The Jewish Dietary Laws in the Ancient World 9781107090347

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments page ix
List of Abbreviations xii
Introduction: Reasonable Creature 1
Organization and Structure 3
1 Hebrew Bible 8
What Not to Eat . . . and Why Not to Eat It 9
Edible and Inedible Animals 9
Blood 19
Sciatic Nerve 20
Slaughtering a Parent and Its Offspring on the Same Day 21
Sending the Mother Bird Away from Her Nest 22
Cooking a Kid in Its Mother’s Milk 24
Animals That Died by Non-Human Agency 25
Conclusion 26
2 Greek and Roman Sources 28
Jews and Pork 29
Noting and Explaining Jewish Pork Abstention 30
Swine Satire 35
Pork-Related Jewish Martyrdom 38
Pork-Related Jewish Martyrdom: A Curious Absence? 43
Conclusion 45
3 The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources 46
Rational Food Laws 49
Animal as Allegory 60
Rationalizing Commensality Restrictions 70
Rephrasing Biblical Rationales 74
Conclusion 75
4 The Hellenistic Period: The New Testament 77
Old Testament Food Laws in the New Testament: Gospels 78
Old Testament Food Laws in the New Testament: Paul 79
The Shared Table 81
Conclusion 85
5 The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources 86
Pork: A Complicated Meat 90
The Illogical Bird’s Nest 94
Meat and Milk 95
Blood and Bugs, Fish and Fowl, Nerves and Nevelah 97
Rationalizing Commensality 101
Conclusion 105
6 The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources 107
Origin and Meaning of the Slaughter Regulations 109
Blood, Meat and Milk, and the Sciatic Nerve 112
Why Various Animals Are Permitted or Prohibited 116
Swine and Signified 117
Fish and Fish Slaughter 121
Flagrant Fowl 123
Other Forbidden Animals 130
Gentile Food and Gentile Table Companions 133
The World to Come 135
Conclusion 139
7 The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Christian Sources 140
Reason Not to Follow the (Ritual) Law 141
Follow the Spirit, Not the Letter, of the Law 142
Allegorically Speaking 143
“Mirror of Human Life”: Animals as Allegories 146
Idol Meat, Strangled Animals, and Blood 153
Break Ties or Break Bread? 155
Conclusion 157
Conclusion: Food Ethic 158
Bibliography 164
Index of Pre-Modern Sources 179
Selected Index of Modern Scholars 190
Selected General Index 192

Citation preview

THE JEWISH DIETARY LAWS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD

In The Jewish Dietary Laws in the Ancient World Jordan D. Rosenblum explores how cultures critique and defend their religious food practices. In particular he focuses on how ancient Jews defended the kosher laws, or kashrut, and how ancient Greeks, Romans, and early Christians critiqued these practices. As the kosher laws are first encountered in the Hebrew Bible, this study is rooted in ancient biblical interpretation. Rosenblum explores how commentators in antiquity understood, applied, altered, innovated upon, and contemporized biblical dietary regulations. He shows that these differing interpretations do not exist within a vacuum; rather, they are informed by a variety of motives, including theological, moral, political, social, and financial considerations. In analyzing these ancient conversations about culture and cuisine, he dissects three rhetorical strategies deployed when justifying various interpretations of ancient Jewish dietary regulations: reason, revelation, and allegory. Finally, Rosenblum reflects upon wider, contemporary debates about food ethics. jordan d. rosenblum is Associate Professor and Belzer Professor of Classical Judaism at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. His research focuses on the literature, culture, and history of the rabbinic movement. He is the author of Food and Identity in Early Rabbinic Judaism (2010) and the co-editor of Religious Competition in the Third-Century CE: Jews, Christians, and the Greco-Roman World (2014). He is also the editor for Ancient Judaism of Currents in Biblical Research.

THE JEWISH DIETARY LAWS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD JORDAN D. ROSENBLUM University of Wisconsin–Madison

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, ny 10006, USA Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107090347 © Jordan D. Rosenblum 2016 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2016 Printed in the United States of America by Sheridan Books, Inc. A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rosenblum, Jordan, 1979– author. The Jewish dietary laws in the ancient world / Jordan D. Rosenblum, University of Wisconsin, Madison. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index. LCCN 2016044120 | ISBN 9781107090347 LCSH: Jews – Dietary laws. | Jews – Food – History. | Rabbinical literature – History and criticism. LCC BM710 .R616 2017 | DDC 296.7/3–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016044120 isbn 978-1-107-09034-7 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

For Josiah

Contents

Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations

page ix xii

Introduction: Reasonable Creature Organization and Structure

1 Hebrew Bible

What Not to Eat . . . and Why Not to Eat It Edible and Inedible Animals Blood Sciatic Nerve Slaughtering a Parent and Its Offspring on the Same Day Sending the Mother Bird Away from Her Nest Cooking a Kid in Its Mother’s Milk Animals That Died by Non-Human Agency Conclusion

2 Greek and Roman Sources

1 3

8

9 9 19 20 21 22 24 25 26

28

Jews and Pork Noting and Explaining Jewish Pork Abstention Swine Satire Pork-Related Jewish Martyrdom Pork-Related Jewish Martyrdom: A Curious Absence? Conclusion

3 The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources Rational Food Laws Animal as Allegory Rationalizing Commensality Restrictions Rephrasing Biblical Rationales Conclusion

4 The Hellenistic Period: The New Testament Old Testament Food Laws in the New Testament: Gospels

vii

29 30 35 38 43 45

46

49 60 70 74 75

77 78

Contents

viii

Old Testament Food Laws in the New Testament: Paul The Shared Table Conclusion

5 The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources Pork: A Complicated Meat The Illogical Bird’s Nest Meat and Milk Blood and Bugs, Fish and Fowl, Nerves and Nevelah Rationalizing Commensality Conclusion

6 The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

79 81 85

86

90 94 95 97 101 105

107

Origin and Meaning of the Slaughter Regulations Blood, Meat and Milk, and the Sciatic Nerve Why Various Animals Are Permitted or Prohibited Swine and Signified Fish and Fish Slaughter Flagrant Fowl Other Forbidden Animals Gentile Food and Gentile Table Companions The World to Come Conclusion

109 112 116 117 121 123 130 133 135 139

7 The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Christian Sources

140

Reason Not to Follow the (Ritual) Law Follow the Spirit, Not the Letter, of the Law Allegorically Speaking “Mirror of Human Life”: Animals as Allegories Idol Meat, Strangled Animals, and Blood Break Ties or Break Bread? Conclusion

141 142 143 146 153 155 157

Conclusion: Food Ethic

158

Bibliography Index of Pre-Modern Sources Selected Index of Modern Scholars Selected General Index

164 179 190 192

Acknowledgments

Although this book was written while sitting alone in an office, many of its ideas were shared with others, whether in classrooms or over a cup of coffee in a hotel lobby at an academic conference. Friends, colleagues, students, family members, and anonymous reviewers have helped shape this book, and I am pleased to have the opportunity to acknowledge them. Due to the limits of space and my memory, I apologize to anyone whom I have omitted. My students are deserving of considerable appreciation, as they have allowed me to use my classroom as a laboratory in which to test my theories. In particular, I would like to thank the hundreds of students who have taken my “Food in Rabbinic Judaism” course at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. Alongside my students, my colleagues have made my time at the University of Wisconsin–Madison rewarding. Lonnie Berger, Don Davis, Tom Dubois, Ralph Grunewald, Anne Hansen, Philip Hollander, Rob Howard, Steve Nadler, Corrie Norman, Dan Quint, Simone Schweber, Nadav Shelef, Karl Shoemaker, Claire Taylor, and Daniel Ussishkin among innumerable others have pushed me intellectually, while also sharing many refreshing beverages and, in the case of Tony Michels, much Chinese food and NYC deli. Thanks to the Wisconsin Idea Seminar, I met David and Jennie Bell, Victor Goldgel-Carballo, Monica Grant, Jonathan Gray, and Sarah Wells. Michael Bernard-Donals is deserving of particular praise for his wisdom as a mentor. The University of Wisconsin–Madison also provided generous financial support. The Graduate School has funded travel to presentations; the Mosse/Weinstein Center for Jewish Studies, along with the Belzer Professorship, have funded research and travel; the Undergraduate Research Scholar program offered support for undergraduate assistance; and the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) provided summer salary and graduate research assistantships. ix

x

Acknowledgments

Undergraduates Ariela Haro von Mogel and especially Emily Hilts helped with the initial exploration of secondary literature. Graduate student research greatly improved this project by helping with matters small and large. Chance McMahon compiled the indices. Christopher Jones, Israel Haas, and Catherine Bonesho worked tirelessly; they pushed me to greater precision in my thinking and took seriously my plea to be brutally honest. Catherine in particular deserves acknowledgment for reading through an entire early draft. Administrative matters were handled capably and efficiently by Diane Bollant in comparative literature and folklore studies and Kesha Weber in Jewish studies. Everyone at Cambridge University Press has been extremely efficient and supportive. Lewis Bateman and Beatrice Rehl have been great editors and advocates for my work. Ian McIver shepherded the manuscript through its production phase. Several conferences and institutions allowed me the opportunity to discuss my work in progress, including: American Academy of Religion; Association for Jewish Studies; Copenhagen University; Creighton University; Georgetown University; Harvard Law School; Judaica Electronic Workgroup at Vanderbilt University; Rutgers University; Society of Biblical Literature; University of Cincinnati; University of Virginia; University of Wisconsin–Madison Department of Comparative Literature and Folklore Studies, Mosse/Weinstein Center for Jewish Studies and Law School; and Yale University. I thank my hosts, copanelists, and audiences. Naftali Cohn, David Freidenreich, Christopher Jones, Jason Kalman, Jonathan Kaplan, Maud Kozody, Phil Lieberman, Patricia Rosenmeyer, Daniel Ullucci, and Katja Vehlow generously offered their time to critique specific chapters. Steven Fine suggested the cover image. Dov Weiss and Christine Hayes offered insights into my comments on The World to Come. Despite all of these colleagues’ diligence, any mistakes that remain in this book are to be set on my own table and not theirs. I am lucky that the line between colleague and friend is often a blurry one. In addition to the many people mentioned elsewhere, I wish to acknowledge the following people: Daniel Kapust and Eunsook Jung are wonderful friends who run the best Korean restaurant in town, which just happens to be located in their home kitchen. Luke Whitmore and Judith Sone somehow ended up in Wisconsin, too, for which I am very grateful. Rob Peyton provided many musical interludes in his basement music room. Michael Slater and Erin Cline always offer great perspective. Lily

Acknowledgments

xi

Vuong has been on adventures in Israel and America with me. Nathaniel DesRosiers is always game to discuss strategy and RS theory, whether at a Bruins game or on a lake in rural Maine. Daniel Ullucci taught me more over a barbeque than I learned in many a classroom. Steven Larson makes me laugh and learn. Gregg Gardner has listened patiently to many of my half-baked ideas and helped me see what needs to go back in the oven, and what should be discarded in the trash. David Freidenreich remains a wonderful conversation partner. Eitan Kensky provides a good perspective on academic and fantasy baseball matters. Saul Olyan somehow manages to teach me without making me feel like I am still a nervous student in his graduate seminars. Michael Satlow continues to offer sage advice. Beth Berkowitz and Elizabeth Shanks Alexander pushed me in new directions. Debra Scoggins Ballentine, David Brodsky, Jonathan Brumberg-Kraus, Yedida Eisenstat, Ari Finkelstein, Aaron Gross, Joel Hecker, Jonathan Kaplan, Jonathan Klawans, Phil Lieberman, Susan Marks, Kevin McGinnis, Andrew McGowan, Jody Myers, Jon Schofer, Nathan Schumer, Arthur Urbano, and Katja Vehlow all provided insight and humor, and make the scholarly life far more enjoyable. Ross Wolfson and Stan Zipper are life-long friends that remind me that life is more than just academia. My family – my mother and stepfather Harold (Fess); Ian; Uncle Rom, Aunt Debby, and Avi; Dad, Rose, and Michael; Aunt Elaine; Ron and Eugenie; and Sarah and Scott – offers me wonderful support and encouragement. My wife, Valerie, is deserving of particular praise. Among other things, she has made my arguments crisper and more elegant; my e-mails more coherent; and my palate more refined. She makes me want to be a better person. She is my rock. Finally, this book is dedicated to our son Josiah Henry Rosenblum. Josiah was born as I completed the first draft of this book. At its heart, this book explores how people justify the way they eat. Your mother and I look forward to explaining to you why we eat the way we do. In the meantime, we look forward to more sleep.

Abbreviations

1QapGen 11QTa AB ANF b. b. BJS CBQ CD Chr Col Cor Dan Deut Eccl Esth ETL Exod Ezek Gal Gen GLAJJ Hos HTR Isa JAAR JAJS JBL Jer JJS

Genesis Apocryphon Temple Scrolla Anchor Bible Ante-Nicene Fathers Babylonian Talmud (Bavli) ben/bar (“son” in Hebrew/Aramaic) Brown Judaic Studies Catholic Biblical Quarterly Damascus Document (Cairo Genizah copy) Chronicles Colossians Corinthians Daniel Deuteronomy Ecclesiastes Esther Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses Exodus Ezekiel Galatians Genesis Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism Hosea Harvard Theological Review Isaiah Journal of the American Academy of Religion Journal of Ancient Judaism Supplement Series Journal of Biblical Literature Jeremiah Journal of Jewish Studies xii

List of Abbreviations JQR JSIJ JSJ JSNT JSOTSup JSQ Kgs LCL Lev m. Matt NPNF NRSV Num OTL OTP PGM Prov Ps R. Rom Sam SJLA Song t. Tim TSAJ y. ZAW

xiii

Jewish Quarterly Review Jewish Studies, an Internet Journal Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic, and Roman Periods Journal for the Study of the New Testament Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series Jewish Studies Quarterly Kings Loeb Classical Library Leviticus Mishnah Matthew Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers New Revised Standard Version Numbers Old Testament Library Old Testament Pseudepigrapha Papyri Graecae Magicae (Greek Magical Papyri) Proverbs Psalm Rabbi Romans Samuel Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity Song of Songs Tosefta Timothy Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism Jerusalem Talmud (Yerushalmi) Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft

Introduction: Reasonable Creature

I believe I have omitted mentioning that, in my first voyage from Boston [in 1724], being becalm’d off Block Island, our people set about catching cod, and hauled up a great many. Hitherto I had stuck to my resolution of not eating animal food, and on this occasion I consider’d, with my master Tryon, the taking every fish as a kind of unprovoked murder, since none of them had, or ever could do us any injury that might justify the slaughter. All this seemed very reasonable. But I had formerly been a great lover of fish, and, when this came hot out of the frying-pan, it smelt admirably well. I balanc’d some time between principle and inclination, till I recollected that, when the fish were opened, I saw smaller fish taken out of their stomachs; then thought I, “If you eat one another, I don’t see why we mayn’t eat you.” So I din’d upon cod very heartily, and continued to eat with other people, returning only now and then occasionally to a vegetable diet. So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for every thing one has a mind to do.1

Benjamin Franklin’s astute observation regarding rationalizing one’s food choices serves as an excellent frame for this book, which explores how cultures critique and defend foodways. While scholars have discussed cross-culturally how and why “We” eat the way “We” do and “They” eat the way “They” do, not enough attention has been paid to the internal and external justifications for one’s cuisine.2 My dataset for this project is the 1

2

Benjamin Franklin, The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin, ed. Peter Conn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 31, original emphasis. For an engaging biography of Franklin, see Walter Isaacson, Benjamin Franklin: An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), in which the above passage is discussed on pp. 36–37. Further, in regard to the dataset that I explore herein, the little previous work done on the subject is either piecemeal, dated, problematic or not scholarly. For an example of the former, see S. Stein, “The Dietary Laws in Rabbinic and Patristic Literature,” in Kurt Aland and F. L. Cross (eds.), Studia Patristica 2 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957), 141–154; and the latter, see Irving Welfield, Why Kosher? An Anthology of Answers (New York: Roman & Littlefield, 2005 [1996]).

1

2

Introduction: Reasonable Creature

Jewish food laws (kashrut). In particular, I am interested in how ancient Jews defended the kosher laws and how ancient Others – including the Greeks, Romans, and early Christians – critiqued these practices.3 Since the kosher laws are first encountered in the Hebrew Bible, the heart of this project is ancient biblical interpretation. I will explore how ancient commentators understood, applied, altered, innovated upon, and contemporized biblical dietary regulations. These interpretations do not exist in a vacuum; they are informed by a variety of motives, including theological, moral, political, social, and financial. In particular, I discuss throughout this book three rhetorical strategies for justifying various interpretations of these regulations: reason, revelation, and allegory. Reason refers to offering rational explanations for food practices. Since “rational” is a culturally-relative term laden with (often misrecognized)4 meaning, I explore how and why each group deploys this strategy. Revelation refers to appeals to divine fiat: the laws are to be followed simply because God says so.5 Revelation-based justifications are common and, as we shall see, often unstated assumptions. Allegory encompasses the allegorical interpretations of the law. Although allegory could be considered a sub-group of “reason,” both the qualitative and quantitative appearances of this rhetorical strategy suggest that it deserves consideration on its own. Forbidden animals are often understood to represent certain traits that humans must not follow. These categories need not be mutually exclusive. Thus, two Alexandrian authors, Philo and Clement (discussed in chapters 3 and 7, respectively), use reason and revelation, as well as allegory. However, the ways in which they deploy these strategies, and the assumptions that underlie their arguments, lead to important differences. For Philo, a Jew, the law must be followed both literally and figuratively. For Clement, a Christian, only

3

4

5

Much of the wording in this paragraph draws from the introduction to an earlier essay I wrote. See Jordan D. Rosenblum, “Justifications for Foodways and the Study of Commensality,” in Susanne Kerner, Cynthia Chou, and Morten Warmind (eds.), Commensality: From Everyday Food to Feast (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 189. I adopt the concept of “misrecognition” from the work of Pierre Bourdieu. An excellent summary of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of misrecognition can be found in David Swartz, Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 88–93. As I was completing final revisions of this manuscript, I learned of a new book: Christine Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law? Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). Though we worked completely independently of one another, our projects are complementary. Hayes’ broader argument regarding the rationality of divine law for Hellenistic Jewish authors vs. the irrationality of divine law for ancient rabbinic authors maps neatly onto my reason/revelation schema.

Organization and Structure

3

the Old Testament moral law endures; the ritual law no longer applies.6 As such, the law should only be followed figuratively. As this example indicates, ancient rationalizations for the kosher laws can be used as a means to examine how biblical interpretation connects to larger social and theological concerns. They can also be used to discuss intra- and inter-religious dialogue. For example, Philo and Clement both lived in Alexandria, Egypt (albeit in different centuries). Looking for convergences like these can offer interesting avenues for comparison. However, I argue that these interactions are almost always more imagined than real, in that the “Other” described is a fictionalized “hermeneutical Other” rather than a “historical Other”; it is “a construct derived not from social interaction but rather from scholarly engagement with sacred texts.”7 What these sources allow us to do is to glimpse at the options being explored in the same time and space, even if they are not in direct conversation with one another.

Organization and Structure A key component of this project is the history of interpretation of biblical dietary laws. As such, it is essential that the reader first becomes acquainted with what the Hebrew Bible says – and even more importantly, what it does not say. Chapter 1 therefore examines all of the biblical food laws and their justifications (or, almost always, their lack thereof), including: abstaining from certain animals (sometimes categorically and other times specifically), animals that die a natural death, animals killed by other animals, blood, the sciatic nerve, and slaughtering a mother and her child on the same day; sending away the mother bird from the nest before taking her eggs/chicks; and cooking a kid in its mother’s milk.8 In discussing the supposed rationalizations for these regulations, I consider well-known anthropological and popular accounts (especially those of Mary Douglas, Jacob Milgrom, and Marvin Harris). I conclude that the biblical laws are almost never explicitly justified, other than by divine decree (i.e. based on revelation). This observation frames the rest of 6 7

8

On Clement’s inconsistency on this subject, see Chapter 7 n. 21. David M. Freidenreich, Foreigners and Their Food: Constructing Otherness in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011), 114, in which Freidenreich discusses Jeremy Cohen’s concept of “the hermeneutical Jew.” See Jeremy Cohen, Living Letters of the Law: Ideas of the Jew in Medieval Christianity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999). On my focus on daily, and not festival, food laws in this book, see Chapter 1 n. 46.

4

Introduction: Reasonable Creature

the book, which examines authors who, given this lack of justification in the biblical corpus, attempt to provide rationales for these dietary rules. These rationales, in turn, are used to critique, defend, alter, and/or extend biblical food laws. Beginning in the Hellenistic period, Jews (and later Christians) were not the only ones commenting on Jewish food laws. Greek and Roman witnesses noted these practices as well: sometimes with curiosity, sometimes with amusement, and other times with outright hostility. In Chapter 2, we encounter Greek and Roman testimony concerning Jewish food rules, especially the growing interest in Jewish abstention from pork. I treat all of the extant evidence for Greek and Roman testimony (some of which is encountered in Hellenistic period Jewish sources) in a single chapter for three reasons. First, since there is not much extant evidence, it fits more neatly into a single chapter rather than in multiple small chapters scattered throughout this volume. Second, the majority of this book examines Jewish and Christian discussions about biblical food laws, for whom the biblical laws were divinely authored. Though they debated the nature and interpretation of biblical laws, both ancient Jews and Christians understood the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament to play a pivotal role in their everyday existence, which distinguished them from other Greeks and Romans. Third, in a related point, it is necessary to contextualize this material against the backdrop of other ancient Mediterranean discussions on the topic. Treating all Greek and Roman testimony here allows me to set up arguments about early Jewish and Christian authors that I make in subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 examines Jewish sources from the Hellenistic period. What, how, and with whom one should or should not eat features prominently in debates of this period. Underlying these arguments is a prominent Hellenistic belief: namely, that the law is rational. Of course, “rational” is contextual. The rational basis provided for these laws, therefore, greatly informs us about what the ancient authors and their presumed audience considered an appropriate and persuasive justification for thought and practice. In providing these rationales, Hellenistic Jewish authors go well beyond the words of the Bible, whose justifications for dietary practice are noticeably terse or absent. Hellenistic Jewish texts mark the beginning of a trend that continues into modernity: the need to justify perceived traditional food practices. This is especially the case for biblical texts, as they are seen as divinely ordained. Since God (and Moses, the divine lawgiver) must be rational in the eyes of Hellenistic Jewish authors, there

Organization and Structure

5

then must be a logical basis for each and every biblical precept and commandment. Chapter 3 first discusses arguments that assert the rationality of Jewish food laws. Proceeding from this assumption of rationality are several related themes. One is that the animals consumed and/or abstained from are embodied and embodying allegories for proper/improper thought and/ or action (also a topic of great interest in Chapter 7). Another is that the act of sharing food, or commensality, is a socially meaningful practice, and that the rules regulating the shared table (almost completely innovated in the Hellenistic period, though not always recognized as such) are founded on logical principles. Commensality becomes a growing concern in subsequent chapters. Finally, some rationalizations are basically repeated from biblical texts.9 In this chapter, therefore, we will encounter justifications for the biblical dietary laws based on reason, revelation, and allegory. In Chapter 4, we turn to New Testament texts that address the meaning and applicability of biblical food laws. Though a handful of New Testament texts debate the relevance of Old Testament food laws, they do not offer much justification for these biblical laws themselves. A notable exception is the discussion of commensality, where New Testament authors exhibit awareness of the potential community-building and destroying abilities of table practices. Yet, as is demonstrated in the previous chapters, Jewish table practices are a product of the Hellenistic period, rather than the Biblical period. We can thus detect an emerging trend, wherein commensality plays a larger role in both the discussion of food laws and in the very food practices themselves. We begin exploring the rabbinic movement in Chapter 5 by turning to the Tannaim, the first group of rabbis, and their justifications for a variety of traditional as well as innovative food practices. While we might expect a continuation of the trend from Hellenistic period Jewish sources, in which justifications for these laws were based on reason, we see that the Tannaim instead turn more toward revelation: Jews must follow these rules because these rules are divinely ordained, not necessarily because they are logical. As Christine Hayes has recently argued, this is part of a larger rabbinic strategy of rejecting rationality as justification for divine law.10 In fact, in at least one instance, a logical rationale is not only rejected, but anyone making this claim is to be silenced.11 Further, the Tannaim display a significantly greater interest in how these laws are to be followed, rather 9 10

As one might expect, the simple repetition of biblical texts appears in other chapters as well. 11 See Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law. See the discussion therein of m. Berakhot 5:3.

6

Introduction: Reasonable Creature

than why. Because God commanded them, one should not question their basis, but rather determine their particulars. Revelation is sufficient justification, so reason is rarely addressed. Following immediately in the rabbinic footsteps of the Tannaim, the Amoraim, the second major rabbinic group and the subject of Chapter 6, continue to discuss how biblical food laws are to be put into practice. However, the Amoraim do at least on occasion discuss why these laws are/ should be practiced. Whether to refine humanity, to act ethically, to ensure proper bowel movements, to act mercifully, or to gain entrance into The World to Come,12 a Jew must observe the kosher dietary laws. Such reasons go beyond straight appeals to revelation. Of course, the rabbis believe that doing something just because God says so is a judicious enough justification for a given action. But for the Amoraim, sometimes it is acceptable to offer a more rational reason for one’s culinary and commensal actions in addition to divine revelation. Chapter 7 explores how many early Christian authors allegorize Old Testament law, offering sustained, varied, and intriguing rationalizations for biblical food regulations. In turning to allegory, the literal reading is discarded (or, according to some early Christian exegetes, it never applied and the embodied allegorical meaning was intended from the very beginning). One may eat a pig, eagle, or cuttlefish, so long as one knows not to act like one. In explaining the assumptions that underlie these allegorical moves, I discuss emerging Christian concepts (e.g. moral vs. ritual law, spirit vs. letter of the law). These conversations also allow for excellent comparisons to Hellenistic Jewish sources, wherein biblical laws were rationalized via reason. The main difference, however, is that Hellenistic Jews like Philo believe in following both the literal and the figurative interpretation, while these early Christian exegetes only believe in following the latter.13 The Conclusion addresses how the ways in which ancient authors critiqued and apologized for the kosher laws can be used to theorize justifications for foodways more broadly. I end by reflecting on how modern debates about food choices can benefit through consideration of the notion of a “food ethic.” The ancient world has much to teach us about the modern world, and vice versa. Because I hope that this book might be of interest to scholars from a variety of fields, as well as to those beyond the ivory tower, I begin each 12 13

All of these are actual examples discussed in Chapter 6. For an important caveat, see Chapter 7 n. 15.

Organization and Structure

7

chapter with a more accessible introduction. Those who are experts on the data may wish to skim the first few paragraphs of each chapter. I shall end as I began, with a quote that grapples with food choices, in particular in relation to vegetarianism. Commenting on the ethics of meat eating, Jonathan Safran Foer notes: There are thousands of foods on the planet, and explaining why we eat the relatively small selection we do requires some words. We need to explain that the parsley on the plate is for decoration, that pasta is not a ‘breakfast food,’ why we eat wings but not eyes, cows but not dogs. Stories establish narratives, and stories establish rules.14

By studying ancient narratives and rules about the biblical dietary regulations, I intend to listen to such stories. 14

Jonathan Safran Foer, Eating Animals (New York and Boston: Back Bay Books, 2010), 12.

chapter 1

Hebrew Bible

This is the story of how we begin to remember.1

Open most modern Jewish cookbooks and you will encounter at least one claim that the laws of kashrut (Jewish food laws) originate in the Hebrew Bible. To cite one example, from a cookbook chosen at random from my dining room shelf: “Kosher food is that food that is prepared according to ancient dietary laws set down in Leviticus and Deuteronomy.”2 Commentators, both ancient and modern, turn to the Hebrew Bible to justify and explain kashrut, but much of what they claim is neither explicit nor perhaps even implicit in the biblical text itself. Rather, they are reading the Hebrew Bible with rabbinic eyes, seeing what the rabbis “saw” in the text. Though the Hebrew Bible never uses the word “kosher” (‫ ;כשר‬literally meaning “fit” or “proper”) to refer to food, commentators still manage to extrapolate an entire system of kosher laws out of biblical texts. To read the Hebrew Bible through rabbinic eyes is to “see” later interpretations and read them as if they are embedded in the text itself. In essence, it is to conflate text with paratext.3 Since this book explores how ancient authors – both Jewish and non-Jewish – understood, interacted with, applied, and deployed biblical food regulations, it is important to first examine what the Hebrew Bible actually says about what one can and 1 2

3

Paul Simon, “Under African Skies” (Graceland; Sony Legacy, 1986). Stephen and Ethel Longstreet, The Joys of Jewish Cooking (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1974), 4. On the increased emphasis on kashrut in American Jewish cookbooks in recent years, see Laurence Roth, “Toward a Kashrut Nation in American Jewish Cookbooks, 1990–2000,” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 28/2 (201): 65–91. For an excellent summary of how paratexts work (including reference to classic literature on the subject), in particular in regard to interpretation of modern media, see Jonathan Gray, Show Sold Separately: Promos, Spoilers, and Other Media Paratexts (New York: New York University Press, 2010), esp. 23–46. For a more discipline-specific usage of the concept of paratext, see e.g. Philip Alexander, Armin Lange, and Renate Pilliger (eds.), In the Second Degree: Paratextual Literature in Ancient Near Eastern and Ancient Mediterranean Culture and its Reflections in Medieval Literature (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010).

8

What Not to Eat … and Why Not to Eat It

9

cannot eat, and on what basis such regulations are justified. It is only after attaining a firm grasp on this data that one can properly analyze how later authors interpreted and utilized such biblical legislation. Thus, we must first understand what the actual biblical texts say before reading them through rabbinic – and other – lenses.

What Not to Eat . . . and Why Not to Eat It Despite claims to the contrary, the Hebrew Bible has very little to say about what not to eat and even less to say about why not to eat it. The Israelites are commanded not to consume certain animals, blood, and the sciatic nerve.4 Further, there are three preparation-based prohibitions, wherein the concern is not what one eats, but rather how one prepares otherwise edible food: slaughtering a mother and her child on the same day; sending away the mother bird from the nest before taking her eggs/chicks; and, most famously, cooking a kid in its mother’s milk.5 Finally, animals that either die a natural death or are killed by other animals are to be avoided. What these laws encompass and – most importantly from the overall perspective of this book – why they were commanded, however, are not quite so clear. I will explore each relevant biblical text, focusing on precisely what is prohibited and on what explicit basis. Edible and Inedible Animals In a famous biblical passage, Leviticus 11 addresses five categories of animals. Within the first four categories, subsets of animals are either permitted or tabooed; the fifth category is completely prohibited. A more condensed, and slightly different version of this list also appears in 4

5

There is also a prohibition against consuming fat (e.g. Lev 3:16–17; 7:22–25). However, this prohibition only applies to sacrificial animals; see e.g. Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 3 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 427. Since the application of this law is limited, and – in a directly related vein – since it will not receive the same amount of attention by later commentators (especially after the destruction of the Temple), I do not discuss it in depth in this chapter. Where this taboo (the violation of which results in Extirpation and which is justified on the grounds of belonging to Yhwh [e.g. Lev 3:16; implied throughout 1 Sam 2:12–17]) is relevant, I will note any germane details. Dan 1:8–16 discusses Daniel and his compatriots’ refusal to eat King Nebuchadnezzar’s food, presumably on the basis of its preparation by non-Jewish cooks. However, since this passage is anomalous in the Hebrew Bible and accords with a pattern detected in Hellenistic period texts, and because Daniel is such a late text, I treat this passage where it more naturally belongs, in Chapter 3. On the development of this pattern in Hellenistic sources, see Jordan D. Rosenblum, Food and Identity in Early Rabbinic Judaism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 36–45.

10

Hebrew Bible

Deuteronomy 14. I focus here on Leviticus 11 for three reasons interrelated. First, this book explores the history of interpretation of ancient Jewish and non-Jewish authors who attempt to account for the what and the why of the biblical dietary laws.6 Therefore, I focus on the redacted text of Leviticus 11 rather than on the source-critical history of the relationship between Leviticus 11 and Deuteronomy 14.7 Second, both ancient and modern authors concern themselves primarily with the text of Leviticus. For the rabbis, Leviticus was Sifra (‫)ספרא‬, an Aramaic term meaning “the book,” and it was with this text that one entered the traditional study of rabbinic Judaism.8 In modernity, especially following the anthropological theories of Mary Douglas (discussed later in this chapter), Leviticus often serves as the academic entrepôt for the study of biblical food prohibitions.9 Third, though there are minor differences between Leviticus and Deuteronomy, these variations do not affect the arguments I make in this book. Where they are relevant to the narrative in later chapters, however, I discuss these differences. For the sake of clarity, and because so many authors in subsequent chapters presume knowledge of these verses from Leviticus, I cite the entire passage and then summarize its salient details. Introduction The Lord spoke to Moses and Aaron, saying to them: Speak to the Israelites thus: Quadrupeds These are the creatures that you may eat from among all of the quadrupeds on the land: any quadruped that has hoofs, with clefts through the hoofs, 6

7

8

9

I say “the Bible” here rather than “the Hebrew Bible” because later authors draw on different bibles (Hebrew, Greek, and Aramaic). When I explore these various interpretive communities in subsequent chapters, I address how the language of whatever text they hold to be “the Bible” affects their arguments. For a summary of the relevant redactional and source-critical issues, see Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 691–704; Esias E. Meyer, “Leviticus 11, Deuteronomy 14 and Directionality,” Journal for Semitics 23/1 (2014): 71–89; Christophe Nihan, “The Laws about Clean and Unclean Animals in Leviticus and Deuteronomy and Their Place in the Formation of the Pentateuch,” in Thomas B. Dozeman, Konrad Schmid, and Baruch J. Schwartz (eds.), The Pentateuch (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 401–432. See Leviticus Rabbah 7:3; Avot d’Rabbi Natan A6:16–17; H. L. Strack and Günter Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, trans. and ed. Markus Bockmuehl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 260. e.g. Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (1966; repr., New York: Routledge, 1999), 42–58; and her own reevaluation in Leviticus as Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). For an example of a scholar who focuses on Deuteronomy rather than Leviticus, see David Bryan, Cosmos, Chaos and the Kosher Mentality (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 130–167.

What Not to Eat … and Why Not to Eat It

11

and that chews the cud – such you may eat. The following, however, of those that chew the cud or have hoofs, you shall not eat: the camel – although it chews the cud, it has no hoofs: it is impure for you; the rock badger – although it chews the cud, it has no hoofs: it is impure for you; the hare – although it chews the cud,10 it has no hoofs: it is impure for you; and the pig – although it has hoofs, with the hoofs cleft through, it does not chew the cud: it is impure for you. You shall not eat of their flesh or touch their carcasses; they are impure for you. Fish These you may eat of all that live in water: anything in water, whether in the seas or in the streams, that has fins and scales – these you may eat. But anything in the seas or in the streams that has no fins and scales, among all of the swarming creatures of the water and among all of the [other] living creatures that are in the water – they are an abomination for you and an abomination for you they shall remain: you shall not eat of their flesh and you shall abominate their carcasses. Everything in water that has no fins and scales shall be an abomination for you. Birds The following you shall abominate among the birds; they shall not be eaten, they are an abomination: the eagle, the black vulture, the bearded vulture, the kite, and falcons of every variety; all varieties of raven; the eagle owl, the short-eared owl, and the long-eared owl; hawks of every variety; the tawny owl, the fisher owl, the screech owl, the white owl, and the scops owl; the osprey, the stork, and herons of every variety; the hoopoe, and the bat. Flying Insects All winged swarming creatures that walk on all fours shall be an abomination for you. But these you may eat among all the winged swarming creatures that walk on all fours: all that have, above their feet, jointed legs to leap with on the ground. Of these you may eat the following: locusts of every variety; all varieties of bald locust; crickets of every variety; and all varieties of grasshopper. But all other winged swarming creatures that have four legs shall be an abomination for you. Purification Procedures11 And you shall make yourselves impure with the following . . . every quadruped that has hoofs but without clefts through the hoofs, or does not chew

10 11

Neither the rock badger nor the hare chew the cud, though the constant movement of their jaws probably led observers to presume they did. See Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 648–649. I abridge this section, as much of the material herein is not directly relevant to the present topic. The omitted text discusses various procedures for purification after coming into contact with these impure items.

12

Hebrew Bible the cud . . . Also all animals that walk on flat paws, among those that walk on all fours, are impure for you . . . The following shall be impure for you among the creatures that swarm on the earth: the rat, the mouse, and large lizards of every variety; the gecko, the spotted lizard, the lizard, the skink, and the chameleon. Those are for you the impure among all the swarming creatures . . . Land Swarmers All creatures that swarm upon the earth are an abomination; they shall not be eaten. You shall not eat anything that crawls on its belly, or anything that walks on all fours, or anything that has many legs, comprising all creatures that swarm on the earth, for they are an abomination. You shall not defile your throats with any creature that swarms. You shall not make yourselves impure therewith and thus become impure, for I the Lord am your God. You shall sanctify yourselves and be holy, for I am holy. You shall not contaminate your throats with any swarming creature that moves upon the earth. For I the Lord am he who brought you up from the land of Egypt to be your God; you shall be holy, for I am holy. Summary These are the instructions concerning quadrupeds, birds, all living creatures that move in the water, and all creatures that swarm on the earth, for discriminating between the impure and the pure, between creatures that may be eaten and creatures that may not be eaten.12

Leviticus 11 addresses five categories of animals. First, quadrupeds must both have split hoofs and chew the cud.13 Explicitly excluded are: the camel; the rock badger; the hare; and the pig (Lev 11:2–8).14 Second, water creatures must have both fins and scales (Lev 11:9–12). It is worth noting that, despite its popularity in modern lore, the terms bottom 12

13

14

Lev 11:1–24, 26–27, 29–31, 41–47. This translation, including its headers (which are not in the biblical text itself), follows Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 643–645 (I have made minor alterations; for linguistic and critical notes on this translation, see Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 645–691). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. I follow Milgrom and understand this passage to refer to quadrupeds in general, and not just domesticated quadrupeds (Leviticus 1–16, 645–646, 668). In the version of these food regulations contained in Deuteronomy, both domesticated and wild animals are mentioned (Deut 14:4–5). For rules concerning consuming wild animals that one has hunted, see Lev 17:13. Like many of the animals mentioned in Lev 11, the identification of ‫ שפן‬as “rock badger” is a debated translation. Since the precise species designation of any of these contested terms does not matter for my purposes, I adopt throughout the translations employed by Milgrom. Though later commentators single out the pig as especially odious, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, there is no reason in the present context to highlight the pig as any more or less problematic than the other named inedible quadrupeds (the camel, the rock badger, and the hare). On this later history, see Jordan D. Rosenblum, “‘Why do you refuse to eat pork?’ Jews, Food, and Identity in Roman Palestine,” JQR 100/1 (2010): 95–110.

What Not to Eat … and Why Not to Eat It

13

feeders, shellfish, lobster, clams, oysters, etc. do not appear in the biblical text, though such water creatures are clearly prohibited due to their lack of the required criteria for their animal category.15 Third, certain species of fowl are excluded, though no criteria for inclusion or exclusion is provided. Prohibited fowl include: the eagle; two species of vulture; the kite; all varieties of falcons, ravens, hawks and herons; eight owl species; the osprey; the stork; the hoopoe; and the bat (Lev 11:13–19).16 Fourth, winged swarming creatures that walk on all fours in general are tabooed; however, those with jointed legs above their feet for leaping on the ground are allowed, including: two locusts species; crickets; and all varieties of grasshoppers (Lev 11:20–23). Fifth, small land animals are prohibited, with no exceptions granted. Specific animals tabooed include: the rat; the mouse; all large lizards; the gecko,; the skink; and the chameleon (Lev 11:29–30, 41–42). Though Leviticus 11 is the locus classicus for biblical dietary restrictions, the rationale behind these regulations is noticeably absent. Biblical scholars and anthropologists alike have scoured this chapter looking for clues as to 15

16

A popular explanation for both this regulation and for the prohibition of pork is that these creatures are tabooed for hygienic reasons. This rationale has a venerable history (e.g. Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed 3.48, in regard to pork) and was further championed by those looking to justify traditional Jewish practice on the basis of modern science (in general, see Mitchell B. Hart, The Healthy Jew: The Symbiosis of Judaism and Modern Medicine [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007]). Some Reform Jews in the 1800s used this explanation to invalidate these laws, arguing that once one understood the underlying hygienic principles of kashrut, one could gain the benefits without following the precise biblical injunctions. Further, some simply disagreed with these practices for various religious, social, and gustatory reasons. For example, oysters, which were widely available, delicious, and boasted many health benefits (including being a long-noted aphrodisiac), were referred to by Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise as “ocean vegetables” (Lance J. Sussman, “The Myth of the Trefa Banquet: American Culinary Culture and the Radicalization of Food Policy in American Reform Judaism,” American Jewish Archives Journal 57/1–2 [2005]: 29–52, 35, 38–39; on the popularity and history of oysters in America, see Mark Kurlansky, The Big Oyster: History on the Half Shell [New York: Random House, 2007]). I return to modern justifications for these laws both later in this chapter and throughout this book. Interestingly, the earliest reference to the biblically forbidden water creatures as being bottom feeders (to my knowledge) is Epistle of Barnabas 10, a pseudepigraphic Christian letter from c.100 CE (discussed further in Chapter 7). The fact that no criteria for either inclusion or exclusion of fowl appear here has led to debates over what fowl one may or may not eat (discussed further in chapters 3, 5–7). One interesting recent controversy related to this lacuna concerns the American holiday of Thanksgiving. The celebration of Thanksgiving involves the preparation and consumption of a turkey, a bird indigenous to North America. Since the ancient Israelites were unaware of this species and Leviticus provides no criteria for inclusion or exclusion of fowl, the question arises: is a Jew allowed to eat turkey? For modern rabbinic Jews, the answer to this question is that if one’s family has a tradition of eating it, he or she may eat turkey; if one’s family does not, he or she may not eat turkey. For a discussion, see Yisrael Meir Levinger, “Clean Fowl May Be Eaten in Accord with the Tradition,” Sinai 64 (1969): 258–281 (Hebrew). On the history of the turkey, see Dan Jurafsky, The Language of Food: A Linguist Reads the Menu (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2014), 78–91.

14

Hebrew Bible

its underlying rationale. Most famous among the questions they have asked, of course, is: Why is the pig tabooed? Other questions include: Why are both cloven hoofs and cud-chewing necessary for ingesting quadrupeds? Why are the camel and the hare verboten? Why are specific fowl excluded, though no classification is provided? In crafting their answers, scholars confront one major obstacle: they must supply a reason where no explicit reason exists. According to Leviticus 11, the Israelites must follow these rules because God says so. In the terminology that I employ throughout this book, this is an argument based on revelation. Yet, as Michael Walzer argues, “The reiterated phrase of Leviticus, ‘for I am the Lord your God,’ may provide a reason for obeying the laws, but it doesn’t provide a substantive justification of their content.”17 The closest approximation to an explicit answer in this text is found in Leviticus 11:44–45: “for I the Lord am your God. You shall sanctify yourselves and be holy, for I am holy. You shall not contaminate your throats with any swarming creature that moves upon the earth. For I the Lord am He who brought you up from the land of Egypt to be your God; you shall be holy, for I am holy.”18 In short, God is holy and set apart, and so the Israelites should be holy and set apart. Discussing this biblical claim, Christine Hayes states: The separatist purpose of the Law explains the presence of commandments and prohibitions for which a rational basis is not self-evident, laws whose very arbitrariness ensures that they will set Israel apart, in all her particularity. Unlike the prohibitions of murder and theft, which may be perceived as universal and rational in character, some of the divine law’s regulations appear to be irrational (or at least nonrational). This is especially true of the dietary laws and purity laws, whose only explicit justification is that they set Israel apart, or “sanctify” (leqaddesh) Israel, as separate and particular.19

Of course, this is not really an answer, as it raises more questions than answers. Thus, scholars have sought to provide more elaborate explanations.

17 18

19

Michael Walzer, In God’s Shadow: Politics in the Hebrew Bible (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 27. The fact that Israel is a holy, separate, and chosen people also appears in reference to the dietary laws in Exod 22:30, Lev 20:25–26, and Deut 14:2, 21. On how this may fit into a broader priestly agenda in Leviticus 11, see Lance Hawley, “The Agenda of Priestly Taxonomy: The Conceptualization of ‫ָטֵמא‬ and ‫שֶקץ‬ ׁ in Leviticus 11,” CBQ 77/2 (2015): 231–249. Christine Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law? Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 17.

What Not to Eat … and Why Not to Eat It

15

Though the focus of this section is on what Leviticus 11 actually says, since this biblical passage is often read and refracted through the lens of these later theories, it is worth our time to briefly explore some of them. I argue, however, that these theories are flawed. Rather than trying to offer an explanation for the absolute origin of these laws – an impossible task that often involves the importation and imposition of our own modern perspectives onto the past – we should note what the text does and does not say and then turn our attention to those ancient Jewish and non-Jewish authors who, when faced with this same puzzle, offered fascinating rationales.20 For this reason, these later interpretations will be the focus of the subsequent chapters of this book. I begin where most do, with the work of Mary Douglas.21 While Douglas was not the first to attempt to explicate Leviticus 11, her work began a scholarly discussion on this issue that continues today. Further, so ubiquitous is the conversation that she began that it would take another entire book to adequately address each theory. For this reason, I abridge my survey of her work. Since my goal is to critique the general approach, but not necessarily to invalidate it, my discussion will be both concise and selective.22 For Douglas, the dietary laws of Leviticus are about matter out of place; therefore, animals must conform to their respective category. Those animals that do not are out of place and are thus unclean.23 For example, because the pig does not conform to the characteristics of its class (it should 20

21

22

23

I have made this point briefly before. See Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 9. Those remarks were intended to be preliminary, as I planned to further buttress those concise claims by writing this book. The two most relevant works are her seminal Purity and Danger, 42–58, and her later reevaluation in Leviticus as Literature, esp. 134–151. I thank the participants of the Judaica Electronic Workgroup for their feedback on the section that follows. For other surveys of the relevant scholarly literature, see e.g. Walter Houston Purity and Monotheism: Clean and Unclean Animals in Biblical Law, JSOTSup 140 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 68–123 and passim; David C. Kraemer, Jewish Eating and Identity Through the Ages (New York: Routledge, 2009 [2007]), 9–24; Seth D. Kunin, We Think What We Eat: NeoStructuralist Analysis of Israelite Food Rules and Other Cultural and Textual Practices, JSOTSup 412 (New York: T & T Clark, 2004), 31–83; Nathan MacDonald, Not Bread Alone: The Uses of Food in the Old Testament (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 17–46 and passim; and Naphtali Meshel, “Food for Thought: Systems of Categorization in Leviticus 11,” HTR 101/2 (2008): 203–229. I do not wish to invalidate these theories because, as I note below, I believe that we can learn much from them, though not about Leviticus itself but, rather, about the legacy of Leviticus. In Purity and Danger, Douglas spoke often of animals out of place being “abominated,” e.g. the relevant chapter was titled “The Abominations of Leviticus” and included such statements as “Hybrids and other confusions were abominated” (Purity and Danger, 54). While Douglas backs off from the language of unclean as being “abominated” in Leviticus as Literature, the major thrust of her argument remains the same: animals must conform to their perceived class.

16

Hebrew Bible

have both cloven hoofs and chew the cud), it is designated as unclean according to the taxonomy of Leviticus.24 Douglas connects the dietary laws of Leviticus 11 to larger structures in the Hebrew Bible that divide things into the binary categories of “clean” and “unclean.” “Clean” things are “holy,” while “unclean” things are not.25 While Douglas’ theory has been critiqued on both factual and theoretical grounds, it still remains persuasive for many scholars.26 In particular, her observation about classification continues to receive strong support. By focusing on Leviticus, however, her argument is doomed to fail. Thus, I will offer my own critique of her approach. First, as noted above, Leviticus does not provide any explicit rationale for the food laws other than: (1) God is holy and so the Israelites should be holy; and (2) God says so (i.e. revelation). Thus, in searching for reason in a revelation-based justification, Douglas makes a circular argument. In her reading of Leviticus, Douglas (re?)constructs a system and then uses that system to decide what is anomalous in that system.27 As such, X does not conform to the system, so X is out of place; yet, X is out of place only because it does not conform to the system of Douglas’ creation. Without an explicit rationale, any quest for an absolute, verifiable origin is, at best, problematic. Second, Douglas is interested in establishing an absolute origin for these rules.28 However, Leviticus does not allow this because one has to supply too much information that cannot be verified. Further, according to anthropologist Seth Kunin, Douglas commits a methodological error here, in that “structuralist analysis is not primarily interested in either origin or meaning, which are secondary interests or phenomena; it is

24 25

26

27

28

Douglas, Purity and Danger, 55–56. Douglas, like many other scholars, reminds her readers that “unclean” does not imply “dirty,” but rather is a technical term that refers to a person’s or object’s status vis-à-vis the cult (Leviticus as Literature, 151). For references to some of these critiques, see Kunin, We Think What We Eat, 29–30 n. 1 and passim. While many of these arguments are useful, they do not address the point I will make: namely, that Douglas is focusing on the wrong text. Of course, this same argument also applies to many of her critics. This same point is made by Marvin Harris, who notes: “But doesn’t the force of [Douglas’] argument lie entirely in its circularity? To observe that the pig is out of place taxonomically is merely to observe that Leviticus classifies good-to-eat animals in such a way as to make the pig bad to eat” (Good to Eat: Riddles of Food and Culture [Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1998], 70). Of course, this goal was common for anthropologists of her time. As a scholar of religion writing five decades later, I do not mean to condemn Douglas for writing from the perspective of her discipline at that time. I am only suggesting that we shift our focus so that we can more profitably use her insights.

What Not to Eat … and Why Not to Eat It

17

interested in abstract structure into which content, including meaning, can be placed.”29 Following Douglas, numerous scholars have attempted to account for the dietary laws of Leviticus. Faced with silence, they have read a variety of reasons into the text. I offer three examples of such scholars. While there are many more, these three theories are both well-known and fairly representative of the various approaches taken. Marvin Harris, a materialist anthropologist, asserts that food aversions are rational (i.e. reason based), resulting from economic and environmental factors. Since the pig is too costly and difficult for a pastoralist residing in ancient Southwest Asia (whether Israelite or, later, Muslim) to raise, it was first avoided due to common sense and then, eventually, tabooed on religious grounds.30 While this argument is interesting, it suffers from the first critique of Douglas cited above: it lacks explicit evidence in the text to verify its claims. Harris must rely more on logic than on concrete data. While this critique is not fatal to his argument, it does suggest the need for scholarly caution. Jacob Milgrom, a biblical scholar, argues that “the biblical laws that limit Israel’s diet to only a few of the animals permitted to other peoples constitute a reminder – confronted daily at the dining table – that Israel must separate itself from the nations.”31 This argument also suffers from a lack of explicit textual evidence. It requires one to read into the text more than the scant extant evidence allows. Further, as David Kraemer points out, animal protein was rarely consumed in the Biblical era.32 Thus, the food laws of Leviticus would rarely have been applied. Since they would not have been “confronted daily at the dining table,” one wonders how significant a social separation they would have constructed. Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, an anthropologist who uses an eclectic method that draws on symbolic, cultural, and structural anthropology, studies animal metaphors in the Hebrew Bible.33 He argues that the kinds of animals permitted for consumption are the kinds of animals that serve as metaphors for Israel and the kinds of animals 29 30

31 33

Kunin, We Think What We Eat, 31. Marvin Harris, Cows, Pigs, Wars, and Witches: The Riddles of Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 35–57; Harris, Good to Eat, 67–87. Harris rightly rejects hygienic explanations offered for the pig taboo (Good to Eat, 68–71). 32 Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 730. Kraemer, Jewish Eating, 13–19. Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism: An Anthropology of Israelite Religion and Ancient Judaism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 115–140.

18

Hebrew Bible

prohibited for consumption are the kinds of animals that serve as metaphors for the other nations. “Thus the dietary restrictions carve up the animal world along the same lines as Israelite thought.”34 There are two main problems with this argument. First, once again, it lacks explicit evidence in Leviticus 11. Eilberg-Schwartz’s metaphorical association must be read into the text rather than read out of it, as Leviticus 11 never makes this association. Second, the binary dichotomy that he mentions is not so black and white, as Israel is sometimes compared to prohibited animals.35 David Kraemer tries to modify Eilberg-Schwartz’s theory, stating that “rather than representing the nations as such, it is clear that the metaphors capture certain qualities marked as positive or negative.”36 However, even Kraemer must admit that this is not always the case.37 For this reason, much like Harris’ theory, I find it intriguing yet advise applying it cautiously. All of these theories lack explicit evidence from the text of Leviticus 11, relying more on logic and inference than on concrete data. They point to bullet holes but no smoking gun. Here I wish to reiterate in strong and unambiguous terms my thesis: without any real primary evidence, scholars have nevertheless asserted that they have uncovered the explanation for why certain animals are biblically declared edible or inedible. I have advanced an argument explaining why, based on the textual data, I am skeptical of this approach and why, unless new evidence appears, I presume that all such explanatory endeavors are doomed to failure. However, once we leave the text of Leviticus and turn to commentaries on Leviticus, we find a veritable embarrassment of riches, as several ancient authors offered their own explanations for these food prohibitions. To continue the forensic metaphor from above, once we turn to ancient authors interpreting Leviticus, we have not only the bullet holes (i.e. biblical food regulations), but the gun and shell casings as well (i.e. justifications for biblical food regulations). Thus, I am far less skeptical about what we can argue based on this later, more expansive data. In the coming chapters, we shall pick up our tool kit and use it to work on these later sources.

34 35 36 37

Eilberg-Schwartz, Savage in Judaism, 125. e.g. see Jer 2:23–24. For other relevant references, see Kraemer, Jewish Eating, 20. Kraemer, Jewish Eating, 20. On his discussion of Eilberg-Schwartz in general, see Kraemer, Jewish Eating, 19–23. Kraemer, Jewish Eating, 20–21.

What Not to Eat … and Why Not to Eat It

19

Blood We turn our attention from sweeping legislation with little justification to a single law with a clearer rationale: the prohibition against consuming blood. Following the Flood in Genesis, God for the first time allows human consumption of animals. Humans are permitted to eat all animals, with a single provision: “However, flesh with its life, its blood, you may not eat.”38 According to this text, blood is life.39 The following verses further clarify this connection, as they require the one who pours out the blood of another human by murder to have their own blood shed.40 The blood taboo appears elsewhere in biblical texts, sometimes with the explicit connection between blood and life and other times as an unjustified prohibition.41 I will not detail the particulars of each individual case, as the specifics are not necessary for understanding the four general, and interrelated, observations that I make.42 First, blood is connected with life. If blood is life, it must not be consumed. Second, what precisely this connection means is not spelled out. Though this law seems clear, its exact meaning is more opaque than is often realized. Further, this connection does not appear in every biblical text involving blood manipulation, so we should exercise caution in assuming this is a ubiquitous presumption throughout the corpus.43 In the coming chapters, we will encounter commentators who attempt to clarify these ambiguities. Third, many subsequent (particularly rabbinic) practices associated with the preparation of kosher meat do not appear here. For example, while some texts inform the Israelites to pour the 38

39

40 41

42 43

Gen 9:3–4. My translation follows: William K. Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible: Meaning and Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 17. On the relationship between Gen 1:26–29 (pre-Flood food rules) and Gen 9:1–7, see Michael Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (1988; repr., New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 318–321. The permission to consume all animals is modified for the Israelites in Lev 11 and Deut 14 (discussed above). On the identification of blood with “life” in the Hebrew Bible, see Gilders, Blood Ritual, 12–25. Gilders notes that this identification is limited, as it “is expressed in the legal core of Deuteronomy and in P and H texts, but is found nowhere else in the Hebrew Bible” (Ritual Power, 24). Gen 9:5–6. See Gilders, Blood Ritual, 19. Consuming/spilling blood are also connected in Ezek 33:25. Lev 3:17; 7:26–27; 17:10–14; Deut 12:16, 23–25; 15:23. The Leviticus prohibition in particular has received a lot of scholarly attention: e.g. Gilders, Blood Ritual, 158–180; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 704–713; Stanley K. Stowers, “On the Comparison of Blood in Greek and Israelite Ritual,” in Jodi Magness and Seymour Gittin (eds.), Hesed Ve-Emet: Studies in Honor of Ernest S. Frerichs, BJS 320 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 179–194. Though scholars usually focus on the Pentateuchal references, the blood taboo appears elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible; e.g. see I Sam 14:31–35; and Ezek 18:5–6, 11, 15; 22:9 (all Ezekiel references with emendation). e.g. for our purposes, it does not matter that these proscriptions are limited to D, P, and H (see n. 39). See Gilders, Blood Ritual, esp. 181–191.

20

Hebrew Bible

blood on the ground and cover it with earth, we do not find the extensive salting procedure later mandated by the rabbis.44 Fourth, “although the identification of blood with life explains why blood may not be consumed, the explanation itself requires interpretation. Why may life not be consumed?”45 Though commentators offer a variety of explanations, “it must be stressed again that the rationale for the blood prohibition and the ideology behind it are implicit rather than explicit in the texts.”46 This final point obviously serves to qualify my initial observation. While biblical texts offer a clearer rationale for the blood prohibition than for the regulations governing the ingestion of animals in general, many questions remain unanswered. Though blood may be the “life” of flesh, a precise understanding of this deceptively simple concept eludes us. Sciatic Nerve Thus far, the rationales for biblical food laws (when present) have not been tied to specific historical events. The prohibition against consuming the sciatic nerve, however, is unique in that its etiology is bound with a particular moment in biblical history.47 In fact, the same verses in which Israel receives this food regulation also contain a key foundation myth for the entire nation of Israel: the moment in which the Patriarch Jacob’s name is changed to Israel. Genesis 32:23–33 describes Jacob’s encounter, and subsequent struggle, with a divine being.48 While Jacob wrestles with this divine being, he 44

45 46 47

48

Though Gen 9:4 does not say what to do with the blood, Deut 12:16, 24; and 15:23 instruct one to pour the blood on the ground, and Lev 17:13 informs that one should pour out the blood and cover it with earth. On the latter text, see Gilders, Blood Ritual, 22–24. On rabbinic slaughter practices (including blood regulations), see chapters 5 and 6. Gilders, Blood Ritual, 18. Gilders, Blood Ritual, 19 (Gilders summarizes some of the possible explanations on pp. 18–19). Another historically bound food regulation is the requirement to avoid leaven on the festival of Passover (e.g. Exod 12:15–20; Deut 16:3–8). I will not discuss this Passover rule in detail for two reasons. First, this regulation is particular to a specific spring festival and my area of interest is in food rules that apply throughout the year. (It is for this same reason that specific Sabbath- and festival-cooking-related regulations do not receive extensive consideration.) All of the other rules discussed herein refer to daily ingestion, which is the subject of my study. Second, later commentators on this regulation tend to build upon the justification already present in the Hebrew Bible itself (i.e. the commemoration of the Exodus from Egypt). Hence, they riff on the biblical themes of liberation, redemption, and freedom. For commentary on this passage, see Jeremy M. Hutton, “Jacob’s ‘Two Camps’ and Transjordanian Geography: Wrestling with Order in Genesis 32,” ZAW 122 (2010): 20–32; Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, OTL (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972), 319–326; and Claus Westermann, Genesis 12–36: A Continental Commentary, trans. J. J. Scullion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 512–521.

What Not to Eat … and Why Not to Eat It

21

injures his hip (Gen 32:26). Despite this injury, he persists in wrestling and, with dawn fast approaching, the divine being wishes to call the match a draw. Jacob, however, has other plans, and instructs the divine being that he will only release his hold if he receives a blessing (Gen 32:27). The divine being complies, and in the process changes Jacob’s name to Israel, “for you have wrestled with God and with humans, and you have overcome” (Gen 32:29).49 After further dialogue, Israel (né Jacob) departs with a noticeable limp (Gen 32:30–32).50 The final verse, which is most likely a later addition,51 contains an important etiology: “Therefore, even today the Israelites do not eat the sciatic nerve that is in the hollow of the thigh, because he struck Jacob on the sciatic nerve” (Gen 32:33).52 The sinew of the thigh, or sciatic nerve, remains eternally tabooed in remembrance of Israel’s wrestling match. In contrast to all other biblical food taboos, this prohibition is attributed to a specific historical event. The importance of this event, however, should not be ignored, as it is at this same moment that the nation’s eponymous ancestor receives his name. Like the Patriarch Israel, the nation of Israel strives; and perhaps sensibly, the way to commemorate this action was not to force every Israelite to limp, but rather to abstain from ingesting the injured sinew. Slaughtering a Parent and Its Offspring on the Same Day The three previous biblical food regulations referred to either specific animals or animal parts and discussed whether they were permitted or prohibited. The next three rules refer to cases where the animals themselves 49 50

51

52

There is a word play here, connecting the name Israel with the verb “to wrestle” (cf. Hos 12:5). My translation agrees with Hutton, “Jacob’s ‘Two Camps,’” 28. On how Jacob’s limp accords with general biblical views on physical disability, see Saul M. Olyan, Disability in the Hebrew Bible: Interpreting Mental and Physical Difference (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 10. See Hutton, “Jacob’s ‘Two Camps,’” 29; Westermann, Genesis 12–36, 520–521. The fact that this is an addition need not bother us, since we wish to understand the redacted biblical text that later commentators inherit. Interestingly, even the early rabbis seem to understand this verse as a later addition. According to m. Hullin 7:6 (discussed in Chapter 5), the sciatic nerve prohibition was given at Sinai, but was recorded in its current textual location so as to explicitly connect the taboo with its origin myth. My translation agrees with Hutton, “Jacob’s ‘Two Camps,’” 29, with minor alterations. As Christopher Jones has suggested to me (personal communication), this might provide an implicit counter-argument to the claim made above in regard to Howard Eilberg-Schwartz and David Kraemer, that the food laws are metaphors for Israel. In the above instance, when a food practice represents Israel, the text is very clear about this fact. Therefore, perhaps this is the litmus test that we should use when assessing the claim that the metaphor of permitted food/Israel applies to other laws, in which this connection is not made explicitly (or perhaps even implicitly).

22

Hebrew Bible

are valid, but how they are prepared or procured renders them invalid. In each case, commentators usually argue that these preparation-based proscriptions – which revolve around issues associated with animal parents and their children – are enjoined on ethical grounds. As we shall see, however, this is not explicit in the biblical texts. The first preparation-based proscription is the commandment not to slaughter a parent and its offspring on the same day.53 According to Leviticus 22:28: “However, no animal from the herd or from the flock shall be slaughtered on the same day as its young.”54 The ethical applications of this law seem obvious. So obvious, in fact, that they are unspoken in the text. While this absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence, one wonders if the ethical dimensions of this law are so important, why are they not mentioned? Further, if this law is designed to be humanitarian, how does one grapple with the fact that parent and child could – without any apparent concern – be slaughtered on successive days?55 Despite the assumptions of many that ethics serves as a basis for this legislation, reason-based justification for this law must be provided by later commentators. Reading this text alone as a lesson in ethics is therefore an act of eisegesis, not exegesis. In addition, the application of this regulation is far from clear. Unlike the previous rules, this one refers specifically to sacrificial animals. Therefore, its applicability beyond that realm is not resolved in the biblical text itself.56 Sending the Mother Bird Away from Her Nest Another preparation-based proscription that involves parent/child relations is found in Deuteronomy 22:6–7:

53

54

55

56

It is debated whether parent refers only to a mother or to either a mother or a father. For discussion, see Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 3A (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008 [1964]), 1884. Since for my purposes I do not need to take a stance on this issue, I employ gender-neutral language. Translation by Milgrom (Leviticus 17–22, 1845). The previous verse prohibits one from slaughtering an animal prior to its eighth day of life. However, this verse received scant attention by later commentators, so I omit it from my main discussion. That being said, the argument I make regarding v. 28 applies equally to v. 27. On Leviticus 22:27, see Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1882–1884. As argued in Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1884 (on the humanitarian argument in general, see pp. 1884–1885). This same logic applies to the case of a mother bird and her eggs/chicks, discussed below. The early rabbis extend this prohibition to all animals, whether consecrated or unconsecrated (e.g. m. Hullin 5:1–2).

What Not to Eat … and Why Not to Eat It

23

If you encounter a bird’s nest before you on the road, in any tree or on the ground, with chicks or eggs and the mother sitting on the chicks or on the eggs, do not take the mother along with her young. Send the mother away, and take only the young, in order that it may go well for you and you may prolong your days.

If in your travels you happen upon a bird’s nest and you desire the eggs or the chicks, you must shoo away the mother before taking her young.57 The stated justification for sending the mother away is that, in doing so, you earn a long, healthy life. In this case, there are grounds to read this regulation as an ethical precept. First, it appears amidst a list of several biblical laws that appeal to moral action. In fact, this law is bookended by commands to return items (animals, garments, etc.) that your companion lost (Deut 22:1–3) and to build a parapet on your roof so as to prevent anyone from falling off and dying (Deut 22:8). Second, the wording of the passage might indicate an allusion to ethics. Commenting on the phrase “the mother along with her young,” Jeffrey Tigay notes: “This same phrase, which also appears in descriptions of warfare, was evidently a common expression denoting total, cruel extermination. Its use here may be an allusion to such descriptions, so as to indicate that taking the mother bird together with its offspring would mark one as ruthless.”58 Further, the final phrase (“in order that it may go well for you and you may prolong your days”) repeats in reverse order the biblical promise assured those who honor their father and their mother in Deuteronomy 5:16. Since inversion is often a means of alluding to a previous biblical passage, perhaps “[t]his allusion calls attention to the fact that the present command is likewise an aspect of respecting a parent.”59 There are equally plausible grounds to exercise caution when reading this text as justified on the basis of ethics. First, though this text is bookended by a list of biblical laws appealing to moral action, it is also bookended by other regulations that are less obviously ethical in nature (e.g. cross-dressing [Deut 22:5], making tassels on the four corners of your garment [Deut 22:12]).60 Second, as noted above, if this law is designed to 57 58

59 60

m. Hullin 12:2 debates whether this extends to the male partridge, who supposedly also guards chicks/eggs in the nest. Jeffrey H. Tigay, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1996), 201. The other texts where this appears in a warfare context, according to Tigay, are Gen 32:12 and Hos 10:14. Tigay, Deuteronomy, 201. Further instructions on making such tassels appear in Num 15:37–41.

