The Global North-South Atlas: Mapping Global Change 2019025296, 2019025297, 9781138588837, 9781138588844, 9780429492037

165 27 45MB

English Pages [181] Year 2019

Report DMCA / Copyright

DOWNLOAD FILE

Polecaj historie

The Global North-South Atlas: Mapping Global Change
 2019025296, 2019025297, 9781138588837, 9781138588844, 9780429492037

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of figures
Editorial page
Acknowledgments
Introduction: The Brandt Line: political or developmental boundary
1. Mapping global change: differences in development and wealth from the 1st to the 21st century
The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions– GDP and GDP per capita: 1–2008 ad
Thesecond series of maps for 22 countries and regions– GDP and GDP per capita: 1500–2008 ad
The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions– GDP and GDP per capita: 1870–2008
The fourth series of maps for every country in the world– GDP and GDP per capita: 1950–2017
The fifth series of maps for every country in the world– HDI: 1980–2017
2. Different philosophies of development: different development boundary lines
3. Towards a new global line?
Figure 3.1 Wealth security I: innovativeness
Figure 3.2 Wealth security II: education
Figure 3.3 Wealth security III: population
Figure 3.4 Effectiveness of the state
Figure 3.5 Intergenerational security I: concern for the younger generation
Figure 3.6 Intergenerational security II: concern for the elderly
Figure 3.7 Confidence in the state
Figure 3.8 Technological advancement. Political freedom
Figure 3.9 Internal security
Figure 3.10 Equality
Figure 3.11 Happiness
Figure 3.12 Social development
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 Health security I and II
Figure 3.15 Human species security
Figure 3.16 Summary map I
Figure 3.17 Summary map II
Figures 3.18 and 3.19 Summary maps III and IV
Figure 3.20 Reference map: Human Development Index and Freedom in the World
4. Conclusions
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

THE GLOBAL NORTH–SOUTH ATLAS

This innovative atlas deconstructs the contemporary image of the North–South divide between developed and underdeveloped countries which was established by the 1980 Brandt Line, and advocates the need for the international community to redraw the global map to be fit for the 21st century. Throughout the book a range of colorful maps and charts graphically demonstrate the ways in which the world has changed over the last 2,000 years. The atlas first analyzes the genesis and characteristics of the Brandt Line’s North–South divide, before going on to discuss its validity through the centuries, especially before and after 1980, and demonstrating the many definitions and philosophies of development that exist or may exist, which make it difficult to define a single notion of a Global North and South. The book concludes by proposing new schemes of categorization between developed and developing countries which might better fit our contemporary global society. This book will serve as a perfect textbook for students studying global divisions within geography, politics, economics, international relations, and development departments, as well as being a useful guide for researchers, and for those working in NGOs and government institutions. Marcin Wojciech Solarz is Professor in the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies at the University of Warsaw, Poland.

THE GLOBAL NORTH–SOUTH ATLAS Mapping Global Change

Marcin Wojciech Solarz

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Marcin Wojciech Solarz The right of Marcin Wojciech Solarz to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Solarz, Marcin Wojciech, 1974- author, cartographer. Title: The global north-south atlas : mapping global change / Marcin Wojciech Solarz. Description: New York : Routledge, 2020. | “© 2020 Marcin Wojciech Solarz.” | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2019025296 (print) | LCCN 2019025297 (ebook) | ISBN 9781138588837 (hardback) | ISBN 9781138588844 (paperback) | ISBN 9780429492037 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Globalization–Maps. | Boundaries–Maps. | International relations–Maps. | Economic development–Maps. | Developing countries–Maps. | Developed countries–Maps. | LCGFT: World atlases. Classification: LCC G1046.G1 S6 2020 (print) | LCC G1046.G1 (ebook) | DDC 911–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019025296 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019025297 ISBN: 978-1-138-58883-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-138-58884-4 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-49203-7 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Swales & Willis, Exeter, Devon, UK

CONTENTS

List of figures Editorial page Acknowledgments Introduction: The Brandt Line: political or developmental boundary 1

2

vi xi xii 1

Mapping global change: differences in development and wealth from the 1st to the 21st century

30

Different philosophies of development: different development boundary lines

96

3

Towards a new global line?

110

4

Conclusions

158

Bibliography Index

161 164

FIGURES

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19

Recent depictions of the North–South divide by selected authors The 1980 Brandt Line and the northern and southern hemispheres The communist world, the 1946 Iron Curtain, and the 1980 Brandt Line Misleading geography of the East–West rivalry The 1980 Brandt Line in the light of GNI per capita (constant 2010 USD) in 1980 – true or false? The 1980 Brandt Line in the light of HDI in 1980 – true or false? The 1980 Brandt Line in the light of HDI in 2017 – true or false? The 1980 Brandt Line and selected groups of countries in 2019 The 1980 Brandt Line and the division of the world into colonies and non-colonies Selected Cold War ways of delimiting development – underdevelopment lines Globalization and development – underdevelopment lines. Time taken to cross the Atlantic from 1492 to 1996 Globalization and development – underdevelopment lines II. Time taken to travel between Paris and Marseille from 1853 to 2001 World population growth and development – underdevelopment lines from 1800 to 2019 North vs. South population growth and development – underdevelopment lines from 1913 to 2015 World GDP and GDP per capita and development – underdevelopment lines from 1960 to 2017 North–South GDP and development – underdevelopment lines from 1960 to 2017 North–South GDP per capita and development – underdevelopment lines from 1960 to 2017 Growth in the number of United Nations (UN) member states and independent states, and development – underdevelopment lines The 1980 Brandt Line and changes to the world political map in 1945–2018

2 3 4 5 11 12 13 14 16 18 20 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Figures

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.23 1.24

A common legend for all series of maps showing GDP and GDP per capita (1AD–2008) World GDP and GDP per capita (1AD–2008) in 1990 international dollars The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: the regions described by the data on the maps for 1AD–2008 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1 AD The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1000 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1500 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1600 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1700 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1820 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1870 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1913 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1937 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1950 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1960 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1973 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1980 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1990 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 2000 The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 2008 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: the regions described by the data on the maps for 1500–2008 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1500 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1600 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1700 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1820

vii

31 32 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44

viii

1.25 1.26 1.27 1.28 1.29 1.30 1.31 1.32 1.33 1.34 1.35 1.36 1.37 1.38 1.39 1.40 1.41 1.42 1.43 1.44 1.45 1.46 1.47

Figures

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1870 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1913 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1937 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1950 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1960 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1973 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1980 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1990 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 2000 The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 2008 The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: the regions described by the data on the maps for 1870–2008 The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1870 The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1913 The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1937 The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1950 The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1960 The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1973 The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1980 The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1990 The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 2000 The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 2008 The fourth series of maps for the whole world: countries and groups of countries described by the data on the maps for 1950–2008 The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 1950

45 45 46 46 47 47 48 48 50 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 64

Figures

1.48 1.49 1.50 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.54 1.55 1.56 1.57 1.58 1.59 1.60 1.61 1.62 1.63 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10

The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 1960 The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 1973 The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 1980 The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 1990 The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 2000 The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 2008 The fourth series of maps for the whole world: a legend for the 2017 GDP and GDP per capita map The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 2017 Human development (1980–2008) and world population (1 AD–2008) The fifth series of maps for the whole world: a common legend for the 1980–2008 human development maps The fifth series of maps for the whole world: HDI in 1980 The fifth series of maps for the whole world: HDI in 1990 The fifth series of maps for the whole world: HDI in 2000 The fifth series of maps for the whole world: HDI in 2008 The fifth series of maps for the whole world: a legend for the 2017 human development map The fifth series of maps for all countries of the world: HDI in 2017 If Plato had drawn the North–South divide in 2019 If Aristotle had drawn the North–South divide in 2019 If Hugo Grotius had drawn the North–South divide in 2019 If Thomas Hobbes had drawn the North–South divide in 2019 If Baruch Spinoza had drawn the North–South divide in 2019 If John Locke had drawn the North–South divide in 2019 If Jean-Jacques Rousseau had drawn the North–South divide in 2019 If John Rawls had drawn the North–South divide in 2019 If Robert Nozick had drawn the North–South divide in 2019 If UNDP were to draw the North–South divide in 2019 If Jared Diamond were to draw the North–South divide in 2019 Wealth security I: innovativeness Wealth security II: education Wealth security III: population Effectiveness of the state Intergenerational security I: concern for the younger generation Intergenerational security II: concern for the elderly Confidence in the state Technological advancement and political freedom Internal security Equality

ix

66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 83 84 86 88 90 92 94 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 112 114 116 118 122 124 126 128 132 134

x

Figures

3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 3.17 3.18 3.19 3.20

Happiness Social development Health security I Health security II Human species security Summary map I Summary map II Summary map III Summary map IV Reference map: Human Development Index and Freedom in the World

136 138 140 142 144 146 148 150 152 154

EDITORIAL PAGE

Maps, graphs, and diagrams prepared by Maciej Zych and Jarosław Talacha. Translation from Polish and English consultation by Pracownia Językowa Małgorzata Klein and Mark Znidericz. Translation and map preparation financed by the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw and the Rector’s Office of the University of Warsaw, Poland.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book could not have been written without the assistance, commitment, and goodwill of several people and institutions. I would like to thank the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies at the University of Warsaw for financing the drawing up of some of the maps and graphs and the translating, editing, and proofreading the texts. I would especially like to thank Dr. Sylwia Dudek-Mańkowska, Vice-Dean for Financial and Academic Affairs at the Faculty. I would also like to thank Dr. Hab. Maciej Duszczyk, Prorector of the University of Warsaw for financing preparing most of the maps in the book. Special thanks go to two outstanding cartographers, namely, Maciej Zych and Jarosław Talacha, for the expertly drawn and compiled, as well as aesthetically tasteful, maps, graphs, and diagrams contained in these pages. The quality of the atlas would have been noticeably poorer without their skill and commitment. Special thanks must go to the translators and editors at Pracownia Językowa Małgorzata Klein, who are responsible for the English version of this book. The idea for analyzing the genesis and popularization of global developmental boundaries against a background of graphs illustrating population, economic, political, and technical changes over a long time span comes from an article of mine published in the Third World Quarterly 38 in 2017 (8), entitled “The birth and development of the language of global development in light of trends in global population, international politics, economics and globalisation”. I would like to thank the editors for their kind permission in letting me use this article when compiling the atlas. The chapter in which I argue that the shape of the North–South divide is determined by the adopted development philosophy is an expansion of a discussion of mine published in a 2018 text entitled “Many worlds, one planet: ambiguous geographies of the contemporary international community” (Solarz 2018c: 65–67). Of course, as usual, responsibility for all shortcomings and errors found within these pages belongs only to the author.

INTRODUCTION The Brandt Line: political or developmental boundary

The year 2020 will mark 40 years since the Brandt Line first appeared – on the cover of a report entitled North–South: A Programme for Survival (Brandt 1980) – as a North–South boundary. An incisive and decisive rift neatly divided the international community into a poor global South comprising Latin America, Africa, and Asia (with the exceptions of the USSR and Japan), and a wealthy global North comprising the rest of the world (see Figure 0.1). The incision was obviously very deep, because the Brandt Line is still being reproduced almost unchanged in academic and popular literature four decades later (Figure 0.1). It is somewhat paradoxical, however, that one of the most influential delineations of the “worlds of the world” in the intellectual history of humanity was originally only a schematic report cover, and as such, can be justifiably dismissed as an offhand drawing. The designations “North” and “South” have drawn criticism from the outset. Physical geography obviously cannot be compromised to accommodate these terms from either an unqualified (the North is not confined to the Northern Hemisphere and the South is not confined to the Southern Hemisphere) or a relative (North countries are not always north of South countries and vice versa) standpoint (see Figure 0.2), but in 1980, economic geography was not so determined and it broadly accepted the Brandt Line (see Figures 0.2, 0.5 and 0.6), and political geography simply supported this way of viewing the world (see Figure 0.2). In any case, the relations between the subdisciplines of geography and the North–South line seem to be highly significant. They seem to clarify its nature (i.e. whether it is a development and/or a political boundary), while explaining its rigidity and durability. The expectation that the North–South antithesis can be an actual, durable, universal, and unique spatial matrix of countries designated as either developed or undeveloped (and the criticism of a North–South boundary, as well as the two concepts themselves, is in no small measure predicated on this) is obviously based on a common misunderstanding or credulity. The same can be said of perceiving North and South as cohesive geographically global blocs of development and underdevelopment (NB: dividing the world into such North and South blocs has always been questionable). This follows from the very nature of development. Naturally, a certain general correspondence with the pattern of developed and underdeveloped countries being arranged in a north–south layout on the world map is still

FIGURE 0.1

Recent depictions of the North–South divide by selected authors

Source: Own elaboration based on Boniface 2003; Boyd, Comenetz 2007; Brandt 1980; Desperak, Balon 2003; Domański 2004; Knox, Agnew 1990; Nouschi 2003; en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North– South_divide

Introduction

FIGURE 0.2

3

The 1980 Brandt Line and the northern and southern hemispheres

Source: Own elaboration based on oecd.org; nato.int; coldwar.org; sipri.org; Kristensen, Norris 2013; britannica.com

noticeable (viz. Europe vs. Africa, USA and Canada vs. Latin America) (Solarz 2014, 2016: 132), but this arrangement is neither fixed in the long term, static from a current perspective, nor a universal geographical truth bereft of exceptions and inconsistencies. Very possibly, the North–South opposition, originating as it did during the Cold War, was

4

Introduction

FIGURE 0.3

The communist world, the 1946 Iron Curtain, and the 1980 Brandt Line

Source: Own elaboration based on Solarz 2014, 2016: 34, 36; Malinowski 1986; Santamaria 1999; Drakakis-Smith, Doherty & Thrift 1987; Korbonski & Fukuyama 1987; Kolodziej & Kanet 1989; Parker 2002; Kennedy 1988; Gawlikowski 2004; Polit 2004; Gawrycki & Lizak 2006; Swift 2003; Nouschi 2003; Boniface 2003

primarily a gauntlet thrown down to the then prevailing East–West dichotomy (Solarz 2014, 2016: 120), with respect to which, however, physical geography was no less

Introduction

5

NATO member countries, 1989 Warsaw Pact member countries, 1989

FIGURE 0.4

Misleading geography of the East–West rivalry

Source: Own elaboration

absolute – a point now largely forgotten or even unknown. The East–West divide did not coincide with the eastern and western hemispheres. Nor was the Western Bloc entirely west of the Eastern Bloc and vice versa (Figure 0.3). The East–West opposition was to a large extent real in Europe, but the perceptions of the world from the U.S. cities of, say, Los Angeles, CA, and Anchorage, AK, were no more different from Washington DC and New York than were Moscow and Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg) from Vladivostok and Khabarovsk in the USSR (Figure 0.4). The North–South divide is essentially a twin, similar to the East–West opposition, with the Brandt Line as the equivalent of the Iron Curtain. This is certainly true in the most general sense, as the two oppositions were eventually streamlined into the dichotomies of freedom vs. lack thereof in both the political (North– South: not colonized vs. colonized; West–East: not communized vs. communized) and

