The Case for Human Factors in Industry and Government : Report of a Workshop [1 ed.] 9780309591188, 9780309058940

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The Case for Human Factors in Industry and Government Report of a Workshop

William Rouse, Nancy Kober, and Anne Mavor, editors

Committee on Human Factors Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education National Research Council

NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS Washington, D.C. 1997

Copyright © 1997. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

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NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the panel responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The work of the Committee on Human Factors is supported by the Department of Army Contract No. DAAD05-92-C-0087 issued by the U.S. Aberdeen Proving Ground Support Activity. The views and opinions and findings contained in this report are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Department of Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation. International Standard Book Number 0-309-05894-5 Additional copies of this report are available from: National Academy Press 2101 Constitution Avenue Box 285 Washington, D.C. 20418 800-624-6242 or 202-334-3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area). http://www.nap.edu Copyright 1997 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America

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COMMITTEE ON HUMAN FACTORS WILLIAM B. ROUSE (Chair), Enterprise Support Systems, Norcross, Georgia TERRY CONNOLLY, Department of Management and Policy, College of Business and Public Administration, University of Arizona, Tucson COLIN G. DRURY, Industrial Engineering Department, University of Buffalo, New York WILLIAM C. HOWELL, American Psychological Association Science Directorate, Washington, DC DANIEL R. ILGEN, Department of Psychology and Department of Management, Michigan State University BONNIE E. JOHN, Human-Computer Interaction Institute, Carnegie Mellon University TOM B. LEAMON, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., and Liberty Mutual Research Center for Safety and Health, Hopkinton, MA DAVID C. NAGEL, AT&T Laboratories, Basking Ridge, NJ KARLENE ROBERTS, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley BENJAMIN SCHNEIDER, Department of Psychology, University of Maryland LAWRENCE W. STARK, School of Optometry, University of California, Berkeley EARL L. WIENER, Department of Management Science, University of Miami GREG L. ZACHARIAS, Charles River Analytics, Cambridge, MA ANNE MAVOR, Director JERRY KIDD, Senior Adviser SUSAN McCUTCHEN, Senior Project Assistant

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The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress of 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. William A. Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. William A. Wulf are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.

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WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS SPEAKERS KENNETH R. BOFF,† Human Engineering Division, Air Force Armstrong Laboratory, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH JOHN LAUBER, Safety and Compliance, Delta Air Lines, Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport, GA TOM B. LEAMON,* Liberty Mutual Research Center, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Hopkinton, MA DAVID C. NAGEL,* AT&T Labs, Basking Ridge, NJ J. BRIAN PEACOCK, Manufacturing Ergonomics Laboratory, General Motors Corporation, Warren, MI STUART S. WINBY, Change Management, Hewlett-Packard Company, Palo Alto, CA (by speakerphone) PARTICIPANTS MICHAEL ADESS, Human Factors Division, Coast Guard, Washington, DC TERRY ALLARD, Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy, Arlington, VA CHARLES E. BILLINGS, Consultant, Columbus, OH WILLIAM BLACKWOOD, Hay Management Consultants, Arlington, VA BRUCE A. BOGER, Division of Reactor Controls and Human Factors, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC M. SUE BOGNER, Office of Surveillance and Biometrics, Food and Drug Administration, Rockville, MD HAROLD R. BOOHER, H.R. Booher Consulting, Bethesda, MD BOB BOST, Headquarters, Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA JANIS CANNON-BOWERS, Training Systems Division, Naval Air Warfare Center, Orlando, FL PETER CARSTENSEN, OHIP/DDUPSA, Food and Drug Administration, Rockville, MD SUSAN CHIPMAN, Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy, Arlington, VA LAWRENCE COLE, AAR, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC BERNARD CORONA,† Human Research and Engineering Directorate, Army Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD RICHARD J. ECKENRODE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC ELEANA EDENS, AAR, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC CATHY EDWARDS, Coast Guard, Washington, DC JUNE ELLISON, Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC LAWRENCE FINE, DSHEFS, National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, Cincinnati, OH DEXTER FLETCHER, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA NAHUM GERSHON, The MITRE Cor poration, McLean, VA

† Sponsor representative * Member, Committee on Human Factors

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STEPHEN GOLDBERG, STRICOM, Army Research Institute, Orlando, FL PAUL S. GOODMAN,* Center for Management of Technology, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA JAMES GRENELL, Human Factors, Boeing Helicopters, Philadelphia, PA GENEVIEVE HADDAD, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Washington, DC DOUGLAS H. HARRIS, Anacapa Sciences, Inc., Charlottesville, VA WILLIAM C. HOWELL,* Science Directorate, American Psychological Association, Washington, DC M. STEPHEN HUNTLEY, JR., Operations Vehicle Systems Division, Department of Transportation, Volpe Center, Cambridge, MA ROBERTA L. KLATZKY,* Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA NANCY KOBER, Consultant, Charlottesville, VA JOHN LOCKETT,† Human Research and Engineering Directorate, Army Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD JEAN MacMILLAN, BBN Corporation, Cambridge, MA GERALD S. MALECKI, Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA ANN MAJCHRZAK,* Human Factors Department, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA GEORGE MASTROIANNI,† SSCNC-YBH, Army Natick RD&E Center, Natick, MA ANNE S. MAVOR,‡ Committee on Human Factors DENNIS K. McBRIDE, Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA SUSAN R. McCUTCHEN,‡ Committee on Human Factors JAMES P. McGEE,‡ Committee on Human Factors MICHAEL MENDELSON, OHIP/DDUPSA, Food and Drug Administration, Rockville, MD JEFF MORRISON, RDT&E Division, Naval Command Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, San Diego, CA CYNTHIA H. NULL,† Aviation Operations Systems, NASA-Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA ROBERT K. OSGOOD, Engineering Research, Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, CA PATRICE O'TOOLE, Federation of Behavioral, Psychological and Cognitive Sciences, Washington, DC J.J. PERSENSKY, Division of System Technology, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC ALAN POPE, NASA-Langley Research Center, Langley, VA JAY A. RACHLIN, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Food and Drug Administration, Rockville, MD WILLIAM ROUSE,* Enterprise Support Systems, Norcross, GA EDUARDO SALAS, Training Systems Division, Naval Air Warfare Center, Orlando, FL CHARLES R. SAWYER, Human Factors, Food and Drug Administration, Washington, DC STEVEN L. SAUTER, Applied Psychology and Ergonomics, NIOSH/ Robert A. Taft Laboratories, Cincinnati, OH PAUL SCHUTTE, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Hampton, VA

‡ Staff, National Research Council

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WALTER L. SCOTT, OHIP/DDUPSA, Food and Drug Administration, Washington, DC HERB SCHLICKENMAIER, White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, Washington, DC BENJAMIN SCHNEIDER,* Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD RICHARD R. SCOTT, General Accounting Office, Washington, DC ALFRED L. SMITH, Jr., ATR, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC LAWRENCE STARK,* School of Optometry, University of California, Berkeley, CA JOHN TANGNEY, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Washington, DC BARBARA BOYLE TORREY,‡ Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council WILLARD VAUGHAN, JR., Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy, Arlington, VA HAROLD VAN COTT, Human Factors Consultant, Bethesda, MD ROBERT M. WATERS, Human Factors, Department of Energy, Washington, DC JACKIE WERTH, General Accounting Office, Washington, DC EARL WIENER,* Department of Management Science, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL WILLIAM A. WULF, President, National Academy of Engineering GREG L. ZACHARIAS,* Charles River Analytics, Cambridge, MA

