Terrorism as Communication: Stocktaking, Explanations and Challenges 3658382414, 9783658382414

Table of contents :
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Tables
1: The Relevance of Terrorism Research Based on Communication Studies
2: Perspective Description and Delimitation of Object and Knowledge Range
2.1 What Is Terrorism?
2.1.1 Own Normative Positioning
2.1.2 Scholarly Definitions
2.1.3 Definitions from Politics
2.1.4 Classification Attempts and Typologies
2.1.5 Terrorism as Label and Tag
2.1.6 The Research Object “Terrorism” in Communication Studies
2.2 Specification of the Term “Communication” for Terrorism Research
2.3 Interim Summary
3: Identification of Relevant Process Steps and Actors in Terrorism
3.1 Terrorism as a Process
3.1.1 Lasswell Formula
3.1.2 Stimulus-Response
3.2 Actors in the Process
3.2.1 Actor Models
3.2.2 Communication Quadrangle
3.3 Stratification into Social Levels
3.4 System for Recording the Terrorist Communication Process
3.5 Interim Summary
4: Middle-Range Theories and Their Applicability to the Phenomenon of “Terrorism”
4.1 A Terrorist Organization Emerges: Organizational Communication and the Formation of Collective Identity
4.2 Written, Visual and Oral Communication of the Terrorist (Group)
4.2.1 Terrorism and Public Relations
4.2.2 Terrorism and Marketing
4.2.3 Terrorism and the Internet
4.3 The Terrorist Attack as Violent Communication
4.3.1 Terrorism as Symbolic Communication
4.3.2 Terrorism as Strategic Communication
4.3.3 Terrorism as Propaganda of the Deed
4.3.4 Terrorism as a Media Event: Routine in Chaos
4.3.5 Interim Summary
4.4 Claims of Responsibility: Attribution of Responsibility
4.5 Determining the General Relationship Between Terrorism and the Media
4.5.1 Categorization of the State of Research
4.5.2 Terrorism and the Media as a Symbiotic or Parasitic Relationship
4.5.3 Terrorism Reporting: Potential for Contagion?
4.6 The Micro Level of Communicators: Journalists, Terrorists, Politicians and Citizens
4.6.1 The Decision-Making Power of the Gatekeeper
4.6.2 The Importance of Word Choice
4.6.3 Citizen Journalism in Terrorism Reporting
4.7 Media: Selection of Events, Event Characteristics and (Attitudinal) Foci
4.7.1 News Values in Terrorism Reporting
4.7.2 News Bias: Bias in Reporting
4.7.3 Agenda Building and Agenda Setting (Media Agenda)
4.8 Media: News Editing and Production Setting
4.8.1 Terrorism and Formats
4.8.2 The Power of Visual Media Content
4.8.3 Narrative Embedding of Acts of Terrorism: Discourses, Metaphors, Myths, Frames
4.9 Theories of Rhetoric
4.10 Communication Rules in Terrorism Reporting
4.11 Crisis Communication Theories and Case Studies on the Interaction of Media and Government
4.11.1 Theory of Change
4.11.2 Interim Summary
4.12 Use, Reception and Impact of Terrorism-Related Messages
4.12.1 Uses and Gratifications
4.12.2 The Audience Agenda
4.12.3 Status Conferral: The Attribution of Importance
4.12.4 Effects of Media Framing
4.12.5 Priming: Judgment on the Part of the Recipient
4.12.6 Terrorism Reporting and the Spiral of Silence
4.12.7 Reception and Effects of Visual Content
4.12.8 Reception and Impact of Terrorism (News) in the Economic Sector
4.12.9 Interim Summary
5: Terrorism from the Perspective of Grand Theories of Communication Studies
5.1 Terrorism from the Perspective of Systems Theory
5.2 Terrorism from the Perspective of Constructivism
5.3 Theories of Action and Their Applicability to the Phenomenon of Terrorism
5.4 Socially Integrative Approaches to Terrorism Research
5.5 Theories of the Public Sphere and Their Usefulness for the Analysis of Terrorism as Communication
5.6 Interim Summary
6: Theoretical Conclusions and Practical Implications
6.1 Compilation and System of Theoretical Approaches for Capturing Terrorism as Communication
6.2 Consequences for Politics, Media and Scholarship
6.3 Future Research on Terrorism in Communication Studies
References

Citation preview

Terrorism as Communication Stocktaking, Explanations and Challenges Liane Rothenberger

Terrorism as Communication

Liane Rothenberger

Terrorism as Communication Stocktaking, Explanations and Challenges

Liane Rothenberger Habilitation thesis at Technische Universität Ilmenau Thuringia, Germany

ISBN 978-3-658-38241-4    ISBN 978-3-658-38242-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-38242-1 © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Foreword

In contrast to other social science disciplines, communication studies has hardly dealt systematically with the phenomenon of terrorism. The book presented by Liane Rothenberger on “Terrorism as Communication” closes this gap in a convincing manner. In addition to a concise review of the current state of international research, the work provides a differentiated analysis of theoretical approaches to terrorism research in communication studies. Communication studies proves to be a rich source for penetrating a phenomenon that was previously viewed primarily from a political science, sociological or psychological perspective. For the first time, a system of theoretical approaches based on communication studies is available that is suitable for classifying, explaining and empirically researching the complex phenomenon of terrorism. To begin with, Liane Rothenberger’s meta-analysis of theories from all relevant fields of research in the discipline provides an overview. Then she provides a variety of detailed theoretical starting points for the empirical study of terrorism and, last but not least, she shows how theoretical insights from communication studies can be made useful for the political and social practice of counterterrorism, for example by developing counter-­narratives. Liane Rothenberger developed the initial ideas for this book as part of her work in the International Crisis Communication Research Group. She has been a member of the research group, founded in 2002 at the Technical University of Ilmenau (Technische Universität Ilmenau), since 2008. Over the years, she has conducted a large number of empirical studies on the communication of terrorist groups, thus significantly expanding the profile of the research group. For example, she has investigated discourses and myths in terrorism reporting, the computer-mediated public relations of ethno-nationalist groups, the communication strategies of the v

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Foreword

RAF, the discursive construction of the identity of terrorist groups, and terrorism as strategic communication. In this updated and revised work, which was accepted as a post-doctoral thesis by the Council of the Faculty of Economics and Media at the Technische Universität Ilmenau in 2018, Liane Rothenberger combines her diverse individual works and substantially expands them with a meta-analysis of theoretical approaches that are rooted in communication studies or at least consider terrorism primarily in terms of communicative aspects. In addition to a readership interested in (social) science, the book thus also offers security policy practitioners suggestions for a deeper understanding of terrorist groups and their actions. Erfurt, Germany July 2020

Martin Löffelholz

Acknowledgements

This habilitation thesis was influenced by professional input and motivation from many sides. I would like to say “thank you” to all who supported me. Part of this work was written during a two-month research stay at the Centre for Global Studies (CFGS) at the University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada. My sincere thanks also go to the staff of the Centre. This English version was automatically translated by the software deepl. Thereafter, Kevin Grieves from Whitworth University reviewed the manuscript and refined it stylistically. I owe him a big “Vielen Dank!”.

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Contents

1 The  Relevance of Terrorism Research Based on Communication Studies�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  1 2 Perspective  Description and Delimitation of Object and Knowledge Range��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11 2.1 What Is Terrorism?������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12 2.1.1 Own Normative Positioning������������������������������������������� 14 2.1.2 Scholarly Definitions ����������������������������������������������������� 20 2.1.3 Definitions from Politics������������������������������������������������� 32 2.1.4 Classification Attempts and Typologies������������������������� 35 2.1.5 Terrorism as Label and Tag��������������������������������������������� 43 2.1.6 The Research Object “Terrorism” in Communication Studies����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 48 2.2 Specification of the Term “Communication” for Terrorism Research����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 53 2.3 Interim Summary��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 61 3 Identification  of Relevant Process Steps and Actors in Terrorism������� 63 3.1 Terrorism as a Process������������������������������������������������������������������� 63 3.1.1 Lasswell Formula����������������������������������������������������������� 64 3.1.2 Stimulus-Response��������������������������������������������������������� 66 3.2 Actors in the Process ��������������������������������������������������������������������� 69 3.2.1 Actor Models ����������������������������������������������������������������� 69 3.2.2 Communication Quadrangle������������������������������������������� 75 3.3 Stratification into Social Levels����������������������������������������������������� 79

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Contents

3.4 System for Recording the Terrorist Communication Process ������� 82 3.5 Interim Summary��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 88 4 Middle-Range  Theories and Their Applicability to the Phenomenon of “Terrorism”������������������������������������������������������������������� 91 4.1 A Terrorist Organization Emerges: Organizational Communication and the Formation of Collective Identity������������� 92 4.2 Written, Visual and Oral Communication of the Terrorist (Group)�����102 4.2.1 Terrorism and Public Relations��������������������������������������102 4.2.2 Terrorism and Marketing �����������������������������������������������107 4.2.3 Terrorism and the Internet����������������������������������������������110 4.3 The Terrorist Attack as Violent Communication���������������������������116 4.3.1 Terrorism as Symbolic Communication�������������������������118 4.3.2 Terrorism as Strategic Communication �������������������������123 4.3.3 Terrorism as Propaganda of the Deed�����������������������������131 4.3.4 Terrorism as a Media Event: Routine in Chaos �������������137 4.3.5 Interim Summary �����������������������������������������������������������146 4.4 Claims of Responsibility: Attribution of Responsibility ���������������150 4.5 Determining the General Relationship Between Terrorism and the Media���������������������������������������������������������������������������������153 4.5.1 Categorization of the State of Research�������������������������154 4.5.2 Terrorism and the Media as a Symbiotic or Parasitic Relationship �������������������������������������������������������������������155 4.5.3 Terrorism Reporting: Potential for Contagion? �������������159 4.6 The Micro Level of Communicators: Journalists, Terrorists, Politicians and Citizens �����������������������������������������������������������������166 4.6.1 The Decision-Making Power of the Gatekeeper�������������167 4.6.2 The Importance of Word Choice�������������������������������������169 4.6.3 Citizen Journalism in Terrorism Reporting �������������������176 4.7 Media: Selection of Events, Event Characteristics and (Attitudinal) Foci���������������������������������������������������������������������������179 4.7.1 News Values in Terrorism Reporting �����������������������������180 4.7.2 News Bias: Bias in Reporting�����������������������������������������188 4.7.3 Agenda Building and Agenda Setting (Media Agenda) ���193 4.8 Media: News Editing and Production Setting �������������������������������195 4.8.1 Terrorism and Formats���������������������������������������������������196 4.8.2 The Power of Visual Media Content�������������������������������201 4.8.3 Narrative Embedding of Acts of Terrorism: Discourses, Metaphors, Myths, Frames�������������������������203

Contents

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4.9 Theories of Rhetoric�����������������������������������������������������������������������218 4.10 Communication Rules in Terrorism Reporting �����������������������������226 4.11 Crisis Communication Theories and Case Studies on the Interaction of Media and Government�������������������������������������������235 4.11.1 Theory of Change�����������������������������������������������������������243 4.11.2 Interim Summary �����������������������������������������������������������246 4.12 Use, Reception and Impact of Terrorism-Related Messages���������256 4.12.1 Uses and Gratifications���������������������������������������������������257 4.12.2 The Audience Agenda�����������������������������������������������������259 4.12.3 Status Conferral: The Attribution of Importance�����������263 4.12.4 Effects of Media Framing�����������������������������������������������265 4.12.5 Priming: Judgment on the Part of the Recipient�������������273 4.12.6 Terrorism Reporting and the Spiral of Silence���������������275 4.12.7 Reception and Effects of Visual Content �����������������������277 4.12.8 Reception and Impact of Terrorism (News) in the Economic Sector�������������������������������������������������������������280 4.12.9 Interim Summary �����������������������������������������������������������281 5 Terrorism  from the Perspective of Grand Theories of Communication Studies���������������������������������������������������������������������������285 5.1 Terrorism from the Perspective of Systems Theory�����������������������286 5.2 Terrorism from the Perspective of Constructivism�������������������������299 5.3 Theories of Action and Their Applicability to the Phenomenon of Terrorism�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������306 5.4 Socially Integrative Approaches to Terrorism Research ���������������311 5.5 Theories of the Public Sphere and Their Usefulness for the Analysis of Terrorism as Communication�������������������������������������314 5.6 Interim Summary���������������������������������������������������������������������������327 6 Theoretical  Conclusions and Practical Implications�����������������������������335 6.1 Compilation and System of Theoretical Approaches for Capturing Terrorism as Communication ���������������������������������������336 6.2 Consequences for Politics, Media and Scholarship�����������������������347 6.3 Future Research on Terrorism in Communication Studies �����������360 References�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������363

Abbreviations

ABC AD a. D. AIK AJE AKrikoMe ARD ATCA BBC BCE CBS CIA CNN CRA CSCC DA Notice DFLP DGPuK DJV e.g. ELM ETA EU FARC

American Broadcasting Company anno Domini retired Bundeswehr Academy for Information and Communication Al Jazeera English Working Group Crisis Communication in the Media Consortium of the Public Broadcasting Corporations of the Federal Republic of Germany Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act British Broadcasting Corporation before the Common Era Columbia Broadcasting System Central Intelligence Agency Cable News Network Centering Resonance Analysis Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications Defence Advisory Notice Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine German Society for Journalism and Communication Studies German Federation of Journalists exempli gratia, “for example” Elaboration Likelihood Model Euskadi Ta Askatasuna European Union Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia xiii

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Abbreviations

FAZ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung FLN Front de Libération Nationale GDP Gross Domestic Product GRAPO Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre HB Herri Batasuna i.e. id est, “that is” IRA Irish Republican Army IS Islamic State ITC Independent Television Commission ITV independent television LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam NBC National Broadcasting Company NFO need for orientation NGO Non-governmental organization No. Number NSU National Socialist Underground NYT New York Times o. V. without a byline OAS Organisation armée secrète p./pp. page/pages PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê PLF Palestine Liberation Front PLO Palestine Liberation Organization PP Partido Popular PR public relations PTA Prevention of Terrorism Act PWG People’s War Group RAF Red Army Faction RAND Research and Development RTL Radio Télévision Lëtzebuerg SCCT Situational crisis communication theory SCT Studies in Conflict and Terrorism SFSIC Société française des sciences de l’information et de la communication SNS social network sites SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats SZ Süddeutsche Zeitung

Abbreviations

TACT Terrorism Act TAK Teyrêbazên Azadîya Kurdistan TPV Terrorism and Political Violence TV Television TWA Trans World Airlines U&G Uses and gratifications U.S. United States UK United Kingdom UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization USA United States of America Vol. Volume WBZ Science Center Berlin ZDF Second German Television

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List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 3.5 Fig. 3.6 Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5 Fig. 4.6 Fig. 4.7

Terrorism quadrangle according to Gießmann (1997, p. 268) ���������70 Model of the socio-institutional contextualization of external terrorism according to Picard (1993, p. 25)���������������������������������������73 “The Triangle of Political Communication” (Nacos, 2007, p. 15) �����74 Triangle of actors�������������������������������������������������������������������������������76 Communication quadrangle���������������������������������������������������������������77 Schematic of the terrorist communication process based on action arenas and settings�������������������������������������������������������������88 Schematic of the factors indispensable for linguistic communication (Jakobson, 1979 [1960], p. 88), supplemented by the functions �������������������������������������������������������120 “The Terrorist’s Psychological Strategies and Tactics of Publicity”. (Gerrits, 1992, p. 33)�������������������������������������������������129 “Indicators of media oriented and non-media oriented terrorist events”. (Surette et al., 2009, p. 362)�����������������������������������������������143 “Measures of media-oriented terrorism”. (Surette et al., 2009, p. 365) �����������������������������������������������������������144 “The Terrorist Threat/Event Communication Process”. (Stoil & Brownell, 1981, p. 211)�����������������������������������������������������169 “The power of antagonists over the news media”. (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 16)�������������������������������������������������������������������185 “A proposed path model connecting values, NFO [need for orientation], and agenda-setting effects”. (Valenzuela, 2014, p. 59)�����������������������������������������������������������������260

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Fig. 4.8 Fig. 4.9 Fig. 4.10

List of Figures

Agenda setting model. (Schenk, 2007, p. 439)�������������������������������262 “Model of the framing process for terrorist events”. (Norris et al., 2003, p. 12)���������������������������������������������������������������271 Linking of emotion (e.g., fear) and cognition (e.g., terrorist) nodes after the reception of a (visual) media frame as well as triggered judgment processes. (Haußecker, 2013, p. 51)�����������������������������������������������������������������278

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 5.1 Table 5.2

Table 6.1

Characteristics, discursive anchors and communicative nexus of terrorist violence����������������������������������������������������������������32 Labels according to Weimann and Winn (1994, p. 193)�������������������45 Evaluation of labels according to Weimann (1985, p. 436)��������������47 Use of news media by insurgent terrorists (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, pp. 53–54)������������������������������������������127 Designations of acts of violence and perpetrators of violence by authors, government representatives and witnesses�������������������171 Crosstab for format categorization according to Schlesinger et al. (1983)�����������������������������������������������������������������197 Terror as a multi-level communication phenomenon (Beck & Quandt, 2011, p. 87)���������������������������������������������������������314 “Indicative content of public communication in different types of public sphere and different modes of ‘public relations’” (Richards, 2004, p. 175)�����������������������������������325 System for the theoretical recording of various communicative manifestations of the phenomenon of “terrorism”��������������������������337

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1

The Relevance of Terrorism Research Based on Communication Studies

Terrorism research has been one of the most rapidly expanding fields of research since the September 11 attacks, and it looks as if the topic will lose none of its currency or relevance in the near future. Journal articles on terrorism have increased significantly since the attacks of September 11, 2001 (Kocks et al., 2011, p. 10); a notable increase in terrorism research after “9/11” and a strong focus especially on the field of religious groups are also shown by Silke (2007 and 2009, p. 35) and Schuurman (2019). Not only books, but also new journals entered the market, and older ones increased the frequency of their periodicity. Since the events of 2001, foundations, political institutions, and other organizations have made more research funds available in this field. And there are now master’s degrees in terrorism studies. Yet the real beginning and also the main period of international terrorism research is in the 1970s (Jones, 2007; Miller & Mills, 2009, pp. 415–416)1; by the end of the 1980s, the wave of publications subsided again. As European social revolutionary groups such as the RAF and the Iron Curtain became a thing of the past, publication levels remained at relatively low levels until another peak occurred after the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. Since then, scholarly contributions on terrorism have increased exponentially (see Knelangen, 2009, p.  76), although Knelangen (2009, p. 77) criticizes the disproportion between publication abundance and original research output: “The virtually exploding number of book titles devoted to the topic in recent years contrasts with an overall still manageable number of studies

 Gordon (2005) dates isolated beginnings in the disciplines of political science and international relations as early as the 1940s. 1

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 L. Rothenberger, Terrorism as Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-38242-1_1

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that satisfy scientific principles in the narrower sense, are based on a broad empirical foundation, and were produced by evaluating primary data.”2 In Germany, the study of terrorism was for a long time closely linked to the study of political extremism, which is derived from the historical situation with right-­wing and left-wing extremist groups (see Knelangen, 2009, p. 76). Again, as in the international field, case studies dominated. According to Goodwin (2006, p.  2027), before the attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism research was the domain of a small group of political scientists and non-academic security experts, few of whom were interested in social science theories. The focus was, and still is (see Schuurman, 2019), on descriptive case studies and case-based ad hoc explanations of terrorist attacks. The core idea of this thesis is therefore to explain terrorism via communication science theories, including empirical studies. Communication studies discovered the phenomenon3 of terrorism as an object of research relatively late (for more details, see Sect. 2.1.6) and then often described and analyzed it without a coherent theoretical framework. At the same time, the manifestations and possibilities of terrorism have changed to a high degree, particularly as a result of innovations in media technology, as shown, for example, by the strong presence of terrorist groups on social media. The components of massive propaganda and propaganda of the deed have become more significant (see Zywietz, 2020). “Violence and propaganda have much in common. Violence aims at behaviour modification by coercion. Propaganda aims at the same by persuasion. Terrorism can be seen as a combination of the two” (Schmid, 2005, p. 142). In this combination of violent and non-violent persuasion attempts lies the peculiarity of terrorism. Terrorism is a multi-causal phenomenon that can and must be viewed from a variety of perspectives in order to penetrate this interplay. ­Approaches from political science, psychology, socioeconomics, peace studies, the security studies established in the Anglo-American world and many other disciplines have been available for a long time. Why an approach from the perspective of communication theory is necessary will be explained in this introduction, before the central research question, the aims and limits of the work and finally the structure and outline are presented. Communication theories and terrorism – how can a connection be made here? Terrorism is a dominant topic in today’s world: it sometimes steers public political discussion as well as private conversations. Communication studies can help to further penetrate the phenomenon of terrorism and provide important pieces of the  All citations in languages other than English are translations.  From Greek “φαίνω”, meaning to appear, to show oneself (Gemoll 2000[1908], p. 777). Here, then, terrorism, as it manifests itself, as it appears to us – in various forms – is recalled. 2 3

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puzzle to grasp it in its entirety. The development of media literacy among some terrorist groups makes it imperative that the “social problem of terrorism” be approached through the lens of communication studies. Technological developments in the media sector have made and continue to make new forms of terrorism possible. Not only the internet and then Web 2.0, but already innovations such as Polaroid photos and video recordings have been incorporated by terrorists into their communication strategies (see Rothenberger, 2017b). Finally, the question remains whether the act of violence itself can be understood as communication. Viewing terrorism as communication complements existing perspectives from other disciplines and allows for a more comprehensive response to the phenomenon. Thus, the primary aim is to analyze the fruitfulness of communication studies approaches for terrorism research. The work is suitable for anyone who wants to deal with communication theories, models and approaches in relation to terrorism (analytical dimension) and at the same time provides a reappraisal of the research object of terrorism from a predominantly communication studies perspective (factual object dimension). That is, descriptions of phenomena are also considered, although the focus is on the application of communication studies theories,4 whose applied relationship to different stages in the terrorist process is systematically captured. This book cannot afford to develop an overarching super-theory that captures “terrorism as communication” in its entirety, because such does not exist. As multifaceted as the phenomena of terrorism and communication are, theoretical approaches will remain equally multifaceted. This book, however, makes a strong argument for discovering and locating theoretical references and creating connections between the individual building blocks, while also developing recommendations for how these findings can be made useful for further research as well as, more importantly, for counterterrorist practice. In doing so, this book, like all ­others concerned with the attribution of “terrorism,” is subject to a certain normative approach. This will be described in more detail in Sect. 2.1.1. A systematic analysis of relevant theoretical approaches to terrorism research in communication studies is long overdue. Rosenthal (1991, p. 3) calls it the “problem of poor cumulation,” which afflicts the social sciences again and again because research that has already been published only garners attention briefly, but then quickly falls into oblivion. “The newer work of the physical sciences builds directly upon the older work of those sciences. The social sciences, on the other hand, seem almost to be starting anew with each succeeding volume of our scientific journals. [...] It seems rather that we have been better at issuing such calls than  This is not the place to discuss which analytical schemes already have the status of “theory” or which are still to be called “approach” or “model,” etc. 4

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at knowing what to do with the answers. There are many areas of the social sciences for which we do have the results of many studies all addressing essentially the same question” (Rosenthal, 1991, p.  4). A synopsis of these individual approaches, their yields, the empirical results and their theoretical foundations is missing so far. Precisely this is the case in the theoretical study of the phenomenon of “terrorism” in the field of communication studies. For this reason, this book also presents theories and approaches that date back some time. For they too can provide insights that can be well coupled with current findings. Knelangen (2009, p. 77) sees as problems in the terrorism research landscape a definitional difficulty as well as a “controversy about the appropriate analytical approach to the phenomenon [...] Thus, there is disagreement about whether terrorism is better studied from a structural-theoretical or an action-theoretical perspective, and whether macro-sociological, micro-sociological or psychological approaches promise the deeper insights. Finally, the social-scientific analysis of the subject matter is associated with considerable methodological difficulties,” for example with severely limited field access. It is precisely this “disagreement” described by Knelangen that has motivated the present work, even if there is no consensus over the view that the aforementioned competing approaches are in any way mutually exclusive; they simply make different aspects of the subject visible. In order to mitigate disagreement, the theoretical approaches are not to be pitted against each other and ordered according to some kind of “best hierarchy,” but rather the aim of the analysis is to locate them to the appropriate domain or process step where a particular theory seems particularly fitting and fruitful. Not always can exactly one theory be assigned to an issue and explain it (as completely as possible). Frequently, several theories are available to explain, for example, the choice of words. Thus, it is asked which approaches can be made fruitful at which point, and which implications can be drawn from them; in the same way, reasons are given why some approaches should be discarded because they are not applicable or only difficult to apply to this subject area. Schmid (2011a, pp.  1–2) calls this ­perspective of looking at one and the same phenomenon from different scholarly perspectives “different frameworks” and “conceptual lenses.” They all contribute to a better overall and detailed understanding of terrorism. “Yet it would be wrong to single out any of these frameworks and claim that it is the ‘right’ one. They are not mutually exclusive, either” (Schmid, 2011a, p. 2). In order to counter the accusation of theory eclecticism to some extent, but also to justify why a selection of theories is necessary and intentional, the beginning of Sect. 3.4 is dedicated to describing exactly how and why the theories mentioned in this thesis were selected. While the Germanists Bronner and Schott (2012, p. 7) note a “moral-normative occupation of the discourse on a key political phenomenon of modernity,” Jarvis

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(2009a, p. 6), following the development in security studies towards “critical security studies,” sees an increased need for “critical terrorism studies,” which should above all be dedicated to the critical consideration of analytics and normativity in this field of research. He identifies considerable “meta-theoretical and normative limitations” and sees the academic study of terrorism as focusing on only three fields, namely definition, causes and countermeasures (see Jarvis, 2009a, p.  6). Jarvis criticizes the excessive monotony of the research agenda and its focus on topics that are relevant to politics and thus limited in scope, as well as on offering solutions to problems. In the worst case, terrorism research degenerates into a “technical exercise of risk governance or management” (Jarvis, 2009a, p.  15).5 Critical terrorism studies is particularly critical of the frequent exclusion of state terrorism in definitions and studies of terrorism. Özdamar (2008, p. 90) also complains that works that attempt to capture terrorism theoretically are rare. In contrast, political descriptions and content analyses of political papers or media content dominate. Although some scholars thus criticize “output-oriented” research, i.e., that terrorism research must always lead to advice for politicians and contribute to anti-­terrorist measures, theory should not be used for its own sake. The first premise should be to achieve a better understanding of the phenomenon, even if this does not necessarily entail recommendations for political action. However, ­socio-­political and scientific-theoretical relevance are two areas that can complement and benefit from each other. Especially in the age of globalization and international relations, a preoccupation with communication aspects of terrorism should not only be anchored in science, but also in the thinking of political strategists. Therefore, this book aims to provide impetus in this area as well. Jones (2007) offers a meta-analysis of the articles and authors of the two flagship journals of terrorism research, Terrorism and Political Violence (TPV) and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (SCT), from 2000 to 2007. He provides a list of the authors with the most contributions (Andrew Silke and Ami Pedahzur) and the most frequently chosen topics (Al-Qaeda, militant Islamism and Jihad). He also  Silke also sees some deficiencies in terrorism research and even calls September 11 a failure, a “research failure” (Silke 2004, p. 22). In general, in his overview of previous terrorism research, he complains that the accuracy of methods often leaves much to be desired and that there is still a lack of studies in the field of preventive research, although there is of course some good research, for example interviews with members of terrorist organizations (see, for example, Horgan’s (2014) approach of conducting interviews with members of terrorist organizations). However, Silke (2004, p. 9) of course also sees the danger of going inside terrorist groups and making oneself known to terrorists as a researcher. One danger of terrorism research, Silke argues, is also that of abandoning a neutral perspective and becoming aligned with a cause – perhaps also because a particular state institution is paying for the study. 5

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identifies the scientific-disciplinary location of the authors: about one-third of the authors are based in political science, followed by authors from independent (political) consulting (15.5%), then disciplines such as psychology (11.4%), sociology (8.2%) and theology/religious studies (4.1%). Authors from “media studies” (Jones, 2007) are still behind representatives from economics or anthropology with 0.9 %. This is also a motivation for the present work. Silke (2004), after reviewing the relevant literature, also found that most terrorism researchers come from the fields of political science, sociology or psychology. History, criminology and law are still relatively common; relatively few researchers have a background in journalism or media studies (see Silke, 2004, p. 193).6 Schuurman (2018) looks at developments after 2007 to 2016 in nine leading journals of terrorism research and finds that over 70% of the authors have published only a single paper, therefore actually have their focus in other fields. Of course, completely different professions outside of academia also deal with the phenomenon of “terrorism,” for example artists.7 “[F]irst and foremost, terrorism is a political phenomenon. Even though other explanations give insights, terrorists’ aims are primarily political” (Özdamar, 2008, p. 100). Terrorism is a political phenomenon, but it is also a communication phenomenon. The goals are political, but also communicative. By no means is the intent to question the achievements of political science in the field of terrorism studies, but communication studies can also contribute to a better understanding and classification. A complex subject area such as “terrorism” can only be captured in a multidimensional way. All of these reasons speak for the necessity of a theoretical reappraisal of the interconnectedness of terrorism and communication from the perspective of communication studies. The present analysis of theories and concepts of communication studies with regard to their fruitfulness for explicating the phenomenon of “terrorism” as well as their location at certain process steps and/or levels of terrorism is oriented towards the following central research question:

 Silke himself has a background in forensic psychology and has worked for both government and academic institutions. 7  Austenfeld et al. (2011) are devoted to the occurrence of terrorism in literature from the 17th century to the present, with a particular focus on the symbolic and performative character of acts of terrorism. Their work includes analyses of Russian, Polish, American, etc. literature on terrorism as well as, for example, an interpretation of the biography of the former left-­ wing terrorist and author Cesare Battisti. 6

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Research Question How can the phenomenon of “terrorism” be captured with the help of theories, approaches and models of communication studies? Since terrorism cannot be understood analytically as a monolithic, inseparable unit, but is composed of various components, some of which build on each other in time, it is seen as a process and divided into six process steps (on the selection, see Chap. 3). For these areas, suitable theories anchored in communication science are used, which analytically capture the communication aspect at precisely these process steps. Theories are to be understood as linguistic structures, that is, “discourses or semantic-narrative units that are much more than the sum of their sentences, statements or hypotheses” (Zima, 2004, p. x). Theories distance themselves from practice “in order to be able to engage with problems that cannot be dealt with in practice itself” (Schülein & Reitze, 2012, p. 228). However, they can later be consulted to derive recommendations for action in practice. To illustrate the topic, empirical studies will also be used to show the extent to which communication studies has already contributed to the description and analysis of the phenomenon of “terrorism” in this way as well. The research question involves the view of not seeing terrorism as a given, rigid phenomenon, as an activity or strategic application, something that merely needs to be described and its characteristics analyzed, as is the case in essentialism, but rather terrorism is considered—according to the post-positivist approach – as a construct, contingent representation and performance (see Jarvis, 2009a). “While positivist contributions to terrorism studies assume that objective knowledge about the world and thus also about the phenomenon of terrorism is possible (i.e., terrorism is a phenomenon independent of our interpretations and directly observable), post-positivist approaches emphasize that all knowledge about the phenomenon of terrorism and all related aspects is socially constructed” (Kocks et al., 2011, p. 11). Contemporary approaches often take a mediating position, hypothesis-driven in an attempt to understand and explain a phenomenon from the inside out. The present work can be classified as belonging to the idiographic research direction, in which the aim is to comprehensively illuminate the research object from different perspectives and precisely on the basis of different segments or process steps. The nomothetic approach, on the other hand, strives to establish scientific laws that claim general validity. Quantitative methods are often used here. The idiographic approach, on the other hand, is of a qualitative descriptive nature and is suitable for the basic theoretical orientation of the work. However, quantitative studies are also used. Terrorism is a phenomenon that is changeable and multifaceted, that is reflected in the reactions of its environment and is expressed in a construct that goes beyond the actual attack. Contingent representations and patterns of interpretation also

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emerge in the strategic domain. Against this background, the aim of this thesis is to provide a theoretical foundation for research on terrorism in communication studies. This occurs within a larger social theoretical frame of reference, since “terrorism” is not an original problem area of communication studies and the theories adapted by communication studies also largely originate from sociology. Furthermore, this work provides a review of the international state of research and includes sources on attempted definitions, descriptions of the subject matter, theoretical approaches as well as empirical studies. There are anthologies and monographs available, especially from the U.S. The most important journals are published in the Anglo-American area. For the present study, reviewing the “international state of research” means above all: reviewing the Western state of knowledge (but not automatically representing the referenced positions), since the author only speaks “Western languages.” Publications from the Arab or Asian regions, for example, which were available in English, were of course included. Precisely because publications on the topic of “terrorism” are available primarily from the perspective of political science,8 the perspective adopted here is from a communication science perspective. Theories from communication studies are examined for their transferability to the phenomenon of “terrorism.” The aim of this work is the synopsis of the analytical argumentation across the six process steps in a new system for the theoretical coverage of different communicative manifestations of the phenomenon of “terrorism.” This model not only serves to classify the theories, but also provides starting points for future empirical studies. Furthermore, the theoretical findings are examined for implications for practice. On the one hand, this work experiences limitations from a disciplinary point of view: theories that communication studies has only marginally taken up are also only marginally illuminated or it is explained why they fall outside the scope of the research question. Reference is then made to the ways in which further work could be done with these “marginal theories.” Another limitation concerns the factual dimension: the penetration of the research subject “terrorism” itself. Even if this work explains the basic features of the phenomenon, it cannot provide a comprehensive reappraisal in this area. The same applies to the theories of communication studies, which are not presented here again in detail, but are immediately related to the object area of terrorism.  Most research on the topic of “terrorism” has been done in the political sciences, for example by Martha Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman and Brian Michael Jenkins. But social scientists and sociologists such as Peter Waldmann and Iring Fetscher, historians such as Walter Laqueur, communication scholars such as Robert G. Picard, and journalists such as James Adams and Conor Cruise O’Brian have also dealt with the topic and with how to approach it. 8

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Having set out the motivation and relevance, research question, aims and limitations of this book, the introduction concludes by introducing Chaps. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 and using this to explain the line of argument of the book. Adopting ideas from Jarvis (2009b), any discipline engaged in terrorism research should ask itself the following three questions: 1 . How does it define terrorism? 2. How does it explain terrorism (with the help of its theoretical and methodological frameworks)? 3. How can conclusions be drawn from this to combat terrorism? Chapters 2 and 3 (question 1), 4 and 5 (question 2) and Chap. 6 (question 3) deal with these three questions in turn. Taxonomies, i.e., the classification of terms into conceptual systems and typologies, are central in sociology and also in communication studies. Therefore, in Chap. 2, the two constituents relevant to the research question, “terrorism” and “communication,” are defined and explained conceptually and typologically. Typology is understood as the classification or systematization according to matching characteristics, also to identify sub-categories that, for example, fall under the phenomenon of “terrorism” but can be distinguished from one another. The section on “communication” is kept relatively short compared to the section on “terrorism,” as the book is mainly aimed at communication scholars and thus the less familiar field must be presented in more detail. In order to further penetrate the object and cognitive field of “terrorism,” the taxonomic review is followed by a look at “terrorism as a process.” Six process steps are identified. As a logical step, it follows that these process steps are inevitably linked to specific actors. The main actors or groups of actors that can be identified and how they interact is the subject of Sect. 3.2. Based on various actor models, a “communication quadrangle” emerges, which is the guiding principle for this work and which will then precede the explanations of each process step in order to highlight the relevant relations of action in each case. The actions of the actors can be located at the micro level. However, actors such as terrorists, journalists and politicians are also subject to organizational constraints that can be located at the meso level. And finally, societal contexts at the macro level play a decisive role. This stratification into societal levels is dealt with in Sect. 3.3. The defined actors and process steps are reflected in a system in Sect. 3.4, which is then used to work through the communication-theoretical location of terrorism. The arrangement of the two largest chapters of the thesis, namely middle-­ range theories at the beginning and basic theories only afterwards, is justified by

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the fact that at the middle-range level more descriptions of phenomena can be included. “Terrorism” is first covered in detail before the basic theory anchoring in the second step. Since the overarching theories draw in part on the body of knowledge developed on the object in the middle range, they occupy the rear position. The meaning and purpose of the structure thus derive from the intention to reach back rather than to reach ahead. A hierarchy or prioritization of theories is in no way implied. Merton (1957, p.  5) speaks of “theories of the middle range,” which are frequently used in everyday scholarly work due to their easier empirical accessibility and verifiability. The fact that theories of the middle range allow us to focus more on descriptions of phenomena also means that Chap. 4 frequently refers to various empirical studies. The review of the respective international state of research does not take place in a separate section but is always placed directly in the appropriate thematic field. For example, studies on “reception behavior and terrorism” can be found in Sect. 4.12, in which communication studies theory concepts are applied to this area at the same time. As the table of contents indicates, the involvement of the media in the terrorist process is an important theme of this book. Various theoretical approaches are devoted to this connection, which is why it is addressed frequently and at different points in this thesis. Based on the presented process steps and the appropriate theoretical building blocks, Chap. 6 designs a new system for the theoretical coverage of different communicative manifestations of the phenomenon of terrorism. This schema allows for references back to the analyses integrated into it in Chaps. 3, 4, and 5 and forms a research guide for future scholarly engagement with “terrorism as communication.” Building on this, the combinations of theories that appear to be the strongest are elaborated, and derivations emerge that present themselves as recommendations for action. At the end of Chaps. 2, 3, Sects. 4.3, 4.11, 4.12 and Chap. 5, I provide brief interim summaries and, above all, make reference to implications for research and practice. The final conclusion, which once again reflects on the structure and contributions of the book and discusses conclusions for the media, politics and academic research and teaching, is followed by an outlook on possible follow-up ­research.

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Perspective Description and Delimitation of Object and Knowledge Range

Communication is a broad field. Terrorism is a broad field, linguistically as well as in the real acts.1 Any definition and naming of events as “terrorism” has a constructional character, is a deliberate asymmetry. This should always be kept in mind, so that it remains clear that the definitional labels listed in this work do not come across as objective characteristics, but as perspective attributions. In the following, definitions of “terrorism” are presented – under the premise of construction – and the object of investigation is delimited by establishing inclusion and exclusion criteria that in terms of perspective separate certain acts of violence from “terrorism” or attribute them to it. It is further explicitly pointed out that definitions are often based on a normative understanding and that even scientific definitions are not always free of moral or legal evaluations.2 “In science, a definition is basically an equation: a new, unknown or ill-understood term (the definiendum) is described  Nacos (2007, p. 8), for example, often refers to the term terrorism simply as “the t-word.” Glück (2008) also limits herself to the abbreviation “T” due to the value-laden nature of the word “terrorism” and writes, for example, “T-act.” Weinhauer and Requate (2006, p. 9) note in a footnote: “Despite all attempts at a ‘neutral’ definition, the political use of language inevitably shows that this is a politically evaluative attribution by others, the aim of which is a clear delegitimization of the perpetrators of violence designated as ‘terrorists’. This fundamental problem of the use of the term should at least be acknowledged. For reasons of readability, the quotation marks will be omitted in the remainder of the text, but they should in principle be ‘thought of’”. Certainly, a correct impulse is given here, however, quotation marks could be thought along with this description for quite a few words with negative connotations. In a description of what is to be understood by terrorism in a particular study that is as clear as possible, they are therefore not necessary. 2  Terrorism researchers Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro reveal their normative rationale right in the preface: “Our fundamental concern is the health of American democracy” (Nacos et al., 2011, p. xi). 1

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 L. Rothenberger, Terrorism as Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-38242-1_2

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(defined) by a combination of at least two known, understandable terms (the definiens)” (Schmid, 2011b, pp. 39–40). In addition to dealing with the two research-­ guiding terms “terrorism” and “communication,” Sect. 2.1.6 shows to what extent the research object “terrorism” is already represented in communication studies.

2.1 What Is Terrorism? The Latin word “terror, terroris” means “fright” and comes from the verb terreo: I frighten, terrify, I scare, chase, frighten away (see Stowasser, 1994, p. 510). It has come to be used almost exclusively by those who feel frightened and wish to attach this “terrorist” label to their adversary. The first terrorist acts come from the Jewish Zealots (zelotes = zealots) and Sicarii (sicas = short swords; religious grouping in early Palestine, 66–73 AD), who rebelled against Roman domination of Palestine in ancient times (see Waldmann, 2005a, pp. 47–48). The Islamic extremist sect of the Assassins systematically carried out attacks on Christians, members of rival Islamic communities, and politicians in the Middle Ages, from the late 11th to the thirteenth century, in the Near East. The Persian Hassan-i Sabbah had founded this feared secret society (see Mader et al., 2002, p. 133; Heine, 2004, p. 46).3 Murder was considered a sacred act there. “Even before Islam and before the time of the Assassins, there were political assassinations and suicide attacks. […] The Assassins, however, are probably the first to create an effective and longer lasting organization for their bloody craft” (Heine, 2004, p. 60). The common ideology created the organization and held it together. The Assassins’ strategic goal was “a general and longer-term insecurity of the ruling elites” (Heine, 2004, p. 61) – a basic constant of terrorist attacks. It is already clear here that the term “terrorism” does not refer to individual political perpetrators, but that the aspect of organization is central. The term “terrorism” first appeared in everyday language in reference to the Jacobin regime: the final phase of the French Revolution (1793/1794) called the reign of terror under Maximilian de Robespierre “régime de la terreur.” Thus, from its origin, the term means violence exercised by a government or a ruling power, i.e., state terrorism; in the case of the Jacobin regime, especially the violence of the aristocracy and its mass guillotining of enemies of the state. Only later, with the

 The English word for political murder, “assassination,” and the “political murderer” in French, “l’assassin,” are derived from the assassins or the name of their founder (see Heine, 2004, p. 47). 3

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Russian anarchists, was the term used for violence against the state and applied to the acts of anti-government rebels (see Jenkins, 2003, p. 27). The Russian group “Narodnaya Volya” (People’s Will) was active in its core period from 1879 to 1883 and consisted mainly of young men and also women who came from the upper middle classes and studied at a university in St. Petersburg (see Waldmann, 2005a, p. 58). They argued that terrorism could be used to bring down an autocratic (tsarist) regime, but that this tactic was forbidden in a democracy. Similar to the members of the Red Army Faction (RAF) later on, the terrorists accused of murder used the courtroom to further publicly point out the grievances. Terrorism, this much can already be said here, is a socially constructed problem that occurs in the public sphere and that is perceived differently by a particular (cultural, linguistic, etc.) group depending on the context. For a detailed overview of terrorism definitions, including an appendix comprising 250 definitions from academia and politics, see Schmid (2011b). The next chapter is not intended to provide a new – and certainly again arguable – definition of terrorism, but to show which definitions exist, where intersections emerge and, most importantly, which term and which classifications seem plausible in the context of this study. This is no easy undertaking, as scholars now count between 150 and 200 different definitions (see Heine, 2004, p. 7; Schmid, 2011b, pp. 99–148). Or, to put it another way, “Sisyphus is the patron of those who seek a universal definition of terrorism” (Malik, 2000, p. 1). Wright-Neville (2010, p. ix) even calls “terrorism studies” an “anomaly” of the social sciences, as there is no consensus on a definition of the research object. Often a national bias creeps in and the phenomenon is all too often seen from the perspective of the state, which locates terrorism with the insurgents, non-state actors. However, states can also act in a terrorist manner (see Sect. 2.1.1). It should be pointed out here, however, that there is no definitional consensus for “communication” either. Malik distinguishes conceptual definitions of terms (as they are mostly found in scholarly publications) from administrative definitions (as they are made by political institutions). “A conceptual definition of terrorism is the starting point for any systematic treatment of the subject […]. An administrative definition is a basis for action. […] The administrative and conceptual definitions are unlikely to be identical; clearly they must be compatible” (Malik, 2000, p. xx–xxi). This distinction is addressed by the next two chapters, whereby the definitions from politics are kept shorter, as they serve more to highlight the characteristics of the scholarly definitions once again in comparison, rather than being relevant in the following for the conceptual sharpening of the concrete research object in the sense of this book.

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2.1.1 Own Normative Positioning This work is based on a normative framework and an epistemological location. As already indicated in the introduction, it should be made explicit once again at this point that the term “terrorism” is always a construction, an attribution, a “fighting term” that carries negative, hostile meanings. This designation attributes the violation of basic norms to the “other side.” Terrorist groups themselves, on the other hand, often describe the other side as “terrorist.” However, in the fact that a group transgresses basic norms and violates them through massive violence, it ultimately recognizes precisely these norms as universally valid. It is, in any case, aware that this transgression will result in an outcry for compliance with the norms. When research deals with “terrorism,” it is at the same time always concerned with the drawing of boundaries and normative guidelines within a society, in this case in democracies. However, there are many different answers to the question of which norms (should) prevail in democracies, in political practice as well as in scholarly debate (see Bozdag & van den Hoven, 2015, p. 255). The author is aware of the complexity of constructs such as “democracy” and “terrorism” and would therefore like to self-critically problematize the fact that at some points in the work, the impression may be given that she is unconditionally taking a particular side, that of the “opponents of the terrorists,” without reflecting on the fact that in some situations these opponents may themselves commit acts that are terrorist in character or at least can be seen in just such a light from a different perspective. In terms of language logic, this state of affairs can be captured as predication using speech act theory (see Sect. 4.9) (see Regenbogen & Meyer, 1998, p. 516): by referring to a state of affairs or an object, a property is assigned to it in a propositional act; it is classified into a category. In part, the object is also explained on the basis of the category, for example, when a group is assigned to the predicator “terror group.” This work has a strong normative dimension. In the interim summary of Chap. 4 (see Sect. 4.11.2), reference is made to the fact that the classification as “terrorist” for groups or individuals can also change within a perspective. The relationship between group and counter-group is dynamic and fluctuates between phases of coming together and drifting apart. In the same way, attributions also change. To return to the fact that terrorists basically acknowledge the existence of basic norms, the claim of responsibility (see Sect. 4.4) should be cited at this point: Here, the perpetrators justify violating the norms for a “higher purpose,” namely, to draw public attention to an urgent problem. This justification strategy also includes countering the foreign attribution of “terrorist” and using terms with more positive connotations, such as “freedom fighters” or “revolutionaries,” to describe one’s

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own group. In this way, the group attempts to legitimize its activities and transgressions or norm violations. Thus, the question arises whether there can actually be justifications for actions classified as “terrorist” by the other side and, in turn, for countermeasures, readily dubbed “measures to maintain internal security and public order” or similar. These questions cannot be answered scientifically, because it cannot be calculated statistically whether and to what degree, for example, violence from below is justified against a state that itself violates basic norms, for example by acting violently against minorities. Such considerations would always be driven and influenced by individual attitudes, values and norms. However, at the moment when (social) science no longer merely analyzes existing attributions but takes the increasingly demanded step of formulating recommendations for action (Rothenberger et  al., 2019; oeffentliche-­kowi.org) – be it claims on politics, media practice, citizenship, or even on science for the design of future studies (see Sect. 6.2) – at that moment an explicit normative and epistemological positioning is needed. This will be presented below. Butko (2009) compiles four different viewpoints on “terrorism”: Standard/ mainstream, radical, relativist, and constructivist. The orthodox mainstream is often represented by politicians and security advisors of Western states, but also by some academics. They make a dichotomous division into “good” and “bad” and condemn according to their own moral principles. Moreover, they point to the futility of terrorist acts and focus mainly on Islamist groups. The representatives of the radical perspective ask who is responsible for the deaths of unarmed people, and here they see above all powerful states (including the United States) as terrorist, which is why in some cases they are accused of treason and disloyalty to the U.S. (see Butko, 2009, pp. 187–188). Moreover, they point out that some groups have succeeded through terrorist acts. The relativist position sees the time- and place-­ bound nature of terrorism as a salient feature: from the designation for radical “leftist” groups in the nineteenth century, to the designation of totalitarian states and dictators in the first half of the twentieth century, to the “great enemy” Soviet Union during the Cold War, to the condemnation of Islamist groups in the twenty-­ first century. Moreover, the lines between war and terrorism would become increasingly blurred (see Butko, 2009, p.  190). From a constructivist perspective, Butko (2009, p. 191) sees terrorism as particularly close to communication, which is why this thesis follows this perspective: “Since terrorism is politically and socially produced, it is a process of communication rooted in language itself and, thus, involves creating or imposing a bridge of shared meanings.” The powerful and resource-rich states are particularly successful in the creation of these shared delegitimizing attributions. Nimmer (2011, p.  229), similarly to Spencer (2010,

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p.  91), concludes that the constructivist view is particularly promising and apt: “From the social constructionist viewpoint terrorism could be viewed as a ‘construct’ created by particular social actors to serve their political needs. […] What is signified with the word terrorism is not an objective fact, nor is it a universal phenomenon, but rather a product of specific systems of classification.” The question arises: Who is labeled a “terrorist” in this book? No book can be written about terrorism without making normative assessments. The attributions used in this work are oriented towards the EU definition, but they can certainly be questioned. Therefore, forms of violence or violent communication will be discussed in detail below. If one assumes a contingent but not ontological character of terrorism, there is also no objective (scholarly) discourse on terror that is dedicated to risk identification and solution management, but rather a critical, questioning discourse that is subject to the historical context (see Jarvis, 2009b, pp.  12–13). Older studies are included precisely because the history of attacks is also a history of research into when which groups, forms of attack and communication were the focus. Terrorism becomes terrorism only when it is encoded. According to the constructivist and interpretivist approach, the researcher does not study terrorism per se, but productions and reconstructions of terrorism (Jarvis, 2009b, p.  12). And this undertaking always takes place within the researcher’s normative, socio-cultural and contemporary-historical framework, in this case the inner “railing” (Leyendecker, 2009, p. 13) of humanism, pluralism and basic democratic principles. Thus, this classification and critical self-reflection approach cultural relativism, which largely rejects absolutizing universal viewpoints and tolerates relativizing views (see Howson, 2009). Any work, moreover, is bound to the concrete environment in which it originated. Certainly, the researcher’s socialization and worldview also play a role, in this case growing up in a Western European democracy with the goal of a deliberative, open, discursive society with free and equal citizens (see Bozdag & van den Hoven, 2015, pp.  251–252, 255). The interpretations in this book are thus to be understood against the appropriate background; “knowledge claims need to be understood by reference to the cultural contexts that produce them” (Howson, 2009, p. 3). Hodges (2011, pp. ix–x), to exemplify another normative embedding, describes himself as a “sociocultural linguist interested in the discursive details of political interaction, but I also write as an American citizen […]. My position as a scholar cannot be decoupled from my position as an intellectual in a democratic society.” Thus, the researcher is always caught between commitment to the cause and distancing himself from the object of research (see Elias, 2003 [1987]). A further difficulty concerns the quality and, above all, the quantity of the state of research. As will become apparent in the following, there is a dominance of U.S.-influenced studies, a “Western” point of view, which is recursively

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strengthened, since hardly any literature from other linguistic circles is or can be considered. From the comprehensive literature-based analysis and the field-specific systematization with interdisciplinary connectivity that builds on it, both of which arise against the background described, the recommendation emerges – as far as can be anticipated here  – that the actors from journalism, politics and communication studies should commit themselves to a humanistic worldview that follows the ideal of humanity characterized by enlightenment, tolerance and equality (see Regenbogen & Meyer, 1998, p. 296). The extent to which this normative foundation can actually guide action is explained in Sect. 6.2. There is no doubt, however, that clear lines will not always be discernible in individual cases, and that precise considerations will be required to determine whether or not a group’s politically motivated act of resistance should be classified as “terrorist.” For example, framing the problem as “terror(ism)” rather than “crime” already entails a different response or a different set of possibilities for (security) policy “responses” to the problem – what Jarvis (2009b, p. 12) calls “congruity or fit between formulations of problems and responses within the context of political violence.” Now, however, it will be explained why “state terrorism” does not fall within the scope of this work and how it is distinguished from underground terrorism. This is not to negate the fact that state terrorism exists – on the contrary: the distinction makes it clear that it represents another form of strategic use of violence – but it is to show why state terrorism is not analyzed here, since its inclusion in the analysis would in many cases require other approaches. As an analogy, an analysis of radio can perhaps be cited, which also requires different approaches than an analysis of television, although both fall under the category of “broadcasting.” Now, the basic distinction is between state terrorism from above in the sense of the Régime de la terreur, the reign of terror of the Jacobins under Maximilien de Robespierre in France from 1793 to 1794 (see Sect. 2.1), and terrorism from below. “State terror is generally not aimed at political change, but primarily at adapting behavior for the purpose of maintaining power” (Gießmann, 1997, p.  266). Terrorism directed against a state or an existing order is thus opposed to terror emanating from the state. There is also a conceptual distinction here: “Terror” is understood in some literature (see among others Mader et al., 2002; Waldmann, 2000) as state terrorism from above, “terrorism” as politically motivated violence from below. This use of the term shows that “terrorists” are always the persons on the opposite side, that this is not a neutral description but a “fighting term” used with the intention of delegitimizing the opposite side. If in the following “terrorism” is the focus for violence “from below”, i.e., against state entities, this does not mean that the author does not also acknowledge that violence “from above” is an equally virulent and

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complex phenomenon, one that is difficult to research. Nevertheless, this book will be dedicated to a reasonably homogeneous object of research and will refer to insurgent terrorism by groups. Nacos (1994, pp. ix–x) differentiates between states and (autonomous) groups as perpetrators and between domestic and international terrorism. Similarly, Martin (2006, p. 50) distinguishes from state terrorism “dissident terrorism” from below, that is, violence directed against the state by ethnic-nationalist, religious or other breakaway groups. Hess (2006, pp. 111–117) distinguishes “terrorism as repression” (i.e., “from above”) from “terrorism as revolt” (i.e., “from below”) and then subdivides into • repressive terrorism by state apparatuses (e.g. Jacobins, National Socialists), • repressive terrorism by para-state and non-state groups (e.g. Mafia, Ku Klux Klan), • revolting terrorism of an ethnic/national/religious nature (e.g. PFLP, FLN, ETA), • revolting terrorism of a social-revolutionary kind (e.g. RAF, GRAPO). Freedman and Thussu (2012) include both state and sub-state violence in their conception of terrorism. Crenshaw (2010, p. 1), on the other hand, uses the term “terrorist organizations” to refer only to “non-state actors opposing government authority through the use of terrorism, a form of violence that does not aim to defeat the government’s military or security forces but to influence popular attitudes.” In this context, the influence is usually not exclusively exerted through terrorist acts, but also through other forms of persuasive communication. Considering that the strong connection between terrorist acts and communication has already been pointed out above, this aspect should also be taken into account when distinguishing between terror and terrorism. Schmid and de Graaf (1982), for example, who understand “insurgent terrorism” to mean social revolutionary, separatist and individual case terrorism, leave state terrorism out of their typology, because state terrorism “from above” avoids the media more than it seeks them out and fears that they might report on its deeds – according to their hypothesis. Schmid and de Graaf call state-sponsored terrorism, which is usually directed against certain social groups or opposition members, vigilantist terrorism (vigilante/state/repressive

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terrorism).4 In this book, too, state terrorism “from above” is excluded from consideration for the reasons given by Schmid and de Graaf. However, it should be noted that the claim that state terrorism has a completely different relationship with the media than insurgent terrorism must as yet be regarded as an unsubstantiated hypothesis and requires further empirical testing. It is also acknowledged that there are empirical phenomena that act as hybrids of this division, for example the Islamic State group, which at least temporarily acted as a state when it ruled over a territory in which it created administrative structures. The “career” of terrorist groups that change from insurgent terrorists to rulers over state-like territories would have to be examined separately in this context. Critical terrorism studies (CTS), which is dominated by political scientists and sociologists, is the main source of impulses to approach the topic of “terrorism” with the help of constructivist and post-positivist approaches (see Jackson, 2016). As early as the 1980s, Stohl and Lopez (1984), for example, argued that terrorism research should increasingly turn to state terrorism, which it had neglected until then. Critical terrorism research thereby also includes state terrorism under “terrorism” and includes it in its analyses. It argues that if state terrorism is excluded from the general definition of terrorism, it gives an advantage to elites who are prepared to use violence. Those who are not labelled as “terrorists” could be perceived as acting legitimately to a certain extent. Herzog (1991, p. 99) describes state terrorism as a means of the state that is capable of “drastically restricting the civil liberties of its citizens and of terrifying the population by acts of violence, creating a sense of fear and intimidation in order to keep them under pressure in a way that direct physical violence can hardly do.” He cites the apartheid regime in South Africa as an example. Imbusch (2006, p. 494) refers to state terrorism as “violence directed according to terrorist principles by state organs or parastatal groups, directed against perceived or real enemies of the state. This violence from above, which is transverse to the other forms of terrorism, has by far claimed the most victims in a comparison of the various terrorisms because of its efficient combination with the superior power of the state.” A summary comparison between  Schmid and de Graaf conducted a study covering the period from 1968 to 1979 and sent questionnaires to journalists (in particular, the questionnaires were distributed to participants in a conference of the International Press Institute in November 1978 entitled “European Terrorism and the Media”, but also to others). More than three-quarters of the journalists surveyed said that their media did not use the term “terrorism” to describe violent acts by states. In the opinion of the authors, the study says more about the relationship between governments and the media on the subject of terrorism than it does about the relationship terrorists – media – recipients, which they actually s to investigate (see Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, p. 5). 4

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u­ nderground and state terrorism based on formal definitional aspects is offered by Badr (2017, p. 81), but without any reference to media or communication strategies. In her study comparing the coverage of Palestinian attacks as well as violent actions by the Israeli military, Badr (2017) argues for the feasibility of comparing the two types of terrorism. However, especially with a view from communication studies, a clear difference between state and underground terrorism becomes obvious: state terrorism has a structural and institutional access to the instruments of power and thus also to the media and it wants to maintain the political status quo, whereas underground terrorists want to overcome it (see Badr, 2017, p.  39) and in this logic attack the “media” as an instrument of power. If we include both types of terrorism under a common definition, it must be limited only to the act of violence and the spreading of fear, regardless of the identity and social position of the actor in the system and – and here comes the essential point for this thesis – regardless of the different media behavior. Mannoni and Bonardi (2003) also acknowledge the different media logic of state and underground terrorism: In underground terrorism, coverage is factually downstream, but it is present as an orienting logic in the terrorists’ strategy even before the attack. State terrorists, on the other hand, are highly uncomfortable with excited, conflict-emphasizing coverage. Like other forms of terrorism, state terrorism requires an ideology and a sophisticated propaganda apparatus, but in this case in order to systematically mislead the public and keep its own crimes secret (see Imbusch, 2006, p. 502) – thus distinct from underground terrorism. All this explains why the existence of state terrorism is not denied, but why the analysis below deals exclusively with underground terrorism.

2.1.2 Scholarly Definitions A large-scale review of definitions of terrorism shows first of all that state terrorism is indeed often excluded. This does not correspond to the historical roots of the phenomenon as outlined above, but is quite understandable for reasons already mentioned, namely the distinguishability of the two types of terrorism, i.e., terrorism from above and terrorism from below. With regard to scholarly definitions, three groupings were identified: (a) which often originated in the sense of a working definition for a particular study, including attempts to differentiate terrorism from other forms of violence such as war, crime or guerrilla warfare; (b) lists of manifestations or characteristics of terrorism; (c) meta-­analyses, which, after reviewing several definitions of terrorism, highlight common features or the greatest possible consensus among the individual definitions. ­Accordingly, the systematiza-

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tion proceeds from the general to the specific, from short individual definitions or delimitations encompassing only a few criteria to more granular and specific criteria. In the following, these three categories will be presented in turn and with a variety of examples, culminating in a tabular overview at the end of the section (Table 2.1). (a) Individual Definitions “Terrorism, one of the most discussed problems of our time, is also one of the least understood,” writes historian Walter Laqueur (1982, p. 7) in the introductory remarks to his seminal book, “Terrorism” (“Terrorismus”). His relatively brief definition of the phenomenon is “the use of covert violence by a group for political purposes” (Laqueur, 1982, p. 100). Terrorism is usually directed against governments, less often against other groups, classes or parties – it can accordingly also emanate from state entities. Schmid and de Graaf5 (1982, p. 15) see terrorism in a rather narrow definition as a form of political violence: “We therefore define terrorism as the deliberate and systematic use or threat of violence against instrumental (human) targets (C) in a conflict between two (A, B) or more parties, whereby the immediate victims C – who might not even be part of the conflicting parties – cannot, through a change of attitude or behaviour, dissociate themselves from the conflict” (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, p. 15).6 Together with Jongman, Schmid clearly distinguishes terrorism from war (see Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p. 13): A salient feature of terrorism is its lack of struggle; the surprise attack by an armed organization, which often hits unprepared and unarmed civilians, means that there is no resistance. Similarly, Picard (1993, p.  11) underlines the characteristic of violence against civilians in his working definition: “In this book, terrorism will be understood as violence or threat of violence, in which civilians or locations habituated by civilians are targets or are frequently involved in the conflict”. The definition by Jenkins (2003, p. 27) also falls into this series: “The word terrorism has commonly come to mean violent acts carried out randomly against nonmilitary, civilian targets, with the aim of inspiring fear in the wider population. Also, the acts are intended to promote some kind of political goals”. While the above-mentioned authors thus also included terrorism by state apparatuses in their definition, political

 Schmid and de Graaf do not describe themselves as “terrorism researchers” but as “peace researchers” (see Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, p. 3). 6  Unless otherwise indicated, highlighting such as italics, boldface, underlining or spacing in quotations always corresponds to the original. If the author has changed the emphasis in the quotation or added her own, this will be noted. 5

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violence “from below”, by insurgents, is now increasingly being described, as the following definitions show. Glaab (2007, p.  13) chooses the following working definition, in which she clearly does not include state terrorism: “Terrorism is a method of systematic threat or use of physical violence by non-state actors”. Here, then, it is not a state that acts as a terrorist regime, but “terrorism” is carried out by non-state actors. Also important is the element of systematicity, of strategy, which Glaab addresses. This work will turn to this in detail later (see Sect. 4.2.3). What Glaab does not take into account is the element of unpredictability and surprise that, for example, Funke (1977, p. 13) considers constitute a terrorist attack: “Political terrorism is generally definable as the systematic, planned threat or use of violence organized as a surprise attack.” It is important that there is a systematic approach and a strategic goal, and that an idea is pursued in the long term. Terrorists keep “this goal alive and present in the consciousness of the general public by striking and disappearing, without allowing an estimation of how and when it can be repeated” (Funke, 1977, pp.  13–14). According to this, the “surprise” factor takes on special importance. There is no expectation of violence, for example, as in the case of two adversaries at war. On the contrary: from the attacked side there is first and foremost no desire to reciprocate with an attack.7 As a result, the public has a “feeling of being exposed” (Funke, 1977, p. 22). Terrorism thus threatens the existing order of a state. Terrorists want to change the existing power relations and to gain a position of power in a revolutionary approach in order to manifest their ideas in society and to implement their ideas of forms of society, culture, religion and government. In doing so, from the terrorists’ point of view, the “necessary change of the system […] is the fault of the attacked” (Funke, 1977, p. 14). For example, separatists are concerned with freeing themselves from an unwanted (territorially defined foreign) rule. Terrorism changes with the developments of the instruments of violence as well as the possibilities of communication and depending on the social, political, psychological, cultural, etc., context. One constant of underground terrorism, however, remains: “Terrorism remains the instrument of power of the ‘little man,’ who subverts the classical forms of antagonism between the powerful in order to be able to succeed against the overpowering agencies of state power” (Palm & Rötzer, 2002, p. 21). Thus, in this view of terrorism, the “little guy” finds himself forced to switch to symbolic (terrorist) actions, bypassing any kind of direct confrontation because he is aware of the asymmetrical balance of power (see Gießmann, 1997, p. 266).  Of course, a declaration of war can be made in the aftermath of an attack. For example, the label “War on Terror” is used to give legitimacy (official declaration of war) to acts of violence against something illegitimate (terror). 7

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The strategies of terrorist groups violate the rules of war; the combatants are not committed to a state, but to an idea or ideology8 (see Palm and Rötzer, 2002, p. 21); in this respect, terrorism often arises from the further development of extremism on the basis of a particular ideology. Terrorists, as Wilkinson (1990, p. 27) also sees it, aim with their attacks to destabilize the political, economic and/or social system they perceive as illegitimate: “Terrorism can be briefly defined as coercive intimidation or more fully as the systematic use or murder, injury, and destruction or threat of same to create a climate of terror, to publicize a cause, and to coerce a wider target into submitting to its aims.” In addition, there are the characteristics of unpredictability and arbitrariness of the attack (see Wilkinson, 1990, p.  28). One component of Wilkinson’s definition is new: “publicizing,” i.e., making public. Terrorism needs publicity in order to exist. Some scholars leaning toward communication studies recognize this as an important component, if not the decisive criterion, that ultimately determines how the violent act is carried out. For example, Picard (1993, p. 13) describes the overarching goal of terrorist attacks as follows: “An important objective of many terrorist attacks is the creation of the propaganda of the deed, that is, the act itself carrying messages.” The “messages” are then that the terrorists have been successful and must be taken seriously, that not everyone approves of the current condition of the state and that the authorities are not in complete control. Miller (1982, p. v) echoes the propaganda idea (see also Sect. 4.3.3) and calls terrorism “an instrument of political violence […]. The propaganda of the deed as a means of creating political change through fear.” Propaganda is often equated with strong persuasion. Terrorism is “a tool of persuasion in a wide variety of power relationships” (Özdamar, 2008, p. 99). Miller (1982, p. v) in turn expands this set of terms with the “theater metaphor” (see also Sect. 5.5): “Terrorism was then and is now a mixture of propaganda and theatre.” And further: “Terrorism can be generally described as the systematic use of random violence against innocents in order to bring about political change through fear” (Miller, 1982, p. 1). Here the author focuses on general political and psychological facets. This is followed by Bockstette’s (2008, p. 8) definition of terrorism: “Political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (some “Ideology” is understood to mean values, principles, goals and beliefs that constitute a particular (political) identity. An ideology contains a motivation, a framework for action, which implies a certain worldview and way of life of an individual (see Martin, 2006, p. 55), which usually does not tolerate any alternative perspective, any deviation from “its truth.” Ideology is often resistant to criticism. 8

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times iconic symbols).” Schmid (2011a, p.  3) distinguishes between terror as a psychological state of extreme fear and paralysis and terrorism as an activity, tactic, and method whose goal is the production of terror in individuals and society. Terrorism is violence that – an important criterion – attracts attention and is tied to it, as opposed, for example, to criminal violence in which murders are committed as stealthily and unseen as possible. O’Hair and Heath (2005, p. 4) even go so far as to say that evoking feedback is the main motive of terrorism. This already names important components of terrorism such as the act of violence, the psychological state of fear, the asymmetry of the demonstration of power, persuasion and propaganda. Terrorists thus challenge the current rulers through their symbolic act; it is a test of power and a declaration of war. The symbolic message lies in the fact that the terrorist act “informs” about what escalation of violence is still possible if the terrorists’ demands are not met (see Baecker, 2007, p. 60). Hoffman, who offers a wide range of elaborations on terrorism and related phenomena, also emphasizes in his definition, “the use of power to enforce political change” (Hoffman, 2007, p. 23). He mentions another “basic characteristic of terrorism: that it is a planned, calculated and therefore a systematic action” (Hoffman, 2007, p. 23). This action of a group against the current government does not always start from a national base. Almost all terrorist groups have a base abroad that is largely beyond the reach of the state directly involved.9 Slocum (2005, p. 5), for the anthology he edited, reaches the understanding of seeing terrorism as a category of political violence and as a morally challenging action, behavior that is situated outside the norms that apply in a state, mediated by its laws, or even to conflict behavior between two or more states. Terrorists themselves see this breach of norms from a different perspective and consider themselves freedom fighters. In their view, they are fighting for a cause that puts those they represent in a better position. The violation of norms is therefore not only accepted, but considered to be downright necessary. A terrorist does not see himself as an individual perpetrator of a crime, but acts in the name of an “oppressed” group. This already makes it clear that terrorists distinguish themselves from criminals, whose main goal is the unlawful acquisition of material resources. Although Crelinsten (2002, p. 78) places “terrorism” in the vicinity of phenomena such as “crime, subversion, insurgency, advocacy, protest and dissent,” he, like Simons  Some leading members of the RAF also fled abroad for some time and directed the group’s activities from there. Furthermore, one only has to think of the enormous diaspora of Tamils supporting the LTTE, especially in Canada, the U.S. and England. 9

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(2010, p. 1), also sees differences: terrorism, by its nature, is not primarily “criminal,” but a form of political communication. Criminals usually do not want to be associated with the crime they have committed because they are only interested in the material value or in taking out a particular person and do not want to deliver a message; terrorists, on the other hand, often use the possibility of a claim of responsibility in letter or video form to deliver a message (see Sect. 4.4) and to support the symbolic communication that has already been established by the terrorist act. Terrorists are distinct from violent thieving criminals in that the motivation behind their atrocities is not a direct material object such as money or the like, but an idea intended to promote a greater cause and aiming for political change. Certainly, however, forms of communication can be found at the level of organizational communication that apply to both crime and terrorism. It is left to future empirical studies to determine whether highly organized gangs such as the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club or the Sicilian Mafia share similarities with terrorist groups in terms of network communication or the spread of fear and terror. The difference between a terrorist organization and a guerrilla group is made clear by Richardson (2007, p. 31): the guerrilla group is an irregular army. “It is militarily organized and generally has many followers, which allows it to conduct quasi-military operations.”10 A terrorist group only needs a few members, some of whom may be organized in small cells that act independently of one another.

 Terrorism as a combat strategy of small, otherwise powerless groups represents an asymmetrical conflict constellation. Guerrilla warfare (guerrilla (Spanish)  =  “small war”; the word root is la guerra = the war) is also an irregular combat strategy, albeit a military one; “here it is a matter of harassment, gradual encirclement and ultimately the destruction of the enemy. In contrast, terrorism, as mentioned, is a communication strategy. Violence is used not for its destructive effect, but as a signal to achieve a broad psychological impact. To again take up a catchy formula coined by Franz Wördemann back in the 1970s: The guerrillero wants to occupy space, while the terrorist wants to occupy thought” (Waldmann, 2005b, p. 19). Guerrilla warfare is an asymmetric struggle of soldiers, i.e. an officially state military apparatus, against a “citizen army” (see Schneider, 2008, p. 187). However, both tactics can also occur in combination. Beermann (2004) and Daase (2001, pp. 703–704) also draw distinctions between terrorism and war, guerrilla warfare and common crime. For a differentiation of neighbouring concepts such as extremism, criminality, war crimes and genocide, see also Badr (2017, p. 40). Chaliand (1987, p. 14) compares terrorism often directed at media, especially television, to guerrilla warfare: “When this type of propaganda terrorism is used by political movements of some size, it becomes a substitute for guerrilla warfare (the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Palestinians). Both guerrilla warfare and terrorism are the weapon of the weak against the strong. As techniques, they are neither of the Right nor of the Left.” 10

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With all the (brief) individual definitions mentioned, important characteristics of “terrorism” and differences from other forms of political violence can already be identified; they are summarized in Table 2.1. In the author’s view, definitions that do not mention the communicative character of terrorism fall short and fail to recognize a decisive feature of this phenomenon. Under (b), detailed “lists of elements” will now be presented in order to define “terrorism” even more narrowly, especially with regard to the communicative components. (b) Lists According to Wilkinson (1997, p. 51), terrorism is characterized by the following five features, which once again summarize some core aspects, but without focusing on the communication aspect: “1) it is premeditated and designed to create a climate of extreme fear; 2) it is directed at a wider target than the immediate victims; 3) it inherently involves attacks on random or symbolic targets, including civilians; 4) it is considered by the society in which it occurs as ‘extra-normal’, that is in the literal sense that it violates the norms regulating disputes, protest and dissent; and 5) it is used primarily, though not exclusively, to influence the political behaviour of governments, communities or specific social groups.” Shanahan (2016), who categorizes terrorism definitions and ranks them according to the use of force, ­indiscriminateness, intimidation, psychological coercion, political motivation, illegitimacy of non-state actors, innocent victims, and moral concerns, also completely omits the communication aspect as an elementary building block of a terrorism definition. For Richardson (2007), unlike Wilkinson, political motivation constitutes a necessary condition. According to him, (underground) terrorism means “acting in a planned and violent manner against civilians for political purposes” (Richardson, 2007, p. 28). His list of characteristics includes seven features (see Richardson, 2007, pp. 28–30), which are certainly worth discussing: 1. The act of terrorism is always politically motivated.11 2 . Violence is used or threatened. 3. The purpose of the attack is not the death of the people per se, but the message.12 4. The act of terror therefore has symbolic significance. The psychological effect exceeds the actual physical damage. The terrorist attack is a “weapon of the weak. Terrorist movements are invariably outnumbered and outarmed by their  Harmon (2008, p.  7) likewise states, “Terrorism is always political, even when it also evinces other motives, such as the religious, the economic, or the social.” 12  It could be argued here that some attacks, for example on the Tsar, were also carried out with the explicit aim of killing this particular person. 11

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opponents, so they employ such strategies to gain more attention” (Richardson, 2007, p. 29). 5. (Underground) terrorism occurs as a modus operandi of groups at the sub-state level, although links to the state may exist. 6. The audience, the public, that the terrorists want to reach is not the same as the victims. “Victims are means to influence the behavior of a larger audience, usually a government. Victims are chosen either at random or as representatives of some larger group” (Richardson, 2007, pp. 29–30). 7. Terrorism is deliberately directed against civilians. Wright-Neville (2010, p. xiii) cites four characteristics, some of which differ from Richardson’s and are drawn more from a more historical perspective: “The first is that terrorism is a form of political theatre wherein violence constitutes a carefully scripted performance designed to appeal to different audiences.” As an example, Wright-Neville cites the Zealots, who fought against Roman domination in Judea in order to establish an independent Jewish state (see Sect. 2.1). They thus addressed the Roman as well as the Jewish public, the “out-group” and the “in-group” (Wright-Neville, 2010, p. 139)13. Many terrorists are united by opposition against something (Western hegemony, oppression, social inequality, colonialism), what they are fighting for is only vaguely declared. The psychological component of feeling powerless and alienated is cited by Wright-Neville as a second characteristic. Wright-Neville (2010, p. xiv) refers to another “historical continuity” as a kind of immature relationship between types of violence and prevailing destructive technologies of the time. Terrorists, he argues, have always been at the forefront of the appropriation of new technologies. “Just as the Zealots used knives, Guy Fawkes and his co-conspirators used gunpowder, the Narodniks used guns and al Qaeda has used aircraft” (Wright-Neville, 2010, p. xiv). As a fourth constant, Wright-Neville considers the central role of charismatic leadership figures, from Hassan-i Sabbah in the Assassins to Velupillai Prabhakaran in the LTTE. They used terrorism as a tactic and employed it in pursuit of political goals (see Wright-­ Neville, 2010, p. xi).

 “the ‘out-group’ whom the terrorists want to terrify and intimidate through their actions, and the ‘in-group’ whom the terrorists seek to inspire” (Wright-Neville, 2010, p. 139). 13

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This ties in well with the somewhat different, actor-oriented approach that RAF expert Andreas Elter14 took in his compilation. He does not define “terrorism” as a phenomenon, but rather the actors. “Terrorist groups • are not legitimized by the state and do not have legitimate political power; • do not have a mass base; • are politically, ideologically or religiously motivated and pursue longer-term goals; • operate illegally as clandestine organizations or as associations of loose cells; • can have different organizational structures in different historical phases; • are usually hierarchically structured, but at the same time have functional divisions for specific tasks, such as the preparation of individual attacks; • primarily rely on physical violence (which, however, at the same time intends psychological effects) and spectacular actions, which are to ensure mass media dissemination, reach the public and bring about a long-term shock effect; • thus pursue the goal of setting an escalation spiral in motion and influencing opinions and actions; • on the other hand, do not have the goal of occupying territory in the military sense in the longer term; • always have an enemy of their own definition; • do not target this enemy exclusively in their actions; rather, the death of innocent bystanders is deliberately planned or at least accepted; • use both the ‘propaganda of action’ and the ‘propaganda of word’; they profess violent actions; • have logistics as well as funding sources; • usually have a base of supporters and/or sympathizers” (Elter, 2008, pp. 24–25). This definition of actors, which is helpful for operationalizations and is relatively narrow in scope, incorporating both the perspective-constructed own determination of the enemy and the elements of persuasion and propaganda of both the act of violence and “the word,” i.e., persuasion attempts outside of the attack, already

 Elter (2008) provides a detailed overview of the development and change of terrorism from political assassination in antiquity to the assassins and tyrannicide in the Middle Ages, “la terreur” of the French Revolution, political assassinations in the late 19th century, and guerrilla warfare in the third millennium. 14

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creates references to communication and its importance within the terrorist process; Crelinsten (2009, p. 1) also notes, “Terrorism is a specific form of violence, one that is characterized by its communicative function.” (c) Meta-Analyses Almost all of the academic literature on the subject of “terrorism” begins with an attempt to define terrorism and then concludes that a widely consensual definition cannot be found (see also research overview by Silke, 2004, pp. 2–3). An already relatively old, but certainly not outdated study illustrates the lack of consensus regarding how to best capture the research object: Schmid sent his own definition to about 200 terrorism researchers and asked them for their verdict. “Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as an instrumental target of violence” (Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p. 1). Of the 50 or so scientists who responded, one third agreed with the definition, but almost two thirds found fault with it. Schmid and Jongman (1988, p. 5) identified 22 word categories in 109 definitions15 of terrorism and counted their frequency: the words “violence” and “force” occurred most frequently, followed by “political,” “fear” and “threat.” At this point, a brief digression should be made, because Parsons (1964, p.  34), for example, considers a distinction between “violence” and “force” to be important, since “violence” merely denotes the means of violence, while “force” as “power” or “strength” represents a part of social interaction, regardless of whether it is ­exercised by an individual or a collective corpus. Against this background, Parsons (1964, p.  34) describes strength as “the use of control of the situation in which ‘alter’ – the unit that is the object of ‘ego’s’ action – is subjected to physical means to prevent him from doing something ego does not wish him to do, to ‘punish’ him for doing something that, from ego’s point of view, he should not have done (which may in turn be intended to deter him from doing similar things in the future), or to demonstrate ‘symbolically’ the capacity of ego to control the situation.” If one substitutes “terrorists” for “ego,” examples can be found for all three cases described: in the beheading of journalists to stop reporting, in the retaliation for the invasion of Iraq, in the “control” of the destruction of a Christmas market or a concert. Parsons (1964, p. 34) specifies with regard to the inherent intent of terrorism: “I do not speak of the use of force unless the action or its ‘threat’ is ‘oriented’ to an alter on whom it is expected to have an impact.” The impact can be first and

 See Schmid and Jongman (1988, pp. 32–38) for an extensive listing of (then) definitions by governments and academics and various typologies (1988, pp. 39–59). 15

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foremost the shock after an attack, or it can extend further to (revised) political decisions. Gerhards et al. (2011, p. 19) sum up their overview of definitions of terrorism with the following description of the phenomenon: terrorism is the “intentional use of violence against civilians by a non-state or sub-state actor who intends to use this violence to spread fear and terror among populations and thus put pressure on decision-makers and promote broader political goals.” Here it is questionable whether the violence really always has to be explicitly directed against civilians. For example, according to the international view, LTTE suicide attacks against Sinhalese authorities (in which civilians were also killed, but not exclusively) also fall under “terrorism.” Jackson (2009) used discourse analysis to examine over 100 academic publications in terms of how they structured and viewed the phenomenon. Many offered an actor-centered definition, while others understood terrorism as strategic political violence that can be applied by both sub-state and state actors (see Jackson, 2009, p. 70); however, few researchers devoted attention to state actors. It is already clear here that meta-studies usually have a limited common denominator, while individual definitions describe the research object of “terrorism” in greater detail. Weinberg et al. (2004) also offer one of the few meta-analyses of definitions of terrorism; they extracted 73 definitions of “terrorism” from articles in the journals “Terrorism,” “Terrorism and Political Violence,” and “Studies in Conflict and Terrorism” since the late 1970s (see Weinberg et al., 2004, p. 780). Again, the elements “Violence, Force” and “Political” asserted themselves in over half of them. At the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, an extensive bibliography emerged in the late 1980s, covering both violence in general and terrorism.16 Researchers Signorelli and Gerbner (1988, p. xi) see the following definition as the basic consensus of the definitions of terrorism in the various studies in this bibliography: “A terrorist act is typically defined as one involving violence by, among, or against states or other authorities in order to spread fear and to make a statement, usually political.” This definition thus also covers “top-down” violence emanating from the state as terrorism, which is explicitly excluded in other definitions (see Sect. 2.1). Martin (2006, p. 47), after analyzing various definitions of terrorism, compiled the following list of coinciding criteria: illegal violence, sub-state actors, unconventional methods, political motives, attacks against “soft” civilian as well as passive military targets, intentional influence on an audience. Again, the reference to strate Primarily Schmid and de Graaf, Alexander, Weimann, Schlesinger and Paletz are mentioned there with their seminal works. 16

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gic communication is striking. After discussing various definitions, Schaffert (1992, p.  15) concludes for his study that political terrorism is: “The perpetration of an unacceptable form of violence against symbolic victims to maximize publicity for the attainment of political goals.” However, what is to be considered an “acceptable” and what an “unacceptable” form of violence remains unclear. Later, the author adds a functional dimension: the focus and function of terrorism is to create an atmosphere of fear (see Schaffert, 1992, p. 52). However, Schaffert does not use the term “function” in the sense of systems theory. The aim of terrorists is still to transform the power they have achieved through attacks into a political force. Terrorism expert Peter Waldmann notes that there is broad agreement among scholarly authors on only three elements that constitute terrorism (see Waldmann, 2000, p. 21): (1) an attack (or threat thereof) (2) the reaction to it (often fear and panic) (3) regulatory consequences such as laws restricting civil rights or manhunts. This last point, however, is quite rarely addressed. Terrorists thus commit an offensive breach of norms, wanting to provoke the state. On one point “all authors who have worked on this form of political violence agree: terrorist attacks do not respect humanitarian conventions; they deliberately flout all moral and legal restrictions” (Waldmann, 2005b, p. 14). Waldmann himself comes up with the following definition: “Terrorism is planned, prepared, shocking violent attacks against a political order from the underground. They are intended to generate general insecurity and terror, but also sympathy and a willingness for support” (Waldmann, 2000, p. 11; see also Waldmann, 2005b, p. 12). Here Waldmann deliberately excludes “state or regime terror” from above as well as “private” coercion or b­ lackmail. A synopsis of the definitions presented can be found in Table 2.1. As already explained above, there are – following a constructivist view – no universally valid and objective criteria for what terrorism is and what it is not (see Nimmer, 2011, p. 225). “Terrorism, then, is not a quality that merely resides within a violent event, and there is no metaphysical essence that makes its appearance in a terrorist act. Rather, it is both an interpretation that we subjectively project onto violent events through narratives and a process in which we mould our understanding of the occurrence to fit pre-existing discursive maps” (Homolar & Rodríguez-Merino, 2019, p.  563). The tabular representation captures the main features or “discursive anchors” (see Homolar & Rodríguez-Merino, 2019, p. 562) of the different definitions, with a focus on the communicative attributes. If a certain combination of violence, actors, etc. is described with the discursive anchors listed in Table 2.1, there is a high probability that the combination will be assigned the label “terrorism”. Before these scholarly definitions are expanded and classifications of different types of terrorism are considered, definitions from politics will be addressed.

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Table 2.1  Characteristics, discursive anchors and communicative nexus of terrorist violence Characteristic Form

Stakeholders

Purpose

Target

Attributes of terrorist violence Justification

Message

Discursive anchor Communicative nexus Physical and instrumental violence or threat Strategic communication of violence; violation of norms of violence in act or threat Non-state; asymmetrical balance of power Exclusion of symmetrical communication Political, change of existing (power) Publicity required to relations (ultimate goal); generate attention/ achieve the intermediate publicity; propaganda of the deed; spreading target fear/paralysis/intimidation (intermediate goal) Civilians; representatives of particular Symbolic governments, ethnicity, religion, nationality; communication about symbolic buildings/facilities selection of victim/ location/building Element of surprise, unpredictability, Event characteristics as intention, strategy news factors Claims of responsibility, own websites, social media, murals → attempts at legitimization We are to be taken seriously. You are weak. We want a change.

Communicative attribution of responsibility; attribution of blame Interpretation

2.1.3 Definitions from Politics Definitions from the administrative sphere can only be used in a preparatory and illustrative way to grasp the phenomenon of terrorism in its complexity, because the definitions of political institutions are usually broadly defined to cover a wide range of interpretations – opportune depending on the political situation. In many countries, lists of terrorist organizations emerged at some point, and contact with those organizations was prohibited as soon as they officially appeared on the list. These lists, of course, differ in many cases, even between ideologically close states such as the UK and the U.S. (see Silke, 2004, pp. 5–6; Jarvis & Legrand, 2018). In

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the following, we now focus on a few selected definitions from Western democratic countries.17 It can be said at the outset that the comprehensiveness of a definition decreases as the amount of countries that are supposed to agree on it increases. The United Nations, for example, has not yet found a uniform definition and does not give a general description of the phenomenon in its agreements against terrorism, but instead describes individual acts such as hostage-taking, bombings or aircraft hijackings as terrorist acts (see Palm & Rötzer, 2002, p. 16). According to Golder and Williams (2004, p. 286), they thus adopt a “specific approach.” By this they mean the approach of classifying certain activities such as hostage-taking or bombings as “terrorism” without seeking a general description of the phenomenon per se. This is contrasted with the “general approach,” which seeks a general definition according to certain criteria such as intention, motivation and the like. In scholarship, this deductive approach to the problem prevails; in politics, the inductive approach. Golder and Williams (2004) list numerous definitions from various organizations, committees, and countries such as Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa that almost always practice the second approach.18 Each statutory definition is then addressed by the case law of the judicial system and interpreted on a case-by-case basis.19 The definition of terrorism applicable to Germany is that of the European Union. The Council of the European Union (2001, p. 93) defines terrorist acts as “intentional acts, which […] may seriously damage a country or an international organization […] with the aim of: (i) seriously intimidating a population, or (ii) unduly compelling a government or an international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or (iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.” The high bar that a violent act must reach to be considered terrorism is contained in the half sentence “seriously intimidating a  The author would have liked to cite definitions from other countries and cultures, but the market for scholarly books did not offer much in this regard – at least nothing that did not fail due to language difficulties. An example, however, from the Islamic world: The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) could not agree on a uniform definition of “terrorism” at a meeting in April 2002, but came to the conclusion that the Palestinian acts of violence at that time were definitely not to be classified as “terrorism”, but as a struggle against the Israeli “occupation” (see Silke, 2004, p. 6). 18  Various definitions of “terrorism” from the perspective of political institutions and the like are also provided by Beermann (2004, pp. 9–12 as well as 63–67). 19  From a jurisprudential perspective, Herzog (1991) deals extensively with a definition of terrorism. 17

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population.” The UK takes a similar tack with the definition of terrorism in the Terrorism Act 2000: “The use of serious violence against persons or property, or the threat to use such violence, to intimidate or coerce a government, the public, or any section of the public for political, religious or ideological ends” (cited in Silke, 2004, p. 5). The 2005 amendment to the British Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) then singularly refers to political motives: “the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear” (see Malik, 2000, p. 4). The description is still broad; in any case, no distinction from guerrilla warfare can be made here. In the United States, different political institutions have different definitions.20 That of the U.S. Department of State in section 22 of the United States Code, section 2656 et seq. (d) reads: “(1) the term ‘international terrorism’ means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than 1 country; (2) the term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; (3) the term ‘terrorist group’ means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.” The definition in the annual report “Patterns of Global Terrorism 1985” of the United States Department of State also includes the addition “usually intended to influence an audience,” i.e., deliberate, politically motivated violence showing an intention (see Friedlander, 1990, p. 69; Hoffman, 2007, p. 66). Here, the aspect of the audience or the public, which is so important from the perspective of communication studies, is directly addressed. Furthermore, the reference to invariably political motives for an attack is created. “Non-combatants” are understood to mean civilians and off-duty military personnel; the attack is thus directed against a place where there is no war. States do not count as terrorist actors because they are not sub-state. Thus, this definition also excludes the U.S. government from being designated as terrorists. The RAND Corporation,21 a U.S. think tank, defines terrorism more in terms of the publicity criterion (quoted in Weimann & Winn, 1994, p.  281): “The use of  Some definitions, for example by the U.S. Department of Defense or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, can be found in Tuman (2003, pp. 6–7). A compilation of definitions of terrorism by the U.S. authorities is also provided by Martin (2006, pp. 47–48). 21  The research institute deals with crises of all kinds: “the RAND Corporation, a non-profit research foundation founded by the United States Air Force with deep ties to the American military and political establishments, as well as private security and military companies” (Jackson, 2009, p. 81). Thus, some U.S. foreign and security policy makers were associated with the RAND Corporation. Databases, institutes and experts such as Walter Laqueur or Yonah Alexander are also intertwined with various government institutions, as Herman and O’Sullivan (1989) point out. 20

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violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. It is defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause. […] The motives of most terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. […] Finally, a terrorist act is intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage it causes.” Here it is clear that terrorism is used as a means of communication and that the actual aim goes beyond physical damage. According to a definition for the Austrian Armed Forces, “terrorism is about a minority seeking to enforce its political and social ideas against established ­political structures through the use of violence. […] Terrorists want to put pressure on the general public by creating fear until the public opens up (in the medium or long term) to the ideology and/or political demands of the perpetrators of violence” (Mader et  al., 2002, p.  131). Here the authors contrast “the minority” with the “broad public.” Terrorists thus represent the interests of a few and seek to assert them against the interests of many. It can be stated in general that there is no internationally recognized definition of the phenomenon of “terrorism” (see, e.g., Roell, 2008, p. 63), as different cultural, religious, political and historical backgrounds shape the current living situation of people in the various states. For this reason, international agreements and regulations in the area of “terrorism” are hardly possible because there is disagreement about its manifestation and definitional criteria. If one surveys the definitions presented, it is noticeable that the communication aspect is not recognized by all states or confederations of states as an essential criterion for the definition of a terrorist act. Possibly, this aspect is also not considered important or dominant enough. This book will show why communication is indeed a kind of constitutive phenomenon for terrorism. To what extent scholarship has succeeded in identifying and categorizing different forms of terrorism is questioned in the next chapter.

