The contribution of western political thought to a science of politics

637 51 20MB

English Pages 421

Report DMCA / Copyright

DOWNLOAD FILE

Polecaj historie

The contribution of western political thought to a science of politics

Citation preview

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Manuscript Theses Unpublished theses submitted for the Master's and Doctor's degrees and deposited in the Northwestern University Library are open for inspection, but are to be used only with due regard to the rights of the authors. Biblio­ graphical references may be noted, but passages may be copied only with the permission of the authors, and proper credit must be given in subsequent written or published work. Extensive copying or publication of the thesis in whole or in part requires also the consent of the Dean of the Graduate School of Northwestern University. Theses may be reproduced on microfilm for use in place of the manuscript itself provided the rules listed above are strictly adhered to and the rights of the author are in no way Jeopardized. This thesis by has been used by the following persons, whose signatures attest their accept­ ance of the above restrictions. A Library which borrows this thesis for use by its patrons is expected to secure the signature of each user.

NAME AND ADDRESS

DATE

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

THE CONTRIBUTION OP WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT TO A SCIENCE OP POLITICS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OP TEE REQUIREMENTS for the degree DOCTOR OP PHILOSOPHY

FIELD OP POLITICAL SCIENCE

By FRED KORT

EVANSTON, ILLINOIS August, 1950

ProQuest Number: 10101614

All rights re serv e d INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality o f this re p ro d u c tio n is d e p e n d e n t u p o n th e quality o f th e c o p y su bm itted . In t h e unlikely e v e n t t h a t t h e a u th o r did n o t s e n d a c o m p l e t e m anuscript a n d th e r e a re missing p a g e s , t h e s e will b e n o te d . Also, if m aterial h a d to b e re m o v e d , a n o t e will in d ic a te th e deletion .

uest ProQ uest 10101614 Published by ProQ uest LLC (2016). C opyright of th e Dissertation is held by th e Author. All rights reserved. This work is p r o te c te d a g a in s t unau tho rized co p y in g u n d e r Title 17, United States C o d e Microform Edition © ProQ uest LLC. ProQ uest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346

TABLE OF CONTENTS I N T R O D U C T I O N ..............

1

Chapter I*

THE CRITERIA OF A SCIENCE OF POLITICS . . . . Natural versus Social Phenomena . . . . . A Method of Inquiry and Its Material . . . The Pragmatic Nature of Science . • • . • ........... Pluralism versus Monism The Non-Ethical Nature of Science . . . . Free Will versus Determinism . . . . . . . Quantitative versus Qualitative Interpretation ....................... Conclusion ........................

II.

ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS

.......................

Aristotle’s Dilemma ................... The Study of Comparative Government, a Form of Early Positivism ......... The Theory of Revolution, a Suggestion of Economic D e t e r m i n i s m ............... An Indication of Geographic Determinism • Conclusion ............................. III.

EARLY POSITIVISM IN POLITICAL THOUGHT . . . .

13 14 17 25 31 34 35 43 46 54 56 59 83 91 92 99

Lucretius • • . . . . . ................. 102 M a c h i a v e l l i ................................ 107 H o b b e s .......................................127 Spinoza .................................. 140 C o n c l u s i o n .................................. 148 IV.

GEOGRAPHIC DETERMINISM

................. 151

Jean B o d i n .................................. M o n t e s q u i e u ................................ Henry Thomas Buckle .............. Ellsworth Huntington . . . . . ........... C o n c l u s i o n ..................................

.U796

153 160 180 191 197

Chapter V.

ECONOMIC D E T E R M I N I S M ......................200 James H a r r i n g t o n ......................202 Karl Marx • • • ........................ 212 Vilfredo Pareto and Harold T.Davis . . . 234 Conclusion * .......................... 244

VI.

PSYCHOLOGICAL D E T E R M I N I S M ............... 249 P a r e t o ............ 251 De Grazia ................... 270 .......................... 281 Conclusion

VII.

SOCIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM ...................

284

Auguste Comte ............................ 286 Herbert Spencer . . . . . ............. j 290 Walter Bagehot .......................... 301 Ludwig Gumplowicz ........................ 310 Lester P. W a r d ........................ 321 Conclusion .......................... 328 VIII.

THE ISSUE OP A SCIENCE OP POLITICS

IN

UTILITARIAN T H O U G H T .................... 334 Bentham* s Concept of Utility . . . . . . James Mill’s Deductive Science . . . . . Macaulay’s Criticism of James Mill’s Position ........................... John Stuart Mill’s Compromise. . . . . . Conclusion .................... , IX.

CONCLUSION

336 341 350 358 374

................................ ...

The Contribution to Method ............. 380 The Contribution in Form of Hypotheses . 390 The Significance of the Contribution of Western Political Thought . . . . . 402 BIBLIOGRAPHY

......................................

403

INTRODUCTION It may be said, that two principal approaches to Western Political Thought have prevailed in contemporary political science*

One may be identified as

an undiscriminating acceptance of traditional political theory as knowledge which provides the basis for the study of politics.

This point of view represents the

belief that the study of politics must remain specu­ lative, and that its progress merely is the result of a cumulative development.

The other prevalent approach

amounts to a complete rejection of traditional political thought as knowledge which could be of any value to a science of politics.

It Insists that Western Polit­

ical Theory, in Its traditional form, is only of academic interest, and that a science of politics must start anew with empirical Investigations,

The

position which is taken in this study, is in disagree­ ment with both of these approaches.

Its opposition

to the first mentioned approach is based on the belief that the study of politics does not have to remain speculative, and, therefore, should not accept traditional political theory without discrimination.

2

It Is in agreement with the other approach to the extent that the possibility or a science of politics is recognized; it is opposed to that approach, however, insofar as the latter insists on the rejection of all traditional political theory for the purpose of scien­ tific inquiry in politics.

The position which is

maintained in this study, is that Western Political Thought has to make a contribution to a science of politics.

The investigation of what that contribu­

tion actually is, constitutes the task of this study. The clarification of two concepts obviously is imperative for the pursuit of this study:

first,

what is meant by a science of politics; secondly, what is understood by Western Political Thought? Since the controversial issue which is involved In determining the meaning of the concept a science of politics hardly can be overestimated, the first chap­ ter of this study Is an attempt to define the criteria of a science of social phenomena, in general, and of political science, in particular.

It would be impos­

sible to proceed in this study without establishing these criteria.

Considerably less disagreement ex­

ists on what constitutes Western Political Thought. Nevertheless, the determination of what literature

3

should be included by that concept, is a problem which is not amenable to a permanent solution*

For

the purpose of this investigation, the following definition is offered:

Western Political Thought

is the total of systems of ideas, pertaining to government and the state, which are found in EuroAmerican Culture.

Any further specification of the

term "idea*1 would involve commitments which may lead to inconsistencies in the course of this study* On the basis of this definition of Western Pol­ itical Thought, the task which is assumed in this investigation - at first - may seem to transcend the limits to w h i c h the present study has to be confined. However, after examining the criteria of a science of politics, it will be seen how comparatively little can be found in Western Political Thought that can be considered as a contribution to a science of politics. Nevertheless, it is believed that - small as this con­ tribution may be - it is sufficiently significant for contemporary political science in. order to warrant this investigation. The limitations which are imposed upon the treat­ ment of the subject of this investigation, would not have to be made in a more voluminous study*

In

4

accordance with the criteria laid down in the first chapter, the principal distinction between political theories which can be regarded as a contribution to a science of politics and those which cannot, is made in terms of epistemology*

The theories which

are based on empiricism as a theory of knowledge, will be examined in the course of this investigation* On the other hand, political philosophies which are based on rationalism as a theory of knowledge, will not be considered;; for rationalism as a theory of knowledge - as will be seen - is incompatible with scientific inquiry*

In a more voluminous treatise*

it would be advantageous to show why the political theories of Plato, Locke* Rousseau, Hegel - to name only a few as examples — cannot be regarded as con­ tributions to the science of politics*

Under the

present limitations, it Is necessary, however, to confine the examinations to those political theories which actually constitute contributions. exceptions will be made*

Only two

In the chapter on economic

determinism, the political theory of Karl Marx will b ky a counter- evolutionary process*

Consequently,

as Ward expresses preferences for certain courses of human action, he advocates extensive state interference rather than l_aissez-faire; for the latter would be a promotion of natural evolution - in that respect he does agree with Spencer - whereas all social evolution, of which government is one manifestation, is a continuous effort to overcome the forces of natural evolution. A scientific method In the study of social phen­ omena is of concern to Ward as it is to the other Social Evolutionists.

His general, concept of science is expressed

by him in the following form: Science, as before remarked, is the co-ordination, or, rather, the systematization of knowledge. It is this causal type of mind which, not satisfied with a heterogeneous mass of known facts and phenomena, each appealing independently and for itself to the intellect, has proceeded^to organize this mass and determine the * relations of its individual facts and phenomena to one another, thus endeavoring to reduce all knowledge to a homogeneous system. This idealhomogeneous system is science. 7 That Ward is thinking of science in terms of a method of inquiry rather than in ten s of content - a point which is not completely clarified in the foregoing passage - is indicated in the following statement:

37* Ward, Lester P., Dynamic Sociology. New York D. Appleton and Company, 1897, v. I, p. 6, hereafter * referred to as Dynamic Sociology.

323

Now, the means by which each of the present estab­ lished sciences has been reached is the hypothesis* It is to the theorizers, to those who, not knowing the relations of things, suppose them and proceed upon their suppositions, and if false, reject them and try other suppositions, until they arrive at the true laws of phenomena, that the world is almost exclusively indebted for what it now possesses of organized science*^® With regard to the status of social studies as a science, Ward has this to say: Whatever may be the difficulty in fixing the posit­ ion of any other science, that of sociology, as Comte clearly showed, must occupy the last place in the seies. Its highly special character, Its great complexity, and above all, the dependence which a careful study of it shows it to have upon all the rest, all point unmistakeably to the end of the chain as its only natural posit­ ion*3^ In other words, Ward recognizes the possibility of a scientific method in the study of social phenomena. At the same time, he is aware of the difficulties which are encountered due to the complexity of social phen­ omena.

Consequently, he would be willing to ccncede

that the Initial success of a science of sociology (ac­ tually, social science in general) would be limited, and that its pursuit would require great caution. It is on the basis of this concept of a scientific method in the study of social phenomena that Ward dev­ elops his political theory.

He does accept the validity

of the Darwinian principle of the struggle for existence

38.

Dynamic Sociology, p. 7

39*

Ibid., pp. 9-10.

324

and the survival of the fittest as an evolutionary proc­ ess, which manifests itself even in society. it assumes is observed as competition.

The form

However, as far

as social institutions, in general, anipolitical instit­ utions, in particular,

are concerned, one dominant var­

iable of human behavior must be recognized; namely, m a n fs ability to transform his environment; A closer analysis shows that the fundamental dist­ inction between the animal and human method is that the env 1ronment transforms the animal, while man transforms the environment. Consequently, all social institutions, of which government is one, are determined by a counter-evolutionary process rather than by the natural evolutionary process of the struggle for existence and the survival of the •fittest: All human institutions - religion, government, law, marriage, custom - together with the innumerable other modes of1regulating social, industrial, and commercial life, are, broadly viewed, only so many ways of meeting and checkmating the principle of competition as it manifests itself in society.41 According to Ward, then, there is a distinction between society which does not exhibit any form of social organization, which is subject to the forces of natural evolution, and social institutions, including government, which are determined by a counter-evolutionary process.

40. Ward, Lester P., The Psychic Factors of Civil­ ization, Boston, Ginn and Company, 1892, p. 257. 41*

Ibid. , p. 262.

325

It is'on that basis that Aristotle's concept of man as a social and political animal, is inacceptable to Ward#

42

Indications are that Ward would more readily agree with Hobbes on the existence of a chaotic state of nature, in which the forces of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest were dominant, and which was overcome by the creation of political organization* The conclusion to which this point of view led Hobbes, namely, the origin of the state by a social contract, definitely Is not part of Ward's political theory*

The

remarkable tit ng is that IWard accepts the conquest theory of the origin of the state: ♦ •••actually imposition of rule by the conquering class over conquered class establishes the state.43 It is difficult to see any cosistency in conceiving government as the result of a counter-evolutionary proc­ ess and in accepting, at the same time, the conquest theory of the origin of the state.

The origin of the

state through the conquest of a weaker group by a stronger group, i.e., as a manifestation of the struggle for exis­ tence, does not represent a phase in the counter-evolu­ tionary development*

Since government is the agent of

the state, it hardly seems, then, that it would serve the promotion of the counter-evolutionary process. A

42.

Dynamic Sociology, v. II, p. 221.

43. Ward, Lester P., Pure Sociology. Hew York, The Macmillan Company, 1903, p. 206, hereafter referred to as Pure Sociology.

326

clarification of that point by Ward, may be seen in the following statement: Immediately following the conquest the conquered race had no status. It was completely under the dominion of the conquering race. Under the state as soon as formed the conquered race acquired rights and the members of the conquering race were assigned duties. The state thus becomes a powerful medium of social assimilation....* However nsb ural the origin of the state may seem when we understand the conditions that called it forth, it was, in the last; analysis, the result df a social necessity for checking and curbing this individualism and of hold­ ing the social forces within a certain orbit where they could interact without injury and where they could do constructive work.44 This compromise is acceptable. however,

It wouLd warrant,

another concession; namely, that political inst­

itutions are not determined exclusively by a counterevolutionary process, but rather by an interaction between natural evolution, i.e., the struggle for exis­ tence, and the counter-evolutionary process.

If Ward

would have been willing to make this concession, is open to question.