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CONTENTS

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Contents

Preface

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Introduction

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Six Perspectives Changing the Culture of Safety: The Aviation Industry, Achieving Competitive Breakthroughs: The Computer and Communications Industry, Persuading the Right People with the Right Message: The Automobile Industry, Increasing Productivity by Focusing on People: The Electronics Industry, Providing Quality Work Day by Day: The Insurance Industry, Seizing Unique Opportunities: The Defense Laboratories,

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Lessons from the Workshop Resource Commitments, Resource Mobilization, Strategies for Advancing Human Factors, Packaging the Outputs of Human Factors, Continuing Issues,

19 20 23 24 27 29

Conclusion

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Appendix: Workshop Agenda

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Committee Reports

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CONTENTS x

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PREFACE

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Preface

The Committee on Human Factors was established in October 1980 by the Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education of the National Research Council. The principal objectives of the committee are to provide new perspectives on theoretical and methodological issues, to identify basic research needed to expand and strengthen the scientific basis of human factors, and to encourage the use of human factors principles and practices in the development of products and systems. Since its inception, the committee has issued more than a dozen reports regarding human factors applications, the state of knowledge, and research needs on topics deemed important by the committee and its sponsors. The field of human factors provides a systematic approach to accommodating the capabilities and limitations of people in equipment design and training. Researchers in the field conduct studies that describe people's sensorimotor, cognitive, psychophysical, and anthropometric characteristics. The data from these studies are used by practitioners in conjunction with the results of targeted user studies to design work environments, to make equipment compatible with the intended user, and to develop effective training. Human factors issues arise in every domain in which people interact with the products of a technological society. To perform its role effectively, the committee draws on experts from a wide range of scientific and engineering disciplines. Members of the committee include specialists in psychology, engineering, biomechanics, physiology, medicine, cognitive sciences, machine intelligence, computer sci

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PREFACE

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ences, sociology, education, and human factors engineering. Other disciplines are represented in the working groups, workshops, and symposia organized by the committee. Each of these disciplines contributes to the basic data, theory, and methods required to improve the scientific basis of human factors. The workshop on the case for human factors emerged from an ongoing discussion with the committee's sponsors. In this era of reinventing government and ever-tightening budgets, a key issue identified in those discussions is a need to articulate the value added to a variety of program development and other activities by human factors. It was clear that convening a workshop with participants drawn solely from government would limit the perspectives needed. To this end, the committee invited executives from the airline, computer and communications, automobile, electronics, and insurance industries to complement participation of government executives and human factors managers. Prior to the workshop, we posed questions to the speakers to enable them to become acquainted with each other's points of view. Presentations by these speakers constituted the first half of the one-day workshop. The second half-day was devoted to several discussion groups, each led by a senior government executive. The discussion groups focused on the six different points of view presented by the speakers, with emphasis on how those perspectives might apply in participants' organizations. This report summarizes both the speakers' perspectives and the lessons identified by participants as important to demonstrating the value of human factors. The committee is indebted to the presenters and those who participated in the discussions. We also extend our thanks to National Research Council staff member Susan McCutchen, who worked with the committee and sponsors on organizing the workshop and preparing this document for publication. WILLIAM B. ROUSE, CHAIR ANNE S. MAVOR, STUDY DIRECTOR COMMITTEE ON HUMAN FACTORS

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THE CASE FOR HUMAN FACTORS IN INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT

The Case for Human Factors in Industry and Government

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THE CASE FOR HUMAN FACTORS IN INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT xiv

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INTRODUCTION

1

Introduction

In this era of performance-based budgeting and accountability, industry and government are demanding demonstrable results from all segments of their enterprises. As just one example, the Government Performance and Results Act requires all federal agencies, beginning in 1998, to evaluate the outcomes of their programs and activities in measurable ways. Researchers and scientists are not exempt from this trend: in all disciplines, they must be able to show how their efforts lead to better products, services, or quality of life. Human factors scientists and engineers face particular challenges in articulating the value of their discipline. Human factors (also called ergonomics) seeks to help people use devices with greater safety, comfort, accuracy, and ease—be it a computer keyboard, cockpit panel, or home oxygen concentrator. How do we articulate the value we add? Certainly in this time of downsizing, right-sizing, and just plain old budget cutting, that is a predominant issue with a lot of organizations. William B. Rouse

Ample evidence exists—from aviation accident reports to job task analyses—documenting the importance of investing in human factors and the sometimes tragic results of failing to consider its contributions. But this evidence is not always presented effectively or targeted at the right people. Many human factors professionals would like to do a better job of educating people about their work and its importance. Recognizing this desire among the profession, the Committee on Human Factors of the National Research Council (NRC) sponsored a

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INTRODUCTION

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workshop to describe the contributions of human factors in a variety of contexts. This report summarizes the presentations and discussions from that workshop and synthesizes some of the key themes and lessons learned (see the workshop agenda in the appendix). The workshop brought together 87 people involved in human factors research and development, including scientists and engineers, corporate executives and senior managers, researchers and leaders from government agencies and the military, and members and staff of the Committee on Human Factors. The workshop had three objectives: • to provide concrete, successful examples of effectively demonstrating the benefits of human factors to industry and government; • to identify cross-cutting concepts, principles, methods, and tools that can demonstrate the value of human factors; and • to identify issues that need to be addressed in making decisions about investments in human factors. The workshop opened with a welcome from William Wulf, president of the National Academy of Engineering, and an introduction by William Rouse, chair of the Committee on Human Factors. During the morning sessions, executives from the private sector and the military shared their experiences of effectively integrating human factors in various settings. The speakers addressed the following questions: • Which strategies are most effective for articulating the value of human factors in their industry? • To whom should the case be made? Who needs to be convinced? • What are the most important lessons they have learned? In an afternoon session, participants broke into four working groups to draw out cross-cutting themes from the morning's presentations and discussions. The working groups addressed three specific questions: • Which points made by the speakers are most relevant to your own organization? • Which are not relevant to or would not work in your organization?

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INTRODUCTION 3

• What other observations can you add about strategies for effectively integrating human factors into the products and processes of the organization?

An afternoon panel discussion compiled lessons learned from the working groups. A final plenary session identified issues that ought to be addressed in the future to inform decisions about human factors. These lessons and issues are summarized in the second half of this report.

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INTRODUCTION 4

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SIX PERSPECTIVES

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Six Perspectives

Different industries and government agencies approach human factors from different perspectives. In fields like medicine and aviation, where mistakes can have major consequences, safety is a primary reason for incorporating human factors. In highly competitive industries like communications and computer technology, corporate leaders prize innovations that will yield an edge in the marketplace. Large manufacturers, such as automotive companies, want to know how to save steps and reduce production costs. The military wants to know how to effectively train large numbers of people to operate complex equipment. Scientists, engineers, and others who are working on effectively integrating human factors in their organizations must understand and respond to different interests. One way to better understand diverse industry needs is to study real examples from enterprises in which human factors experts have successfully integrated their work. To highlight what works and what doesn't in various industries, the Committee on Human Factors asked executives from six fields—aviation, computer and communications technology, the automobile industry, electronics, insurance, and military research and development—to discuss their experiences in effectively articulating the value of human factors. Although some challenges are similar across industries (such as managers who prefer not to bother with human factors until a serious accident occurs), the speakers had unique perspectives that illustrated the diverse situations that human factors experts face. The following sections summarize the speakers' presentations. .