2.1.4 Classification Attempts and Typologies Reichertz (2008, p. 39) speaks of a “family resemblance” of terrorist groups. In other words, they have common characteristics, objectives, etc. that allow them to be attributed to a particular grouping or class, in addition to the main dichotomous distinction between terrorism from above (state terrorism) and terrorism from below (insurgent terrorism) already discussed in Sect. 2.1.1. Existing scientific typologies – used here in the sense of “classification” or “structuring” – are extremely diverse, making it difficult to assign them to larger “typology families.” Certain structural similarities nevertheless became visible, even if they are mostly limited

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to one or a few dimensions. The following division into (a) “single issue” terrorism, (b) motives and objectives, and (c) territorial typologies is now regarded as a rough guide but is by no means precise. Finally, under (d), approaches to causal research are taken up. (a) Single Issue Terrorism Paletz and Vinson (1992, p. 1) as well as Schmid and de Graaf (1982) differentiate between the major groups “state terrorism” of a regime against its own citizens, “state-sponsored terrorism” of a regime against the citizens of other states and “underground terrorism” as well as the motive categories social-revolutionary and ethnic-separatist and the so-called individual case terrorism. “It is ad hoc terrorism by one or a few individuals advocating coercively that the state grant some privilege to a group with which the terrorist sympathizes. We call it single issue terrorism” (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, pp. 59–60). This single-issue form does not appear in many other typologies of political terrorism. Examples of individual cases of terrorism include rampages at schools, shopping malls or the Breivik case in Norway; so-called “lone wolf” acts. In most cases, it is an individual perpetrator, not an organised group with human, financial and material resources, who is behind the attack. Liebl (2006, pp. 170–173) sees a split between universalization and specialization of terrorist concerns and, in addition, a flattening of “insurgent terrorism” as it applies, for example, to the IRA, LTTE and ETA. In the case of universalization, large groups and networks such as Al-Qaeda can be cited: “It is no longer so much the political overthrow of a state system by a group that sees itself as marginalized, but rather the paralysis of entire civilizations that now appears as the strategic objective of terrorist activities” (Liebl, 2006, p. 170). This trend is countered by the specialization of “single issue” terrorism, which includes, for example, attacks on abortion clinics or meat processing plants. The perspective attribution “ecoterrorism” has been coined in this context. Here, the concerns are directed towards a concrete system-subordinate goal and the overthrow of a state is not in the foreground. Badey (1998, p. 93) explicitly excludes such individual acts in his definition of terrorism: “one must clearly distinguish between isolated acts of violence which evoke terror and repetitive violence and systematic patterns of violence, called terrorism. Terror is something one feels. Terrorism is the repeated, systematic exploitation of this fear” (Badey, 1998, p. 93). The same applies to this book. Individual cases of terrorism are not considered further, especially because of the weaker

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communication element and the lack of a systematic approach.22 Here the author follows many definitions that see communication as well as the systematic spreading of fear and terror in large parts of the population as constituents of terrorism. (b) Motives and Objectives A further possibility of typology is offered by the goals pursued by terrorist groups and their underlying motives. Farnen (1990) is of the opinion that, for the West, terrorism has taken the place of the great enemy “communism” after it disappeared. He divides it into religiously motivated terrorist groups, those advocating national liberation, and right- or left-wing political extremists (neo-fascists and racists versus anarchists and Maoists) (see Farnen, 1990, p. 105). According to Gießmann, social revolutionary terrorism usually contains Maoist, pseudo-Marxist and Stalinist ideas and aims at radical socio-political changes (see Gießmann, 1997, p. 266). In addition to groups such as the RAF and Sendero Luminoso, this also includes the Maoists in India, such as the People’s War Group (PWG). However, since the terrorists are mainly active in poor rural areas, the world media are not particularly interested in them. In Wilkinson’s (1987) system, social-revolutionary terrorism does not appear at all. He distinguishes between national terror, which also includes separatist efforts, ideological terror (above all by left-wing or right-wing extremist groups), religious fanaticism, as the most prominent example of which he names groups of Islamic Jihad23 and fundamentalist Shiites, individual fanatics, who direct their attacks against certain topics such as abortion (see section (a)), and state-sponsored (international) terrorism, which emanates from the leadership of a state, for example. Section (a)), and state-sponsored (international) terrorism, which emanates from the leadership of a state that commissions death squads, for example (see Wilkinson, 1987, p. xiii). Picard (1993) divides non-state terrorism exclusively into categories that follow the groups’ own objectives: political, religious, social, economic. Leber (1987) also follows this approach and differentiates according to various objectives and groups of perpetrators, “from state-supported groups to national minorities, from  An individual rampage is also not classified as a terrorist act because it is not intended to achieve a (political) end goal, but usually only one’s own apocalypse. It is an individual event and not planned by a group. 23  From its word origin, “jihâd” means the effort to achieve a certain object or goal. The major jihâd means the effort for faith and morality, the minor jihâd in Islamic law stands for “one of the permissible forms of war for the expansion of the Islamic domain or for its defence (Suren 8:30; 61:8; 2:217 and others). J. is a duty of the community of Muslims that must be constantly pursued” (Szyska, 2002, p. 147). 22

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individual perpetrators to religious or politically sectarian groups” (Leber, 1987, p. 7). National minorities, and more specifically the targeting of separatist groups, are dealt with at length by Byman. His relatively simple definition of ethnic terrorism is: “Ethnic terrorism can be defined as deliberate violence by a subnational ethnic group to advance its cause” (Byman, 2008, p. 185). In most cases, this deliberate use of violence does not lead to the desired goal: “an independent state, free of unwanted outsiders. But terrorism helps to keep ethnic identities alive” (Byman, 2008, p. 187). Ethnic identity is often defined in terms of clinging to one’s own language and culture and distinguishing this from a rival culture that is perceived as “imposed,” such as Spanish as opposed to Basque or Turkish as opposed to Kurdish. In the process, the national government’s “backlash” against separatist terrorism can fuse the insurgent ethnic group even more closely together. A look at Turkey in the 1980s shows that attempts by the government there to silence the Kurds achieved a boomerang effect and resulted in a great deal of support for the separatist PKK (see Byman, 2008, p. 189). Byman suggests that the government should negotiate more with the moderate separatist groups that have renounced violence in order to strengthen a non-violent path. Rothenberger (2017a) also addresses the type of “separatist-motivated terrorist organization,” but in the light of mobilization theory. Chaliand (1987, p. 80) sees separatist terrorist groups or, as he calls them, “liberation movements” as movements with the following goals: Independence or self-­ government, liquidation of the actors of colonialism and rival groups, intimidation of the population to bring it under the group’s control, and ruthless assassinations to separate society along ethnic lines. Chaliand also cites anti-imperialist or revolutionary-­ oriented groups such as the Tupamaros in Uruguay and the Montoneros in Argentina. He also names as a separate type political movements striving for revolutionary overthrow in democratic industrial societies, such as the Red Army Faction and the Italian Red Brigades. The following tripartite division of motives promises the clearest and most practicable solution, for example also for operationalizations in empirical studies. It can be found in various works, but its clarity is best explained by Straßner (2004). Straßner distinguishes between social revolutionary, ethnic nationalist and religiously motivated terrorist organizations. “Social revolutionary terrorist organizations invoke Karl Marx and subsequent ideologies both expressis verbis and implicitly. They strive for a fundamental transformation of political and social reality, with which they link the armed struggle against capitalism, imperialism and global inequality and injustice. In their self-image they fight by proxy for the politically and economically exploited and oppressed of the whole world” (Straßner, 2004,

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p. 360). Straßner cites the RAF and the Brigate Rosse as well as Action Directe and the Japanese Red Army (“Sekigun”) as prominent examples of this type. For the group of ethnic-nationalist motivated terrorists, Straßner (2004, p. 361) sees the main characterization in the fact that “the clientele of these terrorists consists of an oppressed minority, usually located in larger a state system perceived as hostile, ethnically supposedly clearly distinguishable. The core concern of ethnonationalist motivated terrorists is thus primarily the creation of a separate state entity for the minority perceived as oppressed.” Well-known examples are ETA, IRA and Tamil Tigers. In the case of religiously motivated terrorism, Straßner (2004, p. 361) sees a “currently observable tendency to mix religious motivation with social-­ revolutionary and ethnic-nationalist content (Palestine).” He cites Hamas, ­Hezbollah and the Al-Qaeda groups as examples.24 Rothenberger and Müller (2015) also note this overlapping of motives in their analysis and subsequent typology of terrorist groups identified as such by the EU. Townshend (2005, pp.  73–74), who incidentally also distinguishes between (state) “terror” (by the powerful against their own citizenry) and “terrorism” by non-state entities, also categorizes into revolutionary, nationalist, and religious terrorism. Waldmann (2000, p. 18), like Straßner and Townshend, differentiates between nationalist (IRA, ETA), social revolutionary (RAF) and religious (Al-­Qaeda) terrorism.25 This typology proves to be a readily applicable guide when terrorist groups are to be differentiated according to their motives, ideologies and objectives. (c) Territorial Typologies Schäuble mentions a form of terrorism not considered by Straßner, Waldmann and Townshend, which falls under typologies with a focus on the territorial (dis)connecting of terrorist acts: “homegrown terrorism,” terrorism by immigrants or con As mentioned in the introduction, since the attacks of September 11, 2001, many scholars have been concerned with religiously motivated terrorism, especially with Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and Islamic fundamentalism. “Terrorism is on an upturn” (Palm & Rötzer, 2002, p. 11). 25  Later Waldmann adds another (sub-)category and sees essentially four motivations on which he bases a subdivision: “the striving for a revolutionary change of social and political structures in the sense of Marx’s ideas; the will of ethnic minorities or oppressed peoples for state autonomy, or at least for increased political autonomy; a third subtype are law-and-­ order movements that bypass the state, in violation of the law, and pretend to protect the existing social order  – they can be called right-wing radical or vigilantist terrorism. The fourth sub-category is religiously motivated terrorism” (Waldmann, 2005a, pp. 99–100). Examples of radical right-wing terrorism are the Ku Klux Klan in the U.S. or the neo-fascists. 24

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verts. The public can therefore perceive terrorism in different ways: as a purely “foreign” threat or as “so-called homegrown terrorism […], i.e., terrorists who grew up in Germany and underwent a radicalization process here” (Schäuble, 2008, p. 11). Frey (2004, pp. 6–8) chooses a different territorial approach and differentiates types of terrorism according to the following categories: (a) Domestic and transnational terrorism: Groups acting domestically are, for example, the RAF, Brigate Rosse or Aum Shinrikyo. Transnational terrorist groups, on the other hand, pursued international goals such as the worldwide fight against American imperialism or hoped for greater success and international visibility from attacks outside their region (see Frey, 2004, p. 6). Al-Qaeda and Hamas are cited here as examples. (b) State-sponsored and religious terrorism: For example, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and other countries have in certain cases acted as “terrorist sponsors.” Al-Qaeda is cited as the main example of religious terrorism, revealing right away that Frey’s typology lacks discriminatory power. (c) Activities: This includes a categorization by type of attack (for example, assassinations of politicians, airplane hijackings, etc.) or type of weapon (nuclear, virus attack, etc.). In the course of history, terrorism became international and expanded globally to the point of so-called “terror export, i.e., [the] arbitrarily wide relocation of the stages from the terrorist control center” (Funke, 1977, p. 22). It is the media that has made this expansion and disconnectedness possible; “modern terrorism [has] found in many news media virtual multipliers of the systemic fear it seeks” (Funke, 1977, pp. 15–16). Elter (2008, pp. 25–29) has based his classification into three types of terrorism on precisely this spatial (dis)connectedness: “Domestic terrorism” takes place internally, i.e., mostly within national borders; terrorists and victims belong to a common state system (for example ETA, IRA, RAF, PKK). “Global terrorism” takes place externally, i.e., internationally; perpetrators and victims do not have the same nationality; terrorists act abroad (as in the 1972 Olympic attack) or choose “foreign” targets at home, such as representatives of external states. Hijackings of foreign airlines also fall into this category. In the case of “transnational terrorism,” which can be classified as both global terrorism and domestic terrorism, the members of the terrorist organization come from different states and act internally (nationally) or externally (internationally). The focus is not on geographical, but above all on ideological, cross-border ties. In part, there are overlaps between the categories, for example, when the PKK carries out attacks against Turkish banks on German soil, what was originally internal terrorism takes place outside the actual conflict territory. Many of the ethno-nationalist groups operate across borders anyway: the LTTE and IRA instrumentalize the diaspora for donations, ETA used southern France as a launching pad for attacks against the Franco regime, and the Palestinian groups pulled strings in various Arab countries

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(see Waldmann, 2005a, p. 149). All these social communicative acts are part of a terrorist strategy (see Sect. 4.3.2). The overview of typologies of terrorism has shown that there are different ways to distinguish forms of terrorism. They have been grouped according to three types of classification that relate to different aspects of the phenomenon and should certainly guide detailed and phenomenon-based counter-terrorist work. The present work excludes groups or individual perpetrators that fall under “state terror” or “single issue terrorism,” as other media concepts apply here. It refers exclusively to insurgent groups “from below” that exist in the form of an organization and systematically carry out attacks. (d) Approaches to Root Cause Analysis Although this book does not engage in causal research and thus generally does not consider sociostructural, sociobiographical and psychological aspects and studies of why someone becomes a terrorist or even a suicide bomber, it will briefly outline the debate on motives for terrorist acts. The debate can be divided into two poles: The psychological perspective sees certain psychological predispositions and personality traits as the cause of the violent act and brands terrorism as a pathological aberration that can often be traced back to childhood or social-familial situations (Post, 1998).26 The instrumental perspective, on the other hand, emphasizes the rational, strategic nature of the decision to resort to violence, seeing it in part as the end result of a learning process marked by failure (Crenshaw, 1998). Accordingly, terrorists weigh the costs and benefits of the attack in advance; “terrorism can be understood as an expression of political strategy. […This perspective…] interprets the resort to violence as a willful choice made by an organization for political and strategic reasons, rather than as the unintended outcome of psychological or social factors” (Crenshaw, 1998, pp. 7–8). The terrorist act is thus chosen as a conscious alternative in order to enforce (political, social) demands or to generate attention for them. Crenshaw (1998, p. 8) also speaks of collective rationality with regard to this group decision-making process. As “evidence” for this strategic action orientation, she cites, among other things, the well-considered selection of goals (symbolic goals; “ends”; see Sect. 5.3) and the type of act (e.g., kidnapping; “means”;

 A bibliography of works dealing with the topic of “terrorism” mainly from a psychological perspective can be found in Blumberg (2002). In addition to all “content-based” motivations of a political, religious and social-revolutionary nature, one can add the narcissistic motivation of “a compensatory grandiosity” (Hoffmann 2016, p. 111), i.e. the fantasy of gaining a special significance through the act of violence and of enhancing one’s previous sense of self worth, which was characterised by emptiness and inadequacy. 26

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see Sect. 5.3) of many groups (see Crenshaw, 1998, p. 10). Bangert (2011, p. 77) also sees great potential in actor- and action-centered approaches such as “security economics,” which he combines with a game-theoretical and rational choice-based, i.e., instrumental, perspective. According to this approach, actions purposefully follow the principle of utility maximization and collective phenomena are captured “on the basis of an explanation of individual behavior in specific social situations” (Bangert, 2011, p. 78).27 Badr (2017, p. 64) locates the various causes of terrorism at the micro, meso, and macro levels, citing, among others, political causes such as national security, socioeconomic factors such as poverty and education, religious beliefs, the structural possibility of resource mobilization, and psychological-emotional (frustration) and psychological-rational causes (individual calculation). It should also be noted that the exo-system of “relatedness” plays a role in such processes to some extent (see Jaber, 1997). Schlesinger et al. (1983) identify two types of justifications for violence against the state that terrorists give: political or economic oppression – the terrorists’ goal is then to overthrow the system; and secessionist liberation efforts – the terrorists’ goal is then to drive out the nation seen as the “colonial ruler” and move to self-determination.28 However, instead of persisting in the search for causes, terrorists are perceived in the following merely as the main actors and, above all, the executors of a terrorist attack as well as further communication. Beck and Quandt (2011, p. 86) confirm that the goal of communication studies’ consideration of terrorism “cannot consist in clarifying this political, sociological, psychological (as well as moral) question.” Therefore, this book focuses on terrorism as a rational form of communication from a scientific-analytical perspective, but this does not mean in any way that the monstrous cruelty of terrorist acts is negated. In no way is this book connected with any kind of apology of terrorist acts. Terrorist groups rarely refer to themselves as “terrorists.” In the same way, the use in the media is subject to influencing factors such as the concrete event characteristics and also a certain “language fashion.” Neither scholarship nor politics, as has been shown above, has been able to agree on a uniform definition of terrorism. Clarifying how the term is used in the media and how it is assessed by recipients  Bangert (2011) approaches the phenomenon of terrorism from a game-theoretic perspective and shows that this can also describe state defense mechanisms and explains, for example, situations in which states are reluctant to introduce preventive measures because they hope to benefit more easily from the actions of other states. 28  The process of decolonization is often accompanied by the founding of national liberation movements such as the FLN in Algeria or the PFLP in Palestine. 27

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makes a significant contribution to sharpening the concept. Therefore, the following chapter deals with the question of when and how terrorism is used as a label and tag.

2.1.5 Terrorism as Label and Tag Communication is above all also language. The term “terrorist” is an attribution, a labeling, since “a person or group has hardly ever used [this term] to describe itself” (Townshend, 2005, p. 11). Attributes such as inhumanity, cruelty and lack of political assertiveness resonate. According to Rapoport (1977, p.  46), Russian ­anarchists in the nineteenth century proudly called themselves “terrorists”; later, Trotsky spoke of the utility of “Red Terror.” For the modern concept of terrorism, however, “The first group to describe itself as a terrorist organization was the one widely known as ‘The Stern Gang’ […]. Today, the term has so many abusive connotations that no terrorist will ever call himself one publicly, and he will make every effort to pin that term on his enemy” (Rapoport, 1977, p. 46). In the previous sections, definitions of terrorism were given, now we will deal with labels. The difference between label and definition is the following: “to label is to call something or someone by a name. Terrorism itself is, after all, a label. […] In discourse, labeling provides quick, shorthand identification for whatever is labeled. Using the word terrorism to identify a violent attack on civilians in a marketplace gives this violence a quick and easily understood name. Definition, correspondingly, gives shape and narrows or broadens the application of that label and how it may be employed” (Tuman, 2003, p. 32). Definitions thus specify the scope of the label. Definition and label delimit the object or phenomenon from its environment, from the “other”; they form a point of reference for comparisons. The term “terrorism” is a label, a tag that places what it denotes in a specific field. This shows the close interlocking of the term with social reality or its respective construction and also the proximity to communication studies and its methods, for example discourse or framing analysis. According to Crenshaw (1995, p. 9), the choice of terms “frames” human consciousness and the assessment of the legitimacy of the political authorities surrounding us. Language, she argues, can create expectations about how a particular problem will be framed and how it will be dealt with. Terms acquire sharper contours the more frequently they are discussed and classified in public. However, a kind of competition can also arise between different stakeholder groups over the interpretation and use of the term. States that practice terrorism against their citizens are better able to defend themselves against such a negative label as “terrorist state” than small groups that are swiftly named

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“terrorist groups” by the media. No talks or concessions on a political basis are possible with an opponent who is a “terrorist.” The opponent is devalued as illegal and deserves only an asymmetric, usually military, response. Imposing labels is consequently about distinguishing the “in-group” from the “out-group.” Acts of violence by the “in-group” are thus seen as legitimate and justified, while those by the “out-group” are labeled as terrorism. The choice of label has a strong influence on reception (see also Sect. 4.12). “The so-called ‘labeling theory’ or ‘societal reaction theory’ says that labels given by society define the incident and determine the reaction to that incident” (Chakravarti, 2009, p. 135). This would mean that individuals or parts or functional areas of a society do not react to an event in and of itself, but to a label assigned to this event, which in turn raises the question of what reaction would follow if the act were not labeled as terrorism. However, there have been no scholarly studies on this to date. The label “terrorism” and all derivatives of it have negative connotations and are highly emotionally loaded (see Simons, 2010, p. 3). However, it is rare to find a term that better expresses what has happened; “we would note that the word terrorism, particularly when used to describe the actions of insurgents, has profoundly negative connotations. A more neutral term is preferable, but unavailable” (Paletz & Vinson, 1992, p. 2). The word “terrorist” is often used from the (potential) victim’s perspective to describe the perpetrators of violence that the majority within a given society considers politically as well as morally illegitimate. Terrorist acts do not usually occur spontaneously but are planned rationally and systematically (see Sect. 4.3.2). The targets are selectively chosen and exemplary. Terrorist attacks are sometimes described sweepingly as a “war against the civilized world” (see Roell, 2008, p. 62). However, wars are usually fought between states (see Townshend, 2005, p.  15). Also, the physical violence of terrorism is minimal compared to a war; as alluded to in the definitions, the psychological violence component has a much stronger effect here: The opponent is brought to his knees not militarily, but mentally. A term for agents with legitimation of violence is “soldier.” Terms expressing opposition to the status quo are, for example: Rebels, insurgents, guerrilla fighters, revolutionaries and, as an extremely negative form, “terrorists.” Jenkins (1981, p. 3) sees an inflationary use of the term “terrorism,” especially in the media. In general, the word triggers negative connotations: “It is generally pejorative. Some governments are prone to label as terrorism all violent acts committed by their political opponents, while anti-government extremists frequently claim to be the victims of government terror. What is called terrorism thus seems to depend on one’s point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgment; and if one party can successfully attach the label ‘terrorist’ to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint. Terrorism is what the

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Table 2.2  Labels according to Weimann and Winn (1994, p. 193) Negative Murderers Gunmen Saboteurs Terrorists Criminals Kidnappers Hijackers Assassins

Neutral Guerrilla Army Underground Separatists Organization Movement Commandos Group Front

Positive Freedom fighter Liberation organization Liberation movement Nationalists Independence movement Independence organization Patriots

bad guys do.” The word is also an attention grabber and, Jenkins argues, is therefore often used in the media to dramatize a situation. Weimann and Winn addressed the meaning of labels for terrorist groups. They offer (without going into reasons for this classification) the following valuations of labels (Table 2.2). The right-hand column mainly contains terms that Weimann and Winn found in a word count of proper names of terrorist groups. These mainly contained expressions such as liberation, national, people, popular, unity, salvation, democracy and resistance (see Weimann & Winn, 1994, p. 193). In the case of separatist groups, the struggle for “freedom” is already evident in many self-designations, for example, LTTE and ETA. In their print media content analysis, the researchers found mainly negative attributions in all nine newspapers studied. Especially in the case of (airplane) hijackings, the groups responsible were given particularly negative labels (see Weimann & Winn, 1994, p. 203). Pörksen (1999, p. 64) calls such influencing labels “persuasion vocabulary” within the broader field of “worldview language” (Pörksen, 1999, p. 62). Many of these vocabularies served “persuasion external to the group and persuasion internal to the group” (Pörksen, 1999, p. 63) by creating a distinction from the opponent as well as generating solidarity internally. Schönbach (2009, p.  7) even speaks of an “age of persuasion.” According to Schönbach (2009, p. 29), the broad category of persuasion includes “persuasion, threat, and manipulation as well as a polite request.” Persuasion succeeds above all in situations of fear and confusion, in that the communicator manages to win credibility and sympathy for his alternative from those addressed (see Schönbach, 2009). This is precisely where counter-terrorist communication measures must start (see Sect. 6.2).

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Following Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 88), Lockyer (2003, p. 2) produced the following list29 of examples of bipolar expressions that denote the same thing but are used differently by the terrorist and anti-terrorist sides: 1. Criminal – Revolutionary 2. Terrorist – Guerrilla 3. Murderer – Freedom Fighter 4. Gang – Army 5. Subversive element – Liberator 6. Bloodbath – Purge 7. Lunatic – Martyr 8. Mercenary – Soldier 9. Threat – Warning 10. Aggression – Preventive Counter Strike 11. Assassin – Avenger 12. Propaganda – Communiqué 13. Extremist Fanatic – Dedicated Anti-Imperialist 14. Attack – Operation 15. Hired Killer – Example of Revolutionary Solidarity 16. Murder – Revolutionary Justice If the media follow this bipolarization, they are subject to linguistic determination as rhetoric amplifiers from both sides. The “tag” also functions like the “label”; in principle it means the same thing: “Tagging plays a particularly important role in communicative contexts, as it produces expectation attitudes and pre-structures perceptions” (Liebl, 2006, p. 164). The name of an organization contributes decisively to its success. “Referring to important, identity-relevant or identity-creating symbols (charismatic persons, meaningful dates, etc.) is therefore an essential factor for mobilizing consensus (in the audience) and resources” (Liebl, 2006: 164). A certain color symbolism is also a tag, as it adheres to the logo and conveys a certain meaning, because labels can not only be imposed linguistically and by others, but to some extent the terrorist groups themselves want to impress themselves on the public through pictorial rep-

 Nacos (2007, p. 25) compiles a similar list: Instead of “terrorist,” depending on the point of view, nationalist, revolutionary, separatist, guerrilla, bomber, murderer, criminal is used; instead of “terrorism” nationalism, revolution, guerrilla warfare, bombing, kidnapping, crime, assassination. 29

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resentations, symbols30 and logos and create a recognition value. Examples are the red star with machine gun of the RAF or the fist with Kalashnikov of Hezbollah. Social revolutionary groups usually opt for red in their logo, militant Islamist groups for green, the color of Islam, and black often stands for anarchism (see Elter, 2008, p. 35). The groups’ willingness to use violence is also expressed iconographically in the motifs of the flags and logos in order to spread a kind of heroic aura, for example in the logo of the Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre (GRAPO) in Spain with a machine gun in front of lettering and a red star. The effect of these recurring symbols is that the public memorizes them; they ­already convey a certain message, are part of strategic and symbolic communication (see Sects. 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). Weimann (1985, p. 435) believes that terrorist labeling plays a key role in the analysis of terrorism reporting. In a study from the 1980s, Weimann (1985) considers the news factors “(geographical and political) distance” and “(violence) threshold” in their correlation with a label with a particularly positive or negative connotation for individuals, organizations or movements involved in the attack. In his analysis of Israeli news coverage of 381 terrorist attacks between January 1979 and December 1981, he encountered 13 different labels ranging from “freedom fighter” to “murderer.” The articles mainly used labels that were assigned a positive meaning as measured by five seven-level semantic differentials (Table 2.3). The evaluation of the labels was then used as a dependent variable in a log-­ linear analysis; the news factors of degree of violence, geographical distance and political distance were considered as independent variables (see Weimann, 1985, pp. 436–437).31 Weimann (1985, p. 440) concludes that the choice of the label reTable 2.3  Evaluation of labels according to Weimann (1985, p. 436) Negatively evaluated label Murderers Saboteurs Assassins Separatists

Neutrally evaluated label Guerrillas Army Front Nationalists Underground Separatists

Positively evaluated label Patriots Freedom fighters Liberation movement Liberation organization

 A symbol references more than the actual object (which does not have to be a material object), it references beyond itself. 31  Perhaps one could have controlled for the size of the group and the motive of the attack. 30

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ferring to the authors of the attack was usually more influenced by the political significance of the act than by the degree of violence. If both political distance and degree of violence were low, labels with positive connotations such as “freedom fighters” were preferred. On the one hand, the different labels indicate an active and (un)consciously purposeful choice of words by the journalists. On the other hand, it is about the effects of this differentiated labeling on the public and the public opinion and interpretation of a terrorist group (see Weimann, 1985, p. 441). Weimann therefore calls news production a “purposive behavior” (Weimann, 1985, p.  442) and sees it as dangerous that  – according to his study  – geographically distant acts are positively labeled, because here the media usually serve as the only source of information for the public. The media’s labeling of terrorism shapes public opinion. Weimann was one of the first to conduct studies in this area and also one of the first communication scholars ever to address the relationship between “terrorism and the media”  – mostly from an empirical rather than a theoretical perspective.

2.1.6 The Research Object “Terrorism” in Communication Studies In their anthology, Kocks et al. (2011) trace the development of German terrorism research and refer to political science, history and international law research, among others. However, there is not a single contribution from communication studies in it. In fact, the relevant anthologies are mainly populated by historians (e.g., Weinhauer & Requate, 2012) and political scientists (e.g. Spencer et  al., 2011; Jost et al., 2018). As can also be seen with conferences, the professional societies of these two disciplines are increasingly concerned with penetrating the phenomenon of “terrorism,” but not, for example, the German Communication Association DGPuK. Especially in the field of political science, Kocks et al. (2011, p. 19) conclude, “the study of terrorism in the German-speaking world has become considerably more professional and scholarly in recent years.” This statement cannot yet apply to communication studies. In the U.S., terrorism studies emerged in the 1970s (Stampnitzky, 2016, p. 19); the first American conference on the topic of “terrorism” took place in 1972 (Stampnitzky, 2016, p. 19). Again, political science or branches of the International Studies Association dominated. American communication studies must also catch up in this regard and make its contribution to explaining this socially relevant phenomenon. The study of terrorism in communication studies was and still is often triggered by two factors: (a) an incisive terrorist event, (b) personal interest on the part of the

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researchers, often guided by a personal connection to a particular ethnic group (burdened with terrorist events) such as the Israelis (Weimann) or the Tamils (Tekwani). Weimann’s academic trajectory from a bachelor’s and master’s degree in sociology to a doctoral dissertation in communication studies under Elihu Katz exemplifies many researchers in the field of “terrorism and the media” who do not originate in communication studies. Unlike in political science or sociology, the research object “terrorism” was discovered relatively late here, because it was not recognized early enough that “communication is at the heart of terrorism. Terrorism is symbolic, message based, and fully predicts a communication response” (O’Hair & Heath, 2005, p. 5). Picard (1994) dates the beginning of communication studies approaches within terrorism research to the 1980s – in contrast, the beginnings of terrorism research in other disciplines date back much longer (see Gordon, 2005, p. 48). Picard cites the study by Schmid and de Graaf (1982) (mentioned above). Prior to that, only government officials and scholars from other disciplines had commented on terrorism coverage and the role of the media, Picard claims, but they had taken different approaches (see Picard, 1994, p. 122). Fundamental approaches to ‘terrorism and the media’ research emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, as Chap. 4 in particular will show. In the very early research on terrorism, the mass media were only marginally considered, and the focus was on the “terrorist-victim” relationship. The public was long considered passive, observant (see Decker & Rainey, 1982, p. 4). Later, many assumed: “the media is seen as a conduit for the terrorist’s message. […] the media is the dupe of the terrorists” (Decker & Rainey, 1982, p. 6). Opinions went even further, according to which the media were seen not only as “friends” of the terrorists, but even as their accomplices, inciting further acts through their reporting. More recently, more specific perspectives have emerged, such as viewing terrorism as a system from the perspective of systems theory (Fuchs, 2004; see Sect. 5.1). If one groups the specific field of literature, there are some analytical classifications, interpretations, categorizations and interpretations, some scientific empirical studies and extremely few works on communication theory (exceptions are, for example, Archetti, 2013 and Haußecker, 2013). Content analyses are often individual case studies and do not provide an overall view of the coverage of various terrorist attacks over time. Now, one could object that each attack is unique, occurs under different circumstances and against different backgrounds, and that the attacks cannot be compared. And yet all events are based on a certain sequence that assigns them to the category of “terrorism” (see Sect. 2.1); and the media coverage of these very events can very well be examined for similarities and differences.

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Alali and Eke (1991, p. 1) see the surge in terrorism literature in the 1970s and 1980s as a consequence of increased terrorism use by politically and religiously motivated groups, which in turn was due to an increase in media reach and speed in news dissemination and processing useful to terrorists. Mannoni and Bonardi (2003) thus also identify as the two key events in the shared history of terrorism and the media: the development of dynamite, which made the attacks all the more newsworthy, and the development of (satellite) television. This aspect is also seen by Nacos (2007, p. 26), who defines a “mass-mediated terrorism” as political violence against non-combatants perpetrated with the intention of making the act public and thus attracting public and government attention. These findings indicate that research on terrorism is generally linked to events as well as to new changes brought about by the mass media. It is therefore not surprising that media production and content research devoted itself to the study of “terrorism and the media” before reception research. The latter only experienced an enormous upswing after the attacks of September 11, 2001 (see, e.g., Emmer et  al., 2002; Seeger et  al., 2002). Löffelholz (2004a, p. 31), referring to crisis and war communication in general, states that “most empirical studies on crisis and war communication are in the field of media supply research.” One of the reasons for this is that directly during the conflict research is usually difficult and one prefers to deal with crises thoroughly after the fact and possibly still in a comparative perspective. Beck and Quandt (2011) also see the “resonance” of the attacks of September 11, 2001 in German communication studies mainly in content analyses. However, “Usually published under great time pressure, these studies usually leave unclear whether and what journalism and communication studies can contribute to the theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism” (Beck and Quandt 2011, p. 85). Beck and Quandt themselves attempt to illuminate terror(ism) from the perspectives of action theory, systems theory, and network theories. In doing so, however, they do not strive to distinguish between terror and terrorism, and sweepingly investigate “terror as communication.” This perspective, however, insofar as the phenomena of terror and terrorism are differentiated – as they are in many studies (see Sect. 2.1) – is not the right one for communication studies. To refer only to state terror or the feeling of terror among recipients falls short for the discipline. For it is above all the range of “terrorism,” which manifests itself in terrorist communication and in the terrorist act as well as subsequent construction and attribution, that communication studies is able to illuminate. Overall, it can be said that German communication studies in particular is still too hesitant to deal with “terrorism and communication” – a short debate devoted to the topic of “Reporting on Terror – Media and Responsibility” appeared in the association’s publication “Aviso” only in 2017 (DGPuK, 2017). This is different in France, for example, where the disci-

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plinary association SFSIC (the counterpart to the DGPuK) devoted significant space to the topic of “Médias et terrorisme” in its academic journal “Les Cahiers de la SFSIC” in May 2016, with several articles in which proposals for “communication publique antiterroriste” were also discussed (see Sect. 6.2). Ross (2007) classifies the literature on media and terrorism into various categories and comes to the conclusion that articles in peer-reviewed journals and scholarly books predominate. Also typical are edited volumes whose contributions were originally submitted to a conference (for German communication studies this applies, for example, to the anthology by Glaab (2007)), or parts of larger works that deal, for example, with terrorism or political violence in general. Rarer, on the other hand, are monographs (see Ross, 2007, p. 215). The main method of scientific data collection used is content analysis, mostly of articles in Western print media. Discourse analyses and case studies are less common. Content analyses of radio programs are scarce, as are ethnographic studies of terrorists or observations in newsrooms during ongoing terrorism coverage (see Ross, 2007, pp. 219–220). A separate review of the body of research also revealed a strong focus on content analyses of print and television coverage. Knelangen (2009, p. 81) sheds light on the pros and cons of qualitative versus quantitative research on terrorism. He concludes that ultimately the research question determines which method is appropriate. If there is no great heterogeneity in the methodological approach, the situation is different when it comes to theoretical embedding: It is often completely absent or refers to different middle-range theories such as news value theory. Archetti (2013, p.  11) also laments a “lack of engagement with theory” in terrorism research. Moreover, she believes that it is not useful to examine the role of media and communication in the broadest sense only in direct relation to an attack (see Archetti, 2013, pp.  58–59). This event-centeredness of research leads to a great lack of deeper and longitudinal explanations. Communication studies research can be categorized according to research fields such as communicator, media production, media content and reception research. Exemplary studies with their respective thematic focus are mentioned here for the four areas: Terrorist viewpoint and communication strategy (e.g., Rothenberger, 2012a), word choice (e.g., Rothenberger, 2012b), media coverage (e.g., Glück, 2007; Badr, 2017), and emotional reception (e.g., Haußecker, 2013). The sequence results from the flow of communication from the terrorists to the content of the coverage, where word choice plays a significant role during the journalistic production phase, to the impact on the recipients. Empirical impetus with German participation comes from the large-scale project “Responsible Terrorism Coverage” (ResTeCo) by Althaus, van Atteveldt and Wessler (2016), in which a comprehensive cross-national, computer-assisted content analysis reveals parameters of ter-

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rorism reporting. The researchers promise “for the first time a comprehensive, multidimensional system of quality criteria aligned with different normative target values that can be used by others to assess the normative quality of news discourse about terrorism” (Althaus et al., 2016, p. 1). Particularly with regard to terrorism reporting, there is a noticeable swing towards bringing more normativity back into scientific surveys. Analyses of politicians’ speeches and behavior also offer an area for further research. Weinhauer and Requate (2006) give space to the idea of seeing both the designation “terrorism” and the terrorist act as a communication strategy. “After all, terrorist attacks are not only intended to undermine trust in the state and its protective functions, but also to function as a signal and motivation for potential allies among the population. Indeed, there is much to be said for giving this communicative aspect a much higher priority in the study of terrorism than has generally been the case to date” (Weinhauer and Requate 2006, p.  15). As already seen, this ­statement applies at least to the German-speaking world. However, Weinhauer and Requate do not adopt a consistently communication studies focus but seek to tie in with other research disciplines: “The implementation of such a model of thought, which takes the communication component of terrorism seriously, should be designed as a cultural history-informed social history of terrorism, which integrates social, state-political and cultural aspects as well as their interactions and thereby historicizes the available social science findings. All this seems possible within the framework of a social and cultural history of internal security” (Weinhauer & Requate, 2006, p. 16). This approach can be criticized because it does not focus prominently enough on aspects of communication studies and existing theory design. Rather, prior to the theoretical and methodological achievements of communication studies, a new classification of the phenomenon of “terrorism” must take place with regard to its communication component; it must be viewed and understood as symbolic (see Sect. 4.3.1) and strategic (see Sect. 4.3.2) communication. Finally, interest in the topic of “terrorism and communication” can be traced to certain university strongholds and individuals researching and teaching there. Early and still valid focal points are in the United States (e.g., Stanford) and in Israel (e.g., Haifa). For Europe, St. Andrews and The Hague are worth mentioning, with a focus on political science, but there are also ongoing projects on communication aspects. With regard to teaching, Gordon (2005, p. 45) paints a picture that is alarming for communication studies: he examined the range of university teaching on terrorism in the U.S. and sees a broad adherence to old divisions and existing disciplines (above all political science, history, sociology, psychology, religious studies, and (new urban) geography): “The most remarkable fact in the development of new academic courses about terrorism on university campuses is the in-

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ability to overcome academia’s traditional disciplinary division and create an independent field of terrorism studies that will house the new knowledge under one roof.” In Gordon’s proposal for “terrorism as an academic field of study” (Gordon, 2005, p. 56), in which the contents of a possible course of study are presented, the media are only mentioned in passing, and communication aspects with regard to other actors (terrorists, politicians) are not mentioned at all. This is also the case in introductory works on terrorism intended for students (e.g., Martin, 2016): The links to the media and, above all, the communication components inherent in terrorism are not accorded enough space. It should be noted at this point that the scholarly discourse in terrorism research (not only in communication studies) is itself subject to a bias, which Jackson (2009, p. 67) describes as follows: “in the first place, much of the accepted knowledge about terrorism in the field is highly contestable and open to debate. […] Second, the accepted knowledge of the field is in many instances politically biased”. Of course, this is also due to the fact that many researchers take a “Western and non-­ Islamic view” of the subject matter; their own “powerful cultural frames” (Jackson, 2009, p. 80) and often enough also (partisan) political convictions take hold and flow unreflectively into the scholarly discourse. However, here they usually appear in the guise of scholarly rhetoric and rules of language. Political rhetoric is rarely adopted.

2.2 Specification of the Term “Communication” for Terrorism Research “In every branch of science, there are traditions of thought that set definitions or at least prescribe attitudes, and in every subject, in every discipline, concepts undergo changes, adaptations, and recastings over time. It is no different with communication” (Rau, 2013, p. 21). Communication lies “in the borderland of numerous well-­ founded fields of research” (Cherry, 1963, p. 13), of which psychology, linguistics, and biology are examples. In its history of determining its main object of study, communication studies has benefited from the findings of these other disciplines and has refined its own view over decades. Burkart (2003, p. 169) states right at the beginning of his remarks on communication: “There is no overarching, all-­ encompassing theory of communication and there never will or can be. The understanding of communication (and thus its definition) is always connected to the respective epistemological interest and the related (analytical) perspective.” If communication studies has not yet distinguished itself with a detailed examination of the topic of “terrorism”, the definition of its formal and material object

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“communication” has occupied it since its beginnings. This Sect. 2.2 explicates the concept of communication on which this book is based in a metatheoretical approach. Therefore, instead of showing diachronically how the understanding of the concept of communication has become increasingly differentiated, a brief overview of its current status and today’s heterogeneous theoretical debate will be given synchronically. The term “communication”32 appears at a wide variety of points in this thesis, just as communication manifests itself at a wide variety of points in the terrorist process – for example, as interpersonal, as mass-mediated, as stimulus-response, as an element of cognition and action processes. Here, then, the research question is again specified as the second key term emerges. Only then can it be examined whether terrorism is a form of communicative action and whether the act of terrorism contains a communicative component per se. If the word root has already been mentioned in the case of “terrorism”, the reference back to the Latin word origin “communicatio = 1. message, 2. participation, 3. connection” (see Stowasser, 1994, p. 100) should also be mentioned in the case of “communication”. According to this three-way split, the term “communication” will also be circumscribed in the following, namely via various explanatory pillars, which are based on divergent ordering principles or structural models of communication. The chapter begins (a) with definitions that focus primarily on communicative behavior and action, followed by (b) explanations that focus on the shared supply of opinion and meaning, and finally (c) explanations that focus primarily on the interplay between the components of communicator, medium and recipient. In a summarizing concluding section (d), the overarching aspects of the scholarly capturing of “communication” in relation to the study of terrorism are addressed. (a) Communicative Behavior and Actions A recurring component in definitions is the element of interaction. “Communication is symbolically mediated interaction or mutual mediation of meaning” (Scheufele, 2014, p. 107). Köck (2003, p. 132) wants to limit “communication” “to interactions with the help of verbal and non-verbal means of communication, i.e., sign systems, of all kinds. […] It is also crucial that people ‘influence’ each other intentionally, i.e., not unconsciously or accidentally, with the help of signs.” For Burkart (2003, p. 170), too, intentional action, a medium as well as the use of signs belong to the essential components of communication oriented towards understanding. In addition, reciprocity and reflexivity are added to an interaction. An important characteristic of human communication, which manifests itself as action, is thus intentional For the determination of the functions of terms (communicative, contextual, economic, ordering, provocative) and their definition, see Merten (1977, p. 30). 32

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ity (see also Rosengren, 2000, p.  36), often also the reflection of one’s own communicating and that of others. Intentionality or purposefulness often happens intersubjectively: “communication is intersubjective, purposive interaction by means of doubly articulated human language based on symbols” (Rosengren, 2000, p. 38).33 A terrorist attack is a consciously planned, i.e., intentional, act. And it is precisely this intentional behavior that sociology calls “action” (see Weber, 1964, p. 3), or more precisely “social action,” when it is related to the actions of others, for example when the presupposition of horrified reactions by large sections of a society influences a terrorist group in its plans for an attack. The act of communication falls into the category of “social action” because it is ­directed toward a reaction from others. “Now, if meanings are also conveyed in the context of such social behaviors, then these behaviors also possess communicative character” (Burkart, 2002, p. 21). Following Burkart’s (2002, p. 27) model of the intentionality of communicative action, it can be said for terrorists that there is clearly a desire in them to put a certain interest into effect. And this interest lies in getting society to react (in panic). “All communication has information, communication and comprehension aspects. Communication is a social event that can take place linguistically as well as non-linguistically and opens up opportunities for consensus as well as dissent” (Krohn & Küppers, 1992, p.  391). Communication requires reaction and, in the case of a terrorist attack, is aimed at upsetting the normal communication processes in the attacked system. Burkart calls communication “a basic condition of human existence par excellence” (Burkart, 2002, p.  131) and a “basic anthropological constant” (Burkart, 2002, p. 133). In this respect, it is quite natural to assume communication in the terrorist process as well. Even if this process is often declared as inhuman, it is nevertheless man-made. Similarly, according to Merten, communication is “the ultimate prerequisite for the social. On the other hand, social structures act back on the respective possible forms and structures of communication on many levels” (Merten, 1977, p. 93). This is particularly evident in the phenomenon of “terrorism.” The forms of communication that are socially regarded as legitimate (at least in democracies) are no longer considered by terrorists to be viable in the sense of an actionable intention and a successful evocation of feedback. They resort to the terrorist attack as a new and, in their view, more assertive mode of communication. An interplay with the political and social structures encountered in a corresponding society is clearly evident here. “Communication as a volatile little social system is, to put it briefly, the nucleus of all larger social structures” (Merten, 1977, p. 165).  Rosengren (2000, pp. 38–44) distinguishes verbal and nonverbal communication, fixed and non-fixed communication, and mass-mediated communication. 33

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Failed or contrary communication (intentions) can lead to dysfunctions and grievances in the social entities. Even if the terrorist act comes as a surprise (see Sect. 4.7.1), in the long run it arises out of political, social and economic grievances (see Vultee, 2012, p. 44). Merten (1977), after an extensive inventory of definitions of communication as well as a process analysis of communication, in which he focuses primarily on the criterion of reflexivity (summarized by Merten, 1977, pp. 161–162), concludes that communication can best be described “with the tools of systems theory” (Merten, 1977, p. 162), for which he introduces the three dimensions of system differentiation  – temporal, factual, social. His final definition is: “Communication is the smallest social system with temporal-objective-social reflexivity, which allows treatment of actions and differentiates social structures through interaction of communicants” (Merten, 1977, p.  163). Again, Merten creates a link between ­communicative action and structural change, where both sides condition and influence each other. (b) Shared Opinions and Meanings “One of the key functions of communication is to generate shared meaning, a shared sense of the nature of reality. It addresses preferences, evaluations, and expediencies. In that sense, communication is a highly collective endeavor, and the polarizing effects of terrorist violence complicate the possibility of truly collective meaning” (Ayotte et al., 2008, p. 457). Terrorists divide society as well as communicative processes with their attacks. In an initial reaction following an attack, the discourse on this splits into the polarity pairs “agreement-disagreement and support-­opposition” (Ayotte et al., 2008, p. 457). A “shared meaning”, an attribution of meaning shared by the whole society, does not exist. Molotch and Lester (1974, p. 111) suggest looking not for this one attribution of meaning, but for the intentions underlying the communication strategies on which one particular reality (as opposed to another) is created. Communication thus offers the possibility of identification, which happens whenever symbols, opinions or meanings are shared and an “us versus them” feeling is created. According to Burkart (2002, p. 15), communication is first and foremost “about something quite mundane: about communications between people – about the fact that we convey some kind of message to each other […].” The fact that, in the case of terrorist groups, this mediation takes place first and foremost through an act of violence is what makes this mode of communication so extraordinary. Classical communication elements such as speech or (online) texts can additionally contextualize the act of violence. Burkart (2002, pp. 32–33) conceives of communication as a process of understanding that occurs reciprocally and whose main criterion is

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a successful two-way mediation of meaning. The terrorist act, however, is first of all unilaterally goal directed. In this respect, this normative criterion of “communicating about the content to be shared” (Burkart, 2002, p. 34) cannot be applied. Terrorism as communication does not have to lead to understanding in the target society; the terrorist act can also be interpreted here as a disruptive variable and abruptly break off communication without diminishing the attack in its nature as “communication.” However, the violent act often forces follow-up communication from the challenged party (see Fuchs, 2004 and see Sect. 5.1). In this respect, the “challenge” can be recorded as the jointly shared content of the two sides, but not an agreement on the nature, motive and goal of the attack. Rosengren (2000, p. 1) calls communication an “elusive phenomenon”. It varies according to time and space and according to the size and complexity of the communicating entities. It occurs within and between individuals, groups, o­ rganizations, social classes, states, and the like (see Rosengren, 2000, p. 1). Terrorism also occurs at different levels and across different strata of society. Everywhere, a different degree of congruence of meaning is sought or achieved in order, in turn, to satisfy different purposes and intentions. Functions that communication can fulfill in this process are, for example (according to Rosengren, 2000, p. 45), informative, controlling, social and expressive functions: the act of terror also carries information to the recipient, attempts to exert control, has a reflexive effect on social structures and expressively conveys the communicator’s attitude. Especially in interpersonal communication  – for example in recruitment processes  – the information is not always in the foreground at all, but a relationship is established between the communication partners, for example in a propositional, illocutionary or perlocutionary act (Searle, 1971; Austin, 1962; see also Sect. 4.9). (c) Interaction of Communicator, Medium and Receiver Terrorists are communicators because they function as “the source of messages sent out” (Burkart, 2002, p. 64). Specific to the terrorist attack as a mode of communication is the moment of surprise, which is invoked by the communicators out of expediency. This mode of communication contradicts Schmidt’s (1992, p. 303) constructivist view: “Communication is apparently not – as information theorists would have us believe – a directed process (S sends a message to R), but an interaction between equally active communicants.” In a terrorist attack, first of all, the two communicants are not equally active. Rather, the stimulus-emitting side wants to provoke a communicative paralysis, a kind of state of shock in the challenged society, but this does not happen in its entirety, because the receiving side remains active by reporting on the attack, taking security measures, and so on. The act of terror, however, as far as Schmidt’s argumentation can be accommodated, only

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becomes the intended message through (re)action and attribution of the receiver. “The phenomenon of communication does not depend on what is transmitted, but on what happens in the receiver. […] In addition to the content aspect, every communication also has relational aspects, that is, communication always expresses how the communicants assess the relationship between themselves. Successful communication, then, has a heavy presuppositional burden to overcome” (Schmidt, 1992, p. 303). The prerequisite before an act of terror occurs, as has already been pointed out above, is the feeling of asymmetry within the group that feels disadvantaged. The act of terror is now supposed to transform this feeling, it is supposed to turn the relationship sign, at least for a short time, in the other direction and make the communicators appear powerful. In doing so, the communicators, insofar as this is expressed in threatening letters and claims of responsibility (see Sects. 4.3.3 and 4.4), are aware of the enormity and forcefulness of their communication. “The fact that we construct communication within our cognition and language (with or without metaphors), and that we have choices in this regard, implies our responsibility for such constructions” (Krippendorff, 1990, p. 62). The terrorists substitute an act of violence for the act of speaking in order to radically underscore the transportation and “arrival” of their message. This raises the question of whether the act of terror really represents the “communication” or rather the “medium.” If one understands by medium merely the “means of transport”, one could say that the act is this means – but at the same time it is also in itself the message, it does not merely transport it. It is inseparable from it in creation and attribution and cannot exist separately from it. It is not a channel that is filled with a message. It is (as already indicated in (a) and (b)) a self-­ contained system of actions and signs – an original form of communication of the terrorists. Therefore, in the following, the act of terror will not be referred to as a mere “medium,” as a container for a message, but as an independent form of communication that can be observed and described. Krippendorff compiles “[f]ive basic characteristics of communication” (1990, p. 62) (see Krippendorff, 1990, pp. 62–65): 1 . Constructions of communication are largely arbitrary. 2. Communication is a fundamentally recursive process. 3. Knowledge about communication lies in communication practice. 4. Communication processes, language and technology co-evolve. 5. Communication mediates a trialectic between cognitions, interactions, and institutions.

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While arbitrariness and recursiveness of communication have already been implicitly addressed above, and it is also not surprising that theoretical explanations about communication are also oriented towards practice, important components of communication are to be highlighted once again on the basis of points four and five. The terrorist communication process has been particularly clearly oriented towards technological evolution. This can be seen in the fact that Polaroid photos and video recordings, for example, found their way into the transmission of terrorist events by the communicators themselves relatively early on. Terrorist groups also adapted the “new” media of television (including live coverage) and the internet into their communication strategies at an early stage. Regarding trait five, Krippendorff (1990, p. 64) notes, I define cognition as the process of constructing the realities we then see; interaction as the additional consideration of our own and others’ constructions, which includes language and technology that we use to connect these constructions; and institutions as the construction of supra-individual networks of interaction in which we participate but which we metaphorize from lack of understanding by, for example, assigning them legal status, personality, intention, or power. In my view, cognitions, interactions, and institutions cannot exist without communication, and all three are involved in a circular, principally recursive, mutually supportive, and possibly self-terminating process.

Krippendorff thus names individuals (the self and the other) and institutions as (inter)actors. Furthermore, communication can take place (enumeration based on Rosengren, 2000, p. 170) – and also takes place in the field of terrorism • • • • • • •

within a person between individuals within and between groups within and between local, regional, national and international organizations within and between administrative units such as cities or municipalities within and between societies/nations/states within and between associations of states/cultural spheres.

Communication can also be perpendicular to this enumeration, for example between organizations and individuals. This enumeration already includes the dispersion of communication across the different levels of society (micro, meso, exo, macro) and this is also applicable to the terrorist process (see Sect. 3.3). Finally, it should be noted that intrapersonal communication will play a subordinate role in this book. Interpersonal communication, on the other hand, takes

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place within the individual groups of actors (see Sect. 3.2) as well as between individuals within these groups, for example between terrorists and journalists. Communication within and between groups or organizations can take place both as “intra-group” and “inter-group communication.” O’Hair and Heath (2005, p.  4) describe the entire chain of communication and the various forms of communication in the process in detail: “Terrorism is an inherently communicative process. Terrorism is germinated through intrapersonal communication, it is incubated in interpersonal communication processes, it is nurtured through group communication, it is promoted during public communication, organized and enriched by organizational communication, and publicized and perpetuated through mass communication. Frequently, intercultural communication is a primary goal of terrorists. Make no mistake; the response and reaction to terrorism follow the same path. Communication serves as the lens through which responses to terrorism are identified and strategized, and communication becomes a primary tool for counterterrorist activities. In essence, terrorists and counterterrorists become communication interactants, locked in a fray of moves and countermoves that ends only when the communication cycle becomes interrupted.” (d) Overarching Aspects “Communication”, it has been shown, can be viewed from different perspectives and against the background of different theories and “schools.” In this Sect 2.2, a general definition of the term could be made, which will be used to select the aspects to be examined in this book. Since each theory has its own definition of communication – for example, systems theory has a different concept of communication than constructivism – the corresponding chapters will deal separately with the understanding of communication that applies in the narrow sense, for example, in Sect. 5.1 on communication from the perspective of systems theory and the extent to which the communicative aspects of terrorism can be captured using this “template.” To summarize the above, it should be mentioned that according to Krippendorff (1990, p. 63) the separation between communicator, communication and reference of communication cannot be strictly maintained. The researcher does not stand outside the object of research that is “communication” which is to be objectively captured but is part of the reality to be researched. Krippendorff (1990, p. 66) takes a critical view of the study of communication, rejecting an “orthodoxy” in the sense of positivist or naturalistic: the orthodox tradition “assumes the existence of a single, objective, and therefore experience-independent reality that must be discovered and described as it is, apart from perhaps minimal influences by the scientific observer. Even where this tradition accepts the conventional character of hu-

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man communications, positivist or naturalistic research techniques transform communication into an observer-independent phenomenon.” According to Krippendorff, the researcher should rather realize that he is in some way a part of what he sees and studies. Krippendorff (1990, p. 52) assumes “that an awareness of the emergence of knowledge and cognition underlies any understanding of human communication, and that communication research should therefore also be epistemologically oriented.” This awareness, as well as a background oriented towards basic democratic principles, forms the normative framework that underlies this book and was explicitly disclosed in Sect. 2.1.1, as it is increasingly demanded in the field of communication studies (e.g. Scheufele, 2011; Rothenberger & Auer, 2013; Rothenberger et al., 2017).

2.3 Interim Summary The second chapter delimited the object and knowledge area of this book. In order to answer the research question “How can the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ be comprehended with the help of communication studies theories?”, it was necessary to clarify at the beginning what is meant by the terms “terrorism” and “communication.” The analytical penetration of the subject area, the phenomenon of “terrorism”, has yielded the following list of characteristics: violence-laden, goal-­oriented, strategically planned, targeting symbolic goals, with an element of surprise, aimed at political upheaval, usually prompted by motives of a religious, social-­ revolutionary or ethnic-nationalist nature, linked to an organizational level, located outside accepted norms, aimed at spreading fear and terror in a society perceived as hostile. “Terrorism” functions as the material object of this book; the theories of communication studies function as the formal object, that is, as a specific perspective on problem identification and treatment. Communication has been identified as a basic element of social organization and social systems, as an intentional expression of oneself in a variety of ways – be it verbally, figuratively, physically, through violence or similar. The statement that communication is “the fundamental mode of social reality construction” (Altmeppen et al., 2013, p. 46) illustrates the relevance of examining this aspect in relation to the topic of “terrorism”, especially since the functions of communication according to Rosengren (2000, p. 45) – informative, controlling, social and expressive function – could be identified in terrorism. The aim of this book was presented as bringing terrorism and communication research together. Especially in view of the changed communication conditions with the internet and increased participation via Web 2.0 and social media as well as with the emergence of adap-

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tive algorithms in semantic Web 3.0, communication studies can contribute a great deal to better illuminate processes initiated by terrorists and responses to them. An insight into the extensive pool of definitions of “terrorism” revealed deficits in approaching a uniform description of the phenomenon. Above all, discrepancies emerged between the definitions from political institutions, which are often oriented towards concrete acts of violence, and the more abstract definitions from academia. Attempts were made to identify certain “types” of terrorism, distinguished according to motives, degree of organization, ideological affiliation, or territorial spread. One fundamental distinction concerned the difference between state terrorism “from above” and insurgent terrorism “from below.” Since the media behavior of the two types presumably differs significantly and since “state terrorism” is even more difficult to comprehend analytically as well as empirically, this book refers purely to forms of insurgent terrorism. Furthermore, fundamental differences between terrorist and common criminal acts have been outlined. These show why it is important to develop different normative criteria for terrorism reporting than for reporting on criminal offences and “common” crimes. Policymakers also face the dilemma of naming and classifying the crime, bearing in mind that the vocabulary of war feigns a symmetrical conflict, but the strategy of naming it a crime obscures important aspects (see also Fragnon, 2015). The next chapter clarifies which actors are involved in and around terrorism, in which process steps terrorism takes place and on which social levels. When comparing the individual phases, in addition to the communication emanating directly from the terrorists, the references to the arenas of action of the media, politics and civil society are always important.

3

Identification of Relevant Process Steps and Actors in Terrorism

Terrorism and communication are both phenomena that have certain distinguishing elements (see Sects. 2.1 and 2.2) and are characterized by certain processes and constellations of actors. Chapter 3 therefore derives the process steps and actors or actor areas relevant to answering the research question. This approach makes it possible to examine the relevance of approaches and theories to be discussed later.

3.1 Terrorism as a Process Brosius (2003, p. 402) is of the opinion “that a uniform concept of communication that is valid across all disciplines is heuristically not meaningful because it ignores research perspectives in each discipline.” The communication process, however, has an “organizing force in our discipline […], with which the objects, theories and methods of our discipline can be systematically unfolded” (Brosius, 2003, p. 402). The concept of communication as a process running from a sender to a receiver is certainly outdated (see Sect. 2.2). Nevertheless, certain levels of communication and action can be distinguished, which indicate a kind of process that is not straightforward, and sometimes even circular. A possible chain of communication can, for example, run from a politician, terrorist or press spokesperson via the media, the articles framed in them, to the recipients. If the recipient is an opinion leader in the sense of the “two-step flow of communication” according to Lazarsfeld (1968 [1944], pp.  151–152), he can shape the opinion in his environment. The temporal, content-related, etc., process is subject to structural and situational factors of influence. Depending on circumstances and conditions, constant determinants prevail or changing circumstances contribute to changes to the process.

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 L. Rothenberger, Terrorism as Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-38242-1_3

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The Lasswell formula is considered one of the oldest and most simplified process structures of communication. Like the stimulus-response model for describing the terrorist communication process, it should be made fruitful. Criticism of the corresponding approaches is taken up or addressed.

3.1.1 Lasswell Formula Lasswell (1964, p. 37)1 describes the general process of communication like this: “A convenient way to describe an act of communication is to answer the following questions: Who Says What In Which Channel To Whom With What Effect?”

This breakdown was already mentioned in some definitions of terrorism (see Sect. 2.1). As important characteristics of terrorist acts, which are characterized by their symbolic character, many authors state the following: the perpetrator is the communicator, the act of violence the message, the public the recipient, the effect the fear. One could now distinguish between the “What,” that is, the message behind the attack (e.g., the desire for autonomy), and the “Channel” as the act of violence. However, since the act of violence has a symbolic character, it is at the same time the bearer of the message and the message itself (see Sect. 2.2); “an act of terrorism is in reality an act of communication. For the terrorist, the message matters, not the victim. […] In our view, terrorism can best be understood as a violent communication strategy. There is a sender, the terrorist, a message generator, the victim, and a receiver, the enemy and/or the public. […] Without communication, as we have said at the beginning of this chapter, there can be no terrorism” (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, pp. 14–15). Schaffert (1992, pp. 1–2) also examines various definitions of terrorism in order to answer the slightly modified Lasswell question: “Who is doing what, and why are they doing it?” He identifies the perpetrators of violence (who), the method of violence (what) and the goals of the perpetrators (why) as organic elements within the larger concept of political violence. Schaffert (1992, p. 186) describes the main  The first edition of Lasswell’s “The Structure and Function of Communication in Society” appeared in 1948. 1

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function that the media fulfil for terrorists, and which could also contribute considerably to their success – and here again the components of the Lasswell formula come into play – as the transmission of an act of violence, perpetrated on symbolic victims, to a target audience. According to this view, one could even call the mass media the “channel” of the Lasswell formula, which transmits the meaning of the act of communication, that is, the terrorist attack (what), to the recipients (to whom). In this respect, one would recognize a “channel duplication” here, which equates the act of violence and media as channels and identifies them as inseparable carriers of the message. This would mean that there would be no terrorist communication without a publication and multiplication effect, since the spread of fear and terror in a wider circle of the public was mentioned as an elementary characteristic of terrorism. Linking the act of violence to the media is therefore essential. Decker and Rainey (1980, p.  1) therefore see terrorism, in contrast to other forms of violence, as a statement that is aimed at a mass media audience from the outset: “From acts intended to frighten those with power to change the status quo, terrorism has somewhat paramorphetically changed into statements designed to engender support or draw the attention of masses of viewers and hearers”. A sender (the terrorist) sends his message (terrorist act) to a receiver (the public). With regard to the other elements of the Lasswell formula, the questions remain: are the media now conveying the terrorists’ message or how do they contextualize/frame the event? In this case, is the event the message? And are the victims the primary recipients, the public the secondary recipient, which is only reached with the help of the media? The discussions to date lead to the conclusion that the public is the functional recipient because it is necessary for classification as terrorism, but the victims can be regarded as instrumental recipients. For Paust (1977, p. 21), terrorism is the intentional use of violence or the threat of violence by an activator (who). Violence is directed against an instrumental target that only serves to convey the threat of future violence to a primary target. The aim here is to force the primary target to shift its behavior and attitude towards the required (political) shift of power by instilling fear. Paust, therefore, regards the primary targets as those who – seen purely in terms of time – would have to be determined as secondary recipients, that is, not the direct physical victims of the attack, but the public whose opinion should be influenced. The target of the message, the “to whom”, is thus divided into sub-areas. At the final stage, however, the terrorists want to reach the public as the final recipients of the terrorist “message” via the mass media. Molotch and Lester (1974, p. 104) divide the news chain quite schematically into news promoters (in this case the terrorists), news assemblers (journalists) and news consumers (recipients).

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O’Sullivan et al. (1983, p. 42) describe the progress from the Lasswell formula towards an expanded understanding of communication quite basally and with little differentiation as follows: “There are broadly two types of definition of communication. The first sees it as a process by which A sends a message to B upon whom it has an effect. The second sees it as a negotiation and exchange of meaning, in which messages, people-in-cultures and ‘reality’ interact so as to enable meaning to be produced or understanding to occur.” While Lasswell’s approach belongs to the former understanding, the second understanding is interested in the content of communication with its signs and codes, the recipient in his (cultural, etc.) context and both (text and recipient) in relation to their external reality (and the communicator who encodes). Instead of limiting themselves to certain process pieces, McQuail and Windahl (1993) also extend the Lasswell formula – which they consider to be too limited – by a few components: Communication includes a sender, a channel, a message, a receiver, a relationship between sender and receiver, an effect, a context in which the communication takes place, and something to which the messages refer. Sometimes, but not always, they argue, there is also an intent to communicate or receive.2 “Communication can be all of the following: an action on others; an interaction with others and a reaction to others” (McQuail & Windahl, 1993, p. 5). All of these forms can be found in the terrorist process – as an attack, as communication within the group and as feedback evoked by the targeted society. Here, a link is made to the elements of communication already mentioned in Sect. 2.2, which also include (inter)action, reaction, context and recursivity, which – as described above  – also play an important role in terrorism. In its extension, the Lasswell formula can be used to explain fundamental process steps in terrorism.

3.1.2 Stimulus-Response In the concept of stimulus-response, the stimulus corresponds to the “who says what,” which acts (via a channel) on the “whom” and triggers the “response,” that is, the effect. The model does not provide for non-linear interaction and multiple feedback loops, but since the “terrorist attack” event is an extremely strong stimulus, it remains questionable anyway whether equal communication exchange is even possible here or whether the process in this particular constellation is rather relatively one-sided. According to O’Hair and Heath (2005, p. 5), terrorist attacks –  One can contradict this. Basically all attempts at communication are intentional (even if sometimes more, sometimes less conscious), otherwise one could also refrain from them. 2

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however complex they are structured and planned – are always simple in their message: “It made a simple statement. We are here. We can strike. We can hit at your mind, soul, and operations. You cannot prevent us from acting in this manner”. This stimulus usually results in an anxiety-induced response. The stimulus-response model is based on a linear understanding of communication; it neglects individual differences. Similar to the Lasswell formula, it is often criticized as over-simplifying and inadequate. Brosius and Esser (1998), for example, criticize the stimulus-response model and its presentation in media effects research. Theis (1994) speaks of a “mechanistic model”; here “efforts to improve communication processes with regard to the transmission of information logically address the person of the sender, who, in accordance with his or her intentions to inform, manipulate or influence, should design the message accordingly” (Theis, 1994, p. 31). At the receiver’s end, only the reception of the message takes place, which then evokes a response. Terrorist communicators attempt to generate an ever-greater media interest (response) through increasingly devastating acts of violence (stimulus). In addition to the media response, there is the political as well as the public reaction (following the media response). This results in feedback and reflexive processes that the model does not capture. “No communication scholar assumes any more that prefabricated, fixed meanings are transferred in communicative processes – on the contrary” (Burkart, 2003, p. 178). The notion of a passive audience has long since given way to that of active recipients; one-sided linear approaches have been replaced by approaches that provide intervening variables (see Maletzke, 1998). The S-R model was expanded by Woodworth and Marquis (1963, p. 220) by adding the organism: “Responses to stimulation depend in part on the nature of the stimulus and in part on factors in the individual. This principle is expressed in the formula S-O-R” (Woodworth & Marquis, 1963, p. 228). Later, the authors added the “world/environment” component: Thus, environmental factors exert influence on the stimulus, which in turn is processed in an organism-specific manner according to (environmental) world references and evokes a response, which in turn can be considered a stimulus. The model W-S-OW-R-W (Woodworth & Marquis, 1963, p. 220) can thus be continued infinitely. The small “w” on the organism shows that processing is linked to the situation. This is also true regarding the processing of terrorist events. The following R thus depends both on the stimulus and on the organism and its situation. “The formula W-O-W represents the continuous interaction of the environment and the individual” (Woodworth & Marquis, 1963, p. 227) and this reciprocal interaction takes place by means of stimulus-response ­processes. With regard to the victims, those directly affected by the stimulus without the possibility to respond, it is striking that the violence is directed against anonymous

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citizens and non-combatants who share a certain collective identity (see Goodwin, 2006, p. 2027). The individual or personal identity of those affected is not important. Goodwin (2006) calls this indiscriminate terrorism “categorical terrorism”, because it categorically attacks a group that can only be determined by its “enemy” collective identity. This can, for example, be based on a common ethnicity, religion, national affiliation or social class (see Goodwin, 2006, p. 2031; Ellis, 2019, p. 69). Categorical attacks often trigger similar responses in the individuals of the attacked group. They are – in the logic of terrorists – therefore more effective as a stimulus than selective targets. These are attacks in which politicians, for example, serve as targets, and which Goodwin (2006, p. 2030) calls “selective or individualized terrorism.” The stimulus can therefore be set differently by the terrorists. Karber (1971, p. 528) describes terrorism as a “symbolic act” that, like other forms of communication, can be analysed and consists of four sub-components: “transmitter (terrorist), intended recipient (target), message (bombing, ambush) and feedback (reaction of target).” The intended recipient is not identical with the victim. The more arbitrarily the victims of an attack are chosen, for example, not military personnel but commuters in a subway, the larger the circle in which fear is spread and who are called upon to respond. What is interesting about Karber’s division is that although there is a “message,” there is no medium. The terrorist himself acts as a “transmitter.” Without the further spreading of his message through the media, however, his effect would be far less powerful and the feedback, the response would be less. According to Karber, a stringent stimulus-response theory of terrorism would look like this (see Karber, 1971, p. 531): The terrorist attack puts the government of the attacked society in a quandary, since it is powerless to punish the terrorists; especially in the case of suicide attacks, this apparent inaction of the government seems like powerlessness. The state apparatus therefore overreacts by restricting civil rights, instituting surveillance and the like, thereby spreading a climate of mistrust and fear that may well create new followers for the insurgent group. Karber (1971, p. 532) cites the following as confounding variables that can influence the process described above from “transmitter” to “feedback”: “lack of fidelity in the medium of transmission (the choice of victim conveys wrong message to target), background noise (competing events obscure the message), target distortion (recipient misinterprets the meaning of the symbolic act) and lack of responsiveness (transmitter becomes ‘locked in’ on one signal and fails to regulate output to changing circumstances or target feedback).” Every victim – especially in the case of an indiscriminate attack – has symbols at the ready that the terrorist may not have expected and that can change the interpretation of his attack. “Background noise” means a disruption of the process by other attacks that distract from the

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original event. This expression brings to mind the “noise source” in Shannon and Weaver’s (1949, p. 5 and p. 98)3 communication model and breaks up the uniform process of the stimulus-response model.

3.2 Actors in the Process In addition to process and progression models, actor models play an essential role in terrorism research. This chapter identifies the actors in the communication network of terrorism that are relevant to the research questions of this study. It investigates which actors are involved in the communicative process of a terrorist act, its delivery, and the responses to it. The definitions of the phenomenon of “insurgent terrorism” have already made it clear that not only terrorists, but also politicians and other stakeholders engage in targeted communication with regard to the media and the public. Various stakeholders were also mentioned in connection with the Lasswell formula and the stimulus-response model, but these linear models were unable to illustrate the multiple communication relationships. In the following, various roadmaps for the identification of participants in the terrorist process will be presented before, under Sect. 3.2.2, a research-guiding model of its own will be developed, which can guide actor-centered studies as well as studies at the organizational or system level and which will be made fruitful for the systematic approach presented under Sect. 3.4, which reveals the various areas in the terrorist process in which communication studies theories promise to help in penetrating the phenomenon.

3.2.1 Actor Models To begin with, we will use Gießmann’s Terrorism Quadrangle (Gießmann, 1997, p. 268), which “is intended to symbolize a close communicative relationship between the different poles of the context of the act.” In the following, more complex actor compositions are presented (Wilkinson, 1987; Paletz & Boiney, 1992; Picard, 1993; O’Hair & Heath, 2005; Glück, 2008), followed by the reductive triadic

 Rau (2013: 70–74) summarizes criticism of the Shannon-Weaver model, among other things with the concept of triviality. Scheufele (2014: 108) also criticizes Shannon and Weaver’s model, which ultimately describes “no social communication, but only a technical signal transfer between sender and receiver,” since, among other things, a feedback loop is missing. 3

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­ odels (Crelinsten, 1987b; Tan, 1988; Nacos, 2007; Miller, Matusitz, O’Hair, & m Eckstein, 2008) (Fig. 3.1). By “addressee/target group,” Gießmann means the political rulers within the society under attack. He adds an additional level compared to many other models with the pole “victim,” whereby the victims also come from the “public.” However, what the terrorists really want to attack is not the civilians or a particular building like a bridge or traditional events like international football matches or Christmas markets, but the political leaders and above all the society behind it. The responding politicians, in turn, are also addressing not only the terrorists, but also their voters and the opposition, as well as diplomatic allies. For Gießmann, the victim has a proxy or mediator function. The victim transports fear, which is caused by the threat and the risk of further violence. The decisive factor in a terrorist attack is secret preparation and the resulting surprise, which “at the same time suggests the arbitrariness of further targets for subsequent violence” (Gießmann, 1997, p. 268). Gießmann (1997, p. 267) defines terrorist actors as “persons, groups or organizations who seek to achieve a certain (usually political) behavior of third parties by means of publicly effective violent coercion against selected, random victims.” What is important here is the “publicly effective,” which Gießmann (1997, p. 268) also emphasizes for the action level: “The main characteristic here is the active involvement of the public as a supporting means of pressure on the target group by the perpetrator(s).” He even describes the public as “potential secondary victims” (Gießmann, 1997, p. 268), who exert pressure on the government and the environment through their fear of not allowing subsequent

Addressee / Target group

Victims

Public

Perpetrator / Perpetrator group Fig. 3.1  Terrorism quadrangle according to Gießmann (1997, p. 268)

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v­ iolence. Both the terrorist group as well as the target group of political rulers are fighting for public attention. It is surprising that Gießmann does not explicitly include the media as an important stakeholder in his model to achieve this goal. This makes Gießmann’s model  – in comparison to the following one by Paletz and Boiney – unusable for the present work, because the function of media professionals differs from that of the public, of which they are only a part. Paletz and Boiney (1992, p. 24) see the following list of actors: 1 . Terrorists (current and potential members) 2. Government 3. Public 4. Victims and their relatives and friends 5. Media representatives Here, the social levels overlap, since on the one hand concrete actors (media workers, terrorists), and on the other hand, forms of organization (government) and systems (public) are mentioned. Paletz and Boiney also include “victims” in the list of actors, although this group is only involved in the process for a very short time. Wilkinson (1987) also acknowledges this. Wilkinson (1987, p. xi) lets the media be absorbed into “international opinion” and also negates politicians as a group in its own right: “Thus, there are at least five major participants in the process of terror; the perpetrators of the violence, the immediate victims, the wider target group or society that the terrorists seek to intimidate, the ‘neutral’ bystanders within the society experiencing the terrorism, and international opinion, in so far as it is aware of these events.” With this enumeration, Wilkinson focuses on the proximity and distance of a person to the terrorist event and to access to information. However, whether the “neutral bystanders” are actually to be found in the society that has been attacked or rather in societies that are not directly affected by the attack is open to scrutiny. Wilkinson (1987, p. xi) sees terrorism as a special kind of fight, characterized by a well-considered and systematic use of violent intimidation and coercion, which is followed by a climate of fear, referring to a much larger target group than just the direct victims of the attack. The terrorist act is a kind of propaganda of the act (see also Sect. 4.3.3) for its own cause. Wilkinson describes it as a “campaign” that is conducted to publicize the terrorists’ cause and force the wider target group to agree to the group’s demands. In a certain sense, Wilkinson thus implicitly refers to the mass media, without which a wide-reaching publication would not be possible – the “implicit” again clearly shows the research gap, the hitherto inadequate highlighting of the communication elements in the terrorist process.

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The situation is different with regard to the status of the media in Glück’s (2008) categorization. It defines actors and four different addressees in relation to terrorist acts as follows: “The actor performing the T-act [terrorist act, author’s note] applies his act of violence (e.g., activating a bomb) directly against an addressee of violence (e.g., vacationers, non-legitimate targets of violence or ‘innocents’) and indirectly on the one hand against the T-addressee (the populace) and on the other hand against the final addressee (the government), whose monopoly on force is called into question. […] A particularly central addressee, but one against whom no violence is usually exercised, is the media, because they provide access to the public” (Glück, 2008, p. 58).4 Mass mediation in turn triggers follow-up communication in various fields. Additional addressees of terrorists can also be potential recruits of the terrorist organization, its members or competing groups. O’Hair and Heath (2005, p. 5) speak of four actors, whereby the public is only mentioned in passing as a constituent in the communication process and the focus is directly on the media: These would continue the propaganda of the terrorists in the name of freedom of expression, free access to information and the right of the population to information. Public spokespersons, under pressure from the population, further fueled the communication cycle with statements on counter-terrorist measures. This would lead to an undeserved surge of terrorists’ power. The task of the media to provide the public with information overlaps with the terrorists’ desire for public attention. In O’Hair and Heath (2005), the media thus appear even more strongly than in Glück (2008) as a central element around which the other actors rally and which they necessarily call upon to achieve their goals. The model of the contextualization of terrorism according to Picard (1993; Fig. 3.2) also assigns a central position to the media. It is a model of the relationship structure of external terrorism, that is, it takes the perspective of state opponents of terrorism, the terrorists work against the existing system and want to completely overturn its order. State terrorism cannot be visualized in this way. It is not clear, however, why Picard only placed a certain selection of institutions in the inner quadrangle. Where, for example, the system “science” remains, is not addressed. This model makes it clear that terrorists do not belong to “society” from this perspective, which is internal to the system and tied to state institutions. They stand outside of societal happenings and do not belong to the legitimate actors. To this extent, Picard presupposes a social design in which society is reduced to something  Of course, public opinion is not only influenced by “the media”, but also by individual opinions, which in turn are based on socialization, personal experience and interpersonal communication, among other things. See also Sect. 4.12. 4

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73 Terrorists

Media INSTITUTIONS State

Church

Business

Populace SOCIETY

Fig. 3.2  Model of the socio-institutional contextualization of external terrorism according to Picard (1993, p. 25)

that has an outside and an inside, for example, formal demarcations of nations with state borders that make an inside and an outside possible, or simply legitimate and illegitimate actors. With their terrorist attack, the terrorists break through the structure and gain access to the circle of institutions they disrupt. Since the media are part of the existing system, they are in the inner corner of the institutions that make up and sustain the state. Picard sees mutual influences that the different systems exert on each other, as well as the influences of the institutions and individuals in the system itself. He also points to the possibility that some terrorist attacks are not transmitted through the mass media, but only through interpersonal communication, which would contradict most definitions (see Sect. 2.1). The government pursues the short-term goal of putting an end to the act of terrorism (e.g., in the case of a kidnapping) and helping the victims; in the long term, it works to punish the perpetrators and to prevent violence in the future (see Picard, 1993, p. 57). Its messages, conveyed through the media, are directed at the attackers, at citizens (who support the existing order) and at potential perpetrators of violence. In dictatorships that exercise control over media content, terrorists lack direct access to the media, which is determined only by journalistic selection criteria. Here, they take a detour via the democracies and their media, which can then exert (international) pressure on the dictatorships and their rulers. In such situations, however, terrorists can also rely primarily on face-to-face communication and surreptitiously distributed pamphlets. In contrast to Picard’s model are the so-called triadic models (Crelinsten, 1987b; Tan, 1988; Nacos, 2007; Miller et  al., 2008), which make do with a triangle to

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represent the actor relationships. Tan (1988, p. 23) assumes an at least triadic relationship that constitutes the core of terrorism, namely consisting of “a perpetrator, a victim and an observer.” For without an observer, terrorism could not develop its inherent effect. The moment of “making public” is already present in this reduced form, unlike in the case of secretly committed criminal offenses. In his constellation, Tan only refers to the direct terrorist act of violence. Miller et al. (2008) also visualize a triangle; they speak of a “triadic symbiosis that appears to exist among terrorist, media, and the public” (Miller et al., 2008, p. 44). They leave the victim’s perspective out of the equation and even politicians are not involved in the constellation. The triangle of Miller et al. is primarily intended to emphasize the function of the media as multipliers, as bearers of the terrorist message in an attack on the general public. Crelinsten (1987b, pp. 6–7) regards terrorism in his triangle as a form of political communication and in it refers exclusively to the relationship of terrorists to two different target groups. “More specifically, it is the deliberate use of violence and threat of violence to evoke a state of fear (or terror) in a particular victim or audience. The terror evoked is the vehicle by which allegiance or compliance is maintained or weakened. Usually, the use and threat of violence are directed at one group of targets (victims), while the demands for compliance are directed towards a separate group of targets. Hence, we tend to speak of a triangular relationship between the terrorist and two distinct target groups.” Here too, the role of the media is neglected. Nacos (2007, p. ix) sees the following specific characteristic of terrorists: “terrorists are particularly successful in exploiting the links between the mass media, public opinion, and governmental decision-making.” These three elements are reflected in her “Triangle of Political Communication” (see Fig. 3.3). The terrorists must now be added as an equivalent group, as was done for the research-guiding model (see Sect. 3.2.2). Another critical point to note is that here, too, the levels of

Mass media

General public / Interest groups

Government officials / Decision makers

Fig. 3.3  “The Triangle of Political Communication” (Nacos, 2007, p. 15)

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social stratification are mixed together, for example, actors (“decision makers”) at the micro level with organizations (“interest groups”) at the meso level. Nacos, who concentrates very much on religiously motivated terrorism by extremist Islamists and on the anti-terrorism measures of the U.S., represents the “thesis of the media’s centrality in the calculus of terrorism” (Nacos, 2007, p. 7). As a reason for this she cites the fact that terrorist events fit well into the increasingly widespread infotainment genre, which gives “villains and heroes” the opportunity to attract new audiences and retain existing ones (Nacos, 2007, p. 8). Nacos (2007, p. 15) is certain that most terrorists calculated the consequences of their actions, that is, the probability of gaining access to the triangle of political communication via the media. The triangle can be expanded to include an international perspective so that the domestic political construct appears within it, and around it the foreign policy construct with international media, alliances of states and the global public as well as international interest groups or NGOs. Terrorist attacks primarily find resonance in national media and among national audiences, but also in the international arena, depending on the size of the group, the political proximity of the state, the country of origin or country of training of the perpetrators. The internet makes this bridge to the international even easier. In reality, however, there are more terrorist attacks in a national context than in an international one, even if the media often pay more attention to the latter. A look at the actor models identified various participants in the process: Terrorists, supporters of terrorists, direct victims, families and friends of victims, (mass) media (traditional and new), the public, political leaders and governments, stakeholders abroad, an (inter)national (media) audience and others, such as churches and religious communities and businesses. The following chapter explains which stakeholders are considered particularly important for the present study and how they relate to each other.

3.2.2 Communication Quadrangle As already indicated, this book’s design extends the model description of stakeholder communication from triangle to quadrangle. The aforementioned triangle of political communication according to Nacos (2007), with the media, politicians and the public as actors, can serve as the basic framework for the research-guiding model, since terrorism is always politically motivated (see Sect. 2.1.2) and attempts to gain access to the triad. A different derivation could take place in the expansion of the triangle (see Fig. 3.4).

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In this model are the three groups of actors who want or need to communicate with each other. Since direct communication is often not possible, the actors fall back on the media and on (mass media) mediated communication. In this respect, “media” could now be added to each of the cross-ties; thus the strands of action of the media in this schema would be linked to the respective main groups of actors. However, this would not do justice to the central position of the media as actors acting on their own responsibility and would reduce them to the function of a mere channel, a transmitter and messenger. Terrorism, as it is also defined by most researchers (see Sect. 2.1), is to be considered in this work from a point in time when dense interaction with mass media, including above all television, was already possible. Most authors see the 1972 Olympic Games as the key date for the beginning of an extreme medialization of terrorism. If one takes into account the importance of the media, one can no longer speak of a triangle with regard to terrorism, but rather of a communication quadrangle with the constituent public, government, terrorist organization and media, because: “The media do not simply reflect the conflict between the terrorists and the opponents they perceive as enemies: they actively participate in the discussion about terrorism, they select opinions and facts, they evaluate and weight them. In other words, they act actively within the conflict and are thus independent actors” (Glaab, 2007, p. 13). The spatially limited audience, which was a direct witness to the attack, is expanded by the media to a dispersed mass audience. And it is precisely this that is decisive in order to be able to speak of “terror” as a feeling of fear and paralysis within a broad segment of the population. It is the media that create this multiplication of news distribution, through which instilling fear in the whole system and a certain perspective are achieved. The media expand the stage, the public becomes an audience (see Sect. 5.5).

Terrorists

Politicians

Fig. 3.4  Triangle of actors

Civil society

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This argumentation argues in favor of including the media as a fully-fledged actor in the research-guiding model. In the literature, two works can be found that have also identified the four areas mentioned as the central stakeholders: Alkarni (2005) speaks of the following four actors: (a) terrorists: creating events, (b) media: reporting events, (c) governments: influencing events and (d) public: understanding events (see Alkarni, 2005, p. 9). The attribution of functions must be criticized as too schematic: Media and public (reactions) also influence events. Weinhauer and Requate (2006: 15) define quite similarly as participants in the communication process “first of all the terrorist perpetrators of violence and their immediate environment, then the state, which must see itself challenged in its monopoly on the use of force, and finally the affected society, which in turn can be divided into very different groups. The media play a central role in the communication process” (Weinhauer & Requate, 2006, p. 15). What is missing from both of the approaches mentioned is, in turn, the separation of the actors or areas of actors mentioned with regard to social levels. Terrorists as individuals cannot be equated with “the media” or “the state.” The following model (Fig. 3.5) aims to focus this blurring by clearly separating the macro, meso and micro levels. In the communication quadrangle, everyone can communicate unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally and also internally within their own group and level, whereby the processes often run synchronously, that is, several communication relationships are served at the same time. The “citizens” stand for the largest group of “civil society”, but of course representatives of other poles such as politicians and journalists also belong to “civil society”, so that here the term “civil society” preferentially stands for all citizens who do not primarily belong to one of the other groups. “Civil society” in this respect also means the primary “public” addressed by the other groups. Here, the public arena, which will be defined more precisely later (see Sect. 5.5), hovers between the four groups of actors or is constituted by them. The three areas of journalism, politics and civil society only define the attack Fig. 3.5 Communication quadrangle

Terrorism / Terrorist organization / Terrorists

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

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as “terrorism” through their attribution(s). It can happen that not all of them do so, for example, attacks in Israel or Palestine are labelled differently by different media. The direct victims would be in the relevant group, depending on whether they were politicians, journalists or other civilians, and would have to be identified as the appropriate sub-group, depending on the case. The group of victims and their relatives is only relevant for the communication process for a short period of time, and as a unit with the attack, it is rather the trigger (stimulus) of communication. Unless this group receives long-term media attention or compensation from the state, it will quickly fall out of the relevant communication process. Waldmann (2012, p. 49) describes the victims as “message vehicles”; the perpetrators are indifferent to them. This is the reason why the group should not be expelled separately, but rather classified at most as a subgroup of civil society (or of politics or journalism, depending on the type of attack). The target group of terrorists is much broader than the direct victims: the target group is all those who bear specific traits that the victim also possessed.5 Other target groups of terrorists are global public opinion, the government and the national majority that contradicts the aims of the terrorists, the national minority or social class for which the terrorists claim to be fighting, still competing political movements, and their own people and supporters. The target public as a whole is therefore larger than the mere target group of victims and opponents, because this includes those who may be positive or neutral to the cause of the terrorists. Before the next chapter discusses the classification of the quadrangle terms with regard to the three levels of society in more detail, the objectives and forms of communication of the actors will be addressed by way of examples. The goals of the quadrangle participants differ: For the politicians, it is re-­ election, for the media, a high circulation or ratings, for the terrorists, the upheaval of political circumstances and the recruitment of like-minded people, and the citizens strive for security and prosperity. To achieve the goal of re-election, politicians naturally want to ensure security and prevent further acts of violence. To achieve this, they often make use of national security forces or even the military, which they send to a separatist area, for example. Stakeholders use very different forms of communication to contact a particular group or several groups, for example, claims of responsibility from terrorists are addressed to all three other poles, information on the Internet may be intended for  “[T]he political terrorist’s victim is symbolic. A victim is chosen who is representative of a target group that is strategically involved in the terrorist’s political goals” (Schaffert, 1992, p. 44). See also Sect. 4.3.1. 5

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internal communication only; political representatives may choose press releases or face-to-face meetings with journalists or address citizens directly at election campaign events,6 etc. The public sphere of civil society (outside the media and politics) is constituted by social groups and individuals communicating with each other on specific issues. Public expressions of opinion by active citizens entail follow-up communication through the mass media. A certain climate of opinion emerges, is taken up, presented and interpreted by the media and thus transmitted to other communication poles such as politicians and terrorists. In the quadrangle, therefore, bipolar, tripolar and multipolar communication is possible. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with theories of communication studies that can be used to enrich and explain the quadrangle presented above, such as systems theory, action theory, news value theory, constructivism or the spiral of silence, and how the relationships between actors, organizations and systems can be described and examined from these perspectives. First, however, it should be specified at which social levels “terrorism as communication” can be located.

3.3 Stratification into Social Levels In the research-guiding model (Fig. 3.5), the micro-level actors are: terrorists, journalists, politicians and citizens. At the meso level, the organizations follow, that is, associations of individuals subject to certain formalized structures: terrorist organizations, media organizations7 (including news agencies), governments and public or private organizations, here called citizens’ groups, such as associations, clubs, formed ethnic groups, commercial enterprises and religious communities, but also short-term associations such as youth or civil rights movements. “Citizens’ group” is not a set term, so it is introduced in this context as an auxiliary construct to conceptually refine the meso level of the public sphere. Since the meso level, as explained, combines quite different organized entities, a distinction is made below between the meso and exo level. At the macro level, the overarching systems are terrorism, journalism, politics and the public. A precise derivation and location of

 However, politicians often communicate with citizens via the media, unless they are speaking to citizens during an election campaign speech, for example. Thus, political statements usually appear in the media, whether “live” via television or in quotations in a print article. 7  The question of whether media at the meso level should now be treated as organizations or institutions will not be further pursued here, but the discussion on this acknowledged (see Altmeppen, 2006; Kiefer, 2010; Künzler et al., 2013). 6

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these systems is given in the chapters on systems theory (Sect. 5.1) and public sphere (Sect. 5.5). The social levels mentioned can be separated analytically, but not always in practice. For example, changes at the micro or meso level can affect the structures at the macro level and vice versa. According to Shoemaker and Reese (1991, pp. 8–9), communication research ranks on a continuum between the micro- and macro-perspective, between the smallest units of a system up to the largest. A micro-­level study then examines communication as an activity that relates to, emanates from and influences individuals; a macro-level study focuses on social structures that are beyond the control of a single individual, that is, social networks, organizations, or cultures. The organizations mentioned by Shoemaker and Reese are now located at the meso level according to today’s three-level understanding. While Shoemaker and Reese still saw a given hierarchy of influences from the macro to the micro level, it is understood today that the micro level also decisively shapes the higher social levels. The social levels not only reproduce themselves constantly, they can also develop evolutionarily. New things can arise, or rather “emerge,” from their interaction. Krohn and Küppers (1992, p. 389) define emergence as “the appearance of new layers of being […], which cannot in any way be derived, explained or predicted from the properties of an underlying level. Therefore, they are perceived as ‘unexpected,’ ‘surprising,’ etc. In a modern version, one speaks of emergence when a new quality emerges through microscopic interaction on a macroscopic level, which cannot be derived from the properties of the components (causally explainable, formally derivable), but which nevertheless consists solely in the interaction of the components.” To what extent terrorism emerged as a “new layer of being” in existing systems is clarified in Sect. 5.5. The American developmental psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner distinguishes an additional level to the social levels mentioned so far: the exosystem. “An exosystem is an extension of the mesosystem embracing other specific social structures, both formal and informal, that do not themselves contain the developing person[8] but impinge upon or encompass the immediate settings in which that person is found, and thereby influence, delimit, or even determine what goes on there. These structures include the major institutions of the society, both deliberately structured and spontaneously evolving, as they operate at a concrete local level” (Bronfenbrenner, 1978, p. 36). Examples include “the world of work” including the labor and training market with its large authorities, “the administration,”  Bronfenbrenner’s essay deals with developmental psychology; for communication studies, one could speak of “actor” or “individual.” 8

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c­ omprehensive educational institutions of the educational system with (at the meso level) specific schools and universities, the security apparatus with its organizations of police and intelligence service at the meso level,9 “the mobility system,” and larger institutions that are distinct from organizations. As described in the definition, the individual cannot “sign up” for membership in the exosystem voluntarily but is automatically affected by the structures. Thus, one can be enrolled in a school, but not in the “education” system. A soldier has a contract with the organization “Bundeswehr” (German armed forces), but not with the system “security apparatus,” to which he automatically belongs (without further action). From a stratification point of view, the exosystem is located below the macrosystem. “A macrosystem refers to the overarching institutional patterns of culture or subculture, such as the economic, social, educational, legal and political systems, of which micro-, meso-, and exosystems are the concrete manifestations” (Bronfenbrenner, 1978, p. 36). The meso level is characterized by social networks of microsystems in which the subject participates and which exhibit formalized structures. Network theories often start here, at the meso level of communication. “Terror is then either primarily a question of the internal organizational communication of terror networks or a question of the diffusion of messages via interpersonal networks (Beck & Quandt, 2011, p. 87). An organization forms its own structures in the overall societal organism, which contribute to the solution of a specific task (see Cherry, 1963). Network theories provide an analytical approach here. Karmasin and Weder (2014, p. 81), for example, describe corporate communication from a network theory perspective as “communicative network management.” Accordingly, the task and goal of the organization manager is to establish connections to and between the various stakeholders, for example, between potential interested parties, various “departments” such as resource management, internet and social media sites and/or attack planning. It is precisely these networks that need to be discovered in anti-terrorism work and the connections must be disrupted. Even if Bronfenbrenner’s definitions differ slightly from those commonly used in communication studies, it remains to be considered whether certain levels of activity should not be placed on a kind of “exo level” here as well. Kemmesies (2006, p. 17) defines the exo level as “social structures of a formal or informal nature that control the flow and activity patterns within meso- and microsystems”. Examples of exosystems within the actor taxonomy are

 Conversely, also “organized crime” as a subsystem of politics and economy, represented on the meso level by gangs and on the micro level by individual offenders. 9

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(a) Al-Qaida as a network structure with a number of alliances operating at the organizational level; (b) “the publishing industry” as a conglomerate of media organizations or (c) pooling: a structure that brings together individuals (in this case foreign correspondents) from certain pre-selected media organizations. (d) Strictly speaking, the government and opposition are also social structures at the exo level; at the meso level, the party serves as a formal organization. (e) In the public domain, for example, the formal structure of the state-run school system exists, which provides structures for the organizational form of the school and thus also for the specific schools at the meso level, but which itself is in turn rooted in the entire “education system.” An example of informal social structures at exo level is “kinship.” Kinship is neither a macro-system nor an organization, but a structure in which individuals are grouped together according to strict criteria; kinship can also be relevant in terrorism (see Sect. 4.1). The example of religion can also be easily categorized over the four levels: The “faith communities” such as Christians, Muslims, Hindus, etc. are subject to the system “religion,” which includes large organizations such as the Vatican and small organizations such as church congregations and finally, as individual actor, the believer. Since the exo level is not yet established in communication studies, the examples only served as a first draft. Wherever possible, the exo level is introduced into the canon of the theories appearing in Chaps. 4 and 5 as an innovation, otherwise this book leaves it at the traditional three-way division.

3.4 System for Recording the Terrorist Communication Process The individuals, groupings, systems or entities acting on the levels presented appear at various points in the process surrounding the phenomenon of terrorism. On the basis of this process, relevant theories are determined and later made fruitful. In order to counter the accusation of “theory shopping” and arbitrariness, the selection of theories, models and approaches considered will be justified at this point on the basis of a schema to be developed. The focus is on approaches that are firmly anchored in communication studies, even if they originate, for example, in

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­sociology.10 Basically, the list of Altmeppen et al. (2013, pp. 62–64) was used as a compilation of the body of theory in communication studies, matched with the theories mentioned in relevant introductory works (Burkart, 2002; Kunczik & Zipfel, 2005; Donges, Leonarz, & Meier, 2010; series “Konzepte. Ansätze der Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft” [Concepts. Approaches in Media and Communication Studies], edited by Brosius and Rössler; Pürer, 2015; for journalism theories Löffelholz, 2016 and Scholl, 2016). For historical reasons, communication studies, which is still relatively “young,” also draw on many theories from sociology (see Schützeichel, 2004). Sometimes theories have been combined, such as “radical constructivism” and “social constructivism” under “constructivism” (see Sect. 5.2). The selection of the individual middle-range approaches as well as the basic theories will be justified once again in the respective chapters and discussed in terms of fit or applicability. It should be noted that this work does not provide an introduction to the respective theories but presupposes a basic knowledge of them. Also, a historical classification of the theoretical considerations and research is only provided in exceptional cases. Altmeppen et  al. (2013) list 78 theories, which admittedly cannot all be dealt with in this book, as they are not all applicable to the phenomenon of “terrorism.” Therefore, approaches to phenomena that belong to the field of communication studies but do not appear here, for example theories on commercial advertising, parasocial interaction or cyberfeminism, were excluded. How such an eclectic approach can generally be legitimized is explained by Richter (2011, p. 140), who considers a “juggling” with theories to be justified, since each theory is only ever able to illuminate partial aspects of a phenomenon. The evidence of the researcher’s “(epistemological) theoretical

 For the political science field, Jackson et al. (2009), for example, see the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies, Frankfurt School and Critical Theory, as well as historical materialism, as suitable for analyzing and classifying terrorism. Bonacker et al. (2008) have approached this task from a sociological perspective and describe the same problem (the development and activities of the IRA) using different sociological theories. Thus, their volume “Social Theories Compared. The Northern Ireland Conflict as a Case Study” (“Sozialtheorien im Vergleich. Der Nordirlandkonflikt als Anwendungsfall”) contains nine explanatory concepts for the empirical case “IRA”: The hermeneutic approach (Jo Reichertz), the cultural sociological approach (Andreas Pettenkofer), the Weberian perspective (Jens Greve), the neoinstitutionalism view (Georg Krücken/Frank Meier), practice theory (Frank Hillebrandt), functionalism (Christian Lahusen), explanatory sociology (Andrea Maurer), sociological systems theory (Wolfgang Ludwig Schneider), and actor-centered differentiation theory (Uwe Schimank) (see Bonacker et al., 2008, p. 11). Kron and Reddig (2007) aimed to analyze and explain transnational terrorism with the help of sociological theories. Here, too, communication aspects moved into the background. 10

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b­ ackground” (Richter, 2011, p. 215) that has been experienced and recognized so far entitles him or her to select and integrate theories. The selection is made (a) along the communication process in sequences motivated by a terrorist attack (see Fig. 3.6) and (b) on the basis of the interrelationships of the four actors identified and relevant to answering the research question (see Sect. 3.2.2). Also in this book – as in Merten (1977; see above) – communication is to be understood as a process between (at least) two communication partners.11 The schematic introduced above (Fig. 3.5) will precede the process part to be discussed in each section, and the main direction of communication as well as the partners will be emphasized in bold type. A combination of the actor model guiding the research with a model of the terrorist process (Fig. 3.6), which is yet to be presented, helps to keep the focus on the currently discussed process part, but does not obscure the non-linearity of communication. “The scientific concept of process is fundamentally ecological; it suggests that everything is interlinked, sometimes even to the point that it’s hard to tell where or when one thing begins and another ends” (Anderson & Ross, 2002, p. 58). A system for categorizing the process and work steps can now be deductively derived from the broad concept of communication presented above. In a particular situation – as it occurs for the components in the communication process – elements of all three (or four) social levels can always be found. Bronfenbrenner (1978, p.  35) calls such a situation a “setting,” defined as a situation existing through certain constituents: “The factors of place, time, physical characteristics, activity, participants, and role constitute the elements of a setting.” Precisely such settings can also be found in the research-guiding process system to be presented now, to which the theories of communication studies are applied, for example in the case of claims of responsibility written at a certain time (usually after the attack) in a certain space and context, on paper or virtually on the internet, by a member of a terrorist group, addressed to a media representative, a newsroom, “the media” in general, etc. The analytical differentiation according to sub-areas remains necessary in order to be able to capture the terrorist process from the perspective of communication studies. Thus, the process is split into individual components to be able to guarantee a certain observer perspective and research focus (see Sect. 2.2). There is no question that the processes in reality are much more complex and multidimensional.

 In the section on basic theories, the concept of communication applicable here is dealt with in each case within the section on the respective theory, for example, a systems-theoretical or action-theoretical understanding of communication. 11

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The purpose of the deductively derived process representation is to capture the phenomenon of terrorism in a small-scale communication studies perspective. In doing so, theories that appear suitable are assigned to the following parts of the process identified by the state of research: non-violent actions of the terrorists (also before an attack), the attack itself, the claim of responsibility (which in principle also is included in non-violent communication, but is treated separately after the attack because of its direct connection to the attack), actions of the media, actions of politics, actions of the recipients or civil society. It seemed to make more sense to choose a process model than to present the body of theory on the basis of micro, meso and macro levels in the sense of socially integrative models, since many theories do not stringently differentiate these levels, but rather focus more on processes and procedures. The model guides the section sequence of Chap. 4. This deals with middle-range theories. These show different levels of complexity, and a few are partially relevant in several areas of the process system (Fig. 3.6), so they are also mentioned at the appropriate places (again, but related to the respective other “action arena”). Redundancies thus only show the versatile applicability of a certain approach. Finally, Chap. 5 is dedicated to the overarching perspective and brings into focus the so-called basic, foundational, grand, super or key theories (see Rühl, 2008, p. 189), which aim to explain not only a particular section, a particular arena of action, but society and its processes as such. The reason why the basic theories follow the middle-range theories is that it is easier in terms of knowledge construction to go from the concrete, i.e., from the explication (of the circumstances) of a phenomenon, the communication sub-areas or “settings” to the more abstract basic theories. Only knowing in detail allows one to understand the overarching view. A theory should explain a circumstance analytically. In this context, middle-range theories belong to the group of theories that focus on communication in relation to concrete phenomena. They “can generally be traced back to theories of the higher level, but their scope is much smaller, they only want to be responsible for the respective selected area of communicative reality” (Burkart, 2003, p. 171). The individual sections separated later in the model cannot always be clearly delineated and do not always proceed successively. The process diagram forms a kind of ideal-typical sequence, because, for example, an attack is not always followed by claims of responsibility. For analytical reasons, however, an attempt will be made to delimit the areas in the following. These are assigned to so-called main arenas of action, which means that an area has been identified here that can largely be attributed to a defined actor and communicator from whom the communication and/or action to be analyzed emanates. However, “actor” does not mean that the

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action arena in question is dominated by senders at the micro level; rather, this can also mean groups and specific organizations. The communication process begins in the setting or in the phase of group formation and the emergence of terrorist groups; theories of identity formation in social movements are particularly suitable for this. If the organization finally comes into existence, the researcher can turn to it from the perspective of organizational theory. Terrorism, as stated in Sect. 2.1.4, is considered a communication strategy that is put into action in different ways. First of all, the physical act, the deed such as bombing or kidnapping, is a distinguishing factor. However, in addition, terrorists also implement their strategy through text, images, and language. Therefore, textuality and orality before and after the attack such as claims of responsibility or videos are equally considered with theories of public relations and marketing, computer-mediated communication, and specific attribution processes in the ­system. Merten (1977, p. 140) remarks on written communication: “In the factual dimension, writing permits an immensely increased fidelity of reproduction of the content compared to oral transmission and reproduction, thus relieving it of subjective falsification and converging the scope for interpretation. In the temporal dimension, writing permits the accumulation of large sources of experience and their utilization for all future action […]. In the social dimension, writing allows any number of persons who are indifferent to one another to be brought closer to fixed selection abilities, in particular to be bound by knowledge of and adherence to written-down norms.” Other examples of textuality emanating from groups of actors elsewhere in the process include journalistic articles or templates for political speeches. The act that holds the most prominent status as a setting in the terrorists’ arena of action is the attack itself. It can be approached from a communication theory perspective as symbolic or strategic communication, as a media event or from the concept of the propaganda of the act. Clearly, the focus of theories in a communication studies view of terrorism is on theories of the interaction of the insurgent actors with the media and on the reception and impact of media content. Here, communication studies and (for the media action arena) especially journalism studies have theories such as gatekeeping and citizen journalism, newsworthiness theory and agenda setting available. Since strategy in communication has a lot to do with language and persuasion, among the “theories of rhetoric,” linguistic elements will also play a certain role in this book. “Language is man’s most important tool of communication – a fantastic instrument for transferring cognitive, affective and conative (action-oriented) information” (Rosengren, 2000, p.  30). Attempts have been made to distribute the theories across the settings of selection and production; however, even here there is not always complete separation.

