The Nazi Holocaust: Volume 2 9783110968729, 9783598215605

Table of contents :
Part Two: Central and West European Jewry
The Problem of the Rescue of German Jewry during the Years 1933–1939: The Reasons for the Delay in Their Emigration from the Third Reich
The Dispute over the Leadership of German Jewry (1933–1938)
The “Reichsvereinigung of the Jews in Germany” (1938/9–1943): Problems of Continuity in the Organization and Leadership of German Jewry under the Nationalist Socialist Regime
Sisterhood Under Siege: Feminism and Anti-Semitism in Germany, 1904–1938
Women and the Holocaust: The Case of German and German-Jewish Women
The Dual Role of the “Jewish Center” in Slovakia
The Official Jewish Leadership of Wartime Hungary
The Ambiguity of Collaborationism: The Center of the Jews in Romania (1942–1944)
The Jewish Leadership of France
A Jewish Leader in Vichy France, 1940–1943: The Diary of Raymond Raoul-Lambert
The Jewish Community of France in the Face of Vichy-German Persecution: 1940–44
Jewish Leadership and the Holocaust: The Case of France
The Trap of Legality: The Association of the Jews of Belgium
The Controversy Surrounding the Jewish Council of Amsterdam: From Its Inception to the Present Day
The Controversial Stand of the Joodse Road in the Netherlands: Lodewijk E. Visser’s Struggle
Part Three: The Camps
The Concentration Camps as Part of the National-Socialist System of Domination
Social Differentiation in the German Concentration Camps
Social Stratification in the Concentration Camps
The Zionist Character of the “Self-Government” of Terezin (Theresienstadt): A Study in Historiography
“Operation Reinhard”: Extermination Camps of Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka
The Gas Chambers
Belzec Death Camp
Auschwitz: The History and Characteristics of the Concentration and Extermination Camp
Ghetto in an Annihilation Camp: Jewish Social History in the Holocaust Period and Its Ultimate Limits
The Prisoner’s First Encounter with Auschwitz
Sajmiste – An Extermination Camp in Serbia
Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations
The Case of Bruno Bettelheim and Lina Wertmüller’s Seven Beauties
Copyright Information
Index

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THE NAZI HOLOCAUST

THE NAZI HOLOCAUST Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews

Edited by Michael R. Marrus Series ISBN 0-88736-266-4 1. Perspectives on the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-252-4 2. The Origins of the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-253-2 3. The "Final Solution": The Implementation of Mass Murder ISBN 0-88736-255-9 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-256-7 vol. 2 4. The "Final Solution" Outside Germany ISBN 0-88736-257-5 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-258-3 vol. 2 5. Public Opinion and Relations to the Jews in Nazi Europe ISBN 0-88736-259-1 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-254-0 vol. 2 6. The Victims of the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-260-5 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-261-3 vol. 2 7. Jewish Resistance to the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-262-1 8. Bystanders to the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-263-X vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-264-8 vol. 2 ISBN 0-88736-268-0 vol. 3 9. The End of the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-265-6

THE NAZI HOLOCAUST Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews

6

The Victims of the •

Holocaust

Volume 2

Edited with an Introduction by

Michael R. Marrus University of Toronto

Meckler Westport · London

Publisher's Note The articles and chapters which comprise this collection originally appeared in a wide variety of publications and are reproduced here in facsimile from the highest quality offprints and photocopies available. The reader will notice some occasional marginal shading and text-curl common to photocopying from tightly bound volumes. Every attempt has been made to correct or minimize this effect. The publisher wishes to acknowledge all the individuals and institutions that provided permission to reprint from their publications. Special thanks are due to the Yad Vashem Institute, Jerusalem, the YTVO Institute for Jewish Research, New York, and the Leo Baeck Institute, New York, for their untiring assistance in providing materials from their publications and collections for use in this series. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publlcation Data The Victims of the Holocaust / edited by Michael R. Μarrus. p. cm. — (The Nazi Holocaust; v. 6) Includes index. ISBN 0-88736-260-5 (v. 1 : alk. paper). — ISBN 0-88736-261-3 (v. 2 : alk. paper). — $ (set) 1. Holocaust, Jewish (1939-1945) 2. Jews — Europe — Politics and government. 3. World War, 1939-1945 — Concentration camps. I. Marrus, Michael Robert. Π. Series. D804.3.N39 vol. 6 940.53Ί8 s——dc20 [940.53Ί8] 89-12246 CIP British Library Cataloging In Publication Data The victims of the Holocaust - (The Nazi Holocaust; v.6). 1. Jews, Genocide, 1939-1945 I. Marrus, Michael R. (Michael Robert) Π. Series 940.53Ί5Ό3924 ISBN 0-88736-260-5 v.l ISBN 0-88736-261-3 v.2 ISBN 0-88736-266-4 set Copyright information for articles reproduced in this collection appears at the end of this volume. Introductions and selection copyright © 1989 Mecklar Corporation. All rights reserved. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form by any means without prior written permission of the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in review. Meckler Corporation, 11 Ferry Lane West, Westport, CT 06880. Meek!er Ltd., Grosvenor Gardens House, Grosvenor Gardens, London SW1W 0BS, U.K. Printed on acid free paper. Printed in the United States of America.

Contents Series Preface Introduction

Part One: East European Ghettos Epidemics and Mortality in the Warsaw Ghetto, 1939-1942 ISAIAH TRUNK Religious, Educational and Cultural Problems in the Eastern European Ghetto under German Occupation ISAIAH TRUNK The Mind and Spirit of East European Jewry during the Holocaust ERICH GOLDHAGEN The Cultural Life of the Vilna Ghetto SOLON BEINFELD Historical Research or Slander? NATHAN ECK The Judenrat: Conscious or Unconscious "Tool" RAUL HILBERG The Judenäte—Some Conclusions YEHUDA BAUER The Ghetto as a Form of Government RAUL HILBERG Jewish Elites under German Rule LUCJAN DOBROSZYCKI Adam Czemiakow—The Man and His Supreme Sacrifice ARYEH TARTAKOWER The Judenrat in Warsaw YOSEF KERMISZ The Last Days of Adam Czemiakow MENDEL KOHANSKY The Trial of Alfred Nossig: Traitor or Victim MICHAEL ZYLBERBERG The Reports of a Jewish "Informer" in the Warsaw Ghetto— Selected Documents CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING and ISRAEL GUTMAN

4 8 9 11 16 16 17 19 20 21 23 23

24

Dictator of the Lodz Ghetto: The Strange History of Mordechai Chaim Rumkowski SOLOMON F. BLOOM King of the Ghetto: Mordecai Haim Rumkowski, the Elder of Lodz Ghetto SHMUEL HUPPERT The Ghetto in Litzmannstadt (Lodz) BENDET HERSHKOVITCH Between East and West: Jews from Germany in the Lodz Ghetto AVRAHAM BARKAI Jewish Leadership in Occupied Poland—Postures and Attitudes AHARON WEISS The Relations between the Judenrat and the Jewish Police AHARON WEISS Two "Saviors" Who Failed: Moses Merin of Sosnowiec and Jacob Gens of Vilna PHILIP FRIEDMAN The Judenräte in the Lithuanian Ghettos of Kovno and Vilna YITZHAK ARAD The Concept of Labor in Judenrat Policy YISRAEL GUTMAN

295

307 340 378 440 471

488 501 521

VOLUME TWO

Part Two: Central and West European Jewry The Problem of the Rescue of German Jewry during the Years 1933-1939: The Reasons for the Delay in Their Emigration from the Third Reich ABRAHAM MARGALIOT The Dispute over the Leadership of German Jewry (1933-1938) ABRAHAM MARGALIOT The "Reichsvereinigung of the Jews in Germany"(1938/9-1943): Problems of Continuity in the Organization and Leadership of German Jewry under the Nationalist Socialist Regime O. D.KULKA Sisterhood Under Siege: Feminism and Anti-Semitism in Germany, 1904-1938 MARION KAPLAN Women and the Holocaust: The Case of German and German-Jewish Women SYBIL MILTON

553 572

594

608

631

The Dual Role of the "Jewish Center" in Slovakia LIVIA ROTHKIRCHEN The Official Jewish Leadership of Wartime Hungary RANDOLPH L. BR AHAM The Ambiguity of Collaborationist»: The Center of the Jews in Romania (1942-1944) BELAVAGO The Jewish Leadership of France LENIYAHIL A Jewish Leader in Vichy France, 1940-1943: The Diary of Raymond Raoul-Lambert YERACHMIEL (RICHARD) COHEN The Jewish Community of France in the Face of Vichy-German Persecution: 1940-44 YERACHMIEL (RICHARD) COHEN Jewish Leadership and the Holocaust: The Case of France MICHAEL R. MARRUS The Trap of Legality: The Association of the Jews of Belgium MAXIME STEINBERG The Controversy Surrounding the Jewish Council of Amsterdam: From Its Inception to the Present Day JOSEPH MICHMAN The Controversial Stand of the Joodse Raad in the Netherlands: Lodewijk E. Visser's Struggle JOSEPH MICHMAN

668 677

696 719

736

756 780 797

821

844

Part Three: The Camps The Concentration Camps as Part of the National-Socialist System of Domination FALK PINGEL Social Differentiation in the German Concentration Camps W. GLICKSMAN Social Stratification in the Concentration Camps YISRAEL GUTMAN The Zionist Character of the "Self-Government" of Terezin (Theresienstadt): A Study in Historiography LIVIA ROTHKIRCHEN "Operation Reinhard": Extermination Camps of Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka YITZHAK ARAD

909 924 952

986

1021

The Gas Chambers UWE DIETRICH ADAM Belzec Death Camp MICHAEL TREGENZA Auschwitz: The History and Characteristics of the Concentration and Extermination Camp HERMANN LANGBEIN Ghetto in an Annihilation Camp: Jewish Social History in the Holocaust Period and Its Ultimate Limits OTTO DOV KULKA The Prisoner's First Encounter with Auschwitz MICHALUNGER Sajmiste—An Extermination Camp in Serbia MENACHEM SHELACH Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations BRUNO BETTELHEIM The Case of Bruno Bettelheim and Lina Wertmüller's Seven Beauties ELI PFEFFERKORN

