The European Pentarchy and the Congress of Verona, 1822 [1971 ed.] 902471110X, 9789024711109

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THE EUROPEAN PENTARCHY AND THE CONGRESS OF VERONA, 1822

THE EUROPEANPENTARCHY AND THE CONGRESS OF VERONA, 1822 by

IRBY C. NICHOLS, JR. North Texas State University

MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE I 1971

@ 1971 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form

ISBN-13: 978-90-247-1110-9 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2725-0 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-2725-0

TO MY MOTHER

PAULINE WRIGHT NICHOLS AND THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER

IRBY COGHILL NICHOLS WHO INSPIRED ME TO BECOME A DISCIPLE OF CLIO

CONTENTS

PREFACE

XI

PART I GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS: FEBRUARY 1821-0CTOBER 1822

1

PROLOGUE THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF 1. 2. 3. 4.

THE

CoNGRESS

The Congress is called The Eastern Question The Hanoverian Rendezvous The Shift from Castlereagh to Canning

3 3 5 8 13

CHAPTER I

THE ROAD TO VIENNA 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

19

The Castlereagh Instructions The Wellington Mission The Ascendancy of Villele Franco-Spanish Relations, 1820-1822 The Villele-Wellington Interview

19 23 25

27 34

CHAPTER II

THE VIENNA STALEMATE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The Conference Convenes The Spanish Question The Eastern Question Italian Questions A Retrospect

40 40

42 48 54 59

CONTENTS

VIII

PARTn

THE CONGRESS AT WORK: OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1822

63

CHAPTER ill

FROM VmNNA TO VERONA:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

PRELlMINARmS TO THE CoNGRESS

Exodus The Canning Instructions The Villcle Instructions Reunion in Verona: The Congress at Play Agenda and Procedure

65 65

68 72

75 81

CHAPTER IV

THE SPANISH QUESTION

84

The Montmorency Mbnoire The British Remonstrance and Allied Reaction Dichotomy of the French Delegation Triumph of the Franco-Russian Entente International Finance and Intervention: The Brothers Rothschild and Ouvrard 6. A Retrospect

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

84

88 107 112

127 133

CHAPTER V

THE SPANISH CoLONIAL QUESTION 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Genesis Wellington's Dissent The Villcle-Montmorency Vendetta Revisited The British Brief The AngIo-Continental Impasse The Gameiro Affair The British Reservation A Retrospect

137 137

144 145 147 148

151 154 159

CHAPTER VI

THE SLAVB TRADE QUESTION 1. 2. 3. 4.

Genesis The Impossible Quest The Black Tide The Six Points

161 161 165

171 176

CONTENTS

IX

5. The Implacable French and Diffident Allies 6. A Retrospect 7. Epilogue

180 186 189

CHAPTER VII

191

THE ITALIAN CONGRESS

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

The Charles Albert Affair The Evacuation of Piedmont The Evacuation of Naples Metternich's Italian League (Lega Ita/ica) The Sardinian Waldenses The Swiss Confederation and Piedmontese Refugees The Knights of Malta The Aldobrandini Appeal A Retrospect

191 195 200 205 211

212 215 215 216

CHAPTER VIII GREAT BRITAIN AND THE GOLDEN MAXIM

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

218 218 229 244 258 262

The Austrian War Debt The Russian Ukase The Eastern Question The Navigation of the Rhine A Retrospect

CHAPTER IX

264

THE CURTAIN FALLS

1. 2. 3. 4.

The Verona Circular (December 14, 1822) Exodus The Second ViIlele-Wellington Interview A Retrospect

264 266 267 272

PART III

PROBLEMS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY AND INTERPRETATION

275

CHAPTER X WELLINGTON AND THE CoNGRESS

1. The Alleged Crime 2. The Prosecution

277

277 277

x

CONTENTS

3. The Defense 4. The Verdict

280 284

CHAPTER XI CHATEAUBRIAND AND THE CONGRESS

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

286 286 288 292 295 299

The Debate Ambition and Intrigue The Mission Reception at Verona A Retrospect

CHAPTER XU CHATEAUBRIAND'S

1. 2. 3. 4.

WAR

302

The French Ministerial Crisis (December 1822) France Goes It Alone Britain Adopts Neutrality A Retrospect

302 307 312 315

EPILOGUE FROM CoNGRESS SYSTEM TO CONCERT OF EUROPE

1. 2. 3. 4.

The Secret Treaty of Verona The Congress and the Alliance Fall of the Alliance The Legacy

317 317 320 321 324

BmuOGRAPHY

327

INDEX

349

PREFACE

For one reason or another. modem historians have neglected the Congress of Verona. some because they thought the field already had been thoroughly plowed. while others doubted that enough material could be found for more than an article or two on the subject. Indeed. not a single book-length monograph of this international assembly has ever been published in any language. This study. therefore. attempts to fill the gap by (1) explaining the genesis of the Congress. (2) furnishing a comprehensive account of its work. (3) revising some of the interpretations of Sir Charles K. Webster. Harold W. V. Tempedey. and others. and (4) analyzing the significance of the Congress. with emphasis on its contribution to the fall of the Quintuple Alliance. a consequence aided by the dissimilar and often contradictory interests of the allies themselves. This book is essentially a diplomatic history. but diplomats. of course. do not live in a vacuum. Numerous political. social. commercial. financial. and sometimes even religious factors. impinge upon their consciousness. It soon became apparent. therefore. that the scope of this work would be enormous and that its span would stretch from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. if the alpha and omega of every issue discussed at Verona were recounted. Yet anything less than a catholic approach would reduce the claim of comprehensive coverage to an empty pretense. Included within the purview of the study. perforce. are questions which range from Black Sea commerce to the Atlantic slave trade. from the Greek insurrection to Latin American independence. from the navigation of the Rhine to the interdiction of foreign trade with Russian America. and from intervention in the Iberian Peninsula to the persecution of Piedmontese Vaudois. The present volume is an outgrowth of researches which began twentythree years ago in Professor James Logan Godfrey's seminar at the University of North Carolina. By 1949 the paper had grown into a master's thesis which six years later at the University of Michigan envolved into a doctoral dissertation: "Great Britain and the Congress of Verona." But hardly more than the foundation for this work had been laid. for the greater

XII

PREFACE

task of giving equal and adequate treatment to the diplomacy of the four great continental powers remained. There were. moreover. other important questions which required investigation: what impact. if any. did the negotiations at Verona have upon the balance of power in Europe. the foreign policy of the United States. or on Habsburg hegemony in Italy? Nonetheless. the obvious need for a central theme in the midst of involved negotiations on multitudinous issues led me to retain the focus on British diplomacy. Of all the great powers. only Britain. by virtue of her empire. commerce. and ambivalent position in Europe (at once insular and continental). had interests which were truly global. Further research. writing. revision. and the occasional pUblication of findings have occupied my attention for the last decade and a half. For the sake of clarity. I have modernized the spelling and punctuation of most quotations - retaining some archaic forms for their dramatic effect and have translated foreign titles of nobility and office into English. Also to avoid confusion. all Old Style dates have been converted to New Style. During the nineteenth century. the Russian. Old Style calendar was twelve days in arrears of the Gregorian. New Style calendar. Both the organization of this book and my own historiographical creed hang on five basic assumptions. First. the author should take the reader into his confidence at frequent intervals. not just in the Preface and the concluding chapter. Secondly. the essence of history is problems. not chronicles. though no theory of historical interpretation or system of social dialectics in definitive. because such factors as human courage. faith. and ambition are indefinable and unpredictable. Thirdly. notwithstanding the influence of complex material forces. accidents and men's free choice also have produced dynamic results throughout the continuum of history. Does not aio often seem capricious? Fourthly. symbols. such as the martyred Joan of Arc or the modem propaganda image. are sometimes greater than the reality. Fifthly. the interpretation of events is the proper function of the historian and is as important as their narration. Since analyses are subjective and cannot be guaranteed. however. each reader must judge for himself whether a particular conclusion is astute or naive. proven or unwarrented. germane or irrelevant. In conformity with these suppositions. at least one section of each chapter analyzes problems of causation. relationships. and significance. while all of Part III (three chapters and the Epilogue). focuses on questions of historiography and interpretation. Most of the published materials for this study and all of the manuscript collections (except the Adams Papers). are deposited in London. at the British Museum and the Public Record Office. and in Paris. at the Biblio-

PREFACE

XIII

theque Nationale and the Quai d'Orsay. While I have not consulted the governmental archives of Vienna, Berlin, and Leningrad (St. Petersburg), this omission, in my opinion, does not present any serious difficulty in understanding the policies of those cabinets. The British and French archives, especially the embassy files, contain rich deposits of documents pertaining to the diplomacy of the three eastern courts, and these holdings are supplemented by many published collections of Austrian, Prussian, and Russian diplomatic dispatches, memoirs, and diaries. Almost all of the Austrian papers found in the Vienna Staatsarchiv, Kongressakten, Verona, Fascs. 43, 45, and 50, moreover, have been printed in Wellington's new Despatches. Vol. I. I have, of course, made use of the secondary accounts of historians who have labored in foreign archives: Bertier de Sauvigny, Cresson, Schroeder, Sweet, Temperley, and Webster, among others. Finally, I wish to acknowledge with gratitude all who have assisted me in the preparation of this manuscript: the North Texas State University Faculty Research Committee, which materially facilitated my work with eight grants-in-aid, spanning the period 1956-1968; Professors Robert B. Holtman of Louisiana State University and R. John Rath of Rice University, who read and criticized sections of this book in their original (article) form; Emeritus Professor Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky of the University of Michigan, who gave me several insights into Russian policy during the reign of Alexander I; Robert Lee Ellis, James Willard Hurst, and Richard Allen Ward, three former graduate students who undertook theses on problems tangent to this study; Mrs. Vinita B. Davis and Miss Ruth Gray of the North Texas State University Library staff, who helped me locate and obtain needed materials; Miss Patricia Fleischer, Miss Karen Temple, and Miss Linda Cox, student assistants who deciphered my cryptography and typed the first draft of the manuscript; and Mrs. Shirley W. Taylor, who typed the final revision in its entirety. Chapter V and sections of Chapters II, IV, VIII and XII have been rewritten from articles of mine which appeared in The Historian. Journal of Central European Affairs. Pacific Historical Review, and the Southwestern Social Science Quarterly. I am grateful to the editors of these periodicals for permission to use these articles in revised form. A special commendation is reserved for Margaret. my research assistant, literary critic, egeria, and wife, who has contributed more to this book than she knows and I can acknowledge. Irby C. Nichols, Jr. Denton, Texas November, 1970

PART I

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS: FEBRUARY 1821-0CTOBER 1822

PROLOGUE

THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE CONGRESS Himself his moldering monument survives, And sees his labors perish while he lives; His fame is more contracted than his span, And the frail author dies before the man. How would he wish the labor to forbear And follow other arts with more successful care?

Vida. 1

1. The Congress Is Called The origins of the Congress of Verona are as important as they are obscure, stretching back, as they do, to the Laibach conference of 1821. There, on February 25, while the Austrian expedition was marching through the Papal States, the three eastern powers resolved to reunite at Florence in September of the following year to discuss Italian affairs. In April, after the revolts in Naples and Piedmont had been suppressed, the allies reaffirmed this decision and announced that the Florentine congress specifically would determine whether Austrian forces in these kingdoms should be continued, diminished, or withdrawn. For more than a year, the great powers assumed that this would be an Italian conference, since Austria had successfully opposed placing the Spanish revolution on its agenda, and Russian objections had effectively proscribed collective consideration of the Turko-Greek conflict. 2 Nonetheless, the statement is made repeatedly that the Congress of Verona was summoned originally to debate the Spanish and Greek revolutions. To make this assertion is simply to retroject later developments. 3 1 Marco Girolamo Vida, De Arte Poetica, Bk. iii, 11. 252-256, trans. Christopher Pitt, in Albert S. Cook (ed.), The Art of Poetry: The Poetical Treatises of Horace, Vida, and Boileau (Boston, 1892), p. 134. 2 Baron Charles Edmond de Boislecomte, "Resume historique des congres de: Troppau, Laybach, et Verone," France, Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris (hereafter cited as Boislecomte, A.A.E.), 720, 185 (Boislecomte [1796-1863] was a secretary of the French delegation at these conferences.); William Hill, British minister to Sardinia, to Castlereagh, No.1, Turin, Apr. 29, 1821, Great Britain, Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office (hereafter cited as F.O.), Sardinia, 67/63; "Journal des conferences," Feb. 26, 1821, Austria, Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Kongressakten, Laibach, fasc. 40, cited by Paul W. Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy at Its Zenith, 1820-1823 (Austin, 1962), p. 110; Louis de Viel-Castel, Histoire de la Restauration (Paris, 1860-1878), IX, 533; Adrien Maggiolo, Corse, France, et Russie: Pozzo di Bargo, 1762-1842 (Paris, 1890), pp. 262-265. 3 Some recent works and monographs in which this misinformation appears are

4

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

Florence remained the site of the forthcoming congress until June 1822, when Mettemich moved its location to Verona. The motive behind this shift was that a city within Habsburg dominions would ensure greater Austrian control of the congress. Count Karl Robert Nesselrode, Russian foreign minister, opposed the change of sites, protesting that "Austria was determined to exercise a monopoly on the Congresses," but Tsar Alexander was won over by Metternich's arguments that the Venetian police were superior to the Tuscan and that it was necessary to exclude "all strangers, curiosity-seekers, and foreign agents from the scene of the Congress." 4 In any case, geography favored Verona. Situated at the southern end of the Brenner Pass astride the great Lombard highway running from Venice to Milan and thence, by various passes, to France, its location facilitated communications between the Congress and the capitals of the Pentarchy. The road to Verona was a tortuous one for Britain, and, therefore, requires clarification. Because the island kingdom had pursued a "hands off" policy toward Italy since the Neapolitan revolution, had sternly protested against the principle of armed intervention in the internal affairs of independent states, and had sent only an observer to the Troppau-Laibach conference, her withdrawal from the Congress System appeared imminent in the summer of 1821. This estrangement alarmed the Austrian chancellor, because he needed British assistance in restraining the tsar in the west no less than in the east. Having arranged a rendezvous with Castlereagh in Hanover in October 1821, Metternich had persuaded the foreign secretary that a conference on Russo-Turkish affairs should be held in Vienna on the eve of the Italian congress scheduled for the next year. Castlereagh, however, did not commit himself to attend because of recent Parliamentary opposition to conserting with continental despots.5 In a further effort to obtain British Frederick B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1832 (New York, 1934), p. 165; Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822 (Boston, 1957), pp. 309-310; George M. Trevelyan, British History in the Nineteenth Century and After, 1782-1919 (London, 1947), p. 208; Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (new ed.; Boston, 1955), p. 34; Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna (New York, 1958), p. 28; Panfilo Gentile, "Chateaubriand politico," Studi polWei, IV (1956), 19; Andre Nicolle, "Ouvrard and the French Expedition in Spain in 1823," Journal of Modern History (hereafter cited as JMH), XVII (Sept. 1945), 193. 4 Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 206; cf. Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 423; Sir Adolphus W. Ward, Aix-La-Chapelle to Verona, Vol. III of Period of the Congresses (London, 1919), p. 62. 5 Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, Oct. 29, 1821, Memoires, documents, et ecrits divers laisses par Ie prince de Metternich, ed. Richard de Metternich (Paris, 18801884), III, 559; Harold W. V. Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827 (London, 1925), p. 7.

PROLOGUE

5

participation, the chancellor on June 6, 1822, suggested that only issues of interest to Britain be placed on the agenda for the Vienna conference and that Italian questions be reserved for the later congress at Verona, which Britain need not attend. Actually Metternich now did not want to raise the Eastern Question at all, but he had to mention it to give the foreign secretary a pretext to come. Castereagh endorsed this plan on June 22 but confessed to Metternich that he did not know if the cabinet would permit him to attend. "Everything would depend on how matters stood when Parliament rose." The gambit, however, might yet succeed, if he received "a pressing invitation ... with a programme designed to show the usefulness of his attendance and excluding inconvenient items." 6 The chancellor obliged on July 8, but he couched the agenda in extremely vague terms to avoid committing himself on the Eastern and Spanish questions. All that stood in the way of British participation at the Vienna conference was the consent of the cabinet which, still reluctant to send a plenipotentiary to any European congress, delayed approval of the mission until July 25. Announcement then was made to the London diplomatic corps that Lord Castlereagh, his wife, and Richard, Earl of Clanwilliam, Parliamentary undersecretary for foreign affairs, would leave for the continent on August 15. 7

2. The Eastern Question Metternich's anxiety to have British assistance at the Vienna conference is explained by the importance which the Eastern Question assumed during the summer of 1821. The news of Alexander Ypsilanti's invasion of Moldavia on March 6, 1821, reached the tsar at Laibach on the 19th. Although condemning the Moldavian insurrection as a revolutionary movement and disavowing its leader, he opposed collective action. A month later Demetrios Ypsilanti, Alexander's younger brother, hurled the fire brand of revolution into the Morea and several of the South Aegean islands, where the minority Turkish population was slaughtered. The tsar learned of the 6 Metternich to Castlereagh, private letter, Vienna, June 6, 1822, cited by Sir Charles K. Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822: Britain and the European Alliance (London, 1925), p. 480: Castlereagh to Metternich, Foreign Office, June 22, 1822, ibid., pp. 480-481; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 205n. 7 Metternich to Castlereagh, Vienna, July 8, 1822, cited by Webster, Castlereagh, p. 481; Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, London, Aug. 6, 1822, Souvenirs et correspondance tires des papiers de madame Recamier, ed. Amelie Lenormant (Paris, 1859), I, 428. The cabinet intended to keep Castlereagh's mission secret, but Lord Francis Conyngham, second son of the royal mistress, informed "all the ladies at the Opera-house." Richard Plantagenet Temple Grenville, Second Duke of Buckingham, Memoirs of the Court of George IV (London, 1859), 1,355.

6

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

Greek revolt on May 13, just before he left Laibach. Both the anti-Ottoman policy inherited from Catherine the Great and personal sympathy for his Greek co-religionists made the emperor reluctant to accept Metternich's suggestion that he condemn the Greek cause as inspired by J acobinism. On the eve of his departure, Lord Charles Stewart, the British ambassador at Vienna and an observer at Laibach, and Prince Metternich attempted to discuss the Greek insurrection with Alexander, but the tsar refused to comment on his intentions regarding the Balkans, since he considered the TurkoGreek conflict as an issue to be decided solely between Russia and the Porte and desired, moveover, to keep Austria out of the Balkans. s By September 1821, the Eastern crisis had so deteriorated that the cabinets of London and Vienna feared a Russo- Turkish war was imminent. When the Morea rose in rebellion, Sultan Mabmud II immediately responded by closing the straits to Greek ships, which carried Russian wheat from Odessa, and in retaliation for Greek atrocities, J anizaries on April 22, murdered Gregory, the eighty-four-year-old Patriarch, as he celebrated the Easter midnight Eucharist. With him perished two archbishops, ten members of the Holy Synod, eight priests, and almost the entire congregation. During May fanatical Turkish mobs massacred thousands of Greeks in Constantinople, pillaged their churches, and decapitated bishops and priests. Russian sailors, too, were murdered, their ships insulted, and Danesi, the banker of the tsar's embassy was arrested. Since these acts of violence constituted flagrant violations of the treaties of Kuchuk Kainarji (July 21, 1774) and Bucharest (May 28, 1812), the Eastern Question now became a RussoOttoman dispute. Baron Gregory Alexandrovitch Stroganov, the Russian 8 The traditional date for the beginning of the Morean uprising is April 6; however, fighting did not actually commence until April 9. Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 165n, 168; Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 17891825 (Durham, N.C., 1947), pp. 388, 409; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, ed. A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch (New York, 1922-1923), II (1815-1866), 41; Maggiolo, Pozzo di Borgo, pp. 265-266. Before leaving Laibach, Alexander instructed Pozzo, the Russian ambassador at Paris, to work toward an alliance with France in the event he declared war on Turkey. Again, in July 1821, he proposed a RussoFrench alliance to Count de La Ferronays, the French ambassador to Russia, but Pasquier, the French foreign minister, quickly rejected these overtures. Ibid., p. 266; La Ferronays to Pasquier, lettre particuliere, St. Petersburg, July 19, 1821, A.A.E., Russie: Correspondance, Vol. 161; La Restauration, 1820-1824, Vol. V of Histoire de mon temps, memoires du chancelier Pasquier, ed. Ie duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier (Paris, 1894), pp. 342-344; Maurice Bourquin, Histoire de la Sainte Alliance (Geneva, 1954), pp. 303-306. For a scholarly account of the Russian attempts to secure a French alliance during the summer of 1821, see Albert Sorel, "L'Alliance russe et la Restauration," Essais d'historie et de critique (2nd ed.; Paris, 1883), pp. 99-112. Pozzo di Borgo exerted great influence on the tsar and was one of the chief Russian policymakers at Troppau, Laibach and Verona.

PROLOGUE

7

ambassador to the Porte, vigorously protested against these horrors and provocations, and on June 5, after Mohammed Sadik, the Reis-Effendi (Turkish foreign minister), had ignored his remonstrations, he suspended diplomatic relations. His dispatches, describing the bloody May days in Constantinople and Ottoman obstinacy, upon their arrival in st. Petersburg. caused great resentment against the Turks. 9 On July 18. Stroganov transmitted to the Porte a four-point ultimatum which must be met. if Turkey were to co-exist with the other states of Europe: (1) The destroyed or pillaged Christian churches in Greece must be restored. (2) The Christian religion must be protected in accordance with treaty provisions. (3) A distinction must be made between innocent and guilty Greeks in the suppression of the insurrection. (4) Turkish troops must be evacuated from the Danubian Principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia), and the hospodars (princes) re-established. The note also declared that, unless the Porte made satisfactory reply in a week (huit jours), the tsar's ambassador would be withdrawn. Failing to receive an answer on the 26th, Stroganov requested his passports and boarded a Russian frigate in the harbor. Although the Turkish reply was presented a day later, the ambassador refused to accept it. After waiting two weeks for his passports, he sailed for Odessa on August 10 without them. That he was allowed to go unmolested was due largely to the efforts of Percy Smythe, Viscount Strangford, the British ambassador. and Count Rudolph Liitzow, the Austrian internuncio.1o Britain and Austria wished to prevent the dissolution of the Turkish empire at the hands of Russia, and this common interest demanded that they work together to preserve peace. Their efforts infused new blood into 9 Count Joannes Capo d'Istria, "Apen;:u de rna carriere publique, depuis 1798 jusqu'a 1822," Sbornik Russkoe Istoricheskoe Obschestvo [Collection of the Russian Historical Society] (hereafter cited as Sbornik), III (1868), 266-268 (This memoire was addressed to Nicholas I and signed in Geneva, Dec. 24, 1826.); Count Anton von Prokesch·Osten, Geschichte des Abtalls der Griechen vom Turkischen Reiche im Jahre 1821 und der Grundung des Hellenischen Konigsreiches aus Diplomatischem Standpuncte (Vienna, 1867), III, 84-86, 110-111, 113·114, 116; Nesselrode to Stroganov, St. Petersburg, June 28,1821, ibid .• p. 91; ~douard Driault et Michel Lheritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grece de 1821 a nos jours (Paris, 1923-1925) I, 146·147; M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question (London, 1966), p. 60. The last dispatches of Stroganov from Constantinople are dated June 9, 182l. 10 For the French text of this document, see Prokesch-Osten, Abtall der Griechen. III, 95-10l. This note, dated June 28, does not bear the name of its author, but according to C. W. Crawley, Foreign Minister Capo d'Istria wrote it; see Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 18211833 (Cambridge, England, 1930), p. 17; Capo d'lstria, "Ma carriere publique," Sbornik, III, 267. Driault and Lheritier, Hist. de la Grece, I, 150; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 418; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 356·357.

8

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

the Quintuple Alliance, or the "European Pentarchy," to use Metternich's phrase, because both powers recognized that it offered the best means of thwarting isolated action by Russia. When Alexander returned to St. Petersburg from Laibach in the middle of June 1821, he assured Sir Charles Bagot, the British ambassador, of his loyalty to the Alliance and his resolve not to support the Greek insurgents, whom he suspected of being the tools of the Paris liberals. Though encouraged by this assurance and also by the knowledge that the tsar was weary of military campaigns and did not want war, Castlereagh and Metternich yet were disturbed by his vacillating character. His loyalties were divided between Europe and Russia. To continue to ignore the Greek cause or to denounce it as tainted with Jacobinism would be to disregard traditional Russian interests and religious sentiment and to offend national honor. The opinion of his court was almost unanimous that Russia should put an end to the Ottoman Empire. His soldiers, moreover, were growing impatient of inaction, and their morale was being "undermined by revolutionary intrigue." The pro-Greek memoire of Johann Ancillon, Director of the Political Division of the Prussian Foreign Ministry, also inspired in the tsar bellicose ideas. Despite his aversion to war, the enigmatic emperor seemed to be yielding to the demands of the St. Petersburg "war party," led by that patriotic Greek, Count Joannes Capo d'Istria. The moment appeared propitious, for Europe was unwilling to contest Russia's military preponderance in the Near East. The question of the tsar's policy in the Greco-Turkish affair, therefore, continued to cause Austria and Britain grave concern. l1

3. The Hanoverian Rendezvous As Alexander contemplated the possibility of war with Turkey, time became an important factor. Realizing the necessity for speeding up the normal 11 Robert Gordon, secretary of the Vienna embassy, to Castlereagh, Laibach, May 13, 1821, Correspondence, Despatches, and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, ed. Charles W. Vane (3rd ser.; London, 1848-1853), IV, 396; Bagot to Castlereagh, St. Petersburg, June 20, 1821, quoted in Webster, Castlereagh, p. 358-359; Baron Ludwig von Lebzeltern, Austrian ambassador to Russia, to Metternich, St. Petersburg, July 3, 1821, Un collaborateur de Metternich: memoires et papiers de Lebzeltern, ed. Emmanuel de Levis-Mirepoix (Paris, 1949), p. 412; Lebzeltern to Metternich, St. Petersburg, July 15, 1821, Les rapports diplomatiques de Lebzeltern, ed. Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch (St. Petersburg, 1913), p. 76; Edouard Driault, La question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'{j la paix de Sevres (8th ed.; Paris, 1921), p. 106; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1825-1878 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1954), p. 14; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 177-178; Camb. Hist. of Brit. For. Pol., II, 41; Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 58-59. The Ancillon memoire had been published by Count Bernstorff at the urging of Count David d'Alopeus, the Russian ambassador at Berlin.

PROLOGUE

9

processes of diplomatic intercourse, which could be done only by a personal exchange of views, Castlereagh and Metternich agreed to rendezvous in Hanover during October 1821, when George IV visited his one continental possession. 12 On October 8, the chancellor confided to Baron Ludwig von Lebzeltern, the Austrian ambassador to Russia: I am entirely of the conviction that by my interview with Lord Castlereagh ... I shall achieve more in a few days to settle the general question, to strengthen the present and to save the future, than in six months of writing. It is also necessary that I know a little about the English; their role is extremely influential in the European-Russo-Turko-Greek affair. Only this conviction could induce me to travel 500 leagues in the space of four weeks at the most. 13

Though invited, Count Christian Gunther von Bernstorff, the Prussian foreign minister, either could not or would not come. His refusal probably was due to bitterness against Austrian interference in Prussian affairs and to a desire to follow an independent policy in the Eastern Question. He did, however, send Baron von BUlow to Hanover as his personal representative, but in the eight days of the conference, he took no part in the CastlereaghMetternich conversations. a The tsar, too, was invited, but affairs of state required his constant attention in St. Petersburg. To represent him, he directed to Hanover Count Christophe de Lieven, his ambassador at London, with a personal message for George IV.!5 If further inducement were needed to ensure Mettemich's presence at Hanover, it was supplied by Castlereagh when he invited Countess Dorothea Lieven. Castlereagh knew the secret of her heart and thought she would put the chancellor in a more congenial mood. Both the countess and the prince arrived in Hanover on October 20. Thus the stage was set for the Hanoverian conference in October 1821, a reunion which had about it a congress-like atmosphere of festivity, congeniality, and good company, and an air of optimism that peace could be preserved. 16 Private 12 Entry for Wed., Oct. 3, 1821, Aus dem Nachlass Varnhagen's von Ense: Tagebucher von Friedrich von Gentz, ed. Ludmilla Assing (Leipzig, 1873-1874), II, 464; Gordon to Castlereagh, Vienna, Oct. 3, 1821, Castlereagh, Corresp., IV, 439-440; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 364-365. 13 Metternich to Lebzeltern, Vienna, Oct. 8, 1821, Lebzeltern, Rapports, p. 236. Baron von Lebzeltem was created count in 1823. 14 Pasquier, Memoires, V, 350; Prokesch-Osten, Abtall der Griechen, III, 336-346, 351-355; Driault and Lh6ritier, Hist. de la Grece, I, 163-165; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 363-364. 15 Pasquier, Memoires, V, 349-350. Count Lieven was then in Russia on leave of absence. The title of Prince was not conferred upon him unti11826. 16 Unpublished Diary and Political Sketches of Princess Lieven, together with Some of Her Letters, ed. Harold Temperley (London, 1925), pp. 54-55. For an ac-

10

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

conversations between Castlereagh and Metternich got underway on Saturday, October 20, and their tenor set the mood of cordiality which prevailed at subsequent conferences. At the first official interview, Monday, October 22, the chancellor outlined Austrian policy in the Eastern crisis in a memorandum endorsing "the maintenance of peace on the basis of existing treaties." Russia must recognize, he asserted, that she is explicitly committed to the Alliance, and that Austria will continue to give her "moral" support only so long as Russia does not separate herself from the Alliance. Austria cannot consider armed intervention, but she will exert her influence in Constantinople to obtain the acceptance of the tsar's demands. Finally, any project for a rapprochement with the Porte should come from Russia herself rather than from Russia's alliesP Castlereagh unconditionally approved these tenets of Austrian policy, for he already had expressed similar views in dispatches to Bagot and in a private letter to the tsar on July] 6, 1821. The two ministers agreed, however, that a joint declaration would be unwise since such a demarche could persuade the tsar that a conspiracy or combination against Russia had been formed at Hanover. Nor must the Russian court think Britain and Austria needed a conference to agree on fundamental aims. Castlereagh and Metternich, therefore, sent separate dispatches to St. Petersburg and Constantinople. Castlereagh transmitted the necessary instructions to Bagot and Strangford on Sunday, October 28, and Metternich followed suit on the 31st. While identical in purpose, these notes differed in emphasis, as required by the special interests of each nation. Both governments were motivated by a common fear that Russian intervention in behalf of the Greeks would lead to the overthrow of Turkey and, thereby, to Russian hegemony in the Balkans and the Near East. This ascendancy would upset the balance of power in Europe, a contingency that must be avoided.1 8 count of Madame Lieven's first meeting with Metternich and their love affair, see ibid., pp. 48-55, and H. Montgomery Hyde, Princess Lieven (Boston, 1938), pp. 101108. 17 Castlereagh to Bagot, No. 13, Hanover, Oct. 28, 1821, F. 0., Continent: Hanover, 92/47 (This dispatch is 139 pages in length; copies marked "Circular" also were sent to Berlin, Paris, and Vienna.); Hyde, Princess Lieven, p. 129; Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, Oct. 24 and 29, 1821, Metternich, Memoires, III, 553, 555, and 558; private letter, Hanover, Oct. 25, 1821, ibid., p. 509; Camb. Hist. Brit. For. Pol., II, 43. Metternich's note was based on his last dispatches to Constantinople and St. Petersburg, copies of which had just been brought to Hanover by a special courier. 18 Castlereagh to the Emperor Alexander I, London, July 16, 1821, Castlereagh, Corresp., IV, 404-408; Mettemich to Francis I, Hanover, Oct. 24 and 29, 1821, Metternich, Memoires, III, 555, 557-558; Castlereagh to Bagot, No. 13, Hanover, Oct. 28, 1821, F. 0., Continent: Hanover, 92/47; Sir Archibald Alison, Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart (Edinburgh, 1861), III, 163; Webster, Castlereagh, pp.

PROLOGUE

11

The arrival of Count Lieven in Hanover on October 28 was a matter of great import to Castlereagh and Metternich, for he brought from St. Petersburg the assurance that Alexander was not planning a declaration of war on Turkey. These glad tidings prompted Metternich to boast: "Everything that I have heard from Count Lieven shows me that the ... Tsar still remains in the same mind as he was at Laibach." 19 The chancellor was convinced that Alexander desired peace but did not know how to reconcile its preservation with what he regarded as his honor.26 Anglo-Austrian efforts to preserve the status quo in the Near East did not end with sending instructions to St. Petersburg and Constantinople. Austria and Britain also pressed Berlin and Paris to fall into line behind them, and in this, their diplomacy was successful. To find a solution to the Russo-Turkish impasse, Castlereagh and Metternich also agreed at Hanover to hold a conference at Vienna in September 1822, just before the Congress of Florence (the original site of the meeting later shifted to Verona). The presence of the tsar was urged, but it was not at all certain he would attend. Britain and Austria, nonetheless, regarded a reunion of the powers as imperative, not only to refuse intervention in the name of the Alliance, but also to deny Russia the right of separate interference: the attention of Russia must be turned from the Southeast. Consequently, the two statesmen decided "to humour him by appealing to his idealism and reminding him of his solemn engagements to Europe." 21 Confronted with the "alternative of offending the sentiment of his people or bringing down in ruin the whole edifice of his international ideal," the tsar chose the former. He deferred to his allies and agreed in June 1822 to attend the Vienna conference. Thus the danger of separate intervention by Russia was postponed.22 375-379. Capo d'Istria was perfectly aware of the real motives behind the AngloAustrian mediation. Capo d'Istria, "Ma carriere publique," Sbornik, III, 275-277. 19 Quoted in Hyde, Princess Lieven, p. 131. 20 Metternich to Liitzow, Vienna, Oct. 5, 1821, Prokesch-Osten, Abfall der Griechen, III, 207; Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, Oct. 29, 1821, Metternich, Memoires, III, 558-559; Metternich to Lebzeltern, Hanover, Oct. 31, 1821, Lebzeltern, Rapports, p. 238; Leon de Crousaz - Cretet, Le duc de Richelieu en Russie et en France, 1766-1822 (Paris, 1897), p. 475. 21 Metternich to Count Stephan Zichy, Austrian ambassador to Prussia, Vienna, Mar. 25, 1822, Prokesch-Osten, Abfall der Griechen, III, 355; Metternich to Strangford, Vienna, July 31, 1822, Metternich, Memoires, III, 600; Maggiolo, Pozzo di Borgo, pp. 265-266; Myrna Boyce, Diplomatic Relations of England with the Quadruple Alliance, 1815-1830, University of Iowa Studies in the Social Sciences, VII, 52; Webster, Castlereagh, p. 380. 22 W. A. Phillips, Confederation of Europe (London, 1920), p. 226; LobanovRostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 421. Metternich received word from

12

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

Castlereagh, however, did not commit himself at Hanover to attend either the Vienna conference or the Florentine congress because Parliament of late had displayed an increasing animosity to the "entangling Alliance" with autocratic continental sovereigns. Despite the fact that he had no assurance of Britain's presence either at Vienna or Florence, Metternich boasted to his master: "1 have the conviction that next year we shall have Lord Londonderry at the congress which will meet in Italy." But the London cabinet, it will be recalled, waited nine months before agreeing to send a plenipotentiary only to Vienna. 28 The Hanover conference ended on the optimistic note which Lieven had sounded on October 28. Assured by the Russian diplomat that the tsar had no plans for a Turkish war in the spring, George N and Castlereagh departed for England the next day, and Metternich left for Vienna on the 31st. The king and his minister returned to London on November 8, and the chancellor reentered the Austrian capital on the 15th, having spent four day with the Lievens at Frankfurt.24 In retrospect, Anglo-Austrian diplomacy during September and October 1821 indicated that both Castlereagh and Metternich wanted an international conference on the Eastern Question, but, as a result of the Prussian and Russian refusal to send plenipotentiaries to Hanover, they had to settle for a bi-Iateral rendezvous. But this conference, though reduced to an interview, had several significant results. It paved the way to Verona for both Russia and Britain, and its decisions on the Eastern Question reversed the Troppau Protocol (November 19, 1820), which sanctioned intervention in the internal affairs of independent states. Far from being a universal reactionary, or even a European statesman (as Heinrich von Srbik, Hans Rieben, and others have contended), Metternich appears in the role of a Lebzeltern on June 14, 1822, that Alexander would come to the Vienna conference early in September. On August 1, he learned that the tsar expected to arrive in Vienna on September 7. Private letters, Metternich, Memoires, III, 580,597. 23 Temperley, Canning, p. 7; Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, Oct. 29, 1821, Metternich Memoires, III, 559. See Castlereagh's letters to Stewart on Feb. 24 and Oct. 15, 1820; Jan. 5 and Mar. 13, 1821, published for the first time in Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 215n-217n, 223n. These dispatches, taken from the Londonderry MSS. still in the possession of the family, all emphasize Castlereagh's conviction that England could not act in concert with her allies for six months "unless the mind of the nation was in the cause." "If they suppose we can," he confided to his half-brother, "they deceive themselves." Castlereagh to Stewart, London, Feb. 24, 1820, in ibid., p. 215n. 24 Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle, XCI (Nov. 1821), 460-461; Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, Oct. 29, 1821, Metternich, Memoires, III, 553; Lieven, Diary, p. 55; entry for Fri., Nov. 16, 1821, Gentz, Tagebiicher, II, 477.