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The task of theories is primarily “to explain change in a group or social structure over a period of time” (Slawski, 1974, p. 397). This tends to be the case for theories or even models and approaches of middle-range theories for short periods of time; however, they are generally more descriptive and easier to test in empirical settings than basic or macro theories. Slawski (1974, p. 397) identifies four key levels for assessing the quality of a theory: (1) explanatory power, (2) information value, (3) predictability, (4) testability or ease of application. Each theory presented in this book is examined for its explanatory power with respect to the phenomenon of terrorism, but there is no dedicated “quality testing.” Finally, the action arena of politics comprises models of the (limited) effectiveness of communication regulations, so-called “constraints,” which are oriented towards aspects of voter appeal and security, as well as crisis communication theories, which schematically describe the response options of a government. The use, reception and impact of communicative content dealing with terrorism – mainly mass-mediated, but also via distribution channels such as internet blogs, politicians’ town hall meetings or citizens’ demonstrations – are the focus of the last chapter on middle-range theories. Here, approaches familiar from reception and impact research, such as the uses and-gratifications approach, agenda setting, framing or priming, will be addressed. In the terrorist process, civil society is more likely to be a recipient than a producer. Across all stages of the process, moreover, terrorism can be analyzed as a system, as a construction, as an action, or with a focus on the public sphere. These perspectives are taken when examining the basic theories of communication studies. However, two major schools of theory – critical theory and Bourdieu’s field theory – will be left out, as their linkage to the topic of terrorism and communication is not immediately apparent. In Sect. 6.1, this is explained in more detail and suggestions are made as to how smaller points of connection might yet be found. All these considerations about the terrorist and mass-mediated process lead to the following schema (Fig. 3.6), which guides the structure of the two main chapters of this book. Some aspects, such as communication ethics and intercultural aspects, are not given their own chapter, but are repeatedly addressed within the sections. Chapters 4 and 5 will now examine the theoretical approaches mentioned above for their compatibility and usefulness in describing a particular part of the terrorist communication process in each case (see Fig. 3.6). The sociologically anchored basic theories addressed above are at cross-purposes with the schema, as they do not refer to only individual arenas of action. It can certainly be objected that theories of public relations, for example, also prove relevant in relation to different groups of actors, but it reinforces the analytical separation and subsequent empirical imple-

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Terrorists’ action arena (prior to or simultaneous to an attack): Setting “group formation” and “non-violent communication” ------------------------------------------ Theories of identity formation - Organizational communication - Theories of public relations, marketing - Theories of computerassisted communication

Terrorists’ action arena: Setting “the attack” ------------------------------------ Terrorism as symbolic communication - Terrorism as strategic communication - Propaganda of the deed - Terrorism as media event

Terrorists’ action arena: Setting “claim of responsibility” --------------------------- Attribution theories

Action arena of the media -----------------------------------------Meso level - Terrorism and media as symbiotic or parasitic relationship - Contagion theory

Action arena of politics ------------------------------------- Models of influence of communication regulations - Crisis communication theories - Theory of change

Action arena of receivers / civil society -------------------------------------- Uses and gratifications approach - Agenda setting - Theory of status conferral - Framing - Priming - Spiral of silence theory - Theories of reception and effects of visual content

Micro level - Gatekeeping - Citizen journalism Setting “selection” - News value theory - News bias research - Agenda building / setting Setting “production” - Format theories - Iconic turn - Theories of rhetoric

Fig. 3.6  Schematic of the terrorist communication process based on action arenas and settings

mentation to follow the presented schematic in the case of middle-range theories – even if this means accepting redundancies in the description and appraisal.

3.5 Interim Summary The attributes of terrorism identified in Chap. 2 were expanded in Chap. 3 to include actor constellations and sub-areas in the terrorist process. This was necessary to determine the communication processes: At which points does communication occur? Between which actors/organizations/systems does it occur? The prelimi-

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nary consideration of terrorism as a process led directly to one of the oldest and highly simplistic communication models, the Lasswell formula. This was taken up by various scholars (mainly from political science and sociology), some of whom extended it and applied it to the terrorist process. Some researchers additionally asked about the “why” of the terrorist act, some divided the target group (“to whom”) into primary and secondary recipients, others saw the effect divided into physical destruction and psychological fear propagation. Section 3.1.2 discussed the extent to which the stimulus-response model is suitable for describing the terrorist process. Even if the model certainly falls short and cannot suffice for a detailed examination, it essentially captures the two essential elements in the terrorist process with the simplification “S = attack → R = fear in the population.” It is evident that an analytical process model must go beyond this simplification in order to capture the complexity of an attack and its consequences. In a process model presented in this book, which is not logically compelling but structurally plausible, a differentiation was finally made according to six action arenas or settings, which appear as situations determined by certain constituents. The model leads from the formation of a terrorist group to the response of the state, it shows the path from the written or video claim of responsibility to the reception and effect on the reader or viewer. Communication studies models, theories, or families of theories were assigned to each setting and arena. In addition, in a separate step, it was clarified which participants act in the arenas. For this purpose, existing actor models were considered, which often appeared as triangles. However, they often lacked a prominent position of communication and/or media. A mixing of social levels was also conspicuous. These were consistently separated in this book’s model. It presents itself as a quadrangle with the constituents terrorists-­ journalists-­politicians-citizens (at the micro level), terrorist organization-media organization-government-citizen groups (at the meso level), and terrorism-­ journalism-­politics-civil society (at the macro level). An additional level of society, the exo level, mentioned in Sect. 3.3, has not yet been integrated into the model. Its fruitfulness for a communication studies-oriented view of terrorism has yet to be tested. However, initial considerations, such as the possibility of inserting a level of “faith communities” between the system of “religion” and the individual church organizations, are promising. Victims of an attack, who often find a place in already existing models, were not included in this book’s model, since they ultimately only fulfill a proxy function for the entire public in the society perceived as hostile, which is the actual addressee of the terrorist message. Decker and Rainey (1980) addressed the following question already in the early 1980s: “What role should the communication scholar play in the investigation of terrorism?” They found six fields of research: mass media, applied communication,

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small group/interpersonal communication, rhetoric, intercultural communication, and communication ethics. The research guiding model covers all of these identified fields and then some. Depending on the goal, each constituent can c­ ommunicate with different single or multiple partners. Additionally, actors at each pole could be differentiated by national or international scope: Thus, there are terrorist groups that operate nationally, others that operate internationally, national as well as international media, national governments, but also international alliances of states, as well as local, regional, national, international, continental, and the global public. Processes are by no means “purely” national or international. Often, for example, it is nationally active separatist groups such as the LTTE that turn to international organizations and publics (including the diaspora) to a significant extent in order to achieve progress in the struggle for autonomy in the national territory through international recognition of their cause. That the terrorist-media relationship and its effect thus emerge as essential process parts of Lasswell’s formula can be well recapitulated by drawing on Bockstette (2008, p. 8). “The purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience(s) in order to reach short- and midterm political goals and/or desired long-term end states.” Terrorists would primarily aim not for physical effects but for psychological effects, strategically relying on the symbolic power of their attack. The purpose of terrorism would not be to fight, injure or destroy the opponent, but to deliver a message to the target audience. Thus, if terrorism is to be countered, its “primary purpose,” i.e., the success of delivering the message, must be countered. Anti-violence measures often start at the exo level; this is evident in statements such as: “We must fight organized crime.” This creates an analytical naming of the “large-scale phenomenon” but is impractical as a tangible starting point. Concrete actions can only reach the micro and meso levels, such as lone offenders and gangs. One problem with anti-terrorist measures is that for far too long they have been framed in much the same way as measures against ordinary crime and criminality: Catch and punish the perpetrators was the only goal. In the case of terrorism, a phenomenon that is only named in this way from a certain perspective, the communication component in particular must also be addressed; this was initially ignored. When critically comparing different actor and process models, it was noticeable that the communication dimension was sometimes missing, did not occupy a prominent position, or was not elaborated in sufficient detail. When communication processes were mentioned, it was often only in terms of the terrorist-media relationship. This identified research gap again underlines the importance of elaborating in detail the communication dimensions of the phenomenon of “terrorism.” This is addressed in the next two chapters, also in order to guide countermeasures based on communication studies findings.

4

Middle-Range Theories and Their Applicability to the Phenomenon of “Terrorism”

As already mentioned in Sect. 3.4, the actor quadrangle precedes each subchapter in order to make it clear that although terrorism is captured as a process in this book, non-linear action relations are always present. Middle-range theories start particularly close to the phenomenon level. Therefore, this chapter includes many descriptive passages in order to provide a comprehensive account of the phenomenon of “terrorism.” Not all of the authors’ views or theses are empirically validated and some studies can certainly be criticized in terms of methodology, but this is not the focus of this book. Thus, besides the main elaboration of the communication aspects, there are also some specific descriptions of the research object “terrorism.” Furthermore, there are no detailed introductions to the respective theoretical concepts. Basic works on each subject are mentioned as references. Once again, it should be noted that some communication processes are at odds with the system used and that not all terrorist cases fit equally well into the flow chart or omit some points; for example, not all groups use claims of responsibility.

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 L. Rothenberger, Terrorism as Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-38242-1_4

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4.1 A Terrorist Organization Emerges: Organizational Communication and the Formation of Collective Identity Terrorism / Terrorist organization / Terrorists

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

This chapter covers the “theories of identity building” and “organizational communication” (Fig. 3.6) mentioned in the process diagram, which lie within the terrorists’ arena of action prior to an attack. Crenshaw (2010, p. 5) emphasizes what she had already addressed in 1985: “violent organizations can be analyzed in the same terms as other political or economic organizations” (Crenshaw, 2010, p. 5). Information exchange processes of terrorist groups can be described with the tools of organizational communication, a field that has become established in German communication studies, especially coupled with public relations research (see, for example, Zerfaß & Piwinger, 2014). However, research to date has clearly focused on profit-oriented business enterprises. Terrorist groups can be seen as small (or also larger and complex) organizations, as collective actors. How (a) such organizations are formed and what role (b) collective identity plays in this process will be discussed below, also against the backdrop of approaches to organizational communication. In the diagram, the arrows, i.e., the communication relationships between terrorism and the public, are marked in bold, because the terrorist organization feeds on citizens and must therefore win them over in dialogue. (a) Group Formation A terrorist organization often arises from a social movement. Roth and Rucht (1991, p.  18) speak of social movements as soon as “the practice of collective change points beyond selective corrections, indeed ultimately aims for overall social change. Social movement is thus directed, at least in the long term or in the

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background, at the foundations of social order, at fundamental questions of the distribution of power, the legitimacy of interests, the modes of domination, the conditions of socialization.” It is precisely this upheaval of power relations that insurgent groups have in mind. Of course, this is in no way a claim that social movements, even if militant and extremist, are terrorist. Exactly when the shift from peaceful to violent demonstrations to organized activities that the other side classifies as terrorist will happen is difficult to predict. The movements not only attack the status quo from the outside, but they intervene directly in social events. Through them, there can be a push for change and actualization. Often, however, they do not succeed in mobilizing the masses, but the movement remains limited to a small circle of participants. Simon et al. (1998) present a social psychological view of how participation in a social movement and collective identification go hand in hand. In this context, not only the (useful) goals propagated by the social movement and the assumed probability that these will be achieved, as well as any material incentives, play a role in a cost-benefit assessment of the person considering participation, but also emotional components and “social rewards” such as recognition and fame – weighed against social costs such as scorn and ridicule, exclusion or even health risks (see Simon et  al., 1998, p.  647). Tilly (2002, p.  88) foregrounds the communicative nature of social movements by describing them in terms of campaigns. As Tilly argues, they occur as conversations: not as individual performances, but as interactions between different parties. According to Tilly, these include a group of actors, an assertion or claim, and an audience. In addition, there are often allies, competitors and the state power, i.e., the challenged power holders who are supposed to change something as desired by the challenging group. In order to convey the claim to the various target groups, the actors require strategic communication. Which factors are responsible for the perception that the legitimized communication and persuasion possibilities are no longer sufficient and the social movement transforms into an illegitimate terrorist group must still be researched. The predictive potential of organizational theories and social movement theories is not yet sufficient to explain these complex dynamics. Therefore, only initial approaches are presented in the following. Crelinsten (2002, p. 80) refers to the threshold from legal opposition to terrorism as the “violence threshold.” This marks the transition from legal, non-violent opposition to criminality and violence, and from persuasive forms of political control to forms of coercion and violence. In a sense, terrorism forms a culmination of failed communication opportunities and emerges as an “escalation product of economic, ethnic, and cultural/religious conflicts” (Eckert, 2006, p.  77). Within the organization, there is an emotional as well as rational weighing of how and when

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to take the step toward violent communication. Similar to Crenshaw (see above), Kemmesies (2006, p. 5) also remarks on this: “All types of terrorism that have appeared so far are ultimately decipherable and an expression of prior, rationally-­ determined factors – as irrational as the attacks generally appear.” Kemmesies (2006, p. 5) sees terrorism “ultimately as a reaction to social conflict situations”. These give rise to ideologies and solidarity and mass mobilization effects.1 To this end, the terrorist organization that forms carries out persuasion work in its ideologically proximate environment. This is effective under the following framework condition: “There must be a small group of people who feel massively unjustly treated with regard to essential parts of life by another, much more powerful group with which one shares territory (whereby the territory can also be the entire globe)” (Reichertz, 2008, p.  40). When conventional negotiations are unsuccessful, when an open, collected demonstration such as a popular uprising is absent or suppressed, the group may resort to the destruction of symbolic targets, that is, those that represent particularly well the normative and social structures of the one under attack; “terrorism can be a means of interest articulation within the system […], viewing terrorism as a symbolic medium of communication” (Karber, 1971, p. 533). Some groups simultaneously try, via a kind of civil rights debate, to gain international attention and subsequently international protection, for example Tamils or Acehnese. The reason for the formation of terrorist groups is therefore often a lack of inclusion – including communication – in the existing society. At times, however, the existing governments have no intention of looking for solutions here, for example the British government for decades in Northern Ireland or the Turkish government in the Kurdish region. The result is ever greater segregation, which encourages group formation. In the case of many separatist groups, the separate language of the ethnic group is added as an additional communicative distinction. Organizational theory explains the dynamics behind the organizational patterns that terrorist groups use to guide and direct their members and activities (see Sinai, 2007, p. 41). Functions of communication within the organization include establishing loyalty, cohesion, and affection (see Sinai, 2007, p. 41). The charisma of the group leader can also support these functions and increase organizational loyalty. Modes of communication within the organization have changed due to technological advances, allowing secret communication over long distances. This has also allowed for organizational restructuring from hierarchical to network-like (see Sinai, 2007, p.  41), including communication to the legal political arm. For  According to Walder (2009), the topic of mobilization has been late to enter the research field of social movements. 1

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c­ ounter-­terrorist measures, it is precisely these legal organizations, such as Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland or formerly (Herri) Batasuna in the Basque Country, that are starting points for negotiations. This is because non-violent communication is prescribed here, and if solutions are reached here, this can severely disrupt the flow of recruits to the terrorist group, as there is no longer any need for its violent forms of communication. Archetti (2013, p. 1) calls terrorism “a confrontation of ideas – a struggle for the moral high ground and for the ‘hearts and minds’ of global audiences.” In her analysis, she refers to forms of social interaction prior to an attack, especially in relation to group formation and radicalization processes. In her work, Archetti aims to explain how the communicative aspects of social interaction lead to acts of violence; in other words, she conducts causal research (see Archetti, 2013, p. 6).2 She sees terrorist groups as social movements whose (current and potential) members are connected to different networks through communication. Depending on which communication to which network gains strength, the action drifts from non-violent to violent. Terrorism is socially constructed through communication (see Archetti, 2013, pp. 4 and 6). This perspective can be interpreted in the sense that a shift from classical organizational theories to network theories is considered necessary. Both start at the meso level of the terrorist organization and its communication but offer different tools for their analysis and would also guide counterterrorist measures differently. Kemmesies (2006, p. 11), in describing the phenomenon of terrorism, emphasizes above all “the moment of the organized, strategic and continued use of physical violence […]; terrorism is used with the intention of exerting a massive psychological effect on the social environment.” It is precisely for this purpose that the terrorist organization develops and switches its strategy to – from its point of view more effective  – means of communication. Then, however, organizational communication must take place in secret. It is precisely here that it becomes clear why the category of “single issue” terrorism was excluded above: Terrorism arising from group movements excludes by definition an individual actor: “Social movement is a mobilizing collective actor that, with a certain continuity, on the basis of high symbolic integration and low role specification, by means of variable forms of organization and action, pursues the goal of bringing about, preventing or reversing more fundamental social change” (Raschke, 1991, pp.  32–33). Religious movements in particular are sometimes directed against social progress; some separatist groups seek to undo territorial divisions created by colonial rule. Thus, for some groups, it can be stated that “movements arise from the inability of the  In doing so, Archetti refers almost exclusively to Al-Qaeda in her remarks.

2

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established institutional system to find answers to the problems articulated in the movements” (Raschke, 1991, p. 34). If the groups were still seeking a solution with their nonviolent communication as a “response” to their stimulus, they swing to “paralysis” as the desired effect of their attack. If the target society, which they perceive as the “enemy,” does not offer any solutions, the groups undertake the attempt to destroy society. Straßner (2004) ventures a comparative study of terrorist organizations as a basis for a kind of “model curriculum vitae” of such groups. Straßner, who refers primarily to social-revolutionary and ethnic-nationalist terrorist organizations, sees a similarity in terms of the conditions under which they emerge from an extremist milieu, their basic internal structures, their behavior in the face of state countermeasures, and the end of the terrorist organization, which sometimes manifests itself in the transformation into a political party, in self-dissolution, or in fragmentation. There are not only vertically structured and hierarchically structured terrorist organizations, but also small-scale networks with autonomously operating cells without comprehensive leadership – they can be organized acephalously, i.e., headless, or polycephalously (with several Hydra-like heads) (see Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 9). Straßner (2004) identifies the following life stages: A founding and forming phase is followed by the action phase, which in turn is followed by a latency or convalescence phase, which transitions into a phase of re-formation. Actionist and latent phases can alternate several times – sometimes the focus is on substantive counter-designs, sometimes on (also communicative) actionism. Finally, there may be a phase of delegitimization, in which the group acts without being able to continue to count on a relatively broad base; a bureaucratization of the organization may also increase. This is followed by the splinter phase, in which each splinter group claims its sole legitimacy and communicates accordingly. The public, however, is unable to distinguish between the often-similar positions: “The separation tendencies in the structure of the organization result in a lasting loss of effectiveness as well as a reduction in public attention” (Straßner, 2004, p. 378), which can lead to a phase of dissolution of the terrorist organization, since the original purpose of “gaining attention” is no longer fulfilled. Communication between different splinter groups is often counterproductive. Contrary to best practice examples from organizational communication, terrorist groups often do not have a “one voice policy”. For example, the Real IRA’s ongoing attacks undermined Sinn Féin’s peace process and ultimately the IRA’s position (Crelinsten, 2002, p. 82). By relying on different communication strategies, the groups were unable to move closer to their common goal of “reintegrating” Northern Ireland. In counter-terrorist operations, not only by state agencies, this can also be used as a tactic: attributing the attack to different groups in order to disperse attention. It

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would also have the effect of leaving potential recruits unsure which group to approach. Schade (2018) elaborates on the extent to which social movements generally rely on communication. She states, “Social movements fail or succeed because of either failed or successful communication” (Schade, 2018, p. 202). In this context, communication takes place both within the movements in the negotiation processes of collective identity and as outwardly directed communicative mobilization of interests; after all, the media communicate about social movements as a reporting topic (see Schade, 2018, p. 320). Communication plays an important role already in the formation phase of a terrorist organization, and this persists in the chosen or changing organizational structure  – both in the recruitment of like-minded individuals and in the “rethinking” of the group to use violence as a communication amplifier. “Terrorism, with the exception of psychopathic individual perpetrators such as the Unabomber, is a group activity. This results in certain organizational constraints and problems that a terrorist group must solve in order to be ‘successful’” (Daase, 2001, p. 705). The classical organization can be thought of as a four-­ member hierarchy (see Fraser & Fulton, 1984, p. 1): (1) the command – which is small in terms of personnel – is responsible for planning, strategy, leadership, and selection of members. (2) The cadre is directly involved in the attacks. (3) Active supporters procure resources; they often operate in autonomous cells. (4) Passive supporters form the largest group and are usually enthusiastic about the political objective of the organization. The greatest communication input in this hierarchy comes from the command. Terrorism as an act of violence is thought of by the command and implemented by the cadre. Passive supporters can also initiate cross-­ hierarchy communication by addressing one of the first three groups. Ronfeldt and Arquilla (2001, p. 324) identify five areas whose functional capabilities, in their view, determine the strength or weakness of the entire organization: (1) the organizational design, (2) the narrative level, i.e. the “story” that binds the network members together, (3) the doctrinal level, which refers primarily to collaborative strategies and methods, (4) the technological information systems used, (5) the social level – “the personal ties that assure loyalty and trust”. Ronfeldt and Arquilla (2001, p. 311) assume that network-based organizations will replace traditional structures such as tribes, hierarchies and markets. For this reason, they propose network analyses. “Organizational network analysts – or, since this phrase is not widely used, analysts who use network perspectives for studying organizational forms – utilize many of the methods and measures developed for social network analysis. But their approach is quite different – many of them view the network as a distinct form of organization, one that is gaining strength as a result of advances in communications” (Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2001, p.  319). Network

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s­ tructures are superior to hierarchical structures in terms of flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness. They are polycentric and segmented and, above all, linked by an overarching ideology (see Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2001, p.  322). Here, a few tightly connected network nodes contrast with many relatively loosely connected points. The communication flows here are more diverse than, for example, in a hierarchical formation. In this respect, it is not surprising that some terrorist organizations today are more agile and difficult to study. Counterterrorism experts must also acknowledge this and not limit their communication strategy to demonizing only the leaders of the group. Tekwani (2004) points to an important area of communication, namely communication with the diaspora, i.e., with people who have the same (ethnic, religious, etc.) characteristics as the group members operating on the ground, but who do not live in the immediate area of the group. The internet plays a prominent role here and has been able to significantly strengthen integration (see also Sect. 4.2.2). In the case of separatist groups, the internet can even serve to extend the organization to the point of becoming an online nation. Apart from a real physical territory, online nations exhibit a number of characteristics of state structures: they consist of state institutions and bodies, follow fixed decision-making processes, have flags and a national anthem. The “virtual homeland” is particularly interesting for compatriots in the diaspora. Tekwani (2004) has examined the extensive web offerings of Tamils in terms of their virtual national identity and concludes that “Eelam is the outcome of two converging networks, the social network that is the Diaspora and the technological network that is the internet” (Tekwani, 2004, p. 11). The internet, as a relatively new communication channel, has greatly facilitated communication and networking among terrorist organizations. It also helps in building a collective identity. (b) Collective Identity Every individual belongs to a community.3 This in turn requires frequent communication in order to convey and maintain the feeling of belonging to the individual. Depending on who or how the individual is to be addressed, communication must be functionally differentiated. Often, sub-organizations emerge within a terrorist organization that engage in structured communication, for example via websites and forums or in the performance of rituals. The formation of a collective identity can thus be interpreted as the result of communication. The discourse on c­ onverging  A community can arise, for example, through geographical or cultural proximity. In the case of religiously motivated groups, this can also be due to a similar interpretation of faith (see Rothenberger & Kotarac, 2015). 3

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imaginaries and collective identity of groups that have been classified as terrorist from a certain point of view has so far been strongly neglected from a communication studies perspective. This is certainly due to the difficulty of researching inner processes and perspectives.4 On the other hand, research into precisely these collectivization processes opens up new possibilities for anti-terrorist measures. “The real goal must be to stop the radicalization of the communities, as whose self-­ proclaimed vanguard the terrorists see themselves” (Eckert, 2006, p. 80). This requires a detailed analysis of the group’s environment and history. What legal forms of (collective) insurgency and what forms of (state) response to it already existed? What contextual factors have changed? “In other words, just as in figure-ground relations, the figure that is focused upon by the observer is determined by the background […], so the spatial and temporal background of terrorist activity must be analysed in order to grasp the full context from which any terrorist group emerges and within which it operates” (Crelinsten, 2002, p. 78). The term “context” echoes cultural studies, which point to a strong contextualization in media use. In a certain sense, a plea can be derived from this that actions should never be considered in isolation from a wide variety of influencing factors. In the case of radicalization processes in particular, media use, socialization, peer group and other components can only be identified as catalysts in their interaction. Eckert (2006, pp. 71–72) identifies two explanations for terrorist behavior and thus reasons for joining terrorist organizations and incorporating their ideology into one’s identity: “the deprivation theory explanation, according to which perceived deprivation is causal for the propensity to violence, and the culturalist explanation, according to which incompatible cultural traditions lead to progressive tensions and conflicts.” The former, also called the “social-polarization theory of terrorism” (Goodwin, 2006, 2036), holds that vast differences exist between two or  Few researchers work directly at the object of investigation of active terrorists. Of course, there are practical and security reasons for this. It becomes difficult when a researcher works directly with terrorist groups and there are then cases in which they reserve the right to make corrections before a work goes to print. In this case, the researcher gets access to exclusive statements, but at the same time makes himself or herself dependent on the object of analysis. Rapoport (2001) chose a viable alternative. He dealt with nine memoirs of former terrorists, almost all of whom came from social revolutionary movements. Again, of course, the analysis is subject to the self-selection bias of the terrorist writer. Post et al. (2003) chose a different path. They conducted 35 semi-standardized interviews with imprisoned Middle Eastern terrorists: 21 from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or Hezbollah; 14 from Fatah, PFLP, or DFLP. The answers provide direct insights into methods of recruitment, the terrorists’ personal environment (whether secular or religiously (Islamist) motivated), their attitudes towards suicide attacks or weapons of mass destruction. Methodologically, it is important to consider context, interviewer influence, and bias in responses due to self-selection. 4

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more groups, usually associated with economic deprivation of the insurgent group. Both explanations manifest as “unregulated conflicts” which lead to “spirals of interaction (feedback loops) in which violence escalates” (Eckert, 2006, p. 72). If conflict hotspots remain unregulated and no de-escalation takes place, the “emergence of collectives of solidarity and the identity transformation of the actors involved” (Eckert, 2006, p. 73) takes on such proportions that the spiral of violence spirals ever upwards and finally discharges in an attack. As a counter-example that identity transformation and collective formation do not always have to go hand in hand, Eckert cites the RAF, in which identity transformation was extraordinarily successful for many individual actors, but the movement failed to generate a comprehensive collective in solidarity  – one need only think of the solidarity of the population with the RAF victim Hanns Martin Schleyer, which was not calculated by the terrorists (see Sect. 4.10) or the outrage of the French when a four-year-old girl was seriously injured in an OAS attack; her picture was shown in the media with correspondingly emotionalizing captions (see Mannoni & Bonardi, 2003, p. 57). In mobilizing supporters, therefore, contextual variables are again crucial. For example, social revolutionary organizations in China and Cuba, also with violent actions, managed to get large parts of the (rural poor) population behind them, while social revolutionary groups in the European postwar “Wirtschaftswunder/ economic miracle” (an economic boom in the 1950s) did not gain a large following. This shows that even groups with the same motives must devise different (communication) strategies that are adapted to the respective environment. In the 1980s, a number of left-wing terrorist groups in Europe, such as Action Directe (France), the Communist Cells (Belgium), the RAF (Germany), the Red Brigades (Italy) and Dev Sol (Turkey), joined forces because of their collective identity and similar violent and argumentative style of communication (see Daase, 2001, p.  707). Similar goals were later pursued by GRAPO (Spain) and the November 17 Group (Greece). They were all united by a similar “interpretation of the world,” which they actively communicated through various channels (see for the Red Brigades e.g., Re, 2020; for the RAF, Rothenberger, 2017b). Surette et al. (2009, p. 361) have described terrorist groups, based on Fish’s (1976) and Lindlof’s (1988) considerations, as “interpretive or interpretative communities.” This means that they interpret the world in similar ways; the groups just mentioned, for example, interpreted events by looking through a left-wing ideological lens. Interpretations (expressed verbally, in writing or physically) and collective identity are mutually dependent and reproduce each other. A particular collective identity can be in strong conflict with other identities. However, if the conflict increases, for example through a demonstration of violence by a group that attacks a symbolic target, for example buildings or representatives

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of the economy, the sense of belonging to the respective ideological group also increases. Conflicts thus condense collective identity and lead to radicalization (see Eckert, 2006, p. 73). “Perceptual psychologists speak of a contrast intensification that takes place under stressful conditions” (Eckert, 2006, p. 74). In this process, the “friend/foe difference” (see Schmitt, 2000 [1932]) intensifies, which can result in a capping of networks to dissenters. One then withdraws to where one anticipates finding friends and like-minded people, for example to student communities, to Protestant or Catholic districts in Belfast or to the areas in the north of Sri Lanka that were controlled by Tamils at the time. Terrorism, as noted above, is an expression of military inferiority. This violence away from the “legal forms” can be strategically used and stylized by terrorist organizations; they uphold the clandestine, collectively binding character of their group. For example, a kind of “oath of secrecy” may be demanded upon joining the group. For political negotiations, however, it is usually more productive to appear as a representative of the part of the ethnic group, religion, etc., that does not operate clandestinely, as is clear from the example of Öcalan, “who has recently given interviews to the media all over the world but has so far not had a word to say in a Turkish newspaper. […] Underlying Öcalan’s recent statements is undoubtedly an effort to be perceived not as the head of the terrorist organization PKK, but as the political leader of the Kurds” (o. V., 1998, p. 8). It has become apparent that communication studies have not yet contributed much to illuminating and investigating the communication processes in the formative phase of terrorist groups. Here, sociological and psychological theories of group and identity formation provided a solution. In this context, the approach could be well extended with network theories. In this way, the various strands and interconnections in communication that give rise to the group in the first place would become visible. Recalling Slawski (1974), it can be stated that network theories have a high explanatory power, but their predictive power is still low and there are hardly any empirical studies on this. Now that communicative aspects of group formation and maintenance as well as collective identity have been illuminated, the following will always be based on the assumption of an already existing and actively operating terrorist group. First of all, the focus will be on the group’s non-violent communication, which can be regarded as public relations (see Sect. 4.2.1) or marketing (see Sect. 4.2.2) and which now takes place to a considerable extent via the internet (see Sect. 4.2.3). Here the focus is primarily on oral and written, i.e., manifest communication by the group, as well as visual and multimedia aspects such as videos on the internet. The non-violent, written, visual or oral communication is to be distinguished from that which manifests itself in action, i.e., the violent physical act of terror. Finally, Sect.

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4.3 focuses on the attack itself as the crucial terrorist act of communication – and, as discussed, to some extent as a channel of communication. It is the act of violence that, through its impact and subsequent attribution, makes terrorism in the first place.

4.2 Written, Visual and Oral Communication of the Terrorist (Group) Terrorists are aware of their own weakness in terms of military potential, which is why all communication  – even outside the attack  – is so important to them. Crelinsten (2002, p. 77) summarizes, “So, violence by the state or by the non-state actor can be conceived as a form of communication that coexists with other forms of communication, sometimes used in concert with them and sometimes in their stead.” Since, as noted above, terrorist organizations can be analyzed like other organizations, public relations efforts can be identified among them as well. In the process diagram, this area is still in the terrorists’ arena of action.

4.2.1 Terrorism and Public Relations

Terrorism / Terrorist organization / Terrorists

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

Rada (1985) calls both the relationship of terrorism to the mass media and that of public relations to the mass media symbiotic. He sees similarities in the objectives of PR and terrorism, but also identifies the essential difference: “Both share the objectives of commanding attention, delivering a message, and influencing opinion […], what ultimately separates the two is the social responsibility of the practitioner and the social utility of the end. Terrorism seeks legitimacy through

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s­elf-­ definition, not through the mandate of society” (Rada, 1985, p.  26). Organizations and enterprises that operate in a particular state, unlike terrorist organizations – which are classified as such by the state – must be measured against the social utility and compatibility of their actions with the prevailing norms in order to achieve their desired goal. Terrorist organizations go their own way in this regard. In this respect, Rada does not actually compare PR with terrorism, as he states, but rather PR measures of legal-economic entities with those of terrorist organizations, focusing on the attack as the main measure. But what is the role of the national or international media in conveying these “attacks in the name of an ideology”? Have they given rise to a new form of terrorism? “The media are a terrorist’s best friend. The terrorist’s act by itself is nothing. Publicity is everything. […] But the media are a fickle friend, constantly in need of diversity and new angles. Terrorists will always have to be innovative” (Laqueur, 1976, pp.  104–105). Laqueur’s unambiguous words indicate that terrorism has taken on ever broader dimensions in the course of (media) history. Laqueur (1976, p. 102), who perceived a shift from rural to urban guerrilla in the 1970s, already stated at that time: “The title ‘urban guerrilla’ is in fact a public-relations term for terrorism.” The designation does not immediately push the authors into an extremely negative corner but rather puts the actions of the organization in a halfway “legitimate” light. The “PR measure” of acquiring a more positive label is intended to make the group more successful. With regard to the violence aspect, however, it is also a problem of attribution (see Sect. 2.1.5): “It has become an axiom that terrorism describes acts of violence committed by others and that similar violence committed by one’s own nation, or by those with whom one sympathizes, is legitimate violence” (Picard, 1993, p. 3). And proximity to the media also plays a role for public relations strategists: “The success of a terrorist action depends mainly on the amount of publicity it receives. This was one of the main reasons for the shift from rural guerrilla to urban terrorist in the 1960s; in cities, the terrorist could always count on the presence of journalists, television cameras, and thus a large audience” (Laqueur, 1982, p. 133). Frey (2004, pp. 123–124) also provides evidence for later periods: “terrorists have started to change their tactics in order to accommodate media needs. This is one of the major reasons why Latin American, North African and Arab terrorists have shifted their activities from the rural to the urban areas. […] Predictably, terrorists mainly kidnap nationals from countries with large TV stations able to afford complete coverage of the event.” The PR measures of terrorist groups include not only their own naming and the dissemination of the message in the right publicity-oriented environment, but also all attempts by terrorists to communicate via their own channels, which Holbrook (2014, p.  147) calls “indigenous media platforms (such as the dissemination of

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audio recordings, videos or written statements).” Matusitz et al. (2019, p. 15) list five functions of (jihadist) online magazines as “(1) a form of strategic communication, and (2) a vehicle for violent propaganda, (3) a social construction of reality, (4) a recruiting tool, and (5) a training manual.” The magazines each constructed a distinct group identity through “particular rhetorical and public relations devices” (Matusitz et al., 2019, p. 11). Each magazine engaged in its own “brand management” and sought to achieve the widest possible reach. For example, Dabiq, IS’s magazine, is published in English, Arabic, French, German, and Russian (see Matusitz et  al., 2019, p.  15). Holbrook (2014) examined Al-Qaeda’s “PR initiatives,” primarily through its media outlet As-Sahab, and likewise examined PR activities of radical right and left groups. He concludes, “all leaders and strategists emphasised the importance of mobilising a given proportion of the population to join, aid and support the efforts of the particular movement in question” (Holbrook, 2014, p. 156). This finding is shared by Rothenberger (2017a), who used a cluster analysis to examine 70 articles from websites of ethnic nationalist terrorist groups or, alternatively, their extremist political arms.5 She suggests expanding conventional PR theories with mobilization theory (see Klandermans & Tarrow, 1988) to include the aspect that terror groups  – precisely because they perpetrate PR for unethical purposes – strongly aim at identity formation in order to mobilize people to develop a positive attitude towards their organization (consensus mobilization). Only in the second step can “action mobilization” succeed, which incites people to commit acts of violence (see Klandermans & Tarrow, 1988, p. 14), although the reasons for switching from one form to the other have not yet been systematically recorded. In her study, Rothenberger (2017a) found that PR strategies such as the targeted use of metaphors and the omission of counterarguments were definitely used on the websites with regard to the naming of culprits, proposed solutions, effects of the conflict and the acquisition of human and material resources. The salient importance of the (no longer quite so) new media in relation to radicalization processes was also examined by Rieger et al. (2013). They found that members with a similar cultural background (“in-group”) are primarily targeted. An ideology instead of a product is to be “sold” to the target group. It is PR or propaganda for an idea. Rada (1985, p. 26) concludes: “Is not terrorism, after all, simply a public relations campaign, albeit sinister in intent? Terrorism aims, sometimes through violence but more often through coercion and fear, to influence opinions and behavior of specific publics. Public relations, likewise, seeks to influence the opinions and behavior of target groups but through information and persuasion  On the subject of internet-based public relations by selected terrorist groups, see also Rothenberger (2012a) for a summary. 5

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as opposed to coercion.” Both creators need events and information (e.g., product information) to generate media content. The terrorists draw this from the attacks as well as from background information about their group and the specific conflict. Thus, the dissemination of their own ideas and self-representation by no means run exclusively through the act of violence. Torres et al. (2006, p. 399) speak of a “pronounced need for public communication.” Violence, they argue, is never sufficient to achieve the terrorists’ ultimate goals, despite the violence and spectacularity that an attack can achieve. Here, the problem of demarcating terrorist communication as PR from that as propaganda already begins to emerge. When it comes to propaganda, the focus is increasingly on the dissemination of ideologies. Section 4.3.3 deals in detail with “terrorism as propaganda of the deed”. Here, a digression now presents the specific “public relations forms” of threatening communication before an attack as well as press releases in general. Excursus: threat communication and press releases The term “threatening letters” is surely outdated, as terrorists now frequently threaten their attacks on the internet. A threat is particularly effective if it is signed by a group already known for attacks, the name of the sender already triggers an effect in the recipient and activates an emotional or cognitive fear schema, because the society addressed recurs for its experiential values to the scenarios that have already existed and projects them into the future. “If an act is only threatened, it is mainly a matter of stimulating fantasies and referencing predispositions existing in the different segments” (Liebl, 2006, p. 168). These predispositions primarily comprise cultural interpretive frames and references, for example to the history of a (ethnic, religious, etc.) group and to what has already happened to it (see also Sect. 4.8.3). The threat does not always have to be followed by an attack, as this can also generate attention and sow fear. It therefore makes sense not to broadcast such threats in the media. ETA took a very “classic” approach when it carried out an attack in a parking lot at the Madrid airport on December 30, 2006, which resulted in two deaths and 26 injuries: ETA had warned of the attack beforehand and issued a statement to the media afterwards. The Brigate Rosse, active in Italy in the 1970s, are known to have preferred to carry out their attacks on Saturdays so that they could be reported in the weekend editions of newspapers, which had a large volume and circulation; “they were willing to adapt their operations to suit the customs of Western media consumption” (see Miller et al., 2008, p. 52). The Brigate Rosse are said to have sent their press releases to the editors mainly on Wednesdays and Saturdays because the newspapers were more extensive and had higher circulations on Thursdays and Sundays (see Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, p. 51). Something similar is known of the PIRA: “The Provisional IRA […] is known to time its operations to achieve optimum media coverage; its publicity skills have often surpassed those of the British government” (Malik, 2000, p. 8). In the case of terrorists, PR communication usually goes to the media or directly to the public (for example, with leaflets), but relatively rarely directly to politicians

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(see highlighted arrows in the quadrangle of actors above); only sometimes do threatening calls go there or to the police. Therefore, the PR activities in the diagram (see above) are mainly marked in the direction of the media and the public, which does not mean that the information is not directed at the politicians. Only the communication paths are not direct. The media serve as intermediaries; however, their own processing of information is often underestimated – after all, newspapers, for example, are considered to be “tendentious organizations.” “Consequently, opinion-forming journalists and the media often play a dual role as active communicators representing independent goals and as neutral mediators of information and opinions” (Kepplinger, 1998, p. 363). All those interested in political power therefore try to act as communicators themselves (political parties issue press releases, terrorists write communiqués) and push journalists back into the simple role of messengers. Staging events (attack, press conference) is also one of such measures. The respective group supplies the media with events and information they have set themselves. The goals of political communication as persuasion are “the strengthening of one’s own camp, the weakening of the opposing camp, and the winning over of the unaffiliated” (Kepplinger, 1998, p. 365). The aim is thus to mobilize one’s own supporters.

Even at this early stage, an argument against the thesis that the media are the terrorists’ helpers (see Sect. 4.5.2) should be put forward. It comes from the ranks of the insurgents themselves. Irvin (1992) analyzed press releases and documents from Sinn Féin, IRA, Herri Batasuna, ETA and the PLO and conducted a number of interviews with representatives of Sinn Féin and Herri Batasuna, i.e., the legal political arms of the terrorist organizations, between 1988 and 1990. The interviewees described their relationship to the media as follows: “In general, the representatives of the political wings of insurgent organizations whom I interviewed perceive the media as an integral element of the capitalist, hegemonic state that generally conspires with government to suppress alternative political views, especially radical or socialist viewpoints. The media are seen not so much as a medium through which the prevailing order can be attacked, but as one that assists in the perpetuation of the political status quo” (Irvin, 1992, p. 67). According to Irvin’s research, the terrorists do not consider the media as their helpers, but as their enemies. This is why terrorist groups have published their own magazines, such as Al-Qaeda’s magazine “Impulse” (see Colas, 2017, p. 174) and the Islamic State’s “flagship English-language magazine” (Colas, 2017, p.  173) “Dabiq” since July 2014. Dass (2008, p. 63) found that some source proximity can be found in terrorism reporting: Journalists, bound by their work routines, most often select government officials as contacts. The media, as Picard’s model of contextualization (see Fig. 3.2) also showed, are part of the existing system and largely contribute to its autopoiesis. If they became helpers of terrorism, they would have to position ­themselves

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on the margins or outside the system. Even though the terrorists would like to have their name mentioned in the media to generate attention, it is usually not mentioned along with the reasons and causes of the insurgents, but only with the acts of violence, which in turn is met with disapproval by most recipients. The media respond almost exclusively to the attack or threats of attack (see also Sect. 4.3.4), not to press releases explaining ideologies, reasons and causes; event-­related reporting is in the foreground. In this respect, the attack is and remains the terrorists’ main PR instrument. Theories of public relations must therefore be modified when they are applied to the phenomenon of “terrorism,” since, for example, no close interconnection or intereffication can be established as is the case with legal PR measures. Rather, the act of terrorism is determinative by its very nature and designed as an explicit norm violation.

4.2.2 Terrorism and Marketing Not only the public relations strategies, but also the terrorists’ “marketing” strategies, if they may be called that, have changed, and are now increasingly taking place via the internet. Marketing means addressing the needs and demands of stakeholders (see Esch & Strödter, 2008, p.  2767). It consists of a desired goal, strategies leading to it as well as corresponding instruments. The goal is usually to make the “brand” known. In the case of commercially oriented companies, the top priority is to increase sales, but the terrorist groups are not concerned with this, or only to a lesser extent, according to the unsubstantiated assumption. Rather, they want to create a binding collective identity and set themselves apart from other groups in the sense of “brand positioning.” For the number of their followers is their “currency,” since it indicates the extent to which their “product,” i.e., their ideology, has already gained acceptance. Marketing measures include, for example, the sale of clothing and accessories printed with the group’s label. A kind of “terrorist merchandising” is emerging. CDs and download options for music are also available in online shops because music is seen as an important identity factor that creates cohesion and belonging. Terrorists use merchandising to build a collective identity on the one hand, and on the other hand they need the financial resources to keep their organization running. To increase “brand awareness” (Esch & Strödter, 2008, p. 2772), terrorist groups use communicative means such as their own internet presences. A simple, frequently repeated message or logo is particularly quickly memorized by recipients (see Esch & Strödter, 2008, p. 2773). Nelson (2008, p. 2786) highlights the increased importance of the internet and virtual communities for marketing purposes. Marketing is thus another building block of the

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terrorists’ communication strategy, marking the relationship with various stakeholders. The economic perspective on terrorism is primarily characterized by procedures for the (computational) modeling of terrorist processes, including game-theoretical procedures or theories of market failure in order to make predictions based on computational theory (see in summary Özdamar, 2008, pp. 96–97). When classifying the phenomenon of “terrorism” from the perspective of economic science, the question arises “what would actually be considered a product or supply in the context of terrorism?” (Liebl, 2006, p.  168). Liebl (2006, p.  168) himself gives the following answer: “In the present case, therefore, the terrorist act or its threat would be the correlate to the product, the resulting effects and communications to the utility types,” whereby utility types is used synonymously with “possible functions” and also includes the (political) ultimate concerns of the terrorists. If ideology was mentioned earlier as the terrorists’ product to be marketed, a bridge can be built here via the equation act = message = ideology. The physical act itself is certainly not the product to be marketed. This leads to the question of how “success” or “successful communication” can be defined for terrorist groups against this background (see in the following Özdamar, 2008, p. 92). Is the mere sending of the message a success, or the reception, or only a response communication or reaction stimulated by it, which proceeds the way the terrorists desire? Here, too, there are different approaches: The instrumental direction assumes that what counts as “success” is when political changes happen that improve the situation of those for whom the group has campaigned. The ultimate goal (autonomous state, caliphate, etc.) does not have to have been (and usually will not be) achieved. Psychology assumes that the state of tension in the terrorist who is prepared to use violence is released when he commits the act of violence, i.e., he is “successful” in his deed. The “state of mind” of the individual is in the foreground here. From the perspective of organization theory, the continued existence of the terrorist organization is in the foreground, and success could be defined in terms of gaining and retaining (material and humanitarian) resources (see Sect. 4.1). Finally, for communication studies, success becomes apparent when the group has deliberately arranged its attacks in such a way that they become the focus of public attention, i.e., the message reaches as many people as possible, frightening enemies and mobilizing friends. A certain symbolism (see Sect. 4.3.1) and strategy (see Sect. 4.3.2) contribute to this. Liebl (2006) examines the phenomenon of “terrorism” specifically from the perspective of strategic marketing and comes up with terms that have so far been unusual in this context, such as “customer orientation,” “brand management,” “product design and segmentation” (see Liebl, 2006, p.  163), which will be

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d­ iscussed below. Liebl (2006, p. 167) defines the “success” of terrorist groups in economic terms as a success of strategic marketing “in the sense of market-­oriented corporate management […]. Strategic marketing has a teleological dimension in that it is concerned with achieving corporate goals and, in particular, sustainable competitive distinctiveness.” The cognitive and emotional ideas of the “customers,” i.e., the addressees, are the target of the company. Liebl calls one important planning component of the attack “segmentation.” “Segmentation means grouping the buyers or addressees in such a way that each group reacts in a certain way to a measure or a tailored offer” (Liebl, 2006, p. 167). When different groups of addressees interpret an offer differently, marketing refers to this as “interpretive flexibility.” “This interpretive flexibility in the face of different conceptual worlds on the customer side has emerged as an important success factor for the implementation of a new offer, particularly in the context of innovations. A violent action or its threat is therefore all the more effective the more segments it uno actu effectively addresses with a segment-specific message: e.g., political decision-makers and the general public and underprivileged classes and one’s own camp” (Liebl, 2006, p.  167). A marketing-oriented empirical study could thus rank and compare different attacks against this grid and derive a “marketing competence” ranking of different groups. This would prove useful for anti-­ terrorist measures. With this approach, it becomes apparent once again that terrorists act as rational actors. Just as Fengler and Ruß-Mohl (2005) portray the journalist as “homo economicus”, this can be accomplished for the terrorist. Behaving “economically” means giving priority to one’s own interests (see Fengler & Ruß-Mohl, 2005, p. 27). Terrorists communicate their self-interests via non-violent (e.g., claims of responsibility, see Sect. 4.4) as well as via violent communication (e.g., attacks, see Sect. 4.3). Terrorists no longer see the society in which they live ideally “as an enterprise of cooperation for mutual advantage” (Rawls, 1979, p. 565),6 but rather they feel disadvantaged, possibly excluded, and are looking for a means of communicating this in a way that attracts attention and, in the best case, reverses the advantage-disadvantage divide. Thus, one can also speak of an “attention economy” (see Fengler & Ruß-Mohl, 2005, p. 164). In this regard, Russ-Mohl (2013) identified various thematic attention cycles (“issue-attention cycles”) in media

 Rawls (1979, pp.  565–566), however, sees “profound clashes of interests presupposed” within society from the outset and recognizes that private individuals, just like organizations or groups, “have their own private ends, opposed or independent of each other, but by no means complementary to each other.” 6

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c­overage of terrorism and war, which were ultimately traceable to economic-­ rational motivations of various communicators. As already mentioned several times, terrorist organizations can be better grasped if they are regarded as companies like any other. From an economic point of view, terrorist organzsations can be analyzed as “brands” and their attacks as a “product.” Basically, even a SWOT analysis is conceivable, as is often done in the run-up to public relations and marketing measures. For this purpose, the internal “strengths and weaknesses” as well as the external “opportunities and threats” would have to be analyzed from the perspective of the terrorist organization. Liebl (2006, p. 165), in any case, calls the fact that terrorists base their communication measures on high circulation figures on the following day (see Sect. 4.2.1), in marketing technical terms, the perception of a favorable “opportunity structure”. The SWOT analysis is also related to the overarching concept of strategic communication (see Sect. 4.3.2), which is deliberate, intentional and oriented towards achieving a goal (see Holtzhausen, 2008, p. 4849). The approaches from marketing promise good manageability and transferability to terrorist actions. However, a clear distinction must be made between the different approaches as to what should be considered a “success” of marketing and what should not. For example, the distribution of merchandising articles on the internet and the dissemination of an ideology via a symbolic attack have a different value, which in turn would affect the categories of analysis.

4.2.3 Terrorism and the Internet Not only outward-facing PR and marketing measures, but also internal communication by terrorist (groups) is increasingly taking place on the internet. Through their own websites, groups convey a certain collective identity (see Rothenberger & Kotarac, 2015; An et al., 2018; Rothenberger et al., 2018). Their own interpretations of a conflict become globally accessible. Social movements have the opportunity to articulate themselves via the internet, in what is called “cyberprotest” (Chen, 2012, p. 319).7 “If one would realize the nature of the Internet and the nature of terrorism, he could not find anything surprising in the fact that these two phenomena are highly compatible with each other […], the Internet is probably the most flexible, and universal tool the terrorists ever had at their disposal” (Bolechów, 2006, p. 33). As particular advantages, Bolechów names the minimally-regulated  Individual case studies of terrorist or extremist groups on the internet are also provided by Chen (2012). 7

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access, the possibility of using communication channels other than the conventional ones dominated by the primary determinants, i.e. those in power (see Sect. 4.10), interactivity and feedback, flexibility, the decentralised, easily accessible network structure, low costs with a high reach, and for the most part anonymity. In the age of the World Wide Web, it is easier to achieve public effectiveness while remaining clandestine. This suits the clandestine nature of the groups. Since terrorists act outside the law, they have to be careful to maintain secrecy even on the Internet; on the other hand, they strive for public resonance and impact – a contradiction that is inherent in the “terrorism” system and also determines its various communication channels. Of course, the Internet can also be used as a weapon, for example as cyberterrorism8 or data theft. According to Weimann (2006, p. 49), terrorist groups operate web presences to present their case, engage in propaganda, and recruit followers and supporters. Weimann (2006, pp.  111–145) identifies seven aspects of terrorists’ instrumental use of the internet: 1. Data mining 2. Networking 3. Recruitment and mobilization 4. Instructions and online manuals 5. Planning and coordination 6. Fund-raising 7. Attacking other terrorists Important aspects such as self-representation, identity building and identity communication can be assumed under the keywords “mobilization” and “networking.” Following a content analysis of 157 extremist websites, Gerstenfeld et al. (2003, p. 29) conclude that the internet is a particularly powerful and effective instrument for extremists to reach an international audience, recruit members, network with other groups and achieve a high level of image control. Internet sites are simply more difficult to ban than TV stations and radio stations and are not subject to any conventional selection mechanisms. According to Nacos (2007, p.  3), terrorists are becoming increasingly independent of the traditional media if they can operate their own online TV and radio stations and multimedia platforms. The internet contains a wide variety of forums and viewpoints. Many

 “Cyberterrorism is the use of the internet or computer networks to conduct malicious acts that cause, or threaten, loss of life or considerable bodily harm, often to reach political gains through intimidation.” (Matusitz et al., 2019, p. 9) 8

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partial publics are created here.9 Despite all the independence the internet offers, Meckel (2008, p. 251) still calls media coverage “the platform on whose functioning and social resonance terrorists today depend to achieve their goals.” She identifies a new, internet-based two-step flow of terrorism information: “Often terrorists communicate their messages via the internet to traditional media […]. Thus, terrorist groups have the chance to conduct their own agenda-setting via the internet, to activate and mobilize supporters and sympathizers, and to put their own ‘spin’ on the media’s public interpretations of the attacks in advance. In the social communication about terrorism, information and interpretations essentially reach the people from the terrorists via the media” (Meckel, 2008, p. 253). Section 4.5 focuses on this constellation in the actor quadrangle. In the past, according to Meckel’s untested thesis, the direct relationship of terrorists to the public was even stronger, for example when terrorists communicated their attacks via leaflets. In doing so, however, they could not reach such a large number of people as they do today via the internet. Even today, terrorists are not exclusively dependent on the internet or the media for their communication. They can use other means of transmission such as couriers (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 11). Waldmann (2005a, p. 83) sees a task imposed on the media in being a “transmission belt between the isolated act and its socio-psychological after-effects.” Media are “an integral part of the terrorist calculus that cannot be replaced or extracted without this calculus and the strategy behind it collapsing” (Waldmann, 2005a, p. 83). For Meckel (2008, p. 264), information can be used by both parties, the media and the terrorists, to attack and defend: “Information is a weapon. It can be used by terrorists in the fight against an existing order or by journalists in the fight against the simplified symbolism of a worldview that terrorists want to see anchored in people’s minds.” The internet serves terrorists as a propaganda portal, a medium of communication, and a means of generating publicity. However, the possibilities of journalists to prepare information in such a way that it does not play entirely into the hands of the terrorists should not be underestimated (see Sect. 4.12.9). Terrorist organizations use the internet not only as an internal means of communication, but “increasingly as an advertising platform, distance university and

 The Kosovo conflict is considered the “‘first Internet war’, namely due to the ways in which online spaces were created for alternative viewpoints, background materials, eye-witness accounts and interactivity with members of the public” (Allan, 2002, p. 119). 9

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virtual terror camp” (Schäuble, 2008, p.  10).10 For example, radical ideological pamphlets and (also technical) training material can be put online (see Theveßen, 2007). According to Nordeste and Carment (2006), terrorist groups use the internet to make contact with their supporters, as a “how to” manual to expand their knowledge regarding the course of a subway line or, for example, the construction of weapons, for decentralized networking, to recruit money and new recruits, and also for cyber-attacks. As described above, Tamils even run a “simulated nation” on the Internet as the “Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam.” In the meantime, the terrorist organizations themselves have recognized how important the internet is in terms of public relations (see Sect. 4.2.1) and how important it is to be able to offer interested parties information directly, without an intermediate stop. For example, the Islamic State shows great competence in the use of online platforms (see Phillips, 2017; Brown & Pearson, 2019). As another example, on the website of the Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo11, www.aum-­internet. org, one can follow the link to the general website www.aleph.to (Aleph is the current name of the Aum sect) or follow the link https://info.aleph.to, which leads to the sect’s public relations department. The professional-looking communication strategies indicate that the terrorist groups are determined to influence how they are portrayed to the public. They also offer their pool of content to the mass media, who turn to the web in their research. Press releases can also be downloaded in several languages from the FARC and PKK sites. Softness (2016) addresses the question of the extent to which the operators of online communication platforms such as Facebook or Google can be held accountable when their channels are used for planning attacks and running extremist smear campaigns. She stresses that in such a consideration, “values” such as profit, personal rights, freedom of information, freedom from discrimination and national security are always weighed against one another, but that with regard to the platform operators’ own sense of responsibility, much has already been done and the “global norms of cybersecurity and

 On the topic of “terrorist organizations and internet use,” see also Theveßen (2007), Weimann’s (2007) study analyzing 5200 websites over eight years, as well as his book “Terror on the Internet” (2006) and the anthology “Online terrorist propaganda, recruitment, and radicalization” (Vacca, 2020). 11  Also Ōmu Shinrikyō (translated roughly as “Supreme Truth”); Aum is a Hindu mantra. Members of the sect carried out an attack with the poisonous nerve gas sarin in the Tokyo subway in March 1995. Reader (2000) delves into the background and thought structure of the sect under its (almost completely blind) founder and leader Asahara Shōkō. Furthermore, Reader also discusses the reporting on the sect, leader and attack, but not systematically and without empirical evidence. 10

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j­urisdiction” (Softness, 2016, p. 201) are being reviewed and – as far as possible – adapted in small steps. If media have so far refused to broadcast images of executions or other atrocities, the terrorists simply kept their videos available on the internet and hoped that they would spread virally; the internet currently still offers sufficient space and a functional stage for the “public relations of terrorism” (Waldmann, 2005a, p. 96). The organizations can present themselves positively and portray their point of view on the internet, whose censorship measures only take effect after a time lag. “One of the usual legitimizations of their existence is that the authoritarian and repressive state in which they operate leaves them no choice but to defend themselves by force” (Waldmann, 2005a, p. 96). However, media as well as the internet in particular are not able to recruit larger groups of newcomers. “By all accounts, the recruitment of new members is usually a process that runs through personal contacts and role model relationships. […] The Internet does not break through the motivational barriers that generally limit the effect of the media. Like the other media, it has only a catalytic function” (Waldmann, 2005a, p. 98). Interpersonal and internet communication consequently coexist and complement each other in the terrorists’ strategy. Matusitz et al. (2019) examined online magazines published by Al-Qaeda, IS, and Al-Shabaab groups: Inspire, Dabiq, Rumiyah, and Gaidi Mtaani, three issues of each of which were open-coded. The authors argue that these magazines have played a significant role in the diffusion of Islamist ideologies. According to the authors, the texts mix narratives of extreme violence with visions of the caliphate (see Matusitz et al., 2019, p. 2). The magazines also reach people who have shut themselves off from civil society and thus could not have been reached via face-to-­ face radicalization. Matusitz et al. (2019) classify the magazines, their ease of production and distribution via the internet, and especially the content as essential elements of strategic communication. They increase international visibility and can contribute to the radicalization of potential prospects. Referring to Habermasʼ “public sphere,” Matusitz et al. (2019, p. 9) define “jihadisphere” as “the online public sphere to diffuse the jihadist ideology.” In all the magazines, the authors found above all images of the “in-group,” detailed descriptions of attacks, depictions of one’s own strength to intimidate the “out-group,” reasons why modern ways of life should be rejected and destroyed on the basis of religious precepts, and an exaltation of martyrdom. Bosco (2016, p. 124) splits the interaction between terrorism and the media into three levels of intensity: “At the first level, terrorists do not participate directly in writing the news, but only exert an indirect influence by specifically choosing the place and time of their attack in order to achieve the greatest possible media

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c­ overage. At the second stage, they exert a more intense influence by directly contacting the media and broadcasting their messages through these media. Finally, at the third stage, terrorists gain extensive control over the content that media report: They print newspapers themselves, run their own television channels, or spread their messages via the internet. Recently, social media have taken a key position in this process” (Bosco, 2016, p. 124). Fundamentally, the benefits terrorists derive from mass media communication compared to interpersonal communication can also be questioned from their own perspective. Gerrits (1992, p.  35) states as a conclusion after analyzing several memoirs12 of terrorists: “Terrorists do not depend exclusively on radio, television, and newspapers to accomplish their psychological aims. They spend a great deal of time and energy on other ways of promoting their movements and ideals. Gatherings, as well as self-made brochures, pamphlets, and periodicals, remain important in the dissemination of information on movements and their ideas. The mass media are an important and attractive instrument, but not the only vehicle for terrorist propaganda” (Gerrits, 1992, p. 59). The strategic and symbolic communication of terrorists thus also extends to areas far removed from the mass media, although it should be noted that these findings by Gerrits date from the early days of the internet. Weimann (2008, p. 74) cites these figures: “In 1998, fewer than half of the organizations designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department maintained Web sites; by the end of 1999, nearly all these terrorist groups had established their presence on ‘the Net.’” Weimann (2006, p. 15) identifies 4300 websites with terrorist content from 2003 to 2005. Chen (2012, p. 3) puts the figure a few years later at over 100,000. Considering these numbers, terrorists could be counted among the “early adopters” or even “innovators” (Rogers, 2003, pp. 282–283) regarding new technologies; this term from diffusion research also fits the RAF with its early use of Polaroid photos. Terrorist groups were also early adopters of the so-called social network sites (SNS), including Facebook and Twitter. Rothenberger (2012a, p. 16) describes the martial and offensive language and use of symbols and images by three terrorist groups on Facebook. However, the usefulness of SNS for terrorist groups has not yet been surveyed in detail. This is a desideratum that future research can address. Content analysis studies, however, face difficult challenges given the abundance of material; “terrorists’/extremists’ Internet usage is still under-researched because of  Gerrits has used this possibility of accessing primary sources, already mentioned in Sect. 4.1, and points to the possibility that many former terrorists wrote their (naturally very subjective) memoirs either to justify their own behavior, to win people over to the movement, or to deter people from ever joining such a group. He notes with reservation that the memoirs are of course not representative, but reflect individual cases. 12

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the lack of systematic dark web content collection and analysis methodologies” (Qin et al., 2006, p. 4). Here, methods such as text mining, scraping, the extraction of programming interfaces and computer-aided automated content analysis are needed to deal with such “Big Data” volumes. Automated processes can thus be used to capture not only text, but also network characteristics of web pages. This leads back to network theories: They can be made fruitful not only for the analysis of networks between persons, but also for the analysis of technical networks, the connection of text modules and pages on the internet.

4.3 The Terrorist Attack as Violent Communication

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

The terrorist act belongs to the category of “non-verbal communication.” This may include, for example, a bomb attack or a kidnapping. The physical action has priority, even if group calls or religious exclamations are made during or before some attacks. It is only afterwards that the verbal, media or written non-clandestine communication of the attackers gains in importance (see Sect. 4.4). As shown in the quadrangle, communication emanates from the terrorists; others, such as media and politics, respond to the act.13 The act of violence as communication is diametrically opposed to the normative understanding of communication as discourse aimed at mutual understanding. As rhetorician Josef Kopperschmidt (1975, p. 931) puts it, “Violence – in each of its various verbal as well as extra-verbal manifestations – is in fact the very opposition to the claim of language as a medium of argumentatively performed understanding. Violence may enforce the commonality of

 The fact that already the act can also be seen as a response and not as the beginning of communication is shown in Chap. 5. 13

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action, but violence cannot enforce the commonality of the agents by virtue of their agreement on the goals and orientations that guide the action.” The attack is the characteristic that makes terrorism decisive and compelling. At the same time, it is only possible to speak of a terrorist attack when it exhibits certain attributes such as the attention orientation mentioned in Sect. 2.1.2. The symbolism of the attack (see Sect. 4.3.1) and a strategy inherent in it (see Sect. 4.3.2) are also part of the act of terrorism. It is often staged as a media event (see Sect. 4.3.4). These characteristics have led some authors to refer to it as “propaganda of the act” (see Sect. 4.3.3). It should be noted that these are similar approaches, but each with a different focus, which do not claim to be divisive and overlap to some extent in their ideas. The present chapter is devoted to these aspects of the terrorist attack in terms of violent communication sent out by the actors. The diagram therefore focuses on the sending of a message, which is directed from the terrorists to all three other stakeholder groups. The terrorist attack contains a message as a stimulus through its own channel and subsequently through the media and interpersonal communication, which then triggers feedback (see Sect. 3.1.2). Distilled down to its quintessence, propaganda of the act can be thought of in terms of: “The act is the message.” The message as an act cannot be delivered through any other channel. Act and message are bound in terms of being to the channel they themselves constitute. Townshend describes the terrorist process with the following three phases (see Townshend, 2005, pp. 17–20): first attracting attention and horror, then ascertaining the message, and finally, as a reaction, fighting or fulfilling the demands. The attack belongs to the first phase as an initial event. According to Possony (2002), the subsequent frequency of terrorist attacks depends on socio-political circumstances as well as tactical opportunities. Determining the message already belongs on the recipient side, because for the terrorists themselves the message is contained in the act. To begin with, it should be recapitulated at which point in the process (Fig. 3.6) the attack is to be located: An organization has come into being and has already communicated strategically without violence, but without having come any closer to its goal. Extreme violence, as a demonstration of strength, can then force the population to pay attention to certain (political) problems – not, however, to accept certain (political) orientations (see Kopperschmidt, 1975, p. 931). Terrorists communicate to the state and the citizens that the state is no longer fulfilling, or can no longer fulfill, its task of providing for the security of the citizens. This unpredictable threat of violence then possibly leads – according to the terrorists’ plan – to exaggerated reactions on the part of the state, to the destabilization of the social order and even to “social breakdown” (Townshend, 2005, p. 25), whereupon the people revolt against the previous regime and support the terrorists in their u­ prising.

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Terrorism as political communication means: The attacks are a means to disrupt the relations in the system of “society,” especially the relation between the public and current politics.

4.3.1 Terrorism as Symbolic Communication “Terrorism is an instrument that pursues a political goal through the limited but carefully targeted and often highly symbolic use of violence,” as Buck defines (2007, p. 51). Since the direct victims of terrorist attacks are usually found in the “public sphere” of actors (see Sect. 3.2), the victim strategy of terrorists will be discussed in detail once again here. Symbols in relation to an attack can be • places when the target is, for example, a building representing national security or a certain way of life (military installations, places of worship, banks, places of consumption, Christmas markets, animal testing facilities, etc.); • the selected victims such as people of other faiths, politicians, representatives of a certain ethnic group or, for example, two young British soldiers who stand for the British Army as a whole, which in turn refers to its presence in Northern Ireland; “the victims of terrorism function as signs in a propaganda war. […] The selection of victims is both symbolic and instrumental” (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 1); • time or date of the attack, such as national holidays, important political events, or the head of state’s day of honor. Crelinsten (1992, p. 213) distinguishes between three “victim types” that satisfy certain strategic goals: “victims of circumstance” who are present completely by chance, whereby everything is subordinated to the goal of generating attention – victims of one’s own ethnicity, religion, etc. are also accepted (e.g. in the case of a subway attack); victims with a symbolic function such as members of a certain population group, religion, etc. (see also Sect. 4.3.1); instrumental function of victim selection through attacks on military personnel, peace workers, etc. in order to hinder their work and deter others from this work. The IRA, according to Crelinsten (1992, p. 213), for example sought to deter people from doing business with the British Army; it sought as victims people who sold meat to British soldiers, offered laundry services or similar everyday services to the “enemy.” Apart from the attack, the name of the group can be symbolic. For example, the name “Provisional IRA” reminds many Irish people of the 1916 proclamation signed by the “Provisional Government of the Irish Republic.” And the German “2 June

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­ ovement” (Bewegung 2. Juni) has always been associated with the day student m Benno Ohnesorg was killed (see Gerrits, 1992, p. 57). Many aspects of terrorism, but especially the attack itself, carry a certain symbolism. Weimann (2008, p. 62) speaks of it being time “to reconceptualize modern terrorism within the framework of symbolic communication theory.” Such approaches will be presented in the following. Symbols are used to convey a certain conception or opinionated idea of an object or circumstance. Since symbols fall under the category of “signs,” i.e., stand for something other than the actual thing, pointing to something, this way of looking at things can be located in the theories of semiotics. “All communication takes place by means of signs: phenomena signifying something other than the phenomenon itself. The science of signs is called semiotics” (Rosengren, 2000, p.  29). Miller et al. (2008, p. 50) attribute an inherently semiotic dimension to the phenomenon of terrorism: “Terrorism is a semiotic act that can serve as a signal, a message, a symbol, and/or a media image. Culturally, human beings are immersed within and surrounded by images, signs, and symbols. Consequently, there is a compelling semiotic dimension to terrorism, especially when it involves transfixing images of extreme violence.” The term “symbol”  – placed by Miller et  al. (2008) in the conceptual series “signal, message, symbol, media image” – deserves a closer definition. “Signs such as icons, symptoms, indices and signals have a narrow relation between the sign and that which is signified: a relation of similarity or causality. When the relation between a sign and what is signified is more or less arbitrary (a convention more or less explicitly agreed upon) signs are often called symbols” (Rosengren, 2000, p. 30). Accordingly, the referential character of a symbolic act is not as explicit and clear-cut as, for example, a traffic sign or the pictogram “up-down” on an elevator. A semiotic approach thus describes terrorism as a performative act of symbolic transformation, which is thus directed at a much larger audience than the direct audience of immediate destruction (see Miller et al., 2008, p. 50). The symbolic nature of the attack is only bestowed upon it through the transfer of meaning in the circles of addressees. Jakobson (1979 [1960], p. 85) starts from pansemiotic properties, that is, a theory of signs that applies to all speech utterances. He defines as the constitutive factors in any verbal act of communication: sender, message, receiver, context, code and contact. These six components will be explained below (Fig. 4.1). The first interesting thing about the representation is that it does not specify the direction of the communication. There is a connection between sender and receiver, but no flow of communication is indicated by means of an arrow. This can be seen as a clear difference to models such as that of stimulus-response and – applied to the phenomenon of “terrorism” – allows the attacked side more creative

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context (referential function) message (poetic function) source (emotive function)

contact (phatic function)

receiver (conative function)

code (metalinguistic function)

Fig. 4.1  Schematic of the factors indispensable for linguistic communication (Jakobson, 1979 [1960], p. 88), supplemented by the functions

leeway and participation in the success and interpretation of the communication. The sender’s communication requires a context to which it refers, i.e., a reference (see Jakobson, 1979, p. 88). A conflict situation, for example, in the religious, governmental or social sphere provides this contextual framework in the case of an attack. There must be a chance that the message is detectable by the recipient, and it must be verbalizable (as in a claim of responsibility) or transmissible in other communicative signs (such as an attack); “a CODE is further required, which is wholly or at least in part communicable to the sender and the recipient (or in other words the encoder and the decoder of the communication) in common; finally, a CONTACT is also required, a physical channel or psychological link between the sender and the receiver which enables the two to enter and remain in communication” (Jakobson, 1979, p. 88). While the perpetrator and the attacked do not always speak the same language, so that, for example, not all recipients can decode content from terrorist websites, the terrorist act as primarily a (mass-mediated) destructive event can be understood by all. Here, clearly, a channel is given, whereby the channel self-destructs in its message delivery. In this context, an emotive function is attributed to the sender, which can be understood as meaning that a piece of information not only includes cognitive aspects (these are found in the referential function of the context), but that expressive qualities are also used to convey it, for example to express irony or sorrow. The establishment of contact by means of an attack is so vehement that paralysis may occur on the receiving side. Only when this has been overcome can the receiver resume the connection. However, he must look for another channel for this, since not only – as just described – the channel chosen by the terrorists in the attack no longer exists, but a return attack as a form

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of communication is usually excluded according to the legislation of the attacked society. It is therefore a specific feature and, if one sees it from the perspective of the insurgents, an advantage of the terrorists that they can communicate their concerns via both violent and non-violent channels, whereby the choice of the violent channel is also mandatory in order to reach the designation of “terrorism.” Depending on the message and intention, one of the six functions mentioned can dominate the structure of the communication (see Jakobson, 1979, p. 88). For example, if the focus is on establishing or prolonging communication, i.e., contact – for example, in a greeting or a resumption of peace negotiations – the phatic function moves to the first place. If the communication is explicitly directed at the receiver, for example, via the imperative “Go!,” it emphasizes the conative function. “When the sender and/or the receiver want to check that they are both using the same code, the speech is oriented toward the CODE: it performs a METALINGUISTIC (i.e., explanatory) function” (Jakobson, 1979, p. 92). This can be done, for example, by asking questions such as “Do I understand you correctly?” or “Do you understand what I mean?” This function may occur in an exchange about terrorist demands (e.g., release of prisoners). Finally, the poetic function of communication does not refer purely to poetry but means the “attitude toward the MESSAGE as such, the orientation toward the message for its own sake” (Jakobson, 1979, p. 92). Linguistic stylistic devices, for example alliteration in election slogans, are often used in this context. Terrorism as symbolic communication is geared towards political upheaval. It is fundamentally semiotic because it generates acts of violence designed to rupture or disrupt established cultural symbols of power and legitimacy (Miller et al., 2008, p. 51). Miller et al. (2008, p. 50) even speak of manipulation, of a “semiotic act of manipulation”. The attack spreads as “psychological noise” and as a signal of power and terror. In its symbolic function, it supports the political statement behind it. “The terrorist act of violence can initially be understood as a message to both the state and society, which then triggers follow-up communication in all directions: the state (re-)acts, newspapers write about it, films and books interpret the events, scientists take up the topic, and so on, and so on. The peculiarity of this communication now consists in the fact that the acts of terrorism, which in many respects seem incomprehensible, are to be given a kind of meaning or fitted into an explanatory schema” (Weinhauer & Requate, 2006, p.  15). According to Picard (1993, p. 4), it is not the act of violence itself that plays the decisive role, but rather what is said about these acts, how they are interpreted: “Acts of terrorism are thus symbolic acts designed to carry messages from the perpetrators of the violence to various audiences[…] terrorism is a form of communication […]. In the majority of incidents, the most important element in communication about terrorist acts is

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not the acts themselves but the meaning assigned to the acts by media, authorities, and the populace.” In this sense, terrorism is an attribution. Resonance with the public is an important element of the flow of communication for both politicians and the mass media with the topics they set. The terrorists also want to achieve a resonance, whereby fear, horror and paralysis are to be evoked among opponents on the one hand, and euphoria and support among supporters on the other. Regarding the symbolism of terrorist attacks, Tuman (2003) identifies three criteria: Intention of the communicator or “rhetor,” communication context (environment, background, etc.) and relativity of the symbolic message, i.e., how it is received, constructed and interpreted differently by different recipients. Terrorists can communicate their intentions particularly clearly via claims of responsibility (see Sect. 4.4), but usually the intention and thus the symbolic nature are recognized by the audience in their own interpretation of the act. Bassiouni (1982, p. 128) argues that the psychological component (impact) of terrorism is more important than the violence itself, since it is this component that triggers the “feeling of terror” in the population through communication via the media. And this “impact” is more media-created than inherent in the actual act. This opens up two different perspectives in research: While some consider the act itself to be the main symbol, which is followed by an interpretation on the part of the onlookers, others do not attribute the main meaning to the act but believe that the symbolic attribution is primarily made by the recipients, first and foremost via the media. It is clear that without a symbolic nature inherent in the act, pure attribution by the audience would hardly be possible. In this respect, the symbol is created and reinforced in an interplay between the characteristics of the attack and the attribution by the addressees. The target of physical terror is the direct victims of the attack, the target of demands is the government, and the target of propaganda is the audience that is forced to pay attention. The final addressees of the terrorists are not the victims, but the society behind them, which is why the victims were not explicitly considered in the model guiding the research (Fig. 3.5), but are “hidden” in the category of citizens/civic groups/society. Terrorists often choose certain areas of order and communication, such as department stores, as the site of an attack, in which an attack is perceived as particularly surprising and therefore frightening. Terrorists therefore use a plan for their symbolism: a strategy is a precisely planned approach. The media are the key to this communication strategy (see Sect. 4.3.2), because they are the key to attracting public attention, which also means finding a stage for one’s own concerns (the concerns of the terrorists) that opens up access to political circles – not directly to negotiating circles, but actions are triggered at the political level because people there are aware of the high public profile of terrorism. There

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is an ever-increasing “use” of the media by terrorists due to the ever-improving technological possibilities and due to the trend towards infotainment – the combination of information and entertainment: news should inform as well as emotionally captivate. The symbolism of the terrorist attack fits into this media logic. Researchers therefore now speak of mass-mediated terrorism (Weimann, 1985, p.  433; Nacos, 2007) or media-oriented terrorism (Vollmer, 2004, p.  3; Martin, 2013, p. 373). This is because an act that a group must commit in order to generate attention and publicity must attract the interest of the media by generating as much “news value” as possible (see Sect. 4.7.1). If a media outlet reports on a terrorist attack as quickly as possible after it becomes known, thereby attracting the attention of its audience, then the outlet will attempt to maintain that attention with follow-up coverage. “Accordingly, during the ‘lifetime’ of a major story, the focus of media coverage inevitably shifts away from the limited and rapidly diminishing amount of ‘hard’ news and toward human sympathy and touching stories […] or to the breathless revelation of a previously unknown or undocumented fragment” (Hoffman, 2007, pp. 277–278). Terrorists can use this mechanism to their advantage. Their interests and those of the media overlap in this respect: the symbolic event should attract the public’s attention for as long as possible. Then the terrorists’ strategy will have worked.

4.3.2 Terrorism as Strategic Communication Terrorism, as has already become clear, is dominated not only by an ideology, but equally by a strategy that includes the use of symbols just described. In their similar strategies, organizational structures, and structures of action, terrorist organizations become comparable, even if their ideological motives differ significantly (see Münkler, 2004, p. 29; Weissermel, 2017). This chapter begins with an overview of the characteristics of strategic communication,14 before the explanations of the respective strategies are divided between the three strategic targets, namely the stakeholder groups identified in the research guiding model (Fig. 3.5), i.e. (a) the civil society public, (b) the media and (c) politics. Of course, overlaps occur here again, as even terrorists do not focus exclusively on one group in their communication. Since the special relationship to the media will be examined in detail in the further course of the work, the explanations under (b) concentrate only on the essentials. Hallahan et al. (2007, p. 3) define strategic communication as “purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfill its mission.” The fact that terrorist 14

 On terrorism as strategic communication, see also Rothenberger (2015) for a summary.

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groups are not considered ordinary organizations but should be studied as such from an analytical perspective has already been clarified in Sect. 4.1. “Strategic communication is about informational, persuasive, discursive, as well as relational communication when used in a context of an organization’s mission” (Hallahan et al., 2007, p. 17). Thus, an organization needs strategic communication to underpin its intentional actions with regard to its self-representation. In this context, decisions have to be made about specific goals (ends) and suitable instruments (means), because the aim of a strategy is to achieve or at least come closer to a defined goal, usually a certain effect in a certain group of recipients (see Merten, 2013, p. 12). This includes a variety of persuasive, cooperative and coercive instruments (see Gregory, 2005, p. 7). It is precisely the means of communication that are coercive (through violence) that terrorists draw on, but persuasive elements without violence are also part of their communication repertoire. Thus propaganda (see Sect. 4.3.3) and public relations (see Sect. 4.2.1) also fall under the umbrella term “strategic communication.” Strategy is thus “based on structuring the future” (Merten, 2013, p. 91). In contrast, tactics is more narrowly defined. It means the concrete “implementation of a strategy with respective adaptation to relevant contexts (situations, boundary conditions) within the framework of subordinate decisions. Tactics modify the chosen strategy according to situational constraints” (Merten, 2013, p. 406). Tactics can therefore be changed while the strategy remains the same. Gregory (2005, p. 39) sees two types of logic for achieving goals: discursive and instrumental. Here, the first refers to a considered discourse on ideas and values, the goal of which is understanding, but the second refers to an active advocacy and championing of beliefs, decisions, and actions. Terrorist groups act according to instrumental logic. In doing so, they break the barrier of legitimacy with respect to the laws of communication. They use the terrorist attack as an instrument and channel to deliver their message. (a) Civil Society Public Sphere The Chinese originated the stratagem “Kill one to warn a hundred” (see Kirsch, 2005, p. 43). Psychologically, the unexpected exerts a particular terror or paralysis and spontaneous reaction; it emotionalizes. So-called post-heroic societies  – mostly democracies  – react particularly sensitively to news of unpredictable ­violence and threat.15 A climate of uncertainty then dominates the civil society  Post-heroic societies are characterized by gratifications for work as well as by trade and a calculable logic of prosperity that functions according to it. A mentality of martyr veneration is no longer characteristic of them. Attacks from countries that still hold to heroic ideas are therefore often aimed at attracting attention in the media of Western civilization, in which “an honor arising from a willingness to suffer and sacrifice […] plays no role” (Münkler, 2004, p. 35), making the attack particularly incomprehensible and deterring. 15

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public sphere, and this in turn is reflected in the media. In contrast to groups from heroic societies, ETA and the IRA, for example, have tried to minimize their casualty figures (since such bloodbaths usually have a chilling effect on residents in modern democracies and could thus scare away possible supporters) by calling the police before an attack so that people could be evacuated.16 Groups from heroically oriented, mostly non-democratic countries, on the other hand, take advantage of the far-reaching effect that large numbers of victims bring. The psychological consequences within the targeted society are more important to terrorists than the direct physical consequences of the (symbolic) attack. “The unstable mental infrastructure of post-heroic societies includes, for example, the ‘imagination of investors’ that decides the ups and downs of stock market quotations, or the security preferences of tourists and the like” (Münkler, 2004, p. 36). The slump in tourist numbers suffered by Indonesia, the Philippines or even the USA after the respective attacks is considerable. The high economic damage is supposed to wear down pro-Western governments, such as those of Tunisia (attack near Sousse in June 2015) and Indonesia (attack on Bali in October 2002), and lead to the “resignation of their political will” (Münkler, 2004, p. 37). This is where the battle of ideas begins on the international stage after an attack: which states immediately express their sympathy and possibly send financial aid, and which do not? The move to the public sphere by many terrorist groups ran parallel to technological developments in terms of the “media tools of the trade” used for the strategies, i.e., the individual tactics (see definition above) were always also aligned with certain leaps in development, for example the “replacement of the anarchist lone perpetrator, who predominated in the 19th century, by the organized group in the 20th century” (Waldmann, 2005a, p. 29). This depersonalization of attack design also made itself felt in technical terms of range: Dagger assassinations were supplanted by bombs through Alfred Nobel’s invention of dynamite in the mid-­ nineteenth century; this allowed more victims to be targeted at once. The mass press also emerged in the mid to late nineteenth century. Waldmann (2005a, p. 83) speaks of a triad of these new forms of technology, mass communication, and ­political violence, some of which were interdependent. A further leap was then the discovery of television as a public stage for voicing one’s concerns to a broad public in the early 1970s, as happened with the PLO attack on the Munich Olympic Stadium. By then, at the latest, terrorism was already an international and no longer a predominantly domestic threat. Chaliand (1987, p. 77) sees the hijacking of an El Al plane to Rome in 1968 and thus the PFLP as the forerunner of a new terrorism that took advantage of the fact that more and more citizens were opting for air  At the same time, calls were made to media outlets so that they could report in detail from the beginning (see Shpiro, 2001, p. 19). 16

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travel: “a new type of terrorism was born: transnational terrorism, whose main purpose is propaganda.” Thus, technological achievements contributed to the de-­ territorialization of terrorism. Münkler (2001, p. 11) notes: The coupling of “weapons with the effect of mass media […] represents, as it were, the decisive innovation of terrorist use of force. Terrorist strategies cannot function without the amplification effect of the public sphere, and accordingly they follow in their intensity as well as penetrating power the media revolutions that have finally turned local, at best regional publics into a single world public sphere served in real time.” One of the main channels in a society’s communication network that provide access to political discourse is thus the mass media. It is mainly through them that reactions in society and politics are triggered. This already shows how closely intertwined the terrorists’ strategies are towards the two actors of media and civil society. (b) Media Journalists assign (news) value to terrorist acts in a subjective way, and the communication, the dissemination of this news to the public, varies accordingly. The attribution of relevance to terrorist attacks “is not about the real damage done, which could be measured in terms of casualties and deaths. Acts of terrorism are perceived and evaluated according to their symbolic meaning. They represent attacks on the subjective sense of security. The feeling of one’s own threat is decisive for the assessment of their journalistic relevance” (Hoffmann, 2008, p. 240). The public gets to feel its own vulnerability and weakness, feels exposed and it is precisely this that accounts for the great emotional impact, which manifests itself in fear and, in the worst case, panic. The quantity of media use is always particularly high after attacks (see Emmer et al., 2002). This is why such an event, despite or perhaps because of the cruelty that awakens people’s curiosity and fear, is considered a “great opportunity for journalism, despite or even because of all the cruelty that arouses people’s curiosity and terror. People were willing to watch and read far beyond what they normally absorbed” (Schudson, 2002, p. 38). Hoffman describes suicide terrorism17 in particular as “an instrumentally oriented strategy” (Hoffman, 2007, p. 258) with the aim of achieving the highest possible publicity. The media are to some extent responsible for the effect of terrorist attacks. Consequently, for the terrorists, the attack is the means of communicating  Comments on suicide attackers as well as on determining the “statistical average terrorist” are also made by Waldmann (2005a, pp. 199–203 and 2005a, b, pp. 188–196). In percentage terms, most suicide attacks were carried out by the LTTE, followed by terrorist Palestinian groups and the PKK. 17

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with the public, the real target audience: the more terrible the atrocities, the stronger the “leverage” (Hoffman, 2007, p. 269). Hoffman (2007, p. 272) even goes so far as to claim that “terrorism has indeed become a perverted form of show business.” However, this statement applies primarily to TV reporting. The following long list according to Schmid and de Graaf (1982) shows which active and passive possibilities are open to terrorists to use the news media strategically in their favor. However, many of the points mentioned do not always apply at once (Table 4.1). Table 4.1  Use of news media by insurgent terrorists (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, pp. 53–54) Insurgent terrorist uses of the news media A. Active uses 1. Communication of (fear-) messages to mass audience 2. Polarizing public opinion 3. Making converts, attracting new members to terrorist movement 4. Demanding publication of manifesto under threat of harm to victim 5. Using media as conduits for threats, demands and bargaining messages 6. Verifying demand compliance by the enemy 7. Winning favourable publicity via released hostages 8. Linking message to victim 9. Misleading enemy by spreading false information 10. Winning publicity by granting interviews in the underground 11. Intimidating media by killing or wounding journalists 12. Advertising terrorist movement and cause represented 13. Arousing public concern for victim to pressure government to make concessions 14. Discrediting victim by making his ‘confessions’ public 15. Discrediting enemy by making victim’s ‘confessions’ public 16. Deflecting public attention from disliked issue by bombing it from frontpages 17. Announcing further actions 18. Using journalists as negotiators in bargaining situation 19. Inciting public against government 20. Occupation of broadcasting stations to issue message 21. Boosting one’s own morale; herostratism 22. Gaining Robin Hood image B. Passive uses 23. External communication network between terrorists 24. Learning new coercive techniques from media reports on terrorism 25. Obtaining information about identity and status of hostages 26. Obtaining information on countermeasures by security forces 27. Using media presence at site of siege as insurance against ‘dirty tricks’ by security forces 28. Creating fear with the enemy by media’s exaggeration of own strength, thereby reducing likelihood that individual policemen dare to apprehend terrorist 29. Identifying future targets for terrorist violence 30. Obtaining information about public reaction to terroristic act

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This list illustrates that terrorists not only actively approach the media, but also use them as recipients for their own purposes, above all to generate information.18 According to Alexander (1978, p. 102), who refers mainly to the active part, terrorists pursue the following strategic communication goals via the media: to draw the attention of many to their cause through a spectacular act and possibly its repetition, to spread fear and provoke reactions (both from the target society and the government) and thus demonstrate their power or the powerlessness of others. Alexander (1978, p. 101) therefore sees terrorism as a political strategy: “an expedient tactical and strategic tool of politics in the struggle for power within and among nations,” which already names the third actor addressed by the terrorists. (c) Politics Gerrits (1992, p. 32) does not consider the generation of publicity to be the main goal of terrorists; “most terrorists are not aiming at publicity for its own sake. The publicity obtained is instrumental and serves the final aim of the terrorist movement,” i.e., a political upheaval. Sometimes, however, the means are also elevated to the goal of the strategy employed. With regard to the tactics used to generate publicity, Gerrits (1992, p.  45) distinguishes between the (intermediate) goal of moving into the public eye and the measures taken to explain one’s own deeds in a way that attracts public attention, for example by means of claims of responsibility. Gerrits, after studying several descriptions and memoirs from terrorist circles, sees the following psychological strategies and tactics for generating publicity and achieving the ultimate political goal, referring exclusively to insurgent terrorism (“from below”) (Fig. 4.2). This subdivision leads in the end to two main goals: Demonstration of the strength of the movement and demonstration of the vulnerability of the authorities (see Gerrits, 1992, p. 36; Rothenberger et al., 2018). Thus, on the one hand, there is a strengthening effect, on the other hand, a crushing, demoralizing effect. Similarly, Waldmann (2005a, p. 37) sees terrorism as a challenge to existing power structures, as an extreme form of provocation of power, as a “challenge of a strong person by a weaker one.” In this conflict, which is deliberately brought about by the terrorists, the other side is “provoked until it lashes out in retaliation, so that it looks as if it is the aggressive side” (Waldmann, 2005a, p. 37). The provocateur is

18

 The “Contagion Theory”, which is presented in Sect. 4.5.3, also moves in this direction.

4.3  The Terrorist Attack as Violent Communication Chosen Method of Action

Insurgent terrorism

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Psychological Strategies

Tactics of Publicity

Demonstrating the vulnerability of authorities

Committing violent deeds because of their news value

Using repression by authorities

Engaging in supporting and recruitmental activities

Demoralizing the government and its adherents and troops

Choosing optimal time and place for action

Winning or enlarging public sympathy

Issuing statements

Radicalizing the people or polarizing the political situation

Keeping in contact with journalists and giving interviews

Presenting violent deeds as necessary or heroic

Claiming responsibility for terrorist actions

Bringing about a shift from assets to liability

Bringing powerful symbols into play

Fig. 4.2  “The Terrorist’s Psychological Strategies and Tactics of Publicity”. (Gerrits, 1992, p. 33)

dependent on a reaction, feedback, if his strategy is to succeed. On both the personal level (politicians) and the institutional level (government apparatus), it is difficult to avoid this reaction (emotional, physical or verbal). However, because terrorists use an indirect strategy, it is difficult for them to maintain control over the various stages of the process. To conclude the complex of strategic communication, two studies should now be mentioned in which the authors also identified the actors named in the research model (Fig. 3.5) as the main addressees of terrorist strategies. Harmon (2008, pp. 39–44) states:

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1 . Terrorism seeks to disrupt society through fear and anarchy.19 2. Terrorism aims to discredit, weaken or destroy a particular government and replace it with another. In part, terrorists seek to achieve their political goal by damaging the military and its institutions, even if this is a secondary strategy: “Depending on the group, the rendering of damage to the state’s military forces or infrastructure is usually of secondary or tertiary interest; terrorists prefer undefended, nonmilitary targets” (Harmon, 2008, p. 42). 3. Terrorism seeks an international impact  – and in this the media are of great importance. According to Harmon (2008), the economic strategy of the terrorists, i.e., the damage to the economy, had been strongly neglected by political science until 9/11. But here, too, the close systemic interlocking of the economy and politics ultimately leads to effects on the political system as well as pressure to act. Corman and Schiefelbein (2008, pp. 69–70) identify three strategic communication goals of Islamists20 that also correspond to the stakeholders identified in the model (Fig. 3.5): first, the attempt to legitimize the movement (→ civil society; “public”), then second, to propagandize (→ media), and third, to intimidate opponents (→ politics). “Islamists pursue these strategies using sophisticated, modern methods of communication and public relations. They segment audiences and adapt their message to the audience, apply some of the same PR techniques used by large corporations, conduct disinformation campaigns, and coordinate communication with operations” (Corman & Schiefelbein, 2008, p. 70). Although this is talking about the strategies of Islamists and not insurgents in general who engage in violent communication, the observations translate well. It is worth noting that Corman and Schiefelbein do not speak of a disruption of civil society, but of an

 Here Harmon means anarchy probably more in the sense of “chaos” and “disorder or upheaval,” because anarchy means without rule, not tyranny. However, terrorists also seek the dissolution of the current rule. The difference is in the way violence is used. In the same way, there can be peaceful revolutions. “Indeed, terror might be seen as a sub-species of propaganda. Yet terrorism is also a sub-species of revolution, which is a struggle for power. The key to that power is popular allegiance, whether given voluntarily or out of fear” (Tugwell, 1987, p. 409). 20  A good description of Al-Qaeda’s media strategies is provided by Gendron (2007). Gendron sees a stratification of Al-Qaeda’s propaganda to the target groups Ummah, supporters and enemies (see Gendron, 2007, p. 16). 19

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attempt at legitimization. Thus, the act of terror appears as a kind of last chance to convince the population that the group in question is a fully-fledged political actor who has a legitimate interest in political participation – but paradoxically uses illegitimate communication channels to point out its limited situation. Successful terrorist groups therefore always have a concept and pursue their goal in different ways. The analysis of strategic communication towards the three identified stakeholder groups (see Sect. 3.2) summarizes the following findings: (a) The public is intimidated and put in a state of shock. It is the decisive motor to get government actions going – mostly against the assassins, but in some cases even in steps towards the insurgent group. Civilians are often victims of the attacks. (b) The media serve as attention-getters for the terrorists, even if their reporting is mainly event-related with little detail on the background and (political) motivation of the terrorists (see Sect. 4.3.4). (c) The terrorists want to destroy the status quo of politics by overthrowing it. They seek legitimacy in a new political system. This list clearly shows that the strategy of terrorists is to induce changes in attitude and action among the addressees of terrorist communication – triggered by the terrorist act. The attempts to use violent communication as an initiator of change are also often referred to by researchers as “propaganda of the deed.”

