Counter-terrorism and civil society: Post-9/11 progress and challenges 9781526157935

Table of contents :
Front matter
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
List of Figures
List of Contributors
Abbreviations
Part I Conceptual platform
Counter-terrorism knows no borders: the post-9/11 global security regime and the securitization of civil society
Conceptualizing non-state counter-terrorism
Part II The cases: civil society and security governance in the Americas
From Ground Zero: the impact of security policy on civil society in the United States
Canada’s counter-terrorism measures: implications for human security, civil society, and charities
Civil society, pacification programs, and anti-terrorism: Brazil’s ambiguous entrance into the Global War on Terror
In the name of security? Counter-terrorism and insurgency policies and civil society in Colombia
Part III Repressive security and civil society in Europe
The spectacle of ghost security: security politics and British civil society
Repressive security and civil society in France, post-9/11
Repressive security and the unmaking of civil society in contemporary Russia
Regional challenges, national responses: the impact of counter-terrorism policy on civil society in the EU
Part IV Civil society and security in Africa
Nigeria’s counter-terrorism policy: paradox or (sp)oiler of civil society activism?
The securitization of civil society organizations, Islamism, and counter-terrorism in Kenya: a case study of MUHURI and HAKI Africa
A shrinking space: state security and its effects on civil society in Uganda
Part V States of emergency and civil society in North Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia
Shrinking civic space: Egypt’s counter-terrorism policy post-9/11 and beyond
Safeguards or infringement? Counter-terrorism policies, the state and civil society in Pakistan1
“Who becomes the threat?” Counter-terrorism financing and civil society organizations in Bangladesh
Part VI Closed or closing: security policy and civil society in the Asia-Pacific region
Civil society and the security sector in the Philippines after 9/11: tensions between democracy and homeland security
Securitization of aid and counter-terrorism in Indonesia
Conclusion: counter-terrorism as insecurity
Index

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Counter-​terrorism and civil society

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Counter-​terrorism and civil society Post-​9/​11 progress and challenges Edited by

Scott N. Romaniuk and Emeka Thaddues Njoku

Manchester University Press

Copyright © Manchester University Press 2021

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While copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in Manchester University Press, copyright in individual chapters belongs to their respective authors, and no chapter may be reproduced wholly or in part without the express permission in writing of both author and publisher. Published by Manchester University Press Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 5261 5792 8 hardback First published 2021 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-​party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

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Contents

List of figures List of contributors List of abbreviations

vii viii xiv

Introduction: global security architectures and civil society since 9/​11 –​Scott N. Romaniuk and Emeka Thaddues Njoku

1

Part I  Conceptual platform 1 Counter-​terrorism knows no borders: the post-​9/​11 global security regime and the securitization of civil society – Richard McNeil-​Willson and Scott N. Romaniuk 2 Conceptualizing non-​state counter-​terrorism –​Olivier Lewis

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Part II  The cases: civil society and security governance in the Americas 3 From Ground Zero: the impact of security policy on civil society in the United States –​William A. Taylor 4 Canada’s counter-​terrorism measures: implications for human security, civil society, and charities –​Kawser Ahmed and Scott N. Romaniuk 5 Civil society, pacification programs, and anti-​terrorism: Brazil’s ambiguous entrance into the Global War on Terror –​ Camila de Macedo Braga and Ana Maura Tomesani 6 In the name of security? Counter-​terrorism and insurgency policies and civil society in Colombia –​Saúl M. Rodriguez-​ Hernandez and Julio-​César Cepeda-​Ladino

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62

76

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Part III  Repressive security and civil society in Europe 7 The spectacle of ghost security: security politics and British civil society –​Joshua Skoczylis and Sam Andrews

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Contents

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8 Repressive security and civil society in France, post-​9/​11 –​Priya Sara Mathews and Richard McNeil-​Willson 9 Repressive security and the unmaking of civil society in contemporary Russia –​Sarah L. Henderson, Scott N. Romaniuk, and Aliaksandr Novikau 10 Regional challenges, national responses: the impact of counter-​terrorism policy on civil society in the EU –​Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr

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160

Part IV  Civil society and security in Africa 11 Nigeria’s counter-​terrorism policy: paradox or (sp)oiler of civil society activism? –​Olajide O. Akanji 12 The securitization of civil society organizations, Islamism, and counter-​terrorism in Kenya: a case study of MUHURI and HAKI Africa –​Oscar Gakuo Mwangi 13 A shrinking space: state security and its effects on civil society in Uganda –​David Andrew Omona and Scott N. Romaniuk

191

204 216

Part V  States of emergency and civil society in North Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia 14 Shrinking civic space: Egypt’s counter-​terrorism policy post-​9/​11 and beyond –​Bassant Hassib 15 Safeguards or infringement? Counter-​terrorism policies, the state and civil society in Pakistan –​Zoha Waseem 16 “Who becomes the threat?” Counter-​terrorism financing and civil society organizations in Bangladesh –​Scott N. Romaniuk, Emeka Thaddues Njoku, and Arundhati Bhattacharyya

233 255

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Part VI  Closed or closing: security policy and civil society in the Asia-​Pacific region 17 Civil society and the security sector in the Philippines after 9/​11: tensions between democracy and homeland security –​Aries A. Arugay 18 Securitization of aid and counter-​terrorism in Indonesia –​Senia Febrica

283 295

Conclusion: counter-​terrorism as insecurity –​Emeka Thaddues Njoku and Scott N. Romaniuk

308

Index

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Figures

2.1 The terrorism, counterterror, and pseudo-​counterterror relationship. Source: Author’s conception. 2.2 Goals of actions. Source: Author’s conception.

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Contributors

Kawser Ahmed received his PhD in Peace and Conflict studies from University of Manitoba, Canada. He served in the United Nations as a peacekeeper. Currently he is a Research Associate with the Centre for Defence and Security Studies and a junior research affiliate with the Canadian Network for the Study of Terrorism, Security and Society. His research interest includes counter-​terrorism, radicalization, security studies, and peacebuilding. Olajide O. Akanji is Associate Professor in Political Science, University of Ibadan. His research interests include conflict and security studies, human rights, governance, and gender and sexuality studies. His latest publications include “South Africa and Regional Stability in the Mbeki Era: The Nexus Between Personality and Geo-​Political and Economic Concerns in Foreign Policy Making” (Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, 5(10), 2016) and “Nigeria: Between Governance and (Under) Development; Analysing the Root of the Fractured Security” (Conflicts Studies Quarterly, 17, 2016). Sam Andrews is a PhD Researcher and Associate Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Lincoln. His work explores how women are included in the UK government’s Prevent strategy. He is also the project lead for a number of community projects in Iraq, focusing on peace building in partnership with the UN Assistant Mission to Iraq. Aries A. Arugay holds a PhD in Political Science from Georgia State University, Atlanta. He is currently Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines in Diliman. He is also a fellow of the Strategic Studies Program of its Center for Integrative and Development Studies. He has conducted research on comparative democratization, contentious politics, security sector reform, and international relations in the Asia-​Pacific. Aries serves as Senior Editor of Asian Politics & Policy and Associate Editor of the Philippine Political Science Journal. In 2021, he was

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a Visiting Fellow at the National Institute of Defense Studies of the Japan Ministry of Defense. Ákos Baumgartner is a junior researcher of International Relations. He is a graduate student in International Relations at Central European University, and holds a BA in International Relations with a specialization in European Integration from Corvinus University of Budapest, with study exchanges to Nottingham Trent University and Fudan University in Shanghai. He is an alumnus of the College for Advanced Studies of Diplomacy in Practice. Baumgartner has a research interest in non-​traditional security challenges and international development cooperation. Beyond academia, Baumgartner has experience in foreign affairs, is committed to entrepreneurial education, and is the co-​founder of JA Alumni Hungary organization. Arundhati Bhattacharyya is an alumnus of Presidency College, Kolkata. She has a Master’s in Politics with specialization in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University and a PhD from the University of Calcutta. She is currently working as Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Diamond Harbour Women’s University. Her scholarly works include four books, and numerous chapter and articles in national and international books and journals. Julio-​César Cepeda-​Ladino is Professor of Political Science at the School of Industrial Education, Pedagogical and Technological University of Colombia. He has written and published articles, book chapters, and working papers related to international relations, international political economy, foreign policy, and national/​regional politics in Colombia, Latin America, and the Asia-​Pacific. He is currently working on a research project titled “Military Relations between Colombia and the United States, 1939–​1945.” Glen M. E. Duerr is Associate Professor of International Studies at Cedarville University. He is a citizen of three countries: the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada. Duerr is the author of Secessionism and the European Union, which was published by Lexington Books in 2015, and is currently editing a volume on secessionist terrorism. His research centers on issues of nationalism, secessionism, and counter-​terrorism in mature, democratic countries. Senia Febrica is the knowledge exchange associate of the One Ocean Hub, the University of Strathclyde. She is also a honorary senior researcher at the American Studies Center, Universitas Indonesia. She received her PhD from the University of Glasgow. Her research on militarized CSOs in Indonesia

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was funded by the Gerda Henkel Stiftung (2015–​2017). Her book, Maritime Security and Indonesia: Cooperation, Interests and Strategies, was published by Routledge in 2017. Bassant Hassib is Lecturer in Political Science at the British University in Egypt. She earned her PhD in Euro-​Mediterranean Studies from the Faculty of Economics and Political Science of Cairo University in 2017. Her research focuses on democracy and human rights, civil society in Egypt, populism, and feminism and gender equality. Sarah L. Henderson is Associate Professor of Political Science at Oregon State University, School of Public Policy. Her research focuses on Russia/​ Central and Eastern Europe, democratization, civil society, and gender and post-​Communism. She is the co-​author of Women and Politics in a Global World (Oxford University Press, 2013) and Women and Politics in a Global World: Participation and Protest (Oxford University Press, 2009), and is the sole author of Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations (Cornell University Press, 2003). Olivier Lewis is currently a Research Fellow at the College of Europe, Natolin campus, Poland. During his doctoral studies at the University of St. Andrews, he was an Academic Tutor for two undergraduate classes: Introduction to International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis and International Security. Olivier has also conducted internships in Brussels (with the United States Mission to NATO and Transparency International) and in Paris (with the Jacques Delors Institute and the Institute of International and Strategic Relations). Camila de Macedo Braga is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of International Relations (IRI) at the University of São Paulo (USP), and an associate researcher for the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (CCP), at the Núcleo de Pesquisa em Relações Internacionais (NUPR –​USP). Senior fellow at the Center for Advanced Latin American Studies –​CALAS Program in Costa Rica; a Global Fellow at the Center of Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies (CHRHS), Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University; as well as an associated researcher at the Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding (CCDP), Graduate Institute, Geneva. She holds a PhD in Political Science and an MPhil in International Relations. Priya Sara Mathews holds a PhD in Politics, Human Rights and Sustainability, an MA in European Politics and Policies from KU Leuven and an MSc in

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International Studies from the University of Durham. Her research looks at securitization of immigrants and immigrant identity in Europe. Richard McNeil-​Willson is a Research Associate at the Global Governance Programme, the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, in Florence. He holds a PhD from the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter, and additional degrees from the universities of Edinburgh, Durham, and Exeter, UK. He specializes in the organizational development of, and relationship between, “radical” and contentious social movements/​ groups, and state counter-​ terror legislation, with his research currently focusing on Islamism in Western Europe post-​2001. Oscar Gakuo Mwangi is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, National University of Lesotho. His research interests are in the areas of governance, conflict, and security in the Horn of Africa, east and southern Africa. His teaching areas are in the fields of comparative politics, international relations, and political theory. He has published several book chapters, as well as articles in internationally refereed journals. Emeka Thaddues Njoku holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. His research focuses on the intersection of civil society organizations and security governance, particularly post-​9/​11 international and state level counter-​terrorism policies and practices. He is currently a postdoctoral fellow at the International Development Department, School of Government, University of Birmingham, where he holds a 2021–​2023 Newton International Fellowship of The British Academy and The Royal Society, London. In 2019–​2020, he was selected as a Postdoctoral Fellow for the American Council of Learned Societies, African Humanities Program, New York. He was a fellow of the Social Science Research Council’s Next Generation Social Science in Africa program and the Brown International Advanced Research Institutes, Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs, Brown University. His works have appeared in VOLUNTAS: International Journal for Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Development Policy Review, Development in Practice, and Small Wars and Insurgencies. Aliaksandr Novikau holds a PhD in Political Science from Northern Arizona University (Flagstaff). His areas of specialization include international relations, comparative politics, and public policy; in particular, international

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security and counter-​terrorism. His research examines how civil society and social movements influence governmental policies and how the state can affect social movements directly through its capacity to repress civil society and close the policymaking system to non-​state actors, and indirectly through the deliberate shaping of public values. David Andrew Omona holds a PhD in Political Studies with concentration in International Relations and Diplomacy from Kenyatta University-​Nairobi Kenya. He is a senior lecturer and head of department at Uganda Christian University. He is also the National Coordinator of the Religious Leaders’ Justice and Peace Network –​a loose coalition of religious leaders who strive to ensure the operationalization of peace and justice for all in Uganda. Saúl M. Rodriguez-​Hernandez is a PhD Candidate in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, Canada. He holds a Masters in Social Sciences Investigation (with honours) from the University of Buenos Aires and BA in History (with high honours) from the National University of Colombia. He has been a professor and researcher at Javeriana, Sergio Arboleda, and the National University. His books include La influencia de Estados Unidos en el Ejército colombiano, 1951–​1959 (2006) and De milicias reales a militares contrainsurgentes (with César Torres et al., 2008), and he has published more than 30 peer-​reviewed articles and chapters. He specializes in state, war, military, security, democracy and cultural issues from a comparative perspective in Latin America, the global south and beyond. Scott N. Romaniuk received his PhD in International Studies from the University of Trento, Italy. His interests span a range of critical research on the proliferation of counter-​terrorism and security policies and practices, and their effects on civil society in the post-​9/​11 period. He is currently a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Security Studies at the China Institute, University of Alberta, Canada, and a Visiting Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales, United Kingdom. He is the author or editor of several books, including, most recently, Under Siege: Counter-​Terrorism and Civil Society in Hungary (Lexington Books, 2021), Security, Strategy and Military Dynamics in the South China Sea (Bristol University Press, 2021), and The Routledge Companion to Global Cyber-​Security Strategy (Routledge, 2021). Joshua Skoczylis is Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Lincoln. He completed his PhD in Law at the University of Leeds, an MSc in Criminology at the University of Oxford, and an undergraduate degree in

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Criminology at the University of Central Lancashire. He has published a number of books, chapters, and articles on counter-​terrorism, extremism, and public policy. William A. Taylor is the holder of the Lee Drain Endowed University Professorship, previous department chair, and award-​ winning associate professor of global security studies in the Kay Bailey Hutchison Center for Security Studies at Angelo State University in San Angelo, Texas. Taylor is the series editor for the book series Studies in Civil-​Military Relations with University Press of Kansas and author or editor of four books, including, most recently, George C. Marshall and the Early Cold War: Policy, Politics, and Society (University of Oklahoma Press, 2020). Ana Maura Tomesani holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of São Paulo. She is currently a researcher at the Center for Studies in Conflict and Peace –​CCP, NUPRI – USP, and a member of the Research Network on Peace, Conflict and Critical Security Studies (PCECS). She also integrates the Experts Group of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-​TOC). Zoha Waseem is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Institute for Global City Policing, University College London, and Co-​coordinator for the Urban Violence Research Network. She holds a PhD from the School of Security Studies, King’s College London. She specializes in policing, terrorism and counterterrorism, urban security, police culture, and institutional reform in South Asia, the UK, and beyond.

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Abbreviations

BBOG CJTF CSO CTM CVE FARC FATF GWoT IS NGO NPO NSA NSS ODA OECD OSCE USAID WoT

Bring Back Our Girls Civilian Joint Task Force (Nigeria) civil society organization counter-​terrorism measure countering violent extremism Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Financial Action Task Force Global War on Terror Islamic State non-​governmental organization non-​profit organization non-​state actor National Security Strategy Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe US Agency for International Development War on Terror

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Introduction: global security architectures and civil society since 9/​11 Scott N. Romaniuk and Emeka Thaddues Njoku

We can address directly three of the most dangerous sources of terrorist finance, the abuse of charities, the abuse of money service businesses and the abuse of financial transactions. We know that many charities and donors have been and are being exploited by terrorists. (Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, speech given at Chatham House, London, October 10, 2006)

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/​11) against the United States led to new waves of scholarship on the proliferation of terrorism and efforts to combat international terrorism groups, organizations, and networks. One of the arguments put forward was that some civil society organizations (CSOs) are channels for terrorist financing, hence the need for legislative frameworks regulating civil society operations. In this book, we subscribe to the conceptualization of civil society by Howell and Lind (2010c: 3) who define the term to mean: the arena where people deliberate upon and organize around shared collective purposes. As an ideal type it is distinct from the government, market, and family, though in practice the boundaries between these spheres are blurred and interwoven to varying degree [and] includes associational forms such as trade unions, social movements, virtual networks, campaigns, coalitions, faith groups, direct action group, peace groups, human rights organisations.

Following the narrative of CSOs’ vulnerability to terrorism, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an organization created in 1989 by the G-​7 to address financial crimes, established Recommendation 8. The FATF recommendations direct states and financial organizations to establish new ranges of counter-​terrorism measures (CTMs) regulating the operations of CSOs exclusively. The FATF’s Recommendation 8 has been revised following criticisms and lack of empirical evidence of CSOs’ culpability in the rise of

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2

Introduction

terrorism. However, these security practices have become the norm and facilitated the establishment of “best practices” among non-​liberal democratic or authoritarian states, and are deeply entrenched in their security infrastructures. In developing or newly democratized states (those still deemed democratically weak or fragile), these exceptional securities measures are used as a cover for repressing opposition groups considered by these states as threats to their national security and political power apparatuses. Extant studies on the impact of counter-​terrorism have focused on the effects of these policies on human rights and civil liberties. However, there is a dearth of literature on the link between global security practices, specifically counter-​terrorism policies and measures (see Howell & Lind, 2010a, 2010b), and civil society in general despite some research emerging just a few years after 9/​11 signaling the need for both broader and more in-​ depth treatment of the interplay of counter-​terrorism and civil society. Now two decades old, the nasty, brutish, but long “War on Terror” (WoT) has evolved and entered new phases of practices with novel faces of insecurity and threat; however, relatively small bodies of research have yet to move beyond more rigorous and comparative analyses. This book, therefore, serves as an essential scholarly endeavor to establish the foundations for a continuation of previous works, establishing critical structures for carrying the research on the intersection of civil society and CSO, and CTMs into a second-​generation scholarly engagement. One of the primary objectives as such is to account for the experiences of civil society in the enforcement of global counter-​terrorism and security policies by governments in the Americas, Africa, Asia-​Pacific, Central Asia, Europe (Western, Central, and Eastern), and the Middle East. The overall objective of this book is to illuminate the distinct manifestations of the post-​9/​11 global CTMs, underscoring their impacts on civil society, civic spaces, and CSOs. It also accounts for how civil society makes sense of and responded to the CTMs in different parts of the world. The book brings together experts in various fields, advancing theoretical, methodological, and empirical debates on the closing of civic space in the enforcement of counter-​terrorism in the regions, as mentioned above. The editors advance the discourse on global security measures and CSOs by building a compendium of multidisciplinary research addressing these emerging issues in different regions, and a volume serving as the foundation for a new wave of research in an area of both scholarly and policy importance. Hence, the book provides a comprehensive dialogue enhancing the understandings of the relationship between security and civil society now and for the coming years.

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Scott N. Romaniuk and Emeka Thaddues Njoku

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Structure The first part of the book presents the conceptual platform of the various manifestations of CTMs, underlining their impact on civic spaces and their adverse effects (intended and unintended) on CSOs. The chapters describe the contemporary world as a “post-​ emotional society,” where counter-​terrorism institutions, which should safeguard peoples and their communities, have been used by the state to erode civil liberties and thus create environments of fear. Perhaps, this fear influenced the rise of non-​ state actors in counter-​terrorism, thus amplifying Olivier Lewis’ argument. Specifically, Lewis advances the conceptualizations of non-​state counter-​ terrorism efforts, including the roles non-​state actors (NSAs) or private individuals can play in the field of countering terrorism both domestically and internationally. The subsequent sections offer a comprehensive range of chapters divided according to regions of the world. Each chapter presents the unique sociopolitical and historical context in which civil society and state-​level counter-​terrorism policies and measures operate. The chapters are built on two major overriding themes and sub-​themes. The first major theme is the distinctive manifestations of CTMs, mainly their effects on civil society organizations. It includes sub-​themes such as strategic construction of vagueness in counter-​terrorism laws, smear campaigns to de-​legitimize and repress CSOs, identity consciousness and politics in the context of counter-​terrorism, the emergence of neo-​patrimonial state–​CSOs relations. It also includes the immediate and protracted effects of CTMs within and across states and regime types: emerging versus established democracies. The second major theme is how organizations make sense of and responded to the counter-​terrorism policies and measures of their respective states. It also includes sub-​themes such as: CSOs’ support for repressive CTMs of governments, resistance of repressive CTMs through the ballot box, and CSOs engaging in counter-​terrorism physically and tactically.

The divergent manifestations of counter-​terrorism policy A recurrent theme in the book is the intended and unintended consequences of the establishment and enforcement of CTMs in various parts of Western and Eastern Europe and North America. The above view reiterates Howell and Lind’s (2010a) assertion that how the WoT unfolded in various regimes is premised on several factors such as the nature or ideological orientation of political regimes, foreign policy, type of civil society and its relations with the state. The consequence of CTMs is reflected in the following sub-​themes.

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Strategic construction of vagueness in counter-​terrorism laws The vagueness of counter-​terrorism laws, such as the broad definition of what constitute acts of terrorism and the concepts of material support, gives the political actors the leverage to label groups critical to state policies as terrorist groups or as supporters of terrorism. Consequently, it gives these state actors the excuse to deploy exceptional measures such as counter-​terrorism laws to repress and silence these groups. For instance, in the United States, the concept of material support has been a source of legal contestation between the US government and non-​profit organizations. In Brazil, the definition of terrorism, as stated in the 2016 anti-​terrorism law, was so broad that it terms xenophobia, gender, ethnic, and religious definitions as acts of terrorism. CSOs in Brazil voiced their opposition to such a definition, as they believe it could be manipulated to target opposition groups.

Smear campaigns to de-​legitimize and repress CSOs The use of smear campaigns is another practice deployed by state actors to tarnish the reputation of CSOs and de-​legitimize them in the eyes of citizens. Many of these organizations, particularly advocacy groups, were branded as terrorist groups or, at best, as their supporters, and are subsequently listed in the official gazette of terrorist groups. The listing or labeling of these groups as terrorist organizations gave the state the justification to repress these groups. For instance, in Egypt, the government targeted and repressed human rights organizations that received foreign funding from international governmental or non-​governmental organizations by labeling them terrorist groups and restricting their access to their finances by freezing their bank accounts. In Kenya, the government labeled and subsequently listed MUHURI and HAKI Africa, two known human rights organizations, as terrorist organizations. These organizations were key advocates for the rights of Muslim groups and communities that have been treated as suspect communities in counter-​terrorism operations. In the UK, charity organizations that were not supportive of state CTMs were branded unpatriotic. Subsequently, the state uses other laws not linked to terrorism to constrain these organizations.

Identity consciousness and politics in the counter-​terrorism context Identity consciousness and politics is a new theme in the diverse manifestations of CTMs that have not been documented in the literature. CTMs are creating and entrenching new forms of identity consciousness and have thus created deep division among CSOs and citizens generally. The case studies

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Scott N. Romaniuk and Emeka Thaddues Njoku

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of the UK and France best illustrate the establishment of identity consciousness and politics. In the UK, Muslim groups were not only treated as suspect communities in the counter-​terrorism context, but in order for the government to sustain the deployment of exceptional measures, it continues to use various narratives to depict Muslim groups’ activities as a threat to the state and its values, thus breeding fear before the public and validating the use of extraordinary measures. The consequence of state actions does not only create fear but polarizes the society into us versus them. Moreover, charities are being pressured by the government to back its CTMs, as not doing so is tantamount to going against the British values. Similarly, in France, state CTMs have facilitated the institutionalization of racial discrimination against Muslim communities or groups. The government brands all Muslims as having common or collective objectives and that is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, which threatens the French society, its norms and values. These narratives aided in sustaining the use of exceptional measures against these organizations in France. Interestingly, other CSOs in France joined the state in its campaigns against Muslim communities and charities. Thus, the actions of the state, as in the UK, help to create fear, legitimize repressive measures, and sustain rifts within the society.

The emergence of neo-​patrimonial state–​CSOs relations From the contributions of scholars in this book, we argue that the CTMs of the state are changing state–​civil society relations in different ways, one of which includes the creation of a precarious neo-​patrimonial relationship, a patron–​client governance network where the state engages and endorses CSOs willing to serve its interest in the context of counter-​terrorism such as focusing solely on social service delivery and shunning political advocacy. In return, many of these CSOs engaged by the government in many of its projects are provided with funds and given unhindered access to foreign donor funds. This relationship is precarious, as CSOs have become vendors of state largesse, thus diminishing their independence and capacity to collectively act to ensure states’ accountability and transparency in security governance. Independent CSOs faced all manner of state regulations and repression because of their advocacy activities for the rights of individuals in the enforcement of CTMs. A good example where this form of relationship is emerging is Pakistan. The state forms friendly relations with religious organizations, which in turn support the state’s security and other policies. However, secular organizations that were critical to government counter-​terrorism objectives have been targeted and repressed by the state.

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The immediate and protracted effects of CTMs within and across states Questions also remain about the effects of CTMs on CSOs within and across states over short and longer periods of time. Sidel (2004; see Sidel, 2010), Howell and Lind (2009), and Bloodgood and Tremblay-​Boire (2010) raise awareness over the potential perils of governments tightening their existing CTMs, which could have lasting negative effects on CSOs and civil society. The long-​term effects of CTMs have yet to be fully examined and realized, partially because not enough time has lapsed to become aware of the multifaceted effects of CTMs on these organizations. Government policies and practices therefore suggest both implicit and intentional effects on CSO capacities and also on their longevity. This raises the question about the role of norms and state patterns, practices, and behavior in the context of CTMs and CSOs and civil society more broadly. It is clear that governments and leaders around the world have taken stock of the potentially valuable, though illiberal, usage of CTMs for political purposes. The WoT and WoT mentality has facilitated these practices and processes by exposing elements within society for exploitation, including CSOs that have been re-​cast as enemies, threats, and terrorist organizations. Such actions can be deep-​seeded and become the norm in the political life of democratic and non-​democratic states alike with new and broader definitions of terrorism and terrorist acts. Such has been the case in Australia with the country’s broad and malleable counter-​terrorism regime (Pettitt, 2010). Government counter-​terrorism policies and measures can not only have negative short-​term and long-​term repercussions in national development and regional integration, but CTMs can also have considerable and unpredictable short-​term and long-​term impacts on various facets of a given society, ranging from the social to the political, and to the economic dimensions of a state.

Regime type: emerging versus established democracies Regime type could potentially determine the initial step that defines government activities as well as the establishment of expectations concerning domestic and foreign policies. This could not be truer of security policies applied within and beyond their borders. This direction overlaps with views to conducting further research in the direction in the framework of post-​ Communist countries (Central and Eastern Europe). However, neither democratic nor non-​democratic regimes can be lumped together as homogenous groups and certainly within both categories respectively one can find extensive discordance in their policy actions, which can be related to such factors

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as history, economies, and political structures, thus acting as determinants of their overall stability (Geddes, 1999; Wahman et al., 2013). Since individual states have individual identities, the way power is maintained can differ considerably from one state to another. Additionally, the democratic status of a country has also proven to be elusive when attempting to determine the effects of CTMs on, within, and across states. Whereas one established democracy could deviate from the policies of another, those of a lesser-​ developed democracy can violate the expectations of how both democratic states and non-​democratic states approach their unique contexts of countering terrorism and the management of other partners such as CSOs. Looking to the UK, the case shows a near haphazard application of measures to combat an elusive threat misunderstood at the policy level. The UK turned to the “unreflective widening of legal provisions, normalization of emergency powers, the imposition of disproportionate burdens, and high regulatory barriers” (Dunn, 2010: 35). The WoT regime in the United States also turned CSOs into a suspect community and was echoed in the form of polarizing visions of intra-​state relations between government and CSOs in Australia, India, Israel and variations of state–​civil society relations in more positive forms emerge from some of the fragile democracies of East-​Central Europe, and illustrated through disparate cases throughout other developed and developing states in Africa, Central Asia, and elsewhere (Colás 2010a, 2010b; Dunn, 2010; Guinane & Sazawal, 2010; Howell & Lind, 2010a).