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SIX PERSPECTIVES

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CHANGING THE CULTURE OF SAFETY: THE AVIATION INDUSTRY John Lauber Vice President for Safety and Compliance, Delta Air Lines John Lauber approached human factor first as a researcher for the Navy and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, then as a member of the National Transportation Safety Board, and now as an airline executive. From these diverse vantage points he has learned how to change the culture of the aviation industry. Since a large proportion of airline accidents involve human performance issues, safety is a primary driving force for human factors in aviation. But this does not mean that human factors advocates have automatic entry to the industry: they still must be able to demonstrate how investing in human factors research and development is a rational strategy for solving safety problems. This often requires changing certain aspects of the industry culture. We had to convince the airline community—the operational community—that a group of NASA scientists and psychologists could tell a crusty old master of ocean crossings from Pan Am that we could actually make a contribution to the safe operation of aircraft. That was no mean task. John Lauber

For example, human factors professionals at the National Transportation Safety Board realized several years ago that to integrate human factors into their work, they would require changing some conventional ideas about accidents and human performance. In the past, the board's investigations focused on determining who or what was to blame for an accident or error. Under this culture of blame, regulators tried to prevent human error by setting rules that prohibited people from making bad decisions or required them to do the obvious. These rules did little to stem accidents, however, because they ignored the reasons that people make errors. A more constructive approach focuses on recognizing and systematically addressing common problems that contribute to human error. Under this approach, which the board uses today, a main purpose of investigations is to identify systemic human performance problems that can be prevented by applying knowledge from human factors. To change the culture in this way, human factors professionals first targeted the board management, who had become cynical after years of

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SIX PERSPECTIVES

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seeing repeated patterns of error. Eventually human factors advocates aimed their appeals at a wider audience, including the board's technical staff, members of Congress and their senior aides, senior executives in the Department of Transportation, and the White House and Cabinet. The experience of Delta Air Lines illustrates how a major air carrier can change its culture of safety. At Delta, human factors professionals faced the challenge of incorporating human factors principles into the day-today operations of a carrier with some 65,000 employees, 545 airplanes, and over 2,600 daily flights—and to do so with an eye toward both economics and safety. Some key people with the major airlines believe that if a pilot or another employee makes an error, the solution is to discipline the employee. Although this may be entirely appropriate when people deliberately violate standard procedures, most errors do not fall into that category. Most are honest human errors. Airlines cannot assume error-free human performance. Instead, they must devise procedures, training programs, system redundancies, and other engineering principles that will minimize the probability of human error and, most importantly, ensure that the errors that do occur are detected, contained, and corrected before they cause an incident or accident. Toward this end, human factors specialists and other key people at Delta are changing the company's culture to embed considerations of human performance and risk management into every job, from ramp worker to flight attendant to mechanic. Delta's human factors group spends long hours at the maintenance hangar, for example, studying people as they change shifts or try to work as a team. The group is also studying the airline's operations control center, the ''nerve center,'' to improve decision making during major storms and other unusual situations. Because the Delta corporate leadership is strongly committed to this new culture of safety, many of the company's human factors activities no longer have to be justified on purely economic grounds—which shows what can happen when one makes a successful case to corporate executives. Nonetheless, commitments to human factors will not be sustained for long without producing concrete results. In the past, some human factors programs in the airlines were too concerned with psychological dimensions—the "hold hands and we'll fly safe" approach. These programs fell by the wayside because they did not really change how people performed in their everyday jobs.

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Today, the Delta human factors team focuses on solving real problems and improving real performance. Consequently, the team can point to several improvements in productivity and other economic returns. Crew resource management is one area where investments in human factors have paid off, both inside and outside the airline industry. Accident analyses found that highly trained and skilled individuals sometimes failed to function effectively as a cockpit team. Through mission simulations and other research, human factors specialists have developed strategies to help people work well as a crew and efficiently manage all the resources at their disposal. The resulting principles about teamwork are now being applied in a range of settings, from the military to hospital operating rooms. To truly change the culture of safety in aviation, human factors experts must consider more than the major carriers, to appeal to other sectors of the industry, including those who design, manufacture, operate, and monitor the safety of aircraft. Each of these sectors has its own needs and perspectives, and arguments for considering human factors should be tailored to those needs and perspectives. ACHIEVING COMPETITIVE BREAKTHROUGHS: THE COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY David C. Nagel President, AT&T Labs, Basking Ridge, NJ David Nagel has overseen human factors research and development at AT&T, Apple Computer, and the Ames Laboratory of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The key to incorporating human factors, he says, is to show how it can help an organization accomplish its main mission—which in the aggressive computer industry means gaining a marketplace edge. Rationales for incorporating human factors are most effective when they are relevant to the primary mission of the target organization. An argument that emphasizes improved public safety may succeed with a government regulatory agency or a commercial airline, but it will probably fall flat in the computer industry, where accidents that threaten life and limb are rare. A better approach with computer and communications

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companies—which, after all, are in business to turn a profit—is to emphasize how incorporating human factors can lead to competitive advantages in the marketplace. This strategy involves three stages. First, human factors specialists must convince corporate boards and chief executives that attention to human factors can lead to the highly prized goal of "discontinuous change"—in other words, a change that yields a significant competitive advantage, not a minor one. Second, they must persuade these same leaders that an allocation of resources is necessary to make this change happen. Third, because budget decisions are usually relative, they must show that investments in human factors research and development will yield greater returns than investments in chip design, process engineering, or other areas. Human factors specialists should be ready to answer such questions as what they would actually do with more money, what steps they would follow to bring about the desired change, and how they would manage further development after achieving a breakthrough. The best case you can make in a commercial setting is one for discontinuous change. If you give me money, I'll give you a big competitive advantage. If you make that case successfully, you also will be able to make the case for the more evolutionary kinds of slower improvements. David Nagel

The case of the Apple Macintosh demonstrates how human factors breakthroughs can have commercial impact. The Mac combined multiple technological innovations—such as the pointing device, the BITMAP display, and interactive graphics—into a commercially viable system. Many of these innovations helped make computers easier to use, but technology alone could not guarantee commercial success. Equally important were engineering and design breakthroughs, such as windows management software, new modes of visual presentation, and a strong postdesign management process in which Apple representatives worked with third-party developers to ensure that Mac applications were consistent with each other and with the company's design principles. As the Macintosh experience also illustrates, it may take years of precursor research to develop a successful product. Sponsoring this kind of basic research is an important role for government, since commercial organizations find it hard to justify these expenditures. Human factors research has helped spur three major phases of discontinuous change in the computing industry. In the 1960s and 1970s, the dominant computer was the room-sized mainframe. These computers were used primarily by professionals and appealed to a market of roughly 10,000 people. Applications for these systems were completely customized.