PROLOGUE

13

good Austrian, motivated by concern for purely Habsburg interests. 25 His diplomacy in the Russo-Turkish-Greek affair clearly reveals how Austria, no less than Britain, pursued national interests at Constantinople. Even as they tried to hide the collective character of the Alliance from the sultan, they reminded the tsar of his solemn obligations to it. And their influence in Berlin and Paris soon persuaded these courts to support Anglo-Austrian policy. Finally, the Hanoverian rendezvous resulted in a renewal of the cordial relations between Castlereagh and Metternich which had been strained since the apparent break: with the Alliance at Troppau. The foreign secretary, indeed, confided to Countess Lieven that he was anxious to attend the Vienna conference, prologue to the Congress of Verona, in order to see the chancellor. But to the average Englishman, perhaps its most important achievement was the grouping of Britain once more with the autocratic eastern powers. 26 4. The Shift from Castlereagh to Canning

During the summer of 1822, Castlereagh began failing in mind and body, despite his appearance. Hard work, the long and hectic Parliamentary session, the harassment of foreign affairs, constant quarreling with his wife about her hostile attitude toward Elizabeth Denison, Marchioness Conyngham, the new royal mistress, and blackmail, all took their tragic toll: shortly after 7:30 A.M. on Monday, August 12, Castlereagh committed suicide by severing one of his carotid arteries with a small penknife.27 25 Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, Metternich: Der Staatsmann und der Mensch (Munich, 1925), I, 350-420, '456-463; II, 559-566; Srbik, "Der Ideengehalt des Metternichschen Systems," Historische Zeitschrift, CXXXI (1925), 240-262; Arnold O. Meyer, "Der Streit urn Metternich," ibid., CLVII (1938), 75-84; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 240-241; Schroeder, "Metternich Studies since 1925," JMH, XXXIII, No.3 (Sept. 1%1),237-239. The "others" include Algenon Cecil, Constatin de Grunwald, Hugo Hantsch, Arthur Herman, Henry A. Kissinger, and Werner NiH. 26 Sir John A. R. Marriott, Castlereagh: The Political Life of Robert, Second Marquess of Londonderry (London, 1936), pp. 311-312; Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 145-146; Bourquin, Sainte Alliance, p. 309; Mme Lieven to Metternich, London, Nov. 30, 1821, Private Letters of Princess Lieven to Prince Metternich, 1820-1826, ed. and trans. Peter Quennell (London, 1937), p. 142. 27 Wellington to Dr. Charles Bankhead, London, Aug. 9, 1822 in "Obituary: Marquis of Londonderry," Gentleman's Magazine, XCII (Sept. 1822), 179; "The British Chronicle," Edinburgh Magazine and Literary Miscellany: A New Series of the Scots Magazine, XI (Sept. 1822), 390; Hyde, Princess Lieven, pp. 136, 139-140; Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 178; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 482-483. Hyde concludes that there was, indeed, a conspiracy, as Castlereagh had claimed, that he was being blackmailed by "some villains" who threatened to denounce him as a homosexual, but that the charge was absolutely false. The secretary, who occasionally indulged

14

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

For three weeks following his death, the cabinet was deadlocked on the issue of a successor. Thanks largely to the initiative of Wellington, it was agreed finally that an offer to George Canning was necessary. Neither the king nor the ministers liked Canning, distrusting both his motives and his policies, but they loved power more than they disliked him. The government needed his services and the support of his friends. 28 Wellington succeeded in mollifying George IV, and on September 9, Prime Minister Robert Banks Jenkinson, second Earl of Liverpool, proffered the post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But Canning refused this proposal with the comment that he would have "the whole heritage" of Castlereagh or nothing at all; i.e., he wanted also the leadership of the House. On the 11 th, he was offered "the whole heritage"; the 15th he accepted it, and on the 16th, he received from the king the portfolio of the Foreign Office. After entering the royal service, Canning quipped that he felt as though he had been given a ticket for Almack's, and then had found written on the back: "Admit the rogue." 29 Although Castlereagh was dead, the reasons which required his presence in Vienna remained. With regret, he had witnessed the Alliance move away from England. At Troppau and Laibach the Quasi.Quintuple Alliance had himself in brothels, "had been deliberately entrapped" by a youth disguised as a woman. As the boy undressed, his confederates rushed into the room and accused Castlereagh "of being about to commit" a homosexual offense. The victim thus was impaled on the horns of a cruel dilemna: on the one hand, he feared condemnation for a crime he did not commit, and on the other, he dreaded going to the authorities lest his real sin of adultery be disclosed to his wife. To the distraught Castlereagh, suicide appeared the only recourse. Both Wellington and Clanwilliam knew the true circumstances of the case. Hyde, Strange Death of Lord Castlereagh (London, 1959), pp. 15, 182-190. For a recent criticism of Hyde's blackmail theory, see Christopher John Bartlett, Castlereagh (New York, 1966), p. 263. 28 Temperley, "Canning, Wellington, and George IV," English Historical Review (hereafter cited as EHR), XXXVIII (1923), 210; Wellington to Lady Emily Londonderry, London, Sept. 7, 1822, Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K.G., ed. his son Arthur Richard Wellesley (London, 1867-1880) (hereafter cited as Well. Desp.), 1,277-278. 29 Wellington to George IV, London, Sept. 7, 1822, ibid., p. 274; Marcellus, first secretary of the French embassy in London, to Chateaubriand, London, Sept. 15 and 24, 1822, Count Andre Charles Demartin du Tyrac de Marcellus, Politique de la Restauration en 1822 et 1823 (Paris, 1853), pp. 91-92; A. Aspinall, "The Canningite Party," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th ser. (hereafter cited as TRHS), XVII (1933-1934), 205; Temperley, Canning, p. 30; Hyde, Princess Lieven, pp. 143-144. Philip Guedalla, Wellington (New York, 1931), p. 333; Richard Aldington, The Duke: Being an Account of the Life and Achievements of Arthur Wellesley, First Duke of Wellington (New York, 1943), p. 288. On September 16, Lord Henry Bathurst, acting foreign secretary, sent a circular to the British diplomatic corps throughout the world, announcing Canning's ascendancy. Bathurst circular, Foreign Office, Sept. 16, 1822, F. 0., Austria, 120/54. This dispatch reached Lord Charles Stewart in Vienna on September 25.

PROLOGUE

15

been formed. a rump alliance of the three eastern powers, based on principles of despotism and intervention which conflicted with those of Parliamentary government and non-intervention held by Britain. 3o As early as April 1820. Metternich had admitted this shift in the political equilibrium of Europe. confiding to Baron Karl von Vincent. the Austrian ambassador at the Tuileries: It is no longer in the form of the Quadruple Alliance that we can seek ...

remedies .... We must remake it today and the elements are no longer the same. . . . It is impossible to count on the assent of England. Of all faults in politics, those which bear the bitterest fruits are changes of system. 31

Castlereagh was the chief architect of the Alliance. and from its use he had obtained advantages for England. Consequently he had been reluctant to break entirely with the Confederation of Europe and had determined to have one more try at bringing it back to its original purpose. This attempt was scheduled for Vienna in September 1822. Britain's special interests in the Near East demanded. moreover, that she cooperate with Austria in mediating the Russo-Turkish dispute. So far as this issue was concerned, the Vienna conference appeared to Canning, as it had to CastIereagh, a sequel to that at Hanover. 32 The two statesmen, nonetheless, were poles apart in their attitude toward the Alliance. Castlereagh had hoped to reform it, Canning to destroy it and to reassert the diplomacy of isolation as Pitt had practiced it before the Napoleonic wars to preserve the European balance of power. The government. Canning argued. would only provoke further criticism from the public if it attended another conference with foreign autocrats. Canning. in short. differed from CastIereagh on several fundamentals of policy. Even after Troppau and Laibach, CastIereagh had continued to urge close cooperation 30 Augustus Granville Stapleton. Political Life of the Right Honourable George Canning (2nd ed.; London. 1831). II. 36 (Stapleton was Canning's private secretary.); Harriet Martineau. A History of the Thirty Year's Peace: 1816-1846 (London, 1877). I (1816-1824), 397; Temperley, Canning, pp. 47-48; Hyde, Princess Lieven, p. 143; William W. Kaufmann, British Policy and the 1ndependence of Latin America, 18041828 (New Haven, Conn., 1951), pp. 133, 142; Marriott, Castlereagh, p. 342; Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902) or Documents, Old and New, ed. H. W. V. Temperley and L. M. Penson (Cambridge, England. 1938), p. 54. 31 Metternich to Vincent, Vienna, April 7, 1820, quoted in Temperley, Canning, p. 21. The italics are those of Metternich. 32 1bid., pp. 8-9; Webster. Castlereagh, pp. 480-481, 499-501; cf. Spencer Walpole, History of England from the Conclusion of the Great War in 1815 (London, 1890), II, 127.

16

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

with Europe, while Canning favored a policy of isolation. Castlereagh had advocated neutrality and mediation in the Eastern Question, but Canning, by March 1823, had established the novel policy of restraining Russia through joining her as a co-champion of Greek independence. The tenets of Canning's political philosophy were also less aristocratic, more liberal, than those of Castlereagh. Canning's use of the press and public opinion revealed another difference of principle, and at times he needed public support against the king and his opponents in the cabinet. lI3 After 1816 most of Castlereagh's countrymen either opposed or ignored his program for maintaining European peace. Beset by numerous domestic economic and political troubles, they favored a policy of isolation from European problems and dangers. Englishmen manifested, moreover, a universal contempt for foreigners, whether allied or enemy. An all embracing arrogance permeated and characterized "British popular foreign policy." All classes treated Russians, Spaniards, and Austrians as contemptuously as they did the French. Castlereagh knew, of course, that most of his countrymen did not support his policy of cooperation with the allies and despaired of making it intelligible to them. Despite his prominent position in the cabinet and the Commons, Castlereagh, throughout his career, "was impatient of Parliamentary criticism and that of public opinion generally." 34 William W. Kaufmann sums up the dilemma thus: The reconciliation of such a general purpose as peace with the insistent and often contrary demands of domestic politics is a task from which most statesmen shrink, and few emerge with credit or dignity.35 33 Temperley, Canning, p. 48; Webster and Temperley, "British Policy in the Publication of Diplomatic Documents under Castlereagh and Canning," Cambridge Historical Journal (hereafter cited as CHI), I (1923-1925), No.2 (1924), 165-168; Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, XII (1822),651; Parliamentary Debates, new ser., ed. T. C. Hansard (hereafter cited as ParI. Debates), IV (1821), 722-773, 1368, 1370; V (1821), 516; Temperley, Canning, pp. 32-34,48; Trevelyan, British History, pp. 207, 213; "Appendix: Selections from the Writings of Canning," Select Speeches of the Right Honourable George Canning, ed. Robert Walsh (Philadelphia, 1835), pp. 541-542. Canning possessed a brilliant wit which enabled him to gain and keep public support throughout his lifetime. Indeed, one of his political opponents, Sir James Mackintosh, complained that he "had the orator's craving for popular applause." Quoted in Col. E. M. Lloyd, "Canning and Spanish America," TRHS, new seT., XVIII (1903-1904), 80. M Webster and Temperley, "British Publication Policy," CHJ, I, 159; cf. Raymond Postgate and Aylmer Vallance, England Goes to Press: The English People's Opinion on Foreign Affairs as Reflected in Their Newspapers since Waterloo, 1815-1937 (Indianapolis, Ind., 1937), p. 14; Memoirs of George IV, ed. Robert Huish (London, 1830), II, 344, 357, 358. 35 Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 103.

PROLOGUE

17

The foreign secretary's eagerness to establish cordial relations with the continental powers, especially Austria, led him occasionally to sanction acts which he could not defend in the House. On such occasions he withheld information, fearing that the ensuing debates would injure diplomatic relations. To reveal too much of the policy of the allied courts could widen the breach between them and Britain. By preference, he protested privately in his dispatches to Britain's representatives on the continent. He did appeal to public opinion, however, when the three eastern powers "deliberately challenged his conception of the Alliance and threatened to wreck all his schemes by ... using it ... as a wholly unnecessary instrument to put down revolution in Naples." 36 In the case of the Circular of January 19, 1821, protesting the Troppau Protocol, Castlereagh tried to carry Parliament with him, but after issuing it, he did not exploit the situation. Again he resumed his normal relations with the other great powers and thereby "his ceaseless and secret efforts to use the Alliance to prevent Russia from invading Turkey." 37 He rarely tried to convince Parliament with evidence or to appeal to public opinion. Canning, who was quite sensitive to public opinion, differed from Castlereagh and Wellington in believing it absolutely necessary for foreign policy to be both "intelligible and popular." He published state papers freely, though he sometimes edited dispatches which he laid before the Commons. He had a concept of the public and Parliament for which his predecessor had no sympathy and little understanding. Even Sir Archibald Alison, despite his high Toryism and partiality, admits that Castlereagh did not correctly judge the trend of his times. He was a Parliamentary rather than a popular statesman; Canning was both. Castlereagh's system of government was becoming distasteful to the nation, and he probably would have fallen from power had he lived even two years longer. 38 The keynote of Canning's policy was that "the public and private aspects of diplomacy must be the same." He did not think Britain should attend congresses at all and published a series of dispatches on the Congress of Verona to discredit the Congress System, an action which prompted Wellington to complain to Liverpool that Canning's publicity program made it impossible for the cabinet to reach independent decisions as it should. From across the channel, Metternich protested to the "Iron Duke" that the new foreign secretary was a revolutionary who would sacrifice legitimate institutions to a "search after vain popularity." To such remonstrances, Canning 36 37

38

Webster and Temperley, "British Publication Policy," CHI, 1,159-160. Ibid., p. 160. Temperley, Canning, p. 48; Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 187-188.

18

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

might have answered that the principle of ministerial responsibility did not permit the cabinet to be independent of Parliament, nor commercial interests, nor the nation. 39 Now rehabilitated, Castlereagh the Statesman, like Marco Vida's poet, has survived "his moldering monument," the Alliance, and has emerged with credit from the obloquy which stigmatized him while he was yet alive. But as George M. Trevelyan has observed: "The extreme eulogists of Castlereagh, who would have it that he initiated all that was good in Canning's policy, are doing a great injustice to Canning, who also has his rights." 40

39 Webster and Temperley, "British Publication Policy," CHJ, I, 166-168; Wellington to Liverpool, London, Mar. 5,1824, Well. Desp., II, 229. 40 Trevelyan, British History, p. 208n.

CHAPTER I

THE ROAD TO VIENNA Let our object be our country, our whole country, and nothing but our country. - Daniel Webster.1

1. The Castlereagh Instructions

The keynote of the memorandum which Castlereagh had drafted for his own guidance at Vienna was non-intervention. This tenet had been the basis of British policy since November 1818, when Castlereagh had declared at Aix-Ia-Chapelle that the Alliance had no right to intervene in the internal affairs of an independent state. In this case he was referring to the question of Spain and her rebellious colonies, in which England was vitally interested. In February 1820, he reaffirmed that the allies "must not. . . press us to place ourselves on any ground John Bull will not maintain." Throughout 1820 and 1821, he intoned this same theme: No nation has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another; the Alliance was not established for that purpose. 2 Castlereagh's instructions for the Vienna conference. therefore. were but another application of a long established principle of British foreign policy. Castlereagh. indeed. stated that "with respect to

1 Daniel Webster, "Address on Laying the Cornerstone of the Bunker Hill Monument, 1825," Familiar Quotations, ed. John. Bartlett, p. 530. 2 The exception is the Neapolitan revolution of July 1820; in this case, Castlereagh secretly sanctioned Austrian intervention in the hope that he could dissuade Metternich from making an appeal to the Alliance for support. Castlereagh to Stewart, Foreign Office, July 29, 1820, F.O., Austria, 7/148. Castlereagh to Stewart, private, London, July 30, 1820, F.O., Howard de Walden Papers, 360/2; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 261-262; Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 119; Castlereagh to Stewart, London, Feb. 24, 1820, Londonderry MSS, published in Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 215n; Lord Castlereagh's Confidential State Paper of May 5th, 1820, Temperley and Penson, Found. of Brit. Pol., pp. 51-63; cf. Marriott, Castlereagh, pp. 311-312. This paper is published also in Camb. Hist. Brit. For. Pol., II, Appendix A, 622-633, which encloses in brackets the parts omitted by Canning in his abridgment of this note for Parliament. "Additional Papers Relative to Spain," ParI. Debates, new ser., VIII (1823), 1136-1139. The original document is in F.O., Austria, 7/148.

20

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

Spain, there seems nothing to add to, or vary, in the course of policy hitherto pursued." 3 The major issues which Castlereagh expected would be discussed at Vienna were: the Turkish Question, internal and external; the Spanish Question, European and American; and the affairs of Italy. British policy toward Turkey was a continuation of the course followed in conjunction with Austria since April 1821. The tenets of this policy were respect for treaty obligations, the prevention of war between Russia and the Porte, amelioration of the hardships and horrors of the Greco-Turkish war, and observance of strict neutrality. An attempt should be made to reconcile differences arising from Russian protection of Orthodox Christians in Turkey and over navigation of the Straits. If this effort succeeded in preventing a Russo-Turkish war, the problem of Greece might be discussed but with great caution. Castlereagh warned that Greece had gained so much in the last year that it would be difficult to avoid dealing with the provisional government; Britain, however, should refrain either from recognizing Greece or forcing Greek submission to the Porte, and not commit herself beyond the limits of good offices. 4 Regarding Spain, Castlereagh observed that "solicitude for the safety of the royal family, observance of ... engagements with Portugal, and a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country" must form the basis of British policy. Spain should be permitted to settle her own problems, free from foreign interference. Especially must this view be urged on France. On his way to Vienna, the British representative should reach an entente with the French government on the Spanish Question. 5 The brevity of Castlereagh's reference to Spain should not be interpreted as an indication that he misjudged the importance of the Spanish Question. During June and July 1822, conversations with Count Lieven and Viscount Fran~ois Rene de Chateau briand, the French ambassador at London, and dispatches from Metternich, all had made it obvious to Castlereagh that the Spanish situation would be the great issue at Vienna. No amplification of his instructions regarding Spain was necessary, because the position of both the Austrian and French cabinets was uncertain, and because Castlereagh planned to attend the Vienna conference. He wished to reserve judgment on this critical question until he had all the facts, and then, of course, he meant to make the decision himself. Before the congresses of Vienna and Aix-Ia-Chapelle, CastIereagh had followed the same practice in drafting 3

4 Ii

Castlereagh's Instructions, Well. Desp., I, 286. Ibid., p. 285-286. Ibid., p.286.

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instructions for his own use. Had those written at the end of July 1822 been for anyone else, they certainly would have been more detailed and differently worded. 6 On the subject of Spanish America, Castlereagh distinguished between three classes of colonies: those struggling for their independence, those negotiating with the mother country for recognition, and those which already had won their fight for freedom. Since Spain had lost control of the greater part of her South American colonies, he believed that their recognition as independent states was only a question of time. Already the navigation laws had been modified to admit their merchant ships to British ports. The British representative should propose that every province which has actually established its independence should be recognized; that with provinces in which the war still went on, no relations should be established; and that where negotiations are in progress between a revolted colony and the mother country, relations with the colony should be suspended till the results of such negotiations are known. 7 There is no mistaking the commercial motivation behind British interest in Latin America. If the occasion arose, the British plenipotentiary should state that commercial intercourse had existed between Great Britain and the Spanish American empire for a number of years. This trade could not be obstructed or checked without arousing discontent in British manu~ facturing and commercial circles; in its last session, Parliament had deferred to these vested interests by relaxing the provision of the Navigation Act which excluded all South American produce, except in British ships. Britain's duty toward the Spanish colonies was to bring the allied cabinets to the adoption of a common policy, while leaving to the London cabinet complete freedom of action. 8 6 Chateaubriand to Montmorency, London, July 16, 1822, Count Adhemar d'Antioche, Chateau briand, ambassadeur a Londres (1822), d'apres ses depeches inedites (Paris, 1912), p. 315; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 476-478; Bourquin, Sainte Alliance, p.324. 7 Castlereagh's Instructions, Well. Desp., J, 286-287. 8 Ibid., p. 287. In 1815 the United States Congress gave the President power to sign reciprocity treaties with those foreign governments which abolished discriminatory regulations and duties on American vessels. On May 3, 1815, the Liverpool Ship Owners Association, quoting the provisions of the American Act, petitioned the Board of Trade to introduce a similar bill in Parliament; but for six years no action was taken. The United States, meanwhile, promoted British commercial reform by negotiating reciprocal trade agreements with Britain's competitors on the continent of Europe and by actively pursuing other tactics which reduced English trade and carriage. By progressively increasing tariffs in 1816, 1818, 1819, and 1824, passing retaliatory navigation laws in 1817, 1818, and 1820, competing successfully in the East Indies,

22

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

In July 1822, Castlereagh, while preparing his instructions, had informed Wellington of his Latin American policy, emphasizing that it was exclusively Anglo-Spanish, independent of the approval or disapproval of other nations. Spain should be fully informed before any of her colonies were recognized, but there should be no concert with France, Russia, or any other foreign power.9 By contrast, Castlereagh considered the affairs of Italy of secondary importance. He did not think the kings of Sardinia and Naples were ready to dispense with Austrian forces, and Italian politics did not interest him. Consequently, he dismissed Italy with the brief comment that, since Britain had not been a party to the decisions reached at Troppau and Laibach (which led to Austrian intervention in Naples and Piedmont), the British plenipotentiary should merely observe, taking care that nothing was done "inconsistent with the general system of Europe and the observance of treaties." 1(1 In addition to these major problems, Castlereagh laid stress on the slave trade, the Austrian debt, and the Russian Ukase of September 16 (N.S.), 1821, which interdicted foreign vessels from the waters bordering Russian territory in the North Pacific. l l and by smuggling into the West Indies, the United States assailed Britain's preeminent commercial position. The American depression of 1818-1819 and the consequent reduction of imports from England accounted for more than half of the British export loss during those years. Britain herself, by attempting to saturate Europe with manufactured goods and by maintaining, and even increasing in postwar years, her own commercial restrictions, helped to create this situation. At last in 1821, Thomas Wallace, Vice-President of the Board of Trade, took the first step toward initiating a new free trade policy by introducing in the Commons five reforms of the mercantilist navigation statutes. A year later (June 24, 1822), all of his proposals became law. Thus United States policy was instrumental in causing Britain to adopt reciprocity, but it was not the sole factor. Other fundamental causes were: (1) the international depression and the pursuant British petitions for reform, (2) the competition and retaliation of European powers which resorted to methods used successfully by the United States, (3) the plight of the British West Indies which looked to America as a source of needed agricultural products and as a major market, (4) the ambition of British manufacturers to expand trade with Latin America, (5) the tradition of Pitt apparent in the policies of liberal Toryism, (6) the philosophical influence of the Enlightenment, and (7) the composition of Parliament which favored business interests. Vigneron Christophe, "The Reciprocity System," For. Qu. Rev., IX (May 1832), 267-268; Walpole, History of England, II, 154-155; Robert Lee Ellis, "The United States and the British Reciprocity System, 1815-1825" (Unpublished Master's thesis, North Texas State University, 1964), pp. 130-131,151. 9 Castlereagh to Wellington, London, July 6, 1822, quoted in Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 171; Castlereagh'sInstructions, Well. Desp., I, 287. 10 Ibid., p. 285. 11 Ibid., p. 286.

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The pacific character of Castlereagh's instructions - which stands in contrast to the conspiracies and insurrections that convulsed Europe and the New World in 1822 - indicates that he did not try to promote "universal national independence," as Alison has contended. On the contrary, he advocated non-intervention toward Latin America, Italy, and Greece. He indeed favored the recognition of new states in South America, but only when their governments were tully established. and he was no friend of Greek independence. 12 British policy was motivated by national and commercial interests, not by a crusading zeal for self-detennination. Both Castlereagh and Canning by their pragmatic diplomacy incurred the enmity and distrust of the continental powers. a factor which contributed to the develpoment of British "splendid isolation" in the nineteenth century. 2. The Wellington Mission

After Castlereagh's death, Count Lieven called on Prime Minister Liverpool to inquire who would be sent to the continent in his place: "The man is dead, but the reasons which necessitated his presence at ... Vienna are still there. Will someone be sent, and who?" 13 The Duke of Wellington seemed the logical choice: he had been on familiar tenns with the allied sovereigns and ministers since the congresses of Vienna and Aix-Ia-Chapelle and had enonnous prestige throughout Europe. The duke was still in England, due to an attack of influenza which had prevented his departure for the Netherlands (August 9) on his annual inspection of the Dutch fortresses. On August 17, he received the king's command to attend the Vienna conference. He promptly accepted this mission, but continued illness delayed his departure until September 17. Castlereagh's instructions, meanwhile, received the approval of the cabinet and were transmitted to his Grace by Lord Henry Bathurst, acting foreign secretary, on September 14,14 The news of Wellington's appointment delighted Mettemich, for he had secretly requested tlle duke's presence as the "only man who can in a Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 171-172. Quoted in Hyde, Princess Lieven. p. 143. 14 G. N. Wright, Life and Campaigns of Arthur. Duke of Wellington, K.G. (London, 1841), IV, 127; Aldington, The Duke. pp. 288, 389; Guedalla, Wellington. p. 333; Wellington to King George IV, London, Aug. 18, 1822, Well. Desp .• 1,258; Bathurst to Wellington, Downing Street, Sept. 14, 1822, ibid., I, 284; Bathurst to Stewart, No. 12, Foreign Office, Sept. 5, 1822, P.O. Austria, 120/54; Temperley, Canning, p. 53. Henry Bathurst, third Earl Bathurst (1762-1834), held the official position of Secretary of State for War and the Colonies in the Liverpool ministry. During the interim between Castlereagh's death and Canning's appointment (August 12-September 16, 1822), he served as acting foreign secretary. 12 13

24

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

measure replace" Castlereagh. Realizing that the latter's death would cause a delay in the sending of a British representative to Vienna, the Austrian chancellor offered to delay this conference until the Congress of Verona had ended, but the London cabinet declined this proposal, because it wanted the negotiations completed prior to the opening of Parliament on February 4, 1823. With the results before the ministers, they could better defend their policy before that body. They especially were anxious to settle the Austrian debt in order to meet the criticism of the Opposition. The cabinet could not take the chance of postponing the Vienna conference until after that of Verona. 15 When Wellington left England for the continent, Canning had been in office less than forty-eight hours. If the new foreign secretary had had anything to do with the appointment, the duke probably would not have been chosen. Relations between the two never had been cordial. Wellington could not forget that Canning was only half noble and that his mother had been an actress. The duke, moreover, was an ultra-Tory whose conservative principles drew him toward Metternich's political system. The views of Wellington and Canning on foreign policy differed in two important respects: (1) The duke did not wish to break with the Alliance at the Vienna conference, if he could help it, while such a rupture would have delighted the foreign secretary; (2) Canning believed it absolutely necessary for foreign policy to be understandable and popular, while Wellington was highly critical of his chief's publicity program which he believed prevented the cabinet from reaching independent decisions. Finally, the "Iron Duke" was handicapped in performing the duties of a constitutional statesman. By nature and training he found it difficult to compromise; he was a soldier, not a diplomat, and since Waterloo, he had been practically immune to criticism. Canning would hardly have chosen such a man to carry out his aim of wrecking the Alliance.16 After crossing the channel, Wellington's first stop was Paris and an interview with Villele, the new French premier. 15 Stewart to Bathurst, No.2, Vienna, Sept. 4, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Bathurst to Stewart, No. 12, Foreign Office, Sept. 5, 1822, ibid.; private letter, Aug. 25, 1822, Metternich, Memoires, III, 584; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 608. 16 Capt. J. E. S. Green, "Wellington, Boislecomte, and the Congress of Verona, 1822," TRHS, 4th ser., I (1918), 72-73; G. R. Stirling Taylor, "George Canning," English Political Portraits of the Nineteenth Century (Boston, 1929), pp. 56-57, 91; Temperiey, Canning, pp. 31, 34, 48, 53, 486; Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 140; Susan Buchan, The Sword of State: Wellington after Waterloo (New York, 1928), pp. 52-53.

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3. The Ascendancy of Villele On December 12, 1821, the moderate ministry of the Duke of Richelieu had fallen to be replaced three days later by an ultra-Royalist cabinet whose members were drawn from the party of Monsieur (Count of Artois), its principal architectP Although Count Jean Baptiste Joseph de Villele, minister of finance, and Count Jacques Joseph de Corbiere, minister of the interior, were the two dominant members of the Royal Council, LouiS XVIII did not designate a president until September 1822. Meanwhile, confusion and discord, the inevitable results of lack of leadership, divided the French cabinet and especially attended th.e ministerial meeting of August 26 at which Viscount Mathieu Jean de Montmorency, the foreign minister, virtually chose himself to head the French delegation to the Vienna conference. Villele opposed sending an envoy of plenipotentiary status to Vienna, but his influence was not sufficient to prevent it. Since the allied sovereigns and their ministers would be there, nothing less than a representative of cabinet rank would do.1 8 Neither Villele nor the king was pleased by Montmorency's nomination for this mission, because of his belligerent attitude toward Spain. The majority of the council, moreover, enjoined the foreign minister not to take the initiative in any discussion of the Spanish situation and to reserve for France independence of action, if that question were raised by others. On August 29, 1822, Montmorency left Paris, refusing to be guided by any 17 Pasquier, Mernoires, V, 410-411; Rev. Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, La Restauration (Paris, 1955), pp. 238, 240-242; see "Le second ministere du duc de Richelieu: fragment d'autobiographie, 1819-1821," Revue historique, XXXVII (maiaout, 1888), 100-137; "La chute du second ministere du duc de Richelieu et l'avenement du ministere de droite en decembre 1821," Comte Jean Baptiste de Villele, Mernoires et correspondance du cornte de Vi/We (2nd ed.; Paris, 1887-1889), II (1816-1821), 487-488. Other members of the council were: Montmorency (Foreign Affairs), Peyronnet (Justice), Duc de Bellune (War), Clermont-Tonnerre (Navy), and Lauriston (Royal Household). Ironically, Villele himself had persuaded a reluctant Louis XVIII to accept Montmorency in the cabinet rather than the old royal favorite, the Duc de Blacas. In answer to the king's protests that the viscount was a member of Monsieur's corterie, a Chevalier de la Foi, and a founder of the Congreration, Villele successfully argued that Montmorency would draw the votes of the extremeright to the support of the ministry. Jean Fourcassie, Vi/me (Paris, 1954), pp. 194-195; Bertier de Sauvigny, Un type d'ultra-royaliste: Ie cornte Ferdinand de Bertier (17821864) et l'enigrne de la Congregation (Paris, 1948), p. 297. 18 Mernoires de M. de La Rochefoucauld, due de Doudeauville, ed. F. Claude (Paris, 1861-1864), VII, 69, 71; Bertier, La Restauration, p. 252. Louis Fran~ois Sosthene, vicomte de La Rochefoucauld (1785-1864) was Montmorency's son-in-law.

26

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

written memorandum or to promise to follow the oral instructions given him. He arrived in Vienna on September 7. 19 During Montmorency's absence. Louis XVIII entrusted Villele with the direction of foreign affairs. and on September 4. a royal decree proclaimed him the permanent President of the Council. Montmorency regarded this promotion as an "indecorus act." but he swallowed his pride with good grace and congratulated Villele. Other members of the cabinet, except Corbiere. received his ascendancy with jealous resentment. 20 Contemporary observers and modem historians generally agree that Villele was an adroit parliamentary tactician. administrator, and financier, and a man of courage and wit. Even Canning, though he distrusted Villele. admitted that he was "the only man able to steer the boat." Sir Charles Stuart, the British ambassador at Paris, received the news of Villele's ascendancy with some enthusiasm. perceiving in it the crushing of the "numerous intrigues .. , to effect a partial. if not a total. change in the French Administration." 21 Villele had no love for fanaticism. clericalism. or reaction. No less than Chateaubriand. he wanted "to emancipate France from the humiliating control of foreigners, and to assert her independent action and influence." 19 La Rochefoucauld, Memoires, VI, 395; VII, 69, 71; Bdouard Herriot, Madame Recamier, trans. Alys Hallard (London, 1926), II, 112, 116; Villele, Memoires, III, 33-34; Alfred F. Nettement, Histoire de la Restauration (Paris, 1860-1872), VI, 229: Duvergier de Hauranne, Histoire de gouvernment parlementaire en France, 18141848 (Paris, 1857-1872), VII, 139-140; Stuart to Canning, No. 258, Paris, Sept. 19, 1822, F. 0., France, 146/48; Villele to Serre, Correspondance du comte de Serre, 1796-1824 (Paris, 1876-1877), IV (1820-1822), 484. The Comte de Serre was the French ambassador at Naples. 20 Villele, Memoires, III, 38; Montmorency to Villele, Vienna, Sept. 14, 1822, ibid., pp. 51-52; Boulaye to Serre, Ay, Sept. 8, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, IV, 470n; Montmorency to his wife, Vienna, Sept. 15, 1822, Recamier, Correspondance, II, 3. The charge made by Mme Recamier, and repeated by others, that Villele took advantage of Montmorency's absence to obtain the first rank in the council is not true. ViIIele owed his elevation to the influence of Countess Zoe du Cayla, the royal mistress, and Sosthene de La Rochefoucauld, her paramour. The premier did not know of Mme du Cayla's overtures to Louis XVIII in his behalf. The king, moreover, informed the foreign minister of his plans prior to the latter's departure from Paris and before his Majesty sent for Villele. Louis XVIII still distrusted and disliked Montmorency, and to counterbalance his influence, he made Villele President of the Council. La Rochefoucauld, Memoires, VI, 396; VII. 71-72; VIII, 131, 150-151; Recamier, Correspondance, II, 3-4; Villele, Memoires, III, 38, 50; Herriot, Madame Recamier, II, 99; Bertier, La Restauration, pp. 237-238, 241; Bourquin, Sainte Alliance, pp. 328-329; Fourcassie, Villele, pp. 198-204,232. 21 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 293; Stuart to Bathurst, Paris, Sept. 5, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; TemperIey, Canning, p. 59; Andre Maurois, Chateau briand, trans. Vera Fraser (London, 1938), p. 247.

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He disliked the Alliance, because, as Chateaubriand has observed, memories of conferences and protocols, which had brought defeat and humiliation to France in 1814 and 1815, still smoldered in many French hearts and burned brightly in some. Villele, moreover, resented the intrigues of Tsar Alexander and feared his ambition to send a Russian or an allied army through France to Spain. Yet he could not afford to withdraw from the Alliance and leave France isolated to face Great Britain. 22 The great problem facing both France and the Alliance in 1822 was the Spanish revolution, which the tsar regarded as a common menace to all the crowned heads of Europe.

4. Franco-Spanish Relations (1820-1822) It is one of the ironies of history that rebellion in the Spanish American colonies indirectly caused a revolution in the mother country. The insurrection began at Cadiz on January 1, 1820, in the ranks of the army being mobilized there for an expedition to South America. The leaders of this revolt were colonels Rafael del Riego y Nunez and Antonio Quiroga. Of the former it has been remarked that he was "a greater but a more insane hero than Don Quixote." 23 By March 1820, Riego's mutineers, unsupported by the apathetic populace, had been dispersed in Andalusia by loyal troops under General Manuel Freyre. This incident perhaps would have gone almost unnoticed by historians had it not lighted the fuse for a general explosion in the Peninsula. There were many Spanish Liberals who desired to reestablish the Constitution of 1812, which had been revoked by Ferdinand VII on May 4, 1814. During February 1820, the provinces of Galicia, Ferrot and Murcia in the north raised the standard of rebellion. Seeing his opportunity, General Francisco Espoz y Mina crossed the border from France to lead the forces of discontent in Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia. Everywhere the Constitution of 1812 was proclaimed, and with it, the abolition of the Inquisition. By March 3, the insurgents had achieved such success that Henry O'Donnell (Count D'Abisbal) and General Freyre, who commanded the royal army, cast their lots with the rebels. Ferdinand, realizing the tide had turned, yielded as graciously as possible. On March 9, he took an oath to support the Constitution; the following day he issued a proclamation restoring it and all the decrees of the Cortes of 1812.24 See Temperley, Canning, pp. 57-58. Quoted in ibid., p. 10; cf. Webster, "Castiereagh and the Spanish Colonies, 18181822," ERR, XXX (1915), 639. 24 For a French translation of Ferdinand's proclamation, see Nouveau recueil de 22

23

28

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

The immediate reaction of Spain's neighbors to these events was one of disapproval. Only John Forsyth, the American minister at Madrid, offered the congratulations of his government. 25 The new Cortes (which opened on July 9, 1820), had hoped, in particular, for the approval of Russia, since the tsar already had recognized and guaranteed the Constitution of 1812 by the Treaty of Velikiye Luki, July 20, 1812. But in view of Alexander's stem opposition to constitutions in 1820, this was indeed a forlorn hope.26 During the March days in Madrid, Baron Etienne-Denis Pasquier, the French foreign minister, had considered replacing his ambassador, Adrien de Montmorency, Duke of Laval, with Frederic Seraphin, marquis de La Tour du Pin. The mission of the new ambassador would be to persuade the Moderates (doceanistas) to establish a constitutional monarchy on the French model. When Pasquier informed Stuart of La Tour du Pin's projected mission, the ambassador immediately protested against it and enjoined Sir Henry Wellesly in Madrid to undermine French diplomacy. Wellesley warned Evaristo Perez de Castro, the Spanish foreign minister, of Pasquier's impending intrigue, and together they openly attacked France, accusing her of diplomatic machinations and conspiracy against the constitutional regime. The result of British diplomacy was to render a RoyalistModerate entente impossible and to convince Richelieu and Pasquier that it now was useless to send La Tour du Pin to Madrid. Consequently, the whole scheme was dropped. Enraged by Stuart's actions, Richelieu denounced him to Wellington; Anglophobia in the French press increased sharply, and in Paris the rumor spread that Britain was responsible for the Spanish revolution. 27 Failing in its attempt to go it alone, the French cabinet sought to overawe the Cortes by concerting with the great powers. Johann Aneillon, acting Prussian foreign minister, at the prompting of Alopeus, the Russian ambastraites d'aUiance, de paix, de treve, ... des puissances et etats d'Europe, ed. George Frederick and Ie baron Charles de Martens (Gottingen, 1817-1842) (hereafter cited as Nouveau recueil), V (1808-1822), 455-456. 25 John Forsyth was the American minister to Spain from February 16, 1819, to March 2, 1823. 26 Russian Circular, Saint Petersburg, May 1, 1820, Martens, Nouveau recueil, V (supp.), 237-242. 27 The Marquis Joseph Paul Franyois de Gabriac, "Chateaubriand et la guerre d'Espagne, d'apres des documents inedits, Part I: les conferences de Vienne et Ie congres de Verone," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII (1897), 543-544 (The author's father, the Marquis Joseph Alphonse de Gabriac [1792-1865] was La Ferronnays' private secretary at Verona.); Pasquier, Memoires, IV, 492-494; Richelieu to Wellington, Paris, Mar. 30, 1820, Well. Desp., 1,112; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 230 and 231. Adrien and Mathieu de Montmorency were first cousins.

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sador at Berlin, approved the La Tour du Pin mission and agreed that some kind of allied action should be taken toward Spain. Mettemich did not believe in acting where Austrian interests were not involved, and he had no desire to enhance the tsar's influence at Paris or Berlin. He, therefore, opposed an allied demarche against Spain and declared his readiness to support British policy against French and Russian attacks. Toward Spain Austria was willing to follow Britain's lead; throughout April 1820, Metternich anxiously awaited news from Castlereagh, informing him what this initiative would be. Castlereagh's answer to any form of allied intervention in Spain was his State Paper of May 5, 1820. Austria promptly accepted its principle of non-intervention, and Prussia and France finally endorsed its reasoning. Richelieu even conceded that the La Tour du Pin project had been a mistake. Consequently, when Count Charles Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian ambassador to France, proposed a conference in Paris to discuss the Spanish situation, he did not receive any encouragement from the French premier nor from his colleagues in the diplomatic corps. Austria and England had succeeded again in keeping France and Russia separate and alone. Richelieu again resolved to follow exclusively the particular interests of France. 28 From 1820 to 1822, conditions in Spain went from bad to worse. The nation was in a state of anarchy which invited intervention. The government was too weak to restore order. Neither Moderates nor Radicals (exaltados) had the support of the country, for the great mass of people remained loyal to their monarch and priests. Although the Moderates remained in power until December 1821, Radicals and Royalists steadily increased in strength. The king had no confidence in his ministers and continually intrigued against them. Until August 1821, Richelieu pursued a policy of strict neutrality toward the Spanish situation. But he realized that France "was like a house full of inflammable materials, threatened by a fire which had broken out next door." Spanish Royalists openly used French territory as a sanctuary from, and a base against, Spanish constitutional forces with the result that both France and Spain committed numerous provocations and border violations. Without breaking diplomatic relations with the Madrid government, Richelieu, in August 1821, established a cordon sanitaire on the frontier for the alleged purpose of preventing a yellow fever epidemic, then raging at 28 Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIlI, 544-545; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 231-232, 235-236, 243-244. While Count Bernstorff was in Vienna during the last two weeks of March 1820, Ancillon held the portfolio of foreign affairs.

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Barcelona, from spreading into France. In reality, however, the cordon was a corps d' observation to bar revolutionary contagion from infiltrating across the border. At the same time the French cabinet sent Count Augustin Pelletier de La Garde to Madrid to replace Laval as ambassador. The new envoy's mission was to seek an entente with the Moderates and to forestall any formal declaration by the Cortes which could lead to war.29 The number of insurrections in France in 1821 and 1822 is evidence that the danger of a Leftist revolution was real. Inspired by the momentary success of the Spanish revolution, the French Carbonari instigated military uprisings at Belfort, Neuf-Brisach, Colmar, Saumur, and La Rochelle (December 30, 1821-February 24, 1822). All of these movements failed for lack of adequate preparation and co-ordination and quick governmental action, but they and the resulting trials made it clear that secret societies also were undermining the army.30 At the end of February 1822, Francisco Martinez de la Rosa, the poet, formed a Moderate ministry which sought to strengthen the government by SUbstituting a more conservative constitution for the existing one. But in May the outbreak of a Royalist counter-revolution in Catalonia and Navarre dashed these hopes. Joaquin Ibanez, Baron de Eroles, General Vicente Jenaro de Quesada, and militant priests, including Antonio Maranon, the famous Trappist, organized thousands of peasants into the "Army of the Faith," and guerrilla warfare which resembled a crusade began. On June 21, the insurgents captured the city of La Seo de Urgel in Catalonia and founded there a regency in the name of the king. This "Urgel Regency," led by the Archbishop of Tarragona and the Marquis of Mataflorida, sent letters to Louis XVIII, appealing for help, and directed the movement against the constitutional regime. In effect, it constituted a Royalist fifth column in Spain. Further Royalist insurrections at Aranjuez and Valencia on May 30, the king's festival-day, and especially the Royal Guard's 29 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, X, 305; XI, 407; Bertier, La Restauration, p. 251; John R. Hall, The Bourbon Restoration (London, 1909), p. 321; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 545-546. The royal ordinance establishing the cordon sanitaire was issued on August 27, 1821. 30 Recamier, Correspondance, I, 372; Bertier, La Restauration, pp. 244-247. In the spring of 1821, Joubert and Dugied founded the French Carbonari society, and by 1822, its membership numbered approximately 40,000 drawn from students, junior army officers, and the petite bourgeoisie. Generals La Fayette, Foy, Demarcay, Berton, and Colonel Fabvier were among the leaders of the liberal insurrections of 1821-1822. For detailed accounts of secret societies and conspiracies under the French Restoration, see Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 263-347; Edouard Guillon, Les complots militaires sous la Restauration (Paris, 1895), and Pere Nicolas Deschamps, Les societes secretes et la societe (4th cd.; Avignon, 1881).