Responses of civil society to post-​9/​11 counter-​terrorism policy Another important theme of the book is how CSOs made sense of and responded to the effects of CTMs on their operational capacities. Extant discourse on the reactions of CSOs underscored the lack of collective efforts in resisting repressive CTMs (Howell & Lind, 2010a, 2010b; Howell, 2014; Skokova et al., 2018; Njoku, 2020a, 2021a). Scholars assert that in the initial phases of implementation of CTMs, mainstream CSOs did not feel the effects and did not support minority organizations, mainly Muslim groups treated as suspect communities by the government in the enforcement of CTMs (Howell & Lind, 2010a, 2010b). Fowler and Sen (2010) argue that big organizations benefited from the global efforts in counter-​terrorism due to their close affiliations with the government. However, Howell and Lind reason that the implementation of CTMs is never neat; as the laws and policies begin to take root in various political contexts, all organizations will begin to feel the effects of CTMs (Howell & Lind, 2010a, 2010b). Therefore, responses of CSOs to counter-​terrorism range from activities such as documenting and exposing the adverse effects of CTMs (Howell,

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Introduction

2014) to litigation. Specifically, many human rights and faith-​based organizations in the United States have been successful in various court cases where they have challenged the phrase “material support” and other inherent ambiguities in US counter-​terrorism laws (Sidel, 2010). Furthermore, the intensity of CTMs, particularly in authoritarian or hybrid regimes such as Russia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, led some CSOs to close operations. Some changed from political advocacy to primarily service delivery. Others moved from non-​profit to for-​profit as a way of avoiding increasing state interest in and repression of their operations. In some countries, smaller organizations unable to meet new regulations had to partner with bigger and more prominent organizations (Bloodgood & Tremblay-​ Boire, 2010; Stevens & Jailobaeva, 2010; Stevens, 2010; Skokova et al., 2018; Watson & Burkes, 2018; Njoku, 2020a, 2021b). In this book, some of the reactions of CSOs to state repressive CTMs have remained the same. However, we have seen new responses of CSOs to states’ counter-​terrorism laws and policies in some political contexts discussed in some chapters in this book. These include CSOs actively supporting governments’ repressive and discriminatory counter-​terrorism approaches; CSOs taking it upon themselves to combat terrorist groups physically; and some organizations engaging in international advocacy due to their perception that their home government lacks the capacity and political will to address the threats of terrorism.

Support for repressive counter-​terrorism Joshua Skoczylis and Sam Andrews’ chapter on the UK highlights how charities were pressured to support government counter-​terrorism policy, by framing support for counter-​terrorism as being nationalistic and having respect for British values. Hence, charities refusing to support or resisting the government policy were labelled unpatriotic. France had an active civil society that resisted government security measures before 9/​11. However, the state’s success in depicting France as the victim of Islamism influenced mainstream CSOs’ disinterest in advocating for the rights of marginalized and vulnerable individuals within the Muslim communities, post-​9/​11.

International advocacy and physical combat of terrorist groups Olajide O. Akanji, using the case of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Nigeria, highlights another different reaction of CSOs to terrorism or government CTMs. Akanji discusses how groups of civilians in various communities in north-​eastern Nigeria mobilized themselves and formed a vigilante group. The CJTF joined the regular or conventional security agencies to

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physically and tactically combat Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West African Province in Nigeria. Moreover, other CSOs, such as Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG), engaged in international advocacy for the return of the Chibok girls and other women kidnapped and enslaved by Boko Haram, including women whose rights were violated by security agents in counter-​ terrorism operations. The above feeds into the Olivier Lewis’s theorization on the rise of NSAs in global, regional, and state-​level counter-​terrorism operations.

Resistance through the ballot box Another fascinating response of CSOs to repressive CTMs came in the form of the ballot box. Aries A. Arugay captures this in his analysis of CSO responses to CTMs in the Philippines in chapter 17. Explicitly, in the Philippines, CSOs failed in their bid to challenges repressive CTMs through the courts. Hence, they began a campaign to ensure that President Arroyo’s political party would lose the 2010 national elections. These CSOs garnered popular support and facilitated the forming of political coalitions that saw the emergence of an anti-​Arroyo presidential candidate winning the national elections. Thus, this approach saw the emergence of political leaders who shared and continue to share similar ideals with CSOs. The unique responses of CSOs in the Philippines, as Arugay highlights, presents an important contribution to the literature on the diverse responses of CSOs to CTMs in various political contexts. Therefore, this book outlines various ways in which the enforcement of counter-​terrorism policies is rapidly closing civic spaces and changing civil society or associational life. The book provides evidence-​based analysis on the impact of CTMs and CSOs globally. It is hoped that the book will help to enlighten government politicians, policy-​makers, and international development agencies on the well-​consolidated system of the repression of CSOs in the guise of curbing terrorism.

References Bloodgood, E. A. & Tremblay-​Boire, J. (2010). “NGO responses to counterterrorism regulations after September 11th,” The International Journal of Not-​for-​ Profit Law, 12(4): 5–​19. Colás, A. (2010a). “An exceptional response? Security, development and civil society in Spanish policy after 11-​M,” Development and Change, 41(2): 313–​333. Colás, A. (2010b). “Politics as usual: Civil society and development in Spain after 9/​ 11,” in J. Howell & J. Lind (eds.), Civil society under strain: Counter-​terrorism policy, civil society and aid post-​9/​11 (pp. 39–​52). Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.

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Dunn, A. (2010). “UK counter-​ terrorism provision and civil society: Ensuring responsibility, ignoring proportionality,” in J. Howell & J. Lind (eds.), Civil society under strain: Counter-​terrorism policy, civil society and aid post-​9/​11 (pp. 19–​38). Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. Fowler, A. & Sen, K. (2010). “Embedding the war on terror: State and civil society relations,” Development and Change, 41(1): 1–​27. Geddes, B. (1999). “What do we know about democratization after twenty years?” Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1): 115–​144. Guinane, K. & Sazawal, S. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism measures and the NGOs section in USA: A hostile environment,” in J. Howell & J. Lind (eds.), Civil society under strain: Counter-​terrorism policy, civil society, and aid post-​9/​11 (pp. 53–​74). Sterling: Kumarian Press. Howell, J. (2014). “The securitisation of NGOs post-​9/​11,” Conflict, Security & Development, 14(2): 151–​179. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2009). “Changing donor policy and practice in civil society in the post-​9/​11 aid context,” Third World Quarterly, 30(7): 1279–​1296. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2010a). Civil society under strain: Counter-​terrorism policy, civil society and aid post 9/​11. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2010b). “Counterterrorism and the politics of aid: Civil society responses in Kenya,” Development and Change, 41(2): 335–​353. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2010c). “Securing the world and challenging civil society: Before and after the ‘War on Terror.’ ” Development and Change, 41(2): 279–​291. Pettitt, A. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism policing in Australia: Impacts on civil society,” in J. Howell & J. Lind (eds.), Civil society under strain: Counter-​terrorism policy, civil society and aid post-​9/​11 (pp. 75–​92). Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. Sidel, M. (2004). More secure, less free? Anti-​terrorism policy and civil liberties after September 11. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Sidel, M. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the regulation of civil society in the USA,” Development and Change, 41(2): 293–​312. Skokova, Y., Pape, U., & Krasnopolskaya, I. (2018). “The non-​profit sector in today’s Russia: Between confrontation and co-​optation,” Europe Asia Studies, 70(4): 531–​563. Stevens, D. (2010). “Osama or the Georges: Shifting threats and state policy towards civil society in Uzbekistan,” Development and Change, 41(2): 355–​374. Stevens, D. & Jailobaeva, K. (2010). “False choice? The war on terror and its impact on state policy towards civil society in Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan,” in J. Howell & J. Lind (eds.), Civil society under strain: Counter-​terrorism policy, civil society and aid post 9/​11. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. Wahman, M., Teorell, J., & Hadenius, A. (2013). “Authoritarian regime types revisited: Updated data in comparative perspective,” Contemporary Politics, 19(1): 19–​34. Watson, S. & Burkes, R. (2018). “Regulating NGO funding: Securitizing the political,” International Relations, 32(4): 430–​448.

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Part I

Conceptual platform

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1

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Counter-​terrorism knows no borders: the post-​9/​11 global security regime and the securitization of civil society Richard McNeil-​Willson and Scott N. Romaniuk Introduction This chapter maps the development of global security architecture in the context of the “new terrorism” security paradigm, and the impact this is having on civil society –​creating challenges for community integration, securitizing political dissent, and potentially advancing fundamental social and economic inequalities. It argues that the inequalities of counter-​ terrorism represent an internalization of racism associated with colonialism into the heart of the Westernized (but not Western) state model through the language of security. This has blurred the line between what have been traditionally defined as “democratic,” “authoritarian,” and “hybrid” states to such an extent that they are rendered problematic in their usage in a counter-​terror context. As such, more radical approaches to theorizing the relationship between terrorism and counter-​terrorism need to be considered. First, this chapter will offer a broad overview of the foundation of cross-​ national counter-​terror security structures –​the overt security responses of 2001–​2006, which have since given way to a greater focus on preventative countermeasures –​and the supporting discourses which have sprung up. It will also outline how physical and economic manifestations of counter-​ terrorism have developed, spreading existing and sprouting new counter-​ terror structures into areas of civil society, in line with the securitization paradigm. It will also explore how the development of counter-​terrorism models –​ of military detention, secretive courts, pre-​crime arrests, and extrajudicial killings –​represent the active internalization of a certain type of racialized violence in the current state system. Authoritarian and democratic governments alike have recognized and utilized opportunities offered by counter-​ terrorism powers to centralize, consolidate, and expand security powers, as well as engaging in the mutually beneficial trading and co-​optation of counter-​terror and counter-​extremism practices.

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Counter-terrorism knows no borders

Finally, this chapter will argue that this is having a destabilizing effect on the traditional theoretical models tending to define regimes, which bifurcate states between the supposedly oppositional “democratic” and “autocratic” regime. Counter-​terrorism has become a core component in the armament of contemporary statecraft, intertwined with democratic governments to such an extent that, in many cases, treating democratic and autocratic states differently when engaging in counter-​terrorism obfuscates the many overlapping elements of repression. Counter-​terrorism not only replicates structural racism and violence –​echoing many colonial processes –​it is often sustained by counter-​terror techniques drawn directly from modern articulations of settler-​colonialism in Palestine, Northern Ireland, South Africa, the United States, and Russia. Racism and colonialism are therefore not only being internalized and reinforced within Western states, but modern articulations of colonialist-​ style racism and counter-​terrorism have become inherently reliant on each other. As such, the theoretical tools needed to understand the international architecture of counter-​terrorism must be expanded to account for their racial and settler-​colonial scaffolding.

Counter-​terror structures This first section will explore counter-​terrorism as a set of (harmonized) military, discursive, physical, and economic structures, and will examine the directional change for each of these structures.

Military structures The events of September 2001 in the United States opened the stage on the development of a new paradigm of conflict, as Western states pivoted concerns away from hostile states and toward an often-​internal enemy operating across and despite national borders. As such, while military structures and spending has ballooned since the start of the “War on Terror” (WoT), focus has shifted away from operational engagement with the “far enemy” and toward the internalized, “near enemy.” The initial acts of the WoT saw largely “conventional” military engagements in the Middle East, marked by the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and, soon after, Iraq in 2003. Immediately, there was a growth of Western national military capabilities and various engagements in international warfare operations. The start of the WoT led to Western states spending vast funds on international operations against terrorism –​as of May 2018, for instance, the United States is estimated to have spent $5.6 trillion on the

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WoT. This has largely occurred against the background music of fiscal cuts to state services and austerity politics implemented at home. The revelation that key members of the September 2001 attacks operated from Germany (the so-​called “Hamburg Cell”), and that the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings were conducted by cells comprising home nationals, began a shift in security focus away from an external enemy, toward one embedded within, and internal to, the state and its communities. This led to a swing away from the “hard” military articulations characterizing the post-​2001 landscape (bleeding into the post-​post-​9/​11 era landscape), toward “softer,” preventative “pre-​crime” approaches, to combat internal threats –​the growth of international intelligence units, counter-​ terrorism policing units and counter-​extremism programs, such as Prevent and Channel in the UK, which took a closer, more scrutinizing look at society at home and its manifold constituent parts, whether they have always been friendly or not. Significant elements of the model adopted by the EU in dealing with terrorism is drawn from the UK’s CONTEST strategy –​the skeleton of which was established with Britain’s Terrorism Act of 2000. The act indicated a shift toward a broader contemporary working definition of terrorism encompassing more diverse perceived threats, enabling subsequent establishment of a wide range of new police and investigatory powers into traditionally civic spheres.1 With the development of CONTEST came four central pillars or “workstreams” for responding to terrorism: Pursue (“to stop terrorist attacks”); Prevent (“to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism”); Protect (“to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack”); and Prepare (“to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack”) (UK Government, 2015). Since CONTEST was made publicly available in 2006, it has shifted toward a preventative approach to counter-​terrorism, with the “Prevent” workstream coming to dwarf others in terms of power, resources, and reach: It’s fair to say that first of the ten years ago, the principle areas of the contest strategy were on Pursue and Protect. Prevent, which is now such a key part of our work was very much seen as the misunderstood and the little brother in the relation between the four “P”s. (McNeil-​Willson, 2019)

The growth of Prevent has seen a shift in policing toward a more intelligence-​ focused approach, with authorities looking to move away from traditional arrest and prosecute styles to account for preventative approaches to attacks. This was deemed particularly prescient following the 2005 London bombings (also referred to as 7/​7), the 2006 transatlantic aeroplane plot, the Tiger Tiger plot and Glasgow city airport bombing of 2007, creating the framework for close police and intelligence collaboration and coordination.

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With bombings in the UK and the resultant public launch of CONTEST in 2006, Prevent came to be seen within policy circles as key to unlocking the problem of home-​grown terrorism –​an approach becoming increasingly embedded as the Home Office has gained control over the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on issues around terrorism, and further accelerated under the prime ministership of former Home Secretary, Theresa May. This has led to a reliance on “upstreaming” the problem of terrorism –​the introduction of approaches to tackle violence long before it is articulated: I think what we’ll start to see is the Foreign Office starting to engage in more upstream programming in terms of looking at capacity building in the country around Prevent legislation, deradicalisation programmes/​the CHANNEL programme, I think we’ll start to see that emphasis. Certainly, I think the Americans are engaged in delivering deradicalisation programmes upstream. There’s no doubt that under Home Office guidance, the FCO will increasingly become involved in that too. (Jones, 2016)

Much of these developments have been echoed in European Commission approaches, who have adopted wholescale elements of British counter-​ terrorism structures and programmes. Securitization theories illustrate how counter-​ terror structures have developed around the assumption that Western states face a different kind of violent terrorist threat, framed as unique, unpredictable, irrational, and existential –​a “new” terrorism, “particularly savage and relentless” in its aims (Enders & Sandler, 1999; Ilardi, 2004: 223; Juergensmeyer, 2000). Such Manichaean underpinnings create the conditions for another key feature: “terrorism” (Brachman, 2009: 11), as constituting existential harm to “every free society” (Trent, 1980: 12).2 The state itself –​and not just the individual –​becomes a potential victim of those poised to destroy what are framed as “our” freedoms, democracy, and value for life, write Jackson et al. (2011: 68), who further reason: Whatever the terrorists are, we are the opposite: the terrorists hate freedom, we love freedom; they are anti-​ democratic; we are pro-​ democratic; they destroy life; we value life. Labelling something as “terrorism,” in other words, not only condemns the actions of the “other,” it also importantly, helps to construct the identity of the “self.”

From this discursive justification, massive centralization of powers has coalesced (see Buzan, 2006), resulting in the implementation of sweeping counter-​ terror legislation throughout Western states ensuring, according to David Blunkett, “the norms of prosecution and punishment no longer apply” (Wintour, 2004). This process of securitization has enabled the expansion of security structures and capabilities into traditionally civil spheres of democratic states.

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The securitization processes of the ever-​widening WoT have also seen the blurring of state-​military power and private business, with governments outsourcing state concerns about terrorism to a plethora of germinating non-​ governmental military, security, and intelligence firms. This has increased the scope of security, with several actors now implicated in the advancement of counter-​terror interests –​a categorization Earl determines as constituting: state agents with tight ties to national elites; state agents with loose ties to national elites; and non-​state, or private agents (Earl, 2011) –​all with overlapping security interests. Such partnerships are framed as necessities for safeguarding societies and have created a dense body of reinforcing security structures which enable multilevel access throughout civil society.

Discursive structures Alongside these military developments, discourse has grown to support this shift from the “far enemy” to the “near enemy.” These have focused on understanding and responding to “radicalization” and, more recently, “extremism,” which has greatly broadened the scope of internal securitization. During the early stages of the WoT, relatively simplistic neo-​Orientalist rhetoric dominated discussion, building support for international warfare operations based largely on the democratic deficit of (almost exclusively) majority Muslim states and the threat they posed to Western and international stability. However, as focus grew on identifying and responding to internal threats, more complex security discourses have developed in support of greater intelligence capacity at home. The result has been the normalization of counter-​terrorism discourse and practice which has problematized some forms of legitimate dissent and enabled the flourishing of a wide palette of Islamophobic discourse. Much of this discourse, drawn out of attempting to pre-​empt terrorism, has been led by the construction of theories of processes of “­extremism” –​ particularly the so-​called “conveyor belt of radicalization.” Such an approach often draws direct, causal lines between, on the one hand, certain ideologies and ideological markers and, on the other, the carrying out of violent acts. The initial research credited with the start of this movement toward ideology was a study carried out by Christopher Dean and Monica Lloyd, psychologists who worked for the UK Home Office in the National Offender Management Service at the time of the research. The study, conducted using interviews with twenty convicted al-​Qaeda prisoners, identified twenty-​two risk factors serving as the criteria against which radicalization is measured –​ termed the ERG22+. However, this research has been critiqued as containing several significant problems: it generalizes from convicted criminals; it

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has not been subject to peer review (indeed, the data has been embargoed by the UK government to prevent it being subjected to external scrutiny); it is not independent, representing a direct conflict interest; it has not been replicated; and the theoretical outcomes have been unproven, with even the authors expressing concern over the lack of reliability and validity of the result –​despite it forming the basis of the statutory guidance of Prevent approaches. The “conveyor belt” theory of radicalization was developed out of the ERG22+ study, birthed by neo-​conservative think tanks and lobby groups in the US and UK. In the UK, a central component of this shift was driven by the rise of so-​called “former Islamists” or, more recently, self-​proclaimed “counter-​extremists,” largely clustered around a collection of ex-​members of the non-​violent “Islamist” group Hizb ut-​Tahrir Britain –​including the public personalities of Maajid Nawaz, Ed Hussein, and Sharaz Mayer. It has resulted in the creation of various counter-​terror “anti-​extremism” organizations, most notably Quilliam (formerly, the Quilliam Foundation) –​founded in the living room of a small cluster of ex-​members, on the ideological foundations of flipping the purist interpretations of Hizb ut-​Tahrir to create a supposed “antidote” to radicalization through the advancing of specific articulations of liberal capitalist democracy and a set of restrictively defined Western values. The rejection of certain specific values –​of democracy, human rights, or rule of law –​have become cultivated by such counter-​ extremism groups as indicators of “extremism” (or, at least, of a specific “vulnerability” toward it). The establishment of non-​ authority organizations, think-​ tanks, and research centers act as key emulating actors due to their reciprocal relationship with authorities. Toward the UK government, such organizations have acted as legitimizers and amplifiers for policy, ensuring approaches have the legitimacy of an academic veneer. NGOs in the UK include Quilliam, the Tony Blair Institute, and the Henry Jackson Society. Such ­organizations –​ while representing some variety of political hues and often openly competing with each other –​tend to operate, according to Miller and Sabir, as “front groups” for governments, part of the strategic communication component of counter-​terror policies (Miller & Sabir, 2012). By developing recommendations and reports deliberately positioned in line with government policy –​as well as producing problematic statements, such as support for spying on Muslims not suspected of committing crimes –​these organizations have been accused of aiding the de-​politicization of counter-​ terrorism. By constructing hegemonic discourse about terrorism in a way which removes not only any counter-​narratives to an ideological approach terrorism but overtly supports “necessary” coercive counter-​terror tactics, such organizations ultimately act to curtail dissent, reproducing structures

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of repression. They therefore enable a system which attempts to intimidate sections of the population under the guise of a necessary response to terrorism, “essential to the efficacy of coercion and the generation of fear” (Miller & Sabir, 2012). The wider impact of this set of discursive structures has also often specifically problematized Muslim communities as “suspect communities,” more prone (or “vulnerable”) to extremism and radicalization (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009; Smyth, 2009). Such processes replicate problematic assumptions stemming from the ERG22+ report and help to directly or indirectly amplify the narrative that elements of Muslim communities compromise an internal “fifth column” actively mobilizing against the stability of the state. This limits the scope of Muslims, minorities, and counter-​state activists to engage in politics beyond certain set confines, laying down red lines for debate and barriers for mainstream political engagement by explicitly singling out Muslim communities, groups, or political bodies as counter to supposed “Western” or “British” norms (Githens-​Mazer, 2012). It contains highly racialized elements, with counter-​terrorism discourse often reliant on a foundation which engages in a process of “Othering” minorities –​particularly Arab and South Asian Muslims (Patel, 2017). As such, overlaps have developed between far-​ right populist groups, which have centralized a so-​called “counter-​jihad” strand of ideological framing within their core narrative, and liberal “counter-​extremists,” both of which have developed compatible interests in stressing the supposed danger inherent in Islamic activism in the West.

Physical structures As well as a rippling outward of military structures and supportive discursive structures, there have also been a manifestation of physical structures and renderings of counter-​terrorism, which are changing the urban environment and, ultimately, impinging on some traditional means for political and democratic engagement. The post-​2001 terrorism paradigm has spatially changed the civil sphere, creating new security and control measures which impact on the physical body of the citizen. One example area in which counter-​terrorism has grown to operate in is architecture, as new physicalities have been created in urban spaces shaping behavior against terrorism and limiting the opportunities for articulations of violence. This can be seen in new safeguards and security at governmental buildings with, for instance, central Western states “visually exaggerating interests of national security through the architectures of overseas embassies” to transmit the message of physical defense from attack (Coaffee et al., 2009: 500). Attack-​resistant bollards have also become an architectural

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Counter-terrorism knows no borders

mainstay for many state buildings, and a legal requirement for all US military and governmental buildings. However, there have also been the development of significantly less obvious physical articulations of counter-​terrorism. City and town councils and planners, for instance, have started to use innovative means to “influence the behavior of people” in crowds, employing scent and light to change behavior as well as “technical sensors to detect aggression” and “to look out for potential terrorist activity” (Fairs, 2018). Significant research investment has been released throughout Europe to develop technology which can premeditate terrorism and crime through the algorithmic triangulation of CCTV networks, police databases, and the monitoring of private correspondence. In architecture and urban planning, focus has increasingly been placed on the abilities for designers to create urban spaces able to mitigate the development of radicalism within communities. As such, greater value is being placed on how urban spaces create –​and can be used to battle against –​“radicalism,” with research drawing on architectural developments used in Belfast by British authorities or in Jenin by Israeli authorities to systematically control, funnel, and demobilize large-​scale acts of political dissent. “Resilience” has also become a key commodity being developed and exported within counter-​terror physicalities. The Strong Cities Network (SCN) (2019), launched by the non-​ governmental organization (NGO), Institute of Strategic Dialogue, in the UK in 2015, for instance, brings together a network of mayors, political actors, and frontline teams from more than 120 cities across the world. Determining cities to be “on the frontline of building resilience to violent radicalisation,” it aims to tackle “polarisation and radicalisation through partnerships with local communities, mayors and municipal-​level policymakers … to identify and address the methods used by violent extremists to recruit, radicalise and mobilise targeted individuals.” SCN recommendations state, amongst other points, that in order for “extremists [to] have minimal impact on communities,” it is important to “keep demonstrations away from areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities and migrants, community businesses declaring themselves zones where extremists are not welcome, and rapid community responses to paint over graffiti or clean streets after protests.” “Tension monitoring of protests” are also encouraged, such actions carried to out reclaim public spaces and, crucially, to conduct “public order management.” The underlying tension with this kind of approach –​as with so many other counter-​terror structures –​is that it takes “extremism” as a solid, well-​ defined concept, obfuscating its inherent instability and the political contention within the term. It casts a dragnet approach toward extremism that, in so doing, screens democratic engagement and activity, problematizing and

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sanctioning the legitimate role large-​scale protest and contention plays in the political process. It runs the risk of confusing quiescence with political engagement and equating disruption of the political status quo with extremism. Protests thereby become a weakness of the urban space within counter-​ extremism practice, bracketed with other forms of disruption, such as crime and terrorism. As security has become an intrusive and omnipresent concern, architecture has hardened against the citizen, citadelization been promoted, and increased urban segregation has restricted the use of public spaces –​ultimately acting to limit democratic expression and articulation. As counter-​ terror rhetoric explicitly frames an attack on the architecture of the state as an attack on the citizenry of the state, the protection of buildings of state power becomes a highly personalized endeavor. Again, this links with racialization and inequality, the vast sums spent on security almost exclusively confined to “high-​value” areas, whilst low-​priority (often minority) areas are neglected, or face austerity cuts and rising taxes to support the securitization of key state architecture.

Economic structures Counter-​terrorism has also intertwined with international economic structures, as businesses and economies have increasingly become framed as one of the main victims, as well as becoming some of the main beneficiaries, of terrorism, enabling the emergence of a set of new businesses and commodities. The rise of the “new terrorism” paradigm has securitized civil society by opening space for military and security discourses to combine with and reinforce concern about fragmented wage labor, immigration, education, and a number of other civil sites, to create an environment conducive to what Hallsworth and Lea (2011) call the “securitisation of the life-​world.” This enables wide areas of social life and civil liberties to be traded for security, with citizens increasingly coming to accept the closing down and reconceptualization of civil liberties, such as pre-​emptive arrests, or constraints of individuals suspected of “connection” with terrorism –​particularly as upper classes and majority communities are least impacted. Inversely, the closing of civil liberties impacts most severely on minority groups –​p ­ articularly Muslim communities and organizations representing the interests of Muslims, who already face restrictions on accessing education, employment, and the public political arena. While minority groups and those with limited means of accessing societal debate face forms of repression, the beneficiaries of this “securitisation of the life world” are, according to Hallsworth and Lea (2011), the capitalist state. Business and capital become constructed as

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some of the most important and visible victims of terrorism, whilst the stripping away of certain rights to exercise democratic rights through the appropriation of public space have come to be seen as “disturbances” –​potential security threats –​and are policed accordingly. Business and state economies have become high-​profile victims of terrorism, with studies showing terrorism has cost the EU28 economies €180 billion in GDP between 2004 and 2016. However, as businesses and economies have become one of the main victims of international terrorism, the “new terrorism” paradigm has also afforded the leveraging of new business opportunities. Private businesses have become inculcated into the logic of counter-​terrorism, developing counter-​terrorism and counter-​extremism into commodities to be traded between businesses and between states. This commodification and commercialization of counter-​terrorism has led to the development of security responses becoming tradable products between democratic and autocratic regimes. States such as the UK have packaged their “counter-​terror experience” to sell to overseas customers. Such packages include, for instance, counter-​ terror leadership training, whereby private companies and state bodies can receive training in the UK CONTEST strategy, understand UK multi-​agency responses, and develop best practice in managing risk and response to terrorist attacks –​all based on replicating UK government approaches. Massive national security expositions have sprung up, such as the Security and Counter-​Terror Expo, which links together a vast array of private companies with UK public bodies, including the Metropolitan Police, the National Counter Terrorism Security Office, the Cabinet Office, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, Counter Terrorism Policing, and NATO. Offering “top spending nations such as the UK, USA, Germany, France, Belgium, and Netherlands” the means for “accessing international markets and expanding your domestic reach,” events have seen a 50/​50 split between the private and public sectors from over 100 countries, to “tackle extremist behaviour” (SCTX, 2019). Much of this is also focused on “protecting businesses and infrastructure from attacks” and protecting transport links from cyber or physical attack, thereby expanding counter-​terror businesses into new civic fields whilst sustaining an intertwined narrative of capitalism as a potential victim of terrorism. As well as the UK, which draws from its experience and standing in counter-​terrorism from, to some extent, subduing Irish Republican groups in Northern Ireland, another significant player in counter-​ extremism approaches is Israel, which has become one of the largest exporters of programmatic knowledge. State authorities and MPs have worked with the United States and Europe to develop counter-​ terrorism approaches, framing Israel as “the canary in the coal mine when it comes to dealing

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with and fighting terror.” Israeli companies and private businesses have also looked to create “end-​to-​end solution[s]‌for counter-​terrorism” based on their subjugation of Palestinian dissent, with security organizations “repackaging [their] expertise and finding new customers as more countries face threats from jihadi-​inspired attacks” (Harkov, 2018). In 2016, Israel’s defense exports reached US$6.5 billion, with state-​ owned Israel Aerospace Industries (Israel’s largest defense group) offering security packages fusing drones and cameras with intelligence-​gathering, cyber-​security, and command-​and-​control technology “to track down terrorists, smugglers or illegal immigrants” (Harkov, 2018). As such, the settler-​colonial experiences of subjugating minority (Arab-​Muslim) communities are framed as essential experience in dealing with security threats in Europe and the West. Business sectors have leveraged counter-​terrorism, framing capital as a victim of terrorism on par with or above that of human life. Meanwhile, counter-​terrorism companies have directly benefited from this framing, with the WoT providing a “shot in the arm” for the weapons businesses when many were in the midst of restructuring to produce “exactly the highly sophisticated weaponry and surveillance equipment required for a more generalized war against multiple, mobile targets.”

