The European Powers and the Near Eastern Question 1806–1807 9780231893725

Table of contents :
FOREWORD
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I. THE AFTERMATH OF PRESSBURG DECEMBER 1805—MAY 1806
PART II. THE UNSUCCESSFUL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS OF NAPOLEON WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA JUNE—OCTOBER, 1806
PART III. FRANCO-BRITISH RIVALRY IN THE NEAR EAST JUNE 1806—JANUARY 1807
PART IV. BRITISH HOSTILITIES IN THE NEAR EAST JUNE 1806—MAY 1807
PART V. FRANCO-RUSSIAN WAR AND PEACE FEBRUARY—NOVEMBER 1807
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX

Citation preview

STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW Edited by tbe FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NUMBER 349

THE EUROPEAN POWERS AND THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 1806-1807 KT PAUL F. SHUPP

THE EUROPEAN POWERS AND THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 1806-1807

BY

PAUL F. SHUPP, PH.D. Auitlant Profenor of Hitlory Univtrtily of PitUburgh

NEW YORK

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS IjOndon : P. S. KING & SON, LTD.

1931

COPYRIGHT,

1931

BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

PRESS

PRINTED IN T H E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Su MY MOTHER

FOREWORD " L'organisation de I'Orient," wrote M. Lavisse, " est, en somme, le fait capital de la periode moderne." The waning of the Ottoman Empire, whether it be called organization or dissolution, is the nucleus of the Near Eastern Question and is certainly of capital significance in modern history. It may be said to date from the end of the seventeenth century and it continued during the eighteenth. The Empire, menaced by Russia and Austria, readily accepted an alliance with France, whose commercial interests in the Levant were then paramount. England came definitely into the scene in the latter part of the eighteenth century when her developing empire in India stimulated her trade and increased the need for its protection in the Levant. Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt in 1798 broke the French connection with Turkey, and England and Russia in self-defense became her protectors. At the end of 1805 the Treaty of Pressburg gave to France a substantial foothold in the Mediterranean on the very frontiers of the Ottoman Empire and marked the beginning of her attempt to recover her former influence at Constantinople. The purpose of this work is to trace the diplomatic history of the four great European Powers most directly interested in the Near Eastern Question during the brief but important period between the Treaty of Pressburg and the Treaty of Tilsit. Several partial studies have been made of the subject, but hitherto no attempt has been made to correlate the relations of each of the Great Powers with the Near East during this time. 7

8

FOREWORD

The research for the present monograph has been pursued in the United States at the libraries of Columbia and Harvard Universities and at the Library of Congress; in England at the British Museum, the Public Record Office and the India Office in London; in France at the Bibliothèque Nationale, the Archives Nationales and the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris; in Austria at the Court and State Archives in Vienna. To all those in charge of these several libraries and archives who so courteously and liberally assisted in the work the author wishes to extend his appreciation. To Professor Carlton J . H. Hayes of Columbia University he would extend his special thanks for advice in carrying on the study, and he would acknowledge his debt to his colleague at the University of Pittsburgh, Professor B. J. Hovde, who read a portion of the manuscript. Finally the author wishes to express to his wife, Hazel Cole Shupp, his appreciation of her labor, her encouragement and her criticism in the preparation of the manuscript. UNIVERSITY OF MAKCH, 1 9 3 1 .

PrrrsnuncH,

PAUL F . SHUPP

TABLE OF CONTENTS PART

I

T H E A F T E R M A T H OF P R E S S B U R G , D E C E M B E R MAY

1805-

1806

CHAPTER I Fears and Plans of Russia and Austria

15

CHAPTER II Waning of Russian and British Influence in Turkey

46

CHAPTER III Napoleon's policy in the Near East

PART

66

II

T H E U N S U C C E S S F U L P E A C E N E G O T I A T I O N S OF N A P O L E O N WITH G R E A T B R I T A I N AND RUSSIA, JUNE-OCTOBER

1806

CHAPTER IV British Negotiations and the Oubril Treaty with Russia CHAPTER

81

V

Rejection of the Oubril Treaty and Breakdown of British Negotiations 105 PART

III

F R A N C O - R U S S I A N R I V A L R Y IN T H E N E A R JUNE I8O6-JANUARY

EAST,

1807

CHAPTER VI Deposition and Restoration of the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia 9

131

TABLE

I0

OF

CONTENTS PAC«

C H A P T E R VII Rival Intrigues in Moldavia and Wallachia and in Serbia

170

CHAPTER VIII French Occupation of Poland and Russian Occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia 186 C H A P T E R IX The Troubled Neutrality of Austria

216

CHAPTER X British Failure to Preserve Peace between Russia and Turkey. . . 234 C H A P T E R XI Franco-Russian Conflict in the Adriatic and Franco-British Rivalry in Albania 268 C H A P T E R XII Interrelation of Polish and Near Eastern Questions P A R T BRITISH

290

IV

H O S T I L I T I E S IN T H E N E A R JUNE I 8 O 6 - M A Y

EAST,

1807

C H A P T E R XIII Franco-British Rivalry in Egypt

327

CHAPTER XIV The British Expedition to Constantinople

354

CHAPTER XV The British Invasion of Egypt

392 P A R T

V

F R A N C O - R U S S I A N W A R AND P E A C E , FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER

1807

CHAPTER XVI Diplomatic Efforts in the Spring of 1807

417

TABLE

OF CONTENTS

n rAci

CHAPTER XVII Turkey in the War

459 CHAPTER XVIII

Attempted British Mediation in Turkey and Persia

501

CHAPTER XIX Tilsit and Its Aftermath in the Near East

537

BIBLIOGRAPHY

559

INDEX

567

PART I T H E AFTERMATH OF PRESSBURG DECEMBER 1805—MAY 1806

CHAPTER I F E A R S A N D P L A N S OF R U S S I A A N D A U S T R I A I

THE Treaty of Pressburg, concluded between Austria and France in December 1805 after the defeat of the former at Austerlitz, again brought the Near Eastern Question to the front for Russia. Russian official circles had assumed ever since the Egyptian expedition that Napoleon had plans of aggrandizement in the Ottoman Empire, and now his actual acquisition of Dalmatia, Istria and Cattaro by the Treaty of Pressburg seemed to Emperor Alexander and his ministers to jeopardize Russian influence in the Balkan peninsula among the Slav and Orthodox peoples. Incidentally they also feared the possibility that a revolt by the Poles might receive its impulse from Napoleon. Early in January 1806, the Russian State Council met to consider the situation and means for its improvement. They saw that Napoleon was now in a position to attempt aggression in Turkey which might force Russia to undertake there measures for self-defense with consequent unfavorable effect upon her relations with that country. T o prevent this it was necessary that Russia keep her alliance with England and enter into closer relations with the Slavic peoples and the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire and that Prussia should not enter into an alliance with France, even if Russia had to help her in case of a war with that country. A diplomatic mission should be sent to Paris to ascertain the views of Napoleon in regard to Russia and in the meantime the Russian army and navy should be held on a war footing and so placed that they could at once be used where it seemed is

l6

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1800-1807

necessary, especially in Moldavia and Wallachia, in case Austria occupied these principalities or Napoleon laid hands on the Ottoman Empire. 1 Subsequently Czartoryski, minister of foreign affairs, formulated for Emperor Alexander a series of memoirs on Russian policy which were a development of the decisions of the State Council. The first was concerned with the means which should be adopted by Russia for maintenance of her influence in Turkey and removal of the French menace. T o this end there should be prepared on the Dniester River a Russian army of one hundred thousand men which would not only hold the loyalty of the Slavs and Greeks in Turkey, but also in case of a French approach or attack on Turkey occupy Moldavia and Wallachia.® In a second memoir, Czartoryski took up the pan-Slavic idea and indicated the advantages Russia could expect from a dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In the latter event Russia should not lose the fruits of a half century of struggle. He proposed the plan of creating independent states in the Balkans under Russian protection, excepting, however, Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia. Of this territory, " it could hardly be doubted that its proper end would be appropriation by Russia." 8 In a third memoir, Czartoryski considered a proposal for making an immediate peace with Napoleon in order to secure time until the position of Russia was improved.4 In the above decisions of the Council of State and these memoirs of Czartoryski was formulated the Russian policy for 1806. 1

Sbornik lications of 1865-1916), abbreviated

Imperatorskago Russkogo Istoricheskago Obshchestva (Pubthe Imperial Russian Historical Society), ( S t Petersburg, 82, no. 73. Note:—This reference will hereafter be used in form, viz., Sborntk.

* Czartoryski to Emperor Alexander, Jan. 11/22, 1806, ibid., no. 75. * Czartoryski to Emperor Alexander, Jan. 11/22, 1806, ibid., no. 76. 4

Czartoryski to Emperor Alexander, Jan. 16/37, 1806, ibid., no. 77.

FEARS

AND PLANS

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AND AUSTRIA

17

There was also concern at St. Petersburg lest Austria by the Treaty of Pressburg might have involved herself in obligations to interfere in affairs in the Balkans and it was believed that Napoleon, by sharing with her any conquest there, would forge another link binding her to him in permanent alliance. Russian official circles did not forget Austria's traditional jealousy of Russian expansion in the Balkans; they assumed that any agreement by Austria with France would be viewed at Vienna as a bulwark to hold back Russia in this direction. These fears seemed substantiated when reports came from Vienna of Austrian troop movements on the Turkish frontier. Stadion, Austrian minister of foreign affairs, declared that these activities were only for purposes of protection and that Austria had no hostile intentions in regard to Turkey. Proof of this was to be seen in the fact that she had refused aid of any kind to the revolting Serbians. 1 Russia's suspicion of Austria was increased by several newspaper articles appearing in a Hamburg daily early in 1806, the first of which declared that Bosnia and Serbia would be occupied by Austrian and French forces, these Turkish provinces having been promised in the Treaty of Pressburg to Austria as compensation for losses elsewhere. Another article stated that this compensation would be Moldavia and Wallachia.* When Czartoryski demanded from Merveldt an explanation of these articles, the Austrian ambassador denied that there was any agreement concerning Turkey between Austria and France or that Austria had any desire to possess any Turkish provinces. Austria did not want a war at this time with Russia, which she was quite aware would follow 1

Paget to Mulgrave, Jan. 25, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 79.

1

Politik

Report of Merveldt, Jan. 25, 1806, Beer, Die orientalische Oesterreichs seit 1774 (Leipzig, 1883), pp. 158-159.

jg

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

an occupation of Turkish territory. 1 These reassuring words did not allay Czartoryski's suspicions, and he sent instructions to Razumovski, at Vienna, to represent to Stadion the indispensable necessity of removing all doubts of Russia on the views of Austria in regard to the Ottoman Empire. She must be assured that there existed no concert between Austria and France directed against that Empire, and she would also like to know how Austria would consider any enterprise of Napoleon's against Turkey, what measures she would adopt in such a situation and what changes in the Balkans she would tolerate in order to avoid war with Napoleon. 2 Despatches were received from Italinski, Russian ambassador at Constantinople, reporting that the Porte, after hearing of Austerlitz and the Treaty of Pressburg, had shown pronounced pro-French inclinations. A special French mission in the person of M. L e Roux, Secretary of Talleyrand, had arrived at Constantinople late in January, and soon afterwards the Porte had decided to recognize Napoleon's imperial title in spite of protestations from Italinski.8 T h e unfavorable impressions of the conduct of the Porte created at St. Petersburg by these reports were accentuated by further reports at this time from Russian consuls in Moldavia and Wallachia and also from Prince Constantine Ypsilanti, the hospodar of Wallachia, informing the Russian ministry that unusual Turkish military preparations were being made in the two Danubian provinces. Fortresses and garrisons were being strengthened, and orders had been given for large supplies for these places.4 It was i Merveldt to Czartoryski, Jan. 19, 1806, ibid., p. 159. * Czartoryski to Razumovski, Feb. 6, 1806, Kallay, Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes, 1807-1810 (Wien, 1910), no. 118, pp. 481-482. 3

Cf. infra, pp. 48-49.

* Bradisteanu, Die Besiehungen Russlands und Frankrekhs zur Tiirkei, 1806 und 1807 (Berlin, 1912), p. 60.

FEARS

AND PLANS

OF RUSSIA

AND AUSTRIA

19

true orders had been sent from Constantinople to the Pashas of Chocim, Bender and Ismail, and to commanders at Akerman and Ibrail, to improve their respective fortifications, and Ypsilanti also had been ordered to help in these preparations with all his means.1 Czartoryski, in presenting this information to Emperor Alexander on February 23, advised that it was best to anticipate attacks from Turkish forces by occupying at once Moldavia and Wallachia, the entrance of Russian troops into the provinces to be accompanied by a manifesto declaring that the Russians came not with hostile intentions but rather with the desire of giving protection to Turkey against French oppression.2 Emperor Alexander did not wish to take this measure before there was unquestioned evidence of hostility from Turkey. On the following day Czartoryski presented another memorandum to Emperor Alexander proposing that General Michelson should undertake on the Moldavian frontier a hostile demonstration against the Turks in order to produce fear, the only means of making the Porte reconsider its conduct. Also more gold should be sent to Italinski to use according to circumstances, for corruption of Turkish officials was a common practice.3 At the same time Czartoryski presented to the Emperor for his approval instructions prepared for Italinski, in which the Russian ambassador was ordered to make no more efforts to oppose recognition by the Porte of Napoleon's imperial title, but to oppose acceptance of any other French demands. The Porte should be informed 1

Parant to Talleyrand, Feb. 16, 1806, Documente privitdre la Istoria Romanilor, culse de Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki (Bucuresti 1885-1889) X V I , p. 706. Note:—this reference will hereafter be given in abbreviated form, viz., Documente Hurmuzaki. 2

Czartoryski to Emperor Alexander, Feb. 23, 1806, Sbornik 82, no. 85.

'Czartoryski to Emperor Alexander, Feb. 24, 1806, ibid., 82 no. 86.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

that a Russian army of one hundred thousand men was ready on the frontier of Moldavia, which in case of a threatening danger the Sultan could call to his aid, as Russia could not bear to see T u r k e y become dependent on France. Russia demanded that the Sultan recall orders f o r concentration of Turkish troops in Rumelia and Bessarabia, and instead concentrate his forces on the western frontier of the Ottoman E m p i r e which alone was threatened. Should these orders not be recalled, then Russian troops would occupy Moldavia and Wallachia, not in order to subject them, but as a forehanded measure against planned attacks by the French on Russia, and in order to win back f o r T u r key that independence which she had lost through the influence of France. Occupation of these two provinces by Russian forces would also occur if the Porte ventured to grant Napoleon any f a v o r s which opposed the agreements and interests of both T u r k e y and Russia, or if the Porte undertook any change in the system of administration of affairs in these two provinces without a previous understanding with Russia. If the Porte did not agree to these demands Italinski was at once to inform his government and also commanders of Russian land and sea forces adjacent to the frontiers of Turkey, who would then take the necessary measures to sustain them. 1 These instructions, having been approved by the Emperor, were at once sent off to Constantinople. B y the beginning of March it was evident that the Russian government had definitely decided to occupy Turkish territory if circumstances made it seem necessary. Into this strained situation entered at once the Serbian question. A deputation bringing a petition f r o m Serbians in the pashalik of Belgrade to Emperor Alexander asking f o r his help in their insurrection had been received at St. Petersburg 1

Czartoryski to Italinski, Feb. 24, 1806, ibid., 82, no. 87.

FEARS

AND PLANS

OF RUSSIA

AND AUSTRIA

2I

in January 1806. 1 Czartoryski had also received reports from Russian agents concerning extensive military plans of the Porte for action against the Serbians in the coming spring, the purpose of which, according to most of them, was to exterminate the Serbian race.2 In a memorandum to Emperor Alexander, dated January 23, Czartoryski took up the question of the Serbians. He believed these people would soon be reduced to the lowest level of existence by the Turks if they did not secure help, and that if they could not rely upon Russia they would perhaps in desperation seek the protection of Napoleon who would be certain to use them in realizing his designs on Turkey. Further, those Serbians inhabiting other parts of the Balkans, seeing the indifference of Russia towards the revolting Serbs in the pashalik of Belgrade, would also seek French protection. All this was contrary to the interests of Russia, declared Czartoryski, and he now proposed to Emperor Alexander that the petition of the Serbs be communicated to the Porte and that Russia do everything possible to influence the Porte to abandon its military preparations against them and to accept their proposals relative to their future form of government. If the Porte refused, then the Serbians should be given such aid as would enable them to resist Turkish forces. T o this end a sum of money should be sent at once to the Russian consul at Bucharest and arrangements made through him for securing the necessary munitions for the Serbians from Austria. The Serbian leaders should be secretly advised of these measures and encouraged to resist the Turks and to capture Belgrade. But at the same time they should be urged to assure the Porte of their willingness to remain Turkish subjects if their demands were granted. All efforts should be 1 Yakschitch, L'Europe et la resurrection de la Serbie, 1804-1854 (Paris, 1907), pp. 77-78. The Serbians had been in revolt since 1804. »Ibid., p. 86.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

made by Russia to turn the Serbians from any relations with France. These plans should be communicated to Prince Ypsilanti. 1 Emperor Alexander accepted the proposals of Czartoryski and a special courier was sent off to Italinski at Constantinople with instructions embodying them, and also a warning to Turkey that, in order to safeguard her frontiers, it would be wise to pardon the Serbians and to allow them to keep intact their armies as a protection to that side of the Ottoman Empire most exposed to France. 2 Shortly before sending these instructions Czartoryski had sounded out the Austrian ambassador, Merveldt, as to the views of Austria concerning the Serbian insurrection. Judging from his memorandum of January 23, he had expected that Austria would cooperate in giving assistance to the Serbians if it proved necessary. Merveldt, aware of an offer Austria had made to the Porte in the previous September, of her mediation in making peace with the Serbs and of the Porte's favorable reception of the proposal, replied to the Russian minister that Austria sought to offer her services as mediator for peace but would not interfere directly in the affairs of Turkey and the Serbians. In reply to Czartoryski's declaration that the Serbian question had taken on a new aspect since the Treaty of Pressburg in view of the proximity of the French, and that the Serbians should now be considered not as insurgents against their legitimate government but as defenders against an aggressor, the Austrian ambassador contended that such an attitude might lead his country into trouble with France which she desired to avoid. The geographical position of Russia enabled her to do things from which Austria must abstain.' 1

Czartoryski to Emperor Alexander, Jan. 23, 1806, ibid., p. 87. * Instructions to Italinski, Feb. 15, 1806, ibid., pp. 87-89. ' Report of Merveldt, Feb. 6, 1806, Kallay, op. cit., no. 129, pp. 489-490.

FEARS

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OF RUSSIA

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23

At this same time the Russian ministry was attempting to improve Russia's position through a series of diplomatic negotiations with the European powers. After the humiliating defeat at Austerlitz recriminations had followed between members of the Coalition, especially between Russia and England. Russia accused England of not fulfilling her treaty obligations because English troops had attempted no diversion against France in the recent campaign, thereby allowing Napoleon to concentrate his forces against Russia and Austria. England, on the other hand, made it clear that she did not like the terms of Prussia's adherence to the Coalition in October 1805, negotiated by Russia, charging the latter with disloyalty to the interests of Great Britain, particularly in the obligation assumed by Russia to promote the aspirations of Prussia for Hanover. The Russian court had explained that some satisfaction had to be given Prussia on this question in order to secure her adherence to the Coalition. The British cabinet in reply declared that by reason of the connections of the Royal Family with Hanover they would never permit the independence of this state to be impaired. The question of Hanover remained an issue between Russia and England. The death of Pitt in January did not help relations between Great Britain and Russia. Emperor Alexander had been confident that Pitt would always be loyal to the RussoBritish alliance but he was suspicious of Fox, his successor at the British Foreign Office, because of his alleged proFrench inclinations. This did not mean that either member of the Russo-British alliance questioned its continuance, as the political situation in Europe after Austerlitz made its perpetuation essential for both, in view of the increased power which Napoleon had secured by the Treaty of Pressburg. However, the above differences and others also were subsequently to test theirr alliance. One of the first of these

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

difficulties pertained to the Eastern Question as it took shape in the months following the Treaty of Pressburg. Count Pavel A. Stroganoff had been sent in December 1805, on a special Russian mission to England to discuss with the British ministry the political situation in Europe after Austerlitz. Early in February, following the deliberations of the Russian State Council, instructions were sent to Stroganoff at London that Russia would abandon nothing in the Mediterranean and that, if Napoleon sought to undertake enterprises against the Ottoman Empire, it would be the duty of Russia to come to her defense. However, even if Russia were able to prevent Napoleon from invading Turkey now, there would be constant danger of invasion in the future, as his present position on the Adriatic enabled him at any time to attempt aggression on Turkey by direct penetration from Dalmatia or by maritime expeditions to Morea or Egypt. Therefore, perhaps the only means of checking Napoleon would be to establish a new order of things in the East. Stroganoff should attempt to ascertain the views of the British Cabinet on the question of a " change of system " with regard to Turkey. He should propose, if there was agreement to any changes in the East, that the principle of compensation be adopted by the Allies in order to reestablish the political equilibrium of Europe, in which case Russia could find only in Turkey compensation for the recent aggrandizement of France. Stroganoff was to ascertain what England would want, should such a situation of affairs arise, and what would be her ideas on means of realizing it. Since otherwise Turkey would probably fall under the influence of France, Emperor Alexander was convinced of the necessity for remaking politically certain possessions of the Ottoman Empire. Specifically, it was proposed, in order to reestablish the equilibrium of power in the Mediterranean

FEARS

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25

both for Russia and England, that all the Slavic peoples in the region between Cattaro and Serbia be brought together into a single independent state under the protection of Russia, and that the Greek peoples be united in an Ionian Republic. Both of these states would have as their first object to check France from penetrating into Turkey. The mountainous character of the territory of the proposed state beween Cattaro and Serbia would probably help the hardy native peoples successfully to conduct operations against the French with the help, if necessary, of Russian and English forces. And if these native peoples could not stop a French invasion at least they would never attach themselves to Napoleon, as they would be devoted to Russia by similarities of religion and language. Stroganoff was to ascertain the views of the British Cabinet and to indicate how necessary it was to arrive at an order of things more reassuring in southern and eastern Europe without which there could not be secured for Europe adequate peace with Napoleon.1 Stroganoff received his instructions at London in March at the time when Fox was concerned with his project of a general peace in Europe and was preparing overtures to Napoleon. Fox had already taken occasion to inquire of Count Vorontsov, the Russian ambassador, what indemnity Russia desired in a general peace settlement. Vorontsov replied that it could be most easily secured by Russia from Turkey, to which Fox replied that Great Britain would consider such a project of indemnity only after having made all possible efforts to maintain the integrity of Turkey. The British minister feared that, once the claim of Russia for compensation in Turkey was allowed, France would in peace 1

Czartoryski to Stroganoff, Feb. 6, 1806, Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich, Count Pavel Alexandrovitch Stroganoff (St. Petersburg, 1903, 3 vols.), iii, pp. 9-11 ; Martens, Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie, xi, p. 126.

26

THE NEAR

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QUESTION,

1806-1807

negotiations make a counter claim on Egypt which England could never permit because it would endanger her possessions in India. F o x also feared that Russia's demand for indemnities in Turkey would have a bad effect upon Austria or Prussia. 1 Later Fox, having evidently received the Russian proposals for changes in Turkey as given in the instructions to Stroganoff of February 6, declared to Baron Nicolay, counsellor of the Russian embassy, that he foresaw with sorrow the inevitable destruction of the Ottoman Empire in the near future, in which case England could not work in complete accord with Russia and Austria. England would occupy, in the event of any aggression on Turkey, the island of Crete and the town of Alexandria in Egypt. But Fox made no observations with reference to the Russian proposal for the creation of Slavic and Greek States formed on the ruins of European Turkey. 2 It was evident that Russia and England were not altogether in agreement upon questions relative to the Near East. At the same time that Czartoryski was attempting through the Stroganoff mission to strengthen the alliance of Russia with Great Britain, and sounding out the British Cabinet concerning Russia's plans and views upon the Near East, he was also making efforts to come to an understanding with Prussia. Austerlitz had put Prussia at the mercy of Napoleon who had forced her to sign a treaty of defensive and offensive alliance on December 15, 1805.® In January Czartoryski had presented to Emperor Alexander a memorandum suggesting the line of action Russia should adopt toward Prussia. He maintained that Prussia would always be a natural ally of France against Austria. Also Prussia 1

Report of Vorontsov, March 19, 1806, Martens, op. cit., xi, pp. 121-122. * Nicolay to Stroganoff, April 15, 1806, ibid., p. 126. * Driault, Napoléon et l'Europe, Austerlitz (Paris, 1912), pp. 273-277.

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27

would lean to France because of fears of Russia which were greater than her fears of France, as she knew Russia desired and must have control of the Niemen and Vistula rivers, necessary to her trade. With Austria crippled by her recent defeat, Prussia would fear Russia more than ever and therefore the latter might expect a revival of the old coalition of France, Prussia and Turkey. In the rivalry between Prussia and Austria over German affairs, it should be Russian policy to support Austria so that she would not interfere with Russia in Turkey. While there was no hope of making Prussia a permanent ally of Russia, yet a temporary alliance was necessary to save Europe from domination by Napoleon. Therefore, Russia must now seek to prevent a Franco-Prussian rapprochement. The immediate object of Russian policy should be to get Prussia to enter into defensive engagements with her which should include special provisions for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. Russia should avoid any guarantee of advantages Prussia might gain from complaisance to France. Prussia must be bound to Russia, but must be watched, as a war with her would probably eventually occur.1 A Prussian political mission, represented by the Duke of Brunswick, arrived at St. Petersburg in February. It came to offer the services of Prussia as mediator for securing peace between Russia and France,2 and also to explain Prussia's new relations with France in view of the FrancoPrussian treaty of December 15, 1805. The Prussian mission sought to secure from Russia a promise not to assume the offensive in the Near East and a disavowal of any intention of carrying out such plans there as had been attempted ' Czartoryski to Emperor Alexander, Jan. 17, 1806, Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski (London, 1888, 2 vols.), ii, pp. 118-120. » DeLesseps to Talleyrand, Feb. 25, March 10, 1806, Waliszewski, Le Règne d'Alexandre I (Paris, 1923, 3 vols.), i, p. 186.

28

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by Catherine the Great. 1 It is probable that Prussia sought this promise from Russia for the reason that Prussia by her treaty with France had agreed to recognize and defend if necessary the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and now had good reason to fear the responsibilities she had thereby assumed in view of threatened activity by Russia. The negotiations which followed on this subject were concluded with an exchange of declarations guaranteeing the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. Emperor Alexander informed the Prussian mission not only that he was a friend of Turkey and a guarantor of her integrity, but that the policy of Catherine the Great in the East was entirely abandoned.1 The proffer of mediation by Prussia for Franco-Russian peace was not accepted, as Czartoryski had already initiated direct negotiations with France. A s Frederick William of Prussia had not ratified the Franco-Prussian treaty of December 15, 1805, negotiations had been reopened between the two states in January. But meanwhile Napoleon had determined to have Prussia absolutely on his side in the event either of continued war or of peace negotiations with England. He therefore now declared null the treaty of December 1 5 and forced upon Prussia harder conditions. Besides ceding more of her territory to Napoleon, Prussia was to take immediate possession of Hanover and to close to England her ports on the North Sea and the mouths of the rivers flowing thereinto, and the port of Liibeck; further, Prussia was to recognize and to defend, as agreed in the first treaty, the integrity of Turkey.' 1

Martens, op. cit., vi, pp. 371-372.

1

Acte it documente relative la istoria renascerei Románete publícate de Dimitrie A. Sturdza si C. Colescu-Vartic (Bucuresci, 1885-1901, 9 vols.), vol. i, p. 480. Note:—this reference will hereafter be given in abbreviated form, viz., Documente Sturdza. • Driault, op. cit., pp. 284-290.

FEARS

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29

Trouble for Prussia was evident in such terms, for if the defence of Turkey was likely to provoke a quarrel with Russia, the closing of the ports would mean war with England. However, a treaty with these terms was signed by Haugwitz in Paris on February 15, 1806, and ratified by Frederick William on February 24. On March 4 came the announcement from Berlin that Prussia would take posession of Hanover. Great Britain replied by declaring a blockade of Prussian ports and an embargo on her ships. While Haugwitz, recently appointed successor of Hardenberg in the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave the appearance of maintaining correct relations between Prussia and France, at the same time Hardenberg through secret proceedings was striving for closer relations with Russia. French influence was seemingly intrenched in the Prussian court and official circles; 1 but through the influence of an anti-French group headed by Hardenberg and aided by Queen Louise, the Russian ambassador at Berlin, Alopeus, in March started secret negotiations with King Frederick William. Alopeus proposed negotiations for a RussoPrussian alliance on the following principles: if Russia attempted to force France to evacuate any of her territories, especially Italy, Prussia should guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the possessions of Austria, Denmark and Sweden; Prussia should make military preparations for the ultimate purpose of forcing French troops from Germany; Russia in return would use all means to conserve the independence of Prussia; the question of Hanover would be left open until the conclusion of a general peace in Europe, Russia agreeing meanwhile to attempt to convince Great Britain not to make this question the cause of hostile action against Prussia. 2 1

Martens, op. cit., vi, p. 375.

8

Czartoryski to Alopeus, April 16, 1806, ibid., xi, pp. 376-377.

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

While Russia was making both diplomatic and military preparations, following the Treaty of Pressburg, to meet any attempts at aggression in the Balkan peninsula by Napoleon, at the same time Russian policy included pacific overtures to Napoleon. It was Czartoryski's view that, if Napoleon were found to be content with an empire limited to western Europe, Russia should attempt to come to an agreement with him, as he would not then jeopardize Russia's position and interests in eastern Europe. Hence Russia should ascertain, if possible, the real views of Napoleon upon this question. Meanwhile, Russia should occupy certain strong points on the edge of the Ottoman Empire in order to strengthen her position in any negotiations with Napoleon. Czartoryski proposed the following conditions for negotiations of peace and recognition of Napoleon's imperial title: maintenance of a Russian garrison at Corfu; evacuation of Dalmatia by the French ; recognition of contractual engagements by Turkey with Russia; establishment of an independent state between the Ottoman Empire and Italy. For securing other advantages Napoleon should accept the reëstablishment of the former kingdom of Naples and give territorial indemnity to the King of Sardinia. If Napoleon would yield on none of these points, then Russia should attempt to secure a truce for a prolonged period of time. The purpose of the above conditions, as explained by Czartoryski, was to keep Napoleon from the East, with the object of excluding France from any eventual changes or partitions of European Turkey. The peoples affected by such changes or partitions must be exclusively under Russia's influence. As the territory was too large and its peoples too diverse to be established under one government, the only plan was for Russia to establish separate states— Serbia, Montenegro, Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia— each of them under a monarchial regime. Russia would fix

FEARS

AND

PLANS

OF RUSSIA

AND

AUSTRIA

31

precisely her rights of suzerainty and protection over these states, in order that at all times she should be able to exercise police powers over them, preserve union and harmony between the different peoples and maintain the security of the association of states as a whole. 1 The idea of rapprochement of Russia with France had been encouraged by M. de Lesseps, French consul, who had remained at St. Petersburg in spite of the break in relations in 1805. He now suggested that Napoleon desired an understanding with Russia. 2 The Russian Council of State in making its decision to send a mission to Paris had considered M. de Lesseps as a preliminary agent for the enterprise.3 Czartoryski then approached M. de Lesseps on the question of a Franco-Russian rapprochement.* The latter sent at once his agent, M. Ruffin, to Paris with the proposal. Czartoryski continued conversations with M. de Lesseps on the subject, declaring that the relations between Russia and Great Britain did not necessarily prevent arrangements with France compatible with the interests of the Allies. 5 Czartoryski did not think that overtures to France justified any retrenchment of military preparations by Russia. In a communication of March 22 to the Emperor, he declared that energetic measures must be taken to prepare for future events. Russia was not free from danger of war carried to her frontier, in which case he could not answer for the conduct of the Poles. 4 1

Driault, op. cit., pp. 392-394.

1

Sbornik, 82, no. 100.

* Ibid., 82, no. 73. 4

De Lesseps to Talleyrand, Jan. 28, 29, 1806, Waliszewski, op. cit.,

i, p. 187. 5

Driault, op. cit., pp. 423-424.

• Czartoryski to Emperor Alexander, March 22, 1806, Memoirs Prince Adam Czartoryski, ii, pp. 153-156.

of

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

2

For Austria, as for Russia, the Treaty of Pressburg induced fears of conquest by Napoleon in the Ottoman Empire. As a result of his acquisition of Dalmatia, which gave him direct ingress to that Empire, it was suspected that he might attempt its overthrow or at least secure a considerable extension of his control to the east.1 At Vienna there were also fears of a rapprochement between Russia and France, as it was believed that Russia would willingly come to an understanding with France if there were some inducement in such an agreement for Russian expansion to the east.2 From St. Petersburg came reports of the preoccupation of Russia with the question of her relations with Turkey and of the concentration of several Russian army corps on the Moldavian frontier. Further, the Austrian cabinet was informed that Russia hoped to get ahead of Napoleon for possession of Constantinople and that everyone at St. Petersburg was talking secretly of war. There could be no question, reported Merveldt, the Austrian ambassador, that whatever the conduct of Turkey, Russia was determined to establish a dominant influence in the affairs of the Porte, if necessary by force of arms. Nor did the Russian ministers hide the fact that Russia would even destroy and partition the Ottoman Empire rather than see dominance of the French there and consequent closing of the Bosphorus. It had been decided by the Russian State Council, so the Austrian ambassador informed his government, that if the Porte appeared to be under the influence of France or if it made changes in the internal administration of the Empire and carried out the proposed reforms of the army—all of 1

Stadion to Starhemberg, March 1 1 , 1806, Wertheimer, Geschichte Oesterretchs und Ungarns im erst en Jahrzehnt des 19 Jahrhunderts (Leipzig, 1890, 2 vols.), ii, p. 105. * Beer, Die orientalische

Politik

Oesterreichs

seit 1774, p. 158.

FEARS

AND PLANS

OF RUSSIA

AND AUSTRIA

33

which it was feared would follow the diminution of Russian authority there—then Russia must declare war against Turkey to insure the perpetuation of her influence in European Turkey. T o this end, she was already involved in intrigues with the Serbians, Montenegrins, and other subject peoples of the Orthodox religion in the Ottoman Empire. 1 The possibility that Russia was engaged in inciting the subject Slavic peoples, and especially in furthering the Serbian insurrection, was certain to increase apprehension at Vienna over the situation in the Balkans. The Austrians had hoped for some time to see a pacific settlement of the differences between the revolting Serbs and the Porte, and early in the autumn of 1805 had offered to mediate between them. The Porte had accepted the offer late in October,2 but Austria was then too much occupied by war with Napoleon to give attention to the matter. Soon after the signing of the Treaty of Pressburg, reports came to Vienna that the Serbians were going to ask Russia and Austria for arms and other help. The opportunity now appeared good for Austria to intervene in the interest of peace as she had previously proposed to do. Besides, it was recognized at Vienna that the prestige of the Habsburg monarchy would be increased if it succeeded in bringing peace to the Serbian province.3 It was necessary first to allay the suspicions of the Turks concerning Austrian plans in the Balkans, as there were fears at Constantinople that in the Treaty of Pressburg there were secret agreements between France and Austria providing for aggressive action against the Ottoman Empire. Stadion therefore instructed Stürmer, Austrian ambassador at Con1

Reports of Merveldt, February 20, March 21, 25, 1806; Report of Augilar, March ii, 1806, Kallay, op. cit., nos. 5, 7, 8, 9, pp. 453-455. 2 Report of Stürmer, Oct. 25, 1805, ibid., no. 121, pp. 483-484. ' Ibid., p. 106.

34

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

stantinople, to inform the Porte that Austria would give no promises of help of any kind to the Serbians. 1 Meanwhile the Serbian chiefs, fearful of the growing hostility among the Turkish population in the pashalik of Belgrade, had decided late in 1805 to seek assistance from Austria in intervening at the Porte in their behalf.2 A Serbian deputation arrived at Vienna early in February bringing to Emperor Francis a request for his intervention in securing an armistice with the Turks. After further examination of the views of the deputies, Stadion decided, however, that Austria's intervention would not end the insurrection, since it was evident that the Serbians would not renounce their gains of the past two years without some guarantee other than mere promises from the Porte. He therefore advised the Emperor that it was better to leave the Turks and Serbs to reconcile themselves, but to let them know that neither could secure provisions in Austrian territory so long as they were not at peace. However, in view of the recent union of Dalmatia to the kingdom of Italy it was important to Austria as well as to Turkey that the troubles with the Serbians should cease. Therefore, the Serbians should be assured that Austria desired to see an early agreement with the Porte. 3 The Emperor adopted only a part of these suggestions of Stadion, considering it necessary that Austria continue actively to press Turkey for a reconciliation and also giving instructions that a report be sent to St. Petersburg of all that Austria had done in the Serbian affair. 4 Late in February the Serbian deputation was officially received; it asked 1

Stadion to Stürmer, Jan. 6, 1806, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Türkei, Weisungen, 1806. * Yakschitch, op. cit., pp. 77-78. • Stadion to Emperor Francis, Feb. 6, 1806, Kallay, op. cit., p. 189. 4 Emperor Francis to Stadion, Feb., 1806, Beer, op. cit., p. 190.

FEARS

AND PLANS

OF RUSSIA

AND AUSTRIA

35

for munitions and officers. This request was refused on grounds of Austrian friendship for Turkey, but the deputies were informed that Austria would make representations to the Sultan in their behalf and were urged in turn to modify their demands so that they would be acceptable to the Sultan. 1 The Serbians got no farther in their efforts at this time to secure help from Austria. Accordingly early in March Archduke Charles wrote to Kara George, the Serbian leader, and to the commander of the Turkish forces asking that they suspend hostilities.2 At the same time Emperor Francis wrote Sultan Selim that Austria desired to enter into conference with the Porte on means for securing peace with the Serbians. He offered the friendly mediation of Austria. 8 Such was the policy which Austria had adopted in regard to the Serbians when Russia approached her concerning active cooperation with them. In reply Merveldt was instructed to inform Czartoryski that the presence of the French in Dalmatia and the growth of French influence at Constantinople made suppression of the insurrection important. The position of Austria was too delicate for her to attempt to furnish assistance to the Serbians which the Porte would certainly consider an act of hostility. The French would make use of it to establish closer relations with Turey and also to increase their forces on the frontiers of Austria, a course of events which must be avoided. At the same time Merveldt was to assure Russia that Austria did not contemplate for a moment any agreement with France concerning Turkey. If Napoleon menaced Turkey, Austria would 1

Beer, op. ext., pp. 191-193. Archduke Charles to Kara George, March 7, 1806, Beer, op. cit., p. 193; Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 84. 1

'Emperor Francis to Selim, March 12, 1806, Beer, op. cit., p. 194; Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 84.

36

THE NEAR EASTERN

if possible oppose him.

QUESTION, 1806-1807

A n y attack on T u r k e y w a s con-

trary to A u s t r i a ' s interests.

A u s t r i a w a s making every e f -

fort to remove mistrust at the Porte. 1 A u s t r i a w a s in an embarrassing situation, f o r the Serbian insurrection touched her interests v e r y closely in several ways.

N o t only did it considerably disturb her commerce

with T u r k e y but it w a s feared at V i e n n a that the present movement f o r national independence in the pashalik o f Belgrade might

spread to Austria's

own

Serbian

subjects.

T h e n , too, A u s t r i a w a s apprehensive, as w a s Russia, that N a poleon would use the insurrection as a pretext for extending his power into eastern Europe.

T h u s , f o r commercial rea-

sons, by reasons of her proximity to the Napoleonic empire, by the necessity of keeping quiescent any nationalist uprisings of the peoples within the H a b s b u r g empire, and because of her exhaustion a f t e r the recent war, which prevented her now f r o m risking another, A u s t r i a desired a speedy pacification of the Serbian insurrection. A t the same time E m p e r o r Francis and his ministers were confronted also w i t h difficulties in Dalmatia and the A d r i atic.

A c c o r d i n g to the T r e a t y of Pressburg A u s t r i a w a s to

cede C a t t a r o to Napoleon.

T h e A u s t r i a n commander there

issued on F e b r u a r y 10 a proclamation announcing the coming of the French forces to occupy it.

F o r some time there

had been Russian agents in the region, who, a f t e r this proclamation w a s issued, became very active in rousing the people against the French, declaring that their liberty could be secured only b y appealing to the Russians f o r intervention and that their trade would be ruined under the French w h o were incapable of protecting their maritime commerce. A s this commerce w a s the chief livelihood of the people and as the m a j o r i t y were of the Greek O r t h o d o x

faith, the

agitation of the R u s s i a n agents f o u n d a ready response. 1

Stadion to Merveldt, March 24, 1806, Kallay, op. cit., no. 130, p. 490.

FEARS

AND

PLANS

OF RUSSIA

AND AUSTRIA

37

On February 27 Vladika Peter I of Montenegro held an assembly of his people at which he announced that the Russians were coming to give their promised protection to Montenegro and urged that the people oppose the French occupation of Cattaro. 1 On the twenty-eighth a Russian squadron under Admiral Siniavin appeared before the place. On March 5, with additions to their forces, the Russians in conjunction with the Montenegrins proceeded to occupy positions about Cattaro. During these operations the Vladika with the Russian agents visited Admiral Siniavin on board his ship and later, in a celebration over the capture of an important fortress guarding the city and harbor of Cattaro, he delivered a patriotic harangue to the Russian troops, calling them brother Slavs and urging them to carry on their glorious enterprise.2 The Russians and Montenegrins, having occupied important points around Cattaro, demanded the surrender of the town from the Austrian officials, General Ghislieri and Baron de Brady, the Governor, who without any effort at resistance surrendered at once.® Any hope of political independence which the native peoples in and around Cattaro may have reposed in the Russians, based on the declarations of the Russian agents, were soon dispelled when late in March more Russian troops arrived at the garrison at Cattaro.4 It appeared that the Russians intended to appropriate the place for themselves. The French commander in Dalmatia, General Molitor, made no attempt to take Cattaro from the Russians at the time, since his forces were inadequate for so dangerous an operation. Besides, the possible political complications of the affair made it wise 1 Pisani, La Dalmatie de 1797 a 1815 (Paris, 1893), p. 160; Gopcevic, Geschichte von Montenegro und Albanien (Gotha, 1914), p. 304. 1

Pisani, op. cit., pp. 162-163. 3

4

Gopcevic, op. cit., p. 304. Pisani, op. cit., p. 163.

THE to await action.

NEAR

EASTERN

instructions

from

QUESTION,

1806-1807

P a r i s before taking

further

1

A t this time the R u s s i a n naval forces under

Admiral

S i n i a v i n inaugurated a campaign to take certain important islands off Dalmatia. 1

O n M a r c h 3 1 a f t e r a bombardment

General Ghislieri later attempted to justify his action to General Molitor, by declaring that the surrender of Cattaro was necessary because of a lack of forces to resist the unexpected attack of the Russians. More significant was his explanation that the period fixed for handing over Cattaro to the French had passed by the time tliat the Russians appeared and therefore the Austrians had no more right to occupy the territory. The Russians could regard it as French territory and, being at war with France, they had the right to enter it without opposition from the Austrians, who were not at war with Russia. Ghislieri to Molitor, March 7, 1806, and a letter to an Austrian officer, March, 1806, Pisani, op. cit., pp. 160-161. There were grounds for the charges of Molitor in reply that, as the consignment of Cattaro had not as yet actually been made to the French according to treaty obligations, the Austrians therefore remained responsible for the delivery of the town to the French. The delay of the French in taking possession, Molitor declared, was due to the great natural difficulties of getting forces to Cattaro by land, and also to the presence of formidable Russian naval forces. He charged Ghislieri with intrigue with Siniavin. Molitor to Ghislieri, March 8, 1806, ibid., pp. 161-162. There appears to be no conclusive proof as to the complicity of the Austrian government in the seizure of Cattaro by the Russians. It has been said that at the end of January the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg had expressed himself to the Russian Foreign Office in such a way as to imply that Austria desired to see Russia occupy Cattaro. Martens, Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie, ii, p. 502. The British ambassador at Vienna reported that Stadion had hinted to him soon after the signing of the Treaty of Pressburg that now was the chance for Russia and Great Britain to rescue Dalmatia and Cattaro. Stuart to Mulgrave, Jan. 6, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 49. The surrender of Cattaro without resistance has been explained as in part due to the fact that General Ghislieri had a strong dislike for France, and that he had orders to give way only to a naval force. Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, p. 113. According to the French ambassador at Vienna, Ghislieri upon his arrival at Vienna was not well received by Austrian officials and was subsequently imprisoned. Pisani, op. cit., p. 162. General Molitor broke off all relations with Austrian officials in Dalmatia, reported to Paris the circumstances of the surrender of Cattaro, and made his accusations against Ghislieri.

FEARS

AND

PLANS

OF RUSSIA

AND

AUSTRIA

39

Lissa was taken. On April 10 Curzola with a French garrison surrendered. Subsequent attempts to take Lesina failed. 1 However, Siniavin had accomplished'his purpose of occupying key positions on the sea route which the French would have to take to reach Cattaro, and also of cutting off their sea communications between Ragusa and Spalato. Napoleon had consolidated his control over the entire Italian peninsula by this time, but his position in Dalmatia was not yet secure on account of Russian occupation of Corfu and domination of the Adriatic. Also Russia had strengthened her position on the western frontier of the Ottoman Empire. Napoleon looked upon Dalmatia as a key position for defending Turkey against Russia. In acquiring Dalmatia, he declared, it would be his main object to get in touch with Turkey in order to preserve her independence, which interested France more than that of any other power.2 But between the Isonzo River and Istria was an intermediate strip of Austrian territory, cutting off Dalmatia from direct land connections with other French territory in Venetia. The Adriatic did not offer an always safe means of communication, on account of the presence of strong British and Russian naval forces. It was therefore necessary, concluded Napoleon, to secure a right of way through Austrian territory from Venetia to Dalmatia. 3 He maintained that as the Republic of Venice had formerly had such a right of way, it should now be given to France, though no such provision had been included in the Treaty of Pressburg. Therefore, in March, Napoleon demanded from Austria a convention which would accord in perpetuity the right of 1

Pisani, op. cit., pp. 163-165.

2

Correspondance

J

Ibid., p. 226.

de Napoléon,

xii, p. 189.

4

o

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

way for French troops through Austrian territory to Dalmatian Napoleon was in a position to enforce his demand as he still had a powerful garrison at the fortress of Braunau within the Austrian frontier, though he was supposed to have evacuated Austrian territory. Inasmuch as Austria did not appear to be favorably disposed to the demand, Napoleon adopted a threatening tone, declaring that French forces would remain in Braunau and that Baron Vincent, the new Austrian ambassador to France, would not be received until Austria signed the desired convention. If necessary he would make war on Austria. 2 The French ambassador at Vienna, M. L a Rochefoucauld, was given strict orders to demand his passports if the Austrian Ministry would not negotiate the convention." While French and Austrian relations seemed to be reaching a critical stage in the latter half of March, news arrived at Vienna that General Ghislieri, Austrian commander, had delivered over Cattaro to the Russians. For Napoleon, this event made it imperative that he strengthen the French forces in Dalmatia and secure forthwith the right of way through Austria for his troops. Stadion had already taken the view that Austria was in no position to refuse the convention with Napoleon. The Austrian Minister was also aware that Napoleon would hold Austria responsible for the surrender of Cattaro and would therefore be less conciliatory on the question of the convention. He thereupon adopted a more conciliatory attitude himself, 4 and as a result, 1 Talleyrand to La Rochefoucauld, March 25, 1806. Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, p. n o ; Correspondance de Napolion, xii, pp. 90, 186. 1 Correspondance de Napoleon, xii, p. 199; xii, p. 248; Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, 1801-1810 (Leipzig, 1877), p. 216.

• Talleyrand to La Rochefoucauld, March, 1806, Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, p. n o . 4

Stadion ID Vincent, March 19, 1806, ibid., p. 116.

FEARS

AND PLANS

OF RUSSIA

AND AUSTRIA

41

negotiations made progress at Vienna from the end of March, concluding with a convention, signed April 16, 1806, which gave a specified route for passage of French troops to Dalmatia through Austrian territory.1 In view of the recent surrender of Cattaro to the Russians, Austria was in an embarrassing position. While there seems to be no conclusive evidence that the act of delivering over Cattaro to the Russians was in any way planned by the Austrian government, yet Napoleon held Austria responsible for the act and demanded that she provide for the return of Cattaro to him according to treaty obligations. If Austria attempted to take Cattaro by force under French pressure, there would probably be a break with Russia, and if she refused so to act to avoid trouble with Russia and could not otherwise secure the return of Cattaro, then Napoleon would take more territory from her. It was known at Vienna that Napoleon much desired Austrian Istria with Trieste and Fiume in order to connect Dalmatia with his Venetian possessions.2 Then, to complicate matters further for Austria, Napoleon demanded that she close all her harbors to English and Russian ships until Russia gave up Cattaro.® Already the French ambassador at Vienna had reported his suspicions that the affair at Cattaro was linked with the revolt of the Serbians and Montenegrins, and that it was to the interest of Austria, he believed, to support them in order to prevent French expansion to the east.4 Concerning Napoleon's demand that Austria close her ports to England and Russia, Stadion informed his sovereign that it was clear that the French Emperor intended to 1

De Clercq, Recueil des traités de la France, ii, p. 162. Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, p. 114. ' Talleyrand to La Rochefoucauld, April 16, 1806, ibid. * Report of La Rochefoucauld, April 6, 1806, ibid., p. 116. 2

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

involve Austria in war, and that he would soon seize Austrian territory. He feared that Napoleon was seeking to occupy the entire Adriatic coast, and Austria could not prevent him by arms. 1 Thus, the position of Austria created by the matter of Cattaro was difficult; its implications for her, as Stadion had informed the Emperor, seemed to be either war or another humiliating surrender to Napoleon. The fact was that the defeat of Austria at Austerlitz had undermined the prestige of the monarchy and seriously disorganized its military and financial resources. Stadion had already frankly told Emperor Francis that as a result of the recent war and the humiliating Treaty of Pressburg, the inner political power of the monarchcy would be paralyzed for a long while. Also the external position of the kingdom had been weakened, declared Stadion, by loss of territory which, because of its commercial and military importance, was invaluable. By his annexation of the Tyrol Napoleon had placed himself in a position to be a constant menace to Austria. 2 T o Stadion's warning was added a statement by the powerful Archduke Charles, who told the Emperor that another war with France would be the death knell of the monarchy. He proposed instead that Francis write Napoleon, suggesting that negotiations be started for securing a general peace in Europe. This move would at least give time to Austria. It was urgent that the proposal for peace be initiated at once, as every hour increased the danger of loss of Austrian territory. 3 The advice of Archduke Charles was followed and on May 12 Vincent delivered a letter containing a peace pro1 Stadion to Emperor Francis, April 26, 29, 1806, Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, pp. 116-117; Beer, of. cit., p. 218. 2 Stadion to Emperor Francis, March 6, 1806, Wertheimer, op. ii, p. 104.

cit.,

' Archduke Charles to Emperor Francis, April 30, 1806, ibid., p. 117.

FEARS

AND PLANS

OF RUSSIA

AND AUSTRIA

43

posal from Emperor Francis to Napoleon who, before opening it, threatened to declare war on Austria and to take Fiume and Trieste as equivalents for the loss of Cattaro. A f t e r reading the letter he changed his tone, declaring that he desired above all things to remain on good terms with Austria. 1 Having eased her relations with Napoleon by the convention of April 16, and hoping to avert a crisis by her proposal for a general peace, Austria now began to think of the matter of winning concessions from Russia in regard to Cattaro. Upon the good will of Russia in this matter depended the solution of the other question as to whether Austria must close her ports to Russian and British trading ships, a measure which involved the economic and political wellbeing of the country. However, affairs in the Balkans were not propitious for improvement of Austria's relations with Russia. In April, while Austria was in the midst of the difficulties created by the seizure of Cattaro by the Russians, and while she was seeking to bring about at Constantinople a quick and pacific settlement of the Serbian-Turkish trouble, word was received from Merveldt at St. Petersburg that Russia was evidently going ahead with military preparations on the Turkish frontier. He had been frankly informed by Czartoryski that Russia must be prepared to make war on Turkey if there were any evidences that she had an understanding with France. Besides, he had been told that if Turkey were not to fall under French influence, Russia must be prepared to protect her interests against French aggression. Czartoryski had emphatically declared that navigation of the Bosphorus must remain open to Russian naval forces and that French troops must not be allowed in Egypt. A s f o r Austria, she could either adopt a position of neutrality or ' Vincent to Stadion, May 12, 1806, ibid., p. 118.

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

participate. Czartoryski had suggested that, if she cooperated, she could keep in view claims on Serbia, Bosnia and Turkish Croatia. 1 The Russian foreign minister was here obviously making a bid for Austrian support in developments in the Near East. It was the view of Paget, British ambassador at Vienna —a view shared by his Russian colleague, Razumovski— that Napoleon was demanding the convention from Austria allowing passage of French troops into Dalmatia through Austrian territory, in order to send into Turkey an army whose eventual goal was Constantinople and that this would be the end of the Ottoman Empire. 2 Stadion did not share this opinion, believing that Napoleon was too busy in Italy and Germany for any such project. He rather feared that Russia was seeking to involve the Christian peoples in the Balkans in war against Turkey, and that Austria might by this means eventually be dragged into the war between Russia and France.' These fears of Stadion were strengthened soon after, when another report came from Merveldt stating that it was evident that Russia was trying to perpetuate rather than to end the Serbian insurrection in order to have the aid of the Serbians in case of war.4 In spite of later assurances from Emperor Alexander that no hostilities would be undertaken against Turkey unless France forced them on him, Stadion received no encouragement on the question from Merveldt. At about the same time a report came from Constanti1 Merveldt to Stadion, March, 1806, Beer, Die orientalische Oesterreichs seit 1774, pp. 160-161.

Politik

* Paget to Fox, April 12, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 49. 3 Stadion to Merveldt, April 16, 1806, Beer, op. cit., pp. 162-163. 4 Merveldt to Stadion, April 10, 1806, Kallay, op. cit., no. 131, p. 491. 5 Merveldt to Stadion, May 3, 10, 1806, Beer, op. cit., p. 1 6 1 ; Kallay, op. cit., no. 10, p. 455-

FEARS

AND

PLANS

OF RUSSIA

AND AUSTRIA

45

nople that the Porte had completely refused Austria's offer to mediate for a peaceful settlement of Turkish and Serbian affairs. 1 Stadion at once despatched instructions to Stürmer to inform the Porte that Austria would adhere to her policy of not intervening in the affairs of Turkey unless invited to do so, but that, in case disorder within Turkey should have any ill effect on her provinces, she could not remain indifferent to the question of intervention, the value of which the Porte must then certainly recognize.2 Stadion here gave expression to his fear that grave danger might develop for Austria from national uprisings in Turkey in case they should cause agitation among her own subjects, especially among those of her Slavic peoples who were related to the Slavs within Turkish territory. 1

Stürmer to Stadion, April 25, 1806, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Türkei, Berichte, 1806. 2

Stadion to Stürmer, May 16, 1806, ibid., Weisungen, 1806.

C H A P T E R II W A N I N G OF R U S S I A N AND B R I T I S H I N F L U E N C E IN T U R K E Y I

prolonged negotiations a treaty between Russia and Turkey had been concluded on November n , 1805, continuing the alliance made in 1798 between the two powers. The negotiations had revealed serious differences and also evidences of an anti-Russian sentiment at the Porte, which did not altogether give to the renewed treaty the assurance of stability. The British ambassador at Constantinople, Arbuthnot, had taken a very active part in the negotiations and, according to his instructions, had at all times strongly supported the Russian ambassador, Italinski. He had also acted as mediator whenever the negotiations seemed to come to an impasse over a difficult question threatening the conclusion of the treaty. As a result of his experience Arbuthnot became convinced that the unquestioned prestige of Russia at the Porte was a thing of the past, and he was not at all certain about the future of Russo-Turkish relations 1 With the conclusion of the treaty Arbuthnot prepared to take up negotiations with the Porte for the renewal of the Anglo-Turkish treaty,2 which he had dropped for the time being in order to promote the Russian negotiations. It was one of the chief interests of the British ambassador to perpetuate the Triple Alliance of Turkey, Russia and Great Britain. He also had instructions to renew agreements with AFTER

1

Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, August 4, Sept. 10, 18, 1805; Jan. 20, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 45, 46. » T h i s treaty had been made in 1798. 46

RUSSIA

AND BRITISH

INFLUENCE

IN TURKEY

47

Turkey which would promote the commercial interests of Great Britain in the Levant and guarantee to her equal privileges with the other powers.1 Meanwhile, however, events elsewhere in Europe were to have a decisive effect upon these affairs at Constantinople. When Arbuthnot turned, late in December 1805, to renew negotiations for the conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish treaty he found the Porte hesitant and apparently unwilling to treat. Russian prestige had suffered because of the recall of Russian forces from Italy and the Porte felt that Austerlitz had put Russia in a position where she would soon have to defend her frontiers against an eastward advance of Napoleon. It was Arbuthnot's conclusion, as he reported it to the British Foreign Office late in January, that in this situation the Porte was seeking to gain time, hesitating to make any decisive move, fearing Russia and Great Britain should there be evidences of overtures made by Turkey to France, and on the other hand fearing Napoleon if Turkey developed closer relations with Russia and Great Britain. 2 After news of Austerlitz had reached Constantinople the Reis Effendi conveyed to Ruffin, French charge d'affaires, the felicitations of the Porte, declaring " that it was hoped Napoleon would put back his sword into the sheath only after securing liberty for the Poles and giving the Crimea to the Ottomans." ® And later the Reis Effendi delivered to Ruffin the high-sounding declaration, " God wishes not the destruction of the Ottoman Empire since he has predestined to us a savior in Bonaparte." * While these declara1 Instructions to Arbuthnot, Sept. 12, 1804, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 45. 2 Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, Jan. 20, 1806, ibid., 46. ' Driault, Austerlitz, p. 394.

' Ibid.

8

THE NEAR EASTERN

4

QUESTION,

1806-1807

tions may be regarded as a part of the palaver of Oriental diplomacy, it is also probable that they expressed a real conviction at the Porte that France was henceforth a power to be reckoned with in the Near East. Such fears as existed at the Porte, associated with the victories of Napoleon over Austria and Prussia, came to the surface after the arrival at Constantinople of news of the Treaty of Pressburg, when the Turkish ministers approached Ruffin with evident concern as to what it might mean for their country. They were given repeated assurances that Napoleon had only friendly intentions in regard to Turkey, reminded that Russia was the traditional enemy of Turkey and urged to make no alliance with her, which might mean loss of the friendship of Napoleon.1 At the same time the Austrian minister assured the Porte that there were no secret articles in the Treaty of Pressburg prejudicial to Turkey. 2 In January Talleyrand had sent his secretary M. LeRoux, on a special mission to Constantinople, with a letter to the Reis Effendi in which he pointed out that Dalmatia had been given to France by the Treaty of Pressburg and expressed the hope that, now they were neighbors, good relations might be established between France and Turkey. M. LeRoux had one particular object: to bring to a conclusion at once the question of the formal recognition by the Porte of Napoleon's imperial title. Arriving at Constantinople late in January, he made great efforts to convince the Porte of the sincerity and value of Napoleon's friendship for Turkey. He pointed out the dangers Turkey might incur from Russia, surveying the course of Russian aggression on Turkey during the preceding fifty years. It had been a con1

Ruffin to the Porte, Feb. 2, 1806, Äff. Etr. de Turquie, 211.

' Stürmer to the Porte, Feb. 11, 1806, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Berichte, 1806.

Türkei,

RUSSIA

AND

BRITISH

INFLUENCE

IN TURKEY

49

quest, declared LeRoux, not merely by armies but by intrigues and treaties. Proof of the latter statement could be seen in the situation created by treaties respecting Moldavia and Wallachia, where through the influence of Russia the princes had become almost hereditary in their office and increasingly independent of the Porte. Further proof of the dangers which might accrue to Turkey from treaties with Russia could be seen in the one relating to Corfu, by which Russia had obtained passage through the Dardanelles for her troops, which would be used to oppose Turkey in Albania. Russia had also demanded the right to protect all Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, under cover of which she actually incited them to opposition against Turkey. 1 Upon the question of the imperial title LeRoux was soon able to report that the Porte offered no objection. In fact Selim wrote to Napoleon a friendly letter giving recognition of it and also making the proposal that their common interests were grounds for a good understanding and closer attachment founded on treaties between the two empires.2 At the end of January, after information concerning the contents of the Treaty of Pressburg had reached Constantinople, the Porte informed Arbuthnot that in view of the change of affairs in Europe, negotiations for renewal of the Anglo-Turkish treaty were to be suspended for the time being.3 T o the British ambassador this was proof of the presence of French influence and he informed his government that it was evident that British influence at the Porte was on die decline. To improve the unsatisfactory diplomatic position of Great Britain and Russia he suggested 1

Report of LeRoux, Feb. 3, 1806, Documents vol. ii, p. 325. 2

Hurmuzaki,

Suppl, I,

A f f . Etr. de Turquie, Suppl. no. 24.

' Reis Effendi to Arbuthnot, Jan. 26, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 4g.

THE NEAR EASTERN

5°

QUESTION, 1806-1807

that active measures be taken in the A d r i a t i c by Russian forces in cooperation with the British n a v y .

In fact, A r -

buthnot had already taken action in this direction; upon hearing the terms o f the T r e a t y o f Pressburg he had at once sent a communication to S i r A l e x a n d e r Ball, g o v e r n o r of Malta, u r g i n g the immediate despatch of a British blockade squadron into the Adriatic to prevent Napoleon f r o m taking D a l m a t i a and to induce the native peoples in that region to resist French occupation. 1 T h e evidence of a policy at the P o r t e o f

rapprochement

w i t h F r a n c e gave increasing alarm to the B r i t i s h and R u s sian ambassadors, w h o recognized that if negotiations w e r e to be carried on successfully f o r the renewal of the A n g l o T u r k i s h treaty which would perpetuate the T r i p l e Alliance this evident g r o w t h of pro-French inclinations must be combated.

In opposing it the t w o ambassadors w e r e aided by

the p o w e r f u l families of the hospodars of M o l d a v i a and Wallachia, A l e x a n d e r M o r o u s i and Constantine Ypsilanti, w h o exerted a strong political influence at the Porte.

They

had combated every effort of Ruffin to prevent a ratification o f the Russo-Turkish treaty, to check negotiations f o r the A n g l o - T u r k i s h treaty, and to secure recognition of the imperial title of Napoleon.

In F e b r u a r y M o r o u s i sent a vig-

orous note to the Porte in which he contrasted the weakness of F r a n c e on the sea since T r a f a l g a r w i t h the naval supremacy of G r e a t Britain.

A t t e n t i o n w a s called to the

capture of H a m b u r g by Russo-British forces and to the presence o f Russian forces in H a n o v e r during the previous campaign in G e r m a n y ; and it w a s declared that the people o f Holland were awaiting a favorable moment to revolt against Napoleon.

T h e apparent glory of Napoleon, con-

tinued the note, w a s not real.

Besides, he w a s unfriendly

to T u r k e y and his delay in executing his projects of aggres1

Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, Jan. 28, 1806, ibid.

RUSSIA

AND

BRITISH

INFLUENCE

IN TURKEY

51

sion there had been caused only by the refusal of Russia and Austria to unite with him in these projects. It was, therefore, to the political interest of the Porte, in order not to excite the ill feeling of these two powers, to renew at once her former alliance with Great Britain. 1 Ypsilanti also sent a note to the Porte in which he attempted to present as indecisive the recent victories of Napoleon and claimed that by a secret article in the Treaty of Pressburg he had promised to secure Serbia and Bosnia f o r Austria. He wanted a partition of the Ottoman Empire, and had already proposed it to the emperor of Russia who had refused to consider it.2 The Austrian minister at the Porte also tried to rouse suspicions of Napoleon in the Divan. 3 Behind Ypsilanti, Morousi and their respective families were the Greek Phanariotes, the administrative official class which possessed the political intelligence and experience necessary f o r carrying on the affairs of the Ottoman E m pire. The Sultan had at this time few Turkish ministers capable of putting through any policy and the Phanariotes by appeals to fear and by the use of gold exercised considerable influence at the Porte, often promoting their own ambitions even though they might be antagonistic to the best interests of the Porte. They were strongly impregnated with a sense of their Greek nationality and were communicants of the Orthodox Church. It was through them that Russian influence had always operated at Constantinople. The efforts of Ypsilanti and Morousi to oppose the development of a pro-French policy at the Porte met opposition from a certain group among Turkish officials, and 1 Driault, op. cit., pp. 395-396. 2 5

Documente Hurmusaki, Suppl. I, vol. ii, p. 324.

Report of Stiirmer, Jan. 25, 1806, Austria, Berichte, 1806.

Staatsarchiv,

Turkei,

52

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

especially from the Reis E f f e n d i , who revealed to the French agents the intrigues of the two hospodars, calling them " Greek dogs " . W h e n he was asked by Franchini, the French dragoman, how much longer the present hospodars would be endured, he declared that the Sultan had decided that he would wait only until he had received a communication f r o m his new ambassador at P a r i s , to mete out justice to them. 1 The implications of this statement were rather startling since any attempt made by the Sultan to interfere in the administration of the hospodars over Wallachia and Moldavia would be certain to arouse ill feeling at St. Petersburg. On the other hand any such move would be most welcome at Paris. Meanwhile, the Russian ambassador was having difficulties with the Porte. The expressions of pro-French feeling in Turkish official and public circles, accompanied by much disparaging talk concerning the recent defeat of Russia, had brought Italinski to such a condition of suspicion and jealousy that he had come to believe that a Turkish army assembling near Sophia was intended to act against Russia, though the Porte declared its purpose was to suppress the revolting Serbians. 2 The latter was in fact its actual purpose at this time. Arbuthnot apparently shared the belief of Italinski and was convinced that fear of R u s s i a no longer existed at the Porte, and that instead a conviction was growing there that now T u r k e y had in France a powerful ally against Russia in case of need. He believed that British influence had still some weight, and therefore proposed to the Foreign Office that a British squadron be stationed near by and that plain words be spoken to the Porte concerning any disrespect toward Russia. H e considered that such a 1 Ruffin to Talleyrand, March io, 1806, Documente I, vol. ii, p. 320. 1 Arbuthnot Turkey, 49.

to

Mulgrave,

Feb.

15,

1806,

Hurmuzaki,

British

Foreign

Suppl. Office,

RUSSIA

AND

BRITISH

INFLUENCE

IN

TURKEY

53

determined demonstration at this time would help the cause of the allies, as the Porte realized that Great Britain with her navy could quickly occupy important parts of the Ottoman Empire in Asia and A f r i c a . Since the authority of the Sultan in the European portion of his empire was becoming precarious, Arbuthnot believed this combined danger could be used as an effectual means of restraining the Porte from going further with France. Russia should also make a demonstration of force but unfortunately the Russian ambassador appeared to lack instructions to take such a line of action. 1 In view of this apparent decline of Russian prestige at the Porte and the inability of the Russian ambassador to use coercive measures, Arbuthnot considered it best to dispense with the help of Italinski in the future in negotiations for the Anglo-Turkish treaty. However, the prospect did not look bright by the end of February as the Porte replied to all his requests f o r renewal of negotiations with excuses for delay. Arbuthnot then cautiously adopted tactics of intimidation with the Porte, intimating that British naval and military forces were ready to prevent France from getting a foothold anywhere in the Ottoman Empire. T h e Porte continued obdurate and the British ambassador again strongly urged his government to send immediately a British squadron to cruise in the eastern Mediterranean. 2 By March 1806 British and Russian diplomatic relations at the Porte were increasingly unsatisfactory and the French increasingly influential. 2 F e a r s of a Franco-Turkish rapprochement were intensified early in the spring by reports of Turkish military preparations on the northern frontier. Concomitant with these 1

Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, Feb. 15, 1806, ibid.

2

Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, Feb. 25, 1806, ibid.

54

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807

activities Arbuthnot noted symptoms of increasing hostility toward Russia among the people. He had heard that the Council of Ministers had discussed whether the time were advantageous for Turkey, in conjunction with France, to undertake war on Russia. Although he also heard that nothing had been decided by the Council, he believed that a decision in favor of war had been delayed only through fear of a British naval attack, and about the middle of March he sent a warning note to the Porte to the effect that the interests of Great Britain and Russia were so closely identified that enmity toward one must involve the other. 1 In reply to this note the Reis Effendi declared that T u r key had delayed renewing the treaty with Great Britain in order to avoid giving offense to France until she had adequately developed her defences, and that her present military operations were intended only to prepare against a French invasion. Upon Arbuthnot's demand for a definite answer as to when negotiations for the treaty would be undertaken by the Porte, the Reis Effendi replied after some evasion that the Porte had decided to defer negotiations until a general peace had been established in Europe, which would enable Turkey to conclude a treaty without danger to herself. 2 Soon after the refusal o f the Porte to renew the treaty with Great Britain until a general peace should have been made, news arrived at Constantinople of the occupation of Cattaro by the Russians, which was followed by reports of the Russian occupation of other points on the Adriatic. Rumors were rife in the city early in April of Turkish military preparations on the northern frontier and of Russian troop concentration on the Dniester. The Russian ambassador explained that the latter was intended to protect 1

Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, March 16, 1806, ibid. »Ibid.

RUSSIA

AND BRITISH

INFLUENCE

IN TURKEY

55

Turkey against invasion by Napoleon.1 This explanation was as unconvincing to the Porte as the similar one given by itself for Turkish military preparations had been to the British and Russian representatives. For both sides mistrust and dislike were increased. The effect of these reports of Russian military operations was soon apparent in a declaration from the Porte refusing to allow Russian troops or vessels of war to pass through the Dardanelles. Such a permission, it was explained, would be considered by France an infraction of Turkey's neutrality and a cause of war against her.' The Porte also declared that it was unnecessary for Russia to send more troops to defend the Ionian Islands, as she no longer had any claim to continue her occupation of them on the ground that they must be defended against France.' The Russian ambassador in reply declared that Russia had the right of passage through the Dardanelles by an article in the RussoTurkish treaty, which stipulated free passage for Russian ships.4 Both the Russian and British ambassadors informed their governments that some demonstration must be made if they were to retain their influence at the Porte and force Turkey to recognize their interests.® Italinski suggested to Arbuthnot a movement of Russian troops toward Moldavia at the same time that a British fleet should appear in the Dardanelles.4 Arbuthnot did not specifically agree to this particular plan as he had reasons for being uneasy over the ultimate possibilities of Russian troop movements in the 1

Arbuthnot to Fox, April 9, 1806, ibid. Italinski to Vorontsov, April 24, 1806, Archives Vorontsov, xx. ' Arbuthnot to Fox, April 25, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 49. 4 Italinski to Vorontsov, April 16, 24, 1806, Archives Vorontsov, xx. 5 Arbuthnot to Fox, May 5, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 50. • Italinski to Vorontsov, April 24, 1806, Archives Vorontsov, xx. 2

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Balkans, but he wrote F o x that Russia must act or back down, as the Turks had evidently such contempt for her now that it was impossible for her to rely longer on fears she might inspire at the Porte. Energetic action only could restore her influence there and the situation might end in war. 1 Besides these difficulties between the Porte and the allies over the renewal of the British-Turkish treaty and the matter of right of way for Russian war vessels through the Dardanelles, there developed at this time another issue which further strained good relations. It was the question of the barats. The Porte had given to European states the right to issue barats, that is, letters patent of naturalization of Christian subjects of Turkey, giving to the possessors exemption from the taxes and laws of Turkey and virtually making them subjects of the foreign state issuing the barat. The system had been used particularly at first as a means for securing interpreters (dragomans) in the service of foreign diplomatic and commercial representatives. However, in time foreign embassies had come to use more frequently their own interpreters. The subjects of Turkey invested with the barats had turned their protection to use for trade purposes, especially the Greeks, Jews and Armenians, and the number of Turkish subjects possessing them had considerably increased. Russia, who had possessed the right since 1774, had especially in recent years granted each year barats bringing under her authority thousands of Turkish subjects, who also had religious and often national ties with her. The practice had become particularly objectionable to the Porte where Greek merchants and trading vessels, having secured barats from Russia, proceeded to demand for themselves all the privileges secured to native Russians by treaties with Turkey. The result was that Turkish mer1

Arbuthnot to Fox, May 5, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 50.

RUSSIA

AND BRITISH

INFLUENCE

IN TURKEY

57

chants and trading vessels were often at a disadvantage in business, and complained loudly to the Porte. 1 Having come to see that the system of barats was undermining its political sovereignty and jeopardizing its economic interests, the Porte had made efforts at various times to check the practice, objecting especially to granting barats to traders. But these attempts had always been stopped by the united opposition of the powers. However, the situation in international politics after Austerlitz, with its adverse effect on the prestige of Russia at Constantinople, induced the Porte to act again upon the matter. On January 1 7 and March 25, 1806, it issued a circular letter to the powers declaring its intention to enforce regulations limiting the use of the barats. The powers protested as usual that such limitation was a violation of treaties and the Capitulations. At the end of April the Porte sent another note to them. Both the British and Russian ambassadors were most vehement in their protests; in fact Italinski at first refused to accept the second note. Arbuthnot informed his government that the measure was particularly directed against Russia, who, the Porte believed, because of her war with France, was not in a position to menace Turkey. From secret sources, he declared he had reason to believe that Turkey was considering an attack on the Crimea, and that there was a prevailing idea among Turkish troops on the way to the northern frontier that a war with Russia was not f a r distant.2 A s a matter of fact Russian forces had been for some time assembling on the Dniester under the command of General Michelson. Because of the necessity of keeping a considerable force on the western frontier of Russia, only about thirty thousand troops were allowed at 1 Driault, La Politique orientate de Napoleon, 1806-1808 (Paris, 1904), P- 342 Arbuthnot to Fox, May 5, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 50.

58

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

this time for his army, and Michelson, recalling that in previous wars with Turkey, Russia had recruited volunteers from among Turkish Christian subjects, saw now the possibility of increasing his forces by accepting volunteers from among Serbian and Bulgarian refugees from the civil wars in the Ottoman Empire. 1 Early in February it was known that orders had come from Constantinople that the whole Turkish frontier on the side of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia should be put in a state of defence. The pashas of Chocim, Bender and Ismail, and officials at Akerman and Ibrail had received definite orders to improve fortifications in their respective territories, and Prince Ypsilanti, governor of Wallachia, had been ordered to help with all his means.2 Francis Summers, British consul at Bucharest, informed his government in the middle of April that the Porte had issued firmans to Turkish officials in Moldavia and Wallachia denying rumors that Turkey intended war upon Russia, and ordering that such rumors be suppressed. At the same time, however, he learned that firmans had been sent to the hospodars of these provinces, ordering them to take every measure possible to accelerate the movement of artillery and munitions for the fortress in Bessarabia." The Russian consul at Bucharest was actively cultivating pro-Russian sentiments among the boyars of Wallachia. However, according to the French consul, Parant, many of them did not want to pass under the control of Russia and were frightened by rumors that the province was to be given to Austria. 4 In fact Parant and the other French agents 1 Yakschitch, L'Europe et la résurrection de la Serbie, 1804-1834, p. 95; Kallay, Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes, 1807-1810, p. 12. 4

Parant to Talleyrand, Feb. 16, 1806, Documente

3

Summers to Fox, April 17, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 53.

Hurmuzaki,

* Parant to Talleyrand, March 2, 1806, Documente pp. 706-707.

xvi, p. 706.

Hurmuzaki,

xvi,

RUSSIA

AND BRITISH

INFLUENCE

IN TURKEY

59

were promoting this anti-Russian sentiment among the boyars in both provinces. Further, they were successful in recruiting a considerable number of the natives for the French armies, and were also sending Greeks into Morea to help French agitation in that region. It was the view of Summers that the Russians would have to exercise much tact and caution to prevent the opposition in Wallachia from becoming serious; but with the aid of the influence exercised by Prince Ypsilanti, he believed the Russian agents would be able to hold the boyars loyal to Russia. 1 At the same time there were reports of operations against the Serbians by a large Turkish army concentrated in Bosnia. In March the Serbian rebels were in a critical position. Their deputation to Vienna had returned without having succeeded in getting help from Austria. 2 But prompt assistance was imperative and they now sent an appeal to General Michelson for soldiers and munitions.8 Having no orders to give aid to the Serbians, he sent on their request to St. Petersburg, at the same time asking for authority to raise volunteer troops of Serbians for the Russian army. 4 Early in April detachments from the Turkish army in Bosnia crossed the Drina river into the pashalik of Belgrade, pillaging many Serbian villages. The Serbian rebel forces, much as they were in need of munitions and men, were forced to take action, and on April 1 5 they defeated a Turkish force near Valievo (Valjevo) thereby checking for the moment the advance of the Turkish army." Meanwhile, the Serbian question had become a subject of 1

Summers to Paget, April 18, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 79. Cf. supra, pp. 34-35. ' Letter from Serbian chiefs to General Michelson, March 18, 1806, Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 93. 4 Michelson to Czartoryski, April 10/22, 1806, Kallay, op. cit., no. 18, 2

P- 456. 3

Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 93.

THE

6o

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

diplomacy at Constantinople. On March 3 1 Italinski delivered to the Porte a note embodying the instructions of Czartoryski of February 24 1 demanding recall by Turkey of troops being assembled on her northern frontier and threatening, if this were not done, that Russian troops would occupy Moldavia and Wallachia, as a measure of protection both for Russia and for Turkey against France. This occupation would also occur if Turkey gave new favors to France or undertook changes in the permanent administration of the two provinces without first consulting Russia. If the demands were not accepted by the Porte, then the Russian ambassador would inform Russian military and naval commanders that they could take necessary measures." This communication to the Porte also enclosed the petition of December 1805, from the Serbian chiefs to Emperor Alexander, accompanied by a note urging the Porte to adopt a conciliatory policy towards the Serbians/ At this time Stürmer, the Austrian minister, received instructions to act in concert with the Russian ambassador in securing from the Porte the adoption of a conciliatory policy toward the Serbians. Stürmer sent to the Porte the letter of March 1 2 from Emperor Francis to Selim, offering his services as mediator for peace with Serbians, and also copies of the letters of Archduke Charles to the Serbian chiefs and Turkish commanders requesting cessation of hostilities.4 The Porte declined the offer of mediation by Austria, declaring that clemency had been used towards the Serbians to no avail, and that the Porte was now forced to use other means to secure obedience of its subjects. 5 1 s a

Cf. supra, pp. 19-20. Italinski to Reis Effendi, March 31, 1806, Yakschitch, op cit., pp. 89-90. Ibid.

* Stürmer to Reis Effendi, April 8, 1806, ibid., p. 91. * Stürmer to Stadion, April 25, 1806, Austria, Berichte, 1806.

Staatsarchiv,

Türkei,

RUSSIA

AND BRITISH

INFLUENCE

IN TURKEY

6l

Italinski expected a more satisfactory response than Austria had received upon the Serbian question, but in this he was disappointed, f o r the Porte replied to him, that the Serbian question was a domestic affair which would be settled without delay as all preparations had been made to bring the rebels to respect their obligations as Turkish subjects. 1 While Turkey had refused the intervention of Austria and Russia in Serbian affairs, there was yet France to consider, who had not as yet intervened. The Porte believing that the Serbians, if abandoned by Russia and Austria might turn to France for aid, hastened now to approach French officials on the matter. Ruffin, French chargé d'affaires, was quite aware of the recent efforts of Russia and Austria at the Porte and their failure concerning the Serbians. The Porte now approached him on the question, insinuating that if the Serbians appealed to Napoleon, it was believed at the Porte that his professedly friendly sentiments for Turkey would cause him to refuse any help to the rebel Serbians. 2 Ruffin, while he had made no overtures on the Serbian affair, had yet watched it closely and had gotten possession of the Russian correspondence on the subject, which he now forwarded to Paris. 3 At the same time he assured the Porte that Napoleon would have nothing to do with the Serbians as rebels.4 The Porte believed that it had now succeeded in warding off all foreign diplomatic intervention which might produce a peaceful settlement of the affairs of the rebellious Serbians in accordance with their demands. F o r some months extensive military preparations had been made f o r deliver1

Reis Effendi to Italinski, April 26, 1806, Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 92.

2

Callimachi to Ruffin, May 14, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 215.

' Ruffin to Talleyrand, May 15, 1806, ibid. ' Ruffin to Callimachi, May 14, 1806, ibid.

62

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

ing a crushing blow to the Serbians and forcing them to submit. There was every reason for the Porte's desire to crush the rebellion as soon as possible and also for its doubt of the sincerity of the proposals f o r a peaceful settlement from Russia and Austria. There were official reports before the Turkish ministry and also general rumors at Constantinople at this time ( A p r i l ) that Russian agents were helping the Serbians to secure munitions and were giving promises of active help from the Tsar. 1 A s f o r Austria, since the Treaty of Pressburg, there were suspicions at the Porte that she had secret plans for compensating her recent losses by acquisitions of Turkish territory which would be furthered by promoting civil war in Turkey. T h e presence of Austrian troops on the Turkish frontier seemed to confirm these views. Besides, it was believed that the Serbians within the Austrian empire would seek to interest their government in favor of the rebels. Moreover, by this time Turkish agents had probably noticed the effects of an order which Emperor Francis had given to Austrian frontier officials to allow free access into Austria of Serbians from Turkey, provided however, that they should lay down their arms. 2 While this was not intended as any aid to the rebels, it appeared as such to T u r k ish officials inasmuch as it permitted rebellious subjects to find refuge in Austria. Suspicions of Austria at the Porte were also increased when the latter heard of the convention with France, allowing the passage o f French troops through Austrian territory to Dalmatia. T h e Porte demanded some explanation from Austria as to her intentions concerning the Ottoman Empire. T h e Austrian minister, Sturmer, 1 Arbuthnot Turkey, 50.

to

Wellesley,

May

5,

1806,

British

Foreign

Office,

2 Emperor Francis to Stadion, April 8, 1806, Kallay, op. cit., no. 124, p. 487; Beer, Die orienlalische Polittk Oesterreichs set 1774, p. 194.

RUSSIA

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63

unable to make any statement concerning the Franco-Austrian convention, could only ask that Turkey believe in the loyalty of Austria's friendship, and in turn appeal to Stadion for instructions in order that he might speak with more certainty to the Porte. 1 These suspicions at the Porte of Russian and Austrian support of the Serbian insurrection were founded in fact upon inferences and half truths. There is no evidence that the Austrian Government at this time was in any w a y attempting to help or desired to prolong the Serbian insurrection, nor that it seriously considered any plan to take any part of the Ottoman Empire. Rather, it had become the conviction of the Austrian ministry that the dictates of a sound policy for Austria were to procure and keep peace in the Balkans. A s f o r Russia, her situation was different, but there is no evidence that down to the summer of 1806, responsible Russian officials at St. Petersburg had given orders for munitions, etc., to be sent to the Serbians. W h e n the second Serbian deputation appeared at St. Petersburg in May, only vague promises of money and arms were given to them. 2 Russia w a s not yet ready to break openly with Turkey. N o r were there any official Russian agents with the rebel Serbians helping them to secure munitions. It is true there had been informal communications between the Serbians and the Russian consuls in Wallachia and Moldavia, who indicated a friendly interest in their struggle, but no official grants of aid had been made. There can be no denial o f the f a c t — i n view of the approved memoranda of Czartoryski, the development of Russian forces on the Turkish frontier, and the activities of the Russian consuls in the t w o above mentioned provinces in cultivating pro-Russian senti' Stürmer to Stadion, May Berichte, 1806. • Kallay, op. cit., p. 14.

10, 1806, Austria,

Staatsarchiv,

Türkei,

64

THE NEAR

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QUESTION, 1806-1807

ment—that Russia w a s preparing to act, if necessary, against Turkey. But there is every evidence in this respect f o r interpreting Russian policy during the first half o f 1806 as one largely governed by exigencies of the war with France, which it was believed might involve Turkey. Russia's relations with the Serbians were therefore more concerned at this time with considerations of the potential aid the Serbian rebel forces could give her in case of French aggression in the Balkans or of a break with T u r k e y . It is with this view of her policy that one must consider the first serious measure initiated by Russia, seeking to establish close relations with the revolting Serbians. In reply to his request, General Michelson had been given authority f r o m St. Petersburg to enlist volunteer troops for the Russian army from refugee Serbian and Bulgarian subjects of T u r k e y . H e put in charge o f this work a certain Lieutenant Ugritic f r o m Trebinje, generally known there as Novokritenni Bey. 1 T h e purpose of enlisting these volunteers in the Russian army was to increase its size. In view of what followed, it is probable that the Russian commander also had in mind their value as a means, if circumstances should require it, for establishing working relations with the rebel Serbian forces. F o r soon afterwards, Michelson appointed Lieutenant Ugritic to a mission to the headquarters of the Serbian rebels, instructing him to ascertain the sentiments of the Serbian people toward Russia, and also the most favorable conditions in which Russia could use her forces and also those of the Serbians in hostile operations against Turkey. 2 E a r l y in June, U g r i t i c reached the Serbian headquarters before Belgrade and was warmly received by K a r a George and the other Serbian leaders, w h o took this mission to 1

Kallay, op. cit., p. 12.

' Kallay, op. cit., pp. 12-13; Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 93.

RUSSIA

AND BRITISH

INFLUENCE

IN TURKEY

65

mean that Russia was coming seriously to their aid. They asked him to remain with them in order that they might have his advice in their military operations. But Ugritic had instructions to return as soon as possible.1 When he left, he carried a letter from Kara George to General Michelson, asking for gold, munitions, troops and officers, and declaring that, if this help were given, Russia could count on the thanks of the Serbian people.* 1 Kallay, of. cit., p. 13; Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 96. * Kara George to Michelson, June 18/30, 1806, Kallay, op. cit., p. IJ.

C H A P T E R III N A P O L E O N ' S P O L I C Y IN T H E N E A R

EAST

I

WHEN, by the Treaty of Pressburg, Napoleon was given possession of southern Italy, Venice, and Dalmatia, he was placed in a position in which he might well aspire to play a direct and influential part in the internal affairs of Turkey, recover for France her commerce in the Levant, and secure that political ascendancy at the Porte which France had so long possessed but which in recent years had been usurped by Great Britain and Russia. Now again, as after the Treaty of Campo-Formio in 1797, he saw before him in the possession of Italy the means to secure French control of the Mediterranean; while from Venice and Dalmatia the way lay open for him into the Balkan peninsula and the Orient. But before he could give much consideration to any measures for realizing such aspirations, he had to consolidate his power nearer home, in Germany and Holland, and also to establish firmly his position in Italy and Dalmatia, as the basis for any expansion of French influence in the Levant. Immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Pressburg, French forces under General Massena proceeded to occupy the kingdom of Naples, Napoleon having announced that the Bourbon dynasty of this kingdom no longer existed. The British and Russian expeditionary forces which had occupied Naples in November 1805, withdrew from southern Italy in January as the French army advanced. The British retired to Sicily, the Russians 66

NAPOLEON'S

POLICY

IN THE NEAR

EAST

67

to Corfu. On February 15, the French forces under Joseph Bonaparte, governor general of the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, entered the city of Naples.1 With the advance southward into Italy of the French army of occupation, Admiral Collingwood, commanding the British naval forces in the Mediterranean, expected the appearance at any time of a French squadron from Cadiz, with the purpose of taking Sicily. This he did not intend to allow.2 Consequently, he refused appeals from King Ferdinand and Queen Marie-Caroline of Naples for help from British forces in opposing French invasion of their kingdom, considering it necessary to use all naval forces to prevent the French squadron from entering the M e d i terranean, and to concentrate British troops in Sicily to protect it." This became the first object of British naval operation in the Mediterranean in the spring of 1806. Following their entrance into Naples, the French were engaged for some time in confirming their occupation of southern Italy, to which there was considerable local resistance.4 Napoleon kept pressing Joseph to make preparations for the occupation of Sicily in order to make the conquest of Italy complete and to expel the British who would be a menace to the French régime in Italy so long as they remained in Sicily. He urged immediate operations against Sicily before British forces should be strengthened at this point. Joseph replied that the capture of Sicily would not be easy, as the British were firmly entrenched at Messina and were supported by a strong fleet and he doubted whether the French could secure the necessary naval supremacy for the 1

Driault, Napoléon en Italie, 1800-1812 (Paris, 1906), pp. 385-392. * Collingwood to Elliott, Feb. 1806, Memoirs and Correspondence of Vice Admiral Lord Collingwood (London, 1828), pp. 188-190. * Collingwood to Ferdinand, March 6, 1806, ibid., pp. 193-194. 4 Driault, op. cit., pp. 385-392.

68

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

expedition. Besides, all available French military forces must be used to take Gaeta. In spite of these objections Napoleon urged the expedition, proposing that an appeal be made to the people of Sicily by pamphlets presenting the advantages of French rule and promising protection for their commerce.1 Simultaneous with the consolidation of the Bonapartist regime in Italy had come the seizure of Cattaro by the Russians early in March, followed by their occupation of the islands of Lissa and Curzola in the Adriatic. Possession of these islands enabled the Russians to cut off the communication of Napoleon by sea with his new possessions in Dalmatia as well as to threaten the French occupation of this territory. The English at Malta since 1800 had always seriously jeopardized the sea route to the Levant for the French, and now with the Russians at Cattaro commanding the Dalmatian littoral, and at Corfu commanding Albania and Morea, it appeared that a barrier lay also across the path of French expansion to the east by the land route through the Balkans. It was therefore with reason that after the occupation of Cattaro by the Russians Napoleon gave special attention in the Near East. Since the Treaty of Amiens, Napoleon had not ceased to give attention to the improvement of his political relations with Turkey. Efforts in 1804 and 1805 to secure from the Sultan recognition of his imperial title had failed, largely because of the influence of Russia and Great Britain. After the signing of the Treaty of Pressburg, it had been one of Talleyrand's first acts to send his secretary, M. LeRoux, to Constantinople with intelligence of the acquisition by France of Dalmatia and also with overtures for better understanding between France and Turkey, a first test of which should be recognition by the Porte of Napoleon's im1

Ibid., p. 395.

NAPOLEON'S

POLICY

IN THE NEAR

EAST

69

perial title. This recognition, granted as we have noted in spite of the opposition of the Russian and British ambassadors, 1 was received at Paris with great satisfaction. And in fact, during the several months immediately following the Treaty of Pressburg, Napoleon received increasing evidence that the Porte would favorably accept overtures from him for improvement in their relations. Ruffin had reported the eloquent felicitations of the Reis Effendi over the victory at Austerlitz, with his suggestion that Napoleon adopt the role of conserver of the Ottoman Empire. Napoleon also heard of the opposition of the Porte to renewal of its treaty with Great Britain, of the decline of Russian influence, and of the growing mistrust of Russia in connection with the Serbian rebellion. Most impressive evidence of a change of policy at the Porte toward France was the news of the appointment of a Turkish ambassador to Paris. Desiring more exact information concerning political conditions within the Ottoman Empire in order to determine measures necessary to increase his influence there, and also to improve French commercial relations in the Near East, Napoleon prepared in the spring of 1806 to despatch French agents to several important places. In March he appointed Reinhard, consul-general of French commercial relations in Wallachia and Moldavia. 2 This country was important because of its proximity to Russia, which made it a strategic point for the French in getting information upon internal affairs in Russia, especially significant now because of evidences of military preparations on this frontier. For the past two years the French consuls in the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia had reported increasingly active intrigue by Russian agents 1

Cf. supra, p. 49.

* Talleyrand to Parant, March 26, 1806, Documente Hurmusaki, xvi, p. 708.

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807

among the boyars and at the courts of the respective hospodars, to the end of promoting a favorable sentiment toward Russia. It had been repeatedly reported by the French agents that both hospodars were tools of Russia and opponents of France, and that they were really aiming at political independence from Turkey. In spite of the evidence of the success of Russian intrigue in the administration of the hospodars and among a portion of the native aristocracy, there were grounds for hope in the spring of 1806 that French influence might become effectual in this region as a means for combating Russian designs of aggression in the Balkans, which would be dangerous to the eastern frontier of the Napoleonic empire as it stood after the Treaty of Pressburg. Reports from the French consuls at Bucharest and Jassy at the beginning of the year had indicated that there was pro-French sentiment among boyars in both provinces, who feared that realization of their independence from Turkey through Russia would only mean falling under the latter's hegemony. 1 Parant, consul at Jassy, informed Talleyrand that some of the boyars in Moldavia were distinctly pro-French and were ready to place themselves under the protection of a foreign power other than Russia. The mass of people were passive in political questions and unconcerned with Russian intrigue. There was talk at Jassy of a manifesto by Napoleon which would guarantee to Moldavia a greater degree of political autonomy and the restitution to her of Bukovina. There was also interest in the question of the possibility of the reestablishment of Poland by Napoleon and should the French armies advance eastward, as seemed possible, and come near to Moldavia, there were many Poles and also natives in the province ready to enlist in the French army to help the cause. R e p o r t s of Parant, Dec. 22, 1805; and St. Luce, January 4, Feb. 3, 1806, ibid., pp. 695-696, 697-698, 702-704.

NAPOLEON'S

POLICY IN THE NEAR

EAST

71

Provisions could be procured by the French army f r o m this province. 1 St. Luce, French consul at Bucharest, was having difficulty in combating the activities of British and especially Russian agents who were circulating false news of defeats of French armies and opposing his efforts to circulate bulletins of the Grand A r m y announcing the recent French victories. Ypsilanti, the hospodar of Wallachia, was antiFrench, and was supporting the activities of the British and Russian agents, furnishing provisions to Russian forces along the Dniester river, and in correspondence with the revolting Serbians. However, among the mass of people there was general discontent with the existing administration of the province due to the heavy taxes, and to rapine in the country. Among the boyars in Wallachia there were a goodly number, headed by the powerful Ghika family, who were well disposed toward France and who disliked the Russians. However, as the boyars were generally poor, those who were anti-Russian had to hide their opposition and simulate devotion since only this way could they secure and hold official positions in the administration of the province, the income f r o m which offices w a s an economic necessity. 2 These reports f r o m the French consuls at J a s s y and Bucharest were both hopeful and useful to Napoleon in the spring of 1806. B y playing up the menace of Russian intrigue with Turkish subjects, he might expect to weaken the influence of Russia and Great Britain at the Porte and make friendship with France seem a necessity. In order to decide on measures necessary f o r promoting closer relations with Turkey, Talleyrand in April asked Ruffin at Constantinople to send definite information con1 Parant to Talleyrand, Dec. 22, 1805, ibid., pp. 695-696. 2 St. Luce to Talleyrand, Jan. 4, Feb. 3, 1806, ibid., xvi, pp. 697-698, 702-704.

72

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 18(»-1807

cerning the Serbian insurrection and the success of efforts by the Porte to check it. He was also to report on the political situation in Bosnia, Albania and Morea and to indicate by what improvement in their administration order might be secured and the authority of the Porte re-established. This information was desired by the Emperor that he might make use of it at the favorable moment.1 A n important step in the development of Napoleon's plans at this time with respect to eastern affairs was the appointment on May 2, 1806, of General Horace Sebastiani as French ambassador at Constantinople. Not since December, 1804, when Brune had left after failing to secure recognition of the imperial title, had there been a French ambassador there. Napoleon also prepared to make political contacts at other places in the Ottoman Empire. On May 12, Pierre David was appointed French consul at Travnik, residence of the Pasha of Bosnia. In fact, his mission was more political than commercial, and he was instructed to observe constantly and keep his government well informed on political affairs in Serbia and Albania. 2 At this same time Bessieres, who had been at Janina since March learning of the views of Ali Pasha, the most powerful political figure in Albania, and seeking to promote closer relations between him and Napoleon, returned to Paris early in June reporting favorable results of his mission.® Napoleon instructed Talleyrand to send a friendly letter to Ali acknowledging his gifts and avowals of friendship, and to urge upon him the necessity of preventing the Greeks in Morea from aiding Russia. Ali should also make efforts to help subdue the Serbian rebellion. The letter went so far as to hint that, if 1

Talleyrand to Ruffin, April 11, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 211. * Instructions to David, May 12, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 211. 8

Cf. infra, p. 285.

NAPOLEON'S

POLICY

IN THE NEAR

EAST

73

Corfu fell into the hands of Napoleon, he could place it under no better guard than that of Ali Pasha. 1 B y this last guarded proposal Napoleon intended if possible to keep Ali Pasha within his political orbit. He had touched upon a subject which he knew was close to the heart of Ali, and he intended to make political capital out of it to his own advantage. It is to be noted, however, that he did not offer to give him Corfu. A t the end of May there arrived in Paris the Turkish ambassador extraordinary, Mouhib Effendi, bringing from Selim official recognition of the imperial title. On June 5, Napoleon received him, and afterwards issued a public declaration that most cordial relations existed between Turkey and France. All of which eventually reached the Foreign Offices at London, Vienna and St. Petersburg and was certain to have its effects. Soon after this conference, Talleyrand placed in Napoleon's hands pieces of Russian correspondence with the Porte received from Ruffin concerning Russian threats of invasion of Turkish territory and of Russian intervention in Serbian affairs. 2 It appeared to Napoleon that the Serbian > Napoleon to Talleyrand, June 19, 1806, Correspondence dt xii, no. 10378.

Napolion,

»Ruffin to Talleyrand, May 15, 1806, Aff. Etr. de TurquU, a n . Of particular importance in this correspondence was the note of March 31 from Italinski, demanding the recall of orders for concentration of Turkish troops in Rumelia and Bessarabia and requesting their transfer to the western frontier to protect Turkey from a French attack. If this were not done, then Russian troops would occupy Moldavia and Wallachia in order to prevent Turkey from falling under the influence of France. Another important revelation was given to the French concerning Russian relations and projects with respect to Turkey, by the Russian despatches Ruffin had sent on the Serbian question. They disclosed the efforts of Italinski, following instructions from Czartoryski (of February 15), to secure a pardon from the Porte for the rebel Serbians and to utilize them for guarding the Turkish frontier against the French. Ruffin had also reported to Paris the efforts of Austria to mediate with the Porte on

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

rebellion was the first thing to be settled in order to destroy Russian influence in Turkey and to preserve the Ottoman Empire. If the Serbians, he wrote to Talleyrand, secured the degree of independence already possessed by Moldavia and Wallachia, then Morea and other parts of Turkey where there were large numbers of Greeks would aspire to the same status, and the end of the Ottoman Empire would be at hand. 1 A note was despatched to the Porte calling attention to the serious danger of allowing the Serbian rebellion to continue since it promoted the designs of Russia on Turkey. If Russia really desired to conserve the Ottoman Empire, she would cease giving help to the Serbians and would offer her aid in suppressing the revolt. In fact, however, Russia desired to see the dismemberment of Turkey, and she had a definite plan for pushing the Turks out of Europe back into Asia. If the Serbians gained their independence, there was no doubt but that the Greek provinces would also seek the same end. The fatal results of such independence could already be seen in Moldavia and Wallachia which were falling under the control of Russia. 2 the Serbian question and the intrigues of Morousi, hospodar of Moldavia, against the French. Cf. supra, pp. 50-51, 61. Report of Ruffin, March 30, 1806, Documente Hurmusaki, Suppl. I, ii, p. 335. Bradisteanu, Die Bcziehungen Russlands und Frankreichs sur Turkei in den Jahren 1806 ttnd 1807, p. 76. 1

Napoleon to Talleyrand, June 11, 1806, Correspondance xii, no. 10346.

de

Napoléon,

* Talleyrand to Mouhib Effendi, June 23, 1806 ; Talleyrand to Ruffin, June 23, 1806, A f f . Elr. de Turquie, 212. With the note to the Porte Napoleon sent a personal letter to Selim in which he intimated that the rebellions in Turkey were being encouraged by Russia, and that the governors of Moldavia and Wallachia were agents of this power. He also suggested that Russian vessels should be prevented from passing through the Dardanelles. Selim was assured he could count on help from Napoleon against his enemies. Napoleon to Selim, June 20, 1806, Correspondance de Napoléon, xii, no. 10382. Talleyrand also sent friendly letters to the Reis Effendi, the Grand Vizier, Prince Alexander Soutzo, and Prince Callimachi, first dragoman of the Porte. Driault, La Politique orientale de Napoléon, 1806-1808, p. 59.

NAPOLEON'S

POLICY

IN THE NEAR

EAST

75

2 The special instrument chosen by Napoleon to execute the measures for promoting French influence at the Porte was his new ambassador, General Horace Sebastiani. The time was now ripe for sending him on his mission. Therefore, simultaneously with the despatch of these various pieces of correspondence to the Sultan and his ministers offering the help of France to Turkey, Napoleon prepared final instructions for Sebastiani, with orders for immediate departure to his post. Sebastiani was to promote the creation of a triple alliance of France, Persia and Turkey against Russia, to secure closure of the Bosphorus to Russia and of all Turkish ports to Russian and British ships, and to recover for Turkey her control over Moldavia and Wallachia. The revolt of the Wahabis in Arabia was to be investigated with the view to determining the value of a plan for establishing them as a power between India and Europe. The views toward France of Ali Pasha of Janina were to be ascertained with the idea that he might some day extend his power in order to protect French interests in the Adriatic. However, before this was possible, the Russians would have to be driven out of the Adriatic. The instructions to Sebastiani also touched upon the Serbian question, in connection with which he was to press upon the Porte the idea that Russia aimed to assimilate the pashalik of Belgrade to Moldavia and Wallachia, thereby extending Russian power over Turkey. In order to ascertain the causes of the Serbian revolt Sebastiani was to stop on his journey to Constantinople to obtain information upon the attitude of the Serbian people without making, however, any overtures to the leaders of the rebellion which would arouse suspicions at the Porte. All official matters concerning the Serbian question were to be taken up only with the Turkish ministers. In conclusion, the instructions impressed upon Sebastiani the necessity that

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 180&-18G7

France recover her former preponderant influence at Constantinople, and admonished him to assure the Porte that Napoleon sought only to strengthen and preserve, not to partition, the Ottoman Empire in order that it should serve as a barrier to Russia. " L'isolement où la Porte a été longtemps retenue . . . ne convient plus à sa position actnelle. Ce n'est plus comme un territoire qui attend une invasion étrangère qu'elle doit compter en Europe; mais c'est comme un Etat destiné à servir de barrière à la Russie et à conserver le rivage de la mer Noire et le passage du Bosphore." 1 Sébastiani left Paris for Constantinople late in June. These instructions are of particular importance as they reveal Napoleon's eastern policy at the time when he actively entered into international politics associated with affairs in the Near East. In the original draft of his instructions to Talleyrand concerning Sébastiani's mission, Napoleon had clearly stated that he did not want to partition Turkey ; even if he were offered three quarters of it he did not want it. He desired to strengthen the Ottoman Empire and to make it serve him in opposition to Russia. Interesting also were Napoleon's instructions that his ambassador secure French influence at Constantinople " by insinuation and confidence and not by arrogance, force or menace." 2 There are certain significant similarities to be observed in these instructions and memoirs emanating from the French Foreign Office * and the proposals of Czartoryski detailed in 1 Talleyrand to Sébastiani, June 2i, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212. * Napoleon to Talleyrand, June 9, 1806, Correspondance xii, no. 10339.

de

Napoléon,

* A t this time Napoleon was furnished with numerous memoirs and reports, among them several from M. Codrika, special adviser on eastern affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While the proposals thus made were not put into execution, there is no doubt that these reports helped to clarify the ideas of Napoleon and his ministers in regard to the

NAPOLEON'S

POLICY IN THE NEAR

EAST

77

his memoranda to the Tsar. Neither France nor Russia at this time held as the first principle o f its policy the partition o f the Ottoman Empire a m o n g the European Powers. Rather, each preferred to organize at least European Turkey into numerous states according t o race, religion o r political propinquity ( t o each P o w e r ) w i t h varying degrees o f political status. Each wished to bring the Balkan peninsula under its exclusive diplomatic protection. possible future reorganization of the Ottomon Empire, an event which seemed to them not unlikely at this time. The most interesting of M. Codrika's reports is entitled, "Moyens qui sont à pouvoir de la France d'employer auprès de la Sublime Porte, après la mémorable victoire d'Austerlits, pour tirer de ses relations avec cette puissance de très grands avantages politiques et commerciaux." Mémoires et Documents, 1800-1813, A f f . Etr. de Turquie. Two plans were proposed for the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire. According to the first it was to be divided into two empires : one, the Asiatic, to keep the theocratic government with the present ruling dynasty and establish the capital at Bagdad; the other, composed of European Turkey, to be ruled by a Christian prince allied with France and under her protection, with the capital at Constantinople. In the second plan, M. Codrika proposed to divide European Turkey into independent or autonomous provinces. Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia, the Greek Islands and the Cyclades, continental Greece extending to Thermopylae—all these should be made independent provinces. Rumelia, however, should remain under the protection of the Porte. Such pashas in these provinces as already ruled their pashaliks quite independently should be left in control under the guarantee of France, i. e., Pasvan Oglou, pasha of Widin, was to be made governor of Bulgaria for life and all Albania was to be placed under the rule of Ali Pasha of Janina. Egypt was to be annexed to France and to become the emporium for all the commerce of Europe and Asia. M. Codrika gave to Napoleon the role of mediator in the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire and in each of the principalities that of protector. In exchange for the regeneration of the Ottoman Empire the Sublime Porte would renew the Capitulations and France would recover her former commercial and political preponderance in the Levant.

PART II T H E UNSUCCESSFUL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS OF NAPOLEON W I T H GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA JUNE—OCTOBER, 1806

82

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

believing that all Christian subjects in European Turkey would make common cause with the Russian army. 1 T h e necessity of holding Cattaro was the object of another memorandum at this time from Czartoryski. W i t h a strong garrison and a fleet to guard the port, it could be made nearly impregnable, Turkey would become dependent on Russia and would not dare any longer to make alliances dangerous to her, and Napoleon would never be able to carry out any projects in the Levant. Cattaro would also be a bulwark protecting the Ionian Islands and Ragusa, and the position of Napoleon in Italy would be precarious. If Cattaro were given up, Russia would lose much of her influence over the Greeks and would weaken her position at the Porte. 2 These memoranda were not without influence upon the future conduct of Russia, but neither Alexander nor Czartoryski wanted to make the matter of Cattaro an obstacle to an earnest attempt to secure peace with Napoleon. Ruffin, who had been sent by M. de Lesseps to Paris to convey the Russian proposal for peace, had recently brought back a report of the willingness of Napoleon to enter into such negotiations. 3 A f t e r further conversations with M. de Lesseps clarifying their views, the Russian ministry prepared to act. M. d'Oubril, Councillor of State, was appointed to this peace mission and by the middle of May preparations were completed for his departure. Oubril was given instructions which were general and not very clear. According to them the purpose of the mission, was to promote a frank discussion on all questions affecting relations between France and Russia, to the end of preparing for the formal negotiation of a general peace. H e w a s 1

Czartoryski to Alexander, April 5/17, 1806, Sbornik,

2

Czartoryski to Alexander, April 9/21, 1806, ibid., 82, nos. 94-95.

3

Driault, Austerlitz,

p. 424; c f . supra, p. 31.

82, no. 92.

C H A P T E R IV BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS AND T H E O U B R I L T R E A T Y WITH

RUSSIA I

THE seizure of Cattaro, news of which arrived at St. Petersburg late in March, was not an isolated enterprise, but rather the execution of a plan evolved by Czartoryski since the Treaty of Pressburg by which he intended to check the progress of France in the East. W i t h the Russians occupying C o r f u , Cattaro, and the islands of Lissa and Curzola, a line of defence would be formed which would make secure their position in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, oppose any attempt by Napoleon to strike at Russia through the Balkans, and also thwart any plan he might have of aggression against Turkey. However, when news of the seizure of Cattaro reached Emperor Alexander, he showed some hesitancy as to whether the place should be permanently retained, considering the complications its retention might bring in his relations with Austria. 1 Czartoryski, seeing his plan endangered, took occasion to send to Alexander a memorandum urging that Russia take measures to strengthen her position in the Balkan peninsula. It was desirable, he proposed, that twenty to thirty thousand Russian troops be sent to C o r f u , Cattaro. Only in this w a y could Russia prevent French attacks on Turkey. If the Porte opposed the transport of these troops through the Dardanelles, then they should be sent through Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia. Czartoryski did not doubt the success of such an expedition, 1

Archives

Vorontsov,

xv, p. 414. 81

THE

0UBR1L

TREATY

WITH

RUSSIA

83

to intervene in Franco-British peace negotiations, and sign with both Powers sub spe rati all acts judged conformable to the interests and honor of Russia. In any such negotiations Russia would insist upon the following conditions: maintenance of a Russian garrison at Corfu, evacuation of Dalmatia by French forces and establishment of an independent state between Turkey and Italy. In return for Russia's recognition of the imperial title of Napoleon, Oubril was to demand the restoration of the king of Naples to his dominions and an indemnity for the king of Sardinia. He was to work in perfect accord with the British representative at Paris. 1 It was the desire of Alexander, contrary to the judgment of Czartoryski, that the simultaneous negoiations being pursued with Prussia for a treaty should not be disclosed to Great Britain. 2 Apparently Alexander also gave Oubril some confidential instructions ordering him to make peace at any cost, in common with Great Britain if possible, but separately with Napoleon if necessary.8 In this matter the Emperor was without question again in disagreement with Czartoryski. Oubril was to go first to Vienna to arrange through diplomatic channels for formal ratification by France of his mission, settle details for his trip to Paris, and also discuss at Vienna means for dealing with the matter of Cattaro. On this last question Oubril carried instructions to Razumovski, Russian ambassador at Vienna, not to delay the return of Cattaro if he believed the urgency of the matter did not admit of longer delay, but to make it a subject of negotiation with the French. If, however, Austria appeared alarmed over the question, Razumovski was to send orders to Cattaro 1 Instructions to Oubril, May 12,1806, Sbornik, 82, no. 101; Waliszewski, I-c Rcgne d'Alexandre I, i, p. 188. 2

Waliszewski, op. cit., 1, p. 188.