24

Hebrew Bible

be humanitarian, how does one face the fact that the eggs/chicks and the mother bird could – without any outward concern – be taken on consecutive days?61 Third, the mother bird is not necessarily spared any pain, because she is both forcibly removed from her eggs/chicks and, when she returns to her nest, she discovers them stolen.62 Cooking a Kid in Its Mother’s Milk The most famous of the preparation-based food regulations in the Hebrew Bible concerns cooking a kid in its mother’s milk. In fact, in discussing my work over the past decade I have found that audiences usually know two things about biblical food laws: the pork taboo and the prohibition against cooking a kid in its mother’s milk. We will discuss the fascinating development of this legislation in coming chapters. In order to do so, however, we must first grapple with what the text does (and does not) say. On three separate occasions, the Israelites are enjoined: “do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exod 23:19; 34:26; Deut 14:21). While this phrase appears verbatim in each passage, the context in which each one appears differs. Exodus 23:19 and 34:26 locate this admonition amidst a festival calendar and related laws, whereas Deuteronomy 14:21 appends it to the laws for edible and inedible animals (discussed above). Further, each time this phrase appears, it seems to stick out in regard to the wider context of the passage.63 For over two millennia, commentators have attempted to explain this cryptic phrase.64 In subsequent chapters, we will turn our attention to some of the ancient rationales for this prohibition. However, for our present purposes it is important to note what this text does not say. It does not say why the Israelites must abstain from this culinary practice. While ethical concerns are often cited as the underlying justification for this regulation, this assumption is not 61 62 63

64

As argued in Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1884. See Tigay, Deuteronomy, 201. According to Tigay, it is the action itself, not the effect it has on the mother, which motivates this legislation. On how this might relate to the passages in Exodus and Deuteronomy, see William H. Propp, Exodus 19–40: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 2A (New York: Doubleday, 2006), 286; and Tigay, Deuteronomy, 140–141. For an excellent summary of many of the modern (and some of the ancient) rationales, see D. Andrew Teeter, “‘You Shall Not Seethe a Kid in its Mother’s Milk’: The Text and the Law in Light of Early Witnesses,” Textus 24 (2009): 37–63, esp. 41–42 n. 9. Also see Alan Cooper, “Once Again Seething a Kid in Its Mother’s Milk,” JSIJ 10 (2012): 1–34. Other references can be found in Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 737–742; Propp, Exodus 19–40, 285–286.

What Not to Eat … and Why Not to Eat It

25

explicit in the text.65 Though this conclusion is quite logical, never in the three times that this phrase appears do we encounter a clear reason-based justification on these grounds. By paying attention to what these biblical texts omit, we are better prepared to analyze those ancient authors who wish to justify the basis for this legislation, often on a rational or ethical basis. At this point, it is also important to note two other key omissions from the previous preparation-based regulations: (1) a punishment for violating these rules;66 and (2) a ruling on whether one can eat the animals prepared in this manner. Biblical texts are silent on these vital issues. However, answers to these questions are necessary for the practical application of biblical food regulations. For example, if I do not send away the mother bird before gathering her eggs or cook a kid in its mother’s milk, may I still eat the resulting dish? Later authors will seek to fill in these blanks.67 Animals That Died by Non-Human Agency A final biblical food regulation relates to those animals that die by non-human agency, either by means of a natural death (‫נבלה‬, or carrion) or by attack from an animal of prey (‫טרפה‬, or literally “torn”). In some ways this is a preparation-based rule, though it would more accurately be described as a “no-preparation-based rule,” since it involves no human preparation. The animal in question dies at the hands of nature, not at the hands of a human. Biblical texts are contradictory concerning the application of this legislation, as some limit the regulation to priests and others expand it to all of Israel.68 This contradiction extends to the penalty. For the layperson, the only result of eating carrion or torn meat is impurity (i.e. a change in 65 66

67 68

Early rationales included ethical concerns. e.g. see Philo, Virtues, 142–144 (discussed further in Chapter 3). The discussion of consuming the sciatic nerve also lacks a punishment for violating these rules. However, eating edible and inedible animals results in purity contamination and ingesting blood results in Extirpation (e.g. Lev 17:14). Perhaps the promise of a long, healthy life for sending away the mother bird implies that, in not doing so, things will not go well for you and you will shorten your days. e.g. m. Hullin 5:1; 8:3. Also, given that meat consumption was relatively rare at this time (discussed above), how often would these laws be applicable? Texts that limit it to priests: Lev 22:8; Ezek 4:14; 44:31. Texts that refer to all Israel: Exod 22:30; Lev 11:39–40; 17:15–16; Deut 14:21. For discussions of these texts, and how they relate, see e.g. Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1484–1487, 1856–1858; Propp, Exodus 19–40, 272–273. For a rabbinic attempt to reconcile this contradiction, see b. Menahot 45a. Such meat, however, can be sold to non-Israelites (e.g. Deut 14:21).

26

Hebrew Bible

ritual status); there is no penalty, unless one does not cleanse oneself properly after a meal of carrion/torn meat.69 For a priest, however, the punishment is “death by divine agency.”70 While the rabbis will later redefine the meaning of the terms “carrion” (‫ )נבלה‬and “torn” (‫)טרפה‬,71 in biblical passages, their

meaning is clear. What remains unclear is both their application and their rationale. Are these laws applicable to all Israel or just the priests? And, in either case, why are they commanded? Though a hygiene-based explanation might seem reasonable, such concerns stop neither the Israelites from selling such meat to non-Israelites, nor the latter from buying and consuming such meat. Biblical texts never even so much as imply such a justification. Rather, the answer (besides “because God says so” — i.e. revelation) provided in some, though not all, texts is an appeal to holiness, for example: “You shall be a holy people to Me” (Exod 22:30).72 This should not come as a surprise, as we have already encountered such explanations.73 However, we must remember that this is not a real rationale. How do carrion and torn meat actually relate to holiness? The answer to that question remains unresolved. Conclusion In this chapter, we have surveyed the relatively small number of biblical food regulations. In particular, we examined how these rules relate to abstaining from certain animals (sometimes categorically and other times specifically), animals that die a natural death, animals killed by other animals, blood, the sciatic nerve, and slaughtering a mother and her child on the same day; sending away the mother bird from the nest before taking her eggs/chicks; and cooking a kid in its mother’s milk. These 69

70 71 72

73

See e.g. Lev 17:15–16. On the categories of people constructed in this text (in comparison to that of Deut 14:21), see Saul M. Olyan, Rites and Rank: Hierarchy in the Biblical Representations of Cult (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 77. See Lev 22:8–9; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 654; Leviticus 17–22, 1857–1858 (the quote I cite in the above sentence comes from p. 1858). e.g. see m. Hullin 2:4 (discussed in Chapter 5). An appeal to holiness appears in two other texts. Lev 22:9 notes that this taboo, among others, must be kept lest one incurs sin, dies on its account, and commits desecration. Further, it reminds Israel that Yhwh is the one who consecrates them. Only in the latter part (the appeal to Yhwh’s consecration of Israel) is there any real attempt to justify the law. On this verse, see Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1858–1860. Deut 14:21 concludes: “for you are a holy people to the Lord your God.” e.g. see Lev 11:44–45, discussed above.

Conclusion

27

regulations tend to be apodictic, stating the law in a straightforward manner rather than explicitly justifying it on a rational basis.74 Though the Hebrew Bible is the foundation for Jewish dietary laws, many (indeed, most) of these culinary and commensal regulations develop later. Yet, these later laws often assert that they originate in biblical texts. For example, what is the precise meaning of “do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exod 23:19; 34:26; Deut 14:21)? Does this refer just to a kid and its own mother’s milk? What about goat meat and sheep milk? Does this apply to fowl, which produce no milk? These questions, discussed in chapters 3, 5, and 6, are just a few of the many such questions that logically arise when one wishes to implement biblical law in one’s own kitchen. Another problem encountered when one moves from text to later context, from biblical law to later kitchen practice, is the absence of explicit rationale for many of these laws. Most often, they contain the presumption that biblical laws should be followed solely because they are divine laws; or, in the terminology that I employ throughout this book, biblical dietary commandments are justified on the basis of revelation. As we have seen throughout this chapter, the biblical corpus is remarkably silent on both the why and the how of food practices. Thus, when later commentators act like Benjamin Franklin’s reasonable creature,75 reading reason- and allegory-based justifications of (and applications for) these dietary rules back into biblical texts, their answers tell us more about their own context than that of the Hebrew Bible.76 Since all subsequent chapters presume knowledge of biblical dietary regulations, it was necessary to clarify what biblical texts do – and do not – say. Now that we have read these biblical texts with our own eyes, we are ready to examine them through the lenses of ancient authors. Like looking through bifocals, we can read the same text through multiple lenses. Reading near and far (both geographically and temporally), a richer, more complete picture comes into focus. 74

75 76

For an attempt to situate this general trend within a larger theory of early Jewish interpretative practice, see David Weiss Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), esp. 9–17. Discussed in the Introduction. This same statement applies to modern commentators, as well (as noted in my arguments about modern commentators earlier in this chapter).

chapter 2

Greek and Roman Sources

“The worst it got was near the end [of the Holocaust]. A lot of people died right at the end, and I didn’t know if I could make it another day. A farmer, a Russian, God bless him, he saw my condition, and he went into his house and came out with a piece of meat for me.” “He saved your life.” “I didn’t eat it.” “You didn’t eat it?” “It was pork. I wouldn’t eat pork.” “Why?” “What do you mean why?” “What, because it wasn’t kosher?” “Of course.” “But not even to save your life?” “If nothing matters, there’s nothing to save.”1

Jews were not the only ones commenting on Jewish food laws in the ancient world. Non-Jewish witnesses noted these practices as well, sometimes with curiosity, sometimes with amusement, and other times with outright hostility. These sources allow us, for the first time thus far, to compare internal and external data. We can now relate statements about Jewish practice made by Jews to those made by non-Jews – by outsiders looking in. By exploring both sides, we not only paint a richer picture, but we can also check for bias by both groups. As is the case with writing the history of any historical figure or event, it is important to hear from both the supporters/apologists and the opponents/critics. However, it is also important to remember that both internal and external reports are never fully disinterested, so we should exercise caution and presume neither to be completely accurate descriptions of ancient figures or events. In this chapter, we will read the Greek and Roman testimony concerning Jewish food rules, especially in regard to the growing interest in Jewish 1

Jonathan Safran Foer, Eating Animals (New York and Boston: Back Bay Books, 2010), 16–17.

28

Jews and Pork

29

abstention from pork. While much of this material will come from the Hellenistic period, I will also include material that spans the temporal length of this book, ending in Late Antiquity.2 This brief departure from the general chronological order of this book is based on two factors. First, there is not much evidence and it fits more neatly into a single chapter rather than a few, very small chapters scattered throughout this volume. Second, this evidence is a departure from the rest of the sources, wherein authors – both Jewish and Christian – held sacred the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament. This shared presumption of the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament as canonical results in a need to grapple with the claims made in a scripture that both groups deem to be divine and inerrant. The sources in this chapter simply do not share that assumption. For this reason, they are outliers to our overall discussion. Since they add to the picture, but have the potential to distract from the picture as well, I have decided to address these sources in a single chapter early in the narrative. This approach allows the reader to understand what they add and to keep them in mind as the book continues.

Jews and Pork In Eating Animals, a book arguing the merits of vegetarianism, Jonathan Safran Foer recounts a conversation he had with his grandmother about her experiences hiding from the Nazis throughout the Holocaust. During this conversation, which appears as the epigraph to this chapter, Safran Foer expresses surprise that his grandmother refused to eat pork despite the fact that she was starving to death. She replies bluntly: “If nothing matters, there’s nothing to save.”3 Both Safran Foer’s grandmother’s sense of purpose and, sadly, her need to choose between eating pork and living, or abstaining from pork and quite possibly dying, are amply attested as far back as the Hellenistic period. In this chapter, we will first note the 2

3

There are multiple ways of dividing these time periods, and different disciplines (and sub-disciplines) divide them differently. The sources covered in this chapter cover material from several different time periods, mainly what classicists would call the late Hellenistic, Imperial Greek, and Late Antique periods. I will provide the dates for the authors that I cite and I will in general try and avoid getting bogged down in debate about defining periods. When relevant (for example, when I discuss the disappearance of pork-related Jewish martyrdom) I will use period nomenclature in a limited manner. In general, however, I will avoid doing so, as it tends to be more of a distraction than a help in most of the instances discussed above. For a good overview of classical periodization in regard to Greek and Latin literature, see the many essays in Oliver Tapin, ed., Literature in the Greek and Roman Worlds: A New Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Safran Foer, Eating Animals, 17.

30

Greek and Roman Sources

increased awareness of – and, concomitantly, explanations for – the Jewish pork taboo, and then discuss texts that attest to ancient pork-related Jewish martyrdom. Noting and Explaining Jewish Pork Abstention While non-Jews were aware of Jewish dietary restrictions in general, the Jewish avoidance of pork in particular was noticed and commented on more frequently than any other Jewish food regulation in antiquity.4 In modernity, these ancient observations have received a lot of attention, perhaps because pork abstention is one of the three Jewish practices (along with circumcision and Sabbath observance) most often discussed in ancient non-Jewish sources.5 It remains unclear why there was such an apparent widespread knowledge of this Jewish food taboo. Was it because, at that time, pig was the most commonly available biblically prohibited food, or because pig was actually more abhorred than any other biblically prohibited food (e.g. camel)?6 Although pig will play an increasingly important metonymic role in helping to define Jewish/non-Jewish identities in subsequent 4

5

6

For ancient sources on non-Jews noting Jewish dietary restrictions in general, see e.g. Letter of Aristeas, 128; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 14.226–227, 261. Of course, knowledge of Jewish food laws in general does not necessarily mean that this knowledge was correct. e.g. see Pliny the Elder’s claim in Natural History, 31.95 (GLAJJ 1:500) that Jews use a fish sauce for rituals made from fish without scales. Given the fact that Lev 11:9–12 mandates that fish must have scales (and fins), this testimony seems rather fishy. An equally dubious claim is made by another ancient author: that Jews are commanded to eat ostriches (Scriptores Historiae Augustae, 519 [GLAJJ 2:628–629]). Ancient authors were also aware that Egyptians, among others, had similar pork taboos. For sources, see Cristiano Grottanelli, “Avoiding Pork: Egyptians and Jews in Greek and Latin Texts,” in Cristiano Grottanelli and Lucio Milano (eds.), Food and Identity in the Ancient World (Padova: S.A.R.G.O.N. Editrice e Libreria, 2004), 59–93; Jordan D. Rosenblum, “‘Why do you refuse to eat pork?’ Jews, Food, and Identity in Roman Palestine,” JQR 100/1(2010): 95–110, 98. NB: When applicable, I will provide the reference to texts found in the useful resource: Menahem Stern, ed., Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism, 3 vols. (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1976); cited as GLAJJ in the text. Stern usually cites the LCL translation. Modern scholarship on this subject is voluminous, as this observation is referenced in most historical works on Jews in their ancient Mediterranean context. See e.g. Grottanelli, “Avoiding Pork”; David C. Kraemer, Jewish Eating and Identity through the Ages (New York: Routledge, 2009 [2007]), 30–33; Jordan D. Rosenblum, Food and Identity in Early Rabbinic Judaism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 48–58; Rosenblum, “Why do you refuse”; and Peter Schäfer, Judeophobia: Attitudes toward the Jews in the Ancient World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 66–81. On the legacy of these pork taboos, both in Jewish and non-Jewish imaginations, see e.g. Claudine Fabre-Vassas, The Singular Beast: Jews, Christians and the Pig, trans. Carol Volk (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); and Daphne Barak-Erez, Outlawed Pigs: Law, Religion, and Culture in Israel (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007). Kraemer, Jewish Eating, 31; Rosenblum, “Why do you refuse,” 102.

Jews and Pork

31

eras, the reason why this develops during this time period is not entirely clear.7 Many of the sources simply make a casual reference to or offer a relatively benign ethnographic explanation for this Jewish culinary peculiarity.8 Thus, we find Erotianus in the first-century CE recommending that one inquires whether the patient of a certain disease is Jewish, so as to avoid prescribing pork as a remedy.9 Elsewhere, the Jewish philosopher Philo (c. 20 BCE–50 CE) records that the Roman Emperor Gaius asked “a grave and momentous question” of a delegation of Alexandrian Jews: “Why do you refuse to eat pork?” Gaius’ question was met with laughter on the part of his audience, but not by the Jewish delegation, which offered a serious response.10 While Gaius and his audience find humor in this practice, they do not offer a rationale for this dietary abstention.11 Further, the first-century CE Jewish historian Josephus records Apion (a nonJewish critic of Jewish practice) denouncing Jews for, among other things, “not eating pork.”12 However, since we lack the original context for this claim and Josephus does not delve deeper into the issue, we are unable to fully comprehend its meaning. Did Josephus interpret Apion’s comment more harshly than intended, or were Apion’s words meant to condemn? We simply do not know.13 Elsewhere, we find what seems like a very straightforward analysis by the Stoic philosopher Epictetus (c.50–130 CE), who notes that: This is the conflict between Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans, not over the question whether holiness should be put before everything else and should be pursued in all circumstances, but whether the particular act of eating swine’s flesh is holy or unholy.14 7 8 9

10 11 12 14

See chapters 5–7. In general, see Rosenblum, “Why do you refuse.” I take these terms from Schäfer, Judeophobia, 69 and passim. Vocum Hippocraticarum Collectio cum Fragmentis, F33 (GLAJJ 1:446). The Greek Magical Papyri (PGM 4.3007–3086) also suggest avoiding pork in an anti-demon possession charm that is said to be Hebraic in origin; for an English translation, see Hans Dieter Betz, ed., The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation: Including the Demotic Spells, 2nd edn. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 96–97. For another approach to pork, medicine, and Jews, see Damascius, Vita Isidori, cited in Suda, s.v. Domninos, 227 (GLAJJ 2:675–677); discussed in Schäfer, Judeophobia, 71–72. Later, the rabbis will allow pork to be consumed as medicine if it will save one’s life (e.g. b. Yoma 82a [where pork can even be consumed on Yom Kippur!]; and the discussion of the rabbinic relaxation of food taboos due to exigent circumstances in Chapter 6). Embassy to Gaius, 361 (in general, see 361–363). All translations of Philo come from their corresponding LCL volume. See Rosenblum, “Why do you refuse,” 100–101; and the discussion in Chapter 3. Though Gaius does claim the custom of some non-Jews to abstain from eating lamb is due to the fact that “it’s not nice” (Embassy to Gaius, 362). Against Apion, 2.137 (GLAJJ 1:415). 13 See Schäfer, Judeophobia, 69. Arrianus, Dissertationes, 1:22:4 (GLAJJ 1:542).

32

Greek and Roman Sources

Epictetus simply comments that Jews, Syrians, Egyptians, and Romans disagree over whether one can eat pig. This casual reference to Jewish (and other) pork-related eating practices is part of his larger Stoic polemic about the primary importance of virtue.15 Peter Schäfer is correct that this statement is not “purely neutral,” as Epictetus would prefer holiness to be disassociated from dietary laws.16 That being said, there is no reason to think that Epictetus is harsher on pork abstention than he is on any other dietary restriction. He is simply noting a practice, which serves as one example of a larger trend that he wishes to subtly critique. Plutarch (c.46–120 CE) offers a lengthy ethnographic explanation for the rationale(s) behind the Jewish pork prohibition.17 Written as a dialogue, this text explains the Jewish abstention from pork (and other foods) in a variety of manners, most of which seem invented as part of his fanciful ethnography. Calling pork “the most legitimate meat,”18 he raises the question of “Whether the Jews abstain from pork because of reverence or aversion for the pig.”19 Attempts to offer reason-based rationalizations on the grounds of both reverence and aversion are then provided. Cristiano Grottanelli divides Plutarch’s explanations into four themes, each of which will be treated below: (1) Earth and seed; (2) Lepra and scabies; (3) Mud and shit; and (4) Downcast eyes.20 The theme of Earth and seed encompasses the rationalizations for the pork taboo based on reverence. According to this explanation, Jews honor the pig because “it was the first to cut the soil with its projecting snout, thus producing a furrow and teaching man the function of the ploughshare.”21 Given the importance of this lesson, the pig-pedagogue is respected and not consumed; and “We need not be surprised if some people do not eat pork for this reason.”22 Further, if the Jews really hated pigs, then they would kill them.23 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Here I use similar wording to Rosenblum, “Why do you refuse,” 98. Schäfer, Judeophobia, 70. Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 4.4:4–6:2 (GLAJJ 1:550–557). I base many of my comments on the apt observations of Schäfer, Judeophobia, 72–74. τὸ δικαιότατον κρέας; see Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 4.4:4 (GLAJJ 1:550, 554). The same term appears in 5:1 (GLAJJ 1:550, 555). Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 4.5 (GLAJJ 1:550, 554). Grottanelli, “Avoiding Pork,” 63, italics in original. I draw many of my comments in this section from his commentary on each category; see esp. pp. 63–78. Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 4.5:2 (GLAJJ 1:551, 555). For parallels with this theme in ancient texts, see Grottanelli, “Avoiding Pork,” 63–70. Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 4.5:2 (GLAJJ 1:551, 555). The text offers other similar examples from Egyptian and other cultures (e.g. field mouse, lion, ibis, hedgehog). Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 4.5:2 (GLAJJ 1:551, 556); cp. Celsus Philosophus, discussed below. Further, we learn that the Jews honor the ass and the hare, which is why they abstain from eating them; see Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 4.5:2–3 (GLAJJ 1:551–552, 556).

Jews and Pork

33

The other three themes include rationalizations based on a Jewish aversion of swine. Thus, according to the theme Lepra and scabies, Jews avoid the pig because “every pig is covered on the under side by lepra and scaly eruptions.”24 Since Jews abhor such skin ailments,25 they abhor the pig. According to the theme Mud and shit, pigs are dirty.26 They wallow in mud and excrement. Interestingly, the claim appears that “the very filthiness of their habit produces an inferior quality of meat.”27 Such a claim seems odd, as most discussions of the pig in regard to Jews note that the pig is, indeed, delicious.28 According to the final theme, Downcast eyes, “the eyes of the swine are so twisted and drawn down that they can never catch sight of anything above them or see the sky unless they are carried upside down so that their eyes are given an unnatural tilt upward.”29 Such a view marks them as connected to lowly matters and death.30 In the end, however, no single explanation is preferred. Indeed, they are all possible. The explanation for the Jewish pork taboo offered by the Roman senator and historian Tacitus (c.56–117 CE) is less benign. Included among a list of “new religious practices, quite opposed to those of all other religions” instituted by Moses is the pork prohibition: “They abstain from pork, in recollection of a plague, for the scab to which this animal is subject once afflicted them.”31 While this rationalization, in isolation, might seem innocuous, there are two reasons to view it as pejorative: (1) the introduction to and general tone of the list in which it is located;32 and (2) the 24

25 26

27 28

29 30 31

32

Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 4.5:3 (GLAJJ 1:552, 556). For parallels with this theme in ancient texts, see Grottanelli, “Avoiding Pork,” 70–74. The rabbis also note a potential connection between pigs and skin ailments, though not in the manner above. e.g. see b. Qiddushin 49b (and, according to Rashi, referenced on b. Shabbat 129a–b). For a discussion, see Saul M. Olyan, Rites and Rank: Hierarchy in the Biblical Representations of Cult (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 45–47. For parallels with this theme in ancient texts, see Grottanelli, “Avoiding Pork,” 74–77. Also see the discussion in Chapter 7; and the famous speech by Jules in Pulp Fiction (dir. Quentin Tarantino; 1994). Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 4.5:3 (GLAJJ 1:552, 556). e.g. see Philo, Special Laws, 4.101 (discussed in Chapter 3). Similarly, see Schäfer, Judeophobia, 240 n. 42. As the reference to Philo indicates, the assumption that pig is delicious is even encountered in ancient Jewish sources! Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 4.5:3 (GLAJJ 1:552, 556). For parallels with this theme in ancient texts, see Grottanelli, “Avoiding Pork,” 77–78. This concept will appear also in allegories by early Christian authors, discussed in Chapter 7. Tacitus, Historiae, 5.4:1 (GLAJJ 2:18, 25). Of course, Tacitus’ claim that the Jewish pork prohibition is a practice “quite opposed to those of all other religions” flies in the face of evidence that other ancient groups also avoided pork (a fact of which many Greek and Roman authors were aware; see e.g. Celsus Philosophus, quoted in Origen, Against Celsus, 5.41 [GLAJJ 2:257, 286]; Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes, 3.223 [GLAJJ 2:159]). In addition to the introduction, quoted above, the list includes such comments as: “The Jews regard as profane all that we hold sacred; on the other hand, they permit all that we abhor” (4:1). Further,

34

Greek and Roman Sources

connection between this account and the story that immediately precedes this list, in which the Jews were blamed for a plague in Egypt “which caused bodily disfigurement.”33 Since Jews were reputed to be responsible for this plague, “when the Jews abstain from pork in memory of the plague in Egypt, they ultimately commemorate and enforce their disastrous habits which make them hateful to the gods and any civilized nation.”34 Unlike with Plutarch, here the theme of Lepra and scabies marks the practice as negative rather than as neutral (or perhaps even positive). Celsus Philosophus (second-century CE) offers another explanation: namely that the Jews “abstain from pigs because they loathe them.”35 Such a practice might seem “very peculiar but is at least traditional,” which means that it is deserving of (albeit begrudging) respect.36 The fact that this point contradicts Plutarch’s reverence-based argument need not bother us, since this enterprise is less about establishing a mono-causal (or historically or ethnographically accurate!) reason and more about the fact that ancient non-Jewish authors noticed this peculiar culinary tradition of the Jews and sought to account for it based on reason. Further, it is important to note that the status of this biblical law as an ancient practice mitigated (for some, at least) the presumed oddity of the Jewish abstention from the pig. Among ancient authors, the third-century CE neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry offers the most straightforward explanation for the Jewish abstention from pork: there were no pigs around to eat! Though we wage war against wild beasts on justified grounds, still we abstain from many animals who live in association with men. This is the reason why the Greeks do not eat dogs or horses or asses, but eat pigs, the tame ones being of the same species as the wild, and this holds true about the birds. For the pig is of no use but for food.37 But the Phoenicians and

33

34 36 37

Tacitus’ discussion continues, noting that, “the other customs of the Jews are base and abominable, and owe their persistence to their depravity.” One such custom is: “They sit apart at meals.” See Tacitus, Historiae, 5.5:1–2 (GLAJJ 2:19, 26). The increasing Jewish desire for commensal separation is attested both in Jewish and non-Jewish sources, as is discussed throughout this book. Further, such a statement accords with the view of some ancient authors that Jewish food practices are misanthropic (as discussed further, below). Tacitus, Historiae, 5.3:1 (GLAJJ 2:18, 25). Similarly, see Louis H. Feldman, Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World: Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander to Justinian (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996 [1993]), 169; Schäfer, Judeophobia, 75. 35 Schäfer, Judeophobia, 75. Quoted in Origen, Against Celsus, 5.34 (GLAJJ 2:255, 285). Quoted in Origen, Against Celsus, 5.25 (GLAJJ 2:254, 284). This oft-stated claim is not 100 percent accurate. For example, in modern Portugal, a pig’s bladder can be inflated and used as a soccer ball by children. See the well-known account in Anthony Bourdain, A Cook’s Tour: In Search of the Perfect Meal (New York: Bloomsbury, 2001), 16 (and on Portuguese pig customs in general, see pp. 15–28).

Jews and Pork

35

Jews abstained from it, because in their places pigs were not to be found at all. For it is said that even now this animal is not to be seen in Aethiopia.38

With no pigs available to eat, Jews (and Phoenicians) obviously omitted them from their diet. This is not a judgment, just a statement of fact. Implied in Porphyry’s wording, however, is the presumption that, had pigs been an edible option to Jews, they would have followed Greek custom and consumed them.39 While Porphyry states elsewhere that Jews are willing to die rather than transgress this taboo,40 he does not offer another explanation for why Jews observe this practice, or any of the other Jewish food taboos of which he is aware.41 He simply notes that, since pig is not locally sourced, it is off the Jewish menu. Ancient non-Jewish authors were both aware of, and puzzled by, the Jewish pork taboo. While some authors were content to simply note a culinary practice that they deemed bizarre, others played the part of ethnographer and conjectured about the origin of this taboo. Such speculation, which ran the gamut from reverence to hatred of pig, suggests that they were intrigued but not necessarily well informed. Still others used humor to poke fun at this Jewish dietary practice. It is to these satirists that we now turn. Swine Satire Humor is often based on the juxtaposition of the expected and the unexpected. For example, a cartoon depicting a male rabbit on a psychologist’s couch discussing his sexual dysfunction will be seen as funnier than the same cartoon with a human man on the couch. Satire builds upon this juxtaposition, especially by focusing on the foibles, vices, hypocrisy, and alterity of people, practices, and institutions in a given society. The Jewish 38

39 40 41

De Abstentia, 1.14 (GLAJJ 2:433–434); cp. Jerome, Contra Iovinianum, 2.7, who states a somewhat similar reason for a pig taboo (though not in regard to Jews). The anthropologist Marvin Harris makes a roughly similar argument for the biblical food taboo. See e.g. Good to Eat: Riddles of Food and Culture (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1998), 67–87; and Chapter 1. Schäfer, Judeophobia, 75 implies the same observation that I make, but does not make this claim explicit. See De Abstentia, 2.61 (where the Phoenicians supposedly refuse to eat cows, not pigs) discussed further below. Porphyry mentions several Jewish food aversions, first among them the pig, in De Abstentia, 4.14. Many of the rules in this passage are found in the Hebrew Bible, though some clearly are borrowed from Josephus, Against Apion, 2.213 (discussed in Chapter 3). On this passage, see Schäfer, Judeophobia, 76–77. Interestingly, Porphyry ends this passage in an almost Darwinian fashion, by explaining how nature prevents those animal not sacrificed from becoming too numerous.

36

Greek and Roman Sources

avoidance of pork was seen as humorous to pork-loving ancient authors. As such, it seemed ripe for satire. While the previous section explored casual references to or relatively benign ethnographic explanations for this Jewish culinary peculiarity, satire (both ancient and modern) often has more of a bite to it. In contrast to the material that we have already explored, less innocuous are the remarks by the satirical first-century CE Roman author Petronius, who wrongly suggests that Jews may worship a “pig-god” (porcinum numen).42 Petronius’ comments are part of a larger trend of Latin satire of Jewish pork abstention, noted by Peter Schäfer.43 Thus, while these comments might indicate an attempt to rationalize the Jewish pork taboo (i.e. Jews do not eat what they venerate) they are more likely intended to ridicule it, as this passage lampoons other Jewish practices, including circumcision and Sabbath observance.44 According to Plutarch, Cicero, the famous first-century BCE Roman orator, utilized this connection to make a humorous and satirical pun: For instance “verres” is the Roman word for a castrated porker; when, accordingly, a freedman named Caecilius, who was subject to judaizing [ἔνοχος τῷ ἰουδαΐζειν],45 wanted to thrust aside the Sicilian accusers and denounce Verres himself, Cicero said: “What does a Jew have to do with a Verres?”46

While explaining a joke necessarily takes some of the bite out of its sarcasm, most readers will require some context. This quote is part of a record of a trial in which Cicero represented the Sicilian people against their propraetor Verres, whom they accused of corruption. Caecilius, Verres’ crony, tried to interfere and fix the trial in Verres’ favor. Cicero mocks Caecilius by making a pun in which he connects the intended beneficiary of his actions (Verres) with the food (in Latin: verres) that one, “subject to Judaizing” would avoid.47 Why Jews avoid pig is not mentioned. 42 44

45 46 47

43 Fragmenta 37, line 1 (GLAJJ 1:444). See Schäfer, Judeophobia, 77–81. See Schäfer, Judeophobia, 77–79. Cp. Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 4.5 (GLAJJ 1:550–553, 554– 557; discussed above). Strabo suggests that many Jewish practices are based on superstition, including “abstinence from flesh” (αἱ τῶν βρωμάτων ἀποσχέσεις), which might imply avoidance of pork, as this was the most commonly known Jewish food taboo (Geographica, 16.2:37 [GLAJJ 1:295, 300]). However, since this text is neither specific nor, even if it was, would it change the broad picture, I do not comment on it in detail here. On this translation, see Shaye J. D. Cohen, The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 180–181 n. 26. Plutarch, Vita Ciceronis, 7:6 (GLAJJ 1:566), with minor revision (see previous note). As Cohen rightly notes, Plutarch disapproves of such “judaizing” behavior (Beginnings, 180–181). For a recent argument about how the concept of judaizing has been deployed throughout history,

Jews and Pork

37

However, Cicero’s joke presumes that his audience will “get it” – namely, that Jews (Ἰουδαῖος) do not eat pork.48 The renowned first–second-century CE Roman satirical author Juvenal also mocks Jewish pork abstention without providing a rationale (humorous or otherwise) for this practice. He manages to hit the trifecta of satire – mocking people, practices, and politics – when he quips: [A diamond of great renown] was given as a present long ago by the barbarian Agrippa to his incestuous sister [Berenice], in that country where kings celebrate festal sabbaths with bare feet,49 and where a longestablished clemency suffers pigs to attain old age.50

Juvenal pokes fun at the rumor of the Herodian King Agrippa II’s incestuous affair with his sister, Berenice.51 In doing so, he lampoons various Jewish practices, including allowing pigs to grow old by not slaughtering them for consumption. Later, Juvenal jokes that Jews “see no difference between eating swine’s flesh, from which their father abstained, and that of man.”52 Given that Jews abstain from eating both humans and swine, Juvenal asserts that they see no difference between their flesh. Though Juvenal twice satirizes this long-standing Jewish practice, he never offers an account for why Jewish pigs grow old and their flesh is tantamount to human flesh, other than presuming it to be divine decree (i.e. as based on revelation, but not reason).53 Another joke without rationale is attributed to Augustus by the fifthcentury CE antiquarian Roman author Macrobius. Discussing Herod (who began the Herodian line of which King Agrippa II was the end), Macrobius reports a quip by Augustus that plays on Herod’s reputation for ruthlessly killing any enemies, whether perceived or real: “I’d rather be

48 49

50 51 52 53

see David Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013). For a discussion about what being “subject to judaizing” refers to, see Cohen, Beginnings, 180–181. On questions of the veracity of this encounter, see Stern, GLAJJ 1:566. For a brief summary of Greek and Roman commentary on the Jewish Sabbath, see Schäfer, Judeophobia, 82–92. Several of these comments relate to food, including the (somewhat contradictory) notions that the Sabbath was a fast day, upon which wine and cold food was consumed (see Schäfer, Judeophobia, 89–92; and in general, Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 174–175). Juvenal, Saturae, 6.157–160 (GLAJJ 2:99–100). For references and discussion, see Schäfer, Judeophobia, 79. Juvenal, Saturae, 14.98–99 (GLAJJ 2:102–103). On this text in general, see Schäfer, Judeophobia, 79–81. Juvenal does note that Jews “learn and practice and revere the Jewish law, and all that Moses handed down in his secret tome” (Saturae, 14.101–102 [GLAJJ 2:102–103]). However, this only suggests that Jews practice the law because God (via Moses) instructed them to do so, which is not much of a rationalization.

38

Greek and Roman Sources

Herod’s pig than Herod’s son.”54 This pun55 satirically juxtaposes Herod’s penchant for killing his own sons (he had three of them executed) with his alleged piety vis-à-vis Jewish dietary practices.56 It jokingly claims that Herod shows no compunction in violating one of the Ten Commandments (the Sixth Commandment prohibits murder),57 but transforms into a biblically observant Jew when a swine’s head, rather than a human’s, is on the chopping block. Neither the reason for this hypocrisy, nor for the pork taboo itself, is explored. As we have seen, texts that satirize the Jewish pork prohibition in this time period do not offer rationales for this seemingly peculiar practice. We laugh, but we do not learn. Pork-Related Jewish Martyrdom Jewish commensality practices were often perceived as misanthropic in non-Jewish sources. While ancient authors might exaggerate the nefarious intentions of these practices, this perception has some basis in fact.58 Thus, it is not without precedent that the first-century BCE Sicilian historian Diodorus asserts that: they alone of all nations avoided dealings with any other people and looked upon all men as their enemies . . . the Jews had made their hatred of mankind into a tradition, and on this account had introduced utterly outlandish laws: not to break bread with any other race, nor to show them any good will at all.59

The reputed misanthropy of Jews was therefore deemed to be a rationalization for their food (and other) practices. Diodorus then recounts an infamous legendary story, in which “Antiochus, called Epiphanes” – the

54 55 56

57 59

Saturnalia, 2.4:11 (GLAJJ 2:665). Further, see Schäfer, Judeophobia, 81. As Stern correctly notes: “This joke, based on the play of the Greek words υἱός [son] and ὗς [pig], loses its piquancy in the Latin translation” (GLAJJ 2:666). While many scholars point to the historical evidence about Herod’s execution of his sons (e.g. Stern, GLAJJ 2:665), to the best of my knowledge, no author has raised concerns about the supposed piety of Herod regarding Jewish dietary regulations. I find this claim suspect, especially given other evidence indicating that Herod was willing to violate traditional mores and to institute new “Hellenistic” practices (see e.g. Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 15.267–281; on the “Jewishness” of Herod, see Cohen, Beginnings, 13–24 [p. 23 is especially relevant to the discussion at hand]). Either way, the historical perception is more important than the historical reality. Exod 20:13; Deut 5:17. 58 For elaboration, see Chapter 3. Bibliotheca Historica, 34/35.1.1–2 (GLAJJ 1:182–183). For other examples of this type of argument, see 3 Macc 3:4, 7; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 13.245–247. Josephus probably used Diodorus as a source. For a brief discussion with references, see Schäfer, Judeophobia, 66–67.

Jews and Pork

39

Seleucid villain of Maccabeean legend and the Hanukkah story – uses a pig to implement his radical political and cultural agenda. And since Epiphanes was shocked by such hatred directed against all mankind, he had set himself to break down their traditional practices. Accordingly, he sacrificed before the image of the founder60 and the open-air altar of the god a great sow, and poured its blood over them. Then, having prepared its flesh, he ordered that their holy books, containing the xenophobic laws, should be sprinkled with the broth of the meat; that the lamp, which they call undying and which burns continually in the temple, should be extinguished; and that the high priest and the rest of the Jews should be compelled to partake of the meat.61

Antiochus’ preferred method for obliterating the perceived misanthropic practices of the Jews was to use the pig as a symbol of his domination of the Jews. By eating the force-fed pig-meat, the Jews symbolically both submitted to his rule and renounced their reputedly xenophobic practices.62 Pig was therefore used to change the Jewish altar, the Jewish holy books, and the Jewish body. The missing element in Diodorus’ narrative of the legendary encounter between Antiochus and the Jews is that of Jewish martyrdom. Martyrs (from the Greek root meaning “to bear witness”) offer their lives as a testimony of their faith.63 Tessa Rajak summarizes how narratives of porkrelated Jewish martyrdom functioned: This phenomenon can be explained in terms of the specific functions of Jewish martyrology, in which a central purpose is to “save the nation,” to establish models for the preservation of Jewish identity under alien rule. The dietary laws are a vital symbolic distinguishing mark . . . And it is the special contribution of Jewish–Greek martyrology to integrate what had become an everyday identity-marker of Judaism, its dietary rules, with a picture of Jewish identity and faith stretched to abnormal limits in a crisis of 60 61

62 63

This refers to a marble statue with an image of a bearded Moses seated on an ass. See Schäfer, Judeophobia, 55–62, esp. 58–59. Bibliotheca Historica, 34/35.1.3–4 (GLAJJ 1:182–183). As I detail below, pig is by far the most common animal in ancient texts that Jews are reputedly forced to eat. Interestingly, there is at least one reference to non-Jews being forced to eat pig (and fowl) via a prohibition against eating calves – a prohibition intended to counteract non-Jews who, acting like Jews, avoid pig and eat calves instead. See Jerome, Contra Iovinianum, 2:7; and the brief discussion, which reads the text very differently, in Amnon Linder, The Jews in Roman Imperial Legislation (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987), 161. See Rosenblum, “Why do you refuse,” esp. 101–102; Schäfer, Judeophobia, 67. For a concise and relevant discussion of these matters, see Tessa Rajak, “Dying for the Law: The Martyr’s Portrait in Jewish–Greek Literature,” in The Jewish Dialogue with Greece and Rome: Studies in Cultural and Social Interaction (Boston: Brill, 2000), 99–133.

40

Greek and Roman Sources persecution. Whether this representation was generated by a dimly remembered historic moment, a real and traumatic attempt by Seleucid overseers to force forbidden food on certain Jews, or whether by subsequent social developments, we do not know. Nor does it matter very much. Either way, this reconstruction of the past, with its distinctive archetypes of martyrdom, was fixed both in literature and in popular memory.64

The accuracy of these accounts is less important than their cultural power. Martyrs bear witness to their faith by choosing death/principle over life/ compromise. And, starting in the Hellenistic period, this choice becomes symbolized in the decision to eat pork and live, or abstain and die. While in Chapter 3 we will encounter Philo talking about the split hoof as symbolic for the choice between virtue and vice,65 this dilemma was not an abstract philosophical debate; it was a matter of life and death. Or, at least, that is how it is depicted in the literary accounts. Interestingly, the vast majority of these literary accounts come from Hellenistic period Jewish texts. However, since these texts present what they consider to be representative non-Jewish opinions on the Jewish pork prohibition, I include them in the present chapter. Pork-related Jewish martyrdom at the hand of Antiochus appears in two texts (2 Macc 6:18–7:42 and 4 Macc 5–18),66 which describe two accounts of martyrdom: (1) the martyrdom of an old man named Eleazar; and (2) the martyrdom of a mother and her seven sons. Since we are concerned with the rationalizations for biblical dietary laws, we will focus on the expansive text of 4 Maccabees, which narrates the supposed events in greater detail. Yet, even when we focus on the more expansive text, we find that a key element is missing: a rationalization for the law by non-Jews. While Antiochus wanted to force Jews to eat pork as a symbol of their submission to his authority and their renouncement of their misanthropic ways, their reason for abstaining from pork baffled him and his guards. Thus, when Antiochus offers Eleazar the chance to eat pork rather than suffer torture and death, he comments: I respect your age and your gray hairs, although to have had them for so long and still cling to the religion of the Jews makes you anything but a philosopher in my eyes. Why should you abhor eating the excellent meat 64 65 66

Rajak, “Dying for the Law,” 128–129. Also see Rosenblum, “Why do you refuse,” 101–102. See Special Laws, 4.108. Cp. Letter of Aristeas, 150–151. Both texts are discussed in Chapter 3. I discuss another Philo text, below. 1 Macc 1:47 states that Antiochus ordered the building of altars upon which to sacrifice swine and other unclean animals. However, it does not describe the forced consumption of that meat (though it is clearly implied).

Jews and Pork

41

of this animal which nature has freely bestowed on us? Surely it is sheer folly not to enjoy harmless pleasures, and it is wrong to spurn nature’s good gifts. But in my judgment it will be greater folly still if you indulge in idle conceits about truth and continue to defy me to your own cost in suffering. Will you not awaken from your preposterous philosophy, abandon your nonsensical calculations, assume a frame of mind to match your years, and accept the true philosophy of expediency? Bow to my benevolent advice and have pity on your own old age. Consider this also, that, even if there is some power that watches over this religion of yours, it would pardon you for any transgression committed under compulsion.67

Eleazar should realize that his stubborn refusal to depart from his misguided philosophy is about to lead him to a totally unnecessary and violent death.68 While Eleazar will offer an eloquent defense for his position, Antiochus cannot comprehend why one would choose death rather than indulge in the “harmless” pleasure of “eating the excellent meat of this animal.” Antiochus does not give much weight to the biblical commandment to abstain. In fact, he argues that God would understand, and forgive Eleazar for choosing pork rather than death.69 While almost certainly a product of literary imagination, Antiochus fails to give credence to either revelation or reason as a basis for this biblical prohibition. However, as we shall see in Chapter 3, when we examine the Jewish testimony from this text, both reason and revelation come to the forefront. Impressed by his old age and his courage, the guards offer Eleazar another way out. “Why, Eleazar, are you so unreasonably destroying yourself in this foul way? Let us bring you some cooked food, and you pretend to taste of the swine’s flesh and save yourself.”70 Again, even the guards offer no rationalization for this law, though they acknowledge the fortitude of Eleazar’s refusal. They view Eleazar’s decision as unreasonable, especially when they offer him a chance to avoid both death and pork. Doing so, however, would involve a public farce in which Eleazar loses face and, more importantly, the opportunity to die a martyr, in which his death would serve as a witness of his faith. Eleazar refuses to partake in the 67 68 69

70

4 Macc 5:7–13. All translations of 4 Maccabees are from H. Anderson, “4 Maccabees,” in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), OTP (New York: Doubleday, 1985), 2:531–564. On the association between Jews and philosophers in the ancient world, see Michael L. Satlow, “Theophrastus’s Jewish Philosophers,” JJS 59/1 (2008): 1–20. In fact, Antiochus’ suggestion accords with later rabbinic views. e.g. see b. Sanhedrin 74a, which permits one to violate any precept – except idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, or murder – in order to save one’s life. 4 Macc 6:14–15; cp. 2 Macc 6:21–22. Interestingly, contrast e.g. b. Avodah Zarah 18b; Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7.12.1.

42

Greek and Roman Sources

charade and suffers, depending on one’s perspective, either a senseless and stupid or a principled and virtuous death. Following Eleazar’s death, we learn of the tale of the mother and her seven sons. Rather than eating pork, each member of the family suffered a gruesome death. Their reason for abstaining was a desire to remain faithful to their ancestral law and their mastery of their passions. In regard to the latter, 4 Maccabees 13:2 notes: “For if being enslaved to the passions they had eaten unclean food, we would have said that they had been conquered by them.” Fortunately, their reason and self-control prevailed. Such an act of virtue is even more pronounced for the mother, as she both conquered her maternal instinct and the contemporary cultural perception of a weaker female mind.71 Yet, no rationale is offered for the law by the non-Jews in this story. Antiochus implores them not to disobey him: “I not only advise you not to display the same mad frenzy as that old man who has just been tortured, but I beg of you to yield to me and take advantage of my friendship.”72 If they would only “renounce the ancestral law of [their] polity,” they would receive positions of authority and wealth.73 Their answer is firm and fast, as they refuse his offer as soon as Antiochus stops speaking.74 We learn much about their violent and graphic deaths and their reasons for choosing a martyr’s death over pork-consuming life, but we do not learn the non-Jewish rationale for this law. Albeit biased in its portrayal, the text presents the non-Jews as completely baffled as to why Jews observe this food prohibition, even on pain of death. Another pork-related martyr text describes the actions of an Alexandrian mob in 38 CE, which Philo reports seized women in public. Women who were determined to be non-Jewish were released, But if they were found to be of our nation then these onlookers at a show turned into despotic tyrants and gave orders to fetch swine’s flesh and give it to the women. Then all the women who in fear of punishment tasted the meat were dismissed and did not have to bear any further dire maltreatment. But the more resolute were delivered to the tormentors to suffer desperate ill-usage, which is the clearest proof of their entire innocence of wrongdoing.75 71

72 73 74 75

e.g. see 4 Macc 14:11–16:25; 2 Macc 7:20–23. On the construction of masculinity in this text, see Stephen D. Moore and Janice Capel Anderson, “Taking It like a Man: Masculinity in 4 Maccabees,” JBL 117/2 (1998): 249–273. 4 Macc 8:5. 4 Macc 8:7. In general, see 8:4–11. This offer is absent from the version in 2 Maccabees. 4 Macc 8:29–9:9. Philo, Flaccus, 95–96 (the quote is from 96). This passage indicates how difficult it was to distinguish visually Jewish and non-Jewish women, as discussed in general in Cohen, Beginnings, 25–68

Jews and Pork

43

Jewish women who consume the pork are let go, since they have symbolically submitted to Roman authority; those who refuse, are tortured.76 Philo focuses on the torture of these women, but does not record the reason behind this mob’s use of pork.77 Thus, we have another witness to porkrelated Jewish martyrdom that fails to provide a rationale for the very food practice for which Jews are willing to suffer torture and even death. Our survey of pork-related Jewish martyrdom thus far leaves us with more questions than answers. Why has the pig become such a central symbol of Jewish identity? And, most importantly for the present project, how do non-Jews – who are reputedly willing to kill Jews unwilling to ingest pork – understand these food laws? What is the basis for Jewish food regulations according to non-Jews in the Hellenistic period? Did most ancient non-Jews even care about, let alone know about, Jewish dietary practices? Unfortunately, we lack explicit answers to these questions. However, there is one question that I believe we can answer: why do new occurrences of pork-related Jewish martyrdom disappear in Late Antiquity? It is this question to which we now turn. Pork-Related Jewish Martyrdom: A Curious Absence? One area of intriguing difference between Greek and Roman authors from the Hellenistic and Late Antique periods is the curious absence of porkrelated Jewish martyrdom. There are only a handful of texts from this era that refer to this phenomenon, and in each instance it appears to be refracted through the lens of time. According to Sextus Empiricus (secondcentury CE): “A Jew or an Egyptian priest would prefer to die instantly rather than eat pork.”78 This description appears amidst a list of various religious food practices “in people’s worship of their gods.”79 It therefore

76

77

78 79

(this passage is cited on p. 32). On these riots, see Sandra Gambetti, The Alexandrian Riots of 38 C.E. and the Persecution of the Jews: A Historical Reconstruction (Boston: Brill, 2009), which references this passage on pp. 189–190. Rosenblum, “Why do you refuse,” 101. As I noted there, more work needs to be done on the gendered components of these texts. Unfortunately, such a task is beyond the purview of this project. Also see Josephus, Jewish War, 2.152, which describes Roman torture of Jews, “in order to induce them to blaspheme their lawgiver or to eat some forbidden thing” (all translations of Josephus are from the corresponding LCL volume). The reasons for Jewish observance of, or for non-Jewish desire for Jews to violate, these laws do not appear. Further, though not explicit, one wonders if pig is the forbidden thing being forced upon the Jews. Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes, 3.223 (GLAJJ 2:159). Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes, 3.222–223 (GLAJJ 2:159). Schäfer correctly notes that this statement is “markedly neutral” in tone (Judeophobia, 70).

44

Greek and Roman Sources

adds nothing new to the discussion above. Adding only slightly more, Porphyry, whose descriptions were discussed earlier, notes that Jews (Ἑβραίους) do not eat pig, “and even when many kings strove to change them they preferred to suffer death rather than to transgress the law.”80 While many kings sought to change Jewish attitudes toward pig, Jews preferred death to transgression of their laws. Finally, the fourth-century CE Roman emperor Julian observes that, “those whose minds were attuned to the doctrines of the Jews are so ardent in their belief that they would choose to die for it, and to endure utter want and starvation rather than taste pork or any animal that has been strangled or had the life squeezed out of it.”81 Here, Julian uses discourse about Jewish actions as part of his larger polemical project;82 he does not, however, recount a new pork-related Jewish martyr account. To make an analogy to modern journalism: it is a clip from the archive, and not breaking news. Given the apparent popularity pork-related Jewish martyrdom in the Hellenistic period, this absence in the Late Antique period seems rather odd. Were Jews now more willing to eat pork? Did non-Jews cease to use this as a litmus test for survival? There is no way to know for certain, as the record remains frustratingly silent. That being said, I have a theory to account for the near disappearance of this motif. As discussed above, many of the texts in which Jews must choose either swine or survival use Jewish ingestion of pig as symbolic of Jewish acceptance of external authority. Such narratives – real or (in my opinion, more likely) imagined – make sense in an era where Jews were breaking away from the rule of one group (the Seleucids) and then being taken over by another (Romans). In the Late Antique period, however, Jews in Palestine remained under the rule of Rome, who had already (at least reputedly) submitted them to this crucible. While Sextus Empiricus, Porphyry, and Julian remember a time 80

81

82

De Abstentia, 2.61 (GLAJJ 2:434–444); on this text, see Ari Finkelstein, “The Use of Jews in Julian’s Program: ‘Dying for the Law’ in the Letter to Theodorus – A Case Study,” in Jordan D. Rosenblum, Lily C. Vuong, and Nathaniel P. DesRosiers (eds.), Religious Competition in the Third-Century C.E.: Jews, Christians, and the Greco-Roman World, JAJS (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), 169–170; Grottanelli, “Avoiding Pork,” 79–80; Schäfer, Judeophobia, 75–76. Porphyry mentions Jews in a list of groups that would die rather than transgress their food taboos. Interestingly, in this list it is on account of cows – and not pigs – that Egyptians are willing to die. Further, there is little evidence for many of these other groups martyring themselves rather than consuming prohibited foods; rather, “It seems likely that Porphyry is making a generalization here from the history of the Hebrews, about whose fortitude in face of persecution he has much to relate” (Stern, GLAJJ 2:444). Letter to Theodorus, 453C (GLAJJ 2:551–552); translation follows Finkelstein, “Jews in Julian’s Program,” 169. On this text, see Finkelstein, “Jews in Julian’s Program”; Schäfer, Judeophobia, 70–71. In general, see Finkelstein, “Jews in Julian’s Program.”

Conclusion

45

when Jews (at least textually) had to undergo this ordeal, the absence of such narratives during this era might highlight once again the role of this motif as signifying the imposition of foreign dominance on Jews.83 Now that Jews remain under Roman rule, such stories need not be told, which explains this lacuna. But echoes of the memory of the past are still heard.

Conclusion Ancient Greeks and Romans were aware that Jews had specific dietary restrictions, most notably their abstention from swine. They regarded this culinary peculiarity with curiosity, bafflement, and sarcasm. On occasion, they attempted to provide reason-based rationales for a practice that they deemed odd. However, their origin myths rarely reflect direct engagement with Jews, as they seem content to offer their explanations from a distance rather than interviewing the proverbial Jew on the street. This lack of understanding takes a dire turn in texts (usually from Hellenistic period Jewish sources) that report to recount instances of pork-related Jewish martyrdom. In these accounts, Jews are described as choosing death rather than transgressing the biblical commandment not to ingest pig-meat. The fact that Jews view this as a Hobson’s choice – a take it or leave it proposal – baffles their non-Jewish pork force-feeders. Having explored the various ways that Greeks and Romans attempt to account for biblical dietary laws, we can turn our attention now to the interpretations of ancient Jews and Christians, for whom the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament is sacred and canonical. Ancient Jewish and Christian authors seek to rationalize the seemingly irrational biblical dietary commandments encountered in their Scripture. In their doing so, we encounter myriad justifications for these practices based on reason, revelation, and allegory. Unlike Greek and Romans, Jews and Christians are theologically invested in the texts that mandate these practices. Though they will debate whether these commandments are to be observed figuratively or literally (or both), these discussions are noticeably different than those encountered in this chapter. 83

It is telling that, when such narratives appear in later rabbinic texts, they are either reworkings of earlier stories or they are set in the time of the Second Temple. Further, when these stories reappear, the Roman Empire has already become Christianized, making for the imposition of a new authority with new variables, which might explain the return of these tales. See Rosenblum, “Why do you refuse to eat pork?” esp. 102–109.

chapter 3

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

By breeding pure-bred hogs men ought to improve in finances, intelligence and character. Good live stock is a powerful aid in making good men. But some men are too coarse-grained to respond to the humanizing and ennobling influences which the care of animals yields. Unfortunately there are men who seem to acquire in the course of their experience certain traits which are suggestive of porcine association. A human hog is an awful commentary on our agricultural civilization.1

From the rebuilding of the Temple in c.515 BCE to its destruction at the hands of the Romans in 70 CE, the Temple stood at the center of religious, political, and economic life.2 Perhaps the most important figure during this period was Alexander the Great, who brought with him Greek language and culture when he took control of the region in 332 BCE. The effects of Hellenism (fundamentally meaning to speak or act Greek) reverberate throughout this period and, in many ways, even unto today.3 In fact, the traditional model of viewing “Hellenistic Judaism” as its own discrete entity is no longer tenable – since all forms of Judaism in antiquity interacted with, and even adopted, Hellenism.4 1 2

3

4

“Hogs and Men,” Editorial, Berkshire World and Corn Belt Stockman, December 1, 1910, p. 3. I thank Gabe Rosenberg for this reference. The Babylonians destroyed the First Temple in 586 BCE. On the destruction of the Second Temple, see Martin Goodman, Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007). For some accessible histories of this time period, see: John M. G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE-117 CE) (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996); Shaye J.D. Cohen, From the Maccabees to the Mishnah (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1989); John J. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora (New York: Crossroads, 1983); and Eric S. Gruen, Diaspora: Jews Amidst Greeks and Romans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). See Cohen, From the Maccabees, 34–45; Seth Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish Society, 200 B.C.E. to 640 C.E. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 12, 22–25. To offer a concrete example, the Hasmoneans are traditionally viewed as completely opposed to Hellenism. However, this stark binary view must be reassessed. For discussion, see Eric S. Gruen, Heritage and Hellenism:

46

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

47

Much like modern politics in the United States, in which debates about policy, law, ideology, economics, et cetera. center around the halls of Washington, D.C., similar debates in antiquity centered around the courtyards of Jerusalem. The institution and leadership of the Temple was a common target for criticism by various stakeholders, from the Teacher of Righteousness mentioned in the Dead Sea scrolls to Jesus.5 Against this backdrop, the very definition of what it meant to be included in “Israel” was contested. Significantly, the concept of Judaism as a religious, rather than ethnic, identity develops during this period.6 This distinction is important, since one can convert and take upon oneself a new religious identity (e.g. Roman Catholicism), but one cannot convert to join an ethnic identity (e.g. Italian). For the first time, as Shaye Cohen so elegantly summarizes it, “Outsiders could become insiders.”7 Competition over what it meant to belong to “Israel,” over proper ritual practice, and over authorized scriptural interpretation fails to distinguish the Hellenistic period from any preceding or following era.8 What is important about the Hellenistic period is that the debates that occurred therein set the tone and agenda for those that followed. These arguments extended well beyond the borders of the Hebrew Bible. (In fact, the very boundaries of the biblical canon began to emerge during this time period.) For example, it is only during the Hellenistic period that a general prohibition against intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews appears.9 The Hellenistic period is therefore a fascinating era to study, allowing scholars to glimpse at the development of new rituals, laws, concepts, texts, and – in the case of this study – food regulations. What, how, and with whom one should or should not eat features prominently in debates of this period. Underlying these arguments is a prominent Hellenistic belief: namely, that the law is rational. Of course, “rational” is contextual; it is a subjective rather than an objective

5 6

7 8 9

The Reinvention of Jewish Tradition (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 1–40. e.g. see 1QpHab (Pesher Habakkuk); Matt 21:10–17. See Shaye J. D. Cohen, The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 109–139, esp. 135–136. For a critique of this approach, see Steve Mason, “Jews, Judaeans, Judaizing, Judaism: Problems of Categorization in Ancient Judaism,” JSJ 38 (2007): 457–512. Also see Michael L. Satlow, “Jew or Judean?” in Caroline Johnson Hodge, et al. (eds.), “The One Who Sows Bountifully”: Essays in Honor of Stanley K. Stowers, BJS 356 (Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2013), 165–175. Cohen, Beginnings, 110. For a survey of these debates throughout history, see Michael L. Satlow, Creating Judaism: History, Tradition, Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). See Cohen, Beginnings, 241–262.

48

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

term, a fact that I am reminded of every day when I read the news in which various political parties, organizations, and individuals seek to spin the latest poll, tragedy, speech, or (real or perceived) misstep by the opposition. In doing so, each person believes that he/she appeals to a “rational” justification. Further, in doing so, each person believes themself to be appealing to a socially agreed upon set of beliefs and assumptions about what constitutes logical thought and decorum (what Pierre Bourdieu would label “habitus”).10 The rational basis provided for these laws, therefore, informs us about what the authors and their presumed audience considered an appropriate and persuasive justification for thought and practice. And, in presuming a rational basis for these laws, Hellenistic Jewish authors continuously appeal to reason as a foundational justification for biblical dietary regulations. In providing these rationales, Hellenistic authors go well beyond the words of the Torah, where, as noted in Chapter 1, justifications for dietary practice are noticeably terse or absent. Hellenistic texts mark the beginning of a trend that continues into modernity: the need to justify perceived traditional food practices. This is especially the case for biblical texts, as they are seen as divinely ordained. And, since God (and Moses, the divine lawgiver) is understood to be rational, then there must be a logical basis for each and every biblical precept and commandment. To quote the Letter of Aristeas, a text to which we will soon turn, “In general everything is similarly constituted in regard to natural reasoning, being governed by one supreme power, and in each particular everything has a profound reason for it, both the things from which we abstain in use and those form which we partake.”11 Biblically mandated practice is therefore understood as being action justified on the grounds of reason. We will first discuss arguments that assert the rationality of Jewish food laws. Proceeding from this assumption of rationality are several related themes. One is that the animals consumed and/or abstained from are allegories for proper/improper thought and/or action. Another is that the act of sharing food, or commensality, is a socially meaningful practice, and that the rules regulating the shared table (almost completely innovated in the Hellenistic period, though not always recognized as such) are founded on logical principles. Finally, some rationalizations are basically repeated from biblical texts. Throughout, we will see that, though Hellenistic Jewish 10 11

An excellent summary of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus can be found in David Swartz, Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 95–116. Letter of Aristeas, 143. All translations of Letter of Aristeas are from: R. J. H. Shutt, “Letter of Aristeas,” in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), OTP (New York: Doubleday, 1985), 2:7–34.

Rational Food Laws

49

authors presume that Jews must follow biblical dietary regulations because they are divine commandments, they devote their time to explaining the logical nature of these practices. Or, in the terms that I employ throughout this book, Hellenistic Jewish authors presume revelation as a basis for these practices, but explicitly spell out reason as a foundational justification.

Rational Food Laws One of the major tasks in translating Judaism into the context of Hellenism was a rather obvious one: translating the biblical text from Hebrew into Greek. If the goal was to explain Judaism in the context of Greek rationality, then rendering this foundational document into Greek would be a sine qua non. Out of this need arose the Septuagint (LXX), a Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible (albeit with some additions and alterations). Given the importance of this task, it is not surprising that the events surrounding this translation became the stuff of legend. Thus, rather than a single translator for the whole text, or a team sharing the workload, we are told that seventy-two Jews separately translated the Hebrew Bible over seventy-two days.12 While the specifics of these myths are unimportant for our present concerns, one document that describes this translation event is of tremendous value: the Letter of Aristeas.13 In addition to detailing the creation myth of the Septuagint, the Letter of Aristeas provides reason-based explanations for some key biblical legislation. Primary among these laws are those associated with proper diet.14 The letter’s reputed author, Aristeas, suggests why food is such a focal subject, noting: “It is my opinion that mankind as a whole shows a certain amount of concern for the parts of their legislation concerning meats and drink and beasts considered to be unclean.”15 In short, people want to know.

12

13 14 15

The rabbis are also aware of this legend (see e.g. b. Megillah 9a–b, which includes a reason for reportedly mistranslating Lev 11:6). On the history of this legend, see Abraham Wasserstein and David J. Wasserstein, The Legend of the Septuagint: From Classical Antiquity to Today (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). In general, see Sylvie Honigman, The Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria: A Study in the Narrative of the Letter of Aristeas (New York: Routledge, 2003). To put it in perspective, approximately forty-three of the 322 verses that comprise the Letter of Aristeas relate to justifying biblical food rules. Letter of Aristeas, 128. He goes on to note: “For example, we inquired why, since there is one creation only, some things are considered unclean for eating, others for touching – legislation being scrupulous in most matters, but in these especially so” (129). On the concern of “mankind as a whole” for Jewish food laws in the Hellenistic period, see Chapter 2.

50

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

The Letter of Aristeas does not disappoint its inquisitive audience. It catalogues several fascinating rationales for Jewish food laws, including both those with and without a biblical basis (e.g. the laws of Leviticus 11 and the newly developing commensality regulations, respectively). Since the vast majority of these discussions relate to either the animals permitted/ prohibited therein being allegories for proper/improper human decorum or to emerging commensality restrictions, I discuss them later in this chapter. For our present purposes, however, it is worth noting one of Aristeas’ concluding comments on these matters: “In the matter of meats, the unclean reptiles, the beasts, the whole underlying rationale is directed toward righteousness and righteous human relationships.”16 Food laws are about proper comportment, and not just at the table, but in all aspects of daily life. The fact that the Letter of Aristeas was written in Alexandria, Egypt is important to note. In this era, Alexandria was perceived as a key center of Greek culture and scholarship. For a text that translates Jewish concepts into a Greek rational framework to appear in Alexandria during this time period is about as surprising as discovering today that your waiter in Los Angeles wrote a screenplay; that the latest up-and-coming fiction writer lives in a cramped apartment in an equally up-and-coming neighborhood in Brooklyn; or that an aspiring fashion designer is moving to Milan, Italy. Once a center of culture and scholarship is established, many will seek it out; such was the case in Alexandria. Among the many who flocked to, and flourished in, this milieu was a significant Jewish population. Perhaps the most prominent Jewish citizen of ancient Alexandria, at least from the perspective of history, was Philo. Philo (c.20 BCE–50 CE; also known as “Philo the Jew”; “Philo of Alexandria”) came from a prosperous and well-connected family. His voluminous writings indicate that he was well educated, a community leader, committed to observance of biblical law, and had a strong philosophical bent. Further, the fact that he wrote in Greek and constantly appealed to Greek philosophical and rational models indicates his desire to articulate how biblical legislation accords with Greek notions of proper thought and action.17 16

17

Letter of Aristeas, 169. Throughout, I will generally speak of the authorial voice of the Letter of Aristeas as being the narrator Aristeas. However, he does record interactions between others (Eleazar, Demetrius, etc.). Unless a speech is directly reported in another character’s mouth, I simplify the body of my text by attributing remarks to the narrator of the Letter of Aristeas. For a recent study on the influence of Greek thought on Philo, see Hans Richard Svebakken, Philo of Alexandria’s Exposition of the Tenth Commandment (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012).