1057 1085

1115

1133 1151 1168 1186 1222

Copyright Information

1241

Index

1247

Series Preface The Holocaust, the murder of close to six million Jews by the Nazis during the Second World War, stands as a dreadful monument to mankind's inhumanity to man. As such, it will continue to be pondered for as long as people care about the past and seek to use it as a guide to the present. In the last two decades, historical investigation of this massacre has been unusually productive, both in the sense of extending our understanding of what happened and in integrating the Holocaust into the general stream of historical consciousness. This series, a collection of English-language historical articles on the Holocaust reproduced in facsimile form, is intended to sample therichvariety of this literature, with particular emphasis on the most recent currents of historical scholarship. However assessed, historians acknowledge a special aura about the Nazis' massacre of European Jewry, that has generally come to berecognizedas one of the watershed events of recorded history. What was singular about this catastrophe was not only the gigantic scale of the killing, but also the systematic, machine-like effort to murder an entire people — including every available Jew — simply for the crime of being Jewish. In theory, no one was to escape — neither the old, nor the infirm, nor even tiny infants. Nothing quite like this had happened before, at least in modem times. By any standard, therefore, the Holocaust stands out. While Jews had known periodic violence in their past, it seems inretrospectthat the rise of radical anti-Jewish ideology, centered on race, set the stage for eventual mass murder. As well, Europeans became inured to death on a mass scale during the colossal bloodletting of the First World War. That conflict provided cover for the slaughter of many hundreds of thousands of Armenians in Turkey, a massacre that Hitler himself seems to have thought a precursor of what he would do in the conquest of the German Lebensraum, or living space, in conquered Europe. Still, the extermination of every living person on the basis of who they were, was something new. For both perpetrators and victims, therefore, decisions taken for what the Nazis called the "Final Solution" began a voyage into the unknown. As the Israeli historian Jacob Katz puts it: "This was an absolute novum, unassimilable in any vocabulary at the disposal of the generation that experienced it." For more than a decade after the war, writing on the Holocaust may be seen in general as part of the process of mourning for the victims — dominated by the urge to bear witness to what had occurred, to commemorate those who had been murdered, and to convey a wanting to those who had escaped. Given the horror and the unprecedented character of these events, it is not surprising that it has taken writers some time to present a coherent, balanced assessment The early 1960s were a turning point The appearance of Raul Hilberg's monumental work, The Destruction of the European Jews, and the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 stimulated debate and investigation. From Israel, the important periodical published by the Yad Vashem Institute [Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority], Yad Vashem Studies, made serious research

available to scholars in English. German and American scholars set to work. Numerous academic conferences and publications in the following decade, sometimes utilizing evidence from trials of war criminals then underway, extended knowledge considerably. As a result, we now have an immense volume of historical writing, a significant sample of which is presented in this series. A glance at the topics covered underscores the vast scale of this history. Investigators have traced the Nazi persecution of the Jews before the implementation of the "Final Solution," showing links both to Nazi ideology and antisemitic tradition. They have indicated how the Germans coordinated their anti-Jewish activities on a European-wide scale in the wake of their territorial conquests, drawing upon their own bureaucracy and those of their allies, enlisting collaborators and various helpers in defeated countries. They have also devoted attention to the victims — whether in East European ghettos or forests, in Central or Western Europe, or in the various concentration and death camps run by the SS. Finally, they have also written extensively on the bystanders — the countries arrayed against the Hitlerian Reich, neutrals, various Christian denominations, and the Jews outside Nazi-dominated Europe. The volumes in this series permit the reader to sample thericharray of scholarship on the history of the Holocaust, and to assess some of the conflicting interpretations. They also testify to a deeper, more sophisticated, and more balanced appreciation than was possible in the immediate wake of these horrifying events. The literature offered here can be studied as historiography — scholars addressing problems of historical interpretation — or, on the deepest level, as a grappling with the most familiar but intractable of questions: How was such a thing possible? *

*

*

I want to express my warm appreciation to all those who helped me in the preparation of these volumes. My principal debt, of course, is to the scholars whose work is represented in these pages. To them, and to the publications in which their essays first appeared, I am grateful not only for permission to reproduce their articles but also for their forbearance in dealing with a necessarily remote editor. I appreciate as well the assistance of the following, who commented on lists of articles that I assembled, helping to make this project an educational experience not only for my readers but also for myself: Yehuda Bauer, Rudolph Binion, Christopher Browning, Saul Friedländer, Henry Friedlander, Raul Hilberg, Jacques Komberg, Walter Laqueur, Franklin Littell, Hubert Locke, Zeev Mankowitz, Sybil Milton, George Mosse, and David Wyman. To be sure, I have sometimes been an obstreperous student, and I have not always accepted the advice that has been kindly proffered. I am alone responsible for the choices here, and for the lacunae that undoubtedly exist Special thanks go to Ralph Carlson, who persuaded me to undertake this project and who took charge of many technical aspects of iL Thanks also to Anthony Abbott of Meckler Corporation who saw the work through to completion. Finally, as so often in the past, I record my lasting debt to my wife, Carol Randi Marrus, without whom I would have been engulfed by this and other projects. Toronto, July 1989

Michael R. Marrus

Introduction Historians have not taken lightly the task of discussing the victims of the Holocaust, and the topic appeared at one time to be an area of the most intense controversy. Some of die earliest writing on the subject contended that the Jews, or their leaders, responded passively to Nazi persecution, even to the point of cooperating unwittingly with the machinery of destruction, and failed to offer any significant resistance to oppression and murder. Such assessments derive, in the first instance, from calls to resistance made by the Jews themselves: "like sheep to the slaughter," indeed, was an ironic, taunting slogan of the Jewish underground which appealed to the Jews to launch an effectively suicidal assault upon their tormentors. One historiographical tradition has maintained this critical posture, identifying a disposition of Jewish leaders to defer to those who wielded power, to succumb to Nazi ruses, and to become, in effect, pliant instruments of the enemies of their people. Such hypotheses have increasingly been put to the test as historians have looked carefully at the specific circumstances of Jewish victimization during the Holocaust For the most part, historical research has tended to emphasize the hopelessness of die Jews' situation and their terrible suffering at the hands of the Germans—particularly in the East European ghettos and the Nazi camps. Various accounts emphasize the Nazis' consistent and successful use of deception and blackmail in dealing with their quarry. Studies of the victims have also stressed their creative and resourceful strategies for survival, conceived with inadequate information, pitiful resources, and pursued against overwhelming, brutal opposition.

Part Two

Central and West European Jewry

CENTRAL A N D W E S T EUROPEAN JEWRY

553

THE PROBLEM OF THE RESCUE OF GERMAN JEWRY DURING THE YEARS 1933-1939; THE REASONS FOR THE DELAY IN THEIR EMIGRATION FROM THE THIRD REICH

ABRAHAM MARGALIOT

in the rescue of German Jewry were different from those which confronted the Jewish communities in the countries occupied by the Nazis. First of all, the Jews of Germany were allowed to leave the Third Reich during the initial eight and one-half years of the Nazi regime (from spring 1933 until October 1941). In fact, during this period the authorities even encouraged the Jews to leave the country.1 Nonetheless, only 26% of German Jewry — 130,000-140,000 persons 2 out of THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED

1

2

On May 20, 1941, Gruppenführer Schellenberg issued an order to the Gestapo and S.D. which stated: "Gemäss der Mitteilung des Reichsmarschalls. .. ist die Judenauswanderung aus [Grossdeutschland] auch während des Krieges... verstärkt durchzuführen," (Akten der Nürnberger V.S.A. Militärgerichte; NG — 3104). See the petition presented by the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland (hereafter—Reichsvertretung Petition) at the Evian Conference in the summer of 1938. It noted that the number of emigrants from the beginning of 1933 until January 1938 was 130,000. The petition was published as an appendix in S. Adler-Rudel, "The Evian Conference on the Refugee Question," Leo Baeck Institute Year Book (hereafter — LBIYB), ΧΙΠ, London, 1968, Appendix I, pp. 262 fL; see also the petition by the Jewish Agency to the Evian Conference, according to which there were 135,000 emigrants during this period; cf. also the petition of the international organizations to the Evian Conference, which mentions 140,000 emigrants:

554

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST ABRAHAM MARGALIOT

a total of over half a million 3 — emigrated during the first five years of the Third Reich, and the number of those who left Germany throughout the entire period of Nazi rule is estimated at only slightly more than fifty per cent.4 We shall attempt to examine the factors which impeded their departure. Let us begin by examining the reactions of the Jews during the first year of National Socialist rule. Following the elections of March 1933, the S.A. abandoned all restraint and intensified its terror campaign. The Jews were panic-stricken and thousands upon thousands

"Memorandum of Certain Jewish Organizations" (Council for German Jewry, ICA, HICEM, Joint Foreign Committee, Agudas Israel World Organization). This petition, as well as the petition by the Jewish Agency, was published in: A. Tartakower and K. R. Grossman, The Jewish Refugee, New York, 1944, Appendix I, pp. 538 if.; cf. statistics in: W. Rosenstock, "Exodus 1933-1939. A Survey of Jewish Emigration from Geimany," LBIYB, I, London, 1956, pp. 384-387; J. Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem, Report of a Survey, London, 1939, pp. 139-142, and Appendix XI. See also: S. Adler-Rudel, Jüdische Selbsthilfe unter dem Naziregime 19331939, Tübingen, 1974, pp. 109-120; Appendix III, p. 216. 3 The Reichsvertretung petition lists the number of Jews in Germany at the beginning of 1933 as being approximately 522,000. * Researchers have had difficulty in estimating how many of those who remained were liquidated, how many died from natural causes, and how many committed suicide. See H. Genschel, Die Verdrängung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich, Göttingen, 1966, pp. 262-263, 291, table ΧΠ; cf. the estimate of G. Reitlinger in The Final Solution, London, 1968, pp. 32n., 535-536, which are based on a comparison between the estimates of Korherr, Himmler's statistician, and those of Bruno Blau, the statistician of the Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland. Also cf. R. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, Chicago, 1961, p. 717, who does not list the sources for his estimates; H. Lamm, Ober die innere und äussere Entwicklung des deutschen Judentums im Dritten Räch, doctoral dissertation, Erlangen, 1951, p.223.Very different figures are quoted in W.Röder, Die deutschen sozialistischen Exilgruppen in Grossbritannien 1940-1945, Hannover, 1968, pp. 15-19; Appendix I, p. 253, which is based on a source of the Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland of November 14, 1941. For the problems and methodology in the statistical analysis of this subject, see A. J. Sherman, Island Refuge; Britain and Refugees from the Third Räch, 19331939, London, 1973, p. 269. 8 I shall not deal here with the important rescue activities conducted by the various organizations, such as He-Halutz, Youth Aliyah, Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden, etc.

