protest'. He said, 'For more than four years I have followed and admired the attitude of the Holy See. It has succeeded in steering the ship in the middle of rocks of every kind and size without being wrecked. Even if it has trusted the Allies more, it has known how to maintain perfect balance. I ask myself whether, at a time when the ship is almost in harbour, it is sensible to endanger everything. I am thinking about the consequences which such a protest could provoke . . . . The order came from the highest places . . . . Your Eminence will leave me free not to report this conversation although it is official ?' I said I had appealed to his feelings of humanity. This was a friendly conversation, and I left it to his judgment whether or not to make a report. I wanted to remind him that the Hply See, as he allowed, has been very prudent in not giving the German people the impression that it has done or wished to do anything, however litde, against Germany during a terrible war. But I had also to say that the Holy See must not be forced to make a protest. Should the Holy See be compelled to make a protest, it will trust the providence of God about the consequences. 'So, I repeat: Your Excellency has told me that you will try to do what you can for the wretched Jews. Thank you for that. As for the rest, I leave it to your judgment. If you believe it better not to mendon this conversation, so be it.' In this way, Weizsäcker silenced a protest by promising to do what he could. The Vatican documents do not quite say how or why. But Gumpert, attache at the German embassy to the Quirinal, gave evidence that Weizsäcker told him how he had spoken 'very confidentially' to Monsignor Montini; and the most likely point for this conversation is the day of the razzia, 16 October, when cardinal Maglione summoned him to the Vatican. According to Gumpert's story, Weizsäcker said to Montini 'that any protest by the pope would only result in the deportations being carried out more vigorously. I know how our people react in these matters'.1 Through that black day reports of arrests, appeals for information, appeals for help, requests that the Vatican would intercede with the German Embassy. Monsignor Hudal, rector of the German college of S. 1

For Gumpert's unpublished evidence, see Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, Weizsäcker case, Document Book iv, no. 3x9 (214)—evidence given 2 April 1948; in the Library of the Harvard Law School.

1276 BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST Maria dell'Anima, sent that day his famous letter of protest to Generai Stahel. The Actes et Documents (ix. no. 373) edition of this letter makes its genesis almost more mysterious. How did Monsignor Hudal learn of the deportations? According to his own note in the Vatican Archives, he learnt from prince Carlo Pacelli, the pope's nephew. Hudal himself always claimed that he wrote the original letter. The German attache Gerhard Gumpert's unpublished evidence (Nuremberg War Crimes tribunal iv, Case No. 11, Document Book iv, No. 319 (241)) told a different story. His own secretary, Anneliese Krueger, came to tell him of the deportations. He telephoned General Stahel who said that he knew nothing about it (but the consul Moellhausen's telegrams to Berlin show- that Stahel knew that it was or might be imminent). Gumpert then telephoned Weizsäckers embassy and got Kessel. Gumpert and Kessel agreed on the best policy to attempt to halt the action—to get a letter, written by some 'trusted Vatican dignitary', presented that very morning to General Stahel; then they could use the letter as a lever via Weizsäcker u p o n Berlin. In the letter 'the Vatican's and the Holy Father's disgust at those measures was to be reflected'. Weizsäcker himself then suggested that Kessel approach Father Pankratius Pfeiffer, who had already made himself an indispensable link between the Vatican and General Stahel. Father Pfeiffer, who had regular access to General Stahel, himself delivered Hudal's letter. Then Gumpert went to Stahel, and remarking that 'this was an outstanding political matter', asked for the letter and telegraphed it to Berlin. Almost at once Weizsäcker telephoned Gumpert to ask whether the letter had been delivered, and then asked both for the letter and a copy of Gumpert's telegram so that he could use the letter in his own report to Berlin. It looks, therefore, as though Father Pfeiffer suggested Monsignor Hudal as the best man to write the letter—and the reason for the choice was that the only chance of stopping the action was a protest from a man trusted by the Nazis as pro-Nazi, and Hudal fitted this specification more nearly than any other important priest in Rome; that the pope was probably involved because Carlo Pacelli went to Hudal; that the Secretariat of State was certainly involved because Father Pfeiffer delivered the letter to General Stahel. Robert Katz (Black Sabbath, 200-3) interviewed Gumpert and received the impression that Gumpert and Kessel drafted a letter for Hudal to sign. This contradicts Hudal's claim to be the author of the letter. The text-history of the letter makes it more probable that Hudal was right and that Katz partially misunderstood what Gumpert said. In the original draft bishop Hudal wrote that this crisis endangered the peaceful relations between the Vatican and the German army in Rome. He asked that the order be given to stop the arrests, which lowered German prestige abroad and carried the danger that the pope

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might protest. Since the German government had talked of using the Vatican, it would be a pity if these Jewish persecutions made a gulf between Vatican and Reich. These were not heroic arguments. We know from students of the reign of terror, as in The Anatomy of the S.S. State, that they were the only kind of argument which stood a chance of diverting the German government from its purpose. When the German diplomats looked at Hudal's draft, they made a number of fussy little changes. They deleted, however, the phrase Jewish persecutions as counter-productive. This is a litde sign of difficulty in the theory that Gumpert and Kessel drafted the original letter. Two such experienced diplomats would hardly have used such a phrase to Berlin. If they did, it was because they were in a hurry when they made the first draft, and deleted it on reflexion. They may also have had the motive of protecting Hudal. But they added a sentence which astonishes one: \ . . the good relations between the Vatican and the Reich, which must chiefly be attributed to Your Excellency's [Stahel's] political intuition and generosity of heart and which will one day be inscribed in the history of Rome'. Imagination boggles at the attempt to picture either bishop Hudal drafting this sentence or two hard-headed German diplomats afterwards inserting it into the draft. For they were none of them trying to influence Scahel by flattery. Everyone concerned—Secretariat, Pfeiffer, Weizsäcker, Kessel, Gumpert—knew that the object was not to influence General Stahel, who controlled no police. The goal was Berlin. If we could understand how and why this sentence arrived in the draft, we should have largely dissipated the mystery which surrounds bishop Hudal's letter. Perhaps the aim was a reflected flattery of Herr von Ribbentrop, who had a weakness for flattery. Perhaps the addition aimed at raising General Stahel's reputation in Berlin. If so, it was not well-calculated. While sharpening the picture of the harm done to good relationships in Rome and, therefore, of the harm done to German propaganda, the insertion may have lowered Stahel's reputation by its fulsome terms of praise. Before the end of October Stahel was relieved of his command. Rumour decided that he was removed because he was too friendly to the Church. Weizsäcker was sorry to see him go (Hill, Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, 356). But unwittingly he and the other diplomats may have contributed to Stahel's fell. On the next day, 17 October, General Stahel telephoned Monsignor Hudal. He had forwarded the matter to the Gestapo in Rome and to Himmler; and Hudal understood him to say that in consideration of the particular character of Rome Himmler ordered the arrests to stop. The same day Stahel sent round a letter to Hudal: 'About the arrests of the Jews, I can say that as military commander I personally have nothing to do with it. It is purely a police action, and I have no influence

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST 1278 over it because my command is purely of the army. Nevertheless I have of course brought your doubts to the notice of the proper authorities'. 1 That same day, 17 October, Weizsäcker wrote his own telegram to make Berlin pause: . The Curia is particularly shocked that the action took place, so to speak, under the pope's windows. The reaction would be perhaps softened if the Jews could be used for military work in Italy. The groups in Rome hostile to us, exploit the action to force the Vatican out of its reserve. They say that in French towns where similar things happened, bishops took a clear position, and the pope, as head of the Church, could not do less. People are beginning to contrast this pope with his much more fiery predecessor Pius xi. Enemy propaganda abroad will certainly seize the occasion to provoke tension between the Curia and ourselves'. This telegram did as much as any other single document to lower the post-war reputation of Pius XII. Looked at in terms of the reign of terror, and of Weizsäcker trying to do what he could for Jews, it was beautifully drafted. It supported Hudal's plea that the Jews were better used at work in Italy; that the action, or any further action, gravely endangered German propaganda; and that the pope is no danger if treated less inconsiderately, since he is not like his predecessor. On the same day one of the staff of the Vatican Secretariat got into the Collegio Militare, where some 1259 Jews were assembled; and the priest's evidence in Actes et Documents, ix, no. 374 is to be added to the graphic description given by Robert Katz. During that day Danneker released more than 200 persons whom his men had caught—foreigners, mixed families where the wife was Jewish, and certain other categories, including a few Jews whose names enabled them to claim to be nonJews but who risked being shot if discovered. Next day the Gestapo thought that 1,007 Jews were sent northward on a train. Katz believed that they underestimated, and that the real number was more like 1,060. Fourteen men and one woman returned after the war. Appeals for help, from groups and from individuals, began to flood into the Vatican—for refuge for those who had escaped, For information about those who were taken, for a public protest, for influence with the German ambassador. On 22 October the Secretariat sent Weizsäcker a list of baptised Jews—certificates of baptism being lodged at the Secretariat: Actes et Documents, ix, no. 381. On 23 October, the Franciscan Father Reichert, who was the German-speaking confessor at St. Peter's, told the Secretariat that though General Stahel would respect convents, the SS would not, and in his view it was imprudent for convents to receive refugees like Jews and deserters. He thought that the SS would 1

The Italian Commissioner for the government of Rome went round to see General Stahel on the same matter and soon understood that Stahel had no control over the razzia. Stahel put him in touch with one of the German police, who gave him no hope: Actes et Documents, ix, no. 405.

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soon start to hunt through the convents, with hurt to religious orders and unforeseeable wider damage. This fear, which also raged in minds with more responsibility than Father Reichert's, disturbed Weizsäcker. He had established far better relations between Germany and the Vatican; had ensured that the new conquerors of Rome respected Vaucan neutrality; had persuaded the Curia to take no step which would endanger the delicate balance. In a private letter home on 20 October (Hill, 354) he talked of the precarious situation, happy for the moment but it might be upset in an instant—'My job is to smooth things over. We work really hard. But there exists no precaution against possible incidents, like a soldier stopping and searching a cardinal's car with a gun, or the police doing something their chief did not intend'. On 22 October Weizsäcker went to see Fielcl Marshal Kesselring, no doubt still on the business of getting a German public declaration of respect for Vatican neutrality. In the razzia of 16 October the SS arrested the lawyer Foligno. He was Catholic by birth and married to a Gentile wife. The Vatican appealed and secured his release, and on 19 October Foligno came into the Secretariat to express his thanks, and ask if he could be given shelter. But on 23 October the Secretariat was perturbed by an extraordinary canard. A woman who witnessed Foligno's arrest protested to a German officer. The German said that when Weizsäcker was last received at the Vatican, the pope said 'If you've got to deport the Jews, best to do it quick'. The same story came in from another source. The story of Foligno showed that appeals for individuals could do good. During these days after the razzia, Jews fled in all directions, the SS continued here and there to make arrests. On 23 October the Secretariat appealed to Weizsäcker to get the release of five named Jews. Berlin was not content. On 25 October Weizsäcker saw Monsignor Montini and said that information from Germany described Vatican City as a refuge for politicians, Jews, soldiers, etc. Montini said that it was not true: Actes et Documents, ix, no. 387. That same day Father Centioni, chaplain to the Italian police in Rome, came to see Montini. He had a story that a chaplain to the SS (the SS had no chaplains) attacked the church authorities for doing nothing about the deportation of the Jews. Montini noted only T h e Holy See has done what it could'. The train of catde trucks reached Padua about noon on 19 October and there had trouble with one of the trucks. It remained several hours by the station, in which time Fascist officers and bystanders forced the small SS guard to let the prisoners, whose condition they discovered, get water. The prisoners passed messages, some asking the bystanders to tell the bishop of their passing and of their miserable condition, so that he could tell the pope. This information took six days (!) to reach the bishop of Padua, who wrote on 25 October to inform cardinal Maglione: Actes et Documents, ix, no. 389. The prisoners on the train believed that thev passed through Nuremberg, and afterwards decided that this route

1280 BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST to the Polish border was a curious detour. But at Vienna station someone on the platform learnt that the train of piteous people passing through, who begged for water, were Jews from Rome. The observer passed on the information so casually that at last it reached Rome through the Argentine ambassador to the Quirinal, who told a Jewish friend, who told the Secretariat of State; Actes et Documents, ix, no. 395. When travelling from Rome to Auschwitz, one is less likely to g o by Nuremberg than by Vienna. On 25 October Father Tacchi-Venturi, who for years had worked nobly for the Jews, described how appeals came pouring in because of the barbarous treatment inflicted during this last week. He specially asked the Vatican to do everything to get to know what happened to the Jews on that train. Even if the pope failed, the pronouncement would 'certainly increase veneration and gratitude towards the person of the Holy Father'. Father Tacchi-Venturi was evidently one of those who noticed the public silence at the Vatican. On 27 Ο a o b e r , also, the deputy chief rabbi in Rome, David Panzieri, appealed in the name of the Jewish Community (for the chief rabbi, Israel Zolli, had vanished into hiding)—a heart-rending emotional cry of a letter. Meanwhile, o n 26 October the Vatican published what it thought would help. The Osservatore Romano of 25-26 October printed a leading article headed The charitable work of the Pope. T h e charity of the pope, is universal and fatherly. It knows no frontiers—of nationadity, of religion, of race. The pope's continual activity has been increased in these last days because of the sufferings which have fallen upon so many unfortunates'. This article has been widely condemned as too weak or too cryptic for the occasion. That was not Weizsäckers opinion. H e thought it sufficiently dangerous to send with a report to Berlin which would represent it as too weak or too cryptic. So on 28 October he wired to Berlin the second of the terrible messages that would damn the pope's reputation among posterity: 'in spite of the pressure brought to bear upon him from all sides, the pope has refused to let himself be drawn into a protest against the deportation of the Jews of Rome. Even though he must realise that his attitude will be blamed by our enemies and by Protestants in the Anglo-Saxon countries, who will use it for propaganda against Catholicism, he has done everything in this delicate question not to make difficulties in the relations with the German government or the German authorities in Rome. Since new actions against the Jews of Rome are apparently not to be undertaken, we can consider this question, so disagreeable for German-Vatican relations, as closed. There is one piece of evidence that this is h o w it is with the Vatican. In the Osservatore Romano of 25-6 October is a n official communique on the pope's charitable work in which may b e read, in the mistv ornate style which is typical of this organ, that the pope's charity extends to all men, without distinction of nationality, religion or race.

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(Weizsäcker gave italics to the words). The pope's continual activity has been increased recently because of the more severe sufferings of so many unfortunates. It is the less necessary to protest against this publication . . . because very few people will understand it to apply to the Jews'. Weizsäcker, thus, encouraged Berlin to think that the action against the Jews was over; that the Vatican was silent and unprotesting; that danger lay in further action against the Jews of Rome; that the phrases of the Osseruatore Romano were innocuous because to most Romans unintelligible. Weizsäcker has been blamed for twisting his reports and, for the sake of immediate protection of Rome and the pope, destroying the pope's reputation with posterity. But it is arguable diat a man doing the best that he can for human beings in terrible circumstances can hardly be wrong to let men's posthumous reputations take care of themselves. On 29 October Montini appealed to Weizsäcker to get the release of two baptised Jews; and simultaneously he was doing what he could for eight Jews hidden in a convent: Actes et Documents, ix, no. 397-8. Father Tacchi-Venturi brought a petition from the Jewish community in Rome that the Vatican should find out what happened to the Jews sent away on the train. He thought erroneously that the 'barbarously seized' numbered more than 3,000. On 30 October the Swedish minister to the Quirinal came to find out what had happened, and said that 'some public act by the Holy See ... would be well received'. This was the day when Weizsäcker recorded that General Stahel was relieved of his command. It was also the day when there appeared in the Osseruatore Romano the quid pro quo statement for which Weizsäcker worked so long and so hard, that Germany will respect the neutrality of the Vatican, and the Vatican appreciates the behaviour hitherto of the German army. On 31 October and 3 November, 25 November, 1, 6 and 10 December, the Secretariat approached Weizsäcker on behalf of named Jews arrested on 16 October. The appeal of 10 December is the last recorded in these documents. These documents show that many Jews in Rome survived the razzia of 16 October. The petitions mentioned above were not the only Jewish families to remain. 400 Polish Jews arrived in Rome on 8 September 1 943·—the very day of the change of power. The Capuchin Father Benolt was still looking after their needs as a group on 7 January 1944: Actes et Documents, ix, no. 544, note 5. If after 16 October the hunt had continued systematically, such a group could not have survived without dispersion and loss of contact. It looks as though the argument of Weizsäcker, that the razzia was lamentable propagada, may actually have saved lives. On 5 November Father Benoit wrote to Monsignor Montini a letter with an astonishing phrase (Actes et Documents, ix, no. 412). H e said that 499 Jews came from France and were now sheltering in Rome, and were in danger. Father Benoit got the agreement of the Italian authorities and furnished each of them with a certificate, not mention-

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ing that the bearer was a Jew, but certifying that he was a refugee assisted by Benoit's committee and the Swiss Legation and the Red Gross, and had permission to live in Rome. Benoit then, still no doubt without saying that they were Jews, had the coolness to go to the Germ a n embassy to get their approval for what was d o n e ; and the German embassy agreed provided that the Secretariat of State granted a letter of recommendation. W e should like to know m o r e about this enterprising Capuchin, who m a d e the Capuchin house in the Via Sicilia the centre o f an extensive and dangerous relief operation. He gave a partial account o f his endeavours in a Relatione printed by Felice as Document no. 40; and it is pleasant that after the war the Italian Jewish union should have awarded him a gold medal. 1 Meanwhile, the Vatican continued to help with money and food. Despite the razzia, the Jews o f Rome still possessed an organisation. O n 6 N o v e m b e r one o f the Secretariat talked with Father Benoit and was foolish enough to ask whether they should approach Weizsäcker on behalf of these refugees! In mid-November Benoit was in personal danger over a crisis caused by his creation o f ration-cards for persons not supposed to exist: cf. Actes et Documents, ix, nos. 415, 433. T h e Vatican was still afraid that the police would suddenly raid all the convents.. O n 4 November Father Pankratius Pfeiffer, formerly the link between General Stahel and the Vatican, was in Weizsäckers embassy. There he met Obersturmführer Erich Priebke, the SS officer w h o was Kappler's lieutenant. Ί thought it well', recorded Pfeiffer, 'to approach him and enter into conversation'. He told the SS officer h o w he had helped (the n o w removed) Stahel, and received the friendly reply that perhaps he c o u l d still be useful. 'Plucking up courage, I said to him that the other day there was rumour that they intended to raid the convents in search o f people in hiding. H e said that that was not quite right. But what was true was that they had received information that the Vatican had a b u r e a u for helping runaways to find refuge in convents. I told him that this was certainly untrue. H e allowed this, but said that in the Vatican were perhaps a priest or two w h o gave this help. I said that if any priest in the Vatican did such things, he had no authorisation'. Priebke seemed satisfied, and told Father Pfeiffer that he w o u l d d o well if he told the Vatican about the conversation. Despite its friendly tone, this last phrase contained a veiled threat: Actes et Documents, ix, no. 548. Felice printed (Document 39) the list o f religious houses (100 female and 55 male) which sheltered Jews. O n 6 November cardinal Maglione wrote Weizsäcker a letter. He said that he received so many requests for information a b o u t the arrested H e also gave evidence in favour o f Weizsäcker at Nuremberg; C f . War Crimes Tribunal iv. Case n, Document-Book iv, no. 325 (57) in Harvard Law Library: 'our rescue work was greatly facilitated by the intervention of Herr von Weizsäcker, who undoubtedly knew that the institutions of Rome were packed with Jews'. 1

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Jews and begged Weizsäcker to help. Three days later Weizsäcker told Montini that he could not help. He thought the German authorities would use the German Red Cross to inform the Italian republican government, and so the information would come. Montini said that the ordinary channels were inadequate, and that this was a matter over which the pope was in anguish. Weizsäcker said that perhaps the nuncio in Berlin, Monsignor Orsenigo, could more easily get the information. But as he said it, he certainly knew that Orsenigo had as litde chance as himself. O n 15 November the Secretariat made a helpless note, wondering whether or how anything more could be done. T h e year ended with both parties still on tenterhooks. Weizsäcker had established his excellent if precarious relations between the Vatican and the German army on the expectation that the situation would last only two or three weeks until the Allied armies arrived. Weizsäcker was conscious that' every extra day increased the chance o f 'incidents'. H e imagined to himself the appalling consequences if the SS ransacked the convents and found in one of them an internationally famous C o m munist leader (cf. Hill, Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, 362). The state of mind which his papers disclose makes us trust the evidence of the priest w h o afterwards, in Weizsäckers defence, said that he turned away Italians w h o offered information about the hiding places o f Jews (journal of Modern History, 39 (1967), 147 n . 51).

The Secretary of State was equally o n edge. O n 20 December a German colonel told them that the 400 SS in R o m e were soon to be increased to 2,000, w h o then would search the monasteries without warning, and that Kappler did not rule out the possibility o f an incursion into Vatican City: Actes et Documents ix, no. 474. O n 29 December they were told about an alleged bureau for forging certificates for refugee Jews to 'prove' that they were citizens o f Vatican City, and for hiding them in religious houses. Weizsäcker, nevertheless, believed that they had achieved a victory. When Gumpert, w h o really belonged to the embassy to the Italian government and not to the Vatican embassy, was ordered to northern Italy and came to take his leave, Weizsäcker said, 'What a filthy business that was'. But the reports after all gave them such 'cold feet' in Berlin that the deportations had at once been discontinued. 1 Nuremberg War Crimes, Tribunal iv, Case 11, Document Book iv, No. 319 (241), p. 119. 1

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French Churches and the Persecution of Jews in France, 1940-1944 Michael R. Marrus

"France, take care lest you lose your soul." This stern message was the title of the first number of the resistance periodical Temiognage chritien, which appeared in November 1941.1 The tone was the same in the sixth and seventh numbers, appearing together under the title Antisemites, printed just before the massive roundups of Jews throughout France. Hatred of Jews was a grave heresy: As Christians, we have the urgent duty to bear witness before all our brothers, according to the imprescriptable principles of our faith, that antisemitism is incompatible with Christianity. In bearing witness against antisemitism, in favor of truth and justice, we bear witness for Christ.2

Thus spoke a courageous handful of Protestants and Catholics rallied by Father Pierre Chaillet of the diocese of Lyon, and under the patronage of Cardinal Gerlier, the leading Catholic churchman in the unoccupied zone. As the group about Temoignage Chretien realized, however, theirs was as yet a lonely voice within the French Church - anonymous, and received in silence by the episcopal hierarchy to which copies of the tracts had been sent, often at considerable risk. For if antisemitism was indeed a Christian heresy, it was a heresy widely tolerated, if not applauded, during the first two years following the Nazi occupation of three-fifths of France. From the summer of 1940 until the first, massive and regular deportations of Jews from the French camp of Drancy to Auschwitz in the summer of 1942, Jews in France were progressively isolated from French society by separate German and French moves. A series of laws, ordinances and decrees rained down upon both zones of the divided country, removing Jews from businesses, government

1

This paper draws and expands upon material to be found in Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy etlesJuifs, trans. Marguerite Delmotte (Paris, 1981).

2

Cahiers du Timoignage chritien, nos. VI and VII, Antisimites (April/May 1942), p. 119.

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posts and professions, confiscating their property, enumerating them in special censuses, interning some in camps and others in battalions for forced labor. Both French citizens and foreign Jews suffered, although the latter were particularly vulnerable and exposed to repression by a zealous administration. Notably, the French Government at Vichy was especially active. It initiated persecution even before the Germans began to apply pressure upon the French to do so, and proceeded energetically with a nationalistic campaign designed to harness antisemitism to the national interest. Vichy's program, defined as "State Antisemitism," was supposed to help unify the country administratively, to prevent Jewish property from flowing to the Nazis, and to reduce the nefarious influence of a fundamentally unassimilable Jewish population. The Catholic Hierarchy and the Anti-Jewish

Laws

No important voices within the Catholic hierarchy protested this legislation when it was first issued at Vichy, and the virtual total silence on the question in high Catholic circles was especially significant in the unoccupied zone in the southern two-fifths of France, where the clergy were not only free to express themselves but were respected as pillars of the regime. After the war, defending his role as Vichy's first Commissioner General for Jewish Affairs, heading the anti-Jewish agency established in March 1941, the nationalist and Catholic politician Xavier Vallat reminded everyone that the Church had not opposed the anti-Jewish laws, and in a few cases churchmen had even given their approbation. Dissent came, he admitted, but only in 1942 with the deportations. 3 Contemporary historians agree, identifying now what was so painfully recognized by the authors of Temoignage chritien in 1942: for over a year at least, we must accept the verdict of the historian Pierre Pierrard, for whom almost all of Catholic France was as if "anesthetized" in the face of the Jewish Question.4 The occasional exceptions that have been noted tended to support the Vichy Government in its effort to deal with the Jews. An article on Algeria, for example, in the Jesuit journal Construire, referred to anti-Jewish laws as "measures of moral purification as useful for Algeria as for France." 5 The Bishop of Marseille wrote optimistically about the anti-Jewish laws: "Already there begins to appear the face of a more beautiful France, healed of its sores that were often the

3

4 5

Xavier Vallat, Le Nez de Cläopätre: souvenirs d'un homme de droit (1919-1944) (Paris, 1957), pp. 249, 270; Le Proces de Xavier Vallat, prtsentä par ses amis (Paris, 1948), p. 71. Pierre Pierrard, Juifs et Catholiques frangais: deDrumont ά Jules Isaac (1886-1945) (Paris, 1970), p. 298. Jacques Duquesne, Les Catholiques frangais sous I'occupation (Paris, 1966), p. 252.

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work of ... foreigners." 6 In his Easter sermon of 1941 Monsignor Caillot, the elderly Bishop of Grenoble, congratulated Marshal Petain on his repression of Freemasons, and also "that other at least as pernicious power, the half-breeds (meteques) of whom the Jews offer the most outstanding specimen...."7 Such samples of Church opinion are doubtless not representative but they were the views on the subject most often heard in 1940 and 1941. Silence was more common, but in the flush of enthusiasm for Petain and the Vichy regime as a whole in 1940 and 1941, such silence could be fairly taken for approval. What explains this "anesthesia," this insensitivity to Jewish suffering and the manifest injustice of a persecution directed not only by the German occupation, but also by a French Government, operating autonomously and, one should also add, with full openness in its hostility toward Jews? The usual explanation is political - seeing the Catholic Church as broadly aligned with the authoritarian, nationalist and antisemitic stream of French politics, dammed up in the mid-1930s at the time of the Socialist-led Popular Front, but now flowing freely and unimpeded with the Vichy regime. Clearly such loyalties to the right persisted in a Church long associated with anti-Jewish forces in French society. Despite occasional declarations against racism and antisemitism issued by Pius XI, for example, the Vatican remained fundamentally opposed to the liberal state, a position reinforced by the trauma which the Spanish Republic presented for many Catholics during the Civil War in Spain. French Catholics shared the distrust in republican institutions so manifest in the Holy See. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that French Catholicism before the war was wedded to anti-Jewish elements in French society. French Catholic affinity for authoritarian solutions to the problems of the 1930s did not necessarily mean an attraction to antisemitism. To be sure, anti-Jewish statements are not hard to find among the declarations of Catholic leaders, and even in Catholic liturgy. Prejudice against Jews still existed within the hierarchy, of course, but the Jews were hardly a Catholic priority, and the Church had left far behind its antisemitic cast of the Dreyfus era. A report on antisemitism in French society prepared by the World Jewish Congress in 1938, looking especially at Catholic opinion, concluded with cautious optimism, seeing a rapprochement between Judaism and Catholicism, jointly persecuted by the Nazis.8 In early 1938 the widely read Catholic daily La Croix, a newspaper 6 7

8

Claude Langlois, "Le r£gime de Vichy et le clerg6, d'aprös les Semaines religieuses des dioceses de la zone libre," Revue frangaise de science politique 22 (1972): 757. Semaine religieuse de Grenoble, April 27, 1941; Frangois Delpech, "La pers6cution des Juifs et Γ Amitie chretienne," in Eglises et Chritiens dans la lie guerre mondiale: la rigion Rhöne-Alpes (Actes du Colloque tenu ä Grenoble du 7 au 9 octobre 1976), eds. Xavier de Montclos et al. (Lyon, 1978), p. 158. Archives of the Institute for Jewish Affairs (London): "Le problfeme juif et l'opinion catholique frangais," June 5, 1938, mimeographed.