Rational Food Laws

51

Among the many biblical practices that Philo justified in this manner were the food laws.18 For Philo, the biblical food prohibitions were both divinely given and rationally justified; they are based both on revelation and reason. These food practices were instructive, and thus must be both followed on the literal level and understood on the allegorical level (though only a select few possessed the capabilities to grasp the latter).19 Philo’s exposition of these laws, however, did not occur in isolation from his other theories. The food laws, therefore, are justified on similar grounds to other biblical practices. Two prominent themes in Philo’s discussion of biblical food and other regulations are the laws’ connection to temperance in general and their pedagogical functions as lessons in proper decorum. Like a proper Greek scholar, Philo extolled the virtues of temperance and decried the depravity of gluttony.20 The ability to exercise self-control was a highly valued cultural trait in the Hellenistic world.21 While Philo justified many biblical regulations on the grounds of temperance,22 the dietary regulations in particular were seen as paragons of this virtue. The belly is ground zero for intemperance and vice; to control desires of the belly is therefore to control all desires. Or, as Philo puts it: And being a lover of conciseness and wont to abridge subjects of unlimited number by using an example as a lesson [Moses] takes one form of desire, that one whose field of activity is the belly, and admonishes and disciplines it as the first step, holding that the other forms will cease to run riot as before and will be restrained by having learnt that their senior and as it were the leader of their company is obedient to the laws of temperance.23

18 19

20 21 22 23

I thank the author for sending me a copy of the dissertation upon which his book was based to aid in my research. In general, see James Rhodes, “Diet and Desire: The Logic of the Dietary Laws According to Philo,” ETL 79 (2003): 122–133. e.g. though Philo considered himself capable of this dual perception, he did not believe that women possessed the same mental capability as men. Hence, he presumed that women could only understand the literal reading of biblical texts. In general, see Dorothy Sly, Philo’s Perception of Women, BJS 209 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990). Many later Christian authors will argue that only the allegorical – and not the literal – level is important (see Chapter 7). In fact, Philo claims that Alexandrian Jews lived a simple existence (with reference to their food) in Flaccus, 90–91. For a discussion of desire and self-control in Philo and contemporary Greek philosophy, see Svebakken, Philo, 33–108. e.g. Allegorical Interpretation, 3.118. Special Laws, 4.96 (in general, see 4.95–104, and the exposition on animals that follows in 4.105–131, discussed below). Similarly, Philo elsewhere states: “To one who has learnt to disregard food and drink which are absolutely necessary, are there any among the superfluities of life which he can fail to despise, things which exist to promote not so much preservation and permanence of life as pleasure

52

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

If you harness and control the leader of desire – the belly – then you have essentially neutralized the other desires.24 Recognizing the necessity of controlling the belly, Moses enacted legislation concerning food and drink; “to neither of these did he give full liberty but bridled them with ordinances most conducive to self-restraint and humanity and what is chief of all, piety.”25 To do so, Moses required people to give the first fruits from their produce as an offering to God.26 Much more extensively, Moses limited the foodstuffs that were permitted to eat. At the same time he also denied to the members of the sacred Commonwealth unrestricted liberty to use and partake of the other kinds of food. All the animals of land, sea or air whose flesh is the finest and fattest, thus titillating and exciting the malignant foe pleasure, he sternly forbade them to eat, knowing that they set a trap for the most slavish of the senses, the taste, and produce gluttony, an evil very dangerous both to soul and body. For gluttony begets indigestion which is the source and origin of all distempers and infirmities. Now among the different kinds of land animals there is none whose flesh is so delicious as the pig’s, as all who eat it agree,27 and among the aquatic animals the same may be said of such species as are scaleless . . .28 Having special gifts for inciting to self-control those who have a natural tendency to virtue, he trains and drills them by frugality and simple contentedness and endeavours to get rid of extravagance. He approved neither of rigorous austerity like the Spartan legislator, nor of dainty living, like him who introduced the Ionians and Sybarites to luxurious and voluptuous practices. Instead he opened up a path midway between the two. He relaxed the overstrained and tightened the lax, and as on an instrument of music blended the very high and the very low at each end of the scale with the middle chord, thus producing a life of harmony and concord which none can blame.

24

25

26 27

28

with all its powers of mischief?” (Special Laws, 2.195; on fasting in general, see 2.195–203). All translations of Philo come from their corresponding LCL volume. While Kathy Gaca connects this passage to an attempt to control sexual desire, I follow Svebakken, who notes that this passage is about desire in general (after all, sexual desire is not mentioned in this pericope). See Kathy L. Gaca, The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 194–204, esp. 196–198; Svebakken, Philo, 28–31. Special Laws, 4.97. In fact, according to Philo, the perfect man exerts control over the pleasures of the belly even without being commanded to do so; it is only he who is working toward perfection that requires such commandments (Allegorical Interpretation, 3.144). Special Laws, 4.98–99, which references Num 18. The particular tastiness of the pig is often noted in antiquity amidst discussions of the biblical dietary laws. For a discussion, see Chapter 2. Further, this claim makes its way into modern humor. A recent New Yorker cartoon by Paul Roth depicts two biblical figures looking at a pig and features the following tag line: “If He didn’t want us to eat it, why’d He wrap the whole thing in bacon?” (The New Yorker, July 7 and 14, 2014, p. 49). There is debate over whether there is a lacuna here. See Svebakken, Philo, 147–148 n. 136.

Rational Food Laws

53

Consequently he neglected nothing, but drew up very careful rules as to what they should or should not take as food.29

Indiscriminate dining puts one on the disastrous road to gluttony.30 For this reason, Moses introduced legislation that leads to, what I label, “rational rationing.” By limiting food choices, Moses sent the Israelites down the middle path so as to avoid both physical and moral indigestion.31 Moses was not an extremist; he was neither a Spartan nor an Ionian or Sybarite.32 Rather, he was a practical legislator who offered precepts that would keep man rational by rationing – but not completely tabooing – potentially irrational foods (i.e. certain, but not all, domesticated quadrupeds and fish).33 Too much fat and too much deliciousness lead to an excess of intemperance. But like Goldilocks, there is an amount that is just right. There is more to Philo’s concept of rational rationing. And so, he continues: Possibly it might be thought just that all wild beasts that feed on human flesh should suffer from men what men have suffered from them. But Moses would have us abstain from the enjoyment of such, even though they provide a very appetizing and delectable repast. He was considering what is suitable to a gentle-mannered soul, for though it is fitting enough that one should suffer for what one has done, it is not fitting conduct for the sufferers to retaliate it on the wrongdoers, lest the savage passion of anger should turn them unawares into beasts. So careful is he against this danger that wishing to restrain by implication the appetite for the food just mentioned, he also strictly forbade them to eat the other carnivorous animals. He distinguished between them and the graminivorous34 which he grouped with the gentle kind since indeed they are naturally tame and live on the gentle fruits which the earth produces and do nothing by way of attempting the life of others. They are the calf, the lamb, the kid, the hart, the gazelle, the buffalo, the wild goat, the pygarg, the antelope, and the giraffe, ten in all.35 For as he 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

Special Laws, 4.100–102. Philo combines both reasons with regard to fat, as it is both the richest part (thus avoiding it teaches restraint) and because it (and blood) is a first fruit (Special Laws, 4.124). If one is not careful, this can happen even if one is eating permitted foodstuffs. See Special Laws, 3.9, where Philo also mentions the other appetite: sex. Philo also finds Moses utilizing the middle path on several other occasions (e.g. Posterity, 101–102; Migration, 147; Abraham, 257; Special Laws, 4.168). On Philo’s use of these classical references, see Svebakken, Philo, 151–153. Note, however, Providence, 2.68–70, which, after advancing a similar argument, suggests a vegetarian diet for the temperate man. I retain this term rather than switching to the more common (though less specific) term “herbivores” because Philo uses the word “grass-eaters” (τὰ ποηφάγα). The precise translation of these ten species is not certain. For our present purposes, however, this is unimportant. What matters are what traits Philo sees in them and that they are ten in number.

54

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources always adhered to the principles of numerical science, which he knew by close observance to be a paramount factor in all that exists, he never enacted any law great or small without calling to his aid and as it were accommodating to his enactment its appropriate number. But of all the numbers from the unit upwards ten is the most perfect, and, as Moses says, most holy and sacred, and with this he seals his list of clean animals when he wishes to appoint them for the use of the members of his commonwealth.36

Another component of rational rationing within the Mosaic dietary legislation is the avoidance of carnivorous animals. While we will discuss the allegorical interpretation of these laws later in this chapter, Philo notes here that to eat carnivorous beasts is to retaliate against them; to do so would be to walk down a path leading to savagery.37 Rational man should therefore eat only grass-eaters. The connection between biblically tabooed animals and carnivorousness is one common both in antiquity and modernity, though this association is mentioned neither explicitly nor implicitly in the Hebrew Bible.38 For Philo, this connection is as logical as the number ten, which Moses chose because, as with all of his legislation, it is the most “appropriate number” for achieving mathematical and rational harmony.39 Reason is the foundation upon which all of these laws are built. The notion that avoiding carnivorous beasts leads to avoiding acting in a blood-thirsty manner also suggests another Philonic rationalization for the biblical food laws: namely, their pedagogical function as a lesson in proper decorum. Though this theme appears most prominently in his discussion of animal allegories, which we examine below, it emerges quite clearly in a different context. While explaining the rationale for the thrice-repeated yet cryptic biblical command “do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk,”40 Philo notes:

36

37 38

39 40

Further, it is worth noting that, despite urban legend, giraffe is technically kosher, even today. On the connection between these terms and the list in Deut 14:4–5 in the Septuagint, see Rhodes, “Diet and Desire,” 125 n. 12. Special Laws, 4.103–105. Also see Special Laws, 4.119–121, which discusses the effects of eating dead animals (i.e. those killed by other animals or who died of natural causes) and of hunting. The latter text also discusses these issues in regard to general health and to hunting and war. See Svebakken, Philo, 172–175. See Rhodes, “Diet and Desire,” 124, where he also notes that Philo’s argument is based on Greek wordplay. e.g. Letter of Aristeas, 145–149 raises this concern with regard to pure and impure birds. The passage there, however, discusses carnivorousness more in allegorical terms, so I will discuss it below. On the connection between these two texts, see Rhodes, “Diet and Desire,” 124–125; Svebakken, Philo, 158–161. Philo speaks of his admiration for the number ten elsewhere, e.g. Posterity, 173; Decalogue, 20–31. Exod 23:19; 34:26; Deut 14:21. See chapters 1, 5, and 6 for discussion.

Rational Food Laws

55

But so prolific is [Moses] in virtue and versatile in giving admirable lessons, that not content with his own prowess, he challenges it to further contest. He has forbidden any lamb or kid or other like kind of livestock to be snatched away from its mother before it is weaned. He has also forbidden the killing of the mother and offspring on the same day. He now crowns his bounty with the words “Thou shalt not seethe a lamb in his mother’s milk.” For he held that it was grossly improper that the substance which fed the living animal should be used to season and flavour the same after its death, and that while nature provided for its conservation by creating the stream of milk and ordaining that it should pass through the mother’s breasts as through conduits, the license of man should rise to such a height as to misuse what had sustained its life to destroy also the body which remains in existence. If indeed anyone thinks good to boil flesh in milk, let him do so without cruelty and keeping clear of impiety. Everywhere there are herds of cattle innumerable, which are milked everyday by cowherds, goat-herds and shepherds, whose chief source of income as cattle rearers is milk, sometimes liquid and sometimes condensed and coagulated into cheese; and since milk is so abundant, the person who boils the flesh of lambs or kids or any other young animal in their mother’s milk, shows himself cruelly brutal in character and gelded of compassion, that most vital of emotions and most nearly akin to the rational soul.41

Philo interprets this biblical prohibition as a lesson in ethics. Seasoning the meat of a baby animal with the very milk that once sustained it is reprehensible, as it mixes the domains of life and death. For Philo, such a practice goes beyond the pale and is simply cruel. This does not mean, however, that Philo disapproves of eating meat and milk in general, a prohibition that the rabbis will propose later.42 Here, Philo’s concern is not a general meat-and-milk matter, but rather a specific ethical matter reflected in the “cruelly brutal” practice of consuming the milk of a mother together with the meat of her child.43 41

42 43

Virtues, 142–144. My commentary in this section follows what I have written elsewhere. See Jordan D. Rosenblum, “Justifications for Foodways and the Study of Commensality,” in Susanne Kerner, Cynthia Chou, and Morten Warmind (eds.), Commensality: From Everyday Food to Feast (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 190–191; “Jewish Meals in Antiquity,” in John M. Wilkins and Robin Nadeau (eds.), A Companion to Food in the Ancient World (New York: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 352–353. My conclusion disagrees with that of Katell Berthelot, “Philo and Kindness towards Animals,” The Studia Philonica Annual 14 (2002): 48–65, 49–50 n. 6. In a somewhat related view, Andrew Teeter writes in support of Abraham Geiger’s argument that expansions in the Samaritan Pentateuch suggest that they understood this law to refer to premature slaughter. See D. Andrew Teeter, “‘You Shall Not Seethe a Kid in its Mother’s Milk’: The Text and the Law in Light of Early Witnesses,” Textus 24 (2009): 37–63. These expansions are fascinating, as they claim that cooking a kid in its mother’s milk is tantamount to a forgotten/delayed/hated/ equivalent to a blind rat sacrifice, which is an enragement/transgression to the God of Jacob.

56

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

Though the Hebrew Bible prohibits cooking a kid in its mother’s milk on three separate occasions, it never provides an explicit rationale for doing so. For Philo, however, the reason is crystal clear: an ethical eater is an ethical person. And because an ethical eater would never be so cruel as to flavor the dead with the liquid that once nourished and sustained it, the ethical person must follow this dietary and moral prescription. Once again, the rational man follows rational law; and, for Philo, nothing was more rational than Mosaic legislation. Finally, Philo advances a rather unsophisticated rationale for the food laws: certain foods are prohibited simply because it is a people’s custom to abstain from them. This explanation appears in the midst of Philo’s description of his participation in a delegation to the Roman Emperor Gaius. At one point, Gaius asked “a grave and momentous question, ‘Why do you refuse to eat pork?’”44 Gaius’ question was met with laughter on the part of his audience, but not by the Jewish delegation, which offered a serious response: We answered, “Different people have different customs and the use of some things is forbidden to us as others are to our opponents.” Then someone said, “Yes, just as many don’t eat lamb which is so easily obtainable,” whereupon Gaius laughed and said, “Quite right too, for it’s not nice.” Under such befooling and reviling we were helpless.45

The delegation was obviously upset that its food practices – in particular, the abstention from pork – were the subject of laughter, to the point of perceived ridicule. However, Philo’s and the delegation’s rationale was simply to assert that every group has a custom, and this was theirs. While the pork taboo was an oft-noticed food rule,46 their rather weak defense applied to all food practices of all cultures, Jewish or other: the regulations are based on unjustified custom.47 Given Philo’s extensive previous rationales, this reason-based justification is striking as a rather terse, feeble, and (even for his ancient audience) unsatisfactory explanation. Though Philo was perhaps the most prolific extant writer on the subject, he was not the only prominent Jew in antiquity who argued for the

44 45 47

However, they are also notoriously difficult and their interpretation is highly speculative. For these two reasons, I do not address them in depth. Embassy to Gaius, 361. See Jordan D. Rosenblum, “‘Why do you refuse to eat pork?’ Jews, Food, and Identity in Roman Palestine,” JQR 100/1 (2010): 95–110, 100–101. Embassy to Gaius, 362–363. 46 On this, see Chapter 2. Although, perhaps Gaius’ justification for some people’s lamb abstention (“it’s not nice”) is based on roughly analogous grounds as Philo’s justification for the biblical ban on cooking a kid in its mother’s milk (discussed above).

Rational Food Laws

57

superior rationality of Mosaic legislation. Joining Philo in this endeavor was Josephus (37–c.100 CE), a Jew from Jerusalem who, among other things, was: a priest; a rebel general fighting for the Jews during their ill-fated revolt against Rome; a Roman prisoner of war; an adroit reader of the tea-leaves who accurately predicted (to his physical and material benefit) Vespasian’s rise to imperial power; a Roman citizen and wealthy pensioner; and a copious chronicler of Jewish history.48 It is in the latter capacity that he has proved most useful to historians for centuries, as his survey of Jewish history, as well as his own exploits, provide much data for an era often either lacking or simply absent from our extant archives. However, scholars have long noted that no one can claim to narrate from a “no-spin zone,” and Josephus is no exception to this rule, so it is necessary to interpret his work with a grain of salt. With regard to the subject at hand, Josephus accords with much of what has been previously discussed, as he in general also considered Mosaic legislation to be supremely rational, and instructive in virtue, temperance, and piety.49 For example, in a passage that could easily have been written by Philo, Josephus states: All schemes of education and moral training fall into two categories; instruction is imparted in the one case by precept, in the other by practical exercising of the character. All other legislators, differing in their opinions, selected the particular method which each preferred and neglected the other . . . Our legislator, on the other hand, took great care to combine both systems.50 He did not leave practical training in morals inarticulate; nor did he permit the letter of the law to remain inoperative. Starting from the very beginning with the food of which we partake from infancy and the private life/diet51 of the home, he left nothing, however insignificant, to the discretion and caprice of the individual. What meats a man should abstain from, and what he may enjoy; with what persons he should associate.52

Josephus continues to detail various aspects of biblical law that are informed by both methods. Mosaic legislation is therefore the most complete, rational legal system. It is telling that Josephus begins his list with 48

49 50 51 52

For a very brief narrative of Josephus’ life, see Goodman, Rome and Jerusalem, 4–5; for a longer narrative, see Tessa Rajak, Josephus: The Historian and His Society (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984 [1983]). e.g. see Jewish Antiquities, 4.183–184, 193; 16.42–44; and the lengthy treatment (some of which is discussed below) in Against Apion, 2.151–296. Cf. Philo, Creation, 1–3. Since διαίτης can mean either, I decided to reproduce that ambiguity here. Against Apion, 2.171–174, with slight emendation. All translations of Josephus come from their corresponding LCL volume.

58

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

food laws and next moves on to those controlling social intercourse (perhaps implying commensality). In all matters, biblical law is viewed as based on reason. The Mosaic combination of precepts and practical exercises allowed for an integrated system that promotes the Greek ideals of temperance, piety, and virtue.53 For Josephus, this explains why biblical law forbids slaughtering a parent and its offspring on the same day: in order to inculcate “gentleness and humanity.”54 Additionally, this system explains why Jews are exceedingly brave when facing martyrdom. Their simple lifestyle, which “others find difficult to tolerate” and includes “simple diet, discipline which leaves no room for freak or individual caprice in matters of meat and drink” leads them to virtuous action; thus, “our willing obedience to the law in these matters results in the heroism which we display in the face of death.”55 Josephus goes even further in his argument for the Mosaic lifestyle with an intriguing claim: Our earliest imitators were the Greek philosophers, who, though ostensibly observing the laws of their own countries, yet in their conduct and philosophy were Moses’ disciples,56 holding similar views about God, and advocating the simple life and friendly communion between man and man. But that is not all. The masses have long since shown a keen desire to adopt our religious observances; and there is not one city, Greek or barbarian, nor a single nation, to which our custom of abstaining from work on the seventh day has not spread, and where the fasts and the lighting of lamps57 and many of our prohibitions in the matter of food are not observed. Moreover, they attempt to imitate our unanimity, our liberal charities, our devoted labour in our crafts, our endurance under persecution on behalf of our laws. The greatest miracle of all is that our Law holds out no seductive bait of sensual pleasure,58 but has exercised this influence through its own inherent merits; and as God permeates the universe, so the Law has found its way among all mankind.59

If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then this is quite complimentary to the Mosaic lifestyle. Both philosophers and the masses see the 53

54

55 58

Philo is not the only Jew in antiquity who integrated these ideals into Jewish thought and practice. For general references and a discussion that focuses on this trend in rabbinic literature, see Michael L. Satlow, “‘Try to be a Man’: The Rabbinic Construction of Masculinity,” HTR 89/1 (1996): 19–40. Against Apion, 2.213 (which also includes other animal-slaughter-related commandments, both biblical and extra-biblical, that Josephus understands to be instructive on mercy). On this biblical command, see Chapter 1. Porphyry, De Abstentia, 4.14 (discussed in Chapter 2) uses this passage in his discussion of Jewish food practices. 56 57 Against Apion, 2.234–235. Cf. Against Apion, 2.168, 257. See Against Apion, 2.118. 59 Cf. Against Apion, 2.217. Against Apion, 2.281–284.

Rational Food Laws

59

inherent merits of this Law.60 The veracity of this claim need not concern us; the very fact that Josephus considers this argument to be persuasive suggests that, at the very least, his audience would not find this claim completely spurious. In short, Moses’ rationality is legitimized by its adoring Greek public. A final argument for the rationality of biblical food laws comes from 4 Maccabees. Part of a series of books that narrate the supposed events surrounding the rise of Hasmonean (also known as the Maccabean) dynasty,61 4 Maccabees includes an elegant explanation for biblical dietary regulations: Observe in the first place how, in regard to the things that hinder temperance, reason is complete master of the passions. Temperance, as I understand it, is control over desires, and of desires some relate to the soul and others to the body, over both of which reason obviously holds sway. When we are attracted to forbidden foods, how do we come to reject the pleasures to be gained from them? Is it not because reason has the power to control the appetites? I believe it is. Accordingly, when we crave seafood or fowl or the meat of four-legged beasts or any sort of food at all that is forbidden to us under the Law, it is through the mastery of reason that we abstain. For the proclivities of our appetites are restrained and held in check by the prudent mind, and all the motions of the body are muzzled by reason.62

Here, the rational man still craves forbidden foods; however, he uses reason to exercise temperance.63 While similar to many of the explanations that we have already encountered (especially Philo’s), 4 Maccabees advances a slightly different argument. As James Rhodes notes: “For 4 Maccabees, it is the individual who is able, with the help of devout reason, to quell the desire for things forbidden (4 Macc 1:33–35). For Philo, it was Moses who drew the soul back to reason by disciplining the appetites of the belly

60 61 62

63

For additional references to others following Jewish practices, see Cohen, Beginnings, 149–150. For a brief summary of these events, see Cohen, From the Maccabees, 30–31. 4 Macc 1:31–35. Also see 4 Macc 5:14–38; 6:12–23; cp. 2 Macc 6:19–20. All translations of 4 Maccabees are from: H. Anderson, “4 Maccabees,” in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), OTP (New York: Doubleday, 1985), 2:531–564. The dating of 4 Maccabees is a matter of debate. For a summary of some of the main theories, see David M. Freidenreich, Foreigners and Their Food: Constructing Otherness in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011), 237 n. 47. On the function of divine law in the context of this pericope, see Christine Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law? Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 110–111. Cp. Sifra Qedoshim 11:22, discussed in Chapter 5.

60

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

(Spec. 4,95–96).”64 Reason still exerts force upon rational man, but the direction of this force differs in 4 Maccabees. In essence, it is the difference between centripetal and centrifugal forces. Whatever the direction of the force, Mosaic legislation (i.e. revelation) and the powers of reason combine to lead one down the virtuous path. However, there is another guide on this journey: the animal itself.

Animal as Allegory Though animals themselves might be irrational, they have the ability to instruct rational man on proper thought and action. Because animals possess this capability, there is much to learn from the animals permitted and tabooed by the supreme rational agent, Moses. In doing so, we will largely consult two sources: the Letter of Aristeas and Philo.65 Though similar in many ways, we will consider each source separately, in order to understand better the nuances of each author. The Letter of Aristeas articulates a clear thesis regarding animal allegories: “Everything pertaining to conduct permitted us toward these creatures and towards beasts has been set out symbolically.”66 There is a symbolic explanation for each of the biblical dietary food laws. It is from this symbolic explanation that the Letter of Aristeas derives ethical benefits. As Svebbaken argues: The animals exemplify certain noble and ignoble character traits, which Moses either commends or condemns symbolically through the designations “clean” and “unclean.” To eat or abstain as prescribed does not in itself affect the character of the moral agent, who must first correctly discern and then embrace the moral exhortations Moses expresses symbolically through his legislation.67 64 65

66 67

Rhodes, “Diet and Desire,” 133. I thank Christopher Jones, who independently of Rhodes made this same observation (personal communication). Speaking about people who are good but considered “by the two-faced to be sinners,” the Testament of Asher states: “For such people are like gazelles and stags: In appearance they seem wild and unclean, but as a whole they are clean. They live by zeal for the Lord, abstaining from what God hates and has forbidden through his commandments, staving off evil by the good” (4:1, 5; in contrast, see 2:8–10). However, this metaphor is not deployed in order to rationalize biblical food laws (rather to describe the good who the bad misrecognize) and therefore is not relevant to the discussion at hand. Translation of Testament of Asher is from: H. C. Kee, “Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,” in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), OTP (New York: Doubleday, 1985), 1:775–828. Letter of Aristeas, 150. On the rationality based argument advanced in the Letter of Aristeas, see Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law, 105–110. Svebakken, Philo, 159, original emphasis. I disagree with Svebakken’s claim on p. 112 that the Letter of Aristeas’ logic suggests that actual ingestion is irrelevant, so long as one abstains from the amoral behavior that that animal represents. Though Philo accents the literal observance of law significantly

Animal as Allegory

61

The symbolism prompts proper action by a moral agent. Proper action without proper understanding, however, does not yield proper results. The Letter of Aristeas’ exposition on this subject begins with a sweeping statement: “In general everything is similarly constituted in regard to natural reasoning, being governed by one supreme power, and in each particular everything has a profound reason for it, both the things from which we abstain in use and those from which we partake.”68 Since every decision is governed by reason, then one need “not take the contemptible view that Moses enacted this legislation because of an excessive preoccupation with mice and weasels and suchlike creatures.”69 Rather, “everything has been solemnly set in order for unblemished investigation and amendment of life for the sake of righteousness.”70 It is for this reason that Moses permitted domesticated and herbivorous birds, but prohibited wild and carnivorous fowl, since the latter dominate the former and unjustly find food at their expense; “and not only that, they also seize lambs and kids and outrage human beings dead or alive.”71 In labeling wild birds of prey “impure,” Moses binds those bound by the law to act righteously and to not exert their strength over those who depend upon them. They are to act like the gentle permitted birds and not the predatory prohibited birds. Permitted and prohibited animals are allegories for pious and impious action. Therefore, Moses uses these creatures to teach proper decorum.72 Subsequently, the Letter of Aristeas’ symbolic interpretation of the biblical food laws addresses the two required physical traits of permitted domesticated quadrupeds: split hoofed and ruminant. A split hoof, “that is the separation of the claws of the hoof, is a sign of setting apart each of our actions for good, because the strength of the whole body with its action

68 69 71

72

more than the Letter of Aristeas, I do not think that the Letter of Aristeas would support following only the symbolic, and not also the literal, understanding of the law. Many early Christians, however, do support such a stance, as discussed in Chapter 7. Letter of Aristeas, 143 (quoted earlier in this chapter). The Letter of Aristeas had just finished discussing commensality rules, a subject to which we turn next. Letter of Aristeas, 144. 70 Letter of Aristeas, 144. Letter of Aristeas, 145–146. As mentioned above, the Hebrew Bible never explicitly articulates the connection between biblically tabooed animals and animals of prey (nor does it provide a list of permitted fowl, as both the Letter of Aristeas 145 and Philo, Special Laws, 4.117 do). On the history of this association vis-à-vis fowl, see Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 3 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 661–662. Letter of Aristeas, 147–148 (also see 170). Cp. Philo, Special Laws, 4.103–104 (discussed above). The differences between these passages go beyond the fact that Philo refers to domesticated quadrupeds not fowl. More importantly, Philo believes that they are not just symbolic, but that eating carnivores actually accustoms one to act carnivorously. See Rhodes, “Diet and Desire,” 124–125; Svebakken, Philo, 158–161.

62

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

rests upon the shoulders and legs. The symbolism conveyed by these things compels us to make a distinction in the performance of all our acts, with righteousness as our aim.”73 Like a fork in the road, the split hoof marks two distinct paths and is thus symbolic of the distinct, and separate, path upon which Jews tread. This distinguishes Jews from non-Jews, the majority of whom are deemed indecorous, especially in regard to sexual matters.74 Further, the characteristics of the split hoof and, especially, rumination combine “quite clearly [to] express, to those who perceive it, the phenomenon of memory.”75 “Rumination,” according to the Letter of Aristeas, “is nothing but the recalling of (the creature’s) life and constitution, life being usually constituted by nourishment.”76 To remember one’s food is therefore to remember one’s life, since the very basis of life is food.77 This act of remembering, of ruminating on God like a ruminant beast does on grass, is also found in other scriptural commandments, of which the Letter of Aristeas lists several.78 Accordingly, these laws are based on “sound reason,” endow Jews with a “distinct characteristic of memory,” are by “no chance accident . . . ordained as part of our very soul,” and finally are “bound up with truth and the expression of the right reason.”79 In sum, they serve to distinguish Jews as highly rationale. Continuing in the same allegorical vein, the Letter of Aristeas argues that no action or word should be done or uttered “to incline toward injustice.”80 This principle is encountered in the biblical legislation regarding “mischievous” animals like weasels, mice, and similar creatures.81 Mice act unjustly by polluting and defiling everything with which they come into contact.82 The Letter of Aristeas continues: The species of weasel is unique: Apart from the aforementioned characteristic, it has another polluting feature, that of conceiving through its ears and producing its young through its mouth. So for this reason any similar feature in men is unclean; men who hear anything and give physical expression to it by word of mouth, thus embroiling other people in evil, 73 74 76 77 78 79 82

Letter of Aristeas, 150–151. This section on cloven-hoofed and ruminant beasts is similar to Philo’s exposition on the matter, as discussed below. Letter of Aristeas, 152. Also see Rhodes, “Diet and Desire,” 125–126. 75 Letter of Aristeas, 153. Letter of Aristeas, 154. Here I paraphrase both the Letter of Aristeas and Rhodes, “Diet and Desire,” 126. Letter of Aristeas, 155–160. For a brief discussion, see Rhodes, “Diet and Desire,” 126–127. Letter of Aristeas, 161. 80 Letter of Aristeas, 162. 81 Letter of Aristeas, 163. Letter of Aristeas, 164. Herein, the Letter of Aristeas portrays mice as quite unrepentant in their actions, noting that: “Mice pollute and defile everything not only for their own nourishment, but also to the extent of rendering absolutely useless for human beings everything which comes their way to defile.”

Animal as Allegory

63

commit no ordinary act of uncleanliness, and are themselves completely defiled with the taint of impiety.83

Ignoring the obvious biological inaccuracy, the Letter of Aristeas’ claim about weasel reproduction demonstrates how tabooing the weasel functions on the symbolic level. Gossip and slander enter into one’s ear and unjustly leave one’s mouth, mimicking the supposed reproductive process of the weasel. It is for this reason that the weasel is an allegory for these vices. So why is weasel verboten? Not out of a preoccupation with weasels, but because the “Law forbids harming anyone in thought or in deed.”84 The Letter of Aristeas concludes its “brief résumé of these matters” by reminding its readers that all the regulations have been made with righteousness in mind, and that no ordinances have been made in scripture without purpose or fancifully, but to the intent that through the whole of our lives we may also practice justice to all mankind in our acts, remembering the all-sovereign God. In the matter of meats, the unclean reptiles, the beasts, the whole underlying rationale is directed toward righteousness and righteous human relationships.85

Biblical food laws are about just and righteous thought, speech, and action; they regard building righteous relationships with other humans. These regulations are therefore rational and not capricious.86 Understanding the permitted and prohibited animals in their proper symbolic manner (i.e. allegorically) thus prompts the moral agent to appropriate thought, speech, and action. Philo’s discourse on this subject is similar in many ways to the Letter of Aristeas’. However, Philo’s rendering implies that the symbolic interpretation is more concretely embodied in the animal itself.87 The proper 83

84 85 87

Letter of Aristeas, 165–166 (cp. Epistle of Barnabas 10; see Chapter 7 for discussion and additional references). The claim about weasel reproduction is not necessarily odd in the context of antiquity, as many ancient authors made equally implausible claims about animal biology and physiology. For example, see m. Hullin 9:6, which discusses a species of mouse created from the earth, or Pliny the Elder, Natural History 8.33, which discusses how weasel effluvium is fatal to basilisks. Letter of Aristeas, 168. For a refutation of weasel preoccupation as a motive for these laws, see Letter of Aristeas, 144. Letter of Aristeas, 168–169. 86 Similarly, see Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law, 106–108. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the Letter of Aristeas does not present these symbols as embodied. I am simply arguing that Philo advances this point more significantly and in a more nuanced manner than the Letter of Aristeas. I maintain that Philo’s symbolism is a more embodied symbolism because he develops it much further, pushing the point to greater (or, as many of his readers have noted, to tedious) lengths.

64

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

ingestion of the proper animal with the proper understanding, therefore, results in a change in one’s mental, moral, and physical body. We shall return to the extended section of Special Laws, 4 discussed above, in which Philo lays out these embodied and embodying allegories as rationalizations for biblical food laws. After detailing the reasons why there are ten permitted domesticated quadrupeds, Philo continues: [Moses] adds a general method for proving and testing the ten kinds [of permitted beasts], based on two signs, the parted hoof and the chewing of the cud. Any kind which lacks both or one of these is unclean. Now both these two are symbols to teacher and learner of the method best suited for acquiring knowledge, the method by which the better is distinguished from the worse, and thus confusion is avoided. For just as a cud-chewing animal after biting through the food keeps it at rest in the gullet, again after a bit draws it up and masticates it and then passes it on to the belly, so the pupil after receiving from the teacher through his ears the principles and lore of wisdom prolongs the process of learning, as he cannot at once apprehend and grasp them securely, till by using memory to call up each thing that he has heard by constant exercises which act as the cement of conceptions, he stamps a firm impression of them on his soul. But the firm apprehension of conceptions is clearly useless unless we discriminate and distinguish them so that we can choose what we should choose and avoid the contrary, and this distinguishing is symbolized by the parted hoof. For the way of life is twofold, one branch leading to vice, the other to virtue and we must turn away from the one and never forsake the other.88

Philo explicitly compares the physical process of acquiring proper knowledge to that of proper ruminant digestion. The mind digests learning, breaking it down into its constituent parts and extracting vital nourishment in a manner that exactly correlates with how a ruminant digests and then absorbs nutrients. Further, the cleft hoof is directly mapped onto the fork in a road, with one path leading to virtue and the other to vice.89 Elsewhere, Philo further embodies the allegorical symbolism of the cleft hoof. After arguing that only those memories that are exerted on good things are in fact good, Philo states that the hoof must be parted “in order that, the faculty of memory being divided into two sections, language as it flows through the mouth, for which Nature wrought lips as twin boundaries, may separate the beneficial and the injurious forms of memory.”90 88 89 90

Special Laws, 4.106–108. Cp. Letter of Aristeas, 150–151, which also maps this onto the body (discussed above, esp. n. 73). Agriculture, 133 (with minor alterations from the LCL translation).

Animal as Allegory

65

The split hoof is both an allegory for and a literal embodiment of these binaries: good/bad memory exerted on good/bad subject, split/whole hoof, and properly/improperly parted lips.91 Further, man’s mind and beasts’ bodies must possess these mental and physical characteristics because one without the other is useless.92 This explains the impurity of swine and the camel, as each lacks one of the two required characteristics. “For indeed distinguishing without memory and without conning and going over of the things that are best is an incomplete good (as is memory without distinguishing between good things and their opposites), but the meeting and partnership of both in combination is a good most complete and perfect.”93 To lack one of these characteristics is therefore to be incomplete; to have both is to be whole. Ruminant, ungulate, and domesticated beasts with four legs are not the only animals that possess this pedagogic potential for Philo. He therefore continues, making explicit how each category of permitted/prohibited creature displays this combination of embodied and embodying allegory. Accordingly, he turns next to aquatic creatures, which are biblically mandated to have both fins and scales. Any that fail to possess both or one of these marks are swept away by the current unable to resist the force of the stream; those who possess both throw it aside, front and stem it and pertinaciously exercise themselves against the antagonist with an invincible ardor and audacity. When they are pushed they push back, when pursued they hasten to assail, where their passage is hampered they open up broad roads and obtain easy thoroughfares. These two kinds of fish are symbolical, the first of a pleasure-loving soul, the latter of one to which endurance and self-control are dear. For the road that leads to pleasure is downhill and very easy, with the result that one does not walk but is dragged along; the other which leads to self-control is uphill, toilsome no doubt but profitable exceedingly. The one carries us away, forced lower and lower as it drives us down its steep incline, till it flings us off on to the level ground at its foot; the other leads heavenwards the immortal who have not fainted on the way and have had the strength to endure the roughness of the hard ascent.94

Though Philo can often be tedious, akin to reading the fine print of a software user agreement, he can sometimes be delightful and clear. 91 92 93 94

I interpret this passage to refer both to the literal boundaries of the upper/lower lip, as well as to lips divided for good/bad speech. In general, see Agriculture, 131–145 (esp. 134 and 142–145). Agriculture, 145. Philo connects the exclusion of camels with his argument about mental/physical rumination in Posterity, 148–149. Special Laws, 4.111–112 (in general, see 110–112).

66

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

When scholars encounter the latter, it is a joy, as it makes our job of interpreting quite simple. Further, when this happens, it is often easier to cite Philo rather than attempt to summarize clumsily what he so elegantly stated. This passage (like many in this section) is such an instance. According to Philo, fish with fins and scales can swim against the literal tide, just as the moral person swims against the figurative tide. Fish and humans without these physical features are seekers of pleasure; however, fish and humans with these physical features possess the positive characteristics of endurance and self-control. Once again, we encounter a two-fold path, wherein the former takes the easy, low, and wrong road, and the latter take the high, hard, and correct road.95 The criteria of fins and scales are therefore symbolic of the strength needed to lead a moral life. They are embodied and embodying allegories for action. A similar rationale underlies biblical injunctions vis-à-vis reptiles (i.e. flying insects and land swarmers).96 Holding to the same method he declares that all reptiles which have not feet but wriggle along by trailing their belly, or are four-legged and many footed are unclean for eating. Here again he has a further meaning: by the reptiles he signifies persons who devote themselves to their bellies and fill themselves like a cormorant, paying to the miserable stomach constant tributes of strong drink, bake-meats, fishes and in general all the delicacies produced with every kind of viand by the elaborate skills of cooks and confectioners, thereby fanning and fostering the flame of the insatiable ever-greedy desires. By the four-legged and many footed, he means the base slaves not of one passion only, desire, but of all. For the passions fall under four main heads but have a multitude of species, and while the tyranny of one is cruel the tyranny of many cannot but be most harsh and intolerable. Creeping things which have legs above their feet, so that they can leap from the ground, he classes among the clean as for instance the different kinds of grasshoppers and the snake-fighter as it is called; and here again by symbols he searches into the temperaments and ways of a reasonable soul. For the natural gravitation of the body pulls down with it those of little mind, strangling and overwhelming them with the multitude of the fleshly elements. Blessed are they to whom it is given to resist with superior strength the weight that would pull them down, taught by the guiding lines of right instruction to leap upward from earth and earth-bound things into the ether and the revolving heavens, that sight so much desired, so worthy a prize in the eyes of those who come to it with a will and not half-heartedly.97 95 96 97

My analysis in this section generally accords with Rhodes, “Diet and Desire,” 128; and Svebakken, Philo, 163–165. On the use of “reptiles” as a catchall category here, see Svebakken, Philo, 165 n. 192. Special Laws, 4.113–115.

Animal as Allegory

67

This passage reminds me of two well-known food-related words that are often erroneously used as synonyms: gourmet and gourmand.98 Both appreciate food, but the latter does so to excess. Philo’s principle of rational rationing allows for one to be a food-lover, but not a glutton. The tabooed reptiles are therefore no gourmets; they are gourmands. These reptiles/ gourmands fall prey to their unchecked passions; they descend into depravity by the pull of their own desires. Philo here relies on two metaphors: locomotion on one’s belly and desires of the belly, and leaping locomotion and the ability to rise above desire.99 In regard to the first metaphor, Philo clearly views a creature that propels itself on its belly as symbolic of one who seeks pleasures of the belly.100 Though the second metaphor also connects locomotion with desire, it is more complex than the first one, which relies on the simple (and perhaps obvious) association of using one’s stomach for propulsion, whether for physical, moral, or desirous purposes. Means of locomotion generates the symbolism in the second case, but this connection is a little less obvious. It is perhaps for this reason that Philo clearly enjoys this symbolism, employing it on several other occasions. For example, “These are symbols of the souls which though rooted like reptiles to the earthly body have been purified and have strength to soar on high, exchanging earth for heaven, and corruption for immortality.” This is in contrast to those who lack the leaping criteria, and hence, though their soul was reared in heaven, “have left that home for earth the region of things mortal and evil.”101 The “snake-fighter” (ὁ ὀφιομάχης), in particular, receives special allegorical attention by Philo.102 As noted above, the snake-fighter is a reptile with jointed legs above its feet that can leap heavenward.103 According to Philo, “the snake-fighter is, I think, nothing but a symbolic representation of self-control, waging a fight that never ends and a truceless 98 99

100

101 102

103

On these terms, see Mark Kurlansky, ed., Choice Cuts: A Savory Selection of Food Writing from Around the World and Throughout History (New York: Penguin Group, 2002), 14–33. On wordplay in this passage, see Rhodes, “Diet and Desire,” 129. Later, Rhodes argues that it is this focus on pleasures of the belly that leads Philo to switch the order of his discussion, talking about reptiles before birds (since birds appear next in the Leviticus and Deuteronomy passages) but after aquatic creatures. See Rhodes, “Diet and Desire,” 131. Philo makes this association elsewhere, e.g. Creation, 158–159; Allegorical Interpretation, 3.138–139 (on pleasure in the breast, including a rationalization for choosing the ram as a sacrificial animal, see 128–137); Migration, 64–69 (more on 69, below; on wordplay in this passage, see Rhodes, “Diet and Desire,” 130). Heir, 239–240 (in general, see 239–242). Philo likely takes this term from the LXX of Lev 11:22, where the Hebrew word for locust (‫ )חגב‬is rendered as ὀφιομάχην, etymologically “serpent fighter.” The LXX usually uses ἀκρίς to render locust (e.g. see Num 13:33; Eccl 12:5). I thank Christopher Jones for making this point to me. Also see Creation, 163.

68

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

war against intemperance and pleasure.”104 The stakes of this war are monumental, since temperance does not only represent “simplicity and abstemiousness, and . . . a severe and lofty mode of life,” but intemperance, with its focus on extravagance and luxury, leads to effeminacy in both soul and body, which “in the view of right-minded people is worse than death.”105 The temperate man is a man of virtue (or “manliness,” from the Latin vir, meaning “man”). Those with proper locomotion, like the snake-fighter, can use their jointed legs to leap above physical and moral boundaries, and avoid the fate worse than death: effeminacy. Elsewhere, Philo makes another locomotion-related point. Observing that reptiles both with no feet and with multiple feet are tabooed, Philo derives an important symbolic lesson: that one should be neither atheist nor polytheist.106 Only the monotheist possesses the right amount of legs, and vice versa. Biblical laws relating to reptiles therefore teach more than just self-control; they also instruct the careful reader/eater in the importance of monotheism. Before turning to Philo’s summary of his discourse in Special Laws, 4, it is worth noting what Philo does not do: namely, he fails to provide an extensive allegorical interpretation for biblical laws relating to fowl. However, such an interpretation is likely implied in his brief remarks on the subject. Having discoursed on the subject of the different kinds of animals on land and in the water and laid down the best possible laws for distinguishing between them, he proceeds to examine also the remaining parts of the animal creation, the inhabitants of the air. Of these he disqualified a vast number of kinds, in fact all that prey on other fowls or on men, creatures which are carnivorous and venomous and in general use their strength to attack others. But doves, pigeons, turtledoves, and the tribes of cranes, geese and the like he reckons as belonging to the tame and gentle class and gives them to any who wish full liberty to make use of them as food.107

It is odd for Philo to miss an opportunity to pontificate on a subject. As even the review of texts in this chapter has likely indicated, Philo enjoyed pursuing a subject long beyond necessary to make his point. 104 105

106 107

Creation, 164. Cp. Allegorical Interpretation, 2.105–108. Creation, 164. Philo continues to discuss the problem of an effeminate brain in 165–166, where we learn that mind is gendered male while sensations are gendered female. In making this association, Philo is simply echoing a belief common in this time (and for far too long thereafter). For discussion, see Sly, Philo’s Perception, 43–49, and passim. On the “manliness” of maintaining Jewish food rules, also see 4 Macc 5:30. Migration, 69. On the gendering of this text, see Sly, Philo’s Perception, 195. Special Laws, 4.116–117. Cp. Letter of Aristeas, 145–149 (discussed above).

Animal as Allegory

69

Therefore, it is curious that Philo would fail to articulate his point here. Perhaps this reticence is due to the fact that Philo had only just discussed why the “gentle-mannered soul” should abstain from consuming carnivorous animals.108 Philo might have expected his reader to connect the dots between his previous argument and the allegorical interpretation he advanced immediately thereafter. This would make sense; if eating birds of prey leads one to act vengefully, then one should eat gentle creatures, which aid in the cultivation of self-control and proper decorum.109 Philo furthers this argument with the following line, in which he justifies biblical taboos against consuming animals that die a natural death and by the hands of an animal of prey.110 Though he does not turn this into an allegory about the animal, Philo argues against such practices on various grounds, including sharing a proverbial table with creatures of prey, health, respect for Nature, and self-control.111 Perhaps sometimes even for Philo a connection is clear enough that brevity can suffice. In concluding his discourse on permitted and prohibited creatures, Philo offers an elegant summary of his thesis: Thus in each element of the universe, earth, water, air he withdrew from our use various kinds of each sort, land creatures, water creatures, flying fowls, and by this as by the withdrawal of fuel from a fire he creates an extinguisher to desire.112

The dietary laws are therefore intended to extinguish the flames of desire. Permitted and prohibited creatures are symbolic of fire retardants and flammables, respectively.113 Philo’s focus on these animals as embodied and embodying allegories of self-control and desire is explained further by the context in which this extended discourse appears: an exposition on the Tenth Commandment. Commonly known in archaic English as “Thou shalt not covet,” Philo follows the LXX translation of the text, and cites the commandment as “You shall not desire.”114 For Philo, diet (both literally

108 109 110

111 113 114

Special Laws, 4.103–104, discussed above. On this view, see Rhodes, “Diet and Desire,” 131–132. Svebakken (Philo, 169–171) argues that Philo’s reticence here is due to an unwillingness to contradict (if not the text of, then at least the tradition reflected in) Letter of Aristeas, 145–149. Special Laws, 4.119–121. Cp. Special Laws, 4.103–105, discussed above. It is possible to continue this argument into the next passage on blood and suet (Special Laws, 4.122–125), though extending the argument to that point risks straining the logic a bit too much. 112 For a nuanced discussion, see Svebakken, Philo, 172–175. Special Laws, 4.118. Philo’s metaphor does not perfectly summarize his argument throughout, as Svebakken notes (Philo, 171–172). Exod 20:17; Deut 5:21. Philo cites the commandment as such in Special Laws, 4.78. In general, see Svebakken, Philo.

70

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

and symbolically) is a primary means of preventing gluttony and controlling desire.115

Rationalizing Commensality Restrictions Commensality, the act of sharing a meal with another, is a socially meaningful practice. With whom one chooses or refuses to dine serves to define the borders of a given community.116 Though these regulations will be read back into later times, it is only in the Hellenistic period when concerns regarding the community-building (and – destroying) potential of commensality begin to emerge. And fitting with the larger trend we have already encountered, when these concerns appear, they are justified on rational grounds. With the exception of the Book of Daniel, commensality restrictions are notably absent from biblical texts. This statement might seem surprising, as one would expect to find condemnation of such practices in Ezra and Nehemiah, two books famous for their efforts to erect firm boundaries between Judeans and other nations.117 Yet, we find no such restrictions. Further, the Ammonites and the Moabites are explicitly hated because they failed to offer the post-Exodus Israelites commensality.118 If the hated Other is deemed as such because of its refusal to engage in commensality, then it would seem that such restrictions are simply absent from the biblical corpus. Daniel is therefore the anomalous case in the Hebrew Bible. Daniel is further abnormal in that it was written quite late comparable to the remainder of the Hebrew Bible. Despite its claims to have been written in the sixth century BCE, it was most likely written several centuries later.119 The assertions that Daniel makes, as we shall see, are reasonable in a Hellenistic context. Therefore, when Daniel claims to refuse to eat the food provided by a Gentile king lest, in doing so, he might “defile 115 116

117 118 119

Further, see the concluding narrative in Philo, Special Laws, 4.126–131. In general, see Jordan D. Rosenblum, Food and Identity in Early Rabbinic Judaism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); much of the discussion herein draws from pp. 36–45. Also see Freidenreich, Foreigners, 31–46. Similarly, see Freidenreich, Foreigners, 19. See Deut 23:4–5. For rabbinic views on this text, see b. Yevamot 76b–77a. On the date of Daniel, see John J. Collins, Daniel: A Commentary on the Book of Daniel (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 24–38; Louis F. Hartman and Alexander A. Di Lella, The Book of Daniel: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 23 (New York: Doubleday, 1978), 29–42. While the redacted version of Daniel dates to the beginning of the Hasmonean Revolt (167–164 BCE), Collins dates the first chapter to the third-century BCE (Daniel, 36).

Rationalizing Commensality Restrictions

71

himself,”120 he is speaking from a different context than the vast majority of the Hebrew Bible. What does Daniel therefore teach us? He raises a concern for eating a Gentile’s food and drink, though he is willing to consume water and vegetables.121 However, since we are concerned with the rationalizations for these rules, Daniel actually has very little to offer. Despite making a claim that, given other biblical texts, seems to come like a bolt out of the blue, Daniel does not actually justify his practice. Like many innovations, it is simply stated as fact. The refusal by a Jew to eat the food and/or sit at the table of a non-Jewish authority figure (e.g. a political, military, or religious ruler) becomes a trope in late Hellenistic-period texts.122 Interestingly, these sources neither reference foodstuffs explicitly prohibited by the Hebrew Bible, nor do they justify these practices. Thus, we learn that Judah and the Maccabees hid in the mountains and ate herbs so as to avoid defilement.123 In the Greek version of Esther, Esther is careful to point out that she has not partaken of the king’s food.124 In the book of Judith, Judith provides her own food and refuses to use the silver dinnerware, consume the food, and imbibe the wine of the non-Jewish general Holofernes; and when she ultimately dines at Holofernes’ table, she eats her own food.125 In Joseph and Aseneth, Joseph consumes the Egyptian priest Pentephres’ food, but at a separate table; it is only after Joseph and Aseneth wed, following Aseneth’s “conversion” experience, that Joseph engages in commensality with his in-laws.126 In Tobit, Tobit avoids eating Gentile food, though he does note that his abstention is unique among his people.127 Josephus discusses an otherwise unattested Jewish preference for olive oil prepared 120

121 122 123 125 126

127

Dan 1:5. See Freidenreich, Foreigners, 35–36; Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 37–38. For Josephus’ treatment of this tale, see Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 10.190–194; Freidenreich, Foreigners, 236 n. 42. Dan 1:12. Much of this paragraph draws on Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 38–39. On these texts, and the differences between those composed in Alexandria and Judea, see Freidenreich, Foreigners, 31–46. 124 2 Macc 5:27. See Freidenreich, Foreigners, 36–37. Addition to Esther C 28. Judith 10:5; 12:1–4, 17–20. Joseph and Aseneth 7:1. Joseph’s commensality with his in-laws is implied in Joseph and Aseneth 20:8; 21:8. Not coincidentally Aseneth (whom Joseph will not, at first, kiss due to her food practices) throws her previously acceptable food out of the window during her “conversion” experience (Joseph and Aseneth 8:5–7; 10:13). Ross Shepard Kraemer argues against the traditional view of Aseneth having a transformative experience that we would label a conversion. Rather, she suggests that this pericope conforms to the norms of an adjuration text. See When Aseneth Met Joseph: A Late Antique Tale of the Biblical Patriarch and His Egyptian Wife, Reconsidered (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 89–109. Tobit 1:10–13.

72

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

by fellow Jews, states that two Jewish priests imprisoned in Rome maintained their piety by eating only figs and nuts, and notes that Ptolemy appointed Nicanor to prepare food for the translators of the LXX according to the Jewish custom (a tradition that appears in the Letter of Aristeas as well).128 However, he also reports that the Tobiads ate and drank at the table of Ptolemy seemingly without concern.129 Further, the food laws of separatist sects like the Qumran community and the Essenes might reflect some of these general concerns.130 Tacit in many of these texts is the fact that this novel concern about eating foreign food and/or with foreign people creates social distinction. As is discussed elsewhere in this book, this emerging desire of Jews to separate themselves at the table was noticed by both contemporary Jews and non-Jews, and was sometimes perceived to be misanthropic.131 Though pejorative, there is some evidence for the latter interpretation, as two texts make the connection between sharing a table with others and with sharing in their (perceived) improper practices. In the book of Jubilees, a mid-second-century BCE retelling of the events leading up to the Revelation at Mt. Sinai, Abraham’s blessing for his grandson Jacob includes the following injunction: And you, also, my son, Jacob, remember my words, and keep the commandments of Abraham, your father. Separate yourself from the gentiles, and do not eat with them, and do not perform deeds like theirs. Because their deeds are defiled, and all of their ways are contaminated, and despicable, and abominable.132

128

129

130

131 132

Oil: Jewish Antiquities, 12.119–120; Jewish War, 2.591–592; and Life, 74–76. For discussion, see Jordan D. Rosenblum, “Kosher Olive Oil in Antiquity Reconsidered,” JSJ 40/3 (2009): 356–365, esp. 357–359. Priests: Life, 3. LXX translation: Jewish Antiquities, 12.93–100, 105–106; Letter of Aristeas, 180–186. Interestingly, Philo speaks of an annual festival at which Jews and non-Jews dine together. See Moses, 2.41–42. Jewish Antiquities, 12.160–236 in general, with shared meals specifically mentioned in 173–174; 187; 210. On Josephus’ views on foreign food restrictions, see Freidenreich, Foreigners, 236 n. 42. Elsewhere, Josephus notes a Jewish fidelity to their ancestral food customs. See e.g. Jewish Antiquities, 14.226, 261. e.g. 1QS 6; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 2.128–136, 139, 143–144. For concise summaries of the commensality regulations of these two groups, see Albert I. Baumgarten, The Flourishing of Jewish Sects in the Maccabean Era: An Interpretation (New York: Brill, 1997), 93–96; Freidenreich, Foreigners, 37–38. e.g. see 3 Macc 3:4, 7; and chapters 2, 4, and 7. Jubilees 22:16. Translation by: O. S. Wintermute, “Jubilees,” in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), OTP (New York: Doubleday, 1985), 2:98, emphasis added. Freidenreich suggests that this restriction might be motivated by Exod 34:15–16 and Num 25:1–3 (Foreigners, 41). Freidenreich may be correct, but the allusion is, at best, faint. Much of the next few paragraphs draw on Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 39–42.

Rationalizing Commensality Restrictions

73

It would seem that, by eating with them, one would learn about their deeds; and the performance of deeds like theirs would be tantamount to engaging in contaminating, defiling, despicable, and abominable practices.133 This connection (and hence rationale) is not completely explicit, however.134 For a more direct connection between social separation at meals and the separation from improper practice, we must turn again to the Letter of Aristeas, which states: In his wisdom the legislator [i.e. Moses], in a comprehensive survey of each particular part, and being endowed by God for the knowledge of universal truths, surrounded us with unbroken palisades and iron walls to prevent our mixing with any of the other peoples in any matter, being thus kept pure in body and soul, preserved from false beliefs, and worshipping the only God omnipotent over all creation . . . So to prevent our being perverted by contact with others or by mixing with bad influences, he hedged us in on all sides with strict observances connected with meat and drink and touch and hearing and sight, after the manner of the Law.135

The metaphorical barriers that Moses erected at the table prevent Jews from eating with the wrong crowd, who would teach them perverted practices. This explicit rationale for commensality regulations fits with an earlier statement in the Letter of Aristeas, wherein the high priest Eleazar explains the food laws to a Greek delegation. In setting up the allegorical elucidation that follows (discussed previously, above), he comments that “through bad relationships men become perverted, and are miserable their whole long life; if, however, they mix with wise and prudent companions, they rise above ignorance and achieve progress in life.”136 Since biblical food laws prevent “bad influences” and encourage “progress in life,” then choosing the people who surround the table is therefore as important as choosing the food placed upon that table. In subsequent chapters, we will encounter a vast expansion in commensality regulations and a proportional increase in reason-based

133 134

135

For examples of such deeds, see Jubilees 22:17–19. Abraham’s comments on the “defiled” nature of “their deeds” seem to refer to his previous statement about performing “deeds like theirs.” Regarding the statement “and do not eat with them,” Wintermute reasonably suggests that this refers to Gentiles preparing food not in accordance with Jewish purity laws (“Jubilees,” 2:98 n. d). Even if Wintermute is correct here, this connection is tacit and not explicit. 136 Letter of Aristeas, 139, 142, emphasis added. Letter of Aristeas, 130.

74

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

rationalizations for these practices.137 In these discussions, we should notice the legacy of the Hellenistic period, where these concerns first arose. Like the statue emerging from a block of marble, we have only begun to glimpse at the form that will soon emerge.

Rephrasing Biblical Rationales In addition to offering new rationales, based on reason, revelation, and allegory, Hellenistic sources also rephrased justifications of food laws found in the Hebrew Bible itself. While many of these texts amount to no more than summaries of the biblical laws and narratives, some add new food regulations. Given that these rationales are drawn from the Bible itself and that we have already discussed these texts in Chapter 1, my treatment of this topic will be rather concise. One of the most commonly repeated rationalizations for biblical food taboos concerns the connection between blood and life.138 In addition to mentioning it while quoting or summarizing Genesis, this justification is also woven into larger exegetical agendas (as, for example, Philo does in the midst of his larger discourse, discussed above).139 The injunction against consuming the sciatic nerve, and the story that underlies it, also proved popular.140 Other topics include: biblically forbidden animals;141 consuming animals that died from natural causes or were killed by prey animals;142 slaughtering a parent and its offspring on the same day;143 sending the mother 137

138 139

140

141

142

143

e.g. as we shall see, concern about connections between commensality and sexuality will emerge. Such concerns are hinted at in some Hellenistic texts (e.g. Joseph and Aseneth 8:5–7; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12.186–189). In general, see Jordan D. Rosenblum, “From Their Bread to Their Bed: Commensality, Intermarriage, and Idolatry in Tannaitic Literature,” JJS 61/1 (2010): 18–29. e.g. Gen 9:3–4. Jubilees 6:4–16; 7:28–33; 21:18; Pseudo-Philo, 3:11; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 3.260; 6.115–121 (on 1 Sam 14:31–35); 1QapGen 11:17; 11QTa 53:2–8; Philo, Special Laws, 4.122–123 (and, in general, 122–125). On the connection between blood and women in Philo, see Sly, Philo’s Perception, 72–73. Gen 32:23–33; Demetrius the Chronographer, Frag. 2.7; 4Q158 Frag. 1–2, 10–13; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 1.335. On the last two texts, see Lawrence H. Schiffman, “Laws Pertaining to Forbidden Foods in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Albert I. Baumgarten, et al. (eds.), Halakhah in Light of Epigraphy, JAJS (Oakville: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 2011), 73–75. Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12.146; CD 12:11–15; 11QTa 48:1–8; 50:20–21. CD 12:11–15 also adds some new rules regarding eating bees, fish slaughter, and cooking locusts. On these rules, see Schiffman, “Laws,” 65–69; Norman. Golb, “The Dietary Laws of the Damascus Document in Relation to Those of the Karaites,” JJS 8 (1957): 51–69; Jodi Magness, Stone and Dung, Oil and Spit: Jewish Daily Life in the Time of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 37–41. Pseudo-Phocylides, 139–140 (though the meaning here is obscure), 147–148; 4Q251 12:3–5; 11QTa 48:6; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 3.260; Philo, Special Laws, 4.119–121 (where Philo ties this into his larger agenda, discussed above). 4Q251 12:1–3; 4Q270 2ii:15; 4Q396 1:1–4; 11QTa 52:5–7. See Teeter, “You Shall Not Seethe.”

Conclusion

75

bird away from her nest;144 eating forbidden fat;145 and possibly the prohibition against cooking a kid in its mother’s milk.146 These sources do not add much to the discussion, as they either summarize the biblical text itself or just reinforce arguments made elsewhere in their corpus (the latter is especially true with regard to Philo). The approach that many of these sources take is therefore best summarized by Josephus, who states: Moreover, as concerning animals, [Moses] distinguished in detail those which might be eaten and those on the contrary from which one must perpetually abstain. On these, whenever the occasion may come for treating of them, we shall discourse at length, supplying the reasons which influenced him in ruling that some of them were eatable and in enjoining us to abstain from others.147

Sometimes highlighting the rules, sometimes adding to them, and often simply summarizing them, various biblical laws and their rationales reappear in Hellenistic texts.

Conclusion Discussing biblical food laws in the Hellenistic period, Martin Goodman observes that, “Whatever the rationale of such taboos, there can be no doubt of their power, nor of their tendency, as a result, to expand far beyond the restrictions envisioned in the Bible.”148 While Goodman is right that these laws did extend beyond biblical restrictions – a subject that will grow in importance in subsequent chapters of this book – it is most important to note the power of these taboos. They were not just statutes preserved in some archaic document. They were rules to govern one’s daily existence. This latter point explains the need to rationalize this legislation. While one could perhaps participate in an infrequent ritual without pondering too deeply its meaning, this was not an option in regard to food, the ingestion of which is physically required on a regular basis (preferably many times a day!). And each encounter with food 144 145 146 147

11QTa 65:2–5. Philo, Special Laws, 4.124–125 (in general, 122–125; Philo’s exposition here accords with his larger agenda, discussed above); Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 3.260. 4Q251 12:5. See Schiffman, “Laws,” 71–72, 79 (who is a bit too positivistic here, as he seems to want to read rabbinic interpretations back into sectarian documents). 148 Jewish Antiquities, 3.259. Rome and Jerusalem, 276.

76

The Hellenistic Period: Jewish Sources

potentially leads to a question of powerful import: why do “We” eat the way “We” do? Of course, “what” We eat – and even who “We” are – was (and continues to be) a matter of some debate. One such debate is recorded in the New Testament, to which we shall now turn.

chapter 4

The Hellenistic Period: The New Testament

Why, then, ’tis none to you, for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.1

Jesus was a game changer for his followers. Considering him to be “Christ” (the Anointed One, or Messiah) his followers understood his appearance as fulfilling biblical prophecies concerning the Messiah. The rules of this game were further changed by the belief that this also entailed the emergence of a new covenant. Over time, this new covenant was recorded in the New Testament.2 For followers of Christ, therefore, the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible (the Septuagint)3 now became the “Old” Testament (much like the occurrence of World War II changed the name of the “The Great War” to “World War I”). This nomenclature thus signifies both a different text and different theological assumptions by Christbelieving Jews. This final statement is important, as the earliest followers of Jesus were, in fact, Jews.4 While New Testament texts have much to say about food, meals, and commensality,5 they actually say little about the rationalization for biblical food regulations. Rather, as was also the case with the Hebrew Bible/Old 1

2 3 4

5

William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 2, Scene 2, lines 268–270. I consulted: William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, ed. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine, Folger Shakespeare Library (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2009), 99. For an accessible introduction, see Bart D. Ehrman, The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). For discussion, see Chapter 3. The literature on this subject is voluminous. To offer one example of the many possible, see Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). On the split between Judaism and Christianity as it relates to food and meals in general, see Dennis E. Smith, From Symposium to Eucharist: The Banquet in the Early Christian World (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003); and Hal Taussig, In the Beginning Was the Meal: Social Experimentation and Early Christian Identity (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009). In general, see David M. Freidenreich, Foreigners and Their Food: Constructing Otherness in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011), esp. 87–100; Smith, From Symposium to Eucharist, esp. 173–277; Taussig, In the Beginning Was the Meal.

77

78

The Hellenistic Period: The New Testament

Testament,6 the rationalizations for food practices were read back into the text by later Christian authors. It would seem that, in general, interpreting biblical food regulations was an act of eisegesis (reading in to the text), rather than exegesis (reading out of the text).