The definite objects of government which

Ward has in mind, namely, protection, accommodation, and amelioration,

as well as his concept of justice as a

mean to protect the weak agains t the strong,46 would not preclude such a compromise.

44.

Pure Sociology, pp. 550-551.

45.

Dynamic Sociology, p. 214.

46. Ward, Lester P., Applied Sociology. Boston, Ginn and Company, 1906, p. 23.

327

Despite his awareness of the requirements of the scientific method in the study of social phenomena, Ward fails to present concrete historical situations as verifying instances for his principal hypothesis that all political phenomena are determined by a counterevolutionary process. Ward could not be accused of fail­ ing to see the need for empirical verification.

How­

ever, in his presentation he seems to assume that the empirical evidence readily could be supplied and does not require special search*

In this manner, he does

not make any progress, of course, in obtaining any veri­ fication for the hypothesis. His contribution to a science of politics lies In the fact, that, under the predominance of a sociological determinism in terms of the Darwinian principle of evo­ lution, Ward advances the hypothesis that political phenomena are determined by a counter-evolutionary rather than by an evolutionary process.

In this manner,

he suggests at least a possible compromise to the effect that political institutions and events are determined by an interaction between natural evolution and the counter-evolutionary process.

328

Conclusion The extent to which Spencer, Bagehot, Gumplowicz, and Ward applied Comte*s suggestion of a sociological determinism to the actual study of political phenomena in terms of the conditions of the society in which they are found, has been seen in the foregoing examination. All four thinkers agree that the particular conditions of society which determine political Institutions and events, are the products of a process of social evolution. On what the characteristics of that process of social evolution are, the ideas of Spencer, Bagehot, Gumplowicz, and Ward differ. The political theories of the four thinkers In question can be reduced, in each case, to one principal hypothesis.

In the case of Spencer, it would have to

be stated as follows:

political institutions are deter­

mined by social evolution, leading from fundamental homogeneity towards continuously increasing heterogen­ eity, as well as by a concomitant evolutionary process, representing the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest.

Bagehot*s principal hypothesis is that

the degree of authoritarianism and the extent of col­ lective control in government is determined by the in­ tensity of the struggle for existence.

Gumplowicz holds

that all political phenomena are determined by group

329

conflicts#

The principal hypothesis of Ward's political

theory is that political Institutions are determined by a process of social evolution which tends to abate the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, and, in that sense, is counter-evolutionary# None of these hypotheses have been verified with a sufficiently high degree of probability in order to acquire the status of scientific laws.

In all cases,

they are still subject to further investigation#

What

contribution to a science of politics they constitute, depends upon the possibility of their further verifica­ tion and their adaptability to modification. In the case of Spe ncer, it has been seen that no assurance can be obtained whether or not he conceived his evolutionary theory of society, in general, and of political phenomena, in particular, as a hypothesis requiring independent verification.

Indications were

found that one component of his evolutionary theory, namely, the process from fundamental homogeneity towards continuously increasing heterogeneity, was conceived by Spencer as an hypothesis requiring independent verifica­ tion.

On the other hand, evidence supports the view

that the other component - social evolution as a manifest­ ation of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest - was deduced from Spencer*s analogy

330

between the biological and the social organism.

Con­

sidering the premises on which this deduction was based, it is scientifically not valid.

Where Spencer's evolut­

ionary theory in its totality stands, therefore, is questionable.

In view of this status, It is not accept­

able in its entirety to a science of politics.

One

component of his theory, the hypothesis that political institutions are determined by an evolutionary process leading from homogeneity to heterogeneity can be made the subject of further investigation.

The technique by

which Spencer attempted to verify It, would have to be modified, however.

The selection of verifying instances

from the world history at large would have to be aband­ oned in favor of intensive case studies of a few societies, whereby, through close comparison, sane control of var­ iable factors may be achieved and progress be made in the direction of obtaining representative samples. The same criticism applies to Bagehot's technique of verification.

Like Spencdr, he canvasses the entire

history of Western Civilization in order to obtain veri­ fying instances for his hypothesis.

Further verification,

in this case, too, must be attempted by case studies. Although the form in which Bagehot's hypothesis is stated - that the degree of authoritarianism and the ex­ tent of collective control in government, is determined

331

by the intensity of the struggle for existence - is acceptable to a science of politics for further investiga­ tion, its evolutionary implication should be abandoned. Bagehot's contention Is that, in the course of social evolution, the intensity of the struggle for existence diminishes, and, in that manner,

authoritarianism grad­

ually gives way to democracy and collectivism to individmlism.

His hypothesis would be of greater significance

without the evolutionary element of progress; the stated correlation would hold true even If change should occur In the direction of a more rather than a less intensified struggle for existence. Possibly the most significant contribution to a science of politics in form of a sociological determ­ inism has been made by Gumplowicz.

From the viewpoint

of the criteria of the scientific method accepted in this study, hardly any objection can be seen to his concept of the scientific method In the study of social phen­ omena.

His principal hypothesis, that all political

institutions and events are determined by group conflicts, is subject to further verification; nevertheless, his technique of verification, namely, the case-study method, is an adequate approach for further in vestigation. Ward* s main contribution to a science of politics is to have pointed out the possible pitfalls of a sociological

332

determinism in terms of the Darwinian principle of evo­ lution.

For an attempt to Interpret political phenomena

exclusively in terms of a social evolution following the pattern of the struggle for existence and the sur­ vival of the fittest, would border on a sociological fatalism.

In that respect, Ward's suggestion that a

counter-evolutionary social process is at least as dom­ inant as natural, Darwinian evolution in the determination of political institutions and events, is Important.

The

fact that, despite his awareness of the requirements of the scientific method In the study of social phenomena, he does not present any verifying instances in support of his hypothesis, but seems to assume the ready avail­ ability of empirical evidence, is a shortcoming of his approach*

Furthermore, his hypothesis that all polit­

ical phenomena are determined by a counter-evolutionary process, would have to be modified - even on the basis of the evidence Ward himself gives - in the following manner:

political phenomena are determined by an inter­

action between natural evolution in the Darwinian sense and a counter-evolutionary process. The four principal hypotheses of a sociological determinism In political thought, are - with the indicated modifications - compatible with each other, provided that each is regarded merely as one of several

333

potential explanatory principles.

This condition, of

course, Is incumbent upon any form of determinism which - at the present stage - could be accepted by a science of politics.

Chapter VIII THE ISSUE OF A SCIENCE OF POLITICS IN UTILITARIAN THOUGHT Three works are of primary importance for the is­ sue which the Utilitarians took with the question of a science of politics:

James Mill’s An Ess ay on Govern­

ment, which appeared in 1828, Thomas Babington Macaul­ ay’s essay, Mill on Government, which was published in 1829, and John Stuart Mill*s System of Logic, which first appeared In 1843#

James Mill’s essay represents

an attempt to develop a deductive science of politics# It is this approach to the study of government which is the subject of a severe criticism by Macaulay, who denies the possibility of a deductive science of politics and insists that only empiricism and inductive logic can constitute a proper method for the scientific study of government#

John Stuart Mill’s approach to that ques­

tion can be regarded as a compromise between the opposed points of view of James Mill and Macaulay, inasmuch as it is an attempt to combine deductive and inductive logic as a method for the study of politics#

After more

detailed considerations of these viewpoints, it will be seen that the main issue is not a question of deductive or Inductive logic, but a question of epistemology; name­ ly, the acceptance of rationalism or empiricism as a

335

theory of knowledge for a scientific method in the study of government#

Nevertheless, in terms of the contro­

versy between the thinkers Involved, it was stressed as a conflict between deductive and Inductive logic. As far as the representatives of Utilitarianism who were Involved in that controversy are concerned, it is somewhat amazing that, among the numerous volumes of Utilitarian literature, the discussion of this issue is confined to two works; namely, James Millfs essay and the respective portions of John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic# In the history of Western Political Thought, the dis­ cussion of that Issue by Macaulay and the Mills is one of the most emphatic of its kind#

Nevertheless, in John

Stuart Mill's essays, On Liberty and Represent at ive Government» for example, hardly any repercussions of the earlier controversy are found; there is no issue of a science of politics, and the arguments follow the line of traditional political philosophy.

On the other hand,

the controversy between Macaulay and the two Mills is a fundamentally different approach to the study of gov­ ernment#

Some of the problems which were involved in

their discussion of the issue, still are pertinent to a science of politics more than a century later# Since James Mill’s essay definitely reflects Jeremy Bentham’s concept of utility, seme attention first will be given to that concept.

Subsequently, the three works

336

already mentioned will be considered; namely, James M i l l’s essay, Macaulay’s challenge of Mill’s position, and John Stuart Mill’s viewpoint of the Issue. Bentham’s Concept of Utility An early indication in Bentham* s writings of the principle of utility, as applied to the study of govern­ ment , is found in his A Fragment cf Government, first published in 1776.

In the context of that study, utility

is developed as a principle In terms of which the rela­ tions between ruler and subjects must be understood.

The

concept of the social contract is rejected by Bentham as a possible explanation of the mutual obligations by which ruler and subjects are bound.

The promise of the ruler

to govern according to law and the promise of the sub­ jects to render obedience to the ruler according to law, are meaningless criteria of government for Bentham*

A

new criterion is needed, and this criterion is found in the principle of utility.1

In its application, it means

government for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. A complete statement of the principle of utility is found in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals

1. Bentham, Jeremy, A Fragment on Government, pub­ lished with An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Oxford, Basil Blasckwell, 1948, pp. 3156, hereafter referred to as Bentham.

337

Legislation, which appeared in 1789, thirteen years after the publication of A Fragment on Government#

The

opening paragraph of the first chapter should be noted: NATURE has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the stan­ dard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne* They govern us inwall we do, in all we say, in all we think.....The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law.2 One of the most crucial problems of the concept of utility already is implied here. as an ethical postulate,

Is utility understood

indicating what should be done

and what Is desirable, or as a non-ethical determinant in human behavior and in human relations? gests that it is both.

Bentham sug­

He does not make the distinction,

however, which is indispensable to a science of politics; namely, that as a non-ethical determinant, utility can be presented in form of objective empirical relationships, whereas as an ethical postulate it is an expression of preference, a decision based on other than empirical in­ quiries.

A clarification cf the problem Is not obtained

by Bentham1s definitions of the principle of utility and of utility itself:

2.

Bentham, p. 125.

338

By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government. By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness..•.or.••.to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the com­ munity in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of the individual. ^ Since the principle of utility is not only a criter­ ion of individual action, but of collective action as well, it can be applied to evaluating measures of govern­ ment.

Furthermore, it can be conceded that the determin­

ation of which measures of government conform to the principle of utility, i.e., maximize the happiness of the greatest number, is an empirical inquiry, which does not involve ethical issues.

To advocate, hew ever, the

conformance of acts of government to the principle of utility, is an ethical decision.

Indications are that

Bentham does not make the distinction between these two implications of the concept of utility, because he does not accept it.

His efforts point in the direction of a

science of ethics, according to which ethical decisions

3.

Bentham, p. 126

339

are not a matter of preference: Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility one may always say either that it Is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done. One may say also, that it Is right it should be done; at least that it is not wrong it should be done: that it is a right action; at least that it is not a wrong action. When thus interpreted, the words ought. and right and wrong, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they have none.4 The issue involved in a science of ethics was raised before in this study.

It seems necessary to refer

to it again, since Bentham attempts to resolve the question of "ought", "right", and "wrong" In terms of utility.

As pointed out, it is possible to develop util­

itarian relationships which are nan-ethical.

For Instance,

to d e t e m i n e whether an action of government maximizes happiness or not is a question which - in itself - does not

imply whether the measure is good or bad.

question is the subject of scientific Inquiry.

This it does

not indicate whether the particular action of govern­ ment is desirable or not, and does not suggest why communal happiness should be maximized.

On the other hand, the

decision of the desirability of the maximization of com­ munal happiness may be based on the objective utilitar­ ian relationship, but, ultimately, is a matter of pref­ erence.

4.

Consequently, although utilitarian relationships

Bentham, p. 127.

340

which are non-ethical may be developed, they do not decide ethical issues* A further question in Bentham1s case is whether he is concerned with empirical inquiry at all or conceives a pseudo-science of ethics, based on deduction from an ~ PP3-Q**i concept*

Indications are that the principle of

utility} for Bentham, is an a priori concept: Has the rectitude of this principle been ever form— contested? It should seem that it had, by those who have not known what they have been meaning. Is it sus­ ceptible of any direct proof? it should seem not: for that which is used to prove everything else, cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere. To give such proof is as impos­ sible as it is needless*^ Possibly it may be argued that this statement lends itself to an alternative Interpretation; namely, to the inference that Bentham ciple of

actually does conceive the prin­

utility as an ethical postulate, the very point

which has been contested in the foregoing considera­ tions.

This argument would be based on BenthamTs asser­

tion that the principle of utility Is beyond proof.

For

it is exactly that phrase which John Stuart Mill uses in recognizing the principle of utility as an ethical concept, in his essay, Htilitarianisms On the present occasion, I shall, without further discussion of the other theories, attempt to contribute 5.

Bentham, p. 128.

341

some thing towards the understanding and appreciation of the utilitarian” or "happiness" theory, and towards such proof as it is susceptible of# It is evident that this cannot be proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of ^he term* Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good must be so by being shown to be a means something admitted to be good without proof*° John Stuart Mill definitely is speaking in terms of ultimate ends aid values in referring to a concept which Is not subject to proof.

There is no question that, In

that connection, the principle of utility is regarded beyond proof because it is an ethical concept.