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abortive coup of July 7 at Madrid, which the ministry itself had helped to plan, led to the captivity of Ferdinand. In the reaction and confusion that followed these events, the influence of the Moderates in the Cortes waned and that of the Radicals increased. In August Martinez de la Rosa and his colleagues, realizing that a policy of moderation now had no chance of success, resigned, whereupon Colonel Evaristo de San Miguel put together a Radical ministry in which he held the post of foreign minister. Those who had defended the king were removed from positions in the government and army, and many were executed by the firing squad. The cabinet was caught in an embarrassing position between the excesses of both the Spanish Radicals and the Urgel Regency.31 The policy of the Villele ministry toward Spain was tortuous and often vacillating, not because of timidity, but from disagreement between the moderate and ultra-Royalist factions in the council. Villele himself desired to continue Richelieu's policy of neutrality, fearing that Britain would openly support the constitutional government and that French finances and economic interests would suffer from war. The recent insurrections in France had caused him to question the loyalty of the French army, if it were sent against Spanish Liberals, and he could not forget the fate of Napoleon's army in the Peninsula. These considerations persuaded the premier that the best policy was one of restraint,32 By contrast, Montmorency, Pasquier's successor at the Foreign Ministry, wanted to achieve more decisive results. During the spring of 1822, he had instructed La Garde to support the king's efforts to regain his authority and, through inexperience in foreign affairs, had even gone so far as to present to the Spanish government a plan for a constitutional monarchy. Coming from France, this proposal was resented as interference incompatible with Spanish sovereignty. But the Rosa ministry, in any case, would not have implemented the scheme, because the ministers, with good reason, distrusted Ferdinand VII. By the end of July 1822, Montmorency had come to regard war with Spain as inevitable and had correctly perceived that the Spanish Question would be the principal subject of discussion at the Vienna 31 Boislecomte, A. A. E., 720, 234-236; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 405, 408412, 415-420; Bourquin, Sainte Alliance, p. 315; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 195-196n; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 549-550. The precise title of the Royalist provisional government at Urgel was: "Supreme Regency of Spain during the captivity of the King." 32 Bertier, La Restauration, pp. 251-252; Bourquin, Sainte Alliance, p. 330; Rene Pinon, Histoire diplomatique, 1515-1928, Vol. IX of Histoire de la nation fran~aise, ed. Gabriel Hanotaux (Paris, 1929), p. 458; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 407, 422-423; Fourcassie, Viliele, p. 228.

32

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

conference. But no foreign army, he assured La Garde, would cross France. On September 5, the foreign minister again declared to his ambassador at Madrid that war could not be avoided; the longer France waited, the greater would be the dangers of a Spanish campaign. But this dispatch never was sent, being vetoed by VilleIe as too belligerent. Villele, it will be recalled, had become President of the Council the day before. In the interest of moderation, the new premier assured La Garde on September 6 that France would not take any hostile action against Spain, unless compelled by the necessities of self-defense. Even when Radical mobs threatened French consular agents at Cadiz, Santander, Bilbao, and Barcelona, Villele refused to recall them, explaining that such a drastic response would be like "a declaration of war which is by no means our intention." 33 The premier, the king, and the majority of the council, in short, worked to maintain peace, while Montmorency and Claude Victor-Perrin, Duke of Bellune (Marshal Victor), the Minister for War, convinced that conciliation was a bankrupt policy, advocated war as the only means of destroying the revolutionary regime in Madrid. 34 But French policy toward Spain also was influenced by party conflict on both sides of the Pyrenees, a confused situation intelligible only in tenus of the Franco-Spanish dispute. French Radicals, like Spanish Royalists, plotted to provoke war, but for opposite reasons. The former hoped the Restoration monarchy would be defeated and themselves returned to power, while the latter needed French aid to reestablish royal absolutism in Spain. Ferdinand VII, meanwhile, played a double role in this affair. While secretly exhorting the Court of the Tuileries to declare war on Spain, he posed as the willing tool of the Liberal regime in Madrid. The French ultra-Royalists and Clericals believed that a victorious Peninsular campaign fought under the Fleur de Lis would revenge Baylen and Vittoria and give stability to the none-too-finuly-restored monarchy. By the same stroke, they hoped to make France once more a major military power. Strained Franco-Spanish relations thus were brought about by several factions in both nations. As the Marquis Joseph Paul de Gabriac observed: "The unleashing of the revolutionary spirit in Spain" and "the progress of monarchial authority and the ascendancy of a Royalist ministry" in France created a "moral hostility" between the two countries. 35 33 Villele to La Garde, Paris, Sept. 16, 1822, quoted in Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 553. This phrase was written in capital letters in Villele's handwriting. 34 Ibid., p. 546, 553-554; Montmorency to La Garde, Paris, July 29 and Sept. 5, 1822, quoted in ibid., pp. 550-552; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 422-423. 35 Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 17 and Nov. 25, 1822, Villele, Memoires,

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33

Despite mounting pressure within his party and the French press to adopt a sterner attitude toward Spain, Villele refused to go further than to reinforce the cordon sanitaire. When Montmorency and Franchet d'Esperey, the director general of police, suggested to the French council in August, 1822, that the Spanish Royalists be aided secretly with arms, munitions, and money, their proposal was rejected "as neither loyal nor effective." Montmorency and Franchet, nonetheless, dispatched to the Urgel Regency a shipment of munitions, but an alert frontier patrol intercepted it. An investigation quickly revealed those responsible for this patent violation of the embargo. The premier, however, discreetly dropped the affair upon the foreign minister's promise that he would not repeat such impolitic conduct. But other attempts to aid the partisans of Ferdinand VII were successful, and the king himself received over two million francs through the French ambassador.36 The yellow fever in Barcelona having subsided by the fall of 1822 and all danger of an epidemic in southern France having manifestly passed, the French cabinet on September 22 changed the official designation of the frontier regiments from Ie cordon sanitaire to the more dignified and realistic l' armee d' observation. The significance of this modification is its indication of the strength of the French ultra-Royalists, who demanded a more resolute attitude toward the Spanish government. Villele was certain that the allied sovereigns would demand that Spain modify her constitution in order to increase the king's personal power. By adopting a more deterIII, 129,246; Pasquier to Serre, Paris, Feb. 23, 1823, Serre, Correspondance, V, 67-68; Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, and Vienna, Oct. 4, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 291, 345; Stuart to Canning, Paris, Oct. 21, 1822, ibid., I, 407; for extracts from the secret correspondence between the kings of Spain and France, see ibid., pp. 393-400; Jean Baptiste Honore Raymond Capefigue, Histoire de la Restauration et des causes qui ont amene la chute de la branche a/nee des Bourbons (Paris, 1831-1833), VII, 23-25; Alphonse Marie Louis de Lamartine, Histoire de la Restauration (Paris, 1851-1852), VII, 111-112; Viel-Castel, La Restauration. XI, 477; Alison, History of Europe from the Fall of Napoleon to the Accession of Louis Napoleon (Edinburgh, 1853), II, 641642; Fourcassie, Viltele, p. 227; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 554. 36 Villele, Memoires, III, 33; Montmorency to La Garde, Paris, Aug. 14, 1822, quoted in Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 551; Agenor Bardoux, "Le congres de Verone, d'apres les papiers de mme la duchesse de Duras," Seances et travaux de l'Academie des Sciences morales et politiques (Institut de France) (hereafter cited as STAS), CXLVII (1897), 406; Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 226-229. Even the Papacy sent money to the Spanish Royalists through Marie Caroline, duchesse de Berry, granddaughter of Ferdinand I of Naples and sister of Maria Christina, the fourth wife of Ferdinand VII of Spain. La Boulaye to Serre, Ay, Jan. 5, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, V, '4. The Drapeau blanc and La Foudre clamored for war with Spain.

34

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

mined policy, France might induce the Cortes to accept gracefully these demands. But the threat of foreign interference only provoked the San Miguel ministry to summon an Extraordinary Cortes to take counteractions. To the fearful La Garde, this step seemed a prelude to a formal declaration of war on France. 37 Another important element of the Spanish Question was Anglo-French relations. The foundation of British policy toward Spain, it will be recalled, was Castlereagh's State Paper of May 5, 1820. Although the London cabinet had immediately approved the actions of Stuart and Wellesley in the La Tour du Pin affair (March 1820), the foreign secretary had instructed Wellesley to refrain henceforth from interference in Spanish affairs, unless the king's life was endangered, or Portugal was threatened with invasion. To Castlereagh an understanding with France offered the best means of breaking the Franco-Spanish impasse. Thus he counseled moderation to Madrid and mediation to Paris. On September 20, 1822, Wellington arrived in the French capital to urge this policy on Villele in a private interview. 3s 5. The V illele-Wellington Interview

In an effort to achieve an entente with France on the Spanish Question before proceeding to Vienna, Wellington went immediately into conference with Villele. He reached Paris at 1: 30 p.m. and an hour later called at the premier's home. For the next two hours, the British and French ministers debated the Spanish revolution and its possible consequences, the slave trade, and the Eastern Question, but they emphasized the affairs of Spain and the dangers of intervention. Not a word was spoken concerning Italy.39 As the interview opened, Wellington found Villele torn between the demands of the ultra party and his own judgment of what was best for France. When the duke asked if France would permit the passage of foreign troops through her territory, the premier's reply was an emphatic no. His personal opinion was that any expedition to rescue the Spanish king would probably fail and result in the monarch's death. Spanish and French revolutionaries, Villele complained, were in alliance; every day brought new threats to 37 Boislecomte, A. A. E., 720, 235-236; Stuart to Canning, No. 263, Paris, Sept. 26, 1822, F. 0., France, 146/48; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 447; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 465. This session met on October 7, and one of its first acts increased the size of the constitutional army by 30,000 men. 38 Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Sept. 22, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 59; Bourquin, Sainte Alliance, p. 324; Webster, Castlereagh, p. 233. 3D Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Sept. 22, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 59; Walpole, History of England, III, 44.

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35

French forces along the Pyrenees and violations of French territory. The government knew the true situation in Spain and wished only to protect the rights and security of the royal family.40 Wellington estimated that it would take 100,000 men to subdue Spain; to try such a venture with a smaller force would be folly. Villele rejoined that the French army was strong enough to operate without fear of folly. He then revealed that two plans regarding Spain were being circulated in governmental circles. The one which he favored was to wait-and-see the outcome of current developments. The other was to send two columns into the Iberian Peninsula - one of 40,000 men via Perpignan into Catalonia, and the other of 60,000 troops via Irun upon Madrid. The authors of the latter scheme doubted it would be necessary to go beyond the capital city. Whichever policy the French cabinet adopted, the object was the same; viz., to save his Most Catholic Majesty from "being deposed, and the royal family from being murdered." But, Villele warned, if the Vienna conference separated without coming to any decision on the affairs of France and Spain, it was probable that the existing impasse would be aggravated, and that the two countries could be forced into a war. He hoped, therefore, that the conference would consider France's geographical position in relation to Spain and that each ally would declare what line she would take in the event of a Franco-Spanish war. 41 If war with Spain came, the French minister emphasized, it would be through no fault of the French government, whose relations with Spain were based on national interests, entirely separate from anything the Vienna conference might determine. France would ask for no assistance from any other power, for she could not receive it and would oppose any effort to force it on her. In reply, Wellington affirmed that Great Britain could not declare in advance what her policy would be in any hypothetical case. The discussion of the Spanish Question ended with a statement by the premier that he would not object to, but would regret, the formation of a European army on the chance that hostilities might break out between France and Spain. France, he reiterated, would not consent to the passage of foreign troops across her soil; nor would she "wage war at the invitation, still less at the injunction of others, but only if ... she were constrained to do it" by either of two occurrences: (1) the deposition of Ferdinand VII and/or the death of any member of the royal family, and (2) a declaration 40 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, 1822; Verona, Nov. 22, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 290-292, 564; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Sept. 22, 1822, quoted in Nettement, La Restauration, VI,237-238. 41 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 289-290.

36

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

of war by Spain and/or an attack on France. But Villele regarded the British focus on Spanish affairs a dangerous mistake and urged a reorientation in policy.42 Since his instructions emphasized the slave trade, Wellington broached this subject, urging the premier to persuade his government to adopt effective measures for its suppression. France was the chief nation engaged in this black traffic; if her cooperation were obtained, it could be arrested. But Anglo-French cooperation, even on a issue both powers had condemned as morally reprehensible, was difficult to achieve in 1822. The average Frenchman still regarded England as his natural enemy just as his ancestors had for the last five hundred years. Consequently, when the duke raised the slave trade question, Villele protested that his Most Christian Majesty had earnestly sought to put an end to it but had failed to persuade the Assembly to adopt an effective measure. The Chambers refused to attach a degrading punishment to this crime. The abolition of the slave trade, moreover, was unpopular in France, because it was urged by Britain. The existing law for its suppression was the only act which the legislature had ever passed in complete silence, so humiliated were the deputies at having to yield to British demands. France, Villele contended, had done, and would continue to do, everything in her power to suppress this insidious traffic. For this purpose, cruisers were maintained off the coasts of Africa and Madagascar. He then ended the conversation on this subject by refusing to attempt the passage of new laws against the slave trade or to enter into new engagements for its suppression. 43 France's condemnation of the slave trade served the same function as England's Foreign Enlistment Act: each permitted a nation to hide behind the aegis of a legislative act that publicly proclaimed lofty sentiments which were either privately repudiated, tacitly ignored, or flagrantly unenforced for ulterior reasons. The Eastern Question received only passing treatment at the VilleleWellington interview, because substantial agreement already existed between their respective governments. When the duke requested the French minister to adopt with England and Austria a common policy in the Russo-Turkish dispute, he readily agreed to instruct the Marquis Florimond de Fay de La Tour-Maubourg, the French ambassador at Constantinople, to convince the Porte of the necessity of heeding the tsar's demands. In so doing, he 42 Ibid., pp. 292, 294; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Sept. 22, 1822, quoted in Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 237-238. 43 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 295.

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37

was only repeating the assurances which Richelieu had given Castlereagh almost a year earlier.44 On September 21, the day following his conference with VilleIe, Wellington conferred with Sir Charles Stuart and took his leave of Louis XVIII. His Majesty assured the duke that he had no desire for war with Spain, but wished only to protect his kinsman on the Spanish throne. Early on the morning of the 22nd, Wellington left Paris and, traveling via Munich and Salzburg, arrived in Vienna on the 29th. 45 The Villele-Wellington interview reveals that the importance of the Spanish and Greek questions had been reversed by the deterioration of Franco-Spanish relations. A second paramount fact brought out by this conference was the premier's reluctance to use the corps d'observation. While Villele was not above pretending more than he really thought, his correspondence with Count Hercule de Serre, French ambassador to Naples, and the reports of Sir Charles Stuart, contain further evidence that he consistently opposed armed intervention in Spain, which he feared would compromise French interests. 46 On the night of September 21, Wellington had sent several dispatches to Canning covering his talks with VilleIe and requesting further instructions on Spain. These reports reached the Foreign Office on the 24th but did not alarm Canning, for he already had foreseen that the big issue at Vienna would be Spain. Wellington's intelligence, however, gave him a new concept of French policy toward Spain and suggested a means of breaking the European Alliance by separating France from it. She appeared to agree with Britain in opposing collective intervention in Spain. Canning preferred dealing with one power rather than four. On September 27, he replied to Wellington with his memorable "come what may" instruction. 47 The knowledge that Wellington would urge the allies to leave Spain to herself apparently encouraged Villele to resist the growing demand of the ultra-Royalists for intervention. A week after the duke left Paris Stuart had La Rochefoucauld, Memoires, VI, 394. Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Sept. 22, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 63-64; Duc de Blacas, French ambassador at Rome, to Serre, Rome, Oct. 13, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, IV, 405; Walpole, History of England, III, 46; J. E. S. Green, "Castlereagh's Instructions for the Conferences at Vienna, 1822," TRHS, 3rd ser., VII (1913), 123. 46 Stuart to Bathurst, No. 243, Paris, Sept. 2, 1822, F. 0., France, 146/48; Villele to Serre, Paris, Sept. 9 and 15, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, IV, 472, 485-486. 47 Wellington to Canning, Paris, Sept. 21, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 294; cf. British and Foreign State Papers, ed. Lewis Hertslet (London, 1837) (hereafter cited as BFSP), X (1822-1823), 90; Temperley, Canning, pp. 63-64; Green, "Castlereagh's Instructions," TRHS, 3rd ser., VII, 110, 113-114. 44

45

38

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

an interview with the premier about the Vienna conference. Villele stated that every dispatch received from Vienna made him hope that Wellington's arrival there was imminent. His Grace's knowledge of the opinions of the British and French cabinets was necessary to counteract the tsar's views on Spanish affairs, which "a variety of causes had rendered stronger than the circumstances of the moment warrant." Confidential reports from Vienna, moreover, had confirmed his suspicion that Montmorency was not representing the views of the council on Spain. 48 The French minister seemed genuinely alarmed that the Vienna conference would adopt measures so extreme that they would provoke Spain to declare war on France. He blamed the advice of Count Dmitri Tatischev, former Russian ambassador at Madrid, as the chief cause of Ferdinand's embarrassment and declared that Mettemich did not dare contradict the tsar for fear he would repudiate Anglo-Austrian mediation of the RussoTurkisch dispute. Villele, therefore, was uneasy over future developments at Madrid. If the party in power in Spain really intended to follow a moderate course, why had it summoned an Extraordinary Cortes, from which only violent actions could be expected? 49 Although Villele counted heavily on Wellington's influence at Vienna to restrain Alexander, he apparently hoped the duke would not be sent to Verona. France had a special interest in Italy, where French security demanded that she contain and undermine Austrian hegemony. The premier was uncertain of British policy in this area. Might not Britain stand by Austria here as in the Near East? Under the circumstances it seemed best that no British plenipotentiary attend the Congress of Verona. Villele, therefore, inquired of Stuart whether his Grace would continue to the Italian congress, in view of the previous determination of England not to interfere in the affairs of Italy. He observed that Parliament's objections to participation at Verona could outweigh any benefits to be gained from attending. The ambassador replied simply that he had no communication from his government on this subject; but to ease Villele's fears, he added that there should be no objection to a British delegation at Verona, since the avowed purpose of the conference was to remove some of the burdens placed on the Italian states at Laibach.50 This conversation is a sequel to the Villele-Wellington interview and is significant for two reasons: (1) it reveals Villele's anxiety over the decisions 48 Stuart to Canning, No. 266, Paris, Sept. 30 and No. 269, Paris, Oct. 3, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Villele, Memoires, ill, 59-68; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 445. 49 Stuart to Canning, No. 266, Paris, Sept. 30, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48. DO Stuart to Canning, No. 265, Paris, Sept. 30, 1822, ibid.

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of the Vienna conference, and (2) the premier admitted, for the first time to a foreign diplomat, the division in the Paris cabinet between Montmorency and himself. It was this disagreement, moreover, that convinced Villele he should send another delegate to Verona with written instructions to restrain Montmorency.51 Throughout 1822 the struggle between the apostles of war, led by the Count of Artois and Montmorency, and the partisans of peace, headed by the king and Villele, virtually paralyzed the French government in its search for a viable Spanish policy. While the ascendancy of an ultra-Royalist ministry in December 1821 had increased the possibility of war with Spain, it did not make it inevitable, because of the schism in its ranks. The VilleleWellington interview strengthened the premier in his opposition to intervention. On the eve of the Vienna conference, this controversy continued, and French policy maintained its indecisive course. But for the moment, Villele's position remained secure, and his pacific views prevailed.

Stuart to Canning, No. 258, Sept. 19, 1822, ibid. Stuart's informant was Viscount de Chateaubriand, French ambassador at London and "the other delegate." 51

Fran~ois-Rene

CHAPTER II

THE VIENNA STALEMATE At Vienna ... [Spain was] the great question, ... the first, the gravest for ... the Alliance. Montmorency, October 25, 1822.1

J. The Conference Convenes

Before Wellington left London, the allied sovereigns and their ministers had begun their talks in Vienna. Already in the Austrian capital were Sir Charles Stewart (Lord Londonderry), the British ambassador, the Marquis Victor-Louis Charles de Caraman, the French ambassador, Prince Franz Ludwig von Hatzfeldt, the Prussian ambassador, and, of course, Prince Metternich and Friedrich von Gentz, the Austrian publicist and the chancellor's colleague and secretary. On September 7, both Montmorency and the Prussian delegation arrived, the latter composed of Foreign Minister Bernstorff and Baron Friedrich Alexander von Humboldt. Assisting the French foreign minister and Caraman, was Count Pierre-Louis Ferron de La Ferronnays, ambassador at S1. Petersburg, who arrived with the tsar. The Austrian delegation was completed by the addition of Count Stephan Zichy. ambassador at Berlin, who came with the Prussians, Baron Ludwig von Lebzeltern, who traveled with the Russians, and Prince Paul Anton Esterhazy von Galantha, ambassador at London. Having departed from st. Petersburg on August 15, Alexander reached Vienna on September 9. In his entourage were Count Nesselrode, his foreign minister, Count Dmitri Tatischev, Count Charles Andre Pozzo di Borgo, ambassador at Paris, and numerous princes and generals. Conspicuous by his absence was Count Capo d'Istria, who had resigned at the end of July on the issue of war with Turkey. His departure delighted Metternich, for he detested the Greek's liberal views. Lord Stewart and Sir Robert Gordon, secretary of the Vienna embassy, looked after British interests until the arrival of Lord Strangford on September 24 and Wellington on the 29th.2 1 Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Oct. 25, 1822, Congres de Verone: correspondance et protocoles, A.A.B., 721, 114. 2 Stewart to Bathurst, Nos. 2 and 11, Vienna, Sept. 4, and 24, 1822, F.O., Austria,

THE VIENNA STALEMATE

41

The original schedule for the Vienna conference called for the presence of a British representative by September 7, so that the great questions could be discussed before the 28th, the deadline for transferring deliberations to Italy. On September 12, after weeks of frustrating delay, the three eastern sovereigns adopted a new plan: they would wait several more days for Wellington and then, if he had not arrived, proceed to Verona, and the duke could follow them; the first two or three weeks of the Congress would be set aside to discuss the agenda originally planned for Vienna. Since Britain had not been a party to the Laibach resolution of February 25, 1821, the continental powers were particularly anxious for Wellington to take part in discussions at Verona as a plenipotentiary. His attendance in that capacity was needed to give the appearance of unity to the tottering Alliance.3 As the days passed, Stewart's alarm increased that the sovereigns would leave Vienna before Wellington's arrival. He consulted Mettemich, who suggested that a courier be sent to intercept his Grace at Munich or elsewhere and to direct him to Verona, thus saving many miles of travel. Stewart concurred and sent Gordon on the mission, bearing with him a resume of discussions up to September 24. For their part, the crowned heads of Europe again postponed their departure. This maneuver reveals that the allied delegations, lacking information, assumed that Wellington had authorization to go to Verona. 4 His prolonged absence, meanwhile, virtually stalemated 120/54; Boislecomte, "Resume historique du congres de Verone," A.A.E., 722, 46-49, 67 (hereafter cited as Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722); Vicomte Fran~ois Rene de Chateaubriand, Le congres de Verone, Vol. XII of Oeuvres completes de Chateaubriand. ed. Charles A. Sainte-Beuve (nouvelle ed.; Paris. 1929-1938) (hereafter cited as Congres de Verone). p. 34; Private letter, Verona. Oct. 22, 1822, Metternich, Memoires. III, 559; Nettement, La Restauration. VI, 236; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe. 1789-1825. pp. 395-397, 420-421. Though once a revolutionist, Montmorency by 1822 had become "a devout, if somewhat pompous, clerical aristocrat." Upon reaching the Austrian capital, his piety, indeed, cost him an interview with Metternich. No sooner had the foreign minister arrived at his hotel, than he departed on foot to attend mass and to talk to some nuns. He did not return for three hours. The chancellor, meanwhile, informed of the viscount's arrival, had come to greet him, but after a prolonged wait, he left. Temperley, Canning. p. 60; Pasquier, Memoires. V,446. 3 Stewart to Bathurst, Nos. 7 and 8, Vienna, Sept. 12 and 15, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54. 4 Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, Vienna, Sept. 24, 1822, ibid.; Green, "Castlereagh's Instructions," TRHS, 3rd ser., VII, 123. Wellington was at Munich when he learned of the proposed removal of the conference to Verona. Because he was still in poor health, he had taken the longer, but better, road to Vienna via Munich and Salzburg and had traveled slowly and for shorter hours. Couriers also had been sent to Salzburg and Regensburg (Ratisbon) to invite him to Verona.

42

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

the Viennese negotiations, causing Montmorency to complain that the resultant delay "has reduced everything here to simple conversations, which may have their real utility, but which are less positive than conferences." 5 When Wellington finally reached the Austrian capital, he found the allied monarchs and ministers ready to repair to Verona, where they intended to transact all remaining business. He protested against their departure, arguing that such a move would reveal to the world "a disunion among the allied governments, manifested, as it would be, by four of the allied ministers first waiting ... three weeks for the fifth, and then setting out for Italy the day after his arrival." 6 It was quite possible, moreover, that he would not be permitted to go to Verona, since the ministry was anxious to avoid popular misunderstanding of its stand against entering any discussion of Italian questions. Metternich assured him, however, that there was no danger of embarrassing England, since Italian affairs would not be considered at Verona until after his Grace's departure. 7 Perceiving the futility of his protests, Wellington, on September 30, requested clarification of his instructions: should he remain in Vienna, return to London, or go to Verona? But Canning, forewarned of the intended removal of the conference by Lord Stewart, already had drafted new instructions. On October 3, they arrived, directing Wellington and Stewart to attend the Congress of Verona. 8 2. The Spanish Question Although the conversations on the affairs of Spain were private, informal, and indecisive, they, nonetheless, were important, for they portended the course of negotiations at Verona. Despite the admonition of the majority of the French council, Montmorency raised the issue during an interview with Metternich on September 11. The foreign minister confided to the chancellor that he wished France to act toward Spain as Austria had done toward Naples; i.e., France desired the moral support of Europe just as Austria had obtained it at Laibach. But Metternich was as anxious as ever to avoid 5 Montmorency to Mme Recamier, Vienna, Sept. 25, 1822, in Edouard Herriot, Madame Recamier, trans. Alys Hallard (London, 1926), II, 117; cf. Stewart to Bathurst, No.8, Vienna, Sept. 15, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54. 6 Wellington to Canning, Vienna, Sept. 30, 1822, Well. Desp., 1,320. 7 Ibid., p. 319. 8 Ibid., pp. 319-321; Wellington to Metternich, Vienna, Oct. 3, 1822, ibid., p. 340; Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, Sept. 24, 1822, ibid., 349-350; Stewart to Canning, No.7, Vienna, Sept. 12, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Canning to Stewart, No.1, Foreign Office, Sept. 24, 1822, ibid.

THE VIENNA STALEMATE

43

taking a stand on this delicate question which would involve him in a controversy with Britain and Russia, whose opposing views on intervention were well-known. He remained noncommittal, suggesting merely that Montmorency should draft a memoire of his proposals for improving the situation. 9 Although the French minister concurred in this recommendation, he later reported to Villele: At Vienna they wished to concert with me on the great question; Spain was the first, the gravest for us and for the Alliance. It was natural that they should look to me for information. They asked me what were our views, our manner of regarding the course of events, and my idea on the conduct to follow toward a government which menaced us. 10 This statement, of course, is misleading, for it was not the allies who sought to concert with France, but Montmorency who took the initiative in seeking their aid. He misrepresented the facts, when he told his chief: "I have not had to denounce Spain as Austria denounced Naples at Laibach." 11 To Alexander and Bernstorft. he asserted that the Spanish Royalists, if left to themselves, could not triumph over the constitutional government. The existing situation was very dangerous to France. He protested that he did not want war, but thought it inevitable; consequently, prudence required France to prepare for war. The allies must assure France of their eventual support but leave it to France to choose the right moment to strike. 12 But the Vienna diplomatic corps knew that Montmorency's views did not represent the consensus of the French cabinet. Villele had revealed to the allied ambassadors in Paris his determination to avoid war and even had admitted that Montmorency held views stronger than most of the council was disposed to entertain. The French minister's maneuvers, however, placed Metternich in a embarrassing situation. 13 Austria, no less than Britain, opposed a French invasion of Spain, being apprehensive of a renewed family compacU4 It is a popular misconception that the chancellor's policy was universally reactionary; on the contrary, Stewart to Bathurst, No.5, Vienna, Sept. 12,1822, ibid. Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Oct. 25, 1822, Congres de Verone, A.A.E., 721, 114. 11 Ibid. 12 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI,440-441. 13 See above, pp. 37-38. 14 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 431-432; Maurice de La Fuye and t;:mile Albert Babeau, La Sainte-Alliance, 1815-1848 (Paris, 1948), p. 167; cf. Robert A. Kann, "Mettemich: A Reappraisal of His Impact on International Relations," 1MH, XXXII (Dec. 1960),337-339. 9

10

44

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

his "whole doctrine of intervention was conceived realistically and was tempered by consideration of Austrian interests." 15 But since Austria had intervened in Naples and Piedmont, he could not now openly resist Montmorency's project. He did not want war, but he wanted even less a rupture with Russia, whose views on the Spanish constitutional regime had been set forth in the tsar's denunciatory circular of May 1,1820. 16 As early as July 1822, Metternich had accused the French Royalists of having provoked the revolt in the Spanish army, but the tsar had rejected this imputation and had contended as staunchly as ever that intervention was absolutely necessary. Having failed to drive a wedge between the courts of Paris and st. Petersburg, the chancellor had looked to the Vienna conference to soften the tsar's attitude toward events taking place in the Balkan and Iberian peninsulas, and to inspire in him a distrust of France. To accomplish this dual objective he had counted heavily on Castlereagh's influence with Alexander. With it he was sure that he could achieve a solution of the Spanish Question before the Congress of Verona. 17 At Vienna Mettemich, left to his own devices by Castlereagh's death and Wellington's long absence, varied his language to Alexander, Montmorency, and Stewart, to suit Austrian interests. To the tsar, he pretended to approve intervention and to regard the Spanish revolution as no different from those of Naples and Piedmont. Only France, however, should intervene, but could not because of her untrustworthy army. "How can France talk of war," he asked, "when her army is infected by a revolutionary spirit? The order to fight would be, perhaps, for her troops the signal for desertion." 18 War is not popular in France; her finances are scarcely restored, and Premier Villele is all for peace. But let us suppose, [the chancellor continued], all difficulties are surmounted, the army marching obediently and with discipline, the Spanish Revolution 16 Paul R. Sweet, Friedrich von Gentz: Defender of the Old Order (Madison, Wis., 1941), p. 236. 16 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 431-432, 443; for the text of this circular, see Martens, Nouveau recueil, V (supp.) 237-242. The raison d'etre of the Russian memoire was a note which Zea de Bermudes, the Spanish charge d'affaires, at St. Petersburg, delivered to Capo d'Istria in April 1820, describing the change in the Spanish government which had resulted from Ferdinand's proclamation of March 10, restoring the Constitution of 1812. Bermudes requested approval of this change on grounds that Russia already had recognized and guaranteed this constitution by the Treaty of Velikiye-Luki (July 20, 1820). Ibid., pp. 237,242. 17 Metternich to Lebzeltem, Vienna, July 31, 1822, quoted in Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 432-433; Gabriac "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII (1897), 555-556. 18 Ibid., p. 557; cf. Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722,3.

THE VIENNA STALEMATE

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vanquished, and Ferdinand reestablished on his throne, then would not France, intoxicated by her recent victories, regain a taste for the old ideas of conquests and, after having fought for a good cause, undertake unjust wars? 19

Metternich obviously hoped to prevent war by narrowing the field of potential belligerents to one possibility - Fran~ and then eliminating her. To the French delegation, the chancellor described the dire consequences of a Russian army marching across France and advised them to defy the tsar, who regarded Frenchmen as the first revolutionists of Europe. If he desires to undertake himself a Spanish Expedition, [Metternich confided], it is not for the reason he represents to you. Without doubt, he wishes to crush the revolution in the Peninsula and to restore the Spanish monarchy, but, above all, he wants to cross France to take away on his return your Charter and to confiscate your liberties ..2o

But armed intervention in Spain, the chancellor concluded, was unnecessary, since the constitutional government could be overthrown merely by supplying the Urgel Regency with arms and money. Although France, of course, must do what she thought most expedient, she should not separate from her allies, but concert her actions with them, as Austria had done at Troppau and Laibach.21 To Lord Stewart, Metternich condemned the tsar's martial spirit and characterized as foolish his vision of personally leading from 200,000 to 300,000 Russians across Europe into Spain. Thus the Austrian chancellor, "by continual contradictions and the sterile abundance of his words, attempted to confound those who tried to penetrate his true thoughts." 22 Prussia followed Austria's lead, but Bernstorff was more forceful in his efforts to preserve peace. Gordon has given an astute analysis of the diplomatic chess game played before his eyes. He saw clearly the paradox between Montmorency's request for the cooperation of the Alliance in intervening in Spain and his protest that nothing could induce France to permit the passage of foreign troops across her territory. Gordon perceived, too, that the French minister combined his own with his government's views, for when Montmorency realized that Austria and Prussia really did not want a Spanish war, he showed a willingness to soften his tone and to ask the allies for advice. The British diplomat also doubted that Metternich favored the reestablishment 19 20

21 22

Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 557. Ibid., p. 558. Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 443-444. I bid., p. 444.

46

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

of absolute monarchy in Spain, wishing instead that Spain might be "governed according to the forms which were her own in former times." But the one great determination of Austria, Prussia, and Russia was to stand together in their actions. Above all, they were resolved not to have Britain ranged in an opposing camp. The tsar, of course, urged intervention, and his hostility to France's national, anti-Alliance policy grew steadily. Pozzo di Borgo, according to Gordon, held the French ministry "extremely cheap," with the exception of Villele. Pozzo had eminent talents, but unfortunately, he had belonged to the Capo d'Istria faction and now was trying to regain favor with the aid of Nesselrode, who remained his warm friend. 23 Despite the protests of Metternich, Montmorency, and Stewart, Alexander continued to advocate the use of a Russian army to overthrow the Cortes and the constitution he once had recognized and guaranteed. In support of this proposal, Tatischev argued that the "Spanish population would receive the Russians with enthusiasm." 24 But Montmorency put up "an insurmountable resistance" to this scheme, and in answering the tsar, he followed closely VilleIe's conversation with Wellington on September 20. Chagrined, the emperor replied: What do you think of me and my army? Think of the great distance which separates us, and do not forget that you may have need of us to overawe your demagogues, conspiring with those of Europe.'25

Metternich watched this debate with interest. He realized that by going across Austria and Italy and taking ship to Spain, France could be bypassed, but being as little inclined as Villele to permit foreign troops to cross Austria or Italy, he held his peace, preferring that opposition should come from Britain and France.26 The ministers of Russia and Prussia endorsed Mettemich's suggestion of September 11 that Montmorency should draw up a memoire on the views and aims of France to serve as the basis for official deliberations. In drafting the desired note, he studied closely Villele's account of his talks with Wellington and concluded that the premier's views had shifted toward a more aggressive policy.27 Thus Montmorency drafted the memorandum on the Spanish Question along his own lines, encouraged by the rationalization that Villele's opposition to war had weakened. But before he finished it, the 23 Gordon memorandum to Canning: "State of Affairs and the Subjects Likely to Come under Discussion," Vienna, Sept. 22,1822, Well. Desp., I, 297-299. 24 Quoted in Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 447. 26 Ibid., p. 448. 26 Ibid., p. '449. 27 See Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 236-238, for the text of this dispatch.

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Eastern Question disrupted the conference and decided its adjournment to Verona.28 On reaching Vienna, Wellington went immediately into conference with the allied sovereigns and ministers, trying to persuade them to leave Spain to herself. He especially opposed intervention by France. To Nesselrode he declared that "England would not suffer the French to wage war on Spain." Intervention in the affairs of any country, moreover, was not a proper subject for a congress. 29 On the morning of October 1, Wellington had his first audience with Tsar Alexander since the Congress of Aix-Ia-Chapelle. As the duke had anticipated, the Russian emperor denounced Spain and portrayed it as "the headquarters of revolution and lacobinism." The King and the Royal Family, [he insisted], were in the utmost danger; ... so long as the revolution in that country should be allowed to continue, every country in Europe, and France in particular, was unsafe.30

The British minister replied that the objections of his government to interference in the internal affairs of any nation were insuperable. Britain, indeed, had considered that Austria and the Italian states had reason to fear the revolution in Naples and the secret societies which had fomented it. But the ministry never had heard of any apprehension of danger from the Spanish revolution, nor did he believe France complained of it on the score of danger. However urgent the demand of the King of Spain, it could not justify an invasion of that nation to overthrow its existing institutions. Both the Liberals and ultra-Royalists in France and Spain, and Ferdinand VII, were all trying to provoke a war between the two kingdoms. In rebuttal, the tsar, undoubtedly influenced by Metternich and Pozzo di Borgo, maintained that France could not be trusted to invade Spain; the loyalty and military quality of the French army were too questionable. He refused to depart one iota from his insistence on armed intervention, which should be a joint project of the Alliance. When Wellington informed him that France had 100,000 men on the Spanish border, his Majesty showed great dismay, because his secret agents had reported that France "had not half that number of men disposable for service in Spain." His audience with the tsar convinced Wellington that the deliberations at Verona would center almost entirely on the affairs of Spain. But the clashing views of

28 29 30

Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 3. Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 460-46l. Wellington to Canning, Vienna, Oct. 4, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 343.

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GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

France and Russia, he thought, would cancel each other, thus resulting in the decision to leave Spain alone. 31

3. The Eastern Question Since the outbreak of the Greek insurrection in April 1821, Anglo-Austrian policy in the Eastern Question had remained unchanged. This policy, it will be recalled, advocated the observance of existing treaties, prevention of a Russo-Turkish war, termination of the atrocities which attended the Greco-Turkish war, and maintenance of strict neutrality. Differences between the tsar and the sultan arising from the Russian claim to protectorship of Orthodox Christians in Turkey and over navigation of the Straits should be reconciled through mediation. If this effort succeeded in avoiding hostilities, the question of Greece might be cautiously discussed. As Castlereagh had observed in his instructions for the conference, it would be difficult not to deal with the Greek provisional government, but the London cabinet should not recognize it nor force the Greeks to submit to the Porte. Above all, England should not become involved in either dispute - RussoTurkish or Tuko-Greek - beyond the limits of good offices. 32 During the interval between the Hanoverian rendezvous and the Vienna conference, the Russo-Ottoman crisis had abated, though no solution had been found. In February 1822, Tatischev had been sent to Vienna for negotiations on the Eastern Question (March 8-April 12) which resulted in the tsar's complete acceptance in May of Metternich's proposals and the announcement that he would renew diplomatic relations with the Porte when the Principalities were completely evacuated. 33 Evacuation had begun on May 13, and on July 19, 1822, Sultan Mahmud II had appointed two Rumanians as hospodars: Gregory Ghica for Moldavia and Jonitza Stourdza for Wallachia. Pleased with these results, the tsar had proposed a conference between Russia and Turkey at Podolsk, where the Porte could announce officially the evacuation of the Principalities and the return of the Ibid., pp. 345-346. Castlereagh's Instructions, Well. Desp., I, 285-286. 33 Lebzeltern to Mettemich, st. Petersburg, May 22, 1822, Mettemich, Memoires, III, 443. For Mettemich's notes on his talks with Tatischev, and the official protocols, see ibid., pp. 431-450. Despite Capo d'Istria's recommendation that Count Pierre Tolstoy be given this mission, Alexander, much to the embarrassment of the foreign minister, chose Tatischev, whom Nesselrode had nominated. Capo d'Istria, "Ma carriere publique," Sbornik, III, 279. Tatichev returned to Vienna at the end of June to renew the conversations on the Eastern Question. Jubilant over this diplomatic triumph, Mettemich boasted that it was "the greatest victory ever won by one cabinet over another." Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 191. 31

32

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hospodars, and so make possible the renewal of direct relations. 34 Finally, on August 10, Mohammed Sadik, the Turkish foreign minister, had declared to Lord Strangford and Count Llitzow that the Ottoman Empire had complied with every demand to which Russia was entitled under existing treaties; therefore, he considered the mediation of Austria and England at an end. Any further intervention by the allied powers could delay the restoration of relations between Russia and Turkey.3s But with characteristic indifference, the Turks blandly delayed the execution of their promise to evacuate the Principalities until a Russian minister had returned to Constantinople. This rebuff, coupled with Turkish accusations that Russian agents had fomented the Greek insurrection and the renewal in August of the decree closing the Straits to commerce in grain (a measure that severely hurt the Russian wheat export trade of which Odessa was the emporium), so exasperated the tsar that his conciliatory mood of May gave way to severity during August. But though his attitude toward the Turks changed, his opinion of the Greeks did not. He arrived in Vienna on September 9, complaining that "All or most of my servants are either Greeks or Liberals. With such men, how can one avoid trouble?" 36 On September 19, 1822, Mettemich received from Strangford the protocol of a conference which he had had on August 27, with the Reis-Effendi and the Salih-Effendi (Grand Marshal of the Empire), Gianib TschaouschBachi. The chancellor gave a copy of this precis, together with other letters from Strangford, to Nesselrode, but the Russian foreign minister was afraid to show the tsar one dispatch in which the British ambassador to the Porte had complained of the activities of the Russian agent Andre Dashkoff;

34 Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vienna, Sept. 24, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Depeches inedites du chevalier de Gentz aux hospodars de Valachie, ed. Count Anton von Prokesch-Osten (Paris, 1877), II, 150; LobanovRostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 411. The last Turko-Persian war (18211823), by diverting men and material from Greece and by convincing the sultan that he should avoid hostilities with Russia at the same time, assisted Strangford in obtaining these concessions from the Porte. 35 Stuart to Bathurst, No. 246, Paris, Sept. 5, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48, quoting dispatches from Constantinople of August 10 and Vienna of August 24, 1822. On November 1, 1821, Mohammed Sadik had replaced the more moderate Hamid Bey as Reis-Effendi. Strangford to Castlereagh, No. 143, Constantinople, Nov. 10, 1821, F.O., Russia, 181/46. 36 Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vienna, Sept. 24, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Gentz, Depeches inedites, II, 152; Gordon memorandum to Canning, Vienna, Sept. 22, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 299; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 395; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 170-171, 192.