4.3.3 Terrorism as Propaganda of the Deed Propagating one’s own movement or organization is one of the strategic communication goals identified by Corman and Schiefelbein (2008; see Sect. 4.3.2). The aim here is to clarify what is meant by propaganda and where it is to be located in relation to terrorism and its stakeholders. Picard (1993, p. 45) defines propaganda as a communication form that seeks to persuade or manipulate opinions or actions of individuals or groups regarding political, religious or social attitudes. This intention to have an effect allows much of the terrorists’ communication to fall under “perlocutionary act” (see Sect. 4.9). Since terrorists have nothing else in mind with their acts and claims of responsibility than precisely this “winning for themselves” (even if by threat), their communications can be described as propaganda. “Propaganda and terrorism are identical insofar as they both seek to influence a mass audience in a way that is intended to benefit the sponsor. But while terror has a singular purpose  – inducing fear and uncertainty  – propaganda can and does

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serve every imaginable purpose from religion to politics to commerce” (Tugwell, 1987, p. 409). Terrorists “use violence as a signal and message to sow fear and terror and motivate sympathizers. Terrorism is thus a communication strategy. This ‘ingenious’ invention of using violence not only for instrumental purposes (fighting, injuring, destroying the enemy) but to convey messages goes back to the anarchists in the 19th century: Swiss, Germans, Spaniards and above all Russians  – Bakunin, Kropotkin, etc.  – spoke of the ‘propaganda of the deed’” (Waldmann, 2005a, p. 9).21 However, it cannot be conclusively confirmed who first coined the specific expression “propaganda of the deed,” Carlo Pisacane (Italian revolutionary, 1818– 1857), Paul Brousse (French anarchist, 1844–1912) or Johann(es) Most (anarchist, 19th century) (see Elter, 2008, p. 63). In any case, the term originated in an anarchist environment. Laqueur (1978) cites Advice for Terrorists by Johann (also John) Most, whose texts appeared in his newspaper “Freiheit” (“Freedom”), which was first published in London, then later in New York. Most, a Social Democratic member of the Reichstag, had to leave Germany after the enactment of Bismarck’s anti-socialist laws (see Laqueur, 1978, p. 40). Most (quoted after Laqueur, 1978, p. 83) writes clearly: “Since we consider the propaganda of the deed to be useful, we must also take into account the possible side circumstances of it. Now everyone knows from experience that in action propaganda one is able to achieve a greater effect the higher one shoots or blasts and the more perfectly such an enterprise succeeds”. And further: “Today more than ever we are founded on the principle that the right deed at the right time in the right place can be more useful than a literary or oratorical propaganda of thousands of agitators, no matter how great” (Most quoted after Laqueur, 1978, p. 88). It was not the deed itself that mattered, but the propagandistic effect. “If one wants to achieve the desired success completely and fully, posters should even be put up immediately after the accomplished deed, especially in the city where it happened, in which the reasons for the action should be explained and the best should be made of it” (Most quoted by Laqueur, 1978, p.  91). At that time, the posters served as claims of responsibility with detailed justification; and in their own newspapers, too, reference was made to the deed: the reactionary press was trying to cover up the revolutionary attacks or to cast them in a negative light. It was therefore the task of the anarchist press to present the deeds in a positive light, since “every anarchist deed only has a proper propagandistic  However, the “tyrannicide” already served in antiquity as a justification for the implementation of the propaganda of the deed; the murderer “legitimized” his deed before the public as a “martyr’s death” (see Elter, 2008, p. 77): without this drastic means, no change would otherwise have taken place. 21

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effect when it is appropriately illuminated by the press appointed for this purpose and made palatable to the people” (Most, quoted in Laqueur, 1978, p. 91). The importance of the media has persisted to this day: Waldmann (2005b, pp. 14–15) acknowledges that it is true that “violence gives terrorists privileged access to the media, and paradoxically, the more brutal it turns out to be, the more quickly and surely. In our time, media presence establishes prominence, signals importance and significance”. On the other hand, Waldmann argues, this approach results in a negative response, because most readers would feel repelled and rather strengthened in their conservative convictions. Gaining access to the media via a staged event (see Sect. 4.3.4) does not necessarily mean being able to impose a certain frame of reporting on them. However, if antagonistic groups are fundamentally denied access to the media, terrorism becomes a “substitute communication” (Waldmann, 2005b, p. 15). Waldmann suggests that terrorists should never be allowed an interview immediately after an attack, then mistakenly understood as a “reward” (Waldmann, 2005b, p. 16), but only in times of relative calm. Reporting in the sense of “autopropaganda” (Hoffman, 2007, p. 307) might otherwise even lead to a strengthening of cohesion within the terrorist group, because the attack would unite them for their own cause. Many terrorists have justified their actions by saying that the public would otherwise not take notice of them or the problems associated with them. Violence is a lever to force people’s thinking and reflection about a certain problem. Communication in the form of unpredictable physical harm triggers general psychological insecurity. This is the actual and intended effect. Wilkinson (1997, pp. 56–57) notes four main goals of terrorists: spreading fear and terror through the propaganda of the act, attracting attention to one’s cause – presented as justified – among the general public, weakening the attacked government or system by provoking undemocratic countermeasures, and soliciting sympathizers and financial support. This list corresponds to the order of the “strategy recipients” mentioned in Sect. 4.3.2 and shows how propaganda is guided by or is part of an overarching strategy. Terrorist attacks demonstrate the group’s willingness to push through a political cause at the expense of innocent people. The public’s fear, grief, anger, speechlessness and horror arise from the thought: “That could have been me”. If the reporting in this respect has an effect on the public climate, then the translation mechanism from the planning of the terrorists, from the use of violence through the media to the public has been successful. The terrorists’ goal is to use scare tactics and change in the public climate of opinion to persuade those under attack (usually the government) to make decisions that contradict their actual interests and principles (see Wördemann, 1977, pp. 154–155). Often, even if those in power wanted to adhere

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strictly to their principle of non-negotiation, they cannot avoid certain actions or concessions – because of the climate of opinion manipulated by the terrorists. The public demands action to regain a sense of security – even if that action ends up curtailing their own civil liberties, as happened in part with the changes in the law in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. If at first the terrorists must operate in secret and distinguish themselves by mobility and flexibility, they plan and act in the non-public space until the day of the attack, their sudden and forceful march into the public eye. Then the terrorists try to misuse the media for propaganda purposes. Techniques of persuasion are, for example, in an interview or in the claim of responsibility, repetition of the most important arguments, association of one’s own position with a positive context or juxtaposition with something negative, linking with (positive) emotions (see Picard, 1993, p. 41). In contrast, unpleasant facts are played down by omission, trivialization or diversionary tactics. Carlos Marighella (1911–1969), a Brazilian communist, writes in his “Mini-­ Manual of the Urban Guerrillero” about the procedure for a bank robbery: “the urban guerrilla […] must use the assault for propaganda purposes, at the very moment it is taking place, and later distribute material, leaflets, every possible means of explaining the objectives and the principles of the urban guerrilla” (Marighella, 1969, p. 94). Although this description applies to guerrilla warfare, it can nevertheless be applied without difficulty to terrorist acts and their “follow-up”. Marighella (1969, p. 103) himself admits that airplane hijackings, attacks, etc. served the sole purpose and effect of propaganda. In order to provide an insight into propagandist texts and techniques, the next section will present in detail a document made available by Laqueur (1978),22 namely a 197323 declaration by Ulster Protestant activists, which makes explicit reference to the role of the press: “In the last four years mountains of words have been written about us, and our role has been shaped in some way by the press. All the comments about us are based on the following assumptions: That we are narrow-­minded. That we are fanatical. That we are very similar to the IRA. […] Once you read all that has been written about the Scots-Irish in Ireland, you would think that someone had actually grasped the essential aspects of the truth, the real reasons for the bloodshed and the real reason for the hatred. We think, however,  Laqueur (1978) compiles many original sources dealing with terrorism, from contemporary texts, testimonies of tyrannicide in ancient Rome, to Russian anarchists, to interpretations of terrorism by Marx and Engels. 23  The source is given as follows: Ulster: The Counter-Terror. Announcement by a Protestant extremist group, Dublin, Sunday World, 9.6.1973. 22

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that the press has done nothing of the kind, but that it is time to make up for it, since we believe that the press owes our people at least this one thing, namely, to allow them a measure of latitude” (Ulster quoted in Laqueur, 1978, p. 115). The press is even accused of inciting the violent tendencies of Ulster activists. In this regard, there is mention of a case in which an Irish woman made negative comments about the Protestant “oppressors”, which prompted a report. “A lady living in poverty inevitably threw herself into the role of St. Bernadette in heated rhetoric. The press idolized this little woman and she was shown standing gracefully in a garden […]. You, the press, made a heroine of this girl and you now have to bear the responsibility for the consequences. […] It’s a shame you didn’t look in the history books because that’s where the real causes are to be found” (Ulster quoted by Laqueur, 1978, p. 115). This clearly shows that the terrorists closely analyzed and evaluated the media coverage and related it back to their actions: “The bloodbath could very quickly become a reality and you, who condemn us for having brought it about, have unjustly plunged us into it yourselves […]. You have made a revolutionary saint out of an aged little whore: a misguided ecclesiastical fanatic with a soft voice was called a moderate and thus for a terrorist organization [the IRA, author’s note] the necessary and desired publicity had been given” (Ulster quoted in Laqueur, 1978, p. 117). The text concludes with a threat to journalists: “We believe that great injustice has been done to us, and we believe that you should watch the events of the next few months with very special caution” (Ulster quoted in Laqueur, 1978, p. 117). These threatening communications were intended to instill fear not only among journalists, but also among the general population. Journalists themselves were also repeatedly targeted by the Northern Ireland terrorists. As a result, some journalists refrained from signing their articles with names (see Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, p. 44). Wördemann (1977, p. 151) explains the close functional connection between communication and terrorism as follows: “Communication is not only a goal, but an indispensable component of terrorist action. The peculiarity of terrorist action is that the element of fear or anxiety generated is detached from the element of violence actually employed. Even the violence used in the particularly spectacular action is limited in scale; it requires a mechanism of translation to become the greater fear. Here we are basically dealing with the simple technical principle of the translation of force. Communication is the means of translation” (Wördemann, 1977, p.  151). This statement contains the core argument why communication studies must urgently address the phenomenon of “terrorism.” But could the media refuse to play their intended part in the communication process? “In the case of the communications industry, all it needs to do is decide to give preference to a calm news policy and cease the extended, sensational, impression-making portrayals of

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the crime scenes in question. The terrorist action would be deprived of a ­considerable part of its effect, the mechanism sensitively disturbed, because a planned function refused to work” (Wördemann, 1977, p. 155). But the media cannot “simply say no” and evade the propaganda of the act; this will be explained further in Sects. 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9. Propaganda must always be seen in relation to the organization from which it emanates. This institutional context implies a specific communicative practice (see Miller & Sabir, 2012, p. 79). Miller and Sabir (2012, p. 80) see a basic analysis of propaganda in four “key areas”: 1. Institutions: the people and organizations that create or pursue propaganda and the material resources on which they draw. 2. Doctrine: the philosophy and doctrine that theorizes, codifies and organises propaganda efforts. 3. Practice: the activities and outputs of the institutions. 4. Outcomes: in other words the question of impacts.

An analysis of these sub-areas could be accomplished with the help of communication studies methods such as observation and content analysis (1), discourse analysis (2) and input-output analysis (3 and 4). In conclusion, the following quotation once again highlights the core of the “propaganda of the deed,” the connection between violence and message: “The message need not be articulated in words; it can be symbolic (conveyed by the target selected, for example) or simply shocking (conveyed by the indiscriminate nature of the attack). This is classic propaganda of the deed” (Crelinsten, 2002, p. 84). Often the media have no choice but to respond to this propaganda of the deed and include the attack in their event coverage. Terrorism then becomes a media event.

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4.3.4 Terrorism as a Media Event: Routine in Chaos

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

Terrorists do not only use television coverage, which is often first associated with the keyword “media event,” as an amplifying effect for their attacks. A global public is also addressed via the print media, radio and the internet, even if the attack was only local and only affects a regional public. If there is no direct reference to the place of the attack or to the victims, then “the horror is primarily the result of a media event” (Filzmaier, 2001, p.  14). The media make the public aware of the threat in the first place, as they multiply the terrorists’ intended horror and increase its radius. They turn an event into a media event with a wider reach. After an attack, it usually forms the main media event. Then it depends on circumstances such as the success of the manhunt, possible changes in the law, the nations involved, etc., how quickly the issue dies down and is withdrawn from the media. The dominance phase is followed by the normalization phase (Löffelholz, 2008, p. 237): “During the Iraq war, it took just under two weeks for both public and private commercial broadcasters to reduce the amount of coverage of the conflict to pre-war levels.” The exceptions here are pure news channels, which take even longer to cover the topic because they can devote more space to it.24 Finally, there is only selective coverage, for example on the anniversary or when the trial of the perpetrators begins. Overall, the quantitative representation of crises is oriented “towards the routines of event journalism” (Löffelholz, 2008, p.  237). The period Fourteen  days after a key event, in which uncertainty and reorientation play the main role, is regarded as a rough orientation phase; the phases further away from the event can be  It can be assumed that in countries where terrorist attacks are more frequent, a kind of normalization effect occurs earlier in the media. 24

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described as routine phases. Despite the completely new, unexpected situation, however, routine processes also come into play when reporting on unusual, sometimes unthinkable events (see Lilienthal, 2007, p.  4). With regard to photos, for example, it remains the case that – even in times of citizen journalism (see Sect. 4.6.3)  – they often come from large agencies and the enormous time pressure makes it necessary to sift through the pictures quickly. Thus, even in this tense phase, a reliable quantity is created that enables continuous work in stressful situations. Reporting does not proceed unpredictably, but it can bring structural changes. Along these lines, Geyer (2004, p. 29) further developed the ritual media event according to Dayan and Katz (1992) into a “key event” that has longer-term effects on the source, supply and use of the media, for example the increased use of online offerings after the attacks of September 11, 2001 or the willingness to cooperate between the journalists of the online editorial office and those of the parent medium (see Geyer, 2004, p. 111). The extent to which terrorist attacks represent such media or key events and what attributes characterize them will be explained below. Both the terrorists and their (political) opponents are adept at strategic communication – this is at least true for politicians in the U.S., according to Nacos et al. (2011, p. 15): they are similarly adept at using communication to cohere, divide and condemn. Therefore, they argue, the concept of ritual communication in the case of terrorism fits well with the media event defined by Dayan and Katz. Weichert (2006, p. 379), who sees the “crisis as a media event,” notes that in the case of media events such as terrorist attacks “the degree of complexity increases considerably, which television attempts to compensate for in a recognizable way through a deliberate use of familiar narrative modes and suspenseful dramaturgies, the assignment of actor roles and other journalistic framing options. The construction nimbus of media reality understood in this way is the result of an entelechy, i.e., a constant process of staging and ritualization inherent in the medium of television and its programming, which expresses itself in recurring forms of presentation, dynamizing programming sequences, and classical narrative and structural principles.” The catastrophe is thus fitted into a medially predetermined form and an actually incomprehensible event is transformed into a lucid, comprehensible story. The return to accustomed programming structures then brings back familiarity, security and control after a few days (see Weichert, 2006, p. 380). A typical sequence of reporting looks like this: “fright, victimization, empathy with the victims, reassurance that the security authorities are working, solidarization, unification against the enemies from outside” (Lilienthal, 2007, p.  4). The journalists bring order to the initial chaos, after a while they reassure the audience that something is being done against “the evil.” At first, they only communicate

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about the attack, about what just happened, later political analysis and commentary are added (see Lilienthal, 2007, p. 3). As long as the exact circumstances of the attack have not yet been clarified, journalists remain at the event level in their reporting. Deeper analyses could lull the reader into a false sense of security and make him believe in the political-investigative competence of his medium, which it may not even possess. The time pressure also leads to the event being in the foreground during the initial reporting – first the recipients are given the information “what, who, how” and possibly also “which consequence” (for example, numbers of victims) – only then do the journalists move away from the event-centeredness and look for the “why,” the background. Since the topic of “terrorism as a media event” has been researched primarily using the example of “September 11,” this example from the religiously motivated field will frequently be used in the following discussion. Zelizer and Allan (2002), for example, question whether the coverage of 9/11 was not so extraordinary after all, but rather followed predetermined patterns that had been applied for a long time; Zelizer and Allan (2002, p. 18) see routines and cultural and political frames as salient here that had long been practiced in the coverage of violence, terrorism, and Islam. The focus, they argue, has been on the immediate reaction, not on the reasons behind the act or the explanation of structural violence in global society. The few journalists who had provided background pieces had been overshadowed by the many other journalists who had (re)produced stereotypical frames. Thus, rather than drawing a nuanced and multi-faceted picture of historical and current circumstances, familiar frames and narratives such as patriotism and heroism were resorted to in order to provide themselves, i.e., the media industry, and the recipients with some security in the face of uncertainty (see Zelizer & Allan, 2002, p. 20).25 One could clearly see an identification with the victim side. September 11, 2001 was an extreme media event in quantitative terms: “All daily newspapers devoted their main section for political coverage for weeks almost exclusively to the subject of the terrorist attacks against the U.S. The length was up to 15 special pages […]. The terrorist attacks were, however, at the same time a prime example of the competitive disadvantage of newspapers as a print medium with less timeliness and authenticity” (Filzmaier, 2001, p. 16). They nevertheless attempted to achieve authenticity through the selection of laypersons as sources and their intuitive assessment of danger (personal concern), as well as through reports written by correspondents. In contrast, authority was conveyed when experts served as sources and made analytical assessments of danger (professional distance) and when information was passed on by actors in the political 25

 On the concept of narratives, see in-depth Sect. 4.8.3.

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system (see Köstler, 2011, p. 257). Print media caught up in part through detailed background reporting, benefiting from the slightly longer research lead time. Many also used the Internet as their main source: www.cnn.com counted around 9 million hits per hour in the week of the attacks, compared to 11 million hits per day otherwise (see Filzmaier, 2001, p. 16).26 Frequently accessed, for example, were also forums and pages on victim identification and search. The media event thus intervened in the routines of both producers and recipients. The German newspaper Frankfurter Allgeune Zeitung appeared for the first time on September 12 with two photos on the front page. Previously, a picture had only been placed there for historical events such as reunification in 1990. Spiegel and Focus already appeared on Saturday, Stern sent a special supplement ahead and then appeared on Monday, Zeit published an extra edition and already on the day of the attack some daily newspapers published a special edition in the evening, for example Badische Zeitung or Ruhr Nachrichten (see Brosda, 2002, p. 65). This clearly shows that the terrorist attack became a media event and that format and publication rules no longer applied unconditionally in the exceptional situation (see also Sect. 4.8.1). The media themselves partly reflected the peculiarities in their reporting. Some newspaper editors commented on what they saw as overly event-oriented and sensationalist television images. “Newspapers and magazines took on the task of an internal evaluation of events in terms of their media impact” (Brosda, 2002, p. 65). White (2002, pp. 25–26) also concludes that some of the coverage, especially in Western countries, prompted a discussion about the quality of the reporting. This meta level offered added value to users and established transparency, a central task of journalism. After the attacks and the media event of “September 11,” the German Journalists’ Association (Deutscher Journalisten-Verband, DJV) also dealt self-­ critically with the role of the media in relation to terrorism and took the following position: “Melodramatic portrayals in words, pictures and sound to increase ratings or circulation cannot be justified, because they would be part of the terrorist calculation. Journalists who stir up fears and build up or solidify prejudices through exaggerated and undifferentiated portrayals are unintentionally but negligently playing into the hands of terrorists” (DJV, 2002, p. 24). Here the media professionals applied their own practice-relevant quality criteria – but only in the wake of the event-related reporting. The quality of war reporting, as far as content analyses provide information about it, follows these self-imposed criteria only in parts. It can be described with  In terms of time, the same: Just under 30% of the German-speaking population aged 16 and over were informed about the attack on the World Trade Center within a quarter of an hour, and around half of them after half an hour (see Emmer et al., 2002, p. 168). 26

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the following keywords, which largely also apply to terrorism reporting: ­“stereotyping, friend-foe polarization, militainment, trivialization, ritualization, personalization, simplification, collective typification, expertainization, pseudo-­ dramatization, emotionalization, and one-sided orientation towards state sources of information from one’s own country” (Löffelholz, 2004a, p. 33). The media, and among them especially television, make terror tragedies understandable, give them a comprehensible framework through editorial routines and rituals (see Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2009, p. xii). Many terrorist attacks have revealed “the terrible sides of a media society that does not primarily process knowledge or information, but whose foundation is the generation and accumulation of attention and, as can be observed in response, the expansion of surveillance or the secret gathering of information as the usually less noticed flip side of attention. The attacks show that the terrorists as well as the media are caught in a spiral of outbidding, i.e., they have to generate ever bigger and more impressive spectacles in order to continue to capture the public’s attention” (Rötzer, 2002, p. 86). The terrorists’ goal is precisely this public attention, which they achieve via “the gaze of the collective attention organs of the media as the upstream social selection systems” (Rötzer, 2002, p. 88), which they can direct towards themselves but not fully control. This leads to the characteristic of the “element of surprise” that constitutes terrorist attacks. It is this news factor (see Sect. 4.7.1) that sets terrorism apart from guerrilla or civil war movements. The latter two revolutionary groups are in a continuous state of combat and are often in openly contested battles. Terrorists, on the other hand, exploit the unexpected and thus achieve a stronger effect among the populace as well as the mass media. The catastrophe of September 11 is considered the (live) media event with the most viewers in television history to date. “As an ‘extreme event’, the attack on the World Trade Center combines on the level of media selection logic almost all news factors identified so far in research” (Brosda, 2002, p.  54). The images burned themselves in because the same ones were constantly repeated: the explosion, the plane flying into the tower.27 Images are often so powerful that they hinder a rational examination of the subject matter (see Sect. 4.8.2); the public is still so emotionally bound and shocked in the face of the “original images” that it resists classifying and systematic reappraisals. While the first part of this chapter dealt with the phenomenon of terrorism as a media event in a highly descriptive manner, it will now be examined in more detail from the perspective of communication theory. In doing so, we will move away from the view of “media event” as an event originally created by the media. 27

 This staging reinforces the thesis that “terrorism is theater”, presented in Sect. 5.5.

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­ eimann and Winn (1994, p. 92–106) see an act of terrorism as a “coercive media W event or coercion” (Weimann & Winn, 1994, p.  92),28 which does not leave the media the choice to report on it or not, because it combines so many news values that it is impossible to ignore it. The fact that an event is picked up by the media gives it a special importance for the recipient and the terrorists. Weimann and Winn (1994, p. 105) refer to an “incentive” for the terrorists to create a media event because it would reward them with a higher status attribution. This is precisely the logic underlying the concept of “status conferral” (see Sect. 4.12.3). A higher density of reporting ascribes increased importance to the group (and sometimes also to its motives). Dayan and Katz (1992, p. 72) do not speak of “coercive” events, but of “‘hijacked’ events.” This includes the terrorist attack during the 1972 Olympic Games: “By definition, media events attract the attention of the world: the cameras are mounted, the lights are turned on, the ceremony begins. There is no stronger temptation to advocates of some revolutionary cause than to turn these lights and cameras on themselves. Such were the Munich Olympics of 1972, when Palestinian terrorists held Israeli athletes hostage and murdered them in cold blood” (Dayan & Katz, 1992, p. 72).29 An event that extends over several days and can be broadcast live is considered a real “media event” (see Dayan & Katz, 1992, pp. 1–3). The media relevance of hostage-taking lies, among other things, precisely in this. The 17-day hostage drama of the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 by Lebanese Shiite terrorists in Beirut produced as its “output” 500 news reports in those Seventeen days on the three main American TV networks alone. The regularly scheduled program was constantly interrupted for special news (see Schicha & Brosda, 2002, p. 8). The attack advanced to the number one media spectacle; the terrorists had achieved a virtual news monopoly and a high-status attribution with their deed. A claim of responsibility a few days or even a few months after the attack triggers renewed intensive reporting; in this way the topic remains in the public consciousness. The recipient assumes, when reading about an event in the newspaper, that the event really happened, that it happened as written in the newspaper, that important things get more extensive and prominent coverage, and that if one thing is reported frequently, it happens more frequently than other things. These four assumptions are what Kepplinger and Habermeier (1995, p.  372) call the recipient’s “correspondence assumption.” However, it is the case that after key events similar events are often reported and this appears to the reader as an accumulation, although in reality  A category they add to Dayan and Katz’s (1992) systematics underlying their observation.  Note the subtle language: first it says “revolutionary cause,” then “Palestinian terrorists” and finally it refers to murder and “cold blood.” 28 29

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Indicators of media oriented and non-media oriented terrorist events Media oriented terrorism ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Terrorists involve journalists or media personalities in the event Terrorist group announces their association with event Terrorist group informs media of event and purpose Terrorist group or individual is willing to be interviewed Terrorist group tapes or photographs event and provides it to the public through the Internet or media Attacks are in newsworthy countries or on people from newsworthy countries Attack is on established or high-profile newsworthy individuals Event causes fatalities or injury Event is purposely unique and dramatic Most common events is hijacking or hostage taking/kidnapping for nonmonetary reasons

Non-media oriented terrorism ● Events are unclaimed ● Tapes and photographs are not made public ● Attacks are made in less nonnewsworthy country ● Event is standard in procedure or common to prior events ● Low profile or unknown victims ● Most common event is a bombing or assault

Fig. 4.3  “Indicators of media oriented and non-media oriented terrorist events”. (Surette et al., 2009, p. 362)

no accumulation has occurred (see Kepplinger & Habermeier, 1995, p. 388). In any case, it is worth considering whether the terrorist attack should not be described as a “media event,” but rather – following Surette et al. (2009) – as a (staged) “media-­ oriented” event. It is only the media’s taking up of the attack that then makes it a “media event” in retrospect. For it is still up to the media whether they transform an event oriented towards them into their own event. Surette et al. (2009) see the strength of the media orientation of terrorist attacks on a continuum (see Fig.  4.3),30 whereby it must be questioned whether “non-­ mediated terrorism” then moves more in the direction of ordinary crime aimed at material damage. It is actually impossible for any terrorist attack to be described as “standard in procedure” (see Fig. 4.3). 30

 For case studies of terrorist attacks on this continuum, see Surette et al. (2009, p. 362).

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Measures of media oriented terrorism (one point for presence of each factor, else zero) Involves Journalists or media by: 1 point 1 point 1 point 1 point

Informing media of event or purpose Providing statement or interview Posting or distributing images Announcing or identifying group’s association with an act

Attacks a victim or target that is: 1 point 1 point 1 point 1 point

Victims from United States or other Western country High profile due to occupation, religious, or political status Event occurs in United States or other Western country Symbolic non-tactical value

Event is: 1 point 1 point 1 point 1 point

Nonmonetary kidnapping, hijacking, or hostages Aimed at distant audience Five or more fatalities or ten or more injuries Unique or brutal

Note: To receive a point for targeting Westerners, targets had to be an American or from an allied Western country; or the facility or building targeted was specifically disignated as a U.S. or allied military compound. To receive a point for the high profile occupation, religious, or political category the person or place must have preexisting news value. To receive a point for symbolic attack value, the attack must be on a well-known site location or an event must occur on a celebration or holiday date. To receive a point for distant audience, the attack must be aimed at a target owned, controlled, or clearly connected to a distant population (an embassy for example). To qualify as „unique or brutal,“ the attack must employ either a rarely used technique, torture, or a gruesome death.

Fig. 4.4  “Measures of media-oriented terrorism”. (Surette et al., 2009, p. 365)

This shows once again that communication strategy planning is necessary for high-impact media-oriented terrorism. In a further step, Surette et  al. awarded points for particularly media-related characteristics of an attack (see Fig. 4.4), although it is debatable to what extent these points are really indicative of a strongly media-oriented attack or a group’s “media skills.” Moreover, the list has a purely Western-U.S. orientation. The researchers looked at attacks by 20 groups in the period January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2006. Their main finding “… was that group average media

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o­ rientation scores clustered toward the lower end of the possible 0 to 12 score range with only three groups averaging scores greater than 3. High scoring mediaoriented terrorism events were extremely rare” (Surette et al., 2009, p. 364). This is partly due to the fact that – as explained above – many attacks are carried out in Africa, for example, and not in Western countries. However, it is precisely the rarity that makes an event newsworthy for the media. The findings of Surette et al. would have been more meaningful if they had been presented longitudinally in order to prove or disprove a growing media orientation of terrorists. This might have revealed developments such as the “urban migration” already mentioned above by Laqueur (1976) and Frey (2004). Finally, an approach to the topic originating from economics will be presented. Rohner and Frey (2007) developed a game-theoretical model to describe the strategic interactions between terrorists and the media. They describe attacks such as those at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich or in the U.S. in 2001 as “mediated mega-events” (Rohner & Frey, 2007, p. 129). Accordingly, they locate the media as a transporter that makes the major event consumable. Similarly, Perešin (2007, p. 6) calls terrorism, which emerged after the information revolution through new information and communication technologies, “mega terrorism”. Rohner and Frey (2007, p. 131) see the symbiotic relationship between terrorists and the media (see Sect. 4.5.2) as a specific form of social interaction between two “players” as well as a “common-interest-game” (Rohner & Frey, 2007, p. 142), because both media and terrorists take advantage of what is happening and adapt their own actions to the actions of the other player. The attack was already planned by the terrorists as a major event with regard to the media. Here we can speak of a mediatization of the actions. Rohner and Frey (2007) used the Granger Causality Test on a sample of terrorist attacks (with reported death toll) and terrorist coverage in the New York Times and Neue Zürcher Zeitung between January 1998 and June 2005 to demonstrate that attacks and coverage are interdependent. The news values of “proximity” and “elite nation” were also considered; “to make it into the news, terrorists operating in Western countries can commit some minor terror incident with few fatalities, whereas terrorists in developing countries need to ‘produce’ a lot of blood to attract the attention of the Western media” (Rohner & Frey, 2007, p. 141). News values such as proximity and number of fatalities are crucial in selecting events. Since news is both a commercial and a social product for media outlets (see Schmid, 1989, p. 539), publishers must weigh social benefits against market gains. The public’s right to information need not degenerate into sensationalist event journalism that overshadows all other information; however, since commercial profit has now become a priority for many publishers, increasing circulation with “sensations” is

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often condoned if not outright endorsed. Rohner and Frey (2007, p. 132) hypothesize, “Sensationalist media coverage makes it easier for terrorist leaders to establish their terrorist organization as a well-known ‘brand,’ which facilitates fund-­ raising and increases their notoriety.” This leads back to the marketing concepts of terrorist groups (see Sect. 4.2.2) and their portfolio of strategic communications (see Sect. 4.3.2).

4.3.5 Interim Summary The communication before an attack involves the emergence of the group and can be described with approaches from the field of organizational communication, or better yet with network theories. The instrumental perspective was adopted. It assumes that terrorist organizations communicate rationally, the communication processes are not completely random but can be systematically captured as they also function as responses to certain social conditions, actions of governments, etc. Terrorism has been identified as the end point of failed non-violent attempts at communication. Terrorist organizations thus emerge from social movements that cross the threshold into violence. Such radicalization processes are strongly permeated by communicative processes. Above all, the field of collective identity plays a decisive role here. It consists of given parameters such as same ethnicity, same social status (e.g., unemployment) and variable parameters such as rhetoric and charisma of a leader, integration into networks and dependence on or influenceability by opinion leaders. The parameters determine the level of involvement in the collective identity. With regard to the processes of collectivization and radicalization, communication studies can provide valuable impulses for counteracting them, for example through counter-narratives that are developed based on an analysis of the specific motives and group communication structures. The unity of what Lindlof (1988) calls “interpretive communities” can be disrupted by a “disruptive communication” interfering with the hitherto unified interpretation. The theories presented so far in Chap. 4 have referred to two fundamentally different modes of communication: violent versus non-violent communication. Communication studies has so far been concerned almost exclusively with nonviolent communication; the “propaganda of the deed” is still relatively unexplored because the close nexus to the physical act of violence and the lack of oral or written expression run counter to previous communication concepts. Normative approaches that focus on discursive understanding or deliberation lead to a dead end here. Conventional approaches to the description of strategic and symbolic communication, on the other hand, could be transferred well to both the terrorist act and

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the communication that accompanies it, since they are strongly object-related and oriented to the course of the attack. They have a high explanatory power and even a certain predictive potential if one considers from the terrorists’ point of view which targets or victims could act as symbols to convey the group’s motives. Münkler (2001, p. 11) basically defines terrorism as a “strategy that is capable of carrying out a conflict by violent means, even against infinitely superior powers, while making only minor resources of its own available.” To this end, terrorism makes use of two special features, namely the “complete disregard for all rules of warfare” (for example, no identification of combatants) and the “ruthless use of the civilian resources of the attacked opponent” (for example, transport and transmission systems) (Münkler, 2001, p. 12). Of course, monetary resources also play a role in determining which actions can be carried out in the context of strategic communication. The strategy thus includes considerations of the who, when and where of the attack. In hardly any other form of communication are channel and message so inextricably linked and mutually dependent. The channel is the deed, the message the propaganda, the channel is the message as propaganda of the deed. This entanglement, which is quite in line with McLuhan (see McLuhan & Fiore, 2011, p. 10), contrasts with other messages analyzed by communication studies, which can be transmitted alternatively via, for example, printed texts, the internet, TV or even channels such as the telephone. Of course, it is not disputed that here too the channel dominates the mode of communication and that a change of channel can also demand a transformation of message. But the fact that a detachment from the medium is not even possible, because otherwise the message would not exist, is a unique feature of terrorist attack communication. And this is also the reason for its great symbolism. For Crelinsten (1992, p. 214), for example, the fact that the selection of victims carries with it a message is a necessary criterion for defining terrorism: “The victimization must be designed to generate messages to others about the possibility of future victimization, or it is not terrorism.” Crelinsten (1987a, p. 419) sees terrorism as a form of political communication and as an expression of social protest, and the act of terrorism as the transmitter of a message that is not addressed to the purely functionally chosen direct victims, but to those in power as well as to the public. In his communication model, the attack is equivalent to a message in political discourse. The act, he argues, is a demand for attention, for recognition as a political actor, and ultimately for legitimacy to be a permissible representative of a particular (political) direction (Crelinsten, 1987a, p. 419). In order to reach those in power, terrorists require further means of communication that make the message of the attack accessible to them and to a wider circle of society – the public. The at-

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tack as a message carrier can thus be described as a primary and compelling channel. The media functions as a secondary channel or message carrier. Other types of communication can of course run simultaneously, including interpersonal communication directly at the site of the attack or as a conversation about media content, tweets by the police or online forum posts. The communication of terrorists, especially their attacks, was compared to public relations in Sect. 4.2.1. Common to both are the search for attention for their idea and or products, setting topics as well as active, sometimes aggressive, communication offerings. The key difference is that terrorism does not seek social legitimacy in the act itself. Similarly again, press releases and claims of responsibility are increasingly clearly aligned with the media’s modus operandi, in order to ensure that the content “makes it into print” with as little change as possible. Many terrorist groups now also reveal a proximity of their activities to marketing and branding. This is where the concept of the “homo economicus” comes into play, who spreads his information rationally, economically and in line with the target group. The internet, whose advantages for terrorists were comprehensively highlighted in Sect. 4.2.3, can also serve this purpose. For example, the internet can be used for identity and network building, data mining, and fundraising, among other things. It allows the traditional gatekeeper model to be bypassed. Finally, the act of terror was described in Sect. 4.3 as a violent, symbolic and strategic communication, as “propaganda of the act” and media event. Symbolism is evident, for example, in the selection of victims, places (often in post-heroic societies) or a specific date or anniversary. The terrorists send a message with the symbolic act without using verbal or textually manifested communication. Models from semiotics such as Jakobson’s (1979 [1960], p. 88) schema of factors indispensable for linguistic communication, which at first glance deal with normatively “well succeeding” communication, could be applied to the terrorist process with some restrictions (such as “paralysis” on the receiver side).31 The attribute “strategic” was defined as the “intentional, purposeful, and goal-directed use” of communication and distinguished from tactics that are operationally bound as well as of shorter duration. Terrorists use different strategies towards different audiences such as the public, media and government. The main objective is to disrupt and

 (Empirically not proven) practical examples show how in recent years this paralysis receded more and more and the time intervals became shorter until the recipient communicated “normally” again – this was also an intended message to the terrorists: While many concerts and celebrations were cancelled after the attack in the Bataclan in Paris, hardly any such measures were taken after the attack on a Christmas market in Berlin-Charlottenburg. 31

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destroy the social order under attack. The society is put in a state of shock and the government is led to a hasty overreaction. The intensive connection between terrorism and propaganda was already mentioned by Russian anarchists in the nineteenth century. The core argument here is that the attack itself, precisely because of its symbolic nature, can already be assessed as pure propaganda. The act then continues as a media event, whereby it has been shown that in this editorial state of emergency, routines in reporting certainly take effect (see Sect. 4.3.4). Some studies on this topic draw on terms defined in communication studies such as “ritual media event” (Dayan & Katz, 1992) or “coercive media event” (Weimann & Winn, 1994). The constructivist perspective and approaches to measuring quality in news coverage also proved helpful. A scale to assess the degree of media orientation of a terrorist act was presented (see Surette et al., 2009), although it is critical to see whether a terrorist act can be classified as a terrorist act at all if, as an act of violence, it had no media orientation whatsoever. Reference was also made to game-theoretical approaches. They describe the relationship between terrorists and the media as a form of social interaction between two “players” (see Rohner & Frey, 2007, p. 142). As mentioned above, one reason why terrorists like to choose democracies for their attacks could be that there is a higher density of communication there and the groups can thus count on more publicity (see Münkler, 2001, p. 17) and precisely that their media-oriented event becomes a media event, especially since the media are often not subject to direct state influence. Shpiro (2001, p. 20) is also of this opinion and sees politicians as having a duty to react to this peculiarity of terrorism: “Since terrorists use the media to achieve their goals, the war on terrorism must therefore also include a media strategy.” To this end, politicians should be more open and self-critical when addressing the media (see Shpiro, 2001, p. 23). The development of certain cultural (master) narratives can also contribute to a counter-strategy (see Sect. 4.8.3 and Rothenberger et al., 2018). For the purpose of legal propaganda, political arms of terrorist organizations have often also been established. Counter-terrorist measures should therefore also aim to use counter-­ narratives to counter the themes set by the terrorists and extremists at an early stage and pre-empt attributions of blame (against the government).

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4.4 Claims of Responsibility: Attribution of Responsibility

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

Claims of responsibility are part of strategic communication outside the attack, but since they are inextricably linked to it and directly tied to the violent event, they appear at this point according to the process diagram (see Fig. 3.6). They fall into the terrorists’ arena of action. Although the content of claims of responsibility is also addressed to the public or civil society for legitimation purposes, they are usually passed on to the media or political bodies. Thus, the arrows pointing in the direction of journalism and politics are highlighted in the following diagram, which illustrates the main communication flows for Sect. 4.4. Whereas in ordinary violent crimes the perpetrators usually wish to remain unidentified (see Sect. 2.1.2), terrorist groups often acknowledge their actions with a communiqué or a video message. With their claims of responsibility, the perpetrators of violence ensure that their message is understood and placed in a specific context. The message serves as a communication amplifier: the violent communication is explained through a subsequent written (letter, email), oral (phone call, audio message), visual (photo) or multimedia (online video) communication. However, claims of responsibility aim to convince not only argumentatively but also emotionally. Witte and Halverscheid (2006) used attribution theories to analyze, among other things, claims of responsibility from Al-Qaeda and the RAF in order to ascertain patterns of argumentation with which the actors justified their terrorist acts. One result of the study is that the groups hardly ever emphasized the positive consequences of the attack for their group, but rather mostly alluded to the fact that a certain segment of the population would have to fear negative consequences if the “bad” actions of the enemy state were not prevented. The terrorist group was acting in the name of universal rights, but the “enemy” was not fulfilling its moral-ethical duty (see Witte & ­Halverscheid,

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2006, pp. 22–23). The responsibility for the allegedly bad situation was thus clearly attributed to the state organs. Marxist-oriented groups in the 1970s and 1980s usually issued a claim of responsbility, which they passed on to news agencies or media companies, in order to justify their acts of violence and to legitimize them from their point of view. Today, the internet makes it easier for terrorist groups to go public (see Sect. 4.2.3). For example, a claim of responsibility video can no longer be withheld – as was the case in the 1970s by a few German public service TV stations – but is immediately available for retrieval. However, the information is then less concentrated and targeted for a specific audience but is widely distributed. In any case, some groups today refrain from declaring their actions with claims of responsibility: “It remains open whether the terrorists, for their part, are convinced that the targets and the form of the attack speak such a clear language that any additional comment is superfluous; or whether they want to express that they do not consider their enemies worthy of any form of communication other than violence. It is also conceivable that they seek to cover their tracks in this way in order to protect themselves from criminal prosecution, or that they want to further intensify the uncertainty and panic effect resulting from the attacks through anonymity” (Waldmann, 2005a, p. 40). Claims of responsibility can also be used for “free-riding.” In the late summer of 2009, for example, a few days after an accident in a Russian hydroelectric power plant with around 70 deaths, the Chechen extremist group KAVKAZ Center from the Caucasus claimed responsibility for this “attack” on its website (see Ludwig, 2009). The group used this accident, which had apparently occurred without any attack, to spread fear and anxiety about the “assassins.” The Chechen extremists also claimed a bomb attack on a train in Russia as their doing a few days later (see Levy, 2009), although the authorities did not give credibility to this claim of responsibility, which was also posted via kavkazcenter.com, as such a delay in claiming responsibility seemed illogical (see Levy, 2009). In the most common cases, messages of responsibility are received by politicians or the media immediately after the attack, not a few days later. Thus, it seemed that the group first learned about the disaster and then considered how to use it to their advantage and incorporate it into their strategy. A crisis that was unintentionally brought about is thus declared to be intentionally brought about, with the question to those in power as to why they did not know how to prevent it. The authority and competence of the government are called into question. Messages can be composed not only after the act, but also in advance. Hoffmann (2008, pp. 241–242) uses the example of the PKK offshoot “Kurdistan Freedom Hawks” (TAK) to show the ability of terrorist organizations to learn: For a long

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time, their attacks were directed only against Turkish citizens; the international press ignored their activities. Then, after some 25 attacks, came the announcement in spring 2006 that they would begin targeting tourists in Turkish holiday areas. This immediately grabbed the headlines of the international press, media attention was guaranteed, and the problems of the Kurds in Turkey became a topic of discussion. Thereupon the Turkish government issued a law that media may not spread any messages of terror organizations, also no claims of responsibility. Thus, the media also pay less attention to the underlying problems. Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 43) see the power struggle in Ireland as a “propaganda war” in which announcements are firmly embedded in the terrorists’ communication strategy: “In this propaganda war the IRA Provisionals have been holding clandestine press conferences and they have been granted exclusive interviews on television to both the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Independent Television (ITV).” In one of these interviews, David O’Connell, acting chief of staff of the PIRA, had announced a bomb attack in Britain, which was carried out two weeks after the interview: 21 people died in two Birmingham bars. The impact of the acts had been greatly increased by their public announcement. In another case, the PIRA had invited American TV documentarians to accompany them on a terrorist act (see Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, p. 43). Both cases – PKK and IRA – show the usefulness of the threat of future scenarios for terrorists in terms of the attention generation they desire. “The urgency of a problem and its solution is heightened if it is possible to imply that the problem will worsen in the future” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 77). Bockstette (2008, p. 5) identifies the three salient communication goals of terrorists as propagating and growing the movement, legitimizing the group, and intimidating enemies. All of these goals can be pursued with a claim of responsibility. The most important function of the claim of responsibility is to seek legitimacy. By placing the frame of “self-legitimation” on its claim of responsibility, the group attempts to portray itself and its actions as legitimate and as a trustworthy actor (see Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 78). If group actors can “make it plausible that they are right and that they themselves are not acting in particularistic self-­interest – e.g., to enrich themselves, gain reputation or power – but are championing collective goals that concern the general public, public resonance will increase” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 78). For example, separatist groups portray their attacks as “just” retributions for oppression suffered. This leads to the frame of normative charging, indicating that patterns of values – for example, in the case of Marxist groups, anti-capitalist values such as equality of resources or collectivity – are often propagated in claims of responsibility. “Thus, when a problem is linked to a

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larger horizon of values, its importance increases, and the irrefutability of solutions to the problem becomes evident” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 77). The communication of terrorist groups is closely linked to the desire to achieve legitimacy. But this is not only the case on the part of the terrorists, but also on the part of the attacked government. Blames are cast toward each other, the so-called causal attributions, and interpretations are made to fit one’s own strategy.32 “The chances of mobilizing the public will increase if, in addition to general causes, one can also describe specific, reachable causers. […] If, beyond such personalization, it is possible to impute a culpable intention to the causer (intentionalization), the willingness to mobilize will increase again” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 77). The attribution of responsibility is always coupled with a justification of one’s own cause. The following chapters will show the extent to which terrorists succeed in instrumentalizing the media for their justification and intimidation propaganda, and how the terrorism-media relationship can be described in detail using middle-­ range communication studies theories.

4.5 Determining the General Relationship Between Terrorism and the Media

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

The field of “media,” which forms the focus of Sects. 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9, is split into various subsections that are oriented towards the value chain defined by  Gerhards and Neidhardt (1993, p. 75) distinguish interpretive strategies from interpretive dimensions: “Interpretive dimensions designate the more communicative reference problems, thematic fields, to which interpretive processes refer. Strategies refer to the techniques of solving these problems.” 32

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Wirtz (2009, p. 60), which leads via the procurement of information and content (selection), the production of content via the “packaging of the products” (choice of format) through to distribution to the recipient. However, this should not give the impression that there is a linear communication process from the terrorists via the media to the government and finally to the audience. In the following, the relationship between the two groups of actors33 is outlined and described first as a symbiotic, then as a parasitic relationship.

4.5.1 Categorization of the State of Research Research on the interconnectedness of terrorism and the media has emerged primarily from the United States and to some extent from the United Kingdom. The increased proportion of U.S. literature on the terrorism-media debate possibly stems from the early emergence of commercial television there, for there is a surplus of literature discussing television images of terrorist attacks – the coverage is often heavily criticized, and the fight for ratings and sensationalist reporting are condemned. In contrast, the effects of TV coverage on viewers and the climate of public opinion have been insufficiently studied, and if so, only for more recent attacks. Paletz and Boiney (1992) have compiled a list of scholarly literature on terrorism and the media, which they divide into four categories: 1. “Terrorists’ strategies and tactics” (they name Laqueur, Leeman, Weimann, Picard, among others, as authors): Paletz and Boiney criticize the lack of literature from terrorist circles in this group. 2. “Indictments of the media”: This second group is divided into camps of authors who judge the media as pro-terrorist (e.g., Miller, Bassiouni, Alexander) and those who judge the media as anti-terrorist (e.g., Herman, O’Sullivan). However, the literature with the verdict “pro-terrorist” predominates: “According to these arguments, the media’s presence can prolong incidents, hinder police operations, provide terrorists with tactical and strategic information, place in jeopardy the lives of hostages and police, and put inappropriate pressure on authorities to resolve incidents, to settle with terrorists or meet their demands” (Paletz & Boiney, 1992, p.  10). The media goes from being a neutral observer to a

 Since systems theory has not yet provided a theoretical foundation (see Sect. 5.1), this chapter does not yet refer to “systems.” 33

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participating accomplice. However, the authors of this group lack empirical evidence to support the negative role of the press. 3. “Prescriptions” (authors include Alexander, Bassiouni): In addition to criticizing the media, some authors also provide (normative) advice and guidelines on how the media should improve their reporting (see Sect. 4.10). 4. “Studies of media coverage and content” (Brosius, Weimann, Picard, Crelinsten, Altheide, among others): For this last category of empirical (case) studies, Paletz and Boiney (1992, p. 22) conclude: “The actual research evidence tends to support the argument that media coverage does not help terrorists much. In particular, micro-level data on the content of coverage indicate, if anything, that it supports Western governments against terrorism.” Certainly, the different assessments cannot be applied across the board to all cases of terrorism coverage. There will always be cases where the reporting led to police investigations being disrupted. But there will also always be cases where journalists explicitly take sides with the existing system. Fundamentally, the concerns and procedures of terrorist organizations are difficult to reconcile with the societally accepted role of the media, and yet a mutual complementarity of functions occurs. Bernard C. Cohen (1963, pp. 4–5) sees three primary roles of the press in the mediation process: the press as observer, the press as participant, the press as catalyst. In each case, the media, especially as participants and catalysts, exert influence on public opinion (see Schwarzer, 2004, p.  2): they contribute to the formation of public opinion as well as to the formation and development of certain values. They can sensitize social groups to certain issues and also mobilize them. The representation of events and contexts in the media has an impact on the individual, the social group and the national as well as international society. “For each, journalism needs to serve simultaneously as conveyor, translator, mediator, and meaning-­ maker” (Zelizer & Allan, 2002, p. 2). Zelizer and Allan (2002, p. 10) see an essential role for journalism as an information transmitter and context provider. The extent to which terrorists exploit or transform this role will be explained below using the approaches of symbiosis and parasitism.

4.5.2 Terrorism and the Media as a Symbiotic or Parasitic Relationship Perešin (2007, p. 6) finds that the media have become one of the most important levers for both terrorist and anti-terrorist organizations in today’s society. In the media, both sides have their say, not only the opponents of terrorism. In the case of

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an extraordinary event such as an attack, as has already been shown, the media devote a lot of space to the terrorist side and its own form of communication, namely the attack. For this reason, the media have often been accused of profiting from the terrorists’ acts (e.g., in terms of increasing circulation) and of being linked to them in a kind of functional complementarity. Miller (1982, p. 13) speaks of an interdependent relationship: “Terrorism and the media are entwined in an almost inexorable, symbiotic relationship.” Elter (2008, p. 272) also concludes “that mass media and terrorism enter into a symbiotic relationship. One actor provides the other with exactly what it needs: terrorism provides the mass media with the spectacular stories and the mass media provides the terrorists with the attention they depend on.” So, the attacks promise “success” for both sides. “The terrorists’ side knows very well that it needs the media for its purposes and tries to instrumentalize it. […] The attacks are therefore increasingly perfectly tailored to the media perception grid and staged in such a way that journalists cannot ignore them at all according to their own criteria” (Hoffmann, 2008, p. 241). The events are of such great and far-reaching significance that it is impossible for journalists to look past them. Wilkinson (1997, p. 52) sees it as beyond the power of the media to create a terrorist group or to set a series of attacks in motion; but if a terrorist organization already exists, it inevitably enters into a symbiotic relationship with the mass media: “In sociology the term symbiosis is taken to mean relations of mutual dependence between different groups within a community when the groups are unlike each other and their relations are complementary. It would be foolish to deny that modern media technology, communications satellites and the rapid spread of television have had a marked effect in increasing the publicity potential of terrorism.” Wilkinson (1997, p. 54) emphasizes the transfer function that the media perform for the terrorists in order to spread their message – and above all fear and terror – among the population, the fourth stakeholder in the communication quadrangle (see Fig. 3.5): “terrorism by its very nature is a psychological weapon which depends upon communicating a threat to the wider society. This, in essence, is why terrorism and the media enjoy a symbiotic relationship.” Surette et  al. (2009, p. 360) also speak of a “symbiotic relationship between terrorism and publicity,” even of a “marriage of media and terrorism” (2009, p. 361). This can certainly be contradicted, because a marriage assumes a mutual voluntary affection in which the partners are also interested in active cooperation in the future. The media are not. It is noticeable in this context, however, that a differentiation according to social levels can yield different results: Micro-level actors, journalists and terrorists, usually do not seek explicit proximity. The meso level provides a platform for exchange, for example when a terrorist organization sends its claim of responsibility

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to a media outlet. The symbiotic relationship referred to is probably primarily at the macro level: the systems of terrorism and the media complement each other in their functions and have a similar self-preservation mechanism found in the transmission of messages, in the case of terrorism via the attack, in the case of the “media/journalism” system via the dissemination of news. A certain closeness of actors at the micro level, however, occurs in rare cases. It manifested itself, for example, during the “Sipadan kidnapping” in the Philippines in 2000: “In the hunt for exclusive interviews with the hostage-takers, journalists did not shy away from handing over a press review with articles about the kidnapping to the kidnappers so that they could convince themselves of the media impact of their action” (Vollmer, 2004, p. 8).34 The interest-driven journalistic actor violates the normative premise of his duty of responsibility through such actions. Surette et al. (2009, p. 360) assume that terrorists are increasingly aligned with the functional principles of the media, which can be seen, for example, in the selection of victims or the severity of the attacks. Schaffert (1992, pp. 69–70) identifies four tactics used by terrorists in relation to the media: They time their attacks to coincide with anniversaries, political events, or editorial deadlines; they select targets that are readily accessible to journalists; they ensure a sufficiently high number of civilian casualties so that “dramatic” coverage can be given; or they make elite individuals or political representatives of elite nations their victims. They are committed to imposing their part in the symbiosis on the media. “Thus, the twin arts of journalism and terrorism have negotiated a mutually beneficial contract: One is rewarded with dollars and the other with instant fame and publicity” (Farnen, 1990, pp.  107–108). The media can charge more money for advertising due to higher circulation achieved via the “explosive news”. The Bild newspaper, for example, had a long-lasting news theme when it continually demonized the Baader-­ Meinhof group. But the RAF was also able to use the configuration to its advantage because it reached the public and attracted a great deal of attention. It remains  If terrorists are dissatisfied with media coverage, they sometimes consider “turning off” the media. However, this usually does not have the desired effect. For example, in the Israel-­ Palestine conflict in the summer of 2008, an ARD cameraman was kidnapped by Hamas because ARD was allegedly providing overly negative coverage – this, of course, made the tone of ARD reports on the subject even worse. Other groups, especially in pre-internet times, forced certain content to be published: for example, in November 1975, the Montoneros, an Argentine guerrilla movement, kidnapped the director of the Mercedes-Benz plant in Buenos Aires and released him only after the company agreed (among other conditions) to run ads in newspapers in Europe, Washington D.C., and Mexico, forcibly denouncing the “economic imperialism” of multinational corporations in developing countries (see Alexander, 1977, p. 169). 34

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questionable, however, whether the reporting brought in new supporters (action mobilization effect) or at least won over many people to its ideas (consensus mobilization effect). There also remains the question of how the media deal with this “burden” of being, in a certain sense, accomplices of terrorism. Empirical studies and newsroom or news director surveys have yet to provide answers to this. Not all researchers, however, are of the opinion that the media made themselves the accomplices of the terrorists quasi-voluntarily because they expected advantages from it. Rather, they speak of exploitation. Biernatzki (2002) presents these two models of the relationship between terrorism and the media: the culpable media model, in which the media play a guilty part in the relationship, and the vulnerable media model, in which media are seen as victims, not accomplices, of terrorism, and any restriction on coverage is in no way seen as a way out or solution to ameliorate or mitigate terrorism. Here, on the contrary, the media could be actively deployed in the fight against terrorism: “the media can be enemies of the terrorists, carrying counterterrorist propaganda and using criticism and innuendo to discredit the terrorists’ motives and goals as well as their methods” (Biernatzki, 2002, p. 22). The “vulnerable media model” already belongs to the parasitism approach, which will be explained below. While many authors repeat relatively uncritically the buzzwords of the “symbiotic relationship” and the media as the terrorists’ “willing accomplice” (see Althaus et al., 2016, p. 1), on closer inspection it is actually not possible to speak of a symbiosis and mutual dependence of terrorism and the media, because then advice on how to moderate reporting would be counterproductive, since it would detract from the mutual “gain” of the two symbiotic partners. Thus, one should rather assume that the media can achieve their greatest benefit in the current system and that it would contradict their functional logic to act in the interests of opponents of the system. Dass (2008, p. 188) also speaks of a “myth of a symbiotic relationship,” as journalists – unlike terrorists – are interested in maintaining the current system that secures their livelihood. Schultz (2017, p. 101) argues that when it comes to the journalism-terrorism relationship, the symbiotic relationship should not be used as a comparison, but rather the asymmetry in the dependent relationship should be considered: Journalists do not need terrorists, they are not dependent on them for their existence. In the long run, if terrorists did indeed bring down the political system, they would take over the media; thus, in the end, the media would not benefit from terrorism. Schultz (2017, p. 103) therefore describes the relationship as “parasitic.” Schaffert (1992, p. 75) also does not see a symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media, but speaks of parasitism, since the terrorists – should they achieve their goal with the help of the media and come to power  – would acquire control over the media apparatus and certainly replace it in terms of

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personnel and structure. “The often-declared symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorists, when viewed in its entirety, is a myth. The correct label for that relationship is parasitic, not symbiotic” (Schaffert, 1992, p. 76). For Farnen (1990, p. 102), too, the media are the host for the parasite “terrorism.” They are exploited by it. Likewise, Rodrigo Alsina (1991, p. 30) sees mass media not as a willing accomplice and certainly not as a contributor, but as a consequence of terrorism. In his opinion, it cannot be considered confirmed that information about terrorism always promotes a part of propaganda, nor that the symbiosis “media – terrorism” facilitates the spread of terrorism. Borrowing a metaphor from physiology, Rodrigo Alsina (1991, p. 30) sees certain historical causes that prompt a fever to flare up in a society: terrorism. The media discover this fever and take note of it. It would be absurd to prescribe breaking the thermometer as a remedy, that is, to restrict the media in its coverage. The correct diagnosis would rather look for the causes that produce the fever, because the fever (terrorism) is, after all, only the symptom. The fever is always closely linked to the conditions in a particular region or state, therefore, the reactions of the government in question and its interaction with the media play an immensely important role. Ayotte et al. (2008, p. 462) argue that terrorism should not be seen as the dysfunction of a small abnormal fringe group, but rather, similar to Rodrigo’s argument, as the manifestation of a dysfunction of society. Terrorism is then merely the symptom of that. And the media would do well to report not only on the fever, that is, on terrorism, but on the dysfunctions.

4.5.3 Terrorism Reporting: Potential for Contagion? As shown in the previous chapters, the media treatment of terror events plays a decisive role. One and the same topic can be embedded in completely different reference schemata and consequently evoke different reactions. The effect of media coverage on the terrorists themselves has long been – and still is – a controversial field of research with little empirical grounding. In a sense, terrorists are also recipients of the media,35 and there is evidence (see, e.g., Colvin, 2009) that they closely follow coverage of their group and attacks. As mentioned several times before, terrorists depend on the media, among other things, to expand their radius of influence. Could it therefore even be argued that without media coverage there  Since this chapter continues to focus on media coverage and terrorists can only be counted among the civil society audience to a limited extent, they were not included in the chapter on “Reception and Impact” (see Sect. 4.12). 35

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would be no terrorism? The answers of the representatives of the most extreme view of the interplay between terrorism and the media, the contagion theory, aim in this direction: “Contagion refers here to a form of copycat crime, whereby violence-­ prone individuals and groups imitate forms of (political) violence attractive to them, based on examples usually popularized by mass media” (Nacos, 2009, p. 3). Adherents of the contagion theory, such as Yonah Alexander and M.  Cherif Bassiouni, see the media as a contagious factor in terrorism; “the more publicity given to bomb scares, the more bomb scares there are likely to be, and reports about plane hijacking lead to more plane hijackings” (Alexander, 1978, p. 104). If terrorism reporting were curtailed, terrorism would also decrease, according to this view, because terrorists would then lack visibility and hope for legitimacy. Contagion theorists believe that news media serve terrorists in three ways: They provide access to the public, lend legitimacy to the terrorists’ cause, and gather information about terrorist groups’ tactics and strategies (see Dobkin, 2005, p. 128). In a sense, media “advertise” the terrorists’ cause, “rewarding” them for their attack by giving significant space to terrorist concerns, as well as time for journalists to deal in detail with the incidents and background of terrorism. The mere fact that attention is paid to the terrorist cause is said to be a rather positive aspect for the terrorists (see Sect. 4.12.3). However, the extent to which legitimacy is actually achieved is disputed, since the media portray the attack as a negative event. Weimann and Winn (1994, p. 106) call the media “the largest of world stages.” They subscribe to the contagion theory: “In a kind of contagion effect, successful acts of terror tend to be followed by a rash of identical acts” (Weimann & Winn, 1994, p. 106). The authors assume (but provide no empirical evidence) that there is such a contagion effect, since the reporting also has effects on, for example, the reactions and actions of politicians.36 Schmid and de Graaf (1982, pp. 117–143) are also adherents of the contagion theory. They advocate the theory of “media fostered contagion” (1982, p. 127) and “substantiate” their view with research findings on the rise of suicides after such were widely reported (1982, pp. 122–123; so-called “Werther effect”). The prospect of being mentioned in the media is definitely a motivating factor for terrorists (see Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, p.  137), because the media promise visibility. “To be named in the media, to be known, is something that is appreciated highly” (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, p. 139). Terrorist organizations claim this notoriety for themselves as a group pursuing a common goal through certain means, not necessarily for individuals. However, there was no  See also security measures in countries outside the U.S. after the attacks of September 11, 2001. 36

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widespread Internet in the early 1980s. Jenkins (1981, p. 1) even calls the media “accomplice to the terrorist” because of their strong, monopoly-like transmission function at the time. Meanwhile, they would only report on the attacks themselves, not on the background. This had led to terrorists wanting to force some media to publish complete communiqués (see Jenkins, 1981, p. 3). Jenkins (1981, pp. 6–7) noted that both embassy sieges and airplane hijackings became more frequent after a successful action, but also abated afterwards due to diminishing news value. This could also be interpreted with regard to the driving of trucks or vans into crowds of people, as happened first in Nice, then in Berlin, London and Barcelona. More recent studies (e.g., Jetter, 2017; Beckmann et al., 2016) have been able to confirm through time series analyses that there is a Granger causality between terrorism coverage and a longer-term increase in attacks.37 However, it was not possible to clarify whether this has other causes. Thus, contagion theorists assume that reporting reveals information about tactics and methods. “As terrorists watch other terrorists on television, they learn from each other” (Dobkin, 2005, p. 129). Wright-Neville (2010, p. xi) even speaks of an “educative effect. Each attack, successful or otherwise, provides a set of data that is eagerly sought by other well-organized violence-prone groups to calibrate or recalibrate their own actions.” It will be difficult to eliminate this learning effect – if it actually exists, given the lack of empirical proof.38 Citizens and also politicians want to learn about terrorist acts and backgrounds via the media; they trust in the detailed and reliable reporting. In order to avoid this dilemma to some extent, representatives of the theory call for precise guidelines to provide media professionals with a foothold on this narrow path between information necessity and textbook for other terrorists (see Sect. 4.10). Fundamentally, however, the theorists tend towards the view that the media should despise terrorists and, to show this, should intentionally ignore them, condemning them to mediated public non-existence. However, this radical proposal is unworkable in practice. At the same time, its effect is controversial. Whether terrorism would actually be reduced if there were no more reporting can hardly be assumed, since the terrorists would then increasingly use their own channels. Rather, this would be accompanied by a loss of credibility on  In contrast, for example, to a control sample on natural disasters and reporting on them (see Jetter, 2017). 38  In other words, the effects of media coverage of terrorism on the groups mentioned therein or on other terrorist groups have not yet been directly empirically investigated. What has been proven, however, is the “rhetorical effect” (Dobkin, 2005, p. 135): Terrorists trigger reporting, which in turn triggers statements by politicians, citizens, and even other terrorists who, for example, react to or deny the attack. This goes hand in hand with the similar agendas that follow a terrorist attack (see Sect. 4.7.3). 37

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the part of the media: recipients would be disappointed in their expectations of ­being informed by the media about all important events and would turn away from the media. The contagion effect can be broadly classified into three areas: “(1) stimulating effects, which postulates that violence portrayed in media – especially on television – might psychologically stimulate those already inclined toward violent acts; (2) observational learning, which holds that individuals can learn violent behavior by observing it; and (3) reinforcement, which holds that observing violence in media can reinforce existing predispositions to violence” (Picard, 1993, p.  37). However, all this has not yet been empirically confirmed. Essential aspects of the contagion theory are therefore that terrorism reporting stimulates a repetition of acts by the group that has profited from the reporting, and that it stimulates imitation by other groups, since these thus learn to regard terrorist acts as a powerful currency with which publicity can be bought (see Finn, 1990, p. 48). In addition, there would be the strategic and tactical clues that could be garnered from the reporting. Terrorists derive two benefits from the reporting (see McQuail, 1994, p.  345): on the one hand, they draw attention to a particular issue; on the other hand, they spark fear and anxiety, which exert strong pressure on the government. McQuail (1994, p.  344) also describes this rapidly spreading restlessness of the masses as a “contagion effect.” “Contagion” can thus refer to different contamination effects and to different actors involved. Terrorism is a heterogeneous phenomenon and so are the views on it. For example, there are two “schools of thought” regarding contagion theory: “The arguments of the proponents of contagion theory are countered by those of a group we shall call the ‘non-believers’” (Alali & Eke, 1991, p. 8). The group refers to the lack of clear evidence supporting the contagion theory. One representative of these “non-believing” opponents of contagion theory is Robert Picard39, whose critique will now be presented. “The idea that media are the contagion of terrorism has been widely heralded and is repeatedly used to justify efforts to alter media coverage. This has occurred despite the fact that there is no significant evidence that media act as a contagion” (Picard, 1988, p. 1). Picard also rejects as evidence a transfer of  Picard directed the “Media Portrayals of Terrorism” project of the Mass Communications and Society Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, which ran from 1985 to 1990. It brought together researchers from a variety of disciplines, including communication scholars, political scientists, criminologists, psychologists, and sociologists. Picard’s (1993, p. x) conclusion: “After five years of study, nearly every member of that group has come to the conclusion that media do not cause terrorism, but they can make it worse by poor reporting practices, by allowing themselves to be manipulated by interested parties, and by not giving audiences a better understanding of the issue”. 39

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results about the imitation of violent acts shown on television,40 as cited by Schmid and de Graaf (1982), for example. He even calls for more attention to terrorism in the media, but not with regard to the reporting of terrorist acts, but also, for example, as an expression of public deliberation and security measures. Picard believes it is possible to prevent terrorist attacks by, for example, giving separatists a forum in the media – because the attack is just a means of getting into the headlines determined by government opinion. “If the coverage-as-a-preventative-measure theory is correct, such interviews should be helpful […], not allowing the subject of the interview to control the topics covered or the time spent on specific issues. The journalist must steer the subject away from overtly propagandistic statements with probing, serious questions aimed at getting to the heart of the issue; that is, the journalist must truly question the interviewee, not merely provide a forum” (Picard, 1988, p. 5). If the terrorists or their concerns were given attention in the media and public discussions anyway, then the terrorists would not need to generate attention either, and could therefore abstain from attacks. Farnen (1990, p. 103), who also refers to the contagion theory as the “epidemic theory regarding the spread of the terrorist virus or infection,” is also of the opinion that, if possible, controversial groups should be offered a platform in the media in advance in order to forestall the use of violence used as a “publication compulsion.” Space in the media thus serves as preventive medicine against the virus epidemic. Psychiatrist Frederick Hacker takes a radical “contagion” view: contagion is a product of the mass media. They knowingly or unknowingly made themselves the spokespersons and publicists of the terrorists, the carriers of the terrorist message. “The intrinsic mutual dependency of terrorism and mass media on each other (they would have to invent each other if they did not already exist independently) certainly is an important factor in making terrorism a fast-spreading growth industry since, without the possibility (or likelihood and even certainty) of notoriety and hence contagion, terrorism could not flourish” (Hacker, 1981, p. 77). The success seduces other persons and groups, who are already inclined to certain ideologies and violent acts through psychological structures, to commit such acts of violence as well. Schaffert (1992, p. 47) makes a similarly radical simplistic point with regard to the public: “if one does not know of a terrorist atrocity, one is in no way terrorized by it. […] Without the media there is no terror.” Schaffert emphasizes the

 For theoretical approaches to the effects of media violence, such as catharsis hypothesis, inhibition hypothesis, reversal hypothesis, habituation hypothesis, or stimulation hypothesis, see Schenk (2007, pp. 216–227) and Zipfel (2019). 40

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terminology of the press41 with regard to terrorist attacks and groups, which in the worst case resembles a propaganda of the terrorists. He speaks, at least in relation to international terrorism, of the media’s ability to influence public opinion on the subject of “terrorism” (see Schaffert, 1992, p. xiv). Schaffert emphasizes above all the “transmission function” of the media, on which terrorists depend, and the likelihood that potential terrorists will imitate other terrorist groups because of the overwhelming media response (see Schaffert, 1992, p. 71). However, he acknowledges that surveys show that while a terrorist organization becomes more widely known with increased media coverage, fewer and fewer people have sympathy for a terrorist group after an attack (see Schaffert, 1992, pp. 52–53). Tan (1988) also addressed the question of whether increasing media coverage really leads to the legitimization of terrorist groups or political violence in general. She concludes “that the media are not willing conduits of terrorists’ campaign for violence. However, the fact that they are not supportive of terrorism does not necessarily exonerate them from being considered useful by terrorists” (Tan, 1988, p. 3). Tan analyzed three newspapers, The New York Times, The Irish Times and The London Times, in terms of their coverage for one selected IRA attack every two years since 1916 in the week following it. Tan (1988, p. 9) found significantly higher coverage after 1951, “the landmark year of the mass introduction of television” (Tan, 1988, p. 7). Tan could not find support for the terrorists at all. “Before 1951, all three newspapers, led by NYT, presented many more news stories with only a governmental voice than with the voices of both government and insurgents” (Tan, 1988, p.  11). Overall, Tan’s findings support the hypothesis of the positive correlation of coverage and terrorist violence: “the media publicity and the volume of violence measured at the same time do seem to move in the same direction; i.e., more violence is usually accompanied by more coverage, or less violence is usually accompanied by less coverage” (Tan, 1988, p.  15). Tan (1988, p.  22) points out that in addition to the contagion effect, the “escalation effect” must be taken into account, according to which media coverage triggers an increase in violence in the same group. Furthermore, contagion includes an “inspiration effect” with regard to possible methods of violence, targets, etc. Tan (1988, p. 4) also distinguishes between three assessments concerning the position of the mass media: (a) The media promote terrorist violence through their reporting. (b) The media curb terrorism. (c) The media are absolutely irrelevant. Empirical results have not yet been able to dispel any of these positions, as will be shown below.

 Schaffert uses Great Britain, Germany, Italy and the United States as examples for his investigation, thus referring only to reporting in democracies. 41

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A study by Midlarsky et al. (1980) looked at the spread of international terrorism between 1968 and 1974. The authors included 503 terrorist attacks in their count and concluded that a contagion effect was visible in Latin America and also, for example, from Germany to Italy (RAF, Brigate Rosse). In this process, the experience of terrorism transferred from countries with high diplomatic status to countries with lower status; “the initial preeminence of Germany in the West European process, and then the later appearance of significant terrorism in Italy, is an indication of a possible regional hierarchical effect” (Midlarsky et  al., 1980, p. 273). Midlarsky et al. (1980, p. 287) identified five types of terrorism, namely murder, bombing, hostage-taking, hijacking, and robbery. They found that bombings and hostage-taking in particular, and to a somewhat lesser extent hijackings, are more contagious than murders and robberies (Midlarsky et al., 1980, p. 291). The researchers reason that the former methods are particularly powerful and create a longer-term drama, which in turn exerts strong pressure on the government to act. Nelson and Scott (1992, p. 329), on the other hand, present an empirical rebuttal to the contagion theory: “Results indicate that media attention does not Granger cause terrorism.” They examined 788 terrorist events between March 1968 and September 1984, of which the New York Times deemed only 400 newsworthy (see Nelson & Scott, 1992, p. 331). The Granger Causality Test for predicting time series produced no evidence that coverage of terrorism promotes new attacks. Politicians perceive not only the terrorists’ communication but also the public attitude towards terrorism through the media and adjust their “agenda” accordingly; “policymakers may infer changes in the public agenda from changes in the media agenda. Policymakers may decide to change their own policy agenda in anticipation of changes in public opinion that they anticipate from the changes in the media agenda that they perceive” (Weimann & Winn, 1994, p. 158; see also Sect. 4.7.3). Exactly the same pattern, according to Weimann and Winn, also applies to (potential) terrorists and their (imitative) behavior. It is, as it were, only through reporting that the possibilities of attracting and influencing attention become clear to them. Here it is important for the media to anticipate the terrorists’ strategies to a certain extent and to expose them in a transparent manner. The position of the media can also be strengthened by articles that reflect on the role of the media. The extent to which the contagion theory applies or not has not yet been clearly proven. What all chapters and theories on terrorism and communication or mass media have shown, however, is a pronounced proximity of both phenomena (or systems), whether one classifies their relationship as parasitic-exploitative, symbiotic, contagious or otherwise. The extent to which imitation actually occurs or not also depends to a certain extent on the circumstances at the micro level.

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4.6 The Micro Level of Communicators: Journalists, Terrorists, Politicians and Citizens Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

If the relationship “terrorism – media” was described in a general form in Sect. 4.5, the focus will now be on the individual actors, with both interpersonal and mediated communication playing a role. This is why the micro level is highlighted in the communication quadrangle. The process diagram (see Fig. 3.6) makes it clear that we are still mainly situated in the area of media analysis. Terrorist groups aim to gain attention, recognition and legitimacy, i.e., legal recognition, through publicity; the latter goal being the most difficult to achieve. “Political activists, rebels or even members of terrorist groups usually see themselves as champions of a legitimate and just cause. In journalists, they recognize the opportunity to promote that cause. Naturally, they want to abuse the correspondent and do everything they can to force him to provide a platform for a propaganda appearance” (Tilgner, 2008, p.  101). This can go as far as threatening an individual journalist that if he or she does not abide by the terrorists’ or kidnappers’ “rules”, he or she will be “expelled” from the reporting area and consequently not given access to, for example, hostages.42 Journalists can find it difficult to resist such conditions. Terrorists as well as hostages are considered an important source of information, even if such individual encounters among the actors are generally the exception in terrorism reporting. In the following, the perspective on terrorism reporting will be seen primarily from the individual producer of journalistic content. (1) Gatekeeping, (2) word

 Here there is a similarity to embedding, albeit a relatively far-fetched one: One leaves the most “neutral” observer position possible and restricts the perspective to the desired focus, takes on the perspective of complicity. 42

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choice, and (3) citizen journalism fall under the micro perspective, as (1) focuses on the individual news selection, (2) on the individual decision for or against a certain term, and (3) on the individual motivation of a citizen to engage in journalism.

4.6.1 The Decision-Making Power of the Gatekeeper “Gatekeeping”43 is an explanation of message selection, which is the focus of Sect. 4.7; the decision to bring gatekeeping forward and place it under the “micro-level of communicators” stems from the fact that the actor is clearly the focus of the approach. Kurt Lewin coined the term gatekeeper as early as 1943 in an essay using the example of the shopping behavior of American housewives. However, he does not only speak of gatekeepers in relation to food in the home, who regulate the passage through the “channels” (Lewin, 1947, p. 144), but in general they exist in all organizations. Here Lewin already creates a connection between the micro and meso levels. If one wanted to change the organization through the actions of its actors, one would have to start at these gate sections. “Gate sections are governed either by impartial rules or by ‘gate keepers’. In the latter case an individual or group is ‘in power’ for making the decision between ‘in’ and ‘out’” (Lewin, 1947, p. 145). However, the gatekeeper does not decide “by gut feeling,” but is guided by external factors of influence, so that letting in or rejecting depends not only on the gatekeeper alone, but on the overall situation in the channel: “If the pantry and ice box are getting too full, for example, the forces against buying any food will be increased. The amount available in the buying situation also plays a role. The preferences and aversions of the family members are also important” (Lewin, 1947, p. 146). These remarks of Lewin’s can be well applied to the journalist in the newsroom, the amount of news coming in, the editorial resources, attitudes, tendencies of the establishment, etc. These factors also play a role in terrorism reporting, although here too the event per se already has a high news value (see Sects. 4.3.4 and 4.7.1), which makes passing the barrier very likely. David Manning White analyzed the selection processes of a gatekeeper at a city newspaper. “Thus, a story is transmitted from one ‘gatekeeper’ after another in the chain of communications. From reporter to rewrite man, through bureau chief to ‘state’ file editors at various press association offices, the process of choosing and discarding is continuously taking place. And finally we come to our last  An overview of different gatekeeping models is provided by Shoemaker and Vos (2009, pp. 11–21). 43

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‘­ gatekeeper’” (White, 1964, p. 163). White attributes the main part in news selection to personal characteristics, the influence of the environment and personal values consolidated over many years of socialization. They provide the framework for a decision and the subsequent processing of an issue. Thus, it was obvious that the same physical event – called a “criterion event” by White (1964, p. 163) – would be reported by two journalists in two different perceptual frames because the reporters approached the story with different experiences, attitudes, and expectations. A possible different “setting” (see Sect. 3.3) and thus framework of the individual journalists may exist, for example, in quality versus tabloid media newsrooms, as an interplay between micro and meso levels. Gieber (1964, p. 180) expands White’s perspective on personal decision criteria to include the perspective on extrapersonal, institutional influences: “If one means expression of the individuality of the communicator, the answer is that there is some subjectivity. It appears to me that the reporter’s individuality is strongly tempered by extrapersonal factors. […He…] is controlled by the news-gathering bureaucracy.” If one takes these considerations on gatekeeping into account and transfers them to the situation of an editor who is to report on a terrorist event, one would have to conclude: “The editor is that newsperson who, in theory, can make or break a terrorist group dependent on publicity by granting or denying it access to mass audiences and by shaping the political communication of the violent news makers, granting or withholding them a degree of legitimacy” (Schmid, 1992, p. 112). The terrorists would become the “fear generator,” the editors, if they so wished, the “fear amplifier and transmitter” (Schmid, 1992, p. 130). But the problem of terrorism reporting cannot be approached in such a simplistic causal way. Of course, no single editor or publisher is powerful enough to create or deny access to terrorists. That depends on a number of other factors and influences. Moreover, new technology overcomes gatekeepers. In the case of Hanns Martin Schleyer, a news blackout was still able to take effect (see Sect. 4.10). Today, when “in a democracy everyone is a journalist” (Hargreaves, 1999, p.  4), communicators can hardly be controlled. In addition to the terrorists themselves, citizen journalists in particular can act as producers of communication (see Sect. 4.6.3). Shoemaker and Vos (2009, p.  62) put forward an important correction to the gatekeeper research related to individuals: In most cases, while it would be up to individual decisions and routines what would pass the gate and how it would then be presented, it is the decision of the organization to select the gatekeeper and set the rules. And the organization stands in a political or social system. So meso and macro levels must necessarily be included in a broader view. No longer fully rooted in classical gatekeeper research, but drawing on it, Stoil and Brownell (1981, p. 210) outline in a diagram the systemic process by which terrorist threats and

4.6  The Micro Level of Communicators: Journalists, Terrorists, Politicians…

Gatekeeper 1

OFFICIAL DOMESTIC INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Feedback

Domestic Formal Channels TERRORIST THREAT AND EVENT

Informal Channels

Feedback

DOMESTIC MASS MEDIA INDUSTRY

INFORMAL INFORMATION SOURCES

Foreign News Flow to Attentive Public

Foreign-Operated Media Channels

Gatekeeper 1

Feedback

Gatekeeper 2

News Flow to Attentive Public IMMEDIATE ONSITE AUDIENCE PERCEPTION

OFFICIAL DOMESTIC INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

169

Feedback

Domestic Mass Media Channels

Gatekeeper 3 INDIVIDUAL SELECTIVE PERCEPTIONS

TARGET AUDIENCE MEMBER

Foreign Mass Media Channels *

Gatekeeper 2 DOMESTIC MASS MEDIA INDUSTRY

Fig. 4.5  “The Terrorist Threat/Event Communication Process”. (Stoil & Brownell, 1981, p. 211)

activities are transformed into perceptions among mass audiences. They locate gatekeeping at various points, including the receiving individual (gatekeeper 3), which may well be in line with Lewin’s (1947) original conception (Fig. 4.5). The graphic illustrates that the recipient is reached by various information channels, be they national or international. Critically, it should be noted that the starting point “Terrorist Threat and Event” could also be replaced by any other event with high news value. This raises the question of whether news about terrorist events is subject to specific gatekeeping processes at all. The chart does not show this – except perhaps an increased interest from international media. The news usually passes through at least three gates before it reaches the “target audience.” Feedback is possible from any point in the process. The diagram is solely devoted to the flow of the message (is it let through or held up?); the exact characteristics and qualities of the message, such as the choice of words, do not matter.

4.6.2 The Importance of Word Choice Not only the selection of the event, but also the approving, rejecting, changing and new choosing of words belongs to the (now mainly semantic) selection process. Since word selection is a cognitive performance of an individual, it too falls into

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the micro level of individual actors. On the basis of (strongly U.S.-dominated) empirical studies, the following will illustrate which selection decisions regarding the choice of words for an attack or the perpetrators of an attack were made primarily by journalists, but also by politicians and citizens (including victims and witnesses of attacks). Self-naming of terrorists was already presented in Sect. 2.1.5, in which terrorism was described as a label imposed by an opposing side in order to classify a certain group as illegitimate and thus enable any form of punishment. In order to cover the state of research as comprehensively as possible, older studies were also included, although their validity or replicability for today must certainly be questioned. Picard and Adams (1991) examined Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and Washington Post news coverage for the years 1980–1985 with the goal of capturing textual characterizations of acts of political violence and their perpetrators. The researchers divided the words into nominal and descriptive characterizations (see Picard & Adams, 1991, pp. 12–13), e.g. “hijacker,” “bombing,” “gunman” and “attacker” as nominal attributions and “murderer,” “coward,” “freedom fighter,” “brutal”, “criminal” or “terrorist” as descriptive attributions. In total, Picard and Adams examined 258 articles on 127 events of political violence. In each case, the first three characterizations occurring in quotes as well as the first three characterizations not occurring in quotes were recorded, along with attributions in the headlines. In total, coders found 931 characterizations of acts of political violence as well as 589 characterizations of perpetrators of violence. The five most frequently used words for acts of political violence already accounted for over half of all descriptions, and these were the words “hijacking,” “killing,” “bombing,” “explosion,” and “attack.” Almost 70% resulted if one added the next five characterizations, namely “blast,” “shooting,” “seizure,” “assassination” and “slaying” (see Picard & Adams, 1991, p. 14). The five most common terms used for the perpetrators of violence, which together accounted for 63.7% of all descriptions, were (in this order) “hijacker,” “gunman,” “guerrilla,” “terrorist” and “rebel” (see Picard & Adams, 1991, p.  15). Other characterizations included, for example, the words “leftist/rightist,” “left-wing/right-wing,” “armed man,” “attacker,” “extremist,” or “nationalist.” Following this general assessment, the conceptualizations were divided into those made by the authors, i.e., the journalists, those that occurred in quotes from government representatives, and finally those that occurred in quotes from witnesses. This covers three of the groups mentioned in the communication quadrangle (Fig. 3.5). Over 94.3% of the attributions were made by authors; in other words, only in just under 6% of the cases did the authors use quotes to describe acts of

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violence or perpetrators of violence. Table 4.2 shows the five most frequent words in each group.44 The chi-squared test proved that authors and witnesses used nominal characterizations significantly more often (witnesses even exclusively), whereas government representatives used descriptive characterizations. However, it also showed that the authors used nominal attributions much more frequently to name the acts of violence than to name the perpetrators of violence. Here, they used evaluative-­ descriptive terms in one third of the cases. Overall, the researchers conclude that authors and witnesses use more neutral terms than government representatives. The latter used more condemnatory, inflammatory and sensationalist terms (see Picard & Adams, 1991, p. 20). The Poynter Institute (2001) published a collection of front pages of American newspapers the day after September 11. Of the 150 headlines, nearly 20 contained the term “attack,” 5 “war,” “terror” appeared nearly 30 times, and “Pearl Harbor” appeared 7 times. The most quoted statements by President George W. Bush were “Our nation saw evil,” then “cowardly actions.” In five cases, the headline consisted only of the date “September 11” or “09/11/2001.” The date eventually becomes the epitome and synonym of the event that dominated that day. Just as in the names of terrorist groups (see Sect. 4.3.1), it can also be used for symbolic communication on the side of those affected. Decker and Rainey (1982) conducted a content analysis of the first three issues each of the New York Times and Washington Post after the Hanafi Muslim Killings Table 4.2  Designations of acts of violence and perpetrators of violence by authors, government representatives and witnesses Authors Government representatives Characterization of acts Hijacking Criminal (act) of violence Killing Attack Bombing Bombing/brutal act/seizure/ Explosion shooting/terrorism (all tied Attack for third) Characterization of Hijacker Hijacker perpetrators of violence Gunman Terrorist/evil Terrorist Brutal/criminals/rightist/ Guerrilla right-wing Rebel

Witnesses Explosion Shooting Blast Bombing/seizure Gunman/hijacker (only these two words were used more than once)

Own representation based on data in Picard and Adams (1991, pp. 15–19)

44

 Singular and plural were evaluated; only the singular is given here for simplicity.

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on March 10 and 11, 1977, and after the hostage-taking of Israeli athletes by the Black September group at the Munich Olympics on September 5–7, 1972. Decker and Rainey counted the words used to reflect the terrorists’ demands and pronouncements, which represented information about hostages or victims or loss of property, and the words used to describe the government’s helplessness, in addition to those used to criticize the terrorist activities. Their result: in no case was the coverage positive in the sense of the terrorists, but neutral or rather negative, that is, judgmental against the terrorists. Here the usefulness of semantic analysis in terms of responsibility-attribution theories becomes apparent: Words possess different degrees of attribution of guilt; they can make certain acts appear illegitimate or neutral, or even justify them. Decker and Rainey decided to analyze print reporting on the one hand for reasons of research efficiency (easier availability and coding), and on the other hand because they assumed that the print media can report in greater detail and with more reflection, since they are not subject to “live pressure” (see Sect. 4.3.4): “instant information vs. delayed information” (Decker & Rainey, 1982, p.  18).45 Moreover, they see the print media of the 1980s as more influential in terms of shaping the opinions of decision makers and opinion leaders. The coding units were defined relatively loosely in order to inductively arrive at further categories as the material was coded (see Decker & Rainey, 1982, p. 10). The two events studied provided the opportunity to comparatively examine an attack that took place on national soil as well as an international attack. In both cases, “there was an overwhelming amount of unsympathetic reaction reported and given prominent exposure. The explanations even became stereotyped” (Decker & Rainey, 1982, p. 15). The Black September organization, for example, was stylized as the villain; “the Munich coverage was extremely negative and biased completely against the Black Septemberists” (Decker & Rainey, 1982, p. 16). No space was given to announcements by the terrorists. The authors therefore see the print media as the “antagonist of the terrorist” (Decker & Rainey, 1982, p. 18). The “culpable media model” (see Sect. 4.5.2) can therefore in no way be supported by this study. Peralta Ruiz (2000) examined the reporting in El Comercio, an influential daily newspaper in Peru, El País, an important newspaper in Spain, and the New York Times from the U.S. in the years 1980–1994 by means of a content analysis, in  In fact, however, there is also a difference here between TV channels that frequently report live and those that tend to do background reporting even in non-crisis times, as a discourse analysis of the first hours after the attacks in Paris on the night of November 13–14, 2015 shows (Aubert, 2019). Aubert examined the two channels BFM TV (commercial) and France 2 (public). 45

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which he looked in particular at the contextualization of the violent acts of the group “Sendero Luminoso” (see Peralta Ruiz, 2000, p. 10). He found that whether the armed group was seen as an indigenous guerrilla organization, as a gang of criminals and socially disadvantaged people, or as a postmodern expression of international communism, depended on the approach and the value catalogues of the respective newspaper (see Peralta Ruiz, 2000, p. 10). Peralta Ruiz’s findings thus also only provide limited support for the “culpable media model” (see Sect. 4.5.2). With the help of naming and contextualization, the “Shining Path” was put in a light that suited the respective newspaper. The attributions ranged from “criminals” to “post-modern communists” and “Maoist organization” (Peralta Ruiz, 2000, p. 313). Each attack garnered increased news coverage for specific time periods. Peralta Ruiz (2000, p. 11) declares the Sendero Luminoso, with its increasing acts of violence46 at the beginning of the 1980s, to be a “fenómeno mediático,” i.e., a topic on which reporting proved attractive for the press in the sense of expanding readership. Simmons (1991) examined 185 articles on terrorism in the U.S. news magazines “Time,” “Newsweek,” and “U.S. News & World Report” from March 1980 to March 1988. In 65% of the cases, the word “terrorist” was chosen for the active agent of the attack; the second most common word, “gunman,” came in at only 7%. When U.S. citizens were involved as victims, the number of times the word “terrorist” was used rose sharply in contrast to articles about events in which no U.S. citizens were involved (see Simmons, 1991, p.  30). Again, at first glance, this seems like pure quantitative counting in what is, after all, a fairly limited sample. A second part of the study, however – this leads into reception research – consisted of presenting the 13 terms found in the articles to 120 college students – as representatives of sorts of the middle-class public on a micro level – and having them classified on the basis of a seven-level semantic differential47 and an ordinal ranking scale. The result formed three categories: terrorist, hijacker and attacker were perceived by the students as extremely negative, guerrilla, radical, gunman, leftist, armed man, rightist and extremist as somewhat negative and nationalist, revolutionary and militiaman as rather positive. The students rated the word hijacker most negatively (see Simmons, 1991, pp. 31–32), but this may be related to the events associated with it at the time and the coverage of them. Also, in a study by Rothenberger (2012b), in which students had to fill in semantic differentials with  For example, there were attacks on tourists in hotels and on eight journalists in Uchuraccay in January 1983. 47  The six pairs queried were good-bad, kind-cruel, valuable-worthless, fair-unfair, honest-­ dishonest, and brave-cowardly (see Simmons, 1991, p. 28). 46

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eight polarity pairs, the term “suicide bomber” was seen most negatively, “freedom fighter” most positively, and “insurgent” was considered relatively neutral. The choice that the journalist makes with regard to the description of an attacker thus has a strong effect on the (emotional and cognitive) reception. Since the choice of words exerts a decisive influence on the reference schemata of the recipients, not only media professionals but also politicians should attach more importance to it. The strongly emotionalizing language of the terrorists themselves (e.g., on the internet, see Rothenberger et  al., 2018), which culminates in the attack, must be countered with a language of calm and balance. How this can be achieved is discussed in Sect. 4.11.2.48 Dunn et al. (2005) conducted three studies to compare the effect of different word choice and framing in terrorism coverage. They analyzed the content of 62 articles in 12 U.S. daily newspapers from the end of July 2003 to the end of January 2004 in which the search terms “soldier”, “dead” and “Baghdad” appeared. These articles were then searched for various words to determine whether they were related to Iraq/non-allies or to the U.S./allies. Benign words such as “forces” or “campaign” occurred significantly more often in relation to the U.S./allies, while words that insinuated destruction or malicious intent were significantly more likely to refer to the opposing side (for example, “explosion, blast, threat, plot”) (see Dunn et  al., 2005, pp.  71–72). In a follow-up study, the researchers offered American subjects two artificial newspaper articles about a bombing of a building. One group received the “us version” with the benign words, and another received the “the others version” with the words for the opposing side. In fact, readers of the first version were significantly more likely to believe that the U.S. or its allies were responsible for the bombing, that it was a legitimate military action, and that it was necessary for national defense (see Dunn et al., 2005, p. 75). The second group, on the other hand, attributed the act to terrorists (although this word did not appear in the article). Thus, the simple variation of words can influence which classification schemas subjects activate. And even memory becomes distorted: In another study,  An example of how the press denied any rational reasons or justifications to the oppositional perspective of the terrorists and merely adopted the official and populist perspective is given by Schlesinger et al. (1983) by gathering the labels for perpetrators and events one day after the murder of Lord Louis Mountbatten, an uncle of the Queen, by the IRA in the summer of 1979 in the press coverage of the major British newspapers: “evil men” (Daily Mail), “wicked assassins” (The Sun), “psychopathic thugs” (Daily Express), “murdering bastards” (Daily Star), “cowardly and senseless” (Financial Times), “diseased minds rather than political calculation” (Daily Telegraph) (see Schlesinger et al., 1983, p. 29). These attributions convey an image that is strongly emotionally charged and marked by anger. The terrorists were not permitted to express themselves; their only “voice” was the deed. 48

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the authors presented subjects with a list of words and asked subjects to indicate whether or not they had occurred in the articles. The list included words that had actually occurred as well as decoys that came from either the “terrorism” or “patriotism” field. “The ‘them’ version of the article was more likely to elicit false recall of terrorism words than patriotism words, whereas the opposite pattern emerged for the ‘us’ version of the article. […S]imply changing a few words in an article may be enough to change participants’ interpretations of and resulting memory for an act of violence” (Dunn et al., 2005, pp. 80–81). The authors conclude that public support for certain political measures may also depend to a decisive extent on the media representation or semantic framing of an event (see Dunn et al., 2005, p. 83). This would show that mobilization theory, with its cornerstones of consensus and action mobilization, is closely related to theories of semantics. Again, empirical studies are still needed to prove this connection. On the level of media products, Beermann (2004) examined reports from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Spiegel and Bild newspaper for their use and possible explication of the concept of terrorism. He selected 13 events of political violence between 1972 and 2001, all of which could be characterized as terrorist attacks according to his criteria. He examined the entire issues of the above newspapers both One  day and One  week after the event. In total, Beermann coded 261 articles (see Beermann, 2004, p. 76). In only two of these articles is the “terrorism” term and its use explicitly reflected (see Beermann, 2004, p. 119). In general, the term is not used consistently and coherently even within one medium, which suggests that it is the actor and not an inter-organizational leadership that decides in the choice of words. Accordingly, selection occurs at the micro level. The only commonality that Beermann (2004, p. 122) could identify: “The term ‘terrorism’ is obviously used in German print media as a synonym for a sensational act of violence that the author of the text considers illegitimate.”49 Here, however, Beermann again negates the influence of the organization or the system and merely presents the “author of the text,” i.e. the individual actor and gatekeeper, as the authoritative judge of legitimacy and illegitimacy. The term “terrorism” is used “to legitimize political action, to procure majorities for politically explosive decisions, and to discredit political opponents” (Beermann, 2004, p.  122). In this respect, the journalist, through the unreflective use of the term, (unconsciously) makes himself a tool of the politicians who bring this term into the media.  One exception: since the 1960s, the Reuters news agency has refrained from using words such as “terrorism” or “terrorist” or expressions derived from the root word, unless they occur in direct quotations (see Beermann, 2004, p. 7). Al Jazeera follows a similar approach. 49

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Beermann (2004, p.  7) identifies considerable conceptual blurring of “terrorism.” As a result of his study, he states that the three newspapers “do not have and do not use a coherent and stringent understanding of terrorism” (Beermann, 2004, p. 7). However, there was almost complete uniformity among the studied newspaper editions on which event they classify as “terrorism” or “not terrorism.” As a solution, Beermann suggests that German journalists should develop a definition of terrorism, disclose their criteria and, following these, consistently apply the term in their reporting. One could also discuss the criteria used by the EU and U.S. government agencies and other political institutions, according to which groups are placed on terror lists. “This would almost certainly lead to a reassessment of various violent acts and groups of perpetrators, as well as enabling recipients to recognize the implicit evaluations and judgments associated with the terminology” (Beermann, 2004, p. 123). This is because the selection of terms, the language and the style in the media are decisive for the worldview of the recipients, for their perception, classification and contextualization of certain terms.

4.6.3 Citizen Journalism in Terrorism Reporting For some time now, journalists have had to share their territory with citizen actors. Flew (2007, p. 30) quotes the slogan “every citizen is a reporter” from the Korean OhMyNews site in this regard. Web 2.0 enables citizens to act as journalistic actors, and they too make decisions regarding word choice and framing. This section asks what role citizen journalism50 and user-generated content in general play in terrorism reporting and how the emergence of this new form of journalism has broadened the possibilities of reception, although there are only a few studies that provide answers. Watson (2012), in her study on terrorism and citizen journalism, states, “dependent citizen journalism generates distinctive, additional publicity to a terrorist attack” (Watson, 2012, p.  465). It has the potential to generate both negative and positive forms of publicity. In some cases, images and reports from eyewitnesses directly from the scene contribute to the “theatre of terror” (Watson, 2012, pp. 476– 477) because they offer an intimate and terrifying glimpse into scenes of violation and destruction. The traditional media partly resort to blog content, especially in  For a differentiation of citizen journalism from community or open-source journalism, see Welker (2016, pp. 393–397). Flew (2007) provides an overview of various definitions and characteristics of citizen journalism such as “open publishing” and “collaborative editing” (Flew, 2007, p. 31). 50

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disaster reporting (see e.g., Steffens, 2012, p. 105), because these are considered particularly authentic and amateur reports are characterized by a directness and immediacy that journalists are not able to offer (see Steffens, 2012, p. 110). The degree of permitted participation varies greatly depending on the medium (see Domingo et al., 2008, p. 336). When integrating user-generated content, it is important to consider whether journalistic norms and values are impaired and a loss of trust on the part of the audience could result (see Singer, 2010). For example, Domingo et al. (2008, p. 331) argue that some of the institutionalized communication functions of agencies or mass media can also be fulfilled by individuals and civil society organizations, while others remain in the hands of communication institutions, such as balanced reporting, to which the creators of user-generated content usually do not attach importance. Watson (2012) analyzed citizen journalistic products on the day of the July 7, 2005 attacks in London. In doing so, she distinguished those that were offered via citizen journalistic platforms and opportunities by established media (e.g., “reader reporter”, “reader photo”) from those where the citizen undertook the entire production process independently (e.g. via a self-published blog) (see Watson, 2012, p. 468). Using qualitative content analysis, she looked at photographs, videos and comments from citizens on the BBC News site “Special Reports of the London Bombings”; this can be considered dependent citizen journalism as the BBC reserved the right to delete posts that did not comply with BBC guidelines. She found reports from eyewitnesses and survivors, as well as commentary (usually with resistance or remembrance of the victims as the theme). She sees this as empowering those under attack (see Watson, 2012, p. 478). In this respect, participatory journalism can be considered as an alternative public sphere and must be considered as an important response option to a terrorist attack in scholarship and practice. User-generated content, especially via social media, also plays an important role in the flow of information, especially in countries where censorship is exercised. In China, for example, the Twitter substitute Sina Weibo is popular for conveying news. Mass media also rely to some extent on “escaping to the net” themselves if they want to escape media restrictions and control measures that may apply in their own country. Entire editions of newspapers are then moved to the Internet. In democracies, on the other hand, media censorship is hardly possible, and if information gaps do occur after attacks, these can be filled by citizen journalistic contributions in the digital age. With regard to the actor quadrangle presented in Sect. 3.2.2, in terms of participatory forms of journalism, it appears as if the lower right part in the quadrangle is suddenly included in the upper right. Participation is not formally ordered, but only relies on a certain degree of consent by media actors in the case of dependent citi-

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zen journalism. In all other forms (blogs, Twitter, etc.), citizens self-determinedly switch roles and become sources, able to reach other citizens as well as journalists, politicians and even terrorists with their own messages. Considering again the micro level in the quadrangle, it becomes obvious that journalists often have direct encounters with politicians or at least meet them at press conferences, but less often with victims of attacks or their relatives and even less with terrorists. Citizen journalists, on the other hand, as Watson’s (2012) study showed, often have a direct connection to the attack as well as access to victims or participation in the acute event. A further field in the area of “citizen journalism” and “user-generated content” is formed by the (citizen) media of the terrorists themselves (see also Sect. 4.2). The terrorists also make up part of civil society even though they are rebelling against it. Many groups maintain their own media. For example, the PLO had its own radio station, The Voice of the Palestinian Revolution. The Al-Fajr Center was considered “the media hub that coordinates the distribution of online communiqués, videos and statements by Al Qaeda and other jihadi groups” (Archetti, 2013, p. 142). Meanwhile, the Islamic State group has various media production sites and distributes some magazines on the internet, such as Dabiq or Dar-al-islam (see Matusitz et al., 2019; Hussein, 2019; Yarchi, 2019), with themes such as “victimhood,” “brutality” or “utopianism” often specifically supported by visual framing (see Fahmy, 2020). Med-TV was founded as a project to advance the Kurdish state, promoted by Turkish Kurds. The programs were produced in various European countries, mainly Belgium, and the technical broadcasting was carried out via a license from the Independent Television Commission (ITC) in the UK (see Sparks, 2007, p. 163). However, under pressure from the Turkish government, the British authorities closed the channel again. A successor project, Medya TV, was granted a license in France, but focused its content on cultural rights rather than on an independent Kurdish state. Today, with unrestricted access to the distribution possibilities of the Internet (see Sect. 4.2.3), terrorist groups can act as Citizen Journalists themselves. In this way, they circumvent the selection mechanisms of the traditional media, which will be described next. The concept is therefore not to be located exclusively on the side of the general public of the attacked society but must be extended accordingly to the terrorists’ and their supporters’ own channels.