No Indica­

tion to that effect is found, however, in Bentham1s statement.

For Bentham, the principle of utility is beyond

proof because "it is used to prove everything else", because it is an axiom in which " a chain of proofs must have their commencement", i.e., because it is an a priori concept. James Millts Deductive Science of Government It is Bentham1s concept of utility which dominates James Mill *s argument In his essay.

The inadequacies

which result In Mill*s presentation on that basis, will be considered more in detail in the discussion of Mac­ aulay's essay.

At this point, two main features of the

work should be noted, before a closer examination of

6«- Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism- New York- Th« Liberal Art Press, 1948, p. 4. 9

342

M illfs argument is attempted*

First, Mill accepts the

principle that every ird ividual tends to maximize his pleasures and minimize his pains.

He modifies it to

the effect of stating that man always acts in complete self-interest, and employs it as a basic premise from which he believes to be able to deduce a science of gov­ ernment.

What the possible merits of a science of pol­

itics deduced from an a priori concept are, undoubtedly be understood from preceding considerations of the subject in this study; according to the accepted cri­ teria, deductions from a priori concepts are not consid­ ered as science.

As it was pointed out, however, the

shortcomings of Mill's approach will be discussed in con­ nection with Macaulay's criticism. ture of Mill's work is the

The second main fea­

dependence of his deductive

science of government on the ultimate end of the great­ est happiness of the greatest number.

The lack of dist­

inction between an ethical problem and a problem which involves an objective relationship, is found in Mill's approach in the same form in which it is encountered in Bentham* s theory.

The question of what form or what

actions of government will maximize the happiness of the greatest number, is a problem that can be stated in .form of an objective relationship - provided that a standard of what constitutes the greatest happiness of the greatest number can be obtained - and, therefore is the subject of

343

scientific inquiry.

On the other hand, why a form of

government should be chosen which maximizes communal happiness, is an ethical question, to which a science of government cannot provide an answer.

Assumed that Mill's

efforts actually would have been directed at a science of government in the empirical sense, and not at aideductive pseudo-science, the inquiry of what form of govern­ ment maximizes communal happiness would have been a proper subject of scientific Investigation.

He would

have been compelled, however, to stress that the desir­ ability of attaining such a form of government is a sep­ arate problem and Is beyond scientific inquiry*

Like

Bentham, Mill fails to make this distinction, with the result that his essay on government gives the impression of an attempt to solve ethical questions by means of science - science in Mill's sense, of course. If the premises of Mill's deductive argument are not questioned, Its logical consistency hardly can be denied.

Mill readily admits that his theory of govern­

ment is based on the proposition that all human actions are determined by self-interest: That one hum^n being will desire to render the person and property of another subservient to his pleasures, not­ withstanding the pain or loss of pleasure which it may occasion to that other Individual, is the foundation of

344

Government.7 If the proposition that all human beings are motivated by self-interest In their actions Is the first premise, the conclusion that all rulers tend to serve their interest, readily can be obtained by means of a syllogism:

all human

beings are motivated in their actions by self-interest; rul­ ers are human beings; therefore, rulers are motivated by selfinterest.

Mill states his conclusion in the following form:

With respect to the' community', then, we deem it an es­ tablished truth, that the rulers, one or a few, desire an exact conformity between their will and the acts of every member of the community.8 Before Mill proceeds to further deductive elaborations, i

he qualifies his basic premise.

For Mill, there is no limit

to man's self-interest, no saturation point at which all desires of an Individual would be satisfied,

and beyond which human

actions no longer would be motivated by self-interest.

Con­

sequently, there also would be no limit to the extent to which rulers would exploit subjects, no point at which all their desires would be satisfied, and beyond which they would cease to take advantage of their subjects.

On that basis, Mill

fundamentally disagrees with Hobbes' view that government by one or by few will lead to less exploitation than government by many, a view which is based on the belief that there Is a definite limit to an Individual's desire, and that, in case of one or a few rulers, that limit would be reached at a

7. Mill, James, An Essay on Government, Cambridge, At the University Press, 1937, p. 17, hereafter referred to as An Essay on Government* 8.

Ibid., p. 19.

545

lesser expense of the community than in case of many rulers*^

Such possible limitation to the self-interest

of the rulers is not accepted by Mill*

Only a positive

check can curtail the power which rulers will attempt to exercise* If the object of government is the greatest happin­ ess to the greatest number, it cannot be entrusted, therefore, to one or a few: Whenever the powers of Government are placed in any hands other than those of the community, whether those of one man, of a few, or of several, those principles of human nature which imply that Government is at all necessary, imply that those persons will make use of them to defeat the very end for which Government exists.10 However, direct government by the community - the only form which would be a safeguard against public exploitation — is technically impossible, according to Mill*

To assemble the whole community as often as action

by government is required, would preclude any economic activity and, in that manner, make the existence of the community inconceivable.

Furthermore, the conduct of

government requires the organization of functions, which cannot be attained by the participation of the entire 11 community in government *

If the maximization of communal

happiness is the ultimate object of government, Mill is logically consistent,

then, in arriving at the conclusion

AH Bssay on Government, pp, 15-16. • 11#

Ibid*, p* 13. Ibid*, p. 9,

346

that none of the three simple forms of government will serve that object; not monarchy, i.e., government by one, not aristocracy, i«e,, government by the few, and not democracy, i.e. » direct government by the entire commun­ ity: We have thus seen, that the forms of Government, which have been called the three simple forms, not one is ade­ quate to the ends which Government is appointed to secure; that the community itself, which alone is free from motives opposite to those ends, is incapacitated by its numbers from performing the business of Government; and that whether Government is intrusted to one or a few, they have not only motives opposite to those ends, but motives which will carry them, if unchecked, to inflict the greatest evils.12 The next step in Mill*s deductive theory of govern­ ment is to examine possible combinations between simple forms of government, in order to obtain the desired end of maximization of communal happiness.

All of the al­

ternatives in that respect are rejected by Mill.

The

combination of monarchy and democracy, or of aristocracy and democracy, would be in contradiction with the basic proposition that man is motivated in all his actions by self-interest.

The one or the few would not enter into

a coalition with the many, for such an agreement would be a voluntary cession of part of their self-interest. Likewise, the majority never would surrender their inter­ ests by seeking an alliance with the privileged minority.

12.

An Essay on Government, p. 25.

347

A combination of monarchy and aristocracy would be pos­ sible, in view of the similarity of their interests; however, this combination would be as detrimental to the community as the simple forms of government by one or by the few.

The objection to a combination of all three

forms of government is the same a& to the combination of any two.*^ The process of elimination now has been carried by Mill to a point that only one alternative is left for a form of government which maximizes communal happiness. Direct government by the community, government by a com­ bination of the community and the

few, and government

by a combination of the community and the one, all are impossible.

Government by the few, by the one, or by

a combination of the one and the few, is possible, but not desirable.

Consequently, the only alternative is

to make some possible form of government also desirable. On that

basis, monarchiaJL or aristocratic government

would have to be accepted*

The only way in which it can

be made desirable, is to check its power in the interest of the community.

Now, the community itself is incapable

of any function of government.

However, a body which

represents the interests of the community - actually the interests of the majority - could check the power of

13.

An Essay on Government. pp. 30-32.

348

the monarch or of the aristocracy.

Mill is consistent

again with his basic proposition in stressing thd; the representative body, like any aggregate oftindividuals, will be motivated in its actions by self-interest.

In

order to assure, therefore, that the representative body actually will represent the interests of the majority, as well as be able to perform its function, two main requirements must be met: I* The checking body must have a degree of power sufficient for the business of checking. II. It must have an identity of interest with the community; otherwise it will make a mischievous use of its power. ^ To meet the first requirement, the representative body must be able to overcome the power which the ruling one, or few, or one and few combined, can employ to ach­ ieve ends detrimental to the interests of the community. The extent of power which is vested in the representative body, therefore, is determined by a necessary minimum. Consequently, in meeting the second requirement, It would not be recommendable to limit the power of the representative body; for such a limitation may prove disadvantageous to its effective functioning.

The con­

trol which the community must exercise over the repre­ sentative body, should not be directed at the extent of its power, but rather at Its duration in office:

14.

An Essay On Government, p. 35.

349

This, then, is the instrument; lessening of duration is the instrument, by which, if by any thing, trie object is to be attained* The smaller the period of time during which any man retains his capacity of Representative, as compared with the time in which he is simply a member of the community, the more difficult it will be to comp­ ensate the sacrifice of the interests of the longer per­ iod, by the profits of misgovernment during the shorter.1*^ The advocacy of a representative body to check the power of the governing one or few, actually is the prin­ cipal conclusion of Mill*s essay*

It is the result of his

deductions from the basic proposition that all actions of man are motivated by self-interest.

That Mill was fully

aware of theskind of inquiry he pursued, is apparent from the following statement: The whole of this chain of deduction is dependent, as we stated at the beginning, upon the principle that the acts of man will be conformable to their interests. Upon this principle, we conceive that the chain is comp­ lete and irrefragable* The principle, also, appears to stand upon a strong foundation. It is indisputable that the acts of men follow their will; that their will fol­ lows their desires; and that their desires are generated by their apprehensions of good or evil; In other words, by their interests.16 There would be little argument with Mill that "the chain Is complete and irrefragable11, i.e. , that his sys­ tem is deductively consistent.

The main objection would

have to be raised against the validity of his premises. The mere assumption that "the principle, also, appears to stand upon a strong foundation" does not satisfy the

!5.

An Essay on Government, p. 38.

16*

Ibid., p. 62.

350

requirements of a science of government* Macaulayys Criticism of James Mill*s Position The intense sarcasm with which Thomas Babington Macaulay evaluates James Mill's essay, almost endangers the validity of his objective criticism*

His reference

to Mill as "an Aristotelian of the fifteenth century, born out of due season" hardly gives the reader the assur­ ance of an unbiased appraisal.

Nevertheless, the pert­

inence of his criticism cannot be denied as long as he directs it at Mill's disregard of empirical evidence. His argument becomes considerably weaker as he takes issue with the consistency of Mill's deductions, and attempts to prove Mill's error on the very grounds to which Mill resorts aid which he himself rejects as fal­ lacious . On the basis of the criteria of the scientific method which have been accepted in the current study, it must be agreed with Macaulay that Mill's principle fault lies in the assumption of certain propensities of human nature and in the deduction of a science of politics from such premises.

To Mill's rejection of experience as a

guide for inquiry, Macaulay is violently opposed: ^"Experience", says he [Mill], "if we look only at the outside of the facts, appears to be divided on this sub­ ject. Absolute monarchy, under Keros and Caligulas under such men as the emperors of- Morocco and the sultans

351

of Turkey, is the scourge of human nature. On the other side, the people of Denmark, tired out with the oppression of an aristocracy, resolved that their king should be absolute; and, under their absolute monarch, are as well governed as any people in Europe.11lr? The pertinence of Macaulay's reply to the foregoing statement, by which Mill partly attempts to justify his method of deduction from a priori principles, hardly can be sufficiently emphasized: Experience can never be divided, or even appear to be divided, except with reference to some hypothesis. When we say that one fact is inconsistent with another fact, we mean only that it is inconsistent with the theory which we have founded on that other fact. But, if the fact be certain, the unavoidable conclusion is, that our theory is false: and in order to correct it, we must reason back from an enlarged collection of facts to prin­ ciples.18 This challenge of Mill's fundamental approach to a science of government is sufficiently effective in order not to warrant additional arguments why Mill's basic proposition that all human actions are motivated by selfinterest is inadequate.

The further considerations which

Macaulay introduces are far less convincing than his attack on Mill's method of reasoning from a priori con­ cepts.

In that respect, Macaulay's statement that man Is

n o t motivated exclusively by self-interest, that social approval and public opinion are as decisive factors in

17. Macaulay, T. Babington, "Mill on G o v e m m e n t 11, in Critical and Miscellaneous Essays, New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1851, v. V, p. 271, hereafter referred to as Macaulay. 18.

Ibid

352

determining human actions as self-interest, Is not very fortunate in that connection*10

For It could be argued

that his assertion is based on as much - or as little empirical evidence as Mill's a priori proposition that all human actions are determined by self-interest.

As

a counter-argument, Macaulay probably would reply that his statement is not the presentation of any material truth, but merely a claim of Mill's obligation to prove the contrary.

The

validity of this rebuttal may have to be

conceded.

How

would he defend, however, his statement

that Mill would be correct in his conclusions about monarchial and aristocratic government, were man actually motivated exclusively by self-interest?20

For, obviously,

Mill would reply that, even if man's actions were not based exclusively on self-interest, government by the one or by the

few still should be checked by the majority.

It can be

saidthat Macaulay would have even less support

by empirical evidence than Mill as he maintains that costitutional checks on encroachments upon the majority of the ruling minority are ineffective and superfluous, since "the fear of resistance and the s ense of shame operate, in a certain degree, on the most absolute kings

19.

Macaulay, p. 277.

2°.

Ibid., p. 279.

353

and the most illiberal oligarchies".81

The mistake

Macaulay commits is to contest Mill's premises and con­ clusions on the ground of how reasonable they are, and, in that manner, falls into the very error of a priori argument for which he criticizes Mill. The greatest weakness of Macaulay* s attack on Mill1s essay, in that respect, probably is his attempt to take issue In detail with the consistency of Mill's deductions. The following argument is noteworthy as an example: We will attempt to deduce a theory of politics in the mathematical form, in which Mr. Mill delights, from the premises which he has himself furnished us.... No rulers will do anything which may hurt the people. This is the thesis to be maintained; and the fol­ lowing we humbly offer to Mr. Mill as its syllogistic demons tr at i on . No rulers will do that which produces pain to themselves. But the unfavorable sentiments of the people will give pain to them. Therefore no rulers will do anything which may excite the unfavorable sentiments of the people. But the unfavorable sentiments of the people are excited by everything that hurts them. Therefore no rulers will do anything which may hurt the people which was the thing to be proved*88 It is not quite clear what Macaulay's intention here Is.