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GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

consequently, he suppressed it, thereby creating an incident which embarrassed the allies. 37 During his August 27 conference with the Reis-Effendi and Grand Marshal, Strangford had announced his mission to Vienna and had offered to inform the allied sovereigns of the Porte's views. The proces-verbal of his conversation with the Ottoman ministers, which the Russians regarded as "a romance from beginning to end," enraged the tsar by revealing Strangford's Turkophile bias. Why had a minister charged with representing Russian interests not contradicted the Turkish accusations against Russian agents? Why had Strangford seemed to accept the allegation that the Porte had remained faithful to its treaties while Russia had broken them?38 Tatischev declared impatiently: "These affairs shall be ended only by cannon fire. "39 Perceiving this hostile attitude, Mettemich feared that Tatischev and other members of the Russian delegation would destroy Strangford's reputation before his arrival in Vienna. He was alarmed, too, that unless something was done quickly to mend the damage caused by Strangford's blunder, Anglo-Austrian mediation in the East would be seriously compromised. Mettemich, therefore, came to the defense of the British diplomat and discovered Nesselrode's suppression of Strangford's report on the activities of Dashkoff. He then revealed to the tsar the entire contents of Strangford's letters and succeeded in correcting Alexander's impressions of the ambassador. As a result of this affair, the tsar condemned all his ministers who espoused the Greek cause, denouncing them for supporting a movement the success of which would prove his own ruin.4-0 Friedrich von Gentz, secretary of the conference, also was astonished at the contrast between the sentiments of the tsar and the conduct of his agents and generals on the frontiers of the Principalities. Their intrigues, as well as those of Greek emigres, Gentz and Mettemich were convinced, had caused no end of inconveniences which had resulted in the present attitude of the Porte. But Alexander was sincere in disavowing every agent who 37 Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vienna, Sept. 24, 1822, P.O., Austria, 120/54; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 3; Gentz, Depeches inidites, II, 441. 38 Ibid., pp. 144-145; Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vienna, Sept. 24, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 18, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 540; Vie1 Castel, La Restauration, XI, 450-455. 39 Ibid., p. 457. 40 Gordon memorandum to Canning, Vienna, Sept. 22, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 298299; Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vienna, Sept. 24, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Viel-Caste1, La Restauration, XI, 457; Gentz, Depeches inedites, II, 146.

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obstructed his policy of restoring order in the Principalities. Indeed, he dismissed Pini, the Russian consul general at Bucharest, capital of Wallachia, and Pisani at Jassy, capital of Moldavia. Pini was replaced by Minciaky, while the Jassy post was discontinued; thus Minciaky became in 1822 consul general for both Principalities. Gentz, who read the instructions sent to Minciaky, certified that they conformed to the avowed principles of the tsar.41 One accomplishment of the Vienna conference was, therefore, the purging of the Russian diplomatic and consular staff in the Balkans in the interest of peace. On September 26, two days after Strangford's arrival in Vienna, Nesselrode submitted to the conference a memoire on the Eastern Question in which the tsar expressed deep regret that so little progress had been made in the last eighteen months in bringing the Porte "to satisfy the just demands of Russia." Turkey, moreover, had adopted measures which paralyzed the commerce and prosperity of Russia's southern provinces. The note concluded with a list of new conditions which must be met before diplomatic relations with the sultan were restored. 42 Concerning Greece, the Porte was given a choice of action: either enter into direct negotiations with Russia and her allies for granting toleration and amnesty to those Greeks who returned to their former allegiance, as called for by the Austrian memorandum of April 19, 1822; or prove "by a series of deeds" that the Greek religion would be respected and peace re-established in Greece on a just and durable basis.43 Nesselrode insisted that the Porte must completely evacuate Wallachia and Moldavia and permit Russian agents to verify that the measures taken conformed to existing treaties. 44 Relative to commerce and navigation, Russia exhorted the Porte to revoke "all measures taken to restrict the commerce and free navigation of the Black Sea." Turkey again was offered two alternatives:

41 Ibid., pp. 153-155; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 407. Both Pini and Pisani were Greeks, as, indeed, were nearly all of the Russian consuls in various cities of the Ottoman Empire. Prior to his appointment, Minciaky had gained experience in dealing with the Porte as the Russian Chancellor of Commercial Affairs in Constantinople. Stephen P. H. Duggan, The Eastern Question: A Study of Diplomacy, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, XIV, No.3 (1902),623. 42 Nesselrode to Montmorency: Copy of Note, Vienna, Sept. 26, 1822, France et les etats divers de l'Europe, 1822: Le congres de Verone, A.A.E., Vol. 723. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. The Principalities had been occupied in March 1821 and were not completely evacuated until 1826.

52

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

(1) Either accept the Passage [through the Straits] of Sicilian, Portuguese, Spanish, and other vessels [sailing under their own flags], (2) or else respect the [Russian] flag which has protected these ships, this custom being sanctioned by long practice.4l'I

This memoire was not received calmly by the conference. It annoyed France and Prussia, because they had thought the Russo-Turkish dispute indefinitely adjourned and had regarded the Greek Question as nearly ended. Lord Strangford protested to Mettemich that: A victim was necessary for offended Russian pride, and they wanted to offer me up as the holocaust! But the sacrifice shall not be killed without resistance, and the calf, while struggling, shall shake the temple. They have thrown down the gauntlet! Well, I shall take it up, and since they have made me the champion of the Turks, I shall play the role! 46

True to his word, Strangford, in conversations with the allied ministers, insinuated that the Turks were completely right and the Russians wrong, and that Baron Stroganov was the real culprit responsible for the Greek revolt. Astonished by his tactlessness, and fearful that it would undermine the Anglo-Austrian entente in the East, Mettemich, for the second time during the Vienna deliberations, undertook to repair damage caused by Strangford's blunders. To achieve this end he resorted to duplicity, that subtle and effective weapon of a skillful diplomat. He assured Nesselrode that he had answered, as circumstances required, the unjust slanders of the Porte. No one would believe Russia guilty of fostering "revolutionary insurrection." To Strangford, on the other hand, the chancellor deplored the temper of the Russian note, severely criticized Tatischev, and attributed to him the unexpected change in the tsar's attitude. 47 Believing tension too high for serious negotiations, Metternich began to press for an adjournment to Verona. But first, Nesselrode's note had to be answered. The Austrian reply, delivered on September 30, praised the tsar's conduct and the moderation of his memoire, promising support for its proposals. Metternich regretted that the Porte was not "intelligent enough to distinguish the policy of the powers from the activity of a sect whose great objective was to disunite the allied courts and especially the two imperial courts." 48 Prussia and France also replied on September 30. The Prussian 45 46 47

48

Ibid. Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722. Ibid. Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 458.

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note was similar to the Austrian, while the French paper was vague and general. Montmorency promised only that France would cooperate "to inspire in the Porte dispositions capable of assuring the re-establishment of good understanding and diplomatic relations." 49 Wellington received the Russian note upon his arrival in Vienna on September 29. His reply, transmitted two days later, was an apology for Lord Strangford which was not likely to please the Russian. court. The Iron Duke declared that the ambassador deserved the tsar's commendation for past concessions obtained from the Porte. Strangford regretfully could not deny the Turkish accusations against Russian agents in the Balkans, since he had no proof that they were false. The tsar, Wellington affinned, was not shown the dispatch which accompanied Strangford's precis of the August 27th conference, because it named the Russian agents. If his Majesty had known the facts, surely his sense of justice "would have prevented his passing a censure on this minister." If Metternich were annoyed that Strangford had come to Vienna without bearing good news, Wellington, notwithstanding his defense of the ambassador, thought he had made a "false movement" in coming at all.5() But Wellington, convinced that Russia had a case regarding Turkish restrictions on Black Sea commerce, desired Strangford to be more forceful in pressing for a settlement of this issue. Consequently, he requested Canning to urge the sultan to grant the petition of those powers which were seeking permission to pass the Straits under their own flags. If these negotiations were successful, the just rights of the Porte would be preserved and Russian commerce would be placed upon "a better footing than it was before, inasmuch as a legal commerce is more secure than one under a false flag." The London cabinet, of course, preferred this alternative to the former Turkish policy of permitting ships to sail the Straits under false flags. a practice which had hurt the British carrying trade. 51 After the Russian note had been answered, the allied sovereigns and ministers were ready to leave for Verona. All of Wellington's efforts to Ibid., pp. 458-459. Boislecomte, AA.E., 722; Wellington to Nesselrode, Vienna, Oct. 2, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 337-339; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 18, 1822, ibid., p. 540; Wellington's note paralleled closely the arguments used by Metternich in defending Strangford, as Stewart had recorded them on September 24, 1822. It is probable that Gordon conveyed this information to the duke at Munich. Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, Sept. 24, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Green, "Castlereagh's Instructions," TRHS, 3rd ser., VII, 123. 51 Wellington to Canning, Vienna, Oct. 4, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 353; Canning to Wellington, London, Oct. 25, 1822, ibid., pp. 431-433; Strangford to Wellington, Verona, Oct. 29, 1822, ibid., pp. 469-470. 49

50

54

GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

delay their departure failed, and on October 2, the mass exodus from Vienna began. 4. Italian Questions Since the affairs of Italy had been reserved for the Congress of Verona, they received little consideration at Vienna. It will be recalled that the "avowed and known" purpose of this congress was to discuss the situation in Naples and Sardinia-Piedmont. 52 Metternich continued to pretend that Italian questions would be the first to occupy the attention of its sessions, a deception which apparently achieved some success. 53 But at Vienna France raised two Italian issues: the evacuation of Naples and Sardinia and the complex and delicate Charles Albert affair, which stemmed from the ambivalent role that prince had played in the Piedmontese insurrection. Charles Albert, Prince of Carignan, was a scion of the cadet line of the House of Savoy and heir-apparent to the Sardinian throne. A youth of twenty-two at the time of the revolt, he was French educated and a veteran of Napoleon's army. His political views were liberal and anti-Austrian, but by nature he was a waverer. When a delegation of conspirators, led by Santorre di Santarosa, invited Charles Albert on March 6,1821, to lead the struggle for a united Italy, free from Austrian domination, he had vacillated between approval of the plan, rejection, and conditional espousal of it. On the morning of March 7, he had consented to join the movement, but with night came sober reflection and disenchantment. The next day, the prince had withdrawn his support of the conspiracy and had demonstrated his fidelity to the House of Savoy by warning King Victor Emmanual I of the impending crisis. Disturbed by this volte-face. Santarosa on the 9th had countermanded the revolt, but too late to prevent the garrison at Alessandria from launching the insurrection that very night, March 9-10. Two day later, the soldiers and university students of Turin had followed suit, and on March 12 Victor Emmanuel had abdicated in favor of his brother Charles Felix, Duke of Genevois, rather than accept the Spanish Constitution of 1812 and war against Austria, as Santarosa demanded. But Charles Felix was in Modena at the time. Until his return to Turin, Victor Emmanuel had entrusted the regency to his cousin Charles Albert who, immediately yielding to the demands of the rebels, had proclaimed on the 13th the Spanish constitution, though subject to the approval of Charles Felix. There seems little doubt that the regent sincerely believed this action necessary to save the throne for the new king and thereby to protect his own inherit52 68

See above, pp. 3-5. Blacas to Serre, Rome, Oct. 13, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, IV, 505.

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ance. But four days later (March 17) an envoy of Charles Felix had arrived from Modena with a manifesto rejecting the constitution and ordering Charles Albert to repair to Novara where General Count Victor Amadeus Della Torre (or de La Tour) had mobilized about half the Piedmontese army which remained loyal to the king. On the 21st. the prince had obeyed. riding at the head of his cavalry regiment. Upon his arrival in Novara. however. he had received another order from Charles Felix. exiling him to Florence where his father-in-law Ferdinand III (who was Emperor Francis I's brother), ruled as Grand Duke of Tuscany.54 Soon it was rumored in Turin that the king was determined to dispossess the Prince of Carignan. The general feeling at the Sardinian court was that the prince's infant son should be educated by the king and designated as his successor. These troubled waters were made even more turbulent by the intrigues of Mettemich, who since 1814 had wanted to exclude Charles Albert in favor of the reactionary Archduke Francis N of Modena. the Austrian emperor's first cousin. That the chancellor had not completely abandoned this project is indicated by the violent attacks which Count Heinrich von Bombelles, the new Austrian minister at Florence. aimed at the heir-apparent on the eve of the Vienna conference. 55 By September 1822. the Charles Albert affair had long received the serious attention of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia. The Paris cabinet, alarmed over the possibility of an agreement which would increase Austrian influence in Italy, supported the prince, alleging that the doctrine of legitimacy required the recognition of his claim. But this appeal to principle notwithstanding, France's Italian policy was conceived realistically with due regard for the traditional Bourbon interest in the House of Savoy. French 54 The best discussion in English of Charles Albert's conduct in March 1821 is that of Bolton King, History of Italian Unity, Being a Political History of Italy from 1814 to 1871 (London, 1899), I, 31-34, and II, App. A., pp. 384-385; two excellent accounts in Italian are: Cesare Spellanzon, Storia del Risorgimento e deU'Unita d'ltalia (Milan, 1933-1951), I, 848-854, 857-860, and Nicomede Bianchi, Storia documentata della diplomazia europea in ltalia daU'anno 1814 all'anno 1861 (Turin, 18651872), II, 339-340; cf. Pietro Vayra, La leggenda di una corona: Carlo Alberto e Ie perfidie austriache (Turin, 1896), pp. 135, 141, 259; for a contemporary report, see Rodolgo de Maistre, "Simple recit des evenements arrives en Piemont dans les mois de mars et d'avril 1821, par un officier piemontais," in Gli Scritti di Carlo Alberto suI moto piemontese del 1821, ed. Vittorio Fiorini (Rome, 1900), pp. 61-157. Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 117-118, gives a good, brief analysis based largely on Austrian sources deposited in the Staatsarchiv in Vienna. 55 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 67; William Hill to Castlereagh, No. 15, Genoa, Aug. 18, 1821, F.O., Sardinia, 67/63; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 227n-228n. On March 14, 1820, a son named Victor Emmanuel had been born to Charles Albert and Maria Theresa of Tuscany.

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GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS

agents, moveover, in their zeal to combat the Austrian preponderance in Italy (especially in a kingdom situated on France's southeastern doorstep), sometimes committed acts which, to say the least, violated diplomatic etiquette. Duke Emeric-Joseph de Dalberg, the French minister at Turin, indeed had assisted the Piedmontese conspirators by permitting them to hold secret meetings in the French embassy; and the attitude of the Marquis de La Tour du Pin, the French charge, became so obnoxious that Baron Friedrich Binder von Kriegelstein, the Austrian minister, even accused him of having incited the insurrection. When news of the revolt reached Paris, Pasquier dreamed of substituting the French charte for the Spanish constitution in Sardinia and Naples. Toward this end, he suggested Anglo-French mediation in both kingdoms, but Castlereagh's rejection of the proposal and the collapse of the Neapolitan revolution quickly foiled this scheme. France, of course, did not instigate the Piedmontese revolt, but her policy in general and the compromising activities of Dalberg in particular raised again the spectre of French interference in the Apennine Peninsula. 56 Russia, no less than France, sought to undermine Habsburg hegemony in Italy. The Russian legation at Turin especially was active in trying to increase its influence in Sardinia, while thwarting the schemes of Metternich. It was Count Georges de Mocenigo, the tsar's minister, who had obtained the reduction of Austria's occupation force in Piedmont from 15,000 to 12,000 men. 57 Thus when the news of Charles Albert's fate reached st. Petersburg, Nesselrode immediately directed this able diplomat to secure the speedy return of the prince by pressing Charles Felix to grant him a full pardon. But much to Mocenigo's indignation, his remonstrances were ignored. Even George Frederick Petitpierre, the Prussian minister at Turin, joined the ranks of the prince's defenders, despite the fact that the Berlin cabinet in 1822 could not afford openly to gainsay Austria. Petitpierre, therefore, covertly assured William Hill, his British colleague, of his government's sympathy for Charles Albert and requested him to exert his influence in behalf of the prince.58 Charles Albert, in his own defense, stoutly maintained that he never had 56 Hill to Castlereagh, No. 20, Genoa, Sept. 8, 1821, EO., Sardinia, 67/63; VielCastel, La Restauration, XI, 461; Spellanzon, Storia del Risorgimento, I, 843; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 119n and 162; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 335-336. 57 Hill to Castlereagh, Nos. 26 and 27, Turin, Nov. 13 and 25, 1821, F.O., Sardinia. 67/63. In 1816 the tsar, acting on the appeal of Sardinia, had forced Austria to abandon her claims to Alessandria, the region of Novara, and the Simplon road. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 359. 58 Hill to Castlereagh, Nos. 6, 24, and 26, Turin, May 28, Oct. 24, and Nov. 13, 1821, F.O., Sardinia, 67/63. Mocenigo, a native of Zante, one of the Ionian Islands, was a Greek in Russian service.

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57

consented to join the Piedmontese rebels and wrote an historical memoire to that effect which he showed first to Duke Pierre Louis de Blacas, the ultra-Royalist French ambassador at Rome, and then to Mocenigo. Both were impressed with the justice of his cause as was ex-king Victor Emmanuel, who pardoned his cousin for his actions during the interval of a few days. But Charles Felix remained adamant. A judicious appraisal of the Sardinian king's position, however, should take into account the fact that his realm was occupied by 12,000 Austrians. Had he done anything inimical to Habsburg interests, retribution would have been swift. There is no doubt that his first loyalty was to Sardinia, for on more than one occasion he declared to the allied sovereigns his determination to resist any interference with the internal affairs of his government.59 At Vienna, France alone was free to raise the question of the Prince of Carignan and to support him openly. Russia pretended disinterest in this affair. For the sake of the solidarity of the three eastern powers, the tsar could not display the dirty linen of the Alliance by quarreling with Austria over Italy. Metternich found this affair quite disconcerting, for he did not dare avow his design of substituting an Austrian archduke for Charles Albert in order to extend Austrian control over the strongest of the Italian states. Although this policy did not change at Vienna, it appears that the chancellor's opinion of the Prince of Carignan did. Metternich at first believed in Charles Albert's guilt but later came to the conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to prove his complicity. In short, he was no longer certain, but still suspicious. GO In reply to the French foreign minister, therefore, he circulated a confidential memoire, asserting that to dispossess the Prince de Carignan would be an offensive and false policy, but the King [Charles Felix] seems to be decided on it; he is very tenacious in his ideas; this question is highlyembarrassing. 61

On this point, Bemstorff confided to Montmorency that the duty of King Charles-Felix was to tell the Congress that his heir-presumptive threatened to overthrow one day all that had been done for the happiness of his people; it was necessary that he be judicially deposed, or that he renounce for himself the right of succession.6:2 59 Hill to Castlerea.gh, No. 15, Genoa, Aug. 18, and No. 24, Turin, Oct. 24, 1821, ibid.; Vayra, Carlo Alberto, p. 259. The evidence indicates that the prince was lying, but in any case, his adherence to the conspiracy was only momentary. King, Italian Unity, II, 384-385. 60 Vayra, Carlo Alberto, pp. 135 and 141; Metternich, Memoires, III, 526-257. 61 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 67. 82 Ibid.; d. Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI,461-462.

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In September 1822, Metternich apparently hoped that Charles Albert could be persuaded to renounce his right of succession voluntarily, but because of the strong protests of France and the milder opposition of Britain and Russia, he was willing to postpone a decision on this compromising question until the Congress of Verona. His views and those of Bernstorff, however, convinced Montmorency that Austria and Prussia were using Charles Felix to further their own ends. 63 But how can the apparent contradiction between the actions of the Prussian foreign minister at Vienna and those of his minister at Turin be explained? Had Austria forced Prussia to reverse her policy, or was Prussia attempting to conceal her support of Charles Albert from Austria? Subsequent developments at Verona indicate that Prussia was following an independent policy in behalf of the House of SavoyCarignan. The Charles Albert affair was closely associated with the evacuation of Piedmont, for once Sardinian soil was cleared of Austrian troops, Charles Felix would have a freer hand in dealing with the succession rights of his cousin. To obtain this end he needed the support of one of the great powers of Europe; consequently, he appealed to London and Paris to support the complete evacuation of his realm at the Congress of Verona. At Vienna, however, Metternich showed little disposition to reduce the occupying army in Piedmont or Naples, much less to withdraw it from either kingdom, an attitude for which the impecunious condition of Habsburg finances was partly responsible. So long as these troops remained on foreign soil, the Vienna treasury was relieved of the considerable burden of supporting them. 64 The evacuation of Naples presented a different problem, for Ferdinand I considered Austrian bayonets necessary to prop up his insecure throne, despite the fact that the cost of maintaining 52,000 soldiers was ruining the economy and thus undermining the absolute government they were suppose to protect. On the eve of the Vienna talks, Prince Alvaro Ruffo, the Neapolitan premier (President of the Council of State), had tried in vain Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 67; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 161. Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 67; Stuart to Canning, No. 257, Paris, Sept. 19, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 462; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 120-121. When Count Johann Philipp Stadion, the Austrian finance minister, learned of the Piedmontese revolt, he advised Metternich to withdraw the Austrian army from Naples for home defense and to forswear an invasion of Sardinia. His reaction was one of "outraged despair." He remonstrated with the chancellor "to tell him 'for the love of God' just how this was to be paid for. A repetition of the miracle of the feeding of the five thousand ... would be required to do it." Ibid., p. 120. 63

64

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59

to float a loan from Great Britain to finance his government through 1822 and 1823. He admitted that the cost of the Austrian army alone took twothirds of the kingdom's annual income, while the interest on the national debt accounted for another one-fourth of the government's revenues. The occupation costs amounted to 11,450,000 ducats (c. $ 24,761,000), and the yearly deficit by the end of 1822 had reached 1,550,000 ducats (c. $ 3,375,000). Taxation was so heavy that it could not be increased. Despite this serious financial crisis, Ruffo still thought the continued presence of the expensive Austrian guard was necessary. With Metternich, Ferdinand, and Ruffo, all opposing the evacuation of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, this subject would not have become a problem for allied negotiation, had it not been for the interest which France and, later, England took in reducing the size of the Austrian army of occupation.65 Nothing was decided at Vienna on Italian questions, which were carried over to the Congress of Verona for their final disposition. The Vienna talks, however, did underscore the strong opposition of France and the weaker resistance of Russia and Britain to Metternich's Italian policy. 5. A Retrospect

Recent historians of European diplomacy either have ignored completely the Vienna conference of September 1822 or have relied upon the traditional interpretation of Sirs Adolphus W. Ward and Charles K. Webster that this reunion was a mere preliminary to the more brilliant Congress of Verona. 66 But that which appears obvious is not always true. An analysis of the Vienna conference leaves some doubt that the conventional conclusion is altogether justified. While Castlereagh's suicide, the late arrival of Wellington in Vienna, and fundamental disunity among the allies, all combined to stalemate the discussion of Spanish and Italian problems, a signal and significant achievement was scored in the negotiations concerning the Eastern Question which contributed to the preservation of peace between Russia and Turkey for six more years. Metternich at last had realized his dream of making the Austrian capital a "center [foyer] of deliberation" on this issue. 115 William Hamilton to the Foreign Office, No. 57, Naples, Sept. 1, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Serre to Villele, Naples, Sept. 26, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, IV, 491; Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 27, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 307-308; VielCastel, La Restauration, XI, 462. 68 For example, neither Renouvin, Le XIXe siecle: 1815-1871, nor Albrecht-Carrie, Diplomatic History of Europe, even mentions the Vienna conference; nor does Sweet, Gentz, despite the fact that Gentz was secretary of the conference and exercised great influence on Austrian policy in the Near East.

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Castlereagh's death had deprived the chancellor of a close personal friend and staunch ally, whose influence on the tsar was great, but so complete was the Anglo-Austrian entente that his absence neither stalemated nor seriously impaired joint efforts to preserve the status quo in the Near East. The decisions reached on the Eastern Question at the Hanover rendezvous and its sequel, the Vienna conference, reversed the Troppau Protocol, which had sanctioned armed intervention in the internal affairs of independent states. In the name of the Alliance, Alexander, once more "grouped" at Vienna as he had been at Laibach, was restrained from declaring war on the Porte for the sake either of the sultan's Greek subjects, or the Danubian Principalities, or Black Sea commerce. The purging of the Russian diplomatic and consular staff in the Balkans and the restoration of Strangford to the tsar's confidence were other accomplishments which promoted the cause of peace. Since the Congress of Verona subsequently contributed nothing to alter decisions which had previously been taken, its role in the Russo-Turkish dispute was distinctly secondary to the Vienna conference. The special interests of Britain in the Near East had required a return to active participation in the councils of the Alliance. George Canning was, of course, aware of this fact and mindful, too, of the unexpected circumstances which had resulted in his own ascendancy and the long delay of the duke's mission. England would be embarrassed if four of the allied ministers waited three weeks for the fifth and then set out for Italy without him. It was essential to British prestige, Canning thought, that Wellington not return ignored and empty-handed from a conference which his predecessor had helped to plan and of which, albeit reluctantly, the cabinet had approved. 67 Augustus G. Stapleton's opinion that "no British minister would have attended the Italian congress, if Canning had been in office three months earlier" is often quoted. 68 Several recent historians, including the late Harold Temperley, have repeated this conclusion, and in so doing have ignored important facts. Not till the end of July had the London cabinet endorsed participation at the Vienna conference, and no plenipotentiary had been accredited to the proposed congress at Verona until the end of 67 Lieven-Liverpool interview, London, n.d., quoted in Hyde, Princess Lieven, p. 143 (Lieven's conversation with the British prime minister took place in August 1822 soon after Castlereagh's death.); Wellington to Canning, Vienna, Sept. 30, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 320; Webster, Castlereagh, p. 48l. 68 Stapleton, Life of Canning, II, 36; Temperley, Canning, p. 48n; Bourquin, Sainte Alliance, p. 321; Kaufman, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., pp. 138-140; Marriott, Castlereagh, p. 342.

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September. The original plan had called for a British representative to be in the Austrian capital by September 7 and to return home immediately after the conclusion of deliberations which were expected to last about three weeks. 69 When Wellington left London, neither he nor Canning nor any other member of the cabinet foresaw that he subsequently would proceed from Vienna to Verona, thereby enabling Britain to take part in a congress for the first time since Aix-Ia-Chapelle. It appears, therefore, that the unforeseen accidents of Castlereagh's suicide and Wellington's long illness were largely responsible for the duke's presence at the Italian congress. That national rivalry had weakened the Alliance was apparent from the conversations at Vienna, Austria (secretly), Prussia, and Britain, all opposed armed intervention in Spain, while the London cabinet objected even to the exertion of moral or diplomatic pressure. Tsar Alexander wanted to lead a Russian or, at least, an allied army across the Pyrenees, but Villele and Montmorency strongly resisted any such project. The premier, however, desired to reserve to France complete independence of action, while the foreign minister wanted to cooperate with the Alliance. Faced with the equally repugnant alternatives of a French army in Spain or the transit of Russian troops through Austrian territory, Mettemich was on the horns of a dilemma. He did not want war, being apprehensive that a victorious France could upset the balance of power established at Vienna in 1815, but he wanted even less a rupture with Russia. The chancellor, therefore, resorted to duplicity: to the French, he decried the tsar's bellicose attitude; to the Russians, he questioned the loyalty of the French army. Spinxlike, he watched while France and Britain dashed the tsar's dream of Cossacks in Andalusia. By such oblique means he hoped to allay all threat of war, whether by France or Russia. Despite the failure of Wellington's efforts to dissuade the tsar from interfering in Spain and to prevent the removal of the deliberations to Italy, his optimism did not dim. He predicted that no action would be taken against Spain and looked forward to the new opportunity offered by the Congress of Verona for winning acceptance of British policy. Even Villele admitted that reports from Vienna had not justified his expectations; he now doubted that the allies would use force to settle the Spanish Question. Still the premier viewed the approaching congress with foreboding, for he

69 Castlereagh to Metternich, London, June 22 and July 29, 1822, in Webster, Castlereagh, App. D, pp. 546, 548-549; ibid., p. 488.

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feared the eastern powers would deny France freedom of action in dealing with Spain. 70 Such disharmony of interests, clashing personalities, and conflicting policies made it impossible to achieve concerted action at Vienna on any major issue, except the Eastern Question. This impasse was a portend of events to come, for the agenda at Verona was determined largely by deliberations in the Austrian capital. Just as the Troppau conference had adjourned to Laibach to continue its debates, so the Vienna conference repaired to Verona to complete its work.

70 Stuart to Canning, Nos. 269 and 271, Paris, Oct. 3 and 7, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48.

PART II

THE CONGRESS AT WORK: OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1822

CHAPTER III

FROM VIENNA TO VERONA: PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONGRESS The plenipotentiones of ... [France] must, above all, avoid presenting themselves at the Congress as reporters of the affairs of Spain.... This role might have been suitable to Austria at.. . Laybach, because she was determined to invade Naples .... But we are not determined to declare war on Spain . .. , [and] we are not under the necessity of declaring war .... Villele. 1

1. Exodus The exodus from Vienna began on October 2, with the departure of Francis I, accompanied by the Austrian delegation and two distinguished Russian diplomats: Nesselrode and Pozzo di Borgo. Arriving at Salzburg that night, they found Count and Madame Lieven waiting to join their party. As they passed through southern Bavaria on the road to Innsbruck, Metternich stopped at Tegernsee on the 6th for a conference with King Max Joseph. He and the rulers of Baden and Saxe-Weimar, having granted their subjects constitutions under Article XIII of the German Federal Act (June 8, 1815). feared that the Congress of Verona would be a sequel to that of Carlsbad (August-September 1819). As spokesman for the liberal German princes. Max Joseph had been delegated to obtain Mettemich's promise that their political institutions would not be disturbed. Confident of the support of France and Russia. the Bavarian king ably carried out his mission. The Austrian chancellor. in a show of moderation. assured him that the Congress would not deliberate on the general state of Germany nor on any particular state of the Confederation. But he denounced the Bavarian constitution and the revolutionary sect whose influence in the Munich cabinet was incompatible with the peace of monarchial Europe.2 As Paul W. Schroeder has observed:

Instructions de M. de Villele, Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 50-5l. Private letter, Innsbruck, Oct. 9, 1822, Metternich, Memoires III, No. 604; 421; Metternich to Wellington, Salzburg, Oct. 3, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 340; Alphonse de Beauchamp, "Preliminaires du congres de Verone et de la guerre d'Espagne," La Foudre, Oct. 25, 1822. VII, 99; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 462-463. 1

2

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THE CONGRESS AT WORK

Metternich objected to all such constitutions not merely because they were representative, and hence incompatible with absolutism, but also because they were national, and thus incompatible with the structure of the Austrian Empire. A national constitution, Metternich believed, would be the death of Austria .... But if it was in the best interest of Austria not to have a unified constitution, other German states should not set a bad example by having one .... 3 The next delegation to leave Vienna was the Russian. On October 3, the tsar took the road to Verona with the rest of his suite which included generals Prince Alexander Sergeievich Menshikov and Prince Nikita Volkonsky, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Emperor's aide-decamp. Because Alexander had shown leanings toward Catholicism, his mother, Empress Marie, had made him promise that while in Italy he would not visit Rome. Before leaving the Austrian capital, he had had several meetings with the abbot Prince Hohenlohe, who declared that the tsar was the annointed of God "to give peace and quietude to the peoples of Europe." Nonetheless, he did not hesitate to spend a whole evening talking with William Allen, the famous Quaker abolitionist, who had come to Vienna expressly for the purpose. 4 Thus Alexander, as he approached Verona, was again in a mystical and religious mood similar to that which had inspired the Holy Alliance in 1815.5 Montmorency, like Wellington, lacked instructions to go to Verona. Not having received an answer to his request for positive orders by October 4, the foreign minister repaired to Innsbruck to await them. Finally on the 9th, the premier's command arrived, directing him to follow the same course as the British plenipotentiary. Again France paid England the compliment of imitating her.6 Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 16-17, Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, pp. 395-397. 5 Professor E. J. Knapton convincingly demonstrates that the Holy Alliance did not result from Baroness Julie von Kriidener's mystical influence on Alexander. In a well-documented article, he contends that: "The Treaty of Holy Alliance must in the broadest sense find some place in the long category of proposals to secure the peace of Europe by means other than the sword." The document was written by Alexander and shown to Baroness von Kriidener only after he had completed it. It stemmed from the tsar's reaction to contemporary social and political forces, to recollections of Sully's Great Design, Saint Pierre's Project of Perpetual Peace, and the writings of many mystics with which Alexander was familiar. Finally, Knapton maintains that the Treaty of Holy Alliance was the sequel to the "negotiations undertaken between Russia and England in the autumn of 1804 which led eventually to the forming of the Third Coalition." E. J. Knapton, "Origins of the Treaty of Holy Alliance," History, new ser., XXVI (1942), 132-135. 8 Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 4, 1822, quoted in Viel-Castel, La Restauralion, XI, 463; Villele to Mme Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 14, 1822, Recamier, Correspondance, I, 443. 3

4

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67

Wellington and Lord Stewart, it will be recalled, had received their orders to attend the Congress on October 3, the day of the tsar's departure. Stewart's instructions were the same as those he had carried to Troppau and Laibach: observe only. Before leaving Vienna, he had resigned his ambassadorship and was going to Verona to await his Majesty's orders. It is not true that his resignation was caused by Canning's ascendancy. Bathurst's Circular of September 16, telling of his appointment, did not reach Vienna until the 25th, but Stewart (or Lord Londonderry as he became upon the death of Castlereagh, his half-brother), had tried to resign before this date. On September 20, he had written George IV, stating that after eleven years in the diplomatic corps and eight years at Vienna, he wished to return home to claim his brother's inheritance. On October 15, Canning consented to his retirement from the Vienna embassy. Stewart received this dispatch at Verona on the 29th and returned to England in January 1823.7 While Wellington was in the midst of preparations for the journey to Verona, William Allen entered his apartment and requested the duke's assistance in getting to the Congress. He must go, Allen declared, to crusade for the abolition of the slave trade throughout the world. For this cause, he carried an appeal from Wilberforce to Tsar Alexander, but because Austria had blocked entry into Verona to all except official delegates, he could not continue his quest. Wellington, to assist Allen's mission, made him an official courier, and in that capacity, he rode all the way to Verona in the stage just in front of the duke. The departure of Wellington at 1:00 P.M., October 5, completed the Vienna exodus of major plenipotentiaries, although Stewart, accompanied by Strangford and Gordon, joined his Grace in Verona at the end of October.s 7 Stewart to George IV, Vienna, Sept. 20, 1822, in Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 225n; Stewart to Liverpool, Vienna, Sept. 25, 1822, ibid., pp. 225n-226n; Stewart to Canning, Verona, Oct. 29, 1822, ibid., 226n; ibid., 224, 263-265; Stewart to Canning, No.1, Vienna, Sept. 26, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54. Although Stewart later seized upon Canning as a scapegoat, the fact remains that he was tired of public service and wanted to retire to the estate left him by Castlereagh, valued at £80,000. He had ample opportunity to return to public life thereafter, but did not. In 1835 he was appointed ambassador to Russia, but resigned before leaving England as a consequence of criticism of his appointment in Parliament. S Wellington to Canning, Vienna, Oct. 4, and Verona, Nov. 18, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 354, 539, and 542; British Diplomatic Representatives, 1789-1852, Camden 3rd Ser., Vol. L, ed. S. T. Bindoff, E. F. Malcolm Smith, and C. K. Webster (London, 1934), pp. 14-15, 168; Buchan, Sword of State, pp. 54-55, erroneously reports that William Wilberforce accompanied Wellington to Verona; G. R. Gleig, Life of Arthur, Duke of Wellington (London, 1903), p. 300. Before his Grace left Vienna, Camereiro, the Spanish charge d'affaires, called on him to discuss British policy toward Spain and to

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THE CONGRESS AT WORK

2. The Canning Instructions While the allied monarchs and ministers deliberated in the Austrian capital, developments were taking place in London and Paris which profoundly influenced not only the forthcoming Congress but also the fate of the European Pentarchy itself. Convinced by reports from Vienna and Paris that the instructions carried by the British plenipotentiary were inadequate, Canning drafted a series of notes in September and October which modified British policy toward Italy, the Near East, Spain, and South America, and contributed to England's break with the Alliance Stewart's dispatch of September 12, as aforesaid, prompted the foreign secretary to direct Wellington to Verona. The duke's dispatches, and especially Gordon's memoire of September 22, 1822, considerably influenced Canning's thinking, but the immediate cause of his directive of the 27th to Wellington was the A'Court Affair. Early in September 1822, Sir William A'Court was sent to Madrid to replace Lionel C. Hervey as British ambassador. During 1820 and 1821, A'Court, while minister at Naples, had recognized the Neapolitan constitutional government and had criticized Austrian intervention. As a result of Metternich's protests, Castlereagh in February 1822 had replaced him with William R. Hamilton. 9 When the news reached Vienna that A'Court now was going to Madrid, the continental powers were shocked. On the morning of September 12, Metternich, Nesselrode, and even Montmorency remonstrated with Stewart, demanding that A'Court be stopped. His mission, they declared, could be construed as hostile to the Alliance. Surprised assure Wellington that the Madrid government was anxious to maintain cordial relations with England. As the two had known each other since 1815, when the duke was British ambassador at Paris and Camereiro, secretary to the Spanish embassy, Wellington spoke frankly, declaring that if that was the object of Spain, she must refrain from provoking 'revolutionary disturbances in France, and must not interfere in the affairs of other countries." For his part, the charge complained that France was assisting rebels in Spain and that the allied ministers were encouraging the Urgel Regency. This was the whole of the conversation. But Austrian spies reported this visit to Metternich, and later at Verona, the rumor spread throughout the diplomatic corps that the Cortes had sent Camereiro to the Congress to offer England commercial concessions in return for support against France. Not only was the report totally false, but Camereiro never was in Verona. Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 546-547; cf. Gleig, Wellington, pp. 301-302, which, however, spells the Spaniard's name, Carnacero, and does not give his position. 9 A'Court's letter of recall is dated Jan. 16, 1822, but it was not presented until February 11. Hamilton, who was appointed as his successor on February 12, arrived in Naples on April 1, 1822, F.O., King's Letter Bks., 90/45; P.O., Miscellanea, Ser. I, 95/453; ibid., 95/680.