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Michael R. Marius

which once expressed the most extravagant and hate-filled antisemitism, saw in the Nazis' efforts against Jews and Christians "a common desire to annihilate in them the witnesses of the eternal God...."9 La Croix considered antisemitism a vestige of paganism. Cardinal Verdier in Paris and the venerable Archbishop Saliege of Toulouse condemned racism as unchristian at about the same time. Similar sentiments were expressed by Cardinal Maurin of Lyon, originally a supporter of the monarchist and antisemitic Action Francaise, but by the late 1930s strongly opposed to its assault upon Jews. His successor Cardinal Gerlier hosted a meeting against racism and antisemitism in 1938.10 These sentiments reflected one important trend within the French Church during the troubled 1930s, when the primary concerns of many clerics riveted upon social issues rather than old political quarrels. The papal condemnation of Charles Maurras' violently antisemitic Action Francaise in 1926, according to the historian Henri Dubief, had some effect upon Catholic intellectuals in the interwar period, many of whom turned against its resolute opposition to modernity and the Third Republic. A good deal of Church effort swung in the direction of an ouverture sociale in this period, seeking an extension of the message of Catholicism to elements of French society - particularly the working classes - hitherto largely ignored by the episcopacy. Such opinions may not have been that of the majority of French Cardinals and Bishops in 1940, but it is plain that the old equation of Catholicism and Maurrasianism no longer applied by the outbreak of World War II. Jean-Marie Mayeur has stressed that members of the episcopacy who were most influential at Vichy under Petain had few ties to the Action Francaise - Monsignor Chappoulie, and Cardinals Lienart, Suhard and Gerlier - and that some of the most zealous champions of a new order for France - Jesuits involved in the Action populaire - were overtly hostile to Maurras' movement.11 To explain the near-unanimity of Catholic support for Vichy's policy during its period of aggressive, legislated antisemitism in 1940-1941, we must consider not only the Catholic political preferences of the previous decade, but also the curious but massive outpouring of sympathy for Marshal Petain after the disastrous defeat by Germany. The French defeat, so swift and decisive, was seen by one and all as a moral at least as much as a military defeat. Frenchmen shared a near-universal hunger for moral redressment following the debacle, 9 10

11

La Croix, February 9, 1938. See L6on Merklen, "Le probteme juif et l'universalite de la Redemption," La Croix, September 1, 1938; Pierrard, Juifs et Catholiques frangais, pp. 266-285; Delpech, "Persecution des Juifs," p. 152. See Henri Dubief, Le Declin de la me Ripublique (1929-1938) (Paris, 1976), pp. 112-117; Jean-Marie Mayeur, "Les Catholiques et Vichy," Critique 239 (April 1967): 496-497; idem, "Les eveques dans l'avant-guerre," in Montclos et al. eds., Eglises et Chritiens.

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and pronounced an urgent effort to repair a discredited and humiliated society. Sensing this mood, and doubtless sharing it himself, Petain rose remarkably to the occasion. In a tremulous voice, he offered France "the gift of my person" - an unctuous gesture loaded with Christian symbolism which became part of Vichy's style. Petain certainly set the tone at Vichy, giving the new program called the revolution nationale - the imprint of a Moral Order. His program had the capacity to suspend critical judgments, including those of the minority of churchmen on the left, because of the magnitude and apparent nobility of the task, together with the extraordinary opportunities it seemed to afford. Catholics flocked to the regime enthusiastically, less out of commitment to specific legislative acts and more out of affection for a widely proclaimed world view. Around the impassive octogenarian sheltered the tens of thousands of Catholic readers of Action Francaise (now removed from the interdict by Pius XII) as well as more progressive elements within the Church. After decades of secularism and the decline of official support for the Church and its values, after the disturbing visions of religious victimization evoked by the Popular Front and the Civil War in Spain, the new order of Vichy seemed to offer the prospects of deliverance. Petain appeared as a new Salazar, promising order, hierarchy, discipline and respect for religion and traditional values. The old Marshal's dubious past - as a most "republican" general and as a somewhat disreputable roue - were quickly forgotten. France's mood favored atonement for the past, and new beginnings. Painful or unpleasant aspects of Vichy's policy were for a time assumed to be the necessary expiation for the nation's sins; as in 1871, Frenchmen were assumed to be in for a hard time, but the path of duty lay not in complaint or criticism, but in devotion and commitment. This was not a time to quibble about details. Catholic leaders joined in this national mood, and as a measure of their enthusiasm they poured out their adulation for Petain. To Cardinal Suhard, the new Archbishop of Paris, Petain was "the Frenchman without reproach"; to Monsignor Piguet, Bishop of Clermont-Ferrand, the Marshal had been given to France by Providence.12 To Cardinal Gerlier the reconstruction of France would render society "more Christian"; as he noted, "the Marshal said one day: 'our fatherland must recover the beauty of its roots.' Of all its roots, what is the most authentic and the most beautiful, if not Christianity, of which it was born?" To Monsignor Cholet, religion commanded obedience: We do not have the right to dispute the Leader himself or his commandments. The subordinate must obey without seeking or asking for explanation.... We should be.

12

Rene-Bedarida, Les Armes d'espnt: Timoignage chretien (1941-1944) (Paris, 1977), p. 14; Jacques Duquesne, "Defensor Judaeorum - the French Episcopate, 19401944," Wiener Library Bulletin 21 (Spring 1967): 19.

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Michael R. Marrus in the name of our religious conscience, firmly united in the strictest discipline. 13

Statements such as these were widely repeated - in pastoral letters, newspaper articles, and radio broadcasts. By the end of 1940 Frenchmen seemed joined in a new, more intense form of Christianity, encouraged by churchmen of the most varied persuasions and political belief. The Jews were easily forgotten in this atmosphere of reconquista, what was seen as a re-Christianization of France. When occasional sounds of protest began to be heard in the summer of 1941, the time of the second major anti-Jewish law, a census of all Jews and the beginning of a massive aryanizätion campaign, the hierarchy remained largely under the effects of the original anesthesia. A few Church leaders began to see possibilities of injustice emanating from Vichy, but their tone remained respectful and circumspect. 14 The Cardinals and Archbishops of the occupied zone met together with Cardinal Gerlier in July 1941, and in an obvious reference to the persecution they affirmed "respect for the human person" together with the "charity of Christ which extends to all men." Petain still commanded "a sincere and complete loyalty," but the churchmen also declared this to be a loyalty "without subservience (sans infiodation)."14 In some sense Cardinal Gerlier epitomized what emerged as the hesitations of much of the hierarchy, torn between belief in Petain's program and the pull of charitable impulses. Like many of his peers, Gerlier was ripe for "redressment" in 1940: he was outspoken in his veneration for Petain and the rivolution nationale, seeing in them a hope for a French resurrection, the kind of moral revival so longed for in the late 1930s. Like many enthusiasts for the new order, Gerlier was not a theologian or a devotee of the Action Francaise; he was a practical, courtly man of affairs, a brilliant lawyer who had studied with the Jewish consistorial leader Jacques Helbronner, and who was on good terms with other Jewish officials. He was a lifetime follower of the Action catholique, a movement which opposed political engagement and favored constructive social action. But typically, he had a special weakness for traditionalist, authoritarian regimes with a veneer of Catholicism. A strong opponent of Nazi ideology, Gerlier felt much differently about the Franco regime in Spain, for which he showed great sympathy. In his view Petain was following the same path. Despite

13

14

"Dans un vibrant discours. Mgr. Gerlier engage tous les Frangais ä sunir autour du Marechal," Journal des Debats, December 28,1940; Roland de Pury, "Engage dans la lutte," in Chretiens sous I'occupation, Sens: Juifs et Chretiens dans le monde aujourd'hui, nos. 9/10 (1978): 31. See Langlois, "Le regime de Vichy et le charge...," 750-774. On the Algerian clergy, see Michel Ansky, Les Juifs d'Algirie: du decret Cremieux ά la liberation (Paris, 1950), p. 105. Jean-Marie Mayeur, "Les Eglises devant la persecution des Juifs en France pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale," Commentaire (Summer 1981): 257-258.

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his admiration for the head of the state, however, Gerlier too believed in "loyalty without subservience." He was prepared to criticize.15 On several occasions in 1940 and 1941 he intervened on behalf of Jewish internees and, after the prompting of Abbe Alexandre Glasberg, a priest of Jewish origins, he protested against the terrible conditions at the French concentration camp at Gurs, near the Spanish frontier. By the summer of 1941, following more stringent antisemitic laws and after his visit to Petain, Gerlier began to object more forcefully to aspects of Vichy's Jewish policy. In September he met with the regional director of the Commissariat General for Jewish Affairs, and the following month he received Xavier Vallat himself in order to convey his misgivings. Yet even at this point Gerlier had no objections to the principle of the anti-Jewish laws. Like many Catholics of his generation, he occasionally repeated enduring anti-Jewish stereotypes, and while opposing racial policies he tended to be indulgent toward low-grade persecution. According to Vallat's account, the Cardinal called the Commissioner General "an excellent Christian." "Your law is not unjust," Gerlier told Vallat, "but in its application it lacks justice and charity." Gerlier the worldly priest understood the economic case against the Jews, but while admitting that there was indeed a Jewish problem, he insisted that it be solved humanely. 16 The Attitude

of the Vatican

Did Gerlier reflect a general disposition throughout the Church? There is indirect evidence to indicate precisely this, coming from no less a source than the Holy See itself. During the summer of 1941, Petain seems to have been troubled by the occasional critical opinion, and decided to do something concrete: on August 7, 1941, he wrote to his ambassador in the Vatican, Leon Berard, asking for the papal view of Vichy's anti-Jewish measures. Berard replied quickly, saying that he had heard nothing at the Vatican which might suggest disagreement. However, he promised to find out more. On September 2, Berard made a full report, a lengthy document of several closely typed pages, which could only have comforted the Marshal. 17 15

16

17

See idem, "Les eveques dans l'avant-guerre"; "Pierre-Marie Gerlier, Cardinal Archbishop of Lyons," Public Record Office, London (Henceforth PRO); FO 371/31944 (Z8960/81/17); "Le Cardinal Gerlier associe dans un meme hommage le Marechal Potain et le G6neral Franco," Le Figaro, June 14, 1941. The meeting with Vallat took place on October 6,1941. Vallat's report is in Centre de documentation juive contemporaine (CDJC), CDC-106. See also the report of the Commissariat general des questions juives (CGQJ) regional director (Lyon) to CGQJ, September 11, 1941, CDJC, CCXXXVm-61. CDJC, XLII—10. B6rard's report is also printed in Le Monde juif, no. 2 (October 1946); Georges Wellers, "Dans le sillage du colloque duC.D.J.C. (mars 1979)," Le Monde juif,

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The first point was that France's persecution had not really affected the Vatican at all: according to Berard, "it does not seem that the papal authority has been concerned or preoccupied at any moment with this aspect of French policy." Next, the Church was fundamentally opposed to racist theories, being long committed to "the unity of the human species." However, within the human species, the Jews were considered not only a religious community, but also a group with "ethnic particularities." As such, there was every reason "to limit their activity in society and ... to restrain their influence." On this matter there was important theological and practical legislative precedent, going back at least to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Consequently, said Berard, "it is legitimate to forbid them access to the public service; legitimate also not to let them into the universities and liberal professions except in a fixed proportion (numerus clausus)." He then outlined some problems which had arisen between the Vatican and Fascist Italy over the latter's racial laws dealing with the Jews. In the opinion of the Holy See, Mussolini had broken the Concordat of 1929 by setting certain restrictions on marriages between Jews and non-Jews; according to the Church, marriage was a sacrament and the state had no business regulating it by racial laws. The most important part of the report concerned Catholic doctrine and Vichy's anti-Jewish laws. On this score, Petain emerged as would a light smoker with a clean bill of health. Berard noted that by focusing as it did upon race, French law was in formal contradiction with the teaching of the Church. The latter "has ceaselessly taught the dignity and respect of the human person." Therefore, the Holy See could not accept that a Jew with at least three grandparents who had duly converted to Catholicism and who had been baptized, was still a Jew. Church law was explicit: "a Jew who has been properly baptized ceases being a Jew to become part of'the flock of Christ.' " Still, this was "the sole point where the law of June 2,1941 [i.e. the newly revised anti-Jewish law] is in opposition to a principle held by the Roman Church. By no means does it follow from this doctrinal divergence that the French state is threatened ... with censure or disapproval." 18 When it came to the exclusion of Jews from the civil service or the numerus clausus in certain professions, "there is nothing in those measures which can give rise to criticism, from the viewpoint of the Holy See." In

18

no. 94 (April/June 1979): 40-51; and, significantly, in Procäs de Xavier Vallat, pp. 500-509. See also Leon Poliakov, "Le Vatican et la question juive," Le Monde Juif (December 1950): 11-14, and L. Papleux, "Le Vatican et le problfeme juif, Π, 1941-1942," Revue d'histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale 27 (1977): 75-84. For an excellent recent summary of the views of Pius XII, see Fran£ois Delpech, "Pie ΧΠ et la persecution nazie," L'Histoire 32 (March 1981): 25-36. Valeri to Maglione, September 30,1941, in Actes et documents du Saint-Siäge rglatifs ά la secondeguerre mondiale (9 vols., Vatican City, 1970-1975), Vol. 8, Le Saint-Siege et les victimes de guerre, janvier 1941-decembre 1942 (Vatican City, 1974), pp. 295-297.

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conclusion, Berard reassured Petain that the Papacy would not bother Vichy over the issue. "As an authorized source at the Vatican told me, no one would make trouble with us over the anti- Jewish law." Papal spokesmen, however, had insisted upon two things. First, Vichy should not add to its anti-Jewish law any provision touching upon marriage. Second, Vichy should take care that the laws against the Jews be applied with due consideration for "justice and charity" the precise words which Gerlier had used in his meeting with Vallat. Petain took this m e n a g e to heart. Berard was a credible and not inexperienced diplomat; he was a former senator, and had conducted delicate negotiations with Franco's Spain in 1939. A few days after receiving the Berard report, Petain dined with several diplomats, including Cardinal Valerio Valeri, Papal Nuncio in France. In the presence of the ambassadors of Brazil and Spain, the Marshal referred to the report, telling his guests that the Papacy had no serious objections to the anti-Jewish legislation. The Nuncio, an opponent of the anti-Jewish legislation, was embarrassed. When Valeri suggested that the Marshal must have misunderstood the intentions of the Holy See, Petain replied good-humoredly that it was the Nuncio who was out of line: Petain offered to show Valeri the text of the report. Valeri agreed, and seems to have been caught without an adequate reply. Writing to the Papal Secretary of State, Cardinal Maglione, the Nuncio protested that the antisemitic laws contained "grave indiscretions (inconvenienti)" from the religious viewpoint. He wondered aloud who had given Berard his information. Maglione thought this worth pursuing and looked into the matter. Berard's sources, it turned out, were highly placed within the Secretariat of State, and included Monsignors Tardini and Montini (the future Pope Paul VI). At the end of October Maglione replied to Valeri, affirming the substance of Berard's letter but dissenting from what he thought were Petain's "exaggerated deduction" from it. The feeling at the Vatican was that the antisemitic statute was "an unfortunate law (malaugurata legge)" which should be limited to interpretation and application. There is no record of his having said this to Petain, however. 19 Whatever this curious exchange signified, Vichy assumed Vatican support, and acted upon that assumption. In mid-October, after demarches made by Gerlier and the Protestant leader Marc Boegner, Vallat told the Vichy press to deny rumors of Vatican reservations about the government's anti-Jewish measures: We are in a position to make the most formal denial of these allegations; from highly authoritative sources it is clear that nothing in the legislation developed to protect France against Jewish influence is in opposition to the teaching of the Church.20 19 20

Ibid., 33-34. Press communique of CGQJ, October 11, 1941, in Archives nationales (henceforth AN), AJ38 62 M75; CDJC, XLH-110.

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Vallat brandished Berard's report in his conversation with Gerlier at the beginning of October, but the latter claimed not to have seen it. Still, Gerlier seems to have embraced its conclusions, and even its language, referring emphatically to the need for "justice and charity" in the implementation of the antisemitic laws. 21 For about a year, indeed, everyone seems to have assumed solid Church support for the existing legislation, despite the occasional discontent among certain clerics. One regional director of the Commissariat for Jewish Affairs with a flair for analogy told an enquiring prefect that no one had any business protesting because the Church itself counseled obedience: "If Pontius Pilate had ordered a census of the Jews, Jesus Christ himself would have submitted to it; the most humble of his representatives on earth must therefore submit to the requirements of the law, especially when the requirements are not vexatious, and also because humility is a Christian virtue." 22 A year later, when part of the hierarchy denounced the massive deportations of Jews which had just begun, some antisemites were astonished at the clerical intervention. One local Commissariat official in Toulouse, for example, horrified at Archbishop Saliege's pastoral letter decrying the persecution, called for "an energetic interdiction [sic] from the office of the Nuncio, to punish the incongruity of such action." 23 The Nuncio was hardly in a position to "punish" Saliege, of course, but if he had been he might well have criticized official papal policy, rather than the aberrant Archbishop. The Protestants'

Response

French Protestantism was inevitably more sensitive to the predicament of the Jewish minority in France than the Catholic majority. Numbering about 600,000 on the eve of the war, Protestants were divided into several confessional groups, gathered under the umbrella of the Federation protestante de France. Protestants had a long history of being outside the religious mainstream, and carried a historical memory of fierce persecution during the sixteenth and seventeenth

21 22 23

CDJC, CIX-106. Quoted in Duquesne, Catholiques frangais, p. 264. Letter of August 25, 1942, CDJC; XXXVnt-60. German Undersecretary of State Martin Luther, heavily involved in Jewish matters at the Foreign Office of the Reich, made the following observation to his superiors in December 1941: "Recently, it is only Hungary, Italy and Spain which have made criticism {of Germany's handling of the Jewish problem]. We must expect these states to resist a common, European-wide settlement. That is the result of a Catholic outlook and Jewish influence in these countries." France did not pose any problem for Luther at the time. Quoted in Charles Klein, "Le clerg6 et les Chretiens de France tels que les voyaient certains dirigeants nazis sous l'occupation," in Eglises et Chretiens en France durant le 2e guerre mondiale (Colloque de Lyon, January 1978), p. 9.

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BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST French Churches and the Persecution of Jews

centuries. Further, they often had Jewish-or German-sounding names, and of course were normally unable to produce baptismal certificates, used in proving oneself not Jewish. Ever since the advent of the Vichy regime, as pressure mounted against Jews and Freemasons, Protestants harbored fears of " a new clericalism," of which they too might become victims. In the summer of 1941 Pastor Marc Boegner, president of the Federation protestante, heard widespread rumors that Protestants were next on Vichy's list of enemies.24 Along with a handful of other Protestants, Marc Boegner was one of the first to protest Vichy's anti-Jewish legislation. Of Alsatian background, and profoundly patriotic, Boegner was widely respected at Vichy as a figure of international standing. His words could not be ignored. Under instructions from the Eglise reformee de France, of which he was also the head, he expressed his objections in two letters, sent in March 1941, one to the head of government Admiral Francois Darlan (himself of Protestant origins) and the other to Isaie Schwartz, then Grand Rabbi of France. The latter was made public, appearing in the antisemitic newspaper Au Pilori in Paris, and widely distributed in the unoccupied zone.25 Boegner couched his appeal in polite terms, and in deference to official doctrine on the "Jewish problem" he made an unsubstantiated reference to the "hasty and unjustified naturalizations" of the 1930s. (Such references were common at the time, reflecting a sincerely held but erroneous belief about the magnitude of Jewish immigration into France in the decade before the war, and also, perhaps, a desire to make the most credible appeal to the Vichy Government.) But the thrust of his statement was a dignified and open challenge to the injustices of the anti-Jewish legislation. He told the Grand Rabbi: Our Church, which has known suffering and persecution in the past, has an ardent sympathy for your communities which have seen their freedom of worship compromised in certain places and the members of which have been so abruptly struck by misfortune. We have undertaken and we will continue to pursue our efforts to bring about the necessary changes in the [anti-Jewish] law. 26

Like many at the time, Boegner assumed incorrectly that Vichy had acted under Nazi pressure. Consequently, he may have been optimistic for a change in policy, if only Vichy would show more independence. If such were the Protestant leader's hopes, they were dashed in the months

24

See Marc Boegner, "Rapport," in Les Eglises protestantes pendant la guerre et l'occupation. Actes de iassembleginerale

du protestantismefrangais,

1945 (Paris,

1946), p. 16; Boegner to Gillouin. August 23, 1941, AN, AGU610 CM-26 D; A.N. Bertrand, "Rapport," in Violette Mouchon et al. Quelques actions desprotestants de France en faveur

des Juifs persicutis

(Paris, n.d.), p. 18. 25

Boegner, "Rapport," pp. 4-5.

26

Eglises protestantes, pp. 22-26.

sous I'occupation

aüemande, 1940-1944

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which followed. In May, Darlan told Boegner that his sole concern was protecting the Jews who had been in France for several generations - "des Francais Israelites," as they were generally known, to distinguish them from the unassimilated "Juifs." "As for the others," Boegner reported Darlan's views, "he only wants to see them leave."27 Interventions became more numerous after the June 1941 anti- Jewish law and the beginning of the aryanization of Jewish property in the unoccupied zone. Boegner wrote to Petain at the end of August, and apparently mobilized Cardinal Gerlier to make some representation on behalf of Catholic opinion. Simultaneously, a dramatic and forceful appeal came from an associate of Boegner, Rene Gillouin, the son of a Protestant pastor and an authentic traditionalist who was in close and frequent contact with Petain. In these and other expressions of protest from the Protestant camp, beyond the points we have mentioned, was a sense of common biblical heritage which Protestants shared with Jews - the link to the Old Testament and to Jesus himself. In his letter to the Grand Rabbi of March 1941 Boegner affirmed this tie, echoing sentiments in the Protestant underground press. This also emerged during an important meeting of sixteen Protestant leaders at Pomeyrol, near Tarascon in the Bouches-du-Rhöne, in September 1941. The Pomeyrol group had profound religious objections to antisemitism: Founded on the Bible, the Church recognizes in Israel the people that God elected to give a Savior to the world, and that is to be, amidst the nations, a permanent witness to the mystery of its fidelity. That is why, while recognizing that the state finds itself faced with a problem which it has to solve, it raises a solemn protest against any law placing Jews outside the human community.29

Such themes were not universally accepted by Protestants, of course. Like the Catholic Church, Protestants were divided. Notably, the conservative and Calvinist Eglise reformee evangelique independante, which had resisted joining other Protestant confessions in 1938, but which was nevertheless part of the Federation protestante, was far more respectful of Vichy and more favorable to the anti-Jewish laws than the Protestant mainstream. 30 There was even a group of royalist and nationalist Protestants, led by Pastor Noel Noguet, who objected to the Pomeyrol statement on the grounds that Israel would benefit from the punishment inflicted upon it. 31 But generally speaking such dissent was extremely limited and Boegner spoke for most Protestant groups. Uneasiness about the anti-Jewish legislation was both deep and genuine among various Protestant communities. 27 28 29 30 31

Boegner, "Rapport," p. 7. Gillouin to Potain, August 29, 1941, AN, AGn610 CM-26 D. Pierre Bolle, "Les Protestants et leurs 6glises devant la persecution des Juifs en France" (CDJC colloque, March 1979). On this point I am grateful for the precisions of Monsieur F. Lovslcy. Bolle, "Les protestants et leurs £glises...'