3

Ibid.

THE

84

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

that the place war to be given back to Austria. He was to reserve the definite order for evacuation until the Austrian ministry had received formal assurance from the French ambassador that the action would be followed by execution of the provisions of the Treaty of Pressburg by France, and especially by the withdrawal of French troops from Austrian territory. 1 Napoleon was ready at the time Oubril left St. Petersburg to enter seriously into negotiations with Russia, as the evidence of her desire for peace was sufficiently convincing to him and as he had also advanced his projects in Italy, Germany and Holland far enough to have gained the political and strategic advantages he proposed to realize from them. Therefore, instructions were sent to LaRochefoucauld at Vienna that, if he was approached on the question of peace with Russia, he was to declare that any such proposal would be acceptable at Paris, but that France would not enter into any union with Russia or discuss matters foreign to their common interests. 2 Oubril arrived at Vienna on May 27. He informed L a Rochefoucauld of his power to negotiate and requested his passports to Paris. Just prior to this, the Austrian cabinet had given an order for the blockade of Cattaro by Austrian naval forces in co-operation with plans for a French army to move against the town by land.3 In fact at this time a French army was already occupying Ragusa. 4 Following instructions, Razumovski approached the French ambassador on the question of Cattaro and, when the latter demanded its evacuation, offered to give it over to 1

Mikhailovich, Count Pavel A. Stroganoff,

iii, pp. 64-65.

4

Talleyrand to La Rochefoucauld, May 20, 1806, Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, p. 122. ' Report of La Rochefoucauld, May 27, 1806, ibid. 4 Cf. infra, p. 269.

THE OUBRIL TREATY

WITH RUSSIA

85

France. L a Rochefoucauld refused to accept the proffer claiming that it was an a f f a i r between France and Austria. 1 On M a y 3 1 the Russian ambassador in a note to Stadion gave Russia's formal promise to deliver Cattaro to Austria. 2 This act had been urged on Razumovski by Paget, the British ambassador. 3 Stadion secured f r o m L a Rochefoucauld the assurance of Napoleon's intention to execute the T r e a t y of Pressburg particularly with respect to evacuation of Austrian territory. Upon being informed of this, Razumovski despatched orders to Russian officers f o r the delivery of Cattaro to Austrian forces. But at the same time, having heard of Franco-British negotiations at Paris and feeling uncertain as to the reliance to be put on the French ambassador's assurances, he sent separate secret orders to delay its evacuation as long as possible. 4 Stadion, informed of the order f o r Russian evacuation, believed the affair of Cattaro was over, and hoped that the French forces would now evacuate Braunau and leave the right side of the Isonzo, thereby removing f r o m Austria the menace and humiliation of the presence of French forces on her soil. 5 Napoleon's real intentions concerning Austria could be tested by this act, and Stadion wanted to ascertain his views in order to know what Austria would have to expect in her future relations with France. Therefore, V i n cent, ambassador at Paris, was instructed to secure from Napoleon an exposition of his views but to make no demands on him f o r details, as A u s t r i a did not want to give any occasion f o r an invitation to a French alliance, which she might be put in the position of having to refuse. 6 1

Mikhailovich, op. cit., iii, p. 66; Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, p. 122.

1

Stadion to Vincent, May 3 1 , 1806, Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, p. 123.

3

Paget to F o x , June 4, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 79.

4

Mikhailovich, op. cit., iii, pp. 66-67.

5

Stadion to Vincent, June 4, 1806, Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, p. 123.

6

Stadion to Vincent, June 2 1 , 1806, ibid., pp. 123-124.

86

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

That Cattaro was not so definitely removed from the orbit of international politics as the Austrian minister hoped was evidenced by the fact that the Russians were still there at the time, June 23, when Oubril left for Paris. Stadion was soon to learn that not only was Russia determined not to give it up, but also that the British cabinet with the exception of F o x did not want her to give it up for fear that Napoleon would realize his plans against Turkey. 1 It appeared that after all the safety of Austria, in so far as it hinged on the settlement of the Cattaro affair, would depend on the outcome of the approaching Franco-Russian negotiations at Paris. 2 At the same time that Russia was making pacific overtures to Napoleon, Czartoryski was attempting to come to an agreement with the British, particularly over questions concerning the Near East. He considered it necessary first to make clear to them the objects of the Oubril mission. Both Stroganoff and Vorontsov, Russian diplomats at London, were to allay suspicions in the British cabinet that this mission had any purpose not compatible with the RussoBritish alliance, and to assure them that in no case would Russia negotiate separately with France. It had been sent to test Napoleon's alleged desire for peace and also to save Austria. The British ministers should be made fully aware that by the Russian occupation of Cattaro, Napoleon, finding his projects of aggrandizement on Turkey checked there, had taken out his ill-feeling on Austria. It was questionable whether the allies should risk now another FrancoAustrian war, in consideration of Austria's limited resources. However, in spite of this danger it should be made clear to the ministers at London that it was doubtful whether 1

Starhemberg to Stadion, May 27, 1806, ibid., p. 120.

THE

OUBRIL

TREATY

WITH

RUSSIA

87

Russia should give up Cattaro and desert its people who were attached to her by ties of race and religion. Moreover, the place, was advantageous to Russia in defending Turkey against French aggression. 1 Peace was now a necessity for the allies, Czartoryski informed F o x . Their affairs were so disheartening at present that even a patched-up peace which would arrest the advance of Napoleon if only f o r a short time would be an advantage. Russia had been forced to inaugurate a separate discussion with Napoleon without knowing the outcome of the British negotiations 2 because the Cattaro affair had put her in a dilemma between the necessity of giving up the place, which would be a stepping stone for the execution of Napoleon's designs on T u r k e y , and the fear of exposing Austria to his resentment. Whatever the outcome, it was a maxim of Russian policy to remain loyal to Great Britain. 3 Czartoryski received f r o m F o x at this time a proposal that Great Britain and Russia should in appearance negotiate separately with Napoleon, but in secret keep each other informed as to their respective transactions. The Russian minister agreed, as he had already considered it possible that Napoleon would not consent to negotiate jointly with the allies but would rather attempt by a separate action to weaken their alliance. Czartoryski, however, wanted to be sure that Great Britain would not make peace for herself until assured also of peace on the continent. Russia did not want to be left alone with a war on her hands. In order to impress upon the British cabinet the dangers 1 Czartoryski to Stroganoff, May 10, 1806, Mikhailovich, op. cit., Hi, pp. 16-18.

* F o x had been engaged in negotiations with the French since February. Cf. infra, p. 91. 3

Czartoryski to Fox, May,

137-144.

1806, Memoirs

of

Czartoryski,

ii, pp.

88

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

which R u s s i a saw in the possibility o f F r e n c h aggression on Turkey, and therefore the need in the coming negotiations with F r a n c e o f complete understanding between R u s sia and Great Britain on this subject, Czartoryski in M a y sent Stroganoff detailed instructions on the E a s t e r n Question.

Reports had come to S t . Petersburg,

Czartoryski

said, that Napoleon was going to place a large army in Dalmatia in order to make T u r k e y amenable t o his demands. It was suspected that a secret understanding already existed between F r a n c e and T u r k e y to the effect that they would lull Russia into a feeling o f security in her relations with T u r key and allow a war to come between them only when all was prepared so that T u r k e y would have the advantage, with the aid of France.

These plans, so menacing to the interests o f

both Russia and Great B r i t a i n , could be frustrated by an immediate invasion of T u r k e y , not t o conquer her or to appropriate any territory, but to occupy those strategic positions by means o f which Napoleon would invade the country.

I f this measure were not adopted, they must then in

the coming peace negotiations demonstrate to Napoleon the necessity for giving up his projects on the Ottoman Empire. I f it were adopted, the allies should foresee and be prepared to meet the difficulties involved in handling the question in the negotiations for a general peace. Czartoryski proposed that the allies should make the following

conditions

the basis

of

their

negotiations

with

F r a n c e : first, the king o f S a r d i n i a should be abandoned, as nothing remained of his kingdom, though hope should be given him that his interests would ultimately be taken care o f ; secondly, it might be necessary to relinquish the restoration o f the kingdom o f Naples, in which case its ruler should receive compensation by being given the Septinsular Republic ( I o n i a n Islands) or established in a Greek state in Morea, carved out o f the O t t o m a n E m p i r e .

T h e latter was

THE 0UBR1L

TREATY

WITH RUSSIA

89

more desirable as Turkey had need of a defence on this side against France. A s for Dalmatia and Alba/iia, there both Russia and Great Britain had such common interests as to make it essential that neither should conclude peace without providing for the removal from these territories of all French control. If the French were permitted to remain there, nothing could prevent Napoleon from attempting to dominate Turkey and to secure its subjection if necessary. Czartoryski proposed several ways to settle this question, viz., leave Cattaro to Russia; give Dalmatia and Cattaro to Austria with such limits that France would hold no territory beyond Trieste; form in this region an intermediary state which would be vassal of Turkey under the protection of Russia and Great Britain. Stroganoff was to impress upon the British cabinet the fact that if Great Britain made peace with France without obtaining satisfaction on the question of French evacuation of Dalmatia, and if Russia were deprived of the help of the British fleet, then Turkey would be in greater danger than ever from Napoleon. Corfu would no longer be secure, and the French would extend their control south from Cattaro into Albania. If they should eventually dominate the Adriatic, they would make Dalmatia and Albania the base for developing their merchant marine and naval forces, as this region would furnish large naval supplies. Great Britain would then find France in a position to challenge her control of the Mediterranean. If Russia should consent to a separate negotiation, it could only be on condition that Great Britain would not make peace with France before obtaining satisfaction on these conditions. The allies should not give up Corfu and Malta. Judging from a recent communication of Talleyrand to Fox, and from declarations of M. de Lesseps to him, Czartoryski considered it probable that Napoleon would not object on this point. Czartoryski proposed as another sine qua non of

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

peace the strict observance by the Porte of their treaties with their allies. T h e independence and integrity of North Germany and of the possessions of the kings of Sweden and Denmark were also to be conditions sine qua non f o r the allies. 1 A s for the matter of Hanover, a thorny one in Russo-British relations, Czartoryski was noticeably less precise. He had already proposed to Prussia, as a price for her alliance, that Russia should attempt to persuade England to leave open this question until the conclusion of a general peace. F o x had informed Stroganoff that it was impossible for Great Britain to cede Hanover to Prussia. Parliament and the ministry had not the right to cede it and the king was immovable. 2 Stroganoff w a s instructed to present fully to F o x these proposals of Russia and to secure his opinion of them. Oubril was to conclude nothing until he had received from his government or f r o m London information on the position of Great Britain. T h e T s a r would make no decisions until he heard f r o m F o x . 8 Some time later in a conference with Gower, the British ambassador, Czartoryski reaffirmed that peace with France w a s necessary in order that Prussia, Austria and T u r k e y might have opportunity to improve their positions. None of these powers, he declared, could be counted on as allies of Great Britain or Russia in the event of a renewal of war. O n the question of Turkey, Gower declared that Great Britain could follow one of t w o courses; either she could defend T u r k e y in order to maintain the integrity of her present territory, or, if this met with 1 Czartoryski to Stroganoff, May 13, 1806, Mikhailovich, op. cit., iii, pp. 25-30; Martens, op. cit., xi, p. 128 et seq. 2 Reports of Nicolay and Stroganoff, April 15, 1806, Martens, op. cit., xi, p. 126.

' Czartoryski to Stroganoff, May 13, 1806, Mikhailovich, op. cit., iii, pp. 25-30.

THE OUBRIL

TREATY

WITH

RUSSIA

insurmountable difficulties, then she would be satisfied with taking Egypt which would serve her essential purpose, viz., to maintain a barrier against France on the road to India. 1 Stroganoff found that F o x approved of the Oubril mission and that he was aware of the necessity for the allies firmly adhering to their alliance and holding common views in the coming negotiations with Napoleon. 2 Grenville expressed like opinions and assured him that L o r d Yarmouth had received orders to concert with the Russian representative in the negotiations at Paris. The British minister strongly approved of making the surrender of Cattaro to France the subject of a negotiation f o r securing advantages to Austria. 3 3 When the new British cabinet came into office in January 1806 after the death of Pitt, F o x as the new foreign secretary soon initiated peace overtures to France. During the spring these negotiations were prolonged mainly over the question of the participation of Russia, which Great Britain demanded as necessary to protect the interests of her ally. 4 Napoleon had opposed it not only because he desired to treat separately with the two states but also because he wanted to gain time for completing his projects of military and political organization in Holland, Germany, Italy and Dalmatia, the successful accomplishment of which he thought would put him in a more advantageous position. These projects were well advanced by June. In the middle of May Joseph Bonaparte ascended the throne of the kingdom of Naples, and the rest of Italy had undergone reorganization based on 1 Report of conference of Gower and Czartoryski, June 9, 1806, ibid., p. 34. 2 3 4

Stroganoff to Czartoryski, June 20, 1806, ibid., pp. 33-34. Stroganoff to Czartoryski, June 27, 1806, ibid., p. 38. Coquelle, Napoleon and England, 1803-1814 (London, 1904), pp. 81-91.

Ç2

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

the imperial décrets of March 30. 1 By June all Italy except Sicily (and Rome in a sense) was in the power of Napoleon, organized into a system of principalities and kingdoms, vassals of the " Grand Empire ". Possession of Italy now, as in 1797, placed Napoleon in a position f r o m which he could look out upon the very heart of the Mediterranean, and incidentally brought him close to the Balkan peninsula. A s for Napoleon's plans f o r the reorganization of Germany, by the end of June negotiations were well under way for the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine. A n d his plans for Holland were consummated when on June 5 Louis Bonaparte became king of the new kingdom of Holland. 2 O n the same day Napoleon received f r o m the Turkish ambassador newly arrived in Paris formal recognition of his imperial title and avowals of friendship from the Sultan. O n June 9 he ordered Sébastiani to prepare to leave f o r his post as French ambassador at Constantinople, where he was to assure the Porte of his firm friendship and his support against all their enemies, especially Russia. A t the same time he issued orders for enlarging French forces in Dalmatia. Napoleon's conduct since the Treaty of Pressburg—coercion of Prussia, reorganization of Germany, Holland and Italy, preparations for missions to the Near E a s t — a l l revealed something of the object of his policy now that he was prepared to negotiate for a general peace. H e would keep Prussia allied to him as he was attempting to keep the other German states, in order to make sure of his domination of central Europe. A l s o he wanted to get control of the Adriatic and the Mediterranean by securing the withdrawal of the Russians from Cattaro and C o r f u , and the British from Sicily. 1

Driault, Napoléon en Italie, pp. 399-408.

2

Driault, Austerlits,

pp. 342-376.

THE OUBRIL

TREATY

WITH

RUSSIA

It was his intention to come to an agreement with either Russia or Great Britain, as he believed that the secession of either from the alliance would force the other to come to favorable terms with him. But obstacles had already appeared. First, the restrictions which he had imposed on British commerce had aroused Great Britain to resistance instead of frightening her into submission as he had hoped. Second, the British cabinet, as we have mentioned, persistently refused to conduct any negotiation apart from Russia. Third, it was obvious that no agreement with Great Britain could be final unless it gave her Hanover, although Napoleon had already promised it to Prussia. Until this question was settled, Napoleon was aware that he could not carry out the final reconstitution of Germany. Fourth, Napoleon's desire to control the Mediterranean involved the predominance of French influence at the Porte and possession of Sicily, of neither of which was there any certainty. T o lessen these difficulties, Napoleon sent on June 2 a communication to F o x proposing that France and Great Britain undertake to negotiate a peace upon a principle which would be honorable not only to themselves but also to their respective allies. 1 Napoleon had acceded to the British demand that her ally, Russia, be included in the negotiations. F o x accepted the proposal and declared that he was ready to begin negotiations. 2 Napoleon was, however, secretly determined to negotiate separately if possible, and thus, when word was received from Vienna of Oubril's mission, it was decided that his arrival in Paris should be delayed for some time in order to carry on separate conferences with Great Britain and also to gain time to settle affairs in Germany. 3 There had been during 1

Talleyrand to Fox, June 2, 1806, Coquelle, op. cit., p. 91. * Fox to Talleyrand, June 14, 1806, ibid. ' Driault, Austerlits, p. 420.

94

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

the spring constant hopes at Paris that Russia would evacuate Cattaro and that the French would then take over the place. This hope that Cattaro would eventually be removed from the agenda of the conference was another reason for delaying Oubril's arrival. There was also a hope that Sicily would be captured by Joseph Bonaparte at any time. In the middle of June formal negotiations with Great Britain were opened through Lord Yarmouth, a British subject who had until recently been held prisoner in Paris. Talleyrand informed him that he would agree to the return of Hanover to Great Britain if Prussia were compensated, and if Malta were returned by Great Britain to the K n i g h t s of Malta. Concerning Sicily, Talleyrand said, " Y o u are in possession and we are not asking you to surrender anything." Great Britain was to give recognition to the kingdoms recently created by Napoleon in Italy, Germany and Holland. In turn Y a r m o u t h demanded that France give a guarantee of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and Talleyrand agreed. 1 Yarmouth went immediately to London and reported to F o x the result of his conferences. O n June 17 he was back in Paris with authority to negotiate between the two powers, subsequently bringing in Russia, with the general understanding that the principle of uti possidetis should form the basis of negotiations, except in regard to Hanover. 2 Talleyrand informed him that negotiations with Russia were to be kept separate and demanded that Great Britain cede Sicily to France and in return keep Malta. Yarmouth refused. 3 Napoleon insisted that Great Britain must either renounce 1 Yarmouth to Fox, June 13, 1806, Sorel, L'Europe et la Révolution Française (Paris, 1885-1904, 8 vols.), vii, p. 68; Driault, Austerlitz, p. 421.

* Sorel, op. cit., vii, p. 68; Rose, Napoleon I ( N e w York, 1924, 2 vols.), ii, pp. 66-67. ' Driault, op. cit., pp. 421-422.

THE

OUBRIL

TREATY

WITH

RUSSIA

95

the right of guarantee of Sicily to former King Ferdinand of Naples or else give up Malta. If Great Britain had possession of both Malta and Sicily, he declared, she would be an impassable obstacle to French communication in the Adriatic and with Constantinople, and this situation would be difficult for him to accept.1 The matter of Sicily had evidently become the real issue thus early in the Franco-British negotiations. Possession of it was part of a larger plan, as Napoleon wrote Joseph at the time, urging upon him the need of taking it. The plan was nothing less than to hold Prussia to her agreement to close her ports to the British ; to close the Baltic ; and also to force Portugal to close her ports to the British, thus striking a blow at her commerce which would terrify England into submission to his terms. 2 Since it was the great object of Great Britain to keep control of the Mediterranean in order to safeguard the route to India, F o x refused to consider giving Sicily to Napoleon.3 Talleyrand then offered, as compensation for Sicily, to give former King Ferdinand of Naples the Hanseatic towns. When this was refused by Yarmouth, he offered Albania, Ragusa and Dalmatia. Yarmouth again refused and threatened to leave at once if Napoleon persisted in his desire to exclude Ferdinand from Sicily. Talleyrand succeeded in persuading him to wait. 4 Napoleon found that he was not making progress in his negotiations with Great Briain concerning Sicily, and Joseph had not taken it. Also, as the Russians had not 1

Ibid., p. 422.

2

Napoleon to Joseph, June 21, 1806, Correspondance de Napoléon, xii.

* F o x to Yarmouth, June 29, July 5, 1806, Coquelle, op. cit., pp. 93-94; British Parliamentary Papers, 1806, vol. 307. 4 Yarmouth to Fox, July 9, 1806, British Parliamentary Papers, 1806, vol. 307.

g6

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

evacuated Cattaro and as Oubril was becoming impatient at his detention at Strasbourg, Napoleon gave orders at the beginning of July to let him come to Paris. He arrived on J u l y 6, 1806. Oubril took occasion early to inform Talleyrand that Emperor Alexander could not consider peace durable so long as France was a neighbor of the Ottoman Empire, which he feared would be reduced to a state of subjection to Napoleon as Holland and Italy had been. Neither could Russia feel secure, he declared, so long as France possessed Dalmatia and also sought to extend her power into Albania. Talleyrand replied that France in her turn had fears for the safety of Turkey, as Moldavia and Wallachia were already virtually Russian provinces. 1 In a conference with Oubril on July 9, Talleyrand referred briefly to the evacuation of C o r f u by Russia and then proposed that in exchange for Sicily France would give Ragusa, Albania and Dalmatia to the former king of Naples. The latter proposal made Oubril very hopeful, as he believed that by this arrangement France would be placed away from Turkey and Russia would be left in more certain control of affairs of the Balkans. He hoped also to obtain from France abandonment of plans for the reorganization of Germany and to secure a guarantee of the territorial integrity of Swedish Pomerania, the independence of Switzerland, and a Russian station at Corfu. Oubril did not believe he could obtain better terms and he considered it necessary that peace be made, if Austria were not to suffer at the hands of Napoleon. 2 Talleyrand, having evaluated Oubril as a pliable person, pursued a plan of reducing him to submission by partial rev1 4

Driault, Austerlits,

pp. 426-427.

Oubril to Stroganoff, July 9, 1806, Sorel, op. cit., vii, p. 74; Mikhailovich, op. cit., iii, pp. 58-59.

THE

0UBR1L

TREATY

WITH

RUSSIA

97

elations of Napoleon's plans of reorganization of Germany and by threats of an invasion of the hereditary states of Austria if Cattaro were not delivered up. 1 Oubril became increasingly disturbed over this danger to Austria. On July 1 2 the act establishing the Confederation of the Rhine was signed in Paris though it was still held secret, as Napoleon wanted a settlement with Russia before making it known. 2 From now on Oubril was pressed by the French to conclude a treaty as soon as possible. Clarke, now representing the French, insistently kept before Oubril, in a conference on the 14th, the suggestion of the anxiety Russia would experience if, in default of delivering Cattaro to France, Austria should experience " a change in the affairs of her hereditary states." 3 On July 1 6 Oubril learned secretly of the signing of the Act establishing the Confederation of the Rhine and of the abolition of the Holy Roman Empire. Further, he learned that, if Russia continued to refuse to make peace, Napoleon would bring about a complete change in the existing arrangement of affairs in the hereditary states of Austria; that Marshal Berthier was prepared to leave for Vienna with his staff; that General Marmont had orders to place fifteen thousand troops in Dalmatia and that he was destined to the command of an army to be called " the army of Serbia." " On the next day, the 17th, Oubril informed Yarmouth that, in view of the immediate danger to Austria, it was his duty to save her, even if necessary by a separate peace. He believed that it was possible as a condition of this peace to 1

Sorel, op. cit., vii, pp. 75-76.

2

Ibid., p. 76.

3

Conference of Clarke and Oubril, July 14, ibid., p. 77.

4

Sorel, op. cit., vii, p. 77; Driault, Austerlits,

pp. 428-439.

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

bring about the withdrawal of French troops from Germany. Yarmouth tried to dissuade him.1 On the eighteenth Clarke presented to Oubril the French project of a treaty which proposed that Russia renounce her privileges in Moldavia and Wallachia and her rights of passage for Russian troops and vessels through the Dardanelles (or at least grant recognition of the same right to France); that she evacuate C o r f u ; that she agree to assemble only a certain number of troops on the frontier of Turkey; and that she use all means to get England to accept a peace which would not disturb the equilibrium in the Mediterranean.2 The last proposal was obviously vague and might mean much. Oubril was urged to sign a treaty on these terms, but he refused. Again on the next day he was pressed to sign, but would agree to do so only sub spe rati, which was not acceptable to the French. 3 Clarke warned him that Napoleon would at once throw his troops into the hereditary states of Austria under pretext of executing the Treaty of Pressburg, assemble forces on the coast of the Ionian Sea in order to attack the Russians at Corfu, and put an army into Serbia to make her people return to their obedience to Turkey. 1 Then in his turn Talleyrand urged Oubril to sign, which the latter persistently refused to do except sub spe rati. He was awaiting word from London.5 At the beginning of his negotiations at Paris, Oubril had opened communication with Stroganoff at London. On July 9 he transmitted to the latter the French proposal—re1

Yarmouth to Fox, July 19, 1806, British Parliamentary Papers, 1806, vol. 307. J

Driault, Austerlitg,

p. 429.

' Sorel, op. cit., vii, p. 77. 4 6

Driault, Austerlits,

p. 429.

Sorel, op. cit., vii, p. 77.

THE 0UBR1L

TREATY

WITH

RUSSIA

ceived by him on that same d a y — f o r giving Ragusa, Albania and Dalmatia to K i n g Ferdinand as compensation for Sicily. Napoleon had made threats, reported Oubril, to seize Spain and Portugal if Great Britain did not come to terms. H e confided to Stroganoff that the British should not allow this opportunity for peace to escape them, as they would never obtain restitution of Hanover. E v e r y time they attempted to recover it by force they would have France and Prussia against them. However on the other hand if the British signed a treaty on the above mentioned terms they would be in a position to destroy French influence at Constantinople. 1 Upon receiving this depatch, Stroganoff approached Grenville on the subject of the establishment of an independent state composed of Dalmatia, Ragusa and Albania. Such a state, he urged, would assure the stability of the Ottoman Empire and the dominance of Russian and British influence at the Porte, while Austria would be protected on her southern flank f r o m the French. T h e Russian ambassador also touched on the question of Sicily, but found among the British ministers, he informed Oubril, " extreme repugnance " to the idea of giving it up, and also doubts as to whether the advantages which it was claimed would result from erection of the state on the Adriatic would offer an adequate counterpoise to Napoleon's advantages in having Sicily. However, the British had not refused to consider the proposal. 2 T o what extent the British ministers were influenced by the communications f r o m Oubril supported by Stroganoff, concerning conditions f o r peace, and especially the question 1 Oubril to Stroganoff, July 9, 1806, Sorel, op. cit., vii, p. 7 4 ; Mikhailovich, op. cit., iii, pp. 58-39.

' Stronganoff to Oubril, July 16, 1806, Mikhailovich, op. cit., iii, pp. 61-64.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

of Sicily, on which the British had so far refused to n e g o t iate any concession, is revealed in new instructions sent to Yarmouth on July 18. Great Britain, wrote F o x , did not like the project of a state on the Adriatic, as it did not offer security to Great Britain in the Mediterranean compensatory f o r giving up Sicily. Further, Albania could not be incorporated into this state as it was a province of Turkey, whose dismemberment it was the policy of Great Britain and Russia to prevent. Besides, if such a kingdom were created it would lack sufficient territory and revenue to make it an adequate barrier for protecting Austria or Turkey against France, or even to maintain its o w n independence. Also, the heterogeneity of peoples in such a state might make it unstable. T h e project might be acceptable to Great Britain, if, excluding Albania, there were added to this kingdom Istria and most of the Venetian territory, including Venice, combined with adequate arrangements for its future defense. However well this plan might work out, it would be a sacrifice of her interests for Great Britain to accept it and to give up Sicily. But F o x informed Y a r m o u t h that he was ready to consider any advantages suggested by Oubril as coming to Russia and Austria f r o m it. Y a r mouth therefore was instructed to continue negotiations on this proposal, and to co-operate with Oubril. 1 It was evident that the British ministry had modified its attitude towards the question of Sicily. On both June 29 and July 5, instructions to Yarmouth had positively declared that Great Britain could not consider peace if Sicily were to be given to Napoleon. 2 Upon receiving these instructions f r o m F o x on July 20 Yarmouth hastened to communicate them to Oubril and urged him to delay before concluding anything with France, 1

Fox to Yarmouth, July 18, 1806, Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, viii.

2

Fox to Yarmouth, June 29, July 5, 1806, ibid.

THE

OUBRIL

TREATY

WITH

RUSSIA

i0I

in order to discuss further this question of compensation for Sicily. He also urged upon him the need of joint negotiations by the allies with France. 1 By this time Oubril must have received a despatch of the 16th from Stroganoff concerning the views of the British cabinet, which he had wanted to know before going on with the negotiations.' It was with the impression that Great Britain's position on the question of Sicily was more conciliatory than it had been, and the conviction that Austria would be invaded by Napoleon unless he was prevented by a peace settlement requiring evacuation of Germany by French forces, that later the same day (the twentieth) Oubril had a conference with Talleyrand. T h e French minister brought with him the project for a treaty and urged persistently that Oubril sign it. He was informed that Napoleon would evacuate Germany when Cattaro should be given to him. A s the price of this complaisance he expected Oubril's signature to the treaty. Oubril signed, but in spite of Talleyrand's protest he added the formula sub spe rati, which allowed the final word to his government. 3 He had completely disregarded the request of his British colleague for delay and joint negotiation. T h e terms of the Oubril Treaty, as it is generally known, were as follows: Russia agreed to evacuate Cattaro, to recognize the independence of the Seven Islands (the Septinsular Republic) and to limit Russian forces there to four thousand men, to accept the possession of Dalmatia by France, and to recognize Napoleon as emperor of the French and king of Italy. In return France agreed to leave Ragusa and acknowledge its independence and to evacuate Germany as soon as the order to evacuate Cattaro was given to the 1

Yarmouth to Fox, July 20, 1806, ibid.

* Stroganoff to Oubril, July 16, 1806, Mikhailovich, op. cit., in, pp. 61-64. 3

Driault, Austerlits,

pp. 429-430; Sorel, op. cit., vii, p. 78.

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Russian forces, these measures to be executed within three months. The two powers would attempt to secure peace between Prussia and Sweden. Napoleon accepted the good offices of the Emperor of Russia for the reestablishment of maritime peace with Great Britain. The two powers guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In a separate secret article it was agreed that if Ferdinand I V should no longer continue to possess Sicily, then France and Russia would attempt to obtain the Balearic Isles for his eldest son, and that Russia would then recognize the new king of the T w o Sicilies (Joseph Bonaparte). 1 In accepting these terms Oubril had made less secure the position of Russia and her ally, Great Britain, in the Mediterranean. Such a treaty would sanction all the acquisitions on the Adriatic given to France by the Treaty of Pressburg, leaving her on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. The desire at St. Petersburg to separate the frontiers of the French and Ottoman Empire and thus to safeguard the position of Russia in the Balkans, could hardly be said to have been in any way realized in this treaty. Protection for Russia in the Near East might have been implied in the provision for the mutual recognition of the integrity of Turkey but it was only a general declaration which left open every opportunity for French diplomacy to play its part at Constantinople and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire to the detriment of the Russians. A s Oubril admitted later, Napoleon had given no real guarantee to renounce any plans upon Turkey, and during the negotiations Talleyrand always avoided questions concerning Turkey. 2 On the other hand, it should be noted that France did not secure any of the demands in her project of a treaty pre1 1

De Clercq, Recueil des traités de la France, ii, p. 180.

Report of Oubril, July 26/August 7, 1806, Martens, Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie, xiii, p. 293 ; Sbornik, 82, no. 136.

THE

OU BRI L TREATY

WITH

RUSSIA

sented to Oubril on July 18. And so f a r as French fear of Russian ambitions in the Balkans was concerned, the general declaration in Oubril's treaty in behalf of the integrity of Turkey did not take away from Russia advantages she derived from her privileges by treaty rights with Turkey in the administration of Moldavia and Wallachia, or her right of passage of ships and troops through the Dardanelles, not permitted to the French. Nor had Russia given up C o r f u , though its position would be less secure if the French were to have control of the Adriatic and possession of Sicily, and if Russia were to give up Cattaro. Acceptance of the Oubril treaty by Emperor Alexander would in fact be giving Russia's sanction to the Treaty of Pressburg, and in this respect would be a diplomatic success for Napoleon. Russia's acceptance would also have value for Napoleon as a means for forcing peace with Great Britain. This appears to have been in his calculations, f o r after the signing of the treaty, Napoleon wrote in turn to Joseph, Eugène and Berthier, that he was now turning his attention to the English and that he counted on this treaty with Russia as a means of forcing the hand of Great Britain. And he believed that, if he succeeded in inducing Yarmouth to sign a treaty, the result would be that Emperor Alexander would ratify the treaty of Oubril, which in turn might determine F o x to ratify the British treaty. 1 From this it appears that perhaps Napoleon had doubts as to whether E m peror Alexander would ratify Oubril's treaty unless moved by pacific action of Great Britain. The ratification seemed to Napoleon more likely because of the provision that the T s a r should act as mediator between France and Great Britain, which rôle he thought, would flatter Emperor Alex1

Napoleon to Joseph, Eugène, Berthier, July 21, 1806, Correspondance de Xapolcon, xii ; Sorel, op. cit., vii, p. 79.

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

ander as well as encourage him to believe in the sincerity of Napoleon's desire for peace. With a treaty with Russia now to be ratified, with Louis Bonaparte on the throne of Holland and the Confederation of the Rhine organized, Napoleon believed that he could negotiate with the British with decided advantage, confronting them with facts which would force them to accept definitely his proposals or to continue the war, either of which courses of action Napoleon intended should consolidate his work of reorganization on the continent, and also promote his projects in the Mediterranean.

CHAPTER V R E J E C T I O N OF T H E O U B R I L T R E A T Y A N D B R E A K D O W N OF B R I T I S H N E G O T I A T I O N S I

FROM the beginning of July 1806 there had been a lull in Franco-British negotiations. The French had turned their attention to their transactions with Oubril, in which the British plenipotentiary had vainly tried to cooperate with the Russian representative. Immediately a f t e r the signing of the Oubril treaty, the French diplomats prepared to reopen negotiations with Great Britain. T h e question of Sicily w a s the real difficulty. O n July 15 Napoleon wrote Joseph that he did not believe the negotiations with England would come to anything, as she was determined that Ferdinand should keep Sicily, to which he could not agree. 1 O n the twenty-first, informing Joseph of the treaty which had just been signed with Russia, he declared that Sicily was the real obstacle to peace with Great Britain. However, he believed that Russia's abandonment of Ferdinand would have an effect on the English; they would very soon give up Sicily and then he would be master of the Mediterranean, " the principal and constant purpose of my policy ". 2 A s we have seen, it was just at this time, that Y a r m o u t h received instructions which allowed him to negotiate an indemnity for Ferdinand on the Adriatic in exchange for giv• Napoleon to Joseph, July xii, 10507. 2

15, 1806, Correspondence

de

Napoleon,

Napoleon to Joseph, July 21, 1806, ibid., 10530. 105

i o

6

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

ing up Sicily. In conferences with Yarmouth on July 23 and 24 in return for concessions on this question the French seemed ready to restore Hanover to Great Britain though they demanded an indemnity for Prussia for its restitution. The French would also recognize the British occupation of the Cape of Good Hope and Malta. 1 Napoleon became optimistic and expected peace with the British in ten days.2 A f t e r the conferences Yarmouth formulated in the last days of July the project of a treaty which he presented to Clarke. It was delivered to Napoleon on July 31. Its chief provisions were : a promise to reach a special agreement whereby other dominions would be obtained for the late reigning family of Naples and Sicily; recognition by Great Britain of Joseph Bonaparte as king of these two countries (which meant giving Sicily to Napoleon) and of all other political arrangements which Napoleon had made in Italy, Germany, and Holland; recognition by France of British sovereignity over Hanover; restorations by Great Britain to France and Holland of all the colonies that had been taken from them except the Cape of Good Hope ; mutual guarantee of the independence and integrity of Sweden, Portugal, Switzerland, and the Ottoman Empire; dissolution of the Order of Malta and recognition by Napoleon of British ownership of the islands of Malta, Gozo and Camino; limitation of the British garrison at Malta and of the French garrison at Pondicherry to three thousand men ; mutual recognition of the Republic of the Seven Islands (Ionian Islands) as a sovereign state. There were eight secret articles, including : recognition by Great Britain of the agreement between France and Russia to secure from Spain cession of the Balearic Islands for Ferdinand I V , in compensa1

Sorel, op. cit., vii, p. 79.

Napoleon to Joseph, July 26, 1806, Correspondance xiii, 10554. 2

de

Napoléon,

REJECTION

OF THE OUBRIL TREATY

107

tion for Naples and Sicily, only Spanish troops being allowed on these islands; conferring of the title of K i n g of Hanover on the K i n g of E n g l a n d ; a joint effort to secure f o r Prussia a territorial indemnity in Germany of 400,000 souls in exchange f o r Cleves, Anspach and Neufchatel. 1 It is noticeable that nothing was said in the proposed treaty as to compensation f o r Ferdinand I V by means of a state to be created f o r him on the Adriatic. T h e question of " other dominions " f o r him was left open to future negotiations. Perhaps vagueness on this question was a recognition of its difficulties. It is evident that in proposing a treaty on the above terms, Yarmouth had gone as f a r as Great Britain could be expected to yield to Napoleon. In returning the proposals to Talleyrand on August 6, Napoleon seems to have accepted the main principles, objecting only to the f o r m of several of the articles. 2 This proposed treaty marked the high point in the Franco-British negotiations. Thenceforth there developed various significant circumstances or events, unforeseen or unexpected by the negotiators at Paris, which made peace less and less attainable. Oubril had hardly l e f t f o r St. Petersburg to present to his government the treaty he had negotiated, when Napoleon notified the Austrian ambassador of the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine, and added a warning that the Treaty of Pressburg had not as yet been fully executed by Austria, since Cattaro had not been delivered to France. Therefore, French troops would not evacuate Braunau until Austria recognized the Confederation. Communications were sent to Vienna at the same time demanding that E m peror Francis abdicate his title as Holy R o m a n Emperor, 1

A copy of this proposed treaty is attached to following note: Napoleon

to Talleyrand, Aug. 6, 1806, Correspondance de Napoleon, xiv, 10604.

2 Ibid.

jo8

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

and also that he recognize Joseph Bonaparte as king of the the T w o Sicilies. Another note was despatched on August I to notify the German Imperial Diet of the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine and the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. 1 Napoleon also took steps to draw Prussia closer to him. On July 1 5 , the Prussian ambassador, Lucchesini, was informed of the Confederation, and Talleyrand at the same time sent instructions to L a Forest at Berlin to inform the Prussian cabinet of the event and to point out that Prussia acquired advantages through the ending of the imperial authority in Germany. It gave a new guarantee to Prussia of her possession of Hanover, and France also desired to consolidate the power of Prussia in North Germany. 2 However, at the end of J u l y , Lucchesini learned from Y a r mouth that Napoleon in his negotiations with Great Britain was ready to give Hanover to Great Britain. 3 This information was at once sent off to Berlin, there to contribute to the rapid development of a hostile feeling toward Napoleon. Napoleon seems to have believed that the course of international politics was so shaping itself as a result, he believed, of his own adroitness, as to assure the realization of his plans for peace. On August 5, he wrote Joseph that in view of the peace with Russia and the negotiations he had since begun with England, he believed that everything would soon be settled peacefully. 4 Austria would submit to the demands he had made on her; otherwise there would be war. 1

Sorel, op. cit., vii, pp. 80-81; Beer, Zehn Politik, 1801-1810, p. 232.

Jahre

österreichischer

' R e p o r t of Lucchesini, July 15, 1806; Talleyrand to L a Forest, July IS, 1806, Bailleu, Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807 (Leipzig, 1881-1887, 2 vols.), ii, p. 486. 8

Report of Lucchesini, ibid., ii, p. 505.

* It should be recalled that by this time Napoleon had seen the very advantageous terms of the treaty proposed by Yarmouth at the end of July.

REJECTION

OF THE

OUBRIL

TREATY

It w a s better to finish all quickly, he declared, than to be always flourishing the sword, and he had now more reason to believe in peace than in war. 1 O n the same day that Napoleon wrote this letter, there arrived in Paris L o r d Lauderdale, the second British representative to carry on the negotiations for peace. In view of Napoleon's evident belief at this time that events were w o r k i n g to his advantage, it is not improbable that he would take the arrival of this second British envoy as a sign that Great Britain was certainly ready to concede a peace, especially in view of the recent conciliatory proposals of Yarmouth. In order to understand how his hopes were shaken and how in a very f e w days the prospects of peace between France and Great Britain decidedly lessened, it is necessary to consider here the reception which the British cabinet gave to the Oubril treaty. A s already stated, Oubril soon after the beginning of his negotiations at Paris had sent to London a communication urging the British to accept the French proposal, which had been made t o Y a r m o u t h at the end of June f o r merging Dalmatia, Ragusa and Albania into a state f o r Ferdinand of Sicily in compensation for his own kingdom. Stroganoff had found that the idea of peace was not altogether popular in England. F o x w a s ready to do much f o r it, but Grenville was less pacifically inclined. Stroganoff feared, as did also the British ministers, that Oubril would make concessions for Russia without securing adequate guarantees for peace f r o m Napoleon. H o w e v e r , the Russian ambassador found that there were no fears among the British ministers that Napoleon now had any immediate plans of conquest against Turkey, as they believed he would see that there was more to lose than to gain in such an enterprise. Finding that the British were ready to consider 1 Napoleon to Joseph, Aug. 5, 1806, Correspondence 10600.

de Napoleon,

xiii,

no

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

the French proposal of an independent state on the Adriatic, if adequate securities for its protection were given, Stroganoff notified his government of the fact and urged that Russia come forward at once to give Great Britain assurances for the protection of such a state. 1 The conciliatory inclination of the British cabinet on the question of Sicily, indicated to Yarmouth on July 18, changed soon after the Oubril treaty was received on July 25. It was an unhappy surprise for the British cabinet, Stroganoff informed Emperor Alexander, and there was general indignation against Oubril for treating separately and on such terms.2 Fox wrote Yarmouth at once that " it was a mortifying agreement, the honor of Russia and therefore of her ally Great Britain had been stained." Certainly the treaty endangered the position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean.3 Soon after receiving the treaty, the British cabinet received from Yarmouth reports of his conferences with Clarke on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth and the draft of the proposed Franco-British treaty which had evolved from the discussions. The drift of this negotiation and these treaty proposals had implications—particularly those which had to do with the acceptance of Napoleon's hegemony in Holland, the limitation of British troops at Malta, and the return by Great Britain of all her colonial conquests except the Cape of Good Hope—which were not at all agreeable to the British cabinet, some members of which were not strongly inclined to peace. As a result of this and of the Oubril treaty there was a certain stiffening in the position of 1

Stroganoff to Razumovski, July 17, 1806, Mikhailovich, op. cit., iii, pp. 80-82. 1 Stroganoff to Emperor Alexander, July 27, 1806, Sorel, op. cit., vii, PP. 84-85.

* Fox to Yarmouth, July 26, 1806, Parliamentary

Papers, 1806, vol. 307.

REJECTION

OF THE

OUBRIL

TREATY

111

the British with respect to future negotiations with Napoleon. They prepared to push negotiations with him and to conceal from him their annoyance over the treaty, considering, however, that it had released them from their obligations to Russia in any subsequent transactions with Napoleon. 1 Therefore, a second peace emissary was appointed in the person of Lord Lauderdale and his instructions, dated August 2, presented the views of the cabinet at the time. Great Britain returned to the original basis on which she began negotiations, i.e., the principle of uti posseditis, but this did not exclude consideration of terms reciprocally just to both powers based on some other principle. The compensation to Ferdinand for giving up Sicily as provided for in the Russian treaty (the Balearic Islands), was "inadequate in all respects." Some further compensation must be provided by France for Ferdinand before Sicily could be given up. The evacuation of the island by Great Britain would in any event depend upon the execution of other articles of peace between her and France, and also on an agreement that provided for protection and garrisoning of Sardinia, the Balearic Isles and any other territories forming part of the Sicilian compensation, exclusively by Great Britain, who alone could maintain their independence against France. Therefore, Great Britain could not consent to the proposal that only Spanish troops garrison the Balearic Isles. Great Britain refused to consider Corsica, Sardinia or the Hanse towns as compensation for Ferdinand of Sicily. It might be found in the former Spanish and Dutch colonies in South America or the West Indies, and it was only in case that an equivalent could be secured there that Great Britain would consider restoring any of the Dutch colonies. It was left to France to make proposals for compensation in exchange for receiving Sicily. The integrity of Sweden, 1

F o x to Yarmouth, July 26, 1806,

ibid.

112

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Spain and Portugal must also be guaranteed by the two powers in any agreement. Hanover must be returned to Great Britain. If these terms were accepted Great Britain would consent to recognition of " other changes which have taken place in Europe (This undoubtedly referred to political arrangements made by Napoleon in Germany, Holland and Italy). If no acceptable plan of exchange were proposed by France, either with a view to the interests of Great Britain or to those of the king of Sicily, then terms of peace must stand on the basis of uti possidetis with the restitution of Hanover to Great Britain. If these terms could not be secured from France, Lauderdale was not to accept any terms less advantageous, but to declare his mission terminated. There must be no delay in concluding these negotiations, a delay would give dangerous advantages to France. 1 Lauderdale arrived in Paris on August 5. T w o days later Yarmouth and Lauderdale delivered a note to the French, based on the instructions of the latter.2 When Napoleon received this communication he had been for some days convinced that Great Britain would make a favorable peace. The note now presented indicated a change to a less amenable position. On August 8 Clarke replied, under instructions dictated by Napoleon, refusing to recognize the principle of uti possidetis, and declaring that since Prussia and Russia had recognized or guaranteed changes in the kingdom of the T w o Sicilies, Great Britain need not think that she could prevent the conquest of Sicily, separated as it was from the continent by a short distance. Further, if uti possidetis were to be the basis of peace, then France would require a portion of Hungary, all of Austria, Hanover and territory about the mouths of the great rivers of northern Germany leaving Great Britain her colonial conquests.3 1

Instructions to Lauderdale, Aug. 2, 1806, Coquelle, op. ext., pp. 102-107.

Lauderdale to Clarke, Aug. 7, 1806, ibid., p. 109-110. ' Clarke to Lauderdale, Aug. 8, 1806, Driault, Austerlits,

2

pp. 434-436.

REJECTION

OF THE OUBRIL

TREATY

X13

This reply nearly severed negotiations at once. Lauderdale demanded his passports, which were refused by Talleyrand under instructions from Napoleon, who believed that time would work in his favor. On August 6, Emperor Francis renounced the title of Holy Roman Emperor and was prepared to recognize Joseph Bonaparte as king of the Two Sicilies, and any day Napoleon expected news of Emperor Alexander's ratification of the Oubril treaty. 1 Then Great Britain, forsaken by Austria and Russia, would be ready to consider his terms. Napoleon was willing to play a waiting game. 2 And since Lauderdale refused to alter the principle of uti possidetis their negotiations languished after the middle of August. 2 During the sojourn of Oubril at Vienna and Paris events were transpiring which caused opinion at St. Petersburg on the question of the evacuation of Cattaro to become less conciliatory than what had been expressed in the instructions Oubril had taken with him. First came a report that Austria would occupy Cattaro again by force if necessary, and then came news of the Franco-Austrian convention which permitted French troops to pass through Austrian territory to Dalmatia. 3 The first information made an evacuation of Cattaro in face of the menace by Austria appear to be damaging to the honor of Russia, while the Convention made retention of Cattaro necessary in order to oppose the consolidation of French power on the east side of the Adriatic. The Russian cabinet decided at the end of May to give up Cattaro only in case of absolute necessity.* 1

Driault, op. cit., pp. 436-437; Coquelle, op. cit., p. n o .

i

Clarke to Talleyrand, Aug. 13, 1806, Coquelle, op. cit., p. 121.

3 Report of Razumovski, May 14, 1806, Martens, Recueil des trait is conclus par la Riusie, ii, p. 503.

* Despatch of Czartoryski, June 1, 1806, ibid.

I I 4

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Emperor Alexander had been so disturbed upon hearing of the Franco-Austrian convention that f o r the moment he had thought of asking for the recall of the Austrian ambassador, but he soon recognized the need for keeping on good terms with Austria. 1 In fact the Emperor decided at length that the best way of ascertaining the real intentions of Austria and of holding her in line would be a treaty of alliance with her. In June overtures were made at Vienna, proposing a new Austro-Russian secret alliance by means of exchange of autograph letters between the sovereigns which would confirm the obligatory force of treaties which the two powers had previously made. The proposal was unsuccessful, as Austria was intent at this time upon securing a general peace and therefore upon avoiding entangling alliances. While Czartoryski, in accordance with his plans for checking French expansion eastward and increasing Russian influence over the Slav peoples in the Balkans, had always urged the necessity for Russia's keeping Cattaro, yet he was not blind to the danger of Napoleon's possible retaliation upon Austria for the Cattaro affair. He believed that, while safeguarding Russian interests by keeping Cattaro, he could also save Austria from the menace of Napoleon by starting serious negotiations with him for a general peace. Such had been the two objects of the negotiations entrusted to the Oubril mission. 2 Czartoryski was not to have the opportunity to carry out his plans, for at the end of June he was replaced at the Russian Foreign Office by Baron Budberg. It had been evident for some time that Emperor Alexander and Czartoryski were not always in accord on questions of foreign policy. The minister's anti-Prussian views, his Polish plans, and his 1

Despatch of Czartoryski, June I, 1806, ibid. * Czartoryski to Vorontsov, no date, Archives Vorontsov, xv, p. 414.

REJECTION

OF THE

OUBRIL

TREATY

115

attitude on the question of peace with France were not on the whole agreeable to the Emperor, who was more or less influenced by persons within the royal family and by favorites who were unfriendly to Czartoryski. There was also strong sentiment in Russian army circles and other groups against a peace with France without first having attempted to take revenge by arms for Austerlitz. 1 In fact, this change of ministers was a change of policies. M. de Lesseps, French chargé d'affairs, informed his government that it was a change less favorable to France. 2 T h e probability that Russia would now remain at Cattaro, in view of the Franco-Austrian convention, appeared yet more certain when reports arrived at St. Petersburg late in June of the French occupation of Ragusa, and of enlarged French forces in Dalmatia and troop movements in Italy. T h i s information increased the belief in Russian official circles that Napoleon had not actually given up his projects for invasion of Turkey while he was diverting the allies by engaging them in peace negotiations. 3 It was therefore not surprising that among the first acts of the Budberg ministry were decisions to refuse to permit the return of Cattaro to be made an object of negotiations at Paris, and to urge upon Great Britain that the allies ascertain as soon as possible the sincerity of Napoleon's desire for peace in order to prevent him f r o m paralyzing their action by prolonging negotiations while he himself strengthened his military position. Budberg instructed Stroganoff 1

Waliszewski, Le Rcgne d'Alexandre

1

Driault, op. cit., p. 438.

I, i, pp. 189, 195.

3 Czartoryski in his last report to the Czar expressed this view. " Le divan... paraît se laisser éblouir par les promesses astucieuses de Bonaparte, qui ne vise qu'à s'emparer des ressources que possède encore l'empire ottoman et pour s'approprier ensuite telle partie de cet empire qui sera le plus à sa convenance." Czartoryski to Alexander, June 29, 1806, Sbornik, 82, no. 117.

XI

6

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

at London to urge that the allies bring negotiations at Paris as soon as possible to a point where they could judge the intentions of Napoleon. Russia desired to put herself in a position to act effectively if circumstances required. Stroganoff was also to impress upon the British the fact that, if it was necessary to abandon all Italy to Napoleon, a precarious thing, then certainly the allies should not allow him to remain in Istria and Dalmatia, where he would be well placed to execute his projects against Turkey. Russia would never negotiate a peace unless this point were agreed to and she would also oppose any proposal for withdrawing her forces f r o m C o r f u . Budberg declared that he shared the fears of F o x that Austria, in case war continued, would allow herself to be so influenced by fear of Napoleon as to declare against the allies. T o prevent this and to encourage her to resist France, he had informed the Austrian cabinet that a Russian army corps was to be kept on the Galician frontier. 1 A t this time also, on the even of the negotiations at Paris, reports had come to St. Petersburg of growing tension at Constantinople in Russo-Turkish relations over the refusal of the Porte to allow passage of Russian ships and troops through the Dardanelles, and its revocation of barat privileges of Russian subjects. T h e effect upon Russian official circles was to confirm their belief that the Porte had fallen under French influence, and to increase their apprehension that Napoleon had plans of aggression in the Near East. Russian policy was also not unaffected by evidences of Napoleon's g r o w i n g power in the kingdoms, principalities and alliances he w a s creating in Holland, Germany and Italy which came to them concurrently with the report of the arrival of the T u r k i s h ambassador at P a r i s and the public announcement of Napoleon soon a f t e r that most cordial rela1

Budberg to Stroganoff, July 2, 1806, Mikhailovich, op. cit., iii, pp. 74-79.

REJECTION

OF THE OUBRIL

TREATY

117

tions existed between France and Turkey. Informing Stroganoff of these disturbing events, Budberg, however, was reassured by seeing evidence of the unity of the allies —so much a matter of concern now for Russia on the eve of negotiations with Napoleon.—in the strong support given by the British ambassador at Constantinople to Russia in her difficulties with the Porte. It was taken as an assurance that, when circumstances made it necessary, Russia could count on Great Britain to operate in common measures concerning Turkey. 1 The new ministry stood for a policy of conciliation with other powers and return to the Coalition. The relations with Great Britain were to be strengthened and particularly those with Prussia. Negotiations with Prussia for a treaty had been carried on since March. 2 On July 24 Emperor Alexander and Budberg signed with Prussia a treaty which provided that Prussia should not attack Russia if the latter became involved in war with France over Turkey. The Budberg ministry, while ready to continue negotiations for peace with Napoleon, intended nevertheless to make preparations for possible war with him, especially in the Near East. Therefore, when Oubril returned early in August bringing with him the treaty he had made with France, he found his government less hopeful of peace and less friendly to the idea than when he had left in May. It is evident from the despatches of Czartoryski and Budberg, already mentioned, that no treaty with France would be acceptable now at St. Petersburg which did not remove the French from Dalmatia and allow Russia to remain at Cattaro. Nor would any provision be accepted which violated the interests of Russia's ally, Great Britain. Therefore, out of re1

Budberg to Stroganoff, July 4, 1806, ibid., pp. 74-79.

2

Cf. supra, p. 29.

! ig

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807

spect for Great Britain, as well as in accordance with her own desire to drive the French from the east side of the Adriatic, it was probable that the Russian government would not now accept any treaty which gave Sicily to Napoleon. I n view of the growing probability of serious difficulties with Turkey in the near future and the evidences of a Franco-Turkish rapprochement, Russia could not allow any weakening of her position in the Balkans or the eastern Mediterranean. And since the treaty just concluded with Prussia obliged Russia to be concerned with affairs in Germany no general peace could be acceptable to Russia which permitted Napoleon to reorganize Germany in such a way as to endanger Prussia or for that matter, Austria. These were the views of the Russian cabinet in regard to making any agreement with Napoleon at the time when Oubril arrived at S t . Petersburg to submit his treaty to his government for approval. Budberg, after examining it, reported to Emperor Alexander that if Russia accepted the treaty she would virtually abandon Turkey to France. Turkey was so weak now that she could fall into the arms of Russia or France, whichever seemed the stronger. In giving up Cattaro, Russia would give up the means for keeping the Balkan peoples attached to Russia and they in turn would become her enemies. As for the article in Oubril's treaty concerning the evacuation of Germany by French forces, Budberg did not have much trust in it, since Napoleon's changes in Germany rendered a large part of it absolutely dependent on France in any event. Loyalty, declared Budberg, required that Russia should not abandon the interests of Ferdinand, king of the T w o Sicilies. 1 Russia should not allow Sicily to be given to Napoleon. Emperor Alexander then submitted the treaty to the State Council, declaring he would not sign it as it was con1

Budberg to Alexander, Aug. 2/14, 1806, Sbomik, 82, no. 143.

REJECTION

OF THE OUBRIL

trary to the instructions given Oubril.

TREATY

119

The Council also

refused to ratify it. 1 Budberg excused Oubril's conduct to Stuart, the British ambassador, on grounds of nervousness developed under the hectoring threats of Clarke. 2 And he informed Razumovski at Vienna that Oubril's treaty was entirely contrary to his instructions and that to have accepted it would have been to render permanent the existing state of affairs in Europe. It would sanction the encroachments of Napoleon upon independent states, and the evacuation of Germany by Napoleon was a precarious advantage in view of political changes he had already made in that territory. This treaty, continued Budberg, would consecrate the ruin of all Italy and perpetuate the dangers to Turkey resulting from the presence of the French in Dalmatia. It would also separate the interests of Russia and Great Britain. Razumovski was to send this information to Admiral Siniavin, commanding in the Mediterranean, who was to disregard any communication which had been sent him by Oubril. 8 A n official note was dispatched to Talleyrand informing him of the non-ratification of Oubril's treaty, and stating that there could be no durable peace while France remained in possession of Albania and Dalmatia, and while the former king of the T w o Sicilies was not assured peaceful possession of Sicily, and an adequate indemnity given the king of Sardinia for the loss of his states. Oubril had departed from his instructions on these points. However, Russia was ready to renew negotiations on bases securing the above mentioned conditions. Such a peace was to be ratified only 1

Martens, op. cit., xiii, p. 295.

2

Despatch of Stuart, Aug. 9, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 63.

' Budberg to Razumovski, Aug., 1806, Mikhailovich, op. cit., iii, pp. 114-116.

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

180&-1807

if preceded by the termination of the war between France and Great Britain.1 3 Since the middle of August the negotiations between France and Great Britain had been deadlocked, Napoleon emphatically refusing to treat on the principle of uti possidetis which Lauderdale, newly arrived from London, presented as the only basis on which Great Britain would continue to treat. At about this time reports arrived in London concerning affairs in Italy which were opportune in strengthening the position of the British in these negotiations. French forces had pushed into Calabria in the spring and had begun to make extensive preparations for an expedition into Sicily early in June at the very time when negotiations among the powers were opening in Paris. On July i a force of five thousand British troops under General Charles Stuart landed on the shores of Calabria. They soon met the French troops and defeated them, capturing important towns and large military stores destined for the French expedition to Sicily. By the middle of July a large portion of Calabria was in the possession of the British and the menace of a French invasion of Sicily was at least temporarily removed.2 News of the success of the expedition to Calabria reached London early in August, soon after the news of the Oubril treaty which proposed to give Sicily to Napoleon. The British cabinet, relieved of the fear of French attack on Sicily, were now more than ever determined to stand on the principle of uti possidetis as the basis of peace with Napoleon, and less inclined to make concession in regard to 1 1

Budberg to Talleyrand, Aug., 1806, ibid., pp. 130-131.

Fortescue, History of the British Army (London, 1899-1927, 12 vols.), vol. v, pp. 336 et seg. ; Driault, Napoléon en Italie, pp. 408-418.

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the island. Military advantages had come to strengthen British diplomacy with respect to the Mediterranean at just the time when it appeared that Great Britain's ally, Russia, was about to weaken her position there. On August 28 Talleyrand, acting on instructions from Napoleon, informed Clarke and Champagny that they were to delay negotiations with the British as long as possible, and to avoid any break at least until news had come from St. Petersburg of the action taken on the Oubril treaty. 1 On September 3 came news that it had not been ratified, and at the same time a demand from Berlin that French troops evacuate Germany, at once. The coincidence of these events aroused the suspicions of Napoleon and Talleyrand that there existed a Russo-Prussian alliance, and also that Great Britain had had a hand in its formation and no longer seriously wished peace.2 Talleyrand delivered a vitriolic note on the fourth to Lauderdale, now alone representing the British, as Yarmouth had left Paris on August 22. It charged him with having had intentions from the first of breaking the negotiations and stated that his conduct had been menacing instead of pacific; it would seem impossible to conclude a peace with such a representative of Great Britain. 3 Talleyrand received orders to send Lauderdale the passports for which he had been asking since the middle of the month. A s a matter of fact, Lauderdale's communications with the French had always been polite and temperate. He did not reply to this note, thinking it was his duty to remain in Paris. With the report of the refusal of Alexander to accept the Oubril treaty, there also came to the British Foreign Office communications from Budberg affirming the loyalty of 1

Driault, Austerlits,

2

Talleyrand to Napoleon, Sept. 3, 1806, Coquelle, op. cit., pp. 127-128.

3

Talleyrand to Lauderdale, Sept. 4, 1806, ibid., pp. 128-129.

p. 437.

122

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1806-1807

Russia to her alliance with Great Britain and urging the need for joint action. This created better feeling 1 and orders were sent to Lauderdale that he was to treat with France only on behalf of the joint interests of Russia and Great Britain, as the two powers were again in the position they had occupied before the signing of Oubril's treaty. 2 Accordingly, on September 1 3 Lauderdale informed Talleyrand that Great Britain would no longer be able to conclude a peace separately from Russia, and offered to ascertain and present the conditions on which Russia would negotiate. 3 But by this time Napoleon was absorbed with military and diplomatic preparations against Prussia. While there can be no absolute certainty that he had completely abandoned all ideas of peace, it is probable that he now seriously doubted the sincerity of the British overtures. At least for the time being the negotiations f o r peace were of less importance than the pressing necessity for striking Prussia quickly and decisively before her allies could give her any help. His note to Talleyrand, of September 1 2 , " on the actual state of my affairs contained only instructions about the Prussian war, the resumption of war with Russia, and the question of an alliance with Austria. Nothing was said about the negotiations with Great Britain. 4 Lauderdale received from Talleyrand on the eighteenth an affirmative assurance to his question as to whether, if peace were at once signed by Great Britain with Napoleon, the war with Prussia would be averted. 5 Desiring to save 1

Stroganoff to Budberg, Sept 5, 1806, Mikhailovich, op. cit., iii, pp. 127-129. s

Instructions to Lauderdale, Sept. 10, 1806, Coquelle, op. cit., p. 129.

1

Lauderdale to Talleyrand, Sept. 13, 1806, ibid., p. 130.

4 Napoleon to Talleyrand, Sept. 12, 1806, Correspondance xiii.

• Coquelle, op. cit., p. 133.

de

Napoléon,

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123

Prussia from attack, he was most eager to bring the war between France and Great Britain to an end as soon as possible and therefore consented to Napoleon's proposal that the two powers continue to treat alone. Napoleon consented to insert in the treaty a clause which would make possible a reconciliation between France and Russia. 1 This was not quite in accordance with Lauderdale's latest instructions for only joint British and Russian negotiations. However, he assumed the responsibility in the hope of a favorable response from Napoleon. On the twenty-fifth he learned that Napoleon had just left Paris for Mainz to take command of his army, which was prepared now to move against Prussia. Napoleon had determined to crush Prussia before undertaking new negotiations with Great Britain. On the twenty-sixth Lauderdale received new instructions from London. F o x had died on the thirteenth. He had been the constant advocate of peace with Napoleon, though with possibly diminishing conviction in his last days. But there had been a group in the British cabinet who had never had much sympathy with his pacific policy. His death came at a time when the anxiety at London as to the future of British and Russian relations caused by the Oubril treaty had been removed. On the other hand, the British cabinet was confronted with increasing evidences of an approaching war between France and Prussia. These circumstances were certain to have effect on the orientation of British policy regarding peace terms with Napoleon. Accordingly, new instructions were sent to Lauderdale. These instructions, which he received on September 26, stated that the British cabinet, now confronted with the probable resumption by Napoleon of war with Russia and the apparent certainty of war with Prussia, would no longer 1

Lauderdale to Talleyrand, Sept. 19, 1806, ibid.

I 2 4

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1806-1807

agree to the terms for peace which they had been proposing for the last two months. They now proposed that Dalmatia be given to King Ferdinand formerly of Naples, and that the Balearic Isles be given to the former king of Sardinia. A s to Sicily, it was implied that this question could be compromised if the French gave up Dalmatia. 1 It has been suggested that, to save Prussia, the British would at this time have abandoned Sicily to Napoleon. 2 Their return to the proposal to give Dalmatia to Ferdinand was probably largely motivated by consideration of the Russian desire to remove the French from the frontiers of Turkey. Lauderdale at once conveyed the new proposals to Champagny, who forwarded them to Napoleon. Meanwhile, the British cabinet was in process of reorganization following the death of F o x , and the war party was gaining the ascendancy. T h e feeling that an agreement with France was no longer possible had become definite, and instructions were sent Lauderdale which virtually brought peace negotiations to a close. Accordingly, on October 4, while he was waiting for a reply from Napoleon to his latest proposals, Lauderdale presented a note to the French which declared that Great Britain refused to discuss any further negotiations until France had agreed to give up her claims to Cattaro, to evacuate Dalmatia, and to guarantee possession of Sicily to Ferdinand, these several territories to be left in the occupation of English and Russian troops. If these terms were not accepted, then the British plenipotentiary had orders to declare his mission closed.3 On October 5, Napoleon's reply to the British proposals of September 26 was received at Paris. It contained no 1 s

Instructions to Lauderdale, ibid., pp. 136-137. Ibid.

' Lauderdale to Champagny, Oct. 4, 1806, ibid., pp. 138-139.

REJECTION

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I25

conciliatory proposal, completely refused to negotiate on the terms suggested, charged the British with insincerity in their desire f o r peace, and authorized the grant of passports to Lauderdale. 1 Napoleon was unwilling to give up Dalmatia. H e also wanted Sicily, but there were dangers in an exchange of what he had f o r what he did not have. If he gave up Dalmatia, with the Russians at Cattaro, he gave up the most certain means f o r controlling the Adriatic and interposing in Balkan affairs. W i t h Dalmatia under Ferdinand—which meant that it would be virtually a protectorate of the British and Russians—and with the Russians at Cattaro and the British at Malta, Napoleon had reason to doubt the value of Sicily alone. W i t h the refusal of Napoleon to discuss the British proposals of September 26, which the British cabinet had already invalidated by the presentation of their impossible terms in the note of October 4, the British and French negotiations were brought to an end. Lauderdale left Paris on October 9. O n October 6, Napoleon at W u r z b u r g with his army had announced in a ringing proclamation to his soldiers the opening of hostilities against Prussia. 2 His army was started at once on the march along the river Saale. Napoleon's plan was to throw his army between the Prussian army and Berlin, crush the former and take the latter, just as in December 1805 he had turned and defeated the A u s trian forces at Austerlitz and then occupied Vienna. On October 14, Napoleon met and decisively defeated the Prussians at Jena, and moved his army to Berlin. O n the nineteenth Frederick William of Prussia asked Napoleon to suspend hostilities. O n the twenty-fifth Napoleon entered Berlin. Negotiations for peace began at once. A s in De1

Champagny to Lauderdale, Oct. 5, 1806, ibid., p. 139.

2

Driault, Napoleon et I'Europe, Tilsit

(Paris, 1917), p. 35.

J 26

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QUESTION,

1806-1807

cember 1805 at Vienna he had dictated to Austria, so now in October 1806 at Berlin he was to dictate peace to Prussia. The question of Sicily had been the chief cause of the failure of Franco-British negotiations in the summer of 1806, as Malta had been the main cause of their break in 1803. A t this time, as in all important crises in FrancoBritish relations, since November 1 7 9 2 the question was essentially one of naval and commercial advantage. What was really at stake was the question of French control in the Netherlands, and the mastery of the Mediterranean. Both seemed essential to France once her frontiers had been carried beyond her northern frontiers of 1789 and over the Alps. Likewise, the need for maintaining a strategic frontier had made these two areas seem of first importance to Great Britain: first, that she might prevent any great power f r o m holding the coast of the Netherlands—a necessity if she were to protect her east coast from invasion; secondly, that her communications with India be secure. Great Britain had to accept, with the failure of negotiations with Napoleon in October 1806, the continued presence of the French in the Netherlands. And she was also soon after confronted with the fact that Napoleon had Prussia under his control, thereby completely consolidating his control of all central Europe, from Hamburg to Brindisi, and extending his mastery of the continental coast and its commercial ports. On the other hand, in holding the Cape of Good Hope, Malta and Sicily, Great Britain still had entire control of the lines of communication with India. She had shown inclinations during the recent negotiations to bargain off Sicily f o r Hanover or other objectives, but fears that Napoleon's schemes might endanger the route to India led her now, as in 1803, t o c l i " g to Malta and Sicily. In fact, by October sufficient evidence had reached London

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127

concerning the activities of various French agents in T u r key—especially those of the French ambassador at the Porte — a n d concerning the recalcitrant attitude of the Porte toward Great Britain and Russia, to convince the British cabinet of the need for activity and for strengthening British naval control in the Near East. A s the respective interests of Great Britain and France in the Mediterranean were considerable factors in the failure of these powers to negotiate a peace in 1806, so also irreconcilable differences concerned with strategic lines of defense in the Near East had most to do with the failure of FrancoRussian negotiations. T h e treaty signed by Oubril was refused by Alexander and his ministers chiefly because of their increasing and ineradicable fears that Napoleon had plans for extending his hegemony into the Balkans. The mastery of Italy by the French and their possession of Dalmatia, coupled with reports of the activities of French agents in Albania and Morea, and of French naval armaments which were being prepared in Venice; the anti-Russian sentiment increasingly apparent at the Porte and the evidence of a rapprochement with France, with its possibilities that France would recover her former diplomatic ascendancy at the Porte and her commercial privileges in the Levant—these were developments since the time of the Treaty of Pressburg which vitally affected Russia, just as control of the routes to India and the political status of the Netherlands touched interests vital to Great Britain. Although he had refused to accept the Oubril treaty, A l exander had not at that time intended to close the door to renewed negotiations for peace with Napoleon. However, unexpected events in t w o places put Russia in such a position as to make her less inclined to consider peace with France possible or desirable. First, the development of belligerent relations between

I2

8

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807

France and Prussia placed Russia under the responsibility of taking up arms against France to defend, in accordance with recent treaty obligations, her ally Prussia. B e f o r e they had time to concert measures, Napoleon had completely disorganized the Prussian army at J e n a and soon a f t e r had entered Berlin. B y the end of October there were rumours at St. Petersburg that he would occupy Prussian Poland and by appeals to nationalist sentiment there arouse rebellion in Russian Poland. In the Balkans, also, the course of events a f t e r the failure of the Oubril treaty rapidly brought Russia to a critical situation where it seemed that peace and the safety of her frontiers were menaced. T h e conduct of Turkey was so questionable that Alexander and his ministry decided to make an armed demonstration on Turkish territory. Behind their difficulties with Turkey the Russians believed they saw the directing hand of French diplomacy. A t about the same time the British cabinet perceived the same danger and decided to make a naval demonstration off the Dardanelles with the object of recovering British influence at Constantinople and compelling the Porte to repudiate French connections. Consideration must now be given to the development of a f f a i r s within the Ottoman Empire and the course of international politics at Constantinople during the summer of 1806 when the European powers were negotiating f o r peace.

PART III FRANCO-BRITISH RIVALRY IN T H E NEAR EAST J U N E 1806—JANUARY 1807

CHAPTER VI D E S P O S I T I O N A N D R E S T O R A T I O N OF T H E H O S P O D A R S OF M O L D A V I A A N D W A L L A C H I A I

IT will be recalled that during the spring of 1806 while Napoleon was despatching numerous missions to the Ottoman Empire with evident signs of improved relations between France and Turkey, the relations of Great Britain and Russia with the latter power had become less favorable. Ill will had developed over the refusal of the Porte to renew the Anglo-Turkish treaty and to permit the passage of Russian ships through the Dardanelles. There was also the question of the barats. T h e Porte had become increasingly concerned over evidences of Russian intrigue in Moldavia and Wallachia. There were, in addition, suspicions of Russian support of the Serbian revolution and resentment over the diplomatic intervention of Russia and Austria in the Serbian question. These particular issues were made more acute by reason of the fear and distrust developed between Russia and Turkey by the military preparations each was making on her frontier. The Russians suspected that the conduct of Turkey could be laid to intrigue of French diplomats at the Porte. A n d the Porte in turn placed the blame for Russia's actions on her ambitions for expansion in the Balkans, and believed that to this end she was promoting rebellion among subject peoples in European Turkey. 1 Therefore, at the time when Russia, Great Britain and France were settling down to negotiations for peace at Paris, concerned as they were in part with their position in the Near 1

Cf. supra, pp. 46 et seq. 131

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East, the course of events during the spring in this region was endangering peace there and intensifying the rivalries among the several powers. Arbuthnot, the British ambassador at Constantinople, communicated to his government early in June the information that the relations between Russia and Turkey were becoming increasingly less amicable, especially over the question of the barats. The Porte had recently given orders revoking all privileges from the barats held by Russian subjects, and had also revoked rights of protection held by Turkish subjects to trade under the Russian flag and to become Russian subjects. All persons affected by these revocations were given but a few days to deliver up their patents or else become liable to confiscation of their property. 1 The Russian ambassador, Italinski, had vigorously protested and warned the Porte that such action would mean war with Russia. Arbuthnot also protested and also warned the Porte that a war with Russia would mean likewise war with Great Britain, and that he had directed British commanders in the Mediterranean to begin action as soon as a RussoTurkish war was declared.2 These threats seem to have had some effect, for soon after the Porte issued proclamations assuring Russian merchants that there were to be no changes in their commercial privileges. Orders were also issued to Turkish officials to punish anyone circulating statements suggesting war with Russia. The Porte, too, decided not to press for the time being the order revoking the rights of Turkish subjects under the Russian flag. Italinski received at this time instructions to negotiate with Turkey on the various issues between the two powers, and a friendly letter also came from Alexander to Selim. 3 1

Arbuthnot to Fox, June 6, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, so. « Ibid. » Ibid.

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T h e tension in Russian and Turkish relations at Constantinople seemed to be eased, but Arbuthnot continued to urge upon F o x that it was necessary to send a British squadron to the eastern Mediterranean, as he thought that recent affairs revealed a " vacillating and weak character " in Russian policy in regard to Turkey. Besides, he was doubtful of the theory, long held by Great Britain, that Russia alone was a sufficient barrier against Napoleon's aggression on Turkey. If French troops started to invade the country, no single power, he believed, could stop them. 1 In the midst of the difficulties between Russia and T u r key over the barats, news reached Constantinople of the French occupation of Ragusa on May 27. 2 Both Italinski and Arbuthnot took advantage of the fear of the French which the news occasioned at the Porte to promote further distrust by suggesting that Napoleon would also soon take Albania and that only Russia sincerely desired the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. 3 Urged on by the Russian ambassador, the Porte made protests about the occupation of Ragusa to Ruffin, the French chargé d'affaires, who explained that it was temporary and would continue only until the Russians were driven out of Cattaro. If Napoleon, he declared, were actually following a plan of aggression on Turkey he would use Dalmatia, and not Ragusa, as a base of operation. Ruffin in turn protested to the Porte against the activities of the Montenegrins who had helped the Russians occupy Cattaro and had attacked French troops at Ragusa. He demanded that measures be taken by the Porte against them and called them rebels.4 1

Arbuthnot to Fox, June 26, 1806, ibid.

Bradisteanu, Die Beziehungen Russlands und Frankreichs sur Türkei, 1806-1807, p. 75 ; Arbuthnot to Fox, June 26, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 50. 2

3

Cf. infra, p. 269.

4

Bradisteanu, op. cit., p. 76.

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Probably a more immediate factor than fear of the British navy in explaining the seemingly conciliatory attitude taken on the question of the barats by the Porte was the development at this time of an internal crisis. T h e Sultan and his ministers were again threatened with trouble f r o m the janissaries, privileged troops w h o during the past century had acquired much influence at Constantinople at a time when the authority of the Sultan was diminishing. T h e Ottoman Empire had become by the end of the e i g h teenth century in many respects a semi-feudalized state. T h e Sultans had been weak men, certain pashas had become politically powerful, and a latent nationalism was developing among various subject peoples. T h e Empire was in serious danger of political disintegration. W i t h the accession of Selim I I I to the throne in 1789, a program of reform had been evolved by means of which the Sultan hoped to recover his authority, to improve the administration of government, and especially to reform the army. It had caused opposition f r o m religious leaders, the official bureaucracy and the janissaries—who represented conservative or privileged groups and were fearful that liberal reform might a f fect their position or perquisites. The hatti-cherif of March 1805, establishing the reform organization in the army known as the Nisam-Djedid and declaring all troops absorbed into it at once, had been vigorously and successfully resisted by the janissaries. Selim had to build up the organization from troops in A s i a Minor under the direction of Kadi Pasha. 1 Becoming disturbed over the Russian military preparations on the frontiers of Turkey in the spring of 1806, Selim had ordered K a d i Pasha to prepare the reform regiments to g o to the Danube front. These troops arrived in 1 Bradisteanu, op. cit., pp. 52-53 ; Driault, La Politique Napoléon, pp. 36-37.

orientale

de

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the vicinity of Constantinople early in June, causing agitation among the janissaries to whom rumors had come that they might be dislodged from their barracks. The other parties who were opposed to all reform busied themselves urging the janissaries to oppose Selim and also in spreading rumors against him. The janissaries threatened to seek support from the heir to the throne, Mustapha. This was a threat of dire significance to Selim as Mustapha was supposed to be in sympathy with the reactionary parties. 1 The Porte was also concerned at this time with difficulties in Arabia with the Wahabis, who had long been a disturbing element within the Ottoman Empire. The Porte had initiated extensive military preparations against them at the end of 1805, as their attacks on pilgrims en route to Mecca reflected unfavorably on the Sultan as Calif. Youssouf Pasha had been given command of an expedition against them, which had miscarried. There was much disorder in Syria, and the janissaries had revolted at Damascus and at Aleppo. 2 The failure of the expedition, the complaints of the pilgrims, the revolts at Damascus and Aleppo, the victories of the W a habis—all contributed to lessen the prestige of the Sultan and the Porte and to give them grave concern.3 The British ambassador, believing that internal dissension in the Ottoman Empire would be an aid to Napoleon's plans for aggression there, confided to his Russian colleague at the end of June that " a crisis is coming in the Ottoman Empire testing whether Russian and Great Britain will be able to conserve their influence in this part of the world and their possessions in Asia." * It was very probable, he declared, that 1

Arbuthnot to Fox, June 26, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 50. * P. Mouriez, Histoire de Mihimet AH (Paris, 1855-1885, 3 vols), ii, pp. 69-70. 3 Arbuthnot to Fox, June 26, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 50. 4 Arbuthnot to Italinski, June 27, 1806, ibid.

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Napoleon had formed plans for an invasion of Turkey and that, once ready, he would move quickly and might reach Constantinople before British and Russian troops could stop him, especially if Russia delayed action longer. Turkey could not be depended on to defend herself alone.1 It was therefore with much satisfaction that Arbuthnot heard early in July that instructions had come to Italinski to inform the Porte that Russia would assert her right to send troops through the Dardanelles to Corfu, and also that in view of the evidently hostile feeling at the Porte toward Russia orders had been given to Russian commanders on the Turkish frontier to be ready to march. However, it was believed at St. Petersburg, so Arbuthnot heard, that Turkey would do nothing against Russia until the arrival of Sebastiani, the new French ambassador.2 Soon afterwards Arbuthnot received reports of the warm reception given in Paris early in June to the Turkish ambassador, and of increased activities between French agents at Constantinople and the Turkish ministers. There was also much talk about the political importance of the coming of Sebastiani. Arbuthnot found the Turkish ministers more reserved toward him than they had formerly been. He did not like the actions of the several Turkish armies which were being mobilized in the European provinces, and which he believed were not intended to act solely against the rebel Serbians, as the Porte declared they were. Nor did he believe that these military preparations were motivated by fear of Napoleon, in view of the warm friendliness shown in the exchange of ambassadors now taking place between the two countries. Arbuthnot, communicating these facts to his government toward the end of July, warned F o x that all this meant—this was also the belief of Italinski—that the Porte > Ibid. * Arbuthnot to Fox, July 10, 1806, ibid.

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had already decided upon war with Russia, and that it was only awaiting the arrival of Sebastiani in order to make final arrangements. 1 The British and Russian ambassadors' growing distrust of the Porte, which was acting as they believed under French influence, and their fears as to future relations of Russia and Turkey, would have been materially strengthened had they known that at the beginning of July the Porte, urged by the French, was ready to depose Ypsilanti and Morousi as hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, and to put in their places Prince Alexander Soutzo and Prince Charles Callimachi. 2 The proposed new hospodars were partisans of a pro-French policy for Turkey and opponents of Russia. And it would also have been disturbing to the British and Russian diplomats to know that both Ypsilanti and Morousi, pro-Russian in policy but ever ready to take care of their own political fences, were seeking to gain the good will of the French at Constantinople. Bribes had been offered to Ruffin by members of the Morousi party. 3 Partisans of a pro-French and an anti-Russian policy for Turkey were indeed active at this time. A French party among Turkish officials was constantly calling to the attention of the Porte all reports of Russian political intrigue or military activity in Moldavia and Wallachia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Morea. A t the same time, Ruffin in various ways continuously sought to convince the Porte that Napoleon had only the sincerest friendship for Turkey and desired to rescue her from the designs of Russia. 4 Probably a true conception of the position and actual 1

Arbuthnot to Fox, July 25, 29, 1806, ibid. Report of Ruffin, July 10, 1806, Documente vol. ii, p. 34s. 2

3 4

Ruffin to Talleyrand, July 25, 1806, ibid. Ibid.

Hurmusaki,

Suppl. I,

I38

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

views of the Porte at this time with respect to Turkish foreign policy is disclosed in a declaration of the Reis Effendi to Bielfeld, the Prussian ambassador. Prussia was the only one of the great powers which the Porte could feel had no possible ambitions of aggression on her. T h e Reis Effendi declared that Turkey desired to hold the friendship of Russia in case France had ideas of partition of the Ottoman Empire; however, if France sought only to maintain the integrity of Turkey, then they wished to be associated with her in order to remove the too preponderant influence of Russia. 1 In this situation it was inevitable that the Porte should decide to make considerable military and naval preparations to defend Turkish frontiers and support Turkish diplomacy. T h e Porte was aware also of another danger which might arise from the exigencies of a war between Russia and France, should it be renewed: in such a case it would be difficult for Turkey to maintain neutrality or the inviolability of her frontiers, since the country lay between the frontiers of the Napoleonic and Russian empires. Meanwhile, the internal crisis at Constantinople caused by the agitation of the janissaries had not abated, but had rather g r o w n more intense during July. It seems evident that the real intention of Selim was to send his r e f o r m troops to the front and to use them with the armies which were being formed on the Danube. The fact, however, that he retained these troops near Constantinople further increased the suspicions of the janissaries. Neither did they want the reform troops to join the troops at the front, as they feared that, once they became a part of the regular army, the reforms might spread. Hearing finally that the reform army was preparing to start for the front and would pass through A d rianople, the janissaries proceeded to f o r t i f y this city, forc1 Reis Effendi to Bielfeld, Zinkeisen, Geschichte des Reiches in Europa (Gotha, 1840-1863, 7 vols.), vii, p. 396.

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ing the people to do the work and coercing city officials to promise resistance. 1 Selim attempted to secure the help of certain pashas in Rumelia to force the janissaries to obedience, but he found that they also were disposed to resist the military reforms. 2 Unfortunately he had allowed the rebels time to f o r t i f y themselves at Adrianople and, instead of sending his troops t o oppose them at once, had kept them in Constantinople admiring their drill. A t length, with Kadi Pasha in command, the reform army started for the front. They were met at Adrianople by the rebel forces and there was an indecisive struggle. It was evident that Kadi Pasha could not go on. Selim then, having found that he could not rely upon the neighboring pashas for help, and perhaps also unwilling to be left unprotected, ordered Kadi to fall back toward Constantinople. In the retreat the troops were harassed by Terzenik-Oglou, pasha of Rustchuk, and they soon found themselves in Silivia surrounded by their enemies, hampered by lack of provisions and attacked by sickness. There was a report that the janissaries were preparing to march on Constantinople to force a change of government and to get control of that city as they had done of Adrianople. 8 Further, a coalition was and lesser Turkish officials policy at the Porte, which forms. 4 If necessary, they 1

being formed among the pashas in Rumelia to force a change of meant the abolition of army rewere ready to march with armed

Arbuthnot to Fox, July 25, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 50.

s Ibid.

* Arbuthnot to Fox, Aug. 9, 1806, ibid. The opposition of the pashas to the army reforms was to be expected. Under the existing system they were independent commanders of their -own troops who recognized them as their only superiors. Under the new system they would all be incorporated into an army solely under the command of the Sultan and his officers. The pashas were making 4

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QUESTION,

1806-1807

forces on Constantinople, depose Selim and replace him him with Mustapha, and also re-make the Council of Ministers so that it would be friendly to their views. These pashas had shown their hostility to the existing régime by refusing to give provisions to a Turkish army operating against the Serbians. 1 At length there came to Constantinople definite information that Terzenik-Oglou, leader of the coalition, was organizing an army of eighty thousand to march against the city and depose Selim. 2 By the middle of August the Sultan was in a precarious position. Such was the situation when the new French ambassador, General Horace Sébastiani, arrived at Constantinople. His coming was to accentuate the complications of international politics there. He had left Paris late in June, and July 28 he arrived in Bucharest. Following his instructions Sébastiani sought to secure information there concerning political affairs in Moldavia and Wallachia, and upon the Serbian insurrection. He had a conference with Ypsilanti, who seemed very eager to know more about Napoleon's plans. While both hospodars were pro-Russian, they were yet aware that a friendly relationship between France and Russia would have an effect upon their tenure of office. On the other hand, Sébastiani sought confirmation of the suspicions of his government that Ypsilanti was an instrument of Russia in promoting her plans of aggression on Turkey. He proposed that Ypsilanti prove his loyalty to the Porte by persuading the Serbians to be less exacting in their demands. In turn Sébastiani promised that Napoleon would guarantee their the same sort of opposition that the feudal lords had made in western Europe at the time when the rising national monarchs attempted the reorganization of the army from a feudal to a national basis. 1 Summers to Arbuthnot, Aug. 10, 12, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51.

* Driault, La Politique

orientale de Napoléon,

p. 37.

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safety and that he himself would attempt to make the Porte more conciliatory toward them. Ypsilanti agreed to intercede with the Serbians when he had been informed that such intercession was authorized by the Porte, and also agreed that if after conciliation had been attempted, the Serbians hesitated to lay down arms, then he would concur with the Porte in making war on them in order to suppress the insurrection. 1 In making these promises Sébastiani had perhaps gone beyond a strict adherence to his instructions, which required him to take up the Serbian question only with officials at the Porte, and not to arouse suspicions that France was trying to interfere in domestic affairs of Turkey. He was a man of much initiative and aggressiveness, and he may well have made these proposals seriously, or he may have been only playing with Ypsilanti, testing his loyalty to the Porte. Whatever his intentions, the French ambassador had made statements which, if they had been reported to the Porte, might have hurt his position there, as it has already been noted that the Porte in the spring had rejected all offers of mediation on the Serbian question from Austria and Russia, and had warned France that it would be well for her not to interfere. 2 Besides securing information concerning political affairs in Moldavia and Wallachia, it appears, according to the British agent at Bucharest, that Sébastiani was also active in promoting pro-French feeling among the native aristocracy and the upper clergy of Wallachia, having much to say to them concerning alleged intrigues of Russia and Great Britain intended to subject Turkey to them. Napoleon was 1 Confidential report of Ypsilanti to Russian ministry on conference with Sébastiani, Yakschitch, L'Europe et la résurrection de la Serbie, 1804-1834, pp. 105-107. 2

Cf. supra, pp. 60-61.

THE

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QUESTION,

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represented as desiring only to protect Turkey, but the French ambassador warned the boyars and the clergy of the quick chastisement Napoleon would give them should they connive with the above mentioned powers. He also enjoined upon them the duty of loyalty to the Sultan. 1 Upon leaving Bucharest, Sébastiani stopped at Rustchuk where he met Pasha Terzenik-Oglou. He made his visit at an opportune time, as he heard then of the preparations which were being made by this pasha to assemble an army to march on Constantinople and to force Selim to abolish the reforms in the army. He attempted to secure some idea of the character and ambitions of the pasha and urged upon him the importance of bringing about peace within Turkey, in order to make her less susceptible to the intrigues and aggressions of her foreign foes. The instructions of Sébastiani had been definite that Napoleon did not want to sustain rebellions within Turkey, nor to have her partitioned, but rather desired to strengthen her within and without so that she might serve as a bulwark for him against Russia. 2 This policy of pacification of civil strife in Turkey was not without its dangers to French aims in the Near East. The opposition of the janissaries and the pashas of Rumelia to Selim was an affair strictly among the Turks themselves involving only domestic policy and issues. Friendly interference by a foreign power, such as France was now impelled to offer with an eye to external affairs, might arouse resentment from both sides and might be regarded as menacing to the independence of all Turks. There was danger of stirring up the latent anti-Christian feeling of the Moslems. On the other hand, wherever in 1

Summers to Fox, Aug. I, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 50. For an account of the sojourn of Sébastiani at Bucharest see: Baron Prévost, " Constantinople de 1806 à 1808," Revue Contemporaine, 1854. 2

Cf. supra, pp. 75-76.

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OF MOLDAVIA

AND WALLACHIA

143

Turkey foreign influence and interests were strongly intrenched through manipulation of local political forces or special treaty rights and were backed by a considerable nonTurkish or non-Moslem population, interference was less dangerous to the prestige of a friendly foreign power. It was such a situation which existed, for example, in Moldavia and Wallachia. This the French could exploit fully to their political benefit and could utilize in order to create favorable sentiment for themselves among the Turkish people, appearing as their friends against foreign aggression. Foreign war might lessen for the time being the internal discord between Selim and the groups opposing his reforms, consolidate his position on the throne, and offer opportunity for France to establish the desired political ascendancy at Constantinople by working on the traditional Turkish fears of Russia. Sebastiani arrived at Constantinople on August 9, and was received with flattering attention. He took full advantage of his reception, and declared that the mission of France was to save Turkey from her two great enemies, Great Britain and Russia. This called forth from the British ambassador an indignant protest to the Porte, in which he stated that its actions were " impolite condescension". T o counteract French influence, he soon afterwards sent a communication to the Porte giving a flattering account of the recent British victories over the French in southern Italy. 1 Arbuthnot followed his announcement with a demand that the Porte give more attention to the question of the rights of Ferdinand, the former king of Naples and that it refuse to recognize the right of Joseph Bonaparte. Arbuthnot was not aware that in the recent negotiations at Paris his government had been ready to bargain away Sicily, and had definitely recognized the right of Joseph to the throne of Naples. 1

Arbuthnot to Fox, Aug. 14, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51.

I 4 4

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Count Ludolf, minister of the former king of Naples, had in the past made many protests to the Porte, supported by Arbuthnot, upon the French subjection of the kingdom, but had received little satisfaction. When Sebastiani arrived, it was believed that he would demand recognition of Joseph Bonaparte. Arbuthnot, recognizing as he said that he was in a desperate game with the French, determined to combat Sebastiani upon every point. He knew from experience that questions of personal precedence were of material consequence in the opinion of the Turks. If he allowed the French ambassador to gain a personal precedence over him in Turkish official circles, " he would then be listened to only out of deference and not from respect." 1 News of the Oubril treaty reached Constantinople soon after the arrival of Sebastiani. According to Arbuthnot the French ambassador explained the treaty to the Porte as an act of abject submission by Russia to Napoleon. Austerlitz had destroyed Russia's influence in Europe and an invasion of England by Napoleon would now be attempted with unquestioned success. Also a French and Austrian alliance would be made.2 Although Sebastiani sought to make good use of the Oubril treaty to promote French influence at the Porte, in fact it put him in a difficult position. A peace between France and Russia nullified one of the important reasons for his mission, which was to advance French influence in the east by promoting the ill will of Turkey toward Russia. He must now turn around and make explanations to the Porte which would seek to allay her growing distrust of Russia. The recent attempts made by the Porte to take away the ' Ibid. 2 Arbuthnot to Fox, Aug. 16, 1806, ibid. The diplomatic agents of the rival powers secured much information concerning the activities of each at the Porte through secret underground channels.

HOSPODARS

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145

privileges of the barats had, it will be recalled, been a source of irritation between Turkey and particularly Russia, and had contributed materially to strain Russo-Turkish relations. Also, British consuls in Turkey found themselves in difficulty over the matter as it affected commercial privileges. Arbuthnot protested that it was a violation of the Capitulations. 1 Sebastiani took advantage of these difficulties to promote French influence by offering to the Porte the abandonment by France of the system of barats and compliance with all orders of the Porte on the subject. 2 In fact, France had not at stake mercantile interests such as Great Britain and Russia had. Sebastiani levied a price, however, for his submission in the matter of the barats. He secured f r o m the Porte the promise that no Greek, Armenian or Turkish subject would be permitted to navigate under a foreign flag, or become a naturalized citizen of any nation, especially Russia. 3 T h e questions of the barats, tariffs, status of the kingdom of Naples, passage of Russian ships through the Dardanelles, renewal of the Anglo-Turkish treaty—all these became secondary matters as far as British and Russian diplomacy was concerned in view of an event which now occurred and which threatened the maintenance of peace in the Near East. 2 O n August 24 the Porte publicly announced the deposition of the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia and in their place the appointment of Prince Charles Callimachi, to Moldavia, and Prince Alexander Soutzo to Wallachia. 4 1

Arbuthnot to Fox, Aug. 25, 1806, ibid.

* Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Aug. 25, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212. 3

Ibid.

* Arbuthnot to Fox, Aug. 25, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 5 1 ; Sebastiani to Talleyrand, A u g . 25, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212.

I 4

6

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

It should be recalled that the conditions of holding office by the hospodars had been fixed in the Russo-Turkish convention of September 24, 1802, which stipulated that seven years should be the term of office and that removal before the expiration of the term was possible only in case of some misbehavior. In such an event, Turkey was to inform Russia and, if the judgment of Turkey were verified by the latter power, then the hospodar in question was to be deposed. Tenure of office was, therefore, to be jointly controlled by both countries. T h e Porte had already protested more than once to Russia concerning the conduct of the hospodars, Ypsilanti and Morousi. But now the Porte had deposed them without preferring any specific charges against them. Several days a f t e r the deposition, in answer to an inquiry from the Russian ambassador, the Porte charged Ypsilanti with being a traitor because of his relations with Pasha Terzenik Oglou of Rustchuk, and also accused him of instigating the Serbians to rebellion. 1 Arbuthnot urged on F o x that the various questions at issue between Great Britain and Turkey, and now the deposition of the hospodars, justified the consideration of more effectual interference by Great Britain. He said that under the British policy of forebearance to Turkey, " the French are carrying all before them . . . and we must either now make our stand or the habit of disregarding our representatives will be so confirmed that much harsher measures may be hereafter unavoidable." 2 Arbuthnot believed that the deposition of the hospodars was a deliberate act of defense to Russia urged on the Porte by Sebastiani, w h o had declared his intention of getting rid o f all pro-Russian T u r k i s h officials—and that it was also the 1

Arbuthnot to Fox, Aug. 28, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51.

* Arbuthnot to Fox, Aug. 25, 1806, ibid.

HOSPODARS

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147

result of the Oubril treaty which Sebastiani had interpreted to the Porte as humiliating to Russia, with the recommendation that Turkey now demonstrate her independence, which France guaranteed to her. I f Russia, declared Arbuthnot, did not take vigorous measures in this affair concerning the hospodars her influence at the Porte would be gone. 1 It is evident that Arbuthnot was not as yet aware that Alexander had not ratified the Oubril treaty, but several days later, on August 27, Italinski informed him of the fact. However, the British ambassador still believed that the treaty had done irreparable injury to Russian and British influence at the Porte, for the latter was certain to interpret it as a sign of the weakening of mutual British and Russian interests, and would therefore come to be more defiant of Russia. 2 Without discounting the probable effect of the activities of the French diplomats and their endeavors to accentuate the growing fear of Russia at the Porte, the affair of the hospodars cannot be explained without taking into account the serious internal problem confronting Selim and his ministers in the summer of 1806. B y the middle of A u g u s t they knew that the preparation of an army by Pasha TerzenikOglou of Rustchuk to join the janissaries holding Adrianople meant that there was real danger of a revolution which might overthrow the government at Constantinople. The Porte had sufficient evidence to lead it to believe that a connection had been established between the hospodars, especially Ypsilanti, and Terzenik-Oglou, which at this time was too dangerous to be allowed to continue. T o remove the pasha was not only physically impossible, but it was also dangerous as it might hasten the threatened revolution against the Sultan. T h e hospodars could more readily be deposed as they were not involved in the existing crisis. 1 Ibid. 2 Arbuthnot to Fox, Sept. 8, 1806, ibid.

I 4

8

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Also, to depose officials charged with aiding Russia, a common foe now menacing their borders with armed forces, would be an act which might increase the prestige of the Sultan. It would call attention to the danger from without, and the danger from revolution from within might be deflected in a rallying of all elements to protect their frontiers. N o particular act of aggression or offense can be isolated as the cause of Selim's decision. However, for some time he had been contemplating the deposition of the hospodars because of the growing evidence that they had connections with the Russian consuls in Moldavia and Wallachia, and also with the military officers at the head of the Russian army mobilizing along the frontiers of the provinces. According to Ruffin the Sultan had been ready early in J u l y to put Ypsilanti and Morousi out of office. 1 Selim and his ministers had had ample opportunity to know beforehand what might be the effect of their removal, as already in March Italinski had informed the Porte that Russian troops would occupy Moldavia and Wallachia if Turkey undertook changes in the permanent administration of the provinces without first consulting Russia. 2 The belief of the Russian and British officials that Sébastiani could be held accountable for instigating the deposition hardly holds in view of the evidence that Selim had determined upon the act previous to the French ambassador's arrival. However, this consideration does not eliminate the rôle of French diplomacy at Constantinople. There is no doubt that Ruffin had been directing the attention of the Porte toward Russian activities and that he had also encouraged the Turks to believe that Napoleon would stand behind them in any move they might make against Russia. Sébas1

Report of Ruffin, July 10, 1806, Documente P 3452

Hurmuzaki,

Suppl. I, ii,

Instructions from Czartoryski, Feb. 24, 1806, cf. supra, p. 60.

HOSPODARS

OF MOLDAVIA

AND WALLACHIA

149

tiani continued these tactics and at the time the hospodars were deposed he informed Talleyrand that by this act Turkey had made a definite move to free herself from the ascendancy of Russia and to return to her old policy. 1 On August 27, after hearing from St. Petersburg of the non-ratification of the Oubril treaty, Italinski, urged by Arbuthnot, sent a note to the Porte. This note recapitulated the various complaints of Russia against Turkey, i.e., violation of tariff agreements, question of the barats, failure of Turkey to execute the convention of 1800 relative to the Republic of the Seven Islands (Ionian Islands) and the exVenetian towns, violation of the Convention of 1802 with respect to the administration of Moldavia and Wallachia. T o prove its respect for its treaties with Russia, the note stated, the Porte must remove the newly appointed hospodars and call an assembly of the boyars in the two provinces for the purpose of electing one of them to administer the provinces provisionally. The communication concluded with a warning that, while the T s a r desired to remain friendly with Turkey, he was prepared to use his army on the Dniester to oblige Turkey to respect her engagements with Russia. Turkey must give an immediate, categorical reply announcing her intentions on these questions. 2 A t the same time, by agreement with Italinski, Arbuthnot also sent a note to the Porte in which the grievances of Great Britain against Turkey were presented, i.e., the exceptional honors paid to the French ambassador, the refusal to renew the alliance with Great Britain, violation of the Capitulations in tariff matters, and the restriction of the barats. With the deposition of the hospodars Great Britain was not directly concerned, but Turkey should remember that there 1 2

Sébastiani to Talleyrand, Aug. 25, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie,

Italinski to Reis Effendi, Aug. 27, Turkey, 51.

212.

1806, British Foreign Office,

I5Q

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

still existed by treaties a Triple Alliance—Russia, Great Britain and Turkey—and that any weakening of it was a concern of all its members. Further, Turkey should understand that the union of Great Britain and Russia was so intimate that the interests of neither could be attacked without injury to both. It was a mistake to think that recent events had separated Russia and Great Britain. The Porte must decide whether it would listen to France, whose ambition might lead her to attack Turkey, or keep faithful to its allies who had always worked for Turkish integrity. An immediate answer must be made, stating whether the Porte would comply with the demands of Russia. The time had come when facts and not assurances were necessary.1 Arbuthnot did not believe that these warning notes would bring a retraction from the Porte and it was his opinion that war with Turkey was inevitable. He therefore urged F o x to order the British commander in the Mediterranean to despatch two war ships to cruise off the Dardanelles in order to strengthen British prestige at the Porte. Great Britain still held the respect of Turkey on account of maritime power.2 At this time when the British ambassador was warning his government of the possibilities which might result from the deposition of the hospodars, the French ambassador was with much satisfaction informing his government that the act meant the complete ruin of Russian influence in Turkey. In a conference on August 28 the Sultan told Sebastiani that he was resolved to adhere to a policy of good understanding with France and was ready to resist Russia with force, but that he did not have confidence in his troops on account of the recent conduct of the janissaries. He asked that France send engineers and artillery officers to assist his army.8 1 2 1

Arbuthnot to Reis Effendi, Aug. 28, 1806, ibid. Arbuthnot to Fox, Aug. 28, 1806, ibid. Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Aug. 29, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212.

HOSPODARS

OF MOLDAVIA

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WALLACHIA

Sebastiani now urged his government to support T u r k e y and to assume the role of adviser. Following his instructions, he had made overtures concerning the formation of a triple alliance of France, Turkey and Persia. They had been favorably received, there seemed to be prospects of realization of the plan, and Sebestiani asked for powers to negotiate such an alliance. 1 T h e deposition of the pro-Russian hospodars had probably seemed safe to the Porte because of its belief that the provisions of the Oubril treaty had in a measure separated Russia and Great Britain. Arbuthnot's prompt support of the complaints made by Italinski and the announcement that Alexander had not ratified the treaty, however, dispelled this belief and brought about a change in the tone of the communications of the Porte with Great Britain. O n September 6 a note was sent to Arbuthnot to the effect that the Porte had always recognized Russia and Great Britain as its most intimate friends and allies, and desired to continue the relations. 2 Accompanying the note was a special communication from the Sultan in which he blamed his officials for his difficulties with Russia and charged the Russian ambassador with dealing in rumors in order to mislead the T s a r w h o would, the Porte was convinced, approve the Sultan's deposition of the hospodars if he knew the conditions existing in their provinces. 3 Arbuthnot believed that this explanation was only an attempt on the part of the Sultan to evade his own responsibility for the differences between Russia and Turkey. Besides, he believed that French influence had gained power over the Sultan and his ministers to such an extent that, in spite of the conciliatory tone of the reply, it 1

Ibid.

Reis Effendi to Arbuthnot, Sept. 6, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, Si. 2

* Imperial rescript from Selim enclosed with above note from the Reis Effendi.

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807 might yet be expected that they would be called upon any time by the French to commence war against Russia and Great Britain. Only a vigorous demonstration by Great Britain, he advised F o x , could offset French influence. Arbuthnot warned, " W e must act quickly if we would save this Empire from the grasp of our enemy." Russia must efface by successful use of force the bad impression created in T u r key by her defeat at Austerlitz. I f the allies waited, the Dardanelles would be barred to their naval forces by new fortifications erected by French engineers. Dalmatia would be filled with French troops waiting to advance into Turkey, and with the subjection o f Turkey by France, Great Britain would have to seek another barrier for the protection of India. 1 A t the same time Italinski sent a despatch to his government expressing his conviction that, unless orders were sent at once for the Russian army on the Dniester to enter T u r key, all idea of continuing Russian influence at the Porte must be abandoned. 2 T h e conduct o f the Austrian minister, Sturmer, during this crisis at Constantinople, was expressive o f the equivocal attitude of his country with respect to affairs in the Near East. The Porte had rebuffed the efforts of Austria in the previous spring to mediate between Turkey and the Serbians, and had also resented the right to asylum on her soil which Austria had granted to unarmed Serbian rebel refugees. 3 Not satisfied with the declaration o f Austria that she adhered to a policy of neutrality toward the Serbian insurrection, the Porte again late in June made known to Sturmer its suspicion o f professed Austrian neutrality in Balkan affairs and made the accusation that the Serbians had received 1

Arbuthnot to Fox, Sept. 8, 15, 1806, ibid.

2 Ibid. 3

Cf. supra, pp. 60-63.

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153

munitions and food supplies from Austria. The Sultan demanded an explanation.1 The Porte was assured, in Stiirmer's reply, that no help had been given nor ever would be given to the Serbians and that the Emperor of Austria keenly deprecated such doubts of the loyalty of Austria to Turkey. 2 Stürmer pressed the Porte for an explanation of the matter of the hospodars. He advised the Porte not to act too hastily in the matter, but to try to prevent hostilities with Russia and Great Britain. A war with them, he believed, would result unfortunately for Turkey and he warned his government that, in case such a war was extended to include France, Austria would be put in an embarrassing and dangerous position.8 There was little need to give the warning, as the Austrian cabinet had been haunted since the Treaty of Pressburg by fears of a war in the Balkans with its dangers for Austria. While these attempts were being made to coerce the Porte into reinstating the former hospodars and remaining loyal to her treaties with Russia and Great Britain, the French ambassador was working to alienate Turkey from these powers. On September 16 he sent a note to the Porte in which he charged Russia with having refused to accept the Oubril treaty because it provided for the removal of Russian troops from the Ionian Islands. This Russia would never do as she was determined to remain in the Mediterranean so that she might be able to attack Turkey from two sides. Also, Russia had refused to consider the return of Ragusa to Turkey in spite of the fact that the treaty contained a stipulation guaranteeing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 1

Report of Stürmer, June 25, 1806, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Berichte, 1806. 2

Stadion to Stürmer, July 18, 1806, ibid., Weisungen,

' Stürmer to Stadion, Sept. 10, 1806, ibid., Berichte,

1806.

1806.

Türkei,

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Turkey must not continue, Sebastiani warned, her alliance with Great Britain and Russia as it would be considered an act of war by Napoleon. Further, the Emperor would allow the Porte to recognize only his own representative from Naples. As an expression of friendship and proof of the professed neutrality of Turkey, Napoleon demanded that the Porte forbid passage through the Dardanelles of any war vessel carrying troops, munitions or food supplies. Turkey's refusal of this demand, in conjunction with her refusal to permit French troops to pass through Turkish territory in order to oppose Russia on the Danube, would also be considered by Napoleon an act of hostility toward him. He had an army in Dalmatia to protect Turkey unless her conduct compelled him to use it otherwise. Napoleon demanded assurances from the Porte on these matters. 1 Such was the reply of Sebastiani to the threats which Arbuthnot and Italinski were making to use British naval forces in the Mediterranean and the Russian army on the Dniester to force Turkey to retain her alliance with their governments and to reject French overtures. It appeared that the sword was pointed at Constantinople from the Dardanelles, the Dniester and Dalmatia, and that Turkey could not avoid trouble in one or another of these places, whatever efforts she might put forth. The creation of a new Turkish ministry in the middle of September had a bearing upon international politics at Constantinople. Since the middle of August the Sultan and the Porte had been in a precarious position. The reform army on which they might have relied had remained at Silivia surrounded by the rebel janissaries and their allies, who threatened to march on Constantinople and join forces with the groups agitating a revolution to depose Selim. By this time the whole of Rumelia was in arms against the Sultan. 1

Sebastiani to Reis Effendi, Sept. 16, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie,

212.