The counter-​terror discourse between democratic and non-​democratic regimes The links developed between states (as well as associated state bodies, through capital) and counter-​terrorism are particularly significant because of the problems they pose to analysis. Initial reactions to the WoT from non-​ Western governments often ranged from indifference to open hostility, as invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq were framed as representing a means by which Western states could justify expanding their sphere of interest against non-​democratic regimes –​as exemplified, for instance, in the construction of the so-​called Axis of Evil. However, as security concerns by Western states have internalized, authoritarian or “hybrid” regimes have, in turn, co-​opted and utilized such language to crush internal dissent under the auspices of the wider and undefinable WoT –​largely with Western acquiescence. Western states have in turn adopted strategies or technologies from hybrid or authoritarian regimes in their attempts to curb terrorism –​an issue so openly defined that it incorporates by accident or design huge swathes of legitimate political action. We can see the way in which non-​democratic and democratic hybrid regimes collaborated during the course of the WoT by examining the way in which civil society organizations (CSOs) have been regarded and treated

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under the cloak of counter-​terror security. The WoT has led to a specific backlash against civil society, particularly against non-​governmental and CSOs in authoritarian regimes or “managed” democracies such as China, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kenya, and Uganda, alongside many new cases –​though illiberal conduct has been observed and recorded in deep-​rooted democratic societies as well (Howell, 2006, Quigley & Pratten, 2007, Howell & Lind, 2009, 2010; Dunn, 2010; Rubongoya, 2010; Sidel, 2010; Stevens & Jailobaeva, 2010; Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011; Spalek et al., 2013; Njoku, 2020a, 2020b; Romaniuk, 2021). However, the language put into service to target CSOs in such regime states is largely drawn from Western articulations of the WoT. CSOs in Europe and the United States are targeted by governments and NGOs with strong governmental ties and interests under the auspices of fighting terrorism or extremism. Organizations targeted are often legally and legitimately operating but are being increasingly squeezed by the rise of so-​called “counter-​extremism” measures. These measures trumpet a perceived “suspect character” of religious organizations, principally Muslim organizations, constructing and then immortalizing xenophobic-​Islamophobic properties housed in the core of the WoT and its security panic since 2001 and its backlash effects in American and Western society (Kaplan, 2006; Awan, 2010; Kunst et al., 2012; Kimball, 2015). Examples of organizations targeted include Muslim civil and human rights groups such as CAGE (once known as CagePrisoners) or Muslim Engagement and Development in the UK, or Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France, all of whom are lumped together into a “suspect community” and face regular attacks from politicians, journalists, and political interest groups, such as the neo-​conservative Henry Jackson Society or the neo-​liberal Quilliam and Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. Such attacks are very often highly racialized, singling out Muslim organizations for certain criticisms which are not leveled at similar majority communities. At the same time, well-​established and non-​suspect organizations partnering with organizations of “suspect character” have been heavy criticized. Such was the case in February 2010, when Amnesty International was rebuked for several years of work with CAGE (McMicking, 2015; NGO Monitor, 2015). The targeting of “the financing of terrorism” has been used to financially cripple individuals, charities, welfare and social justice organizations (McCulloch & Pickering, 2005: 471). Civil society is thus being compressed in a global process which draws upon the language of security to target (often minority) organizations critical of government policies, with equal processes taking place in both democratic and authoritarian countries. Taking the example of Russia –​where democratic actors have faced a growing barrage of attacks –​we can see a shining example of the way in which the language of the WoT is employed for the purpose of consolidating

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regime power. Despite the freezing of relations between Russia and the West, counter-​terrorism has consistently been held up as one of the few positive links between Russia and the West, with ongoing cooperation despite international sanctions. Russia has strongly embraced and utilized the language of the “new terrorism” paradigm to target the “threats within” –​political dissidents in the historically troublesome areas of Chechnya and Dagestan (Hill, 2002). This has also been used to crack down on political dissent in Crimea following its annexation by Russia in 2014. Crimean Tatar communities have been subject to specific persecution, including cases of torture, arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances by Russian security forces, and prosecution in secretive military courts (Savchuk, 2018, 2019). Much of this has been couched within the language of counter-​terrorism, as Russian security forces arrest Muslims on spurious ex-​post facto charges of Islamist involvement. Ethnic Russians have faced punitive responses by the Russian government for their criticism of policy coming out of Moscow, including internal and foreign policies. Two bloggers in Siberia received harsh sentences, one for criticizing Russia military intervention in Ukraine and another for criticizing Russia’s military involvement in Syria (HRW, 2017). Meanwhile, democratic observers in the country face harassment and arrest on counter-​ terror charges, the actions of democratic bodies framed by authorities as hostile to the state. The Erdogan regime in Turkey has also been able to leverage political value from the WoT, imprisoning journalists and political critics of the regime as “terrorists.” This includes signing favorable deals with the EU to prevent the flow of refugees from Syria on the back of European concerns over foreign fighters, as well as the squeezing of Kurdish dissent using military violence on Turkish soil in Syrian “safe zones” under the camouflage of the international engagement against Islamic State. However, the optics of the WoT are not just traveling from democratic regimes to authoritarian regimes. There is also exchange taking place in the opposite direction of travel, as states with “managed” democratic systems sell counter-​terrorism procedures to the West which impinge on democratic and political rights. One example is the way in which the EU has started to copy the predictive policing of Israel’s counter-​terrorism approach, whereby authorities are able to crack down on individuals prior to a crime being committed. On March 15, 2017, EU member states adopted a directive on combating terrorism which criminalized the accessing of certain websites and made the “glorification” of terrorism a criminal offense, directly following advice given to the EU’s counter-​terrorism coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, by Israeli officials. Specific EU countries have also independently adopted counter-​ terrorism technologies developed to limit certain forms of democratic

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engagement –​often in direct conflict with national laws. Denmark, for instance, has begun amending laws to ensure police are able to engage in pre-​crime arrests and, in 2016, Denmark’s national police force, Rigspolitiet, integrated the software platform POL-​ INTEL (by Palantir) into their counter-​terrorism work –​a platform combining and analyses information from police databases, social media, CCTV cameras, and automated number plate recognition to predict crime before it happens. Only after its purchase were national laws on personal data changed to allow police to make full use of the platform. Other notable examples include the UK Metropolitan Police force which, with direct support from Israel, Sri Lanka, and Russia, developed Operation Kratos in response to the 2005 London bombings –​a system which resulted in the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes.

Conclusion: implications for the analysis of counter-​terrorism architectures The interactive exchange between democratic and non-​democratic regime types challenges the way we can understand both counter-​terrorism and the normal divisions between democratic and non-​democratic societies. A significant dialectic is taking place between democratic and authoritarian states which are co-​opting and trading counter-​terrorism and counter-​extremism practice and implementation. Responding to the extent literature, which largely contends hybrid or authoritarian regimes adopt repressive counter-​ terrorism laws, policies, and measures from the West, we are presently witnessing an inverse drift, whereby the counter-​terrorism practices of repressive governments are being adopted by advanced and liberal democracies in the West. This view builds on the small but budding literature based on studies by Howell and Lind (2010), Rubongoya (2010), and Njoku (2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2021a, 2021b). The problem with swathes of contemporary research into terrorism and counter-​terrorism is that researchers tend to treat democracies and autocratic regimes as inherently different and subject to different sets of strict conditions. This is clear, for instance, in much social movement research –​a paradigm coming to dominate analytical approaches to political violence. Leading research by scholars have taken the bifurcation of democracies and autocracies as a central means of utilizing social movement analysis (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). However, this bifurcation breaks down when we account for non-​democratic states utilizing the language of democratic states as part of the WoT, as well as democratic states openly implementing practices imported wholesale from authoritarian or “hybrid” regimes. Within the context of counter-​terrorism, governments

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of democratic states have been able to bypass former legal limitations, implementing extensive military powers under the guise of security. This has included protracted states of emergency, large-​scale surveillance, secret courts, rendition sites, pre-​crime arrests, extrajudicial killings, and –​more recently –​attacks on political dissent framed as extremism. If this is the case, then one of the central theoretical assumptions in contemporary political science –​that democratic states operate differently because of the checks and balances inherent within their state structures –​is destabilized. One of the keys to maybe unlocking a response to this problem is to account for the racialized elements of counter-​terrorism, and to move it to a more central position in serious political analysis. Particularly notable for integration are theories which frame the racialized violence of counter-​ terrorism within the context of contemporary articulations of colonialism (Patel, 2017). That so much experience in responding to terrorism has been drawn from main settler-​colonial contexts –​Israeli occupation of Palestine or British occupation of Northern Ireland –​is, therefore, not a quirk of contemporary counter-​terrorism but integral, and therefore represents a means of developing an explanatory framework as to why counter-​terrorism so often targets minority groups. Such examples we can use includes Yael Berda’s theorizing of the framing of dangerous populations –​such as Muslims within in the language of counter-​terrorism –​as a direct legacy of international colonialism. This process is perhaps conceptualized through Foucault’s (2003: 103) “boomerang” effect, in which colonial models were brought back to the West with the aim of putting in place structures and setting in motion practices akin to colonization, or an “internal colonialism.” This changes how we view the democratic/​non-​democratic state binary within such an analysis. Those who argue counter-​terrorism is an illiberal force, intruding into the democratic and civic body of the state –​as is assumed in some social movement or critical securitization approaches –​seem wide of the mark. Rather, counter-​terrorism represents a perfectly normal continuation of the liberal state order, as is clearly demonstrated through intertwining interests of capital and state within the heart of the WoT. What it does represent, however, is a smaller shift in the shape and formation of colonialism which is being used –​a shift from the practice of a “far colonialism” to the practice of a “near colonialism.” The scaffolding of an approach which accounts for new articulations of colonial violence onto existing theories examining the interplay between counter-​terrorism and contentious actors offers a means to build theoretical approaches which account for the significantly racialized elements of counter-​terrorism. It also highlights the problems we face as analysts in understanding the international architecture of counter-​terrorism, as well as offering a means to scrutinize the blurring of lines between democratic and

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non-​democratic regimes looking to shore up state and governmental power by globalizing the security architecture of counter-​terrorism.

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Notes 1 “Section 1. (1) In this Act ‘terrorism’ means the use or threat of action where: (a) the action falls within subsection (2); (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government [or an international governmental organisation] or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and; (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, [racial] or ideological cause. (2) Action falls within this subsection if it: (a) involves serious violence against a person; (b) involves serious damage to property; (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action; (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or; (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. (3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.” 2 Brachman (2009: 11) articulates that, “[r]‌eality, for ideological adherents, becomes nothing more than a reductionist Manichaean dualism, a struggle between good and evil, between the light and the darkness … such diametric opposites will remain in constant conflict until one triumphs over the other.”

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Earl, J. (2011). “Political repression: Iron fists, velvet gloves, and diffuse control”, Annual Review of Sociology, 37: 261–​284. Enders, W. & Sandler, T. (1999). “Transnational terrorism in the post-​cold war era”, International Studies Quarterly, 43: 145–​167. Enders, W. & Sandler, T. (2005). “After 9/​11: Is it all different now?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(2): 183–​200. Fairs, M. (2018, January 4). “Eindhoven pioneers use of scent and light to ‘influence the behaviour of people’ in crowds,” Dezeen. www.dezeen.com/​2018/​01/​04/​ design-​terrorism-​talk-​eindhoven-​pioneers-​use-​scent-​light-​influence-​behaviour-​ people-​in-​crowds/​ Foucault, M. (2003). Society must be defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975–​1976. London: Picador. Githens-​Mazer, J. (2012). “The rhetoric and reality: Radicalisation and political discourse,” International Political Science Review, 33(5): 556–​567. Hallsworth, S. & Lea, J. (2011). “Reconstructing Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state,” Theoretical Criminology, 15: 141–​157. Harkov, L. (2018, February 25). “Likud MK Berko lends counter-​ terrorism expertise to Europe,” The Jerusalem Post. www.jpost.com/​Israel-​News/​ Likud-​MK-​Berko-​lends-​counter-​terrorism-​expertise-​to-​Europe-​543556 Hill, F. (2002, June 1). “Putin and Bush in common cause? Russia’s view of the terrorist threat after September 11,” Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. www. brookings.edu/​articles/​putin-​and-​bush-​in-​common-​cause-​russias-​view-​of-​the-​ terrorist-​threat-​after-​september-​11/​ Howell, J. (2006). “The Global War on Terror, development and civil society,” Journal of International Development, 18: 121–​135. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2009). Counter-​terrorism, aid and civil society: Before and after the war on terror. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2010). Civil society under strain: Counter-​terrorism policy, civil society and aid post-​9/​11. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2017, July 18). “Online and on all fronts: Russia’s assault on freedom of expression.” www.hrw.org/​report/​2017/​07/​18/​online-​and-​ all-​fronts/​russias-​assault-​freedom-​expression Ilardi, G. J. (2004). “Redefining the issues: The future of terrorism research and the search for empathy,” in A. Silke (ed.), Research on terrorism: Trends, achievements and failures (pp. 214–​228). London: Routledge. Jackson, R., Jarvis, L., Gunning, J. & Smyth, M. B. (2011). Terrorism: A critical introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Jones, S. (2016, March 29). “Home Office seizes overseas counterterror role,” The Financial Times. www.ft.com/​content/​279c262e-​f5c9–​11e5–​803c-​d27c7117d132 Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious violence. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kaplan, J. (2006). “Islamophobia in America? September 11 and Islamophobic hate crime,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(1): 1–​33. Kimball, C. (2015). “The War on Terror and its effects on American Muslims,” in J. I. Smith & Y. Y. Haddad (eds.), The Oxford handbook of American Islam.

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New York: Oxford University Press. www.oxfordhandbooks.com/​view/​10.1093/​ oxfordhb/​9780199862634.001.0001/​oxfordhb-​9780199862634-​e-​018 Kunst, Jonas R., Tajamal, H., Sam, D. L. & Ulleberg, P. (2012). “Coping with Islamophobia: The effects of religious stigma on Muslim minorities’ identity formation,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 36(4): 518–​532. McCulloch, J. & Pickering, S. (2005). “Suppressing the financing of terrorism: Proliferating state crime, eroding censure and extending neo-​colonialism,” British Journal of Criminology, 45: 470–​486. McMicking, H. (2015, February 27). “Cage: Important human rights group or apologists for terror?” BBC. www.bbc.com/​news/​uk-​31657333 McNeil-​ Willson, R. (2019). “Islamic activism and the counterterror state: The impact of the securitised lens on Hizb ut-​Tahrir in Britain and Denmark” (PhD thesis). University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom. Miller, D. & Sabir, R. (2012). “Counter-​terrorism as counterinsurgency in the UK’s ‘War on Terror,’ ” in S. Poynting & D. Whyte (eds.), Counter-​terrorism and state political violence (pp. 12–​32). London: Routledge. NGO Monitor. (2015, December 30). “Lending legitimacy to terror? Amnesty’s partnership with CAGE.” www.ngo-​monitor.org/​reports/​lending_​legitimacy_​to_​ terror_​amnesty_​s_​partnership_​with_​cage/​ Njoku, E. T. (2020a). “Politics of conviviality? State-​civil society relations within the context of counter-​terrorism in Nigeria,” VOLUNTA: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 31(5): 1063–​1076. Njoku, E. T. (2020b). “Investigating the intersections between counterterrorism and NGOs in Nigeria: Development practice in conflict-​affected areas,” Development in Practice, 30(4): 501–​512. Njoku, E. T. (2020c). “Making sense of state service-​delivery oriented partnership with civil society organisations in counter-​terrorism context in Nigeria,” Development Policy Review:1–​16, https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​dpr.12524 Njoku, E. T. (2021a). “Strategic exclusion: The state and the framing of a service delivery role for civil society organizations in the context of counterterrorism in Nigeria,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 44(5): 410–​430. Njoku, E. T. (2021b). “The state and the securitization of civil society organisations in Nigeria,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​ 08997640211003256 Pantazis, C. & Pemberton, S. A. (2009). “From the old to the new suspect community: Examining the impacts of recent UK counter-​terrorist legislation,” British Journal of Criminology, 79: 646–​666. Patel, T. G. (2017). “It’s not about security, it’s about racism: Counter-​terror strategies, civilising processes and the post-​race fiction,” Palgrave Communications. https://​www.nature.com/​articles/​palcomms201731 Quigley, N. & Pratten, B. (2007). “Security and civil society: The impact of counter-​ terrorism measures on civil society organisations,” National Council for Voluntary Organisations. www.ncvovol.org.uk/​uploadedFiles/​NCVO/​Policy/​ Civil_​Society_​and_​Participation/​2007%2001%2024%20Secuty%20and%20 Civil%20Society-​A%20report%20from%20NCVO.pdf

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Romaniuk, S. N. (2021). Under siege: Counter-​terrorism policy and civil society in Hungary. Lanham: Lexington Books. Rubongoya, J. (2010). “The politics of Uganda anti-​ terrorism law and its impact on civil society,” in J. Howell and J. Lind (eds.), Civil society under strain: Counter-​terrorism policy, civil society and aid post-​9/​11 (pp. 209–​226). Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. Savchuk, A. (2018, June 19). “How Russia’s security services target Crimean Tatars as ‘Islamic terrorists,’  ” Open Democracy. www.opendemocracy.net/​en/​odr/​ how-​russias-​security-​services-​target-​crimean-​tatars-​as-​islamic-​terrorists/​ Savchuk, A. (2019, April 1). “ ‘My only crime is that I am a Muslim’: Mass terrorism arrests hit Crimean Tatar solidarity campaign,” Open Democracy. www.opendemocracy.net/​en/​odr/​my-​only-​crime-​is-​that-​i-​am-​a-​muslim-​mass-​ terrorism-​arrests-​hit-​crimean-​tatar-​solidarity-​campaign/​ Security and Counter Terror Expo (SCTX). (2019, May 19–​21). “Counter Terror Expo.” www.counterterrorexpo.com/​ Sidel, M. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the regulation of civil society in the USA,” Development and Change, 41(2): 293–​312. Smyth, M. B. (2009). “Subjectivities, ‘suspect communities,’ governments and the ethics of research on ‘terrorism,’ ” in M. B. Smyth, J. Gunning, & R. Jackson (eds.), Critical terrorism studies: A new research agenda (pp. 194–​ 215). London: Routledge. Spalek, B., Limbada, Z., Mcdonald, L. Z., Silk, D., & Da Silva, R. (2013). “Impact of counter-​ terrorism on communities: Methodology report,” Open Society Foundation, Institute of Strategic Dialogue. www.strategicdialogue.org/​ Methodology_​paper_​SF_​FINAL_​17_​Oct.pdf Stevens, D. & Jailobaeva, K. (2010). “False choice? The war on terror and its impact on state policy towards civil society in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,” in J. Howell and J. Lind (eds.), Civil society under strain: Counter-​terrorism policy, civil society and aid post-​9/​11 (pp. 93–​108). Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. The Strong Cities Network (SCN). (2019). “About the SCN.” https://​webcache. googleusercontent.com/​search?q=cache:_​R6DNWyKxjsJ:https://​strongcitiesnet work.org/​en/​about-​the-​scn/​+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca Tilly, C. & Tarrow, S. (2015). Contentious politics (2nd edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Trent, D. M. (1980). “The new religion: Terrorism,” Human Rights, 8(4): 10–​13, 47–​49. UK Government. (2015). “2010 to 2015 government policy: Counter-​terrorism,” Foreign & Commonwealth Office Cabinet Office, Home Office and Ministry of Justice. www.gov.uk/​government/​publications/​2010-​to-​2015-​government-​policy-​ counter-​terrorism/​2010-​to-​2015-​government-​policy-​counter-​terrorism Wintour, P. (2004, March 13). “Blunkett warns of growing danger,” The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/​politics/​2004/​mar/​13/​uk.terrorism

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Conceptualizing non-​state counter-​terrorism Olivier Lewis

The correct use of […] words is a question not only of logical grammar, but of historical perspective. –​Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves

Introduction A young man called Malik returns, veiled Syrian wife in hand, to his parents’ farm in Tunis. A few days later, his father, Mohamed, denounces the radicalized son to the police (The Economist, 2018; Joobeur, 2018). The plot of this short film by Meryam Joobeur describes a possible example of non-​state counter-​terrorism. But the film, which is called Brotherhood, can also be considered an example of non-​state counter-​terrorism.1 On October 29, 2018, a woman committed a suicide attack not far from the Carthage Film Festival, where the film was being projected. Audiences continued to attend the festival nonetheless, providing a third possible example of non-​ state counter-​terrorism. As these examples show, what constitutes non-​state counter-​terrorism is not self-​evident. But these examples also illustrate the many ways people not working for a government might try to oppose non-​state terrorism. If one is going to try to study such phenomena, then these examples demonstrate the need for formal conceptualizations. Without formal conceptualizations, it will never be clear what exactly non-​state counter-​terrorism is, what it is not, what forms it can take, and what are its causes and consequences. Lest definitions are made explicit, the greatest danger is that of synecdoche, of confusing the “species for the genus” (Burke, 1945). One might mistake a small sample of non-​ state counter-​ terrorism for the entire “universe” of possible types. By suggesting one way non-​state counter-​terrorism might be conceptualized, this chapter attempts to assist counter-​terrorism scholars in avoiding such “faulty inferences” and “self-​ delusions” (Sartori et al., 1975).

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State of the art Formal conceptualizations of non-​state counter-​terrorism are virtually inexistent because few counter-​ terrorism scholars use formal conceptualizations and few study non-​state actors and organizations. And seeing that “counter-​terrorism studies” is a small field (at least in comparison to terrorism studies), it is safe to say the niche that is the conceptualization-​of-​non-​ state-​counter-​terrorism is indeed quite small. Although few studies exist on non-​state counter-​terrorism, the sub-​field is growing (see Horgan, 2008; Rosand et al., 2008; Briggs, 2010; Porges, 2010; Crelinsten & Schmid, 2012; Crelinsten, 2013; Aly et al., 2015; Kelly, 2015). Interestingly, some of those studying non-​state counter-​terrorism are not counter-​terrorist scholars. Rather, they are experts in political geography (Coaffee & Rogers, 2008), political sociology (Bail, 2012), international humanitarian law (Howell, 2010; Pantuliano et al., 2011), human rights (Brechenmacher, 2017), peacebuilding (Brett, 2017), security sector reform (Lawrence, 2012), security studies (Hayes, 2012), policing (Palmer & Whelan, 2006), and criminology (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011). In fact, “pockets” of non-​state counter-​terrorism studies are to be found throughout the social sciences. Unfortunately, such scholars rarely reference non-​ state counter-​terrorism studies from other disciplines. While it is unlikely this diverse group could ever agree on a common definition of non-​state counter-​terrorism, a definitional debate could do nothing but aid the study of non-​state counter-​terrorism. Many abhor definitions and definitional debates. Scholars tend to want to “get on with” their research. They justify not entering such debates by quoting judges talking about “knowing things when they see them.” Although there is much more to social science than definitions and conceptualizations, it is also true that all knowledge is concept-​laden and avoiding conceptual reflection can only lead to poor and possibly unethical research. Nowhere is this more the case than in studies aiming to produce knowledge (and often policy advice) relating to violence, politics, and civil liberties. In addition to offering some reflective and possibly critical insights (i.e., helping avoid self-​delusion and faulty inferences) (Sartori et al., 1975), conceptual reflection can also help establish generalizations, even if they be only modest ones. To establish generalizations, one needs, of course, to compare cases, note their similarities and differences, and possibly explain said similarities and differences. But to do so, one first needs to be able to identify what the cases are, and thus one requires a definition of what constitutes “a case” (Sartori et al., 1975). In short, formal conceptualizations of non-​state counter-​terrorism could help advance the scientific study thereof.

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Defining terrorism To define non-​state counter-​terrorism, it is necessary first to define the concepts comprising it, starting with terrorism. One might think that terrorism is a “universal,” ahistorical term. If one examines either the word’s everyday use or its contemporary scientific meaning, one realizes that terrorism is a modern term. As is well-​known, the term terrorism is less than 250 years old, being first used to refer to the practices of revolutionaries in France (Hoffman, 2013). Edmund Burke, for example, is quoted as referring to the revolutionaries as “those hell-​hounds called terrorists” (Laqueur, 2001). In its contemporary scientific meaning, terrorism is a type of political violence where a person or a group (repeatedly) uses violence (or threats of violence) against non-​combatants/​civilians/​the innocent in a public manner to reach a political goal (see Morgenthau et al., 1977; Primoratz, 1990, 1997, 2004, 2007, 2015; O’Keefe & Coady, 2002; Coady, 2005; Schmid & Jongman, 2005; Nathanson, 2010; Wilkinson, 2011; Schmid, 2013; Lewis, 2015). The term terrorism, then, does not so much reference a type of actor or a type of goal, but to a type of method (i.e., a tactic) (Jenkins, 1980). And in doing so, it implicitly refers to the idea that there are certain categories of persons that should not be the targets of violence and threats of violence (Primoratz, 2015). In other words, terrorism makes an implicit reference to the ethical and legal argument that violence should only (if ever) be used discriminately. Inasmuch, terrorism is modern, for the notion of “regulated violence” is modern, if only because the effective regulation of violence requires modern states (Lackey, 1989; Friedrichs, 2006; Kochi, 2006; Müller, 2006; de Garay, 2008; Schmitt, 2008; Slomp, 2009; Werner, 2010).

Defining counter-​terrorism Based on the scientific definition of terrorism, one can easily conclude that counter-​terrorism is an action that has as its goal the opposition of a type of political violence (repeatedly) using violence and threats thereof against non-​combatants/​civilians/​the innocent in a public manner to obtain a political goal. Under this definition, counter-​terrorism is an intentional and purposeful oppositional activity (Schmid & Jongman, 2005), which, unlike terrorism, is defined by its goal. To develop this definition of counter-​terrorism, one can specify its contrary and its contradiction, i.e., to form a negative definition (Aristotle, 350 bce; Goertz, 2012). If the contrary of activity is passivity, then the

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contrary of counter-​terrorism might be passivity in the face of terrorism (i.e., to be a bystander). Those who see the world in black and white would put passivity and terrorism in one group, and argue that to do nothing is to “take a side.” As much as this might make sense from certain ethical and moral standpoints, for social scientific purposes this confusion of terrorists and bystanders makes little sense. Likewise, some might argue that the use of terrorism to counter terrorism is never justified. But when trying to explain various forms of political violence, the goals pursued must be clearly identified and explicitly distinguished. So, as much as counter-​ terror, i.e., the use of terrorism to counter terrorism, can be seen as contrary to a lay definition of counter-​terrorism, it is nevertheless a subtype of counter-​terrorism (see Lewis, 2015). And, in fact, a subtype of the subtype can be identified, namely pseudo-​counterterror, where the terrorism to be countered does not exist. Figure 2.1 illustrates terrorism, the subtype counterterror, the sub-​subtype pseudo-​counterterror in a Venn diagram. The diagram thereby draws attention to the similar means of all three types of action, i.e., terrorism.