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4.7 Media: Selection of Events, Event Characteristics and (Attitudinal) Foci Section 4.7 deals with media-related selection processes in the sense of newsworthiness theory and the creation of an agenda based on this. This media agenda is partly determined by the political agenda or the agendas of the terrorists51 or the citizens, whereby individual citizens rarely set the topics, but rather groups of citizens (see Sect. 3.3). The media agenda, for its part, can again influence the agendas of the other participants in the communication quadrangle. A separate Sect. 4.12.2 deals with the audience agenda; the agenda-setting concept has thus been split according to the process model. This shows that the same communication studies theory can be used for different starting points. If actor-centered gatekeeping has already been described in Sect. 4.6.1, the following is about actor-independent selection mechanisms in journalism in terrorism reporting. It should be noted right away that a central criticism of newsworthiness research is that the functionality of news values has not been studied for all cultural areas, differs with regard to media genres, as well as being dependent on the subject matter (see Maier et al., 2010, pp. 112–114). Scholl and Weischenberg (1998, p. 9) characterize journalism as a construction enterprise with its own rules and evaluations and as a selection authority with distinctive methods of assigning relevance. Both system and actors within it are important as well as their coupling to external events. The journalist in the system and in the organization functions as a gatekeeper who holds back certain content and does not allow it to reach the public via the media system but provides and processes other content instead. Different stations in this selection process include primary sources, journalists in news agencies, editors-in-chief and editors, all of whom are involved in different social, political, administrative, economic, normative-ethical, institutional, organizational, structural and other contexts. The actors are thus subject to manifold restrictions or constraints (see Scholl & Weischenberg, 1998, p.  67).52 Some functional principles, such as news values, have overarching validity. They are particularly prominent in the case of a terrorist attack.  As mentioned above, the terrorists take into account the points included by the media in their selection of topics, such as editorial deadlines, news values, higher circulation on certain days, need for visuals, and so on. The terrorist event conforms to the media as a result. 52  Basically, even an empirical study would have to determine not only the socialization in everyday professional life and through work processes, but also the individual, class- and gender-specific socialization of the individual journalists who write about the terrorist acts in the articles studied. 51

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The arrow in the quadrangle is intended to illustrate the terrorist event that reaches the media as a message carrier and is then reported on or – depending on the selection decision – not reported.

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

4.7.1 News Values in Terrorism Reporting There are three traditions in news selection research: Gatekeeper research (see Sect. 4.6.1), news bias research (see Sect. 4.7.2) and news value research. Liebl (2006, p. 168) describes the newsworthiness of an event as “a measure of publishability from a media perspective”; it is measured by various news values. The three aforementioned news selection concepts “are not mutually exclusive, but at least partially complementary” (Staab, 1990, p. 202). Whereas in the “gatekeeper” explanatory model the journalist remained a personally important information broker, a kind of filter who is subject only to a limited extent to internal editorial routines, he no longer plays a prominent role in news value theory. Rather, it seeks to trace “the news selection and shaping of the mass media to specific properties and qualities of events or reports” (Staab, 1990, p. 203). Rühl (1980, p. 319) describes the function of journalism as “the production and provision of topics for public communication.” Which topics are provided is largely decided by the news values, the “publication potential,” in a sense, that characterizes an event. The news values determine the selection logic of the mass media, and terrorist acts then are included in the events that appear to be particularly newsworthy and can generate broad public interest. Almost everyone wants to be informed about terrorist attacks, because the next time it could also affect them; it is therefore a “common” topic.

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Staab describes news values as the objective characteristics of an event.53 These determine the scope, placement and presentation of the news – at least this is how the “apolitical causal model of news selection” sees it (Staab, 1990, p. 207). Building on Kepplinger, Staab supplemented this view with the final model, which “takes into account the aspect of the intentionality of journalistic action and also views the news values as consequences of publication decisions” (Staab, 1990, p.  207). According to this model, journalists not only select events according to the characteristics inherent in these events, but they also “attribute these characteristics to them in the first place or emphasize them in particular in order to give the respective article a special weight” (Staab, 1990, p. 98). The event is thus also selected on the basis of its instrumental character, its anticipated publication consequences, and thus its newsworthiness is legitimized. Staab sees two types of attribution here: on the one hand, explicit attributions – for example, conferring international notoriety on an artist (or indeed to a terrorist group) -, on the other hand, implicit ones – for example, selecting certain statements or addressing certain consequences or causes that another journalist might omit (see Staab, 1990, pp. 98–99). Since an act of terrorism in itself already has strong newsworthiness, an emphasis of these characteristics on the part of the journalists can possibly be noticed here, but not an attribution of news-relevant characteristics after the fact. Depending on the attribution, the article takes on a different tone, different connotations, a different frame and can evoke different classification schemas in the reader. Fretwurst (2008) even proposes an integration of news recipients into the model of news value theory. His study shows that recipients may classify an event as “important” but do not necessarily find it “interesting” (see Fretwurst, 2008, p.  232). Weimann and Winn (1994, p. 111)54 agree with the final model when they write: “Journalists are in turn affected by how they perceive their peers’ perceptions of public expectations.” So the authors build in another detour: Not only audience expectations, but the observation of audience expectations of peers influences the selection decisions of journalists. With regard to the effect of terrorism reporting, which occurs according to news factors, there are two main lines: “media effects may take the form of agenda setting, influencing the choice of issues people deem important, or priming, influencing the criteria by which people evaluate issues” (Weimann & Winn, 1994, p. 146). Of course, Weimann and Winn concede, in keeping with the spirit of cultural  On the problem of the concept of event, see Staab (1990, pp. 100–106).  Weimann and Winn (1994, pp. 119–125) had already considered the newsworthiness of terrorist acts and described the 12 news factors according to Galtung and Ruge in relation to this subject area. 53 54

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s­ tudies, the attitudes, knowledge, and expectations of recipients play a role in the context. Archetti (2010a, p. 571), who examined coverage of the September 11, 2001 attacks in eight elite newspapers in four different countries, concludes that three variables influenced editors’ publication decisions: national interest, journalistic culture, and editorial orientation. These three are independent of the “act of terror” event, are not event characteristics such as negativity or surprise, but are relatively constant. In the case of journalistic culture, they can of course change slowly or guidelines can be changed, for example, after negative experiences in reporting. In addition to these parameters that are not directly linked to the event, it is above all certain news values of the terrorist act that influence selection. These have been identified in various studies. According to Thomaß (2004), suicide attacks have particular news value. She classifies “suicide attacks as a means of combat against superior opponents” (Thomaß, 2004, p. 75). News values that are primarily served are surprise (unless such attacks are too common in a particular region), conflict, negativism, and unambiguousness (see Thomaß, 2004, p. 76). A main factor characterizing the terrorist attack, as has also already been made clear in many definitions of “terrorism” (see Sect. 2.1), is thus the factor of surprise or “unexpectedness”. This is because it is primarily those events that deviate from the norm that cross the threshold of being included in the news process. “A primary characteristic of newsworthy events is whether the event, the people, or the issues are deviant” (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009, p. 25). Surprise is also mentioned by Liebl (2006) as the primary news value, followed by the availability of visual material, the number and nationality of victims. Kirsch (2005, pp.  65–69) applied Galtung and Holmboe Ruge’s (1965) news values to the phenomenon of terrorism and also emphasized the moment of the unexpected for positive selection. In contrast, personalization factors took a back seat. In Galtung and Holmboe Ruge’s study, the authors asked themselves the question: “how do ‘events’ become ‘news’?” (Galtung & Holmboe Ruge, 1965, p. 65) and answered it with eight culture-independent factors (1965,

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p.  65) as well as four culture-dependent factors (1965, p.  68).55 In light of that study, the following remarks can be regarded as particularly applicable to terrorist groups and their radius of action: “The lower the rank of the person, the more unexpected will the news have to be. […] The lower the rank of a person, the more negative will his actions have to be” (Galtung & Holmboe Ruge, 1965, pp. 82–83). According to this, the terrorists, who mostly operate in secret and are unknown, find themselves incited to perform acts that are as surprising and negative as possible for reasons of newsworthiness. According to Weimann (1983, p. 38), terrorist acts combine the following news values: “unexpectedness, unpredictability, scarcity, negative reference to elite people or elite nations, absolute intensity, unambiguity, and frequency.” Picard (1990, p. 220) lists as event characteristics that favor selection: conflict, disaster, consequence, human interest, proximity – as temporal, geographic or even cultural proximity, depending on when, where or with which victims (e.g. belonging to the same ethnic group) an attack occurs. The “factors inherent in the news process” that Einar Östgaard (1965, pp.  45–40) identified, namely simplification, identification, and sensationalism, however, are more likely to be seen as strategies for making the content more attractive to the audience. Shoemaker and Reese’s (1991, pp. 91–92) list of six news values includes “the unusual” as well as “conflict/controversy” at the top of the list for terrorist attacks, but other values such as “human interest” or “timeliness” are also addressed. Depending on the notoriety of the group, the size and proximity of the attack, the values of “prominence/importance”56 and “proximity” rise. These lists already show why terrorist attacks can develop into “media events” (see Sect. 4.3.4). The geographical context in which the attack took place is decisive for the decision to report, although proximity in “kilometers” or “miles” is not the decisive factor. For U.S. media, for example, “Latin American terrorism is underreported while  Galtung and Holmboe Ruge (1965, pp. 84–85) themselves suggest that journalists would do well to work against all 12 factors. A reappraisal of the influence and reception of Galtung and Holmboe Ruge’s article in communication and journalism studies is provided by Harcup and O’Neill (2001, pp. 264–266). The authors find fault with the study of the two Norwegians in that it deals with foreign political news in a crisis situation and thus the news factors apply to such events but not to everyday newspaper content (see Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, p. 276). They propose their own and more contemporary list of 10 news factors (see Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, p. 279). Criticism of Galtung and Holmboe Ruge’s news value theory is also expressed by Brighton and Foy (2007). They advocate the following factors: Relevance, Topicality, Composition, Expectation, Unusualness, Worth, and External influences (see Brighton & Foy, 2007, pp. 25–29). These are subject to considerable fluctuations depending on the medium, genre, target group, time pressure, etc. 56  On the selection criterion of prominence, see also the theoretical and empirical work of Peters (1994). 55

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t­errorism in the Middle East is comparatively overreported” (Weimann & Winn, 1994, p. 78).57 The authors speculate that this may be due to the higher number of fatalities in attacks in the Middle East. Regarding the nationality of the victims, Weimann and Winn (1994, p. 83) state that an event tends to become newsworthy as soon as there are Israeli victims. Weimann and Winn then examined reporting frequency and density in relation to the nationality of the terrorists. Again, groups from the Middle East ranked highest. From this, Weimann and Winn (1994, p. 85) conclude, similarly to Archetti (see above), that the ability of terrorists to attract media attention depends on the political interests of the country in which the media outlets are located, as well as the country’s cultural affinity for the victims or the terrorists. Palestinian or other Middle Eastern attackers were mainly found in Egyptian, Israeli and New  York newspapers, German and Spanish terrorists in European newspapers and Irish terrorists were mainly written about in the British as well as the Canadian press  – because of “Toronto, a longstanding center of Protestant Ulstermen” (Weimann & Winn, 1994, p. 85). Attacks by Puerto Ricans were reported mainly in the North American newspapers and also in the London Times. If a certain cultural proximity plays a role as a news value with regard to the people, then a high degree of brutality and cruelty determines the news value of the execution of the attack: among the events studied, aircraft hijackings had the highest probability of becoming a news story, followed by attacks against civilians on the ground and attacks on military targets. Attacks with fatalities found their way into the newspaper more easily than those without (see Weimann & Winn, 1994, p.  128). Further, journalists preferred to fill their agendas with terrorist attacks where perpetrators claimed responsibility rather than those in which the perpetrators remained unidentified. Many factors therefore influence when and why a terrorist event is reported or not. The political scientist Linder (2011) compared the reporting of BBC World, CNN International and Al Jazeera English (AJE) from February to July 2009 using a qualitative-quantitative content analysis. She concludes that, according to the news value of “proximity,” AJE reported more frequently on terrorist attacks in the  Weimann and Winn (1994) used data from the RAND Corporation for their study and limited themselves to events of international terrorism between 1968 and 1980. They then surveyed the print articles and made use of the Vanderbilt Archive, which provides news recordings of the U.S. television networks CBS, NBC and ABC for the relevant period. The print content analysis included the New York Times (New York), Globe and Mail (Toronto), Times of London and Daily Telegraph (both London), Le Figaro (Paris), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt), Yediot (Tel Aviv), Al Ahram (Cairo), and Pakistan Times (Islamabad) newspapers. 57

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Near and Middle East and – insofar as the U.S. military was involved in actions – AJE’s reporting was more critical, and in part also included civilian testimony, than that of the BBC or CNN (see Linder, 2011, p. 323). Perpetrators or groups of perpetrators were not given any space on any of the news channels (see Linder, 2011, p. 330). Wolfsfeld has taken on news values and media framing (see Sect. 4.8.3) in a schematic (Fig. 4.6) that he sees as a model of competition for space in the media and thus for power. He believes that the role of the media with regard to political issues can best be understood by seeing competition for the media as part of a broader struggle between political opponents for political control (see Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 3). Wolfsfeld even goes so far as to say: “The news media have become the central arena for political conflicts” (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.  2); hence they are in a central position in the model. Molotch and Lester (1974) already emphasized that public events – and terrorist attacks can be counted among them – are not organized because of their own inherent importance, but for practical purposes. If two parties (as in Wolfsfeld’s schematic the authorities and the challengers) have different ideas about a problem, a struggle breaks out over access to the mechanisms of message transmission, i.e., to the mass media (see Molotch & Lester, 1974, p. 103). In the case of the terrorists, news value is attributed to the “challengers” particularly because they display extraordinary behavior and exert a decisive influence

Fig. 4.6  “The power of antagonists over the news media”. (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 16)

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on the political agenda. In this respect, the terrorists are in a powerful position ­vis-­à-­vis the media, and they have an opportunity to impose their preferred frames on the media (see Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 16). But the terrorist group is also dependent on the media (dependency factors), for example to assert its political influence as well as with regard to the recruitment of like-minded people. “Thus, dependence on the media is determined by the need for an antagonist to send its message ‘up’ (to major decision makers) and ‘out’ (to the public)” (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.  23). Three of the groups of actors involved in the quadrangle can be found in this picture by Wolfsfeld; the civil society public can easily be thought of as recipients of the “outcomes.” Communicators have one thing in common: “All communication actors seek strategic control of messages” (Beck & Quandt, 2011, p. 89). By allowing the “first definer”, i.e., the government, to dominate the interpretation of an event, the media reinforce the existing power structure. Those in power have habitual access to the media through their position, but those who are not in power must force access through staging, such as spectacular attacks. This staging generally does not bring about positive coverage: “The result is that, while modern insurgent terrorists can manipulate the media into devoting time and space to their activities and even to their political claims and demands, the media manipulates them in turn, by playing up the violent aspects at the expense of analysis, in order to attract consumers. This, in turn, tends to undermine the terrorist’s claim to legitimacy by depicting him as merely violent, and not political” (Crelinsten, 1987a, p. 421). Wolfsfeld (1997, p. 31) calls the relationships between antagonists and the media “a set of cultural interactions” in which the antagonists promote their own frames and views of the conflict while the media try to present the story in a way that is understandable and profitable for their audience. Three components influence the frame in which an event is reported (see Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 41): (1) the nature of the information and the event, i.e., its news values, (2) the need for a “good news story,” and (3) the need to craft a news story that will resonate in a particular (political) culture. This is where the “value factors” come into play, with status being the primary factor with regard to politics, and extreme action being the primary factor with regard to terrorism. The factors dominate the selection decisions and – according to Wolfsfeld (1997, pp. 215–216) – also the frame; the journalists become executive figures: “one finds that journalists spend most of their time reacting, not initiating. They respond to political power, they reflect the political values and norms of their society in which they operate and they react to events.” Therefore, the media are susceptible to event-oriented coverage of terrorist attacks, and government statements easily find their way into the paper. The news value of government news increases even more when, for example, not only terrorism prevention is abstractly discussed, but a military counterattack is decided upon.

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Here  – just as in the case of terrorist attacks themselves  – the news values of ­dramaturgy, violence, suspense, etc. take effect. “[The] best route to public recognition is through appealing to traditional news values: drama, conflict and tragedy” (Biernatzki, 2002, p. 6). Media often report violent acts for the sake of violence alone. Terrorist actions therefore automatically become the subject of reporting (see McQuail, 1994, pp. 345–346). Terrorists know how to exploit this interest. “September 11 is a prototype for those events to which extreme news values are largely accordingly attributed in the given historical situation” (Emmer et al., 2002, p.  166). These cases, called “extreme events” by the authors, are characterized primarily by the following factors, some of which have already been identified as salient for terror events: surprise, harm, conflict/aggression, proximity/status of event region/influence, and personalization. Summarizing the different studies and news values mentioned for terror events, it is clear that almost all of them have been listed and thus there can be no doubt about their high newsworthiness. This circumstance also allows us to understand why voluntarily not covering such an event is unthinkable for media decisionmakers. Finally, the news should be considered from a reception-oriented point of view according to Eilders, even if this leads us already to the very last part in the process schema (see Fig. 3.6). Eilders sees news in itself as a “selection product” (see Eilders, 1997, p. 13), whereby the selection of relevant events is the responsibility of journalists. But recipients also select according to certain criteria when they turn to media content. This content is then individually cognitively processed and interpreted; it is thus a matter of selection on the one hand, and of information recall on the other (see Eilders, 1997, p. 16). Eilders’ (1997, p. 71) assumption: While journalists are more homogeneous in their news perception and processing due to their professional roles and routines, “recipients presumably show more distinct individual differences in their information processing.” Here it depends, for example, on the geographical location of the recipient, whether he is interested in the reporting of a (nearby) attack, or on his knowledge about a certain group. Eilders builds a bridge from the communicator to the recipient perspective with the help of the dynamic-transactional approach as a theoretical framework. According to this approach, it is not only the stimulus that determines the subjective interpretation on the part of the recipient, but also the “individual prior knowledge, goals and expectations of the recipients which control this processing stage” (Eilders, 1997, p. 121). Thus, a news value only has an effect if the recipient perceives it according to its importance. New information is integrated into existing knowledge structures, so-called schemata, in the case of news values, for example,

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into the schema of “relevance.”58 If an event is marketed by the media as relevant and if it also matches the recipient’s area of interest, e.g., IRA attacks for a Northern Irish reader, a positive reception decision is an obvious outcome. Another finding of Eilders’ study is that readers pay most attention to articles that are emphasized by formal features such as size and placement, as these have already been found to be particularly important by the selecting journalists. “Personal characteristics and the article topic have shown little influence on article selection” (Eilders, 1997, p. 211), although other studies show that terrorist attacks are strongly received precisely because of their dramatic topic and development (see Emmer et al., 2002). In the further processing of articles, the recollection of content, it was shown that only very highly pronounced news values are perceived as significant and thus the content is recalled (see Eilders, 1997, p. 255). Importantly, “individuals with extensive political knowledge oriented their processing less strongly to news values than individuals with low political knowledge” (Eilders, 1997, p. 257). A reader who has not yet accumulated much experience and information in a particular field and has not yet solidified his or her opinion on it is more easily influenced. This is especially relevant with regard to political insurgency and opposition. However, if one has an entrenched opinion, one wants to see it confirmed, and anything that contradicts it is more likely to be dismissed. Overall, Eilders (1997, p. 262) concludes that journalistic selection and processing by the audience “definitely have similarities,” even though the influencing factors may be different. The responsibility for turning an event into mediated news still lies with the journalists; and especially in the case of sensitive topics such as terrorism, decisions for or against publication should be carefully examined at various selection levels as well as guidelines drafted.

4.7.2 News Bias: Bias in Reporting News bias research sees selection in news coverage as related to characteristics of communicators, such as their political attitudes. According to news bias research, there is a link between a journalist’s subjective political attitudes and his or her news selection. “News bias research examines political leanings (bias), imbalances, and distortions in media coverage due to the attitudes, opinions, and basic positions of journalists, editors-in-chief and publishers, and editorial orientations” (Scheufele, 2014, p. 123). It is thus primarily located at the micro level but can also  In her codebook, Eilders recorded as the “central event” of an article that “which takes up the most space in the heading and first paragraph” (Eilders, 1997, p. 161). 58

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affect the meso level with organizational guidelines and the orientation of partisan organizations. Theoretically and empirically grounded news bias studies with regard to terrorism are few and far between; usually a “bias” is only mentioned in passing, but the concept is not explicitly used as a theoretical scaffolding for the study. A striking self-serving bias is evidenced by Shamir and Shikaki (2002), who show that acts of violence by the side perceived as hostile by Israelis and Palestinians respectively were classified as “terrorism,” while acts of violence by their own group were not. Valdeón (2009) describes as bias that media from the Anglo-­ American region frequently refer to the ETA as a “separatist organization” while referring to the IRA as a “terrorist group;” the national Spanish media, on the other hand, always refer to members of the ETA as “terrorists” (see Valdeón, 2009). Epstein (1977) examined the – distorted – use of the term “terrorism” in the sense of a political label in American print media and concludes that all the newspapers studied (New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Salt Lake Tribune) showed a similar bias: they portrayed individuals who opposed U.S.-backed regimes as fanatics who irrationally resorted to violence and destruction. In particular, violent acts against authoritarian regimes in Latin America were dubbed “terrorism.” In contrast, journalists refrained from pointing out repressive acts by the respective governments against certain segments of the population. “Terrorism is normally used as a shorthand expression for ‘left-wing extremism’” (Epstein, 1977, p. 71). For Epstein, this one-sided usage represents an “anti-leftist/Cold War bias” in media coverage.59 The journalists, he argues, had declared themselves partisan. “Press bias, however, derives not from using ‘terrorism’ per se but from using the word in a highly partial fashion” (Epstein, 1977, p. 70). It is possible to disagree here: Using the word “terrorism” is already framing per se. The assumption as to what exactly constitutes a bias can also be viewed differently and must be set against the temporal background of the Epstein study. Unlike the U.S. media, the national media in Uruguay in 1968–1969 tended to disseminate communiqués and interviews with Tupamaros in a positive frame. “Tupamaro activities were reported sympathetically, and this helped to create the group’s Robin Hood image. Beginning in late 1969, however, the government imposed strict censorship. The press was forbidden to use such words as cell, commando, terrorist, extremist, subversive, or Tupamaro” (Hewitt, 1992, p.  174). Finally, in April 1974, any news about guerrilla activities was  Norris et al. (2003, p. 298) also ask whether in the U.S., the “Cold War frame” has been replaced by the “War on Terrorism frame” in which conflicts are interpreted. Płudowski (2006, p. 112) contrasts the Madrid attack with 9/11 coverage in U.S. print media and finds that the main “War on Terror” frame was used here as well. 59

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banned – unless it came from the government – and newspaper outlets that reported too positively were shut down. Finnegan (2007, p. xiii) criticizes that good journalism only emerges through critical scrutiny of the actions of those in power, but not when – as after the events of September 11, 2001 – the actions of the U.S. government are merely transcribed. “The media, like the rest of the world, was, as Bush so simply put it, ‘either with us or…with the terrorists.’ Given the choice, and his sudden popularity after the attacks, the press decided it was with the president” (Finnegan, 2007, p. xix). This basic political posture influenced the choice of topics as well as their interpretation in the media. Finnegan observes a strongly patriotic press or a press showing solidarity from Western countries. There was often great consensus among journalists in their portrayals of terrorist events; they wrote “against evil.” The British Daily Mirror headlined “War on the World,”60 and Le Monde announced that “We are all Americans.” Some newspapers thus identified with those attacked, saw the attacks as directed against “the world” and triggered a “we-feeling”; others distanced themselves from the target country and spoke of the “War on America” (see Bromley & Cushion, 2002, p.  164). The Bild newspaper also showed solidarity with U.S. citizens with the title “We are all Americans” and ran seven special pages the day after the attacks. The Bild logo featured the U.S. flag, which could be seen there for a week (see Neubert, 2002, p. 132). This shows a clear, openly political statement which went hand in hand with a coloring of the news. Bild online set up a virtual condolence book, demonstrating that the tabloid media strongly personalized and often took the side of the victims. They sought to create public unity against “the enemy” with slogans such as “We’ll get you” or “Wanted!” (see Bird, 2002). A process of mobilization and identification with the Western-oriented public began. Soon after the attacks, however, these expressions of empathy rapidly diminished abroad and critical voices were raised (see Finnegan, 2007, pp. 1–2). In the U.S., the situation was largely different: “Reporters have said they were afraid to appear unpatriotic, afraid to anger readers and viewers who they believed were in a nationalistic fervor, afraid to ask the wrong question, and afraid to anger Bush and lose their access to officials on his staff” (Finnegan, 2007, p. 19). An attitude

 Quite the opposite of the headline “How can 59,054,057 people be so dumb?” after George W. Bush was elected president of the United States. 60

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of ­“patriots first and journalists second” was expected.61 The bias was thus not exclusively induced by the journalists’ own political attitudes, but imposed on them from the outside, by the anticipated expectations of the recipients. This points to the power of the receiving side of the messages that is often not mentioned prominently enough in news bias research. Journalists’ attitudes, and the extent to which they are expressed in their media products, thus depend not only on their own beliefs, but also on what beliefs journalists expect their audiences, as well as their colleagues and peer groups, to hold. This can be the deciding factor, especially in politically charged phases. Maier (2003) conducted nine focus group discussions on television coverage after September 11, 2001, with 76 German or German-based Afghan, Turkish, and U.S. television viewers in Stuttgart, Hamburg, Berlin, and Nuremberg in early 2002. The Americans rated the German reporting as considerably more objective and less emotional than the American reporting, in which they saw a patriotic position quickly emerge (see Maier, 2003, p. 55). Regardless of nationality, the subjects felt that the reporting was not well grounded, especially at the beginning, which was due to a lack of interest on the part of the media in the overall situation in Afghanistan beforehand. This omission led to speculation and dubious expert statements. Thus, the presumption of guilt and the division into “good” and “bad” had also been made too hastily and not yet substantiated (see Maier, 2003, p. 59). Over time, however, the media made up for their omissions. But: “To the extent that the quality of reporting increased, however, the interest of the recipients decreased” (Maier, 2003, p. 57). Of course, the time lag since the disaster may have been the main factor here. A bias may be present not only in the reporting, but also in the selection, as Kearns et al. (2019) show. Using regression models for attacks in the United States listed in the Global Terrorism Database between 2006 and 2015, they show that the number of articles in U.S. newspapers was significantly higher if the perpetrator was of Muslim faith. This circumstance could lead to an impact on popular perceptions, resulting in a “feedback loop that perpetuates biases in both media coverage and public perception” (Kearns et al., 2019, p. 1000).  Among Spaniards, too, a rather patriotic, unified sense of nationhood was triggered after the attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, with almost 200 dead: “Pocos son los momentos en la reciente historia de España en los que las mentes de sus ciudadanos hayan estado tan unánimemente clarividentes como en el 11-M y los días posteriores al mismo” (Amo et al., 2004, p. 9). Amo et al. translated reactions to the attacks from the Arab press – almost unanimously condemning the attack and the perpetrators. But there were also clear tones against the Iraq war, which was seen as the cause, among other things, because of the Spanish participation in it (see Amo et al., 2004, p. 20). 61

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With regard to the conflict in the Basque Country, Glück (2003) compared the Spanish newspapers “Egin” and “El País.” Egin was published in the Basque Country, El País is one of the major national newspapers. “From the beginning, Egin represented a left-wing nationalist position with a clear stance in favor of the independence of the entire Basque Country (including Navarre and the French Basque provinces), which later earned it the reputation of HB’s [Herri Batasuna, author’s note] house newspaper or also a mouthpiece of ETA” (Glück, 2003, p. 91). El País is considered a pro-government newspaper (see Glück, 2003, p.  201). Glück comes to the following conclusions (see Glück, 2003, p. 249): Both newspapers made their political positions clear; however, hardly any future scenarios for the Basque Country were played out. Within the articles, the editors mostly placed “expressions of opinion that correspond to the editorial orientation, forming both the beginning and the end of the articles and thus making it clear who holds the ‘right’ opinion, while in the middle of the articles opposing positions also have their say, but are usually refuted by the final quote” (Glück, 2003, p. 250). As a daily newspaper with a positive attitude towards ETA, Egin used words such as “terrorism” or “murder” only in quotes and described ETA’s attacks with the term “political violence” (violencia política) (see Glück, 2003, p. 253). El País, on the other hand, used “terrorist organization” as the most frequent synonym for ETA (see Glück, 2003, p. 255). In this way, each medium reflected its political orientation. The working group Crisis Communication in the Media (AKrikoMe) at the University of Duisburg (Universität Duisburg) evaluated 1921 reports in the politics sections and special sections of the German daily newspapers Frankfurter Rundschau, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as well as 224 reports in the magazines Spiegel and Focus in the period between September 12 and October 8, 2001 and came to the following conclusion: “Crisis communication has a tendency toward one-dimensionality, so that the reporting contributes to demonizing others and to a mobilization of the public for military solution options” (Werthes et  al., 2002, p.  83).62 It can certainly be questioned whether it makes sense, especially in terrorism reporting, to describe as “unbiased” a media treatment that allows both sides to have their say equally. What exactly is regarded as “bias” is ultimately also a question of point of view and what is or should be deemed an “unbiased” standard. And even if the media act as “neutral” reporters and as watchdogs of the existing system, they are not a platform for perpetrators of  For example, 63% of the 930 articles that had an orientation focus included no references to possible causes or backgrounds. In addition, the working group found a strong tendency towards personalization and visualization (see Werthes et al., 2002, p. 84). 62

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violence and their messages. Clearly normative viewpoints, as also considered in Sect. 4.11.2 in the interim summary, play a role here.

4.7.3 Agenda Building and Agenda Setting (Media Agenda) Winfried Schulz, David M. White as well as Walter Gieber and David Weaver can be associated with analytical empiricism with their work on news selection and agenda setting, which can be understood as middle-range theories (see Löffelholz, 2004a, p. 62). This research has mainly dealt with the decisions of journalistic actors on a micro level. Here we are now concerned with how media actors set their agenda and how they are influenced in doing so.63 This is important because recipients ascribe particular relevance to issues that are reported on intensively. The chapter on reception therefore examines the audience agenda (see Sect. 4.12.2) and the related approaches of framing (see Sect. 4.12.4) and priming (see Sect. 4.12.5) in relation to the coverage of terrorist events. It is important to keep in mind that agenda setting is closely related to newsworthiness, because events launched by terrorists that combine many news values more easily make their way onto the media agenda (see Sect. 4.7.1). In short, “Terrorism has an extremely useful agenda-setting function” (Crenshaw, 1998, p. 17). Not only the journalistic public agenda, but also culture, politics, etc. are more or less powerfully determined by the terrorist events. “Terrorism has become a major cultural phenomenon that is the subject of tens of thousands of novels, movies, television programs, news items, comics, plays, academic studies, websites, blogs, and the like. It has become an important subject of interpersonal discourse on a daily basis” (Breen Smyth et al., 2008, p. 1). A small act by a few people thus has such an impact on the actions, thinking and reporting of many people. Terrorism becomes a kind of industry that leaves few areas of daily life untouched by its diffuse effects (see Breen Smyth et al., 2008, p. 1). Not only are elections partly determined by terrorism or by politicians’ attitudes toward and willingness to act against terrorists, and new laws are made and security strategies are considered, but also in the cultural sphere, questions arise over the appropriateness of art exhibitions or film screenings, for example of RAF actions.

 Different influences and levels of influence on media content are schematically represented, for example, by Weischenberg’s (1992, p.  68) “onion model,” which is strongly reminiscent of Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical influence model (1991, p. 54). 63

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Agenda setting64 describes the priority of topics in the media (= media agenda) or among recipients (= audience agenda), but the agenda of political actors also plays an important role. Which agenda has which influence on whom is disputed (see Maurer, 2010, p. 24). Influences of political actors on the media agenda are also referred to as agenda building (see Maurer, 2010, p. 65). Rogers and Dearing (2007, p. 81)65 describe this distinction somewhat differently, contrasting between “(1) agenda-setting, a process through which the mass media communicate the relative importance of various issues and events to the public […], and (2) agenda-­ building, a process through which the policy agendas of political elites are influenced by a variety of factors, including media agendas and public agendas” (Rogers & Dearing, 2007, p. 81). The latter is also called “policy agenda-setting” by the two authors. Agenda building can thus work in two directions: from politics to the media and from the media (and the public) to politics. Another direction of impact has been largely overlooked and is clearly evident in the terrorist attack: terrorists can also engage in agenda building and use their actions to set the agendas of the media and politicians. In their simplified causal model, Kohlsche et al. (2014, p. 129) assume an influence of terrorist attacks on media coverage (agenda building), from there on (public) problem perception (agenda setting) and further on decisions in security policy (agenda surfing). The results of their study with data from 2001 to 2006 largely confirm this model. Kohlsche et al. (2014, p. 128) define by agenda surfing as referring to terrorist attacks “for raising one’s political profile.” In contrast to agenda surfing, which is often postulated by proponents of contagion theory (see Sect. 4.5.3) and in which terrorists ride the wave of already established topics (see Maurer, 2010, p. 67), cases of agenda camouflaging by terrorist groups can be identified. In this process, terrorists seek to obscure events that are on the media agenda. Schmid and de Graaf (1982) report a case in which the IRA chief of staff admitted to using bombings as a diversion from coverage of elections in Northern Ireland. The limited news space was to be taken for the IRA’s cause; other news disruptive to the group was to be suppressed. Wanta and Kalyango (2007) conducted a study on agenda building in U.S. politics as well as in the New York Times in relation to terrorism in Africa. They related mentions of 20 African countries in U.S. presidential documents and New York Times articles to the “real” number of fatal incidents (terrorist or not; collected through political databases) and the amount of U.S. aid (general and counterterrorism) to these 20 African countries. Wanta and Kalyango looked at the  Maurer (2010, p. 17) refrains from calling agenda setting a “theory.”  Rogers and Dearing’s work (2007) was first published in Communication Yearbook 11 in 1988. 64 65

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period between January 1, 2001 and July 30, 2005. After conducting a path analysis, they found that the agenda-building model only applied when it came to deaths from terrorism, not from other causes. “Overall, the findings here point to the strong impact of President Bush in the agenda-building process involving terrorism and African nations. His public statements put into motion a process of news coverage, which in turn highlighted his policy initiatives. This process, however, was only evident when the President, media and policy agendas involved a terrorism frame” (Wanta & Kalyango, 2007, p. 447). Agenda building thus depends on politicians’ interpretation of the violent event. Critically, it can be noted that the end of agenda-setting or agenda-building effects is usually not surveyed in empirical studies; only the maximum effect (peak) is sought (see Gehrau, 2014, p. 9). With regard to the actor quadrangle, it can be stated that the media agenda that the citizen ultimately perceives is influenced by a struggle for issue placement and interpretive sovereignty mainly between government and terrorists. Interpretive sovereignty “describes the ability to determine or significantly influence the prevailing public view of the case and its individual aspects” (Buck, 2007, p. 268). In addition, other actors such as the political opposition, civil society communicators, and citizen journalists vie for attention and strive to convey their interpretations of the event as well as their approaches to resolving it. The media stand in the middle between the actors (see also Wolfsfeld’s schematic, Fig. 4.6).

4.8 Media: News Editing and Production Setting

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

Once the decision to report on a certain topic has been made and the topic agenda has been set within the editorial team, questions arise about the preparation of the media content, for example about certain focal points and, above all, about suitable

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formats. Of course, there are differences in terms of medium (e.g., radio versus television), target group (e.g., young or old), content orientation (quality medium versus tabloid medium), frequency of publication (e.g., weekly versus hourly updates) and universality (specialty magazine or daily newspaper covering a wide range of topics). Since the decisions are largely based on the public to be reached, the arrow from the media (actors) to the citizens is thick. In the setting of the preparation and production of news, this chapter deals with journalistic formats (see Sect. 4.8.1), especially visual content (see Sect. 4.8.2) as well as narrative elements (see Sect. 4.8.3).

4.8.1 Terrorism and Formats Lünenborg (2016, p.  325) considers journalism as a cultural discourse in which forms and patterns of narration have developed and have been ritualized since its beginnings, that is to say, how events are processed in writing, visually and acoustically. The recipients have become accustomed to these narrative forms and know what to do with them. In most cases, the journalist as narrator remains in the background in such presentations, so that an impression of distance and objectivity is conveyed, designed to create trust in the presentation. However, there are other forms in which the narrator is allowed to emerge (e.g., in narrative journalism), and there are forms in which documentary and fiction are mixed (e.g., in “documentary soaps”). Depending on the format, recipients have a certain idea of what to expect, and they differentiate “truth-oriented” journalism from fictional entertainment production, for example when reading the genre designations in a TV program guide. Against the backdrop of genre theory, Lünenborg (2016, pp.  331–336) explains that the terms representational form, genre, format and the like are sometimes used in similar ways in practice as well as in academia. Together, they can be understood as “communicative genre” (Lünenborg, 2016, p. 334). Genre theory has its origins in literary studies and in media studies (see Lünenborg, 2016, p. 332). Each format is historically bound and so, for example, citizen journalism and user-generated content (see Sect. 4.6.3) gave rise to new formats. Taking the recipients or “new users” and their subjective perceptions as the starting point for determining genres and letting them point out the differences according to their field of experience is entirely in line with constructivist media genre theory, which also opposes categorizing primarily on the basis of print classification (see Michael, 2017). Even a glance at new television formats makes it clear that a separation into, for example, report, narrative piece, commentary and satirical piece is no longer sufficient. In the meantime, a dissolution of clearly defined schemata can be observed. When, for

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example, the “heute-show” (a German news satire program) explains terrorism, it joins the ranks of “contingent hybrids” (see Lünenborg, 2017, p. 376), in which factuality and fictionality can no longer be distinguished. Basically, it is important to distinguish between event-related and background reporting. Altheide (1987, p. 161), after a comparative content analysis of the coverage of American and British TV coverage of IRA attacks in London’s Hyde Park and Regent’s Park on July 20, 1982, comes to the conclusion that the broadcasts can be divided into two formats: “News formats of the event type associated with regular evening newscasts in both countries focused on visuals of the aftermath and tactics of terrorism, while topic type formats associated with interviews and documentary presentations included materials about purposes, goals, and rationale.” Altheide had categorized the broadcasts according to the criteria mentioned by Schlesinger et  al. (1983) (open  – close, tight  – loose; see below) and added the distinction “scanning – object time,” whereby “scanning” corresponds to the event type and “object time” to the topic type, since here there is no such strong (temporal) tightening and the topic is presented more strongly in a broad context (see Altheide, 1987, pp. 167–168). Schlesinger et al. (1983) looked at British television coverage of terrorist events in 1981 and 1982 by way of 15 different programs, some of which were regularly scheduled ones. The researchers assigned the programs to a crosstab consisting of the following possibilities (Table 4.3). Schlesinger et al. (1983, p. 32) provide the following definitions in this regard: (a) Closed: These formats “operate mainly or wholly within the terms of reference set by the official perspective” (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p. 32). (b) Open: These formats “provide spaces in which the core assumptions of the official perspective can be interrogated and contested and in which other perspectives can be presented and examined” (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p. 32). (c) Tight: “A tight format is one in which the images, arguments and evidence offered by the programme are organised to converge upon a single preferred interpretation and where other possible conclusions are marginalised or closed-off” (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p. 32). Table 4.3  Crosstab for format categorization according to Schlesinger et al. (1983) Closed Tight Loose

Open

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(d) Loose: “A loose format […], is one where the ambiguities, contradictions and loose ends generated within the programme are never fully resolved, leaving the viewer with a choice of interpretations” (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p. 32). Most of the TV formats studied by Schlesinger (news, magazines, documentaries) showed either a combination of closed and narrow or of open and wide, but there were also exceptions. Overall, the picture was as follows: open programs occurred far less frequently than closed programs and they reached a smaller audience (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p. 166). Henn and Vowe (2015) also investigated the question of how (in this case German) media report on terrorism, crime and disasters and, similar to Altheide (1987) and Schlesinger et al. (1983), came to the conclusion after a content analysis of various media offerings (TV, internet, print) that terrorism reporting is predominantly linked to key events and that current happenings are consistently in the foreground, with security aspects taking on a decisive role. In general, the topic of violence is increasing in the media (see Dyson, 2003), but this is not always explained and classified. Results of a study by Boyd-Barrett (2003, p. 37) using the method of comparative reading, internet research and statistics, confirm that the media are very cautious in interpreting evidence, avoid difficult questions or background explanations and are happy to place themselves behind political figureheads such as George W. Bush, “transformed into positive, iconic status.” Konow-Lund et al. (2019) describe innovativeness as a strength of crisis journalism. The authors divide the phases after an attack into “shock, start-up, and transformation” (Konow-Lund et al., 2019, p. 952). In the shock phase, research and reporting run as routinely as possible to disseminate facts and build on familiar procedures in the chaos. There is little time for creativity. In the start-up phase, journalists perceive the needs of the recipients and also adjust the tone of their reporting, for example showing empathy and mourning for the victims. Social media monitoring is often helpful in this phase. The transformation phase begins as soon as the most important facts have been reported and a certain temporal distance from the event and the mourning has been gained. This is the phase of possible genre innovation; sometimes formats or technical solutions are used for the first time that have circulated in the newsroom before but were not included in daily work routines. Multidisciplinary teams create new multimodal, interactive and data-driven offerings (see Konow-Lund et al., 2019; Salaverría, 2005). It is left to newsroom management to make the innovations permanent.

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The focus of the media after the September 11 attacks was on the victims.66 In its series “Portraits of Grief,” the New York Times ran about 15 small obituaries each day for various victims of the attack on the World Trade Center – a form of presentation that had never been seen before. Fox News Channel showed a graphic during the 2002 memorial service at “Ground Zero” in which the two towers of the World Trade Center consisted entirely of the names of the victims (see Chitty et al., 2003, p. xii). “So many people stopped watching the news or reading newspapers soon after the attacks because they could no longer digest the flood of sad news or diffuse warnings” (Male, 2008, p. 142). It is precisely in such emotionally charged situations that the willingness to try out new formats increases. In terms of format diversity, the tragedy spurred significant results: Dörmann and Pätzold (2002) compiled the front pages of more than 150 daily newspapers on September 12, 2001 and noted “that everything that had previously been difficult or even impossible in the daily press became possible in the context of coverage of September 11: more space for journalism, format breaks, photos on otherwise photo-free pages, interplay between main and local sections, flow of topics through the departments, self-researched background information and great variability in the forms of presentation” (Dörmann & Pätzold, 2002, pp. 12–13). New forms of presentation after 9/11 were also found on CNN.com: “Incoming reports were included as short news items in a bullet point list roughly sorted by relevance, which remained clearer than fully constructed texts and whose updating was easy to handle. The ‘news list’ as a practical online form of presentation could be a model for similarly complex and unclear situations in the future” (Geyer, 2004, p. 156). Geyer (2004, p. 157) postulates that there was usually no time in the newsrooms in the hectic after 9/11 for greater interactivity with the reader (chats, voting, moderated forums) and an exploitation of multimedia. Mostly, journalists are the producers of public statements, the recipients the audience. In this perspective, not only does constructivism (see Sect. 5.2) mix with systems theory (see Sect. 5.1), but there is also a vertical interweaving of action and systems theory, because social systems are hierarchically built on cognitive foundations (see Scholl & Weischenberg, 1998, p. 154), which means that they are ultimately dependent on actors. And these in turn construct their system and environmental reality in a roughly similar way, because this is the only way the system as  For insights into the coverage in U.S. media after September 11, see also Gross and Stapf (2002) and Brosda (2002). The journalist Ambrogio Amati (2002) takes a very subjective look at the coverage in Italian daily newspapers after September 11, 2001. Further empirical studies on the media treatment of the attacks of September 11, 2001 can be found in Greenberg (2002), but they are given little or no theoretical underpinning. 66

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such can exist and function. As a form of representation or presentation for news and information journalism, the editors who are integrated into their structures and systems usually use the formats of news item or report in routine times as well as in times of crisis – this corresponds to the expectations of the audience. The concrete portrayal and naming of terrorism in the media often occurs not only in opinionated forms of presentation, but also in “neutral” reports according to the friend/ enemy distinction (see Schmitt, 2000 [1932]): the terrorists are clearly the enemy of the existing society.67 Within the media landscape, certain media then take on certain functions again: “Non-daily news reporting already concentrates more on the factual dimension of social environment expectations. However, it can only do this because it is freed from the constraints of timeliness by the daily news coverage” (Kohring & Hug, 1997, p. 26). An investigation by Fuller (1988) shows that in the Christian Science Monitor, a religiously oriented daily newspaper, almost 300 articles on the subject of “terrorism”68 appeared as early as 1985, in such diverse forms as guest editorials, reports, book reviews, cartoons, series and the like. The newspaper also asks how “terrorism” should be defined, how the media might deal with the issue, and what organizations actively combat it (see Fuller, 1988, pp. 125–126). Scholars such as Robert Picard also have their say, or excerpts from official documents are reprinted – in other words, it was primarily elites who were quoted. This again speaks for the thesis presented above that journalism acts on the side of the existing political system and helps to maintain the status quo to a large extent. Kirsch (2005) conducted a content analysis of the coverage of the terrorist attacks in Djerba (2002), Madrid (2004) and the hostage-taking in Beslan (2004) in the German newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung. The topics were reported on in almost all sections of the daily newspapers (see Kirsch, 2005, p. 83), even in the sports section. This once again confirms the flow of topics across all departments in the case of major attacks. Kirsch could not find strong personalization and concentration on victim stories in the quality papers (see Kirsch, 2005, p. 89). This contradicts the theoretical assumption of the common forms of journalistic construction of crises that make up the quality of  However, the friend/enemy difference does not only exist on the side of the media. The terrorists also have a fixed friend/enemy image that they communicate, for example the “philistine bourgeoisie” that the RAF opposed, or the heretics such as “Jews and crusaders” (Schneider, 2007, p. 139), on whom the radical Islamists declared war. 68  It is interesting to note that in the annual index of the Christian Science Monitor the term “terrorism” does not appear at all in the years 1975–1977, one is referred to the listing under “violence” for the year 1978, and only then did this topic make more and more headlines (see Fuller, 1988, p. 121). 67

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r­ eporting in such times, such as personalization, pseudo-dramatization, emotionalization and friend/foe polarization (see Löffelholz 2004a, p. 33; see Sect. 4.3.4). In summary, it can be said that not all content and formal formats or “communicative genres” (Lünenborg, 2016, p.  334) always reflect the classic structures of crisis reporting, even if they are often dominated by them.

4.8.2 The Power of Visual Media Content Many formats are automatically not pure text formats but are conceived with a visual component from the beginning. Terrorism as an act of violence is always associated with “powerful” images. Terrorists adopt this media thinking and stage an act rich in images. “In the communication strategy of religious terrorism, images have emancipated themselves from text” (Münkler, 2001, p. 15). Historian Schmid (1989, p. 544) sees the shift from radio to television as a change also in terms of terrorist orientation: “If radio power was mainly for state terrorists, the advent of television played more into the hands of non-state terrorists.” These developments show the need to turn separately to the visual elements in the media treatment of terrorist events. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the special role of television. Reporting on terrorist attacks cannot be compared with conventional reporting on conventional wars, civil wars or crisis regions. Violent acts generally have a high news value because they are unique and extraordinary events, but the involvement of the populace is much higher in the case of terrorist attacks because of the surprise factor (see Sect. 4.7.1). This emotional impulse increases attention, and the media also frequently use the emotionalization factor in their reports. TV journalists, in particular, strive for an easily comprehensible treatment, a format that is good and easy for recipients to consume. The aforementioned (and arguable) identical interest of media and terrorists, namely, to reach a broad public in terms of readership or viewership, can be supported with the help of images. “Without the dissemination of its actions via television and the Internet, the Al Qaeda group led by Zarqawi in Iraq would not have become known so quickly, nor would it have been able to achieve the enormous recruitment success it did” (Tilgner, 2008, p. 103). Television jumped on Al-Qaeda propaganda so quickly because the group used video messages as a means of communication. “In Iraq, Al Qaeda spread its message from anonymity. Terror videos were sold to journalists working in Baghdad. They then offered sensational footage to their home editors and accepted being misused as propagandists of terror” (Tilgner, 2008, p. 103). When thinking of Al-Qaeda, the image of Osama bin Laden often comes to mind; when thinking of “September 11,” the burning towers of the World Trade Center. It is the images,

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not the background text and research into the causes, that dominate these thoughts. Weber (2001, p. 12) writes about the “predominance of the image over the word”, which he substantiates with terms such as “pictorial turn” or “iconic turn”: “What is meant is that the pictorial, the iconic loses its attachment to the word and regains independence” (Weber, 2001, p. 12). In Weber’s (2001, p. 4) view, the “September 11” event was “the greatest attractor in television history to date: the real-time mediatization of a particularly symbolic attack, hitherto unimaginable in its destructiveness.”69 Because of 9/11, many channels cancelled certain feature films and did not broadcast any comedy programs for about a week. Another example of close interaction between terrorism and television is the 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise ship70 “Achille Lauro” by the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) led by Abu Abbas, in which an American tourist was killed. Widespread manhunts for Abbas were still underway when NBC broadcast an extensive interview with him in May 1986 – the terrorists had probably approached the media to use them as a visual-distribution platform. Cottle (2009, p. 122) notes that the “war on terror” has in many ways become the “war of media images.” This means that it is not just the terrorists, but also those under attack who exploit the potential of images. Wolfsfeld’s (1997, p. 16) schema of “The power of antagonists over the news media” presented above can thus easily be extended to include the visual component. It represents a factor that can determine access to the media and the scope of reporting, and possibly also on framing, and is regarded as an important resource in the power struggle, so that it is easy to speak of a “war of images” (see Münkler, 2001, p. 13): The images of the attacks of September 11 were followed by images of the deployment of the U.S. military and of declarations of patriotism by the populace. Baudrillard (2001) sees a war as a solution strategy of the attacked state as an unnecessary staging of a pseudo-event that is supposed to offer support to the populace: “substituer à un véritable et formidable événement, unique et imprévisible, un pseudo-événement répétitif et déjà vu.” With the added war rhetoric of then U.S. President Bush, text and image complemented each other in their persuasive intentions. In France, on the other hand, President Chirac did not

 Images of the September 11 attack were soon available on CNN (see Weber, 2001, p. 4). A good overview of the reaction to the events and processing of the events of September 11, 2001  in German television programming is provided by Kammann (2001). Among other things, presenters are judged according to their competence, commercial breaks and banners are analyzed. Regarding the power of television images in terrorist attacks, see also Beuthner et al. (2003). 70  Previously, it was mostly airplanes that were hijacked. Therefore, this is a deliberate change in strategy and symbolism. 69

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combine the attacks with this choice of words; only after the 2015 attacks did President Hollande use the phrase “la France est en guerre” (see Fragnon, 2015). Photographs possess a similar suggestive power. Schicha (2019, p. 160) compiles arguments for and against the publication of images of violence, for example the duty to inform and educate, the appeal function and collective memory versus fatigue, stress, voyeurism and disinformation. Becker (2013) foregrounds the meaningfulness of press photographs in her qualitative analysis. In doing so, she emphasizes the “experience of horror” (Becker, 2013, p. 16) and how an image can serve to address crisis. She approaches the topic from the perspective of constructivism but sees the mediated coverage of the attacks of September 11, 2001 as largely undoing media (re)construction, calling “the irritation of the boundaries between primary and secondary experience [a] key characteristic of the 9/11 image event. Where physical distance in normal media operations is accompanied by a psychological distance resulting from a desensitization of the recipients flooded with images of horror, the images of 9/11 affected a global media audience to an unprecedented degree and turned a world community into eyewitnesses of horror” (Becker, 2013, p. 24). The images dominated because initially there was no narrative that would have immediately allowed for a classification. “Because the event at the moment of occurrence largely refuses to be classified into narrative structures by the media, it is primarily the images reproduced in endless loops that determine the recipients’ horizon of experience” (Becker, 2013, p. 278). Later, however, as will be described in the next chapter, there is a narrative classification and a splitting into culture- and nation-specific narratives that account for the differences in media coverage.

4.8.3 Narrative Embedding of Acts of Terrorism: Discourses, Metaphors, Myths, Frames After this foray into the particular role of the visual in terrorism reporting, this section pivots back to text-based narrative structures. This and the following chapter will explore the connection of terrorism to theories and concepts that are not necessarily the focus of communication studies, but whose approaches promise insightful findings and practical implications for counterterrorist measures. The focus is now primarily on language and narrative concepts, and later on theories of rhetoric (see Sect. 4.9). This theoretical framework for media coverage draws on the concept of myth, discourse analysis, metaphor rhetoric, narrativity and framing in relation to terrorism. Narratives are deeply rooted in a particular culture. Van Ginkel (2015) defines them as “a storyline to communicate and legitimise a political or

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religious conviction, with the aim of generating support and with a call to action in support of that conviction” (van Ginkel, 2015). The chapter closely follows that on word choice (see Sect. 4.6.2), as appropriate rhetoric forms the basis for discourses, myths, narratives and frames. The production of the text occurs directly after or simultaneously with the selection of words to name terrorist groups. It takes place as embedding and contextual processing within certain socio-cultural structures and schemas. The section is divided into three subsections on a) discourses, including the meaning of metaphors, b) myths in terrorism reporting, and c) framing at the level of media content. (a) Discourses Hülsse and Spencer (2008, p. 571) criticize the actor focus of terrorism research and propose a change to a discourse-centered perspective against a constructivist background: “From a constructivist point of view, terrorism is a social construction. The terrorist actor is a product of discourse, and hence discourse is the logical starting point for terrorism research. In particular, it is the discourse of the terrorists’ adversaries that constitutes terrorist motivations, strategies, organizational structures and goals.” Shifting the starting point of research from the perpetrators of the violent act to the attributors who first classify the act as “terrorism” requires a complete shift in perspective. Zulaika and Douglass (1996) also emphasize the rhetorical and narrative dimension of terrorism, which they argue manifests itself primarily as discourse transmitted through the mass media, because terrorists bypass – or must bypass – direct political debate in order to make themselves heard; “the indexical sign (the attack) directs the attention of the audience (the public) to the object (the terrorist’s cause) through the catalyst of spectacular publicity (the media)” (Zulaika & Douglass, 1996, p.  130). Anthropologists Zulaika71 and Douglass (1996, esp. Chapter 3) consider terrorism as a taboo ritual in society as well as, to a lesser extent, in the personal narratives of individuals acting terroristically. Terrorism consists of statements: messages from the terrorists, the government, the public, possibly comments from the media itself. A proximity of “narrative” to “frame” is obvious, as Entman (2007, p. 164) himself points out: “We can define framing as the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation.” It is a question of interpretation, worldview. Two different worldviews collide in the discourse. “Terrorism news is framed according to a definite world view that opposes countries and cultures within a  Zulaika himself is Basque and comes from the village of Itziar, where he conducted research as an ethnologist. 71

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h­ ierarchy of values in which ‘we’ are at the top and the practitioners of terrorism at the bottom” (Zulaika & Douglass, 1996, p.  13). Terrorism is in every sense the detached entity: a group of people abjuring society without normative constraints, without conventional war strategy, unpredictable, and without logical form or order. Terrorism reveals itself as the non-normal and formless in opposition to the orderly process in the society of the “we” (see Zulaika & Douglass, 1996, pp. 182– 183). Instead of closeness and solidarity in society, a great distance builds up, triggered by an attack, which is nourished by fear, as one draws away as far as possible from the frightening element and wants to see it as separate from one’s own life. The terrorists are always the others. Zulaika and Douglass (1996, p. 14) therefore speak of a “slippery/phantom quality […,] a parody of accusation and counteraccusation.” For example, in an ETA publication, Bulletin Zutik, the possession of which was punishable, there was often talk of “police terror” in the Basque Country, so the perpetrator-victim relationship was reversed (see Zulaika & Douglass, 1996, p. 37). Altheide (2006) is also of the opinion that the media discourse on terrorism is subject to the “fear” frame, which can also extend to the behavior of recipients as a self-fulfilling prophecy, so to speak, in that they are more suspicious of their surroundings and also view extended security checks, such as at airports, as a necessary evil. The populace more readily accepts measures restricting civil liberties the more significant the attack appears to them and the more convincingly the media narrative presents the urgency of such measures as a “rescue from evil.” In general, after an attack, more relevance is attached to security measures than to civil liberties. This is shown, for example, by a survey of 1600 Russians in 2005 after a number of terrorist attacks (65% considered security more important than civil liberties) and in the relatively quiet year of 2006 (only 45% were still in favor of prioritizing security) (see Simons, 2010, p. 9). After an attack, scores for questions such as “Does terrorism pose a threat to your country?” or “How unsafe do you feel in your country?” skyrocket (see Norris et al., 2003, p. 290). According to Altheide (2009), after attacks, the media support this “discourse of fear,” which manifests itself in painting a picture of an uncertain future, a general state of danger and permanent risk. The need for leadership and unity, as well as the assumption that society must accept restriction of its civil rights, are also central to the media and political rhetoric (see Altheide, 2009, p. 68). The lack of a tangible enemy, he argues, leads to the symbolic elevation of the “enemy” and the framing of the response to an attack as a “communal patriotic experience” (Altheide, 2009, p. 71). Altheide (2009, p. 71) also discusses the extent to which the American arms industry used this communal-social scenario of united resistance to market its products – allegedly with considerable success.

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Köstler (2011), referring to Luhmann and operative constructivism conceived in terms of schema theory, cites fear as a communicative schema that emerges in media discourse, namely by presenting terrorism as a risk or a danger. “Fear communication, understood as communication about fear of terror, is to be understood as a social process that refers meaningfully to terrorism and therefore generates resonances that co-constitute and reproduce the conflict system. Fear communication signals the basal understanding of a terrorist message of violence and provides an additional breeding ground for the parasitic conflict system” (Köstler, 2011, p. 53). Particularly problematic is that “in anticipatory reference contexts” (Köstler, 2011, p. 313), the expectation of future frightening events is fueled, which is reflected in increased fear in the current situation. In this respect, terrorism and public discourse are closely linked via the bridge of the media. “Violent acts, especially if they are politically justified, form an ‘obvious’ topic of discussion for politicians and the media. Moreover, it is only in the context of public discourse that certain acts of violence and their actors are classified as ‘terrorist’ in the first place. Since – apart from a few cases – the actors labeled in that manner reject the stigmatization and delegitimization associated with that categorization, the result is an immediate conflict of self-interpretation and interpretation by others, which, depending on the degree of ideological support for the terrorist actors by legal groups and, where appropriate, the media, can become a special topic of public discourse” (Musolff, 2006, p. 302). Thus, turning to the topic of “discourse,” the phenomenon of the “public sphere” again plays a central role. “Today, mass media largely produce the public sphere about social problems. Those who want to bring a problem into the societal consciousness generally try to launch their interpretation into the media” (Wessler, 1999, p. 19). The mass media provide the infrastructure for this making public; a platform for discourse, so to speak. The mass media are still the main vehicles of public discourse in modern society, as they have a wide reach (see Brüggemann et al., 2006, p. 3), even though individual influencers on social media can also guide discourse. Wessler (1999, p. 28) speaks of intermediaries (media), spokespersons (or coalitions of spokespersons), which include terrorist groups and politicians, and audiences. If one sees the public sphere as a process, one can identify “an interplay of statements and counter-­ statements, of opinion and counter-opinion” (Wessler, 1999, p.  39; see also Fig. 4.6), the so-called media-public discourse, which was already identified above as a reflective strategy of mutual accusations, for example in the case of an attack. An issue is identified as a problem; the causal explanation or even consequences of it become a central part of the public interpretation process (see Wessler, 1999, p. 59). It can therefore be decisive where the attribution of causality and responsibility (see also Sect. 4.4) is to be located and which evaluative or neutral statements

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evoke which counterstatements (reaction) and whether there is more symmetrical or more asymmetrical communication. In the case of terrorism, the insurgents succeed for a short time in gaining access to the mass media and thus to public discourse, which is otherwise occupied by legal, political and other actors who conform to the system; in so doing, the insurgents demonstrate their communicative strength. However, the discourse remains asymmetrical. An equal exchange is not possible and would contradict the communicative logic of terrorism. The course and strength of the discourse are also dependent on various phases, which have already been discussed or will be discussed in the sections on “Terrorism as a Media Event” (see Sect. 4.3.4) and the “Arena and Theater Model” (see Sect. 5.5): The initial phase, which focuses on the event and spontaneous reactions, and the phase of “diversification of the interpretative repertoire beyond the actuality of the event” (Wessler, 1999, p.  228) are followed by phases in which the event is no longer the focus. Two empirical studies will be cited below as illustrative of the development of discourse after a terrorist attack. Weiß (2004) used discourse analysis to examine the levels of communication about the events of September 11 and distinguished between two levels: The first level is the government, or, as the case may be, the actions and communication of political decision makers. The second level is the public, represented by the media as well as by expert discourse.72 The core thesis of the study is: “Events do not speak in and of themselves, but must be interpreted” (Weiß, 2004, p. 6). This would contradict the thesis that many news values are already inherent in the terrorist event by virtue of its nature, instead lending support to the final model of the subsequent attribution of properties. Criticism of Weiß’ thesis can also be made to the effect that, especially in the case of the terrorist act, the event is inextricably linked to the message, it is in essence the message itself, and a certain interpretation is already predetermined via the symbolism of the act. Many results and developments of the discourses surrounding September 11, which Weiß describes in his evaluation, are similar on the level of political discourse as well as on the level of media discourse. The – only slightly delayed – thematic and opinion-related parallelism indicates that the media were strongly oriented towards political discourse during this period and supports the agenda-­ building model (see Sect. 4.7.3). Weiß divided his investigation into three phases: The first phase began immediately after the attack, the second phase ran from September 15 until the ­international  Individual opinions or, within the framework of a limited exchange, expert discussions prevail, but this is not of particular interest here, as individual opinions are not meant to be the focus. 72

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peacekeeping force was sent to Afghanistan in December 2001, and the third phase arose around Bush’s “axis of evil” speech in January 2002. The basis of the discourse analysis was the reporting of the New York Times in its series “A Nation Challenged.” In the first phase, politicians quickly portrayed Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden as responsible for the attack and cited links to the Taliban in Afghanistan. In that phase, Weiß found a high degree of personalization in connection with Osama bin Laden (see Weiß, 2004, p. 104). He notes as a negative that there was no examination of the background, that neither the context in which terrorism arose nor Islamic fundamentalism were addressed, and that there was no questioning of the intentions and goals of the attackers. In the early days, politicians soon made references to war events and drew comparisons with Pearl Harbor: “In this way, an event that was difficult to comprehend could be understood through another event of which there was a broad background knowledge. Only over time was the concept of war to become established in media discourse as well. This came about, among other things, because an incredible number of verbatim quotes from President Bush were included in the reporting” (Weiß, 2004, p. 105). Part of the discourse was also formed by opinion polls cited by the New York Times in order to present the views of the public, including that, for example, the populace supported the government’s request for military action (see Weiß, 2004, p. 106). Also, with regard to the public’s assumption that the U.S. had carried out an attack on Kabul, as seen in the evening television pictures, the media played the role of discourse mediator and questioned the government, which denied the attack and presented its position. The media thus took what was said from both sides and reproduced it in quotes. Weiß also found little contextualization and explanation in the second phase. Above all, the “wrong” behavior of Saudi Arabia is emphasized, the problem of the stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia is not emphasized, and likewise “the role of the U.S. in supporting the holy warriors against the Soviets played only a subordinate role in the reporting of the New York Times” (Weiß, 2004, p. 108). The attacks on Afghanistan were covered by the New York Times, but not criticized. There was no deeper root cause analysis of the phenomenon of terrorism. The reporting thus largely corresponded to statements by the political decision-makers (see Weiß, 2004, p. 108); there was a high degree of convergence not only of agendas but also of levels of discourse. In the third phase, the political discourse, like the media discourse, was less concerned with the question of responsibility for the attacks than with appropriate measures for “resistance.” Bush’s talk of the “axis of evil” was for the most part simply reproduced. Weiß’s study demonstrates how the levels of discourse are similar, how the media rhetoric adopts the political rhetoric,

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how little the insurgents are heard. He also shows how dynamic a discourse can be, and how certain events bring about twists and turns. The overarching discourse is composed of a mosaic of small-scale discourses on a specific topic (issue), problem, anchor point, etc. In their study, Moshe and Lehman-Wilzig (2006) sought to find out how terrorist attacks – using the example of September 11, 2001 and the Al-Aqsa Intifada from September 30, 2000 – influenced the framing of patriotic discourse in Jewish-Israeli media. To this end, they surveyed the discourse unit “patriot” in multiple forms; “the discourse unit is defined as a word string (a phrase, a sentence, a group of sentences, containing the term ‘patriot’ in all its inflections) that appears in a newspaper article and epitomizes the journalist’s attitude, whether critical or supportive, to patriotic behavior” (Moshe & Lehman-Wilzig, 2006, p. 185). In both cases, all sections of the daily newspapers Ha’aretz (elite newspaper) and Ma’ariv (tabloid newspaper) were examined both a year before the attack and a full year after. “The most outstanding and unequivocal finding in quantitative terms is that patriotic discourse is more prominent in the popular press (1051 articles), and far less in the elitist press (a mere 190 articles)” (Moshe & Lehman-Wilzig, 2006, p.  186). This discourse is particularly strong and frequent during periods of anti-Israeli and anti-American terrorism (Moshe & Lehman-Wilzig, 2006, p.  186). The discourse is primarily framed in a genuinely “patriotic” way, but also occasionally in a meta-level critical engagement with the phenomenon of “patriotism/nationalism/ethnocentrism.” The explanations already show an approximation to macro-theories of public sphere (formation) (see Sect. 5.5). In the struggle for sovereignty over space and interpretation, ideas of hegemony take hold and are reflected in discourses and also metaphors. Terrorism is first constructed through and in discourse. Metaphors in particular play a key role in this construction (see Hülsse & Spencer, 2008, pp. 571 and 578; Spencer, 2010). The linguistic side of media texts, especially metaphorical concepts, is also addressed by Kirchhoff (2010). She sees the function of metaphors in public discourses in the “de-/legitimization of wars” (Kirchhoff, 2010, p. 16). Metaphors function as evaluation, argumentation substitutes, provide options for action on a linguistic level and structure thinking “by making it possible to understand one object in terms of another. They thus form a bridge between discursive practice in texts and the social processes that produce these texts” (Kirchhoff, 2010, p.  16). Kirchhoff focused on metaphors in the categories of event, actor and place in cover stories of the German news magazines Spiegel and Focus. In her discourse analysis, she considered periods before and during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (2001–2003). One of the results is that metaphors help construct identity, that is, a demarcation of the own from the foreign (see Kirchhoff, 2010, pp.  276–278). In this way, the individual creates his or her own space.

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Pörksen (1999, p.  67) also deals with “metaphor as a persuasive vocabulary.” Metaphor enables the communicator to accentuate (identity) features or to conceal them, which is used in a targeted way especially in political communication. Labeling the other as a “terrorist” amounts to a symbolic negation of the other (Altheide, 2006, p. 982). “Factually, the only universally recognized characteristic of the term ‘terrorism’ is that it is negative. Terrorism is what the bad guys do” (Richardson, 2007, p. 27). These attributions can be crucial in a group’s discursive struggle against the state. If a newspaper writes of “terrorists,” the group is seen as socially delegitimized. If the public can be convinced of the appropriateness of state counterterrorism measures, this helps to transfer resources from other civil state functions to spending on security. But if sufficient segments of the public can be convinced that the state’s perspective on a “war against terrorism” is contestable, public support may decline. “Language matters, and how the media use language matters” (Schlesinger et  al., 1983, p.  1). The narrative image determines possible follow-up actions. Research can examine this image not only through the discourse analysis approach, but also through the myth concept. (b) Myths Nossek and Berkowitz (2006) examined the coverage of two terrorist attacks in Israel in U.S. and Israeli newspapers, Ha’aretz and Yedioth Ahronoth as well as the New  York Times and USA Today. They based their analysis on the concept of “myths” that journalists use as part of and as narrators of a particular culture: “journalists construct stories based on narrative conventions that are culturally resonant for themselves and their audiences. […] These cultural narratives are also known by the term myth” (Nossek & Berkowitz, 2006, pp.  692–693). These myths are conceptions of society, its institutions and values; they have culturally determined recognizable narrative structures and therefore belong to the overarching concept of narratives that ultimately constitute discourses. Terrorists, like those in power, fight to enforce their own messages, but they use violent communication in its most extreme form to do so. Often both sides show little willingness to compromise, and the (identity) narratives intensify. Depending on whether an act of terrorism takes place on culturally proximate or distant territory, journalists use different narratives to present a story. “When news about terrorism is culturally proximate, the professional narrative tends to lead, since journalistic work can proceed in a more predictable fashion. When terrorism is culturally remote, however, cultural narratives must be relied on more heavily to assist journalists’ sense-making” (Nossek & Berkowitz, 2006, p. 693). The greater the cultural distance, the more the journalist relies on symbols and myths in reporting to facilitate the reader’s reception in familiar narrative schemes. For example,

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as Nossek and Berkowitz found, the Dizengoff assassination in Tel Aviv on March 5, 1996, was reported in American newspapers in the style of a Wild West myth, with Israeli troops rushing to the aid of pioneers fighting savages. As a “hero,” they brought in President Bill Clinton, who reaffirmed to Israel the United States’ commitment to always stand behind its friends in good times and bad (see Nossek & Berkowitz, 2006, p. 697). As a modern hero, Clinton sent Israel the latest bomb detection equipment as well as technology experts. “Reporting followed a cultural narrative more than a professional one, as it shifted from the facticity of chronicle and toward the colorful approach of story” (Nossek & Berkowitz, 2006, p. 698). In Israeli newspapers, on the other hand, the assassination was reported more like a chronicle from a historical perspective that focused on the emergence of the state of Israel and Zionism and created a link to the Holocaust. In the case of the second event studied by Nossek and Berkowitz, the 2002 Mount Scopus Campus Cafeteria bombing at Hebrew University that killed five American students and injured others, American journalists also did not push mythmaking as far, but rather approached it through a chronological-historical approach. The explanation for this is that culturally more distant events appear more abstract and thus require greater use of myth to meet the journalistic task of conveying meaning and reducing complexity (see Nossek & Berkowitz, 2006, p. 703). Nossek assumes that reporting conveys the cultural characteristics of a society. Myths are part of the form of reports and discourses within a particular culture as a communication component, as they reproduce dominant values in their stories that are recognized by the target society (see Nossek, 1994, p.  120). Recurring cultural myths can be found repeatedly in new stories and event reports. They function as a schema, so to speak, as a cultural lens that repeats and creates national and cultural identity; in Israeli society, for example, the Holocaust and the emergence of the state of Israel – narratives that are frequently used in reporting (see Nossek, 1994, p. 119). They are used as points of comparison and distinction in the reporting of terror events in order to provide a frame of reference for classifying what has happened (see Nossek, 1994, p. 129). In an earlier study, Nossek examined the coverage of various terrorist attacks in the period between 1968 and 1978 in six Israeli daily newspapers, which collectively reflected a wide political spectrum. In all of the events, the newspapers explicitly used the Holocaust as a metaphor to describe what had happened (see Nossek, 1994, p. 124). Nossek arranged the statements according to reporter, commentator, survivor, and political leader. The commentators, for example, compared the attackers to Nazis in connection with coverage of the massacre at Lod Airport (see Nossek, 1994, p. 125). In contrast, the Israeli soldiers were referred to as “angels” or “messengers of God” and appeared as saviors and avengers, for example

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in hostage rescues (see Nossek, 1994, pp. 126–127). The Pope and the French government, among others, appeared as accomplices through their passivity in the hijacking of an Air France plane to Entebbe. In the articles on the attack during the Olympic Games in Munich, the city was explicitly named as the cradle of the Holocaust; Dachau and a poem by a Holocaust survivor also appeared in the coverage. The respective event was thus always embedded in the framework of a certain narrative. Terrorist attacks appropriate the “collective stores of images and reservoirs of cultural motifs and collective phantasms” (Liebl, 2006, p.  174), i.e. myths, in a society, for example the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center and perhaps also blockbusters such as “Independence Day.” “Such inventories have a natural dual function in that they can serve precisely not only as blueprints for attacks or threats, but also as collective interpretive frameworks and amplifiers of experience” (Liebl, 2006, p. 174). Political as well as terrorist actors, supported by such cultural stores of interpretation or myths, attempt in discourses and performative acts “to assert hegemonic patterns of interpretation and to legitimize their own actions. Media fulfill an important function in this process because they both produce publicity and are themselves involved as actors in the construction of meanings” (Kirchhoff, 2010, p. 287). They make attributions of responsibility – either themselves or by reproducing quotes. These attributions are more successful the more they appeal to cultural myths. Archetti (2013, p. 144) emphasizes that narratives are socially constructed and help to shape identities – by those who construct the narratives and by those who appropriate them. This direction is further differentiated in constructivism (see Sect. 5.2). In summary, narratives can be regarded as a concept of the social sciences. With their help, actors explain certain processes in the social world. Many analyses of terror rhetoric, according to Ayotte et al. (2008, p. 461), explore “mediated terrorism” as an example of a particular rhetorical-theoretical concept (e.g., narratives) or as part of a larger rhetorical “genre” (e.g., “social movement rhetoric”).73 Language, as a social practice, is socially constructed. So-called “reality” is (also) constructed through language, knowledge is generated and transformed through it. Narratives exist through continuously unfolding collective reconstruction, retelling and transmission processes (see Archetti, 2013, pp. 125–126). “The reason why the narrative keeps on existing is that it is constantly retold and re-evoked by wider audiences. […] Al Qaeda’s narrative might be contained in a journalistic report about the Al Qaeda leadership’s latest message, in a critique of the terrorist  See also the theories of identity formation of terrorist groups arising from social movements under Sect. 4.1. 73

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o­ rganization, or in an academic study about it” (Archetti, 2013, p. 141). Not only the media in the content of their products, but also nations make use of different narratives and myths to position their country in a certain light. Especially in the field of international relations and “public diplomacy,” i.e., persuasion and influencing attitudes beyond nation-state borders, the shaping of strategic narratives is crucial (see Archetti, 2013, p. 126; Ellis, 2019, p. 81). With the help of narratives, for example, friend/foe demarcations can be made, political decisions can be embedded in a historical narrative, or even justified with it. Both terrorist group formation processes and counter-terrorism measures often adopt narratives in order to persuade people. From the terrorist side, an insurgent narrative is used that challenges the everyday narrative of the political leadership and general public. It is often grounded in a group’s cultural and/or ethnic history, in its myths. Archetti (2013, p. 141) equates myth and narrative. She even includes the branding concept: “These parallels between narratives and brands exist because, ultimately, brands are narratives” (Archetti, 2013, p. 149). However, they are not as complex. Phillips (2017, p. 737) takes a similar view for the Islamic State: “IS’s state-building is intimately tied to the group’s ability to fashion a brand that can mobilize networks.” Mobilization, Phillips argues, does not occur primarily through religious incentives, but through “motivational drivers” such as the desire for clear identity, status, adventure, and retribution. Countermeasures must also take this into account. These should in no case apply the “clash of civilizations” master narrative, which promotes the exclusion of Muslims, for example, which merely adopts the IS master narrative in mirrored form (see Phillips, 2017, p. 741). The branding concept can be used effectively for anti-terrorist measures by communicating a consistent “democratic brand” that emphasizes values (see Archetti, 2013, p.  168). Myths therefore not only constitute past and present cultural interpretations, but also influence future imaginative spaces. (c) Framing The framing concept is based on the “basic idea that topics can be presented and defined differently by selecting and emphasizing certain aspects of reality that guide thought” (Peter, 2002, p. 21). Frames, as already shown above with the quote from Entman (2007, p. 164), like narratives and myths, are considered as interpretive schemata, as a classification framework. “The framing approach postulates that the way certain aspects are presented or emphasized in media coverage influences the judgment of recipients” (Maurer, 2010, 24). A frame analysis examines precisely this value template. “In essence, frame analysis examines the selection and salience of certain aspects of an issue by exploring images, stereotypes, metaphors, actors, and messages” (Matthes, 2009, p. 349).

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Stern (2003) examined the coverage in German and (South) Korean national daily newspapers74 one day after the attacks of September 11, 2001, until the beginning of the attacks on Afghanistan on October 8, 2001, primarily in terms of agenda setting and framing. Regarding previous studies, he notes, “A key observation of the case studies is that American media before and during the Gulf War tended to follow the stance of their own administration in their framing of options for action in the conflict” (Stern, 2003, p.  13). Stern collected frames only from opinion pieces. Regarding the causes and background for the attacks, there were two contrasting frames found in the newspapers: In one frame, the U.S. was seen as not responsible for the attacks and the perpetrators were seen as purely evil; in the other frame, the U.S. was seen as complicit because its actions had provoked the attacks (see Stern, 2003, p.  138). With regard to the U.S. military response, the analysis of the media framing revealed: “Both Korean newspapers rejected military operations. In both German newspapers, statements could be found that did not categorically reject military actions or that affirmed them. […] The shock caused by a perceived proximity to the threat was a very strong factor influencing the attitude towards the attacks” (Stern, 2003, p. 161). In Germany, the limited distance from the events suppressed opposition to military action. After all, these “actions” provided the highly concerned population with a certain feeling of security. Moeller (2009) sees, especially for the U.S., the Cold War frame replaced by a new one, the War on Terror frame, to which statements by government officials have contributed to a great extent. Within terrorism coverage, Moeller (2009, pp.  94–106) identifies several frame options that would often be applied in American media to simplify, prioritize, and structure: the “we are at the mercy of an uncontrollable cycle of violence” frame, the “such and such nation or ethnic group is to blame and is our enemy” frame, or, for example, the “save those who are innocent and suffering” frame. Overall, “frames simplify, prioritize, and structure news events and issues” (Moeller, 2009, p. 94). In this context, the choice of quotes (and those quoted) plays a weighty role. For example, Weller (2002) suggests that the events of September 11, 2001 did not gain their significance from themselves, but from the political interpretations and reactions that followed.75 “These interpretations are politically consequential because they shape the public’s understanding and political evaluation of the events. […] In the live coverage on German television, the interpretive pattern ‘war’ increasingly prevailed on  Stern chose one conservative and one left-leaning newspaper each, namely Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Chosun Ilbo, and Frankfurter Rundschau and Hankyoreh Shinmun. 75  Weller (2002) used a constructivist perspective to examine the linguistic level of television coverage on September 11, 2001, by German television channels ARD, ZDF, and RTL. 74

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9/11/2001, which was taken up in the evening by Chancellor Schröder in his statement to the press, thus reaffirming and reinforcing it (‘declaration of war against the entire civilized world’)” (Weller, 2002, p. 3). However, the interpretation was driven in a certain direction by the symbolism already inherent in the communication. Similarly, Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira (2008) examined the framing of terrorism in the Washington Post, New York Times, London Financial Times and Guardian using qualitative as well as software-based quantitative Centering Resonance Analysis (CRA, using the analysis software “Crawdad”). The U.S. newspapers clearly showed a “military frame” (see Papacharissi & de Fatima Oliveira, 2008, p.  68): events were framed in terms of overall military strategy, commentaries observed progress in military policy decisions, and the selected sources also aligned with this direction. In contrast, British newspapers offered a more diplomatic, international view of events (see Papacharissi & de Fatima Oliveira, 2008, p. 69). The authors wondered whether the coverage might be promoting or seeking to promote a policy solution in the respective sense, or whether the political guidelines and circumstances determined the framing of the coverage (see Papacharissi & de Fatima Oliveira, 2008, pp. 70–71). As in the case of agenda setting, the directions and strengths of influence are not unambiguous and can vary as well as promote, oppose or cancel each other out. In a qualitative-quantitative content analysis, Gerhards et al. (2011) compared the terrorism coverage of the television channels ARD, RTL, BBC One, CNN and Al Jazeera (Arabic version) with regard to different theoretical assumptions justified by country specifics, regionalization, forms of financing and global standardization. Particular emphasis was placed on capturing the portrayal of emotions. The attacks in Madrid (March 11, 2004), London (July 7, 2005), Sharm El-Sheikh (July 23, 2005) and Amman (November 9, 2005) served as events. The main finding can be considered to be that no major differences can be found between the broadcasters in terms of the presentation of content and emotions. However, there are differences in terms of the strength with which the terrorist acts are condemned. Although the media reflect the opinion of the main political actors and conform to the global “elite consensus” of officially classifying terrorist attacks as illegitimate (see Gerhards et al., 2011, p. 226), the pan-Arab broadcaster Al Jazeera inserts “differentiations and relativizations into its reporting. […] Thus, the channel gives more space to the perspective of the perpetrators and the presentation of their political goals. While CNN portrays the perpetrators in a rather woodcut-like manner and partly demonizes them, Al Jazeera sometimes gives them an individual face, for example by illuminating their family backgrounds. Moreover, Al Jazeera addresses the illegitimacy of the foreign policy of the U.S. and its allies more strongly than

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other broadcasters” (Gerhards et al., 2011, pp. 229–230). Such findings show how framing strongly approaches constructivism; the concept, they argue, allows us to understand that media did not replicate events but constructed them according to their respective understandings (see Robinson, 2001, pp. 531–532). The construction takes place among journalistic actors as well as recipients and other (political) actors, as Alonso (2016, p. 521) shows with reference to the close intertwining of the frames (according to Entman) of the IRA and Sinn Féin: “This framing has aimed at defining the PIRA’s terrorist campaign as part of a violent conflict in which IRA violence was seen as a necessary recourse in order to defend the nationalist community.” In turn, Republicans portrayed IRA terrorism as a response to state violence and unionist terror groups as morally justified. As a solution, or “treatment recommendation,” Sinn Féin and PIRA enter into a peace process with state institutions as “peacemakers” and are rehabilitated as political and social actors through the narrative they set (see Alonso, 2016, p. 521). Since the mid-1980s, expressions such as “freedom,” “justice” and “peace” have appeared more and more frequently in Sinn Féin documents (see Alonso, 2016, p. 522). Scheufele (2003, p. 46) develops a common core from various framing definitions: “Frames can be understood as patterns of interpretation that help to classify new information in a meaningful way and to process it efficiently. Framing is the process of emphasizing certain aspects, i.e., making them salient, while others fade into the background.” In this way one arrives at certain classifications. Scheufele calls criteria of journalistic selection and structuring, i.e. working routines before publication and thus before the public is informed, “journalistic frames” and distinguishes them from “media frames,” which make up the structures of reporting that can then be consumed by the public (see Scheufele, 2003, p. 59; see Sect. 4.12.4). The framing approach thus refers both to the process of communicator-centered news production and to the media impact on the recipient. This was taken into account in the structuring of the process diagram (Fig. 3.6) and by dividing the concept into two arenas of action (see here and Sect. 4.12.4). As already indicated above, framing can be considered a kind of second stage after agenda setting, whereby the agenda-setting hypothesis does not suggest that media determine “what the audience thinks about certain topics, but rather what topics they think about in the first place” (Dahinden, 2006, p. 84). Both approaches have to do with the construction of a media reality: “Both agenda-setting and framing assume that the media do not faithfully represent extra-media reality in the sense of objectivism, but they construct a new media reality through the selection of topics (agenda-setting) and the structured presentation (framing)” (Dahinden, 2006, p. 85). Framing analyses create an awareness of the influence of terminology and aspect selection. Morin (2016, p. 999), for example, refers to the demarcation

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of the perpetrator of the violence as a framing strategy, which can often already be found in the headline, for example, when it is mentioned that the perpetrator belongs to a different religion or ethnicity than the one that is predominant in the target society, or when he or she is presented as mentally ill: “Othering the perpetrator is a common rhetorical convention used in both crime and terror frames.” Dahinden76 (2006), who follows Entman’s (1993, p. 52) frame definition, sees two central functions of frames, “namely, on the one hand, the selection of perceived aspects of reality and, on the other hand, the structuring of communication texts about this reality. Frames are characterized by the following four defining elements: First, they offer a problem definition, which is connected with a causal interpretation. Furthermore, a moral evaluation of the problem is given, which can be based on moral or other values and is also linked to a treatment recommendation to solve these problems” (Dahinden, 2006, p. 14). Some events entail reports on issues that in themselves did not necessarily achieve newsworthiness at all, but by being related to the (newsworthiness-bearing) issue appear worthy of selection. “Such key events establish a frame that shapes subsequent coverage” (Scheufele, 2003, p. 51). Preliminary coverage of an event can also fuel the expectations and even actions of certain actors, for example, prompting a larger police presence because media assume violent confrontations or fearmongering. The frame forms the micro level, so to speak, and the specific topic forms the macro level of an article. Both together form the discursive structure of a text. In the case of journalistic frames, stable, unstable, modified, or linked frames emerge as a result of (changing) routines, orientation to colleagues, or non-media imprints. “According to the framing model, journalists prefer information that meshes with their frames or schemas: the more attributes of an attack fit into the slots of the journalistic attack schema, the more likely the journalist will report on the attack” (Scheufele, 2003, p. 102). Thus, insofar as the attacks fit into the journalist’s pre-formed cognitive and attitudinal edifice, they will be reported on (in a way determined, or at least influenced, by them). The journalist’s socialization can

 Dahinden (2006, pp. 18–19) sees framing on its way to becoming an integrative middle-­ range theory that has left the stage of a descriptive concept. Framing and priming can be classified under legitimist empiricism, which examines reality relations in the context of journalistic actors. “Schemas” are defined by Dahinden (2006, p. 35) as a sub-concept of “frames” because they “represent a specific variant of frames, namely frames that can be localized within cognitive structures of individuals (including PR practitioners, journalists, recipients).” 76

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influence his or her viewpoint,77 for example, certain role models the journalist has adopted, in the newsroom or in the country, codes of conduct that apply in his or her culture, or even political and professional attitudes that potentially have an impact at the micro level. In relation to the role of frames and narratives in terrorism, Archetti (2013, p. 125) claims that a better understanding of the social construction of narratives can help decide which content and communication channels to utilize in the “battle of ideas” and the fight against violent extremists. This idea is echoed in the interim summary (see Sect. 4.11.2) and in the implications. Social construction in this context also depends crucially on the rhetoric of the four groups of actors, which will be examined in more detail in the following section.

4.9 Theories of Rhetoric

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

Palmerton (1988, p. 107) assumes “that terrorism is a rhetorical phenomenon, that is, it is a communication strategy attempting to serve distinctly persuasive functions.” In any respect, rhetoric plays an eminent role in relation to terrorism, as do

 Hafez (2002, p. 78) identifies three central factors that characterize the professional socialization of journalists: The individual news value routine, which is determined both by learning processes within the media organization (i.e., at the meso level), by exchange relationships between the organization and society (macro level), and by individual interpretations (micro level); the adaptation of journalistic role models, i.e., the journalistic and other maxims of action that journalists set for themselves explicitly or implicitly; the adaptation of professional codes of conduct, i.e. professional and explicitly or even legally anchored professional norms, which are designed to curtail the influence of “political as well as professional socialization influences by means of a (nevertheless individually interpretable) media ethic” (Hafez, 2002, p. 78). 77

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all semiotic-persuasive approaches. Section 2.1.5 already highlighted the importance of labeling. However, it is not only the individual choice of words, but also complex rhetoric struggles that have an effect on the recipients. They are closely related to the discourses and narratives discussed above. The diagram above shows that rhetorical strategies emanate primarily from the side of terrorists and politicians. However, since rhetoric is mediated through the media, this point in the process flow, i.e., media content, is the right place to address theories of rhetoric78 in relation to terrorist events and related coverage. Although the effect only takes place on the recipient side, the application already happens here. As already mentioned in Sect. 2.2, the speech act theory is suitable to theoretically classify statements of terrorists and politicians as well as to capture the terrorist act itself. According to Searle (1971, p. 40), there are three types of speech acts in which communication occurs: (a) Utterances of words (morphemes, sentences) = consummation of acts of utterance; (b) Reference and predication = consummation of propositional acts; (c) Asserting, questioning, commanding, promising, etc. = performing illocutionary acts.

Several of these acts can also be performed at once, for example a propositional act with an illocutionary act. Austin (1962) distinguishes one more act: the perlocutionary act; this is also recognized by Searle (1971, p. 42). This act means utterances with intended effects: “Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention or purpose of producing them” (Austin, 1962, p. 61. Whether the effect actually occurs is another matter. All that matters about the perlocutionary act is the intention. And thus it is suitable as a framework for classifying persuasive statements by both terrorists and politicians. Usually, the perlocutionary act is not present in its pure form, but is combined with propositional or illocutionary acts, for example in subliminally persuasive questions (“Whose side are you on?”). At this point, it is possible to go one step further: Although speech act theory was originally devised for interpersonal communication, since direct speech involves special meaning transfers, the theory can just as easily be applied to mediated communication. Here, punctuation marks such as question marks and exclamation  Since rhetorical analysis is not the main focus of the discipline of communication studies, it will not be discussed in full detail here. The anthology by O’Hair et al. (2008) is recommended for further reading. 78

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points help in interpretation, as do intonation and timbre in the audiovisual field. Furthermore, the term “act” can refer not only to language but also to an action. The act of terror can therefore also be considered a “perlocutionary act.” In it, the act becomes communication, language and message. It is an utterance with a clearly intended effect. Even more: it is performed solely for this purpose and is therefore highly rhetorical; “terrorism is a rhetorical act targeted to supporting and opposing audiences. It speaks rhetorically, is framed rhetorically, and is responded to rhetorically” (Heath & O’Hair, 2008, p. 18). Both parties – terrorists and politicians alike – use rhetoric to gain supporters and compete for public opinion. Those who are skilled in rhetoric increase their chances of successfully fighting a battle. Politicians are precluded from likewise resorting to an act of terror as a rhetoric of extremes. However, they are free to use aggressive speech rhetoric alongside military options. The following will now focus first on a) the rhetoric of the terrorists, then b) the rhetoric of the politicians, and finally c) the media’s reception, editing and public transmission of the rhetoric battle, whereby they also make predications themselves, as Spencer (2010) demonstrates with an analysis of newspapers Bild and The Sun. Here the following metaphorical attributions were made: “Terrorism is war/is crime/is natural/is disease.” (a) Rhetoric of the Terrorists Tuman (2003, pp. xiv–xv) sees terrorism as a communication process with rhetorical dimensions, since our perception of the phenomenon of “terrorism” is based on the statements made about it by the various stakeholders.79 In this context, Tuman (2003, p. 28) understands rhetoric as “communication as persuasion,” which can be conveyed through signs, symbols and narratives. The encoding of the terrorists’ message takes place in the sign systems of violence, not language (see Tuman, 2003, p. 18). The terrorist attack becomes a symbolic act, a symbolic communication (see Sect. 4.3.1). Communication is thereby conceived as the transmission of meaning; the bearer of meaning is the terrorist act. In it, the message is encoded, i.e. translated into a language or code that is adapted to the channel and intended for a specific recipient (see McQuail & Windahl, 1993, p. 5). The terrorists encode their message in the act of terror, and here there is no two-stage process, rather the act is already message and channel in one. Decoding by the populace suggests that the message has been understood: We (the terrorists) are stronger than you. You must be afraid of us. Decoding within the target groups then usually takes place in  As will be shown in the section on “Terrorism and Constructivism” (see Sect. 5.2), media help to construct the public perception of an issue. Variables influencing perception can also be, for example, age, life experience, culture, education, religion, etc. 79

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follow-up discourses. Thus, there is feedback, the process is bidirectional and transactional, as the “response” of the target groups reaches the terrorists either directly (for example, through government decisions on security measures) or indirectly through the mass media. According to Leeman (1991, p.  46), violence is commonly considered unethical, violating norms; therefore, terrorists’ violence becomes a message to the system: “In McLuhanesque fashion, the medium of violence becomes the message, suggesting by its very nature that the established order is illegitimate.” Terrorist attacks are classified by the recipients as violations of the norm, thus “correctly” decoded. In this sense, the violence of the terrorists is not to be seen as the beginning of a discourse (see Sect. 4.8.3), but as a response to an already implicit statement of the system under attack (“What do we see as outside the legitimate?”). Accordingly, the rhetoric of the terrorists is a bipolar,80 exhortatory discourse (see Leeman, 1991, p. 46): the terrorists divide into “inhumane system versus legitimate use of force in response to it”; the terrorist rhetoric is then devoted to the task of finding as many supporters as possible against the system. Due to their situation and the goal they pursue, terrorists take certain rhetorical paths; the act of violence demands justification, so the action in turn entails a discourse. Terrorists thus show that they are serious and want to be perceived as credible (see Dowling, 1986, p. 18). This desire can already be seen in their own naming (see Sects. 2.1.5 and 4.6.2): the IRA, for example, calls itself an “Army” in order to uphold a certain legitimacy. Terrorists often use language to conceal certain facts, such as violations of ethical norms, and to emphasize and enhance others. Often, certain terms also compete with each other; for example, there was a difference between calling the RAF the “Baader-Meinhof Group” and the “Baader-­ Meinhof Gang.” Or in the case of the “Bloody Sunday” event, the very mention of the name of the place made clear the British (Londonderry) or indeed the Irish perspective (Derry). The rhetoric is thus found in both violent and non-violent communication. The internet offers terrorists the opportunity to classify their acts of violence and motives themselves and to use rhetorical strategies (see Sect. 4.2.3). In most cases, the texts contain many manipulative elements such as black-and-white depictions, demonization of the enemy, simplification, repetition of arguments and justifications (see Corman et al., 2008; Rothenberger & Kotarac, 2015; An et al., 2018; Rothenberger et al., 2018). The recipients of terrorists’ online communications do not correspond to the broad populace (citizenry), nor do they resemble the user group of traditional media. Civil society is reduced there to the net user

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 Bipolar in the sense that a classification is only possible according to “good versus evil.”