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155

Selim was advised by his ministers and the Ulema to make terms with the rebels.1 He evidently followed this advice, for on September 14 he deposed the Grand Vizier and soon after made a complete change in his council of ministers. The chief, or aga, of the janissaries, Halimy Ibrahim Pasha, was appointed Grand Vizier. This meant that no reforms in the army would be carried out and that the reform corps would not be used at the front. 2 A goodly number of the new ministers were known to be pro-French. This was interpreted by Sebastiani as another victory for France and he believed that his demands on the Porte embodied in the note of August 16 would be complied with.8 To the British ambassador it seemed that the presence of a strong pro-French and anti-Russian faction in the Council of Ministers made it less likely that the Porte would respect the interests of the allies.4 The Russian ambassador had received no reply from the Porte to his note of August 27 demanding that Turkey show her intention of adhering to her treaties with Russia by removing at once the new hospodars and calling an assembly of the boyars in each of the provinces to elect an official to head the administration provisionally. On September 22 he sent a second note requesting an immediate reply to his first communication, adding that Great Britain had increased her forces in the Mediterranean and that Russia had an army assembled on the Dniester, the purpose of both being to come to the aid of Turkey should Napoleon carry out an invasion of her territory. However, the Porte was warned that the destination of this Russian army would be changed in case provocative conduct was continued. On the reply to this 1

Arbuthnot Arbuthnot 3 Sebastiani * Arbuthnot 2

to Fox, Sept. 8, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51. to Fox, Sept. 15, 1806, ibid. to Talleyrand, Sept. 21, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212. to Fox, Sept. 15, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51.

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note, Italinski concluded, depended the destiny of the Ottoman Empire. 1 The Porte made reply on September 26 and took up the charges Italinski had made in the first note. It was conciliatory in regard to the differences with Russia over tariffs, the barats and the status of the Septinsular Republic (Ionian Islands), but vague on the question of passage of Russian vessels through the Bosphorus. As for the deposition of the hospodars, that was brought about because the Porte had discovered their treason, which was proved by the recent sudden flight of Ypsilanti from Wallachia. No state could allow treason among its officials; therefore this act of deposition could not be considered a treaty infraction. 2 It is to be noted that the Porte did not produce any specific data to support its charges against the deposed hospodars. A day or two after this note from the Porte reached Italinski, there arrived at the Russian embassy an official, Rodofinikine, who brought important despatches. He had been a special agent from St. Petersburg in Wallachia since the latter part of August and he now brought to the Porte a virtual ultimatum from the Tsar. 8 Upon his arrival he informed Italinski that in view of the conditions in the two provinces and the existing anti-Turkish sentiment at the Russian court, he thought war with Turkey inevitable. Italinski was to present once more to the Porte the grievances of Russia insisting that they be satisfied at once, but suggesting that they might be subject to negotiation later. However, there must be no delay in restoring the deposed hospodars who were to be kept in office until the end of their terms. If Turkey did not accede to these demands, then Italinski was to quit the country. Rodofinikine had orders 1

Italinski to the Porte, Sept. 22, 1806, ibid.

* The Porte to Italinski, Sept. 26, 1806, ibid. 3

Cf. infra, p. 201.

HOSPODARS

OF MOLDAVIA

AND WALL AC HI A

I 5 7

to return at once to Jassy to buy provisions for the Russian army and also to execute plans for the formation of a munitions magazine. The Tsar, he declared, perceived the necessity of preparing for war. 1 Accordingly on September 29 Italinski sent to the Porte a note dwelling upon the growth of disorder in Moldavia and Wallachia since the departure of the deposed hospodars, and especially complaining that bands of Turks were financially exploiting Christian subjects in the provinces. Unless order were restored by returning the former hospodars to office, Russia would be obliged to intervene to protect the Christian population.2 Arbuthnot supported Italinski by sending a note to the Porte at the same time. If Turkey rejected Russia's proposals and the Russian ambassador left Constantinople, then the British ambassador could not remain either, as he did not intend to be a witness to the ascendancy of France in the a f fairs of Turkey. 3 3 The Porte was putting much hope at this time in the successful conclusion of a general peace in Europe, which would provide the means of escape from the danger of war with Russia. Arbuthnot heard that the Turkish ambassador at Paris had informed his government that a Franco-British peace seemed quite possible and that he had received assurances of it from official British sources. Arbuthnot learned further that Sebastiani had also informed the Porte that the negotiations between England and France were progressing well.4 It is probable that the French ambassador encour1

Arbuthnot to Fox, Sept. 28, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51.

* Italinski to the Porte, Sept. 29, 1806, Docilmente Hurmuzaki, Suppl. I, ii, pp. 352-353; also enclosed in despatch from Arbuthnot to Fox, Sept. 29, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51. 5

Arbuthnot to Fox, Sept. 29, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51.

1

Arbuthnot to Fox, Sept. 28, 1806, ibid.

i58

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QUESTION,

1806-1807

aged the favorable view of French and British relations in order to impress upon the Porte the idea that the RussoBritish alliance was not so secure as it had been and that, with Great Britain at peace with France, Russia would be isolated and therefore less fearful to Turkey. Arbuthnot, possibly aware of the danger which might arise if the Porte should gather any such impression, and not knowing definitely the status of the Anglo-French negotiations, demanded from London information and also instructions, charging the Foreign Office with neglect in affairs pertaining to the Near East. 1 Though he was ignorant of the waning possibilities for peace in Europe, Arbuthnot had arrived at a definite conclusion that war would soon break out between Turkey and Russia. On September 29 he wrote F o x that " it is not to be imagined that war can be avoided." He did not anticipate a satisfactory answer from the Porte to the Russian and British notes and therefore expected that Italinski would leave, and the latter believed that Russian troops would cross the Turkish frontier as soon as they heard of his departure. 2 A s for his own conduct, however, Arbuthnot decided that, even if Italinski should break off relations, he would await the arrival of the British squadron before taking any measures. The presence of an armed force, he wrote F o x , was the only means of bringing the Porte to consider the interests of the allies, possibly of preventing war with Russia and checking the rapidly developing dominance of France, one sign of which was the recent change in the Turkish ministry. He believed that a British fleet could pass through the Dardanelles without danger and from the Sea of Marmora could reduce Constantinople without recourse to arms simply by cutting off its food supplies from Asia. 8 1

Arbuthnot to Fox, Sept. 29, 1806, ibid. * Ibid. *Ibid.

HOSPODARS

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T h e Porte replied to Italinski on October 1 in a note in which Russia w a s charged with violation of treaties with Turkey.

She had violated Turkish sovereignty over the

Ionian Islands where the conduct of the Russian officials had been such as to indicate that they considered themselves rulers of the islands.

T h e deposition of the hospodars was a

necessity; Ypsilanti particularly w a s a traitor, as his flight proved. 1 Soon after the delivery of the note to the Russian ambassador, the Porte requested a conference with Arbuthnot, which was held on October 5.

Arbuthnot presented his

complaints and gave the Turkish ministers to understand that war with Russia would almost certainly mean w a r also with Great Britain.

If the Russian ambassador left Con-

stantinople, he would also prepare f o r his departure.

In

reply the Turkish ministers declared that the policy of T u r key was to maintain a perfect neutrality; to keep friendly with both France and Russia. 2 In answer to Arbuthnot's demand for a statement as to their future relations with Great Britain, the Turkish ministers declared that they did not dare to negotiate f o r a renewal of the alliance, as such negotiation might bring about w a r with France.

But they suggested that an instrument

be drawn up postponing the expiration of the existing treaty. A s to the question of passage of Russian ships through the Dardanelles, the ministers

promised that Turkey

would

never again raise the question or listen to the French on the subject.

This

seemed

fairly

satisfactory

to

Arbuthnot.

Upon the matter of the hospodars, however, the T u r k s were 1 The Porte to Italinski, Oct. i, 1806, Documente Hurmusaki, Suppl. I, ii, pp. 333. This statement referred to reports which the Porte had probably received of the actions of Ypsilanti, who after hearing of his deposition had hurriedly left Bucharest and gone with his family to Kiev. There were rumors that he was going to St. Petersburg. 2

Arbuthnot to Fox, Oct. 14, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51.

!6O

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

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1806-1807

less amenable. They insisted that the Sultan had acted to save his honor and that a restoration of the hospodars would seem in the eyes of his subjects an act of weakness which might cost him his throne. T h e Sultan preferred a foreign to a civil war. Arbuthnot was asked to act as mediator between Russia and Turkey in the matter. He refused, but in answer to their request for a w a y out suggested that the Sultan send a letter to the Tsar, avowing the bad conduct of his Grand Vizier in not first consulting the Russian ambassador, and saying that in reparation the Sultan would depose the hospodars he had just appointed and would choose others in concert with the Tsar. T h e T u r k s agreed to this suggestion and the conference ended. 1 Arbuthnot reported the conference to Italinski and vaguely suggested that the latter urge his government to refrain f r o m warlike acts in case Turkey satisfied the substance of the demands made upon her by Russia. More specifically he suggested that Italinski should not leave Constantinople unless it became absolutely necessary. If he should g o before the Sultan had time to carry out what he had agreed to do at the conference, the Turks might be provoked to action. If Russia could keep peace with Turkey, the development of a European Coalition against Napoleon would be more certain. 2 T h e threatening attitude of the Russian and British ambassadors and the fact that they themselves were unprepared for war determined the Sultan and his ministers to adopt for the time being a policy of conciliation. This is disclosed in a letter which Selim sent to Napoleon on October 6. In it he explained his intention of restoring the deposed hospodars and declared that he was forced to do so by the menaces of Russia and Great Britain in order to prevent a premature 1 2

Ibid. Arbuthnot to Italinski, Oct. 6, 1806, ibid.

HOSPODARS

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war. H e assured Napoleon, however, that he did not intend that their " confidential liaisons" should be less effective. 1 Meanwhile, Sebastiani had been doing all he could to urge the T u r k s to defy Russia, playing upon the alarm occasioned by Russian military preparations on the Dniester and the recent reports of the advance of Russian forces into Georgia. 2 Upon hearing of the conference of the Turkish ministers with Arbuthnot, he hastened to secure for himself a conference on the seventh. He also sent a note to the Porte, exhorting it not to submit to the Russian demands and giving assurances that Napoleon would never abandon T u r k e y in war or peace. 8 Sebastiani reported to Talleyrand that the recent British and Russian notes had produced fright at the Porte. T h e public treasury was empty, the army badly organized and its morale weakened by the recent rebellions of the janissaries, and the fortifications in bad condition. It was evident that the Porte would endeavor in every way to avoid war. It was noticeable that no measures had been taken to punish those Greeks who were agitating for the restoration of Ypsilanti and Morousi. However Sebastiani believed that war was inevitable but he doubted whether the Turks, who he was convinced were incapable of self-improvement, could defend themselves against the Russians in the Balkans or the British in the Dardanelles. 4 This did not mean that Sebastiani refrained from inciting the T u r k s to action, or that the Porte fell into a complete paralysis. Orders were given for strengthening the fortifi1

Selim to Napoleon, Oct. 6, 1806, Ä f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212.

Stürmer to Stadion, Sept. 25, 1806, Austria, Berichte, 1806. 2

Staatsarchiv,

' Sebastiani to the Porte, Oct. 9, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 4

Sebastiani to Talleyrand Oct. 10, 1806, ibid.

Türkei, 212.

!Ô2

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

cations along the Danube, and measures initiated for recruiting new armies in the Asiatic and European provinces. 1 The Porte was able to proceed with some effectiveness because of a lull in the internal crisis through which the country had passed. The recent rebellion of the janissaries and their allies seemed a thing of the past now that they had secured what they wanted and a portion of the Sultan's r e f o r m army was being disbanded. 2 Also an attempt was being made to come to terms with the Serbians. 3 Sébastiani sent a despatch at this time to General Marmont, commander of French forces in Dalmatia, asking him to prepare for eventualities in the Balkans. It appeared that a break between Turkey and Russia was inevitable, and that Russian forces would soon enter Moldavia and Wallachia. A large portion of their troops would probably be used against the French in Dalmatia. 4 Meanwhile the Russian and British ambassadors had not been unoccupied. Italinski had refused to consider anything but a strict adherence to his instructions in reply to Arbuthnot's appeal for a more conciliatory attitude in view of the promises made by the Turkish ministers at the recent conference with the British ambassador. Arbuthnot suggested then to the Porte that a conference be arranged with Italinski and the Porte assented. But a statement made by the Russian ambassador in accepting the proposal to the effect that his views could not be changed, irritated the Turks and the conference was called off. 5 T h e Porte again appealed to Arbuthnot to help them, and » Ibid. * Arbuthnot to Fox, Sept. 29, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51. 3

C f . infra, p. 181.

Sébastiani to Marmont, Oct. 11, 1806, Mémoires, (Paris, 1856-1857, 9 vols.), iii, p. 85. 4

8

Duc

de

Raguse

Arbuthnot to Fox, Oct. 14, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51.

HOSPODARS

OF MOLDAVIA

AND

WALLACHIA

X63

on October 10 he sent a note to Italinski inquiring what would be the response of Russia if T u r k e y avowed her fault in deposing the hospodars and offered to name successors in concert with the Tsar, and if the Porte signed an act by which its treaty with Russia was again put in full force, providing that the Russian ambassador did not leave Constantinople. 1 Italinski refused to discuss these points and in reply sent a copy of his instructions with a declaration of his intention of maintaining strict obedience to them. 2 The Porte then tried to separate Russia and Great Britain by proposing a special Anglo-Turkish convention. This Arbuthnot refused. 8 A g a i n the Porte asked Arbuthnot to serve as mediator with Russia, this time presenting a proposal for the restoration of the former hospodars but stipulating that the restoration should not be given immediate publication. 4 Italinski refused to accept any such proposal. 8 Arbuthnot was perplexed, feeling that he had gone as far as he should go without instructions. However, he decided to g o on and this time to adopt a stronger line of action, " by so combining threatening and friendly expressions as to convince the Porte that nothing but a sense of duty forced on by the state of affairs in Europe could have obliged me to use offensive language." * He believed that the RussoTurkish crisis had reached an impasse, and he knew that 1

Arbuthnot to Italinski, Oct. 10, 1806, ibid.

«Italinski to Arbuthnot, Oct. 11, 1806, ibid. » Arbuthnot to F o x , Oct. 14, 1806, ibid. 4

T h e Porte to Arbuthnot, Oct. 11, 1806, ibid.

Italinski to Arbuthnot, Oct. 12, 1806, ibid. W i t h the consent of the Porte, Arbuthnot had modified their proposal so that it provided that the official declaration of the restoration of the hospodars should be made at St. Petersburg instead of at Constantinople, and that time should be given f o r a letter from the Sultan to reach the T s a r requesting that t w o other hospodars might ultimately be chosen. 5

' Arbuthnot to F o x , Oct. 14, 1806, ibid.

!64

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 180S-I807

Sebastiani was exploiting the situation to his advantage. He had just heard from Adair at Vienna of the possibility of a new war in Europe arising from the growing hostility between France and Prussia and of the efforts to form a Coalition against Napoleon. It seemed to him necessary that uncertainty as to peace or war in eastern Europe be removed. Accordingly on October 1 2 Arbuthnot sent a note to the Reis Effendi conveying Italinski's refusal to accept the last proposal of the Porte. In view of the firm position taken by Russia, he advised that there be immediate and unequivocal restoration of the hospodars. If this were not done, Russian troops would certainly cross the Turkish frontiers and Arbuthnot would be forced to give orders to the British fleet, expected at any time, to advance through the Dardanelles to a place where it could command Constantinople. It was impossible for Turkey to have a war with Russia without having one also with Great Britain. It was for her to decide now between France and the allies. Austria and Prussia would be disturbed if Turkey declared war on the allies and all the armies of Napoleon could not protect her from the British fleet. If Turkey refused to give proof of her desire for peace and friendship with Russia and Great Britain by at once restoring the hospodars, then nothing, Arbuthnot warned them, could prevent the British fleet from acting at once without waiting for final orders from the home government.1 Arbuthnot prepared to support this note by sending Pole, one of his staff, directly to the Turkish ministers to impress upon them the serious results for Turkey if she refused the demands of the allies. Pole was to urge a meeting of the Council of Ministers and to use effectively information just received from Adair concerning the formation of an armed Coalition—Prussia, Sweden, Russia and Great Britain— 1

Arbuthnot to the Reis Effendi, Oct. 12, 1806, ibid.

HOSPODARS

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WALLACHIA

165

against Napoleon. Arbuthnot was anxious to get this information to them before Sebastiani had time to give it and to interpret it from the French angle. 1 W i t h Arbuthnot's note and instructions, Pole went early on the twelfth to the Reis Effendi, demanding first that he call a meeting of the Council. Evidently he made an impression, as a Council was soon called. Pole spoke to the ministers in a straightforward manner, giving information concerning the Coalition and urging that T u r k e y take quick action in restoring the hospodars and that she avoid any other act which might force the Russian ambassador to leave Constantinople. I f a general European war broke out, he declared, formidable British military and naval forces would be assembled at Gibralter, Malta and Sicily. These forces would be used to aid Russia in driving the French f r o m Dalmatia, and also to prevent the French from getting into Egypt. Pole then withdrew, leaving the Council to discuss matters. 2 In the Council were pro-allied and pro-French groups. The former party believed that France in acquiring territory on the western frontier of the Ottoman Empire, had become a dangerous neighbor, though the nature of the country prevented her from making a quick, extensive attack. They claimed that, since Russia could attack T u r k e y on all sides and Great Britain could easily get control of all ports, all the armies of Napoleon could not protect Constantinople or any other place from bombardment by British naval forces. Therefore, it was urged by this group that Turkey should keep peace with the allies, and that she should now reestablish the hospodars, if this act were necessary for the securing of such a peace.3 1

Arbuthnot to Fox, Oct. 14, 1806, ibid.

1

Pole to Arbuthnot, Oct. 14, 1806, ibid.

' Arbuthnot to Spencer, Oct. 30, 1806, ibid., 52.

J66

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

Representatives of the pro-French party in the Council argued for a policy of rapprochement with France as most certain to protect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. They stressed the menace of Russia as the " historic enemy " of Turkey. The leader of this group, Ibrahim Effendi, former Chiaga Bey, was an influential person, very near to Selim and most feared by the British and Russians. 1 A f t e r a long discussion the Council by a majority decided to submit to the demands of Russia. 2 Soon afterwards the Porte received word from the British embassy that Italinski had gone on board a Russian vessel preparing to leave Constantinople. Through the mediation of the British officials the Porte at once sent word to Italinski declaring that the hospodars would be restored, but with the condition that the news should not at once be made public, and that they should not return to their posts until the Sultan had written a letter to the Tsar. Italinski refused to consider the proposal in spite of Arbuthnot's advice that he do so, and demanded an immediate and unconditional restoration of the hospodars. Otherwise, he threatened to leave Constantinople.3 Arbuthnot turned again desperately to bring pressure upon the Porte, " convinced now that nothing but reenforcement of the dread of the British fleet at the Porte could decide affairs in favor of the allies." * Pole was therefore sent on October 13 to speak to the Council, if it was in session, and instructed to use such language as the circumstances might require. He found the Council in session and noted that the Mufti were present. This meant that the question of peace or war with Russia was being discussed. Ibid. * Ibid. * Arbuthnot to Fox, Oct. 14, 1806, ibid., 51. 4 Ibid. 1

HOSPODARS

OF MOLDAVIA

AND

WALLACHIA

167

Pole learned from " inside sources " that the pro-French group had been very active in the interval since the decision of the Council the previous day to submit to Russia. Ibrahim Effendi had got in touch with Sebastiani, who had proceeded to spread denials of the formation of a Coalition against Napoleon. In the council now being held Pole heard that Ibrahim was using these reports of Sebastiani and doing all that he could to influence the Council and the Mufti to declare war on Russia. 1 Pole saw that his task was to counteract vigorously these pro-French activities. He proceeded f r o m outside to bombard the Council with a series of notes, each one a strong denial of statements made by the pro-French group, with the purpose of prolonging the discussion and preventing the proFrench party from bringing about a stampede and sudden decision. A f t e r much conniving through underground channels Pole got a note to the Sultan warning that drastic action would be taken by the British fleet if Turkey declared war on Russia. Towards evening of the thirteenth he was informed that the Council had adjourned and that no decision would be made that day. A s Sebastiani was to have a public audience with the Sultan on the next day, the Council would not convene again until the day after that. 2 F o r several reasons the British agents wished to prevent delay in the decision of the Council, the most important being Arbuthnot's ever present fear that Italinski would refuse to remain longer in Constantinople. 8 H e considered that the pro-French party was now more than ever desirous of delay since they had not secured a hurried decision against the allies, which this party had hoped to have f o r an answer to their asseveration that a Coalition had not been formed. It 1

Arbuthnot to Spencer, Oct. 30, 1806, ibid., 52.

' Pole to Arbuthnot, Oct. 14, 1806, ibid., 51. * Arbuthnot to F o x , Oct. 14, 1806, ibid.

l(&

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

was believed that Sebastiani's conference with the Sultan had been arranged with this same purpose of gaining time, in the hope that news might arrive from Austria to help their cause. Pole was therefore sent at once to the Reis Effendi w h o after some delay informed him that the Porte had agreed to the Russian demands. 1 O n the next day, the fourteenth, Pole delivered a note from the Porte notifying Italinski of this decision. 2 A t length through British mediation a conference was arranged between Italinski and the Turkish ministers for the next day. A t this conference, Italinski refused to listen to any proposals to negotiate, and demanded unqualified and immediate acceptance of the Russian demands. A f t e r prolonged and unsuccessful attempts by the T u r k s to manoeuvre the Russian ambassador into a position where he would discuss the questions at issue, they agreed to his demands." Meanwhile, Ibrahim Effendi had been working against the allies. A f t e r the conference of the ministers with Italinski, he made declarations to the effect that he would threaten with death the t w o deposed hospodars if they accepted their office again. 4 Upon hearing this, Arbuthnot notified the Reis Effendi that any attempt to delay matters would cause the Russian ambassador to leave Constantinople and that Great Britain would thereupon take action to support her ally. 5 T h e result was that the Reis Effendi issued a decree on the next day, October 16, reinstating Ypsilanti as hospodar of Wallachia. O n the seventeenth a decree reinstated Morousi in Moldavia.* T h e Porte also agreed secretly to permit 1

Pole to Arbuthnot, Oct. 14, 1806, ibid.

• Reis Effendi to Italinski, Oct. 13, 1806, ibid. ' Arbuthnot to F o x , Oct. 17, 1806, ibid. *lbid.

• Arbuthnot to Reis Effendi, Oct. is, 1806, ibid. • Arbuthnot to F o x , Oct. 17, 1806, ibid.

HOSPODARS

OF MOLDAVIA

AND WALLACHIA

169

Russian war ships to pass through the Dardanelles, to renew with Russia treaty engagements concerning Moldavia and Wallachia, and to acknowledge the deposition of the hospodars as a violation of the Turkish treaty with Russia. 1 1

Arbuthnot to Howiek, April 6, 1807, ibid., 55.

CHAPTER

VII

R I V A L INTRIGUES IN MOLDAVIA AND AND IN

WALLACHIA

SERBIA

i A N examination of the crisis in Russo-Turkish relations precipitated by the deposition of the hospodars, Ypsilanti and Morousi, must take into account events during this period in Moldavia and Wallachia and also their effect on the Serbian question. The administration of the two provinces and the Serbian insurrection were not in fact merely domestic affairs ; it should be evident by this time that they were of vital interest in varying degrees and ways to the several powers—Austria, Russia, France and Great B r i t a i n — directly concerned in affairs in the Near East. In Moldavia and Wallachia the administration of Y p s i lanti and Morousi had favored a growth of Russian political influence and a fostering of Russian commercial interests until by 1806 it was the general belief at the Porte that these hospodars were virtually Russian agents. When Napoleon began in the spring of 1806 to participate more aggressively and extensively in affairs of the Ottoman Empire, he had among other specific objects that of securing a change in the administration of those two provinces in order to eliminate Russian influence and to inaugurate a proFrench regime. T o promote these objects he had appointed Reinhard commissioner-general of commercial affairs in Moldavia and Wallachia with his residence at Jassy. 1 Parant, already consul, was to be under-commissioner, sta1

Cf. supra, p. 69. 170

RIVAL

INTRIGUES

171

tioned at Bucharest. Under the guise of commercial officers these men were to act as political agents: to work against the Russian agents, and to maintain and strengthen the loyalty of the people to the Sultan, as well as to promote their friendliness toward France. 1 Reinhard arrived at Bucharest on July 1 3 , 1806 and soon secured a conference with Ypsilanti in which he accused the latter of being attached to Russia. Reporting the meeting later to Talleyrand, he expressed the belief that Ypsilanti considered his own political ambition above everything and acted according to circumstances in his attachment to Russia and that under favorable circumstances he might turn to France. 2 On July 24 Reinhard had a conference at Jassy with Morousi whom he found more favorable to France than Ypsilanti had been.3 Soon after, Reinhard heard that a Russian military road was being constructed to the Dniester opposite the Turkish fortress at Chocim. However, in spite of these evidences of increased Russian military activity, he reported that there was a general belief that there would be no outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey in the near future. It was thought that Russia would be prevented from moving against Turkey by the fact that Moldavia and Wallachia would become the scene of an earlier war between France and Russia.* 1 Talleyrand to Reinhard, Aug. 1, 1806, Documente Hurmuzaki, P- 7252 Reinhard to Talleyrand, Aug. 1, 1806, ibid., pp. 725-732.

xvi,

* Bradisteanu, op. cit., p. 88. Reinhard to Talleyrand, Aug. 1, 1806, Documente Hurmuzaki, xvi, pp. 732-741. It so happened at this time that a secret French military mission was being despatched to secure information for Napoleon concerning the strength and position of the Russian forces on the Dniester, the condition of the fortresses on the Danube, and the line of defence along the Pruth. A young officer, Falkowski, a native of one of the two provinces, had been assigned to the task and at the end of July started on his mission. Documcnte Hurmuzaki, Suppl. I, ii, pp. 346-347. 4

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Soon after the arrival of Reinhard at his post, Sebastiani had appeared at Bucharest, en route for Constantinople. T h e appearance of the two was disturbing to Russian and British agents in Moldavia and Wallachia, and it was natural that they should see some connection between the increased French activities in the provinces and the deposition of Ypsilanti and Morousi, which occurred some weeks after their arrival. The appointment of Soutzo and Callimachi, both known to be pro-French, as the successors made it seem all the more evident that, unless something were done to prevent it, French ascendancy might replace that of Russia in the affairs of Moldavia and Wallachia. Within a week after the order for their deposition— August 24—Ypsilanti and Morousi had vacated their offices. T h e former left Bucharest with his family in great haste and secrecy and soon after it was learned that he was on his way to Kiev, a fact which appeared to the T u r k s to substantiate their belief that he had become an agent of Russia. T h e new hospodars, however, did not leave Constantinople at once for their respective capitals. O n September 8 A r buthnot informed his government that they had not as yet been formally installed in office and were waiting to go to their posts. This delay, he had heard, was due to the domestic political crisis at Constantinople in the course of which the janissaries had forced the appointment of ministers committed to opposition to the proposed reforms of Selim. Arbuthnot also heard that the new hospodars had difficulty in securing a loan from the bankers to buy presents for the Turkish ministers. 1 Officials representing them, however, arrived in the two capitals and became at once the objects of political attack and intrigue by Russian agents in each province and of friendly overtures from the French. » Arbuthnot to Fox, Sept. 8, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51.

RIVAL

INTRIGUES

173

Among the latter, Reinhard was particularly active. He at once established relations with M. Negri, the representative of Prince Callimachi of Moldavia. 1 Negri tried without success to establish official relations with the Russian consul, Bolkonoff, who refused to recognize the new administration until he received instruction from his government.2 Rodofinikine, another Russian agent at Jassy at this time, had recently come from St. Petersburg on a special mission to observe affairs and promote Russian interests. He had seen Ypsilanti at Bucharest just before the deposition of the latter and, coming subsequently to Jassy, had been actively propagating among the clergy and boyars the idea of independence from Turkey, to be realized with the aid of Russia. 3 Late in September, he had left Jassy to convey to Italinski at Constantinople special despatches from St. Petersburg. He had soon after returned to Jassy with full knowledge of the precarious relations between the Porte and the Russian ambassador, of the ultimatum of September 29 to the Porte, and of the tense feeling at St. Petersburg against Turkey. And it was with entire awareness of the implication of the situation that he called in the middle of October a meeting of the boyars of Moldavia. He informed them that the Porte had deposed the previous hospodars in violation of treaties with Russia and that the latter demanded their reestablishment or the retirement of the Russian ambassador from Constantinople. Soutzo was charged with being an instrument of France. 4 Nothing definitely derogatory was said of Callimachi. perhaps from considerations of prudence. 1

Reinhard to Talleyrand, Sept. 18, 1806, Docmnenta Hurmusaki, xvi,

PP- 754-7552

Reinhard to Talleyrand, Sept. 18, 1806, ibid., pp. 754-755, 757. ' Reinhard to Talleyrand, Oct 7, 1806, ibid., pp. 764-766. 4 Reinhard to Talleyrand, Oct. 17, 1806, ibid., pp. 769-773.

174

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1801

When he heard of this meeting Negri demanded an explanation f r o m Rodofinikine and warned him not to stir up insurrection in the province. H e confided to Reinhard that he did not believe the boyars would give any trouble as they were divided into factions which he was working to perpetuate as a means of frustrating plans of Russian agents who were trying to reconcile the different groups. 1 In the pro-Russian party of the boyars were two w i n g s : one f o r immediate revolt against the Turkish rule, the other f o r delay. Both were f o r independence from Turkey, to be guaranteed by Russia. 2 A m o n g the pro-French boyars Reinhard also found ideas of independence f r o m Turkey, but they distrusted Russia and thought it could best be guaranteed by Napoleon. However, this was a minority party and its members hesitated to take action because of the proximity of Russian troops, the preponderance of Russian influence in the previous administration, and the possibility of war between R u s s i a and Turkey which would render the new administration uncertain. They were generally disposed to remain reserved toward the French agents after the change in hospodars. 3 A t the beginning of October Reinhard wrote Talleyrand that there was in general an increase of anti-French sentiment in Moldavia. This registered itself in the reserve recently adopted by Negri which was forced upon him, Reinhard believed, by political necessities. Negri's position was unstable because he lacked instructions f r o m Callimachi, whose influence was being jeopardized by his failure to appear at his post. The same situation existed at Bucharest. 4 This absence of the new hospodars from their posts no i Ibid. 1

Reinhard to Talleyrand, Sept. 24, 1806, ibid., pp. 757-758.

•Reinhard to Talleyrand, Sept. 11, 1806, ibid., pp. 752-753. * Reinhard to Talleyrand, Oct. 1, 1806, ibid., pp. 761-763.

RIVAL

INTRIGUES

175

doubt contributed to give an impression of uncertainty to their régime, harmful to their supporters and helpful to the Russians who were working f o r restoration of the former administration. The new administration in Moldavia and its French supporters had also f r o m the beginning to contend with rumors of armed invasion of the province by Russian forces. A s early as September 3, Reinhard wrote Talleyrand that reports were current that two Russian regiments had entered Moldavia and that others were soon to follow. While the Russian consul denied that Russia had any such plans, Reinhard, however, expected that the Russians would soon take aggressive measures as a result of the deposition of the hospodars and they could easily enter the province as the Turkish forts along the frontier could give little resistance. 1 E v e n if the Russians did not send troops, their influence in the province would be formidable because of religious and political affiliations. 2 There were also rumors that Austria was thinking of Moldavia and Wallachia as possible compensation f o r her loss of territory in Italy. Reinhard, in reporting this to Paris about the middle of October, expressed doubts that Austria would try any such move at this time at least. 3 Shortly a f t e r this he reported again that in spite of denials from St. Petersburg that Russia had hostile intentions on Turkey and ambitions f o r the two provinces, local Russian agents believed that there was every probability of a break in relations with Turkey very soon and had sent to St. Petersburg f o r instructions to meet this contingency. Reinhard had information also that the R u s sian consul had orders to quit J a s s y whenever the new hos1

Reinhard to Talleyrand, Sept. 3, 1806, ibid., pp. 748-749.

' Reinhard to Talleyrand, Sept. 1 1 , 1806, ibid., pp. 752-7533

Reinhard to Talleyrand, Oct. 17, 1806, ibid., pp. 769-773.

i 7

6

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

podar arrived. 1 Soon afterwards, on October 26, Callimachi arrived at Jassy to take up his duties. Two days later he received the order of his deposition from office.2 Meanwhile the situation in Wallachia, as in Moldavia, after the deposition of the former hospodars, was one of breakdown in the administration of the province aided by absence of the new hospodar. There was also much intrigue with native boyars by rival Russian, British and French agents, and rumors were rife of a Russian invasion of Turkey and possible war. The French agents, Parant and Ledoulx had viewed with great satisfaction the removal of Ypsilanti, and awaited eagerly the arrival of Soutzo, who was known to be pro-French. The British agent, F. Summers, was much disturbed when he heard that the French agents were active in giving advice to the boyars concerning the administration of the province, and he had sought at once to impress upon some of the boyars that the French were impertinently interfering in affairs where they had no right to do so.3 The boyars of Wallachia, whatever their political differences, were now disturbed by a common danger. For a long time the powerful and ambitious pasha of Widin, Pasvan Oglou, had cast covetous eyes on this rich province. He now profited by the unstable situation of the province and also by the disturbances at the Porte attendant on the change in ministry to invade Wallachia with bands of brigands, levying heavy contributions on the Christians and threatening to advance towards Bucharest to demand an indemnity from the government of the province.4 1

Reinhard to Talleyrand, Oct., 22, 1806, ibid., pp. 774-776.

* Reinhard to Talleyrand, Oct. 26, 28, 1806, ibid., pp. 777-778. • Summers to Adair, Aug. 30, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 80. Driault, La Politique orientate de Napoleon, p. 65. Reinhard to Talleyrand, Oct. 4, 1806, Documente Hurmusaki, xvi, pp. 764-767. 4

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These troubles were used as the basis for propaganda by supporters of the former administration, particularly by the pro-Russian party. They attacked the new régime and spread the idea that security could be restored only if the Russians intervened. There was no doubt that the absence of Soutzo from his post in the face of this menace from Pasvan Oglou was detrimental to his influence and weakened the position of his supporters in the province. He at length arrived in Bucharest in the middle of October, just in time to receive the order for his deposition.1 2 It is necessary to observe developments in the Serbian question and the effects upon it arising from the crisis in Russo-Turkish relations precipitated by the dismissal of the hospodars. First may be considered briefly the relations of the Serbians and the Turks during the summer of 1806. The Serbian forces had succeeded in April in checking the advance of the Turkish armies on the frontiers of the pashalik of Belgrade. 2 But the leaders were concerned over the continued danger of invasion by a Turkish army from Bosnia on the western side, the weak point in their defenses. During their critical situation in March they had despatched another deputation to St. Petersburg to secure help from the Russians. This deputation arrived there in May, securing however only vague promises of help.8 A mission, headed by Lieutenant Ugritic and sent by General Michelson, commander of Russian foes along the Dniester, arrived early in June at Serbian headquarters near Belgrade to ascertain the sentiments of the Serbians toward 1

Ledoulx to Talleyrand, Oct. 25, 1806, Documenta

Hurmusaki,

xvi,

P. 776. 2

Cf. supra, p. 59-

3

Kallay, Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes,

1807-1810, pp. 13-14.

I78

THE

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QUESTION,

1806-1807

Russia and also to find out the most favorable conditions under which the Russian forces could work in conjunction with them in operations against Turkey. In accordance with his instructions, Ugritic made no definite promises of help from Russia, and very soon left, carrying with him a letter from Kara George to General Michelson asking for money, munitions and officers. 1 In view of their failure to secure an alliance with the Bosnians and the uncertainty of any immediate help from the Russians, the Serbians now turned to the Montenegrins for help. Since the beginning of their insurrection they had often made proposals of alliance to these people but without success. A letter was now sent by Kara George to Peter I, Prince Bishop of Montenegro, fervently appealing for help in the name of common ties of religion, race and history between the two peoples. The Montenegrins were asked to make an armed diversion into Bosnia against the Turkish forces there, and in this way to relieve the Serbian frontier. 2 While waiting for a reply from Peter, Kara George was improving defenses especially on the western frontier adjoining Bosnia. On July 12 word came from Peter; he gave plenty of advice but no promises of help.3 Kara George wrote again. However, it was too late for the Montenegrins to be useful, as large Turkish armies from both Bosnia and Rumelia had started at the end of June to advance upon the western and southern frontiers of the pashalik of Belgrade.4 Menaced now on two sides and having received no effective aid from any source, the Serbian leaders decided to 1

Cf. supra, pp. 64-65.

2

Yakschitch, L'Êurope et la résurrection

* Ibid., p. 95. 4

Ibid., p. 96.

de la Serbie,

1804-1834, p. 94.

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179

make a last effort to come to an understanding with the Porte. For this peace mission to Constantinople they appointed Peter Itchko, formerly in the diplomatic service of Turkey. After a conference of the leaders on July 13, instructions were given him to attempt to secure a convention with the Porte on the following principles: (a) The Serbians to pay taxes and other contributions which were to be fixed in amount, (b) the Porte to send to Serbia an imperial mohasil and certain other officials to receive the taxes, (c) the Serbians to have control of all other officials in the pashalik and to see that they executed the orders of the Sultan, (d) the janissaries and krdjalis to be expelled from the pashalik and the Serbs to take charge of guarding the frontiers. 1 At the same time a communication was prepared for the Russian ambassador, Italinski, informing him of the mission and requesting his aid.2 Itchko left at once for Constantinople. After he had departed, the Serbians turned their attention to strengthening the defenses of their menaced frontiers. They were not much concerned about the southern frontier, as they held a strongly fortified place on the route from Nish, and they were confident it could hold in check for a long time Turkish forces coming from that direction. But on the western frontier the Serbian position was weakest and open to invasion at several points. There the chief Serbian leaders, Kara George and Milan Obrenovitch, centered their efforts. But already considerable Turkish forces had crossed the Drina, penetrating into Serbian territory, and soon the main Turkish force was on the road to Belgrade.2 The situation of the Serbians was bad by the beginning of August. With small forces they hesitated to venture a 1

Instructions to Itchko, July 13, 1806, ibid., pp. 96-97.

* Ibid. ' Ibid., p. 99.

I go

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

battle with the advancing Turkish army. However, Kara George decided finally to offer battle and entrenched his forces at Michar (Macva). On August 13 the Turkish army arrived and attacked them, but so well planned were the Serbian operations that the Turks were soon in disorder and retreat over the Drina. The danger to the Serbians on their western frontier apparently was removed for the time being. Meanwhile, the Serbian forces on the southern frontier of the pashalik were successfully repelling a Turkish army coming from Rumelia. News of the defeat at Michar weakened the morale of this army and it was soon in retreat toward Nish. 1 Thus, by the end of August all the frontiers of the pashalik of Belgrade held by the Serbians were safe for some time. Meanwhile, Peter Itchko came to Constantinople at the beginning of August, just before the arrival of Sebastiani. He conferred with Italinski and requested his aid. But the Russian ambassador soon became wholly concerned in the diplomatic duel with Sebastiani, who was impressing on the Porte the idea that Russia had instigated and was supporting the Serbian insurrection. Italinski could not very well intervene in favor of the Serbian peace mission without seeming to verify the charges of the French ambassador and further compromising his already difficult position at the Porte.2 Besides, the Porte believed that the Serbians would be effectively subjected now by the Turkish armies which had been sent against them. In these circumstances Itchko soon found himself accomplishing nothing, neglected by both the Russian ambassador and the Porte. Thus at the time when the Serbians had secured the safety of their 1

Ibid., pp. 99-100.

2

Italinski to Budberg, Aug. 14, 1806, ibid., pp. 107-108.

RIVAL

INTRIGUES

l8l

frontiers by arms, their efforts to safeguard themselves by diplomacy against the Turks did not seem hopeful of success. Then occurred the dismissal of Ypsilanti and Morousi which precipitated the Porte into further troubles with the Russian and British representatives. Soon afterwards, the Porte received word of the defeat and retreat of both the Turkish armies attempting to invade the pashalik of Belgrade. In this situation the Porte urged by Sébastiani, believing it impossible to suppress the Serb rebellion that year and menaced now by the greater danger of Russian intervention in Moldavia and Wallachia, decided to adopt a policy of conciliation. Therefore the Serbian peace envoy, who since his arrival in August had been ignored, was called about the middle of September to the Porte and informed that the Sultan would grant in principle the concessions demanded by the Serbians. Soon afterwards Hassan Bey of Nish was appointed mohasil of the pashalik. He was to conclude a convention with them.1 Toward the end of September Itchko left Constantinople carrying back to the Serbian leaders the following proposals from the Porte : that the Sultan would issue a firman giving to the Serbians complete amnesty and would grant to them, under certain conditions, control of the administration of the pashalik of Belgrade; the krdjalis and their chiefs would quit the pashalik; other Turks should be allowed to remain but without rights to indemnity for any losses incurred at the hands of the Serbians; in Belgrade would be stationed a garrison of three hundred Turkish troops; the administration of the pashalik would be controlled by a supreme knéze at Belgrade and by twelve knézes, each in charge of a district, all elected by the Serbians; the Serbians would have a garrison in Belgrade of five hundred troops and would have for their own use all the revenues of ' Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 108.

182

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807

the pashalik except an annual sum of six million piastres to be paid to the mohasil for the Porte. * A t length Itchko delivered to an assembly of the Serbian chiefs at their headquarters at Semendria a report of his mission and the proposals from the Porte. Soon afterwards, Hassan Bey arrived and was given a great reception by the Serbian chiefs. He had not brought with him, as the Serbs had hoped, the promised firman from the Sultan, but Hassan assured them that the Porte agreed to the terms brought by Itchko.* By the latter part of October all seemed ready for negotiations at Semendria for a settlement of the differences between the Serbians and the Porte. The Serbians had arrived at an advantageous position, in which it appeared that they were about to realize most of their aspirations, not only because of their bravery in arms and their military successes, but also because they had profited by the crisis in Russo-Turkish relations arising from the question of the hospodars. On the other hand, however, this crisis endangering peace in the Balkans—at the same time that war was renewed in Germany with the possibility that it might lead to a reopening of the struggle among all the powers—was a situation which also endangered the permanence of any peaceful settlement between the Porte and the Serbians. Perhaps the Serbians were not aware of it, but in fact the insurrection they had started and from which now in October it seemed they were about to realize their hopes, was an affair which was to be manipulated by one of the powers—Russia—with regard to her own interests in the Near East. It is necessary here to retrace our steps and to take account of the first measures undertaken by Russia to give material support to the Serbian insurrection. 1

Ibid., pp. 109-110.

*Ibid., p. no.

RIVAL

INTRIGUES

183

In a conference at the end of August with the Russian agent, Rodofinikine, Ypsilanti had proposed that Russia should help raise an army of one hundred thousand men in Moldavia and Wallachia and had said that, with the aid of rebellious Turkish subjects, this force could conquer the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. He had also urged that Russia help the Serbians and had impressed upon Rodofinikine the fact that Russia was making a mistake in neglecting to establish closer relations with them, as they had forty thousand men under arms and could if they had the means increase their force to seventy thousand. The Serbians needed considerable financial help, declared Ypsilanti, and he proposed that Russia should demand from Austria that she furnish munitions to the Serbs to be paid for by Russia. If such help were not given, Ypsilanti believed that the Serbians would turn for aid to Napoleon who would use them to his advantage. These views and proposals of Ypsilanti were sent off to St. Petersburg by Rodofinikine at the very time when the Porte was deposing Ypsilanti and Morousi from office.1 Rodofinikine became immersed in the affairs of Moldavia and Wallachia after the deposition of Ypsilanti and Morousi, but apparently he did not forget the importance to Russia of establishing closer relations with the Serbians, for following his first communication of August 24 on the subject, again on September 17 he wrote Budberg urging that he accept proposals from General Michelson to send munitions and artillery to the Serbians.2 This despatch crossed one from Budberg to Michelson, a reply to the latter's request for aid for the Serbians, which had evidently been sent after Budberg had received the de1 Rodofinikine to Budberg, Aug. 24, 1806, Yakschitch, op. cit., pp. 1161 1 7 ; Kallay, op. cit., p. 14. 1

Rodofinikine to Budberg, Sept. 17, 1806, Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 117.

184

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spatch of August 24 from Rodofinikine. Budberg declared that under existing circumstances the Serbians could not expect Russia to give them arms and munitions. But in case of war with Turkey, she would give them everything they needed. However, a sum of money was being sent by order of Emperor Alexander to Kara George. 1 This information was eventually communicated by Michelson to Rodofinikine at about the time when the latter received a letter from Kara George again presenting an appeal for help from Russia. This letter had been sent about the middle of September at a time when the Serbian leaders had evidently concluded that their peace mission to Constantinople had failed, since Itchko reported that he was being ignored by the Porte. A s a result the leaders had decided to renew the struggle with the Turks and again to seek help from Russia. It was not until after Kara George had sent off the letter mentioned above that he heard from Constantinople that the Porte had begun negotiations with Itchko proposing to grant substantially the demands of the Serbians. Upon receipt of the letter, Rodofinikine assured the courier that a considerable sum of money was on the way from St. Petersburg and that until it arrived he would give them a smaller sum.2 Again at the end of October he sent more money.* Evidently Russia was now ready to do more than show friendly interest in the Serbian insurrection. It should be remembered that during this time she was aroused not only by the action of Turkey but also by the possibility of renewed war with Napoleon. The British ambassador at Constantinople saw with much satisfaction the efforts of the Serbians and the Porte to •Budberg to Michelson, Sept. 12, 1806, Kallay, op. cit., pp. 14-15; Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 117. * Rodofinikine to Budberg, Sept. 24, 1806, Kallay, op. cit., p. 15. * Ibid., p. IS-

RIVAL

INTRIGUES

185

come to an understanding. If this were effected, the danger of war between Russia and Turkey would be lessened and Russia would be able to give all her attention to opposing Napoleon in central Europe. He suspected that the Russians were aiding the Serbians but he feared that, if Russia did not show a friendly interest in them, they might turn to Napoleon for help. The British had none of the varied interests which connected Russia with the Balkan territory. Their chief concern was to keep control of the Mediterranean and they wanted to conserve the Anglo-Russo-Turkish alliance, as it would be a solid bulwark against any projects of Napoleon to establish himself on the route to India. This alliance was endangered by anything which promoted ill-feeling between Russia and Turkey, and therefore the evidences of strong anti-Russian feeling at Constantinople after the restoration of the hospodars much disturbed Arbuthnot. If peace could be secured between the Serbians and the Porte, he informed his government, one source of this unfriendly feeling would be removed and there would be more certainty of peace between Turkey and Russia. 1 1

Arbuthnot to Spencer, Oct. 30, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52.

CHAPTER FRENCH

VIII

O C C U P A T I O N OF P O L A N D A N D

RUSSIAN

O C C U P A T I O N OF MOLDAVIA AND W A L L A C H I A I

THE battle of Jena, October 14, had been decisive, and Prussia was at the feet of Napoleon. On the nineteenth K i n g Frederick William demanded an armistice which Napoleon refused, declaring that it would give time for Russian forces to come to the aid of Prussia. 1 Napoleon wanted nothing less than a definitive peace, negotiations for which began soon afterwards. On the twenty-fifth Davout at the head of the victorious French regiments marched into Berlin, while Napoleon installed himself nearby at Potsdam. Napoleon dictated the conditions for peace: Prussia was to give up all her territories to the left of the Elbe river as f a r as Magdeburg and the Old Mark of Brandenburg; recognize all changes which had been made in Germany including the incorporation of Saxony and other German states in the Confederation of the Rhine; close all her ports to the British; pay an indemnity of one hundred million francs; and guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and agree to use her military forces in cooperation with the French against Russia if the latter power entered Moldavia and Wallachia. 2 The Prussians took these terms under consideration, while Napoleon after his arrival in Berlin ordered his generals to move their forces steadily eastward 1

Driault, Napoleon et I'Europe: Tilsit, p. 38.

* Driault, ibid., pp. 39-40; Bailleu, Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807, ii, p. s77186

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OCCUPATION

OF POLAND

187

and to occupy important places in Prussian territory. Not only did he intend to secure military control of Prussia as soon as possible, but it was also essential that he prepare to meet the Russians. Ever since he had received word at the beginning of September of the refusal of Alexander to ratify the Oubril treaty and at the same time been informed of Prussia's demand that he himself evacuate Germany, he had believed that there existed an alliance between the two powers. He had prepared for war with Prussia with the idea that he must also eventually settle with Russia. Before striking the Prussians, he had therefore taken measures to disconcert Russia through diplomatic channels. He attempted to play upon the fears at Vienna occasioned by the presence of a Russian army on the borders of Turkey. 1 On October 3 he had written from Wurzburg to his ambassador at Vienna urging the importance of an alliance with Austria founded on the principle of the independence of the Ottoman Empire, and also instructing him to keep him informed on affairs in Moldavia and Wallachia and of the movements of the Russians in Turkey. 2 He further sought to strengthen his position at the Porte and to stir up war against Russia in the Balkans. He had recently received the reports of Sébastiani concerning his favorable reception by the Sultan, and the inclination of certain Turkish ministers to promote a policy of closer relations with France. He had also heard of the difficulties of the British and Russian ambassadors at the Porte, and he had seen in the appointment of the new hospodars an act favorable to the interests of France. This evidence of the progress of French influence at the Porte and the alienation of Turkey from 1

Cf. infra, p. 224.

> Napoleon to L a Rochefoucauld, Oct. 3, 1806, Correspondance Napoléon, xiii, 10932.

de

x88

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

her alliance with Russia and Great Britain were most satisfactory to Napoleon. On October 9 Sebastiani was instructed to keep constantly before the Porte the project of an alliance of France, Turkey and Persia. To promote such an alliance, Talleyrand pointed out that the relations between Turkey and Persia should be improved. They were waiting at Paris for the return of Jaubert from his mission to Persia and his recent sojourn in Constantinople, in order to know more fully the views of Turkey and Persia toward each other.1 On October 1 1 Talleyrand sent instructions to the French agents in Moldavia and Wallachia. Parant at Bucharest was to establish close relations with the new hospodar, Prince Alexander Soutzo, and to warn him of all the dangers to which Wallachia was subject in view of its proximity to the Serbian insurrection and its exposure to Russian intrigues.2 To Reinhard at Jassy Talleyrand sent instructions to urge upon Prince Charles Callimachi the importance of strengthening the defenses of the frontiers of Moldavia against the Russians and of taking such other measures as would insure the province from ever again falling under Russian influence. It was necessary to reestablish there the authority of the Porte. Further, Callimachi should never forget that he owed his office to France. Reinhard was to assure him of Napoleon's protection.8 As has already been noted, Napoleon had presented as one of his conditions of peace with Prussia that she agree to take up arms against Russia should the latter power adopt aggressive measures against Turkey. He had forced Prussia in the settlement after Austerlitz to adopt a similar obliga1

Talleyrand to Sebastiani, Oct. g, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie,

'Talleyrand to Parant, Oct. 11, 1806, Documente

Hurmuzaki,

P. 768.

' Talleyrand to Reinhard, Oct. n , 1806, ibid., pp. 768-769.

212. xvi,

FRENCH

OCCUPATION

OF POLAND

^

tion. Later, it will be recalled, Russia in her treaty with Prussia in July had secured freedom from interference in affairs in the Balkans. 1 Napoleon was now putting to a test Prussia's loyalty to her agreement with Russia. Subsequently Napoleon was to find, in the several weeks after he had settled himself at Berlin, that the Poles might also be converted into allies against Russia. It would not be the first time in her history that France had made use of a combination of the Poles and the Turks to circumvent her enemies. Already toward the end of September Metternich had reported to Vienna that there was talk at Paris of the reëstablishment of Poland. 2 At about this time Napoleon had given orders for the formation of legions in the French army made up of Polish deserters from the Prussian army." It was, however, only after Prussia had been reduced to submission at Jena and peace negotiations had begun that Napoleon was in a position to consider seriously the Polish question. Polish leaders came to him at Berlin offering their services and furnishing information regarding affairs in the Polish provinces.4 Napoleon wrote to Lannes on November 3 that there were evidences of much activity among the Poles and that many proposals had been made to him.8 Reports came to him of the enthusiasm shown by the Poles at the approach of his troops. On the seventh he wrote Mortier that he would possibly start for Poland in a few days.9 1

Cf. supra, p. 117.

2

Report of Metternich, Sept. 24, 1806, Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, p. 253. ' Correspondance de Napoléon, xiii, 10853, 10858. ' Handelsman, Napoléon et la Pologne, 1806-1807 (Paris, 1909), p. 7. ' Correspondance de Napoléon, xiii, 11160. • Handelsman, op. cit., p. 1 1 .

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

Napoleon received during this time numerous memoirs upon the Polish question. One came from M. d'Hauterive of the French Foreign Office, who on October 23 sent Talleyrand a memoir entitled Considérations sur l'utilité du rétablissement de la Pologne comme suite de la bataille d'Iêna. It proposed an exchange of Prussian Silesia for the Austrian Polish province of Galicia and Austrian territory on the Adriatic. A new Polish state was to be formed from the Prussian and Austrian Polish provinces and joined with Moldavia and Wallachia through agreement with Turkey. This new state was to be under the protection of Napoleon and brought with Saxony into the Confederation of the Rhine. This combination would protect France and Italy. It would put Napoleon in command of all the frontiers of Austria except on the side of Hungary. And, what was more important, such a state would establish a barrier against Russia and guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 1 A t the beginning of November Napoleon received another memoir. First it proposed, on the assumption that the Ottoman Empire would eventually be broken up, that European Turkey should be refashioned under the direction of Napoleon. A Polish state should be created extending to the Black Sea including Bessarabia with the fortress of Bender, thereby procuring for Poland navigation on the Black Sea and an outlet for her products in this direction. Austria was to be given indemnities in return for giving over Galicia to Poland. The remainder of European Turkey not included in this Polish state would offer means of aggrandizement along the Adriatic for the kingdom of Italy, while the provinces of ancient Greece were to be created into a separate state with a French prince. France would derive great commercial advantages in the Levant from this arrangement, and it would also make her mistress of the 1

Driault, op. cit., p. 69.

FRENCH

OCCUPATION

OF

POLAND

Mediterranean. Further, should Austria ever threaten Italy, she would have to contend with allies of the king of Italy on all sides of her, i. e., the princes of Poland, Moldavia and Wallachia, and the king of the new state of Greece. As for Russia, the French princes on the Polish throne and at Constantinople would be in a position to threaten her seriously. The Sultan, free from his present constant difficulties in European Turkey, would be much stronger with his power firmly concentrated in the Asiatic provinces. He would be in a position to use all his forces to reestablish his authority in Egypt. 1 In another memoir which reached Napoleon on November n it was proposed, on the assumption that Prussia would never become really reconciled to Napoleon, that this state be completely destroyed and in its place a Polish state be created. Such a state would be an effective check to the aggression of Russia to the west, and it would also detach Austria from her. The restoration of Poland would prolong the existence of the Ottoman Empire, enabling the latter to close the Dardanelles to Russia. Russia would be thrown back into Asia. It was also necessary to carry out an effective continental blockade against England. T o execute this blockade Napoleon would have to create a great fleet and dethrone the Bourbon dynasty in Spain. 2 In the 1 Handelsman, op. cit., pp. 167-176. This memoir is entitled: Observations sur le rétablissement de la Pologne et les différentes dispositions des Polonais à cet égard, conformément à la domination sous laquelle ils vivent actuellement. Berlin au commencement du mois de Novembre, 1806; par un ancien employé du Bureau des Affaires Etrangères de Pologne. The proposal in this memoir that the rule of the Sultan be eliminated completely from Europe and to his advantage confined to the Asiatic provinces, and that French rule be established in new states to be carved out of European Turkey, was similar to a proposal which Napoleon had already received from M. Codrika, special adviser on Eastern affairs to the French Foreign Office. Cf. supra, pp. 76-77, footnote. * Memoir by Montgaillard, Nov. 5, 1806, Handelsman, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

latter proposals of this memoir appeared the outline of a system which Napoleon was later to adopt. Still another memoir received by Napoleon at about this same time attempted to present the advantages of an alliance with Prussia, by giving her as much Polish territory as possible, and thereby securing for the Poles a certain territorial cohesion. Such an arrangement would provide for Napoleon a counterbalancing force against Russia and Austria. 1 These memoirs, indefinite and impracticable as they were in many ways, no doubt contributed to the evolution and clarification of Napoleon's views. Of particular interest was the proposal, recurring in each of them, that he consider the question of a revived Poland under his protection as a means of safeguarding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Whatever speculation such a proposal may have called forth, it was obviously necessary that Turkey be brought into the approaching war with Russia as soon as possible—and as an ally of France. On November 7 instructions were sent to Sébastiani at Constantinople to work vigorously to bring about a war between Russia and Turkey. It was again urged, as in the previous despatch of October 9, that he secure an alliance of France, Turkey and Persia on the basis of their common interests against Russia, and that Persia be admonished not to abate her war with Russia. 2 At the same time instructions were sent to the French consul at Bucharest, Parant, to acquaint Prince Soutzo of Wallachia with the news of Napoleon's victories over Prussia, of the advance eastward of his armies, and of his intention to protect Turkey. When Napoleon commenced military operations which would even1 Memoir from Jomini, received by Napoleon about Nov. io, Handelsman, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

* Talleyrand to Sébastiani, Nov. 7, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212.

FRENCH

OCCUPATION

OF

POLAND

tually bring him to the frontiers of Turkey, then Soutzo should be ready to protect his own province against Russia. 1 Meanwhile, Frederick William of Prussia had received the terms of peace imposed by Napoleon. A t a special meeting of the Council of State on November 6 these terms were accepted. The king, writing Napoleon of his acceptance, also informed him that orders had been given which would assure the retreat of Russian forces from the Prussian frontier. 2 However, in notifying Alexander of the event the Prussian monarch declared that, since he had been forced to accept such a disastrous peace, his only hope now was in Russia. It was doubtful whether Napoleon really wanted peace, and he called upon the Tsar to continue the war against Napoleon.8 The doubts of the Prussian monarch as to the sincerity of Napoleon's proffer of peace seemed confirmed when the latter refused to concur in Prussia's acceptance of the original conditions for peace. Since Napoleon had presented these terms he had learned much regarding the internal condition of Prussia; his generals were easily and quickly getting control of the country; his troops had entered Polish territory and he had received increasing evidence that the 1 Talleyrand to Parant, Nov. 7, 1806, Documente Hurmusaki, xvi, pp. 782-783. Napoleon sent a personal letter to Soutzo at the same time declaring his intention of defending the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Napoleon to Soutzo, Nov. 7, 1806, Documente Hurmusaki, p. 783. Talleyrand also sent a personal communication to Soutzo assuring him that, since Wallachia was a neighbor to Poland, Napoleon was particularly interested in the province. Because of his recent victories and present position he would be able to safeguard Moldavia and Wallachia, and in so doing assure the independence of the Ottoman Empire. Talleyrand to Soutzo, Nov. 7, 1806, ibid., p. 783. Talleyrand sent a similar note to Prince Callimachi, the hospodar of Moldavia. Talleyrand to Callimachi, Nov. 7, 1806, ibid., p. 784. 2

Driault, op. cit., pp. 41-42.

' Frederick William to Alexander, Nov. 8, 1806, Martens, Recueil traites conclus par la Russia, vi, p. 406.

des

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QUESTION,

1800-1807

Poles were ready to become his allies. He had come to no decision on the Polish question,1 but the memoirs he was receiving, which urged the project of a Polish state under his protection as a means of checking Russian expansion not only westward but also in the Balkan peninsula, appeared particularly significant when word came to his headquarters of the dismissal of Soutzo and Callimachi as hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia and the restoration of the former hospodars who had been regarded by the French as proRussian. Judging from the French correspondence it appears that news of this event reached Napoleon on November 8 or 9, since there was no mention of it in the communications of the seventh, already noted, from Talleyrand to Sébastiani, Parant, and the two hospodars. However, under date of the ninth there are despatches from Talleyrand to Parant and Reinhard, announcing that word had come of the deposition of Soutzo and Callimachi. Both consuls were instructed to persuade influential boyars in their respective provinces to demand of the Porte their return. They were also to encourage the native» people to resist any advance of the Russian armies into the provinces and to assure them of their safety, instructing them concerning Napoleon's present position and his ability to protect them and the Ottoman Empire.2 At the very time when Napoleon was extending his military control over the eastern provinces of Prussia, the return to office of the former hospodars impressed him with the fact that Moldavia and Wallachia were virtually subject to Russia, and that he needed to strengthen his position in this region in order to help Turkey defend her northern frontier 1

Correspondance de Napoleon, xii, 11258, 11279. * Talleyrand to Reinhard, Nov. 9, 1806, Documente

pp. 785-786.

Hurmuzaki,

xvi,

FRENCH

OCCUPATION

OF

POLAND

should Russia undertake to seize the provinces. The possibility of Russian aggression in Turkey might force him also to take definite action on the Polish question. However, any decision on this matter would also have to take account of the future status of Prussia and, as affairs in Poland were at present in a state of flux, a settlement with Prussia might well be postponed. Largely influenced, no doubt, by these events and circumstances, Napoleon decided not to accept the peace proffered by Prussia although it was based on his own original terms. On November 9, therefore, he dictated a note demanding that the negotiations with Prussia be only for an armistice. The conditions he laid down reduced the territory of the Prussian monarch to a small area in the northern and eastern portions of Prussia. 1 At the same time Talleyrand sent to the Prussian negotiators a declaration to the effect that one of the wrongs done to France by the coalition against her was the loss of the independence of Turkey. The reestablishment of the former hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia had been forced by Russia, and actually represented a Russian conquest of the two provinces. The complete independence of the Ottoman Empire was one of the first interests of France. The Emperor would lose the choicest fruit of his recent successes if he were not assured on this point and therefore, declared Talleyrand, he would not return to any country the arms taken from her until the Ottoman Empire had fully recovered all her rights in Moldavia and Wallachia, and until her absolute independence had been recognized and guaranteed.2 Two days after Talleyrand had made this declaration to the Prussian negotiators, he sent instructions to Sebastiani 1 Instructions for Duroc, Nov. 9, 1806, Bailleu, Preussen und Frankretch, ii, pp. 579-580. * Note of Talleyrand, Nov. 9, 1806, Driault, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

I9

6

THE

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QUESTION,

1806-1807

to assure the Porte that Napoleon would restore Berlin or Warsaw only when Turkey had recovered complete control of Moldavia and Wallachia. 1 A t the same time Napoleon sent a personal letter to Selim expatiating upon his mission to serve and save Turkey and urging the Sultan to reestablish Soutzo and Callimachi as hospodars.2 Along with the letter to Selim instructions were sent Reinhard at Jassy to rouse the people in Moldavia to the necessity of saving the province for the Ottoman Empire; to urge the development of defenses along the Dniester against the Russians; and to promote among the boyars a sentiment favorable to the reestablishment of Callimachi and Soutzo as hospodars.3 Similar instructions were sent to Parant at Bucharest. He was to seek to rouse the people in Wallachia against the Russians by belittling the size of their forces on the Dniester, and also to discredit them by spreading abroad the idea that they were afraid of a nationalist uprising in Poland now that Napoleon was in that country.4 A t this time when Napoleon and Talleyrand were giving considerable attention to affairs in Turkey, it is interesting to note that Napoleon informed General Dejean that perhaps he would take part in supporting insurrection in Poland. 5 He doubtless envisaged the suppressed Poles rising to smite Russia as his army marched against her over the Vistula, while Selim led the Turks over the Dniester for the same purpose. The Prussian envoys, Lucchesini and Zastrow, took under consideration the new terms dictated to them on November 9, ' Talleyrand to Sebastiani, Nov. 11, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212. * Napoleon to Selim, Nov. 11, 1806, ibid. • Talleyrand to Reinhard, Nov. 11, 1806, Documente pp. 787-788. 4 Talleyrand to Parant, Nov. n , 1806, ibid., p. 788. ' Handelsman, op. cit., p. 11.

Note of November 12.

Hurmusaki,

xvi,

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OCCUPATION

OF POLAND

197

and also Talleyrand's declaration that peace with Prussia depended on securing safeguards for Turkey in her complete possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. A week later, November 16, they signed an armistice according to Napoleon's terms. They had been considerably disturbed, according to Lucchesini, by the advance of French troops into Posen and by reports that a Polish insurrection was under way. They also knew of the meetings of Polish leaders with Napoleon at Berlin. These disturbing events led them to submit to Napoleon, believing that an agreement should be made with him as soon as possible in order to check the dangerous drift of affairs in the Polish provinces. They were certain that Napoleon was ready to disarm Prussia and use her as a tool to secure peace with Russia, but they felt that a restoration of Poland must be prevented if possible.1 A f t e r they had signed the armistice, it was sent off to the Prussian sovereign for ratification. Unquestionably Napoleon desired to secure an advantageous peace with Russia, and he was preparing to use his control of Prussia and also the Polish agitation as means for bringing Russia to terms. After the signing of the armistice on the sixteenth by the Prussian plenipotentiaries, Talleyrand urged them to inform the Russian Emperor that there would be danger for Russia if she did not make peace and if rebellious Poland were given a prince who was to be vassal of France. 2 The intentions of French diplomacy at this time were further revealed by a communication from Talleyrand to M. d'Hauterive of the Foreign Office. The 1 Ibid., p. 20. Lucchesini also claims that they were held like prisoners at Charlottenberg and could not get information of the true situation of affairs. They thought the Russian armies still too far away to give help. The Czar, it was thought, would be ready for peace if Napoleon decided not to attempt the restoration of Poland. For a precis of Lucchesini's apology see: Ranke, Hardenberg, v, p. 421. 2

Handelsman, op. cit., p. 20.

I98

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terms of the armistice were such, declared Talleyrand, that Poland—if there were a Poland—would be able to recover her liberty. The troops of France would not retire from that portion of Prussian Poland which they already occupied and there were to be no troops belonging to either side in the remaining portions. If this Poland could demonstrate its existence apart from Prussia and could menace Russia in this way there might be brought about the peace with Russia which France desired, a peace which would also preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 1 An army under Davout entered the city of Posen on November 20 and by the end of the month Napoleon had secured control of virtually all Prussian Poland. He arrived on the twenty-seventh and on the same day the first French forces under Milhaud entered Warsaw. The advance of the armies through Prussian Poland was thus far a triumphal march accompanied by the acclamations of the people who greeted them and the Emperor as restorers of their national liberties. Prussian officials had been removed from office and replaced by Poles and the flag with the Prussian eagles was replaced by the Imperial eagles.2 In presenting his latest terms to Prussia, Napoleon had indicated that his greatest enemy besides Russia was England, who, he proclaimed, by her conquest of colonies belonging to France, Holland and Spain had become a menace to European states. He therefore prepared now to strike a blow at England and to this end proposed to establish a blockade which would cut off all British commerce with the continent. On the twenty-first he signed at Berlin a decree, generally known as the Berlin decree, whereby the British Isles were declared to be in a state of blockade and all com1 Talleyrand to d'Hauterive, Nov. 17, 1806, ibid., Talleyrand to Andreossy, Nov. 18, 1807, ibid., p. 215.

' Handelsman, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

pp. 20-21;

also

FRENCH

OCCUPATION

OF

POLAND

merce and communication with them forbidden. All British merchandise and property were to be seized and no British vessel from either England or her colonies was to be received in any port.1 Instructions were sent to Sébastiani to continue most vigorously his efforts to incite Turkey to defend her frontiers against Russia. He was to impress upon her that a continuation of any alliance with Great Britain and Russia would lead only to the dismemberment of Turkey; to proclaim the Berlin decree, explaining how disastrous it would be for England; and to urge that Turkey adhere to the decree and break off commercial relations with England. When all Europe and the Orient were closed to England, she would be unable to continue the war and must submit to France. 2 It was at the end of November, when Napoleon by the Berlin decree had invoked Turkey and all other neutral powers to make war on England and had established large armies not far from the frontier of Russia with the intention of planning active hostilities against her in the spring, that Russian armies were crossing the frontiers of Turkey and proceeding to military occupation of Turkish territory between the Danube and the Dniester. Thus, at the moment when Napoleon was in a position to attack Russia, the latter by her invasion of Turkey had committed an act almost certain to convert this country into an ally of France. This had been an object of Napoleon's Near Eastern policy since the Treaty of Pressburg.

2 During the time when Napoleon was making final swift preparations for his campaign against the Prussians which 1

Correspondance de Napoléon, xiii, 11383.

1

Talleyrand to Sébastiani, Nov. 23, 1806, Aff. Etr. de Turquie, 212.

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QUESTION,

1806-1807

ended in the victory at Jena, Emperor Alexander of Russia and his ministers, ignorant of the rapid climax in the affairs of Germany, were preoccupied with the situation in Turkey. They had received reports from agents of the arrival of Reinhard, the new French consul-general in the two provinces, and had also heard of the activities of Sebastiani at Bucharest when at the end of July he was en route to Constantinople.1 Ypsilanti had sent to Budberg a report of his conference with Sebastiani, declaring that the French had a project for bringing all the rebellious groups in European Turkey into an alliance with them for the purpose of promoting French interests. Ypsilanti warned Budberg that he might expect Sebastiani, upon arrival at Constantinople, to commit some indiscreet act.2 Subsequently reports had come to St. Petersburg from Italinski concerning the flattering reception given by the Turkish ministers to Sebastiani when he arrived at Constantinople. Then there had come reports of Turkish military preparations along the Danube, and finally the news of the deposition of Ypsilanti and Morousi without previous notice to Russia and of the appointment of successors who were known to be pro-French. In view of this accumulation of evidence concerning the apparent development of French influence at the Porte, it is not surprising that the Russian cabinet decided that definite measures must be taken to protect Russian interest in the Balkans and to put a check to French ascendancy at the Porte. The last seemed imperative to the Russian ministry in view of the possibility of renewal of war in Europe. Prussia and France seemed to be preparing for war, and Russia must be ready to help Prussia, in accordance with obligations assumed in the recent treaty between the two 1 1

Cf. supra, pp. 140-142; 170-172. Yakschitch, op. cit., pp. 105-107.

FRENCH

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OF

POLAND

powers. 1 Also, Napoleon must not succeed in making Turkey his ally. Therefore, as soon as news reached St. Petersburg of the deposition of Ypsilanti and Morousi, an ultimatum was sent off to Constantinople in which it was made clear that Russia would take immediate action with armed forces unless the Porte reinstated the deposed hospodars and corrected her conduct generally.2 Merveldt, the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg, believing after the non-ratification of the Oubril treaty that Russia would of necessity direct her attention to renewal of hostilities with Napoleon, renewed with more vigor his efforts to persuade the Russian ministers to avoid war with Turkey. He urged a peaceful settlement upon all issues between them, arguing that Russia should concentrate all her forces on her western frontier against France. 3 In reply to Merveldt, Budberg emphatically declared that Russia was not afraid of a double war against both France and Turkey. She was well prepared in both financial and military resources for war with Turkey, which must surely come if the Porte did not alter its conduct. There seemed to be a general belief among the Russians, Merveldt informed his government toward the end of September, that Turkey was too weak to offer serious resistance and that Constantinople could be taken by a relatively small Russian army.4 The Austrian ambassador made some further efforts to divert the Russian ministry from taking action against Turkey, but he was informed that the situation in the Bal1

In this treat}' Russia agreed to use her forces to maintain the integrity of Prussian territory. Martens, Recueil de traites cottclus par la Russie, vi, pp. 370-380. 1

Driault, La Politique orientate de Napoleon, p. 70.

3

Merveldt to Stadion, Sept. 11, 1806, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Russland, Berichte, 1806. * Merveldt to Stadion, Sept. 23, 1806, ibid.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

kans was getting more unfavorable and that recourse to arms might soon be necessary.1 The British ambassador, Stuart, had also been trying to improve the relations of Russia with Turkey and to divert the attention of the former to the west. Stuart urged the necessity of completing the new coalition of the powers against Napoleon, before Russia should take any action against Turkey. Budberg would give no other assurance than that, in case of war with Turkey, Russia would withdraw no troops from her western frontier. 2 T o Stuart's renewed attempts to persuade him to give up military plans and to settle differences with Turkey by negotiation, Budberg replied that Russian military occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia did not necessarily mean war with Turkey. 3 Early in October Budberg through a special agent, Pozzo di Borgo, sounded out Merveldt as to what Austria would want in case of an eventual partition of Turkey. Pozzo approached the subject with a declaration that recent news indicated such pronounced French influence at the Porte as to make it necessary to consider the question of securing some control over portions of European Turkey. And in case of eventual partition it was essential to know the desires of each interested country. Russia would probably want Moldavia and Wallachia. Pozzo declared that he believed Russia would agree to Austrian occupation of Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia. Further, Russia would herself take over these provinces for Austria so that the latter would not be involved in trouble with France. Merveldt replied that in view of Russia's conduct in the matter of Cattaro, Austria could not but believe that a Russian occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia would mean i Merveldt to Stadion, Sept. 29, 1806, ibid. 4

Stuart to Fox, Sept 30, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 64.

• Stuart to Fox, Oct. 12, 1806, ibid.

FRENCH

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permanent possession. He refused to discuss the proposals on the ground that he did not know the intentions of his sovereign about any partition of Turkey, though he was certain of his desire to maintain as long as possible the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. However, if Austria were to secure adequate frontiers in the event of a partition, she must look for them beyond Serbia in Bulgaria and Rumelia. 1 Judging from the conduct of Budberg, it is evident that the Russian ministry had decided that military measures against Turkey were almost inevitable. At the beginning of October the British ambassador reported that it was generally believed in Russian official circles that Italinski must have left Constantinople and that the advance of Russian troops into Turkish territory would necessarily follow. 2 Evidently the Russian ministry had persuaded itself that the Porte had refused the ultimatum, though it was not possible for authentic news of any such decision to have reached St. Petersburg at that time—the beginning of October. Emperor Alexander was advised to send orders at once to General Michelson to march Russian troops into Moldavia. The Emperor, however, advocated patience and delay until October 15. 8 On October 16 the Sultan reinstated Ypsilanti and Morousi, but the news could not reach St. Petersburg before the beginning of November. However, on the same day— on October 16—orders were sent from St. Petersburg for General Michelson to move his army into Moldavia 1

Merveldt to Stadion, Oct. io, 1806, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Russland, Berichte, 1806. At about this same time the Russian ambassador at Vienna, Razumovski, hinted to Stadion Russia's willingness to come to an understanding with Austria over the eventual possible elimination of Turkey from Europe. Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, 18011810, p. 255. 1

Stuart to Fox, Oct. 2, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 64. ' Driault, La Politique orientate de Napoleon, p. 70.

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QUESTION,

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non en ennemi . . . mais dans l'unique but de faire rétablir les anciens rapports qui ont si longtemps subsisté entre les deux empires d'après les traités, de prévenir les effets pernicieux de l'influence française qui s'établit à Constantinople et qui menace ia Porte d'un asservissement total et enfin de paralyser le dessein hautement annoncé par l'ambassadeur Sébastiani de faire traverser les états ottomans à une armée française pour venir nous attaquer sur le Dnjester.1 Such were the purposes of this order, Budberg explained to Italinski.

Since Emperor Alexander had received no

reply to his ultimatum, he had come by this time r i g h t f u l l y to believe, Budberg declared, that the Porte did not wish to s a t i s f y his demands upon her. Dans cet état d'incertitude, il ne restait à l'empereur d'autre parti à prendre que de suivre avec persévérance et fermeté le plan, que se Majesté Impériale s'était trace d'avance pour le maintien de sa dignité et de ses droits, autant que pour ramener la Porte par une commotion extraordinaire aux seuls principes que ses intérêts positifs lui commandent de suivre invariablement.2 Until all demands made by Russia upon the Porte were satisfied, Budberg informed the British

ambassador,

an

" amicable demonstration " against T u r k e y would be expedient.

Complete fulfillment of every term of her treaty

with Russia was necessary before good understanding could be restored with Turkey. 8

Budberg requested Stuart to

suggest to his government that it warn T u r k e y of the consequences of any attack she might make against Russia and also of any armed resistance.

Stuart replied that Great

Britain would expect in return some support f r o m Russia on the question of the restitution of Hanover. i ' Bradisteanu, op. cit., pp. I O O - I O I . 1

Budberg

Budberg to Italinski, Nov. 15, 1806, Sturdza Documente, I, pp. 518-522

' Stuart to Howick, Oct. 29, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 64.

FRENCH

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refused to consider that reciprocal obligations were involved in the two questions and complained that Great Britain had recently seemed indifferent about matters of common interest to the two powers at Constantinople.1 In the first days of November word was received at St. Petersburg of the restoration to office of Ypsilanti and Morousi. This communication was accompanied by no explanation from the Porte. 2 On November 4 the Russian Foreign Office, seeking to justify its action, sent to members of the diplomatic corps a circular note. First was presented a résumé of the history of the more recent relations between Russia and Turkey. It dwelt particularly on the questionable conduct of the Porte in deposing the hospodars and in closing the Bosphorus to Russian vessels of war, and on the military preparations of the Turks. All these acts were attributed to the intrigues of Sébastiani, and communications from the French ambassador to support the charges were cited. In the circumstances, it was explained, Russia must guard her honor from insult, protect the Christian peoples in Turkey as she had promised to do, preserve Russia's privileges in Turkey, and check the projects of her enemies. Russia did not intend to use the army she had ordered to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia for the destruction of Turkey, but rather to bring her back by the only efficacious means which existed to the principles which she had violated against her own interests in the face of solemn engagements. This occupation was also a means of precaution for Russia in the dangerous crisis confronting Europe. If the Porte corrected its behavior, " the Emperor would give new evidence of his magnanimity." Otherwise, Russia would use all possible means to force the Porte " a adopter un système dans lequel S.M.I. [Sa Majesté Im1 s

Ibid. Bradisteanu, op. cit., p. 1 0 1 .

2o6

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périale, Emperor Alexander] aura le plus grand soin de concilier la conservation de ses intérêts avec le bien général de l'Europe, qu'Elle regardera toujours comme inséparable du sien propre." 1 Further evidence that Russia intended to carry out her plans for military occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia in spite of the restoration of the hospodars was revealed in a conference between Stuart and Budberg on the same day the circular note was issued. Budberg declared that news had lately come from Constantinople to the effect that France was threatening Turkey, if she did not renounce her connections with Russia and England, and was preparing to send armies across Turkish territory to attack the Russians on the Dniester. Confronted with such dangers, Russia must take adequate measures to protect herself in that direction. It was his belief that there was little hope that good relations with Turkey could be restored by gentle, pacific means. Therefore, the Tsar had decided to take decisive measures. Budberg hoped that by then Russian forces had crossed the Dniester to meet the French forces threatening to come from Dalmatia.2 Budberg advised the Emperor, in spite of the restoration of the hospodars, not to countermand the orders which had already been sent to General Michelson, but to await further news from Italinski, which might give additional evidence of the real inclinations and the sincerity of the Porte. The Russian army should remain in Moldavia and Wallachia to bring pressure on the Porte to return to the exclusive protection of Russia. By military occupation of these provinces, Russia could also establish securely her connections with Christian peoples in Turkey, especially the Serbians, 1

Russian circular note to the powers, Nov. 4, 1806, Sturdsa Documente, I, PP- 513-518. ' Stuart to Howick, Nov. 4, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 64.

FRENCH

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who could advantageously be used and should therefore be helped with arms and money.1 Russia's policy, which now seemed to be inflexibly determined, would be disturbing to Austria in particular. While Merveldt, the Austrian ambassador, was being urged to secure from his government a favorable response to the Russian proposals concerning a partition of European Turkey, he heard of the order sent General Michelson on October 16 to move his army into Moldavia and Wallachia He at once sought an explanation from Budberg and reminded him that Austria depended on Russia to maintain the integrity of Turkey. Budberg answered that the measure was instigated only for the purpose of placing Russia in a position to oppose the French in Dalmatia. Merveldt subsequently reported to his government that he believed that Russia was interested in promoting an insurrection of all Orthodox peoples in Turkey and intended to put them in control of European Turkey. This would be dangerous to the safety of the Austrian Empire, in view of the fact that some of her subjects were of the Orthodox faith. He believed that the time was near at hand when Austria must choose between Russia and France.2 These ominous reports from St. Petersburg reached Vienna not long before news arrived of the actual advance of Russian forces into Moldavia, and made a very bad impression on the Austrians. The Russian circular note of November 4 caused the 1 Budberg to Alexander, November, 1806, Sbormk, 82, no. 160. This note has no exact date. It is evident, however, from its contents that it was written and sent some time very soon after word had come from Italinski—Nov. 4—concerning the restoration of the hospodars. In this communication Italinski also urged that Russian forces remain on Turkish territory to protect Russian interests in the probable event in the near future of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. 2 Merveldt to Stadion, Oct. 24,27,1806, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Russland, Bcrichte, 1806.

2O8

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

Austrian minister to call once more for an explanation of Russian intentions. He frankly told Budberg that it would not be agreeable to Austria to see Russian frontiers extended from the Dniester to the Adriatic, nor to suffer the economic loss which would result from an incorporation of the two provinces into Russia. Budberg then proposed Russian, Austrian and British cooperation in a plan for general partition of European Turkey. Great Britain was to be included since her navy would be necessary to reduce the maritime portions of the country. Merveldt refused to discuss such a proposal and demanded a written assurance that the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia was only temporary and that the provinces would be returned to Turkey as soon as she had fulfilled treaty obligations. Budberg promised to give this assurance. Merveldt, however, was not at all reassured by remarks of the Russian minister to the effect that Russia intended to continue relations with the Serbians. 1 Stuart, the British ambassador, warned Budberg that the Russian circular note would have ill effects at Vienna. Subsequent attempts to modify Budberg's attitude failed and he made no reassuring statement except to repeat emphatically that Russia had no plans of aggrandizement on Turkey. 2 Stuart learned from Budberg that Russia did not, for several reasons, like the recent conduct of Austria. First, the Austrian minister at Constantinople had not helped to promote Russian interests during the recent Russo-Turkish crisis over the hospodars; then, too, reports had been received to the effect that Austria would exchange her Polish territory for Silesia or whatever compensation Napoleon might offer; further, while Austria had declared that the evacuation of Cattaro by Russia was necessary to get back 1

Merveldt to Stadion, Nov. 8, 1806, ibid.

* Stuart to Howick, Nov. 4, 11, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 64, 65.

FRENCH

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Braunau from Napoleon, yet she had ceded Gradisca to him. Budberg requested Stuart to use his good offices to get Austria to adopt a more friendly attitude toward Russia. 1 The Austrian ambassador was ready to talk over their differences but refused to discuss with the Russians any proposal for a partition of European Turkey. He wanted, however, to settle with them the question of the evacuation of Cattaro and also to secure a definite written statement that Russia had no intention of aggrandizement in Turkey. Stuart thereupon urged on Budberg that Russia give over Cattaro to Austria and thus save the latter power from being humiliated by Napoleon and perhaps driven to arms against Russia to avoid war with him. The existing critical situation required that the two powers establish a concert quickly. England was ready to promote such a concert and now offered her services as mediator for the purpose. Although Budberg refused to commit himself on the matter of Cattaro, Stuart was impressed with his evident desire to come to a close understanding with Austria. 2 About this time — approximately the middle of November—Stuart received instructions dated October io. 3 He was to assure Russia that England was ready to sustain her in her demand that Turkey fulfill treaty obligations, especially if the conduct of the latter seemed to be determined by French influence. However, Stuart was to urge Russia to secure satisfaction from Turkey if possible by pacific measures, and thus to avoid diverting her attention from France. Stuart heard also at this time of despatches just received at the Russian Foreign Office confirming the earlier report of the restoration of Ypsilanti and Morousi, and he proceeded again to urge that Russia come to a quick, pacific settlement 1

Stuart to Howick, Nov. u , 1806, ibid., 65.

* Stuart to Howick, Nov. 19, 1806, ibid. ' Howick to Stuart, Oct. 10, 1806, ibid., 64.

2IO

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with Turkey in view of the growing danger to the western frontier of Russia from the eastward advance of Napoleon's troops through Prussia. In reply, Budberg repeated his usual argument that the Porte was very probably insincere in its apparent submission on the question of the hospodars, and that until Turkey renewed her treaty with England and agreed to other demands of Russia, which would be proof that she was no longer under French influence, Russia would continue to advance her troops into Turkish territory in order to establish for herself a secure frontier on the Danube.1 Merveldt also urged again that Russia come to an agreement with Turkey. Budberg replied that Russia wanted a desirable peace with Turkey as soon as possible, but could not neglect French influence in a country so unstable politically. Russia intended not to use her forces to destroy Turkey, but merely to force Turkey by the only possible efficacious means to remain faithful to her treaties and to the principles of interest common to both, as well as to correct those abuses within Turkey detrimental to the welfare of her Christian subjects. Russian military occupation of Turkey would end when satisfaction on these matters and a guarantee for the future were secured.2 It must have been obvious to the Austrians from the statements of the Russian foreign minister that the criteria laid down for determining the good behavior of Turkey left the way open to Russia for an indefinite occupation of Turkish territory. Budberg, evidently in response to the latest despatches concerning the restoration of the hospodars, had sent instructions to Italinski indicating the conditions which the Porte must fulfill before Russia would recall her troops, i. e., 1

Stuart to Hawick, Nov. 17, 20, 1806, ibid., 65. Merveldt to Stadion, Nov. 23, 1806, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Berichte, 1806. 2

Russland,

FRENCH

OCCUPATION

OF POLAND

211

renewal of the treaty with England; a declaration of the Porte giving right of passage of Russian vessels through the Dardanelles; restoration of all rights and privileges in Moldavia and Wallachia; guarantee of the establishment of law and order in Moldavia, if necessary with the aid of Russian troops, and the creation there of a national army for defense on the Danube. Italinski was to assure the Porte that the Russian occupation represented no unfriendly intentions, but aimed only to protect Turkey from an invasion by the French which might follow as a consequence of the restoration of the hospodars. Italinski should try to convince the Sultan that Emperor Alexander had high regard and friendship for him, and that he hoped the Sultan would give proof of like sentiments by fulfilling these conditions. Then relations between them would be better than they had ever been.1 A t the same time that Russia had become convinced that her varied interests in European Turkey and on her southern frontiers were menaced by the French and must be safeguarded by military measures, even though such measures were detrimental to the good feeling between Austria and Russia which England was working to secure, a situation was rapidly developing which made war inevitable on her western frontier. A f t e r his refusal to ratify Oubril's treaty, Emperor Alexander had not given up the idea of peace with Napoleon.* He had been waiting for word from Paris on the subject of reopening negotiations, when he was suddenly confronted by the declaration of war by Prussia on France. The final 1

Budberg to Italinski, Nov. i s , 1806, Sturdza Documente, i, pp. 518-522.

Cf. supra, pp. 119-120. A f t e r the non-ratification of the Oubril treaty, the Russian court had not overlooked the possibility of renewal of war between France and Russia, and had sent a warning note to Prussia urging that she prepare her armed forces. Budberg to Stackalberg, Aug. 10, 1806, Martens, op. cit., vi, p. 390. 2

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807 break was not entirely unexpected at St. Petersburg, as Frederick William had early in August sent to Emperor Alexander a warning of such a possibility. 1 Actual hostilities had, however, begun sooner than Russia had expected. She had been unprepared for the rapidity of Napoleon's movements from the time he left Paris to the decisive defeat of the Prussians at Jena three weeks later. Russia had not had time to come to the aid of her ally. A f t e r all was over, Napoleon had left the Prussians in possession of only two fortresses in the northeastern corner of the kingdom — Danzig and Königsberg — behind which Frederick William had to seek refuge with his court in the little town of Memel on the frontier of Russia. Within several weeks the war zone moved near to the very frontiers of Russia with the advance of the French armies eastward into Prussian Poland. Polish territory was an uncertain frontier for Russia, as it was a region surcharged with the nationalist sentiment of a suppressed people. Reports were soon rife at St. Petersburg that Napoleon intended to restore Poland. W a r with France was inevitable. The armed forces of Russia, inadequate at the time to defend properly the western frontier against the French, were only slowly recruited in spite of appeals of Alexander to the country to rally to the national cause. The mass of people were indifferent and passive. There was also deplorable lack of equipment in guns and munitions and there was no outstanding commander for the Russian forces. When old Field-Marshal Kamienski was at length placed in command, he had neither the ability nor the health for the position. Besides, there would also be rivalry with Generals 1 Frederick to Emperor Alexander, Aug. 8, 1806, Bailleu, op. cit., ii, p. 509. Again early in September, Frederick William wrote Alexander that he was preparing for war as peace was no longer possible with Napoleon. Frederick William to Emperor Alexander, Sept. 6, 1806,

ibid., p. 552.

FRENCH

OCCUPATION

OF POLAND

2x3

Bennigsen and Buxhoewden commanding under him, which would be detrimental to discipline. The first Russian troop movements to the western frontier started at the beginning of November, with a force of sixty thousand under Bennigsen. A month later there followed another force of forty thousand under Buxhoewden. A juncture was to be made with the remnant of Prussian forces which remained after Jena. 1 While Alexander was addressing patriotic manifestoes to his subjects and a Russian army was being quickly prepared and sent to join the Prussians against Napoleon in Poland, Budberg was engaged in the preparation and despatch of two important missions. One was a mission to Prussia in the person of Count Peter Tolstoi, and its purpose was to offer to Frederick William the armed assistance of Russia. He had left about the middle of November.* Early in the month Frederick William had written Alexander that the only hope of help for his country was from Russia, and had asked for immediate aid from Russian armies. When Alexander received this letter he had already decided to come to the help of Prussia and to join her in war against France.' The other mission was to Austria. On November 12 Emperor Alexander addressed a letter to Francis II, asking that Austria join in war against Napoleon. War was now necessary, as Napoleon evidently intended to reestablish Poland and to subject all Prussia. Austria was particularly endangered.4 A letter was also addressed by Alexander to ' Waliszewski, Le Règne d'Alexandre

I, i, pp. 202-204.

* Stuart to Howiek, Nov. 17, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 65. ' Martens, Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie, vi, p. 406. 4 Alexander to Francis, Nov. 12, 1806, Martens, op. cit., ii, p. 505 ; Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, 1801-1810, pp. 472-473. A text of the letter is given here.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

Archduke Charles, urging armed intervention and presenting the possible glories for Austria from such action.1 These letters were to be taken to Vienna by Pozzo di Borgo, who was appointed to a special diplomatic mission with the purpose of securing the participation of Austria in the war against Napoleon. Stuart had been urging the necessity and quick expedition of such a mission.2 Pozzo received instructions to promote a closer understanding with Austria and to enter upon some agreement which would prevent Napoleon from securing Poland; to assure Austria that Russia sought no aggrandizement anywhere unless it was necessary for the safety of her frontiers; to propose a mutual agreement of the two powers to carry the war to the limit and to make peace only together; to secure a convention determining the military forces to be contributed by each power.* Pozzo left for Vienna on November 20. An important object of the proposed agreement was to prevent Austria from bargaining away with Napoleon her own Polish territory for compensations elsewhere. Suspicions of Austria had already been aroused at St. Petersburg by reports that negotiations were being conducted with Napoleon concerning a possible exchange of Austrian Polish territory for Silesia or some other province. This question had been furtively touched upon at a conference toward the end of November between Merveldt and Budberg, and it appears that there had also been mention of certain suspicions current at Vienna that Russia would accept, if necessary, losses in Poland in compensation for gains in the Balkans. The Austrian ambassador afterward reported that Budberg had declared that Moldavia and Wallachia could not be con' Alexander to Archduke Charles, Nov. 12, 1806, Beer, ibid., pp. 473474. The text of the letter is given here. * Stuart to Howick, Nov. 20, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 65. • Stuart to Howick, Nov. 28, 1806, ibid.

FRENCH

OCCUPATION

OF POLAND

215

sidered by Russia compensation for any possible losses in Poland. 1 The significance of the Polish question and also of the Near Eastern question, which in view of the uncertainty as to future relations between Russia and Turkey was not less important, must now be considered in relation to the development of affairs at the Austrian court. 1

Merveldt to Stadion, Nov. 23, 1806, Austria, Staotsarchiv, Russland, Berichte, 1806.

C H A P T E R IX T H E T R O U B L E D N E U T R A L I T Y OF A U S T R I A I

DURING the spring of 1806 the Austrian court had watched with growing anxiety the mobilization of Russian forces on the frontiers of Turkey and of Turkish forces along the Danube. Reports had also been made by Austrian agents of increasing ill feeling in official circles at St. Petersburg and at Constantinople. The presence of the French in Dalmatia and southern Italy accentuated traditional fears at Vienna that Napoleon had projects of conquest in the Levant. The seizure of Cattaro by the Russians had created difficulties for Austria, putting her in the position where she must either submit to the Russian occupation and incur danger of trouble with Napoleon or else attempt to force Russia from Cattaro and jeopardize her relations with that power. T o gain time the Austrian court had proposed to Napoleon in May negotiations for a general peace and the latter had accepted, having already received overtures from Russia and England. While he was in Vienna, en route to Paris, Oubril had given assurances that Russia would withdraw from Cattaro. This question apparently being settled and the powers preparing to negotiate for a general peace, Austria felt by the end of June that her position was improved. Since Austria was at peace with every one she took no part in the negotiations at Paris, but she was nevertheless apprehensive on certain points. She feared that Russia might secure territory in the Balkans in a treaty with Napoleon, as 216

THE TROUBLED

NEUTRALITY

OF AUSTRIA

2

1J

it was believed that she could not resist proposals for a partition of Turkey, especially if Great Britain were a party to it. She also feared possible complications for herself from the Serbian rebellion and heard with concern that in June a second deputation to St. Petersburg had been given promises of munitions and encouragement to continue their struggle. Further, it was learned at Vienna that in official Russian circles the conquest of Constantinople was talked of as a project easily attainable, and that preparations were being made on the Black Sea and the frontiers of Turkey to secure all necessary means for a sudden march on that city.1 Motivated probably by the consideration that if Russia were more certain of her situation with respect to Balkan affairs she would be less inclined to listen to Napoleon's intrigues in the forthcoming negotiations with regard to projects on Turkey, Stadion sent to Merveldt late in June instructions to inform the Russian ministry that the conduct of the Porte since the Treaty of Pressburg and especially the influence gained there by France required a very close surveillance of affairs in that direction. Also, the imposing measures and almost warlike attitude which Russia had taken in the circumstances were regarded by Austria as most salutary. However, the preparations should not be pressed into execution, but rather await the time when they should become indispensable. Stadion feared that French intrigue at the Porte would become more effective if Russia made a premature break with Turkey. Austria, declared Stadion, continued to hold to a policy of strict neutrality, giving no aid to the Serbians but allowing them asylum on her territory upon condition that they lay down their arms.2 This message, in spite of its assertion of Austrian neutral1

Merveldt to Stadion, May 31, June 12, 1806, Kallay, op. cit., no. 11, p. 455; Beer, Die orientaliscke Politik Oesterreichs seit 1774, pp. 161-162. 2 Stadion to Merveldt, June 26, 1806, Kallay, op. cit., no. 132, p. 491.

218

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

ity, gave certain encouragement to Russia to perpetuate the Serbian insurrection by its mention of the necessity of being prepared for possible action against Turkey. That it did not entirely accomplish its purpose of allaying Russia's fears and thus restraining her from rash action against Turkey, is shown by Budberg's reply to the effect that Russia and Austria would evidently not be able to come to an understanding on Turkey. Fear of France prevented Austria from acting independently and therefore Russia would expect to see the latter opposing her. The Austrian court could be assured, however, that it was the desire of Russia to keep on good terms with Turkey. 1 A f t e r hearing of the Oubril treaty Stadion believed that, whether it were ratified or not, it would be equally dangerous for Austria. He was convinced that Russia would not make such an agreement unless Napoleon consented to Russian plans of conquest in the Balkans, and that both powers were ready to sacrifice the interests of Austria to satisfy their own ambitions. He believed that if the Oubril treaty were not accepted at St. Petersburg and if war followed between Russia and France, Russia would soon attack Turkey and Napoleon would attempt to strike at Russia through Turkey. Under such circumstances Austria's neutrality would not be respected by either of the powers, and Austria, Stadion was convinced, would soon be forced into war with 1 Merveldt to Stadion, July 29, 1806, ibid., no. 193, p. 492. The Austrian court was also apprehensive over German affairs. Alarming reports had come from Vincent to the effect that a French army had orders to advance into Austrian territory if Emperor Francis refused to abdicate the imperial throne of the Holy Roman Empire or to recognize the Confederation of the Rhine and Joseph as King of Naples. Metternich was sent to Paris in July to replace Vincent and if possible to come to some better understanding with Napoleon regarding affairs in Germany. He arrived too late, as the articles of the Confederation of the Rhine had already been signed. Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, 18011S10, pp. 228, 232.

THE TROUBLED

NEUTRALITY

OF AUSTRIA

219

one or the other, in which case she might in the end be deprived of territory or else be made subject to a humiliating foreign domination. Therefore, Stadion concluded, it would be advisable for Austria to accept the Oubril treaty, assuming it were ratified, as it would keep peace and give Austria time to get information concerning the nature of the treaty. It would also give her opportunity to prepare for any intervention, if necessary, to protect her interests to the east. For if it were found that there was a special Franco-Russian agreement on the fate of Turkey, then Austria would insist upon taking part in the partition of the country.1 Therefore, late in August, instructions were sent to Count Merveldt at St. Petersburg that, in case the question of partition of Turkey should come up, he should seek to obtain for Austria the greater part of those Turkish provinces which were assigned to her in the Convention between Joseph I I and Catherine in 1782. 2 If the Oubril treaty was not ratified, Merveldt was to use every means to prevent Russia from attacking Turkey.® Hardly had these instructions been despatched when Stadion heard of the non-ratification of the Oubril treaty. He was at once pressed by Adair, the British ambassador, to make a decision as to what position Austria would take in view of a possible war between France and Russia, and the offer again was made of British aid if Austria resisted Napoleon's demands.'' Adair was much concerned with the 1

Kallay, op. cit., p. 117.

2

According to this project Austria was to have Chozim, little Wallachia, Nicopolis, Widin, Orsova, Belgrade. From the Venetians she was to take Istria and Dalmatia and they in turn were to have the Morea, Crete and most of the islands in the Greek archipelago. It is probable that this last arrangement was not considered now by Austria. 8

Stadion to Merveldt, Aug. 24, 1806, Beer, Austria,

Russland, Weisungen, 1806. 4

Staatsarchiv,

Adair to Fox, Aug. 26, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 80.

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

fear that Cattaro might have already been given over to the French as a result of Oubril's treaty, and he went so far as to secure the services of an Austrian officer to draw up plans for the recapture of Cattaro and also for the expulsion of the French from Dalmatia. This officer had recommended that if the Montenegrins were given help, the French could soon be expelled from Dalmatia and also from Cattaro, which Adair advised F o x should be one of the immediate objects of the military plans of the allies.1 A t about the time that the Austrian court heard of the failure of the Oubril treaty, they also had startling information of the mobilization of the Prussian army and the increasingly belligerent attitude toward Napoleon at Berlin. 2 W a r between France and Prussia would make Austria's neutrality difficult. Soon afterwards news reached Vienna of the deposition of Ypsilanti and Morousi. It threw the Austrian monarch and his cabinet into a fright. When informed of the event Emperor Francis wrote to his foreign minister, " God grant that Russia contain herself." ' Here again was a menace to Austria's neutrality. It was believed at Vienna that this act would bring about war between Russia and Turkey which would result in war between France and Russia, and that Napoleon would then make demands that Austria permit his troops to pass through her territory. T o avoid the difficulty, Stadion wrote Metternich at Paris that Austria would prevent if possible a break between France and Russia and would use every opportunity for friendly intervention.4 However, the evidence which subsequently came to Vienna of the probability of war between Prussia and France must 1 Ibid. 2

Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer

Politik,

1801-1810, p. 238.

* Emperor Francis to Stadion, Sept. 14, 1806, Beer, Die Politik Oesterreichs seit 1774, p. 166. 4

Stadion to Metternich, Sept. 17, 1806, ibid.

orientalische

THE

TROUBLED

NEUTRALITY

OF AUSTRIA

2

2I

have impressed the Austrian cabinet with the decreasing possibility of preventing a war between France and Russia, as it was believed that Russia would certainly come to the aid of Prussia. Also prospects of a war between Russia and Turkey, which would be helpful to Napoleon, would make him less inclined to keep peace with Russia. The Austrian court foresaw that in the near prospect of war the several powers would attempt to make alliances with Austria. This was, in fact, the course each adopted. Overtures had already been made to Austria at the end of August by the Prussian representative, Count Finkenstein.1 He was supported by Adair, the British ambassador. Stadion adopted an attitude of reserve towards the efforts of the two diplomats and replied only that Austria was not threatened by a war between Prussia and France.2 The Prussians came to believe that an alliance existed between Austria and France, though Stadion denied it.8 Adair had also been unsuccessful in securing from Austria a promise to oppose Napoleon in case of a Franco-Russian war. Austria realized that Napoleon was a common enemy to Russia and to herself, but the Eastern Question interposed itself between them. She feared that in either peace or war the ambitions for expansion in the Balkans, of which she suspected Russia, would be furthered. Nor had the Prussian and British diplomats at Vienna been able to gain the adherence of Austria to Prussia against France. The prospect of bringing Austria into another coalition against Napoleon at this time did not seem favorable. Meanwhile Napoleon also had been making overtures to Austria for an alliance. 1

Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, p. 238.

2

Report of Finkenstein, Sept. 26, 1806, Wertheimer, Geschichte Oesterreichs und Ungarns im ersten Jahrsehnt des 19 Jahrhunderts, ii, p. 142. 3

Ibid.

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

For some time several difficult questions had been pending between Austria and France. There was the matter of changes on their frontier along the Isonzo, which Napoleon wanted made so that he might control the land route to Dalmatia. Then the question of Cattaro had not been settled, as the Russians had not given it up in accordance with the promises made by Razumovski at the end of May.1 Napoleon refused to evacuate Braunau on the Austrian frontier until Austria had delivered Cattaro to him. On this question, however, there seems to have been some vacillation at St. Petersburg; early in August Merveldt sent back a report to Vienna declaring that he had been given assurances that orders would be sent to surrender Cattaro to Austria. 2 Perhaps this was merely a Russian gesture to safeguard Austria from danger of immediate invasion by Napoleon. The Austrian cabinet awaited with impatience for news of the fulfillments of this promise. But on September 8, after the arrival of a courier at Vienna, the Russian ambassador announced that the Russian officers in command at Cattaro had decided not to give it up either to the French or to the Austrians.8 Such conduct, Stadion wrote Merveldt, was a severe test of the good will of Austria toward Russia, and he was again much concerned over the difficult position in which Austria was placed by the Cattaro affair. It was essential that Austria relieve herself of obligations to France in this matter so that her hands would be completely free.4 Shortly thereafter Stadion received a threatening note from Napoleon regarding Cattaro, followed by a demand that Austrian troops be sent into Dalmatia to join French troops in the taking of Cattaro by force. Not daring to re1 1

Cf. supra, pp. 84-85. Beer, op. cit., p. 244.

»Ibid., p. 245. 4

Ibid.

THE

TROUBLED

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223

fuse the demand, Stadion agreed to use three or four thousand troops for the purpose without, however, making any formal convention with France. Stadion felt that a declaration should be made to Russia to prevent her from misunderstanding the dangerous position in which Austria was placed in regard to Cattaro by Napoleon.1 Then, too, affairs in Germany contributed to the difficulties between Napoleon and Austria. Napoleon had forced the latter to recognize the Confederation of the Rhine and had made Emperor Francis abdicate the imperial throne of Germany. 2 He had also demanded recognition of Joseph in Naples. This, Emperor Francis did not refuse, but expressed a desire that it be given first by other powers.8 Subsequently came new threats from Napoleon that force would be used against Austria if Joseph were not definitely recognized. Late in August Stadion informed Metternich at Paris that Napoleon's threats of attack on Austria made it necessary to take measures of precaution.4 Archduke Charles opposed any further concessions to Napoleon which would threaten the integrity of the monarchy.5 It was just at this time, when relations between Austria and Napoleon were most unsatisfactory, that news of the non-ratification of the Oubril treaty reached Paris and at the same time Knoblesdorf, the Prussian envoy, demanded that French troops evacuate Germany at once. In view of the probability of a war with Prussia and also with Russia, Napoleon saw that there was extraordinary need of an understanding with Austria. He at once changed his tone and on September 2 informed Metternich that he had no desire to be 1 2 s

Report of Stadion, ibid. Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, pp. 130 et seq. Instructions to Metternich, Aug. 6, 1806, Beer, op. cit., p. 233.

* Stadion to Metternich, Aug. 27, 1806, Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, p. 134. 4

Report of Archduke Charles, Aug. 24, 1806, Beer, op. cit., p. 233.

224

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QUESTION,

1806-1807

emperor of Germany and wished to live at peace with Austria. He warned him of the dangers for Austria from a new coalition and of its weakness before the might of his armies.1 Some days later Talleyrand suggested a FrancoAustrian alliance which among other things would guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Metternich in turn stressed the neutrality of Austria. 2 On September 20 Talleyand despatched to Vienna a proposal for a formal defensive alliance including a guarantee of all the continental possessions of Napoleon as emperor of the French and king of Italy; a recognition of the king of Naples and Sicily, the king of Holland and the Confederation of the Rhine; an agreement that Saxony should remain isolated and outside a Confederation of North Germany; and joint defense aganst all attacks on the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire whose integrity and independence were equally important to both.3 The last proposal was Napoleon's appeal to Austria's apprehension over Russian ambitions in the Balkans which he knew had grown at Vienna in recent months with the mobilization of a Russian army on the Dniester. He hoped that these fears would drive Austria into an alliance with him and, by preventing her from joining Russia, would frustrate plans for the creation of a grand coalition of the great powers against him. He also hoped to paralyze plans which he believed Russia had for attacking him in Dalmatia by military operations through Turkey. Besides, he believed that Russia would force Turkey into war if she refused to join a war against the French. Napoleon knew of the demands Russia had made at the Porte that Turkish forces be concentrated along the western frontier of the Empire and of her threats to invade Turkish territory if this were not done.4 1

Report of Metternich, Sept. 2, 1806, ibid., pp. 241-242.

5

Report of Metternich, Sept 16, 1806, ibid., p. 242.

s Driault,

Ausierlitg, pp. 480-481.

* Cf. supra, p. 73 and footnote.

THE TROUBLED

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OF AUSTRIA

225

Stadion had foreseen with anxiety the probability that Napoleon would attempt to bind Austria to him. He believed that his real aim in a proposal to Austria would be to prevent her from participating against him in any war he might make on the other European powers and eventually to settle matters to his own advantage, after having prevented Austria from intervening to safeguard her own interests. Besides, the proposal of an alliance demanded that Austria virtually underwrite the changes made by Napoleon in Italy and Germany, involving as they had serious losses to the Hapsburg monarchy in territory and political influence. These changes had been outwardly accepted in a formal official recognition by Austria, but it was another thing to bind herself by a written contract to defend and forever perpetuate them. Stadion, therefore, decided to refuse any such proposal from France. 1 When late in September L a Rochefoucauld, French ambassador, presented the draft of the alliance, Stadion received it with reserve.2 Treating the advances of the Prussian and British representatives with the same reserve, avoiding decisions, remaining friendly with each of the powers, Stadion endeavored to maintain the policy of neutrality which was the only one possible for Austria if she were to maintain her political and financial stability and gain time for reorganization of her military forces. It was during the time that Austria was concerned with these difficulties and attempting to remain non-committal to the demands of the several powers, that news arrived of the crushing defeat of the Prussians at Jena, the entrance of Napoleon into Berlin, and the ensuing advance of his troops into Prussian Poland. Soon after this startling news, came 1

Report of Stadion, Sept. 24, 1806, Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, p. 143; Beer, op. cit., p. 243. 2

Report of La Rochefoucauld, Sept. 28, 1806, Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, P- 143.

22

6

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

word from St. Petersburg of the order which had been sent on October 16 to General Michelson to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia. Austria thus found herself confronted with dangers from two sides—Poland and the Balkans. She was vitally concerned with the situation in both these areas by reason of geographical and ethnological connections. Whatever advantages either Napoleon or Russia might gain, Austria would not be left entirely out of consideration. For Napoleon the Polish and Near Eastern situations were both an asset and a liability to his diplomacy, which aimed to break up any coalition against him. Much depended on how well he could manipulate them so as to keep Austria out of a combination with Russia and Great Britain, Prussia having been eliminated. In turn the efforts of Great Britain and Russia to bring Austria into a coalition would depend for their success on the solution of the Polish and Near Eastern questions. Of the state of affairs in Prussia varied reports came to Vienna. There was mention of agreements made by Napoleon and Frederick William, and much speculation about the terms Napoleon would impose on Prussia. No word came from Russia as to her attitude toward affairs in Germany. The Austrians began to fear that Russia would possibly make no attempt to help Prussia, nor Austria either if she were threatened by Napoleon. Prussia would be left to her fate and Russia would use the situation to realize her own ambitions in the East. 1 The Austrian court was also concerned about the position which Russia might take on the Polish question. From Metternich in Paris came word that there were reports that Napoleon intended to restore Poland with Jerome Bonaparte on the throne. He reported, too, that Parisian political circles were wondering whether Austria would give up her 1

Beer, op. cit., pp. 225-226.