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY EMIGRATION OF GERMAN JEWRY

555

(1933-1939)

sought to leave Germany immediately. Thousands of Jews assembled daily in long lines in front of the Palestine Office6 and the various branches of the Hilfsverein,7 seeking aid and advice concerning emigration. Chaim Arlosoroff, who visited Berlin in spring 1933, was profoundly impressed by the large number of applications for immigration to Palestine submitted by individuals,8 who until recently had never even considered such a possibility. How did the Jewish organizations and leaders both inside and outside Germany react to this phenomenon? It seems that they took steps against the spontaneous reaction of the Jewish masses to flee from the Third Reich. Thus, for example, in April 1933, in its first public statement,9 the Central Committee for Relief and Rehabilitation (Zentralausschuss für Hilfe und Aufbau), which incorporated all the large Jewish organizations in Germany, condemned the hasty flight of German Jews as an irresponsible act vis-ä-vis suffering coreligionists, and as an escape from communal obligations. The non-Zionist organizations were even more adamant in their opposition to a large-scale emigration campaign because they believed that it would bring about an unnecessary abandoning of positions and would constitute a blow to their struggle to safeguard the rights of citizens of Jewish origin. At the time, Alfred Hirschberg, a leader of the Central Verein, the largest Jewish organization, even declared that, "There is no need at all to enlarge upon the Utopia of resettlement."10 At the opposite end of the political spectrum was He-Halutz ("The Pioneer"), which trained young people as laborers in preparation for their emigration to Palestine. In one of the movement's publications which appeared at the time, immediate immigration to Israel, without prior preparation, was labelled "a Zionist crime."11 Thus the movement's leaders in Berlin β 7

8 8 10

11

See Jüdische Rundschau (hereafter — J.R.), May 23, 1933, p. 215. "Aus dem Arbeitsbericht des Zentralausschusses für Hilfe und Aufbau für das Jahr 1933," in: Informationsblätter im Auftrage des Zentralausschusses für Hilfe und Aufbau der Juden in Deutschland, Vol. 2, So. 3. J.R., May 23, 1933, p. 215. See C.V-Zeitung (hereafter — C.V.-Z.), April 27, 1933. A. Hirschberg, "Der Centraiverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens," in: Wille und Weg des deutschen Judentums, Berlin, 1935, p. 22. Ober die Arbeit des Hechalutz im Halbjahr Mai-November 1933," Berlin, December 1933, p. 6 (published by Mercaz He-halutz).

556

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST ABRAHAM MARGALIOT

refused to accede to the pleas of the Executive Committee of the Histadrut (Labor Federation) in Tel-Aviv, which demanded that a large number of immigrants be sent immediately.12 Nonetheless, the leaders of He-Halutz energetically began developing training projects, which eventually played a very important role in the emigration of young Jews from Germany. The above summarizes the basic positions adopted by the Jewish organizations which operated within the boundaries of the Third Reich in 1933. As for the policy of Jewish organizations throughout the world, we must first of all examine the discussions of the International Jewish Conference for the Assistance of German Jewry, which met in London in the fall of 1933 (October 29-November 1, 1933). Representatives of the large Jewish communities and organizations (American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Jewish Colonization Association, Central British Fund for German Jewry, Jewish Agency, etc.) participated in the conference. The Jewish leaders assembled resolved that the emigration of the middle-aged, destitute, and retail merchants should be prevented because of the difficulties in their absorption and the anticipated opposition in the potential countries of refuge.13 According to these criteria many German Jews were considered unfit for emigration. The international organizations decided to give most of the funds they had earmarked for professional retraining and emigration to the youth,14 who constituted a minority within the community. Herbert Samuel15 and Stephen Wise,10 who were among the central figures of British and American Jewry respectively, had declared even earlier that the basic solution must be sought in Germany. Emigration to Palestine or to other countries could constitute an acceptable solution for only a small number of German Jews. Chaim Weizmann con12

Records of the Executive Committee of the Israel Federation of Labor, file 24, Germany, emissaries of He-Halutz; correspondence between the Executive Committee of the Labor Federation, signed by Eliyahu Dobkin, and the He-Halutz in Berlin, dated July 12, 19, 29, and 31, 1933. 13 See Central Zionist Archives (hereafter — CZA), L — 1 3 / 1 4 8 . « Ibid. 15 Herbert Samuel to the British House of Commons, on April 13, 1933, quoted in the Digest of Events of Jewish Interest, edited by H. S. Linfield, n.d. (published weekly by the Jewish Statistical Bureau). ig See declaration by Stephen Wise to the Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, according to J.R., April 4, 1933, p. 132.

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY EMIGRATION OF GERMAN JEWRY

557

(1933-1939)

curred with this view at that time. In a speech he delivered in London in late 1933, Weizmann stated that the Zionist Organization, as a national liberation movement, was anxious that the Jews continue their work in Germany and opposed abandoning the positions and rights attained many years ago.17 The public declarations which we have presented clearly reveal the efforts made in 1933 by Jewish organizations both inside and outside the Third Reich to halt the increasing flow of Jews leaving Germany. There were different reasons for the positions adopted by each group. The policies of the Jewish institutions in Germany were based upon the belief that German Jewry had vested rights in that country and upon the desire to safeguard the work of generations of German Jews. The leaders of the Jewish communities in Europe and America viewed the German Jews' ability to persevere as a test-case for the fate of other Jewish communities who were confronted by increasingly powerful anti-Semitic elements. They feared that a general exodus of Jews from the Third Reich might serve as a precedent for anti-Semites elsewhere to expel Jews.18 Thus they encouraged the Jews of Germany not to leave their homes. We have outlined the positions adopted by the various organizations during the first months of the Third Reich. Their stance was to a large degree based on the expectation, which was prevalent among Jews and non-Jews, that the National Socialist regime would not last long. This forecast, however, did not prove accurate and the debate for or against emigration became a permanent item on the agenda of German Jewry. This debate was conducted publicly, in the press, in conferences, and also in closed sessions of community leaders. Moreover, the problem was not only the concern of institutions and organizations. Every single German Jew faced the same problem. It should be emphasized that massive emigration meant the liquidation of the Jewish community in Central Europe. This issue was the subject of a heated controversy between radical Zionists and their opponents. The latter believed that since their families had been living 17

18

Chaim Weizmann's address to the members of the Joint Foreign Committee, November 1, 1933, Weizmann Archives. Tangible proof of this fact, which was the basis for their fear, can be found in an article in Gazeta Warszawska, reprinted in World Jewry, London, April 19, 1935, under the title "Driving out the Jews."

558

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST ABRAHAM MARGALIOT

in Germany for generations they would be able to continue to reside on German soil. Thus, for example, their spokesman Julius Brodnitz declared that, "The history of the Jews of Germany teaches that we must exhibit patience and wait! And indeed we have the ability to wait." 19 There were groups, however, whose opposition to leaving Germany did not stem from an optimistic assessment of the situation, but rather from a sense of obligation. Many of the veteran community leaders considered themselves obligated to continue fulfilling their tasks during the period of persecutions. They stubbornly refused to leave their communities,20 and they also encouraged others to stand their ground during the crisis. There were also groups of assimilationist youth who saw themselves as "the last defenders." They declared in a heroic tone that as German patriots they were forbidden to flee their homeland, to which they were bound heart and soul. They asserted that they had resolved to choose the more difficult course and remain in Germany, even if this decision would lead to their destruction. 21 The members of He-Halutz, led by Enzo Sereni, opposed this viewpoint. At a meeting of the leaders of He-Halutz held in Berlin in 1934, Sereni asserted that German Jewry was doomed to liquidation within the coming decades, and demanded that this inevitable process be used as a means of settling Palestine.22 The position adopted by the Organization of State Zionists was similar. Their leader, Georg Kareski, repeatedly declared that the hour of "the liquidation of German Jewry" 23 had arrived, Mid he bluntly demanded the step-by-step evacuation of the Jewish community. The controversy we have described did not remain confined to theoretical speculation. Each side strove to implement its policies. We « C.V.-Z., December 6, 1934. 20 Numerous examples of this may be found in G. E. Lowenthal (ed.), Bewäh. rung im Untergang, Ein Gedenkbuch, Stuttgart, 1965. 21 See the articles by Hans Joachim Schoeps and his colleagues in Der deutsche Vortrupp, I, Frankfurt, October 1933, and in the subsequent volumes of this journal. 22 J.R., October 5, 1934; see also J.R., October 16, 1934, and March 25, 1935. 25 See G. Kareski, "Liquidation des deutschen Judentums — Konkurs oder Zwangsvergleich," Der Staatszionist, March 21, 1935, cf. petition by the Organization of State Zionists to the German Foreign Ministry, Yad Vashem Archives (hereafter — YVA), JM/2245-K—1506.

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY EMIGRATION OF GERMAN JEWRY

559

(1933-1939)

must, therefore, examine how each of the different institutions operated, and we will begin by describing the work of the Palestine Office. The fact that tens of thousands of persons made use of its services is an indication of the broad scope of its work.24 In addition to the main office in Berlin, an additional 22 branches, manned by hundreds of volunteers and officials, operated throughout the country. They dealt with all matters related to immigration to Palestine, from registration and classification of candidates to planning the future of the immigrants once they arrived.25 The Zionist Organization, which directed the work of the Palestine Office, was confronted by a dilemma. On the one hand, they sought immediate solutions which would alleviate the distress of the Jews in the Diaspora, yet at the same time they had to ensure the future stability of the settlement they were building in Palestine. The debates on this question were an expression of the tremendous gap, which was revealed in the 1930's in all its intensity, between the long-range Zionist vision and the possibilities of finding a practical short-range answer for the urgent needs of the Diaspora. Moreover, this problem must be viewed in light of the existent conditions in Palestine: a small settlement of slightly less than a quarter of a million Jews, deficits in the budget, a shortage of land for settlement, and most important, the policy of the Mandatory Government which limited the number of immigration permits according to its own interests without considering the plight of the Jews in the Diaspora. These circumstances restricted the work of the Palestine Office in Berlin, which was forced to reject the application of two-thirds of those who requested immigration permits to Palestine during the years 1933-1935.20 As time passed, fewer and fewer applicants received affirmative replies, while the situation in Germany became increasingly intolerable. The candidates for immigration as pioneers were selected very carefully and only a small number of individuals above age 35 were 24

25 26

Arbeitsbericht des Zentralausschusses für Hilfe also Bericht der Zionistischen Vereinigung für giertentag, Berlin, 1936, p. 125 ff. Ibid. Address of Dr. Rau, Director of the Palestine 3, 1935, Central Archive for the History of the CAHJP), N —19/94.

und Aufbau, p. 15 ff.; see Deutschland an den Dele'

Office in Berlin, November Jewish People (hereafter —

560

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST ABRAHAM MARGALIOT

granted permits.27 The pioneers were required to undergo professional and ideological training,28 know Hebrew,20 pass a medical examination, etc.30 During this period, the principle of "rescue as a stimulus for growth" was crystallized and thereafter the importance of immigration was measured in qualitative, rather than quantitative, terms.81 Immigration was therefore restricted to select groups,32 especially the young and those with means, and thus it could not serve as a solution for the majority of the Jewish population. The leaders of the Zionist movement, however, did not reconcile themselves to the circumstances which prevented them from finding a remedy for the problems confronting Diaspora Jewry. Their refusal to resign themselves to the situation is manifest in the declarations they issued on the need to prepare for a mass immigration of Jews from Europe. This view was expressed by Berl Katznelson33 and David Ben-Gurion at the 19 th Zionist Congress, held in Lucerne in the summer of 1935;34 by Chaim Weizmann in his speech before the

27

28

20

30

31

32

33

34

Statistical survey by the economist Ernst Kahn, December 4, 1935, CZA, S-25-9703. From the address of Alexander Adler, a leader of the Palestine Office in Berlin, to the convention of the workers of the Palestine Office in Germany, November 3, 1935, CAHJP, N-19-94. Letter of Enzo Sereni to Miriam Rabinowitz, April 16, 1934, Givat Brenner Archive, "Givat Brenner — Germany" correspondence file. Statement by Dr. Herbert Neumann, physician of the Palestine Office, CAHJP, N-19-94. See the address of Siegfried Moses, Chairman of the Zionist Federation of Germany, to the national conference of the Federation, reported in J.R., February 2, 1936. See J.R., November 14, 1933, p. 799: "the way to immigration is open to only a few, those endowed with special qualifications"; see also J.R., November 26, 1933; cf. also the remarks of Franz Meyer, Vice-Chairman of the Zionist Federation of Germany, praising the principle of selectivity, at the national conference of the Federation, reported in J.R., February 7, 1936, p. 6. See B. Katznelson, "Ha-Tziyonut Havevet Teshuvah," Kitvei Berl Katznelson, Vol. 6, Tel-Aviv, 1947, pp. 159-160; see also Katznelson's address to the 20th Zionist Congress, stenographic report of the 20th Zionist Congress (August 21-23, 1937), p. 79. See Ben-Gurionrs address in the Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XIX Zionistenkongresses, Lucerne, 1935, pp. 84-85, 94.