1296

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST French Churches and the Persecution of Jews

The High Point of Church Protest Persecution of Jews in France reached a new intensity in mid-1942. First came the imposition of the Yellow Star in the occupied zone - decreed at the end of May by the German forces for all Jews over the age of six. Following quickly upon this decree came a series of Nazi ordinances excluding Jews from public life north of tbe demarcation line. Henceforth, Jews were regularly hounded by the French and German police in the occupied zone: they were literally excluded from public places (parks, libraries, theaters, cafes, swimming pools and so forth), could only shop for a few hours each afternoon, and each day risked arrest as they ventured forth with their Jewish badges. Within days, the deportation trains carrying them to Auschwitz began to roll, leaving the improvised French concentration camp of Drancy in a dreary suburb northeast of Paris. Four convoys left in June, each carrying about a thousand Jews; eight left in July, thirteen in August, thirteen the following month, and four in November - altogether over 42,000 deportees during the year 1942 alone. Notably, several thousand of these deportees came from unoccupied France, rounded up in the massive manhunts conducted by French police and various French auxilliary forces, and then sent to Drancy. Everywhere, as families were torn apart, young and old, men and women were being arrested, and as Jews were being jammed into cattle cars for the terrible journey to the east, French police and administrators were conspicuously involved. The first dramatic episode after the imposition of the Yellow Star was the huge roundup of over 12,000 Jews in Paris on July 16-17, followed by days of brutal internment and neglect for some of the arrestees at the Velodrome d'Hiver; but soon these dreadful scenes were repeated all over France, even in the southern zone, where no German appeared in uniform and where Vichy assumed all responsibility. Church opposition to the persecution of the Jews had been voiced before these events, but in a rather limited or muted form, as we have seen. Apart from the interventions of Boegner and some Protestant associations, direct and specifically Christian attacks on antisemitism fell to individuals or to small groups during those two years. These were relatively isolated in centers like Lyon or Toulouse; unable to do much beyond issuing statements, helping individual Jews, and awaiting a change in the political climate. Best known of these opponents is the ecumenical T6moignage Chretien, whose Cahiers had an important effect, even if hardly representative of Catholic or Protestant opinion. Begun in November 1941, the underground periodical was read by several thousands in early 1942. A number devoted to racism appeared that spring, and Antisimites, to which we referred at the outset of this paper, was printed in May. The latter was thirty-two pages in length, and was the first number to reach a circulation of20,000 copies. Received in silence by most of the hierarchy,

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some of whom denounced it as communist-inspired, there are indications of its being more appreciated by ordinary clergy and laymen.32 But then the imposition of the Yellow Star, the roundup of the Velodrome d'Hiver and its sequel throughout the rest of France, and the ominous deportations to an unknown destination, provoked a much more important burst of activity. For the first time in the course of the occupation, substantiell numbers of churchmen began to denounce the persecution of the Jews. The first appeal came from clerics of the occupied zone where, coincidentally, the annual assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops of that part of France took place in Paris in the week after the roundup of mid-July. During this meeting some loosely coordinated protest began. The Cardinals and Archbishops decided to declare their opposition to the roundups, and Cardinal Suhard carried the meeting's unpublished statement to Petain. Consistent with previous announcements of the Holy See, this short appeal limited itself to "the exigencies ofjustice and the rights of charity." Not everyone felt this strong enough, and the Nuncio judged it to be "a platonic protest." In a letter to the Vatican, Valeri noted that the assembled clerics feared that a public protest could lead to government retaliation against hitherto tolerated Church institutions, notably the Action catholique. Still, there was a new urgency, both on the side of justice (now described as "the imprescriptable rights of the human person") and of charity ("pity for the immense suffering, particularly that which affects so many mothers and children"). Suhard supplemented this statement in a personal meeting with the head of government Pierre Laval, in Paris. 33 Throughout August and early September leading members of the hierarchy in the unoccupied zone abandoned the reticence of the assembly of Cardinals, and Archbishops, and spoke out in public statements, pastoral letters, and Semaines religieuses. Perhaps the most eloquent voice was that of Jules-Gerard Saliege, the old and partially paralyzed Archbishop of Toulouse, a man of great personal popularity and authority who to some degree had stood apart from Vichy since the beginning. Saliege's pastoral letter, first read in the Toulouse region on Sunday, July 30, was the clearest voice yet heard in France on the persecution of the Jews: That children, women, fathers and mothers are treated like cattle, that members of one family are separated from each other and packed off to an unknown destination, it has been left until our time to witness such a sad spectacle. Why does 32

33

H.R. Kedward, Resistance to Vichy France: A Study of Ideas and Motivation in the SouthernZone, 1940-1942 (Oxford, 1978), p. 178, n. 66; Bedarida ,Les Armes d'isprit; Marialetizia Cravetto, "II problema ebraico nella resistenza cristiana," Revista di storia e letteratura religiosa VI (1970): 3-64. AN, AGn492 CC 72-A; Duquesne, CatholiquesfranQais, p. 256; Actes et documents du Saint-Siege, vol. VIII, p. 610; Mayeur, "Les eglises devant la persecution," pp. 259 n. 24, 260.

1298

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST French Churches and the Persecution of Jews the right of asylum no longer exist for our churches? Why are we defeated?... The Jews and the foreigners are real men and women. Everything is not permitted against them, against these men and women, against these fathers and mothers. They are part of the human species. They are our brothers, like so many others....34

Other churchmen followed at their own pace, some hesitantly, some quickly, and some, of course, not at all. Cardinal Gerlier was approached by Grand Rabbi Jacob Kaplan on August 17, and by Boegner the following day. Apparently ill informed despite the roundups in his own city of Lyon in early August, and somewhat sluggish even then, Gerlier nevertheless wrote to Petain supporting the demarche previously made by Suhard. In the words of Francois Delpech, Gerlier's letter reflected "an astonishing moderation." 35 Gradually, Gerlier was drawn into a more forthright appeal on September 6 which, despite its continued loyalism, perhaps for that very reason, had an important effect. Loyalism, indeed, was the keynote of more than one "protest." Monsignor Delay, the Bishop of Marseille, denounced indiscriminate arrests of men, women and children, as well as deportations which could "be sending them perhaps to their deaths," but at the same time gave solid recognition to the famous "Jewish problem": We are not unaware that the Jewish Question poses difficult national and international problems.... We fully recognize that our country has the right to take all necessary measures to defend itself against those who, especially in recent years, have done it so much harm, and to punish those who abuse the hospitality which has been so liberally accorded them. But the rights of the state have limits.... 36

It is tempting now to depreciate the value and the significance of such statements, and to highlight the extent to which so many of them reflected ancient anti-Jewish prejudices. And it is true that there were few protests which sounded so clearly as that of Saliege, or of Pierre-Marie Theas, Bishop of Montauban, for whom there was no need to defer to a "Jewish problem" or respect for Petain: I give voice to the indignant protest of the Christian conscience, and I proclaim that all men, Aryans or non-Aryans, are brothers, because created by the same God; that all men, whatever their race or religion, have owing to them the respect of individuals and the state. 37

34

35 36 37

Duquesne, Catholiques frangais, p. 257; Claude Levy and Paul Tillard, La Grande Rafle du Vel d'Hiv (16Juület 1942) (Paris, 1967), pp. 182-183; Papleux, "Le Vatican," p. 78. Delpech, "La persecution des Juifs," p. 168. Duquesne, Catholiques frangais, p. 261. "Mgr. Theas," Documentation catholique. May 1, 1977, p. 447.

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Yet for contemporaries the remarkable aspect of the Church statements derived precisely from the previous near-unanimity of support for the regime, including its antisemitic aspects. In most Catholic circles, these episcopal protests marked a new beginning. Boegner's appeals had their own eloquence, of course the Protestants added yet another message on September 22, read from almost all pulpits - but Protestants had long since appeared troublesome and marginal. The hesitations of Gerlier and others were less apparent at the time, when the Petainist Cardinal of Lyon was suddenly considered, as a result of his new public statements, as in sympathy with de Gaulle and the London Resistance. Bishop Delay, to take another example, despite his solicitude for the "Jewish Question" which we have noted, sent a stinging letter to Gringoire (of Marseille) when the latter applauded the deportation of Jews. Such actions, the Bishop said, were "contrary... to the true spirit of the revolution nationale."38 Despite their hesitations, these voices carried. The address of the Cardinals and Archbishops remained confidential during July 1942, but having been sent to priests throughout France it was hardly secret, and by December it was even printed in the Contemporary Jewish Record, published in New York. Despite vigorous efforts by the local prefect to stop Saliege's pastoral letter, it quickly circulated throughout the diocese of Toulouse, where it was read in at least half the churches, and appeared also in Temoignage chretien, Franc-tireur, Combat, and other resistance journals as well as being broadcast by the B.B.C. Saliege's words "spread like wildfire throughout the entire region of the southwest," according to one observer, a view shared by the special anti-Jewish police who deplored their effects. And however moderate were the opinions of Gerlier, they were thought compelling enough to be carried at great risk by teams of cyclists going from parish to parish along the Rhone and the Loire.39 One measure of the importance of these interventions is the extent to which the authorities strove to stop them and to reduce their effects. Vichy tried to force its own benign view of the deportations upon various newspapers, including the respected La Croix. The editors of the latter refused stoutly to accede, citing their unwillingness to go against papal and episcopal policies, and in the end Vichy had to back down, making do with publishing their propaganda in the non-confessional Grand Echo du Midi. Vichy was all the more disturbed because the clerical agitation appeared at times to have the 38 39

Quoted in Andre Sauvageot, Marseille dans la tourmente, 1939-1944 (Paris, 1949), p. 157, n. 2. Duquesne, Catholiques frangais, p. 257; Henri Cadlier, Le Calvaire d'Israel et la solidariti chritienne (Geneva [1945], p. 49; Kedward, Resistance to Vichy France, pp, 182-183; Bernard Aulas, Vie et mort des Lyonnais en guerre, 1939-1945 (Roanne, 1974), p. 212, n. 11; report of September 1942, CDJC, LXXXIX-39; Pierre Limagne, Ephemerides de quatre ans tragiques, 1940-1944 (3 vols., Paris, 1945-1947), vol. Π, pp. 767; Joseph Billig, Le Commissariat giniral aux questions juives (1941-1944) (3 vols., Paris, 1955-1960), vol. II, pp. 96-97.

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BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST French Churches and the Persecution of Jews

blessing of the Vatican. It is true that there was no outcry from the Holy See following the great roundups of Jews, but during the first week in August there were widespread rumors that the Papal Nuncio Valeri had conveyed strong disapproval to Petain. Reports along these lines continued to be received later that month, although the Pope himself remained resolutely silent. Laval, who never felt comfortable dealing with clerics, took the trouble to visit Cardinal Suhard in Paris and present his own case. Capitalizing upon papal reticence, Laval warned Church officials repeatedly of how these protests might injure France's international position. Laval urged Church leaders to stay out of politics. Pointedly, he reminded Suhard that the Pope had not personally spoken out on the affair. At the end of August he summoned Valeri's assistant to condemn Saliege's pastoral letter and to press for his destitution. 40 Laval reported his various moves to the German ambassador, Otto Abetz, for Church protests had begun to affect relations with the Reich. Simultaneously, he gave strict instructions to regional propaganda officials to crush the opposition, presented by the Ministry of Information as "sinister propaganda, the object of which is to compromise the work of the Marshal." Against this, the press were reminded of "the trustworthy doctrine of Saint Thomas and the Popes," an echo of Leon Berard's memorandum of 1941.41 Clearly, Laval was worried. The Limits of Church Protest,

1942-1943

Unfortunately, these protests diminished almost as quickly as they arose. Although the public Church declarations of 1942 were important, and had some effect upon those who listened, they were neither universal nor long-lasting. Indeed, the current which seemed to be gathering strength in August and September proved rather flaccid by the end of the year. Obviously, there were many episcopal leaders who had not participated in the protest. This was particularly true of the occupied zone, where the penalties for doing so were higher, and where the flow of information was much less free. One curious case is Cardinal Lienart of Lille, who before the war stood out in the

40

41

Papleux, Le Vatican et le probleme juif, pp. 79-80; Limagne, op. cit., vol. Π, pp. 697, 737, 770-771; "Papal Protests to Vichy about Anti-Semitism," Evening Standard (London), August 6,1942; Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) report of August 16,1942; Abetz to Ribbentrop, August 28, 1942, Nuremberg Document (ND), NG-4578;Bergen to Wilhelmstrasse, September 14, 1942, ibid.; Osborne (Berne) to War Cabinet (London), September 14, 1942, PRO, FO 371/32680 (W12493/4555/48); Valeri to Maglione, August 14, 1942, Actes et documents du Saint-Siege, pp. VHI, 620-621. "Note d'orientation du 4 septembre 1942," CDJC, CIX-123; PRO, F0 371/32056 (Z7281/1716/17); JTAreport of September 4,1942; Duquesne, Catholiques frangais, p. 270; Abetz to Wilhelmstrasse, September 2, 1942, ND, NG-5127; note of Hägen, September 4, 1942, CDJC, LXV-15.

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campaign against racism and antisemitism, but who remained relatively indifferent to the plight of Jews under Nazi occupation.42 Moreover, there were also powerful expressions of loyalism which were designed to counter the dissent which we have noted. 43 Well aware of their political significance, office carefully monitored the declarations of support as they flowed in - on September 19, from a gathering of Bishops of the southwest, headed by the Archbishop of Aix, and on October 2 from the Archbishops of Paris, Rheims and Besancon, and the Bishops of Chalons, Verdun, Le Mans, Chartres, Soissons, Beauvais, Nancy, Saint-Die, Langres, Troyes and Vannes.44 As early as the end of September Petain received a report which contended that the worst was over and the Church "appeased." 45 True, the Church had to agitate, the report continued, "but all that with moderation, for the episcopacy has desired to avoid any useless incidents, both because of fidelity to the Marshal... and on account of fear of seeing such incidents exploited, inflated, distorted by the enemies of the government." The report contrasted France, which had a legitimate government, with wholly occupied countries like Belgium and Holland where protest made more sense and clerical involvement in politics was more tolerable. Optimistically, the report concluded that "the minor blaze which was developing seems now to be extinguished...." Reinforcing this conclusion, several of the protesters themselves gave serious indications of fidelity - even before the convoys to Auschwitz had ended their passage in 1942. Sensitive to the widespread reproduction of his pastoral message in resistance organs, Cardinal Saliege objected forcefully in the local Semaine religieuse in early October to "the indecent usage which certain people have made of his letter." He went on to renew "his most complete loyalty to the Marshal and to the government of the country." Cardinal Suhard declared himself similarly as reported in LeMoniteur of October 5, and Gerlier followed suit in a letter to the mayor of Lyon protesting his "loyalty in conformity with the traditional teaching of the Church." 46 At the end of the month, as if to seal publicly some kind of rapprochement, Suhard and Gerlier, the ranking representatives of the Church in both zones, met Petain and Laval in Vichy, and appeared together with them at a military review.47

42 43 44 45 46 47

Danielle Delmaire, "Le Cardinal Li6nart devant la persecution des Juifs de Lille pendant la seconde guerre mondiale" (CDJC colloque, March 1979). Quoted in B^darida, Les Armes d'esprit, p. 125. AN, AGn492 CC 72-A. Report (unsigned) to P6tain, September 29, 1942; ibid. See "L'Eglise affirme ä nouveau son loyalisme envers les pouvoirs publics. Une conference du Cardinal Suhard," Le Moniteur, October 5, 1942. Pierre Nicolle, Cinquante mois d'armistice: Vichy, 2 Juiüet 1940- 16 Aoüt 1944. Journal d'un timoin (2 vols., Paris, 1947), vol. Π, p. 48; "Second Cardinal to See Laval," Manchester Guardian. October 29, 1942.

1302

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST French Churches and the Persecution of Jews

More was involved at that meeting than sociability. In fact, the government took the opportunity to make concrete offers to the Church involving tax concessions for religious congregations and other measures favoring diocesan associations and Catholic institutions of higher learning. 48 Since the outbreak of protest, Laval had not been adverse to using Church subsidies to threaten Catholics, and the decision seems to have been taken now to purchase good relations by additional measures. 49 There is no record of any direct link being made with the Jews, but they could hardly have been far from people's minds. Speaking of the new measures, one of Petain's secretaries wrote to Leon Berard at the Vatican saying that they were "manifestations of goodwill on the part of the French state, and as such, I hope that they will encounter a reciprocal goodwill in certain religious circles." He could hardly have been more plain. Valeri certainly accepted the measures gratefully, declaring them to be "clear testimony to the profound desire of the Marshal to build the new France upon the sole reliable foundation, that is to say spiritual values." 50 As negotiations proceeded, the Jews slipped out of sight in relations between Vichy and the Church - doubtless just as the French Government had intended. In January 1943 Cardinal Suhard went to Rome to discuss important matters affecting France and the Vatican. His visit seems to have crowned Vichy's efforts at appeasement. Leon Berard reported the results of the visit on January 18, giving some tantalizing information about the Pope: I have learned from a source close to the Sovereign Pontiff that he has been favorably impressed by his discussions with the Archbishop of Paris. He is in complete agreement with the latter. He praised the Marshal and his work in warm and sensitive terms and took a keen interest in the actions of the government which augur well for a renewal of religious policy in France.51

Nothing at all was said about the Jews. Cardinal Suhard seems to have taken the lead in this rapprochement, not only in his visit to Rome but in subsequent dealings with Pätain. When the deportations of the Jews resumed in February 1943, and all of the horrors returned, the hierarchy did not repeat its protests of the previous summer and autumn. Suhard wrote to P6tain in confidence, asking him to issue discreet orders regarding the arrests:; "I refer to the maimer in which the measures against the Israelites are being carried out," he said. Brutalities had occurred. Suhard drew special attention to the arrests of Jewish mothers or fathers in

48 49 50 51

Lavagne to Berard, January 4, 1943, and Valeri to Lavagne, January 5, 1943, AN, AGn492 CC 72—A. See note of Hägen on his conversation with Bousquet, CDJC: LXV-5. Lavagne to Blrard, January 4, 1943, and Valeri to Lavagne, January 5, 1943, AN, AGn492 CC 72-A. Bärard to Laval, January 18,1943, ibid.

1303

CHURCHES Michael R. Marrus

"Aryan families." However, except on the question of how the deportations were managed, his resignation was complete: Everyone knows that the French Government cannot be held entirely responsible for the measures taken. It remains that, by one of those dramatic fatalities of the present moment, it is Frenchmen who must follow the orders. We would at least wish, if the orders cannot be avoided, that their execution not involve excessive severity and inhumanity.52

For many months thereafter the episcopacy maintained its support for the regime. Compulsory labor service in Germany became an important public issue in 1943, and to some degree clerical objections to this program supplanted protests on the Jewish question. Firmly Petainist, Suhard remained optimistic almost a year after the wave of episcopal opposition to the deportations of Jews: "Our Bishops refuse to join certain protests which are currently going around certain Catholic circles," he told Monsignor Chappoulie in the spring of 1943.53 There was no mention of the Jews. Occasionally, the Jewish issue surfaced once again when individual churchmen distanced themselves from the Vichy regime. One such episode occurred in the summer of 1943, when Vichy came under strong German pressure to conduct a sweeping denationalization of French Jews. Nazi leaders felt that such a step might remove some of the reluctance which French police and administrators now manifested when it came to deporting French citizens. As Laval hesitated over the denationalization order, Monsignor Chappoulie, representing the French Cardinals and Archbishops, visited Petain to tell him that the Vatican was unhappy with the new anti-Jewish measures in France. The Pope, he is reported to have said, was personally concerned about the Marshal's soul. 54 Petain seems to have been impressed by this solicitude, and indeed he eventually vetoed the denationalization decree which he had already signed. The Church and Rescue

Activity

Throughout the Vichy period, some churchmen were active in France at all levels, providing practical aid for the Jews escaping persecution. From the very beginning parish priests or their assistants were in a strategic position from which to help, for they often had custody over baptismal records (together with mayors), without access to which it was practically impossible for those suspected of being Jewish to satisfy authorities about their "Aryan" descent. Vichy officials constantly suspected priests and mayors of falsifying some 52 53 54

Suhard to Petain, February 22, 1943, ibid. Chappoulie to Berard, May 15, 1943, ibid. Billig, Le Commissariat general aux questions juives vol. I, p. 271; Mayeur, "Les 6glises devant la persecution," p. 262.

1304

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST French Churches and the Persecution of Jews

records to help certain Jews escape. Jews in camps received aid from clergymen of all backgrounds and denominations, especially from a group of Americanbased Quakers. Hundreds of Jewish children were hidden, thanks to the work of Protestant and Catholic religious institutions. Rescue activity began even before the turning point in the summer of 1942, but vastly expanded thereafter, when Jews were literally being hunted down and were often in desperate need of false papers, aid and shelter. Such work was usually clandestine, often dangerous, and conducted frequently in relatively isolated areas. 55 Reistance networks helping Jews usually developed first in urban centers, where Christian dissidents were located and formed their earliest associations: in Lyon, where there were good contacts with Switzerland and from which escape in that direction was organized; in Toulouse, with its large concentration of Spanish exiles, an important assembly point for those crossing the demarcation line to the unoccupied zone, and also those awaiting frontier guides to take them across the border to Spain. Protestant and left-wing Catholics formed the core. Unlike political groups such as the communists, for example, for whom the essential tool of resistance was the pamphlet or underground newspaper, these religious communities had some experience and affinity for the provision of practical assistance to those in dire need. Idealistic leaders of Catholic youth groups, like Germaine Ribiere, eagerly helped the Jews, despite the reticence of their elders.56 Particularly outstanding was the work of Abbe Alexandre Glasberg, a priest of Jewish origins, engaged since 1940 in important relief work and eventually underground activity. Glasberg worked with Father Chaillet in the ecumenical Amitie chretienne, also centered in Lyon, an association of priests and laity which was formed in May 1942. Amitie chretienne dispersed Jewish children among religious houses and other locations, and refused to give them up even when Vichy placed Chaillet under house arrest in a psychiatric hospital for three months. Cardinal Gerlier himself refused the addresses to Alexandre Angeli, the regional prefect of Lyon.57

55

56 57

See Joseph Haennig, "Quels moyens de preuve peuvent etre fournis par le m£tis juif pour etablir sa non-appartenance ä la race juive?" Gazette du Palais (1943, ler semestre): 31-32; Joseph Weill, Contribution ά l'histoire des camps d'internement dans I'anti-France (Paris, 1946); Donald Lowrie, The Hunted Children (New York, 1963); Zosa Szajkowski, Analytical Franco-Jewish Gazetteer, 1939-1945 (New York, 1966). See Ribifere's comments in Montclos et al., Eglises et Chrätiens dans la lie guerre mondiale, pp. 205-207. Delpech, "La persecution des Juifs," pp. 162-179. On the rescue of Jewish children, see Hillel J. Kieval, "Legality and Assistance in Vichy France: the Rescue of Jewish Children," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 124 (October, 1980): 339-366.

CHURCHES

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Michael R. Marrus

Protestants, deriving often from prewar youth movements, formed a number of groups helping the Jews. Vital relief and later resistance efforts were organized by CIMADE (Commission Inter-Movements aupres des Evacuäs), a relief organization originally established to assist internees in 1939, led by Madeleine Barot and Pastor J. Delpech. In heavily Protestant areas, such as the isolated communes of the Haute Loire, the Hautes Alpes, or the Tarn, Jews found shelters and sometimes illegal assistance in leaving the country. Chambon-surLignon (in the Haute Loire) is perhaps the most famous of these Protestant centers, virtually an entire commune mobilized for rescue. Frequently cut off by snowdrifts during the winter, this almost homogeneously Protestant enclave helped thousands of refugees who passed through it. Jews there received the solid support of the local population, as well as the Cevenole normal school, headed by two nonviolent Protestant pastors, Andre Pascal Trocme and Edouard Theis.58 Looking back, one is impressed by the diversity of response among French churchmen, whose reactions to the persecution of Jews extended from the support given to Vichy's anti-Jewish laws by the occasional enthusiast in 1940, to the wholehearted plunge into rescue activity by Protestant youth groups who provided Jews with false identity papers or smuggled them across the Spanish frontier. There was no single "Church" reaction, just as there was no single reaction from French society. That there was aid extended to Jews, that there was a sense of human brotherhood is obvious from the many cases of heroism and practical help to which many survivors of the Holocaust in France can testify. That this aid was insufficient or unsustained, too slow in coming, and too limited, especially in Catholic circles, is also clear, as churchmen themselves involved were painfully aware.

58

Guiditte Rosowsky, "Camus et le sauvetage des Juifs," Archives juives XIV, no. 1 (1978): 16-18; Kedward, .Resistance to VichyFrance, p. 181; Emile C. Fahre, ed., God's Underground, trans. William and Patricia Nottingman (St. Louis, Mo., 1970); Philip Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed (New York, 1979).

1306

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

Vatican Policy and the "Jewish Problem" in "Independent" Slovakia (1939-1945) LIVIA

ROTHKIRCHEN

C E R T A I N A S P E C T S of the history of "independent" Slovakia cannot be properly understood unless we survey previous events occurring at least fifty years before its establishment. The life of Father Andreas Hlinka (1864-1938), the first Slovak nationalist leader, runs like a thread through this period, which marks the national awakening and the beginning of the clerical movement in all its phases. In 1895 Hlinka entered upon his priestly calling in the small town of Tri Sliace and only a year later he already belonged to the active membership of the Clerical "People's Party" (Neppärt), which was then founded in the region of Upper Hungary (Horniaky, Felvidek), as Slovakia was then termed. This party re-established by Hlinka in 1918 and later called by his name, was associated from its inception with the struggle against the Jews both on the economic and the ideological planes. This phenomenon is especially important in view of the fact that with the party's activity, political organization among the Slovak people began to assume a great popular scope. The Slovak peasant became for the first time politically conscious and this was through the instrumentality of the clerical movement, hence the Catholic Church's great influence among the people. As a Slovak democratic leader defined it: "Politics and religion were for many years identical concepts in the people's view."1 The significance of this will be understood if we mention the percentage of Catholics among the population. (According to the census held in 1930, the percentage of Catholics was 77.4% of the total population: 70.9% of these being Roman Catholic and 6.5% Greek Catholic; the percentage of 1

Ivan Derer, Slovensky Vyvoj Üvahy, Praha, 1946, p. 201.

α Ludackd

Zrada,

Fakta, Vzpominky

a

1307

CHURCHES L1VIA R O T H K I R C H E N

Protestants of various sects amounted to 16.6% while the Jews constituted only 4.5%). 2 The first motives for anti-Semitic feeling were aroused at the commencement of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy in the 'seventies. The background appeared to be national and linguistic, but in reality it was rooted in economic conditions. The Liberal Era brought development to this remote region, and a result was an improvement in the position of broad strata of the Jewish population who were the pioneers of industry and development. Concomitantly the Jews of the area learned Hungarian and thus became an instrument of "magyarization," which aroused the anger of the Slovaks. With the foundation of the clerical "Peope's Party," anti-liberalism was laid down as its basic tenet and henceforward it constituted one of the focuses of the campaign against the Jews. Furthermore, the clerical movement used a moral-cultural argument when it claimed that the influence of the Jews was most destructive in the spheres of morals and the intellect. These motifs occupied an important place in Slovak literature in the period before the First World War, and their influence on the population was also considerable in the period of independence. Something can be learnt of the methods of nationalist clerical propaganda from the following examples. During the 1896 parliamentary elections the candidate of the People's Party in the provincial town of Csoma warned the voters, that if the candidate of the Liberals (usually supported by the Jews—L.R.) should win, all the crosses would disappear from the streets and "the churches would be turned into Jewish storeshops."3 In Slovakia at that time it was a frequent occurrence that peasants were made to swear on the crucifix to vote for the People's Party. The People's Party leaflet of 1906 advises people, inter alia, not to buy from the Jews and to learn shopkeeping. "Wherever there is a Jewish public house, set up one of your own, a Christian one. 4 Despite the fact that with the dismemberment of the Austro2

Statistische

Übersicht

der

Tchechoslovakischen

Republik,

Prag,

1930,

p. 11. 3

Seton Watson (Scotus Viator), Racial 1908, p. 185. * Juraj Kramer, Slovenski Autonomisticke Bratislava, 1962, p. 117.