Old Testament Food Laws in the New Testament: Gospels Jesus’ most famous food-related pronouncement is found in Mark 7:14–23: Then he called the crowd again and said to them: “Listen to me, all of you, and understand: there is nothing outside a person that by going in can defile, but the things that come out are what defile.” When he had left the crowd and entered the house, his disciples asked him about the parable. He said to them: “Then do you also fail to understand? Do you not see that whatever goes into a person from outside cannot defile, since it enters, not the heart but the stomach, and goes into the sewer?”7 (Thus he declared all foods clean.) And he said, “It is what comes out of a person that defiles. For it is from within, from the human heart, that evil intentions come: fornication, theft, murder, adultery, avarice, wickedness, deceit, licentiousness, envy, slander, pride, folly. All these evil things come from within, and they defile a person.”8

According to this account, the Pharisees have come from Jerusalem to see Jesus at Gennesaret, where they are shocked by the food and purity practices of Jesus’ disciples.9 Jesus responds by declaring all foods clean. However, Jesus’ assertion about all foods is in parentheses for a reason: it is likely a later addition.10 Reading this text without the comment in question results in a lesson in morality, but not necessarily of negation: one should concern oneself with impurities that originate in the heart and exit into the world rather than those that originate outside and enter into the stomach. The addition of that line 6

7

8

9 10

Throughout this book, I will use the term “Hebrew Bible” when discussing the biblical scripture for Jews and “Old Testament” when referring to biblical scripture for Christians (and Christ-believing Jews, since they would share this same theological assumption about the connection between Old and New Testaments). Concerns about elimination appear in other Jewish sources in antiquity. See Jodi Magness, Stone and Dung, Oil and Spit: Jewish Daily Life in the Time of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 130–144; Jonathan Wyn Schofer, Confronting Vulnerability: The Body and the Divine in Rabbinic Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 53–76. Cp. Matt 15:10–20; Gospel of Thomas 14. All New Testament translation are from the NRSV, as it appears in Amy-Jill Levine and Marx Zvi Brettler (eds.), The Jewish Annotated New Testament (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). In general, see Mark 6:53–7:23 (cp. Matt 14:34–15:20). See Heikki Räisänen, “Jesus and the Food Laws: Reflections on Mark 7.15,” JSNT 16 (1982): 79–100. This comment does not appear in the parallel in Matthew (and Luke omits it). Also see the references in n. 11.

Old Testament Food Laws in the New Testament: Paul

79

reframes Jesus’ words so as to better accord with other texts in the New Testament canon (discussed below).11 In removing it, as we probably should, we can reread the text, and discover the “historical” Jesus:12 one who was not as interested as his later disciples were in overturning biblical food laws. In fact, it seems likely that Jesus himself followed Jewish food taboos.13 Whether Jesus actually uttered these words does not affect a key point for the topic at hand: either way, Jesus never rationalizes the biblical food laws. If Jesus embraced these dietary regulations (which, based on the evidence, is most probable) then his reasons for doing so are not recorded. And if Jesus rejected them, then the only justification this text provides would be to claim that foods cannot defile a person. How this relates to Old Testament texts that claim the opposite is in no way explicitly addressed.14

Old Testament Food Laws in the New Testament: Paul Justifications for Old Testament food laws remain elusive even after we move beyond the words of Jesus. For example, there is a common refrain in the New Testament: everyone should “abstain only from things polluted by idols and from fornication and from whatever has been strangled and from blood.”15 That is, of course, if one is aware of the meat’s provenance. Otherwise, according to Paul, one should “Eat whatever is sold in the meat market without raising any question on the grounds of conscience, for the ‘earth and its fullness are the Lord’s.’”16 Paul, a Jewish Christ-believer 11

12

13

14 15

16

See e.g. Acts 10:15; 11:9; and the Pseudo-Pauline Epistle 1 Tim 4:3–5. This same conclusion is reached by Lawrence M. Wills in his commentary on Mark in The Jewish Annotated New Testament (see p. 74); and is seconded by David M. Friendereich’s essay on “Food and Table Fellowship” that appears in that same volume (see pp. 521–524). I am well aware of the myriad problems with attempting to construct the “historical” Jesus. Throughout this chapter, therefore, I will only be referring to the literary construction of the words and practices of Jesus as depicted by the authors of the New Testament. (For an accessible summary of the issues surrounding searching for the historical Jesus, see Bart D. Ehrman, Jesus: Apocalyptic Prophet of the New Millennium [New York: Oxford University Press, 1999].) All I am claiming above is that, in my reading of the evidence, the concerns about rejecting Jewish food taboos are read back into earlier times by later authors. While others may (and have) wish to argue that this is not the case, I find this argument to be the most compelling. Cp. Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 88. Though in Luke 10:7–8 Jesus tells his seventy missionaries to eat and drink whatever is placed before them while on the road, this does not necessarily refer to violating biblical food laws. For biblical texts that discuss food laws in the language of defilement, see e.g. Lev 11:43–44; 17:15. Acts 15:19 (cf. 15:28–29; 21:25). For additional references and discussion, see Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 89–96. In general, see Alex T. Cheung, Idol Food in Corinth: Jewish Background and Pauline Legacy (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999); and John Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003). 1 Cor 10:25–26 (in general, see 10:23–31).

80

The Hellenistic Period: The New Testament

whose letters are part of the New Testament canon, quotes Psalm 24:117 as proof that everything belongs to God. Therefore, one should assume that all meat is innocent until proven guilty.18 Paul’s leniency results from his general understanding that it is only one’s mindset of eating, and not the food itself, that is defiling.19 If one therefore has the attitude that the meat in question is acceptable and not transgressive, then thinking makes it so.20 Yet, the relationship between New Testament rules and Old Testament food regulations is unclear. Perhaps the most elusive food-related New Testament passage is Paul’s discussion of the differences between the “weak” and the “strong” in regard to food.21 Talking to a community of believers in Rome, Paul states: Welcome those who are weak in faith, but not for the purpose of quarreling over opinions. Some believe in eating anything, while the weak eat only vegetables. Those who eat must not despise those who abstain, and those who abstain must not pass judgment on those who eat; for God has welcomed them . . . I know and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus that nothing is unclean in itself; but it is unclean for anyone who thinks it unclean. If your brother or sister is being injured by what you eat, you are no longer walking in love. Do not let what you eat cause the ruin of one for whom Christ died . . . For the kingdom of God is not food and drink but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit . . . Do not, for the sake of food, destroy the work of God. Everything is indeed clean, but it is wrong for you to make others fall by what you eat; it is good not to eat meat or drink wine or do anything that makes your brother or sister stumble.22

Must Gentiles who believe in Christ follow the Old Testament food laws? This is a central question that Paul tackles, and he decides that they need not do so. They are not Jews and are thus not bound by Jewish law.23 17 18 19

20 21

22 23

LXX: Ps 23:1. Contrast t. Berakhot 4:1, which uses this biblical verse as proof that all food must be blessed; otherwise, one is stealing from God. Of course, if it is guilty (i.e. idol meat), then one should not eat it (see 1 Cor 10:28; Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 92–96). Daniel C. Ullucci argues that here Paul refers to the possibility that eating sacrificial meat might lead recent converts to return to their previous idolatrous ways (The Christian Rejection of Animal Sacrifice [New York: Oxford University Press, 2012], 70–72). Ullucci’s suggestion does not contradict what I am arguing above, as it is another reason that the food itself is not defiling, but rather one’s mindset is (in this case, that doing so might lead one to backslide into Pagan practice). See Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 93. Cp. the Pseudo-Pauline Epistle Titus 1:15. Also, see my comments in n. 19. The bibliography on this subject is voluminous. For brief discussions and additional references, see Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 89–96; Smith, From Symposium to Eucharist, 173–217, esp. 182–184; and Ullucci, Christian Rejection of Animal Sacrifice, 71–72. Rom 14:1–3, 14–15, 17, 20–21. Cf. 1 Cor 8; the Pseudo-Pauline Epistle Col 2:16. See Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 89–90.

The Shared Table

81

However, the relationship between Old Testament food laws and the current New Testament world is complicated. Should Jewish Christ-believers still follow the food laws? Amidst all of this confusion, two opinions prevailed: Christ-believers who follow Old Testament food laws (the “weak”) and those who do not (the “strong”).24 For Paul, no food is “unclean” (literally “profane” or “common”; κοινὸν). But, if one thinks the food is, then it remains so, because otherwise one would be violating what that person considers to be biblical law.25 Again, we are left disappointed in regard to why such laws exist in the first place. In all cases, justification for these food laws is absent. For such rationales, we must wait for Chapter 7, wherein later Christian authors interpret Paul’s words and expand upon them. While these later Christian authors will see Old Testament laws as allegories and justify them accordingly, New Testament texts turn neither to reason, revelation, nor allegory in order to justify biblical dietary laws.

The Shared Table As I argue throughout this book, we must not only pay attention to the food on the table, but also to the people around the table. Such commensality concerns do appear in the New Testament. And the shared table is in fact one place where rationalizations for foodways do appear, both in New Testament texts and in the rabbinic and early Christian sources discussed in subsequent chapters. Aware of the social repercussions for closing the borders of the table (and the Jewish tradition of embracing such boundaries), early Christ-believers decide rather to open the borders of their table and invite others to join. It should be noted, however, that Jesus (as he is depicted in the New Testament) does not explicitly advocate for the wide-open borders that even his early followers espoused. Thus, while John Dominic Crossan argues that Jesus created a revolutionary social program at the table, which he labels “open commensality,” there is an important caveat: for 24

25

For another way of reading the weak/strong dichotomy, see above n. 19, which notes that Ullucci would frame this argument in terms of potential backsliders to Pagan practice (the “weak”), rather than Old Testament practice. If Ullucci’s interpretation is correct, then these texts address concerns about Pagan practice and thus are irrelevant for the discussion at hand. Regardless of which stance one takes on this particular issue, my overall conclusion for this section still stands (namely, the absence of justification in the New Testament for Old Testament food laws). However, if one agrees with Ullucci, then this chapter should have been much shorter! Rom 14:23. Also see the Pseudo-Pauline Epistle 1 Titus 1:15, which declares: “To the pure all things are pure, but to the corrupt and unbelieving nothing is pure.” Cf. nn. 19 and 24, above.

82

The Hellenistic Period: The New Testament

all of Jesus’ supposed transgressive eating in sharing a table with those of different social classes and purity statuses described in the New Testament, Jesus never shares a table with non-Jews.26 His dining companions might have been socially undesirable or problematic Jews, but they were Jews nevertheless. When we turn to Jesus’ early followers, however, we encounter the opening of the borders of the table so as to include non-Jews. This decision did not occur without some controversy, which is fortunate for us, since this resulted in the need to articulate the logic behind such practices. A famous example is found in the incident in Antioch, in which Paul rebukes Cephas (= Peter/Simon),27 a Jewish Christ-believer, for his commensal actions: But when Cephas came to Antioch, I opposed him to his face, because he stood self-condemned; for until certain people came from James, he used to eat with the Gentiles. But after they came, he drew back and kept himself separate for fear of the circumcision faction. And the other Jews joined him in this hypocrisy, so that even Barnabas was led astray by their hypocrisy. But when I saw that you were not acting consistently with the truth of the gospel, I said to Cephas before them all, “If you, though a Jew, live like a Gentile and not like a Jew, how can you compel the Gentiles to live like Jews?” We ourselves are Jews by birth and not Gentile sinners; yet we know that a person is justified not by the works of the law but through faith in Jesus Christ. And we have come to believe in Christ Jesus, so that we might be justified by faith in Christ, and not by doing the works of the law, because no one will be justified by the works of the law.28

Paul condemns Cephas for choosing not to break bread with Gentile Christ-believers. While Cephas had formerly done so, he had been influenced by a faction within early Christ-believers who both adhered to Jewish law and believed in Christ.29 When Jewish Christ-believers only eat with one another, according to Paul, they distance themselves socially 26

27 28

29

e.g. see John Dominic Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1991), 341–344. For another critique of Crossan’s approach, see Smith, From Symposium to Eucharist, 237–239. For examples of Jesus’ transgressive eating, see e.g. Matt 9: 10–13; Mark 2:15–17; Luke 5:27–32. On Peter/Simon, see Acts 10:5. Gal 2:11–16. On this text, see Peter J. Tomson, Paul and the Jewish Law: Halakha in the Letters of the Apostle to the Gentiles (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 222–230; E. P. Sanders, “Jewish Association with Gentiles and Galatians 2:11–14,” in Robert T. Fortna and Beverly R. Gaventa (eds.), The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul & John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990), 170–188; and Magnus Zetterholm, The Formation of Christianity in Antioch: A Social-Scientific Approach to the Separation Between Judaism and Christianity (New York: Routledge Press, 2005), 129–164. See Acts 15.

The Shared Table

83

from Gentile Christ-believers when, in fact, they should bring them close and establish a single community.30 For this reason, Christ-believers should practice commensality with one another, whether Jew or Gentile. While the actions of Cephas/Peter/Simon in Acts vary, the same general message applies: commensality between Jewish and non-Jewish Christ-believers must occur.31 At first, Peter (his predominant name in Acts, a book which post-dates Galatians by about half a century)32 wishes to maintain traditional Jewish food and commensality laws, but a heavenly voice declares: “What God has made clean, you must not call profane.”33 Influenced by this divine intervention, he informs Cornelius (a Roman centurion and potential convert) and an assembled crowd of Gentiles: “You yourselves know that it is unlawful for a Jew to associate with or to visit a Gentile; but God has shown me that I should not call anyone profane or unclean.”34 In introducing Christ into the world, God has changed the rules of the game. For this reason Peter and his fellow Christ-believers should no longer concern themselves with traditional Jewish food and commensal practices. However, this does not mean that everyone is welcome at the table, according to Paul. As Paul informs the Corinthians: I wrote to you in my letter not to associate with sexually immoral persons – not at all meaning the immoral of this world, or the greedy and the robbers, or idolaters, since you would then need to go out of the world. But now I am writing to you not to associate with anyone who bears the name of brother or sister who is sexually immoral or greedy, or is an idolater, reviler, drunkard, or robber. Do not even eat with such a one. For what have I to do with judging those outside? Is it not those who are inside that you are to judge? God will judge those outside. “Drive out the wicked person from among you.”35

30 31 32

33

34 35

Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 97 offers a similar interpretation. For a comparison of these two texts on this subject, see Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 96–100. I mention the relative dating of these texts not to make a historical argument about Cephas/Peter/ Simon, but to remind the reader that I am more interested in how this character is deployed in these separate, chronologically distinct texts in order to make a similar theological point regarding commensality. In general, I treat the New Testament at the redactional level, as I do for all texts throughout this book. Acts 10:15 (in general, see 10:9–16). Peter reports this vision and his resulting actions to other apostles in Acts 11:1–18 (where the same words appear in 11:9). Also cp. the Pseudo-Pauline Epistle 1 Tim 4: 3–5. Acts 10:28. As Freidenreich correctly notes: “Acts, here and elsewhere, equates hospitality with the sharing of food” (Foreign Food, 98). 1 Cor 5:9–13. 5:13 is a quote from Deut 17:7.

84

The Hellenistic Period: The New Testament

Here, Paul clarifies an apparent ambiguity in an earlier (and non-extant) letter he wrote to the Corinthian community. There, he did not mean that Christ-believers should “go out of the world” by refusing commensality with Gentiles and non-Christ believers. Rather, Christ-believers should only abstain from commensality with fellow Christ-believers (“brother or sister”) who hypocritically engage in sinful behavior. Therefore, Paul asserts: judge those within your community, and leave the rest for God to judge. Paul’s wording allows Christ-believers to engage in commensality with members outside their community and members in good standing within their community. It only excludes those who are within the Christ-believing community but violate what Paul deems to be key tenants.36 In this, Paul still adheres to his concerns about idolatry and fornication. But, as noted earlier, five chapters later Paul will institute a “don’t ask, don’t tell policy,” wherein “If an unbeliever invites you to a meal and you are disposed to go, eat whatever is set before you without raising any questions on the ground of conscience.”37 It is only if you are explicitly told that it is idol meat that you should refrain from eating it.38 Further, the grounds of conscience are not your own, since your actions were done on account of thankfulness – not idolatry – and thus should not be denounced.39 Taken together, Paul’s words inform his followers of the social importance of commensality. Borders at the table build one type of community and demolish another. For Paul, this is especially important since he believes that the Messiah has come and the end of the world is nigh. Faith in Christ allows Gentile Christ-believers to participate in the coming events, and it is important for all Christ-believers (both Jew and Gentile, alike) to accept God’s plan, which includes these new commensality rules. Paul therefore allows for leniencies in order to include Gentiles, but stringencies in order to exclude Christ-believers who stray from the fold. In using commensality to create and destroy certain social groupings, Paul is just another Hellenistic Jew. 36

37

Similarly, see Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 90–91. For another attempt to explain the history behind 1 Cor, which includes a summary of much of the recent scholarship on these issues, see John W. Parrish, “Cultural Anthropology and Corinthian Food Fights: Structure and History in the Lord’s Dinner,” in William E. Arnal, Willi Braun, and Russell T. McCutcheon (eds.), Failure and Nerve in the Academic Study of Religion: Essays in Honor of Donald Wiebe (Bristol: Equinox Publishing, 2012), 157–176. 38 39 I Cor 10:27. 1 Cor 10:28. 1 Cor 10:29–30.

Conclusion

85

Conclusion New Testament texts that discuss the relevance of Old Testament food laws provide us with much information. However, they do not offer us much justification for these biblical laws. For this we must wait for early Christian commentators, whom we will meet in Chapter 7. A notable exception is with regard to commensality, where New Testament authors exhibit awareness of the potential community-building and -destroying abilities of table practices.40 Yet, as we have seen in the previous chapters, Jewish table practices are more a product of the Hellenistic period, rather than the Biblical period. We can thus detect an emerging trend, wherein commensality plays a larger role in both the discussion of food laws and in the very food practices themselves. With this observation in mind, we turn to a small group of Jews who would have an enduring and transformative impact on Judaism: the rabbis. 40

A similar awareness appears in 1 Cor 10, in which Paul discusses how partnership in rituals (expressed in terms of eating) creates communities. For discussion, see Ullucci, Christian Rejection of Animal Sacrifice, 72–74.

chapter 5

The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources

In some profound way, kashrut is not rational . . . That may even be part of it. The idea may be just to cause you to pause before you put food in your mouth. To stop and ask a question.1

If the Hellenistic period is shaped by the presence of the Temple, then the Tannaitic period (70–c.250 CE) is defined by its absence.2 The destruction of the Temple left more than the physical structure in ruins; indeed, in the rubble one can find theological, political, social, economic, and psychological destruction. However, many attempted to salvage Judaism from this wreckage. One such group that rose from the ashes was the rabbis.3 The description of the rabbis as rising from the ashes of the Temple is actually more than just a turn of phrase. Indeed, the origin legend of the rabbis claims that during the siege of Jerusalem, Rabban Yohanan b. Zakkai smuggled himself in a coffin out of the city in order to have a clandestine meeting with the Roman general (and soon-to-be emperor) Vespasian, during which he secured safety for himself and his disciples in a new location (Yavneh).4 This story is best read as part of a revisionist history, as it was written in the sixth and not, as it claims, in the firstcentury CE.5 Furthermore, the rabbis locate their authority as deriving from an unbroken chain of authority going back to the divine revelation to 1 2

3

4

5

Arthur Waskow, quoted in Samantha M. Shapiro, “Kosher Wars,” The New York Times Magazine, October 12, 2008, 50–55, 55. Since I treat the texts on the redactional level (see below, n. 16), I consider the Tannaitic period to last until c.250 CE. This allows me to include the tannaitic midrashim, edited slightly after 220 CE, which is another commonly cited date for the end of this period. For an accessible history of the developments described in this introduction, see Martin S. Jaffee, Early Judaism: Religious Worlds of the First Judaic Millennium, 2nd edn. (Bethesda: University Press of Maryland, 2006). e.g. see Avot d’Rabbi Natan A4:41–77; b. Gittin 56a–b. On this story, see Jeffrey L. Rubenstein, Talmudic Stories: Narrative Art, Composition, and Culture (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 138–175. See Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 151–201.

86

The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources

87

Moses (whom they call “Moses our Rabbi”) on Mount Sinai.6 The fact that modern Judaism is rabbinic Judaism has furthered these assertions, as the rabbis are the foundation for modern beliefs and practices. Thus, it is not without controversy that recent scholars have poked holes in these historical claims. Despite what some may think, to temper rabbinic claims about their rise to power and authority after the destruction of the Second Temple is not to minimize the rabbis themselves. Though they may have been marginal figures for longer than they claim, they still managed to rise to power (albeit over a longer period of time) for a variety of factors, including political maneuvering, a little luck, and – not to be ignored – their own rhetorical persuasion and cultural savvy.7 Moving to a more nuanced historical picture, in which the early rabbis (or: Tannaim; singular: Tanna) were but one competitor in the marketplace of ideas, both better accounts for the historical record and explains the development of the rabbinic movement.8 A modern analog proves instructive. If scholars in the year 3016 CE read texts produced by modern rabbis and conclude that such rabbis were authoritative, obviously, their conclusion would be false.9 However, if the authors of the extant texts claimed a universal authority (as, for example, Artscroll volumes do),10 then future scholars might make historically inaccurate conclusions. If in the age of the Internet, when even the most arbitrary rabbinic opinion is available via the World Wide Web, many Jews (regardless of level of observance) are unaware of many modern rabbinic documents, then how much the more so in antiquity? Further, to claim that rabbis are authoritative today (or in the ancient

6 7 8

9

10

e.g. m. Avot 1:1. See Seth Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish Society, 200 B.C.E. to 640 C.E. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Such an understanding is not aimed at undermining any theological claim, the verification and/or nullification of which is inappropriate for an academic context. For a theoretical model of religious competition among religious experts in the third-century CE (albeit with particular attention to early Christianity), see Daniel C. Ullucci, “What Did He Say? The Ideas of Religious Experts and the 99%,” in Jordan D. Rosenblum, Lily C. Vuong, and Nathaniel P. DesRosiers (eds.), Religious Competition in the Third-Century C.E.: Jews, Christians, and the Greco-Roman World, JAJS (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), 21–31. e.g. see the opinion of Rabbi Michael J. Broyde on whether a Jew can celebrate Thanksgiving (and also Halloween): www.tfdixie.com/special/thanksg.htm (last accessed July 20, 2016). On modern rabbinic opinions about Thanksgiving, also see Beth A. Berkowitz, Defining Jewish Difference: From Antiquity to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 219–227. On Artscroll, see Jeremy Stolow, Orthodox by Design: Judaism, Print Politics, and the Artscroll Revolution (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010).

88

The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources

world) would be to push the boundaries of the definition of “authoritative” beyond recognition. Rather than being the sole Jewish authority in antiquity, the rabbis were one group of Jews who attempted to fill the void left by the destruction of the Temple. While the early rabbis were a marginal group, they sought to move from margin to center, and thus they presented themselves as such.11 They also created a rich corpus of literature, translating Temple practice into a world without a Temple and therefore extending biblical law to fit new and ever-changing realities.12 One of the primary ways in which the rabbis sought to expand their domain was through their concept of two Torahs: the Written Torah and Oral Torah.13 The Written Torah is an established canonical text: the Hebrew Bible. It is the Torah. Oral Torah is a more wide-ranging text.14 It is Torah, without the definite article. While the rabbis claim that both were given to Moses on Mount Sinai, Oral Torah is ever expanding, unlike the Written Torah. This dual concept allows for continued revelation, as rabbinic law (halakhah) can adapt to changes in time, circumstance, place, et cetera. Like water poured into a new vessel, Oral Torah shapes to the contours of its environment, while still maintaining its own integrity. Included in the concept of Oral Torah is exegesis on the Written Torah. This exegesis, known as midrash, is notoriously difficult to define. For our purposes, however, I accept Michael L. Satlow’s concise definition: “Midrash is a rule-driven form of interpretation, or genre, that emerges from some basic rabbinic assumptions about the nature of the biblical text.”15 Since we are concerned with how biblical prohibitions regarding 11

12

13 14 15

Whenever possible (in this chapter and in Chapter 6), I will also cite non-rabbinic Jewish evidence. However, since history is written by the victors, we have much more evidence for rabbinic views on the food laws. Further, we must keep in mind (as noted above) that the rabbis represent neither the majority of Jews, nor “normative” Judaism at this time. On how the rabbis used the memory of the Temple to establish their own authority, see Naftali S. Cohn, The Memory of the Temple and the Making of the Rabbis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). For an accessible introduction to rabbinic literature, see Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert and Martin S. Jaffee, eds., The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). For a good introduction to these concepts, see Jaffee, Early Judaism, 49–89. On the orality of this text, see the essays by Martin S. Jaffee and Elizabeth Shanks Alexander in Fonrobert and Jaffee, Cambridge Companion to the Talmud, 17–57. Michael L. Satlow, Creating Judaism: History, Tradition, Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 126. For an accessible discussion of the history of midrash, see Steven D. Fraade’s essay in Fonrobert and Jaffee, Cambridge Companion to the Talmud, 99–120. On the rules of midrash and the assumptions about the Hebrew Bible, see James L. Kugel, In Potiphar’s House: The Interpretive Life of Biblical Texts (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), 247–270 (on his well-known “Nine Theses”); H. L. Strack and Günter Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, trans. and ed. Markus Bockmuehl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 15–30; and Azzan Yadin, Scripture as

The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources

89

food are interpreted, expanded, and applied, midrash will obviously be of interest to us. Further, the rabbinic concept of Oral Torah, the umbrella under which midrash is found, offers us a rich source of rabbinic interpretation. As we shall see, the Tannaim read new regulations back into the Written Torah (i.e. eisegesis not exegesis) and create new rabbinic enactments based on their own perceived legal authority.16 In this chapter, we will examine rabbinic justifications for a variety of traditional as well as innovative food practices. While we might expect a continuation of the trends from the Hellenistic period, wherein justifications for these laws were based on reason, we will see that the Tannaim turn almost exclusively toward revelation: Jews must follow these rules because they are divinely ordained, not necessarily because they are logical. Further, the Tannaim display a significantly greater interest in how these laws are to be followed, rather than why. Asking why would be to conduct an inquiry based on reason; asking how, however, presumes (often unstated) that revelation is a sufficient basis for following divine fiat. Because God commanded them, one should not question their basis, but rather determine their particulars. While this answer might seem weak in comparison to the more philosophically oriented responses encountered in previous chapters, we should not underestimate the importance of a revelation-based justification for the Tannaim.17 In addition to the explanatory power of divine commandment in-and-of-itself, the early rabbis were interested in the practical and theoretical application of the biblical food laws. This interest often manifested itself for the Tannaim in a focus on how these laws were to be understood and applied. While how is a different question to why, this is often the manner in which the rabbis work. For example, in the very beginning of the Mishnah, m. Berakhot 1:1–3:6 asks how one of the central

16

17

Logos: Rabbi Ishmael and the Origins of Midrash (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 48–79. A note on my assumptions is necessary here. In general, I will treat the texts at their redactional level. When it is informative or relevant, however, I will discuss the redactional layers of a given text. While these texts are collections of previous conversations, interactions, and opinions, they are also edited documents. Further, I do not claim that when a text attributes a statement to “Rabbi X” that “Rabbi X” did, in fact, make that statement; I am postulating only that the text claims that “Rabbi X” made such a statement. Finally, I attempt to tease out trends in rabbinic corpora. This effort is often stymied by a variety of factors, including the presence of only a single tradition, of conflicting traditions, or the opaque nature of a given comment. Throughout I will try to temper my claims according to what the evidence allows. When I feel that I am pushing the evidence as far as it can go, I will note that this is the case, so readers can decide for themselves whether to accept, reject, or nuance my conclusions. In general, see Christine Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law? Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

90

The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources

rabbinic prayers, the Shema’, is recited; it does not ask why. In the process of answering how, one uncovers many arguments that also contribute to answering the unasked question of why.

Pork: A Complicated Meat I take the title for this section from that of an online memoir collected by journalist and renowned pickler Jeffrey Yoskowitz, entitled “Pork Memoirs: Personal Stories about a Complicated Meat.”18 As we have seen in previous chapters, the pork taboo proved popular in critiques and apologies for Jewish food rules. This is a trend that will continue, both throughout this book and in the eras beyond our consideration. While Yoskowitz’s website chronicles the modern incarnation of this pork phenomenon, we can trace this fascination to ancient times.19 For the Tannaim, much like those who came before and after them, pork was indeed a complicated meat. While later Jews will offer hygienic reasons (among others) for the biblical pork taboo, the Tannaim were aware that the Hebrew Bible lacks an explicit rationale for this law.20 They were also aware that non-Jews both knew about and mocked this prohibition.21 Addressing these issues, Sifra states: [A] “You shall observe my ordinances [‫[ ”]משפטי‬Lev 18:4]: [B] These [ordinances] are the matters written in the Torah. [C] But even if they had not been written, it would have been logical to write them, 18 19

20 21

http://porkmemoirs.com (last accessed July 26, 2016). I would like to acknowledge Jeffrey Yoskowitz for discussing pork with me, as (in his words) a fellow “Semitic Swinologist.” On pork in ancient times, see Jordan D. Rosenblum, “‘Why do you refuse to eat pork?’ Jews, Food, and Identity in Roman Palestine,” JQR 100/1 (2010): 95–110; in medieval times, see Claudine FabreVassas, The Singular Beast: Jews, Christians and the Pig, trans. Carol Volk (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); and in modern times, see Daphne Barak-Erez, Outlawed Pigs: Law, Religion, and Culture in Israel (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007). On hygiene as a rationale, see the well-known comments by Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, 3:48 (who references b. Berakhot 25a). On the Hebrew Bible’s lack of a justification, see Chapter 1. Awareness and derision of Jewish pork prohibitions by contemporary non-Jews is evidenced in ancient sources (see especially chapters 2 and 7). In regard to this text, see David C. Kraemer, Jewish Eating and Identity through the Ages (New York: Routledge, 2009 [2007]), 32. Another tannaitic text that perhaps describes non-Jewish mockery of the Jewish pork taboo is t. Ohalot 18:16–17. I do not comment on this pericope here since no justification for the food law is contained therein. On this text, see David Levine, “Between Leadership and Marginality: Models for Evaluating the Role of the Rabbis in the Early Centuries CE,” in Lee I. Levine and Daniel R. Schwartz (eds.), Jewish Identities in Antiquity: Studies in Memory of Menahem Stern, TSAJ 130 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 205–208.

Pork: A Complicated Meat

91

[D] for example, [prohibitions against] robbery, forbidden sexual relations,22 idolatry, blasphemy, and murder, which even if they had not been written [in the Torah], it would have been logical to write them. [E] But23 there are those that the Evil Inclination24 refutes and the nations of the world, who worship other gods, refute, [F] for example, [prohibitions against] eating pork, wearing mixed species, the shoe-removing ritual for a deceased childless brother’s widow, the purification ritual for skin disease, and25 the goat that is sent forth,26 which are those that the Evil Inclination refutes and the nations of the world, who worship other gods, refute.27 [G] [Therefore,] Scripture states: “I am the Lord” [Lev 18:4], [H] [meaning that] I28 have decreed these statutes [‫]חקקתי‬, and29 you are not permitted to refute them.30

Certain laws are logical and therefore reason would have led to their establishment. Others are not and therefore God must decree them in order that Jews observe them. This text seems to make a distinction between two categories of biblical law: mišpatim (‫ ;משפטים‬commandments with a basis in logic) and hukim (‫ ;חוקים‬commandments that, while ˙ 31 This distinction, which is more explicit illogical, must still be followed). in a later version of this tradition,32 allows one to sidestep an explanation for some of the “weirder” rules of the Hebrew Bible, from the elaborate 22

23

24

25 26 27 28 29 30

31 32

On the meaning of the term ‫עריות‬, see Michael L. Satlow, Tasting the Dish: Rabbinic Rhetorics of Sexuality, BJS 303 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1995), 62–63 (63 n. 169 references this passage) and passim. Some manuscripts add here: “‘And my statutes you shall keep’ [Lev 18:4]: These are the statutory matters in the Torah.” Manuscripts for several tannaitic documents, including Sifra, can be accessed online at: www.biu.ac.il/JS/tannaim/ (last accessed August 23, 2016). On the Evil Inclination and rabbinic assumptions about gender, see Michael L. Satlow, “‘Try to be a Man’: The Rabbinic Construction of Masculinity,” HTR 89/1 (1996): 19–40, esp. 26–40. The parallel baraita on b. Yoma 67b replaces “Evil . . . other gods” with “and the Satan” (though note that Rashi equates Satan with the Evil Inclination in his commentary on b. Yoma 67b). “And” is added based on manuscript evidence. See Lev 13–14 (skin disease rituals); 16:3–10 (on the scapegoat); 19:19 (wearing mixed species); and Deut 25:5–10 (shoe-removing ritual). The parallel baraita on b. Yoma 67b replaces “which are those . . . refute” with “And perhaps you might think these are vain acts.” Some manuscripts repeat the “I (am the Lord)” for emphasis and clarity, so as to distinguish between the lemma and its exposition. “And” is added based on manuscript evidence. Sifra Ahare Mot 9:13 (ed. Weiss 86a; cp. b. Yoma 67b). While section markers (A–H) do not appear in the original text, throughout this book I follow the common scholarly convention of adding section markers when translating rabbinic texts, as doing so allows for ease of reference when discussing these often difficult texts. These words appear in the text above; see sections A and H respectively, where I reproduce the Hebrew. See the baraita on b. Yoma 67b, which although very similar to the text in Sifra, contains slight variants in wording that serve to highlight and clarify this distinction.

92

The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources

shoe-removing ritual to the pork prohibition. Further, the critique of these irrational laws is put in the mouth of the Evil Inclination and idolaters, implying that such a criticism should not be viewed favorably.33 Nevertheless, these illogical statutes are divine statutes, and as such must be followed on the basis of revelation.34 Most interestingly, as we shall see both in this chapter and even more so in Chapter 6, just because the food laws are illogical statutes (hukim) does not mean that rabbinic authors do ˙ not try to offer rational reasons for their creation and observance.35 One such rationale offered for the pork prohibition is that of social distinction and separation. This plays off a theme alluded to in the Hebrew Bible.36 Thus, we read later in Sifra: [A] “[And you shall be holy to me, for I, the Lord, am holy,] and I have separated you from the nations to be mine” [Lev 20:26].37 [B] If you are separated from the nations, behold, you are mine; [C] but if not, behold, you are of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylonia, and his associates. [D] R. Elazar38 b. Azariah says: [E] From whence do we derive that a person should not say: I do not want to wear a wool and linen garment [‫;]שעטנז‬39 I do not want to eat pig meat; I do not want to have intercourse with a forbidden sexual partner. [F] But [rather, a person should say]: I want [to perform these prohibited acts, but] what can I do, for my father in heaven decreed concerning me thusly? [G] [Therefore,] Scripture states: “and I have separated you from the nations to be mine.” [H] Consequently, one separates oneself from transgression and accepts upon oneself the yoke of heaven.40 33 34

35

36 37 38 39

40

See Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law, 247–252 (especially p. 248). Many Christians come to different conclusions, as I argue in Chapter 7. According to Sifre Deuteronomy 101, the pig prohibition (as well as that of the camel, hare, and rock badger found in Deut 14:7–8) is based on revelation, though an extension of this regulation is understood to be based on logic (din). For discussion, see Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law, 181–182. For example, see m. Bava Qamma 7:7, which forbids Jews to raise pigs anywhere (i.e. this law applies both inside and outside the Land of Israel). Amoraic literature offers a ‘historical’ interpretation of this prohibition (see y. Ta’anit 4:5, 68c and b. Bava Qamma 82b). See Chapter 1, which discusses this theme and argues against those who claim that this is a central reason behind the biblical food laws (e.g. Jacob Milgrom). On this text, see Saul M. Olyan, Rites and Rank: Hierarchy in the Biblical Representations of Cult (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 84. Some manuscripts have “Lazar.” Many manuscripts read here ‫כלאים‬. Other manuscript variants include: one simply says “I do not want to wear”; another reverses the order of the first two items on this list; and one does not mention wearing such a garment. Sifra Qedoshim 11:22 (ed. Weiss 93b).

Pork: A Complicated Meat

93

Eating pork, like wearing mixed garments and having incestuous sex, are things that, apparently, one desires to do. One should not state (disingenuously) that the desire to transgress is not present. After all, as Philo notes in Special Laws 4.101, everyone agrees that pig is the most delicious of all land animals. As I discuss in regard to this text in Chapter 3, Philo explicitly connects this claim to his larger conception of what I label “rational rationing.” The rabbis, however, take a different tack. Rather than denying the allure of pork, a Jew should admit that the desire to eat it is indeed present, but that God has decreed against such behavior. Note that the precise logic for each decree is not given. Therefore, why is a Jew prohibited from eating pork, wearing a wool and linen garment, and having sex with his sister? Because God decreed against such behaviors. And why did God so? In order that Jews would separate themselves and be a holy people unto their holy God. While this separation distances Jews from transgression and allows them to accept the yoke of heaven, ultimately, this text parrots the vague justifications for these laws in the Hebrew Bible, discussed in Chapter 1. This is an interesting contrast to 4 Maccabees 1:31–35 (discussed in Chapter 3), which argues that rational man uses reason to curb his desire for illicit foodstuffs. Here, it is not reason, but revelation: God has decreed and through following those decrees, one exercises self-control and achieves the desired goal of social separation. Though both Hellenistic-period Jewish and rabbinic sources value the cultivation of self-restraint vis-à-vis food regulations, the justification for these ethical practices differs.41 The result might be the same, but the mechanism is different. The notion that pork established social separation between Jews and non-Jews is implied in tannaitic texts that associate pork with non-Jews. Thus, a Jew who eats pork is considered an apostate;42 the bread of Samaritans – a category of people who are Jew-ish, sometimes considered Jews and other times non-Jews – is deemed equivalent to pork;43 and a recent convert to Judaism is mocked for having pig meat between his teeth.44 This association will be even more evident in later texts, both Jewish and non-Jewish, as we see in other chapters of this book. 41 42

43 44

On how the rabbinic notion of self-restraint functions in this text, see Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law, 254–255 (on p. 255 Hayes suggests that a similar logic appears in m. Makkot 3:15). t. Horayot 1:5. On this text, which mentions other practices (including eating other foods and wearing a mixed garment), see Jordan D. Rosenblum, Food and Identity in Early Rabbinic Judaism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 140–141. m. Shevi’it 8:10. See Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 160–161 (on Samaritans in general, see pp. 158–161). Mekilta d’Rabbi Ishmael Mishpatim Nezikin 18. See Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 56–57.

94

The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources

The argument for the pork prohibition as justified based on social separation therefore gains credibility over time. While it might not have been the original reason for the law, a tannaitic Jew would be justified in making this connection, as he/she lived in a world in which the complicated meat was, indeed, the “Other White Meat.”45

The Illogical Bird’s Nest Though seemingly illogical, “because God says so” was a good enough justification for the prohibition of pork. However, what if this justification is unsatisfactory? What if a Jew wished to validate this unjustified law based on reason and not just revelation? These questions are treated in another tannaitic text in which, once again, revelation trumps reason. Addressing inappropriate comments to make during prayer, the Mishnah includes one about the biblical requirement to send away a mother bird from her nest before taking her eggs or chicks:46 The one who says [when leading communal prayer]: “May your mercies extend to a bird’s nest,” or “May your name be remembered for the good,” or “We give thanks, we give thanks,” they silence him.47

While the second and third sayings do not concern us, it is important to note that all three comments are deemed theologically problematic.48 Although this mishnah is not explicit about the reasons why someone who, while praying, states “May your mercies extend to a bird’s nest” is silenced, the Talmudic commentary on this passage seems on point: such a statement assumes this prohibition is based on divine mercy and not divine fiat.49 One shoos away the mother bird because God says so, not because it is an act of mercy. Such a statement seems to contrast starkly 45

46 47 48 49

See n. 19; and chapters 2, 3, and 6. The well-known slogan “Pork: The Other White Meat” debuted in 1987 as an advertisement for pork by the National Pork Board. See www.porkbeinspired.com /towm_promo_heritage_page.aspx (last accessed August 23, 2016). For a brief history of this advertising campaign, see David Sax, The Tastemakers: Why We’re Crazy for Cupcakes but Fed Up with Fondue (Plus Baconomics, Superfoods, and Other Secrets from the Food World) (New York: Public Affairs, 2014), 237–240 (and p. 253, which notes that the slogan was retired in 2011). See Deut 22:6–7 (discussed in Chapter 1). m. Berakhot 5:3 (ed. Albeck 1:22–23). Cp. m. Megillah 4:9. On this text, see Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism, SJLA 25 (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 99–108 (on the bird’s nest, see pp. 104–105). See y. Berakhot 5:3, 9c; y. Megillah 4:10, 75c; b. Berakhot 33b; b. Megillah 25a; Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law, 260. Similar concerns are raised in modernity. For example, a modern reporter writes: “Avi Shafran, a spokesman for Agudath Israel, told me that if kashrut is framed as simply an ethical practice, or as a practice with any specific function other than obeying God’s law, it could set the stage for the practice to ultimately be discarded” (Shapiro, “Kosher Wars,” 55).

Meat and Milk

95

with Hellenistic-period Jewish texts, wherein biblical food prohibitions were routinely justified on rational grounds. While the food laws might represent rational rationing for Philo, they represent divine decree for the Tannaim. Yet, as I will argue in the next section, rejecting mercy as an explanation does, in some sense, address the why question.

Meat and Milk Another interesting area of comparison between Philo and the rabbis is in regard to the thrice-repeated biblical injunction: “do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.”50 As discussed in Chapter 3, Philo understands this legislation literally:51 one should not literally cook a baby animal in its own mother’s milk. For this reason, one must follow this ethical injunction and obtain meat and milk from separate sources. The ethical eater may eat meat cooked in milk, as long as they are from unrelated animals. The rabbis interpret this biblical law in a radically different manner:52 [A] All meat is forbidden to be cooked with milk, except for the meat of fish and locusts. [B] And it is forbidden to serve it with cheese on the table, except for the meat of fish and locusts. [C] One who vows [to abstain] from meat is permitted [to eat] the meat of fish and locusts. [D] Fowl may be served with cheese on the table, but it may not be eaten;53 the words of the House of Shammai. [E] But the House of Hillel says: It may neither be served, nor may it be eaten.54 [F] R. Yosi said: This is one of the lenient rulings of the House of Shammai and the stringent rulings of the House of Hillel. [G] Regarding which table did they speak? [H] Regarding a table that one eats upon; but regarding a table upon which one arranges the food, one may place one beside the other and does not scruple.55 50 52 53 54

55

Exod 23:19; 34:26; Deut 14:21 (discussed in Chapter 1). 51 See Virtues 142–144. In general, see Kraemer, Jewish Eating, 39–54; Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 141–143. Ms. Parma omits “but it may not be eaten.” Clauses D–E also appear in m. Eduyyot 5:2. In general, the rulings of the House of Hillel are more lenient than the House of Shammai, although there are a few exceptions, as noted in m. Eduyyot 5: 1–5. m. Hullin 8:1 (ed. Albeck 5:137–138). Translations of m. Hullin are based on the current draft of my forthcoming translation: Jordan D. Rosenblum, “Hulin,” in Shaye J.D. Cohen, Robert Goldenberg, and Hayim Lapin (eds.), The Mishnah: An Annotated Translation (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

96

The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources

Though never quoted, the biblical law looms in the background.56 The Tannaim interpret the biblical law to refer to cooking all meat and all milk together, regardless of whether they come from different sources.57 Philo’s supposition that a Jew can eat meat cooked with milk from an unrelated mother is no longer kosher (for the rabbis, at least). Further, this prohibition extends to bringing meat and milk (which is exemplified in this case by the milk-product cheese) even to the same table.58 The rabbis do not justify this innovative interpretation on any other grounds besides divine decree. They do not resort to ethics, or any other rational explanation. Rather, they devote their energies to exploring the extent of the law. Does it apply to meat and milk of different species (e.g. goat milk with lamb meat)?59 To wild animals or just to domesticated ones?60 What about to fowl, which do not produce milk?61 And does it apply only to pure meat, or also to impure meat?62 Further, there are practical concerns: although one may not cook it, can one eat it? Derive benefit from it?63 What about accidental contact while cooking?64 Or cooking milk in a pot in which one has just cooked meat?65 Or cooking a cow’s udder that

56

57 58 59 60 61

62

63

64 65

This is not uncommon, as the Mishnah rarely cites biblical passages. In general, see Alexander Samely, Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture in the Mishnah (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Cp. m. Avodah Zarah 5:9. Targum Onqelos shows rabbinic influence when it translates the biblical verses: “You shall not eat meat with milk” (‫)לא תיכלון בסר בחלב‬. Milk itself was relatively rare in their diet (see Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 21–22 n. 27). They were much more likely to consume cheese, which explains why they use cheese to discuss this issue. See e.g. Mekhilta d’Rabbi Ishmael Kaspa Mishpatim 20. See e.g. Mekhilta d’Rabbi Ishmael Kaspa Mishpatim 20; Mekhilta d’Rabbi Shimon b. Yohai at Exodus 23:19; Sifre Deuteronomy 104. See e.g. m. Hullin 8:1 (cp. m. Eduyyot 5:2), 3–4; t. Hullin 8:3; Mekhilta d’Rabbi Ishmael Kaspa Mishpatim 20; Mekhilta d’Rabbi Shimon b. Yohai at Exodus 23:19; Sifre Deuteronomy 104. For references in later rabbinic texts, see Chapter 6. In general, see Jordan D. Rosenblum, “Thou Shalt Not Cook a Bird in its Mother’s Milk? Theorizing the Evolution of a Rabbinic Regulation,” in Elizabeth Shanks Alexander and Beth Berkowitz (eds.), Religious Studies and Rabbinics (New York: Routledge, forthcoming). See e.g. m. Hullin 8:4–5; t. Hullin 8:11; Mekhilta d’Rabbi Ishmael Kaspa Mishpatim 20; Mekhilta d’Rabbi Shimon b. Yohai at Exodus 23:19; Sifre Deuteronomy 104. Obviously, purity concerns are also part of this question. On eating and/or deriving benefit, see e.g. Mekhilta d’Rabbi Ishmael Kaspa Mishpatim 20; Mekhilta d’Rabbi Shimon b. Yohai at Exodus 34:26. These rules are read back into the text by Targum Neofiti and Pseudo-Jonathan, which display their rabbinic influence when they translate the biblical verses as explicitly referring to the prohibition against eating, cooking, and deriving benefit from such a mixture. See e.g. m. Hullin 8:3; t. Hullin 8:6–7. See e.g. t. Terumot 8:16. On rabbinic law about separate dishes (which develops significantly later), see Kraemer, Jewish Eating, 99–121.

Blood and Bugs, Fish and Fowl, Nerves and Nevelah

97

has milk in it?66 Can one eat a meat meal at the same table that another eats a dairy meal?67 And so on.68 Once again, where Philo turned to reason, the rabbis turn to revelation. Since they do not question the very premise of this law, they devote their time instead to investigating its particulars. However, in exploring the how of this law, at least one element of the why is addressed; namely, a rejection of one possible why argument. For example, for some rabbis, this law cannot refer to fowl, since fowl “has no mother’s milk.”69 Understanding the law as general (all meat and all milk) rather than particular (milk from the mother that nursed that literal animal) prevents the rabbis from offering an explanation based on mercy, as Philo does. Tacitly, therefore, the Tannaim once again reject a biblical food regulation as being based on mercy. In doing so, however, their answer how does point to a why, insofar as it rejects a particular ethical justification for this legislation. While an answer as to the why of this law is not advanced, the rejection of a possible why does appear.

Blood and Bugs, Fish and Fowl, Nerves and Nevelah As we saw also in Chapter 3, the rabbis simply rephrase and summarize some of the biblical rationalizations for food laws. Further, the rabbis add new regulations, another feature that appears in Hellenistic-period texts, as well. However, the rabbis include a new twist: as we saw above, they tease out the extensions of the law, rather than spend time necessarily justifying it.70 The prohibition against consuming blood proved as popular in the Tannaitic period as it did in the Hellenistic period.71 In terms of 66 68

69 70

71

See e.g. m. Hullin 8:3; t. Hullin 8:8–9. 67 See e.g. m. Hullin 8:2; t. Hullin 8:4–5. e.g. does this prohibition apply: only in the Land of Israel, only when there is a Temple, only to goat’s milk (since the “kid” in the Hebrew Bible [‫ ]גדי‬means a “kid goat”), to human milk, etc. For these (and other) concepts, see e.g. t. Hullin 8:1, 9–13; Mekhilta d’Rabbi Ishmael Kaspa Mishpatim 20 (see ed. Horowitz pp. 321 and 336); Mekhilta d’Rabbi Shimon b. Yohai at Exodus 34:26. m. Hullin 8:4 (ed. Albeck 5:139). It is for this reason that Shaye Cohen identifies the unique contribution of rabbinic law in the Mishnah as “scholastic.” See Shaye J. D. Cohen, “The Judean Legal Tradition and the Halakhah of the Mishnah,” in Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert and Martin S. Jaffee (eds.), Cambridge Companion to the Talmud (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 134–135. While Cohen comments on this trend in the Mishnah, the scholastic approach permeates the subsequent rabbinic corpus. Though the prohibition against consuming fat is often cited alongside this prohibition, the former only applies to sacrificial animals, so its application is more limited (e.g. see m. Hullin 8:6; Sifra Sav 15:10). For these reasons, I will not treat the discussion of fat in detail (as also noted in Chapter 1 n. 4).

98

The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources

rationalization, the rabbis seemed content to accept the biblical text at face value.72 For example, Sifra quotes biblical verses that connect blood and life and then simply states that this is the reason for the prohibition.73 Instead of expounding upon this rationale, the rabbis devote significant attention to understanding the application, and extension, of this law. Thus, though Leviticus 17:13 commands that the blood of a slaughtered, hunted animal must be covered with earth (‫)וכסהו בעפר‬, it does not describe this procedure in any detail. The rabbis fill in the gaps, accounting for a variety of variables, including which animals (and animal products) require this, and which substances are considered “earth” with regard to covering.74 Moreover, the rabbis ask why must one cover the blood of a slaughtered animal with earth? According to Sifra, it is because it is a religious commandment from God (‫)מצוה‬.75 Because God commanded it, it must be done. It seems that the rabbis only believe it necessary to explicate how this practice must be done, and they are not interested in dwelling on why it is done. Other blood-consumption related issues that the Tannaim consider include whether these laws apply to: non-Jews; proselytes; women;76 children (and parents on their behalf); slaves; one who eats blood and one who feeds blood to another; and consecrated/unconsecrated, pure/impure, properly/improperly slaughtered, hunted/domesticated, and hybrid animals.77 They also use the biblical blood taboo to justify the Noahide Law incumbent upon all humanity – Jewish and non-Jewish alike – that prohibits the ingestion of a limb from a living animal.78 Finally, the rabbis reiterate the biblical punishment for eating blood – Extirpation (‫ – )כרת‬but they do not say why this 72 73 74 75 76

77 78

Based on Deut 12:23, m. Makkot 3:15 accepts as self-evident the fact that a person’s soul loathes blood. For discussion of this text, see Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law, 255. See Sifra Ahare Mot 10:8; 11 (ed. Weiss 84a), where after the lemmas (Lev 17:11, 14, respectively) the texts state: ‫להגיד מה גרם‬. See Chapter 1 for discussion of these biblical passages. For examples see m. Hullin 6:1–7; 12:1; Sifra Ahare Mot 11. On covering blood on festival days, also see m. Bikkurim 2:9; m. Betzah 2:1. Sifra Ahare Mot 11 (ed. Weiss 84a). Interestingly, this text (Sifra Ahare Mot 10:8 [ed. Weiss 84a]) play a role in establishing the rabbinic matriarchal principle; see Shaye J. D. Cohen, The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 318–320. E.g. see m. Hullin 8:6; Sifra Sav 15:10; Sifra Ahare Mot 10:8; 11. t. Hullin 7:9 (which cites Deut 12:23). Generally, this law is not rationalized by the Tannaim; it is merely stated (e.g. t. Demai 2:24; t. Avodah Zarah 8:6; t. Hullin 7:10; Sifra Sav 15:10). On the Noahide laws in general, see David Novak, The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism: An Historical and Constructive Study of the Noahide Laws, Toronto Studies in Theology 14 (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1983).

Blood and Bugs, Fish and Fowl, Nerves and Nevelah

99

most serious punishment is commanded;79 rather, they discuss how (and by whom) Extirpation is performed.80 Another interesting blood-related discussion is to which animals, animal parts, and other animal products the blood prohibition applies. While the Hebrew Bible does not specify this, the rabbis explicate the constraints of the blood prohibition. According to the rabbis, the law applies to domesticated and wild animals, and to fowl, but not to blood from the spleen, heart, or eggs; or from fish or locusts.81 Also, what happens if one finds human blood on a loaf of bread? And what if that discovery occurs once the bread is already in one’s mouth?82 The latter questions establish that, while one should not consume human blood (as the text suggests that, if found before consumed, one should scrape it off the bread), it is not prohibited in the same manner as non-human animal blood. As above, the Tannaim are interested in explicating the how of the law, not the why. In the midst of the discussion of blood, another tannaitic theme appears: namely, the teasing out of to what species the biblical food laws apply. Remember from Chapter 1 that the Hebrew Bible is sometimes very explicit about criteria for legal inclusion or exclusion, but at other times simply lists permitted or prohibited animals. The rabbis attempt to determine to what animals these laws apply, whether in regard to the blood taboo or for general consumption. Once again, they are not interested in why these laws are commanded, but rather in how they are to be understood and applied. Sometimes these discussions consist of lists of permitted or prohibited animals and their characteristics for inclusion or exclusion.83 However, other times, the rabbis are curious about the extensions of these laws. For example, is the blood of a fish kosher? Can it be cooked with milk? What happens if a kosher fish swallows a non-kosher fish?84 Does 79

80 81

82

83 84

e.g. Lev 7:26–27; m. Keritot 1:1 (which also notes that Extirpation applies to the one who eats leaven on Passover and who eats on the Day of Atonement, Yom Kippur; see Exod 12:15 and Lev 23:29, respectively). e.g. Sifra Sav 15:10; Sifra Ahare Mot 10:8; 11. See m. Keritot 5:1; Sifra Sav 15:10. The rabbis will discuss whether fish require slaughter in later texts; see Chapter 6. For modern laws regarding blood from an egg, see Binyomin Forst, The Kosher Kitchen: A Practical Guide (Brooklyn: Mesorah Publications, 2011 [2009]), 49–51. On these cases, see t. Terumot 7:11. As Lieberman notes, this blood is most likely to have come from the mouth of the one eating the bread. See Saul Lieberman, ed. The Tosefta: According to Codex Vienna, with Variants from Codex Erfurt, Genizah Mss. And Editio Princeps (Venice 1521), Together with References to Parallel Passages in Talmudic Literature and a Brief Commentary, 5 vols. (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1955–1988), 1:145. e.g. m. Hullin 3:6–7; t. Hullin 3:20–27; Sifre Deuteronomy 103. For these questions, see e.g. m. Keritot 5:1; m. Hullin 8:1; m. Bekhorot 1:2; Sifra Sav 15:10 (the latter two texts also consider the kashrut of hybrid animals). Locusts are often discussed alongside fish and are often deemed analogous to them vis-à-vis halakhah, as several of these texts indicate.

100

The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources

eating biblically forbidden food affect a Jew’s status vis-à-vis the rabbinic community? And if so, how does it affect his/her status?85 Another interesting example of the application of this food law relates to consuming bugs. Since the presence of insects in food was more common before modern refrigeration (they are present in food today more than most would like to think!) the rabbis established rules for what insects one could and could not eat, some of which were based on their contemporary understanding of entomology.86 This debate has actually become quite important in modernity, as bugs in produce is one of the most controversial issues in regard to the modern kashrut system.87 The previous observations also hold for tannaitic discussions of the biblical prohibition not to eat the sciatic nerve.88 However, this taboo raises an interesting question: did this law apply prior to the giving of the law at Mount Sinai? And if not, why was it written in Genesis, prior to the time of revelation? The answers are found in the Mishnah: [A] [The prohibition against consuming the sciatic nerve] applies to a pure [animal], but it does not apply to an impure [animal]. [B] R. Judah says: Also to an impure [animal]. [C] R. Judah said: Was not the sciatic nerve forbidden from [the time of] the sons of Jacob, yet an impure domesticated animal was still permitted to them? [D] They said to him: At Sinai it was said, but it was written in its [present] place.89

Sections A and B debate whether the prohibition against consuming the sciatic nerve applies to both pure and impure animals. R. Judah then points to a problem: if this prohibition also applies to impure animals (as he holds) then why was the sciatic nerve forbidden back in Jacob’s time, long before revelation, before impure animals were first forbidden?!90 The Sages 85

86 87

88 89 90

e.g. t. Bava Metzi’a 3:25; t. Horayot 1:5; Sifra Ahare Mot 12; Sifra Behar 8; Sifre Deuteronomy 104. For a discussion of several of these texts, see Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 68–70, 73, 140–141. On how to handle cravings for forbidden foods in particularly difficult situations (e.g. during pregnancy) see m. Yoma 8:5–6 (cp. t. Kippurim 4:4). See e.g. m. Terumot 8:2; m. Parah 8:2; t. Terumot 7:11. For discussion, see Kraemer, Jewish Eating, 147–172; and for a more journalistic treatment, see Sue Fishkoff, Kosher Nation: Why More and More of America’s Food Answers to a Higher Authority (New York: Schocken Books, 2010), 166–185. See Gen 32:33, discussed in Chapter 1. In general, see m. Hullin 7:1–6; t. Hullin 7:1–8. m. Hullin 7:6 (ed. Albeck 5:137). Cp. t. Hullin 7:8. As Shaye Cohen notes, with reference to this text: “Some rabbis could admit that Jacob and his sons did not observe the legal distinctions between clean and unclean animals because before the revelation at Mount Sinai the Israelites were not bound to observe the laws of the Torah, but the general tendency of rabbinic literature, like that of Jubilees and other pre-rabbinic works, is to claim that the patriarchs observed the law in a manner consonant with later beliefs” (Beginnings, 269; for

Rationalizing Commensality

101

explain that, although the sciatic nerve was prohibited at Mount Sinai, it was written in the Genesis narrative so as to place the prohibition alongside its rationale. This is a sort of explanation, though it relies on a simple restatement of the biblical rationale in Genesis 32:33. It is recycling a justification, not manufacturing a new one. Thus, while tannaitic texts spell out expansions upon and extensions of biblical food laws, they do not offer original justifications for these laws. They are content to discuss the how and not the why. This is the case even when they radically alter the definition of terms, as they do in regard to nevelah and terefah, which the Hebrew Bible considers to be carrion (i.e. an animal that died a natural death) and an animal killed by another animal, respectively. However, the rabbis consider them respectively to be an improperly slaughtered animal and a properly slaughtered animal that is rendered invalid for another reason.91 Even when the definitions of key terms are changed, the rationale for the underlying law is not justified in any new or meaningful way. The rabbis accept the law as divinely ordained and, as such, they seek to explicate its application, but not its justification.

Rationalizing Commensality The one area where we do encounter tannaitic rationalizations for food laws is in regard to commensality restrictions. As noted in Chapter 3, with the exception of the late book of Daniel, such restrictions are absent from the Hebrew Bible.92 Therefore, the rabbis build upon the justifications that were used to begin enacting such policies in the Hellenistic period. Though the Tannaim greatly expand and innovate upon Hellenistic-period concerns about how the status of the preparer affects the status of the foodstuff, these discussions focus on the how and not the why.93 In fact, in one instance in

91

92 93

additional references, see pp. 317–318 n. 19). On this general rabbinic trend, see Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law, 331–346 (discussion of the above text appears on pp. 347–348). See m. Hullin 2:4. For reasons that might declare an animal invalid, see e.g. m. Hullin 3:1–5. Over time, terefah will become a generic term for any non-kosher food item, even if that foodstuff is not subject to rabbinic slaughtering regulations (e.g. pork). Further, as I argued above in Chapter 3, the book of Daniel does not rationalize these laws; it just references them. For discussion and references, see Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 75–91, 154–161. One issue treated therein is the fact that some tannaitic texts equate Gentile slaughter to carrion or that of an ape and slaughter by a heretical Jew to idolatry (e.g. m. Hullin 1:1; t. Hullin 1:1). However, as I have argued elsewhere (see Food and Identity, 79–80, 155–158; Jordan D. Rosenblum and Daniel C. Ullucci, “Qualifying Rabbinic Ritual Agents: Cognitive Science and the Early Rabbinic Kitchen,” in Jordan D. Rosenblum, Lily C. Vuong, and Nathaniel P. DesRosiers (eds.), Religious Competition in the Third-Century C.E.: Jews, Christians, and the Greco-Roman World, JAJS [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014], 105–114), the Tannaim view only Jews as capable of Effecting proper slaughter;

102

The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources

which a rabbi cannot provide a reasonable foundation for the novel rabbinic prohibition against consuming Gentile cheese, the rabbi simply changes the subject.94 The only foodstuff that is given an explicit rationale for its prohibition is Gentile wine, as there is a grave fear of Gentile wine or wine consumed with Gentiles. This fear is based on the rabbinic assumption that non-Jews will go to almost comic lengths to offer any wine in sight as a Pagan libation.95 Gentile wine is therefore banned, not because of the actual foodstuff, but because of a practice that wine could incur – idolatrous libation. The fear of Gentile wine is compounded by the fear of commensality with non-Jews.96 Although the rabbis do not completely ban the practice, they do express concern about it.97 It is in fraught commensal encounters such as this that rationalizations for rabbinic food laws appear. Thus, when discussing sharing wine (and a table) with non-Jewish women, we encounter the following provocative text: [A] She [a Moabite woman] would say to him [an Israelite man]: “Would you like to drink [some] wine?”98

94

95

96

97

98

therefore, a Gentile cannot do so, so his/her slaughter is deemed a natural and not a cultural act. Jews are technically capable of affecting slaughter, so a heretical Jew’s slaughter must count as something, which is why it is deemed idolatrous. Since this is the logic of the passage, I do not consider this to function as a true rationalization of the food laws, as it does not offer a real account for why the slaughter of a Gentile or heretical Jew is prohibited for ingestion. In short, it explains why their slaughter is placed into a forbidden category, but not why the category itself is forbidden. m. Avodah Zarah 2:5. On this text, see David M. Freidenreich, Foreigners and Their Food: Constructing Otherness in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011), 56; Amit Gvaryahu, “A New Reading of the Three Dialogues in Mishnah Avodah Zarah,” JSQ 19 (2012): 207–229, 209–211; David Henshke, “‘For Your Love is More Delightful than Wine’: Concerning Tannaitic Biblical Traditions,” JSIJ 10 (2012): 1–24 (Hebrew); Shlomo Naeh, “‘Your Affections Are Better Than Wine’: A New Approach to Tractate Avoda Zara 2:5,” in A. Edrei et al. (eds.), Studies in Talmud and Midrash, Tirtzah Lifshitz Memorial (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2005 [Hebrew]), 411–434; Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 87–88. Gvaryahu, citing Naeh, comes to a conclusion that buttresses my argument here: namely, that this narrative concludes by tacitly suggesting that one should not question the rational basis for these laws (“New Reading,” 210–211). On rabbis changing the subject in general, see Jordan D. Rosenblum, “Changing the Subject: Rabbinic Legal Process in the Absence of Justification,” Review of Rabbinic Judaism 18/1 (2015): 23–36 (on m. Avodah Zarah 2:5, see pp. 29–31). For references and discussion, see Freidenreich, Foreigners and Their Food, 57–60; Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 81–83; Sacha Stern, “Compulsive Libationers: Non-Jews and Wine in Early Rabbinic Sources,” JJS 64/1 (2013): 19–44. In general, see Jordan D. Rosenblum, “From Their Bread to Their Bed: Commensality, Intermarriage, and Idolatry in Tannaitic Literature,” JJS 61/1 (2010): 18–29; Food and Identity, 91–101. e.g. m. Avodah Zarah 5:5, which regulates – but does not outright prohibit – such inter-religious drinking events. On this text, see Freidenreich, Foreigners and Their Food, 58–59; Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 81–83. Here, the rabbis understand the category of “Moabite” to refer to “non-Jew” and “Israelite” to refer to Jews.

Rationalizing Commensality

103

[B] He would drink and the wine would burn within him and he would say to her: “Listen to me!” [an idiom meaning “have intercourse with me!”] [C] She would take out an image of Pe‘or from under her bra and say to him: “Rabbi, is it your desire that I listen to you? [If so, then] bow to this!”99

This text comments on the account in Numbers 25:1–3, in which Moabite women seduce Israelite men into committing idolatry. Playing on a common biblical metaphor, the Israelite men are described as whoring (‫)לזנות‬, implying that they are in fact cheating on Yahweh, with whom they are supposed to be in a theologically monogamous relationship.100 Though Numbers 25:2 describes shared commensality, the menu is not recorded. The rabbis therefore fill in the gaps, and describe a night of drinking that leads to sexual arousal and, potentially, idolatry.101 Thus, this is a cautionary tale: drinking with non-Jewish women leads to getting drunk with non-Jewish women, which leads to a desire to fornicate (or, more literally, “to whore”) with them, which leads these women to pull out the idolatrous image that they soconveniently keep hidden in their bra for just such occasions. Thus, it is better to avoid such practices. Note that this caution is implicit not explicit in the text, though I believe that the moral lesson is clear.102 Fear of idolatry is the motivating factor behind another tannaitic discussion about the dangers of inter-religious commensality. Debating whether a Jew should attend the wedding feast held by a non-Jewish neighbor, t. Avodah Zarah 4:6 states: [A] R. Shimon ben Elazar says: “Jews outside of the Land [of Israel] are idolaters.” [B] How so? 99

100 101 102

Sifre Numbers 131 (ed. Horowitz p. 171). Cp. y. Sanhedrin 10:2, 28c–d; b. Sanhedrin 106a; Numbers Rabbah 20:23; Tanhuma Balaq 27. Much of my discussion of this text draws on my earlier writing about it; e.g. Jordan D. Rosenblum, “Bacon, Banquets, and Bras: Rabbinic Food Regulations and Boundary Formation,” Journal of Indo-Judaic Studies, forthcoming; Food and Identity. 93–97; “From Their Bread,” 23–25. On how this text shows concern for the loss of the important rabbinic trait of self-control, see Satlow, Tasting the Dish, 148–150. For examples of this metaphor in both the biblical and rabbinic corpora, see Warren Zev Harvey, “The Pupil, the Harlot, and the Fringe Benefits,” Prooftexts 6 (1986): 259–271. On rabbinic gap filling, see Daniel Boyarin, Intertextuality and the Reading of Midrash (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994 [1990]), esp. 39–49. Caution against commensality also appears in t. Shabbat 1:14 (ed. Lieberman 2:3–4), which states that zavim (those impure from genital discharge) should not eat together “because it leads to transgression.” However, I do not discuss this issue in detail because it is an extension of purity concerns, and not a rationalization for biblical food laws. On these issues, see Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 132–135. As purity concerns are not my focus here, I will also omit discussion of texts about commensality between the haver (“associate”) and the ‘am ha’ares (“person of the land”). On these, ˙ et Pratiques de l’hospitalité: Mondes˙ Juifs et Indiens Anciens (Stuttgart: see e.g. Philippe Bornet, Rites Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010), 116–120; Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 116–120, 143–154.