Should It be to point out a self-contradiction

in Mill's deductions by stressing the conclusion that "no rulers will do anything which may hurt the people",

21.

Macaulay, p. 289.

22.

Ibid., p. 278.

354

Macaulay would be mistaken in ascribing the foregoing conclusion to Mill.

For the second premise, 11***.the

unfavorable sentiments of the people will give pain to them"

(the rulers), is a premise which Mill certainly

would not have accepted.

Consequently, the entire syl­

logistic sequence does not apply to Mill at all.

Should,

on the other hand, Macaulay's intention be to show that Mill's way of reasoning lends itself to developing a theory of politics with conclusions contrary to those reached by Mill, Macaulay would ruin his own argument. For the basis of his challenge is that a deductive theory of politics cannot attain the status of a science of gov­ ernment : Our objection to the essay of Mr. Mill is fundamental. We believe that it is utterly impossible to deduce the science of government from the principles of human na­ ture. 23 The addition which would have to be made to the above statement from the viewpoint of the position taken in the current study, is: ....as long as the "principles of human nature" have not become verified hypotheses, i.e., scientific laws.

Nevertheless, the Idea which Mac­

aulay Intends to convey here is fully acceptable to a science of politics.

Consequently,

it must be said that

his argument with Mill on the basis of deductive reasoning

23.

Macaulay, p. 298.

355

actually Is detrimental to his otherwise perfectly tenable pos ition. Macaulay's criticism Is much more consistent with his fundamental position when it is directed at Mill's disregard for empirical evidence.

Accordingly, the per­

tinence of his comment that "Mr. Mill Is not legislating for England or the United States....but for mankind",84 readily must be conceded.

For, indeed, the tendency of

formulating a theory of government which has universal application, is as characteristic of James Mill as it is of his fellow Utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham.

This tendency

accompanies deductive reasoning from a priori principles, which are regarded as universally applicable, which have not been tested as to their validity, which have not been examined as to their agreement with empirical evidence, and which - In other words - are not treated as hypotheses requiring independent verification.

The result of this

approach is the fallacy which Macaulay correctly points out; namely, a complete disregard for the numerous var­ iables of the cultural setting which determine political organization.

If Macaulay's above comment is regarded as

a criticism of Mill's neglect of the variable place, his following comment may be considered as being directed against Mill's neglect of the variable time:

"it would

still be Incumbent on Mr. Mill to prove that the Interest

24.

Macaulay, p. 290.

356

of every generation is identical with the interest of all succeeding generations"*25 The method of inquiry for a science of government which Macaulay recommends as an alternative to Mill*s approach, is consistent with the statement with which he opened his attack on Mill1s essay; namely, that ex­ perience is the basis of scientific inquiry into prob­ lems of politics: How, then, aie we to arrive at just conclusions on a subject so important to the happiness of mankind? Surely by the method which, in every experimental science to which it has been applied, has signally increased the power and knowledge of our species, - by that method for which our new philosophers would substitute quibbles scarcely worthy of barbarous respondents and opponents of the middle ages, - by the method of induction; - by observing the present state of the world, - by assiduously studying the history of past ages, - by sifting the evi­ dence of facts, - by carefully combining and contrasting those which are authentic, - by generalizing with judge­ ment and diffidence, - by perpetually bringing the theory which we have contrasted to the test of new facts, - by correcting, or altogether abandoning it, according as those new facts prove it partially or fundamentally un­ sound*26 It as on the basis of this statement that it may be said Macaulay places the emphasis on induction, in con­ trast to James Mill, who accepted exclusively deduction as a metnod of inquiry for the study of politics*

It is

apparent, however, that Macaulay is not confining his system of investigation to induction in a narrow sense

25*

Macaulay, p. 293*

25.

Ibid., p. 302*

557

similar to the one in which James Mill employs deduction* The method of inquiry Macaulay recommends would not find the least objection from the contemporary standards of a scientific method in the study of social phenomena* There is no indication that Macaulay’s method of inquiry .would exclude deductive elaborations of verified hypoth­ eses*

His suggestion should not be interpreted, there­

fore, as a n 'insistence on inductive logic, in contrast to Mill’s deductive logic, although a comparison of his approach with the investigations of the problem by James Mill and by John Stuart Mill may convey this view* The opening sentence of the above quoted statement seems to warrant some additional comment.

Macaulay’s

referring to Ma subject so important to the happiness of mankind” should not be understood as an attempt towards a science of ethics, in the sense of Bentham and James Mill*

Certainly, problems of government are of vital

interest to the happiness of mankind.

However, to advo­

cate actions of government conducive to collective hap­ piness, is not the task of a science of politics. point has been stressed repeatedly.

This

In the case of Mac­

aulay, there is no indication that he considered the ethical question of what actions of government are desir­ able as a matter for scientific inquiry.

Probably he

would have agreed with the position maintained In this

358

study, that ethical decisions may be based on objective, on ethical relationships, but that the two are not the subject of the same kind of inquiry*

What Macaulay

therefore should have pointed out in his criticism of Mill* s essay, but failed to do, is to show Mill1s neg­ lect to make that distinction.

To stress this particular

shortcoming of Mill's approach to a science of govern­ ment, would have been more important for the effective­ ness of Macaulay*s argument than his efforts to take issue with the reasonableness and the consistency of Mill*s deductions* John Stuart Mill*s Compromise As it was pointed out, John Stuart Mill's approach to a science of politics may be regarded as a compromise between the respective views of James Mill and Macaulay, H

the criterion of inductive and deductive logic is

employed*

Actually, some indication already has been

found in the case of Macaulay that the issue involved does not lend itself to interpretation entirely in terms of inductive and deductive logic.

Further indications

to that effect, likewise, will be seen in the case of John Stuart Mill.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that

John Stuart Mill regarded that issue as being a question of inductive and deductive logic.

359

Mill is aware of the objections to a science of politics.

He admits that most of these objections are

justified on the basis of what actually has been done in the study of government: And in politics, the questions which engaged general attention were similar: - Is such an enactment, or such a form of government, beneficial or the reverse - either universally, or to some particular community? without any previous inquiry into the general conditions by which the operation of legislative measures, or the ef­ fects produced by forms of government, are determined. Students in politics thus attempted to study the pathology and therapeutics of the social body, before they had laid down the necessary foundation in its physiology; to cure disease without understanding the laws of health.*^ Mill is dealing here with two fundamental problems: first, with the very issue which has been emphasized in connection with James Mill*s essay, the distinction between ethical questions and objective, non-ethical relationships; secondly, with the problem of possible objections to a science of politics.

As far as the first

problem is concerned, the younger Mill recognizes the need for the distinction which the older Mill failed to make.

The "pathology” and the "therapeutics" to be

applied to political organization are processes which are based on "physiology", but are distinct from it. Possibly, the separation of applied science from pure science may be inferred from Mill's suggestion.

If this

distinction is ascribed to John Stuart Mill, certain

27. Mill, John Stuart, A System of Logic, London, Log­ mans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1875, v. II, p. 465, hereafter referred to as System of Logic.

360

qualifications must be made*

Applied science is not

concerned with what is good and bad, with what Is desir­ able and undesirable,

although the notion often is enter­

tained that it is concerned with that*

By now, it has

been repeatedly stated that such questions are the sub­ ject of ethical decisions and not of science*

Applied

science does present the alternatives of possible ac­ tion, but it does not recommend which of these alter­ natives should be followed*

If the separation of applied

from pure science is accepted, three levels of inquiry would have to be distinguished:

first, pure science,

i.e., the establishment of objective relationships be­ tween phenomena; secondly, applied science, i*e*, the presentation of possible alternatives how to control those relationships; thirdly, the ethical question, i»e*, which of those alternatives should be followed?

Now,

whether or not Mill accepts the distinction between these three levels of inquiry, is not sufficiently indicated in his above quoted statement.

What definitely is pointed

out, however, In that passage, is the distinction between questions which are the subject of ethical decisions and questions which are the subject of scientific inquiry. In that manner, John Stuart Mill indirectly takes issue with ore of the shortcomings of James Mill's approach to a science of government.

361

As far as the second problem with which Mill deals in that connection is concerned, he believes that the ob­ ject ions to a science of politics may be overcome if the errors of the past are corrected: It is not necessary even to the perfection of a science, that the corresponding art should possess uni­ versal, or even general rules* The phenomena of society might not only be completely dependent on known causes, but the mode of action of those causes might be reducible to laws of considerable simplicity, and yet no two cases might admit of being treated in precisely the same manner*****But although, in so complicated a class of subjects, it is impossible to lay down practical maxims of universal application, it does not follow that the phenomena do not conform to universal l a w s * ^ 8 It should be noted again that Mill distinguishes between art and science, between the task of the legis­ lator and the task of the political scientist.

The

important point here Is, of course, Mill’s belief in the possibility of establishing regularities in the behavior of social phenomena.

In his opinion, the difference

between natural and social phenomena does not warrant different methods of inquiry for their study, but merely necessitates an awareness of the greater complexity of social phenomena in employing one and the same method: There is, Indeed, no hope that these laws, though our knowledge of them were as certain and as complete as in astronomy, would enable us to predict the his tory of society, like that of the celestial appearances, for thousands of years to come. But the difference of cer­ tainty is not in the laws themselves, it is In the data to which these laws are to be applied**^

System of Logic, v. II, p. 466* 29*

Ibid.,

362

It is believed that no injustice is done to Mill by restating his foregoing point as follows:

the difference

between the phenomena with which astronomy deals and the phenomena with which social science is concerned, does not lie in the procedure by which hypotheses about them are formulated and verified.

The difference lies in the

degree of probability (certainty, in Mill’s terms) with which these hypotheses can be verified.

Since the sub­

ject matter of astronomy is relatively homogeneous, its hypotheses can be verified with a comparatively high degree of probability.

Since, on the other hand, the

subject matter of the social sciences Is relatively het­ erogeneous, their hypotheses can be verified only with a comparatively low degree of probability.

The method of

inquiry, however, remains the same. Mill’s subsequent considerations of a scientific method in the study of social phenomena, therefore, do not deal with the question of h®r that method differs from the method of the natural sciences, but with the question of how the scientific method, in general, can be applied to the study of social phenomena, in particular.

Now,

it is true that Mill rejects "the chemical, or experi­ mental method" and the "geometrical, or abstract method" as adequate approaches to the study of social phenomena. However, in the former Instance, he actually does not re­ ject a method of Inquiry, but a technique of verification.

363

In the latter Instance, he does take issue with a methodof inquiry.

That distinction, which Mill fails to make,

irnst be stressed.

For to say that experimentation is not

possible in the social sciences, does not mean that the scientific method is inapplicable to the study of social phenomena;

it merely means that experimentation, as a

particular technique of verification of the scientific method, cannot be employed in the study of social phen­ omena.

Undoubtedly, Mill was aware of that distinction,

even though he did not state it clearly.

For it can be

seen from the preceding cai si derat ions that he accepts one scientific method of inquiry for the study of both, natural and social phenomena. It is in the search for an adequate application of the scientific method to the study of social phenomena, In general, and to political phenomena, in particular, that Mill rejects the "experimental, or chemical meth­ od" and the "geometrical, or abstract method". Mill1s Rejection of the Experimental or Chemical Method.

Mill’s fundamental objection to the experimental

method in politics is that no adequate technique can be developed to control the numerous factors which determine political phenomena.

He Is willing to concede that induc­

tive inference - which he ccnsicLers to be the basic cri­ terion of the experimental method - can be employed In

564

the study of politics.

Inferences would have to be made,

however, from historical situations, and the control of variables which determine historical situations would encounter difficulties which could not be surpassed. To illustrate his point, Mill advances a hypothesis for testing by various "methods of experimental inquiry". His hypothesis Is that national wealth is determined by restrictive and prohibitory commercial legislation.^ His "methods of experimental inquiry" are the Method of Difference, the Indirect Method of Difference, the Method of Agreement, the Method of Concomitant Variations, and the Method of Residues. In employing the Method of Difference, two instances have to be found which are identical in every respect except In the one which is the subject of

i n q u i r y * 31

in

the case of the hypothesis under investigation, two na­ tions would have to be found which are identical econ­ omically, politically, socially, culturally, and In every other respect, except that one would have protective tariffs and the other one would not.

If these two na­

tions also would differ in their national wealth, a cor­ relation could be established between protective tariffs and national wealth.

According to Mill, such instances

30*

System of bogie, v„ •XI* p. 472.

31.

Ibid.

565

are Inconceivable, since nations which are identical in every respect also would agree in their legislative policies on tariffs.32 The Indirect Method of Difference requires two classes of instances, whereby the instances of one class have only one circumstance in common, which is absent in all Instances of the other class.

For the particular

case in question, then, two classes of nations would have to be found; one class of nations which have nothing in common but protective tariffs, and another class of nations which have nothing in common but free trade*

if

the nations which adhere to a policy of protective tar­ iffs are more prosperous than the nations which prac­ tice free trade, the inference may be made that national wealth is determined by restrictive commercial legisla­ tion*

The inadequacy of this method is seen by Mill in

the fact --that prosperity may be the effect of more than one cause, and, since other variable factors have not been controlled in this "experimental" situation, there is no assurance that protective tariffs are the cause of national w e a l t h . ^ It should be noted at this point that Mill is not quite consistent In rejecting the various "methods of

32*

System o f Logic , v *, 11,:.p. 473*

33.

ibid.