Problems Hnutie

in Hungary, ν Rokoch,

London, 1918-1929,

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BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST T H E VATICAN AND T H E " J E W I S H

P R O B L E M " IN SLOVAKIA

Hungarian monarchy, leaders of the People's Party regarded the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic (1918) as a positive act, already in the 'twenties individuals among them were undermining its existence under the influence of Hungarian irredentism.5 Among the opposition leaders was Professor A. Tuka, already a sympathizer with Mussolini and Italian Fascism. (In 1929 he was put on trial for his activity in the service of the Hungarian regime and sentenced to imprisonment on a charge of treason.) The struggle of these elements became more open with the emergence of the "secular" and "progressive" character of the Republic (some 700,000 Czech citizens defined themselves as having no religion, and their number was increasing).'® The antagonism of the Slovaks, who were dissatisfied with the Centralist Czechoslovak government, found expression in a struggle for autonomy. From the beginning of 1932 even the Slovak National Party (Slovenskä Narodni Strana), most of whose members were Protestants, belonged to the Autonomist Bloc, but the struggle continued to be conducted over the participation of the two peoples in the framework of the Czechoslovak Republic.7 Although in this period the Autonomist Bloc represented less than a third of the Slovak population, the Catholic clergy played a prominent role, and the voice of its leader, Hlinka, who became the symbol of nationalism in the people's consciousness, was powerful. The relations between the leaders of the Slovak People's Party and the Vatican were very close and amicable, as distinct from official relations between Czechoslovakia and the Vatican, which suffered a grave crisis in the middle 'twenties. In 1925 special tension was created as a result of the Czechoslovak Parliament's decision to celebrate the anniversary of the death of Jan Hus as a day of commemoration, .further following the preparations for the year 1926 as the 510th anniversary of Hus' martyrdom at the stake. The Papal Nuncio quit his post at Prague as a sign of protest, and only in 1927, after prolonged discussions, was A modus vivendi attained Iredenta a Separatizmus ν Slovenskej Politike, 1919-1938, Bratislava, 1957. ® Imrich Stanek, Zrada a Ρ Ad, Hlinkovsti Separatisti a Tak Zvany Slovensky Stdt, SNPL, Praha, 1958, p. 160. T Jozef Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia, Atlantic Press, Lodon, 1956, pp. 78-80. 5

CHURCHES

1309

LIYIA ROTHKIRCHEN

which smoothed out the differences between the Vatican and the Czechoslovak Republic.8 Even in this period the policy of the Slovak People's Party towards the Jewish minority was hostile and critical. The Jews were now the tool of "czechization" and the supporters of the ruling group. As the economic crisis became aggravated in the 'thirties, the nationalist press launched a campaign against Jewish capital and Jewish members of the liberal professions—chiefly in law where the number of Jews kept constantly growing. At the University of Bratislava demonstrations were held against Jewish medical students, and the demonstrators included Slovak Fascist elements of the "Omladina" (the People's Party Youth Group) and of the local Germans (Volksdeutsche). 9 The antiJewish line of the People's Party acquired new momentum in 1935, following the Mutual Aid Agreement between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia. The struggle against the regime as a whole, and against the Jews in particular, was carried on simultaneously in parliament and in the press. The Jews were described as the embodiment of "Judeo-Bolshevism." (The use of this linguistic "term" began in Slovakia as early as 1919, in the days of the "Slovak Soviet Republic," when part of the eastern areas of Slovakia was held by the Communist forces of Bela Kun.) Karol Sidor, representing the People's Party in the Prague Parliament in 1936 suggested that the Jews of Slovakia and Carpatho-Russia be transferred to Birobidjan. In the years 1936-1937 a number of stormy anti-Jewish demonstrations took place in Slovakia under the influence of this propaganda. 10 The efforts to heal the breach between the Czech and the Slovak peoples were of no avail. The activity of the People's Party after the 1935 elections increased in the political sphere, under the influence of the Sudeten-German Party (Sudetendeutsche Partei). On February 8, 1938, Hlinka signed an agreement with the Sudeten leaders for a coordination of party activities towards "common aims."11 After Hlinka's death in August 1938, the priest Dr. Jozef Tiso inherited the party leadership which led, after the Munich Agreement, β

Memoirs of Dr. E. Bene}. London, 1954, p. 3 4 0 ; Stanek, op. cit., pp. 166-169. » See Zidovki Zprivy, Praha, May 1, 1936. "»See Medina Iwrit, Praha, March 12, 1937; September 3, 1937. 11 J. Ctsar, B. Cerny, Politika Nemeckych BurSoazntch Siran ν Ceskoslovensku ν letech 1918-1938 p. 440.

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BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST T H E VATICAN A N D T H E " J E W I S H

PROBLEM" IN

SLOVAKIA

to autonomy (October 1938), and following the separatist struggle— to the "independence" of Slovakia (March 1939). In this period the Slovak people acquired a generation of young leaders educated on the legacy of the People's Party and with a keen affinity with the current Right-Radical ideology. "Independent" Slovakia entered the arena of international politics on March 14, 1939. The newspaper "LOsservatore Romano" devoted a special article to "Slovakia's Celebration" ("La Festa Slovacca"). The Czechoslovak Ambassador was told in an audience at the Vatican that the Republic had ceased to exist, and the new Pope Pius XII, on March 25, 1939, announced his de jure recognition of the new Slovak state. Thus "independent" Slovakia, which had been created by the Führer and was "so near to his heart" (Eine Herzenssache des Führers), 12 as Ribbentrop declared in a conversation with Slovak leaders in July 1940,—embodied two outlooks, appearing "Christian" on the one hand and "National Socialist" on the other. 13 The statement that "Slovakia occupies a special place on the map of Nazi genocide,"14 applies from several points of view. First of all as a Catholic state par excellence, particular significance attaches to the stand adopted by the Vatican towards "The Jewish problem and its solution." This aspect has well enough been understood by various historians and interpreters who have discussed Vatican policy during the Second World War, but most of them, due to the absence of reliable information, have dealt with the subject in general lines only.19 On the other hand, distorted and twisted versions have been presented by ex-statesmen and diplomats 1 · of "independent" Slovakia, with the intention of justifying their past actions. 12 13

14

15

16

Fritz Rössler, Die Slowakei, Dresden, 1943, p. 166. Cf. J. Robinson in the introduction to my book, (Livia Rothkirchen), The Destruction of Slovak Jewry, A Documentary History, YAD VASHEM, Jerusalem, 1961, p. IV. Leon Poliakov, Harvest of Hate; The Nazi Program for the Destruction of the Jews of Europe. Syracuse Univ. Press, 1954, p. 160. Paul Duclos, Le Vatican et la seconde guerre mondiale. Action doctrinale et diplomatique en faveur de la paix. Editions A. Pedone, Paris, 1955; Avro Manhattan, Der Vatikan und das XX. Jahrhundert, Verlag "Volk und Welt," Berlin, 1958; Edmond Paris, Le Vatican contre l'Europe, Librarie Fischbacher, Paris, 1959. J. A. Mikus, La Slovaquie dans le Drame de l'Europe. Les lies d'Or,

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Several features of the Slovak drama have been recreated in the play "The Deputy." 17 In one of the scenes, while Eichmann is amusing himself at Falkensee in the "hunters' cellar" with brandy and billiards, his representative in Slovakia appears and tells him that difficulties have arisen in the expulsion of the Jews owing to the intervention of the Papal Nuncio at Pressburg (Bratislava). Among the authentic names in the play, President Tiso is mentioned as a "decidedly intelligent man" (the words are put into the mouth of Eichmann). Only a few of the important works and studies which have been written on this subject may be mentioned here. In our view, the principal reason why the story of the Vatican's intervention against the expulsion of the Jews from Slovakia, and the attitude of the local Churches, have not yet found adequate appraisal (apart from the simple reason that the relevant documents in the Vatican archives have not yet been published), lies in the fact that several first-rate sources are in the Slovak or Czech languages, which are not generally understood by Western European researchers.18 How else can we explain why an important source like the trial of Dr. Tiso and his associates, held in Bratislava in 1946-47,19 has failed in any way to attract the attention of scholars. What is more, Karol Sidor's apologetic book, Six years with the Vatican, was published in Slovak in the United States in 1947.20 Although the entire purpose of Sidor's book was to submit his version of events, as an informed "insider" he adduced important new facts concerning conversations with top-ranking personalities in Slovakia and other matters. He also published the originals of several interesting documents.

17

18

19

20

Paris, 1955; Joseph Kirschbaum, Slovakia. Nation on the Crossroads of Central Europe. Robert Speller and Sons, New York, 1960. Rolf Hochhut, Der Stellvertreter, Schauspiel, mit einem Vorwort von Erwin Piscator. Berlin, 1962, p. 35. The works which have till now appeared in Czechoslovakia on the Slovak Jewish catastrophe have refrained from mentioning the Vatican intervention, but discuss at length the activity of President Tiso—cf. Stanek, op. cit. Lud'dctvo pred Narodnym Sudom 1945-1947, Slov. Akad. Ved., Bratislava, 1961; Tnrud 6 / 4 6 , Bratislava, 1947 (YAD VASHEM-M-5/28-9). Sest Rokov pri Vatikdne, Edicia Slovo. Obrana Press Inc., Scranton Pa., 1947.

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

1312 THE

VATICAN AND T H E " J E W I S H

P R O B L E M " IN

SLOVAKIA

Further valuable data on the subject-matter were gained in 1961 from Father F. Cavalli's article, published in " L a Civilitä Cattolica", "The Holy See against the deportation of the Jews of Slovakia during the Second World War" (La Santa Sede contro le deportazione degli ebrei dalla Slovacchia durante la seconda guerra mondiale) It is only to be regretted that this primary and authoritative source, which draws on Vatican records, cites the documents in precis, and quotes only a few extracts tn extenso. In

my

book

The

Destruction

of Slovak

Jewry,22

which

ap-

peared some time before the publication of the above-mentioned article, I described the attitude of the Vatican and of the local Churches. Here I shall deal mainly with several new facts, and some of the most controversial points, the more so as the new studies on the policy of the Catholic Church and of Pius XII, 2 3 which have been published in recent years and have gained worldwide repute, discuss Slovakia only indirectly, although their authors emphasize the country's unique character. In July 1939, three months after the foundation of "independent" Slovakia (on March 14, 1939), the first satellite state to arise under the Führer's patronage, its Ambassador, Karol Sidor, presented his credentials at the Vatican City. In the speech which he made before Pope Pius X I I , he re-emphasized the ancient Christian tradition upheld by his country and its pronounced Catholic character, stressing the fact that the Slovak state's emblem displays a double apostolic cross on a background of hills. It is in fact known that the Pope regarded favourably the «consolidation of the Slovaks in their own state, and more than once in various ways displayed his goodwill to the Ambassador Sidor and to "the beloved Slovak people" (gens carissima) 24 However, when the Pope heard that the priest Dr. Tiso, then head of the Slovak government, had been designated as president of the republic,

22

23

24

Anno 112, Vol. I l l , Roma Luglio 1961, pp. 3-18. L. Rothkirchen, The Destruction of Slovak Jewry. YAD VASHEM, Jerusalem, 1961. Jacques Nobecourt, 'Le Vicaire' at I'Histoire. Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1963; Günther Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany. McGrawHill, New York, 1964; Saul Friedländer, Pius XII und das Dritte Reich. Rohwolt, Hamburg, 1965 (German edition); Carlo Falconi, Le Silence de Pie XII, 1935-1945, Editions du Rocher, Monaco, 1965. Sidor, op. cit., p. 62.

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he was far from satisfied and expressed his apprehensions "that in these stormy times, when war is on the agenda, it might prove inexpedient that Dr. Tiso, a priest of our religion, should bear so responsible a position." 25 But some time afterwards, when he received the news of Tiso's election to the presidency, the Pope saluted his "dear son" (dilectus filius) gladly (libenter) with the apostolic blessing.28 T h e first restrictions placed on the Jews by the Slovak authorities (according to Ordinance no. 63 of April 18, 1939, Jews were defined by their religion), with the aim of excluding them from economic and social life, drew no reaction whatever from the Vatican. After the Salzburg meeting (July 28, 1940), 2 T at which Tiso, Tuka and Mach met the rulers of the Third Reich, a qualitative change took place in the ideological sphere. Like the twenty-five points in the Nazi Party's programme of 1920, Tuka proclaimed fourteen demagogic points in his programme for the new regime. But the paradox inherent in a state which was both National Socialist and Christian, was patent to all. From this date the anti-Jewish line of the government became distinctly harsher. A dozen Nazi advisers (Berater) to the various ministries arrived in Slovakia, among them Nageler, as adviser to the Hlinka Guard, and Dieter Wisliceny, as adviser to the Ministry of Economics ( Ü H Ü ) , but actually Eichmann's deputy. 28 The Vatican's stand on the Jewish question was put to test anew when anti-Jewish legislation was promulgated in Slovakia on September 9, 1941. T h e contrast between the moderate and reserved reaction of the Vatican to the anti-Jewish laws (Statut des Juifs) introduced into the Vichy France of Petain and that expressed by the Vatican to the Jewish Code No. 198/1941 (2idovsky Kodex) of the Catholic Slovakia of Tiso, substantially illustrates the Pope's feeling towards the latter country. In the case of Vichy, as we learn from the report of Leon Berard, Vichy Ambassador to the Vatican, to Marshal Petain, "they do not intend to pick a quarrel with us over the Statut des Juifs" and merely request "that no stipulation concerning marriage be added" and that "precepts of justice and charity be taken "Ibid. p. 61. Ibid. p. 64. 27 Documents on German Foreign Policy, D. vol. X . , pp. 345-348. **Ibid. pp. 375-376.

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P R O B L E M " IN

SLOVAKIA

into account in the application of the law." 2 9 On the other hand a note was sent to Slovakia by Cardinal Maglione, Secretary of the Vatican, on November 12, 1941, which opened with the words "with real sorrow," (con vivo dolore), and whose purpose was to defend mixed marriages and converts "of Jewish origin." The letter singles out three paragraphs (9, 33, 38) of the law, its chief argument being that " a pronouncedly Catholic state" was about to initiate legislation "based on the principle of race," which contradicted the principles of the Catholic religion. 30 Pius X I I appears to have ascribed special symbolical importance to these "principles"; for this reason, following the events in Slovakia, which was in no sense "just under his window," 31 he took up a stand unparallelled, in our view, in other countries. At the end of the letter, the Secretary of the Vatican expressed his hope that the Slovak government would find a way to change the aforementioned clauses and remove from them all that ran counter to Catholic principles. It is worth noting that German diplomats held the opinion that from a certain point of view (in respect of mixed marriages and half-Jews) the law was "much more severe" than the Nuremberg Laws, and ascribed great importance to this fact, since "the state was headed by a Catholic priest." 32 T h e Slovak government replied to the above note only six months later, i.e. on May 23, 1942, emphasizing that "the arguments adduced in it have ceased to be important following the tremendous change which has meanwhile occurred in the solution of the Jewish problem." 3 3 Besides the victorious campaign of Hitler's armies on the Russian front, several other important events had occurred in this period: the meetings between the leaders of the Slovak government and of the Reich, at Hitler's headquarters in autumn 1941, where T u k a held -a very pointed conversation with Himmler; Slovakia's adherence to the anti-Comintern pact on November 25, 1941; and the infamous Wannsee Conference on January 20, 1942, concerning 29

30 31

32

33

Poliakov, op. cit. pp. 299-301; Poliakov, T h e Vatican and the "Jewish Question," Commentary, Nov. 1950, p. 445. Sidor, op. cit., p. 140. Weizsäcker, in his report on the deportation of the Jews from Rome of 17, 1943, uses these words to stress the Pope's proximity to the events. See Ludin's telegram to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Sept. 10, 1941, N M T Trials X I I I , NG-4409, p. 230. Sidor, op. cit. pp. 144-45.

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the "Final Solution" of the Jewish problem, a meeting which gave such an impulse to the entire question that all discussion and controversy over laws and restrictions seemed pointless to the Slovaks "who knew the latest." Nevertheless the Slovak reply deals seriously with several of the Vatican's arguments and is "more pontifical than the pope." As to marriages between Jews and non-Jews, the letter justifies the Slovak law, which lays down an unequivocal impedimentum, i.e. an absolute prohibition against such marriages, citing in authority Cardinal Gasperi's book Tractatus Canonicus de Mattimonio published at the Vatican in 1932." The "Aryanization" process was completed at this period and Jewish capital passed to Slovak owners, satisfying the material greed of many. Simultaneously the Jews, who had been ousted from social and economic life, became inconvenient. At the beginning of 1942 the Slovak government decided to expel its Jewish inhabitants from the state's territory. The "rumour" of the expected deportations swiftly reached the ears of the Vatican, and produced a series of acts of intervention. The source of the information was the Apostolic Delegate at Bratislava, Mgr. Guiseppe Burzio, who was also able to report that the prime movers behind the deportation programme were the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. A. Tuka, and the Minister of the Interior, Sano Mach. The Papal Legate visited Tuka at the end of February 1942," and the latter defended the legality of the decree vehemently (con veemenza), seeing in it "nothing inhumane or contrary to Christian principle" (nulla di inumano e di antichristiano). In this context the Apostolic Delegate declared that the deportation of 80,000 people to Poland meant condemning most of them to certain death, or, in his own words: "La deportazione di 80,000 persone in Polonia alia merce dei nazisti equivale a condannarne gran parte a morte sicura" (Cavalli, p. 10). Although it can be said that by "certain death" he did not mean the machinery of extermination (gas-chambers, furnaces and the like) put into operation at a later more "deve®< Ibid., p. 145. 3Γ· The visit appears to have been made on February 28; the exact date is not indicated—it is only stated that it took place on a Saturday. The Apostolic Delegate's report arrived on March 9.

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loped" stage, it nevertheless contains an explanation of the ultimate aim ("Endziel") of the consignments. Saul Friedländer, the author of the well known book (in the chapter entitled "The Vatican's Information in 1942") poses the question, what information the Vatican possessed at the beginning of 1942 as "one of the basic questions" (eine der wesentlichen Fragen) which he desires to answer. In this context he refers to the evidence of Hans Gmelin, 36 counsellor to the Reich Embassy .at Bratislava, who declared at the end of the war that the Apostolic Nuncio in Slovakia sent a letter to the Prime Minister, Tuka, in February 1942, in which he explained that "it is an error to think that the Jews will be sent to Poland to work; actually they will be exterminated there."* Hence in the extract quoted above from Cavalli's .article, Hans Gmelin's evidence is authenticated beyond all doubt. Although the Slovak ministers frequently emphasized in their speeches that the Jews were to be sent to Polish areas for purposes of work, other views were rife. It must here be mentioned that Slovak troops who served in fighting units beside the Germans on the Russian front (in 1939 they also participated in the conquest of friendly Catholic Poland—as the Reich's only allies!) were eye-witnesses of the fate of the Jews in German-occupied areas.31 When they reached Slovakia for leave they told of the atrocities and of the mass-murders perpetrated upon the Jews. In addition the plight of Polish Jewry and the fate of the "stateless" Jews who had been deported mainly from the former Czechoslovak areas annexed to Hungary, and massacred in the town of Kamenetz Podolsk by the S.S. in autumn 1941, were known to the Jewish public from Jewish refugees. When the Jewish leaders learned of the danger of deportation in February 1942, they brought the news of the fate of Polish Jewry to the knowledge of the Slovak government, of the Apostolic Delegate, and of others.38 Friedländer, op. cit., p. 78. * "Es sei ein Irrtum zu glauben, die Juden wurden nach Polen verschickt, um dort zu arbeiten; in Wirklichkeit wurden sie dort vernichtet." ST Stanek, op. cit., pp. 309-310; cf. also Report of Anton RaSla to the Slovak Minister of Defence, CatloS, in 1941, referred to in Rasla's reminiscences published in Kulturny Zivot, Bratislava, July, 1966. 3 8 According to the evidence of Dr. T. Kovics in the trial of Dr. VaSek, before the National Tribunal at Bratislava, File 1 7 / 4 6 ( 7 2 ) , Tnl'ud, p. 71 36

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March 1942, was a trying month for the Slovak Ambassador to the Vatican. On March 14, the day on which the third year of the existence of the Slovak state was celebrated by a thanksgiving ceremony, Sidor was summoned urgently, by telephone, to an interview with the Political Secretary of the Vatican, Mgr. Maglione, who handed him a note of protest against the deportation of the Jews.3® It was the first time that the Vatican had intervened by sending an official protest. 40 T h e letter referred to the "rumour" of the anticipated deportations of 80,000-130,000 Jews, "without distinction of faith," to the area of Lublin and Galicia. T h e last sentence of the protest stressed the main concern of the Vatican, "that it could not perceive that a state desiring to conduct itself according to Catholic principles, should adopt steps so rigorous and so painful in their consequences to so many families."* The wording of the note reminds us in some way of the appeals made by the leaders of Slovak Jewry, and it even looks as if several sentences had been cited from them. The first appeal was circulated in the name of "the Jewish Communities" (on March 5, 1942) and the second by the rabbis of Slovakia (on March 6) among ministers of the government, the Apostolic Delegate, and other public figures. T h e rabbis of Slovakia appealed directly to President Tiso, imploring him to consider that "in existing circumstances the deportations mean physical extermination," and begging, that "as thousands of us desire only to earn dry bread with the sweat of our brow, let these wretched people live, Your Excellency, with their families where they have been till n o w . . . We are enduring these infringements of our health and our lives, of our self-respect and our property, without crying out, in humility before God, a humility available in YAD VASHEM Archives J V / M - 5 / 3 1 ( 3 ) . 39

The Vatican's intervention is generally placed at a later period, although the date is very significant. According to Hilberg it occurred "some time after the deportations had started." Reitlinger, for example, relying on Wisliceny's testimony, indicates the end of July; cf. Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution, London, 1958, p. 390; Raoul Hilberg, The Destruction of European Jewry. New York, 1961, pp. 469-470.

Friedländer therefore is mistaken when he dates the Vatican's first attempt at diplomatic intervention with Budapest through the medium of the Nuncio Angelo Rotta, to May 1944. Cf. Friedländer, op. cit., p. 152. * ' provvedimenti cost gravi a di conseguenza cos! penose per tante famiglie" (cf. Cavalli, p. 10). 40

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we have learnt in the course of two-thousand years of .agony. But these evil decrees, so brutal and so unjustified, this multiplication of the fear of death by eighty-thousand—we have not experienced even in our ancient history replete with woes and fears."'11 President Tiso received the appeal adding a note in his handwriting: "I have taken note; to be filed away" (ad acta). The appeal of the Bishop of Trnava, Dr. Jantausch, that he act in the interests of humanity on behalf of the Jews who had turned to him in their hour of affliction, was in vain. 42 O n March 24, after additional information had been received from Mgr. Burzio telling of the Slovak government's plan to dispatch a contingent of 10,000 young men and women, and of the first concentration of Jewish girls aged 16-25,—"presumably to the German front" (al fronte tedesco), 43 Sidor was again summoned to the Vatican, this time on the direct instruction (per ordine diretto) of Pope Pius XII. He was requested to take immediate action with his government. Simultaneously a telegram was sent to the Apostolic Delegate in Bratislava; he was required to protest personally to the President of the Republic, Tiso, and to appeal to his "feelings as a priest of the Catholic faith" (sentimenti di sacerdote) (cf. Cavalli, p. 11). Sidor actually travelled straight to Bratislava, and we learn of this visit from the report of the Reich Ambassador to Slovakia, Η. E. Ludin,—"The meddling of the Vatican in the Slovak policy towards the Jews" (Einmischung des Vatikans in die slowakische Judenpolitik) ,44 Ludin notes that Ambassador Sidor, during his stay 41

Rothkirchen, op. cit., Doc. no. 53, pp. 130-131. « Tnl'ud 6 / 4 6 pp. 187-188. 43 Another soütce also states this destination, viz. the letter of Lichtheim, representative of the Jewish Agency and the World Jewish Congress, to Dr. Lauterbach in Jerusalem. This contains a report of the sketch submitted to the Nuncio Bernadini in Bern; (this letter was found in the files of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the extract quoted below is underlined in pencil) : "A large number of girls of the ages 16 to 36 have been placed in brothels established for troops on the Polish frontier." ("Es wird von guten Authoritiiten behauptet, dass eine grosse Anzahl von Mädchen im Alter von 16 bis 36 in Soldaten-Bordelle gesteckt werden, die an der polnischen Grenze errichtet wurden'). German Ministry of Foreign Affairs files, Microfilm in Y A D V A S H E M records, Κ 40357; J M / 2 3 4 1 . ** Ibid., Κ 403510.

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at Bratislava, received instructions from the head of the government, Tuka, to reply simultaneously to both memoranda of the Vatican (of November 12, 1941 and March 14, 1942 respectively); he w,as also charged with explaining at Rome that the Jews were going to the Reich as part of a "labour conscription" scheme (Arbeitseinsatz), in a manner resembling the departure of 120,000 Slovak workers conscripted for labour in the Reich; Ludin notes that the fact that the analogy was a distortion of the truth was clear (to the Slovaks in Bratislava), but that they considered that visa-vis the Vatican such an explanation was indispensible. " I n effect, the Slovak note will suffice to reject the Pope's protest," 45 * concludes the Reich Ambassador. Despite the fact that Ambassador Sidor "was not completely convinced" by the explanation "justifying the mass deportation of the Jews," he transmitted it as he had been charged.4® It is to be assumed that a different "explanation" of the future of the transports was in possession of the Vatican after March 18, 1942, from a Jewish source. We refer to a memorandum handed to the Apostolic Nuncio in Bern, Mgr. Bernardini, after an interview held in his office (March 18, 1942) with the representatives of the Jewish organizations in Switzerland. The memorandum refers inter alia to the anticipated fate of the Slovak deportees: "It is to be feared that they will be sent from here (Slovakia) straight to Poland and that there their fate will be the same as that which befell the multitudes deported from Rumania." 4 7 ** (Elesewhere in the same report it is mentioned that the Jews of Bukovina and Serbia had been taken to the Rumanian frontier and there massacred.) «Ibid. * "Darüber, dass der Vergleich der Judenabschickung mit dem Einsatz slowakischer Arbeiter im Reichsgebiet schief ist, ist man sich hier selbstverständlich klar, man glaubt jedoch dem Vatikan gegenüber auf dieses Argument nicht verzichten zu sollen. Praktisch wird jedenfalls die slowakische Antwortnote auf eine Zurückweisung des päpstlichen Einspruchs hinauslaufen." 46 Cf. an extract from the record of the Political Secretary of the Vatican (April 11, 1942) cited in Father Cavalli's article, p. 11. 47 Lirhtheim and Riegner's letter to Bernardini, of March 18, 1942; cited by Friedländer, op. ext., p. 82. ** "Es steht zu befürchten, dass sie von da aus unmittelbar nach Polen geschickt werden und dort desselbe Schicksal erleiden wie die aus Rumänien

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The Slovak government's "assuring" response concerning the "resettlements" and the "humane treatment" which was to be enjoyed by those "transferred to the protection of the Reich" (Schutzbefohlene), was handed to the Vatican in writing at a later date, on May 23, 1942.48 The text of the reply is "based" on the memorandum jointly signed in Bratislava, on April 10, 1942, by Himmler's deputy, Reinhard Heydrich, and the head of the Slovak government, Tuka, and seems to have been prepared largely with the intention of calming the Vatican. That sentence in the memorandum which says that "Slovakia is the first country whose Jews the Reich had consented to accept" (italics—L.R.) was naturally not mentioned to the Vatican. Instead it was explained to the Holy See that preparations for deportation were being made in a number of countries (in the Hungary of Källay too—sic!— although this was not referred to in the Heydrich-Tuka memorandum) .4e The end of the letter said that "the converts" were to be deported and quartered in a special area.50 Yet further steps were taken to calm public opinion. Somewhere about June 10-12, 194251 Wisliceny, Eichmann's representative in Slovakia, went to Berlin at the request of Tuka following the Nuncio's appeal, in order to discuss the possibility of an inspection tour to be made by a Slovak delegation (which was to include a Catholic and a Protestant clergyman), with the aim of ascertaining the state of the deportees in the concentration camps. (The matter of this delegation dragged on down to February 1944, without results, for most of the Jews, in the words of Eichmann to Wisliceny in June 1942, were no longer alive!) Only in June, that is two months after the lodging of the protest, did the Vatican take a further step to urge the Slovak government to take action with the Germans and ascertain the fate of the deportees. During the interim, silence enveloped the Vatican. (The only hint in Cavalli's article is the record of a conversation between the Secretary of the Vatican and the Ambassador, Sidor, on April 48

vertriebenen jüdischen Volksmassen." Sidor, op. cit., p. 143.