104

The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources [C] A non-Jew makes a [wedding] banquet for his son and goes and invites all of the Jews who live in his town. [D] Even if they eat and drink [only] their own [food and wine] and their own servant stands and serves them, they are idolaters, [E] as it is said: “And he will invite you and you will eat from his sacrifice” [Exod 34:15].103

At issue here is the commensal encounter, not the food. A non-Jewish wedding banquet is itself a non-kosher affair. For our present purposes, what is most interesting is the reason given for this fact: attending such an event is ipso facto a violation of the injunction in Exodus 34:15. No amount of kosher food served by “kosher” servers can overcome this fact. This reasoning also appears in another tannaitic text, which states: “You shall not make molten gods for yourselves” [Exod 34:17]: Thus, if one eats of their sacrifices, he will marry from their daughters, and they will lead him astray and he will worship idols.104

Both of these texts are extensions of a biblical rationale for eschewing relations with certain prohibited peoples in the Hebrew Bible.105 Though the biblical account refers to specific groups, the rabbis expand this prohibition to all non-Jews. They therefore take a specific rule and expand it into a general one. Further, in the toseftan text, they clarify that even if kosher food is brought to the event, the social encounter is so fraught that one is still considered to have consumed idolatrous sacrifice. Since participation is tantamount to ingestion, one is guilty by association. While we have encountered a few rationalizations for the commensality restrictions, the Tannaim actually wrote very little on the subject. Clearly, the early rabbis were concerned about sharing a table with non-Jews, but they did not discuss this in the same detail as did the next group of rabbis, the Amoraim. The Tannaim continue the conversation that began in the Hellenistic period, wherein commensal relations with non-Jews began to be viewed as problematic, but we must wait for the Amoraim before we encounter significant discussion on these matters.106 103

104 105

Ed. Zuckermandel 466. Much of my discussion of this text draws on my earlier writing: e.g. Rosenblum, “Bacon, Banquets, and Bras,” forthcoming; Food and Identity. 91–93; “From Their Bread,” 21–23. Cp. Bornet, Rites et Pratiques de l’hospitalité, 128–132. Though Bornet focuses on the version of this narrative in the Babylonian Talmud (b. Avodah Zarah 8a; see below, Chapter 6 n. 141), his observations apply equally to the toseftan version. I thank the author for sending me a copy of his book. Mekilta d’Rabbi Shimon b. Yohai at Exodus 34:17 (eds. Epstein and Melamed 222). On the connection between these two texts, see Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 93–95. See Exod 34 (esp. vv. 15–17). 106 See Chapter 6.

Conclusion

105

Conclusion Elsewhere I have argued that the Tannaim used food practices in part to establish their own unique identity that is distinct both from non-Jews and from non-rabbinic Jews.107 Their interpretations of biblical food laws are therefore not disinterested acts. As is the case with all exegesis, “reading out” of a text is a political, social, economic, and theological endeavor. By looking at tannaitic discussions about food regulations, we are reminded that what is on the plate is not just food, but embodied values and practices.108 That being said, the Tannaim do not focus on the why of biblical laws; rather, they are interested in the how. They devote considerable attention to understanding the application of culinary injunctions and relatively little to comprehending the basis for this legislation. Revelation is sufficient justification, so reason is rarely addressed. And when reason does appear, it is often a repackaged statement of a biblical verse. One notable exception was in regard to commensality, but even here the discussion was rather terse. Commensality with non-Jews was seen as a slippery slope, a downward spiral that leads to idolatry. We must wait for the Amoraim, the subsequent group of rabbis discussed in the next chapter, to develop further this theme. By way of concluding, I will cite another tannaitic text about rabbinic foodways. [The other nations] would then go up to Jerusalem and observe Israel [i.e. the people of Israel] – who worshipped only one God and ate only one food; whereas, amongst the nations, the god of one [nation] was not the god of another, and the food of one [nation] was not the food of another. [Thus,] they would say: “There is no better nation to cling to than this.”109 107

108 109

See Rosenblum, Food and Identity. For my understanding of the concept of “identity,” see Food and Identity, 5–8. Martin Goodman claims that rabbinic discussions of ingredients and food preparations “do not suggest any particular cultural fascination in late antiquity with eating as a means of establishing Jewish identity—the cultural phenomenon later known among assimilated Jews in the Hapsburg empire as Fressfroemmigkeit” (Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007], 293). Though I was unaware of this quote when I wrote my first book, my argument therein disproves Goodman’s claim. I thank Emily Hilts for helping me to sharpen this point, which is applicable to modern debates about foodways (e.g. organic vs. conventional produce). Sifre Deuteronomy 354 (ed. Finkelstein 416); cp. Genesis Rabbah 355. My interpretation of this text accords with what I have written elsewhere; see Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 73–75. Interestingly, a Hasidic rabbi once claimed that the “one food” of which this text speaks is none other than the Sabbath kugel! For reference and discussion, see Allan Nadler, “Holy Kugel: The Sanctification of Ashkenazic Ethnic Foods in Hasidism,” in Leonard J. Greenspoon, Ronald A. Simkins, and Gerald Shapiro (eds.) Food and Judaism, Studies in Jewish Civilization 15 (Omaha: Creighton University Press, 2005), 209.

106

The Tannaitic Period: Jewish Sources

Through both theological and culinary monotheism – worshipping one God and eating one food – Jews are reported to be the envy of their neighbors. This text could be read as a rationalization for the food rules, wherein these rules serve to create communal and theological harmony.110 This text would therefore be the exception that proves the rule, as the Tannaim rarely appeal to reason to justify their culinary practices. Of course, this could also refer to their commensal practices, which (at least sometimes) they do justify on grounds of reason.111 Either way, it would be rare. 110 111

Pace Sacha Stern, Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writings (New York: Brill, 1994), 78 n. 212. To clarify: culinary practices refer to what one eats, while commensal practices refer to how one eats.

chapter 6

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

Underlying the notion of food ethics is the assumption that following dietary guidelines improves health and well-being. If ethics is viewed as a matter of good conduct versus bad, then choosing a healthful diet— and advising people to do so—would seem to be virtuous actions.1

When we first met the rabbis in Chapter 5, the world from which they emerged is one wracked with the immediate cultural, religious, social, and economic aftershocks of the Temple’s destruction. Several centuries later, the rabbis still experienced these tremors. However, they had also developed a more complex and nuanced system to interact with, and compensate for, this new lived reality. Around the middle of the third-century, a subtle shift occurred, in which rabbis seemed increasingly uncomfortable disagreeing with their predecessors. This growing tendency to put these earlier authorities on a pedestal eventually results in the emergence of a second group of rabbis: the Amoraim (singular: Amora). The Amoraim lived in both Palestine and Babylon, often sharing traditions between the two settings and (often competing) rabbinic groups.2 Though the Palestinian and Babylonian Amoraim shared many characteristics, they also differed due to the influence of their respective environments. While these differences can sometimes be quite significant, they do not play a major role in amoraic justifications for the biblical (and now increasingly, rabbinic) food rules.3 1 2

3

Marion Nestle, Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health, rev. and exp. edn. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007), 362. For a concise and accessible history of the Amoraim, see Isaiah M. Gafni, “The World of the Talmud: From the Mishnah to the Arab Conquest,” in Hershel Shanks (ed.), Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism: A Parallel History of Their Origins and Early Development (Washington, D.C.: Biblical Archaeology Society, 1992), 225–265; and for a short and approachable discussion of their literature, see Julia Watts Belser, Power, Ethics, and Ecology in Jewish Late Antiquity: Rabbinic Responses to Drought and Disaster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 24–33. Comparative approaches to these two major rabbinic communities have become increasingly popular in scholarship in the last few decades. For brief introductory essays, see the contributions by

107

108

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

Determining a convenient end date for this period is difficult, especially given that many of the texts attributed to the Amoraim reached their final edited form long (sometimes hundreds of years) after the traditional end date for the Amoraic period, c.500 CE.4 Because I am considering rabbinic texts at their redactional level, I will use the mid-seventh-century CE as my terminus ad quem.5 The primary historical reason for this decision is the fact that the Arab conquest in Palestine in 640 CE changes conditions on the ground; and the primary textual reason for this decision is that it is during this time that the redactional layer of the Talmud was added by the anonymous redactors, the Stammaim.6 Since the dialectical text that forms the basis for our inquiry is largely crafted during this period, this chapter considers documents attributed to the Amoraim, composed and redacted roughly from the mid-third until the mid-seventh centuries CE by the Stammaim. When diachronic and editorial concerns are relevant to the discussion, I will note them. While the Tannaim of Chapter 5 focus on the how and not the why, the Amoraim are interested in both, though their focus remains predominantly on the former. The Amoraim agree with their earlier colleagues that these rules are to be followed because God said so (i.e. revelation), but they are not always satisfied with that answer alone. On the few occasions that they

4 5

6

Catherine Hezser and Yaakov Elman in Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert and Martin S. Jaffee, eds., The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Two especially popular areas of comparison have been sexuality, gender, and marriage; and idolatry. On the former, see e.g. Daniel Boyarin, Carnal Israel: Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995 [1993]); Michael L. Satlow, Tasting the Dish: Rabbinic Rhetorics of Sexuality, BJS 303 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1995); Jewish Marriage in Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); on the latter, see e.g. Alyssa M. Gray, A Talmud in Exile: The Influence of Yerushalmi Avodah Zarah on the Formation of Bavli Avodah Zarah, BJS 342 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005); Christine Elizabeth Hayes, Between the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds: Accounting for Halakhic Difference in Selected Sugyot from Tractate Avodah Zarah (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). For a brief summary of this dilemma, see Gafni, “The World of the Talmud,” 251–253. I noted above my focus on the redactional layer (see Chapter 5 n. 16). Additionally, scholarship on Jews in Palestine often concludes in 640 CE, with the Arab conquest of Palestine; e.g. see Seth Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish Society, 200 B.C.E. to 640 C.E. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Brief and accessible summaries of the Stammaim (with additional, more technical, references) can be found in Jeffrey L. Rubenstein, Talmudic Stories: Narrative Art, Composition, and Culture (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 15–21; and Barry Scott Wimpfheimer, Narrating the Law: A Poetics of Talmudic Legal Stories (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 50–51. For longer treatments, see e.g. David Weiss Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 76–92; The Formation of the Babylonian Talmud, trans. Jeffrey L. Rubenstein (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), where Halivni argues that the redactional activity continues until about 750 CE; and Moulie Vidas, Tradition and the Formation of the Talmud (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

Origin and Meaning of the Slaughter Regulations

109

do consider why these regulations exist, the Amoraim reflect a return to reason (though not quite like their Hellenistic predecessors) as they seek to justify the food laws by logic, as well as by divine fiat. In doing so, however, the Amoraim are not just justifying the biblical food laws; they are also justifying their (often quite extensive) culinary and commensal expansions and innovations. And it is in service of this latter goal that they turn to both reason and revelation.

Origin and Meaning of the Slaughter Regulations While the Amoraim discuss the biblically permitted and prohibited animals (see below) they spend a significantly greater time addressing the manner in which valid animals should be slaughtered. In doing so, they justify such practices on both biblical and rational bases. Despite modern assumptions, compassion is almost never cited as a reason for these rules.7 The one possible exception is a text that depicts Rabbi Judah the Patriarch (the editor of the Mishnah, popularly known simply as “Rabbi”) telling a terrified calf on its way to the slaughter, which is screaming out for Rabbi to save him, that there is nothing he can do, since this is the very reason that the calf was created. For his lack of compassion, Rabbi is afflicted with painful toothaches, which are only healed once he shows compassion for other animals by saving their lives.8 That being said, this text never specifies 7

8

Whether kosher slaughter is based on notions of compassion to animals is complicated and, in that it underlies modern political and religious debates, quite fraught. Since I am a scholar of antiquity, I will not weigh in on these highly charged debates that are currently ongoing. For more on this topic, see Aaron S. Gross, The Question of the Animal and Religion: Theoretical Stakes, Practical Implications (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015); Roger Horowitz, Kosher USA: How Coke Became Kosher and Other Tales of Modern Food (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 211–257. However, this tension is not unique to the present day. For a discussion about such arguments in the modern era, and how they can be used to justify and (rather ominously) critique Jews and Jewish practice, see Mitchell B. Hart, The Healthy Jew: The Symbiosis of Judaism and Modern Medicine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 67, 79, 145–146, 149, 152–153, 184–188, and passim; Robin Judd, Contested Rituals: Circumcision, Kosher Butchering, and Jewish Political Life in Germany, 1843–1933 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 2–3, 63–68, 71–78, 107–116, 134–137, 159–160, 170–174, 208–210, 224–232, and passim. See y. Ketubbot 12:3, 35a; Genesis Rabbah 33:3; b. Bava Metzi’a 85a; cp. Tanhuma Vayehi 12.6 which mentions Rabbi’s toothaches, but does not note their cause. Though similar, the precise animals that Rabbi saves in order to heal his toothache vary in each text: mice, land swarmers, and weasels, respectively. On these traditions, see Gross, Question of the Animal, 5, 164–171. Also see b. Berakhot 17a, which states that the fate of a human is death, and the fate of an animal is slaughter. For a medieval text that asserts that animals chose this fate, see the discussion in Joel Hecker, Mystical Bodies, Mystical Meals: Eating and Embodiment in Medieval Kabbalah (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2005), 95–97. A possible limit on meat consumption appears in a famous baraita on b. Pesahim 49b, in which meat consumption is permitted only to those who engage in Torah study. However, this is a polemic

110

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

that the basis of these regulations is compassion; rather, it only suggests that Rabbi’s comments to the terrified calf were inappropriate. Rabbi’s words, however, were outside of the slaughter system itself, and hence they – but not necessarily the system itself – are judged based on the grounds of compassion. If not based on compassion, then why do such rules exist? One rationale for the entire system of animal slaughter is its effect on humanity: [A] Rav said: The commandments were only given in order to refine humanity by them. [B] For what does the Holy One, Blessed be He, care whether one slaughters [an animal by cutting] at the throat or whether one slaughters [an animal by cutting] at the back of the neck?9 [C] [Rather,] it is intended to refine humanity.10

This argument occurs in the midst of an exegesis on a biblical verse in which God’s word is described as “refined” (‫)צרופה‬.11 Thus, as the refining process purifies metals, God’s commandments (i.e. God’s words) serve to refine (‫ )לצרוף‬humanity. Moving from the more general to the particular, the text here singles out a specific set of commandments: the proper way to slaughter an animal. In quite an intriguing fashion, we learn of the underlying logic for such regulations: namely, it is not that God really cares about the proper method, but that the required actions function as a means of refinement for the human agents who perform these practices.12 As Christine Hayes argues: “it is precisely because these prescriptive divine commands lack intrinsic reason and intrinsic utility that they generate an

9

10

11 12

against those whom the rabbis deemed to be the unlearned masses and not a justification for biblical legislation. On this text, see Jonathan Brumberg-Kraus, “Meat Eating and Jewish Identity: Ritualization of the Priestly ‘Torah of Beast and Fowl’ (Lev 11:46) in Rabbinic Judaism and Medieval Kabbalah,” AJSR 24/2 (1999): 227–262; Jordan D. Rosenblum, Food and Identity in Early Rabbinic Judaism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 153–154. For further commensal polemics against such people, see e.g. b. Berakhot 47b; 63b–64a. See m. Hullin 1:4, which explains these slaughter rules using similar phrases. My translation of ‫עורף‬ as “back of the neck” is influenced by the discussion in b. Hullin 19b. On the rabbinic rules concerning reciting blessings at this time, see e.g. y. Berakhot 9:4, 14b. Genesis Rabbah 44:1 (ed. Theodor and Albeck 424–425); cp. Leviticus Rabbah 13:3 (which only has clause A); Tanhuma Shemini 12 (which is a bit more expansive). On how this text is deployed in later discussions of Jewish ethics, see Gross, Question of the Animal, 215 n. 2. In Genesis Rabbah 44:1, the verse is 2 Sam 22:31; in Leviticus Rabbah 13:3, the verse is Prov 30:5. Elsewhere we learn that sacrifice was a means of distancing the Israelites from idolatry (Leviticus Rabbah 22:8; a similar concept appears in some early Christian texts, as noted in Chapter 7). The question of God’s/gods’ desire for ritual action appears in another context: ancient discussions of the basis for sacrifice. In general, see Daniel C. Ullucci, The Christian Rejection of Animal Sacrifice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), esp. 28–29, 35–36, 55–56, 102–104 (which discusses Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 22, in which biblical sacrifice was understood to be a temporary measure to distance the Israelites from sin, especially that of idolatry), 105–107, 109, 121, 130–131, 143.

Origin and Meaning of the Slaughter Regulations

111

obedience that refines humans and conduces to virtue.”13 Or, in the terminology that I employ throughout this book, the reason is that the rabbis deem it virtuous to follow an action justified solely on the grounds of revelation. Proper animal slaughter therefore is not concerned with the one slaughtered, but rather with the one doing the actual slaughtering.14 Many of the amoraic discussions on this topic seek to authorize particular rabbinic food practices via perceived biblical precedent. Again, it is worth noting that the Hebrew Bible displays explicit awareness of almost none of the animal slaughter practices which the rabbis mandate.15 Yet, such ritual actions are read back into the biblical corpus as a means of backcanonization. Thus, the requirement for ritual slaughter, as well as the prohibition of the ingestion of a limb from a living animal, is believed to be hinted at in God’s words to Adam in the Garden of Eden.16 And the fact that, during the ‘aqedah (the binding of Isaac in Genesis 22), Abraham stretches out his hand to take a knife is understood to indicate that proper slaughter must be done with a moveable object (‫תלוש‬/‫ )מטלטל‬and not a fixed object (like a rock in the ground).17 And the specific length of a proper slaughtering knife is supposed to be specified by Saul (who, not coincidentally, is credited with being the one to fulfill the biblical commandment of pouring out blood). How did the rabbis determine that this is an appropriate regulation for food practice? In 1 Samuel 14:33–34, when Saul instructs his troops to stop eating the blood with the meat, he orders that cattle be brought to him and he will slaughter them “‫( ”בזה‬bazeh) – a word that can mean either “in this (place)” or “with this”18 – which leads the rabbis to ask: [A] What is [the meaning of] bazeh [‫?]בזה‬ [B] Our rabbis say: [It means] he showed them a knife fourteen fingers long. 13 14 15 16 17

18

Christine Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law? Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 258, original emphasis. This concern with the slaughterer is also reflected in rabbinic discussions about limiting meat consumption. See e.g. b. Hullin 84a. See the earlier discussion in Chapter 1. The notable exception of the requirement to pour out an animal’s blood is discussed below. Genesis Rabbah 16:6. On the limb from a living animal, see below and Chapter 5 n. 78. Genesis Rabbah 56:6 (ed. Theodor and Albeck 601–602); b. Hullin 16a. On the laws discussed further in this text, see e.g. m. Hullin 1:2; b. Hullin 15b–16a; b. Bava Qamma 41a–b. The specific biblical verse I reference above is Gen 22:10. On the connections between Gen 22 (the binding of Isaac) and the narratives in Genesis Rabbah 56:6 and b. Hullin 16a, see Jane L. Kanarek, Biblical Narrative and the Formation of Rabbinic Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 31–66. Francis Brown, S. R. Driver, and Charles A Briggs, The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003 [1906]), 261.

112

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources [C] B [‫ ]ב‬is two, z [‫ ]ז‬is seven, [and] h [‫ ]ה‬is five.19 [D] He said to them: In accordance with this, you must slaughter and eat.20

The fact that the length of the knife Saul specifies does not become the standard length for rabbinic slaughter need not detain us.21 The rabbis will tinker with the details, but they understand the gestalt to come from the biblical figure, Saul. And Solomon, renowned for his wisdom, is thought to have imparted several lessons regarding the slaughter of quadrupeds, fowl, and fish.22 These sources, and others like them,23 serve to authorize later rabbinic practices based upon biblical texts. The Amoraim thus use revelation as a reason for their innovative practices, claiming they are biblical in origin and, as such, these practices must be followed.24

Blood, Meat and Milk, and the Sciatic Nerve In line with a trend that we saw in the tannaitic corpus, the Amoraim continue to be interested more in the how, rather than the why. This 19

20

21

22

23

24

The three letters that comprise the word bazeh [‫ ]בזה‬each have a numerical value that adds up to fourteen. The substitution of number values for letters to uncover additional interpretive meaning (known as gematria) is a common rabbinic hermeneutic technique. Leviticus Rabbah 25:8 (ed. Margulies 585–586); cp. Song of Songs Rabbah 5.15.1. According to b. Hullin 17b, “with this” [‫ ]בזה‬in 1 Sam 14:34 indicates that a slaughtering knife requires inspection in order to assure that it is sharp enough to comply with rabbinic standards. On the required length of a slaughtering knife, see e.g. m. Hullin 2:3; b. Hullin 31a. While the exact length of the knife is debated therein, these arguments revolve around defining “the width of the neck,” a measurement that does not reflect Saul’s standard. Numbers Rabbah 19:3; Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 4:3 (cp. Pesiqta Rabbati 14:9; citing 1 Kgs 5:13); Tanhuma Huqqat 15. On the rules discussed therein, also see m. Hullin 2:1; b. Hullin 27b; and the discussion below. Further, Numbers Rabbah 19:3 and Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 4:3 (cp. Pesiqta Rabbati 14:9) also include a discussion about hunting land swarmers and the impurity of their skins found elsewhere in rabbinic texts (e.g. m. Shabbat 14:1; m. Hullin 9:2; cf. b. Pesahim 23a). Finally, it is worth noting that the rabbis believe there is a distinction derived from the Hebrew Bible between the way that quadrupeds and fowl may be slaughtered (requiring the severing of two or one organs of the throat, respectively; see e.g. m. Hullin 2:1; b. Yoma 75b; b. Hullin 4a [which acknowledges that rabbinic slaughter rules for fowl are not stated explicitly in the biblical text (this ambiguity is also noted elsewhere, e.g. 16b)]; 27a–b; and passim). For additional references, see e.g. Leviticus Rabbah 13:4 (cp. m. Hullin 3:1); 22:7 (cf. Tanhuma Ahare Mot 17); b. Yoma 75b; b. Hullin 16b–17a; 27a; 28b (in which “Moses” is a synecdoche for Oral Torah); 30a–31a. Though I do not address sacrifice here (a topic worthy of its own book), there are many similar claims in regard to biblical sacrificial law. For example, according to y. Megillah 1:13, 72b (based on Gen 9:3), Noah taught that only pure animals are valid for sacrificial offerings. Despite the reputed biblical origin of many of these practices, the rabbis believe that priests require rabbinic instructors to guide them through biblical sacrificial procedure (see e.g. m. Yoma 1:6; Song of Songs Rabbah 3.7.3). For a discussion of how the early rabbis understood themselves to be Temple authorities and the power dynamics that such narratives construct, see Naftali S. Cohn, The Memory of the Temple and the Making of the Rabbis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). Finally, it is worth noting that the rabbis believe that the Hebrew Bible itself authorizes non-priests to perform non-cultic animal slaughter (see e.g. b. Berakhot 31b; b. Zevahim 32a).

Blood, Meat and Milk, and the Sciatic Nerve

113

observation holds true for amoraic discussions about the biblical prohibitions against consuming blood, meat cooked with milk, and the sciatic nerve. The biblical blood prohibition remains a subject of interest for the Amoraim.25 As was the case with the Tannaim, however, few new justifications are offered. Though a popular topic of conversation, the rabbis are more interested in how this is to be done, rather than why they should do so. Thus, they accept at face value the biblical explanation that blood is life, claiming revelation as their means of justification.26 Instead, they turn their attention to matters related to pouring out blood;27 covering blood;28 deriving benefit from it;29 its application to both consecrated and unconsecrated animals;30 negative/positive commandments;31 et cetera.32 The same holds true for amoraic discussions concerning the prohibition against meat cooked with milk. As noted in Chapter 5, the Tannaim offer an innovative interpretation: the biblical prohibition is not particular, but general, and as such, it bans mixing all meat with all milk.33 No substantively new justificatory discussion appears in this later corpus.34 In fact, often 25 26 27

28 29 30 31 32

33

34

e.g. see Gen 9:3–4. Additional references and discussion can be found in chapters 1, 5, and passim. See e.g. y. Makkot 3:18, 32b, which plays on the association between life and eternal life. See e.g. y. Terumot 8:9, 46b; y. Pesahim 1:8, 28b. Also see Pesiqta Rabbati 2:6, in which the allowance to pour blood on the earth in Deut 12:15–16 is used to authorize the bloodshed committed by David, via a comparison of the wording found in 1 Chr 22:8. See e.g. Deuteronomy Rabbah 4:6 (citing m. Betzah 1:2); b. Shabbat 22a; b. Betzah 7b–8b; b. Hullin 31a; 84a. See e.g. y. Orlah 3:1, 62d; y. Pesahim 2:1, 28c (contrast m. Yoma 5:6). See e.g. y. Pesahim 5:8, 32d (cp. Sifra Ahare Mot 8:3); b. Keritot 4b. See e.g. y. Bikkurim 2:1, 64d. See e.g. y. Terumot 8:3, 45b; y. Ma’aser Sheni 2:1, 53a (cp. y. Yoma 8:3, 45a; y. Shevu’ot 3:2, 34b); 5:8, 56d; b. Pesahim 74b; b. Sanhedrin 59a–b; 63a; b. Keritot 4b; 20b–22a. On a few occasions, the blood prohibition appears in sexualized contexts; see e.g. Leviticus Rabbah 25:8; y. Yevamot 10:3, 10d (in which a court permitting adultery is compared to a court permitting consuming forbidden fat and blood); b. Hullin 109b (cp. Leviticus Rabbah 22:10; Deuteronomy Rabbah 4:6, 9; Tanhuma Shemini 12; see Susan Weingarten, “Gynaecophagia: Metaphors of Women as Food in the Talmudic Literature,” in Food and Language: Proceedings of the Oxford Symposium of Food and Cookery 2009, ed. Richard Hosking [Totnes: Prospect Books, 2010], 365–367). This association is probably due to the cross-cultural association between food and sex, and (especially in the latter text) due to the association between animal blood and female menstrual blood (the latter of which also is associated with food; see e.g. b. Shabbat 13a [wherein a menstruating woman sharing a bed with her husband is compared to the rules concerning mixing meat and milk; cf. b. Betzah 25a]; b. Yoma 18b; b. Ketubbot 10b; b. Nedarim 20b [implied in the metaphor of kosher sex as properly prepared meat; see Weingarten, “Gynaecophagia,” 364–365]). The Amoraim themselves admit that this rule is novel. See e.g. b. Pesahim 44b; b. Nazir 37a–b; b. Hullin 108a. Also see b. Hullin 110a, which acknowledges that not all Jews knew of the rabbinic interpretation of this law. Texts that focus on how to follow (especially in regard to cooking) and not why to follow this regulation are myriad in rabbinic literature. See e.g. b. Pesahim 24b–25a (which also cites revelation

114

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

tannaitic texts are either cited or paraphrased by the Amoraim.35 Further, the Targumim (Aramaic translations of the Hebrew Bible) read the rabbinic interpretation back into the biblical text, which explicitly prohibits the consumption of meat and milk.36 Like changing a Wikipedia page to support one’s own argument, this serves to back-canonize rabbinic interpretation rather than to translate strictly the text. It is therefore a form of revelation-based justification, but one that puts words in God’s mouth, and then uses those words to defend a practice. Finally, it is telling that the only new rationalization for this prohibition relates to why God gave the Torah to humans, taking it out of the hands of the angels. Apparently, when the angels pointed to the Golden Calf incident in Exodus 32 as representative of why humans are undeserving of the Torah, God replies: [A] Are you the ones who fulfill the Torah? [B] A freshly weaned child in Israel fulfills it more than you. [C] [For when] he gets out of school, if he has meat and milk to eat, he only eats milk after he washes his hands from the meat.37 [D] But you [angels], when you were sent down [from Heaven] to Abraham, he brought before you meat and milk at the same time, and you ate them, [E] as it is said, “And [Abraham] took curd, and milk, and the calf which he had dressed, and he set it before them. And he stood by them under the tree, and they did eat [Gen 18:8].”38

35

36 37

38

as grounds for this law); 30a–b (cp. b. Zevahim 95b); 75b–76a; b. Nazir 37a; b. Sanhedrin 4a–b; b. Hullin 103b–116b. One interesting extension that the Amoraim discuss (building on the dispute in tannaitic texts) is the extent to which this applies to fowl. See e.g. b. Shabbat 130a; b. Pesahim 76a; b. Hullin 104a–b; 113a; 116a; Chapter 5 n. 61; and Jordan D. Rosenblum, “Thou Shalt Not Cook a Bird in its Mother’s Milk? Theorizing the Evolution of a Rabbinic Regulation,” in Elizabeth Shanks Alexander and Beth Berkowitz (eds.), Religious Studies and Rabbinics, (forthcoming). For an extended treatment of the principles treated in these texts (e.g. the notions of imparting taste and nullifying through mixture), see David C. Kraemer, Jewish Eating and Identity through the Ages (New York: Routledge, 2009 [2007]), 39–72 and passim. See e.g. y. Terumot 1:8, 41a (citing m. Eduyyot 5:2); Leviticus Rabbah 22:10 (cp. m. Hullin 8:3; and see above, n. 32 for discussion); y. Avodah Zarah 5:12, 45b (cp. Mekhilta d’Rabbi Ishmael Kaspa Mishpatim 20; b. Hullin 115b); b. Menahot 101b (a baraita also cited on b. Qiddushin 57b; b. Hullin 116a; b. Bekhorot 10a); b. Hullin 114a. The theme of accounting for why the Torah prohibits meat in milk in three separate places continues in this later corpus. In addition to the latter reference, see e.g. Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 10:9 (cp. Tanhuma Re’eh 16); Pesiqta Rabbati 25:3; b. Qiddushin 57b; D. Andrew Teeter, “‘You Shall Not Seethe a Kid in its Mother’s Milk’: The Text and the Law in Light of Early Witnesses,” Textus 24 (2009): 37–63, 58–61. On these texts, see Teeter, “You Shall Not Seethe,” 57–61. Also see Chapter 5 n. 57. On this custom, see b. Hullin 104b–105a; and, in general, Kraemer, Jewish Eating and Identity, 39–54 and passim. On Christians washing their hands before touching the Eucharist, see e.g. John Chrysostom, Homilies on the Statutes, 20.19. Pesiqta Rabbati 25:3 (ed. Ulmer 638–639); the logic is even more explicit in the parallel passage in Midrash Psalms 8:2.

Blood, Meat and Milk, and the Sciatic Nerve

115

Immediately thereafter, God is said to have instructed Moses to write the words in Exodus 34:26–27, prohibiting meat and milk. The humans are given this prohibition because angels could not adhere to a rule that even newly weaned human children can!39 Abraham did not violate the meat and milk prohibition because, at the time that he served (though, perhaps importantly, did not himself eat) the meal, apparently only angels knew about the forthcoming commandment to abstain from this mixture.40 The Jewish patriarch therefore acted appropriately, but the angels did not. Of course, this does not justify why this commandment exists, it only explains how it became an earthly commandment. And by focusing on the how and not the why, the presumption of revelation as a basis for adherence to law remains prominent; no other reason need be supplied. The prohibition against the sciatic nerve is another biblical law that, rather than discuss why it is prohibited, the Amoraim prefer to address how it is to be avoided. Further, nothing new is added to previous discussions, as the how discussed therein has already been established in tannaitic texts.41 Once again, the Amoraim seem satisfied to accept the answers 39

40

41

Earlier in Pesiqta Rabbati 25:3, immediately preceding the above passage, another reason is offered for why angels cannot have the Torah: Lev 11:4, 9 discuss rules associated with eating, and angels neither eat nor drink! The fact that angels do not eat is also noted in other retellings of Gen 18 (which claim that the angels pretend to eat; see the sources in n. 40, below) as well as in other contexts (e.g. Avot d’Rabbi Natan A37:3, which notes that humans and demons eat and drink, but ministering angels do not; Tanhuma Behuqqotay 6, which references Lev 11:21 and notes that, unlike humans, ministering angels do not eat) though some texts claim that angels eat when on the earth, but not in heaven (e.g. Exodus Rabbah 47:5; Tanhuma Ki Tissa 9:19). On the question of whether God eats (which includes a reference to angels not eating) see e.g. Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 6:1 (cp. Numbers Rabbah 21:16; Pesiqta Rabbati 16:2; 48:3). Finally, on Israel faithfully observing the biblical food laws (but not the biblical Adam) see Tanhuma Shemini 13. In general, when the story of Gen 18 is recounted, the fact that Abraham serves a non-rabbinically kosher meal is ignored. For example, see Genesis Rabbah 48:14; Ecclesiastes Rabbah 3.14.1; Avot d’Rabbi Natan A13:4–5 (this detail is also sometimes omitted in Christian retellings; e.g. John Chrysostom, Homilies on First Corinthians, 34.10). There are two texts that might hint at a solution to this quandary. According to b. Bava Metzi’a 86b, the meal was served as each item was ready and not at the same time, possibly suggesting that the proper rabbinic food sequence of milk then meat could have been served. Targum Pseudo-Jonathon, in its rendering of this verse, describes the meal as being prepared “according to the way of the law [i.e. halakhah] of the creatures of the world” [‫ ]כאורח הילכת בריית עלמא‬perhaps hinting at rabbinic food practices. Interestingly, the account of Gen 18 in Jubilees 16:1–4 fails to mention the meal at all. The extent to which Abraham observed the commandments in general (which are given generations after Abraham) is debated elsewhere, e.g. b. Yoma 28b; for additional references, see John T. Townsend, Midrash Tanhuma: Translated into English with Introduction, Indices and Brief Notes, Vol. 1 (Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House, 1989), 61 n. 3. For a general discussion of rabbinic views on normative practice before revelation at Sinai, see Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law, 330–354. e.g. see Genesis Rabbah 78:6 and b. Keritot 21b (cp. Leviticus Rabbah 22:10) which discuss, respectively, whether this prohibition applies to the right or left thigh of the animal (it applies to both) and whether it applies only to quadrupeds and not to fowl (it applies only to quadrupeds). Both of these rules are already found in m. Hullin 7:1. On deriving benefit from the sciatic nerve, see e.g. y. Orlah

116

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

(and, interestingly, the lack of questions) offered by their tannaitic predecessors.42

Why Various Animals Are Permitted or Prohibited While the rabbis continue to focus on the how, the why is not totally ignored by the Amoraim. Though general explanations for biblical food rules are offered, the majority of attention is paid to accounting for why specific animals or animal categories are permitted or prohibited.43 I therefore provide a brief overview of the general explanations, and then devote several sub-sections to exploring specific animals and animal categories. In regard to general explanations, the Amoraim have relatively little to say. They note that God was especially reasonable: of the ten quadrupeds considered valid for ingestion, only three of them were required for sacrifice – and they happen to be the three that are domesticated (the ox, the sheep, and the goat) and thus are easier to corral.44 Further, the requirement to eat only “living things” (‫ )החיה‬in Leviticus 11:2 is understood in several ways, including: (1) as a commandment given in order to refine humanity;45 and (2) in the words of Resh Laqish; “If you prove yourselves worthy, then you will consume [living things]; but if not, you will be consumed by [enemy] empires.”46 Eating “living things” therefore

42 43

44

45 46

3:1, 62d; y. Pesahim 2:1, 28c (cp. m. Hullin 7:2); b. Pesahim 22a. On the punishment for cooking the sciatic nerve on a festival day, see the baraita on b. Betzah 12a–b (cp. b. Pesahim 47b; b. Makkot 21b). e.g. see b. Hullin 101b, which simply further spells out m. Hullin 7:6 (discussed in Chapter 5; cp. b. Sanhedrin 59a–b). In general, see e.g. b. Hullin 59a–b; and the references in the following sections. Given their interest in categorization, it is unsurprising that the rabbis devote considerable attention to hybrid animals that fall between categories. e.g. the koy (‫)כוי‬, an animal of uncertain taxonomy (e.g. m. Bikkurim 2: 8–11), proves worthy of careful attention (e.g. y. Bikkurim 2:7, 65b, which includes quotations from several earlier sources; b. Yoma 74a–b; b. Betzah 8a–b; b. Keritot 21a). Another such creature is the tahash (‫ ;תחש‬e.g. Numbers Rabbah 6:3; Pesiqta Rabbati 33:10; b. Yevamot 102b). Also, see the mythical ˙ clearly non-kosher) shesu‘ah (‫שסועה‬, based on a misreading of Deut 14:7, is understood to be (but a creature with two backs and two spines; see e.g. b. Hullin 60b; b. Bekhorot 6b; b. Niddah 24a–b; Esther Rabbah 4:12). Despite their interest in these (and other) interstitial animal categories, they do not offer specific justifications for them. Rather, the rationalizations (or lack thereof) for the categories in which they fall would apply. See e.g. Leviticus Rabbah 27:6; Numbers Rabbah 20:5; 21:16; Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 6:1; 9:5; Pesiqta Rabbati 16:1; Tanhuma Emor 13. The ten permitted domesticated quadrupeds are listed in Deut 14: 4–5, with the three sacrificial ones in v. 4 and the others in v. 5. The conclusion that the ox, sheep, and goat are the only sacrificially valid quadrupeds is based on an exegesis of Lev 22:27. See Leviticus Rabbah 13:3; and the discussion above at n. 10. Leviticus Rabbah 13:4 (ed. Margulies 280). Other manuscripts attribute this statement to other rabbis. I discuss the enemy empires further below. In b. Hullin 42a, this verse is also used to elucidate slaughtering regulations and definitions regarding terefah animals.

Why Various Animals Are Permitted or Prohibited

117

serves to refine, satiate, caution, and protect Jews (both in This World and in The World to Come, as discussed further, below). The rabbis also comment on Moses’ role in these regulations. God dictated the laws in Leviticus 11 to Moses because he was in charge of the Israelite community.47 Moses apparently foresaw that the prohibited animals in Leviticus 11 and Deuteronomy 14 represent empires that would cause trouble for Israel in the future: the camel (Babylon),48 the rock badger (Media), the hare (Greece), and the pig (Rome).49 Though these amoraic texts do justify the existence of some biblical food rules, they really only hint at why these particular animals are chosen.50 While we encounter more of the same when we turn to discussions of specific animals and animal categories, a few reasons do appear. It is to such narratives that we now turn. Swine and Signified The title for this sub-section comes from the field of semiotics, wherein the sign is composed of parts in a dyadic relationship: the signifier and the signified. The sign communicates meaning (signification) and represents the totality of the association between the signifier and the signified. Semiotics has proven useful in a variety of fields, including the study of food. As Roland Barthes observes: “[t]o eat is a behavior that develops 47

48

49

50

Leviticus Rabbah 1:8 (ed. Margulies 22–23) contains a parable in which God is compared to a king entering one of his cities, who first consults his market-commissioner (‫)אגרנומון‬, to whom Moses is compared. Moses also set other food practices, including meal times (e.g. b. Yoma 75b). On at least one occasion, the camel is associated with Esau, who himself is associated with Rome. See Pesiqta Rabbati 16:6 (which cites m. Shabbat 24:3). On the connection between Esau and Rome in general, see Gerson D. Cohen, “Esau as Symbol in Early Medieval Thought,” in Alexander Altmann (ed.), Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 19–48. For further discussion about the kashrut of the camel, see e.g. b. Hullin 59a; b. Bekhorot 6b. See Leviticus Rabbah 13:5 (cp. Tanhuma Shemini 14). This text also extols the visionary leadership of all of the prophets in regard to their ability to foreshadow the future tormentors in Israel. While Abraham and Daniel are also singled out, only Moses is credited with using the food categories to foreshadow these events. I discuss this extensive text, which pejoratively compares traits of the forbidden animals with those of the hated nations, below. On this text in general, see Misgav HarPeled, “The Dialogical Beast: The Identification of Rome with the Pig in Early Rabbinic Literature” (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2013), 169–173. Further, the rabbis understand themselves as bound to interpret the biblical food laws within the specific parameters found in the Hebrew Bible itself (see e.g. b. Sanhedrin 99b–100a). Of course, this understanding is somewhat disingenuous, given the considerable latitude they allow themselves in many contexts. However, see the attempt to place this account in its historical context in Yaakov Elman, “Middle Persian Culture and Babylonian Sages: Accommodation and Resistance in the Shaping of Rabbinic Legal Tradition,” in Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert and Martin S. Jaffee (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. 176–177.

118

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

beyond its own ends, replacing, summing up, and signalizing other behaviors, and it is precisely for these reasons that it is a sign.”51 The pig is a prime example of a sign. As shown in previous and subsequent chapters, the pig is invested with much signification.52 It is a sign, hence the playful title: swine and signified. Keeping this in mind, I begin by turning to two amoraic discussions that answer a question asked previously in this book: are pigs more tabooed than other biblically forbidden creatures? Numbers Rabbah 12:4 asks this very question, and concludes that pigs are just as prohibited as other biblically prohibited animals, no more and no less.53 However, a more positive answer seems to appear in Leviticus Rabbah 13:5: [A] “And the swine” (Deut 14:8) [B] This alludes to Edom [i.e. Rome].54 [C] Moses placed the three of them [i.e. the camel, the hare, and the rock badger in Deut 14:7] in one verse, but this one [by itself] in another verse.55 [D] Why?, [inquired] R. Yohanan and R. Shimon b. Laqish.56 [E] R. Yohanan said: Because [the swine] is equivalent to the three of them. [F] R. Shimon b. Laqish said: It is exceptional [‫]יתירא‬.57

Three of the four forbidden quadrupeds that represent evil empires appear in one biblical verse (Deut 14:7), while the pig alone appears in Deuteronomy 14:8. A reasonable question is asked: why? Two rabbis offer different conclusions. According to R. Yohanan, the swine is equal to the other three; thus, it is as bad as all three other animals (and the empires that they represent) combined.58 According to R. Shimon b. Laqish, the fact that 51

52

53 54 55

56 57 58

“Toward a Psychosociology of Contemporary Food Consumption,” in Carole Counihan and Penny van Esterik (eds.), Food and Culture: A Reader (New York: Routledge, 1997), 25. In the same edited volume, a famous (but very problematic) essay also appears: Jean Soler, “The Semiotics of Food in the Bible” (pp. 55–66). This statement continues to apply today. For examples from modern cinema, see Nathan Abrams, “‘I’ll Have Whatever She’s Having’: Jews, Food, and Film,” in Anne L. Bower (ed.), Reel Food: Essays on Food and Film (New York: Routledge, 2004), esp. 91–92. This text is an exegesis on Isa 66:17. In some manuscripts, “Persia.” However, Rome is the preferred reading. For a discussion, see HarPeled, “The Dialogical Beast,” 172 n. 470. One manuscript renders the final phrase: “but not in a verse by itself.” On whether this is a particular or general prohibition, see Sifre Deuteronomy 101 (and the discussion thereof in Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law, 181–182). R. Simeon b. Laqish’s name is often abbreviated to “Resh Laqish” (as, in fact, is the case with some manuscripts of this text). Thus, this is the same authority cited above (see n. 46). Ed. Margulies 290–291. This text is part of a longer discussion, noted above (see n. 49). Support for this reading could be found in Lev 11:4–7, in which each quadruped receives its own verse. Further support can be found in rabbinic texts that claim that, when discussing the biblically forbidden quadrupeds, God spoke using a circumlocution (‫)עיקם‬, and in which the wording of each verse in Lev 11:4–7 is compared and considered analogous. See e.g. Genesis Rabbah 32:4; Leviticus

Why Various Animals Are Permitted or Prohibited

119

the pig is mentioned in its own biblical verse indicates that the pig is “exceptional” (i.e. it is far worse) compared to the other animals/empires.59 While this text might appear to be asking about the swine (the signifier), it is really discussing the empire that the swine represents: Rome (the signified). Rome, symbolized by the pig, is the hated enemy.60 This hatred inspires the common rabbinic epithet for Rome: “The Evil Empire” (‫)מלכות הרשעה‬.61 When asking “why,” therefore, the rabbis are not asking why the pig itself is tabooed, but indeed what the biblical passages about swine have to teach about the (evil) character of Rome. According to R. Yohanan, Rome is as bad as the other empires combined; according to the R. Shimon b. Laqish, it is even worse than the sum of the other three. This observation helps us to understand several other pig-related passages in this corpus. In each instance, despite what it might seem at first glance, the swine/sign is not the subject of inquiry; rather, the rabbis are talking about Rome/the signified. Thus, when they ask why Rome is compared to a pig, they make an analogy between porcine anatomy (kosher on the outside [hoofs], but non-kosher inside [does not chew the cud]) and the Roman civic body (seemingly just on the outside, but – upon closer inspection – corrupt at its core).62 This explains neither why the features of cloven hoofs and cudchewing were biblically mandated, nor why the pig itself is tabooed. Rather, it accounts for why Rome itself is so reviled.63 In a similar vein, the rabbis ask

59

60

61 62 63

Rabbah 26:1; Numbers Rabbah 19:2; Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 4:2; Tanhuma Huqqat 6; b. Pesahim 3a (cp. Pesiqta Rabbati 14:5). Such texts explain the logic for the phrasing of the verses, but not the logic for the regulations contained therein. Although this text does not resolve whether pig is exceptional, pig functions often in rabbinic texts as a metonym for all forbidden foods. e.g. see discussions of the relaxation of food prohibitions in certain exigent circumstances (e.g. b. Yoma 82a; b. Megillah 13a; b. Hullin 17a) or the illogical food laws (hukim; e.g. b. Yoma 67b [cp. Sifra Ahare Mot 9:13, discussed in Chapter 5]). My interpretation ˙ of Leviticus Rabbah 13:5 was influenced (and greatly improved) by an important suggestion from one of the anonymous reviewers. On the connection between the Rome and the pig, see Har-Peled, “The Dialogical Beast”; Jordan D. Rosenblum, “‘Why do you refuse to eat pork?’ Jews, Food, and Identity in Roman Palestine,” JQR 100/1 (2010): 95–110; and the references cited therein. See e.g. Genesis Rabbah 65:1. Genesis Rabbah 65:1; Leviticus Rabbah 13:5. On these texts, see Har-Peled, “The Dialogical Beast,” 173; Rosenblum, “Why do you refuse to eat pork?” 109–110. The supposed hidden non-kosher nature of the pig is seen as a metaphor for duplicity in other contexts, as well. For example, see Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 24:11, in which Cain acting penitent before God in Genesis 4 is compared to a pig acting pure before man: their external action/appearance belies their internal corruption. For other connections between the pig and Roman duplicity, see y. Berakhot 4:1, 7b (cp. y. Ta’anit 4:8, 68c) and b. Menahot 64b (cp. b. Bava Qamma 82b; b. Sotah 49b), which offer a reputed historical explanation for the fall of Jerusalem that involves pig as a Roman weapon deployed in the siege of Jerusalem. In these texts, the pig clearly represents Rome, but no justification for the food laws is explicitly addressed. On these texts, see Har-Peled, “The Dialogical Beast,” 106–110; Rosenblum, “Why do you refuse to eat pork?” 102–107.

120

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

why the Hebrew word for pig is hazir (‫)חזיר‬. The answer: “because it will return [‫ ]שמחזרת‬the crown to its ˙[rightful] owner.”64 The pun between the Hebrew word for pig (‫ )חזיר‬and the verb “to return” (‫ )חזר‬is used to speak of a future time, when Rome will get its due and Israel will rise triumphant and will once again wear its rightful crown. We encounter a similar pun, but in a naughtier context, when we learn that R. Aqiba resists indulging in a night of pleasure, despite spending the evening between two beautiful Roman women. All night, these gorgeous Roman women entreat R. Aqiba “Turn toward me!” [‫]חזור אצלי‬, but he remains seated between them, spitting at them. When the Roman prefect, who organized this evening, inquires why R. Aqiba resisted this ménage à trois, R. Aqiba replies that he was repulsed by their body odor, as they reeked of carrion and swine flesh [‫!]בשר חזיר‬65 Finally, on the lam from Rome, R. Meir tricks his pursuers by pretending to eat pork. His prestidigitation (he dips one finger into swine’s blood and then sucks on another one, thus fooling them) functions as a cover, and he escapes capture.66 This text plays on the association between Rome and pig – after 64

65

66

Leviticus Rabbah 13:5 (ed. Margulies 295). A similar pun appears twice in Ecclesiastes Rabbah 1.9.1, the first time in a comparable fashion and the second time to talk about The World to Come. In the latter instance (also see below, nn. 153 and 157), the pig seems to be singled out. However, other forbidden animals/animal preparations are mentioned, as well. Pig clearly represents all non-kosher animals in this text, though no specific argument is given for why the pig is exceptional or necessarily forbidden. Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana Supplement 3:2 (ed. Mandelbaum 461); cp. Avot d’Rabbi Natan A16:15–18, which does not specifically mention the pig, but lists nevelah, terefah, and land swarmers. On the latter text, see Moshe David Herr, “The Historical Significance of The Dialogues Between Jewish Sages and Roman Dignitaries,” in Joseph Heineman and Dov Noy (eds.), Scripta Hierosolymitana (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1971), 22:135–137; Jonathan Wyn Schofer, The Making of a Sage: A Study in Rabbinic Ethics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 108–111; David Stern, “The Captive Woman: Hellenization, Greco-Roman Erotic Narrative, and Rabbinic Literature,” Poetics Today 19/1 (1998): 91–127, esp. 114–115; and on both texts, see Jordan D. Rosenblum, “The Night Rabbi Aqiba Slept with Two Women,” in Susan Ashbrook Harvey et al. (eds.), A Most Reliable Witness: Essays in Honor of Ross Shepard Kraemer, BJS 358 (Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2015), 67–75. I discuss these other forbidden animals, below. The connection between swine and sexuality also appears in y. Shevi’it 8:10, 38b, which quotes the statement in m. Shevi’it 8:10 (noted in Chapter 5) that Samaritan bread is comparable to pork and interprets it to mean that one should not marry the daughter of an ‘am ha-aretz (a Jew who does not follow rabbinic purity concerns). On rabbinic food-related discussions about the ‘am ha-aretz, see Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 116–120, 143–154. One other possible reason for this smell being deemed repulsive is the assumption that pigs’ mouths are full of excrement (see e.g. b. Berakhot 25a). While this connection might be at play here, I am not convinced that this association necessarily informs the text above. Rather, I believe that R. Aqiba uses their porcine body odor as a metonymic response to his repulsion of their perceived otherness. Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7.12.1 (cp. b. Avodah Zarah 18b, where he eats Gentile food [‫]בשולי עובדי כוכבים‬ not specifically pork; and Numbers Rabbah 20:21, where cooking pork is used to hide the Jewish identity of a shopkeeper). Such texts are also part of a trope, discussed in previous chapters, wherein pork ingestion is used to signify submission to foreign (particularly Roman) domination. Romans can also force Jews to eat other non-kosher foods, such as nevelah (e.g. y. Shevi’it 4:2, 35a–b; cp. y. Sanhedrin 3:6, 21b; for discussion, see Alyssa M. Gray, “A Contribution to the Study of Martyrdom and Identity in the Palestinian Talmud,” JJS 54/2 [2003]: 242–272, esp. 252–254).

Why Various Animals Are Permitted or Prohibited

121

all, he uses pig to fool The Pig – but offers no justification for why the pig itself is biblically prohibited. Moreover, the pig represents general Otherness, a notion that is not unique to this corpus. Though the Amoraim discuss this issue in depth, they are almost always addressing the signified and not the signifier.67 Thus, despite the fact that they venture beyond justification based solely on revelation, the reasons provided relate more to explaining why The Pig (Rome) is embodied in the reviled pig and not why pig itself is biblically forbidden. While they do debate whether pig is more tabooed than other quadruped, they do not significantly answer the question posed to Philo so long ago: “Why do you refuse to eat pork?”68 Fish and Fish Slaughter Do fish require ritual slaughter? The general rabbinic answer to this question is no.69 At least one rabbi, however, felt that fish did in fact require ritual slaughter. His argument is refuted and he himself concedes the point.70 Thus, the debate is settled: unlike quadrupeds and fowl, fish 67

68

69

70

e.g. if one does not follow the rabbinic requirement to wash the hands before eating, then one will be mistaken for a non-Jew and unknowingly will be fed pork (y. Berakhot 8:2, 12a; cp. Tanhuma Balaq 24; Numbers Rabbah 20:21 [see above, n. 66]; briefly referenced in b. Yoma 83b and b. Hullin 106a; on deserving the death penalty for not washing one’s hands before eating, see e.g. b. Eruvin 21b; b. Berakhot 62b implies that not washing one’s hands before eating leads to poverty). Elsewhere, a non-Jew who assumes that a Jew who looks happy must be drunk, flush with cash due to lending money on interest, or a pig farmer (y. Shabbat 8:1, 11a; y. Pesahim 10:1, 37c; y. Sheqalim 3:2, 47c; Pesiqta Rabbati 14:10; Tanhuma Huqqat 19; b. Nedarim 49b) is shocked to discover that the Jew’s happiness solely derives from the delight he takes in studying Torah. Embassy to Gaius, 361 (discussed in Chapter 3). To offer one final example: Leviticus Rabbah 22:10 (see above, n. 32) records a series of forbidden things, each of which has a corresponding permitted thing. Most of these objects are foodstuffs, one of which is the pairing between the prohibited pig and a permitted fish tongue/fish said to taste like pork (the latter identification differs based on manuscripts; see ed. Margulies 522). While this text notes that pork is prohibited, it does not offer a reason why this is so. e.g. see Leviticus Rabbah 22:10 (ed. Margulies 521), which states: “I have forbidden you [to eat without] ritual slaughter regarding fowl, but I have permitted you [to eat without] ritual slaughter regarding fish.” On this text (including several parallels), see n. 32; and cp. Pirqe d’Rabbi Eliezer 9 (which makes explicit the implied words that I supply in brackets). This allowance continues in modern interpretations of kashrut, which does not mandate that fish be ritually slaughtered. See Genesis Rabbah 7:2 (cp. Numbers Rabbah 19:3; Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7.23.3; Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 4:3; Pesiqta Rabbati 14:9; Tanhuma Huqqat 15; b. Hullin 27b). In conceding his point, the rabbi (rhetorically, at least) goes so far as to submit to whipping because he was so wrong! On this text, see Steven Fine, “Nabratein in the Ancient Literary Sources,” in Eric M. Meyers and Carol L. Meyers (eds.), Excavations at Ancient Nabratein: Synagogue and Environs (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2009), 3–14; Richard Hidary, Dispute for the Sake of Heaven: Legal Pluralism in the Talmud, BJS 353 (Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2010), 278–280. This debate is not new, as there is evidence for it at Qumran. See the Damascus Document (CD 12:13–14; discussed in Fine, “Nabratein in the Ancient Literary Sources,” 9; and the sources cited in Chapter 3 n. 141).

122

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

do not require ritual slaughter.71 While there are hermeneutic arguments made in favor of this interpretation, Steven Fine also points to the practical problem that such a requirement would create: “If actually carried out, the ritual slaughter of fish would have been quite cumbersome. It would have meant that Jews could only procure live fish, which they would then have had to ritually slaughter very soon after the fish were actually caught.”72 Unlike fowl and quadrupeds, fish need water to survive. Adding stringency like this would have made their consumption (especially in the fresh, but also in the preserved form) quite difficult.73 The more lenient position thus became the normative rabbinic ruling. Though the Amoraim discuss whether fish require slaughter, they do not justify the biblical laws regarding permitted/prohibited sea creatures. Rather, they remain interested in the how and not the why.74 For example, what happens if a fish is hatched without fins and scales, but grows them later? Or vice versa? Is it kosher? (Indeed, fish in both cases are permitted.)75 Also, in the mythical realm, are mermaids kosher?76 While they do claim (on no explicit empirical grounds) that there are 700 permitted species of fish,77 beyond the ubiquitous (and often unstated) presumption of revelation, amoraic texts fail to provide any rationalizations for this, and other, piscatorial legislation. 71

72 73 74

75 76

77

A creature that is often paired analogously with fish in this literature is the locust. For references and discussion, see Jodi Magness, Stone and Dung, Oil and Spit: Jewish Daily Life in the Time of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 37–41. Further, the rules prohibiting the consumption of blood do not apply to either fish or locusts (see e.g. b. Keritot 20b–21b; contrast Magness, Stone and Dung, 39, which discusses earlier sectarian legislation [and also includes references to additional rabbinic fish prohibitions]). Finally, perhaps neither fish nor locusts require ritual slaughter because the rabbis do not consider them to be “meat” (‫ ;בשר‬see e.g. m. Hullin 8:1; b. Nedarim 54b). Fine, “Nabratein in the Ancient Literary Sources,” 11. I thank Maud Kozody for helping me to sharpen this point. The only “why” question they seem to ask relates to what can be gleaned from the wording or placement of relevant biblical passages (e.g. see y. Bikkurim 2:1, 64d; y. Sanhedrin 7:11, 25b; b. Bava Metzi’a 61b; b. Niddah 51b). However, these technical discussions do not address in any meaningful way why these laws were commanded. Otherwise, amoraic texts focus on how these laws are to be understood and/or applied. e.g. on how many counts does a man incur flogging if he were to eat an eel? See e.g. b. Eruvin 27b–28a (cp. b. Pesahim 24a; b. Makkot 16b). See e.g. b. Avodah Zarah 39a; b. Hullin 66a. For later interpretations of this, see Yoreh Deah, 83:1. See e.g. b. Bekhorot 8a (part of a discourse on various fish mating concerns that begins on b. Bekhorot 7b; interestingly, the fact that non-kosher fish might not be able to breed in the same aquatic environment as kosher fish is noted in b. Sukkah 18a). For a brief discussion and application of this text to modern halakhah, see Michael J. Broyde, “Cloning People and Jewish Law: A Preliminary Analysis,” n.p, www.jlaw.com/Articles/cloning.html, n. 35 (last accessed July 19, 2016). See Pesikta d’Rab Kahana 13:10 and b. Hullin 63b (the same text lists the number of kosher grasshoppers at 800!; on the kashrut of grasshoppers, see e.g. b. Hullin 65a–66a). To this number we can add one more: the Leviathan will be declared kosher in The World to Come (see e.g. Leviticus Rabbah 22:10; b. Hullin 67b; on The World to Come, see the discussion below).

Why Various Animals Are Permitted or Prohibited

123

Flagrant Fowl The Hebrew Bible lists the forbidden fowl, but provides neither general criteria nor a similar list of permitted fowl.78 Like many who came before and after them, the Amoraim notice this curious omission and find it worthy of remark. For example, according to Leviticus Rabbah 1:8, the verse “The following you shall abominate among the birds” (Lev 11:13) clearly indicates that: “These [enumerated fowl] you shall abominate, but those [fowl not enumerated] you need not abominate.”79 The biblically enumerated fowl are forbidden, but all others not listed are thus understood to be allowed.80 God’s silence implies divine permission.81 Another tactic is to read rabbinic criteria back into the biblical text, as one author of an Aramaic translation (Targum) of the Hebrew Bible does. In “translating” Leviticus 11:13, Targum Pseudo-Jonathan expands the description and reads: “The following varieties you shall abominate among the birds: those that do not have an extra toe, and one that does not have a crop and whose gizzard cannot be peeled, shall not be eaten; they are an abomination.”82 The legislation in Leviticus now accords with rabbinic law. In fact, the very wording itself matches that of m. Hullin 3:6, where these criteria for fowl are first enumerated.83 Though additional criteria are provided, beyond the standard (and often unstated) presumption of revelation as a basis for justification for the entire system, these texts do not answer the why question. Such an answer is provided in Leviticus Rabbah 3:4, a complicated passage which employs logic that should seem familiar to us by now:

78 79

80 81 82

83

See Lev 11:13–19; Deut 14:11–18; and the previous discussion in Chapter 1. Ed. Margulies 23 (on the discrepancies between the list of birds in Lev 11:13–19 vs. Deut 14:11–18, see b. Hullin 63a–b). Of course, this leaves open problems of uncertain taxonomy – i.e. what if one cannot identify a specific bird? Such an issue is addressed in Genesis Rabbah 65:3, in which an unidentified bird is placed on a roof where an Egyptian raven flies and sits next to it, which is understood to mean that the bird is a variety of raven and thus cannot be consumed. On why the world needs ravens, see Genesis Rabbah 33:5. In regard to some fowl, local custom decided whether a bird was deemed kosher. For example, see b. Hullin 63a–b. For how later commentators understand this, see Chapter 1 n. 16. In the original Hebrew, Lev 11:13 reads: “The following you shall abominate among the birds; they shall not be eaten, they are an abomination.” In my translation above, I intentionally echo Milgrom’s translation of Leviticus 11 that I use in Chapter 1. I also draw on the wording from the current draft of my forthcoming translation of m. Hullin. See Jordan D. Rosenblum, “Hulin,” in Shaye J.D. Cohen, Robert Goldenberg, and Hayim Lapin (eds.), The Mishnah: An Annotated Translation (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). This wording is picked up by other rabbinic sources, both tannaitic and amoraic (e.g. Sifre Deuteronomy 103; b. Hullin 60b–61a).

124

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources [A] [“When a person/soul [‫]נפש‬84 presents an offering of cereal” (Lev 2:1)]85 [B] What is written prior to this matter? [C] “He shall remove its crissum by its feathers” (Lev 1:16).86 [D] R. Tanhum b. Hanilai said: This bird flies and soars throughout the world, and eats everything.87 It eats food [obtained] by robbery and by violence. [E] The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Since this crop is full of robbery and violence,88 let it not be presented upon the altar. [F] Therefore, it is said, “He shall remove its crissum by its feathers.” [G] But this domesticated quadruped is reared in its master’s manger, and it does not eat everything, neither [food obtained] by robbery, nor [food obtained] by violence. Therefore, all of it is presented [upon the altar]. [H] Therefore, it is said: “and the priest shall present all of it upon the altar” (Lev 1:13).89 [I] Because this person/soul [‫ ]נפש‬robs and commits violence, come and see how much trouble and how much weariness does he experience90 until he evacuates his bowels [‫]עד שיצא ממנה‬. [J] From the mouth to the esophagus, from the esophagus to the abomasum, from the abomasum to the omasum, from the omasum to the reticulum, from the reticulum to the rumen, from the rumen to the ileum, from the ileum to the duodenum, from the duodenum to the jejunum, from the jejunum to the cecum, from the cecum to the rectum, from the rectum to anus.91

84

85

86 87 88

89 90 91

On the difference between biblical and rabbinic notions of the word nefesh [‫]נפש‬, especially in regard to Leviticus Rabbah, see David Stern, “Vayikra Rabbah and My Life in Midrash,” Prooftexts 21/1 (2001): 23–38. This quote is included in Leviticus Rabbah 3:3 in Margulies’ edition (p. 64). However, it clearly sets up the text that follows, so I include it here. The translations of Leviticus in this passage follow those found in: Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 3 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 133, 134, and 177. On rendering the difficult phrase ‫מראתו בנצתה‬, see Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 169–171. Also see m. Zevahim 6:5; b. Zevahim 65a. The phrase I render “eats everything” (‫ )מכל צד‬implies that the bird hunts (‫ )צוד‬all of its food indiscriminately. This phrase could have a more particular meaning, namely that the foodstuffs in the crop are illgotten gains acquired by nefarious means. However, I chose to render the phrase more abstractly, which captures both the particular meaning and a more general sense that the bird’s crop is full both literally (the foodstuffs themselves) and figuratively (the sins themselves). The biblical text actually reads: “and the priest shall present all of it and turn it into smoke on the altar.” The same phrase about trouble and weariness appears multiple times in Ecclesiastes Rabbah 1.3.1. Cf. Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7.19.1, 3. I base my identifications of the various anatomical parts of the stomach on the commentary of Margulies (p. 65). From first (mouth) to last (anus), the actual order of stomachs in an ungulate ruminant quadruped is: rumen, or paunch; reticulum; omasum; and finally the abomasum, or maw. Also, the proper order of intestines from first to last is: duodenum, jejunum, and ileum.