THE TROUBLED

NEUTRALITY

OF AUSTRIA

227

Polish territory for Silesia. 1 These reports, with others concerning the advance eastward of French armies, were full of grave meaning for Vienna. Emperor Francis feared that Napoleon would attempt to seize Galicia. 2 Napoleon, however, had no intention at the time of forcibly seizing any territory belonging to Austria and thus driving her to arms and into an alliance with Russia and Great Britain, the very thing which it was the object of his diplomacy to prevent. Before Jena, he had sought a rapprochement with Austria and had worked upon her fears of Russian aggression on Turkey. He wished now to force her out of her neutral position and to make her declare her views, as his new position in Germany and his plans for moving his armies eastward made it necessary for him to safeguard his flank against attack by Austria. A n alliance with her would be useful to France also as a means of protecting the integrity of Turkey against the ambitions of Russia. He was concerned over the concentration of Austria's military forces on the frontiers, especially in Bohemia. Austria was to be wooed to an alliance, but at the same time be believed that it should be firmly understood that he would tolerate no double dealing from her. On October 19 he sent instructions to his ambassador at Vienna, La Rochefoucauld, to warn Stadion that if he did not make an alliance with France now he might repent it, and to urge the necessity of such an alliance for protecting Turkey against the ambitions of Russia. 3 On the twenty-fourth, Talleyrand wrote L a Rochefoucauld instructing him to point out to the Austrians that by an alliance with France they would more certainly realize their desire of securing peace and maintaining the in1

Reports of Metternich, Sept. 30, Oct. 21, 1806, ibid., p. 253.

2

Ibid.

' Napoleon to La Rochefoucauld, Oct. 19, 1806, Driault, Napoleon ¡'Europe: Tilsit, p. 58.

et

228

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

tegrity of their empire. The victories of Napoleon were such that Austria need have no fear of the menaces of Russia if she were to enter an alliance with France. 1 On November 5 La Rochefoucauld, in accordance with his instructions renewed his proposal to Stadion for an alliance which would also provide for maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. Stadion presented objections, whereupon the French ambassador threatened a French alliance with Russia in case Austria refused, suggesting at the same time, however, that Napoleon was ready to give some advantage to Austria if she consented. Stadion persistently refused to declare himself. Then La Rochefoucauld sharply demanded an explanation of Austrian military preparations.2 In another conference on the seventh Stadion sought to assure the French ambassador that Emperor Francis had no belligerent purpose in the preparations. They were only for defense and for protection of Austria's neutrality; he desired peace not only with France but with all Europe. La Rochefoucauld, however, did not appear satisfied with these declarations.8 L a Rochefoucauld later received orders to demand the immediate dissolution of the Austrian army corps established on the frontiers of the country. If the corps were not at once disbanded, the orders stated, Napoleon could only consider failure to do so as a menace and even an evidence of intention to attack. However, the ambassador should so handle the matter as not to oflfend the self-respect of the Austrians. 4 In spite of these warnings from Napoleon, Austria continued during November to increase the armaments on her 1

Talleyrand to La Rochefoucauld, Oct. 24, 1806, ibid., pp. 58-59.

2

Report of Stadion, Nov. 3, 1806, Beer, op. cit., p. 252.

' Report of Stadion, Nov. 7, 1806, ibid., pp. 252-253. 4

Talleyrand to La Rochefoucauld, Nov. 20, 1806, Driault, op. cit., p. 59.

THE

TROUBLED

NEUTRALITY

OF AUSTRIA

229

frontiers. Napoleon's declarations of his desire for closer friendship with Austria and his intention of jeopardizing her interests in no way, could not dispel the growing concern at Vienna as to his purposes in Prussia and especially in Poland. One of the Austrian armies was being prepared for Galicia to defend Austrian Polish possessions. In Austrian official circles there were those who believed that the establishment of a Polish state by Napoleon would give him the means for preventing Russia from ever coming to the aid of Prussia. Also, it was believed that Austria might have to defend her position in Poland alone since Russia, if guaranteed compensation in the Balkans, might come to an understanding with Napoleon for giving up her Polish territory. 1

2 The removal of Ypsilanti and Morousi and its attendant implications that Russia would make use of the event to make war on Turkey had aroused grave fears at Vienna lest, as Turkey was too weak to defend herself, Austria would be under necessity of intervening to prevent extension of Russian control in the Balkans. Suspicion of Russia's designs there had been further increased at Vienna by reports from Merveldt of the proposals which had been made to him early in October for a concert of the two powers on the question of a possible partition of European Turkey. The Russian ambassador at Vienna, Razumovski, was at the same time pressing Stadion to come to an agreement with Russia concerning Turkey. Stadion refused and urged that Russia delay action in the Balkans until a better time for " the act of revenge ". 2 Stadion sent instructions to Merveldt at the beginning of November not to enter negotiations 1

Beer, op. cit., pp. 253-254.

* Beer, Die orientalische Politik Oesterreichs seit 1774, p. 167.

230

THE

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QUESTION,

1806-1807

with Russia upon any project for the partition of Turkey. He was to warn Russia that she would have to deal with Napoleon on her western frontier. Therefore, to divert part of her forces to the south against Turkey would be most unwise. In case of war between Russia and Turkey, Austria would remain neutral, as she very much desired the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. 1 In this difficult situation the Austrian cabinet was unfortunately divided on the question of policy. The influential Archduke Charles thought that Russian ambition in the Balkans was a matter of as great importance to the Austrians as the question of the French in Poland, and that Austria should therefore take as effective measures to safeguard her interests in one territory as in the other. However, Stadion inclined to the opposite view, believing that the major danger for Austria lay in the consolidation of French power in Germany and Poland.2 These differences did not mean that either party advocated a policy of close alliance with Russia or France. The question was one of calculation and judgment and not of partisanship. As a result of the division in opinion the policy of the Austrian cabinet continued to be reserved; it favored neither an approach to Napoleon nor an agreement with Russia, unless forced to one or the other by events. Austria's position was probably most aptly expressed by Adair, who reported to his government in the middle of November that Austria was waiting upon events. There was no evidence, he believed, that she could be relied upon to help Russia against Napoleon. Nor would she make any such move unless he should meet great reverses in Poland.3 Soon after this, Stadion explained to Adair why Austria had 1

Stadion to Merveldt, Nov. 2, 1806, ibid., pp. 167-168.

1

Ibid., pp. 168-169. Adair to Howick, Nov. 11, 16, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 81.

3

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231

taken no action against Napoleon. She was hampered by uncertainty as to the results of the Franco-Prussian negotiations, for if Austria declared war on Napoleon and peace were made by these powers, then Austria would be in serious danger. Then too the Russian armies were so far away that they would be almost useless to Austria; Napoleon could be in Vienna before they could come to her aid. Stadion doubted whether Russia would give aid to Austria, anyway, or to Prussia either, once she became fully aware of the significance of the defeat of Prussia. 1 Shortly before this, Stadion had informed the Prussian ambassador, Finkenstein, that Austria would make no declarations upon the matter of giving help to Prussia if the negotiations of the latter power with Napoleon broke down, until she had complete knowledge of Russia's position.2 In reply to Stadion's explanation of Austria's refusal to take arms against Napoleon, Adair proposed again, as he had done for weeks past, that England was ready to give Austria financial aid if she took such action. As before, Stadion refused the proposal.8 Since the failure of the Oubril treaty England had been unsuccessful in her efforts to bring Austria into a coalition. In fact, she could not succeed unless Napoleon should suffer serious defeats at the hands of Russia and fears at Vienna of Russian ambitions in the Balkans should be removed. The first was unlikely. And the latter seemed almost an impossibility when about November 20 word reached Vienna that Russian troops on the Dniester had orders to move into Moldavia. This news gave apparent confirmation to the belief of some persons in Austrian official circles that Russia was primarily concerned with her interests in the East and was quite prepared to neglect affairs 1

Adair to Howiek, Nov. 19, 1806, ibid. Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, 1801-1810, p. 256. ' Adair to Howiek, Nov. 19, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 81. 2

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in central Europe. Adair wrote Howick that this act would definitely influence Austria against Russia. However, much depended on her subsequent actions.1 A t the same time that this news reached Vienna, the Russian political mission headed by Pozzo di Borgo started for Vienna with the purpose of securing the cooperation of Austria against Napoleon. The situation in the Balkans was not very propitious for the success of the mission, and by the end of November the prospects that Great Britain or Russia would have the help of Austria in the war about to be renewed with Napoleon did not seem hopeful. Meanwhile, French diplomacy had been active at Vienna. La Rochefoucauld had been replaced as French ambassador by General Antoine F. Andreossy, who arrived about November 20 with instructions to demand immediate reduction of Austrian armed forces to a size conformable with the neutrality which Austria professed. Failure to make such a reduction would lead Napoleon to question her motives. 2 Just before this, Stadion had again received word from Talleyrand making the same demand, and stating that if it were not complied with Napoleon would conclude that Austria was in agreement with Russia. Napoleon demanded that Emperor Francis give his promise not to use arms against him.8 Stadion had already advised the Emperor to transfer some of his forces in Bohemia to the Polish and Silesian frontier where they would be available if necessary for active measures.4 Therefore, in reply to Talleyrand Stadion could point out that Austrian forces were already being reduced in Bohemia, a clear demonstration, he de1

Adair to Howick, Nov. 22, 29, 1806, ibid.

* Driault, op. cit., p. 62. * Talleyrand to Stadion, Nov. 2, 1806, Beer, op. cit., p. 257. 4

Report of Stadion, Nov. 12, 1806, ibid., pp. 257-258.

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233

clared, that Austria's only purpose in using military force was to maintain her neutrality. 1 Andreossy believed that this did not represent any actual diminution of forces but only a shifting of fronts in a direction toward the upper Vistula where the Austrians could more easily cooperate with the Russian armies. Also, he informed Talleyrand, there existed a pronounced antiFrench sentiment in all classes at Vienna where they counted upon Spain and Portugal to join the allies against Napoleon. 1 1

Stadion to Talleyrand, Nov. 25, 1806, ibid., p. 258.

Report of Andreossy, Nov. 25, 1806, Driault, op. cit., pp. 62-63; Beer, op. cit., p. 266. 1

CHAPTER X B R I T I S H F A I L U R E TO P R E S E R V E P E A C E

BETWEEN

RUSSIA AND T U R K E Y I

THE restoration to office on October 16 of Ypsilanti and Morousi, as hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, was taken by the British and Russian agents at Constantinople as a diplomatic victory, by which they hoped to recover their former political ascendancy at the Porte and to eliminate French influence. In turn the French agents could not but view this unexpected act of the Porte with disturbed feelings, as they had come to believe more and more after the removal of the hospodars that substantial ground was being laid for converting Turkey into an instrument for promoting French political and commercial hegemony in the near East. Sebastiani, the French ambassador, voiced his feeling in a despatch to Talleyrand notifying him of the deposition of the new hospodars, Callimachi and Soutzo—partisans of France. What was the use, he complained, of giving friendly advice and offering help to the Turks, a people possessed of chronic fear and corruption. The Porte was governed only by gold and terror. The new hospodars had been deposed because of fright caused by the menaces of Russia and Great Britain and by news of a coalition formed against France. Money had been used, Sebastiani declared, by Y p silanti and Morousi with the Turkish ministers, particularly the Reis Effendi. The Porte had also feared, if the former hospodars were not restored, that there would be an insurrection of all Greek subjects in Turkey. Sebastiani believed 234

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that if France could secure the transfer of Moldavia and Wallachia to Austria, Greek influence at Constantinople would be broken, and the Greek princes now in the office of hospodar would no longer have at their disposal the treasury of these two provinces for purposes of intrigue at the Porte to further their ambitions.1 Sebastiani repeatedly tried after the removal of the new hospodars to secure an audience with Selim but he was unsuccessful. He laid his failure to the opposition of the Reis Effendi who, he complained, disregarded him, and whom he charged with having sold himself to Ypsilanti and Morousi. However, in spite of this, Sebastiani assured Talleyrand that nothing had been done by the Porte seriously to disturb the harmony of Franco-Turkish relations.2 Sebastiani was able to make this statement from his knowledge of a friendly letter which Selim sent to Napoleon at the time, explaining the restoration of the former hospodars. They had been first deposed because their behavior was not satisfactory to the Porte. Indeed, no previous notice had been given to Russia, Selim explained, because he had been led to believe, after hearing that Napoleon had secured a clause in the treaty with Russia which provided a guarantee of the independence of Turkey, that the arrangement of Turkey with Russia concerning the administration of Moldavia and Wallachia ought to be annulled. But since the treaty between Russia and France had not been confirmed, this arrangement was restablished and therefore the omission by the Porte of previous notification to Russia in deposing the hospodars would have to be considered contrary to treaty stipulations, and their restoration to office was now necessary. Further, declared Selim, he could not fight Russia and Great Britain, as offensive war was contrary to 1

Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Oct. 16, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212.

3

Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Oct. 20, 1806, ibid.

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Moslem religious law. Also, war would have for his empire bad results, which Napoleon would surely not wish to see. He had been put in a position where he had to agree to reinstate the former hospodars. This however meant, he assured Napoleon, no change in his political system, and he hoped the trustful relations and friendship between Napoleon and himself would continue.1 Although Sebastiani felt depressed over the seeming defeat of French interests as a result of the restoration to office of Ypsilanti and Morousi, the Russian and British ambassadors were not at all certain of their victory. Arbuthnot drew easier breath now that the crisis involving a probable break in the peaceful relations of Russia and Great Britain with Turkey seemed to have passed, and he was pleased to see that British officials were received with marked attention by the Turks. However, his satisfaction was not complete, for he was disturbed by a pronounced anti-Russian feeling among Turkish officials and people. In a special secret letter to the Foreign Office concerning this sentiment, he wrote, " abhorrence of Russia is extreme here and increases every moment with reflection, but on account of England they dare not show it." 2 Arbuthnot feared that any tendency of the Russians to be unduly severe or arrogant would provoke a dangerous reaction among the Turks, and he therefore proposed that his government bring pressure upon Russia to adopt conciliatory measures towards Turkey. 3 Arbuthnot believed that the most effective means of keeping peace between Russia and Turkey was to promote fear of Great Britain at the Porte. It would also be well to keep a close surveillance upon all affairs at the Porte with the view 1

Selim to Napoleon, Oct. 18, 1806, Hurmusaki Documente, Suppl. I, ii,

PP- 354-355-

' Arbuthnot to Fox, Oct. 17, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51. 'Ibid.

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of preventing any crisis from arising. Among the Turkish officials he relied particularly upon the Reis Effendi, Galib Effendi, and he proceeded by presents and other means to cultivate him assiduously and also to promote his friendship with Italinski. 1 Arbuthnot considered that he had made some progress when he succeeded in getting Selim to write a friendly letter to George III announcing the restoration of the hospodars, and also suggesting that the British sovereign secure from the Tsar a more conciliatory attitude toward Turkey. 2 A t the end of October, Arbuthnot informed his government that it was possible that British influence might recover its former ascendancy at the Porte, but that much depended on events and he was not over sanguine. For one thing there was a problem for British diplomacy in the war between Russia and Persia. This war should be ended, in order to permit Russia to give all her attention to affairs in the west. Great Britain should also improve her own relations with Persia, who had become alienated from her by reason of the Russo-British alliance, so that as a result French influence had increased there. Arbuthnot hesitated to make any move in these matters as he was fearful of offending the Russians. There was also need, he advised, to secure good relations between Persia and Turkey, which at present were prevented by the hostile relations of Persia with the Pasha of Bagdad. The danger was that any mediation attempted by Great Britain in this matter might be taken wrongly by either side, and the British purpose of bringing Turkey and Persia together might be defeated. It was also 1 Arbuthnot to Spencer, Oct. 30, 1806, British Foreign Office, T u r k e y , 52. Arbuthnot was quite ready to exploit f o r his own ends the fears of Galib Effendi of Sebastiani who he knew was seeking to secure his dismissal from office and to put in his place Ibrahim Effendi, leader of the proFrench party in the Council. 5

Selim to George III, October, 1806, ibid.

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his idea, assuming that the triple alliance of Great Britain, Russia and Turkey were maintained, to bring Persia into the combination, which would make a solid bulwark against French projects in the East. 1 It is interesting to note here that soon after the despatch of these proposals from the British ambassador to his government urging that action be taken to bring Persia within the political orbit of the allies, Sébastiani received instructions from Paris to keep before the Porte the project of a Franco-Turco-Persian alliance, and to urge Persia to push vigorously the war against Russia. It was also necessary that Sébastiani make a settlement of the differences between Persia and Turkey, in order to promote such an alliance.2 It was evident that Persia might soon become, like Constantinople, the scene of a diplomatic struggle between France and Great Britain. In this survey of affairs in the East, which Arbuthnot was presenting to his government at the end of October, he also pointed out that in attempting to keep peace with Turkey, complications might arise from internal situations in European Turkey, uncertainty of the tenure of the existing régime at Constantinople, political unrest and disorder in Moldavia and Wallachia, dangers to the Porte arising from the ambitions of powerful pashas such as Pasvan Oglou of Widin and Mustapha of Rustchuk. With the Serbians the Porte was trying to make peace, but with no surety as to the outcome. But whatever the future as to war or peace in the east, Arbuthnot believed that the British naval power could be depended on to act as a decisive factor. Fear of this power had recently prevented war between Russia and Turkey, and British influence at the Porte could never be completely destroyed by France because of it. However, 1

Arbuthnot to Spencer, Oct. 30, 1806, ibid. * Talleyrand to Sébastiani, Oct. 9, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212.

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British influence was liable to a test at any time in view of the varying currents in European politics, and British diplomacy, Arbuthnot warned, could not hope for a second victory over French influence at the Porte " by bare words unsupported by real facts." With a British fleet any situation could be met, and he strongly urged that a squadron be sent at once to the Near East. 1 In fact, the British Fofleign Office had just previously taken measures to back its diplomacy at Constantinople by more than " bare words ", when on October 22 orders were given for the despatch of a squadron to a station off the Dardanelles.2 On November 12 Rear Admiral Louis, in command of a squadron of five ships anchored at Malta. He notified Arbuthnot of his presence and indicated that the squadron was intended only to " give weight " to the position of the British ambassador at the Porte an,d would observe the strictest neutrality.8 Louis left Malta with the squadron on the fifteenth and arrived on the twenty-first at Tenedos off the entrance to the Dardanelles. Anchoring there, he waited for a favorable wind and also for word from Arbuthnot as to whether the squadron should come to Constantinople.14 Let us turn now to note the activities of the French at the Porte. Since the restoration to office of Ypsilanti and Morousi, Sebastiani had been steadily pursuing his main purpose of inciting the Porte to resentment against Great Britain and especially against Russia, and urging an alliance of Turkey with France. In the latter part of November he was able to inform Talleyrand that the Porte seemed in1 2

Arbuthnot to Spencer, Oct. 30, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52. Cf. infra, pp. 358-359-

* Louis to Arbuthnot, Nov. 12, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52. Cf. Collingwood to Louis, Nov. 1, 1806, ibid. * James, The Naval History of Great Britain, iv, p. 214.

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dined to come to a close understanding with France. A Turkish ambassador was very soon to be sent to Paris to negotiate a treaty. However, the Porte wanted to know more about the aims of Napoleon, particularly in Poland, before Turkey made any break with Russia. 1 Sebastiani had pressed upon the Porte the necessity of haste. The Reis Effendi had declared a break with Russia at the time to be a practical impossibility in view of the incomplete preparation of Turkish armaments which would take some months to put in adequate condition. He seemed concerned to ascertain whether Napoleon wanted to make an alliance with Turkey offensive or defensive in character. The Koran, he maintained, permitted war only in case of legitimate defense. Sebastiani urged that the Porte assume an attitude of complete confidence in Napoleon, as he sought only the good of Turkey. 2 Selim sent a letter to Napoleon at this time congratulating him upon his victory at Jena and expressing a desire to bring to a " happy fruition their amicable relations." He was sending an envoy to Napoleon to negotiate for an alliance and he desired to see the matter quickly concluded. Turkey was preparing for military operations on her frontiers against Russia.8 In view of these expressions of pro-French inclinations at the Porte, Sebastiani at the end of November asked his government for power to sign a treaty of alliance with Turkey. He reported that the Turkish ambassador mentioned by Selim had just left for Paris. Further, Sebastiani reported that in response to his recommendations the Porte was taking vigorous measures to repair and arm the for1

Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Nov. 22, 1806, Aff. Etr. de Turquie, 212.

1

Ibid.

3

Selim to Napoleon, Nov. 25, 1806, ibid.

BRITISH

FAILURE

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PEACE

241

tresses on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, while a Turkish fleet was being rapidly equipped in the Black Sea. 1 Further, a Persian ambassador to France had just arrived and was preparing to leave for Paris. With him was Jaubert, returning from a French mission to Persia. The Persian envoy carried with him a communication from the king of Persia professing a firm and lasting friendship for Napoleon and expressing hope of receiving such friendship from him. He would, in order to prove his friendship, give aid to Napoleon if he should invade India. He would also help him if he should make war on Turkey. The French would be allowed to use any port or station in the province of Kars for military passage to India.2 The military and diplomatic activities of the Turks as reported by the French ambassador were no doubt much stimulated by the appearance of the British squadron, which since its arrival off Tenedos on November 21 had been waiting for word from Arbuthnot at Constantinople. The latter at once replied and suggested that Louis bring his squadron into the Dardanelles for the sake of the effect it might have at the Porte. A s yet he had learned of no change in the policies of the Porte as a result of Napoleon's victories. He believed that British influence at the Porte had not been seriously shaken by events, and that Turkey really preferred an alliance with Great Britain, if it appeared that the latter had sufficient force to aid and protect her.3 Arbuthnot learned soon afterwards of the favorable results of the recent conference between Sebastiani and the Reis Effendi concerning an alliance between Turkey and Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Nov. 29, 1806, ibid. Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Nov. 29, 1806, ibid.; Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 1, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52. The British consul at Bagdad had in some way gained knowledge of the contents of this letter and had sent information to Arbuthnot 1

2

3

Arbuthnot to Louis, Nov. 21, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, Ï806-1807

France, and he advised Louis not to leave the Dardanelles with his squadron until it was clearly proven that Turkey had resisted the French demands. Its presence would furnish the Porte arguments for such resistance. If the Porte submitted to the French, declared Arbuthnot, " then the interest of Great Britain depends so much on the preservation of this Empire that we must save them in spite of themselves." Arbuthnot then proposed that Louis come to Constantinople in one of his ships, leaving the others in the Dardanelles, in order to join him in his negotiations with the Porte. 1 On the evening of November 27 Louis entered the Dardanelles with part of his squadron and, leaving two ships anchored at a certain place, he went on in the other ship to Constantinople. He arrived off Seraglio point late on the afternoon of the twenty-eighth. 2 The Porte suddenly issued a statement soon afterwards to representatives of all the powers declaring that in order to make the neutrality of Turkey respected, she intended, in imitation of Austria, to place troops on her frontiers. 8 For Turkey, this declaration was a measure whereby she might avoid trouble and also gain time to prepare adequately for it. She was confronted by a British squadron in the Dardanelles and a Russian army on her frontier along the Dniester, and pressed by France to break connections and declare war on Russia and Great Britain. She had no really friendly feeling for any of these powers, whatever her seeming inclinations to any of them at any time. They were all viewed as potential enemies and it was a necessity that she so manipulate herself as to ensure her own protection in the midst of war among them. A t the very time when this declaration of neutrality was 1

Arbuthnot to Louis, Nov. 23, 1806, ibid.

* James, op. cit., iv, pp. 214-215. 3

Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 1, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52.

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243

issued, the Porte asked Arbuthnot to use his good offices to get assurances from Russia that she would take no action which would cause Turkey to give further displeasure to France, such as asking for passage of Russian ships through the Dardanelles. Arbuthnot was certain that Italinski would not recede from his determination that Turkey adhere strictly to the terms of her treaty with Russia. The British ambassador suspected that this request was a move by the Porte to separate Great Britain from Russia and that to accede to it would be taken as a sign of the weakness of the Anglo-Russian alliance. Therefore, he refused and informed the Porte that Great Britain would fully support Russia in demanding that all treaties must be observed. She also demanded strict neutrality from Turkey. Further, until Turkey had made a decision on the demands of France, the British fleet would remain in Turkish waters, Turkey might need its protection against the French should she refuse their demands.1 Arbuthnot was constantly in fear that news would come of other French victories and that Napoleon would send an army from east Prussia and incite Turkey with its aid to declare war on Russia. However, he still had confidence that a British squadron could counterbalance a French army and that only in a last extremity would Turkey declare war on Great Britain. He also feared that undue confidence in the French might motivate the removal of Ypsilanti for a second time from office, as his conduct in going to St. Petersburg after he left Wallachia had confirmed and accentuated the suspicion at the Porte that he was an instrument of Russia. 2 Arbuthnot wanted to avoid reopening this question as it would endanger peace between Turkey and Russia, which was already precarious. 1

Ibid.

2

Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 2, 1806, ibid.

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These fears of the British ambassador were accentuated, when in the first days of December reports arrived at Constantinople that a Russian army was entering Moldavia. The effect upon the Turks was very bad, reported Arbuthnot, and there was every probability that it would precipitate war by Turkey upon Russia. 1 It will therefore be well here to note the development of events in Moldavia and Wallachia. 2 W a r between Russia and Turkey actually began with the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia by Russian troops in November and December 1806. General Michelson, commander in chief of Russian forces on the Dniester, received at the beginning of November the order of October 16 from St. Petersburg to occupy at once the two provinces.2 He proceeded to make preparations for the invasion and on November i o started to move his troops, in all about forty thousand. The immediate object of the Russians was to occupy all the important fortresses in Bessarabia, which would then put them in a position to secure control of Moldavia and Wallachia, and for this purpose their forces were divided into several armies. The opposition of the Turkish fortresses was slight. On November i o Chocim, which in 1788 had surrendered to the Russians only after a long siege, opened its gates to them without resistance. On November 22 the surrender of Bender to General Meyendorff was accomplished with equal ease, and on the thirtieth an army under Count Richelieu entered Akerman unopposed.8 There now remained in Bessarabia but two towns of strategic importance, Kilia and Ismail, not occupied by the Rus1

Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 4, 1806, ibid.

2

Cf. supra, p. 203.

1

Documente Hurmuzaki,

Suppl. I, iii, pp. m - 1 1 2 .

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sians. Richelieu shortly received representatives from the commanders of these places asking that Russian troops be sent at once to help defend them against threatening attacks by Bulgarian brigands. He immediately sent a force to Kilia which surrendered to him on December 4. 1 O f the demand for a Russian garrison at Ismail, Richelieu notified Meyendorff at Bender, expecting him to furnish the necessary troops as he was amply able to do. However, Meyendorff dallied for days and finally arrived before Ismail on December 26. He had come just too late, as the day before a strong force of troops belonging to Mustapha, pasha of Rustchuk had entered the fortress. Meyendorff made several demands for surrender, but received only a haughty refusal and artillery fire, followed later by a vigorous attack by Mustapha's cavalry which was repulsed only with difficulty. Thereupon Meyendorff withdrew his forces. 2 This was the only failure of the Russians thus far and Ismail would have been taken as easily as the other fortresses had been, if Meyendorff by his delay had not allowed Mustapha to reach the place before him. By the end of December Russian garrisons occupied all important fortified places except Ismail in Bessarabia without a single act of armed resistance having been made by the Turks. In the previous war with Turkey the Russians had taken most of these places only after arduous sieges and severe losses. That they should be taken now so easily indicated a deplorable lack of morale in the Turkish military system. Also there were evidences of sheer treachery and venality among the Turkish commanders. While the several Russian armies were securing control of these important fortresses in Bessarabia another army under the direct command of General Michelson crossed the 1

Ibid.,

2

Ibid.,

pp. 112-113. pp. 118-120.

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QUESTION, 1806-1807

Dniester on November 10 at a central point near Moglief and proceeded toward Jassy, where the advance guard of the army arrived on the sixteenth. Several days later General Michelson arrived with the remainder of his army. 1 Soon afterwards Michelson issued a public proclamation, declaring that the Russian troops came only for the good of Turkey. They had come to restore order in the country and also to protect Turkey against French domination. Napoleon, said Michelson, intended to destroy the janissaries and help Selim to establish the Nizam-Djebid. If Turkey remained without protection, Napoleon would eventually proclaim himself emperor of the East and overlord of the Ottoman Empire. Russia was therefore concerned only with the welfare of the Porte, and she promised to withdraw her troops when the Porte fulfilled her treaty obligations. Meanwhile, Russia had no intention of engaging in hostilities unless provoked to do so.2 Michelson sent a copy of this proclamation with a personal letter to Mustapha of Rustchuk, with whom he hoped to establish a friendly understanding, realizing his dominance in northern and eastern Bulgaria and also his suspicions of the Russians. He expressed his belief that Mustapha would understand the just motives of the Tsar in sending his troops into the two provinces and hoped that he could depend on his friendship.8 This overture, however, did not remove Mustapha's dislike of the Russian invasion, not so much because of his loyalty to the Sultan, as because of the danger to his own domain and to his plans for political expansion in Wallachia which the presence of Russian troops created. He therefore sent the letter and proclamation from Michelson to the Porte with unfavorable comments and the 1

Ibid., Suppl I, ii, p. 365.

2

Ibid., pp. 366-367.

3

Ibid., p. 365.

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247

announcement that he was sending troops into Wallachia to resist the Russians. 1 Mustapha then proceeded to make an alliance with Pasvan Oglou, pasha of Widin, who had for some time been making raids into Wallachia and exacting tribute from the natives. He had also been receiving tribute from Bucharest by threatening an attack, and, indeed, he had been a generally disturbing factor in the political situation in the province. It was obvious that he would seek to oppose the occupation of Wallachia by the Russians, as it would put a stop to the flow of tribute from the province and also threaten the security of his own dominions. He was therefore quite ready to make an alliance with Mustapha. Together they agreed upon a plan for a confederation of all the pashas along the Danube, including the commandant of Adrianople and Ali Pasha of Janina, in order to oppose the Russians and also the Serbians. The latter were believed to be allies of the Russians and they threatened now the capture of Belgrade. This project, if it were successful, would give the Serbians complete control of the pashalik of Belgrade, a possibility which Pasvan Oglou, as a neighbor, naturally viewed with fear and distrust. The plan for a confederation of the pashas was never carried out, however.2 There was too much fear and jealousy among them. Nor would the Porte have looked favorably upon such a plan. It would have been fearful of the use which a powerful and ambitious pasha like Pasvan Oglou might make of such an organization to further his own ambitions of which the Porte had long been distrustful. After their alliance, Pasvan and Mustapha made military preparations to resist the Russians. Pasvan, however, much Ibid., pp. 369-370. Bradisteanu, Die Besiehungen Russlands und Frankreich zur Turkei, 1806-1807, p. 115. 1

2

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

concerned over the Serbians, was dilatory and only Mustapha acted vigorously. Late in November he informed officials in Wallachia that he was sending an army of five thousand to defend Bucharest against the Russians. 1 However much such protection might be needed, this news was received with misgiving by the people in Bucharest as they feared Mustapha as much as Pasvan Oglou. It is therefore not surprising that many people in Bucharest should look favorably upon the coming of the Russians. Some of the boyars openly proclaimed their loyalty to Russia. Others, incited by the French agents, declared allegiance to Turkey. The victory of Napoleon over Prussia had made an impression, which the French agent at Bucharest, Ledoulx, hoped would operate to undermine the loyalty of the Russian partisans among the boyars. However, both groups were united in their fear of the neighboring pashas in Bulgaria. The affairs of Wallachia since the deposition of Soutzo as hospodar at the end of October had been administered by the chief boyars. Ypsilanti, restored to the office, had however not returned to Bucharest to take up his duties and had not appointed anyone to function for him. Since his deposition from office in August he had been at St. Petersburg. There were rumors in circulation that he might not return to office, and as a result there was some concern as to how affairs in the province would be conducted in the future. 2 The same uncertainty existed in the administration of Moldavia. At the time when the Russians crossed the Dniester Morousi had not resumed his office as hospodar, and had refused when ordered to do so by Russian officials at Jassy. Upon hearing of the invasion of the Russians and their capture of Chocim and Bender, he had at once notii/frid. Ledoulx to Talleyrand, Nov. 8, 12, 1806, Documente Hurmusaki, xvi, pp. 784-788. 1

BRITISH

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249

fied the Porte, asking for instructions and also warning Turkish commanders at various places concerning Russian operations. When he learned of the plans of the Russians to invade Wallachia, he had communicated with Mustapha of Rustchuk concerning measures for defence of the province. He had also undertaken to get into communication with Napoleon through his ambassador at Vienna. 1 It was evident that Morousi was to be no instrument of the Russians, as Ypsilanti had become. The latter now returned from St. Petersburg and followed the Russian army to Jassy. He remained with General Michelson during his sojourn there and was finally appointed by the Russian commander governor of Moldavia as well as of Wallachia. T o some it seemed that he was about to realize his alleged ambition of securing the hereditary crown of Dacia.2 Since the departure from Jassy of Callimachi at the end of October, Reinhard, the French consul, had redoubled his activities to promote anti-Russian sentiment in the province, but apparently without much encouragement. On November 9 he reported to Talleyrand that he found that many of the boyars felt that French protection could be substituted for Russian only in the event of the proximity of French armies. Others feared that the removal of Russian control from the province would mean personal losses. There was much interest in the reestablishment of Poland.' Later Reinhard reported that the Russian agents were apparently much disturbed over events in Poland and that there was talk about French influence there and its effect on Turkey's relations with Russia. 4 1

Ibid., Suppl. I, ii, pp. 368,371-372. Bradisteanu, op. cit., p. 113. 3 Reinhard to Talleyrand, Nov. 9, 1806, Documente Hurmuzaki, xvi, pp. 786-787. 4 Reinhard to Talleyrand, Nov. 22, 1806, ibid., pp. 790-791. 2

250

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QUESTION,

1806-1807

Toward the end of November—the twenty sixth—Reinhard received instructions from Talleyrand that he attempt to persuade the boyars to demand of the Porte the return of the recently deposed hospodars and also to encourage the native people to resist the Russians and assure them of Napoleon's protection, which was possible now that his troops were in Poland. 1 Reinhard, therefore, made arrangements to meet the council of boyars in order to inform them of these views of Napoleon and to urge their fidelity to Turkey. Soon afterwards—on the thirtieth—a guard was suddenly placed around his residence and he was informed by a Russian official that he had been alarming the boyars with false news and that it was necessary that he have no further communication with them.2 Reinhard was later taken to Russia and subsequently set free. In this way very soon after their arrival in Moldavia the Russians put an end to all official French connections with the province, as they no doubt had intended to do from the first. A f t e r his arrival at Jassy, General Michelson had sent a force under General Kamenski to take Braila on the lower Danube. It was not taken so easily as the other fortresses already mentioned, for the Turkish commander, remaining faithful, thought it his duty to resist the Russians and therefore refused their demand for entrance into the town. Another force under Prince Dolgoruki was sent to take Galatz. Subsequently the place was taken without resistance.8 Another Russian army under General Miloradovitch was sent off for Bucharest, which had been occupied early in December by a force of over five thousand Turkish troops belonging to Mustapha of Rustchuk. The chief commander 1

Cf. supra, p. 194.

'Reinhard to Sebastiani, Nov. 30, 1806, Documente Hurmusaki, PP- 795-796. * Ibid., Suppl. I, iii, p. 114.

xvi,

BRITISH FAILURE

TO PRESERVE

PEACE

251

of this force, Eidin Pasha, had assumed absolute authority over the province. The Russian consul had been arrested and sent to Rustchuk. The two French agents at Bucharest, Ledoulx and Lamare—the latter sent by Sebastiani to take the place of Parant who had died—offered to give aid to Eidin Pasha and encouraged him to resist the Russians. They found that many of the Turkish officers hoped that their troops might eventually join a French army from Poland. The Turkish troops, however, were badly lacking in guns and bayonets, and had hardly any artillery.1 The Russian army steadily advanced while the Turks waited at places on the route to Bucharest. The Russian advance guard soon met and routed a Turkish force and the main Russian force continued to move forward while the Turks gave way without offering serious resistance. The French agents fled to Rustchuk to secure the protection of Mustapha. The Russians entered Bucharest on December 1 3 and were followed two days later by Michelson and Ypsilanti. 2 Michelson issued a public proclamation in which he declared that he would respect the local customs and officials. Soon afterwards the people were called upon to take an oath to remain loyal to the Russian Emperor and to submit to their hospodar, Ypsilanti, now also hospodar of Moldavia.* With the occupation of Bucharest, Russian military operations came to an end in Wallachia, and by the end of December all the Russian forces in both provinces were preparing to enter into winter quarters. In about six weeks the Russians had secured possession, in all instances without resistance from the Turks, of most of the important fortified places necessary to give them control of Bessarabia, Moldavia and Wallachia. At the end of December 1806 Russia 1

Lamare to Talleyrand, Dec. 18, 1806, ibid., xvi, pp. 806-807.

- Ibid., Suppl. I, iii, pp. 115-116. 3

Bradisteanu, op. cit., p. 117.

252

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

appeared to have so strongly intrenched her forces in this part of Turkey as to guarantee her complete political hegemony over the territory. Coincident with the Russian occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia, came the final complete establishment by the Serbians of their political control over the pashalik of Belgrade and the consummation of their aspirations for national political autonomy. The two events should be treated here together since both mark a step in the process of political disestablishment of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. Further, this extension of Russian military control and political interest to a region almost contiguous with the Serbian frontiers was certain to promote a political rapprochement between the Russians and the Serbians, who were already knit together by common ties of language and religion. Evidence of the intentions of Russia to associate her occupation of the Turkish Danubian provinces with establishment of close relations with the Serbians was revealed in an order dictated by Emperor Alexander on December 4 to General Michelson instructing him to inform the Serbians that they would receive military aid from Russia when her troops had occupied Wallachia and could establish close relations with the Serbian forces. Also certain Russian army officers had been appointed as instructors for Serbian troops and would be sent to them at once, though in the disguise of Turks. 1 Late in December there was sent from St. Petersburg a sum of money to the Serbians, with promises of further aid.2 So far Russia had refused to promise the Serbians actual military aid fearful of its political effects at Constantinople. But since she was now engaged in a coercive measure against Turkey and was also preparing to renew 1

Kallay, Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufslandes, 1807-1810, p. 15;

Yakschitdi, s

Ibid.

L'Europe

et la resurrection de la Serbie,

1804-1834, p. 117.

BRITISH

FAILURE

TO PRESERVE

PEACE

253

war with Napoleon whose armies were already in Poland, and whose influence at the Porte was dangerously strong, it was considered at St. Petersburg necessary to stand behind the Serbians and convert them into close and useful allies of Russia. It will be recalled that at the time when the desposition of Ypsilanti and Morousi involved Turkey in difficulties with Russia and Great Britain, the attempts by Turkish armies to invade the pashalik of Belgrade with the purpose of putting down the Serbian rebellion, had failed, leaving the Serbians masters of the pashalik except for the city of Belgrade. The Porte, realizing that the Serbians could not be conquered at the moment and also finding that their relations with the Russians and British were becoming more menacing, decided to come to peace with the Serbians. The latter had already had a peace emissary, Itchko, at Constantinople for some time and negotiations were opened late in September.1 The Porte agreed to grant in principle the demands of the Serbians as the basis for an agreement. Hassan Bey, appointed the Turkish mohasil for the pashalik and also peace negotiator, arrived at the Serbian headquarters at Semendria toward the end of October and further negotiations were at once started. A convention was soon agreed upon which would give the Serbians that political autonomy within the Ottoman Empire which they desired. Among the terms of the Serbian and Turkish convention was one providing for the removal from the pashalik of all those Turkish troops called krdjalis. They were easily eliminated from other places, but those holding the fortress in Belgrade refused to evacuate. The Serbian chiefs, seizing the opportunity to test the sincerity of the intentions of the Porte to live up to the Convention with them, demanded of Hassan Bey that he force the krdjalis from the place. Upon demand by Hassan, 1

Cf. supra,

pp. 180-181.

254

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

the chief of the krdjalis refused to evacuate Belgrade unless he received orders direct from the Porte. As Hassan already had such orders, which he had shown the chief, preparations were made for a siege of Belgrade.1 Before starting the siege an assembly of the Serbian chiefs was held on November 17, and the terms of the proposed treaty with Turkey were discussed and finally ratified. Itchko was appointed to return to Constantinople to convey the Serbian ratification and to conclude the treaty by securing its ratification by the Porte.2 The siege of Belgrade was then started and on December 12 the town was taken. A process of starvation was applied to the fortress by stopping its food supplies and it surrendered on December 29." The chief city of the pashalik was now in the possession of the Serbians; it was the final achievement of their aspirations for self government. At the end of 1806 the Serbian insurrection was apparently at an end and peace was established between the Serbians and the Porte, the latter having made concessions which had been forced upon it largely by the threats of Russia in the affair of the deposed hospodars. These threats had materialized, during this time of the settlement of peace terms with the Serbians, into actual seizure of nearly all Turkish territory north of the Danube and the Russian armies had been brought very near to the Serbians. The Russian invasion was almost certain to provoke violent reactions at Constantinople. 3 When reports arrived at Constantinople in the first days of December that Russian troops had crossed the Turkish 1

Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 111.

iIbid. 3

Ibid.,

pp. 111-112.

BRITISH

FAILURE

TO PRESERVE

PEACE

255

frontier, Selim at once despatched a letter to George I I I of England condemning Russia's action as a violation of treaties and stating that Turkey must resist the advance of the Russian forces in self defence. However, it was to be hoped that the friendship between Turkey and Great Britain would not be disturbed and that the latter would give ample proof of her amiable intentions in the affair. 1 In reply to demands made by the Porte and Arbuthnot for an explanation, Italinski professed complete surprise and ignorance as to the motives and intentions of his government. He claimed that he had not received any communication. However, he refused to admit that Russia by this act necessarily showed any intention of commencing war on Turkey. He attempted to ease matters by declaring that he expected hourly the arrival of a courier with despatches which would certainly give a satisfactory explanation of the conduct of Russia. 2 Italinski was in an unfortunate position. He could not give an adequate explanation of the conduct of his country at a time when it was above all necessary that he be able to do so, and to plead ignorance under such circumstances could only excite the suspicions of the Turks. Italinski tried to explain to the Porte that his failure to receive instructions from his government was probably due to its belief that he had already left Constantinople.3 In fact there is no evidence of any communication concerning the Russian invasion of Turkey having been sent to Italinski until a month after the order had been sent to General Michelson to occupy the Turkish provinces. The despatch from St. Petersburg explaining the actions of Russia was dated 1

Selim to George III, Dec. 7, 1806. British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52.

Italinski to Hautzerli (Dragoman of the Porte), Dec. 13, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52; report of Vorontsov, Feb. 12, 1807, Archives Vorontsov, vol 22. 2

' Ibid.

256

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

November 15 and its contents have already bee noted elsewhere. 1 It was first sent by land but never reached Constantinople, the courier evidently having been intercepted. The despatch was sent again by sea but it reached Constantinople only after the Porte had declared war and Italinski had left the city. Then the Russian ship carrying the despatches was fired upon by the Turks and the pilot threw the despatches into the water. 2 This tardiness of the Russian government in informing their ambassador at Constantinople of their plans for occupation of the Turkish provinces can hardly be excused, whatever the reasons for it. If there was sincerity in the declarations at St. Petersburg that Russia meant to keep on friendly terms with Turkey while establishing a military occupation in some of her territory, then certainly it was short sighted and questionable action not to have kept Italinski informed from the beginning so that he might attempt to maintain official relations with Turkey and to negotiate for the acceptance of Russian demands. Only by such a method would it have been possible to bring Turkey to accept Russian occupation of her territory as an " amicable demonstration " and not a declaration of war. And perhaps Turkey would have broken with Russia in any case, but at least the conduct of Russia would have appeared less questionable. The British ambassador also felt embarrassed and concerned over the actions of his country's ally. T o demands from the Porte for an explanation he could only plead ignorance and exhort the Porte to be moderate and patient. He presented the Russian occupation as a necessary precautionary measure for the protection of Turkey, and the killing of the Turkish despatch couriers only as an accident. 1 2

Cf. supra, pp. 210-211. Bradisteanu, op. cit., p. 118.

BRITISH

FAILURE

TO PRESERVE

PEACE

257

Great Britain was ever ready to be of use in improving relations between Russia and Turkey. 1 Sebastiani was using every means to persuade the Porte that its honor should be defended and that armed measures should be taken at once against Russia. However, he confided to Talleyrand that he doubted whether the Porte would declare war against Russia as it was in a timid state of mind, made fearful by the presence of the British fleet and by the strength of the Russian army. This state of mind, Sebastiani claimed, was being promoted by certain persons in the anti-French party among the Turkish ministers, especially the Reis Effendi, and also by agents of the hospodars.2 On December 12 arrived news of the entrance of the Russian troops into Jassy, of their occupation of the fortresses at Chocim and their advance on Bender. Further, Turkish despatch carriers from the Porte had been killed near Chocim and their despatches taken. Such news was certain to rouse the passions of the masses. " They had not expected such an easy capture of Chocim, possession of which along with control of Jassy, it was believed, would virtually place the Russians in control of Moldavia.3 The Porte asked Arbuthnot to protest to Russia in the name of the professed British interest in the welfare of Turkey. 4 Arbuthnot, however, did not express his real feelings to the Turks. This may be judged from a despatch of the thirteenth to Howick to the effect that he and Italinski were in despair. Both believed they would have been prisoners by this time in the Seven Towers had it not been for the presence of a British squadron. The Porte had never for1 Arbuthnot to Hautzerli, Dec. 13, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52. 2 Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Dec. 8, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212. 3 Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 13, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52. 4 Reis Effendi to Arbuthnot, Dec. 12, 1806, ibid.

258

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1907

given the way Great Britain and Russia had forced the reestablishment in office of the present hospodars. 1 O n the same day Italinski requested Arbuthnot to arrange for the transfer of the Russian embassy to a British vessel in the harbor. 2 Several days passed without Italinski receiving any news from St. Petersburg or Russian officials in Moldavia, explaining the action of Russian troops. The Turkish ministers were also in a state of fear and suspense and the Reis Effendi at length called Arbuthnot into a conference. 3 A r buthnot only repeated his former opinion that Russia was seeking to protect Turkey against Napoleon and urged the Porte to await patiently until explanation came, as it surely would. He added that unless Turkey abstained meanwhile from all acts liable to precipitate hostilities there could be no hope that Great Britain would use her office for mediation between Turkey and Russia. 4 The Reis Effendi promised to wait several days longer for word from Russia and to avoid committing any hostile measures, at least until the British ambassador had been consulted. He added that he feared British counsel for peace would have little weight at St. Petersburg, as the Porte had information that the T s a r was seeking to reopen negotiations for peace with Napoleon. Such a peace, the Porte believed, would be at the expense of Turkey. Arbuthnot suspected that this last statement was a ruse, an attempt by the Porte to separate Great Britain from Russia, or else to stimulate her to bring pressure on Russia in the interests of Turkey. He strongly refuted any idea of a Franco-Russian rapprochement 1

Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 13, 1806, ibid.

2

Italinski to Arbuthnot, Dec. 13, 1806, ibid.

This conference was probably held about the 16th; no exact date is given. 3

4

Arbuthnot to Howick Dec. 22, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52.

*Ibid.

BRITISH

FAILURE

TO PRESERVE

PEACE

259

At about the same time the British ambassador was having this conference with the Reis Effendi, the French ambassador had an audience—on the 16th—with Selim, delivering to him a letter from Napoleon dated December 1 from Posen, urging that this was the moment for Selim to recover his independence from Russian control in his empire and offering to help the Sultan to repulse the Russians. 1 Sebastiani proceeded to carry out instructions just received, and in the conference with the Sultan supported the letter from Napoleon, elaborating upon the theme of the sincere interest of the French Emperor in conserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In the name of honor, religion and the future existence of his empire Sebastiani appealed to Selim to declare war on Russia. He found the Sultan disposed to declare war. 2 Later on the same day there was held a meeting of all the Turkish ministers in which the proposal of a declaration of war against Russia was discussed. Sebastiani was eventually admitted to the conference, and reported later that there was opposition to such a measure from the pro-British and pro-Russian party among the ministers led by the Reis Effendi, but a strong preponderance of opinion in the council was for war. It was finally decided that war should be declared. Sebastiani was to inform Napoleon at once of this decision.3 Soon after this decisive meeting of the Council of Ministers, news arrived at Constantinople of the Russian occupation of Bender, and also of the manifesto which General Michelson had issued after his arrival at Jassy, explaining the invasion as intended only to protect Turkey against the dangers of French aggression, and also to keep her loyal to her treaties with Russia and Great Britain, with the purpose of eliminating French influences at the Porte. 1

Cf. infra, pp. 292-293.

2

Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Dec. 17, 1806, Aff. Etr. de Turquie, 212.

3

Ibid.

260

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

These events produced great agitation at Constantinople. There was popular clamor, particularly from the Ulema and the janissaries. From pro-French sources this clamor was whetted by news of the arrest of the French consul at Jassy, Reinhard. Sebastiani demanded that the Russian ambassador be arrested in retaliation. Italinski was again asked by the Porte to explain the conduct of his country but he replied only that he had as yet received no messages. Another meeting of the Council of Ministers was held on the twentieth. There was a strong demand for immediate public declaration of war. The Reis Effendi attempted to check the war party by declaring that Turkey could remain friendly with Great Britain only by acting with moderation toward Russia. The Council finally decided that no open hostilities should be undertaken for the present.2 The Reis Effendi then requested Arbuthnot to use his offices to secure explanation and moderation of action from General Michelson. Arbuthnot consented and in a rather pointed letter to the Russian commander informed him of the very bad impression which was being made at the Porte by the inability of the Russian ambassador to explain the actions of his government. The manifesto issued by the general was unfortunate in its reference to conditions in Turkish provinces and had offended the Turks. A change had taken place at the Porte, which was now inclined to a policy of moderation and it was to be hoped a like change would occur in the policy of Russia. Arbuthnot then proposed that the advance of the Russians troops be suspended in case orders for their advance had been given before it was known that affairs in the two provinces concerned with restoration of the hospodars had been settled by Turkey. He also proposed that the French consul, Reinhard, be freed 1 2

Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 22, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52. Ibid.

BRITISH

FAILURE

TO PRESERVE

PEACE

2ÖI

if possible, or else an explanation of his arrest be made to the Porte through the Russian ambassador. Otherwise the latter was liable to be imprisoned by the Turks. 1 At the same time Arbuthnot sent a letter to the Reis Effendi to be read to the Council of Ministers, reiterating his advice of the past two weeks that the Porte patiently await word from Russia concerning the occupation of Moldavia which was not to be taken as a hostile act. An emphatic warning was given that Great Britain would be forced to take action if Turkey adopted hasty measures against Russia. 2 The Reis Effendi believed that with this letter and the announcement of Arbuthnot's letter to Michelson he could delay in the Council an open declaration of war. A r buthnot admitted to Howiek that he and Italinski were impressed with the forbearance of the Porte in the situation.3 Selim again wrote George I I I protesting against the Russian seizure of Bender, and the manifesto of General Michelson which he interpreted as having the purpose of exciting the people in the two provinces to rebellion. Russia by her actions had virtually declared war on Turkey, and the latter must repel the aggression.4 The Austrian minister at Constantinople wrote Stadion on December 22 that the pro-French party in the Council of Ministers had gained in influence.5 Ascendancy of the war party soon showed itself in a demand that Italinski leave Constantinople. Already for several days regular official connections of the Porte with the Russian embassy had been discontinued. Arbuthnot demanded of the Reis Effendi 1

Arbuthnot to Michelson, Dec. 21, 1806, ibid.

1

Arbuthnot to Reis Effendi, Dec. 21, 1806, ibid.

3

Arbuthnot to Howiek, Dec. 22, 1806, ibid.

4

Selim to George III, Dec., 1806, ibid.

6

Stürmer to Stadion, Dec. 22, 1806, Austria, Staatsarchiv,

Berichte, 1806.

Türkei,

262

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-im

that he keep his promise to take no hostile measure until a response had been received from General Michelson to Arbuthnot's letter. He saw the Turkish ministers and warned them that Turkey in going to war against Russia became an ally of France and therefore involved herself in the possibility of war with Great Britain. " I painted in the strongest colors ", reported Arbuthnot, " the dangers to Turkey in case of war with Great Britain and by every effort of entreaty and remonstrance tried to obtain delay." 1 In reply the ministers were loud in their invective against Russia and very pronounced in their protestations of friendship for Great Britain. They declared that removal of the Russian ambassador was necessary to appease public clamor and save the ministry. The Reis Effendi was able to give the assurance that Turkey would remain on the defensive until Arbuthnot heard from General Michelson, but in return asked Arbuthnot to agree that, if his efforts should fail to stop the advance of the Russian troops, then the Russian ambassador -was to leave. Arbuthnot refused to do this.1 Not long after the conference with the Turkish ministers Arbuthnot learned that Italinski had received word from Razumovski at Vienna that the Russian invasion had been ordered in ignorance of the fact that the hospodars had been restored.11 On December 23 Arbuthnot went to the Porte and, finding no change in the decision to remove Italinski, he made use of the news he had just heard and offered to make the agreement he had declined the day before. He also proposed to write another letter to General Michelson.4 The Reis Effendi agreed only to report these proposals to the other ministers. 1

Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 26, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52. * Ibid. * Ibid. * Arbuthnot to Reis Effendi, Dec. 23, 1806, ibid.

BRITISH

FAILURE

TO PRESERVE

PEACE

263

The efforts of the British ambassador to save his colleague were in vain. Later that day the Porte informed Italinski that he would be given three days and Russian merchants ten days to quit the country.1 The next morning, the twentyfourth, Arbuthnot received a note from the Porte refusing his offer of the previous day, and stating that the silence of Russia had been only for the purpose of deceiving Turkey and keeping her unprepared to defend herself. Turkey must now resist her. Mediation by Great Britain would not be able to bring retirement of Russian troops.2 Arbuthnot had not expected this kind of reply and he turned at once to help the Russians in Constantinople, securing from the Porte an extension to five days for the Russian embassy to remain, and twenty days for Russian merchants. In spite of the refusal of the Porte to accept his mediation, Arbuthnot wrote a second letter to General Michelson. It was a last desperate attempt to prevent war. After presenting the precarious position of Italinski, Arbuthnot requested that Russian troops abstain from any hostilities until the general had received further orders. He pointed out that because of the inability of the Russian ambassador to explain matters, the Porte which had been moderate could not much longer resist the demand of the people for war. Arbuthnot offered to act as a medium through which Michelson could communicate with the Porte* Later that day the Porte sent an official declaration of war to the Russian embassy. Ypsilanti and Morousi were ordered removed as hospodars and Prince Alexander Soutzo, former hospodar of Wallachia, was appointed again to the post with control of affairs in Moldavia also until a hospodar for this province should be appointed. The Grand Viz1 2 5

Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 26, 1806, ibid. Reis Effendi to Arbuthnot, Dec. 24, 1806, ibid. Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 36, 1806, ibid.

264

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

ier publicly announced his approaching departure to take command of the army on the Danube. These official proclamations were received with great enthusiasm by the people, the Ulema and the janissaries. 1 Before another day passed news reached Constantinople of the capture of Ismail by the Russians. This event accentuated the agitation for war both among the public and in official circles. The British ambassador informed his government that he feared much blood must be shed before peace could be restored.2 On the same day—the twenty-fifth— the entire staff of the Russian embassy went aboard the British ship, Canopus, belonging to Admiral Louis' squadron anchored in the Dardanelles. About one thousand Russian subjects at the same time went aboard other British ships.3 In a note to Arbuthnot on the twenty-sixth, the Porte made a bid for keeping the friendship of the British, declaring that it had no hostile intentions toward them.4 The British ambassador, evidently feeling the strain of an increasingly tense situation privately voiced his feelings to Howick. He said that Russia had without question been guilty of injustice toward Turkey and that, if she were defeated, her disgrace would be justly deserved. Italinski had also expressed criticism of the conduct of his country, the result he believed of bad counsel given the Tsar. 8 But whatever the private views of the British ambassador, he could not act independently of Russian interests, even though he realized that the more closely he allied himself with the Russian cause, the more certainly French influence would be enhanced at the Porte. 1

Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Dec. 24, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212.

2

Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 26,1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52.

3

Ibid.

* Porte to Arbuthnot, Dec. 26, 1806, ibid. * Artmthnot to Howick, Dec. 26, 1806, ibid.

BRITISH FAILURE TO PRESERVE PEACE

265

Arbuthnot's difficulties were increased when he received from the Porte a protest against the reception of native subjects of the Septinsular Republic on board British ships for protection along with Russians. These islands, it was claimed, were under exclusively Turkish protection. 1 In a sharp note of reply Arbuthnot declared that Turkey was mistaken in assuming that she alone had protection over these islands, and reminded her that Great Britain had been one of the powers that had originally guaranteed the existence of the Septinsular Republic and that she did not intend to give up her protection. 2 Arbuthnot learned above this time through his dragoman, Pisani, that there were unfriendly feelings toward him at the Porte, which seemed to be largely based upon a belief that during the recent crisis he had been advising Turkey to delay with the real purpose of giving Russia time to secure military advantages, and that the recent conduct of both British and Russian ambassadors had been devious. There were evidences, Pisani had reported, that the Reis Effendi, so far a partisan of England, had also adopted this view. Further, when Arbuthnot soon afterwards asked for an audience with the Sultan he had been put off, treatment to which he had not been accustomed in the past. And when he learned that Sebastiani had recently received a fine present from the Porte, it seemed conclusive proof to him that French influence was rapidly gaining an ascendancy which, he informed Howick, would result in an intimate understanding between France and Turkey. 3 In fact, however, the French ambassador was not in a wholly contented state of mind. He felt that there was a lack of decision and energy in the conduct of the Turkish 1

Reis Effendi to Arbuthnot, Dec. 24, 1806, ibid.

2

Arbuthnot to Reis Effendi, Dec. 27, 1806, ibid.

' Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 28, 1806, ibid.

266

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807

officials, evidences of the chronic inertia characterizing the administrative machinery generally. He had tried to make them realize the necessity of quick and decisive action. He did not have much hope, he confided to Talleyrand, that his efforts to energize the Turks would be successful and he doubted their capacity to make effective war on Russia. The Turkish troops were not prepared to cope with modern trained forces. It was absolutely necessary to send more French artillery officers and engineers to be used for rebuilding the fortresses of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. In order to keep himself well informed concerning military operations Sebastiani was preparing to send his adjutants to strategic points—Coigny to the headquarters of the Turkish army on the Danube and Lascours to Erzerum. The personal note of uncertainty and discouragement in this despatch reached its climax in an appeal at the end that he be relieved of his post, as he disliked it and had little confidence in his success.1 On December 27 a letter from the Divan to the Grand Vizier, laid stress on the falseness and treachery of Russia against the faithful. All believers were under obligation to take part in the religious war. 2 On the same day Selim sent a letter to Napoleon in which he spoke of the natural alliance between them by virtue of their common interests in peace and in war. Both would now march their troops against Russia and bring her to terms.® The final act of the Porte in declaring war was the despatch on January 5, 1807, to all foreign legations, of a manifesto presenting the issues between Russia and Turkey. Russia was charged with violation of treaties and with having inordinate ambitions. Her unfriendliness to Turkey 1

Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Dec. 24, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212. Zinkeisen, Geschichte des osmamschen Retches «1» Evropo, vii, p. 418. ' Selim to Napoleon, Dec. 27, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212.

2

BRITISH FAILURE

TO PRESERVE

PEACE

267

was revealed by her intrigues with the Greeks and Montenegrins, and in the aid she had given to the Serbian insurrection. Also, Russian forces controlled the Seven Islands, and finally they had invaded Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte had waited before declaring war for some explanation from Russia concerning this last act of aggression, but the Russian minister had been silent and General Michelson had issued a false proclamation. Turkey had been obliged to take up arms to defend her empire.1 Besides this manifesto, two circular notes were sent to all the foreign legations. One declared that all Turkish subjects under Russian patents of protection must give them up or be subject to imprisonment. The other note declared that henceforth the Bosphorus would be closed to ships of all nations. Preparations for war would be made by Turkey, although military operations would not be started until spring.2 Turkey had finally launched herself into a war with Russia which was not to end for six years. 1

Zinkeisen, op. cit., vii, pp. 418-420.

2

Bradisteanu, op. cit., pp. 124-125.

CHAPTER XI F R A N C O - R U S S I A N C O N F L I C T IN T H E A D R I A T I C A N D F R A N C O - B R I T I S H R I V A L R Y IN

ALBANIA

I

AFTER the seizure of Cattaro by the Russians early in March 1806 the Russian naval forces proceeded to occupy certain islands off Dalmatia, thereby cutting off the French from communication by sea with the Republic of Ragusa. 1 The French commander in Dalmatia, General Molitor, in view of rumors that a Russian army would come from the Danube through Bosnia and Croatia, prepared plans of defense. 2 N o Russian army appeared, however; and in M a y Molitor received orders to send several French regiments under General Lauriston to take Cattaro by a land expedition. This operation would necessitate crossing the territory of the Republic of Ragusa. Since the Treaty of Pressburg the Republic of Ragusa had been playing a double game with the Russians and the French. Upon hearing of the French acquisition of Dalmatia, Ragusa had sent declarations of devotion to Napoleon.2 Hearing of these pro-French sentiments at the time when he appeared before Cattaro, Admiral Siniavin, commander of the Russian naval forces, had threatened the Republic with a Russian naval expedition and with a land attack from the Montenegrins, the mortal enemies of the 1

Cf. supra, pp. 38-39-

Molitor to Vice Roy, May 14, 1806, Pisani, La Dalmatie de 1797 & 1815, p. 162. 2

' Ibid., p. 166. 268

FRANCO-RUSSIAN

CONFLICT

269

Ragusans, unless it maintained an absolute neutrality. However, Ragusa continued to carry on secret communications with General Molitor. Meanwhile, Siniavin, busy elsewhere with his expeditions in the Dalmatian islands, did not give particular attention to affairs at Ragusa until about the middle of May, and then hesitated to take any forcible measures to strengthen Russian influence there, because he had no instructions and because he recognized the danger which might result from any violation on his part of Russia's long standing treaty with the Republic. The French expedition under General Lauriston arrived at Ragusa on May 26 and took possession of the city. The Russian fleet was away at the time and the place was unprepared to offer any resistance to the sudden appearance of the French. 1 At once, however, the Vladika of Montenegro called upon his people in the name of religion to attack the French, and early in June a force of three thousand Montenegrins led by the Vladika assaulted the fortified places about Ragusa held by the French.2 Siniavin with the Russian fleet arrived on June 14 from Trieste and in cooperation with the Vladika worked out a joint plan of operations to force the French out of Ragusa. The Russian and Montenegrin forces soon established a blockade around Ragusa, so rigorous that the city was speedily threatened with famine.* Meanwhile General Lauriston awaited reenforcements. Molitor sent word that as a result of recent negotiations at Vienna, an Austrian force had been prepared at Trieste to take Cattaro from the Russians and deliver it over to the French and that as soon as the Austrians appeared the Russians would probably raise their siege of Ragusa. 4 It was 1 2

Ibid., pp. 169-173. Copcevic, GeschichU von Montenegro und Albanien, p. 306.

3

Ibid., p. 308.

4

Molitor to Lauriston, June 14, 1806, Pisani, op. cil., p. 175.

270

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

true that an Austrian force of three thousand men had beert prepared at Trieste late in the spring with Marshal Bellegarde in command and with orders to take Cattaro, if necessary by force, and to deliver it to the French. 1 But Lauriston viewed the situation less favorably than Molitor, believing that the Russians, if obliged by the Austrians to give up Cattaro, would seek to indemnify themselves by taking Ragusa. 2 Lauriston's feelings of insecurity at Ragusa was enhanced when on June 19 Admiral Siniavin opened a heavy bombardment upon fortified places around the city, and simultaneously a land attack was delivered by Russian troops aided by the Montenegrins, who engaged in pillaging and burning homes and massacring the people.3 A brief suspension of hostilities having been arranged on the twenty-second to take care of the dead, the Austrian consul at Ragusa, Jean Timoni, accompanied by M. de Lagrange, secretary of the French embassy at Vienna, seized the opportunity to deliver to Siniavin a despatch which Lagrange had just brought from Vienna, which announced that Emperor Alexander had promised the evacuation of Cattaro. Marshal Bellegarde would take possession of it in the name of the Emperor of Austria. Siniavin replied that he had received no instructions on the subject, refused to give up Cattaro and in turn demanded the immediate surrender of Ragusa, threatening to deliver over the place to the dreaded Montenegrins if his demands were not complied with.4 The people of Ragusa were disappointed upon learning of the failure of Timoni's 1

Bellegarde to Molitor, June 6, 1806, ibid.

2

Ibid., p. 176.

3 For an account of the military operations by the Russian and Montenegrin forces about Kagusa in June 1806, see: Gopcevic, op. cit., pp. 306-312.

* Pisani, op. cit., p. 179.

FRANCO-RUSSIAN

CONFLICT

271

mission as they had hoped it would relieve them of the French and also bring peace in the Adriatic. T o account for the despatch which Lagrange had brought from Vienna and for the efforts of the Austrian consul to negotiate a delivery of Cattaro to the Austrians, it will be recalled that at the end of M a y the Russian ambassador at Vienna, Razumovski, on the basis of instructions he had just received from his government through Oubril, then on his w a y to Paris, had given Stadion a formal promise that Russia would surrender Cattaro to Austria, who it was understood would eventually deliver it to the French.

Stadion

hoped and believed that the thorny question of

Cattaro,

which had threatened all the spring to endanger Austria's relations with Napoleon, would now be quickly settled. Razumovski had at once despatched orders for delivery of Cattaro to the Austrians, but almost immediately afterwards he had sent separate and secret orders to delay the evacuation as long as possible.1 Stadion and the French ambassador, desiring to secure the Russian evacuation of Cattaro as soon as possible, had sent Lagrange off at once with the Russian declaration. Whether Siniavin had received the orders from Razumovski to evacuate Cattaro when Legrange presented to him the despatch from Vienna, can not be asserted with absolute certainty.

Siniavin's statement that he had not received

instructions would indicate that he had not heard from Razumovski.

Until

he

had

received

official

instructions

through Russian channels he was justified, of course, in refusing to negotiate on the subject. Following the unsuccessful effort of Timoni to negotiate with Siniavin, the latter reopened his attack upon Ragusa. Timoni and Lauriston waited anxiously for the appearance of Bellegarde and his force, which they believed would com1

Cf. supra, pp. 84-85.

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807 pel the Russians to raise the siege. On June 28, Lauriston received a formal summons from Siniavin to surrender Ragusa. Without definitely accepting it, Lauriston sent an aide to Russian headquarters, where he found M. de l'Epine, commander of the Austrian naval force in conference with Siniavin. The Vladika of Montenegro joined them and negotiations were again opened. The French stated that they would evacuate Ragusa on condition that they should be replaced by an Austrian garrison, and that Cattaro should be surrendered to the Austrians who would then hand it over immediately to the French force which had evacuated Ragusa, and that all Russian troops should return to Corfu. Nothing was concluded. An official record was taken of the French proposals but the French officer was sent away without any definite promises. M. de l'Epine departed on the twenty-ninth to rejoin Bellegarde who with his troops was then at Lesina. 1 Lauriston then attempted to make peace with the Montenegrins and to win the Vladika to his side by offering him the position of Patriarch of Dalmatia. The letter refused and proceeded to send reports into Albania and Herzegovina that the French intended to conquer those provinces. 2 Siniavin reopened his bombardment of Ragusa and the Montenegrins at the same time renewed their attacks, pillaging and burning houses in the suburbs of the city. Siniavin had a second time refused to negotiate with the Austrians and French. Very likely by this time—the end of June—he had received the secret order from Razumovski, directing him to delay evacuation of Cattaro. He had also probably received some information concerning the approaching Franco-Russian negotiations at Paris and had been given to understand by Razumovski that Cattaro would not be given up by Russia until she had definitely secured from France an acceptable peace settlement. 1

Pisani, op. cit., pp. 180-181.

2

Gopcevic, op. cit., p. 317.

FRANCO-RUSSIAN

CONFLICT

273

O n July 6, a French force under General Molitor entered Ragusa, giving Lauriston the much desired reenforcements and probably saving the city for the French. 1 A t the end of July, General Marmont, the new French military commander of Dalmatia, arrived at Ragusa with the purpose of consolidating more effectively the French position there. Opposition had already developed in the Senate of Ragusa to the interference of the French with the government of the Republic and they had sent secret appeals to Constantinople asking that the Porte intervene to secure withdrawal of the French and thereby recover the independence of the Republic. A letter was also sent to the Turkish ambassador at Paris demanding that he protest against the French occupation of the Republic which was declared to be vassal territory cf Turkey. Also a letter of protest from the Senate was despatched to Napoleon.2 Along with his task of organizing the French regime at Ragusa, Marmont prepared plans for driving the Russians and Montenegrins out of the strong positions they held adjacent to the city. Until they were forced out, the French could not hope to advance upon Cattaro to the south and also there could be no security for their communications with the French government in Dalmatia. Marmont attempted to divert the Montenegrins from Ragusa by making trouble for them elsewhere. He sent word to the Pashas of Bosnia, Mostar and Trebinje urging that now was their opportunity to pay back old scores against the Montenegrins. But none of them moved.3 Marmont had about matured plans for an attack upon his opponents when word came to him early in August of the signing of the Oubril treaty at Paris providing for the evacuation of Cattaro by the Russians.4 1

Pisani, op. cit., pp. 181-183 ; Mémoires Duc de Raguse, ii, pp. 381-383.

2

Pisani, op. cit., pp 184-185.

3

Gopcevic, op. cit., p. 316.

4

Pisani, op. cit., p. 257.

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Lauriston again opened negotiations with Siniavin for evacuation of Cattaro. Hostilities were suspended by the Russians and their allies, but the Russian admiral treated the question with reserve and protracted the negotiations.1 Marmont suspected that the Russian admiral was awaiting the arrival of a British fleet from Malta in order to deliver Cattaro to them, playing the same trick which the French believed the Austrians had used in March in allowing the Russians to take the place.1 T o checkmate the Russians Marmont hastened to prepare his troops at Ragusa to enter Cattaro as the Russians retired and he placed a strong battery at the Punta d'Ostro, a place which commanded the entrance to the Bay of Cattaro in order to oppose any attempts by the British to seize the town.* No British expedition appeared nor did the Russians make any move to leave Cattaro, and early in September word came of the non-ratification of the Oubril treaty. Hostilities were reopened at once. On September 12 Siniavin led his fleet in an attack upon the important French position at Punta d'Ostro. This was a sign for attacks by the Russian allies. Bands of Montenegrins and Bocquais incited by Russian agents again became active around Ragusa and on the twenty-seventh Punta d'Ostro was taken after a combined attack by Russian naval forces and an army of six thousand Montenegrins under the Vladika. 4 In August Marmont, taking advantage of the absence of any Russian garrison on the island of Curzola, had placed a small French garrison there. With the renewal of war he proceeded to strengthen this garrison, recognizing the importance of the island in protecting the approach to Ragusa and also in safeguarding its communication with Spalato." 1

Pisani, op. cit., p. 258 ; Mémoires Duc de Raguse, iii, p. 5.

2

Mémoires Duc de Raguse, iii, pp. 6-7.

' Mémoires Duc de Raguse, iii, pp. 6-7 ; Pisani, op. cit., p. 258. 4

Gopcevic, op. cit., p. 318.

5

Pisani, op. cit., pp. 164 ; 259-260.

FRANCO-RUSSIAN

CONFLICT

275

Concerning Cattaro, Marmont received instructions not to undertake any expedition to capture the place and to await results of attempts to settle the question by diplomacy. However, before placing his troops in winter quarters, he made a successful sortie late in September in the direction of Cattaro, forcing the Russians out of several minor positions with the intention of impressing upon them that they might have in the future to reckon with him.1 During October and November, Marmont devoted attention to the fortifications of Ragusa and its approaches by land. He also fortified the islands of the Archipelago of Ragusa—Daxa, Calamotta, Mezzo, Guipanna—and other places safeguarding the approach to Ragusa by water, and he strengthened his position on the island of Curzola and Brazza.2 Siniavin sent addresses to the people of Herzegovinia calling them to arms against the French who it was declared intended to subject them. They replied that they were willing to take up arms at once. Siniavin advised them to wait until spring ; meanwhile they could contribute to the common cause by refusing to sell food to the French. 1 This was not so alluring to them as they had an eye for trade. In October the Vladika received from the Russians a considerable sum of money sent directly from St. Petersburg for the purpose of replenishing the war treasury of the Montenegrins. The Tsar also promised to send the Vladika a cross of much value as a sign of appreciation of his services. No important engagements occurred during the autumn and early winter between the French and the Russians though there was a series of minor operations.4 On De1

Ibid., pp. 260-261.

2

Mémoires

8

Duc de Raguse, iii, pp. 21-23 ; Pisani, op cit., pp. 263-264.

Gopcevic, op. cit., pp. 334-335-

4 For account of military operations during October to December see : Gopcevic, op. cit., pp. 322-339.

276

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

cember 9 Siniavin suddenly appeared before Curzola with a squadron and after a brief attack forced its surrender. This in turn obliged the French to give up their positions on the neighboring island of Brazza. Thus the Russians were enabled again to threaten French communications between Dalmatia and Ragusa. Siniavin was about to extend his operations, intending to take Lesina, when he received word from Corfu that Ali Pasha was preparing to attack it. Siniavin departed for Corfu late in January 1807, leaving a small squadron at Cattaro.1 Meanwhile the Austrian expeditionary force under Bellegarde had remained inactive, doing nothing aside from the one attempt by M. de l'Epine late in June to negotiate with Siniavin, to get the Russians out of Cattaro. No demonstration of force was attempted by Bellegarde; his troops were kept inactive first at Lagosta and then on the island of Guippana in the archipelago of Ragusa. According to a despatch of the British ambassador at Vienna dated July 20 the Austrian government, seeing that the Russians had not evacuated Cattaro (in accordance with the promise of Razumovski at the end of May) and fearing retaliations by Napoleon upon Austria, had sent orders to the Austrian commander to use force if necessary to take it.2 Such orders could not have reached Bellegarde before he received word of the signing of the Oubril treaty. He had then waited upon the course of diplomacy to enable him to receive Cattaro from the Russians and Ragusa from the French, in this way assuring the Russians against French retention of Ragusa and acting as agent for the delivery of Cattaro to the French. After hearing of the failure of the treaty, Bellegarde continued to do nothing, again adopting a position of neutrality as the Russians and French renewed hostilities in 1 2

Ibid., p. 337. Adair to Fox, July 20, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 80.

FRANCO-RUSSIAN

CONFLICT

2 77

the Adriatic. A f t e r remaining inactive throughout the autumn and early winter, the Austrian forces returned to Trieste at the end of March, 1807, according to an arrangement between the French and Austrian governments. 1 A t the end of 1806 Russia still remained in complete control of the Adriatic. Attempts made by Napoleon through diplomacy or through force—with the aid expected from Austria—to secure possession of Cattaro and thus eliminate the Russians and establish the French in the Adriatic, had failed. Until the French could command sufficient naval forces to hold the islands on the east side of the Adriatic, and until the Russians were forced out of Cattaro, the French position in Dalmatia was not secure and any attempts in the future to extend French political hegemony in the Balkans would be precarious. However, there had remained to the French throughout 1806 one possibility for extending and consolidating their position in this region; this was to bring Albania into their political sphere and to make alliances with the political chiefs of Albania, particularly with Ali Pasha of Janina. 2 A f t e r the Treaty of Pressburg, Albania had acquired a distinct political importance for both parties to the European war. For Napoleon with his new acqusitions of southern Italy and Dalmatia, it was significant because of its proximity to both of these countries. Besides, it gave entrance into the Balkan peninsula and was, therefore, to be considered in whatever plans Napoleon might make for intervening in the affairs of the Near East. For sometime after the Egyptian expedition, Napoleon had neglected to cultivate political relations with the pashas of Albania. However, in the autumn of 1805 he had appointed a political mission to promote good relations with Ali Pasha 1

Pisani, op. cit., pp. 262-263.

278

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

of Janina, the most powerful and important person in A l bania and the Morea. This mission had been given to François Pouqueville and Julien Bessières, who arrived at Janina, the capital of the pashalik, early in February, 1806. Ali Pasha received them cordially. 1 A f t e r numerous conferences between Ali and the French agents, Bessières left Janina early in March for Paris, bearing a friendly letter from Ali to Napoleon. Pouqueville remained as permanent agent in order to continue to cultivate the good will of Ali Pasha and to promote commercial relations with France.* Perhaps the relations of Ali Pasha with France were never so good as at this time. He had good reason for cultivating such a friendship while the Russians occupied the Ionian Islands and their fleet cruised in the Adriatic. Ali Pasha's dislike for the Russians had existed ever since their occupation of the Ionian Islands in 1799 and was enhanced in the spring of 1806 by their seizure of Cattaro and the Dalmatian islands.® The French mission had arrived at a time when these events would seem to help its cause. On the other hand, Ali did not intend to throw himself into the arms of Napoleon. He was not unaware of the favorable position he occupied for making himself politically important to both sides in the European struggle, so far as it was concerned with the Balkans, and he intended to take advantage of it to realize his ambitions for territorial expansion. Since Albania had become important to Napoleon by reason of his new positions in southern Italy and in Dalmatia, it was certain also to acquire significance for the allies, Russia and Great Britain. It would become a necessary link in a chain of defenses which they were seeking to establish along the western frontier of the Ottoman Empire in order 1

Boppe, L'Albanie et Napoléon (Paris, 1914), pp. 37-48.

' Ibid., pp. 593

Ibid., pp. 61-62.

FRANCO-RUSSIAN

CONFLICT

279

to check any plans which it was assumed Napoleon was making for expansion eastward. With the British holding Sicily and Malta, and with the Russians at Corfu and Cattaro and in the Dalmatian islands, this line of defense had been fairly completed by the spring of 1806 with the exception of Albania. The British feared that the pashas of Albania, who were seeking to increase their independence of the Sultan, would intrigue with the French in order to realize their ambitions which were detrimental to the stability of the Ottoman Empire. John P. Morier, who had been British consul at Janina in 1804 and now stationed at Constantinople, urged his government to take measures to arouse the Albanian pashas to oppose the French in Dalmatia. He estimated that an army of one hundred thousand could be raised in Albania. Great Britain should furnish these pashas money, munitions and training officers and bring them, especially Ali Pasha into action against the French. 1 Captain William Leake, British agent, after a year of travel through Greece upon a mission of political observation, reported to his government in March 1806 that he believed that the alleged attempts of French agents to excite the Greeks in Morea to revolt had been unsuccessful. He had not come across any French agents there and he had found the Greeks, while generally desirous of being free from the oppressive Turkish regime, still in such a state of fear from memories of the massacres following their unsuccessful revolt in 1770 that they would hesitate to attempt another rebellion. It was, therefore, the opinion of Leake that if a French army invaded Turkey relying upon help from a rebellion of the Greeks, such help would be possible only after considerable progress had been made by the invad1

J. P. Morier to Mulgrave, March 6, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 53-

280

t h e

NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

ers in bringing Turkey to subjection, and thus assuring the Greeks of their future safety. 1 Upon hearing at Constantinople of the arrival of the two French agents at Janina, Arbuthnot, the British ambassador, at once sent Morier on a mission to Ali Pasha with the purpose of counteracting the influence of the French mission. Morier arrived at Janina on April 23. In answer to Morier's complaint as to his conduct in receiving the French agents, Ali Pasha asserted that he had considered no proposals which in any way affected his attachment to Great Britain. Morier found Ali very hostile to the Russians at Corfu who he believed had aided with arms neighboring Greek tribes who were making raids into his territory. Morier feared that the French might use the fact of the alliance of Great Britain with Russia to influence Ali against the British. He saw, therefore, that it was necessary to mitigate Ali's hostility towards Russia by some act of Great Britain which would demonstrate the good will of the allies towards him. Ali Pasha demanded of Morier the aid of Great Britain in subjugating the neighboring hostile Greek tribes, and also in securing for him control of the towns of Preveza and Purga. He hinted that if he was not so aided he might be forced to take measures. Morier believed that in this last vague statement there was a threat of alliance with France, and he therefore urged the British Foreign Office not to remain indifferent to Ali Pasha's demands. He proposed that Great Britain help Ali reduce the hostile Greek tribes on his frontier. This would allow Ali to divert his military resources elsewhere against the French. 2 The greatest difficulty, Morier pointed out, would be to secure control for Ali Pasha over Purga and Preveza. These towns, until re1

Leake to Mulgrave, March 29, 1806, ibid., 57.

2 J. P. Morier to Fox, April 25, 1806, ibid., 53.

FRANCO-RUSSIAN

CONFLICT

281

cently possessions of Venice, had self-government presided over by a Turkish official appointed by the Porte. To the people of the towns it mattered very little whether or not control passed to Ali Pasha, yet the intervention of Great Britain in any such operation might strain her relations with the Porte. 1 Furthermore, British diplomacy with respect to Albania was confronted with a very difficult problem in the matter of improving the relations between Ali Pasha and the Russians. Russia's position in the Ionian Islands was regulated by the treaty with Turkey of March 2 1 , 1800. Since that time Ali Pasha had made himself more independent of the Porte, and his independence associated with ambitions for more territory, was certain to bring him eventually into conflict with whatever power controlled the Ionian Islands. The position of the Russians as protectors of the Septinsular Republic and as occupants of Corfu was certain to bring them into conflict with Ali's ambitious projects of expansion. The pasha's suspicions of the Russians were intensified in the spring of 1806 by their seizure of Cattaro and the Dalmatian islands. Moreover, Russian agents, in attempting to carry out after the Treaty of Pressburg a plan for strengthening the position of Russia along the western frontier of the Ottoman Empire against Napoleon, had found in Ali Pasha an uncertain quantity. Their fears that he would ally himself with Napoleon were strengthened now by the presence of the French mission at Janina, and by April the Russian minister to the Septinsular Republic, Count George Mocenigo, had become convinced that Ali Pasha was working actively against Russia. On the other hand, the good will of Ali Pasha was of capital importance, especially after the Treaty of Pressburg. If the Russians attempted to win the friendship of Ali by 1

J. P. Morier to Fox, April 27, 1806, ibid.

282

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

satisfying his territorial ambitions, their position at C o r f u would probably be weakened since Ali demanded territory upon which Corfu was dependent for supplies and which also had strategic importance in protecting the island. O n the other hand, even supposing the Russians were disposed to accede to the Pasha's demands, they had not the right of free disposal of any territory belonging to the Septinsular Republic. And if Russia helped Ali Pasha to secure the ex-Venetian towns on the mainland, not only would Corfu be endangered, but also there would be complications for Russia with the Porte, such as Morier indicated would likewise ensue for Great Britain, should she help Ali Pasha secure these towns. In view of their common fears of Napoleon's possible intervention in affairs of the Near East, neither power desired to weaken its position at the Porte. Besides, it would be difficult for the Russians to bring themselves to help Ali Pasha to subject the Greek peoples, since to do so would violate religious feeling among the Orthodox Christians and also weaken the political influence of Russia among Orthodox and subject Slav peoples in the Balkan peninsula, which it had become a part of Russian policy since the Treaty of Pressburg to strengthen. Great Britain had been aware since 1800 of these difficulties inherent in the relations between Ali Pasha and the Russians occupying the Ionian Islands. But she had pursued a hands-off policy. When in February, 1805, Russia had informed Great Britain that she would not molest Ali Pasha, if he would remain content with the territory he occupied, the British had accepted this as a statement of Russian policy and an earnest of improved relations between that country and Ali Pasha. 1 Since then, Great Britain had been unresponsive to requests from Ali Pasha for support. In fact, she had treaty relations with Russia and with Turkey which 1

J. P. Morier to Foresti, May 13, 1806, ibid.

FRANCO-RUSSIAN

CONFLICT

283

did not permit her to show interest in him.1 However, the advance of Napoleon into territory on the east side of the Adriatic territory granted to him by the Treaty of Pressburg, now made necessary in Albania some policy other than that of neutrality. Morier had gone from Janina to Corfu early in May, where with Foresti, British consul at Corfu, he had sought to impress upon Count Mocenigo the necessity for adopting a more conciliatory attitude toward Ali Pasha. 4 Not only did the British agents consider this necessary on the general grounds of weakening French influence at Janina, but they were also concerned over an incident which occurred late in April when a Russian war vessel intercepted provision boats belonging to Ali Pasha, and also ordered his armed vessels to leave the neighborhood of Arta. Complaint over this matter had been made by Ali to Morier at Janina and the British agent had therefore a specific reason for going to Corfu. 3 Mocenigo maintained that the action of Russia in this matter was based upon the Russo-Turkish treaty of 1800, which Ali Pasha had violated by allowing his vessels to come within maritime limits of the Septinsular Republic, whose inviolability Russia guaranteed. Besides, Russia was obliged by this treaty to guarantee to Turkey her possession of the ex-Venetian towns—Purga, Preveza, Butrinto and Vonitza—which were now menaced by Ali Pasha.* It was to safgueard the Republic and these towns, declared the Russian minister, that the armed vessels of Ali Pasha had been ordered to leave the waters about Arta. The Russians were really afraid that, if Ali Pasha should secure control 1 2

Ibid. Foresti to J. P. Morier, May 22, 1806, ibid.

* J. P. Morier to Foresti, May 13, 1806, ibid. * Foresti to Arbuthnot, May 20, 1806, ibid.

284

THE

NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807

of these towns, he would menace the food supply of C o r f u and become ambitious to control the neighboring islands. They also believed that A l i Pasha in order to realize his ambitions would be quite ready to make an alliance with Napoleon. 1 In reply to this explanation, the British agents warned Mocenigo that a more conciliatory policy must be adopted toward Ali Pasha if he were to be kept loyal to the allies and prevented from making such an alliance.2 Mocenigo considered Ali Pasha too unreliable to aid the cause of the allies, whatever help might be given him. T h e British agents were in private concerned over the attitude of the Russian minister, fearing it would cause loss of British influence with A l i Pasha. They believed that the Russians were secretly making efforts to diminish the power of Ali Pasha by inciting the other pashas in Albania against him and also by giving aid to the Greek bands making raids into his territory. 3 Both the British agents believed that A l i Pasha was taking advantage at this time of his strategic position in the European war to realize his own ends and to silence opposition from the allies by threats of accepting French proposals of alliance. In view of this situation Foresti recommended that Great Britain should give him to understand that she and Russia were in close union and that he could expect aid from the former only by maintaining conduct in no way inimical to the interests of Russia. 4 Morier adhering to a more conciliatory view, urged that Great Britain court the friendship of A l i Pasha so that he would not be inactive in case of a French attack on Turkey or in event of a Franco-Turkish alliance. 5 1

J. P. Morier to D. R. Morier, May 22, 1806, ibid.

1

Foresti to Mocenigo, May 17, 1806, ibid., 50.

' J. P. Morier to Arbuthnot, May 27, 1806; Foresti to Arbuthnot, May 20, 1806, ibid. 4

Foresti to Morier, May 22, 1806, ibid., 53.

5

J. P. Morier to Foresti, June 4, 1806, ibid.

FRANCO-RUSSIAN

CONFLICT

285

While Morier and Foresti were thus laboring with the Russian administration at Corfu to secure improved relations between the latter and Ali Pasha, and also recommending to their government that Great Britain give immediate attention to the improvement of her political connections with Ali in order to prevent him from becoming an ally of the French, French interests were being quietly promoted at Janina by Pouqueville under cover of his profession of medicine. Bessieres arrived in Paris early in June and delivered to Napoleon a report of his mission along with a friendly letter and presents from Ali. The report indicated a situation in Albania favorable to the promotion of French political connections. Neither the British nor the Russians had any official representative there to hinder the French, and Ali had clearly shown his dislike for the Russians and his suspicions of the British because of their Russian alliance. This favorable report concerning Albania came at an opportune time for Napoleon, who was then in the midst of diplomatic ventures whereby he hoped, first, to extend and strengthen the frontiers of his Empire on the Adriatic and Mediterranean and, secondly, to improve political relations with the Porte and promote French commercial interests in the Ottoman Empire. As for the first, it will be recalled, Napoleon was preparing at this time—in June—to enter into formal negotiations for peace with Great Britain and Russia. He would persuade Russia to give over to him Cattaro, which he had been vainly waiting all the spring to secure through pressure on Austria. Possession of Cattaro was necessary for complete control over Dalmatia. Ragusa had been occupied by the French at the end of May and was now being defended against efforts of the Russians to force them out. Napoleon also had hopes in these negotiations of getting the Russians to

286

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

evacuate Corfu, but if this was not possible, at least he would secure cession of Sicily by Great Britain. It was in the midst of such plans that Napoleon received the favorable report from Bessieres. If he could bring the pashas in Albania, especially Ali Pasha, within his political orbit, gain possession of Cattaro and Sicily and keep control of Ragusa, Napoleon believed he would be in a position to guarantee his dominance in the Adriatic, secure naval bases for operations in the eastern Mediterranean, and also gain access to several main entrances by land into the Balkan peninsula. The return of Bessieres found Napoleon concerned with plans for two other political missions which were to promote French political connections in the Ottoman Empire. Reinhard was already well on his way to his post of Consul-General in Moldavia and Wallachia. Napoleon also had prepared plans to establish a French consul, primarily a political agent, at Travnik, the residence of the Pasha of Bosnia. Since the acquisition of Dalmatia, Bosnia, like Albania, had become of greater political importance to Napoleon. David, appointed to the post, had instructions to establish close connections with the Pasha and to urge and approve any military operations which the Bosnians made against the revolting Serbians or the Montenegrins.1 David departed for his post at the beginning of August. Napoleon had also by June made preparations for sending Sebastiani to Constantinople with instructions which specified among other things that he should keep himself informed of the attitude of Ali Pasha of Janina toward France, as it might be well at some time to see his domain extended in order to protect French interests in the Adriatic. However, the time for this had not come as the Emperor had not yet completed the consolidation of his power in this region. It was first necessary for him to eliminate the Russians there.2 1

Instructions to David, May 12, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 211. * Talleyrand to Sebastiani, June 21, 1806, ibid., 212.

FRANCO-RUSSIAN

CONFLICT

287

A t the same time Napoleon gave instructions to Talleyrand that a friendly letter be sent to A l i Pasha acknowledging his avowals of friendship for France. The letter urged Ali to prevent the Greeks in the Morea from aiding the Russians and to help the Porte in suppressing the rebellion of the Serbians. It said further that, should Napoleon secure Corfu, he would like to place it under the guard of Ali. 1 It is to be noted that Napoleon did not promise to cede the island to Ali. He intended only to dangle a choice prize before the Pasha, hoping thus to hold him to his side and prevent him from forming a British alliance. The breakdown of peace negotiations between the powers, with the consequent development of tension between Russia and France—and at the same time the growing ill feeling between Russia and Turkey—created a situation which promoted a mutuality of interests between Ali Pasha and the French in opposing Russia, which had the effect of perpetuating a rapprochement between them for the remainder of 1806. Ali did not like French control of Ragusa, 2 but found it preferable to Russian control. Therefore, Pouqueville pursued with satisfaction his mission at Janina, always able to appeal to fears which were caused by the continued presence of the Russians at Cattaro and Corfu. Besides, the belligerent activities of the Greek peoples upon the frontiers of Ali's domain continued, and were furthered, he suspected, by the Russians. Also the reports Ali received from Constantinople of Russian aggressive intentions on the Dniester added to his hostility, which was caused not so much by the fear that they would infringe on his domain as by the fact that they blocked his ambitions for expansion. It was probable that he could successfully seize some of the neighboring islands and the ex-Venetian towns were it not 1 Napoleon to Talleyrand, June 19, 1806, Correspondance de Napoleon, xii, 10378. 3

J. P. Morier to Fox, June 10, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 53.

288

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

that they were protected by the Russians. His main reason for keeping friendly with the French during this time was the hope that they would force the Russians out of the Ionian Islands and leave him free to pursue his plans of expansion. He had therefore received with great satisfaction the letter from Napoleon with its offer of placing him in control of Corfu should it come into the hands of the French. Sebastiani, after taking his post at Constantinople, did not neglect any opportunity to promote the French cause at Janina, and it was very much through his efforts at the Porte that Ali secured the appointment of his two sons, Mouktar and Veli, to the pashaliks respectively of Morea and Lepanto. 1 The British government appears to have made no special effort during the latter half of 1806 to cultivate political connections with Ali Pasha, in spite of the recommendations from Morier and Foresti in June that the presence of a French agent at Janina and the pronounced anti-Russian sentiment of Ali make it imperative that Great Britain should not neglect the Albanian pashas. There is no evidence of any British political missions to Janina for the remainder of the year after that of Morier in April. Pouqueville therefore had no rival to disturb him. The British must not arouse suspicion at the Porte that they were aiding the well known ambitions of the pasha, and on the other hand they must not compromise the interests of their ally, Russia. 2 Not until Great Britain was freed from the inhib1 !

Boppe, op. cit., p. 63.

The sensitiveness of the Russians upon this point was disclosed by reports of Mocenigo to his government expressing dislike of Morier's mission to Ali and especially of the later attempt of the British agent to impress on him the need of conciliatory relations with Ali. The result was that Budberg urged Fox to remove Morier, charging him with an unfriendly attitude to Russian officials with respect to Ali Pasha. Budberg to Stroganoff, July 4,1806, Mikhailovich, Count Pavel A. Stroganoff, iii, pp. 78-79-

FRANCO-RUSSIAN

CONFLICT

289

iting difficulties of this middle position, as happened eventually with the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey, could she act more decisively with respect to Albania. Further, the British had been more concerned during the year with affairs in the western Mediterranean and had devoted major attention to southern Italy and Sicily and to the blockade of French ports, leaving to the strong Russian fleet under Admiral Siniavin the task of safeguarding the interests of the allies in the eastern Mediterranean. They had also left the Adriatic pretty much to the care of the Russians, believing no doubt that they could prevent French arms and troops from getting to Ali Pasha and that in turn Ali would hesitate openly to join the French from fear of their chastisement. However, the possibility that Turkey would enter the war as an ally of France was certain to impress upon the British the immediacy of the question of the policy they should pursue with respect to such semi-independent areas within the Ottoman Empire as Albania and Egypt. Morier, forwarding to the British Foreign Office at the beginning of December a lengthy report on resources and conditions in Morea and Albania, advised that in view of the existing conditions it would be a sound policy for Great Britain to help to strengthen parts of the Ottoman Empire which had some political independence under a strong leader, such as the pashas of Albania and Bosnia, who would act with more energy than the central government was capable of. 1 So long as Great Britain was at peace with Turkey she would not be likely to adopt such a policy lest it contribute to the dismemberment of Turkey and rouse ill feeling at the Porte. However, under the exigencies of war and confronted with the necessity of rivaling French influence in such local areas, she might favor Morier's views. 1

D. R. Morier to Howick, Dec. 4, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 53. This report of J . P. Morier was enclosed in the above despatch of his brother.

CHAPTER XII I N T E R R E L A T I O N OF P O L I S H A N D N E A R

EASTERN

QUESTIONS I

NAPOLEON'S headquarters at Posen in December 1806 and at Warsaw in January 1807 was the center of manifold and widely extended administrative and diplomatic activities. Among other things protection was secured for the long line of French communications extending from the Rhine to Warsaw, and new levies of troops were raised for the Grand Army. A strong line of French troops was established along the Oder as a base for operations to the east against the Russians and an alliance was made with Electoral Saxony. 1 Napoleon received word at the beginning of December of the refusal of Frederick William of Prussia to ratify the armistice and the two powers reverted to a state of war though Prussia seemed quite incapable of continuing hostilities. Toward the end of December the Russians and French met at Pultusk north of Warsaw and fought an indecisive battle. Poland had become the theatre of war and Napoleon sought to attach the Poles to his cause. On entering Posen at the end of November he had been popularly acclaimed as the savior of Poland and in the weeks following he read Polish history and secured reports on contemporary political, social and economic conditions in Poland. He assiduously cultivated the acquaintance of Polish leaders, re1

Driault, Napoleon et I'Europe: 290

Tilsit 1806-1809, pp. 56-57.

INTERRELATION

OF POLISH

QUESTIONS

ceived deputations, and issued public proclamations avowing his interest in the aspirations of the Poles for liberty but avoiding making any definite commitments to procure national independence for them. From this manipulation of the Polish nationalist agitation Napoleon realized certain material benefits : a considerable number of Polish recruits were added to the Grand Army, and a provisional government was set up in Prussian Poland under French direction which levied food supplies for the French armies and money for the imperial treasury. 1 However, upon the question of the restoration of Poland, any ideas which Napoleon may have evolved from the various official memoirs on the subject already noted,2 were always secondary in his mind to the question of the future of Prussia, the need of maintaining friendship and securing an alliance if possible with Austria, and the desirability of an eventual peace with Russia which would separate her from England and thus unite the Continent against the latter power.3 Poland was at all times for Napoleon an instrument to be used to further his own political interests, its use to depend upon the course of events, and nothing became more important for him during this period than the problem of so organizing eastern Prussia as to provide an adequate safeguard for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Hearing of the Russian invasion of Turkey and at the same time of the breakdown of negotiations with Prussia, Napoleon was left free to push his conquest further to the east, striking Russia at her frontiers, helping the Turks against the Russians, and manipulating the Polish movement without re1 Handelsman, Napoleon et la Pologne, 1806-1807, PP- 45, 51-55, 67-68, 76-86. Correspondance de Napoléon, xiii, 11328, 11318, 11324; xiv, 11529, 11350, 11333, 11399, 11732, 11766. 2

Cf. supra, pp. 190-192.

Sorel, L'Europe et la Révolution française, vii, p. 113; Handelsman, op. cit., pp. 67-68; Rose, Life of Napoleon I, ii, pp. 101-102. 3

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807 gard for Prussia's sensibilities. H e appears to have considered for the moment the proposal in Mongaillard's memoir, 1 viz., to wipe Prussia completely out of existence and in its place establish a Polish state, which should be a check to Russian aggression to the west and a guarantee of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In an imperial decree prepared probably about December 9 Napoleon declared : Les événements nous ont fait vivement sentir de quelle indispensable nécessité il est pour l'Europe qu'entre le Rhin et la Vistule il existe une puissance inséparablement unie d'intérêts avec l'Europe Ottoman, qui fasse constamment cause commune avec lui et contribue dans le Nord à la défense pendant que la France ira l'embrasser au sein même des provinces Ottomanes.2 Coincident with the efforts of Napoleon to stimulate the Polish nationalist movement and yet to keep it under such control as to make it serve his political and military purposes, were his attempts to exploit for the same ends the difference between Russia and Turkey with a view to converting the latter into an aggressive ally for him against the former. Early in November while he was still at Berlin, instructions had been sent to Sébastiani to work vigorously to bring about a war between Russia and Turkey and secure an alliance of France, Turkey and Persia. A letter from Napoleon to Selim at the same time urged the Sultan to take immediate action to free Turkey from foreign domination. Then, soon after his arrival at Posen, Napoleon had sent another letter to Selim declaring that Prussian and Russian Poland was preparing to recover their independence. It was the moment also for Selim to recover his independence from 1

Cf. supra, p. 191.

* Bailleu, Preussen und Frankreich, ii, pp. 581-583.

INTERRELATION

OF POLISH

QUESTIONS

the yoke of Russian domination.1 A t the same time instructions were sent to Sebastiani to sign a treaty which would guarantee Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia to Turkey ; to urge the Porte to send troops at once to Chocim and other fortresses on the northern frontier, and assure the Turks that Napoleon would make peace with Russia only in concert with Turkey. 2 Reinhard at Jassy was also ordered to spread news in the two provinces that Napoleon would make no peace with Russia until the rights of Turkey were reestablished in Moldavia and Wallachia and to rouse the natives in these provinces to join with the French to defend Turkey.* Early in January there arrived at Napoleon's headquarters at Warsaw, John Ghika, an envoy from Prince Morousi with requests for French aid in Turkey. It will be recalled that Morousi, reinstated in October as hospodar of Moldavia, had not assumed his duties at Jassy when the Russians invaded the province. He had thereupon refused to come to Jassy and had at once become active in stirring up opposition to the Russians. He encouraged the plans of Mustapha of Rustchuk and Pasvan Oglou of Widin to form a federation of pashas in Bulgaria to oppose the Russians. 4 Also Morousi became an active worker among those boyars in the two provinces who had long opposed Russian influence in their affairs. He had been put at the head of this group and had attempted to organize opposition to Ypsilanti and the Russian regime which supported him.5 Having avowed the devotion of Morousi and his follow1

Napoleon to Selim, Dec. i, 1806, Correspondence

de Napoleon

xiv,

Hurmueaki,

xvi,

"338. 2

Napoleon to Sebastiani, Dec. 1, 1806, ibid., 11337.

* Talleyrand to Reinhard, Dec. 15, 1806, Documente pp. 805-806. * Cf. supra, p. 247. 5

Andreossy to Napoleon, Jan. 1, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 213.

294

T H E

N E A R

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

ers to Napoleon, Ghika sought to win the latter's support for the project of a confederation of the pashas on the Danube and in Bulgaria, including possibly A l i Pasha of Janina, for defense of Turkey against the Russians and Serbians. Such an organization with the aid of the French would be able to force the Russians out of Turkish territory. 1 Talleyrand was surprised that Morousi should be associated with such overtures to France as he had always been considered, along with Ypsilanti, a partisan of Russia. He therefore replied with circumspection declaring that Morousi should first show his devotion to the Porte by raising forces to defend the Turkish frontiers. 2 Morousi's mission, however, was opportune and had its influence in shaping Napoleon's plans along with other events in the Balkans which were reported soon after at his headquarters. Reports came from Sebastiani of the agitation among all classes in Constantinople for war on Russia following the first news of the Russian invasion of Turkish territory, the subsequent decision of the Council of Turkish ministers on December 16 to declare war on Russia and their request that it be at once reported to Napoleon. Sebastiani, having presented the inadequacies in the Turkish military equipment, recommended that aid should be given to Turkey. Reports had also come from French agents in Moldavia and Wallachia concerning the pro-French sentiment among some of the boyars opposed to the Russians, and their hopes that with the advance of French armies eastward, protection and aid might be given to these provinces. Then had come news of the arrest of Reinhard at the time of the Russian occupation of Jassy, and later word of the capture by the Russians of Bucharest. 3 1

Report of Talleyrand, Jan. 9, 1807, ibid.

1

Talleyrand to Morousi, Jan. 11, 1807, ibid.

3

Cf. supra, pp. 249-250; 259.

INTERRELATION

OF POLISH

QUESTIONS

As Napoleon thus became aware of events which gave evidence that war was about to break out between Russia and Turkey, he felt the need of having more sure and rapid information on affairs in the Balkans than French officials in Dalmatia and at Constantinople were able to give. Also since both France and Turkey were now at war with Russia it was more than ever necessary that the views and plans of the Porte be frequently and quickly known. Therefore he decided to establish at some central place on the Danube a French liaison officer, making him a means of communication between imperial headquarters, Constantinople and Dalmatia. He chose Widin, located on the only available route for couriers between Constantinople and Vienna and near to Serbia and the Danube provinces. Also it was in the pashalik of the powerful Pasvan Oglou who was an enemy of the Russians and who held the fortresses—Negotin, Gladova, Orsova—only by means of which the Russians could safely establish a union with the Serbian forces. Adjutant Commandant Meriage, military secretary to the French embassy at Vienna, was appointed to the post. Besides keeping open communications with Constantinople by Widin he was to arouse the Turks to prevent Russian forces from joining the Serbians and to sound out Pasvan Oglou on sending of a French army corps to the Danube.1 Meriage left for Widin at the beginning of February. Lamare, formerly stationed at Bucharest, was made French agent at Rustchuk where he was to cultivate good relations with Mustapha.2 On January 17 Napoleon wrote to the Shah of Persia describing his victorious advance toward the Russian frontier 1

Napoleon to Talleyrand, Jan. 20, 1807, Correspondance de NapoUon, xiv, 11670. 1

Boppe, " La Mission de 1'Adjutant-Commandant Meriage a Widin," Annates de Vecole des sciences politiques, Avril, 1886, p. 263.

296

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

and the retreat of the Russians. Now was the time for Persia to join with France and Turkey against Russia and recover for herself possession of Georgia. 1 On January 20 he again wrote Selim urging him to take vigorous action against their common enemy and reestablish his supreme authority in the Ottoman Empire. 2 With this letter went instructions to Sebastiani to impress upon the Porte that Russia had not sufficient forces to advance beyond the Danube, and that Turkey should take the offensive at once by invading the Crimea so as to force the Russians to weaken their forces on the other fronts. The Turkish navy should be active in the Black Sea where the Russians were deficient in naval force. The Porte should urge the Persians to take the offensive and push their forces into Georgia, and the Pasha of Erzerum should be ordered by the Porte to advance his army into Georgia against the Russians. They should all attack at the same time—in Georgia, in the Crimea and on the Danube.8 With his own armies advancing at the same time over the Vistula, Napoleon envisaged a great circling attack on Russia, so overpowering as to force her into submission. It was therefore with much satisfaction that he received the letter of December 27 from Selim dwelling upon the natural alliance between them and affirming that the armies of France and Turkey would soon bring Russia to subjection. 4 A message of about the same date from Sebastiani reported the beginnings of Turkish military preparations against Russia, hampered, however, by inertia and lack of equipment. French engineers and artillery men should be sent at once to aid them.5 1 Napoleon to Shah of Persia, Jan. 17, 1807, Correspondance de Napoleon, xiv, 11651.

'Napoleon to Selim, Jan. 20, 1807, ibid., 11671. 8 4 5

Talleyrand to Sebastiani, Jan. 20, 1807, Aff. Etr. de Turquie, 213. Cf. supra, p. 266. Report of Sebastiani, Dec. 24, 1806, Aff. Etr. de Turquie, 212.

INTERRELATION

OF POLISH

QUESTIONS

It seemed that now was the time to help the Turks and therefore at the end of January Napoleon ordered that Sébastiani be instructed to notify the Porte, that, if it was so desired, he would send twenty-five thousand French troops from Dalmatia, six ships to assist in the Black Sea, and also some companies of artillery for defense of the Bosphorus.1 Orders were sent to General Marmont, commanding in Dalmatia, to send at once five engineers and five artillery officers to Constantinople. A staff officer should also be sent to the pashas in Bosnia and Bulgaria to ascertain what aid they wanted and to grant them help at once. Marmont should await orders for sending twenty-five thousand troops to Widin to support the Turkish army on the Danube. The Turks as well as the Persians were to be considered henceforth allies of France. Her relations with Persia were so favorable as would enable the French to advance forces to the Indus. Two French frigates would be sent to the Persian Gulf carrying a special envoy to the Shah.2 Evidently plans were being laid for sending a French mission to Persia. Napoleon also prepared to manipulate public opinion at home in favor of his plans to carry war into eastern Europe. A message dated January 29 was sent to the Senate. It was a flamboyant declamatory epistle appealing to patriotic sentiments concerning the necessity of preserving the Ottoman Empire from demolition by the Russians—fanatics and barbarians—who stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean might otherwise overwhelm civilized Europe. A secure and certain peace for Europe required a guarantee of the complete independence of the Ottoman Empire and Persia.3 To give support to this official message Napoleon 1 Napoleon to Talleyrand, Jan. 29, 1807, Correspondance de Napoléon, xiv, 11729. 1 Berthier to Marmont, Jan. 29, 1807, ibid., xiv, 11734. • Ibid., xiv, 11722.

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-Î807

had instructions sent to the Foreign Office at Paris to open in the press a strong agitation against Russia with a view to creating a favorable popular sentiment for the idea that Napoleon wished only to establish a durable peace in Europe and to prevent any power from so enriching itself at the expense of the Ottoman Empire as to become formidable to the other powers. The conservation of the Ottoman Empire should become the first interest of France. 1 It is interesting to note here that Talleyrand, who sent these communications to Paris, expressed privately different views on the question of Turkey. In a letter to his colleague, M. d'Hauterive in the Foreign Office, he expressed the belief that Turkey was incapable of improvement and was doomed to dissolution. The real question for France to consider was what portion she should take in the inevitable partition some day of the Ottoman Empire. 2 Talleyrand shared with Napoleon the idea that Russian ambitions must be checked, but he did not believe Turkey a safe barrier against the Russians. He still adhered to the project embodied in his memoir of October 1805—that Austria, eliminated from Germany and Italy, should be given compensations in the Balkans. Her interests should be diverted to the east and she should be set up as the barrier to Russia, who must eventually be pushed back into Asia. In this process European Turkey would be broken up. s In fact at this very time Talleyrand was trying to engage Austria to come to some understanding with France on the question of future political rearrangements in the Balkans involving extension of Austrian frontiers in that direction. This leads us to 1

Vandal, Napoléon et Alexandre

I, I, p. 26.