**Ibid., p. 142. 50 91

Lettrich, op. cit., p. 363. Evidently this was not in July, as stated by Wisliceny in his testimony at Nuremberg, but in the first half of June 1942; cf. Rothkirchen, Doc. No. 50, p. 123.

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11, 1942, when Sidor submitted his government's explanation justifying the deportations, and the Secretary of the Vatican requested him to bring his own critical remarks in this context to the knowledge of the Slovak government.) Precisely in this period, between March and June 1942, the fate of 50,000 Slovak Jews deported to Auschwitz and Lublin, was sealed, among them some 17,000 young men and women between 16 and 35 years of age, the flower of the youth, who were sent first to prepare "dwelling quarters." At this time expulsions were the order of the day throughout Slovakia—endless transfers and concentrations accompanied by scenes of the fiercest savagery were daily occurrences in the streets of towns, large and small. Now a certain change took place among the Slovak public, first indifferent in its reaction to the persecution of the Jews, as a result of the "rumours" which had become widespread. During the months of April and May the first escapees (of the groups deported from Slovakia in March), had reached the country, and were relating the fate of the deportees in the Lublin area, and the murders and atrocities to which they had been subjected. Another source of information was furnished by the Hlinka Guard, members of which had accompanied the trains carrying the transports to the frontiers and had handed them over to the S.S. They knew their real destination and more than once were heard to say that they "were intended for soap."" Echoes of the awakening of public opinion can be detected in the telegram sent by the Reich Ambassador to Slovakia on June 26, 1942, to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs saying inter alia: "The deportations of the Jews have become unpopular among the broad circles of the local population." 53 The transports stopped from the middle of June to September 1942. At this stage an underground "Working Group" (Pracovnä Skupina) was organized under the leadership of Gisi Fleischmann, to fight for the retention of Jews within the state's territory. From this period dates the plan known as "Plan Europa," for rescuing the European Jewish remnants on the initiative of Rabbi Weissmandel. While the "Working Group" put forth all its powers and was successful in transmitting the first accounts of fugitives (unmasking S2

r,s

The testimonies of I. Stanek and A. Steiner in the trial of Dr. VaSek, File Tnl'ud 1 7 / 4 6 (72) pp. 101,192. N M T , Trials, X I I I , N G - 4 4 0 7 , p. 231.

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the concentration camps) to the Jewish organizations in the free countries,*4 those in charge of the "Final Solution" were endeavouring to refute the "rumours." On Himmler's orders Wisliceny made a tour of several concentration camps with the journalist Fritz Fiala. Fiala's articles on the "orderly life" of the camps were later distributed and published in numerous papers.35 Certain circles in the free world learnt of the "Final Solution" as early as August 1942. On August 8, 1942, G. Riegner, representative of the World Jewish Congress at Geneva, transmitted the first report on the "Final Solution" to New York through the instrumentality of the American Embassy.56 As a result of two international events which occurred in 1942 and at the beginning of 1943, viz. the declaration of the Allies in reaction to the extermination of the Jews (December 17, 1942), and more especially the surrender of General Paulus at Stalingrad (January 31, 1943), a new political climate was created in Slovakia, which found expression in a more elastic attitude to the Jews. But hardly had the Jewish remnants managed to draw breath, than the Minister of the Interior, Sano Mach, declared in a speech, at Ruzomberok on February 7, 1943, that "March will come, April will come, and the transports will roll again" (as in the year 1942!). 9 7 His words created panic among the Jewish public, .and those active in the "Working Group" summoned to their aid factors at home and abroad in order to divert the peril of the deportations. The first reaction came on February 16, from the Catholic Episcopate of Slovakia when an appeal was submitted to the Slovak government and its president. However, the bishops required one thing only, that "converts should not be deported." In this context it should be noted, that in Ludin's estimate, 10,000 of the 15,300 Jews registered with the authorities were converts, including 3,000 of long standing (altgetaufte). 58 54

ss 5e 37

Also first authentic evidence of Auschwitz-Birkenau (known from the Nuremberg trials, as N G - 2 0 6 1 ) , and recorded from escapees who had reached Slovakia in April-May 1944, was transmitted by means of the "Working Group" to the free world and served to arouse public opinion; cf. Rothkirchen, pp. 3 5 - 3 7 . Rothkirchen, Doc. no. 6 6 , pp. 1 4 6 - 1 4 7 . Friedländer, op. cit., p. 82. Gardistn, Bratislava, February 9, 1943.

"See

Ludin's report from 1944, YAD VASHEM Κ 2 1 3 0 1 2 ;

JM/2218.

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Several weeks later the Catholic Episcopate published a Pastoral Letter (March 8, 1943),59 which was read (in Latin 60 ) from the church pulpits on March 22. Its text was based on the official stand of the Church, as published in an article in the Catholic journal "Katolicke Noviny" of April 26, 1942; this included among its quotations from the New Testament the parable of the Good Samaritan who rendered help to the unfortunate Jew (Luke 37.10); the letter further emphasized Clause 81 of the Slovak constitution of 1939, which guaranteed equal rights to all inhabitants without difference of nationality, religion or origin. The efforts to prevent the deportation continued at several levels. A considerable share in the sequence of intervention conducted from outside Slovakia in the spring of 1943, must be credited to the Nuncio at Istanbul, Mgr. Angelo Roncalli, later Pope John XXIIΙ. β 1 In this period we learn of the most energetic step taken by the Vatican through its representative in Bratislava. On April 7, 1943, Mgr. Burzio appeared at the office of the Prime Minister, Tuka, and expressed verbally the Vatican's sharp opposition to the deportation of the remaining Jews. He referred to the information of the cruel fate of the deportees in Poland and the Ukraine, and stressed that "the entire world was talking about it" (Tutto il monde ne parla.) Refraining from all response to "the offensive and vulgar reply" (non reagii alia scortese e volgare risposta) of Tuka, he warned him of international public opinion, which was likely to influence the future of the Slovak people (an allusion to what would happen after the war—cf. Cavalli, p. 15). In addition to the above demarche, the Vatican expressed its opposition again in a note of May 5, 1943 (no. 2731/41 ).*2 Here too Mach's words on the renewal of the transports were mentioned. The plaint is repeated: "The pain of the Holy See is all the greater in view of the fact that these measures are being applied by a people of profound Catholic tradition and by a government that has dcse

The Slovak Pastoral Letter was also published by the Vatican Press on June 21, 1943, cf. Cavalli, p. 13. en According to an oral communication from Dr. F. Steiner of Jerusalem, formerly resident of Bratislava, si Cf. Hayim Barlas, "John X X I I I and His Attitude to the Jews" (Heb.), Davor, Tel Aviv, November 4, 1959. 62 Sidor, op. cit., p. 146.

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clared itself ready to continue and to safeguard such. (Cf. Cavalli p.15) * This time the Slovak government's reply was not long in coming; it was sent to Sidor to Rome on May 20, 1943.®3 It said that in the future only such Jews would be deported as "endangered the State." It was further stated, that all those Jews that had no part in economic life, would be concentrated in labour camps in Slovak territory and the rest, i.e., those with certificates of exemption of one sort or another, "could work in their professions without interference and would not be disturbed in their private lives." The Slovak government referred in a special paragraph to "its concern" for the dispatch of a mission to tour the concentration camps, and "to visit ex-Slovak citizens now in Poland, in order to collect information and determine authoritatively in what conditions they were living and whether Slovak Jews in the concentration camps who had become Christians were being allowed to practise the duties of the Christian religion"6* (italics—L.R.). We may add that in conclusion the "naive" pledge was given that a special statement would follow concerning the findings of the mission. The all-powerful Tuka endeavoured to convince the Reich Ambassador, Ludin, of the great benefit that would accrue from the dispatch of such a mission, as we learn from Ludin's report to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs "On the Pastoral Letter of the Catholic bishops against the government's anti-Jewish measures."89 This report includes extracts from Tuka's conversation with the Apostolic Delegate (on April 7, 1943, mentioned above as recounted to Ludin by the Slovak Prime Minister). We shall cite some of the report's observations below, for they help to throw light on the attitude of the clergy and the Slovak public to the "Jewish problem." Ludin emphasized the attitude of the clergy to the Pastoral Letter as follows: " I am informed that while the clergy in some localities hesitated to implement the appeal, interpretations have been interpolated into the sermons given in other churches, with the intention * "II dolore della Santa Sede έ anche piü vivo, considerando che siffate misure sono attuate in una nazione di profonde tradizioni cattoliche e da un govemo che di tali tradizioni si dichiara seguace a custode." e s See Rothkirchen, Doc. no. 56, pp. 135-136. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. Doc. no. 65, p. 146.

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of quieting the population or of weakening the affect of the Pastoral Letter." Nevertheless it is known that individual priests, mostly of low rank, went to the assistance of Jews, and aided them at all stages of the persecution. Thus, for example, the work of the Catholic priest of Bratislava, Augustin Pozdech, has earned high praise ;ββ another instance was that of the Franciscan Father Rafael P. Fidrik, of Beckov n/Vahom, who during the deportations of 1944 concealed in his monastery four Jews, among them the Chief Rabbi of Slovakia, Abraham Frieder. 67 As regards the attitude of the clcrgy as a whole, it must be remembered in the first place that the high Catholic clergy were the chief supporters of the Slovak People's Party of Hlinka ( H S I L S — Hlinkova Slovenska Ludova Strana). An important factor in the clerical stand was their patriotic feeling: their desire to support the government and to strengthen its prestige was manifest also in their attitude to the Jews. T h e Protestant clergy, on the other hand (descendants of the exiled Hussites), and for the most part supporters of the pro-Czechoslovak line, were prominent for their more adaptable approach, mainly in the furnishing of certificates of conversion to Christianity. 88 Some Protestant clergymen have even been charged with profit-making motives and with granting hundreds of certificates of conversion within a day or two. 69 Worth mentioning in this context is the more rigid attitude of Catholic priests who demanded "sincerity" and "conviction" on the part of applicants for conversion. Where Tiso's approach is concerned, in his speech at Holic he cited HIinka's dictum that "A Jew remains a J e w even if he is baptized by a hundred bishops." 70 The patriotism of the nationalist clergy was not a little influenced by the propaganda slogans of the People's Party concerning the 6(3

D. J . Neumann, Im Schatten 1956, pp.

β7

des Todes,

Edition "Olamenu," T e l Aviv,

68-69.

Oral information from one of the rescued persons, Dr. E. Löwinger, now resident in Jerusalem.

β"

The list of applicants for "certificates of exemption" submitted by the Protestant Church to President Tiso, proves that many Jews were converted

during

the

actual

mass-deportations

M-5/22(5). ββ

Sidor, op. cit., p. 144.

70

See Gardista,

Bratislava, August 18, 1942.

in

March-May,

1942.

JV/

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peril of Bolshevism; these foretold repeatedly that the victory of "Judeo-Bolshevism" would bring about the collapse of ecclesiastical institutions. Ludin's report also emphasized, in connection with the Pastoral Letter, the "endemic anti-Semitism" of the Slovak people in the following words: "The attitude of the Slovak people—which is, as experience has shown, fundamentally anti-Semitic—as well as antiSemitic propaganda consistently conducted in recent years and directed by us, have created soil which seems ill-adapted to preachings of this kind on the part of the heads of the Church." Ludin is of course exaggerating in his generalization concerning the entire people, and he does not mention those righteous people who were mockingly named "the white Jews" (Bily 2id), most of them ordinary people, who went to the help of the persecuted and aided them in various ways (the number of Jews saved by hiding in country farms and similar places after the suppression of the Slovak Uprising, was, by the way, far from negligible). It is true that Nazi propaganda had strengthened the prejudices and hatred of many Slovaks towards the Jews. This was evident during the Revolt of August 1944, when the Jewish combatants, fearing for their own fate, were often forced to appear under "Aryan" names. A further fact is that a number of incidents and acts of violence, in which survivors from the concentration camps fell victims to fascist hooligans, occurred in the provincial towns of Slovakia and even in Bratislava at the end of the war.71 The Reich Ambassador added a further remark of the Apostolic Delegate Burzio, made to Prime Minister Tuka (on April 7, mentioned above), in protest against the continuation of deportations. He mentions his words in connection with the account of the atrocities at Lublin and in the Ukraine, to the effect that "he appealed to the Catholic-Christian conscience" of Tuka. The latter replied that for him there existed a higher authority in this matter, to wit, his confessor. The latter had asked him if he could take upon his conscience the responsibility for the deportation of the Jews as a thing done for the good of his people. When Tuka replied in the affirmative, the confessor, he said, had not opposed the actions involved. Tuka's conscience was at rest, and indeed to the very 71

Leaflets, and reports of acts of violence in the Yad V a s h e m Records,

JV/M-5/46(l).

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end he threw all his weight behind the deportation of the remaining Jews—even when a majority in the cabinet opposed him with the plea that the transports meant "physical annihilation." 72 We know from the memoirs of Ambassador Sidor that Tuka intended to pay a visit to Mussolini in Rome and to the Pope in the Vatican City in the spring of 1943. He wished to tell the Pope some "convincing" things about the "Jewish Problem." With this visit in mind, Sidor tells us, he described in a letter to Tuka the atmosphere prevailing at the Vatican, the character of the Pope himself and similar matters. He also informed him with a note of undisguised envy of the visit of the then Hungarian prime minister, M. Källay, to the "Holy Father." On Pius X I I ' s conversation with Källay on the "Jewish Problem," Sidor observes with a moralizing note that they (the Hungarians) did not brag, either on the radio or in the press. "They do everything to save appearances." 73 Although Sidor's description of Kallay's visit is brief, it is to be discerned that he is apprehensive of what will be said in the conversation between the Pope and Tuka, hence he reminds his Prime Minister that "we are the only state at whose head stands a Catholic Priest." 74 Källay himself of course mentions the meeting with the Pope in his memoirs." We learn that Pius X I I "condemned the system and the methods of the Germans, which independently of the war were inhuman and brutal especially towards the Jews, but also towards their own race." And he adds: "He (Pius X I I ) thanked me for having succeeded in keeping Hungary from such inhumanity and said that he felt confident that with its culture and Christian faith, the Hungarian people would never follow such paths.7* The meeting between the Pope and Tuka did not take place. When the visit to Mussolini was cancelled owing to events in Italy, Tuka had also to cancel his visit to the Vatican. 72 73

74 75

Rothkirchen, p. 146. A hint that Sidor, as an experienced diplomat, did not approve of the way people " a t home" were bragging loudly of what they were doing about the "Jewish Question." Anti-Jewish declarations in the press and on the radio were then a daily feature in Slovakia. Sidor, op. cit., p. 179. Nicholas Killay, Hungarian Premier; A Personal Account of a Nation's Struggle in the Second World War. London, 1954. Ibid, p. 169.

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In his article Father Cavalli uses cautious language concerning the personality of President Tiso (calling him consistently Dr. Tiso; only citations in the text make it clear that he is a Catholic priest). Referring to his attitude to the "Jewish Problem" he recalls: "A common opinion exists that Tiso resolutely opposed the introduction of anti-Jewish legislation, but gave way before simultaneous internal and external pressure." In the end he reserved for himself the right, it is alleged, of granting "certificates of exemption" in accordance with Para. 255" of the Jewish Code (cf. Cavalli, p. 6). As regards internal pressure, it can be stated that there were elements within the topmost levels of the government which demanded a radical and immediate solution of the "Jewish question." Nor was the part of Franz Karmasin, the Political Secretary of the German Minority, negligible in this respect. But we know absolutely nothing of Tiso's opposition to Jewish deportations; the contrary is the case. It is true that the Slovak leaders made such use of the pretext of "external pressure." The Reich Ambassador also reports in this spirit to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs: " . . . at any rate, Slovaks have openly alleged several times that all anti-Jewish measures were, as a matter of fact, introduced under German pressure.18* In 1946 the Slovak National Tribunal proved the initiative of Slovak leaders in the 1942 Jewish expulsions—the criminal operation was carried out by the 14th Department of the Ministry of the Interior, the men of the Hlinka Guard and the Slovak Gendarmerie. (Of 60,000 Jews expelled between March and October 1942, only 250 returned at the end of the war.) 79 We incline to concur with the view of Mgr. Burzio, who in his report to the Vatican described Tuka .and Mach as "the prime movers" behind the anti-Jewish measures. But in connection with Dr. Tiso's attitude, we accept the definition of the Slovak National 77

According to this paragraph of the "Jewish Code" the President of Slovakia was permitted to exempt idividuals from adverse legislation and grant them complete, partial or even conditional protection, and could also at any time cancel such privilege. See Slov. Zdk. c. 52, Bratislava, September 10, 1941, p. 681. 78 See Ludin's report. Microf. in YAD V A S H E M records JM/2218; K213017. * " . . .allerdings wurde slowakischerseits nach aussen anscheinend mehrfach angedeutet, dass alle Juden-Massnahmen lediglich auf deutschen Druck erfolgt seien." 79 Verdict in the trial of Tiso and his accomplices, Tnl'ud 6/46, p. 29.

CHURCHES

1329

LIVIA ROTHKIRCHEN Tribunal which judged him at the end of the War in 1946-47 (he was condemned to death by hanging, and one of the paragraphs of the sentence confirmed his crimes against humanity—on account of his share in the deportations of innocent Jewish inhabitants to the concentration camps ) in the following words: "If he was not one of the initiators (in the "Jewish question"), he was an instigator." 80 We may add one instance in proof. In August 1942, when 55,000 Slovak Jews had been deported, when the most prominent French bishops had publicly denounced the persecution of Jews in France and Father Dillard was on his way to a concentration camp for his declarations on behalf of the Jews,"1 President Tiso's "sermon" weis different. In his speech at Holia>s:m.

,4 T1H·

1428

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

Herbert A. Strauss migration issue part of German "grosse PolitikAt stake were German relations with Great Britain, German responses to the overtures made by Arab spokesmen, the formulation of a German policy towards a Jewish state, and, the German policy of supporting Zionist agencies in promoting Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine. Jewish emigration, in fact, developed into the key issue in the policy debate now getting under way, because Jewish immigration and capital transfer to Palestine were recognised as contributing to the industrial and professional strength of a future Jewish state. Emigration was also seen as affecting German-British relations. Emigration and Haaoara had been dealt with carefully and discreetly by German diplomacy while German policy in Europe was based on the expectation of continued British appeasement of German foreign policy in Europe, then presented as a mere revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Fear of offending British sensitivities had counselled caution in supporting Hadj Amin El Husseini (the Mufti) and other Arabs arguing for German support of Arab propaganda and armament. The Arabs had appealed to common hatred of the Jew as a basis for German support for the Arab cause. (Even cautious German support would prove of significant advantage for the Arab cause.) That a Jewish state was perceived as undesirable by Nazi diplomats of all persuasions by 1937 may, in fact, have been a belated compliment to Theodor Herzl. There was talk of a "Vatican-like" centre of Jewish political strength that would be able to demand the protection of Jews in Germany under minority statutes, or to retaliate against German settlers in the international setting (völkerrechtliche Basis) of an improved "Jewish power position . . ." In consequence, the further transfer of capital and "highly civilised" (hochzivilisierU) immigrants from Germany to Palestine was perceived as undesirable. The decrease in Jewish emigration to Palestine in 1937 suggested, in addition, that the disadvantages of Haavara for Germany now outweighed its advantages. Germany's true interest was seen in dispersing Jewish emigres all over the world, not in strengthening the yishuv and helping to found a Jewish state. The debate within executive and policy levels of the Nazi administration - the several Referate of the Auswärtiges Amt, the Ministry of the Interior, the Auslandsorganisation - is beyond the focus of this essay. It was resolved, in late 1937 or early 1938, by a (typically verbal, i.e., only indirectly documented) Hitler decision communicated through Alfred Rosenberg "that the emigration of Jews from Germany be furthered by all possible means".1® Speculation on the motives of this decision, which disregarded the recommendation of the more radically antisemitic groups in the Auswärtiges Amt and the Nazi party, will have to take not only the changed German image of British attitudes towards German continental expansion under consideration. ,T Continued emigration to Palestine was perceived as a means to increase British difficulties in world politics. The decision '•DGFP, scr. D, vol. V. p. 784. See Ben FJissar. op. at., p. 216. O n e of ihr most instructive documents illustrating this turning point is 'Memorandum for the Führer. Conclusions regarding report entitled "German Embassy London 5522" conccminij the future development of German British relations', datrd Berlin, 2nd January- 1938 by R f j o a c h i m von Ribbentrop, upon leaving his post as Ambassador to the Court of St. James], in DGFP, ser. D, 1938, pp. 162 Irt8.

,T

APPENDIX

1429

Jewish Emigration from Germany belongs also into the context of the "final phase" of the Nazi policy of expulsion inaugurated in late 1937/early 1938 culminating in the Kristallnacht. Domestic priorities in the "Jewish Question" had apparently been a major factor in pushing foreign policy concerns and Nazi radicalism aside. From January to 2nd September 1939, immigrants from Germany on Α-certificates represented 82 per cent of all immigrants in this category. As -pointed out in Part I of this essay, the amount transferred by Ηαανατα during the eight months before the Nazi attack on Poland and the British declaration of war (RM 8-2 million) represented a significant drop-off in RMamounts following the peak achieved in 1937 (RM 31-4 million), and the respectable level achieved in 1938 (RM 18-8 million, close to the amounts transferred in 1935 and 1936). As yet, no explanation for this apparent paradox - a drop in the amounts transferred by the most advantageous exchange rate during a period of maximum personal and economic pressures to flee persecution - has come to light. A comprehensive synthesis of the history of the German-Jewish aliyah is as yet unavailable. On the organisation level, it would deal with the structure of political and social organisations created by Jews from Germany (and Austria or Czechoslovakia) and their comprehensive contribution to the economic and cultural integration of Central European immigrants, and to the development of policies and practices connected with the reparations (Wiedergutmachung) programme of the German Federal Republic. It would draw together available information and review the settlement pattern of German-Jewish olim not only in "middle-class" settlements but also in the kibbutz-movement, youth aliyah, the labour movement and the trade unions. It would research the role German Jews played in the development of industry, international trade, the law or medicine. It would clarify the significance of German Jews for the religious life of the country including the first roots of the Reform movement. It would broaden existing studies of the cultural contribution of German Jews to include the development of academic and scientific life, e.g., at the Hebrew University, the Weizmann Institute, or agricultural research. Above all, it would contribute to the understanding of the process of acculturation under the unique conditions met by immigrants from Germany in a unique development country with special personal and ideological significance for the immigrant exposed to historic crosspressures created by his German background and the war and post-war history of the Jewish people. By its very dimensions, a review of the present state of information on the subject transcends the limitations of this essay.18 '"For the acculturation of German Jews in Israel sec the following u n c o m p l e t e ; list of studies e x c l u d ing Hebrew language works not researched for this essay): F.. Beling, Die gesellschaftliche Eingliederung der deutschen Einwandern in Israel zuischen und i ' j - f j , Frankfurt a. \ l a i n 1967: Ina BritschgiSchimmer, Die l'mschuhtung der jüdisch/n Einwanderer aus Deutschland zu städtischen Berufen in Palastina. Jerusalem 1936; Herbert Freedcn, 'Deutsche J u d e n in Israel'. Emuna-Horizonte, 6 J a n u a r y 1970 , pp. 43 46; Willy Guggenheim, ^ur Soziologie der Einwanderung nach Israel. Zürich 1954 based on larger diss. phil. ; Erich Lehmann, Λαήαπγα Beitrag der mitteleuropäischen Einwandererung ;um Aujhttu des Landes Israel. Nahariyah 1960; Gerda Luft, Heimkehr ins l'nbekannte. Intro»!. Willy Brandt. Wuppertal 1977; Leopold Marx, Cber Shavej-^ion. Shavej-Zion I960; M a r g a r e t e Turnovi sky-Pinner. Die Ziieite (leneratinn mitteleuropäischer Sudler in Israel. Tubingen 196'J Schriftenreihe w i v s e i L s c h a l l l i i h r r Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 5,; Henrv Uriel Spierer. The (ierman-Jewish Immigration to

1430

B Y S T A N D E R S TO THE HOLOCAUST

Herbert A. Strauss I I . I M M I G R A T I O N T O T H E U.S.A. By 1936, the number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine had begum to decline. In 1937, the supply of candidates suitable for retraining on C-certificates and of applicants for Α-certificates dwindled as the Palästina-Ami was forced to reject a considerable number of applicants for C-certificates for reasons of age, or other r e a s o n s . " By 1937, the U . S . A . began to supplant Palestine as the major country of emigration from Germany, as 38 per cent of all Jewish emigrants succeeded in obtaining admission to the U . S . A . T h e United States of America has traditionally been viewed in G e r m a n literature and opinion as the classic land of opportunity for the young a n d the enterprising in search of freedom and fortune. American opinion, in turn, has taken pride in perceiving the U.S.A. as a haven for victims of European political or religious persecutions or economic exploitation. T h e U.S.A. had been the major target of pre-Hitler European immigration in spite of recurrent periods of nativism and religious or racial hate movements directed against selected groups of residents or immigrants. Reached by Jewish immigrants since pre-revolutionary times, America had been settled by Sephardic J e w s in the eighteenth century, by Jews from Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and by the large Eastern Jewish migration that fled Czarist oppression and Austro-Hungarian economic misery between 1880 and the 1920s. Following the mass immigration of Eastern and Southern Europeans, latent nativist trends had coalesced by the turn of the century into a broadly supported political restrictionism tinged with anti-Catholic, anti-Slav and anti-Jewish prejudice. As a result, restrictive immigration laws were passed between 1917 and 1924, amended in 1929, which introduced a system of " q u o t a s " based on national origin as reflected in the number of nationals of a given country enumerated in the U . S . census at a given time (initially 1910, then 1890 and 1920. This change in date was adopted to decrease the quotas for nationals of certain countries judged undesirable by the majority of the Congress). Immigration laws effectively minimised or stopped the immigration of Orientals, Catholics, Eastern and Southern Europeans, Greek Orthodox and Eastern European Jetos. National origin was ciefined by country of birth, not nationality at time of application for entry. 20 U . S . immigration laws established three main categories of visas: non-immigrant visas (for tourists or travellers in transit); non-quota immigrant visas (for Palestine 1933 i'jj8. Trends, Patterns, Characteristics, Unpubl. Diss. Dropsie College, Philadelphia Pa. 1977; Agnes Viest, Identität und Integration, dargestellt am Beispiel mitteleuropäischer Einwanderer in Israel, Frankfurt a. Main Bern 1977; Curt D. Worman, 'German Jews in Israel. Their Cultural Situation sincc 1933'. in l.Rl Year Book ΛΤ ;1970|, pp. 73 103; Rccha Freier. Youth Aliyah. Let the Children Come. The Early History of the Youth Aliyah, translated from Hebrew, 1961; Chaya Pincus, Come from the Four Winds. The Story of the Youth .Uiyah, New York 1970. '•See Arbeitsberichte des ^entralausichusses für Hilfe und Aufbau bei der Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutsch· land, 1936 .Mimeographed), in: Library, Leo Baeck Institute, New York. " F o r references to the immigration restrictions and provisions in effect in the U.S.A. during the 1930s and 1940s sec the literature quoted in Jewish Immigrants of the .Veci Period in the U.S.A., vol. II: Annotated Biblingraphy. up. cit.. Sections IV, I 5.