Why Various Animals Are Permitted or Prohibited

125

[K] Come and see how much trouble and how much weariness does he experience until he evacuates food92 from his bowels.93

This complex and fascinating passage requires explanation. The heart of this pericope is an exegesis of biblical texts. It begins by playing on a pun: in rabbinic Hebrew, the word nefesh [‫ ]נפש‬can mean “living being,” “person,” or “soul.” Leviticus 2:1, concerning a nefesh presenting a cereal offering, is then connected to Leviticus 1:16, which regulates priestly procedure regarding preparing fowl for burnt offerings. This conversation becomes an opportunity for an allegorical rationalization of food rules and a lesson on ethics. Birds soar in the sky and dive for their prey, seizing their food by means of “robbery” and “violence.” While the forbidden birds are never explicitly mentioned, it is telling that the text speaks of “This bird,” which seems to suggest a specific variety of birds – namely, those that are forbidden.94 Though this could also be a generalization about all birds, I believe the former suggestion to be the most likely. Such a reading would be in line with other commentators who claim that the biblically forbidden fowl are birds of prey.95 And, as the text continues, it would also be in line with those interpreters who see this connection as imparting a moral lesson.96 Such a bird is contrasted with “this domesticated quadruped,”97 an ethical animal to whom all food is properly given by its master. This suggests that the quadruped (‫ )בהמה‬is both domesticated and biblically permitted. It need not violently steal any of its food; it is moral, and thus permitted. For these reasons, its presence is allowed upon God’s altar, as is implied in Leviticus 1:13. From this conclusion, a general moral lesson is imparted: because, like a bird of prey, “this nefesh”98 steals and acts malevolently, its digestive tract rebels. The pain this nefesh inflicts upon the world is therefore inflicted upon its bowels. Lex talionis – an eye for an eye – not only makes the world go blind, it also has other, more carnal, effects. As one commentator notes: “The idea appears to be that appetite, or ‘greediness’ (also called nefesh), has to pay the penalty of its satisfaction.”99 In what amounts to a rather mixed metaphor, humans – who, according to Leviticus Rabbah 3:4, have the same digestive system as 92 93 95 96 98 99

In some manuscripts “food” also appears in the same phrase above in section I. 94 Ed. Margulies 64–65. The wording “This bird” is present in all extant manuscripts. This reading is implied already in m. Hullin 3:6 (discussed on b. Hullin 65a). This criterion is applied elsewhere in amoraic texts (e.g. b. Niddah 50b). 97 On this, see chapters 3 and 7. “This” is not in all manuscripts. “This” is not in all manuscripts. J. Israelstam in H. Freedman and Maurice Simon (eds.), Midrash Rabbah: Translated into English with Notes, Glossary and Indices, 10 vols. (New York: Soncino Press, 1983 [1939]), 4:39 n. 4.

126

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

ruminant quadrupeds – can learn from biblical fowl regulations.100 Those who act like birds of prey – with greed and malevolence – will pay in the end, both figuratively and literally. The connection between ethics and the digestive tract is not unique to this text, as it appears elsewhere in the rabbinic corpus.101 What is unique is that this passage connects this ethical lesson with an allegorical rationalization for biblical food laws. Forbidden fowl represent embodied vices, and these vices have bodily repercussions. This moral embodiment functions both allegorically and literally: allegorically, in that the permitted/prohibited animals represent proper/improper moral action; and literally, in that the consequences for said actions manifest themselves in the physical body. Aside from this allegorical rationalization, however, no other text seriously grapples with the why question in regard to fowl. We learn that the permitted fowl are innumerable, but we do not learn why they are permitted (or prohibited, for that matter).102 As in the previous cases, the rabbis prefer to debate proper slaughtering technique, rather than to inquire about the regulation itself.103 Beyond the unstated presumption of revelation, no other justification for these practices is offered. While the general question is rarely interrogated, a more specific fowlrelated question is raised: what is the reason for the biblical requirement to send away a mother bird from her nest before taking her eggs or chicks?104 As we saw in Chapter 5, the Tannaim claim that anyone who attributes this divine rule to mercy is to be silenced. Revelation was sufficient ground for 100

101

102

103

104

To this one can also add the fact that fowl are not ruminants, which further contributes to the mixed metaphor. Of course, as we see in previous and subsequent chapters, rumination is associated with proper moral thought and action, which perhaps also accounts for the fowl’s foul behavior. For discussion and references, see Magness, Stone and Dung, 130–144; Peter Schäfer, Jesus in the Talmud (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 82–94; and especially Jonathan Wyn Schofer, Confronting Vulnerability: The Body and the Divine in Rabbinic Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 53–76. See Pesikta d’Rab Kahana 13:10; b. Hullin 63b (cf. Sifre Deuteronomy 103, which both claim that there are more kosher fowl than non-kosher ones). To this number we can add mythical birds like the ziz (‫ ;זיז‬e.g. Leviticus Rabbah 22:10; Pesiqta Rabbati 16:4; mentioned in the Hebrew Bible in Ps 50:11; 80:14) and the bar yokhani (‫ ;בר יוכני‬e.g. b. Sukkah 5a–b; b. Bekhorot 6b). For a discussion and enumeration of kosher and non-kosher fowl, see b. Hullin 60b–63b (on eggs, as well as fish roe, see 63b–64b). See e.g. y. Sotah 9:5, 23d; b. Ketubbot 5a; b. Hullin 20a–b; and the sources cite above, nn. 22, 69, and 70. Another issue discussed is whether the requirement that fowl be ritually slaughtered is biblical or rabbinic in origin (see e.g. b. Yoma 75b; b. Nazir 29a; b. Qiddushin 71a; b. Hullin 4a; 16b; 20a–b; 27b). Finally, there are debates about to what extent fowl is “meat” and, thus, its applicability vis-àvis the meat and milk prohibition (see above, n. 34; and on the debate over whether fowl is “meat,” see e.g. b. Nedarim 54b). See Deut 22:6–7 (discussed in Chapter 1).

Why Various Animals Are Permitted or Prohibited

127

this ruling, according to the Tannaim. The Amoraim continue this trend, as well as clarifying its logic and expanding its scope: [A] It is taught: “The one who says [when leading communal prayer]: ‘May your mercies extend to a bird’s nest,’ or ‘May your name be remembered for the good,’ or ‘We give thanks, we give thanks,’ they silence him.”105 [B] R. Pinhas106 in the name of R. Simon [said]: [One who recites “May your mercies extend to a bird’s nest”] is like one who recites complaints against the Holy One, Blessed be He’s modus operandi, [saying] “Your mercies extend to [‫ ]על‬a bird’s nest, but your mercies do not extend to that person?!” [C] R. Yose in the name of R. Simon [said]: [One who recites “May your mercies extend to a bird’s nest”] is like one who sets limits to the Holy One, Blessed be He’s nature, [saying] “Your mercies extend only until [‫ ]עד‬a bird’s nest [but no further]?!” [D] Some Tannaim teach [that the wording of the Mishnah in section A reads] “to/upon” [‫]על‬, and other Tannaim teach [that the Mishnah reads] “only until” [‫]עד‬. [E] The one who states “to/upon” [‫ ]על‬supports the opinion of R. Pinhas,107 and the one who states “only until” [‫ ]עד‬supports the opinion of R. Yose. [F] R. Yose b. R. Bun said: It is not good [to suggest] that the commandments are based on the merciful nature of the Holy One, Blessed be He. [G] [Thus,] those who translate [the Hebrew verse in Lev 22:28, which reads, “However, no animal from the herd or from the flock shall be slaughtered on the same day as its young”108 into Aramaic as follows:] [H] “My people, children of Israel, just as I am merciful in heaven, so too should you be merciful on earth. [I] [For this reason,] a cow or a ewe shall not be slaughtered on the same day as its young” [the translators] are not doing good,109 because [in doing so, they suggest] that the commandments are based on the merciful nature of the Holy One, Blessed be He.110 105 106 107

108 109

110

As the introductory formula “it is taught” (‫ )מתני׳‬indicates, this text begins by quoting a tannaitic statement: m. Berakhot 5:3 (cp. m. Megillah 4:9), discussed in Chapter 5. In some manuscripts: R. Isaac. In some manuscripts: R. Isaac (although even some manuscripts that cite R. Isaac in clause B cite R. Pinhas here, which is a key reason why I prefer to read R. Pinhas above). Note that the parallel in y. Megillah 4:10, 75c also attributes this tradition to R. Pinhas. See Chapter 1 nn. 53–54. I use this more literal rendering to convey the fact that it is not just an improper practice, but also a contradiction of the ethical sense of “good” when a translator renders the verse as such. In a theoretical discussion on y. Avodah Zarah 4:1, 43c–d, the rabbis debate the penalty for one who slaughters a parent and its offspring on the same day for the sake of idolatry (since the former is punished by lashes and the latter by being stoned to death). y. Berakhot 5:3, 9c (ed. Schäfer and Becker 1/1–2:152–153; cp. y. Megillah 4:10, 75c; b. Berakhot 33b; b. Megillah 25a).

128

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

The Amoraim further emphasize that the biblical bird’s nest legislation is not based on compassion. Even when they argue about interpretation of the Mishnah (see section D–E) everyone agrees that mercy is not a tenable supporting argument. While a common rabbinic name for God means “The Merciful One” (‫)רחמנא‬, such legislation is not to be understood as deriving from God’s merciful nature. Further, this argument is extended to include another biblical food rule: the prohibition against slaughtering a parent and its offspring on the same day.111 Apparently, the concern is that an Aramaic translator of the Hebrew text would insert an introductory phrase (section H) that would lead the audience – who only knew Aramaic and not Hebrew – to incorrectly assume that this rule is based on God’s compassion and not just God’s command.112 As Christine Hayes observes: What is striking about this teaching is that it too denies a rationale to a biblical law that might otherwise be understood – quite easily and naturally – as arising from moral considerations. To ascribe a moral rationale or purpose to this law is portrayed not merely as misguided or unnecessary but wrong – divine law must be understood and affirmed first and foremost as pure fiat that attests to the sovereignty of its author.113

Once again, the reason why is asked, but the answer is: “Because God said so. Now, shut up and do it.” In short, the argument is based on revelation and not reason. Despite vehemently condemning mercy as justification for these biblical laws, there is at least one amoraic tradition that suggests that such an argument might be valid. [A] “[However, no] animal from the herd or from the flock [shall be slaughtered on the same day as its young]” (Lev 22:28). 111

112

113

As we have seen also in numerous other cases, the rabbis tend to focus on the how and not the why of this legislation. For example, see b. Hullin 82a–b, which only discusses the intricacies of the same day law and not its justification. Further, though this text explicitly refers to God as “The Merciful One” (‫)רחמנא‬, it never raises the possibility that this legislation is rooted in the divine attribute of mercy. Another instance in which mercy is not appealed to in regard to this legislation is b. Shabbat 117b (cp. 124a), in which the question of animals’ suffering is brought up, but as part of a specific case and clearly not in regard to the same day law itself. On the practice of translating the Hebrew Bible into Aramaic in general, see Steven D. Fraade, “Rabbinic Views on the Practice of Targum, and Multilingualism in the Jewish Galilee of the Third-Sixth Centuries,” in Lee I. Levine (ed.), The Galilee in Late Antiquity (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1992), 253–286. Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law, 260.

Why Various Animals Are Permitted or Prohibited

129

[B] R. Berekiah in the name of R. Levi [said]:114 It is written: “The righteous man understands what his beast desires” (Prov 12:10).115 [C] “The righteous man understands” – this refers to the Holy One, Blessed be He, who wrote in His Torah: “do not take the mother along with her young” (Deut 22:6). [D] “while the ‘mercies’ of the wicked are cruel” (Prov 12:10) – this refers to Sennacherib116 the wicked, of whom it is written: “the mother was dashed in pieces with her young” (Hos 14:10). [E] Another matter: [F] “The righteous man understands what his beast desires” (Prov 12:10) – this refers to the Holy One, Blessed be He, who wrote in His Torah: “However, no animal from the herd or from the flock shall be slaughtered on the same day as its young” (Lev 22:28). [G] “while the ‘mercies’ of the wicked are cruel” (Prov 12:10) – this refers to Haman the wicked, of whom it is written: “[And letters were sent . . .] to destroy, to slay, and to annihilate [all the Jews, both young and old, little children and women, on the same day]”(Esth 3:13).117

Here, God appears to be “The Merciful One” (‫)רחמנא‬. As a compassionate deity, God discerns the desires of beasts and issues commands that address these desires. The divine decrees in Deuteronomy 22:6 and Leviticus 22:28 are therefore based on God’s mercy.118 In contrast, the wicked Sennacherib and Haman lack mercy; hence, they perform heinous acts like smashing into pieces mothers alongside their children and massacring all Jews on the same day, regardless of their age or gender.119 Importantly, however, it is God who is merciful for writing these commandments in God’s Torah. This text does not take the next step and explicitly extend the attribution of mercy to God’s chosen people, the Jews, who follow God’s merciful commandments. For this reason, a Jew who follows these biblical commandments is not, by nature of doing so, engaging in a merciful act. And, further, this text refers to God as “righteous,” while the evildoers are mockingly referred to as merciful. Thus, even though divine mercy is 114 115

116 117 118

119

The names of these rabbis are not consistent in all manuscripts. On the translation of this verse, and relevant commentary, see Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 10–31: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 18B (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 551–552. One manuscript reads: “Nebuchadnezzar.” Leviticus Rabbah 27:11 (ed. Margulies 644–645; cp. Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 9:11; Tanhuma Emor 18). While this passage focuses on Lev 22:28, it brings Deut 22:6 and the issue of the bird’s nest into the discussion about mercy as a justification for these biblical commandments. Therefore, I address this text in the present section. Elsewhere, one could read the condemnation in b. Shabbat 67b of the reputed Amorite practice of breaking eggs on a wall in front of fledglings as being based on mercy (cp. to the actions of Sennacherib above). However, this text almost certainly condemns a magical practice intended to save the life of the fledglings, so it is not relevant to the conversation at hand.

130

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

implied, it is not stated outright. Hence, one who recited this tradition would not necessarily be silenced. These two traditions potentially stand in unresolved tension with one another. On the one hand, anyone who dares to assert “that the commandments are based on the merciful nature of the Holy One, Blessed be He” is to be silenced; on the other hand, these same divine decrees are understood to be authored by “The righteous man,” whose commands are acts of mercy. While the former is an extension of earlier traditions, the latter is a new wrinkle. It would appear that, for at least some Amoraim, these biblical laws are “based on the merciful nature of the Holy One, Blessed be He.” For most Amoraim then, revelation was sufficient; for some, revelation stood alongside reason as justification for these biblical commandments.120 Other Forbidden Animals Amoraic texts also address various other biblically forbidden animals, including: nevelah, terefah,121 swarming creatures, and impure animals in general. Although many of these conversations are fascinating, they address issues related to the how and not the why, from whether these prohibitions extend to deriving benefit from these animals,122 to the minimum amount necessary to ingest in order to violate the laws,123 etc.124 The need for much 120 121

122

123

124

Regardless of which stance an Amora took on this issue, probably all would agree that following this biblical commandment merits one a reward in The World to Come (see e.g. b. Qiddushin 39b). On nevelah and terefah, see the discussions in chapters 1 and 5. These terms often stand in for all forbidden foods, such as in Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 10:9 (cp. Tanhuma Re’eh 16), when the ingestion of untithed produce is deemed equivalent to the consumption of nevelah and terefah. Further, they can serve as metaphors for forbidden “foods” (i.e. sexual partners, especially women) as is the case in b. Qiddushin 21b–22a. On this text, see Shaye J. D. Cohen, The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 258. On the connection between food and sexuality, see nn. 32, 65, and 142. See e.g. y. Shevi’it 7:4, 37c; y. Pesahim 2:1, 28c; y. Bava Qamma 7:10, 6a; b. Pesahim 23b. On b. Pesahim 21b (cp. 41a; b. Qiddushin 56b), a general principle appears: whenever the Hebrew Bible prohibits the ingestion of a foodstuff, that prohibition includes a ban on deriving benefit thereof, unless an explicit exception appears in the biblical text (and cites nevelah as an example of the latter). See e.g. y. Sanhedrin 11:6, 30b (which implies that the minimum amount is a rabbinic, and not biblical, ruling). Included in this is the mixture principle, in which a certain amount of permitted food nullifies a specific ratio of prohibited food. See e.g. y. Terumot 5:3, 43c; y. Orlah 1:3, 61b; b. Hullin 98a–b; and for general discussion of this principle (which is tannaitic in origin) see Kraemer, Jewish Eating, 55–72. See e.g. y. Yoma 8:5, 45b (medical dispensations, citing m. Yoma 8:6; contrast Ruth Rabbah 6:4 [cf. m. Yoma 8:4], in which such behavior can lead to apostasy!); y. Megillah 1:11, 71d (a Torah may be written only on a scroll made from animal hides technically valid for ingestion); y. Nazir 6:1, 54c–55a (a collection of relevant biblical sources for prohibitions of various foodstuffs); y. Sanhedrin 8:2, 26a (in regard to the rebellious and incorrigible son; cp. m. Sanhedrin 8:2); y. Shevu’ot 1:5–8, 33a–b (offering made to atone for eating forbidden foodstuffs); Tanhuma Huqqat 2 (Lev 20:25 also

Why Various Animals Are Permitted or Prohibited

131

discussion on the how-to is warranted, as even Moses himself reportedly required patient instruction by God on some of these matters.125 While the how receives much attention, the only time that a why for these laws arises is in a discussion about how a rabbinic judge should be able to argue that a land swarmer is both pure and impure in one hundred different ways.126 Of course, the purpose of this is to prove the legal knowledge and prowess of the rabbinic judge, and not to provide a general rationale for the law itself. The explicit rationale for these laws remains unquestioned. This is the case even when it seems like such a discussion would be warranted. For example, why do (good, rabbinic)127 Jews not eat forbidden foods placed before them? Because the Torah commands a Jew to abstain.128 When Pesiqta Rabbati 10:3 asks this question, this answer is accepted at face value. God’s words serve as a means to prevent one from violating God’s words. Torah is a hedge of lilies129 that protects one from violating God’s wishes. The question left unanswered is: why were these God’s wishes? While this question is not addressed (beyond the consistent, and often unstated, justification based on revelation) the repercussions for those who are less than careful with regard to these forbidden foodstuffs is

125

126

127 128

129

applies to the utensils by which impure foodstuffs are prepared, and further specifies the mechanisms by which they are purified); b. Hullin 67a–b (on the permissibility of various insects based on ancient understandings of entomology and biology). This includes forbidden parts and/or preparations of animals, for example the limb of a living animal (e.g. y. Orlah 3:1, 62d; y. Pesahim 2:1, 28c; y. Nazir 6:1, 54c–d; Genesis Rabbah 16:6; 34:8, 13; 84:7; b. Pesahim 22b; b. Sanhedrin 56a–b; b. Zevahim 116a [which includes a discussion of whether Noah had non-kosher animals on the ark]; b. Hullin 68a–69b; 101b–103a; b. Me’ilah 16a). See e.g. Exodus Rabbah 15:28; Numbers Rabbah 15:4; Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 5:15; Pesiqta Rabbati 15:21; b. Menahot 29a (cp. Mekhilta d’Rabbi Ishmael Pisha 2; Tanhuma Shemini 11). According to Tanhuma Tazria 2, God instructs babies in the womb about the biblical food laws and then, having accepted the commandments, the baby is born. See y. Sanhedrin 4:1, 22a (cp. b. Sanhedrin 17a–b), which also notes that one must have substance (Torah knowledge) and not just style (fancy rhetoric that lacks true content). Contrast Tanhuma Shemini 13, which states that only God can declare things pure or impure (in regard to Lev 11). However, according to Pesiqta Rabbati 21:6, God built an equal amount of contradictory reasons into the Hebrew Bible itself; further, when the resolution seems unclear, one must follow the majority opinion. The reason for the existence of impure creatures, but not of the prohibition thereof, is discussed in y. Berakhot 9:3, 13c. It is worth remembering that, as is also the case today, not all Jews adhered to biblical (and certainly not rabbinic) law in antiquity. While b. Bava Metzi’a 61b notes that forbidden foods are deemed more repulsive than other biblically prohibited items or practices (e.g. usury) it is notable for what it both mentions (that all of these prohibitions have the same reward) and does not mention (an explicit rationale besides revelation). The repulsiveness of non-kosher food is presumed often in rabbinic texts (e.g. b. Bekhorot 37a; above, n. 65). Here the text cites Song 7:3.

132

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

a subject of discussion.130 One story recounts the tale of an unscrupulous butcher who gives Jews non-kosher meat under fraudulent pretenses. He receives an appropriate recompense: since he stole food fit only for dogs (i.e. nevelah) he ends up dead with dogs licking his blood.131 This tale is part of a trope in which Jews, intentionally or accidentally, acquire and ingest non-kosher meat, and the text then assesses the repercussions of said purchases/consumption.132 Such tales contrast with stories of heroic Jews who, when confronted with temptation in the form of pleasure (remember R. Aqiba’s story) or survival (choose nevelah or death), show self-restraint and select the rabbinically correct option.133 All of these stories sit at the intersection between abstract scholastic thought and practical reality. They engage in theoretical thinking but also confront real-world scenarios, in which Jewish butchers are unscrupulous; the careful are accidentally or intentionally led astray; or temptation for sex or survival might lead to theologically and physically disastrous results. In doing so, they address the what happens if . . . question, but not the why. In sum, the rabbis presume that the reason for these laws is obvious: God spoke, and Jews must comply (i.e. revelation). They thus turn their attention to other matters that they deem worthy of further conversation. 130

131

132

133

In addition to the texts discussed below, b. Horayot 13a–b might be relevant. This sugya notes that eating that which a mouse ate (and, how much the more so eating the mouse itself or a cat, which eats mice!) leads one to forget his learning. Further, it comments that mice are greedy and destroy property even though they do not derive sustenance from doing so. That being said, this passage in no way connects these concerns to justifications for biblical food laws. Unlike the allegories for the weasel that we see in chapters 3 and 7, this passage does not expand a polemic against a particular animal into an allegory for vice and virtue, which then serves to justify the biblical ban on that animal. For a discussion of the polemics in this text, see Joshua Schwartz, “Cats in Ancient Jewish Society,” JJS 52/2 (2001): 211–234, esp. 229–233. See y. Terumot 8:5, 45c; y. Avodah Zarah 2:3, 41a; Leviticus Rabbah 5:6 (contrast b. Sanhedrin 25a, which suggests it is possible for such a butcher to atone for his business and theological fraud). In a polemical text, Ishmael is compared to a dog who eats carrion in Genesis Rabbah 45:9. For the opposite case, in which a scrupulous butcher is rewarded for his pious actions, see Pesiqta Rabbati 23:7. For historical views of the dog in Judaism in general, see Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman and Rakefet Zalashik, eds., A Jew’s Best Friend? The Image of the Dog throughout Jewish History (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2013). See e.g. Leviticus Rabbah 4:3; Ecclesiastes Rabbah 12.14.1. The latter reference has two relevant pericopae: the first is parallel to the former source, and the second one discusses the issue of butchers removing forbidden fat and veins (on this, see e.g. y. Demai 2:5, 23a). On the effects that such actions have on one’s ability to provide legal testimony, see b. Sanhedrin 27a; and on one’s status visà-vis the rabbinic community, see e.g. b. Gittin 47a; b. Avodah Zarah 26b; 46b; b. Horayot 11a; Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 154–161. On the ability of a rabbinic court to prevent a minor from eating forbidden food if his father instructs him to do so, see b. Shabbat 121a (cf. b. Yevamot 114a). R. Aqiba’s story: see above, n. 65. Survival: see y. Shevi’it 4:2, 35a–b; y. Sanhedrin 3:6, 21b (and above, n. 66). Further, as b. Shabbat 145b notes, the non-kosher diet of idolaters makes them lustful. On the bodily effects of non-kosher food, also see below, n. 134.

Gentile Food and Gentile Table Companions

133

Underlying these discussions is the presumption that the vast majority of these rules are applicable to Jews and not Gentiles.134 This notion also leads to the presumption that “Jewish food” and “Gentile food” are two separate, distinct categories, the latter of which is forbidden to Jews. It is to this concept that we now turn.

Gentile Food and Gentile Table Companions In their expansive interpretation of the biblical food laws, the rabbis add a series of regulations not encountered – neither explicitly nor implicitly – in the Hebrew Bible. Some of these rules are adaptations of earlier Jewish practices, but many are rabbinic innovations.135 The area of the most extensive new regulations concerns Gentile participation in food preparation (both supervised and unsupervised) and the resulting status of those foodstuffs.136 The reasons for these rules are often assumed. However, when the rabbinic rationale is provided, it often centers on fear of idolatry,137 fear for Jewish safety (especially concerning poisoned 134

135 136

137

e.g. see Leviticus Rabbah 13:2 (cp. Exodus Rabbah 30:22; Ecclesiastes Rabbah 5.6.1); Lamentations Rabbah 1.3.28; b. Ketubbot 15b; b. Bava Metzi’a 58b (converts no longer eat non-kosher food; for a discussion of this tradition, see Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 72–73); 111b. Interestingly, b. Shabbat 86b (cp. b. Niddah 34b) notes that the ingestion of biblically forbidden animals by nonJewish women raises their body temperatures and thus disintegrates semen in their bodies (and suggests that the same process occurs in Jewish women’s bodies as a result of the heat generated by their worry about properly observing the commandments; on non-kosher food raising body temperatures in another context, see b. Avodah Zarah 31b). On the issues raised in this text, see Satlow, Tasting the Dish, 96–98. For discussion, see especially Chapters 3 and 5. Sometimes the status of a Gentile foodstuff can depend upon the availability of an alternative product prepared by a Jew. Bread is an example of this phenomenon. See e.g. y. Shevi’it 8:4, 38a; y. Ma’aser Sheni 3:1, 54a; y. Shabbat 1:7, 3c; y. Avodah Zarah 2:8, 41d; b. Avodah Zarah 35b. For discussion, see David M. Freidenreich, Foreigners and Their Food: Constructing Otherness in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011), 76–83; “Contextualizing Bread: An Analysis of Talmudic Discourse in Light of Christian and Islamic Counterparts,” JAAR 80/2 (2012): 411–433. This is especially true in regard to wine (also noted in Chapter 5). See e.g. y. Shevi’it 4:2, 35a; y. Terumot 8:5, 45c; y. Avodah Zarah 4:8–9, 44a–b; 4:11–5:14, 44b–45b; b. Shabbat 17b (cp. b. Avodah Zarah 36b); b. Yevamot 46a (cp. b. Avodah Zarah 59a); b. Avodah Zarah 29b–32a; passim (and on idolatry in general, see the entire tractate of Avodah Zarah). The rabbis themselves acknowledge that Gentile wine was not always prohibited. See e.g. b. Hullin 4b (cf. Song of Songs Rabbah 4.12.3; Sifre Numbers 131). Further, they debate how to handle the wine of interstitial categories of people (see e.g. b. Avodah Zarah 64b). Other Gentile food prohibitions are also recognized as novel, for example regarding Gentile cheese (see b. Avodah Zarah 35a–b [cp. Song of Songs Rabbah 1.2.1; cf. m. Avodah Zarah 2:5 and parallels (discussed in Chapter 5); Freidenreich, Foreigners and Their Food, 56; 242 n. 41]); and olive oil (e.g. y. Avodah Zarah 2:8, 41d; b. Avodah Zarah 35b–36b; on these texts, see Hidary, Dispute for the Sake of Heaven, 327–332). General concern with the cooked food of idolaters is also evidenced (e.g. Tanhuma Behar 9), but not with their raw food (e.g. b. Shabbat 51a;

134

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

food),138 fear of ingesting non-kosher food,139 and occasionally oblique references to biblical injunctions.140 Another fear is one that we have encountered in previous chapters: commensality. Like their Hellenistic and tannaitic brethren, the Amoraim are concerned about proper table companions (from the Latin com + panis = “together with bread,” meaning the person(s) with whom one shares bread). With whom one eats is as important as what one eats. Thus, celebrating commensally with Gentiles – even if one were to provide kosher food and servers – is still deemed non-kosher.141 As we have also seen before, table companionship is sexualized, with the fear that social intercourse leads to sexual intercourse.142 While this section does not add much direct evidence for justifying biblical food laws, it does lay out some of the assumptions that underlie

138

139 140

141

142

b. Betzah 16a–b; b. Yevamot 46a [cp. b. Avodah Zarah 59a]; b. Avodah Zarah 37b–38a [commenting on m. Avodah Zarah 2:6]; further, see below, n. 139). See e.g. y. Terumot 8:5, 45c–d (various foodstuffs regarding uncovered liquids in general; cp. m. Terumot 8:4–7; t. Terumot 7:12–17; and the discussion that continues in y. Terumot 8:6–8, 45d–46a); y. Shabbat 1:7, 3d (cheese and various liquids); b. Avodah Zarah 30a–b; 31b; and for general discussion, see Kraemer, Jewish Eating, 69–72; and Freidenreich, Foreigners and Their Food, 73–74. See e.g. y. Terumot 8:5, 45d (milk; cp. m. Avodah Zarah 2:6; t. Avodah Zarah 4:11; y. Shabbat 1:7, 3d); y. Sheqalim 7:5, 50c (meat). See e.g. y. Avodah Zarah 2:8, 41d, y. Shabbat 1:7, 3d, and b. Avodah Zarah 35b–36b (Daniel, in Dan 1:8, decreed against Gentile olive oil); b. Sanhedrin 104a (inappropriate commensality led to exile, commenting on 2 Kgs 20); y. Shabbat 1:7, 3c (cp. y. Avodah Zarah 2:8, 41d), which references Deut 2:6 in order to argue that Jews should only purchase uncooked food from Gentiles. This preference for raw vs. cooked food obviously echoes the famous theory of Claude Lévi-Strauss, a connection that did not escape the attention of Freidenreich, Foreigners and Their Food, 61–62. I have written elsewhere about my views on the applicability of Lévi-Strauss to the study of rabbinic texts (see Rosenblum, Food and Identity, 77 n. 151). See Avot d’Rabbi Natan A26:13–15; cp. t. Avodah Zarah 4:6 (discussed in Chapter 5); b. Avodah Zarah 8a. On these texts, see Philippe Bornet, Rites et Pratiques de l’hospitalité: Mondes Juifs et Indiens Anciens (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010), 128–132; Freidenreich, Foreigners and Their Food, 74–76; Hayes, Between the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds, 160–169. For possible leniencies, see Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish Society, 174 n. 25. See e.g. y. Sanhedrin 10:2, 28d (cp. b. Sanhedrin 106a; Numbers Rabbah 20:23; Tanhuma Balaq 27; Sifre Numbers 131, discussed in Chapter 5); y. Shabbat 1:7, 3d; b. Megillah 12b (cf. Esther Rabbah 3:13; Song of Songs Rabbah 8.14.1); b. Avodah Zarah 31b; 35b; and implied in several other texts (e.g. b. Megillah 13b; b. Shabbat 17b [cp. b. Avodah Zarah 36b; see Satlow, Tasting the Dish, 210–211]). The same applies to commensality between rabbinic Jews and non-rabbinic Jews (e.g. y. Shevi’it 8:10, 38b; b. Shabbat 13a). Finally, this can also be observed in contexts that use food metaphors to discuss forbidden sexual relations, either with a non-Jewish or Jewish (i.e. a menstruant) woman (e.g. b. Shabbat 13a; 62b–63a [see Satlow, Tasting the Dish, 152]; b. Qiddushin 40a; b. Sanhedrin 75a; Weingarten, “Gynaecophagia”; and above, nn. 32, 65, and 121). Another related topic is the difference in table talk. Gentiles are depicted as discussing lascivious matters at the table (see e.g. Esther Rabbah 3:13; b. Megillah 12b) and abstaining from reciting proper blessings of thanks to God (see e.g. Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 28:2; Pesiqta Rabbati 52:2). Rabbinically proper decorum is especially important since the rabbis understand the rabbinic table to function as a replacement for the Temple altar (see e.g. b. Berakhot 55a; b. Hagigah 27a; b. Menahot 97a).

The World to Come

135

relevant rabbinic discussions. And perhaps no area of rabbinic investigation bases itself on these presumptions more than discourse related to our next subject: The World to Come.

The World to Come The rabbis believe in two worlds: their present reality (This World; ‫)עולם הזה‬ and a future time, when the just receive their divine reward and the wicked incur their divine punishment (The World to Come; ‫)עולם הבא‬. The World to Come solves the problem of theodicy, or divine justice. Since present reality does not always accord with rabbinic ideals (for example, good things happen to bad people, while bad things happen to good people) this future time allows for an alternate universe in which the real and the ideal are in harmony.143 Important for the matter at hand are two aspects of The World to Come. First, since it is a future time when divine reward and punishment are meted out, the rabbis use The World to Come as a vehicle to discuss the reason why some commandments exist.144 While the answer (especially in regard to food regulations) usually amounts to “because they merit one admittance into The World to Come,” such conversations prove worthy of our consideration.145 Second, The World to Come is a time when that which is hidden in This World becomes crystal clear.146 As such, it serves as a mechanism to answer theologically befuddling questions. Such an argument requires one to act piously and have faith that all things will be revealed in the future. It is in this capacity, as we shall see below, that sometimes the rabbis use The World to Come as a means of justification for their preferred dietary practices in This World. 143

144

145 146

For an expanded version of my argument in this section, see Jordan D. Rosenblum, “Dining In(to) The World To Come,” “olam ha’zeh v’olam ha-ba”: This World and the World to Come in Jewish Belief and Practice, ed. Leonard Greenspoon, Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Symposium of the Klutznick Chair in Jewish Civilization-Harris Center for Judaic StudiesSchwalb Center for Israel and Jewish Studies, October 25–26, 2015 (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2017 [forthcoming]). As Pesiqta Rabbati 23/24:2 notes: since one does not know which commandments will merit entrance into The World to Come, one should take heed to observe them all! Interesting in light of our topic of food is the rabbinic idiom often used to describe the reward that one accrues for following certain practices: eating fruit in This World and enjoying its remaining principle in The World to Come (see e.g. m. Pe’ah 1:1; b. Qiddushin 39b). See e.g. Tanhuma Shelah 28; implied in b. Qiddushin 39b; and the examples below. This wording is drawn from Pesiqta Rabbati 14:13 (ed. Ulmer 247). Further, Elijah will expound new interpretations therein, some of which involve the food laws (see e.g. b. Menahot 45b, which refers to Ezek 44:31).

136

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

Both of these aspects are present in a parable that appears in Leviticus Rabbah 13:2: [A] R. Tanhum b. Hanilai said: This may be compared with the case of a physician who went to visit two sick persons, one who would live, and another who would die. [B] To the one who would live, he said: “This and that you may not eat.” [C] But to the one would die, he said to them:147 “Whatever he wants [to eat], bring it to him.” [D] Thus, of the [other] nations of the world, who are not destined for the life of the World to Come, [it is written in regard to them,] “[Every moving thing that lives shall be food for you]; as the green herbs, I have given you all” (Gen 9:3).148 [E] But to Israel, who are destined for the life of The World to Come, [it is written], “These are the living things [‫ ]החיה‬that you may eat from among all of the quadrupeds on the land” (Lev 11:2).149

Using the common rabbinic technique of the parable, the text discusses a physician who has two patients: one presents with a minor illness and the other with a fatal illness. To the one who will survive, the doctor prescribes a careful dietary regimen, since that patient will heal. To the one who will not survive, however, the doctor allows all foods, since a dying person need not worry about dietary issues.150 After all, there is no reason to skip dessert if these are a person’s last few meals on earth. In the parable, Gentiles are the dying patient. They can eat “all,” since they are destined to die in This World. Hence, Genesis 9:3 allows them to eat everything. Jews, on the other hand, are the living patient. They cannot 147

148

149

150

The plural pronoun (‫ )להם‬here either: anticipates the application of the parable (wherein the dying person is compared to the other nations); is addressed to the ones taking care of the patient; is a typographical error (the singular form appears in one manuscript); or the plural form should appear in both instances (as it does in some manuscripts) and merely suggests the general application of this parable. Some rabbis understood the prohibition against consuming blood (discussed in the next biblical verse, Gen 9:4) to also apply to Gentiles; most authorities considered the prohibition against spilling human blood (see Gen 9:5–6) to apply universally, as well. For example, see Genesis Rabbah 34:8. The above text only cites Gen 9:3, which refers to “all,” and is a universal permission given prior to the particular rules given only to Israel at Sinai. Ed. Margulies 276 (emphasis added). Cf. Exodus Rabbah 30:22; Ecclesiastes Rabbah 5.6.1; Tanhuma Shemini 10 (which spells out the logic even more clearly). I have written elsewhere about this text: see Jordan D. Rosenblum, “Justifications for Foodways and the Study of Commensality,” in Susanne Kerner, Cynthia Chou, and Morten Warmind (eds.), Commensality: From Everyday Food to Feast (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 191–192; “Jewish Meals in Antiquity,” in John M. Wilkins and Robin Nadeau (eds.), A Companion to Food in the Ancient World (New York: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 353–354. Though in a different context, a similar metaphor is used by Augustine (On the Profit of Believing, 29).

The World to Come

137

eat “all,” since they are destined to live beyond This World and to enter The World to Come. Hence, Leviticus 11:2 commands them to only eat “living things” (‫)החיה‬.151 I have purposely translated this word differently than as it appears in Chapter 1, as “creatures.”152 The rabbis are playing on the dual meaning of the Hebrew word ha-hayya (‫)החיה‬, which literally means “living things.” They understand God˙to command Jews to eat only living things, which in turn will grant Jews life in The World to Come. Gentiles do not eat only living things, and thus they are denied access.153 This text presumes the chosen-ness of Israel, who alone enters The World to Come.154 Of course, this is not the only domain in which the rabbis presume that Israel is a special, chosen, and divinely set-apart people. It is for this reason, for example, that since the Tannaitic period, the daily morning liturgy includes a blessing praising the fact “that [God] did not make me a Gentile.”155 Chosen for a special diet with special benefits, Jews are rewarded. Eating is a biological necessity. It is a matter of life or death. For the rabbis, it is also a matter of eternal life or death. The reason for biblical food laws is therefore to guarantee that Jews ingest the essential vitamins and nutrients to assure them entrance into The World to Come.156 Eating food sustains them in This World; and eating “living things” sustains them in The World to Come. Yet, though food is an instrumental means for entrance into The World to Come, once one enters this future world, the rules change. In a fascinating reversal, foods forbidden to Jews in This World will be permitted in The World to Come. The reward for not eating pork, terefah, and nevelah in This World, therefore, is not only entrance into The World to Come, but the opportunity to enjoy these formerly

151 152 153

154

155 156

Elsewhere, rabbinic slaughter regulations are derived from the same wording of this passage (see e.g. b. Hullin 42a). For additional amoraic hermeneutics of this verse, see above nn. 45–46. As I note in Chapter 1, I follow the translation of Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16. For other discussions about Gentiles eating everything only in This World and only Jews entering The World to Come, see Pesiqta Rabbati 16:6; Ecclesiastes Rabbah 1.9.1. Converts receive entrance to The World to Come and can partake of the food therein, as is implied in regard to the Leviathan in y. Megillah 1:13, 72b (cp. y. Megillah 3:2, 74a; y. Sanhedrin 10:6, 29c). On this text, see Shaye J. D. Cohen, “The Conversion of Antoninus,” in The Talmud Yerushalmi and Graeco-Roman Culture I, ed. Peter Schäfer (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 141–172. For a discussion of how this general concept functions throughout the rabbinic corpus, see Sacha Stern, Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writings (New York: E.J. Brill, 1994), 42–46, 200–202, and passim. t. Berakhot 6:18 (ed. Lieberman 1:38); cf. b. Menahot 43b. Speaking more generally, b. Yoma 39a notes that if one makes himself impure in This World, then he is impure also in The World to Come (an exegesis of Lev 11:43); in contrast, if one makes himself sanctified in This World, then he is sanctified also in The World to Come.

138

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Amoraic Sources

forbidden foodstuffs for eternity.157 As Leviticus Rabbah 13:3 makes abundantly clear: why are Jews commanded not to eat forbidden food in This World? “In order that you may eat it in The Time to Come.”158 This delayed reward is made even more deliciously spectacular by the addition of two mythical creatures to the permitted buffet to come: Behemoth, a land creature; and Leviathan, a sea creature.159 As a combination platter, these formerly forbidden and formerly mythical creatures provide a sense of purpose to unjustified biblical food laws. Or, in the terminology that I employ throughout this book, they offer a reason beyond just revelation. Though The World to Come promises both eschatological and epicurean delights, the rabbis do not forget that one must make the most of This World. Thus, we find: [A] R. Hezekiah [said] R. Cohen [said] in the name of Rav: In the future, man must give a summary and account concerning all [permitted foods] that his eyes beheld, but he did not eat. [B] R. Lazar considered this teaching and set aside funds so that he could eat every [permitted] thing once a year.160

The World to Come promises to be a culinary extravaganza.161 However, the rabbis do not want Jews to forget that there are plenty of delicious foods 157

158

159

160

161

See e.g. Leviticus Rabbah 13:3 (nevelah and terefah; other forbidden foodstuffs appear in manuscript variants); 22:10 (Leviathan and ziz [see above, n. 102; cp. Pesiqta Rabbati 16:4]); Ecclesiastes Rabbah 1.9.1 (pork, nevelah, terefah, abominations, and land swarmers; and also includes an etymology of pork, discussed above at n. 64; cp. Tanhuma Shemini 14); Pesiqta Rabbati 16:4 (general discussion about Behemoth, Leviathan, and ziz). It should be noted that not all rabbis agree with these views. e.g. Rav argues that there is neither eating nor drinking in The World to Come (b. Berakhot 17a). Most rabbis, however, presume not only eating and drinking, but sumptuous feasting therein. Ed. Margulies 279 (commenting on Lev 7:24); cp. Midrash Psalms 146:4 (which has traditions that both support and contradict this notion). “The Time to Come” (‫ )לעתיד לבוא‬is another way of referring to The World to Come in rabbinic literature. Further, according to Leviticus Rabbah 22:10, certain fish and birds were prohibited in This World, but they will be replaced by the permitted mythical creatures Leviathan and ziz, respectively, in The World to Come. Finally, on the fact that God gave Israel commandments in order to give them a reward, see e.g. Tanhuma Shemini 13. See e.g. Leviticus Rabbah 13:3 (which includes their method of slaughter, with reference to m. Hullin 1:2 and future instructions by God); Pesiqta Rabbati 48:3; Tanhuma Beshallah 24 (which also mentions the ziz); b. Bava Batra 74b–75a. For a discussion that places these traditions in their broader ancient context, with reference to additional texts, see Debra Scoggins Ballentine, The Conflict Myth and the Biblical Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 150–166. On the question of whether Christians will eat in their conception of The World to Come, see e.g. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man, 19; On the Soul and the Resurrection (for the latter reference, see NPNF 2.5.463–464). y. Qiddushin 4:12, 66b (ed. Schäfer and Becker 3:432); cf. b. Eruvin 54a. On making sure to eat food that one likes (and, perhaps, with repercussions vis-à-vis The World to Come) see Avot d’Rabbi Natan A26:19. The World to Come is assured to be a sumptuous feast in several of the texts noted above and elsewhere in rabbinic literature (e.g. Pesiqta Rabbati 41:5; b. Ketubbot 111b). The notion that a future time will offer a mouth-watering buffet was not unique to the rabbis. It was clearly a belief held by other Jews in

Conclusion

139

in This World. In fact, it is these very permitted foods that combine to form the diet necessary for entrance into the buffet found in The World to Come. Further, by remembering to eat all permitted foods in This World, one is constantly reminded of the eternal-future-oriented purpose of the very system. The World to Come promises many rewards. Entrance into it is granted to Jews who engage in proper, rabbinic practice, especially regarding observance of food regulations. Though admission into this future world serves as a rabbinic justification for the biblical food regulations, why precisely this is the case remains unexplained; revelation, therefore, remains an unstated justification when reason fails. Leviticus 11:2 may command Jews to eat “living things” in order to assure them entrance into The World to Come, but why a cow is a “living thing” and a pig is not continues to confound.

Conclusion Following in the rabbinic footsteps of the Tannaim, the Amoraim continue to discuss how biblical food laws are to be put into practice. Despite perpetuating this trend, however, the Amoraim do at least on occasion discuss why these laws should be practiced. In these instances, the Amoraim go beyond straight appeals to revelation in order to justify their own foodrelated interpretations and practices. Of course, the rabbis believe that doing something just because God says so is a reasonable enough justification for a given action. But for the Amoraim, sometimes it is acceptable (and perhaps even necessary) to offer a more rational reason for one’s culinary and commensal actions in addition to divine revelation. As we shall see in the next chapter, the why question is central to early Christian exegetes, who understand the biblical dietary laws to be allegories for proper moral action, but not for proper dietary practice. Further, despite sharing a similar chronology and attention to the same biblical texts, these early Christian authors seem to be engaged not in a dialogue with the rabbinic texts discussed either in this chapter or in the previous one, but rather in a monologue with themself. antiquity, though each group placed its own spin on it based on its own theological assumptions. For example, see the famous messianic banquet described in the Dead Sea Scrolls (e.g. 1Q28a 2:11–22).

chapter 7

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Christian Sources

There is more or less hog in all of us. Our business in this world is to get rid of it. We can be men instead of hogs if we do our best to starve the hog part of us . . . So long as we are slaves to the lust for wealth we are essentially no better than hogs.1

Hellenistic Jews understood the biblical food laws to be based on reason. They are logical and result in proper thought and action.2 For the rabbis, the basis of these laws was revelation. God revealed them and thus they must be followed. That is reason enough. Though, as we saw in Chapter 4, New Testament texts rarely offer justifications for biblical food laws, in the centuries that follow many early Christian authors3 interpreted these laws as allegories for proper thought and action. In this way, they seem similar to Hellenistic Jews. However, there is one major difference: for these early Christians, once one understands the allegory, one need not follow the literal law. Yet, the moral lesson still must be heeded.4 The approach employed by these early Christian exegetes therefore combines revelation, 1 2

3

4

“Hogs and Men,” Editorial, Berkshire World and Corn Belt Stockman, December 1, 1910, p. 3. Character development was an important part of ancient ethics. For a discussion that applies modern scholarship on ethics to the ancient world (in particular, in regard to the rabbis) see Jonathan Wyn Schofer, The Making of a Sage: A Study in Rabbinic Ethics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005). It is hard to find a concise and precise nomenclature for the group of authors that I discuss in this chapter. While many of them would later be labeled “Church Fathers,” others are considered schismatics or heretics. In order to not take a particular stance on any of these normative issues, I will resort to using various phrases like “early Christian authors/exegetes/interpreters,” or even simply “early Christians.” I also take this approach so that I can talk about the broader concepts of these religious experts without getting too bogged down in an issue that is not of my present concern. My understanding of the term “religious expert,” which lurks in the background of how I read many of these texts, is informed by: Daniel C. Ullucci, “What Did He Say? The Ideas of Religious Experts and the 99%,” in Religious Competition in the Third-Century C.E.: Jews, Christians, and the GrecoRoman World, eds. Jordan D. Rosenblum, Lily C. Vuong, and Nathaniel P. DesRosiers, JAJS (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), 21–31. Similarly, see Marcel Simon, Verus Israel: A Study of the Relations between Christians and Jews in the Roman Empire AD 135–425, trans. H. McKeating (Portland: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2009 [1966, 1986]), 150–151.

140

Reason Not to Follow the (Ritual) Law

141

reason, and allegory: these divinely revealed laws must be followed, but the reason why they are followed is due to their allegorical meaning. In this chapter, we will explore how many early Christian interpreters allegorized biblical food laws. Though early Christian authors and the early rabbis discussed in the previous two chapters both interpreted biblical texts about dietary regulations, their various conversations display no discernible sign of being in direct conversation with one another. Rather, it seems that their different hermeneutical assumptions led them to very different exegetical conclusions. Therefore, before examining these fascinating texts, we must discuss two important and interrelated assumptions that undergird this allegorical turn: (1) that the Law need not be literally followed; and (2) the requirement to observe the Spirit of the Law, but not the Letter of the Law. For it is only after we understand these assumptions that we can fully grasp how and why these early Christians chose this particular hermeneutic strategy.

Reason Not to Follow the (Ritual) Law In his classic volume, Verus Israel, Marcel Simon offers an account of how and why early Christians developed their allegorical exegeses. According to Simon, they made “a fundamental distinction between the moral law, on the one hand, and the ritual and ceremonial law on the other.”5 Old Testament moral law is universal, continually relevant, and eternal. Old Testament ritual law is particular, historically bound, and transient. Given these premises, the ritual laws are no longer in effect, as they are long past their expiration date.6 Alternatively, according to other early Christian exegetes, the ritual laws were always an allegory, and thus they were 5 6

Verus Israel, 163. Throughout this entire section, I draw on the theories developed by Simon (in general, see pp. 156–178, esp. pp. 163–169). Also past its expiration date is the Jews’ covenant with God. Now, that covenant has transferred to Christians. Or, in the words of Augustine: “And so we see the Jews reprobate, and Christians called from the East and West, to the heavenly banquet, to sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, where the bread is righteousness, and the cup wisdom” (Sermons on New Testament Lessons, 12.6 [NPNF 1.6.300]). On Augustine’s discussion of Jews and Judaism in general, see Paula Fredriksen, Augustine and the Jews: A Christian Defense of Jews and Judaism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010 [2008]). Unless otherwise noted, all translations for the texts cited in this chapter will come from either: Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, ed., Ante-Nicene Fathers: The Writings of Fathers Down to A.D. 325, 10 vols. (1885; repr., Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2012), abbreviated ANF; or Philip Schaff, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series; 14 vols. (1886–1889; repr., Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2012); Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series; 14 vols. (1890–1900; repr., Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994), both abbreviated NPNF. When I quote a text, I will also provide the reference to the volume and the page number in ANF or NPNF for ease of reference.

142

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Christian Sources

misunderstood from the very beginning and only now, when read properly through a Christian lens, are the true meanings of those allegories understood. Either way, the moral laws remain in effect, since they ipso facto have no expiration date (and perhaps were the original meaning anyway). This logic underlies arguments in regard to the literal observance of Old Testament food laws. According to this model, Jesus abolished the actual (ritual) practice of such laws.7 Literal adherence to the “burdensome code of rules in regard to food” no longer applies.8 Further, “For if we still live according to the Jewish law, we acknowledge that we have not received grace.”9 Literally following these Old Testament laws after Jesus has abrogated them and/or properly elucidated their true meaning is tantamount to publicly denying Christ’s grace.

Follow the Spirit, Not the Letter, of the Law According to many early Christian exegetes, then, while ritual law no longer applies (or never did in the first place), moral law is eternally relevant and applicable. Or, to render this binary in its more well-known nomenclature: the Spirit of the Law (moral) endures, while the Letter of the Law (ritual) ends.10 Old Testament legislation regarding food must 7

8 9

10

e.g. Tertullian, Against Marcion, 5.7, 19; On Monogamy, 5 (on how such passages fit in with Tertullian’s work in general, see Daniel C. Ullucci, The Christian Rejection of Animal Sacrifice [New York: Oxford University Press, 2012], 110–111); Origen, Against Celsus, 5.34–36 (Christians have the right to question their ancestral food laws), 49 (with special regard to pork); Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 5. While my argument throughout this chapter refers to their views toward biblical food laws, most of the same arguments can be applied to their view of other Old Testament legislation (as I note below). To offer one example, see Epistle of Barnabas, 4 (cf. 14), where the Israelites are said to have lost the covenant, which sets up the reestablishment of this covenant with Jesus. Origen, Against Celsus, 8.29 (ANF 4:650). Epistle of Ignatius to the Magnesians, 8 (ANF 1:62). This statement (in slightly different wording) appears twice in this chapter. In the second instance, circumcision is also mentioned. On several occasions, early Christian interpreters connect their discussions of the biblical regulations regarding food and circumcision (e.g. Epistle to Diognetus, 4; Origen, Homily on Numbers, 5.1.3; Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 2.13.3) because they perceive circumcision to raise many similar issues. The latter has received more scholarly attention as of late. For example, see Shaye J. D. Cohen, Why Aren’t Jewish Women Circumcised? Gender and Covenant in Judaism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), esp. 67–92; Andrew S. Jacobs, Christ Circumcised: A Study in Early Christian History and Difference (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). For additional references and discussion of Christian groups who adhere to earlier Jewish food practices, see Andrew McGowan, Ascetic Eucharists: Food and Drink in Early Christian Ritual Meals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 144–151. Augustine uses a food metaphor to discuss the differences between Old and New Testament law: “The old Law is barley compared to the Gospel wheat” (Sermons on New Testament Lessons, 80 [NPNF 1.6.499], where he further explains this metaphor). For another Augustine food metaphor, see The Confessions, 13.38.

Allegorically Speaking

143

therefore be read spiritually, not legalistically. A concise summary of this exegetical approach appears in the Epistle of Barnabas: “Is there then not a command of God that they should not eat [these things]? There is, but Moses spoke with a spiritual reference.”11 Once the Old Testament is read for Spirit and not Law, it opens up the text to new interpretations.12 More significantly, it suggests that literal laws are to be read only as allegories.13

Allegorically Speaking Building on the two premises above, we are now ready to examine texts in which the biblical food laws are allegorized. In such readings, the presumption is that there are two ways to read the text: literally or figuratively;14 or, in the hermeneutic model of many early Christian authors, respectively, the wrong way and the right way to read the text.15 11

12

13 14

15

Epistle of Barnabas, 10 (ANF 1:143; cited in Clement, The Stromata, 5.8). Similar claims appear on numerous occasions (including later in Epistle of Barnabas, 10). To cite a list that is more representative than exhaustive (additional references appear throughout this chapter): Epistle to Diognetus, 4; Clement, The Instructor, 2.1; Tertullian, On Fasting, 2, 15; Origen, De Principiis, 4.15, 17–18; Against Celsus, 5.60 (not about food per se, but a good statement of this general assumption); Homily on Genesis, 5.5; Homily on Exodus, 7.1; Homily on Leviticus, 7.4.1–4; 7.5.5–7; Homily on Numbers, 5.1.3; Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 2.9.1; 6.7.11; Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 2 (and passim). On the social function of this exegetical move, see David M. Freidenreich, Foreigners and Their Food: Constructing Otherness in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011), 102. It should also be noted that Epistle of Barnabas, 2 argues that sacrifice, an important ritual practice in the Old Testament, was not actually wanted by God. On this passage (and on Christian interpretations of biblical sacrifice in general) see Ullucci, Christian Rejection of Animal Sacrifice, 97–98. e.g. see Augustine’s continuous discussion of “daily bread” as “spiritual bread” and/or the Word of God (e.g. Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, 2.27, 37; Sermons on New Testament Lessons, 6.10; 7.7; 8.5; 9.6); On the Psalms, 37.3.4; 49.2.7; 132.17 (also see John Chrysostom on this: e.g. Homilies of St. John, 34.1–2 [on “meat” as salvation]; 45.1–2). It is for this reason that the Old Testament must not be completely discarded. See e.g. Augustine, Against Faustus, 6.9. As Azzan Yadin reminds us, the assumption that there is a “literal” reading of a text by necessity assumes a figurative reading of the same text; “both the figurative and the literal need to exist for either to be meaningful” (Scripture as Logos: Rabbi Ishmael and the Origins of Midrash [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004], 62; in general, see pp. 61–68, which include [on pp. 63–65] a discussion of Clement, discussed further below). Again, it is worth pointing out that, for some early Christian authors, the literal meaning was once correct, but that time has long since passed. Throughout this chapter, as I note above, I conflate the views of early Christian exegetes who claim that the literal law never applied and those who think that it once did, but it no longer does. I combine these approaches because the end result is the same: namely, that the law must be understood allegorically. Whether the law must have been interpreted as such ab initio is not a necessary distinction to make in order to discuss the larger trend that I wish to explore herein. Regardless of what one thinks about the original intent of the biblical food laws, these early Christian authors all believe that the literal stance is currently the wrong approach and that it is incumbent on Christians to read these laws for their allegorical meaning.

144

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Christian Sources

In a long passage concerning the proper way to eat, Clement of Alexandria extols the virtues of self-restraint.16 In many ways, Clement sounds remarkably similar to a fellow Alexandrian who died (in 50 CE) one hundred years before his birth: Philo of Alexandria (discussed in Chapter 3). Both agree that self-restraint in all areas of life – and especially in the kitchen and dining room – are virtuous and biblically mandated. To offer an example: if subjected to a blind-test, many scholars would fail to identify which author wrote: These gluttons, surrounded with the sound of hissing frying-pans, and wearing their whole life away at the pestle and mortar, cling to matter like fire. More than that, they emasculate plain food, namely bread, by straining off the nourishing part of the grain, so that the necessary part of food becomes matter of reproach to luxury . . . A man like this seems to me to be all jaw, and nothing else.17

For both Clement and Philo, the avoidance of gluttony is the justification for these laws. Behind both of their reasoning is an allegorical understanding, in which the embodied deeper meaning of the food laws points to Moses leading his people toward a moderate way of life that results in the virtue of temperance in action and thought. There is one key difference between these two fellow Alexandrians. Philo – a Jew – believes that one should follow both the figurative and the literal law, while Clement – a Christian – believes that one should follow only the figurative law. Philo would never utter the words that summarize Clement’s allegorical interpretation: “We are not, then, to abstain wholly from various kinds of foods, but only are not to be taken up about them.”18 For Clement, so long as one avoids the pitfalls associated 16

17

18

The Instructor, 2.1 (similar views can be found elsewhere in his corpus, e.g. in regard to not eating the hare and the hyena in The Instructor, 2.10); also see Tertullian, On Fasting, 3, which argues that the food laws are about controlling sin through controlling caloric intake; and Clement, The Instructor, 2.7, which discusses general commensal and culinary restraint (further, see e.g. Origen, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 9.37.1–9.38.1; 9.42.9). Since Clement is representative of early Christian viewpoints and because this passage represents one of the most extended and clear presentations of the subject, I devote the most attention to Clement here, and in the notes comment where his views agree or are nuanced by others. Clement, The Instructor, 2.1 (ANF 2.237–238); also see Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 4; Tertullian, On Fasting, 6 (with regard to forbidden fat). Both Clement and Philo also go on to compare unrestrained humans to animals who follow after their belly. On Philo, see Chapter 3. Cyprian, in Treatises, 60 condemns lusting after food in a passage comprised almost completely of quotations from the Old and New Testaments. Clement, The Instructor, 2.1 (ANF 2.239); also see Origen, Against Celsus, 8.30. To abstain from the literal food means that one has missed the figurative point. Similar logic underlies Justin Martyr’s comments about the spiritual interpretation of the unleavened bread for Passover: “But you have understood all things in a carnal sense, and you suppose it to be piety if you do such things, while

Allegorically Speaking

145

with these foods, namely intemperance, then one may eat them.19 In a similar vein, Augustine asserts: “It is not the uncleanness of meat that I fear, but the uncleanness of lusting.”20 Philo would never make such an assertion, because he views the Letter of the Law as still binding. Herein lies another key difference between the authors. Clement views the ritual laws as no longer in effect. They were a passing phase, once necessary but no longer so,21 a view evident when Clement states: The Jews had frugality enjoined on them by the law in the most systematic manner. For the Instructor, by Moses, deprived them of the use of innumerable things, adding reasons – the spiritual ones hidden; the carnal ones apparent, to which indeed they have trusted . . . For since it is impossible for those who use dainties to abstain from partaking of them,22 he appointed the opposite mode of life, till he should break down the propensity to indulgence arising from habit.23

Christians have literally kicked the habit; therefore the carnal laws cease to apply. While the ancient Israelites needed such literal legislation, it was intended to function only as a transition period, during which their corporal and spiritual bodies acclimated.24 But much like methadone or

19

20

21

22

23 24

your souls are filled with deceit, and, in short, with every wickedness” (Dialogue with Trypho, 14 [ANF 1.201]). For discussions about the proper (i.e. spiritual) meaning of the Passover sacrifice and “bread” in the Lord’s Prayer, see respectively Origen, On the Passover, 28–29; On Prayer, 27.1–17; and on the “hidden meaning” of the Passover leaven prohibition, see e.g. John Chrysostom, Homilies on First Corinthians, 15.5–11 (NPNF 1.12.85–87). While Clement lists several local delicacies that people go to great lengths to obtain and prepare (The Instructor 2.1), he does not speak about these in reference to biblical law; rather, they serve as examples of intemperance and gluttony. It should also be noted that Clement similarly allegorizes the biblical sacrifice laws (with the caveat noted in n. 21, below). For a discussion, see Ullucci, Christian Rejection of Animal Sacrifice, 109–110. The Confessions, 10.46 (NPNF 1.1.155; and on lust and food in general, see 10.43–46). For Augustine’s general understanding of allegorical vs. literal interpretation of the Old Testament, see e.g. On the Profit of Believing, 5. Clement does not consistently deploy this approach. Elsewhere, he argues that biblical ritual law was always to be understood allegorically, and never literally. For discussion, see Ullucci, Christian Rejection of Animal Sacrifice, 107–110. Earlier in this section, Clement uses a bit of etymological exegesis, noting: “Gluttony, called ὀψοφαγία, is nothing but excess in the use of relishes (ὄψον); and λαιμαργία [greed/gluttony] is insanity with respect to the gullet; and γαστριμαργία [gluttonous] is excess with respect to food – insanity in reference to the belly, as the name implies; for μάργος [furious] is a madman” (The Instructor, 2.1 [ANF 2.240]). Clement is correct about these compound words with μάργος, as the first adds the intensifying prefix λαι- and the second adds γαστήρ, or belly. Clement would be happy to know that μάργος on its own also can mean greedy or gluttonous. See the relevant entries in H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, An Intermediate Greek–English Lexicon, abridged edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002 [1891]). Clement, The Instructor, 2.1 (ANF 2.242). Also see Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3–5 (esp. 5); Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 20; Origen, Against Celsus, 5.49; Simon, Verus Israel, 166–167. Formerly, the laws were to be followed literally, but that was just to foreshadow the symbolic interpretation brought about through Christ. For example, see Augustine, Against Faustus, 6.7, 9

146

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Christian Sources

the nicotine patch, they are a means to end a nasty addiction.25 Once the fog clears from their eyes, they should discern the hidden spiritual reasons for the laws. And, as we shall see below, the spiritual reason is to abstain from the allegorical vice, not the literal food.26

“Mirror of Human Life”: Animals as Allegories27 Discerning the Spirit of the biblical food laws, especially in regard to edible and inedible animals, was a subject of great interest to early Christians. After all, if the Old Testament contains figurative, not literal, legislation, then one needs to investigate the matter deeply in order to excavate this meaning.28 The biblical animals are not carnal beasts; rather, “In the animals it is the characters, and doings, and wills of men that are depicted.”29 Such a reading requires explanation and interpretation. Once again, we will see many similarities between the authors of these readings and Philo, who would

25

26

27 28 29

(on food laws). Further, others argue that the temporary literal adherence to the laws was to distance Israelites from idolatry; e.g. see Athanasius, Letters, 19.3–4; and Aphrahat, Demonstrations, 15. More pointedly, Aphrahat also views the biblical food laws as a punishment to Jews for their idolatrous sins (see Demostrations, 15; on this notion also appearing in the Qur’an, see Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 134). On Aphrahat’s discussion, see Eliyahu Lizorkin, Aphrahat’s Demonstrations: A Conversation with the Jews of Mesopotamia, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium 642 (Louvain: Peeters, 2012), 81–102; and for a translation of Demostrations, 15, see Jacob Neusner, Aphrahat and Judaism: The Christian–Jewish Argument in Fourth-Century Iran (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 51–59. Of course, the implication of this view is that, having not yet kicked the habit, the Jews remain as stubborn addicts. According to several texts, the logical conclusion of the literal stance is that it would presume that God is the Creator of unclean things, a viewpoint that is anathema (see e.g. Epistle to Diognetus, 4; Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 2–3; John Chrysostom, Homilies on Timothy, 12 [at Ver. 4]). This might explain the curious omission of the biblical prohibition of the sciatic nerve from early Christian authors’ retelling of Jacob/Israel’s wrestling match with a divine being in Gen 32. Since they can still provide the spiritual reason in detail, they need not mention a food rule that they now consider to be abrogated. See Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 58; 126; Clement, The Instructor, 1.7; Origen, To Africanus, 10; Novation, Treatise Concerning the Trinity, 19. The same reasoning also may lie behind the omission of pork from the brief reference to the martyrdom of the seven brothers from Maccabees in Cyprian, Treatises, 11. I take this title from Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). e.g. see Clement, The Instructor, 3.11. Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). Also see Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 5.8.4 (5.8.2–3 on irrational animals as allegories in general); Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.4.7. The idea that the biblically permitted/prohibited animals represent character traits is raised as a potential explanation behind the initial legislation. See Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism: An Anthropology of Israelite Religion and Ancient Judaism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 115–140; David C. Kraemer, Jewish Eating and Identity through the Ages (New York: Routledge, 2009 [2007]), 19–23; and the discussion of both authors in Chapter 1. Basil (The Hexaemeron, 8–9) discusses the various pedagogical lessons that numerous animals impart to those who studiously analyze them. However, he never connects this knowledge to the biblical food laws.