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY EMIGRATION OF GERMAN JEWRY

561

(1933-1939)

Royal Commission in late 193635 and again at the 20th Zionist Congress in the summer of 1937;3® and by Ze'ev Jabotinsky,87 of course, whose demands on this issue became a cardinal principle in his political program. There were, however, other Zionist leaders who issued totally different proclamations. Their position was based on the fear that the immigration of multitudes of refugees from every corner of the earth would impede the creation of a just society in the national home in Palestine. As Arthur Ruppin stated at the Zionist Congress held in Prague in the summer of 1933: "In order that the immigration not flood the existing settlement in Palestine like lava, it must be proportionate to a certain percentage of that settlement."38 Moshe Sharett's statement in 1935 that under certain circumstances it was necessary to treat the Diaspora with a degree of cruelty,39 is also characteristic of this viewpoint. Two years earlier, Berl Katznelson had expressed himself in a similar vein.40 The most clear-cut expression of this view, however, appears in Chaim Weizmann's speech before the Zionist Executive in 1935. On that occasion, he declared that the Zionist movement would have to choose between the immediate rescue of Jews and the establishment of a national project which would ensure 35

89

37

38

39

40

See "Statement made before the Palestine Royal Commission in Jerusalem, on November 25, 1936," in M.W. Weisgal (ed.), Chaim Weizmann, Statesman, Scientist, Builder of the Jewish Commonwealth, New York, 1944, pp. 304 ff. Chaim Weizmann's address to the 20th Zionist Congress, stenographic report of the 20th Zionist Congress, pp. 32-33. See, e.g., Jabotinsky's testimony to the Royal Commission, London, February 1937, printed in A. Hertzberg (ed.), The Zionist Idea, New York, 1959, pp. 559 ff. See "Hitnahalutam shel Yehuda Germanyah be-Eretz Yisrael," an address by Arthur Ruppin to the Zionist Congress held in Prague in 1933. A. Ruppin, Sheloshim Shenot Binyan be-Eretz Yisrael, Jerusalem, 1937, p. 268. See M. Shertok's address to the Zionist General Council, "Moshav ha-Va'ad ha-Po'el ha-Tzioni, Jerusalem, 27 Adar Π—5 Nissan 5695 (1935), p. 250; cf. his address to the 19th Zionist Congress in Lucerne, Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XIX Ziomstenkongr esses, Lucerne, 1935, pp. 445-446. " . . . And we know that we are not able to transfer all of German Jewry and will have to choose on the basis of the cruel criterion of Zionism." Katznelson, "Ha-Tziyonut Hayevet Teshuvah," pp. 159-166, (see note 33).

562

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST ABRAHAM MARGALIOT

lasting redemption for the Jewish people. Under such circumstances, the movement, according to Weizmann, must choose the latter course.41 The fact that various leaders adopted different and at times even contradictory positions on this fateful question, is indicative of the struggles within the Zionist movement over the policies which should be adopted in response to the undermining of Jewish life in Europe. We will now turn to a discussion of the position of the Hilfsverein, which at that time dealt with emigration to all countries except Palestine. Under the leadership of Max Warburg and Mark Wishnitzer, the Hilfsverein established eighteen branches throughout Germany, extended financial assistance and advice to tens of thousands of people," and enabled the emigration of myriads of German Jews.43 The organization also did the basic preparatory work for the dissemination of information regarding immigration and absorption in dozens of countries throughout the world,44 and for the systematic classification of the applicants for emigration. It should be pointed out that the Hilfsverein was guided by the conviction that its duty was not only to assist Jews to leave the country, but also, for their own sake, to deter them from taking this course of action in cases where the chances of their successful absorption abroad appeared slight.45 Both the Hilfsverein and the National Representation of Jews in Germany (Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland) believed that the scope of the emigration must be based on the possibilities of absorption. The arrangements for an orderly departure and successful absorption abroad were, in their opinion, one indivisible task. Thus they did not

« "Moshav ha-Va'ad ha-Po'el ha-Tziyoni," 25 Adar Π, 1935 (March 30, 1935), Jerusalem/London, p. 127 (address by Chaim Weizmann), CZA. 42 In 1933 alone, assistance and advice were extended to 60,000 people. Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden, Korrespondenzblatt, Berlin, August 1934, p. 4. According to a leaflet issued by the Hilfsverein in January 1935, during the period since April 1933, information and advice had been extended to 92,000 people and financial aid for the purposes of emigration to 11,200 people. See CAHJP, AHW, 151, Vol. 63, No. 11. 4S S. Adler-Rudel, Jüdische Selbsthilfe unter dem Naziregime 1933-1939, Tübingen, 1974, pp. 216-217, tables 2-3. 44 Aus der Arbeit des Hilsfvereins der deutschen Juden im Jahre 1933, Berlin, 1934, p. 5. « Ibid., p. 8.

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY EMIGRATION OF GERMAN JEWRY

563

(1933-1939)

attempt to find havens at any price and under any conditions, and they thoroughly investigated the climate, employment situation, cultural, and social conditions in the countries where candidates sought to settle permanently.46 This approach undoubtedly reveals the responsible attitude of the Hilfsverein administration toward the problem of the absorption of the emigrants, but such a policy was unlikely to spur large-scale Jewish emigration at an accelerated rate. On the contrary, it made the task of finding locations which could offer immediate refuge all the more difficult. This position was similar to the stance adopted by the Reichsvertretung, the major German Jewish organization, with whom the Hilfsverein cooperated closely. For a long time, the members of the Reichsvertretung sought a basic solution for the majority of the community inside Germany, and opposed a general exodus from the Third Reich. Their work was based on two fundamental principles: the desire to ensure the existence of the individual and of the autonomous Jewish frameworks, and the support for the emigration of the young and of those who were unable to earn a living.47 While fostering feelings of solidarity, the leaders of the Reichsvertretung established self-help projects. They devoted great efforts to the rehabilitation of the unemployed through loan funds and vocational training.48 Concurrently, the Central Office for Jewish Adult Education operated under the leadership of Martin Buber. Its goal was to deepen the appreciation of Jewish tradition as a means of increasing the spiritual and moral resistance of the community in the face of persecution. According to Otto Hirsch and his colleagues, emigration was only a solution for those who had no other alternative,50 and it could not be considered a desirable remedy for the overall problem. This concept was to some extent altered following the proclamation 46

47 48

49

60

This approach is evident in all the publications of the Hilfsverein put out during the Third Reich, including the periodical Korrespondenzblatt which had a circulation of thousands. See the first statement by the Reichsvertretung, J.R., September 29, 1933. The annual reports issued by the Reichsvertretung until 1939 contain an exact description of this activity. See E. Simon, "Jewish Adult Education in Nazi Germany as Spiritual Resistance," LB1YB, I, London, 1956, pp. 68-93. See Otto Hirsch's statement on this matter in Oer Morgen, February 1934, p. 439.

564

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST ABRAHAM MARGALIOT

of the Nuremberg Laws. At that point, there was a change in their position, which may be seen in the declaration they published in October 1935.51 The trend towards vocational training and emigration grew stronger, but the Reichsveriretung continued to uphold the principle of gradual, planned, orderly emigration. It should be stressed, however, that the implications of the formulation of this principle were two-fold. It was not only an indication of their reservations about mass emigration, but it also constituted an expression of their opposition to the demands of the extreme anti-Semites for the rapid evacuation of the Jews from the Reich. As leaders of the community, they believed it was their duty to safeguard the heritage of German Jewry and preserve the existence of its communities and assets. A characteristic expression of their position may be found in the March 1937 declaration of Alfred Neumeyer, head of the Association of Jewish Communities in Bavaria. "Despite everything one must not contemplate the liquidation of German Jewry."52 Leaders of the international Jewish organizations in New York, Paris, and London expressed similar opinions, as may be seen from Nahum Goldmann's speech at the founding of the World Jewish Congress in 1936, in which he stated that the Jewish world was enjoined to fight for the rights of the Jews in Germany. Their communities must not be liquidated; on the contrary, they must be helped and strengthened. Goldmann claimed that the National Socialists intended to attack not only the Jews living under their rule, but all Jews the world over. The Jews must not abandon the positions and relinquish the rights they had been granted as a result of the Emancipation. They had an established claim to these rights and it was their duty to preserve them to the best of their ability.53 In view of the attitude prevalent in the Jewish world, it is no wonder that two years passed after Adolf Hitler's appointment as Chancellor before the Reichsveriretung established a special department to deal with matters concerning emigration. This department, however, did not achieve much as the Reichsveriretung continued to devote 51 52 53

See J.R., September 24, 1935. B. Ophir (ed.), Pinkas Kehillot Germanyah-Bavaria, Jerusalem, 1972, p. 56. Letter of the German Foreign Ministry reporting on Nahum Goldmann's address, August 27, 1936, YVA, Μ — 3138, AA-Auswanderung der Juden aus Deutschland, Inland II A/B, Vol. I.