APPENDIX

1431

Jewish Emigration from Germany clerics, including women clerics, university teachers, bona-fide students, former residents of the country, and relatives of qualifying individuals); quota-immigrant visas (in two categories: preference visas for parents of U.S. citizens and wives and children under twenty-one years of age of legal residents); and ordinary immigration visas. Prerequisite for admission as quota immigrant was proof that the immigrant would not be "likely to become a public charge" (LPC clause)."* Immigrants not in possession of adequate means to guarantee economic self-sufficiency were required to provide "affidavits of support" to be executed by relatives or close friends in the U.S.A. Such affidavits had to be accompanied by detailed proof of financial solvency. Discretion over the granting of visas rested with consuls acting on directives issued by the Visa Division of the Department of State, with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, an agency first under jurisdiction of the Department of Labor, then the Department of Justice, reserving the right to deny entry at port to immigrants deemed in non-fulfilment of requirements, including medical condition. The immigration quota for German nationals was fixed at about 25,000 per year, comparable to the quota for immigrants from the United Kingdom. This compared to a quota of about 6,000 persons each for Italy or Poland. Ironically, their birth in Germany would have made German-, and from 1938 on, Austrian-Jewish immigrants (whose quota of about 2,000 persons was incorporated in the German quota following the Anschluss) beneficiaries of the "Nordic" prejudices built into the law. Birth in Germany qualified for the quota. German Jews also had the advantage of having relatives among the several German-Jewish immigration waves preceding Hitler. This applied especially to Southern and Western German Jews. Affidavits of support could be obtained TABLE IV Percentage of the German-Austrian quota fulfilled, and number of German and .Ί us Irian immigrants admitted to the United Stales, 1933-1944 Total quota Per cent: Numbers:

100 27,370 Total quota

Percent: Numbers:

1933

1934

1933

1936

1937

1938

5-3 1,450

13-7 3.740

20-2 5,530

24-3 6.650

42-1 11.520

65-3 17.870

1939

1940

1941

ttj4^

1943

1944

47-7 13.050

17-4 4.760

4-7 1.290

4-8 1.351

100 95-3 27.370 26.080

Calculation* of absolute n u m b e r s p r e p a r e d by the a u t h o r , based u p o n peri e n t a s e s a d a p t e d In M. Davie, »p. at. see T a b l e V , p. 29. from ( ; . Kriehefsky. " Q u o t a I m m i i ; r a t i o n . I'.f'ij ΜΗ-ί". Immigration and \'n:urrili-ation Sen-ite Monthly Rfitru\ I I . 1 Ί . J u n e 1 Ή 5 . p p . 1 .it) I')."). Sourcc H e r b e n A. Strauvs. "The I m m i g r a t i o n ami Λ κ u l m r u t t o u of : h e (ii rm.in J7 1 . p. 68.

1432

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST Herbert A. Strauss

from relatives, many of whom had first to be (bund in the U.S.A. with the help of Jewish organisations like the Hebrew Immigrant Sheltering and Aid Society (HIAS) or the Council of Jewish Women which had established separate service departments for this purpose. In spite of this favourable s t a r t i n g point, however, the immigration of Jews from Germany to the U.S.A. under the quota provision remained extremely low during the first four years of the Nazi regime. These small numbers gain added poignancy if the total number of arrivals and departures by immigrants is contrasted with these figures: TABLE V Admissions and Departures of Immigrants to the United States of America,

Tear

Emigrant Immigrant Aliens Departed Aliens Admitted

tgjj-rg44

Met Entries

1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

97,139 35,576 23,068 29,470 34,956 36,329 50,244 67,895 82,998 70,756 51,776 28,781 23,725 28,551

61,882 103,295 80,081 39,771 38,834 35,817 26,736 25,210 26,651 21,461 17,115 7,363 5,107 5,669

35,257 -67,719 -57,013 -10,301 - 3,878 512 23,508 42,685 56,347 49,295 34,661 21,418 18,618 22,882

Totals

661,264

494,992

166,272

Source: Maurice R . Davie. Refugees in America (from Annual Reports oj the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, for the appropriate years), Harper & Brother., New York. 1947, p. '2! reproduced with the permission of the author's estate).

A variety of factors m a y be citcd in explanation of this low q u o t a i m m i g r a t i o n . Since S e p t e m b e r 1930, a directive issued by President H e r b e r t H o o v e r had enjoined consuls to d e m a n d exacting proofs from applicants in satisfaction of the LPC-clause. M a n y immigrants sufTered long delays in their efforts to provide a d e q u a t e assurances to local consuls following these directives. O n their part, G e r m a n J e w s seeking to immigrate were well a c q u a i n t e d with the severity of economic conditions they were likely to meet in the U.S.A. d u r i n g the slow recovery years 1933· 1937. U n k n o w n to most immigrants, one presumes, most

APPENDIX

1433

Jewish Emigration from Germany states of the Union, industry and labour unions, in addition, had placed formal or informal restrictions on the economic activities of aliens following their admission.*1 Other factors presumed to have delayed emigration were the time needed to search for relatives, the time-consuming process of gathering the extensive proofs demanded by consuls for guarantees of livelihood or maintenance, the cultural and geographic distance, the lack of intellectual bonds between German Jews and the U.S.A., and the widespread ignorance of the English language. All over Germany, adults returned to classrooms to learn English, Hebrew, or, less frequently, Spanish, and the Jewish newspapers introduced serial columns teaching these languages. Mastering the language of the prospective immigration country was expected to ease economic adjustment. It also laid the basis for the cultural integration of the immigrant. The broad-based efforts made by Jewish and non-Jewish groups in the U.S.A. to persuade President Roosevelt and the Congress to liberalise immigration laws or admission procedures during the 1930s proved fruitless in view of prevailing public attitudes towards immigration in a period of economic distress.22 In contrast, non-quota immigrants, university professors, research specialists, writers and artists reached the U.S.A. in appreciable numbers. Some of these were admitted with the political refugees following the fall of France by special presidential efforts (the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees). Beginning in 1937, the Hoover directive was, in effect, eased, and the number of refugees arriving in the U.S.A. began to increase. Consulates in Germany established waiting lists for applicants. They lengthened rapidly. German Jews soon waited months, then years, for calls to the consulates to undergo the required screening. At one consulate (Stuttgart) a low-level employee (Wolff?) was reputed to have accepted bribes in exchange for advancing the registration (quota) numbers of applicants by then panicking to leave Germany (mid-1938). Efforts to obtain confirmation of this case from the relevant archives - the irregularity was discovered and the employee removed from his position - proved unsuccessful. The incident throws light on the intense pressures for admission prevailing by late 193/ in Germany. The results of such corruption, of course, disadvantaged applicants unable to dispose of the funds required for the delinquent official.23 The last chapter of this policy began with President Roosevelt's reaction to the atrocities committed by Austrians against Jews following the Anschluss, and the mass flight of Austrian Jews, soon debarred from entering European havens of refuge. Although the President seemed to have been well aware of the public '•"For a description of occupational restrictions im|>oscd on noil-citizens ill the several states ot the U n i o n d u r i n g the depression vcars see Harold Fields. ' U n e m p l o y m e n t a n d the Alien". South Atlantw Quarterly, 130 1931 . I. pp. 60 78. " K x h a u s i i v c analyses of the politics of immigration in the U.S.A. h a v e been published l>y Feingold. op. (it.-, David S. W'yman. Paper 11 alL. America and the Rcju«re f.'mn njji. Amherst 1%H; Arthur D. Morse. 11 hilf Si\ Milium Died. .1 Chronicle of'American Apathy. New York 1%7: Saul S. Friedman. ,\o Haven for the Oppressed. I'mted States Policy tn:rarj\ Rfjii-taiuiatcd MI far in the absence of accev. to tile relevant !»«i\rriuncni documentation.

1434

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

Herbert A. Strauss mood of restrictionism prevailing not only in the U.S.A. but around the globe, and of the unwillingness of Congress to change U.S. immigration laws, he felt urged - by whatever political considerations - to convene an international conference about the plight of refugees. This conference, meeting on the (French) shore of Lake Geneva, at Evian-les-Bains, was handicapped b y the restrictions that, by now, were in effect in most potential immigration countries, and by British attitudes vis-a-vis immigration to Palestine. It led to n o practical results. In the U.S.A., attempts to introduce legislation in Congress in 1938/1939 to permit German-Jewish children to enter outside the quota system failed. A bill to this effect, the Wagner-Rogers bill, died in committee without «reaching the floor of the House or the Senate.*4 A committee established by the Evian Conference, the intergovernmental Committee on Refugees sitting in London, also failed to achieve results in spite of negotiations with Hjalmar Schacht, then already demoted to the position of President of the German Reichsbank. The German proposal to finance GermanJewish emigration was adjudged akin to blackmail and universally rejected, and the Committee's negotiator, George Rublee, failed to penetrate the Nazi curtain in Berlin. Only following the Evian Conference and the Kristallnacht dad the Jewish refugees from Germany finally gain admission to the U.S.A. to the full extent of the quota. Following Pearl Harbor, America's entry into the Second World War practically closed the door to Jewish immigration from Germany and Austria. Many German and Austrian Jews, however, had been unable to obtain U.S. immigrant visas from the U.S. consulates in Germany and (incorporated) Austria prior to 1st September 1939. Some of these Jews were permitted to enter Great Britain in 1938/1939 on the understanding that they would be assigned low numbers under the American immigration quotas for "Greater" Germany and leave their temporary shelter at the earliest opportunity. This arrangement, while humane, had the indirect efTect of denying exit opportunities to those remaining behind under the Nazis' thumb and thus, inadvertently, of causing their destruction during the Holocaust when a Himmler directive ended all emigration in October 1941. Shipping difficulties and the entry of the U.S.A. into the Second World War kept many of these would-be immigrants in Great Britain for the duration of the war. The total number of Jewish immigrants from Germany, including arrivals on visitor's visas whose visas were subsequently extended until legal immigration procedures could be efTected, often by temporary residence in Canada or Mexico, has been estimated as about 132,000 until the end of the war. Subsequently, German Jews entered as quota immigrants or under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 from Germany, Palestine-Israel, and numerous countries of intermediate settlement. Their number has never been determined." " F o r details see literature ciicd in note 22. On the Evian Conference see also S. Adlcr-Rudcl, 'The Evian Gmference on the Refugee Question", in LB I Tear Book XIII 11968), pp. 235-273. ° T h r history of the acculturation, integration, resettlement or contribution to American-Jewish life of the German-Jewish Immigrants of the Nazi period is .systematically explored by the Research Foundation for Jewish Immigration, New York, which was founded for this purpose upon the initiative of this author. Rrsearrh tools are bring prepared through its oral history project J o a n

APPENDIX

1435

Jewish Emigration from Germany III. I M M I G R A T I O N T O CENTRAL AND S O U T H A M E R I C A Latin America took in a substantial number of refugees from Germany, Austria, and Axis-occupied Europe. In spite of its importance - more refugees may have found shelter in the sub-continent than in Palestine in the 1930s - research on a comprehensive scale appears not to have been undertaken. Statistics on the number of refugees admitted are often vague and contradictory. The domestic political factors, or the administrative decisions that determined the opening and closing of countries to Jewish immigration, have not been presented cohesively. For most countries, reliable data on the integration of immigrants and of their children are absent. This gap in research may derive from a number of factors characteristic for the admission laws and practices prevailing in some of the Latin-American countries in the 1930s. In most countries, consuls stationed abroad were authorised to issue visas to applicants on the basis of existing regulations. Some of these regulations contained ethnic restrictions, or limits on occupational categories for prospective immigrants. Following the grant of an entry permit, the port authorities or an immigration agency at a capital retained the right to exclude arrivals. In some countries, admission on visitors' visas, especially if travellers arrived first class or with a fixed sum of cash in their possession, was relatively unrestricted. Once admitted to a country, immigrants frequently used often comparatively loose regulations for crossing land frontiers between Latin-American countries to settle in a country that had been their first choice to begin with. 26 The literature and the sources also suggest that at some Latin-American consulates, immigrant visas could be obtained in return for payments exceeding the fees stipulated by law, and that visas could be obtained for payment of additional amounts from travel bureaus, e.g., in Paris or Berlin. Similarly, following admission on visitors' visas, local aid agencies, with the financial aid of U.S. organisations, frequently succeeded in obtaining residence and work permits for refugees. The Nazi authorities (Secret State Police - Gestapo), pursuing their L e s s i n g , c u r a t o r ^ a n d t h r o u g h its series Jewish Immigrants of the .Yfl-t Period in the U.S.A.. vol. I: Archival Resources, c o m p . S t e v e \V. S i e g e l ; v o l . I I : Annotated Bibliography, v o l . I I I . 1: Oral History Holdings of the Research Foundation fur Jewish immigration: a Descriptive List. c o m p . J o a n L e s s i n g : vol. I I I . 2: . ! C.lasstfied List of Articles (.'oncerning Emigration in the German-Jewish Press, t y j j t'j'jS. c o m p . D a n i e l S c h w a r t z w i t h D a n i e l N i e d e r l a n d . . V o l . I: 1979: vols. I I a n d I I I : in p r i n t , 1981 . S u b s e q u e n t vols, a r e p r o j e c t e d for sources ! I V a n d V ; a n d a social a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y , M . D o b k o w s k i a n d H e r b e r t A . S t r a u s s in p r o g r c s s j . F o r p r e s e n t l v a v a i l a b l e s t u d i e s o n t h e U . S . A . see Annotated Bibliographν 'Sections IV, 3 7 . " F o r d e t a i l s o n t h e i m m i g r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s of L a t i n - A m e r i c a n c o u n t r i e s s e e Judische Auswanderung, hdrrr\ponden~blatt über Ausuanderungsund Sudlunguresen. H i l l s v e r e i n d e r J u d e n in D e u t s c h l a n d , B e r l i n . S e p t e m b e r 193t> r e p r i n t e d w i t h o u t c h a n g e s 1939 . passim. T h e h'tirre\pondenz.blatl a l s o inc l u d e s c o n s i d e r a b l e a n d u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n o n c o n d i t i o n s in t h e s e c o u n t r i e s , a n d r e p r i n t s l e t t e r s sent t o t h e Hilfsirrrin b y C c r m a n - J c w ish i m m i g r a n t s t o t h e s e v e r a l L a t i n - A m e r i c a n c o u n t r i e s i n c l u d e d in t h e lx»>k. F o r g e n e r a l m o v e m e n t by r e f u g e e s , ι ι γ ι ν . f r o n t i e r s b e t w e e n L a t i n - A m e r i c a n s t a t e s sec. e . g . . [ A m e r i c a n J e w i s h J o i n t D i s t r i b u t i o n C o m m i t t e e ] , 'J.!).(,'. Bulletin Λ » . 7. P r e s e n t A c t i v i t i e s o f the J . D . C . R e f u g e e Aid lo S o u t h a n d C e n t r a l America, the P h i l i p p i n e s a n d S h a n g h a i J"th M a r c h 19-M. T y p e s c r i p t . " N o t f o r p u b l i c a t i o n . " - p p . '· A m e r i c a n - J e w i s h C ' - o m m i t t c c . B l a u s t e m L i b r a r y . N e w Y o r k . L a t i n - A m e r i c a file·. F o r r e f c r e m es t o i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s - r e b e l o w

1436

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

Herbert A. Strauss goal of the mass expulsion ofJews at any price following the Kristallnacht, exerted pressures on Jewish emigration agencies to become parties tvo such practices. Gestapo tactics, specially during the earlier period, allegedly also included the issuing of fraudulent papers to prospective immigrants not considered suitable candidates for assistance by these agencies. Discovery of unla&wful practices on the part of foreign consuls by-the home government led often Ko the dismissal of the official in question - and to the tragedy of immigrants travelling on chartered boats learning, upon arrival,37 that their visas had been declared invalid. Further in-egularities were made possible by the categories o f occupations as formulated in the immigration regulations of some Latin-Araierica/i countries. Designed for the traditional proletarian immigrant, they ill-fiitted the middleclass German or Austrian Jew. This applied especially to the '"farmer" category to which immigration laws tended to restrict admissions in sonue countries, since the farming practised by, e.g., a South German country Jew offered little preparation for clearing tropical jungles or growing cash crops under adverse conditions in countries characterised by the immense gap in status arad living standard between latifundista and peon. It also applied to such categories ais "entrepreneur" or "industrialist" included as desirable immigrants in some immigration codes, and to persons qualifying for admission under "crafts" categories following a short retraining course in the country of origin. As a result, immigrants tended to .•ongregatr in the major cities, vitiating attempts made by governments to distribute them over the countryside and smaller cities, and hold them to the occupational pursuits which had formed the basis of their admission.28 "Observations on this aspect of the persecution and immigration history, which c a n n o t be divorced from its "official" aspccts but has to be seen in the proper relationship to the overwhelmingly "legal" a n d " o r d e r l y " escape of German Jews from their intrinsically "illegal" a n d "disorderly" persecution abound in the literature. They are the more poignant as the average G e r m a n J e w had been a product of the law-and-order society from which he came, and returned to fixed middleclass behaviour a n d respect for authority as he reintegrated into renewed middle-class economic and social roles. For an analysis of this social function among German-Jewish immigrants to the U.S.A. see Η . A. Strauss ' Z u r sozialen und organisatorischen Akkulturation deutsch-jüdischer Einwanderer d e r N.S.-Zeit in den U.S.A.', Historische Perspektiven, H a m b u r g 1981 (in print), and idem, ' T h e Immigration and Acculturation of the G e r m a n J e w in the United States of America', in LSI Tear Book XVI (197 Γ . pp. 63-94. For references to irregularities in granting visas to applicants, or to technically illegal practices, for whatever motives, by consular officials see, e.g., M . Wischnitzer, 'Die Jüdischc· W a n d e r u n g unter der Nazi-Herrschaft", in Die Juden in Deutschland. 1951152-5712. '95^59 5T9Almanach, H. Ganthcr (ed.), 2nd edn. (Neuauflage), H a m b u r g 1959, pp. 119 123; Ν. Eck, ' T h e Rescue of Jews with the Aid of Passports and Citizenship Papers of Latin-American States", in Yad I'ashem Studies, 1 1957), pp. 125 152; A. Prinz, ' T h e Role of the Gestapo in O b structing and Promoting Jewish Emigration', in Yad I'ashem Studies, 2 (1958), pp. 205-210, 216-219; Klaus Drobisch et αι., Juden unterm Hakenkreuz, Berlin (DDR) 1973, p. 181; A. Prinz, 'Was der "Hilfsvcrem" geleistet hat. November 1938 - W e n d e p u n k t der jüdischen Auswanderung", MB des Irgun Olej Merkas Europa, 41 17th November 1978), pp. 3 - 4 ; Yehuda Bauer, My Brother's Keeper. Hiitoiy of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 1929-1939, Philadelphia 1974, pp. 287-289; Kurt R. Grossmann, Emigration. Geschichte der Hitler-Flüchtlinge 1935 1945, Frankfurt α. Main 1969. pp. 152 155; R. M. Levine. 'Brazil's Jews during the- Vargas era and after', Lu^n-Brazilian Reneu·. 5, 1 19681, pp. 48. 54. For additional references to individual countries in Latin America, see below. w

Tlu- best cohesive description of the drift of German-Jewish immigrants to urban areas following admission on agricultural permits, or of their settlement in such areas a general characteristic of the period iK i urnni; in nearly .ill Latin-American slates may be found in G. N e u m a n n , 'German Jews in Colombia: .1 -.inriv of imtnigrani adjustment'. Jeirish Social -Studie*, 3 • 1941 .·. pp. 18!) 206.

APPENDIX

1437

Jewish Emigration from Germany In general terms, the elements of "illegality" documented in secondary treatises and primary sources were forced upon the traditionally law-abiding German Jew by the state of war the Nazi government had imposed upon him byits persecution, whatever its formal "legal" (decree) character may have been. Illegality was part of the process by which many G e r m a n Jews asserted their legal rights against the illegalities imposed upon them by the Nazi regime, whether they crossed frontiers illegally following a period of " u n d e r g r o u n d " life, avoided arrest, forged identification papers or refused to deliver items like radios or cameras to the Nazi authorities (as did this author), or whether they resorted to "unlawful" means to save at least part of their rightfully acquired property by smuggling it out of the country. Acts such as these are part of the resistance against unlawful government that have become characteristic of life under totalitarian regimes in twentieth-century history. They also include "Aliyah Beth"\ the smuggling of immigrants into Israel against the rules laid down by a mandatory authority charged by international law with the creation of a national Jewish home. If such resistance against authority may be classified as group resistance (national or ethnic liberation) against extreme and illegal persecution or denial of rights, immigration provision in many countries imposed similar resistance on individuals (Notwehr). Finding themselves in danger of life and/or internment in a concentration or extermination camp, with predictable results, refugees entered countries in Europe and overseas without visas or permits, or outstayed their official welcome, as certified by residence or work permits. Usually, such acts could not be engaged in without the help of persons in authority - frequently local or low-level bureaucracies and police authorities. Their motives ranged from bureaucratic indolence to financial, moral and political interest in assisting a petitioner for help. In some countries, such authorities were guided by traditions of administration that did not exclude the hand-out or the bribe in exchange for considering or deciding speedily applications for residence permits, visas, work cards, or other papers that meant the difference between being hunted even after escaping Nazi persecution, and the "legalisation" of one's existence, that peculiar invention of the refugee condition in which the arrogance of power confronts the "paperless" or worse, "stateless" outcast. As has been pointed out in Part I of this essay, following the turn of events culminating in the Holocaust and the defeat of the Axis powers, media and opinion in some of the countries involved changed their perception of persons who had been assisting refugees against the harsh regulations prevailing during the Nazi period opposing their admission or settlement, however temporary. For social analysis, resort to illegal means, including bribery, must thus be seen as a corrective, dictated by the state of civil war :the Hobbesian "state of nature") in which the hunted refugee found himself. In certain circumstances, bribing officials did not involve damages or unfair advantage to the wealthy since the poor applicant would have been frozen out of consideration in any event. In other circumstances - such as advancing oneself on a waiting list · tin·

Kxamples nt' ihr ditlu ulues tared bv immigrants settling on the land may be found in ihr letter» reprinted under the several lountrv entries in ^jüdisch/ .lu.1.7andtiun^ see note 2t>

1438

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

Herbert A. Strauss socially damaging aspects in favour of the wealthy against the poor are obvious. In still other situations, especially in connection with some Latin-American immigration, organisations in aid of refugees, often helped by at history of cooperation with relevant police or bureaucratic authorities, avaOted themselves of traditional ways of expediting official business and, in fact, succeeded in having the tourist visas of literally hundreds, if not thousands of arrivals converted into residence and work permits without considerations of wealth our poverty. However, such organisational intervention often met insurmountable financial limits or political obstacles, especially in countries characterised by factionalised political establishments. Typical for such situations was the well-described case of the German steamship St. Lotas. It had left Hamburg with 930 refugees aboard on 13th May 1939. Its passengers had valid immigration visas to Cuba stamped in their passports. They had been issued by the official in charge of such matters, a Colonel Benites. When the ship arrived at Havana, the refugees were refused entry: the official in charge happened to take sides with his own government's rival (chief of staff Fulgencio Batista), and considered the immigration issue a popular cause to embarrass the regime he officially served. In addition, rightwing street politics (led, amongst others, by ex-President Grau San Martin - see below) had made the government's allegedly open admission policies for immigrants a public issue at about that time. The price asked by the warring Cuban factions above and below the table was properly considered dangerous to all immigration in Latin America (setting a precedent for other governments) by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee ($500,000 for the government, and $450,000 for each of the warring factions). In addition, the U.S. State Department warned the Jewish negotiator that the Cubans might have been bluffing in any event. As a result, the ship turned back to Europe where its passengers, after much negotiation, were permitted to land in English and Western Europeans ports. Those caught up by the Nazi invasion a year later ultimately met their deaths in the Holocaust." The events surrounding the SS St. Louis, which also involved a humane and sympathetic German captain, Gustav Schroeder, illustrate well enough the absence of legitimacy in the dealings of government authorities with die Jewish victims - even though these governments had not been the ones to cause the victimisation in the first place. Human relations had, by force, reverted to the Hobbesian state of nature. In this connection, the strict legalism of American-Jewish organisations in the face of the emergency also deserves mention in view of the unwillingness of U.S. governments in the 1960s and 1970s to enforce immigration laws against the literally millions of illegal immigrants in the country. Would more courage have saved more lives? Whatever one's perception of this situation, the illegality described above (and below) for Latin-American situations represents a quality " T h e brst concise review of the "St. Ijouis afihir" may be found in Bauer, op. at., pp. 278 f. For fuller descriptions see also the (fictitionalised) accounts: Hans Hcrlin, Kein gelobtes Land. Die Irrfahrt der St. Ijiuis. Hamburg 1961; idrm. Die Reise der Verdammten. Eine Tragödie der St. Louis, Munich 1977; Gustav Schrödcr, Heimatlos auf hoher See. Berlin 1949 (report of the Captain of the St. Louis); Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan Witts, The Voyage of the Damned. New York 1974; Max Yaffcc, The Voyage of the Franz Joseph [St. Louis), Now York 1970.