6

Introduction

socio-economic (North–South and West–East: development vs. underdevelopment, high vs. low quality of life) spheres. The inconsistency between the two divides is apparent in that the North–South divide was considered complete and separable (every country was assigned to the North or the South, and although it had been demonstrated that there were additionally contentious and ambiguous cases, pains were taken to eventually assign them to one or the other), whereas in the case of the West–East divide (leaving aside countries whose affiliation might have been moot), a third segment of the international community (the Third World, the Non-Aligned Countries) was identified as being at least formally on a par with these two primary groups (the First World and the Second World). This inconsistency, however, was only ostensible, as in a world in the grip of superpower global conflict, a non-aligned stance, especially on the part of weak countries, i.e. those only just building their statehood (see decolonization) and economic prosperity (see development) (i.e. the countries of the South), was rather a luxury they could ill afford. The two blocs waged a global political conflict and they built up a global marketplace of inducements, favors, disfavors, and punishments, in which everyone was involved to a greater or lesser extent (Solarz 2014, 2016: 69). The East–West divide was therefore truly complete and separable, or at least very nearly so. There are no reservations about the two sides of the North–South divide being labeled as “global North” and “global South”, because it really is a planetary divide. Nevertheless, the “rich North” and “poor South” labels too often seem to be narrowly understood as only referring to monetary wealth. However, so far as the global North–South dichotomy is concerned, the adjective “rich” should primarily be understood similarly as with colors or sounds as “full, deep, mellow, strong”, or alternatively as the equivalent of “high in quality”, where “poor” is the antonym thereof (Hornby 1988: 647, 728). The 1980 Brandt Line is arguably the most common cartographic representation of the global development divide. It has effectively inculcated the belief in many that the international community can be cleanly and clearly divided into highly developed and underdeveloped countries, and that it performs this function best. This result of its impact on public opinion, the media, academics, politicians etc. obviously comes as no surprise. Nor is this due solely to its having been so often reproduced, even in publications that enjoy an international circulation and considerable status. That is also because maps have always been highly regarded. They can create a new actuality and they exude an aura of trustworthiness. The information they contain is usually accepted with a great deal of confidence and deemed reliable. Finally, they give an appearance of being neutral and of conveying complete knowledge. One reason for this exceptional status is that, as a rule, maps present information clearly and unambiguously, i.e. they do not leave a lot of room, volition, or opportunity for equivocality, uncertainty, lack of precision, or apparent transience (Blacksell 2006). A simple comparison of the contents of the Brandt Report with the Brandt Line depicted on the cover serves to aptly illustrate the foregoing with respect to the course of the North–South boundary line. The boundary on the cover, as described above, is explicit: the global South generally lies to the south of the USA, Europe, the former USSR, and Japan, although the boundary also dips deeply into the Southern Hemisphere so that Australia and New Zealand are included in the global North (however, the essentially negligent way of drawing the 1980 Brandt Line on the cover of the 1980 Brandt Report raises doubts as to its actual course (Asia) or deviates from the traditionally adopted one on the maps (the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans); see Figure 0.10).

Introduction

7

The descriptive part of the report, however, is not so decided as to where the Eastern Bloc and Communist China fit in this North–South divide (Solarz 2014, 2016: 127–128). Reproducing the Brandt Line over the following 40-odd years (1980–2019), with at best minor corrections that do not fundamentally change its course, has only strengthened misunderstandings about the 1980 North–South Line. As well as conveying the impression of truth and explicitness from the outset, the Brandt Line additionally acquired the stamp of permanence and universality at a certain point. However, if the Brandt Line is truly a development partition line, then it cannot be either permanent or universal by its very nature. It is a result of the development of particular countries and societies, and development is an example of non-uniformly variable motion, i.e. changes constantly affect its value, direction, and rate of acceleration, as assigned to each segment of the international community. Hence development levels are only temporary states that are stable to a greater or lesser degree. A fixed development boundary drawn in a constantly changing world (there are close to 200 states changing position with respect to each other and to accepted benchmarks, e.g. the Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals) would be like a non-blowing wind or a non-flowing river (Bauman 2004). The universality of the boundary demarcating differences in development levels is likewise an illusion. Reflecting on the following paraphrased words of American academic Jared Diamond should suffice to illustrate this: if you want to understand a development divide and you are permitted to ask its author only two questions permitting only one-word answers, the two most important questions to pose are: “Where were you born?” and “When was your divide born?”. (Diamond, accessed 2018, emphasis added) Specifying the place of origin of the person who drew up the demarcation line of the divide and set its time limits can be pivotal to understanding its geographic configuration. An old Roman proverb states that quam duos faciunt idem non est idem (When two do the same thing, it is not the same thing). This means that having different people search for a development boundary (or boundaries) can produce completely different results – even if they do so simultaneously. Scholars have their own personal experiences, social and ethnic backgrounds, world and philosophical views, political preferences, educational backgrounds, religious affiliations, reading experiences, intellectual characteristics, personalities, etc. The Brandt Line is commonly taken to be a development boundary, whereas it seems to be in fact a political boundary. And this is not at all because it is based on political borders (i.e. between countries) and more or less follows them. First, it is political insofar as its delineation seems to have been influenced by the international situation. Nowhere in the report did the Commission adopt an unequivocal position on whether the Eastern Bloc was affiliated with the global North or the People’s Republic of China with the global South. This was probably due to political reasons (Solarz 2014, 2016: 127–128). On the one hand, the Commission stressed that “the market-economy industrialized countries […] is how we will usually interpret the ‘North’ in this Report” [i.e. without the communist countries] and “when we speak of the ‘South’ we also usually exclude China” (emphasis added) (Brandt 1980: 31) (but in fact usually means “in most cases, but not always”). On the other hand, however, the Commission pointed out that, in a global North and global South context respectively, “many of our observations also apply to the industrialized countries of Eastern

8

Introduction

Europe”, and that China, “the largest developing country”, “has not formally joined the grouping of the developing countries, though it commonly identifies itself with them” (Brandt 1980: 31, 46). The Brandt Line on the cover of the Report, however, is hard and unequivocal (e.g. the Eastern Bloc is firmly a part of the global North and China of the global South). Furthermore, its general overtone was clearly anti-Soviet, merging as it does the USSR and its European satellites with the West in contradistinction to the global South, but in the Report itself was written: the industrialized countries of Eastern Europe […] do not want to be lumped together with the West, or to be contrasted with the South in a division which they see as the consequences of colonial history. […] They had long argued that they were not responsible for the colonial heritage of other powers. […] Many developing countries regard the Soviet Union as ranking in living standards among the industrialized countries. It is therefore hoped and expected that the Soviet Union and other eastern industrialized countries will increase their participation in world trade and in economic, scientific and technical cooperation, particularly with developing countries. (Brandt 1980: 31, 45–46) This attitude has finally changed, and certainly, at least during Gorbachev’s leadership (1985–1991), the Kremlin had already abandoned their official view of North–South relations as no more than a West–South relationship (Brandt 2013: 286). There is therefore discernible friction between the officially “soft” line in the report and the “hard” demarcation line on the cover, between text presumably scrupulously drafted in a spirit of compromise by an international Commission and an unexceptional cover conventionally, if not downright carelessly, drawn by an obscure designer. In the end, the politically hard message, and not the politically nuanced contents of the report, won out. This might seem natural and obvious, but whether it was intentional is debatable. Brandt called for the globalization of politics, a kind of domestic world politics, an international community grounded on the principles of balance and justice, an equitable North–South partnership, and the initiation of various mechanisms to provide assistance and economic support to the global South (Merseburger 2011: 578–580). It should go without saying that a distinct and clear-cut North–South boundary was a natural ally in this offensive, as it forcefully apprised the world of the existence of a destitute South that was anticipating assistance. Any division, by its very nature, is a simplification of reality, and this applies a fortiori to a dichotomous division. Its task, however, is to direct attention to the most important matters. Paradoxically, the Brandt Line has accomplished more than the Brandt Report over time. The Report itself achieved very little (if anything) in terms of practical outcomes, and this is partly due to the international political situation in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Merseburger 2011: 579–580; Brandt 2013: 279–280, 284, 286). It might therefore be even more paradoxical that Willy Brandt never mentions the North–South line in his memoirs, first published in 1989 (Brandt 2013: 277–287). Politics might have impacted the course of the North–South boundary after the Cold War as well. One outcome of the Cold War was to fully expose the developmental backwardness of the Eastern Bloc vis-à-vis the West (Solarz 2014, 2016: 133–134). The post-Cold-War Brandt Line, however, failed to discern this. Any revisions to the North–

Introduction

9

South boundary were in fact purely cosmetic. Apart from Australia and New Zealand, being transformed from a global North peninsula to a global North island in the southern hemisphere (and therefore a part of a revision of the course of the Brandt Line in the Pacific), the only noteworthy change is the severing of the non-European Soviet successor states from the global North (however, not on all maps and not always in the same way) (Figure 0.1). Not excising the “heart” of the former USSR (i.e. primarily Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus) and its European satellites from the global North immediately the Cold War had ended, when the illusion of a highly developed Eastern Bloc was shattered, seems to have been connected with the international politics of the time, a lack of politico-economic reflection, and/or politically motivated stereotypes (this situation is ongoing in the case of some countries for the same reasons). There should have been a thorough and far-reaching review of the North–South boundary shortly after the Cold War had ended. This not only concerns the period after 1989; its 1980 course should have been reevaluated once the illusion that the USSR and its satellites were highly developed had been dispelled. This, however, did not happen. A boundary defined solely as a development boundary – which is, after all, how the Brandt Line is perceived – whose course remains fixed for decades is nothing short of astounding. Only politics (or a lack of reflection) has the innate property of being able to fossilize intrinsically variable development boundaries. Similarly, 30 years earlier, only politics, specifically inter-bloc conflict and political propaganda, was able to effectively conceal the developmental deficiencies of the communism system, so that East and West could be merged into the rich North in 1980. The Brandt Line therefore seems to be something of a political relic of the Cold War period. The next three arguments in favor of the Brandt Line being political in nature also have to do with the Independent Commission on International Development Issues and its report. And therefore, the second reason is that the Commission was dominated by serving and former politicians. The Commission comprised 21 members, although 22 people sat on it at various times. Perhaps only five members had no political experience, whereas there was a former president (Frei Montalva), and four past and future prime ministers (Willy Brandt, Edward Heath, Olof Palme, and Pierre Mendès France (resigned from the Commission in 1978)), as well as serving and former parliamentary speakers, ministers, ambassadors, and party leaders among the remaining 17. The president of the Commission, Willy Brandt, was not only a former FRG Chancellor (1969–1974), but was also Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party (1964–1987) (Brandt 1980: 293–295). This raises the question of the extent to which their work on the Commission was free of politics – both current and understood as a set of views and beliefs determining public activity. The Report noted that: “This Commission has been independent. Its members were invited to serve in a private capacity, not under governmental instructions” (Brandt 1980: 293). Brandt himself recalled that the Commission’s decisions were always made by consensus, but at the same time he conceded that the political views of its members, no less than North–South discrepancies and incompatibilities, made consensus difficult to obtain (Brandt 2013: 279). Brandt thought that it was very important and saw to it that representatives from the South were not in the minority (eventually, 11 commissioners represented the North, including one from Yugoslavia which had a de facto politically mixed status, and ten represented the South; interestingly, Brandt himself (NB: in line with many countries, including Yugoslavia itself) included Yugoslavia in the global South, even though, according to the Brandt Line, it was clearly in the global North; he therefore considered the South

10

Introduction

to be represented by a majority of the Commission (Brandt 2013: 281)). Brandt also paid close attention (officially) that the Commission was not dominated by a single political worldview, but he declined to invite the Eastern Bloc delegates to assist in its work. This (rather politically motivated) decision was guided by the dissimilarity of their diagnoses of the challenges facing the world and their visions of international relations to his own (Merseburger 2011: 578). Brandt stipulated that the Commission had conducted working talks in Moscow and Beijing, and kept communist governments informed about its work, but stressed that the time was not yet ripe for Second World representatives to sit on the Commission (Brandt 2013: 279). Third, the fact that the North–South boundary first appeared on a Peters projection map was ipso facto a political statement as well (Solarz 2014, 2016: 128–129). The editorial page of the Report clearly stresses that the Peters projection “represents an important step away from the prevailing Eurocentric geographical and cultural concept of the world” (Brandt 1980). Fourth, the lack of information on the criteria and indicators according to which the North–South line was delimited is puzzling. For a line that putatively indicated a development divide, it is incomprehensible. As a boundary resulting from a political decision (or a graphic vision), however, there is nothing surprising about it. Comparing the Brandt Line with economic, socio-economic, and economic-institutional indicators (see also Chapter 1) demonstrates that this boundary does not correspond with any division of countries in terms of development level or wealth (Figures 0.7 and 0.8). Nor did it do so in 1980 (Figures 0.2, 0.5 and 0.6). Paradoxically, the first critical comment to address this problem can actually be found in the 1980 Brandt Report itself: There are obvious objections to a simplified view of the world as being divided into two camps. (…) The “South” ranges from a booming half-industrial nation like Brazil to poor landlocked or island countries such as Chad or the Maldives. A few southern countries – mostly oil-exporters – have higher per capita incomes than some of the northern countries. (Brandt 1980: 31) Apart from being drawn up late (20 years after introducing the North vs. South opposition into development vocabulary (Solarz 2014, 2016: 120–121)), the geographical shape of the 1980 Brandt Line and the stability of its course strongly impeach its credibility as a development boundary. The lack of information on the developmental or economic criteria and indicators according to which the North–South line was delimited may simply be due to the lack of them. However, it is easy to indicate such criteria and indicators of a political and military nature (the global North primarily as a community of signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) (with the exception of Turkey), the Pacific Security Treaty (ANZUS), the US–Japan security treaties, and the Warsaw Pact; the rest of the world is defined as the global South) (Figure 0.2), or political-civilizational, and even political-racist (remembering the particular case of Japan, the global North as the West, or primarily as a community of Europeans and (especially) their Anglo-Saxon descendants, or a community dominated by white people). In this light, the Brandt Line is definitely a political boundary. Fifth, although the North–South boundary seems to have pointedly disregarded contemporary international politics by conjoining East and West, immersed as they were in the

Introduction

FIGURE 0.5

11

The 1980 Brandt Line in the light of GNI per capita (constant 2010 USD) in 1980 – true or false?