“Mirror of Human Life”: Animals as Allegories

147

agree, for example, “that the clean animals indeed can be understood as memory, learning, understanding, examination and discernment of those things which we read, and other things like these,” while unclean animals represent “concupiscence and wrath,” which though unpleasant, are necessary evils (concupiscence for “succession of posterity” and wrath because no “correction or discipline [can] exist without anger”).30 However, as before, Philo would not agree with the contention that, “the literal, legal sense of the biblical passage is annulled once the figurative reading is adduced, and the verses cease to count as laws.”31 While ancient Jews and Christians agreed that animals served as a “mirror of human life,”32 they disagreed about what should be learned from looking at their reflection. Embodied allegorical interpretations such as these are found throughout early Christian writing. To better understand this approach, we will look at how various authors accounted for the biblical laws regulating edible and inedible animals. To construct a more coherent narrative, I have organized my discussion by following (to the extent possible) the order of permitted/ prohibited animals and animal categories that appears in Leviticus 11.33 Permitted quadrupeds must have both split hoofs and chew the cud (Lev 11:2–3). While Old Testament texts fail to offer a specific reason for these criteria, early Christians have no such reticence. In fact, they provide a variety of allegorical interpretations. Split hoofs demonstrate that “with the firm step of innocency they tread the ways of righteousness, and of every virtue of life.”34 They walk vigorously, with a firm grip on the proper path.35 Cloven-hoofed men walk in this world, but look forward to a 30

31 32 33

34

35

Origen Homily on Genesis, 2.6. Translation from: Ronald E. Heine, trans., Origen: Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, The Fathers of the Church, vol. 71 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), 87–88. Origen writes elsewhere about the meaning of the binary clean/unclean: see Homily on Leviticus, 5.10.1–5 (also see Augustine, Against Faustus, 16.30, where clean/unclean animals are said to represent those who will/will not be united to Christ’s body). In another passage, Origen claims that Mosaic legislation bans animals connected with divination and demons, specifically referencing the wolf, fox, serpent, eagle, and the hawk. He also notes that such animals are used as exemplars of the wicked in the Old Testament (Against Celsus, 4.93). Yadin, Scripture as Logos, 63. Yadin refers to Clement here, but his observation is more broadly applicable. Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). On Leviticus 11, see Chapter 1. Many of the reasons that appear below have parallels of degree or kind in Hellenistic Jewish sources. I will note these when I believe they are of immediate relevance. In general, see Chapter 3. Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647); also see Clement, The Instructor, 3.11 (ANF 2.289), which notes that the split hoof “indicates the equilibrium of righteousness.” Since it is such a fascinating and extensive text, I usually cite Novation in the body of this section and place comparable sources in footnotes. Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3; cf. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 5.8.4; Clement, The Stromata, 7.18.

148

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Christian Sources

better day.36 Cud-chewing indicates that “they have in their mouth as food the divine precepts.”37 Such animals receive God’s Word, by which they are nourished, satisfied, and gladdened; they literally “ruminate” on it.38 Further, the men of whom [a non-ruminate]39 animal is a symbol are unclean, not by nature, but from their own fault; because, though they gladly hear the words of wisdom, they never reflect on them afterwards. For to recall, in quiet repose, some useful instruction from the stomach of memory to the mouth of reflection, is a kind of spiritual rumination. The [non-ruminant] animals . . . are a symbol of those people who do not do this. And the prohibition of the flesh of these animals is a warning against this fault.40

Permitted quadrupeds are perfect in all of these physical, moral, and figurative manners, in stark contrast to those who lack either of the traits named, or both, and are thus prohibited.41 Christians have both of these characteristics; Jews (who potentially inherit the covenant but deny faith in Christ) and heretics (who join the covenant but then violate proper practice) lack one of the two; and Gentiles lack both.42

36 37

38

39 40 41

42

Epistle of Barnabas, 10 (cp. Clement, The Stromata, 5.8). Also see Clement, The Instructor, 3.11; Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.6.4. Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). Also see Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.6.3, which notes that cud-chewers without split hoofs are men of words, not deeds (with reference to Matt 23:3 and Ps 50:16–17). Epistle of Barnabas, 10 (cp. Clement, The Stromata, 5.8); Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 5.8.4; Clement, The Instructor, 3.11; The Stromata, 7.18. According to Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.6.2, those who chew the cud ruminate on the spiritual meaning of the laws, unlike those who ruminate neither literally nor figuratively. Also see below, nn. 42–43 and 46. For a modern spin on the above belief, see the words of Benedictine nun and beef farmer, Sister Maria-Walburga Schortemeyer, who, when commenting on her life of prayer and animal husbandry in contemporary America, said: “Praying with the scriptures is like chewing the cud. So all through the day, we’re ruminating on it. We chew, chew, chew, swallow, regurgitate, chew, chew, chew” (Luke Runyon, “Nuns on the Ranch Give a Heavenly Twist to Beef,” NPR.org, December 22, 2014, www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2014/12/22/ 371485558/nuns-on-the-ranch-give-a-heavenly-twist-to-beef, last accessed August 23, 2016). Here, Augustine is talking about a “pig” person vs. a “lamb” person, but his comment can serve as a general allegory for non-ruminants vs. ruminants. Augustine, Against Faustus, 6.7 (NPNF 1.4.171). Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3; Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 5.8.4; Clement, The Stromata, 7.18; Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.6.3. There are obvious similarities between these interpretations and Philo, Special Laws, 4.106–108 and Letter of Aristeas, 150–161 (both discussed in Chapter 3). Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3; also see Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.6.3–8. Clement, The Stromata, 7.18 (cp. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 5.8.4) notes that Jews ruminate, but do not have the split hoof, and therefore they slip from the proper path, lacking the faith symbolized in the cleft-hoof. Heretics, on the other hand, have the split hoof, but do not ruminate; hence, they are physically capable of walking along the proper path, but have not properly digested the Word of God. Gentiles lack both faith and proper rumination. On Christians chewing and digesting food/ Scripture properly, see e.g. Augustine, Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, 2.37.

“Mirror of Human Life”: Animals as Allegories

149

With regard to specific quadrupeds, the camel (Lev 11:4) is banned because “by the example of that animal it condemns a life nerveless and crooked with crimes.”43 And why is the hare prohibited (Lev 11:6)? Because “It rebukes men deformed into women.”44 Hare-like people continuously seek fornication, a constant desire that corrupts them.45 The pig is tabooed (Lev 11:7) for reasons that remain popular in modern explanations for this taboo: “It assuredly reproves a life filthy and dirty, and delighting in the garbage of vice, placing its supreme good not in generosity of mind, but in the flesh alone.”46 Further, the pig is “the emblem of voluptuous and unclean lust of food.”47 Christians must avoid people who are swine-like (but not the swine itself),48 as they are pleasure-seekers who forget God until they need something, much like a pig ignores his master until he is hungry and the master has food.49 Though not mentioned in the Old Testament, a common quadruped (which neither has split hoofs nor chews the cud) 43

44

45

46

47

48

49

Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.6.2 notes that camellike people cannot ruminate, and thus cannot properly digest the Word of God. For more on the conniving camel, see Basil, The Hexaemeron, 8.1. Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). There is obviously a concern about the appearance of effeminate actions and characteristics on the part of ancient, male authors. Perhaps the connection with women refers to their perceived constant desire for sex, a trait (according to many ancient authors) not shared by the self-restrained, masculine male. See below, n. 45 and, in general, Michael L. Satlow, “‘Try to be a Man’: The Rabbinic Construction of Masculinity,” HTR 89/1 (1996): 19–40. Epistle of Barnabas, 10; Clement, The Instructor, 2.10 (which connects the hare and the hyena, since both people tend to “gustare libidinem,” or “taste [sex/food] lustfully”). Testament of Asher 2:8–10, a Hellenistic period text that has later Christian interpolations, states that those who commit sexual misconduct but are careful of their diet are half clean, and thus likens such people to hares (and, in some manuscripts, also to swine). Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). See also Clement, The Instructor, 3.11; The Stromata, 5.8; Lactantius, The Divine Institutes, 4.17. Further, pig-like people do not practice “spiritual rumination” (Augustine, Against Faustus, 6.7 [NPNF 1.4.171], discussed above in regard to all nonruminants). Clement, The Stromata, 5.8 (ANF 2.456). Also see Clement, The Instructor, 2.1; and Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 5.8.2, 4, which compare gluttonous people to swine and dogs. John Chrysostom combines both approaches, calling pigs out for their foul odor and comparing them to fornication (see Homilies on Thessalonians, 5); also see Methodius, Fragments: Extracts from the Work on Things Created, 1. Or, in the words of Simon and Theophilus, 7.28: “You are not prohibited from allowing pork meat, but swinish actions [facta porcina].” Translation and Latin text from: William Varner, Ancient Jewish-Christian Dialogues: Athanasius and Zacchaeus, Simon and Theophilus, Timothy and Aquila: Introductions, Texts, and Translations, Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity 58 (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellon Press, 2004), 130–131. Epistle of Barnabas, 10 (on avoiding swine-like people, also see Clement, The Instructor, 3.11). It is for this reason that I chose the quote that appears as the epigraph to this chapter. Later on in Epistle of Barnabas, 10, such swine/people are said to have been referenced by David in Ps 1:1, which cautions against those who stand in the path of sinners. Elsewhere, John Chrysostom claims that pigs are not unclean; rather: “It is your unthankful disposition to God that is unclean” (Homilies on Timothy, 12 [at Ver. 4; NPNF 1.13.445]).

150

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Christian Sources

discussed by ancient Christian authors is the hyena – an adulterer or corrupter because of the common perception that it is androgynous.50 Permitted fish must have both fins and scales (Lev 11:9–12).51 Those with scales are rough, rugged, substantial, and have grave manners, all of which are met with the approval of man. Fish and men without these scales are seen as trifling, fickle, faithless, and effeminate, all of which are met with disapproval.52 Fins allow one to rise from the mire and ascend to the net of faith; scales embody the spiritual, and not carnal, person.53 Although the Old Testament provides only criteria for inclusion and exclusion, some authors mention specific fish that are tabooed. Thus, we discover: “And thou shalt not eat,” [Moses] says, “the lamprey, or the polypus, or the cuttlefish.”54 He means, “Thou shalt not join thyself or be like to such men as are ungodly to the end, and are condemned to death.” In like manner as those fishes, above accursed, float in the deep, not swimming [on the surface] like the rest, but make their abode in the mud which lies at the bottom.55

Not only are specific fish mentioned and allegorized,56 but also a general explanation is offered for why these creatures are forbidden: such fish lie in 50

51

52

53 54

55 56

Some authors believed the hyena to regularly change its sex (e.g. Epistle of Barnabas, 10); others believed that it simultaneously possessed both male and female genitalia (e.g. Clement, The Instructor, 2.10, who identifies the prohibition of the “hyena” [and the “hare”] as a ban on both non-procreative sex and homoerotic sex). For a discussion, including a plausible explanation behind this ancient belief (i.e. that the sex of hyenas is difficult to discern with the naked eye, even today), see Mary Pendergraft, “‘Thou Shalt Not Eat the Hyena’: A Note on ‘Barnabas’ Epistle 10.7,” Vigiliae Christianae 46 (1992): 75–79. For a more general connection between the hyena (and the weasel) with destructive pleasure seeking, see Methodius, The Banquet of the Ten Virgins, 5.6. Though these are the biblical criteria, early Christian exegetes tend to focus on only one criterion: the lack of scales (e.g. Epistle of Barnabas, 10; Clement, The Instructor, 2.1). Early Christian interpreters are not unique in this regard, as the rabbis believed that all fish with scales have fins, and hence scales can serve as the means of identification for kosher fish. See e.g. m. Niddah 6:9 (which also notes that all kosher quadrupeds have horns); t. Hullin 3:26; b. Niddah 51b; b. Hullin 66b; Yoreh Deah, 83:3 (for later interpretation); and for discussion, Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 3 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 655. For a text that gives both criteria equal attention, see Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.7.1. Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.5.1; 7.7.1 equates permitted/prohibited fish with good/bad people (and, in the latter text, with saints), with reference to Matt 13:47–48. Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.7.1. Cf. Simon and Theophilus, 7.28. Tertullian also discussed the cuttlefish, claiming that cuttlefish-like people, when proven wrong, “eject the black venom of their blasphemy [tenebras hinc blasphemiae intervomunt; more literally ‘they vomit the dark things of blasphemy’]” (Against Marcion, 2.20 [ANF 3.312–313]). On cuttlefish ejecting ink as a survival strategy, see Pliny the Elder, Natural History, 9.45. Epistle of Barnabas, 10 (ANF 1.143). Also see Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.7.1, which mentions the eel in the midst of an eloquent passage connecting the depths of the sea and the depths of depravity. Clement speaks of a fish called an “ass” (ὄνος; see The Instructor, 2.1 [ANF 2.242]). However, this is a metaphor for one who buries his mind in his belly, and not an allegory of biblically forbidden fish.

“Mirror of Human Life”: Animals as Allegories

151

the muck of the seabed. To my knowledge, this is the earliest reference to biblically forbidden fish as ‘bottom-feeders.’57 While the Old Testament prohibits certain fowl, there is neither specific criteria for exclusion, nor a list of those subject to inclusion (Lev 11:13–19). In general, forbidden fowl are understood to be birds of prey.58 The hawk, the kite, and the eagle (Lev 11:13–16) represent “plunderers and violent people who live by crime”;59 such people know not how to acquire food by honest labor, but only by seizing that which belongs to others;60 hence, such people (but not these fowl) are to be avoided. Much the same applies to the vulture (Lev 11:13), who endeavors to find booty left behind by the dead;61 the raven (Lev 11:15), which “holds accused crafty wills”;62 the sparrow, the prohibition of which is meant to condemn intemperance;63 the owl (Lev 11:16–18), which reminds one to hate “those who fly from the light of the truth”;64 the swan, whose long neck reminds one not to be “proud with high neck”;65 the seamew, which cautions against having “too talkative an intemperate tongue”;66 and the bat (Lev 11:19), which represents “those who seek the darkness of night as well as error.”67 Finally, the Old Testament cries foul against those whose words sound just, but their 57 58

59 60

61 62 63 64 65 66

67

Later on in Epistle of Barnabas, 10, such fish/people who dwell in darkness are said to have been referenced by David in Ps 1:1, which cautions against walking in the council of the wicked. See e.g. Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.7.2. The association between biblically prohibited fowl and birds of prey is also found in Hellenistic period Jewish sources (e.g. Philo, Special Laws, 4.116–117; Letter of Aristeas, 145–149; and the discussion in chapters 3 and 6). Further, birds of prey (and the type of people they represent) sit idle, find ways to prey on others’ flesh, and generally pester others. See e.g. Epistle of Barnabas, 10. Later on in Epistle of Barnabas, 10, such bird of prey/people are said to have been referenced by David in Ps 1:1, which cautions against sitting in the company of scorners. Concern about prey animals also underlies Justin Martyr’s claim that God commanded abstinence from violent animals, though fowl are not singled out in the text (Dialogue with Trypho, 20). Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647); cp. Clement, The Stromata, 5.8. Also see Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.7.2. Epistle of Barnabas, 10, which also adds the raven to this category. Clement, The Stromata, 5.8 adds the crow, but then discusses the individual symbolism of the eagle (robbery), the hawk (injustice), and the raven (greed) and references Ps 18:25–26 (26–27 in Hebrew; Clement also adds the raven to the list in The Instructor, 3.11). Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). Also see Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.7.2. Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). Also see Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.7.2. Epistle of Barnabas, 10 puts the raven in the category of the eagle, hawk, and kite (see above, n. 60). Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). See below, n. 66. Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). See below, n. 66. Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). The seamew (along with the sparrow and the swan, mentioned above) does not appear among the prohibitions in Leviticus 11, that is unless one follows the conjectural argument based on textual corruption of Lev 11:19 suggested in W. M. Lindsay, “Bird-Names in Latin Glossaries,” Classical Philology 13/1 (1918): 1–22, 4 (where the suggestion itself is noted with a question mark). Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). It makes sense that the well-known nocturnal creatures, the bat and the owl, are associated with hiding in the “darkness” and avoiding the “light,”

152

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Christian Sources

unjust actions expose their true impure fowl-like nature. Rather than soar in the spiritual heavens, such fowl-like people “sink down from the heights to dead and stinking flesh.”68 Land swarmers, which swarm upon the earth, are categorically banned in the Old Testament (Lev 11:41–45). Those who crawl on their bellies are “beasts in human shape after the image of their father, the voracious beast.”69 Their means of locomotion signifies their primary desire: the belly.70 In regard to specific land swarmers, the weasel (Lev 11:29) serves to reprove theft.71 Further, the weasel is banned for reasons that we have encountered before: Thou shalt not be like to those whom we hear of as committing wickedness with the mouth, on account of their uncleanness; nor shalt thou be joined to those impure women who commit iniquity with the mouth. For this animal conceives by the mouth.72

Wicked words come from wicked mouths, much like unclean weasels come from unclean weasel mouths. Finally, avoid the lizard (Lev 11:30) and avoid “aimless waywardness of life”;73 and avoid the newt (Lev 11:30) because it “execrates mental stains.”74 All of the vices that these creatures represent are to be avoided. However, the creatures themselves are not.75 This is the main difference between

68

69 70 71 72

73 74

75

respectively (see Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.7.2, with reference to John 3:20). For more on the bat and nocturnal creatures (in contrast to diurnal animals), see Basil, The Hexaemeron, 8.7. Origen, Homily on Leviticus, 7.7.2. Translation from: Gary Wayne Barkley, trans., Origen: Homilies on Leviticus 1–16, The Fathers of the Church, vol. 83 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1990), 152. Such people have been instructed properly, but have chosen to act unjustly. Clement, The Instructor, 2.1 (ANF 2.239). A similar connection was made by Philo (e.g. Special Laws, 4.113, discussed in Chapter 3). Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). In Chapter 1, I followed Milgrom and rendered “rat,” rather than weasel in Lev 11:29. For other possible translations, see Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 671. Epistle of Barnabas, 10 (ANF 1.143), quotation marks included because the text claims to be translating Moses’ words and intentions. A similar claim about weasel allegory and reproduction is found in Letter of Aristeas, 165–166 (discussed in Chapter 3). Elsewhere, Clement claims that an apt designation for a glutton is a “weasel” (The Instructor 2.1, where “flies” is another appropriate term). Worthy of note is the gendering of women as iniquitous gossips. On the gendering of gossip in ancient texts, in particular regard to ancient rabbis, see Miriam B. Peskowitz, Spinning Fantasies: Rabbis, Gender, and History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 131–153. Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647). I rendered the “eft” (stellio) in ANF as “newt,” a more common term. I presume that this refers to the animal in Lev 11:30 that Milgrom translates “skink,” as “newt” appears in the LXX. See Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 671. Novation, On the Jewish Meats, 3 (ANF 5.647) concludes that it is not the animals’ faults that they act out/represent these vices, since they were born this way. Humans, however, have the ability to choose not to act this way, and thus they are to be blamed for opting for vice over virtue. This argument both favors the allegorical over against the literal reading, and sidesteps the thorny theological problem of God having created non-virtuous creatures. Also see Augustine, Against Faustus, 6.7.

Idol Meat, Strangled Animals, and Blood

153

these early Christian authors and Hellenistic Jews (including Jesus, as he is depicted in the New Testament), for whom both the embodying creatures and the embodied vices should be avoided. This conclusion is reinforced in Clement’s discussion of two other biblical food laws: the prohibitions against slaughtering a parent and its offspring on the same day, and against cooking a kid in its mother’s milk.76 Both prohibitions are intended to instruct concerning humanity and piety. Not slaughtering a parent and its offspring on the same day is connected with other biblical parent/child animal husbandry laws in an attempt to connect honoring nature with the avoidance of another concern for early Christians: the exposure of children for the purpose of death.77 Not cooking a kid in its mother’s milk is commanded because: For the nourishment of the living animal, it is meant, may not become sauce for that which has been deprived of life; and that, which is the cause of life, may not co-operate in the consumption of the body.78

In a passage that clearly shares similarity to Philo’s rationale, Clement understands the biblical passages to refer to potential impious and perverse behavior. In both instances, the laws serve pedagogical purposes. However, Clement is more interested in teasing out the moral application of the laws than in the actual literal practice thereof.79 As was the case with the animals in Leviticus, it is the allegorical interpretation that is of ultimate significance. For these early Christian exegetes, it is the moral lesson that is important, not the meat itself; it is about decorum, not diet.

Idol Meat, Strangled Animals, and Blood While New Testament texts evidence a debate over the continued applicability of Old Testament food laws, there are a few culinary rules that remain in place once the dust settles: namely, the avoidance of food 76 77 78

79

Clement, The Stromata, 2.18. In general, see W.V. Harris, “Child-Exposure in the Roman Empire,” The Journal of Roman Studies 84 (1994): 1–22. On ancient exposure of children and abortion, see e.g. Minucius Felix, Octavius, 30. Clement, The Stromata, 2.18 (ANF 2.368). Compare Philo, Virtues, 142–144 (discussed in Chapter 3), which employs similar language. Interestingly, in retelling the story in Gen 18, where Abraham serves his visitors a meal of meat and milk, Origen notes that the meal contained both meat and milk but does not comment on it (Homily on Genesis, 4.1). The rabbis almost always omit this detail when they retell the story (see the discussion in Chapter 6 n. 40). For example, Clement introduces the passage about cooking a kid in its mother’s milk by decrying those who actually kick a pregnant dam’s belly in order to kill the baby and make the womb its grave, so that they may consume milk with meat. This claim obviously takes the cooking of milk and meat up a notch and represents an interpretive leap in order to underscore its potential depravity.

154

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Christian Sources

offered to idols, animals that have been strangled, and blood.80 As David Freidenreich notes: They do not regard these prohibitions as contradicting in any way the permission of eating “all foods” irrespective of Jewish dietary laws – a permission that the vast majority of Christian authorities endorse. Quite the contrary: this combination of permissions and prohibitions, equally rooted in the New Testament, defines what it means to approach food as a Christian because it distinguishes Christians from both Jews and Greeks.81

This unholy trinity of tabooed foodstuffs serves to distinguish Christians from the Greeks who partake of them, and the Jews who abstain from much more. Christians take the middle path, only excluding that which they feel they must. But why do they feel they must exclude some of these foodstuffs? What is the rationale behind this legislation? Most texts simply repeat the prohibition, often with reference to Old and/or New Testament texts for support.82 For blood, sometimes the biblical justification is repeated: blood is life, and one must not consume the life force.83 Elsewhere, the biblical connection between the blood taboo and murder reappears.84 Another rationale is familiar to us by now: such laws are instructive in regard to self-restraint, 80 81

82

83

84

See e.g. Acts 15:19 (cf. 15:28–29; 21:25); and the discussion in Chapter 4. In general, see Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 101–109. Foreign Food, 104. Also see Augustine, Against Faustus, 32.13. Elsewhere Freidenreich notes: “Prohibitions against food offered to idols disappear entirely from Greek-language canons by the end of the fourth-century, only to be replaced by prohibitions against food associated with Jewish holidays” (Foreign Food, 120; see below, n. 89). See e.g. Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 20; 34; Clement, The Instructor, 2.7; Tertullian, On Monogamy, 5; On Modesty, 12; On Fasting, 15; Minucius Felix, Octavius, 30; Origen, Against Celsus, 8.29; Cyprian, Treatises, 119; Gregory Thaumaturgus, Canonical Epistle, 1; Augustine, On the Morals of the Manichaeans, 14.31–35; Against Faustus, 32.13; Sermons on New Testament Lessons, 12.7; John Chrysostom, Homilies on First Corinthians, 20. For additional sources, see Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 253 n. 5. Also see the terse mentions of these prohibitions in early Christian canons, e.g. Council of Gangra, 2; Council of Trullo, 67; Canons of the Holy and Altogether August Apostles, 63; and Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 254 n. 21 (with additional references). See e.g. Origen, De Principiis, 2.8; Aphrahat, Demonstrations, 15.3 (cf. Lev 17:14, discussed in Chapter 1). Interestingly, Origen goes on to discuss the blood of various other animals (specifically, insects and bivalves) as part of his narrative on the soul (anima). Elsewhere, Origen understands the blood taboo to be a universal law, applicable to both Christian and non-Christian alike. See Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 2.13.14 (on the prohibition itself, also see 2.13.13). This prohibition would therefore not necessarily distinguish Christians from non-Christians. However, non-Christians who viewed this prohibition as binding would, in effect, be interacting with, and following the interpretative authority of, the Christian community. Such people would further maintain this dichotomy, as they would be using the blood taboo to mark themselves off from those who do not follow Christian law, so the polarity would remain. Tertullian, On Modesty, 12; On Fasting, 9; Augustine, Against Faustus, 32.13 (cp. Gen 9:4–6, discussed in Chapter 1).

Break Ties or Break Bread?

155

temperance, and the avoidance of gluttony.85 The ban on these foodstuffs is also connected with the avoidance of the food of demons, “and a man of God must not join the table of demons.”86 And in avoiding dining with demons, a true Christian should be ready to face martyrdom rather than eat idol meat.87 While early Christian texts regarding idol food, strangled animals, and blood do not add much new material to our discussion, they serve to confirm much of what we have already seen: namely, that early Christian authors view the biblical dietary laws more as allegories of proper practice, than as legislation regulating the ingestion of actual animal protein.

Break Ties or Break Bread? As we saw in Chapter 4, the New Testament contains several texts that debate the continued applicability of the Old Testament dietary laws and their communal repercussions. While New Testament texts depict Jesus as more traditional in both what and with whom he ate,88 his immediate followers broke with tradition, allowing everything to be eaten (except the three exceptions just discussed) in the presence of everyone – Jew or 85 86

87

88

See e.g. Tertullian, On Fasting, 4; Clement, The Stromata, 4.15; Origen, Against Celsus, 8.30; Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, 18. Origen, Against Celsus, 8.30 (ANF 4.650; in general, see 8.30–32), which notes that idol food is offered to demons, blood – especially its odor – is demon food, and strangled animals still have their blood in them (so eating them would be akin to dining with demon spirits). Also see Didache, 6.2–3 (on this text, see Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 104); Clement, The Instructor, 2.1; Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, 6; Pseudo-Clementine, Recognitions, 4.36; Homilies, 7.4, 8; 8.23; 9.23; Augustine, Against Faustus, 32.13; John Chrysostom, Homilies on First Corinthians, 20.1. On the connection between demons and idolatry (including additional references), see Ra‘anan S. Boustan and Annette Yoshiko Reed, “Blood and Atonement in Pseudo-Clementines and The Story of the Ten Martyrs: The Problem of Selectivity in the Study of ‘Judaism’ and ‘Christianity,’” Henoch 30/2 (2008): 333–364, esp. pp. 338–340. Aristides, Apology, 15.4 attributes the avoidance of idol food to the need to maintain purity (a claim that appears only in the Syriac, and not the Greek, manuscripts; see Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 104, 253 n. 7). Contrast Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 20, where the purpose of the food laws is to keep God before one’s eyes during ingestion (cp. Origen, Against Celsus, 8.32). Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 34. For discussion and additional references, see Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 104–105. In this way, perhaps idol meat functions as pork did for Jews: as the symbolic foodstuff of foreign domination and, hence, for the metonymic Other. This comparison makes sense, as both idol meat (Roman imperial cult) and pork (Roman authority) represent Rome. For an interesting contrast, see Origen, Against Celsus, 1.52, in which the Egyptians are said to stubbornly refuse, even on pain of death, to eat the flesh of their own animal gods. Apparently, Jesus’ grandmother was also very careful about her diet, as she made sure that Mary (Jesus’ mother) never ate anything profane or unclean (see Infancy Gospel of James, 6:4). On Mary’s purity in the Infancy Gospel of James, see Lily Vuong, “Purity, Piety, and the Purposes of the Protevangelium of James” in “‘Non-canonical’ Religious Texts in Early Judaism and Early Christianity,” eds. Lee Martin McDonald and James H. Charlesworth, Jewish and Christian Texts in Contexts and Related Studies Series (New York: T&T Clark, 2012), 205–221.

156

The Rabbinic/Patristic Period: Christian Sources

Gentile. By relaxing these rules, early Christians allowed their foodways to serve as a means of separation and inclusion: separation from Jews89 and inclusion of Gentiles. Conversations about these topics tend to revolve around quotations, allusions/references to, and summaries of the relevant New Testament passages, usually understood allegorically and interpreted for the Spirit of the Law.90 Such texts introduce topics already discussed in this chapter, including the concern about sharing a table with demons.91 Further, some texts discuss general table manners, including not making a mess, swallowing elegantly, not talking while eating, not eating and drinking at the same time, etc.92 In tension with the majority of texts that relax commensal restrictions is another tradition that goes in the opposite direction. Discussing the organization of the nascent Church community, some texts address the commensal repercussions for those who do not follow the rules and/or share in faith: one should not break bread with them until they fall in line with these rules.93 The reason for this avoidance is that they are a bad 89

90

91

92 93

On not feasting with Jews, see e.g. Synod of Laodicea, 37; Council of Trullo, 11; Canons of the Holy and Altogether August Apostles, 70. For discussion and additional references, see Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 110–128; further sources can be found in Shaye J. D. Cohen, The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 187–188. In regard to what one eats, see e.g. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 12.7; Clement, The Instructor, 2.1; The Stromata, 3.6; Tertullian, On Fasting, 2; 15; Origen, Against Celsus, 2.2; 3.11 (remembering foodways as a point of contention for early Christians); Commentary on Matthew, 11.12–15; Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 8.8.8–13; 9.35.1–9.38.1; 9.42.1–10.5.7; Hippolytus, Fragments from Commentaries, 3.1.8–12 (discussing the Old Testament book of Daniel; on Daniel, also see Tertullian, Treatise on the Soul, 48; Origen, Against Celsus, 7.7); Constitutions of the Holy Apostles, 7.20; Augustine, Confessions, 10.46; John Chrysostom, The Gospel of St. Matthew, 51.3–4; Aphrahat, Demonstrations, 15.1–2. In regard to with whom one eats, see e.g. Epistle of Ignatius to the Philadelphians, 3; Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 12.15; Clement, The Instructor, 2.1; Tertullian, Against Marcion, 5.3; To His Wife, 2.3; On Modesty, 9; 18; Origen, Against Celsus, 2.1; Homily on Leviticus, 3.3.3 (which compares improper table companions to corpses); 7.5.2; John Chrysostom, Homily on Hebrews, 25.7; Council of Ancyra, 7 (on this text, see Cohen, Beginnings, 55 n. 116; and Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 105–106, which both reference t. Avodah Zarah 4:6, discussed above, in Chapter 5; and Chapter 6 n. 141). See e.g. Clement, The Instructor, 2.1; Pseudo-Clementine, Recognitions, 2.71. Also see 1 Cor 10:14–22. On improper/proper table talk and idolatrous/legitimate sacrifice, compare m. Avot 3:3 and the discussion thereof in Jordan D. Rosenblum, Food and Identity in Early Rabbinic Judaism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 100–101. See e.g. Clement, The Instructor, 2.1; 2.7. On the potential for banqueting to cause envy, see e.g. John Chrysostom, Homilies on the Statues, 15.4; Homilies on Thessalonians, 2. See e.g. Pseudo-Clementine, Recognitions, 2.71–72; 7.29; Homilies, 13.4, 9 (this raises issues of impurity; on this subject in the Pseudo-Clementine corpus, including additional references, see Boustan and Reed, “Blood and Atonement”); The Epistles of Pope Fabian, 1; 2.2; Augustine, Letters, 29.5 (which all cite 1 Cor 5:11; for a text that combines commensality restrictions, purity, and 1 Cor 5:11, see Tertullian, Against Marcion, 4.8). In addition to the sources cited above in previous notes, for the opposite view see Justin Martyr, who argues that, even if Christ-believers (erroneously)

Conclusion

157

influence and thus, like a cancer, they will infect the whole community. However, an invitation to join the Christian table is always open, once one is baptized a Christian and engages in proper practice.94

Conclusion Early Christian allegorization of Old Testament law offers sustained, varied, and intriguing rationalizations for biblical dietary regulations. In turning to allegory, the literal reading is either discarded or is understood to have never been applicable from the very beginning. One may eat a pig, eagle, or cuttlefish, so long as one knows not to act like one. The moral Law endures, while the ritual Law concludes. Like training wheels on a bicycle, the Letter of the Law served its purpose.95 With Christ, the training wheels have come off, allowing Christians to ride with the Spirit of the Law keeping them upright.

94

95

decide to observe Old Testament food laws, Christians should still break bread with them (Dialogue with Trypho, 47; Freidenreich, Foreign Food, 107). See e.g. Pseudo-Clementine, Recognitions, 2.71–72. On not sharing the table with those who commit certain vices, but still sharing the Eucharist, see e.g. Augustine, Letters, 22.3. Just to clarify: I am not arguing that early Christians (and their tables) were a radically open group, only that many of their texts depict themselves as such. However, the bar for entry for a Gentile into Christianity should not be understated, as it would include such things as rejecting all Greek and Roman gods and (depending on the time period) potentially opening oneself up to severe discrimination and persecution. Of course, if you were an early Christian exegete who believed that the Law was always an allegory, then you would claim that one never needed training wheels in the first place.

Conclusion: Food Ethic

An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct . . . All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts . . . The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.1

I teach a course at the University of Wisconsin–Madison entitled “Food in Rabbinic Judaism.” On the last day of class, I allow students to ask me whatever questions they have that I have not yet answered. And every year, the same question is asked: some form of “Should Jews keep kosher?” As a professor at a secular, state institution of higher learning, I cannot directly answer a normative religious question. However, as a scholar of religion who focuses on food, I find the question of “what should We/They eat?” fascinating. Underlying this question, as readers of this book will no doubt discern, is the accompanying question “Why should We/They eat in a particular manner?” And over the years, I have developed an answer to these questions, which is worth discussing by way of concluding this book. I use this question to remind students of what they have learned throughout the semester (some of which appears in this book).2 A leitmotif in my course is the various ways in which different food choices encode meaning, whether in regard to what, how, or with whom one eats. Every culinary and commensal choice that people make communicates their values and understandings; in sum, food choices function as a mechanism for meaning-making. (This is not to say that other actions do not function 1 2

Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac: With Essays on Conservation from Round River (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970 [1949]), 238–239. I thank my students for allowing me to use our classroom like a laboratory, in which I could test my latest research out on them. They continually push me toward greater clarity, which I hope is reflected in my arguments throughout this book.

158

Conclusion: Food Ethic

159

similarly, but in both my course and this book I have chosen to focus on this particular topic.) Given that the act of eating – and, as this book argues, the act of talking about what, why, and how one eats – is a mechanism for meaning-making, the concept of ethics seems an apt avenue for discussion of this subject. Of course, “we should recognize that ‘ethics’ is a notoriously difficult-todefine concept . . . Nonetheless, we can say that ethics deals with the domain of values rather than descriptions, the ‘ought’ rather than the ‘is.’”3 Ethics function as a sort of checklist against which to gauge one’s potential actions. Or, to use a food metaphor, it is a shopping list that reminds you what your ideal diet suggests you purchase when at the grocery store and presented with the temptation of buying chocolate cake instead of broccoli. So I introduce the concept of ethics to my students and then tell them about famous ecologist and former University of Wisconsin–Madison professor Aldo Leopold. Most of my students are less familiar with Leopold through his writings than through his eponymous campus café, Aldo’s Café (at which some of the coffee that fueled the writing of this book was purchased), so I briefly explain to them his scholarship on environmentalism. In particular, I discuss his famous concept of “the land ethic,”4 a summary of which appears as the epigraph to this chapter. Leopold’s notion of the land ethic requires a reorientation of people’s relationship with their surrounding environment in order to include the land within their notion of community.5 It requires the inclusion of the ecological repercussions for a given act within one’s assessment of performed practice. Further, it asserts that “community” is constituted by both human and non-human entities. I suggest to my students (and now, to my readers) that Leopold’s concept can profitably be applied to food. Let us examine Leopold’s words in the epigraph a little more carefully. According to Leopold, “An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct.”6 Such a sentiment maps neatly onto our discussion of ancient conversations about the biblical 3 4 5

6

Aaron S. Gross, The Question of the Animal and Religion: Theoretical Stakes, Practical Implications (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 16. In general, see Leopold, Sand County Almanac, 237–264. This functions similarly, in many ways, to Latour’s concept of ANT (Actor-Network-Theory), in which non-human entities (such as Leopold’s “soils, waters, plants, and animals”) work together to assemble the social. In general, see Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to ActorNetwork-Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007 [2005]). Leopold, Sand County Almanac, 238.

160

Conclusion: Food Ethic

dietary laws. Allow me to illustrate by means of the pedagogical animal of the pig. Avoiding pig (either literally or metaphorically) is a practice of limitation in service of achieving an ethical goal. Avoiding those who eat/ act like pig is a practice of social differentiation (i.e. commensality restrictions). Leopold reminds us to consider such non-human agents in our discussion of ethics and community, which is exactly what ancient Jews, Christians, Greeks, and Romans did when they talked about the biblical dietary laws.7 At this point, I should note to my readers a caveat that I carefully make to my students: I am not arguing for a singular, normative food ethic. (This is why I omit the definite article from “Food Ethic,” unlike Leopold’s chapter, which is entitled “The Land Ethic” and argues for a more normative view.) While I do hold my own views on food practices, my main argument is that the various ways that all humans engage with their food (i.e. their foodways)8 serves to communicate various ethics. We should all be aware of this and check to make sure that our “ought” accords with our “is” – that is, that our actual practice does not differ from our ideal practice. For the ancient Jewish and Christian authors discussed in this book, that meant deciding how to apply biblical food laws to their present physical, theological, social, and economic reality. Such conversation continues today, where in both religious and secular contexts debates about culinary and commensal ethical practice (e.g. ethical kashrut; vegetarianism vs. veganism vs. carnivorism; Slow Food vs. Fast Food), agricultural policy (e.g. GMOs; organic vs. conventional), and a myriad of other issues occupy the time of scholars, cooks (both professional and amateur), television personalities, philosophers, etc.9 To offer an example of a modern culinary and ecological quandary: if 7 8

9

For a forceful argument concerning the importance of considering the animals themselves in such discussions, see Gross, Question of the Animal. To offer a concise definition of “foodways,” they are: “the modes of feeling, thinking, and behaving about food that are common to a cultural group” (Frederick J. Simoons, Eat Not This Flesh: Food Avoidances in the Old World [Madison and Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967], 3). The scholarship and popular literature on this subject is too voluminous to fit within a single footnote. To offer a few examples of more scholarly works, see Conrad G. Brunk and Harold Coward, eds., Acceptable Genes? Religious Traditions and Genetically Modified Foods (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009); Gross, Question of the Animal, which summarizes much of this modern material, with particular emphasis on debates in modern Judaism; Mary L. Zamore, ed., The Sacred Table: Creating a Jewish Food Ethic, CCAR Challenge and Change Series (New York: CCAR Press, 2011), a hybrid book which focuses on the modern Reform Jewish movement and combines scholarly and theological approaches; and Benjamin E. Zeller et al., eds., Religion and Eating in North America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), which focuses on a variety of religious traditions in modern North America. The popular literature on this topic is even more daunting, as it includes a vast library of both print and online sources. A good place to start is the author who has perhaps done more to popularize this subject than any other: Michael Pollan.

Conclusion: Food Ethic

161

one’s goal is to reduce the environmental impact of one’s grocery shopping, is it better to purchase a tomato with low “food miles” (i.e. grown in close proximity to where one lives), even if it requires significantly more energy to grow than a tomato from a far-off land needed to be grown, packed, and shipped?10 Answering this question requires one to place various data on one’s own ethical scale in order to determine which action carries the most ethical weight. A foodie in modern-day Madison, Wisconsin who debates her tomato purchase is engaging in analogous ethical decision making to an early Christian deciding how to act when offered pork: namely, how to put their food ethic into practice. In focusing on the critiques and apologies for the biblical dietary laws in the ancient world, I argued that there were three primary rhetorical strategies for justifying various interpretations of these regulations: reason, revelation, and allegory. More work needs to be done in order to test whether these strategies are applicable cross-culturally, or whether additional (and/or different) strategies apply to other temporal and geographic data sets. My suspicion is that additional approaches apply elsewhere, but that the Jewish dietary laws are not the only ones to which these three rhetorical strategies apply. Another observation that has come into focus for me as I reflect back on this project is the need to remind oneself that conversations about traditional food practices are really conversations about perceived traditional food practices. When ancient authors used texts from the Hebrew Bible/ Old Testament to justify their contemporary practice, they often did so by appealing to ancient precedent. As we have seen, such “precedent” was very often an act of eisegesis rather than exegesis; that is, it was an act of reading into a text, rather than out of a text. Hiding behind such appeals to “traditional” food practices are various agendas –whether polemical, hierarchical, theological, etc. As numerous other studies have shown, however, food traditions change over time and we are often mistaken about our assumptions regarding the variance of those traditions (e.g. the association between white rice and Japan; what food was like back in “the old country”; what constitutes “authentic” Chinese food).11 As is the case in

10 11

Of particular relevance is his In Defense of Food: An Eater’s Manifesto (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008), since it serves as how-to manual of sorts for his previous book, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006). For discussion, see Sarah Murray, Moveable Feasts: From Ancient Rome to the 21st Century, the Incredible Journeys of the Food We Eat (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008 [2007]), 259–269. In corresponding order, discussion of each of the above examples can be found in: Emiko OhnukiTierney, Rice as Self: Japanese Identities through Time (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993);

162

Conclusion: Food Ethic

so many other domains, to appeal to the past is often to make a particular claim about the present. It is to engage in what Mark Swislocki terms ‘culinary nostalgia’ – the recollection or purposive evocation of another time and place through food.”12 Thus, we must always remember to interrogate the historical assumptions and authoritative claims behind such discourse.13 Finally, on a personal note, as I was completing this book, my son – to whom this book is dedicated – was born. I approached my wife’s pregnancy as a scholar would and thus read widely on the topic, so as to be best prepared for the arrival of our child. Of particular interest to me, as one might expect, was the subject of nutrition. There is much ink spilled on the subject of what to eat while pregnant;14 what food to offer your child immediately after he is born (breast milk vs. formula); when to introduce a bottle; what, when, and how to feed him solid food; the list goes on (quite literally) ad nauseam.15 As I diligently did my homework on these topics, I began to see the subject matter of this book lurking in the background. Conversations about how we feed our children reflect our broader values. Such discussions are fertile grounds for consideration since we are often more concerned about what we feed our children than we are with our own diet. Perhaps this is the reason that proper nutrition for a child often serves a metaphor for proper spiritual nutrition.16 Even before my son was born, he was literally embodied and embodying my wife and my food ethic. And as he grows older, we will relate to him the

12

13

14

15

16

Hasia R. Diner, Hungering for America: Italian, Irish, and Jewish Foodways in the Age of Migration (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); and Jennifer 8. Lee, The Fortune Cookie Chronicles: Adventures in the World of Chinese Food (New York: Twelve Books, 2008). A recent broad survey of some of these changes, with particular focus on linguistic shifts, is Dan Jurafsky, The Language of Food: A Linguist Reads the Menu (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2014). Mark Swislocki, Culinary Nostalgia: Regional Food Culture and the Urban Experience in Shanghai (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 1. A recent example of this is when Michael Pollan evokes his grandmother’s kitchen (see In Defense of Food, 3–5). My thinking here is informed by Bruce Lincoln’s theories of discourse, especially as discussed in Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual, and Classification, 2nd edn. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014 [1989]). One scholarly article relevant to the topic at hand is Heather Paxson, “Post-Pasteurian Cultures: The Microbiopolitics of Raw-Milk Cheese in the United States,” Cultural Anthropology 23/1 (2008): 15–47. For a historical overview of these topics, see Amy Bentley, Inventing Baby Food: Taste, Health, and the Industrialization of the American Diet, California Studies in Food and Culture (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2014). For a recent critical assessment of many of these arguments, see Courtney Jung, Lactivism: How Feminists and Fundamentalists, Hippies and Yuppies, and Physicians and Politicians Made Breastfeeding Big Business and Bad Policy (New York: Basic Books, 2015). For example, see Maimonides, Guide to the Perplexed, 1.33.

Conclusion: Food Ethic

163

narratives behind our own (ever evolving) food ethic. With every story, we will be explaining to him why we eat this way (and not that way) and how these practices reflect our broader values. Researching and writing this book has taught me the importance of attending17 to the stories that groups tell in order to justify their own (or critique another’s) perceived traditional food practices. It is my hope that I have not only elucidated an ancient case study of biblical dietary laws, but also provided the beginnings of a vocabulary to continue conversation about critiques and apologies for foodways in other temporal and geographic locations. Or, at the very least, I hope to have inspired conversation around your dinner table tonight. 17

On the importance of using the verb “attending” in this context, see Gross, Question of the Animal, 13.

Bibliography

Primary Sources Avot d’Rabbi Natan: Schechter, Solomon, ed. Aboth de-Rabbi Nathan: Solomon Schechter Edition: With References to Parallels in the Two Versions and to the Addenda in the Schechter Edition. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1997 [1887]. Babylonian Talmud: Vilna: Romm, 1880–1886. Contra Celsum: Chadwick, Henry, ed. Contra Celsum. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965. Deuteronomy Rabbah: Lieberman, Saul, ed. Midrash Debarim Rabbah: Edited for the First Time from the Oxford Ms. No. 147 with an Introduction and Notes. Jerusalem: Wahrmann Books, 1964. Diodorus: Walton, Francis R., ed. Diodorus Siculus: Library of History, XII, Fragments of Books 33–40. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Epictetus: Oldfather, W.A., ed. The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments: Epictetus. 2 vols. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978–1979 [1925]. Genesis Rabbah: Theodor, J. and Ch. Albeck, eds. Midrash Bereshit Rabba. 3 vols. Jerusalem: Wahrmann Books, 1965. Hebrew Bible: Alt, A., O. Eißfeldt, and P. Kahle, eds. Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1997. Jerusalem Talmud: Schäfer, Peter and Hans-Jürgen Becker, eds. Synopse zum Talmud Yerushalmi. 7 vols. TSAJ. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991–2001. Josephus: Thackeray, H. St. J., R. Marcus, A. Wikgren, and L. H. Feldman, eds. Josephus. 10 vols. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926–1965. Juvenal: Ramsay, G. G., ed. Juvenal and Persius. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979. Leviticus Rabbah: Margulies, Mordecai, ed. Midrash Wayyikra Rabbah. 4 vols. London: Ararat Publishing Society, 1954. Mekilta d’Rabbi Ishmael: Horowitz, Hayim Shaul, ed. Mekilta d’Rabbi Ishmael. Jerusalem: Bamberger & Wahrman, 1960. Mekilta d’Rabbi Shimon b. Yohai: Epstein, J. N. and E. Z. Melamed, eds. Mekilta d’Rabbi Shimon b. Yohai. Jerusalem: Meqisei Nirdamim, 1955. 164

Bibliography

165

Mekilta d’Rabbi Shimon b. Yohai: Hoffman, David Zvi, ed. Mekilta d’Rabbi Shimon b. Yohai. Frankfurt: J. Kauffman, 1905. Mishnah: Albeck, Hanokh, ed. Six Books of the Mishnah. 6 vols. Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1952–1958. New Testament: Aland, Barbara, Kurt Aland, Johannes Karavidopoulos, Carlo M. Martini, and Bruce M. Metzger, eds. The Greek New Testament. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2005. Papyri Graecae Magicae: Preisendanz, Karl, ed. Papyri Graecae Magicae: Die griechischen Zauberpapyri. 3 vols. Leipzig: Teubner, 1928–1944. Second improved edn: edited by Albert Henrichs. 2 vols. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1974. Pesikta d’Rav Kahana: Mandelbaum, Bernard, ed. Pesikta de Rav Kahana. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1987. Pesiqta Rabbati: Ulmer, Rivka, ed. Pesiqta Rabbati: A Synoptic Edition of Pesiqta Rabbati Based Upon All Extant Manuscripts and the Editio Princeps. 3 vols. New York: University Press of America, 2009. Petronius: Hezeltine, M. and W. H. D. Rouse, eds. Petronius: Satyricon; Seneca: Apocolocyntosis. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913. Philo: Colson, F. H., G. H. Whitaker, and R. Marcus, eds. Philo: In Ten Volumes (and Two Supplementary Volumes). LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929–1962. Plutarch: Clement, P. A. and H. B. Hoffleit, eds. Plutarch: Moralia, VII: Tabletalk, Books 1–6. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. Plutarch: Perrin, Bernadotte, ed. Plutarch: Lives VII: Demosthenes and Caesar. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919. Porphyry: Clark, Gillian, ed. Porphyry: On Abstinence from Killing Animals. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. Septuaginta: Rahlfs, Alred, ed. Septuaginta: Id est Vetus Testamentum graece iuxta LXX interpretes. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979 [1935]. Sextus Empiricus: Bury, R. G., ed. Sextus Empiricus. 4 vols. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968–1983. Sifra: Finkelstein, Louis, ed. Sifra or Torat Kohanim: According to Codex Assemani LXVI. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1956. Sifra: Weiss, Isaac Hirsch, ed. Sifra on Leviticus. New York: Om, 1947. Sifre Deuteronomy: Finkelstein, Louis, ed. Sifre on Deuteronomy. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1969. Sifre Numbers: Horowitz, Hayim Shaul, ed. Siphre d’be Rab: Sifre to Numbers and Sifre Zutta. Leipzig: Gustav Fock, 1917. Tacitus: Moore, Clifford H. and John Jackson, ed. Tacitus: Histories 4–5; Annals 1–3. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931. Tanhuma: Buber, Solomon, ed. Midrash Tanhuma. 2 vols. Israel: Books Export Enterprises, 1977 (1885). Tosefta: Lieberman, Saul, ed. The Tosefta: According to Codex Vienna, with Variants from Codex Erfurt, Genizah Mss. And Editio Princeps (Venice 1521), Together with References to Parallel Passages in Talmudic Literature

166

Bibliography

and a Brief Commentary. 5 vols. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1955–1988. Tosefta: Zuckermandel, Moses Samuel, ed. Tosefta: Based on the Erfurt and Vienna Codices with Parallels and Variants. Jerusalem: Bamberger and Wahrmann, 1937.

Secondary Sources Abrams, Nathan. “‘I’ll Have Whatever She’s Having’: Jews, Food, and Film” in Anne L. Bower (ed.), Reel Food: Essays on Food and Film. New York: Routledge, 2004, pp. 87–100. Ackerman-Lieberman, Phillip and Rakefet Zalashik, eds. A Jew’s Best Friend? The Image of the Dog throughout Jewish History. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2013. Alexander, Philip, Armin Lange, and Renate Pilliger, eds. In the Second Degree: Paratextual Literature in Ancient Near Eastern and Ancient Mediterranean Culture and its Reflections in Medieval Literature. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010. Anderson, H. “4 Maccabees” in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), OTP, vol. 2. New York: Doubleday, 1985, pp 531–564. Ballentine, Debra Scoggins. The Conflict Myth and the Biblical Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. Barak-Erez, Daphne. Outlawed Pigs: Law, Religion, and Culture in Israel. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007. Barclay, John M. G. Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE–117 CE). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996. Barkley, Gary Wayne, trans. Origen: Homilies on Leviticus 1–16. The Fathers of the Church, vol. 83. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1990. Barthes, Roland. “Toward a Psychosociology of Contemporary Food Consumption” in Carole Counihan and Penny van Esterik (eds.), Food and Culture: A Reader. New York: Routledge, 1997, pp. 20–27. Baumgarten, Albert I. The Flourishing of Jewish Sects in the Maccabean Era: An Interpretation. New York: Brill, 1997. Belser, Julia Watts, Power, Ethics, and Ecology in Jewish Late Antiquity: Rabbinic Responses to Drought and Disaster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Bentley, Amy. Inventing Baby Food: Taste, Health, and the Industrialization of the American Diet. California Studies in Food and Culture. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2014. Berkowitz, Beth A. Defining Jewish Difference: From Antiquity to the Present. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Berthelot, Katell. “Philo and Kindness towards Animals.” The Studia Philonica Annual 14 (2002): 48–65.

Bibliography

167

Betz, Hans Dieter, ed. The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation: Including the Demotic Spells, 2nd edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Bornet, Philippe. Rites et Pratiques de l’hospitalité: Mondes Juifs et Indiens Anciens. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010. Bourdain, Anthony. A Cook’s Tour: In Search of the Perfect Meal. New York: Bloomsbury, 2001. Boustan, Ra‘anan S. and Annette Yoshiko Reed. “Blood and Atonement in PseudoClementines and the Story of the Ten Martyrs: The Problem of Selectivity in the Study of ‘Judaism’ and ‘Christianity.’” Henoch 30/2 (2008): 333–364. Boyarin, Daniel. Intertextuality and the Reading of Midrash. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994 [1990]. Carnal Israel: Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995 [1993]. Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Brown, Francis, S. R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs. The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon. 1906. Repr., Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003. Broyde, Michael J. “Cloning People and Jewish Law: A Preliminary Analysis,” www.jlaw.com/Articles/cloning.html, cited July 19, 2016. Brumberg-Kraus, Jonathan. “Meat-eating and Jewish Identity: Ritualization of the Priestly ‘Torah of Beast and Fowl’ [Lev. 11:46] in Rabbinic Judaism and in Medieval Kabbalah.” AJSR 24/2 (1999): 227–262. Brunk, Conrad G. and Harold Coward, eds. Acceptable Genes? Religious Traditions and Genetically Modified Foods. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009. Bryan, David. Cosmos, Chaos and the Kosher Mentality. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995. Cheung, Alex T. Idol Food in Corinth: Jewish Background and Pauline Legacy. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999. Cohen, Gerson D. “Esau as Symbol in Early Medieval Thought” in Alexander Altmann (ed.), Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, pp. 19–48. Cohen, Jeremy. Living Letters of the Law: Ideas of the Jew in Medieval Christianity. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999. Cohen, Shaye J. D. From the Maccabees to the Mishnah. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1989. “The Conversion of Antoninus” in Peter Schäfer (ed.), The Talmud Yerushalmi and Graeco-Roman Culture I. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997, pp. 141–172. The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000. Why Aren’t Jewish Women Circumcised? Gender and Covenant in Judaism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005. “The Judean Legal Tradition and the Halakhah of the Mishnah” in Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert and Martin S. Jaffee (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to

168

Bibliography

the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp 121–143. Cohn, Naftali S. The Memory of the Temple and the Making of the Rabbis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. Collins, John J. Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora. New York: Crossroads, 1983. Daniel: A Commentary on the Book of Daniel. Hermeneia. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993. Cooper, Alan. “Once Again Seething a Kid in Its Mother’s Milk.” JSIJ 10 (2012): 1–34. Crossan, John Dominic. The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant. San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1991. Diner, Hasia R. Hungering for America: Italian, Irish, and Jewish Foodways in the Age of Migration. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. Douglas, Mary. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. 1966. Repr., New York: Routledge, 1999. Leviticus as Literature. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Ehrman, Bart D. Jesus: Apocalyptic Prophet of the New Millennium. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Eilberg-Schwartz, Howard. The Savage in Judaism: An Anthropology of Israelite Religion and Ancient Judaism. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990. Elman, Yaakov. “Middle Persian Culture and Babylonian Sages: Accommodation and Resistance in the Shaping of Rabbinic Legal Tradition” in Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert and Martin S. Jaffee (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 165–197. Fabre-Vassas, Claudine. The Singular Beast: Jews, Christians and the Pig. Translated by Carol Volk. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Feldman, Louis H. Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World: Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander to Justinian. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996 [1993]. Fine, Steven. “Nabratein in the Ancient Literary Sources” in Eric M. Meyers and Carol L. Meyers (eds.), Excavations at Ancient Nabratein: Synagogue and Environs. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2009, pp. 3–14. Finkelstein, Ari. “The Use of Jews in Julian’s Program: ‘Dying for the Law’ in the Letter to Theodorus – A Case Study” in Jordan D. Rosenblum, Lily C. Vuong, and Nathaniel P. DesRosiers (eds.), Religious Competition in the Third-Century C.E.: Jews, Christians, and the Greco-Roman World. JAJS. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014, pp. 168–178. Fishbane, Michael. Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel. 1988. Repr., New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Fishkoff, Sue. Kosher Nation: Why More and More of America’s Food Answers to a Higher Authority. New York: Schocken Books, 2010.

Bibliography

169

Foer, Jonathan Safran. Eating Animals. New York and Boston: Back Bay Books, 2010. Fonrobert, Charlotte Elisheva and Martin S. Jaffee, eds. The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Forst, Binyomin. The Kosher Kitchen: A Practical Guide. Brooklyn: Mesorah Publications, 2011 (2009). Fotopoulos, John. Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003. Fox, Michael V. Proverbs 10–31: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. AB 18B. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. Fraade, Steven D. “Rabbinic Views on the Practice of Targum, and Multilingualism in the Jewish Galilee of the Third-Sixth Centuries” in Lee I. Levine (eds.), The Galilee in Late Antiquity. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1992, pp. 253–286. Franklin, Benjamin. The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin. Edited by Peter Conn. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005. Fredriksen, Paula, Augustine and the Jews: A Christian Defense of Jews and Judaism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010 [2008]. Freedman, H. and Maurice Simon, eds. Midrash Rabbah: Translated into English with Notes, Glossary and Indices, 10 vols. New York: Soncino Press, 1983 [1939]. Freidenreich, David M. Foreigners and Their Food: Constructing Otherness in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Law. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011. “Food and Table Fellowship” in Amy-Jill Levine and Marx Zvi Brettler (eds.), The Jewish Annotated New Testament. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 521–524. “Contextualizing Bread: An Analysis of Talmudic Discourse in Light of Christian and Islamic Counterparts.” JAAR 80/2 (2012): 411–433. Gaca, Kathy L. The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003. Gafni, Isaiah M. “The World of the Talmud: From the Mishnah to the Arab Conquest” in Hershel Shanks (ed.), Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism: A Parallel History of Their Origins and Early Development. Washington, D.C.: Biblical Archaeology Society, 1992, pp. 225–265. Gambetti, Sandra. The Alexandrian Riots of 38 C.E. and the Persecution of the Jews: A Historical Reconstruction. Boston: Brill, 2009. Gilders, William K. Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible: Meaning and Power. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. Golb, Norman. “The Dietary Laws of the Damascus Document in Relation to Those of the Karaites.” JJS 8 (1957): 51–69. Goodman, Martin. Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.

170

Bibliography

Gray, Alyssa M. “A Contribution to the Study of Martyrdom and Identity in the Palestinian Talmud.” JJS 54/2 (2003): 242–272. A Talmud in Exile: The Influence of Yerushalmi Avodah Zarah on the Formation of Bavli Avodah Zarah. BJS 342. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005. Gray, Jonathan. Show Sold Separately: Promos, Spoilers, and Other Media Paratexts. New York: New York University Press, 2010. Gross, Aaron S. The Question of the Animal and Religion: Theoretical Stakes, Practical Implications. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. Grottanelli, Cristiano. “Avoiding Pork: Egyptians and Jews in Greek and Latin Texts” in Cristiano Grottanelli and Lucio Milano (eds.), Food and Identity in the Ancient World. Padova: S.A.R.G.O.N. Editrice e Libreria, 2004, pp. 59–93. Gruen, Eric S. Heritage and Hellenism: The Reinvention of Jewish Tradition. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998. Diaspora: Jews Amidst Greeks and Romans. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. Gvaryahu, Amit. “A New Reading of the Three Dialogues in Mishnah Avodah Zarah.” JSQ 19 (2012): 207–229. Halivni, David Weiss. Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified Law. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. The Formation of the Babylonian Talmud. Translated by Jeffrey L. Rubenstein. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Har-Peled, Misgav. “The Dialogical Beast: The Identification of Rome with the Pig in Early Rabbinic Literature.” Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2013. Harris, Marvin. Cows, Pigs, Wars, and Witches: The Riddles of Culture. New York: Vintage Books, 1974. Good to Eat: Riddles of Food and Culture. Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1998. Harris, W. V. “Child-Exposure in the Roman Empire.” The Journal of Roman Studies 84 (1994): 1–22. Hart, Mitchell B. The Healthy Jew: The Symbiosis of Judaism and Modern Medicine. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Hartman, Louis F. and Alexander A. Di Lella. The Book of Daniel: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. AB 23. New York: Doubleday, 1978. Harvey, Warren Zev. “The Pupil, the Harlot, and the Fringe Benefits.” Prooftexts 6 (1986): 259–271. Hawley, Lance. “The Agenda of Priestly Taxonomy: The Conceptualization of ‫ ָטֵמא‬and ‫שֶׁקץ‬ ֶ in Leviticus 11.” CBQ 77/2 (2015): 231–249. Hayes, Christine Elizabeth. Between the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds: Accounting for Halakhic Difference in Selected Sugyot from Tractate Avodah Zarah. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. What’s Divine about Divine Law? Early Perspectives. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. Hecker, Joel. Mystical Bodies, Mystical Meals: Eating and Embodiment in Medieval Kabbalah. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2005.

Bibliography

171

Heine, Ronald E., trans. Origen: Homilies on Genesis and Exodus. The Fathers of the Church, vol. 71. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1981. Henshke, David. “‘For Your Love is More Delightful than Wine’: Concerning Tannaitic Biblical Traditions.” JSIJ 10 (2012): 1–24. (Hebrew) Herr, Moshe David. “The Historical Significance of the Dialogues Between Jewish Sages and Roman Dignitaries” in Joseph Heineman and Dov Noy (eds.), Scripta Hierosolymitana, vol. 22. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1971, pp. 23–150. Hidary, Richard. Dispute for the Sake of Heaven: Legal Pluralism in the Talmud. BJS 353. Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2010. “Hogs and Men.” Editorial. Berkshire World and Corn Belt Stockman. December 1, 1910, p. 3. Honigman, Sylvie. The Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria: A Study in the Narrative of the Letter of Aristeas. New York: Routledge, 2003. Horowitz, Roger. Kosher USA: How Coke Became Kosher and Other Tales of Modern Food. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016. Houston, Walter. Purity and Monotheism: Clean and Unclean Animals in Biblical Law. JSOTSup 140. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993. Hutton, Jeremy M. “Jacob’s ‘Two Camps’ and Transjordanian Geography: Wrestling with Order in Genesis 32.” ZAW 122 (2010): 20–32. Isaacson, Walter. Benjamin Franklin: An American Life. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. Jacobs, Andrew S. Christ Circumcised: A Study in Early Christian History and Difference. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. Jaffee, Martin S. Early Judaism: Religious Worlds of the First Judaic Millennium, 2nd edn. Bethesda: University Press of Maryland, 2006. The Jewish Annotated New Testament. Edited by Amy-Jill Levine and Marx Zvi Brettler. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Judd, Robin. Contested Rituals: Circumcision, Kosher Butchering, and Jewish Political Life in Germany, 1843–1933. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007. Jung, Courtney. Lactivism: How Feminists and Fundamentalists, Hippies and Yuppies, and Physicians and Politicians Made Breastfeeding Big Business and Bad Policy. New York: Basic Books, 2015. Jurafsky, Dan. The Language of Food: A Linguist Read the Menu. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2014. Kanarek, Jane L. Biblical Narrative and the Formation of Rabbinic Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Kee, H. C. “Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs” in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), OTP, vol. 1. New York: Doubleday, 1985, pp. 775–828. Kraemer, David C. Jewish Eating and Identity through the Ages. New York: Routledge, 2009 [2007]. Kraemer, Ross Shepard. When Aseneth Met Joseph: A Late Antique Tale of the Biblical Patriarch and His Egyptian Wife, Reconsidered. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

172

Bibliography

Kugel, James L. In Potiphar’s House: The Interpretive Life of Biblical Texts. New York: Harper Collins, 1990. Kunin, Seth D. We Think What We Eat: Neo-Structuralist Analysis of Israelite Food Rules and Other Cultural and Textual Practices. JSOTSup 412. New York: T & T Clark, 2004. Kurlansky, Mark, ed. Choice Cuts: A Savory Selection of Food Writing from Around the World and throughout History. New York: Penguin Group, 2002. The Big Oyster: History on the Half Shell. New York: Random House, 2007. Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007 [2005]. Lee, Jennifer 8. The Fortune Cookie Chronicles: Adventures in the World of Chinese Food. New York: Twelve Books, 2008. Leopold, Aldo. A Sand County Almanac: With Essays on Conservation from Round River. New York: Ballantine Books, 1970 [1949]. Levine, David. “Between Leadership and Marginality: Models for Evaluating the Role of the Rabbis in the Early Centuries CE” in Lee I. Levine and Daniel R. Schwartz (eds.), Jewish Identities in Antiquity: Studies in Memory of Menahem Stern. TSAJ 130. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009, pp. 195–209. Levinger, Yisrael Meir. “Clean Fowl May Be Eaten in Accord with the Tradition.” Sinai 64 (1969): 258–281. (Hebrew) Liddell, H. G. and R. Scott. An Intermediate Greek–English Lexicon. Abridged edn. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002 [1891]. Lincoln, Bruce. Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual, and Classification, 2nd edn. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014 [1989]. Linder, Amnon. The Jews in Roman Imperial Legislation. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987. Lindsay, W. M. “Bird-Names in Latin Glossaries.” Classical Philology 13/1 (1918): 1–22. Lizorkin, Eliyahu. Aphrahat’s Demonstrations: A Conversation with the Jews of Mesopotamia. Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium 642. Louvain: Peeters, 2012. Longstreet, Stephen and Ethel Longstreet. The Joys of Jewish Cooking. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1974. MacDonald, Nathan. Not Bread Alone: The Uses of Food in the Old Testament. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Magness, Jodi. Stone and Dung, Oil and Spit: Jewish Daily Life in the Time of Jesus. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011. Mason, Steve. “Jews, Judaeans, Judaizing, Judaism: Problems of Categorization in Ancient Judaism.” JSJ 38 (2007): 457–512. McGowan, Andrew. Ascetic Eucharists: Food and Drink in Early Christian Ritual Meals. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Meshel, Naphtali. “Food for Thought: Systems of Categorization in Leviticus 11.” HTR 101/2 (2008): 203–229.