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at the commotion A'Court's appointment had caused, Stewart requested Stuart, the British ambassador at Paris, to detain him there until London had been informed of allied reaction. But A'Court had passed through the French capital on the 11 th, twelve days before the arrival of Stewart's dispatch. 10 On the morning of September 26, Baron Philipp von Neumann, the Austrian charge d'affaires, and Baron Heinrich Wilhelm von Werther, the Prussian minister, called on Canning to protest the appoinment of A'Court to the Madrid embassy, alleging that his mission could create the impression of disunion among the allies. Although absent in person, Baron Paul Andreiivitch Nicolay, the Russian first secretary, sent through his colleagues a similar note of protest and thus joined them in this remonstrance. They requested Canning to recall him before he reached his destination. At this point in the interview, Viscount Charles Demartin de Marcellus, first secretary of the French embassy, arrived and seemed disappointed at finding the others there; however, he supported the representations of his colleagues. The foreign secretary countered their arguments be asserting that he did not see why so much importance was assigned to a new ambassador to Spain. Hervey had been relieved only because of poor health. Canning treated the matter as lightly as possible, since he intended to do nothing about it. But the A'Court Affair aroused his suspicions, and he correctly perceived in it evidence that the allied sovereigns were contemplating a public declaration on Spain. The attempt of the French charge to make a separate communication indicated, Canning thought, "some shade of difference between the views of France and those of the other Allied powers." 11 The new foreign secretary's insight into the motives behind this allied demarche led him to send additional instructions to Wellington. On September 27, in the first of a series of notes, Canning modified British policy toward Italy, the Near East, and Spain. He relaxed Castlereagh's "keep silent" admonition about Italy and left the duke free to offer suggestions on the evacuation of Piedmont and to request a reduction of the Austrian garrison in Naples. If he thought Austrian troops still necessary, he should revert to his original instructions to keep silent on Italian questions, so long 10 Stewart to Bathurst, No.6, Vienna, Sept. 12, 1822, F.O., Austria, 120/54; Stuart to Canning, No. 260, Paris, Sept. 23, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Montmorency to Chateaubriand, Vienna, Sept. 11, 1822, Antioche, Chateaubriand. pp. 373-374. 11 Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 27, 1822, Well. Desp., J, 301-302. A'Court arrived in Madrid on Sept. 25 and presented his credentials three days later. F.O .. King's Letter Bks., 90/64.

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as they do not affect treaty obligations, the rights of independent powers, or "the political balance and general tranquility of Europe." 12 A fortnight later (October 15), Canning, in imitation of Oliver Cromwell, directed Wellington to caution the King of Sardinia to respect the privileges of the Protestant community of Waldenses or Vaudois residing in his realm; Britain was concerned about their welfare, future good treatment, and religious toleration. This was a clear case of Canning contradicting his own policy of non-interference with the internal affairs of an independent state, though he did so without menace and through diplomatic channels.13 Concerning the Eastern Question, the foreign secretary declared tersely that Britain would not go to war to help Russia or Greece against Turkey, or Turkey angainst Greece, since war would be ruinous to British interests. Thus he adopted Castlereagh's official posture of neutrality in the RussoTurkish dispute, but privately he was a philhellene. Notwithstanding the assertion of Golo Mann that Canning did not want to help the Greeks, regarding them as a "rascally set," unofficially he was, in fact, quite sympathetic with their cause. He recognized hem as belligerents (March 1823) and permitted a consortium of bankers to lend them £ 3,800,000 (1824). As Stanley Lane-Poole explains, Canning could not openly support the Greeks in 1822-1823 for fear .he "would be accused of joining the Holy Alliance." He was, moreover, anxious to avoid entanglement in a continental issue.14 Turning to the New World, Canning united the Spanish American and slave trade questions: Britain, he affirmed, would recognize only those states which had completely abolished the slave trade and would not take part in any declaration on the "rights and dominion of Spain over her revolted colonies." 15 France, of course, would obstruct any measure for the effective suppression of the slave trade. Every new British overture to the Paris cabinet on this subject, Canning complained on September 30, only served to arouse and strengthen French resistance and to convert a question of moral duty and political obligation into one of national pride. Throughout the continent, indeed, there seemed to be a growing conviction that England desired to abolish the traffic in Negroes as much for reasons of self-interest as for the sake of humanity.1 6 Canning had qualms about permitting the allies to condemn the slave Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 27, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 307-308. Canning to Wellington, London, Oct. 15, 1822, ibid. p. 358. 14 Ibid. p. 372; Mann, Gentz, p. 270; Stanley Lane-Poole, Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, K. G. (London, 1890), p. 116; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 419; Temperley, Canning, p. 326. 15 Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 27, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 304-305. 1e Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 30, 1822, ibid., I, 323. 12

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trade as piracy. Such liberty, he thought, would give them "an authority, which they might tum to worse purposes; and which, other powers - but certainly America - would laugh at." 17 But despite these misgivings, he directed the duke on October 1 to recommend that the maritime powers should "negotiate slavetrading into piracy." Confident that the French government would reject it, he wished to embarrass France by making it appear that she was the enemy of humanitarian reform. Not possessing Canning's diplomatic adroitness, Wellington did not understand this maneuver; nonetheless, he carried out his chief's order.1S There were two proposals, however, which Canning thought the Congress could accept: (1) a convention by the allies to refuse "admission into their Dominions of the produce of ... Colonies belonging to Powers who have not abolished, or who notoriously continue the Slave Trade"; (2) a covenant renewing the denunciation of the Congress of Vienna in the name of the whole Alliance, or in the name of the three remaining powers, if France declined.1 9 But Canning, realistically, did not expect the Congress to do much about this iniquitous commerce. Concerning the European Spanish question, the British foreign secretary on September 27 made his famous "come what may" statement: But if ... there is entertained by the Allies a determined project of interference by force, or by menace, in the present struggle in Spain, so convinced are his Majesty's government of the uselessness and danger of any such interference, so objectionable does it appear to them in principle, and so utterly impractical in execution, - that, if the necessity should arise, ... I am to instruct your Grace [Wellington] at once frankly and peremtorily to declare, that to no such interference, come what may, his Majesty shall be a party.20

Canning made it clear, however, that the London cabinet's decision "to abstain from all interference in the internal struggles of Spain" did not mean that Britain had abandoned her right to self-defense against the "external violences" of Spain ish subjects. The royal navy, in short, would continue to protect British shipping from the ravages of Spanish corsairs. Spain's inability to prevent piracy in the West Indies., indeed, caused Canning on October 15 to complain to Wellington that "in the present situation of Spain with respect to her colonies, we suffer equally from the maintenance of her 17 Canning to Wellington, London, Oct. 1, 1822, F.O., Continent: Congress of Verona, 92/48. 18 Ibid.; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 28, 1822, ibid., 92/49; Boyce, Diplomatic Relations, p. 68; Petrie, Wellington, p. 224. 19 Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 30, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 324·325. 20 Canning to Wellington, London, Sept. 27, 1822, ibid., p. 304.

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claim of sovereignty by herself, and from the violation of it by her lawless subjects." .21 Canning's note of October 15, the last transmitted to Wellington before the opening of the Congress, concluded a series of dispatches by which he amended Castlereagh's instructions. Canning, in resume, relaxed his predecessor's laissez-faire policy toward Italian affairs, united the Latin American and slave trade issues, and questioned the wisdom of authorizing the Alliance to declare the slave trade piracy, but - certain of a French veto made this request in a move to embarrass the Paris cabinet. 3. The VilleLe Instructions On August 26, the French council had directed Viscount Fran~ois Rene de Chateau briand, ambassador at London, to join La Ferronnays and Caraman at Verona. Three days later Montmorency had left Paris for the Vienna conference, refusing to be guided by any written memorandum or to promise to follow the oral instructions given him. Reports from Vienna soon convinced Villele, who had been appointed president of the council on September 4, that the foreign minister was not representing the views of the council and that his diplomacy would forfeit France's freedom of action in dealing with the Spanish Question. Villele knew, of course, that Montmorency was jealous of him, being resentful of his elevation to the premiership, which the foreign minister had coveted for himself. For these reasons Villele hoped that Montmorency would return to Paris at the conclusion of the Vienna conference, whereupon Chateaubriand would leave for Verona with general instructions for the Congress. 22 While the foreign minister awaited the premier's command at Innsbruck, the council deliberated over Chateaubriand's instructions, which Villele, who was charged with the direction of foreign affairs during Montmorency's absence, had drafted on August 30. These circumstances and lack of information about the Vienna exodus kept Chateaubriand in Paris for three weeks. At the time of his departure for Verona on the night of October 5, Canning to Wellington, London, Oct. 15, 1822, ibid., p. 357. Stuart to Canning, No. 258, Paris, Sept. 19, 1822, and No. 269, Paris, Oct. 3, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Aug. 27, 1822, Antioche, Chateau briand, p. 359; Villele, Memoires, III, 33-34; La Rochefoucauld, Memoires, VI, 395-396; VII, 69-71; VIII, 131, 150-151; Villele to Serre, Sept. 15, 1822, Serre, Correspondance, IV, 484; Marcellus, Chateaubriand et son temps (Paris, 1859), pp. 282284; Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 229; Bardoux, "Congres de Verone," STAS CXLVII, 407; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 561; Bertier, La Restauration, pp. 252-253. 21

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he still did not know whether Montmorency or Wellington would attend the Congress, and Villele did not definitely learn their destination until the 14th. Chateaubriand's mission. therefore. was to counterbalance the influence of Montmorency (whom he disliked personally as a rival for the affections of Julie Recamier), and to serve as the special envoy of Villele. Disagreement between the premier and his foreign minister and the ambition of the romantic litterateur, Chateaubriand, were to produce a tortuous, vague, and vacillating diplomacy at Verona. afterward leading to the resignation of Montmorency and his replacement by Chateaubriand.23 The French instructions to the Verona delegates covered the situation in Italy, Spain, and Latin America. In Villele's view, the action of the Congress should be focused on Italy in order to distract the tsar's attention from the east. To put an end to Austrian intrigues, Naples and Piedmont must be evacuated and Charles Albert. whom France recognized as the hereditary prince of Sardinia. reconciled with Charles Felix. The object of French policy was to defend the small states of Italy and Germany from the expanding hegemony of Austria. Negotiations on these issues were placed in the hands of Caraman and La Ferronnays.24 Turning to Spain, Villele ordered the French delegation to leave France a free hand in dealing with the Spanish Question and not to permit any interference by the Congress. No aid should be sent to the Urgel Regency, whose cause was hopeless, and especially must the tsar be prevented from sending troops into Spain. To emphasize his views, the French premier declared: "We are taking charge of Spain ourselves." Villele speculated that Austria could be forced to endorse Russian demands for armed intervention in order not to offend the emperor. who had supported the Austrian invasion of Naples, and that Prussia would follow suit. Britain, he correctly assumed, would object to any form of intervention and try to stop it. While France did not need, and would not accept, material aid against Britain, she would welcome moral support from her allies to prevent British interference in Spain. 25 But Villele, realizing that any discussion of the Spanish 23 Stuart to Canning. No. 269, Paris, Oct. 3, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Chateaubriand to Marcelius, Paris, Sept. 16, 1822, Antioche, Chateau briand, p. 380; Chateaubriand to Villele, Paris, Oct. 5, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance generaie, ed. Louis Thomas (Paris, 1912-1924), III, 265; Villele to Marcellus, Chateau briand, p. 282; Villele to Mme Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 14, 1822, Recamier, Correspondance, 1,443; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 444-445, 455; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Part I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 560-561; cf. Maurois, Chateau briand, p. 249. 1/4 "Instructions pour les plenipotentiaires fram;:aises au congres de Verone du 30 Aout 1822," A.A.E., Le congres de Verone: correspondance et protocoles, Vol. 721. 25 Ibid., cf. Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 231-234.

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Question could cause great embarrassment to France, preferred that this controversial issue not be raised at Verona. In subsequent dispatches to Montmorency as well as in talks with Stuart, he reaffirmed and expanded his pacific, wait-and-see policy.26 Concerning Latin America, France strongly supported the recognition of Brazil and the Spanish American colonies, in order not to leave to Britain the advantageous position of being the most favored nation. As a further blow at British commerce, VilleIe proposed an international convention allowing "no particular power special advantages" in South America. 27 The Villele instructions reveal that the Paris cabinet "did not want to be the executor of a European policy in Spain" but intended to follow one of its own. 28 It is equally clear that French policy was motivated by: (1) rivalry with Austria in Italy, (2) fear of Russia, and (3) jealousy of Great Britain's commercial position. Despite his independent attitude, VilleIe had no desire to withdraw from the Alliance, for such a move would leave France to face Britain without support. The basic design of his policy, therefore, was to persuade the allies to support France against Britain, while leaving the former a free hand in Spain. 29 But Villele was badly served at Verona by Montmorency and Chateaubriand. 21; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Sept. 23, Oct. 12 and 15, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 70-71, 115-116, 122-123; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 4, 1822, quoted in Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 261; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Oct. 17, 1822, A.A.E., Congres de Verone, Vol. 721; Stuart to Canning, No. 269, Paris, Oct. 3, 1822, and No. 271, Paris, Oct. 7, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48. Tarnawski contends that Villele was as much an apostle of war as Montmorency, but was more nationalistic. Schroeder argues that the premier was "neither pro-nor antiwar, but - unwilling to be committed to any step which might prove embarrassing later.... " These views are contradicted, however, by evidence in the Quai d'Orsay, the Villele family archives, and by the published statements of the premier's colleagues. Fourcassie's investigation, which parallels my own, also indicates that Villele resolutely championed a policy of peaceful coexistence with Spain, fearing that war would ruin French finances which were still in a precarious condition. Notwithstanding Schroeder's opinion that Villele gave Montmorency an impossible task at Verona, what actually ensued was quite close to what the premier wanted and expected to happen. Ferdinand Franz Tarnawski, "Der Kongress von Verona" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Vienna, 1925), pp. 198-200, cited by Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 209n; ibid., pp. 208-209; Journal du marechal de Castellane, 1804-1862, ed. comtesse de Beaulaincourt and P. Le Brethon, (Paris, 1895-1897), I (1804-1823), 451; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 36; Jean Fourcassie, Viltete, pp. 229-231, 235-236; Irby C. Nichols, Jr., "The Congress of Verona, 1822: A Reappraisal," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly (hereafter cited as SWSS Qu.), XLVI (March 1966), 385399. 27 Instructions pour Ie congres de Verone, Aug. 30, 1822, A.A.E., Congres de Verone, Vol. 721. 28 Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 233. 29 Temperley, Canning, pp. 57-58.

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4. Reunion in Verona: The Congress at Play While Canning and VilleIe revised their instructions for the Congress in the light of recent developments at Vienna, the crowned heads of Europe and their ministers converged on Verona. On October 7, the day after the Tegemsee rendezvous with the King of Bavaria and oth.er German notables, Mettemich proceeded to Innsbruck, where he joined his son Victor, Lebzeltern, Nesselrode, Pozzo di Borgo, and the Lievens. Two days later this company entered the Brenner Pass. 3{) So impressed was the chancellor by the majesty of the Tyrolean Alps in autumn, that for a moment he forgot about affairs of state and exclaimed: We are traveling through the most beautiful country, in the most glorious weather, and as there is no hurry, we can make excursions to the right and lefL31

On the afternoon of Sunday, October 13, they reached Verona. On the 15th Wellington and Francis I entered the city, preceding by a day the tsar and his entourage. Their majesties had journeyed at a more leisurely pace in order to enjoy the festivities in their honor. When the two emperors reached Tegemsee on October 8, its citizens had put on an extraordinary illumination for them. As Alexander and Francis passed through the Tyrol, they had been greeted by mountaineers in their colorful, native dress, singing folksongs and waving ancient tribal flags. On the 10th, these loyal subjects had marched into Innsbruck to welcome their sovereign and his august guest, making the mountains "resound with their acclamations and crys of joy." 32 With the arrival in Verona of Alexander, Montmorency, and La Ferronnays on October 16, the transferal of the Congress from Austria to Italy at last was complete. 33 All were present who had attended the Vienna conference, but this select group was greatly augmented by numerous Italian, German, and Swedish potentates, princes, and notables, British and French 30 Beauchamp, "Preliminaires du congres," La Foudre, Oct. 25, 1822, VII, 100; Private letter, Innsbruck, Oct. 9, 1822, Metternich, Memoires, III, No. 604, 421; entries for Mon., Oct. 7, and Wed., Oct. 9, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 792-93. 31 Metternich, Memoires, III, 422. 32 Entry for Sun., Oct. 13, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 95; Kasirnierz Waliszewski, La Russie it y a cent ans: Ie regne d'Alexandre ler (Paris, 1925), 111,99; Beauchamp, "Preliminaires du congres," La Foudre, Oct. 25, 1822, VII, 100. 33 Montmorency to Mme Recamier, Verona, Recarnier, Correspondance, I, 444; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 471.

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newspaper correspondents, hundreds of attendants, and scores of singers and actors "come - to amuse the other actors, the kings." 34 On October 14, Chateaubriand entered the city to join the French delegation, and later in the month, Lord Richard Clanwillian, who had recently resigned as British undersecretary of foreign affairs, Lord John Burghersh, minister at Florence, and Sir Frederick James Lamb, minister at Frankfurt, arrived separately to assist Wellington, Stewart, and Strangford. King Frederick William III, his two sons, Prince William and Prince Charles, and Prince Karl Augustus Hardenberg, the Prussian chancellor, reached Verona on October 15. But the king and the royal princes stayed only overnight in the city, for the presence of two emperors relegated Frederick William to secondary importance. He had confidence, moreover, in their imperial majesties and in his ministers (Harden berg, Bernstorff, and Hatzfeldt), to take care of Prussian interests. On the 16th, they left for Venice, not returning to the Congress until the end of October, only to depart again on November 5 for Rome. 35 Nor did Chancellor Hardenberg remain long in Verona. At the beginning of November, he went to Rome where he concluded a concordat with the Holy See. Returning through northern Italy on his way back to Berlin, the aged prince, then in his 73rd year, was stricken in Genoa with violent cramps in the chest. After resting in the home of Karl Theodors, the Prussian consul, he showed some improvement, but at 2 P.M., November 26, he suffered an "apoplectic stroke," causing him to fall into a coma. At 11 P.M. he died. 36 Of the numerous Italian princes and ministers present at Verona, the most important were: Ferdinand I of Naples and premier Prince Alvaro Ruffo; Charles Felix of Sardinia and foreign minister Count Victor-Amedee Sallier de La Tour (or Della Torre); Grand Duke Ferdinand III of Tuscany and Minister of the Interior Prince Neri Corsini, the Senior; Archduchess Marie Louise of Parma (widow of Napoleon) and Count Adam Adelbert von Neipperg, her premier and consort; Duke Francis IV of Modena and the Marquis Filippo de Molza, the Modenese foreign minister; Archduke 34 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 33-34; Chateaubriand, Memoires d'outretombe, ed. Maurice Levaillant (cent. ed.; Paris, 1950), III, 133 n; cf. Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 5, 46-49. 35 Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Oct. 15 and 29, Nov. 5, 1822, in Gabriel Pailhes, La duchesse de Duras et Chateaubriand d'apres des documents inedits (Paris, 1910), pp. 218,221, 222-223; Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Oct. 13, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 267; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 4, 69; La Foudre, Oct. 25, Nov. 20 and 30, 1822, VII, 98-99, 242, 309; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 469, 471. 36 Gentleman's Magazine, XCII (Dec. 1822), 643; Georg Heinrich Pertz, Das Leben des Ministers Freiherrn Vom Stein, (Berlin, 1849-1855), V, 759, 762.

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Rainer of Austria, the Viceroy of Lombardy-Venetia and the youngest brother of Emperor Francis I; and Giuseppe Cardinal Spina, papal legate to Bologna, representing the Holy See.37 Among the great powers, France had by far the most elavorate official delegation at the Congress, while Britain, the wealthiest nation in Europe, sent the smallest. Naples, despite her poverty and endebtedness, also maintained one of the largest diplomatic suites. Other notables who attended the Congress for private or business reasons were William Allen; Gioacchino Rossini; Manoel Gameiro, the Brazilian envoy; Gabriel Ouvrard, the French financier and army contractor; the brothers Solomon, James, and Carl Rothschild, and Prince Oscar of Sweden, whom the allied sovereigns received coolly, since they regarded him, the son of Bernadotte, as tainted by the French Revolution.lIs During their stay in Verona, most of the allied delegations lived at the Casa Lorenzi. Two exceptions, however, were the tsar and his entourage, who resided in the beautiful castle of the Marchese di Canossa, and the Austrian chancellery, which remained at the Palazzo Cappellari. The city of Verona, with a normal population of 60,000 was so crowded that hotel rooms could not be had; very modest apartments rented for 4,000 francs ($ 800) a month, and house rentals were more exorbitant. Even a garret room cost twenty-five German ducats (c. $ 45.00) a month. 39 The deliberations of the Congress were conducted with uncommon secrecy. Strict censorship, which Gentz called "the supreme law of the Confederation [of Europe]," 40 was enforced, and passports were required of everyone entering or leaving the city. Austrian police were everywhere in evidence. As the Annual Register reported: Every precaution was taken to baffle prying curiosity; no stranger was allowed to remain in Verona, without a most satisfactory explanation to the Austrian 37 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 46-49; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 33-34. General Della Torre and Count de La Tour are, of course, the same person, but after he became foreign minister, he usually was addressed by the French form of his title, since French was the universal language of diplomacy. 38 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 720, 411; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 90-91; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 468, 470; Count Egon Caesar Corti, The Rise of the House of Rothschild, trans. Brian and Beatrix Lunn (New York, 1928), pp. 278, 282. 39 La Foudre, Nov. 20 and 30, 1822, VII, 242, 309; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 33; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 397; VielCastel, La Restauration, XI, 470; A. M. Allen, A History of Verona (London, 1910), pp. 341-342. 40 Quoted in Sweet, Gentz, p. 271.

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authorities of the business which kept him there; nor was permission even to pass through that town easy to be obtained. 41 The Congress of Verona was attended by a continuous social whirl of balls, operas, concerts, banquets, little suppers and soirees, and finally a horse race, as befitted this last brilliant reunion of the crowned heads and ministers who had ruled Europe since 1815. At the invitation of Mettemich himself, Gioacchino Rossini provided the music for the Congress. Lacking time to create anything new, the famous composer extracted pieces from several of his operas and adapted them to fit contata form. For one of these, La Santa Alleanza, Rossini employed a local poet, Rossi, to compose the lyrics. Working rapidly under the pressure of a tight time limit, the poor poet completed his commission only to be driven to distraction by the obstinate Austrian censors who forced him to revise his verses three times to remove every allusion to politics, war, or peace. But that was not all; when the lyrics had been cast in their final form to everyone's satisfaction, the Podesta of Verona, "to make assurance doubly sure, forbade the printing of them on the only too solid ground that in that case nobody would be able to understand anything, anyhow!" 42 On the night of November 21, Rossini staged and directed in the wellpreserved Roman theatre a performance of his opera, La Donna del Lago. which starred Madame Angelica Catalani, one of the greatest sopranos of her day. The following evening La Santa Alleanza was performed by a ballet company supported by a choir of twenty-four voices and an orchestra of 125 members. This contata was the highlight of a festival held before a capacity audience of 23,000 in the great Roman arena, in size second only to the Flavian amphitheatre (Colosseum) in Rome, but far better preserved. The program also featured a lottery, to help defray the cost of the Congress, and a concert of a work by Renaud d'Ast entitled Avec Ie Temps. il y viendra. But the evening's performance, though a brilliant success, had been a terrifying experience for the corpulent Rossini. While conducting the music, he glanced upward and saw to his horror that a large statue of Concord, under the impact of sound vibrations, was teetering precariously on its pedestal. Until the concert had ended, it threatened at any moment to come crashing down on his head. For his next cantata, II Vero Omiiggio.

Annual Register, LXIV (1822), 218. Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone. p. 36; Francis Toye, Rossini: A Study in Tragi-Comedy (New York, 1947), p. 88. 41

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presented two days later (December 2), he returned to the safer confines of the smaller theatre beside the Adige. 43 It was not in operas, concerts, and spectacles, however, that the beau monde of the Congress took their greatest pleasure, but in salons and soirees. Although Rossini, the god of harmony, sang at these private parties, so dear to diplomats, he was no competition for the feminine element. In the cosmopolitan and secular atmosphere of this august assembly, grandes dames played an influential role in backstairs intrigues and amours. Like the gods and goddesses of ancient Olympus, this new race of sublime potentates was delightfully amoral. Tsar Alexander devoted much of his time to having an affaire with the charming and sensual Frances Anne, Marchioness of Londonderry and wife of Lord Stewart. The beautiful and talented Countess Lieven came to Verona to renew intimate relations with Metternich who had become her lover in 1818. The chancellor understandably considered her salon the "only social resource" of the Congress, and he was not alone in this view. The influence of Dorothea Lieven, nonetheless, was not as great at Verona as it had been at Aix-Ia-Chapelle, for her affaire with Metternich was no secret. The tsar certainly knew of it and approved, since this liaison, he thought, promoted cordial relations between Russia and Austria, but other members of the Russian delegation believed her to be pro-Austrian. 44 Also prominent in the social life of the Congress were Princess Zenaide Volkonsky, Countess Tolstoy, the widow of the Grand Marshal of the Court, and the Archducess Marie Louise. Countess Tolstoy'S parties were frequented by ultra-Royalists, and her influence with the French delegation was great by virtue of her recent marriage to M. de Vernegues, a French monarchist and former agent in Russia. Now a resident of Paris, she was the intermediary of Chateaubriand and the Empress Elizabeth, dispatching observations on French politics which the tsar himself studied closely. To the famous author-turned-diplomat, she was "la bonne comtesse" who gave him "un grand secours" at the Congress which he did not find elsewhere. Countess Lieven, he thought, was "a wretched (mechante) creature," and 43 Ibid., pp. 88-89; La Foudre, Nov. 30, 1822, VII, 309-310; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 470. 44 Private letter, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Metternich, Memoires, III, 560; Toye, Rossini, p. 89; Herman, Metternich, p. 166; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825, p. 398; Hyde, Princess Lieven, pp. 1'44-145. It was generally believed at the time that Metternich was the father of Dorothea's fourth son, George, whom the wits called "['enfant du congres," supposing that he had been conceived at Aix-laChapelle, but, as Hyde observes, "the jest was ill-timed," for the boy arrived on October 16, 1819, almost eleven months after the lovers had parted on November 27, 1818. Ibid., pp. 105-106.

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the Archduchess Marie Louise, indifferent and antiquated, an unkind view which Wellington, who took tea and played cards with her, certainly did not share. At thirty the archduchess was still beautiful, warm, and gay. Her frequent fetes were quite popular and were well attended by monarchs and ministers alike. While trying to forget that she once had been Empress of France, she retained in Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, some of Napoleon's laws and institutions. It is not generally recognized that her rule in these duchies was marked by moderation and amnesty, a policy for which Count Neipperg shared equal responsibility. But this former general, who wore a black eyepatch, was also "a man of elegant manners." He had so diverted Marie Louise from thoughts of the past that she "fruitfully cuckolded" the modern Prometheus. On May 1, 1817, and again on August 8,1819, she bore her paramour sons, Albertine and William Albert. For two years their existence was carefully concealed behind castle walls, because Napoleon did not die until May 5, 1821, and Marie Louise meanwhile did not dare admit this adulterous union even to her father. But the following September, the count, in a secret marriage, became the archduchess's morganatic husband, and by the time the Congress opened in Verona she was again pregnant. 45 It appears, therefore, that Marie Louise was far from being an indifferent or antiquated person, Chateaubriand notwithstanding. Among the illustrious ladies who attended the Congress from the various courts of Italy were Queen Christina of Sardinia, the Vicereine Marie Elisabeth of Lombardy-Venetia, the Grand Duchess Marie Louise of Tuscany, the Duchess Beatrice of Modena, and Lucia Migliaccio, the Duchess of Floridia, morganatic wife (and former mistress), of Ferdinand I of Naples. 46 Reflecting upon the grandeur of the Congress sixteen years later, Chateaubriand commented: "Thus all the magnificence of the modern age was assembled in Verona amidst the ruins of ancient greatness left by the Romans." 47 The days of petticoat politics, though numbered, had not passed.

45 Chateaubriand to Mme Duras, Verona, Oct. 25 and Nov. 12, 1822, in Pailhes, Duras et Chateau briand, pp. 220, 224 (Countess Tolstoy arrived in Verona on October 24 and returned to Paris on November 16.); Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 35; La Foudre, Nov. 30, 1822; VII, 309; Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 17891825, p. 398; Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 141; Frederic Morton, The Rothschilds: A Family Portrait, (New York, 1963), p. 75. 46 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 46-49. 47 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 35.

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5. Agenda and Procedure While the gentlemen of Verona danced. many vexatious problems awaited their serious attention. The harmony of Rossini's concerts. unfortunately, had no counterpart in the world of Realpolitik. The discordant notes struck in Vienna. upon being repeated at Verona, increased in volume. The members of the European Pentarchy followed their own interests, and no two powers could be found whose aims were united. Personal jealousies, too, abounded in cabinets and around the diplomatic green table. If Chateaubriand were disliked and ridiculed at Verona, Pozzo di Borgo was ardently detested by Canning, Wellington, Villele, Chateaubriand, and Mettemich alike. While the Austrian prince regarded Canning as a "malevolent meteor," he cared nothing for Alexander's chimerical schemes, so long as they did not lead to any practical action. And none of the allied courts trusted Mettemich. Chateaubriand considered him mediocre and weak; Canning had no faith in him; Baron Heinrich vom Stein, the Prussian statesman and historian, thought him lazy and petty, and Baron Peter Meyendorff, a Russian diplomat, observed that duplicity had become second nature with him.48 At first the continental statesmen and sovereigns did not believe the substitution of Wellington for Castlereagh would make any difference in British policy. They recalled that the foreign secretary had publicly protested against armed intervention in Naples but had privately expressed sympathy with Austria. 49 But Canning's attitude toward congresses and the alliance system in general was as yet an unknown factor which caused anxiety in allied councils. On September 23, Count Achille Fran90is de Jouffroy, editor of the Gazette de France and a member of the French delegation, complained to Montmorency: It is impossible to anticipate exactly the resolutions which the Duke of Welling-

ton shall bring to the Congress. The death of Lord Londonderry has created a fear of some unfavorable alteration in the dispositions of the London Cabinet.5~

48 Baron Louis Pierre Edouard Bignon, Les cabinets et les peuples, depuis 1815 jusqu'a la fin de 1822 (2nd ed.; Paris, 1823), pp. 370-371; Boyce, Diplomatic Relations, p. 53; Temperley, Canning, pp. 61-62, 342; Constantin de Grunwald, Metternich, trans. Dorothy Toll (London, 1953), pp. 153-154; Chateaubriand to Mme Duras, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, in Pailhes, Duras and Chateau briand, p. 224. 49 Martineau, Hist. of the Peace, I, 394; Walpole, History of England, Ill, 49; Temperley, Canning, pp. 23-24, 47. 50 Memorandum of Jouffroy to Montmorency, Vienna, Sept. 24, 1822, BFSP, X (1822-1823), 957.

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The Congress did not have long to wait before learning what these dispositions were. The original purpose of the Congress of Verona, as aforesaid, was to determine whether Austrian forces in Naples and Piedmont should be continued, diminished, or withdrawn. But with the Congress at hand, Metternich saw that this reason was of no value. He did not wish to give the tsar another opportunity to intervene in the affairs of Italy and, of course, of Austria. Nor was the chancellor much interested in events beyond the Pyrenees, for they were far removed from Austria's frontiers. He had counted heavily on Castlereagh to calm Alexander's bellicose temperament. Now the death of the foreign secretary had reduced the influence of Britain at Verona, leaving the burden of placating Russia almost entirely on the chancellor's shoulders. While Prussia concurred in these opinions, her influence also was weak at Verona. 51 The agenda for the Congress was determined primarily by the circumstances which had attended the Vienna conference. The late arrival of Wellington had prevented a British plenipotentiary from participating in these negotiations and thus had virtually stalemated them. Many questions raised there could not be answered, while others could not be raised at all. Montmorency had not finished the memoire on Franco-Spanish relations requested by Metternich. Discussions of the Russo-Turkish dispute and the affairs of Italy had been adjourned. Latin American independence and the slave trade, two questions of international importance. still waited offstage, as did a host of other issues which ranged round-the-world from the tsar's interdiction of trade along the coast of Russian America (Ukase of September 16. 1821) to Dutch restrictions on the navigation of the Rhine, from the pretentions of the Order of Malta to the petition of the Senate of Argos, and from the right of Switzerland to grant asylum to Piedmontese political refugees to the demands of Britain for repayment of the longstanding Austrian war debt. 52 The procedure of the Congress was secretive and irregular, for its meetings were not governed by a rigid agenda or schedule. As one court completed a note it wished to present. a confidential session met to hear it read. Later, copies were transmitted to the allied delegations who. after the lapse of a day or two, replied with written memorandums. These in tum were usually annexed to the minutes of the conference at which the responses were delivered. Some questions, to be sure, never came before a formal 51Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 41; Pasquier, Memoires, v, 442-443. 52 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 5-10; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 37; VielCastel, La Restauration, XI, 611-612.

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session of the Congress, but were handled entirely behind the scenes either in private interviews, as in the Charles Albert affair, or through the exchange of notes, as in the cases of the Russian ukase and the Austrian loan.53 But of all issues discussed, that of Spain "loomed largest on the canvas." 54 It was the first question to be raised when the Congress of Verona began its work in mid-October, 1822.

53 04

Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 39. Temperley, Canning, p. 324.

CHAPTER IV

THE SPANISH QUESTION Congresses had hitherto been a meeting of almost supernatural beings, whose secret and solemn decisions carried with them a sense of awe and mystery. It was at Verona that the 'archangels' were 'damaged.' Temperley.l

1. The Montmorency Memoire At the opening of the Congress, a spirit of self-confidence and optimism animated Wellington, for he thought Metternich agreed completely with the cardinal points of Britain's policy toward Spain: the observance of strict neutrality and the maintenance of diplomatic relations. The duke's health improved and likewise his humor, as a host of adoring young ladies immediately surrounded him. To his Grace, "the political sky seemed bright and the war clouds rolled away." 2 He assured Canning that "all notion of what is called a European army, or any offensive operation against Spain, is at an end." a His optimism soon was shattered, however, as much by the clash of personalities as by conflict of policy. Metternich, he learned, had deliberately deceived him in order to retain his support in restraining the tsar. On October 15, the day of Wellington's arrival in Verona, the chancellor had secretly proposed to Nesselrode and Bernstorff that the three eastern courts should take the initiative in a demarche to destroy the Spanish constitutional regime through moral action. Toward this end the two constitutional powers, Britain and France, should be persuaded to join them in breaking diplomatic relations with Madrid. A French invasion of Spain would be so dangerous to France herself, he argued, that such a course should be discouraged. Only in the event of a Spanish attack on France, should the Alliance even consider the question of material action. Metternich, in short, maintained that if Europe presented a united front to Spain, her revolutionaries would be cowed and the problem solved. To have a Temperley, Canning, p. 74. Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I (1918), 65; cf. Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 141; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 211-212. 3 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 18, 1822, Well. Desp. I, 384. 1

2

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proper setting for this purpose, the stage had been carefully arranged at Verona. Clearly the chancellor hoped that moral action in the Iberian Peninsula would appease the tsar.4 On Sunday night, October 20, Nesselrode, Bernstodf, Montmorency and Wellington met at Metternich's apartment in the Cappellari Palace for the first working session of the Congress. Metternich, who was President of the Congress, served as chairman of this and subsequent formal conferences, and Gentz, as secretary. The purpose of this meeting was to hear two papers which concerned the affairs of Spain. The first was the long awaited memoire on Franco-Spanish relations, which the chancellor .had asked the French foreign minister to prepare on September 11, and the second was an appeal from the Urgel Regency.5 Reading from his note, Montmorency declared that despite France's sincere desire to avoid a rupture with Spain, she suffered from numerous provocations and attacks along the Pyrenees. France's patience was not inexhaustible, nor was she "blind to the danger which must inevitably attend such a state of affairs." The "revolutionary fire" in Spain threatened not only France but all of Europe. The Paris cabinet, moreover, feared that at any moment the Spanish government might resort to "formal aggression," describing it, however, as "a glorious effort by liberty against tyranny." Montmorency foresaw that circumstances might occur which would force the king to recall his ambassador from Madrid, an action which, in tum, might provoke the Cortes "to make an immediate declaration of war on France." War, he contended, was possible, even probable, though for France it would be a defensive war. But guided by principles of moderation and loyalty to her allies, France wished to submit this great question to the grand alliance for consideration. 6 She is above all convinced, [Montmorency affirmed], that ... the concurrence of the great powers is necessary in order to preserve that unanimity of views which is the fundamental character of the alliance, and which it is of the utmost importance to maintain and emphasize as a guarantee for the repose of Europe. 7 4 "Memoire confidentiel sur les affaires d'Espagne et de Portugal," Oct. 15, 1822, Austria, Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Kongressakten, Verona, Fasc. 43, cited by Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 211-212 (Gentz was the author of this memoire.); entry for Tues., Oct. 15, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 96; cf. Temperley, Canning, pp. 66, 73. 5 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 22, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 409; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 75; entry for Sun., Oct. 20, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 97-98. 6 Communications verbales de M. Ie vicomte de Montmorency, Ie 20 octobre 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 52-53. 7 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

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THE CONGRESS AT WORK

To ascertain the policy of each of the allied courts in the event of a FrancoSpanish war, the French foreign minister, in concluding his note, put three questions to the Congress: (1) If France were forced to break diplomatic relations with Spain, would the great powers "be disposed to take a similar step and recall their respective legations [from Madrid]?" (2) If hostilities occurred between France and Spain, what "moral support" would the allied powers extend to France? (3) If France requested the active intervention of her allies, what "material aid" would they be disposed to give? 8 When Montmorency had finished his aide-memoire, he distributed copies of it to his colleagues. At Metternich's suggestion, another conference on the Spanish Question was scheduled for October 30 to answer the French note and to consider what posture should be adopted toward Spain. 9 Having postponed a discussion of the questions posed by Montmorency, Metternich turned to the next item on the agenda: an appeal from the Urgel Regency brought to Verona by Count Charles of Spain.1o In this long and verbose address, the Regency painted in somber colors the adversities which had convulsed Spain for more than two years. With the captivity of the king, the ancient liberties of the realm had been lost. Spain could expect no help from her neighbors, for the King of Portugal was himself held captive, and France was the source of agents who subverted Europe. The cause of the Spanish Royalists was the cause of all legitimate thrones. The Regency requested, therefore, the aid of the allied sovereigns "to restore the King to his throne and to reestablish all things as they had been before March 9, 1820." 11 No action was taken on this appeal at the meeting of October 20, since the question it raised could not be separated from those of Montmorency's note. Four-fifths of the Alliance, moreover, disagreed with the Regency's views. Only Russia wanted to march an army into Spain but could not without the permission of France and Austria. Under the circumstances, the petition of the Spanish Royalists was politely shelved, and Count Charles of Spain was denied a seat at the Congress as the envoy of the Urgel Ibid., p. 54. Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 29,1822, Well. Desp. I, 457. 10 Boislecomte, A.A.B., 722, 75; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. pari., VII, 201; VielCastel, La Restauration, XI, 481. Don Carlos de Bspagna, a general, was not related to Don Carlos de Bourbon, the brother of Ferdinand VII. 11 Boislecomte, AA.B., 722, 75; cf. Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 481. The address of the Urgel Regency was dated Septemb~r 12, 1822, and was signed by the Marquis de Mataflorida and the Archbishop of Tarragona. 8 9

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Regency, though he was allowed to remain in Verona as an unofficial observer.12 The fate of Spain had to await the outcome of future deliberations. In the language of diplomacy, Montmorency's memoire of October 20 meant war, if it meant anything at all. Despite the note's assurances that France would fight only if Spain attacked her, its defensive character was only a stalking-horse and was so regarded by the Congress. 13 The purposely vague, general, and hypothetical language of the paper and the frequent use of "if" and "may" clauses also stamp its mood as subjunctive. Not once did the foreign minister mention a specific act of provocation or border violation. Since Austria and Prussia wanted to prevent a rupture between France and Spain, they were careful to take the French paper at its face value. The tsar, too, understood the true meaning of Montmorency's memoire, though he wisely chose to play the game according to the rules and pretended to regard France's posture as defensive. Nor was Wellington deceived, despite his later avowal in Parliament that he saw in this note "no appearance of force or menace." 14 By taking the initiative at Verona on the question of hostilities, and by asking the allied powers, in writing, what they intended to do, if a FrancoSpanish war should break out, Montmorency had made this issue a congress affair, which was precisely what Villele wanted to avoid. Not only did the minister deliberately violate his instructions, but he also misrepresented the views of the Paris cabinet when he alleged that it feared Spanish aggression. The premier, indeed, held just the opposite opinion. Montmorency alone must bear the responsibility for placing his country in such an awkward position at Verona, for in drafting his memoire, he did not consult any of his colleagues. He soon discovered, however, that he had rashly opened a Pandora's box. 15 As the allied ministers left Metternich's apartment on the night of October 20, the uppermost thought in the mind of each was the probability of a Boislecomte, AAE., 722, 75; Hauranne, Hist. du govt. parl., VII, 201. Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 66-67. 14 Ibid., pp. 67-68; Boislecomte, AA.E., 722, 78-79; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 22 and 29, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 409, 457; Pari. Debates, new ser., VIII (1823), 1225. Wellington's remarks were made on April 24, 1823, in opposition to Lord Ellenborough's motion to reprimand the ministry for its conduct of negotiations relative to Spain. The Lords rejected the motion by a vote of 142 to 48. Ibid., cols. 1l93-1253. 15 Stuart to Canning, No. 266, Paris, Sept. 30, 1822, and No. 271, Oct. 7, 1822, F.O., France, 146/48; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 78-79; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 55, 84-85; Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 67. 12 13

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THE CONGRESS AT WORK

France-Spanish war. And from their private, informal discussions during the next two days, there emerged a hypothetical plan for a Spanish campaign: If a French army advanced only to the Ebro, it could live easily in the northern provinces while giving powerful encouragement to the Royalists. If circumstances called the French to Madrid, the march there also would be easy, and reinforcements could be assured by occupying the line of frontier fortresses along the Pyrenees.1 6 Wellington, the old soldier, could not remain a silent witness to these conversations. Recalling the Peninsula War, he offered the opinion: If Bonaparte had remained on the Ebro, I would never have thought of at-

tacking him there; but he scattered his armies all over Spain. Having thus given me the population, I ... was able to oppose him at every point with superior forces.1 7

It was now too late, the duke thought, for the Cortes to raise an effective resistance; nothing could prevent even so small a force as 25,000 troops from reaching Madrid. If Spain were the aggressor, moreover, Britain "would wish France good luck and do nothing to interfere with her." High Tory that he was, Wellington revealed clearly his personal anti-revolutionary bias. But soon thereafter, he resumed his official role, declaring that 100,000 men could not accomplish such an enterprise, so certain and terrible would be the dangers to which they exposed themselves. 1s 2. The British Remonstrance and Allied Reaction

Between the 20th and 31st of October, the general confusion on the Spanish Question was so great that several ministers regarded the adoption of a concerted policy toward Spain as impossible. Only the British delegation appeared to be free from uncertainty, but all of the great powers were embarrassed that the apple of discord had been flung into their midst.1 9 The Emperor of Austria washed his hands of the whole question. "The Russians, if you need them, will help you ... ," he informed Chateaubriand on October 23; "as for myself, I have more than I can do with Italy.... It is necessary to end this affair and to end it well." Although Metternich 16 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 75-76; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 481-482. On November 20, Chateaubriand suggested a similar plan to Villele. Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 282-284. 17 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 76. 18 Ibid.; Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 67; Green, "Wellington and the Congress of Verona, 1822," EHR, XXXV (1920), 200-201. 19 Entry for Sun., Oct. 27, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 101.