Terrorism

Counterterror

Pseudocounterterror

Figure 2.1  The terrorism, counterterror, and pseudo-​counterterror relationship

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Conceptualizing non-state counter-terrorism

Counterterrorism

Passivity

Counterterror

Pseudocounterterror

Figure 2.2  Goals of actions

Of course, pseudo-​counter-​terrorism in general and pseudo-​counterterror in particular are not types of counter-​terrorism, for, by definition, they are actions not actually seeking to oppose terrorism. Therefore, pseudo-​ counter-​terrorism (along with pseudo-​counterterror) is logically contrary to counter-​terrorism. Unlike Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2 focuses on the goal of the actions in question, with the diagram on the right focusing on the negative definitions of counter-​terrorism (i.e., to do nothing against terrorism and to pretend to be countering terrorism). One could, of course, limit oneself to these negative definitions of counter-​terrorism, but a positive definition will be of much more use to social science. Here then, the attributes of counter-​terrorism must be stated. Taken literally, counter-​ terrorism is any action intentionally seeking to oppose violence and threats of violence against non-​combatants done for political purposes (Lewis, 2015). In other words, the less an action seeks to protect non-​combatants from harm and fear, the less it can be considered counter-​terrorism.

Defining “non-​state” Moving from the basic definition of counter-​terrorism to the secondary one, i.e., the one stipulating the essential attributes (i.e., characteristics), is a large “step” away from abstraction and toward specificity, but it remains imprecise and of little use to scientists, if only because it is not clear always evident who is doing the countering.

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Consider, for example, the 1,300 floor tiles in an art gallery situated near the Presidential Palace in Bogotá. They were designed by an artist called Doris Salcedo; built from Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rifles, pistols, and grenade launchers; and hammered into the ground by civilian victims (e.g., those who were raped by paramilitaries, guerrillas, or army soldiers) (Parkin, 2018). Salcedo said the objective of the “anti-​ monument” was to make something useful that did not celebrate war. The creation and installation of these art gallery floor tiles is explicitly in opposition to violence and threats of violence against non-​combatants for political purposes. “The fact that these guns have been destroyed means that many, many lives have been saved” Salcedo told a journalist (Otis, 2018). But who exactly is doing the countering of terrorism? One might argue that this is a joint action by both state and non-​state actors … that is until one learns that the president of Colombia, Iván Duque Márquez, declined to attend the tiles’ inauguration (Parkin, 2018). So, despite the military participating in the project (the weapons were melted by Colombian military officers in their foundry), it is not clear that “the state” partook in the action. In this example, what type of actor is performing the counter-​terrorism? Those familiar with policy debates about “state sponsors of terrorism,” “non-​combatant immunity,” and civilians as “innocent victims” will know that distinguishing between different types of actors is never an easy task. And yet, these ontological and methodological questions are essential to the study of political violence, for political violence is in part a contestation of such distinctions, of who should be protected, who has authority, who has legitimacy, who is an actual state actor. Such contestation makes the scientific study of political violence extremely challenging. One could argue these philosophical questions and political debates are also at the core of the study of non-​state counter-​terrorism, and particularly at the core of this book. What are the organizational boundaries of the state? How can one measure the autonomy and independence of non-​state actors and non-​state organizations? Who is legally, but also ethically and causally responsible for the violent actions of non-​state actors? The adjective “non-​state” in “non-​state counter-​terrorism” refers not to the goal of the action, nor to the method employed, but to the type of actor committing the act: non-​state counter-​terrorism is counter-​terrorism by non-​state actors. To define non-​state counter-​terrorism it is necessary to define non-​state actors, which in turn requires a definition of “the state.” The state can be defined in several ways, of course, and the definition one selects should be based on the type of research question to be answered. When studying political violence, for example, official recognition by other recognized states is far less important than actually being a modern (i.e., Weberian) state: does the entity in question have an administration; does the

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administration claim to have the authority to regulate violence in a defined territory; do the residents of this territory recognize these authority claims as legitimate; does the administration effectively regulate the inhabitants of this territory –​and related to the last question, does the administration prevent ingerence by other states (Weber, 1978; Weber et al., 2004; Anter, 2014). If these questions are answered positively, then the organization in question is, de facto, a state. So, for example, Northern Cyprus, Kosovo, the Donetsk People’s Republic, Hezbollah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant have all, at one point in time, had some or all of the attributes of de facto statehood (Lewis, 2017). This review of definitions of statehood might seem banal or boring, but, as mentioned, definitions of states and statehood are often the very reason for political violence. Legitimacy, governance and statehood are frequently the goals of those who employ terrorism –​this type of political violence helped create Algeria and Israel, for example. With this clarification in hand, we can now ask to what the term non-​state counter-​terrorism refers. The most basic definition of non-​state counter-​ terrorism is counter-​terrorism by organizations without the attributes of statehood.2 This definition might seem trite. In fact, to some the definition of non-​state organizations might seem evident: non-​state organizations are simply organizations not legally part of the public organization that is the state. But for social scientists, commonsensical (i.e., lay) approaches to definitions are misguided. The official, legal status of organizations (and their members) is just one aspect of organizations. In fact, much of the empirical work of those who study political violence consists in determining to what degree states and state actors influence or control non-​state organizations and non-​state actors. Here, the growing literatures on proxy warfare, “paramilitary operations,” and the public contracting of private military and security companies might come to mind. These works are good sources of inspiration in synthetic approaches to conceptualizing non-​ state counter-​ terrorism, for they catalogue the many types of cooperative relationships non-​state organizations can have with states (notably in counterinsurgency, counter-​ terrorism, and counternarcotic operations, but not limited to these). The resources states can provide are many (e.g., staff, money, equipment, information). Likewise, non-​ state organizations can provide many types of services to states (e.g., terrorism and counter-​terrorism). And yet, if one looks at only violent proxy and auxiliary organizations for types of non-​ state counter-​terrorism, one will perforce focus on violent types of counter-​ terrorism, while in fact there are many types of non-​ violent non-​ state counter-​terrorism.

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What is more, actors never play just one role. It is the responsibility of the social scientist to determine what these roles are and at what point in time and place they are being fulfilled. In the context of counter-​terrorism, and state/​non-​state cooperation, it needs to be recalled that official state actors can always be co-​opted by other states (via the other state’s intelligence agency, for instance) or by non-​state organizations. This can be done in many ways, via manipulation and deceit for example, but also through persuasion, bribery, and blackmail. Official state actors can also conduct non-​authorized acts of their own initiative, for both personal gain or for a greater good. Think, for example, of instances of defection, desertion, whistle-​blowing, mutiny, and coups. As demonstrated in this book, it is the possibility for duplicity and unofficial covert action allowing many states to plausibly accuse non-​state organizations of being the agents of other states, allegedly trying to foster dissent and subversion. Further complicating (if not blurring) the distinction of state and non-​ state organizations (and their members) are extra-​legal and covert relations. Non-​state organizations (and their members) can be, for example, non-​ official but authorized state agents; such practices are often used in covert and clandestine state operations. Thus, when studying non-​state counter-​ terrorism, one must keep various possible roles in mind: state authorized agents, non-​state authorized agents, state unauthorized agents, and non-​ state unauthorized agents (see Thorup, 2010). One must distinguish the obedient civil servant from the rogue officer, and the informal proxy from the insurgent enemy combatant. Finally, even when non-​state organizations conduct counter-​terrorism for a state, they might not actually do so –​they might “shirk” (see Bloodgood & Tremblay-​Boire, 2010). Just as in criminal law there is “the guilty act” and “the guilty mind,” for an action to be considered counter-​terrorism, the actor must physically try to counter terrorism. If either the intention or the act is inexistent, then there is counter-​terrorism. Meanwhile, the attentive reader might be frustrated by the absence above of any reference to the concept designating this monograph, i.e., civil society. Many are the reasons for focusing on “non-​state” and avoiding the term “civil society.” Analytically, civil society organizations can be considered a subtype of non-​state organizations. This means that, depending on what one hopes to study, a focus on the civil or civic aspect of non-​state organizations might be too restrictive, too narrow. Likewise, the use of the term “civil society” might lead one into the trap of methodological nationalism, where one prematurely conceptualizes political relations as being primarily delimited by the borders, laws, and identities of states. In other words, depending on the geographic and temporal scope of one’s study, treating

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states as the “containers” of political life can lead to fallacious conclusions. Indeed, purely “national” phenomena are quite rare –​transnationalism and “transfrontieralism,” rather, are the norm (see Strange, 1976; Keohane & Nye, 2000; Kaldor, 2013).3 This is not to say that the term civil society is analytically useless or cannot be used to study local, regional, transnational, or even global phenomena (see Boli & Thomas, 1999). If one wants to examine associational life writ large, or investigate the degree to which a political community is a liberal democracy or a republic (as many chapters in this book do, especially regarding checks and balances), then references to “civil society” and “civil society organizations” are perfectly legitimate. When working on broader questions and higher-​level conceptualizations, however, reliance on the term “civil society” is inadvisable. The term “non-​state,” on the other hand, can help one devise wider definitions and imagine a plethora of possible cases; it leads to a broader perspective.

Defining non-​state counter-​terrorism With this discussion of “non-​state” in hand, it is possible to provide a working definition of non-​state counter-​terrorism. Non-​state counter-​terrorism is the act of opposing the use of violence and threats of violence against non-​ combatants in a public manner to obtain a political goal by a person who is not officially working for a state and who does not have the authority of the state to do so. As such, the term “non-​state counter-​terrorism” does not specify if the counter-​terrorist is working as an individual or for a non-​state organization. As this book demonstrates, in both cases, states can try to use their resources (including laws and jurisdictions) to try to control the actions of such non-​state actors. But as mentioned above, one must keep in mind that if the person or the organization is being coerced into conducting the counter-​terrorism, such action can hardly be considered non-​state counter-​terrorism (see Bloodgood & Tremblay-​Boire, 2010). Instances of this are visible, for example, when counter-​terrorism is not one of the non-​ state organization’s official goals. This being said, types of veritable non-​state counter-​terrorism are many: • scholars study terrorism and counter-​ terrorism and provide policy advice (Cortright & Lopez, 2007; Rosand et al., 2008); • schools encourage resentment to be expressed in non-​violent ways (Aly et al., 2015); • former terrorists, clergy, and psychologists partake in encouraging terrorists to disengage and “de-​radicalize” (Horgan, 2008; Porges, 2010; Dechesne, 2011);

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• victims and of victims’ families lobby governments or partake in peacebuilding (Brett, 2017; Kelly, 2015); • journalists self-​censor and avoid making terrorists famous (Blair, 2018; Hollywood, 2018; Teves & Teves, 2018); • terrorists denounced to state authorities by their families (Coaffee & Rogers, 2008; Briggs, 2010); • and of course, private companies perform state functions or cooperate with states in preventing and responding to attacks (Palmer & Whelan, 2006). Researching any of these forms of non-​state counter-​terrorism could lead to interesting and original knowledge. Still, two caveats regarding typologies of non-​ state counter-​ terrorism must be stated. The first important point is that, conceptually, non-​state counter-​ terrorism should not be limited to non-​ state counter-​ terrorism against non-​state terrorists. Non-​state actors have, do, and can counter state terrorism. In fact, most insurgencies and civil wars involve counter-​terror by non-​state actors. This leads to a second important point concerning types of non-​state counter-​terrorism. Just as conceptualizations of non-​state counter-​ terrorism should not solely focus on violent forms of counter-​terrorism, neither they should focus solely on non-​violent forms of non-​state counter-​ terrorism. A convincing argument can be made that in many regions security sector reform should include violent non-​state actors, such as clans, tribes, vigilantes, militias, paramilitaries, etc. (Lawrence, 2012). As of 2019, the state-​based world order is, partly at least, returning to a more complex, medieval-​like form of governance, where many overlapping organizations claim to have the authority to regulate violence; and more often than not, these multiple organizations are not rational, nor bureaucratic, nor impersonal –​i.e., they are not modern states. In this sense, maybe in a few centuries non-​state counter-​terrorism will be the norm and state counter-​ terrorism the exception.

Conclusion This chapter has argued that formal conceptualization can increase the quality of social science, and that this is particularly true concerning the study of political violence, where ontological claims are often the raison d’être of the conflict. In the use of terrorism, for example, it is often the application and use of concepts such as innocent, civilian, legitimate, and state that are being contested, violently. The chapter has not covered the important issue of operationalization, which in terrorism studies is complicated. An individual’s motives, reasons, and objectives, for example, are

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often multiple and mixed, and virtually impossible to observe directly, thus making the study of purposive action extremely challenging.4 Likewise, it is difficult to determine with certainty what social role a person is playing at a certain time and place, and if they are doing so consciously, intentionally, and instrumentally. This renders an actor’s actual group membership uncertain. Also unclear is the degree to which the inhabitants of a population see a government and its security forces as being the legitimate regulators of violence. Finally, as terrorism is a mere tactic, one can question the utility of using the concept to identify actors and organizations. If anyone is capable of employing terrorism, it is just as true that no one is essentially or “only” a terrorist. State officials, for example, regularly employ terrorism abroad, all while seeking to counter it domestically.5 Consequently, social scientists should follow Augustine of Hippo and distinguish the “sinner” from the “sin,” not for moral, ethical, or religious reasons, but because people and conflicts are both far more complex than a narrow focus on terrorism would suggest. Political actors often use several tactics and methods, of which terrorism is just one; and political conflicts are always multidimensional phenomena. Neither actors nor conflicts should be reduced to a single characteristic, i.e., the use of terrorism. Difficulties in operationalization, however, should not lead one to conclude that studying terrorism is impossible or futile. Terrorism is an important ethical, political, and scientific topic. Whether anyone should be protected from political violence and whether these people should be protected at all costs are two serious questions, which cannot be answered without defining terrorism and counter-​terrorism. And the conceptualization of terrorism and counter-​terrorism can be of another use. As this book shows, counter-​terrorism is often pseudo-​counter-​terrorism. It is used as a pretext, hiding ulterior motives, hidden agendas. Formal conceptualizations of terrorism and counter-​terrorism are essential to identifying and critiquing such false pretenses. Finally, devoting time to conceptualization, especially when one uses the analytical method, can lead to the discovery of new cases, the study of understudied phenomena, or simply the examination of familiar topics under a “new light.” Social science should never be limited to conceptualization, but it is always a good place to start.

Notes 1 In fact, the film can be considered artistic non-​state counter-​terrorism. 2 A state that fails to protect civilians from violence and fear of violence often loses legitimacy, if only because of the functions of the modern state is to regulate violence.

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3 Reversely, at various points in modern history one can identify totalitarian states, where anything resembling liberal conceptions of “civil society” is inexistent. 4 An organization’s tactics and goals, on the other hand, are far easier to determine. 5 Currently the officials of the United States, Iran, and Pakistan all do this, i.e., they oppose terrorism on their territories while simultaneously enabling terrorism in other states’ territories. Likewise, non-​state organizations using terrorism often also perform counter-​terrorism, especially when the non-​state organization is involved in a territorial conflict and takes on state-​like responsibilities (Hamas and the FARC might be good examples of this).

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Morgenthau, H. J., Alexander, Y., & Finger, S. M. (1977). Terrorism: Interdisciplinary perspectives. New York: John Jay Press. Müller, J. W. (2006). “An ‘irregularity that cannot be regulated’: Carl Schmitt and the war on terror,” Notizie di Politeia: Rivista di Etica e Scelte Pubbliche, 22. Nathanson, S. (2010). Terrorism and the ethics of war. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Keefe, M. & Coady, C. (2002). Terrorism and justice: Moral argument in a threatened world. Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing. Otis, J. (2018). “In Colombia, artist renders tons of rebel guns into floor tiles,” NPR. www.npr.org/​2018/​11/​06/​663473304/​in-​colombia-​artist-​renders-​tons-​of-​ rebel-​guns-​into-​floor-​tiles?t=1618835662489 Palmer, D. & Whelan, C. (2006). “Counter-​terrorism across the policing continuum,” Police Practice and Research, 7: 449–​465. Pantuliano, K., Mackintosh, K., Elhawary, S., & Metcalfe, V. (2011). “Counter-​ terrorism and humanitarian action: Tensions, impact and ways forward,” HPG Policy Brief. Humanitarian Policy Group. Parkin, J. (2018). “Colombian artist melts guns into tiles to make ‘anti-​monument’ to conflict,” The Guardian, December 10. Porges, M. L. (2010). “Deradicalisation, the Yemeni way,” Survival, 52: 27–​33. Primoratz, I. (1990). “What is terrorism?” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 7: 129–​138. Primoratz, I. (1997). “The morality of terrorism,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 14: 221–​233. Primoratz, I. (2004). Terrorism: The philosophical issues. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Primoratz, I. (2007). “Philosopher looks at contemporary terrorism,” Cardozo Law Review, 29: 33. Primoratz, I. (2015). Terrorism. http://​plato.stanford.edu/​archives/​spr2015/​entries/​ terrorism/​ Rosand, E., Millar, A., & Ipe, J. (2008). Civil society and the UN global counter-​ terrorism strategy: Opportunities and challenges. Washington, DC: The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. Sartori, G., Riggs, F. W., & Teune, H. (1975). Tower of Babel: On the definition and analysis of concepts in the social sciences. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh. Schmid, A. P. (2013). The Routledge handbook of terrorism research. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis. Schmid, A. P. & Jongman, A. J. (2005). Political terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature. Abingdon: Routledge. Schmitt, C. (2008). The concept of the political. Expanded edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Slomp, G. (2009). Carl Schmitt and the politics of hostility, violence and terror. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Strange, S. (1976). “The study of transnational relations,” International Affairs, 52(3): 333–​345. Teves, T. & Teves, C. (2018). No notoriety. https://​nonotoriety.com/​

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Thorup, M. (2010). An intellectual history of terror: War, violence and the state. Abingdon: Routledge. Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press. Weber, M., Owen, D. S., Strong, T. B., & Livingstone, R. (2004). The vocation lectures. Berkeley: Hackett. Werner, W. G. (2010). “The changing face of enmity: Carl Schmitt’s international theory and the evolution of the legal concept of war,” International Theory, 2: 351–​380. Wilkinson, P. (2011). Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state response. Abingdon: Routledge.

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Part II

The cases: civil society and security governance in the Americas

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From Ground Zero: the impact of security policy on civil society in the United States William A. Taylor

Introduction This chapter explores the critical relationship between counter-​terrorism policy and civil society in the United States, which is a contested arena in which counter-​terrorism policy has impacted civil society and vice versa. There exists extensive literature on securitization, which provides the theoretical framework within which this chapter resides (Buzan et al., 1997). This discursive milieu also includes the concept of “macrosecuritisation,” which is a useful framework for analysis of the Global War on Terror (Buzan & Wæver, 2009). Jude Howell explains, “Both the Cold War and the Global War on Terror (GWoT) are examples of overarching macro-​ securitisations that encompass and trump narrower types of securitisation” (Howell, 2014: 152–​153). Moreover, there are widespread sources that examine the nexus between counter-​terrorism policy and civil society organizations (CSOs) around the world (Sidel, 2007, 2010; Howell & Lind, 2009; Howell, 2014). Much of this work highlights how the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, known colloquially as 9/​11, triggered specific responses by the United States as part of a broader global reaction to combat international terrorism. In turn, the resulting counter-​terrorism measures had serious implications for civil society within the United States.

Major security policies the 9/​11 terrorist attacks prompted The terrorist attacks of 9/​11 were a watershed moment, claiming the most victims of a foreign assault on American soil in history. The 9/​11 terrorist attacks prompted substantial alterations in security policy aimed at combating international terrorism. Deflem and McDonough (2015: 70) discerned: [t]‌he terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have dramatically heightened concerns over national security and brought about, in the United States perhaps

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more than anywhere else, a sharp rise in anti-​terrorism laws and related initiatives to build and improve counterterrorism efforts.

Policy-​makers had implemented some measures prior to 9/​11, such as the 1996 Anti-​terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, although these directives paled in comparison to what would follow. A tidal wave of major security policies in the United States followed 9/​11 in short order. On September 24, 2001, US President George W. Bush implemented an executive order on terrorist financing. In the Rose Garden outside the White House, Bush warned, “At 12:01 a.m. this morning, a major thrust of our war on terrorism began with the stroke of a pen. Today, we have launched a strike on the financial foundation of the global terror network” (Bush, 2001: 1). Bush’s executive order highlighted a delicate dichotomy. On the one hand, terrorist organizations had utilized some CSOs to raise funds, so increased scrutiny and reporting requirements addressed this problem. On the other hand, counter-​terrorism measures also adversely impacted other legal charities. Bush argued, “Just to show you how insidious these terrorists are, they oftentimes use nice-​sounding, non-​governmental organizations as fronts for their activities. We have targeted three such NGOs. We intend to deal with them, just like we intend to deal with others who aid and abet terrorist organizations,” inaugurating freezes on CSOs’ bank accounts and injunctions against associating with them (Bush, 2001: 1). Executive Order 13224 became the hallmark security policy linking terrorist financing and civil society. William P. Fuller and Barnett F. Baron perceived, “Although the policy objectives of these measures are widely supported, considerable public debate continues about their possible impact … and their potentially chilling impact on American private philanthropy and development assistance” (Fuller & Baron, 2003: 11). A little more than one month later, the US Congress, on October 26, 2001, passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, innocuously labeling it the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act. This massive modification in security policy transformed investigative tools previously used to combat organized crime and drug trafficking and applied them broadly to counter-​terrorism efforts, including those aimed at terrorist groups and those directed at CSOs. The act eased restrictions on domestic surveillance and linked terrorist activity with material support thereof, an often-​vague range of activities. This was especially problematic regarding CSOs whose fieldwork occurred in conflict-​prone regions because they often operated in areas where militants were also present even if they did not coordinate with them. The terrorist attacks of 9/​ 11 also spurred the largest national security realignment in US history since the National Security Act of 1947.

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On November 25, 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security and established a cabinet-​level secretary to lead it. The new bureaucracy consolidated portions of twenty-​two federal agencies and departments performing various functions related to counter-​terrorism. The organization began operations on March 1, 2003, and quickly grew to more than 240,000 employees. In addition to legislative and bureaucratic changes, 9/​11 also fostered a complete reassessment of US grand strategy. President Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 focused every aspect of the US national security apparatus on counter-​terrorism and removed many of the previous distinctions between it and civil society, thereby seriously restricting the available space for CSOs in the United States. Andrew S. Natsios, administrator of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) at that time, reiterated the profound impact of the NSS on development. Natsios remarked, “Opening up the developing world to economic opportunity and expanding the ranks of democratic states are now vital to our own national security. These are the goals of what future generations might call the Bush Doctrine, and they are now central to the mission of USAID” (Natsios, 2006: 132). The Bush Doctrine argued poor governance, fragile states, and extreme poverty undergirded terrorism and therefore envisioned development as a viable counter-​terrorism measure. To reinforce his approach, Bush visited Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002 and announced a heightened focus on development, planning to increase it by 50 percent no later than 2006; he also made such expanded aid provisional on economic, legal, and political reforms in recipient countries (Hughes, 2002: 21). The results were dramatic: US overseas development assistance rose from US$10 billion in 2000 to US$25.5 billion in 2005 (Natsios, 2006: 136). Therefore, a stark contrast emerged. After 9/​11, CSOs encountered restrictions domestically in the United States while simultaneously experiencing greatly expanded roles globally in terms of international aid and economic development. Counter-​ terrorism policy reverberated into the finance sector. In November 2002, the US Treasury Department promulgated its Anti-​ Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-​ Based Charities. Around the same time, President Bush implemented a secret surveillance program run by the National Security Agency (NSA), known as the NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program (Deflem, 2010). In 2004, the United States created the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which also altered the relationship between the state and civil society. In addition to the security policies themselves, these major changes created ripple effects constraining civil society in far-​reaching ways. Howell (2010: 20) expounded, “These included first-​order measures aimed specifically at suspected terrorists …

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and second-​order measures that are built into other policies such as official aid assistance, refugee and asylum practices, education, and community-​ engagement initiatives.”

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How policy adjustments have fundamentally altered civil society within the United States These resulting security policy adjustments fundamentally altered civil society within the United States by shifting the social contract and privileging security over liberty. A group of radical Islamist terrorists inspired, trained, and financed by al-​Qaeda had perpetrated the terrorist attacks of 9/​11. In response, US policy-​makers identified international terrorism as the number one threat to the United States. President Bush cautioned, “Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us. To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal –​military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing” (Bush, 2002: i). This focus resulted in security policy alterations, which in turn produced a palpable shift in public discourse. Bail (2012: 855) observed, “Although most organizations deployed pro-​Muslim discourses after the September 11th attacks … anti-​Muslim fringe organizations dominated the mass media via displays of fear and anger.” Within this milieu of elevated angst regarding terrorism, there was an essential difference in the relationship between security policy and CSOs after 9/​11. Overall, counter-​terrorism measures restricted civil society and regulated the space within which civil society could operate. Such a trend was not unique to the United States. The International Center for Not-​for-​ Profit Law (ICNL) revealed from 2004 to 2010 more than fifty countries attempted to restrict CSOs largely based on newly implemented counter-​ terrorism policies. Rutzen (2015: 29–​ 30), president and chief executive officer of ICNL, explained: Two models emerged in these countries: In some, CSOs were given latitude to operate, provided that they stayed away from politics. In others, the government sought to coopt CSOs and to shut down groups that resisted, particularly those that received international funding.

This worldwide trend evidenced itself within the United States, revealing far-​reaching implications for the relations between the state and civil society in the United States. One of the most visible changes in civil society in response to counter-​ terrorism measures in the United States was the federal government’s

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explicit linkage of defense, diplomacy, and development, also known as the 3Ds. The United States formally combined these three previously disparate concepts and made their new collective identity the bedrock of not only counter-​terrorism but also US foreign policy more generally. For example, the federal government argued the 3Ds “are the three pillars that provide the foundation for promoting and protecting U.S. national security interests abroad” (US Department of State et al., 2012: 4). Fowler and Sen (2010: 1) clarified, “The global war on terror was used by the Bush administration and its allies to defend a US dominated geopolitical configuration. To this end, counter-​terrorism measures … were introduced which strengthened the alignment of development aid with diplomacy and defence.” When analyzed over time, USAID increasingly has aligned with the Department of Defense and the Department of State since 9/​11 (Moss et al., 2005). Such a momentous transformation not only emanated from Washington, DC, but also appeared in the field in the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The US government introduced PRTs in the aftermath of 9/​ 11. These units included military officers and civilians, often diplomats and development experts, thereby linking military forces with non-​ governmental organizations (NGOs) in the most visible and tangible manifestation of the 3Ds. PRTs sought to bolster local governance, often in weak and fragile states. Andrew S. Natsios, administrator of USAID from May 2001 to January 2006, articulated, “It is a moment of historic realignment in the national security structure of the federal government, including USAID, where changes have been dramatic, both in funding levels and in internal restructuring” (Natsios, 2006: 132). Other connections transpired. USAID created Anti-​Terrorism Certificates and the Partner Vetting System, both controversial because they placed the onus on CSOs to certify and vet every individual and organization they associated with. Many observers criticized this requirement based on feasibility questions, privacy grounds, and increased costs. Some large foundations, including the Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation, followed these governmental changes in some form, thereby further impacting CSOs pursuing and receiving private grants. In addition to the federal government linking development with defense and diplomacy, counter-​ terrorism policy had ripple effects because the nature of development in the United States had shifted dramatically. During the 1970s, the vast majority of development support was governmental. By 2005, however, more than three-​quarters of development funding was characterized as non-​governmental, much of it provided by not-​for-​profits (Natsios, 2006: 133). Sidel (2010: 298) elucidated, “The Guidelines carried the risk that legitimate and well-​meaning charities would struggle to comply with standards while less professional or less well-​meaning groups might just ignore them.” In addition, aid shifted dramatically toward weak

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and fragile states because of the heightened nexus between development and defense in the aftermath of 9/​11. Jude Howell remarked, “While in the 1990s ‘good governance’ was the guiding principle for allocating aid, in the last decade bilateral donors have increasingly focused attention and resources on ‘fragile states’ in order to preserve both global and national security” (Howell, 2010: 20–​21). As a result, the emphasis shifted from good to poor governance. Such considerable alterations had major insinuations for CSOs in the United States, especially NGOs. Jude Howell perceived, “After the launch of President Bush’s War on Terror, US and allied governments shifted their approach to development NGOs from one of enthusiastically courting them as co-​producers of development and security to an approach that cast greater suspicion on their activities” (Howell, 2014: 151). In their comprehensive analysis of the impact of counter-​terrorism policy on international NGOs, Alan Fowler and Kasturi Sen demonstrated, “Whilst NGOs have varied experiences of state approaches to combatting terror, they have been uniformly affected by the uncertainties and burdens that accompany most counter-​ terror measures,” including more stringent compliance requirements and increased expenses (Fowler & Sen, 2010: 1). Counter-​terrorism measures disproportionately confined Muslim organizations within the United States. US security policy targeted dozens of charities, most of them Muslim, in the aftershock of 9/​11, resulting in extensive investigations, asset seizures, forced closures, and some convictions, revealing that Islamist terrorists had manipulated certain charities to solicit resources in the United States and that counter-​terrorism measures (CTMs) to interrupt these pursuits were not automatically targeted at Muslim charities as a whole. The most publicized case was that of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development based in Richardson, Texas, which was the largest Muslim charity in the United States. The US government based this action on its claim that the foundation provided material support to Hamas, a group that the US State Department had labeled in 1997 as a terrorist organization (US Department of State, 1997). President Bush terminated the organization in December 2001 and three years later, John Ashcroft, US attorney general, used the Patriot Act to indict the foundation on forty-​two counts. Ashcroft contended, “There is no distinction between those who carry out terrorist attacks and those who knowingly finance terrorist attacks.” MacFarquhar (2007: A14) reported, “The case is being closely watched by a large number of charitable organizations, as well as Muslim-​Americans, because its outcome might well help determine the line separating legitimate giving from the financing of banned organizations.” Although originally slated for October 2004, numerous delays resulted in the trial lasting from 2006 to 2007. A federal judge declared, on October

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22, 2007, a mistrial on all 197 counts in the case. Leslie Eaton observed, “In the verdict, the jury said it failed to reach a decision on any of the charges against the charity” (Eaton, 2007: A1, A22). Much of the indictment revolved around the concept of zakat, meaning charity in Arabic, which is a central aspect of Islam; zakat committees routinely provide social services. The challenge, of course, became not the charities themselves but rather how they used the funds collected. Some supported militants with them, whereas most simply helped those in need. In addition, definitional morass made ascertaining whether recipients were extremists or not rather challenging and made prosecuting such actions quite problematic. As a result, determining where the boundary rested between benevolent social services and material support of a terrorist organization became the crux of this lawsuit and illustrated broader tensions between security policy and civil society in the United States. A little more than one year later, federal prosecutors secured “sweeping convictions” on all 108 counts against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development and its senior leadership. Kovach (2008: A16) reported, “The jury, which deliberated for eight days, reached a starkly different result than the jury in the first trial, which ended in a mistrial.” Khalil Meek, spokesman for the foundation, lamented, “This jury found that humanitarian aid is a crime.” The verdict and the sweeping pronouncement made in its wake stunned many Muslim charities. Goodstein (2008: A23) recounted: Part of the reason for the silence from Muslim leaders on Tuesday, some of them said, is that the government publicly named more than 300 individuals and American Muslim organizations as “unindicted co-​conspirators,” without allowing them to hear the evidence against them or defend themselves in court.