Source: Own elaboration based on the World Bank Open Data, https://data.worldbank.org

conflict of the Cold War, into one segment, its apoliticality was in fact merely ostensible in this case as well, and this is not only because the Brandt Line, as mentioned above, was essentially anti-Soviet. Newly independent countries were demanding political and socio-

12

Introduction

FIGURE 0.6

The 1980 Brandt Line in the light of HDI in 1980 – true or false?

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Report 2014. Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience

economic equality (i.e. that they overcome underdevelopment in all areas). These were their most important demands, as expressed in international politics (see e.g. decolonization, New International Economic Order) and in everyday communication (with terms such as

Introduction

FIGURE 0.7

13

The 1980 Brandt Line in the light of HDI in 2017 – true or false?

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

“Third World”, “developing countries”, and “global South” (Solarz 2014, 2016)). The illustration on the map, and a world described in terms of a North–South divide, were steps towards meeting these demands, as the East–West divide ignored the Third World. The

14

Introduction

FIGURE 0.8

The 1980 Brandt Line and selected groups of countries in 2019

Source: Own elaboration

Brandt Line, which geographically indicated the North–South divide, challenged the Iron Curtain, which was the geographical reflection of the East–West divide. It was as if its intended purpose was to simply erase it. It ignored the internal political divide in the colonial powers (in this respect, the USSR, as the rightful heir of the Russian Empire,

Introduction

15

belonged to this group), making the West and East together responsible for development of the global South. Willy Brandt, as can be judged with the hindsight of years, challenged the Iron Curtain twice. The first time was when he set a new foreign policy course (Neue Ostpolitik/Ostpolitik) to West German policy as FRG Chancellor. The second was when, as president of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, he attempted to break down and, at the same time, downgrade the Cold War East–West divide by popularizing the terms “North–South” and the “North–South Line”. The Brandt Line undermined the communist East vs. free West divide globally, just as Ostpolitik had undermined the Iron Curtain in Europe. The 20th-century international system was rocked by two great political upheavals, namely, the emergence of the communist world and large-scale decolonization, primarily in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific and Caribbean regions. The first caused the East–West rift, the second the North–South rift. Just as the Iron Curtain (as Winston Churchill dubbed the East–West boundary in Europe in a speech in Fulton, Missouri in 1946) had dissevered the communist world from the rest of the international community, the 1980 Brandt Line dissevered the decolonized and decolonizing countries from the rest of the international community (however, apart from some ex-British settler colonies, for example), a substantial part of which comprised their former and sometimes still current colonial overlords (Figure 0.9). In fact, however, both lines are boundaries between the West and the rest of the world. The Iron Curtain was a globally significant boundary; it was hard and impermeable (as attested by Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Poland (1981)), but only designated where the East–West divide was clear-cut, walled end-to-end, and most dangerous. The Brandt Line, on the other hand, was not only globally significant, but followed a global course. Being delimited on a global scale should have made it soft, permeable, and malleable (see Chapter 1). Contrary to its nature, however, it coagulated on maps like the Iron Curtain. The Iron Curtain reflected a political divide (albeit one with an implicit developmental significance), whereas the Brandt Line was regarded as a development boundary (although it was an implicit political boundary). Sixth and finally, concepts and phenomena such as development, underdevelopment, international inequalities, international migrations, decolonization, the Third World etc. additionally, and inevitably, politicize the Brandt Line. Each has political subtexts, as well as political ramifications and repercussions, and in fact cannot be omitted from any reflection and discussion of the North–South divide. In his memoirs, Brandt, in the context of the Report and proceedings of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, explicitly pointed out the close connection between the development of the global South and world peace, security, and freedom, and hence development and politics (Brandt 2013: 277, 278, 280, 285–286). In the same spirit in the Report itself was written: History has taught us that wars produce hunger, but we are less aware that mass poverty can lead to war or end in chaos. While hunger rules peace cannot prevail. He who wants to ban war must also ban mass poverty. (Brandt 1980: 16) The Brandt Line therefore seems to be a political boundary. The Iron Curtain vanished with the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991, whereas decolonization had come to an abrupt halt a decade earlier. Both boundaries should therefore have ceased to exist, save

16

Introduction

FIGURE 0.9

The 1980 Brandt Line and the division of the world into colonies and non-colonies

Source: Solarz 2014, 2016: 19

together as mementoes of an age of competing blocs, decades ago. This should be so, as the Cold War East–West divide no longer exists (which is not at all to say that there are no visible relics of the communist world, e.g. the PRC, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba (Swift 2003: Map 50)) and the North–South divide cannot be reduced to two

Introduction

17

uniform hemispheres, one rich, the other poor, as the Brandt Line dictates (which emphatically does not mean that the world is not dichotomously divided into developed and undeveloped sectors, or that the Brandt Line was accurate and credible as a global developmental boundary in 1980). There was a worldwide burst of interest in development and underdevelopment in the 1940s (Solarz 2014, 2016: 44–49). This had its origins in the population, economic, technical, political, and civilizational transformations that had been ongoing since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution (Solarz 2017). The direct impetus, however, were the four great turbulences that shook the international order during the 20th century, namely, the Great Depression (1929–1933/1939), WWII (1939–1945), the Afro-Asian postwar decolonization wave (1945–1975), and the Cold War (1945–1990) (Solarz 2014, 2016: 46–48). The political, and not the developmental, nature of the Brandt Line is also laid bare when its origins are analyzed over the long term in reference to globalization (Figures 0.11 and 0.12), population (Figures 0.13 and 0.14), wealth (Figures 0.15, 0.16 and 0.17), and the number of countries, and in the light of the last two of the four abovementioned great turbulences (Figures 0.18 and 0.19). The analytical work of Lord Oliver Shewell Franks and the research conducted by Albert O. Hirschman in 1957–1959 most probably first gave rise to the terms “North” and “South” (Hirschman 1957, 1962; Hesburgh 1974; Lambert 1992; Tomlinson 2003), but it was only the 1980 Brandt Report that created the popular cartographic image of the North–South divide. In a test procedure to determine the exceptionality of 1980 in the context of the succeeding delimitation and popularization of the North–South global development divide, five other “lines”, albeit nowhere near as well known as the 1980 Brandt Line, that divide the international community into developed and undeveloped countries (Figure 0.10) were considered. Apart from the Brandt Line, the developmental division lines mentioned below do not exist in the collective consciousness. Since the 1940s, there has been a veritable Big Bang of vainglorious spatial terms associated with world development divides, e.g. “Third World”, “developing countries”, “South”, “North” (Solarz 2014, 2016), which makes the lack of any similar abundance of famous demarcation lines and the fact that the first globally popular development boundary (viz. the Brandt Line) was only drawn up in 1980 puzzling and surprising. The eponymous names of the following lines are modeled on the name of the Brandt Line and were coined by the author. These are as follows: •

• •

the Sauvy Line: Alfred Sauvy’s article in the 1961 edition of Le “Tiers Monde”: Sousdéveloppement et développement [The Third World: Underdevelopment and Development] (first published then) contains a map dividing the international community into the Third World vs. the rest (Sauvy 1961: VI); The article in which Alfred Sauvy coined the term “Third World” (Sauvy 1952), was not accompanied by a corresponding map showing its geographical boundaries, which is puzzling from a geographer’s perspective. The “Sauvy Line” probably took shape as early as 1961, but it remains largely unknown; the Moyes-Hayter Line: In World III: A Handbook on Developing Countries (1965), a textbook on developing countries, the editors, Adrian Moyes and Teresa Hayter, give a detailed geographical definition of the Third World (Moyes and Hayter 1965: 2); the Lacoste Line I (1968): The second edition of Géographie du sous-développement [Geography of Underdevelopment] by Yves Lacoste, published in 1968 (the first edition

FIGURE 0.10

Selected Cold War ways of delimiting development – underdevelopment lines

Source: Own elaboration based on Brandt 1980; Lacoste 1968: 22; Lacoste 1976: 28, 62–63; Lacoste 1979: 16; Moyes, Hayter 1965: 2; Sauvy 1961: V–VIII; Solarz 2014, 2016: 58; Wolf-Philips 1979:109–115

Introduction





19

appeared in 1965), contains a map dividing the world into developed and undeveloped countries (Lacoste 1968: 22); the Lacoste Line II (1976, 1979): The third, completely rewritten, edition of the abovementioned book by Lacoste [now titled Géographie du sous-développement: Géopolitique d’une crise (Geography of Underdevelopment: Geopolitics of a Crisis)], contains two maps dividing the world in a partly new way compared to the 1968 map into developed (according to Lacoste’s second map The Centre) and undeveloped countries (according to both maps Third World); both maps from the 1976 edition are consistent as to the course of the dividing line except Uruguay (Lacoste 1976: 62–63; 281); the first map from the 1976 edition was reproduced without changes in the 6th edition (1979) of another book by Lacoste entitled Les pays sous-développés (Underdeveloped Countries), first published in 1959 (Lacoste 1979: 16); the Wolf-Philips Line: The first issue of Third World Quarterly included an article entitled “Why Third World?” by Leslie Wolf-Philips in which a table divided the international community into 4 worlds; this was de facto simplified into a North vs. South divide on an accompanying map (Wolf-Philips 1979: 110–116).

Globalization (whose advances are reflected in the shorter travel times between Europe and North America, and Paris and Marseille; see Figures 0.11 and 0.12) condensed the world dramatically by bringing societies closer together and intensifying interactions between individuals and social groups. The North–South boundary came into being the moment when “globalization is, already, a victorious revolution” (Solarz 2018b: 2) (Figures 0.11 and 0.12). The drastic and relatively sudden shrinking of the world in the 19th and 20th centuries as a result of the revolution in transport and communications seems to be one of the most important factors leading to the delimitation of a North–South boundary (however not necessarily just in 1980), as designating a boundary is a natural consequence of proximity. Only proximity can make drawing up boundaries important, if not necessary, and globalization has effectively created a “global village”. Analyzing population changes, GDP and GDP per capita does not uncover anything exceptional about 1980 in terms of plotting the Brandt Line and popularizing it internationally – neither on a global scale (Figures 0.13 and 0.15) nor in the rich North vs. poor South divide (Figures 0.14, 0.16 and 0.17). The striking demographic explosion was (Figures 0.13 and 0.14), however, part of the process of condensing the world leading to drawing the North–South lines. In turn, the world as a whole became indisputably more wealthy (Figure 0.15) while the gap between North and South widened (Figures 0.16 and 0.17). The stark and rapidly widening global gap in development and wealth was definitely a strong incentive to delimit the North–South boundary, but the anticipated moment of this delimitation cannot be determined from the diagrams inserted here (in any case, this is not 1980). It is reasonable to assume, however, that the synergy of the three phenomena that had been dramatically escalating since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century, namely, increasing geographical proximity (as a result of progress in transport and communications), the demographic explosion, and ever greater differences in quality of life, provided the impetus that generated and heightened interest in development and underdevelopment and which eventually led to a North–South boundary being drawn up and popularized internationally.

20

Introduction

FIGURE 0.11

Globalization and development – underdevelopment lines. Time taken to cross the Atlantic from 1492 to 1996

Source: Own elaboration based on Piesowicz 1962: 170

FIGURE 0.12

Globalization and development – underdevelopment lines II. Time taken to travel between Paris and Marseille from 1853 to 2001

Source: Own elaboration based on L'Histoire des inventions: 87

The quantitative and qualitative evolution of the international community after 1945 seems to be the key to understanding the specialness of 1980 in terms of delimiting and

World population growth and development – underdevelopment lines from 1800 to 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on Worldometers, http://www.worldometers.info

FIGURE 0.13

North vs. South population growth and development – underdevelopment lines from 1913 to 2015

Source: Data illustrated by the light blue and yellow line is author's own elaboration based on Maddison 2006: 636. Data illustrated by the blue and red lines is the author's own elaboration based on World Population Prospects 2017.

FIGURE 0.14

FIGURE 0.15

World GDP and GDP per capita and development – underdevelopment lines from 1960 to 2017

Source: Own elaboration based on the World Bank Open Data, https://data.worldbank.org

FIGURE 0.16

North–South GDP and development – underdevelopment lines from 1960 to 2017

Source: Own elaboration based on the World Bank Open Data, https://data.worldbank.org

FIGURE 0.17

North–South GDP per capita and development – underdevelopment lines from 1960 to 2017

Source: Own elaboration based on the World Bank Open Data, https://data.worldbank.org

Growth in the number of United Nations (UN) member states and independent states, and development – underdevelopment lines

Source: Own elaboration based on https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html

FIGURE 0.18

FIGURE 0.19

The 1980 Brandt Line and changes to the world political map in 1945–2018

Source: Own elaboration

28

Introduction

popularizing globally the Brandt Line (Figures 0.18 and 0.19). The number of countries more than doubled in the period 1945–1980. This quantitative expansion of the international community was particularly steep with the wave of decolonization that swept mostly Africa in the period 1960–1962, when it increased by almost a third in the space of three years. As a result, it was infeasible to mark out a stable development boundary in a dramatically increasing community of countries and the instability of the world political map was a factor blocking wider popularization of any development boundaries set at that time. Stabilizing the world political map, which only occurred in the 1980s with the subsiding of the decolonization wave, was a precondition for the success of any attempt to draft a relatively durable North–South boundary with real opportunities for its international popularization. This appears to have been the first stimulus that made it possible to draw up, popularize and stabilize the popularity of the Brandt Line. Interestingly, the 1980 Brandt Line appeared right on the threshold of the period during which the number of countries was to be stabilized. At most, this stabilization was just beginning to loom on the horizon (Figure 0.18). Was this just random luck, a brilliant intuition, or an accurate diagnosis and extrapolation of international processes on the part of Brandt and his team? Second, the development opportunities of the newly independent countries were generally viewed optimistically until the 1970s (this is encapsulated by the term “developing countries”, which was born in the late 1950s and early 1960s), when the prospects for Third World development started to be viewed more pessimistically (Solarz 2014, 2016: 100–109, 124–126). The 1970s, then, saw the conviction that underdevelopment was bound to be chronic unless there were revolutionary changes, e.g. a New International Economic Order (Brandt compared the possible consequences of the UN resolutions adopted in 1974–1975 to a “world revolution”; see Brandt 2013: 280). The developmental, and not just the political, makeup of the international community therefore appeared to be unstable as well (in this case, until the 1970s). It does not therefore seem possible for a fixed and globally accepted North–South boundary to have been delimited until sometime around 1980. The problem, however, became urgent following the decolonization wave of 1945–1975, when the composition of the international community was considerably transformed at the expense of the North (in 1945, the countries that later came to be known as the global North comprised approximately 45% of the international community, whereas this figure was only just over 23% in 1975). The wave of decolonization that swept across Africa and Asia in the period 1945–1975 was a qualitative change that altered the complexion of the international community in such a way as to leave it looking decidedly non-European (i.e. non-Western, non-Northern). This naturally boosted interest in development and underdevelopment, and raised urgent questions about the internal divisions in this remodeled community of countries. The following political and having political dimension factors therefore seem especially responsible for the Brandt Line being drawn in 1980: the sharp increase and subsequent stabilization of the number of countries, the emergence and subsequent waning of optimism regarding development, and the birth of a new bloc in international relations in the form of a new group of states – the global South. Interestingly, the end of the Cold War rendered the Brandt Line obsolete for similar reasons: the sharp increase and subsequent stabilization of the number of states, the shattering of the illusion of a highly developed communist world, and the disappearance of an entire segment of the international community – the Second World. First, the international community went through a sudden quantitative