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY EMIGRATION OF GERMAN JEWRY

565

(1933-1939)

great efforts to strengthen Jewish life in Germany. Thus it expended considerable sums to transfer destitute families living in remote places to the larger cities, where it was easier to obtain work, and where they could find moral support within the large Jewish communities. The statistics for the year 1936 give us an indication of the scope of the internal migration of Jews, as compared with the Jewish emigration from Germany. During that year, 16,000 Jews left the country34 and at least 10,000 people moved from small settlements to large cities in order to rehabilitate themselves on German soil.55 In December 1937, it was decided to expand the activities of the Emigration Department of the Reichsvertretung, which was hereafter called the Central Authority for Jewish Emigration. This body united all the Jewish agencies in Germany which dealt with the problem and served as a sort of umbrella organization for matters concerning emigration. Since most of the work, however, was done by the Palestine Office and the Hitfsverein, the establishment of the new authority changed very little as far as the policies and actions taken to remedy this situation. It is worthwhile examining whether there were any Jewish leaders who proposed large-scale rescue plans during that period. In order to elucidate the problem we shall present the following facts: On September 13, 1933, the Zionist Federation of Germany transmitted a proposal to the German Foreign Ministry, through Martin Rosenblüth, concerning the emigration of nearly fifty percent of the Jews in Germany within the next ten years.56 Even earlier, in summer 1933, at the Zionist Congress in Prague, Arthur Ruppin had proposed the emigration of 200,000 Jews from Germany during the coming decade.57 In spring 1935, Siegfried Moses proposed systematic emigration for twenty years at a rate of 10,000 Jews per year. According to this plan, most of the emigrants would be young persons, and the majority would go to Palestine.58 Following the proclamation of the 5* See Rosenstock, op. cit., p. 377. See Auswanderung der Juden aus Deutschland; Reichsstelle für das Auswanderungswesen, April 5, 1937, YVA, JM-AA Inland II A / B . »« See YVA, JM/2394-332764-775, September 13, 1933. 57 A. Ruppin, "Hitnahalutam shel Yehudei Germanyah" (see note 38). =8 Letter of Siegfried Moses to Selig Brodetsky, March 17, 1935, CZA, S-7/200.

65

566

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST ABRAHAM MARGALIOT

Nuremberg Laws, Benno Cohen, spokesman for the Zionist Federation, expressed opposition to the idea of mass emigration, which was liable to bring about the liquidation of the Jewsh community in Germany. He proposed that the Jews leave gradually, with 15,000 people emigrating to Palestine annually.59 In this context we must also mention Georg Kareski, leader of the Organization of State Zionists, who in late March 1935, demanded the orderly liquidation of German Jewry and proposed an average annual emigration of 20,000 people during each of the next ten years.60 According to the revised proposal which Kareski presented in 1936, the evacuation would be carried out over a period of twenty-five to thirty years.61 In December 1935, Simon Marks proposed that 100,000 young Jews aged eighteen to thirty-five emigrate from Germany within a four-year period,62 and in spring 1938, Arthur Ruppin suggested an annual emigration of 20,000 Jews from Germany and Austria,63 which had recently been annexed by the Nazis. Also of note is a petition submitted by the Reichsvertretung to the Evian Conference in the summer of 1938, which demanded that the departure over several years of "those qualified for emigration" (auswanderungsfähig) be planned.04 The petition, however, did not state what length of time was required for the emigration, nor did it identify those whom it considered "qualified for emigration." An examination of the various proposals — in terms of the scope and rate of emigration we have presented the maximalist proposals — reveals that they were to be implemented over a period of ten to twenty-five years and would, if executed, remove only part of the total Jewish population — the young, those with means, and the "elements qualified for emigration." Moreover, the proposals were based on the explicit assumption that the problem would thus be solved, and that 59

Report on Benno Cohen's address, J.R., September 24, 1935, p. 3. Kareski, "Liquidation des deutschen Judentums" (see note 23). 61 Letter of Georg Kareski to Ze'ev Jabotinsky, April 9, 1936, Kareski archive. 02 For details on Simon Marks's proposal see YVA, JM — 3138, Inland A / B , Vol. I, Auswanderung der Juden aus Deutschland, Deutsche Botschaft, Washington, February 7, 1936. « Α. Ruppin, Pirka Hayyai, Vol. 3, Tel-Aviv, 1968, pp. 298-299. 64 Reichsvertretung Petition (see note 2) co

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY EMIGRATION OF GERMAN JEWRY

567

(1933-1939)

the government would not harm those Jews who would remain in Germany. Thus it becomes clear, that none of the individuals who drew up the various proposals perceived the unprecedented danger which lay in store for the Jews under the National Socialist regime. Virtually all the Jewish organizations continued their usual "day to day activities" — fundraising drives, and information meetings — and at the same time extended aid to refugees and organized gradual emigration. None of them, however, produced a practical plan for an emergency evacuation. In fact, until early 1939, even the organizers of the illegal immigration to Palestine (on both sides of the political spectrum) did not attempt to extricate the Jews from the Altreich This is undoubtedly quite surprising in view of the fact that illegal immigration was initiated because of the plight of European Jewry and the spread of anti-Semitism. While it is true that "rescue" appeared as a slogan in declarations issued during the 1930's by various institutions and organizations, the contents of the statements reveal how meaningless they were. This was already apparent in the "Public Appeal to the Jews of the Entire World" issued by the Jewish Agency in May 1933.66 The document's authors, who called for action for "rescue," demanded that an emergency drive 'be launched to raise funds for the settlement of German Jewry in Palestine. They did not demand, however, that a large-scale rescue operation be undertaken immediately, nor did they warn that the situation was urgent and time was precious. The lack of a significant response to this "call for rescue" is evident from a programmatical article, from which contained the following passage: "... gilt es, das deutsche Judentum... über diese Zeit in eine bessere hinüber zu retten"" (that means that German Jewry... must be safeguarded during this period to be preserved for a better future). The use of the word "hinüberzureiten" does not mean the immediate evacuation of the Jews from the Third Reich, but rather indicates that they must be helped to survive the period of persecutions on German soil. It appears that this time "rescue" was not considered a clear-cut political principle with operational implications. How can this fact be C5

66 CT

K.Y. Ball-Kaduri, "Ha-Aliyah ha-Bilti Hukkit mi-Geimanyah ha-Natzit," Ydkut Moreshet, Vol. 8, March 1968, pp. 127-144 (hereafter — Ball-Kaduri). See Ha'olam, May 25, 1933. Bayerische Israelitische Gemeindezeitung, June 1, 1933, p. 165.

568

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST ABRAHAM MARGALIOT

explained? It seems that the matter was rooted in the government's policy vis-ä-vis the Jews. We are referring not only to the deliberate deception, but also to the perverse implementation of the anti-Semitic doctrines of the Third Reich during the 1930's. Periods of hostility and oppression alternated with times when the pressure was relaxed, a phenomenon which recurred repeatedly. It appears that the government's policy on the Jewish question was not planned by a central authority. Opposing approaches were adopted by the ruling party and the government ministries as well as by the various federal offices. The delays, pauses, and manifestations of self-restraint in the government's position vis-ä-vis the Jews confused the Jewish community and were viewed by its members as a sign that the government ultimately intended to treat the Jews with forebearance. They were especially encouraged by the fact that many German Jews were allowed to continue their economic activities. It should also be noted that during this period, Jewish communal life was flourishing. Moreover, the authorities did not obstruct the extensive work done by Jewish organizations and educational, cultural, and athletic institutions, and in various instances even facilitated their activities. The politics of the time, which seemed to be relatively moderate, and the reassuring declarations of the country's leaders, influenced the Jewish public. They reinforced the Jews' hope that they would, be able to survive under National Socialist rule. It is clear to us today, however, that all these were merely false signs. The situation changed, however, in 1938, a year during which the government's attitude toward the Jews took a turn for the worse and the Jews were ousted from the German economy. With the annexation of Austria an additional 200,000 Jews were brought under National Socialist rule. During this period the S.D. played an increasingly prominent role in determining the policy vis-ä-vis the Jews and Eichmann's machinery of oppression was activated in Vienna. By this time, many Jews realized the severity of the situation and it seemed that the debate for or against emigration was terminated and had given way to the question of "where to go?" This turnabout did not occur all at once, however, nor did all the hesitations and illusions disappear overnight. Evidence of this may be found in the entry Arthur Ruppin made in his diary upon his return from a visit to Berlin in 1938, "It seems to me that many Jews in Germany do not

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY EMIGRATION OF GERMAN JEWRY

569

(1933-1939)

yet fully and seriously comprehend what has befallen them."08 Ruppin added that, "Rabbi Leo Baeck, an elderly man, claims that eighty or ninety percent of the Christians are not anti-Semitic."09 The most interesting part of Ruppin's diary, however, is his assessment that by the emigration of 20,000 people a year, it would be possible to solve the Jewish question in the Third Reich. (According to his estimate, there were 530,000 Jews under Nazi rule after the annexation of Austria.) The remark, which was made in 1938, is extremely illustrative since it was made by a man known for his realistic approach. It indicates that even experienced political observers found it difficult to foresee events, despite the lessons of five years of National Socialist government. It should be noted that Ruppin was more involved with the problem of the Jews in the Third Reich than anyone else in the upper echelons of the Zionist Organization, as he had headed the Jewish Agency Department for the Settlement of German Immigrants in Palestine. He assiduously followed the events in Central Europe and visited there himself in order to gain a first-hand impression of the situation. The question of how the plight of German Jewry was assessed by those living during that period, is undoubtedly an important element in any evaluation of the problem of rescue. The example we have presented, and others like it, prove quite clearly how limited the ability of those in authority was to forsee the development of Nazi policy and inform the public ahead of time what it could expect. In the wake of the deterioration of the situation in 1938, however, the hopes which many still nurtured quickly disappeared. A shocking declaration issued by the Reichsvertretung in the summer of 193870 stated that the situation was intolerable, and that the Jews of Germany could no longer bear their suffering. The heads of the institutions stressed the urgent need for large-scale emigration, but they still sought to ensure that it would be carried out in an orderly fashion. This theme is also conspicuous in the petition submitted by the leaders of the Reichsvertretung in July 1938 to the Evian Conference.71 They 08

« 70

71

A. Ruppin, Pirkei Hayyai (see note 63). Ibid. Informationsblätter, published by the Reichsvertretung land, 1938, p. 67. Reichsvertretung Petition (see note 2).

der Juden in Deutsch-

570

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST ABRAHAM MARGALIOT

were obviously guided by the desire to prevent a hasty, unorganized flight. In this context, it should be noted that representatives of twenty Jewish organizations from various countries, including Germany, participated in the Evian Conference. In written and oral statements they explained the precarious position of the Jews under National Socialist rule to the representatives at the conference. Not one of them, however, presented the demand for the immediate evacuation of all the Jews in the Third Reich and their transfer abroad to temporary havens. It would appear that they were not yet fully aware of the fact that this was what the situation demanded. In the wake of various measures taken by the Nazi government, the plight of the Jews worsened. Nearly 20,000 Jews who were Polish citizens were expelled from Germany in October 1938, and in early November, "The Night of the Broken Glass" took place. There was no longer any doubt about what course to choose. The number of Jews leaving Germany increased. It is difficult to determine how many German Jews succeeded in leaving the country between summer 1938 and the end of 1939. We have no confirmed statistical data and there are conflicting estimates.lt seems, however, that 100,000 Jews left Germany during this short eighteen month period.72 In view of the fact that 140,000 Jews emigrated during the first five and one-half years of the Third Reich's existence (from 1933 until mid-1938), the number of those who left Germany in 1938 and 1939 is relatively high. From spring 1938, there was also emigration from Reich-annexed Austria, and by the end of the year, 67,000 Jews had emigrated. By June 1939, the figure reached 120,000 people.73 These statistics not only indicate the increase in the dimensions of the emigration during the years 1938 and 1939, but also point to a change in the cause and significance of the flight. If we consider the perception of those who lived during that period of the danger to Jewish existence as a 'basis for understanding the rescue problem, we must note that while the emigration prior to 1938 was considered post factum by the majority to be rescue, the subsequent emigration constituted a deliberate attempt 72

M. Wischnitzer, "Die Jüdische Wanderung unter der Naziherrschaft 19331939," Die Juden in Deutschland, Almanach 1951/52, Frankfurt, 1953, pp. 35-36; see also Rosenstock, op. cit., pp. 385-387. w Ibid.