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People had to learn to interact with the systems through commands that required long hours of training. In computing, human factors has had a huge impact on the industry. It has enabled a new industry called personal computing and will enable the next new industry called network computing, or whatever term it is given by historians. David Nagel

We are now in the second major phase, the era of the personal computer. These desk-sized systems, which rely on shrink-wrapped software, are used primarily for word processing and relatively simple accounting. They appeal to a market that currently numbers about 200 million and may grow to about half a billion. The dominant interface is "point and click," but the systems are still too hard for many people to use. Today the industry appears to be on the threshold of another discontinuous change, one that holds great opportunities for applying knowledge from human factors. We can soon expect to see pocket-sized processors that will do 1 billion operations per second and will be used primarily to gather and use information. Virtually everyone will be able to use these easy-to-operate systems, just as almost everyone uses a telephone. In each of these phases, human factors research measurably improved the interactions of people with technology and greatly expanded the market of potential users. PERSUADING THE RIGHT PEOPLE WITH THE RIGHT MESSAGE: THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY Brian Peacock Director, Manufacturing Ergonomics Laboratory, General Motors Corporation A former professor of ergonomics who has also worked in manufacturing in the United Kingdom and the United States, Brian Peacock understands the powerful forces that cause large manufacturing companies to hesitate about investing in human factors. But these forces can be overcome with the right messages directed to the right people. Human factors engineering, or ergonomics, can improve automobile manufacturing in many ways. It can help to prevent car accidents, improve product quality and performance, and reduce driver trauma and discomfort. On the manufacturing floor, it can increase worker productivity, improve em

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ployee health, safety, and comfort, and enhance job satisfaction. Powerful outside forces also motivate the automotive industry to pay attention to ergonomics: government standards and regulations; government voluntary compliance programs; pressure from unions; high costs of insurance and workers' compensation; and pressure from the media, the academic community, and suppliers of ergonomics devices. At the same time, equally strong forces discourage car manufacturers from investing in ergonomics: it is expensive to hire ergonomics specialists and to train engineers and operators; it costs more to retool manufacturing components and redesign parts than to carry over existing equipment; and the costs of giving employees more rest time, or "ergonomic relief," run contrary to the corporate trend of "lean manufacturing," or getting the most out of the workforce. If I put a thing on a table instead of on the floor, I can save a few seconds. If we build 5 million cars a year, with 2,000 operations per car, I can save millions of dollars by a simple method improvement. Brian Peacock

The General Motors experience proves that these barriers can be overcome by strategic thinking by human factors specialists. Over the past decade, the company's attitude toward ergonomics has gone from sporadic attention to a reactive approach aimed at fixing known problems to a proactive approach aimed at preventing human factors problems through good product design. And since 1994, when the corporate board declared employee health and safety to be a top priority, the company has sought to incorporate ergonomics into all stages of the manufacturing process. How did this change happen? The human factors specialists at GM understood that to make a successful case in a large corporation, they had to target several audiences, each with a specialized message. Executives and managers, for example, listen to arguments of dollars and cents. Every second shaved off the time of a manufacturing activity—such as saving a worker an unnecessary step—can save a company millions of dollars. Good design can reduce manufacturing costs and decrease the number of employees required on the manufacturing floor. Investments in human factors can achieve large savings by cutting back on warranty problems, reducing employee absenteeism due to injury and illness, and lowering medical fees and workers' compensation costs. Executives are also concerned about corporate image; they do not want their company to look bad because it has an inferior safety program. Executives and managers can also be persuaded by showing how human error

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results in accidents and process failures. They can take corporate leaders onto the manufacturing floor to watch the line employees do their jobs, then ask how they would like to do that job every 30 seconds. Ergonomics must survive, because that is why engineering exists, to build things for use by people. So ergonomics will survive, whether we sell it or not, because it is just the right thing to do. Brian Peacock

Engineers are the group with primary responsibility for applying human factors. General Motors trains its engineers in ergonomics and provides them with good "rules and tools" for embedding human factors into existing processes. Designers similarly receive training and concepts for embedding human factors into product architecture. As a long-term strategy, human factors specialists should encourage universities, business schools, and trade schools to make ergonomics a regular part of the preparation of engineers, business leaders, and technicians. Corporate lawyers can also be a target audience for attention to ergonomics. Human factors experts can demonstrate that investments in human factors will help avoid product liability suits, fines for noncompliance with federal regulations, and other potential legal problems. They can also stress that companies have a responsibility under federal occupational safety and health laws to prevent their employees from getting hurt. Union leaders are another audience. Unions are usually already committed to the importance of human factors, and many are raising ergonomic issues during contract negotiations. INCREASING PRODUCTIVITY BY FOCUSING ON PEOPLE: THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY Stuart S. Winby Director of Change Management, Hewlett-Packard As a human factors engineer with Lockheed and later as the change management director for HewlettPackard, Stuart Winby has learned to appreciate the impact of human resource issues on company success. Helping companies develop better "people" systems is an important and growing role for human factors experts.

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Research suggests that new products sometimes fail not because of problems with technology, but because companies lack effective strategies for organizing and using their human resources. With their specialized knowledge and multidisciplinary perspective, human factors professionals are well positioned to help companies improve their human, social, and organizational structures in ways that increase productivity. Human factors is concerned with much more than people interacting with equipment. Human factors experts also study how people work as individuals and as part of a larger team, how job responsibilities are organized into processes and systems, and how human systems and technological systems are coordinated. Indeed, the discipline of human factors is rapidly moving into a phase in which successes will come less from technological solutions and more from integrated people solutions that improve organizational capacity. The Change Management Group at Hewlett-Packard illustrates how human factors professionals can be leaders in organizational change. In the process, they can build substantial credibility for their discipline within a large, fast-growing, highly competitive company. One point I want to make, again in terms of making the case for human factors, is that the action research process is very effective in building client commitment, motivation, and trust. It is not an expert model, but, rather, a collaborative process involving the researcher, the consultant, and the client. Stuart Winby

The group seeks to develop new business processes that will increase the flexibility of the company's numerous divisions and improve time to market for new products. The company's other divisions are the group's clients, and they pay the group directly for its services; in this sense, the Change Management Group is selfsupporting. Demand for its services exceeds capacity, and more than 70 percent of its clients are repeat customers. The group has used several strategies to promote human factors at Hewlett-Packard. One key strategy is an "action research" process, whereby the group collects data about client objectives, changes selected variables in the client's operations, then evaluates the effects. Every project undergoes an evaluation, which may include peer reviews, customer satisfaction reviews, assessments of performance against objectives, and case studies by outside organizations. Collaboration with the client at all stages is a critical element of the group's success. The human factors group and the client

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jointly develop a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that identifies the goals of the project—such as increasing output or developing new assets—and the measures that will be used to determine whether the goals have been met. The memorandum also includes an economic justification for the project. The memoranda for completed projects show considerable returns on investment—from 15 to 51 percent. Savings are achieved by eliminating waste, developing leaner overhead structures, improving cycle time and market time, and raising quality while lowering costs. One client, for example, saved $17 million by improving worker productivity. Strong support from customers has enhanced the group's credibility, as has its quick and effective response to customer demands. We have a process called a work innovation network, in which customers review the projects in a large forum three times a year. This review is disseminated throughout the company and provides substantial credibility and testimony of value. PROVIDING QUALITY WORK DAY BY DAY: THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY Tom B. Leamon Vice President and Director of Research, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company Before going to Liberty Mutual as head of the research center, Tom Leamon served as a university department head in ergonomics. He attributes the success of his Liberty Mutual human factors team not so much to a few spectacular achievements as to a regular string of accomplishments, day in and day out. The human factors research team at Liberty Mutual Insurance has grown in 6 years from 3 specialists and a budget of under $1 million to about 20 specialists and a budget of about $6 million. This occurred even as the company was laying off staff and cutting back spending in other departments. How has the human factors team— whose objective, in a sense, is to prevent rare events from happening—achieved this remarkable success in an industry founded on the notion that rare events indeed happen only rarely? Rather than trying to sell the flashy side of ergonomics, the team has made its case, first, by