Introduction

29

transformation in 1989–1993. Several countries broke up (the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia), adding 21 new countries to the international community (in total in the world 24 states appeared and five disappeared), and several other countries that had been de jure sovereign, but which were de facto Soviet vassals, gained legitimate independence (in Europe, this included, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria). The sharp increase in the number of countries in 1991 (16 countries; in total 17 states appeared and one disappeared) was comparable to that of 1960 (18 countries). After 1993, however, the world political map was stabilized again. Second, the collapse of the communist system in 1989–1991 put an end to the Cold War, and initiated a colossal qualitative realignment of international relations. It laid bare the level of underdevelopment of the Soviet bloc and revoked the superpower status of the USSR (since 1991 Russia). Third, in this situation it was necessary to redefine the place on the world developmental map of the newly independent countries of the former Soviet bloc. The quantitative and qualitative changes in the international community that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s patently required the delineation of a new global development divide – a “new Brandt Line”; one that factored in the revolutionary changes in the international order. The anticipated new demarcation, however, has still not occurred and our thinking about the world and development is still erroneously conditioned by the Brandt Line. And even back in 1980, the Brandt Commission exhorted us to be open towards modifying the North–South boundary in the future, asserting that North and South are not “permanent grouping(s)” (Brandt 1980: 31) and It would be highly misleading to present the Third World as an unchanging picture of widespread poverty. Even among the low-income countries progress is occurring […]. In a number of developing countries, moreover, there have been truly remarkable advances. […] Several of what used to be called “peripheral” countries are now becoming significant nerve centres of industrial production. Other smaller industrializing countries illustrate how fast the economic map of the world is shifting. […] Another group, the oil-exporting developing countries, has become rapidly richer in the last few years. (Brandt 1980: 53–54)

1 MAPPING GLOBAL CHANGE Differences in development and wealth from the 1st to the 21st century

Developmental inequalities exist at every level of human political organization, but the crucial role of the nation state in the modern world makes the inequalities between these entities the most important. A country’s status, autonomy, and international political options all depend on its level of development. Differences in development levels between countries are also important at the “molecular” level, as they are reflected in the lives of individuals. Having here maps based on the contemporary political map is also a result of the way(s) in which the source data on which these maps have been compiled were aggregated. It seems that Maddison’s general assumption was to give GDP and GDP per capita estimations based on the boundaries of modern states, although he made some exceptions, that were sometimes ignored for practical or other reasons here on maps (Maddison 2006). This chapter contains five series of maps; four trace the evolution of GDP and GDP per capita, and one shows the changes in human development. The series of maps for GDP and GDP per capita vary in both detail and time scale. Time and precision are inversely correlated here. The longer the timeframe, the greater the area(s) to which the data pertain, and, by virtue of the manner with which Angus Maddison aggregated the data, their geographical boundaries are sometimes quite special. In the case of GDP and GDP per capita, the detailed series of maps cover respectively 13 territorial entities (16 maps for the years 1–2008), 22 entities (14 maps for 1500–2008), 69 entities (ten maps for 1870–2008), and all the countries in the world (eight maps for 1950–2017). The series related to the evolution of human development level encompasses all the countries in the world in the period 1980–2017 (five maps). HDI levels are marked with color and areas of circles correspond to the population(s) of the given country(ies) (in the case of previous series, GDP per capita and GDP respectively). This additionally allows quality of life to be examined not only through the prism of states but also in societies. This series is the shortest, as the history of HDI only dates back to 1990, and historical analyses of human development have only been conducted over a limited time period. It should be emphasized that an accurate reading of the maps in this chapter requires a thorough reading of both the legend (the four

Mapping global change

FIGURE 1.1

31

A common legend for all series of maps showing GDP and GDP per capita (1AD–2008)

Source: Own elaboration

series of maps for GDP and GDP per capita have a common legend (Figure 1.1), as do the maps in the HDI series (Figure 1.57); the exception being maps for 2017, which have their own legends (Figures 1.54 and 1.62), and a separate introductory map that has been inserted into each series (with the exception of human development maps showing data for all the countries of the world) to illustrate the way(s) in which the data were geographically aggregated, i.e. to depict the regions described by the data (Figures 1.3, 1.20, 1.35, 1.46). Any attempt to show world development over the past 2000 years is fraught with risk. During this time, a great many polities have risen and fallen and political boundaries have changed radically. Moreover, the essence and understanding of development have changed. The more distant the past, the fewer the hard figures, and the more uncertain, questionable, and debatable the estimates and hypotheses. As noted above, the maps below for 1–2000 (GDP and GDP per capita) are based on estimates by Angus Maddison (2006), subsequently extended to 2008 with his data available on a website managed by a team that has been continuing his work at the Groningen Growth and Development Center since his death (Maddison 2010). Maddison’s final estimates published on this website have been partially revised, but these could only be accessed after the maps had been drawn. However, they do not appear to have significantly changed the overarching view of the past 2000 years. Maddison’s

32

Mapping global change

FIGURE 1.2

World GDP and GDP per capita (1 AD–2008) in 1990 international dollars

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006, 2010

compilations have to be treated critically and with a great deal of caution – and not merely on account of the temporal and geographical scope of his research. For example, he has simultaneously juxtaposed 19th-century data on Poland (with its present borders) and Germany (with its 1870 borders). However, not only did Poland not exist as a nation state in the 19th century, but nearly 50% of Poland’s current territory was part of Germany (NB: united only in 1871) in the period 1815–1918 (Solarz 2018a: 61). Still, the overall view of world development over the past 2000 years, as offered by Maddison’s historical statistics, would appear to be broadly accurate. These maps enable a multifaceted and multidisciplinary analysis of the international situation, including the composition and organization of the international community. They can form the basis for analyzing changes in both the political and the socioeconomic order. Such analyses can have a horizontal (in reference to a specific year), as well as a vertical (in reference to a certain period ranging from 40 to 2,000 years, depending of the map series) dimension. The maps enable the evolution of the number and locations of development poles, and the changes in GDP, GDP per capita and human development level over time to be tracked. All maps in all series (with the

Mapping global change

33

exception of maps for 2017) have a common fixed point at which international society is split into states and regions of high and low development, of an acceptable and unacceptable level of development (the world average GDP per capita and HDI values for 2000, respectively, have been adopted for GDP per capita and HDI). People should not only be equal across countries and regions and the common North–South boundary, designed for all the maps in each series, reflects the belief in human equality across time (obviously in a philosophical, not a historical sense). A fixed reference point additionally makes it easier to observe the direction and dynamics of developmental processes. The year 2000 was selected on account of the Millennium Development Goals announced at the time. These are a decisive and widely known symbol of the global rejection of a low quality of life. In the analysis covering 2000 years, and bearing in mind the decision on preserving comparability between maps and series of maps, the abrupt acceleration of development and the enormous increase in wealth around the world that followed the Industrial Revolution brought about a huge flattening out of the developmental differences in the presented maps that had existed in the preindustrial world. The maps from each series drawn up for 1980 throw doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the Brandt Line.

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions – GDP and GDP per capita: 1–2008 AD The first series of maps gives a very general picture, but over the longest time horizon (see Figures 1.3–1.19). Global wealth has increased dramatically over the past 2,000 years (see also Figure 1.2). Until the turn of the 20th century, most of the world’s wealth resided in Asia and Europe, or rather, to use the term coined by Nicholas Spykman in the 1940s, in the Rimland established along the coast of those two continents. The planetary opposition of Eurasia vs. the rest of the world was the norm prior to globalization and during its initial phases. From the Industrial Revolution until the beginning of the 20th century, the West as a whole became the world’s predominant political and economic center, and it achieved the highest quality of life. This new unipolar international community framework, viz. the West vs. the rest, was developed right up until 1913. Simultaneously, however, the fissure in the West over quality of life was born in 1937. The maps for 1950–1990 illustrate the world development (wealth) sprawl and show that depicting the postwar world (1945–1990) in bipolar categories was misguided. The superpower status of the USSR was an illusion and the Cold War world was actually a unipolar system with the USA (or more generally, the West) as the preeminent political and economic power pole. The maps presented here show that the Cold War must have ended and ended with the defeat of the USSR. The latter is fully illustrated by comparing the maps for 1990 and 2000. In terms of GDP per capita, the Brandt Line was badly mapped in 1980.

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions – GDP and GDP per capita: 1500–2008 AD This series, similarly to the first, depicts the progressive enrichment of the world (see Figures 1.20–1.34). It is shorter than the previous one, only covering 500 years, but is much

FIGURE 1.3

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: the regions described by the data on the maps for 1AD–2008

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006, 2010

FIGURE 1.4

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1 AD

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.5

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1000

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.6

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1500

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.7

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1600

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.8

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1700

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.9

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1820

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.10

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1870

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.11

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1913

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.12

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1937

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.13

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1950

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.14

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1960

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.15

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1973

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.16

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1980

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.17

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1990

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.18

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 2000

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.19

The first series of maps for 13 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 2008

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2010

FIGURE 1.20

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: the regions described by the data on the maps for 1500–2008

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006, 2010

FIGURE 1.21

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1500

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.22

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1600

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.23

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1700

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.24

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1820

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.25

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1870

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.26

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1913

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.27

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1937

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.28

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1950

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.29

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1960

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.30

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1973

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

48

Mapping global change

FIGURE 1.31

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1980

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.32

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1990

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

more precise as a result, especially regarding Western Europe (this region is now split into three countries, namely, Germany, France, and Italy, and three regions, namely, the British Isles, Iberia, and the rest) and its offshoots (the USA, Canada, and Australia and New Zealand are treated separately). Given the political fragmentation of Germany and Italy from the Middle Ages until the late 19th century, the maps for 1500–1700 draw attention to the pole position of France in Europe. The resources of the rival Habsburg Empire were

Mapping global change

49

distributed among many autonomous Western, Southern, and Central European polities. The map for 1500 clearly shows that the peoples of the New World had no chance in their confrontations with the newcomers from Europe. The fall of the Aztec Empire can be observed by comparing the maps for 1500 and 1600, and the map that refers to 1820 reveals the initial effects of the Industrial Revolution. The British Isles (precisely speaking in 1820 the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland), which until then had been on the periphery of Europe, became as powerful as France. The map for 1820 further reveals the growing potential of the United States for the first time. By 1913, the USA was the most powerful state in the world. According to the 1913 map, the result of WWI was wholly foreseeable the moment the conflict turned into a war of attrition, and especially after the United States entered the conflict in 1917. The United States and the United Kingdom were the wealthiest world powers in 1937, as the Pax Americana steadily replaced the Pax Britannica. This series also shows the global development (wealth) sprawl since WWII. Once again, the deceptive and misleading nature of the Brandt Line as a development boundary is apparent on the map for 1980. The international order appeared to be bipolar in 2008 (the USA vs. China), only this time, the duopoly was more explicit than during the Cold War. The United States, however, dominated.

The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions – GDP and GDP per capita: 1870–2008 The third series of maps, which spans just under 140 years, draws a detailed picture of Europe (see Figures 1.35–1.45). It is also more precise in reference to Latin America and Asia. If the criterion for dividing the international community into a rich North and a poor South is GDP per capita for 2000, then apart from the USA and the UK, only Switzerland and New Zealand qualified as highly developed in 1937. Prior to 1937, no country or region had a per capita GDP in excess of the “millennium value”, i.e. the average GDP per capita for the world in 2000 (the “millennium value” is also referred to as the “millennium boundary” or “millennium line”). By 1950, the group of highly developed countries so defined included additionally Australia, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, and Venezuela, and by 1960, its boundaries had further expanded in Europe. The 1973 oil crisis made it possible for the Arabian Peninsula states and Libya to cross the “millennium boundary”. By then, the highly developed world had also expanded to include Japan, Israel, Argentina, and Southern Europe, and behind the Iron Curtain, the USSR and Czechoslovakia. By 1980, outside Europe, the “millennium boundary” had been crossed by Uruguay, Mexico, Syria, and Iraq, and in Europe, Yugoslavia and two of the remaining Eastern Bloc countries that bordered the Western Bloc (namely, Hungary and Bulgaria; the map does not consider the GDR). The only communist countries in Europe below the “millennium line” were Poland and Romania, the two largest countries in the bloc (excluding the USSR) not bordering a Western country. Their socio-economic plight was due to their political dependence on the USSR. The smaller communist countries might have fared better, but, as the previous series shows, the state of the Polish and Romanian economies had a major impact on Central-Eastern Europe seen as a whole. This series also highlights the fictitiousness of the Brandt Line as a development boundary in 1980. The “millennium boundary” seems to have lost its value as a demarcation line separating the wealthy North from the poor South in the 21st century as a result of global wealth having increased and more countries having become increasingly rich and developed. It has ceased to separate rich countries from poor ones in favor of separating the most poorly developed countries

50

Mapping global change

FIGURE 1.33

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 2000

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.34

The second series of maps for 22 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 2008

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2010

from the rest of the international community. The 21st century calls for a new threshold for delineating the North–South boundary.