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY EMIGRATION OF GERMAN JEWRY

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(1933-1939)

to effect rescue from mortal danger.74 Eichmann's machinery of terror in Vienna and the calamities of November 1938 left no doubts as to what was in store for the Jews under the Nazi regime. Another change which took place during this period must be noted. The German Jews who were not accustomed to forging passports, bribing consular officials, and crossing borders illegally, showed great resourcefulness in gaining entry to countries of refuge. The illegal immigration to Palestine is also part of this episode. From March 1939 until September 1940, six transports carried a total of 1,700 people to Palestine.73 While the movement of Jews leaving Germany reached large proportions, those who, despite their desperate efforts did not succeed in finding a place of refuge, grew increasingly depressed. Tens of thousands of Jews pounded in vain on the doors of heartless consuls who implemented the instructions of governments which were indifferent to the fate of the persecuted Jews. Just as these governments refrained from taking forceful action against the racial persecution in the Third Reich, so they showed no readiness to admit Jewish refugees. The international conference convened at Evian in the summer of 1938 with the participation of representatives from thirty-two countries has already been mentioned. It, too, did not help solve the problem. In summation, I have tried to elucidate the reasons which caused a delay in the emigration and rescue of the Jews who lived in the Third Reich. I especially emphasized the factors related to the Jewish community, but this is only one aspect of the problem. The decisive cause for the failure of the rescue attempts which were undertaken during the fateful period when the situation became unbearable and the Jews of Germany tried to flee en masse was rooted in the circumstances which Chaim Weizmann described in November 1936: "For six million Jews in Eastern and Central Europe the world is divided between states in which it is not possible for Jews to live, and others which prevent them from entering their boundaries."7®

74

75

78

See, e.g., "Arbeitsbericht für das Jahr 1938, Hitachduth Olej Germania w'Olej Austria," Haifa, p. 5. Ball-Kaduri, op. cit.; cf. W. Feilchenfeld et. al, Haavarah Transfer nach Palästina, Tübingen, 1972, p. 90. See note 35.

572

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST

The Dispute over the Leadership of German Jewry (1933-1938)* ABRAHAM MARGALIOT of the Third Reich, the Jews of Germany set about reorganising their communal institutions. Their endeavours were accompanied by a clash between advocates and opponents of the proposal to unite all factions under one central authority. Before the National Socialist rise to power, the Jewish community was marked by a multiplicity of organisations and institutions. In addition to the 1,600 local communities (kehillot), there were regional associations of communities, political parties, societies for Jewish culture and for charitable purposes, religious organisations, professional federations, etc. These bodies had not been established according to any unified plan; they were formed at different times on the initiative of some individuals or groups, and functioned without mutual coordination. Furthermore, competition or even hostile relations and duplication of functions were a common phenomenon, since the organisations lacked an all-inclusive organisational framework and overall leadership. This state of affairs changed in 1933, when the German Jews suddenly faced a situation which required leadership and mutual coopeU P O N THE ESTABLISHMENT

* Several articles have been published on the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland, but to date no research has been made on the stand taken by the groups opposing it. The most important works on the Reichsvertretung are: Gruenewald, M., "The Beginning of the Reichsvertretung," ΙΛΟ Baeck Institute Year Book, Vol. I, London, 1956; S. Adler-Rudel, Jüdische Selbsthilfe unter dem Naziregime 1933-1939, Tübingen, 1974. Also of note is the article by Ball-Kaduri, "The National Representation of Jews in Germany—Obstacles and Accomplishments at its Establishment," Yad Vashem Studies, Vol. II, 1958, pp. 159-178 (hereafter—Ball-Kaduri) based on the testimonies of founders and officials of the Reichsvertretung.

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY

573

ABRAHAM Μ ARGALI OT ration. It was thus necessary to transform the medley of independent institutions into a unified system whose parts would work together to solve the pressing problems facing the community. There was opposition to the Establishment in some circles which claimed that what was needed was a radical reorganisation, an internal revolution to match the revolution from without. 1 The proponents of this view were mostly former members of Zionist and non-Zionist youth movements, students and academicians at the start of their careers, who demanded a revitalisation of the Jewish leadership and the appointment of imaginative young people to positions of influence.2 The new elite class which was to arise must dissociate itself from the legacy of the past and from outdated patterns of thought. 3 These circles, however, remained a minority and their radicalism soon evaporated, as the great majority maintained that the existing order would not be corrected by dissolving its foundations. Instead, the decision was made to reinforce and expand the existing framework. In an effort to mould the organisational structure and prevent outside interference 4 two central institutions were established: The Central Committee for Relief and Rehabilitation (Zentralausschuss für Hilfe und Aufbau) 5 and The National Representation of Jews in Germany (Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland). See, for example, the articles in Central Verein-Zeitung (hereafter— C.V.-Z.) by Alfred Hirschberg on May 24, 1933 and by Joachim Schoeps on July 13, 1933. 2 See the following issues of the Jüdische Rundschau (hereafter—J.R.): July 14, 1933, p. 332; July 21, 1933, p. 353; July 28, 1933, p. 371, and the article by Georg Lubinsky, September 20, 1933. See also Israelitisches FamUienblatt (hereafter—ISFAM), May 24, 1933; C.V.-Z., June 29, 1933, p. 247. 3 Der deutsche Vortrupp, Heft 1.—Frankfurt, October 1933, p. 8. 4 See the plan proposed by Arthur Lilienthal in the spring of 1933 which urged the Jews to organise their communal institutions as quickly as possible so that the Government should not impose a leadership. (At the time, Lilienthal was Secretary of the Association of Prussian Communities. He later served as a senior official in the central Jewish institutions.) Archives of the Leo Baeck Institute (ALBI), Jerusalem, Section A-43. 5 A survey of the development of the Central Committee and its activities is found in Informationsblätter im Auftrage des Zentralausschusses für Hilfe und Aufbau, Berlin.

1

574

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST T H E LEADERSHIP OF GERMAN J E W R Y

(1933-1938)

The Central Committee for Relief and Rehabilitation, which was supported by the most influential elements in the community, tried to promote and guide the various organisations engaged in rehabilitation and philanthropy. At the same time the Committee also helped in organising gradual emigration and in financing projects for vocational training. The Reic hsver tretung was established to serve as the representative body of the community vis-ä-vis the government and Jewish organisations throughout the world. It was also charged with strengthening internal unity and bridging factional differences. Its chances for fulfilling its functions depended to a large extent on the support which it received from the various Jewish bodies. In fact, many communities as well as the large federations, on whose initiative the Reichsvertretung had been set up, supported its activities. However, there were several Jewish bodies which opposed it. For this reason the period of the Reichsvertretung was one of a steady struggle over the leadership of the Jewish community in spite of the efforts to maintain internal peace. The opponents of the central institutions were divided among themselves. Some claimed the leading position of authority for themselves while others preferred that the existing state of affairs should continue. Four groups which differed in their character and ideology were prominent in the opposition: (1) assimilationist circles; (2) the independent orthodox; (3) the "Organisation of State Zionists"; (4) the large kehillot. Let us first examine the attitude of the extreme assimilationists. Though split into various factions, they were united at the outset in their opposition to the Reichsvertretung.β They declared it unfit to represent the entire Jewish population because they denied the right of the Zionists and their sympathizers to hold office in an institution which claimed to represent the entire community, including devoted patriots like themselves.7 In their view, German Jewry was deeply divided between members of the old families who had been rooted in the German Fatherland for many generations, and Zionists and Jews of East European origin, who looked to Palestine as β For example, see Jüdisch-liberale Zeitung, March 2, 1934. Τ For example, see Der Schild, No. 20, June 1, 1934; J.R., October 10, 1933, p. 784; November 14, 1934, p. 803.

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY ABRAHAM MARGALIOT

their national home. Between these two extremes were, according to their contention, persons who revealed tendencies in both directions.8 The assimilationist factions were opposed to the establishment of a uniform status for all the Jewish inhabitants of Germany, as demanded by the Reichsvertretung. Instead they urged that grades of civil rights should be introduced for the various groups according to their attachment and loyalty to Germany. 9 Proposals along these lines were submitted to the Chancellory and to the various Ministries, and they negotiated with senior government officials until shortly before the promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws. As early as April 1933 the patriotic assimilationists set up their own Actions Committee (Aktionsausschuss) , 10 to serve as a separate representative body designed to safeguard the rights of their members as citizens of the State and an integral part of the German nation. They constantly stressed their loyalty to the State and the fact that they were deeply rooted in the German land and culture. They even pleaded with the government to authorise them to set up a leadership which would administer the affairs of the Jewish community in the spirit of German patriotism and punctiliously carry out the government's instructions.11 Their suggestions also included a request that all Jewish organisations be united and placed under their direction. 8 See a detailed petition dated May 2, 1934 which was submitted by Max Naumann on behalf of the Verband nationaldeutscher Juden to the Chancellery. The Federal Archives, Koblenz, the Files of the Chancellery, E-611957-67. See also the memorandum of March 20, 1935 which Max Naumann submitted to Adolf Hitler and the German Foreign Minister von Neurath, Yad Vashem Archives (YVA), JM/2245-K/1506 AA, Inland II/A/B. 9 See Max Naumann's petition to the authorities dated September 1, 1935, entitled "Vorschläge für gesetzliche Bestimmungen zur Überwindung der deutschen Judenfrage," photocopy YVA, JM/2246. See the article by Hans Herzfeld in Der Schüd, June 13, 1933. 10 Photocopy YVA, JM-2858/1-831. 11 Petition of May 6, 1933 by the National League of Jewish Frontline Soldiers to Adolf Hitler, The Federal Archives, Koblenz, The Files of the Chancellery, E-611964; See also Max Naumann's petition of May 2, 1933, E-611957-67; See also Naumann's opinion as expressed in C.V.-Z., September 7, 1933.