Bibliography

173

Meyer, Esias E. “Leviticus 11, Deuteronomy 14 and Directionality.” Journal for Semitics 23/1 (2014): 71–89. Milgrom, Jacob. Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. AB, vol. 3. New York: Doubleday, 1991. Leviticus 17–22: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. AB, vol. 3A. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008 [1964]. Moore, Stephen D. and Janice Capel Anderson, “Taking it Like a Man: Masculinity in 4 Maccabees.” JBL 117/2 (1998): 249–273. Murray, Sarah. Moveable Feasts: From Ancient Rome to the 21st Century, the Incredible Journeys of the Food We Eat. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008 [2007]. Nadler, Allan. “Holy Kugel: The Sanctification of Ashkenazic Ethnic Foods in Hasidism” in Leonard J. Greenspoon, Ronald A. Simkins, and Gerald Shapiro (eds.), Food and Judaism. Studies in Jewish Civilization 15. Omaha: Creighton University Press, 2005, pp. 193–214. Naeh, Shlomo. “‘Your Affections Are Better Than Wine’: A New Approach to Tractate Avoda Zara 2:5” in A. Edrei et al. (eds.), Studies in Talmud and Midrash, Tirtzah Lifshitz Memorial. Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2005, pp. 411–434. (Hebrew) Nestle, Marion. Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007. Neusner, Jacob. Aphrahat and Judaism: The Christian–Jewish Argument in FourthCentury Iran. Leiden: Brill, 1971. New Yorker, The. July 7 and 14, 2014, p. 14. Nihan, Christophe. “The Laws about Clean and Unclean Animals in Leviticus and Deuteronomy and Their Place in the Formation of the Pentateuch” in Thomas B. Dozeman, Konrad Schmid, and Baruch J. Schwartz (eds.), The Pentateuch. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011, pp 401–432. Nirenberg, David. Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013. Novak, David. The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism: An Historical and Constructive Study of the Noahide Laws. Toronto Studies in Theology 14. New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1983. Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko. Rice as Self: Japanese Identities through Time. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Olyan, Saul M. Rites and Rank: Hierarchy in Biblical Representations of Cult. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. Disability in the Hebrew Bible: Interpreting Mental and Physical Difference. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Parrish, John W. “Cultural Anthroplogy and Corinthian Food Fights: Structure and History in the Lord’s Dinner” in William E. Arnal, Willi Braun, and Russell T. McCutcheon (eds.), Failure and Nerve in the Academic Study of Religion: Essays in Honor of Donald Wiebe. Bristol: Equinox Publishing, 2012, pp. 157–176. Paxson, Heather. “Post-Pasteurian Cultures: The Microbiopolitics of Raw-Milk Cheese in the United States.” Cultural Anthropology 23/1 (2008): 15–47.

174

Bibliography

Pendergraft, Mary. “‘Thou Shalt Not Eat the Hyena’: A Note on ‘Barnabas’ Epistle 10.7.” Vigiliae Christianae 46 (1992): 75–79. Peskowitz, Miriam B. Spinning Fantasies: Rabbis, Gender, and History. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997. Pollan, Michael. The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006. In Defense of Food: An Eater’s Manifesto. New York: The Penguin Press, 2008. Propp, William H. Exodus 19–40: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. AB, vol. 2A. New York: Doubleday, 2006. Räisänen, Heikki. “Jesus and the Food Laws: Reflections on Mark 7.15.” JSNT 16 (1982): 79–100. Rajak, Tessa. Josephus: The Historian and His Society. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984 [1983]. “Dying for the Law: The Martyr’s Portrait in Jewish–Greek Literature” in The Jewish Dialogue with Greece and Rome: Studies in Cultural and Social Interaction. Boston: Brill, 2000, pp. 99–133. Rhodes, James. “Diet and Desire: The Logic of the Dietary Laws According to Philo.” ETL 79 (2003): 122–133. Roberts, Alexander and James Donaldson, eds. Ante-Nicene Fathers: The Writings of the Fathers Down to A.D. 325. 10 vols. 1885. Repr., Peabody Hendrickson Publishers, 2012. Rosenblum, Jordan D. “Kosher Olive Oil in Antiquity Reconsidered.” JSJ 40/3 (2009): 356–365. “‘Why do you refuse to eat pork?’ Jews, Food, and Identity in Roman Palestine.” JQR 100/1 (2010): 95–110. “From Their Bread to Their Bed: Commensality, Intermarriage, and Idolatry in Tannaitic Literature.” JJS 61/1 (2010): 18–29. Food and Identity in Early Rabbinic Judaism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. “Changing the Subject: Rabbinic Legal Process in the Absence of Justification.” Review of Rabbinic Judaism 18 (2015): 23–36. “Justifications for Foodways and the Study of Commensality” in Susanne Kerner, Cynthia Chou, and Morten Warmind (eds.), Commensality: From Everyday Food to Feast. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015, pp. 189–194. “The Night Rabbi Aqiba Slept with Two Women” in Susan Ashbrook Harvey, Nathaniel DesRosiers, Shira L. Lander, Jacqueline Z. Pastis, and Daniel Ullucci (eds.), A Most Reliable Witness: Essays in Honor of Ross Shepard Kraemer. BJS 358. Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2015, pp. 67–75. “Jewish Meals in Antiquity” in John M. Wilkins and Robin Nadeau (eds.), A Companion to Food in the Ancient World. Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World Series. New York: Wiley Blackwell, 2015, pp. 348–356. “Dining In(to) The World To Come,” “olam ha’zeh v’olam ha-ba”: This World and the World to Come in Jewish Belief and Practice. Edited by Leonard Greenspoon. Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Symposium of the Klutznick Chair

Bibliography

175

in Jewish Civilization-Harris Center for Judaic Studies-Schwalb Center for Israel and Jewish Studies, October 25–26, 2015. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2017 (forthcoming). “Bacon, Banquets, and Bras: Rabbinic Food Regulations and Boundary Formation.” Journal of Indo-Judaic Studies, forthcoming. “Hulin” in Shaye J. D. Cohen, Robert Goldenberg, and Hayim Lapin (eds.), The Mishnah: An Annotated Translation. New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. “Thou Shalt Not Cook a Bird in its Mother’s Milk? Theorizing the Evolution of a Rabbinic Regulation” in Elizabeth Shanks Alexander and Beth A. Berkowitz (eds.), Religious Studies and Rabbinics. New York: Routledge, forthcoming. Rosenblum Jordan D. and Daniel C. Ullucci. “Qualifying Rabbinic Ritual Agents: Cognitive Science and the Early Rabbinic Kitchen” in Jordan D. Rosenblum, Lily C. Vuong, and Nathaniel P. DesRosiers (eds.), Religious Competition in the Third-Century C.E.: Jews, Christians, and the Greco-Roman World. JAJS. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014, pp. 105–114. Roth, Laurence. “Toward a Kashrut Nation in American Jewish Cookbooks, 1990–2000.” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 28/2 (201): 65–91. Rubenstein, Jeffrey L. Talmudic Stories: Narrative Art, Composition, and Culture. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. Runyon, Luke. “Nuns on the Ranch Give a Heavenly Twist to Beef.” NPR.org. December 22, 2014. www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2014/12/22/371485558/nuns -on-the-ranch-give-a-heavenly-twist-to-beef. Samely, Alexander. Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture in the Mishnah. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Sanders, E. P. “Jewish Association with Gentiles and Galatians 2: 11–14” in Robert T. Fortna and Beverly R. Gaventa (eds.), The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul & John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990, pp. 170–188. Satlow, Michael L. Tasting the Dish: Rabbinic Rhetorics of Sexuality. BJS 303. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1995. “‘Try to be a Man’: The Rabbinic Construction of Masculinity.” HTR 89/1 (1996): 19–40. Jewish Marriage in Antiquity. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. Creating Judaism: History, Tradition, Practice. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. “Theophrastus’s Jewish Philosophers.” JJS 59/1 (2008): 1–20. “Jew or Judean?” in Caroline Johnson Hodge, Saul M. Olyan, Daniel Ullucci, and Emma Wasserman (eds.), “The One Who Sows Bountifully”: Essays in Honor of Stanley K. Stowers. BJS 356. Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2013, pp. 165–175. Sax, David. The Tastemakers: Why We’re Crazy for Cupcakes but Fed Up with Fondue (Plus Baconomics, Superfoods, and Other Secrets from the Food World). New York: Public Affairs, 2014.

176

Bibliography

Schäfer, Peter. Judeophobia: Attitudes toward the Jews in the Ancient World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. Jesus in the Talmud. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. Schaff, Philip. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. First series. 14 vols. 1886–1889. Repr., Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2012. Schaff, Philip and Henry Wace. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. Second Series. 14 vols. 1890–1900. Repr., Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994. Schiffman, Lawrence H. “Laws Pertaining to Forbidden Foods in the Dead Sea Scrolls.” in Albert I. Baumgarten, Hanan Eshel, Ranon Katzoff, and Shani Tzoref (eds.), Halakhah in Light of Epigraphy. JAJS. Oakville: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 2011, pp. 65–80. Schofer, Jonathan Wyn. The Making of a Sage: A Study in Rabbinic Ethics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005. Confronting Vulnerability: The Body and the Divine in Rabbinic Ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. Schwartz, Joshua. “Cats in Ancient Jewish Society.” JJS 52/2 (2001): 211–234. Schwartz, Seth. Imperialism and Jewish Society, 200 B.C.E to 640 C.E. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. Segal, Alan F. Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism. SJLA 25. Leiden: Brill, 1977. Shakespeare, William. The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark. Edited by Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine. Folger Shakespeare Library. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2009. Shapiro, Samantha M. “Kosher Wars.” The New York Times Magazine. October 12, 2008, 50–55. Shutt, R. J. H. “Letter of Aristeas” in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), OTP, vol. 2. New York: Doubleday, 1985, pp. 7–34. Simon, Marcel. Verus Israel: A Study of the Relations between Christians and Jews in the Roman Empire AD 135–425. Translated by H. McKeating. Portland: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2009 [1966, 1986]. Simon, Paul. “Under African Skies.” Graceland. Sony Legacy, 1986. Simoons, Frederick J. Eat Not This Flesh: Food Avoidances in the Old World. Madison and Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967. Sly, Dorothy. Philo’s Perception of Women. BJS 209. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990. Smith, Dennis E. From Symposium to Eucharist: The Banquet in the Early Christian World. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003. Soler, Jean. “The Semiotics of Food in the Bible” in Carole Counihan and Penny van Esterik (eds.), Food and Culture: A Reader. New York: Routledge, 1997, pp. 55–66. Stern, David. “The Captive Woman: Hellenization, Greco-Roman Erotic Narrative, and Rabbinic Literature.” Poetics Today 19/1 (1998): 91–127. “Vayikra Rabbah and My Life in Midrash.” Prooftexts 21/1 (2001): 23–38. Stern, Menahem, ed. Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism. 3 vols. Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1976.

Bibliography

177

Stein, S. “The Dietary Laws in Rabbinic and Patristic Literature” in Kurt Aland and F. L. Cross (eds.), Studia Patristica 2. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957, pp. 141–154. Stern, Sacha. Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writings. New York: Brill, 1994. “Compulsive Libationers: Non-Jews and Wine in Early Rabbinic Sources.” JJS 64/1 (2013): 19–44. Stolow, Jeremy. Orthodox by Design: Judaism, Print Politics, and the Artscroll Revolution. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010. Stowers, Stanley K. “On the Comparison of Blood in Greek and Israelite Ritual” in Jodi Magness and Seymour Gitin (eds.), Hesed Ve-Emet: Studies in Honor of Ernest S. Frerichs. BJS 320. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998, pp. 179–194. Strack, H. L. and Günter Stemberger. Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash. Translated and edited by Markus Bockmuehl. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996. Sussman, Lance J. “The Myth of the Trefa Banquet: American Culinary Culture and the Radicalization of Food Policy in American Reform Judaism.” American Jewish Archives Journal 57/1–2 (2005): 29–52. Svebakken, Hans Richard. Philo of Alexandria’s Exposition of the Tenth Commandment. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012. Swartz, David. Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. Swislocki, Mark. Culinary Nostalgia: Regional Food Culture and the Urban Experience in Shanghai. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009. Tapin, Oliver, ed. Literature in the Greek and Roman Worlds: A New Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Taussig, Hal. In the Beginning Was the Meal: Social Experimentation and Early Christian Identity. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009. Teeter, D. Andrew. “‘You Shall Not Seethe a Kid in its Mother’s Milk’: The Text and the Law in Light of Early Witnesses.” Textus 24 (2009): 37–63. Tigay, Jeffrey H. The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1996. Tomson, Peter J. Paul and the Jewish Law: Halakha in the Letters of the Apostle to the Gentiles. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990. Townsend, John T. Midrash Tanhuma: Translated into English with Introduction, Indices and Brief Notes, vol. 1. Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House, 1989. Ullucci, Daniel C. The Christian Rejection of Animal Sacrifice. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. “What Did He Say? The Ideas of Religious Experts and the 99%” in Jordan D. Rosenblum, Lily C. Vuong, and Nathaniel P. DesRosiers (eds.), Religious Competition in the Third-Century C.E.: Jews, Christians, and the Greco-Roman World. JAJS. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014, pp. 21–31. Varner, William. Ancient Jewish–Christian Dialogues: Athanasius and Zacchaeus, Simon and Theophilus, Timothy and Aquila: Introductions, Texts, and Translations. Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity 58. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellon Press, 2004.

178

Bibliography

Vidas, Moulie. Tradition and the Formation of the Talmud. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014. von Rad, Gerhard. Genesis: A Commentary. OTL. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972. Vuong, Lily. “Purity, Piety, and the Purposes of the Protevangelium of James” in Lee Martin McDonald and James H. Charlesworth (eds.), “‘Non-canonical’ Religious Texts in Early Judaism and Early Christianity.” Jewish and Christian Texts in Contexts and Related Studies Series. New York: T&T Clark, 2012, pp. 205-221. Walzer, Michael. In God’s Shadow: Politics in the Hebrew Bible. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012. Wasserstein, Abraham and David J. Wasserstein. The Legend of the Septuagint: From Classical Antiquity to Today. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Weingarten, Susan. “Gynaecophagia: Metaphors of Women as Food in the Talmudic Literature” in Richard Hosking (ed.), Food and Language: Proceedings of the Oxford Symposium of Food and Cookery 2009. Totnes: Prospect Books, 2010, pp. 360–370. Welfield, Irving. Why Kosher? An Anthology of Answers. New York: Roman & Littlefield, 2005 [1996]. Westermann, Claus. Genesis 12–36: A Continental Commentary. Translated by John J. Scullion. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995. Wimpfheimer, Barry Scott. Narrating the Law: A Poetics of Talmudic Legal Stories. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. Wintermute, O. S. “Jubilees” in James H. Charlesworth (ed.), OTP, vol. 2. New York: Doubleday, 1985, pp. 35–142. Yadin, Azzan. Scripture as Logos: Rabbi Ishmael and the Origins of Midrash. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Zamore, Mary L., ed. The Sacred Table: Creating a Jewish Food Ethic. CCAR Challenge and Change Series. New York: CCAR Press, 2011. Zeller, Benjamin E., Marie W. Dallam, Reid L. Neilson, and Nora L. Rubel, eds. Religion and Eating in North America. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. Zetterholm, Magnus Z. The Formation of Christianity in Antioch: A SocialScientific Approach to the Separation Between Judaism and Christianity. New York: Routledge Press, 2005.

Index of Pre-Modern Sources

Hebrew Bible 1 Chronicles 22:8, 113 Daniel 1:5., 71 Daniel 1:8, 134 Daniel 1:8–16, 9 Daniel 1:12, 71 Deuteronomy 2:6, 134 Deuteronomy 5:16, 23 Deuteronomy 5:17, 38 Deuteronomy 12:15–16, 113 Deuteronomy 12:16, 20 Deuteronomy 12:23, 98 Deuteronomy 12:24, 20 Deuteronomy 14, 10, 117 Deuteronomy 14:11–18, 123 Deuteronomy 14:2, 14 Deuteronomy 14:4–5, 12, 54, 116 Deuteronomy 14:7, 116, 118 Deuteronomy 14:7–8, 92 Deuteronomy 14:8, 118 Deuteronomy 15:23, 19, 20 Deuteronomy 16:3–8, 20 Deuteronomy 17:7, 83 Deuteronomy 14:21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 54, 95 Deuteronomy 22, 22–24 Deuteronomy 22:1–3, 23 Deuteronomy 22:5, 23 Deuteronomy 22:6, 129 Deuteronomy 22:6–7, 94, 126 Deuteronomy 22:8, 23 Deuteronomy 22:12, 23 Deuteronomy 23:4–5, 70 Deuteronomy 25:5–10, 91 Ecclesiastes 12:5, 67 Esther 3:13, 129 Exodus 12:15, 99 Exodus 12:15–20, 20 Exodus 20:13, 38 Exodus 20:17, 69 Exodus 22:30, 14, 25, 26

Exodus 23:19, 24, 27, 54, 95 Exodus 32, 114 Exodus 34, 104 Exodus 34:15, 104 Exodus 34:15–16, 72 Exodus 34:17, 104 Exodus 34:26, 24 Exodus 34:26–27, 115 Ezekiel 4:14, 25 Ezekiel 18:5–6, 19 Ezekiel 18:11, 19 Ezekiel 18:15, 19 Ezekiel 22:9, 19 Ezekiel 33:25, 19 Ezekiel 44:31, 135 Genesis 1:26–29, 19 Genesis 9:1–7, 19 Genesis 9:3, 112, 136 Genesis 9:3–4, 19, 74, 113 Genesis 9:4, 20, 136 Genesis 9:5–6, 19, 136 Genesis 18, 115 Genesis 22, 111 Genesis 22:10, 111 Genesis 32, 146 Genesis 32:12, 23 Genesis 32:23–33, 20, 74 Genesis 32:26, 21 Genesis 32:27, 21 Genesis 32:29, 21 Genesis 32:30–32, 21 Genesis 32:33, 21, 100 Hosea 10:14, 23 Hosea 12:5, 21 Hosea 14:10, 129 Isaiah 66:17, 118 Jeremiah 2:23–24, 18 1 Kings 5:13, 112 2 Kings 20, 134 Leviticus 1:13, 125 Leviticus 1:16, 125

179

180 Leviticus 2:1, 125 Leviticus 7:24, 138 Leviticus 7:26–27, 99 Leviticus 11, 9, 10–14 Leviticus 11:1–24, 12 Leviticus 11:2, 137 Leviticus 11:2–8, 12 Leviticus 11:4, 115, 149 Leviticus 11:4–7, 118 Leviticus 11:6, 149 Leviticus 11:7, 149 Leviticus 11:9, 115 Leviticus 11:9–12, 12 Leviticus 11:13, 123 Leviticus 11:13–19, 13, 123 Leviticus 11:19, 151 Leviticus 11:20–23, 13 Leviticus 11:21, 115 Leviticus 11:26–27, 12 Leviticus 11:29, 152 Leviticus 11:29–30, 13 Leviticus 11:29–31, 12 Leviticus 11:30, 152 Leviticus 11:41–42, 13 Leviticus 11:43, 137 Leviticus 11:44–45, 14 Leviticus 11:46, 110 Leviticus 13–14, 91 Leviticus 16:3–10, 91 Leviticus 17:13, 12 Leviticus 17:14, 154 Leviticus 18:4, 90 Leviticus 19:19, 91 Leviticus 20:25, 130 Leviticus 22:27, 116 Leviticus 22:28, 22, 129 Leviticus 23:29, 99 Numbers 13:33, 67 Numbers 15:37–41, 23 Numbers 18, 52 Numbers 25:1–3, 72, 103 Numbers 25:2, 103 Proverbs 12:10, 129 Proverbs 30:5, 110 Psalm 1:1, 149, 151 Psalm 18:25–26, 151 Psalm 18:26–27, 151 Psalm 23:1, 80 Psalm 24:1, 80 Psalm 50:11, 126 Psalm 50:16–17, 148 Psalm 80:14, 126 1 Samuel 2:12–17, 9 1 Samuel 14:31–35, 74 1 Samuel 14:33–34, 111

Index of Pre-Modern Sources 1 Samuel 14:34, 112 2 Samuel 22:31, 110 Song of Songs 7:3, 131

Hellenistic Literature, Apocrypha, and Pseudepigrapha Addition to Esther C 28, 71 Dead Sea Scrolls CD 12:11–15, 74 CD 12:13–14, 121 1QapGen 11:17, 74 1QpHab, 47 1QS 6, 72 1Q28a 2:11–22, 139 4Q158 Frag. 1–2 10–13, 74 4Q251 12:1–3, 74 4Q251 12:3–5, 74 4Q251 12:5, 75 4Q270 2ii:15, 74 4Q396 1:1–4, 74 11QTa 48:1–8, 74 11QTa 48:6, 74 11QTa 50:20–21, 74 11QTa 52:5–7, 74 11QTa 53:2–8, 74 11QTa 65:2–5, 75 Demetrius the Chronographer, Frag. 2.7, 74 Joseph and Aseneth 7:1, 71 Joseph and Aseneth 8:5–7, 71, 74 Joseph and Aseneth 10:13, 71 Joseph and Aseneth 20:8, 71 Joseph and Aseneth 21:8, 71 Josephus: Against Apion, 2.118, 58 Against Apion, 2.137, 31 Against Apion, 2.151–296, 57 Against Apion, 2.168, 58 Against Apion, 2.171–174, 57 Against Apion, 2.213, 35, 58 Against Apion, 2.217, 58 Against Apion, 2.234–235, 58 Against Apion, 2.257, 58 Against Apion, 2.281–284, 58 Jewish Antiquities, 1.335, 74 Jewish Antiquities, 10.190–194, 71 Jewish Antiquities, 12.93–100, 72 Jewish Antiquities, 12.105–106, 72 Jewish Antiquities, 12.119–120, 72 Jewish Antiquities, 12.146, 74 Jewish Antiquities, 12.160–236, 72 Jewish Antiquities, 12.186–18, 74 Jewish Antiquities, 13.245–247, 38 Jewish Antiquities, 14.226–227, 30 Jewish Antiquities, 14.226, 261, 72

Index of Pre-Modern Sources Jewish Antiquities, 14.261, 30 Jewish Antiquities, 15.267–281, 38 Jewish Antiquities, 16.42–44, 57 Jewish Antiquities, 2.128–136, 72 Jewish Antiquities, 2.139, 72 Jewish Antiquities, 2.143–144, 72 Jewish Antiquities, 3.259, 75 Jewish Antiquities, 3.260, 74, 75 Jewish Antiquities, 4.183–184, 57 Jewish Antiquities, 4.193, 57 Jewish Antiquities, 6.115–121, 74 Jewish War, 2.152, 43 Jewish War, 2.591–592, 72 Life, 3, 72 Life, 74–76, 72 Jubilees 6:4–16, 74 Jubilees 7:28–33, 74 Jubilees 16:1–4, 115 Jubilees 21:18, 74 Jubilees 22:16, 72 Jubilees 22:17–19, 73 Judith 10:5, 71 Judith 12:1–4, 71 Judith 12:17–20, 71 Letter of Aristeas, 49–50, 60–63 Letter of Aristeas, 128, 30 Letter of Aristeas, 130, 73 Letter of Aristeas, 139, 73 Letter of Aristeas, 142, 73 Letter of Aristeas, 143, 48, 61 Letter of Aristeas, 144, 61 Letter of Aristeas, 145, 61 Letter of Aristeas, 145–146, 61 Letter of Aristeas, 147–148, 61 Letter of Aristeas, 150, 60 Letter of Aristeas, 150–151, 40, 62, 64 Letter of Aristeas, 150–161, 148 Letter of Aristeas, 152, 62 Letter of Aristeas, 153, 62 Letter of Aristeas, 154, 62 Letter of Aristeas, 155–160, 62 Letter of Aristeas, 161, 62 Letter of Aristeas, 162, 62 Letter of Aristeas, 163, 62 Letter of Aristeas, 164, 62 Letter of Aristeas, 165–166, 63 Letter of Aristeas, 168, 63 Letter of Aristeas, 168–169, 63 Letter of Aristeas, 170, 61 Letter of Aristeas, 180–186, 72 1 Maccabees 1:47, 40 2 Maccabees 5:27, 71 2 Maccabees 6:18–7:42, 40 2 Maccabees 6:19–20, 59 2 Maccabees 6:21–22, 41

2 Maccabees 7:20–23, 42 3 Maccabees 3:4, 38, 72 3 Maccabees 3:7, 38, 72 4 Maccabees, 59 4 Maccabees 1:31–35, 59, 93 4 Maccabees 1:33–35, 59 4 Maccabees 5–18, 40 4 Maccabees 5:7–13, 41 4 Maccabees 5:14–38, 59 4 Maccabees 5:30, 68 4 Maccabees 6:12–23, 59 4 Maccabees 6:14–15, 41 4 Maccabees 8:4–11, 42 4 Maccabees 8:5, 42 4 Maccabees 8:7, 42 4 Maccabees 8:29–9:9, 42 4 Maccabees 14:11–16:25, 42 Philo: Abraham, 257, 53 Agriculture, 131–145, 65 Agriculture, 133, 64 Agriculture, 134, 65 Agriculture, 142–145, 65 Agriculture, 145, 65 Allegorical Interpretation, 2.105–108, 68 Allegorical Interpretation, 3.118, 51 Allegorical Interpretation, 3.128–137, 67 Allegorical Interpretation, 3.138–139, 67 Allegorical Interpretation, 3.144, 52 Creation, 1–3, 57 Creation, 158–159, 67 Creation, 163, 67 Creation, 164, 68 Creation, 165–166, 68 Decalogue, 20–31, 54 Flaccus, 90–91, 51 Flaccus, 95–96, 42 Embassy to Gaius, 361, 31, 56, 121 Embassy to Gaius, 361–363, 31 Embassy to Gaius, 362, 31 Embassy to Gaius, 362–363, 56 Heir, 239–240, 67 Heir, 239–242, 67 Migration, 64–69, 67 Migration, 69, 67, 68 Migration, 147, 53 Moses, 2.41–42, 72 Posterity, 101–102, 53 Posterity, 148–149, 65 Posterity, 173, 54 Providence, 2.68–70, 53 Special Laws, 2.195, 52 Special Laws, 2.195–203, 52 Special Laws, 3.9, 53 Special Laws, 4, 64, 68

181

182

Index of Pre-Modern Sources

Philo: (cont.) Special Laws, 4.100–102, 53 Special Laws, 4.101, 33 Special Laws, 4.103–104, 61, 69 Special Laws, 4.103–105, 54 Special Laws, 4.105–131, 51 Special Laws, 4.106–108, 64, 148 Special Laws, 4.108, 40 Special Laws, 4.110–112, 65 Special Laws, 4.111–112, 65 Special Laws, 4.113, 152 Special Laws, 4.113–115, 66 Special Laws, 4.116–117, 68, 151 Special Laws, 4.117, 61 Special Laws, 4.118, 69 Special Laws, 4.119–121, 54, 74 Special Laws, 4.122–123, 74 Special Laws, 4.122–125, 69, 74, 75 Special Laws, 4.124, 53 Special Laws, 4.124–125, 75 Special Laws, 4.126–131, 70 Special Laws, 4.168, 53 Special Laws, 4.78, 69 Special Laws, 4.95–104, 51 Special Laws, 4.96, 51 Special Laws, 4.97, 52 Special Laws, 4.98–99, 52 Virtues, 142–144, 25, 55, 153 Pseudo-Philo, 3:11, 74 Pseudo-Phocylides, 139–140, 74 Pseudo-Phocylides, 147–148, 74 Testament of Asher 2:8–10, 78 Testament of Asher 4:1, 60 Testament of Asher 4:5, 60 Tobit 1:10–13, 71

Rabbinic Literature Avot d’Rabbi Natan A4:41–77, 86 Avot d’Rabbi Natan A6:16–17, 10 Avot d’Rabbi Natan A13:4–5, 115 Avot d’Rabbi Natan A16:15–18, 120 Avot d’Rabbi Natan A26:13–15, 134 Avot d’Rabbi Natan A26:19, 138 Avot d’Rabbi Natan A37:3, 115 b. Avodah Zarah 8a, 104, 134 b. Avodah Zarah 18b, 41, 120 b. Avodah Zarah 26b, 132 b. Avodah Zarah 29b-32a, 133 b. Avodah Zarah 30a-b, 134 b. Avodah Zarah 31b, 133, 134 b. Avodah Zarah 35b, 133, 134 b. Avodah Zarah 35b-36b, 133, 134 b. Avodah Zarah 36b, 133, 134 b. Avodah Zarah 37b-38a, 134

b. Avodah Zarah 39a, 122 b. Avodah Zarah 46b, 132 b. Avodah Zarah 59a, 133, 134 b. Bava Batra 74b-75a, 138 b. Bava Metzi’a 58b, 133 b. Bava Metzi’a 61b, 122, 131 b. Bava Metzi’a 85a, 109 b. Bava Metzi’a 86b, 115 b. Bava Qamma 41a-b, 111 b. Bava Qamma 82b, 92, 119 b. Bekhorot 6b, 116, 117, 126 b. Bekhorot 7b, 122 b. Bekhorot 8a, 122 b. Bekhorot 10a, 114 b. Berakhot 17a, 109, 138 b. Berakhot 25a, 90, 120 b. Berakhot 31b, 112 b. Berakhot 33b, 94, 127 b. Bekhorot 37a, 131 b. Berakhot 47b, 110 b. Berakhot 55a, 134 b. Berakhot 62b, 121 b. Berakhot 63b-64a, 110 b. Betzah 7b-8b, 113 b. Betzah 8a-b, 116 b. Betzah 12a-b, 116 b. Betzah 16a-b, 134 b. Betzah 25a, 113 b. Eruvin 21b, 121 b. Eruvin 27b-28a, 122 b. Eruvin 54a, 138 b. Gittin 47a, 132 b. Gittin 56a-b, 86 b. Hagigah 27a, 134 b. Horayot 11a, 132 b. Horayot 13a-b, 132 b. Hullin 4a, 112, 126 b. Hullin 4b, 133 b. Hullin 15b-16a, 111 b. Hullin 16a, 111 b. Hullin 16b-17a; 27a, 112 b. Hullin 17a, 119 b. Hullin 17b, 112 b. Hullin 19b, 110 b. Hullin 20a-b, 126 b. Hullin 27a-b, 112 b. Hullin 27b, 112, 121 b. Hullin 28b, 112 b. Hullin 30a-31a, 112 b. Hullin 31a, 112, 113 b. Hullin 42a, 116 b. Hullin 59a, 117 b. Hullin 59a-b, 116 b. Hullin 60b, 116 b. Hullin 60b-61a, 123

Index of Pre-Modern Sources b. Hullin 60b-63b, 126 b. Hullin 63a-b, 123 b. Hullin 63b, 122, 126 b. Hullin 63b-64b, 126 b. Hullin 65a, 125 b. Hullin 65a-66a, 122 b. Hullin 66a, 122 b. Hullin 66b, 150 b. Hullin 67a-b, 131 b. Hullin 67b, 122 b. Hullin 68a-69b, 131 b. Hullin 82a-b, 128 b. Hullin 84a, 111 b. Hullin 98a-b, 130 b. Hullin 101b, 116 b. Hullin 101b-103a, 131 b. Hullin 103b-116b, 114 b. Hullin 104a-b, 114 b. Hullin 104b-105a, 114 b. Hullin 106a, 121 b. Hullin 108a, 113 b. Hullin 109b, 113 b. Hullin 110a, 113 b. Hullin 113a, 114 b. Hullin 114a, 114 b. Hullin 115b, 114 b. Hullin 116, 114 b. Hullin 116a, 114 b. Keritot 4b, 113 b. Keritot 20b-21b, 122 b. Keritot 20b-22a, 113 b. Keritot 21a, 116 b. Keritot 21b, 115 b. Ketubbot 5a, 126 b. Ketubbot 15b, 133 b. Ketubbot 10b, 113 b. Ketubbot 111b, 138 b. Makkot 16b, 122 b. Makkot 21b, 116 b. Me’ilah 16a, 131 b. Megillah 9a-b, 49 b. Megillah 12b, 134 b. Megillah 13b, 134 b. Megillah 25a, 94, 127 b. Menahot 29a, 131 b. Menahot 43b, 137 b. Menahot 45a, 25 b. Menahot 45b, 135 b. Menahot 64b, 119 b. Menahot 97a, 134 b. Menahot 101b, 114 b. Nazir 29a, 126 b. Nazir 37a, 114 b. Nazir 37a-b, 113 b. Nedarim 20b, 113

b. Nedarim 49b, 121 b. Nedarim 54b, 122, 126 b. Niddah 24a-b, 116 b. Niddah 34b, 133 b. Niddah 50b, 125 b. Niddah 51b, 122, 150 b. Pesahim 3a, 119 b. Pesahim 21b, 130 b. Pesahim 22a, 116 b. Pesahim 22b, 131 b. Pesahim 23a, 112 b. Pesahim 23b, 130 b. Pesahim 24a, 122 b. Pesahim 24b-25a, 113 b. Pesahim 44b, 113 b. Pesahim 47b, 116 b. Pesahim 49b, 109 b. Pesahim 74b, 113 b. Pesahim 76a, 114 b. Qiddushin 21b-22a, 130 b. Qiddushin 39b, 130, 135 b. Qiddushin 40a, 134 b. Qiddushin 56b, 130 b. Qiddushin 57b, 114 b. Qiddushin 71a, 126 b. Sanhedrin 4a-b, 114 b. Sanhedrin 17a-b, 131 b. Sanhedrin 25a, 132 b. Sanhedrin 27a, 132 b. Sanhedrin 56a-b, 131 b. Sanhedrin 59a-b, 113, 116 b. Sanhedrin 63a, 113 b. Sanhedrin 74a, 41 b. Sanhedrin 75a, 134 b. Sanhedrin 99b-100a, 117 b. Sanhedrin 104a, 134 b. Sanhedrin 106a, 103, 134 b. Shabbat 13a, 113, 134 b. Shabbat 17b, 133, 134 b. Shabbat 22a, 113 b. Shabbat 51a, 133 b. Shabbat 62b-63a, 134 b. Shabbat 67b, 129 b. Shabbat 86b, 133 b. Shabbat 117b, 128 b. Shabbat 121a, 132 b. Shabbat 124a, 128 b. Shabbat 130a, 114 b. Shabbat 145b, 132 b. Sotah 49b, 119 b. Sukkah 5a-b, 126 b. Sukkah 18a, 122 b. Yevamot 46a, 133 b. Yevamot 76b-77a, 70 b. Yevamot 102b, 116

183

184

Index of Pre-Modern Sources

b. Yevamot 114a, 132 b. Yoma 28b, 115 b. Yoma 39a, 137 b. Yoma 67b, 91, 119 b. Yoma 74a-b, 116 b. Yoma 75b, 112, 117, 126 b. Yoma 82a, 31, 119 b. Yoma 83b, 121 b. Zevahim 32a, 112 b. Zevahim 65a, 124 b. Zevahim 95b, 114 b. Zevahim 116a, 131 Deuteronomy Rabbah 4:6, 113 Deuteronomy Rabbah 4:9, 113 Ecclesiastes Rabbah 1.3.1, 124 Ecclesiastes Rabbah 1.9.1, 120, 137, 138 Ecclesiastes Rabbah 3.14.1, 115 Ecclesiastes Rabbah 5.6.1, 133, 136 Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7.12.1, 41, 120 Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7.19.1, 124 Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7.19.3, 124 Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7.23.3, 121 Ecclesiastes Rabbah 12.14.1, 132 Esther Rabbah 3:13, 134 Esther Rabbah 4:12, 116 Exodus Rabbah 15:28, 131 Exodus Rabbah 30:2, 133 Exodus Rabbah 30:22, 136 Exodus Rabbah 47:5, 115 Genesis Rabbah 7:2, 121 Genesis Rabbah 8:13, 131 Genesis Rabbah 16:6, 111, 131 Genesis Rabbah 32:4, 118 Genesis Rabbah 33:3, 109 Genesis Rabbah 33:5, 123 Genesis Rabbah 34:8, 131, 136 Genesis Rabbah 44:1, 110 Genesis Rabbah 45:9, 132 Genesis Rabbah 48:14, 115 Genesis Rabbah 56:6, 111 Genesis Rabbah 65:1, 119 Genesis Rabbah 65:3, 123 Genesis Rabbah 78:6, 115 Genesis Rabbah 84:7, 131 Lamentations Rabbah 1.3.28, 133 Leviticus Rabbah 1:8, 123 Leviticus Rabbah 3:3, 124 Leviticus Rabbah 3:4, 125 Leviticus Rabbah 4:3, 132 Leviticus Rabbah 5:6, 132 Leviticus Rabbah 7:3, 10 Leviticus Rabbah 13:2, 133 Leviticus Rabbah 13:3, 138 Leviticus Rabbah 13:4, 112 Leviticus Rabbah 13:5, 118

Leviticus Rabbah 22:7, 112 Leviticus Rabbah 22:8, 110 Leviticus Rabbah 22:10, 122, 126, 138 Leviticus Rabbah 26:1, 119 Leviticus Rabbah 27:6, 116 Leviticus Rabbah 27:11, 129 m. Avodah Zarah 2:5, 102, 133 m. Avodah Zarah 2:6, 134 m. Avodah Zarah 5:5, 102 m. Avodah Zarah 5:9, 96 m. Avot 1:1, 87 m. Avot 3:3, 156 m. Bava Qamma 7:7, 92 m. Bekhorot 1:2, 99 m. Betzah 1:2, 113 m. Betzah 2:1, 98 m. Eduyyot 5:1–5, 95 m. Eduyyot 5:2, 95, 96, 114 m. Hullin 1:1, 101 m. Hullin 1:2, 111, 138 m. Hullin 1:4, 110 m. Hullin 2:1, 112 m. Hullin 2:3, 112 m. Hullin 2:4, 26, 101 m. Hullin 3:1, 112 m. Hullin 3:1–5, 101 m. Hullin 3:6, 123, 125 m. Hullin 3:6–7, 99 m. Hullin 5:1, 25 m. Hullin 5:1–2, 22 m. Hullin 6:1–7, 98 m. Hullin 7:1, 115 m. Hullin 7:1–6, 100 m. Hullin 7:2, 116 m. Hullin 7:6, 21, 100, 116 m. Hullin 8:1, 95, 96, 99, 122 m. Hullin 8:2, 97 m. Hullin 8:3, 25, 96, 114 m. Hullin 8:4, 97 m. Hullin 8:4–5, 96 m. Hullin 8:6, 97, 98 m. Hullin 9:2, 112 m. Hullin 9:6, 63 m. Hullin 12:1, 98 m. Hullin 12:2, 23 m. Keritot 1:1, 99 m. Keritot 5:1, 99 m. Makkot 3:15, 93, 98 m. Megillah 4:9, 94, 127 m. Niddah 6:9, 150 m. Parah 8:2, 100 m. Pe’ah 1:1, 135 m. Sanhedrin 8:2, 130 m. Shabbat 14:1, 112 m. Shabbat 24:3, 117

Index of Pre-Modern Sources m. Shevi’it 8:10, 93, 120 m. Terumot 8:2, 100 m. Terumot 8:4–7, 134 m. Yoma 1:6, 112 m. Yoma 5:6, 113 m. Yoma 8:4, 130 m. Yoma 8:5–6, 100 m. Yoma 8:6, 130 m. Zevahim 6:5, 124 Mekhilta d’Rabbi Ishmael Kaspa Mishpatim 20, 96, 97, 114 Mekhilta d’Rabbi Ishmael Pisha 2, 131 Mekhilta d’Rabbi Shimon b. Yohai at Exodus 23:19, 96 Mekhilta d’Rabbi Shimon b. Yohai at Exodus 34:26, 96, 97 Midrash Psalms 8:2, 114 Midrash Psalms 146:4, 138 Numbers Rabbah 6:3, 116 Numbers Rabbah 12:4, 118 Numbers Rabbah 15:4, 131 Numbers Rabbah 19:2, 119 Numbers Rabbah 19:3, 112, 121 Numbers Rabbah 20:5, 116 Numbers Rabbah 20:21, 120, 121 Numbers Rabbah 20:23, 103, 134 Numbers Rabbah 21:16, 115, 116 Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 4:2, 119 Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 4:3, 112, 121 Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 5:15, 131 Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 6:1, 115, 116 Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 9:5, 116 Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 9:11, 129 Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 10:9, 114, 130 Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 24:11, 119 Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana 28:2, 134 Pesiqta d’Rav Kahana Supplement 3:2, 120 Pesiqta Rabbati 2:6, 113 Pesiqta Rabbati 10:3, 131 Pesiqta Rabbati 14:10, 121 Pesiqta Rabbati 14:5, 119 Pesiqta Rabbati 14:9, 112, 121 Pesiqta Rabbati 15:21, 131 Pesiqta Rabbati 16:1, 116 Pesiqta Rabbati 16:2, 115 Pesiqta Rabbati 16:4, 126 Pesiqta Rabbati 16:6, 117 Pesiqta Rabbati 25:3, 114, 115 Pesiqta Rabbati 33:10, 116 Pesiqta Rabbati 48:3, 115 Pirqe d’Rabbi Eliezer 9, 121 Ruth Rabbah 6:4, 130 Sifra Ahare Mot 8:3, 113 Sifra Ahare Mot 9:13, 91, 119 Sifra Ahare Mot 10:8, 98

Sifra Ahare Mot 11, 98 Sifra Ahare Mot 12, 100 Sifra Behar 8, 100 Sifra Qedoshim 11:22, 59, 92 Sifra Sav 15:10, 97, 98, 99 Sifre Deuteronomy 101, 92, 118 Sifre Deuteronomy 103, 99, 123, 126 Sifre Deuteronomy 104, 96, 100 Sifre Deuteronomy 354, 105 Sifre Numbers 131, 103, 133, 134 Song of Songs Rabbah 1.2.1, 133 Song of Songs Rabbah 3.7.3, 112 Song of Songs Rabbah 4.12.3, 133 Song of Songs Rabbah 5.15.1, 112 Song of Songs Rabbah 8.14.1, 134 t. Avodah Zarah 4:6, 103, 134, 156 t. Avodah Zarah 4:11, 134 t. Avodah Zarah 8:6, 98 t. Bava Metzi’a 3:25, 100 t. Berakhot 4:1, 80 t. Berakhot 6:18, 137 t. Demai 2:24, 98 t. Horayot 1:5, 93, 100 t. Hullin 1:1, 101 t. Hullin 3:20–27, 99 t. Hullin 3:26, 150 t. Hullin 7:10, 98 t. Hullin 7:1–8, 100 t. Hullin 7:8, 100 t. Hullin 7:9, 98 t. Hullin 8:1, 97 t. Hullin 8:3, 96 t. Hullin 8:4–5, 97 t. Hullin 8:6–7, 96 t. Hullin 8:8–9, 97 t. Hullin 8:11, 96 t. Hullin 9–13, 97 t. Kippurim 4:4, 100 t. Ohalot 18:16–17, 90 t. Shabbat 1:14, 103 t. Terumot 7:11, 99, 100 t. Terumot 7:12–17, 134 t. Terumot 8:16, 96 Tanhuma Ahare Mot 17, 112 Tanhuma Balaq 24, 121 Tanhuma Balaq 27, 103, 134 Tanhuma Behar 9, 133 Tanhuma Behuqqotay 6, 115 Tanhuma Beshallah 24, 138 Tanhuma Emor 13, 116 Tanhuma Emor 18, 129 Tanhuma Huqqat 2, 130 Tanhuma Huqqat 6, 119 Tanhuma Huqqat 15, 121 Tanhuma Huqqat 19, 121

185

186

Index of Pre-Modern Sources

Tanhuma Ki Tissa 9:19, 115 Tanhuma Re’eh 16, 130 Tanhuma Shelah 28, 135 Tanhuma Shemini 10, 136 Tanhuma Shemini 11, 131 Tanhuma Shemini 12, 110, 113 Tanhuma Shemini 13, 115, 131, 138 Tanhuma Shemini 14, 117, 138 Tanhuma Tazria 2, 131 Tanhuma Vayehi 12.6, 109 y. Avodah Zarah 2:3, 41a, 132 y. Avodah Zarah 2:8, 41d, 133 y. Avodah Zarah 4:1, 43c-d, 127 y. Avodah Zarah 4:8–9, 44a-b, 133 y. Avodah Zarah 4:11–5:14, 133 y. Avodah Zarah 5:12, 45b, 114 y. Bava Qamma 7:10, 6a, 130 y. Berakhot 4:1, 7b, 119 y. Berakhot 5:3, 9c, 94, 127 y. Berakhot 8:2, 12a, 121 y. Berakhot 9:3, 13c, 131 y. Berakhot 9:4, 14b, 110 y. Bikkurim 2:1, 64d, 113, 122 y. Bikkurim 2:7, 65b, 116 y. Demai 2:5, 23a, 132 y. Ketubbot 12:3, 35a, 109 y. Ma’aser Sheni 2:1, 53a, 113 y. Ma’aser Sheni 3:1, 54a, 133 y. Makkot 3:18, 32b, 113 y. Megillah 1:11, 71d, 130 y. Megillah 1:13, 72b, 112, 137 y. Megillah 3:2, 74a, 137 y. Megillah 4:10, 75c, 94, 127 y. Nazir 6:1, 54c-55a, 130 y. Nazir 6:1, 54c-d, 131 y. Orlah 1:3, 61b, 130 y. Orlah 3:1, 62d, 113, 116, 131 y. Pesahim 1:8, 28b, 113 y. Pesahim 2:1, 28c, 113, 116, 130 y. Pesahim 5:8, 32d, 113 y. Pesahim 10:1, 37c, 121 y. Qiddushin 4:12, 66b, 138 y. Sanhedrin 10:2, 28c-d, 103 y. Sanhedrin 10:2, 28d, 134 y. Sanhedrin 10:6, 29c, 137 y. Sanhedrin 11:6, 30b, 130 y. Sanhedrin 3:6, 21b, 120, 132 y. Sanhedrin 4:1, 22a, 131 y. Sanhedrin 7:11, 25b, 122 y. Sanhedrin 8:2, 26a, 130 y. Shabbat 1:7, 3c, 133, 134 y. Shabbat 1:7, 3d, 134 y. Shabbat 8:1, 11a, 121 y. Sheqalim 3:2, 47c, 121 y. Sheqalim 7:5, 50c, 134

y. Shevi’it 4:2, 35a, 133 y. Shevi’it 4:2, 35a-b, 120, 132 y. Shevi’it 7:4, 37c, 130 y. Shevi’it 8:10, 38b, 120, 134 y. Shevi’it 8:4, 38a, 133 y. Shevu’ot 1:5–8, 33a-b, 130 y. Shevu’ot 3:2, 34b, 113 y. Sotah 9:5, 23d, 126 y. Ta’anit 4:8, 68c, 119 y. Terumot 1:8, 41a, 114 y. Terumot 5:3, 43c, 130 y. Terumot 8:3, 45b, 113 y. Terumot 8:5, 45c, 132, 133 y. Terumot 8:5, 45d, 134 y. Terumot 8:6–8, 45d-46a, 134 y. Terumot 8:9, 46b, 113 y. Yevamot 10:3, 10d, 113 y. Yoma 8:3, 45a, 113 y. Yoma 8:5, 45b, 130

Other Classical Jewish Literature Maimonides Guide to the Perplexed, 1.33, 162 Guide for the Perplexed, 3.48, 13, 90 Targum Neofiti, 96 Targum Onqelos, 96 Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, 96, 123 Yoreh Deah, 83:1, 122 Yoreh Deah, 83:3, 150

New Testament Acts, 83 Acts 10:5, 82 Acts 10:9–16, 83 Acts 10:15, 79, 83 Acts 10:28, 83 Acts 11:1–18, 83 Acts 11:9, 79, 83 Acts 15, 82 Acts 15:19, 79, 153 Acts 15:28–29, 79, 154 Acts 21:25, 79, 154 Colossians 2:16, 80 I Corinthians, 83–84 I Corinthians 5:9–13, 83 I Corinthians 5:11, 156 I Corinthians 5:13, 83 I Corinthians 8, 80 I Corinthians 10, 85 I Corinthians 10:14–22, 156 I Corinthians 10:23–31, 79 I Corinthians 10:25–26, 79 I Corinthians 10:27, 84

Index of Pre-Modern Sources I Corinthians 10:28, 84 I Corinthians 10:29–30, 84 Galatians 2:11–16, 82 John 3:20, 152 Luke 5:27–32, 82 Luke 10:7–8, 79 Mark 2:15–17, 82 Mark 6:53–7:23, 78 Mark 7:14–23, 78 Matthew 9:10–13, 82 Matthew 13:47–48, 150 Matthew 14:34–15:20, 78 Matthew 15:10–20, 78 Matthew 21:10–17, 47 Matthew 23:3, 148 Romans 14:1–3, 80 Romans 14:14–15, 80 Romans 14:17, 80 Romans 14:20–21, 80 Romans 14:23, 81 1 Timothy 4:3–5, 83 Titus 1:15, 80, 81

Early Christian Literature Athanasius Letters, 19.3–4, 146 Aphrahat Demonstrations, 15, 146 Demonstrations, 15.1–2, 156 Demonstrations, 15.3, 154 Aristides Apology, 15.4, 155 Augustine Against Faustus, 16.30, 147 Against Faustus, 32.13, 154 Against Faustus, 6.7, 145, 148, 149, 152 Against Faustus, 6.9, 143, 145 Letters, 22.3, 157 Letters, 29.5, 156 On the Good of Marriage, 18, 155 On the Morals of the Manichaeans, 14.31–35, 154 On the Profit of Believing, 5, 145 On the Profit of Believing, 29, 136 On the Psalms, 37.3.4, 143 On the Psalms, 49.2.7, 143 On the Psalms, 132.17, 143 Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, 2.27, 143 Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, 2.37, 143, 148 Sermons on New Testament Lessons, 12.6, 141 Sermons on New Testament Lessons, 12.7, 154 Sermons on New Testament Lessons, 6.10, 143 Sermons on New Testament Lessons, 7.7, 143 Sermons on New Testament Lessons, 8.5, 143 Sermons on New Testament Lessons, 80, 142

187

Sermons on New Testament Lessons, 9.6, 143 The Confessions, 10.43–46, 145 The Confessions, 10.46, 145, 156 The Confessions, 13.38, 142 Basil The Hexaemeron, 8–9, 146 Canons of the Holy and Altogether August Apostles, 63, 154 Canons of the Holy and Altogether August Apostles, 70, 156 Clement of Alexandria The Instructor, 1.7, 146 The Instructor, 2.1, 145, 149, 150, 152, 155, 156 The Instructor, 2.10, 149, 150 The Instructor, 2.7, 154, 156 The Instructor, 3.11, 146, 147, 149, 151 The Stromata, 2.18, 153 The Stromata, 3.6, 156 The Stromata, 4.15, 155 The Stromata, 5.8, 143, 148, 149, 151 The Stromata, 7.18, 147, 148 Constitutions of the Holy Apostles, 7.20, 156 Council of Ancyra, 7, 156 Council of Gangra, 2, 154 Council of Trullo, 11, 156 Council of Trullo, 67, 154 Cyprian Treatises, 11, 146 Treatises, 119, 154 Treatises, 60, 144 Didache, 6.2–3, 155 Epistle of Barnabas, 2, 143 Epistle of Barnabas, 4, 142 Epistle of Barnabas, 10, 143, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152 Epistle of Barnabas, 14, 142 Epistle of Ignatius to the Magnesians, 8, 142 Epistle of Ignatius to the Philadelphians, 3, 156 Epistle to Diognetus, 4, 142, 143, 146 Gospel of Thomas 14, 78 Gregory of Nyssa On the Making of Man, 19, 138 On the Soul and the Resurrection, 138 Gregory Thaumaturgus Canonical Epistle, 1, 154 Hippolytus Fragments from Commentaries, 3.1.8–12, 156 Infancy Gospel of James, 6:4, 155 Irenaeus Against Heresies, 12.15, 156 Against Heresies, 12.7, 156 Against Heresies, 5.8.2, 149 Against Heresies, 5.8.2–3, 146 Against Heresies, 5.8.4, 146, 147, 148, 149 Jerome Contra Iovinianum, 2:7, 39

188

Index of Pre-Modern Sources

John Chrysostom Homilies on First Corinthians, 15.5–11, 145 Homilies on First Corinthians, 20, 154 Homilies on First Corinthians, 20.1, 155 Homilies on First Corinthians, 34.10, 115 Homilies of St. John, 34.1–2, 143 Homilies of St. John, 45.1–2, 143 Homilies on the Statues, 15.4, 156 Homilies on the Statutes, 20.19, 114 Homilies on Thessalonians, 2, 156 Homilies on Thessalonians, 5, 149 Homilies on Timothy, 12 (at Ver. 4), 146, 149 The Gospel of St. Matthew, 51.3–4, 156 Justin Martyr Dialogue with Trypho, 14, 145 Dialogue with Trypho, 20, 145, 151, 154, 155 Dialogue with Trypho, 22, 110 Dialogue with Trypho, 34, 154, 155 Dialogue with Trypho, 47, 157 Dialogue with Trypho, 58, 146 Dialogue with Trypho, 126, 146 Methodius Fragments: Extracts from the Work on Things Created, 1, 149 The Banquet of the Ten Virgins, 5.6, 150 Minucius Felix Octavius, 30, 153, 154 Novation On the Jewish Meats, 2, 143 On the Jewish Meats, 2–3, 146 On the Jewish Meats, 3, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152 On the Jewish Meats, 3–5, 145 On the Jewish Meats, 4, 144 On the Jewish Meats, 5, 142, 145 Treatise Concerning the Trinity, 19, 146 Origen Against Celsus, 1.52, 155 Against Celsus, 2.1, 156 Against Celsus, 2.2, 156 Against Celsus, 3.11, 156 Against Celsus, 4.93, 147 Against Celsus, 5.25, 34 Against Celsus, 5.34, 34 Against Celsus, 5.34–36, 142 Against Celsus, 5.41, 33 Against Celsus, 5.49, 145 Against Celsus, 5.60, 143 Against Celsus, 7.7, 156 Against Celsus, 8.29, 142, 154 Against Celsus, 8.30, 144, 155 Against Celsus, 8.32, 155 Commentary on Matthew, 11.12–15, 156

Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 2.9.1, 143 Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 2.13.13, 154 Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 2.13.14, 154 Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 2.13.3, 142 Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 6.7.11, 143 Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 8.8.8–13, 156 Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 9.35.1–9.38.1, 156 Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 9.37.1–9.38.1, 144 Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 9.42.1–10.5.7, 156 Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 9.42.9, 144 De Principiis, 2.8, 154 De Principiis, 4.15, 143 De Principiis, 4.17–18, 143 Homily on Exodus, 7.1, 143 Homily on Genesis, 2.6, 147 Homily on Genesis, 4.1, 153 Homily on Genesis, 5.5, 143 Homily on Hebrews, 25.7, 156 Homily on Leviticus, 3.3.3, 156 Homily on Leviticus, 5.10.1–5, 147 Homily on Leviticus, 7.4.1–4, 143 Homily on Leviticus, 7.4.7, 146 Homily on Leviticus, 7.5.1, 150 Homily on Leviticus, 7.5.2, 156 Homily on Leviticus, 7.5.5–7, 143 Homily on Leviticus, 7.6.2, 148 Homily on Leviticus, 7.6.3, 148 Homily on Leviticus, 7.6.3–8, 148 Homily on Leviticus, 7.6.4, 148 Homily on Leviticus, 7.7.1, 150 Homily on Leviticus, 7.7.2, 151 Homily on Numbers, 5.1.3, 142, 143 On the Passover, 28–29, 145 On Prayer, 27.1–17, 145 To Africanus, 10, 146 Pseudo-Clementine, 2 Homilies, 7.4, 155 Homilies, 7.8, 155 Homilies, 8.23, 155 Homilies, 9.23, 155 Homilies, 13.4, 156 Homilies, 13.9, 156 Recognitions, 2.71, 156 Recognitions, 2.71–72, 156 Recognitions, 4.36, 155

Index of Pre-Modern Sources Recognitions, 7.29, 156 Simon and Theophilus, 7.28, 149, 150 Synod of Laodicea, 37, 156 Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, 6, 155 Tertullian Against Marcion, 2.20, 150 Against Marcion, 4.8, 156 Against Marcion, 5.3, 156 Against Marcion, 5.7, 142 On Fasting, 2, 143 On Fasting, 3, 144 On Fasting, 4, 155 On Fasting, 6, 144 On Fasting, 9, 154 On Fasting, 15, 143, 154 On Modesty, 9, 156 On Modesty, 12, 154 On Modesty, 18, 156 On Monogamy, 5, 142 To His Wife, 2.3, 156 Treatise on the Soul, 48, 156 The Epistles of Pope Fabian, 1, 156 The Epistles of Pope Fabian, 2.2, 156

Greek and Roman Literature Arrianus Dissertationes, 1:22:4, 31 Damascius Vita Isidori, 31 Diodorus Bibliotheca Historica, 34/35.1.1–2, 38 Bibliotheca Historica, 34/35.1.3–4, 39 Erotianus Vocum Hippocraticarum Collectio cum Fragmentis, F33, 31

Julian Letter to Theodorus, 453C, 44 Juvenal Saturae, 14.101–102, 37 Saturae, 14.98–99, 37 Saturae, 6.157–160, 37 Macrobius Saturnalia, 2.4:11, 38 Petronius Fragmenta 37, line 1, 36 PGM 4.3007–3086, 31 Pliny the Elder Natural History, 8.33, 63 Natural History, 9.45, 150 Natural History, 31.95, 30 Plutarch Quaestiones Convivales, 4.4:4–6:2, 32 Quaestiones Convivales, 4.5, 32, 36 Quaestiones Convivales, 4.5:2, 32 Quaestiones Convivales, 4.5:2–3, 32 Quaestiones Convivales, 4.5:3, 33 Vita Ciceronis, 7:6, 36 Porphyry De Abstentia, 1.14, 35 De Abstentia, 2.61, 35, 44 De Abstentia, 4.14, 35, 58 Scriptores Historiae Augustae, 519, 30 Sextus Empiricus Hypotyposes, 3.222–223, 43 Hypotyposes, 3.223, 33, 43 Strabo Geographica, 16.2:37, 36 Tacitus Historiae, 5.3:1, 34 Historiae, 5.4:1, 33 Historiae, 5.5:1–2, 34

189

Selected Index of Modern Scholars

Alexander, Elizabeth Shanks, xi, 88, 96, 114

Hart, Mitchell B., 13, 109 Hayes, Christine E., 2, 5, 14, 59, 60, 63, 89, 92, 93, 94, 98, 101, 108, 111, 115, 118, 128 Hecker, Joel, xi, 109 Hezser, Catherine, 108 Hidary, Richard, 121, 133

Ballentine, Debra Scoggins, xi, 138 Barclay, John M. G., 46 Barthes, Roland, 117 Baumgarten, Albert I., 72, 74 Berkowitz, Beth A., xi, 87, 96, 114 Bourdieu, Pierre, 2, 48 Boyarin, Daniel, 77, 86, 103, 108 Brumberg-Kraus, Jonathan, xi, 110 Bryan, David, 10

Jaffee, Martin S., 86, 88, 97, 108, 117 Judd, Robin, 109

Cohen, Shaye J. D., 36, 38, 42, 46, 47, 59, 95, 97, 98, 100, 130, 137, 142, 156 Cohn, Naftali S., x, 88, 112 Collins, John J., 46, 70 Cooper, Alan, 24 Douglas, Mary, 10, 15–17 Eilberg-Schwartz, Howard, 17, 21, 146 Elman, Yaakov, 108, 117 Fabre-Vassas, Claudine, 30, 90 Feldman, Louis H., 34 Fine, Steven, x, 121, 122 Finkelstein, Ari, xi, 44 Fonrobert, Charlotte Elisheva, 88, 97 Freidenreich, David Moshe, x, 133, 134, 143, 146, 154, 155, 156, 157

Kraemer, David C., 17, 18, 114, 130, 134, 146 Kraemer, Ross Shepard, 71 Kunin, Seth D., 15, 16 Lieberman, Saul, 99, 103, 137 Lizorkin, Eliyahu, 146 Magness, Jodi, 74, 78, 122, 126 Mason, Steve, 47 McGowan, Andrew, xi, 142 Milgrom, Jacob, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 61, 92, 123, 124, 137, 150, 152 Neusner, Jacob, 146 Olyan, Saul M., xi, 21, 26, 33, 92 Peskowitz, Miriam B., 152

Gafni, Isaiah M., 107, 108 Gilders, William K., 19, 20 Goodman, Martin, 46, 57, 75, 105 Gray, Alyssa M., 108, 120 Grottanelli, Cristiano, 30, 32, 33, 44 Gruen, Erich S., 46

Rajak, Tessa, 39, 57 Rhodes, James, 51, 54, 60, 61, 62, 66, 67, 69 Rosenblum, Jordan D., 2, 9, 12, 15, 30, 31, 32, 37, 39, 43, 45, 55, 70, 71, 72, 74, 90, 93, 96, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 114, 119, 120, 133, 134, 135, 156 Rubenstein, Jeffrey L., 86, 108

Halivni, David Weiss, 27, 108 Har-Peled, Misgav, 117, 118, 119 Harris, Marvin, 16, 17, 18

Safran Foer, Jonathan, 7, 28, 29 Satlow, Michael L., xi, 41, 47, 58, 88, 91, 103, 108, 134, 149

190

Selected Index of Modern Scholars Schäfer, Peter, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44, 126 Schiffman, Lawrence H., 74 Schofer, Jonathan Wyn, xi, 78, 120, 126, 140 Schwartz, Seth, 46, 87, 108, 134 Simon, Marcel, 140, 141, 145 Smith, Dennis E., 77, 80, 82 Stern, David, 120, 124 Stern, Menahem, 30, 37, 38, 44 Stern, Sacha, 102, 106, 137 Stowers, Stanley, 19 Svebakken, Hans Richard, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 60, 61, 66, 69

191

Taussig, Hal, 77 Teeter, D. Andrew, 24, 55, 74, 114 Ullucci, Daniel, xi, 80, 81, 85, 87, 101, 110, 140, 142, 143, 145 Vidas, Moulie, 108 Walzer, Michael, 14 Weingarten, Susan, 113, 134 Wimpfheimer, Barry Scott, 108 Yadin, Azzan, 143, 147 Zetterholm, Magnus Z., 82

Selected General Index

allegory, 2, 5, 27, 60–70, 74, 81, 132, 140–141, 143–153, 157 bat, 11, 151 Behemoth, 138 blood, 19–20, 74, 79, 97–99, 113, 154–155 bread, 99, 120, 133, 134, 141, 144 butchery, animal, 132 carrion, 101, 120, 132 carrion/torn animal, 26 cheese, 55, 95, 96, 102, 133 circumcision, 30, 36, 82, 142 cloven hoofs, 14, 16, 119, 147–148 commensality, 61, 70–74, 83, 101–104, 134, 160 cooking, 20, 55, 56, 74, 96, 113, 116, 120, 153 cuttlefish, 6, 150, 157 domesticated quadrupeds, 10, 12, 53, 61, 64, 116 eel, 150 eft, 152 eggs, 3, 9, 23, 24, 94, 126 Eucharist, 114, 157 fat, 9, 53, 75, 97, 113, 132, 144 foodways, 1, 81, 105, 156, 160, 163 fowl bearded vulture, 11 black vulture, 11 eagle, 6, 11, 147, 151, 157 eagle owl, 11 falcons, 11 fisher owl, 11 hawk, 147, 151 hawks, 11 herons, 11 hoopoe, 11 kite, 11

long-eared owl, 11 osprey, 11 raven, 11 scops owl, 11 screech owl, 11 short-eared owl, 11 sparrow, 151 stork, 11 swan, 151 tawny owl, 11 white owl, 11 fox, 147 fruit, 53, 135 gazelle, 53, 60 hare, 11, 14, 92, 117, 118, 144, 149 hunting, 54, 112 hyena, 144, 149, 150 insects crickets, 11 grasshopper, 11 locusts, 11 koy, 116 lamb, 31, 53, 55, 56, 61 Land Swarmers, 12, 66, 109, 112, 120, 131, 138, 152 Law, The “Moral Law,” 141–142 “Ritual Law,” 141–142 Letter of, 141, 142–143 Spirit of, 141, 142–143 Leviathan, 122, 137, 138 limb of a living animal, 131 Martyr/martyrdom, 38–45, 58, 146, 155 mice, 61, 62, 109, 132

192

Selected General Index milk, 24–25, 55, 97, 113, 114, 153, 162 Moses, 37, 39, 53, 54, 59, 60, 61, 73, 87, 88, 115, 117, 131, 144, 145 nest, of a bird, 22–24, 95, 127, 128, 129 newt, 152 olive oil, 71, 133, 134 pork, 29–45, 90–94, 117–121, 137–138, 149, 155, 161 prey animals, 74, 151 quadrupeds camel, 11, 30, 65, 92, 117, 118, 149 giraffe, 53 mouse, 12 pig, 11, 17 rat, 12 rat, 55 reason, 2, 5, 6, 22, 27, 32, 41, 45, 48, 51, 54, 56, 58, 62, 73, 74, 81, 89, 91, 93, 138, 139, 140, 146, 147, 161 reptiles, 50, 63, 66, 67, 68 chameleon, 12 gecko, 12 skink, 12 spotted lizard, 12 revelation, 2, 5, 6, 27, 37, 41, 45, 51, 74, 81, 89, 92, 126, 161 rock badger, 11, 117

Rome, 44, 57, 117–121 ruminant/rumination, 62, 64, 126, 148 Sabbath, 20, 30, 36, 37, 105 sacrifice, 40, 104, 116 Samaritans, 93 scales, 66, 122, 150 bottom feeders, 13, 150–151 clams, 13 lobster, 13 oysters, 13 shellfish, 13 sciatic nerve, 20–21, 25, 74, 100–101, 112–113, 115–116 seamew, 151 serpent, 147 sinew, 21 skink, 13, 152 slaughter, of animals, 21–22, 37, 58, 98, 101, 109–112, 121–122, 128, 153 vegetables, 71, 80 vulture, 151 weasels, 61, 62, 63, 109, 152 wild animals, 12, 96, 99 wine, 37, 71, 80, 102, 103, 104, 133 wolf, 147 World to Come, The, 6, 117, 135–139 ziz, 126, 138

193