The 2008 US presidential election brought Barack Obama to power and his inauguration on January 20, 2009 ushered in the Obama administration, which wanted to pivot from the Bush administration’s approach related to counter-​terrorism and civil society. Most notably, Obama advocated for ending torture and closing Guantanamo, although his rhetoric distanced himself more from Bush in theory than his policies did so in practice. Little changed regarding the link between counter-​terrorism measures and civil society. US Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton reinforced this continuity with the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, which formalized the 3Ds throughout the whole of government by applying a Department of Defense process (the Quadrennial Defense Review) to diplomacy and development, thereby cementing the 3Ds into one unified whole. Clinton (2010: i) contended, “we will build up our civilian power: the combined force of civilians working together across the U.S. government to practice diplomacy, carry out development projects, and prevent and

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respond to crises.” Most visibly, Obama continued to deploy provincial reconstruction teams as a potent reminder of the militarization of development (Perito, 2007). In his second national security strategy in 2015, Obama concentrated on countering violent extremism (CVE) and placed it among his administration’s highest priorities. In doing so, he envisioned a broad range of counter-​terrorism measures aimed at local community engagement, including such diverse efforts as counseling services and Twitter campaigns. The Department of Homeland Security budgeted US$10 million toward CVE that would fund CSOs. Obama distanced his administration from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan but did so “while preserving and strengthening important tools that have been developed since 9/​11” (Obama, 2015: i, 9–​10). There were two general definitions of CVE. Aziz (2017: 258) revealed: The first definition is effectively the soft-​arm of counterterrorism that supplements anti-​terrorism surveillance, prosecution, and convictions. The second definition treats CVE as separate, though complementary, to counterterrorism insofar as it is more focused on providing long-​term social services.

The Obama administration pursued the first approach and contended, “family members, friends, or close acquaintances are the most likely to observe activities or behaviors suggesting an individual is being radicalized or has violent intent” (Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2016: 11). Many contemporary observers regretted the ironic consistency between the two administrations vis-​à-​vis counter-​terrorism policy and civil society. Brechenmacher and Feldstein (2017: 65) observed, “[y]‌et the CVE agenda brought varying results. Domestically, some civil-​rights groups criticized the CVE agenda for unfairly stigmatizing American Muslim communities.” Even so, many NGOs sought an augmented role, and the requisite funding, to expand their CVE efforts.

Responses of civil society organizations to state counter-​terrorism policies CSOs have replied to state counter-​terrorism policy in myriad ways. Jude Howell clarified, “State attempts to restrict development NGOs have evoked a spectrum of responses, ranging from ready compliance to outright resistance that has led to only partial success in securitizing development NGOs” (Howell, 2014: 151). In the United States, there was some opposition from both American society and from CSOs. In terms of American society, the more time that passed after 9/​11, the less inclined it was to tolerate unfettered counter-​terrorism policy and its associated effects on civil

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society. Deflem and McDonough (2015: 77) demonstrated that, “along with a dwindling fear of terrorism since 9/​11, data show that Americans express considerable concerns over counterterrorism measures and are less willing to accept such measures in the name of the fight against terrorism” and based their conclusions on extensive study, revealing that public support for CTMs that might violate civil liberties had fallen from 47 percent in January 2002 to only 25 percent by 2011. There also have been individual challenges to CTMs based on their impact on civil society. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) brought a case against the Patriot Act for its use of national security letters, which were administrative subpoenas related to national security issued by the US government. The ACLU argued they were unconstitutional. Judge Victor Marrero of the Federal District Court of Manhattan agreed, explaining that in spite of “an atmospheric pressure, a heavy weight that, foglike, has loomed densely” over the case due to 9/​11 and thereby gave impetus for the government’s expanded CTMs, he sought “the most sensitive judicial balance” between security policy and civil society (Preston, 2004: A26). The rejoinders from CSOs, however, have been uneven. There has been some forbearance against anti-​terrorism certificates and a heightened awareness of the vulnerability of aid workers in the field due to the blurring of lines between defense and development, thereby lessening the distinctions between military and civilian personnel. There also have been some auspicious victories. In January 2004, CSOs won an important triumph when Judge Audrey B. Collins of the Federal District Court of Los Angeles overruled provisions of the Patriot Act dealing with material support, arguing the prohibitions were overly ambiguous, lacked clarity, and were “impermissibly vague” (Lichtblau, 2004: A16). Partly in response to such criticisms, the United States revised the act in 2006. Even so, reactions have varied. Sidel (2010: 293) observed that those groups most targeted by security policy, predominately Muslim charities and civil liberties advocates, “have openly resisted these measures, while mainstream non-​profit sector and philanthropic institutions have often acquiesced in the introduction of new policies, ‘guidelines’ and legislation, opposing them only when they felt directly threatened.” Opposition to US CTMs has come at a cost, however, including limited access to funding, shifting the risk of certification and vetting from the government to civil society, or characterizing a CSO’s mission from social services toward a politicized context. Many efforts to structure ripostes from civil society have been useful. In 2008, an association of interested parties and CSOs established the Charity and Security Network to analyze the relationship between counter-​terrorism policies and civil society and chart a path forward. Since then, the group has focused on research, education, coalition building, and advocacy, publishing studies on financial

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access for CSOs in the United States and testifying in hearings on freedoms of assemble and association held by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.

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Conclusion The impact of counter-​terrorism policy on civil society continues to grow around the world. Ben Emmerson, UN special rapporteur for human rights and counter-​ terrorism, commented on October 26, 2015, “In the past three years, this ideological pandemic has started to spread. More than 60 states have proposed or passed laws during that time restricting freedom of assembly, or prohibiting the foreign funding and activities of civil society organizations” (Plachta, 2016: 149). Even in its most benign form, such expansions negatively impact civil society. The Charity and Security Network warned, “Increasingly, their work is undermined by counterterror bureaucracies imposing unnecessary restrictions on operations” (Charity and Security Network, 2016: 1). In addition, there also have been supranational developments yielding wide-​ranging consequences. The Financial Action Task Force is a multinational organization focused on combating terrorist financing, along with money laundering and proliferation funding. Its Recommendation 8 (R8) stated, “[n]‌on-​profit organizations are particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused” (Global Non-​Profit Coalition on Financial Action Task Force, 2015: 1). This move has proven controversial, resulting in revision to R8 in 2016, which sought to move away from the previous concept that non-​profits were “particularly vulnerable” to involvement with terrorist financing (Financial Action Task Force, 2016: 1). Overall, civil society within the United States changed after 9/​ 11 in response to security policy in numerous, important, and sometimes worrisome ways. In the wake of 9/​11, counter-​terrorism measures dominated social discourse and to a large extent reigned supreme. The space within which the state and civil society had previously collocated became indelibly constricted, with the state vastly expanding its dominance and civil society reeling under the pressure of extensive, powerful, and often intrusive security policy. The fundamental realignment of US national security around counter-​terrorism in emphasis, bureaucracy, and funding impacted nearly every aspect of American society. In the intervening years, CSOs pushed back, albeit intermittently and inconsistently, regaining their agency and recovering some lost ground. While counter-​terrorism policy still wields more power than civil society within the United States, there has been some equilibrium reached in the two decades after 9/​11.

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The future of state–​civil society relations within the United States is uncertain. The administration of US President Donald J. Trump favored counter-​ terrorism policy over civil society, thereby reversing some of the parity reached previously. In January 2017, Trump quickly shifted the emphasis of CVE from violent extremism to Islamic extremism and thereafter cut its funding and minimized community engagement, choosing instead to emphasize law enforcement. Salam al-​Marayati, president of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, objected, “Community-​led initiatives that were the centerpiece of this grant process are being deleted and rendered obsolete by the [Trump] administration” (Powers, 2017: 8). This is especially true with his stringent policies on immigration and his strengthened associations between terrorism and weak and fragile states, particularly Muslim countries. In response, there has been a steep increase in interest in CSOs and their related activities. Membership in the ACLU surged more than 375 percent in the first four months of the Trump administration, spiking from 425,000 to 1.6 million (Segal, 2018: 1582). In October 2018, Trump unveiled a new counter-​terrorism strategy, arguing that it “marks a shift in America’s approach to countering and preventing terrorism,” including a heightened role for civil society (Trump, 2018: 21–​22, 25). The many connections previously discussed have remained quite resilient. Saskia Brechenmacher and Steven Feldstein (2017: 58) cautioned, “Not only has the threat of terrorism persisted, but it is escalating and intensifying in dangerous ways.” They continued, “Likewise, Trump should invest in the development capabilities of USAID, multilateral institutions and civil-​ society partners, all of which are critical to sustaining long-​term rebuilding efforts in fragile areas … Whether he chooses to take heed is another matter” (Brechenmacher & Feldstein, 2017: 59). Indeed. The choices the Trump administration makes vis-​à-​vis counter-​terrorism policy and civil society will shape the relationship between these two vital aspects of American society for years to come.

References Aziz, S. F. (2017). “Losing the ‘war of ideas’: A critique of countering violent extremism programs,” Texas International Law Journal, 52(2): 255–​279. Bail, C. A. (2012). “The fringe effect: Civil society organizations and the evolution of media discourse about Islam since the September 11th attacks,” American Sociological Review, 77(6): 855–​879. Brechenmacher, S. & Feldstein, S. (2017). “Trump’s war on terror,” National Interest, 152: 58–​68.

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Bush, G. W. (2001, September 24). “President freezes terrorists’ assets: Remarks on executive order,” 1–​3. https://​2001–​2009.state.gov/​s/​ct/​rls/​rm/​2001/​5041.htm Bush, G. W. (2002). The national security strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Buzan, B. & Wæver, O. (2009). “Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: Reconsidering scale in securitization theory,” Review of International Studies, 35(2): 253–​276. Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1997). Security: A new framework for analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Charity and Security Network. (2016). “Barriers to cross border nonprofit operations and the role of the Financial Action Task Force,” Issue Brief, 1–​2. www. charityandsecurity.org/​system/​files/​FATF%20Issue%20Brief%20AUG2016.pdf Clinton, H. R. (2010). “Leading through civilian power: The first quadrennial diplomacy and development review,” US Department of State and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). https://​2009-​2017.state.gov/​ documents/​organization/​153139.pdf Deflem, M. (2010). The policing of terrorism: Organizational and global perspectives. New York: Routledge. Deflem, M. & McDonough, S. (2015). “The fear of counterterrorism: Surveillance and civil liberties since 9/​11,” Society, 52(1): 70–​79. Eaton, L. (2007, October 23). “U.S. prosecution of Muslim group ends in mistrial,” New York Times, A1. Executive Office of the President of the United States. (2016). Strategic implementation plan for empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Financial Action Task Force. (2016, April 22). “Public consultation on the revision of Recommendation 8 (non-​profit organisations),” 1. www.fatf-​gafi.org/​publications/ ​fatfrecommendations/​documents/​public-​consultation-​npo-​r8.html Fowler, A. & Sen, K. (2010). “Embedding the war on terror: State and civil society relations,” Development and Change, 41(1): 1–​27. Fuller, W. P. & Baron, B. F. (2003, July 29). “How the war on terror hits charity,” Christian Science Monitor, 11. Global Non-​Profit Coalition on Financial Action Task Force. (2015, October 8). “Outdated text in FATF R8 and its interpretive note,” 1–​11. http://​fatfplatform. org/ ​ w p- ​ c ontent/​ u ploads/​ 2 015/​ 1 0/​ O utdated- ​ Text- ​ i n- ​ FATF- ​ R 8- ​ a nd- ​ i ts-​ Interpretive-​Note_​final-​draft.pdf Goodstein, L. (2008, November 26). “U.S. Muslims taken aback by a charity’s conviction,” New York Times, A23. Howell, J. (2014). “The securitisation of NGOs post-​9/​11,” Conflict, Security & Development, 14(2): 151–​179. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2009). Counter-​terrorism, aid and civil society: Before and after the war on terror. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2010). “Securing the world and challenging civil society: Before and after the ‘war on terror’,” Development and Change, 41(2): 279–​291. Hughes, J. (2002, March 27). “War against terror needs more than guns,” Christian Science Monitor, 21.

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Kovach, G. C. (2008, November 25). “U.S. wins convictions in retrial of terrorism-​ financing case,” New York Times, A16. Lichtblau, E. (2004, January 27). “Citing free speech, judge voids part of antiterror act,” New York Times, A16. MacFarquhar, N. (2007, July 17). “As Muslim group goes on trial, other charities watch warily,” New York Times, A14. Moss, T., Roodman, D., & Standley, S. (2005). “The global war on terror and U.S. development assistance: USAID allocation by country, 1998–​2005,” Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 62, 1–​19. Natsios, A. S. (2006). “Five debates on international development: The US perspective,” Development Policy Review, 24(2): 131–​139. Obama, B. H. (2015). National security strategy. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Perito, R. M. (2007). The US experience with provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congressional Testimony. U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC. www.usip.org/​publications/​2007/​10/​us-​experience-​provincial-​ reconstruction-​teams-​iraq-​and-​afghanistan Plachta, M. (2016). “UN special rapporteur releases report on the impact of counter-​ terrorism policy on human rights and civil society,” International Enforcement Law Reporter, 32(4): 148–​151. Powers, B. (2017). “Losing hearts and minds: How Trump quietly gutted a program to combat homegrown extremists,” New Republic, 248(10): 8–​10. Preston, J. (2004, September 30). “Judge strikes down section of Patriot Act allowing secret subpoenas of internet data,” New York Times, A26. Rutzen, D. (2015). “Civil society under assault,” Journal of Democracy, 26(4): 28–​39. Segal, M. R. (2018). “America’s conscience: The rise of civil society groups under President Trump,” UCLA Law Review, 65(6): 1574–​1589. Sidel, M. (2007). More secure, less free? Anti-​terrorism policy and civil liberties after September 11. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Sidel, M. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the regulation of civil society in the USA,” Development and Change, 41(2): 293–​312. Trump, D. J. (2018). National strategy for counterterrorism of the United States of America. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. US Department of State. (1997). “Designation of foreign terrorist organizations,” Federal Register, 62(195): 52650–​52651. www.gpo.gov/​fdsys/​pkg/​FR-​1997–​10–​ 08/​pdf/​97–​27030.pdf US Department of State, US Agency for International Development, and US Department of Defense. (2012). 3D planning guide: Diplomacy, development, defense. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

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Canada’s counter-​terrorism measures: implications for human security, civil society, and charities Kawser Ahmed and Scott N. Romaniuk Introduction In 2004, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin released a policy statement on national security titled, “Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy” (Government of Canada, 2004). Davies (2016) categorized it as more of a policy framework than a strategy document, nonetheless, he observed that subsequent national security policies, in fact, were built upon it. Within Canada’s national security governance, the body providing central decision-​making on national security issue and in emergencies is called the Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergency Preparedness (SPHEP). Among the Ministers, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) looks after the core functions of public safety, security and intelligence, policing and enforcement, corrections and crime prevention, border services, immigration enforcement, and emergency management (Bearne et al., 2005). Since October 2004, the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) is functioning to enable information-​ sharing and integrated intelligence analysis (Bearne et al., 2005: 6). Unlike the Charity Regulatory Commission in the UK, Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) is the lead government organization monitoring charitable organizations1 and there are guidelines about “giving” and charities are expected to follow the rules (Blumberg, 2018).2 However, part six of the Anti-​Terrorism Act details how Canadian charities are governed, which includes the Charities Registration (Security Information) Act. According to this act, the government can revoke the charitable status of a charity: on the grounds that the charity has or will support a terrorist activity … [it] allows the government to deny the application of a new charity (sec 4) … [if deemed necessary] the deregistration process is initiated with the issuance of a security certificate against the charity, the consequences of which can go beyond the negative impact of loss of charitable status (sec. 5). (Kari, 2018: 12)

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This chapter is organized into three segments based on the key terrorist events that influenced Canada to adopt various counter-​terrorism measures (CTMs) that affected human security and charitable organizations operations. When identifying key events, two essential criteria are kept in mind: an event which has local-​global implications and which prompted lawmakers to adopt counter-​terrorism legislation. Following such criteria, the 9/​11 attack on the World Trade Center in the United States, and the first-​reported Canadian foreign fighter who traveled to Pakistan in 2010 are chosen as a baseline of the phases. Data were gathered from several sources: parliamentary debate proceedings in the House of Commons, media reports, government documents, survey results, and social media sites. The following sections contain a number of cases exemplifying vulnerability regarding human security, Canadian evolving anti-​terrorism bills, and its overall impacts on charities and not-​for-​profit organizations.

The “rapid engagement” phase (2001–​2010) –​9/​11 and beyond 9/​11 was the watershed moment not only for Canada but also for the rest of the world for two reasons: the event marked the dawn of the era of Islamic/​ Jihadi terrorism through global-​ local solidarity and the United States’ launch of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) targeting Muslims and Islamic organizations disproportionately. Canada, as the United States’ closest ally and neighbor, quickly reacted to the event by enacting counter-​terrorism policy resulting in the employment of a variety of CTMs. Since 2001, up until 2006, the Liberal Party was at the helm at the federal level and the Conservative Party assumed power from 2006 until 2015. A number of bills were introduced in the House of Commons and were approved to address the situation. The first one was Bill C-​36, the Anti-​ Terrorism Act, which was introduced on October 15, 2001, by Honourable Justice Minister Anne McLellan (Cotler, 2007). One observer poignantly noted the following: “it was drafted and studied under considerable time constraints and political pressures. Perhaps most significantly, it proposed changes touching on some our deepest societal values and most profound philosophical ideas –​individual human rights, racial and religious inclusion, national security, and liberty of the person” (Mazer, 2003: 21). Three years after the passing of the bill, the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) explored the impacts of the bill and noted the following: repeal of Criminal Code section 25.1 and related sections regarding unregulated policing practices; the perils of intelligence gathering violating individuals rights and freedoms; the danger of information sharing between Canada and other countries; absence of a robust oversight mechanism to avoid abuse of power; amendment of

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the Non-​Disclosure of Information –​Canada Evidence Act, section 38.04 to allow open proceedings; Terrorist Financing Offences relating to terrorist financing (Criminal Code sections 83.02, 83.03 and 83.04) were “broad and uncertain in scope”; and charitable activities might be susceptible to “criminal charges for facilitating ‘terrorist activities,’ ‘de-​registration,’ and surveillance of its financial activities” (CBA, 2005: v–​viii). However, the CBA opined, “the greatest impact of the Anti-​terrorism Act may not be its direct application, but rather its indirect impact in creating fear of the ‘shadow of the law’, even if the Act is never enforced against a charity” (CBA, 2005: v–​viii). Following on from the foundational legislation, Bill C-​25 was introduced in the legislature to increase the monitoring and oversight of the charitable organizations in Canada; it received Royal Assent on December 14, 2006 (Parliament of Canada, 2006). This bill added a number of reporting authorities in order to fund disbursement including reporting to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC). More specifically, according to the bill, charities were expected to furnish “designated information” such as “the name, address, electronic mail address and telephone number of each partner, director or officer” of the charity and “any other similar identifying information.” Additionally, the Proceeds of Crime Act in this bill referred to pertinent information, which could be retained for up to five years, as “designated information.” This information could be shared with both foreign and domestic government agencies (Carter, & Agent, 2008: 26). Observers argued this bill had a “negative effect” on Canadian charities. For example, following the enactment of Charities Registration (Security Information) Act and “the very broad wording of the Act and the broad powers afforded to the government render Islamic charities and their employees vulnerable to criminal prosecution for unwittingly providing support to organizations that on their face are not identified by any government as having links to terrorism” (Claridge & Carter 2012: 7, cited in Kari, 2018: 12). Additionally, other scholars posited that CTMs (particularly the anti-​ terrorism legislation) are complex and charities might unwittingly get into trouble and could be alleged to be violating Criminal Code Offences (such as section 83.02–​4, 8, 18, and 21) and also because “the coordination of several federal Acts and the lack of evidence to date concerning how the legislation may be implemented because of its relative novelty and the fact that much of the enforcement of these Acts is and will be conducted in secrecy” (Carter, & Agent, 2008: 19). In terms of human security, one scholar found that CTMs provide two distinct powers to law enforcers: “powers of legislative hearing and preventative arrest” (Jacoby, 2004: 74). Although such power is necessary to

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apprehend terrorists, a cursory glance over a number of cases suggests that such an approach also strained relations between law enforcers and ethnic groups, most notably, Arabs and Muslims, who arguably found themselves targeted and discriminated against by the government tasked with ensuring their safety as legitimate members of Canadian society. Maher Arar, a dual Canadian and Syrian citizen, is a notable case. While traveling through the United States, its law enforcement agencies detained and deported him to Jordan alleging he was a member of al-​Qaeda. This is termed as “extraordinary rendition.” Arar eventually found himself in Syria, where he was imprisoned for a year, and subjected to torture (Abu-​Laban & Nath, 2007). Responding to Canada’s public demand, he was returned in 2003, and a fact-​ finding commission was established to establish how intelligence-​sharing went awry, causing irreparable damage to an innocent person. Moreover, the incident raised serious concern about the intentions of Canadian intelligence and partnership with the United States, and the possible repercussions of being Muslim in Canadian and US society post-​9/​11. The commission published its report in 2006, which exonerated Arar of terrorism charges, and in 2007 Prime Minister Stephen Harper extended an official apology and compensated Arar CAD$11.5 million (Amnesty International, 2017). Nonetheless, scholars observed that this case brought to light the impact of CTM in Canada by displaying a dualism, “The first dualism spins around Arar’s status as a Syrian citizen (‘foreigner’) and his status as a Canadian citizen and full member of Canada’s immigrant-​receiving and multicultural polity. The second dualism spins around a tension between the force of law (where coercive power allows for an environment in which anything is possible) and the rule of law (where the Canadian government’s commitment to human rights both nationally and domestically limits the force, or at least legitimacy, of repression)” (Abu-​Laban & Nath, 2007: 3). Among the lesser-known cases are those related to Abdullah Almalki (a Canadian engineer who was imprisoned in May 2002), Ahmad Abou-​Elmaati (a dual Canadian-​Egyptian citizen imprisoned in November 2001), and Ahmad Abou-​Elmaati (a dual Canadian-​Egyptian citizen imprisoned in December 2003), who traveled to Syria. An internal inquiry concluded that “information sharing” between the Canadian and the US agencies caused their suffering (Iacobucci, 2008). Another remarkable case was that of Mohamed Harkat. He came from Algeria and received refugee status in 1997 (Jacoby, 2004: 74). Since December 10, 2002, Harkat had been held under a Security Certificate following Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) accusations against him that he was a “sleeper.” According to CSIS, he admitted his ties with the Front islamique du salut and its military wing –​Groupe islamique arme, which committed civilian massacres in Algeria (CBC, 2002). Although

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Harkat claimed his innocence, he was locked up for three years and was released in 2006 under stringent conditions. On November 16, 2017, he appeared before the Supreme Court of Canada appealing for a relaxation of his terms (Bronskill, 2017). The other important impact of Canada’s CTMs is the relationship of the government with Muslim civil society organizations (CSOs) in Canada. The prime example is the former Canadian Council on American-​Islamic Relations (CAIR-​CAN), rebranded as the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) or the Conseil National des Musulmans Canadiens (CNMC) on July 6, 2013,3 which was touted as a “bridge builder” and a “moderate player” (Collacott, 2006: 74). The relationship came under heavy criticism because CAIR-​CAN was related to a US-​based CSO named Council on American-​Islamic relations (CAIR), which was implicated in a lawsuit by the family of a former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counter-​terrorism official killed in the 9/​11 attacks. It alleged that both the organizations “aided, abetted, and materially sponsored terrorism” (Collacott, 2006: 74). Global Philanthropy estimated that about sixty-​five cases were in the Federal Court of Appeal with charities challenging Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) revocations (or refusal to register a charity).4 In light of this, the Ontario-​ based Muslim charity named International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy (IRFAN-​Canada) drew lots of public attention in 2008. In 2007, several US prosecutors alleged that IRFAN-​Canada had financial links to the largest US-​based Islamic charity Holy Land Foundation (HLF) and Hamas (Kari, 2018). It prompted CRA to investigate this organization (Ridley, 2012: 88). As a result, in 2011, CRA stripped IRFAN-​Canada of its charitable status “for failure to maintain adequate records and accounts” (Bell, 2008),5 although scholars observed that the connection between IRFAN-​Canada to Hamas “were long and tortuous, and through several CSOs based in Gaza” (Ridley, 2012: 88). Meaning, “the way in which HLF routed funds to IRFAN-​Canada, which were then transferred on to a UK CSO/​charity that then sent the funds onwards to Hamas. Hamas would then link Gaza CSOs to these funds as part of multiple fund transfers to many relief organizations in Gaza and Palestine” (Ridley, 2012: 89). Nevertheless, IRFAN-​Canada was added to the list of terrorist organizations maintained under the Canadian Criminal Code in 2014 and it appealed to remove its name from the terrorist list in 2017 (see Blumberg, 2018; Government of Canada, 2014; Parry, 2014). In exemplifying the phenomenon of “long and tortuous” connection, the 2009 Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s decision in R v. Ahmad, is worth looking into.6 This charity provided funds for humanitarian activities in Gaza yet the Canadian government “argued that by providing funding for humanitarian activities

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in Gaza, the Canada-​based charity was providing Hamas (a designated terrorist entity) the means to spend the money of Canadian donors,” which literally blurred the line between legitimate contributions and illegitimate ones (Kari, 2018: 16). Similarly, the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA Canada) received deregistration of its charitable status on September 21, 2013 (CRA, 2013; Jeffords, 2013, both cited in Kari, 2018). CRA alleged it “had entered into a funding arrangement with the Kashmiri Canadian Council/​ Kashmiri Relief Fund of Canada (KCC/​KRFC), non-​qualified donors under the Act, with the ultimate goal of sending the raised funds to a Pakistan-​based non-​ governmental organization named the Relief Organization for Kashmir Muslims (ROKM) without maintaining direction and control” (Kari, 2018: 16). In both the above-​mentioned cases, it is evident that Muslim charities are under heavy scrutiny and CRA does not permit “charity defence.” Thus, such an environment perpetuates a “climate of fear” and a “burden of suspicion” hangs heavily, discouraging donors from giving. Recently, the Toronto Sun reported that the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC) received government grants to fund activities for its various chapters across Ontario despite the fact that RCMP had searched its headquarters in 2015 to investigate its link with IRFAN-​Canada (Malcolm, 2018). Its 113-​page warrant mentioned, “ties between MAC and IRFAN-​Canada, and alleges both terrorist financing and that financial transaction took place at a MAC mosque in Montreal” (Malcolm, 2018). While comparing the Canadian government’s differential responses to charity regulations in the above-​mentioned phases, two trends stand out. First, US prosecution of charities in its own country and the existing information-​ sharing regime influenced many Canadian government responses related to charity control. Second, Islamic extremism and its finances are treated as a global problem in general directly threatening US national security interests, whereas Sikh militancy and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) charities have aspired towards a “home-​cause” (i.e., achieving self-​determination). Thus, Collacott (2006: 69) poignantly noted, “while concern over the threat from Islamic terrorists is justified, they and their sympathizers form only a small minority of Muslims in Canada and the United States.”