366 experimental Inquiry".

The Method of Difference is not

accepted by him because no two instances could be found which agree in everything except in a policy of protect­ ive tariffs.

The Indirect Method of Difference is con­

sidered inadequate by Mill because the effect in question may have more than one cause.

Now, the grounds on which

these two methods are rejected, are entirely different. In the first Instance, it is the impossibility of obtain­ ing the required "experimental" situation which makes the method inapplicable.

In the second instance, on the oth­

er hand, it is the inadequacy of the method itself which makes it useless* M illfs objection to the Method of Agreement is the same as to the Indirect Method of Difference.

Two na­

tions would have to be found which have nothing in common except a policy of protective tariffs.

If the status of

their national wealth should be found to be the same,. It could be inferred that protective tariffs and national wealth are correlated.

However, the shortcoming of this

method, according to Mill, also is that more than one cause may determine the observed prosperity.34 The same argument is used by Mill in rejecting the remaining "methods of experimental inquiry", the Method of Concomitant Variations and the Method of Residues.

34.

System of Logic, V..

II., p. 474.

367

The Method of Concomitant Variations consists in estab­ lishing a causal relationship between two phenomena which vary correspondingly or between these two phenomena and a third phenomenon*

Since national wealth depends on more

than one cause, however, this method is considered by Mill as inapplicable to the case under investigation*

The Meth­

od of Residues relies on the elimination of all those cir­ cumstances which are not the cause of the effect in question and on. inferring that the remaining circumstance or circum­ stances,

i,e*, the residue, are t he cause or the causes of

the effect under investigation.

The virtual impossibility

of eliminating all circumstances except one or a few as antecedents of the effect in question, makes this method too inapplicable to the examination of the relationship between protective tariffs and national wealth.35 Mill!s principle error in the foregoing sequence of arguments is the identification of experimental techniques with inductive inference.

Certainly, experimental veri­

fication of hypothes is based on inductive inference.

How­

ever, there are other techniques of verification which are not experimental and which are nevertheless based on induc­ tive inference.

Induction may be regarded as being identical

with the scientific method of inquiry, but experimental verification merely is one of several techniques of verifica­ tion which are employed by the scientific method; consequently,

35.

System of Logic, v. II, pp. 475-477.

368

the experimental technique is an application of inductive inference, but is not identical with it.

If Mill, there­

fore - possibly quite adequately - rejects the experi­ mental technique

as suitable for the study of social

phenomena, he is not justified in rejecting simultan­ eously inductive inference: In an age In which chemistry Itsdlf, when attempt­ ing to deal with the more complex chemical sequences, those of the animal or even the vegetable organism, has found it necessary to become, and has succeeded in be­ coming, a Deductive Science - it is not to be apprehended that any person of scientific habits, who has kept pace with the general progress of the knowledge of nature, can be In danger of applying the methods of elementary chemistry to explore the sequences of the most complex order of phenomena in existence*36 This statement supports the opinion which was ex­ pressed earlier; namely, that Mill is not attempting to develop a scientific method for the study of social phenomena, distinct from the one which is employed in the study of natural phenomena.

His efforts are devoted to

determining what the scientific method, applicable to the study of all classes of phenomena, is.

No disagree­

ment between Mill!s view and the position maintained in the current investigation exists on that account.

How­

ever, Mill*s notions of a deductive science of Chemistry - as an example of the natural sciences - is subject to further argument.

36*

It cannot be denied, of course, that

System of Logic, v*. 4X1* p. 478.

569

Chemistry does resort to deductive inferences; but these inferences are deductive elaborations of hypotheses which have been verified with a high degree of probab­ ility, which have acquired the status of scientific laws#

By no means has Chemistry abandoned inductive

inference# make*

This concession Mill certainly would have to

His rejection of induction forth© study of social

phenomena because of the fact that even natural sciences employ deduction, is not well founded.

For, in consid­

ering Macaulay’s position on that point, it already was seen that induction does not preclude deduction.

Ob­

viously, Mill's position needs further clarification; for, from the subsequent considerations, it will be seen that his concept of the scientific method does not cor­ respond to deduction from a priori principles either# Mill's Rejection of the Geometrical or Abstract Meth­ od#

It is the attempt to deduce a science of politics

from a priori principles which John Stuart Mill desig­ nates as the "geometrical, or abstract method".

In his

criticism of it, he actually takes issue with James Mill's essay, although he does not specifically say so: The profound and original tninkers who are commonly known under this description, founded their general theory of government on one comprehensive premise, namely, that men's actions are always determined by their interests.##.. The theory goes on to infer, quite correctly, that if the actions of mankind are determined in the main by their selfish interests, the only rulers who will govern accord­ ing to the interest of the governed, are those whose

370

selfish interests are in accordance with it. And to this is added a third proposition, namely, that no rulers have their selfish interest identical with that of the governed, unless it be rendered so by accountability, that is, by the dependence on the will of the governed* In other words (and as the result of the whole), that the desire of retaining or the fear of losing their power, and what­ ever is thereon consequent, is the sole motive which can be relied on for producing on the part of the rulers a course of conduct in accordance with the general interest*37 Despite the length of the foregoing statement, it has been quoted here in full, since it is a precise presentation of James Mill1s argument in his essay On Government»

John Stuart Mill*s criticism is directed

at two shortcomings of this approach; first, the inade­ quacy of the premises; secondly, the deduction of con­ clusions on government from one single principle of hu­ man nature.

Neither Is it true, according to John Stuart

Mill, that rufers are motivated in their actions exclus­ ively by self-interest, nor is it true that the identity of the interest of the rulers with the Interest of the governed can be achieved by positive means of enforcing responsibility*58

Mill is careful not to commit the

error by which Macaulay weakened the effectiveness of his argument; namely, to take Issue with the consistency of the deductions which are based on those premises. ingly, Mill makes the following comment:

57•

System of Logic,

58*

Ibid* * p. 484.

II,- pp. 482-483*

Accord­

371

^1 am only concerned to show that their method was unscientific; not to measure the amount of error which may have affected their practical conclusions.5^ In another respect, however, Mill*s attack on this approach to politics is even less effective than Macaul­ ay^.

Macaulay, at least, states clearly that no science

of government can depend on deductions from a priori principles, but must be based on empirical inquiry.

Mill

does not stress this point at all, although indications from other considerations are that he too is opposed to deductions from a priori concepts.

Possibly, in order

not to be inconsistent with his rejection of the "exper­ imental, or chemical method11, he hesitates to place the emphasis on experience.

By failing to do so, Mill ac­

tually misses the most fundamental criticism of a deduc­ tive science of government. More important than his challenge of the truth of the premises, is his attack on the second shortcoming which he sees in the "geometrical, or abstract method". Mill1s belief that a science of politics cannot be deduced from one single principle of human nature, Is in agree­ ment with the position which Is maintained in this study; namely, that political phenomena must be interpreted in terms of several rather than in terms of one explanatory

39„

System of Logic, V, 11**p . 485.

372

principle.

In other words, a science of government

must be pluralistic rather than monistic. Mill1s Inverse Deductive Method.

After rejecting

the "experimental, or chemical" and the "geometrical, or abstract" methods, Mill proceeds to developthe method which he considers adequate for the study of social phenomena.

This method he believes to obtain by a minor

modification of the one employed in the natural sciences, namely, the Concrete Deductive Method.

According to

Mill, the characteristic features of the latter are the following: The ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science is not the a priori reasoning itself, but the accordance between its results and those of observations a posteriori. Mill thus seems to clarify his rejection of both, the "experimental" and the "geometrical" methods.

In

not accepting the former, he obviously did not mean, then, to exclude empirical verification from scientific inquiry.

In failing to stress the inadequacy of exclus-

^ve j* priori reasoning in his discussion of the "geo­ metrical" method, he actually did not reveal, then, his unawareness of that criticism.

Mill* s above quoted state­

ment does not only clarify his position, but presents a concept of the scientific method which offers no ground

40.

System of Logic, v.

;II', p. 490*

373

for objections.

The results of the minor modification

which Mill believes to be making, lead, however, to a complete reversal of the suggested method: Nothing more results than a disturbance in the order of precedency of the two processes, sometimes amounting to its actual inversion: insomuch that instead of deducing our conclusions by reasoning, and verifying them by observation, we in some cases begin by obtaining them provisionally from specific experience, and after­ wards connect them with the principles of human nature by a priori reasonings, which reasonings are thus a real Verification.41 Mill is grossly underestimating his "minor modifica­ tion" by saying that "nothing more results than a distur­ bance in the order of precedency of the two processes". What he actually does, is to destroy the fundamental cri­ terion of scientific inquiry, namely, empirical verifi­ cation.

A priori reasonings may, under circumstances,

lead to the formulation of hypotheses, but they never can serve as possible means of their verification.

Mill

does admit that verification by a priori reasoning does not furnish a sufficiently high degree of probability in order to make predictions, that It only indicates what is possible.

What Mill should have recognized, however,

is that a. priori reasoning Is no verification at all. The fact that he bases his Inverse Deductive Method on a priori

verification, deprives the former of its validity

as a scientific method:

41.

System of Logic, v. II, p. 490.

374

•♦•.we cannot even show that vhat did take place was probable a priori, but only that it was possible. This, however - which, in the Inverse Deductive Method that we are now characterizing, is a real process of verification, - is as indispensable, as verification by specific experience has been shown to be, where the con­ clusion Is originally obtained by the direct way of de­ duction.42 On the basis of the criteria of the scientific meth­ od which have been accepted in this Investigation, no agreement can be reached with Mill on his Inverse Deduc­ tive Method.

Had he concluded his argument after stating

his concept of the Concrete Deductive Method, no -objec­ tion could be raised against his compromise between Induc­ tion and deduction as exclusive methods of inquiry* Conclusion The contribution to a science of politics which can be found in James Mill*s essay, In Macaulay*s criticism of that essay, and In John Stuart Mill*s attempted com­ promise between the two views, must be seen In the pre­ sentation of methods of Inquiry rather than in hypotheses for further investigation.

In that respect, the prob­

lems which are dealt with by the two Utilitarians and by Macaulay, are exactly the ones with which this study is concerned*

The principal issue which is involved in the

three respective approaches, should be somewhat modified. A comparison of Macaulay's point of view with James Mill*s

42.

System of Logic, v. II, p. 514.

375

theory of government, may suggest that the issue involved Is a question of induction versus deduction as a method of inquiry. such.

John Stuart Mill dealt with the issue as

Actually, however, the critical question under

discussion is one of epistemology; namely, whether rat­ ionalism or empiricism serves as an adequate theory of knowledge for a scientific method in the study of polit­ ics. James Mill!s concept of a'science of government is of interest to the present study only insofar as it is subject to Macaulay's criticism and John Stuart Mill's comments. cannot be.

It is

an

example of what a science of politics

Deductions from a priori principles mean -

in terms of the criteria of the scientific method - de­ ductive elaborations of hypotheses which have not been verified, for which, moreover, no attempt off* verification has been made, and which, as a result, are mere assump­ tions.

This shortcoming of James ^Ill's approach to a

science of government has been pointed out by Macaulay. The alternative approach which Macaulay suggests, would riot find the least objection from the viewpoint of the scientific method which is maintained a century later. Certain weaknesses in Macaulay's argument against Mill*s essay have been noted.

Nevertheless, he clearly maintains

that a science of government must be based on empiricism

376

as a theory of knowledge, that hypotheses must be veri­ fied by inductive inference from given instances of ex­ perience, in other words, that there is only one standard of the scientific method, and that this standard also appli©s to a science of politics* John Stuart Mill would agree with Macaulay in two respects; first, that there is no dual standard of a scientific method, but that the criteria of a scientific method for the study of social phenomena are the same as for the study of natural phenomena; secondly, that de­ ductions from a priori principles - the "geometrical, or abstract method", in Millfs terminology - cannot con­ stitute a science of government.

Mill would disagree

with Macaulay that inductive inference is the fundamental criterion of the scientific method as applied to politics. M i l l 1s rejection of induction is based, however, on an erroneous identification of experimental inquiry with inductive inference.

Experimental inquiry merely is one

of several techniques of verifying hypotheses, whereas all techniques of verification which are employed by the scientific method resort to inductive inference. does not see this distinction*

Mill

A concession towards

induction is made by him in his concept of the Concrete Deductive Method*

In that Instance, Mill stresses the

fact that a priori reasoning must be supported by a

377

posteriori evidence, i*e*, empirical verification, which implies inductive inference.

The compromise Mill makes

between induction and deduction in developing his concept of the Concrete Deductive Method, does not conflict with the criteria of the scientific method*

However, his in­

version of the process, namely, the formulation of hy­ potheses from experience and their verification by a priori reasoning, lacks all conformance to scientific inquiry.

His Inverse Deductive Method seems to be a re­

turn to rationalism as a theory of knowledge* An adequate concept of a scientific method for the study of politics actually can be found only in Macaulay1s presentation.

Nevertheless, the relevance of the argu­

ments of the older and the younger Mill for the very prob­ lems with which this study is concerned - despite their disagreement with some of the criteria which have been accepted in this investigation - certainly cannot be denied.

Chapter IX CONCLUSION For the purpose of this study, three principal cri­ teria of a science of politics have been advanced:

first,

the employment of a particular method of inquiry, which has been identified as the scientific method; secondly, the concern with objective, non-ethical relationships; thirdly, the interpretation of political phenomena in terms of several rather than In terms of one explanatory principles, i.e., a pluralistic rather than a monistic approach to the study of politics.