»Talleyrand to Hauterive, Jan. 29, 1807, Correspondance xiv, 11722. 3 Bertrand, Lettres pp. 156-174.

inédites de Talleyrand

à Napoléon

de

Napoléon,

(Paris, 1882),

INTERRELATION

OF POLISH

QUESTIONS

consider briefly Napoleon's relations with Austria during this time. From the time that Napoleon had started to push his armies eastward from Berlin until finally they reached the Vistula, he had recognized that the safety of his long line of communication required that he prevent Austria from becoming his enemy. She also lay on the flank of the French communication by land between Dalmatia and Italy. The development of the Polish movement in Prussian Poland presented a new problem in Napoleon's relations with Austria. He must placate her on this question and at the same time attempt to hold her to his side by tempting offers of compensation. Therefore soon after his arrival at Posen he sent a personal despatch to Andreossy at Vienna instructing him to impress upon the Austrian government that Poland was on the point of rebellion and that he could not prevent a national explosion. Andreossy should make clear that Napoleon had never recognized the partitions of Poland, and would favor insurrections in Prussian and Russian Poland but he would not interfere in the affairs of Austrian Poland as he had guaranteed Austria her territory by the Treaty of Pressburg. Further, if the Emperor of Austria concluded it would be difficult to conserve Austrian Poland in case of political upheavals among the Poles, and desired as an indemnity a portion of Silesia, then Andreossy was to offer to begin negotiations on the subject. 1 Napoleon was on dangerous ground when he affirmed his support of Polish insurrection in Prussia and Russia, and recruited Polish regiments into his army, and yet expected to keep Austria friendly. He might keep Austria in line in spite of any distrust of him in connection with the Poles by playing upon fears at Vienna of Russian intentions in the Balkans. 1 Napoleon to Andreossy, Dec. I, 1806, Correspondance xiv, 11339.

de

Napoleon,

oo

3

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807

Early in January there arrived at imperial headquarters, just established at Warsaw, a special envoy from Vienna, Baron de Vincent. He had come with instructions to keep watch upon the relations of Napoleon with Russia, and in the event of peace overtures to prevent any settlements between them detrimental to Austria. It was suspected at Vienna that, if Russia were allowed a free hand by Napoleon in Turkey, she would be willing to sacrifice the interests of Prussia and leave Napoleon to go his own way in Poland. Vincent was also to promote the idea of a general peace through Austrian mediation if necessary.1 On January 10 Napoleon received Vincent. After giving assurance that he had no intentions of satisfying the aspirations of the Poles and that he would restore to Prussia a portion of her territory, he urged that Austria and France should come to some understanding for safeguarding the independence of Turkey against Russian ambitions. Austria must share responsibility in this matter as she was imperiled by the influence of Russia over the Orthodox and Slavic peoples in Turkey. He therefore proposed a treaty cf alliance with the object of guaranting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but with the suggestion that they further agree to act in concert to the interests of both powers if it was proved that it was no longer possible to conserve this empire in its entirety. Vincent in reply declared that in the latter contingency Austria would not want to see Orsova and Belgrade fall into the hands of the Russians and she would take measures to occupy these places. Napoleon agreed, provided Austria did not act too openly at first and avoided as far as possible arousing the ill will of the Turks. He would not accept Austrian intervention in the interest of a general peace in Europe, as he would negotiate alone with Prussia, and he would not press the war against Russia if she were willing 1

Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, 1801-1810, pp. 261, 266-267.

INTERRELATION

OF POLISH

QUESTIONS

to give up all projects in the East. Peace with England would then follow. 1 In a letter to Emperor Francis, Napoleon urged the need of an understanding between them over the situation in Turkey, as both powers had common interest in opposing Russia whose strength lay not so much in her army as in the possibly dangerous political effects of her religious influence over various peoples in the Balkans. 1 This attempt to direct Austria to eastern affairs was quite in line with Talleyrand's views, as already noted, of making Austria not Turkey the bulwark against Russia. In his conference soon after with Vincent, Talleyrand touched upon the idea that the Ottoman Empire might cease to exist in the near future and that therefore an alliance between Austria and France on eastern affairs was necessary. Vincent was assured that Austrian claims in the east would be favorably received by Napoleon.' Before a reply could come from Vienna to these proposals, Talleyrand again approached Vincent, arguing that the suggested alliance would force Russia to make peace soon. Austria should not wait upon the course of events before making a decision, but come to an agreement at once with France. 4 In the midst of negotiations at imperial headquarters with Austria and preparations for establishing closer relations with Turkey, Napoleon was suddenly forced late in January to break the winter camp of his army and advance upon the Russians under Bennigsen who had unexpectedly manoeuvr e d his forces into a position threatening Warsaw. On February 8 the two armies met at Eylau. The battle, it is 1 Report of Vincent, Jan. 12, 1807, Beer, op. cit., pp. 267-268 ; Driault, Napoléon et l'Europe: Tilsit, pp. 82-83. 2 Napoleon to Emperor Napoléon, xiv, 11670.

Francis, Jan. 20, 1807, Correspondance

de

' R e p o r t of Vincent, Jan. 24, 1807, Beer, op. cit., pp. 268-269; T a l l e y Tand to Andréossy, Jan. 26, 1807, Vandal, op. cit., 1, pp. 29-30. 4

Report of Vincent, Feb. 5, 1807, Beer, op. cit., pp. 268-269.

302

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

generally agreed, was indecisive. Napoleon had failed a second time to annihilate the Russian army and deliver such a blow as he hoped would force Russia to sue for peace.

2 It will be recalled that in October and November 1806 the major interests of Russia in foreign affairs were threefold. First, the subjection of Prussia by Napoleon and the advance eastward of his armies into Polish territory had determined the Tsar and his ministers to renew war at once upon him. Patriotic appeals were made to the country to aid recruitment and two armies were sent to the western front in November to be joined with the remnants of the Prussian army. Secondly, the reopening of war with Napoleon had given rise to a move for bringing Austria also into the war as an ally of Russia. T o this end a special mission in the person of Pozzo di Borgo had been despatched in the middle of November to Vienna. Thirdly, Russia had instigated an invasion and occupation of the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, which Alexander had explained to the other powers as a disciplinary measure for keeping Turkey loyal to her treaty obligations and a precaution for protecting Russian southern frontiers. By mid-November four Russian armies were crossing the Dniester into Turkish territory. 1 The Polish question assumed capital importance at St. Petersburg by reason of the presence of French armies in Prussian Poland and the reports of French connections with Polish agitation for independence. In Poland and Lithuania there was a party among the upper nobility who looked to Russia as the patron of any project to revive Poland, and who doubted the sincerity of Napoleon's intentions to help the Poles. This group represented the conservative element 1 Cf. supra, chap, viii, sec. 2.

INTERRELATION

OF POLISH

QUESTIONS

among the Polish nobility which feared that political independence fostered under Napoleon's protection would bring objectionable social reforms, especially the freeing of the serfs. In Russia they perceived a more conservative patron.1 Their leader at St. Petersburg was Prince Adam Czartoryski who sought to reconcile the Poles to Russia and to reconstitute a political organization of the Poles under her suzerainty. Behind the project was the idea of a union of all the Slavs. With the revival of agitation in Prussian Poland, Czartoryski and his party became active at the Russian court. Early in December, Czartoryski sent to Alexander a memoir which urged upon the Emperor that by reason of political necessity he should make better offers to the Poles than Napoleon was milking. He should proclaim himself king of the Poles, an act which would inaugurate a plan for the union and federation of all Slavic peoples.2 In 1805 he had proposed to Alexander that the Polish territory of Prussia be taken from her.s Even now a plan was being secretly discussed by the Polish party at St. Petersburg for forcing the hand of Alexander by bringing about a meeting of the Polish nobility at Vilna to proclaim him King of Poland.4 However Alexander was not responsive to these proposals. He was an ally of Prussia and he knew that the reestablishment of Poland under his protection might arouse the suspicions of Prussia. He did not believe Prussia would ever consent to such a plan.® Also it would arouse Austria who would see in it the germ of a pan-Slavic movement which would affect her own political stability. On the other hand to 1 2

Handelsman, Napoléon et la Pologne, Sorel, L'Europe

1806-1807, p. 58.

et la Révolution frattfaise, vii, p. 127.

' Driault, Napoléon et l'Europe:

Tilsit, p. 73.

* Handelsman, op. cit., p. 58. 5

Waliszewski, Le Règne d'Alexander

I, i, p. 200.

304

T H E

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

abandon Prussian Poland to Napoleon was not possible, and as more reports came of activities of French agents there and also of agitation in other parts of Poland coupled with the rumor that Napoleon intended to place Jerome Bonaparte upon the throne of Poland, it became the conviction of official personages at St. Petersburg that a Polish revolution menaced the Russian empire and that immediate action was necessary to check the danger. Information of the proceedings of Czartoryski in connection with the Polish question reached Stuart, the British ambassador, who took alarm and informed Howick at the end of December that an attempt to carry out such schemes would mean disaster to a European coalition, the creation of which had been the main object of Great Britain since Jena.1 The British ambassador was further disturbed by the arrival at the beginning of January of a Prussian officer, Major Kriisemarck, who came on a special mission from Frederick William of Prussia with the object of urging Russia to make peace with Napoleon and to use her influence to persuade Great Britain to treat also with him.2 In answer to Stuart's inquiry concerning the Prussian mission Budberg assured him that Kriisemarck had been informed that Russia would not make any overtures to Napoleon.8 Stuart, however, was not reassured. He saw the Russian foreign minister later and found that he had changed his position. Budberg now declared that Russia was prepared to ascertain through the medium of Prussia upon what basis France was willing to treat and her views concerning a general peace. Russia would not directly make any overtures to France, but a Russian plenipotentiary would be prepared to negotiate as soon as the character of the French views were 1

Stuart to Howick, Dec. 29, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 65.

Butterfield, The 1929), PP- 53-57. 2

Peace

Tactics

of

Napoleon,

1806-1808

(London,

' Stuart to Howick, Jan. 7, 1807, British Foreign Office, Russia, 65.

INTERRELATION

OF POLISH

QUESTIONS

known. Stuart asked that Russia delay taking any such measures until he had word from his government and urged on Budberg that Russia should continue the war against Napoleon for her own salvation and that of legitimate monarchs in Europe. In reporting these proceedings to Howick, Stuart declared that the more conciliatory attitude towards France on the part of Russia was attrbutable to the influence of Czartoryski, to the efforts of an anti-British party at the Court and to the effect of the recent conduct of Austria. 1 Not only the questions concerning Poland and the views of Austria were of first importance to Alexander and his cabinet but also the question of the future relations of Russia with Turkey. It remained to be seen whether the invasion of Turkey would produce the salutary effects at the Porte irtended by Russia. The Russian court believed it probable at the end of December in view of the latest despatches that the Porte would offer resistance.2 Following his most recent instructions," Stuart urged a pacific settlement if possible and also notified the Russians of the despatch of a British squadron to the Dardanelles to support their cause. Confronted with such a demonstration of British naval power, the Porte would probably accept the 1

Stuart to Howick, Jan. 17, 1807, ibid. Upon the last point Stuart had observed that there was growing uneasiness among the Russian ministers about Austria and the question of Cattaro, there being a feeling that she would attempt to take it from the Russians by force in spite of denials from the Austrian ambassador. Also by this time, the Russians had heard of the unfavorable attitude at Vienna to the mission of Pozzo di Borgo. Stuart to Adair, Jan. 19, 1807, ibid. The Austrian ambassador had also reported shortly before this that Alexander strongly suspected Austria of having an understanding with France. Report of Merveldt, Dec. 25, 1806, Kallay, Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes, 1807-1810, no. 138, p. 4932

Stuart to Howick, Dec. 29, 1806, ibid.

* Howick to Stuart, Nov. 21, 1806, ibid.

3O6

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QUESTION, 1806-1807

demands of Russia. 1 Stuart did not know that at this very time the Russian ambassador had left Constantinople and that the British ambassador there was uncertain as to how long friendly relations between Great Britain and Turkey would continue. The hopes of the British ambassador of peace between Russia and Turkey were lessened when about the middle of January he learned that the Porte had rejected Russian proposals. This strengthened the view in Russian official circles that war with Turkey was inevitable which to them meant also a war against the French on the southern as well as on the western frontier. News had also come to St. Petersburg of the surrender of Belgrade to the Serbians. This event, Stuart believed, had caused Budberg to speak with confidence, in view of the close relations between the Serbians and Russians, of the ability of Russia to hold a line of forts from the Danube to the Adriatic. 2 Budberg informed Stuart that orders had been sent General Gudovitch, commander of Russian forces in the Caucasus against the Persians, authorizing him to sign immediately a peace with Persia on the condition that all the Persian forces be directed against the eastern provinces of Turkey. Russian troops thus released from Persia would be sent to Asia Minor to cooperate with the Russian fleet on the Black Sea. Budberg had then pointedly remarked that Russia would not confine her operations to eastern Turkish provinces, but could easily acquire in other parts of the Ottoman Empire sufficient territory to balance the recent acquisitions of France. Stuart deduced from the last statement that Russia was starting out on a conquest of Turkey. His suspicions were strengthened by the reserved manner in which Budberg treated his proposal that, in order to improve 1

Stuart to Howick, Dec. 29, 1806, ibid.

1

Stuart to Howick, Jan. 17, 1807, ibid., 67.

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relations with Austria by removing her fears concerning Russian expansion in European Turkey, Russia should ask Austria to participate in a guarantee insuring the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The British ambassador implored his government to send him more specific instructions in view of the possible effects on British interests in Syria, Egypt, and India from Russian projects against Turkey. 1 On January 23 Budberg informed Stuart that Turkey had decided to oppose the Russian occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia and that therefore it was necessary for Russia to take precautionary measures at once to protect her interests.2 The probability of war with Turkey caused Budberg to bring up again the questions of cooperation of Russian and British naval forces in the Mediterranean, and of a British military expedition to the continent against the French. Since the mobilization of Russian forces for renewal of war against Napoleon, Budberg had urged upon the British government an expedition to Holland or France to divert French forces from Russia.8 Stuart had not been able to give any promise of such an expedition and his position on the question had recently become more difficult when news had arrived that British forces had been withdrawn from positions in southern Italy which they had held since the British expedition to Calabria in July.* This was not at all agreeable to the Russians who had hoped that the British would make an effective diversion against the French régime in the kingdom of Naples. They also feared that a withdrawal of the British would be dangerous to Russia's position in the Adriatic and the Ionian Islands.5 1

Ibid. Stuart to Howiek, Jan. 23, 1807, ibid. ' Stuart to Howiek, Dec. 18, 1806, ibid., 65 ; Budberg to Alopeus, Dec. 8, 1806, Martens, Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie, xi, p. 132. 4 Cf. supra, p. 120. 5 Stuart to Howiek, Dec. 29, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 65. 2

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THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

Upon the question of cooperation of Russian and British naval forces in the Mediterranean Budberg had proposed that a British squadron unite with the Russian fleet, the British to be under the Russian commander, for immediate operation in concert with a Russian army against Turkey in case of war and that the Russian commander should assume responsibility for the defense of allied interests in the eastern Mediterranean, including the Adriatic, while the British should operate exclusively in the western Mediterranean. 1 Stuart would not assent to the proposal and in turn, acting upon instructions recently received, complained of the detention of large Russian naval forces in the Adriatic, when they could more advantageously be used in the allied cause elsewhere in the Mediterranean against the French. 2 There were also other questions provocative of misunderstanding between the two powers. Russia had long made complaints of the capture and detention of Russian trading vessels by British warships. In the negotiations for an alliance in 1805 Russia had proposed a possible revision of the maritime code. The British had refused. More recently Russia had made another complaint at London concerning British seizures in reply to which the British government promised to give orders prohibiting seizure of Russian vessels, but in turn demanded that Russian merchants cease trading with the French.8 There was also the question of the renewal of the commercial treaty between the two powers. The British had been urging it but the Russians had held back desiring certain changes which the British considered unfavorable to themselves.4 On December 14 the 1

Budberg to Stuart, Jan. 7, 1807, ibid., 67.

* Stuart to Howiek, Jan. 8, 1807, ibid. ' Mertens, op. cit., xi, p. 127. 4

Stuart to Howiek, Dec. io, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 65.

INTERRELATION

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QUESTIONS

Tsar issued a ukase forbidding all trade with France. 1 However, this seemingly more favorable turn of affairs for the British was changed when early in January a ukase was issued which declared that, in order to protect Russian commerce and home industry and also to meet the necessity of finding new sources of revenue, certain privileges which British merchants had been given in Russia by the last commercial treaty, that of 1797, should be abolished. Russia was ready to agree to a commercial treaty with Great Britain but not to the previous treaty without changes.1 This decision was certain not to be favorably received at London and, combined with these other questions of difference, created friction between Russia and Great Britain during the winter of 1806-1807, at a time when both the presence of large French armies in Prussian Poland and the declaration of war against Russia by Turkey placed a heavy strain upon the capacities of the two allied powers. Also, by the end of January it was evident, from the reports of Pozzo di Borgo and those of Adair, that Russia and Great Britain could not expect Austria to come to their assistance. The alliance of Russia and Great Britain was still not seriously endangered, for it rested upon a recognized economic and political interdependence. Especially in the Near East both Powers were faced by the same danger—the danger that the mightest ruler Europe had known for centuries might be able to extend his political hegemony and acquire commercial supremacy in the Ottoman Empire. 3 Austria became during the last quarter of 1806 and the first months of 1807 the center of European international politics by reason of events during that time in central and 1 1

Stuart to Howick, Dec. 17, 1806, ibid. Martens, op. cit., xi, pp. 133-134.

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

eastern Europe. Vienna was the scene in the autumn, as we have already observed, of a diplomatic duel between Napoleon and the allies—Great Britain and Russia, each attempting to win Austrian Great Britain had been urging Austria by promises of a British subsidy to enter a coalition against Napoleon. But by the end of November the British ambassador at Vienna, Adair, had come to the conclusion that only serious military defeats of Napoleon at the hands of the Russians could possibly move the Austrians to take up arms against him; and decisive Russian victories were not expected at Vienna. More damaging to the allied cause was the news that orders had been sent from St. Petersburg to General Michelson to occupy Moldavia. This act did much to confirm suspicions at Vienna that Russia was more concerned in realizing her ambitions in the Balkans than in helping Prussia or Austria against the French. The Austrians suspected that Russia would not go to war against Napoleon but rather would seek a peace with him if adequate compensations were assured her in the east. Adair reported to his government that the invasion of Turkey would probably definitely turn Austria against any alliance with Russia, though that would finally depend on how far the Russians would go in the Balkans and also how far Napoleon would go with the Polish nationalist movement. s The Austrians also had doubts as to whether Russia, if she continued the war against Napoleon, would place adequate forces in Poland, a fear enhanced by their concern over the inadequacy of their own army to oppose the French. Before they would take up arms they must see three hundred thousand Russian troops in Poland. T o get the Aus1

Cf. sufira, p. 319 et seq. * Adair to Howick, Nov. 29, Dec. 6, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 81.

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311

trians to move, Adair offered a guarantee by Great Britain that, so long as Russia was in alliance with her, Russia would not expand herself at the expense of Turkey. 1 About the middle of December, news reached Vienna of the entry of Russian forces into Moldavia, accentuating old fears concerning Russian expansion in the Balkans. Adair urged that his government make every exertion to induce Russia to concentrate all her efforts on her western frontier against Napoleon.2 Napoleon, like the British, had been urging Austria to enter an alliance, his chief object being to safeguard from Austrian attack his line of forces extending eastward through Prussian Poland. He also hoped to prevent Austria from opposing any attempt to move French forces eastward from Dalmatia through Turkish territory in order to attack the Russians from the south, if prolongation of the war with Russia made such a project necessary. Parallel with his proposals for an alliance Napoleon had demanded reduction of Austrian armed forces, though avoiding any threat which might drive her to seek protection in the coalition. But at the end of November the French ambassador at Vienna, Andreossy, reported that Austria was not at all inclined to an alliance. Little credence was to be given to her assurances that her increased military forces were only for defense. Further, there was pronounced anti-French sentiment in all classes at Vienna. * Word had been received at Vienna about this time of the signing of the FrancoPrussian armistice on November 16. It aroused fears in Austrian official circles that Napoleon, having made peace with Prussia and believing that Russia was so involved in 1

Adair to Howick, Dec. 10, 1806, ibid. Adair to Howick, Dec. 14, 1806, ibid. 1 Andreossy to Talleyrand, Nov. 35, 1807, Driault, NapoUonet I'Europe: Tilsit, pp. 62-63. 1

312

THE NEAR

EASTERN

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affairs in the Balkans that she would readily consent to make peace with him, might then suddenly turn upon Austria who would find herself without the aid of either Prussia or Russia. In fact, Napoleon had no such plans; rather, as we have already noted elsewhere, he was very anxious to promote friendship with Austria. And in the development of the Russo-Turkish crisis he hoped to find a means for keeping Austria out of any coalition against him. But we have seen that he was concerned over the prospect of difficulties with Austria arising from the Polish question, and was proposing to obviate them by offering to return Silesian territory to Austria in exchange for Galicia. 1 Stadion after persuading Emperor Francis not to enter negotiations upon the question informed Andreossy that the proposed exchange of territory could not be considered. If Silesia were taken by Austria it would create for her a perpetual liability of war in the future with Prussia which no guarantee by France of its possession by Austria could necessarily remove.2 News of the Russian invasion of Moldavia having reached Vienna at about the same time that Napoleon's proposals were received, the French ambassador tried to work upon Austrian fears of the situation in the Near East in order to promote the French cause. Stadion, however, maintained his customary reserve, whatever his real feelings, declaring that Russia had satisfactorily explained her intentions with respect to Turkey and that the fears of Austria were allayed. Besides, the conservation of the Ottoman Empire was not of sufficient importance to Austria for her to join with 1 2

Talleyrand to Andreossy, Nov. 18, 1806, ibid., pp. 63-64.

Wertheimer, Geschichte Oesterreichs und Ungarns tm ersten Jahrsehnt des 19 Jahrhunderts, ii, pp. 162-163; Andreossy to Talleyrand, Dec. 23, 1806, Handelstnan, Napoleon et la Pologne, 1806-1807, PP. 217-218.

INTERRELATION

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France in war against Russia. Austria needed above all peace and could not afford to go into another war. Andréossy informed Talleyrand afterward that Austria was playing a waiting game and would avoid for the time being placing herself in alliance with any of the powers, though he believed she leaned toward Russia. 1 It was evident that neither France nor Great Britain had been successful in their efforts to win Austria to their respective sides. Now Russia was to make a definite effort to win over Austria by means of a special mission represented by Pozzo di Borgo. The origin of this mission has already been considered elsewhere.* Preliminary announcement of the coming of the Russian mission had reached Vienna simultaneously with a request from Prussia that a special Prussian mission in the person of Götzen be received. Stadion did not view either favorably, suspecting that the purpose of each was to inveigle Austria into an alliance and war, which it had been his constant policy to avoid. Besides, he feared the bad impression upon the French of the appearance of both these special emissaries at the same time. The Prussian mission was shunted off and a meeting with an Austrian representative at Troppau substituted. But Stadion did not dare to refuse to receive the Russian mission. He was assured that Pozzo would shortly continue his journey to Naples.3 Pozzo, who arrived in Vienna on December 13, delivered the letters from Alexander for Emperor Francis and the Archduke Charles which recounted the dangers to Austria from the position of Napoleon's armies in Germany and called on her to take up arms with Russia to protect herself. 1 Andréossy to Talleyrand, Dec. 23, 1806, Handelsman, op. cit., pp. 217-218. 2

Cf. supra, pp. 213-214.

3

Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, 1801-1810, p. 256.

314

THE

NEAR

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QUESTION, 1806-1807

In the first conference with Stadion Pozzo stressed the point that Russia was in a precarious position and was attempting almost alone to defend the rights of legitimate monarchs in Europe. Stadion expressed decisively his disapproval of the Russian occupation of the Turkish provinces and the rupture with the Porte certain to follow. Pozzo protested that Russia had no plans of conquest in Turkey, and sought only to bring pressure on the Porte to remain loyal to its treaties and to check French influence there by a temporary occupation of the two Danube principalities.1 Pozzo afterward reported to his government that it was evident that Austria feared dangers for herself from both Russia and France. He believed that her real inclination was to join with Russia, but that fear of Napoleon's vengeance held her back.2 Following his conference with Pozzo, Stadion advised the Emperor to adhere to a policy of strict neutrality, at least for the time being. For Napoleon to move his army further eastward against the Russians, he believed, would be a hazardous undertaking in the winter, while if he remained in his present position for several months it would give Russia the necessary time to strengthen her position and prepare for war. At best Napoleon's position in Poland was not secure. However, considering the other side, it was doubtful whether Russia, judging from her past and present conduct, would take advantage of her opportunities. She had insufficient troops and was lacking in able generals and wavering in her policy. Certainly while she was engaged in an invasion of Turkey, she would not have the forces for effective action against the French. Stadion believed that the course of events would probably force Austria eventually to 1

Report of Stadion to Emperor Francis, Dec. 14, 1806, ibid., p. 260.

»Report of Pozzo di Borgo, Dec. 14, 1806, Vandal, Napolion

Alexandre I, i, pp. 21-22.

et

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315

give up her position of neutrality. If it could not be sustained then she should attempt to show a veiled partiality for both France and Russia and finally decide for one or the other according to her best advantage. Any declarations to Russia, Stadion urged the Emperor, which might be used to compromise Austria with France, must be avoided. 1 In spite of these recommendations from his foreign minister, Emperor Francis was inclined for the moment to negotiate through Pozzo di Borgo an agreement with Russia. But he could not completely overcome fears that Russia, diverted by prospects of conquest in the Near East, might make an armistice with Napoleon, and that, if Austria should have shown any unfriendliness to him, Napoleon would then make war on her, leaving the latter without the help of Russia. Francis therefore decided to follow Stadion's advice and to maintain the policy of strict neutrality and avoid war at any price at least temporarily. 2 Stadion feared, however, that neutrality involved a danger for Austria in the possibility that Russia and France might make a peace detrimental in some way to Austria. In order to be acquainted with developments of this kind and to dispel French distrust of Austria which would be enhanced by the presence of Pozzo at Vienna, as well as to keep before Napoleon Austrian interests, Stadion urged the Emperor to despatch at once to Napoleon's headquarters a special mission in the person of General Vincent. The Emperor agreed.* General Vincent departed late in December for Napoleon's headquarters. Stadion, having secured the decision of the Emperor to adhere to a policy of neutrality, was able to inform Pozzo 1

Report of Stadion, Dec. 18, 1806, Beer, op. cit., pp. 260-261.

4

Ibid., p. 263.

1 Report of Stadion; Emperor Francis to Stadion, Dec. 20, 1806, Beer, op. cit., pp. 266-267; Wertheimer, op. cit., ii, p. 163.

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THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

on December 20 that Austria could not consider the proposals of Russia. T o engage in war would place the monarchy in grave danger. Further, Russia's action in occupying Cattaro and her belligerent operations against Turkey did not contribute to better understanding between the two powers. 1 The British ambassador, Adair, had been active in promoting Pozzo's mission. H e urged Stadion to consider favorably the Russian proposals and offered again a guarantee by Great Britain that Russia while in alliance with her would not expand at the expense of Turkey. 1 The causes for Austria's neutrality, declared Adair, no longer existed; there was no doubt as to the sincerity of the intentions of Russia and Prussia to carry on the war against Napoleon. Further, Russia was ready to agree to put into the field the number o f troops which Austria demanded. Stadion in reply pointed to the Russian occupation of Moldavia, condemning it as unnecessary in view of the restoration of the hospodars demanded by Russia, and also as an unfortunate division of Russian forces when all were needed on the western front if Austria were to risk an immediate declaration of war against France. Adair attempted to combat these views, arguing that the restoration of the hospodars amounted to nothing unless they were supported and that French victories in Germany had so enhanced French influence at the Porte as to make it necessary for Russia to prepare for possible trouble from that direction. Besides Russia must also have armed forces ready on the Danube for any operations against the French in northern Italy. The Russian occupation of Moldavia was only for defensive purposes and not for conquest. In reply to Stadion's argument that financial and military unpreparedness made it impossible for Austria 1

Beer, op. cit., pp. 261-262.

2

Adair to Howick, Dec. 18, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 8».

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to take up arms, Adair impressed the danger of losing the Silesian fortresses. Stadion seemed to have no concern over that frontier. Adair could not remove the evident apprehensions of the Austrian minister though the latter accepted an offer from Adair to act as intermediary for securing from Pozzo di Borgo a disavowal of any projects by Russia against Turkey other than for counteracting French intrigues. A declaration to this effect was subsequently secured from Pozzo. Adair, informing his government at the end of December of these transactions, admitted the failure of the Russian mission, but hoped the relations of the two powers had been improved by their discussion of questions.1 Disturbing news reached Vienna about this time which complicated for the Austrian government its relations with both France and Russia. It heard of the declaration of allegiance to Napoleon of the Poles in Prussian Poland and their recruitment in considerable numbers into the Grand Army, and of the alliance of Electoral Saxony with Napoleon and her entrance along with the Saxon duchies into the Confederation of the Rhine. There were, too, reports of further movements of French forces eastward. So far as the Austrians could learn, the Russian armies were doing nothing. Then came the first news of the battle at Pultusk which was reported as a complete victory for Napoleon.2 Emperor Francis thought of calling out more troops fearing that the French would enter Galicia. Archduke Charles, minister of war and the most influential political adviser of the Emperor besides Stadion, opposed any such measure lest it arouse the enmity of Napoleon. A defeat in battle, he informed the Emperor, would seal the doom of the monarchy and an indecisive victory could not save it. Austria ' Adair to Howick, Dec. 30, 1806, ibid. Reer, op. cit., p. 262.

2

3

i8

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

had not the military forces to secure a decisive victory and therefore the establishment of a good understanding with Napoleon was absolutely essential. 1 Charles headed a party at the Court which believed that Russia was incapable of offering much military aid to Austria, and that she was more to be feared than France since she was launched on secret intrigues and projects with a view to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. This party had constantly worked against Pozzo di Borgo.* Stadion was inclined to differ with Archduke Charles about the relative dangers to Austria from Russia and France, and he also took a calmer view of the situation than did the Emperor. He did not believe Napoleon had any designs on Galicia. Certainly Napoleon would not venture to use force in such a move and bring on war with Austria until he had first come to terms with Russia. Further, there were evidences of unrest in the French armies. Also there was no trustworthy evidence as yet that the French had secured a decisive success in the recent engagements with the Russians, and therefore Emperor Alexander would not be forced to make peace. s T h e Austrian Emperor, advised by both his minister of war and his foreign minister, though each with different inclinations, not to enlarge Austrian armaments, undertook no such measures at the time. In spite of the powerful influence of the Archduke Charles in the councils of state, Stadion kept the direction of foreign affairs in his own hands, and the tenets of his policy seem fairly well delineated in a note to Merveldt written late in January, 1807. He wrote to the ambassador at St. PetersReport of Archduke Charles to Emperor Francis, Jan. 8, 1807, ibid.

1

2KalIay,

Die

Geschichte

des serbischen

Aufstandes,

130-131. 3

Stadion to Griinne, Jan. 10, 1807, Beer, op. cit., p. 263.

1807-1810, pp.

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burg that he was seeking to bring about a congress of the powers to negotiate a general peace. Whatever its results, it would give Austria time to make necessary preparations for eventualities. Merveldt should point out to the Russians the advantage of joining such a congress and if they were not amenable to the proposal he should make clear to them the necessity for their pushing the war against the French with energy. 1 Following urgent instructions from Budberg, Pozzo di Borgo again pressed Stadion to take up arms. Stadion refused, declaring that Austria must give its whole attention to internal affairs. Austria was too weak to fight against Napoleon. Further, if Austria did declare war, then Turkey, who was now bound to the French, would also attack Austria. Besides, Austria by remaining neutral might be able to mediate in the end. a favorable peace for Russia. In a position of neutrality Austria might better be able to preserve the existence of the Ottoman Empire which was of paramount interest to her. Merveldt was instructed to talk with Budberg on eastern affairs only in a general way and to prevent any impression that Austria would support Russian expansion in the east. * In line with his purpose to insure as far as possible the integrity of Turkey, Stadion had sought all along to hold Austria to a strictly neutral position toward the internal affairs of that empire particularly with reference to the Serbian question which touched Austria most closely, and also in the diplomatic struggle at Constantinople between the allies, Russia and Great Britain, and the French, following the arrival of Sebastiani and the deposition of the hospodars. Attempts earlier in 1806 by the Serbians to secure help 1 Stadion to Merveldt, Jan. 25, 1806, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Russland, Weisvngen, 1806.

' Ibid.

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from Austria have been mentioned elsewhere. 1 Early in December a Serbian envoy arrived at Vienna with a new request from Kara George for provisions and munitions. Upon the advise of Stadion the Emperor refused their request.2 Acceding to it would have endangered Austrian relations with Turkey, which the Austrian government wanted to avoid at any time and particularly at this time when affairs in Germany and Poland occupied their attention. Stadion was aware that at the Porte there were suspicions of Austria in spite of his reiterations of her policy of neutrality on the Serbian question and his frequent avowals of her complete lack of interest in any project of conquest in Turkey. His attempt in the previous spring at mediation for peace between the Serbians and the Porte had aroused i"l feeling at the Porte.* The Austrian cabinet had desired to see the Serbian insurrection brought to an end, fearful lest its continuation bring possible repercussions among their own Slavic subjects. They were therefore happy to hear in November that the Serbs and the Porte were engaged in peace negotiations. This was another reason for refusing the latest request from the Serbs, since to have given them any aid, even if there were peace, would certainly have aroused the ill will of the Porte. Vienna's hopes that the Serbian insurrection would be pacifically settled were soon rudely disturbed, when early in January it was learned that the Serbs had taken Belgrade.' It was feared in some quarters that, with the Serbs in possession, it would be easy for Russia to occupy this place to the danger of Austria. It was probable that the Serbians would 1

Cf. supra, pp. 34-35Stadion to Emperor Francis, Dec. 22, 1806, Kallay, op. cit., no. 143, pp. 496-497. 4 Cf. supra, pp. 60; 62 * Cf. supra, p. 254. 2

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ask the Russians to be their protectors and that the latter might then use Belgrade as a basis for war. Archduke Charles advocated seizing and retaining Belgrade until peace was established between the Serbians and the Porte. A n Austrian occupation of the place would also stop the Serbs from coming over the Austrian frontier, which was dangerous to the internal peace of Austria and increased suspicions at the Porte concerning Austrian relations with the Serbians. Charles believed that the Porte would agree to the Austrian occupation as a means of securing speedy peace with the Serbians. 1 However, Stadion did not favor the proposal and, in presenting it to the Emperor, he raised questions as to its feasibility. Austria, he thought, might in the process of carrying it out get into trouble with Russia, the Serbians, Napoleon, and also Turkey. A t least it should be ascertained before attempting it whether the Serbians would accept an Austrian occupation of Belgrade. It was quite probable that Turkey would view it as an act of hostility, as it would force Austria to increase her troops on her Turkish frontier. Also, while it was true that a Russian occupation of Belgrade would create dangerous liabilities for Austria in her relations with that power, on the other hand Austria could not afford in view of the menace of Napoleon to get into difficulties with Russia. A s for Napoleon, Stadion continued, this act would give him a long-sought pretext for war with Austria. He would also get Turkey to declare war on Austria on the grounds that Austria was working in conjunction with Russia to partition the Ottoman Empire. Or he might attempt to provoke trouble between Russia and Austria over the affair. Thus Austria might be attacked on all sides. Instead of undertaking the occupation of Belgrade, Austria should make every effort to secure a settlement between the 1

Archduke Charles to Stadion, January 15, 1807, Kallay, op. cit., p. 133.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

Serbians and the Porte, making it clear to the Serbians that Austria would promote their interests at the Porte, but on the condition that they meanwhile should not attack Turkish troops.1 The Emperor accepted Stadion's recommendations. Archduke Charles, however, continued to urge his plan and, to prevent any hasty action in the matter Stadion then proposed to Emperor Francis that if the Turks or Serbians should ask for an Austrian occupation of Belgrade their views should first be fully ascertained. Before making any final decision the Emperor wanted to hear from Vincent concerning the attitude of Napoleon. 1 Very soon a report came from Vincent to the effect that Napoleon seemed willing that Austria should take over Belgrade and Orsova provided that her troops came in Turkish uniforms so that the ill will of the Turks would not be aroused.3 Francis also received Napoleon's letter urging an understanding between them regarding Turkey. 4 Francis and his ministers were unfavorable to Napoleon's conditions for Austrian occupation of Belgrade and they also suspected that his acquiescence could not be safely relied upon unless Austria first accepted his proposal for an alliance. This determined the Emperor to reject any plan for occupying Belgrade and even Archduke Charles agreed with him.5 Thenceforth the Austrians anxiously sought information from St. Petersburg concerning Russian relations with the Serbians and observed closely the operations of Russian and Serbian forces along the Danube. 1

Stadion to Emperor Francis, January 16,1807, ibid., no. 150, pp. 500-502.

* Ibid., p. 138. * Report of Vincent, January 12, 1807, Beer, op. citpp. 4

267-268.

Napoleon to Emperor Francis, January 20, 1807, Correspondance Napoleon, xiv, 11670. 4

Kallay, op. cit., no. 153, p. 502.

de

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QUESTIONS

T h e situation at Vienna, where both France and Russia urged political alliances on Austria, was reproduced in the situation of the Austrian minister, Stürmer, at Constantinople at this time. H e found himself assiduously cultivated by both Sebastiani and Italinski with results increasingly embarrassing for himself. In accordance with instructions from Vienna he had adopted a policy of extreme reserve and to both ambassadors spoke neither for nor against the Porte. Early in January Stadion had received word from Stürmer that he was much concerned lest the Porte should hear of the frequent suggestions made to him by Sebastiani that Austria acquire control of Moldavia and Wallachia. 1 There had been rumors for some months in these two provinces, which must also have reached the Porte, that Russia would not undertake to consummate her conquest in Turkey without first satisfying Austria with a share of the spoils. It was also rumored that Austria looked for possession of certain Turkish provinces as compensation for her losses in Italy. In fact we know that Stadion had persistently refused to consider or discuss the overtures from Russia during the autumn for an understanding on the question of the possible eventual partition of European Turkey. 2 W e have also noted that he refused to give his approval to the Russian invasion of the two provinces and had instructed Merveldt at the end of January carefully to avoid giving any impression that Austria would support Russian expansion in the east. Further, when he heard from Vincent of Talleyrand's veiled insinuations that Austria should look toward the Ottoman Empire for increase of her powers, Stadion instructed Vincent to make clear to the French that Austria did not 1 Stürmer to Stadion, Dec. u , 1806, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Türkei, Berichte, 1806. 2

Cf. supra, pp. 229-230.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

think of conquest in the east and desired only the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. Only if forced by the conquests of another power would Austria take part in a partition of Turkey in order to preserve the balance of power. 1 Austria's position at the end of January was such as to cause fears and uneasiness at Vienna. She might be forced into war by the exigencies of the Russian and French war now actually under way, or she might become involved in dangerous developments which the Polish nationalist movement might assume with French aid; or she might have to act to protect her interests in the east in view of the Russian invasion and occupation of Turkish territory north of the Danube. Austria would adhere strictly to a policy of neutrality as long as possible and meanwhile work for a general peace as the way out of her difficulties. 1

Stadion to Vincent, Feb. 4, 1807, Beer, op. cit., p. 269.

PART IV BRITISH HOSTILITIES IN THE NEAR EAST JUNE 1806—MAY 1807

C H A P T E R XIII FRANCO-BRITISH RIVALRY IN

EGYPT

I

A s a result of a popular revolution in Cairo in May, 1805, the Turkish governor of Egypt, Kourschid Pasha, had been deposed and his military commander, Mohammed Ali, had been proclaimed governor or pasha, in his stead. The Porte, confronted with this situation, sent a special mission to investigate affairs in Egypt and to determine the question of the governorship. In spite of the adverse opinion of the mission and the hostility of the Mameluke Beys, who held upper Egypt and a part of lower Egypt, Mohammed Ali was able by means of a decisive victory in September to force the mission to recommend his appointment to the Porte. In October, 1805, this Albanian adventurer, who a few years before had been entirely unknown, was formally appointed Pasha of Egypt. 1 Mohammed Ali found himself, however, in the position of being officially recognized by the Porte as master of Egypt, while as a matter of fact his power was operative only in the region around Cairo. It was necessary that he extend his authority and restore order in the whole country. T o do this he must conquer the Mameluke Beys and also the delhis, the Arab cavalry which the former governor had brought into the country from Syria in the previous spring in order 1 On the rise of Mohammed A l i in Egypt, and particularly the activities of rival British and French agents in local political affairs during the period 1803-1805, see the following works based upon French and British archive material: Ghorbal, The Beginnings of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mehemet Ali (London, 1928), pp. 207-229; Douin, Mohamed Aly, Pacha du Caire 1805-1807 (Cairo, 1926), pp. 1-87. F o r older accounts, see Mengin, L'Egypte sous Mehemet Ali, 2 vols. (Paris, 1823), i, pp. 1-175; Mouriez, Histoire de Mehemet Ali, 3 vols. (Paris, 1858), i, pp. 1-240.

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to suppress the rising political power of A l i himself. The delhis had become a nuisance, pillaging the country. Ali forced some of them out of Egypt and the remainder he hoped to recruit into his army. The Mameluke Beys remained the chief opponents to his political mastery of Egypt. 1 1 Originally the Mamelukes had been recruited from the slave markets of Georgia to serve as the bodyguard of the rulers of the Ayyubid Dynasty in Egypt. They soon acquired such authority as to be able in 1250 to destroy the dynasty and to elect as Sultan of Egypt one of their chiefs. The new Sultans, however, were not firmly established and the country soon became the theater of brigandage and civil wars between rival factions of the Mameluke Chiefs or Beys. After two hundred years of political turmoil Egypt was conquered in 1517 by Sultan Selim of Turkey, and it became a province of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultans of Turkey retained the Mamelukes as a check on the pasha or governor of the province. So long as tribute was regularly paid there was no interference from Turkey and the Mamelukes held high administrative posts. But in the course of time they encroached upon the power of the Turkish pasha till by the latter part of the eighteenth century only the shadow of his power remained. In form everything was done in the name of the Sultan; in fact the Mameluke Beys dictated to the pasha who, unless he were amenable, soon found his way back to Constantinople. As the central government at Constantinople weakened during the eighteenth century, tribute from Egypt was not regularly paid and there were attempts to declare the province independent under the rule of the Mamelukes, notably that of Aly Bey, the ally of Catherine II and the forerunner of Mohammed Ali. The Porte was preoccupied with defending the European provinces of the Empire against Austria and Russia and made no attempt to suppress the Mamelukes, adopting instead a policy of promoting rivalry among them. The people were heavily taxed, commerce declined, and British and French consuls in Egypt constantly made complaints to their home governments. It is no wonder that numerous memoirs made the suggestion that occupation or conquest of Egypt was the only way to improve French and British trade there. Napoleon, in his expedition to Egypt, had good reason to attempt to destroy the Mamelukes—an attempt partially successful—in order to assure to Egypt political and economic progress. After expelling the French expeditionary forces, the British gave back the control of Egypt to the Turks, who were, however, unable to reduce the Beys to submission with such forces as they could send to Egypt. Mohammed Ali, chief of a band of Albanian adventurers, came to Egypt in 1803, ready for service wherever there might be adventure or booty and was enlisted in the service of the Sultan to help to reduce the power of the Mameluke Beys.

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The Mamelukes at the end of 1805 were divided into three parties under their three most powerful Beys: Osman Bey El-Bardissi, Osman Bey Hassen, and Mohammed Bey Elfi. The two former claimed upper Egypt as their political patrimony, while Mohammed Elfi claimed lower Egypt. Elfi was the most formidable and influential of the Beys and he had long cherished the plan of uniting all Egypt under himself. He had the backing of the several British agents in Egypt, but, on the other hand, he had aroused the antagonism of the other two Beys. Osman Bey Bardissi was inclined to be pro-French because of his fears of British favor to the cause of Elfi. Osman Bey Hassan appeared to be neutral, though inclining increasingly to be pro-British as the power of Mohammed Ali increased.1 After his appointment as pasha, therefore, Mohammed Ali was occupied for the remainder of the year 1805 with plans for subjecting the Beys and developing an adequate and loyal army. Discipline must be secured even among his own Albanian troops who continued to view him only as their chieftain. Above all, money must be procured for the support of the army. Ali undertook separate negotiations with each of the Beys, with the object of promoting the latent rivalry among them and weakening their united opposition to him. These negotiations were haphazard and inconclusive, as each party had a vaulting ambition for himself and a deep-rooted fear of the others.2 If Ali were to be recognized as pasha by the Beys he would have to grant them such concessions of territory, to be held under their absolute political control, as would seriously curtail his authority. These he was unwilling to grant. The Beys counted upon the troubles of Ali 1

Missett to Mulgrave, January i, 1806, British Foreign Office, Egypt, 2. Drovetti to Talleyrand, Nov. 12, Dec. 9, 1805, Douin, Mohamed Aly, Pacha du Caire, 1805-1807, pp. 84-87. This work is a compilation of despatches mainly from Drovetti, the French consul at Alexandria, and also instructions to him. 2

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with his troops to force him to make more favorable terms with them.1 Finding that peace with Mohammed Elfi was not possible and recognizing in him his greatest enemy, Mohammed Ali had made military preparations during the winter of 1805-1806 against him, and at the same time continued negotiations for peace with the other two Beys in the hope of isolating Elfi. However Ali's plans met with serious obstacles. Frequently his troops engaged in forays of pillaging in Cairo and demanded additional pay; and Ali, realizing the damage to his political prestige from these evidences of his lack of control over his army, had tried to suppress them by securing money by special levies upon the people of Cairo. These levies he carried out with hesitation and caution, for he recognized the dangers of excessive taxation, which had been the cause of the overthrow of his predecessor. The situation of Ali during the winter of 1805-1806 had therefore not been a happy one. Though nominal governor of all Egypt, his political power was confined to the city of Cairo and even there his position was insecure. Outside Cairo, he had not been able to do anything to protect the people from the constant pillaging to which they had long been subject from the Mamelukes, and likewise from the delhis and the Turkish remnants of the army of the former pasha. Under such treatment many villages and farms were deserted, trade stagnated, and the richer classes were stripped of their wealth. Unrest and discontent were prevalent among the mass of people, who were ready to accept any political regime which could restore law and order in the country.2 All of upper Egypt was held in subjection by the Mameluke Beys, while lower Egypt was constantly threatened with invasion by them, especially from Mohammed 1

Drovetti to Talleyrand, Jan. 13, 1806, ibid., pp. 88-89.

* Missett to Mulgrave, Jan. i, 1806, British Foreign Office, Egypt, 2.

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Elfi, who claimed that portion of the country. A s long as Mohammed Ali could not extend his authority permanently beyond Cairo, even his position there was subject to this danger of invasion from the Beys. However, it should be noted here that Ali had in Cairo a place of strategic military value with a strong fortress and of great political and commercial importance. Besides, as long as he was able to retain the support of the people of Cairo, with their wealth and commercial position, and to maintain some degree of control over his army, Mohammed Ali had with his own political and military sagacity the potential resources for establishing his power in Egypt, or at least for preventing any other person from getting complete control. In March 1806 the negotiations broke down between Mohammed Ali and the Mameluke Beys. The former declared he was going to seize all the possessions of the Beys in upper Egypt, and at the end of March he started a force in that direction.1 A t the same time Mohammed Elfi started his forces northward toward lower Egypt. By the spring of 1806 Egypt was in a state of civil war. Neither of the forces at war really represented or cared for the interests of their sovereign, the Sultan of Turkey. Both were ready to use the influence of the Porte or, if necessary, to defy it, in promoting their respective personal ambitions for political mastery of Egypt. The Mamelukes had long been disturbers of the peace for Turkish governors in Egypt, and now behind the plans of Mohammed Elfi to secure the office of governor by being pliant to the demands of the Porte was a traditional defiance and dislike of the Turk which the Mamelukes had always shown. On the other hand the advent of Mohammed Ali to the office of pasha was indicative of the limited authority of the Porte in Egypt. Ali, an Albanian adventurer, had virtually forced his appointment as pasha 1

Drovetti to Talleyrand, March 22, 1806, Douin, op. cit., p. 93.

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through a revolution against a Turkish governor. Sharing the ambitions for political autonomy found among other powerful pashas in the Ottoman Empire at this time, he was as ready to defy the authority of the Porte as were the Mameluke Beys. Never did the authority of the Porte in Egypt seem less secure than now when the political administration of the country was divided between two alien groups, with no Turkish officials in the country with desire or power to safeguard the interests of the Porte. Egypt had for half a century been the scene of rivalry, especially between France and Great Britain, because of her strategic and commercial position with respect to the eastern colonial possessions of these two powers. Great Britain, whose influence had been paramount at the Porte since 1799, had succeeded in gaining commercial and political advantages in Egypt. Now, however, in 1806 there was an advance of the French frontiers eastward on the Mediterranean, with evidences of a rapprochement between France and Turkey. Difficulties for Russia and Great Britain had developed at the Porte, while in Egypt with the accession of Mohammed Ali to the office of governor had come into existence a political power having common interests with the French in combating the British, the supporters of the Mameluke Beys. All of these developments were indicative that henceforth French and British rivalry would be more acute in Egypt as elsewhere in the Near East. During the period of political upheaval in Egypt, from May to October, 1805, the French agent, Drovetti, had looked favorably on the cause of Mohammed Ali, who avowed his friendliness to France. However, it appears from his despatches that his relations with Mohammed Ali had been circumspect and cautious, in contrast with the aggressive activities of the British in promoting the interests of the Mameluke Beys. 1 Drovetti reported to Paris that he 1

Douin, op. cit., pp. 17-82; Ghorbal, op. cit., pp. 228-229.

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perceived in the rise of Ali to political power the chance to promote French interests in Egypt, but he did not propose that France make any close connections with him. It is evident that as yet he considered Ali's authority as pasha too limited and his future position too uncertain for the French to be other than cautious. Drovetti was no doubt governed by his latest instructions dated July, 1805, which ordered him to recognize the authority of any administration in Egypt only when it had secured a victory giving it decisive control of the country.1 He desired however to be very friendly to Ali, as he proved by giving him secret information concerning the actions of the Beys and the intrigues against him of the British agents. He followed closely the negotiations between Mohammed Ali and the Beys during the winter, advising Ali and warning him especially of the dangers which might arise from British connections with Mohammed Elfi. Finally Ali following Drovetti's advice, refused to negotiate further with the latter until he renounced the protection of Great Britain. 2 On the other hand, the British agents in Egypt, the most important of whom was Major Missett, had been active in undermining the influence of Mohammed Ali at the Porte and in Egypt, and in promoting the cause of the Mameluke Beys. Missett informed his government that Ali was completely under French influence and that he oppressed the people who in turn thoroughly disliked him. Only by the expulsion of Ali with his Albanian troops could good government and order be restored in Egypt. Missett had prevented Ali from getting possession of Alexandria, and had seen to it that the city was placed under an official hostile to the pasha.3 1

Talleyrand to Drovetti, July 22, 1805, Douin, op. cit., pp. 62-63.

* Drovetti to Talleyrand, Feb. 19, 1806, ibid., p. 92. 'Missett to Mulgrave, Jan. i, 1806, British Foreign Office, Egypt, 2. This was a Turkish official of the former governor supported by a garrison of Turkish soldiers. Turkish officials and soldiers generally controlled other towns not held by the Mamelukes or Ali's troops, both disliked by the Turks.

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Early in January 1806, he had suggested to the British government that since Alexandria and the whole Egyptian coast were unprotected against foreign invasion and since the Porte evidently could not restore order in the country and protect it, a small British force in cooperation with the Mamelukes could and should give the necessary protection and order. Such a force would win the good will of the people for Great Britain, which would be an advantage to her. 1 Late in March, Missett presented to Arbuthnot at Constantinople the desirability of a British force in Egypt. Mention was made of the fact that the Porte had made overtures to Elfi for discussing means for restoring peace in Egypt, and that Elfi had insisted on a British guarantee of any agreement he might make with the Porte concerning restoration of the Mamelukes to power in Egypt. Missett now asked Arbuthnot to help promote the cause of the Mamelukes at the Porte. He doubted though whether the other two principal Beys, Bardissi and Osman Hassan, would accept Elfi as their head. However, the greatest opposition would come from the Albanian forces headed by Mohammed Ali who probably could be made to evacuate Egypt only by force. Missett proposed that the Porte should apply to Great Britain for several regiments of British troops to occupy Alexandria. If Great Britain refused to send them, then the Porte should be persuaded to acknowledge the Mameluke Beys as governors and to order Mohammed Ali and his Albanian troops out of Egypt. A n appeal should be made to the people and the ulema to help the Mamelukes to expel them.2 A s already mentioned Mohammed Ali and the Mameluke Beys, having failed by negotiations to come to an agreement, declared war late in March on each other for political su1 Ibid. 1

Missett to Arbuthnot, M a r c h 22, 1806, ibid.

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premacy in Egypt. The army which Mohammed Ali sent southward under his lieutenant, Hassan Pasha to conquer the Mameluke possessions in upper Egypt did not reach its objective, and was very soon seriously depleted by desertions of Albanian troops to the army of the Beys where there was less rigorous discipline and also more chance for booty. By the middle of April Ali's situation was critical : his political prestige was endangered by the pillaging of his troops even in Cairo, and the disorganization of his forces made it questionable whether he could defend lower Egypt from an invasion by Mohammed Elfi, who was now advancing in this direction. The other two Beys continued inactive in upper Egypt, and did not apparently intend to join Elfi in war on Mohammed Ali.1 Elfi, aware of the pasha's difficulties, made peace proposals demanding increased territory for himself. Ali refused to negotiate, whereupon Elfi continued his advance into lower Egypt. 2 Elfi has laid seige to Damanhur, an important town in lower Egypt ' which lay between Cairo to the south and Alexandria and Rosetta to the north. If he could get possession of it, Mohammed Ali would be prevented from establishing connection between these places and Elfi might then control the entrance to Egypt from the sea. Such was the critical situation of Mohammed Ali in May when another danger confronted him from an unexpected direction. Reports had come to Constantinople of Ali's difficulties, and the Porte began to think of deposing him in favor of another man who could reduce to submission the disturbing elements in Egypt and restore peace and content1

Douin, op. cit., pp. 94-97; Mouriez, Histoire 240-241. 2

de Méhémet

Ali, i, pp.

Reybaud and Saintine, L'Histoire scientifique et militaire de l'Expédition française en Egypte (Paris, 1830-1836, 12 vols.), ix, pp. 255-256. * Douin, op. cit., pp. 98-100.

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ment. Besides, the Porte had never forgotten that the appointment of Ali, an Albanian, had been in a measure forced upon it as a result of a revolution against a Turkish governor. The Porte was also disturbed by the fact that Mohammed Ali had not as yet paid any tribute to the Sultan's treasury, an act of political as well as fiscal importance to the Sultan. 1 The Porte now decided upon measures for undermining the position of Mohammed Ali. For some time past there had been intrigue at Constantinople with the object of establishing in his place a government of the Mameluke Beys headed by Mohammed Elfi. Judging from the despatch of Missett to Arbuthnot of March 22, it seems evident that not long before this the Porte had made overtures to Elfi implying willingness to consider him as the next governor. 2 A s Missett had long had close relations with Elfi, it is probable that the latter had very soon informed the British agent concerning them. A t length two agents of Elfi had been sent on a mission to Constantinople with the object of negotiating for the restoration of the Mamelukes through British mediation.8 Elfi and Missett worked hand in hand. Elfi demanded that any agreement with the Porte providing for a government under the Mamelukes should have behind it a British guarantee. This was in fact asking for the presence of British forces in Egypt if necessary in order to support the Mameluke regime, and it is very likely that the proposal had been made by Missett, who had been urging his government to send British troops to Egypt. He had urged the British ambassador to mediate with the Porte for the restoration of the Mamelukes.4 Arbuthnot, however, consented to 1

Reybaud and Saintine, op. cit., ix, p. 266.

* Missett to Arbuthnot, March 22, 1806, British Foreign Office, Egypt, 2. J

Arbuthnot to Fox, May 5, 1806, ibid., Turkey, 50.

* Missett to Arbuthnot, March 22, 1806, ibid., Egypt, 2.

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mediate only in case the Porte asked him to do so. The Porte made no such proposal and the ambassador would have nothing more to do with the affair. However the cause of Mohammed Elfi was helped at Constantinople by his promise to pay faithfully the annual tribute to the Sultan, the payment specified in the agreement to be guaranteed by Great Britain. Elfi also promised to recognize fully the supreme authority of the Porte.' An agreement was finally made with Elfi's agents which guaranteed to the Porte the sum of fifteen hundred purses to be divided equally among the three Mameluke chiefs.' Moved by these considerations, and influenced by the financial aspect of the question, which was of the greatest importance, the Porte at length decided to take action leading to a change in the government of Egypt. Preparations were made for a mission, to carry out the arrangement, by force if necessary, and a Turkish squadron commanded by Saleh-Pasha, Grand Admiral of the Turkish navy, was to be sent. Mohammed Elfi, informed by Missett of these negotiations at Constantinople and hearing of the plan to send the Turkish mission now had more than one object in descending into lower Egypt. In May he was operating his forces there, laying siege especially to Damanhur, which was defended by a Turkish garrison. He had demanded the surrender of the town, declaring that he was soon to be given control of the government of Egypt by the Porte and that the town should recognize his position. His demand was refused. 4 Turkish soldiers and troops from the army of Mohammed Ali while succeeding in forcing Elfi to raise tem' Arbuthnot to Missett, June s, 1806, ibid., Turkey, 50. Reybaud and Saintine, o/>. cit., ix, pp. 267-268; Mouriez, op. cit., i, p. 242. 2

* Ghorbal, op. cit., p. 230. 4

Mouriez, op. cit., i, p. 243; Reybaud and Saintine, op. cit., ix, p. 268.

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porarily the siege could not drive him out of lower Egypt. Ali seemed to be incapable of any extended military operations as he continued to have difficulties with his soldiers and appeared unable to weld together an army which could extend his political authority much beyond Cairo and its environs. Missett urged on Elfi the necessity of keeping his forces in lower Egypt, in order to be able to receive and cooperate with the Turkish mission which he declared was coming to give over the government to the Beys. Elfi was assured that the other Beys would recognize his leadership among them, 1 an assurance which seemed to be belied by their aloofness from Elfi's campaign against Ali. Drovetti, the French agent, reported that the British agents were intimating that a British force might come to Egypt should the French take Sicily or should there be a rupture in relations between Great Britain and Turkey. 2 It is true that early in May Missett had informed his government that he considered it very probable that a French force might attempt to occupy Alexandria and by an alliance with one of the Mameluke parties get control of Egypt. The chief ulema in Alexandria had received a letter from Napoleon seeking his cooperation in a plan for French penetration of Egypt. T o prevent this, Missett proposed that a British force should occupy Alexandria, or, if this were not feasible, that a British squadron should be kept in the region. Otherwise, the people of Egypt who were looking for freedom from the Turkish yoke might turn to France, whose agents were concealing the real designs of France upon the country by promises to the people of freedom and better conditions.3 This was at least the second time in recent months that Missett had urged the British government to send an 'Drovetti to Talleyrand, June n , 1806, Douin, op. cit., pp. 103-104.

'Ibid., pp. 104-105. ' Missett to Mulgrave, May 2, 10, 1806, British Foreign Office, Egypt, 2.

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expedition to Egypt. In his second proposal, presenting specifically the danger of a French attempt on Egypt, he was certain to touch upon latent fears at London, which had been intensified since the Treaty of Pressburg by the development of British and Russian difficulties with the Porte and by reports of activities of French agents in Turkey and of pro-French inclinations at the Porte. Missett was urging upon the British Foreign Office intervention in Egyptian affairs at the same time that Arbuthnot from Constantinople was recommending the despatch of a British squadron to a station off the Dardanelles to check French influence at the Porte, while Morier was also suggesting British intervention in the affairs of Albania which, by giving help to Ali Pasha of Janina, might help to block any French projects in the Balkans. 1 Missett's insistence upon a British expedition to Egypt was partly motivated by secret doubts as to loyalty of either Bardissi or Osman Bey Hassan to any overlordship of Mohammed Elfi unless the latter was supported by the presence of British forces. Whether Missett knew of any communications going on between either of these Beys and the French agent was not mentioned, but it was a fact that Drovetti had received from Bardissi in June a declaration that he was always faithfully attached to France. 2 Drovetti had followed closely the military operations during the spring, and had sent frequent and detailed reports to Paris concerning local affairs. 8 By June when he had certain information that the Porte was preparing to make Elfi governor, he advised his government that, if the Beys were placed in power in Egypt, it would be well for France to enter upon friendly relations with them and thus lessen 1

Cf. supra, pp. 55; 133; 284.

* Drovetti to Talleyrand, June 11, 1806, Douin, op. cit., pp. 105-106. ' Reports of Drovetti, ibid., pp. 93-108.

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British influence which he thought would not be sufficiently important to the Beys to give the British a dominant influence in the administration and commerce of the country. It is significant that in none of the despatches of Drovetti during this time does he make any mention or suggestion of French support for Mohammed Ali, even though the menace to the latter's position from British intrigue was becoming increasingly evident. This seems to give grounds for thinking, as already mentioned, that French policy with respect to Mohammed Ali was still most circumspect and cautious. W h e n it appeared that A l i might soon be removed from political power, Drovetti proposed friendly overtures to the Mameluke leaders. Probably he knew of the desires of his government for closer relations with the Porte, and accordingly followed a policy which would produce no ill will there against France. 2 A test of the relative strength of French and British diplomacy, and also of the actual authority of the Porte in E g y p t , was at hand when the Turkish mission to stabilize the government arrived. O n June 16, 1806 two Turkish frigates appeared before Alexandria. Drovetti heard that there was much rejoicing at the camp of Elfi which probably meant, he wrote Talleyrand, that Elfii had been appointed governor. Drovetti did not see how the Porte could let E g y p t fall under British influence. France, he warned, should not be indifferent to this situation if she was interested in the welfare of Turkey. There was danger to French commerce if Elfi were in power. 1 O n June 27, 1806, a Turkish squadron of six ships arrived at Alexandria. O n board were about five hundred troops, an entirely inadequate number if the Porte intended to use force to place the Beys in political power and restore order 1

Drovetti to Talleyrand, June 16, 1806, ibid., pp. 105-108.

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in the country. Through the British agents, communications were soon established between Mohammed Elfi and Saleh-Pasha, at the head of the Turkish mission. The latter sent a firman from the Porte to Mohammed Ali ordering him to quit Cairo and giving him a choice of becoming governor of the pashalik of Salonica or of that of Crete. A t the same time Saleh-Pasha sent a firman to the people and the sheiks of Cairo demanding that they take up arms against Ali if he did not evacuate Egypt. 1 Drovetti relied upon a certain number of the sheiks who were pro-French to refuse to obey this firman. He had especially cultivated the good will of several of the most powerful of those around Cairo, such as Sheik El-Messiri and Soliman El-Fayoumi, who were now being asked by the British to alienate the sheiks from Mohammed Ali. Officers of the Turkish mission, possibly incited by British agents, began publicly to announce that a strong Turkish army was coming from Salonica, that Elfi was governor of Egypt, and that the mission would depart only when he was master of Cairo. 2 Drovetti, having received definite information from Ruffin that the Porte had decided to reestablish the Beys in political control, prepared to oppose the appointment of Elfi. He informed Mohammed Ali of the plans of the Porte and distributed money in Cairo to help the cause of Ali. Drovetti sounded out Ali as to his plans and was informed that he would make every effort to oppose the entrance of Elfi and his supporters into Cairo, and would never surrender his office regardless of orders from the Porte. Ali indicated that if a British force should come to help Elfi, he himself would demand help from the French, but that if only Turkish troops came, he could buy them off and would not require French assistance; he was calling to his support the sheiks and other influential groups in Cairo. Drovetti be1

Drovetti to Talleyrand, June 30, 1806, ibid., pp. 10^-113.

2 Ibid.

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lieved that A l i could also count on the rivalries among the Beys, and the lack of discipline in their troops, and that he could also buy off some of them, especially the Arabs. Besides, the people in the country did not like the Beys because of their pillaging. 1 A t this stage of developments in Egypt, Drovetti advised Talleyrand that, if the Beys should succeed in establishing their political control, their friendship should be cultivated by France and they should be made to realize that her protection was more advantageous than that of Great Britain. However, if Turkey severed relations with Great Britain, it would be better, he thought, to have Mohammed A l i in control of Egypt, as he would be more likely than the Beys to resist a British occupation. 2 If the people and sheiks in Cairo had obeyed the firman from Saleh-Pasha to take up arms against Mohammed Ali, and if the forces of the three chief Mameluke Beys had been united, it is very probable that A l i would have been forced to leave Egypt and that the subsequent history of the country might have been very different. However, he was saved by his success in keeping the loyalty of the people of Cairo, by the divisions among the sheiks, by the jealousy and rivalries among the Beys, and by the failure of the Turkish mission to bring adequate troops to enforce its orders. When, therefore, on July 5 A l i received notice from Saleh-Pasha that he should leave Egypt at once for Salonica or Crete, he refused to comply and declared that there were conditions attached to his removal which must be first considered. 3 The Albanian chiefs in his army promised to remain loyal, and the influential men in Cairo—the cadi and sheiks—despatched to the Sultan a petition voicing their opposition to a government under the Mameluke Beys, and 1

Ibid.

* Ibid.

' Reybaud and Saintine, op. ext., ix, p. 273.

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asking that Mohammed Ali continue as governor. This petition was carried by an official who also bore a sum of money given by the Albanian chiefs to be so distributed among members of the Divan as to help Ali's cause.1 Mohammed Ali felt increasingly confident of his political position as a result of these demonstrations of support of his cause, and he boldly declared to Drovetti that he did not fear the Turkish mission and would resist any European army which might come to the aid of the Mameluke Beys. He asked Drovetti if it would be possible for Napoleon to send to his aid five hundred soldiers from Italy or France. Drovetti advised Talleyrand that such a force would be useful in Egypt, especially if France had any plans for controlling the country.2 As soon as Saleh-Pasha received Ali's reply to his demand that he leave Egypt, he sent a second one, but received this time only evasive declarations. To all further orders, Ali replied with a show of deference and with protestations of loyalty to his sovereign but made no move to obey." He had now not only won the support of most of the people of Cairo and the loyalty of his army, but he had also the French agents working in his cause. Soon after the arrival of the Turkish mission, Drovetti had sent an agent to the camp of Elfi to urge his followers to desert him and take service with the other two beys, Osman Hassan and Osman Bey ElBardissi, who had, as we have already seen, refrained from joining Elfi in his advance into lower Egypt in the spring and had remained in upper Egypt with their forces gathered at Siout and Monfalout.4 'Drovetti to Talleyrand July 15, 1806, Douin, op. cit., pp. 118-123; Reybaud and Saintine, op. cit., ix, pp. 278-279; Mouriez, op. cit., i, pp. 248-250. 1 Drovetti to Talleyrand, July 30, 1806, Douin, op. cit., pp. 123-124. ' Reybaud and Saintine, op. cit., ix, p. 280. 'Drovetti to Talleyrand, July 1, 1806, Douin, op. cit., pp. 114-115.

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While Drovetti aligned himself with Mohammed A l i because he seemed the surest instrument for furthering French interests in Egypt, he realized that the outcome of the local situation was uncertain and therefore, in accordance with the advice he had already given to his government that it would be well to cultivate the friendship of the Beys, even the proBritish Elfi, he had attempted early in June to discover the views of Elfi concerning Napoleon and had sent him an Arabic translation of an official French bulletin describing the victory at Austerlitz and the resulting increase of power and glory for Napoleon in Europe. Elfi made it clear in reply to these overtures that he would have nothing to do with the French. The power of Napoleon, he declared, was ephemeral. Even if he had crushed the Austrian and Russians, he had not conquered the English. Besides, Elfi asserted, he himself had now made peace with the Porte and was little concerned with what happened in Europe; no power could prevent Egypt from becoming his domain; he regarded the war between the French and the English as a safeguard for him, since while they destroyed each other he would have time to establish himself firmly on the throne of Egypt; he did not like the French because they really sought to destroy the Mamelukes and, besides, they were his enemies because they were also the enemies of the British. 1 A f t e r a sojourn of several weeks in Egypt, it became clear to the Turkish mission that it was accomplishing nothing. Mohammed Ali continued to send only evasive and unsatisfactory replies to the demand that he leave Egypt and assume 1 Drovetti to Talleyrand, July io, 1806, ibid., pp. 115-116. Drovetti heard simultaneously that Elfi already applied to himself the title of Sultan of Cairo, that he had given a considerable sum of money to SalehPasha and another to a British agent in payment of his debts to the British, and that he had promised, once he was established in power at Cairo, to grant certain trading concessions to a British commercial firm.

FRANCO-BRITISH

RIVALRY

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the governorship of Salonica, and there were reports that the inhabitants of Cairo were supporting him and his army was growing stronger. The Beys in upper Egypt appeared to be making no effort to respond to the mission's demands; each refused to pay the tribute to the Porte which, according to the promises of Elfi's agents at Constantinople, was to be paid equally by all the Beys. They rightfully declared that Elfi had never consulted them and must therefore pay it all as he was responsible for this attempt to get a new governor. Bardissi in particular was emphatic in his opposition and declared that there would be no help of any kind from him, as the Porte evidently intended to favor Elfi at the expense of the other beys.1 It seemed likely that the tribute would not be paid unless Elfi paid it. This was not satisfactory to the Turkish mission, which was perfectly aware that its first duty was to collect tribute for the Porte. A s was customary in such transactions, Saleh-Pasha had also a personal stake in the bargaining. He became disgusted and disgruntled, and began to charge Elfi with having exaggerated his forces and influence.2 Missett, the British agent, tried his hand at persuading Mohammed Ali to leave Egypt. He offered to guarantee his position in the pashalik of Salonica. T o this the pasha responded that he feared nobody and that he would soon be in a position to resist even the Europeans. Missett then proposed to the Turkish mission plans for a campaign against Ali, urging that the mission take the offensive in concert with Elfi and occupy certain places.8 Missett informed Arbuthnot at Constantinople that Mohammed Ali had sent gold to be used at the Porte to secure confirmation of his 1 Mouriez, op. cit., i, pp. 256-257; Reybaud and Saintine, op. cit., ix, p. 287, 296-297. 1

Drovetti to Talleyrand, July 24, 1806, Douin, op. cit., p. 121.

•Missett to Arbuthnot, July 31, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

governorship of Egypt. He would also have the support of Sebastiani. Arbuthnot should try to thwart this intrigue, for Ali's appointment would give the French preponderant influence in Egypt. 1 Evidently Missett's advice that force must be applied to Ali was heeded, for at the beginning of August Elfi moved his army in the direction of Cairo. Meeting a force belonging to Mohammed Ali near Naguile, he entered upon an engagement in the course of which Ali's troops suffered losses and were obliged to retreat. The affair, however, was indecisive and Elfi fell back to his previous position in the neighborhood of Damanhur. The situation remained essentially as it was before.2 Elfi then concentrated his efforts upon the siege of Damanhur, the operations apparently being directed by Saleh-Pasha. Days passed and the place could not be taken, although it was defended only by a small garrison of Albanian troops." Elfi, supported by Missett, urged Saleh-Pasha to attack Rosetta, but he refused on the ground that he must await instructions from the Porte. This inaction led Missett to suspect that he did not really have at heart the cause of the Mameluke Beys/ Meanwhile Mohammed Ali was holding Cairo, securing reenforcements for his army from Syria, and strengthening his garrison at Rosetta. 5 Bardissi, Ibrahim Bey and Hassan continued to hold their forces inactive in upper Egypt, declining to cooperate with Elfi. Bardissi sent a letter to Drovetti proclaiming his admiration for Napoleon and asking that French aid be sent to 1

Missett to Arbuthnot, July 14, 31, 1806, ibid.

* Drovetti to Talleyrand, Aug. 3, 8, 1806, Douin, op. cit., pp. 124-126. ' Drovetti to Talleyrand, Aug. 20, 1806, ibid., pp. 128-129. 4

Missett to Arbuthnot, Aug. 9, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 50; Missett to Windham, Aug. 14, 1806, Douin and Fawtier-Jones,

L'Angleterre et VEgypte (Caire, 1928), p. xxv. 4

Drovetti to Talleyrand, Aug. 35, 1806, Douin, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

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the Beys. 1 The French consul replied with assurances that Napoleon would protect those Beys who did not join the British.* Not only did Drovetti attempt during August to strengthen the distrust of the Beys in upper Egypt for Elfi and his allies but, having received word of Sebastiani's favorable reception in Constantinople, he impressed upon the Turkish mission the idea that the improved relations between Turkey and France might have implications for the political situation in Egypt. That is, Mohammed Ali might be favorably considered at the Porte. Ali requested Drovetti to urge Sebastiani to intervene in his behalf at Constantinople.3 During September it became apparent that the cause of Ali was gaining. He remained firmly intrenched at Cairo and Rosetta, undertaking no extensive operations with his army except to send relief with some success against Elfi at Damanhur.4 He was awaiting results of French diplomacy and the use of his money at the Porte. For his opponents the situation was more discouraging. In the middle of September Missett wrote Arbuthnot that Saleh-Pasha was interested only in bargaining and as Ali seemed to have money to distribute among the Turkish ministers, his cause was gaining.5 On the twentieth Drovetti wrote Talleyrand that Saleh-Pasha had suspended preparations for an attack upon Rosetta and had entered into negotiations with Mohammed Ali.® Evidence that some kind of bargaining was going on between him and Ali for the purpose of securing for the latter his position as governor of Egypt is indi1

Douin, op. cit., pp. 131-133.

* Drovetti to Talleyrand, Aug. 25, 1806, ibid., pp. 129-131.

'Ibid. •Drovetti to Talleyrand, Sept. 2, 12, 20, 1806, ibid., pp. 133-136. * Missett to Arbuthnot, Sept. 18,1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51. •Drovetti to Talleyrand, Sept. 20, 1806, Douin, op. cit., pp. 135-136.

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cated in the next report of Drovetti, which stated that SalehPasha had sent one of his officers to Cairo to receive a sum of money promised by Ali. 1 A t the same time Missett reported the payment of a large sum of money by Ali to the head of the mission, evidently indicating that the pasha was buying off the Turkish mission.2 By the end of September Missett had come to the conclusion that the cause of the Mamelukes was almost hopeless. Something must be done, he informed Arbuthnot, to improve the prestige of the British which was seriously jeopardized by their association with the Mamelukes.3 Missett then attempted to mediate between Mohammed Ali and Elfi with the purpose of counteracting French influence and trying to restore that of Great Britain by making his own country appear in the role of peace maker. Missett, however, believed that the results of the diplomatic duel going on at Constantinople between the French and the Russian and British ambassadors would considerably affect the political situation in Egypt and that, until that duel was ended, he would try to keep Elfi's army in lower Egypt where it would be useful if the British should decide to occupy Alexandria.' In reply to Missett's proposal to mediate between Elfi and Ali, the latter refused to treat separately with Elfi, saying that he would negotiate only in conjunction with the other Beys. 5 Moreover, when Elfi presented his terms, they were found to be so unreasonable, as even Missett admitted, that Ali refused them at once.* Meanwhile, arrangements were being completed between Ali and Saleh Pasha to leave the 1

Drovetti to Talleyrand, Sept. 30, 1806, ibid., p. 136.

2

Missett to Arbuthnot, Oct. I, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51.

8 4

Missett to Arbuthnot, Sept. 25, 1806, ibid. Missett to Arbuthnot, Sept. 29, 1806, ibid.

• Drovetti to Talleyrand, Oct. 10, 1806, Douin, op. cit., p. 137. • Missett to Arbuthnot, Oct. 26, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 51.

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349

former in his position as governor and to have his appointment confirmed as soon as possible by the Porte. A n officer was to be left behind to collect payment of the fixed sums Ali was to pay for the appointment.1 O n October 18 the mission sailed for home. If Selim had expected that it would bring tranquillity to this part of his empire, he was to be disillusioned, for Egypt was left, as it had been previously an armed camp, the scene of civil war between Mohammed Ali and Elfi. The mass of people had grievously suffered from confiscation of crops, heavy taxation and tribute exacted on trade. In order to secure peace in the country the Porte should have sent a sufficient force to subdue both the Mamelukes and the Albanians, but it had apparently neither the capacity nor the energy for doing this. Like other provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt was slipping away from the control of the central government. The weakening of central authority had left the country open to rival local parties and there was needed a strong and wise administration of which the Turkish mission had certainly given no assurance. It remained to be seen whether Mohammed Ali, who had given some evidence of being a man of exceptional ability and energy, could enforce his authority as governor, restore order and wisely administer the country. The mission had also provided the background for the play of rival British and French interests in the political affairs of Egypt. Both powers were ready to perpetuate civil strife if it would help to promote their own respective interests. The eminent historian of Napoleon's diplomacy, M. Driault, speaks of the rivalry between Mohammed Ali and Elfi as " une des formes de la lutte des influences françaises ei anglaises."2 The belief of the British agent, Missett, that Mohammed Ali had become an instrument of 1

Reybaud and Saintine, op. cit., ix, p. 304.

'Driault, La Politique orientale de Napoléon, p. 112.

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the French had led him to intrigue against the pasha at the Porte through Elfi's agents, and to use the ambitions of the latter to further the Turkish mission by means of which he hoped to see Ali removed from the country and with him all French interests. On the other hand it is evident that the French consul, Drovetti, though he supported Mohammed Ali, was yet ready to change his political affiliations and to join whichever side should win in the local struggle. Both Drovetti and Missett pursued an opportunistic policy which was not governed by any consideration of the welfare of Egypt. The Turkish mission to Egypt had been conceived and promoted at a time when British influence was paramount at the Porte, and when it could aid the cause of Elfi there. But with the arrival of Sebastiani, strong French influence became active. He had come to Constantinople with instructions which were only general in regard to Egypt. They stated that Napoleon did not desire to sustain in power there any rebel against the Porte; the only object of his policy was to be allied as closely as possible with the Porte. 1 In contrast to Sebastiani the British ambassador, Arbuthnot, seems to have remained aloof, refusing in spite of Missett's appeals to intervene in the interest of the Mameluke Beys and declaring that he would act only as a mediator to settle the contest in Egypt between Mohammed Ali and the Beys, if the Porte requested it. The Porte did not seek his mediation, and Arbuthnot remained inactive in the affairs of Egypt. 1 Under these circumstances the cause of Mohammed Ali, aided also by his generous dispensing of money, gained strength at the Porte with the result, as we have seen, that the Turkish mission—no doubt under orders from Constantinople—came to terms with Ali. 'Talleyrand to Sebastiani, June 21, 1806, A f f . Etr. de Turqute, 211. Arbuthnot to Missett, June 5, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 50.

1

FRANCO-BRITISH

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IN EGYPT

351

A f t e r the departure of the Turkish mission, Egypt during the remainder of the year 1806 presented nothing of special significance in international politics. The chief interest centered in the efforts of Mohammed Ali, after his position was officially confirmed by the Porte, to place his army on a satisfactory financial basis and to subdue the Mameluke Beys. The first problem was pressing and its settlement absolutely essential for maintenance of his authority. A number of serious outbreaks by his troops warned Ali of the need for taking care that they were paid.1 As we have already noted, the raising of funds for this purpose involved always the danger of arousing reactions in taxpayers which Ali realized that he could not afford to incur at this time. Besides, he was forced to raise by means of taxation a large sum of tribute money in order to pay the Porte for confirming his office.2^ As for the Mamelukes, Ali planned to push war against Elfi, who continued his siege to Damanhur. He demanded of Drovetti that the French send him troops and arms.3 Just at this time came news of the death of Bardissi on November 19. Shahine Bey Mourad was chosen his successor. He was known to be an enemy of Elfi, however, in spite of common fears of the latter yet the election of Shahine intensified the jealous dissension among the other Beys, each of whom secretly desired to appropriate as much as possible of Bardissi's patrimony. The death of Bardissi increased Elfii's hopes of becoming the undisputed master of Egypt as the passing of Bardissi removed the most able and influential opponent among the other Beys. Elfi sent to the Porte a petition to return the Mamelukes to authority in Egypt,— which meant of course that he would become governor— 1 Drovetti to Talleyrand, Nov. 21, 1806. Bulletin of events in Egypt October 23 to November 20, Douin, op. cit., pp. 140-143. 1

Reybaud and Sairrtine, op. cit., ix, pp. 304-305.

* Drovetti to Talleyrand, Nov. 21, 1806, Douin, op. cit., p. 141.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

and he also sought British mediation there in his behalf. 1 Arbuthnot, adhering to his policy of non-intervention in Egyptian affairs unless requested to intervene by the Porte, refused to intercede now in behalf of Elfi's petition and also recommended to Missett that he take as little share as possible in the civil dissensions in Egypt. He believed that no faith should be placed in Elfi or the other Beys. Besides the Porte would never consent to British mediation.2 The British ambassador's refusal to interfere was no doubt governed by political considerations. At the time he received this latest request to intercede in behalf of Elfi he had good reason for refusing, as his own relations with the Porte were strained because of the break of Turkey with Russia, and interference in Egyptian affairs might further weaken the British position. Drovetti, believing that the British agents would take advantage of Bardissi's death to promote a union of all the Beys under British protection and having heard that the British had urged Elfi to take advantage of the event to promote his influence in upper Egypt, had sent a French agent to a certain chief of some influence, Soliman Bey el-Gergiaoui, a French partisan, urging that he seize the opportunity at this time of dissension among the Beys to appropriate some of Bardissi's possessions.8 Mohammed Ali also sought to prevent a union of the Beys, hoping by intrigues to promote jealousies among them and particularly to keep alive the fear of Elfi on the part of the other Beys whose territory was in upper Egypt. By a liberal use of money he succeeded in bringing about the desertion of important officers and their troops from the service of the Beys. He moved his forces cautiously with the object of blocking any 1 Missett to Windham, Dec. 29, 1806, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., p. xxix.

'Arbuthnot to Howick, Jan. 15, 1807, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 55. * Drovetti to Talleyrand, Dec. 10, 1806, Douin, op. cit., pp. 144-145.

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353

attempted advance of the Mamelukes from upper into lower Egypt. 1 Missett kept before Elfi during this time the possibility of a British expedition to Egypt which would, he declared, enable Elfi to realize his ambitions. He urged Elfi to keep his forces in lower Egypt in readiness to cooperate with the British. 2 About the middle of December Elfi made a desperate attempt to take Damenhur by storm, but failed. At about the same time Mohammed Ali moved a force from Rosetta to Rahmanieh, and sent another force from Cairo to Choubra. These movements so seriously threatened Elfi's position at Damanhur that he decided to retreat southward to Faiyum. 3 He hoped then to come to an understanding with the two of the other chief Beys, Ibrahim Bey and Osman Hassan, on the basis of their common opposition to Shahine Bey Mourad, the successor to Bardissi, and also to secure their adherence to his cause. He was on his southward march when word was brought to him that the two Beys in question refused to come to an agreement with him.4 On January 27, 1807, Elfi suddenly died as a result of a quarrel in his harem. This unexpected event materially strengthened Ali's cause. He had no more formidable enemies among the Mamelukes; Elfi and Bardissi had been the only leaders among them able to dispute control of Egypt with him. Union of all the Mamelukes under Elfi was in fact the only likely plan for securing them in power, but they had been incapable of cooperation and, with the passing of Elfi, there was no longer much hope for their cause. The prospect that Mohammed Ali would become undisputed master of Egypt seemed near to realization. 1

Reports of Drovetti on the situation in Egypt from Dec. 14 to 27, 1806, ibid., pp. 145-147. * Mouriez, op. cit., i, p. 264. •Missett to Arbuthnot, Dec. 31, 1806, British Foreign Office, Egypt, 2 ; Report of Drovetti, Dec. 27, 1806, Douin, op. cit., pp. 145-147. 4 Reybaud and Saintine, op. cit., ix, pp. 322-324; Reports of Drovetti, Dec. 27, 1806, Jan. 10, 21, 1807, Douin, op. cit., pp. 145-148.

CHAPTER

XIV

T H E B R I T I S H E X P E D I T I O N TO C O N S T A N T I N O P L E I

IN the latter part of 1806 the British government was concerned with several major questions. First, the failure of the negotiations of the powers for a general peace and the renewel of war on the continent, resulting in the rapid subjugation of Prussia by Napoleon and the approach of his armies almost to the frontiers of Russia, had brought the British face to face with the dire need of creating a new coalition against him. Secondly, they were now forced to consider means for combating the continental system which Napoleon had inaugurated by the Berlin Decree of November 21 and which threatened to cut off their lucrative commerce. Thirdly, they were concerned with their relations with T u r key and the protection of their interests in the eastern Mediterranean against the French. A s for the first, the British cabinet had already, while still engaged in negotiations with Napoleon, taken steps to prepare for the possibility of renewal of war on the continent and the organization of another coalition of the powers. As soon as they heard of the Oubril treaty, 1 they undertook to ascertain what Austria would do if the treaty should fail of ratification and if war should break out again between Russia and France. In this event they expected Napoleon would make such stringent demands upon Austria as would force her from her neutral position, and they began at once to prepare for such a contingency. A despatch was sent off to Adair at Vienna, at the end of July, to the effect that, if 1

Cf. supra, p. n o . 354

BRITISH

EXPEDITION

TO CONSTANTINOPLE

355

Austria had decided to resist the demands of France, he was to give assurances that Great Britain would support Austria, and the Russian ambassador at Vienna was to be similarly informed. 1 It was intended that the statement should be reported at St. Petersburg and strengthen any disinclinations of Emperor Alexander and his ministers to accept the Oubril treaty. Soon afterwards Fox, under persuasion of Stroganoff, the Russian ambassador, who opposed the Oubril treaty, sent instructions to Adair to support the efforts of Stroganoff to restrain the Russian ambassador at Vienna from giving any orders for evacuation of Cattaro by the Russian forces. 2 In fact Adair had already taken steps at Vienna during the time of Oubril's mission at Paris to influence the Russian Emperor toward a critical attitude on the results of the negotiations. On July 11 he had sent to the British ambassador at St. Petersburg information which he had received from Yarmouth concerning Napoleon's plans for changes in Germany. 8 And later, having received word of the Oubril treaty, Adair had sent to St. Petersburg such critical comments upon it as he hoped, reaching Emperor Alexander ahead of Oubril, would have an effect upon his reception of the treaty. 4 Soon afterwards Adair heard that Oubril had gone beyond his instructions. He believed that, if Emperor Alexander refused to sign the treaty, Napoleon would at once start military operations against Russia, moving eastward along the southern and northern frontiers of Austria, in which case the latter power would not be able to maintain her neutrality. Acting upon these assumptions Adair pro' F o x to Adair, July 28, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 80. 2

Fox to Adair, A u g . 8, 1806, ibid.

3

Adair to Fox, A u g . 2, 1806, ibid.

* Ibid.

356

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QUESTION, 1806-1807

ceeded to urge upon Stadion the necessity for deciding upon the course of action Austria should take.1 He kept pressing Stadion to make a declaration as to what Austria would do if Russia and France renewed war and if Napoleon called upon Austria to declare for or against Russia, but found unsatisfactory the response of the Austrian foreign minister, who declared that for the immediate future the policy of Austria would be defensive. She would avoid all disputes with France and there would be no opposition to passage of French troops through Austrian territory to Dalmatia. However, she would not permit any sacrifices of territory and would defend her possessions to the last. If Austria were forced into an immediate war with France, Stadion declared, she would not risk a battle before Vienna, but would first withdraw her forces into Hungary. 2 Reports from Adair of these interviews with Stadion had reached London coincidentally with news of preparations by Prussia for war with Napoleon. Later had come reports of the Prussian defeat at Jena. The situation made it seem more than ever imperative at London that Austria be brought into an offensive alliance against France. Therefore at the end of October and again in mid November instructions were sent to Adair to urge upon the Austrians the necessity for coming to the aid of Prussia before it was too late, as any reduction of Prussia would endanger other states. Assurances of financial support from Great Britain were to be given, but only after Austria had shown that she definitely intended to act.3 There were in these despatches evidences of the fear that Austria would remember at this time that Prussia had failed to come to her aid after Austerlitz. Later the British cabinet learned that Russia, by her action 1

Adair to Fox, Aug. 9, 1806, ibid.

2

Adair to Fox, Aug. 13, 1806, ibid. Howick to Adair, Oct. 28, Nov. 14, 1806, ibid.

3

BRITISH

EXPEDITION

TO CONSTANTINOPLE

357

towards Turkey, was doing much to destroy the chance of bringing Austria into an alliance. Adair made it clear that as a result of the critical relations existing between Russia and Turkey, the Austrian court was so much opposed to an alliance with Russia that even the offer of a British guarantee against Russian conquest in Turkey was unavailing. 1 Howick, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, was left with only the dubious hope that a decisive Russian victory over the French might induce Austria to take up arms. B y January 1807 the British cabinet had little reason to expect success with Austria even with offers of generous subsidies, and yet a coalition without Austria would by no means be complete or secure. In view of the attitude of Austria, Howick decided that " Great Britain would keep an intimate concert with Austria awaiting events which may enable Austria to act more decisively; meanwhile Great Britain would seek to promote better relations between Russia and Austria." 2 In view of the establishment of French control in east Prussia in the later months of 1806, it was of first importance to Great Britain that she strengthen her alliance with Russia and do everything possible to help her against the menace of a French attack. Requests had come from Russia urging British expeditions to France or Holland and to Italy in order to force Napoleon to weaken his hold in eastern Prussia. These, however, Great Britain did not undertake during the autumn and winter of 1806, partly because troops available for such expeditions were engaged elsewhere, notably in South America. 3 British relations with Turkey had first taken on a serious aspect for the home government in the latter part of Sep1

Cf. supra, pp. 2 3 1 ; 310-311. ' Howick to Douglas, Dec. 30, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 68. 3 For an account of British activities in South America in 1806, see Fortescue, History of the British Army, v, pp. 318-319; 369-380.

358

THE

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EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

tember. The difficulties between Russia and Turkey over the deposition of the hospodars, Ypsilanti and Morousi, were taken at London as evidence of a French diplomatic victory seriously endangering the solidarity of the alliance of Russia and Great Britain with Turkey, which England had considered a bulwark against French attempts to expand in the Levant and a safeguard of British interests in India. Napoleon would probably come to the aid of Turkey in case of war by the latter with Russia and it was believed at London that he would certainly take advantage of it to advance his own interests in the east. Encouragement must be given to Russia by her ally. Accordingly, early in October instructions were sent Stuart at St. Petersburg to inform Russia that England was ready to sustain her in her demands that Turkey fulfill her treaty obligations, if the conduct of the latter seemed to be determined by French influence. However, England desired to have Russia secure satisfaction if possible by pacific means and not to divert her resources from the coalition against Napoleon. In presenting these views Stuart was at the same time to give assurances of support by England to Russia, " where her honor was involved and where the interests of the two countries were in common." 1 The British Foreign Office received reports from Arbuthnot at Constantinople concerning the activities and growing influence of the French ambassador at the Porte after the deposition of Ypsilanti and Morousi. Since June Arbuthnot had been asking for a British squadron in the eastern Mediterranean as an effective political instrument for checking the growth of French influence at the Porte and keeping Turkey loyal to her treaties with England and Russia. 2 The British cabinet finally decided to adopt this recommendation, 1 2

Howick to Stuart, Oct. io, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 64. Cf. supra, pp. 133; 150; 152.

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359

and on October 22—eight days after the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon at Jena, and six days after the order had been sent by Emperor Alexander to Michelson to march Russian troops into Moldavia—the British Admiralty sent orders to Admiral Collingwood, cruising off Cadiz, to send at once five ships from his fleet to reconnoitre the Turkish forts in the Dardanelles, " as a measure of prudence in case circumstances should call for attack on them by a British force." 1 Reports were subsequently received at London concerning the tense feeling at St. Petersburg over the deposition of Ypsilanti and Morousi, and of the growing demand in Russian official circles for military occupation of the Turkish provinces. Accordingly instructions were again sent Stuart about the middle of November to assure Russia that England would be ready to oppose to the utmost any hostile measure against her to which Turkey might be instigated by France. 2 At the same time, Arbuthnot was sent instructions to the effect that, however recalcitrant might be the conduct of the Porte, he was to use every method of amicable remonstrance in the hope of influencing the Turks to keep peace with Russia. However, he was to demand that the Porte give immediate satisfaction to Russia's demands. He was assured that his government was prepared to send a squadron " sufficient to give weight and if necessary to enforce an acquiescence to your representations." He was to take measures to protect British commercial interests in Turkey, and as a break in official relations might occur, he was to take all necessary measures to secure the belongings of the British embassy.3 After receiving further reports from Constantinople and St. Petersburg which made it seem that war between Russia 1

James, Naval History of Great Britain, 1793-1827, iv, p. 213. This squadron was placed under the command of Rear Admiral Louis. 1 Ho wick to Stuart, Nov. 11, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 65. * Ho wick to Arbuthnot, Nov. 11, 1806, ibid., Turkey, 52.

360

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QUESTION, 1806-1807

and T u r k e y was a serious possibility, and a f t e r hearing of the advance of Napoleon's troops eastward through Prussia to a position where French connections might be made with T u r k i s h forces on the Danube, the British cabinet decided further to reenforce the efforts of their ally, Russia, in order to bring T u r k e y to terms. First, instructions were sent Arbuthnot, declaring that the recent conduct of the Porte demonstrated clearly the prevalence of French influence and therefore made it necessary that England take vigorous measures to safeguard her interests and fulfill her engagements to Russia.

T o this end

another British squadron was being ordered to the Dardanelles.

U p o n its arrival Arbuthnot was to i n f o r m the Porte

that the squadron had come to attack or to defend T u r k e y according to her conduct.

French influence must cease or

British friendship was at an end.

T u r k e y could give proof

of the former event by keeping her engagements with E n g land and Russia.

T o keep peace with England she must im-

mediately comply w i t h the following demands: first, the former hospodars must be restored to office and in the future no hospodars must be deposed without the consent of R u s s i a ; secondly, permission must be given f o r passage of Russian warships

through the

Dardanelles.

If

these

conditions

were complied with, then the British fleet would remain only as long as necessary f o r the protection of T u r k e y .

Arbuth-

not was to give strong assurances that England would support T u r k e y in case trouble resulted f r o m a break France.

with

If the Porte refused or unduly delayed satisfaction

on these two points,

Arbuthnot

was to declare

British

official relations at an end and to retire to the British fleet and i n f o r m the commander that hostilities were to commence at once.

T h e Porte should also be asked to expel Sebastiani

and to renew the treaty with England, but these were minor points and if the Porte satisfied the British ambassador on the t w o m a j o r ones, failure to comply with the minor would

BRITISH

EXPEDITION

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not justify hostile action. If a war between Russia and Turkey began, Arbuthnot was to offer mediation on the basis of Turkey's immediate compliance with the two major demands; if it was accepted, he was then to request the Russian commander to suspend hostilities; if Turkey refused, he was to sever official relations and instruct the British naval commander to begin action. 1 The British naval forces were to be used in the Dardanelles like the Russian armies entering Moldavia, to make an " amicable demonstration " in order, if possible, to bring Turkey to terms. Simultaneously with these instructions to Arbuthnot orders were sent to the Admiralty to detach as soon as possible a second squadron from Admiral Collingwood's fleet off Cadiz, and send it to the Dardanelles, there to take such action as circumstances required. The commander was to be guided in the use of his fleet by communications from A r buthnot. If the British ambassador failed to secure a favorable response from Turkey, the squadron was to act offensively. The commander was to demand the surrender of naval supplies and the Turkish fleet; if this was refused he was to attack and bombard Constantinople. But this was not all. " In the event of strong measures becoming necessary immediately on the commencement of hostilities," the commander of the squadron, who was to be Rear Admiral Duckworth, should then inform General F o x stationed at Sicily and commanding British military forces in the Mediterranean, to send a force of five thousand men to occupy Alexandria. 2 " The object of His Majesty's Government is not the conquest of Egypt but merely the capture of Alexandria for the purpose of preventing the French from regaining a footing in that country." s 1

Howick to Arbuthnot, Nov. ao, 1806, ibid. Howick to Lords of Admiralty, Nov. 21, 1806, Admiralty Records, i, 412. 2

• Windham to Fox, Nov. 21, 1806, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, L'Angleterre et V&gypte, La Campagne de 1807, pp. 1-2.

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Stuart was also informed of the proposed measures, and in communicating them to the Russian government, he was instructed to make it clear that England considered the entrance of Russia into a war with Turkey at this time most unfortunate, but would not hesitate to contribute assistance to uphold the rights and promote the interests of her ally.1 A British occupation of Egypt would not give Russia the most direct and effective assistance. The latter had requested a British expedition from Sicily to Italy, expecting with good reason by this diversion to force a reduction of French forces in Dalmatia and thus to prevent the French troops from being used to help Turkish forces on the Danube against the Russians. If the British had desired only to help the Russians, they would have sent troops not to Egypt but with the British squadrons to the Dardanelles. The fact was that, in spite of official declarations that Great Britain acted only out of consideration of the interests of Russia, the British government was chiefly concerned in insuring its control of the Mediterranean route to the east against French aggression. Already, before the RussoTurkish crisis had arisen, Admiral Collingwood had expressed his belief that the French naval forces then being prepared in the Adriatic were not intended for Sicily but for E g y p t 2 and Missett, British agent in Egypt, had urged for some time that a British force be sent to Egypt to prevent any such venture by Napoleon and also to help the Mameluke Beys establish their control over Egypt which in turn would best secure British influence there.* Soon after the order of November 21 had been despatched for a second British squadron to the Dardanelles, reports 1

Howick to Stuart, Nov. 21, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 65

'Collingwood to H. Elliott, July 20, 1806, G. L. Collingwood, spondence of Lord Collingwood, p. 240. 8

Cf. supra, pp. 333 et seq.

Corre-

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reached the British Foreign Office of the restoration to office of Ypsilanti and Morousi, but at about the same time had come word from St. Petersburg of the intention of Russia to send her army on the Dniester into the Turkish Danubian provinces. Also reports came from Arbuthnot of the ill feeling toward him at the Porte and of the increasingly hostile feelings of the Turks towards Russia since the restoration of the hospodars had been forced on them. Then, later, came news of the advance of the Russian armies into Turkish territory, simultaneously with further reports of the movement of Napoleon's troops in Poland. Instructions were sent off to Arbuthnot in the middle of January 1807 declaring that there was great apprehension in Great Britain over the advance of Napoleon's forces towards the Russian frontier, as it would unfavorably influence the actions of Turkey towards Russia. As to the Russian advance into Moldavia, Great Britain relied upon the assurances made by Russia as to its non-aggressive purpose. Arbuthnot should seek to secure a pacification between Russia and Turkey as soon as possible if war broke out between them. But in case of war it was the first object of Great Britain always to support Russia with whom it was necessary to keep a close alliance in this critical period. Mere assurances by the Porte of friendship for Great Britain should not be fully accepted.1 To combat Napoleon's attempt to fight England by a blockade of her commerce with the continent,—the " Continental System " inaugurated by the Berlin Decree,—the British government on January 7, 1807, issued a decree proclaiming a blockade of all French ports, including those of her colonies. Neutral vessels were forbidden to trade at the closed ports without first touching at England or Malta to secure permission. This was tantamount to forbidding all trade with France. 1

Howick to Arbuthnot, Jan. 13, 1807, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 55.

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A s for any plans Napoleon might have f o r using Turkey as an instrument for helping him to humble Russia or attacking Great Britain through her trade and possessions in the Levant, the British government new relied upon an effective demonstration of British naval power in the eastern Mediterranean. On January 1 5 , 1807, the second British squadron to be despatched to the east Mediterranean, under Rear Admiral Duckworth, sailed from Cadiz for the Dardanelles, there to execute such an effective tour de force for British diplomacy at the Porte as, it was hoped at London, would allay further troubles in the Near East arising out of difficulties between Russia and Turkey and would hold Turkey loyal to her alliance with Great Britain and Russia. If this failed, the British would occupy Egypt and prevent Napoleon from establishing himself at the one place in the Mediterranean not already under British or Russian control where he might seriously endanger the British route to India. How successful the British were to be in these ventures we shall next consider. 2 Since early in December the first British squadron had been anchored in the Dardanelles, while its commander, Rear Admiral Louis had been at Constantinople attempting to give support to the demands of the British ambassador upon the Porte to keep peace with Russia. Louis left Constantinople on December 28 leaving one of his ships, the Endymion, to guard the British embassy and British merchants, and soon rejoined his squadron then anchored in Azire Bay. His attempt thus f a r to frighten the Porte by the presence of the squadron into submission to the Russian and British demands had apparently failed. 1 His instructions forbade him to go farther in case he was too weak to exert force effectually against the Turks. With Louis went the Russian ambassador, Italinski. 1

C f . supra, pp. 239; 241-242; 254-265.

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Arbuthnot remained at Constantinople to await the turn of events which he was aware, in view of the growing popular agitation in the city against Russia, might seriously endanger his own position. Ever since the Divan had decided —on December 16—upon a definite break with Russia, the British ambassador had experienced a distinct coolness on the part of the Porte. He learned that there was a growing feeling that Great Britain had been playing a double game, proclaiming her desire for peace with Turkey but secretly abetting the cause of Russia. 1 After the Porte declared war on Russia January 5, 1807, Arbuthnot was uncertain as to what course of action his government would want him to pursue. Also he was uncertain whether it would approve of what he had done. He had interfered from the beginning in the differences between Russia and Turkey over the passage of Russian vessels through the Dardanelles, and over the hospodars, as he had assumed that Great Britain had a right to intervene in these issues which concerned treaty agreements of 1799 to which she was a party. If the treaty were broken by one of its members its validity for all members was destroyed. Arbuthnot had also believed that the interests of Great Britain made it necessary at all costs to prevent the dissolution of the triple alliance, which had originally been made to prevent France from acquiring any interests in the Ottoman Empire. 2 Besides such instructions as he had received had repeatedly and definitely declared that Great Britain would go to the limit if necessary in support of Russia's demands upon Turkey. Confronted now with an actual declaration of war between Turkey and Russia and having received no instructions for 1

Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 28, 1806, ibid., 52.

* Arbuthnot to Canning, Feb. 1808, ibid., 62. In this communication written after Arbuthnot had retired from his post and when British relations with Turkey were being discussed in Parliament, he attempted to explain the basis of his conduct.

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a considerable time past, Arbuthnot at length wrote Howick on January 15 that he was uncertain as to the aims of British policy in this situation of affairs and needed instructions. The Turks, encouraged by the French, would be likely to offer stout resistance on the Danube to the Russians. The French ambassador, Sebastiani was trying to convince the Porte that Russia lacked a sufficient army to oppose seriously the advance of Turkish forces, and was also saying that Napoleon was advancing eastward through Poland with the Russians retreating before him and that he would not stop until he was in St. Petersburg. In the existing crisis, Arbuthnot continued, Turkey would very probably accept help from Napoleon. However, if Russian troops could be transported to the northern end of the Bosphorus and at the same time British naval forces advanced from the other direction through the Dardanelles, Constantinople would soon be forced to surrender and the Porte would be brought to terms. It would not be very difficult, Arbuthnot believed, for the British fleet to come through the Dardanelles in its present defenseless condition. He had therefore refused a request from the Porte that Admiral Louis's squadron he removed from the Dardanelles.1 Arbuthnot was also undoubedly moved to make his refusal by reason of fears for his personal safety and that of his staff and of British merchants. On the twenty-third Arbuthnot was gladdened by the arrival of Howick's instructions of November n, : 2 approving his earlier conduct in the development of the RussoTurkish difficulties. Further, Arbuthnot was informed that Great Britain intended to support the demands of Russia on Turkey by force if necessary, but preferred to secure the submission of the Porte if possible first by pacific 1 2

Arbuthnot to Howick, Jan. 15, 1807, ibid., 55. Cf. supra, p. 359-

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means. Therefore a second British squadron would be sent at once. Reassured, Arbuthnot was now ready to take more decisive action. In a long conference on January 25 with the Turkish ministers he incisively presented the intentions of Great Britain to support Russia by force to the limit if necessary, and warned of the dangers to Turkey if she maintained her associations with France. The Turkish ministers endeavored to discover whether the restoration of the hospodars had been known in London at the date of the last instructions. Arbuthnot refused to disclose the information. 1 Not satisfied with this attempt to coerce the Porte, Arbuthnot followed it with a sharp note to the Reis Effendi charging Turkey with initiating war against Russia and saying that, while the hospodars had been reinstated, the evident ill feeling shown by the Porte in the act justified the demand that it give an adequate guarantee as to the future security of the interests of Russia and Great Britain and also that Sebastiani be removed at once. If the Porte did not agree to the demands of the two powers, then a strong British fleet in conjunction with Russian naval forces would enter the Dardanelles. The British ambassador proceeded to point out as impressively as possible the disasters for Turkey which might result from operations of such a naval combination in conjunction with Russian armies in the Balkans.2 The Reis Effendi replied, vigorously denying that the French exercised any influence upon the action of the Porte. The hospodars had been first deposed because of evidence of disloyalty to their sovereign and their subsequent reestablishment had been proof of a desire of the Sultan not to 1

Arbuthnot to Howick, Jan. 27, 1807, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 55.

'Arbuthnot to Reis Effendi, Jan. 26, 1807, ibid.

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break with Russia and Great Britain. In spite of this Russia had proceeded with preparations for war and her troops had invaded Turkish territory and committed acts of violence against Turkish subjects. It was to be hoped that Great Britain would act with more justice. The Sultan had confidence in the justice of his cause and would take the necessary measures to defend his empire.1 The Porte was very anxious to avoid war with Britain, the French ambassador wrote on the twenty-seventh.2 From the report of the recent conference with Arbuthnot it was evident that the Turks suspected that his latest instructions had been formulated at London before the fact of the restoration of the hospodars had become know there. Furthermore, the Porte knew that the British ambassador had no time to seek new instructions from his government even if satisfaction were given by Turkey to Russia's demands, and that it was he who was to determine what conduct the British naval commander should adopt. Therefore, to avoid an immediate break with Britain which might arise from a British naval expedition to Constantinople and also to avoid placing itself in a difficult position with the French, the Porte now foolishly resolved to " isolate" Arbuthnot and prevent him from communicating with the fleet, at least until the situation should be improved. When on the twenty-seventh Arbuthnot sought to secure an order from the Porte permitting an officer of the Endymion to carry despatches, it was not granted, the Reis Effendi implying that the Porte desired that the ambassador should be fully acquainted with the views of the Porte before communicating with his government. Again applying for the order the next day, Arbuthnot sent a note assuring the Reis Effendi that he was sending no decisive communications to 1

Reis Effendi to Arbuthnot, Jan. 27, 1807, ibid.

* Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Jan. 27, 1807, A f f . Etr., de Turquie, 213.

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his government. The Reis Effendi hesitated and finally declared that it would be embarrassing to the Porte in the existing state of affairs for the ambassador to maintain communciation with the admiral of the British squadron as the latter might construe reports regarding the situation at Constantinople as justification for forcing a passage of the Dardanelles and opening hostilities. In the end he attempted to leave the impression that the order had not been refused but only delayed. Arbuthnot in reply demanded more explicit explanation as to the real intentions of the Porte with respect to its future relations with the British. On the same day—the twenty-eighth—Arbuthnot, so he later reported, heard that the Turks were in a state of elation over news of the defeat of the Russians by Napoleon at Pultusk and therefore were not going to listen to the demands of Great Britain. Also they intended to seize the Endymion and keep the British embassy as hostages. Knowing that in the past the Porte had thrown representatives of foreign powers into the grim Castle of Seven Towers, he decided on the morning of the twenty-ninth to quit Constantinople. He also felt justified in retiring from his post when he was no longer allowed the right of communication with his government. 1 That evening he went on board the Endymion and several hours later the ship set sail for Tenedos. Before the Endymion departed, Arbuthnot sent a note to the Porte declaring that the constraint placed upon his right of communication with his government indicated that T u r key did not desire to preserve friendly relations with Great Britain. He had therefore sought safety on the British fleet. T o keep peace with Great Britain, the Porte must stop war at once with Russia upon the terms laid down by the latter at the opening of the war, which involved no sacrifices by Turkey but only a return to her former relations 1

Arbuthnot to Howick, Feb. 3, 1807, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 55.