The “global-​local engagement” phase (2010–​present): foreign fighters, lone wolves, and the ISIS effect In Canada, the Conservative Party ruled until October 2015 and the Liberal Party assumed the helm of power in December the same year. While the

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former introduced Bill C-​51, the Anti-​Terrorism Act, 2015,7 in the fall of 2014, the Liberal Party agreed to most of it while the New Democrat Party (NDP) and the Green Party both decried the Bill. However, during this phase, another important proposition was made by the Conservative government to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (also known as the Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act). Both of these have a significant impact in public life as well as charity sectors. Thus, when Bill C-​51 was presented in parliament, an opposition NDP MP described it as the “most significant piece of legislation to come before the House … touching on the two most important topics that we ever deal with in this chamber: national security and our civil liberties.”8 This phase is punctuated by several lone-​ wolf terrorist attacks, a high-​profile Canadian parliament attack, a right-​ wing extremist attack on a mosque, and a number of Canadians joining ISIS in Syria and other terrorist groups in Algeria, Russia, and Pakistan.9 In 2011, an Ipsos Reid survey reported that six out of ten (58 percent) Canadians were more worried about a terrorist attack on Canada at that period than before 9/​11 (Wright, 2011). Overall, three-​quarters (74 percent) of Canadians believed that the government’s response had been “appropriate”; a majority (62 percent) “agree” (10 percent strongly; 52 percent somewhat) that they “trust the Canadian government to keep us safe from terrorist attacks,” while a minority (38 percent) “disagrees” (9 percent strongly; 29 percent somewhat) (Ipsos, 2011). Another survey, which was carried out in 2015 by Pollara Strategic Insights for CBC, suggested that close to 50 percent of Canadians felt less safe from terrorist acts than they did two years ago and two-​thirds said it was likely that an attack would occur in Canada within the next five years (Hembrey, 2015). However, 71 percent of Canadians also said they were concerned that Canadian youth could become radicalized or recruited by extremists (Hembrey, 2015). Nonetheless, this survey was conducted at a time when the parliament attack happened and the ISIS foreign fighter phenomenon reached its apex. It is worthwhile to note that although the “fear” of terrorist attacks decreased (from 58 percent to 50 percent), the presence of Muslims within society remained “contentious” for two reason: first, Muslims were the fastest growing religious minority in Canada; second, security concerns (in the long wake of 9/​11) (Environics Institute, 2016). “Muslims in this country do not enjoy the acceptance of other religious minorities, and are a focal point for discomfort about immigrants not fitting into Canadian society,” the survey concluded. Another survey that was carried out in 2017, remarkably, found that 74 percent of Canadians believed ISIS stood as the greatest security threat, followed by North Korea (73 percent), al-​Qaeda (72 percent), and homegrown or radicalized terrorists (72 percent) (Russell, 2017). A 2018 survey also echoed Canadians’ fear about homegrown terrorism

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as it highlighted that the majority (54 percent) of Canadians believed that radical Islam is cause for “a great deal of concern,” while 44 percent said the same of white supremacy, and 41 percent of Canadians believed that there are radicalized individuals living within their communities (Angus Reid Institute, 2018). In order to understand the complexity of the terrorism financing system, the Terrorist Resourcing Model (TRM) is worth considering.10 Between 2001 and 2015, five listed entities in Canada were researched using open source materials of terrorist resourcing, revealing that: the most prevalent resourcing actors were non-​profit organizations, weighted that way because of the observed LTTE and Hamas cases. Similarly, the most prevalent form of resourcing was fundraising by those organizations that targeted individual cash donations of small amounts. Funds were pooled and transmitted through chartered banks. (O’Halloran et al., 2016: 1)

In this context, Bill C-​51 was passed in parliament. Two leading law professors in Canada (Craig Forcese and Kent Roach) critiqued the bill, as it “run[s]‌counter to the rationale for CSIS’s formation and foster a more active, invasive and dangerous sphere of activity of CSIS that risks criminalizing lawful conduct, and justifying surveillance and disruption tactics towards Canadians for mere regulatory violations” (Voices-​voix, 2015). When the Bill was made public the then Prime Minister Steven Harper referred mosques to the radicalization of young Muslims. In response, the NCCM and the Canadian Muslim Lawyers’ Association demanded an apology (Voices-​voix, 2015). In the same vein, it was posited that Bill C-​51 “grants the Government of Canada extraordinary, vague and unnecessary powers that pose a risk to the civil rights and privacy rights of Canadians,” which are “contrary to the recommendations of the Arar Inquiry, as echoed by the Privacy Commissioner’s 2014 report, especially with respect to information sharing, independent review and accountability” (Voices-​ voix, 2015). Additionally, Bill C-​51 gave CSIS the power to carry out “disruption activities” if it deems a threat that might affect national security; it also introduced the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, through which government agencies can share Canadians’ personal information if these find it undermines national security (International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, 2016). Most importantly, within Bill C-​51, CBA (2016) observed that: “the broad impact of audit and sanction capabilities of Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) for charities operating in conflict zones, specifically around their ability to demonstrate effective control over charitable assets and programs to avoid placing the organizations, and their directors, officers, employees and volunteers at risk.” It further opined, the mere “suspicion

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of ties” with terrorist organizations had serious consequences, “not only for the organization, but for its board of directors, officers, employees, volunteers, and even members and their families, for their capacity to carry out charitable activities and for personal security” (CBA, 2017). According to a director of a charitable organization helping migrants and refugees relocate and settle: C-​51 is an instant umbrella of suspicion opened over the whole of Canadian society, encompassing the work of NGOs the most sensitive of areas and overlooked by an agency with filthy capabilities. You could imagine the feeling of insecurity and unease felt by NGOs trying to help vulnerable peoples who just happen to fit the government’s description of terrorists and possible violent criminal offenders. Really, it was just a matter of time before the government tied perceived threat with Canada’s security for the sole purpose of justifying the creation of these powers.11

The Liberal Party of Canada introduced the Bill C-​59, which is dubbed as National Security Act 2017, in June 2017, and propose a number of amendments to Bill C-​51. It contains seven main sections and the most important aspects of the Bill are its addition of an oversight body (National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, NSIRA); creation of a new Intelligence Commissioner; and several amendments to Bill C-​51 in four major ways. These are amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act (SCISA), the Secure Air Travel Act, and the Criminal Code regarding preventative arrest and investigative hearings (ICLMG, 2017). The Canadian Bar Association supported the new bill generally and posited that, “this would extend to information subject to solicitor-​client privilege, professional secrecy of advocates and notaries, or litigation privilege, creating an open-​ended mechanism to review the legal advice given to government” (CBA, 2017). Nonetheless, it declared that the bill was a positive move that would amend the SCISA and rename it the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act thus addressing only “disclosure of information and not its collection or use” (CBA, 2017). Further, the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada” was also amended, leaving out “advocacy, protest, dissent or artistic expression” as an activity that undermines national security. However, the proposed “Criminal Code amendments on listed entities would change little procedurally but would change the focus of the Minister’s recommendations to the Governor in Council from recommending removal of a listed entity to recommending that the entity remain a listed entity” (CBA, 2017). In terms of human security, in this phase, Canadians witnessed an extraordinary extradition case of Ottawa-​based Professor Dr. Hasan Diab who was alleged in 2007 as one of the perpetrators by the French authorities for a 1980 synagogue bombing (Justice for Hassan Diab, 2018). The

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RCMP arrested him in November 2008. His extradition hearing was held in 2011 and he was extradited to France in November 2014. After serving three years and two months in a French prison, he was finally released and returned to Canada in February 2018. This case brings to the fore Canada’s problematic Extradition Law as it “places the burden of proof on the person sought to show that the evidence against him/​her is manifestly unreliable. The test for unreliability is so high that it is virtually impossible to meet.”

Conclusion Scholars using the Government Actions in Terror Environments (GATE) Canada dataset, analyzed “whether Canada’s monthly counts of overseas actions relevant to Al Qaeda-​inspired extremism are associated with changes in the number of government actions that are relevant to potential homegrown Al Qaeda-​inspired groups” (Chenoweth & Dugan, 2016: 317). The analysis confirmed previous survey results that Muslims in Canada were disproportionately targeted under Canada’s current anti-​ terror regime, with Muslim-​based CSOs also becoming the primary targets of Canada’s then blossoming counter-​terrorism policies and emerging CTMs.12 Scholars observed five types of responses from CSOs such as “hiding, shirking, vocal opposition, participating, and litigating” while negotiating with CTMs in OECD countries (Bloodgood & Tremblay-​ Boire, 2011: 2). In Canada, “participating and litigating” are found to be the main responses so far. Nonetheless, challenges to CTMs have come from Muslim CSOs, human rights organizations, and civil liberty groups, whereas government-​funded civil society/​external donors primarily remained uncritical and inactive in the face of CTMs (Howell & Lind, 2010). Many argue that Canada, being a member of the Five-​Eyes, gathers intelligence from the United States that eventually influences its own CTMs, demonstrating a dangerous domestication of CTMs from abroad (see Njoku, 2021a). However, a particular case in point can be cited as a deviation to this assumption that happened with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. While the United States suspended its funding to this organization, which operates in Gaza, the Canadian government continued its support by committing $50 million, stating that the US decision was flawed (Blanchfieldm, 2018).

Notes 1 Charities and giving, www.canada.ca/​en/​services/​taxes/​charities.html 2 A checklist can be found at www.canadiancharitylaw.ca/​blog/​P175

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3 CAIR.CAN evolves –​Introducing the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM). www.nccm.ca/​introducing-​the-​national-​council-​of-​canadian-​muslims-​ nccm/​ 4 Recent CRA letters of revocation for Canadian registered charities: www. globalphilanthropy.ca/​blog/​recent_​cra_​letters_​of_​revocation_​for_​canadian_ ​registered_​charities 5 CRA notes: www.canadiancharitylaw.ca/​blog/​international_​relief_​fund_​for_​ the_​afflicted_​and_​needy_​canada_​irfan-​canada_​h 6 R v. Ahmad, 2009 CanLII 84774 (ON SC), para 80. www.canlii.org/​en/​on/​onsc/​ doc/​2009/​2009canlii84774/​2009canlii84774.html 7 Bill C-​51 has five parts: part one enacts the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, authorizing the disclosure throughout and within the government of Canada of information regarding activities “undermine[ing]” Canadian security. Part two enacts the Secure Air Travel Act, which creates listing mechanisms and prohibitions for persons who may pose a threat to air transportation or who may travel abroad to commit terrorism offenses. Part three amends the Criminal Code in significant ways including the creation of propagation crimes criminalizing the expression of ideas related to terrorism and its propaganda. Part four broadens the mandate of CSIS to operate both inside and outside of Canada (also in conjunction with Bill C-​44) and to this end to be authorized to seek judicial authorization on a number of matters that may otherwise violate Canadian law and the Constitution. Part five relates to amendments to immigration security certificate legislation allowing, in part, the government to withhold information from the specially appointed, national security approved Special Advocates retained to represent a detained person in confidential and closed national security hearings. http://​voices-​voix.ca/​en/​facts/​profile/​ bill-​c-​51-​anti-​terrorism-​act-​2015 8 Openparliament.ca, House of Commons, proceedings. 9 Notable here are the June 3 Canadian Tire attack by Rehab Dughmosh; the January 29, 2017 Quebec City mosque attack by Alexandre Bissonnette; the August 10, 2016 RCMP shooting and killing of Aaron Driver in Strathroy, Ontario; the October 22, 2014, Parliament Hill attack by Michael Zehaf-​ Bibeau; and the October 20, 2014 Saint-​Jean-​sur-​Richelieu attack by Martin Couture-​Rouleau. 10 It has five activities: acquisition of funds and end-​use and exchange goods; pooling or aggregation of those resources; their transmission to a terrorist organization; their transmission to a terrorist or operational cell; and their conversion to goods and services to support the organization’s activities, including for an act of terrorism (O’Halloran et al., 2016). 11 Authors’ interview via Skype with the director of a charitable organization assisting migrants and refugees (Ottawa, Canada, May 7, 2019). 12 The dataset shows: (1) “more than 35% of the actions related to Muslim constituencies.” (2) “Actions relevant to Muslims generally include decisions regarding religious rights such as the right to wear a hijab in the classroom, refugee and immigration issues relating to Muslims who try to stay in Canada, and investigations into abuses of Muslims (as in the Maher Arar case).” (3) “Although

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the government has adopted some conciliatory actions toward Muslims in Afghanistan and at home, the dominant mode of Canadian actions toward this constituency has been repressive.” And (4) “the government has also increased general counterterrorism actions since 9/​11. Such actions have generally been repressive or ‘threatening’ … there was no commensurate number of conciliatory actions (e.g., court cases ruling that certain elements of anti-​terrorism laws are unconstitutional, etc.) for Muslims or for general constituencies” (Chenoweth & Dugan, 2016: 321).

References Abu-​Laban, Y. & Nath, N. (2007). “From deportation to apology: The case of Maher Arar and the Canadian state,” Canadian Ethnic Studies, 39(3): 71–​98. Amnesty International. (2017). “The case of Maher Arar.” www.amnesty.ca/​legal-​ brief/​case-​maher-​arar Angus Reid Institute. (2018). “Radicalization and homegrown terrorism: Four-​in-​ ten say radicalized individuals live in their communities.” http://​angusreid.org/​ radicalization-​homegrown-​terrorism/​ Bearne, S., Oliker, O., O’Brien, K. A., & Rathmell, A. (2005). National security decision-​making structures and security sector reform. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Bell, S. (2008). “IRFAN-​Canada links to Hamas,” Organizational charts showing links between IRFAN-​Canada and Hamas, by Canada Revenue Agency. www. scribd.com/​document/​221397643/​IRFAN-​Canada-​links-​to-​Hamas Blanchfield, M. (2018). “Canada gives $50M to UN Palestinian refugee agency that U.S. says is ‘flawed’.” www.ctvnews.ca/​politics/​canada-​gives-​50m-​to-​un-​ palestinian-​refugee-​agency-​that-​u-​s-​says-​is-​flawed-​1.4131874 Bloodgood, E. A. & Tremblay-​Boire, J. (2011). “International NGOs and national regulation in an age of terrorism,” VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 22(1): 142–​173. Blumberg, M. (2013, October 5). “Federal Court of Appeal deals with motion by IRFAN.” www.canadiancharitylaw.ca/​blog/​federal_​court_​of_​appeal_​deals_​ with_​motion_​by_​irfan/​ Blumberg, M. (2018). “Canadian charities and terrorism: Protecting the resources of your favourite charity.” www.globalphilanthropy.ca/​images/​uploads/​Canadian_​ Charities_ ​ a nd_ ​ Terrorism_ ​ - ​ _ ​ p rotecting_ ​ t he_ ​ r esources_​ o f_​ y our_​ f avourite_​ charity.pdf Bronskill, J. (2017). “Security certificate detainee Mohamed Harkat seeks relaxation of monitoring.” www.theglobeandmail.com/​news/​national/​security-​certificate-​ detainee-​mohamed-​harkat-​seeks-​relaxation-​of-​monitoring/​article37002211/​ Carter, T. S. & Agent, T.-​M. (2008). “The impact of anti-​terrorism legislation on charities in Canada: The need for balance,” Provost’s forum on international affairs 2008: Counter-​ terrorism and civil society. University of Iowa, United States. CBA. (2005). Submission on the three year review of the Anti-​terrorism Act. Canada.

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CBA. (2016). Bill C-​ 51. www.cba.org/​CMSPages/​GetFile.aspx?guid=802dfa6f-​ e183–​43b1–​8f25–​2b6fd840bcf2 CBA. (2017). Bill C-​ 59–​ National Security Act, 2017. www.cba.org/​CMSPages/​ GetFile.aspx?guid=af8ac20b-​0d2a-​4249-​a743–​0ba351012c54 Chenoweth, E. & Dugan, L. (2016). “The Canadian way of counterterrorism: Introducing the GATE-​Canada data set,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 22(3): 316–​330. Collacott, M. (2006). “Canada’s inadequate response to terrorism: The need for policy reform.” www.fraserinstitute.org/​sites/​default/​files/​InadequateResponseto Terrorism.pdf Cotler, I. (2007, November 1). “From professor to justice minister: Charter rights and anti-​ terrorism,” Policy Options Politiques. https://​policyoptions. irpp.org/​magazines/​ontario-​2007-​dalton-​mcguinty/​from-​professor-​to-​justice-​ minister-​charter-​rights-​and-​anti-​terrorism/​ Davies, C. (2016). “Standing on guard? A benchmark comparison of Canada’s national security architecture.” Canada: The Conference of Defence Associations Institution. Environics Institute. (2016). “Survey of Muslims in Canada 2016.” www. environicsinstitute.org/p ​ rojects/p ​ roject-d ​ etails/s​ urvey-​of-​muslims-​in-​canada-​2016 Government of Canada. (2004). “Securing an open society: Canada’s national security policy.” http://​publications.gc.ca/​site/​eng/​9.686980/​publication.html Government of Canada. (2014, April 29). “Government of Canada lists IRFAN-​ Canada as terrorist entity.” canada.ca/​en/​news/​archive/​2014/​04/​government-​ canada-​lists-​irfan-​canada-​terrorist-​entity.html Hembrey, J. (2015). “Terrorism survey: 50% of Canadians feel less safe than 2 years ago.” www.cbc.ca/​news/​canada/​terrorism-​survey-​50-​of-​canadians-​feel-​less-​safe-​ than-​2-​years-​ago-​1.2978177 Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2010). “Securing the world and challenging civil society: Before and after the ‘war on terror’.” Development and Change, 41(2): 279–​291. Iacobucci, F. (2008). Internal inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-​Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin. Canada: Minister of Public Works and Government Services. International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (ICLMG). (2016). Bill C-​ 59: Changes to C-​51. http://​iclmg.ca/​issues/​bill-​c-​59-​the-​national-​security-​act-​of-​ 2017/​bill-​c-​59s-​changes-​to-​c-​51/​ ICLMG. (2017). Bill C-​59, the National Security Act of 2017. http://​iclmg.ca/​issues/​ bill-​c-​59-​the-​national-​security-​act-​of-​2017/​ Ipsos. (2011, September 6). “Six in ten (58%) Canadians more concerned about a terrorist attack on Canada now than before 9/​ 11.” www.ipsos.com/​en-​ca/​ six-​ten-​58-​canadians-​more-​concerned-​about-​terrorist-​attack-​canada-​now-​911 Jacoby, T. A. (2004). “Terrorism versus liberal democracy: Canadian democracy and the campaign against global terrorism,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 11(3): 65–​79. Justice for Hassan Diab. (2018). “Justice for Hassan Diab: Preserves the rights of Canadians under extradition law.” www.justiceforhassandiab.org/​about

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Kari, M. (2018). “Following the money trail: How Canada’s anti-​terrorism laws impact charities,” Manitoba Policy Perspectives, 2(1): 10. Malcolm, C. (2018). “Another controversial Islamic group gets Summer Jobs Grant funding.” https://​torontosun.com/​opinion/​columnists/​malcolm-​another-​ controversial-​islamic-​group-​gets-​summer-​jobs-​grant-​funding Mazer, A. (2003). Debating the anti-​terrorism law: Lessons learned (Vol. Canadian Parliamentary Review). Ottawa, Canada. Njoku, E. T. (2021a). “Strategic exclusion: The state and the framing of a service delivery role for civil society organizations in the context of counterterrorism in Nigeria,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 44(5): 410–​430. O’Halloran, J., Dizboni, A. G. P., Leuprecht, C., Adelstein, D., Green, A., & Porges, M. (2016). Research into how resources are acquired, moved and used to support acts of terrorism. Canada: Royal Military College of Canada. Parliament of Canada. (2006). Bill C-​25. www.parl.ca/​DocumentViewer/​en/​39–​1/​ bill/​C-​25/​royal-​assent Parry, T. (2014, May 6). “IRFAN-​ Canada charitable status appeal put on hold,” CBC News. www.cbc.ca/​news/​politics/​irfan-​canada-​charitable-​status-​ appeal-​put-​on-​hold-​1.2633854 Ridley, N. (2012). Terrorist financing: The failure of counter measures. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Russell, A. (2017). “Canadians say ISIS, North Korea, homegrown terrorists among greatest security risks: Ipsos poll.” https://​globalnews.ca/​news/​3932055/​ isis-​north-​korea-​home-​grown-​terrorists-​security-​risks-​canada/​ Voices-​voix. (2015). Bill C-​51: Anti-​Terrorism Act, 2015. http://​voices-​voix.ca/​en/​ facts/​profile/​bill-​c-​51-​anti-​terrorism-​act-​2015 Wright, J. (2011). “Six in ten (58%) Canadians more concerned about a terrorist attack on Canada now than before 9/​11.” www.ipsos.com/​sites/​default/​files/​ ­publication/​2011–​09/​5323.pdf

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Civil society, pacification programs, and anti-​terrorism: Brazil’s ambiguous entrance into the Global War on Terror Camila de Macedo Braga and Ana Maura Tomesani Introduction In the post-​ 9/​ 11 (2001) global security framework, leading authorities sought to frame the growing insecurity of world order within the macrosecuritization process of the US-​led Global War on Terror (GWoT). In many accounts, the analysis of this changing environment starts at the turn of the twenty-​first century. However, this chapter will argue that the social context in which the new discursive frame for international security was set had been prepared decades earlier, within a systematic process of securitization directed toward the development agenda and practices. These initial moves are observed within two distinct sets of macrosecuritization processes (Buzan & Wæver, 2009): one associated with the Cold War, largely successful, and another associated with the GWoT, in which success cannot be subsumed as fast. We argue that the acclaimed GWoT was only partly successful, mainly in consolidating the previous convergence between two sets of interrelated frames in global governance (i.e., between security and development). In doing so, it was able to recast the global security framework, including and extending the numbers of issues and actors associated with and impacted by it. Critical scholars have argued that the convergence between security and development in global governance is supported by the nexus between conflict and (under)development; a relationship which has contributed to the worldwide “criminalization of the poor” (Duffield, 2014), who are displaced to or localized in social sites constructed as vulnerable or insecure. In Brazil, among other countries, this convergence resulted in the implementation of stabilization programs designed as pacification policies in places deemed insecure. In such design, insecurity flows from places where poverty and crime were joined together to form perceived “ungoverned areas,” particularly vulnerable to international terror. To approach these spaces, state policies combined with the discursive framework of the GWoT,

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in which public security issues were presented as emergent threats to the state and, therefore, to national security. Portrayed as matters of national defense, where the internal order was under threat, former public issues were incorporated to the national military agenda and new practices were designed such as the use of integrated civil and military forces. In order to understand how the global security framework, under the GWoT, helped to consolidate the securitization of the development agenda, its agents and practices, we address Brazil’s systematic entrance into the GWoT. Although Brazil has prided itself on its pacifist culture and the absence of terrorist threats in the domestic space, the state was not immune to the global change in security patterns. As Lasmar (2015) has consistently argued, the Brazilian government’s strong denial about the presence of terrorism in Brazil (the negacionismo politics) is supported by the long-​standing absence of terrorist attacks within national borders. However, attacks represent a small phase within a cycle of terrorist-​related activities: In fact, any attack is preceded by a series of interconnected activities such as recruitment, radicalization, and diffusion of ideas, financing, training, logistics, material resource management, sharing of knowledge and materials, planning, surveillance, etc. Similarly, following the attack, the terrorist group still engages in other activities such as escape and evasion of the surviving terrorists, dissemination, and propaganda of radical group /​individual facts and ideologies, exploitation political and ideological of the attacks, etc. (Lasmar 2015: 48)

Therefore, in recent years, particularly as the country became the host of a number of mega-​events, such as the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016, Brazil suffered considerable international pressure to adapt its legislation and practices in accordance with US-​led GWoT (Saraiva et al., 2012). The growing restrictions imposed to global-​wide financial flows have directly impacted civil society organizations operating in high-​risk areas of the country. In Brazil, subsequent changes in assistance programs and public security policies culminated in funds being diverted from poverty-​ reduction programs to so-​called “pacification” programs, operationalized in the favelas (slums) of Rio de Janeiro during the current decade. Thus, this chapter begins by analyzing how a new discursive frame connecting security and development emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century and was further institutionalized by the declaration of the GWoT. In turn, the second part addresses how the regional and national agendas, policies and practices, were transformed in response to mounting international pressure, financial constraints and hardening policing practices associated with the revision of Brazilian terrorism legislation.

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The new global security framework The global international economy, advanced by informational capitalism, has structured the world in regionalized core systems connected by thickening and deepening networks of financial investment, production, and trade (Duffield, 2014). These interconnected cores are described as the “global North.” Although they include East Asian nations, many have come to associate the “North” with “Western civilization” and their liberal roots. In turn, all areas outside of it, at least in part, have come to be loosely associated with the “global South,” with their formal inclusion in the global economic order presented as work in progress. After the decolonization processes in the 1960 and 1970s, the Bretton Woods systems embraced the task of promoting liberal institutional development within emerging nations. Nonetheless, as the 1980s would show, a decade of neoliberal reforms and economic shocks produced increasing instability and social unrest in many post-​colonial states. Since then, conflict and violence were associated with growth rates of socio-​economic inequality, informal economies, criminal networks, and factionalized wars erupting in the developing “global South.” By contrast, the Northern industrialized nations remained relatively peaceful, advancing in a new wave of the information age and capital expansion, marked by stable relations and the diminishing number of international wars involving great powers. The contrast is important as it helped to crystallize the notion of the underdeveloped South as non-​Western, poor, and dangerous. This emerging perspective, linking poverty with conflict and violence, contributed to the promotion of significant changes in the aid sector when radical development discourses of “social engineering” were tested. At the same time, the predominant frame for security governance during the Cold War had subordinated all lower level securitizations to the overarching possibility of another international war, with the engagement of nuclear powers. It was not until the end of the Cold War that the possibilities for new security engagements were opened. A decade later, the post-​9/​11 global security framework, imbued by the GWoT “long-​ war” formulation, would shape security practices around the world, directing resource flows to the fight against terrorism (Buzan & Wæver, 2009: 256). Contrary to the macrosecuritization produced by the Cold War, which imposed a hierarchy to lower level securitizations incorporated into the main conflict, the macrosecuritization promoted by the GWoT has bundled other securitization issues together, without necessarily outranking them (Buzan &Wæver, 2009: 257). The flexible approach was paramount in embedding development goals within international, regional,

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and national security agendas, directing considerable resources to civilian protection policies in Latin America and elsewhere. The changing nature of North and South relations may be read within this injunction, as the perceived threats emerging from the South (armed conflict, criminal activity, terrorism) worked to foment international instability. By mid-​1990, the need to address violent conflict became a central concern for international development policies and programs; seen as essential to preserving internal order and international stability. Development had a renewed purpose, particularly attuned with security concerns, as the nature of security itself was re-​cast (Duffield, 2014). Thus, the 1990s would become a golden age for civil society organizations, with financial flows being reoriented from relief assistance to conflict resolution and societal reconstruction, and the growing rapprochement between traditional actors, such as states and financial institutions, and non-​governmental organizations (NGOs). The novel agenda for humanitarian assistance and development, aimed at transforming whole societies, lent support to multidimensional integrated programs, promoting democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. In the new humanitarian space, NGOs specialized in the promotion of human rights, social justice, and rule of law interconnected with a burgeoning donor community and multilateral agencies in order to govern the complexity of a rapidly changing global South. Poor and non-​democratic spaces were presented as sources of instability and violence, pressuring the borders and stability of the North. They were envisaged as the new sites for international intervention and conditional lines for financial aid were institutionalized, building new forms of subordination between North and South (Howell, 2014; Duffield, 2014). Consequently, when the 9/​11 attacks happened in 2001, the forms of international intervention put in place, connecting security to development practices, had already been tested quite broadly since the 1960s. For example, US government operations in Central America and Vietnam sought to promote what was called a “pacification” policy, following a “hearts and minds” strategy, which engaged civil society organizations operating locally in order to support US military interests and oppose communist groups (Howell, 2014). Unlike the current modes of stabilization, the term pacification referred to a mode of intervention in social life in order to bring about a new political order, superior to the previous one (Neocleous, 2011). In the second half of the twentieth century, the term was applied when the RAND organization published the report called “Organization and Management of the ‘New Model’ Pacification Programme” (1970), designed to replace the old model of “counter-​insurgency.” In the report, written by Robert W. Komer, Special Assistant for Pacification from 1966

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to 1968, security was seen as the key to pacification. But it was much more than territorial security. It was an integrated approach that affected all dimensions of social life as it sought to create a socio-​political environment in which future insurgency would not emerge. Thus, it involved a series of interlocking programs concerning land reform, economic development (re)construction of infrastructure, institutional reforms, etc. “In other words, pacification touches on the fundamental nature of security in its most expansive sense, involving ‘police type actions and constructive politic-​economic programs as security is restored” (Komer, 1970: 168, 257; cited in Neocleous, 2011: 193–​194). During these first experiments in pacification, civil society organizations were approached on two fronts: by state security agencies, in order to monitor or outright block those with left-​wing tendencies; or by statist development agencies and international donor communities, which made use of international and local NGOs to promote the neoliberal agenda (Howell, 2014: 160). By the end of the 1990s, however, following decades of ambiguous engagement, concerns were already emerging over the efficiency and effectiveness of NGOs, as well as problems of probity, transparency, and accountability in their work. The GWoT took shape against this background, providing an opportunity for international institutions and donor communities to re-​evaluate their strategies and modalities of engagement with civil society organizations. At the same time, as critical scholars such as Bigo (2006) have noted, the post-​9/​11 security environment has been marked by an upsurge of electronic surveillance over individuals and groups, and the use of a citizen’s security narrative in order to legitimize exceptional measures and regularized techniques for social control. These movements, when associated with other regionalized and localized securitization processes, have reinforced the perception of public security in terms of vulnerability and emergency, particularly when associated with “sites” where the state’s presence is contested by the presence of armed non-​state actors. Considering these sites, defined as ungoverned areas, the next section explores how the security system in Brazil has responded to the GWoT.