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demonstrating its strategic value to the corporation, and, second, by providing quality work to the company, day by day and year by year. These strategies have enabled the team to overcome the resistance of people who do not know what human factors is and others who see it as a passing fad. Have you ever seen a cost justification for the application of a pharmaceutical? Here is a drug, here are the symptoms, and the benefit is so many dollars? Of course not. Have you ever seen a department of romance languages in a university as a major intellectual operation justify itself on cost benefit? Of course not. Even clean water: We cannot justify the cost we spend in our village on clean water on a cost benefit basis. In other words, human factors experts are no different from how most of the world operates. Tom Leamon

One strategy to make the case for human factors is emphasizing corporate ethics: it might be argued, for instance, that a company should be treating its workers at least as well as do its competitors. A strategic justification might also focus on business relevance: human factors research contributes to the corporate mission. Or it could emphasize business sensitivity: the application is in the mainstream of where the industry is heading. Cost-benefit analyses, while important, can become a trap unless they are made with care. It is difficult to determine the real dollar benefit amounts of applying ergonomics to human practice, especially since much of human factors involves preventing rare occurrences. Other preventive fields, such as pharmaceuticals, architecture, education, and environmental protection, are not asked to provide detailed cost-benefit justifications. One way around this potential trap is to use long-term data on the costs and outcomes of human factors research —to look, for example, at the number of widgets produced per year. A yearly time frame gives a more accurate picture of the costs per item and allows for realistic accounting of such driving forces as employee absences and labor turnover due to inadequate workplace ergonomics. One must also not lose sight of benefits that are not quantifiable in dollar terms, such as lower staff turnover or reductions in accidents. The second strategy, demonstrating quality daily work, involves several steps. First, it is important to listen to the problem, then really try to determine what it is. Too often, human factors specialists defer to a customer's narrow view of the problem instead of applying their own expertise. Second, human factors specialists should consider whether they can deliver more than they are asked. (This approach goes against the advice of some corporate philosophers, who suggest delivering no more and no less than one promises.) After

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thinking about a particular problem, a human factors professional will often see additional improvements that can be made. For example, a major human automation project in the British coal mining industry grew out of a simple request from a customer about how much lighting was needed on a control console. Imagine going to a brain surgeon and his saying to you: What do you think your problem is? We are the repository of knowledge as far as human factors are concerned. We have the duty of listening to the problem and developing our solution and strategies. If we pass that responsibility, however well meaning, to nonexperts, we shall end up with nonexpert solutions. Tom Leamon

Third, human factors professionals need to focus less on methods and more on depth of expertise. Although human factors methods often appear to be based on common sense, the field is not well served if customers think that all they have to do to get results is to apply a few reproducible, common-sense formulas. This kind of misunderstanding overlooks the considerable knowledge and decades of research that helped to achieve those results. SEIZING UNIQUE OPPORTUNITIES: THE DEFENSE LABORATORIES Kenneth R. Boff Director, Human Engineering Division, Armstrong Laboratory, U.S. Air Force The military laboratory system played a key role in establishing and strengthening the field of human factors. Ken Boff is intimately familiar with the unique opportunities for applying human factors expertise in the new generation of military systems. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) laboratory system has a healthy budget for human factors—about $220 million in fiscal year 1996—and has made numerous contributions to the human factors knowledge base. In these respects, the laboratories appear to be demonstrating their value effectively. But like their counterparts in industry, government human factors scientists must be positioned to take advantage of new opportunities for research and development. Several trends have converged to create abundant opportunities for human factors expertise in today's military. First, weapons systems are becoming more costly and more technologically complex, raising the skills required of the military workforce and creating demands for new training strategies.

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Next-generation defense systems, such as night vision systems and virtual crews, are integrating human capacity with technological capabilities in unprecedented ways. Soldiers are being trained through models and simulations instead of live environments, which opens up new problems and opportunities for human factors research and development. Second, a spate of tragic and costly aviation incidents has highlighted some incompatibilities between the way that systems are designed and the way that people perceive, think, and act. This is the case that we must continually make: Is there a unique core competency in human factors that is supplied by the defense laboratories that needs to be supported because it cannot be out-sourced to the industrial or academic community? What do we contribute that is different and of added value to the mission and the function of the Department of Defense? Ken Boff

Third, the department is emphasizing the development of military technologies that can be transferred to the private sector, thereby opening up new potential customers for defense laboratories. Finally, the military, like many businesses, is trying to do more with less. This means that the military is upgrading and modifying existing weapons systems instead of funding entirely new ones, which gives human factors experts a chance to improve the match between equipment and operators. This move to economize also translates into smaller, more mobile forces that can accomplish missions more quickly, with greater precision, and with few or no casualties. Human factors specialists can help design these new kinds of forces. To help meet all of these challenges, Department of Defense researchers must be able to articulate a solid case for government investments in human factors. They must be able to persuade two major groups of stakeholders: first, upper management in the service branches and the Department of Defense, who request work from the laboratories, determine their funding, and give authority for their continued operation; second, users of laboratory products, including project sponsors and the broader science community. Each group is best addressed with a different approach. What the first group, defense managers, typically want from human factors is quick response problem solving. They are less interested in the science behind a situation than in the resolution of a problem. Human factors experts must speak their language, understand the unique military context, and show key managers how they can produce results in a timely manner. Four arguments are critical in convincing defense manage

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ment. First, human factors work carried out by Department of Defense laboratories occupies a niche that cannot be filled by academia or industry. Second, human factors experts must be able to demonstrate how their work helps to further the broader strategic goals of the Department. Third, they must convince management that the specific program being proposed represents the best investment for human factors—in other words, they must justify why the laboratory is doing one kind of research instead of another. And fourth, experts must make the case that human factors is a more worthy investment than another technological area. This may be difficult, since the Department of Defense can be conservative when it comes to supporting nontraditional technologies. Much of the reputation of the Department of Defense laboratory system rests on its credibility with the second key audience, product users, and the scientific community. The laboratories have gained this credibility by doing work that has practical applications and that adds to the scientific knowledge base. However, human factors laboratories have not effectively reached a critical subgroup of product users, the designers and engineers of military systems. Some designers remain unconvinced that human factors research can significantly improve the usability of their systems. Since many of today's systems are being developed with computer-aided design and engineering, human factors specialists must create products that are compatible and workable in a computer-aided context.

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Lessons from the Workshop

I think the days of human factors meetings, where we all wring our hands and complain that we are not brought into systems development soon enough, are over. Our program officers in the laboratories are developing prototypes that are being sought after by the Navy.... We are leading, we are the initiators. Willard Vaughan, Jr.