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with her allies and a renunciation of French counsels. If she refused, the British fleet would be sent into the Dardanelles to take hostile action and different terms would then be demanded of her. A n immediate reply of " yes " or " no " to these demands was required. He would be quite ready to return to his post if the reply of the Porte permitted.1 T o Baron de Hübsch, Danish minister, who was left in charge of the British embassy's property, Arbuthnot left a letter stating that he considered himself no longer safe in Constantinople on account of difficulties in getting messages. Hübsch found that the Porte was much surprised at Arbuthnot's departure and denied that it had attempted to prevent delivery of messages for the British embassy or that there was any danger to the person of the ambassador.2 Stürmer, the Austrian minister, reported that there was a general opinion at Constantinople that the presence of the British fleet and also the sudden departure of the British ambassador indicated a plan for a British expedition to Egypt.® It is evident that the whole course of British diplomacy at 1

Arbuthnot to Howick, Feb. 8, 1807, ibid.

Hübsch to Adair, Feb. 9, 1807, British Foreign Office, Austria, 83. Stürmer to Stadion, Feb. I, 1807, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Turkei, Berichte, 1806. Arbuthnot's conduct in his hasty departure from Constantinople has been both condoned and severely criticised by historians. James, in his able work on British naval history has nothing good to say of Arbuthnot over this affair. Naval History of Great Britain 1793-1827, iv, p. 215. Another writer in a recent study based upon archive material says it was a foolish mistake with no argument which can be adduced in its defense and that, even if Arbuthnot had been thrown into prison by the Turks, British naval forces could have soon effected his release. Ghorbal, The Beginnings of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mehemet Ali, p. 245. On the other hand the eminent British historian of this period, J. Holland Rose, after a special study of the affair says that the ambassador had good reason for flight. " An ambassador," he writes, " is bound to retire from a capital when the authorities there prevent him communicating with his government."—Rose, The Indecisiveness of Modern War and Other Essays ( N e w Y o r k , 1927), p. 165. See Chapter x for a special study of the British expedition to Constantinople. 1

8

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Constantinople during the development of the Russian and Turkish crisis had rested upon an assumption that the actions of the Porte could be laid chiefly to the intrigues and influence of the French ambassador. How much influence he had actually acquired thus far at the Porte can not perhaps be measured, though certainly circumstances had favored his mission. The break between Russia and Turkey and the unceremonious departure of the British ambassador now presented an opportunity to the French ambassador to intrench his influence at the Porte and win popular favor with the people in Constantinople, who were zealous for war against Russia and disturbed by uncertainty as to what the British might do. After the decision of the Divan to declare war on Russia, Sebastiani had taken an active part in the plans of the Turks for military preparations, urging quick and decisive operations on the Danube against the Russians and offering to secure French artillery officers and engineers especially for use in strengthening the dilapidated Turkish fortresses on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. He had a French officer, Juchereau de Saint-Denis, examine and give a report to the Sultan upon the condition of these fortifications and Selim issued orders for immediate execution of work which this report indicated as necessary. Sebastiani sent his aide, M. Lascours, to the Dardanelles to help in organization of its defenses. On January 27 he reported to Talleyrand that he had had numerous conferences with the Turkish ministers and had found them quite ready to accept his advice. Also the Sultan frequently sought his counsel, had conferred upon him the Grand Order of the Cross, and had prepared presents for Talleyrand and Napoleon. Sebastiani had called upon the Greeks to remain loyal to the Sultan, and at the same time the Patriarch Gregory had issued a mandate to the ecclesiastical hierarchy to the same effect. 1 1

Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Jan. 27, 1807, Aff. Etr. de Turquie, 213. The

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On January 28 Sébastiani wrote General Marmont, commanding in Dalmatia, that he expected to see a British and Russian squadron appear soon before Constantinople, but that even if they did reduce the city, this would not be the end of Turkey. Two French armies, one in Poland and the other in Dalmatia, would assure the continued existence and independence of the Ottoman Empire, promised by Napoleon. However, in pointing this out to the Turks he had not been able to remove their fears of the British. He urged Marmont to send munitions and officers to Ali Pasha of Janina, who alone stood in the way to Russian aggression in Greece.1 Sébastiani wrote Marmont again several days later—after the departure of Arbuthnot from Constantinople—to the effect that the Sultan had requested that French officers be sent as soon as possible for use in defending Constantinople, the Dardanelles and Salonica and that he had sent orders to all the pashas to facilitate passage of these officers. Marmont should arrange to send officers at once.2 Sébastiani had hoped, by taking advantage of the resentment over the departure of Arbuthnot and the threatening note he had sent on the twenty-ninth before leaving, to secure from the Porte a declaration of war against England. However, on February 9 he wrote to Paris that he had been Austrian minister reported to his government on January 24 that Sébastiani had great influence at the Porte, in striking contrast to the loss of it by the British ambassador. He was often consulted and he kept in constant touch with the Turkish ministers, presenting to them numerous plans for military operations. He had said much to Stürmer about a general peace. The Austrian minister appears to have suspected that this was merely a device to keep on good terms with him. Stürmer had found the Porte disturbed over certain recent movements of Austrian army corps on the frontier and he had hastened to give assurances that Austria would continue her policy of neutrality. Stürmer to Stadion, Jan. 24, 1807, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Türkei, Berichte, 1806. 1

Sébastiani to Marmont, Jan. 28, 1807, Mémoires Due de Raguse, iii, PP. 91-95* Sébastiani to Marmont, Feb. 1, 4, 1807, ibid., iii, pp. 95-96.

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unsuccessful, the Turks apparently intending to wait for the British to begin hostilities. He had been able to obtain only an embargo on British merchant vessels and an assurance that the Porte would not accept any of the British demands. He really did not believe Turkey would remain firm against England and he had little confidence in her powers of resistance to any attack by the British. While work on the defense of the city was going on with considerable rapidity, he had constantly to urge it on and to see that important defensive places were occupied. Further, he was aware of certain opposition to him. The anti-French party in the Divan was active in attempts to prejudice the Porte against France, claiming that she was seeking an agreement with Russia. Then rumors were arising of reverses of French armies in Poland, of discontent among French troops, of uprisings against Napoleon in Germany, and of British occupation of Naples. 1 These reports, untrue as they were, had evidently reached Constantinople early in February at a time when the question of war or peace with England was being weighed at the Porte. Sebastiani judged that there was good reason to fear lest they might cause the Porte to hesitate to enter into war with Great Britain in spite of assurances of French support. Much would depend upon the conduct in the im1 Report of Sebastiani, Feb. 9, 1807, Arch. Nat., A. F. I V , 1688. It is probable that these rumors had come in part from Vienna where already in the middle of January reports were circulating that the army under Bernadotte had been defeated, that the Russians had advanced into Warsaw as the French forces fell back to Posen, and that Russian and British forces had landed at Naples while Joseph fled to Florence. Driault, La Politique orientate de Napoleon, p. 92. Then despatches were intercepted at Constantinople from the British consul at Bucharest for Arbuthnot which mentioned that there were serious desertions from Napoleon's armies caused by the hardships of the winter campaign in Poland; also that Austria was on the point of declaring war against Napoleon.

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mediate future of the British naval forces then off the Dardanelles. Also the Porte might be able by skilful parleying with the British to ward off any immediately serious danger of an attack and at least gain time to strengthen Turkish defenses before a break should occur if it were found impossible to avoid it. On January 31 the Endymion bearing Arbuthnot 1 joined the other vessels of Admiral Louis' squadron at Azire Bay and the entire fleet then moved out of the Dardanelles to a position near the island of Tenedos. Then Arbuthnot awaited a reply from the Porte to his note of the twentyninth, a virtual ultimatum intended to force Turkey to take a position as friend or foe. However, should the Turks prove to be recalcitrant and refuse to accede to the demands embodied in the note, the question arose whether the ambassador was in a position with the naval forces at hand to carry out his threat of hostile measures against the Turks. It appears that Admiral Louis did not believe it could be done, for on February 5, without as yet having heard from the Porte, he wrote Collingwood that it was evident that active measures against Turkey would have to be restored to, but he did not believe his present forces were at all adequate and he must have reenforcements. A t least ten sail of the line, a proportionate number of frigates and smaller vessels were necessary to force passage of the Dardanelles, destroy the forts, reduce Constantinople and capture the Turkish navy. Also troops were necessary to garrison the forts, especially in the Dardanelles.2 Louis' recent sojourn with his fleet in the Dardanelles had given him opportunity to observe conditions involved in any operations which the British 1 Arbuthnot had left his family behind at Constantinople and British merchants also remained. The ambassador apparently looked upon his absence as only temporary.

Louis to Collingwood, Feb. 5, 1807, Parliamentary Expedition to the Dardanelles, March, 1808. 2

Papers relative to

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might attempt against Constantinople and therefore his views deserved attention. On February 6 Arbuthnot received the instructions from Howick of November 2 0 1 ordering him upon arrival of the second British squadron to inform the Porte that French influence there must cease or friendship with Great Britain could no longer exist. Great Britain wished observance of treaty agreements, especially those involving the hospodars and free passage of the Dardanelles. If these demands were not complied with, then Arbuthnot should end his mission and hostilities would begin against Turkey. With such decisive instructions, backed by the promise of enlarged naval forces, Arbuthnot sent off a note to the Turkish commander of the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles, announcing that the British naval forces were prepared to act effectively if negotiations were not reopened at once, but adding that if the British fleet did pass through the Dardanelles it would not fire upon the forts as Great Britain desired peace.2 Arbuthnot, having delivered a second summons to the Turks to consider British demands at once or else get a taste of British naval power, awaited anxiously the coming of the second British squadron promised in his last despatches. Admiralty orders of November 21 for such a detachment had been delayed in their departure from England by contrary winds detaining the vessel which conveyed them, and it was not until January 12 that they were received by Admiral Collingwood, then stationed off Cadiz, from whose fleet the squadron was to be detached and placed under the command of Rear Admiral John Duckworth.8 It was to go 1

Cf. supra, pp. 360-361.

2

Arbuthnot to Captain Pasha, Feib. 6, 1807, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 55. ' James, Naval History of Great Britain, 1793-1827, iv, p. 216.

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directly to the Dardanelles and take such a position as would enable it to bombard the city in case Arbuthnot's negotiations were not effective or should the Porte refuse to deliver up the Turkish fleet and naval supplies. Duckworth's orders at this point were obscured by contingencies significant to note in view of the subsequent acts of this officer. He was always to consult Arbuthnot on measures for coercing the Turks, and only when the latter judged it proper for hostilities to commence was he to demand surrender of the Turkish fleet. If hostilities seemed inevitable but the Turks proposed negotiations which seemed designed only to give them time, Duckworth was to recommend to the ambassador that negotiations continue for not over a half hour. If Turkey refused British demands then Duckworth should proceed to cannonade Constantinople or attack the Turkish fleet. It was very important that this fleet be captured. Also if hostilities opened he should at once inform General F o x who would be ready to send an expeditionary force to take Alexandria. 1 On January 1 5 Duckworth departed on his mission with six ships, two others to be added later at Malta. On the twenty-fifth he arrived off Palermo where Drummond, the British minister to the Sicilian government, informed him that he had heard through unofficial sources that war had been declared by the Porte on Russia. On January 29 Duckworth arrived at Malta. On the same day he wrote General F o x that, if Turkey had actually declared war on Russia, then " the causes of the two countries are so involved that it must produce a direct adoption of hostilities on our side," and inquired whether Fox did not consider that such a situation would call for immediate commencement of hostilities and the despatch of the British force to take possession of Alexandria. In this case Duckworth declared that he would 1

Collingwood to Duckworth, Jan. 13, 1807 (secret), Admiralty Records,

i, 413.

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attempt to send a detachment from his squadron to cruise off the coast of Egypt. In case of war with Turkey he would attempt to establish a naval base in the Aegean Archipelago, particularly examining the island of Milo for this purpose. If it were found advisable to establish it there, he asked that Fox send some troops to take possession.1 Soon after Duckworth had left Malta on February 3 he met the Apollo bearing General Sir John Moore sent by Fox to consult with him. They talked of the intrigues of the Sicilian government with France, and Moore urged that the despatch of the British troops to Alexandria be deferred until Duckworth had authentic evidence that hostilities between the British and the Porte had actually occurred. The latter agreed to this.2 The fact was that difficulties which the British officials in Sicily were having with the Sicilian government, coupled with suspicion of intrigue with Napoleon, made Fox much disinclined to weaken the British forces on the island at this time. On the night of February 8, Duckworth met with the Endymion just out from Tenedos from whose captain he learned of the departure of Arbuthnot from Constantinople. He wrote Fox on the ninth of the event, " this completely deciding the point of hostilities between us and the Porte." Therefore the expedition should be started at once for Alexandria.8 1 Duckworth to Fox, Jan. 29, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, L'Angleterre et L'Egypte, La Campagne de 1807, pp. 4-5. Shortly after anchoring at Malta Duckworth learned that a British frigate, the Activc, had just arrived bringing Italinski. He wrote Fox soon afterwards of this event, though without giving any evidence of having as yet communicated with the Russian ambassador, suggesting that this circumstance might help him to decide concerning the expedition to Egypt. Duckworth to Fox, January 30, 1807, ibid., p. 5. 2 3

Duckworth to Fox, Feb. 9, 1807, ibid., pp. 11-12.

Duckworth to Fox, Feb. 9, 1807, ibid. Concerning the manner of Arbuthnot's departure, Duckworth wrote that he "had been forced to fly Constantinople."

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Duckworth had thus committed himself to an act of aggression upon the Ottoman Empire, before he had consulted Arbuthnot concerning his negotiations with the Porte or ascertained his views as to whether a state of hostilities existed. Duckworth's instructions, it is true, had authorized him to order the expedition to Egypt when hostilities had actually opened with Turkey but in determining when a state of hostility existed between the two powers it is evident that his instructions implied that the decision was to be made only in conjunction with Arbuthnot. A t the time of the meeting of Duckworth with the captain of the Endymion, who had just come from Louis' squadron, he must have learned the real position and intention of Arbuthnot, unless the captain garbled his account of affairs. His premature commitment of the British to an invasion of Ottoman territory seriously jeopardized any settlement which Arbuthnot might now attempt to effect with the Porte. 1 Duckworth and his squadron subsequently joined Louis at Tenedos. The former assumed command of the combined squadrons. Arbuthnot having received no reply to his communication of the sixth to the Turkish commander, sent another communication again demanding that Turkey cease hostilities against Russia. A conference held on the thirteenth, after delay caused by storms, did not improve matters for Arbuthnot, as the Turk refused to negotiate on the basis of the British demands, claiming that because of the rapid advance of the French armies in Poland, Napoleon was in a position to threaten Turkey with invasion should the latter attempt to make peace with Russia. 2 1 There is no evidence in Arbuthnot's despatches to date that he knew anything as yet about the proposed British expedition to Egypt, and he must have learned of it only after Duckworth had sent the order to F o x — o n the ninth—to despatch the expedition. i

55-

Arbuthnot to Howick, Feb. 14, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey,

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TO CONSTANTINOPLE

379

T h e same day Arbuthnot received a note from the Porte explaining that there had been no hostile intentions in refusing the British ambassador the right of sending despatches, but that in view of the threat in his note of January 26 to bring a British fleet through the Dardanelles, the Porte considered it necessary as a matter of protection before granting the permit to the British despatch bearer, to ascertain more exactly the intentions of the ambassador. The delivery of the permit had been merely deferred and nothing had occurred to give cause for the ambassador's leaving. However Turkey, desiring to continue friendly relations with Great Britain, would refrain from showing any enmity towards her and in turn expected proof of British friendship. The differences between Russia and Turkey should not necessarily affect adversely the relations of Great Britain and Turkey. 1 Such was the reply of the Porte to Arbuthnot's note of January 29 demanding a yes or no reply to specified demands. There was no mention of any of the terms laid down by Arbuthnot. Also the Turkish commander had made clear that the Porte was not inclined to submit to the allied demands. Clearly the British ambassador had been rebuffed. His orders and also Duckworth's instructed them in case negotiations with the Porte was ineffectual to proceed at once to hostile measures. It remained to be seen whether they would interpret the situation as justifying such action. Duckworth now urged that the fleet be taken through the Dardanelles to Constantinople before they made any further attempts to negotiate. Arbuthnot at length agreed to this, though not without misgiving, and sent word to the Turkish commander, of the forts at entrance to the Dardanelles, of the decision declaring, however, that no hostile measures were intended.2 On the evening of the fourteenth one of the 1

Porte to Arbuthnot, Feb. 5, 1807, ibid.

2

Arbuthnot to Howick, Feb. 14, 1807, ibid. Arbuthnot's apprehension

380

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

British ships, the Ajax, burned, and over two hundred men lost their lives, a severe loss to the strength of the fleet.1 Then immediately followed bad winds which made it impossible to start at once, and every day of delay, they feared, would enable the Turks further to strengthen their fortifications. Louis, while no longer in command, was the one man who had experience in passing the Dardanelles and who had made observations as to the terrain about Constantinople. He had seriously doubted from the first, it has been noted, the expediency of undertaking such an expedition without a considerably greater number of ships than were now available even with the addition of Duckworth's squadron. Also he believed they should have ample troops for supporting operations on shore. A s it was they had with them only the ordinary quota of marines which was insufficient for extensive land operations or to provide garrisons for any positions taken from the Turks. However, in spite of their qualms, Arbuthnot and Duckworth had committed themselves to the expedition before the Turks and the honor of their country made it imperative that it be carried out. Also they considered that they were under obligation to help Russia end the war with Turkey, particularly, if, as reported, she were hard pressed by the French in Poland. Arbuthnot was ready, in order to secure about the proposed expedition is revealed in his despatch at this time to Howick that, in view of reported recent improvements of the Turkish fortifications in the Dardanelles, the passage would be made at considerable risk. Ibid. Duckworth was also apprehensive, and at the same time wrote Collingwood that he viewed the enterprise as the most arduous and doubtful that he had ever undertaken. They would be surrounded by enemies with only their own resources to rely upon and the return passage of the straits would be even more formidable as the Turks, aided by the French, would have decidedly strengthened their fortifications by that time. Nevertheless the expedition would be attempted. Duckworth to Collingwood, Feb. 14, 1807, James, op. cit., iv, p. 218. 1

James, op. cit., iv, p. 218.

BRITISH

EXPEDITION

TO CONSTANTINOPLE

381

cessation of the Russo-Turkish war, not to insist " too strenuously on all that I have been directed to demand." 1 Such show of willingness by the British ambassador to demand less of the Turks than his government had indicated, coupled with the decision already made to proceed to Constantinople to negotiate in spite of the obvious evasion to his ultimatum of January 29, did not sound as though he intended to use the British squadron to give the Turks a whipping first and bring them to terms afterwards. In view of the fact that Duckworth had already decided that a state of hostilities existed between the two powers which justified him sending orders for a British invasion of Egypt, it might well have been expected that the British fleet would now proceed to use force. Possibly the delay in starting had given Arbuthnot and Duckworth opportunity to speculate over dangers for the proposed expedition and had undermined their morale. Certainly no consideration of Arbuthnot's conduct during the whole affair can fail to take account of the fact that his family remained in Constantinople. In his despatch to Howick on the fourteenth announcing the decision to bring the fleet to Constantinople, he had declared that he was in an agony of fear for them.2 At last on February 19, favorable winds came and the British squadron weighed anchor and proceeded into the Dardanelles, receiving fire from Turkish forts at two places but with trifling damage. It had been previously decided by Arbuthnot and Duckworth that, if the Turks fired upon them, they would take such reprisals by force as were deemed necessary. And yet they still adhered to the plan of attempting to negotiate with the Porte. 1

Arbuthnot to Howick, Feb. 15, 1807, British Foreign Office, Turkey,

55. ' Reports received on the seventeenth concerning development of Turkish fortifications increased fears on board the British squadron over the outcome of the expedition. Arbuthnot to Howick, Feb. 17, 1807, ibid.

382

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

A t the upper end of the Dardanelles, in the bay of Nagara, the British suddenly came upon a Turkish squadron and at once opened fire upon it. Within several hours the Turks were completely routed; some of their ships were burned and others, disabled, drifted ashore. Late on the twentieth the British squadron anchored near Prince's Island about eight miles below Constantinople. 1 The next morning, with the squadron remaining at anchor, Arbuthnot sent a note to the Porte containing the following demands: the immediate delivery of the Turkish fleet and six months of naval stores; surrender of the Straits to the British fleet; permission that Russia, until peace was made, should occupy Moldavia and Wallachia and Turkish fortresses on the Danube. Turkey by its acts, continued the note, was in a state of war with Great Britain, but the latter power was ready to be friendly and desired to negotiate an understanding. The Porte would have until the evening of the twenty-second for an unqualified response.2 For a second time now the British ambassador had delivered a virtual ultimatum to the Porte presenting specific terms and demanding an immediate categorical reply of " yes " or " no ". A t just the time the fleet anchored off Prince's Island, Arbuthnot fell ill, and the responsibility for conducting the negotiations fell on Duckworth, who was not the man for the occasion if any credence can be given to the testimony of one of his captains who stated that " he was excellent only if acting as a second in command to a Nelson." 8 Arbuthnot's illness would very likely make him more inclined than ever to continue the negotiations, though Duckworth had been 1 Duckworth to Collingwood, Feb. 21, 1807, Parliamentary PaPers relative to Expedition to the Dardanelles, March, 1808.

* Arbuthnot to Howick, March io, 1807, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 55* Blackwood to Castlereagh, March 6, 1807, Correspondence of Castlereagh (London, 1851, 12 vols.), vi, pp. 165-166.

BRITISH

EXPEDITION

TO CONSTANTINOPLE

383

cautioned not to allow the Turks to prolong them. Meanwhile the Tuiks had been preparing to meet the British. When news reached Constantinople of the approach of the British fleet, Sébastiani had sought at once to calm fears at the Porte, giving assurance that the winds were not good for any near approach of the British to the city and that in a few days the defenses of Constantinople would be in good shape. He exhorted the Sultan to maintain his honor by refusing the demands of the British, warning that, if Selim submitted, he would forfeit the friendship of Napoleon and also probably lose most of European Turkey. By chance on the same day, February 20, Selim had received the letter from Napoleon of January 20 declaring that the Russians were retreating before him, that the moment had come for Selim to attack them vigorously, and that he would help in every possible way. 1 This message could not have arrived at a more opportune time to impress upon the Sultan the idea that Napoleon remained the sole defender of his empire, even though he may well have considered that his armies were too far away to save the Porte from the immediate danger of a British naval attack.2 The Austrian minister, Sturmer, reporting to his government on the twenty fourth stated that Sébastiani neglected nothing to arouse the enthusiasm of the Turks and was evidently succeeding. As long as the Turkish ministers listened to Sébastiani all negotiation with the British would be under 1

Cf. supra, p. 296. In spite of his efforts to bolster up the morale of the Turks, Sébastiani had his own secret doubts over the situation which he set down in a despatch that evening to Talleyrand. The defenses of the city were still inadequate. The Turkish officials were dilatory and they lacked courage. It was quite possible the Sultan would accede to British demands which Sébastiani believed might bring about his own imprisonment. The Sultan had made it clear that he could not be responsible for his safety. Sébastiani to Talleyrand, Feb. 20, 1807, Arch. Nat., A F IV, 1688. 2

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

his dictation as they virtually had been thus far. Sébastiani was also spreading reports concerning the subjugation of Prussia and the defeats of Russian armies by Napoleon and he also took every occasion to stress the idea of a rapprochement between France and Austria. Sturmer had kept silent and in the background throughout the course of recent events at Constantinople, which had evidently puzzled the Porte, in view of Sébastiani's statements. He had at length felt obliged to tell the Porte that Austria had undertaken no measures with a view to an alliance with France. 1 A f t e r five days of intensive activity numerous batteries were set up about the city representing a fairly formidable array of cannons and mortars. 2 With this development of defenses had gone an improvement in the morale of the Turks. Meanwhile the Porte under direction of Sébastiani had been seeking to prolong negotiations with the British in order to gain the necessary time to put the defenses in adequate condition for resistance if a break should finally occur. In reply to Arbuthnot's note of the twenty first, a Turkish representative, Isaac Bey, appeared next day proposing a conference with the Porte and begging the British fleet not to come nearer to Constantinople for fear of a massacre of the remaining British subjects. This was a clever and well directed appeal to the stricken British ambassador well calculated to make him more inclined to rely upon negotiations as long as possible, but after Isaac Bey had presented his terms Arbuthnot declared that they so completely failed to meet the British demands that he threatened to end further efforts at negotiation, and Duckworth announced that he 1

Sturmer to Stadion, Feb. 24, 1807, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Turkei, Berichte, 1806. Report of the Austrian mission represented by Vincent to Napoleon's headquarters (cf. supra, p. 300), had forced Sturmer to make this disavowal of an Austro-French alliance. * Driault, La Politique orientale de Napoléon, p. 103.

BRITISH

EXPEDITION

TO CONSTANTINOPLE

385

would proceed toward Constantinople with the fleet.1 Later that day—the twenty second—came favorable winds which would have permitted the fleet to move up to Constantinople. Duckworth later declared that he wanted to make the move but that Arbuthnot advised giving the Porte a little time to consider his reply and make its choice. While they were thus waiting it became calm again.2 Arbuthnot later justified the delay as being in accordance with his instructions to attempt first to bring the Porte to terms by pacific means before having recourse to force. 3 However no reply came from the Porte and the next morning Duckworth sent a note to the effect that if Constantinople was to be saved from calamity a Turkish envoy must be present at the British fleet by the morning of the twenty fourth with power to conclude peace.* The Porte was obviously seeking to gain time when it replied shortly by inquiring who officially represented Great Britain in the negotiations, and also tried to attribute the slowness of proceedings to difficulties in the translation of documents/ Early the next day—the twenty fourth—Duckworth sent another note which reaffirmed the pacific disposition of the British and declared that if the Porte guaranteed his safety he would come to some designated place for a conference. He noted, however, that new batteries were being erected commanding the approach to the city and warned that there was a limit to his patience.8 Later on the same day Duckworth sent another note to the Porte complaining of Turkish preparations for defense and demanding response to his 1 1

Arbuthnot to H o w i c k , M a r c h 6,1807, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 55. Duckworth to Collingwood, March 6, 1807, ibid.

* Arbuthnot to H o w i c k , M a r c h 6, 1807, ibid. 4

Duckworth to Porte, Feb. 23, 1807, ibid.

5

Porte to Duckworth, Feb. 23, 1807, ibid.

• Duckworth to Porte, Feb. 24, 1807, ibid.

386

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

previous communication within three hours.

Otherwise all

T u r k i s h boats in the Sea of M a r m o r a would be taken or burned. 1 T h e Porte replied that evening naming a place f o r a conference.

Duckworth

appointed R e a r

Admiral

Louis

as

British representative, 2 and then waited all o f the twenty fifth

f o r the T u r k i s h boat which w a s to take L o u i s to the

proposed conference.

Late in the day he sent a note of

inquiry to the Porte, with a proviso that the British would not demand surrender of the T u r k i s h fleet nor abandonment of Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia if the

Porte

would consent to the removal of the French ambassador and renewal of the triple alliance, offensive and defensive. 3 T h e Porte replied at once that there w a s no place on T u r k i s h soil where the safety of a British subject could now be secured against the popular f u r y of the Moslems.

Be-

sides, the D i v a n had decided not to treat until the British fleet

had retired

through

the

Dardanelles. 4

Duckworth

therefore delivered a sharp note making threats to bombard the city and declaring that the British returned to their original demands.

H e waited in vain f o r w o r d f r o m the Porte.

T h e r e continued to be no wind which would enable the fleet to move in any direction.

T h e fact w a s that the A d m i r a l

could not have carried out his threats, and he became less inclined to try to do so.

One of D u c k w o r t h ' s captains later

described the situation as one in which they had to decide whether they could afford to remain longer, without any possibility of getting help f r o m outside, confronted with strong T u r k i s h batteries, a fair-sized T u r k i s h fleet at the upper end of the Sea o f Marmora and many fire boats ready 1

Duckworth to Porte, Feb. 24, 1807, ibid.

* Duckworth to Porte, Feb. 24, 1807, ibid. 8

Duckworth to Porte, Feb. 25, 1807, ibid.

4

Porte to Duckworth, Feb. 25, 1807, ibid.

BRITISH

EXPEDITION

TO CONSTANTINOPLE

387

to move against them. It was eventually decided not to use force against the Turks but to prepare for departure when the winds were favorable. 1 On March 1 a favorable wind appeared and anchor was weighed but the fleet remained maneuvering about that day in view of Constantinople in the hope of receiving a favorable word from the Turks. Nothing was heard and that evening the fleet departed southward toward the Dardanelles. A f t e r a day of inquietude in Constantinople caused by sight of the British fleet and a night of suspense, great was the rejoicing of the people the next morning to see no trace of British sails. They acclaimed the Sultan, who in turn showered felicitations upon Sebastiani and gave him the chief credit for their success. The Sultan, forced by public clamor but against his own judgment, ordered the Turkish fleet to pursue the British. 2 Meanwhile the British squadron was passing through the Dardanelles without serious difficulties. On the fourth the fleet came to anchor off Tenedos. The British expedition to Constantinople was ended. The reasons for its failure are probably fairly well summed up by one of the captains of the fleet who later reported that it could be attributed to adoption of half and half measures with the Turks. Also wind and weather were unfortunate and the British should have had troops. 8 Concerning the first of these reasons, the failure of the expedition, aside from any alleged personal incapacity of the British admiral or personal interest of the ambassador in avoiding use of force on the Turks, can be laid to the existence of a divided responsibility and a lack of 1

Blackwood to Castlereagh, March 6, 1807, Correspondence of reagh, vi, pp. 161-167.

Castle-

' Sebastiani to Talleyrand, March 3, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turqute, 213. • Blackwood to Castlereagh, March 6, 1807, Correspondence of Castlereagh, vi, pp. 161-167.

o? « 8

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

coordination between diplomatic and naval policy. Duckworth's hands were tied by instructions from the home government requiring him to defer to the judgment of Arbuthnot. If Duckworth had followed Collingwood's advice not to let negotiations drag on, on the critical day of February 22 when the wind was favorable for the fleet to advance on Constantinople, the Turks might have then been brought to terms. But instead Duckworth had deferred—as the orders of Howick required—to Arbuthnot's request for delay. It is very probable in view of authentic reports of the panic generally produced among all classes in Constantinople over the arrival of the British fleet and the inclination of the Porte out of respect for British sea power to keep peace with Great Britain, that had the British shown determination to use force on the twenty-second they would soon have dominated the situation. Confirming this fact, Sébastiani wrote afterwards that it was not to be denied that, if the British had struck a blow soon after their arrival, they would have established control of the situation without difficulty.1 The Turkish fleet at the time was at the upper end of the Bosphorus and thus Constantinople had no defense on water and the land fortifications as already indicated were in a deplorable state. It is possible that had the strong Russian fleet under Admiral Siniavin been cooperating closely with British naval forces in the Mediterranean it might have made the British naval demonstration in the Dardanelles more effective. At the time of Duckworth's departure to the east, Admiral Collingwood had written Siniavin asking for his cooperation. Siniavin was near Cattaro at the time but at the end of January brought a squadron to Malta where it remained until February 22 when word came from Duckworth concerning the departure of Arbuthnot from Constantinople. When 1

Sébastiani to Talleyrand, March 3, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 213.

BRITISH

EXPEDITION

TO CONSTANTINOPLE

389

Duckworth asked for support f r o m the Russians, Siniavin left Malta with a squadron of eight sail and nine hundred Russian troops, arriving off Tenedos soon after the British fleet returned there from Constantinople on March 4. 1 O n March 7 Siniavin declared a blockade of all Turkish ports and proposed to Duckworth that the two fleets return together to Constantinople and compel the Porte by force if necessary to make peace. H e claimed he had orders to do this and they must be fulfilled. 2 Duckworth replied that in view of the formidable Turkish batteries a naval force could not get through the Dardanelles and reduce Constantinople without cooperation of land forces. Russian troops might be used for this purpose. I f the Russians had f r o m the first helped the British expedition as the British had expected, they might have been successful.' Siniavin replied that it was not impossible to force the Dardanelles a second time. He had positive orders to force a passage. If the British joined, their combined forces would be so formidable as to insure success. T w o thousand Russian troops were available for land operations. He also proposed that they seize certain islands in the Archipelago—Tenedos, Lemnos, T a s s o — a s sources of provisions, for use in establishing a permanent blockade of the entrance to the Dardanelles, and also as a base for cruising off the coast of A s i a Minor. 4 Duckworth was favorable to the last proposal but refused to participate in an expedition to Constantinople. T h e number of troops Siniavin offered, he declared, was inadequate for land operations. Besides, Duckworth claimed his fleet was needed elsewhere in the Mediterranean. He suggested that the Russian fleet alone should thereafter safeguard the 1

James, op. cit., iv, p. 217.

* Siniavin to D u c k w o r t h , M a r c h 7, 1807, A d m i r a l t y Records, i, 413. * Duckworth to Siniavin, M a r c h 10, 1807, ibid. 4

Siniavin to D u c k w o r t h , M a r c h 12, 1807, ibid.

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Adriatic against the French and the Archipelago against the Turkish fleet.1 Duckworth later informed Collingwood that he did not believe in the sincerity of the Russian admiral's proposal of an expedition to Constantinople, feeling it was designed merely to justify him for not having first help the British. 2 Collingwood in fact had distrusted Siniavin ever since the failure of the Russian admiral to help the British in their expedition to Calabria in the previous summer. Duckworth's refusal of Siniavin's proposals may also be partly explained by the fact that he knew that Collingwood was apprehensive of a French attack upon Sicily and of the danger to the British in the western Mediterranean from considerable French naval forces concentrated at Toulon. H e awaited orders from Collingwood for return of a portion of his squadron to the western Mediterranean. Also he wanted to be free to help the British expedition to Egypt. O n March 6 he had heard from F o x that all preparations had been made for departure of the expedition. Duckworth had replied at once that he intended to send some of his ships to Alexandria as soon as repairs had been completed. 3 A division of Duckworth's fleet soon occurred, one portion returning to the west and the remainder being left under command of Rear Admiral Louis in the eastern Mediterranean tc watch the Turks, to guard Alexandria, and to give any help necessary to the Russian fleet in the Adriatic. Siniavin, having failed to secure British support for his project of a joint expedition to Constantinople, went his own way. He did not venture alone upon such an enterprise. 1

Duckworth to Siniavin, March 13, 1807, ibid.

Duckworth to Collingwood, March, 1807, G. L. Collingwood, spondence of Lord Collingwood, p. 282. 2

* Duckworth to Fox, March 7, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, terre et L'&gypte, La Campagne de 1807, p. 20.

CorreL'Angle-

BRITISH

EXPEDITION

TO CONSTANTINOPLE

391

However, he was determined to strike some blow against the Turks as war had been declared. He took possession of the island of Tenedos late in March. After several days bombardment the town of Salonica also surrendered to the Russians. 1 With possession of these two places Siniavin believed he had secured control of the entrance to the Dardanelles and thereby had placed himself in a position to coerce the Turks. 1

Driault, op. cit., p. ill.

CHAPTER

X V

T H E B R I T I S H I N V A S I O N OF E G Y P T I

IN the latter part of January 1807 General F o x had received orders marked " most secret " from the British government to prepare immediately a force of five thousand troops in Sicily for a possible expedition to Alexandria. He was to despatch them when he received word from Admiral Duckworth that hostilities had begun between Turkey and Great Britain. 1 F o x was perturbed by this unexpected demand and informed his government that it was unwise to weaken the defence of Sicily unless in case of absolute necessity. He hoped that a rupture with Turkey would be avoided. 2 F o r some months the relations of British officials in Sicily with the native government had been increasingly unsatisfactory largely because of the opposition of an anti-British clique in government circles headed by Queen Marie Caroline, whom the British had good grounds for suspecting of intriguing with Napoleon. Lord Acton, long the British special adviser of King Ferdinand, had been dismissed and his place taken by Marquis Circello, a follower of the Queen. She had opposed a treaty proposed by Great Britain, which among other things would have placed all the military forces and fortifications of Sicily, under the complete control of British officers and thus assured the British this strategic place in the Mediterranean. 3 She had also urged a British expe1

Windham to F o x , Nov. 21, 1806, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, L'Angleterre et L'Egypte, La Campagne de 1807, pp. 1-2. This work is a compilation of official despatches taken from the British War Office and Admiralty Records. 1

F o x to Windham, Feb. 6, 1807, ibid., pp. 7 - 1 1 .

5

Fortescue, History

392

of the British Army,

vi, pp. 28-29.

THE

BRITISH

INVASION

OF

EGYPT

393

dition to Italy, a suggestion which had been taken by Drummond, the British minister, and Fox as a ruse to weaken British hold on Sicily and deliver the island to Napoleon. Early in February F o x had written home that the British would never have a secure place in Sicily while the Queen and her followers remained there.1 The hope of Fox that it would not be necessary to weaken his forces in Sicily by an expedition to Egypt was not to be realized; on February 18 he received the despatch from Admiral Duckworth stating that the departure of Arbuthnot from Constantinople, of which he had just heard, definitely meant that hostilities existed between the two powers, and that Fox was therefore to send the expedition at once.2 He embarked the troops, under command of General Fraser, and with Captain Hallowell in command of the transports the expedition sailed from Messina on March 6.3 It appears that both the Porte and Mohammed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, had been expecting a British attack on Egypt for some time before the expedtion actually arrived. At the end of December Missett, British agent, had written Arbuthnot that noticeable attention was being given to the fortifications of Alexandria, probably by order of the Porte.4 Late in January he reported that orders had recently come to Mohammed Ali from the Porte to place the country in a state of defence and to oppose by every means the landing of British troops in Egypt. Missett gave assurances to the home gov• Fox to Grenville, Feb. g, 1807, ibid. J

Fox had previously importuned Duckworth to be sure to ascertain without any doubt that hostilities existed between the two powers before he committed himself to the expedition to Egypt. However, as we have already noted, Duckworth had sent the order for the expedition before he had met Arbuthnot and fully learned his views as to the status of British relations with the Porte. Cf. supra, pp. 377-378. ' Fox to Windham, March 4, 5, 6, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., pp. 17-20. 4 Missett to Arbuthnot, Dec. 31, 1806, British Foreign Office Turkey, 52.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

ernment that, if such an expedition were sent, Alexandria would be incapable of offering resistance. Also he had received declarations from the chiefs of several neighboring Arab tribes that they would support the British. 1 Missett had long urged that his government send troops to Egypt to safeguard the country against a French invasion, to help the Mameluke Beys to restablish their control there and to assure the predominance of British over French influence in local political affairs. Ever since the Turkish mission had departed in October, leaving Mohammed Ali in his position of governor Missett had continued to hold before the chief Beys the hope of a British expedition. But the cause of the Mamelukes had recently suffered severe blows in the deaths of the two most capable Beys, Bardissi in November and Elfi in January. 2 Mohammed Ali had no more very formidable enemies among them, but he was by no means master of Egypt as yet. He was aware of the hope of the Beys and the British agents of a British expedition and he knew that the orders from the Porte to prepare for this possibility were induced by the fear that Great Britain would undertake the retribution, threatened by Arbuthnot, for the Porte's decision to break with Russia. For some time the French consul, Drovetti, had been urging Mohammed Ali to take measures to strengthen the coast defences, especially Alexandria. He had also been very active, much to the disturbance of Missett, in advising the commandant o f that city how to improve its defences.3 He had urged on Ali, in view of the possibility of a British attack, the necessity of reducing the Mamelukes as soon as possible so that they could not help the British. The two 1 Missett to Windham, Jan. 26, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., PP- 3-42 Cf. supra, pp. 351; 353s Missett to Windham, Feb. 6, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., p. 9.

THE

BRITISH

INVASION

OF

EGYPT

most influential Mameluke chiefs having died, Drovetti urged that by a quick and vigorous attack Ali might drive the remaining Beys out of Egypt or at least force them to adopt a position of neutrality in case of British invasion..1 After the death of Elfi, Ali had succeeded in recruiting some of his soldiers and had hoped thus to weaken his party. He first proposed peace to Elfi's successor, Shahine Bey, but the latter's reply was not conciliatory.2 He then decided to make an attack on the Mamelukes and on February 12 started for upper Egypt with an army. On the eighteenth he halted at Benisouef and sent an officer to Cairo for reenforcements, hoping by a great display of force to intimidate the Beys and oblige them to negotiate with him.3 When soon afterwards Ali learned of the declaration of war by Turkey against Russia, he ordered representatives to be sent at once to open negotiations with the Beys. 4 At about this time news reached Egypt of Arbuthnot's departure from Constantinople. At once rumors spread that the British would soon invade Egypt, rumors which Drovetti reported that the British agents were encouraging.5 Ali received orders from the Porte to make peace with the Mamelukes, restore to them their property and unite with them to oppose the landing of any foreign troops in Egypt. Also the Porte called upon the Beys to accept the terms of the pasha and to join him against the enemies 1

Reybaud and Saintine, L'Histoire scientifique et militaire de tion française en Egypte, ix, p. 331.

l'Expédi-

1

Mouriez, Histoire de Mékémet Ali, i, p. 273. This Bey, who will henceforth be called Shahine Bey l'Elfi, must not be confused with the successor of Bardissi, Shahine Bey l'Bardissi. ' Mengin, L'Egypte 4

sous Méhémet Ali, i, p. 267.

Abdurahman Al Djabarti, Merveilles Biographiques et Historiques Chroniques, French trad. (Caire, 1896, etc., 9 vols.), viii, p. 51. 4

ou

Drovetti to Talleyrand, March 2, 1807 ; Drovetti to Sébastiani, March 2, 1807, Douin, Mohamed Aly, Packs du Caire, 1805-1807, pp. 152-154.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

of the Sultan. Missett did not believe the Beys would agree but, to offset inclinations which any of them might have to obey these orders, he sent couriers to them announcing a break in official relations between Turkey and Great Britain, declaring that it would be politically advantageous for them not to break with Great Britain, and inviting them to look forward with confidence to happier days. 1 At the same time he wrote F o x that it would be easy for a British force to take Alexandria as the garrison was small, guns and munitions lacking, and the native people would like to see the country occupied by the British who they hoped would restore order and peace. Also, a British expedition would be certain to check any union o f the Beys with Mohammed Ali ordered by the Porte. 2 At the same time Drovetti urged Mohammed Ali to hasten the development of defences along the coast and to send all his available troops into lower Egypt. Thereupon Ali sent a thousand Albanian troops to reenforce the garrison at Alexandria, but they were refused admittance by the commandant, Emin Bey, and this in spite o f the efforts of Drovetti to persuade him to grant it. Emin Bey had been urged to make the refusal by Misetti, who was also in Alexandria at the time and who had been opposing Drovetti's anti-British propaganda by spreading the idea among the natives that only by the protection of the British could they be freed from the depredations of the Albanian soldiers. He considered that he had won a victory when the people armed themselves and appeared on the walls of the city ready to resist the pasha's troops who eventually retired with the appearance of the British expedition. 3 Missett to Windham, Feb. 21, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., p. 141 Missett to Fox, Feb. 21, 1807, ibid., pp. 15-16. 1

•Drovetti to Sebastiani, March 25, 1807, Douin, op. cit., pp. 154-160; Missett to Fraser, March 15, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., pp. 20-22.

THE BRITISH

INVASION

OF

EGYPT

On March 13 a British ship of war appeared in the harbor of Alexandria bringing to Missett news of the approach of the expedition and requesting information concerning the situation. Missett sent the British consul, Briggs, on board to assure the commander that the garrison was weak and incapable of serious resisance and the people ready to receive the British. 1 A t the same time he sent a letter to Shahine Bey l'Elfi announcing the arrival of the ship, urging that he at once join the British, and stating that Great Britain was making war on the Porte for the purpose of permitting the Beys to reenter Cairo. 2 Drovetti at the same time sent a courier to Mohammed Ali with news of the arrival of the British brig, urging that he stop all messengers from the British to the Beys, force them to come to terms with him and concentrate his forces as soon as possible in lower Egypt. Drovetti also urged Emin Bey to resist the landing of the British forces.8 On March 14 the British fleet appeared before Alexandria. General Fraser issued a manifesto declaring that the British had come as liberators of Egypt to rescue it from French influence and from the rapacity of Mohammed Ali. 4 He 1 Missett to F r a s e r , M a r c h 15, 1807, D o u i n and Fawtier-Jones, op. pp. 20-22.

cit.,

2 Missett to Shahine B e y l'Elfi, M a r c h 13, 1807, Douin, op. cit., p. 173. It was upon this B e y , inheritor of the patrimony of M o h a m m e d Elfi, w h o had f o r m e r l y been the special political protégé of the British, that Missett chiefly relied f o r help. H e hoped that Shahine would have enough prestige—as successor to M o h a m m e d E l f i — t o influence the other Beys. T h e other chief B e y s , it will be recalled, w e r e O s m a n B e y Hassan, Ibrahim B e y , and Shahine B e y l'Bardissi. T h e first t w o w e r e jealous of the successors of Bardissi and Elfi, while the last, k n o w n to be the enemy of the late Elfi, could not be expected to have much good w i l l f o r Shahine B e y l'Elfi. In fact, chronic jealousy and distrust existed a m o n g all the Beys, the numerous less important ones becoming uncertain partisans of each party as circumstances directed.

* Drovetti to Sébastiani, M a r c h 25, 1807, ibid., pp. 154-160. 4

Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

hesitated to debark in spite of Missett's favorable reports. Emin Bey refused a summons to surrender the city, which increased Fraser's misgivings, but Missett insisted that the place could be easily occupied and that the people were really glad to see the British. Fraser finally consented to begin operations and during the next few days the British occupied various points in the vicinity of Alexandria and on the twentieth the city surrendered. 1 Upon the first appearance of the fleet Drovetti had made every effort to prevent the surrender of the city, appealing in vain to the principal sheiks to oppose it. He hastily left the city on the seventeenth, arriving in Cairo several days later. There he attempted to strengthen the cause of Mohammed A l i and to mitigate the alarm caused by the appearance of the British by declaring that the French would come very soon to drive them f r o m the country. H e sent word to Shahine Bey l'Bardissi and Soliman Bey el Gergiaoui urging them not to join the British but to keep neutral and rely on the French who alone would secure a definite political organization of Egypt. 2 Shortly after the British occupation of Alexandria, Missett sent proclamations to the chief Beys and others announcing the event and declaring that the British had come not to conquer Egypt, but to prevent the French from executing their plans. Only by joining forces with the British could the Beys hope to realize their ambitions. He asked that they send a " confidential " person to state their wishes.® Missett believed that, unless the British effectually helped 1 For reports on military operations see Hallowell to Duckworth, March 24, 1807; Fraser to Windham, March 25, 1807; Appendice: Notes on an Expedition to Alexandria, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., pp. 27-29; 29-34; 183-194.

* Drovetti to Sebastiani, March 25, 26, 1807, Douin, op. cit., pp. 154-161. * Missett to Ibrahim Bey, Osman Bey Hassan, Cashefs and Mamelukes, March 22, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

THE

BRITISH

INVASION

OF

EGYPT

the Beys to secure Cairo, they would not be given their cooperation. 1 He had mingled for several years in the political rivalries of the country and he was of the opinion that a British expedition had a distinct political function—that of placing the Mamelukes securely in control of Egypt. This he thought the surest way—next to permanent British control of the country—to safeguard British interests against the French of whom he believed that Mohammed Ali was the tool. On the other hand, the officers commanding the British expedition would probably see their task primarily as a military operation intended, as their instructions had indicated, to prevent the French from making any invasion of Egypt by occupying the chief ports of entrance to the country. Having accomplished this they would probably not be much concerned over enterprises involving extension of operations for political purposes—though their instructions had mentioned assisting parties in Egypt which were favorably disposed toward the British. The limited size of their military force would make them hesitant to extend their operations beyond points on or near the coast where contact could be readily maintained with their naval forces. None of them were acquainted with the country, the inhabitants of which were non-European peoples in whom the average British officer had little confidence. Such considerations must be taken into account if we are to understand the differences which arose between Missett and the officers in charge of the expeditionary forces. Hardly had the British got settled in Alexandria when Missett informed Fraser that the city had on hand only a very small supply of wheat. If immediate famine were to be avoided, Rosetta must be occupied at once and control of the region upon which they depended for food assured.2 1

Missett to Windham, March 23, 1807, ibid., pp. 25-26.

2

Missett to Fraser, March 23, 1807, ibid., pp. 26-27.

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Missett was certainly the one person among the British who knew well the local situation. However he has been charged by some critics with harboring behind this proposal grand political schemes for the conquest of Egypt, and with having deceived Fraser. 1 Whatever ulterior motives Missett may have had, if any, Fraser at least appears to have been disturbed by the proposal and much disinclined at first to consider it. Vessels were despatched to the Greek islands to secure provisions and to invite the natives to send their produce to Egypt. 2 It would, however, take time for provisions to come from these islands and meanwhile food must be had; therefore Fraser, apparently forced by necessity, finally agreed to the occupation of Rosetta. 3 Preparations were at length completed for the expedition 1 Banbury, The Great War with France, p. 291, note. For another unfavorable account of Missett's conduct throughout the British occupation of Egypt see Ghorbal, The Beginnings of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mehemet Alt, p. 248 et seq. * Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., p. 195.

* Fraser's disinclination for the task is evidenced in a despatch which he sent at this time to the home government, declaring that, while he was authorized to take possession only of Alexandria, it might be necessary to occupy other places as well. He had already agreed, against his inclinations, to Major Missett's project of an occupation of Rosetta and it was therefore advisable that additional troops be sent at once to Egypt. Also he desired specific instructions conveying the wishes of the home government in the matter of assisting the Mamelukes to get possession of Cairo and to expel the Albanians entirely from the country as it appeared that Major Missett had already encouraged them to expect help from the British forces in both these undertakings. Fraser to Windham, March 27, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., pp. 34-35. The instructions which Fraser had brought with him were general in so far as they concerned the political aspects of the expedition and they pointed out that interference in party dissensions in Egypt would probably be unavoidable, but that the home government could not at the time indicate the " precise line which it will be proper . . . to take in the exercise of such interference." On such questions he should seek the advice of Major Missett. Windham to Fox, Nov. 21, 1806; instructions transmitted to Fraser, Fox to Fraser. Feb. 2, 1807, ibid., pp. 1-2; 7-8.

THE BRITISH

INVASION

OF

EGYPT

and on March 29 a force of fourteen hundred soldiers under General Wauchope left Alexandria, appearing on the thirtieth before the town. The British officers seem to have believed that the place could be easily taken, for without any preliminary investigation as to the disposition of the opposing forces the troops marched into its narrow streets.1 The Turkish commander, Ali Bey, had only about five hundred troops and few munitions, nor could he count upon the support of the townspeople whose chief leader, the Sheik Hassan seemed to be pro-British. 2 He cleverly hid his troops in houses along the main streets and, when the British had well advanced, suddenly opened fire upon them from all directions. They were surprised and for a while disorganized, but soon rallied and advanced again into the town, forcing back the Turkish troops, though at the cost of the life of General Wauchope. The British now seemed secure in their control of the town, the native people were friendly, and the British agent, Petrucci, was preparing the banquet for the officers. When Ali Bey found that he was no longer pursued by the British, his courage was renewed and he turned his troops back toward Rosetta, suddenly appearing in the town where the British troops had imprudently been allowed to disband. Surprised, they were unable to rally sufficiently to drive back the Turks again, and consequently had themselves to retreat. They returned at once to Alexandria.* After this disastrous and humiliating affair Fraser wrote to Fox and also Windham, Colonial Secretary, that, since 1

It is probable this confidence was due to previous injudicious reports from the British agent at Rosetta, Petrucci, w h o was so sure that the British would be successful that he had prepared a banquet for the officers to enjoy after their occupation of the town. Mouriez, op. cit., i, p. 279. 4

Mengin, op. cit., i, p. 2 7 1 ; Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., pp. 1 7 5 180 (nos. 1 3 4 - 1 3 7 ) . 8 For detailed official reports of this expedition see, Douin and FawtierJones, op. cit., pp. 195-200.

THE NEAR

EASTERN

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J80&-1807

Great Britain was at war with Turkey, her forces in Egypt would certainly be involved eventually in a struggle not only with Mohammed Ali's Albanian troops but also with the Turks. Already they had a combined force of twelve thousand and it was reported that considerable reenforcements of Turkish troops were coming into the country. Encouraged by these accessions to their number and by the recent defeat of the British, Fraser believed they would now take the offensive, and attempt to surround Alexandria and cut off its supplies. If they should be successful the British would be forced to evacuate the place. There was as yet no evidence that the Mamelukes would come to the aid of the British. Reenforcements were necessary if they were to retain Alexandria and occupy adjacent points in order to safeguard the town. Fraser complained that the real state of the country had been misconstrued from the first. (This remark was no doubt directed at Missett). He wanted specific instructions concerning his future conduct and also immediate reenforcements.1 However, the desire to restore the honor of British arms, the importance of reestablishing British prestige among the native people and above all the pressing representations of Missett, supported by a deputation of notables from Alexandria, of the necessity for securing food supplies, decided Fraser to prepare a second expedition to Rosetta, without waiting for the requested reenforcements.2 On April 3 twenty five hundred men under General Stewart left Alexandria with that objective. Meantime Ali Bey, suspecting that the British would make a second attempt to take the town, had sent a courier posthaste to Cairo demanding reenforcements, from Mohammed 1

Fraser to Windham, April 6, 1807; Fraser to Fox, April 6, 1807, ibid., pp. 40-43; 44-45' Fraser to Windham, April 6, 1806, ibid., pp. 40-43.

THE BRITISH

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OF

EGYPT

Ali's Albanian forces, which by the seventh were on the way. 1 The fortifications of the town were strengthened. On the seventh the main British force appeared before Rosetta, but General Stewart found that he would not be able to take the place at once. He had, moreover, to detach half of his force to guard his line of communications. A part of this detachment was surrounded by the Albanian troops arriving from Cairo and forced to surrender, and troops sent to their aid were routed by the Turks and Albanians. Stewart's forces were in this way so reduced that he was obliged to withdraw from Rosetta and return to Alexandria. 2 During the siege of Rosetta Stewart had waited for the Mameluke Beys to appear with their troops. There had been a report that they were coming and their cavalry were especially needed.8 But the Beys during this time were well up the Nile leisurely awaiting the outcome of events in lower Egypt. At this point it will be well to consider events which meanwhile affected the relations of Mohammed Ali and the Mamelukes. It will be recalled that about the middle of February Mohammed Ali had suddenly left Cairo for upper Egypt, hoping by a decisive campaign against the Beys to force them to peace. Soon after his arrival at Benisouef, he had heard of the official declaration of war by the Porte upon Russia, and he had received orders from Constantinople to make peace with the Mamelukes. He then despatched orders to Cairo that certain sheiks be sent at once to open negotiations with them. Believing, however, that they would be more amenable to the idea of peace if he could first inflict a defeat upon them, while he was awaiting the arrival of the sheiks, he suddenly attacked the camp of Shahine Bey l'Elfi, 1

Gabarti, op. cit., viii, p. 102. * Reports of second British expedition: Stewart to Fraser, April 18, 25, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., pp. 50-54; 68-73. • Ibid.

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807 capturing a considerable amount of baggage and artillery, and inflicting some losses. Then A l i marched quickly upon the important town of Assiout on the Nile and forced it to surrender. 1 The other chief Beys had remained inactive since the arrival of Mohammed A l i in upper Egypt and to them Ali sent his representatives, now arrived from Cairo. They were favorably received and negotiations were started.2 On March 19 news had reached Cairo of the arrival of the British expedition. The kiaya, chief lieutenant of the pasha left in charge there, decided to call back Mohammed A l i with his troops.3 Not only the presence of the British at Alexandria but also the local situation seemed to require his return. In the absence of Ali the natives of Cairo had shown a disposition to arm themselves and combat the Albanian soldiers, and the kiaya had been forced to reduce his force by despatching troops to Rosetta and other places in lower Egypt to oppose the British. 4 Drovetti, arriving in Cairo from Alexandria on the twenty-fourth, urged the kiaya to take measures for defending the city against a possible attack by the British aided by the Beys, but he wrote Mohammed A l i not to leave upper Egypt until he had obtained a decisive success over the Beys and assured their neutrality.® A t the same time he sent messengers to several of the Beys requesting that they hold to a strict neutrality.® Drovetti feared that the ill will of the inhabitants of Cairo for the Albanian soldiers might affect their loyalty to the pasha, and he per1 Drovetti to Sebastiani, March 28, 1807, Douin, op. cit., p. 162; Mengin, op. cit., i, p. 273; Reybaud and Saintine, op. cit., ix, pp. 333-334. R e f e r ences do not agree upon the date of this engagement, but it probably took place between the twentieth and the twenty-fifth of February.

' Mouriez, op. cit., i, pp. 280-281. 5

Gabarti, op. cit., viii, p. 94.

4

Drovetti to Sebastiani, March 26, 1807, Douin, op. cit., p. 160.

5

Drovetti to Sebastiani, March 25, ibid., pp. 154-160.

• Drovetti to Sebastiani, March 26, ibid., pp. 160-161.

THE

BRITISH

INVASION

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ceived that the arrival of the British had also arouse fears which he made strenuous efforts to dispel by presenting the idea that a French army would soon come to force the British out of Egypt. 4 W h e n Mohammed A l i received word from Cairo of the British expedition, the occupation of Alexandria, and the request of his lieutenant that he return to improve affairs there, he ordered his representatives to make peace with the Beys at all costs. 2 T h e Beys at about the same time, March 31, received letters from Missett asking that they send agents to present their wants, since the coming of the British would now make the realization of their ambitions possible." Ibrahim and Shahine Bey l'Elfi replied at once declaring that they rejoiced to hear that Great Britain had declared war on the Porte for the purpose of restoring the Mameluke government in Egypt. T h e y were proceeding toward lower E g y p t and, when they reached Gizeh as they hoped to do in several days, they would prepare to combat Mohammed A l i in conjunction with the British. Some of the Mameluke troops, Shahine declared, would be sent to join the British army. These two Beys did not hesitate to misrepresent affairs, for they declared that in a recent battle they had decisively defeated Mohammed who was now retreating down the Nile to Cairo. 4 W h i l e Shahine and Ibrahim were thus encouraging the British to think that they could expect immediate help from them, they were also proceeding, with the other chief Beys, with negotiations with Mohammed A l i which would make such help impossible. A l i was aware of the mutual rivalries among the Beys in spite of their appearance of unanimity 1 3

Ibid.

' Gabarti, op. cit., viii, p. 103.

Cf. supra, p. 398.

* Ibrahim Bey to Fraser, April 1, 1807; Shahine Bey l'Elfi to Missett, April i, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., pp. 36-38.

4O6

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

of action, and he now postponed his plans for subjecting them hoping to secure their neutrality at least and if possible their participation in any struggle he might have with the British. His envoys represented to them that the British really intended to take the country for themselves and recalled precepts from the Koran forbidding Moslems to call on Christians to combat other Moslems. The Beys replied that they wanted peace in Egypt and to secure it would even fight under the orders of Mohammed Ali, but that they were not certain of his good faith. They were assured that Mohammed Ali was inclined to accede to all their demands and that he made no condition except that they aid him in driving out the British, after which a council would be called to fix definitely the terms of peace. Meanwhile he would evacuate upper Egypt and leave it under the control of the Mamelukes. The Beys finally agreed to these terms. 1 The provisional character of the agreement is significant. Both sides had obviously left its execution to the chances of victory or defeat of the British. If the British were successful the Beys would be free to join them in an attempt to drive the pasha from the country; if they were unsuccessful Ali could renew war with the Beys hoping thereby eventually to secure control of all Egypt. For the present each side was most interested in assuring its own position. The agreement was a success for Ali's diplomacy as it guaranteed him against attack from the Beys and enabled him to concentrate his forces against the British. The Beys had thrown away what was destined to be their last opportunity for realizing their ambitions. After the conclusion of this agreement—at the beginning of April—the chief Beys with their respective armies proceeded slowly down the Nile toward Gizeh to await events. 1

Gabarti, op. cit., viii, pp. 103-106.

THE BRITISH

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OF EGYPT

Mohammed Ali with his troops arrived at Cairo on April 10.» Drovetti found him confident that, as a result of his negotiations, the Beys would not join the British. H e himself, however, was not so sanguine, believing that they would do so as soon as the British gained a victory.' Ali, receiving word soon after his arrival at Cairo of the second attack by the British upon Rosetta, at once despatched more troops in that direction. T h e defeat of the British in their first attempt had strengthened his cause in Cairo and the sheiks, urged by Drovetti, now wanted to arm the people and march them against the British. Ali responded that the people would do their part if they furnished munitions and money f o r his soldiers.' In the last days of April news reached Cairo, along with British prisoners, of the failure of the second British attack on Rosetta. There was much rejoicing and soon afterwards it was noised about that A l i would soon lay siege to Alexandria. 4 2

Gloom and uncertainty pervaded the British camp at Alexandria. Fraser blammed Missett for his difficulties, charging him with having from the beginning held out false hopes of help from the Beys and the native people, who would now be little inclined to give their aid since the British had suffered two defeats. Missett had also given too confident assurance that Rosetta would easily surrender and the failure to take it might make necessary the evacuation of Alexandria. s Missett tartly replied that the people of E g y p t 1

This is the date given by Mengin, i, p. 227. the thirteenth. 2

Drovetti gives it as

Drovetti to Sebastiani, April 14, 1807, Douin, op. cit., pp. 168-169.

8

Mengin, op. cit., i, p. 278; Reybaud and Saintine, op. cit., ix, p. 358.

4

Drovetti to Sebastiani, April 30, 1807, Douin, op. cit., pp. 169-170.

s

Fraser to Missett, April 2 1 , 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., PP- 54-56.

4O8

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

were really friends of the British; he had never given any promises that they would take up arms against the Albanians and Turks. He believed that the Beys would come to the aid of the British, but they had not as yet had sufficient time to bring together their forces since the arrival of the latter. A s for the matter of evacuating Egypt, Missett warned Fraser that he should weigh the consequences of such an act and must know " the lively interest which Great Britain takes in this country and the anxiety which H. M. Government feels lest this key to our East India possessions should fall into the hands of the French. . . . " 1 Fraser's misgivings grew with each passing day. Closely confined within Alexandria and certain that the Albanians and Turks would soon surround the city on land, he knew that the danger of famine was great. He wrote Fox on April 24 that unless reenforcements, provisions and money were sent at once the position of the British would be precarious.2 Hopes at British headquarters that the Mamelukes might yet come to their aid were dimmed by letters from Ibrahim Bey and Shahine Bey l'Elfi refusing, amid voluble protestations of loyalty, to assist the British until they had shown a superiority in arms, taken Rosetta, and commenced an attack on Cairo.® Not only had the defeats of the British resulted in the dereliction of the Beys, but they had also made the British lose political prestige in the eyes of the natives. It was soon learned that several of the neighboring Arab tribes around Alexandria had entered into the service of Mohammed Ali and that others, who they had hoped would furnish the city and the British army with food supplies, refused to help them until the latter should have gained some victories.4 1

Missett to Fraser, April 22, 1807, ibid., pp. 61-62.

2

Fraser to Fox, April 24, 1807, ibid., pp. 64-65.

8

Ibrahim Bey to Fraser, April 21; Shahine Bey l'Elfi to Missett, April

22, 1807, ibid., pp. 56-60. 4

Missett to Windham, April 26, 29, 1807, ibid., pp. 83-84; 89-90.

THE BRITISH

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EGYPT

Fraser wrote Windham at the beginning of May, that Alexandria could not be held long under existing circumstances. Its possession must be secured under a treaty with the Porte or else a British force must be sent of sufficient size to master the whole country with the help of one of the local parties. The demands of the Beys were evidently the result of rash promises, made by Missett, that their political power over Egypt would be restored. 1 Missett in turn wrote Windham blaming Fraser for the failure of the second expedition to Rosetta and claiming that he had sent an insufficient number of troops. Fraser had been more concerned in keeping a strong garrison at Alexandria because of his ungrounded fears that the natives were hostile to the British. In spite of their present difficulties, Missett urged that the British army be continued in Egypt, since British influence must be restored in the country and Mohammed Ali and his troops must be eliminated. T o accomplish these purposes the army must be considerably increased.2 Early in May reports came to Alexandria that the Beys had made peace with Mohammed Ali, and also that a large body of Turkish troops at Cyprus might soon be sent to Egypt. 8 Several times the Albanians and Turks made assaults on the city but were repulsed.4 Missett opened negotiations with certain neighboring Arab chiefs and at length succeeded, by the plentiful use of money and presents, in inducing them to supply the city with considerable quantities of food.® 1

Fraser to Windham, May i, 1807, ibid., pp. 91-92.

2

Missett to Windham, April 26, 1807, ibid., pp. 83-84.

* Fraser to Windham, May 6, 1807, Missett to Fraser, May 8, 1807,

ibid., pp. 96-98. 1

Fraser to Windham, May 19, 1807, ibid., pp. 114-116.

5

Missett to Castlereagh, May 18, 1807, ibid., pp. 1 0 8 - m .

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1800-1807

Negotiations were opened with Mohammed Ali for release of British prisoners. Taking advantage of this opening, Ali sent his dragoman to Fraser about the middle of May making peace overtures, proposing that the British give over Alexandria to him and offering to return all prisoners of war, protect British commerce in the country, and oppose entrance into Egypt of any European army seeking to conquer it or searching for a passage to India. Fraser replied that the British were quite ready to be friendly with him and to unite to oppose common enemies, but that they could not give up Alexandria. It would be to Ali's advantage to permit the British with their superior naval forces to guard the entrance to the country against any invasion by sea. If the British prisoners were liberated and Ali agreed not to intercept supplies between Alexandria and Rosetta, Fraser in turn would not interfere with the internal government of the country. 1 However sincere Fraser may have been in carrying on this negotiation, Missett at least opposed any agreement with Mohammed Ali and viewed an attempt to negotiate with him merely as a means of gaining time for the British troops to regain their morale and to strengthen the fortifications at Alexandria. Also it might give time for unfavorable impressions of British arms in the country to pass off. He opposed any alliance with Ali on the theory that it would weaken British influence with the natives, who detested the Albanians, and also that it would convert the Mamelukes into French agents. Missett believed that, if Fraser would screw up his courage and challenge Mohammed Ali to battle, the British would be victorious even with their present forces and would regain their prestige in the country.2 1 2

Fraser to Fox, May 18, 1807, ibid., pp. m - 1 1 4 . Missett to Castlereagh, May 18, 1807,

ibid., pp.

108-m.

THE BRITISH

INVASION

OF EGYPT

411

However, even Missett began to have serious doubts whether the Beys really intended to help the British after he received a letter toward the end of May from Shahine Bey 1'Elfi declaring that, while he desired to come to the aid of the British, his way was blocked by Ali's armies. The other Beys remained in upper Egypt. Shahine assured him, however, that he was giving evasive replies to Ali's peace overtures. Missett preferred anyway that the armies of the Beys should not be in lower Egypt at this time as they would consume provisions needed in Alexandria. For the present it was most important, he wrote Castlereagh, that the British remain friendly with the Arab chiefs in order to secure provisions.1 The fact was that the Beys were incapable at this time of any activity by reason of their mutual jealousies, their resentment against Mohammed Ali, and their doubts concerning the effectiveness of the British expedition. Although they had entered into a treaty with Ali, as already noted, secretly they hoped that the British would deal him a decisive blow of which they would take advantage to break the agreement. Aided by the British, they hoped to drive him from the country. The unexpected defeats of the British at Rosetta has been disturbing. Ali could not be completely assured of the Beys' neutrality and he knew that in case he suffered reverses they would be strongly tempted to attack him. He was compelled to keep part of his army at Cairo, thereby lessening the strength of his forces in lower Egypt, but he could depend on reenforcements of Turkish troops. He continued to watch the Beys closely and to follow a policy of treating separately with each of them, playing upon their jealousies and hoping to prevent united action on their part. 2 Appeals 1

Missett to Castlereagh, May 29, 1807, ibid., pp. 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 .

2

Mouriez, op. cit., i, p. 291.

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made by him to the Beys for help in driving out the British they refused under one pretext or another. 1 Drovetti followed closely Ali's negotiations with the Beys and the British without believing that either would be successful. With the exception of Osman Bey he thought that the Beys would eventually join the British. 2 He had kept aloof at first from Ali's conferences but. when he heard at the end of May that the British had received reenforcements and also that certain persons belonging to the camp of Shahine Bey l'Elfi had gone to Alexandria to confer with the British, he decided to intervene, and sent one of his agents, Mengin, on a mission to camps of various Beys to persuade them not to join the British. He also gave much publicity in Cairo and in camps of the Beys to a recent circular from Sébastiani announcing a victory for Napoleon at Eylau. 8 In response to Fraser's appeals for reenforcements, over fourteen hundred British troops arrived at Alexandria from Sicily on May 29. Fraser believed he could now hold Alexandria until instructions arrived advising him what should be done.* Along with the troops Fraser received instructions from F o x declaring that the British expeditions to Rosetta had been imprudent as the home government had intended to possess only Alexandria. Communications should be kept up with the Mamelukes, who might yet come to the aid of the British. The home government must decide whether they should continue to hold Alexandria and, until word came, Fraser should remain there unless compelled to evacuate it by lack of provisions. It would be 1

Gabarti, op. cit., viii, p. 112.

I j 2 Drovetti to Sébastiani, May 27, 29, 1807, Douin, op. cit., pp. 180-182. * Drovetti to Sébastiani, June 14, 24, 1807, ibid., pp. 183-185. 4

Fraser to Windham, May 30, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., pp. 123-124.

THE BRITISH

INVASION

OF

EGYPT

ruinous to British interest and honor and would give preponderance to French influence, if Egypt were abandoned, at least until the home government had time to decide what should be done.1 A t the same time that F o x sent this communication to Fraser, he sent another to Windham stating that the British could not control the situation in Egypt and help the cause of the Mameluke Beys with less than fifteen thousand troops. Great Britain could not afford to be driven out of Egypt by her enemy.2 However, before this despatch reached London the home government, now under a new ministry, had already decided that war with France could not be vigorously prosecuted until Great Britain had attempted to make peace with Turkey and had deprived Napoleon of the advantages which would accrue to him from a British rupture with that power. 1

Fox to Fraser, May 13, 1807, ibid., pp. 100-102.

* Fox to Windham, May 14, 1807, ibid., pp. 104-105.

PART V FRANCO-RUSSIAN WAR AND PEACE FEBRUARY—NOVEMBER 1807

CHAPTER XVI D I P L O M A T I C E F F O R T S I N T H E S P R I N G OF

1807

1 THE battle of Eylau on February 8, 1807 had not been for Napoleon the decisive victory over the Russians which he wanted in order to force them to sue for peace. After the battle he placed his army again in winter quarters between the Vistula and the Passarge and established his headquarters at Osterode. His situation was insecure. With the Swedes in possession of Stralsund and the islands at the mouth of the Oder and with a Prussian garrison at Kolberg, an expedition of the allies could organize here and, moving along the Havel, descend upon Berlin and break the line of French positions between the Elbe and the Vistula and between Magdeburg and Posen. He expected the British would make some great effort in the spring to land forces in Sicily, Holland, Germany or possibly France, and he wanted a free hand to deal with them. The conduct of Austria was uncertain; she was still in arms and had considerable numbers of troops already massed on her frontiers which might be used at any time to attack him in the rear. It was true that he had recently secured an ally in Turkey when she had declared war on Russia. But she was unprepared and the Russians held strongly fortified places on Turkish soil while a British squadron was anchored in the Dardanelles threatening an attack if the Porte did not submit to Russia. Having failed to realize his purposes by recourse to arms, Napoleon turned to the devices of diplomacy to protect his position. His first act was to drop the plan he had thus far pursued of refusing peace with Prussia with the idea of using his control over the latter power as a means for wringing advantageous terms from his enemies in a general 417

4I8

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

peace settlement. 1 Another policy was needed at the moment in view of his present unstable situation. H e would attempt now to lure Prussia to a separate peace and away from the coalition by undermining her confidence in the capacity of her ally, Russia, to secure the reestablishment of her former frontiers. H e would represent to her the idea that a congress of the powers to negotiate a general peace would cause long delays and would serve her less effectively than a separate peace with France. 2 Therefore on February 13 he despatched his aide de camp, Bertrand, direct to the Prussian king at Memel with an offer of restitution of all his territory as far as the Elbe if he would conclude such a peace. A n envoy from General Benningsen, commander of the Russian armies, arrived at Memel just before Bertrand with a message which urged the king to continue the war, and gave assurances that reen for cements would arrive soon for the Russian army. 3 A party at the Prussian court advised Frederick William to make peace with Napoleon. Hardenberg, on the other hand, urged the king not to desert Russia, declaring that Napoleon wanted to negotiate a separate peace only so that he could more effectively carry on the w a r ; 1 Napoleon had refused to conclude a definitive peace with Prussia after Jena and would agree only to an armistice, the terms of which had been dictated by him and accepted by the Prussian plenipotentiaries on November 16. Cf. supra, pp. ! 9S x97- This armistice was subsequently rejected by the Prussian government and they turned to their ally, Russia, for help. France and Prussia were therefore still technically at war and Napoleon refused to conclude a peace as he wanted to use Prussian territory for military purposes in his forthcoming campaign with Russia. He also intended to use his conquest of Prussia as a diplomatic weapon in his dealings with the powers. She would be a negotiable factor in a large scheme of " compensations "—particularly for wresting conquered colonies from England—in a general peace congress in the near future. 2

Correspondance de Napoleon, xiv, 11809, 11810.

* Waliszewski, op. cit., i, pp. 208-209.

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE

SPRING

OF 1801

419

Prussia should adhere to the plan of peace arranged through a congress in consultation with her ally, Russia. The king finally adopted Hardenberg's advice and sent off a special envoy, Kleist, to French headquarters to explain to Napoleon that his overtures were being communicated to Russia and that, if the allies came to an agreement, he would be further informed. 1 Napoleon received Kleist on February 24 and showed considerable irritation over the Prussian answer.2 He sent him back on the twenty-sixth with a letter to Frederick William which spoke favorably of the idea of a congress, mentioned Turkey also as a participant, but expressed a preference for separate negotiations. He attempted to weaken the faith of Prussia in her allies by hints that he doubted the pacific intentions of England and Russia, the latter especially because of her conduct toward Turkey. He would make peace with Russia only if she gave up her projects on Turkey. 3 Before Kleist arrived, Napoleon had received word from Vienna in reply to the proposals he had made to Austria in January for an alliance based upon an agreement concerning Turkey. 4 The reply was ambiguous and reticent on the question of an alliance, but it revealed that Austrian policy in the Balkans was a fixed one. In principle Austria wanted nothing and would demand nothing. She would interfere only when aggression of other powers upon the Ottoman Empire obliged her to claim compensation and reestablish equilibrium in the Near East. 5 1 Ranke, Denkwürdigkeiten von Hardenberg (5 vols., Leipzig, 1877), v, P- 4322 Report of Kleist, March 2, 1807, Bailleu, Preussen und Frankreich von 1785 bis 1807, ii, pp. 586-589. 3

Correspondance de Napoleon,

xiv, 11890.

* Cf. supra, pp. 300-301. 5 Stadion to Vincent, Feb. 4, 1807, Beer, Zehn Jahre Politik, 1801-1810, p. 269.

österreichischer

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Napoleon had secured no satisfaction on the matter o f an alliance, which w a s what he really wanted.

H e wrote Talley-

rand that he comprehended nothing f r o m this note and did not know what A u s t r i a wanted.

W o u l d she negotiate f o r

guarantee o f the integrity of T u r k e y ? consent.

I f so, he would

O r would she treat on the basis that Russia acquire

some T u r k i s h territory and that Austria be compensated? T h a t could yet be arranged.

Talleyrand was to find out

f r o m Vincent, the A u s t r i a n envoy, what she wanted and to propose that, if an agreement were not concluded

with

Prussia and if meanwhile Austria joined France, A u s t r i a should have a part of Silesia without condition. 1

Talley-

rand thereupon approached Vincent with this proposal and also took up again the question of Turkey, declaring that it was the only serious cause of difference between France and Russia.

Since Austria had also a common concern

with France over the future of T u r k e y , they must come to an agreement concerning her.

France was ready to follow

the wishes of Austria as to whether it would be based on the principle of the integrity or the partition o f the Ottoman Empire.

Vincent replied as usual without committing

himself. 2 Vincent had talked vaguely since his arrival at N a p o leon's headquarters about a general peace and

Austrian

mediation, but had not seriously pressed the matter, hoping first

to learn more concerning Napoleon's plans and his

conditions f o r peace and also to get a reply f r o m Russia in regard to the proposal.

In an interview early in M a r c h

Napoleon stressed the point that to secure

peace in Europe

France must make an alliance with either Russia or Austria. H e preferred Austria but intimated that, should she hesi1 Napoleon had attempted before to win Austria to an alliance with such a proposal. Cf. supra, p. 299.

»Report of Vincent, March 7, 1807, Beer, op. cit., p. 273-

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN

THE

SPRING

OF 1807

421

tate, she might later have occasion to regret a Russo-French alliance. He urged Vincent to enter negotiations for a treaty on terms which would secure restitution of Prussian territory—which he implied should remove Austria's fear that Poland would be reconstituted—and also take care of the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey. Vincent had no power to negotiate, but he declared that his court would make no engagement binding Austria to join a war to secure peace. She would use only moral measures to bring the powers to reason.1 Vincent's responses had been unsatisfactory to Napoleon, who seemed no nearer than before to realizing his plans in regard to Austria. He again referred to an alliance with Russia in a communication to Talleyrand of the fourteenth stating that, while he strongly desired peace with Austria, he believed an alliance with Russia would be very advantageous if any dependence could be placed on the court and if there were some basis on which a rapprochement could be made with her.2 This proposal must not be taken too seriously ; he was most interested in the reply to his latest offers to Prussia and the suggestion of a union with Russia was a prod with which to rouse the Austrians. Vincent at length received instructions about the middle of March to the effect that the Tsar had given a favorable answer to the tentative proposal of Austrian mediation. On the eighteenth he informed Talleyrand of Austria's intention to mediate a general peace for all belligerents and of Russia's acceptance of it in principle. Further, Vincent revealed that in the Russian response it had declared that in making peace with Turkey Russia demanded only restoration of former treaties and alliances and that, after peace had been concluded between them, Russian troops would be 1

Correspondence

de Napoleon,

xiv, 11977.

2 Napoleon to Talleyrand, March 14, 1807, ibid., xiv, 12028.

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

withdrawn from Turkey. This last was not acceptable to Talleyrand, who declared that restoration of peace between Russia and Turkey on the basis of former treaties would not mean for Turkey the complete independence which Napoleon insisted upon. Also, he perceived that the Tsar thought that his war with Turkey was separate from his war with France, and that he was disposed to conclude it by a separate transaction. Vincent, avoiding argument, declared that modifications could be made later when negotiations f o r a general peace were started. 1 A report at this time from Andréossy declared that it would be impossible to bring Austria into an alliance and that any overtures she made in the matter would not really be sincere. He also spoke of increased armaments which were in prospect.2 The position of Napoleon was not happy at the moment. Prussia had thus far shown that she would have nothing to do with his proposal for a peace which would separate her from her allies. Austria was apparently not amenable to his proposal for an alliance even when he appealed to her fears concerning affairs in the Balkans and agreed to restore Prussia. Her armaments gave him reason to be suspicious of her. On the other hand his military position was not such that he could refuse the proposal of Austria for a general peace through her mediation, and thus run the risk of driving her into the coalition. He had every reason for seeking to gain time and beginning a negotiation with his enemies which might relax their military preparations or provide dissensions among them. Talleyrand therefore was instructed to reply to Vincent in such a way as to intimate that Napoleon would be favorable to the Austrian offer of mediation but would demand 1 Talleyrand to Napoleon, March 18, 1807, Bertrand, Lettres de Talleyrand à Napoleon, no. cclxv.

* Report of Andréossy, Driault, Tilsit, pp. 105-106.

inédites

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE

SPRING

OF 1807

423

that as a token of her sincerity she should not arm herself. 1 Andreossy was given instructions to stress the point at Vienna that France demanded that Turkey be included in the general peace, which must assure her integrity and independence, Moldavia and Wallachia not excluded. On this question the two powers should have a common interest.2 Napoleon was engaged in his old trick of holding before the Austrians the bogey of Russian expansion in the Balkans. He would leave them to toy with their plans for mediation, but he would take advantage of any occasion to bring them into opposition to Russia. Soon after, writing to the king of Sweden of his desire for peace, Napoleon said that Sweden had nothing to fear from France and everything to fear from Russia. 3 Here again he was questioning the intentions of Russia with a view to dividing the allied powers. He did not deny, he informed Talleyrand, that he wanted peace with Russia as he believed it would bring peace also with England. The best way of securing peace in Europe was for the powers to treat with one another directly.4 A t the beginning of April Napoleon moved from his humble quarters at Osterode to a more pretentious dwelling in the nearby Chateau of Finkenstein. Talleyrand remained at Warsaw to carry on his duties. Spring was at hand, the 1 Napoleon to Talleyrand, March 20, 1807, Correspondance de xiv, 12098.

Napoleon,

* Talleyrand to Andreossy, March 31, 1807, Driault, op. cit., pp. 106-107. 3 Butterfield, The Peace Tactics of Napoleon, 1806-1808, p. 171. Napoleon had previously made overtures to Sweden in the middle of November for a separate peace, suggesting that Sweden could expect in this event an augmentation of territory and also be assured continued possession of Swedish Poinetania. If peace were not made Napoleon threatened seizure of Swedish Pomerania including Stralsund. The Swedish monarch however refused to negotiate, ibid., pp. 43-45.

' Napoleon to Talleyrand, March 20, 1807, Correspondance de xiv, 12098.

Napolion,

424

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

ground would soon be sufficiently firm for the marching of the armies. The depression which Napoleon had felt because of the indecisive engagements at Pultusk and E y l a u was passing with the change of season. Confidence came back and the man of action reasserted himself. H e had been talking of peace for two months but in doing so he had not intended to commit his armies in Prussia to inaction. He would have peace, he said, though he had to fight for it. He was talking peace with his sword in hand. W h e n on March 20 he wrote to Talleyrand intimating that he would be inclined to accept the mediation of Austria, he added that in three months his troops would be ready and that by September he would have eighty thousand men. 1 H e must be in the most advantageous military position possible in negotiating peace whether separately as he really desired, or in a general congress. If there was to be war then likewise he must be in position to carry on a decisive campaign. Napoleon's thoughts upon war and peace were focussed on the Russians. T h e Prussians were in subjection, their armies he viewed with disdain. H e had plans under w a y for taking Stralsund f r o m the Swedes, and bringing them to terms, and preventing the British from sending an expedition to this point. D a n z i g must be had to place him in complete control of the line along the Vistula facing the Russians. Napoleon had his agents located at important political points in the Ottoman Empire,—Drovetti in Egypt, Poqueville in Albania, David in Bosnia, Meriage at Widin, Lamare at Rustchuk, Sebastiani at Constantinople, Morousi intriguing with the boyars in Wallachia—all concentrated upon the task of combating the Russians and the British. Success seemed to have crowned his efforts when in January he had heard that the Porte had decided on war against Russia. At the same time he received a letter from the Sultan dwelling 1

Ibid.

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE SPRING

OF 1807

425

upon the alliance that should exist between them. Napoleon replied that now was the time for Selim to drive the Russians out o f Turkey, invade the Crimea and secure control of the Black Sea. The Persians also should be urged to take the offensive. He sent word to Sébastiani to offer the Porte the help on the Danube of a French army of twenty-five thousand men from Dalmatia, and of companies of artillery for defense of the Bosphorus and of a squadron of French ships to secure the Turkish control of the Black Sea. Orders were sent to Marmont, commanding in Dalmatia, to be ready to send infantry and artillery and also to attempt to aid the pashas in Albania, Bosnia and along the Danube. Napoleon had written the Shah of Persia that now was the time for Persia to join with France and Turkey against Russia and to recover her possession of Georgia. 1 It remained to secure an offensive alliance with Turkey and Persia in order to assure their armed cooperation. On February 8 Talleyrand wrote Napoleon that Jaubert had just returned to Paris from his mission to Persia 2 and had reported that Persian and Turkish ambassadors would soon arrive at imperial headquarters with powers to conclude an alliance with France. 3 At the end of February the two ambassadors arrived at Warsaw. In response to Talleyrand's request for instructions Napoleon answered that he could give none until he had examined Jaubert's report upon Persia and had more insight into the purposes of the Porte in sending the Turkish ambassador.* Two days later Napoleon received despatches from Sébastiani giving an account of events leading up to the depar1 2 5

Cf. supra, pp. 295-297. Cf. infra, pp. 433-434Sturdsa Documente, i, p. 543.

* Napoleon to Talleyrand, March 3, 1807, Correspondance xiv, 11918.

de

Napoléon,

426

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

ture of Arbuthnot f r o m Constantinople and also information about the Turkish military preparations, available forces, and deficiencies in military organization. Napoleon thereupon informed Talleyrand that he was considering sending into Moldavia an army of thirty thousand men under Massena, which would eventually be united with the army which he proposed to send from Dalmatia to the Danube under Marmont. T h e Turkish ambassador should wait in W a r saw and before negotiations were started Talleyrand should get information from him as to whether the Porte wanted any French troops to help protect Constantinople. If not, would they be wanted on the Danube and how would they be treated by the T u r k s ? A l s o he should ascertain whether the Porte were favorable to the proposal of a general peace and whether, if a congress of the powers were held, the Turkish ambassador had authority to participate. 1 O n March 8, Talleyrand sent Napoleon another despatch from Sebastiani, dated February 9, describing the preparations of the T u r k s to defend Constantinople against possible attacks by the British fleet and his success in securing from the Porte a declaration that it would not accept any of the British demands, though he had not secured a declaration of war against England. 2 Talleyrand also reported that, according to the Turkish ambassador, Emin Vahid Effendi, the Porte wanted an offensive and defensive alliance which he had full powers to conclude. Turkey hoped if possible to secure the Crimea again. A strong Turkish army was going to be sent to the Danube to oppose the Russians and other troops would be sent to Georgia to help the Persians against them. T h e ambassador stated that he did not have 1 Talleyrand to Napoleon, March 4, 1807, Sturdsa Documente, i, p. 546; Napoleon to Talleyrand, March 6, 1807, Correspondance de Napolion, xiv, 119432

Cf. supra, pp. 372-373-

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE SPRING

427

OF 1807

any authority to request the despatch o f French troops into T u r k e y and would therefore have to await official instructions f r o m the Porte.

A l s o he must have instructions con-

cerning participation in a peace congress. 1 T h e Persian and T u r k i s h ambassadors remained during M a r c h at W a r s a w waiting f o r Napoleon to open negotiations, but the Emperor w a s preoccupied and more concerned w i t h his negotiations with Prussia and Austria. A t the beginning of A p r i l Napoleon received word o f the failure of the British expedition to Constantinople.

H e at

once despatched a letter to Selim congratulating him on his victory and the valor of the Moslems.

H e w a s ready to

send French artillery forces, arms, munitions, officers, even m o n e y , — a l l would be sent at once if Selim asked f o r them. Selim should cooperate with the S h a h of Persia in a vigorous attack upon the Russians.

Napoleon declared he

would

never accept a general peace which did not guarantee the absolute independence and integrity o f the O t t o m a n Empire. 2 Immediately

afterward

Napoleon

received

a

despatch

f r o m Sébastiani ( o f M a r c h 10) indicating that since the repulse of the British expedition French influence at C o n stantinople w a s paramount.

T h e Sultan desired to establish

close cooperation with Napoleon in his military plans and promised to enter the Continental S y s t e m ; he accepted N a p o leon's offer o f six w a r vessels and companies of French artillery and w a s willing to have a French army sent f r o m Dalmatian

M o r e Napoleon could hardly have wished t o w a r d

realizing his plans f o r converting T u r k e y into an active ally against his enemies. 1

Talleyrand to Napoleon, March 8, 1807, Sturdsa

Documente,

i, pp.

551-552* Napoleon to Selim, April 3, 1807, Correspondance 12277.

de Napoléon,

xiv,

* Sébastiani to Talleyrand, March 10, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 213.

428

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

Napoleon ordered that instructions be sent to Sebastiani to urge the Porte not to attempt to send the Turkish fleet into the Mediterranean but rather into the Black Sea to damage Russian commerce there. T h e Turkish army should plan to cross the Pruth in order to join the French army, and the Turkish ambassador should be sent powers and instructions to participate in a general peace congress. Napoleon would begin peace negotiations only on condition that Turkey be allowed to participate. Napoleon also ordered Talleyrand to send instructions to Lamare at Rustchuk to assure Mustapha, Pasha of Rustchuk, that, if he so desired, a French officer would be sent to confer with him concerning military operations of his army on the Pruth. 1 In a letter to Selim of April 7, Napoleon complimented him upon his decision to prohibit British commerce; announced that he had conferred the decoration of the Legion of Honor upon Sebastiani for his services at Constantinople; assured the Sultan of success in his plans against their common enemy and promised that he would require that a general peace assure complete independence to the Sultan's empire.® O n the same day Talleyrand informed Napoleon that Austria had officially offered her services as mediator for establishing peace in Europe, but without mentioning T u r key as one of the powers to participate in the negotiation. W h e n Talleyrand called Vincent's attention to this omission, the latter replied that there was no intention of leaving her out; Austria wanted Turkey to participate and there would be no difficulties in the way. 3 A t this moment the Austrian court, as a matter of fact, was seeking to promote with the Russians its proposal for mediation by giving assurances that Turkey would be kept out of the congress. 1 Napoleon to Talleyrand, A p r i l 5, 1807, Correspondance x v , 12302.

* Napoleon to Selim, A p r i l 7, 1807, ibid., x v , 12324. 5

Bertrand, op. cit., no. c c l x x x v i .

de

Napoleon,

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS IN THE SPRING

OF 1807

429

T h e Austrian offer had come at a time when Napoleon felt that his situation was still insecure ; he had not improved his military situation as he had desired. It was important that he should not offend the Austrians. During March Andréossy had sent a succession of disturbing reports from Vienna concerning Austrian military preparations accompanied by sinister comments on secret intentions of Austria to attack the French when the opportunity seemed good It was impossible to expect an alliance with her. 1 In discussing with Talleyrand the question of acceptance of the Austrian offer Napoleon declared that it was necessary that he gain some time as he was not inclined to make an armistice before he had taken Danzig which he hoped to secure in a fortnight. 2 A t length they formulated a subtle, carefully phrased note of acceptance with statements calculated to provoke controversy and delay.' This was delivered to Vincent on April 19. Napoleon then instructed Talleyrand as to the policy he should pursue in regard to the Austrian mediation. He should use much circumspection in any discussion concerning peace and above all he must not agree as yet to an armistice ; he must " await events ". It was quite necessary that the French first possess Danzig, and possibly Graudenz. T o avoid commitments at any time Talleyrand should declare that he knew nothing of the intentions of Napoleon and he should agree to nothing. The proposal of Austria for her intervention had been answered, declared Napoleon, because for the moment he did not wish to give any pretext for war.* About this time Napoleon received a letter from Frederick 1

Butterfield, op. cit., pp. 162-163.

* Correspondance de Napoléon, xv, 12341. ' This note is given in Driault, Tilsit, p. 108. 4

Correspondance de Napoléon, xv, 12390, 12450, 12453.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 18O6-Î80T

William of Prussia, (in reply to his own letter of February 26), declaring that Russia, Prussia and England were in agreement on all matters and were ready to reestablish peace. Austria and Sweden were to participate in the peace congress but there was no reason for Turkey's participation. Russia had no projects against Turkey and desired only to have her maintain existing treaties.1 This letter clearly intimated that the allies were solidly united, and that the coalition still existed and could not be broken up by any negotiations such as Napoleon had undertaken with Prussia. The question of whether Turkey should be allowed to participate in a congress of the powers had apparently become at the outset an issue between Napoleon and the allies. It enabled Napoleon to engage his opponents in a prolonged discussion which gave him time to strengthen his military position and take Danzig. It would also give time for the Turks to complete their preparations for operations on the Danube. In reply to this letter Napoleon declared that the allies of France—Spain and Turkey—must be allowed to participate in a general congress. 2 On the twenty-third the French began the bombardment of Danzig.® Having disposed of the question of peace through Austrian mediation in a way which he hoped would involve his opponents in a prolonged discussion, and having secured evidence that the Turks were engaged in extensive military preparations for compaigning against the Russians and were in1

Driault, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

2

Correspondance de Napoleon, xv, 12487.

' On the twenty-sixth, Napoleon ordered Talleyrand to send instructions to Sebastiani to again assure the Porte that he would not treat for peace without the participation of Turkey, but also to impress upon them the necessity that Turkey redouble her military preparations; when the Turkish army had crossed the Danube, and Danzig had been taken, he would set out to drive the Russian back. Napoleon to Talleyrand, April 26, 1807, ibid., xv, 12474.

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN

THE

SPRING

OF 1807

43 x

clined to receive French military aid, Napoleon now entered into formal negotiations with the Turkish ambassador, Emin Vahid Effendi, for an alliance with Turkey. Napoleon offered to Emin Effendi a guarantee of the complete independence of the Ottoman Empire and to save her from the fate of Poland. He would tear up the onerous articles imposed on Turkey since the treaty of KutchukKainardjii which gave to Russia special privileges in Moldavia and Wallachia, return to Turkey the Crimea, and thereby restore to her control in the Black Sea. But to realize that it was necessary that Turkey work in concert with Persia; a Turkish fleet must be placed in the Black Sea to oppose the Russian fleet; the Turkish army on the Danube should take the offensive and push the Russians back over the Dniester, whereupon French forces would come to their support and attack the Russians. 1 It soon appeared, however, that Emin Effendi was seeking to retard proceedings; he avoided decisions on certain points, declared that he lacked power to discuss certain questions, and in general adopted a reserved and critical attitude. Napoleon pressed him to conclude a treaty, but without success. Causes for this conduct of the Turkish envoy can not be exactly determined. It may have been that he was chagrined at the casual treatment accorded him during his long period of waiting, which was in marked contrast to the attention paid to the Persian ambassador upon his arrival. But more important is the probability that Emin Effendi entered upon his mission warned by the Porte to be on the watch for any indications of a change in the relations of France and Russia. As early as December 1806 the Reis Effendi had declared that an alliance between these two powers at the Sultan's expense was a most probable event.2 Emin Effendi had arrived at Warsaw at a time when Napoleon was engaged in 1

Driault, La Politique orientale de Napoleon,

1

Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 22,1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 52.

1806-1808, pp. 168-169.

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1800-1807

his peace overtures and during the weeks of his sojourn there he had picked up much information through secret channels concerning negotiations of the powers for peace which probably strengthened these half beliefs in Turkish official circles that Napoleon would make peace with Russia and desert Turkey if necessary to gain his ends.1 Under the circumstances the best course for the Turks was to remain as they were, decline formal engagements with Napoleon, but keep on his side. The negotiations dragged on, delayed in part by the tactics of the Turkish envoy and also by the fact that Napoleon's attention was much diverted by the siege of Danzig. Reports began to come in from Sebastiani, Lemare at Rustchuk, Menage at Widin and David at Travnik of opposition from the Turks to Napoleon's proposal that a French army from Dalmatia cross Turkish territory to help the Turkish armies on the Danube.2 Therefore, on May 21 Talleyrand wrote Sebastiani that the project of sending a French army from Dalmatia to the Danube would be given up for the present at least and that the French would confine their help, upon demand of the Sultan, to sending some French officers and a troop of six hundred artillerymen. Any further cooperation would be made the subject of a special treaty between the two powers.8 May 23 Danzig surrendered; and Napoleon, more concerned now with plans for military operations against the Russians, turned over the Turkish negotiations to Calincourt assisted by Le Roux, who reopened them at Danzig on June 3 / Calincourt sought an offensive and indefinite Franco1

Emin Effendi had organized in Warsaw a bureau of secret information. Ghorbal, The Beginnings of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mehemet AH, p. 258, footnote. 2

Cf. infra, pp. 472-483.

* Talleyrand to Sebastiani, May 21, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 4

214.

Napoleon to Vahid Effendi, May 28, 1807, Arch. Nat. A. F., iv, 1706.

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE

SPRING

433

OF 1807

Turkish alliance against Russia and Great Britain. Emin Effendi declared that his instructions allowed only for a defensive alliance against Russia for three years and that the Porte would never agree to a perpetual alliance with France although their friendship might be perpetual. Besides, an offensive alliance would not be permissible according to Moslem principles which prescribed only the right of defense. Nor would Turkey enter an alliance against England, as they were not actually engaged in war against each other, no official declaration of war having ever been made. 1 This ended negotiations at Danzig. Emin Effendi returned to Finkenstein, nor were the negotiations actually continued thereafter. The results of Napoleon's negotiations meanwhile with the Persian ambassador were more successful. Napoleon's efforts to establish official relations with Persia had begun in 1803 after the renewal of war with England. He had been kept in touch with the Persian situation through an efficient network of French consuls, merchants, and spies.2 In September 1803 he had instructed Talleyrand to secure extensive information concerning political and commercial affairs in Persia, and the possibility of sending a French minister there. 5 In the spring of 1804 Napoleon was considering the appointment of an agent to be sent to Persia to examine the situation.4 However, nothing was done that year. In January 1805 Napoleon received a letter from the Shah intimating that he would like to make an alliance with France. 5 Napoleon then appointed two persons, Amedeé Jaubert and Adjutant General Romieu, on a mission 1

Le Roux to Talleyrand, June 3, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie,

214.

2

Alfred de Gardane, Mission du Général Gardant en Perse, sous le Premier Empire (Paris, 1856), pp. 9-10; Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir John Malcolm (2 vols., London, 1856), i, p. 396. ' Correspondance 4

de Napoléon,

ix, p. 4.

Ibid., ix, p. 367.

* Driaut, La Politique

orientale de Napoléon,

1806-1808, pp. 172-173.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

to Persia. Romieu was especially charged to secure information concerning the topography and military resources of Persia, while Jaubert was to be more concerned with political affairs, particularly to arrange for an alliance and to urge upon the Shah continuance of his war against the Russians. 1 A f t e r numerous adventures, Romieu at length arrived at Teheran in October 1805,*but Jaubert having been imprisoned by Turks did not reach the end of his journey until June 1806. Romieu died soon after Jaubert's arrival, and at about the same time the Persians were badly defeated by the Russians at Askeran with the result that Persia lost Baku and the territory of Daghestan and the Shah became more than ever anxious to secure help against the Russians. Jaubert did not remain long at Teheran as his health was effected by the climate and the Persians were anxious to come to a definite understanding with Napoleon as soon as possible. In January 1807 he arrived in Paris, accompanied by a Persian ambassador with power to negotiate an alliance. The latter arrived at Talleyrand's headquarters at Warsaw at the end of February. While awaiting the return of Jaubert, Napoleon had not lost sight of Persia. Sebastiani had been sent to Constantinople in June 1806 with instructions to promote at the Porte the formation of a triple alliance of France, Turkey and Persia. For the remainder of 1806 Napoleon had continued to urge on Turkey the need of establishing good relations with Persia. In December he seems to have had in 1

Napoleon to Shah Feth Ali, Feb., 1805, ibid., p. 148. Romieu had been detected en route by British agents. Jones, British consul at Bagdad, had written to the Persian court warning them against intrigues with French agents which might create disagreeable relations between Persia and Great Britain. Jones to Mirza Bozurg, Aug., 1805, British Foreign Office, Persia, 1. Jones was informed in reply that Persia needed help against the Russians and that Great Britain had done nothing to put a stop to the Russian war. Mirza Bozurg to Jones, Oct. 12, 1805, ibid. 2

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE

SPRING

OF 1807

435

mind sending another mission to Persia as on the tenth he instructed Decrés to prepare at once two frigates destined for the Persian gulf to carry a French agent with a letter to the Shah. 1 On January 17, 1807 he had written the Shah a letter urging him to join with France and Turkey in attacking the Russians and to recover for himself possession of Georgia. T o Marmont on January 29 he wrote that the Persians were henceforth to be considered allies of France and that they would enable the French to read the Indies. What had been a chimera before seemed possible now. Two French frigates were to be sent to the Persian Gulf carrying a special envoy to the Shah. 2 Napoleon seems to have been as much concerned with using Persia as an instrument of attack on the British in India, as for opposing the Russians in Georgia. Jaubert's report encouraged Napoleon about the possibilities of an expedition against the British in India. Jaubert informed him that there was much discontent in India with British rule and that the Shah had constantly shown his ill will toward the British who, he believed, were furthering the Russo-Persian war in order to weaken Persia to their advantage. He asked for an agreement with France by which neither would make peace separately with Russia and he had repeatedly declared that, if after the Russians had been expelled from Persia Napoleon then wanted to march an army against India, he would concert with him.® At the beginning of March Napoleon appointed one of his aides de camp, General Claude Gardane, ambassador extraordinary to Persia.4 He was given instructions dated 1

Correspondance de Napoléon, xiv, p. 72.

2

Cf. supra, pp. 295-297.

' Report of Jaubert, Arch. Nat. A F, iv, 1686. 4 Gardane was chosen because he was well known in the commercial ports of the Levant and Persia, where members of his family had long held consular positions.

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

March 10, and ordered to be ready to leave early in April. He was to be joined in September by two French frigates in the Persian Gulf bringing munitions for the Persians and a force of twelve thousand troops under a French general to strike a decisive blow against the Russians and the British in the East. 1 April 26 the Persian ambassador, Mirza Riza Khan, arrived at Finkenstein and was received with particular marks of attention. Napoleon entertained him with reviews of his troops, lengthy discourses upon the history of Persia and the ancient Near East, dwelling upon the expedition to India of Alexander the Great. 2 Negotiations were soon concluded and a Franco-Persian treaty of alliance was signed on May 4, 1807. 3 France agreed to guarantee the integrity of Persian territory, including Georgia, and to furnish munitions, arms, officers, and engineers. Persia agreed to break all political and commercial relations with the English and declare war upon them; to enter into the system of the continental blockade; and to use influence with the Afghans and' other peoples in that region to organize forces to invade India. If Napoleon sent an army into India by land, it was to have passage through Persia; if a French squadron arrived at Persian ports it was to be given all needful help. A treaty of commerce was to be negotiated later at Teheran. There was no article in the treaty definitely committing France to military action against the Russians from Persia. Also noticeable was the preponderance of articles relative to the British. Driault says that the treaty was above all an 1

A t the beginning of April Napoleon despatched a letter to the Shah, narrating his victories over the Russians, and urging that now was the time for Persia together with Turkey to deliver a decisive attack against them and to stop all communication of the English with India. Napoleon to Shah Feth Ali, April 3, 1807, Correspondance de Napoléon, xv, 12278. 2

Driault, op. cit., p. 177.

' De Clercq, Recueil

des traités de la France, ii, pp. 201-203.

j

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN

THE

SPRING

437

OF 1807

instrument for action against England. Napoleon did not seriously count upon the efficacy of a Persian military diversion against Russia. 1 Following the conclusion of the treaty, Napoleon sent an effusive letter to Shah Feth Ali expatiating at length on the value of the treaty ; it would bring back the former glory of his empire and cause despair to the common enemies of both.2 Napoleon was now ready to despatch Gardane on his mission to Persia. His departure had been delayed pending conclusion of the alliance. According to the final instructions for Gardane dated May io, 8 he was to incite the Persians to take the offensive against the Russians, while they were occupied in Europe ; to help bring Persia and T u r key together in friendly cooperative relations, by presenting their common danger as greater than their religious differences; and to prevent Persia from making a separate peace with Russia, as " it was necessary to carry on the diversion of war in Persia so long as war in Europe had not ceased." Gardane should encourage the demands of the Shah for the assistance of French arms, as " a more active prosecution of the war against Russia is an essential object of the alliance." Also he should ascertain just what help could be expected from Persia in case it was judged opportune to undertake an expedition against the British in India. He was to ascertain whether any political relations existed with the English, because thus far the Shah had not conducted himself towards them with reserve or defiance. Commercial privileges which the English might have should also be secured for France, who should henceforth be the most favored nation; and direct commerce should be established between France 1

Driault, Tilsit,

p. 149.

2

Napoleon to Shah Feth Ali, May 5,1807, Correspondance x v , 12533. ' Instruction to Gardane, May 10, 1807, Arch.

de

Napoléon,

Nat., A . F . iv, 1686.

438

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

and Persia and other points in A s i a through the Persian G u l f by w a y of the Mediterranean and T u r k e y , since other routes by the great seas were dominated by the British.

Therefore

Gardane should investigate and report upon possibilities of the establishment of a French base in the Persian G u l f , expecially on the island of K h a r e k which might be secured f r o m Persia.

A l s o he should personally investigate O r m u z ,

which by its position near to the entrance of the Persian Gulf would be able to command navigation in that region.

The

W a h a b i s were located there and it was possible that A r a b i a might become an independent nation under them.

" We

would wish neither to prevent nor to f a v o r this event.

This

would only distract us f r o m the w a r which should occupy us before all."

But Gardane in his journey should ascertain

the situation of the Wahabis, their resources, and the political projects of their chiefs.

H e was also to g o to Muscat

to ascertain the dispositions of the chiefs there

toward

France, " as an expedition which sought to change affairs in A r a b i a would require much aid f r o m neighboring countries and f r o m E g y p t in particular. . . ." These

instructions to Gardane, like the terms of

the

Franco-Persian treaty, reveal the preponderant importance which Napoleon attached to using the alliance as a means to attack the British in India and f o r development of French commerce in the Levant.

Gardane was to concentrate his

efforts mainly on these ends.

It remained to be seen what

effect this would have upon the future stability o f the alliance f r o m the side of Persia, f o r to the Shah the most important thing in the alliance was to end the w a r with Russia and to recover his former possessions.

H e had no political objec-

tives in attacking the British in India with w h o m he maintained valuable trade relations.

In fact he was as ready to

accept British as French aid against the Russians. Gardane departed for Persia shortly a f t e r receiving his

DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN THE SPRING OF 1807

439

instructions. A t the same time the British government was preparing to send a British mission to Persia to counteract French influence and to establish its own commercial relations more firmly. A British peace mission to Turkey was also being prepared, while a Russian mission was on the point of opening negotiations with Turkey f o r peace.

2 A t the end of January the new British ambassador to Russia, Marquis Douglas, had arrived at St. Petersburg with instructions to promote better relations between Russia and Austria, secure Russia's support of the claims of the British monarch to Hanover, and conclude a commercial treaty with Russia. 1 Douglas soon found, however, that the Russians were not at all inclined to renew the former commercial treaty and would only agree to prolong it temporarily. 2 H e warned them that this would seriously damage Russian trade with the British and also adversely affect Russia's chances of getting a state loan at London. 3 T h e Russians had their grievances, complaining that the British government had been tardy in restoring cargoes of Russian merchant vessels seized by British cruisers. 4 T h e question of Russo-British commercial relations continued to be a bone of contention between the two powers. Douglas constantly pressed f o r the renewal of the treaty, urging that political relations necessitated the closest union. 5 The Russians complained that the British were not helping 1

Howick to Douglas, Dec. 30, 1806, British Foreign Office, Russia, 68. For discussion of earlier development of these questions, cf. supra, pp. 23; 208-209; 305n; 307-309. 2 Budberg to Douglas, Feb. 1, 1807, British Foreign Office, Russia, 68. 3 Douglas to Howick, Feb. 6, 1807, ibid. 4 Douglas to Howick, Feb. 8, 1807, ibid. 5 Douglas to Budberg, Feb. 26, March 6, 11, 1807, ibid.

440

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

them against the French. Their troops were inactive in Sicily and were making no attempt to attack the French in Italy, nor were they attempting any expeditions to France, Holland or Germany. 1 Douglas refused to see any relation between the two questions, and pointed out that the British had supported Russia against Turkey, and also contributed to the common cause by blockading all the coast of Europe controlled by Napoleon. On the question of Hanover, the Russian court refused to consider the British demand unless the British should satisfy an equivalent demand of Russia that they send an expedition to France. 1 The arrival of a Prussian envoy at St. Petersburg early in February aroused Douglas's suspicions that Russia was engaged in secret dealings for peace with Napoleon, who, it was reported, was making peace overtures to Prussia. Douglas was assured by both Alexander and Budberg that Russia would make peace only in conjunction with her ally, but the ambassador was not completely satisfied and reported to his government on several occasions that he believed an anti-British party in upper Russian circles was trying to influence public opinion by spreading rumors that Russia was being neglected by her ally. This party was working for a rapprochement with France and if Great Britain did not use her troops in some way very soon to help Russia, it was probable that the efforts of this party would be successful.8 The Prussian envoy had brought to Alexander a report of Bertrand's mission. The Tsar saw in Napoleon's proposals only an attempt to put a wedge into the coalition and he wrote Frederick William not to listen to Napoleon's proposals but to continue the war. Russia was ready to renew 1 Budberg to Douglas, March 2, 1807, ibid.; Budberg to Alopeus, March 3, 1807, ibid., 72. 2 Douglas to Howick, Feb. 4, 8, 1807, ibid., 68. * Douglas to Howick, Feb. 8, 28, March 19, 1807, ibid.