Brazil’s ambiguous entrance into the Global War on Terror Terrorism is nothing new to Latin American political contexts. Even so, a process of institutionalization for a securitizing move happens over time, when “a persistent threat leads to the creation of bureaucracies, procedures, and military establishments” (Howell, 2014: 162). By practical reproduction of life, conceived as insecure, routines of rationalization and

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technologies of surveillance combine to transform prior exceptional measures into everyday practices for the protection of populations living in insecure environments. As such, in Latin America and, particularly in Brazil, three elements were central for integrating the GWoT in domestic agendas, policies, and practices: (1) the vague definition of terror, which made it open to co-​option and interpretation, favoring its political use to deal with a wide set of issues; (2) the GWoT association with second-​order securitization processes at the regional level, leading to the internationalization and militarization of domestic issues associated with public security and social control, like narco-​economies, criminality, and certain social movements; and (3) the institutionalization of the conflict–​poverty nexus, directing resources invested in development and poverty-​reduction to programs where citizen security was at the forefront. Initially, the GWoT was embedded in the regional agenda through the inclusion of associated threats, such as the “War on Drugs,” international crime, and some persisting left-​wing groups which adopted guerrilla-​like strategies (Suarez et al., 2017). The association was already present in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, with a particular focus on Colombia (Villa, 2014). This condensation of securitizing processes had the effect of promoting what Mark Duffield called the “internationalization of public policy,” which sought to address common issues of public safety, usually the realm of national state policies, with the universalizing narrative on citizens’ security. In line with this, American agencies actively supported and financed regional institutional mechanisms such as the Comité Interamericano contra el Terrorismo, part of the Organization of American States. In parallel, with the regional institutionalization of the conflict–​poverty nexus, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Latin American countries became part and parcel of the new global security framework. The ODA reports to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) represent the flux of resources that travel from Northern developed countries to Southern developing states, which are subjected to some restrictions. For example, neither military aid nor direct anti-​ terrorism activities are ODA-​eligible as this generally implies some form of military costs. Nonetheless, a considerable number of activities associated with the prevention or mitigation of terrorism are ODA-​eligible. These include programs to strengthen the capabilities of border security patrols to identify the smuggling of narcotics, money, or illegal arms, as well as programs to strengthen the capacity of local security agents to identify money laundering schemes (we will return to this subject in the next section). As part of this process, changes in international assistance also impacted the civil society organizations operating regionally and in Brazil, setting new

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priorities and conditions for accessing assistance funds. For development and civil rights protection NGOs, the introduction of extra-​legal and regulatory measures severely affected their capacity to work. Among these measures, we find the introduction of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Special Recommendation VIII in the Anti-​Money Laundering Act, requiring greater scrutiny of money transfers to charities and development NGOs. Besides a number of recommended policies to be applied, FATF also publishes a blacklist of countries which do not implement them, thus pressuring states to adopt the international agenda, and criminalize terrorism. Brazil, during Luis Ignacio “Lula” da Silva’s administration (2003–​ 2010), was among the countries that faced increasing pressure to adopt stricter norms against terrorism, associated with international crime, money laundering, corruption, and drug trafficking (Suarez et al., 2017). After September 11, 2001, Brazil expressed its condemnation of all forms of attacks against civilians and –​in doing so –​joined the rhetoric of other mobilized nations against international terror. Nevertheless, the US-​ sponsored macrosecuritization of terrorism was not immediately received or accepted by the national audience, and no formal changes were made in the legal framework for counter-​terrorism (Suarez et al., 2017: 286). One possible reason, as highlighted by Suarez et al. (2017), emerges with the earlier association of “terrorism” and “terrorist groups” with left-​wing organized civilian groups, which opposed the civil-​military regime between 1964 and 1985. The perceived threats associated with the presence of these groups ensured a state of exception during the military regime, authorizing state agents to operate through extremely coercive measures. At that time, reports on torture, unlawful killings, and disappearances provided the other face of terror in Brazil –​the state terrorism. As Celso Lafer noted, Brazil “bandwagoned” on the macrosecutization of terrorism in a mimetic way, without promoting relevant changes in its legislation or practices (Lafer, 2003, cited in Suarez et al., 2017). This was possible due to the fluid definition of terrorism and associated threats within the GWoT, which included a wide range of issues, such as the presence of failed or weak states, fragile and corrupted institutions and law enforcement agencies, their perceived absence in some regions, as well as the growing informal economies and criminal organizations, supported by non-​transparent or regularized financial systems. This “package” of securitized issues was key in connecting Brazil to the anti-​terrorist global security framework, particularly due to the mounting attention received by the tri-​border area interconnecting Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, where a Muslim community of approximately 30,000 members was established (Villa, 2014). The region has been the central focus of international intelligence on counter-​terrorism since 1980, when Moshen Rabbani, associated with a series of terrorist

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attacks, sent the Iranian mullah Mohammad Tabataei Einaki to Brazil. Both men were associated with the Lebanese Shiite group, Hezbollah. In the following years, many observers would also assert that the preparation activities for the terrorist attacks on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, and the 1994 suicide bombing of the Israel-​Argentina Mutual Association, took place in that region (Lasmar, 2015: 52–​53). However, further attention has been directed to the region due to the operation of large criminal organizations within narco-​economies. Today, media outlets and governmental authorities have emphasized that there is a relationship between organized terror and criminal groups, particularly drug cartels. The association is usually supported by the rising rates of violent crimes.1 During the 1980s and 1990s, countries of Latin America and the Caribbean experienced a noticeable increase in violent crime rates, especially homicides, as well as the development of national and transnational criminal organizations based on drug trafficking. Among them, Brazil was at the top. In the turn to the twenty-​first century, the use of the word “terror” by some authorities and media agencies when describing particular events helped to consolidate the connection between crime and terror. One of the first cases happened in 2006, when a criminal organization called Primeiro Comando da Capital waged a series of attacks in São Paulo, resulting in the death of eighty-​six people; the second, in 2010, was launched by Comando Vermelho in Rio de Janeiro (Suarez et al., 2017: 286). In the following years, organized crime would become the focus of national security concerns. Nonetheless, once popularized in media outlets and political agendas, the term “terror” was not only employed to describe criminal actors but also in relation to radical groups vandalizing public buildings during social protests. The label emerged in a media battle due to the contentious use of excessive force by the military police against students and young citizens during Brazilian protests in June 2013 (Suarez et al., 2017: 287). These protests provoked heated debates in the Brazilian Congress, at the time concerned with the upcoming mega-​events. The government’s decision to host the Environmental Conference Rio + 20, the 2014 Soccer World Cup, and the 2016 Summer Olympics, provided new grounds for the country’s engagement with the GWoT strategic framework. As Suarez et al. observe: “The combination of external pressures for the adoption of an anti-​terrorist framework for the mega-​events and the conservative forces’ discourse against the protesters ultimately made the country update its national anti-​terrorism law” (2017: 287). The mounting international pressure and governmental efforts culminated in the Antiterrorism Law (13.260/​2016), sanctioned in 2016, showing that Brazil was not immune to the global changes in security governance.

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Briefly, the law defines terrorist acts as actions motivated by xenophobia or discrimination (of race, color, ethnicity, or religion) that disturb the public order and cause generalized terror, putting citizens’ lives in danger. However, when the law was approved by the Congress, it was considered harmful by observers and civil society organizations, as it could provide grounds for the intimidation and criminalization of social movements, limiting NGOs and other civil society organizations’ activities in sensitive areas, particularly those spaces knowingly occupied by criminal groups. In response, former president Dilma Roussef vetoed several polemic points, producing some measure of animosity among the conservative Congress members who supported the original text. Yet, some articles of the law arouse concerns, such as the criminalization of blockages of public services facilities, which usually happens in situations of strike or protests. Currently, the Brazilian Congress studies a hardening of the approved policy, with the project-​laws PL 5065/​ 2016 and PL 272/​2016, including also political and ideological motivations as levers for terrorist actions, which could –​in effect –​also criminalize social movements and political organizations. NGOs have exposed their position publicly through open letters in their websites, written manifests, and notes signed by several organizations. It happened in 2015 when the Act was passed and it happens now when organizations show their disagreement with the two law projects that alter the original law cited above. A recent manifest released in June of 2017 and signed by sixty organizations, besides scholars and left-​wing politicians, expresses concern with the inclusion of “political and ideological” in the motivations of terrorist acts, explaining that the broad and generic character of the law will actually free the judicial system to frame social protesters as terrorists.2 Another document, a technical note signed by twenty-​one civil society organizations in November 2018, argues against such general and subjective legislation on terrorism, stating: [t]‌he inclusion of “political and ideological” motivation as a special subjective element of the type directly confronts fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association, since it presents as criminal and submits to disproportionate sentences a conduct, which, more than legitimate, is truly essential to any democratic regime: political expression and the right to assembly.3

A repudiation note that was signed by six human rights organizations in the country also alerts to parts of these projects, where it is mentioned that encouraging terrorist organizations, even via social networks, may also be criminalized. Therefore, it could provide the ideal environment to criminalize individuals who give “likes” to protests calls and public acts.4

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The international development agenda, Global War on Terror, and local voices In recent years, the country has received significant support in terms of international resources to fight possible threats associated with the GWoT. Notably, considering ODA resources directed to Brazil from 2004 to 2014, many of the supported programs were associated with the post-​9/​11 global security framework. Table 5.1 presents, in chronological order, ODA-​ supported programs for security sector reform (SSR) in Brazil. Remarkably, if all the cited programs are gathered, from the total amount of US$2.5 million directed to Brazil by donor countries, US$1.2 million, or 48 percent of it, is related to anti-​terrorism activities. It is not surprising that 75 percent of this total is funded by the United States. It could be argued that, besides border security and inter-​ police technical cooperation programs, composing the majority of the programs funded by the United States, Germany, and France, there are three other programs that may be included in the hall of anti-​terrorist activities: (1) the technical assistance for the state of Rio de Janeiro in emergency operations (aid for the implementation of Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs; Units of Pacification Police)), from the United States in 2007; (2) the cyber-​security studies in 2013 and 2014, funded by the United Kingdom; and, finally (3) the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, also funded by the US. Among them, as part of an US-​funded program, the establishment of UPPs in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro drew national and international attention as it appeared to be the best solution to deal with local armed groups and recover territories dominated by drug trafficking. The idea behind the UPPs was that the state, initially through its security forces, should permanently occupy these spaces deemed to be insecure. Officially, there was no war on trafficking but the neutralization of it through the police occupation of the territory, with secondary objectives of the program entailing the increase of public services in the region, the formalization of activities and the integration of the territories into the city (World Bank, 2012). The UPPs were, thus, the first local experience in pacification. The pilot experiment was carried out in Morro de Santa Marta in 2008, functioning as a pre-​test for the future implementation of other units. Since then, many other units have been deployed, reaching a total of thirty-​eight in 2014, all in the city of Rio de Janeiro.5 The technique was based on a violent entry into the favelas, with intensive police action and a significantly higher

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Table 5.1  SSR programs financed by international donors in Brazil, 2004–​2014

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Year

Donor

Program description

Amount (in USD)

2007 Belgium

Violence prevention

88,754.14

2007 Netherlands

Human rights promotion

35,362.15

2007 United States

Police training (export controls /​border security)

65.80*

2007 United States

Technical assistance for the state of Rio de Janeiro in emergency operations

65,796.51

2008 France

Police training (civil defense)

3,904.57

2008 France

Police training (civil defense)

9,135.11

2008 Netherlands

Human rights promotion

138,070.90

2008 United States

Police training (export controls /​border security)

145,206.65

2008 United States

Police training (export controls /​border security)

64,536.29

2009 United States

Police training (export controls /​border security)

4,298.94

2010 United States

Assistance program to the non-​ 631,849.56 proliferation of nuclear weapons –​ Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)

2011 Canada

Comparative study: Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil

105,958.62

2012 Germany

Police training, and gear /​equipment assistance

21,598.92

2012 Germany

Police training (improving efficiency of border controls)

196,585.36

2012 IADB Special Fund

Redesign and implementation of citizens’ security programs

201,056.63

2012 IADB Special Fund

Violence prevention

351,849.10

2013 Germany

Police training (improving efficiency of border controls)

7,105.02

2013 United Kingdom Study on cybersecurity (Cyber Barometer Report Brazil)

78,173.86 (continued)

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Table 5.1 (cont.) Year

Donor

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2014 France

Program description

Amount (in USD)

Inter-​police technical cooperation

320,060.56

2014 United Kingdom Study on cybersecurity (Cyber Barometer Report Brazil)

29,375.79

Total

2,498,744.47

Note: *This value is believed to be incorrect as it is inconsistent with the North American SSR donation pattern for the studied period. The OECD was notified in 2018. No change has been made since then. Source: Tomesani (2018).

number of security agents than in ordinary police interventions. According to the Rio de Janeiro State Government official website’s explanation: The implementation process of a pacification unit has, in all, four phases: tactical intervention, preferably developed by special operations groups … that carry out tactical actions for the effective recovery of territorial control; stabilization, which includes tactical and siege actions to prepare the ground for deployment; implementation of the UPP, when police officers specifically designated and trained for this function occupy the site; evaluation and monitoring.6

After a couple of years, the program resulted in a significant reduction of lethal violence in “pacified” territories, even when compared to control groups in non-​pacified regions, with a 75 percent reduction in the number of homicides. There was a reduction in armed confrontations, including a fall in police lethality (homicides committed by police officers during actions), whose numbers reached almost zero in these localities. There was also a reduction of 50 percent in cases of robberies (Cano et al., 2012). Nonetheless, in recent years, the UPPs were abandoned due to administrative and budgetary inefficiencies. In aggravation, some widely publicized scandals impacted their capacity to hold public support. In 2013, the disappearance of a construction worker named Amarildo provoked public consternation and protests from local advocacy NGOs like Rio de Paz and Justiça Global. He was last seen being taken by the police to a UPP unit. In 2014, it was the turn of Cláudia Silva Ferreira, mother of four children, who was shot during a police operation and dragged for 250 meters by the police car that removed her body from the scene. These situations marked the beginning of the end for the UPPs, as the project lost its popularity among public opinion, residents, and the NGOs working to protect their rights.7

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Referring back to ODA support to Brazil, the numbers demonstrate that the anti-​terrorist agenda would find increasing purchase within the national and public security policy framework, where concerns with rising criminality rates and organized crime have taken center stage. However, the majority of these programs do not address the security priorities voiced by the official Brazilian organs of state or local NGOs. In general, Brazil mimetic adoption of the anti-​terrorist global security framework leads the government to update and expand its practice and control over public security issues and citizens’ protection policies. In line with this, the gap between the domestic demands and the broad-​based agenda, inscribed in the GWoT, which sought to create an internationalized public security framework, is evident when we access Brazil’s agenda on public security. Two national institutions best present this agenda: the first (and only) National Conference on Public Security (CONSEG), which took place in 2009, and the National Council on Public Security (CONASP), which worked well between 2010 and 2012, when it was left aside by the federal administration (Marques, 2015). Besides the massive participation of civil society organizations in these organs,8 they are official institutions, as they were organized and formatted by the federal government to be advisory formalized instances to help the formulation of public policies in the sector. For their members, Brazilian priorities in the field of domestic security may be summarized in seven topics: (1) the integration between security policies and other social policies aimed at crime prevention; (2) encouragement of social participation through local councils; (3) transparency and social control of penitentiary management; (4) appreciation of public security professionals; (5) repudiation of police abuses; (6) unrestricted support for disarmament; and (7) actions to prevent crimes of racism and religious intolerance. Markedly, this agenda was also endorsed by Brazilian civil society organizations operating within the security and human rights sectors. As information flows became a field of dispute and control, the data provided by these organizations represented a measure of civilian oversight over national security forces. In 2018, some of them developed a document, pointing out the priorities in the sector.9 In the document, they point out the urgent need to reduce and prevent violent crimes and to weaken the structures of organized crime. For that, they list some proposals such as the appreciation and constant qualification of the security agent, the external control of police activities, the restructuring of the prison system, the prevention of crime by way of inter-​institutional actions (education, health, social assistance); and regulation and control of arms. Also, the NGOs’ agenda states the importance of a reorientation of drug policies. They support the decriminalization of consumption as well as the regulation of production, distribution, and

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consumption of some kinds of drugs for medicinal and adult use, which could put in check the trafficking’s finances. Although almost ten years separate the CONSEG and the CONASP from the NGOs document presented in 2018, many of the priorities listed are still the same. The notable difference is the topic of drugs that did not appear on the agenda of CONSEG and CONASP. This means that, in general, official and non-​official discourses are quite aligned. Paradoxically, as we discussed here, international assistance programs have gone in a different direction. International flows for aid and development re-​oriented national security to address the threat of terrorism and drug trafficking by strengthening border and information control, particularly when associated with financial flows and potential money laundering schemes.

Conclusion Public security is, nowadays, a central concern for Brazilian security forces. However, changes in the national security framework happened in a mimetic way, by adopting and adapting the internationalized public policy framework embedded in the GWoT. As we argued in this present chapter, the GWoT discourse is present in the international donors’ agenda and that of the national federative states themselves, as evident in the case of Rio de Janeiro. Part and process of the post-​9/​11 international security framework, which endorses the internationalization of public security agendas, the installation of UPPs in Rio de Janeiro, and the pacification process promoted by this program reflect other “mano dura” (tough on crime) policies adopted by Latin American countries during the first decade of the twenty-​first century. Nevertheless, repressive policies and the subsequent mass incarceration processes have not resulted in lesser rates of armed violence nation-​wide. On the contrary, the geography of crime was restructured with the emergence of transnational networks and fluid criminal communities. The spaces where state presence was null, weak, or contested, and where civil society organizations were at the forefront, became the new sites of conflict. In the decades that follow the securitization of terror in the Americas, urban violence has reached unprecedented levels and rising insecurity has forced many NGOs to abandon their regular activities. As such, the Antiterrorism Act of 2016 was a tentative move to avoid the violence of mass protests, stimulated by the mega-​events happening in Brazil. However, the legislative move has not answered or addressed the specificities of local security issues. The Antiterrorist Act, although responding to external pressure –​and in particular to the FATF regular reports –​gave

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conservative and extreme right-​wing parties the chance to criminalize activities of civil society organizations. These organizations did not participate in the debates that led to the production of the above-​mentioned legislation and some have expressed their belief that they are the real focus of it. According to them, neither the current law nor its eventual hardening will be able to reduce criminality. The current global security framework, connecting security and development, has effectively securitized poverty and poor areas, particularly vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist groups. In Brazil, it is notable, in one hand, through practical actions which resulted in the securitization of civil society organizations and social movements, such as the Antiterrorism Act; and, on the other hand, through the militarization of police actions in ungoverned areas, deemed insecure, represented by the UPPs’ stabilization endeavors and by the federal military intervention in Rio de Janeiro in 2018. Both examples of state policy and practice did not echo the local civil society organizations’ discourse. As observed in the last section, these organizations, as well as the CONSEG and the CONASP, support policy arrangements in which questions related to the provision of public services, such as education and social assistance, are more relevant than the militarization of ungoverned areas or the criminalization of protests in order to curb violence and/​or organized crime. The present analysis suggests that the securitization of development and the turn to pacification policies failed to address the roots of conflict and violence in Brazil. It suggests that the recovery of vulnerable spaces (the so-​ called ungoverned areas) should not happen through the securitization of the residents, but otherwise by their increasing integration into the social and urban space, with the concomitant bottleneck of the trafficking’s finance. In these sites, the state presence must not be represented solely by its security forces but supported by it.

Notes 1 See the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime dataset for further information on each country. Brazil’s data is available at www.unodc.org/​lpo-​brazil/​pt/​crime/​ informacoes-​adicionais.html 2 The manifest is available on the website of the NGO, Conectas Human Rights: www.conectas.org/​noticias/​retrocesso-​do-​retrocesso. 3 Authors’ translation. The link to the technical note may be found at the end of this page: www.iddd.org.br/​index.php/​2018/​11/​20/​ampliacao-​da-​lei-​ antiterrorismo-​e-​discutida-​no-​senado/​ 4 See: https://​projetosdelei.protestos.org/​terrorismo/​16.08.01%20-​%20Nota%20 PLs%20que%20modificam%20a%20lei%20antiterrorismo.pdf

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5 Information available at www.upprj.com/​index.php/​faq. 6 www.upprj.com/​index.php/​faq 7 Information about the first incident may be found in the Human Rights Watch 2014 Report: www.hrw.org/​world-​report/​2014 8 The statutes of CONSEG and CONASP establish public participation in: 40% for CSOs, 30% for security forces, and 30% for public managers. 9 The agenda may be found at: https://​goo.gl/​UJnHdX

References Bigo, D. (2006). “Security, exception, ban and surveillance” in D. Lyon 68). (ed.), Theorizing surveillance: The panopticon and beyond (pp. 46–​ Cullompton: Willan. Buzan, B. & Wæver, O. (2009). “Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: Reconsidering scale in securitization theory,” Review of International Studies, 35(2): 253–​276. Cano, I., Borges, D., & Ribeiro, E. (2012). “The owners of the hill: An exploratory assessment of the impact of the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) in Rio de Janeiro” [Os donos do morro: uma avaliação exploratória do impacto das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) no Rio de Janeiro]. Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, São Paulo. Duffield, M. R. (2014). Global governance and the new wars: The merging of development and security. London & New York: Zed Books. Howell, J. (2014). “The securitization of NGOs post-​9/​11,” Conflict, Security & Development, 14(2): 151–​179. Lasmar, J. M. (2015). “The Brazilian legislation to combat and prevent terrorism fourteen years after September 11: Limits, failures and reflections for the future” [A legislação brasileira de combate e prevenção ao terrorismo quatorze anos após 11 de Setembro: limites, falhas e reflexões para o futuro. Revista de Sociologia e Política]. www.scielo.br/​scielo.php?script=sci_​arttext&pid=S0104–​44782015000100047 Neocleous, M. (2011). “ ‘A brighter and nicer new life’: Security as pacification,” Social & Legal Studies, 20(2): 191–​208. Saraiva, J. M. V., Santos, M. D. L. S., Souza, M. A. C., Rocha, P. D., & Lacerda, T. S. (2012). “Securitization of transnational terrorism and mega-​events in Brazil” [A securitização do terrorismo transnacional e os megaeventos no Brasil. Fronteira], Belo Horizonte, 11(22): 96–​119. http://​periodicos.pucminas.br/​index.php/ ​fronteira/​article/​view/​12157/​9753. Suarez, M. A. G., Brancoli, F. L., & Acacio, I. D. P. (2017). “Counterterrorism policies in Brazil: A securitization syndrome?” in Power dynamics and regional security in Latin America (pp. 273–​293). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Tomesani, A. M. (2015). “CONASP: Um Jovem Conselho em Busca de Sua Identidade,” Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública, 9(2): 180–​197. Tomesani, A. M. (2018). “International assistance and security sector reform in Latin America and Caribbean.” Ph.D. Thesis. International Relations Institute. University of São Paulo.

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Tomesani Marques, A. M. (2015). “CONASP: Um Jovem Conselho em Busca de Sua Identidade,” Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública, 9(2): 180–​197. Villa, R. D. (2014). “The paradox of macrossecuritization: When the war on terror does not securitize other ‘wars’ in South America” [O Paradoxo da Macrossecuritização: Quando a Guerra ao Terror não Securitiza Outras “Guerras” na América do Sul], Contexto Internacional, 36(2): 349–​383. World Bank (2012, October 1). “Bringing the state back into the favelas of Rio de Janeiro: understanding changes in community life after the UPP pacification process” [O retorno do Estado às favelas do Rio de Janeiro: Uma Análise da Transformação do Dia a Dia das Comunidades após o Processo de Pacificação das UPPs]. https://​goo.gl/​qyn4pX

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In the name of security? Counter-​terrorism and insurgency policies and civil society in Colombia Saúl M. Rodriguez-​Hernandez and Julio-​César Cepeda-​Ladino Introduction The events of September 11, 2001 (9/​11) marked the beginning of a new era in the world context, which impacted many spheres across the globe ranging from politics, economy, culture, and particularly security. After more than a decade since the fall of the communist bloc, stability, security, and free market seemed to be the normal trend in the Global North (Wallerstein, 2003: 5–​6); however, in large areas of the South the situation was less encouraging. For example, during the 1990s, the Colombian case was one the last remnants of the Cold War in the Western hemisphere, which mixed with illegal drugs trafficking reached an unusually violent intensity for global standards. In this context, the Colombian authorities clamored for any kind of support to confront this chaotic scenario, and the events of 9/​11 fitted like a glove to align to global discourse and actions about the “War on Terror” led by the United States. The latter country had become the main Colombian international ally since the second half of the twentieth century, particularly in the local East-​West confrontation and in the “war on drugs” (Moe & Müller, 2018). Amid a tense situation between the Colombian state civil society due to the implementation of the internal enemy doctrine, the new era of “Global War on Terror” (GWoT) intensified the clash between these actors, particularly after the arrival of Alvaro Uribe to the presidency in 2002, who carried out a security policy to combat illegal armed groups (guerrillas and paramilitaries), known as “Democratic Security Policy” (DSP). It was a counter-​insurgency policy, which in its first phase incorporated much American discourse, not only to respond to local threats but also to ask for economic and military support framed under the umbrella of “Plan Colombia” (Echavarria, 2010). The Plan Colombia policy was a US strategy aimed at supporting the Colombian war on drugs, which slowly turned to a counter-​insurgency plan. The transformation of the Plan Colombia policy

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deepened the stigmatization of civil society, specifically through such actions as illegal interceptions and extrajudicial killings, which put many, including activists, political opponents, civil society organizations (CSOs), and members of other sectors, at risk and on the front line (Howell & Lind, 2010). In this respect, this chapter analyses the relationship between Colombian security policies and civil society in the post-​9/​11 period. This term has been marked by the most intense stage of the Colombian internal war supported by the Uribe and Santos presidencies, along with the consequences after the peace process was signed with the left-​wing guerrilla group Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) in 2016. In the first part, we will describe the historical record regarding internal conflict and civil society since the mid-​twentieth century. In the second part, we will examine the main security policies in the Colombian context from a historical perspective until the Uribe and Santos governments. In the third section, we will study the impact of the DSP on the civil society realm and its implications for democracy during this period.