The fourth series of maps for every country in the world – GDP and GDP per capita: 1950–2017 The last series of maps with GDP and GDP per capita is the shortest and barely covers 65 years (see Figures 1.46–1.55). It is, however, the most precise, as it presents data from

FIGURE 1.35

The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: the regions described by the data on the maps for 1870–2008

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006, 2010

FIGURE 1.36

The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1870

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.37

The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1913

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.38

The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1937

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.39

The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1950

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.40

The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1960

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.41

The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1973

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.42

The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1980

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.43

The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 1990

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.44

The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 2000

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.45

The third series of maps for 69 countries and regions: GDP and GDP per capita in 2008

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2010

FIGURE 1.46

The fourth series of maps for the whole world: countries and groups of countries described by the data on the maps for 1950–2008

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006, 2010

FIGURE 1.47

The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 1950

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.48

The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 1960

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.49

The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 1973

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.50

The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 1980

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.51

The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 1990

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.52

The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 2000

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2006

FIGURE 1.53

The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 2008

Source: Own elaboration based on Maddison 2010

FIGURE 1.54

The fourth series of maps for the whole world: a legend for the 2017 GDP and GDP per capita map

Source: Own elaboration

Mapping global change

79

almost every country in the world. The map for 1973 confirms the vertical (growth in GDP per capita) and horizontal (ever more wealthy countries) expansion of wealth in Western Europe. Western Europe as a whole had become the pole of wealth by 1973. The satellite states of the USSR were enclaves of poverty in Europe, even though GDP had been increasing. This map, however, enables an even deeper look behind the Iron Curtain, i.e. into the USSR. The economic situation varied considerably within the Soviet Union, with Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Russia outperforming the other republics. The map for 1980 incontrovertibly demonstrates that if the Brandt Line was predicated on GDP per capita, then it should have followed a completely different course from the North–South line on the cover of the Brandt Report. The world in 1980 did not consist of two hemispheres differentiated by development level, but an archipelago of high development scattered in an ocean of lower development. The map for 1990 draws attention to the decline in development in the Middle East. The situation in the collapsing communist bloc was ambiguous. Poland was stagnating while Romania and Bulgaria were going backwards. Poland was the poorest Western country after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. The situation in the USSR was varied, but GDP per capita in the European part was above the “millennium value”. The map for 2000 shows that Poland was the country to benefit definitely from the collapse of the Eastern bloc, while Russia clearly lost out in the disintegration of its internal and external empires. Poland began to develop rapidly, while Russia regressed. The neo-colonial nature of the Russian domination of Poland in the second half of the 20th century can be observed on these maps. The global North and global South in the 21st century are diffuse, i.e. the international community is not divided into two hemispheres with different levels of development, but is broken up into many developed and underdeveloped “islands” that vary in size. The case of Equatorial Guinea on the map for 2008 illustrates how unreliable GDP per capita can be as a tool for evaluating development levels (according to Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update, in 2017 Equatorial Guinea was ranked 141 out of 189 countries in terms of HDI, and life expectancy was below 58 years; the dramatic increase in GDP per capita was due to the country’s sudden enrichment from the revenues of crude oil extraction after 1996). Therefore, more and more diverse indices and indicators will have to be taken into account if an accurate and reliable development line is to be drawn. This is attempted in the final chapter. Unfortunately, for methodological reasons, the last map for 2017 cannot be compared with the other maps in the series (this is because GDP was not calculated the same way as it was for the rest of the maps in 2017). Moreover, the “millennium line” has been removed from the world average GDP per capita for 2000 to 2015 (the year the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were announced) on this map. The SDGs set new developmental goals in place of the formally expired Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015, and as development is a process, a new North–South line was required. We have thereby obtained an updated developmental division of the world, albeit one that retains the structure of a developmental archipelago.

The fifth series of maps for every country in the world – HDI: 1980–2017 The final series of maps in this chapter directly refers to quality of life (see Figures 1.56–1.63). The map for 1980 shows that human development also rendered the Brandt Line spurious from the outset. Nor does the North–South line from the Brandt Report split the international community into two disconnected groups of countries in the case of human development.

FIGURE 1.55

The fourth series of maps for the whole world: GDP and GDP per capita in 2017

Source: Own elaboration based on the World Bank Open Data, https://data.worldbank.org; World Economic Outlook Database, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLS/world-economicoutlook-databases#sort=%40imfdate%20descending

FIGURE 1.56

Human development (1980–2008) and world population (1 AD–2008)

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Report 2014. Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience; Maddison 2010

FIGURE 1.57

The fifth series of maps for the whole world: a common legend for the 1980–2008 human development maps

Source: Own elaboration

FIGURE 1.58

The fifth series of maps for the whole world: HDI in 1980

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Report 2014. Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience; Maddison 2010

FIGURE 1.59

The fifth series of maps for the whole world: HDI in 1990

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Report 2014. Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience; Maddison 2010

FIGURE 1.60

The fifth series of maps for the whole world: HDI in 2000

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Report 2014. Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience; Maddison 2010

FIGURE 1.61

The fifth series of maps for the whole world: HDI in 2008

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Report 2014. Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience; Maddison 2010

FIGURE 1.62

The fifth series of maps for the whole world: a legend for the 2017 human development map

Source: Own elaboration

Mapping global change

93

Countries with varying levels of development lie on either side of it, although there are fewer such cases than on the map in the previous series. Europe was the constant pole of high quality of life between 1980 and 2017, but the slight contrast between the European part of the Western and Eastern Blocs in 1980 undermines confidence in the HDI as a tool for drawing up a completely trustworthy division of the international community on the grounds of quality of life. Could the communist Poland of 1980, an undemocratic country that failed to observe basic human rights and which was beset with deep social and economic crises, be included in the global North, alongside the wealthy and democratic UK or France? HDI does not therefore appear to be capable of delimiting the North–South boundary on its own. At the very least, it needs to be supported by an indicator measuring the observance of political rights and civil liberties, as these significantly affect the quality of life of the individual. Nevertheless, the series of maps compiled according to human development (together with Figure 1.56) shows that the world generally became a better place to live from 1980 to 2017. It also points up the growing migratory pressure where Europe meets Africa. The threshold dividing the world into developed and underdeveloped countries is higher in the last map in the series. A different colored scale was therefore introduced for it. This additionally precludes it from being compared with the earlier maps in the series. Generally speaking, the North–South divide should not be fixed because development is a process. The adoption of the SDGs by the United Nations in 2015 prompted the “millennium boundary” to be raised to the average HDI for the world in 2015. The SDGs set new developmental goals in place of the MDGs, which formally expired in 2015, and so a new dividing line was required. This enabled an updated map of the North–South divide to be obtained. The new map continues to depict the global development divide as an archipelago rather than hemispheres built by a single continuous line.

FIGURE 1.63

The fifth series of maps for all countries of the world: HDI in 2017

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

2 DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHIES OF DEVELOPMENT Different development boundary lines

The geographical picture of the North–South divide is determined by the definition of development that is adopted. This is not only subject to scholarly investigation, but also to e.g. political and/or cultural interpretation, and before it undergoes conceptualization and popularization, this definition is (or at least should be) primarily the product of philosophical reflection on the substance and meaning of human existence. However, there are many competing philosophical approaches to the reality around us. If, therefore, development can be simultaneously understood and defined in many ways, then it is possible for many global Norths and global Souths to coexist in parallel. Built on varying philosophical premises and planes, North–South dichotomies may have completely different cartographic representations, and the legitimacy of each divide is relative, and open to question and debate. This chapter focuses exclusively on challenging the belief in the universality (i.e. an exclusive claim on truth irrespective of time and place) of any conception of the world being divided into highly and poorly developed countries. To this end, the thinking and studies of several philosophers and academics over the past 2,500 years is called into service but their concepts are always interpreted and understood here in a modern way. The first two philosophers considered are Plato and Aristotle. Both sought to determine the attributes of an ideal state. Their ideal state would correspond to a highly developed country in our contemporary perspective of focusing on development divisions. The second group of thinkers are the proponents of what generally encompasses social contract theory. This belongs to a group of elementary theories that attempt to explain the origin of society and the state (although it should be borne in mind that it has many variations). The present observations do not merely focus on classical social contract theorists, such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau; Hugo Grotius and Baruch Spinoza are also analyzed, as are John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Their thinking is of interest here, as social contract theories, at their core, also address development and underdevelopment. All social contract theory takes the state of nature, inherently pre-political, to be the starting point for further reflection on society and the political organization that we call the state. Human life in the state of nature was defined by a set of features, at least some of

Different philosophies of development

97

which eventually came to be deemed unacceptable. It was then considered necessary to abandon the state of nature to which the fundamental problems that had been identified seemed to inhere. The state emerged to resolve the problems of the state of nature which had driven humanity in the direction of a social contract. People organized themselves into states because they wanted to create political entities that would completely resolve the problems of the state of nature. However, in day-to-day practice, this has proved difficult. Development may therefore be viewed as a sliding scale, where the starting point is the state of nature, with all its attendant problems, and the end point is the political body of the state, which has wholly eliminated the problems of inter-human relationships arising from the state of nature. Therefore, the state of nature, along with political states based on a social contract but either completely or substantially failing the expectations of the governed contractual party, correspond to the undeveloped and underdeveloped worlds (i.e. “the South”). The political entities that are most effective, at least in a given era, in removing the defects of the state of nature, are situated at the opposite pole of development (i.e. “the North”) and constitute highly developed countries. Due to varying conceptions of the social contract, there will be varying definitions of developed and underdeveloped countries, and consequently, various geographical depictions of North and South. The view that the world is divided according to the criterion of human development, calculated as per the Human Development Index (HDI) adopted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), actually belongs to the group of global development divisions associated with social contract theory. The concept and measurement of human development might have been developed by the economists Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen, who respectively came from Pakistan and India, i.e. from the global South, but human development appears to perfectly express the way in which the most highly developed part of the Western world views development, which it takes to mean ensuring that the individual has the greatest possible scope for fulfilling his/her wants and needs. The last case considered here is similar to the UNDP in that it differs by virtue of not being solely based on philosophical reflection. In his celebrated book Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, Jared Diamond, the previously mentioned U.S. geographer and evolutionary biologist, suggests the motivating causes for building political institutions (political power), eventually including states, that have, practically without exception, carved up the entire world between them. It can therefore be assumed that those states that best resolve the four challenges that people face in a pre-political state of nature (according to Diamond) will be highly developed. Each of the 11 cases selected presents a different view of the world (see Figures 2.1–2.11). But even if only a single development philosophy were to be selected (whether from those enumerated above or in general), the international community, as shaped by development, could be broken down in many different ways in the same time. Selection criteria, indices, and indicators that delimit the hemispheres of development and underdevelopment, need to be devised in order to illustrate the division of the world into highly and poorly developed countries on a map for each of the philosophical trains of thought on development divisions. Border points pinpointing the breakdown of the international community into the wealthy North and the impoverished South also have to be drawn up. It also needs to be borne in mind that some ideas may be difficult to translate into the language of the usable indices and indicators. Hence the universality of the marked boundary demarcating differences in development levels is likewise an illusion. Given that we recognize that e.g. “the weapons of

98

Different philosophies of development

the strong are … classification, delineation, division” (Bauman 2000: 113, emphasis added), the claim to universality could be nothing more than a function of the political power of those who divide the world. It follows that the divisions that dominate development discourse are not necessarily those with the greatest explanatory power, and indeed, they might not be strictly accurate or even true. It also seems that the political and economic cores of the international order can still effectively impose their discourse and marginalize alternative narratives from variously defined peripheries (not only from the South but also from parts of the North, e.g. the post-communist countries). This also makes any counter-hegemonic discourse developed in the cores illusory, as it is simply a further, albeit disguised, form of the dominant discourse with an analogous (i.e. negative) relationship to views developed on the periphery. The end result is the inevitable exclusion of alternative perspectives and the propagation of a core-centric orientation. This chapter might seem to be a mere mind game with the reader. However, it presents just a few of the possible solutions to the problem of identifying the boundary between North and South in the modern world. Those suggested here are built around the ideas of some of the most famous thinkers in history with no reference to the ideas of their lesserknown counterparts, i.e. for example there is virtually nothing from the non-European (non-Western) thought world. There are therefore many more Norths and Souths than the chapter addresses, and consequently, it will hopefully encourage readers to reflect on the key ontological and epistemological issues arising from contemporary research into development, the structure of the world, and international relations. Last but not least, it should be borne in mind that although there are many real North–South divisions, they are not all equal in terms of cognitive merit or intrinsic significance. The primary focus should therefore be on those that best correspond to the nature of high and poor development, because only they can tell us what is most important about the world and its political, economic, and social structures. Ideal state and social contract theorists have sought to find this nature by addressing the question of what people should consider or consider most important in their lives. The everyday reality that corresponds to their particular answers can be deemed high development, which in turn allows various North–South boundaries to be identified. But which are accurate and important to understanding humanity and the world is another matter entirely. Perhaps all of them are, perhaps only some.

FIGURE 2.1

If Plato had drawn the North–South divide in 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update; Olszewski, Henryk, Zmierczak, Maria (1993). Historia doktryn politycznych i prawnych. Poznań; Plato (translated by G.M.A. Grube) (1992). Republic. Hackett Publishing

FIGURE 2.2

If Aristotle had drawn the North–South divide in 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update; Aristotle (translated by C. Lord) (2013). Politics. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press

FIGURE 2.3

If Hugo Grotius had drawn the North–South divide in 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update; Freedom in the World 2018, Freedom House; Grotius, Hugo (2017). On the Law of War and Peace. Altenmünster: Jazzybee Verlag Jürgen Beck; Olszewski, Henryk, Zmierczak, Maria (1993). Historia doktryn politycznych i prawnych. Poznań

FIGURE 2.4

If Thomas Hobbes had drawn the North–South divide in 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update; Porębski, Czesław (2004). “Umowa społeczna”. In Słownik społeczny, edited by Bogdan Szlachta, Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM

FIGURE 2.5

If Baruch Spinoza had drawn the North–South divide in 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update; Freedom in the World 2018, Freedom House; Olszewski, Henryk, Zmierczak, Maria (1993). Historia doktryn politycznych i prawnych. Poznań

FIGURE 2.6

If John Locke had drawn the North–South divide in 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update; Locke, John (1988). Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

FIGURE 2.7

If Jean-Jacques Rousseau had drawn the North–South divide in 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update; Freedom in the World 2018, Freedom House; Porębski, Czesław (2004). "Umowa społeczna". In Słownik społeczny, edited by Bogdan Szlachta, Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM

FIGURE 2.8

If John Rawls had drawn the North–South divide in 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update; Freedom in the World 2018, Freedom House; Rawls, John (2005). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press; Olszewski, Henryk, Zmierczak, Maria (1993). Historia doktryn politycznych i prawnych. Poznań

FIGURE 2.9

If Robert Nozick had drawn the North–South divide in 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update; Olszewski, Henryk, Zmierczak, Maria (1993). Historia doktryn politycznych i prawnych. Poznań; Jelonek, Barbara Anna (2014, accessed October 1, 2018). Idea umowy społecznej. http:// www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/Content/51951/01_Barbara_Anna_Jelonek.pdf

FIGURE 2.10

If UNDP were to draw the North–South divide in 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update; Griffiths, Martin and O'Callaghan, Terry (2007). International Relations: The Key Concepts. London & New York: Routledge

FIGURE 2.11

If Jared Diamond were to draw the North–South divide in 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update; Diamond, Jared (1999). Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company

3 TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL LINE?

Attaining high development status is to a country what conquering the Crown of the Himalayas and Karakoram (i.e. the Himalayan and Karakoram eight-thousanders) is to an individual. In this chapter, we go in search of the “developmental eight-thousanders” that form the “Crown of High Development” with the aid of 15 4-class composite choropleth maps showing the relations between selected social, economic, and political indicators. Twenty-six indicators were used to draw the maps in Figures 3.1 to 3.15. Some were calculated and some are the results of public opinion polls. Each map shows an important sphere of life. A single sphere of life is sometimes shown by more than one map, and conversely, a single map sometimes shows more than one sphere. It is assumed that only the map that integrates the 15 partial thematic maps or 26 indicators used to draw them can illustrate the division of the international community on the basis of development level. Just as the Crown of the Himalayas and Karakoram comprises 14 eight-thousanders, it is important not to look at just one “development eight-thousander” (here a single map or indicator) when mapping out the “Crown of High Development”.