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disapproved of France's undertaking a counter-revolution in Spain either alone or with Russia, he was equally convinced that since Montmorency had thrown the affair into the midst of the Congress, it would be less dangerous "even to do badly, than to do nothing at all." He added, however, that "it is only by continued friction that roughness and resistance are worn down and smoothed; ... give me time to link the will of Russia, who wants to rush forward, and that of England, who wants to do nothing." 20 The Prussian cabinet maintained that France was not at all menaced, that if she attacked Spain, she would be beaten, for she had only "youthful and inexperienced soldiers and officers in whom no confidence could be placed." Consequently, there would be no war. Wellington, who shared these views, knew from his conversations with Alexander, Villele, and Montmorency, that the foreign minister was a member of the French war party and that his attitude toward the tsar's projected army of observation directly contradicted that of his chief. But the duke committed an indiscretion in revealing to the Congress his conviction that a personal bias motivated Montmorency's diplomacy.21 By October 22, Wellington was persuaded that the tsar had given up the idea of attacking Spain, at least for the moment, and would follow the lead of France. Both Wellington and Metternich had tried to deter Alexander from pursuing a policy so dangerous to the French government and so opposed by the rest of Europe. The Austrian chancellor succeeded, too, in persuading Montmorency to oppose "the movement of any troops by any of the Allies, till they shall be positively called for by France." 22 No pressure, indeed, should have been required, since Villele's instructions had placed this obligation squarely on Montmorency's shoulders. In order to clarify this confusion, Tatischev, Metternich, and Bernstorff agreed among themselves that "France must consider herself an agent of the Grand Alliance, and that the question of Spain was entirely European." As Bernstorff put it: France must not "go to war with the Spaniards unless Europe consents to it; nor must she withdraw her legation from Madrid unless the other Powers recall theirs." This position was, of course, exactly what Villele had cautioned his plenipotentiaries to avoid. Consequently, the French delegation declared to the Congress that "in as much as they had Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 77. Ibid., pp. 77-78; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Oct. 25, 1822, A.A.E., Congres de Vthone, Vol. 721, 115; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 457; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 474-475, 480. 22 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 22 and 29, 1822, Well. Desp., J, 408-409, 457. 20

21

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THE CONGRESS AT WORK

no ambition to dictate to anyone, they certainly would not permit anyone to dictate to them." 23 In a further attempt to discourage armed intervention, Metternich on October 24 read to a private conference of Montmorency, Nesselrode, Wellington, and Bernstorff, a dispatch from Count Brunetti, Austrian charge d'affaires in Madrid, who argued that it would be difficult to determine the effectiveness of an invasion. Such a policy was so repugnant to Spanish pride that it would have little chance of success, unless the life of the king were threatened or a reign of terror ravaged the country. Even some Royalists were cautious about intervention. If war were declared, moreover, the allied powers would have to state clearly their views regarding the institutions best suited to Spain and determine the point at which all interests coincided. If military intervention were decided on, Brunetti concluded, the last country that should intervene was France; French troops in the Peninsula would rouse all the memories left by Napoleon's invasion. 24 The other allied ministers regarded this last opinion as coming from the chancellor himself, since it was the habitual argument of the Austrian government to dissuade the Congress from armed intervention. 25 If they are right, Metternich, realizing that France would never permit foreign troops to cross her soil, thought that the Congress could prevent war merely by disapproving French intervention. In any case, the chancellor, by October 26, had become quite distressed at the failure of his diplomacy. He protested that: For days and nights, I have had no rest. My head is under a hammer; everything seems, at the moment, to slip between my hands. Three times have I seen the Emperor of Russia without persuading him to adopt a more moderate course. If I do not press him toward war, I upset him; if I show myself less ardent and zealous than he, he ignores me. 26 The complaints of Bernstorff were no less vociferous. As for Wellington, he sought to restrict discussion on the question to Britain, France, and Spain. On October 26, he suggested to Montmorency: "All means have not yet been exhausted .... There remains to us only one way by which we can extract ourselves from such a complication. Accept our mediation in order to end your differences with Spain." 27 Montmorency, of course, rejected this offer. 23 24

25

26 27

Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 78. Ibid., p. 80; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 484-485. Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722,81. Ibid. Ibid., p. 82.

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While Austria, Britain, and Prussia were trying to dissuade France from war, Pozzo di Borgo and Tatischev were overlooking no argument which might determine France to favor hostilities. With more finesse than his ministers, Alexander on October 24 assured Montmorency that he was aware of France's dilemma, but considered her position as "less delicate" than his own. While I might be suspected of nourishing ambitious views with respect to Turkey, [the tsar confided], no one would think that you seek to conquer Spain. Your position is all the more excellent because you are on the defensive. It is for you to decide what you want to do; it is a question that must be treated by you. As for myself, I shall act only according to your request . ... After having been condemned for making war against France, ... I shall be happy to wage it with her .28

It appears that the tsar wanted France to ask for his aid in the west so that he would have an excuse for not using his army in the east. Still emphasizing this theme, Alexander, three days later (October 27), pledged to La Ferronnays that not a single Russian soldier would set foot on French soil without the consent of the Paris cabinet. He remarked, however, that the French ministry seemed to be showing hesitation and uncertainty in its decisions, for Montmorency had spoken more strongly at Vienna than he had since arriving in Verona. Villele, he correctly assumed, was responsible for this more moderate tone. But France, he argued, was more seriously threatened by the Spanish revolution than Austria had been by that of Naples and must adopt the same stand that Austria had taken in 1820. 'I will not leave Verona,' the tsar declared, 'until this affair is ended. It is too dangerous to do nothing about it. If the Congress separates without adopting a common policy, revolutionaries everywhere will be convinced that we cannot agree on one and that our union is broken. The only aim of the Alliance is that for which it was formed: to combat revolution.' La Ferronnays replied that France stood on her note of October 20, of which his Majesty had approved. France did not want war, but, far from being guilty of hesitation, she was ready to wage it alone, if she were attacked. The Paris cabinet, however, must delay a decision on the Spanish Question until it has received the answers to the French note. Austria, Britain, and Prussia did not even admit the existence of a menace which might force 28 Ibid., p. 79; cf. Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 487 (The italics are mine). Since the pious Montmorency was almost as visionary and mystical as Alexander himself, he fell victim to the tsar's charm and persuasion. W.P. Cresson, The Holy Alliance: the European Background of the Monroe Doctrine (New York, 1922), p. 113.

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France to fight the main army of the Spanish revolution. Consequently, his Majesty must not press the Court of the Tuileries to adopt any policy until the reconciliation of these conflicting opinions. The ambassador further warned that Europe would regard any movement of Russian troops as a measure intended to coerce France to war, a view which would compromise her. Unimpressed by these arguments, Alexander reiterated his political creed: "I believe the formation of an army of observation useful; but it will remain as distant from you as all the space which separates Russia from France." After speaking of the satisfaction he would feel at seeing Russian and French soldiers fighting side by side, the tsar terminated the audience. 29 Metternich, too, suspected dissention within the French ministry regarding its Spanish policy. On the morning of October 28, he explained to Lord Charles Stewart (now the third Marquess of Londonderry), his request for a French policy statement: I wished. . . France to be committed to state what she wanted and what she aimed at. Whether I had a good or a bad France! I wished to be certain that there was no disunion among the French Ministers here, and that M. de Montmorency and M. de Villele were fairly of the same line, which Chateaubriand's arrival rendered doubtful, as it was rumored he came to play a great game, as the avowed confidant of the ... first minister of France.30

The chancellor concluded the interview with a condemnation of the "mad notions" of the tsar. By October 28, Metternich had prepared another piece of diplomatic strategy which he hoped would draw Montmorency from the position he had assumed in his note of October 20. One of the questions raised by this memoire was: would the other powers withdraw their legations from Madrid, if France recalled hers? The Austrian prince wanted to avoid the obligation of following the lead of France, yet Russia's attitude toward Spain made it almost mandatory for him to give an affirmative answer to this question. Metternich knew, too, that Alexander wanted to wash his hands of the Turkish affair, but to do so, he needed the aid of the Spanish Question. 31 Such was the embarrassing position of the Austrian chancellor. Metternich began the maneuver by assuring Montmorency that the allies were ready to give France all the support that she desired. He then suggested that, to save time while their replies were being drafted, the Congress Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 83-84; cf. Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 489. Londonderry to Wellington, Verona, Oct. 31, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 475. 31 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22, 1822, ibid., p. 567; cf. Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 69. Both Montmorency and La Ferronnays support this view. Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Oct. 28, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 160. 29

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should consider the means of communicating their disapproval to the Spanish government. For this purpose, he listed four alternatives from which the Congress could choose the one it thought best. (1) The powers could draw up a collective declaration, announcing to the Cortes their resolution to recall their legations. (2) A special declaration condemning the Spanish constitution could be sent separately by each power. (3) France alone could recall her minister from Madrid and adopt a posture toward Spain like that which Russia now assumed toward the Porte. (4) Britain alone could be charged with speaking to Spain in the name of Europe. 32 It should be noted that proposal one would obviate the necessity of following France's lead. Proposals two and three would free the allies from the obligation of withdrawing their ambassadors, if France did. Number three, moreover, is almost the antithesis of Montmorency's question. Number four was made to conciliate Wellington by supporting his offer of mediation and ignoring the issues raised by the French note. Thus Metternich hoped to undermine Montmorency's diplomacy. These propositions were made to Montmorency as though on behalf of all the allies, but in fact neither Russia nor Britain knew of them before they were presented formally on Monday, October 28. The ensuing discussion, though inconclusive, revealed the moderation of Austria. Metternich favored the sending of a collective declaration as the best means of frightening the Spaniards. He adamantly refused to recognize that France had a legitimate cause for declaring war and, therefore, a valid reason for withdrawing her minister from Spain. Caraman, the French ambassador in Vienna, proposed that Spain be given two months in which to set the king at liberty before the allied ministers were withdrawn. This suggestion was too vague, however, for the allied powers to rest their future relations with Madrid on it. Seeing the opposition which favored the recall of ambassadors, Metternich adjourned the reunion confidentielle until the next day.33 When the allied ministers met again on the 29th, the chancellor urged that a collective declaration be adopted as the best means of announcing to Spain the condemnation of Europe. Again conflicting views postponed a decision on this question until after the conference of October 30, at which the French memoire of October 20 would be answered. This Metternichian maneuver served, however, to soften the attitude held by Montmorency at the beginning of the Congress, for he now seemed more inclined 32

33

Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 85. Ibid., pp. 85-86; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 490-491.

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to collaborate with the Alliance. But neither the entreaties of Metternich nor of Wellington carried any weight with the tsar, who, on October 29, declared himself ready to conclude a treaty with France, stipulating the assistance he would give. He announced further his intention of dispatching an army of 150,000 men through Germany into Piedmont in order to be in a position to fall upon France, if the Liberal party in that country attempted a revolution in the absence of the French army, or upon Spain, if the French army needed assistance. 34 Like all previous meetings, the conference of Wednesday, October 30, was a secret reunion of the chief ministers of the five allied courts. Its purpose was to reply to the Montmorency note. In conformity with the tsar's declaration of the previous day, the Russian answer promised support to France in all three cases: Russia would recall her minister from Madrid, if France withdrew hers, and would give France both "moral support" and "material assistance" in the event of a Franco-Spanish war. Austria and Prussia, though not wishing to break diplomatic relations with Spain, could not withstand the combined pressure of France and Russia. Consequently, they promised to recall their ministers from Spain, "if France were forced to withdraw" hers. To the second question, Austria and Prussia promised moral support, but Austria reserved the right to decide for herself the most propitious means of making this aid "useful and effective." As for the third question, both Austria and Prussia dodged the responsibility of giving material support, while giving different reasons for their veiled refusal. Both courts affirmed that they were ready to grant material assistance, if requested by France. But Prussia doubted that her geographical position and internal situation would permit her to give it, and Austria contended that she could not give armed support unless her allies recognized its necessity. To determine its "extent, quality, and direction," there must be "a new, common deliberation of the allied courts." 35 Thus Austria pretended to want another full congress, while Prussia was even vaguer. Both replies, indeed, were so fraught with conditions and loopholes that, as guarantees to France, they were worthless. Wellington's note, which was the first official statement of British policy at Verona, contrasted Anglo-Spanish to Franco-Spanish relations since April 1820. Britain had consistently maintained toward Spain a policy of non-intervention as set forth in Castlereagh's famous state paper of May 5, 34 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 86-87; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 457. 85 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 91; Wellington to Stuart, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 519; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 58-59; cf. Temperley, Canning, p. 66.

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1820, and had advised her allies to exercise similar restraint. At Troppau and Laibach, British representatives had opposed the principle of foreign interference with the internal affairs of an independent and friendly state. Thus the tenets of British policy were well-known to the allies.36 Conditions in Spain, the duke observed, could best be improved by Spain herself rather than by foreign powers, whose attempts to assist Ferdinand VII to overturn what he had guaranteed would only put him in a false position. Such interference would be an unnecessary assumption of responsibility which might expose the Spanish king to danger and the power (or powers) involved to obloquy, possible disasters, enormous expenses, and final failure to achieve the desired result. A general rupture of diplomatic relations, in short, was more likely to produce greater disturbances in Spain than to allay them. The great object of England was to preserve peace. Wellington declined to commit either himself or his government on the three hypothetical cases of the French note, stating that he could give no answer until he had complete and accurate knowledge of Franco-Spanish relations since 1820. Specifically, he had to know "the exact ground of complaint and the exact cause of war" before he could support the other members of the Alliance. But because of civil war and other internal difficulties, it seemed improbable that Spain desired to break relations with France. Regardless of the tone of the Cortes, Spain was in no condition to endanger France. It appeared unlikely, therefore, that Spain would provoke war with her neighbor to the north. While admitting that France had a right to maintain a corps d' observation along the Pyrenees in view of the civil war in Spain, Wellington denied that the Spanish revolution threatened other nations with a "moral contagion." On her part, France should explain the purpose of her frontier army to the Madrid cabinet in such terms as to satisfy the Cortes. A candid explanation, the duke thought, could remove some of the Spanish enmity against France. The British note concluded with the assertion that the French king would suffer humiliation if he had to call on his allies for assistance. His Britannic Majesty, Wellington declared, regrets that his allies do not concur in his opinions. The concurrence of England is so important to this issue that, without her, you can do nothing, and your efforts to maintain peace - peace being your object - shall fail entirely.37 Wellington's note, Verona, Oct. 30, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 499. Ibid., pp. 499-501; minutes of the conference of Oct. 30, 1822, ibid., p. 504; cf. Temperley, Canning, p. 67. In the interest of clarity, I have paraphrased Wellington's concluding statement. 36

37

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The effect produced by the British memorandum was immediate and serious. Gentz described it as "an acid work," and Metternich denounced it as "wholly detestable and a singular example of inexperience." The probable meaning of the chancellor's remark is that Wellington blundered in finding in Montmorency's paper "what it did not actually contain, and what, moreover, it explicitly denied," viz., a French threat to Spain. The duke broke the rules of the diplomatic game by not accepting the French note at face value. Indeed, he demolished its thinly veiled hypocrisy and pretenses by pointing out how absurd it was for France to expect or fear a declaration of war by Spain. Only Britain and Russia, for entirely different reasons, found this memoire aggressive in spirit.3 8 Hardly had Wellington finished his reply than an exasperated Montmorency hotly denied the allegations that France was in no danger of Spanish aggression, that Louis XVIII would be humiliated by asking for aid against Spain, and that Great Britain's approval was necessary for a successful solution of the question. So long as there existed in Spain a revolutionary party connected with that in France, the French minister declared, Spain would be hostile to France. 39 Following this outburst, the talks were adjourned to the following evening. It is difficult, nonetheless, to accept Temperley's description of Wellington's note of October 30 as a "bombshell" which prevented the Alliance from using force against Spain. 40 The duke's memoir came as no surprise, for Britain had intoned the same refrain throughout 1820 and 1821. British policy had been clearly presented in Castlereagh's state paper of May 5, 1820, which he reaffirmed on January 19,1821. Wellington, even before he received Canning's "come what may" dispatch of September 27, had on October 1 informed the tsar at Vienna that "the objections of his government to interference in the internal affairs of any nation were insuperable, and that such intervention was not a proper subject for a congress." Thus, when the negotiations on the Spanish Question were resumed at Verona, the position of each of the allied powers was well-known to all. But so divided were the continental allies on Spain, that even had Britain connived at intervention, concerted action would not thereby have been assured. Gentz makes it quite clear that "persistent great confusion" had characterized the talks on Spain long before the meeting of October 30. 41 The sin38 Entry for Thurs., Oct. 31, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 103; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 100; Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 68-70. 39 Minutes of the conference of Oct. 30, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 504. 40 Temperley, Canning, p. 67. 41 Entry for Sun., Oct. 27, 1822, Gentz, Tagebucher, III, 101; cf. Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 5, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 177-182.

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cerety of Mettemich's denunciation of Wellington's memorandum also may be questioned. Despite his denial that he had seen the British note before it was read, there is evidence that the duke had showed it to him and that the chancellor had even suggested some changes in its phraseology, hoping to produce a declaration so violent that it would stop the negotiations, force the withdrawal of all that had been done, and bring about a rapprochement to the question on an entirely new basis.42 It appears, therefore, that Temperley placed too much reliance on Canning's own explanation of his Verona policy in the House of Commons and on John E. S. Green, who seven years earlier (1918) had asserted that Wellington's note had had the effect of a "storm" on the Congress.4:I On Thursday evening, October 31, the first general conference of the Congress was held at the tsar's request. Attended by all thirteen plenipotentiaries of the allied powers, its purpose was to obtain formal endorsement of the decisions reached in numerous private and confidential conversations and to receive officially the answers to Montmorency's memoire. At 8:00 P.M., Mettemich, as President of the Congress, opened the proceedings with an address on the state of Europe in which he voiced the hope that "there might be some intervention to check or correct the progress of the revolution [in Spain]." The four responses to the French memoire of October 20 then were read. The Austrian chancellor significantly prefaced his note with the statement that he was replying to a France who was "ready to defend herself and not to attack." 44 Thus he laid the foundation for Austrian neutrality if France began hostilities. After Wellington had finished reading his note, discussion shifted to the first protocol of the Congress. Montmorency requested that only the three questions with which his memoire closed be entered in the protocol. Wellington immediately announced to the assembled ministers that Britain "could never stipulate to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain in any manner" and demanded that his answer be inserted. When objection was made because of its length, he asked that it be annexed to the protocol. This request accepted, Austria, Prussia, and Russia demanded that their replies also be attached. But these countermoves served only to checkmate each other, for rather than reveal to the world the disunity within the Alliance, the allied Boislecomte, AAE., 722, 100; cf. Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 68. Canning to the House of Commons, Apr. 30, 1823, Pari. Debates, new ser., VIII, 1482-1483; Green, "Wellington," THRS, 4th ser., I, 68. 44 Boislecomte, A.AE., 722, 91; entry for Thurs., Oct. 31, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 103; minutes of the conference of Oct. 31, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 505; Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Oct. 31, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 168: Chateaubriand to Mme Duras, Verona, Oct. 31, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 374. 42 43

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ministers decided not to issue a protocol on the conversations held thus far on the Spanish Question.45 In a further effort to establish a consensus, while taking some moral action which might satisfy Alexander, Mettemich submitted a revision of his proposals of the 28th for informing Spain of the Congress's condemnation. This time, however, he condensed the four modes of procedure to three: first, the allied powers could send a collective declaration or separate instructions to their ambassadors in Madrid; secondly, four of the allies could intercede with Spain for France, the injured party; or, thirdly, one power could be chosen to speak for the rest. 46 An analysis of this new Austrian memoire reveals that the first two propositions of the original note have been consolidated into one. Its second suggestion would take the Franco-Spanish dispute completely out of the hands of France, and the third proposal was another attempt, however veiled, to prevent the separation of Britain from the Alliance. Although the chancellor did not now suggest England for the role of spokesman or mediator, as he had on the 28th, his colleagues understood his intent. Significantly, Mettemich's earlier suggestion that France could emulate Russia's Turkish policy was missing from his note of the 31st, apparently because he had come to believe that if France alone broke diplomatic relations with Spain, war would ensue. 47 Austria was just as anxious to group France in the west as she was Russia in the east and thus restrain both. Because of the acrimonious mood of the session, the discussion of Metternich's memoire was brief and indecisive. Montmorency, anxious to seize any means which offered an opportunity to escape from the difficult position in which he had placed himself, welcomed a debate of the alternatives suggested by Metternich. He apparently did not realize that by accepting this discussion, he was casting France in the role of executrix of the Congress's will. But La Ferronnays, more astute than his chief, suggested that sending separate instructions would be the most convenient mode of procedure, since it allowed each power to draft a note which reflected the circumstances peculiar to her. Pozzo di Borgo concurred and pronounced it the only method to which Russia could subscribe. At this point, however, Nesselrode raised a new issue which forced an adjournment of the conference. 45 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722,96; minutes of the conference of Oct. 31, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 505. 46 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 96-97; minutes of the conference of Nov. 1, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 506; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 216. 47 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 85 and 96; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 491.

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The tsar expected, he declared, that when the Congress had agreed on the type of communication to make to Spain, it would consider what to do if the allied protest had no effect. Specifically, his Majesty desired that a treaty or treaties should be signed, stipulating, as far as possible, the Casus Foederis, the number and description of troops to be furnished by each power, the line of march and place of assembly of each corps, etc. 48

Nesselrode's demand served notice to Austria and Britain that Russia would send a hostile note to Spain. Wellington responded by requesting another five-power conference for the next evening, November I, in order to explain his position and to cooperate with the continental allies, "if possible, consistently with the principles on which his government acted, or ... at least not do them any injury." Since the assembled ministers were not prepared to discuss at this time the question posed by Nesselrode, they approved the duke's petition and thereupon adjourned the first plenary session of the Congress. 49 In the wake of this conference, and partly because of the animosity which it engendered, a long period of angry debate and intrigue ensued during which the British and Russian delegations vied with each other for control of French policy. On one occasion, Strangford remonstrated with La Ferronnays: Consider what encouragement you give to the [Spanish] revolutionaries, if you show them England separated from the general action of the powers. The great name of Wellington can produce a prodigious effect in Spain; he is a God to that country. When the diplomatic La Ferronnays replied that his court was "too convinced of the purity of the intentions of the English cabinet to believe it would ever consider giving support to revolutionaries," Strangford, far from promising neutrality, boasted that Britain "would prevent France from waging war against Spain as she had restrained Russia in the East." The tsar, he asserted, "has 800,000 men with which he knows how to do only one thing; he wants to use 100,000 of them, and that is the whole question." 00 Wellington, who was less imperious than Strangford, tried a different 48 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 96-97; minutes of conference of Oct. 31, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 505; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 490-491, 498. 49 Minutes of the conference of Oct. 31, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 506; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 498. 00 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 97-98.

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tack with La Ferronnays. "Let us suppose," he asked, "that you are already in Madrid and that only two battles have been required to take you there, what would you do then? Would you overthrow the constitution, or would you let it stand?" But the French diplomat adroitly avoided the question by replying: "If France found herself in such a position and had the good fortune to set the king at liberty, she would leave it to him, as an independent sovereign,. . . to do what he thought best for the welfare of his people." 51 With no less zeal than the partisans of peace, the trio of Nesselrode, Pozzo, and Tatischev pushed France toward the abyss of war. Reproaching the French plenipotentiaries for being intimidated by Britain and deceived by Austria, they all declared that Russia would support France, if Britain took the side of Spain. Nesselrode assured La Ferronnays: "If you still harbor any doubt on this subject and this fear stops you, I can return in fifteen minutes with the signed engagement." Pozzo urged Montmorency to pick up the gauntlet thrown down by Wellington and to reply with vigor to the British note, lest it be brought to the attention of Parliament, and France should suffer a loss of dignity for having "permitted it to pass unchallenged." 52 As Chateaubriand had observed: "Count Pozzo, quick to seize his master's ideas, hoisted all sails for the ultras." 53 Meanwhile, the tsar's ardor for war, rekindled by Montmorency's request for material aid, was kept ablaze by British remonstrances and the dire prediction of the Italian princes that unless revolution were crushed in Spain, it would be reborn in Italy. Although Alexander refrained from making an avowal of his intentions, the tenor of his conversations revealed a strong desire to set his troops in motion. 54 Wellington, on the other hand, seemed to be obeying to the letter Canning's instructions to break the unity of the Congress, if necessary. But Metternich was just as determined to preserve it, since Austria's national interests demanded the maintenance of the Alliance. On Friday morning, November 1, the day after the first plenary session, he and Wellington together had warned Montmorency not to bring before the Congress "dangerous contestations which served no purpose." During the rest of the week, Metternich called upon the tsar several times to persuade him of the necessity to preserve peace. Alexander received him graciously, but, exasperated by the arrogant tone of England, he remained adamant in his 51

52 53

54

Ibid., p. 97. Ibid., p. 98; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 492, 498-499. Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 57. Boislecomte, A.A.B., 722, 99.

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desire for war. Pozzo and Tatischev claimed that they had undermined the chancellor's credit with the tsar. While admitting that Metternich had, indeed, influenced the emperor in the Eastern Question, Pozzo explained that in the Russo-Turkish dispute, the prince's views had coincided with those of his Majesty. But he who thinks the chancellor must play the same role in the Spanish Question, the count declared, deceives himself. "Today the sentiments of the Emperor are entirely opposed to his." 55 At the conference of ministers held on the evening of November I, Wellington again protested against "the objects, views, and considerations set forth in Prince Metternich's paper, delivered to the Conference of the night before.... " Metternich immediately denied that his memoire bore the meaning. .. affixed to it, viz., a determination to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain, but [expressed] only the ... wish that the intervention of the Allies to prevent a rupture between France and Spain might lead to a better order of things in Spain. 56

A discussion ensued as to the best means of preventing such a rupture. While objecting to a treaty or "anything like menace," Wellington urged his colleagues to adopt Metternich's suggestion of the previous evening that "France ... apply to one of the Allies to communicate to Spain for her." Going along with the duke, the chancellor again proposed Britain for the task. Montmorency protested against the use of mediation, since there was no definite area of dispute; furthermore, the "many reserves" and "peculiar position" of England prevented her from saying for France what France wished to have said. Wellington replied that Britain was not at all anxious to be charged with such a responsibility and could not undertake the task of mediation without the complete confidence of France.57 The true cause of Montmorency's opposition to mediation was, of course, that he wanted war. At this point, Metternich again suggested that the allies might "hold a common language by separate notes but uniform in their principles and purpose." 58 This proposal was essentially the same as that made by Metternich to the plenary conference of October 31. Montmorency, Bernstorff, and Nesselrode accepted this compromise, but Wellington pleaded his inability "to form a judgment upon a hypothetical case." 59 First, he would 55 Ibid., pp. 98-99; Green, "Wellington," TRRS, 4th ser., I, 70; Green, "Congress of Verona," ERR, XXXV, 201-202; Temperley, Canning, p. 66. 56 Minutes of the conference of Nov. 1, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 506. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Wellington to Stuart, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, ibid., p. 519.

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have to know whether the allies signed a treaty against Spain, and then the language held by each in its note. As an alternative course, he strongly recommended that all powers wanting to interfere in the Iberian Peninsula should confine themselves to the "external quarrel between France and Spain." They should take care not to approach Spain as "enemies bound in a treaty of defensive alliance against her." He emphasized that while Britain could not join in a "general declaration" against the Cortes, she would always regard the "peace and honour of France," rather than "counter-revolutionary projects, ... as the great object of any negotiation with Spain." Finally, Wellington protested against holding any more general conferences on the Spanish Question. 60 Having lasted more than three hours, the meeting ended with its members once again indignant. As the ministers were leaving the conference room, Wellington asked Montmorency if he would insist on a treaty. The French minister replied that he considered the Declaration of Aix-Ia-Chapelle (November 15, 1818) as sufficient. Overhearing the remark, Metternich interposed the observation that "the Protocols of Aix-Ia-Chapelle stipulated nothing but union." Montmorency answered that he still would be satisfied without a treaty, but he did not forget Metternich's words as the next ministerial meeting revealed. 61 The Congress's second plenary session was scheduled for Saturday afternoon, November 2, to hear the French reply to the allied notes of October 30, and especially to that of Britain. Pozzo di Borgo, it will be recalled, was responsible for persuading Montmorency to answer the British memoire. Shortly before 3 P.M., the allied plenipotentiaries began to arrive at Metternich's apartment in the Palazzo Cappellari, the usual scene of such conferences. 62 Separating into small groups, they engaged in animated conversation while awaiting the official opening of the meeting. Seeking out Wellington, who was talking to Nesselrode and other members of the Russian delegation, Montmorency read to them his reply to the allied notes in which he thanked the "three Courts of the North" for their sympathetic understanding and promised assistance. Then speaking directly to the duke, he confessed his regret that Britain had not seen fit to concert with the other powers. He saw with pain that the London cabinet's opinions were founded, 60 Ibid., p. 520; minutes of the conference of Nov. 1, 1822, ibid., pp. 506-507; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 5, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 178-179; cf. Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 217. 61 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 5 and 99. 62 Ibid., p. 99; entry for Sat., Nov. 2, 1822, Gentz, Tagebucher, III, 104; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 5, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 178-179.

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in part, on ignorance of what had passed between France and Spain since 1820. But the facts on this point, he had assumed, were of public knowledge. France, faithful to the principles of the Union sanctified by the protocols of Aix-Ia-Chapelle, [he declared], has never kept secret ... her relations with the Spanish Government .... Moreover, the ... [causes of] the present state of affairs have been revealed so clearly to the ... Four Courts, that no doubt remains of the solicitude of his Majesty's government for preserving peace and avoiding, on its part, every ... [cause] for rupture. 63

Wellington made no reply to Montmorency's bold declaration, but during its course, he remarked from time to time: HC'est bien, tres bien." Upon its conclusion, the British note became the sole topic of heated discussions among the plenipotentiaries who were still dispersed into groups. At length, the duke offered to withdraw his memoire, if the other ministers would do the same. Montmorency, who did not want to separate England completely from common action, suggested that they could just consider the British note as "null and void" (non avenue). Nesselrode, however, protested that a document which had been presented officially to the Congress could not be withdrawn. In the ensuring debates within the several groups, differences of opinion became so great that the assembled delegates resolved to adjourn without having convened the conference. 64 The unofficial meeting of November 2 proved to be the watershed of the tortuous negotiations on the Spanish Question. It was not Wellington's protest of October 30 alone which caused a change of procedure, but, as Gentz complained, Britain's "whole obscurantist system" on this issue. 65 Realizing that nothing could be done with the duke. the continental powers, from November 2 until the 20th, concerted their policy in secret conversations without him, inviting him only to formal sessions. Thus they sidestepped the critical impasse with Britain. Wellington was relieved that he no longer had to attend these confidential meetings where he would be embarrassed to object continually to the actions of the allies. But if absent in person, the influence of his remonstrances certainly was present; moreover, 63 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 100; cf. Green, "Congress of Verona," EHR, XXXV, 201-202. The italics are mine, used to emphasize how Montmorency turned Metternich's own words against him. 64 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 100-101; entry for Sat., Nov. 2, 1822, Gentz, Tagebucher, III, 104; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 5, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 179; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 501-502. Green contends that Wellington's offer resulted in the practical withdrawal of his famous protest of October 30. He attributes the duke's proposal to the influence of Metternich. On November 21, Wellington received a copy of Montmorency's reply, and on the 26th, he transmitted it to Canning. 65 Entry for Wed., Oct. 30, 1822, Gentz, Tagebucher, III, 102.

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he continued to have private talks with Mettemich, Montmorency, and Tsar Alexander. The duke admitted that jealousy of Britain by French ministers, the presence of ultra principles in Paris and at Verona, and fear of offending Russia, all conspired to impede a Franco-Spanish reconciliation, but he still believed that allied disunity and the doubts of the French delegation concerning the outcome of war would forestall intervention. Thus, as late as November 5, he hoped to achieve complete inaction at Verona, though Lord Stewart did not share his optimism, and Canning foresaw that France might be driven to intervene in Spain. 66 At Russia's suggestion, the other members of the Alliance, meanwhile, decided on November 4 to send separate instructions to their ambassadors in Madrid, since that "mode of proceeding. " [afforded] greater latitude for discussion and explanation than official notes." 67 These dispatches, however, "should be such as would lead unfailingly to a break in relations with Spain." 68 While Montmorency had agreed to send instructions of this tenor to Count de La Garde, French ambassador at Madrid, he interposed the reservation that they were subject to the approval of the king-in-council. Drafts of these dispatches should be shown to Wellington in the hope that the London cabinet would "go along with" (marcher it cote') the allies, or at least, not oppose them. The eastern courts, nonetheless, were determined to act with, or without, the concurrence of England or France. On November 6, Nesselrode announced that Russia would suspend diplomatic relations with Spain, if her note had no effect on the Cortes. Two days later, the tsar declared this same determination to Montmorency.69 Metternich, the editor of all the notes, received drafts of the French and 66 Entry for Sat., Nov. 2, 1822, ibid., p. 104; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 6; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 5, 12, and 19, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 494, 532-533, 555556; Londonderry (i.e., Lord Stewart) to Canning, memoranda, Nos. 2-5; Nov. 2, 3,8, and 14, 1822, ibid., 484-486, 486-489, 510-511, 534-535; Montmorancy to Villele. Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 223, 226; Green, "Congress of Verona," EI-IR, XXXV, 202-203, 205; Temperley, Canning, p. 67. On November 5, the tsar seemed more anxious than ever for a crusade of kings against Spain. 67 Wellington to Stuart, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 519; Boislecomte. A.A.E., 722, 101. 68 Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 217. On November 5, the three eastern powers returned to the idea of a common declaration but abandoned it again the same day in favor of separate instructions. Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 102; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI 502. 69 Boislecomte A.A.E., 722, 102; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 5, and 19, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 180, 223, 226; Green, "Congress of Verona," EHR, XXXV, 205; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand et la guerre d'Espagne, Part II: Chateaubriand: ministre des affaires etrangeres," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIV (1897), 62.

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Prussian dispatches on Friday, November 8. He approved their content and even considered them moderate, though he made some alterations. Nesselrode remitted the Russian instructions on November 9, and Gentz finished the Austrian draft late the night of the 12th. Wellington was not consulted on the preparation of any of these dispatches, though Montmorency on November 8 read the French draft to him. The duke objected to its intemporate language so strongly that the foreign minister agreed to moderate its tone. 70 The two German courts were determined to avoid war, but they were equally obliged to do something. If they did not assist the tsar, he might have to yield to the demand at home for a war on the Ottoman Empire. His sacrifices in the east imperatively demanded an effort in the west. Alexander acted as though war already had been declared. He wanted to wash his hands of the Turkish affair, but to do so, he needed the aid of the Spanish Question. The reward which he now claimed for his forbearance in the east was the right to send his legions into Spain. The Russian army had to be put to some use before its morale and efficiency were undermined by inertia and revolutionary conspiracy. Austria and Prussia were compelled, therefore, to adopt a language consistent with that held at TroppauLaibach toward Naples. Though reluctant to express the same principles on this occasion, they could not risk offending the powerful tsar. 71 Austrian and Prussian friends of Lord Stewart declared that if a Franco-Spanish war broke out, which occurrence they thought improbable, no consideration should induce ... [Austria and Prussia] to take part in ... [it], as neither their finances nor their position, considering all other abundant circumstances belonging to it, would allow them. 72

Having done all that was expected of them, Austria and Prussia prayed that Providence would be kind. In an effort to gain the secret connivance of Britain, Nesselrode, Tatischev, 70 Londonderry to Canning, Verona, Nov. 8, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 510; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, ibid., p. 531; Wellington to Stuart, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, ibid., 519-520; entries for Sat. and Tues., Nov. 9 and 12, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 107-108; Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Nov. 4 and 6, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 174-177, 182-190; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 11, 1822, ibid., 200-201; Temperely, Canning, pp. 67-68. Montmorency not only permitted Mettemich to edit the French instructions, despite Villele's admonition not to trust the chancellor but also showed his dispatch to Alexander, N esselrode, and Bemstorff. 71 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Oct. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 457-460; Londonderry to Canning, Verona, Nov. 8, 1822, ibid., pp. 510-511; Wellington to Stuart, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, ibid., pp. 520-521; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 11, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 201-202. 72 Londonderry to Canning, Verona, Nov. 8, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 511.