575

576

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST T H E LEADERSHIP OF GERMAN JEWRY

(1933-1938)

It is proper to stress that, despite their separatist stand, the largest of the factions did participate in the general institutions of the community and even in the Reichsvertretung. They demanded, however, that its functions be limited to social work and that it be denied any political authority,12 because as far as the latter was concerned they had no common denominator with other members of the community. 13 • * * Another group which refused to recognise the supremacy of the Reichsvertretung was the independent Orthodox community composed of members of "Agudath Yisrael" and the "Halberstadt Union" (Halberstädter Verband). They viewed the establishment of a secular body as the supreme authority in the community with suspicion, which was reinforced by the fact that the Reichsvertretung was headed by a Liberal rabbi—Leo Baeck. Just as they had formerly opposed tendencies to form a national union of all German Jews, so they persisted in their separatist attitude during the period of persecution. They were afraid that a unification of organisations might infringe on the autonomy of the orthodox congregations, whose members strictly maintained a religious way of life. Stressing their independent political stand, the orthodox organisations presented a petition to Adolf Hitler in October 1933,14 which expressed their views on the racist policy and its violation of the sanctity of the Jewish religion. They also demanded that they be enabled to live according to their ancestral tradition. (Ritual slaughter was prohibited in the Third Reich.) In the spring of 1934 they set up their own representative body of five members, and even informed the German Chancellor of its establishment.15 They did not intend to compete with the heads of the central institutions, nor did they aspire to leading positions in the Jewish community. Their purpose in establishing the committee was to create a body which would represent the Orthodox communi12 13 14 15

Der Schild, December 17, 1933; February 23, 1934. Der Schild, September 28, 1934; J.R., February 27, 1934. Photocopy YVA, JM/2462/L-383445-452. The declaration of the independent Orthodox community on March 14, 1934, YVA, JM/2461 (L-1428-30).

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY ABRAHAM MARGALIOT

ties vis-a-vis the government and insure the fulfillment of their religious needs in accordance with the Halacha. This matter was their main concern. At the same time they made known their readiness to cooperate with Leo Baeck and his colleagues in defending the legal status and honour of German Jewry, and in providing economic assistance.16 This declaration did not, however, lead to any real rapprochement between the two sides. The orthodox continued to suspect the Reichsvertretung of aspiring to become an institution with coercive authority. For this reason they published a protest in October 1935 against what seemed to them to be the dominating tendency of the Reichsvertretung.17 Their adamant insistence on remaining independent of the general communal institutions was their guiding principle under the National Socialist regime. Thus it is evident that, while the assimilationists were opposed to the political activity of the Reichsvertretung, the independent orthodox objected to its activities within the community. Nevertheless, the particularistic stand of both of them constituted an obstacle to the unification of the whole community under the leadership of a central authority. *

*

*

The stubborn struggle waged by Georg Kareski which agitated Jewish public opinion both inside and outside Germany during the thirties constitutes a separate chapter. Kareski directed his attacks not only against the central institutions but also against the entire array of political parties upon which they were based. He used two bodies in this campaign: the Berlin community on whose adminitration he served, and the "Organisation of State Zionists," a branch of the Revisionist Movement. Kareski discerned the seriousness of the Jewish plight earlier than most of his fellow community workers. He was also one of the first to conclude that not much time was left and that the rate of emigration must be increased.18 He opposed the ΐβ Der Israelit, March 14, 1934. 17 H.B. Auerbach, Die Geschichte des "Bund gesetzestreuer jüdischer Gemeinden Deutschlands" (1919-1938), Tel Aviv, 1972, p. 56. 18 Georg Kareski, "Liquidation des deutschen Judentums—Konkurs oder Zwangsvergleich," Der Staatszionist; March 31, 1935, see also the issues of May 5, 1935, May 19, 1935; Compare Georg Kareski's plan (Plan

577

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST

578

T H E LEADERSHIP OF GERMAN JEWRY

(1933-1938)

Reichsvertretung's long-standing policy of holding Jewish positions in Germany by "Aid and Rehabilitation", and instead demanded that the Jewish communities in the Third Reich be dissolved and the Jewish masses removed from the country. In his opinion the Nazi regime was more than a passing phenomenon and therefore there was no future for Jews in Germany.19 Kareski was adamant in his opposition to the leadership of the community. He believed that it had shown a lack of political insight by delaying Jewish emigration, a policy which was bound in the end to bring disaster upon the German Jews.20 He accused the leaders of failing to recognise the trends and forces which were shaping the government's attitude to the Jews and of misinterpreting the situation. He also opposed the established leadership because of its lack of initiative and inability to guide the community in its hour of need. According to his view, if it maintained its traditional policies it could never succeed in making contacts with the ruling powers in the state in order to solve the Jewish question.21 He called for a radical reform of all the organisational frameworks and the transfer of authority to a new, bold leadership which he himself would head. In order to attain his aims Kareski appears to have received help from persons in the government 22 who also favoured large-scale emigration as a means of removing all the Jews from the Reich. The opposition of most of the community to his appointment to a key position did not, according to his rivals, deter him from trying to attain his goal with the help of Gestapo personnel and officials of the Propaganda Ministry.23 He believed that by serving as the "State-appointed" Commissar for Emigration (Auswanderungskom-

19 20

21 22

23

einer Aussiedlung) which was apparently drawn up in summer 1935, The Kareski Bequest. Der Staatszionist, March 31, 1935. See Kareski's speech delivered in Berlin on February 2, 1937, The Kareski Bequest. Ibid. M. Gruenewald, "About the Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden," Imposed Jewish Governing Bodies Under Nazi Rule, YIVO Colloquium, December 2-5, 1967, New York, 1972, pp. 42-54 (hereafter—YIVO Colloquium). Ibid.

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY ABRAHAM MARGALIOT

missar)24 he could perform a task vital to the persecuted Jews. Kareski's detractors allege that the assistance he received from the German authorities in the internal community conflict was a blow to Jewish autonomy and encouraged the regime to deny the Jewish leaders any freedom of decision. On the other hand, his defenders pose the following question in reply: What other way was open to a man of the opposition to gain the power and authority to remove Jews from the danger zone and enable them to reach safety while there was still time? *

*

*

The opposition of the large communities to the hegemony of the Reichsvertretung was led by the heads of the Berlin community, (Zionists as well as non-Zionists) who were supported by representatives of other communities, especially those of Frankfurt-on-Main and Breslau. There are many aspects to this controversy which lasted for years. A key factor was the differences in age and social status of the disputants. On one side stood the wardens of the communities, members of the old guard, bankers, wealthy businessmen and highranking judges who regarded themselves as the rightful incumbents of the positions of honour. They were supported by the affluent classes, who financed the work of the philanthropic institutions and various societies for cultural activities. Their opponents were young communal workers,25 including former members of youth movements and academicians in their thirties who were just embarking on their careers. They were joined by persons with initiative 26 from various circles, most of whom had hitherto played no role in the life of the Jewish community, but who considered it their duty to work for the common good in this time of distress. The wardens of the old guard resisted any suggestion that their positions of influence in the central organisations be handed over to new claimants. On principle they were not prepared to accept the view that the tremendous

25

28

See the September 11, 1935 petition by Max Schulmann to the German Foreign Office, photocopy YVA, JM/2245 (K-1506); See also Der Staatszionist, August 25, 1935. The most outstanding among them were Ludwig Tietz, Wilfrid Israel, Georg Lubinsky, and Lola Hahn-Warburg. For example, Hans Schaff er and Karl Melchior.

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THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST

WtATSZIONIST

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Document No. 2

Cohen)

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY

893

T H E JOODSE RAAD IN T H E NETHERLANDS

Document No. 5 D. Cohen to L. E. Visser

Amsterdam-Z Van Breestraat 172 14 November 1941 My dear friend, My secretary is entirely trustworthy and because we carry on a great deal of correspondence, I cannot possibly exclude her from these matters. She certainly does not reveal anything and from sheer lack of time I have to dictate everything to her. There is only one exception: your letter hurt me deeply. I, for one, would never have rejected, for any reason whatsover, a meeting which you had requested. I wanted to try to restore in a personal conversation the relationship which exists between us despite all our differences of opinion. The inclination for this should however come from both sides, and therefore I leave it at that. My personal feelings of friendship are no more damaged by this than are yours. With best regards, yours, D. Cohen

Document No. 6 L. E. Visser to D. Cohen

18/11/41 My dear friend, Thank you very much for the information on the letter of the Permanent Committee, which however does not at all change the matter itself, as well as for your reply to the letter of the Coordination Committee.1 1

Reference is to the November 10 letter sent by the Permanent Committee of the Netherlands Israelitic Congregation which dissolved the Coordination Committee.

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST

894

JOSEPH MICH MAN

From your information, it is obvious, first of all, that the German authorities, though they say that they base their decrees on existing laws, do not actually do so, as what they have labelled as interpretation of the Anordnung of Sept. 15th does not fit into this category. Furthermore, the right to interpret these laws has not been granted to them anywhere.2 This is therefore solely the prerogative of the judge. I am interested to know how they can explain away the new law regarding Jewish gatherings3in the J. W. of the 14th inst. which is in direct conflict with par. VII of decree 138/41. It has no basis. The authorities in question can perhaps enforce deviations from existing laws, but not in this manner. The news that "official authorities" also include the Dutch is quite terrible as it means that Jews can no longer turn to their own public authorities. Not only does this order nullify our constitution; it also attempts in a devious fashion to bring about the total isolation of the Jews, something which they could not or dared not accomplish by legal means. I really do not enjoy constantly criticising—you have enough trouble as it is—but I do not understand how both of you could cooperate to prevent our own authorities from doing something for us in this matter, which I am sure they undoubtedly would have done. I cannot possibly accept this way of making laws. In your letter you also broached the fundamental side of the ques2

In an ordinance (Verordnung) issued by the Reichskommissar on June 4, 1941, the appearance of Jews in public was made subject to limitations. On September 15, these limitations were expanded in an order (Anordnung) issued in the name of Generalkommissar Rauter. Of particular importance in understanding the correspondence is clause 3 which reads as follows: "A permit is needed by Jews for any temporary or permanent change in the city or place of residence." Rauter's representatives in Amsterdam interpreted this clause to mean that a permit was needed even for travelling. The Joodse Raad announced (in the Jewish Weekly of October 31) that one must apply to the Joodse Raad in Amsterdam for such permits. ' According to the order of September 15, Jews were not allowed to participate in gatherings. In accordance with the interpretation given the order by the German officials, published in the October 14 issue of the Jewish Weekly, the calling of meetings was even more severely limited than called for by the original order.