It has been stated

that, on the basis of these criteria, a contribution of Western Political Thought to a science of politics can be seen in two respects:

(1) the development of methods

of Inquiry which conform to the standards of the scien­ tific method;

(2) the presentation of hypotheses which

are relevant to contemporary political science, and which lend themselves to further investigatIon,

additional

verification, or eventual refutation. Four principal steps in the process of inquiry which is employed by the scientific method have been disting­ uished: facts;

(1) the accumulation and classification of (2) the relation of these facts to an explanatory

principle, In form of a hypothesis;

(3) the verifica­

tion of the stated hypothesis by its consequences, i.e.,

379

its establishment as a scientific law; (4) deductive elaborations of the verified hypothesis*

It was pointed

out that the first step may be placed in parentheses; for not all formulations of hypotheses are preceded by a search for facts; even rationally conceived hypotheses may prove to be valid, provided that verification by their consequences, i *e* * by empirical evidence, is ob­ tained*

As far as the fourth step is concerned, it must

be emphasized that only verified hypotheses, i*e* scien­ tific laws, lend themselves to valid deductive elabora­ tions * In the course of this study It has been seen that ione of the hypotheses which were examined, have been ver­ ified with a sufficiently high degree of probability in order to acquire the status of scientific laws.

Conse­

quently, the contribution of Western Political Thought to a science of politics - In one of the two mentioned respects - is not a presentation of scientific laws, but merely the suggestion of relevant hypotheses, which, have been verified only with a relatively low degree of probability, for further investigation*

Furthermore,

the preceding examination of political theories showed that the criteria which have been defined as a concern with objective, non-ethical relationships and a plural­ istic interpretation, also pertain to method*

It Is

380

justifiable, therefore, to consider the contribution of Western Political Thought to a science of politics in terms of method and relevant hypotheses*

Like the pre­

ceding investigation, the subsequent summary will be made in those terms* The Contribution to Method In the foregoing chapters, the methods of inquiry which have been employed by the political thinkers under consideration, were examined with regard to the follow­ ing question:

To what extent do these methods comply

with the criteria of the scientific method which have been accepted, and what suggestions do they contain, on that basis, for the application of the scientific method to the study of politics?

A summary of the obtained re­

sults, therefore, is attempted according to the following points:

empiricism as a theory of knowledge for Inquiry,

the formulation and verification of hypotheses, the de­ ductive elaboration of hypotheses, the concern with the problem of a scientific method in politics, the emphasis on the non-ethical nature of a science of politics, and the pluralistic interpretation of political phenomena* Empiricism as a Theory of Knowledge for Inquiry* At the beginning of the present study, it was pointed out that the acceptance of empiricism as a theory of knowledge

381

would serve as a criterion of selection for determining which political thinkers should be considered in this investigation.

The justification for employing this cri­

terion now can be seen*

Although It has been conceded

that the accumulation and classification of facts does not In all cases precede the formulation of hypotheses, it must be recognized that, only by resorting to empir­ ical evidence, can hypotheses be verified.

’ W ith the in­

dicated exceptions of Marx and James Mill, all the po­ litical thinkers whose theories were examined In this study, have based their inquiries on empiricism as a theory of knowledge. Most noteworthy, in that respect, is the contribu­ tion of Aristotle.

By his comparafc ive study of govern­

ment, he offered Western Political Thought an alternative to the pursuit of the Platonic tradition.

’ Without the

benefit of this alternative, the study of politics would have been confined to philosophical speculation, and could not have aspired to the status of a science. One of the contributions Aristotle and all the political thinkers who have been considered in this study - with the exception of Marx and James Mill - have made to a science of politics, therefore, is the recognition of empiricism as a necessary basis for scientific inquiry.

382

The Formulation and Verification of Hypotheses.

The

empirical evidence on which the study of politics must relys are historical situations*

Again it may be said

that all the thinkers who have been considered in this investigation, have formulated hypotheses by relating facts to an explanatory principle, and have attempted to verify their hypotheses by selecting historical sit­ uations as verifying instances*

In that respect, only

James Mill could be cited as an exception; for even Marx heavily relied on historical evidence; his rejection as a contributor to a science of politics is based on other considerations, which were discussed earlier. The beginning of the formulation of hypotheses and their verification by their consequences ** i.e., by empirical evidence - in the study of politics, also can be found In Aristotle* s writings*

It was seen that his

hypotheses, pertaining to the theory of revolution and the rule of the middle class, were supported by histor­ ical situations as verifying instances. It may be said that the difficulty of this method of inquiry, namely, the control of variables, first was recognized by Machiavelli.

An awareness of factors which

alter a situation so that it cannot be used as a veri­ fying instance, is indicated In The Prince*

The Discourses

383

may be regarded as the first attempt of a case study in politics, In which a certain control of variables is obtained by selecting and comparing different instances from the same political setting, i.e., from the Roman Republic.

Apparently, this suggestion In Machiavelli*s

writings has been ignored by political thinkers of later centuries.

In the cases of Spencer and Pareto,

attempts still are made to verify hypotheses by can­ vassing the history of the world from ancient to contemp­ orary times, without the prospect of coping with the innumerable variables which determine instances from many different historical, cultural, social, geographic, political, and economic settings.

The large number of

verifying instances which are obtained in this manner, still gives no assurance of the validity of the selec­ ted Instances as representative samples.

It was Gump-

lowicz who recognized the limitations of this technique of verification and resorted to case studies.

It must

be admitted, of course, that the verifying instances which are secured by case studies, are comparatively few.

However, since some control of variables is ach­

ieved by case studies, the potentiality of the result­ ing verifying instances as representative samples in­ creases.

The contribution of Gumplowicz In this respect

is noteworthy.

384

It was pointed out that the accumulation and class­ ification of facts - the first step in the process of scientific inquiry - must not necessarily precede the formulation of hypotheses.

Furthermore, it was emphas­

ized that deductive elaborations are valid only Insofar as they are made from hypotheses which have been veri­ fied with a high degree of probability, i.e., which have acquired the status of scientific laws.

It will be

recalled that an objection to Hobbes1 and Spinoza1s meth­ ods was raised because of the fact that they resort to inductive inferences from hypotheses which have been verified only with a relatively low degree of probabil­ ity.

Consequently, the emphasis rests on the second and

third steps of the scientific method, namely, the form­ ulation and the verification of hypotheses.

Inasmuch

as all thinkers who have been considered In this study with the indicated exceptions - have stated hypotheses and attempted their verification by instances selected from historical situations, or have, at least, recog­ nized the need of such verification, it must be con­ ceded that all have contributed to the application of the scientific method to the study of politics. The Deductive Elaboration of Hypotheses.

One of

the objections which have been raised against a science

385

of social phenomena, in general, and a science of polit­ ical phenomena, In particular, is the difficulty of de­ ductive elaborations of hypotheses which are stated in qualitative terms.

It was stressed that quantitative

interpretation is not a criterion of the scientific method.

It was conceded, however, that deductive elab­

oration is facilitated by resolving qualitative diff­ erences in quantitative terms.

As soon as a science of

politics T^ill have verified its hypotheses with a suf­ ficiently high degree of probability in order to proceed to deductive elaborations, a technique by which quali­ tative differences can be resolved in quantitative terms, will become highly relevant.

In that respect, the quan­

titative relationship between income distribution and political disturbances which was established by Harold T. Davis, is a significant contribution to a science of politics. The Concern with the Problem of a Scientific Method in Politics.

Not all the thinkers who have been con­

sidered in this study, have consciously coped with the problem of a scientific method in the study of polit­ ics.

Certainly, no concept of the scientific method, in

the contemporary sense, could be Inferred from the theor­ ies of Aristotle, Lucretius, Machiavelli, Bodin, Montesquieu,

386

and Harrington.

Their methods of inquiry do conform to

standards of the scientific method, but it hardly would be adequate to say that they entertained a concept of the s e i e n t m c method, in contemporary terms. Begin­ nings in that direction are found in the writings of Hobbes and Spinoza.

However, only to the thinkers who

have been considered as representatives of later geo­ graphic and economic determinism, and of psychological and sociological determinism, could a concept of the scientific method, as defined in this investigation, be ascribed.

Nevertheless, not even in their case, is a

concern with the problem of a science of politics as emphatic as in the controversy in which the two Mills and Macaulay were involved. It was seen that, in the course of the controversy between James Mill, Macaulay, and John Stuart Mill, an adequate presentation of a scientific method for the study of politics was given only by Macaulay.

John

Stuart Mill rejected the possibility of a deductive science of government, as developed by James Mill, approached an acceptable compromise in form of his Concrete Deductive Method, but invalidated his argument by resorting to his Inverse Deductive Method.

Nevertheless, all three points

of view - despite the unacceptability of some on the bas­ is of the criteria of the scientific method - are relevant

387

for the problems of a science of politics.

It is In that

respect that a contribution can be seen In the contro­ versy between James Mill, Thomas Babington Macaulay, and John Stuart Mill. The Emphasis on the Non-Ethical Nature of Science• The problem of the non-ethical nature of science neces­ sarily Is related to the question of method.

For, since

it is understood that scientific inquiry must rely on empirical evidence, ethical decisions which may be based on empirical evidence, but cannot be determined by it, are not the subject of scientific inquiry.

Now, it has

been seen that the majority of political thinkers who have been considered In this study,, definitely express preferences and value-judgements and do concern them­ selves with ethical questions.

The fact is that they

go beyond the limits of a science of politics, into political ethics.

Any contribution to a science of pol­

itics can be found only in those portions of their writ­ ings which deal with objective, non-ethical relation­ ships.

This point has been repeatedly emphasized before.

What is of interest, however, is that some of these thinkers make a clear distinction between non-ethical problems and ethical questions. A distinction to that effect already is found in

388

Aristotle* s Politics.

Government 11as it ought to be*1 is,

for Aristotle, a question to be decided by an ethical judgement*

Government 11as it is found to exist11 Is the

subject of empirical inquiry.

Aristotle*s use of the

criteria of expedience should not be interpreted as an attempt to solve ethical questions empirically.

Exped­

ience does not involve an ethical problem, but the state­ ment of an objective relationship.

For example, whether

or not a particular form of government promotes the wel­ fare of the community, is subject to empirical inquiry. A decision whether or not this form of government Is de­ sirable, may be based on this relationship, but is not causally determined by It.

In that respect, Aristotle

made a distinction which the early Utilitarians failed to see.

Certainly, Aristotle is concerned with ethical

questions as well as with non-ethical relationships. However, he deals, in that respect, with two separate issues. In a similar manner, Spencer recognizes a distinc­ tion between an objective study of political phenomena and their evaluation in terms of preferences*

By no

means does Spencer confine himself to the former task, despite his awareness of that distinction.

A similar

awareness of the necessary separation of these two prob­ lems, Is expressed by John Stuart Mill in his emphasis

389

on the need of basing political reform on the determina­ tion of functional, non-ethical relationships in gov­ ernment. Although the same political thinkers who stress the distinction between objective relationships and ethical issues, concern themselves with value judgements, their recognition of the fact that ethical questions cannot be decided by empirical inquiry, must be regarded as a contribution to a science of politics. The Pluralistic Interpretation of Political Phen­ omena.

In the course of the current study, a definite

suggestion to the effect that political phenomena must be interpreted in terms of several rather than in terms of one explanatory principle, has been found only in the writings of John Stuart Mill.

However, the actual con­

tributions in the direction of pluralistic Interpretation - unintended as they might have been - are even more sig­ nificant than Mill*s relevant statement.

It was seen

that, in the history of Western Political Thought, main trends have been developed which were considered In this investigation as geographic, economic, psychological, and sociological determinism.

The beginnings of two of

these trends, namely, geographic and economic determin­ ism, can be found in Aristotle*s Politics.

None of

390

these forms of determinism, except Marx*s economic de­ terminism, represent attempts to interpret political phenomena exclusively in terms of one particular class of determinants.

They merely constitute correlations

between one set of non-political factors and political institutions and events.

A science of politics can ac-

cept, therefore, each of these forms of determinism as one of several explanatory principles, in terms of which its phenomena can be interpreted.

Sociological deter­

minism, itself, already suggests this approach, by rec­ ognizing the integration of geographic, economic, and psychological factors Into a process of social evolution, which, in turn, determines political institutions and events.

A science of politics cannot accept, of course,

the principle of social evolution without reservations. Nevertheless, to regard each of these relationships as one of several explanatory principles, is an approach which conforms to the criterion of pluralistic interp­ retation. The Contribution in Form of Hypotheses None of the hypotheses which have been advanced by the political thinkers under consideration In this study, have been verified with a sufficiently high de­ gree of probability in order to acquire the status of

391

sclentific laws*

The difficulty of controlling variables

and of obtaining highly representative samples readily accounts for this fact.

In all cases, however, an attempt

has been made by the respective thinkers to supply veri­ fying instances in support of their hypotheses, or, at least, to indicate the need for empirical verification. The relevance of these hypotheses for a science of pol­ itics is based on two criteria:

one, that they are

pertinent to problems with which a study of politics is concerned; the other, that they do lend themselves to additional verification or eventual refutation - but, in any case, to further investigation - by the scientific method, as applied to the study of political phenomena* In many cases, the particular technique to be followed for further investigation has been suggested by the or­ iginators of the hypotheses in question.

In other cases,

the suggested techniques have to be modified.

Likewise,

some of the hypotheses have to be modified In content and form, in order to lend themselves to further invest­ igation.

Particular recommendations In that respect

were made previously, in connection with the detailed examination of the respective theories.