Figure 3.1 Wealth security I: innovativeness Innovativeness drives development. Innovativeness makes it possible to achieve and maintain highly-developed-country status. Increasing expenditure on research and development is a powerful stimulus for progress.

Figure 3.2 Wealth security II: education Education likewise drives development. Only an educated society, with a highly educated elite and a body of top quality specialists, can compete in a globalized world, and build a profitable, stable, and secure future. Knowledge is the flywheel of development.

Towards a new global line?

111

Figure 3.3 Wealth security III: population The affluence of a society is closely bound with its demographic processes. Poor countries with high birth rates will become even more impoverished unless they develop really quickly. This creates great migratory pressure with a lot of potential for domestic and international conflicts. A relatively high birth rate is favorable in a wealthy country in so far as it prevents a costly ageing of the population and obviates the need for mass immigration, with all the political and social risks and tensions that that entails. Young societies are more energetic and innovative than ageing ones, which are additionally burdened with increasing social costs and insufficient working-age populations. A relatively low birth rate in a wealthy country exposes it to a series of serious threats, but the future can still be promising thanks to e.g. a well thought-out immigration policy and/or technical progress. A relatively low birth rate in a poor country can reflect or lead to stagnation and sustained underdevelopment.

Figure 3.4 Effectiveness of the state Countries vary according to the efficiency and effectiveness of their institutions. Countries that are nigh exemplary in fulfilling their functions and failed states can both be found in the international community. The remaining ones lie somewhere between these extremes, with efficiency and inefficiency existing in varying proportions. The purpose of development is to build a country that can effectively resolve the political, social, and economic problems afflicting the citizenry. A highly developed country has institutions that efficiently and effectively carry out the tasks entrusted to them domestically and abroad. A country’s effectiveness in registering births is used to gauge the minimum administrative efficiency of its national institutions. Obtaining this sort of information in a timely manner is a basic and essential task of national institutions, as the proper execution of many important state functions depends on it. On the international level, the minimum efficiency of a country is indicated by its military expenditure to GDP ratio. This is because providing security from external threats is a fundamental state function. A country’s ineptitude in registering births completely compromises state institutions, whereas low defense expenditure needs to be examined, as it may have various justifications, none of which may be due to inefficiency on the part of state institutions. High military expenditure is sometimes more indicative of the rogue character of a state in the national and/or international sphere than of its efficiency and concern for security.

Figure 3.5 Intergenerational security I: concern for the younger generation Development also means improving the quality of society. Every generation should be healthier and better educated than the one that preceded it. The under-five mortality rate (which reflects the development of the healthcare system) and the primary school student– teacher ratio (which reflects the development of the education system, and the individualization of education being translated into better results and a more comprehensive development of children’s talents) have been selected as the diagnostic indicators for the level of concern for improving the quality of society. These additionally indicate the degree of efficiency of state institutions.

FIGURE 3.1

Wealth security I: innovativeness

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.2

Wealth security II: education

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.3

Wealth security III: population

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.4

Effectiveness of the state

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

120

Towards a new global line?

Figure 3.6 Intergenerational security II: concern for the elderly There are many reasons why increased life expectancy is a positive developmental outcome, but it comes with social and economic costs, and can have negative ramifications for the individuals concerned. Sickness, suffering, infirmity are inevitable concomitants of old age, and necessitate the provision of aged care. This has to be provided by the next couple of generations, either by taking care of their own parents and grandparents personally or by establishing and maintaining a universal aged care system. In either case, the society should be demographically resilient.

Figure 3.7 Confidence in the state Everyone lives in a state. The political authorities and the judicial system have an enormous impact on the quality of life of the individual. A state that is weak, inefficient, unjust, and/or lawless creates a political environment in which the quality of life of the society is debased. Theoretically, states that best fulfill their functions are characterized by a high level of confidence in the government and the judicial system. A low level of confidence indicates a dysfunctional state and a crisis of social confidence in its institutions. Those states in which the indicators under consideration have adopted conflicting values merit a thorough analysis. When it comes to confidence in state institutions, it seems to be more reliable to appraise the judicial system than the government, as the former is decidedly closer to the individual and his/her concerns than the authorities in the capital. Government appraisals are often affected by political views, preferences, and ordinary emotions (including especially political or ideological unity or discord). These often divert attention from actual government competence in solving real political, social, and economic problems. Paradoxically, disputes and controversies, although natural in a democracy, can therefore lower confidence in the government, while an aggressive international policy, pursued by a state with dysfunctional internal policies, can increase it. Figure 3.7 compels serious consideration of the motives for state appraisals.

Figure 3.8 Technological advancement. Political freedom The extent to which political rights and civil liberties are observed is of key importance in evaluating quality of life. Quality of life is impaired whenever freedom of thought, speech, and/or religion are restricted or non-existent. Political rights and civil liberties are a cornerstone of human rights, and are not abrogated by geographical location, affiliation with a particular culture or civilization, or adherence to a specific form of government. In principle, all people are equal: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). Articles 18–21 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights contain a brief catalogue of the most fundamental political rights and civil liberties: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. […] Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. […] Everyone has the right to

Towards a new global line?

121

freedom of peaceful assembly and association. […] Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948) The globalization of even this basic catalogue remains the key challenge facing the world today. Any attempt to measure the extent to which political rights and civil liberties are observed involves many challenges of different kinds. In principle, this should be evaluated sine ira et studio, which can be done by way of an expert evaluation, such as that performed annually by Freedom House. However, an expert evaluation is only as credible as the experts who prepare it, and its reliability depends on their knowledge and integrity, as well as the transparency and balance involved. No less important is what the recipients of these expert opinions know about the experts who prepared them and their evaluation process, and hence their confidence in them. So far as the evaluations prepared by Freedom House (viz. Freedom in the World) are concerned, little is actually known about the experts who prepare them, their political views and affiliations, and their knowledge of the languages and realities of the countries and regions evaluated. Figure 3.8 shows the results of an unconventional method of measuring the extent to which political rights and civil liberties are observed. It uses indicators related to completely different processes and developments, but which have a strong (but indirect) connection with human rights in the modern world. These indicators are “blind” in the sense that, in contradistinction to experts, they do not have political views. Freedom of thought, opinion, and information, and, indirectly, freedom of assembly and shared management are closely connected with complete and unfettered access to the latest technology, as this ensures broad access to information, and free and permanent contact with fellow citizens. The accuracy of this evaluation, however, is very seriously limited by for example online censorship imposed by national governments. In this way, broad Internet access and unfettered access to information do not always mean the same thing in different countries. Therefore, free countries and (admittedly, relatively few) countries that have no respect for the freedom of their citizens are both numbered among those that have the broadest access to cell phones and the Internet. However, while the accuracy of any diagnosis of the degree of observance of political rights and civil liberties based on access to the latest technology, such as that considered here, should be a suitable topic for debate and further research, it is beyond dispute that development should be associated with technological progress in the state and society. The base layer of Figure 3.8 shows the technological advancement of countries and societies.

Figure 3.9 Internal security A country’s quality of life depends on its internal security (this is associated with feeling physically safe, and having property rights protected and contracts enforced). This evaluation is facilitated by the murder and incarceration rates. Ideally, these indicators are both zero or at least they are as low as possible. The feeling of security in society is then maximized and repression is low. A relatively high murder rate, especially when combined with a low incarceration rate, is evidence of a country’s ineffectiveness, as one of its most basic functions is to ensure the safety of its citizens. A relatively high incarceration rate is

FIGURE 3.5

Intergenerational security I: concern for the younger generation

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.6

Intergenerational security II: concern for the elderly

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.7

Confidence in the state

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.8

Technological advancement and political freedom

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

130

Towards a new global line?

evidence of a country’s permanent or temporary (if e.g. measures to improve security have been taken) ineffectuality as well and/or its excessive repressiveness, possibly in the domain of political rights and civil liberties.

Figure 3.10 Equality Equality is one of the most essential values in social life: “All human beings are born (…) equal in dignity and rights” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). Figure 3.10 suggests that equality be evaluated using two indicators that attempt to diagnose the status of women in society (namely, the share of seats in parliament held by women, and women with accounts at financial institutions or with mobile money-service providers). Greater equality can be expected in countries where these two indicators are as high as possible, i.e. where they strive for 50% and 100% respectively. The converse implies a discriminatory country or society that does not endeavor to ensure that its citizens are equal and/or which is simply poorly developed.

Figure 3.11 Happiness Development should serve to satisfy reasonable expectations (described by e.g. the law of equal liberty). With this reservation in mind, countries should build and reinforce happiness among their citizens, as there are few people who do not want to be happy. Figure 3.11 delineates the global happy–unhappy divide. This is based on satisfaction with place of residence and male suicide rate. The combination of high satisfaction with place of residence and low male suicide rate probably describes a happy society and the converse an unhappy one.

Figure 3.12 Social development A highly developed country should have a high level of social development. This is evidenced by a high level of civic (social) participation. This not only evinces the maturity of a society, but also its level of education and material status. A high level of activity on behalf of the community in the form of volunteering should be associated with a developed society and country. The number of people afflicted with tuberculosis has a similar diagnostic significance, as a high level of social development also implies freedom from physical and mental deprivation. TB is a classic example of a social disease associated with poor living (accommodation, nutrition), working, and recreational conditions. The link between TB and deprivation has long been observed. Malnutrition, poor housing and sanitary conditions, illiteracy, lack of education, low health culture, restricted or impeded access to medical care, and constant mental stress that can lead to alcohol, nicotine, and drug addiction are all associated with deprivation (Warsaw Institute of Tuberculosis and Lung Diseases, Poland; www.igichp.edu.pl/subpag/conalezy.html; accessed 7 December 2018). The number of TB cases is therefore a diagnostic indicator of the degree of social negligence and, consequently, social development.

Figures 3.13 and 3.14 Health security I and II “The quality of life is almost meaningless without health” (Brandt 1980: 16). Development is positively correlated with more and better healthcare (Figures 3.13 and 3.14) and an

Towards a new global line?

131

improvement in health conditions (Figure 3.14). Development is not possible without investing in the healthcare system and improving the health conditions of society, but it also ensures improved healthcare and overall health. A developed health service demands a great deal of financial expenditure, and wealthy countries are more readily assured the high standard of medical services required. Theoretically, not only is healthcare better developed in a highly developed society than it is in less developed countries, but people live longer and enjoy better health. Figure 3.14 also indicates the quality of healthcare.

Figure 3.15 Human species security Development processes go beyond the present. There can be no development, let alone high development status, without people. Therefore, a country should additionally care for the security of humankind. Existential threats can be biological or environmental, as well as political, economic, social, and cultural. Whole societies were annihilated by epidemics in the past, and the future of humankind is threatened by the stress that it is exerting on the environment. The high developed state, therefore, should care for biological and environmental security as well. Not carrying out vaccinations is especially dangerous in a globalized and increasingly populous world. The proportion of unvaccinated children is another indicator of the effectiveness of a state.

Figure 3.16 Summary map I Figures 3.1–3.15 only draw partial pictures of the international community. The summary maps combine and aggregate them and delineate the construction of the international community with reference to all 26 indicators used on the maps in Figures 3.1–3.15. The partial pictures, however, can be aggregated in more than one way, and more than one summary map can therefore be drawn. They will not be identical. A summary map “evens out” the picture of the international community, as a country might have a different picture within the scope of some indicator(s) than in the light of most of the remaining ones. Figure 3.16 builds a comprehensive picture of the international community on the basis of a score placed in the legend of each map. This score gives an appraisal of the conditions constructed by pairs of selected indicators, and are as follows: 1 point – positive; 0 points – hard to say, open to several interpretations, neutral, or lack of data; –1 point – negative. Obviously, the allocation of points results from a subjective assessment of the analyzed conditions. The international community has been divided into five segments. Countries for which there was a lack of data in more than half the partial maps (see Figures 3.1–3.15) have been omitted. Just how spatially elaborate a structure the contemporary international community is can be seen on Figure 3.16 (and 3.17–3.20). This picture can be simplified into a dichotomy of a developed North and a not-so-developed South with those countries with a very good result deemed the global North and the rest the global South. The North is a byword for the highest attainable quality of life. This makes the South a very heterogeneous group of countries covering all the remaining quality of life variants.

Figure 3.17 Summary map II Figure 3.17 is based on another simple synthetic indicator. Here, the summary map directly refers to all 26 partial indicators, not to an assessment of the conditions designated by the 15

FIGURE 3.9

Internal security

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.10

Equality

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.11

Happiness

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.12

Social development

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.13

Health security I

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.14

Health security II

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.15

Human species security

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.16

Summary map I

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.17

Summary map II

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.18

Summary map III

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.19

Summary map IV

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update

FIGURE 3.20

Reference map: Human Development Index and Freedom in the World

Source: Own elaboration based on Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update; Freedom in the World 2018, Freedom House

156

Towards a new global line?

pairs of selected indicators illustrated on the maps in Figures 3.1–3.15. Figure 3.17 is therefore not based on Figures 3.1–3.15, but on the indicators used to draw them. In the case of every indicator, the international community has been divided in half. These indicators have simultaneously been separated into positive (an increase in value corresponds to improved conditions) and negative (an increase in value corresponds to worsened conditions). In the case of positive indicators, countries above the median were given 1 point and those below 0 points. This was reversed in the case of negative indicators. Next, the point value for each country was divided by the number of indicators available to it. The synthetic indicator was not calculated for those countries for which less than two-thirds of the indicators (i.e. fewer than 18) were available (these are marked on the map as countries for which there are no data), as the picture was already distorted enough. As with Figure 3.16, the international community is divided into five classes containing roughly the same number of members. The opposition between countries with a very good point result vs. the rest constitutes a counterpart to the global North–South dichotomy.

Figures 3.18 and 3.19 Summary maps III and IV Figures 3.18–3.19 are variants of summary map II (3.17), and similarly refer directly to all the 26 partial indicators used to draw the maps in Figures 3.1–3.15. All the partial indicators on Figure 3.18 have been normalized, being given values in the range 0–1, where 0 is the minimum and 1 the maximum. In the case of negative indicators, which constitute a mirror image of the positive ones, the values obtained are subtracted from 1, as the lowest indicator values represent the best (i.e. most favorable) scores. The calculated partial indicators are then totaled and divided by the number of indicators describing the given country (if there are fewer than 18, then analogously to Figure 3.17, the data are deemed insufficient and the country is not included). Summary map III (Figure 3.18) therefore illustrates the structure of the international community on the basis of the indicator values. The countries were ranked by indicator value on summary map IV (Figure 3.19). The country with the most favorable indicator value was placed first and the country with the least favorable was placed last. Each country then had the number of points corresponding to its place in the ranking allocated to it. The country occupying the top position was given 1 point, and the country occupying the bottom position was given as many points as there were countries assigned an indicator (e.g. 193). Countries with the same indicator value were given the same number of points and placed in an equal position, namely, the one that corresponded to the highest place due to them in the ranking (countries with the same indicator value could have been placed successively in ascending alphabetical order). The country (or countries) ranked immediately after a group of equally ranked countries, by dint of having the next highest indicator value, was placed in the first free position in the ranking after a break equal to the number of such countries. Those countries with the lowest indicator value were an exception. These were relegated to equal last place in the ranking and allocated a corresponding number of points. The sum of the points for each country was then divided by the number of indicators specified for that country (countries with fewer than 18 indicators were not considered). In this way, each country was assigned a position in a ranking that included all 26 partial indicators (the lower the point value of the position, the better the country performed).