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­community (netizenry),81 which, however, is steadily increasing because the internet increasingly represents the real citizenry. Politicians are also increasingly using this communication channel. (b) Rhetoric of Politicians The government’s first and most important rhetorical “weapon” is certainly to label the perpetrators of the attack as “terrorists.” Picard (1990, p. 223) calls the term “terrorism” a “semantic weapon for those with access to media.” The word “terrorism” is value-laden and always implies an attribution of guilt (see Sect. 4.5). Expressions such as “revolutionary,” “freedom fighter” or even “terrorist” are characterized by a strong relativism; “terrorism” always implies a demonstration of violence. Terrorists, as just described, often opt for euphemisms such as “revolutionary,” “hero,” etc., in order to push that which is negatively violent into the background. “What is a terrorist for some is a freedom fighter for others” (Roell, 2008, p. 63),82 depending on which point of view one takes. Leeman (1991, p. 19) believes that terrorism, like counterterrorism measures, is crucially rhetorical in its demands, declarations and designations of its own side as well as the other side. They align their rhetoric with the ductus of the opponent, so that each party acts as one half in a rhetorically interrelated discourse that is actually addressed to public society (see Leeman, 1991, p. 19). The two parties are not trying to convince each other, but the courted third party is the public. The main goal of politicians, for example, is not to make terrorists repent and turn back, but to choose their own actions and words in such a way that they will be viewed positively by the public. Depending on the strategy, counterterrorism representatives should use rhetoric that mirrors the statements of the opposition or choose non-­ reflective responses: “Specifically, the respondent will need to decide to what degree the opposition’s rhetoric should be reflected, and which features of it should be mirrored. Those decisions may together constitute a strategy which, broadly, may be termed reflective or non-reflective” (Leeman, 1991, p.  42). Palmerton (1988, p. 106), examining the holding of Americans hostage in Iran from 1979 to 1980, also concludes “that the rhetoric of terrorism is created in large part by those responding to terrorist acts.” Reflective rhetoric should be chosen when consent is to be signaled or when specific points of difference are to be pointed out.  For the expressions, see Corman et al. (2008, p. 20).  Daase (2001, p. 703) attributes the statement that one man’s terrorists are another man’s freedom fighters to former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who used it to justify U.S. support for Nicaraguan Contra rebels. Other platitudes include the phrase attributed to Margaret Thatcher: media are the oxygen of terrorists. 81 82

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­ on-­reflective rhetoric, on the other hand, is appropriate when the speaker wishes N to convey general disagreement or take the debate to another level or topic. Consequently, the non-reflective strategy, which shows greater independence, is more suitable for government statements. In contrast, the frequently cited “War on Terror” rhetorically only reflected “Jihad” (“Holy War”). Reflective rhetoric can also be found, for example, in responses to claims of responsibility (see Sect. 4.4), in which the terrorists portray the current system as inhumane and dangerous and call for a fight against it. A government would then behave in a reflective way when its concrete response in turn portrays the terrorists as inhumane and dangerous and calls for a fight against them. Both elitism in the sense of “We are on the side of truth, we stand out from the others, only we act legitimately” and populism à la “We are one people, the others are the opponents” would be propagated here (see Leeman, 1991, pp. 81–84). A factual, neutral engagement with the demands of the terrorists would thus be excluded – also for the public – since both opponents would equally paint a bipolar picture of the conflict. Non-reflective rhetoric, on the other hand, would not begin by establishing that one’s cause is legitimate, but would ask what legitimacy actually is and how it can be discerned. By taking this approach, which precisely does not mirror the good-­ evil binary of terrorists, the government stance could be strengthened in the public sphere and discourse could be brought to another level – one that is no longer rhetorically equal (see Leeman, 1991, p. 115). This would include classifying terrorists not as warriors for an idea (which they propagate as heroic), but as criminals (see also below). Corman et al. (2008) also examine the strategic communication and deliberate use of rhetoric by the “other side,” in this case primarily the U.S. government in its fight against terrorism by Islamic fundamentalists, and they reveal gross rhetorical errors. However, the authors also make suggestions for improvement as to which rhetorical strategies could be applicable and possibly goal-oriented, i.e., could reduce conflict and win the other side over to their own cause. So far, they argue, the government has followed the wrong model of strategic communication, namely one that is used for its own citizens. In this case, however, this is “an outmoded and inappropriate model of communication that is poorly adapted to the task of persuading audiences already hostile to the messenger and disenchanted with the

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­message” (Corman et al., 2008, p. 5).83 The strategic communication of an attacked government must think much more from the point of view of those who are (potential) supporters of the insurgents. It must already “anticipate” the interpretation of its statements in this target group in order to foresee a possible rejection or misinterpretation of its message. Certainly, sophisticated rhetoric by speechwriters in politics stands in the way of a conflict-mitigating course. For an “us versus them” polarization can be delivered in a particularly fulminant and voter-appealing manner. Hardly any politician would prefer a toned-down, conflict-reducing rhetoric here. Hess and Justus (2008, p. 129) advocate replacing the rhetoric of war with a “new vocabulary of international crime.” Among the advantages they cite: “the labeling of terrorist organizations as ‘criminal’ decreases the perceived legitimacy of their acts by potential recruits” (Hess & Justus, 2008, p. 129). Furthermore, international crimes are a global phenomenon, not a war of one state against another (in the case studied by the authors, the United States against Afghanistan), and a global phenomenon requires a global, or at least international, solution. Moreover, compared to “jihadism” or “Islamist terrorism,” the religious connotation is avoided. Koren (1996, p. 213) also speaks of “demystifying” terrorists by selecting appropriate vocabulary: “L’antidote le plus énergique du terrorisme ‘publicitaire’ et de ses justifications théoriques, ce sont toutefois les dénominations qui veillent à le démasquer, à le réduire à un crime de droit commun alors qu’il voudrait se faire passer pour un acte politique.” In a democracy, one does not kill for ideas, but one polemicizes to defend them; one fights by means of discourses and arguments. Presenting terrorists as criminals reflects a legally compliant approach without any consideration for political requests. Koren considers it inadmissible to describe the terrorist as a “combattant de la liberté” or as a “résistant,” i.e., as a freedom or resistance fighter, since this makes his act appear justified (see Koren, 1996, p. 235).  Corman et al. (2008, p. 5) cite the following example: “For example, President Bush and Secretary of State Rice simply declared freedom and democracy to be universally embraced values without a full understanding of how those terms are made meaningful by targeted audiences. Not only were they not ideal spokespersons (because they lack credibility with the intended audience), but the message itself was often fraught with strategery: soundbite statements that might play well in the U.S. but are interpreted in radically different ways among diverse global audiences. As a result, the messengers were discredited and the message was either discounted, distorted, and/or used as propaganda for the audiences we attempted to persuade. The unreflective use of potentially equivocal or even inflammatory terms – such as freedom and democracy – coupled with a simplistic public influence model of communication that foregrounds the sender’s message instead of the audience’s interpretations of those messages characterizes our largely unsuccessful strategic communication efforts since 9/11.” 83

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Here again the dilemma of attribution becomes apparent, and “criminal” is not actually the right term either, since the two phenomena differ in terms of their communication behavior; this was shown by the above-mentioned scientific-­definitional differentiation of criminality and terrorism (see Sect. 2.1.2). In the course of a counter-terrorism strategy, however, it is of course possible to consider whether it would not be a possibility for politicians and media representatives to intrude into the terrorists’ communication strategy by eliminating these differences. (c) Mediated Rhetoric Lockyer (2003) considers terrorism from a linguistic and semantic point of view and complains first of all about a lack of neutral words in the media. The choice of words (see Sect. 4.6.2) determines the frame in which the audience perceives the event. Of course, politicians or other spokespersons already present their statements in certain frames and narratives, and their quotes can only be presented, ignored, indirectly reproduced, but not rephrased by journalists. The language in which media report on terrorism often carries over into public discussion (see Lockyer, 2003, p. 1). As shown, the terminology and phraseology of terrorists and government officials are often at odds with one another. Depending on whose linguistic style and nomenclature the media adopt, the respective source can claim a small victory over the media and thus over parts of the public. Not only the event selection decisions mentioned above (see Sect. 4.7), but also the naming decisions have an effect. Nacos (2007) found, through keyword searches in the archives of various newspapers, television and radio stations, that the frequency of the terms “Muslims,” “Arabs” or “Islam” had increased almost tenfold in the Six months after the attacks of September 11, 2001 compared to the Six months before September 11 (see table in Nacos, 2007, p. 55). This indicates a huge increase in the number and length of reports on this topic area. Reports equating “terrorist” with “Muslim” were particularly questionable. Likewise, “war” was quickly referred to; “a terminological framework was established, which was far from self-evident but within which virtually all journalism after September 11 would come to operate. The vocabulary of armed conflict became imperative before the war had even started […]. Whether it came to headlines, editorials or news reporting, the word ‘war’ was now the guiding principle” (Rosenberg, 2002, p. 1). September 11 was seen as a “war event” that called for a counterattack. To a certain extent, U.S. politicians provided the media with the war-related formulations, as they “framed” the event in this light in their rhetoric. Thus, in a framing study, Entman also noted how much President Bush’s “framing” of the 9/11 attacks influenced the media and the public, and how much they adopted that frame. He attributes this to the Cascading Activation

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Model, which explains “how interpretive frames activate and spread from the top level of a stratified system (the White House) to the network of nonadministration elites, and on to news organizations, their texts, and the public” (Entman, 2003, p. 415). He also sees deviations from his model, for example when journalists oppose the dominant frame. Ultimately, however, they too can only act within certain limits. Basically, the media do not reflect this adoption of the rhetoric of politicians or of terrorists strongly enough. In this context, Koren (1996, p. 258) criticizes a mixing of condemning and legitimizing expressions in terrorism reporting, as this confuses the reader and ultimately only leads to a portrayal of the ideological struggle that does not help the reader (Koren, 1996, p. 258). If, on the other hand, journalists manage to detach themselves from the rhetorical spiral and place events and statements in context, the recipient can learn to intentionally process (and possibly also build an intentional immunity against) such rhetoric. The extent to which a “war of ideas” emerges on the basis of deliberately rhetoric- and narrative-guided reporting certainly also depends on the implicit and explicit rules and guidelines that apply in each case in terrorism reporting. They are often neglected as an influencing variable in content analyses; here, the meso level of the organization determines the decisions of the editor on a micro level.

4.10 Communication Rules in Terrorism Reporting

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

The conduct of politicians is strongly aligned with the media. Plasser and Lengauer (2010, p. 21) even speak of a fusion of the political and media systems. Both are strongly oriented toward the public, toward the reception of their content by the citizens. This chapter, as the process diagram makes clear, lies at the transition from media production (see Sect. 4.8) to interaction of media and government (see

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Sect. 4.10). It presents considerations, coming primarily from the field of political science, for restricting the flow of communication between the media and the public. The proposals for dealing with constraints contain a strong normative, media-­ ethical component: Norm specifications aim to influence communication actions. Requirements such as stating all sources, correcting mistakes, separating news and opinion, classifying events, saying that one does not know something, not making sweeping generalizations, being extremely careful with suspicions, etc., are to be observed. Roughly speaking, there are three views on what measures should be taken with regard to the media in the case of terrorism: (a) the “laissez-faire” attitude without any intervention, (b) censorship or state regulation of reporting, and (c) voluntary self-restraint and guidelines for the media. The following section presents representatives of the respective views and their justifications. (a) Laissez Faire According to the “laissez-faire” attitude, the media should be able to do whatever they want. In the sense of unrestricted liberalism, no influence whatsoever emanates from political institutions. However, scholars usually do not answer the question of the correctness and applicability of guidelines and censorship in terrorism reporting with a pure plea for unrestricted freedom of the press. Vollmer’s (2004, p. 1) basic claim, for example, is that “the challenge in reporting on terrorist acts is to maintain or strengthen the democratic responsibility of the media while providing the public with comprehensive information without providing terrorists with a global stage for hatred and violence and without creating a mood of hysteria. In this task lies an inextricable tension between the duty to inform and the duty not to spread terrorist ideas.” “Laissez faire” is accordingly only desired to a limited extent, since other standards and conditions for consideration apply with regard to the subject of terrorism, because the media find themselves in the ethically difficult position that both they and the terrorists are vying for the attention of a mass audience (see Viera, 1991, p. 74). Especially shortly after a terrorist attack, demands for absolute freedom of the press can be put aside in the course of security policy arguments. Only after some time has passed does one ask in retrospect: Was the reporting appropriate? Did the media allow themselves to be exploited? If the latter, calls for regulation will be heard. (b) State Regulation State intervention is often called for after reporting that crossed value and norm boundaries in the target society and possibly led to critical situations in a kidnapping situation or in the pursuit of the perpetrators. Cohen-Almagor (2005) lists

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some incidents in which he believes media acted irresponsibly and gave too much space to terrorists, for example the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth after the Dizengoff Center attack. This criticism of superficial reporting, perhaps dangerous to those kidnapped by terrorists, is directed primarily at television. As a counterexample, Cohen-Almagor cites the Schleyer kidnapping in 1977, where most media outlets ceased their coverage of the event and awaited instructions from the government. To use the ‘theater metaphor’ (see Sect. 5.5): The terrorists’ stage was briefly closed here, the curtain blocking the audience’s view. Bassiouni (1982, pp. 134–135)84 compiles the following possibilities for regulation: • Restrictions in advance: The government determines a sort of censorship of any media content about terrorism. Failure to comply could possibly result in a fine or even imprisonment. Greece had introduced a law in the early 1990s that allowed state powers to impose a ban on publishing statements made by terrorists.85 Violations could be punished with prison sentences for the editors (see Nacos, 1994, p. 154). However, this “solution” is merely proof of the state’s powerlessness to take effective action against terrorists and to competently monitor media coverage. • Restrictions after the fact: Improper or overly sensationalistic reporting will be penalized. • Restrictions on access (e.g., to the site of the terrorist act, hostage camps) can be imposed on the media, or a time limit (no reporting before day X). As an example, Denmark has a joint arrangement between the government and the Danish Broadcasting Corporation to wait for instructions from the government on certain national crises, to withhold a particular publication, etc. This arrangement had arisen from an agreement on the reporting of natural disasters.86 In line with the uses-and-gratifications approach, readers often use the press specifically to inform themselves about a certain topic, in this case the terrorist attacks. In normative terms, the newspaper has an outright duty to fulfill this requirement. Certainly, the media multiply the effect of the terrorist attack by increasing its reach to multiple audiences; but the public, or readers, usually identify with the victims, not with the cause of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, some governments  Bassiouni also describes in detail the problems between reporters and law enforcement.  Under the Social Democrats it was repealed again in 1993. 86  Dass (2008, pp.  18–51) discusses different approaches to regulating media coverage of terrorism in Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom. 84 85

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sometimes find it necessary to ban terrorism coverage. This view is also shared by Schaffert (1992)87: he argues several times in favor of government intervention in terrorism reporting. In his opinion, restrictions do not endanger democratic principles. These communication regulations from the political or legal system applied to the media from the outside will be illustrated in the following using examples from reporting on the IRA and PKK. In the summer of 1988, Margaret Thatcher initiated a decree, the so-called “Broadcasting Ban,” which stated that British television could no longer broadcast interviews with IRA leaders. This broadcasting ban applied not only to reports on and interviews with IRA members, but also to all Sinn Féin members and extremist loyalist groups. It was finally considered outdated in 1994 when peace talks between the parties got under way. As a result of pressure from the Thatcher government, the BBC had already refrained from broadcasting the documentary “At the Edge of the Union” in the summer of 1985, which contained an interview with IRA leader Martin McGuinness.88 BBC and ITV employees then went on strike (see Viera, 1991, p. 74), but were unable to prevent further regulation. In the end, the Broadcasting Ban did not fulfill its purpose of curbing terrorism by cutting off its access to the media. However, it was not radical enough to be used as counterevidence for the contagion theory. The situation in Great Britain today is different, but still includes pressure from the state. The Prevention of Terrorism Act89 states: “The act makes it possible to require journalists to notify authorities before they have contact with groups engaged in violence, to report any unplanned contacts, and to provide copies of materials to the authorities. Security officials can deny permission for material to be  These, as well as other studies of terrorism studies of the 1980s and early 1990s, are still strongly influenced by the Cold War and East-West dualism. They contain sentences such as: “The Soviet Union regularly employed terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. Extensive evidence has been documented and is available through numerous Western sources” (Schaffert, 1992, p. 21). Even scholars are not immune from making normative pejorative attributions. 88  The film should have been part of the series “Real Lives.” It dealt with the development of violence in Derry (in Protestant parlance “Londonderry”) and featured Martin McGuinness, IRA leader and member of the Sinn Féin Irish Nationalist Party, and Gregory Campbell, member of the Northern Ireland Assembly and militant loyalist who fought for Northern Ireland’s continued membership of Britain. Thus, both points of view were expressed. 89  In the United Kingdom, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act was passed in 1974 in response to the terror of the IRA. In July 2000, the UK then consolidated various anti-terrorism laws into the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT), which came into force in February 2001. TACT was extended by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCA) following the attacks of September 11, 2001. 87

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carried by media if they deem it harmful” (Picard, 1993, p. 117). Even in the direct context of an attack, there are regulations that journalists must adhere to (see Simons, 2010, p. 132): In the United Kingdom, the government can use the socalled DA-Notice to order certain content to be kept out of the media in the name of security. If a government reserves the right to interfere with the freedom of the press, this is always justified with reference to security policy concerns. Censorship, however, always means a victory point for the terrorists, because in a free constitutional state, liberties are suddenly restricted. Likewise, rumors and speculation are given more impetus (see Tan, 1988, p. 4). A high level of interference can be found in Turkey. Here, journalists are repeatedly arrested for their reporting on the Kurds. “The Supreme Criminal Court in the southeastern Turkish province of Diyarbakir sentenced Kurdish journalist Vedat Kursun to 166.5 years in prison last year. He is accused of ‘membership in a terrorist organization’ and ‘spreading illegal propaganda.’ His actual offense: He published ‘PKK-friendly’ articles in the Kurdish newspaper Azadiya Welat, of which he was editor. His colleague Emine Demir received 138 years for the same offense. In Turkey, it is considered ‘PKK-friendly’ if journalists visit rallies of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party or talk to PKK supporters for research purposes. Kursun and Demir received prison sentences for every single article they were responsible for that appeared between 2008 and 2009. That resulted in a total of well over 100 years in prison. The two trials hardly caused a stir. The newspaper at issue was too small, the province too far east, the repression against members of the Kurdish minority too commonplace” (Ergin, 2011, pp. 75–76). This rigid type of interference affects not only the freedom of reporting, but the physical freedom of movement of journalists. Schlesinger et  al. (1983, pp.  139–155) generally do not see censorship as a possible solution. In this regard, they can cite the failure of the Broadcasting Ban. Of course, it can also be a media strategy of the state not to impose a ban or withhold information but, on the contrary, to cultivate particularly intensive positive relations with the media or with individual journalists and thus to “voluntarily” involve them in the state’s goals and concepts, as Israel’s intelligence service did with its “Editors’ Committee” (Magen, 2017, p. 273). Only when a close relationship of trust is established between the government and the media is it possible to work with the media and ask them, for example, not to publish important information. Hocking (1992, p. 102) calls this approach “state’s integration of the media into this national security design.” State interference is thus feasible with both punishment (censorship) and reward (granting exclusive information).

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(c) Media Outlets’ Own Guidelines Between positions on state influence and unrestricted media freedom lie positions that emphasize guidelines or ethical rules of conduct in newsrooms, possibly enforced by professional associations, and also the problem of self-censorship by the media. Rarely, but repeatedly, do the media themselves address their position in the context of the “terrorism quadrangle”: The journalist Sabine Pamperrien herself asked in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung whether a code of conduct for terrorism reporting would make sense in order to avoid the danger of involuntary propaganda (see Pamperrien, 2006). She comes to the conclusion that instrumentalization should not be prevented by a code, but that the media, or more specifically journalists, should deal more strongly and more frequently with their own responsibility and the results of terrorism research as well as communication studies findings. Also with regard to the terrorists themselves, journalists should include scientific research, read up on terrorists’ self-representations on the internet and subscribe to newsletters. For this, it would be beneficial to have a mix of editors with different ethnicities and language skills. Only then would they get a more comprehensive picture of the conflict. Chaliand (1987, p. 122) goes beyond normative demands of and on publisher alliances by demanding, “It is high time that every newspaper, magazine and television channel had one person responsible for all events connected with terrorism.” In times of economic limitations in journalism, however, such demands are usually not implemented. Alexander (1978, p. 112) opposes constraints on press freedom, since such restrictions on freedom are an admission of the impotence of what the terrorists see as the “enemy state,” and the insurgents would thus achieve one of their goals. Sets of newsroom rules such as the BBC Editorial Guidelines are considered more sensible. Bassiouni (1982, p.  139) examined such guidelines90 of various American television stations and newspapers and came to the conclusion that the guidelines are similar and mostly do not prescribe overarching rigid regulations but leave room for interpretation: “First, they adopt a flexible approach emphasizing case-­ by-­case determination of the newsworthiness of the event, the use of balance and restraint, and the avoidance of sensationalism. Most attempt to avoid affording the terrorist an unedited platform, often suggesting that the demands be paraphrased.” It is also often stated that only experienced reporters should work on such sensitive issues. Media outlets can also voluntarily follow practical guides from political institutions, such as the handbook “Terrorism and the Media. A Handbook for Journalists” by UNESCO (2017).  Perešin (2007) also provides a good overview of the literature dealing with the different ways media companies can behave in times of terrorist crisis. 90

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Wilkinson (1990, pp.  32–33) advocates for a ban on terrorist content (interviews, documentaries, etc.) at least on broadcast outlets and also sees media guidelines as an appropriate form of restrained reporting: “voluntary self-restraint and self-regulation by the media are the best policy options for a democratic society with regard to the media’s response to terrorism” (Wilkinson, 1997, p. 51).91 The media should consider practical, service-oriented forms in their reporting, such as advice to watch out for and report unusual, abandoned luggage as well as what countermeasures the government could take in emergencies, etc. (see Wilkinson, 1997, p. 60). Thus, the media could even become a “weapon against terrorism.” However, this sober, non-reflective way of reporting does not always succeed in the event-centered media business. Nacos takes an innovative view. She suggests that in the case of sensationalist reporting, “increased peer review within the news industry” (Nacos, 1994, p. 158) could substitute for externally set rules. If the media observe themselves and punish transgressions of values within their circle through joint ostracism and criticism, something like an internal reporting ethos for terrorist events could emerge that would make restrictive rules from outside superfluous. This debate has once again shown that journalists are confronted with manifold problems regarding the phenomenon of “terrorism.” Ross (2007, pp.  217–218) identifies six basic difficulties in reporting on terrorism that are directly related to the question of guidelines and (self-)censorship: 1. Selection and self-censorship for fear of reprisals – whether from the state or from terrorists;

 Self-imposed guidelines for terror coverage in the 1970s can be found in Miller (1982), for example, the “CBS News Production Standards,” the guidelines of “The Courier-Journal and the Louisville Times,” “The Sun-Times and Daily News (Chicago) Standards for Coverage of Terrorism,” and the “Guidelines of United Press International.” What all of these guidelines have in common is that reporters do not want to associate themselves with the terrorists’ cause, nor do they want to put lives in danger. Furthermore, the examples show that media guidelines can be formulated very loosely and in general terms, or they can be quite detailed. Similarly, Cohen-Almagor (2005) analyzed guidelines set by the media themselves in the U.S., UK, Israel, Canada and Germany. Schmid (1992) sent a lengthy questionnaire to 20 editors-in-chief or department heads of daily, weekly newspapers, TV, radio stations and news agencies in Germany, Kenya, Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK, Ireland, Jordan, Belgium, Italy, South Africa, Norway and Peru. In terms of terrorism reporting, the outlets all represented quite different attitudes, for example with regard to the usefulness of guidelines, the time lag of reporting, the influence of research findings on their publishing behavior or newsworthiness of terrorist acts. Due to the lack of representativeness, the country differences will not be addressed here. 91

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2. Reluctance on the part of editors, who sometimes shy away from letting a story or photos that are ready to be published make their way to the public; 3. Too few specialists well enough versed in terrorist groups and tactics to report on them professionally; 4. Strategically dispersed disinformation by national security authorities leading to false or biased reporting; 5. The risk of endangering anti-terrorist operations through reporting, in the worst case even putting hostages in danger; 6. Tendency to sensationalize: playing up events in order to attract readers. In the United States, the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting freedom of reporting or freedom of expression, and so the unpleasant, quandary-­ like decision for or against certain publications is left to the media, but the danger of self-censorship remains: “In fact the media are in an uncomfortable position. If they censor the terrorist news they are infringing on the public’s right to know. If they give extensive coverage, they might terrorize the public and become allies of the terrorists. If they follow the government line, they might become a propaganda and police tool” (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, p. 98). The strongly patriotic media discourse following attacks (see Sect. 4.8.3) has shown that the media are by no means immune to this bias. Cohen-Almagor (2005, p. 385) does not believe that journalists should report on the “act of terrorism” event as neutral observers: “Instead, they may feel free to make moral judgements. It is an objective matter that terrorism in democracies is wrong.” To again anticipate an analogy to the theater metaphor (see Sect. 5.5): Theater critics are free to make their attitudes toward a play known, as long as no one is endangered as a result. Soria and Giner (1990) also call for a general detachment of the journalist from imperatives such as “neutrality” and “objectivity” in terrorism reporting, and for the advocacy of peace from an inner ethical stance and the adoption of the victim’s perspective (see Soria & Giner, 1990, pp. 65–68).92 This perspective can be attributed to the concept of advocacy as well as conflict-­ sensitive or peace journalism, in which journalists actively contribute to conflict mitigation (see Bilke, 2008; Kempf, 2017). Soria and Giner (1990) assume that silence is not an option for the media in terrorist attacks. However, they caution, no attention should be paid to the initial attacks of a small group, in order to counteract the group’s strategy of gaining attention (see Soria & Giner, 1990, pp.  60–61).  In his framing study of three daily newspapers in Burkina Faso after the January 2016 attacks, Yaméogo (2018) demonstrates that the pro-peace frame was present in all newspapers but alternated with the patriotic and struggle frames. 92

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Picard, on the other hand, fears that a self-imposed denial of access to the media will lead to increasingly fatal attacks, so that at some point exclusion and non-­ coverage by the media will become impossible. If one gave the terrorist groups a hearing in the media and thus in public outside of attacks, one could possibly prevent further attacks (see Picard, 1993, p.  119). These proposals can be partly counted as constructive journalism, whose representatives have made it their task to report in a future- and solution-oriented manner (see Meier, 2018). In conclusion, it can be said with regard to journalistic values and norms, explicitly stated in guidelines, that even after “9/11” hardly anything has changed in the reporting of terrorist events, although one might have thought that the obvious overtaxing of the journalism system should have led to editorial guidelines and contingency plans that make one prepared for future incidents so that they do not mutate into a media spectacle. For the attacks in Kenya on November 28, 2002, at any rate, Haußecker (2007) was unable to detect any improvement in German public-­service and commercial television coverage: “Aspects discussed at the time [after the attacks of September 11, author’s note], such as strong emotionalization and a lack of contextual classification, are still to be found” (Haußecker, 2007, p. 153). Terrorism experts are and remain scarce in newsrooms.93

 The spontaneous editorial decisions taken in such tense situations sometimes have personnel consequences: Channel 1 of the Israeli Broadcasting Corporation dismissed a presenter because he allegedly did not show enough empathy with the victims of the attacks (see Lilienthal, 2007, p. 3). On Israel’s Channel 2 there was a split screen for a short time because the station boss did not want to lose sports rights acquired at great expense; “football on the left, terror on the right. He had been the head of the channel for the longest time” (Lilienthal, 2007, p. 5). It always depends on whether the format, presentation style, presenter characteristics and the like are suitable and appropriate for the topic of “terrorism.” 93

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4.11 Crisis Communication Theories and Case Studies on the Interaction of Media and Government

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

Government officials communicate with the media not only in terms of rules and regulations, but also in terms of any of the other aspects that arise around the crisis of “terrorist attack” and the existence of a terrorist group. This section concludes with a focus on this relationship before moving on to “Reception and Impact” in Sect. 4.12. The present section is composed of a general introduction to the problem (a), a case study: the Sipadan kidnapping in 2000 (b), and a subsection on crisis communication theories applied to the research area of “terrorism” (c). A concluding Sect. 4.11.1, presents the theory of change, which has received little attention in communication studies, and how it can be applied to governments in crisis scenarios. The interim summary in Sect. 4.11.2 refers to all chapters on the arenas of action of media and politics, i.e. Sects. 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11. Since interaction between the media and the government is particularly virulent in the case of hostage-taking, this chapter often refers to this type of terrorism. Of course, the communication relationships, represented by the arrows in the diagram, between government and terrorists, between journalists and civil society, etc. also play a role, even if they are not the focus. Theoretical concepts touched upon here remain very much at the middle-range level. Often it remains with umbrella terms (such as “CNN effect”) and explanations of the course of phenomena of a similar nature, for example crisis phases. (a) Introduction to the Problem The media replace direct communication between politicians and the public, which has become largely impossible due to the size and complexity of society, and this has led to a mediatization of politics. With their opinion-forming function, the

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media ensure that participation in public communication is made possible for all citizens, that citizens develop mature judgment. The support of politically mature citizens of the general public brings about the legitimacy of political action in democratic societies. The ultimate goal of politics is to make and enforce collectively binding decisions. Politicians therefore need skill to legitimize themselves to the public via the media. Consequently, politics and the media are in a relationship of mutual dependence, both simultaneously pursuing the goal of “generating the widest possible attention for common issues” (Buck, 2007, p. 23). Since this is also the goal of the terrorists, one can ask: Who is dependent on whom? Who is instrumentalizing whom here? Government and terrorists are in competition for quantitative and qualitative media coverage, in “competition for public opinion” (Buck, 2007, p. 56), in the antagonists’ power struggle for the media (see Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 16; see Sect. 4.7.1). The forms of behavior of governments towards the media in terror situations are manifold. They are related to interactions between media and terrorists themselves, between government and terrorists, and with civil society. They are all interdependent; thus, not only has the “media-terrorists” relationship been described as symbiotic (see Sect. 4.5.2), but so has the “politics-media” relationship (see Nacos, 1994, pp. 43–44). In contrast, the state and terrorists do not enter into a symbiotic relationship; they are opponents. Nevertheless, both make use of the public as a recruitment pool. The demand or response of the public is crucial for media, politicians and insurgent organizations. Democratic forms of government are particularly “easy” to attack because of the freedom to express one’s opinion, to assemble and organize, and to move about freely. Democracies are also limited in their responses because of established civil liberties. For example, they cannot easily restrict the prevailing freedom of the press (see Sect. 4.10). Counterattacks with torture are also ethically indefensible. The problem of the challenged state is to “effectively combat the inhumane without abandoning the humanistic principles of its own social order” (Mader et al., 2002, p. 139). To this end, some states seek international assistance in the fight against domestic terrorism; other (authoritarian) regimes sometimes try to inflate the danger posed by terrorists, thereby justifying stricter security measures. The terrorist attack is the tip of a slowly building iceberg. Preliminary stages to terrorist acts of violence, in which the state apparatus can already seek communication and (re-)act, are social protest, for example in the form of demonstrations by small groups (see Sect. 4.1), then violent protest movements, then terrorism and later possibly a civil uprising, civil war, revolution or secession. A group rebels against overbearing (state) forces in order to make the public aware of a problem to which they can now – through the act of terrorism – no longer turn a blind eye. “So

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this is the message of the attackers: you can protect the targets as much as you want – we will strike anyway” (Kornelius, 2005). The attacked state is supposed to overreact, the followers are supposed to show solidarity. Terrorism is communication and therefore requires counter-communication as deliberate crisis communication (see below), but not overreaction. The media act as the messenger of the state’s counter-communication. Hall et al. (1978, p. 57) distinguish between primary and secondary definers. Accordingly, the primary definers are those in power: “The media thus tend, faithfully and impartially, to reproduce symbolically the existing structure of power in society’s institutional order. […] Effectively, then, the primary definition sets the limit for all subsequent discussion by framing what the problem is” (Hall et al., 1978, pp. 58–59). Only then are secondary definers such as representatives of ethnic groups or economic associations allowed space in the media, with their statements and viewpoints appearing in the light or frame of the primary definers. Coverage is ‘framed’ by political elites, as they are often used as sources. Rasul (2017), for example, in a qualitative framing study, provides evidence that newspapers follow the orientation of their country’s foreign policy in interpreting terrorist events (in the case of the study, the major newspapers of India and Pakistan in relation to Taliban attacks). According to this model, the media are more on the side of those in power than they are involuntary propagandists of the terrorists.94 However, the order is not always politics – media. The so-called CNN effect proves that the reverse order can also occur. It describes “the direct influence and steering of political decisions by the reporting of the dominant Western 24-hour news channels” (Weichert, 2007, p. 87) and, in general, “the potential influence of global war and crisis journalism on politics, diplomacy and the military” (Hampe & Löffelholz, 2008, p.  290).95 (War) coverage affects political decisions. “The CNN effect assumes a strong causal effect of global real-time reporting on security policy processes” (Hampe & Löffelholz, 2008, p. 291). Media achieve a kind of “public diplomacy” through their publicity. Government officials have to adapt to this environment, which is co-determined by the media, and realize that the discussion of political action in public forces politicians to act ever more quickly; “news

 A study by Herman and O’Sullivan (1989) – albeit an old one – supports this view; they counted 135 U.S. newspaper articles and TV news reports on terrorist events between 1978 and 1985 with regard to the use of sources and found that representatives of the U.S. government were quoted in 42.3% of the cases (see Herman & O’Sullivan, 1989, p. 194). This leads the authors to conclude that there is a “closed system of newsmaking and opinion” (Herman & O’Sullivan, 1989, p. 195). 95  CNN is considered an influential medium for many other media outlets. 94

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media coverage actually plays a key part in causing policy-makers to intervene during a humanitarian crisis” (Robinson, 2001, p. 528). Politicians are influenced in their decision-making by images of victims or violence, and by the public opinion of the citizens who will eventually re-elect them.96 If politicians manage to portray their actions in the crisis situation as if they provide relief, this positive self-presentation can eventually lead to the so-called rally effect. It describes a “surge in popularity of state institutions […,] a conspicuous but comparatively short-term increase in public support for the president, his policies, Congress, and the military” (Hampe & Löffelholz, 2008, p. 291). This “rally-around-the-flag” is mostly caused by positive, supportive news coverage. Terrorism is usually covered in terms of events, but also in terms of people; a lot of space is given to the statements and actions of those in power. However, too much communication on the part of government agencies is not always effective: the agency is then easily accused of scaremongering. When defensive and when offensive communication strategies are appropriate must be decided on the basis of the situation at hand. Each country has its own measures, which can start at the level of primary prevention (consolidating certain values, strengthening the community, etc.), secondary prevention (e.g., controls at airports) or also within the framework of operational suppression (for example, the prosecution of illegal organizations). Finally, the highest level is situation management during an attack, as well as consequence mitigation afterward, for example by helping the victims’ relatives. The communicative components in abductions will now be illustrated by means of a case study. (b) Case Study: The Sipadan Kidnapping Buck (2007) examined the interaction of government and media in hostage-taking, more specifically “mediatized […] hostage-taking of own nationals abroad” (Buck, 2007, p. 7). This is because the media have an influence on the framework of action of governments (see above). The assumption that the journalist, as a neutral observer, exerts no influence whatsoever on the reality surrounding him or her proves to be an illusion here. Buck sees government and the media as two independent systems, which – according to game and rational choice theory (see Sect. 5.3) –  An example: The U.S. government sent soldiers to Somalia in the early 1990s, partly because TV stations had shown images of misery and hunger there. The public was jolted by this, and politicians thought it better to take account of this public opinion, which was expected to bring electoral success, and intervened in Somalia in 1992. Later, when images of mutilated U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu were broadcast, the climate of opinion shifted and, partly in response, the U.S. withdrew its troops from Somalia (see Robinson, 2001). 96

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nevertheless interact strategically with each other. It is not possible to say which of the two social functional areas dominates the other. To address this issue, Buck conducted a case study based on the abduction of the Wallert family on the island of Jolo in 2000.97 In this abduction by the Islamic fundamentalist terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, which operates on the southern islands of the Philippines, the media played very different roles: “from neutral observer to subject who takes action” (Buck, 2007, p.  97). Eventually, it got to the point where journalists made their way into the hostage camp on their own and were taken hostage themselves. Thus, “during the kidnapping of their own journalists, the media at times even turned themselves into the object of government action as well as their own reporting” (Buck, 2007, p. 97). The kidnapping on the island in the Philippines became a major media event: 189 journalists accredited themselves on Jolo (see Buck, 2007, p. 133). Some have to pay a toll of around U.S. $400 to the Abu Sayyaf men who provide an “escort.” Journalists flock to the hostage camp, for example on “kidnapped four months” day, to obtain statements and conduct their reporting. In June 2000, European ambassadors are admonished by Philippine Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon to call on the media in their countries to reduce their reporting. “By reporting, they were stoking the kidnappers’ business, making negotiations more difficult, and driving up demands” (Buck, 2007, p. 147). However, the hostages on Jolo also used the “media as a survival strategy” (Buck, 2007, p. 110), because sometimes the abductees were able to give small notes to the correspondents; these ensured a high level of media attention and sympathy from the public. Nacos (2007, p. 87) writes that the hostages on Jolo became “celebrities in their respective homelands” for the German, French and Finnish public. “The Abu Sayyaf wrote a new chapter in the annals of hostage-holders’ media management. At times the terror gang98 asked Western journalists for ‘fees’ in exchange for access to their jungle camps, and when this method did not yield enough hard cash, they took whole groups and individual media representatives hostage, stripped them of their belongings, and extorted ransom. Even after the Abu Sayyaf’s tactics had scared Western reporters away, the captors and their hostages remained a

 In addition, he took into account the kidnapping of 32 “Sahara hostages” in Algeria and Mali in the spring of 2003, the kidnapping of the German archaeologist Susanne Osthoff in Iraq in the winter of 2005 – the first “test” (Buck, 2007, p. 12) of German Chancellor Angela Merkel -, the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran from 1979 to 1981, the kidnapping of German diplomat Jürgen Chrobog and his family in Yemen in 2005, and the kidnapping of two German engineers in Iraq from January to May 2006. 98  Note the choice of words. 97

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prominent story in Europe” (Nacos, 2007, p.  88). The media made the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, previously quite unknown in Europe, known. However, the media did not always speak of terrorists, but also of “militant Muslim rebels” or the “rebel group” (see Nacos, 2007, p. 104). The analysis of the hostage-taking in the Philippines shows “how modern terrorism takes into account and uses the media for the worldwide projection of its predominantly symbolic power” (Buck, 2007, p. 300). The terrorists’ calculus of effect relied increasingly on the media (see Buck, 2007, p. 11). The terrorists took advantage of the fact that the media still have a far-reaching sovereignty in conveying information to the populace and also often the sovereignty of interpretation. Journalists take care of providing fact-oriented descriptions of events; they also place them in a larger context and offer an “interpretation that becomes part of public perception and thus in turn influences the government’s scope of action” (Buck, 2007, p. 265; see Sects. 4.7.3 and 4.12.2). It also depends on the government’s actions whether there is a further radicalization not only of the terrorist group but of an entire segment of the population that sees itself constrained by the countermeasures (see Bueno de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007). Through the media, the government itself pursues the goal of legitimizing its actions and a positive self-portrayal, as well as successful crisis management, ending the hostage-taking, winning votes and securing party support. The mediatization99 or media treatment of a crisis changes the framework of all participants, including the government’s crisis management. In the hostage camp on Jolo, journalists were present more often than government representatives and provided daily footage (see Buck, 2007, p. 11); the many media reports increased public attention enormously. When such a crisis takes place abroad, the German federal government, for example, does not always have the possibility to control or protect the access of media representatives to the scene. The journalists on location thus sometimes gain an information advantage and the government receives important information from the domestic or foreign media. “What the media determine is a crisis automatically becomes a crisis, even if the government in question disagrees” (Buck, 2007, p. 301). If the government decides not to speak directly to terrorists, hostage-takers, or another government, the media can take on the role of  One definition of “mediatization” reads as follows: Mediatization “in the context of political communication can denote three things: (1) the growing fusion of media reality with political as well as social reality, (2) the increasing perception of politics by way of mediated experience, and (3) the alignment of political action and behavior with the principles of the → media system. Mediatization can be the consequence of a unilateral alignment of politics towards the media or of the media towards politics, or also the result of symbiotic (→ symbiosis) relationships due to a mutual interest” (Sarcinelli, 1998, pp. 678–679). 99

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a quasi-diplomatic channel (see Buck, 2007, p. 75), a role that goes beyond its actual functional scope. (c) Crisis Communication Theories The case study has vividly demonstrated the government’s need for good crisis communication. Therefore, in this subsection, government communication in times of terrorism crisis will be classified against the background of current crisis communication theories. Because, “Crisis management provides a useful framework for analyzing and understanding the effects of the terrorist attacks […]. Crisis management is a four-step process: prevention, preparation, response, and learning” (Coombs,100 2005, pp. 211–212). The focus of crisis management is on confronting the crisis and averting, or at least reducing, damage. This requires communication management in general. According to Simons (2010, p.  12), the function of communication management is to use logic and arguments to sell an idea to a target group that would not be present (to the same degree) in the target group without these efforts. The change in thinking can then lead to a change in behavior that is beneficial to the originator of the message. This struggle for one’s own perceptions can also be applied to the terrorists’ intent. They present their message via an attack and challenge the government. The government’s reputation is at stake after a terrorist attack (see Canel & Sanders, 2010), and only an appropriate crisis communication strategy can prevent failure in the next elections. Thus, at the end of the process chain of an attack, the government is planning and preparing in order to be better equipped for the next attack. In this sense, reputation is also heavily dependent on attributions of responsibility. Governments have to justify their responses – much like terrorists have to justify their attacks. Both sides are subject to a compulsion to explain. How the state should deal with the challenge of a terrorist attack and respond to it communicatively can be described with the help of Coombs’ (1999) Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT). Coombs (1995, p. 457) classifies terrorism as an externally and intentionally caused crisis (from the perspective of the society under attack). He proposes “suffering” and “mortification” as crisis communication strategies (see Coombs, 1995, p. 468): the attacked should present themselves as humiliated and suffering as much as possible in order to reject responsibility for this crisis. Studies show that through efficient, honest and open crisis communication after an attack, the government can gain the trust of the populace and strengthen its reputation as well as mitigate the attribution of responsibility for the attack (see  Coombs (2005) himself plays out the various points using the September 11, 2001 attacks as an example. 100

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Crijns et al., 2017, pp. 230–231). Canel and Sanders (2010) used SCCT to examine the Spanish and British governments’ responses to the Madrid and London attacks. They conclude that the Spanish party Partido Popular (PP) used culturally incongruent frames and consequently these were not picked up by the media and the opposition. “PP managed the practical response to the crisis extremely well. It failed, however, to manage well the communication of the events […]. Blair, on the other hand, had always assigned a high priority to communication […], Blair’s communication themes of unity, resilience, and tolerance chimed well with historically shared narratives relating intimately to Britain’s and London’s identity” (Canel & Sanders, 2010, pp. 462–463).101 This weakness in its crisis communication led to the election defeat of the Spanish government. Thus, unlike in the U.S. and the UK, the Spanish media did not adopt the government’s framing after the attacks three days before nationwide elections in Spain. In both politics and in the media, the attribution of responsibility was a key focus (see Canel, 2012, p. 215). In this context, the party still in power under Aznar tried to paint ETA as responsible for the attacks; the challenging Socialists around Zapatero tried to draw attention to Islamist groups that could use it to avenge the fact that Aznar had supported the Iraq war. A short time after the attacks, the media, on the other hand, were no longer primarily looking for those responsible for the cause of the attack (cause responsibility), but rather focused on the question of which party was behaving in a particularly “vote-catching” manner due to the upcoming elections (see Canel, 2012, p. 221), that is, how they were dealing with the entire situation (treatment responsibility). The fact that the Spanish media and the populace reacted so differently to the frame of “democracy, constitution and national cohesion” issued by politicians than the Americans and the British may also be due to Spain’s cultural fragmentation and strong regional identities – especially in the Basque Country, Galicia and Catalonia (see Canel, 2012, p. 218). Following SCCT, a successful government manages not only to respond competently to crisis situations, but also to recognize acute crisis symptoms such as threats to life, emergencies, and general uncertainty in advance and to act appropriately depending on the situation. For example, Sellnow et al. (2009) address how governments can strategically deal with empty threats (e.g., bomb threats that turn out to be false; phone calls declaring the occurrence of an epidemic, etc.), by showing how well prepared they would have been. In any case, the state is keen to appear as the system’s guardian.

 Here again, the proximity of frame, narrative and identity-forming myth is evident (see Sect. 4.8.3). 101

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The Zurich economist Frey (2004) criticizes that almost all previous communication strategies of politics have strengthened the cohesiveness of the terrorist group. He therefore proposes the principle of “diverting attention” as a crisis communication strategy: naming different groups as possibly responsible for the attack. This takes the full attention away from only one group. In addition, such a way of dealing with the situation harbors a high level of frustration for the real perpetrators, since the “competition” between the groups  – even with similar political goals – is high and free riders are not granted “fame” (see Frey, 2004, p. xiii).102 Furthermore, the conventional deterrence policy (“stick”) should be replaced by a positive approach to terrorists (incentives or “carrot”): economic and immaterial “rewards” could provide incentives for potential criminals to switch sides. By offering an alternative, terrorists would be given a way out of the terrorist organization and a general climate of insecurity and mistrust would be created within the organization, since everyone would believe the others would opt for economic or immaterial remuneration and thus turn their backs on the terrorist group (see Frey, 2004, p. xiii). A crisis communication policy that operates neither with stick nor carrot is demonstrated by the fact that the challenged state and the populace show no reaction whatsoever and react with composure: The challenged live as before, negating the terrorists’ strategic goal of spreading fear and terror. In this respect, crisis communication theories are useful for bringing a certain elasticity to the range of reactions and to reflect them systematically.

4.11.1 Theory of Change The explanations have shown that crisis communication theories can help to analytically capture the actions of a government and structure them into process stages. The examples have demonstrated that each attack has its own dynamic contextual variables. In a crisis scenario, the so-called “outcome,” the desired end state, is a crucial point of reference that – according to the theory of change – should guide all actions. The theory of change can be seen as a component of SCCT that fits well into the process schema of prevention, preparation, acute crisis management and follow-up presented above. Especially in prevention, a long-term goal should be set, a desired “outcome” that can be measured by certain indicators of success (see Taplin & Clark, 2012, p. 2), such as a decrease in attacks. A government acting  Arguments against such a “positive strategy” are compiled by Frey (2004, pp. 131–133) himself. 102

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according to the theory of change would have to define small steps, so-called “interventions” (Taplin & Clark, 2012, p. 2), which lead to small changes until ultimately the final goal is reached in the most effective way possible. The evaluation can then address the individual intervention points and assess their effectiveness. Such an approach presupposes that the government does not interpret terrorist activities as irrational madness, but rather as a reaction, a response to external stimuli such as social spaces and actions of states and social groups (see Crenshaw, 2001, p.  13). Crenshaw (2001, p.  13) refers to the view of terrorist violence as purposeful, intentional and motivated as an “instrumental approach.” This approach has already been introduced in Sect. 2.1.2. In contrast, the organizational process theory sees the reasons for maintaining the terrorist organization not in external variables, but in the organization itself, in internal group dynamics. Young people join the organization not for ideological motives, but for personally enriching reasons such as financial and reputational advancement. In the same way, group leaders may not relinquish their position once certain political goals are achieved, but rather see to it that the organization that makes them leaders keeps running as an end in itself. With an instrumentally acting group, a government may succeed in preventing them from engaging in further acts of terrorism through interventions such as concessions of a political nature. In the case of process-oriented organizations, the government must focus on luring away members, including at the leadership level, and must work to provide them with equivalent incentives. In most cases, however, the two phenomena do not occur separately. The media can provide the government with an important forum for negotiating both types of approaches. Attention must also be paid to engaging the civil society public in order to secure politicians’ backing there. Liebl (2006, p. 17) suggests a shift in thinking from “what if” to “what would have to be in order for” (see Liebl, 2006, p. 174) for the creation of future scenarios on which politicians’ decisions and actions are based. In this way, unpredictability could be countered. This approach is compatible with the theory of change. Change as an “outcome” would also include a change in the government’s online strategy. As argued above (see Sect. 4.2.3), terrorists use the internet to bypass the selection criteria of traditional media and have control over everything they want to publish themselves. Qin et al. (2006, p. 5) speak of virtual psychological warfare, which results in helplessness and a feeling of loss of control in the target society. Politicians can also bypass the media to practice direct online communication. However, they still have some catching up to do in that regard, especially in terms of interactivity, as Qin et  al. (2006) postulate. Using a quantitative combined automated-­manual collection and analysis, they compared approximately 222,000 web documents of terrorist and/or extremist groups from the Middle East with ap-

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proximately 277,000 web documents of state agencies with regard to their level of technical development, the richness of multimedia applications and the characteristics of web interactivity. Overall, both groups of providers are at a similar level of sophistication. However, there are also differences: “Because of their covert nature, terrorist/extremist groups seldom disclose their contact information on their Web sites. However, in terms of supporting community-level interactivity, terrorist/extremist Web sites are doing significantly better than government Web sites by providing online forums and chat rooms” (Qin et al., 2006, p. 13). A project from the United States attempted to close a gap here. Using the Twitter hashtag “#thinkagainturnaway” from the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), tweets with Islamist content were responded to in an attempt to get Twitter users to rethink. According to SCCT, this falls into the prevention phase. Even in the acute crisis phase, the internet, as an all-round information distributor and repository of intermediaries, can provide not only citizens, journalists and terrorists with their own communication channels, but also the authorities. After attacks, authorities no longer rely on information being passed on exclusively by the media, but open their own portals, such as the Twitter hashtag “Breitscheidplatz” after the attack on a Berlin Christmas market on December 19, 2016. Citizens turned directly to the authorities with queries. The international level of terrorism should also to be taken into account in the government’s communication strategy – and in its analysis (see Sect. 2.1.4). Seib (2012) sees efforts in the field of public diplomacy as essential to combating terrorism. The use of non-military means to support political goals has so far been underestimated (Seib, 2012, p.  63), both in terms of preventive measures and anti-­ terrorist strategies after an attack. In this regard, all counterterrorism measures should be subject to the requirement of transparency: “Transparency, long considered annoying and even dangerous by many diplomats, is increasingly expected and can be driven by YouTube, Twitter and other social media” (Seib, 2012, p. 65). Especially groups that are primarily exposed to the messages of terrorist groups should come into the focus of such “soft power” efforts. Thus, one “outcome” could be the de-radicalization of exposed groups via multiple interventions on social network sites. In terms of content, Matusitz et al. (2019, pp. 276–278) outlined 15 points to consider when creating journals for de-radicalization, including: emphasizing the effectiveness of non-violent interventions, eliminating the binary division into “in-group” and “out-group,” featuring or giving voice to known converts, i.e., former extremists, using different linguistic and stylistic forms such as logic and humor, and publishing in as many languages as possible.

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4.11.2 Interim Summary The role of the media in the terrorist process is a controversial topic in communication studies (but even more so in political science), which gives rise to normative demands. Waldmann (2005a, p. 83) sees the media as a “transmission belt between the isolated act and its socio-psychological after-effects.” Some scholars have described the relationship as mutually beneficial, i.e., symbiotic, while a few have described it as parasitic, with the media as an (involuntary) host for the parasite of terrorism. There is also disagreement among researchers regarding contagion theory. Whether media coverage leads to the provision of information and incentives for free riders, resulting in further attacks, has not yet been distinctly clarified empirically. Observations of more recent acts, such as vehicle-ramming attacks, suggest that the contagion theory cannot be discarded. Attribution theories could be profitably used as a theoretical framework in connection with claims of responsibility. Terrorists usually attribute responsibility for the unrest to the government’s status quo, which they find intolerable. At the same time, they seek to justify themselves and gain legitimacy. Wolfsfeld’s (1997; see Fig. 4.6) schema illustrated the struggle between the antagonists “politicians” and “terrorists” over space in the media, which is considered a “mechanism for influence” (Simons, 2010, p. 139). This battle is often decided by whoever offers the news with higher newsworthiness (selection/exclusion hypothesis). The terrorist act combines many news values (additivity hypothesis) and these are particularly emphasized (bias hypothesis) or compensate for weaker values (complementarity hypothesis), which is increasingly emphasized in the various processing stages up to the presentation (replication hypothesis).103 Contrary to the final model, it was clearly shown here that the news values are already inherent in the event itself and are not only attributed to it retroactively. Newsworthiness theory as an explanatory model for selection decisions was employed by some researchers; they unanimously named values such as conflict, negativism, unambiguity, human interest, proximity, harm, but above all surprise as primary selection criteria. Religious proximity or distance, as well as good or bad bilateral relations, are also considered predictors of framing in news coverage (see Yang & Chen, 2019, p. 412). The micro-perspective of the communicators proved to be important: The gatekeeping approach helped clarify why it does not only depend on the system and organization when and which messages are passed on, but to some extent also on individual (media) actors. These are shaped by certain norms, values and cultural

103

 For the hypotheses, see also Galtung and Holmboe Ruge (1965).

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narratives – often also by a certain newsroom culture, which in turn might indicate a stronger meso-level influence. The different choice of words by communicators were recorded in empirical studies, but not yet clearly explained; influences can be identified at various levels: the socialization of the actor (micro level), the actor’s integration into a partisan organization and its regulations (meso level) as well as the respective political system and its positioning in the international environment, integration into confederations of states, relationship to the system of “religion” and similar (macro level). Few newsrooms have a language guide as to when a journalist may name an attack or group as terrorist. In this context, research on the problem of news bias was considered. News bias assumes a link between a journalist’s subjective political stance and his or her news selection, and also his or her accompanying choice of words in terms of perspective. After the September 11 attacks, for example, the narrative of patriotism appeared in many articles, as it did after ETA attacks in Basque newspapers compared to national Spanish ones (see Zelizer & Allan, 2002; Glück, 2003). Against this background, the media can be called upon to reflect more on the use of different terms in connection with “terrorism.” The repertoire of terms should be analytically processed, and the results made public. This would also distinguish a professional journalistic reappraisal of terrorist events from the increasing user-generated content on the Internet, which usually does not offer such transparency. Although the news bias approach was well suited to describe the emergence of biased reporting after an attack, and thus has a relatively high information content, the explanatory power of the approach is not yet fully developed, as the exact relationship and weight of the influencing factors that ultimately lead to a certain bias in one or the other (political) direction could not be determined. The concept of “citizen journalism” describes a new form of participation in the dissemination of information. Especially directly after attacks, a lot of unfiltered information finds its way onto the internet, be it videos from citizens who were at the location or political groups that then immediately become active. All these information flows pose challenges for journalism, in whose processes the involvement of citizens must be constantly reconsidered. In addition to participatory journalism, there is also the possibility for pure citizen journalism disconnected from the journalism system, i.e., self-sustaining blogs or Twitter accounts. Of course, these in turn can serve as external sources for journalistic reports. Here, neither the media nor politics have so far succeeded in paying sufficient attention to citizen journalism, exploring its possibilities and actively involving it not only in terrorism reporting but also in counter-terrorism measures taken by politics. The concepts of agenda building, agenda setting and agenda surfing were explained in Sect. 4.7.3, where the focus was on the media agenda, not the audience

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agenda. That terrorist events have a high issue priority is beyond question. Researchers disagree on whether politicians and pressure groups set issues and the media then take them up, or whether politicians and citizens follow the media in their issues. There is certainly often an interaction. In the case of terrorism, however, it is primarily the terrorists who put the issue on the agenda through their attack and the media, politicians and citizens are forced to react (“coercive media event”; see above). This is precisely what is criticized by some scholars, who see the media as having a duty to write articles about terrorist groups, their motives, etc. more frequently, even apart from event-related reporting. With regard to reporting, the question arises as to the form (journalistic form of presentation, placement, images, etc.) in which the terrorist event is processed and with the help of which communication studies concepts this can be described. Against the background of genre theory, it was shown that a national journalistic encoding culture as well as a learned, often nationally conditioned decoding culture of the recipients are decisive, but also editorial guidelines such as “no photos on page one” can influence the design of genres and forms of presentation. Archetti (2010b) assumes that even in times of advanced globalization, no homogeneous coverage can be found, but national politics and the values and norms of each individual media organization and culture are crucial for the construction of an event (with global implications). “The analysis of the international news coverage in the aftermath of 9/11 shows that elite press news is shaped by national interest, national journalistic culture, and the editorial policy of each individual media organization” (Archetti, 2010b, p. 3).104 With regard to TV formats, Schlesinger et al. (1983) and Altheide (1987) were able to differentiate between “event type” and “topic type” as well as between narrow/wide and open/closed formats. Here, communication studies provides an analytical framework for practical testing, a self-­ evaluation of broadcast stations as to whether they are more likely to choose open, wide, contextual, topic-related, probing programs or more often narrow, closed, event-related contributions tied to the official perspective. Various examples have shown that in the event of a terrorist attack, traditional format guidelines and production routines are at least briefly broken.105 Detailed questions still need to be

 Archetti (2010b) looked at post-9/11 news coverage in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal (USA), Le Monde and Libération (France), La Repubblica and Il Corriere della Sera (Italy), and Dawn and Nation (Pakistan). She adopts a decidedly constructivist point of view for her study (Archetti, 2010b, pp. 9 and 22), focusing on the national media level and culture, describing them as crucial to the construction of news (see Archetti, 2010b, p. 2). 105  See the new forms mentioned in Sect. 4.8.1, such as the “Portraits of Grief” in the New York Times and the photos on the Frankfurter Allgemeie Zeitung front page. 104

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clarified by genre theory, for example, to what extent irony or satire are (or can be) applied as stylistic forms in terrorism reporting at all (see Koren, 1996). Above all, visual forms of representation are associated with emotions. Communication studies has described this dominance of the image over the word with terms such as “pictorial turn” and “iconic turn” (see Weber, 2001). September 11 is often cited as a prime example of the impact of images, as a kind of “communal horror scenario” was created in the minds of (media) viewers. This was underpinned by the “War on Terror” frame, the war narrative embedded in an overarching discourse of fear and solidarity (see, as an example, Weiß, 2004). Here, constructivism can again be used as a theoretical framework, which also includes the myth concept: journalists use myths as part of and narrators of a particular culture (see Sect. 4.8.3) in order to (re-)construct complex issues by means of culturally easily decodable schemata. Discourse analyses allow us to capture the respective narrative, frame or myth in a structured way and, for example, to ascertain metaphors that are culturally conditioned and imply certain evaluations. In this way, metaphors can be used to construct identity (“We are all in the same boat”) and to establish a friend/foe differentiation (see Schmitt, 2000 [1932]). Certain patterns of interpretation then assert themselves and are passed down. Thus, the media, terrorists and also states pass on certain value concepts, such as that of a free democratic basic order, in their narratives. For the state level, this can be described with concepts such as public diplomacy and nation branding. Narratives and theories of rhetoric offer a more sophisticated theoretical framework than, for example, the concepts of propaganda of the deed and terrorism as a media event, which remain at a rather descriptive level. Discourse and narrative theories could be used to explain nationally and culturally shaped (patriotic) discourses after an attack. The asymmetry of the conflict and the vehement start of the discourse, set by the violent message of the terrorists, could also be captured and interpreted by these language-oriented theories. It is also important to consider the possibility of interpreting the attack not as the beginning of a discourse, but as a response to and exclusion from social discourses. The act of terror thus occurs as – from the terrorists’ point of view – the only way out in order to participate (again) in the discourse. The “answer” to the discourse of the attacked society is “shouted in the face” of society by those who feel excluded, and in such an extreme and forced form that it briefly has the effect of completely breaking off the previous social discourse. The silencing of discourse is seen by the terrorists as a victory and success of their chosen form of communication. The act finally forces the government to respond to the terrorists after the “moment of shock.” Thus, they manage to (again) participate in the discourse through their extreme perlocutionary act.

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Whether to “publish or not to publish” depends, on the one hand, on intrinsic selection criteria such as organizational and professional specifications, and, on the other hand, on extrinsic selection criteria such as subjective attitudes of publishers or journalists and their personal preferences (see Flegel & Chaffee, 1971). Cottle (2006, p. 23) calls the routine structures of television newsgathering and news presentation “communicative frames.” These frames, Cottle (2006, p. 23) surmises, are universally present among television journalists of diverse nationalities. Such frames include, in liberal democratic societies, demands for balance, independence and impartiality, for example. Within these “macro-frames” Cottle identifies the “dominant frame” as a news story that is largely based on a single source. This frame was shown to be influential in international terrorism reporting after the attacks of September 11, 2001: here, the focus was on the interpretation as a “War on Terror” (see Cottle, 2006, p. 35). Cottle sees the lack of inclusion of multiple perspectives as endangering democracy. News is mostly event-related and lacks far-­ reaching contextual references. Failure to present important background information can be taken as an indicator of biased reporting. According to Hafez (2002, p.  65), decontextualization can be understood as “the neglect of political, economic, social, and cultural cause-and-effect relationships.” Decontextualization thus proves particularly pernicious in the field of terrorism reporting and can be observed especially in agenda setting and status conferral on the occasion of acts of violence. Often, the reappraisal is event-related (episodic frame) and not background-­ related (thematic frame). Therefore, researchers such as Nimmer (2011, p.  231) call for terrorism discourses to always be embedded in socio-­ political, socio-economic, situational and textual contexts and not to present terrorism as an abstract, context-free threat. In reporting after an attack, journalists select and structure or evaluate the information available to them. In contrast to newsworthiness theory, which can be considered a micro-concept to explain selection decisions, framing can be described as a meso-concept, since frames – unlike simply named news values – describe complex and multidimensional structures (see Dahinden, 2006, p. 71). “News values can be understood as content-free universal schemas. In contrast, frames are constituted by content-bound schemata” (Scheufele, 2003, p.  106). The more news values a message fulfills, the higher its newsworthiness. The more frame-consistent aspects a message contains, the higher its value (see Scheufele, 2003, p. 106). Certainly, the approaches from semiotics are not yet fully developed, as they are not separable and the definitions of narratives, rhetorical stylistic devices, discourses, myths and, in the end, frames are similar and overlapping. It is not clear what the overarching concepts are and which subordinate theoretical building blocks could possibly be integrated into a more comprehensive model of ‘terrorism

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semiotics,’ especially as these would need to be differentiated according to the different actors (terrorists, journalists, politicians, citizens) and modes of communication (terrorist act, reporting, campaign speech, blog, etc.). But despite all the criticism that can be leveled at approaches from semiotics, interdisciplinary approaches that can be developed together with media scholars and linguists and then lead to semiotic analyses (also in a historical perspective) promise new insights here. These could also address the question of how certain personal attitudes, organizational constraints, and overall societal conditions explain individuals’ word choices and narratives, and how one can in turn infer these conditions via word choices and narratives. Such analyses could also turn to the degree of (consensus and action) mobilization that comes about through narratives and discourses to which a recipient is exposed, and, conversely, to the question of how such processes can be prevented. As case studies, discourses of the Turkish government could be analyzed in comparison to self-representations on websites of extremist Kurdish groups. With this strongly confrontational mirroring rhetoric of both groups, an intensification of the conflict is out of the question. Terrorist attacks as well as military counterattacks must be considered as discourse elements and violent responses to social discourse exclusions in such analyses. In this context, both deed and written and multimedia (online) representation are understood as communication. Various studies that refer to approaches in linguistics and theories of rhetoric showed the diversity of expressions and their connotations (see Sects. 4.6.2 and 4.9). Rhetoric has a high value in the context of terrorism. According to Austin’s (1962) and Searle’s (1971) speech act theory, terrorism has been classified as a perlocutionary act performed with the purpose of achieving a certain effect. The task of politicians is to prevent this intended effect from occurring, if possible. Of course, they have no power over the physical damage of the act (which has then already occurred), but they can help to reduce fear and terror in society by not using “reflective rhetoric” (Leeman, 1991), but by breaking off the discourse at the same level and pulling it to a higher discourse level instead (for examples see Sect. 4.9). Mirroring rhetoric also leads to even stronger rejection rather than conversion, especially among those who are already hostile to the politicians sending the message and their system. With regard to possible state interference in media reporting, three groups of measures were identified: (1) the “laissez-faire” attitude without any intervention, (2) state regulation of reporting, and (3) voluntary restraint through internal editorial guidelines or media guidelines proposed by media associations, although a major shortcoming was identified here. The UK with the Broadcasting Ban in the 1980s and the current situation in Turkey were cited as representative countries for attempts at interference. Communication studies also describes the

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close ­relationship between media and politics with terms such as the “CNN effect” and the “rally effect” (see Sect. 4.11). The example of the “Sipadan kidnapping” illustrated the meshing between media, politics and terrorism. If a government applies a well-thought-­out crisis management system that is underpinned by crisis communication theories and includes intensive crisis preparation and follow-up, it is easier to avoid mistakes in future crises. Therefore, states should rethink their crisis communication strategies and align them with research findings. The SCCT could be effectively applied to crises triggered by terrorist events, even if some of the response options modeled there, such as “apology” and “denial,” are not applicable. The SCCT would also need to be specified and extended, since, for example, an act of terrorism happens more unexpectedly than a hurricane and it is accordingly more difficult to prepare for the acute crisis phase. In addition, sensitive issues such as the restriction of freedoms, for example in the case of increased controls at airports and access to festivals and cultural events, must be communicated here. If one transfers the concept of peace journalism to the political actors, a conflict-sensitive communication strategy by the government can have a de-escalating effect, especially outside the acute crisis phase, because fundamentally the state faces the dilemma after an attack of “not being able to deal with violence consistently without becoming violent itself” (Neidhardt, 2006, p. 13). Thus, the state must balance intangible goods, norms and values – freedom and security, non-violence, reassurance through the demonstration of (inter)national strength, peace and justice from the perspective of different stakeholders. If, in this context, the theory of change is used as an extension of SCCT for communication and prevention processes, interventions should be considered that lead to a long-term end goal, i.e., no short-term military actions, for example. According to Frey (2004), one example of a government approach might be to disperse attention: If one names different groups as responsible for attacks, one deprives the actual group of “attention glory.” At the same time, however, one plays with credibility and attribution of competence: some citizens might deny politicians the ability to quickly identify the perpetrator(s). An even more radical demand, however, not voiced by a communication scholar but by the Tunisian psychoanalyst Fethi Benslama, is that the media should make a pact to always keep the attackers completely anonymous. An excerpt from an interview Benslama gave to Radio France Culture, printed in the Huffington Post, states: “Peut-être qu’il est temps […] qu’il y ait entre les mé-

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dias un pacte pour ne plus publier les noms et les images des auteurs de ces actes-là parce que c’est un ressort très important par rapport à ce qu’ils font pour être connu de toute la planète, alors même que leurs victimes sont anonymes et le resteront” (Benslama quoted in Bellamine, 2016). By remaining invisible, the attackers cannot be attributed status – this would be a d­ irect practical implementation of the media restraint demanded by status conferral theorists. However, the sense of fear could increase among recipients because the source of the fear cannot be named and made tangible but remains faceless and unidentified. Schultz (2017) also provides some suggestions for viable responsible terrorism reporting. For example, if possible, no photos of the perpetrators should be shown, but naming is allowed, the journalistic process should be made transparent (and this also includes saying that one does not know something at the moment), editorial guidelines and guides on terrorism reporting should be made available to all recipients, contexts should be presented and, above all, the media should take on a “constructive role” (Schultz, 2017, p. 113) by pointing out solutions, also and especially by reporting on scholarly findings from terrorism research. Overall, middle-range theories are well-suited for this research. They have a higher predictive potential and a better handling of application than basic theories such as constructivism, but they lack a high level of abstraction. They often remain at a highly descriptive level, for example the description of agenda entanglements. However, they are well-suited to guide empirical studies, as they can be used to design testable research models. Practicable counterterrorism measures can also be derived from the findings, as demonstrated below. Neidhardt (2006) points to the difficulty governments have in avoiding not only overreactions but also underreactions. In this context, it is important to take into account the increased risk sensitivity of the populace to the issue of “terrorism.” An overly demonstrative composure would weaken confidence in the state security apparatus. “The zero option is not available as a reaction pattern to terrorism under the conditions of mass communication and the population’s inclination to fear, at least in democracies” (Neidhardt, 2006, p. 12). If the government completely refrains from communicating with the perpetrators, this demonstrates a great moral distance and rejection of the act, but hardly remedies the problems. Where possible, governments make do by talking to the politically active and legal wings of the

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groups, such as Fatah or Sinn Féin.106 It should be critically noted that so far reference has been made almost exclusively to the communicative reaction possibilities of governments in democratic forms of government. In other political systems, other processes are conceivable. “In societies without functioning statehood, terrorism has the chance to develop into guerrilla warfare, and to compensate for state response deficits, a vigilantism of self-appointed law enforcers forms very easily as a consequence, which in its profile of terror is no longer distinguishable from the violence it claims to combat” (Neidhardt, 2006, p. 12). Colombia could be cited as an example here. The reflections culminate in the assumption that it is not possible for either politicians or the media not to react, not to respond to this powerful stimulus, that is, when the message of terrorism has reached them in an act of violence. “Citizens are entitled to information. They understandably want to know what happened, where dangers lurk, who was victimized, how and why, what motives and goals guide the perpetrators, and what authorities and politicians are doing to protect citizens” (Schultz, 2017, p. 103). The normative demands of what responsible terrorism reporting should look like must always take into account the underlying understanding of political participation. Is it based on a liberal-pluralist, a republican or a deliberative understanding of politics (see Althaus et al., 2016)? In the first case, the greatest possible transparency is paramount and forms the goal that reporting should achieve; in the second case, the news media should contribute to strengthening community and political unity; and finally, in a deliberative perspective, argumentative negotiation in discourse has top priority (see Althaus et  al., 2016, pp. 3–4). These differences also condition the different crisis communication strategies of governments. The political (security) authorities find themselves in a similar dilemma as journalists: they too would like to verify information first, need time to do so, but would like to report successes to the populace (and thus also to journalists) as soon as  At the micro level, transitions from terrorist organization to politically legitimized organization can be observed: Yasser Arafat, founder of Fatah, was “for years listed by the CIA and European intelligence services in their files as a top terrorist. To a younger generation, however, he is known as the president of the Palestinian Authority and as a Nobel Peace Prize winner (1994)” (Elter, 2008, p. 20). Sean McBride, former IRA member, also received the Nobel Peace Prize, as did Menachem Begin, former leader of the Irgun. Begin, leader of the Likud Party, was Prime Minister of Israel from 1977 to 1983. A similar case is presented by John Martin McGuinness, former member of the IRA, in whose car 113 kilograms of explosives and 5000 rounds of ammunition were found in 1973 (see Elter, 2008, p. 20). After his release from prison, he became deputy head of the Northern Ireland regional government and remained so until 2017. 106

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possible in order to demonstrate their competence. In the case of (airplane) hijackings, for example, state authorities must deal with passengers from different countries and are confronted with many different communication and negotiation partners for bilateral or multilateral talks and agreements, which requires time. Such aspects have not been sufficiently explored in communication studies research so far. In this respect, Schultz (2017, p. 100) criticizes the fact that the focus is primarily on the relationship between “terrorism and the media,” while the equally important and very delicate relationship between “journalists and security authorities” is largely ignored. Practical experience, starting with RAF terrorism in the 1970s and the taking of German hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s and ending with the “Wallert kidnapping” in 2000, shows that many actors are well aware of the “media as a disruptive factor.” “A government’s task in ending a hostage situation would be simpler (in the sense of less complex) if the media were not interested at all or could be kept out of it altogether. This was also explicitly stated several times by government officials as well as journalists in the cases considered” (Buck, 2007, p. 294). Buck’s (2007, p. 301) surveys support “the thesis that the work of the media in a hostage situation can significantly influence, and sometimes thwart, government action.” At times, the media overtly show themselves as the fourth estate. Sometimes they actively intervene in crisis scenarios and stir up emotions among members of the public. This can take the focus away from politicians making rational decisions. Vice versa, of course, it is also possible for the government to involve the media and use it for its own purposes if it understands and engages the media system. Therefore, there is an urgent need to reflect on “the right degree and manner of terror reporting […]. Within the limits of their constraints and logic of action, the media may well try to adopt the attitude of ‘heroic serenity’” (Schultz, 2017, pp. 109–110) And this applies to both terrorists and actionist politicians. An even more far-reaching, strongly normative approach opens up with conflict-sensitive journalism (see Sect. 4.10). This advocates that journalists actively position themselves as peace actors and leave the path of uninvolved, impartial reporting. The “professional storytellers,” as Wolfsfeld (1997, p.  1) calls journalists, can break their routines by not always serving certain narratives (see Sect. 4.8.3). For example, a counter-narrative (in this case, therefore, directed against terrorist actors and their ideologies) is intended to promote peace, democracy and constructive non-­ violent communication instead of violent ones. Critics of the approach would again see this as bias in reporting, which is rejected by proponents with the question of whether it could ever be criticized that media take sides too strongly in favor of peaceful coexistence.

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Neidhardt (2006, p. 10) seeks explanations for “how the relatively small stimuli that such microsystems [attackers, terrorist networks; author’s note] can trigger the large effects at the macro level of societies that have been observable again for some years now,” especially with regard to security policy and the formation of alliances against “terror,” which are borne by fear and anger in large parts of societies. Reception and effects research promises answers here.

4.12 Use, Reception and Impact of Terrorism-Related Messages

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

In this chapter, following Scheufele (2014, p. 125), “questions of mere attention to and use of media (content) are included in the use perspective. The reception perspective, on the other hand, looks at the actual reception and its modality. The effects perspective, in turn, encompasses the effects resulting from use and reception.” In addition, there are, of course, influences and interrelationships between the domains. Shoemaker and Reese (1991, p. 2) emphasize that it is equally important to examine the influences on the creation of media content as it is to examine the effects of media content on recipients. In this context, effects of communication are considered to be all “changes in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior through communication” (Merten, 2013, p. 11). Not every content is received in the same way by every actor. This depends on many variables and contextual factors. “It is consequently not sufficient to analyze statements of mass communication without the social context, in particular the cultivated interactive contacts, because it is precisely these that determine to a high degree how a statement is evaluated and thus also what effect it can have” (Merten, 1977, p. 165). The two-step flow of communication already mentioned in Sect. 3.1 reveals itself to be effective with regard

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to reception (Lazarsfeld et al., 1968 [1944], pp. 151–152), because it is precisely in reception that interpersonal communication plays an important role (see Picard, 1993, pp. 31–32). Not only media consumption is responsible for an individual’s stock of information and interpretation, but also other sources accessible, for example, through interpersonal communication. Section 4.12 focuses on theoretical concepts adapted in or originating from communication studies that address the phenomenon of “terrorism” and its effects (primarily mass-mediated). In addition, suitable empirical reception and impact studies are mentioned. After a short introduction, the chapter starts with the uses-­ and-­gratifications approach, leads to agenda setting on the audience agenda and to the concept of “status conferral” before dealing with the concepts of framing and priming, which are closely related to agenda setting.107 Finally, the chapter addresses cognitive as well as emotional effects, especially through the impact of visual content. Two thematically separate chapters deal with the theory of the spiral of silence and with effects on the economic sector, which are particularly virulent in the context of terrorism.

4.12.1 Uses and Gratifications

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

“Uses and gratifications (U&G) research deals with the individual uses made of mass media, and with the gratifications derived from that use” (Rosengren, 2000,  The connections between agenda setting, framing and priming and how strongly these concepts relate to (political) power are also shown by Entman (2007). He also addresses connections to the concept of news bias (see Sect. 4.7.2), which is also in the context of influence and power allocation. 107

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p. 21). Katz and Foulkes (1962, p. 379) were quick to emphasize a connection between the uses-and-gratifications approach and functional approaches as well as theories of popular culture. They describe the quintessence of the approach as asking “What do people do with the media?” instead of “What do the media do to people?” (Katz & Foulkes, 1962, p. 379). Consequently, the uses-and-gratifications approach perceives recipients as active audiences. In the context of terrorist attacks, recipients use the media in a variety of ways; for example, the Internet in particular experiences a boom in such times of crisis (see Emmer et  al., 2002). After September 11, 2001, for instance, people communicated via social networks on the web, via interpersonal communication in direct face-to-face speech, as well as via telephone. Dass (2008, pp. 232–235) found out in focus groups with Turkish migrants living in England that they showed increased and more diverse media use after the events of September 11, 2001 and turned to both Turkish and English TV news programs to compare them skeptically and critically. The Brussels population mainly used television and radio, i.e., traditional media, as sources of information after the attacks in 2015; however, one fifth of the respondents also used Facebook to search for information (see Crijns et al., 2017, p. 230). Outside of studies dealing with “9/11,”108 the reception of terrorism reporting explicitly against the theoretical background of the uses-and-gratifications approach has been little researched. Two directions are possible: on the one hand, one can think in the direction of the factual need for information and orientation; on the other hand, one can equally think in the direction of emotional need satisfaction. According to Schmid and de Graaf (1982, p. 68), reporting on crises and crimes has always had a positive effect on media sales figures. Violence is always newsworthy and strengthens the commercial function of the media. There is an audience that is interested in violence and considers the satisfaction of their interests in the form of substitutive experiences as a kind of “entertainment”: “violence in the media give them the thrill that is largely absent in their own adventureless lives” (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982, p. 69). The feeling of fear and threat thus exerts a kind of fascination on the reader. Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) assume a dependency of the civil society audience on the media and an accompanying change in opinions, behavior and

 The anthology by Greenberg (2002) contains a large number of empirical studies on media use, classification and the reaction of recipients shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, although these tend to be data presentations without a theoretical classification. Nacos et al. (2011) examined both the media products and the public mood with the help of opinion polls in the U.S. (above all via the iPoll archive) in the years after the attacks of September 11, 2001. 108

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feelings, especially in times of rapid social change and prominent social conflicts. Their “dependency model of mass-media effects” assumes a dependency of the audience on the media, especially in industrial societies, when there is uncertainty about upcoming decisions, such as going on vacation to a certain country or attending a major event. In times of crisis, both quantitative and qualitative media use increases, and it shifts “towards instrumental, targeted use” (Gehrau & Görke, 2008, p. 293).109 This is accompanied by a search for information that can satisfy the need for understanding and new information on the crisis. Recipients engage more intensively and attentively with the media offering and its content (see Gehrau & Görke, 2008, pp. 292–293). The attack or the crisis puts the audience in an “ad hoc state of alarm” (Gehrau & Görke, 2008, p. 292) and audience members react more sensitively to media information; thus, not only the use, but also the reception and effect are impacted. The terrorists have thus achieved one of their goals: “The goal of terrorism is to send a message, not defeat the enemy. […] Terrorism is about getting the public’s attention” (Moeller, 2009, p. 18). In this sense, it is once again evident that terrorists are not (only) concerned with physical damage, but they employ psychological warfare (see Norris et al., 2003, p. 20).

4.12.2 The Audience Agenda

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

 Media use research distinguishes between ritualized and instrumental use: “Rituals include reading the newspaper at the breakfast table as well as watching the evening news on television at a scheduled time. Instrumental use, on the other hand, describes the targeted seeking out of specific media content for a specific purpose” (Gehrau & Görke, 2008, p. 293). 109

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More than research into the reasons why people turn to media content and what benefits they derive from it, research into the setting of topics by recipients plays a role in terrorism-related communication studies. While agenda building and agenda setting were already presented in relation to the media agenda in Sect. 4.7.3, this is now also done – following the process schema – in relation to the audience agenda. Agenda setting among recipients takes place on an individual as well as on a systemic level, because on the one hand, personal involvement (am I personally affected by the issue or not) and media use are relevant, and on the other hand, complexity reduction in and for society plays a role (see Gehrau, 2014, pp. 3–6). Valenzuela (2014; see Fig. 4.7) sees a “high impact” of topics on the agenda of recipients only if the three relevance areas of social, personal and emotional importance apply, which build on the respective individual value framework. This is usually the case with a terrorist event in various gradations, which is why there is a high probability of agenda setting and issue salience, i.e., the prominence of a particular topic. The social relevance can be, for example, increased security measures in the social environment that affect the value of “freedom.” Personal relevance occurs when there is a conflict related to the ethnic group to which one belongs. And emotional relevance is manifested after an attack, when one feels frightened and perceives the value of “security” threatened. Many empirical studies on the reception of terror news show how influential news coverage can be. Through the mass media, recipients not only learn about new issues, but they also learn from the location (e.g., front page) and size (e.g., lead story) of a news item how much importance Social relevance

Values

Media exposure

Personal relevance

Emotional relevance

Issue salience

Fig. 4.7  “A proposed path model connecting values, NFO [need for orientation], and agenda-setting effects”. (Valenzuela, 2014, p. 59)

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they should attach to this or that issue (McCombs & Shaw, 1972, p. 176). In an experiment by Iyengar and Kinder (1987), subjects watched (manipulated) news at a university for a week and then completed a questionnaire on the importance of issues and their evaluation of them. Certainly, it should be noted here that the age of the study limits any applicability of the findings to today’s online environment. One of the findings concerns agenda setting: “television news powerfully influences which problems viewers regard as the nation’s most serious […] – all these (and more) become high priority political issues for the public only if they first become high priority news items for the networks” (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, p. 4). A terrorist attack is also attributed special significance via TV and online video coverage, which is related to the impact of the visual (see Sects. 4.8.2 and 4.12.7). If one’s own ethnic or social “affected group,” i.e. African Americans, Tamils, unemployed, Hindus, etc., is the focus of the report, the subjects rate the topic as significantly more important if they belong to this very group (see Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, p. 49; see also the relevance areas just mentioned according to Valenzuela, 2014). The reaction to an attack is also a question of identification: “If we identify with the victim of violence, we suffer psychologically, feel humiliated, disoriented, intimidated – a victory of sorts for the terrorist. On the other hand, if we identify with the man with the bomb or gun, he has won a new ally in his struggle. Either way he is strengthened” (Schmid, 1989, p. 545). Agenda setting functions, as it were, as “an agenda of public problems” (Rössler, 1997, p. 22). The media draw the attention of large sections of society to a particular issue and stimulate public discourse. News values play a role, as does the sudden appearance of the topic (see Rogers & Dearing, 2007, p. 91). In the case of a terrorist attack, both factors apply: It is an important event because of its spreading of fear, and it occurs quickly and surprisingly. Altheide (1987, p. 162) calls terrorists “successful communicators” in terms of getting “on the media agenda” – not in terms of any resulting positive coverage, as this is often withheld from terrorists. Whereas Rogers and Dearing (2007, p. 82), in their agenda-setting model originally from 1988, still applied some arrows in the sense of a unidirectional effect and saw no influence of the audience agenda on the media agenda, Schenk (2007; see Fig. 4.8) locates the influences reciprocally from different agendas, which is certainly also true in the case of terrorism reporting, public opinion on “terrorism” and, for example, security policy measures. The “spectacular event of terrorist attack” might furthermore gain importance through reality indicators such as oppression of certain ethnic groups, theft of resources or the like. Influential media, in turn, engage in agenda setting for other media, which then also cover these topics and thus create an awareness of certain facts among more and more people. Research is also increasingly looking at the role of Web 2.0 with regard to agenda

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Gatekeepers, influential and opinionleading media, spectacular events

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Personal experiences and interpersonal communication among elites and other individuals

Media agenda

Audience agenda

Political agenda

Real-world indicators about the meaning of a topic or event

Fig. 4.8  Agenda setting model. (Schenk, 2007, p. 439)

setting (see Tran, 2014). There, topics can spread virally without the intervention of the media and only subsequently find their way onto the media and/or political agenda. Particularly in view of the manifold online activities of terrorist groups (see Sect. 4.2.3), this method of dissemination is becoming increasingly relevant. The model (Fig. 4.8) shows different directions of influence; in the quadrangle at the outset of the chapter, only the arrows from terrorism (and politics) to the media and from the media to the public have been bolded, as this flow is the focus here. Finally, Rössler (1997, p. 25) creates a link between agenda setting and constructivism: “Reality is present, but as a whole it cannot be depicted objectively, rather it is always at least intersubjectively mediated. The agenda-setting approach attributes to the media the ability to exert an influence on the individual’s image of reality through their ranking of relevant issues.” However, not only the individual ranking, but also the collective audience in the social system is influenced in terms of topics: “Social agenda-setting generally describes the diffusion processes in the course of which topics and events are accentuated by mass media and subsequently occupy a prominent place on the public agenda” (Rössler, 1997, p.  390). Here, Rössler (1997, p.  390) sees points of connection to Luhmann’s systems theory: “The topic structure generated by media coverage thus contributes to the fulfillment of existing needs for orientation. In this reading, the agenda-setting mechanism represents one of those filters that screens out of the quasi-infinite pool of existing information that which is relevant to the respective target group as a

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s­ ubsystem.” The “reality indicators” can be compressed or emphasized, i.e., constructed, by the media in order to determine the significance they wish to assign to a certain fact, the status they accord it. If images of an attack are added, they reinforce the agenda-setting effect through emotions: “Horror, revulsion, astonishment, and intimidation are common reactions. These images convey importance and reinforce the agenda-setting function of the media, and also advance the social construction of reality surrounding the meaning and interpretation of a terrorist act” (Bowen, 2005, p. 69). After a concrete attack, the abstract, latently existing topic of “terrorist threat” gains momentum again and sets the agenda, not only of politicians and the media, but of civil society as a whole. This is why the newer society has already been called a “threat society” (Nohrstedt, 2010, p. 20). Empirical studies also confirm the assumptions of agenda setting in relation to terrorism issues: Hewitt (1992) correlated the number of fatalities from attacks with the results of surveys on the extent to which terrorism is the main public concern for the populace and found for Spain in the years 1979–1982: “within Spain, the changing level of concern is closely linked to the monthly death totals. Indeed, it is striking how quickly public attitudes change in respect to short-term fluctuations in the numbers killed” (Hewitt, 1992, p. 180). It was remarkable, however, that it was not in the Basque Country but in the other parts of Spain that this “worry rate” was highest. Hewitt’s (1992, p. 180) explanation: in areas with high rates of violence, the local population has already become accustomed to these living conditions. However, in Ireland, where Protestants were the main victims of terrorist attacks in 1982, they cited “terrorism” as the country’s biggest problem, whereas among Catholics, high unemployment ranked first (see Hewitt, 1992, p.  180). These findings once again support the plea to the journalism system to report on the simmering conflicts even in non-acute times of crisis and to choose thematic, not exclusively episodic, accounts. In this way, the insurgents would also receive “status attribution” not only for their acts of violence, but also for non-violent activities, that is, they would be perceived by recipients.

4.12.3 Status Conferral: The Attribution of Importance The quantity of reporting alone says nothing about the way it is perceived by the recipients, but it can contribute to a certain attribution of status (status conferral) to a terrorist group, although this does not mean that the group is thereby given legitimacy (see Schmid, 1989, p. 561). The concept of status conferral goes back to Lazarsfeld and Merton in Lyman Bryson’s anthology “The Communication of Ideas” (see Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1964 [1948]). It means: “persons and groups

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gain status and become viewed as important when they are covered by the media” (Picard, 1993, p. 38); a group is selected from a multitude of groups, it is valued as “newsworthy.” The concept thus also carries a component from media content research, as firstly journalists ascribe status to the group. However, since this then also applies to the recipients, the concept is only cited at this point in the process diagram (see Fig. 3.6). Lazarsfeld and Merton (1964 [1948], p. 101) describe the status conferral function of the media as follows: “The mass media confer status on public issues, persons, organizations and social movements. Common experience as well as research testifies that the social standing of persons or social policies is raised when these command favorable attention in the mass media. […] But this is only one element in the status conferral function of the mass media, for enhanced status accrues to those who merely receive attention in the media, quite apart from any editorial support.” The authors explicitly refer not only to an image gain through a positive status attribution in the media, but to a gain in importance that comes about independently of favorable reporting. The person who is reported on has distinguished himself by overcoming the hurdles of selection; his behavior or opinion was significant enough to generate a report for the public (see Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1964 [1948], p. 101). The status attribution approach captures phenomena such as the media’s stylizing of Osama bin Laden as a (negative) leader figure after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Arab media in particular “covered him as America’s number one public enemy. […He] was covered as frequently and prominently as the world’s most influential legitimate leaders or sometimes even more frequently and prominently. The attention conferred to him by both the mass media and political leaders elevated him as much to a global leading figure” (Weimann, 2008, p. 73). A similar thing happened with the organization behind him: “Al-Qaeda is overestimated and – with the aid of the media – positively built up through the schematic attribution of all possible terrorist actions” (Japp, 2007, p.  188). This schematization leads to self-reinforcement and latent insecurity (see Japp, 2007, p. 188). Al-­Qaeda, with Osama bin Laden as its mouthpiece, was strongly personalized by the media and thus acquired a certain celebrity status. “By celebrity we mean the generalized ability of an actor to attract public attention” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 74). In this respect, status conferral is similar to the concept of agenda setting, which also involves prioritizing issues for the public agenda. Only the perspective of valence – the object that makes it onto the agenda is ascribed a highlighted status – does not contain agenda setting in this form. In this respect, status conferral can complement agenda setting and offer an extended theoretical model, especially for terrorism reporting and its effects.

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Cruel behavior can therefore increase status, especially notoriety, which does not mean that the media thereby endanger existing social values. On the contrary, by showing what deviates from the norm, the media can also strengthen the values prevailing in the public (see Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1964 [1948], p. 104). It simply depends on the context in which the act is presented. “Media not only thematize terrorism (agenda setting), but also shape the public perspective on the events and their valence (priming, framing)” (Glück, 2008, p. 32). These two aspects will be the focus of the following.

4.12.4 Effects of Media Framing

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

Priming, framing and agenda setting are related concepts (see Entman, 2007; Peter, 2002, p. 21; see Sect. 4.7.3). The agenda setting concept deals with “the influence of the media on the perceived importance of issues” (Peter, 2002, p. 21). Framing is considered second-level agenda setting.110 “Agenda setting can thus be seen as another name for successfully performing the first function of framing: defining problems worthy of public and government attention” (Entman, 2007, p.  164). Terrorist groups also “frame” through certain omissions and emphases in their online texts, perhaps hoping that recipients will adopt the desired interpretations. Whereas Sect. 4.8.3 dealt with framing by journalists, this section will now focus on the adoption or rejection of frames by recipients, where conceptual overlaps become apparent. Frames are encoded by media producers and decoded by media recipients (see Dahinden, 2006, p. 82). Of course, the encoding and decoding pro Seeing framing as the second stage of agenda setting is also suggested by Tuchman (1978, p. 2). 110

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cesses do not proceed in the same (intended) way. Among the recipients there are in turn very different readings and “frame decoding competences.” In the case of attacks by ethnically motivated terrorist groups, for example, it depends with which ethnicity the recipient identifies. Frames are not directly and manifestly recognizable, but rather as “latent patterns of interpretation hidden in texts or in the consciousness of individuals” (Dahinden, 2006, p. 202). Therefore, the effect on the recipient is often, but not exclusively, influenced by media use (see Dahinden, 2006, p. 218). Marcinkowski (2014) conceptualizes framing as a political process and struggle for interpretive sovereignty. “Initially, it can be about increasing public attention to social conditions and recommending them for political treatment, whereby certain interpretations are assumed to have more appeal and generate more shock than others. Once an issue is established as a subject of political consideration, framing can help the particular preferred course of action gain traction because certain interpretations of the problem suggest certain government actions more closely than others” (Marcinkowski, 2014, p.  9). For example, the extent to which a group can make its deprivations explicit and the extent to which the state feels able to remedy them is crucial. In terrorism research, the framing perspective based on public and movement theory plays a particularly decisive role. Some authors, for example, devote themselves to the question of how social movements (often also outside the boundaries of the legitimate) try to enforce their interpretive patterns, recruit followers, and score strategic successes in the battle of ideas and ideologies (see Snow & Benford, 1988; Scheufele & Engelmann, 2016, p. 446). Here, the sequence often goes from actors to media content to recipients.111 “In the effects-based approach, the media frame represents the independent variable for studying framing effects on the recipient” (Haußecker, 2013, p. 46). Sociologist Erving Goffman112 (1986, p. 27) speaks of primary frameworks as being dependent on individuals and culture; “a primary framework is one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful” (Goffman, 1986, p. 21). A particular event is thus interpreted within a schema (“framework”). The (written) language of the media sets such a particular schema which directs the recipient’s reception in one direction or another. Depending on whether an event is perceived as real or as mediated, different frames or certain frames come to the fore to different degrees. Frames are thus directly related to involvement (see Goffman, 1986, p. 345).  Entman’s (2003) “cascading activation model” describes how frames are passed on or changed, starting with sources such as politicians, etc., via the media to the public. 112  Goffman (1986) is a reprint of the original 1974 edition. 111

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Iyengar (1991) examined TV news in terms of the distinction between episodic and thematic news frames.113 The episodic frame focuses on specific events or cases, while the thematic frame places political issues and events in a general context (see Iyengar, 1991, p.  2). Television news mostly conforms to the episodic frame. Iyengar (1991, p. 27) notes for news stories on terrorism on ABC, CBS, and NBC between 1981 and 1986 that there is a strong event bias: “74 percent of all news stories on terrorism consisted of live reports of some specific terrorist act, group, victim, or event, while 26 percent consisted of reports that discussed terrorism as a general political problem.” Attributions of responsibility (see Sect. 4.4), for example, of specific political problems to a government, depend on the different framing: While thematic stories reinforced attributions of responsibility to government and society, episodic stories had the opposite effect on recipients (see Iyengar, 1991, p. 3). A frequent excess of episodic framing results in a trivialization of politics and those responsible for it. For example, if a terrorist attack was reported in the thematic framing of general political unrest, causal attributions to society and government came to the fore. When the attack was highlighted in episodic framing, viewers attributed responsibility to the individual characters of the terrorists (see Iyengar, 1991, p. 39). In this latter framing, approval was cited for measures such as military counterattacks or the death penalty. When societal reasons were emphasized, the president’s reputation among recipients simultaneously declined; but when individuals, i.e., terrorists, were held responsible, this did not negatively affect the president’s reputation (see Iyengar, 1991, p. 114). However, the party affiliation of the U.S. subjects also played a role here (see Iyengar, 1991, p. 119). Hodges (2011) examined speeches by then President Bush between September 2001 and March 2008 using discourse analysis of the “war on terror” narrative as well as its transfer to the media and to citizens or students. His goal was to see to what extent a narrative introduced at the macro level infiltrates discourses at the micro level (see Hodges, 2011, p. 4). In this case, the “war on terror” narrative was able to effectively penetrate all levels because of its catchiness and brevity. Frames thus form patterns of interpretation or interpretive frameworks for (terrorist) events. They offer possibilities to explain, understand and make sense of events. Especially in a case of conflict, media can thus  – consciously or unconsciously  – steer the reader in a certain direction. If there is a consensus among the information elites regarding a certain problem, the media find it more difficult to frame it in a clearly  Iyengar (1991, p. 11) provides this definition: “the concept of framing refers to subtle alterations in the statement or presentation of judgment and choice problems, and the term ‘framing effects’ refers to changes in decision outcomes resulting from these alterations.” 113

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controversial way. Depending on the level of uncertainty in the decision-making circles, the media can exert more or less influence. In addition, it is also important to consider the work of active strategic framing, i.e., the launching of planned actions to steer coverage in a particular direction. For example, a targeted escalation strategy is chosen so that a group is associated with and presented in conjunction with violent images. Framing also happens in acute crisis reporting: “The crisis forms the interpretive framework, so to speak, in which other information is interpreted. Thus, all information becomes potential components of the crisis” (Gehrau & Görke, 2008, p. 294). During certain national crises, there is also a higher receptivity because of the high level of involvement (see Sect. 4.12.2). The effects of frames therefore move in different directions: Frames can offer readers orientation by reducing complexity, but can also result in stereotypical, simplifying reporting (see Dahinden, 2006, p.  20). Accordingly, violence can be stereotypically portrayed not only as a cruel act, but also as a means of propagating ideas (see Desantes Guanter, 1990, p. 127). The recipient is (sometimes also mis)guided or influenced in his perception of reality by frames and stereotypes in the media, so that it seems worth discussing whether there can be talk of a politically “objectively” informed, mature and independently deciding citizen. Haußecker (2013, p. 14) attributes a “significant role” to visual framing in terrorism reporting in particular.114 The government’s loss of control is transported by emotionalizing images of chaos and catastrophe, i.e., “uncertainty, unpredictability” (Haußecker, 2013, p. 15). However, the transfer from frame to direction of opinion does not always succeed and can even achieve the opposite, as a boomerang effect: “This is understood to mean those effects of persuasive messages which correspond exactly to the opposite of the intended persuasion” (Dahinden, 2006, p. 101), for example when a terrorist group wants to gain followers or win people over, but they are then alienated by too much violence and experience empathy with the victims. To describe the problem in asymmetric conflicts, the media often use the David and Goliath frame. A small insurgent seeks a fight with a large state power. This frame can also be found in terrorism reporting. Another frame for terrorism can be the search for those responsible for the damage and, furthermore, the question of (appropriate) reactions to the incident. This can be discussed with a lesser or a greater level of controversy. The frame for the perception of the actors is already determined by the chosen labels such as criminal, martyr, etc. (see Sect. 2.1.5). The framing effects of political and media labeling were investigated by Montiel and  In her work, Haußecker (2013, p. 17) understands terrorism as “a violent communication strategy staged via the media,” although it is questionable to what extent a strategy can be violent in itself. 114

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Shah (2008). Using Christian and Muslim Malays and Filipinos as examples, they found that socially disadvantaged groups preferred the “freedom fighter” frame to the “terrorist” frame; the reverse was true for groups in dominant social positions. When frames are similar in many media outlets, particularly influential ones, a certain opinion climate can emerge in society. The collective understanding of an audience resembles the knowledge contained in the public sphere115 (see Scheufele, 2003, p.  44). Framing occurs on three levels, which can be similar in terms of frames: among journalists, who process facts for recipients; among recipients, i.e., citizens, who consume media content; and among public actors such as political groups, business enterprises or similar associations, who announce or interpret facts and want to make their view of them clear (see Scheufele, 2003, p.  47). Furthermore, everyone has their own expectations of certain circumstances, which they have formed, among other things, on a discursive level (with colleagues, those of similar political orientation, in the family, etc.). In contrast to agenda setting, which only focuses on the “putting on the agenda” of certain topics, and in contrast to priming, which refers to the way in which certain public actors are assessed, framing describes the phenomenon that recipients, when looking at an issue, perceive it in very specific grids and frames. A frame is a kind of “horizon of expectations” (Scheufele, 2003, p. 213). If a judgment must be made during later reception, the previous frame may be unconsciously applied again. The longer the interval between the frame impulse and the judgment, the more likely the recipient is to again make increased use of chronically accessible schemata. Such chronic schemata can also be formed by long-lasting cumulative and consonant media coverage. An example often mentioned in this regard is the condemnation of Muslim citizens after the attacks and the media coverage after 9/11. “If media cumulatively address certain reasons or explanations, recipients will decreasingly draw on the previous attribution […] but increasingly the mediated one” (Scheufele, 2003, p. 66). The schemata for causal attribution are changed by the media frames (transformation effect) or even created in the first place (establishment effect). Thus, with long-lasting consonant cause attribution for certain terrorism phenomena, a sameness could emerge among recipients’ schemas. For example, as a negative attribute, newspapers might always emphasize the reprehensibility of terrorists’ use of violence. On the other hand, they could also focus their attention on the “right to autonomy” of separatists, which could translate into more positive evaluations among recipients. If separatist groups that declare their part of  Knowledge here means “cognitive structures that are socially mediated and changed” (Scheufele, 2003, p. 44). Knowledge is formed through patterns of discourse and interpretation, frames and the like. 115

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the country to be illegitimately part of a larger state have their say in the media, they arouse the feeling among the populace that they can change this state through collective action and thus create potential for identification. If the media did not allow the separatists to have their say, this process might not take place. The frame of reference of the portrayal is therefore quite decisive for the public image. Norris, Kern and Just (2003, p. vii)116 see terrorists as initiators of coverage, but after this “initial effect” they are said to be deprived of power over framing (see Norris et al., 2003, p. 9) – however, claims of responsibility can exert further influence. Norris et al. (2003, p. 10) see the selection of sources, the journalist’s personal view, as well as editorial routines and predetermined decision-making paths as essentially determining the frame (see Sect. 4.8.3). Frames are created by structuring and weighting facts, and to some extent by simplification. No matter where in the world an attack happens along the lines of “unanticipated targeted violence with a political goal,” journalists can frame it with the “terrorism frame.” “Without knowing much, if anything, about the particular people, groups, issues, or even places involved, the terrorist and anti-terrorist frame allows us to quickly sort out, interpret, categorize, and evaluate these conflicts. Conventional news frames never provide a comprehensive explanation of all aspects of any terrorist act, leaving some important puzzles unresolved, while accounting for those factors which best fit the particular interpretation of events” (Norris et  al., 2003, p.  11). In Norris et  al.’s model, the framing process for terrorist events looks like that shown in Fig. 4.9.117 The direct (e.g., political) actor is left out; it is included in “government frame” or “policy agenda.” By “societal culture,” Norris et al. (2003, p. 12) mean the prevailing norms, values and beliefs in a community. In many cases, within this culturally homogeneous community, there is a consistent view of the angle from which a particular terrorist organization and its acts are observed; this then affects the opinions of the government, the public as well as journalists. The “news frame” determines what the public learns about the group that perpetrated the attack, how to judge it, and how to weigh risks and dangers in the future. Government officials’  In their anthology “Framing Terrorism” Norris et  al. focus on the following questions: “how are interpretative frames about terrorism generated and to what extent are they reinforced by the news media? Do common news frames shape patterns of media coverage of terrorism in different contexts and cultures […]? Do conventional news frames about terrorism have the power, as many assume, to affect public opinion […]?” (Norris et al., 2003, p. vii). However, the authors only provide hypothetical approximations and no answers to the questions. 117  The schema largely corresponds to that of Schenk (2007, p. 439; see Fig. 4.8), except that the box “Media agenda” has been replaced by “News frame.” 116

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Personal experience and interpersonal communications Government frame

Social Culture

Terrorist event

News frame

Public opinion

Policy agenda

Group frame Real-world indicators

Fig. 4.9  “Model of the framing process for terrorist events”. (Norris et al., 2003, p. 12)

responses are also shaped directly by the “news frame” and indirectly through public opinion. But the media frame is only one of several factors that guide public opinion. Indicators from the “real” world (e.g., number of plane crashes), personal experience, and interpersonal communication have the same effect. However, Norris et al. (2003, p. 13) assume that the dominant media frame has a strong influence on public reactions. Government representatives are always concerned that the “official” frame they project prevails in the reporting. Those in power often try to unambiguously demonize the terrorists, as also happened after the attacks of September 11, 2001: “Without anyone on television having any political intention in doing so, the continuous television communication about interpretations of the events in New York and Washington meant that there was a lot of talk about war and retaliation in the mass media construction of September 11, 2001. As a consequence, this was bound to make the German public particularly receptive to the military counter-terrorism strategy subsequently proposed by the U.S.-led anti-terrorism alliance” (Weller, 2002, p. 3). The more frequently certain connections (such as “ETA” and “terrorism” or “Al-Qaeda” and “terrorism”) are repeated in the media, especially in quotes from official sources (frequency), the more strongly they become imprinted in the minds of the recipients (recognition) and create in the reader a positive environment and framework for imprinting this mode of explanation (familiarity) (see Moeller, 2009, p. 126). Sometimes frames are also visible in the manner in which the media assign certain terrorist actions to certain countries by attributing them to certain terrorist groups. This can lead to these countries automatically being

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“­ devalued” in the perception of the populace, which in turn can increase hostility at all three levels of society: between individual citizens, between companies and organizations, and between the states concerned. As soon as different perspectives on a topic exist or an event is included and interpreted in different contexts, a kind of competition for interpretive sovereignty begins. According to Canel (2012, p. 215), in such “framing contests” the winner is the organization that shows the highest capacity to create “areas of shared meaning” with different audiences. Whoever can get public opinion on their side has (temporarily) won the “framing contest” (see Canel, 2012, p. 215). The reception of the framing of the messages happens individually against the backdrop of one’s own experience. “One of psychology’s major insights is that perception, categorization, and memory are not direct reflections of life outside the mind, but are actively shaped by expectancies and prior experience. […] The everyday act of reading the news is one arena in which nuances in reporting may shape how events are perceived, and ultimately judged and remembered” (Dunn et al., 2005, pp. 67–68). This shows the close connection between framing and priming. Finally, in relation to agenda setting, framing and priming, reference should be made to Merten (1977), who speaks of a “presumption of knowledge” that comes about through mass communication. The public agenda is fed by media consumption, especially in the case of terrorist events, in which only a few people are directly involved – compared to the public, which is informed later. In interpersonal conversations “the next day” it is then assumed that the counterpart or the majority of civil society knows about the incidents. This is followed by “the formation of widely homogenized or homogenizable opinions” (Merten, 1977, p. 147). “The condition for [the] possibility of socially shared or even public opinion is apparently the freedom to verbally negate what is written, that is, the differentiation of topics and the evaluation of these topics. […] This connection to the topic, however, has the consequence that already the publication of a topic is not only a report on an event, a mediation of knowledge, but at the same time also has the character of an implicit reference to existing possible opinions on this topic” (Merten, 1977, pp. 147–148). Here Merten makes the connection to framing and priming.118 This often comes about through media coverage, but can also be based, especially in the case of interested recruits, on opinions published by terrorists, for example through positions in communiqués on autonomy or the recognition of parts of the country.