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and Lieven called on Lord Stewart on Thursday, November 7. They inquired whether Wellington - failing to approve of the course adopted by the allies in separate notes to their legations in Spain - would, nonetheless, induce Sir William A'Court, British ambassador at Madrid, "in an indirect, if not in an open manner, to sustain the object set forth in representations to the Spanish government?" Stewart professed "perfect ignorance." The next day he confessed to Canning that the eastern powers seemed to be pursuing a course similar to that employed at Laibach. It is singular, [Stewart observed], that Sir William A'Court should stand at Madrid much in the same position as he formerly did at Naples. The Allies at Laybach ... addressed separate dispatches, conveying the same sentiments on the Neapolitan revolution, to their ministers at Naples, and these were to make a united declaration on the receipt of them, while at the same time, I was solicited to encourage A'Court in every way, to support secretly the common effort.7 3

It is perhaps significant that the Russian diplomats called on the halfbrother of the late Lord Castlereagh. If they had been certain of the duke's

attitude, as Baron Charles Edmond de Boislecomte has observed, there would have been no need to ask anyone what action he would take. 74 Would England act toward Spain as she had toward Naples and secretly support intervention? But if there were doubt in Nesselrode's mind about Britain's stand on the Spanish Question, there was none in Montmorency's. By the time the latter left Verona, he was so exasperated by Wellington's tactics that he complained to ViIlele: "The English plenipotentiary... always raises difficulties of principle, ... renewing from time to time his efforts to disunite the Four, or to obtain complete inaction.... " 75 Finally, Metternich himself admitted that Wellington had not been consulted in the matter of the Spanish dispatches, because of the known "wide difference" between the course followed by England and that which the continental powers intended to pursue. 76 The Alliance now excluded Britain, one of the charter members of the system. Ibid., p. 510. Boislecomte reports that Wellington "desired to separate as little as possible from the action of the Allies and was not opposed to sending, himself, analogous instructions to M. A'Court." (Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 103). Green accepts and repeats this charge. (Green, "Congress of Verona," EHR, XXXV, 205). No credence should be placed in this report, except possibly, as an indiscretion caused by inexperience in diplomacy. The correspondence of Montmorency with VilU:le, moreover, describes the duke's role as one of consistent protest and objection. Cf. Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 11, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 202. 75 Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, ibid., pp. 226-227. 76 Londonderry to Canning, Verona, Nov. 8, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 510; cf. Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 233n. 73

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3. Dichotomy of the French Delegation At the beginning of November, Metternich, too, flattered himself that he had dissuaded Montmorency from taking any belligerent action. France's allies, the chancellor concluded, had effectively restrained her. But despite his great diplomatic talents, the prince's optimism was premature. Not only had he not reckoned with Chateaubriand, whose views on Spain still were unknown, but he also had underestimated Russian influence on Montmorency, who, since July 1822, had regarded war with Spain as inevitable. 77 Both throne and altar, the foreign minister thought, would benefit from the "destruction of the anticlerical and revolutionary regime at Madrid." 78 Notwithstanding the opposition of Villele, Mettemich, and Wellington to war, the arguments of Alexander, Pozzo di Borgo, and Tatischev had confirmed Montmorency in this view. But if war were his object, he still wanted the support of the Alliance. Unfortunately, he did not take his colleagues - La Ferronnays, Caraman, and Chateaubriand - into his confidence, thus placing them in the embarrassing position of being ignorant of his policy. They knew, of course, that powerful forces were working to convert Villele to the cause of war, and his language, they thought, occasionally indicated a certain hesitation. Finally, La Ferronnays asked Montmorency to state clearly his position on the Spanish Question so that the other members of the French delegation could follow a uniform policy in accordance with the views of their government. 79 In response to this demand, Montmorency requested Baron Boislecomte to prepare a list of arguments for and against war. The foreign minister received this memorandum on November 5, and three days later, he called a secret meeting of the four French plenipotentiaries at which he submitted two questions: "Is war with Spain desirable? If so, should we work to bring it about?" 80 Chateaubriand and La Ferronnays declared in favor of war; Caraman voted for peace; but the position of Montmorency remained ambiguous. While refusing to commit himself, the foreign minister appeared 77 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 106-108; Stewart memoranda, Nos 1. and 2, Verona, Oct. 29 and Nov. 2, 1822, Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 229n, 231n; Fourcassie, Vi/We, p. 231. 78 Hall, Bourbon Restoration, p. 327. 79 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 98-99, 106-107; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 458; Cresson, Holy Alliance, p. 113; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 507; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Pt. II," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIV, 68; Gentile, "Chateaubriand," Studi politici, IV, 19. 80 Pasquier, Memoires, V, 458.

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to favor the maintenance of peace. But he did not deceive Chateaubriand, who reported in his history of the Congress that Montmorency desired war so ardently that he represented "all the princes as seized with a warlike mania," though he visited hardly anyone but the tsar. S1 The one satisfactory explanation of Montmorency's circumspection is that he realized the danger of compromising himself, if he revealed his true sentiments to the French delegation. Thus the premier was badly served, indeed, at Verona, with three of his four plenipotentiaries following a policy opposed to his own. The reason also becomes clear why Montmorency wanted to keep this meeting a secret from Villele, and in this, he succeeded. Nonetheless, the disagreement between the two on what to do about Spain eventually caused the foreign minister's resignation. For the present, however, the disunity of the French delegation and the timidity of Montmorency continued to thwart their efforts to support a positive and consistent policy.s2 If there were confusion in the ranks of the French delegation as to the true policy of their chief, there was none in the mind of Wellington, who knew that Montmorency had demonstrated at Verona an utter disregard for the views of ViIlele and Louis XVIII on the Spanish Question. Neither king nor premier thought that France had anything to fear from the Spanish civil war. But the foreign minister, the duke suspected, hoped that, with the support of French ultra-Royalists, he could persuade the Paris cabinet to adopt his policy. Despite his assurances to ViIlele that in everything he had reserved complete freedom to the king and council, he had agreed to act in concert with the three eastern courts in withdrawing the French ambassador from Madrid when they recalled theirs.83 In this respect, he had acted "in a sense more purely European than French." 84 In effect, he had created a policy of his own in opposition to that of the premier. To break this impasse, one of them had to leave the cabinet; on November 22, Montmorency left for Paris and the showdown with Villele. For the remaining duration of the Congress, Chateaubriand was in complete charge of French diplomacy.85 81 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 85; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 107-108; see ibid., pp. 108-114, for Boislecomte's essay on war or peace. 82 Ibid., p. 108; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 458-459; Green, "Wellington," TRHS, 4th ser., I, 61; Pinon, Histoire diplomatique, IX, 458. 83 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 531-532; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, No. 19, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 223. 84 Temperley, Canning, p. 69. See also Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 68. 85 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12 and 22,1822, Well .Desp., I, 531,536; Gabriac, "Chateaubriand, Pt. I," Revue des deux mondes, CXLIII, 566-567; Nettement, La Restauration, VI, 265; Hall, Bourbon Restoration, p. 328.

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Though chosen to counterbalance Montmorency's legitimist obsession, Chateaubriand had become the slave of his own vanity. As early as July 1822, while ambassador at London, he, too, had come to regard a FrancoSpanish war as both desirable and inevitable, but he carefully veiled this opinion. At Verona Alexander fed the famous author's ego with personal attention and compliments. Pretending to take the ambassador into his confidence, the tsar declared that an invasion of Spain would certainly restore French prestige.86 Flattered by the thought that the emperor agreed with him, Chateaubriand adopted this theme and repeatedly urged Villele to seize this occasion to restore France to the first rank of European military powers. There was no danger, since all Europe, excepting Britain, would support France. Success would be easy, and an occupation of Spain would be unnecessary.87 If England became angry, [he argued], she would not even have time to throw herself on a colony. As for the Chambers, success covered everything. To destroy a source (foyer) of Jacobinism, to reestablish a Bourbon on the throne by the arms of a Bourbon, these are results which outweigh considerations of a secondary nature. 88

Always ready to suspect Britain of selfishness and ulterior motives, Chateaubriand assured Villele on November 28, that he now saw clearly the reasons for the violent protests of Wellington against either French or allied intervention in Spain. Britain, he declared, had concluded a commercial treaty with the Cortes which gave her liberal trading privileges in the Spanish colonies. She feared her interests would be jeopardized by the over86 Actually Alexander doubted the statesmanship and strength of the French government to invade Spain. He thought it likely that such an expedition would be unsuccessful and that the consequence of its failure would be disorders in France. A victorious campaign, on the other hand, might inspire France to adopt once more a policy of aggrandizement. What he really wanted, therefore, was intervention by a Russian or European army. Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 613-614; Georges Grosjean, La politique exterieure de La Restauration et l'Allemagne (Paris, 1930), p. 63. 87 Chateaubriand to Montmorency, Nos. 40 and 41, July 16 and 19, 1822, in Antioche, Chateau briand, pp. 316-317, 320; Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Oct. 31, Nov. 19, 20, 28, and 30, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 271, 280, 285, 291-292, 296-297; Fourcassie, Ville/e, pp. 233-234; Bardoux, "Congres de Verone," ST AS, CXLVII, 407; Temperley, Canning, pp. 60-61; Cresson, Holy Alliance, p. 113. The value of Cresson's views is enhanced by the fact that he used unpublished Russian materials on the Congress of Verona while secretary of the American embassy in Petrograd immediately following the March Revolution, 1917. He had access to both the Imperial Archives and the Russian Foreign Ministry Archives. 88 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Oct. 31, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 271.

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throw of the constitutional government of Spain. A reliable source reported, moreover, that Britain had given Spain "two hundred million francs to use as she saw fit, and had promised her four hundred thousand more," if it were needed. 89 With great imagination, the ambitious ambassador formulated a plan for Spain which he was sure "would arrange everything if it were adopted." 90 He conceived a national policy between the extremes of VilleIe and Montmorency: France alone should interfere in Spain, with equal disregard for the threats of Britain and the wishes of the other allies, "who wanted to make ... [France] the agent of their resolutions." 91 While recognizing the value of opposing to Britain a union of the continental powers, so that it would appear that a war with France meant a war with Europe, Chateaubriand did not like the wording of Montmorency's note of October 20. He, like Villele, would not have asked Europe's categorical opinion on the Franca-Spanish dispute, nor would he have requested material support. He would have asked merely: "Should we be obliged to go to war, will you, if England intervenes, embrace our alliance?" 92 Chateaubriand was equally contemptuous of the notes which the three eastern powers proposed to send their representatives in Madrid. He thought them insignificant, observing later in his memoirs: "To this inoffensive procedure, that could not lead to anything, was reduced that famous intervention of the Congress of Verona, about which so much noise has been made." 93 Incurable romanti89 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, ibid., pp. 291-292. Gabriel Ouvrard was the source of Chateaubriand's information about a British loan to Spain; in this case the report was false. On October 18, 1822, Canning sent a strong remonstrance to the Spanish government, protesting the seizure of British merchant ships by Spanish privateers and announcing his intention to land troops on the coast of Cuba to destroy the pirates who used the island as a base of operations. Mter many complaints and demands for redress of grievances, Spain, not wishing to lose her only friend in Europe, yielded. She acknowledged Britain's right to trade with the insurgent colonies and paid 40,000,000 reals (c. £ 500,000) for the liquidation of British claims. On February 4, 1823, George IV announced in his speech convoking Parliament, that the complaints of the British government to the Court of Madrid "respecting the depredations committed on the commerce of His Majesty's subjects in the West Indian seas" have been redressed and reparation granted. Canning to Stuart, Nos. 12 and 15, London, Nov. 29 and Dec. 1, 1822, F.O., France, 146/50; Canning to Bagot, No.3, London, Dec. 10, 1822, F.O., Russia, 181/48; King's Speech, Feb. 4, 1823, Pari. Debates, new ser., VIII, 2; Canning to the House of Commons, Apr. 14, 1823, ibid., col. 879; Walpole, History of England, III, 59-60. 00 Chateaubriand to Mme Recamier, Verona, Dec. 12, 1822, Recamier, Correspondance, I, 454. 91 I bid., II, 4-5. 92 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 55. 93 Ibid., p. 63; cf. Paquier, Memoires, V, 449-450.

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cist that he was, Chateaubriand dreamed, too, of scrapping the Vienna settlement and reversing the decision of Waterloo. From Richelieu and Pasquier, he had inherited the idea of a Russian alliance but developed it further: perhaps Russia could be persuaded to' take Constantinople in exchange for agreeing to the return to France of the left bank of the Rhine. 94 Confident that the premier would triumph over the foreign minister, Chateaubriand took pains to assure Villele of his loyalty to whatever course of action the council decided upon. As the ambitious author explained in his Congres de Verone: "We had no wish to render ourselves impracticable; we feared lest, if we unveiled ourselves too much, the president of the council would no longer listen to us." 95 Repeatedly Chateaubriand declared to Villele: "I shall not separate my political destiny from yours.... I am your man .... My stand is taken; you may do with me whatever you like. I am determined to follow you in bad as in good fortune. If you stay, I stay; if you leave, I leave." 96 Even in his private correspondence with Claire de Duras, he consistently maintained: Despite the faults and enormous stubbornness of VilleJe, I shall not part company with him. After all, he is the only capable man in the ministry, and I like him a hundred times better than the hypocritical, jealous folly and low intrigue of Mathieu [de Montmorency].97

By such protestations of fealty, however insincere, and by falsely representing the views of the allies, Chateaubriand deceived the premier and fostered his own ambition to enter the foreign ministry, which he had long coveted in order to realize his cherished desire for war.98 In sum, Villele wanted peace with independence of action; Montmorency favored war in close collaboration with the Alliance; and Chateaubriand desired war with independence of action. 94 Grosjean, La Restauration et I'Aliemagne, p. 59; Marcellus, Chateau briand, p. 246; Maurois, Chateaubriand, p. 259. 95 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 85. 96 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Nov. 19, 20, 30, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 280, 285, 296-297. 97 Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Nov. 30, 1822, ibid., p. 297. The fact that the Duchess of Duras was also a close friend and confidante of Villele may explain Chateaubriand's discretion in this letter, but on other occasions, he did confide to her his great desire for war. Her response was to chide him for his great ambition which "overshadowed every other feeling." cf. Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, ibid., p. 281; Maurois, Chateau briand, p. 255. 98 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 85-86; Pasquier, Memoires, V, 459, 463-'464; Bardoux, "Congres de Verone," STAS, CXLVII, 407; Maurois, Chateaubriand, pp. 258-260.

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4. Triumph of the Franco-Russian Entente Aware that Montmorency was not following his instructions, Wellington, on November 12, sent the French premier through Stuart a lengthy memo~ randum on the Spanish Question and Britain's stand on it. When shown a copy of this document, Mettemich pretended to agree with every opinion in it, but he declared, nonetheless, that if France followed the "proposed course of procedure, he must go with ... [her]," and that as he went, so went Prussia. 99 Two days later (Thursday, November 14), Stewart called on Mettemich to discuss the Franco-Spanish dispute. The chancellor, in a subdued tone which sounded strange to one accustomed to his usual arrogance, admitted the difficulty of getting France to state explicitly her complaints and aims against Spain, but he still expressed confidence in the "moderation of France and in her positive decision against an offensive war," though she "did not see very clearly how to proceed." As for the Spanish revolution, it was drawing to its close, "even by its own acts, and the terror ... inspired by the meeting of the Congress." Suppose we should arrive at doing nothing ... , [Metternich argued]; in the nation itself, there is no popular feeling that rallies round the constitutional government. One must not judge Spain by Madrid alone. From the reports from all sides, we know the country is very sick of its revolutionary position, and where a revolution does not advance, it is near its death. The work may possibly be effected, therefore, without our agency, and merely by the aid of our attitude. 100

Although Stewart made no reply to these views, he did not share Metternich's optimism, for he did not believe that the tsar would give up all his "diplomatic territory." Nor did he think Russia would consent to delay action until Montmorency retumed to Paris and the French cabinet reached a decision. Austria and Prussia, in short, were committed to Russia, who, in tum, was pledged to support the French initiative. It seemed probable, therefore, that some positive demarche against Spain would be adopted by the continental powers before the Congress adjoumed. 101 Within the week, the astuteness of Stewart's conclusions was demonstrated. 99 Wellington to Stuart, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 519; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, ibid., pp. 532-533. 100 Stewart to Canning, Verona, Nov. 14, 1822, Londonderry MSS, pub. in Alison, Castlereagh and Stewart, III, 234n. 1111 Ibid., p. 235n.

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The chancellor, of course, continued to warn the tsar of French unrealiability and British separatism and to insist that the three aims of the eastern courts should be the forestalling of armed intervention, the reestablishment of order in Spain, and the maintenance of the Alliance. But despite these admonitions, Wellington, on the morning of November 14, found Alexander just as determined as ever to intervene in Spain. For the tsar, counter-revolution was the goal to be achieved, and war, the only means of obtaining it. He preferred using a Russian army, but rather than no army at all, he would have Spain invaded by a French army, supported by the allies. Spain, he declared, must be occupied by an army of the Alliance.1 02 On Sunday evening, November 17, Montmorency presented to a conference composed of Metternich, Nesselrode, Bernstorff, and himself, a "projet de protocole" which contained the casus foederis requested by Nesselrode on October 31. This second French memoire was the corollary to that of October 20. Since the allies already had promised support, if hostilities occurred between France and Spain, the only question which remained was: what events would force France to declare war on Spain? Montmorency's note answered this question. Any of the following cases would cause war: (1) An attack by Spain on French territory, or an official act of the Spanish government inciting to rebellion French subjects; (2) the deposition, trial, or death of the king or any member of his family; (3) a "formal act of the Spanish government, subversive to the rights of legitimate succession of the royal family." 103 The foreign minister added that other circumstances could also lead to war. As casus belli, he cited attacks on, or threats to, the Spanish dynasty, insults to France or her minister in Madrid, and threats to French citizens in Spain. 104 After the French "projet de protocole" had been submitted to the conference, two amendments were proposed. Metternich, always ready with a diplomatic formula to impede independent action by someone else, suggested that all unforeseen cases should be referred to a conference of the allied ambassadors at Paris and the French premier for consideration. Nesselrode insisted that there should be perfect reciprocity between France and her allies concerning the three hypotheses of Montmorency's note. All 102 Wellington to Stewart, Verona, Nov. 12, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 520; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, ibid., 555-556; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 218. lOS Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 54-55; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 556. Montmorency's note was dated November 14. 104 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 518; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p.218.

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THE CONGRESS AT WORK

of the allied powers, not just France, he contended, should have the right to request a joint consultation on situations which could become casus belli. In the ensuing discussion, it was agreed to revise the French "projet de protocole" to include the Austrian and Russian proposals and to meet the next day to study the new draft.1 05 Following the conference of November 17, Montmorency sought the advice of the French delegation on the question of reciprocity. La Ferronnays and Chateau briand, both ardent nationalists, opposed reciprocity of the casus foederis on the grounds that it assumed a parity of juxtaposition to Spain among the allies which did not exist. While the civil war in Spain posed a real danger to France, it produced no effect at all in Russia. The issue, moreover, had been raised in an arbitrary manner. They urged their chief to exclude, at least, the case of a provocation by Spain. But to Montmorency and Caraman, the Russian demand seemed a "genuine exigency." This debate gives further evidence of the lack of accord among the French plenipotentiaries at Verona, and it is singular that none of them had anticipated a request for reciprocity.1 06 At the four-power conference of November 18, the amended draft protocol, which consisted of two articles, received serious examination. After long discussion, Montmorency, disregarding the advice of La Ferronnays and Chateau briand, accepted reciprocity of the casus foederis as "the most sacred of obligations." The first case was revised to read: "An attack with military force by Spain on French territory or an official act of the Spanish government directly inciting to rebellion the subjects of anyone of the powers." Finally, the casus belli enumerated in the original French note were deleted, and the document entitled a "proces-verbal." 107 Consistent with their practice of confronting Wellington (who no longer attended their private conferences), with a fait accompli, Metternich, Montmorency, Nesselrode, and Bernstodf called on the duke Tuesday morning, November 19. The purpose of their mission was twofold: to give him a copy of the revised proces-verbal and to read to him the final drafts of the dispatches which Austria, France, and Prussia proposed to send to Madrid. They promised to wait for his views before signing the proces-verbal and urged him to sign it with them. Metternich explained that Austria must act 100 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 556; VielCastel, La Restauration, XI, 518-519; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, pp. 217218; Tempedey, Canning, p. 68. 106 Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 519-520. 107 Ibid., pp. 519, 521; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 6; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 54-55; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 218.

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with her allies in condemning the Spanish revolution and in recalling her minister from Spain. lOS The chancellor apparently wanted to convince the duke that he was acting in an official capacity, and then only under duress. Anxious to learn Wellington's reaction to the amended proces-verbal of November 17, the allied ministers waited while he read it. No sooner had he finished, than he refused to sign the document, describing it as both a treaty and a protocol which would prevent Britain from taking any useful part in the discussions between France and Spain. 109 Nor could his Britannic Majesty admit the probability of the events specified by the casus foederis. Concerted intervention by foreign powers, moreover, could endanger the very party it was intended to help. Finally, the duke observed, cases two and three of Article I of the proces-verbal pertained to points which were "properly the subject of municipal law." But the laws which declare the ... sovereign inviolate, [Wellington asserted], do not equally protect the persons of their august families, and this procesverbal may tend to hold out a protection to the Royal Family of Spain which the laws of Spain do not afford them, and which is not afforded to the Royal Families of other countries in Europe by the laws of those countries. 110

After the duke's refusal to endorse the proces-verbal of November 17, the four allied ministers withdrew. That night, in an "informal and tumultuous" conference, they made some minute changes in the wording of this document and apparently relabeled it a "protocole" before signing it. In any case, what Wellington in the morning had called a proces-verbal," Gentz that night described as "the Protocol in which the Four Powers set forth their defensive treaty." 111 All five courts were again represented at the conference of Wednesday, 108 Wellington to Stuart, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 544; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, ibid., 556. Though Nesselrode had finished the Russian note by this date, he did not read it to Wellington on this occasion. The manuscript copy of the proces-verbal found in the Wellington Papers is undated. Ibid., pp. 648-649. 109 Ibid.; Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 223; entry for Tues., Nov. 19, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 111; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI. 523-524. 110 Note of Lord Wellington, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, A.A.E., Congres de Verone, 723, 128. 111 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 6; Verona Protocol, Nov. 19, 1822, Mettemich, Memoires, 1111, 609-610, entry for Tues., Nov. 19, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 111; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 523; Temperley, Canning, p. 68; Nichols, "Congress of Verona," SWSS Qu., XI.VI, 396. This document is also called the proces-verbal of November 19, since it was signed on that date. TemJlerley incorrectly gives the 15th as the date of its signing.

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November 20, Wellington having returned to the diplomatic green table (from which he had been absent since November 2), to receive officially the allied instructions to their ministers in Madrid. 112 In a stormy session, the Iron Duke not only refused once more to sign the proces-verbaux of October 20 and November 17, but also delivered a Philippic against the dispatches which the allied courts intended to communicate in extenso to Spain. While asserting that Britain surely had more cause than France for quarreling with Spain, he accused the continental powers of deviating from the policy they had professed to follow but three weeks before, viz., "to allay the irritation existing in Spain against France, and to prevent a possible rupture .... " The apparent object now was to make an insulting declaration against the state of affairs in Spain which "cannot assist the cause of France." He requested the allies to withdraw their dispatches or, at least, to delay their transmission to Madrid, since they would vex the Cortes, embarrass France and Britain, and result in the severance of diplomatic relations between the allied courts and Spain. Being apprehensive of these consequences, his Britannic Majesty could not send a note to the Spanish government "on the subject of its relations with France"; nor could he "hold a common language with his allies upon this occasion." Instead, his Majesty must limit his exertions to allaying "the ferment which these communications must occasion ... ," although he had failed at the Congress to prevent the use of provocative language. 113 Following this outburst, the allied ministers agreed, as a meaningless concession to Wellington, to relabel the protocol of November 17 (not signed until the 19th), a "prod$-verbal," and Bernstorff accepted two minor amendments to the Prussian "Instruction ostensible" proposed by the duke. In the first paragraph, HIes Puissances de ['Europe" was amended to read HIes Souverains reunis a Verone," and in the second, "les Puissances Alliees" was changed to "les Souverains reunis." Wellington obviously wished to avoid any inference that Britain was a party to the allied demarche against Spain. 114 112 Entry for Wed., Nov. 20, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, Ill; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 563. 113 Note of Lord Wellington, Verona, Nov. 20, 1822, A.A.E., Congn!s de Verone, 723, 134; cf. Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 20 and 26, 1822, Well. Desp., J, 556, 592; Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 59. 114 Bois1ecomte, A.A.E., 722, 6; Verona Protocol, Nov. 19, 1822, Metternich, Memoires, III, 609-610; Bernstorff to Wellington, Verona, Nov. 27, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 598; Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Nov. 28, 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 75; Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 219; Temperley, Canning, p. 68. Bois1ecomte, Gentz, Metternich, and Villele, all refer to this document as a protocol.

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When this furious meeting had ended, the illusion no longer remained in Montmorency's mind that Britain might 'go along with" the allies. That night a weary Gentz confided to his diary the terse comment: "What a day!" 115 And Chateaubriand, in angry retrospect, declared: It would have been impossible to use worse arguments than those given by the Duke of Wellington, and to conceal less adroitly the animosity of the Cabinet of St. James towards France. The English plenipotentiary imagined he was still commanding at Waterloo.1 Hi

The final five-power conference on Spain met on the afternoon of Thursday, November 21, to receive officially Wellington's reply to the entire course of action taken by the continental allies in the Spanish Question. Reiterating Britain's opposition to any form of intervention in Spain, the duke read to the conference the minutes of his verbal answers to the allied ministers on the 19th (in declining to sign the proces-verbal), and the 20th (upon the official communication of the Spanish dispatches).117 In the debate which followed Wellington's recital, he learned that the policy of the three eastern courts would not depend, come what may, upon that pursued by France, but that they wanted French cooperation, nonetheless, is indicated by their decision to send their dispatches first to Paris and not to forward them thence to Madrid until the French cabinet had decided what policy it would adopt. The duke, in response to Metternich's previous urging, then inquired whether, in the event of a successful invasion of Spain, that country would be occupied, and if so, would the occupying force be composed of French troops alone or those of other nations? Speaking first, Nesselrode declared that "this was a matter which must remain undetermined till the King of Spain should be at liberty, and enabled to decide for himself whether he would require such [a] force or not." Carefully choosing his words, Metternich replied that the occupation of Naples and Piedmont had been such a burden to Austria that his Imperial Majesty was unwilling "to saddle any Sovereign with an occupation by foreign troops unless at his own desire." That the Paris cabinet "could wish to occupy Spain with French troops," he did not think possible. Disappointed in Metternich's answer, Wellington described it as "a flourish" and avowed to 116 Montmorency to Villele, Verona, Nov. 19, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 223; entry for Wed., Nov. 20,1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, 111,111. 116 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 60. 117 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22 and 26, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 563, 591; Wellington to Mettemich, Verona, Nov. 25, 1822, ibid., p. 585. On November 25, Wellington transmitted to each of the allied delegations copies of these minutes with a covering official note.

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Canning that he would not have raised this issue had not the chancellor assured him on the preceding night that Austria "would not hear of" a French occupation of Spain. After Bernstorff had seconded the views of his Austrian colleague, Montmorency declared that the French government certainly wished to avoid occupying Spain, but that the question depended, of course, on the ultimate solution of the Franco-Spanish dispute. liS Following this exchange of views, the discussion shifted to Portugal, which in August 1820 had followed Spain along the revolutionary path and, on June 27,1821, had adopted a constitution similar to the Spanish Constitution of 1812. Then on the eve of the Congress, Brazil had declared her independence of the mother country (September 7, 1822). Montmorency asked Wellington about Canning's assurance of October 1 to De Moraes Sarmento, the Portuguese charge at London, that Britain would continue "the existing guarantee in favour of Portugal," when Castlereagh had declined to give such an assurance. The duke explained that the late Lord Londonderry had refused only to guarantee that kingdom's political institutions, but that England's ancient treaty of defensive alliance with Portugal (the Methuen treaty, 1703), was still in effect. Britain was obligated to protect her ally's independence and territorial integrity only if she were invaded, but not if she were the aggressor. But Montmorency pressed the question: would Britain aid Portugal, if the latter signed an offensive engagement with Spain and that nation declared war on a third power? Wellington replied categorically that in such a case, Portugal would have no right to call upon England for help. All present expressed their satisfaction with this explanation. 119 The last question discussed was what documents should be drafted to publicize the measures taken by the Congress against Spain. After a brief Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22, 1822, ibid., pp. 563-564. Ibid., pp. 560-562; for Sarmento's note verbale (Sept. 25, 1822) and Canning's answer (Oct. 1), see ibid., pp. 305-307 and 335-336; cf. Temperley, Canning, pp. 194197. The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of Allianoe, February 19, 1810, which bound England to a "perpetual guarantee of the House of Braganza," had been abrogated by the Treaty of Vienna, January 22, 1815. It is clear that Canning did not include Portugal's colonies in the guarantee of territorial integrity. Because of the foreign secretary's unequivocal declaration of October 1, 1822, Portugal dropped her project for an offensive alliance with Spain, and the Hispanic-Portuguese "treaty of defensive alliance and mutual guarantee of the constitutional system of the two kingdoms" came to nought, because the Spanish Cortes would not ratify it. But Villele took Canning at his word and warned Angouleme on May 6, 1823, to leave Portugal alone, for, if he provoked that country, Britain would intervene. Canning to Stuart, No.5, London, Jan. 24, and No. 25, London, Mar. 11, 1823, F.O., France, 146/55; Canning to A'Court, London, Feb. 4, 1823, F.O., Spain, 185/91; Villele to duc d'Angouleme, Paris, May 6, 1823, Villele, Memoires. III, 418-419. 118

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debate, it was agreed that there should be no protocol and that all diplomatic pieces exchanged among the powers should be regarded as "confidential communications from one cabinet to another." In short, everything should be kept secret, and nothing published. By such circumspection, the continental courts hoped to hide from Europe the disunion of the Congress and especially the great divorce of England from the autocratic powers. Wellington, however, protested that the transmission of the Spanish dispatches to the Madrid cabinet would be followed immediately by their appearance "in every newspaper in Europe," in which case his government would be compelled to communicate something to Parliament. Since the allied courts could not prevent the London ministry from publishing whatever papers it wanted to, they made a virtue of necessity and agreed to permit the British government to produce the duke's observations on the dispatches as well as his answer to the proces-verbal, if either "instrument should ever come before the public in an official form." These decisions reached, the conference adjourned; the congressional debates on the Spanish Question at last had ended. 120 The following morning, Montmorency left for Paris to report to Villele on his diplomacy at Verona and to persuade the council to act in concert with the autocratic powers in the affair of the Spanish dispatches. To recap the important developments of the week, Montmorency's "projet de protocole," completed on November 14, was presented to the eastern courts on the 17th, revised on the 18th, and entitled a "prodsverbal" before being shown to Wellington. On the 19th, the continental powers relabeled this document a "protocole" and signed it, only to change it again the next day to a "proces-verbal," as an insignificant response to Wellington's bitter condemnation. But the autocratic courts, refusing to budge on the question of the Spanish dispatches, agreed on the 21st to transmit them to Paris to await the decision of the French king-in-council. Although the continental allies protested that the proces-verbal of November 17 was neither a treaty nor a protocol, both Metternich and Villele privately called it a "protocole," and Gentz, indeed, referred to it as both a protocol and a treaty. Despite its name, it was a treaty, the significance of which was threefold: (1) it contained the casus foederis desired by Russia; (2) it permitted the tsar, through Pozzo di Borgo in Paris, to take the initiative in the Spanish Question; and (3) it made it more difficult for France to go it alone, because of her dependence on the three eastern courts. 120 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 564; entry for Thurs., Nov. 21, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 112; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 523-524.

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The need for further revision had delayed the completion of the Spanish Jispatches until November 17, and the confidential four-power conference of the 18th had approved their final drafts. Significantly, Montmorency had entitled his note a "plan for instructions" (cadre d'instruction) and had submitted it in his own name, not that of his government. The remarkable similarity of these instructions gives mute testimony to the long hours spent on their editing. Each consisted of three distinct documents: (1) a trenchant indictment of the Spanish government which demanded the immediate restoration of the king to absolute power; (2) a secret dispatch ordering the minister to request his passport and leave the country, if, within a certain time, the Madrid cabinet had not instituted "a decisive change in the state of affairs" in Spain; and (3) a project for a note to be delivered to the Spanish government at the moment of departure. Russia sent a fourth piece, a supplementary note which was not communicated to the Congress, explaining that her original endorsement of the Constitution of 1812, of course, had been contingent upon the subsequent approval of Ferdinand VII, then held prisoner in France. The Prussian instructions were the most severe of the four, and the French, most moderate, but none was intended to be acceptable to Spain. Couched as they were in provocative language, they were well-calculated to produce the desired break in diplomatic relations. l2l On November 27, the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian dispatches were sent to Paris so that they could be transmitted to Madrid in conjunction with the French note. Dated November 26, Nesselrode's instructions to Count BuIgary, Russian minister to Spain, paints in sanguine colors the calamities which had befallen that unhappy land since 1820: revolution followed by anarchy, the loss of colonies, the destruction of property, blood spilled on scaffolds and in the royal palace, the captivity of the king, and daily threats of death to the royal family. Not content to stay at home, Spanish conspirators now strive "to excite disturbance and rebellion" in France, to gain accomplices in more distant states (i.e., Naples and Piedmont), and to extend their "proselytism" everywhere. France, Nesselrode predicted, would be compelled to use her army to put an end to "the provocations of which she is the object." At length the note demanded that his Catholic Majesty be set at liberty to form a new government founded on absolutist principles. In justification of this policy, the Russian foreign minister declared that: 121 Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 6; entries for Thurs, and Mon., Nov. 14 and 18, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 109-110; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 517-518; Schroeder, Mettemich's Diplomacy, p. 220n.

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To express the desire to see a protracted misery terminate, to snatch from the same yoke an unhappy monarch and one of the first among European nations, to stop the effusion of blood, and to facilitate the reestablishment of an administration at once wise and national, is certainly not attacking the independence of a country, nor insisting upon a right of intervention against which any power whatever would have reason to protest. 122 dispatch to Count Brunetti in Madrid, also dated November 26, was actually Gentz's work. 123 The text, though more moderate in tone than either the Russian or Prussian notes, was in principle just as objectionable to Britain. It contained frequent references to the ancient bonds of friendship and common tradition existing between Austria and Spain. His Imperial Majesty, the instructions declared, viewed "the situation in which the Spanish monarchy found itself as a ... grave question." The anarchy and civil war, produced by the revolution now rampant in Spain, are destroying the resources, prosperity, and prestige of the nation. But, after all, "a military revolt can never form the basis of a happy and durable government." His Majesty, nonetheless, feels such "repugnance at meddling in the internal affairs of an independent state" that he would not make a pronouncement on this occasion, were the evils of revolution confined to Spain itself. But, unfortunately, this is not the case. The Spanish revolution, "by the contagion of its principles and its example, and by the intrigues of its principal partisans," caused the revolutions of Naples and Piedmont. These principles, the emperor disavows as "false, pernicious, and condemnable." But these harsh words do not apply to "Spain - either as a nation or as a power -" but only "to those who have ruined and disfigured Spain, and who persist in prolonging her sufferings." The note emphasized the emperor's desire for peace and conceded that there was no "direct danger" to Austrian subjects. It did not even mention the possibility of a war with Spain, and made only one vague allusion to Franco-Spanish relations. They "have assumed a character so problematic," Metternich contended, "that one can surrender himself to serious distress over the complications which may result." The only consideration which compels his Imperial Majesty to suggest a change in the present government of Spain is his sincere desire to restore to the Spanish people the prosperity, happiness, and peace which they enjoyed before the conquest of their land M~tternich's

122 Depeche de Ia Russie au cornte Bulgary, Verone, Ie 26 novembre 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 64-65; cf. Annual Register, LXIV (1822), 568. 123 Entries for Tues. and Thurs., Nov. 12 and 14, Gentz, Tagebucher, III, 108-109; depeche de l'Autriche, Verone, Ie 26 novembre 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 65.

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by the Corsican orge. To achieve this goal, the dispatch concluded, the King of Spain must be free. [His Catholic Majesty] ... will be free the moment that he has the power to terminate the evils which afflict his people, to restore order and peace in his kingdom, to surround himself with men equally worthy of his confidence by their principles and their intelligence; and finally, to substitute for a regime acknowledged as impracticable even by those whose egotism or pride still holds them to it, an order of things in which the rights of the monarch would be happily combined with the true interests and legitimate desires of all classes of the nation. 124

Count Bernstorff's instructions of November 22 to Bartholomaus Schepeler, Prussian charge d'affaires in Madrid, was, by far, the most violently worded of the four, perhaps as a means of compensating for the weakness of her position at Verona and the nullity of her policy, which was dominated by Austria. She was, moreover, linked by geography to Russia.1 25 After surveying the origins, progress, and results of the Spanish revolution, the note vehemently attacked Spain's existing governmental institutions. Bernstorff deplored the fact that a revolution, issuing from military revolt, has suddenly tom asunder all the bonds of duty, upset all legitimate order, and broken down the elements of the social structure, which in falling has covered the entire country with its ruins.

The Constitution of 1812, the dispatch continues, confuses "every principle and every power, leaving only the principle of a permanent and legal opposition to the government," which perforce is powerless and paralyzed and no longer has the means "either of doing good, or of preventing ... evil." The Cortes is an assembly which has presented only a conflict of opinions and views and a collision of interests and passions in the midst of which the most dissimilar propositions and resolutions are constantly crossing, disputing, or neutralizing one another.

The "sectarians in Spain," Bernstorff declared, have abandoned every notion of sound policy for "pernicious doctrines" and have sacrificed "every sentiment of justice and moderation ... to dreams of sham liberty." The established institutions of the country are "instruments of injustice and violence" which thinly veil a "tyrannical system with a legal appearance." 124 125

Ibid., pp. 65-67; cf. Annual Register, LXIV, 571. Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 101, 248; Walpole, History of England, III, 49. On

November 5, Metternich had remarked that the Prussian instructions displayed a violence which must be moderated.

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The rule of this lunatic faction of idealistic liberals would have ended long ago, had not deceitful invectives from the tribune, ferocious outcries from the clubs, and the freedom of the press, ... compromised the opinion and stifled the voice of the healthy and sane party of the Spanish nation, which. .. forms an immense majority.

But for all its Sturm und Drang. the Prussian note did not go as far as th~ Russian in threatening war. Bernstodf contented himself with the sweeping charge that the "frightful sickness" which afflicts Spain disturbs her relations with foreign powers and "can compromise the tranquillity of Europe." Like Metternich, he alluded to Franco-Spanish relations only once, asserting that their troubled state "is of a nature to give just fears for peace between the two monarchies." Only the unequivocal liberation of Ferdinand VII and the restoration of the ancien regime, the dispatch concludes, can remedy the evils which engulf his realm and "dispel the causes of our grief and of our well-founded worry concerning his safety." 126 Notwithstanding that the Berlin cabinet followed Vienna's lead at Verona, it would have preferred to avoid the Spanish Question altogether. Bernstodf, indeed, thought that Metternich should have strongly opposed the tsar's views on Spain from the beginning, instead of waiting for a congress at which he hoped to have the assistance of Castlereagh. Had the chancellor done so, he might have prevented the issue from getting out of hand before the Vienna conference met. The Prussian foreign minister, who desired peace and distrusted the Paris government, was convinced that "it was better to do nothing than to cooperate with France in taking a step which could lead to a war." But by November 1822, it was too late; the affair had come to the point where it was impossible to get out of it without some kind of declaration to which Britain could not be a party. Bernstodf's dispatch, despite its violence, was not inconsistent with this moderation. Not only was Prussia's hand forced by Austria and Russia, but also Frederick William TIl, because of traditional Hohenzollern militarism, was the most extreme of the three eastern autocrats on the subject of military mutiny. If called upon to communicate with Spain at all, he was determined to make manifest this personal abhorrence. 127 Reflecting on the proceedings of the Congress, Wellington ruefully observed on November 22 that the scene had changed since the Congress of 126 De¢che de la Prusse Ii M. de Schepeler, Verone, Ie 22 novernbre 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 63-64; cf. Annual Register, LXN, 572-573. 127 Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22,1822, Well. Desp., I, 566.