The subsequent

summary follows the outline of the entire study, with the exception that Aristotle1s hypotheses will be con­ sidered in conjunction with the ones advanced by the

392

school of Economic Determinism, in order to place greater emphasis on their significance. The Hypotheses of Early Positivism.

Since the con­

tribution of Lucretius, Hobbes, and Spinoza to a science of politics must be seen exclusively In terms of method, the contribution of Early Positivism in form of hypotheses rests entirely with Machiavelli.

Five hypotheses which

were advanced by Machiavelli, seem to warrant further investigation; (1) Power in a conquered area is secured by alliances with the weaker neighboring states rather than by all­ iances with the stronger neighbors. Suffice It to say that history beyond Machiavelli1s time can furnish more verifying instances in support of this hypothesis than Machiavelli himself could have ob­ tained. (2)

In order to be accepted without opposition,

political reform must be introduced in terms of exist­ ing Institutions* The validity of this theory - despite its lack of sufficient verification - seems to have been accepted in practical politics.

For example, in the United States,

the advocates of authoritarian government claim to be the most ardent defenders of democracy and the Constitu­ tion.

393

(3)

Democratic government will not endure where

it has been preceded by a continued tradition of auth­ oritarianism. The collapse of the Weimar Republic merely would be one of numerous verifying instances in support of this hypothesis. (4)

It is not the form or the extent of dictatorial

power which is the

criterion for whether or not demo­

cratic principles have been violated, but the way in which dictatorial power has been attained. The relevance of this hypothesis possibly is best illustrated by the position of the President of the United States in times of national emergency.

The ques­

tion would be, can the power of the executive border on dictatorship - regardless of its extent - as long as it remains responsible to the electorate? (5)

No form of government can endure for an ex­

tended period of time without tacit popular support. Machiavelli presents this hypothesis In the discus­ sion of The Prince.

His contention is that even des­

potic government cannot endure without tacit popular support.

What is meant by "an extended period of time"

is subject to further definition.

394

Thgjjjrpothesea of Geographic Determinism*

All

representatives of Geographic Determinism are in ag­ reement with regard to the following hypothesis:

Cli­

mate, soil, and other factors of the physiographic en­ vironment, are determinants of political institutions and events*

It was seen that Huntington refutes the par­

ticular hypothesis of Bodin and Montesquieu that repub­ lican forms of government are predominant in mountain­ ous territories and monarchial forms of government pre­ vail in low countries.

Other particular hypotheses of

Bodin and Montesquieu, however, have been supported by recently obtained empirical evidence*

It was pointed

out that Clarence A. Mills interprets the bid for power by northern countries - like Germany, during the Second World War, and Russia, at present - in terms of climatic cycles which have swept over Europe over a period of several centuries,.

In view of these findings, it would

not be justifiable to deny all validity to Bodin* s hypothesis that all major conquests in Europe proceeded from the north to the south, and to Montesquieu* s cor­ responding hypothesis that direct contacts between nor­ thern, colder and southern, warmer climatic zones, have resulted In the conquest of the southern countries by the northern neighbors.

395

The Hypotheses of Economic Determinism.

Harring­

ton s hypothesis on the separation of economic and pol­ itical power is a modification of Aristotle's theory of revolution*

Aristotle's hypothesis may be stated in the

following form:

Wherever economic and political power

are separated, a revolution is likely to occur. noted that, according to Aristotle,

It was

either the former

holders of economic power or the former holders of pol­ itical power would acquire both, economic and political power, as the result of a revolution.

Harrington's

hypothesis states that, as a consequence of a revolution which has been precipitated by a separation of economic and political power, political power always will follow economic power.

He modifies Aristotle's hypothesis

to the extent that he eliminates the alternative of a unification of economic and political power in the hands of the former holders of political power.

Both, Aris­

totle and Harrington present verifying instances in sup­ port of their respective hypotheses.

It must be recog­

nized, however, that any evidence in favor of Harrington's hypothesis would be heavily contested by evidence support­ ing Aristotle's original hypothesis.

A verification with

a high degree of probability of one of them, would in­ volve a refutation of the other.

396

A possible support of Aristotle *s original hypoth­ esis may be found in its analogy with Harold T. Davis1 hypotheses on income distribution and political distur­ bances.

Davis obtains his hypotheses by modifying and

expanding Pareto’s theory of income distribution.

He

states them in the following form; (1)

Whenever the concentration ratio of income

exceeds a certain critical value above 0.5, i.e., when­ ever a certain critically high concentration of income in the hands of a few exists in a given society, a revo­ lution is likely to occur. (2)

Whenever the concentration ratio is lower than

a certain critical value below 0.5, i.e., whenever in­ come is dispersed beyond a certain critical minimum of Concentration, a civil war is likely to take place. Aristotle did not draw a distinction between polit­ ical disturbances in terms of revolution and civil war. Comprising both under the term "sedition", he had ref­ erence to any change in government by extra-constitutional means, usually effected by the exercise of physical force.

Davis distinguishes, in that sense, between pol­

itical disturbances which are advocated by the majority, i.e., revolutions, and those which are promoted by a minority, i.e., civil wars.

The analogy between Davis*

hypotheses and Aristotle’s theory of revolution is based

397

on the following considerations.

As Davis states that,

wherever the concentration of income in the hands of a few goes beyond a certain critical point, a revolution is likely to occur, he would agree with Aristotle that a separation of economic and political power exists insofar as the economic power which is vested in a wealthy few, is resented by the many, who hold sufficient political power in order to effect a revolution.

Likewise, the

hypothesis that the dispersion of income below a certain critical minimum of concentration is likely to promote a civil war, is in agreement with Aristotle’s theory, since attempted equalization cf income by a majority which holds the political power, will be resented by the wealthy few who are the holders of economic power, and who eventually will resort to a civil war in order to prevent a further reduction of their wealth.

If Aris­

totle' s concept of sedition is considered as synonymous with both, revolution and civil war, in Davis'

sense,

the agreement of Davis’ theory of the determination of political disturbances by income distribution with Aris­ totle’s theory of revolution, hardly can be denied. Aristotle's hypothesis which is related to his theory of revolution, Is that constitutional stability under a polity will be achieved best where there is a strong middle class.

Since polity, for Aristotle, is a

398

right constitution which provides for government by the many in the interest of the one, the few, and the many, this hypothesis may be stated in contemporary terms as follows;

democracy will be most stable where there is

a strong middle class. The Hypotheses of Psychological Determinism.

In

its original form, Pareto’s principal hypothesis on gov­ ernment has to be stated as follows;

Government is the

result of the manipulation of certain psychological fac­ tors - designated as residues and derivations - In the governed class, by a governing elite, which - by virtue of its endowment with certain residues - is able to per­ form this manipulation.

Since the universal application

of Pareto’s hypothesis cannot be conceded, and, further­ more, since the adequacy of the constructs residues and derivations must be questioned, the following modifica­ tion of Pareto’s hypothesis has been recommended in this study:

At certain places, and at certain times, govern­

ment is characterized by the manipulation of components of human behavior by a governing elite. DeGrazia conceived his principal hypothesis on gov­ ernment in opposition to existing elite theories, by placing the emphasis on psychological determinants in the ruled population.

Actually, however, the hypotheses

399

of Pareto and DeGrazia supplement each other. hypothesis was stated in the following form:

DeGrazia’s The endur­

ance of certain belief-systems in the governed popula­ tion sustain a certain form of political organization, whereas the disintegration of these belief-systems, the occurrence of anomie, -undermines its existence.

On

this basis, it is conceivable that a governing elite manipulates the belief-systems, held by the governed population, in such manner that the belief-systems will sustain an existing political organization* The Hypotheses of Sociological Determinism.

Despite

disagreements, such as the one between Spencer and Ward, the hypotheses which have been advanced by Sociological Determinism can be regarded as compatible with one another, as long as each is considered as implying one of several explanatory principles. Spencer’s principal hypothesis was stated in the following form:

Political Institutions are determined

by social evolution, leading from fundamental homogeneity towards continuously increasing heterogeneity, as well as by a concomitant evolutionary process, representing the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Indications were found that one component of Spencer’s hypothesis - namely, social evolution as a manifestation

400

or the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest - was deduced from Spencer* s analogy between the biological and the social organism.

Considering the

premises on which this deduction is based, it was nec­ essary to regard it as scientifically not valid.

Con­

sequently, for purposes of further investigation, Spen­ cer* s hypothesis has been reduced to its other compon­ ent:

namely, that political institutions are determined

by an evolutionary process leading from fundamental homo­ geneity towards continuously increasing heterogeneity. Some modification also was suggested in the case of Bagehot1s hypothesis.

Although the form in which

Bagehot’s hypothesis was stated - namely, that the de­ gree of authoritarianism and the extent of collective control in government is determined by the intensity of the struggle for existence - can be retained by a science of politics for further investigation, its evolutionary implication should be abandoned.

The stated correlation

would hold true even if change should occur in the direc­ tion of a more ratherthan a less intensified struggle for existence.

In that manner, it may be shown that

during times of war or domestic emergency - Instances of greater intensification of the struggle for existence there Is a trend towards greater collectivism, in the form of state interference in economic matters and the

401

restriction of certain civil liberties, as well as a trend towards authoritarianism, by vesting more powers in the executive.

On the other hand, with the return to

peace-time and normal domestic conditions - instances of a lessening of the struggle for existence - the trend towards greater individualism and more democracy is re­ sumed.

It Is in reference to such situations that Bage-

h ot’s hypothesis is relevant.

It can be separated from

the evolutionary principle that, In the course of social ©volution, authoritarianism gives way to democracy and collectivism to individualism, as the intensity of the struggle for existence gradually diminishes. Grumplowicz* s principal hypothesis Is found in the following statement:

All political institutions and

events are determined by group conflicts.

One of its

most important implications is that domestic politics and International relations would have to be interpreted in terms of one continuum.

The latter would be distin­

guished from the former merely by the characteristic of representing group conflicts at a different level. Ward’s hypothesis that political Institutions are determined by a counter-evolutionary process which tends to abate the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, represents a marked deviation from the theories which have been advanced by the other Social

402

Evolutionists.

However, even on the basis of evidence

which Ward himself supplies, a compromise may be reached by the following modification of his hypothesis:

polit­

ical phenomena are determined by an interaction between natural evolution - in the Darwinian sense - and a counter-evolutionary process. The Significance of the Contribution of Western Political Thought to a Science of Politics It cannot be

asserted that Western Political

Thought has developed a complete system of a science of politics.

The method of inquiry which may be synthesized

from numerous attempts by the representatives of Western Political Thought, requires considerable further specif­ ication with regard to techniques of verification.

The

hypotheses which have been advanced In the course of the history of traditional political theory, are only a minute fraction of the ones which ultimately will have to be dealt with.

However, in the absence of any other

definite suggestion in the direction of a science of politics, the contribution of Western Political Thought represents - at least - a concrete beginning.

BIBLIOGRAPHY SOURCES CONSULTED IN DEVELOPING THE CRITERIA OF A SCIENCE OF POLITICS Catlin, George Edward Gordon* Politics*

New York;:

The Science and Method of

A. A. Knopf.

1927.

360 pp.

An attempt to define the area of concern for polit­ ical science in terms of its relationship to other social sciences. The position is taken that all social sciences deal with the same class of phenomena, but that each one is concerned with a different focal point in establishing relationships between these phenomena. The emphasis in this work Is placed on the belief that the scientific method is applicable to the study of political phenomena* Cohen, Morris R. and Nagel, Ernest. Logic and Scientific Method. Brace and Company.

1934.

An Introduction to New York:

Hartcourt,

467 pp.

A concise and, at the same time, comprehensive pre­ sentation of the essential and characteristic features of formal logic and of the scientific method, as applied in mathematics, natural sciences, and social studies. Dewey, John.

Intelligence in the Modern World:

Dewey*s Philosophy.

Edited and with an Introduc­

tion by Joseph Ratner. 1939.

John

New York:

Random House.

1077 pp.

A collection of selected excerpts from the writings of the contemporary American philosopher and educator, John Dewey. An extensive introduction by the editor sum­ marizes and evaluates the author's philosophy. The sel­ ections are not presented in a chronological order, but are grouped according to the salient points In Dewey's phil­ osophy.

404

James, William* and Co#

Pragmatism#

1946*

New York:

Longman, Green

426 pp«

A series of lectures which, were delivered by Wil­ liam James in 1906, and which are regarded as the clas­ sical statement of the philosophy of Pragmatism. Lewis, Clarence Irving. Valuation#

An Analysis of Knowledge and

La Salle, Illinois:

Publishing Company.

1946.

The Open Court

567 pp.

A presentation of a theory of knowledge which is based mainly on empiricism, but which also endeavors to reach a compromise with rationalistic elements. The author* s approach may be characterized as that of a Kantian Pragmatist* Lundberg, George A. York:

Foundations of Sociology#

The Macmillan Company.

1939.

New

556 pp.

As an attempt to develop a science of sociology, this study also deals extensively with problems per­ taining to the application of the scientific method to social phenomena in general. The emphasis rests heavily on quantitative Interpretation. Mach, Ernst.

The Science of Mechanics *

the German by Thomas J. McCormack. Open Court Publishing Co.

1907.

Translated from Chicago:

The

605 pp.

This work primarily Is devoted to tracing the de­ velopment of the science of mechanics. However, the cri­ teria of scientific inquiry which are laid down by the author, are such that they do not confine the applicability of the scientific method to the study of natural phen­ omena. It Is noteworthy that a physicist is following this approach. Pearson, Karl. C. Block.

The Grammar of Science. 1900#

548 pp.