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY THE JOODSE RAAD IN THE NETHERLANDS

tion and therefore I, on my part, also wish to reiterate the basis for the C.C.'s opposition. The Jewish Council's standpoint is that we live under a powerful occupier. One must therefore comply totally with his will, and whoever does not believe that, lacks any sense of reality. The matter however is not all that simple. The members of the C.C. and numerous people in the country—among them some of your own coworkers who think as we do—are certainly fully aware that the occupier is here and that he is to be reckoned with, but they believe that that is not all there is to it. For besides this occupier there is another reality—the position one adopts vis-ä-vis the occupation proper. This is a reality which the occupier must and does take into account; this reality you overlook. The attitude of the Jewish Council is to oblige the occupier, to obey his orders meekly, I would almost say, to be subservient to him, hoping thereby "to prevent worse to come," a hope which has not been fulfilled. This, however, is not the attitude of the major and best portion of the Dutch people which does not submit meekly, but wants to stand up for its rights and convictions, wherever and as long as this is at all possible. In one of our meetings you referred to this attitude, with a hint of irony, as "a mere heroic attitude," but that is really the attitude which inspires men such as Colijn, Donner, Telders, Cleveringa'4 and so many * Professor R. P. Cleveringa was one of the jurists who urged the Supreme Council not to acquiesce in the dismissal of Visser. When Professor £. M. Meyers, the most famous Jewish jurist in Holland and a professor at Leyden, was dismissed from his post, Cleveringa lectured in his stead, praised him, and condemned the Germans. The students went on strike, and the university was closed by the Germans. Cleveringa was arrested on November 28, and was released eight months later. Professor Β. M. Telders of Leyden University was Chairman of the Liberal Party and one of the leaders of those who opposed the Germans. He too tried to influence the Supreme Council not to acquiesce in Visser's dismissal. Telders was arrested on December 18, 1940, sent to various concentration camps, and died in Bergen-Belsen on April 6, 1945. J. Donner was a member of the Supreme Council and one of the leaders of the Anti-Revolutionary Party (a Calvinist party). One of the leaders of the Resistance Movement in Holland, he was arrested three times, and was held hostage from June 1941 to April 1943. He protested against the persecution of the Jews. H. Colijn was Holland's most important statesman. He was Prime Minister

895

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THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST JOSEPH MICHMAN

others, the attitude of men who refuse to forfeit their self-respect. Why must it be so different with us Jews? Both of you could have served as an example; it is all the more disastrous that you allowed yourself be pushed in the direction which brought you to that which is apparent from your announcements in the J . W. and which will, probably to your own regret, push you much further yet. All this may cost Dutch Jewry the sympathy of the Dutch people, a sympathy which you yourself once termed one of our most precious assets. It is possible that in the end, the occupier will achieve his goal concerning us, but it is our duty as Dutchmen and as Jews to do everything to hamper him in achieving that goal and refrain from doing anything which might smooth the way for him. That is not what you are doing! Moreover, it is tragic that, once started along this road, you will find it difficult to leave it. You allow yourself and others to be dragged along to such an extent that a "retreat" would lead to catastrophe, the more so since little by little your organisation created quite a number of entities which stand or fall with you. To prove that you serve the Jewish cause well, you call attention to the mitigations you obtained. I am willing to assume that here and there you accomplished something on minor points, but it is highly debatable whether you did not pay too high a price. You certainly did not accomplish more than the C.C. has achieved now and again through the intervention of the Dutch authorities. Moreover, if your publications regarding the refugees are reliable, something of which I am not convinced, then all your achievements amount to less than nothing as compared with what Mr. Frederiks managed to accomplish, as a result of my appeal to the "College." 6 But please do not conclude from the above that I do not admire your great self-

5

five times, and held the post of Minister in several Cabinets. With the surrender of Holland, he published a pamphlet calling for collaboration with the Germans, but immediately thereafter rescinded it, and organised the members of his party for resistance against the Nazis. He was arrested and held hostage, and was later transferred to Germany where he died (1944). Frederiks informed Visser that there would be no further arrests of Jews. The Joodse Raad also received similar notification, and published a notice to that effect in the Jewish Weekly.

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY T H E JOODSE RAAD IN T H E NETHERLANDS

sacrifice—because you yourself probably hate your job—and your great energy, which you display now more brilliantly than ever. On the contrary, I respect that enormously, and therefore regret even more that we can no longer march together. With best regards, tt

Document No. 7 D. Cohen to L. E. Visser Amsterdam-Z Van Breestraat 172 30 November 1941 My dear friend, The reason why you had to wait so long for my reply is because I did not want to dictate this letter, as I noticed that this is not agreeable to you. I am very busy every day, almost from early morning until late at night. Regarding the contents of your letter, it will not be easy for us to agree with each other. This is not because I do not understand or appreciate your point of view. In fact, I would like to concur with it. If ever I called it heroic, it was not done in irony; I did so deliberately. However, just as Heracles the hero perished by fire, so, mutatis mutandis, fared the heroes of our time. Just as he was received among the Gods, again mutatis mutandis, will this be their lot. What I mean is this: in every epoch there are people who pave the way for the future—the strong-minded revolutionaries, and others who make the best of existing conditions—the realists. These two groups can never cooperate with one another. At best the second group may admire the first, but never vice versa. What you call breach of law and order, I view as exercise of power. We are both right, but our viewpoints and the way we see things are different, as

897

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THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST JOSEPH MICHMAN

are the consequences. You offer resistance; I do not exclude resistance, but first try to find a way to make the best of given circumstances. You could therefore not appreciate certain remissions which we achieved, thereby aiding hundreds, even thousands; you only notice, and rightly so from your point of view, that we, by making ourselves accessible, pave the way for measures which harm thousands. It does not help at all if I deny this and maintain that these rules would have been implemented just as well without our knowledge, and without us, or with others who could not have obtained these exemptions. For, in the words of Pindar (and truly, I do not mean this ironically, because he himself says elsewhere that all of us carry something divine within us); "The one is the family of gods, the other of mankind"—and therefore different. Undoubtedly Frederiks achieved a lot—and for that we are indebted to you and to him. However, we achieved more in the minor day-today problems, and now we achieve it with greater ease—as I know from experience—than do the organs of our government. And concerning contact with the latter, and the much wider question, that of our own community1 which is connected with this and with other problems, it is so totally different in practice than what it seems to be in theory. After all, all questions end up with the German authorities and the direct course, as proven, leads more quickly and easily to the goal. During our deliberations about the Van Leer Foundation,2 you yourself saw how alarming the two sides of this problem are, and knowingly chose one specific side, a fact for which many non-Jews blame us. However, one does not escape criticism; and we, 1

2

Cohen is referring to Visser's view that the Jewish public in Holland should not aid the Germans in establishing a barrier between the Jewish community, the local population and the Dutch authorities. The industrialist van Leer, who was allowed to emigrate from Holland in return for a large sum of money, left 600,000 Dutch florins (from the forced sale of his enterprises) at the disposal of the Jewish community "for the advancement of art and science among Dutch Jews." The van Leer Foundation was established on August 26, 1941, and Visser accepted the chairmanship. The foundation organised concerts and theatrical performances, acquired art objects, etc. There were non-Jewish artists who protested against these activities of the foundation, and refused to appear "under Nan sponsorship."

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY

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THE JOODSE RAAD IN THE NETHERLANDS

constantly faced by choices and conscious of the inescapability from the principle of the separate community, try in this respect to make the best of everything from the other side of the problem. I know that many people find fault with us for using the Jewish Weekly for this purpose, but they forget that had we not taken this matter into our hands, this Jewish Weekly would have been published in an entirely different form 3 and that the concessions, which, for example, you will find by comparing the last issue and the previous one, would have been out of the question. But, as I said before, I cannot convince you. So, as you rightly desire, let us each go our own way. We cannot practice the saying of Homer, "Where two go together, each one thinks for the other as well." But I shall think of you. Because one thing would be fatal; if I, putting my own views into practice, should forget yours. Believe me, with cordial regards, D. Cohen

3

Cohen is referring to the activities of de Leon at the beginning of the occupation. The latter was a Revisionist who believed that he would find the Nazis sympathetic to his "fascist" views. Due to his contacts with a German official (a subject which has not as yet been sufficiently researched), he was granted permission to publish a weekly named Ηet Joodsche Weekblad (The Jewish Weekly) at a time when all the Jewish papers were closed down. When the Joodse Raad was established, Asscher and Cohen requested permission to publish a Jewish newspaper. The Germans granted the necessary permit but attached two conditions, that the newspaper be the Jewish Weekly, and that de Leon be a paid member of the editorial board. From that time on de Leon was no longer active on the Jewish Weekly, but he maintained his contacts with the Germans and tried to serve as a counterweight to the leaders of the Joodse Raad. Cohen and Asscher denounced him to a German official (Rodegro) claiming that he had smuggled boxing equipment into the Jewish labour camps. When Rodegro replied that he saw nothing wrong with sports equipment, Cohen and Asscher stated that de Leon was dangerous because he was a supporter of Jabotinsky, the founder of the Jewish Legion. Shortly thereafter, de Leon was arrested, and he died in a concentration camp. After the war, Asscher claimed (in the course of the police interrogation) that de Leon was arrested at his own request.

900

THE VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST JOSEPH MIC Η MAN

Document No. 8 D. Cohen to L. E. Visser Amsterdam-Z Van Breestraat 172 20 December 1941 My dear friend, I cannot possibly tell you how upset and dismayed I am that you wrote to the "College" of the Secretaries General regarding the question of the unsubsidised schools, without informing us. You would then have learned (what every expert in matters of education knows) that the term unsubsidised schools in no way precludes the granting of a subsidy; furthermore, that the way you went about this was exactly the worst you could have chosen, and in addition, that we have already been dealing with this matter for months, and that your intervention would make our work more difficult. It is certainly not a mere phrase when I write that in case this affair falls through, the responsibility is yours and Isaac's, who, without full knowledge of the facts, sent off such a letter. I cannot understand what led you to do this. The Coordination Committee has ceased operation; "constant vigilance" surely does not mean that you want to disrupt our work. I do not ask for an answer on this, but implore you not to take any steps without consulting us. Therefore, do not do anything to rectify this either. We will do whatever we possibly can in this respect. Cordial regards, D. Cohen

CENTRAL AND WEST EUROPEAN JEWRY tf Der, |ii( nlet ale ten rata jltse autorltelten habban one achter firklutrt, dat da be do el l ης aan and ire *aa an dat 00k reiten hleroneer »alt, e*engoed al. so ond«r *Srholtuus In par. 1 00k heratel van gezondheld firiUai. Im.erda*d will*.) 00k da Dultee autorltelten hun bapalin^eo gronden op beataanda vooreebrlften. Ze ontlrnen oohter (behalve blj da bridgeoluba) da «rondalag tea hun optraden aan lntarpretatle, 41a ae aen aan Veroreenlng of Anordauag goven. Ir.dlcn dasa Inter^retatle van dla onaor Jurlaten afvljkt, to de»t dlt In da praktljk ar »einig toe, oadat da beellaelog to eh blj de Sultaa lnet-iatlea llgt an slat blj oiua Jurlataa. s· opcerklogon, «elks 2e Coffrdlnatle-Ceaalaale aaekt, koran overeea •·« die 1 «el«e 00k elder« worden gehoord. Z1J baruaten echter β. I. op aea gebrek a»n beaef, dat «ij leven In eoa beset land, «aar da beaettar 4a •acht haaft, zlja «11 door ta lettan. V1J anzerzljda kuman aiieen trachten of bepa&lde punten ean altlgotle ts varkrljgea, 41a sonder onae tuaaenxaaat nlet uu aljn toage. C - s g l c ? « ο eco χ ι i > Pti

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