 The relation between framing and priming has already been elaborated in principle by Fish (1976), without recourse to these terms. 118

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4.12.5 Priming: Judgment on the Part of the Recipient Peter (2002, p. 22) sees media priming as a special form of the general priming known in psychology, in which “a variety of environmental events can increase the accessibility of stored knowledge.” Since in media priming this phenomenon occurs via information from the media, he defines it as the “process in which 1) mass-­ mediated information (as ‘primes’) makes existing units of knowledge 2) temporarily more accessible in the recipient’s memory” (Peter, 2002, p. 22). “The priming approach postulates that recipients not only consider the topics on which the mass media report particularly frequently to be especially important, but furthermore, they also increasingly use them to form judgments about politicians and as criteria for voting decisions” (Maurer, 2010, pp. 23–24). Thus, media not only influence agendas and create attention, but also affect image formation, attitude changes, and behavioral options (see Weimann, 1983, pp. 38–39). Of course, changes in opinion are not exclusively traceable to media reporting. As with the uses-and-gratifications approach, priming, unlike framing, has been the subject of few studies in the field of terrorism research. Iyengar and Kinder (1987, p. 5) examined priming effects regarding approval or disapproval of the U.S. president: When TV news focused on national defense, priming was evident among recipients in that they judged the president on how successful he had been with regard to national defense. If the issue of terrorism is prominent especially before presidential elections, it can influence the outcome of the elections. When President Carter was voted out of office, the media’s focus on the failed negotiations during the Iranian hostage crisis played a role (see Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, p.  106). Furthermore, in an experimental study, Weimann (1983, p. 38) found that receiving news about terrorism could change media consumers’ attitudes about terrorism, especially those who held more tenuous opinions about it. Weimann surveyed the attitudes of 80 college students before and after they read articles about one terrorist attack each. The results partially confirm assumptions of consistency theory, which assumes that cognitive dissonance causes psychological states of tension: participants with moderate concerns about terrorism changed their evaluations after reading the articles; participants with extreme concerns maintained their attitudes (Weimann, 1983, p. 43). Accordingly, the former group sought to resolve the cognitive states of tension. The trilogy of agenda setting, framing and priming becomes clear in Glück’s (2007) study: Glück compared the results of her content analysis of a politically clearly positioned pro-Basque as well as a Spanish newspaper with issue-related surveys of Spanish research institutes and found that the respondents oriented their

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issue agenda to that of the media when they were asked to name important events. “Respondents followed the lines given by the media in evaluating and also prioritizing important issues” (Glück, 2007, p.  28). Basques still deviated most frequently from “media opinions,” which Glück explains by the fact that they experience certain events or politicians on the ground and thus do not rely exclusively on mediated opinion. The perception of the recipients, which is ultimately reflected in their actions and their communications, is thus subject to complex processes. Recurrent interactions and communications of individuals in their networks can lead to changes in cognitions and emotions, which in turn create other conditions for priming. Fundamentally, however, cognitive systems “have a tendency to behave conservatively” (Hejl, 1992, p. 278). This means that people like to hold on to what is already there  – often also perceived as majority pressure. The return to patriotism already mentioned above (see Sect. 4.7.2) “obligated” media, politicians as well as citizens to conform to this sentiment. Just as the majority strives to integrate dissenting opinions, there is a willingness of minorities to join the majority (see Hejl, 1992, p. 278). The majority opinion of the system is largely impervious to divergent individual communications and interactions, insofar as they do not use the violent mode of communication to force attention. The framing of the media is reflected, as shown, in the priming of the recipients. A terrorist attack and its protagonists are perceived by news recipients as a particularly vehement danger because an attack still represents a relatively new risk, and dangers of a catastrophic nature that claim many victims at once increase the perception of risk in society, even if other dangers are statistically much higher (see Woods, 2007, p. 5). Moreover, certain article topics and attack descriptions can be reflected in emotional reactions and political attitudes: “Both fear of terror and anger at government increased demand for anti-Muslim policies” (Matthes et al., 2019, p. 948). Empirically it can only be assumed so far that recipients, according to the priming thesis, evaluate political actors primarily against the criteria of defending against terrorism. Aust and Zillmann (1996), who turned to the effects of “victim exemplification” (i.e., articles in which a problem is illustrated by the example of a victim) – albeit using the example of salmonella – came to the conclusion that danger was rated higher after reading emotionally stirring articles with a victim perspective than after reading non-emotional texts. A threat is also rated as particularly “close” if it has a high degree of salience in the cognitive stimulus system, for example, if an image of it quickly comes to mind (such as the burning towers of the World Trade Center). According to Woods (2007, p. 5), salience in journalistic articles on September 11, 2001 has tended to decrease, as the topic of “terrorism” has drifted over time away from the specific attack towards related topics such as the financial market (see Sect. 4.12.8) or tourism security. Risk

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p­ erception also decreases when reporting is balanced, i.e., with pro and con arguments as well as several relativizing sources (see Woods, 2007, p. 5). The selection of opinions presented and their classification are thus decisive for priming. “Opinions then likewise represent a case of reflexive communication, in which a topic is chosen on the propositional level and opinions about it are developed on the meta level; those opinions may be divergent. Here, too, the consequence is that the abandonment of a truth norm for statements mobilizes creative divergences which become the basis of all reasoning, indeed of all science par excellence, and which recur in a different guise as ‘public opinion’” (Merten, 1977, p. 141). Public opinion119 is thus a kind of attitude towards a state of affairs that is widespread in society (see Lazarsfeld, 1993 [1968], p. 32). One can also consider public opinion as a system and ascribe various dimensions to it (see Lazarsfeld, 1993 [1968], p. 32): the direction of the opinion, the communication structure, i.e., the various components shaping the opinion, which also includes the mass media, and the basis on which the consensus takes place, for example a liberal-democratic basic consensus in the audience belonging to a certain (nation-state) society. It is precisely this basic consensus that terrorists wish to attack and unsettle, and therefore they make use of the communication structure that provides access to many opinions. Security in the nation-state, for example, is to be removed through acts of terrorism, and the opinion that a certain area should be granted autonomy is to be strengthened. In order for such mediation processes to get underway, the media must first report on the terrorist act or group, put it on their “agenda.” If the media then express a strong opinion, this can have an effect on the public climate of opinion, in the sense of the spiral of silence.

4.12.6 Terrorism Reporting and the Spiral of Silence “Opinions gain their often-irrational influence precisely because they are themselves based on a reflexive structure in the social dimension: On the belief that and what others believe” (Merten, 1977, p. 148). Wherever public space arises, the so-­ called spiral of silence (despite all criticism of it, see Rössing, 2011, pp. 83–87 for

 Noelle-Neumann dates the use of the term “public opinion” “entirely in the modern sense” (Noelle-Neumann, 1998, p. 81) to the year 50 BCE, referring to a letter from Cicero to Atticus. The term “climate of opinion” was probably first used by Joseph Glanvill in 1661 (see Noelle-Neumann, 1998, p. 81). The phrase “climate of opinion” then came into fashion at the end of the seventeenth century (see Lazarsfeld, 1993 [1968], p. 33). Since the Enlightenment, “public opinion” has also increasingly been used in the sense of “published opinion.” 119

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a summary) can also come into play. Noelle-Neumann (1998, p. 86) herself explains the spiral of silence as follows, namely that “almost all people in a society form opinions about which conventions to adhere to, or in current disputes, which is the morally approved position that one can take publicly without isolating oneself, without making oneself unpopular, and which position is the weaker one and is condemned. When a position is taken by the majority of influential media, and the populace becomes increasingly convinced of that position, the adherents of that view become increasingly bold and speak out loudly and confidently in public, thereby infecting others to speak out in public as well. At the same time, adherents of the opposing view become insecure and fearful and lapse into silence, infecting others to also remain cautiously silent in public. Thus, the first camp appears stronger than it really is, and the opposite camp weaker than it really is. And thus the spiral of silence – one can also say the spiral of speech – gets going and decides which opinion will prevail in the battle for public opinion.” Accordingly, public opinion often prevails not on the basis of factual arguments, “but via moral charges” (Noelle-Neumann, 1998, p. 87). The media can influence this struggle for the distribution of power in a political system as well as upcoming decisions. Consistency theory (see Sect. 4.12.5) is at work here: people strive for consonance and usually only consume or remember media messages that are consistent with their previous opinion. People prefer to avoid inconsistencies or dissonances. But this is exactly the case when talking to other citizens: One does not want to deviate from the (perceived) group opinion and then prefers to remain silent. This is also the result of a study by Spencer and Croucher (2008) on the public perception of ETA in Spain. The spiral of silence effect was stronger the closer the participants in the study were to the Basque Country (geographically as well as culturally). That is, they did not reveal that they had a positive attitude towards ETA and Basque nationalism in general. In the same way, a spiral of silence can also develop with regard to the attributions of responsibility already elaborated in Sect. 4.4. Attributing blame other than in the direction of the terrorists is thus hardly possible in public without having to fear social sanctions. Addressing errors in one’s own system is forbidden by “social etiquette” and also by solidarity with the victims. Schenk and Pfenning (1991, p. 168) see three levels that influence the formation of personal opinion: on the micro level individual value attitudes, on the meso level involvement in group structures and the relationship to opinion leaders, and on the macro level the perception of public opinion and the content of the mass media. After an empirical investigation, they come to the conclusion that “above all, the subjective perception of the tendency of the public opinion climate is decisive” (Schenk & Pfenning, 1991, p.  181). Accordingly, the macro level determines

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i­ndividual judgment behavior. This is supported by the findings of the information service “Media Monitor,” which Noelle-Neumann (1998, p. 89) presents in a handbook article: “They found a correlation of unexpected strength between positive and negative evaluations by influential media, especially television, and the development of the attitudes of the American populace as measured by opinion research, for example on the popularity of U.S. presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton.” In most cases, TV news evaluations ran just ahead of popular opinion until the latter adopted the attitudes presented in the media. In this respect, the media can be said to have a clear effect on public opinion on certain topics, especially on the topic of “terrorism.” The formation of opinion is not only influenced by journalistic texts, but also strongly by the selection of visual material.

4.12.7 Reception and Effects of Visual Content The often mentioned “battle of ideas” is won with rhetorical (see Sect. 4.9) and visual communicative means. Haußecker (2013, pp. 31–34) presents an overview of studies on the reception of media representations of terrorist events; research in this area has been conducted primarily in the United States and since the September 11 attacks. These studies focus on the emotional reactions of recipients, such as fear and a sense of threat (see Haußecker, 2013, p. 38).120 Haußecker (2013, p. 207) herself found in her exploratory reception study that subjects perceived terrorism images as unpleasant or exciting rather than naming the basic emotion fear as such. “Overall, women show stronger emotional responses to depictions of injury and blood” (Haußecker, 2013, p. 209). It was also significant that “light viewers always show higher scores in their emotional responses” (Haußecker, 2013, p.  210). In addition, significant differences in reactions are shown when comparing a group viewing “terrorism violence” with a group viewing “other violence” (see Shoshani & Slone, 2008). Nellis and Savage (2012) found in a U.S. telephone survey that women generally showed more fear of terrorism, as did people who consumed TV news more frequently. These findings are also confirmed in a study by Williamson  Seeger et al. (2002, p. 63) write about the results of their survey of 1329 U.S. citizens within five days after the attacks of September 11, 2001: “initial emotional responses were very intense, particularly sorrow, sadness, anger, and confusion. Sorrow and sadness appear to be the most consistent emotional responses across this group, while being frightened was the most variable. Taken together, these results are broadly consistent with an uncertainty view of crisis, where a surprising and threatening event creates strong emotional arousal leading to high levels of uncertainty and informational needs.” A clear result was found with regard to gender: women indicated much stronger emotions (see Seeger et al., 2002, p. 63). 120

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et al. (2019). Of course, it may also be the case that individuals who have a heightened fear of terrorism turn to TV news more frequently. In an exemplary illustration, Haußecker (2013, p. 51; Fig. 4.10) clarifies the link between emotions and cognitions. Journalism fulfills a ritual function via such emotional and cognitive nodes with regard to the memory of incisive media events. This collective memory is created primarily through visual material and maintained even years later, for example on anniversaries (see Ammann & Grittmann, 2013). Here, Ammann and Grittmann (2013, p. 383) speak of a “specific memorial iconography” that makes “communities of mourning and remembrance visible.” In the case of the anniversaries of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the press photos in German daily newspapers had “generated the idea of a cosmopolitan community of destiny” (Ammann & Grittmann, 2013, p. 383), which opposed the global threat scenario of “terrorism.” The images thus linked emotional and cognitive connection components. The edited volume by Zelizer and Allan (2002) addresses newspaper coverage of September 11, 2001, and not just the textual portions. It addresses the problem of how photography, as an integral part of journalism, can contribute to overcoming trauma and at the same time bring about support for government action (see Zelizer & Allan, 2002, p. 17). Questions about the “right” choices for the “right” images in a post-traumatic situation are central. For the significance of photography after an attack, this means: “Photography is well-suited to take individuals and collectives on the journey to a post-traumatic space. The frozen images of the still photographic visual record are a helpful way of mobilizing a collective’s post-­ traumatic response” (Zelizer, 2002, p. 49). The traumatic emotional effects brought

Terrorist Weapons Contempt Visual Frame: Violence & counterviolence

Fear

Destruction

Anger

Opinion, Feelings, Decisions

Hate

Fig. 4.10  Linking of emotion (e.g., fear) and cognition (e.g., terrorist) nodes after the reception of a (visual) media frame as well as triggered judgment processes. (Haußecker, 2013, p. 51)

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about by the attack or the images of the attack are entirely in the terrorists’ interests. They first want to create a climate of fear in order to then make their (political) demands in this tense state. However, the emotionally aroused state of a society that occurs in the immediate aftermath of terrorist attacks cannot be maintained over a longer period of time. Sooner or later, it will subside, because other issues will again dominate everyday life or be placed on the media agenda. A social debate on the phenomenon of “terrorism” and its classification takes place via the media. In the process, the media, as already described, convey emotions and influence certain images and perceptions of issues in the public. On this level, photographs prove to be particularly memorable, be it the photos of Hanns Martin Schleyer or of the collapsing World Trade Center. The production and distribution of these images are part of the terrorists’ communicative strategy and are meant to attest to the group’s power. Through the photos, the public collectively becomes a witness to the deed. However, the media images often focus on the victim and thus the inhumanity of the attack. Nevertheless, disgust and horror are subconsciously mixed with unwanted admiration and fascination in some recipients. Bromley and Cushion (2002) examined the front pages of ten British dailies on September 12, 2001, and one of their findings is that most newspapers on that day omitted text from their front page altogether (except for the headline) and allowed a large-format photograph to take effect (see Bromley & Cushion, 2002, pp. 163–164). Editors were aware of the symbolic power of images.121 Although research into the impact of visual communication received a boost after the attacks of September 11, 2001, it still enjoys a niche existence compared to textual analyses. Tomanić Trivundža (2010, p. 99) criticizes: “Despite the proliferation of framing research, the visual component of news reporting remains terra incognita, or rather, terra invisitata.” He compiles a five-point list of reasons why the visual component should also be included in framing analyses (see Tomanić Trivundža, 2010, pp. 101–102), emphasizing above all the strong (also emotional) influence of the visual on recipients. Here – especially in comparison to content analyses – there is a lack of user studies with regard to terrorism reporting.

 Castaños and Muños (2006) also examined the photographs of the attacks in New York, Madrid and London in U.S. and Spanish newspapers on the basis of the front pages but did not come to a uniform conclusion regarding the choice of format. 121

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4.12.8 Reception and Impact of Terrorism (News) in the Economic Sector While the effects on civil society and citizens in general have been dealt with so far, this chapter will focus on the field of the economy, which has received little attention up to this point. Here, too, news of terrorist attacks plays an important role in the actions of actors. This affects not only the individual stock trader, but also companies and organizations, i.e., the meso level. Certainly, as always, the terrorists are ultimately concerned with harming the state via the “auxiliary channel of the economy”; to this end, the mechanisms of action of the economic system are explicitly included. The pressure that the economy can exert on the state is increased. Media coverage is the main channel through which terrorism causes economic harm, not direct attacks on businesses. The influence has increased over the years, there is an increasing impact on tourism122 or financial markets for example. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003, p. 113) studied the impact of terrorist attacks in the Basque Country on its economic development and found that after the outbreak of terrorism in the late 1960s, the gross domestic product per capita in the Basque Country declined by about 10 percentage points compared to an artificial terrorist-­ free control region.123 Taking the 1998/1999 ceasefire as a natural point of comparison, the authors found that – once the agreement was credible – shares of companies with a strong presence in the Basque Country rose relative to a Spanish non-Basque portfolio, but fell again when an end to the ceasefire became clear. This “good” and “bad” information was made known to traders and shareholders through the media: “for the Basque portfolio, the coefficient of Good Newst is positive and significant while the coefficient of Bad Newst is negative and also significant” (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003, p.  125). The goal of terrorists is to weaken and economically wear down the state under attack. Daase (2001, p. 708) sees the terrorist actions of, for example, ETA and the IRA as a “classic strategy of

 For example, many Americans canceled their trips to Europe after the TWA hostage crisis in 1985 (see Schmid, 1989, p. 557). 123  The authors created the artificial control region by weighting various factors such as the degree of industrialization and per capita income before the start of ETA activities. Mainly, Catalonia served as a comparable data field. Catalonia is generally useful as a control group for studies on the Basque Country, since there the demands for more self-determination are usually not communicated through violence. Thus, it is especially true for the Basque Country: “Spain differs from all other Western democracies, not only in the strength of its peripheral nationalisms but also in the level of violence associated with center-periphery conflicts” (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995, p. 410). 122

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deterioration,” which serves to ensure that the challenged state wears itself out through its constant struggle against terrorism and, in a sense, collapses internally. At the beginning of the terrorist activities in the early 1970s, the Basque Country was one of the richest regions in Spain (in terms of GDP per capita); by the end of the 1990s it had fallen to sixth place. Political and economic instability are thus closely linked. In order to finance its activities, ETA – like other terrorist organizations – carries out attacks on entrepreneurs, company headquarters and owners, or attempts to extort money through kidnappings or threats of violence. Many Basque entrepreneurs have already left the region for these reasons (see Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003, p. 115). Consequently, the economic and thus also the social situation in the crisis region is deteriorating as a result of the attacks. Eldor and Melnick (2007) examined the reactions of the stock market and the exchange rate to the 639 terrorist attacks that took place in Israel between 1990 and 2003. They differentiated the acts by location, type of attack, target of attack, number of victims, and number of attacks in a day. Their study found that suicide bombings had an impact on stock market and currency prices, as did the number of deaths and injuries. The location of the attack showed no effect. Nor was it possible to establish that a desensitization effect occurred (see Eldor & Melnick, 2007, p.  121). The intensification of the terrorist attacks after the failure of the peace process on September 27, 2000 had no effect on the exchange rate of the shekel, but it did have an effect on the stock market value (see Eldor & Melnick, 2007, p. 143). The public, and therefore the stockholders of the listed companies, were informed by the media about the attacks and acted in response. The government’s economic policy, however, was not influenced by the attacks.

4.12.9 Interim Summary The last step in the process diagram (Fig. 3.6) is dedicated to the “action arena of the recipients/civil society.” In this area, communication studies offer a particularly large number of theories and approaches for analytically processing the use, reception and impact of reporting on terrorist events. There is a consensus that such an event is not without disruptions on its way to the recipient and that the recipient’s different images of the media as well as the journalist’s images of the recipient influence the selection and transmission. After terrorist attacks, according to the uses-and-gratifications approach, the need for information increases and so does media use. The information function is most important, but also a kind of satisfaction of a desire for entertainment and fascination are present. Thus, the act of terrorism is not only on the topic agenda of recipients because of its social relevance,

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but also because of its emotional and finally personal relevance (see Valenzuela, 2014). This means, for example, paying attention to news about controls at airports out of a need for security, or information that concerns the recipient as a member of a certain ethnic or religious group. In addition, political involvement plays a role in determining the potential influence on attitude change: TV coverage is particularly effective in shaping the judgments of citizens with limited political resources and abilities, whereas people with high political involvement, such as party members or activists, are less easily persuaded to change their attitudes (see Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, p. 60). The concept of “status conferral” indicates that terrorists are already accorded a certain status simply by the fact that they are reported on. The concept, which goes back to Lazarsfeld and Merton (1964 [1948]), refers purely to an attribution of importance and prominence; it does not interpret this as a gain in image or legitimacy. In terms of its approach, it is quite close to agenda setting. A particular image, on the other hand, can be conveyed through frames (salience and interpretation schemata). The framing approach is strongly rooted in communication studies research. With regard to terrorism reporting, it helps to determine which perspective politicians and journalists take, how the problem is classified and to whom responsibility is attributed, which reasons are sought and which possible solutions are preferred. Should a certain region be given autonomous status, or should military intervention be used? Are social deprivations cited as the predominant reasons for an act, or is fanaticism? Following Norris et al.’s (2003) schema, “real-world indicators,” personal experiences, and interpersonal communication, that is, in a sense, an individual’s various “world references” and communicative networks, also influence the recipient’s opinion. Individuals communicate by referring to the world directly or indirectly (via references to world references) (see Kuhlmann, 2016, p. 229). Again, constructivism is recognizable as an overarching theory and, as a practical implication, again the call for journalists to report not only in event-­ related, closed and episodic frames, but in context-rich, open and thematic frames. Recipients take in (not only through the media) different frames; but it cannot be assumed that they align their own opinions with them. The concept of priming is dedicated to these processes. Often the existing opinion is held on to, but sometimes it is discarded, as the recipient abandons the state of tension of cognitive dissonance in favor of a homogeneous opinion frame. Something similar happens in the spiral of silence (see Noelle-Neumann, 1998): those who feel that they do not represent the majority opinion (which is often spread via the media) increasingly isolate themselves. Although empirically confirmed for many situations, the predictive power of the spiral of silence remains limited, since other factors are also always decisive for it not always occurring to the expected extent. With regard to

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the implications for reporting, it can be stated that even against the background of framing and the spiral of silence, a high degree of transparency is required in the presentation of the attribution of cause and responsibility, so that non-majority opinions such as criticism of one’s own system can also be expressed. The explanations have shown that communication studies already provide some approaches to explaining selection decisions and effects, but that the important question of persuasion towards conflict-sensitive reactions to a crisis, has not yet been adequately answered. Here, models from persuasion research can contribute to a better understanding of why an individual decides for or against a certain idea – whether it is presented in the media or on the home page of a terrorist group. As a representative of other models, the potential of Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) elaboration likelihood model should be discussed here. This model, like so many others, did not originate in communication studies but in social psychology. However, it is well suited to be applied to questions in communication studies, because persuasion plays a central role in interpersonal as well as in mediated communication, during the reception of television news as well as while listening to a sermon in a house of worship or streamed from a video platform. Of course, the same persuasion attempt can lead to different outcomes; the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) attempts to explain the framework for this. In our case, we are concerned with the “success” of terrorist communication versus the success of political communication, usually transmitted through the media. The recipient is thus faced with two diametrically opposed persuasion attempts by two actors: those of the status quo political system and those who seek to overthrow the current system and replace it with their own. The model describes how likely it is (likelihood) for a person to engage with an argument (elaboration). A peripheral route applies to recipients who give little thought to the persuasion attempt, and a central route applies to those who exhibit intense elaboration (see Klimmt, 2011, p. 19). The central route is characterized by a careful and circumspect examination and evaluation of the merits of the presented position. The peripheral route, on the other hand, is oriented toward cognitive, affective, or behaviorally expressed signals in the context of the influence attempt that are directly associated with the merits of the presented recommended position (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, pp. vii–viii). Behavioral changes gained for beliefs via the central route are, according to Petty and Cacioppo (1986, p. viii), more resistant to influence attempts by the opposing party. In this respect, this route should be preferred in counterterrorism measures. A limiting consideration here is that personal relevance and concern, prior knowledge, and positive or negative feelings regarding an issue all play a role in the predictive ability of the model. In the final analysis, attempts at persuasion would have to be individually tailored. At the very least, however, arguments can be

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p­ repared with regard to specific target groups and embedded in affective and situational settings. Since personal relevance has a decisive influence on the strength of elaboration, it must also be decisively explained in terrorism reporting why it is worthwhile to engage with peaceful attempts at a solution. These persuasion attempts must be designed for the long term, as this is the only way to permanently consolidate attitudes and thus also behavior and to remain stable against counterpersuasion. Depending on the target group of the medium, the communication strategies for different target groups must be adapted by different media (see Klimmt, 2011, p. 79), just as politicians must strategically communicate their persuasion attempts in a way that is appropriate for the target group. Again, recourse to non-reflective rhetoric can be helpful in this regard. As outlined in Sect. 4.12.7, anger, rage, a sense of threat, fear, uncertainty and excitement were cited as the main emotions following an attack. Proposals for a de-escalating response to the violent communication of a terrorist act must take these emotions into account in their crisis communication strategy, not negate them, but build the response behavior on them in recognition of these emotions. The dominance of terrorist events leaves emotional and cognitive traces on the recipient. Terms such as Ulrich Beck’s (1986) “risk society” or Stig Arne Nohrstedt’s (2010) “threat society” describe effects at the macro level of society as a whole and point to the expansion of a “culture of fear” (Nohrstedt, 2010, p. 24), which can be further fueled by unreflected media reporting. Nohrstedt (2010, p. 25) sees his “threat society” as complementary to the “risk society”: “From a semantic point of view, it seems that the word ‘threat’ presumes an active subject that directs a danger towards someone else, an object, whereas this is not the case with the word ‘risk’.” Risk has a rather latent, threat an acute character, Nohrstedt defines with reference to a document of the “Swedish Commission on Threat and Risks.” It is certainly a risk to travel to certain areas that are home to terrorist organizations, but there is not always a current threat situation that causes tourism to collapse. The preoccupation with middle-range theories, which were the focus of Chap. 4, has already clearly shown that communication studies can and already does make fruitful use of its own and other disciplines’ approaches in order to penetrate the communication aspects of the phenomenon of “terrorism.” Chapter 5 will now show whether more comprehensive theoretical approaches, the so-called grand theories, can also contribute to this.

5

Terrorism from the Perspective of Grand Theories of Communication Studies

While the previous chapters have presented the connections between terrorism and communication on the basis of middle-range theories, the following section will now deal specifically with a review of various basic grand theories of communication studies and their contribution to terrorism research and understanding, i.e., the extent to which these theories are helpful in breaking down the communication aspects inherent in terrorism. Admittedly, these theories do not originate from the relatively young field of communication studies but are predominantly sociological theories of society. However, since they are now rooted in the discipline, belong to the “regular repertoire,” so to speak, and have been adapted for communication studies, they have been labeled “grand theories of communication studies” in the title.1 Mostly, but not always, they start at a higher social level, which entails a complex level of abstraction. However, they can also be very concretely concerned with the actions of individuals, or the levels are linked in a socially integrative approach. Grand theories are characterized by the fact that they provide a comprehensive perspective and a combination of the middle-range theories, each of which relates only to parts of the communication process. For example, gatekeeper and newsworthiness theories are located in the broader framework of action theories; aspects of constructivism played a role in agenda setting and framing. Thus, grand theories offer an identification and description of complex communicative circumstances on both an analytical and a synthetic level (see Rühl, 2008, p. 190). This presupposes that the theories themselves also have a higher degree of complexity than, for example, middle-range theories. As a result – and here Slawski’s (1974, p. 397)  Rühl (2008, p. 189) uses the term “key theories” for these overarching theories. Rau (2013, p. 13) calls systems theory a “super-theory” of communication studies. 1

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assessment criteria can again be applied – they do not, however, have as high a predictive capacity as some middle-range theories and are more difficult to handle in application. Since it is the nature of the grand theories to overlap with the process system presented in Sect. 3.4, in the following only the communication quadrangle will be placed at the beginning of each chapter in order to clarify which level of social stratification is being addressed.

5.1 Terrorism from the Perspective of Systems Theory

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

“The working hypothesis was that terror was not only, as is self-evident, a social fact, but served a function” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 9), writes Peter Fuchs about the basic idea behind his book “Das System ‘Terror’.” The sociologist, with whom Niklas Luhmann, among others, jointly published “Reden und Schweigen” in 1989 (see Luhmann & Fuchs, 1989), turns to the phenomenon of terrorism directly from the perspective of systems theory. Because Fuchs has already illuminated the connection between “terrorism and systems theory” well, his remarks as well as those of the sociologist Dirk Baecker are the focus of this chapter. They are supplemented by conceptions of other systems theorists. Critically, it should be noted that Fuchs refers to the system as “terror,” not as “terrorism.” As pointed out in Sect. 2.1, terrorism research often distinguishes between terror as a feeling of fear and terrorism as a phenomenon consisting of organization, act and effect. Fuchs did not follow this distinction. “With the decision to understand terror as a system, the decision has also been made to understand it as a social system. […] Social systems are communications that reproduce a specific context […] – unconcerned about what a communication might be about. Thus, when we talk about terror as a system, we are no longer

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t­alking about good and evil. We are talking about a specific connectivity of communication operations” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 11). The form of organization of a terror group does not play a role in this view, but purely communication, which is conceived “as the ongoing synthesis of information, communication and understanding […]. Communication finds connections when and insofar as events occur that describe it as communication and are themselves described as communication by further events” (Fuchs, 2004, pp. 17–18). In this context, the result of clandestine preparation, the act of terror itself, represents a (temporary) end of communication. “The operation that reproduces the system ‘terror’ is the drawing together of (violent) termination of communication and the thereby installed forcing of further communications that must contend with the end, although they (as continuation of communication) just prevent the end” (Fuchs, 2004, pp.  18–19). Fuchs (2004, p. 19) cites as an everyday example of ending communication “a forceful, angry slamming of a door” that causes communication to stop abruptly from one side, but not without hoping for subsequent follow-up communication through this effect. If, however, no further communication was to take place, the operation (door slamming, act of terror) could have no social effect. Then, however, the involved side would look for ever more powerful effects, which would finally make a strategy of non-observance or a communicative complete ignorance of the system of terror impossible (see Fuchs, 2004, p. 19). The (violent) termination of communication thus forces follow-up communication, since – and here Fuchs (2004, p. 19) brings the public into play – “the social world does not simply break off beyond localizable terror scenarios. It is today a world society observing itself through mass media.” Baudrillard (2001) sees the possibility of briefly paralyzing an entire system with the help of an attack like the one in 2001 as also being caused in the system itself. The system’s vulnerability results from its size, which brings with it an inner fragility. “C’est le système lui-même qui a créé les conditions objectives de cette rétorsion brutale. En ramassant pour lui toutes les cartes, il force l’Autre à changer les règles du jeu” (Baudrillard, 2001). It is not possible to react directly to the act of terror, that is, the deliberately-­ induced attempt to terminate communication, because the perpetrators are often unreachable, in some cases having annihilated themselves. This “kind of annihilation of self-referential possibilities of communication […forces…] communication about the termination, which completes the operation through connections that relate communicatively to the self-referential annihilation of the event that they are, after all, recording as communication. The terrorist event itself (the exploding bomb, the plane making impact) is not a terrorist operation without these connections” (Fuchs, 2004, pp. 23–24). This view is consistent with the characteristics of terrorism presented in Sect. 2.1. Schneider also notes, “Yet it is only the reaction

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that defines a violent action as a terrorist attack” (Schneider, 2008, p. 188). That is, it is only after the fact, when follow-up communication takes place, that it is possible to say whether or not it was terrorism, or whether it was, for example, a kidnapping to extort ransom, or a murder that had a personal and not an overarching motive. “The primary criterion for the success of terrorist operations, then, is not the achievement of specific individual goals. Rather, they typically function as spectacular communications that seek to focus public attention on a conflict indicated therein, to gain support, and in this way to establish the senders of such communications as relevant addresses in the context of the political system” (Schneider, 2008, p. 189). Therefore, according to this definition, the attacks of the neo-Nazi organization “National Socialist Underground” (NSU), for example, could not be described as terrorist until the connections became clear and triggered reactions in different social systems. For a long time, the strategy and systems of the organization were not publicly known, and the acts were regarded as individual murders without a political goal. Fuchs (2004, p. 24) even goes so far as to say: “In the final analysis, this means that the connections through mass media, but also the connections that serve to ward off terror, the controls at airports, even anti-terror wars, etc., are themselves part of terror. They supplement it. The terrorist operation would not be perfect if the end it orchestrates was actually an end.” The “terrorist of the non-terrorist” makes the operations2 of terror as a social system possible in the first place (see Fuchs, 2004, p. 24). For Fuchs, those who die in a terrorist attack are in this respect “double victims: as killed, mutilated bodies and in that they are instrumentalized for the dramaturgy of the message” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 23). It does not matter who dies, since it is not specific individuals that count, but only bodies in their function as persons. Individuals play “at most the role of corporeal addressees and specific terrorist organizations are largely left out in favor of a structural-­ functional view” (Beck & Quandt, 2011, p. 87). Terrorists as individuals also play no role in the systems theory approach. They are considered mental systems and are to be included as a relevant environment of the system “terrorism.” Their motive and goal backgrounds unite them in this. “These shared intentions, attitudes and beliefs form the social boundary of the group” (Küppers & Krohn, 1992, p.  171). Mental systems are characterized by certain properties that first define them as what they are, and these properties first emerge in communication and interaction with elements of other systems. In doing so, these other elements usually presuppose certain properties from their interaction partners. However, the (perceived) properties can also change if, for example, terrorists suddenly become willing to negotiate.  “Operations” are only referred to in the context of a system.

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With regard to the concept of function, which is important in systems theory, Küppers and Krohn (1992, p. 162) argue that it refers “to a non-contingent relationship of a system to its environment vis-à-vis the system that is functional for this environment. This is because the environment confers its function on the system and controls its fulfillment. From the point of view of the system, negative feedback is set up in the environment through which it organizes its adaptation in a learning way.” It is the society under attack that transmits its function to the system of terrorism through its responses. The feedback with regard to the system of terrorism occurs through its attention, through the degree of public attention. If this remained absent, the system of terrorism would have to reorganize itself, since its function, the irritation of society, would no longer be the result of its operations. The negation of attacks would thus lead to ever more violent terrorism, so that the communicative connections mentioned above, and thus proper functioning, would be guaranteed. Küppers and Krohn (1992, p. 167) introduce the notion of “boundary formation” of systems in this context. “In the case of physical systems, it is the laws of nature which, as external boundary conditions, control which choice is to be made in determining the variables and their interaction. In the case of social systems, it is the function they perform internally (for individual mental systems) or externally (for other social systems) that selects the specific (functional) forms of interaction from the pool of possible ones as external boundary conditions. More generally, it is structures in the environment which, as boundary conditions in the system, acquire significance as selection criteria because they determine the system-­specific interaction.” In this sense, the self-organization of a system can also be rethought as “an achievement of the system itself” (Küppers & Krohn, 1992, p. 169). In summary, Küppers and Krohn (1992, p. 169) propose as a definition of boundary formation: “Boundary formation is thus the operational demarcation of a system from its environment due to external boundary conditions and the reproduction of this demarcation due to an internal variation of individual parts of the recursive network of interaction.” The external boundary conditions of the (sub-)system of terrorism3 are thus the communicative connections mentioned by Fuchs (2004) in the three areas shown in the quadrangle (Fig. 3.5): media, politics, civil society and also their surrounding “public.” Accordingly, the emergence of subsystems or system changes is closely related to the boundary formation of a particular system. For example, changing environmental conditions, such as access to resources, may ensure the emergence of new structures that do not fit the functional primacy of an existing system and favor a subsystem. The boundary of the subsystem itself also remains dynamic and may continue to be subject to change.  Also called “second-order system” by Fuchs (2004), see below.

3

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The subsystem can mature into an independent, self-organized system; it produces information that is carried outward, into the environment to other systems, and processed there. Küppers and Krohn (1992, p. 175) see a fixed and a free boundary, whereby the fixed boundary exists through organizations and institutions of the system, whereas the free boundary is created by specific rules of interaction that are formed through communication and cooperation. Thus, the dynamic boundary in particular can lead to different solutions to a particular problem, specifically terrorist attacks. The attack, perceived as a disruption or irritation in the policy system (meso level) and in the security system (exo level; see Sect. 3.3), requires these systems to adhere to both the consistency postulate and the coherence postulate in their anti-terrorist actions. “The consistency postulate requires that any new solution be compatible with the system’s accepted set of rules, or that any deviations be under special pressure to be justified and succeed. The coherence postulate demands that all problems not yet solved, for which a competence exists or is claimed, be declared to belong, to be a new part of the whole” (Küppers & Krohn, 1992, p. 177). A disruption such as a terrorist attack, lying outside any routine processes, poses a great challenge to the system under attack. It must make the disruption manageable in a way that is compatible with the system’s inner workings. This is where the achievements of peace journalism and conflict-sensitive SCCT can be made fruitful. In a political system it is usually the case that the legitimacy of the monopolization of violence falls solely to the state or its executive organs. If another political system uses violence against the former, the aggressor has usually subjected this act of violence to the question of legitimacy beforehand. Terrorism, on the other hand, escapes this process; it is “elusive violence” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 40). In contrast to everyday crime (burglary, money laundering, etc.), this form of violence is not designed to act covertly (see Sect. 2.1) but uses overt violence as a demonstration of communication termination and thus of power. Thus, the system of terrorism is first of all related to the system of politics and behaves “parasitically” to it (Fuchs, 2004, p. 43; Köstler, 2011, p. 314). Schneider (2008) also sees terrorism as a parasitic form to challenge the general societal recognition of the binary code of politics (superior power/ inferior power). If “the state’s war on terror also affects bystanders in the presumed environment of terrorist groups, it may contribute to creating or stabilizing a milieu of supporters and sympathizers that provides favorable infrastructural conditions for the continuation of terrorist actions. Terrorist organizations and networks, as parasitic social systems, can thus transform the noise produced in the political system by the communication of claims to power and counter-power into an independent type of operation and use it as a basis for reproduction” (Schneider, 2008, p. 185).

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Terrorism is also in relationship with other systems such as science, art, economics and journalism. Terrorism also has a parasitic relationship with the mass media (see Sect. 4.5.2). However, terrorists cannot address (functional) systems such as “politics” – they themselves as actors are, after all, in the environment of the systems. They also cannot address society per se, because they are “anonymous systems behind whose anonymity no one hides” (Fuchs, 2004, p.  48). Terrorists therefore attack the environment, as they inevitably must, and attack real people. “In a sense, terror is the result of the realization that communication (directed at society, at the functional systems) ‘gets us nowhere’” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 48), since nowadays there is no longer social stratification with representatives and influential hierarchical levels, but functional differentiation and anonymous complexity. Killing the Tsar (see Sect. 2.1) would be unsuccessful in today’s “politics” system. According to Fuchs (2004, pp. 49–50), the “terror” system expresses precisely this “problem of the non-addressability of society and its functional systems.” The system of “terrorism” itself cannot be addressed either: “This is the reason why one searches for perpetrators, names terrorists, i.e., one proceeds in a roundabout way” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 50). On both sides, therefore, the actors fail because of the non-­ addressability of the systems that they nevertheless try so hard to break through. “Terror cannot reach society or the functional systems directly because they are not addressable. Therefore, it develops an operation of ‘detour’ that instead reaches out to the physical and psychological environment of society. […] The violent marking of an end states the futility of directly intervening in society” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 55). However, it gets to the point where the desperate, destructive termination “forces ongoing social communication to assume a relationship to the termination” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 55). “The termination of communication in the violent act is an operation forcing observation that only succeeds or is completed when social communication allows itself to be disturbed and set into self-oscillation” (Fuchs, 2004, pp. 55–56). If one continues to strictly follow systems theory, one cannot avoid assigning a binary code to the system of “terrorism.” This must be different from the binary code of the political system (superior power/inferior power), since terrorism works as a disruptive factor against the political system. “Codes are binary distinctions by which it is determined what the system ascribes to itself and what thereby falls outside its purview” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 53). The code facilitates the system’s selection decisions, it clarifies what it deals with and what is to be classified in its

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e­ nvironment (system-environment difference).4 The code of the war system (victory versus defeat) cannot be applied to the phenomenon of terrorism because military inferiority is clear from the outset and is not questioned. Knowing this very thing, terrorists apply their other form of power challenge to avoid direct confrontation. In the case of terrorist attacks, direct military counteraction is therefore not possible because of the surprise effect. Thus, countermeasures are delayed. “The guiding difference or code of terrorism, which guides the conduct of each operation, is therefore the distinction between successful strike and failure. […] Strategy and tactics as well as variable terrorist targets, which can be justified in different ways (ethno-nationalistic, religious, etc.), function as programs of terrorism” (Schneider, 2008, p. 188). The code is very different from the one identified by Fuchs (2004), namely “guilt/innocence” (see below). This shows that the struggle for persuasive codes is not unique to communication studies and the systems it deals with (such as journalism, media, public sphere). Even the aforementioned programs, which Schneider assigned such diverse and yet quite general items as “strategy” and “goals,” prove problematic if one wants to capture the core of the terrorist system in concrete terms. Schneider names the attainment of public attention for a conflict as “success” and thus as an element of the code. This corresponds to the view that only the public reaction makes terrorism into terrorism. Accordingly, a failure, that is, a failure to attract public attention, would not be part of the system of terrorism at all, just as a “failure to publish” would not be part of the system of journalism, and something that does not involve the act of “paying” would not be part of the system of “economics.” Fuchs (2004, p. 56) draws on the distinction “guilt/innocence” to define the binary code: “it is a clearly binary scheme. The side of guilt is delineated by society and its primary differentiation, but there is no one to whom guilt can be attributed; the side of innocence is the world of people and things, but this world moves into ‘vicariousness.’ It becomes the projection surface onto which the opposite side of guilt is projected – in the system.” This explanation for the code comes as a surprise, since “guilt” first brings to mind the terrorists. Moreover, both code elements are located in the social system that terrorism opposes: the non-addressable (guilty)  System/environment difference means that the systems theory distinguishes between involved and non-involved components. For example, the binary code of the media system is “publish/not publish,” that of the political system is “power superiority/power inferiority,” that of the war system is “victory/defeat” (see Schneider, 2007, p. 138), that of the technological system is “controllable/uncontrollable.” In this book, reference is made to Marcinkowski’s (1993, pp. 65–66) binary code, namely “publish/don’t publish,” but not to the system “media studies,” rather to the system “journalism.” For the problem and demarcation, see also Scholl and Weischenberg (1998, pp. 63–71). 4

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system and the (innocent) people in it. The code does not contain an action (pay, publish, successfully strike) that, in distinction to the negative action (do not pay, do not publish, fail), unavoidably attributes an action to the system of terrorism. It is precisely for such differentiated considerations that it is important to differentiate between levels for future research as well: Even though they share a common corner in the actors’ quadrangle (see Fig. 3.5) and are mutually dependent, the elements cannot be exchanged – civil society, civic organizations and citizens. The system of terrorism actually wants to attack the guilt side, that is, society, but has to redirect the attack to concrete people and things, i.e., the innocence side, due to the inaccessibility of the former. Through this “proxy action,” the actual attack on the addressee “society” always remains unsatisfied. However, this is where the mass media come into play, as they reach large parts of “society” through their public function. Via the “side of innocent people and things, society can be irritated in the sense of that communicative escalation that gives terror the prominence it needs” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 57). The irritation triggered by the act of terror, this “forcing of observation” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 64), sets society into self-oscillation, as already indicated above, so that “it must gain a relationship to the violent termination of communication” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 65). In this context, the act of terror, while attention-grabbing, is an event that is itself connected to information only to a very low degree. The disruption is the focus – who is behind it or the nature of their concern – is often only clarified afterwards, for example via a claim of responsibility (see Sect. 4.4). Fuchs next inquires about the symbolically generalized communication medium of the “terror” system. He calls “escalation the perverse medium of the terror system” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 66). In this context, “perverse” refers to the fact that the medium ultimately only motivates and strengthens itself and does not have an effect where it would actually like to motivate. Here, one can easily refer to the considerations noted earlier, according to which a terrorist organization often exists and acts only for its own sake, in order to maintain itself and the system of terrorism. If the medium were to act where it actually wants to, i.e., if a political upheaval were to take place, it would make itself superfluous and thus its own organization as well as the entire system of terrorism. Escalation refers to “the imposing nature of the terrorist act” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 66), which is reflected, for example, in ever higher numbers of victims and more elaborate, symbolic attacks. “In increasing the imposing nature of violence, escalation symbolizes the unattainability or even (what amounts to the same thing) the omnipresence of an unbeatable enemy” (Fuchs, 2004, pp. 67–68). According to Kohring and Hug (1997, p. 16), the social functional system of the public sphere, which is so essential for terrorism, is “the genuine state of research

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in journalism studies.” The authors present this social functional system “public sphere,” whose performance system is journalism, within the framework of a macro-theory: the public sphere and journalism communicate about events with multi-system affiliation and environmental relevance. They carry out “an observation of these social relations of dependence or interdependence that is not determined by self-interest” (Kohring & Hug, 1997, p. 16). The function of the public sphere lies in the (external) “observation of events that characterize social interdependence relations and can thus be used to form mutual environmental expectations” (Kohring & Hug, 1997, p. 20). The media thus provide the follow-up communication required by the system of terrorism in various systems, whereby the opinions that are formed there can change or solidify (see Sect. 4.12.5). Cross-societal circumstances – and terrorism is one such circumstance – have consequently led to the emergence of the functional system “public sphere” or, more concretely, “journalism,” which is exclusively concerned with the observation of these circumstances. The space of the public sphere thus becomes a “space of experience on the basis of which the systems in the environment of the event can form their environmental expectations. By ‘form’ we do not mean merely the establishment of new environmental expectations, but the modification or confirmation of already existing environmental expectations” (Kohring & Hug, 1997, p. 21). This means that attitudes towards terrorism are quite significantly determined by public opinion, which is shaped by the media and its selection results. Basically, the events, in this case the terrorist acts, provide the input from outside into the environmentally open system “journalism.” Nevertheless, this system then operates autonomously and is self-contained – one could also say that the system “journalism” observes its neighboring systems. If an event then fulfills a set of news values, a routine program runs, so to speak, which anticipates and determines decisions. The task of journalism is then to reduce complexity: journalists make many topics accessible to the public through their selection and processing work (see Sects. 4.7 and 4.8). Since journalism serves the introspection of society, it is also clear that the media respond to the public’s reactions to the attacks (such as fear, preventive measures, possibly even panic, and their effects such as cancellations of travel to affected regions). The extent to which the media follow a binary schema in their terrorism coverage has been demonstrated by Köstler (2011): she sees fear increase versus fear decrease as poles. In this context, the schema “fear increase” is associated with terms such as “reaction,” “past,” “non-transparent damaging event,” while the schema “fear reduction” is associated with terms such as “prevention,” “future” and “calculable damaging event.” In Köstler’s view, the communicative schema of fear should be replaced by the media with a schema of alert composure; in other words, reporting that partially deprives the terrorists’

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p­ ropaganda of its effect, but nevertheless remains detailed, critical and attentive (see Köstler, 2011, p. 318). Fuchs (2004, p. 77) calls the mass media the “organizational security of escalation.” This is because terrorist organizations themselves are organizations, albeit “obscure or self-occult” ones (Fuchs, 2004, p.  78), which therefore have no address, communicate in secret, and whose members often know little about each other. Usually there is no addressable representative and no records. The mass media “provide the body-consuming actions with the ‘echo’ they need to appear as not just local panic generation” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 79). Following Niklas Luhmann, Fuchs sees the dichotomous pair “information/non-information” as the binary code of the system “mass media” and the self-observation or self-description of society as its function. The system “terror” now claims its medium of escalation, which has a novelty or surpassing value compared to previous events (see Fuchs, 2004, pp. 79–80), and thus creates a direct reference to the “information/non-­information” distinction: The event, the act of terror, becomes news through the selection process of the mass media system; “the more imposing the losses and destruction, the higher the news value, the stronger the resonance, the more far-reaching the production of irritation, the longer lasting the need to process irritation” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 81). Fuchs (2004, p. 81) also names the massive violation of norms5 as well as the fascination with the extraordinary, the unimaginable as news values. According to systems theory, the media system – like any other system – is only interested in its own (re)production in the sense of autopoiesis, so extensive coverage of terrorism is quite natural. Such attention-grabbing topics bring in high ratings and click-throughs, thus ensuring the existence of media organizations. The audience is “a central reference for journalism” (Scholl & Weischenberg, 1998, p. 120). There are reciprocal influences. However, “it is not the actual expectations of the audience that form the independent variable for journalistic action, but the audience image held by journalists, which in turn is composed of communication intentions and imagined audience expectations. From a constructivist perspective, audience image is an external reference (imagined audience expectations) built into self-reference (communication intentions). The audience thereby forms an environment – albeit a relevant one – for journalism” (Scholl & Weischenberg, 1998, p. 121). To transfer the whole thing tangibly to the micro level, even if this hardly plays a role in systems theory: Journalists assume that reporting on terrorism is desired and demanded by citizens.

 This is also a difference to warlike or military operations. The latter often emphasize the norm appropriateness of their actions, as reflected in the so-called international law of war. 5

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In summary, Fuchs does not speak of a symbiotic relationship between the systems of mass media and terror (see Sect. 4.5.2), but of a structural coupling:6 one could “even speak of the system of terror maintaining a (for the observer infamous) co-production with those media and their organizations. Or in a slightly different formulation: the mass media are (at least with regard to the news program) coupling favorites” (Fuchs, 2004, p.  82). Complementing this, Schneider (2007, p. 125) argues that “‘terrorism’ can be interpreted as a social relationship in which the exercise of violence serves as a medium of communication.” This communication only completes itself through the media, which carry the event into the communication of society. However, neither Schneider nor Fuchs hold the mass media responsible for terror: “co-production is not a question of causality” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 82). Fuchs does not consider a refusal of resonance by the media (whether self-­ imposed or demanded elsewhere as censorship; see Sect. 4.10). The decision to refuse to pay attention to terrorism would at the same time mean refusing to oppose it. This would be socially sanctioned. In the end, three possibilities of reaction remain: affirmation, negation or aversion. In the sense of the “theory of change,” this would mean that the crisis communication strategy of the government as an organization in the system of politics would first need to determine the desired “outcome” and then the respective interventions, which can contain elements of resistance or disavowal. Baecker (2007, pp. 7–8) describes violence as “the monstrous[, which] is part of the socially possible. It is just as dependent on social constitution as the pleasurable and desirable. Sociology must remain neutral here, but this does not not [sic] prevent it from seeing even in the demolition of something, even in the destruction, a contribution to the continuation of something, a building up.” Here the remarks are similar to the “slamming of doors” mentioned by Fuchs. Baecker (2007, p. 35) speaks of “this paradoxical phenomenon of included excluded violence” because, according to Baecker (2007, p. 34), systems at every level of society – i.e., interactional, organizational and also functional systems of society  – contain violence, which they exert on the one hand as a domestication pressure on the system’s interior and on the other hand as a (usually passively dormant) threat on the system’s surroundings. Terrorism, by contrast, is the active use of violence. Terrorists carry  According to Niklas Luhmann’s functional-structural systems theory, bridges develop between systems – for example from politics to journalism and vice versa. These are referred to as “structural coupling” (see Maturana, 1985, p. 251) or, more strongly, as interpenetration: sometimes neighboring systems make elements available to each other without losing their own operational closedness (see Scholl & Weischenberg, 1998, p. 48). For example, the audience (environment) can be considered structurally coupled to the journalism system through the attention it pays to it. 6

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a form of violence that is actually excluded from the social system, an excluded form of communication, into it (see Baecker, 2007, p. 46). Baecker (2007, p. 46) speaks of an unprecedented “forcing of the reduction of communication to action” that the terrorists undertake, and which, precisely because it is norm-breaking and law-violating, exerts a kind of fascination on society.7 “The concept of violence in the system is determined by the forcing of attributions of a communication onto an action” (Baecker, 2007, p. 50). Politics claims to be the only social system that has sovereignty over the threat and use of physical violence, for example by ordering police operations or by entering into war (see Baecker, 2007, p. 57). Thus, violence is positively functionalized for the system (see Baecker, 2007, p.  62) and used against actors usually perceived as “guilty” by large parts of the public. However, if terrorism penetrates the system, the ruling system of power is “exposed.” “Violence fascinates as a sovereign simplification turning communication against communication” (Baecker, 2007, p. 45). The reason for this is that violence entails a reduction of possible responses and follow-up communication. “The reduction to action eliminates so many options of connection, imposes so many decisions as already made, that it becomes even less likely than in the normal case that subsequent communications will seek a connection” (Baecker, 2007, p.  46). Terrorists take advantage of an uncertainty that occurs in their action, which then motivates a connection communication – often amounting to power struggle (with reflective rhetoric) – of, for example, a government. The terrorists try to transfer their own incapacity or political powerlessness, which leads them to the act of violence, onto those attacked. This “ambiguous logic of powerlessness” (Baecker, 2007, p. 56) consists of translating one’s own powerlessness into a brief absolute power – namely over the attack and its victims – and thus demonstrating the powerlessness of the opponent (see Baecker, 2007, p. 56). This mechanism succeeds “because the physical violence exercised by terrorism is part of a communicative strategy that substitutes attributional unambiguity for communicative openness” (Baecker, 2007, pp. 55–56). It would be difficult to state more clearly the duty and responsibility of communication studies research to take a greater interest in the phenomenon of “terrorism.” By this characteristic, terrorism falls directly into the core area of the subject. Finally, it remains to be asked whether the system of terror is a system that stands on the same level as “politics,” “economy” and the like. The explanation of its emergence plays an essential role here because a system forms through emergence. “Emergence occurs when self-referential circles emerge that chain together  However, it must be clarified here that this refers only to insurgent terrorism, not to state terrorism, since in the case of state terrorism society is partly unaware of the acts of violence. 7

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in such a way that they form the elements of a new system. […] The emergence of self-referential relationships is to be understood as a gradual process leading to the formation of new and at the same time autonomous systems” (Teubner, 1992, p. 192). A new phenomenon, to be understood as systemic, can be interpreted as an “emergent form” in an “iterative process of subsystem formation” (Küppers & Krohn, 1992a, p. 19). Thus, if we observe in a given system “organizational forms that are not captured by the model of the system (its rules) that we have developed, then theory can exclude them as extraneous to the system or include them as an evolutionary extension” (Küppers & Krohn, 1992a, p. 20). The emergent form can also be seen as external and then only enter an already existing system as a “re-­ entry.” However, the system of terrorism, which can be seen as external to existing systems and as an irritation of those existing systems, can also evolve in an evolutionary way when, for example, terrorist groups renounce their violent operations and switch back to actions as a political organization. In this way, they return to the political system as a “re-entry” and thus also change their code to “power/no power” or “elect/don’t elect”; they give up their affiliation to the terrorist system as well as their communication medium of escalation strategy. Many terrorist groups set aside a legal, political “arm,” which Schneider (2008, p. 189) calls a desired structural coupling with the political system, and that in the best case can lead to system (re)integration and the dissolution of the violent wing. Overall, however, the system of terrorism is always there, since it is conceivable in the cognitive systems that constitute the public sphere and this possibility of belonging to the system presupposes it. Fuchs (2004, pp. 107–108) classifies the system of terrorism as a second-order functional system, “not in the sense of subordination or superiority, but rather in a recursive understanding that states that those systems operate on the consequential problems of functional differentiation.” He calls it “a parasitic system of society” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 108), which directly addresses the primary systems and forms of order because it is excluded from them (hence “parasite”). The terrorist group sees no place in society to express its concerns through conventional channels of communication and participation. Therefore, it develops a method of message delivery in a non-addressable society: the act of violence. Fuchs (2004, p. 87) summarizes: “In doing so, we recall that we have located the function of this system (i.e., the problem we have constructed and as whose solution we interpret terror) in the context of the non-addressability of society and its functional systems. […] The system must therefore, as we have tried to show, stage a ‘detour’ which in effect produces resonance in society via escalating attacks against innocent bodies (and things), which then does so with the help of the coupling favorite of the mass media, which  – forced to observe  – enforce an uncontrollable spread of these

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o­ bservations.” Seen in this light, it is surprising that the close connection between the systems of terrorism and the mass media, as derived from systems theory, did not come into the focus of terrorism researchers much earlier.

5.2 Terrorism from the Perspective of Constructivism The construction of terrorism by journalists, recipients, politicians as well as by the symbolism of the attack has already been mentioned several times. The main focus of communication studies is the media construction. “Media systems influence the way in which patterns of perception and experience are elaborated in a society through the selection, emphasis and staging of media offerings; they provide occasions for the social as well as individual construction of reality, and offer life concepts and convey sensitivities and moods” (Schmidt, 1992, p. 307). Consequently, almost everything that most people know about and regard as terrorism is a media creation (see Farnen, 1990, p. 100). This justifies why in this chapter constructivism will be considered mainly in the “media” process section, because here terrorism is communicated as a construction to the recipients.8 The following conception of communication underlies this: “Communication is a central instrument of social construction of reality in and by the individual. Communication mediates the close mutual relationships between 1 . cognition as the mental process of constructing reality; 2. interaction as the process of comparing one’s own constructions of reality with the constructions of others; 3. institutions as social networks that organize interactions” (Schmidt, 1992, p. 305). Since constructions take place at all levels of society and in every identified “actor’s corner,” no actors’ quadrangle was presented at the beginning of this chapter. Schmidt (1992, p. 305) describes the interplay of all three dimensions he mentions as essential for the emergence of “subject-bound reality construction […]. My models of reality must be confirmed in interaction in order to become the reference point of experience and action as a shared reality.” And for this, communication is needed. This communication takes place in and emanates from the individual terrorist, in the terrorist group, in the comparison with like-minded people and  For a summary of the developmental strands of constructivism in (German-language) communication studies and its connection to cultural studies, see Hepp et al. (2017). 8

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a­ dversaries. The attack only becomes a terror event, a “terror reality,” in the construction by the recipients. In constructivism, “reality” is considered “the result of a progression of processing and construction” (Hejl, 1992, p. 269). On theorizing in constructivism, Hejl (1992, p. 269) writes, in summary, that theories are understood “as classifying, describing, and explaining, and above all communicatively usable, constructs of what has been constructed in and through observational (classifying, describing, experimenting, etc.) interactions as a specific ‘object’. At the same time, it [constructivist theorizing, author’s note] assumes that its object domain emerges from and in the interactions of equally constructively perceiving and thinking human beings.” Ontological statements about “reality” are far from constructivist theorizing.9 In this respect, a constructivist theory of terrorism is aware that it constructs terrorism in its observation and description, and that it simultaneously attempts to (re)construct how terrorism is constructed by other actors such as insurgents, media, politicians, and citizens in their cognitions, interactions, and institutions. One of the basic assumptions of constructivism is as follows: “Messages do not bring meanings to receivers from senders; instead, messages are occasions for people to create – or ‘construct’ – realities through their interpretation of the messages” (Anderson & Ross, 2002, p.  126). The micro-phenomenon of individual constructing observers gives rise to the macro-phenomenon of constructed systems and ultimately constructed “world-reality.” The cognitive presuppositions and capacities of each individual receiver play a crucial role in this process, as does their emotional and conative framework. Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976, p. 18) speak of constructed social realities: “The social realities people hold are the product of the processes by which the societal system enculturates and socializes persons and structures their social action.” The question of the relationship between media and “reality” has been pursued by many scholars without finding a unified answer. According to Bentele (2008, p. 69), there is a “difference between reality and media reality, the difference between the events themselves as well as their media presentation.” With regard to media construction, Bentele (2008) takes a balancing, mediating position between realism and constructivism, aligning himself with evolutionary epistemology as well as hypothetical realism. Accordingly, Bentele (2008, p. 280) sees journalistic reporting as a “multi-level reconstruction of reality,” as it has already been described in the different news selection and news presentation theories in relation to  “It is the central assumption of all constructivist approaches that we are biased in cognition, that access to an absolute truth is impossible” (Pörksen, 2016, p. 249). Pörksen (2016) offers a good overview of “journalism as reality construction.” 9

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terrorism (see Sects. 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8). Radical constructivism, and within it, constructivist newsworthiness theory, is less concerned with the way “event and incident reality is transformed into media reality, but rather focus[s] on the study of content weighting within media reality” (Hafez, 2002, p. 16). What stands out here is a connection to semiotic theories that make constructions by generating meaning through word choice and linguistic context embedding, such as national myths. However, because it is based on a broad consensus, the media conception of reality is considered “real” by most recipients and actors. A further criterion is intersubjective verifiability, on the basis of which comparisons can be drawn between facts available outside the media (e.g., direct information and perception of the attack) and the mediated components. Media play a central role in the production of the public sphere and thus in conveying their constructions of reality to the recipients – whereby the construction of reality proceeds individually within the respective recipient. Tuchman (1978, pp. 4–5) sees the media as a social institution of reality construction because it reserves space for certain stakeholders to make their statements: “First, news is an institutional method of making information available to consumers. […] Second, news is an ally of legitimated institutions. […] Third, news is located, gathered, and disseminated by professionals working in organizations. Thus, it is inevitably a product of newsworkers drawing upon institutional processes and conforming to institutional practices. […] Accordingly, news is the product of a social institution, and it is embedded in relationships with other institutions. It is a product of professionalism.”10 Professional information control also happens on the side of the antagonists “terrorists versus politicians.” Here constructivism could be combined with persuasion models such as the elaboration likelihood model, whereby it is recorded which content the media make available to persons with different strengths in each case when dealing with arguments. “In a multimedia society, political reality is overwhelmingly mass media constructed and mediated reality. The presentation and staging of politics are guided by the rules of presentation and attention of the media arena” (Plasser, 2010, p. 7). To a certain extent, the latter also applies to terrorist groups (see Sect. 4.2.1). Tuchman (1978) sees news as a social construction of reality and in this the frame, the “window frame,” plays a crucial role (see Sect. 4.12.3): it can be narrow or wide, clear or fogged, that is, size and construction are important. The window frame only reveals a certain section of reality, depending on how the media creators design it. Print media, for example, transform an actual event into a readable text  Seen in this light, the coverage of September 11, 2001 became a “profound test of the professionalism of journalists” (White, 2002, p. 25). 10

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as well as two-dimensional photographs on paper, and the events are constructed as shared social phenomena only through the editors’ attribution of meaning. In many cases, media coverage occurs along the lines of individuals, their individual stories, and culturally rooted narratives and myths (see Sect. 4.8.3), but these are directly related to the event: “addressing social problems and historical events by focusing on individual rather than systemic conditions” (Slocum, 2005, p. 22). By way of example, it should be remembered that many recipients associate the problem of “Al-Qaeda” directly with “Osama bin Laden” and not with the systemic conditions in Afghanistan. Thus, for the reader there is a reduction of reality and complexity, the ability to experience the event is reduced, a real participation is excluded at the time the text is available. At most, the recipient can be present quasi-­simultaneously during a live TV broadcast, but here the recipient cannot fall back on a profound journalistic classification of the events. If the reader has not personally attended the event in advance, his or her knowledge and opinion formation will depend largely on mediated communication, that is, on information provided by people and the media (see also Figs. 4.9 and 4.10). Particularly in crisis situations, many people resolve the discomfort of not knowing by increasingly turning to the media (see Sect. 4.12.1) in the hope of finding answers there. How the recipient then contextualizes a contribution and the statements it contains depends very much on his or her particular situation, whether, for example, he or she is a resident of the Basque Country or a relative of a victim of an attack, how he or she has been socialized with regard to media use, etc. (see Sect. 4.12.1). (see Sect. 4.12.5).11 Media use in turn entails follow-up communication, for example in interpersonal communication about opinion leaders. The “media images that we have received on particular occasions and to which only we can connect in a communicative and opinion-forming way are constructions. Moreover, with increasing temporal distance from the event, the degree of constructiveness of the reporting increases” (Weber, 2001, p. 6). The constructions thereby proceed from two sides: “On the one hand, society helps to shape consciousness. On the other, through their intentional apprehension of phenomena in the shared social world – through their active work – men and women collectively construct and constitute social phenomena” (Tuchman, 1978, p. 182). News is thus in one sense the mirror of society with its norms, concerns and interests, and in another sense also the result of individual and collective action and thus also of the active, momentary selection by journalists, who in turn have a normative and formative effect on the audience. For example, the media used a specific term for the Vietnam War objectors: “young men who refused to serve in Vietnam are commonly referred to as draft ‘evaders’ (the 11

 Here a bridge can be built to cultural studies and network theories.

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media’s term), rather than draft ‘resisters’, as they prefer to be called. The words ‘evaders’ and ‘resisters’ imply different political orientations to these men and their relationship to their country and the war” (Tuchman, 1978, p. 2). The construction of terrorism, as has already been shown in several places, is also closely linked to word and speech act constructions (see Sect. 4.6.2 as well as labeling in Sect. 2.1.5), to metaphors, frames and narratives (see Sect. 4.8.3) as well as to theories of rhetoric in general (see Sect. 4.9). Schulz (1990, p. 28) assumes “that news is an interpretation of our environment, a making sense of what is observable and, above all, of what is not observable.” An important insight here is that recipients incorporate and (partly) adopt these media constructions into their own conceptions of reality. In this way, the “media reality” can trigger an “effect reality” in the recipient: “Whatever the relationship of the media reality to ‘factual’ reality may be, it is certain that the news is usually regarded by the recipients as verified testimonies of ‘actual’ events, i.e., that they are to be equated with reality in their effects” (Schulz, 1990, p. 29). This alone explains panic outbreaks after attacks. “It is assumed that media with their presentation of events are able to bring certain topics into public discussion and to evaluate them by the way they are presented, by identifying main themes and ignoring certain aspects and/or by prescribing lines of argumentation” (Stern, 2003, p. 41). In this process, the media in their construction, agenda setting and framing, can reinforce conflict as well as reduce it. This usually depends on how strongly the media or media creators themselves feel affected by the conflict or crisis. The greater the degree of involvement, the more frequently the media equate themselves with the ideas of “their government” vis-à-vis an enemy image (see Sect. 4.7.2); they call for patriotism, for example. The quality of information dissemination also depends on the extent to which journalists, for example from tabloids, are afraid of overwhelming media consumers with the complexity of the subject matter. Finally, with their decision for or against publishing as well as with their framing – with their construction  – journalists create connections to the most diverse circles of recipients and, in the sense of systems theory (see Sect. 5.1), to the most diverse systems. For the actors, the directly perceived and the mediated events or observations are both relevant for the decision-making action, for example of the government. The intervention of the media, be it in the case of an abduction, be it in the case of the freeing of detainees, does not necessarily have to be bad: “Through their communication performance, the media quite generally reinforce the power and influence of those whose point of view they convey and thus enforce in their construction of reality” (Buck, 2007, p. 295). Thus, they can also reinforce the government’s perspective in the conflict. In constructivism, journalistic representations of

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events are neither understood as depictions of reality nor as manipulations. “The media are per se part of real events because they participate in the creation of reality” (Buck, 2007, p. 301). The more similar the constructions become and largely coincide, the higher the degree of agreement, “the more likely we are to set processes of understanding in motion in our relationships, and communication can succeed” (Rau, 2013, p. 158). In this context – in addition to the social environment field – the mutually existing image of the other also has an influence on the production and reception behavior of communicator and recipient (see Rau, 2013, p. 85). A theoretical approach that can be well transferred into a content analysis, i.e., made usable for empirical terrorism research, is reconstructivism-deconstructivism according to Hafez (2002). Media content as journalistic reality constructions of terror events or circumstances promoting terrorism can be compared in the sense of social science and cultural studies reconstructivism-deconstructivism with one’s own reality concept or an alternative one. It is of course certain that even such “extra-media data” as autonomy referendums or casualty figures are constructions in one way or another. Schulz (1990, p. 25) objects to the use of extra-media data, arguing that these in no way provide “more realistic” images, that one is therefore merely comparing different sources with one another and that the representation of “reality” in the media can thus in no way be falsified. Moreover, extra-media data would hardly be available on effects, explanations, backgrounds and the like, but one could at most compare the facts of the event itself. Schulz (1990, p. 26) concludes “that trying to compare news with ‘what really happened’ is impossible in principle.” “Reality” can only be perceived subjectively by everyone, and researchers and media professionals must be aware of this. Nevertheless – as Schulz also allows – it is legitimate to compare media reality with a normatively set conception of reality that can be located outside the media. The comparison of two media realities – for example, that of a national newspaper and that of a newspaper from the separatist region – with data collected extra-medially allows permissible conclusions to be drawn, since the relation to the same reference value, an attack in one’s own country with a certain number of victims, etc., is given. In order to ascertain the facts external to the media, an empirical investigation requires the involvement of various disciplines, above all political science, statistics, and history, from whose fields studies on terrorist associations, classifications of terrorist acts, and developments of terrorist groups originate; “through their access to extra-media sources [they] can present alternative drafts to the reality developed in mass media” (Hafez, 2002, p. 20) on this topic. In addition to these “intersubjective counter-designs” (Hafez, 2002, p. 21) to media reality, a full exploration, classification, and assessment of the phenomenon of “mediated image of a terrorist attack” requires a comprehensive content analysis in order to concretely capture

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media reality and determine its achievements and shortcomings. In addition, the social and editorial process of the creation of the media statements in the respective country and any limitations should be illuminated, such as the socio-economic situation in the country, readership, illiteracy rate, political system, reach of the newspaper, sponsorship, and so on. It is only in this way that the media construction can be captured. The effect of reporting on the individual cannot be derived from such an analysis of content, since, as described, one’s own “conceptions of reality” are only constructed in the respective individual and depending on context, socialization and the like. If one summarizes the statements made in a three-step process, following Hafez (2002, pp. 22–23), the following interplay of constructivist theory and empiricism emerges: 1. Reconstruction of media reality, which in turn can be seen as a reconstruction of extra-media reality, i.e., the construction by the communicators (especially politicians and terrorists), through quantitative and qualitative methods of content analysis. 2. Deconstruction of media reality, in that an extra-media conception of reality is developed through (primarily scientifically collected) data. 3. Explanation of the discrepancy between media and extra-media conception of reality by means of communication studies theories (e.g., newsworthiness theory, framing). This (de)construction process illustrates anew the importance of the media in the transmission of an attack. They serve as a stage (see also Sect. 5.5) for the constructions and interpretations of the event. Chakravarti sees the media as vital to terrorism (see Chakravarti, 2009, p. 116) and terrorism itself as a “social construction” (Chakravarti, 2009, p. 134), dependent and susceptible to manipulation and various interpretations. The goal of terrorists is to have their attack constructed as terrorism. This is done through the response behavior of the government and the panic reactions of the people. The media function as a platform for the various interpretations and classifications. In this respect, they offer “bundles of constructions” that usually correspond entirely to the expectations of the terrorists.

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5.3 Theories of Action and Their Applicability to the Phenomenon of Terrorism

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

In contrast to systems theory and constructivism, theories of action are relatively clearly located at the micro level of the actors.12 With these theories, collective facts are explained “via individual behavior in a social context” (Opp, 2009, p. 28). If individual action can be explained, social and institutional phenomena can also be explained in this manner; psychological models of explaining behavior at the micro level thus take on a new significance. The theory of action treats terrorism as an action, as a communication (concept) or “message.” Crelinsten (2002, pp. 83–84) explicitly builds his definition of terrorism on an action theory view: “Using this behavioural approach, I define terrorism as the combined use and threat of violence, planned in secret and usually executed without warning, that is directed against one set of targets (the direct victims) in order to coerce compliance or to compel allegiance from a second set of targets (targets of demands) and to intimidate or to impress a wider audience (target of terror or target of attention).” It is important to note that Crelinsten refers to both “use” and “threat” of violence. The latter can also be considered a constitutive element of the phenomenon of “terrorism” if it triggers the aforementioned reactions. Crelinsten (2002, p. 83) explicitly includes state terrorism in his definition, because for him actors or motives are not decisive, but only the action. “A ‘behavioral approach’ means that terrorism will be conceived as a tool of coercive persuasion in a wide variety of power relationships”  Although constructivism is often placed at the individual level, with the argument that it is a theory of cognition, the constructivist perspective is just as much aimed at the system level, since it is based on a comprehensive systemic conception of reality and takes place at all levels (see Sect. 5.2). 12

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(Crelinsten, 2009, p. 4). The direct victims of an attack are regarded merely as an upstream link in the intended chain of action. The instrumental approach, which is entirely in line with theories of action, comes from political science and sees terrorism as a self-chosen reaction to an external stimulus (usually decisions by the current government) (see Özdamar, 2008, p. 91). The choice of the type of response is strategically selected according to the cost-benefit principle – a view that is also at home with representatives of rational choice. Beck and Quandt (2011, p. 87) place both the conceptualization of terrorism as strategic communication (see Sect. 4.3.2) and that of the “Theater of Terror” (see Sect. 5.5) among the theories of action, since here – entirely in the sense of rational choice – decisions are made with regard to publicity advantages. The question of whether terrorism is rational or irrational, whether it is “method or madness,” is answered briefly by Malik (2000, p. 44): “Terrorism is a method.” Rational choice theory, like symbolic interactionism, is a theory of action (see Opp, 2009, pp. 36–38). It assumes that an individual weighs the costs and benefits of alternative actions and then decides in favor of the alternative that appears most profitable. Max Weber already considered rational means-end thinking as a characteristic of modernity; however, he suggests limitations due to the orientation towards traditions. “Even when action is largely rationalized, the impact of traditional orientation is relatively significant. As a rule, rational orientation primarily determines the guiding action” (Weber, 1964, p. 48). Furthermore, action is oriented towards expected reactions. “To study, for example, the actions of insurgent terrorists in isolation from the reactions of intended and unintended audiences is to ignore a key element of the terrorist phenomenon  – its communicative nature” (Crelinsten, 1987b, p. 7). Indeed, the “communicative nature” of terrorism involves strengthening relationships on one’s own side (recruiting) and weakening them on the other (the state). To describe the communicative tactics of “terrorism,” Crelinsten draws on symbolic interactionism based on George Herbert Mead13 on the one hand, and political conflict theory on the other. According to the interactionist paradigm, the meaning of a given action derives from the social reaction it provokes. This in turn defines the action in a particular way, “labeling it and thereby confining its meaning to a particular interpretation. The conflict approach

 Mead’s disciple Blumer (1969, p. 2) lists three premises of symbolic interactionism: “The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them. […] The second premise is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows. The third premise is that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters.” 13

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r­ecognises that groups compete for resources and power and that institutions of social control serve as instruments in such conflicts” (Crelinsten, 1987b, p. 8). The media are also among such social institutions. It is characteristic of all terrorist propaganda that terrorists portray their cause as absolutely justified; “because of their belief in their own righteousness, the terrorists can portray their opponents not as simply misguided but as totally evil, as corrupt oppressors” (Wilkinson, 1990, p. 29). This assumption guides the terrorists’ actions. Such propaganda campaigns compensate for the military weakness of the terrorist group. However, in the end, the recipient, who according to the theory also acts rationally, decides on an assignment of meaning in the decoding of the mass mediated events. The hallmark of symbolic interactionism, namely, “is the active role attributed to the recipients of mass-mediated content. The emphasis is on the interpretive achievements of the audience, which are crucial for the fact that (mass media) contents cannot be regarded as stimuli determinable by the sender” (Theis, 1994, p. 50). The idea of the recipient with regard to the communicator and, conversely, the idea of the communicator (terrorists, media professionals, politicians) with regard to the recipient make communication in symbolic interactionism a complex, recursive and social action. The orientation of communicators to available means and ends, which is taken up by theories of action, leads directly to the remarks of Talcott Parsons. “Parsons’ starting point had been Max Weber’s statement to the effect that all human conduct involves ends and means, implying that ends and means are universal and, hence, fundamental categories for the analysis of action” (Lidz & Staubmann, 2010, p. 8). Lewin, contemporary of Parsons, also stated that most actions occur out of the perception of a discrepancy, for example, taking a glass of water because the state of being “thirsty” was perceived as unsatisfactory and in this sense as a discrepancy to a desired pleasant state (see Lewin, 1947, p. 148). Actions cannot be analyzed without the categories “ends” and “means.” This shows why a motive analysis of terror groups can also be made fruitful for an action-theoretical approach or even be considered necessary for it (see Rothenberger & Müller, 2015). Religious, ethnic-­nationalist or social-revolutionary motives (see Sect. 2.1.4) determine, for example, the selection of victims or the territory in which the attack takes place. An analysis of the ultimate goal (anarchy, caliphate, etc.) and the intermediate goal (e.g., more autonomy, reign of terror) can also be approached in terms of action theory, and the actions necessary to achieve this goal could be countered on the political side with the help of the “theory of change” (see Sect. 4.11.1). The terrorists’ actions continue to be guided by their desire to stage the attack as a media event (see Sect. 4.3.4). The actions are linked to certain expectations and also expectations of expectation. For example, terrorists work with media expectations

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and calculate them into their decisions to act. “Maximum (media) attention is to be achieved by ‘serving’ news values, media schemas and frames” (Beck & Quandt, 2011, p. 88). It is not only individual actors who are motivated to take certain actions; mechanisms of action are also set in motion at the organizational level. Norms set limits to actions. In institutions, organizations and groups, certain explicit as well as implicit norms can prevail (see Parsons, 201014, pp. 153–157). For example, some terrorist groups use suicide attacks as an option for action, while others refrain from doing so. If a situation arises in which a norm violation is required, a situation of tension may arise. Parsons (2010, p. 88) speaks of “the tension between normative pattern and situation.” The “situation” considered by Parsons (2010, p. 38) as essential for the determination of actions is similar to the “settings” described by Bronfenbrenner (1978; see Sect. 3.3). Such a situation usually, but not necessarily, consists of several actors (see Lidz & Staubmann, 2010, p. 11). According to the mutual expectations and context variables, each situation is to be regarded as an individual setting and can trigger different (communicative and social) actions. For example, a suicide bomber may refuse to act in a particular situation. Or the situation of women in a country brings about new decisions: for example, the fact that women in Sri Lanka often wear loose clothing, which makes the bomb belt more inconspicuous, and are seldom patted down at security checkpoints has motivated the LTTE to increasingly use women as assassins (see Ramasubramanian, 2004, p. 10).15 Frequently, a major change within an organization (terrorist group, media organization, government, citizens’ group; see Fig. 3.5), which may also have been triggered from outside, is also responsible for a change in action. The structures of an organization align themselves with the environment and in turn influence it recursively (see Altmeppen, 2006, pp. 48–49). Likewise, action and structure relate to each other: they condition and change each other. In order to achieve a structural change, a certain action or communicating is necessary, which in turn leads to the area of strategic communication (see Sect. 4.3.2). “In order to achieve a defined goal, it is necessary to initiate certain actions and refrain from others, and to make a choice among possible strategies” (Altmeppen, 2006, p. 56). In summary, terrorism as communication must first be understood as social action in order for it to be analyzed and explained with the guidance of action theory (see Waldmann, 2005b, p. 11; Crelinsten, 2009). Terrorism is seen as a communicative act directed at and  Parsons probably wrote the essay in 1939.  Here, too, a strong construction, a separate perspective on “reality” is built up with words: The group of female assassins of the LTTE called themselves “Birds of Freedom” (see Ramasubramanian, 2004, p. 11). 14 15

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towards the public and “exhibits an indispensable public component” (Waldmann, 2005b, p. 12). The act of violence has a symbolic character; it conveys a message or rather several messages: “Let all who stand in our way fear and be afraid, for our next attack can also strike you. All who wish to join us, to you we hereby show our strength and assertiveness.” In order for these messages to prevail, a relatively interference-free communication space is required, a “situation” in which the terrorist act reaches all groups of actors presented in the quadrangle: “Messages of violence, however, are only ‘heard’ if the noise level in a society is not too high, if the public space is not already densely occupied with acts of violence. This is one of the main reasons why terrorists prefer the Western industrialized countries as a stage for action, where the state has achieved a monopoly on violence and violent eruptions ‘from below’ are among the widely discussed anomalies” (Waldmann, 2005b, pp. 15–16). Too frequent bombings and the like lose their significance because they fall into a kind of inflationary spiral (see Sect. 4.7.1). According to the rational choice approach, this leads to increasingly violent actions (“means”) in order to still reach the “ends.” Beck and Quandt (2011, p.  91) criticize the explanatory potential of action-­ theoretical approaches for terrorism research in communication studies and criticize that it remains unclear “whether collective behavior actually results from individually rational action or  – as we suspect  – whether here, conversely, the rationality of the terror organization (in the sense of an efficiency-oriented purposive rationality) does not decisively shape individual action.” At the outset, the terror organization was already explained in terms of collective identity (see Sect. 4.1). But this too is created through the interaction of similarly constructing identities of individuals. In this respect, we cannot speak here of a determination of the meso over the micro level, but of a mutual influence. Moreover, Beck and Quandt (2011) criticize that the rational choice approach or other actor-centered theories could not explain the act of suicide bombing with one’s own death on the cost side. A way out of this would be to fall back on value-rational explanatory schemas, which do not presuppose that the actor can rationally justify his values (such as “honor” in traditional settings), and to fall back on psychological persuasion models (see Sect. 4.12.9).

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5.4 Socially Integrative Approaches to Terrorism Research

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

The actor is integrated into structures. Social structures are “those effects of action that manifest themselves as solidified patterns and thus prescribe the further conditions of action for the actors” (Schimank, 2010, p. 16). Structures thus “appear as ‘external’ to human action, as a source of constraints on the free spontaneity of the independently constituted subject” (Giddens, 1995, p. 68). At the same time, however, structures are internalized by the actor. Structures thus regulate transformational relations and, as “structuration,” determine the reproduction of social systems (Giddens, 1995, p. 77). Action and structure thus enter into a duality. Social action and social structures continuously condition and constitute each other. “Socially integrative” therefore gets to the heart of Schimank’s remarks because he wants to link system-theoretical approaches with actor-theoretical approaches and to see these “not as competing theoretical offerings” (Schimank, 2007, p.  183). Accordingly, action is not completely determined by the system, but it does not dominate it either. Consequently, the act of terrorism and the system of terrorism are in an interdependent relationship. Social structures determine how and on what occasion an action, however motivated, can express itself. With regard to motives, “structural features of modern society, such as its degree of bureaucratization or the erosion of communities, make certain motivations virulent” (Schimank, 2010, p. 18). Group-induced action such as a terrorist attack can have an immense effect on bystander action, for example, ending in a recruitment surge. However, the chain between action and effect can be interrupted, for example, by security measures – also of a communicative or censorious nature. Spectator action can also be influenced by the media and result in stronger support for the existing government or security policy restrictions.

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Schimank (2010, p. 47) defines four sociological actor models for the choice of motivations: Homo sociologicus, homo economicus, emotional man and identity assertor. Since homo economicus and rational choice have already been discussed in Sect. 4.2, the following are considerations on the identity assertor, into whose category terrorists can primarily be classified. Identity assertors are characterized by the fact “that they literally devote themselves body and soul to a very specific [question] and its solution” (Schimank, 2010, p. 142). They make their choice of action against the background that they are anxious to confirm their self-image (see Schimank, 2010, p. 143). Especially in situations where an actor sees his identity threatened (and this is the case with terrorist groups), the motive of identity assertion takes hold as a motivation (see Schimank, 2010, p. 152). This is why the formation of a collective identity is so important for the emergence of a terrorist group (see Sect. 4.1). Social action, Giddens and Schimank agree, takes place within certain structures and at the same time continuously generates them as it takes place. Kriesi (1988) makes the connection between action and structure specifically for social movements. He calls these movements both reason and consequence for social change (see Kriesi, 1988, p.  349). “Collective action emerges from the ongoing reproduction of structural conditions in society” (Kriesi, 1988, p. 362). In collective action, dissatisfaction with the current situation is articulated in (speech and other, also violent) actions. Schimank (2010, p. 45) explicates that actors can also be “organizations, social groups or social movements,” although these are readily referred to as “supra-individual actors,” which ultimately consist of individuals with common motives and common goals. Thus, micro and meso levels are interrelated here. Organizational leaders calculate an addition of their group’s influence based on how many more members the group contains. This is why terrorist groups also go to great lengths to recruit. Schimank (2007, p. 244) sees modern society as a “primarily functionally differentiated society” with the levels of roles, organizations and subsystems. Schimank (2007, p. 245) identifies the integration of the subsystems as a problem: “On the part of the individual members of society, problems of orientation and identity increase, because ties that create meaning across subsystems erode.” The non-­addressability of the functional systems has already been referred to in Sect. 5.1. The subsystems are increasingly oriented towards different goals and horizons, so that there is incompatibility, which can lead to erosion in the system. At this point, the subsystem “terrorism” explained in Sect. 5.1 could form and become “emergent” as a structure formation. In it, the actions of individual actors take place, interacting with meso- and exo-level structures and motivated by the formation of system boundaries – one’s own system emerges, while other systems move

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into its environment or (such as the traditional exo-level security system) disintegrate. Society, for example, becomes less physical, eroding in physical space, but becomes vulnerable in virtual space, as witnessed by the rise of cyberattacks. Forsberg (2012, p. 81) explains the mutual influences in actor-structure dynamics: “To use a physics analogy, the individuals are the particles and the rules under which they operate are the forces. Forces in physics depend on the particles, just as the movement of the particles depends on the forces involved.” Forsberg (2012, p. 96) sees, especially in the area of triggers and reasons for terrorist acts, a connection between levels that can be linked in a socially integrative way: system level (e.g., globalization tendencies), exo level (legislation, unemployment), organizational level (belonging to an ethnic or religious association) and individual behavior (willingness to use violence). The examples illustrate how the characteristics are mutually dependent. A successful counter-terrorism strategy must therefore be active at all the levels mentioned. It cannot start only at the organizational and structural level in the hope that this will change the individuals, but also at the micro level of the actors, so that the organizations change. It can possibly raise the costs of an action for the terrorists (based on the rational choice principle; see Sect. 5.3) (“stick”), offer them rewards for actions that run counter to the terrorist idea (“carrot”) or take the pressure to act off them or at least reduce it (see Forsberg, 2012, p. 17; Frey, 2004), for example by not allowing discrimination with regard to their language or religion and thus reduce states of tension. Beck and Quandt (2011) present “terror”16 as a multi-level communication phenomenon and illustrate this by means of an (extremely selective) choice of theories and their location on the various social levels (see Table 5.1). The selection is presented here because it shows possible connections in the sense of socially integrative approaches. All approaches mentioned under “theories” and “concepts” have already been detailed in this book. Table  5.1 shows once again how structure and action are mutually dependent, even if the interlocking of the levels has not been visually highlighted. That Beck and Quandt’s account also starts from a normative premise is shown by the fact that they describe terrorism as an attack on the idea of rational understanding. According to this, the attackers act according to aspects of rational choice, but at the same time their act is the interruption of a discourse based on understanding, which should actually be the meaning and purpose of (understanding-­ oriented) communication. This interruption in the form of intensely shocking violent communication takes place on all levels: between terrorists and victims,

16

 In the linguistic style introduced in Sect. 2.1, actually “terrorism.”

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Table 5.1  Terror as a multi-level communication phenomenon (Beck & Quandt, 2011, p. 87) Level Theory Micro Theories of action • Rational choice • Expressive action

Concepts Terror as strategic (public) communication ‘Theater of terror’

Meso

Terror as (internal) organizational communication

Network theories

Macro Systems theories

Attack on the idea of rational understanding

Terror as a communication system/parasitic functional system

Strengths and weaknesses + Communication objectives, means, strategies and effects − Suicide as utility maximization? − Free riders and collective rationality + Symbolic order + Realistic view of human nature − Forecasting knowledge − Concept/function of communication? − Hierarchical communication + Diffusion of messages − Empirical validity − Added value, conceptual consistency

b­ etween terrorist groups and governments, and also between “terrorism” and “civil society.”

5.5 Theories of the Public Sphere and Their Usefulness for the Analysis of Terrorism as Communication

Terrorism / Terror organization / Terrorists

Politics / Government / Politicians

Journalism / Media organization / Journalists

Civil society / Citizen group / Citizens

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The topic of “public sphere” has already emerged in the previous chapters as elementary for the consideration of the communication components of the phenomenon of “terrorism” and has proven to be a complex system, especially in the digital age, as the public sphere combines characteristics such as emergence, networking, self-organization, non-linearity and heterogeneity (see also Waldherr, 2017). Public spheres can be found in a wide variety of places in both the actor quadrangle (see Fig. 3.5) and the process schema (see Fig. 3.6). The basic notion of “public sphere” can be located in the quadrangle under “civil society”; of course, sub-­publics in certain groupings are also formed for this purpose. After an introduction to the concepts of public sphere and public opinion (a) and a presentation of various public spheres important for the study of terrorism as communication (b), this chapter is devoted to the two approaches of “terrorism in the arena” (c) and “terrorism as theater” (d). (a) Publicity and Public Opinion Ross (2007, p.  215) clearly sees “the connection between terrorism and public opinion.” Terrorist attacks never target only the direct victims, but the society behind them, a specific public with a specific public opinion. “Part of the essence of terror is to spread maximum terror with minimal effort. For this, the attackers depend on the mass media. Publicity as the lifeblood of terrorism” (Elter, 2008, p. 2). According to Elter (2008, p. 11), “there is, after all, always a close connection between violence and its public impact. The public is the real addressee of terrorist communication.” Terrorists are interested in the systematic spreading of fear and terror and “thus the very word ‘spreading’ makes it clear what terrorists have always been and still are concerned with: their kidnappings, bombings or assassinations must be known, must be disseminated by the media with a wide reach in order to evoke maximum fear and terror. To put it bluntly, one could say: Terrorists whose deeds remain unknown do not exist  – at least not for the public” (Elter, 2008, p. 11).17 Nor – in the sense of contagion (see Sect. 4.5.3) – for other terrorist groups, who then cannot orient themselves on the “role models” or “rivals” portrayed in the media.