Several cross-cutting themes and lessons about explaining the value of and promoting human factors emerged from the workshop presentations, discussions, and working groups. Many human factors professionals are optimistic about the future of their discipline, based on several developments. Domains like health care and telecommunications offer rapidly growing challenges and opportunities for the application of human factors. In the medical arena, for example, demand is soaring for home health care devices that family caregivers can use safely and comfortably. Hospitals and health care professionals are demanding greater attention to human factors in equipment and systems that range from simple to high-tech, so opportunities for significant contributions are growing. Procedures and systems are becoming more complex in many industries. More complex systems place greater demands on human users, which creates a need for better design, improved training, and serious attention to strengths and vulnerabilities of humans throughout system development and implementation. Workforces in both the private and public sectors are being cut, encouraging greater collaboration among workers, and increasing their reliance on technology—changes that rely on human factors expertise for effective implementation. The military, for example, is reducing the

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number of manned defense systems, embedding training in the equipment itself, and emphasizing support systems for making decisions: all three trends will need innovations based on human factors. Several government agencies—including the Department of Defense, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration—have adopted regulations or procedures that require decision makers to consider human factors. The Navy, for example, has made interdisciplinary management an institutional requirement for advanced programs, and it is a procedure in which human factors expertise has provided critical support. Although these regulations ensure that human factors will receive some type of attention, they do not guarantee that decisions will be made by human factors experts or that involvement will amount to more than checking off a box. Human factors professionals still must articulate and demonstrate the value of bringing in the right kinds of people and effectively using their expertise. The rest of this section identifies key points drawn from workshop discussions regarding resource commitments, resource mobilization, strategies for advancing human factors, and packaging the outputs of human factors; it ends with a note on continuing issues in the field. RESOURCE COMMITMENTS Human factors research and development can produce numerous benefits for individuals, business, government, and society. The workshop discussions focused on some of the most compelling reasons that industry and government should invest in human factors. Safety A strong case can be made that investments in human factors improve health and safety. Companies that do so also signal that they have positive values: they care about the health, safety, and well-being of their employees and the consumers of their products. One factor that persuaded the military to fund ergonomics research after the Vietnam War was the number of American casualties attributable to our own errors, including such highly visible errors as blowing up an ammunition dump or shooting a rocket into one of our own tanks. The airline industry also

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provides dramatic examples of the relationship between safety and human factors. In 1977, two Boeing 747s collided on a runway at Tenerife in the Canary Islands, the worst commercial aircraft disaster in history. As with any major accident, several factors were involved, but a critical one was the misunderstanding in voice communications between the controller and the captain of one of the aircraft. As a consequence of this disaster, major efforts were made to standardize communications procedures in international airspace. There are a lot of cases in which failure to go in up front has been followed by serious problems, which have been fixed, but very expensively. Charles Billings

Examples do not have to be large scale or sensational to be convincing. Every industry has modest but compelling instances of discomfort, injuries, illnesses, or accidents that could be prevented with greater attention to human factors. An example is the large number of slips and falls that happen on the ground under ordinary circumstances. Human factors experts not only must be able to identify particular areas where safety improvements could be made, but also must be prepared to demonstrate, in clear and specific terms, how their involvement will appreciably improve the existing situation. They must take into account both the human side of the equation—a healthier, safer, happier workforce—and the monetary side, such as cost savings due to fewer absences, lower medical fees, reduced insurance and workers' compensation costs, and fewer lawsuits. Human Variability Human factors practitioners confront the fact that human characteristics among individuals are variable. These characteristics include physical dimensions; personality states and traits; knowledge, skills, and aptitudes; cognitive schema and style; motivation; and a host of behavioral attributes—which collectively contribute to variability in human performance. Maximizing system reliability and performance requires effectively addressing the most variable component—the human. Some human factors practitioners consider human variability the Achilles' heel of human factors. But many consider the challenge of managing human variability a core competency of human factors that should be highlighted during discussions of organizational strategic planning. Management of human variability requires the application of human factors principles,

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data, and methods across the life-cycle of product development. This includes taking into account human variability throughout analysis, design, and test and evaluation activities. Economic Advantages The opportunity for economic gains is among the strongest justifications for taking account of human factors. Investments in human factors can give companies a marketplace edge by producing innovations that represent a competitive advantage. They can add value to products or services, making them more desirable to consumers. An economic justification for human factors should not be based solely on the hope of a major market breakthrough; often the effects of human factors are more subtle or cannot be easily determined until after they have happened. For example, investments in human factors can increase productivity and reduce manufacturing costs, identify time-saving steps in the manufacturing process, or increase the life span of expensive equipment—effects that are convincing over the long term. Advocacy for human factors will essentially boil down to the simple statement that this is a mature technology that can generate profit. John Tangney

Sometimes the economic justification for human factors comes down to a simple phrase: pay now or pay later. Examples abound in which a failure to address human factors up front was followed by a serious problem that was very expensive to fix. Attention to human factors can also reduce expenditures for warranty problems, health care, accidents, absenteeism, and legal fees. These ''cost avoidance'' arguments can be persuasive, but they are not always enough. Businesses and organizations do not have unlimited budgets. Many corporate executives who are sympathetic to human factors investments must still be convinced that they can afford them, given their budget constraints. Human factors experts disagree about how much one should emphasize cost-benefit analyses and how precisely one can calculate savings due to human factors. For example, it is not always easy to determine what portion of profits from a successful new product are attributable to investments in human factors. And even where specific savings can be calculated, people do not always give human factors appropriate credit. Nevertheless, human factors professionals should know how to produce cost-benefit analyses because organizations like to see them and often find them persuasive. It is also

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important to present cost-benefit models in language and format tailored to a specific client's needs. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION Some of the very characteristics that define the discipline of human factors can be used to help articulate its value. The most successful human factors innovations tend to be those that share certain key features. Multidisciplinary Nature When I have hired a new Ph.D. out of school, I have provided this advice. I think the sooner you can become an expert in at least two areas outside of human factors, and possibly three if you're good, the better off you are going to be. Douglas Harris

The multidisciplinary nature of human factors (including individual, group, and organizational considerations) can be a great strength, although potential clients do not always understand it. Human factors professionals must be able to explain how human factors principles can be adapted to meet the needs of a wide variety of disciplines. In fact, some human factors professionals also become experts in other areas to enable them understand and meet the needs of a particular industry or technological field. The real work of human factors is often done in multidisciplinary teams. In many companies, people who are not specialists in human factors still have responsibilities for implementing and in some cases designing innovations based on human factors. Thus, human factors professionals must know how to educate designers, engineers, managers, and other key individuals to think about and address human factors in their work. Opinions differ about whether human factors specialists operate most effectively in a self-contained division or as part of a multidisciplinary team. Some companies have a distinct division for human factors, which provides a clear place where people can go for expertise and helps to maintain a unified approach and identity, especially in times of tight budgets. Sometimes these divisions are organized as self-sustaining enterprises that generate their own profits and manage their own budgets. Other companies choose to distribute human factors expertise across several departments. Human factors functions can also be organized by customers or by processes.

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LESSONS FROM THE WORKSHOP

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Systemic Orientation To make the real change, we have to get into systemic change, where we are looking at the whole organization. How can we change the organization to give them incentives to want to consider human factors? We are part of that process now, and I think we are being very successful. Robert Bost

Human factors experts take scientific findings about human performance from biology, psychology, cognitive science, and other fields and apply them to the design of procedures, systems, technology, and devices. They can translate new knowledge about human physiology, learning, and behavior to bear on concrete products and processes. They can multiply the influence of technological advances by ensuring that people can implement the technology to its best advantage. One of the great strengths of human factors is its ability to look at operations, problems, and needs across an entire system or organization. Successful applications of human factors tend to use this systemic approach to influence practices across a department, a company, or even an industry. Human factors experts can align the small details of a system (the "micro" level) and the broader processes (the "macro" level) around the same strategic goals. In fact, the human factors discipline is moving toward a "sociotechnical" approach, which designs integrated strategies for improving organizational capacity. User Needs You need to come as a helper, not a killer. In many cases, we have seen programs where the human factors engineer simply walks in and proceeds to try to change the program or terminate it. That is certainly not the attitude to have in this day and age. Bernard Corona