Towards a new global line?

157

Similarly with Figures 3.16–3.17, the countries in Figures 3.18–3.19 were assigned to five classes, where the highest class can be considered the counterpart of the global North. Figures 3.17–3.19 are predicated on the assumption that every indicator is equally important. Figures 3.16–3.19 demonstrate that choosing a method to build a summary map from all the partial maps or indicators is no less important than selecting which indicators to use, as it can also change the picture of the structure of the international community.

Figure 3.20 Reference map: Human Development Index and Freedom in the World Figures 3.16–3.19 are based on a set of indicators selected by the author. For this reason, they are open to the criticism that they do not so much reflect a genuine developmental divide as a subjective selection of partial indicators. It is obviously incontestable that both the selection of indicators and the choice of method used to aggregate them have impacted the picture of the structure of the international community presented here. The distribution of countries with very good results (i.e. the global North) depicted in Figures 3.16–3.19, where the group with the highest level of development has an “island” structure, undeniably differs considerably from the picture of the wealthy North designated by the Brandt Line. The Brandt Line, however, does not prove this picture incorrect, but on the contrary, the presented maps undermine its credibility. To strengthen the credibility of the picture of the world built by the maps in Figures 3.16–3.19, and delegitimize the Brandt Line even further, the reference map for Figures 3.16–3.19 was drawn based on both political and socio-economic dimensions of quality of life, and widely known “classic” indices and indicators. The choice of these two dimensions is a corollary of the Polish experience; the nationwide “Solidarity” revolution against the communist system in Poland in 1980–1981 had a political and a socio-economic dimension. The political dimension is defined by Freedom House using the Freedom in the World Index, and the socio-economic dimension is measured by the UNDP via the Human Development Index (HDI). A country will not have a high quality of life until it has delivered high standards in each of them. Both indicators were normalized so as to have a value from 0 to 1 during the compilation of Figure 3.20. The synthetic indicator is the arithmetic mean of these two normalized indicators. The international community has also been divided into five approximately equinumerous categories in order to facilitate comparison with Figures 3.16–3.19. Countries that lacked any indicator(s) were marked “No Data”. Figures 3.16–3.20 admittedly vary in detail, simultaneously allocating some countries to several categories, but – and this is a most important observation – on a general level, they are surprisingly convergent.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Some of the inferences to be drawn from reading this atlas had already been raised by the mid-1960s. In 1965, Adrian Moyes and Teresa Hayter stated that “none of the attempts to define developing countries with more precision is entirely satisfactory”, as: (i) “there is no single meaningful criterion”; (ii) “developing countries differ widely from each other”; and (iii) “there is no hard dividing line between rich and poor” (Moyes and Hayter 1965: 1, emphasis added). Moyes and Hayter continue: “In practice more or less arbitrary lists of ‘developing countries’ are used; […] Developing countries as a whole do not form a natural unit apart from their geographical contiguity” (Moyes and Hayter 1965: 3, emphasis added). Finally, they emphasize that the other difficulty in giving a precise definition of developing countries is that there is no hard dividing line between developed and developing countries. There are countries at every stage of development – from the very poor and primitive countries of Africa, through India and Argentina, to Switzerland and Sweden and the USA. (Moyes and Hayter 1965: 3–4, author’s emphasis) These inferences remain every bit as valid now more than half a century later: the countries of the South differ significantly from one another; the countries of the world are arranged in a developmental continuum and are not divided in compact developmental blocs that stand out in the international community; there is no single criterion (or any group of commonly accepted criteria) against which countries can be designated as developing or developed, any such distinction involves arbitrary decisions, and there is no hard North– South boundary. This last assertion is especially noteworthy as it was made 15 years before the Brandt Line – a clear example of a “hard dividing line between developed and developing countries” – was drawn up and popularized. The “geographical contiguity” indicated by Moyes and Hayter as a distinguishing feature of the global South is merely a secondary feature, but more importantly, transient by definition, however accurate it might have been in the 1960s and later. The maps in the atlas (see Chapter 1) show the migration of development and underdevelopment boundaries. Their courses also depend on

Conclusions

159

more or less arbitrarily accepted criteria, as well as indices and indicators, and the threshold values, according to which a North–South classification is made. However, it is ambiguous to say that “there is no hard dividing line between developed and developing countries”. This statement may or may not be true depending on the context. The Brandt Line is a “hard dividing line” and “hard” developmental boundaries can be drawn in the international community, but Moyes and Hayter are also correct. First, it can be argued that, so far as placing countries on a level-of-development continuum is concerned, there is no sharp (“hard”) boundary that can neatly slice the international community into a group of countries labeled “global North” and another labeled “global South” (ditto for more than two groups). From this standpoint (so long as we disregard the extreme version, which rejects the possibility of any division), the division can admittedly be drawn, but there is a gray area – an “in-between world” – between the developed and underdeveloped worlds. This perspective, however, is also true and false. It is true in that when countries are placed on a continuum, there is no developmental gap in the sense of a clear and permanent break that could constitute a sharp, natural, and hard boundary between global North and global South. We can only designate a soft border here, i.e. one susceptible to contention and undermining. It is false in that there are no such natural points to demarcate the boundary(ies) of the in-between world either. However, we can always arbitrarily designate a breakpoint dividing the international community into a rich North and a poor South, and thereby obtain a “hard dividing line between developed and developing countries”, i.e. one that is artificial, arbitrary, but clearly dividing. Second, any developmental dividing line is in fact so relative and subjective as to be ipso facto soft. Anyone can designate their own “dividing line between developed and developing countries”. The atlas in Chapter 2 shows that this is perfectly possible. This situation may stem from a profound philosophical reflection about the world and the meaning of human existence, although, unfortunately, it could also be the result of a lack of reflection, knowledge and expression of the general case. The designated lines differ, however, in importance and cognitive value, and any significant, substantial developmental boundary can be defined as a “hard dividing line between developed and developing countries”. The Brandt Line was also every bit a “hard dividing line” in this sense, notwithstanding any doubts as to its actual developmental character. Third, the adjective “hard” can imply that a developmental boundary is stable (and even permanent) and impermeable, whereas it is changeable in time (as development is an action, not a state), open and porous (i.e. soft). It can be crossed – in both directions – by entire societies and countries, and not only by individual migrants. However, it is difficult to overcome in reality, so from this standpoint it is a hard boundary. As a developmental dividing line, the Brandt Line could legitimately cross out and eliminate the in-between world, but as a development boundary, there is no way it could have endured without corrections over the following decades. Moreover, it was definitely relative in the sense that its inception was linked with the work of a specific team (the Brandt Commission). Hence, separating countries and societies with a clear and important boundary might have been a “hard dividing line between developed and developing countries”, but it was only a “soft dividing line between developed and developing countries” in terms of the permanence, shape, veracity, and validity of the North–South divide. All developmental dividing lines are therefore variable and relative (i.e. soft), but this emphatically does not mean that there are no genuinely distinct and substantial (i.e. hard dividing lines) boundaries among them.

160

Conclusions

The most important conclusions to be drawn from the atlas can therefore be reduced to three points: 1.

2.

3.

We should generally be optimistic, as the world is an increasingly better place to live from the standpoint of socio-economic criteria. This is a long-term trend that can be observed over the past 2,000 years (see Chapter 1). This is obviously a general conclusion, and is applicable to many countries and regions, but there are still countries and regions that stand out negatively against the rest of the international community. This especially applies to Africa (see Chapter 3). Most of the least developed countries (see Figures 3.16–3.20) are on this continent and create a veritable “poverty belt” (Brandt 1980: 78) or “fall belt” – a parking lane on the development highway. The burning question is whether we will one day “equalize the developmental pressure throughout” the entire planet “at the level of the most advanced” (and still advancing) societies, bearing in mind “the current structure and organization of the international community, and given the domination of various individual and collective egoisms over global solidarity” (Solarz 2018b: 1). A lot of development boundaries, including boundaries dividing the world dichotomously, can be drawn up (see Chapter 2). These differ in importance and cognitive value. A precondition for obtaining the most accurate North–South dividing line possible is to take a broad spectrum of the major challenges and problems confronting humanity into account when delimiting it. Such an attempt is made in Chapter 3. The international community can be divided into a global North and a global South, but this cannot be done with a single continuous line. The picture is one of an archipelago of highly developed islands dispersed in an undeveloped ocean (see Introduction, Chapters 1–3). Reducing its area can uncover new islands or enlarge existing ones, but its waters can also wash away or submerge existing islands. Such a picture is as constantly, rapidly and dramatically changing as reality. The contrast between land/islands (high development) – ocean (underdevelopment) is a reminder that high development did not appear immediately on a large scale, but had to be achieved step by step, place by place, and that its maintenance requires effort. The maps in the atlas (see Chapter 1) clearly and distinctly illustrate that the development map of the world is most aptly described by Heraclitus’ aphorism that all is flux. The world is as interesting as it is complex and dynamic. The Brandt Line, as a developmental boundary, could only remain unaltered in a world in which developmental progress and regress were eliminated. These processes, however, are innate to our world. We should therefore regularly seek out new, significant, and authentic North–South boundaries, so as to continually transgress them. And the Brandt Line, being in fact more of a political than a developmental boundary, should be permanently consigned to books on world political and economic history.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Texts: Aristotle (translated by C. Lord). (2013) Politics, Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press. Bauman, Z. (2000) Liquid Modernity, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Bauman, Z. (2004) “Ponowoczesność”, in B. Szlachta (ed.), Słownik Społeczny, pp. 902–914, Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM. Blacksell, M. (2006) Political Geography, London: Routledge. Boniface, P. (ed.) (2003) Atlas Des Relations Internationales, Paris: Hatier. Boyd, A. and Comenetz, J. (2007) An Atlas of World Affairs, 11th edn, London and New York: Routledge. [Brandt, W.] (Independent Commission on International Development Issues). (1980) North–South: A Programme for Survival: The Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt, London, Sydney: Pan Books. Brandt, W. (2013) Wspomnienia [Erinnerungen], Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie. Co należy wiedzieć o gruźlicy – jej objawach, wykrywaniu i leczeniu, Poland: Warsaw Institute of Tuberculosis and Lung Diseases, available at: www.igichp.edu.pl/subpag/conalezy.html (accessed 7 December 2018). Desperak, J. and Balon, J. (2003) Tablice Geograficzne, Warszawa: Świat Książki. Diamond, J. (1999) Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company. Diamond, J. Jared Diamond, available at: www.jareddiamond.org/Jared_Diamond/About_Me.html (accessed 1 October 2018). Domański, R. (2004) Geografia Ekonomiczna. Ujęcie Dynamiczne, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. Drakakis-Smith, D., Doherty, J. and Thrift, N. (1987) “Socialist Development in the Third World. Introduction: What Is a Socialist Developing Country?” Geography 4: 333–335. Gawlikowski, K. (ed.) (2004) Azja Wschodnia na przełomie XX i XXI wieku. Stosunki międzynarodowe i gospodarcze, Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Wydawnictwo TRIO. Gawrycki, M.F. and Lizak, W. (eds.) (2006) Kuba i Afryka. Sojusz dla rewolucji, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR. Griffiths, M. and O’Callaghan, T. (2007) International Relations: The Key Concepts, London and New York: Routledge.

162

Bibliography

Grotius, H. (2017) On the Law of War and Peace, Altenmünster: Jazzybee Verlag Jürgen Beck. Hesburgh, T.M. (1974) One Earth: The Problem and Opportunities on a Very Interdependent Planet, 20 September, The Ditchley Foundation Lecture XIII, available at: www.ditchley.co.uk/confer ences/past-programme/1970-1979/1974/lecture-xiii (accessed 14 October 2012). Hirschman, A.O. (1957) “Investment Policies and ‘dualism’ in Underdeveloped Countries”, The American Economic Review 47 (5): 550–570. Hirschman, A.O. (1962) The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. Hornby, A.S. (with Cowie, A.P.) (1988) Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jelonek, B.A. (2014) “Idea umowy społecznej”, available at: www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/Content/ 51951/01_Barbara_Anna_Jelonek.pdf (accessed 1 October 2018). Kelley, R.D.G. (1999) “A Poetics of Anticolonialism”, Monthly Review, 6 (November), available at: http://monthlyreview.org/1999/11/01/a-poetics-of-anticolonialism (accessed 22 October 2012). Kennedy, P. (1988) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, London, Sydney, Wellington: Unwin Hyman. Knox, P. and Agnew, J. (1990) The Geography of the World Economy, London, New York, Melbourne, Auckland: Edward Arnold. Kolodziej, E.A. and Kanet, R.E. (eds.) (1989) The Limits of Soviet Power in the Developing World, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Korbonski, A. and Fukuyama, F. (eds.) (1987) The Soviet Union and the Third World, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press. Kristensen, H.M. and Norris, R.S. (2013) “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69 (5): 75–81. Lacoste, Y. (1968) Géographie du sous-développement, 2nd edn, Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Lacoste, Y. (1976) Géographie du sous-développement. Géopolitique d’une crise, 3rd edn, Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Lacoste, Y. (1979) Les pays du sous-développement, 6th edn, Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Lambert, B. (1992) “Lord Franks, Diplomat Who Led Marshall Plan Effort, Dies at 87”, The New York Times, 18 October, available at: www.nytimes.com/1992/10/18/world/lord-franks-diplomat-wholed-marshall-plan-effort-dies-at-87.html (accessed 14 October 2012). L’Histoire des inventions. Jusqu’où irons-nous? Paris: Le Monde. La Vie, 2015. Locke, J. (1988) Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Malinowski, M.J. (1986) Ideologie afrykańskie 1945–1985, Wrocław: Ossolineum. Merseburger, P. (2011) Willy Brandt. 1913–1992. Wizjoner i realista, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie. Moyes, A. and Hayter, T. (eds.) (1965) World III: A Handbook on Developing Countries, Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, Macmillan Company. Nouschi, M. (2003) Petit atlas historique du 20e siècle, Paris: Armand Colin. Olszewski, H. and Zmierczak, M. (1993) Historia doktryn politycznych i prawnych, Poznań: Przedsiębiorstwo Wydawnicze Ars Boni et Aequi. Parker, G. (ed.) (2002) The Times Compact History of the World, New York: Harper Collins Publishers. Piesowicz, K. (1962) Wielki przewrót. Opowieść o rewolucji przemysłowej, Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna. Plato (translated by G.M.A. Grube). (1992) Republic, Indianapolis, IN and Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing. Polit, J. (2004) Chiny, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio. Porębski, C. (2004) “Umowa społeczna”, in B. Szlachta (ed.), Słownik społeczny, pp. 1497–1502, Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM. Rawls, J. (2005) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. Santamaria, Y. (1999) “Afrocommunism: Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique”, in S. Courtois, N. Werth, J.-L. Panné, A. Paczkowski, K. Bartosek and J.-L. Margolin (eds.), The Black Book of Communism. Crimes, Terror, Repression, pp. 637–659, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.