 The RAF is a good example of a terrorist organization that clearly included the media and its publicity in its strategy (see Rothenberger, 2017b). 17

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The term “public sphere” originated in the Enlightenment.18 Subsequently, the public sphere increasingly formed a kind of controlling corrective of politics. The Latin “publicus” means something like “public, belonging to the people/the state/ the community; general, widespread” (see Stowasser, 1994, p. 415). In addition, the public sphere has a cultural function (see Winter, 1993), in that goals and identities are discussed in and grounded in the public sphere. According to Otto Groth (1998), the public or audience in the sense of “publicity” with timeliness, periodicity and universality even represent one of the four defining characteristics of the daily newspaper. In this respect, “publicity” belongs to the basic concepts of communication studies (see Merten, 1999, p. 49), but is not clearly defined in its interpretation for the discipline. Despite various approaches to clarifying the concept and phenomenon of “public sphere,” the term has remained “structurally diffuse” (Rühl, 1999, p. 37). In 1990, Gerhards and Neidhardt laid the foundation for describing the structures and functions of the modern public sphere in a publication of the same name.19 “The public sphere forms an intermediary system whose political function consists of the reception (input) and processing (throughput) of certain topics and opinions, as well as in the communication of the public opinions resulting from this processing (output) to the citizens on the one hand, and to the political system on the other” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 54). Media form an essential part of this system. Merten (1999, p. 49) defines the public sphere by five characteristic elements: “the basic observability of everything by everyone (which may be limited by certain access roles), which triggers discourses about it, on topics that are dealt with according to relevance and provoke opinions about them.” When an issue such as a terrorist attack reaches the public sphere, i.e., leaves the private or local sphere, it becomes commonly accessible and can be discussed in conversation and social discourse. Newspapers publish topics after checking and selecting them on the basis of news values (see Sect. 4.7.1), and the public thus engages in discourses on topics that have already been classified as socially relevant by the editors. In the formation of social opinion, pro and con arguments are then weighed (also influenced by opinion leadership, environmental and socialization influences) and a  “For the semantic development of the term ‘public sphere,’ the expansion of the geographical field of vision of Europe was decisive. A transnational exchange of political ideas emerged, which was particularly promoted by the increasing circulation of books and journals and the growing correspondence among private individuals” (Winter, 1993, p. 31). On the history of the word “public” as well as its counterpart “public sphere” see also Hohendahl (2000). 19  Quoted here from the 1993 reprint in Langenbucher’s anthology “Politische Kommunikation.” 18

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positive or negative mood is formed with regard to the topic in question – rarely a neutral one. Public opinion is a “collective quantity” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 58) and in principle accessible to all members of society. Openness (to the audience) is a central characteristic of the public sphere. Thus, multiple opinions should be heard in the arena. However, since the public sphere cannot accommodate and place issues without limits, it is necessary to “generate attention for an issue and an opinion. This is done in the public sphere system by means of incentives that secure general – i.e., effective in a large lay audience – attention, namely by generating high discrepancies. Surprises, novelties, crises, and scandals are stimuli capable of accomplishing this” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p.  62). Terrorism generates precisely these discrepancies. Here again a bridge is built to newsworthiness theory (see Sect. 4.7.1), whose value in describing terrorism as communication has already been discussed. The climate of opinion as a whole usually corresponds to “prevailing views, attitudes, prevailing tastes, and in terms of expected, fixed, approved behaviors, [the] morals” (Noelle-Neumann, 1979, p. 205). This is exactly what is observable after an attack. This is interpreted by the public as an extreme violation of norms and morals. Since almost everyone is afraid of isolation in public, they adapt in a certain way to the climate of opinion they perceive by observing their environment – i.e., also the media – and the spiral of silence is set in motion (see Sect. 4.12.6). Merten (1999, p. 54) precedes his model of the public sphere in relation to the media (see Merten, 1999, p. 54) with three models of the public sphere, representing the presence of two, of three and of several persons vis-à-vis a communicator. Finally, the medium, which replaces the communicator who is directly present, sends information to different recipients, the so-called latent public, and these either communicate directly with one another or, in virtual perception, assume public knowledge on the part of the other recipients, since the information is, after all, generally accessible. “In contrast to the real-world face-to-face communication system, mass communication can therefore be described as a virtual communication system which, although very diffuse, fulfills socially comprehensive consensual functions with regard to ideas, expectations and opinions and thereby catalyzes a further, much more diffuse system: ‘public sphere’” (Merten, 1999, p. 57). In most cases, recipients also assume that other recipients also attribute this media-­ generated knowledge to them and to everyone else. Thus, the public can be found colloquially in the insinuation “everyone knows that,” more specifically: in the “everyone.” According to Merten (1999, p. 58), the public sphere in this sense is “the assumption – catalyzed by the production of accessibility or reachability of something – of perceptibility by others and at the same time the assumption that

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others also assume perceptibility.” Especially in the case of highly violent terrorist attacks with many fatalities, which trigger a great media response, the assumption of knowledge  – often in between or in groups  – becomes clearly apparent. The public sphere becomes, so to speak, a “social knowledge system” (Merten, 1999, p.  59). The function of the mass media is to keep feeding and maintaining this knowledge consensus: Now there are photos of the perpetrators, now they are caught, etc. Communication on this consensual knowledge, the formation of judgments about it, can then be regarded as “public opinion.” Public opinion and general commitment to certain topics thus only come about through mass media transmission; they are “constructed” by it (see also Sect. 5.2). “The public sphere theoretical approach is concerned with constructions of reality in (mediated) public discourses” (Scheufele, 2003, p. 84). Discourses and the public sphere inherently contain a concept of collectivity, a kind of “sense of community” (Szyszka, 1999, p. 9). The system of journalism maintains this sense because it is directed towards universal, not partial, interests and periodically informs a dispersed audience about current information. This is also the reason why, in relation to terrorism, reporting is mostly event-related, not background-related. The event is topical and interests many, partly because of the surprise effect. A collective fear situation arises and is processed collectively by means of cultural narratives. The journalism system enters into a relationship with society, the surrounding public, and attempts to identify common denominators. In order to gain publicity, a topic must be relevant and accessible to many people. In this respect, media point out possible topics for discussion in the public sphere, they multiply the accessibility of certain sets of topics for a large number of recipients, and they suggest the relevance of topics (see Szyszka, 1999, p. 146). Once a topic is set, they try to maintain the attention span, for example with ever new information about the machinations of the Islamic State. Common attention to a matter can thus be considered a characteristic of the public sphere (see Westerbarkey, 1999, pp. 150–151). It should be noted that the public sphere and the opinions that are formed in it are of course influenced not only by the media, but also, for example, by the public relations work and campaigns of companies and politicians. In relation to the topic of “terrorism,” this would be, for example, issues management departments and their strategies to ensure a positive reception of legislative changes in society after a terrorist attack. According to this, the public sphere can be divided into three sub-­ areas (see Szyszka, 1999, p. 7): public relations as a sub-area of public communication (related to society), the public sphere as an organizational variable that can be influenced by public relations (related to organizations), and the public sphere as determining action in public relations (related to actors). Actors belong to the concept of the public sphere as constitutive elements whose actions and existence

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make the public sphere possible in the first place. However, they can belong to different (sub-)systems. (b) The Public Sphere as a Constituent of the Sub-Areas of Politics, Terrorism and Civil Society “Common attention” is not homomorphic. It can be subdivided into different sub-­ areas in which contrary opinions can also be presented. Gerhards (1998, p. 269) suggests not to use the term public sphere in the singular, but to use the plural term “public opinions”: “Public opinions are the issues and opinions communicated in the public sphere system, which are to be distinguished from the aggregated individual opinions of citizens.” In this context, Gerhards sees the public sphere as an intermediary system that allows citizens and actors in the political system to observe and communicate with each other by observing and producing public opinions themselves. In the case of the phenomenon of terrorism, the latter would be added as a further stakeholder and fighter for public opinion, spreading opinions that are, above all, contrary to those of the current political system. Each actor must first gain the attention of the audience for its issues and then try to convince them of its positions, with terrorists trying to force this by means of violent communication. “Both audiences and collective actors have formed interpretive patterns through which they interpret political issues. These in turn are shaped by the structure of a society’s social conflict lines. A line of conflict is a perpetual antagonism between actors regarding political issues, with each side of the antagonism characterized by a coalition between a socially structural and ideologically relatively homogeneous segment of the population, interest groups, and parties” (Gerhards, 1998, p. 271). Even though this of course refers to politically legitimized parties, the model of the lines of conflict can also be applied to the controversy between the government, that is, the “status quo system,” and challenging terrorists. The separatist camp, for example, is located primarily in the ethnic minority (Tamils, Basques, etc.) as well as in their political wing (Sinn Féin, (Herri) Batasuna, etc.). Here, from a certain perspective, certain homogeneous patterns of interpretation prevail. The “oppression issue” and the “liberation struggle” meet with particular resonance in the sense of an “arena consonance” (see below).20 Above all, one can speak of persuasive communication; it “intends or produces the persuasion of the addressee of the information” (Kepplinger, 1998, p. 363). And  The “looking-glass” effect can occur, i.e., “projection effects of personal attitudes on the perception of the climate of opinion” (Schenk & Rössler, 1994, p.  261). If both attitudes conform, the opinion is strengthened. In between there is still the opinion of the personal reference group, which is also compared with one’s own opinion. 20

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these persuasive efforts take shape in the terrorists’ act of violence, which is intended to reach the general public as a skillful display. The aspect of the publicity of the mass media plays a central role in the arena and theater models to be presented in the following section: the media have the public sphere as their addressee and are at the same time important constituents of it. They take up different opinions from many sub-areas of the public sphere and carry them into large parts of civil society. (c) Terrorism in the Arena Gerhards and Neidhardt (1993, p. 63) present the public sphere as “a broad and diffuse entity. It comprises a multitude of small and large forums that are only partially interconnected.” Furthermore, the public sphere appears as a system divided into several levels, which differ “firstly according to the quantity of communication participants, and secondly according to the degree of structural anchoring” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 63). For example, it depends on the type of society, i.e., macro-structural specifications, information flow control, illiteracy rate, infrastructure and geographical conditions, whether the public sphere, for example, takes place more on the level of face-to-face communication or via the mass media. With regard to terrorist groups, it can also be seen that they adapt to the respective situation and, for example, FARC or IS are also very active in direct communication, especially in rural areas or mountain regions that are difficult to reach. Gerhards and Neidhardt call the forums of public communication, in which topic-specific discourses are brought to bear, “arenas”;21 these are assigned various sub-arenas, which are distributed among the different levels such as micro, meso and macro. The success of the arena actors, however, “is ultimately decided in the gallery” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 68), i.e., through the approval or rejection of the audience. Thus, it can also be seen in the subject area of terrorism that the arena of the like-minded, however large it may be, has little chance if it cannot win over the gallery (e.g., the international audience, international organizations, and militarily competent alliances of states). The arena spokespersons are characterized by a special zeal in communication: “We assume above-average willingness to communicate among population groups whose interests have been violated by particular events or constellations and who therefore see reasons to complain, to criti The arena model was developed by Gerhards, Neidhardt and others at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WBZ) since the early 1990s. The special issue (Neidhardt, 1994) contains a number of other fundamental essays on the subject of the “public sphere.” In the sense of the arena model, the communication quadrangle (see Fig. 3.5) can also be reduced to a triangle of speakers/actors, media and audience. 21

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cize, to demand. […] Public communication is, in political terms, to a strong ­degree problem communication” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 73). If, for example, a social protest movement does not get through to the decisive forums, it may resort to violence as a forcing act of communication. This brings its arena back into focus and gives it connections to the political arena, the media arena, and pushes it all the way to the gallery. In summary, it can be stated that the public sphere is constituted by arenas in which actors express themselves on certain topics. The observing public is located in the galleries as the addressee of arena speakers and the media, i.e., as their “publicity-constituting reference group” (Neidhardt, 1994, p.  12). The public sphere is the forum of communication about certain topics that a large number of citizens find interesting and important. Thus, if most of the opinions of the arena actors agree on a topic, an “arena consonance” (Neidhardt, 1994, p. 7) is created and public opinion is said to exist. “In a forum model of the public sphere, then, ‘public opinion’ refers not to individual opinions of the audience, but to mass-­ mediated expressions of opinion by speakers before an audience” (Neidhardt, 1994, p. 26). As already shown above, the mass media and the content conveyed to the public through them serve political spokespersons to provide their actions with a certain legitimacy. And the terrorists also strive for this through non-violent communication such as claims of responsibility and PR and marketing measures. Media address an extremely heterogeneous lay audience with a weak degree of organization (see Neidhardt, 1994, p. 13). The common motivations of the audience are curiosity, conformity and participation in what is commonly accessible. Individuals have an interest in a shared repertoire of knowledge with “the others,” which leads to Mertens’ (1999, p. 59) aforementioned social knowledge system. In the triangle “speaker – mediator – audience,” the audience can give feedback to the speakers either directly (e.g., in a personal letter) or mediated, for example via letters to the editor. The reader of the newspaper is both a paying recipient of the information offered, but on the other hand also a citizen and member of various networks and a certain social class, and the reader will pass on this information and incorporate it into his or her behavior and actions towards politicians and other citizens and groups. In the same communication structures and networks, therefore, several arenas can be formed and located simultaneously: the “bourgeois”

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public sphere according to Habermas22 is then supplemented by, for example, ­various subcultural or class-specific public spheres (see Habermas, 1990, p. 15).23 In this context, Imhof (2003, p. 204) calls for “taking into account different powers of definition and opportunities for participation. This is of interest in a perspective that asks about the conditions under which social movements achieve resonance at the expense of established actors and disrupt the routines of the political system.” Terrorism is thus to be understood as the design of a counter-public sphere and accordingly stands in opposition to the relatively uniform public sphere in a deliberative democracy according to Habermas (see Wessler, 2018, p. 151). Counter-­ public groups claim their own communicative space in which they negotiate and develop their own identity. They expose the normative ideal (or assumed normative framework) on which deliberative public communication is based. They assault it by creating their own space of counter-publicity that, in an attack, collides violently with the “unitary master sphere” (Wessler, 2018, p. 151) and penetrates it like a spike. The (communicative) ripples of this impact spread through society, but then also ebb away. However, Wessler (2018, p. 152) also sees approaches with Habermas to conceptualize counter-publics that struggle for attention. Emotions that are discharged in aggressive discourse and deeds play an important role here, but also the moral indignation in society that denies any legitimacy to the demands of the counter-public. It is precisely this struggle for public discourse arenas with regard to media audiences that Schlesinger et al. (1983) addressed. They developed a model describing the attempt of (violent) insurgent movements to evoke a “response” at the expense of established actors, which can be well used for empirical content analyses on terrorism reporting. They divide the statements or quoted persons in TV reports into four categories according to their perspective on the events (see Schlesinger et al., 1983, pp. 2–33): • the official perspective: This is the view taken by government representatives. “The key users of these official definitions of terrorism are government ministers, conservative politicians and top security personnel. Given their high status as news sources their opinions are assured a prominent place in media cover On the dialectic of bourgeois and proletarian public spheres, see Negt and Kluge (1977). Here, the existence of different public spheres of workers and bourgeoisie is merely to be pointed out, but in the following, these two will not be distinguished, since, as the authors themselves write, this separation cannot be made clearly and becomes more and more blurred over the course of time. 23  The first edition of Habermas’ “Structural Change of the Public Sphere” appeared in 1962. 22

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age” (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p. 2). Journalists themselves or academics may also hold this perspective in their commentaries, which need by no means have a self-contained body of thought, except for the view that the state must be preserved in its present form and the validity and moral as well as political-­ functional superiority of existing laws are emphasized. Media in the country directly involved in the conflict often rely on statements by representatives of state organs propagating the benefits of their actions. • the alternative perspective: Its representatives contradict the official perspective in large parts but are united against violence as a solution strategy. Above all civil rights activists, academics, so-called intellectuals, but also journalists and statesmen belong to this arena. They are concerned that their opinions in the media form a counter-opinion to the official version. They raise their voices especially when the state resorts to restrictive measures that limit civil liberties in the name of security. The worse the act of violence, the more difficult it is for them to defend their position. • the populist perspective: “If there is warlike talk, what about warlike action? Why not kill the terrorists, whether by military operations, or by imposing the death penalty after they have been captured and convicted? Proponents of this view take the metaphor of war seriously. We have labelled the framework in which it is developed the ‘populist’ perspective” (Schlesinger et  al., 1983, p. 24). Here, one thinks in terms of the dichotomy of “good versus evil,” reactionary violence forms no boundary, the original state is to be restored, no matter by what means. If the state does not take appropriate means, the representatives of this hard uncompromising line call upon citizens not to be satisfied with the inadequacy of the security forces, but to take the fight against terrorism into their own hands. “At this point the populist perspective on terrorism shades into the more general advocacy of popular vigilantism as a way of combating violent street crime” (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p. 25). Especially in Ireland, such forms of populist demands and also their implementation could be observed. Since such calls for violence are politically incorrect and in part punishable, and also only trigger resonance in a few sub-publics, representatives of the populist perspective appear relatively rarely in the media; “the populist perspective […] puts the demand for order above the need for strict legality. Such openness is not available to official spokesmen” (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p. 27). • The oppositional perspective: This is the perspective of the terrorists, or of all those who support their (political) goals and see violence as a legitimate means of achieving them. The terrorists’ aim is to create a kind of counter-public and to (re)win over the supporters of the ideas of the social movement from which the terrorist group emerged (see Sect. 4.1) and to convince them that violence is

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the right path. Representatives of the official perspective are keen to ensure that the opposition has as little to say in the media as possible. They strengthen their position by ensuring that the acts of violence stand for themselves as atrocious events and are explained and justified by the opposition as rarely as possible, even if with plausible reasons. “The less they [the events, author’s note] are placed in context by oppositional spokesmen and women, or by communiqués, the more they are subject to explanation in official terms, as criminal, barbarous and irrational” (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p. 27). The description of the different arenas makes it clear that people are won over to a cause if the attention aroused is “brought into an opinion direction” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 62), if values shared by the group are linked to and if a personalization of the issue is successful. Then empathy and agreement can be expected (see Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 63). Critically, it can be asked, especially in the case of the last three categories, whether these groups do not sometimes also derive their benefit from the conflict situation, since they are now (finally) being heard. With regard to strategies for generating attention in terms of specific, culturally shaped public spheres, Richards (2004, p. 169) makes a distinction between “spectacular and participatory types of public sphere” and between “values-based and power-based modes of address.” The terrorist act belongs to the categories “spectacular” and “power-based.” In many respects (see Sects. 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.2), however, terrorists also engage in a clearly values-based appeal to their reference groups, especially with regard to identity formation. Here, the focus is on friend/foe symbolism, which is linked, for example, through martyrdom with values such as sacrifice (one for the community), fame and bravery. Richards (2004, p. 172) sees two global publics: the “Islamic public” versus the “Western public,” which try to unite the respective publics by means of different PR strategies. Both pursue two strategies: a first strategy is to show their own (military) power (power-based PR). In contrast to this is, secondly, value-based PR, as practiced by most companies: “Professional PR communication is about the reputation or practical goodness of clients and their works. It is about demonstrating the client’s adherence to or association with certain values or standards which is why we could call it ‘values-based PR’” (Richards, 2004, p. 173). This orientation towards the values-based mandate of society, which ultimately distinguishes “ordinary” corporate PR from PR by terrorist groups, has already been referred to in Sect. 4.2.1. The public sphere, according to Richards, has two faces and can therefore be reached in two ways: On the one hand, there is the rationally decisive participatory

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public sphere,24 as conceived for example by Habermas for liberal democracies (see Richards, 2004, p. 174). On the other hand, there is a passive public, ­“vulnerable to manipulation and charisma. This is not a participatory public but a spectator public, whose collective mind is full not of fact and argument but image and emotion” (Richards, 2004, p. 174).25 In earlier times, this public could be impressed, for example, by royal pomp and papal coronations. But even today the modern public is receptive to symbols, rituals, spectacles and staging – such as the big emotionally charged “picture show” of September 11. Richards sees a need to catch up on the side of value-based PR, which is supposed to reach the participating, reasoning type of public (see Table  5.2; Richards himself declares the areas to be non-­ separable). Anti-terrorism measures would have to be effectively communicated to the public through value-based moral arguments together with or via symbols (see Richards, 2004, p. 175). The more spectacle-oriented public, on the other hand, would have to be made offers of (emotional) identification, for example advertising spaces that extol liberal values as “This belongs to me.” For their statements, politicians can either use direct communication to civil societies or mass-mediated messages. For merely addressing the group of rationally-pragmatically oriented publics, as is often done in editorials and high-quality news broadcasts, is not sufficient to counter “terrorism as theater.” (d) Terrorism as Theater In their book “The Theater of Terror,” Weimann and Winn (1994, p. 52) shed light on the metaphor of terrorism as theater: “Modern terrorism can be understood in Table 5.2  “Indicative content of public communication in different types of public sphere and different modes of ‘public relations’” (Richards, 2004, p. 175) Mode of ‘public relations’ Power-based Values-based

Type of public sphere Participation Pragmatic calculation Reasoned moral argument

Spectacle Awe, fear, pride, etc. Passionate identification, commitment

 “Political participation is understood as the voluntary actions of citizens with the aim of influencing political issue-related and personnel decisions at various levels of the political system or to participate directly in such decisions” (Gabriel & Brettschneider, 1998, p. 285). 25  While the analysis of communication and rhetoric of a speaker can still be located in the (peripheral) area of communication studies, the important analysis of speaker charisma falls more into the area of psychology. 24

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terms of the production requirements of theatrical engagements. Terrorists pay attention to script preparation, cast selection, sets, props, role playing, and minute-­ by-­minute stage management.” Even though the approach was described in “pre-­ internet times,” it still retains its validity, especially today. The “terrorism as theater” approach is considered plausible by many notable representatives of ­terrorism studies. The term “hostage drama” aptly describes this perspective (see Beck & Quandt, 2011, p. 94). Richards (2004, p. 171) sees a “theatrical element of terror” as do Weimann (2008), Gordon (2005) and also Cohen-Almagor (2005). According to Weimann (2008, p. 69), the metaphor of terrorism as theater refers to modern terrorism’s attempt to communicate messages with the help of arranged and orchestrated violence. Weimann (2008, p. 71) himself speaks of the “9/11 performance.” The achievement of the terrorists’ goal, namely to make known their motives, demands and grievances, is dependent on the media (see Weimann, 2008, p. 72). In this respect, media in Western democratic societies are particularly susceptible to terrorism, as “free” media are more inclined to give space to the drama of the attack and to grant the terrorists the main role in it. It can be argued that these circumstances encourage terrorists to use this so quickly and easily available stage more frequently to deliver their message (see Herman & O’Sullivan, 1991, p. 47). In their goal of generating attention, terrorists and politicians are similar, even if the former rely more on a sudden strike and the latter on leadership and guidance: “Terrorism is theatre, and politics, generally, is dramaturgy” (Miller, 1982, p. 13). From a historical perspective, terrorism has only emerged as a theatrical event through the mass media coverage and processing of violent acts. “This trend, the massive media coverage of terrorism, has created a new mode of modern terrorism, referred to as the ‘theater of terror’. This is terrorism for the sake of capturing headlines and valuable broadcasting time” (Weimann, 1985, p. 434). Demoralization and chaos in civil society dominate public discourse after an attack. When the public as audience seems so eminently important, the thought of a theatrical stage on which the terrorists perform their acts is not far off. “Yet the audience is as vital to the terrorist as it is to the actor on the stage; and indeed terrorism is a form of drama that succeeds or fails according to its impact on a selected clientele” (Gutmann, 1979, p.  517). Cohen-Almagor (2005, p.  385) sees a clear dependency between terrorism and the media with regard to the public and also uses the theatrical metaphor: the success of the terrorists depends to a large extent on the media and the public that is frightened via the media, which leads to a delicate relationship between the two actor areas. The media help the terrorists to stage a horrifying drama in which the terrorists and their victims are the protagonists who perform a spectacle of suspense and agony – usually broadcast with a time delay. At the heart of the theatrical metaphor is the audience; media practitioners are like theater critics,

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communicating their assessment of the play and its content to the public. Depending on the coverage, the media could influence public opinion by interpreting and judging the “performance” put on by the terrorists. However, simply making it onto the front pages of newspapers would confer a certain status in the eyes of the public (see Sect. 4.12.3) – “He/The group is important.” Weimann and Winn (1994, p. 111) also attribute a powerful and self-determined position to the media and the journalists acting through them: “In the theater of terror, the mass media provide a stage that is often worldwide in dimensions. The actor-directors are the gate-keeper journalists who determine if, when, and how theatrical opportunities are provided to would-be thespians.” These decisions rarely depend on personal reasons such as curiosity or individual political attitudes; editorial routines, self-image and role perception of the journalist, adherence to and interplay of hierarchical levels, news values and competitive thinking within the media industry can also lead to the coverage of terrorism. The theater metaphor can be critiqued in that it provides a nice visual comparison to describe the demeanor of actors but lacks theoretical depth and contributes little to a broader understanding of the functioning mechanisms of systems and actors. It bears a resemblance to Rodrigo’s (1991) body-fever metaphor (see Sect. 4.5.2), as media censorship could also be symbolized here, as the silencing of drama critics. However, the theatrical metaphor points to overly simple and unrealistic solutions, since it does not represent the actual dysfunction of society. According to its logic, one would only have to expel the terrorists from the stage and leave the replacement to the politicians, and peace would return.

5.6 Interim Summary Grand theories in communication studies take a broader, more abstract perspective and are more fundamental in nature than middle-range theories. This makes them more difficult or impossible to test empirically. Systems theory conceives of terrorism as a social system, or more precisely, as a parasitic functional system, rather than as an individually generated phenomenon of action. As such, terrorism as an interruption of communication paradoxically forces follow-up communication at the same time, since those who are attacked cannot cope with this interruption in any other way (see Fuchs, 2004). A non-observance, a complete ignorance in a communicative sense is not possible. The difficulty for the political system is that it often does not know to whom it should address its response, especially when the perpetrator has eliminated himself. However, this is exactly the problem that the terrorists’ side had before: Their attack is conceived as a response to the non-­

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addressability of society. The innocent victims become proxies. With the act of terror, the attackers seek to cause an irritation in the political system. This must now find a response to the disturbance and a solution that is compatible with the principles that apply in the system (consistency postulate; see Küppers & Krohn, 1992, p.  177). The detour does not have to be via (innocent) real bodies, but it ­already proceeds more and more frequently via other areas that are vital in certain settings, such as virtual space. Here, cyberattacks can have an impact on concrete life-world domains, for example as account blockages, power outages and breakdowns in transport infrastructure. The attacks then often cause less physical damage to individuals but reach a wider audience directly. Neither the code of the political system (superior power/inferior power; Schneider, 2008) nor that of the war system (victory/defeat) can be considered a binary code for terrorism. Schneider (2008) suggests “successful attack/failure,” Fuchs (2004) “guilt/innocence,” where society takes the side of the guilty. Terrorism attacks society via actually innocent people and – following the primary guiding difference of its system – turns the blame around: “society” is to blame, the micro-­ level victims, as physical and psychological systems in the environment, are its proxies. Fuchs (2004, p. 55) calls this procedure the principle of “detour.” The terrorists, as the system sees it, ultimately take the side of innocence, since their attack was legitimized and justified by society’s guilt. Thus, in the last instance, as innocents, they are on the side of the victims they attack. This paradoxical constellation makes it clear that the system of terrorism cannot in itself clarify any separation and that the only feasible culprit is a non-addressable macro-phenomenon, society, not actors – be they victims or attackers. This insight of systems theory is immanently important for entirely new approaches to counterterrorism, since it abolishes the repeatedly emphasized friend/foe distinction and renders it irrelevant. Rather, the abstract “society itself” must become addressable, for example by breaking down the exo to the meso and micro levels. “The security apparatus” must become concrete and manifest in organizations with actors; and at a very basal level, “addresses” and contacts must be communicated. The military in Northern Ireland, the militias in Sri Lanka – they act as shadows, as constructs without faces in the name of the society under attack. That such theoretically derived considerations find their way into counter-terrorism measures would owe much to the greater use of communication studies. The system of terrorism emerges from social movements that become increasingly self-referential as a result of the non-addressability of society and finally opt for the circuitousness of violent communication, reduced entirely to action, in order to briefly display their absolute power (and society’s guilt) in the attack (see Baecker, 2007, pp. 46 and 56). The public sphere and the media become important

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in systems theory as “experiential space as a framework on which systems can form their environmental expectations in the environment of the event” (Kohring & Hug, 1997, p. 21). In this context, the mass media form the “organizational security of escalation” (Fuchs, 2004, p.  77) of the attack; they are “coupling favorites” (Fuchs, 2004, p. 82), especially when they broadcast fear-inducing messages instead of fear-reducing ones (see Köstler, 2011, p. 318). In terms of autopoiesis, i.e., the self-preservation of the system, terrorism “responds” again and again to the counter-reaction of society. The crux of self-­ preservation of a system once established is that a way out requires profound dynamic changes in a wide variety of systems. In order to get back within the boundaries of the political system, terrorists, as the environment of their terrorist system, must virtually abolish it themselves, deprive it of its breeding ground by making its functions superfluous. The difficulty becomes apparent in concrete terms in the fact that hardly any terrorist group manages to make the leap into a political order. This is not the aim of the terrorist system (but rather its preservation). That is why groups like the IRA, ETA or IS do not have a concrete plan for an order according to their ideas in peacetime but propagate only vague ideas with catchwords like “caliphate” or “autonomy” without specific formulations. In most cases, therefore, attacks are perpetuated until the group is suppressed by the opposing side with violence, increased security measures and counterpropaganda. The “fever” (see Sect. 4.5.2) is suppressed by strong means, the thermometer (the media) no longer shows any spikes – therefore it does not have to be stopped (censorship). But the illness, the dysfunction of the body (society) is far from being remedied and can even break out again all the more violently after some time. A second major grand theory, constructivism, can be located in all corners and at all levels of the actor quadrangle. The media, however, function as a central location, since they reach a large audience that consumes these constructions and possibly turns them into their own constructions, or at least matches or combines their own with those of the media. This is also what happens with the phenomenon of “terrorism,” perhaps even to a greater extent, since hardly any recipients have had primary experience with it. When individuals compare their constructions of reality with each other, the assumption of knowledge also plays a role. The media construction is preceded by constructions from the terrorists and the politicians. The terrorist act can be seen as a construction per se and is thus subject to a double construction: by the terrorists who carry out the act and by the media. Politicians and terrorists try – via the media as an auxiliary channel – to influence the constructions of the recipients. The interpretation of their own camp is to be adopted by the public. Since recipients turn to the media for orientation, especially in times of crisis, the frames transmitted by journalists can have the effect of reinforcing or

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reducing conflict. Journalists should be aware of these constructions – which are often culturally shaped – and also of their effects, which are gaining in importance especially in terrorism reporting. However, the public is admittedly not only made up of those who perceive a (uniform) construction, but of a multitude of individual constructions, because individuals are exposed to different “inputs”  – media reports, major events, cultural rituals and the like. For journalists, the input is specific events, but also reports from other media and agencies. For media professionals, there is a temporal separation between input (event) and output (appearance of the publication), during which further inputs (e.g., new editorial guidelines, arrival of a claim of responsibility, shift in political friend/foe schemata) can occur that exert influence on the initial input and thus possibly change the output (see Rühl, 1973, p. 20). The output is regarded as performance in the journalism system and at the same time as input for the recipients or the environments of the journalism system. As an empirical approach to the observation and analysis of media constructions, reconstructivism-deconstructivism according to Hafez (2002) was introduced, which can be applied in a three-step process, whereby a content analysis of the media coverage to determine the constructed media reality is followed by a recording of the media-external image of reality and finally a comparison of the two. Theories of action are first and foremost linked to the micro level. Terrorism is integrated into a chain of actions and is sometimes described not as an initial action but as a response to upstream actions (e.g., by the government). According to rational choice theory, terrorists ask themselves before their act how great the disruptive action must be in order to force a reaction. In this context, the recipients as addressees of the attack are ascribed an active role, as is also the case with the dynamic-­ transactional approach (see Früh & Schönbach, 1982): only through their reaction – one could also say action or active attribution of meaning – does the act of violence become what it was intended to be: an act of terror. The sovereignty of the recipients postulated by the dynamic-transactional approach, which has replaced the cause-effect linearity, is in the specific case of the attack, however, a forced one, since it is already calculated into the act. The act without the inevitable attribution would not have been de- and thus simultaneously encoded as terrorist. The ‘intention,’ an alignment with ‘means’ and ‘ends,’ sets the act apart from pure behavior and highlights it as requiring reaction26 – though the re-action can also consist of passive shock. Thus, it should be reiterated that motives must first be analyzed before countermeasures take place, as they should be aligned with the different  Transintentionality may also have to be taken into account. Transintentionality means “the unintended consequences of intentional events” (Greshoff et al., 2003, p. 10). These unintended, uncontrolled effects take place at the individual, organizational and system levels. 26

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“means” and “ends” that the terrorist group aligns itself with. For example, social revolutionary, religious, and ethnonationalist terrorist groups pursue different goals with often the same means. The analysis should ask which norms (no longer) determine the group’s actions and how the group could be brought back into the ­desired circle of norms and rules. The goal does not have to be a complete return all at once, but in accordance with the theory of change (see Sect. 4.11.1), individual intermediate outcomes with concrete intervention points should be defined. For example, the overarching goal of “national unity” in Spain or “democratic liberal worldview” for Islamist groups would be broken down into smaller goals, which in turn would guide actions. Examples include improving the status of women, acclimating to the benefits of a non-religious legal system, and enjoying common ground with dissenters. A possible intervention would be, for example, the intentionally induced play of children of different faiths or nationalities. The overarching goal should not be mentioned in external communication about these interventions. Terrorism has been identified in the previous chapters as a social system (systems theory), as social action (action theory) and as a social construction (constructivism). Bringing all perspectives together is a task that advocates of social integrative approaches have set themselves. However, to date there is no major work that addresses the phenomenon of “terrorism” distinctly from this perspective. The interplay of action and structure is crucial and takes place between levels, but also within levels. Structure and action are mutually dependent. If structures break down (e.g., social networks) or unwelcome structures expand (for example, bureaucratization or no college opportunities for members of ethnic minorities), this has an influence on the actions of individuals and/or organizations. A terrorist can be seen as an “identity assertor” (Schimank, 2010, p. 14) who is fully committed to a particular idea. Anti-terrorist measures, according to a conclusion drawn from this assumption, would thus have to start from suppressing this identity (“stick”), attracting it to another idea (“carrot”) or making the struggle to maintain it superfluous (“recognition,” acknowledging the identity through concessions such as autonomy, free exercise of religion, etc.). In doing so, each government must weigh its costs (increased police presence, values advertising campaigns, loss of reputation if too much force is used, etc.) against the benefits (short-term calm through “stick,” long-term coexistence through “recognition”). Since the goal of arena spokespersons is to get as close to the gallery as possible in order to make their voices heard there, they often opt for the speech of the punishing stick, because it usually attracts more media attention than the laborious path of alternative solution models. This is again related to the news factors (see Sect. 4.7.1).

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An important building block in the analysis of terrorism as communication is taken up by theories around the topic of the “public,” which has emerged as central to the terrorist process. The public is considered one of the main addressees of the terrorist act, since it is only through their fear that the “terrere” is brought forth in its origin as “to produce fear, to frighten.” The fact that the mass media support this “transport of fear” (however voluntarily or involuntarily) has already been noted several times. Social goals and identities are discussed in the public sphere (see Winter, 1993). Collective moods are formed on the basis of opinions – and fear of isolation should one express a view different from the dominant one. Media ensure that (according to their selection) relevant events are shared in the public discourse and that the sub-sectors of politics, economy, civil society, etc., pay communal attention to them. In the process, various forums or “arenas” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993) develop, each with internally largely homogeneous patterns of interpretation. If the opinions in many arenas are the same, Neidhardt (1994, p. 7) speaks of “arena consonance” and finally of overarching “public opinion.” In this context, arena speakers are shown to be particularly active in communication; the less active audience forms the “gallery” (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993, p. 68). Within arenas as well as across arenas, there is a struggle for the power of definition, the power over the frames that are passed on by the media. Schlesinger et al. (1983) see four possible positions or arena opinions after an attack: the official, the alternative, the populist, and the oppositional perspectives. They all vie for space in the media and proximity to the gallery. In this context, it is not possible to precisely clarify at what point the routine resonance-generating mechanisms of the established (political) actors are breached. Is a non-violent demonstration enough for the insurgents to be heard in the arena and in the gallery? Is a violent demonstration necessary, later attacks and further escalations? In terms of addressing the public, Richards (2004) distinguishes between power-based and values-based modes. If the terrorist attack clearly falls into the power-based mode, a terrorist group’s other, non-violent communication or PR often occurs in the value-based mode as it works to create a collective identity. This is also where countermeasures can come in and offer alternative identity designs. Beck and Quandt (2011, p. 87) have described terrorism as an attack on the idea of rational understanding, because violence as communication is directed against the Habermasian ideal of mutual understanding (and the will to do so). Violence is not, therefore, the focus of communication studies. However, new forms of violence (including non-corporeal forms) are increasingly pushing it into the discipline’s sphere of responsibility, because aggressive forms of communication (especially virtual forms) that are not geared towards understanding, such as hate speech and fake news, are on the rise. Here, the ideals of communication are willfully mocked.

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Terrorists use attacks to terrify the part of the population that reacts very emotionally and evaluates things less rationally. The corresponding concept of the “theater of terror” was mainly popularized by Weimann and Winn (1994) in their book of the same name, although it was already described in the 1970s by Gutmann (1979), for example. In the “theater,” terrorists and politicians engage in a battle on stage and try to determine the dramaturgy, while the audience watches and the media act as theater critics. Against this background of the theater audience, “public” should finally be defined in comparison to “mass.” The formation of public opinion from the public sphere in distinction to “mass” is explained cogently by Blumer (1966, p. 43): “We are selecting the term mass to denote an elementary and spontaneous collective grouping […]. The mass is represented by people who participate in mass behavior, such as those who are excited by some national event.” All social classes can be represented in the mass. The individuals who constitute the mass, however, are separated and stand anonymously next to one another, although they devote their attention to one and the same object, for example a terrorist attack. If a discussion on a certain topic arises in the mass or from parts of the mass, Blumer (1966, p. 46) speaks of the public: “The term public is used to refer to a group of people (a) who are confronted by an issue, (b) who are divided in their ideas as to how to meet the issue, and (c) who engage in discussion over the issue. […] The presence of an issue, of discussion, and of a collective opinion is the mark of the public.” The public is thus attached to an issue, not, for example, to nationality. Thus, as an amorphous group, it is formed anew depending on the topic of discussion. Only when an individual from the masses ventures into the theater hall via an admission ticket (e.g., the newspaper) does he or she become part of the public, which watches the production “Terrorism,” for example, and receives input for the construction of its opinions from various arena speakers as well as the “theater critics.” Because the new stage theme or stage event is viewed controversially, a public opinion is gradually formed: “[Public opinion] can be thought of, perhaps, as a composite opinion formed out of the several opinions that are held in the public; or better, as the central tendency set by the striving among these separate opinions and, consequently, as being shaped by the relative strength and play of opposition among them” (Blumer, 1966, p. 48). Thus, even a once minority opinion can rise to become the dominant public opinion if the gallery becomes convinced by it. This public opinion then shows a certain stance or a proposed solution in view of the discussed issue; the formation can be supported by the mass media as a public forum. Of course, influence is also exerted at this level through professional PR and propaganda by various interest groups (see above). Thus, many actors participate in the play and influence the audience. The starting point for counter-terrorist measures is

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always the public (macro level), which emerges from connected individuals. The individuals of the mass remain separate. Therefore, the goal can also be to let the masses become the public through participation. To this end, it is also necessary to address the problem of filter bubbles, which exhibit strongly self-referential structures and a large degree of coexistence without connecting elements. Based on the explanations and conclusions just made and in the preceding chapters, the following concluding chapter develops a research system for the analysis of the phenomenon of “terrorism” motivated by communication studies as well as a programmatic plea on how the topic is to be integrated into research, teaching and practice and what conclusions can be drawn for politics and journalism.

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Theoretical Conclusions and Practical Implications

The aim of this study was to examine the relevance of communication studies approaches to the description and analysis of terrorism and thus to create starting points for further research. This was done along the lines of the research-guiding model of the communication quadrangle (Fig. 3.5) with its actors and actor areas at all three levels of social stratification, as well as along a process system with six sub-areas (Fig. 3.6), which functioned as an ordering schema for the main communication flow. Direct connections to research in communication studies were identified at various points. However, some approaches proved to be not yet fully developed with regard to terrorism (e.g., priming, contagion theory), others as quite basic comparative models (e.g., terrorism as theater). Some of them showed the same limitations as in the transfer to other phenomena. For example, the exact influence of the gatekeeper compared to the influence of the organizational and systemic framework can no more be determined in terrorism reporting than in business reporting. As an output of the previous chapters, a guideline for future research in this field will now be developed, a system for the theoretical recording of various communicative manifestations of the phenomenon of “terrorism.” This serves as a model for locating and orienting the theories mentioned above, which have proven helpful in capturing the phenomenon of “terrorism” from a communication studies perspective. Even though the systematic approach was in a way already implicit in the process and level models that also shaped the selection of the theories, it only emerges as a clear schema from the critical analysis and examination of the theories and their applicability to the phenomenon of “terrorism.” It is only now, for example, that the similarity or even the variability of some theories in terms of location becomes visible; thus, constructivist elements could be identified at the micro, meso and macro levels. Theories of rhetoric were found in equal measure © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 L. Rothenberger, Terrorism as Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-38242-1_6

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among the three communicators: terrorists, journalists and politicians. In the case of the journalists, a proximity to the use of narratives, to framing and thus ultimately to the concept of news bias could be identified. Theories not only serve to structure processes, experiences and knowledge by abstracting from the individual case, but recommendations for action for politics and journalism, some of which are normative (see Sect. 2.1.1), can be derived from the interplay of theories. The implications show once again the close interconnection of scientific theory and socio-political as well as professional relevance of the question.

6.1 Compilation and System of Theoretical Approaches for Capturing Terrorism as Communication Like a model, the function of a system is to classify and order. The developed system (Table 6.1) is structured as follows: The location of the communicative aspects of the terrorist process is along a 3 × 6 field matrix. Here, the action arenas and settings identified in Sect. 3.4 represent the outline sections on the x-axis. The y-­ axis divides according to the three levels of society – micro, meso and macro. This corresponds to Chaffee and Berger’s (1987, p. 107) differentiation into interpersonal level, network or organizational level, and macroscopic societal level. The intra-individual level also mentioned there can be taken into account insofar as studies on gatekeepers or recipients, for example, using the method of thinking aloud, can reveal such processes. The exo level mentioned in Sect. 3.3 could not be identified to a sufficient extent with regard to the theory model. This is possibly because it has not yet been integrated into communication studies and thus, for example, theoretical aspects of communication in the context of kinship or religious communities do not yet play a salient role. Nor can each theory be located at a specific level. For example, it remains debatable whether news bias research focuses on the micro or meso level. However, since most of the time the focus was not on articles written by individuals but on biased representation by “the paper,” i.e., the organization, the meso level was chosen. In the same way, the approach of conceptualizing terrorism as a media event was also assigned to the meso level. For here, too, it is not the individual journalist, but rather the publisher, editors-in-chief and editorial staff together, i.e., the organization as a whole, or even the entire institution of “media,” that undertakes the creation of the media event. Once the event has been named and framed as “terrorism,” individual editors will not deviate from this and suddenly write about “freedom struggle.” In contrast, the approaches of symbiosis and parasitism are on a macro level, as here the coupling of systems is considered.

Theories of collective Newsworthiness identity; network theory; news bias theories; organizational theory communication theories; PR and marketing theories; attribution theories Terrorism as a media event

Social integrative approaches; constructivism; terrorism as theater

Terrorist (group): Attack

Media (actors): Selection

Media (actors): Production

Citizen journalism; framing Gatekeeping Theories of rhetoric

Format theories; iconic turn; contagion theory; news bias theory

x = object of investigation according to action arenas; y = levels of social stratification

 y Terrorist (group):     x Communication outside of attack

Theories of rhetoric

Micro Constructivism; theories of action; social integrative approaches

Meso

Terrorism as Agenda setting symbolic communication; terrorism as strategic communication; propaganda of the deed Terrorism and the media as a symbiotic or parasitic relationship

Communication of politics (politicians)

Theories of rhetoric; Labeling

Crisis communication theories; Theory of change

Agenda building; models of the effectiveness of communication regulations

Macro Systems theory; public sphere theories; social integrative approaches; constructivism

Uses and gratifications; framing; priming; spiral of silence; status conferral Reception and effects in civil society

Contagion theory

Table 6.1  System for the theoretical recording of various communicative manifestations of the phenomenon of “terrorism” 6.1  Compilation and System of Theoretical Approaches for Capturing… 337

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The so-called medium-range theories can be assigned relatively well to individual action arenas or process steps. Grand theories such as systems theory or constructivism, on the other hand, span the individual processes and address the problem as a whole. In this context, the x-axis is not meant to be chronological: Of course, politicians’ communication, for example, does not start after the media has reported the terrorist attack, but before. The individual boxes are merely meant to illustrate a particular focus. They can also be thought of as permeable at the sides since a processual understanding of terrorism as communication focuses on the connections between arenas of action. For example, theories of rhetoric as well as genre theories can be applied to a research object such as media coverage of terrorism. Priming and spiral of silence effects can be examined in impact studies. The factors that can be combined in the model are the social levels and the process steps. Only from the combination of these can a decision be made about the suitability of a particular theory. Empirical testing then starts primarily at the micro level, at the lowest level in the quadrangle of actors, i.e., journalists, politicians, citizens and terrorists. But communication by organizations (for example via hashtags like #breitscheidplatz and #thinkagainturnaway) can also be analyzed. Depending on the theoretical focus, other empirical designs are recommended, for example a framing analysis or the reconstructionism-deconstructionism sequence (see Sect. 5.2). The fact that actors can act in different geographical as well as cultural spaces – from local, national, transnational to global – must be taken into account when selecting theory and method. Anderson and Ross (2002, p. 69) describe a model as “a way of simplifying the complex interaction of elements in order to clarify relevant relationships.” According to McQuail and Windahl (1993, p.  2), models have three functions: “Firstly, they have an organizing function by ordering and relating systems to each other and by providing us with images of wholes that we might not otherwise perceive. A model gives a general picture of a range of different particular circumstances. Secondly, it helps in explaining, by providing in a simplified way information which would otherwise be complicated or ambiguous. This gives the model a heuristic function, since it can guide the student or researcher to key points of a process or system. Thirdly, the model may make it possible to predict outcomes or the course of events. It can at least be a basis for assigning probabilities to various alternative outcomes, and hence for formulating hypotheses of research.” The model serves as a simplifying and structuring representation of a section of reality, in this case the course of terrorist communication (organizing function). The most important premise is that the attack is not conceived as an irrational act of mentally pathological perpetrators, but as strategic communication. Only the most important relationships are integrated into the schema, influencing variables are summarized

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and reduced; the complexity of the phenomenon “terrorism as communication” is made more manageable and easier to understand (explanatory function). In this sense, the new system (Table 6.1), or rather the theoretical frameworks identified in it, serve as a basis for future work on the communication aspects of terrorism. It made sense to carry out the analysis on the basis of action arenas, since it was necessary to start with the phenomenon first and not with a priori theoretically distinct levels, in order to test the approaches first. For the future, the path can now be reversed and, with the system developed here, research objects can now be classified and analyzed from the outset. The communication scholar interested in the phenomenon of terrorism is thus provided with a set of instruments that can be used to integrate and structure research (heuristic function). The model has a predictive function insofar as it can be predicted that in certain arenas of action certain phenomena covered by the respective theory will be encountered, for example the attribution of responsibility in a claim of responsibility, which can be evaluated within a framework of attribution theories. The extent to which the model is suitable for the hypothesis generation called for by McQuail and Windahl (1993, p. 2) will be illustrated using two theories as examples. Against the background of news bias theory, it could be assumed that patriotic discourse in daily newspapers increases after a terrorist attack. Against the background of the spiral of silence, it could be hypothesized that people who advocate higher security measures will express their opinion more strongly in conversations after an attack than people who do not hold this view. As already explained in the introduction, it is neither possible nor sensible to present “terrorism as communication” in an overarching “super theory,” but rather to pursue a detailed approach by means of the theory-integrating process system. The process-oriented approach made it possible to identify theories that at first glance might not have been associated with the research topic and subject topic, for example rational choice or attribution theories. Already for the phase of the emergence of a terrorist organization, i.e., before a movement decides to use terrorist violence, theories of communication studies such as organizational communication theories and network theory can be fruitful because they take into account the communication structures that can also later determine the functioning and processes in the terrorist organization. In most cases, terrorists have already engaged in public communication before the attack as an explicit way of approaching the public. Since their goal is also to change public opinion, they pursue this in two ways: with nonviolent communication and with violent communication. The component of publicity also shows that the differentiation of terrorism from ordinary crime is essential: many of the theories do not apply to ordinary crime, for example

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propaganda of the crime or theories of public relations. This illustrates the specific characteristics of the phenomenon of “terrorism.” Against a post-positivist backdrop, the close entanglement of terrorism and communication became clear, whereby the grand theory of constructivism proved particularly useful: terrorism was understood as a social construction and performance that goes beyond the actual attack. Communication as a basic element of social order and social systems, as a basic mode of social reality construction (see Altmeppen et al., 2013, p. 46) plays a significant role here through the intentionality of expression. “Expression” is based on a Latin root meaning “to press out,” i.e., a prerequisite of public communication, as it also occurs in terrorism, which as an act is often placed in places of “public life,” that is, carried by its communicators directly into the public sphere. The assumption of a rational decision for a certain type of communication as well as for a certain choice of channel – the attack as a message – corresponds to the instrumental perspective. The “homo economicus” approach also finds confirmation in marketing, branding, the amalgamation of PR and terrorism, and generally in the grand concept of strategic communication. Abrahms (2008, p. 78) refers to what Crenshaw (1998, 2001) calls the “instrumental view” as the “strategic model” and states, “people use terrorism when the expected political gains minus the expected costs outweigh the net expected benefits of alternative forms of protest” (Abrahms, 2008, p. 78). In this context of rationality, Abrahms (2008, pp. 94–95) highlights the usefulness of organizational theories that explain that members join the organization not only because of its overarching goals, but because of expected fraternity and group solidarity. The continuation of the group, often enabled by members’ affective bonds, is also paramount in attacks, not necessarily the achievement of the final political goal. The strategic communication approach postulates that attacks are characterized by intentionality. The terrorists want to achieve certain ends by certain means via the three groups of actors: the media, politics and the public. To this end, they use violent and non-violent communication. In doing so, they often refer to symbolic victims, places or points in time, such as anniversaries. Jakobson (1979 [1960], p. 88) has called this component of communication, which is entirely focused on the recipient, the conative function. However, there is always a relativity to the symbolic message, for it depends on the interpretation of the receiver. His decoding performance determines the “impact” (Bassiouni, 1982, p. 128) of the event, his fear of being one of the victims next time. Sometimes the terrorists help the decoding process with claims of responsibility in which they attempt to impose certain attributions and interpretations. Because the attack, as a surprising and ideologically motivated act of violence, is both a primary channel and a message, it is not possible to detach the message

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from the channel; this is thus a necessary and compelling condition for terrorism.1 Only secondary channels such as different media or interpersonal communication are variably used to deliver the message. Theories of the ritualization of reporting proved useful in illuminating the existence of routines after an attack. Here, the journalism system frequently draws on nationally influenced (and often patriotic) narratives and historical myths to provide culturally easily decoded schemas. Studies on reporting found that the media report in a strongly event-related manner in so-called “episodic framing,”2 when the terrorists engage in agenda building through their attack. This automatically entails ascribing a certain status to the insurgent group, as the concept of “status conferral” assumes. According to genre theory, the choice of format as well as the imagery also play a prominent role, as described in the approach of the “iconic turn.” Changes in the communicator structure have led to the possibility of these two components changing: In their analysis of online presences of three major French and three British newspapers after the Paris attacks on November 13, 2015, Ginesta et al., (2017) demonstrate that the media primarily relied on user-generated content such as Twitter messages and mobile phone videos from citizens and reported in a live blog-like style. Reporting was also strongly oriented towards visual criteria (such as embedding infographics) and a non-linear narrative structure (see Ginesta et al., 2017, p. 629), which Ginesta et al. (2017, p. 631) describe as a “mashup news-making style.” These new application-combining formats and visual stimuli will certainly find increased use in terrorism reporting through the possibilities of virtual augmented reality and immersive journalism. That the attack becomes an event can be explained by the news values that are definitively inherent in the event itself. The newsworthiness also increases if the attack takes place in an elite nation (see Roman et al., 2019). In any case, post-heroic societies are often chosen for attacks, as there is a higher density of communication here (see Münkler, 2001, p.  17). The attack thus becomes a “coercive media event” (see Weimann & Winn, 1994). Since very few  The violence does not have to be physically executed but can also be present in the threat. The compelling connection between the message and the act of violence in the channel is sufficient, even if the act is only named. With reference to the definitions mentioned in Section 2.1, the threat of an attack also counts as terrorism. It can possibly be considered as a diluted form, but it can equally trigger a state of fear in the society. Cyberattacks are also considered terrorism, as an act of violence not on physical bodies but on the virtually determined environment. However, there can also be effects on concrete physical bodies, for example, if a hacker attack cuts the power supply to a hospital. However, this too can first be threatened. 2  As mentioned above, academic research also often proceeds in an event-based manner and in case studies of specific terrorist attacks (see Schuurman, 2019). 1

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n­ ewsrooms have established guidelines specifically for terrorism reporting, the influence of editorial culture at the meso level often remains limited to non-manifest influences. If the attack is seen as a response to certain social conditions, as is sometimes the case in systems theory, one must ask what one’s own side actually said before this response, what possibly evoked this (kind of) response. Was the statement of a type that such an egregious response was foreseeable? The “statement” in this case could be the action of a government, for example, Spain’s involvement in the Iraq war. Usually, after such a vehement response, the person making the statement is first paralyzed – a victory for the responders, the terrorists. However, the more often a “shouting match,” i.e., an attack in response, takes place, the better prepared governments have become in the meantime and the shorter the reaction time. The responder is told that his response, or rather the tone and manner of his response, is unacceptable because it violates the norm. The respondent may now try to forbid further responses, to sanction harshly, to suppress and to silence the responder. But he can also try to change the answer, perhaps by phrasing his statement differently, by allowing other kinds and tones of answers, and thereby returning the communication to the control circuit, to the accepted forms of discourse. Normativity plays a large role in this topic, as modes of communication are guided by socially established norms. Both the sanctioning of an attack and the sanctioning of violent countermeasures are related to the question of the fundamental goals in a given society. These are discursively negotiated in the public sphere (not the masses) in a continuous process. The importance of theories of the public sphere is therefore particularly great because it is in the public sphere that it is decided whether or not terrorism succeeds as a fear-generating strategy. The arena model illustrates how close or far away arena spokespeople can be to the public. The metaphor of terrorism as theater is also ultimately merely an image for the distribution of roles among actors and for their placement in the space of public discourse they wish to determine. The possibilities given to politicians, for example, to influence coverage can be discussed using three approaches: Laissez-faire, censorship and the media’s own guidelines. These approaches would have to be extended and related to political systems and types of organization of the media system (public, state, commercial). Such a combined model could provide predictions for possible interventions in reporting after a terrorist attack. The large pool of approaches from reception and effects research includes various (social) psychological models for the processing of media stimuli. The adoption of media frames from terrorism reporting and the activation of certain cognitive schemata (priming) triggered by this still need to be investigated empirically in greater detail. The extent to which these models can be used to predict attitudes and

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behavior remains to be critically questioned. The image of the respective medium or the quoted politician, interpersonal communication, personal networks and contacts, situational factors and internal dispositions such as shock, mood of the day and others all play a role in processing. All this can lead to disturbances (“noise,” “distortion”) in the decoding of the message on its way to the recipient. In their simplicity for describing the process, models such as stimulus-response, long thought to be outdated, have also proved helpful in breaking down terrorism into its two main components, “attack” and “fear.” In its extension in the formula W-S-OW-R-W (Woodworth & Marquis, 1963, p.  220), the model incorporates world (or environment) references (“world”) and idiosyncrasies of the processing organism and can thus better explain the variance that can occur on both the stimulus and response sides. Following the dynamic-transactional approach (see Früh & Schönbach, 1982), the important position and active role of the recipients, the decoders, and the public, respectively, should be considered in the development of counterterrorism measures, as they influence the attribution of meaning – including future attributions of meaning by journalists and politicians. The aim is to avoid the “culture of fear” (Nohrstedt, 2010, p.  24). Therefore, non-reflective rhetoric (Leeman, 1991), inclusion of citizen journalism and consistent communication (type) that takes emotions into account are recommended. According to Ginesta et al. (2017), the French state engaged in successful “public relations” by also integrating the high percentage of French Muslims into a sense of national unity after the November 13, 2015 attacks through patriotic celebrations at iconic sites such as the Eiffel Tower, the Sorbonne, and the Invalides Cathedral, targeting opinion leaders online, and relying on the “paradiplomatic channel” (see Ginesta et al., 2017, p. 625) of citizens and their (social) media, first and foremost their use of the smartphone, to spread the images of unity and thus reinforce them (see Bogain, 2019 for a critical view). The uses-and-gratifications approach asks what benefits and advantages individuals derive from receiving news about terrorism. In this context, particular emphasis was placed on the satisfaction of the need for information, which must be weighed against the fact that the reporting can also trigger states of anxiety. In this respect, the uses-and-gratifications approach could be well combined with approaches from crisis communication research to explore which information about the attack crisis is considered particularly useful by recipients. Terrorists as media consumers are the focus of contagion theory, which was arranged in the model in the arenas of “media production” and “reception and impact,” since contagion only occurs through a connection between the two settings. The risk of contagion would have to be taken more into account by journalists when choosing their coverage, as terrorists learned from each other through the

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media. Directly following this is the controversial concept of the symbiosis of the “terrorism” and “journalism” systems. Although it has already been questioned by some researchers (see Rodrigo Alsina, 1991; Schaffert, 1992; Rothenberger, 2016; Schultz, 2017) and could be replaced by the concept of parasitism with the media as the involuntary host of terrorism, it continues to determine much academic work on the topic of “terrorism and the media.” More broadly, Wolfsfeld’s (1997, p. 16; see Fig. 4.6) antagonist schema explains the relationship of both challengers, in other words, terrorists, and challenged, that is, the government, to the media: they both are in contact with the media and want to launch their messages, set the media as well as the public agenda, but cannot be sure of the cooperation of the media, who act according to their own premises. Certainly, the media are usually closer to the representatives of the status quo (though again, not in symbiosis), but the challengers’ issues can also dominate the media – precisely because of their challenging nature. However, the fact that the act of violence, the strongest communicative action of the challengers, is understood as a request for legitimacy and is disseminated as such via the media is almost never the case, as various framing studies have shown (e.g., Morin, 2016). The synopsis shows that the respective theories do justice to the circumstance that the six identified action arenas and in them certain “settings” must be regarded as situations determined by different constituents. The difference in scope between grand theories and middle-range theories is evident in the diagram (Table  6.1). Theories of action include, for example, gatekeeping and rational choice, and they consider the decisions of the individual communicator on a micro level. At the same time, gatekeeping can also be classified as constructivism, since selection results in a certain construction of reality, which can also be reflected in reception. The social-integrative approaches, which aim to integrate action, structure and system context in their model, are ambitious, as a wide variety of influencing variables have to be taken into account. According to Schimank (2010, p. 14), the terrorist in his role has already been identified as an “identity assertor”; exactly what the interactions between action and (functional) structure look like in this field has yet to be described. The difficult part of operationalizing the various theories, especially the grand theories, is still unresolved in many cases. While theories of action, systems, the public sphere and integrative social theories have been dealt with in detail, many normative-critical theories such as the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, approaches of feminist media research and historical materialism have yet to be inserted into the schema, since they set their focus primarily on inequalities caused by economic relations and gender

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­stereotypes.3 If capitalist production contexts and class struggles do not play a superficial role at first glance, findings could nevertheless be classified against this theoretical backdrop that indicate how strongly political and economic elites also dominate terrorism reporting. Miller and Mills (2009, p. 430), for example, demonstrate how closely academia, think tanks, the media, and state institutions are intertwined. As the critical theory approach focuses its attention on the reproduction of labor, its usability in communication studies-led terrorism research is not immediately apparent.4 Critical approaches reflect on the relationship between capital, domination, power, communication, and society, usually drawing on the approaches of Karl Marx. In his view, society is undergoing a process of commodification, in which more and more becomes a commodity. This also applies to information, which the capitalist media organizations use to create their products. A sensitization of journalists for a more conscientious handling of the commodity “terrorism news” could also emerge from this. Thus, terrorism research guided by communication studies would strongly situate critical theory in the field of critique of the culture industry and the media (see Donges et al., 2010, p. 155). The theory is strongly normative, focusing on values such as justice and the public good. In this respect, following this approach, the media should always have the public good and autonomous judgment in mind when deciding for or against publication as well as during the process of shaping the content. Empirical studies could reveal the extent to which journalistic role models and terrorism reporting are shaped in socialist countries. Critical theories are certainly also particularly applicable to the area of state terrorism, which has not been dealt with in this study for the reasons previously explained. Terror committed by the state can appear as oppression and deterrence of disadvantaged classes; violence is intended to prevent them from participating in decision-making processes and from gaining access to certain resources. Paying more attention to state terrorism is the concern of critical terrorism studies. Following critical theory, they also consider “scholarship as a social practice, which is inextricably embedded in the historical contexts, social values, material interests, and social struggles that produce and constitute it” (Jansen, 2002, p. 11).  An attempt to describe the coverage of female Islamic State recruits by British online newspapers “[t]hrough the lens of technological fetishism’s intersection with gendered terrorism” (Shaban, 2020, p.  535) is presented by Shaban’s (2020) content analysis. Female (youth) supporters of terrorist groups are thus embedded in different narratives than male ones, for example, the victim perspective is clearly emphasized. The image of women in IS texts, conveyed via the magazine “Dabiq,” was examined by Salih and Kraidy (2020). 4  However, Fuchs (2017) confirms that critical approaches are again increasingly to be found in current debates. 3

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In this respect, U.S.-dominated terrorism research should also be critically questioned. Adherents of critical theory call for illuminating the power relations that lie behind and emerge from or are constituted by scholarly articles as well as media products, or for exploring, for example, the role of women in terrorism (see Ortbals & Poloni-­Staudinger, 2014). The model of the propaganda of the act can also be considered or integrated in a certain way within the framework of critical theory, since the terrorists, with their action as a rallying call, question the authorities and systems of production and call for a social overthrow. In some groups of the social revolutionary type, such as FARC, RAF or Sendero Luminoso, elements of class struggle and the goal of equal distribution of resources stand out anyway. The attacks are directed against an accumulation of power and capital of the rulers (see Rothenberger, 2017b). Another theory that has yet to be put to concrete use is Bourdieu’s field theory, which also belongs to the socially integrative approaches (see Scholl, 2016, pp. 377–378). Here, similar to the systems theory perspective, the question arises whether terrorism is a field (or system, a “theater space”) in its own right and how it forms and distinguishes itself from other fields.5 “Fields are very different social entities: from simple associations such as among friends and in families, to organizations, to larger social networks. The positions of the actors result from the ‘capital’ they possess” (Scholl, 2016, pp. 390–391). What capital, i.e., possessions, education, skills, do terrorists combine? And in which framework (micro, meso, exo, macro level) can fields be described? The habitus, i.e., attitudes and dispositions, connects field and actor level. How are actors recruited for the field of terrorism and to what extent do terrorists penetrate the field of journalism as external influencers through their attacks? Or are they merely actors in the field of politics (see Bourdieu, 2001)? In clear terms, Bourdieu (2001, p. 130) described the relativity of designations against the background of the distribution of power: “The dominant view of the social world, or the production of taxonomies, is the deployment of a struggle between actors who, depending on their position in the distribution of the various social resources (the various types of capital – economic, cultural, social) and their position in the space of classifications potentially inscribed therein, are very unequally equipped to impose their view of the world, in particular, to act at the level of designations and institutions which, like the perceptual and evaluative schemes that have found expression in language, or titles (titles of nobility, academic titles), are themselves a product of symbolic struggles and previous struggles of classification, and which express, in a more or less modified form, the state of the symbolic relations of forces.” Certainly, connections to systems theory,  The journalistic field has already been described by Hanitzsch (2016), for example.

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c­ onstructivism, framing, and rational choice present themselves here, for many fields and their actors play together; these construct their lineups and make choices, joining the orthodox or becoming heretics. The model (Table 6.1) not only demonstrates the usefulness and importance of communication studies in researching and penetrating the phenomenon of “terrorism,” it can also prove useful in the search for counter-terrorism measures. If communication studies uncovers which communicative processes are prevalent in the formation of collective identities of terrorist groups, policymakers can launch targeted counter-narratives. If communication studies research offers clues as to which formats in terrorism reporting trigger which effects in which groups of recipients, new forms of presentation can be developed against the background of genre and format theories, old ones revised or deliberately omitted. Crisis communication strategies of the government and media crisis reporting can be adapted if the integration of user-generated content proves useful in the context of terrorism – even temporally not in direct relation to a specific attack. Immediately following the presentation of the model (Table 6.1), the question of its limitations arises. One weakness is certainly the need to accept a high degree of generalization in order to cover the entire process. This is further accompanied by the question of whether the model is so abstract that the phenomenon of “terrorism” could easily be replaced by any other phenomena. This is countered by the representation of the communication process as the generation of meaning between at least two communication partners, but it is crucial to know who these communication partners are. Thus, although the analysis of the organizational communication of a pharmaceutical company can be carried out against the same background of communication theory as a terrorist group, it will differ fundamentally at the phenomenon and object levels. Furthermore, the identification of actors (micro) or groups of actors (meso) and spheres of action (macro), as was done in Sect. 3.2.2, exclusively allows for a clear assignment of the schema to communication flows in the terrorist process. In addition, the schema reflects some approaches that are only applicable to terrorism, for example, terrorism as theater, or media and terrorism as a parasitic relationship. It is left to future research on terrorism, guided by communication studies, to fill possible gaps in the schema.

6.2 Consequences for Politics, Media and Scholarship This work was not primarily concerned with explaining the general actions, i.e., intentional behavior, of terrorist groups and their causes, but first and foremost with uncoupling the communicative parts of the terrorist process, in other words,

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d­ etermining at which points communication studies can apply its repertoire. Many areas are already covered by other disciplines such as sociology, political science, and psychology, and the corresponding terrorist action is explained using approaches from these fields. An unexpected result of this present work is that hardly any areas could be identified to which communication studies could not contribute. Paradoxically, terrorism consists of communication. It is an extreme and vehement type of communication. For this reason, theories of communication studies prove to be particularly fruitful when it comes to developing theory-based counterterrorist measures and instruments. What is special about the act of terror is the complete reduction of communication to action. Since action-theoretical approaches postulate that action is communication, and since violence is an action, violence is communication. The challenged actors should also counter this with communication, and non-violently at that, and they should draw on the findings of communication studies, and consequences for (a) politics, (b) media and (c) science should be pointed out. Violence is the terrorists’ means of communication; they have reduced their communication entirely to action, which causes a breakdown of all communication flows in the first frightening moment. In this way they attract attention. If one intervenes at the level of communication, changes can also be achieved at the level of violence. The results of theoretical and empirical research in communication studies are therefore not only relevant for advancing one’s own discipline, but also for reporters in the media as well as for the formulation of government responses or in negotiations during abductions. Especially against the background of Nohrstedt’s (2010, p. 25) “threat society” it seems important to conduct this reappraisal. After all, threat is often perceived as a communicative act. In this context, despite a high degree of abstraction, insights for practice can also be derived from complex theories such as systems theory, such as in this case ignoring the communication breakdown in order to demonstrate the strength of the “politics” system. (a) Implications for Policy, Policy Organizations and Actors The communicative and symbolic act of violence, the propaganda of the deed described in Sect. 4.3.3, is considered the entelechy of terrorism, the force that determines its orientation. In it, actors communicate and form their construction, their worldview as communication. Mannoni and Bonardi (2003, p. 59) speak not of the “frame” but of the terrorists’ “glasses” (“lunettes”), which first determine their selection (type of event such as bomb threat or suicide attack, location of the attack, time, etc.) and then their construction of the event (later processed by the media). Effective countermeasures are aimed at interrupting precisely this construction. In this context, semiotic theories prove to be particularly fruitful, since persuasion can

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be pursued through an interplay of approaches such as framing, narratives, discourses and myths. These forms are already extensively practiced by terrorists (and media), as they help to build a certain identity that is meant to carry a certain ideology. In the future, such forms of persuasion could be used in a more targeted manner in political communication, without becoming a pawn in political (politician) staging. The use of certain narratives or discourse-guiding elements can be controlled with the help of the theory of change in individual intervention steps and, if possible, culminate in a long-term discourse strategy towards a humanistic world view that – in contrast to the discourse strategy of the terrorists – dispenses with the construction of an enemy image. Terrorists always have an enemy defined by themselves. This enemy must be identified in the course of anti-terrorist discourse research and then dispersed, so that the enemy image (in the sense of systems theory, the non-addressable society) essentially disintegrates. Concrete proposals for implementation have already been listed in Sect. 5.6. The aim of the measures is that there is both no longer a symbolically attackable enemy for the terrorists and no longer any reason for those attacked to feel that they are fused together as a group which then possibly demonizes the attackers themselves again. Schmidt (2005, p. 143) concludes, “If terrorism is a form of psychological warfare, we should be focusing as much if not more on countering the propaganda as we focus on preventing and controlling terrorist violence.” The resilience of young people, in particular, not to be mobilized on the basis of certain incentives must be strengthened and exemplified by attractive role models. “The language of hate and violence needs to be answered by the language of reason and humanity – and deeds that match our words” (Schmid, 2005, p. 144). Children’s and young people’s media literacy and, above all, online skills need to be strengthened; they themselves, their parents and teachers must be enabled to critically evaluate and contextualize texts and images. In this context, the choice of communicators and good training are crucial – especially in the sensitive use of language with regard to ethnicity and religion. Here, scholars and practitioners suggest choosing as communicators, if possible, people who are close to the target group. If counterterrorist measures are given a label by the government or police, these measures would often be perceived as not credible and viewed with skepticism (see Parker et al., 2019, p. 271). Working with non-governmental partners, while costly and sometimes time-consuming, can pay off. After all, if the communicators are not deemed trustworthy, the prevention measure could also turn into the opposite. One focus could be on reaching people who are still undecided, not those who are already strongly indoctrinated. Here, cooperation with moderate groups seems promising, with non-extremist networks of those at risk, who can then possibly exert influence on them.

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All levels shown in the system (Table 6.1) (re)act with and to each other: the system is not conceivable without actors, and actors’ actions are not conceivable without belonging to the system. The levels at which political countermeasures can be applied depend on how viably the insights gained from the theories can be operationalized. Impact at the intra-individual level is difficult to measure. It is easier to reach the inter-individual and institutional levels, the latter, for example, by modifying government statements directed at the media. Models describing the relationships between PR and journalism can help: intereffication, determination, mediatization. Anti-terrorist PR should also adapt to media logic so that its messages are disseminated there. This means that the message is populated with news values that lead to high newsworthiness. This further means that the message is structured in such a way that the core message is at the beginning and remains intact even if it shortened at the end. Considering the multimodal preparation in the newsroom, the message should not only consist of text, but also of audio, video and graphics files. In addition to measures aimed at transport via the media, direct attempts at communication should also take place, for example through the purchase of billboards or through murals, which have served as propaganda tools for the antagonists in Northern Ireland for years. Rapp (2014, p. 100) sees murals, that is, politically motivated murals, as a “sui generis means of mass communication.” They have an influence on the formation of the recipients’ opinions and possibly also on their behavior. Against the backdrop of an increasing diversification of communication channels, as many of these as possible should be used and a humanistic worldview that focuses on respect for human dignity should be conveyed. If the government’s reputation is damaged after an action that has been negatively evaluated by the public or other states, it can be helpful to refer to crisis communication theories such as image restoration theory (see Benoit, 1995) and send messages that explain the failure transparently to the public and present improvements in a credible manner. The role of the individual in society should not be underestimated: Individuals (re)categorize the information that reaches them according to their own personal information utilization schema. According to various individual “references to the world” (Kuhlmann, 2016), a part of which is the media and its content as well as messages from politics, individuals create (or construct) their situational environment in order to continue navigating it. According to Mannoni and Bonardi (2003, p. 65), a “social representation” thus created in the individual is one’s own organization and construction of an encountered issue influenced by opinions, attitudes, values, images, symbols, and the like formed by socialization in particular orientation groups. Although “objective” criteria of violence (numbers of victims, crime statistics, etc.) can be communicated to the individuals constituting the public, the subjective concern (belonging to a

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certain socio-­demographic group, one’s own sense of fear, etc.) makes these facts and figures appear in an ever-different light – depending on the “glasses” of the recipient (see Wieviorka, 2009, p. 2). The French political scientist Julien Fragnon (2016, p. 32) proposes an institutionalized “communication publique antiterroriste”: This communication should be centrally controlled and should contain homogeneous, neutral and depoliticized practical messages, for example – also presented in simple graphics – advice on how individuals should behave during a current “terrorism” threat situation (see Fragnon, 2016, pp. 36–37). This information should be prepared in a similar way to messages on behavioral advice, for example for the threat situations “fire” or “pandemic,” and should be available on the same websites of state institutions. In this way, “terrorism” would be classified among other threats and made “manageable.” This approach fits in with the three major goals of anti-terrorist communication in France: Informing the populace, national mobilization, and sympathy for the victims. One consideration is that too many measures can also stir up fears among the population. If citizens are constantly asked to watch out for suspicious suitcases or to report unusual behavior of their fellow citizens, a “vigilance culture” (Parker et al., 2019, p. 281) and mutual distrust may inadvertently emerge. This is, for example, one of the reasons for “the decision in Denmark not to conduct large-­ scale communication campaigns for fear of scaring the public compared to the increasing use of such campaigns in the United Kingdom” (Parker et  al., 2019, p. 283). In order to make the responses to violence and propaganda, to the propaganda of the deed, more effective by means of communication, a change of perspective is necessary on the part of political communication. To take the right communicative actions, to choose the appropriate formats and to start at the right network points, it is advantageous to first think from the terrorists’ point of view and to identify what benefit they derive (according to the rational choice approach) from which (communicative) actions. Countermeasures must increase the costs versus the benefits that certain individuals think they will derive from terrorist acts. Just as crisis teams must think their way into particular states, analyzing their structures, references, goals, technical capabilities, and the like, in order to design, for example, a public diplomacy strategy (based on communication studies insights and models), so too must policy advisors think their way into terrorist groups: how strong is the leader? What constitutes his charisma? Do hierarchical or network communication flows prevail in the group? Can spiral of silence or two-step flow communication processes be set in motion? Since terrorism strategically involves media coverage, counter-terrorist activities should also be accompanied by an appropriate media strategy. A counter-terrorism strategy must also take into account what stage the

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terrorist group is in. Are there competing groups? Is there a discernible breakaway that can be supported? Or is the group still in its formative stages? Circumstances must always be considered from the logic of the terrorists as communicators. This means that first the logic of violence as communication must be understood in order to then resist and, above all, counteract this violence. It is clear that just one terrorism does not exist; terrorism always requires a historical and socio-cultural contextualization. However, the overarching feeling that it is no longer possible to achieve “success” with acts that are not directed against people is dominant and leads to a high strategic, symbolic, and systematic use of violence, which can be seen in the selection of the site of the attack and the victims, as well as in the motivation to attack existing structures and power relations and to render them incapable of action for a short time. The option of muzzling insurgent groups by denying them media access (as with Britain’s Broadcasting Ban) has proved ineffective. Another option, also considered by contagion theorists, is to provide alternative avenues for the groups to be heard. In this way, the focus on violence as the only way out dwindles and there is not as great a risk of copycat acts, as the groups would be reported primarily in the context of non-violent actions. After this plea for a communication studies-based (political) intervention against and in the terrorist process, this will be extended to the field of media. (b) Implications for Media, Media Organizations and Media Professionals Schultz (2017), Valdeón (2009) as well as Lepre and Luther (2006) argue that future journalists should already be sensitized to the problems of terrorism reporting during their training and that special attention should be paid to language, as the topic is more problematic and consequential than others, as some news bias studies have demonstrated (see Sect. 4.7.2). Also, discussions of ethical dilemmas of terrorism reporting are not yet sufficiently embedded in journalism education (see Lepre & Luther, 2007). Certainly, media are rarely triggers for terrorist acts;6 rather, these acts are rooted in political, economic, social, ethnic, religious and other causes and motives (see Sect. 2.1), but the media can influence the consequences of the terrorist event to a limited extent. On the one hand, globalization and digital change make it more difficult for journalism to exercise its interpretive sovereignty, as a multiplicity of sources and a scramble for information and its processing arise; on the other hand, they increase journalism’s interpretive power, because many people trust journalists’ competence, especially when it comes to  Attacks following the Muhammad cartoons in 2005 and 2006 and on the editorial offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in 2015 are exceptions. But even when one’s own guild is affected, it is important to engage in conflict-reducing reporting. 6

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such crucial issues as terrorism. Sensitization presupposes a sense of direction, a normative perspective on how the media should behave in relation to terrorism, or more generally, the basic assumption that they are and should be against terrorism, which contradicts the symbiosis assumption. Against this background, the main focus of sensitization is to raise awareness of constructions (see Sect. 4.11.2). For this purpose, the insights of constructivism and agenda setting as well as theories of semiotics such as discourse and framing theory prove helpful, because the overall construction of a journalistic narrative consists of individual decisions for a certain source, a certain linguistic action, for certain labels or tags. In this respect, journalists differ little from other communicators such as politicians or terrorists. However, they are more committed to “objective” communication, i.e., reporting, and act in the role of mediator. The media (and other factors) contribute to how recipients “construct” their world. And so Krippendorff (1990, p.  62) should be quoted again here: “The fact that we construct communication within our cognition and language (with or without metaphors), and that we have choices in this respect, implies our responsibility for such constructions.” This responsibility is particularly true for media creators. In this regard, the socio-historical and -political ties of one state to another often also influence media coverage, such as the general Israel sympathies of the German media (see Badr, 2017, p. 365) in contrast to the French media: “l’amitié franco-arabe dicte, par exemple, en France une certaine prudence dans la condamnation des actes de violence commis par les Palestiniens, et l’interprétation qu’en propose les israéliens” (Mannoni & Bonardi, 2003, p. 63). To discover such influences, to name them and to make journalists aware of them is the task of academia. For even in democracies with free media systems, journalism does not manifest itself as a neutral worldview, but rather as cultural discourse and cultural practice with its own format characteristics, as could be demonstrated with the help of genre theories. The approach often found in the literature of seeing terrorism and the media as a symbiosis has already been contradicted several times, because the news media in the system under attack show a clear system affiliation to those in power. Parasitic approaches describe more aptly how the media are exploited by the terrorists in their communication practices. It is only through them that the system of terrorism manages to expand its micro-effects on individuals into macro-effects affecting society as a whole. If the media are usually used by various arena actors, such as politicians, as the only channel for transmitting information, in terrorism they are reduced to a secondary channel, a supplement, since the terrorist act itself already functions as a channel, with violence as its medium of expression. On the way to the recipient, the two channels of violent act and media then merge into one carrier of the message. Wieviorka (2009, p. 68) even speaks of a “diabolical pact.”

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Against the backdrop of the cultivation hypothesis, Nellis and Savage (2012) postulate that people who watch TV news more often are more fearful of terrorism and that this could lead these individuals to increasingly support anti-terrorist measures that threaten to restrict liberties. These possible influences and effects of the media, which are reflected not only in the thinking (priming) but also in the actions of recipients, suggest that the “laissez-faire” attitude towards completely free reporting presented in Sect. 4.10 needs to be reconsidered. The question arises as to what standards (and values) news about terrorist events that originate in media in democratic state systems must meet, and whether separate guidelines are needed specifically for this news subject. A normative answer is offered by the approach of conflict-sensitive or peace journalism. Here, reporters and editors explicitly advocate for defusing the conflict. According to Bilke (2008, pp. 210–242), journalistic actors in this model advocate de-escalation, create awareness of specific framing, name PR material as such, and report in a motivated and solution-oriented manner. Multiple perspectives and the greatest possible transparency require journalists to have a high level of expertise and far-reaching autonomy in their work. All this would have to be integrated into journalism training (Bilke, 2008, p. 234). Bilke (2008, p. 233) calls for a “human rights-guided conflict sensitivity,” conveyed by journalists to recipients. Bilke (2008, p.  232) thus advocates that in the circumstances of a crisis, journalists should be allowed to leave the role of information mediator and become an “orientation mediator.” In some circumstances, they might even act as advocates for active citizens in a peaceful democracy. Hanitzsch (2004) is critical of the concept of peace journalism; he sees it as based on naïve realism and linear media effects. The task of politicians to contribute to de-escalation, he argues, is illegitimately assigned to journalists who actually act autonomously. It is left to reception and effects research to examine whether de-escalating coverage also leads to attitudinal changes among recipients. Kraus and Ramchen (2017, p.  10) go beyond peace journalism demands and plead for constructive journalism that exhibits traits of anthropology and futurology in that it listens more than it explains, while remaining thoroughly critical. It is not the task of journalists to offer solutions to the conflict themselves, the authors argue, but to ask the right critical questions in dialogue with those in power and with the audience. This also includes preventing the media from acting as a disruptive factor, as is sometimes the case in negotiations with hostage-takers (see Sect. 4.11). This leads to the question of whether it is sufficient to simply transfer guidelines for war and crisis reporting to terrorism reporting. The argument that this is not sufficient and that terrorism as a special case requires special guidelines is justified by the formal differences between war and terrorism, such as the surprise factor

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and the absence of the law of war. There are sufficient approaches to measuring quality in reporting that could be applied to the special requirements of terrorism reporting (see Arnold, 2008 for an overview). A practical example could be to confront recipients with facts that run counter to general public sentiment, such as the fact that currently in Europe more attacks are still perpetrated by ethnic-nationalist motivated groups than by religiously motivated ones (see Europol, 2019). Since the study by Haußecker (2013), among others, has proven the close interconnection of cognitive and emotional nodes, a “heating up” of the debate, a stoking of fear should be avoided. One suggestion for this is to refrain from using photos of the perpetrators and the victims. Krippendorff (1993, p. 20) refers to the mass media as an “instrument of power” because it is through them that one can create and construct reality with text or audio-based language and visual materials. This “power” should be used in the sense of promoting a humanistic worldview. (c) Implications for Research and Teaching in Communication Studies The notion of science is about exploring connections in the world as truthfully as possible (see Luhmann, 1981); “science is about observing a phenomenon, coming up with an idea or a theory why something happens, and then testing the theory against facts” (Swedberg, 2014, p. 8). This book’s assumption that terrorism contains communicative components culminated in identifying terrorism in its entirety as communication. The order that emerged from the analysis (Table 6.1), consisting of a systematization of theories and approaches, emerges in its totality as a theory of the terrorist act as message. The physical act in its technical-practical execution or threat cannot be separated from the communicative-symbolic act. Both are dimensions of a phenomenon that only appears through both; one dimension cannot be thought of without the other, they are inevitably connected. The system can also be read as a research program for terrorism research guided by communication studies. Only the interplay of the theories, no matter how different they may be, such as constructivism, action theory and systems theory, provides a complete picture from different analytical perspectives. For this reason, a socially integrative approach should be advocated at this point, which can either help address individual components or can refer back to the interplay of different levels and factors. Empirical studies can be conducted at various points7 and individual steps in the process can be analyzed in detail – be it the connection between threats and the generation of fear or the strength of communicators on behalf of peaceful  On the pitfalls of the empirical implementation of questions guided by systems theory or constructivism, see also Loosen et al. (2002). Thus, constructivism also views empirical research as a construct. 7

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coexistence. Courses for prospective communicators should not only provide recommendations for the practical communication professions, but also impart methodological knowledge on how to investigate questions in the field of terrorism research that are oriented towards communication studies. Many different methods can be made usable, from cluster analysis to framing analysis to critical discourse analysis (see Chenoweth & Lowham, 2007; Valdeón, 2009; Rothenberger et  al., 2018). In addition to data analyses that are as value-free as possible, communication studies should not shy away from supporting a humanistic worldview in discussions of implications and derivations of results. The research work could also crystallize what image communication studies has of the human being and, in particular, of the terrorist and his communication. Scientism  – evidenced by buzzwords such as positivism, objectivity and value freedom – and humanism – evidenced by buzzwords such as interpretative paradigm, phenomenology, hermeneutics and contextualization – must no longer represent irreconcilable opposites (see Maletzke, 1998, pp. 175–186). Communication studies already has a lot to show in terms of theory building: Whether strategic communication, organizational communication, symbolic communication – however, these theories have rarely been applied to the research object of terrorism. This book has shown that it sometimes takes a few tricks to make a particular theoretical approach usable for this topic. In the future, it should be considered whether some dimensions could not be better captured with interdisciplinary theoretical approaches. For example, one could work with economics to describe effects of reporting on the economy, or with media and cultural studies to describe effects on the entertainment and cultural industries, on art exhibitions, or on the production of fictional films (see e.g., Bharat, 2020). As is generally the case in communication studies, the field of entertainment is relatively unexplored, both on the supply side, i.e., formats and content, and on the effects on recipients, but above all in communicator research. Suggestions here would be guided surveys of scriptwriters for films or series about terrorism or of writers of news satire. While implications for theory building, empirical research, journalistic and political practice have already been discussed, the area of teaching will be touched on under the question “Enabling the ‘wrong’?” What is meant by this is that there are repeated cases in which knowledge of communicative competence and persuasion is passed on to students who use this knowledge either for propaganda for violent groups or directly for acts of violence as communication. Examples include RAF members who studied at the Berlin Film Academy, among others (Aust, 2010, p. 215), or possibly members of Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines who took PR courses at universities in Zamboanga. The question arises whether addressing terrorist communication in communication studies courses sometimes amounts to

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p­ romoting propagandists. Addressing such issues and dealing with them are often neglected in the scholarly community. Moreover, there are hardly any empirical reports available that would make it possible to set ethical standards here. If guidelines can be defined to a certain extent for journalistic reporting and there are also bodies that can monitor compliance (such as the press councils), the situation is more difficult with regard to teaching and training. Knowledge about the most effective use of communication can hardly be withheld. It is also readily available on the internet anyway. It is not new that findings from scholarship can always have positive as well as negative effects. All research is subject to this condition. “Theories of communication are used both to sell people cigarettes and to persuade them not to smoke,” Chaffee and Berger (1987, p. 100) noted several decades ago. It would also be difficult to exclude from PR courses a student who is an unnoticed supporter of an association that glorifies violence. Other ethical issues that arise in communication studies-led terrorism research include how to prepare students to analyze terrorist material, such as how to deal with martyr videos. How much exposure to such content is acceptable? Are there cases where deterrence turns into fascination or even motivation and mobilization? Research involves theory building and implementation as well as testing in empirical designs. In teaching, both are conveyed to the next generation of researchers and practitioners. “First, in order to do good social science, you need three things: solid empirical data, a skillful handling of methods, and some good theorizing. Today’s social scientists are usually well trained to handle the two first of these requirements – but not the third” (Swedberg, 2014, p. 210). Alongside empirical analyses, for example of terrorist groups’ homepages, and alongside practical exercises (such as the development of a counter-terrorist communication concept for a specific state), scientific theory-building should therefore once again find its place in teaching. In this context, one could ask how certain theories would have to be developed in order to be tailored to certain social phenomena, such as terrorism, and what the strengths and weaknesses of a communication studies perspective on terrorism are. “Reviewing the literature on terrorism, one concludes that it has yet to develop a grand theory of terrorism” (Özdamar, 2008, p. 99). Although Özdamar’s conclusion can be confirmed after reviewing the relevant literature for this book, his conclusion is not shared. There can be no “super theory” to explain terrorism as communication, nor can there be a classification of the phenomenon that fits all scientific questions. Nor would it even make sense to develop such a theory, as it would not do justice to the complexity of the subject matter. Although the overarching social theories presented in Chap. 5 allow us to draw a comprehensive arc across many arenas of action, no “super theory” can be identified among them

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e­ ither. Each of them illuminates the object of study from a different angle. For example, systems theory focuses on different areas of social diversification with their own binary codes, while constructivism focuses on processes of reality construction at different levels and in relation to different triggers and indicators. Jenkins (2001, p. 321), as an experienced terrorism researcher, clearly states: “I don’t believe that there is a solution to the problem of terrorism. Rather, it is an enduring task, changing over the years as the threat evolves.” In this quote, “terrorism” can easily be replaced by “theory of terrorism.” Again, emerging forms of terrorism, such as cyberattacks, as well as new varieties of communicative responses to terrorism, will require continual adjustments to theory. Perhaps theories such as contagion theory will also be refuted by extensive empirical studies. This book has therefore not been bogged down by such problems of demarcation and summary, which exist in many disciplines and with regard to many objects of investigation. It seemed much more useful to develop a system (Table 6.1) in which different theoretical approaches are located in the right place and which makes it easier for researchers to identify the appropriate theory for a particular section of the field of “terrorism as communication” – and, of course, to keep it connectable in different directions. One strength of the new heuristics is that they are clearly related to the field of communication studies and focus on the media field (environment). With the development of a research system, the main focus was on scholarly progress. It offers impulses to expand the body of knowledge in communication studies to a field that has not been systematically addressed so far. Altmeppen et al. (2013, p. 46) have spoken of the requirement for the discipline of communication studies to “reflect on the relevance of its social role and to present this publicly.” This book has highlighted the possibilities and potential for sifting through the pressing problem of “terrorism” within the body of theory in communication studies, as well as deriving some practical recommendations for curbing terrorism by way of example. This book provides a focal point for anyone wishing to engage with the theoretical framing and reappraisal of the web of terrorism as communication. It provided an initial overview of how terrorism as communication can be captured in communication theory at different points and referenced a variety of studies that provide examples and suggestions for the empirical implementation of particular research questions. Although the importance of communication studies in the study of terrorism was explicitly emphasized, this does not diminish the achievements of political science, history, sociology and other subjects in the field of terrorism research. It is important, however, to approach the phenomenon from as many different perspectives as possible, and the literature review has shown that while other disciplines also make “excursions” here and there into issues surrounding communication, only communication studies itself can go into

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depth with its own theories and approaches in its area of specialization. Terrorism cannot be explained in purely “political” terms – here, for example, political science needs communication studies – just as communication studies is unable to grasp terrorism without resorting to the help of basic sociological theories. In order to draw a critical conclusion of the implications for research in communication studies at this point, reference will be made once again to the actor and process models presented in Chap. 3. In conclusion, the question of the most relevant actors must certainly be determined first, before pursuing a specific research question. However, the overall focus on the areas of terrorism, politics, journalism and civil society has proven to be highly appropriate. Leaving out the victims or including them under “civil society” proved to be the right decision in the theoretical discussion. From the perspective of systems theory, they paradoxically even came to be placed on the side of innocence in the realm of the terrorists themselves. The ordering schema of the terrorist communication process was fueled by the notion of action arenas and settings. These were used primarily in the medium-range theories presented in Chap. 4. Chapter 5 argued more broadly, but in some instances, it became concrete; thus theories of action could often be located directly at the micro level, for example in the specific decision to produce a claim of responsibility. The focus of communication studies results in the majority of the theories illuminating the connection between terrorism and the media, or from there to the recipients. It has been shown that it is usually the media that expand terrorist communication into mass communication. They expand the circle of recipients to a dispersed audience. The content of the media and actions of journalists, for example the decision which source to call, also prove to be essential for the public response from politics. Parallel to this, the high level of media competence of terrorist groups became apparent. They largely use professional media products of their own and social media for various target groups. However, the groups use new technologies not only for communication, but also for damage: social systems and within them political, economic, transport and health systems can also be disrupted via virtual space. Against this heuristic background of the two models of actors and process steps, it was possible to comprehensively work through the phenomenon of terrorism from a communication theory perspective and to decipher its accompanying diffusion process into the actor arenas of politics, media and civil society. It can certainly be critically questioned whether some approaches, such as cultural studies or critical theory, should not have been taken up more comprehensively. Here it should be pointed out that the model must first be tested in (communication) scholarly practice and that an expansion is pending after appropriate studies. The objection that the approaches presented could have been criticized more strongly is

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countered by the argument that the focus here was on the benefits as well as the encouragement to communication studies to apply its supply of theory to the important object of study of “terrorism.” For there is certainly still potential in this. Finally, the question remains whether, instead of talking about “terrorism as communication,” it would be correct to construct the equation “terrorism = communication.” This equation would not be correct, because then everything that would be communication would necessarily also be terrorism. The equation does not work because communication is always more than terrorism. While it is an important element of terrorism, communication is only one specific element, not an all-­ encompassing one. Terrorism is composed of more building blocks in order to produce what constitutes it or is propositionally attributed to it and allows it to emerge. Since political science, history, psychology and ethnology already deal with many equally important elements and aspects of terrorism, it is left to communication studies to highlight even more clearly the dominant element of communication in the terrorist process, and to detail it and make it transparent by means of discipline-specific explanations. The discussion has shown that this is possible and should be tackled more intensively in the future in order to make the merits of the discipline more accessible to the public with regard to this relevant and current problem.

6.3 Future Research on Terrorism in Communication Studies Terrorism, it was shown, is a multifaceted dynamic phenomenon that can be captured from a wide variety of communication theoretical perspectives, be it approaches from newsworthiness research, public relations, reception research or political communication. The book showed the breadth of the processes and fields that can be theoretically captured in the interconnections between terrorism and communication. And many of the theoretical subfields presented are currently still insufficiently researched in relation to terrorism; in this respect, the systematic approach can guide future research on terrorism in communication studies. Be it with regard to the spiral of silence or constructivism: Often there are only initial vague discussions and studies on the problem, no body of literature that does justice to the problem. Follow-up research is therefore possible in every field of the matrix (Table 6.1), be it with a focus on the theoretical or additionally the empirical level. It would also be conceivable to enlarge the matrix and expand it into an interdisciplinary research program with theoretical input from political science, history, psychology, or economics – ideally from an international perspective. “International,

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inter-governmental and transnational communication is an integral part of the broader context in which terrorism emerges, waxes and wanes. For the analyst, this contextual complexity requires a multi-dimensional approach that combines different disciplines, methodologies, theories and levels of analysis” (Crelinsten, 2002, p. 110). Thus, the merits of each discipline in penetrating many subfields of terrorism could be clearly presented and serve as a guide to future researchers as well as demonstrate the usefulness of the disciplines to policymakers, media practitioners, and the civil society public. A detailed bibliography for each subfield would provide quick access to the state of research in that field. For example, theoretical and empirical (case) studies on the concept of status conferral could be bundled. Future research on terrorism in the field of communication studies should not only take place on an abstract level, but also concretely on the object of research. Dolnik (2013, p. 1) also sees “the need for more first hand research.” In the volume he edited, he brings together examples of field research such as interviews with terrorists or observations. Van Ginkel (2015), to mention another approach, took the construction of narratives as a theoretical background, analyzed narratives of “cyber jihad” and then gave tips to practitioners on how they could design their counter-narratives. Websites or social media presences of terror groups offer suitable material for analysis. “The Internet is a potent and rich environment for analyzing terrorist/extremist organizations’ behaviors since website features, contents, and online discussion forums are examples of cultural artifacts that mirror the organization’s activities” (Qin et al., 2006, p. 5). In this context, research should not stop at the analysis of the communicators and media content but should always include effects on the recipients in the sense of effects research, whereby theory input from emotional psychology could again be included. “From a socio-­historical perspective, new social media data may provide invaluable insight into societal change if it can be classified, stored and analyzed systematically in ways that are recoverable for future social scientific inquiry” (Edwards et al., 2013, p. 251). The content that citizens themselves post on the internet and the messages that they disseminate via social media should be more strongly monitored and analyzed in the future. Different groups can be identified through different framing (see Silverman & Sommer, 2019). Further future research is possible with regard to internal communication. The communication processes and strategies between government, anti-terrorist units, technical, political and other coordination centers, security agencies, intelligence services, etc., could be examined for their efficiency. This would have a high socio-­ political relevance, because although there is a high military superiority of the “Western” world, “nevertheless the feeling of insecurity and defenselessness [in the public] is spreading” (Weidenfeld, 2004, p.  11). Similarly, communication

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within terrorist groups, as well as among competing groups, would suggest itself. This could be represented in a theoretical model in correlation with the organizational structure of the group (hierarchical, network, functional). The terrorist as communicator would also have to be examined with regard to the influences acting on him. One could, as it were, place the terrorist instead of the journalist as a reference point in the “onion model” (Weischenberg, 1992, p. 68) or the “hierarchy of influences” model (Reese & Shoemaker, 2016) and identify factors of influence at different levels. At all times, the research ethics perspective should also play a role, which leads to the final point to consider, which also applies to this book: Can it be considered a “success” of terrorists that they have managed to get scholars to extensively study their occurrence, their acts, and their goals? Gordon (2005) views the post-9/11 effort by U.S. scholars to better understand the motivations of terrorists, and Islam in particular, as the “Stockholm syndrome.”8 This refers to the reaction of individuals or groups taken hostage to turn emotionally towards their captors, thus focusing on the “terrorist-citizen” relationship at a micro level. This turn of phrase, which seems paradoxical at first glance, can be explained by the fact that the abductees (unconsciously) want to mitigate the shock situation, to emotionally “get a grip” on the suddenly life-threatening and stress-inducing situation. The victim reduces his panic by seeking protection and shelter, thus largely blocking out “the evil” in his abductor and replacing it with an understanding of his ideology and deed. This approach, Gordon argues, leads the abductee to hope for life preservation (see Gordon, 2005, pp. 50–51). Thus, the fear that “9/11” caused led to new (understanding-oriented) courses at universities and thus to a preoccupation with the reasons for the attacks in order to alleviate precisely this situation of tension and the feeling of threat. Many funds were also freed up after the September 11 attacks to promote the study and decoding of the phenomenon of “terrorism.” Can this therefore be seen as a “success” for the terrorists? Certainly not, because (communication) scholarship deals with all kinds of social problems, be it the media portrayal of climate change or computer game addiction. To exclude a field with negative connotations from future research would contradict the relevance and task of scholarship, which is to shed light on the phenomenon through analytical penetration, to make it manageable and to point out possible solutions.

 The expression goes back to a hostage situation in a bank in Sweden in 1973.

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