Experienced human factors specialists often begin their work by examining the needs of the user and working backwards toward a human factors solution, rather than focusing narrowly on the human factors dimensions of a specific problem. Clients seldom say they need expertise in human factors, because they may not understand fully what that means. Instead they say they are looking for solutions to a complicated problem involving people and systems. The clients themselves may misdiagnose or misdefine the real problem. The astute human factors professional should listen to the problem, observe and investigate the situation, decide what really needs to be done, and describe the value of the proposed action. Human factors experts advise against trying to fit an organization into a textbook design

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LESSONS FROM THE WORKSHOP

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process; instead, they recommend working to adapt knowledge about processes to the unique needs of the specific client. Every enterprise has its own processes and systems; it is the job of human factors to understand these processes, recognize what they are intended to accomplish, then figure out how to make necessary but compatible changes. STRATEGIES FOR ADVANCING HUMAN FACTORS Every potential client has unique problems and perspectives. An economic strategy that convinces one executive to invest in human factors may fizzle with another. Given this diversity, human factors experts will be most effective if they are familiar with a variety of strategies for articulating value. Tailor the Message Experienced human factors experts suggest that specialists in the field get to know their customers well. It helps to learn the industry vocabulary, study the steps in the development process for a particular commodity, and find out what a company values. This kind of knowledge can help the experts tailor their strategies to specific audiences, customers, and individuals. For example, a vice president of human resources who has trouble filling jobs might like to know how human factors can help reduce absenteeism and retain a skilled workforce. A line manager looking at labor-capital tradeoffs could respond to figures showing reduced cycle time. A business process engineer might want to see new ideas for clustering tasks. Reach the Right People Who needs to know about the potential value of human factors? Often the answer is multiple people, even within the same industry, company, or organization. Within an industry, human factors specialists might target product designers, manufacturers, operators, safety personnel, and product consumers. Within the same company, one might approach the chief executive officer, the product designers, and the managers, all with somewhat different messages. Often a good strategy is to educate one person at a time, until a critical mass of people in the organization understand and support human factors. Potential users are not the only audience. Many people outside the field of human factors have a stake in the discipline's

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LESSONS FROM THE WORKSHOP

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vitality and could become articulate advocates. In the field of medicine, for example, one might address not only physicians and nurses, but also home caregivers' associations and medical malpractice attorneys. Human factors experts have not effectively enlisted these kinds of nontraditional supporters. Instead of thinking about a traditional group, in this case physicians and nurses, they were thinking, well, maybe malpractice attorneys are really part of the key audience. That is the "out-of-the-box" thinking that is needed here. Ann Majchrzak

Reaching the right people also means educating the general public about what human factors are and why they are important, which in turn suggests that human factors specialists must speak and write in lay language. Change the Organizational Culture Experience shows the importance of having an organizational culture that values human factors and infuses human factors in all its actions and processes. When such a culture exists, every decision to invest in human factors does not have to be separately justified and debated. When the culture does not understand or support human factors, resistance may be hard to overcome. In these situations, it is often worthwhile to try to change the culture by demonstrating to the corporate leadership that human factors is relevant to the organization's mission. Indeed, a welcoming culture often begins with a strong commitment to human factors among executives and senior management. The military experience illustrates how leadership attitudes toward human factors can send signals through an organization. Efforts a decade ago to promote human factors in the Navy were not successful until key admirals recognized its importance. Even with leadership from the top, however, it still took time to infuse new attitudes throughout the system—from the Pentagon brass to the systems designers to the sailors—and to make compatible changes in policies and practices. Start Early When human factors experts enter the loop too late, after a product or process has already been designed but isn't working well, their role comes down to patching a poorly designed system with training or procedures. It is easier and more cost

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LESSONS FROM THE WORKSHOP

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effective if they become involved in the initial phases of design. Several companies and agencies recognize this and are bringing human factors people to the table from the beginning. The Army, for example, has instituted the MANPRINT process, which is designed to bring human factors experts and tools to the table in the early stages of system design. Although somewhat bureaucratic and laden with paperwork, this process has helped to call attention to human dimensions at the beginning of a project. In fact, it is often the human factors people who initiate ideas and innovations for defense systems. With good contacts and with folks like us in the room, we can solve a lot of problems up front. Generally what I find myself doing is getting to the executives at the time the design is being written and saying: Do you know what you're buying and do you know why you want it? Have we thought that through from a business point of view and does it get you what you want? William Blackwood

Deliver Short-Term Payoffs Successful human factors specialists believe that a good way to establish user trust is to deliver a series of short-term payoffs, such as designing useful products at a regular pace. Then, with enhanced credibility, human factors teams can tackle more extensive projects with longer timelines and less certain rewards. In cases where human factors experts have a large project as their first job, it often makes sense to start with the most variable component of the device or the process and find ways to improve it. A success with one component can have a powerful impact. PACKAGING THE OUTPUTS OF HUMAN FACTORS In an era of performance-based budgeting, the case for investing in human factors will depend on measurable outcomes. These outcomes of human factors research and development include new or better devices, but they need not be limited to material products. Increasingly, human factors research is producing new processes and strategies for structuring job tasks, helping people work together, and organizing large systems and organizations. For instances, human factors knowledge can yield more effective training strategies, improved manufacturing processes, and innovative strategies for organizing work. Often the most highly valued outcomes of human factors are the most comprehensive—addressing tasks, jobs, processes,

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LESSONS FROM THE WORKSHOP

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and work flow, rather than simply changing the way people work with machines. Emphasizing Products and Processes Concrete products and actual processes provide a stronger rationale for investing in human factors than do abstract research results. Products and processes show how human factors can yield marketable technology and devices and can improve operations in workplaces and other settings. Tangible products and processes are more persuasive to potential investors, who want to know in the beginning what outputs an investment can yield and how they can be marketed. Emphasizing tangible products has a down side, however. A strategy that rewards immediate gains and quick time to market holds little incentive for funding long-term basic research. Yet the future of human factors depends on basic continuing research. Knowledge from research leads to innovation and monumental change, while a product orientation generally produces incremental change. Embedding Human Factors into Current Tools and Practices Some of the most appealing and innovative products and processes embed human factors knowledge into existing tools and effective practices. Human factors experts have developed tools that can teach engineers and product designers about human factors issues as they work their way through the design process. Tools embedded in computer-aided design programs can alert engineers to potential human factors problems, answer critical questions, and help designers make wise decisions. Human factors research has also produced techniques and processes to help organizations build their own repositories of human factors knowledge. Industry and government are conducting more training, research, development, and analysis in synthetic or simulated work environments, rather than actual settings. This trend has created considerable demand for tools that embed human factors principles into computer-aided design, computer-aided engineering, and synthetic task environments. The Air Force, for instance, is developing methods for extrapolating real-world tasks into a laboratory setting. Human factors research

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LESSONS FROM THE WORKSHOP

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ers are conducting experiments in these environments to investigate how certain variables affect human performance. Human factors professionals should prepare to meet the growing need for tools and processes that can help designers visualize how new devices will look, rapidly produce and improve prototypes, and refine devices based on user needs. CONTINUING ISSUES The workshop raised several issues—including some fundamental questions about the nature of the field of human factors—that could not be covered in the time available. They are certain to be the subjects of continuing discussion as the role of human factors in industry and government expands. If our user community is satisfied with some deliverables, with some regular pace of useful products, we will have established credibility with them. And they will say: You have delivered in the past, maybe we should just go ahead and let you do this basic science because we don't want to eat the seed corn. Terry Allard