London:

A. and

405

A summary and critical survey of the concepts of science which were entertained at the end of the nine­ teenth^ century. The influence of the theory of evolu­ tion (in the Darwinian sense) is a dominant factor In this interpretation* Poincar^, Henri.

The Foundations of Science.

Transla-

ited from the French by George Bruce Halsted. New York and Garrison, N. Y: 1921*

The Science Press.

553 pp.

The general subject of this work is the same as the one of Pearson*s study* Primary attention is given to the physical sciences, with an emphasis on quantitative interpretation* Russell, Bertrand. its*

New York:

Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Lim­ Simon and Schuster.

1948.

524 pp.

This recent book by Russell is largely a restatement of his philosophy which has been expressed in earlier works. Insofar as a modified theory of knowledge is pre­ sented in this work, no exclusive reliance on empiricism is maintained, but a compromise with certain rationalistic points of view is attempted. ------ •

Qup Knowledge of the External World*

Open Court Publishing Co.

1914.

Chicago; The

245 pp.

A series of lectures, delivered in Boston in 1914, which were concerned with the question of the application of the scientific method to problems of philosophy. Of particular Interest to the preceding study, is the last lecture of the series, On the Notion of Cause, with Ap­ plications to the Free-Will Problem. PRIMARY SOURCES SELECTED FROM THE HISTORY OF WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT Since the preceding study consists largely of an interpretation of the works listed under this heading, elaborate comments on every one are found in the text

406

of the study. At this point, explanatory remarks will follow the citation of the respective source only in a few cases. Aristotle.

The Politics of Aristotle.

edited by Ernest Barker. Press.

1946.

Translated and

Oxford:

At the Clarendon

411 pp.

This recent translation of The Politics attempts to cast Aristotle1s ideas in contemporary terns. In this manner, it reveals many significant points in Aristotle*s political theory which are ccncealed in the generally accepted older translation by Benjamin Jowett. On the other hand, by placing the emphasis on a modern inter­ pretation, Ideas which were not entertained by Aristotle are inferred in this translation. For Instance, the concept of sovereignty, which appears in Barker*s trans­ lation, cannot be ascribed to Aristotle. Bagehot, Walter.

Physics and Politics:

Thoughts on the

Application of the Principles of 11Natural Selection'* and "Inheritance" to Political Society. D. Appleton and Company. Bent ham, Jeremy.

1873.

New York:

224 pp.

A Fragme nt of Government and An Intro­

duction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford:

Basis Blackwell.

Bodin, Jean.

435 pp.

The Six Books of a Commonweale.

by Richard Knolles. 1606.

1948.

London:

Translated

Impensis G. Bishop.

794 pp.

Buckle, Henry Thomas. New Yorks Comte, Auguste.

History of Civilization in England.

D. Appleton and Company. Positive Philosophy.

1855.

838 pp.

2 volumes.

Freely translated

and condensed by Harriet Martineau. Calvin Blanchard.

1878.

New York:

407

Davis, Harold T. inois:

Political Statistics.

Copyright by Author*

De G-razia, Sebastian.

1948*

320 pp.

The Political Community.

The University of Chicago Press. Gumplowicz, Ludwig.

Evanston, Ill­

1948.

Chicago:

258 pp.

The Outlines of Sociology.

lated by Frederick W. Moore.

Trans­

Philadelphia;

Ameri­

can Academy of Political and Social Science.

1899.

209 pp. — .... •

Ausgewaehlte Werke.

Innsbruck, Austria:

versItaets-Verlag Wagner.

1928.

Uni-

4 volumes.

Vol­

ume III contains Per Rassenkampf. Harrington, James. berg:

Jame s Harrington1s Oceana.

Universitaetsbuchhandlung.

Hobbes, Thomas. of 1651.

Leviathan. Oxford;

1924.

Heidel­ 372 pp.

Reprinted from the edition

At the Clarendon Press.

1929.

557 pp. Huntington, Ellsworth. Haven: .

— .

Yale University Press.

The Human Habitat.

Company. —

Civilization and Climate.

1927*

New York:

333 pp.

D. Von Norstrand

293 pp.

Mainsprings of Civilization.

Wiley and Sons, Inc. ......

1915.

New

1945.

The Pulse of Asia.

ton Mifflin Company.

New York:

600 pp.

Boston and New York:

1907.

John

415 pp.

Hough­

408

Lucretius, Carus Titus.

On the Nature of Things.

lated by Cyril Bailey. Press.

1926.

At the Clarendon

312 pp.

Machiavelli, Nicolo.

The Discourses.

Christian E. Detmold. The Prince.

Oxford:

Trans­

New York:

Translated by

Published together with The M o d e m Library.

1940*

540 pp. ♦

The Prince,

translated by Luigi Ricci and

E. R. P. Vincent. Discourses.

Published together with The

New York:

The Modern Library.

1940.

540 pp. Macaulay, Thomas Babington. Essays.

New York:

5 volumes*

Crit icaj and Misee11aneous

D. Appleton and Company.

1861.

The fifth volume contains the essay

Mill on Government. Marx, Karl.

Capital.

Volume I:

Moore and Edward Aveling. schein, Lowrey and Co.

Translated by Samuel London:

1887.

Volumes II and III:

Translated by Ernest Untermann. H. Kerr and Co. , —

1909.

omy.

Charles

Manifesto of the Communist

Authorized English Translation.

International Publishers. a

Chicago:

3 volumes.

and Engels, Friedrich. Party.

Swan Sonnen-

1948.

New York:

48 pp.

Contribution to the Crit Ique of Political Econ Translated by N. I. Stone.

Chicago:

Charles

409

H. Kerr and Co. Mill, James.

1918.

An Essay on Government.

the University Press. Mill, John Stuart.

.

Utilitarianism.

Press. Montesquieu* Nugent.

1948.

Cambridge:

37 pp. London:

1875*

New York:

The Liberal Art

2 volumes.

Translated by Thomas

The World*s Great Classics.

Gillerman.

Long­

and Dyer*

The Spirit of Laws.

Oppenheimer, Franz.

At

69 pp.

The Colonial Press.

1914.

1937.

A System of Logic.

mans, Green, Reader, — —

314 pp.

1899,

The State.

Indianapolis:

New York:

Volumes 37 and 38. Translated by John M. The Bobbs-Merill Co.

302 pp.

Pareto, Vilfredo. Switzerland:

C our s.D* Economie Politique. F. Rouge.

Lausanne,

Libraire-Editeur.

1897.

2 volumes* — —



The Mind and Society.

Translated by Andrew

Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston.

New York:

court, Brace and Company.

4 volumes.

Spencer, Herbert. Speculative.

1935.

Har-

Essays:

Scientific, Political and

London:

Williams and Norgate.

1901.

3 volumes. Volume I contains the essay The Social Organism, Volume III the essay Representative Government - What is It Good for?

410

Spencer, Herbert*

First Principles*

Appleton and

New York:

D*

Company. 1864. 550 pp.

tv,

This Is the first volume of Spencer* s Synthetic Philosophy. ------•

The Man versus the State together v/ith Social

Statics.

Abridged and Revised.

Appleton and — ---- •

New York:

D.

Company. 1893. 431 pp.

The Principles of Sociology.

Appleton and

New York:

D.

Company. 19001 2 volumes.

This work constitutes the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth volumes of Spencer1s Synthetic Philosophy. -•

The Study of Sociology.

and Company.

1900.

Spinoza, Benedictus. Spinoza.

New York:

D. Appleton

411 pp.

The Chief Works of Benedict de

Translated by R. H. M. Elwes.

George Bell and Sons.

London:

1891* 2 volumes.

The first volume contains A Political Treatise. Ward, Lester F. Company. ------- -

Applied Sociology. 1906.

------*

1897.

New York:

D. Appleton

2 volumes.

The Psychic Factors of Civilization.

1892. s

Ginn and

384 pp.

Dynamic Sociology.

and Company.

Boston:

Boston:

369 pp. Pure Sociology.

millan Company.

1903.

New York, London; 607 pp.

The Mac­

411

SECONDARY SOURCES CONSULTED FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIMARY SOURCES Berlin, Isaiah.

Karl Marx.

worth Ltd.

1939.

An^Interpretation theory in terms of his as well as in terms of influences to which he Borkenau, Franz. Inc.

Thornton Butter-

256 pp. of Marx* s economic and political personal background and experiences, the environmental and intellectual was subjected.

Pareto.

1936.

London:

New Yorkr

J. Wiley and Sons,

219 pp.

An account of Pareto*s general sociology, with par­ ticular emphasis on his theory of Elites and circulation of felites, and Its relationship to fascism and communism* Brown, John L.

The Methodus ad Facilem Historiarum Cog-

nitionem of Jean Bodin. Washington, D. C: Press.

1930.

Doctoral Dissertation.

The Catholic University of America

212 pp.

The object of this study is to show that the prin­ cipal points of Jean Bodin*s political theory, which generally are identified with his major work, Les Six Livres de la R^publique, already can be found in his Methodus. On that basis, the opinion is expressed that greater emphasis should be placed on the latter work. Eastman, Max.

Marxism, is it Science?

Norton and Company, Inc.

1940.

New York:

W. W.

394 pp.

An examination of the theories of Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky, directed at the determination of their scientific validity. The conclusion Is reached by the author that Marxism is not scientific. The author's criteria of the scientific method are not Identical with the ones which were developed in the preceding study. Consequently, his analysis differs from the presentation in Chapter V of this study*

412

Lichtenberger, James P. New York:

Development of Social Theory.

D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc.

1938.

468 pp. A presentation of sociological theories from Plato to the late nineteenth century, as a product ofacontinuous, evolutionary process. McGovern, Vtfilliam M. New York, etc:

From Luther to Hitler. Houghton Mifflin Company.

Boston, 1941.

683 pp. A study of the development of the etatist-authoritarian tradition of Western Political Thought, from the Reformation td> the present. For the purpose of the pre­ ceding investigation, the chapter oh Social Darwinism is of particular interest. Popper, K. R.

The Open Society and its Enemies.

George Rutledge and Sons, Ltd.

1945.

London:

2 volumes.

The "Open Society" is Identified by the author as the concept of the individualistic-democratic state of Socrates. In the political theories of Plato and Aris­ totle, the author sees a "betrayal" of the "Open So­ ciety" of Socrates, a "betrayal" that was carried on by later thinkers, like Hegel and Marx. Sabine, George H. York:

A History of Political Theory.

Henry Holt and Company.

1937.

New

797 pp.

Of particular interest to the preceding study in this history of political thought, is the section which is devoted to the discussion of Marx. Strauss, Leo.

The Political Philosophy of Hobbes.

Translated from the German manuscript by El^tsa Sinclair* 172 pp.

Oxford:

The Clarendon Press.

1936.

413

^i^-torpret at Ion of Hobbes* political theory as he manifestation of an independent positivism, wnich should^be identified neither with a modification of traditional political philosophy, nor with a leaning towards natural science. Vaughan, Charles Edwyn.

Studies in the History of Pol­

itical Philosophy Before and After Rousseau, chester.

The University Press,

1925.

Man­

2 volumes.

The farst„ volume of this work corl ains a detailed account of the political theory of Spinoza, a philosopher who often is disregarded as a political thinker. It Is in that respect that this work is of interest to the foregoing investigation. ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS Mills, Clarence A.

"Climate:

Key to G-reatness?"

Con­

densed from Science magazine in Science Digest. Vol. 27, No. 1.

January, 1950.

pp. 23-27.

This article suggests a possible Interpretation of individual accomplishments, of social relations, and of political events in terms of climatic cycles. Its prin­ cipal interest to the preceding study lies inthe rela­ tionship of its content to the ideas of Bodin and Mont­ esquieu.

VITA Name:

Fred Kort

Date and Place of Birth:

November 12, 1919; Vienna, Austria.

Educational Career: Real-Gymnasiujji,Vienna.

Abitur degree, 1937.

University of Vienna, School of Law. Study interrupted 1938, because of annexation of Austria by Germany. Northwestern University, The University College. degree, 1947. Undergraduate Courses in Political Science

Semester Hours

UA1 American Government UB24 Federal Regulation of Business UB10 State and Local Government UC30a Constitutional Law . UC30b Constitutional Law UC41 American Foreign Policy UB1 European Government UC23 Public Personnel Administration UC91 Russian Political and Economic Institutions Northwestern University, Graduate School. 1947. M.A* degree, June, 1950. Language requirement met:

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

Ph.B.

Grade AB B AB~ AAA A

Entered September

German, 12-10-48. French, 12-12-49.

Qualifying examination passed:

1^26-50.

Graduate courses: Political Science C43 C80 C61 C19 C63 C51 C40 D99

Quarter Hours

Nationalism Classical Political Theory Modern Political Theory Government of Dependencies Contemporary Political Theory Government of Eastern Asia International Law Independent Study In Polit.Theo. 5

4 4 4 4 4 4 4

Grade A A A A A A A A

Quarter Hrs»

C42 United Nations C50 Asia In World Politics D1 Systematic Political Science D99 Independent Study in Public Law D60 Political Theory E99 Thesis Research

3 4 4 4 4

Grade > > > > >

Political Science

30

Economics Intermediate Economic Theory Labor Legislation Planned Economies Advanced Economic Theory

4 4

Dd Cd > >

Cll C4 C42 D1

4

b

4 4

Sociology G6

Principles of Sociology

Anthropology Cl

Theories of Culture

4

B

Philosophy CIO C28

Philosophy of Science Theory of Knowledge

3 Audit

A

4

A

Mathematics E2

Independent Study In Pol*Stat*

Total Quarter Hours 113