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE

SPRING

OF 1807

it with more forces, Napoleon was in a critical position, together they could soon ruin his military power and establish the basis for a durable peace, which should recover for Prussia her former frontiers and confine the French to the other side of the Rhine. 1 Soon afterwards the Tsar received a letter from General Benningsen urging him to come to Russian headquarters in order to counteract pro-French influences about the Prussian monarch, and it was hoped to force Austria to indicate to which side she was inclined. If she joined the allies, Napoleon could be decisively defeated as he lacked cavalry and his army was decimated by sickness. If Austria were not inclined to join the coalition, now was the time for Russia to make an advantageous peace with Napoleon in view of his offers to Prussia of restitution of her territory. Also, he would no doubt consent not to interfere further in the affairs of Turkey. If Austria did not join the allies it would be dangerous for Russia to continue the war with France/ Alexander replied that he was preparing to come to Russian headquarters.8 On February 16, Merveldt, the Austrian ambassador, wrote Stadion that Budberg had declared that his government was favorably inclined to the Austrian proposal for a general peace congress and further that Russia was inclined to conclude peace with Turkey and renounce every acquisition.4 Although this last was probably intended by the Russian minister to reassure Austria, it evidently had some degree of sincerity, for at the end of February Budberg wrote the Grand Vizier expressing surprise and regret over 1

Letter of Alexander, March 4, 1807, Driault, Tilsit, p. 91. Benningsen to Alexander, March 9, 1807, Mémoires du General ningsen, ii, pp. 262-263. 2

* Ibid., pp. 263-264. 4 Merveldt to Stadion, Feb. 16, 1807, Austria, Berichte, 1807.

Staatsarchiv,

Ben-

Russland,

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

the declaration of war by Turkey and declaring that Russia was ready to negotiate peace on the terms that Russia be given right of passage through the Bosphorus and retention of her previously recognized privileges in Moldavia and Wallachia. 1 Soon afterwards, Douglas offered the mediation of Great Britain in settling differences between the two powers, if Russia would concentrate all her efforts to military operations on the Vistula and declare that she had no plans of aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey. Budberg in reply avowed, as he had done repeatedly before, that Russia desired only peace with Turkey if she lived up to existing treaties; also Russia sought no change in the political status of the people in Bulgaria or the Ionian Islands, and in Moldavia and Wallachia desired only that the former hospodars be replaced and the original situation in the two provinces recognized by Turkey. 2 Arrival of news about this time—the middle of M a r c h — of the departure of Arbuthnot from Constantinople disturbed Douglas as it meant that there was no British representative at that place to help bring peace between the two states.3 However, he was encouraged when soon afterwards Budberg informed him that instructions had been sent to Pozzo di Borgi to leave Vienna at once upon a peace mission to Turkey. This had been decided upon to offset the embarrassment of the plans for British intervention in the interests of peace which the departure of Arbuthnot from Constantinople had caused.4 Pozzo was available, as his mission at Vienna had failed. 5 1 Bradisteanu, Die Besiehungen 1806-1807, p. 204.

Russlands und Frankreichs

sur

Turkei,

1 Douglas to Howick, March io, 19, 1807, British Foreign Office, Russia, 68. * Douglas to Howick, March 19, 1807, ibid. 4 Douglas to Howick, March 22, 1807, ibid.

*Cf. supra, pp. 313-317; 319-

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE

SPRING

OF 1807

443

He had sent word in the middle of February that to bring Austria into war on the side of the allies would require at least two conditions—first, a decisive defeat of Napoleon, secondly, an end of the Russo-Turkish war. Austria was certain of victory of the Russian army over the Turks and feared it might affect affairs in the Balkans. 1 N o doubt the connection between the failure of this mission to Austria and Russia's action in Turkey had much to do in determining the Tsar to make a demonstration for peace with Turkey. Douglas received a copy of the instructions for Pozzo and the Russian project for a peace treaty with Turkey. The latter was to be submitted to the British government for its consideration. The Russian project of a peace treaty was as follows. By the first article, all previous " conventions and treaties " were to be renewed. The second article stated that, as the French possession of Dalmatia was a source of danger to Turkey, the two states should use all possible means to drive out the French from that territory and settle among themselves its future status. The third article provided for the renewal of the Anglo-Turkish alliance and a joint guarantee by Russia and Great Britain of the integrity of the Turkish Empire. The fourth article authorized Russia to possess the fortresses of Chocim and Bender as " sureties " till peace was concluded with France. The fifth article stipulated that Serbia was to be erected into a " tributary principality " under a prince to be elected by the people for life and to be confirmed by the Sultan. The sixth article restored Wallachia and Moldavia to their former status but stipulated that Ypsilanti could maintain a force of four thousand or five thousand men " to protect his province against incursions from the right bank of the Danube." 2 1 Report by Pozzo di Borgo, Feb. 14, 1807, Martens, Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie, ii, 506. 2

British Foreign Office, Russia, 69.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

The instructions to Pozzo di Borgo throw light on these terms. With regard to the second article, the envoy was authorized to be satisfied " que la Porte emploie ses bons offices à contribuer à l"évacuation de ce pays (Dalmatia) par les Français sans que pour cela elle se constitue en état de guerre avec eux." But in return for this concession Russia should be allowed free access for her troops and the right of annexing the province or disposing of it as she might think fit. He need not insist on the third article. Concerning the fourth, Pozzo should understand that the Tsar had no particular interest in Chocim and Bender, that all that he desired was " pouvoir compter avec quelque certitude sur la constance de la Porte dans la système qu'il lui convient qu'elle suive." He would therefore accept any other " gages " of equal value, for example, the expulsion of Sébastiani. As for the fifth article concerning the Serbians, because of identity of religion Russia could not permit them to be left entirely to the dangers of persecution by the Turks. But if the Porte offered strenuous opposition to this article it should not be insisted upon. Pozzo, however, should find some means of doing something for the Serbs "de manière toutefois que nous puissions conserver avec ce peuple intéressant un lien quelconque au moyen duquel nous puissions du nouveau compter sur lui si jamais les circonstances le rendraient nécessaire." In the sixth article, he was authorized to reduce if necessary the number of the force to be maintained by Ypsilanti to fifteen hundred.1 I f Pozzo failed to negotiate a treaty, he was to work out with Admiral Siniavin a plan of attack upon the Turks. This plan, from what Douglas could learn, was to provide for a blockade and then an attack on Turkish forts in the Dardanelles by Russian land and naval forces.2 1

Budberg to Pozzo di Borgo, March 12, 1807,

2

Douglas to Howick, March 22, 1807, ibid., 68.

ibid.,

72.

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE SPRING OF 1807

445

Douglas approached Budberg at this time upon the question o f securing peace between Russia and Persia, suggesting British mediation if it should be desired. He had heard of the return of the French agent, Jaubert, from his mission to Persia accompanied by a Persian ambassador. The result, he informed Budberg, would be a Franco-Persian alliance unless something were done by Russia and Great Britain to prevent it. Budberg, however, appeared indifferent to the question, passing off Russian relations with Persia as a minor matter. Besides, he believed it probable that by this time a Franco-Persian alliance had actually been consummated at Napoleon's headquarters. He suggested a British diversion as the only means of relieving the danger to the British interests in India. 1 This attitude concerning the Persian question would certainly not be agreeable to the British government which was considering at this time means for establishing closer relations with Persia. In the latter part of March Alexander and Budberg left St. Petersburg ostensibly for Russian headquarters, though really intending to go first to the Prussian court at Memel. Their departure was disconcerting to Douglas as their absence would retard negotiations and render more uncertain the settlement of questions concerned with the commercial treaty and Hanover, besides making it impossible for him to observe closely political currents and influences around the men who really shaped Russian policy. Early in April reports reached St. Petersburg concerning the British expedition to Constantinople but without exact information as to conditions causing its withdrawal. Douglas wrote Howick on April 16 that " i f the British fleet has been obliged to give up coercive measures, the idea of protracted war with Turkey will create much uneasiness at St. Petersburg, and perhaps alarm the Austrian cabinet." 2 He 1

Ibid.

2

Douglas to Howick, April 16, 1807, ibid.

446

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807

wrote Adair at Vienna urging the necessity of making clear to the Austrian court that Russia had no plans for conquest in Turkey. 1 Douglas may have feared that the British expedition might provoke a definite break between Turkey and Great Britain and lead to reprisals by the latter power which would defeat the Russian peace mission. By this time he had probably received instructions from London to assure Russia that the British fleet in the Mediterranean would give all possible assistance in the war against Turkey. 2 These instructions, sent after the British government heard of the Turkish declaration of war on Russia, did not exactly meet Douglas's needs at this time when Russia was sending a peace mission to Turkey. News of the British expedition to Egypt was not favorably received at St. Petersburg where it provoked suspicions that Great Britain had ambitions for conquest. Nor did the Russians see how it helped the common cause of Russia and Great Britain, in spite of Douglas's efforts to explain that to do so was the only purpose of the expedition. 8 Also irritation over the conduct of the British in the Mediterranean was enhanced by reports from the Russian minister at Palermo, Tatischeff, that F o x refused to adhere to the proposal of the Sicilian Court that a joint British and Sicilian expedition be sent against the French in Naples. 4 A f t e r the despatch of orders to Pozzo di Borgo to open peace negotiations with the Porte whereby it was hoped at St. Petersburg to check any plans by Napoleon to utilize Turkey as an instrument of war against Russia, the chief interests of the Tsar and his minister during the next two months centered in military preparations in Poland, diplomatic manoeuvres concerned with organizing the coalition, 1

Douglas to Adair, April n , 1807, ibid.

* Howick to Douglas, Feb. 20, 29, 1807, ibid. * Douglas to Howick, May 22, 1807, ibid. * Cf. infra, pp. 521-522.

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN

THE

SPRING

OF 1807

447

and the question of a general peace. Alexander arrived at Memel at the beginning of April. One of the first effects of his arrival was the return to power of Hardenberg, who was at the head of the anti-French party at the Prussian Court. Once again in control of affairs, Hardenberg urged on the two monarchs the need for all enemies of France to take concerted action. Austria was to be pressed to join immediately in the campaign. On the subject of future peace he urged the adoption of a political scheme, a statement of what the allies were fighting for, and a " platform " that should bring the powers into line with one another so that no dissensions might make a cleavage in the coalition. Hardenberg presented a programme for the political reconstruction of Europe. 1 At Bartenstein after further discussion it was agreed that the correspondence with Napoleon concerning peace should be taken up again and the negotiations for a congress resumed. It was arranged that the aims of the proposed concert of the powers at war with France should be modified according as England, Austria and Sweden agreed to subscribe to the treaty. Finally the proposals of Hardenberg were diluted and formulated into harmless generalizations in a convention concluded between Prussia and Russia at Bartenstein on April 23. 2 A restored and reconstituted Germany was to form a barrier against France, and the obsolete Holy Roman Empire was to be replaced by a strong federation. But the precise features of the plan were omitted to avoid trouble. Austria was to be consulted in the reorganization of Italy. Questions of compensation were left vague. Under no circumstances was either Russia or Prussia to conclude a separate peace with France. Ambitions of Russia were not considered in the document. The independence of Turkey 1 3

Ranke, Denkwürdigkeiten

von Hardenberg,

III, pp. 341-344.

The Convention of Bartenstein is printed in Martens, op. cit., vi, p. 409.

448

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

was guaranteed. A military convention was also concluded with Sweden on April 21. O n the same day the Prussian monarch in behalf of Russia, Prussia and England sent a letter to Napoleon. 1 It declared that the allies desired a general peace. The settlement should equitably indemnify those victims of the war to whom England and Russia were bound by solemn engagements. Assurances were given that England was willing to make sacrifices for the sake of peace. It was affirmed " with the most complete certainty " that the T s a r had no designs against Turkey and merely demanded the maintenance of the existing treaties with her. T h e participation of Turkey in the proposed congress, therefore, was considered to be out of place; but Sweden should be admitted and also Austria should be allowed to join in the negotiation. Napoleon was invited to present the terms upon which he would treat. 2 Russia and Prussia, having now inaugurated separate peace negotiations with Napoleon, did not welcome the reception of the official offer of Austrian mediation for peace. A t this juncture of affairs the allies were more interested in bringing Austria into their agreement. T h e Prussians had never desired to see a peace concluded under Austrian auspices; their ambitions in Germany were too much opposed to those of Austria. T h e Tsar, however, had already expressed separately his satisfaction with the idea of Austrian mediation. 3 He could not repudiate it now nor on the other hand could he disregard the feelings of his ally. H e left to Prussia the task of replying to Austria and the former sent her the Convention of Bartenstein declaring that hopes for peace would be sooner and more fully attained by accession to it. 4 A t the same time Alexander had instructions sent 1 A favorable reply had been received f r o m London to the proposal f o r a general congress. s

Butterfield, op. cit., pp. 174-175.

3Cf.

infra, p. 451.

4

Butterfield, op. cit., pp. 160-161.

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE SPRING OF 1807

449

to Razumovski to secure the adhesion of Austria to the Convention. 1

3 B y the end of January 1807 it was evident that the efforts of the British and Russian ministers at Vienna to win Austria to the side of the coalition had failed. Pozzo di Borgo wrote that the Austrians had no love for France; " mats la peur glace leurs coeurs; il est la cause dominante de leur conduite." 2 They dreaded a victory for Napoleon which might cause him subsequently to turn upon Austria. They also feared lest Russia make a separate peace with France resulting in extension of her frontier in the Balkans and they were uneasy over the possibility that England might also come to a private agreement with Napoleon. Secretly hoping for the downfall of Napoleon, the Austrian court felt the dangers of the position they had adopted. A t the end of December Stadion admitted " that it was morally impossible in the present state of things to look forward to neutrality as a permanent system." * T o escape these difficulties Stadion had decided to work for a general pacification through mediation of Austria, and to that end Vincent had been sent off to French headuarters. 4 Merveldt was directed to ascertain the views of the Tsar upon the question. 8 The first reports from Vincent, received late in January, did not remove uncertainties at Vienna concerning the intentions of Napoleon, as the latter talked about the " integrity of Turkey " and also about compensations for Austria in Instructions to Razumovski, April 25,1807, Martens, op. cit., ii, p. 507. * Report of Pozzo di Borgo, Dec. 14, 26, 1806, Vandal, op. cit., i, p. 82. 3 Adair to Howiek, Dec. 30, 1806, British Foreign Office, Austria, 81. * C f . supra, p. 315. s Stadion to Merveldt, Jan. 25, 1807, Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, 1801-1810, pp. 269-270. 1

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

Turkey. Stadion at once replied that Austria would not consider any plan for the partition of Turkey unless forced to do so by conquests of some other power. 1 When the first news of the battle of Eylau reached Vienna, brought by an English courier who reported that the French had retreated, Emperor Francis voiced his real sentiments: " God grant that the news be true." 1 But Eylau did not move the Austrian court to take up arms with the allies; the Russians had not secured the clear-cut victory over Napoleon which might have moved them to do so. There were also other restraints. Just previously news had come of Turkey's declaration of war on Russia which enhanced antiRussian sentiment at Vienna and increased anxiety over possible difficulties for Austria in the east. Adair, the British ambassador, hoped that Great Britain's assurances that Russia planned no aggression in the Balkans would eventually prove effectual in removing this obstacle to Austria's joining the coalition.® A t the end of February Adair wrote Howick that it was quite hopeless to expect Austria to cooperate actively with the allies, even with the inducement of aid from British subsidies. Nor had his attempts to mitigate the alarm caused by the presence of the Russians in Turkey been successful. The anti-Russian party at the Court had perceptibly gained in influence. The belief was becoming current that it was to the best interest of Austria to let Russia and France wear themselves out in the contest until both should cease to menace their neighbors. T o improve matters, Adair urged that Great Britain and Austria attempt to mediate peace between Turkey and Russia. 4 Stadion had already approached 1

Stadion to Vincent, Feb. 4, 1807, ibid., p. 369.

* Report of Stadion, Feb. 18, 1807, ibid., p. 270. * Adair to Howick, Feb. 7, 1807, British Foreign Office, Austria, 83. * Adair to Howick, Feb. 26, 1807, ibid.

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE SPRING

OF 1807

451

Pozzo di Borgo concerning Austrian mediation between Russia and Turkey, but was unable to secure from him any binding assurance that Russia would accept the proposal. He was inclined to view this as evidence that she intended to prosecute the war against Turkey. 1 Anti-Russian feeling at the Austrian court was also nourished by fears concerning the future of Germany. Stadion told Razumovski that they suspected at Vienna that Russia was carrying on the war in the interests of Prussia. 2 Prussia had notified Vienna of Napoleon's peace overtures after Eylau, giving assurances that she would not make a separate peace. The German states were ready to rise against Napoleon and Austria should take up arms now. Stadion replied that Austria would continue her present policy.® The Austrian court distrusted the ambitions of Prussia in Germany. At length a report came from Merveldt that the Tsar was favorably disposed to Austrian mediation for a general peace, though he wanted to see Austria arm herself meanwhile. The Tsar had also declared that Austria's intervention in the interest of peace should help put an end to his differences with the Porte.4 At about the same time came Vincent's report giving as Napoleon's bases for peace the restoration of Prussia with its implication of the removal of the Polish question, and assurance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and suggesting that he might be forced to make a treaty with 1

Stadion to Merveldt, Feb. 24, 1806, Beer, Die orientalische Politik Oesterreichs seit 1774, p. 169. * Butterfield, op. cit., p. 124. Stadion meant promotion of plans of expansion by Prussia in any later reorganization of Germany. * Report of Stadion, March 6, 9,1807, Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, 1801-1810, pp. 270-271. 4 Merveldt to Stadion, Feb. 16, 1807, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Russland, Berichte, 1807.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION,

im~180T

Russia if Austria refused to consider an alliance.1 Stadion urged the Emperor not to make an alliance with Napoleon. If he did so, Austria would not be in a position to prevent Napoleon from making a separate peace with Russia and Prussia. On the other hand, now that Napoleon appeared to have given up his Polish plans and Russia had declared her intention of preserving the integrity of Turkey and had indicated a desire for peace with her, Austria was placed in a favorable position for pursuing her plan for mediation for a general peace. Unless peace were concluded, however, Stadion did not believe Austria could long remain neutral and therefore she should make military preparations. Then if the allies were victorious in any engagements Austria would be in a position to intervene effectively in a final settlement. On the other hand if Napoleon were victorious Austria must be able to maintain her independence.2 Vincent was informed that nothing had been determined concerning an alliance with France and that he was to refuse any proposals from Napoleon concerning Turkey. 8 A disturbing report came from Merveldt that he had suspicions that Russia had proposed to the Serbians that Russian troops be placed in the garrison at Belgrade. 4 This was offset, however, by news that the Porte had accepted the peace overtures of the Serbs, though Stadion half believed that Russia would find some means to prevent a settlement.5 Then at 1

Report of Vincent, March 7, 1807, Beer, op. cit., p. 273.

2

Reports of Stadion, March 18, 19,27, 1807, ibid., pp. 271; 273; 276-280.

* Stadion to Vincent, March 24, 1807, ibid., p. 275. 4 Report of Merveldt, March 3, 1807, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Russland, Berichte, 1807. This proposal was in fact not made until after the Paulucci mission. Cf. infra, pp. 499-500. 4 Stadion to Merveldt, March 19, 1807, ibid., Weisungen, 1807. This evidently refers to the Serbo-Turk negotiations which had started late in January. Apparently the Austrian court was as yet unaware of the subsequent breakdown of these negotiations. Cf. infra, p. 462.

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE

SPRING

OF 1807

453

the end of March had come news of the withdrawal without results of the British expedition to Constantinople and many rumors in regard to the dominance of French influence at the Porte. Adair wrote Howick that the party opposed to Austria's joining the allies now sought to justify their position by pointing out the failure of England to send any expeditions to the continent against the French. 1 The Austrian court having received from the Tsar a disclaimer of all intentions of aggression against Turkey and a favorable reception to the proposal of Austrian mediation— and from Napoleon declarations that he would restore the Prussian monarchy and abandon his Polish schemes—prepared now an official offer to the powers of the good offices of Austria in behalf of peace. Some time previously Stadion had in an unofficial way given an outline of the principles which he would wish to lay down for a proposed peace congress: Poland must be left as she was before the war, the settlement of affairs in Germany and Italy should be the subject of general revision and negotiation, and the question of the Ottoman Empire should be settled according to former treaties.2 There would be difficulties in applying these principles inasmuch as Napoleon had recently announced his refusal to accept as a basis for the settlement of difficulties between Russia and Turkey the renewal of the old treaty arrangements between the two powers. This Stadion expressed in private. In the official invitation to the powers, he was careful to frame a note which avoided controversial issues and could be accepted by all parties, demanding only that the negotiation for a general peace " should extend over the reciprocal interests and essential relations of the Powers Adair to Howick, April 4, 1807, British Foreign Office, Austria, 83. Adair to Howick, March 14, 1807, British Foreign Office, Austria, 83; Razumovski to Budberg, Feb. 20 / March 4, 1807, Wassiltchikow, Les Rasoumovski (Halle, 1893-94, 6 vols.), ii, pp. 100-102. 1

s

454

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

taking part in it " and that a stable settlement should be made for the future. However, in an explanatory note appended to the communication as it was sent to the enemies of France, Stadion expressed the view that Turkey was outside the system of Europe and was not involved in the questions at issue in the negotiation. If she took part she would be under the complete influence of France whenever the discussion touched on the large European issues. The Porte was merely to be notified of the mediation, but not invited to join in the congress.1 Napoleon intended that Turkey should participate in the congress. Stadion evidently believed that the cause of peace would be less jeopardized by consenting to Russia's terms of peace and excluding Turkey from the congress than by admitting Napoleon's demands. Their cause seemed brighter to the Austrians when it was learned that Pozzo di Borgo had received instructions to go at once to Constantinople to negotiate peace with Turkey. Adair hastened to write Howick, again urging mediation by England, by force if necessary, to bring Turkey to peace with Russia. 2 Adair was not concerned about securing peace in the Balkans so far as it might help along Austria's pursuit of a general peace; rather, it would remove, he hoped, a serious obstacle to Austria's joining the coalition. He believed—perhaps because he wanted to—that circumstances would eventually force her to cooperate with the allies. He therefore asked for instructions to enable him to meet any request she might make for subsidies or an alliance. He centered his hopes in the influential Archduke Charles and sought to encourage his growing conviction that with Napoleon in Italy and gaining power over all Germany there would soon be an end to the independence of Austria unless she acted at once against him.* ' Butterfield, op. ctt., pp. 130-131. 1

Adair to Howick, April 5, 1807, British Foreign Office, Austria, 83.

' Adair to Howick, April n , 1807, ibid.

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE

SPRING

OF 1807

455

Stadion's policy of neutrality applied to the Serbian question, and the Russo-Turkish war did not save him from worries during the spring. Stürmer sent reports from Constantinople that the Porte continued to be disturbed over the presence of Austrian troops upon the frontier between Austria and Turkey. A suspicion persisted among the Turkish ministers, which it was evident was furthered by Sebastiani, that eventually Austria would join with Russia in war against France. This idea helped to perpetuate another suspicion at the Porte that the Austrians were furnishing arms to the rebellious Serbians. The prospect that three powers — Russia, Austria, England — were to be against Turkey gave impetus to the project for alliance with France. Upon the subject of a general peace, Stürmer reported there were certain misgivings at the Porte as to how the powers would treat Turkey and the Turks were not above the suspicion that Napoleon might sacrifice Turkey at any time if realization of his own plans required it.1 Stadion sent instructions to Stürmer to assure the Porte that Austria intended to maintain strict neutrality in the war between Russia and Turkey. He was to suggest tactfully that Austria had good reason to believe that Russia had no designs for aggrandizement on Turkey. 2 A s for the Serbs, Austria had repeatedly informed the Porte that she had no connections with them in any way; grants of arms and grain to them had been forbidden as Austria did not wish the rebellion to go on. She had a right, declared Stadion, to expect that the Porte would accept the veracity of her declarations on the subject.3 Stadion became, however, increasingly doubtful whether Reports of Stürmer, March 25, April 25, May 25,1807, Austria, archiv, Türkeii, Berichte, 1807. 1

2 1

Stadion to Stürmer, May 3, 19, 1807, ibid., Weisungen, Stadion to Stürmer, May 19, June 2, 1807, ibid.

1807.

Staats-

456

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

the Serbian rebellion ever would be ended, at least so long as the Russians were at war with Turkey. Reports were received from Merveldt that there was no evident intention at the Russian court to permit a reconciliation between the Serbs and the Porte. Further there were reliable reports, Merveldt said, that the Serbian leader, Kara George, had been named an officer of high rank in the Russian army. He had agreed that Belgrade should be deemed a Russian fortress and surrendered only on orders from the Russians. Further Kara George would use his armies under the orders of the Russian commanders and he had agreed not to make a separate peace with the Porte. 1 Then too, reports had reached Vienna early in May that Kara George intended soon to join his forces with the Russians in operations on the Danube.2 At the end of April Austria received acceptance of her offices of mediation for a general peace from Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and France. Their replies contained complicating questions and conditions, but the principle was admitted by all the powers and Stadion believed it possible to proceed with organizing the congress.3 At the same time he received the Convention of Bartenstein with a strong hint that it would be wise for Austria to sign it. This Convention was not acceptable to Austria, particularly the articles dealing with the reorganization of Germany, which aroused Austrian suspicions of Prussia's ambitions. Besides, Austria could not become a party to a prearranged agreement at a time when she was seeking to play the role of mediator for a European peace on grounds of her 1

Reports of Merveldt, March 23, April 21, 1807, ibid., Russland, Berichte, 1807. 8 Stadion to Merveldt, May 7, 1807, ibid., JVeisungen, 1807. 3 Driault, Tilsit, p. 1 1 1 ; Vandal, op. cit., i, pp. 43-44; Butterfield, op. cit., pp. 155 ct seq.

DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS

IN THE SPRING

OF 1807

457

neutrality. Throughout May the Russian and Prussian ambassadors, supported by their British colleague, Adair, pressed on the Austrian court acceptance of the convention. T o Adair's argument that it was more favorable to Austria than was thought, Stadion replied that the treaty of Pressburg was the basis of Austria's negotiations for a general settlement. Adair believed that if Danzig were taken by the French, Austria might then decide to accept the convention and join the allies.1 Stadion evaded giving a definite refusal to Prussia and Russia as he did not want to jeopardize the plan for Austrian mediation. Meanwhile he had been vainly endeavouring to secure from Napoleon some definite instructions for procedure toward general peace from the French side. Vincent could get nothing at French headquarters, Talleyrand was removed from his reach, and he could secure no interviews with Napoleon. Finally at the end of May, simultaneously with news of the surrender of Danzig on May 26, Napoleon sent an evasive and hollow reply to Austria. 2 A t the same time the Austrian court received a kind of ultimatum from Russia and Prussia demanding immediate definite answer as to acceptance of the Convention of Bartenstein. Adair urged its acceptance. Stadion countered by showing alarm over the safety of Austria's frontiers in the Balkans. Adair sought to convince him that Russia had all she could do in defending her own frontiers and could not be occupied with schemes of conquest in the Balkans.8 The decisive demand from the allies for Austria's answer concerning the Bartenstein agreement decided Stadion to send a special mission to their headquarters. Besides he suspected that separate negotiations might be going on between 1

Adair to Canning, M a y 29, 1807, British F o r e i g n Office, A u s t r i a , 83.

' Driault, op. cit., pp. 99, h i . 1

Adair to Canning, June 3, 10, 1807, British F o r e i g n Office, Austria, 83.

458

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Napoleon and the allies. General Sutterheim was appointed to this mission and instructed to deliver if necessary a refusal of Austria to the Convention of Bartenstein and to present various reasons: the Russian war with Turkey created complications for Austria; the coalition gave no sign of activity or promise of success; England to all appearances was indifferent to the fate of Europe. 1 Before Sutterheim was given his instructions, however, news arrived of the battle of Friedland. For days there had been tense expectation at Vienna of a decisive military engagement between Napoleon and the allies and therefore there had been no hurry in sending an answer to the allies on the Bartenstein Convention.2 1

Butterfield, op. cit., pp. 205-207; Beer, Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik, 1800-1810, pp. 285-286. * Adair to Canning, June 17, 1807, British Foreign Office, Austria, 83.

CHAPTER XVII T U R K E Y IN T H E W A R I

THE declaration of war by Turkey upon Russia in January 1807 produced no immediate military operations of any consequence. The winter season was unfavorable; Turkey was unprepared for war, and time was necessary to collect armies and work out plans for a campaign. The Russian armies occupying Turkish territory remained quiet, the only major operation undertaken by them being an attack on Ismail late in February which soon settled down into a prolonged seige.1 The Russians viewed their occupation of Turkish territory as in part a defensive measure intended to improve their position for meeting attacks undertaken by the French. It has already been noted that the Tsar and his ministers were of the opinion that their difficulties with the Porte in the latter part of 1806 had been chiefly the result of French intrigue. At the beginning of January before word had come to St. Petersburg of the declaration of war by Turkey, Budberg had presented to Alexander a plan for operations in the Balkans. The Russians should occupy and fortify the entire north bank of the Danube from Orsova to the Black Sea. The line should be continued from Orsova to Belgrade now held by the Serbians, with whose forces the Russians should make direct connections. They should then continue the line westward to the Adriatic, secure support of the people 1

Bradisteanu, Die Besiehungen Russlands und Frankreichs sur m den Jahren 1806 und 1807, p. 195. 459

Tiirkei

460

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

of Herzegovina, and unite with the Montenegrins. The Serbian leaders should be joined more closely to Russian interests by assurances that the independence of Serbia would be maintained under a Russian protectorate. T h e various Turkish pashas along the Danube, particularly Mustapha of Rustchuk and Pasvan O g l o u of Widin, should be won to the side of Russia by promises of sovereignty over their respective territories. T h e Russian fleet in the Black Sea and Mediterranean should secure and retain control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles until the French were eliminated from Turkey. 1 T h i s plan looked very well on paper but it remained to be seen whether it could be carried out. There would be difficulties for the Russians in winning over the Danubian pashas. W h e n the Russian armies had invaded the Danubian provinces, Mustapha of Rustchuk had been most active in trying to organize a confederation of the pashas in European Turkey to take the offensive against them. T h e plan had not materialized and Mustapha had been forced to view with alarm the Russians establish a strong garrison nearby at Bucharest. 2 A s for Pasvan Oglou of Widin, it was questionable whether he could be placated, as he had been ill pleased with the successes of the Serbians in establishing their control over the neighboring pashalik of Belgrade. If the Russians planned to establish military cooperation with the Serbians, it would be difficult to come to terms with him. Obviously the success of the Russians in establishing the western end of the proposed line of defense from the Black Sea to the Adriatic very much depended upon securing the support of the Serbians, who with the surrender of the strong fortress of Shabatz early in February were finally given control of the entire pashalik of Belgrade. The im1

Budberg to Alexander, Jan. 4, 16, 1807, ibid., pp. 192-193.

2

Cf. supra, pp. 247; 250-251.

TURKEY

IN THE

WAR

461

portant capital city, Belgrade, had been captured in December. 1 Meanwhile their political relations with the Porte and the Russians underwent significant developments. The Serbian delegation appointed in November 2 to conclude a convention with the Porte had arrived at Constantinople just when the first news arrived there of the Russian invasion of Moldavia, and the Porte, absorbed afterwards in the diplomatic complications with the Russian and British ambassadors, had given scant attention to the delegates. The Turks were certain that Russia had aided the Serbian insurrection, in which belief they were encouraged by Sébastiani who declared that the Russians would attempt as soon as possible to unite with the Serbians and that the already closely allied Montenegrins would provoke a revolt of the Greeks in the Morea and the Archipelago. T o prevent execution of this plan Sébastiani had advised the Porte to make sure of the fidelity of Pasvan Oglou in order to hold Widin, and to place a large store of provisions in Belgrade so that it might be able to resist a long time.3 In his concern to prevent the Serbians or Russians from capturing Belgrade, Sébastiani had gone so far as to send a request to Vienna without the knowledge of the Porte, asking that Austria send provisions there. However, by the time it reached Vienna the Serbs had taken Belgrade. This event produced much agitation at the Porte where there was a strong suspicion that Austria was involved in the affair. 4 After the capture of Belgrade, the Porte at length decided on the advice of Sébastiani to prevent a union of Russia with 1 Yakschitch, L'Europe et la résurrection de la Serbie, 1804-1834, pp. 112-113. 2

Cf. supra, p. 254. The articles of the convention had already been drawn up by both parties and ratified by the Serbians. It now remained to secure the ratification of the Porte. 3 4

Sébastiani to Talleyrand, Dec. 8, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 212. Sébastiani to Talleyrand, Jan. 25, 1807, ibid., 213.

462

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

the Serbians by coming to terms at once with the latter and winning them away from a Russian alliance.1 Accordingly the Serbian deputies who had been waiting for weeks at Constantinople were called to the Porte to receive ratification of the Convention which was signed January 25.2 The Serbian emissaries, accompanied by a Turkish official suite, left Constantinople for Belgrade in order to secure final official ratification of the Convention by the Serbian government. But soon after leaving Nish the Turkish suite was attacked in a village by native Serbians who massacred all of them. A s a result of this unfortunate event the Porte refused to conclude the convention, relations between the Serbs and Turks were again broken, and the war between them was continued.8 The situation was propitious for the Russians to secure an alliance with the Serbians. Already in January, General Michelson, commander of Russian armies occupying Moldavia and Wallachia, upon orders received from Emperor Alexander, 4 had sent an emissary to Kara George to deliver money and an offer of military aid from Russia and to propose the establishment of close relations between their military forces. Kara George replied that it would give joy to the Serbians to see among them the Russians, " their dear brothers of race and religion." 6 A second letter from Michelson came soon afterwards addressed to all the Serbian chiefs and the Senate, felicitating them on the capture of Belgrade and urging that they should not accept any peace proposals from the Porte. Michelson declared he had all kinds of help for them and 1

Ibid.

' Y a k s c h i t c h , op. cit., p. 116. sKallay, Die Geschichte serbischeti Yakschitch, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

* Cf. supra, p. 252. s

Yakschitch, op. cit., pp. 117-118.

Aufstandes,

1807-1810, p.

18;

TURKEY IN THE WAR

463

asked for a statement of their needs, plans and means for establishing permanent communication with the Russian armies. The Serbians should attempt particularly to take Widin, and Michelson asked that four thousand Serbian troops be sent to Crajova to operate with the Russias. " The hour had at last sounded ", he declared, " for the Christian combatants to throw off the Moslem yoke and reclaim the Christian peoples to their former dignity, to their glory and welfare " . Turkey had declared war on Russia because of Russia's interest in the welfare of a people to whom she was bound by close ties of religion. The Serb nation was an example to the whole world of the heroism of a people moved by the Christian religion and by love of country. The Serbs deserved to be a nation and it would be a disgrace for them to pay tribute to the Turks. In a final benediction the Russian general urged the Serbs to be brave and to hope in God and Alexander I. 1 This panegyric and the offers of help from Russia were encouraging but they did not altogether remove doubts and suspicions among some of the Serbian leaders and members of the Senate that Russia had political ambitions in the Balkans and would be ready if necessary to sacrifice the interest o f Serbians to her ends. There were also those among the upper class who distrusted the Russians because they were jealous of the growing influence of K a r a George and feared he would make use of the Russians to strengthen his power. However, there were a substantial number who wanted closer relations with Russia. Kara George belonged to those who did not fully trust Russia's declarations and doubted whether she would give the help promised, but like many others he saw the need for immediate help against the T u r k s / A general assembly was called early in March to which 1

Kallay, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

' Ibid., pp.

17-18.

464

THE

NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

Kara George put the question whether they should attempt again to come to some agreement with Turkey or seek alliance with Russia. While there was evidence that neither course was exactly desirable, it was at length decided to accept alliance with Russia and to establish a junction of Serbian troops with the Russian forces. A Serbian deputation was appointed to proceed at once to General Michelson's headquarters at Bucharest to work out plans for joint operations against the Turks. It was also to arrange for sending a high Russian official to the Serbians to promote good feeling between the two peoples and especially to help organize a permanent administrative system for the country. The mission was to secure Russian military officers to help the Serbians erect fortifications and organize the artillery service, and also to obtain munitions and a sum of two hundred thousand piastres.1 The Serbian envoys departed on their mission early in April. The Serbians in renewing war with Turkey and seeking an alliance with Russia had converted their struggle into a national war and not a mere insurrection against bad local government under Turkish administration. With control of the whole pashalik of Belgrade, they had established the territorial foundations for a national state, and were preparing an administrative system for the country built exclusively upon Serbian foundations. However, the Serbian leaders realized that the existence of the new state was not securc and that it was only by means of an alliance with some strong state, such as Russia now offered, that their political independence in the immediate future could be in any way assured. These needs of the Serbians were most opportune for Russian plans for establishing a solid line of defense from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. The western half of such a 1

Yakschitch, op. cit., pp. 119-122; Kallay, op. cit., pp. 20-22.

TURKEY

IN THE

WAR

465

line was conceived as a bulwark especially against any possible attacks by the French from Dalmatia, and armed support from the Serbians was necessary to complete it. The Serbs could contribute a fair sized army. They lacked an adequate training cadre, arms, munitions and money, but these needs might be supplied by Russia. The immediate practical problem confronting the Russians was to effect an actual junction of their armies. Between them, however, was the pashalik of Widin, holding the strong fortresses of Negotin, Gladova, and Ostrow, which, so long as they were in the possession of the Turks, would prevent the Russians from establishing a secure line of communication with the Serbians. The Pasha of Widin would not wish a junction of Russian and Serbian forces, knowing full well that it would strengthen the new Serbian state on the western frontier of his pashalik. There were two other powerful local political leaders in the western part of the Balkan peninsula—the Pasha of Bosnia and Ali Pasha of Janina—who had also uneasily observed the gains of the Serbians and who would certainly object to a union of their forces with the Russians and likewise to any attempts to establish a line of defense westward to the Adriatic, strengthening the Russian hold on Cattaro and the alliance already existing between the Russians and the Montenegrins. In the circumstances it might be expected that the Porte and these pashas would look favorably upon proffers of help from the French.

2 A f t e r the declaration of war on Russia by Turkey, it remained for Napoleon to secure a definitive alliance with Turkey, thereby gaining her adherence to the Continental system and assuring her support against the Russians and British in the east. With the purpose of aiding the Porte

4

66

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

to organize its military forces more effectively to this end, he had sent to Sebastiani at the end of January instructions to sound out the Porte upon the proposal of sending a corps of twenty-five thousand French troops from Dalmatia to help the Turks on the Danube against the Russians. Ships and some companies of French artillerymen would also be sent to Constantinople, and munitions would be furnished to the pashas in the western provinces.1 This despatch had reached Sebastiani about the time the British expedition retreated down the Dardanelles leaving the Sultan and his people to celebrate the event as a Turkish victory, while Sebastiani was showered with felicitations from Selim as the savior of Constantinople. Selim accepted Napoleon's offer of ships and artillery forces. Orders were sent to the Bey of Algiers to attack English commerce and to treat the French as allies. Concerning the proposal for sending a French army from Dalmatia to the Danube, Selim asked that, in order to placate Moslem opinion, the request for this army should seem to come from Napoleon. He requested Sebastiani to write Napoleon that he himself would do everything possible to combat their common enemies, and that Napoleon had not a more sincere friend than the Sultan. Sebastiani informed Talleyrand that the Turks seemed to have much confidence and to be determined to combat the Russians vigorously while they showed a marked animosity toward the English. In contrast the French were everywhere warmly greeted.2 Sebastiani wrote Marmont at the end of March that he should be prepared to send, upon order from the Porte, companies of French artillery whose help had been accepted. The Porte was much disturbed over the Russian seizure of Tenedos and over reports that the Serbians were preparing 1

Cf. supra, p. 297.

2

Sebastiani to Talleyrand, March 10, 1807, Aff. Etr. de Turquie, 213.

TURKEY

IN THE

467

WAR

to j o i n with the Russian army. A s a result of these events the Porte more than ever desired help of the French and orders had been sent to the various pashas to permit and help passage of any French officers and troops. The Pasha of Bosnia had been sent orders to help Marmont combat at Cattaro the Russians and their allies, the Montenegrins. 1 A t the end of March everything seemed favorable at Constantinople for realization o f Napoleon's plans for cooperation between French and Turkish forces in the coming campaign against the Russians. A Turkish ambassador was already at French headquarters waiting to negotiate a treaty of alliance between the t w o powers.

3 Napoleon had long recognized the fact that there were political forces to be taken into account in Turkey other than the Sultan and the Porte at Constantinople. There were also certain powerful pashas whose good will must be won and whose local political ambitions must be considered in promoting French interests in the Near East. B y the spring of 1807 he had established political connections through special agents with each o f the most important pashas in European Turkey, among them A l i Pasha of Janina, the most powerful political figure in Albania and the Morea. Since March 1806 there had been at Janina a French political agent, Pouqueville, who had succeeded in establishing a rapprochement between A l i and Napoleon by playing upon the fears of Ali over the presence of the Russians in the neighboring Ionian Islands and in the Adriatic. 2 W i t h the reopening of war in the autumn between France and Russia, A l i became aware of the possibilities of deriv1 Sebastiani to Marmont, March 31, 1807, Mcmoircs iii, pp. 99-101. 2

Cf. supra, pp. 277 et seq.

Due de

Raguse,

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

ing from it advantages for himself. He had been kept informed through his own and French sources of the growing difficulties at Constantinople between the Porte and Russia. He had also watched in the Adriatic in the latter months of 1806 the Russians occupying and fortifying certain of the Dalmatian islands and strengthening their position at Cattaro. And when at the end of 1806 Turkey declared war on Russia, Ali thought himself justified in starting active hostilities. With Russia engaged in two wars, he concluded the situation was advantageous for him to attempt to promote his own ambitions by securing Corfu and certain important neighboring towns on the mainland—Parga, Preveza, Butrinto, Vonitza. F o r Napoleon the time was at hand for converting the restless and ambitious Ali into an active ally in the task of weakening the hold of the Russians at Corfu, and if possible helping Marmont eliminate them from Cattaro. Therefore in January he had sent instructions to Marmont and Joseph Bonaparte tc send to Ali Pasha artillerymen, cannon, munitions and also French officers to help him organize his army and develop his defences. 1 A s a result, in the latter part of March there arrived at Janina from Naples a small force of some twenty artillerymen with several cannon and some munitions. At the same time came another detachment of artillerymen and several officers sent by Marmont from Ragusa. 2 Joseph had sent Colonel Guillaume de Vaudoncourt to help Ali organize his artillery and also to keep a close eye upon him and send back information concerning affairs in the Ionian Islands. Napoleon did not fully trust Ali Pasha, suspecting that he would sacrifice political agreements any time to advance his own personal ambitions. 3 1

Correspondance

3

Boppe, L'Albanie

' Correspondance

de Napoleon, et Napoléon,

xv, 12664. 1797-1814, p. 66.

de Napoléon, xv, 12664.

TURKEY

IN THE

WAR

469

T h e British and Russian naval forces had not interfered thus far. Foresti, British agent at C o r f u , had warned his government at the beginning of the year that the French were going to send help to A l i Pasha from southern Italy and he urged that Russian and British squadrons keep close watch in the region. 1 But during the early months of 1807 the British and Russian naval forces were preoccupied in the eastern Mediterranean. F o r a while after the declaration of war by Turkey upon Russia there had been some doubt as to what position the Septinsular Republic (Ionian Islands) would take. T h e Porte had called upon the Republic as a vassal of Turkey to support her, while Russia demanded that it remain loyal to her as its protector. It was a difficult situation. T h e Republic realized that to break with Turkey would mean a loss of trade and would endanger the source of food supplies. But opposition to Russia would expose it to attacks by Russian naval forces. The deciding factor would be the position Great Britain should take, for to join with the T u r k s and find the British united with the Russians would certainly be disastrous. Therefore, when it was learned that a British expedition was going to Constantinople, the government of the Republic decided to break with the Porte and under direction of Russian officers to prepare armaments. 2 B y this act the Republic also became an enemy of A l i Pasha, thereby making him more inclined than ever to seek alliance with the French. A f t e r the arrival of the French detachments, Janina became the scene of great activity. F r o m all parts of Albania came native bands under their leaders attracted by prospects of the booty offered by military service under Ali Pasha. 1

Foresti

to

Howick,

Jan.

10,

1807,

British

I s l a n d s , 9. ' F o r e s t i to H o w i c k , M a r c h 7, 1807, ibid.

Foreign

Office,

Ionian

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807 They were a daring undisciplined lot, particularly proud of their cavalry. Most o f the better organized troops of Ali were concentrated about Preveza, which would be the base of operations against the Russians on the neighboring island of Santa Maura and later against Corfu. 1 T h e relations between Ali and the French officers became most amicable. Under their direction fortifications were soon erected on the coast, especially at Preveza; a fleet o f flat boats was built to carry the troops for the attack upon Santa Maura; and the organization of the pasha's army was noticeably improved. Pouqueville, like his colleague Sebastiani at Constantinople, helped with these preparations, advising Ali and encouraging him to rely upon the friendship o f Napoleon. 2 Elated by the rapid improvement in his military position, Ali soon became anxious to begin active operations. He was no doubt encouraged by the repulse of the British expedition to Constantinople, which had been reported to him as a great victory for the Turks. He also learned of the military preparations of the Porte against the Russians and the possibilities of help on the Danube from the French. Orders came to him from the Porte to attack the Russians. The fact that both Russian and British naval forces were away made it seem an opportune time to begin operations, from which Ali hoped to realize his dream of conquest of the Ionian Islands. 3 The native people in the Ionian Islands had never wished to have Ali Pasha rule over them. They had just grounds for fearing the rapacity of this capable but unscrupulous chieftain, and they also realized full well the depredations which his Albanian troops would probably commit. There was, however, a considerable pro-French party in the Islands 1

Boppe, op. cil., pp. 70-72.

* Ibid., pp. 77-78. • Ibid., pp. 73-74-

TURKEY

IN THE

WAR

471

w h o opposed a Russian as well as an Albanian regime. T h e y would probably help the French secure possession of the islands should they attempt to do so. 1 T h e government of the Septinsular Republic, hearing of the plans of A l i Pasha, proceeded to assemble troops and develop fortifications at Santa Maura. These hostile proceedings of Ali and the fact that he was aided by the French had contributed much to decide the Republic to join with the British and Russians and to break with Turkey. 2 T h e fact was, however, that with a strong Russian force at C o r f u and a strong Russian fleet in the Mediterranean the Republic could not have safely done otherwise than join with the Russians. In spite of his own confidence and the encouragement of the French officers, A l i Pasha had secret doubts whether he would ever permanently possess the Ionian Islands, especially C o r f u . Napoleon had assured him the year before that he would not object to seeing him take over control of C o r f u should the French take the Ionian Islands. 3 T h i s was, however, no guarantee of his possession of the islands nor had Napoleon ever given any assurances that he would permit him permanently to possess any of the islands. A l i suspected the ambitions of Napoleon in this direction. T o ascertain more definitely the Emperor's views, he sent off his secretary, Mehemet Guerini, in the first days of April, on a mission to imperial headquarters. 4 Shortly afterwards Ali launched his first attack from Preveza upon Santa Maura, but without any decisive suc1

Foresti to A d a i r , A p r i l 6, 1807, British F o r e i g n Office, A u s t r i a , 83.

* Hid. 3

Cf. supra, p. 287.

* Pouqueville to Talleyrand, A p r i l 5, 1807, Boppe, op. cit., p. 75. B e fore Mehemet Guerini could conclude his mission the treaty of Tilsit had settled the question of the future of C o r f u .

472

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

cess. 1 H e soon discovered that the Russians had so well fortified the place that he would not be able readily to carry out his plans of conquest and that more forces were needed if he expected to drive the Russians out of the Ionian Islands. N o t long afterwards, however, the French were given possession of these islands as a result of the Franco-Russian treaty concluded at Tilsit.

4 Napoleon's acquisition of southern Italy and Dalmatia had also made him see the importance of establishing friendly political relations with the neighboring Turkish province of Bosnia. T h e most important political personage there was Krousseref Mehemet, w h o had long been pasha. H e was an able administrator and had served loyally his sovereign. While he had acquired great prestige in the province, he did not belong to the category o f governors, like Mohammed A l i in Egypt, A l i Pasha in Albania, Pasvan O g l o u of Widin or Mustapha of Rustchuk, who by this time had virtually acquired such authority over their respective pashaliks as amounted to political autonomy and made them ever ready to flout the authority of the Porte if it conflicted with their own interests. Krousseref had always exercised his authority in accordance with orders from the Porte and as an obedient servant of the Sultan. In M a y 1806 Napoleon had appointed Pierre David French consul at Travnik, the capital of Bosnia. He was really intended to be a political agent, instructed to foster a friendly attitude of Krousseref and the local chiefs in Bosnia towards the French regime in Dalmatia; to observe and report on affairs in Serbia. 2 A f t e r some delays David had arrived at Travnik in February 1807. T o w a r d the end of 1806 rumors had begun to circulate in 1

Ibid., pp. 78-82.

2

Cf. supra, p. 286.

TURKEY

IN THE

IVAR

473

the country that a French army would soon come from Dalmatia through Bosnia to attack the Russians on the Danube. David found that most of the natives suspected that the real intentions of the French was conquest, and even news of Turkey's declaration of war on Russia did not allay these suspicions. Krousseref assured him of his friendship for France and his desire to see her carry on the war against Russia, but declared he could not permit passage of a French army. Nor could he raise an army against the Russians unless ordered to do so by the Porte. He feared that even if the Porte gave the order permitting passage of French forces, the native people would very much dislike it. 1 Reports coming to Travnik of renewal of war between the Serbians and the Porte, the former to be aided by the Russians, and news that a Russian expedition supported by the English was advancing upon Constantinople seriously alarmed Krousseref over the safety of his province and convinced him that the help of the French was necessary to save Turkey. 2 David assured him that French aid would be forthcoming if the Porte would indicate its needs and consent to the passage of French troops through Turkish territory. That the Porte intended to accept French offers of aid seemed evident when on March 26 Krousseref received instructions to keep on friendly terms with Marmont, and to request him to send at once French officers and artillerymen to Constantinople, as they were needed to help combat the British who had appeared before the city with a fleet. The most intimate union, the despatch declared, existed at the Porte with the French. 3 Nothing was said however, concerning the proposal for a French army corps coming from Dalmatia to help the Turks on the Danube. 1

Pierre David, " Extraits du Journal de Pierre David," Revue toire diplomatique, (1924) 38, pp. 156-157. 2

Ibid., pp. 159-162.

3

Ibid., p. 159.

d'His-

474

THE

HEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

Events followed which caused more alarm at T r a v n i k . A b o u t the middle o f April a Serbian agent w a s captured bearing a letter f r o m the V l a d i k a of Montenegro to Serbian and Russian officers which declared that they could rely upon all the Greeks in Bosnia to revolt at the favorable moment. T h e n came w o r d of invasion of Bosnian territory to the east by a Serbian force and of attacks on the western frontier of the province by bands of Greeks and Montenegrins. Krousseref and D a v i d waited impatiently for an order from the Porte permitting French forces to come to the aid of Bosnia. Krousseref became so concerned that he was about to request D a v i d to send word a n y w a y to Marmont to come on with an army, when on April 24 he received a firman f r o m the Porte g i v i n g him authority to raise an army for w a r against the Serbians and Russians and to call f o r help f r o m the French if necessary and to permit passage of French officers and an artillery force. 1 O n the twenty-ninth a letter f r o m Marmont announced that he was ready to send a force of artillerymen but insisted that they should proceed together and in French uniform. A l s o he was prepared to send five hundred men, though the Porte had asked f o r only about three hundred. 2 Krousseref informed D a v i d that he did not have authority to settle the question as to the size of the detachment or their manner of passage, and that he could not guarantee, in view of evident popular hostility to the idea o f a French force, their safe conduct through Bosnia if they came in French uniform and together. H e must await further orders f r o m the Porte.' 1

Ibid., pp. 163-165.

* Ibid., p. 167. A b o u t the middle of A p r i l M a r m o n t had received a firman f r o m the P o r t e authorizing entry into Bosnia of a force of several hundred F r e n c h artillerymen t o proceed to j o i n the T u r k i s h army. It proposed that they should come in small detachments and in T u r k i s h

dress. 3

Mémoires, Duc de Raguse, iii, p. 46.

David, op. cit., pp. 167-169, 302.

TURKEY

IN

THE

WAR

475

David tried unsuccessfully to get the pasha to consent to Marmont's terms. In the middle of May Krousseref left Travnik to inspect his camps and also to observe the situation on the frontier next to the Serbians. A f t e r the departure of the pasha, David felt the hostility of the natives and began to fear f o r his personal safety. A portion of the popular hostility was directed against the pasha, because he was believed to have sold out to the French. 1 Anti-French sentiment among the populace was sustained by the frequent passage through Travnik of some French officer or officers usually going eastward to Constantinople or some other place.2 Krousseref also found the same sentiment among regiments of Turkish janissaries in the province who refused to leave their garrison posts upon his request that they help drive back Serbian forces who had invaded the eastern frontier of Bosnia. They claimed that it was necessary that they be ready to defend their posts against the French if the latter came into Bosnia. 3 While Krousseref was attempting to drive back the Serbians, the Montenegrins and Russians, aided by Bosnian Greeks, were attacking on the southern and western frontiers of the province. Vladika Peter of Montenegro had persuaded the Russian commander at Cattaro to use a portion of his garrison in conjunction with Montenegrin forces in an attack upon Niksics, an important place in Bosnia on the frontier adjacent to Montenegro. This operation got under way in the latter part of April. Another Russian force was sent against Sulemein Pasha, governor of Trebinje, to prevent his coming to the aid of Niksics. The latter place, however, was not taken by the allies.4 Subsequently, late in 1

Ibid., pp. 304-305.

1

Ibid., pp. 161, 303.

' Ibid., p. 303. 4

Gopcevic, Gcschichte von Montenegro und Albanien, pp. 337-338.

476

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

May, Russo-Montenegrin forces attempted to attack another Turkish fortress in this region at Klobuk. Sulemein Pasha called on Marmont for help and was sent a French force under General Launay. He also requested the help of the French to put down a revolt of certain begs in this region who had connections with the Montenegrins and the Russians. Sulemein and his French allies succeeded in dispersing their enemies.1 Russian agents during this time were inciting native peoples along the whole Dalmatian littoral to insurrection against the French. Several local uprisings occurred early in June aided by Russians and the Montenegrins. Marmont succeeded in suppressing them, although the Russians during the spring got control of several more islands. 2 While Krousseref was away from Travnik engaged in defending the frontiers of his province, David awaited word from Constantinople which would settle the question with regard to the passage of French forces through Bosnia. At length an order came from the Porte at the end of May permitting entrance of a French artillery force without specifying previous requirements regarding uniform, etc. David communicated this to Marmont. On June 6 word reached Travnik that a French artillery detachment under Delort had entered Bosnia, though no arrangement for its passage had yet been made. David secured a passport for it and also orders to local chiefs to furnish provisions. However, at a council of chiefs of the region about Travnik opposition was expressed to the coming of the French and it was even declared that the people should oppose them with arms. David attempted to convince the chiefs of the good intentions of the French in helping Turkey against the Russians. 3 1 Gopcevic, op. cit., p. 338; Pisani, La Dalmatie de 1797 a 1815, PP- 267; 280-281.

* Pisani, op. cit., pp. 272-279. ' David, op. cit., pp. 307-308.

TURKEY

IN THE WAR

477

The French detachment at length arrived at Travnik and soon after, on June 12, departed. The same day word came of a revolution at Constantinople, the dethronement of Selim and the accession of a new Sultan. David, believing that the revolution was the result of Russian and British intrigue, feared now that Krousseref would be removed. Upon request from the pasha's kiaya and also because of advice from Sebastiani, David sent word at once to Delort urging him to turn back with his force and wait until the views of the new government, particularly toward the French, were known. 1 The French detachment returned to Travnik the next day but the kiaya did not dare let them pass through the city until he had held a divan of the local chiefs and secured the promise that the French would not be molested; in the meantime they camped outside the city. Krousseref returned on the sixteenth and soon afterwards issues a proclamation declaring that the new Sultan desired the friendship of France but asked for the recall of the French artillerymen. 2 Perhaps this proclamation was intended by the pasha to improve his own position, as there had been an agitation for his deposition and evidence that the people took the revolution to mean a repudiation of French influence under the former government. At least David believed he saw in their reaction to the revolution very clear evidences of anti-French sentiment, and he therefore prepared to send his family off to Dalmatia. He believed he might be forced to end his mission at any time. But the situation looked better to him when early in July an official order came from the Porte confirming Krousseref in his office and ordering him to raise an army at once to attack the Serbians. 3 However, before the pasha could prepare an army to attack the Serbians, the war in the Balkans was temporarily suspended by the Treaty of Tilsit. 1

Ibid., pp. 3 0 9 - 3 1 0 . ' Ibid., p. 313.

1

Ibid.,

p. 3 1 2 .

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 180&-1807

5 Napoleon had proceeded after hearing of the Turkish declaration of war on Russia to establish political missions at Widin and at Rustchuk, the capitals of the two most powerful .pashas on the Danube, Pasvan Oglou and Mustapha. Meriage had been appointed to Widin, and Lamare, formerly stationed at Bucharest to Rustchuk. 1 Both these pashas were ambitious and powerful, inclined to view their respective pashaliks as their own patrimony. This was particularly true of Pasvan Oglou, who had long been pasha of Widin and who, with a full treasury and a strong army, actually ruled his pashalik quite independently of the Porte, where he was feared and disliked. A f t e r the declaration of war by Turkey upon Russia, Sebastiani had despatched one of his secretaries, Jaubert, to Widin to urge Pasvan Oglou to remain loyal to the Sultan and to persuade him to help keep open a line of communication for couriers between Constantinople and French headquarters. This Pasvan promised to do.2 The way had been opened for Meriage who arrived at Widin on February 20. However, shortly before this, Pasvan Oglou died. Pending appointment by the Porte of a successor, the government of the pashalik had been placed in the hands of a council of local officials, but actually the real authority was held by the favorite lieutenant of the dead pasha, Molla A g a Hasnaclar, to whom Pasvan had left the care of his sons, soldiers and treasury. Meriage at once became aware that the attitude of the successor to Pasvan toward the French would very definitely affect his own mission. Molla gave him to understand that he was in control of affairs, but was loyal to the Porte. He Cf. supra, p. 295. Boppe, " La Mission de 1'Adjutant-Commandant Meriage a Widin," Annales de I'Ecole libre des sciences politique*, Avril, 1886, p. 267. 1

2

TURKEY

IN THE

WAR

479

suggested that Meriage urge Sebastiani to help secure for him the appointment as pasha. Molla had put Widin in a state of defense with full arsenals and a strong army at his command. It was clear to Meriage that Molla intended to oppose the Porte if it did not accept him as pasha and it would be unfortunate to have civil war now when the Porte had begun a war with Russia. A s Molla appeared to be favorably inclined toward the French, Meriage wrote Sebastiani describing the situation at W i d i n and suggesting that he promote the appointment of Molla. 1 T h i s won the good will o f Molla who promised Meriage that, if appointed, he would loyally serve the Porte and place an army in the field against the Russians and Serbians. Meriage took advantage of the opportunity to propose that Molla place some troops in the region directly to the east of the pashalik of Widin, known as Little Wallachia, marked off from the rest of Wallachia by the A l u t a river. C r a j o v a was the chief town. T h e Russians did not as yet occupy it, and it was the intention of Meriage to prevent their doing so and thus to widen the distance between them and the Serbians. Meriage also proposed that Molla give Prince Charles Soutzo control over this region with his uncle Prince George Soutzo as governor. 2 Meanwhile Sebastiani, upon recommendations of 1

Meri-

Ibid., p. 270.

* Prince Charles Soutzo had been appointed hospodar of Wallachia by the Porte at the time of the decision to declare war on Russia but as the Russians by that time had occupied the province, proclaiming Ypsilanti as hospodar, Soutzo had never assumed office. He had resided since at Sistova engaged in encouraging the pashas in Bulgaria to resist the Russians, intriguing with those boyars in Wallachia who were antiRussian and issuing proclamations to the people of the province not to recognize Ypsilanti and to help Turkish forces in every way. Meriage had at once got in touch with Soutzo and they had conceived this plan regarding Little Wallachia which they hoped to make a center for the anti-Russian party of boyars in Moldavia and Wallachia. Ibid., p. 271.

480

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807

age, had intervened at the Porte in the cause of Molla, and in spite of some opposition in the Divan had finally secured his appointment to the office of Nazir or administrator of taxes in the pashalik. While not as yet pasha, Molla was f o r the moment satisfied with this appointment as it legitimized his authority over the province. He was profuse in his thanks to Meriage f o r his services in his behalf and expressed the hope that Sebastiani would soon secure his appointment as governor, in return f o r which he promised to do what he could to support the French. 1 He agreed to the proposals of Meriage concerning Little Wallachia, and ordered his troops there. Meriage believed that he had now successfully established his mission. Subsequently he received word from Talleyrand approving his conduct and instructing him to get Molla to attack the enemy and prevent union of the Serbians and Russians; to assure him of Napoleon's loyalty to the Porte and also of Napoleon's protection; to offer him arms, munitions, etc., and see that Molla kept on good terms and cooperated as much as possible with Mustapha of Rustchuk.® Already Molla, moved by efforts of the French agents to secure him office and above all by necessity, had decided to take action against the Serbians, who after the death of Pasvan Oglou had started operations early in April against the important fortress of Negotin held by Molla's forces. This threatened his communication with Gladova and Orsova, the other important fortified places he held on the Danube. S o long as Molla held these fortresses, it would be difficult for the Russian and Serbian armies to establish s a f e permanent connections. Molla succeeded in driving back the Serbians. Meanwhile Molla received his appointment as pasha, and 1

Reports of Meriage, March 15, 20, 1807, ibid., p. 272.

* Talleyrand to Meriage, April 5, 1807, ibid., p. 272.

TURKEY

IN THE

WAR

took the name of Hydris Pasha. Again the French agents had put Hydris in their debt, and Meriage, expecting something in return, now approached him upon the question of the passage of a French army from Dalmatia to the Danube. Hydris could do nothing else than show readiness to accept the project and to offer his help should they come. 1 Meriage had been informed by two French officers, Captains Bigex and Leclerc, agents of Marmont, that the pashas of Nish and Bosnia had given assurances that they would welcome French assistance. It remained only for the French to secure the consent of Mustapha of Rustchuk. Meriage had hoped from the first to establish close cooperation between Hydris and Mustapha in opposing the Russians and also to make their unified forces a substantial support to the French army when it arrived on the Danube. 2 However, he soon learned that the two pashas were too near each other to be on good terms. He learned also that Mustapha was not on the best of terms with the Sultan. There was even suspicion that Mustapha was negotiating with Ypsilanti who, it was discovered, had an agent at Rustchuk.* Toward the end of March Lamare reported that Mustapha was not inclined to accept the proposal for bringing a French army to the Danube in spite of his urgent appeals. Mustapha replied likewise to Soutzo, and to Coigny who had been sent by Sebastiani to promote the project. Mustapha had also received ungraciously a French officer, Captain Charroy, sent by Marmont to ascertain his needs and offer him help from Napoleon. He declared he had sufficient troops to push back the Russians without the aid of French troops; nor did the Porte need to accept their help.4 Mus1 2 5 4

Report Report Report Report

of of of of

Meriage, April 24, 1807, ibid., p. 274. Meriage, March 9, 1807, ibid., p. 274. Meriage, March 20, 1807, ibid., pp. 274-75. Lamare, March 26, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 213.

482

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

tapha became so violent in his denunciations of the French that Lamare eventually retired to Sistova. That this opposition to French troops on the Danube was not merely localized in Mustapha at this time is indicated by a despatch of March 3 1 from Sébastiani to Marmont to the effect that there were evidences of opposition to the project among various groups at Constantinople and elsewhere. 1 On April 1 4 Sébastiani wrote Talleyrand that there was considerable uneasiness among the Turkish people and evidence of opposition to reports that a French army was coming from Dalmatia. The pashas also showed opposition. Mustapha of Rustchuk had expressed himself with much feeling against it. Ali Pasha of Janina had recently sent word to the Porte reproaching it for supporting French projects. Also he had heard that the pasha of Bosnia would not take responsibility f o r allowing French troops to pass through his province. 2 A t about the same time Soutzo wrote to Mériage that there was obvious sentiment among the Turks against the use of French troops. They talked more about French subjection of Turkey, he declared, than the advantage of French aid against the enemy of Turkey. Soutzo believed that because of popular opposition from his Turkish subjects the Sultan would refuse to permit the French army to come.3

6 Difficulties between Selim and the janissaries during the previous summer over the question of reforms in the army have already been mentioned.* In the recent triumph over 1 Sebastiani to Marmont, March 31, 1807, Mémoires iii, p. 9.

Duc de

* Sébastiani to Talleyrand, April 14, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, * Soutzo to Mériage, April 15, 1807, ibid. * Cf. supra, pp. I34-I3S; 138-140; IS4-I5S.

Raguse, 213.

TURKEY

IN THE

WAR

483

the British, the janissaries had contributed little; the work had been done by the soldiers of the reformed regiments or Nizatn-Djedid, and the irregular troops or yamaks, both under the personal direction of Selim, and especially by the French officers and Sebastiani who immediately after the withdrawal of the British had been received with effusive demonstration not only by Selim and his ministers but also by the people in Constantinople. However, there were certain groups, particularly the janissaries, who saw in the recent affair a victory for the party o f reform, and who feared that Selim would use his increased prestige to carry out his plans for reform of the army. T h e janissaries were encouraged in this by the ulema, that inherently conservative theocratic body that also feared penetration of western ideas. A f t e r the withdrawal of the British expedition, the Porte, urged on by Sebastiani, had proceeded to draw up plans for the forthcoming campaign against the Russians. Sebastiani's counsel was sought and gladly given. B y the end of March a general plan had been worked out so that active measures for organization and movement of the Turkish armies to the Danube were taken. T h e northern fortresses were to be reenforced by transferring thither most of the troops from Rumelia. T h e command was to be entrusted to the Grand Vizier, whose duties at Constantinople during his absence were to be discharged by Mussa Pasha. 1 But at this point difficulties arose at Constantinople over the composition and organization of the army to be sent to the Danube. The force of irregular troops, yamaks, which had been brought to Constantinople from A s i a Minor at the time of the break with the British, had remained in the city after the British had left. It seems that Selim had thought of incorporating them into the Nizam in order to give them 1 Ottokar V . Schlechta-Wssehrd, Die Revolutionen in den Jahren 1807 und 1808 (Vienna, 1882), p. 74.

in

Constantinopcl

484

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

a regular place in the army, a plan which would be certain to arouse the opposition of the janissaries. Selim wanted the army to have a strong contingent of his reformed regiments, but his ministers warned him that for political reasons it would be necessary to mobilize the janissaries for the service. Though he had confidence only in his Nizam he yielded to his ministers, and the army which eventually left for the Danube had a large contingent of the janissaries from Constantinople. 1 Companies of the janissaries, however, remained in the capital, and also the irregular troops or yamaks and some troops of the Nizam. Following the departure in the latter part of April of the main Turkish army headed by the Grand Vizier, a pronounced agitation soon developed in Constantinople against the French, coupled with a noticeably open and strong criticism of Selim. This was instigated by the janissaries and the ulema whose fears that reforms were to be made in the army were increased when it became generally known that Selim was planning to bring French officers to help train Turkish troops and a French army from Dalmatia to aid the Turkish army on the Danube. The malcontents complained of Selim's pro-French policy and attempted to excite public opinion by attributing ambitions to Napoleon dangerous to Turkey, pointing tu his attempt in 1798 to subject Egypt and Syria and declaring that behind the growing number of French officers in the Turkish army, and especially the plan for importing a large French army, lurked Napoleon's hidden schemes for conquering Turkey as he had conquered Europe. It was time, therefore, declared these agitators, to resist the penetration of French influence in the affairs of Turkey. Besides, they pointed out that there was no assurance, as the French claimed, that an alliance with Napoleon would safeguard Turkey against her enemies, Russia and 1

Ibid.

TURKEY

IN

THE

WAR

485

Great Britain. Napoleon could not protect her against the forcing of the Dardanelles by British and Russian fleets; the British were occupying E g y p t and could occupy other parts of the Empire; and the Russian armies beyond the Danube could advance at any time. Early in May Sebastiani wrote Marmont that the Porte would probably not accept the proposal to send a French army from Dalmatia to the Danube. It was obvious that opposition from various sources was becoming too considerable for the Sultan to consent to such a measure. Rumors that the French army was coming had spread everywhere and the reported numbers of the French troops had been enlarged as rumors spread. T h e Sultan was being told that these troops would be used to subjugate Turkey, and the janissaries were suspicious that the French troops were going to be used by the Sultan against them. 1 T h e janissaries proceeded to excite the yamaks against Selim by declaring that if the latter were incorporated into the Nizam they would lose their privileges. Also they appealed to their religious fanaticism, saying that the Nizam was a Christian European invention. Agitation among the yamaks was in fact being promoted by agents of none other than the heir apparent, Prince Mustapha, and Selim's chief 1 Sebastiani to Marmont, M a y 8, 1807, Lavallee, Histoire de la Turquie (2 vols. Brussels, 1859), ii, p. 286. T h e anti-French agitation in Constantinople, conducted by the janissaries, w a s reinforced by similar agitation among Christian peoples in the provinces, stirred up by Russian agents w h o circulated what purported to be a discourse by Talleyrand b e f o r e the French Senate, according to w h i c h the Greeks were described as barbarous and the Moslems as long-suffering. Sebastiani reported that this calumny had been successful in stirring up anti-French f e e l i n g among the subject Christian peoples and w a s becoming decidedly h a r m f u l to French action. Sebastiani to Talleyrand, M a y 23, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 214. T h e Christian subjects w e r e also f e a r f u l of the effect of a Franco-Turkish alliance in strengthening the Ottoman Empire and lessening the possibility of their securing freedom f r o m T u r k e y .

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

minister at this time, Mussa Pasha, who, as inspector of the yamaks, had the opportunity to intrigue among them.1 Selim, ignorant of the duplicity of his minister, revealed to him enough to indicate that he intended to extend the army reforms. The climax of the agitation was reached in the accusation that Selim was no longer the defender of Islam but was under control of Europeans, for the present the French, who actually sought the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. The agitators pointed to the post glories of the Empire, especially under Solyman the Magnificent, and contrasted with them the subservience of Turkey under Selim I I I . The anger of Allah manifested itself clearly in the fact that the Wahabis held the Holy Places, and the cause of His anger could be found in the treason of the Padishah to the interests of Islam. Such talk was dangerous to the Sultan as the appeal to Islam always aroused the religious fervour of the masses of Moslem subjects. And the janissaries were not without considerable influence ; their organization still wore the halo of the conquerors at the time when the Empire was at its height and they proclaimed themselves the invincible warriors of Allah. Moreover, political agitation could always count upon the economic misery of the people. It was easy to make them believe that the new reforms advocated by Selim would cause increased taxation. The whole affair was really the beginning of the struggle between the Old and the Young Turks, a struggle between reaction and progressive reform which was to continue throughout the century. It was not fundamentally concerned with the question of foreign policy, as the attacks upon the French might seem to indicate. However, since the agitation was being promoted by criticism of the foreign political connections of the country, the Sultan and his ministers 1

Schlechta-Wssehrd, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

TURKEY

IN THE

WAR

487

would probably be forced to refuse proposals of help from the French, especially of a French army which would have to traverse a considerable stretch of Turkish territory. The sudden conversion in the latter part of May of the agitation in Constantinople by the opponents of Selim's army reforms into a revolution may be traced in large part to the fact that treasonable officials such as Mussa Pasha had not kept Selim truthfully informed of the strength of the popular agitation and the ramifications of the intrigues of the janissaries during the previous weeks. The opponents of reform had grounds for believing that in the absence of most of the janissaries the army reforms would be attempted, and several events contributed to enhance the fears of the conservatives and to hasten open revolt. On May 22 Selim while attending a weekly religious rite had remarked to the Lieutenant A g a of the janissaries, Arief, that in the interest of public safety it seemed necessary to increase the number of Nizam troops at guard posts. He appeared in no hurry to place these troops on guard duty, but Arief reported the remark to others and it soon spread among all the janissary troops in the city, naturally increasing the agitation. 1 Soon afterwards a certain Pasha Slamli Rhagib was to leave his post at Scutari for another and, evidently desiring to make a favorable impression upon his sovereign, proceeded to put on his body guard certain badges worn by the Nizam. Some of his guard coming from the same region as the yamaks refused to wear the badges and they at once informed other yamaks of their refusal. The affair was made worse by propaganda: it was said that many tailors were making Nisam uniforms and it was soon reported that when Selim made his next visit to the Mosque he was to be accompanied by Nizam troops and would himself wear their badges. It was said that the Nisam were to attempt some 1

Schlechta-Wssehrd, op. cit., pp. 79.

4

88

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

night to kill all the janissaries in the city and also those at the front. A l l these rumors provided sufficient fuel for a conflagration. Mussa Pasha knew fully what was going on and with or without the knowledge of the Sultan he gave to inspectors of the batteries on the Bosphorus the order to use the next pay day of the soldiers to force the troops connected with these batteries to accept the Nizam uniform. 1 This was the signal for revolution. T h e revolution started on the twenty-fifth, 2 when the yamaks in the city under their chief, Cabakchi-Oglou, suddenly attacked the Nizam troops in their garrisons and at the batteries. Being inferior in numbers and unprepared, the latter were soon routed. Within a few hours the yamaks were in control of all the forts about the city. Mussa Pasha reported falsely to Selim the events of the day, declaring that they were insignificant and that all was tranquil again in the army. In fact emissaries from the janissaries were trying with the help of money to excite the yamaks further, urging that now was the time to destroy the Nizam. Members from the ulema supported the agitation by giving it the character of a kind of holy war. The yamaks were roused to a fanatical pitch and ready for anything their chief ordered. On the twenty-seventh a body of the yamaks headed by CabakchiO g l o u entered the gates of the city. Harangues were delivered by agitators in the public squares and to troops at their garrisons. A list of high officials, designated as traitors, was eventually presented to the populace and the soldiers, 1

Ibid., pp. 80-81.

F o r a detailed and authentic account of the M a y revolution in Constantinople, s e e : Schlechta-Wssehrd, op. cit., pp. 8 1 - 1 1 3 ; see a l s o : St. Denis, Histoire de I'Empire Ottoman de 1792 a 1844 ( P a r i s , 1844, 4 v o l s . ) , ii, pp. 19S et stq. T h i s w o r k contains nearly all material given in the same author's book, Histoire des Revolutions de Constantinople en 1807 et en 1808 ( P a r i s , 1819, 2 v o l s . ) . 2

TURKEY

IN THE

WAR

489

who acclaimed their punishment. Assassins began their work with these condemned persons, and their heads were presented to public view in traditional Turkish fashion. On the twenty-ninth Selim submitted to the rebels by issuing a hatti-cherif suppressing the Nizam. This did not satisfy them for by this time they had come to the decision, abetted by harangues of agitators, that there could be no complete restoration of Islam, so long as Selim ruled. On the thirty-first Cabakchi-Oglou, at the head of a band of rebel yatnaks and a crowd of fanatics from the populace, delivered a harangue at a public square openly demanding the deposition of Selim and charging him with violation of sacred principles of the Koran. The mufti pronounced a divine benediction upon the necessity of deposition. The crowd raised cries against Selim and at the same time proclaimed Mustapha savior of the people. Thereupon Cabakchi pronounced the deposition of Selim and proclaimed Mustapha legitimate ruler. Selim was notified of his deposition and, knowing that his faithful Nizam regiments could not come to his aid with the city controlled by the yamaks and janissaries, he offered no resistance and was soon a prisoner. Mustapha ascended the throne as Mustapha I V . The real master, however, in the new regime, was Cabakchi-Oglou, who became commanding general of all garrisons on the Bosphorus. 7 Meanwhile the main Turkish army headed by the Grand Vizier had been marching northward. When the Grand Vizier and his staff arrived at Shumla, a council of war was held and it was decided to begin attack as soon as possible against the Russians. Final arrangements were made for carrying out the plan of operations, which had already been worked out at Constantinople with the aid of Sebastiani.

o

4 9

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1800-1807

O n the extreme left the pasha of Bosnia was to attack the Serbians to prevent their forces f r o m joining the Russians. A l s o the Pasha of Widin should prevent the union of Serbian and Russian armies. The main attack, however, was to be delivered by the Turkish army under the Grand Vizier supported by the army of Mustapha of Rustchuk. One part of the Grand Vizier's army was to cross the Danube at Ismail and attack the Russians in Moldavia. T h e other part was to cross at Silistria and move around behind the Russians at Bucharest, while Mustapha was to move on Bucharest from the front. It was then expected that the Russian army in Wallachia which was largely centered in Bucharest, finding itself attacked from both sides, with its line of communication with Moldavia—which the T u r k s were also to invade—severed, would be forced to evacuate Wallachia and to retreat to the Carpathian Mountains. 1 It had been doubtful whether Mustapha would help. It was rumored that he was disloyal to the Sultan, was intriguing with Ypsilanti and would come to an agreement with the Russians. 2 Early in May General Michelson had sent him a letter proposing an alliance.® Rumors concerning Mustapha caused worry to the French agents, which was enhanced by his evident animosity, already mentioned, to proposals of help f r o m the French. Mustapha's dislike of the French is explicable in large part on the same grounds as those which gave rise to anti-French sentiment among the janissaries. He also opposed the proposed army reforms of the Sultan, seeing in them a menace to that privilege of control over their own troops which the pashas exercised and which enabled ambitious pashas like himself to act independently of the Sultan if they wished. 1

Bradisteanu, op. cit., p. 199.

1

Report of Meriage, May 20, 1807, Boppe, op. cit., p. 275.

8

Mustapha to Meriage, June 9, 1807, ibid., p. 277.

TURKEY

IN THE

WAR

491

This unfavorable situation with respect to the conduct of Mustapha had caused Soutzo with the support of Meriage finally to go to Rustchuk to counteract the intrigues of Ypsilanti and try to persuade Mustapha to join the Turkish army in an offensive against the Russians. 1 He had succeeded in getting promises from Mustapha to use his army against the Russians and in cooperation with the Grand Vizier. 2 Indeed, when the Grand Vizier arrived at Shumla late in May with his army and called on Mustapha for help, the latter agreed to give it. In the latter part of May when the Turkish forces reached the Danube and prepared to attack the Russians, a Russian force under General Issaief suddenly invaded Little Wallachia, occupied Crajova and started for the isle of Ostrow, held by the Pasha of Widin, possession of which would enable the Russians to join the Serbian forces. The Russian attacks on the place were repulsed, thanks to the aid of the French officer, Captain Bigex, and Issaief retired with his army. Meriage was very anxious for the Grand Vizier to start operations, hoping thus to force the withdrawal of the Russian army under Issaief from its threatening proximity to Widin. He wrote the Grand Vizier to that effect. 3 In the last days of May the Grand Vizier started the attack which it was hoped would soon drive the Russians off Turkish soil. The Turkish troops were enthusiastic. The army arrived at Silistria. On May 29 a portion of it crossed the Danube and occupied Kalarashi nearby. On June 1 Mustapha led his army across the Danube from Rustchuk and started toward Bucharest. Michelson ordered a retreat of the Russian troops there. However, the Russian commander at Bucharest, General Michael A. Miloradovich, did 1

Report of Meriage, May 12, 1807, ibid., p. 276. Report of Meriage, June 1, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 214. 3 Reports of Meriage, June I, 5, 1807, ibid. 3

492

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

¡806-1807

not hurry to leave the town and soon was confronted with the prospect of being surrounded by Turkish forces much larger than his own. 1 With the approach of the Turks many of the boyars and native people fled from the town. Several leading boyars came to the camp of Mustapha to negotiate surrender of the place.2 Meanwhile Miloradovich prepared to defend it. All was going well in execution of Turkish plans when news arrived of the revolution at Constantinople resulting in the deposition of Selim. This immediately paralyzed operations. The regiments of janissaries refused to go on, and Mustapha soon returned with his army to Rustchuk. Other pashas acted likewise and for the same motives. They were all more anxious now concerning the acts of the new government as it might affect the future of their own fortunes and privileges than with the war against the Russians. The Grand Vizier and his staff and those ministers in the former government who had accompanied him to the front had good reason to be uneasy for their own safety as such political unheavals usually resulted in the execution of a certain number of officials of the former regime whose continued presence would be a menace to the new government. The advance of the various Turkish forces was halted. Thus, as a result of the revolution, the Turkish campaign went to pieces at a time when it appeared to be succeeding. The plan if followed out at this time, it was admitted later by General Comte de Langeron, head of a Russian army corps, would have forced the Russians to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia. 3 The last engagement in the campaign in this region occurred on June 14 near Oltenitza, where the Turks were repulsed. By this time the morale of the Turkish army was 1 2

Bradisteanu, op. cit., pp. 199, 202. S t Denis, Histoire de /'Empire Ottoman de 1792 ä 1844, ii, p. 202.

' Memorandum of Comte de Langeron, Boppe, op. cit., p. 280.

TURKEY

IN THE

WAR

493

gone. Bucharest had been saved; the people acclaimed Miloradovich and later erected a plaque in his honor. With the cessation of Turkish operations around Bucharest, General Issaief again moved upon the isle of Ostrow and took the place, and soon after, late in June, he joined a Serbian force of five thousand under K a r a George at Palanka on the Danube above Widin. This juncture completely cut the communications of the Turks at Widin with Orsova. Meriage blamed the inactivity of the main Turkish army for thus allowing the Russians to get into Little Wallachia and permitting connection of the Serbian and Russian forces. The position of Hydris Pasha of Widin was now difficult. His important fortresses—Negotin and Orsova—were menaced. Meriage wrote Sebastiani to urge the Porte to send an army at once to help him. 1 Issaief with the Serbians resumed his advance, with the object of taking Negotin. Hydris Pasha, counseled and aided in every way by Meriage, had gathered an army and went forth to oppose the advance of the Russians and Serbians but was repulsed in an engagement and forced to fall back to Negotin. The Russo-Serbian forces appeared before the place early in July and began a siege. The situation was grave for the Turks, as the place was not prepared f o r a long resistance. 2 Meriage was discouraged. He had heard of the collapse of the Turkish attack in Wallachia. Mustapha of Rustchuk was reported to be wrapt up now with political affairs at Constantinople from which he hoped to derive personal advancement, and not to be inclined to give attention to operations against the Russians. Meriage waited anxiously for word from Sebastiani that the Porte would send an army to help Hydris Pasha. He had grounds for believing the situation • M e r i a g e to Sebastiani, June 22, 1807, ibid., p. 281. 5

Yakschitch, op. cit., pp. 1 2 2 - 1 2 3 ; Boppe, op. cit., p. 281.

4 9 4

THE

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EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

critical, for if the Russians and Serbians succeeded in taking Negotin they would be in a position also to take Orsova and Gladova which would then firmly establish for them a solid line of defense through to the frontiers of Bosnia. It would be expected that Meriage should now ardently wish that the proposed French army from Dalmatia were at hand. But that was not to be, and by this time the possibility of securing passage of any kind of a French force through Turkey had passed. The whole plan of Turkish offensive operations which Sebastiani and French agents in European Turkey had worked during the spring to realize and which they had counted upon as a diversion for Napoleon in Poland, came to nothing. Turkey had contributed nothing to bringing Russia to terms on the field of battle, which Napoleon was doing at Friedland at the very time when the Turkish offensive on the Danube finally collapsed. Nor had the Turks succeeded any better in breaking the Russian blockade of the Dardanelles. It will be recalled that after the failure of the British expedition, the Russian naval commander, Admiral Siniavin, after vainly trying to interest Admiral Duckworth in a second expedition in conjunction with his own forces, had proceeded to establish a blockade of the entrance to the Dardanelles. He had seized late in March the islands of Tenedos. 1 Another Russian squadron in the Black Sea had meanwhile established a blockade of the Bosphorus. This blockade of both ends of the Straits caused great alarm at Constantinople as it not only seriously damaged trade but also endangered the food supply of the city. It was felt as a more immediate danger than the presence of Russian armies in the more distant Danubian provinces. Hopes of breaking up the Russian blockade were brightened 1

Cf. supra, pp. 390-391.

TURKEY

IN

THE

WAR

495

by elation over their recent success against the British, and a Turkish fleet with a force of about five thousand troops were prepared at Constantinople to attack the Russians off the Dardanelles and recover possession of Tenedos. All was ready by the middle of May, and on the nineteenth the expedition, having passed through the Dardanelles, attempted to take Tenedos, the Russian fleet at the time being at the neighboring island of Imbros. However, the Turks failed to secure a landing on the island and withdrew. On the twenty-second the two fleets came in sight of each other, and an engagement followed in which the Turks decidedly got the worst of it and at length retreated into the Dardanelles. 1

8 While Russian and Serbian military forces were endeavoring late in the spring, with final success, to join and establish for Russia a continuous line of communication and defense from her frontier on the Dniester and along the Danube to Belgrade, the Russians were attempting to establish a close political union with the Serbians. It will be recalled that after the breakdown of the Serbian and Turkish negotiations early in March, the Serbian assembly had decided not only to attempt to establish a close military entente with the Russians, securing munitions and arms from them, but also to secure the aid of Russian officials in organizing the civil administration of their country. A Serbian delegation had been despatched to Russian headquarters for this purpose. They arrived at Bucharest on May 7, where they made known to General Michelson their mission. The Russian commander received them with marked attention, handed over a sum of fifty thousand piastres, gave presents for K a r a George and other Serbian leaders, and promised to make their requests known at once 1

James, Naval

History of Great Britain, 1793-1827, iv, p. 234.

496

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

to the Tsar. 1 Michelson wrote Emperor Alexander recommending that help be given the Serbs since the aid of their army would be important in the war. He also urged that a Russian official be sent to the Serbians as he would be helpful in directing public opinion in favor of Russia and useful in keeping peace between factions among the Serbians. Michelson proposed that Constantine Rodofinikine be appointed to the post, as the Serbian deputies had asked for him. 2 This official had been in Moldavia and Wallachia since the previous year as special agent of the Russian government to promote pro-Russian sentiment among the natives, to combat French propaganda and he had also kept in touch with Serbian affairs. 3 On June 28 Michelson sent word to K a r a George that Rodofinikine had been appointed and would come at once to Belgrade to assume his post. By this act, Michelson declared, the Tsar expressed his fatherly interest and care for the Slav-Serb nation, his intention to give it protection and his desire to bring the two peoples closer together. 4 Rodofinikine received instructions to ascertain the real views of the Serbian leaders and people toward Russia; their plans for realizing their national aims; their intentions regarding military cooperation with Russian armies. He should urge the necessity of the latter and also persuade them of the value of conforming to Russian directions and policy in return for which Russia would always be ready to furnish them arms. Any French propaganda should be combated and French agents eliminated.5 Rodofinikine left at once, at the end of June, on his mission. 1 Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 122; Kallay, op. cit., pp. 21-22. * Michelson to Alexander, May 10, 1807, Yakschitch, op. cit., pp. 129-130. 3

Cf. supra, pp. 173; 183-184.

* Michelson to Kara George, June 28, 1807, Kallay, op. cit., pp. 22-23. 5 Instructions to Rodofinikine, June 28, 1807, Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 130; Kallay, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

TURKEY

IN

THE

WAR

497

Meanwhile another Russian political mission had been directed to the Serbians. It had originated at St. Petersburg because of a need felt by the government for more exact information concerning conditions in the pashalik of Belgrade : the military resources of the Serbians and their sentiments towards Russia. A l s o the government wanted exact information concerning French forces in Dalmatia and disposition of the inhabitants there and in neighboring provinces, particularly Bosnia, towards the French. Everything must be done to prevent any combination of the French with the Moslem people in Bosnia, which would seriously affect plans of the Russians for getting a line established to the Adriatic. Besides, entrenchment of the French in Bosnia would enable them to carry out a plan for transporting a French army to attack the Russians on the Danube. The help of the Serbians was essential to cope with this situation and it was believed at St. Petersburg that, if their support could be definitely secured, any danger from that direction could be successfully obviated. W h a t was wanted was an agreement with the Serbians giving Russia control over their armed forces. 1 T o secure this information regarding the French and the situation of the Serbians, Emperor Alexander while at B a r tenstein appointed a Colonel Paulucci, w h o was particularly acquainted with Dalmatia, upon this mission. He was instructed to press on the Serbian leaders the danger of relying on promises of the Sultan or of Napeleon; to learn the character of the sentiment toward Russia among Serbian leaders, people and troops, and ascertain whether there were any French partisans; to seek to establish permanent Serbian communications with the Montenegrins and with Russian forces on the Adriatic and give assurances that Russia was 1

K a l l a y , op. cit.. p. 24.

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

ready to aid with arms and money. 1 Paulucci was also to deliver a personal letter to K a r a George from Budberg pointing out the advantages of a union of Russian and Serbian troops on the Danube. 2 Paulucci left towards the end of May upon his mission going first to Trieste, then through Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia. H e arrived at Belgrade on June 2 0 — j u s t before Rodofinikine left Bucharest on his mission. Already, it will be recalled, Russian and Serbian forces had effected a juncture and at this time they were preparing to lay siege to Negotin. Palucci proceeded to their camp where he had interviews with K a r a George, but found the latter rather too reserved in expressing his views. Palucci took pains to warn K a r a George, of the danger of French attack with the aid of the neighboring Bosnians, and also urged him to beware of any proposals from Austria." He expounded the advantages of an alliance of Serbs with Russia, with their common interests and religion, against Turkey. K a r a George, however, did not appear, reported Paulucci, as yet very enthusiastic over the proposal of an alliance and promised merely not to deal with Austria. 4 K a r a George's attitude changed shortly.

N e w s came of

1

Budberg to Paulucci, May 23, 1807, Yakschitch, op. cit., p. 124.

1

Budberg to Kara George, May 23, 1807, Kallay, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

3

This last admonition was intended for one thing to prevent the Serbs

attempting to secure peace with the Turks through mediation of Austria. * Paulucci to Budberg, July 30, 1807, Yakschitch, op. cit., pp. 124-127. A s already mentioned earlier in the chapter, Kara George had secret fears, suspicions from the first as to possible ambitions of Russia lurking behind their proposals for a rapprochement with the Serbians. Kara George did not like particularly the proposals of Paulucci that an alliance should provide for establishment of Russian garrisons in Serbia; the incorporation of Serbian troops into Russian armies to be used outside of Serbia in Russian operations against the Turks and the French in the Balkans.

TURKEY

IN THE

WAR

499

extensive preparations, abetted by French agents, for an invasion of the pashalik of Belgrade by an army from Bosnia. All that Paulucci had said about an eventual attack by the pashas of Bosnia supported by the French seemed to be true. This danger made union with Russia seem necessary to save the Serbians. Besides K a r a had noticed that his rival for supreme command, Milos Obrenovich, had been won over by Paulucci to the idea of an alliance with Russia and, knowing that Milos was quite prepared to use any occasion to secure his overthrow, Kara decided it would be unwise to permit matters to come to an internal crisis over the question of relations with Russia. 1 For these reasons he now changed his conduct and at length informed Paulucci that he was ready to make a convention with Russia. 2 Negotiations began on July 10, and in several hours a convention was concluded. According to its terms the Serbian people solicited the protection of the Tsar who was to appoint a governor who should help drawn up a constitution for Serbia, develop an administrative organization and see that order was maintained in the country. Other high officials, who were not to be Greeks, were also to be appointed by the Tsar. In all fortresses there should be garrisons of regular Russian troops, each under a Russian commander. A n article provided f o r a Russo-Serbian army of twenty thousand to be used not only to defend Serbia against attack by the pasha of Widin, but also in Bulgaria if necessary to help the Russians against the Turks. Another article provided for a Russo-Serbian army of fifteen thousand for invasion of Bosnia and Dalmatia to prevent the French from helping Turkey, and also to attempt to establish connections with the Montenegrins. Other terms in the convention 1 Milos was founder of the later Obrenovich dynasty of Serbia, rivals throughout century of the Karageorgevich dynasty. 2

Kallay, of1. cit., p. 29.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

dealt with obligations of R u s s i a to furnish Serbia money, munitions, training officers, artillery force and medical staffs. 1 Paulucci believed that by this convention, securing to Russia occupation of fortified places in Serbia and guarantee of help of Serbian armies integrated with Russian troops, there had been provided the base f o r important and extensive Russian operations in combating the French and T u r k s in Bulgaria, Bosnia and Dalmatia.

Considering it also prob-

able that Russian forces f r o m Cattaro and the Ionian Islands would soon invade Albania, Paulucci enthusiastically wrote Budberg that he saw in the near f u t u r e Russian victory over the T u r k s and French. 2

T h e original plan of Budberg f o r

establishment o f a solid Russian line of defense through the Balkan peninsula f r o m the Dniester to the Ionian Islands seemed near to fruition. A f t e r the convention with the Serbs had been concluded, Paulucci l e f t f o r Bucharest to report results of his mission to General Michelson and to send the articles of the convention to St. Petersburg for ratification by the T s a r .

Before

he was able to despatch them, however, he heard of the T r e a t y of Tilsit and therefore in his report he declared that perhaps the convention was now useless f o r Russia.

But

nothing had as yet been signed binding Russia, and the Emperor could accept or refuse it as he chose. 3 1

Yakschitch, op. cit., pp. 127-128; Kallay, op. cit., pp. 30-33.

2

Report of Paulucci, Kallay, op. cit., no. 44, pp. 459-460.

3

Report of Paulucci, ibid., no. 45, p. 460.

CHAPTER XVIII A T T E M P T E D B R I T I S H M E D I A T I O N IN T U R K E Y A N D PERSIA I

FROM the reopening of war on the continent in the autumn of 1806 to the spring of 1807 Great Britain had done almost nothing in a military way to help her allies on the Continent. True, a British naval squadron had been sent to the Dardanelles in the name of the " common cause ", but it had failed in its mission of preventing a declaration of war by Turkey upon Russia. More British troops had been sent to Sicily but instead of being used for an expedition against the French in Italy as Russia requested, they were held there to await their possible consignment to an expedition to E g y p t which subsequently at the beginning of March was undertaken. T h i s enterprise had not been o f the remotest benefit to England's allies. In fact the project of the Egyptian expedition was dictated purely by British imperial interests, as was also the assignment of British forces to distant enterprises in South America. A t the same time Prussia and Russia were calling for British military expeditions to France, Italy, Holland, and Germany, hoping thereby to weaken Napoleon's hold on Prussia and divert him from operations upon the western frontier of Russia. In reply to requests from Russia and Prussia for such diversions the British government talked of them hopefully but always deferred execution on grounds of the necessity for holding adequate forces in reserve at home for defense at any time of some threatened part of the far-flung possessions of the British empire. A l s o it was claimed there was need of economy in the government's budget. It was true that British finances were not flourishing and that recruiting f o r SOI

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

the army was sluggish, but the Grenville ministry was inclined to view everything in relation to its own political fortunes rather than to the larger considerations of England's interest in checking the extension of Napoleon's power on the continent. T h e outlook of the government seemed to be insular and therein the reverse of the preceding Pitt ministry. T h e government had, it is true, sought to develop a continental coalition and invigorate it by offers of subsidies to be granted on the condition that they be used only for purposes of carrying on an offensive war. Austria had not been won over to the coalition by any such offers. Sweden relied on British subsidies and hoped for a British expedition to the Baltic. England's relations with Russia since the reopening of the war had been disturbed by annoying questions between them. 1 The Russians were irritated by the demand that they should guarantee British rights to Hanover against Prussia's claims. Then there was the insistent demand by the British for renewal of the commercial treaty with Russia with no loss of British privileges, coupled with the refusal of the British cabinet to guarantee a Russian state loan in London; and there were instances of seizure and retention of Russian merchant vessels on grounds of alleged trading with the enemy. Alopeus, the new Russian ambassador, upon his arrival in England in February 1807 let it be known that Russia expected important sacrifices from England in the interest of her continental allies. T o his demand that a British expedition be sent to France or Holland, Howick, Foreign Secretary, replied that such a thing was not possible at the time; besides, the English had already made immense sacrifices to the common cause and they were discontented with the refusal of Russia to renew the commercial treaty. 1

Cf. supra,

pp. 208-209.

BRITISH

MEDIATION

IN TURKEY

AND RUSSIA

503

Howick also refused the ambassador's demand for guarantee of a Russian state loan.1 Alopeus then demanded a subsidy of one million pounds sterling and was finally promised a half million.2 When, soon after, Howick learned that the Russian court still insisted upon making the renewal of the commercial treaty contingent upon a British military expedition to the continent, he instructed Douglas at St. Petersburg to inform the Russian court that the British government did not like and would never accept any such proposal. " It is the language", he declared, " which produces destruction of harmony and confidence." Great Britain could give only limited forces for operations on the continent because of the extent of her naval operations and the necessity of armed support of her distant colonies.' The Prussian proposals for a general peace conveyed to St. Petersburg in January were, as agreed, relayed by the Tsar to London and their support by Great Britain was urged. However, the unfavorable reports from Douglas concerning the activities of the party at the Russian court seeking peace with France was certain not to improve feeling in the British cabinet toward Russia upon this question.4 Hutchinson, arriving at Memel in January as British minister to the Prussian court, also received these proposals for a general peace from the Prussian government. From the reports of Hutchinson it was evident to the British cabinet that the plan for a general peace was based on the assumption that Great Britain would return colonies to France as compensation for Napoleon's restoration of Prussia. Hutchinson had reestablished peace between Prussia and England by 1

Report of Alopeus, February 26, 1807, Martens, op. cit., vi, p. 130.

*Ibid., pp. 131-132. ' Howick to Douglas, March 10, 1807, British Foreign Office, Russia, 68. 4

Cf. supra, pp. 440-441.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

a treaty signed at Memel at the end of January,* but when the British cabinet received word of the Prussian peace proposals, old suspicions of Prussia were revived. The British did not wish to see Napoleon's armies holding north Germany in subjection, but no more than Napoleon did the British like the idea of a confederation of German states under the hegemony of Prussia, a plan which ran counter to the interest of the British ruling house in Hanover. Howick replied early in March to the Russian court concerning the peace proposals, declaring that he supported the Tsar's demand that there must be a formal statement of the French basis of negotiation preliminary to a meeting of any peace congress. But he made clear that England would not return any colonies to France, since a restored Prussia would be an insecure barrier to France in the future. England, however, would agree to an increase in power of Austria and Russia. 2 Howick was merely voicing here the disinclination in England to seeing Prussia raised to a great power in north Germany. Instead, Austria should be made the bulwark against French aggression. But would not Russia prefer to see Prussia rather than Austria enlarged as the barrier ? Might not Russia's interests and aspirations in the Balkans be endangered by an access in Austria's power? Here was a fundamental issue between the allies. There were other questions which Howick sought to clari f y at St. Petersburg. Russia could be assured that Great Britain would give all possible naval assistance in the eastern Mediterranean against Turkey, but the British could not accept the proposal for any union of naval forces under Russian command. Russia should not expect Great Britain to furnish any financial aid for carrying on war against Turkey. She was reconciled to Russian occupation of the Turk1

Prussian and British relations had been officially severed since M a r c h

1806. Cf. supra, p. 29. 2

H o w i c k to Douglas, M a r c h 7, 1807, British F o r e i g n Office, Russia, 68.

BRITISH

MEDIATION

IN TURKEY

AND

RUSSIA

505

ish provinces after Russia's explanation that her motives were not for aggrandizement and urged that Russia make the same explanation to Austria. 1 Howick had heard from Vienna at the beginning of March of the apprehension at the Austrian court over Russia's action in Turkey, and of French efforts to secure an alliance with Austria by appeals to the necessity for safeguarding Turkey. He sent instructions to Adair to do everything possible to improve relations between Austria and Russia, and to explain that Russia's occupation of the Turkish provinces was to forestall French designs on Turkey which if carried out would be dangerous to Austria. If Napoleon should conquer Poland and secure a predominant influence at the Porte, he would be in a position to endanger Austria from almost all sides. If there were no news of the departure of Arbuthnot from Constantinople, Adair was to assure the Austrian court that Great Britain with her naval forces hoped to save Turkey from ruin at the hands of France. Besides, Great Britain would secure, if Austria desired, assurances from Russia that she had no ulterior motives in the occupation of Turkish territory. 2 The Grenville ministry, however, never had to settle the disturbing question of British relations with Turkey, for toward the end of March the ministry fell over a purely domestic matter.® There were, however, more far-reaching causes indirectly contributing to its downfall which grew out of its conduct of foreign affairs. Therefore the event marks a significant change in the temper of British foreign policy. There had been those, even within the party in power, who since the reopening of war on the continent had 1

Howick to Douglas, February 20, 29, March 7, 1807, ibid.

* Howick to Adair, March 6, 1807, British Foreign Office, Austria, 83. * The ministry fell in an attempt to extend to Roman Catholics the right to hold commissions in the army and navy.

THE NEAR

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severely criticized the government for failing to send strong military support to the aid of England's continental allies. And when subsequently the British saw Napoleon reduce Prussia, thus completing his control over most of Germany and making the existence of Hanover precarious, with his armies almost at the frontiers of Russia and Turkey apparently within his political orbit, the conviction grew on all sides in England that the Grenville ministry had frittered away British military resources in distant and difficult enterprises when they should have struck at France on the continent and that failure to do this had given Napoleon a free hand to consolidate his power over Prussia and threaten the allies with war in eastern Europe. Appeals had been made in vain to Grenville to send expeditions to the continent against the French. In March there were one hundred and sixty-five thousand men in arms in England aside from volunteers, but only thirty-three thousand men were deemed ready for foreign service. And owing to diverse responsibilities assumed in the Mediterranean, at the Cape of Good Hope, and in South America, the ministry had thought it hazardous to send more than twelve thousand abroad for any expeditions to the continent. But a real difficulty was that the government had failed to provide transports for immediate despatch of these troops. 1 Canning, coming into the Foreign Office in the new ministry, soon made it evident that it was not for nothing that he had in the past declared himself an adherent of Pitt's policy of active cooperation with England's allies. He believed that time was not to be lost if the coalition were to be saved. He ordered Hutchinson to proceed to Sweden to promote plans for a joint Anglo-Swedish expedition in the Baltic and to negotiate with Sweden a military convention. 2 1 Ward and Gooch, The Cambridge History of British Foreign (3 vols., London, 1922), i, p. 359. 1

Bulterfield, op. cit., p. 150.

Policy

BRITISH

MEDIATION IN TURKEY AND RUSSIA

507

T o the demands from Alopeus f o r British expeditions to France, Naples and Stralsund, Canning replied that active military measures were being undertaken f o r such purposes. He did not forget, however, British interests, f o r in turn he urged conclusion of the commercial treaty and informed the Russian ambassador that f r o m the point of view of the British public the future good relations between the two countries would depend much upon the settlement of commercial questions. If Russia were ready to negotiate the treaty, Great Britain would be considerate of Russian views. 1 Canning had the king send a personal letter to the T s a r expressing hope of their continued good relations and of the strengthening of their common interests. 2 In furtherance of his policy of improving the relations of Great Britain with her continental allies, Canning sent word to Russian and Prussian headquarters early in April that the British government was engaged in ascertaining the highest amount of pecuniary aid England could give her allies. A l s o he was about to send an ambassador to Russia who would go first to allied headquarters with powers to deal at once with the question of subsidies f o r the allies. Only he insisted that Prussia should conclude a treaty of alliance and give a guarantee that she would make no separate peace with France, before she could receve any money f r o m 1 Alopeus to Canning, March 31, 1807; Canning to Alopeus, April 1 1 , 1807, British Foreign Office, Russia, 72. The demands of business interests upon the British Foreign Office to bring pressure on Russia with regard to commercial affairs is illustrated by a petition at this time from the Manufacturers and Exporters of British salt from the counties of Chester and Lancaster demanding that the British government make e f forts to secure more favorable terms for the importation of salt into Russia. This petition is enclosed in instructions to Douglas, March 3, 1807, British Foreign Office, Russia, 68. 1

George I I I to Alexander I, April 10, 1807, ibid., 72.

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England. 1 Canning much distrusted Prussia and seriously feared that she would make a separate peace.2 On April 1 8 the Austrian ambassador delivered to Canning Austria's formal offer of mediation for a general peace. Canning replied on the twenty-fifth accepting the offer on the condition that England's allies did the same. 3 Canning did not actually believe that Napoleon's acceptance of the Austrian proposal was sincere when he agreed to discuss both Germany and Italy at the congress. It was only a trick to gain time. Canning thought the offer of mediation inconvenient to all; the only possible advantage to be derived from it lay in inducing Austria as a result of its failure to take up arms. He declined to consider a naval armistice, and the T s a r should be persuaded not to listen to a military armistice. He left the final decision upon the Austrian offer to the Tsar. 4 Canning's attitude was in part influenced by existing uncertainties as to the future of British relations in the Near East. B y the end of April the British government had become acquainted with significant developments meanwhile in their relations with Turkey. News had come of the hasty departure of Arbuthnot from Constantinople; incomplete reports had come by way of Vienna that the British naval expedition to Constantinople had retreated without having accomplished its purpose. Also word had reached London of the departure of the British expedition to Egypt. 5 This expedition was certain to be taken at the Porte as evidence of hostile intentions by Great Britain toward Turkey. From St. Pet1

Canning to Hutchinson, April 5, 1807, Butterfield, op. cit., p. 150.

* Canning to Alopeus, April 1 1 , 1807, British Foreign Office, Russia, 72. * Starhemberg to Canning, April 18, 1807; Canning to Starhemberg, April 25, 1807, ibid., Austria, 83. 4 5

Canning to Gower, May 16, 1807, ibid., Russia, 69.

Castlereagh to Fox, April 25, 1807, Douin and L'Anglelerre et L'Egypte, pp. 66-68.