Bibliography

163

Sauvy, A. (1952) “Trois mondes, une planète”, L’Observateur 118: 5. Sauvy, A. (1961) Le “tiers-monde”. Sous-développement et développement. (Réédition augmentée d’une mise à jour par Alfred Sauvy). Travaux et Documents. Cahier no 39, Paris: Institut national d’études démographiques, Presses Universitaires de France. Solarz, M.W. (2014, 2016) The Language of Global Development: A Misleading Geography, London and New York: Routledge. Solarz, M.W. (2017) “The Birth and Development of the Language of Global Development in Light of Trends in Global Population, International Politics, Economics and Globalisation”, Third World Quarterly 8: 1753–1766. Solarz, M.W. (ed.) (2018a) Geograficzno-polityczny atlas Polski. Polska w świecie współczesnym. Atlas of Poland’s Political Geography. Poland in the Contemporary World, Warszawa: Trzecia Strona. Solarz, M.W. (2018b) “Introduction”, in M.W. Solarz (ed.), New Geographies of the Globalized World, London and New York: Routledge. Solarz, M.W. (2018c) “Many Worlds, One Planet: Ambiguous Geographies of the Contemporary International Community”, in M.W. Solarz (ed.), New Geographies of the Globalized World, pp. 65–67, London and New York: Routledge. Swift, J. (2003) The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of the Cold War, Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Tomlinson, B.R. (2003) “What Was the Third World?”, Journal of Contemporary History 2: 307–321. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948, available at: www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/ UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf (accessed 17 July 2019). Wolf-Philips, L. (1979) “Why Third World?” Third World Quarterly 1: 105–115.

Databases and websites: Encyclopedia Britannica, available at: www.britannica.com Freedom in the World 2018, Freedom House, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/freedom-world-2018 Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-present, available at: www.un.org/en/sections/memberstates/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update, available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/ default/files/2018_human_development_statistical_update.pdf Human Development Report 2014. Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience, available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf Maddison, A. (2006) The World Economy, Paris: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Maddison, A. (2010) Maddison Database 2010. Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1–2008 AD, Maddison Database 2010, available at: www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/ maddison-database-2010 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, available at: www.oecd.org North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, available at: www.nato.int Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, available at: www.sipri.org The Cold War Museum, available at: http://coldwar.org Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia, available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page Worldometers, available at: www.worldometers.info/ World Bank Open Data, available at: https://data.worldbank.org World Economic Outlook Database, available at: www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLS/worldeconomic-outlook-databases#sort=%40imfdate%20descending World Population Prospects 2017, available at: https://population.un.org/wpp/

INDEX

Page numbers in italics refer to maps and illustrations. 1–2008 AD GDP and GDP per capita 31, 32, 33, 34–42 1500–2008 AD GDP and GDP per capita 33, 42–48, 48–49, 50 1870–2008 AD GDP and GDP per capita 49–50, 51–61 1950–2017AD GDP and GDP per capita 50, 62–78, 79, 80–81 1980–2017 AD Human Development Index (HDI) 79, 82–92, 93, 94–95 Africa 1, 3, 15, 19, 28 Afro-Asian postwar decolonization wave 17 Americas 1, 3, 19, 20, 33, 48–49; see also United States of America anti-Soviet sentiment 10–15 ANZUS (Pacific Security Treaty) 10 Arabian Peninsula 49 archipelagos, development 79, 93 Argentina 49 Aristotle 96, 100 Armenia 79 Asia 1, 7–8, 10, 15–17, 33, 49 Australia 8–9, 33, 48–49 Aztec Empire 43, 49 boundaries see lines Brandt Line 1–29, 158–160; colonies/noncolonies 15, 16; GDP per capita 58, 79; GNI per capita 10, 11; HDI 10, 12; new Brandt Line 29; northern/southern hemispheres 1, 3; political nature 17, 19, 20–25; selected countries 2019 10, 14; UN member states/

independent states 20, 26, 28; world political map 20, 26, 27, 28; see also North–South divide Brandt Report 6–8, 10, 17, 58, 79 Brandt, W. 9–10, 15 British Isles 33, 48–49 Bulgaria 28–29, 49, 79 Canada 1, 3, 33, 48–49 Caribbean regions 15 Central Europe 48–49 China 7–8, 15–17, 49 choropleth maps 110–157 classical social contract theorists 96, 102, 104–105; Cold War 3–4, 8–17, 18, 28–29, 33 colonialism 5–6, 10–15, 16 Commission on International Development Issues 9, 15; see also Commission, the; Independent Commission on International Development Issues Commission, the 7–10; see also Commission on International Development Issues; Independent Commission on International Development Issues communism 4–6, 15, 28–29, 49, 93 confidence in the state 120, 126–127 Crown of High Development 110–157 crude oil extraction 79 Cuba 15–17 Czechoslovakia 15, 28–29, 49 Declaration of Human Rights 120–121 decolonization 10–15, 17, 19, 28

Index

Denmark 49 developed countries 1–17, 18, 28–29, 32–33, 44–45, 48–49 developing countries 6, 10–15, 17, 19, 28 development 5–6, 15, 158–160; choropleth maps 110–157; Cold War/delimiting 17, 18; division lines 17, 19; globalization 17, 19, 20; Human Development Index (HDI) 30–33, 79, 82–92, 93, 94–95, 154–155, 157; inequalities 30; islands 79, 93; North–South GDP 17, 19, 24; North–South GDP per capita 17, 19, 25; North–South population growth 17, 19, 22; philosophies 96–109; social 130, 138–139; United Nations 20, 26, 28, 97, 108; world GDP and GDP per capita 17, 19, 23; world population growth 17, 19, 21; see also GDP and GDP per capita Diamond, J. 7, 97, 109 disease 130 Eastern Bloc 4–5, 7–9, 10, 93 East–West divide 5–6, 5, 10–17 economic indicators 5–6, 10–15 education 110, 111, 114–115, 122–123 effectiveness of the state 111, 118–119, 131 eight-thousanders (choropleth maps) 110–157 elderly populations 120, 124–125 equality 10–15, 30, 33, 130, 134–135 Equatorial Guinea 61, 79 Estonia 79 Eurasia 33 Europe 33, 48–49, 79, 93; Brandt Line 1, 3, 28–29; travel times 19, 20 First World countries 6, 49 France 19, 20, 33, 48–49 France, P.M. 9 Franks, O.S. 17 freedom 5–6, 120–121, 128–129, 146–155, 157 GDP and development (North–South) 17, 19, 24 GDP and GDP per capita 17, 19, 23–25, 30–96; AD 1 33, 34; AD 1000 33, 35; AD 1500 33, 35, 43; AD 1600 33, 36, 43, 48–49; AD 1700 33, 36, 44, 48–49; AD 1820 33, 37, 44; AD 1870 33, 37, 45, 52; AD 1913 33, 38, 45, 53; AD 1937 33, 38, 46, 54; AD 1950 33, 39, 46, 55, 64–65; AD 1960 33, 39, 47, 56, 66–67; AD 1973 33, 40, 47, 57, 68–69; AD 1980 33, 40, 48, 58, 70–71; AD 1990 33, 41, 48, 59, 72–73; AD 2000 33, 41, 50, 60, 74–75; AD 2008 33, 42, 50, 61, 76–77; AD 2017 78; common legend 30–31 Géographie du sous-développement (Lacoste) 17, 19

165

Germany 32, 33, 48–49; Social Democratic Party 9 “global South” 10–15, 28–29, 79 globalization 17, 19, 20 GNI per capita 10, 11 Gorbachev, M. 8 Great Depression, the 17 Grotius, H. 96, 101 Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (Diamond) 97, 109 Habsburg Empire 48–49 happiness 130, 136–137 Hayter, T. 17, 158–159 HDI see Human Development Index health security 130–131, 140–143 Heath, E. 9 highly developed countries 49 Hirschman, A.O. 17 Hobbes, T. 96, 102 Human Development Index (HDI) 30–33, 154–155, 157; 1980 Brandt Line 10, 12–13; 1980-2017 79, 82–92, 93, 94–95; freedom 146–155, 157; social contract theory 97 Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update 79 Human Rights 120–121 human species security 131, 144–145 Hungary 15, 28–29, 49 Iberia 33, 48–49 ideal state theorists 96, 99–100 independence 10–15, 28–29 Independent Commission on International Development Issues 9, 15; see also Commission, the; Commission on International Development Issues independent states 20, 26–27, 28 Industrial Revolution 17, 33, 44, 49 industrialized countries 7–8 inequalities 15, 30 innovativeness 110, 112–113 institutional indicators 10 intergenerational security: elderly populations 120, 124–125; younger generations 111, 122–123 internal security 121, 130, 132–133 international inequalities 15 international migrations 15 Iraq 49 Iron Curtain 4–6, 10–15, 49 islands, development 79, 93 Israel 49 Italy 33, 48–49

166

Index

Japan 1, 49; US–Japan security treaties 10 Kazakhstan 79 Korea 15–17 Kremlin, the 8 lack of freedom 5–6 Lacoste Line, developmental division 17, 19 Lacoste Line II, developmental division 19 Laos 15–17 Latin America 1, 3, 49 Latvia 79 Libya 49 lines: Brandt 1–29; Lacoste 17, 19; Lacoste II 19; “millennium value” 49–50, 79, 93; MoyesHayter 17; Sauvy 17; Wolf-Philips 19 Lithuania 79 Locke, J. 96, 104

and development 17, 19, 22; recent depictions 1, 2; update 93 Nozick, R. 96, 107 oil extraction 79 Ostpolitik, Neue 14–15 Pacific regions 15 Pacific Security Treaty (ANZUS) 10 Palme, O. 9 Paris 19, 20 Pax Americana 49 People Republic of China (PRC) 15–17 philosophies of development 96–109 Plato 96, 99 Poland 15, 28–29, 32, 60, 79, 93 political freedom 120–121, 128–129 political indicators 5–6, 10–17 political nature of Brandt line 17, 19, 20–25 political-civilizational/racist definitions 10 population 111, 116–117; North–South growth and development 17, 19, 22; political nature of Brandt line 17, 19, 21–22; world growth and development 17, 19, 21 post-Cold-War Brandt Line 8–9 PRC (People Republic of China) 15–17 A Programme for Survival (Brandt) 1 proverbs 7

Maddison, A. 30, 31–32 mapping global change see GDP and GDP per capita; Human Development Index Marseille 19, 20 MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) 7, 33, 79, 93 member states of United Nations 20, 26, 28 Mexico 49 Middle East 59, 79 migrations 15 military indicators 10 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 7, 33, 79, 93 “millennium value” 49–50, 79, 93 Montalva, F. 9 Moyes, A. 17, 158–159 Moyes-Hayter Line, developmental division 17

racism 10 Rawls, J. 96, 106 Rimland 33 Roman proverbs 7 Romania 28–29, 49 Rousseau, J-. J. 96, 105

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 10 Neue Ostpolitik 14–15 New International Economic Order 10–15 New World peoples 43, 48–49 New Zealand 8–9, 33, 48–49 Non-Aligned countries 6 non-colonies 15, 16 North America 19, 20; see also Canada; United States of America North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) 10 North Korea 15–17 North–South: A Programme for Survival (Brandt) 1 North–South divide 5–6, 96–98, 99–109, 110–157; Brandt Line/GDP per capita 58, 79; classification 158–160; GDP and development 17, 19, 24; GDP per capita and development 17, 19, 25; genesis 17, 19; population growth

Sauvy Line, developmental division 17 SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) 7, 79, 93 Second World countries 6, 28–29 security: health 130–131, 140–143; human species 131, 144–145; intergenerational 111, 120, 122–123, 124–125; internal 121, 130, 132–133; treaties 10; wealth 110, 111, 112–113, 116–117 social: contract theorists 96–97, 101–109; development 130, 138–139 Social Democratic Party 9 socio-economic indicators 5–6, 10–15 Southern Europe 48–49 Soviet Bloc 79 Soviet Union see USSR Spinoza, B. 96, 103 Spykman, N. 33

quality of life 30 quam duos faciunt idem non est idem (proverb) 7

Index

state: confidence in 120, 126–127; effectiveness 111, 118–119; United Nations 20, 26, 28 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 7, 79, 93 Sweden 49 Switzerland 49 Syria 49 technological advancement 120–121, 128–129 Third World countries 6, 10–15, 17, 19 Le “Tiers Monde”: Sous-développement et développement (Sauvy) 17 travel times 19, 20 treaties 10 tuberculosis (TB) 130 underdevelopment 5–6, 15, 158–160; Cold War/ delimiting 17, 18; globalization 17, 19, 20; islands 79; North–South GDP 17, 19, 24; North–South GDP per capita and development 17, 19, 25; North–South population growth 17, 19, 22; UN member states/independent states 20, 26, 28; world GDP and GDP per capita 17, 19, 23; world population growth 17, 19, 21; world population growth and development 17, 19, 21 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) 97, 108 United Nations 20, 26, 28, 93, 97, 108 United States of America (USA) 44–45, 48–49; Brandt Line 1, 3, 5–6; Cold War

167

3–4, 8–17, 18, 28–29, 33; US–Japan security treaties 10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 120–121 Uruguay 49 USSR 1, 5–9, 41, 49, 79; Cold War 3–4, 8–17, 18, 28–29, 33 Venezuela 49 Vietnam 15–17 Warsaw Pact 10 wealth: education 110, 114–115; innovativeness 110, 112–113; political nature of Brandt line 17, 19, 23–25; population 111, 116–117 Western Bloc 4–5, 93 Western Europe 33, 48–49, 57, 79 “Why Third World?” (Wolf-Philips) 19 Wolf-Philips Line, developmental division 19 world GDP and GDP per capita 17, 19, 23, 32 World III: A Handbook on Developing Countries (Moyes-Hayter) 17 world population growth and development 17, 19, 21 World War I 45, 49 World War II 17, 49 younger generations/intergenerational security 111, 122–123 Yugoslavia 9–10, 28–29, 49