The current climate has made it difficult to balance the need for basic research with high demands for applied activities. Perplexing questions remain, with no clear consensus among human factors experts. Is the primary function of human factors to conduct new research or support design? What is the right balance between short-term and long-term needs? Can the same people who fight fires also prevent them; in other words, should the experts who deal with immediate, urgent problems in work settings also conduct basic research, or should people specialize in one or the other? In the past, the federal government has provided incentives for basic research, but government, like industry, is now moving toward a product orientation. The Navy, for example, no longer wants to invest in research with a 20-year timeline. University researchers in human factors continue to do basic research, but they, too, are becoming more dependent on outside funding. The field of human factors must take steps to ensure that basic research continues to receive attention and funding. One recommendation—a somewhat controversial idea—is to place both basic research and applied functions within a single organizational unit of a company or agency. Some feel that this encourages constant cross-pollination between basic researchers and applied engineers and ties basic research to real-world problems in need of solutions. This arrangement can also provide higher visibility and additional funding options for

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basic research. A human factors division that delivers successful products may have a wider latitude from its users or funders to conduct basic science. Regardless of how divisions are organized, human factors professionals who focus on the applied side can still contribute to and advocate for basic research. For example, human factors engineers who are struggling with a particular dilemma could request basic research—or do it themselves. Some experts also view "action research"—research that tries to solve problems identified by clients—as a middle ground between basic and applied research. Action research can produce new knowledge and keep the discipline on the cutting edge. Organizationally, some professionals contend that having a separate identity within an organization does not really matter, as long as human factors has sufficient funding and authority. Others believe that without a strong disciplinary identity, expertise and funding might disappear over time. Finally, as with any research-oriented field, human factors efforts do not always succeed. Even with good design, procedures, and training, some products and processes do not work as intended. Although errors can serve as a pathway to scientific discovery, innovation, and creative solutions, the current climate of user satisfaction tends to discourage investigation of fruitful errors. What can be done to ensure that human factors professionals learn from their mistakes? How can managers at all levels create work environments in which errors are not the focus of blame as much as the source of creative scientific thinking?

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CONCLUSION

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Conclusion

The workshop dealt with two broad approaches for framing the issue of articulating the value of human factors. One approach is to make the case in general for the pervasive value of human factors research and applications. This approach is usually adopted when trying to assure support for human factors in general rather than for specific investments. The second approach focuses on the costs and benefits of specific projects. In a few cases, this can be done fairly quantitatively. However, in many other cases, costs and benefits are approached much more qualitatively. If strong arguments can be made for quantum qualitative changes, it may obviate any needs for quantification. Some arguments are easier to make than others. Cost reduction and avoidance are easier to argue than revenue enhancement, because of inherent market uncertainties with the latter. Some cases are fraught with problems, such as safety, especially for large-consequence rare events, e.g., airplane crashes or nuclear power plant accidents. Although it is relatively straightforward to estimate the costs saved by avoiding such rare events, it is not so easy to estimate the specific contributions of human factors amid the wealth of factors that contribute to accidents that do not happen. Beyond quantitative arguments if possible and qualitative arguments if necessary, another important ingredient in demonstrating the value of human factors is the credibility and track record of the profession. To this end, articulating the value after

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CONCLUSION

32

the fact—which is far easier than making the case beforehand—is very important. Compelling success stories can provide the needed evidence, both in general and in particular: the former yields support for the field; the latter results in repeat customers due to past accomplishments. Perhaps the most important aspect of articulating the value added by human factors is the realization that it needs to be done, combined with understanding alternative approaches. Such realization and understanding were evident among the speakers and most of the participants. Thus, many of the discussions in the workshop related to experiences of having successfully articulated the value of and promoted human factors. In this regard, the workshop participants paid less attention to frustrations with barriers and hindrances and more attention to assessing the basis of a wide variety of successes.

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APPENDIX WORKSHOP AGENDA

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Appendix Workshop Agenda

Committee on Human Factors WORKSHOP ON MAKING THE CASE FOR HUMAN FACTORS December 17, 1996 Lecture Room National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 8:30 a.m.

WelcomeèWilliam Wulf, Interim President, National Academy of Engineering

8:35 a.m.

Introduction and Overviewè William B. Rouse, Chair, Committee on Human Factors

8:40 a.m.

Aviation Industry èJohn Lauber, Vice President for Safety & Compliance, Delta Air Lines

9:10 a.m.

Computer and Communications Industryè David C. Nagel, President, AT&T Labs

9:40 a.m.

Automobile Industryè J. Brian Peacock, Manager, Manufacturing Ergonomics Laboratory, General Motors Corporation

10:10 a.m.

Break

10:30 a.m.

Electronics Industryè Stuart S. Winby, Director of Change Management, Hewlett-Packard (presentation by speakerphone; A. Majchrzak will assist on-site)

11:00 a.m.

Insurance Industryè Tom B. Leamon, Vice President and Director, Liberty Mutual Research Center, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

11:30 a.m.

Defense Laboratories è Kenneth R. Boff, Director, Human Engineering Division, Armstrong Laboratory, U.S. Air Force

12:00 p.m.

Lunch

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APPENDIX WORKSHOP AGENDA

1:00 p.m. Working Groupsè Senior Executives from Government Agencies as Discussion Leaders (Breakout Rooms: 180, 250, 280)

2:30 p.m. Panel Discussion of Working Group Conclusions èChair, William Howell, Executive Director, Science Directorate, American Psychological Association

3:30 p.m. Break

3:50 p.m. Lessons Learned èFacilitator, Ann Majchrzak, University of Southern California

4:50 p.m. Closing èWilliam B. Rouse

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COMMITTEE REPORTS*

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Committee Reports*

Application Principles for Multicolored Displays: A Workshop Report (1990) Distributed Decision Making: Report of a Workshop (1990) Emerging Needs and Opportunities for Human Factors Research (1995) Ergonomic Models of Anthropometry, Human Biomechanics, and Operator-Equipment Interfaces: Proceedings of a Workshop (1988) Flight to the Future: Human Factors in Air Traffic Control (1997) Fundamental Issues in Human-Computer Interaction (1989) Human Factors Aspects of Simulation (1985) Human Factors in Automated and Robotic Space Systems: Proceedings of a Symposium (1987) Human Factors in the Design of Tactical Display Systems for the Individual Soldier: Phase I (1995) Human Factors Research Needs for an Aging Population (1990) Human Factors Research and Nuclear Safety (1988) Human Factors Specialists' Education and Utilization: Results of a Survey (1992) Human Performance Models for Computer-Aided Engineering. Cambridge, MA: Academic Press (1989)

* All reports published by the National Academy Press unless otherwise indicated.

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COMMITTEE REPORTS*

Mental Models in Human-Computer Interaction: Research Issues About What the User of Software Knows (1987) Methods for Designing Software to Fit Human Needs and Capabilities: Proceedings of the Workshop on Software Human Factors (1985) Organizational Linkages: Understanding the Productivity Paradox (1994) Quantitative Modeling of Human Performance in Complex, Dynamic Systems (1990) Representing Human Behavior in Military Simulations: Interim Report (1997) Research Issues in Simulator Sickness: Proceedings of a Workshop (1984) Research and Modeling of Supervisory Control Behavior: Report of a Workshop (1984) Research Needs for Human Factors (1983) Research Needs on the Interaction Between Information Systems and Their Users: Report of a Workshop (1984) Safe, Comfortable, Attractive, and Easy to Use: Improving the Usability of Home Medical Devices. Report of a Workshop (1996) Tactical Display for Soldiers: Human Factors Considerations (1997) Workload Transition: Implications for Individual and Team Performance (1993)

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