Fawtier-Jones,

BRITISH MEDIATION IN TURKEY AND RUSSIA

509

ersburg had come the unexpected news of the appointment of Pozzo di Borgo on a mission to make peace with Turkey. The report was accompanied by the draft of the proposed treaty of peace which the British government was invited to approve and support.1 It was clear that Russia and Great Britain had failed to bring the Porte to terms at once by threat of coercion and demonstration of force. England had severed official relations with Turkey though no war had been declared and she had also committed herself to another expedition which involved a dispersion of British naval and military forces in the Mediterranean. The Government was happy to hear of the Russian move to make peace with Turkey as it would enable Russia to concentrate all her energies against the French in Poland. Canning perceived that the situation called for a clarification of views with Russia on Turkish affairs, and a move by England to renew friendly and official relations with Turkey. Canning had already selected Lord Granville LevesonGower for the post of ambassador to Russia and upon him he laid the responsibility for improving British relations with her ally. In instructions to Gower dated May 16,2 Canning took up the eastern question and pointed out that the recent failure of the British fleet to bring the Porte to terms had left the relations of the allies with Turkey unfavorable. The danger was that Russia might give too much attention and divert too much of her military resources to operations against Turkey. The Russian court should be informed that a British mission was being prepared to reestablish if possible former relations with Turkey and to support the Russian peace mission. There should be little difficulty in restoring peace between Russia and Turkey if, as it was understood, Russia offered peace based on the integrity 1

Cf. supra,

2

Canning to Gower, May 16, 1807, British Foreign Office, Russia, 69.

pp. 442-444-

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION, 1806-1807 of the Ottoman Empire. The following, Canning declared, were the demands Russia should make on Turkey f o r peace: recognition of existing treaties between Russia and T u r k e y ; cooperation in forcing France out of Dalmatia; Turkey to renew her alliance with Great Britain, and Russia and Great Britain to guarantee the integrity of T u r k e y ; Turkey to establish the principality of Serbia under a prince chosen by the Serbians; Moldavia and Wallachia to enjoy rights granted them by treaties (i.e., of 1 8 0 2 ) . Canning warned Gower to be careful in speaking on the subject of the British expedition to E g y p t and to correct the impression that it was undertaken solely to promote British interests and expand British power. The Russian court should know that England was ready to leave E g y p t if she could thus promote peace between Turkey and Russia. The British occupation should be represented as a diversion of great importance to Russia, and considered a means for bringing pressure on Turkey to make peace. Until peace was made Russia should enforce the blockade of the Bosphorus. It should be impressed upon the Russians that, if war with Turkey continued and England of necessity had to strengthen her forces in Egypt or occupy some islands in the Archipelago, her offensive operations in Italy would be weakened. In presenting these facts, Gower should not appear to lay blame on Russia, but rather emphasize the idea " that Great Britain feels herself in the Turkish war by no act and for no interest of her own, merely subsidiary to Russian objects " . and that in return she expected support from Russia in Sicily, where the British were seeking to get rid of suspected pro-French persons in the council of the King. Besides the eastern question, there were other matters which Gower was instructed to take up as tactfully as possible with the Russian court. It should be made clear that

BRITISH

MEDIATION

IN TURKEY

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511

while England desired to unite closely with Russia in the war against the French, Russia should not expect too much in the way of British expeditions to the continent as British forces had been drained to Sicily and thence to Egypt. Nor must Russia expect too much from Great Britain in pecuniary aid as she must be ready to help Austria in this way if she should enter the war. At least Russia should postpone her own demands for subsidies until Austria's cooperation was secured. As to the refusal of the British government to grant the request for a loan, it should be pointed out in turn that Russia had been unwilling to renew the former commercial treaty between the two powers and had thereby affected adversely British commercial interests. Great Britain would not ask for a continuance of all the former commercial privileges and concessions; she desired only a reasonable treaty. Gower was to conclude a treaty with Russia, the object of which " shall be joint prosecution of the war until the conclusion of a general peace which should comprise and secure interests of all the powers engaged in the contest." All the enemies of France were to be invited to adhere to it. Canning intended that this proposal should " destroy any impressions of Great Britain's desire to withdraw from all connections with the continent." The day after these instructions to Gower were drawn up, word was received at London of the Convention of Bartenstein, in which Canning read an effort to secure a concert of the powers opposing France, such as he had in mind in his proposals to Russia. Gower was at once informed that this event cancelled his first instructions on the question and that England would doubtless join the concert provided by the Convention of Bartenstein, but probably with the reservation that her accession to it was conditional upon the Tsar's agreeing to guarantee the literal execution of the Prussian

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

and English treaty signed at Memel on January 28. 1 Canning intended that the Tsar should be a check on the ambitions of Prussia. 2 All the efforts of Alopeus to convince the British that Prussia nourished no plans of aggrandizement in Germany did not change their views. 3 While Canning threatened the T s a r with refusal to accede to the Convention of Bartenstein if Prussian designs were not checked, he did not intend to lose any opportunity to bring Austria into the concert, and therefore informed the Austrian court of his intention to accede to the convention and urged her to do likewise. 4 A t the same time Canning drew up instructions for Lord Pembroke, the new British ambassador to Austria. Pembroke was to do everything possible to alleviate the chief source of Austrian ill-feeling toward Russia which arose from the latter's conduct toward Turkey. He should cooperate with Gower in every way to moderate Russian plans concerning Turkey if they were found to be more extensive than Russia avowed, but nothing was to be done which would in any way weaken her. England must support Russia in every way as she was " the only effective check to the predominant and otherwise irresistible tyranny of France." If Pembroke found that there were real grounds for Austria's apprehensions of Russian expansion in the east, he was to assure her that Great Britain was ready to help her recover her position and secure her power, but British sub1

Canning to Gower, May 17, 1807, ibid. Canning to Gower, May 16, 1807, ibid. * Report of Alopeus, June 28, 1807, Martens, op. cit., xi, p. 133. 4 Butterfield, op. cit., p. 153. The British government never signed the Convention of Bartenstein. Preparations for the official transaction of jointly signing the convention by the three powers at London were not completed until June 28. Two days later, before anything had been done, reports came of a battle lost at Friedland. This was to end the coalition. Canning to Gower, June 29, 30, 1807, British Foreign Office, Russia, 69. 1

BRITISH

MEDIATION

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sidies would be given to Austria only when she had definitely committed herself to the offensive against France and was ready to enter a joint agreement to carry on the war until a satisfactory peace was secured. I f the Austrian court persisted in continuing their present policy, after his efforts to persuade them to take up arms and accept British subsidies, then he was free to quit Vienna. 1 Pembroke and Gower were to leave England at the same time, both going to Memel, where Pembroke was to secure such information concerning the attitude of the T s a r towards Austria as would help improve their relations. In the latter part of May the t w o ambassadors left England. Canning believed that not only was it necessary to come to a better understanding with Russia over questions of peace and war on the continent, commercial relations and clarification of views concerning eastern affairs but also it was essential that England improve her relations with Turkey. The allies could more vigorously prosecute the war with France and the w a y would be better cleared to a general peace if the Turkish war were ended as soon as possible. Russia should be free to devote all her resources to the war with France, and there were other reasons w h y Great Britain should reestablish friendly relations with Turkey. Continuance of the present uncertain state o f Anglo-Turkish relations would probably bring loss of markets and invalidation of British commercial agreements beneficial to British trade in the Ottoman Empire. Besides if the connections of the Porte with France were continued Turkey would be certain to be brought into the Continental system. 2 Despatches were re1 Canning to Austria, 83.

Pembroke,

May

15, 16, 1807, British

F o r e i g n Office,

2 Indicative of the interest of British commercial firms in securing a rapprochement with T u r k e y is seen in a memoir received by Canning f r o m a M r . Abbott, representing the Grecian C o f f e e House, w h o urged that war with T u r k e y should be averted. T h e r e still existed in T u r k e y

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ceived from Arbuthnot and Admiral Duckworth concerning the reverses of the British expedition to Constantinople. Then, too, reports came early in May of the mutiny of Sepoy troops in India. This was an affair seriously affecting the political status of the British in India and the home government decided to send at once four thousand troops to India. 1 More troops might be required there and this might seriously drain British military resources in the Mediterranean if war were pursued with Turkey. A s yet the British government had no knowledge of the reverses of the British expedition in Egypt but General F o x had already warned them that as a result of the despatch of troops to Egypt the British garrison at Sicily would be dangerously near the minimum for defense of the island.2 Reports of suspected intrigues of Queen Caroline with the French and the ever recurring rumors that the French were preparing a naval expedition to take Sicily contributed to make the British government uneasy over its position in Sicily and therefore not inclined to extend its liabilities in the eastern Mediterranean. Likewise a further deflection of its limited available surplus troops to the east would incapacitate Great Britain for undertaking military diversions on the continent which Canning saw were necessary, if for no other reason than to demonstrate that she had not separated her political interests from those of her continental allies. In summary, because of the exigencies of war on the continent, the need of defense of the empire in distant parts, and promotion of British commercial interests in the eastern Mediterranean, Great Britain must come as a strong inclination to keep at peace with Great Britain. Abbott hinted that Great Britain had harmed her relations with Turkey by too much reliance upon Russia. Abbott to Canning, May 9, 1807, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 59. 1 2

Fortescue, History of the British Army, vi, p. 47. Cf. supra, p. 392.

BRITISH

MEDIATION

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515

soon as possible to a peaceful settlement with Turkey. The Russian peace overtures to Turkey enabled the British to make their offer of peace without the appearance of humiliation. A f t e r news of the fiasco of the British expedition to Constantinople, the British government attempted to " save its face " by declaring that all of their efforts in Turkey " had been made solely in compliance with express wishes of Russia, in support of Russian hostilities, and for the attainment of Russian objects." 1 Sir Arthur Paget was to be sent on the peace mission to T u r k e y . Its object, according to his instructions, 2 was to endeavor to accommodate the differences which have broken out between the Porte and Russia and to bring back the Porte to a just sense of the expediency of renewing and maintaining its former engagements as well with Russia as with this country and of throwing off the predominant influence which is now exercised over the councils of the Divan by France. H o w e v e r probable the fall of the Ottoman Empire might be, continued the instructions, it was neither the wish nor to the interest of Great Briain to be " instrumental in precipitating this event." A l l efforts must be made to oppose the ambition of France, which if realized would mean dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The weakening of Russian exertions against the French to the west as a result of this diversion of her forces towards Turkey might not only drive A u s tria into an alliance with Napoleon but also drive Sweden to a separate peace and leave Germany without chance of recovering her independence. Paget was to work as far as possible with the Russian peace envoy, Pozzo di Borgo, to impress moderation upon him, and should see that the integrity of Turkey was maintained. 1

Canning to Alopeus, June 3, 1807, British Foreign Office, Russia, 73.

2

Instructions to Paget, May 18, 1807, ibid., Turkey, 56.

516

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A s for specific points, Paget was to consider " the termination of the war as upon the whole a more desirable object than the satisfaction of particular demands." He should guide himself by circumstances, " supporting Russia on the whole but endeavoring rather to reconcile the Russian plenipotentiary to terms somewhat short of those which were originally required." Paget should not make a demand for the surrender of the Turkish fleet and should drop that relating to the dismissal of Sebastiani, " if he could not press it with advantage." It was doubtful if his dismissal and a promise by the Porte not to receive French representatives in the future, could be secured anyway, at least not without such drastic use of force as would produce a popular explosion of hostility against the British. Great Britain was willing to evacuate Egypt rather than to permit failure of the effort to secure peace with Turkey. But there would be no such evacuation until all confiscated British property was paid for. That recourse to force might be necessary to support diplomacy was indicated in a subsequent portion of Paget's instructions, which made clear that while a naval expedition to Constantinople did not appear effective as a means of coercing Turkey to accept the British peace overtures, the British might use a strict blockade of the Dardanelles and Smyrna. This, coupled with the expected blockade by a Russian fleet of the Bosphorus and with the British occupation of Alexandria, would soon cut off the food supply of Constantinople and would probably oblige the Porte to negotiate with Russia and Great Britain. Just before these final instructions to Paget were drawn, the Admiralty received orders on May 14 that " in view of recent hostile proceedings of the Ottoman Porte there should be a strict blockade of the Straits (Dardanelles) and Smyrna." 1 1

Castlereagh to Admiralty Office, May 14, 1807, ibid., 59. The plan to starve Turkey into peace by a blockade perhaps owed its origin to, or

BRITISH

MEDIATION

IN TURKEY

AND

RUSSIA

517

While Paget was to use the British occupation of Egypt as a lever to coerce the Porte to peace, the British government was aware at the time Paget was given his instructions of the possibility that a speedy evacuation might be forced upon them even before they had secured peace with Turkey. When the news first reached London in the latter part of April of the departure from Sicily of the British expedition for Egypt, the Government had as yet only scanty and incomplete reports, sent from Vienna, concerning the fortunes of the British expedition to Constantinople. Castlereagh at the W a r Office, wrote F o x on April 25 a despatch marked " secret " approving the expedition to Egypt under the circumstances as described by Admiral Duckworth, and instructing F o x that if, after consultation with Arbuthnot and Duckworth, he considered that an effective attack could be made by a force of British troops supported by a British squadron upon Constantinople " or any other important point of the Turkish Empire " which would help the common cause more effectively than by confining all British forces to Alexandria, he had authority to make such an atat least received influential support from a memoir sent to Canning early in April by Green, the Treasurer of the Levant Company House. Green was acquainted with the sources of Constantinople's food and indicated how a blockade would soon cut off the supplies of the city and also seriously curtail the revenues from trade. Green having an eye for business also suggested that as other nations would be shut off by the blockade from trading with Turkey, Great Britain could then promote her own trade by establishing an emporium on some island near the Dardanelles or Smyrna, viz., Tenedos or Scios. Green to Canning, April 4, 1807, ibid. The possibility of failure of the British peace mission was presented by Arbuthnot, who arrived in England about this time and warned Canning that only by a decisive Russian victory over Napoleon could Turkey be expected to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward Russia. And while a separate settlement between Turkey and Great Britain would not be difficult but for the latter to support Russia would seriojisly jeopardize the chances of securing her own peace with Turkey. Arbuthnot to Canning, May 28, 1807, ibid., 55.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

tack, using such part of the British forces at A l e x a n d r i a as he considered necessary.

H o w e v e r , it w a s to be feared, de-

clared Castlereagh, that by this time the T u r k s had assembled a strong military force f o r the protection of Constantinople and had established formidable defenses along the D a r d a nelles.

T h e extent of such T u r k i s h preparations should be

fully ascertained, and " every exertion should be made which prudence will j u s t i f y by a coup de main or other efforts to compel the Porte to shake off the influence of France and to return to her connection w i t h Great Britain and R u s s i a . " If such an operation seemed feasible, Castlereagh suggested that, in view of the small size of the French army in Italy, F o x might, without endangering the safety of Sicily, take some troops f r o m there f o r this purpose and to j o i n those spared f r o m A l e x a n d r i a and possibly some Russian troops which might be secured f r o m C o r f u .

Castlereagh pointed

out that, as the home government did not have sufficient information to enable it to direct any specified operations in this region, it should be l e f t to British and Russian officials on the spot to determine " the prudence and practicability of any attempt " . 1

T h e British government at the end of

April w a s evidently still committed, though with circumspection, to the project of another expedition to Constantinople as the quickest w a y to bring the Porte to terms. S o o n a f t e r w a r d s , however, despatches were received f r o m Arbuthnot and D u c k w o r t h g i v i n g a detailed account of the unfavorable fortunes of the British expedition to Constantinople.

Castlereagh then sent another " secret " despatch

to F o x stating that it was quite obvious that the defences of the Dardanelles and Constantinople were already so strengthened " a s to render any operations hopeless unless undertaken with a very numerous army, much more considerable 1 Castlereagh to Fox, April 25, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., pp. 66-68.

BRITISH

MEDIATION

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519

than your means, aided by those of the Russians at Corfu, can possibly enable you to assemble, consistently with the security of Sicily." Therefore the Government relied now upon a blockade of the principal ports of the Ottoman Empire with a complete interruption of their commerce as the means of bringing the Porte to terms. Accordingly orders had been sent to British commanders in the Mediterranean to establish in concert with the Russian squadron, a blockade of the Dardanelles, of the port of Smyrna, of the mouth of the Nile, and of any other principal ports through which supplies might be sent to Constantinople. The Russians in the Black Sea had also been asked to watch the entrance to the Bosphorus and the Turkish ports on the Black Sea. It was hoped these measures would pave the way for the pacific overtures of Sir Arthur Page. However, F o x was still left to take such military measures, without waiting for instructions from home, " as the exigency of affairs shall appear to you to require." 1 Not only was the fiasco of the expedition to Constantinople known at London at the time when Canning drew up final instructions for Paget's mission, but also reports had been received from General Fraser and Missett concerning the occupation of Alexandria, the question of British relations with the Mameluke Beys, and the problem of assuring food supplies by extension of British occupation to Rosetta and Rahmanieh.2 It was particularly Fraser's demand for reenforcements which alarmed the home government and called forth from Castlereagh a positive declaration concerning the intentions of the British in Egypt. He informed F o x in a despatch of May 17, that he feared " that the occupation of Alexandria, originally intended to guard more effectually against the French acquiring a footing in that country, might 1 2

Castlereagh to Fox, May 8, 1807, ibid., pp. 98-100. Cf. supra, pp. 399 et seq.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

become a much heavier drain upon our military resources than was originally anticipated ". A l s o the British might become too deeply engaged in the local politics of the country. Fraser should not, therefore, " frame his conduct in the expectation of reenforcements." He should also keep in view that " His Majesty is not prepared to look to the permanent possession of Egypt after a peace. T h e prosecution of other military objects of greater moment in other quarters or the result of the discussion now pending with the Porte may possibly even during the war determine His M a j esty to withdraw his forces from Egypt. . . ." T h e capacity of the British to take effective measures against the French in Italy might be destroyed, should they attempt to extend their operations in Egypt " beyond the security and occupation of Alexandria ". Fraser, therefore, was to give no pledges to help the Mameluke Beys to recover Cairo or commit the Government " with respect to any eventual system of government to be hereafter established in E g y p t " , and was to confine himself to assurances of " good offices ". Castlereagh again reiterated, in conclusion, that nothing must be done by the British commander " which, can interfere with His Majesty's withdrawing his forces from Egypt at any time, either as a concession to the Porte, or with a view to other more pressing services." 1 There had been a general implication in the instructions to F o x that a British attack might be made upon Italy; and on M a y 21 Castlereagh wrote F o x urging that an effort be made to expel the French from the kingdom of Naples; the expeditionary force to be largely made up of Neapolitan troops with the addition of a fair sized contingent of British troops which Castlereagh believed could be spared from Sicily. 2 H e figured there were twenty thousand British troops 1 Castlereagh to F o x , M a y 17, 1807, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., pp. 105-108. 2

Fortescue, op. cit., vi, pp. 34-35.

BRITISH

MEDIATION

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521

in Sicily and fifteen thousand Neapolitan troops; and he informed Canning, who was anxious to make some demonstration of the intention of Great Britain actively to help her continental allies, that there was a large fleet of transports at hand in the neighborhood of Sicily to carry the troops to Italy at short notice.1 Castlereagh did not know, when he wrote F o x , that the Sicilian government was about to launch an expedition against Naples without any support from the British. E v e r since the departure of the expedition to Egypt, F o x had been pressed by the Sicilian government to send an expedition to recover Naples. The fact that Queen Caroline ardently urged such an expedition, did not favor the proposal in the eyes of F o x or Moore. Drummond, the British minister, had by this time in some way fallen under the influence of the Queen and was supporting her request, and thus, unfortunately, the British officials in Sicily were not united on the question. The idea of an expedition was also helped along by reports which came to Palermo concerning Napoleon's difficult military and political situation after Eylau and concerning the plans of Prussia and Russia to carry on the war. The Russian minister at the Court of the Sicilian government, Tatistcheff, no doubt on instructions from his government, also urged the expedition to Naples. Tatistcheff, working through Drummond, pressed F o x to support the expedition, presenting it as a diversion in favor of Russia. F o x refused. He distrusted the Sicilian Court; he had little confidence in their army and believed that his 1

Memorandum of Castlereagh, May 26, 1807, Correspondence of Castlereagh, viii, pp. 66-68. Castlereagh should have known that the Neapolitan troops were unreliable and that Fox had been forced to send eight thousand troops to Egypt instead of five thousand as ordered by the home government. He did not know that Fox had been forced by a mutiny early in April at Malta further to weaken his forces at Sicily by sending a battalion to restore confidence there. Fortescue, op. cit., vi, p. 32.

522

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own force of nine thousand men barely sufficed for the island's defence. The Sicilian Court, however, adhered to the project, and late in May a Sicilian force was landed at Reggio and proceeded to advance toward Naples. A French force attacked and badly defeated them on May 28, forcing them to abandon the expedition. It had resulted as F o x had foreseen, but the Sicilian Court and Tatistcheff blamed him for its failure. 1 This version of the affair was eventually to reach the T s a r and contribute to his growing disillusionment concerning the efficacy of his British ally. It was the psychological setting of Tilsit. In the latter part of May the British government was also preparing for an expedition to the continent. In the same memorandum in which Castlereagh discussed an expedition to Naples, he declared that with a view to aiding Britain's allies in northern Europe a squadron of sixteen sail would soon proceed to the Baltic and cooperate with the Russian and Swedish navies. Also a corps of twenty five thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry was being prepared for immediate service. If Britain's allies were prepared to oppose the enemy, this corps might be used in conjunction with Swedish and Russian forces in operations from Stralsund against the French, and on Dutch or French coasts.2 On June 8 Canning sent a despatch to Gower, who was on his way to the Tsar's headquarters, instructing him to inform the Tsar that, as an expression of British desire to support the common cause, the British government was preparing to send a force of ten thousand troops to Stralsund, to help Sweden take the offensive in Pomerania. Further, the British government was making plans for an attack on Naples." 1

Fortescue, op. cit., vi, pp. 30-34.

* Memorandum of Castlereagh, May 26, 1807, Correspondence reagh, viii, pp. 66-68.

of Castle-

' Canning to Gower, June 8, 1807, British Foreign Office, Russia, 69.

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AND RUSSIA

523

By the middle of June the British government received news of two events which were disturbing to their plans in the Baltic and the Mediterranean. One was the capture of Danzig by Napoleon; 1 and the other was the situation in Egypt. From F o x despatches told of the failure of the two British expeditions to Rosetta and the consequent demand for considerable reenforcements in order to make the British position tenable in Egypt. F o x also reported the depletion of the British garrison at Sicily of the eighteen hundred men sent to Alexandria. 2 Here was an unexpected demand upon the British government for troops at a time when for political reasons it needed all available troops at Sicily for an expedition to Naples. Castlereagh wrote Fox on June 14 that it appeared to the Government in view of Fox's recommendation that fifteen thousand troops were necessary to make the British occupation of Egypt secure, that unless they were willing to make up this force by troops largely detached from home, " there is no other alternative than to make an option between the evacuation of Egypt or the abandonment of Sicily ". It was impossible, declared Castlereagh, in view of the limited available forces in the Mediterranean effectively to maintain both places. Such being the question, Fox should know, " that it is not an alternative upon which the smallest hesitation can exist here." The Government considered " the possession of Alexandria, in point of policy, subordinate to the security of Sicily and to the more important object of acting offensively against the enemy in Italy". The evacuation of Alexandria should take place at once if it had not already taken place.3 Orders 1 The British answer to Napoleon's capture of Danzig was an order for the blockade of the Vistula. Castlereagh to Lords of Admiralty, June 17, 1807, ibid., 73. 2Cf.

supra, pp. 408-409; 412-413.

' Castlereagh to Fox, June 14, 1806, Douin and Fawtier-Jones, op. cit., pp.

132-134.

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

were despatched to Admiral Collingwood, commander in the Mediterranean, to retain a British squadron off the coast of E g y p t so as to prevent food supplies from being sent to Constantinople. I f it was found unnecessary for this purpose he might keep it there as a precaution against the French sending a force to Egypt. 1 T h e British government had acted too late to effect a British diversion in Italy, or any other place on the continent, for by the time Castlereagh's instructions to F o x for an expedition to Naples reached the latter, the coalition was in process of dissolution at Tilsit. 2 Canning's plans in the spring of 1807 for ending the Russo-Turkish war, so that Russia might put all her energy into the war against France in Poland, included a project for ending the Russo-Persian war and at the same time improving British relations with Persia. A t the beginning of the century Persia had become a field of diplomatic operations not only because it laid claim to lower Mesopotamia and lay athwart the land routes to India, but also because Shah Feth Ali, engaged in war with Russia, was eager to establish cordial relations with any power which might aid in checking the steady encroachments of the Russians on his kingdom. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and his invasion of Syria with evidence that he was planning with the help of the Arabians and Persians to march thence overland to India had produced great excitement for the British in India. The Bombay government had sent an armed force in 1799 to establish military bases at the mouth of the Red Sea to obstruct any possible move of the French toward India by that route. A f t e r a brief sojourn on the island of Perim the expedition had transferred its base to A d e n on the Arabian mainland where it was well received 1

Admiralty to Collingwood, June 16, 1807, ibid., p. 134.

BRITISH

MEDIATION

IN TURKEY

AND

RUSSIA

525

by the natives. The Sultan of Lahej, who controlled Aden, had proposed a treaty of alliance. This had been refused by the British commander, who had promised however, to aid the Arabs in case of any attack from the French. On this basis a treaty of friendship had been drawn up in 1802. 1 A t other places along the Arabian coast British diplomatic penetration had begun at this time. In 1798 a first treaty had been negotiated with the Inman of Muscat providing for the expulsion of French agents. Another treaty was signed with him in 1800. Other engagements were formed about the same time with semi-nomadic Arabs on both sides of the Persian Gulf, most of which were of short duration. 2 In December, 1799, while excitement still ran high over Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, the British government in India despatched a special mission headed by Captain John Malcolm to Persia." Malcolm was successful, and political and commercial treaties were soon concluded. The British envoy agreed to furnish munitions of war to the Shah in case he was attacked by the Afghans or the French. There were stringent provisions for expulsion of any French subjects who might settle in Persia. Malcolm carefully avoided giving explicit guarantees of British aid in the struggle against Russia, but vague assurances were given that Great Britain would not permit her Persian ally to be despoiled.4 F o r several years after the conclusion of this treaty the Russians steadily continued their attack on the Persians. The Shah appealed in vain to the British for help and in time felt obliged to seek French aid. 5 1

Hoskins, British Routes to India ( N e w York, 1928), p. 65.

2

Ibid.

' Malcolm's instructions a r e given in J. W . Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir John Malcolm (London, 1921, 2 vols.), i, pp. 30, 89. * Ibid., i, pp. SiS-525. 5

Cf. supra, p. 433-

526

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

T h e British home government had given little attention to its political relations with Persia f o r several reasons. T h e development of the w a r on the continent had absorbed British attention, and consideration for the feelings of their ally, Russia, so long as she was at war with Persia, made the British court hesitant to make any moves which would appear to indicate close relations between Great Britain and Persia. Moreover, during this time the French had been inactive in Persia and had given the British no cause f o r alarm. T h e British government had felt fairly secure in the belief that so long as Great Britain maintained her naval supremacy in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, and so long as there existed the triple alliance of Russia, Great Britain and Turkey, the French could not seriously endanger British possessions. However, in the latter part of 1806 and the early part of 1 8 0 7 the British government was confronted with a series of events which brought to the fore the question of British relations with Persia. First, it was learned at London during the latter part of 1 8 0 6 that the French were seeking to establish connections in the Red Sea. E a r l y in 1806 the British government in India had learned f r o m Pringle, the British agent at Mocha, that French agents were in that region seeking to establish a base in the Red Sea under the A r a b flag. T w o French officers had been seen in the neighborhood of Hodaida and the island of Kamaran just to the north, in the company of an Arab trader, Syed Mohamed Akil. Pringle had heard that Syed had purchased the island of K a m a r a n from the Sheik of Lahiya. He suspected the deal was in the interest of the French and he had at once protested to the Sheik on the matter. 1 This news alarmed the Government in India and measures 1

Minto to Secret Committee of Board of Directors of British East India Company, M a y io, 1806, India Office, Factory Records, 3 1 .

BRITISH

MEDIATION

IN TURKEY

AND RUSSIA

527

were considered f o r combating the French. It was decided that certain native chiefs in that region should be incited against the French, among them the Sheik of Lahiya, who should also be reimbursed for the sum he received for the sale of the island; he should then pay back a like sum to Syed the suspected agent of the French, and thereby annul the sale. T o guard against any future repetitions of the French scheme the British should establish friendly relations with the Sheik and furnish him with munitions. 1 Long standing fears among British officials in India of a French attack were so stimulated by this affair that when it was reported that a French squadron had escaped from Brest, Admiral Pellew, commanding in Indian waters, collected his fleet, suspecting that this French squadron was destined for the east. 2 B y chance all was quiet in India at this time and therefore the India government was in a position to take prompt action to check penetration of the French in the Red Sea area. Late in July 1806 two frigates of the British East India Company bearing a detachment of troops left Bombay to " reestablish the commercial interests of the British nation in the Red Sea and secure our commerce from intrigues of the French to establish any rival interests in that quarter." 3 With them went letters to various Arab chiefs warning them to oppose any overtures by the French and also pointing out the advantages of keeping on good terms with the British. The expeditionary force was particularly directed to the region of the island of Kamaran. 4 1

Barlow to Duncan, May 29, 1806, ibid. * Duncan to Castlereagh, June 1, 1806, Correspondence of Castlereagh, v, pp. 440-44I' Minto to Secret Committee, July 11, August 20, 1806, India Office, Factory Records, 31. 4 Duncan to Castlereagh, July n , 1806, Correspondence of Castlereagh, v, pp. 441-442-

528

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Captain David Seton, the India Company's agent at Muscat, was to be taken along as the special political agent to deal with the Sheik of Lahiya for recovery of his possession of Kamaran. I f he refused the British offer of repurchase, and threats were unavailing, then the British force should seize and hold the island. If the Sheik was amenable he should be offered a supply of arms. Seton should also investigate the possibilities of making commercial agreements with some of the A r a b chiefs; in this way it was hoped to supersede American and French commerce in the region as well as to remove the possibilities of French political penetration. Certain chiefs in the region of Aden had recently shown an inclination to establish better relations with the British India Company and an interest in having a Company factory at one of the ports. 1 T h e suspicions of the Government in India that the French were engaged in some project of penetration in that region seemed verified when, soon after the departure of the expedition, it was learned that a French envoy was at Teheran with an offer of alliance with Persia. Minto in reporting this to London advised that Great Britain must not disclose her anxiety over the matter to Persia, as the latter would take advantage of it to get concessions from the British. 2 It was also learned that British relations at Bagdad were not going well. In 1798 the first British agent in the person of H a r f o r d Jones had been sent to Bagdad with the double object of arranging with the pasha for regular transmission of British official despatches through his pashalik, and to observe and counteract work of French agents who were then active in the region. Jones had since remained as political 1

Duncan to Seton, July 14, 1806, India Office, Factory Records, 31.

4

Minto to Secret Committee, Aug. 20, 1806, ibid.

BRITISH

MEDIATION

IN TURKEY

AND RUSSIA

529

agent of the East India Company. 1 Bagdad was of strategic importance to the British as it was a main point on the land route to India. Lying between Bagdad and Persia was Kurdistan, with its mountain passes controlling main routes of travel east and west. A frontier of this kind was certain to be a bone of contention between Persia and Turkey. There were sectarian religious differences between the Moslems of the two countries; also difficulties were almost certain to occur because of the predatory warfare which the fierce Kurdkish tribes constantly carried into Persian and Turkish territory. Turkish Kurdistan lay within the jurisdiction of the Pasha of Bagdad, but recently his governor of this region, taking advantage of troubles which the pasha was having in another direction with the Wahabis, had risen in revolt and had sought aid from the Shah of Persia who had not been on very good terms recently with the pasha. The Shah, however, had been too busy fighting the Russians to be able to give much attention to affairs in Kurdistan. This local situation, however, would not have particularly concerned the British had they not heard at this time of the French mission to Persia represented by Jaubert and Romieu,' who, it was reported, were urging the Shah to take advantage of the difficulties of the Pasha of Bagdad to get control of Kurdistan and were also suggesting that France might help the Shah secure possession of Bagdad.® Unfortunately the relations of the British with the Pasha of Bagdad were 1

Hoskins, Op. cit., p. 64. With the weakening of the Sultan the Pasha of Bagdad, like certain other pashas Empire, had acquired a considerable degree of political pashalik and was therefore of importance to the British 2

3

C f . supra,

authority of the in the Ottoman control over his and French.

pp. 433-434-

Jones to Hines, Aug. 8, 1806, Minto to Secret Committee, August 20, 1806, India Office, Factory Records, 3 1 ; Arbuthnot to Fox, June 27, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 50. Arbuthnot had received word from Jones concerning these French intrigues.

530

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

not favorable. Jones, after a series of quarrels with the Bagdad officials, was virtually expelled in 1806 from his post, leaving British influence under a cloud. Manesty, appointed to succeed Jones, found on his arrival at Bagdad that the pasha was not favorably inclined toward Great Britain. He had also found that the British factory at Basra had not been well treated by the local governor, although the commercial classes in Basra and Bagdad were friendly enough to Great Britain. 1 Jones had advised that Great Britain should defend Bagdad as a barrier against a French attempt to send an expedition toward India. The attention of the Porte should be called to the need for improving affairs at Bagdad and the danger to Turkey in this region from French intrigue with Persia. Great Britain should offer her mediation to settle the trouble between the pasha and the Wahabis, and also the differences between the pasha and Persia over Kurdistan. Also a convention should be made between the British India Company and the pasha.2 Any measures taken by the British government to strengthen its position in the Middle East, especially in Persia, must take account of the Russo-Persian war. Now, perhaps for the first time, the question of Russia's expansion along the Caspian and the extension of her frontier in the direction of India became pertinent for Great Britain. In June 1806, Stuart, the British minister at St. Petersburg, forwarded a lengthy memorandum to London concerning the possible effects of Russian advance in the Caucasus upon the future of British interests in the East. Russian advance in this direction was attributable to the necessity of securing good frontiers and also to cupidity. It was a question for 1

Manesty to Secret Committee, June 26, 1806, India Office, Factors Records, 31. 1

Arbuthnot to Fox, June 27, 1806, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 50.

BRITISH

MEDIATION

IN TURKEY

AND

RUSSIA

531

Great Britain " to decide how far policy forbids that such possession should extend beyond present limits and when it may be necessary in future to impede this progress ". T h e Persian provinces of Ghilan and Mazanderan, located at the southern end of the Caspian and valuable f o r their silk industry, might fall into the hands of the Russians, opening the w a y for a line o f communication with Basra and thereby place themselves in a position to establish a strong commercial rivalry in this region with Great Britain. Russia's advance on the western coast of the Caspian, already considerable, might also lead to her occupation of Baku, which would give her control of certain important trade routes. Russia was perhaps too distracted by war in Europe to engage at this time in such a scheme, declared Stuart, but it was the arrière pensée of many in the Russian official class. " It is to the interest of Great Britain that such projects should not be thought o f . " I f there should be a Franco-Russian peace, France might allow Russia to develop in this direction. This possibility raised the question whether Great Britain should use her offices to bring a speedy reconciliation between Russia and Persia, which would close a channel of French intrigue and also check Russia's advance to the south. Stuart urged the British government not to delay in offering her services as he believed the Russians would consider a proposal of peace with Persia which would permit them to keep their latest acquisitions and would leave both with good frontiers. Also mediation by Great Britain would help to attach Persia to her. 1 Another memoir upon British policy as it concerned Russian expansion along the Caspian and British relations with Persia was forwarded at about the same time to the home government by Arbuthnot. It really expressed the views of 1 Memorandum from Stuart, June 23, 1806, British Foreign Office, Persia. 1.

53

2

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Jones. Great Britain could not afford to weaken her understanding with Russia by giving arms to Persia for the sake of improving her relations with the latter. Nor was it likely that Russia would accept peace on Persian terms, i.e., evacuation and restoration of Georgia and all Russian conquests in the province of Azerbijan. Great Britain could join Russia in bringing pressure to bear on Persia to accept peace on Russia's terms, but there was a question whether Great Britain wanted Russia to be finally established in this region at the expense of Persia, especially on the southeast of the Caspian. Besides, an attempt to coerce Persia would probably destroy Great Britain's valuable commerce with her; and the existence of many industries in India depended on the prosperity of Persia. An effective means which might be used to bring pressure on Persia to give up connections with the French would be for the British to espouse the cause of the Princes of the Zund Family for the throne. They had strong support in southern Persia where the people were more favorable to England because of their commerce with India. 1 It was not, however, until the early part of 1807 that the British government was moved to give serious attention to possible measures for bringing peace between Russia and Persia and improving British relations with Persia. By this time the British government had become fully acquainted with the efforts of the French to establish a base in the Red Sea and their intrigues at the Persian court against the pasha of Bagdad. Also word had come of the return of Jaubert from his mission to Persia accompanied by a Persian ambassador whose instructions had fallen into the hands of British agents and had been forwarded to London. The instructions revealed that in return for an alliance to be secured with France, Persia was ready to help Napoleon in any at' Arbuthnot to Fox, June 27, 1806, ibid., Turkey, 50.

BRITISH

MEDIATION

IN TURKEY

AND

RUSSIA

533

tempt to invade India. 1 T h i s news startlingly revealed to the British court the probability that a Franco-Persian alliance would be consummated before they could forestall it, unless very prompt measures were taken. A t this time when the British government needed information concerning affairs in Persia and adjacent regions, fortunately there was at hand H a r f o r d Jones who had recently returned to England. Early in January 1807 Jones presented a memorandum 2 to the Foreign Office in which after first elaborating upon the injuries France could do Great Britain and Russia if she gained a footing in Persia he pointed out how necessity had forced Persia to seek aid from anyone. Not finding the British willing to help her against Russia, she had made overtures to France. Persia preferred peace to a continuation of the war with Russia. France could not relieve Persia by mediation or by arms from the Russian war, while Great Britain could do so by mediation. Jones proposed that the British government urge Russia to make peace with Persia in order to counteract French intrigue, and that they send to Persia a British envoy w h o should g o first to St. Petersburg to arrange terms with Russia for peace, and then proceed to Russian headquarters in Georgia to open up communications with the Persians. In spite of any engagements made by the Persians with the French, Jones believed they could be won over " by proper appeal to self motives." It was necessary, however, that Great Britain act speedily in the matter. Believing that the British government was inclined now to give attention to Persian affairs, Jones had written at the same time to Hines, agent at Basra, asking that he get in touch at once with the Persian court and express to them hopes that Great Britain would soon show a warm interest in Persia.' ' Arbuthnot to Howick, Dec. 1, 1806, ibid., 52. ' Memorandum from Jones, Jan. 7, 1807, ibid. 3

Jones to Hines, Jan. 7, 1807, ibid.

534

T H E

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

In February word had come from Stuart that the Russian court had expressed hope of securing peace with Persia and would offer her inducements of securing territory from Turkey. Further, Stuart reported that powers to negotiate a peace with Persia had been issued to General Gudovitch in command of Russian forces in the Caucasus. 1 Instructions were sent to Douglas—who had just succeeded Stuart at St. Petersburg—to urge on the Russian court the necessity of the two powers taking measures to counteract the designs of the French in Persia. Besides, Russia should have her forces diverted as little as possible from the main war with France. Therefore peace with Persia was desirable. Great Britain was contemplating sending a special envoy to Persia, and, if agreeable to Russia, would offer her mediation to restore peace with Persia. 2 Subsequently word reached London of overtures made by Persia to the Government in India for help against the Russians, also suggesting a British mediation for peace between Persia and Russia. The Persians in the preceding June had suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Russians. The Shah in desperation had looked around for help. The arrival of the French agent, Jaubert, about this time opened up the possibility of help from France.® The Shah, primarily concerned with getting an ally, was ready to secure help from any source and therefore while parleying with the French for an alliance he also made overtures to the British. Therefore in December 1806, while a Persian envoy was returning with Jaubert to France, the Shah sent his brother-in-law, Aga Nubi Kahn, on a special mission to the Government in India. A g a had instructions to secure British help against Russia. They should be informed that the Shah had not yet con1

Stuart to Howick, Jan. 14, 17, 1807, ibid., Russia, 67.

* Howick to Douglas, Feb. 29, 1807, ibid., 68. 8

Cf. supra, p. 434.

BRITISH

MEDIATION

IN TURKEY

AND RUSSIA

535

eluded anything with the French envoys and that he would not do so until A g a returned. If his mission were successful and the Russians were defeated, the French agents would then be dismissed. A g a was also to ascertain whether the British would attempt to mediate a settlement between Russia and Persia. 1 It was clear that Shah Feth A l i intended to use the threat of an alliance with the French to wring support if possible f r o m the British. A g a was unsuccessful in his mission. He was told that the relations of Persia and Great Britain were defined by the treaty of 1801 which specified that the British would come to the aid of Persia only in case a French army attempted to establish itself in Persia or in the event of attacks by the A f ghans upon Persia. A l s o by this treaty Persia was bound to refuse to allow the French to reside in Persia. If Persia made any engagements with France it was in violation of this treaty. A g a was further informed that Great Britain could not afford to break her friendship and alliance with Russia as they were making war together against the French. As to the question of British mediation between Russia and Persia, it would be referred to the British government at London for consideration. 2 The affair of the Persian mission indicated to the home government Persia's willingness to accept a British mediation in the interest of peace with Russia. A l s o it had clearly shown that the Shah was prepared to come to an agreement with the French. N e w s came of the arrival of the Persian ambassador at Napoleon's headquarters. Canning believed it was time to act. It seemed clear to him that the situation demanded that the first immediate object of British diplomacy in the east should be to remove any advantages Napoleon might derive from his connections with Persia and Turkey 1

Shah Feth Ali to Aga Nubi Kahn, British Foreign Office, Persia, 1.

1

Edmonstone to Aga Nubi Kahn, Jan. 10, 1807, ibid.

53

6

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

and also to enable Russia to concentrate all her efforts on the European war by securing peace f o r her with Persia as well as with Turkey, and likewise improving relations of Great Britain with both these countries. A f t e r preparing Paget f o r his mission of pacification between Russia and Turkey and reestablishment of British official relations with the Porte, Canning wrote H a r f o r d Jones on June 2 that he should undertake a mission to Persia. He was to go first to St. Petersburg in order to help Gower —recently appointed to succeed Douglas—secure the assent of Russia to British mediation of peace. If upon his arrival Jones found Russian and Persian affairs were being settled separately, or if Russia refused British mediation, then he was to go directly thence to Persia to carry on his mission. 1 T w o days previously Napoleon had concluded at Finkenstein a treaty of alliance with the Persian ambassador in which Persia engaged to declare w a r on England immediately and to help in every way a French expedition to India. B e f o r e preparations had been completed f o r the British mission, the news of Friedland and subsequent negotiations at Tilsit changed the situation and not until months later did Jones depart, this time directly for Persia. 1

Canning to Jones, June 2, 1807, ibid.

C H A P T E R

XIX

T I L S I T AND ITS A F T E R M A T H IN T H E N E A R E A S T I

MAY 1807 found Napoleon and the allies haggling with each other over a peace congress while each was secretly talking of war and preparing for it, hoping to secure some military advantage before a congress met. Austria, seeking to maintain neutrality and to promote her own interests by peace-making, vainly waited for Napoleon to make such specific declarations concerning his terms as would help clear the w a y for the congress, at the same time that she tried to escape the demand of the allies that she adhere to the Convention of Bartenstein as a first step towards a general peace. 1 Martial ardor prevailed at both French and allied headquarters. Napoleon had started his military operations with the siege of Danzig. He moved against the Swedes in Pomerania and compelled them to make a truce. Reports came to his headquarters at Finkenstein concerning extensive military preparations of the Sultan aided by the French to take the offensive soon against the Russians on the Danube. It appeared that T u r key had been successfully converted by Napoleon into an instrument of war against Russia and the British. Further, he was attempting to complete his rapprochement with Turkey by negotiating an offensive alliance with her. While the Turkish ambassador resisted the conclusion of such a treaty, Napoleon signed one with Persia which had noticeably more in it about enterprises against the British in India J

Cf. supra, pp. 456-458. 537

THE NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

than about anything else.1 Peace with Russia which would bring her into the Continental System against England was Napoleon's final objective, but while talking of a general peace he would improve his position by recourse to arms. He removed Talleyrand from Warsaw out of reach of the Austrian envoy, Vincent, when he believed his foreign minister's conduct was not in accord with his instructions to him " to be circumspect, to go quietly and to watch things happening. Wait for events." 2 At Prusso-Russian headquarters during this time there was likewise talk of coming military operations. It seemed, however, to be confined largely to optimistic declarations, as their armies were inactive. Both the Tsar and the commander of his armies, General Bennigsen, had assured the Prussian court from the first that strong reen for cements would soon arrive for the Russian army which would place it in a position to renew the war vigorously. There had been much talk at Russian headquarters of attacking the French when these reenforcements arrived.8 However, they did not come; there was much sickness in the ranks, food was scarce and bad, discontent developed among the troops; and the necessary reorganization and effectual operation of the army were paralyzed by intrigues of higher officers against Bennigsen and by indecisiveness of the latter arising from his physical ailments.4 Napoleon's siege of Danzig did not lessen the confident optimism pervading allied headquarters during these weeks as it was believed the city could resist the French until help was given.5 There was a general belief 1

Cf. supra, p. 436.

* Correspondence

de Napoleon,

xv, 12390, 12453.

* Hutchinson to Adair, April 5, 1807, Adair, Historical Memoirs Mission to the Court of Vienna (London, 1844), pp. 283-284. * Waliszewski, Le Regne d'Alexandre ' Butterfield, op. cit., p. 182.

I, i, pp. 214-315.

of a

TILSIT

AND

ITS

AFTERMATH

539

that Austria would soon declare war, and they awaited her signature to the Convention of Bartenstein as an event which would precipitate her into war on the side of the allies. The differences between Austria and Russia over eastern affairs could easily be settled.1 It was true that no message of reassurance had come from England, no money, no military expeditions to the continent to help the allies, although it was hoped that the appearance of a British expedition in the Baltic would persuade Austria to join the coalition.2 Hutchinson, British minister at the Prussian court, neglected to keep his government fully posted upon the situation, and besides he was thoroughly disliked at allied headquarters." Finally there was word from London that a new British minister to the Russian court, Gower, was coming to discuss with the Tsar plans for promoting the common cause and that an English expedition to the continent could be expected. 4 Resentment and impatience were stifled for the moment, while the allies awaited fulfillment of their hopes. Then suddenly came news of the surrender of Danzig, on May 26. The prevalent psychological atmosphere of confident optimism among the allies was suddenly transformed, and suppressed fears and reproaches were given utterance. Sir Robert Wilson, a member of the British official circle at Memel, wrote after the event that it had depressed all their spirits ; the situation of the English was very uncomfortable as they were accused of having caused the disaster by their supiness and England was charged with disloyal conduct." 1 Beningsen to Nesselrode, April 24, 1807, Mémoires Bennigsen (Paris, 3 vols.), ii, p. 120. 1

Ibid., ii, pp. 118-119.

' Butterfield, op. cit., p. 183. * Cf. sufira, p. 507. 4

Wilson, Private Diary (London, 1861, 2 vols.), ii, p. 170.

du

General

54°

THE

NEAR

EASTERN

QUESTION,

1806-1807

Repeated complaints were made to Alexander by Hardenberg, Prussian minister of foreign affairs, and others of the Prussian court of the inefficiency of the Russian generals and Bennigsen was charged with being in league with the Russian peace party. 1 A s a result of Hardenberg's attacks. Alexander sent an officer to investigate Bennigsen's conduct with orders to remove him if advisable. 2 Alexander was in a troublesome position on the eve of Friedland with an underfed army, incapable and quarrelsome generals, and an intriguing peace party. There now appeared on the scene the new British ambassador, Lord Leveson-Gower. When he met Alexander at Tilsit on June 10 the latter gave a glimpse of his state of mind. Gower's instructions, drawn up by Canning in ignorance of the immediate difficulties pressing about the Tsar, were compounded of fine declarations that England desired to unite closely with Russia in the conduct of the war, and complaints over Russia's conduct on old issues between the two powers—the commercial treaty, the question of Hanover, the failure of Russia to cooperate in Sicily—along with a flat refusal by the British government to grant Russia a loan, or to accede to the Convention of Bartenstein unless Russia provided a guarantee against aggrandizement of Prussia in any future reorganization of Germany. With such instructions Gower was hardly in a position to soothe Alexander over his difficulties, nor was he prepared for the rebuffs he unexpectedly received at the hands of the depressed Tsar. Alexander complained that Russia had to bear the whole burden of the war and that he had received no response to his repeated requests for a British military diversion on the 1 Waliszewski, op. cit., i, p. 215. There was a peace party headed by Czartoryski in Russian official circles, of which Grand Duke Constantine in the army was a member. Hardenberg and Budberg were for pursuing the war 2

Tatistcheff, Alexandre

et Napoleon

(Paris, 1891), pp. 115-116.

TILSIT AND ITS

AFTERMATH

541

continent. T h e future independence of Europe, omniously declared the T s a r , now hung in the balance. Gower could not promise that any appreciable British force would be sent to the continent, and to Alexander's sharp criticism of the tardiness of the British in attacking the French in Italy, he replied that it was because of diversion of British forces from Sicily to help Russia against Turkey. Alexander refused to accept explanations for Great Britain's inability to furnish Russia with much financial help, and evidently spoke in such an unrestrained manner concerning the conduct of his British ally as to startle Gower who reported that the T s a r " used a tone of language perfectly unexpected." 1 Gower received the same heated and unrestrained attack f r o m Budberg. T o his suggestion that he could give some financial aid to Russia, the Russian minister " replied in rather an angry tone " that Russia, now contending alone against the enemy, needed not British money but British soldiers. 2 Gower had no time to renew discussions with Alexander or Budberg f o r early on the morning of June 1 6 at Olita the T s a r received a message from Bennigsen half admitting defeat at Friedland on the fourteenth and recommending that negotiations f o r peace be begun at once with the French, if only to gain time to repair losses.® Depressed by defeat, disillusioned over possibilities of help from England, pressed to make peace by the peace party and his generals and by Grand Duke Constantine who even hinted at the possibility of assassination and revolt in the army if he failed to do so, Alexander finally decided to negotiate for peace with Napoleon. 4 1

Gower to Canning, June 17, 1807, British Foreign Office, Russia, 69. Gower to Canning, June 18, 1807, ibid. * Tatistcheff, op. cit., p. 119. 4 For original documents upon the negotiations at Tilsit see Tatistcheff,

1

THE

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QUESTION,

1806-1807

Legendary accounts of Tilsit depict the transactions of Alexander and Napoleon on a raft in midstream of the Niemen as a grand contest in dupery between the two emperors in which the question of the partition of European Turkey assumed first place. Which emperor duped the other has never been decided. What each said to the other on the subject of Turkey will probably never be known. But it is a fact that Turkey escaped from the affair without serious loss of territory. A proposal for a partition of European Turkey had been made to the Russians by Hardenberg, as part of a scheme of which the chief purpose was to secure a restoration of Prussia. Early in the Tilsit negotiations before Alexander had received from Napoleon an offer of alliance the idea had been advanced by Hardenberg who drew up a series of proposals whereby Russia and Prussia, finding it necessary to abandon war with France, should join in an alliance with Napoleon thereby establishing a combination which could regulate affairs upon the continent to the mutual benefit of the combined powers. To provide a balanced scheme of territorial reorganization, European Turkey should be divided. Russia would have Moldavia, Wallachia, Bessarabia, and Bulgaria. Napoleon should have Greece and the adjacent islands. Prussia would take none of Turkey but would have Saxony, transferring the king of Saxony to the throne of a reconstructed kingdom of Poland. To balance her acquisitions in Turkey, Russia was to give up her Polish provinces. Austria was to do the same with her Polish provinces and in their place be given Dalmatia, Bosnia and Serbia. Prussia would also give up a part of her Polish territory. 1 op. cit., pp. 120 et seq.; Sbornik, lxxxix, pp. 16 et seq.; Deutsche Rundschau, c x ; Ranke, Hardenberg, in, iv. For a good secondary reference based upon sources, see Butterfield, The Peace Tactics of Napoleon, 1806-1808, pp. 238 et seq. 1 Ranke, Hardenberg, iii, pp. 460-462.

TILSIT

AND ITS

AFTERMATH

543

Hardenberg's proposals may appear audacious and shrewdly calculating, but international diplomacy of the late eighteenth century had always been thus characterized especially where Poland, Germany or Turkey was in question. A s Frederick the Great in 1 7 7 2 had turned Catherine from further aggression on Turkey to Poland, so Hardenberg thought now to turn Napoleon from Prussia to Turkey. But in 1 7 7 2 Frederick was in a position to pursue his plans, while in 1807 Frederick William had neither an army nor a kingdom. Hardenberg's proposals were accepted on the twenty second by both Frederick William and Alexander, though the latter had misgivings as to how they would be received by Napoleon. General Kalckreuth, who was about to go to Tilsit to negotiate an armistice for Prussia, was instructed to sound out Napoleon on the subject of a partition of Turkey. 1 This was as f a r as Hardenbeurg got with his scheme. He was forced out of the subsequent negotiations upon Napoleon's demand and Prussia was set aside to wait while Napoleon and Alexander concluded matters. Hardenberg continued to urge Alexander to follow his plan in the negotiations with Napoleon. But it appears that while the Tsar accepted Hardenberg's idea of a triple alliance and assented to the proposal for the partition of Turkey, he hesitated to propose the plan to Napoleon. He possibly had lingering doubts as to its feasibility as a whole. At their second interview, on June 26, Napoleon brought up the subject of dissolution and partition of the Ottoman Empire. Alexander, reporting it afterwards to Frederick William, warned that they must move with the greatest caution. On July 3, Frederick William wrote Queen Louise that the Tsar believed that Napoleon and Talleyrand were much engaged with the project of a partition of the Ottoman 1

Ibid., iii, pp. 463-464.

THE

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Empire, which appeared to have become a favorite idea of Napoleon.1 On July 4, Frederick William wrote again to Queen Louise that Alexander and Napoleon " were trying to come to business over Turkey." By this time the Prussian monarch and his consort had serious doubts whether Alexander had the courage to press the Prussian plan on Napoleon.1 In the last days of June word reached Tilsit of the recent revolution at Constantinople.* T o Hardenberg it probably seemed a happy event arguing well for his proposal for a partition of Turkey and helping to convince the Tsar and Napoleon that the Ottoman Empire must soon fall. After Napoleon had received a full report of the revolution from Sebastiani, who also pointed out that there were evidences of anti-French sentiment in the new regime, he declared that he had been released from all obligations to Turkey. It was he said, a " decree of Providence." 4 Whatever were Napoleon's views on Turkey at this time, it appears that the French Foreign Office had already examined the possibility of considering the Turkish Empire as " le théâtre et le moyen d'une négociation qui mettrait fin aux démêlés subsistants entre l'Empereur et le Tsar et qui ouvrirait la carrière aux combinaisons les plus vastes et les plus importantes." 5 On the other hand the evidence of disorder in the body politic of the Ottoman Empire may have appeared to Napoleon one reason for securing an alliance with Russia which would set a limit to Russian expansion at Turkey's expense. 1

Butterfield, op. cit., pp. 257, 263.

* Ibid., p. 258. 8 Cf. supra, pp. 487-489. Napoleon first heard of the revolution on June 24 through reports from Vienna. •According to the Tsar this was what Napoleon said. Napoleon, Nov. 4, 1807, Sbornik, 83, pp. 180-184.

Savary to

5 Arch. Nat. A. F, iv, 1688. The memorandum is without date or signature. But from some of its ideas it seems to have been Talleyrand's.

TILSIT

AND ITS

AFTERMATH

545

But at least until Napoleon knew the end of his negotiations with Russia, he did not intend to throw away prematurely any advantages of French connections with Turkey, and he therefore had instructions sent to Sébastiani to do everything possible to conciliate the new Turkish government and to establish friendly relations with it. He was to continue to urge the Turks to make military preparations, for if he found that Russia did not negotiate in good faith he would pass the Niemen and join the Turkish armies. 1 Although plans concerning Turkey may have provided material for talk and manipulation in the negotiations, the Treaty of Tilsit was largely concerned with western and central Europe and had nothing to say concerning a conquest or a partition of Turkey. 2 It stipulated that an armistice should be concluded between Russia and Turkey, to be followed by the immediate evacuation of Wallachia and Moldavia by the Russians, while the Turks were not to enter the provinces until after the ratification of a Russo-Turkish treaty of peace to be negotiated through French mediation. However, article eight of the Treaty of Alliance laid down that in the event of the Sultan's refusing the offer of French mediation, or if the negotiations for peace led to no " satisfactory result " after three months, France would then make common cause with Russia and the two powers " s'entendront pour soustraire tous les provinces de l'Empire Ottoman en Europe, la ville de Constantinople et la Province de Roumelie exceptées, an joug et aux vexations des Tures." Of perhaps more immediate importance to Napoleon was the agreement by the Russians to evacuate Cattaro and Corfu, which completely removed them from the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. But everything was subordinate to Correspondance de Napoléon, xv, 12819. ' For text of treaty see : Vandal, Napoléon et Alexandre I, i, Appendice, i, pp. 499-507. 1

54

6

THE NEAR EASTERN

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his desire to isolate England, and to this end he already envisaged the possibility of enterprises in Spain in the near future. He must be free from any entanglements in the east. This did not mean that he intended to leave Turkey a free field for Russian aggrandizement, and he had so shaped the large important features of the Tilsit treaties as to leave him master of the continent and where forced to make important concessions to Russia to satisfy her interests in the Balkans, he made them vague and remote. There is no doubt that Alexander had aspirations during the negotiations of securing acquisitions in Turkey. Though he failed to get definite concessions or definite guarantees on the subject, because of the adroitness of Napoleon's diplomacy, at least his conduct in the months immediately after Tilsit in urging Napoleon to hasten the partition of Turkey reveals his real expectations. If Alexander was duped at Tilsit it was in believing that Napoleon was as preoccupied as himself with the idea and would therefore enter into a scheme for its realization. If Napoleon was duped it was perhaps in the belief that he could secure peace between Turkey and Russia, retain French influence at the Porte and keep intact an alliance with Persia, while the latter was at war with Russia, and at the same time preserve his own alliance with Russia. At Tilsit, Napoleon really sacrificed his political rapprochements in the east to consolidate his position in the west. 2 Two days after the signing of the Treaty of Tilsit a French officer, Guilleminot, left Tilsit to mediate an armistice between the Russians and the Turks. Napoleon took the occasion to send instructions to Sebastiani to inform the Porte that he was still a friend of Turkey and desired to be on good terms with the new Sultan. Sebastiani should do everything to keep the Porte within the political orbit of

TILSIT AND ITS

AFTERMATH

547

France, though he should not inform the Turks that Cattaro and the Ionian Islands belonged now to France. Consent should be secured from the Porte for the passage of Russian vessels through the Dardanelles. Also it was important to secure acceptance of French mediation for a Russo-Turkish peace, and the Porte should be urged to get the negotiations under way by having a Turkish ambassador sent to Paris as soon as possible.1 The Russian peace mission to Turkey represented by Pozzo di Borgo 2 had failed. Pozzo had arrived at Corfu from Vienna early in May. He desired first to improve Russian relations with Ali Pasha of Janina, as he was quite aware that any hope of a Russo-Turkish peace must include improvement of the relations between the Russians controlling the Ionian Islands and Ali Pasha. French influence must be eliminated, not only from Constantinople but also from Albania. Pozzo requested the British agent at Corfu, Foresti, to assume the role of mediator. Foresti consented to pave the way by sending a friendly letter upon the subject to Ali, but he refused to do more." Having prepared the way for negotiations with Ali Pasha, Pozzo then set off for Tenedos, arriving on May 24. He now prepared to open negotiations with the Porte. He at once sent off to Constantinople notification of his mission and requested the Porte to open negotiatons. He received no response and at length after hearing of the revolution which had started on the twenty-fifth he sent to the Porte a lengthy communication upon the political situation in Europe, presenting Napoleon's position as very precarious and pointing 1 Napoleon to Talleyrand, July 9, 1807, Correspondance de Napoléon, xv, 12886. 2

Cf. supra, pp. 442-444.

•Foresti to Howick, May 12, 1807, British Foreign Office, Ionian Islands, 9.

THE NEAR EASTERN

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1806-1807

out the advantages to Turkey of reestablishing her former relations with Russia and England. Sebastiani demanded of the Porte, under threat of the loss of Napoleon's friendship, that negotiations should not be opened with the Russian peace envoy. 1 The Porte submitted and refused to grant permission to Pozzo to come to Constantinople. Nor could he secure any response to further overtures.2 Pozzo was still at Tenedos when the British peace mission to Turkey represented by Paget arrived on July 28. Paget had stopped at Sicily on July 10 and in concert with General Moore had suspended the orders of the home government for the evacuation of British forces from Egypt. 3 He felt the need of having a lever in his negotiations, and there was no other available, for the British blockade of the coasts of Turkey had not yet begun.4 After his arrival at Tenedos he collaborated closely with Pozzo di Borgo in negotiations with the Turks. The Porte continued to refuse to negotiate with the Russian envoy and constantly offered excuses for delay in getting in touch with the British peace mission and finally a combined Russian and British fleet moved up to the mouth of the Dardanelles in order to make the Turks more receptive to peace overtures. Then came word of the treaty of Tilsit. Its arrangement for a Russo-Turkish peace by means of French mediation put an end to Pozzo di Borgo's mission and did not improve Paget's situation. The Turks expressed a desire to reestablish friendly relations with the British, but they did not wish to conclude any agreement with them or to permit the return of a British ambassador for the present, as they feared to give the new 1 1

Sebastiani to Talleyrand, June 9, 1807, Aff. Etr. de Turquie, 214. Pozzo di Borgo to Paget, July 29, 1807, British Foreign Office, Turkey,

56.

Cf. supra, p. 523. * Paget to Canning, July 12, 1807, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 56. 3

TILSIT

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ITS

AFTERMATH

549

allies a pretext for attack. 1 Paget's misgivings over the future of his mission were enhanced when early in September he was forced to consent to the evacuation of Egypt by the British expedition because of the departure of most of the British squadron from the eastern Mediterranean, measures represented as necessary by Admiral Collingwood who informed Paget, that, in view of the French acquisitions by Tilsit in the Mediterranean, Sicily was seriously menaced and all available British military and naval forces must be concentrated for its protection.2 Thus ended the second British invasion of Egypt. Moore's criticism of it can not be refuted: if the expedition was undertaken to influence the Turks to accede to the demands of Russia and England, Egypt was too far away to effect the course of events at Constantinople, and if Egypt was to be occupied as the British share in a scramble for Turkish spoils it could have been taken at any time. The troops should have remained in Sicily, where they should have been used to promote the common cause of Great Britain with her allies in the continental war by a British attack on Italy; or they should have been sent to the Dardanelles to support the British naval expedition.8 Nor had the British Egyptian expedition left the internal political situation of the country more favorable to them. Missett protested against evacuation, claiming that Egypt under Mohammed Ali would be a " field for French intrigue " and that it was a blow to British prestige.4 The fact was that the Mamelukes, whom Missett wanted the British to put in control of Egypt in order to safeguard British interests, were ' Reports of Paget, Aug. 14, 23, 30, Sep. 3, 1807, ibid. * Collingwood to Paget, Sept. 4, 1807, Paget Papers, iii, pp. 343 et seq.; Paget to Sir John Moore, Sept. 5, 1807, ibid., iii, p. 353. ' Maurice, The Diary of Sir John Moore p. 151. 4

(London, 1904, 2 vols.), ii,

Missett to Paget, Aug. 22, 1807, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 56.

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

as a political body now practically extinct. Thenceforth Mohammed A l i was to convert Egypt into a patrimony of his own. A t the end of September Paget received instructions from Canning, dated August 14, enclosing a copy of the public articles of the Treaty of Tilsit. Paget was informed that, since Great Britain no longer had any motive for being unfriendly to Turkey in order to help Russia, he should secure restoration as soon as possible of former good relations between them. He should stress the dangers to Turkey of the alliance of Russia and France, each of which had long nourished projects to acquire Turkish territory. T h e instructions gave no promises of help from Great Britain for Turkey, should the Tilsit allies attempt a partition. But what Great Britain might do was revealed in a separate despatch marked secret, in which Paget was instructed to sound out the various pashas in Turkey, particularly Ali Pasha of Janina and the pasha of Smyrna as to what they would do in resisting the French and Russians. Paget was to assure any of the pashas who seemed willing to resist the new allies, of the naval and moral support of Great Britain. 1 These instructions, however, added nothing to the effectiveness of Paget's mission. He lingered on at Tenedos vainly endeavoring to get the Turks to take up negotiations seriously, and finally ended his mission at the end of October after the Porte had declared that, in view of the critical situa1 Canning to Paget, Aug. 14, 1807, ibid. Within a few months after Tilsit, A l i Pasha of Janina, fearing the presence of the French in the Ionian Islands, turned toward Great Britain. He sent an envoy to London. Canning, however, refused to encourage the pasha to expect any aid except in case the Porte succumbed to French influence or could not resist encroachments of France. A l i would then receive British naval support and his independence would be established. Canning, however, had artillery and munitions sent to A l i after the visit of his envoy. A l i Pasha to George I I I (undated) ; Canning to Adair, June 26, A u g . 20, O c t 21, 1808, British Foreign Office, Turkey, 60, 61.

TILSIT

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551

tion with respect to their relations with Russia and France, it would have to break negotiations with the British for the time being but would renew them later.1 One of the first immediate effects of Tilsit, therefore, was to force the British to weaken their position in the eastern Mediterranean, leaving their relations with the Porte as dubious as before. In turn the refusal of the Porte to conclude anything with the British mission was taken by the French as a victory.

3 Though the May revolution at Constantinople had been supported by groups vociferous in criticism of Selim's reforms on the ground that they were promoted by the French, the outbreak had nothing to do essentially with foreign affairs. 2 Therefore, soon after the revolution Sébastiani was able to write Talleyrand that he had secured from the new government a public proclamation continuing the war against Russia.® Sébastiani had thus apparently been successful in his efforts to combat Russian peace proposals which by this time Pozzo di Borgo had made known to the Porte, and which had received support from the Prussian and Austrian ambassadors.4 At the same time, however, the new Sultan revoked the order which Selim had given for the services of six hundred French artillerymen from Dalmatia, and demanded their immediate recall.8 But Sébastiani was reassured when a note 1

Paget to Canning, Oct. 22, 1807, ibid.

Stunner to Stadion, May 31, 1807, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Türkei, Berichte, 1807; Sébastiani to Talleyrand, June 1, 1807, Ä f f . Etr. de Turquie, 214. Cf. supra, p. 486. 2

8

Sébastiani to Talleyrand, June 9, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 214.

Stürmer to Stadion, June 10, 1807, Austria, Berichte, 1807. 4

5

Staatsarchiv,

Türkei,

Sébastiani to Talleyrand, June 10, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 214.

55

2

THE NEAR EASTERN

QUESTION, 1806-1807

from the Porte declared that Turkey intended to maintain her alliance with France and asked that France renew her intentions. Sébastiani gave assurances that Napoleon would make no treaty without stipulating the independence and integrity of Turkey. 1 When, soon after, Sébastiani heard that a British peace mission was on its way he hastened to urge the Porte to refuse all its proposals. He was assured that the British envoy would not even be allowed to come to Constantinople and that no peace proposal would be considered until the British evacuated Egypt and their fleet had left. 2 But Sébastiani, hearing that the Porte was still in communication with Pozzo di Borgo, threatened to quit Constantinople unless all connections with him were stopped. This threat seemed to have the desired effect, for the Turks permitted him to dictate a note to be handed to both the Russian and the British peace envoys, which stated that Russia and Great Britain must evacuate all Turkish territory before they could expect Turkey to consider peace. Then she would treat only in conjunction with France.* Hardly had Sébastiani won this victory, when he was placed in a difficult position by the arrival of news that a Franco-Russian armistice had been signed. The Turks hastened to demand whether the independence of Turkey were involved. As Sébastiani received no official communication in the days following concerning the negotiations at Tilsit, his position became, he wrote Talleyrand, most difficult, and certain groups were taking advantage of his embarassment to promote anti-French sentiment. He feared that a Franco-Russian settlement might oblige the Porte to make peace with Great Britain.4 1

Sébastiani to Talleyrand, * Sébastiani to Talleyrand, ' Sébastiani to Talleyrand, 4 Sébastiani to Talleyrand,

June IS, 1807, ibid. June 17, 1807, ibid. June 28, 1807, ibid. July 18, 25, 1807, ibid.

TILSIT

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The Austrian ambassador reported that the Porte was much agitated as to whether France would take care of Turkey, and there was some underground sentiment for separation from France. Russian peace proposals had thus far been refused because of French influence and also because of the anti-peace views of leaders of the recent revolution, who really dominated the Turkish ministers.1 At the end of July Sebastiani received a despatch dated June 27 from Talleyrand informing him of the Franco-Russian armistice and the negotiations for a treaty of alliance. The Porte was to be assured that, if a peace were made by France with Russia, the interests of Turkey would be safeguarded. But since the Turkish ambassador had refused to conclude any agreement, Napoleon was obligated in no way to Turkey nor could Turkey demand anything from him.» The Sultan wrote Talleyrand, giving official recognition of the Franco-Russian armistice and declaring that he was ready to negotiate an armistice with Russia ; he affirmed his faith that Napoleon would guarantee the integrity of Turkey.3 The Reis Effendi wrote Talleyrand at the same time requesting that the Turkish ambassador, Vahid Effendi, be admitted to the Franco-Russian negotiations and saying that he would have powers to work out a treaty of alliance with France. 4 A Turkish plenipotentiary, Galib Effendi, was appointed to negotiate an armistice with the Russians and he immediately left for Turkish army headquarters on the Danube to await the opening of negotiations. It was just at this time that the Porte first heard of the articles of the Tilsit Treaty. 1

Stiirmer to Stadion, July 25, 1807, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Turkei, Berichte, 1807 2 Talleyrand to Sébastiani, June 27, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 214. ' Mustapha to Talleyrand, Aug. 5, 1807, ibid. 4 Reis Effendi to Talleyrand, Aug. 5, 1807, ibid.

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Some of the Turkish ministers violently denounced France, charging Napoleon with having broken his promise not to make peace except in concert with Turkey, and declaring that the Porte should now treat with the British ambassador. Sebastiani sought to assure them that Napoleon had not abandoned Turkey. He continued, however, to hear of rumors that Napoleon would sacrifice Turkey if necessary to promote his own interests.1 The Reis Effendi confided to the Austrian minister that he really favored a policy of neutrality and no alliances with any power. But if an alliance were to be made by Turkey, he believed that at present an alliance with France was of more value than one with Great Britain. He doubted the durability of a peace between Turkey and Russia unless there were provided a guarantee that she would not again invade Turkey. Merely to withdraw Russian forces because of Napoleon's demand was but putting off to a later date Russia's return to her designs upon Turkey. 2 This furor at the Porte over the Tilsit treaty soon subsided without apparently affecting any change in policy. The Porte decided to proceed with negotiations for an armistice with Russia. As length Sebastiani was able to inform Talleyrand, on August 23, that the Porte gave formal adherence to the Treaty of Tilsit, signifying thereby its willingness to have negotiations for peace with Russia carried out at Paris through French mediation. The Turkish ambassador at Paris was given powers not only to negotiate a peace treaty with Russia but also to conclude an alliance with France. The Sultan had declared that his policy was one of alliance with France and that peace would not be made with Great Britain in order not to displease Napoleon.3 1

Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Aug. 9, 1807, ibid. Stürmer to Stadion, Aug. 10, 1807, Austria, Berichte, 1807. 2

Staatsarchiv,

Türkei,

* Sebastiani to Talleyrand, Aug. 23, 1807, Ä f f . Etr. de Turquie, 214.

TILSIT

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AFTERMATH

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These professions did not mean that there was complete confidence in the friendship of Napoleon. The Reis Effendi confided privately to the Austrian minister that there were reasons for suspecting the sincerity of French promises to protect Turkey, and that something was hidden in the Tilsit Treaties detrimental to her. The Porte was getting tired of being constantly menaced by Sebastiani with the hostility of France should Turkey open negotiations with the British. Besides the Porte did not believe that the French could protect Constantinople and the Turkish coast from the danger of British naval forces. Turkey desired peace with everyone, declared the Reis Effendi, but had little hope in French mediation with Russia and preferred that Austria assume the office of mediator. The Austrian minister, in reporting this to his government, declared that from his observations French influence was no longer what it had once been at the Porte. 1 Such were the political cross-currents at Constantinople when the Russo-Turkish negotiations at Slobodzie for an armistice were concluded on August 24. They had been under way since August 12 through the mediation of the French officer, Guilleminot. T w o questions had been outstanding, one of which was the government of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Turkish envoy had insisted almost to the point of breaking up the conference that Turkey recover full control over the two provinces pending conclusion of a definite peace between Russia and Turkey. The Russians in the end won their point, supported by Guilleminot, that a temporary government be set up free of both Russian and Turkish control. The other difficulty was Serbia. The Russians insisted that the Serbians be included in the armistice, a point which the Turks would not accept. The point 1 Sturmer to Stadion, A u g u s t 25, Sept. 11, 1807, Austria, Staatsarchiv, Turkei, Berichte, 1807.

THE

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1806-1807

involved was obvious: to have included the Serbians would have given them the status of a legitimate enemy, whereas the Turks viewed them as rebels with none of the rights of international intercourse. The Turks feared that behind the project was Russia's intention of furthering the independence of the Serbian principality. The Russians wanted them included in the armistice so that they could safeguard acquisitions secured by the Serbs, which were also beneficial to Russian interests.1 In the end the articles of the Russo-Turkish armistice contained nothing on the Serbians. According to other articles, Russia and Turkey contracted to name plenipotenitaries for the negotiation of a definite peace. In thirty days following the establishment of the armistice, Russia was to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia. A t the same time all Turkish troops were to retire south over the Danube, leaving garrisons only at Ismail, Braila and Galatz. Russian vessels of war were to quit Tenedos and the islands of the Archipelago. 2 The Porte accepted the terms of the armistice and at the same time renewed its solicitation for Napoleon's mediation in securing peace with Russia." Guilleminot was aware of the possible difficulties in the evacuation of the two provinces and he remained for a time at Rustchuk to observe how much conformity there would be to the agreed terms. His doubts were soon confirmed when almost two weeks after the armistice, Russian forces still occupied the island of Ostrow and other places. The death of General Michelson at this time was used as an excuse to retard evacuation for some days until the arrival of the new commander, General x Yakschitch, op. cit., pp. 135-142; report of Guilleminot, Aug. 24, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 214. 2

Martens, op. cit., iv, p. 456, Suppl. A ; viii, p. 689, Suppl. B.

• Reis Effendi to Sebastiani, Sept. 21, 1807, A f f . Etr. de Turquie, 215.

TILSIT

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AFTERMATH

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Meyendorff. Galib Effendi protested over the delay when, on September 5, he was informed by the Russian envoy, Lascarov, that the Russian forces had commenced a general retreat, but that because of raids of Turkish brigands pillaging the natives in the evacuated territory, it would be suspended.1 The Russian forces eventually quitted the island of Ostrow, but from the middle of September there were no more operations of evacuation. In fact Russian military dominance in Moldavia and Wallachia was in no way lessened. Alexander was hardly back in St. Petersburg from Tilsit before he was talking to the French ambassador about the partition of Turkey. He refused to ratify the armistice of Slobodzie, basing his refusal on the " fact " that the Russian general had no powers to conclude an armistice, that the terms were humiliating and that as soon as the Russians had begun to withdraw the Turks followed on their heels and started plundering and murdering.2 Alexander justified his violation of the Treaty of Tilsit by referring to his conversations with Napoleon there, and declaring that the French Emperor " ma'a souvent dit qu'il ne tenait point à cette evacuation, qu'on la traînerait en longuer pour se dispenser et qu'il n'était pas possible de souffrir plus longtemps les Turcs en Europe, il me laissait même entrevoir le projet de les jeter en Asie. Ce n'est qu'ensuite qu'il est revenu à leur laisser Constantinople, et quelques provinces environantes." * If the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was soon to take place and its heirs to take their respective portions, why should not one of them keep what he had in hand? * Napoleon was prepared. If Alexander was going to play fast 1

Driault, La Politique orientale de Napoléon, 1806-1808, p. 23a. Report of Savary, Sept. 23, 1807, Sbornik, 83, pp. 79, 85. ' Savary to Napoleon, Aug. 6, 1807, ibid., 83, pp. 6-7. ' Savary to Napoleon, Nov. 4, 1807, ibid., 83, pp. 218-222. 2

558

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and loose with agreements in refusing to withdraw his troops from Turkish territory, then he himself would not evacuate Prussian Silesia. 1 The Near Eastern Question was to continue to be a matter of discussion between the two emperors, for one a matter of evasions and vague promises and for the other of petulant complaints and insistent demands. It was in the end to contribute to the dissolution of their alliance. 1

Napoleon to Savary, Oct. 6, 1807, Correspondance

13225.

de Napoléon, xvi,

BIBLIOGRAPHY SOURCES I N

MANUSCRIPT

Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Paris). Turquie, Correspondance Politique, vols. 211-215. Turquie, Supplements (1806-1810), vol. 24; (1803-1807), vol. 31. Turquie, Mémoires et documents (1800-1813), vols. 63, 64. Histoire de la diplomatie française dans le Levant, par Pelissier. Perse, Correspondance Politique, vols. 8, 9. Archives Nationales (Paris). AF. IV. 1686. Perse. Indes 1767-1809; AF. IV. 1687. Pologne. Egypte États Barbaresques (an VIII1813) ; AF. IV. 1688. Porte Ottomane pièces diplomatiques (an VIII - 1808) ; 1714 Provinces Illyrie. Staatsarchiv, K. u. K. österreichisches (Vienna). Türkei, Weisungen und Berichte, 1806-1807. Russland, Weisungen und Berichte, 1806-1807. Foreign Office Records (London). F. O. 7 (Austria), vols. 79-83. F. O. 24 (Egypt), vol. 2. F. O. 42 (Ionian Islands), vol. 9. F. O. 60 (Persia), vol. 1. F. O. 65 (Russia), vols. 64-69. F. O. 78 (Turkey), vols. 45-55Admiralty Records. Ad. I, vols. 412, 413, despatches of Admiral Lord Collingwood for 1806 and 1807. India Office (London). Home Series, Miscellaneous, vols. 728-737. Factory Records, Persia and Persian Gulf, vol. 31. Bengal Secret Letters, vol. 9. Secret Despatches to India, Board's Records, vol. 1. DOCUMENTS I N

PRINT

Archives Vorontsov, 40 vols., 1872-1895. Bailleu, Paul, Preussen und Frankreich von 1785 bis 1807, Diplomatische Correspondensen, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1881-1887. Bertrand, P., Lettres inédites de Talleyrand à Napoléon, 1800-1809, Paris, 1882. Bonaparte, Joseph, Mémoires et correspondance politique et militaire, ed. A. du Casse, 10 vols., Paris, 1853-1854. 559

5öo

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Ward, Sir A. W. and Gooch, A. P., The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 3 vols., London, 1922. Wassiltchikow, A., Les Razoumovski, ed., fr., Alexandre Bruckner, 3 torn (in 6 vols.), Halle, 1893-1894. Wertheimer, Eduard, Geschichte Oesterreichs und Ungarns im ersten Jarhzehnt des 19 Jahrhunderts, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1884. Wilson, Sir Robert T., Private Diary, ed. H. Randolph, 2 vols., London, 1861. Yakschitch, Gregoire, L'Europe et la resurrection de la Serbie, 18041834, Paris, 1907. Zinkeisen, Johann W, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa, 7 vols., Gotha, 1840-1863.

INDEX Acton, Lord, dismissed from Sicilian Court, 392 Adair, Sir Robert, British ambassador to Austria, efforts to bring Austria into coalition, 219, 221, 3i 1, 35S-3S7; urges settlement between Turkey and Russia, 454 Aga Nubi Kahn, Persian envoy to British Government in India, 534-535 Albania, interests of various powers, 1806, 277 et seq. See Ali Pasha of Janina Alexander I, Tsar of Russia. See Russia Ali Pasha of Janina, relations with French, Russian and British in 1806, 277 et seq.; military preparations with French aid in 1807, 467-472; mission to Napoleon, 471; efforts to secure British help after Tilsit, 55on Alopeus, Russian ambassador to Prussia, negotiations for RussoPrussian alliance, 29; ambassador to England, 502 Andreossy, General Antoine F., appointed French ambassador to Austria, 232; anti French sentiment, 232; attempts to provoke anti Russian sentiment, 312-323 Arbuthnot, British ambassador to Turkey, unsuccessful negotiations for renewal of Anglo-Turkish treaty, 46-47, 49. 53-54; urges " naval demonstration" against Turks, 52-54; diplomacy in regard to deposition and restoration of hospodars, Ypsilanti and Morousi, 146-150, 155-168, 23623g, 241-243; efforts after invasion by Russia to avert war, 256 et seq.; uncertainty of position after Turkey's declaration of war on Russia, 365-366; break

with Porte and departure from Constantinople, Jan. 1807, 368; negotiations with Turks, 375, 378-379; accompanies Duckworth's expedition to Constantinople, 381-382, 384-386, 387; memoir on Russo-Persian peace, 531-532 Austria, disavowal of hostile intentions towards Turkey a f t e r Treaty of Pressburg, 1 7 ; attempted mediation for peace between Turkey and Serbians, 22; 33-35; fear of Russia in the Balkans, 32; question of Austrian complicity in Russian seizure of Cattaro, 38n; negotiations with Napoleon for convention giving French right of way to Dalmatia, 39-41; difficulties arising from Russian seizure of Cattaro, 41-43; adoption of policy for mediation of general peace, 42-43; dangers arising from Russian intrigues and civil wars among Balkan peoples, 43-44; negotations concerning Cattaro, 84-86, 220-223; position in spring of 1806 and the Oubril treaty, 216-218; efforts of other powers to secure alliance with Austria after failure of Oubril treaty, 219, 221, 223225, 227-229, 232; apprehension of Russian invasion of Turkey, 226; differences in cabinet, 230231; expedition to take Cattaro, 270, 276-277; Vincent's mission to Napoleon's headquarters, 300301, 315, 420-423; negotiations with Russian mission of Pozzo di Borgo, 313-317. 319; divergence of opinions of Stadion and Archduke Charles, 317-318; Serbians seek help, 319-320;

567

568

INDEX

question of Austrian occupation of Belgrade, 320-323; refusal of British overtures to enter coalition, 355-357; dangers in policy of neutrality, 449*453; Stadion's opposition to rapprochement with Napoleon, 451-452; concern over R u s s o-Serbian understanding, 452, 455-456; offer to powers of Austrian mediation for general peace, 453-454; efforts at better understanding with Turkey, 455; question of acceptance of Convention of Bartenstein, 456-458 Bagdad, relations of Pasha with Persians and British, 528-530 Ball, Sir Alexander, governor of Malta, 50 Barats. See Turkey Bartenstein, Convention of, 447-448 Belgrade, p a s h a l i k of. See Serbians Bellegarde, Marshal, commander of Austrian expedition to Cattaro, 270, 276-277 Bennigsen, General Levin, appointed to command of Russian army in Poland, 213; urges Tsar to come to army headquarters, 441 Bessieres, Julien, French agent to Janina, 278; reports on mission, 72, 285 Bonaparte, Joseph, enters Naples as governor general, 67 Borgo, Pozzo di, Russian diplomat, overtures to Merveldt on partition of Turkey, 202-203, 208; mission to Austria, instructions, 213-214; negotiations at Vienna, 313-317. 319; appointment to peace mission to Turkey, 441444; negotiations with Turks, 547-548 Bosnia, pashalik of, activities of French agent, David, 473-477; attacks on frontiers of Russians, Serbians and Montenegrins, 474476 Brunswick, Duke of, mission to Russia, 27 Budberg, Baron, appointed Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 114. See Russia

Buxhoewden, General, appointed to command of Russian army in Poland, 213 Calincourt, French diplomat, negotiations for Turkish alliance, 432 Callimachi, Prince Charles, appointed hospodar of Wallachia, 145; delay in assuming office, 172, 175-176; deposition, 168 Canning, George, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, 506. See England Cattaro, seizure by Russians, 3637; negotiations at Vienna, 84-86 Charles, Archduke of Austria, Minister of W a r . See Austria Clarke, French envoy in peace negotiations with Oubril and England, 97 et seq. See Napoleon Codrika, official in French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, memoirs on reorganization of European Turkey, 76-77 and n. Collingwood, Admiral, commander of British naval forces in Mediterranean, preparation for French attack on Sicily, 67 Czartoryski, Prince Adam, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, memoirs to T s a r on relations with Turkey and Napoleon, 16; instructions to Italinski, 19-20; memoir on Serbian question, 2122; asks help of Austria for Serbians, 22; instructions to Stroganoff on remaking Turkey, 2425; memoir on relation with Prussia, 26-27; terms for peace with Napoleon and plan for reorganization of European Turkey, 30-31; discussions with M. de Lesseps, French consul, 31; offers of Turkish territory to Austria, 43-44; memoirs on Russian occupation of Cattaro and Corfu, 8182; resignation, 114-115; connections with Polish agitation, 303 David, Pierre, French consul in Bosnia, instructions, 72; arrival at Travnik, 472; anti French sentiment, 472-473; difficulties over passage of French troops from Dalmatia, 473-477

INDEX Davout, Louis Nicolas, French general, 198 Douglas, Marquis, British ambassador to Russia, difficulties in regard to commercial treaty, etc., 439-440; offer of English mediation for peace with Turkey and Persia, 442, 445 Drovetti, French consul at Alexandria, political connections with Mohammed Ali, 332-333; opportunistic policy, 339-340. 342, 344; intrigues against Turkish mission, 341-343. 347; support of Mohammed Ali against British expedition, 394-398, 404-405, 412 Drummond, Sir William, British minister to Sicily, 393 ; urges British expedition to Naples, 521 Duckworth, Rear Admiral, commander of second British squadron to Dardanelles, 361 ; instructions, 375 ; journey of squadron to Tenedos, 375-378; orders General Fox to start expedition to Alexandria, 377-378 ; decides upon expedition to Constantinople, 379-381 ; passage of squadron to Constantinople and negotiations with Turks, 381-382, 384-386; return of squadron to Tenedos, 387; refuses Siniavin's proposal of joint expedition to Constantinople, 389-390; departs for west Mediterranean, 390 Egypt, revolution in Cairo, 327 ; struggle between »Mohammed Ali and Mameluke Beys, French and British connections, see Chap. XIII ; economic condition of country, 330; limitation of Sultan's power, 331-332; failure of Turkish mission to restore order, 349-350; British occupation of Alexandria, 397-398 ; British expeditions to Rosetta, 399-403 ; evacuation of British, 549-550 Emin Vahid Effendi, Turkish envoy to France, negotiations with Napoleon, 430, 433 England, formation of Grenville ministry, 23, 91 ; differences with

569

Russia over Eastern question, 25 ; blockade of Prussian ports, 29; approval of Oubril mission, 91 ; negotiations of Fox with Napoleon, 91, 93-95, 99-101 ; negotiations with Napoleon after Oubril treaty, 106-113, 120-125; reasons for failure, 126-128; squadron under Louis sent to Dardanelles, 239, 241-242; relations with Ali Pasha of Janina, 278-284, 288-289; question of commercial treaty with Russia, 308-309; efforts to bring Austria into coalition, 354-357; formulation of policy and measures for meeting growing difficulties in Near East, 357-364; decree of Jan. 7, 1807, 363; severance of official relations with Turkey, 364-370, 374-375; expedition to Constantinople, 378-387; reasons for failure, 387-388; expedition to Egypt, Chap. X V ; inadequate military support of continental allies by Grenville ministry, 501502; disturbing factors in relations with Russia, 502-505 ; treaty with Prussia, 503-504; f^ll of Grenville ministry, 505-506 ; policy of Canning and his views on Austrian mediation, 506-508; attempt to come to understanding with Russia, 508-509 ; Gower sent to Russia, instructions, 509-511; Canning's policy concerning Convention of Bartenstein, 511-512 and n. ; Pembroke sent to Austria, instructions, 512-513; events in Near East resulting in Paget's peace mission to Turkey, 513516; orders to General Fox, 517518; order to blockade Turkish ports, 518-519; question of continued occupation of Alexandria, 519-520; question of expedition to Naples, 520-521 ; preparations for expeditions to continent, 522; evacuation of Egypt, 523-524; beginnings of British political connections in regions of Red Sea and Persian Gulf, 524-525; Malcolm's mission to Persia, 525 ; Persian relations neglected before 1807, 525-527; opposition to

57°

INDEX

French in Red Sea, 1806, 526528; unfavorable relations with Pasha of Bagdad, 528-530 ; effect of Russian expansion in Middle East on British affairs, 530-532; need for Russo-Persian peace, 532-533; Jones memorandum on Persia, 533 ; instructions to Douglas to mediate RussoPersian peace, 534; report of overtures of Persia to Government in India, 534-535; Jones appointed on mission to Persia, 536; failure of Paget's mission, 548-549; failure of expedition to Egypt, 549-55°; Canning's instructions to Paget after Tilsit, 550 Eylau, battle of, 301-302 Ferdinand I V , King of Sicily, failure to secure British aid against France, 67 Feth Ali, Shah of Persia. See Persia Finkenstein, Count, Prussian ambassador to Austria. See Prussia Foresti, British consul at Corfu, efforts to improve Russian relations with Ali Pasha of Janina, 283-284 ; 547 Fox, Charles James, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs. See England Fox, General, commander of British military forces in Mediterranean, opposes expedition to Egypt, 292293; expedition sent to Egypt, 393 France. See Napoleon Francis I, Emperor of AustriaHungary, sends proposal for general peace to Napoleon, 43 ; gives up title of Holy Roman Emperor, "3 Fraser, General, commander of British expedition to Egypt, 393, 397-413 Frederick William I V , King of Prussia, treaties with Napoleon, 28-29 ; refusal to ratify armistice with Napoleon, 290 ; letter to Napoleon, 429-430; negotiations at Tilsit, 543-544

Galib Effendi, Turkish representative in negotiations for armistice with Russia, 553, 555*556 Gardane, General Claude, appointed French ambrassador to Persia, 435-436; instructions, 437-439 Ghika, John, boyar of Wallachia, mission to Napoleon, 293-294 Ghislieri, General, commander of Austrian forces at Cattaro, 37-38 and n. Gower, Lord Granville Leveson, appointed British ambassador to Russia, 509-511; confers with Tsar and Budberg at Tilsit, 540541 Oudovitch, General, commander of Russian forces in Caucasus. See Russia Guilleminot, French officer, mediator in negotiations of RussoTurkish armistice after Tilsit, 546, 555-557 Hanover, British claims for its independence, 23 Hardenberg, Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs, secret negotiations with Russia, 29; opposition to separate peace with Napoleon, 418-419; efforts to cement coalition, 447-448; proposals at Tilsit, 542-544 Haugwitz, Prussian. Minister of Foreign Affairs, negotiates treaty with Napoleon, 28-29 Hauterive, d', official in French Foreign Office, memoir on Polish question, 190 Holland, Louis Bonaparte becomes king, 92 Hutchinson, British minister to Prussia, reports on plans for general peace, 503; treaty with Prussia, 503 Ibrahim Bey, leader of Mamelukes, 397n., 405 Issaief, General, commander of a Russian army on Danube, 491 Italinski, Russian ambassador to Turkey, 18; instructions on Serbian question, 22; Turkish plans to attack Russia, 52; threatens Russian invasion, 60; efforts

INDEX to remove Soutzo and Callimachi as hospodars, 149, 155-160, 162168; difficulties with P o r t e a f t e r Russian invasion, 255 et seq.; leaves embassy, 264 Italy, consolidation of French domination, 91-92; British evpedition to Calabria, 120 Itchko, Serbian official, peace mission to Turks. See Serbians Janissaries. See T u r k e y Jaubert, Amedee, French agent, mission to Persia, 433-434 Jones, H a r f o r d , agent of British East India Company at Bagdad, difficulties with P a s h a of Bagdad, 528-530; proposals to home government, 530; memorandum on Persia, 5 3 3 ; appointed on mission to Persia, 536 K a r a George, chief leader of revolting Serbians. See Serbians Krousseref Mehemet, pasha of Bosnia, 472. See Bosnia Kriisemarck, M a j o r , mission to Russia, 304 Lamare, French agent in Turkey, efforts to help T u r k s defend Bucharest, 251 La Rochefoucauld, Alexandre, French ambassador to Austria, 40; negotiations on Cattaro, 8485 Lauriston, General Jacques, officer in French army in Dalmatia, command of expedition to take Cattaro, 268; o c c u p a t i o n of Ragusa, 269 Leake, Captain William, British agent, report on affairs in Greece, 279 Ledoulx, French agent in W a l l a chia, 176 Le Roux, secretary to Talleyrand, mission to Constantinople, 48-49, 68-69; helps negotiate Turkish alliance, 432 Lesseps, de, French consul at St. Petersburg, negotiations w i t h Czartoryski, 31 Louis, Rear Admiral, British naval officer commanding squadron at

57* Dardanelles, 239, 241-242; leaves Constantinople, 364 ; command of squadron remaining in east Mediterranean, 390 Louise, Queen of Prussia, participation in negotiations f o r alliance with Russia, 29 Lucchesini, Prussian diplomat, reports on Napoleon's negotiations with England on Hanover, 108; negotiation of armistice with Napoleon, 196-198 Malcolm, Captain John, British officer in India, mission to Persia, 525 Mamelukes, history and leaders, 328n.-329. See Egypt Manesty, agent of British E a s t India Company at Bagdad, 530 Marie-Caroline, Queen of Sicily, failure to secure British aid against French, 67 ; F r e n c h intrigues, 392-393 Marmont, General A u g u s t e F r é d éric, French military commander of Dalmatia, operations against Russians and Montenegrins, 273276; instructed to send military aid to Turks, 297; difficulties with T u r k s over passage of French troops through Bosnia, 473-477 Mengin, agent of Drovetti, 412 Mériage, A d j u t a n t Commandant, French official, mission to Widin, 295, 478-482, 491, 493-494 Merveldt, Count, Austrian ambassador to Russia, r e f u t a t i o n of Austro-French agreement concerning Turkey, 17; reports on Russian s e n t i m e n t against T u r k e y and preparations f o r war, 32-33, 43-44; attempts to divert Russia f r o m Balkans, 201 ; overtures f r o m Russia on partition of Turkey, 202-203, 208; Russian invasion of T u r k e y , 207208 Metternich, Prince, 2i8n. Mevendorff, General, commander of a Russian army occupying Turkey, 244-245 Michelson, General, commander of Russian forces on T u r k i s h f r o n -

572

INDEX

tier, 57-58; seeks aid for Serbians, 59, 64-65, 183; leads Russian army into Turkey, 244 et seq.; negotiations with Serbians, 462465, 495-496 Miloradovitch, General, commander of a Russian army occupying Turkey, 250-251, 491-492 Mirza Riza Khan, Persian ambassador to France, negotiations with Napoleon for alliance, 436437 Missett, Major, British agent in Egypt, favors Mameluke Beys, 333-339. 345-346, 353; attempts mediation, 348; seeks support of Beys for a British expedition, 393-394. 396-398; views on political purpose of expedition, 398399; criticism of Fraser, 409; opposition to negotiations with Mohammed Ali, 410 Mocenigo, Count George, Russian minister to Septinsular Republic, 281 et seq. Mohammed Ali, becomes governor of Egypt, 327; authority limited, 327-328; struggle with Mameluke Beys, 329, 335. 337-338, 335; opposition to Turkish mission of Saleh Pasha, 342-343; negotiations with Saleh Pasha, 347-349; refusal to negotiate with Mohammed Elfi, 348; local situation in winter of 1806-1807, 351-353; seeks agreement with Mameluke Beys to combat British, 395, 403406; negotiations with Fraser, 410 Mohammed Bey Elfi, Mameluke leader, 329; military operations against Mohammed Ali, 331, 335, 337-338, 346, 353; intrigues at Porte, 335-337; death and political significance, 353 Moldavia, rival activities of Russian and French agents, local political sentiment, 69-70, 170177, 249-250; Russian occupation, 246 Molitor, General, French commander in Dalmatia, 37-38, 269, 273 Molla Aga Hasnaclar (Hydris P a s h a ) , successor to Pasvan

Oglou as pasha of Widin, 478482, 491, 493 Montenegro, aid to Russians in capturing Cattaro, 37; Vladika Peter refuses help to Serbians, 178; aids Russians in operations about Ragusa, 268-276 Moore, General Sir John, officer in British army in Sicily, 377 Morier, John P., British consul at Constantinople, political mission to Ali Pasha of Janina, 280-281; mission to Corfu, 283; report on Morea and Albania, 289 Morousi, Prince Alexander, hospodar of Moldavia, combats French influence at Porte, 50-51; deposition from office, 145; restoration, 167; intrigues against Russians, 248-249; second deposition, 263; Ghika's mission, 293-294 Mouhib Effendi, Turkish ambassador extraordinary to France, 73 Mustapha, Pasha of Rustchuk, 246247, 481, 490-491 Naples, kingdom of, occupation by French, 66-67 Napoleon, new treaty with Prussia, 28-29; convention with Austria on right of way to Dalmatia, 39-41; demand for Cattaro from Austria, 4 1 ; aspirations in Sicily, 67-68; barriers to advance in East, 68; friendly inclinations of Turkey, 69; letter to Ali Pasha of Janina, 72-73; instigation of measures hostile to Russia at Porte, 74 and n.; eastern policy, 76-77 and n.; consolidation of power in Italy, Germany and Holland, 91-92; negotiations with England f o r peace, 91, 93-95; negotiations with Oubril, 95-98, 101 ; Oubril treaty, 101-104^ subsequent negotiations with British, 106, 113, 120-125; reasons for failure, 126-128; demand that Austria recognize r e o r g a n i z a tion of Germany, 107-108; attempt to reconcile Prussia to Confederation of the Rhine, 108; Jena, 125-126, 186; peace negotiations with Prussia, 186, 193-197; overtures to Austria, 187, 223-

INDEX 225, 227-229, 232; further efforts to bring war between Turkey and Russia, 187-188, 192-196, 199; Polish nationalist movement, 189, 196 ; memoirs on Polish question, 190-192; demand for armistice with Prussia, 193-198; Berlin decree, 198-199; connections in Albania, 277-279, 283-288 ; uses of Polish situation, 290-292 ; efforts to make Turkey aggresive ally, 292-293, 296-297 ; Ghika's mission, 293-294; appointment of Mériage to Widin, 295 ; letter to Shah of Persia, 295-296; negotiations with Vienna, 299; negotiations with Vincent, 300-301 ; attempt to strengthen position after Eylau, 417-418; mission of Bertrand, 418; refusal of Prussia to proposal for separate peace, 419; attempts at understanding with Austria, 419-423; overture to Sweden for separate peace, 42jn. ; arrival of Turkish and Persian envoys, 425 ; communications with Constantinople, 425428 ; acceptance of Austrian proposal of mediation of peace, 428-429; letter of Frederick William of Prussia, 429-430; negotiations for alliance with Turkey, 431-433; relations with Persia before 1807, 433-4351 appointment of Gardane as ambassador to Persia, instructions, 435-436, 437-439; alliance with Persia, 436-437; assistance given to Ali Pasha of Janina, 468; attempted establishment of base in Red Sea, 526; armistice with Sweden, 537; negotiations at Tilsit on Near East question, 542-547Obrenovich, Milan, Serbian leader, 179 Osman Bey El-Bardissi, Mameluke leader, 329, 345-346, 351352 Osman Bey Hassen, Mameluke leader, 329, 345-346 Oubril, d', Russian official, peace mission to France, instructions, 82-83; negotiations at Paris, 95-

573 101 ; signs treaty, 101-102; treaty rejected by home government, 118-119

Paget, British ambassador to Austria, suspicions of Napoleon's projects against Turkey, 44; peace mission to Turkey, 515516; negotiations with Porte, 548-549 Parant, French consul in Moldavia, 58. 70 Pasvan Oglou, Pasha of Widin, threats against Wallachia, 176; opposition to Russian occupation, 247; death, 478 Paulucci, Russian agent, mission to Dalmatia, Bosnia and Serbia, 497-500 Pellew, Admiral, commander of British naval forces in Indian Ocean, 527 Pembroke, Lord, appointed British ambassador to Austria, 512-513 Persia, letter from Napoleon to Shah Feth Ali, 295-296; relations with Napoleon before 1807, 433-435; alliance with Napoleon, 436-437 ; Malcolm's mission, 525 ; overtures to British government in India, 534*535 Peter I, Vladika (Prince Bishop) of Montenegro. See Montenegro Phanariotes, influence on Porte, 51 Poland, nationalist agitation and efforts to s e c u r e help of Napoleon, 189; activities of proRussian party, 302-303 Pole, special agent of Arbuthnot in negotiations for restoration of hospodars, 164-168 Porte, Sublime Ottoman. See Turkey Pouqueville, François, French agent at Janina, 278 et seq. Pringle, agent of British East India Company at Mocha, 526 Prussia, a l l i a n c e treaty with France, 26; mission of Duke of Brunswick to Russia, 27-28; negotiations for alliance with Russia, 29; treaty with Russia, 117; defeat at Jena, 125-126, 186; negotiations with Napoleon, 193197; efforts of Finkenstein to

574

INDEX

make Austrian alliance, 221 ; mission of Kriisemarck to Russia, 304 ; refusal of Napoleon's overtures for separate peace, 418-419; mission to Russia concerning peace, 440; questions of war and peace at Russo-Prussian headquarters, 446-448; Convention of Bartenstein, 447-448; treaty with England, 503-504; condition of allied army, 538-540 Pultusk, battle of, 290 Ragusa, Republic of, 268-269; French occupation, 269; attacked by Russians and Montenegrins, 269, 270-271 Razumovski, Russian ambassador to Austria, instructions concerning Cattaro, 83-84 ; negotiates evacuation of Cattaro, 84-85 Reinhard, French consul-general in Wallachia and Moldavia, 69 Richelieu, Count, commander of a Russian army occuping Turkey, 244-245 Rodofinikine Constantine, Russian agent in Wallachia and Moldavia, despatches to Constantinople, 156-157 ; efforts to secure Russian aid for Serbians, 183-184; mission to Serbians, 496 Romieu, Adjutant General, mission to Persia, 433-434 Ruffin, French chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, 47 Russia (see also Czartoryski), decisions of State Council after Treaty of Pressburg, 15-17; troop concentration on Dniester, 57-58; relations with Serbians, 63-64, 183-185, 252, 461-462, 495496, 497-500; Napoleon's acceptance of peace proposal, 82 ; peace mission of Oubril to France, instructions, 82-83 ; instructions to Razumovski on Cattaro, 8384 ; attempt at understanding with England over E a s t e r n affairs, 86-91 ; less favorable attitude to peace with Napoleon, 1 1 3 - 1 1 7 ; treaty with Prussia, 1 1 7 ; rejection of Oubril treaty, 118-119; effect of deposition of hospodars of Moldavia and

Wallachia, 200-201 ; efforts of Merveldt and Stuart to divert Russia from hostile action against Turkey, 301-202, 207-210; decision to occupy Turkish territory, 203-204; circular note to powers, 205-206; instructions to Italinski, 210-211; preparations for war with Napoleon, 212-213; mission of P. Tolstoi to Prussia, 213 ; mission of P. di Borgo to Austria, 213-214; occupation of Turkish provinces, 244-251 ; relations with Ali Pasha of Janina, 278 et seq.; Polish question, 302304; mission from Prussia, 304; instructions to Gudovitch on peace with Persians, 306 ; demand for British diversion on continent and cooperation in Mediterranean, 307-308; difficulties over commercial treaty with England, 308309; negotiations of P. di Borgo at Vienna, 313-317, 319; Prussian peace mission, 440-441 ; peace mission of P. di Borgo to Turkey, 441-444, 547-548; offer of British mediation with Turkey and Persia, 442, 445 ; British expedition to Egypt, 446; questions of war and peace at RussoPrussian. headquarters, 446-448; Convention of Bartenstein, 447448 ; Budberg's plans for military operations in Balkans, 459-460; Russian agents in Dalmatia, 476; mission of Paulucci to Dalmatia, Bosnia and Serbia, 497-500 ; Russian army in Poland, 538540; conference of Tsar with Gower at Tilsit, 540-541 ; negotiations on Near East Question at Tilsit, 542-546; negotiations at Slobod^ie, 555-556; evacuation of troops from Wallachia and Moldavia suspended, 556-557 ; refusal of Tsar to ratify armistice with Turkey, 557 ; urges partition of Turkey, 559-560 Saleh Pasha, Turkish admiral, mission to Egypt, 337. 340-349 Sébastiani, General Horace, French ambassador at Constantinople, 72; instructions, 75-76; at Buch-

INDEX arest and Rustchuk, 140-142; arrival at Constantinople, 143; political use of issue of barats, 144-145; efforts f o r French alliance, 150-151, 153-154, 161-162, 239-241; urges declaration of war on Russia, 257 ci seq.; unpreparedness of Turks, 265-266; aid to T u r k s , 371-372; urges resistance to British expedition, 383-384; opposition to project of help f r o m French army, 482; relations with Porte a f t e r Tilsit, 551-552, 554 Selim III, Sultan of Turkey, 17891807, army reforms and opposition of janissaries, I34-I35i 137140; overtures to France, 150; letter to Napoleon, 160-161, 235236; letter to George I I I of England, 237; suggestion of alliance to Napoleon, 240; protest to George I I I about Russian invasion, 255; further correspondence with Napoleon, 266; opposition of janissaries, 4182-488; abdication from throne, 489 Septinsular R e p u b l i c (Ionian Islands), join Russia against Turkey, 469, 471; pro-French sentiment, 470-471 Serbians (in T u r k e y ) , seek help from Russia, 20-21 and n., 59, 63, 65; seek help from Austria, 3435, 319-320; repel Turkish attack, 59; military and diplomatic operations, 177-184; peace mission of Itchko to Constantinople, 179182; aid from Russia, 252; capture of Belgrade, 253-254; ratification of treaty with Turkey, 254; failure of treaty, 461-462; development of alliance with Russia, 462-465, 495-496, 498499, 500; attacks on frontiers of Bosnia, 474-476; o p e r a t i o n s against Pasha of Widin, 480 Seton. Captain David, agent of British East India Company at Muscat, 528 Shahine Bey Elfi, Mameluke leader, 397n., 405 Shahine Bey Mourad (Shahine Bey l'Bardissi), Mameluke leader, 351

575

Sicily, unfavorable relations of court with local British officials, 392-393 ; failure of expedition to Naples, 521 Siniavin, Admiral, commander of Russian naval forces in Mediterranean and Adriatic, capture of Cattaro and islands in Adriatic, 37-39; operations about Ragusa, 268-276; proposals for joint British-Russian expedition to Constantinople, 389-390; occupation of Tenedos and Salonica, 391 Soutzo, Prince Alexander, appointed hospodar of Moldavia, 145 ; delay in assuming office, 172, 175-176; deposition, 168; intrigues with French agents, 481-482, 491 Stadion, Count Philip, Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs. See Austria. Stewart, General, commander of second British expedition to Rosetta, 402-403 Stroganoff, Count Pavel, Russian diplomat, mission to England, instructions concerning Turkey, 2425 ; participation in peace negotiations, 99 Stuart, British ambassador to Russia, efforts to improve Russian relations with Turkey and Austria, 202, 208-210, 305-306; combats separate peace between France and Russia, 107, 304-305 ; memoir on Russian expansion in Middle East and need f o r RussoPersian peace, 530-531 St. Luce, French consul in Wallachia, 71 Sturmer, Austrian ambassador to Turkey, 152-153, 383-384 Summers. Francis, British consul at Bucharest, 58-59, 176 Talleyrand-P e r i g o r d, Charles Maurice, French Minister of Foreign Affairs. 298. See France Tatistcheff, Russian minister to Sicilian court, 521-522 Terzenik Oglou, Pasha of Rustchuk, 139-140 Timoni, Austrian consul at Ragusa, 270-271

576

INDEX

Tolstoi, Count Peter, Russian diplomat, political mission to Prussia, 213 Turkey, orders for military preparations in Danube provinces, 18-19; refusal of Austrian offer to mediate with Serbians, 45; efforts of French agents to remove fears occasioned by Treaty of Pressburg, 48; Reis Effendi on possible removal of hospodars, Morousi and Ypsilanti, 52; refusal to renew treaty with England, 54; refusal to permit passage of Russian ships through Dardanelles, 55; barats, 56-57, 132; Serbian question, 60-63, 106, 178, 180, 181-182; French occupation of Ragusa, 133; troubles of Selim with janissaries, 134135. 137-140; Wahabis, 135; pro French intrigues, 137; question of recognition of French regime at Naples, 143-144; deposition of Ypsilanti and Morousi as hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, 145-146; consequent negotiations with British and Russians, 151, 155-160; change of ministry, 154-155; hospodars restored to office, 168-169; events leading to declaration of war on Russia, 255 et seq.; second deposition of Ypsilanti and Morousi, 263; anti-British sentiment at Porte, 265; negotiations with Mohammed Elfi of Egypt, 335337; mission of Saleh Pasha to F.gypt, 340-349. 35o; Arbuthnot leaves Constantinople, 368-370; preparatians for war with Russia, 371: measures against British trade, 372-373; anti-French intrigue at Porte, 373; negotiations with Abuthnot after his departure, 378-379; failure to conclude convention with Serbians, 461-462; acceptance of Napoleon's offer of armed assistance, 465-

467; opposition to project of help from French army, 482; agitation of janissaries against Sultan and French. 482-488; revolution at Constantinople, 488-489; operations of Turkish armies along Danube, 489-494; failure to break Russian blockade of Dardanelles, 494-495; overtures of Russian peace mission, 547-548; British peace mission of Paget, 548-549; reactions at Porte to negotiations at Tilsit, 552-555; negotiations at Slobodzie for armistice with Russia, 555-556 Ugritic, Lieutenant (Novokritenni Bey), Russian army on Dniester, mission to Serbian headquarters, 64-65, 177-178 Vaudoncourt, Colonel Guillaume de, 468 Vincent, Baron, Austrian ambassador to France, 40; mission to Napoleon, 300-301, 315, 420-423 Wallachia, rival activities of French and Russian agents, 6971; local political cross currents, 170-177; Russian occupation, 248 Wauchope, General, commander of first British expedition to Rosetta, 400-401 Yarmouth, Lord, British envoy in peace negotiations with France, 94 et seq. See England. Ypsilanti, Prince Constantine, hospodar of Wallachia, combats French influence at Porte, 50; deposition, 145; restoration to office, 167; efforts to secure Russian aid for Serbians, 106, 183; connections with Michelson, 249; second deposition, 263 Zastrow, Prussian envoy in negotiations with Napoleon, 196-198