1439

APPENDIX

Jewish Emigration from Germany inherent in many aspects of the - in general quite legalistic - manner in which German Jews transferred out of Germany and settled in other countries. It would be incorrect, however, not to differentiate between several qualifying aspects in the immigration process in Latin-American countries. Until the Kristallnacht, the admission of Jews from Germany generally followed the more or less orderly patterns established by the laws and regulations of the countries willing "to accept such immigrants. Observers noted that Jews from Germany usually arrived with their furniture in crates, and were well able to pay the charges involved in being admitted for themselves and their belongings.3® (Observations such as these overlook the fact that household goods frequently were the only capital Nazi regulations left a Jew to take out of the country. That many Jewish families set up boarding houses, or maintained themselves by taking in sub-tenants in apartments furnished by these salvaged remnants of their once bourgeois lives, resulted from this despoliation pattern of emigres by the Nazi authorities.) The Kristallnacht pogroms of 9th/10th November 1938 changed this relatively orderly pattern and created the Hobbesian emergency for German Jews that Nazi terror had created for its political enemies in 1933. Now organisations in aid of emigration, frequently under Gestapo pressure, chartered ships and sent groups of persecuted refugees abroad with visas that were acquired through questionable channels, or with no immigrant visas at all, hoping that overseas governments would waive regulations, or aid organisations, relatives or friends would be on hand to set things straight. Ships such as these would be shunted from port to port until a government, in the humanitarian tradition of LatinAmerican cultures, would admit their unfortunate human cargo. Countries taking in such refugees - either via their ports or as a humanitarian gesture included Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Yet, since the receiving country was not the one originally aimed at (where relatives, friends or conditions beckoned favourably), considerable numbers of such persons crossed a "green frontier", climbed a mountain or traversed a river without valid entrypapers, and entered countries where refugee-created or native Jewish aid organisations, with financial assistance provided by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), helped them to "legalise" their status.31 T h e pattern described will not be understood if the relatively loose administrative traditions it suggests remain unrelated to structural aspects of LatinAmerican political cultures. Both personal gain and humanitarian traditions in administration derived from a background of rule by family networks. In such networks, the personal aspect tends to become the prime factor not only in the exercise of political power - whatever the ideological cloak under which the ruling groups exert control - but also in administrative independence. Yet. in spite of rule by families, there were considerable differences in the immigration policies of Latin-American countries and, within countries, the several provinces (e.g., between Sao Paulo and Parana in Brazil . Some of these differences, to be sure, were caused by single, high-placcd political personalities e.g., Roberto M. * L r v i i i t · . Αν. a l . . p. "For

fur i m m i g r a n t s to Brazil .

a g e n e r a l o v e r - a l l v i e w s e c J.D.C.

quoted

below.

Bulletin

.W

7. F o r i n d i v i d u a l

rounmes

sec : i i e

literature

1440

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

Herbert A. Strauss Ortiz in A r g e n t i n a in 1938, or J . A. Lins d e Barros in the g o v e r n m e n t of Getulio V a r g a s in Brazil). N o n e the less, immigration regulations and ttheir changes may b e related, to some extent, to the socio-economic and politkcal histories of the countries involved, a n d to the image of the J e w created by religious or cultural traditions a n d by earlier Jewish immigrants. T h e J e w i s h communities in Latin America in the 1920s and 1930s fell into two groups in terms of size: only small to minuscule Jewish settlements existed in Bolivia, C o l o m b i a , C u b a , Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peiru, Venezuela and U r u g u a y - considering only those countries that admitted Germain/Austrian-Jewish refugees in some n u m b e r s d u r i n g the Nazi period. In none of (these-countries was a "critical m a s s " reached for strong community organisation. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, in contrast, had been settled by larger n u m b e r s of Jews when the Nazi emergency broke. In none of these countries were the older, colonial German-Jewish or Sephardic community, or the bloody traditions of Inquisitiontortured M a r r a n o settlement more than memory or history. W h e r e Sephardic communities existed, they h a d constituted themselves from Near Eastern sources during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, much a* the predominant immigration, the Eastern Jewish group, had arrived during this period. This, the Eastern Jewish immigration, had been greatly increased during the 1920s when the U.S.A. had b a r r e d Eastern European nationals from entry in larger numbers. Latini\ m e n can countries - with the significant exceptions mentioned a b o v e -appeared as obvious waiting rooms for later moves north to join relatives a n d take part in the vibrant c o m m u n a l affairs of the great Jewish concentrations of America. Socially, this type of immigrant was generally of the lower economic group, and entered the labour market as middle-man, labourer, or small independent, in parallel to his brothers elsewhere during this period. K n o w n as Polacos, Romanci, or Rusos, the Jewish immigrants formed a culturally separate a n d politically isolated g r o u p of strangers, and when the decline of raw material prices on world markets slowed down the economies of predominantly agrarian countries, or of countries p r o d u c i n g a single raw material for the world market, a turn to authoritarian rule a n d economic nationalism was effected by the p r e d o m i n a n t ruling classes, w h e t h e r latifundislas or industrialists, and by the thin u r b a n middle class concentrated in capitals, provincial centres, or ports above the mass of the rural proletariat, the natives and the slowly developing urban fringes of Lumpenproletariate a n d labour. T h e economic programmes developed by such authoritarian regimes, while preserving the existing class relations, resembled the fascist and Nazi combination of government-controlled social reforms and economic controls with aggressive international trade policies. They also embraced a nationalist cultural policy to ward off oppositional dangers to the regime from foreign-influenced right-wing or left-wing extremists. Thus, in the 1930s, the old and honoured constitutional and liberal traditions of Latin-American political history were submerged in several countries in a native authoritarianism. Where the population included significant numbers of immigrants from G e r m a n y or Italy - as was the case, for example, in Brazil or Argentina native authoritarianisms were challenged by openly fascist groups whose leaders were either influenced by. or imitated, European models like

APPENDIX

1441

Jewish Emigration from Germany Franco, Mussolini, or Hitler, or were in their pay outright. Such armed groups included the Chilean National Socialist Party, the Associacion Nationalism in Mexico, the National Fascist Party led by ex-President Grau San Martin in Cuba, the Αςαο InUgralista BrasiUira and several groups in Argentina. In response, native authoritarian governments - most typically in Brazil - strengthened policies aimed at the disintegration of immigrant cultures, especially the German concentrations now supported and infiltrated by Nazi money and personnel. Like the Americanisation drives known to twentieth-century U.S. history, these policies aimed at creating the political integration and cultural homogeneity that would permit the continued operation of existing social and political arrangements while adapting European power techniques to the special conditions of the area. 32 Policies such as these - given significant local variations and heterogeneous national traditions - and the impact of the world depression had brought about in most countries the severe restrictions on immigration in force in 1933. Parallel to, or influenced by, the example of the U.S.A., countries had adopted codes giving preference to "eugenically valuable stock" capable of "easy assimilation". Jews were not considered as preferred under these categories, together with Orientals or Slavs. In addition, regulations embodied restrictions favouring agricultural workers, farmers, craftsmen, industrialists or entrepreneurs able to import capital. Commerical employees, small businessmen or retailers, and professionals like physicians, lawyers or academics, were unerwünscht. Regulations such as these excluded the vast majority of Jews from Germany or Austria. 33 T o substantiate these general observations, the immigration history of Central European Jews in Latin-American countries will be detailed for the two major centres of settlement, Argentina and Brazil, and reviewed for the other countries where Jews from Central Europe settled in some numbers, or passed through in some numbers on their way to final destinations in the U.S.A. or other countries prior to the post-1945 emigration from some countries. Such emigration, e.g., from Argentina or Chile, is beyond the framework of the present essay. Argentina's34 strong Jewish population, concentrated in Buenos Aires and " O v e r a l l views of Latin-American reccni history· (by countries) a n d their social b a c k g r o u n d may be found in H u b e r t Herring, .Ί History of Latin America from the Beginnings to the Present, 2nd edn.. New York 1961. and Fred C . Rippey, Ijatin Ammca. .-1 .Modern History. N e w rev. edn., A n n Arbor. M i c h . 1968. T h e foregoing is summarised from materials q u o t e d for i n d i v i d u a l countries discussed or reviewed below, and from the relevant chapters in these texts. " T h e most uninhibited statement, in pseudo-scientific terms, of L a t i n - A m e r i c a n " e u g e n i c s " in immigration policy may be found in H a r r y H . Laughlin, ' T h e codification a n d analysis of the immigration control laws of the several countries of Pan America. A n a l y t i c v o l u m e : A statement of the basic problems and of thr m a i n findings in the analysis of the P a n - A m e r i c a n i m m i g r a t i o n control laws and policy.' Lugenics Office of the C a r n e g i e Institution W a s h i n g t o n D . C . 1936 Mimeographed*. T h e immigration regulations valid in the 1930s in these countries a r e compiled in Jit· dische AuMianderung. S e p t e m b e r 1936. reprinted 1939. References to c h a n g e s in these provisions d u r i n g the period, and to changes in their application, are chronicled in the G e r m a n - J e w i s h mainstream press and the Informationsblätter issued by the ^~/ntralausschu\s fur Hilfe und Aufbau. Berlin 1933 1938 passim. See Jewish Immigrants of the Λ«-ι Period in the ('.S.A.. vol. I l l , 2 see note 25 for the a p p r o p r i a t e countries. •"For the discussion of immigration κ» Argentina see J n l m L. Bernstein, ' T h e Migration ot Jew* in Recent Years'. American Jewish Year H 37 . pp. 117 134: American Jewish tear Rook. :»(>ί·4 1934 35 . ρ 37.Ϊ; J.DC. Hulletin Vo. Digest o f I n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t the situation in S o u t h

1442

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

Herbert A. Strauss some major cities, has never been reliably counted: estimates made in 1938 by a social scientist delegated to survey Latin-American Jewries by the Conference on Jewish Relations, New York, placed the number at between 253,000 and 300,000; in 1933, the American Jewish Yearbook had estimated them at 215,000, with more than 100,000 of this number immigrants since 1913. As late as 1960, the census figure for persons- identifying themselves as Jews was 275,913; the "true" number of Jews in Argentina was held to be 400,000 to 450,000 if the Jewish portion of the "non-affiliated" in the census - a total o f 930,000 - were included in the estimate. ICA, the Jewish Colonization Association of Baron Maurice de Hirsch, had established agricultural colonies in Argentina since the nineteenth century, and made the country the major centre of .such settlements outside Palestine/Israel. Yet by 1925, no more than 20,382 Jews had been brought to the Argentine countryside and turned into Jewish cowboys, farmers and farmhands. By 1962, only 5,907 Jewish settlers remained, while 10,220 nonJews had meanwhile settled in the originally Jewish colonies. In the twentieth century, the country had become a major goal of European immigrants. Already in 1914, almost one third (2-4 of 7-89 million inhabitants) had been born abroad. That Jews were called "Rusos" suggests an absence of consciousness on the part of the population towards the immigrant Jew, but appears to have triggered an identification of Jewish immigrants with Russian B o l s h e v i s m by 1919, when major riots erupted against Jews in Buenos Aires and other major cities of Jewish residence. The xenophobic nationalism following the First World War - in parallel to the isolationist moods of the 1920s in the U.S.A. - brought about the immigration restrictions met by immigrants of the Nazi era. Italian fascist and German Nazi influences were strong both among ethnics of these countries and among establishment families. Argentine policies in both the First and the Second World Wars towards the Central and Axis powers, respectively, and at the League of Nations, show, with the exception noted below, that rancheros and latifundislas open to German-Italian influence had enough power to determine policies, and enough organised native or foreign support to prevail over the strong Allied sympathies among Anglophiles and liberals. It was characteristic of this mood that although ICA had entered into agreements with Argentine governments in the 1920s concerning Jewish farm immigration, a considerable portion of the approximately 79,000 Jews arriving in Argentina between 1918 and 1933 had entered the country without valid immigration visas. German-Jewish immigration, correspondingly, was at first limited to relatives of residents and agricultural workers. As antisemitic campaigns gained ground, American countries. J a n u a r y 1940; 10 pp. mimeographed .; no author or provenance, presumably from reports by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committer) in: Blaustein Librarv, loc. cit. • The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the chief librarian of this library and her xssist a tils for drawing his attention to this and similar materials quoted subsequently, and for permission to use them for this essay; Julio Adin, 'Nationalism and Nco-Nazism in Argentina', in In ihr Disunion, ed. by World /.ionist Organization. 5/6 ;Spring 1966 p. pp. 139 160; Friedrich Borchartli and David (Hick. Argentina. Rc|>ort of Messrs. Friedrich Borrhardt and David Click, received J u n e 10. 3 pp. · typescript.. in: Blaustein Library, hx. at.: Herring, i>f>. cit.: Rippcy, op. cit.: Encydoptudia Judaua. Jerusalem 1971. vol. 3. cols. 408 433 "Argentina"! .for social census of Jews in Quilmas and other material·.

APPENDIX

1443

Jewish Emigration from Germany defence efforts stressed the contributions of Jewish immigrants to economic life in Argentina. I n 1936, the HilfsDerein der Juden in Deutschland believed that with the some 4 , 5 0 0 Jewish immigrants from Germany included in the 11,607 Jewish immigrants that had landed during the first four years, 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 3 6 , the absorptive capacity of the country for commercial employees and middle businessmen was practically at an end. Still, Hilfsverein and I C A succeeded in resettling "several thousand immigrants" in the ICA colony Avigdor. In spite of the economic recovery brought about by changes in world raw material prices, and the Rooseveltian economic policies of President Agustin P. Justo, a conservativeauthoritarian dictator o f pro-British leanings, Argentine immigration policies remained restrictive. T h e situation changed with the election of the liberal president Roberto M . Ortiz whose openly pro-British and pro-Allied policies "alienated the pro-Axis group among Argentine army officers and their nationalistic supporters". Ortiz's liberalisation and constitutionalism favoured, paradoxically, Nazi propaganda efforts since the courts protected the mailing of Nazi hate literature. Still, Nazi excesses led the Ortiz government to outlaw the Argentine Nazi party in May 1938, stop the radio priest Virgilio Filipo, and ban the teaching of foreign ideologies as well as anti-Jewish propaganda. T h e O r t i z g o v e r n m e n t , in September 1938, also passed new i m m i g r a t i o n restrictions w h i c h h a d the effect of limiting J e w i s h i m m i g r a t i o n , b u t w e r e waived in practice following the Kristallnacht pogroms. (By M a y 1940 O r t i z w a s forced to withd r a w f r o m office d u e to ill health, to be followed by pro-Axis Vice-President R a m o n S. Castillo). J e w i s h immigration 1933-1943 was estimated at 2 0 , 0 0 0 30,000 persons, a b o u t 3 0 - 3 3 per cent entering w i t h o u t valid i m m i g r a t i o n visas or crossing frontiers illegally. A report d a t e d J u n e 1939 estimated that the "largest proportion of these immigrants had come from G e r m a n y " . A n o t h e r source reports t h a t Argentinian officials h a d sold tourist visas to prospective J e w i s h immigrants. T h e funds needed by the Hilfsverein of Buenos Aires to obtain residence permits for the "extensive unregulated i m m i g r a t i o n " to A r g e n t i n a , e.g., from Bolivia, C h i l e , U r u g u a y a n d other countries, a m o u n t e d to S5,000.00 per m o n t h in 1939. T h e y were provided by the American J e w i s h J o i n t Distribution C o m mittee, a n d served to assist, for example, Jewish refugees a r r i v i n g aboard the SS Conte Grande, Cap Norte. General Artigas, Mendoza, a n d o t h e r steamships. T h e p r o g r a m m e of aid developed by the Hilfsverein $ president Adolfo Hirsch included, in addition, d a y nurseries to feed u n d e r n o u r i s h e d children of working mothers, s u m m e r c a m p placement, and similar assistance. It attested to the plight of m a n y arrivals. T h e national office of t h e A m e r i c a n J e w i s h J o i n t Distribution C o m m i t t e e ( J D O in New York, concerned with the adverse reaction of Argentinians and other populations in Latin A m e r i c a to this large u n p l a n n e d influx of J e w i s h refugees and its potential for antisemitism, organised a J D C C o m m i t t e e on Refugees in Central and South A m e r i c a to fort-stall the spreading of antisemitism to America and provided large-scale aid. G e r m a n immigrants used the organisational p a t t e r n s of the religious congregation, the m u t u a l aid societs self-help. Hilfsierein. Frauenhilfycerein· and the Jüdische Κ'ullurGemeinschaft founded in Buenos Aires in 1937; to express their sense of c o m m u n i t v . Λ Gei .nan-language weekly. Jüdische i t '< κ heme hau established by H a r d i

1444

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST Herbert A.

Strauss

Swarsensky, provided community information. (The paper died with the death ofits founder in 1968.) A central coordinating agency (Centra) of Genman-Jewish immigrant settlements on the sub-continent continued the tradition oftbe Reichsvertretung'm parallel to foundations in other countries and the Council ofJews from Germany, which Centra joined. By the 1960s, however, the integration of younger immigrants and the second generation with the majority culture, and the decline of the original group due to re-emigration, adverse political conditions, and ageüng, brought about a fusion of Centra with the World Jewish Congress and its virtual disappearance. Data on the economic development of immigrants from Central Europe are scanty and impressionistic, but they suggest for Argentina, its for other LatinAmerican countries, that the upward mobility in business in the immigrant generation, and in the professions in their offspring, followed patterns characteristic of Jewish social structures. A 1968 study reveals surprising similarities between Argentine-Jewish occupations and that of mature Jewish communities elsewhere, including pre-Nazi Germany. The study showed that in a representative community (Quilmas) 70-9 per cent were self-employed or employers, 23-2 per cent white collar workers, and 3-5 per cent manual labourers. German Jews may be presumed to have conformed to this pattern. Here as in other countries, Jewish immigrants from Germany formed a middle class of some cohesion, wedged in between the native peasantry and the establishment classes to \hirh they failed to gain access as a group. Their economic integration and contribution to industrial and commercial civilisation remains unanalysed. In 1936, the Korrespondenzblatt of the Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland painted an attractive picture of the development potential and the climatic and cultural advantages of Brazil's Säo Paulo and Rio de J a n e i r o . " The country had in fact been a major target of European immigrants in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including Germans (Parana, Rio Grande do Sul), Italians and, in the twentieth century. Eastern European Jews. Between 1913 and 1932, 96,844 Jews were recorded as immigrants. In Brazil, too, the closing of the U.S.A. to Eastern Jewish immigrants in the 1920s had increased immigration. They settled in the two major cities in sizeable numbers, with some ICA agricultural settlement in Rio Grande do Sul and scattered Jewish communities in the smaller cities of other states of the large land-mass encompassed by Brazil's borders. The very size of the country had fostered regional autonomism and independence, occasionally anarchic and violent, and had opened the country to foreign " F o r ι he discussion o f immigration 10 Brazil, see Ludwig Lorch, "Abstract and translation in pan of memorandum of M a y 12, 1938, from Dr. Ludwig Lorch of S ä o Paulo to Mr. Paul Bacnvald. Confidential', 1" pp. typescript;, in: Blaustein Library, American Jewish Committee, New York. Latin America file: uiem, 'Condensed report. Confidential from Säo Paulo ;Dr. Lorch;, M a y 1940", German original: ri pp., Knglish translation: 4 pp. :typescript), in: Blaustein Library, loc. nt.\ Frederick Borrhardt >:* . and David Click. "Report of Frederick Borchardt and David Click on R i n d e Janeiro dated New York J u n e '27. 1939', 4 pp. :mimeographed), in: Blaustein Library, loc. nt.; 'Digest of Information about the situation in South American countries, January 1940' see note 34·: American Jeu:^. Year Bk. 5G98 1938;39;, pp. 489 I".; idem. 570Ü 1940:, pp. 4 4 8 f.; Lcvme. loc. cif.. pp. 45 58 see note 27 ; Alfred Hirschherg, 'The [-'.conomic Integration of German-Jewish Immigrants in Säo Paulo', Jewish Social Studies. 7 J a n u a r y 1945 . pp. 31 40; Karl LocwenMein. Bra'il under 1 Vjrtvu. New York 1944: Herring, "p. cit., Rippev, op. ft/.: Encyclopaedia Judaica. vol. 4, cols. 1322 1333 "Brazil·· .

APPENDIX

1445

Jewish Emigration from Germany meddling in some states, e.g., Germans in the southern areas. Being an immigration country, Brazil's establishment politics - as in other countries characterised by family networks, latifundistas, business or military control of civilian governments - had sought, since the xenophobic 1920s, to use cultural nationalism to advance the political and social integration of the country's immigrant groups. With the 1930s, the rate of urban growth and industrialisation had begun to quicken and had created conditions in which the classically corrupt rule of conservative presidents was redefined in twentieth-century semi-fascist terms by the fusion of mass politics and authoritarian social reform against a background of blatantly twisted constitutional traditions. Developments were focused on Getulio Vargas (1883-1954). He had captured the presidency in a military coup in 1930 and had been elected president for four years by a Constitutional Convention whose handiwork - the constitution of 1934 - lasted about one year and embodied, besides social reforms, strong centralising tendencies. (As late as 1932, the state of Säo Paulo had offered armed resistance to Vargas but was defeated by federal troops). A possibly left-inspired revolt, which included elements of the military, gave occasion to oudaw the Left. The Right, led by a confused ideologue (Αςαο Integralista BrasiUira under Plinio Salgado) was manipulated by the dictator to support his Brazilian version of Franco-inspired caudillismo, the Estado Novo (November 1937), but suppressed in May 1938 following an alleged attempt to dislodge the president. A new paper constitution (1937) provided the framework for Brazil's version of authoritarian reform nationalism. German influence - especially strong in the Southern states where German immigrants had settled in large numbers - increased as Brazil entered into bi-lateral barter agreements with Nazi Germany, and obtained industrial equipment in exchange for its agricultural products. In 1937, at their peak, Nazi Germany's exports had reached twice the value of Germany's foreign trade with Great Britain. From then on, the U.S.A. replaced Germany as Brazil's foremost trading partner, and the Vargas regime, represented by its foreign minister Aranha, joined the Allies in August 1942 and declared war on the Axis powers. The immigration policies of the Vargas government developed against a complex background of differences among the federal states, and public opinion as formulated in the press. Early on during Vargas' march to power, the province of Säo Paulo, a commercially and industrially advanced state, had experienced a campaign for increased immigration to the state (July 1935). A year later, its press called for increased immigration as part of a general liberal press campaign that included demands for the protection of Jewish minority rights (April 1936). In contrast, Nazi influence among German settlers in the state of Parana had increased to a point where the Vargas government closed Nazi, Fascist and Integralist centres as harmful to the state (April 1936). In October 1936, latifun· diitas in the state of Matto Grosso advanced a project to settle 10.000 Jewish immigrants in the countryside. The project collapsed when Jewish settlement agencies found the project unsound and warned against its implementation. Yet, in spite of a tradition favouring immigration, the Vargas government followed the neo-mercantilist and nationalist economic protectionism ot ihr period, and look steps to end this tradition. As early as 1930. Labour Minister

1446

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST Herbert A. Strauss

Waldemar Falcäo obtained legislation to curtail immigration. T h e constitutions of 1934 and 1937 included provisions restricting immigratiom, especially Jewish immigration, possibly also in response to Inlegralista antisemiitism and in pursuit of the increased cultural homogeneity of the national population. In 1936, the trial of a Comintern agent (Berger) was used to increase antisemitic feelings. When, in 1937, Vargas's economic policies faced difficulties,, a (secret) directive ordered Brazil's consuls to deny visas to Jews. As a result, financial requirements for admission were raised steeply. (This step may have been influenced also by reports of American-Jewish hostility to his regime, reaching the dictator via his ambassador O. Aranha from Washington.) Already in January ,1937, German Jews arriving in possession of valid tourist visas were refused admission, and eighty such persons already in Brazil were arrested. Their deportation was stayed with the help of aid organisations. This development culminated in a severe system of quotas imposed on Jewish immigration by the National Council of Immigration and Colonisation (1937). Protests lodged by the World Jewish Congress through its president, Nahum Goldman, proved unavailing. A y, p. 39.

APPENDIX

1457

Jewish Emigration from Germany migration waves, primarily from Lithuania and the Baltic countries of Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its Jewish population had grown from about 4,000 in 1880 to 38,000 in 1904, 71,800 in 1926 and 90,600 in 1936. This immigration had taken place in the teeth of Afrikaans restrictions based on the Afrikaans view of the desirable ratio of the white and the black populations. In 1930, the influx of Jewish immigrants had led to the passing of a "Quota Act" which restricted immigration. Although in the 1930s the country was affected probably more than other countries by Nazi antisemitism, and the National Party, in 1937, had called for a stop to all Jewish immigration among other anti-Jewish measures, immigration from Germany profited from the fact that Germans had been exempted from the quota systems imposed by the Immigration Regulation of 1913 and later enactments. In 1933, 653 Jewish immigrants from Germany were recorded as having entered the country, and total figures for 1933-1939 amounted to about 6,000 Jews from Central Europe. Until 1936, admission was granted upon proof of "landing money" of £ 1 0 0 in the possession of the arrival, or upon a guarantee provided by an independent South African citizen. In 1935, the country's economy turned decidedly upward, and attracted immigrants, especially craftsmen and technically skilled personnel. Commercial employees, businessmen and professionals, as usual, found the going rougher. In response to this Jewish "mass immigration", the government imposed new restrictions on Jewish immigration from Germany effective from November 1936, and followed them up with a law (February 1937) that gave sweeping powers of exclusion to a Commission to be appointed by the Governor General. The Commission was authorised to exclude any person from entering the country whose profession - or the profession he might be expected to follow after his arrival was judged to be already represented in adequate numbers in the country. In addition, all arrivals were now required to "show" £ 1 0 0 upon arrival, independent of support papers submitted by South African citizens. With this, the majority occupational groups among German Jews (commercial employees, businessmen) were excluded from the country even if the tight German foreign currency laws (.Devisengesetzgebung) and Jewish impoverishment in Germany had permitted a substantial number of German Jews to acquire £ 1 0 0 for "landing money". When the government announced its impending restrictions in 1936, the Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland chartered a passenger liner (the SS Stuttgart) and sailed 540 Jewish immigrants to Capetown before their visas became invalid. The resettlement of the immigrants appears to have followed English models and suggests a strong separation between immigrant and second generations in a framework of mutual aid for the aged, religious organisation and substantial initial economic problems. The immigration policy of the demographically as yet under-populated Commonwealth member Canada39 "had always been as ethnically selective as it

"For Canada ser the excellent anahsis offered by Irving Arhella and Harold Τ roper, ' "The Line Must be Drawn Somewhere". Canada and Jewish Refusers 1933 1939". Canadian Historical Rtvtru·. 60 June 1979 . No. 2. pp. 179 209 from whuh ihr following presentation is to a larijr part al>stracted. Sec also the literature quoted in Jeunh Immi^mnli of thr \5; autumn 1937, pp. 18 19; jittkichr Auswanderung, 1937. pp. 18 48 New Zealand pp. 30 t". ; Adler-Rudel. p. at., pp. 93 t".; l\ V. Mcddinv;. Aaimilatum to Survival. A Political and Soiial Study nf the Australian jeunh (.'immunity. Mellwiiinir Ν »Λ» York 19(>8. \V. Simon Mattsdorl". "No Tim«· to Grow. Tile Story of the Gross-Brecsi-ncrs in Australia". 1973 mimeographed;; Encyclopaedia Judaua. vol. 3. cols. 877 887, "Australia"

APPENDIX

1461

Jewish Emigration from Germany Central-European immigrants were reported for Australia, and a total of 7,000 Nazi victims (of all kinds) is reported to have arrived between 1935.and 1940. As in Canada, enemy aliens transferred from internment centres in Britain to Australia included Jewish refugees, who were inducted into labour battalions during the war. By 1947, the total number of Jews in Australia was 32,019. By then, Canadian-Jewish organisations had been vitalised and placed under central Jewish representative bodies (Board of Deputies representing all Jewish agencies and organisations, Executive Council of Australian Jewry founded in 1944) and pursued an active programme in education, defence and support for Zionism/ Israel. Included among the immigrants were some former trainees of the German-Jewish non-Zionist agricultural retraining centre Gross-Breesen. Immigrants also founded some immigrant congregations led by a German-Jewish preacher and a rabbi. Attempts made by the chairman of the (Jewish-Territorialist) Freeland League, Dr. I. Steinberg, to obtain permission from Australian authorities for the foundation of a Jewish agricultural colony during the Second World War (the "Kimberley Project") came to naught. Australia, secure in its global distance from the cosmopolitan culture that created and sustained it, failed in 1938 to follow the motherland in yielding to liberal impulses, and the political need to take the pressure off immigration to Palestine while appeasing Nazi Germany: the November Kristallnacht had no repercussions "down under".