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Aix-Ia-Chapelle. The eastern powers had closed their eyes to French intrigues in Spain, of which there were "the most undoubted proofs," and to the dangers of a French army in Spain. He realized at last that the Austrian chancellor had used him and Montmorency to oppose Alexander's ambition to lead a European army into Spain. Once the tsar had abandoned this idea, Metternich had supported Russian policy regarding the casus foederis, the Spanish dispatches, and the deliberate provocation of Spain. Having accomplished the dismissal of Capo d'lstria, Metternich, the duke contended, had become the tsar's "principal adviser," but to maintain his influence, the chancellor now was obliged "to bend his own opinions" to bring them closer to those of Alexander. Wellington still hoped that Villele could preserve peace with Spain, but he was no longer optimistic, having learned that the autocratic powers would transmit their dispatches to Madrid regardless of what the Paris cabinet did. Wellington's only recourse, therefore, was to withdraw from the Congress. 128 During his last audience with Alexander on Wednesday morning, November 27, Wellington declared that what had passed at Verona would disturb the peace of the world. The tsar replied that he neither believed nor wished that peace between France and Spain would last. War, he affirmed, was the only measure which could overturn the Spanish revolution. The duke reminded the emperor that he had not availed himself of an old ally: Time, which could remedy many of the evils alleged to have been spawned by the Spanish revolution. Why not let Time try its perspective and apply its healing process? The Russian autocrat answered that he feared, while Europe waited for the remedy of time, "much mischief would be done," and the cause of the Spanish Royalists would be lost. He apparently let his arriere-pensee slip when he confessed his hope that a French invasion of Spain would provoke insurrections at home, thus furnishing the eastern courts with a pretext for intervening in France with their European army. In response to this undiplomatic avowal, Wellington inquired if his Majesty thought the Paris government could survive a war with Spain. "No," the tsar exclaimed, "but if it should not, we have the means of setting all to rights!" 129 Wellington took his leave of Francis I on the evening of the 27th. His Apostolic Majesty declared his fervent hope that peace could be preserved and seemed surprised, even alarmed, by the tsar's bellicose views. On November 29, Wellington informed Metternich that the Marquis of LondonIbid., pp. 563, 568-569; cf. Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy, p. 219. Wellington to Canning: Memorandum on Conversation with Emperor of Russia, Verona, Nov. 27, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 613-614. 128

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derry (Charles Stewart) had been appointed to attend the conferences on Italian affairs. Early the next morning, the duke left Verona for Paris and thence to London. 130 From the beginning to the end of the Congress of Verona, the Spanish Question remained unchanged. Without exception, the policies of the major European powers were motivated by national interests. Chateaubriand described the situation thus: Whatever is done here pleases no one. France is obliged to act against her will; Russia thinks that nobody goes far enough; Austria has stirred only to avoid breaking with Russia; Prussia dreads the least movement; and England opposes everything.1 31 VilleIe was delighted with the proces-verbal of November 17, which stipulated the casus-foederis. Praising it as a "genuine success," he declared: [N ow] we are assured of the moral support that we desired on the part of the three great powers in order to confine the ill will of the fourth.132

But the premier was far from pleased with the determination of the eastern courts to send notes to Madrid, and he was frankly skeptical of their contents. To Chateaubriand, his man in Verona, he confessed on November 28, that he had no objection if the "whole weight of the determination relative to Spain" were shifted "upon our shoulders," so long as they leave us two bowls; but if they give me but one, I cannot be seduced by the appearance of so much honor: everything depends on the notes which are to be delivered ... to Spain.1 33 Villele, moreover, was absolutely opposed to sending the dispatch which Montmorency had drafted in Verona, regarding it as well-designed to break diplomatic relations with Spain. The security and reputation of France, the premier believed, would be compromised if France associated with the other three powers in sending simultaneously a note to the Spanish government, and in recalling the French ambassador at the moment those of the other powers left Madrid. 134 130 Ibid., p. 611; Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, ibid., p. 619; Chateaubriand to Mme de Duras, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, Ill, 291. Pozzo di Borgo left Verona for Paris on November 28 two days before Wellington. 131 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, Villele, Memaires, III, 247-248. 132 "Suites du congres de Verone," ibid., p. 276; cf. Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Nov. 28, 1822, A.A.E., Congres de Verone, 721, 243. 133 Ibid. 134 "Suites du congres de Verone," Villele, Memoires, III, 273-274.

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Finally, VilleIe was convinced the severance of relations would lead immediately to war, or to a "state which will be so like it that we shall not in reality have any choice.... Why, [he lamented], must these unfortunate foreign affairs come to disturb ... [our] prosperity!" 135 Determined at all costs to avoid a war on the southwest frontier of France, the premier made one more attempt before the close of the Congress to prevent the withdrawal of the allied ministers from Madrid. On December 1, he, with the king's support, secured the council's approval of his policy, and Montmorency, who had returned to Paris just the day before, acquiesced for the moment. Four days later (December 5), Villele requested the autocratic powers to withdraw their notes or, at least, to refer the recall of ministers to the conference of ambassadors in Paris. The situation in Spain, he declared, had completely changed since they were written. Their transmission now would be inopportune and would only promote England's interests. The defeat and dispersal of the Army of the Faith, the fall of the Urgel Regency, and the mobilization of Mina's army along the Pyrenees meant that the sending of notes, the withdrawal of ministers from Madrid, and the beginning of hostilities, "form but one and the same fact, accomplished in a week." There were, moreover, other important factors to be considered: the danger of British intervention on the side of Spain, the "disastrous effect" war would surely have on French commerce, industry, and finances, and the opposition to war of "the soundest and most general portion of public opinion." Because of these circumstances, it was "no longer appropriate" for France even to send a note. In a rare display of rhetoric, ViIleIe concluded his entreaty to the eastern courts with an appeal to heaven: God grant, for my country and for Europe, that they may not persist in a determination which, I declare beforehand and with complete conviction, must compromise the welfare of France herself,136 Upon the arrival of the premier's plea in Verona, December 11 (only three days before the Congress ended), Chateaubriand hastened to implement it. Despite his arguments, Alexander and Mettemich rejected the French request, fearing that agreement would appear to be a surrender to the Spanish revolution. The absolute monarchs, nonetheless, did grant the Paris cabinet 1M Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Nov. 28, 1822, AAE., Congres de Verone, 721, 243. Villele had estimated a treasury surplus of 25 million francs by the end of 1822. 136 Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Dec. 5, 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 80-81; cf. Maurois, Chateau briand, p. 259.

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"several days to act with them ... [or] if the moment were not opportune ... , to act a little later after them." But the Spanish government must receive the dispatches in time to know they were the work of the Congress. 137 Metternich consistently opposed war throughout the Congress, though the realities of the situation demanded he be circuitous in his methods, lest Austria be compromised and his influence with the tsar undermined. As late as December 12, he declared his opposition to war to Chateaubriand, urging him "to support Villele and to restrain the ardor of Montmorency." 138 But two days later, the chancellor, who distrusted the French author-diplomat and had no confidence in his ability as a statesman, "implored Montmorency not to let France act alone and to induce his government to content itself with a moral remonstrance alone." 139 While sharing the desire of Wellington and Villele for peace, Metternich did not share the latter's alarm at the possible consequences of breaking diplomatic relations with Spain. In his opinion, "the recall of their ministers was the extreme of what could or would be done, especially by Austria and Prussia." 140 5. International Finance and Intervention: the Brothers Rothschild and Ouvrard

Not all the notables at Verona were plenipotentiaries and potentates, or even members of the official delegations. The parts played by several famous ladies and by the composer, Rossini, already have been noted, but their influence was almost entirely social and, therefore, irrelevant to the political results of the Congress. By contrast, the Brothers Rothschild Solomon, James, and Carl - and Gabriel Julien Ouvrard, a French army contractor and financier, were deeply involved in the Spanish Question, and their similar, though separate, cases furnish important evidence of the role of moneyed power in international politics. Mindful of Solomon Rothschild's timely assistance in financing the Austrian expedition to Naples in 1821, Metternich and Gentz brought him to the Congress. Upon arriving in Verona, Solomon learned that a rumor 137 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona., Dec. 12, 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 83; Wellington to Canning, Paris, Dec. 17, 1822, Well. Desp., 1,656-567; Viel-Castel, La Restauration, XI, 604. 138 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 110. 139 Metternich to Montmorency, Verona, Dec. 14, 1822, quoted in Camb. Hist. of Brit. For. Pol., II, 60; cf. Temperley, Canning, p.60. 140 Stewart to Canning, Verona, Nov. 8, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 510, quoting a conversation with Metternich on Nov. 7.

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was being circulated that the House of Rothschild had offered a loan to the Spanish consitutional government. He hastened to spike this baseless allegation, assuring Metternich on October 22 that his family "was lending its support only to the legitimists and the conservative regime." 141 Throughout the Congress, Solomon and Gentz were inseparable. The two had enjoyed an intimate and mutually profitable rapport since Aix-laChapelle. In exchange for gifts of money and investments in his behalf, the publicist had given the banker political information, served as a confidential connection between him and the chancellor, assisted him in negotiating a loan to Austria in 1820, and the following year had successfully defended the House of Rothschild from the attacks of Baron Johann Friedrich Cotta's influential Allgemeine Zeitung of Augsburg. To assure himself of Gentz's continued support, Solomon offered him the prospect of future lucrative transactions. 142 The chevalier was not ungrateful; he introduced the Vienna Rothschild to Nesselrode, Lieven, and Tatischev, who soon secured a state loan of £ 6,000,000. This business deal brought Solomon and his Paris brother, James, not only a handsome profit but also increased prestige. In recognition of their services, the tsar conferred upon them the Order of S1. Vladimir. 143 Notwithstanding that Gentz was, indeed, a mercenary of the pen, his venality was more apparent than real. He made no secret of the gifts he received from the Rothschilds, the Danubian hospodars, and others. Metternich knew and approved of these arrangements and never thought that they would compromise the secretary's sincerety or cause him to write anything contrary to his political convictions. Remarkably candid, the scribe did not hesitate to criticize his employers' policies when he disagreed with them. Despite an ultra-Royalist point of view, Gentz's writings reveal an impartiality and objectivity rare for this age of reaction and revolution. His total immersion in the society of princes, statesmen, and financiers, his influential work as Metternich's henchman and alter ego, a realistic attitude toward the rapidly changing world of the early nineteenth century, and a political insight, which at moments was profound, all make Gentz's correspondence, diary, and essays valuable historical documents. 144 Corti, House of Rothschild, pp. 233-236,278. Entry for Tues., Oct. 22, 1822, Gentz, Tagebiicher, III, 97; Sweet, Gentz, 218219, 273-274. Stegemann, the editor of the Zeitung, promised Cotta that he would refrain from printing any further criticism of Rothschild's relations with Austria. 143 Corti, House of Rothschild, pp. 279-280. When this news was published in the 6sterreichischer Beobachter, the word "saint" was deleted, because of the impropriety of a Jew being made a member of a Christian order. 144 Sweet, Gentz, pp. 219, 229, 275, 285-287, 296-297, 299. 141

142

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While at Verona, Solomon established a private courier service with Vienna and Paris. So swift was this service that it was used by both the Austrian and French delegations to the Congress as well as by their home governments. By exploiting news from Verona, which he got before anyone else, James Rothschild, reaped huge profits on the Paris Bourse. Since no one expected war at the beginning of the Congress, French bonds and bank notes rose steadily in value.1% Suddenly, James sold five million francs worth of French securities. The next day it was learned in Paris that armed intervention in Spain was expected. As the rumor spread that the Crowned Heads of Europe were holding warlike councils in Verona, the price of government bonds fell in all continental nations, and to some extent in Britain as well. Alarmed by this decline, Villele warned Chateaubriand that war would ruin France's financial structure.146 But this admonition failed to impress either the Congress or the ambitious ambassador who observed sardonically: "Surrounded by gentlemen of the Bourse, whose stock-jobbing was deranged by the sound of cannon, he [Villele] was frightened by the cries of the ruined speculator. ... " 147 As the ultra journals in Paris continued to preach war and to embarrass the government, the slump became more acute, until Stuart received word that no decisions had been reached and that Wellington was still opposing intervention. Once more the price of government bonds began to rise. 148 On November 18, Villele informed Montmorency that: The Rothschild courier is causing our bonds to rise again .... He is propagating the news that there will be no intervention. I fear these deceptive booms, which pave the way for new variations [in stock values] and great losses, if later war is again feared. 149

145 Three types of official French capital notes were sold on the Paris stock exchange: securities of the Bank of France and the Mortgage Bank (La Caisse hypothlkaire), bonds of the national government (rentes sur l'Btat), and municipal bonds, especially those of Paris and Bordeaux. Frederick B. Artz, France under the Bourbon Restoration, 1814-1830 (New York, 1963), p. 215. 146 Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Nov. 28 and Dec. 5, 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, pp. 75, 80-81; Annual Register, LXIV, 218, Corti, House of Rothschild, pp. 280-281. 147 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 86. 148 Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Dec. 10, 1822, ibid., p. 83; Corti, House of Rothschild, p. 281. 149 Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Nov. 18, 1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 219. In November 1822, Cortes bonds sold in London for 75 per cent of par, but by January 1823, they had fallen to only 35 per cent of par, a drop of 40 per cent in two months. During the same period, French government bonds, by contrast, fell only 12 points, from 90 to 78. Nicolle, "Ouvrard," IMH, XVII, 195.

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Thus the House of Rothschild turned the political situation to its own purpose. When Solomon suggested to James that his presence in Verona could be useful in view of the great decisions pending there, the latter needed no further urging. Already he had become alarmed by the contradictory reports from the Congress. He arrived in Verona on November 22. Six days later they were joined by a third brother, Carl, who was in charge of the Naples branch of the banking house. Only brothers Nathan and Amschel were absent from Verona; Nathan's political sympathies and close connections with the British government kept him in London, and Amschel's business would not permit him to leave Frankfurt-on-Main.1 50 To strengthen relations between Austria and his House, Solomon paid all of Metternich's personal expenses at the Congress, a sum of 16,370 lira ($ 3,274). The Rothschilds, indeed, provided all the cash spent in Verona by the various delegations. 151 After discussing Italian and Spanish problems with Carl, Solomon and James returned to their respective homes on or about December 1. James was as reluctant as Villele to send a French expedition into Spain, fearing it would hurt his financial system; nonetheless, when war became inevitable, he raised the money for the campaign by underwriting the sale of 6 per cent French Royal Bonds and "negotiating a Spanish loan payable to France." The premier, remembering the precedent of Austria and Naples, had suggested the "Spanish loan" to James Rothschild. By "Spanish" was meant, of course, Ferdinand VII and the Royalist Regency.152 The association of the Rothschilds with the Congress of Verona was, in short, of great advantage to all concerned, with the exception, of course, of the Spanish constitutional government. The Rothschild tactics will be familiar to anyone who has studied the methods of a modern lobbyist. While Ouvrard could not match the Rothschilds' great fortune and international prestige, he compensated for these deficiencies with incredible audacity and imagination. Born near Nantes in 1770, he was the son of a paper manufacturer. During the French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, he made a fortune and attained prestige as an army supply contractor. He was an unscrupulous, greedy, but "genial war profiteer," financier, and speculator. He earned an estimated fifteen million francs in Paris and London 150 Corti, House of Rothschild, pp. 282, 284. Solomon introduced James to Rossini, while the three were in Verona. The friendship of the French Rothschild and the composer dates from this meeting. 151 Ibid., p. 283. The specie was drawn from France and the money exchanges of Lombardy-Venetia. 152 Ibid., pp. 282, 285; Boislecomte, A.A.E., 722, 8.

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through speculation in government bonds whose value had fallen as a result of the war scare of 1822. 153 While the chiefs of the Alliance were meeting in Verona, Ouvrard agreed to grant the Urgel Regency a loan of five million francs to recruit, equip, and train an army, but only on condition that either the Alliance or France officially recognize the Regency. When Ouvrard approached Villele on this issue, the premier for a moment considered endorsing the scheme, since it seemed to offer a chance of averting war. But he soon recovered. He rejected the proposal, realizing that he could not recognize the Regency without declaring war on the Spanish constitutional government. He refused even to give Ouvrard a letter of introduction to any member of the French delegation at Verona,154 Rebuffed by Villele, Ouvrard struck out for Italy on his own. In Milan, he met Montmorency, easily secured that minister's support for his plan, and obtained from him a letter of introduction to Chateaubriand. Ouvrard's mission was brief; he arrived in Verona on November 25 and left on December 1. The Alliance vetoed his petition because recognition of the rebel regency would have required war with Spain anyway, though Chateaubriand favored the use of Ouvrard's scheme in the event of a Franco-Spanish war.155 That zealous diplomat was, of course, doing everything in his power to bring about such a war. Metternich was amused by this "audacious adventurer" who aspired to kill the Cortes by "dint of money and the Urgel Regency," without any military assistance from France. As much as he wished such a plan could succeed, he considered it "chimerical" and gave it no support. Though Ouvrard declared he would be satisfied if only Russia recognized the Regency, Nesselrode refused lest such recognition embroil Russia in a Spanish war against the wishes of her allies. The Russian minister regarded Ouvrard's plan as more an aid to foreign intervention than a substitute for it, since his loan would provide money for an invasion. 156 On Gentz's advice, Ouvrard did not call on Wellington, despite the fact 153 George Weill, "Le financier Ouvrard," Revue historique. CXXVII (1918),31-47, 51; Nicolle, "Ouvrard," IMH, XVII, 194. 154 Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Nov. 4, 6, and 14, 1822, VillilIe, Memoires, III, 175, 182-183, 214; "Suites du congres de Verone," ibid., 277; Weill, "Ouvrard," Revue historique, CXXVII, 50; Nicolle, "Ouvrard," IMH, XVII, 194. 155 Montmorency to Chateaubriand, Milan, Nov. 24, 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 88; Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Nov. 28 and 30, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 293, 296; Weill, "Ouvrard," Revue historique. CXXVII,51. IIH1 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 294-295.

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the two were well-acquainted, his Grace having lived in the financier's Paris home for three years. The duke, therefore, was deliberately kept in the dark and was not sure what was going on.1S7 To Canning, he complained: I cannot say that I know exactly what brought him [Ouvrard] here .... The

secrecy, however, in which this transaction has been kept will show you how we stand here. 1SS

Determined to talk to Ouvrard, Wellington on November 29, finally succeeded in meeting him, but the wily speculator hid the real purpose of his mission. He misled the duke by declaring that he had come to Verona "to obtain some kind of guarantee" for a twenty million franc loan to the Spanish RoyalistS. 1S9 Rejected by Villele and the Congress, Ouvrard returned to Paris, where he soon came forward with another project. He was prepared for the POSSIbility of war and ready to bank heavily on the Royalists, not that he was a conservative crusader, but only because he wanted to make money. Toward this end, he had served first the French Revolution and then Napoleon; now he would serve the Restoration - for a price. This time his efforts were crowned with success; he acquired the contract for supplying the French expedition which invaded Spain in April 1823. He had, indeed, a virtual monopoly of the food supply and transportation for the Bourbon army. His prices were twice the prevailing level. He received the privilege of establishing the cost of forage at a later date, and on this item, he also was given a "blank check." He received a 2 per cent commission on all purchases made with government funds. A charge of 7Yz centimes per day per horse was levied, and there were 25,000 of them. All accidental losses were to be borne by the Royal Treasury. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Ouvrard made 30,000,000 francs ($ 6,000,000) as the supply contractor of the French army in 1823. 160 Concerning the "apparition" of Ouvrard, Metternich astutely observed: "It is not Ouvrard who is fabulous, but the times in which we live." 161 Ibid., pp. 293, 295; Weill, "Ouvrard," Revue historique, CXXVII, 51. Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 29, 1822, Well. Desp., I, 612. 159 Ibid., The original amount offered by Ouvrard was, indeed, twenty million francs, but only five million was to be in cash; the rest was to be paid in "worthless securities" (mauvais titres) of the prerevolutionary Spanish government. The Regency wisely refused the offer of claims they probably could never collect. The final sum agreed on was five million francs in silver. Villele to Montmorency, Paris, Nov. 4 and 6,1822, Villele, Memoires, III, 175, 182. 160 Nicole, "Ouvrard," IMH, XVII, 195; Fourcassie, Viltele, pp. 246-247. 161 Chateaubriand to Villele, Verona, Nov. 28, 1822, Chateaubriand, Correspondance, III, 295. 157

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THE SPANISH QUESTION

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6. A Retrospect

Permeating the negotiations on the Spanish Question were four significant forces: (1) the predominance of the Franco-Russian entente, (2) the influence of the tsar on Austria and Prussia, (3) the disunity of the French delegation caused by the determination of Montmorency and Chateaubriand for war, despite Villele's desire for peace, and (4) the subtle diplomatic maneuvering of Mettemich to preserve, at least, a rump alliance which could restrain France and Russia. After returning to London, Wellington explained to Canning that with Russian assistance, French policy, not Austrian, had gained ascendancy at the Congress: From the commencement to the end of the proceedings at Verona, [the duke declared], the case of Spain under consideration was a French case, and nothing else. It was brought forward as a French case; the answers given were ... to a French case; the replies were from French ministers; and the proces-verbal is founded upon French cases. 162

Not to overlook the obvious, it should be noted, too, that the conversations, cabinet pieces, protocols, and precis of the Congress were all in French, the international language of diplomacy. As much as Austria and Prussia wanted peace in Western Europe, they wanted even more to prevent a Russo-Turkish war; they agreed, therefore, to the proces-verbal of November 17, containing the casus foederis desired by the tsar, and drafted dispatches to Madrid in the language held at Laibach. Before coming to the Congress, both Montmorency and Chateaubriand had become converts to the "war party." Once in Verona, the influence of Alexander and his agents, Pozzo and Tatischev, confirmed this conviction by counteracting the arguments of Metternich and Wellington in favor of peace. The views of the foreign minister not only split the French delegation, but also led him to violate his instructions by committing France to an action opposed by the premier: the sending of simultaneous notes to Spain. Villele had watched with mounting anxiety and disapproval Montmorency's conduct at Vienna and Verona. His impolitic diplomacy, the premier believed, made it appear that France had appealed to the eastern courts for help and had accepted from them a mandate to act as their agent. Thus he had seriously compromised the dignity and independence of France and 162

Wellington to Canning, London, Dec. 31, 1822, Well. Desp .• 1.672.

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had forfeited to the Alliance the initiative in the Spanish Question. Montmorency, moreover, had permitted Metternich to edit the ostensible La Garde dispatch, despite Villele's specific admonition not to trust the chancellor. Under these circumstances, the premier's disavowal of his minister's policy became more probable. Austrian diplomacy was, of course, contingent upon Russian policy. From the moment the Spanish Question occupied the tsar's attention, Metternich displayed great anxiety about it. Not wishing to oppose Alexander's views directly, he solicited Wellington and Montmorency to object to his first plan of marching Russian troops through Germany and France to attack Spain, and to protest against his second scheme of stationing a European-Russian army in Piedmont to watch the French campaign in Spain. By November 6, they had succeeded in pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for Austria. While they were remonstrating with the tsar, no one was more convinced than the chancellor that nothing should be done about the internal affairs of Spain. But no sooner had the pressing danger of the march of a Russian army across Habsburg dominions been removed, than Metternich did an about-face, supporting the Russian proposal that the continental courts should conclude a treaty in response to the French demands. Failing to control the congressional debates on Spain, he was perforce obliged to adopt the tsar's view in this matter. On November 1, the chancellor had proposed that Britain be given the responsibility of mediating between France and Spain and had even professed the belief that such was the only means of solving the Franco-Spanish crisis without war and, by the same stroke, preventing the separation of Britain from the Alliance. Metternich repeatedly assured Wellington of his concurrence in all the duke's views and especially with respect to "the inconvenience which must result from anything in the shape of a treaty, and from the establishment of a conference at Paris," which would be dominated by Pozzo di Borgo. 163 Yet, when Alexander insisted on a treaty of some sort, and Montmorency endorsed the idea, Metternich offered no objection, notwithstanding that he knew a treaty would render it impossible for Britain to cooperate with the Alliance, even in the work of preserving peace. As a final artifice, the chancellor discovered that the Emperor of Austria had no alternative but "to pronounce his opinion upon the Spanish revo~ lution and against what was passing in Spain." 164 There can be no doubt, however, that Russian influence, which manifested itself despite the opinions 183

1~4

Wellington to Canning, Verona, Nov. 22, 1822, ibid., p. 565-566. Ibid.

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and prejudices of Austria and Prussia, was primarily responsible for these Metternichian maneuvers. A reappraisal of the long and complex negotiations on the Spanish Question reveals that the allies were so divided on Spain, even before the Congress began, that concerted action was impossible. When the Vienna conference convened, it was already too late, as Bernstorff observed, to adopt any demarche that the London cabinet could support. It appears, therefore, that Temperley has exaggerated the importance of Wellington's note of October 30, since the duke's reply to Montmorency added nothing new to the well-known British policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of independent states. Under these circumstances, the intervention of the Congress was confined to three "insignificant dispatches," as Chateaubriand has called them,lM and France, far from being the instrument of the Alliance, actually pursued a separate, national policy against the wishes of Britain, Austria, and Prussia. The two German courts wanted to go no further than a moral remonstrance to the Spanish government and then to sever diplomatic relations. They feared a Franco-Spanish war for two reasons: (1) If it resulted in a French victory, France might become too strong, since a renewal of the Bourbon Family Compact seemed almost certain; (2) if France were defeated, they might be compelled to go to war to save her from being overrun by Liberals and Revolutionaries. The tsar, of course, did not share these fears, for he believed and hoped that a French invasion force would be routed, that this defeat would produce disturbances at home and thereby create a pretext for allied intervention in France as well as Spain. Britain, Austria, and Prussia tried to prevent war up to the very end. For all practical purposes, the European Pentarchy died at Verona. Against the wishes of three-fifths of the Alliance, the Paris cabinet, for the first time in seven years, manifested a will of its own. Thus the conventional interpretation that the Alliance commissioned France to attack Spain is untenable. 166 British policy had little chance of gaining ascendancy at Verona in the face of the solid opposition of the continental powers, all of whom favored some kind of intervention in Spain, although each followed its own interests. The time had passed when the continent was financially dependent on British subsidies (as during the common struggle against Napoleon), and could ill afford to gainsay the court of Saint James. British motives, too, were suspect, for it was no secret to the allies that "those shopkeeping 165 168

Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, p. 63. Bignon, Les cabinets et les peuples, pp. 440, 469, 494.

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THE CONGRESS AT WORK

islanders" were more interested in trade with Spanish America than in the political institutions of the mother country. VilU:le certainly associated the two questions and thought the Congress had made a mistake not to connect them as a means of restraining England in the New World. 167 Thus Britain's cry for non-intervention was viewed as an attempt to protect her lucrative commerce with Latin America. In sum, continental, and especially French, statesmen believed that "John Bull" was more interested in the welfare of his pocket-book than in helping Spanish Liberals maintain their hopelessly unstable government. The prospect of a French invasion of Spain did not alarm Canning, for he had anticipated this possibility and had seen it as a means of detaching France from the Alliance, which he wanted to destroy. This objective he hoped to accomplish by withdrawing Britain and separating France from the Congress System. So long as intervention was restricted to one country France - and the arena of conflict was confined to Spain proper, British interests were only remotely involved. Where Canning did not propose to act, he did not threaten. But where British interests were concerned - as in the case of Portugal and Latin America - Canning was as good as his word. The question of Spanish America and of Europe's attitude toward this area must now be discussed.

167 Villele to Chateaubriand, Paris, Nov. 28 and Dec. 5, 1822, Chateaubriand, Congres de Vb-one, pp. 75, 80.

CHAPTER V

THE SPANISH COLONIAL QUESTION! H France occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order to avoid the consequences of that occupation, that we should blockade Cadiz? No. I looked another way. I sought materials for compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain 'With the Indies.' I CALLED TIlE NEW WORLD INTO EXIS'IENCE, TO REDRESS TIlE BALANCE OF TIlE OLD. - Canning, 1826.2

1. Genesis The Napoleonic Wars had virtually assured the emancipation of Spanish America, but European recognition of this newly won independence remained as important diplomatic question for a decade thereafter (18151825). By the fall of 1822, this question, like the slave trade, had become an issue to be decided primarily between Britain and France, since the interests of the other continental powers were only remotely involved. The role of the Congress of Verona, appears to have been that of a watershed in the colonial quest for European recognition. But during Latin America's long struggle for independence, British policy toward this area, inspired largely by economic and political expediency rather than by any libertarian principles, was characterized by frequent shifts and reversals. As early as May 9, 1790, General Francisco Miranda of Venezuela had presented to Prime Minister William Pitt a scheme for Latin American Emancipation. This plan would have been executed at the time had not the Nootka Sound Incident been amicably settled. Early in 1801, Henry Addington, Pitt's friend and successor, revived the project and began military preparations, but the Peace of Amiens (March 25, 1802) again 1 An abridged version of this chapter appeared in the Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XL (June 1959), 28-39. My views today, however, are not identical to those held then. In 1959, I believed that Chateaubriand's policy statement at Verona on the Spanish Colonial Question could not "be reconciled with French attempts to establish Bourbon monarchies in the New World, nor with Villele's repeatedly affirmed policy of recognition." (ibid., p. 34). But under the impact of additional research and more reflection, this opinion gradually gave way to the conviction that the two, indeed, can be reconciled. 2 Canning to the Commons (corrected version), December 12, 1826, in Temperley, Canning, App. VI, p. 584.

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postponed its execution. When war with France was renewed on May 16, 1803, the liberation of Spanish America once more became a major aim of British policy, despite the dissent of Captain Sir Home Popham, who advised Pitt on October 14, 1804, that, while the conquest of South America was out of the question, it was quite possible for England to capture its commerce and open for British manufacturers and shippers boundless riches. The plan, however, was suspended again "by the affairs of Europe, and by the hopes and exertions of the Third Coalition." 3 After July 1808, when Britain became Spain's ally against Napoleon, the London cabinet dismissed all idea of using force to detach the Spanish American colonies from the motherland. In 1810 the Spanish navigation laws, restricting trade in the West Indies and along the coast of South America, were suspended by an unwritten Anglo-Spanish entente. 4 When Castlereagh returned to the Foreign Office two years later, he laid down the tenets of England's Latin American policy. Britain would undertake mediation, he declared, but only if Spain agreed: (1) to sign a satisfactory treaty with England on the slave trade, (2) to proclaim "a general amnesty and armistice" to the insurgents, (3) to place the South Americans on a "footing of legal equality" with European Spaniards, (4) to grant her colonies "free commercial intercourse with all nations," Spain enjoying, as the mother country, "a fair preference," and (5) British mediation shall not "under any circumstances assume an armed character. ... " 5 On October 17, 1816, and again on January 10, 1817, Carlos Jose Francisco Gutierrez de los Rios, Count of Fernan-Nunez, the Spanish ambassador at London, inquired if this policy remained unchanged. In return for armed assistance, Spain, he asserted, would grant Britain a liberal commercial treaty. In rejecting this bribe, Castlereagh repeated his earlier demand for the abolition of the colonial system and absolutely refused to use force against the colonies. On August 28, 1817, he issued a Cabinet Memorandum to inform the allied powers of these views. Since no Spanish 3 Don Juan Gusman, "Lettre aux Espagnols-Americains," Edinburgh Review, XIII (1809), 278, 285, 292, 297; "Documents: Miranda and the British Admiralty, 18041806," ARR, VI (1900-1901), 513; Kaufman, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 104; J. H. Rose, William Pitt and National Revival (London, 1911), p. 569 (Addington, who succe-ooed Pitt on March 14, 1801, was created Viscount Sidmouth in January 1805). An army under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley actually was raised in 1808 to aid General Miranda in emancipating Colombia, but it was sent instead to Portugal, when the Spanish revolted against the French. 4 Canning to the Commons, Mar. 5, 1824, ParI. Debates, new ser., X (1824), 753. 5 Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 408-409,413; cf. Webster, "Castlereagh and the Spanish Colonies, 1815-1818," ERR, XXVII (1912), 87.

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government would accept the British terms, and Britain would not mediate unless they were accepted, a stalemate ensued which lasted for the duration of the negotiations on this issue. 6 Meanwhile in Madrid, Tatischev, the Russian ambassador, tried "to stir up Spanish jealousy against the British South American policy," and encouraged Ferdinand VII in his hope of recovering the revolted colonies with the promise of aid from the Quadruple Alliance. And in the French capital, Pozzo di Borgo, who warmly seconded this plan, not only succeeded in gaining the support of Premier Richelieu, but also proposed to the Paris Ambassadors' Conference that Britain should employ a commercial boycott to break the resistance of the insurgent Spanish colonies. But when Tsar Alexander learned of these intrigues, he reprimanded his ambassadors for fostering "the Spanish dream of re-subjugation." He even complained of Tatischev's actions to Castlereagh, when the two met at Aix-Ia-Chapelle in the fall of 1818. Far from advocating the use of force to regain the colonies, Alexander, still inspired by a spirit of moderation, suggested that Wellington be given the task of mediation and even expressed a willingness to permit the United States to have a voice in the negotiations. The tsar hoped, as did Castlereagh and Wellington, to see the colonies reconciled with the mother country, but he also wished to replace Spain's absolute rule in the colonies with a more liberal system of government. 7 In private conferences with Alexander, Castlereagh emphasized "the absurdity of expecting British ministers to acquiesce in the idea of a commercial boycott [of the Spanish American colonies]." Since Austria and Prussia remained unwavering in their support of Britain, the conferences at Aix-Ia-Chapelle resulted in the withdrawal of Russian support from Richelieu's proposal that the Alliance aid Spain in reconquering her colonies. It should be understood, however, that it was the tsar's ambassadors, Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 409-411, 415. Ibid., pp. 412-414; "Documents: Protocols of Conferences of Representatives of the Allied Powers Respecting Spanish America, 1824-1825," AHR, XXII (1916-1917), 595; Dexter Perkins, "Russia and the Spanish Colonies, 1817-1818," ibid., XXVIII (1922-1923), 668-670,671; Webster, "Span. Cols., Pt. I," EHR, XXVII, 84, 93-95. Castlereagh had several conversations with Richard Rush, the American minister, on Latin America and even gave him copies of official correspondence which persuaded the Washington government to postpone recognition of the Spanish colonies until the completion of Britain's mediation in behalf of Spain to restore them to their former allegiance. John Quincy Adams, however, never doubted for a moment that this mediation would fail. Alexander's efforts to include the United States in the inner sanctum of the Alliance, his willingness to see her participate in discussions on the colonial question, and his disapproval of reestablishing absolute rule in Spanish America, all indicate a latent liberalism. 6 7

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THE CONGRESS AT WORK

Tatischev and especially Pozzo, who had urged this measure, not the tsar himself. Alexander not only rebuked his ministers, but even tried to secure Spanish approval of the British conditions for mediation. All of the continental powers (excepting Spain) now accepted the principles which had been the basis of Britain's South American policy since 1812.8 The next attempt to defeat British policy came from France in 1819, when Richelieu and his successor, Jean Joseph Dessolle, tried to establish a Bourbon monarchy in La Plata. 9 The whole affair was revealed in July 1820 as a plot to undermine British diplomacy.1o That such was the definite aim of France has now been definitely established. The idea occurs again and again in the correspondence of the French ministers .... It is favored in 1822 by Montmorency. It was the favorite dream of Chateaubriand. It was the hope of Villele. l l

The recognition of the independence of Argentina (La Plata), Colombia, Chile, and Mexico by the United States in 1822 compelled Britain to take some action, and British public opinion favored following the American example. 12 Castlereagh and Wellington, however, opposed immediate recognition, since they shared the objection of the continental courts to re8 Webster, "Castlereagh and the Spanish Colonies, 1818-1822," EHR, XXX (1915), 635-636; Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., pp. 119-120. 9 The Spanish viceroyalty of La Plata was later divided into the modern states of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina. In 1819 and 1820, France showed definite signs of wishing to interfere in the newly established states of South America. Temperley, "French Designs on Spanish America in 1820-1825," EHR, XL (1925), 37; Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., pp. 124-125. 10 "Paper Relative to a Secret Project for Erecting the Provinces of South America into a Kingdom, and Placing the Prince of Lucca on the Throne - 1819," BFSP, VI (1818-1819), 1085-1100; Perkins, "Europe, Spanish America, and the Monroe Doctrine," AHR, XXVII (1921-1922), 210; Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 125; Webster, "Span. Cols., Pt. II," EHR, XXX, 637-638. The Prince of Lucca was a Bourbon, though not closely related to the King of Spain. The whole plot was revealed by a memorandum of Count Fran~ois-Gerard de Rayneval to Valentin Gomez, the Secretary of State of Buenos Aires. In 1819 Rayneval was a member of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in January 1821 he succeeded Chateaubriand as minister to Berlin. He attended the Congress of Verona. 11 In July 1823, the French cabinet again sanctioned the project of founding Bourbon monarchies in the New World and notified the French ambassador at Madrid of this decision. Perkins, "Europe and Span. Amer.," AHR, XXVII, 210. 12 In a special message on March 8, 1822, President Monroe requested Congress to recognize the independence of Buenos Aires, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico. Congress readily complied, and on May 4, Monroe signed an act providing funds for such missions. Colombia was formally recognized on July 19, 1822, Mexico on December 12, and Chile and Buenos Aires (United Provinces of La Plata) on January 27, 1823, William S. Robertson, History of the Latin American Nations (2nd ed.; New York, 1932), pp. 224-225; cf. Phillips, Confed. of Europe, p. 247.

THE SPANISH COLONIAL QUESTION

141

cognizing revolutionary governments and did not wish to pursue a policy so strongly opposed by the Alliance. The Foreign Enlistment Act (1819), "forced through an unwilling Parliament in defiance of public opinion, showed how little real sympathy the Tory government had with the rebels." 13 But Castlereagh could hardly ignore the clamor of the commercial and industrial classes for recognition. Britain and Latin America had become mutually supplementary: the one, the producer of manufactured commodities; the other, the producer of raw materials. British merchants and manufacturers, who formed powerful lobbies in Parliament, regarded the expansion of trade with the Spanish American colonies as the best means of pulling England's economy out of the terrible international depression which had swept over Europe and North America during the immediate postwar period and had reached its nadir in 1819. The dilemma of John Bull, moreover, became more desperate yet, when Spain, after 1815, broke the entente with her wartime ally, blockaded the West Indies and Spanish America, and seized several British merchant ships. Thus was produced the paradox of Britain claiming of Spain compensation for injuries inflicted by colonial authorities, while British merchants and soldiers were aiding Spanish colonies to win their independence. 14 In these troubled times, the British shipper and merchant became increasingly distinct classes. This division, well-established in London by 1815, often meant the loss of merchant support in the maintenance of shipping discrimination and the formation of an alliance between merchant and manufacturer. Manufacturing, because of its tremendous wartime growth, now challenged trade as the basis of the economy. The capitalist bought a seat in the Commons and in that capacity denounced or approved the foreign policy of the ministry. During the Congress Era, the rich middle class remained small, but the composition of the unreformed Parliament definitely favored business interests.1 5 Webster, "Span. Cols., Pt. II." EHR, XXX, 636. Ibid., pp. 641, 643-644; Kaufmann, Brit. Pol. and Lat. Amer., p. 121; "Foreign Policy of England - Mr. Canning," For. Qu. Rev., vm (1831), 412; Canning to the Commons, Apr. 14, 1823, Parl. Debates, new ser., vm, 879-880; Ellis, "British Reciprocity System," pp. 60, 62-64, 67-68, 72, 76,90, 127-128, and 130-131. Five thousand troops, in most cases Wellington's veterans, had been recruited in England and Ireland to aid the South American rebels. These soldiers helped Simon Bolivar win the Battle of Carabobo (June 24, 1821). Lord Cochrane founded the Chilian navy and with it defeated the Spanish on the Pacific coast. "Loans of many millions sterling were raised, chiefly in the London market, to provide the sinews of war." Col. E.M. Lloyd, "Canning and Spanish America," TRHS, new ser., VIII (1903-1904), 82. 15 Boyce, Diplomatic Relations, p. 65; S. G. Checkland, "American versus West Indian Traders in Liverpool, 1793-1815," Journal of Economic History, XVIII (March 1958), 142; William Cunningham, Rise and Decline of the Free Trade Movement 13

14

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THE CONGRESS AT WORK

Realpolitiker that he was, the foreign secretary in 1821 and 1822 took several cautious steps which produced significant results in three directions: they modified the Latin American policy he had followed since 1812, appeased the strong friends of the government, and brought about the commercial recognition of the Spanish American colonies. On the economic front, Castlereagh, as Leader of the House of Commons, vigorously supported the five trade and navigation bills introduced by Thomas Wallace, Vice-President of the Board of Trade, to tum Britain from a mercantilist system toward one of reciprocity and lower tariffs. First proposed in 1821, these reforms, after a year's delay, were reintroduced in modified form on May 20, 1822. The five bills passed without major amendment or division in Parliament, and all received the royal assent on June 24,1822.1 6 Having separated the economic from the political aspects of the question, Castlereagh now addressed himself to the latter. Commercial recognition must be granted immediately, but political recognition could wait until the opportune moment arrived. So long as Britain's trade with Latin America continued to expand, "the great mass of public opinion," he thought, "would not worry too much about the niceties of diplomatic recognition." 17 In the spring of 1822, he returned to a plan he had conceived in 1807: the establishment of monarchies in South America with or without the approval of Spain. But he did not wish to act alone. Perhaps the concerted action of Britain and the Alliance or Britain and France, the only European maritime p