VI. T H E G E R M A N - J E W I S H C O M M U N I T Y AND E M I G R A T I O N : T H E P O L I C I E S O F T H E R E I C H S V E R T R E T U N G DER J U D E N IN D E U T S C H L A N D Although it has been the burden of the preceding argument that organised Jewish policies and publicity concerning emigration were not a major motive in the decision of Jews in Germany to emigrate, and in its timing or ultimate direction, they had a distinct influence on numerous emigres once such factors as economic condition or perception, ideological orientation, family connection, and availability of a target country had been weighed. This influence took several forms. German-Jewish public opinion, a highly differentiated opinion articulated by periodicals of different party allegiance and richly structured in its texture through the Gemeinden and numerous associations of all kinds, reacted to the rise of Nazism in a differentiated fashion that defies easy analysis, including the analysis of the major Jewish periodicals. As for other Jewish communities so differentiated, a unified representation had been beyond the grasp of the German-Jewish community, and not for w ant of trying over a seventy-year span prior to its destruction. Only in September 1933 did a group of German-Jew ish leaders succeed in creating a central organisation, the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland a change of name forc ed upon it later on by Nazi authorities ditiering from the original designation " d e r deutschen Juden".11 Even after the Nazi " DiM'ii.vMuns of ι hi· hiMorv of i h r Rtuhii-rrirrtun« b\ participant* a n d < o n t r m p u r a n < - \ i n c l u d e K u r t Alexander. 'Die Ri-11'h-.vrnri-tiim; di-r d e u t e l t e n J u d e n " . :n Fi'ihthnf) R.ihhinrr l)r l.i > Jt-i'ri. cd

1462

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

Herbert A. Strauss emergency motivated German-Jewish leaders to establish this anified representation, the diversity of Jewish organised and cultural life continued and, if anying, intensified, while cultural links between individual Jews and German literature, art, the cinema, or the stage continued to remain alive, especially in the large cities, and postal connections or travel abroad remained possible for numerous others. Thus, in the absence of a comprehensive "intellectual history" of German Jews of the Nazi period, and of the reception of this "history" by the community, the impact of community policy on emigration cainnot be evaluated merely by concentrating on mainstream publications, or the programmatic pub-

Council for the Protection of the Rights and Interests ofJ e w s from Germany, London 1 9 5 3 , pp. 7 6 84; M a x Grucnewald, 'The Beginning of the "Reichsvertrttung" in LB I Year Book /, ( 1 9 5 6 ) , pp. 5 7 - 6 7 ; Leo Baeck, 'In Memory of T w o of our Dead', ibid., pp. 5 1 - 5 6 ; Hugo H a h n , 'Die G r ü n d u n g d e r R c i c h s v e n r e t u n g ' , in In ζιοά

Welten. Siegfried Moses zum fünfundsiebzigsten Geburtstag, e d . H a n s

T r a m e r , Tel-Aviv 1962, pp. 9 7 - 1 0 5 ; Friedrich S. Brodnitz, 'Die Reichsvereretung d e r deutschen J u d e n ' , ibid., pp. 1 0 6 - 1 1 3 ; Adler-Rudel, op. eit., pp. 9 - 2 8 . For references to archival depositions by eyewitnesses and participants see K u r t J a k o b Ball-Kaduri, Das Leben der Juden in Deutschland im Jahre 1333. Ein %ntbmcht. Frankfurt a. Main, pp. 1 3 6 - 1 4 7 ; 2 1 3 - 2 1 4 . For analysis b y others see J a k o b Ball-Kaduri, 'The National Representation of J e w s in Germany. Obstacles and Accomplishments of its Establishments', in Yad Vashem Studies, 2 (1957), pp. 159 f.; idem, 'Von d e r Reichsvertretung zur Reichsvereinigung'. Zeitschriftfur die Geschichte der Juden, T e l - A v i v , 1 ( 1 9 6 4 ) , pp. 1 9 1 199; S h a u i Esh, 'The Establishment of the Rcichsvenretung der J u d e n in Deutschland', in Yad Vashem Studies, 7 ( 1 9 6 8 ) , pp. 1 9 - 3 9 ; Bauer, op. cit., pp. 1 0 9 - 1 1 3 ; Abraham Margaliot, 'The Problem of the Rcscuc of G e r m a n J e w r y During the Years 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 3 9 . The Reasons for the Delay in Their E m i g r a t i o n f r o m t h e T h i r d Reich", in Rescue Attempts During the Holocaust. Proceedings of the Second Tad Vashem International Historical Conference Jerusalem April 8-11, 1974, J e r u s a l e m 1 9 7 7 , p p . 2 4 7 - 2 6 6 ; idem,

'The Dispute over the Leadership of German Jewry', in Yad Vashem Studies ( 1 9 7 4 ) , pp. 1 2 9 - 1 + 8 ; Drobisch, op. cit., pp. 1 1 4 - 1 1 8 ; 1 7 7 - 1 8 3 ; 2 1 4 - 2 1 7 ; 3 1 7 - 3 1 9 . See also Boas, op. cit., pp. 6 7 - 9 3 . Margaliot's thesis of the prime responsibility of Jewish leadership, both Zionist and non-Zionist, for the "delay" in Jewish emigration from Germany and Austria presumes a government-like executive power of this leadership and its influence which is nowhere bome out by closer scrutiny: Jewish leaders, even more than the executives of established governments, faced intractable realities among Jewish populations and in major immigration countries - including Palestine, as the record amply demonstrates - that made much of their planning and lobbying frequently of ephemeral significance for the issue, the emigration and immigration of J e w s from Central Europe during the Nazi period. This "illusion of omnipotence" (H. Feingold's apt phrase) should be laid to rest by the arguments offered in Part I and II of this essay. Drobisch et al.. while writing from an ideological perspective that appears superimposed on the record, nonetheless offer valuable primary d a t a on the history of the period based on archival materials. Some of the participant's records are less than candid, or open only in a veiled way out of respect for the sensibilities of their contemporaries or their relatives, and tend to gloss over the political history of the Reichsvertrttung that pitted ideologies, institutions, personalities, and styles of communication or human relations against each other. As a result, reports on such central issues as the role of the only German-Jewish Quislingfigure Georg Kareski. the policies of Heinrich Stahl : President of the Berlin Jewish GemeindeI, the links Ικ-tween Rnrk\rrr:r f tun% and German authorities in significant domestic areas, are late in being published, .intl a c omprehensive political history even a history limited to central organisations is as yet a desideratum. Most reports also suffer from the narrow locus on Jewish internal events without coming to g r i p s with either the place of Jewish policies in its own historical c o n t e x t preconditions a n d habits of poliiieal behaviour , or with the Nazi background and context of the\e policies. This mu\ well reflect the noii-|>oliiiral framework in w h i c h J e w i s h leaders v i e w e d the |M s

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necessity of interpreting official communications or letters issued! by Jewish or* ganisations in Germany in the proper way, and to convey to foreign friends the Reichsvertretung's suggestions for publicity or political action. This significant "samizdat"-style activity, favoured by Berlin's position as the centre of international organisations and as the capital housing diplomatic corps and listening posts, also remains undocumented. Still another part, the Reichsvertretumg's publication of directives, proclamations, prayers or policy suggestions, or its public protests against antisemitic defamations, like the Stürmer's, and the documents and memoranda it submitted to the Reich government, are on record and have been discussed in print - although here, too, cohesive and methodologically sophisticated analyses by non-participants are as yet missing. For the purpose of this essay, of main interest is the Reicksvertretung's developing policy on emigraxion and its execution both by the central organisation and by its cooperating agencies. T h e chart reflects the table of organisation of the Reichsvertretung on the operational level at a point when the organisation was at the height of its organisational development. It suggests that emigration was only one and, organisationally, at first not a major activity of the Reichsvertretung. Further analysis will provide a test for this first impression. To begin with the organisations serving emigration. 4 · Traditionally, services to migrants to and through Germany from Eastern Europe and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the nineteenth century had been rendered by the Gemeinden and private welfare agencies, as a considerable number of Jewish migrants passed through Germany on their way to overseas destinations. Since 1917, a specialised agency, Hauptstelle für jüdische Wanderfürsorge, with branches across the country, had cared for immigrants to Germany, primarily from Eastern Europe. From 1933 on, it functioned primarily to assist Jews of foreign nationality to leave Germany for their country of origin, or for Western Europe and overseas, to assist in the repatriation to Eastern Europe of Jews of foreign nationality who had returned to Germany following panic flight to Western Europe, and give assistance to other returnees from abroad in 1933-1935. 29,137 persons, the record suggests, were assisted by the Hauptstelle between 1933 and 1939. Of similar origin - aid to Eastern Jews - was the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden (founded in 1901). It had set up a department in aid of emigration in 1904, and had developed into the central Jewish agency in Germany in aid of Jews in need abroad, primarily Jews of Eastern European origin. After 1933, the Hilfsuerein accepted responsibility for aid to emigres from Germany to all countries except Palestine (and Eastern Europe). Its vastly expanded services included counselling (about 60,000 persons sought its advice during the nine-months period April to December 1933 : information: it published elaborate and near-scholarly analyses of major immigration countries overseas in its Korrespondenzhlatl; maintained over 400 correspondents reporting on current developments in immigration countries; sent experts to investigate immigration possibilities in then remote areas, e.g.. Africa, and provided current information to the Jewish press through "Tin· following disrussinn is adapted from Adler-Rudel. op. fit., pp. 76 120 whiih paraphrases in considerable. but well -o:rt ted detail the Arbeitsberichte des ^enlratau-wckunes JUT Hi!FIE und

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APPENDIX

1469

Jewish Emigration from Germany its Pressestellr, negotiations with Nazi agencies and Jewish aid agencies abroad; language courses, and similar services. Most significant was, however, its practical aid. It obtained immigration visas or permits; found transportation, including, in some cases, the chartering of entire ocean steamers to transport emigres overseas; organised group setdement in agricultural colonies overseas (under the auspices of the Jewish Colonization Association - ICA); and provided a wide range^of financial assistance to emigres in the form of travel money, expenses for visas and permits, "show money" (needed for admission at ports in certain countries), overseas passage, the transportation of household goods and similar needs. The HilfsOerein and its fifteen main branches in major cities (most of which were established in 1936 when demand for its services suddenly increased) cooperated with the welfare offices of Gemeinden across the country. It assisted about 33,000 persons to emigrate overseas and about 19,000 persons to enter European countries. It thus helped more German Jews to leave Germany than any other agency. The migration to Palestine was primarily centralised in the Palästina-Amt. The Amt allocated the immigration certificates to Palestine made available by the Jewish Agency for Palestine to Jews in Germany from the semi-annual allotment fixed by the High Commissioner's Office, and thus in practice functioned akin to a visa-granting consulate. Its services included legal, economic and general information about Palestine and immigration, advice to, and screening of, applicants, international negotiations linked with immigration, cooperation with workers' organisations (Hechaluz, Brilh Chaluzim Daliim-Bachad) organised the individual or collective training or retraining of applicants under workers' certificates and similar services. In 1933, 30,000 persons demanded information and other help from its central offices in Berlin. By 1936/1937, decentralisation and changes in the flow of immigration diminished demands for its services. Like the Hilfsverein, the Palästina-Amt gave financial aid to emigres and organised group transports to Palestine especially when immigration was threatened by an impending government cut-ofT. T h e total number of persons helped, according to records, was about 18,000, or about one-third of immigrants to Palestine. Thus, serv ices to migrants by these three member organisations of the tralausschuss für Hilfe und Aufbau, whose work the Reichsvertretung coordinated until they were organisationally incorporated in the parent body in 1936, were available to German Jews from the very beginning. However, as alluded to in the foregoing, these services could not be separated from the economic and social emergency in which a substantial number of Jews in Germany found themselves, especially as a result of the depression and. following 1933, as a result of Nazi persecution. For these social services, the year 1933 signified at first merely an aggravation of a condition they had worked to ameliorate lor years before: German Jewry had developed a wide range of social serv ices for the unemployed, the indigent, youth, the handicapped, the small rural community unable to care for its needy. Now. with the Nazi emergency, the leading social work journal opined, existing institutions had to expand; they would be suiliciem. in their missions, to take on the new problems created by the dismissal of civil sen. ants and professionals, and the needs of craftsmen and small businessmen tor low-cost loans to re-enter the economy.

1470

BYSTANDERS TO THE HOLOCAUST

Herbert A. Strauss The decision was to "assist and reconstruct" Jewish life, and: aid to emigration was one of the "productive" services offered (in opposition to tihe maintenance of the life of the aged, handicapped, or chronically ill - a divisiion of social work into "productive" and "non-productive" segments rejected »ultimately by the profession). In this "constructive" series of services, the above made clear, concern with emigration took front rank between 1933 and 1937. This relates especially to training and occupational retraining and to segments of education and adult education. Dictated by changing conditions and perceptions, the weight in emphasis shifted from "maintenance" services to "productive" or "reconstructive" ones. A comparison of the prevailing philosophy of social services (Sozialpolitik in the somewhat grandiose language of the pericwd) with the policy on emigration adopted by the Reichsvatretung will throw additional light on the distribution of efforts as between maintaining (and reconstructing) Jewish life in Germany and emigration. As indicated in the (only) major German-language periodical dedicated to Jewish services, Jüdische Wohlfahrtspflege und Sozialpolitik, Jewish social services had shared certain assumptions with some of their German colleagues, and had reflected on the goals of their profession in the context of German society. The social Utopia influencing this social work philosophy was derived from Marxism, and provided for the usual Systemzjvang projections based on the Marxian acceptince of :he classical labour-value theory: the capitalistic economy would yield to a system based on manual labour as the middle classes would be proletarianised, and a new socialist ethos would turn the now "productively" engaged "new man", the manual labourer, into the leader of tomorrow. Social workers, armed with this somewhat simplified analysis of social development but apparently confirmed in their beliefs by the impact of the depression on the "liberal" structure of the German economy, used this Marxian Weltanschauung to explain away the basically system-supportive effect of social work.47 German-Jewish Sozialarbeiter, like their colleagues in the U.S.A., had turned these assumptions into an action programme for social change in the Jewish community. The traditional Jewish economic roles had become obsolete. In Germany, Jews had been excluded ("ausgestossen") from the German economy for a decade prior to 1933 since they had failed to adapt to changing conditions. They had therefore slid into a structural crisis that would not lift with the end of the depression in Germany. Jewry was "schwer erschüttert" in its social basis, its "unheilvolle Berufsstruktur" had to be changed. The method to be used by Sozialpolitik to change this crisis situation was a reorientation of Jewish occupational ,T

The following analysis of trends in Jewish social work a n d . as one of its parts, in emigration assistance and planning is based on the analysis of policy directives published in articles in Jiiducht WMfahrUpflegt und Sozialpolitik J W ' S P ' . voLx. 4 1933/1934! to 8 .1938, last issue Octobcr 1938;. They were published by the executive directors of the ^rntralausichiui including M a x Kreutzberger, the editor of the journal, and Paul Kppxtcin. one of bis successors and later the executive co-director of the Reichsirrtrrlunz irr juden m Drutschland see note 41 above:. O n e of the articles, an editorial, is unsigned but must in· presumed authoritative by its placement at the head of the first issue of the year in question 193Ü see Sielow . The "philosophical assumptions" guiding the Utopian Zionist Socialist Kreuizberger were developed in several earlier articles in JW'SP. and repeated in Max Kreiitzberger. T.tule und Anfang', J W S P . 4 1933 1934 . pp. lbl 184. and idem. J ü d i s c h e Sozi.ilarb.-it heute'. JW'SP. 4 1933 1934 , pp. 39 94.

APPENDIX

1471

Jewish Emigration from Germany values: youth had to be trained for manual work, and weaned away from the intellectual professions which were "in tiefer Berufsnot" and traditional middlemen commercialism. Older persons, especially the unemployed, were to be retrained (Umschichtung) in agriculture and the crafts. They would then see "that to be a proletarian is a gift of fortune because it enables man to feed himself by the work of his own hands". Itvnatters little, in this context, that the writer's social Utopia both on the Jewish and on general social levels was incorrect: an empirical study of postindustrial social trends published as early as 1936 in the same journal pointed to the similarity in occupational roles among Jews and the general population and concluded that they "differed only in the speed and balance (GUichmass)" of their development. Here was a Weltanschauung that offered a broad rationale for social action for the depression years. Now, in 1933, Jewish social work was ready for the new tasks: although it had never anticipated the rapid impact of Nazi persecution, the socialist view of Jewish development had been proven correct. For the next decade, occupational retraining would be the main task. Mutual aid, loan banks for small crafts- and businessmen, economic counselling and Jewish labour exchanges would have to be strengthened or newly organised to deal with the new situation. For youth, emigration to Palestine remained the only escape hatch. The majority of German Jews would be unable to emigrate in the foreseeable future. Social work had therefore to maintain their economic potential while Jews fought back against their German surroundings and rejected the lower status and loss of rights they were threatened by. Elaborating this programme a year later, a writer projected (mid-1934·! that only those aged thirty and under would be able to emigrate, in view of the immigration restrictions prevailing in target countries. Including the 70,000 persons already gone (sic - an exaggerated estimate for mid-1934), a rational plan to admit limited quotas of German-Jewish immigrants in the different countries should present no obstacles. (The writer's lists make absurd reading if held against later admission figures.)48 Also in mid-1934, it had become clear that emigration to European countries offered no solution to the crisis. Attempts to adapt the most constructive solution - chalutziutk in Palestine - to Germany and attempts to "normalise" Jewish occupations by founding Jewish agricultural colonies in Germany (as had been proposed by some ideologues of the GermanJewish youth movement) were doomed to failure since the economy of Nazi Germany rejected Jewish craftsmen or agriculturists. Besides Palestine, only overseas settlement offered hope for Jews, especially Jewish youth, once they had chosen new manual oc cupations. Yet, a substantial part of German Jewry would remain incapable of colonisation. It would have to find a basis for its existence in Germany: " D i e Eri).ilium; dieses d e u t s c h e n J u d e n t u m s in seinem wirtM'haftlii hen u n d j u d i s c h - k u l t u r r l l c n Bestände ist wenn nichts U n v o r h e r g e s e h e n e s eintritt e i n e K o m p o n e n t e •.eines Lebenswillens . . . " " Έ . K.ihn. D.i> Ausu.inderunvrsprohlem d e r deutsc hen J u d e n " . J W S P . 4 ί'».i.i l'M4 . pp. J'-'"» T h e vxnler luid .LsMi»ned 7.000 i m m i g r a n t s to ι he U.S.A.. 500 t o IJrcLiI Urii.un. ih.OUO : Palestine ijaintullv eniploved. d e p e n d e n t to hi· .iddeii .

1472

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Herbert A. Strauss although it will have to be prepared to lower its standard of livimg.4· This analysis from the pen of the leading figure of Jewish so>ciaI thought in Germany, the secretary of numerous social agencies including, beifore his emigration in 1935, the Zentralausschuss, corresponds in its factual observations to the social realities faced by the Jewish community. Emigration as ai form of resistance to Nazi persecution was to be limited to the young, especialtly those qualifying for admission to Palestine on C-certificates through occupational retraining (such certificates were limited to persons under thirty-five yeairs of age). The main thrust of Nazi persecution was to be met by economic reconstruction in Germany. Typically, during this first period 1933/mid-1935, the: Reichsvertretung had not found it necessary to create an independent emigration division and relied on the three operating agencies described above. Emigration to Palestine was, in fact, more substantial than to any other country in 1934/1935 (see above). Wealth or poverty, links with family or friends abroad, and similar factors determined all other migratory moves. Emigration remained an individual decision with the sole exception of migration to Palestine and the retraining programme of the agencies concerned. Some ReichsOertretung-'poWcies conflicted with its recommendation for the emigration of the young:50 in December 1934, it modified its push for occupational retraining by yielding to pressures "from several quarters" and adopting a resolution recommending that suitable young persons of school-leaving age be steered into commercial apprenticeship training. Such training, the Zentralausschuss suggested, would be "useful anywhere in the world", and was necessary to guarantee suitable replacements {"Nachwuchs") for Jewish companies. Too many of the young turned to manual training, and this had created a scarcity. This recommendation, it felt, did not imply that it had abandoned its demand for occupational normalisation. Similarly, the jjmtralausschuss felt the need to recommend that young Jewish women serve as household aides (maid servants) since the supply of such aides was limited. Aside from the sexist nature of the second recommendation, the decision to recommend commercial apprenticeships (to supply cheap labour to Jewish firms that formed part of the second of the "two economies" described in Part I of this essay) while numerous commercial employees could not find work and were refused admission to most immigration countries because their occupation was considered undesirable, points to a conflict between emigration and reconstruction in Germany that merits detailed testing of the social effects of the entire range of social welfare and emigration practices and policies. On the level of cultural policies, the problem has already " K r e u t z b e r g c r , toe. cit.. pp. 161 164. T h e concept of "chalutziuth in G e r m a n y " implied acceptance of ihr anti-"lii>eral" collectivist premises of Labour Zionism and its adaptation to Jewish occupational and ideological reconstruction within Grrmany. Jewish newspapers of thr period reflected this U t o p i a n «"heme in their belief that a separate Jewish existence alongside German culture but within G e r m a n economic life would be possible and an aim of Nazi policy see l'art I of this essay for background). T h e phrase "second 'post-emancipatory' emanc ipation" in newspaper editorials e.g. in the C.Y.-^tilun^ symtioliscd a half-way-house stop on the mad to accepting the finality of Jewish expulsion from G e r m a n y . « T h e report on thr decision to recommend placing suitable voting men in coninUToal apprentice* ships is reprinted in Arbntsbnteht des ^entralaasSchusses für Hilft und Aufbau, op. at., 1934. pp. 62.

APPENDIX

1473

Jewish Emigration from Germany been raised previously by people like Robert Weltsch or Ernst Simon who have questioned whether the policy of reconstrucdng a (for a time vibrant) Jewish ghetto culture in Germany, or of relying on the merely psychological feet of renewed Jewish pride ("Tragt ihn mit Stolz, den gelben Fleck!") in combating antisemitism or changing Nazi attitudes towards Jews, had not contributed to complacency and thus, for those staying behind, to their murder in the Holocaust.srsu-in. 'Au.swamiiTiini; 1:Γ> . |)|). 137 1 Hi.

IIIMI

Bcsiaixl «irr jüdisch«·» IJcvulkcrunii in Deutschland'. JWSP. 5

APPENDIX

1475

Jewish Emigration from Germany emigration from Germany, was to become an active agent in this planning effort."· With this position, the programmatic development of the Reicksvertretung come to an end, and events beyond its control increasingly began to dictate its direction. The direction of emigration changed to overseas countries with the imposition of restrictions in Palestine. The figure the Reichsvertretung had projected for the ne*t few years was exceeded by respectable percentages even if its upper limits are taken as a base (25,000 in 1936, 23,000 in 1937). The great hopes held for a settlement of retrained German-Jewish agriculturists by such Social Democratic planners as Shalom Adler-Rudel did not materialise. Jewish emigration remained a matter of individual decision, as Paul Eppstein reported to a meeting of Jewish social workers in Germany held eight weeks before the Kristallnacht (September 9th to 10th, Berlin).47 And the impoverishment of the Jewish community in Germany, i.e., of its "second economic sector" (see Part I of this essay), created the special mission of the Reichsvertretung which by itself secures it an important place in the history of Jewish emigration from Germany: its activities, and the activities of the social agencies whose work it at first coordinated and then incorporated in its structure, had the effect of compensating for the advantages enjoyed by wealth and privilege among German Jews in securing admission to immigration countries. In its last phase before the outbreak of the Second World War the Reicksvertretung channelled funds which it obtained from the transfer schemes Haavara, Paltreu and Al treu to poor emigres in need of "show money" or basic equipment. As late as September 1938, Otto Hirsch, the administrative head of the organisation, had called for the support of the propertied for the financing of emigration, i.e., ways had not yet been found, even at that late hour, to arrange for a system for taxing Jewish wealth in Germany for the purpose of emigration. Published figures show, however, that in spite of Hirsch's admonition, expenditure raised from all sources - including the compulsory government tax (Kirchensteuer) collected as a changing percentage of the income tax and turned over to the Jewish Gemeinden until they lost their status under German law as bodies falling under the provisions of the "public law" (öffendichrechtliche Körperschaften) in 1938 - amounted to RM 20,000,000 while the " F o r the Wanderungsauuchuss of ihc Reiehsvntretung see Adler-Rudel, op. cit., pp. 76--80. An additional board, the ^entraisulle ßir jüdische Auswanderung was set up by the Wandemngsausschuss on 13th December 1937 when pressure to emigrate had increased among'the Jewish population in response to the renewed persecution measures. " T h e 1937 volume of J W S P deals with the following topics in separate articles (excluding miscellaneous notes): Migration Social work Education Occupational training Organisation of social work Grmtindtn and organisations

17 16 16 12 12 6

in addition to statistics (3), health '41. job placement .2; and migration within Germany I ·. For 1938 sre P[aul| F.(ppstcin|, T a g u n g jüdischer Sozialarbeiter". J \ V S P . 8 1938 . pp. 148 152. Includes report on the presentations made by Otto Hirsch and Paul Eppstein to the about 100 assembled social workers at the meeting.

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Herbert A. Strauss percentages contributed by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee to the total budget of the Zentralausschuss i.e., a small part of tfoe total Jewish expenditure for communal purposes, ranged from 28-7 per cent (1936) to 36-3 per cent (1937).** The problems to be solved by social assistance had reached staggering proportions and social workers laboured "deeply und er the shadows of the grave problems to be solved". Equally, the reliance German-Jewish social workers like Eppstein placed on international negotiations to bring about a planned solution of the problem ofJewish emigration from Germany was dashed by reality. Like the efforts of German Jews within Germany or abroad, Jewish agencies, as this essay has made clear for some of them, and the relevant-literature has established for other countries, were at best able to persuade governments to modify their restrictionism in the face of overwhelming emergency conditions like those faced by German Jews after the Kristallnacht. The melancholy record of international negotiations by Jewish spokesmen, e.g., at the Evian Conference, merely anticipated the equally melancholy record of governments in the face of the Holocaust to follow. The Appendix with which we conclude this essay and where selected projects for the group resettlement of German-Jewish refugees are outlined, illustrates well, by way of a final comment, the futility and powerlessness of Jewish policy as a factor in rescuing Jews from Nazi Germany. "For the budget of the Jewish community and foreign contributions see Bauer, op. cit., p. 127.

1477

APPENDIX

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