A weak civil society: between democracy and conflict in Colombia Since the mid-​twentieth century, Colombia has suffered a tough internal armed conflict resulting in nearly 250,000 deaths and six million victims of internal displacement. Similarly, despite economic stability unusual in Latin America, Colombia remains the second most unequal society in the region. Electoral democracy, with the main political parties Liberal and Conservador, has been active since the late 1950s. However, low participation in elections is the norm and human rights activism remains dangerous. Violence has become common in this culturally diverse country, one beset by social exclusion, intolerance, and a wealth gap between urban and rural zones (Rodriguez, 2019: 284). The contemporary Colombian conflict began in the mid-​1960s when several left-​wing guerrilla groups emerged in Colombia, including the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN). These were the by-​product of a limited political scenario and the socio-​economic discomfort of one part of the population. The government, instead of trying to solve structural problems that lead to the formation of these groups, focused its actions on a military solution that combined heavy combat actions and civil-​military activities to gain people’s hearts and minds (Ospina & Marks, 2014: 361). Governments since then orchestrated a witch-​hunt to accuse any social and political groups pushing for reforms as collaborators of the guerrillas under the East–​West logic against communism. This situation had a perverse result in Colombia. Any leader or social movement advocating for

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change through political or collective actions was rapidly stigmatized, and, in a violent scenario, the murdering of activists became a daily occurrence. Between 1981 and 2012, 1,227 community leaders, 1,495 political activists, 1,287 public servants, 685 unionists, and 74 human rights defenders were killed in Colombia (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación. Área de Memoria Histórica, 2013: 46). This worsened when drug cartels appeared on the scene in the 1980s, because drug barons tried to diminish any disturbance in their zones of influence to avoid state action, threatening, persecuting, and killing social activists. The beginning of the 1990s marked a milestone in the emergence of civil society as a concept and a stakeholder across the world. As Howell et al. have pointed out, “The concept of civil society soon became a rallying cry against oppressive regimes in Latin America, the Soviet Union, and Africa. Development agencies gradually absorbed and appropriated the idea into their discourses and policies, subsequently making it a central part of their aid programmes for developing countries and transition countries” (Howell et al., 2008: 83). In this regard, the Colombian case has its own particularities. First, despite the wave of democratization in Latin America, Colombia did not experience a formal transition to democracy since the country did not have a dictatorial government. The novelty was on the enactment of a new constitution in 1991 that promoted political and social inclusion in the institutional realm to accept social demands from excluded sectors of society (Hincapié, 2015: 11). Second, one of the most violent peaks in the internal armed conflict took place in that period of time, when guerrilla groups intensified their military action against the state, particularly the FARC. In response, illegal right-​wing groups, known as “paramilitaries,” began a brutal campaign against the civilian population in regions where guerrillas acted. These overlapping factors produced a singular scenario for civil society and NGOs in Colombia. In the 1990s, democratic openness was restrained due to the high intensity of violence and the fear of people in faraway regions to exercise their constitutional rights. But, as a consequence, it led to the emergence of civil society, in part, due to violence and abuses exerted against them, by different actors, including the state’s armed forces. Likewise, at the beginning of the twenty-​first century, and thanks to the support of international cooperation agencies and NGOs, there was a boom in these kind of actors during this period –​approximately 5,432 Colombian-​based NGOs (Fletcher, 2003). In this respect, civil society could be defined as an “array of organizations such as trades unions, professional associations, faith-​based groups, and the media”, and NGOs (Howell et al., 2008: 84). These organizations demanded numerous transformations regarding democracy in the middle of an internal war –​an extremely difficult task.

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The role of civil society during the Colombian armed conflict has been crucial in calling for human rights protection, democratic openness, and denunciation of violations and crimes in the last two decades. However, the risks related to these activities discouraged the majority of the population from being involved in these actions. In part, this is because the long-​lasting tradition of violence, stigmatization of human rights defenders and patronage have limited the Colombian democracy to private interests more than common well-​being. For these reasons, social capital among Colombian citizens has been weak and massive involvement in social and political issues has been restrained for many years to a minority. For example, the political participation in formal democratic activities like polls has been characterized by electoral abstention, in part because ordinary citizens believe it does not have a relevant impact to change the situation in the country. After the 9/​11 attacks, and in part due to the historical Colombian alignment with the United States as a recipient of funds to fight against illegal drugs, local politicians took advantage of this situation to ask for more funds in the new GWoT, linking in an opportunist way the Colombian conflict to this US campaign. For local politicians, this situation was useful to maneuver internationally and diminished the effect of persecuting civil society members inside the Colombian democracy. It also coincided with the strongest governmental response against left-​wing guerrilla groups. In addition, the recent military campaign led by the Colombian government started a kind of rare social-​political scenario, where any critiques or comments againts the state were treated in derogatory terms to minimize its coherence and veracity. Howell et al. refer to this as “fear and suspicion, the demonization and criminalization of particular communities and their organizations, and the partial silencing of political dissent” (Howell et al., 2008: 84).

Security policies: a long partnership between the United States and Colombia The beginning of the contemporary US–​Colombian relationship on security and defence matters can be traced back to the early 1950s when Colombia deployed an infantry battalion and a couple of warships in the Korean War together with US forces. Colombian experience in the first conflict of the Cold War was very useful to handle the problems related to an explosion of partisan violence during the 1950s. With the advice of the US Army, Colombia founded one of the first counter-​insurgency schools in the world, known as the “Lancero School,” in 1955 to learn to combat guerrilla groups and deal with the civilian population (Leal Buitrago, 2011).

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Nonetheless, the situation changed radically after the Cuban Revolution in 1959, when Latin America became one of the hot spots in the Cold War. According to Elhawary (2010), since this period there have been three basic stages in US–​Colombian relations on security matters. [Firstly] the efforts by the US to stem the threat of communist revolution in Latin America through the Alliance for Progress (AFP) (1961–​1973); [second] the US backed counter-​narcotics strategy, Plan Colombia, alongside President Alvaro Uribe’s “democratic security” policy (2000–​2007); and [third] the current “integrated approach” with its focus on consolidating the state’s territorial control (2007). (Elhawary, 2010: S389)

Guerrilla groups emerged in Colombia as a mutation of previous partisan groups asking for political inclusion. For example, FARC turned from a Liberal guerrilla group related to this political party to a left-​wing guerrilla group (Echavarria, 2010: 23). However, in its first stage, the Colombian government did not appreciate its particularities as a peasants’ group and attacked them without any mercy (Bushnell, 1996), avoiding any kind of political negotiation, which ended up bringing more problems than solutions in the coming years. In this sense, other guerrilla groups were treated in the same way. The Colombian government followed US lines in relation to the fight against communism in the region. This was reflected in the so-​called National Security Doctrine, which entailed a variety of measures to combat communism locally via counter-​insurgency missions and the persecution of apparent left-​wing supporters (Leal Buitrago, 2011). The unique difference with other Latin American countries was that Colombian political elites assumed this kind of militarism in the absence of a military dictatorship, unlike what happened in the neighboring countries from the 1960s to 1980s. In this line, a group of top-​ranking Colombian officers advised by US armed forces created the most important plan to combat guerrillas in the 1960s, known as Plan Lazo. This included five phases: “the first four were of the operational actions type, of shock, using military forces: preparation, training, execution, and destruction. But the last phase –​called ‘reconstruction’ –​was dependent on the political capacity and commitment [of the government]” (interview with Colonel Ruiz Mora 2011, in Dufort, 2017: 330–​331). This plan was very useful to combat guerrillas but it granted an extreme autonomy to carry out different operations across the country under US sponsorship, including military control of municipal governments. Along with these counter-​insurgency plans, in 1965 the Colombian state authorized citizens to organize and carry firearms, which became a tacit policy in the Colombian context in the next years. Its effects are notorious,

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particularly between the 1980s and 2000s with the paramilitaries “acting at the behest of the state’s security apparatus not only against the insurgency but against all opposition figures, including union leaders, journalists, students, university professors, and human rights advocates” (Richani, 2007: 408). Perhaps the local epitome of the National Security Doctrine in Colombia was the National Security Statute. This was enacted by President Julio Cesar Turbay in 1978, and followed much of the US Army’s School of Americas Doctrine, and authorized the Colombian Armed Forces to fulfil non-​common duties for this institution, such as: capture and detain civilians without judiciary order; persecute student and workers’ movements; and carry out intelligence operations against political and social opponents. All of these were justified under the fight against communism. With the exception of the negotiation peace policy of President Belisario Betancur (1982–​ 1986), subsequent presidents all considered it to be valid to use the military apparatus (force and intelligence activities) to combat insurgency and any local related threats in Colombian society (Leal Buitrago, 2011). With the fall of communism at the beginning of the 1990s, illegal drugs became the new enemy in the United States. As one of the main cocaine and heroin producers in the world, Colombia was rapidly involved in the new war on drugs driven by the United States. However, aside from other Latin American countries, the fall of communism did not mean the end of local left-​wing guerrillas. On the contrary, local guerrillas, particularly FARC, enhanced their military power to fight against the government. Thus the term “narcoterrorism” was coined in the United States to catalogue the ambiguous situation in Colombia, and for that reason, the United States began to train the Colombian armed forces to fight drug trafficking and –​ indirectly –​guerrilla groups (Echavarria, 2010: 31–​32). Since then until 2001, drug trafficking was the central issue in bilateral relations between Colombia and the United States. Nonetheless, due to an increase of human rights violations committed by right-​wing paramilitary groups, in some cases supported by the Colombian military, this topic “took relevant importance for governing elites and foreign policy makers in Capitol Hill” (Castrillón Riascos & Guerra Molina, 2017: 39). In this case, Washington began to demand results to protect activists and NGOs. However, the results were not any better, in part because the Colombian state was in the middle of a crisis thanks to FARC, which at the end of the 1990s sustained a steady and furious military offensive against institutional forces (Ospina & Marks, 2014). In this scenario, in 1999 the United States approved “Plan Colombia,” a military aid package to help Colombia to fight against drug trafficking, which was considered the key resource used by guerrilla groups to enhance

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their military capacities. However “US legislation at the time required that the security assistance could only be used in counter-​drug training and equipment, and not for counter-​terrorism” (Bruneau, 2017: 345–​346). This review of the long partnership between the United States and Colombia on security policies (counter-​insurgency and counter-​narcotics) has been useful to examine its main implications for Colombian democracy since the second half of twentieth century. Precisely, the National Security Policy is the local manifestation of a US security policy during the Cold War. And the impacts on Colombian civil society are related to the stigmatization of activists, political opponents, NGOs, and other socio-​political actors during the internal armed conflict. Later, in the 1990s and the 2000s, there was a reconfiguration of the approaches on security and defense matters in different countries around the world (Howell & Lind, 2010). In Colombia, as well as the fight against communism and drug trafficking representing the counter-​insurgency policy, the violence of illegal armed groups meant the construction of the counter-​terrorism strategy, better known as DSP.

Democratic Security Policy (DSP) and civil society in Colombia Against the framework of the United States’ so-​called GWoT, Colombian politicians took advantage of the new security situation to enhance security policies asking for US support to fight the local war against different illegal armed groups. This brought several effects on democracy and civil society in the first decades of the twenty-​first century (Fowler & Sen, 2010; Sidel, 2010). Until the end of the 1990s, the US–​Colombian partnership was based on “counter-​narcotics” policies regarding security and defense matters. The tip of the iceberg was “Plan Colombia,” launched a few months before the 9/​ 11 attacks. This plan was supported by the United States, which contributed US$1.3 billion during the first two years to enhance the military capacities of the Colombian armed forces. The large budget was the most controversial aspect of this plan because many experts considered that a “new Vietnam” may occur in Colombia (Bruneau, 2017: 345–​346). To avoid these kind of accusations US legislators restricted the uses of military aid to Colombia exclusively to counter-​narcotics activities and banned the Colombia armed forces from using it against the left-​or right-​wing illegal groups (Dube & Naidu, 2015: 249–​250). Nonetheless, due to the 9/​11 attacks, the changes in US security priorities allowed Colombia to use US military support to fight against left-​wing guerrilla groups. The differences between counter-​ insurgency and counter-​ narcotics policies disappeared and since the 2000s it is only a counter-​terrorism policy. For Colombian

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right-​wing parties, national government, Congress, and the armed forces, it was an opportunity to fight against guerrillas and paramilitaries’ violent actions. As Elhawary (2010) pointed out: “weak states were reconceptualised as the most serious national security threats to the US.” For that reason, Colombia became a priority (Elhawary, 2010: S393). The GWoT overlapped with a deep internal crisis in Colombia in 2001. The people lost their faith in the peace and progressively a new pro-​war environment appeared, asking for an iron hand solution against illegal groups. The result was the election of Alvaro Uribe, a politician who ran his political campaign hoisting the slogan of counter-​terrorism to reach the presidency (Vauters & Smith, 2006). His policy, known as the DSP, consisted of a counter-​insurgency program, under the US counter-​terrorism umbrella and economic support (Rodriguez, 2018). Like their US counterpart, they used all state apparatus to fight against illegal armed groups (guerrillas and paramilitaries), particularly the FARC, and one of Uribe’s first political actions in 2002 was to delegitimize this group as a guerrilla and tag it as a terrorist group. This action not only combined the tracking of the US GWoT perspective but also took away any legitimate cause to this group (Sitter & Parker, 2014). The DSP was progressively successful, according to Elhawary (2010), for at least three reasons: (1) the weakening of FARC via military operations; (2) the demobilization of 30,000 United Self-​Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) paramilitaries and reduction of related violence; and (c) the increasing of civil and military forces presence in almost all Colombian municipalities in less than four years (300 in 2002 and 1,098 in 2006) (Elhawary, 2010: S394). However, the DSP failed on the protection of large sectors of civil society in Colombia. The initial proof of this situation was the indiscriminate use of the language of terrorism. Howell et al. (2008) have observed that since the presentation of the report “The Authoritarian Curse” in 2003, it is possible to criticize Uribe’s government due to its political discourse having changed from the need for democratic citizen participation and the protection of human rights to multiple accusations against humanitarian groups for being “spokespersons of terrorism” (Howell et al., 2008: 87). Different forms of action have been undertaken by this government against these groups including illegal interceptions against social and political leaders, the killing of innocent people, and the persecution of NGOs based in Colombia during the 2000s and 2010s. First, illegal activities to spy on different social and political actors were carried out by state agencies. Known as chuzadas, these actions were an open violation of democratic rules. Among the opposition leaders affected by these actions were members of Liberal and Polo Democrático Alternativo

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political parties during Uribe’s presidency (2002–​ 2010). As well, those systematic actions affected journalists and scholars like Daniel Coronell, Hollman Morris, Ramiro Bejarano, and Alfredo Molano, who have denounced the effects of the DSP on Colombian civil society. But one of the most controversial was the illegal monitoring of judges of the Colombian Supreme Court like Iván Velásquez, César Julio Valencia, and Jaime Arrubla, who were investigating cases about linkages between paramilitaries and Colombian politicians, the fraudulent re-​election of Uribe in 2006, and the truth about the Palace of Justice siege in 1985, where several civilians were “disappeared” by the Colombian military. A common denominator was the active participation of the Colombian state central agency, the Department of National Intelligence, in security and intelligence issues that were beyond its functions and competencies (Pérez Pérez, 2011: 146). Second, the tensions between the Uribe government and political opposition due to the implementation of the DSP achieved an unsuspected situation in September 2008 when the falsos positivos (“false positives”) scandal was denounced by “Soacha Mothers,” a social movement created in the town of Soacha near to Bogotá, which denounced the extrajudicial killings of innocent people including their sons. According to Human Rights Watch and the United Nations General Assembly, approximately 3,000 innocent civilians were assassinated between 2002 and 2008 and currently more than 700 military are being investigated due to this illegal practice (Bruneau, 2017: 348; Castrillón Riascos & Guerra Molina, 2017: 41). In this sense, Rojas (2009) notes that the Decree 540 of May 5, 2006 established a system of incentives for the military who killed guerrilla combatants. Instead of that, they killed hundreds of civilians to show them as members of left-​wing guerrillas (hence the term “false positives”). In a subsequent interview, Mario Iguarán, former Colombian attorney general, said that falsos positivos were not an “official military policy” and those actions were committed by a few members of the Colombian armed forces (Pérez Pérez, 2011: 145). Since then, multiple local and international NGOs have been denounced as more falsos positivos, in different regions across the country such as Antioquia, Casanare, Cesar, Meta, and Norte de Santander. After a long inquiry, in April 2017, twenty-​one military officers (including Colonel Rincón Amado) were sentenced due to cases reported by “Soacha Mothers.” Also, the International Criminal Court investigated twenty-​three generals and six colonels of Colombian army because of their responsibility in 1,228 extrajudicial killings (Olasolo & Canosa Cantor, 2018). Third, the DSP has had a negative impact on the already weak Colombian democracy, because any suspicious individual or political opponent has been considered by the government as an enemy of the state or potential terrorist. In this respect, in the middle of this atmosphere of fear, civil

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society’s range of action has been restrained or limited. The friend-​enemy logic of GWoT and DSP in both the United States and Colombia have effects over constitutional and democratic guarantees for the wider society. In Colombia, civil society and NGOs were affected in a differentiated way. More than 70 percent of the main NGOs work on areas related to democracy, citizen participation, coexistence, and human rights (Gómez-​ Quintero, 2014). On the one hand, some far right sectors of society welcomed the DSP through actions such as supporting the creation of a network of civilian informants along with mass, selective and arbitrary arrests against social and political leaders, and their immediate relatives, accused of being terrorist suspects (Carvajal Martínez, 2008). On the other hand, independent NGOs have criticized Uribe’s government due to decisions related to the possibility to implement permanent restrictions over constitutional rights and principles like freedom of movement, judicial independence and legal reserve, inviolability of home and correspondence, all of them contradicting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and later-​related international agreements signed by the Colombian state (Borda Guzmán, 2012). These independent CSOs were attacked by the Uribe government by means of a systematic strategy that included unsupported criminal proceedings and harmful public statements in order to delegitimize and silence the potential criticisms of DSP in Colombia and the international community. Between 2003 and 2009, it is possible to find several events related to this situation, in which more than twenty NGOs like Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular, and Comité Permanente por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos en Colombia have denounced death threats against their members by state actors and paramilitaries (“Águilas Negras”). Labels such as “spokespersons of terrorism,” “terrorists camouflaged as citizens,” and “intellectual bloc of the FARC” also reached large sectors of civil society including indigenous people in Cauca and the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, the peasant organizations in Arauca and the Peace Community in San José de Apartadó (Carvajal Martínez, 2008). Despite all those public stigmatizations, and according to ONG por la Transparencia, Colombian NGOs have been very successful managing resources from different sources such as international cooperation, own resources and state-​private funds, and just during 2008–​2009 global financial crisis its income was reduced (Gómez-​Quintero, 2014). Among the few available spaces for advocacy on human rights in the civil society in Colombia, it is possible to find the “human security from the bottom-​ up” or Seguridad Humana desde abajo as an alternative and counter-​hegemonic approach for security policies beyond DSP. This

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proposal attends to build bottom-​up initiatives, where citizens play a central role to protect human rights together with transnational advocacy networks that help to improve security policies in the post-​conflict scenario (Angarita Cañas, 2012). Recently, in 2010, Juan Manuel Santos was elected president to continue Uribe’s security policy against the FARC. However, President Santos decided to partially carry out the DSP on the one hand, attacking high-​value targets of the FARC, killing some of their main leaders, like Aka Mono Jojoy (2010) and Alfonso Cano (2011). On the other hand, Santos also promoted a peace process with a weakened FARC in Havana (Cuba) between 2012 and 2016 to try to end the internal armed conflict (Rodriguez, 2019). The negotiations had five points: land reform; political participation; illegal drugs solution; truth for victims of armed conflict; and positive measures to end the conflict. All of them constituted a unique opportunity to open new spaces for civil society in Colombia with the support of the international community (Grajales, 2013). After the first signed agreement in Cartagena de Indias between the Colombian state and the FARC (September 2016), the adverse results in the plebiscite asking for support for the agreement (October 2016), and the later-​signed agreement in Bogotá (November 2016), it is evident that the post-​conflict scenario is fragile and requires an active engagement of civil society. This should include the work of NGOs to ask for fulfilment of the peace agreement and protection of the Colombian citizenry, particularly social activists, communities, and political opponents from small and medium municipalities far away from Bogotá. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to implement the peace agreements between the Santos government and the FARC, supported by the international community, as soon as possible and continuing in the next decades (Ospina et al., 2016).

Conclusion The relation between counter-​insurgency/​terrorist policies and civil society in Colombia has been tortuous due to the negative impacts of these policies carried from the Cold War until the GWoT, including the DSP. In this sense, the mid-​term historical perspective has been useful to describe and analyze the main implications of security policies such as DSP and its effects on Colombian civil society before and after the 2000s. Although the 9/​11 attacks were a turning point to explain and understand some of the changes on US policies (counter-​insurgency, counter-​narcotics, counter-​terrorism) and thus the US–​Colombia alliance, it is necessary to identify the diachronic components of these processes.

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In addition, this articulation between US global-​oriented security policies and its allied countries in different political contexts during the post-​ 9/​11 period can be observed through the counter-​terrorist legislation and measures, the responses and impacts on civil society and NGOs, and the development of prospective citizens’ initiatives. In this sense, the works of Sidel (2010) and Howell and Lind (2010) are pioneers for promoting the reflection about the consequences of GWoT for the civil society and NGOs along with the reforms on the security policies that allows the protection of the citizenry. The Colombian case –​in the Americas and the world –​represents the opportunity to study, via cross-​national comparison, the everyday politics of civil society organizations beyond the US counter-​terrorist policy two decades after the 9/​11 attacks.

References Angarita Cañas, P. E. (2012). “La Seguridad Democrática. Punta del iceberg del régimen político y económico colombiano,” in A. Vargas Velásquez (ed.), El prisma de las seguridades en América Latina. Escenarios regionales y locales (pp. 15–​50). Buenos Aires: CLACSO. Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales. Borda Guzmán, S. (2012). “La administración de Álvaro Uribe y su política exterior en materia de derechos humanos: de la negación a la contención estratégica,” Análisis Político, 25(75): 111–​137. Bruneau, T. C. (2017). “Security providers: Obstacles to effectiveness in democracies,” Democracy and Security, 13(4): 336–​362. Bushnell, D. (1996). Colombia, una nación a pesar de sí misma: de los tiempos precolombinos a nuestros días. Bogotá: Planeta. Carvajal Martínez, J. E. (2008). El Estado de seguridad dentro del Estado de garantías: La seguridad democrática y el caso de las privaciones de la libertad en Colombia durante el período 2002–​2006. Bogotá: Instituto Latinoamericano de Servicios Legales Alternativos. Castrillón Riascos, J. A. & Guerra Molina, R. A. (2017). “A deep influence: United States-​ Colombia bilateral relations and security sector reform (SSR), 1994–​ 2002,” Revista Opera, 20: 35–​54. Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación. Área de Memoria Histórica. (2013). ¡Basta ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad. Bogotá: Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. Dube, O. & Naidu, S. (2015). “Bases, bullets, and ballots: The effect of US military aid on political conflict in Colombia,” The Journal of Politics, 77(1): 249–​267. Dufort, P. (2017). “A typology of military factions in the Colombian officer corps: Origins and evolution of Colombian counter-​ insurgency,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 42(3): 320–​349. Echavarria, J. A. (2010). In/​security in Colombia: Writing political identities in the democratic security policy. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

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Elhawary, S. (2010). “Security for whom? Stabilisation and civilian protection in Colombia,” Disasters, 34: S388–​S405. Fletcher, N. (2003). “Advocates or obstacles? NGOs and Plan Colombia,” Cultural Survival Quarterly, 26(4): 22–​25. Fowler, A. & Sen, K. (2010). “Embedding the war on terror: State and civil society relations,” Development and Change, 41(1): 1–​27. Gómez-​Quintero, J. D. (2014). “Organizaciones no gubernamentales y entidades sin ánimo de lucro en Colombia: Despolitización de la sociedad civil y tercerización del Estado,” Gestión y Política Pública, 23(2): 359–​384. Grajales, J. (2013). “State involvement, land grabbing and counter-​insurgency in Colombia,” Development and Change, 44(2): 211–​232. Hincapié, S. (2015). “Conflicto social, reformas estatales y crimen organizado en México y Colombia, 1982–​2012,” in K. Ansolabehere, S. Serrano, & L. D. Vázquez (eds.), Los derechos humanos y la violencia: Estado, instituciones y sociedad civil (pp. 3–​44). Bogotá & México: Universidad de los Andes: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2010). “Securing the world and challenging civil society: Before and after the ‘war on terror’,” Development and Change, 41(2): 279–​291. Howell, J., Ishkanian, A., Obadare, E., Seckinelgin, H., & Glasius, M. (2008). “The backlash against civil society in the wake of the long war on terror,” Development in Practice, 18(1): 82–​93. Leal Buitrago, F. (2011). “Una visión de la seguridad en Colombia,” Análisis Político, 24(73): 3–​36. Moe, L. W. & Müller, M.-​ M. (2018). “Counterinsurgency, knowledge production and the traveling of coercive Realpolitik between Colombia and Somalia,” Cooperation and Conflict, 53(2): 193–​215. Olasolo, H. & Canosa Cantor, J. (2018). “La Responsabilidad del Superior en el Acuerdo de Paz en Colombia a la luz del Derecho Internacional,” Política Criminal, 13: 444–​500. Ospina, C. A. & Marks, T. A. (2014). “Colombia: Changing strategy amidst the struggle,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25(2): 354–​371. Ospina, C. A., Marks, T. A., & Ucko, D. H. (2016). “Colombia and the war-​to-​peace transition: Cautionary lessons from other cases,” Military Review, 96(4): 40–​52. Pérez Pérez, T. H. (2011). “Conflicto y posconflicto en Colombia: una mirada a la política de seguridad democrática,” Magistro, 5(10): 129–​150. Richani, N. (2007). “Caudillos and the crisis of the Colombian state: Fragmented sovereignty, the war system and the privatisation of counterinsurgency in Colombia,” Third World Quarterly, 28(2): 403–​417. Rodriguez, S. M. (2018). “Building civilian militarism: Colombia, internal war, and militarization in a mid-​term perspective,” Security Dialogue, 49(1–​2): 109–​122. Rodriguez, S. M. (2019). “Colombia: A long journey to peace,” in C. P. Peterson, W. M. Knoblauch, & M. Loadenthal (eds.), The Routledge history of world peace since 1750 (pp. 284–​295). New York: Routledge. Rojas, C. (2009). “Securing the state and developing social insecurities: The securitisation of citizenship in contemporary Colombia,” Third World Quarterly, 30(1): 227–​245.

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Sidel, M. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the regulation of civil society in the USA,” Development and Change, 41(2): 293–​312. Sitter, N. & Parker, T. (2014). “Fighting fire with water: NGOs and counterterrorism policy tools,” Global Policy, 5(2): 159–​168. Vauters, J. & Smith, M. L. (2006). “A question of escalation –​from counternarcotics to counterterrorism: Analysing US strategy in Colombia,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 17(2): 163–​196. Wallerstein, I. (2003). The decline of American power: The US in a chaotic world. New York & London: The New Press.

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Part III

Repressive security and civil society in Europe

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The spectacle of ghost security: security politics and British civil society Joshua Skoczylis and Sam Andrews

Organized crime and terrorism undermine stable and predictable socio-​ economic and political conditions. A core function of the state is to protect its citizens and institutions. Indeed, the state should be empowered to act in the defense of its interests (Walker, 2009). An important aspect of the state’s safeguarding function is protection and the reduction of fear amongst its citizens, within the confines of the rule of law. Over the last decade or so counter-​terrorism legislation has enhanced the powers of the executive while eroding civil liberties such as freedom of expression and assembly, which are indispensable features of democracies. The standard response to each new security challenge has been to increase security measures which inevitably favor security over civil liberties. Policing and protective security promise short-​term reassurance, conveying a false sense of safety and security despite their limitations (Coaffee & Lee, 2016; Dalgaard-​Nielsen et al., 2016). “It is a deep irony that, by alerting citizens to risk and scattering the world with visible reminders of the threat of [security], it tends to increase subjective insecurity” (Zedner, 2003: 163). Indeed, security is promoted as a universal good, but presumes social exclusion, due to the ever-​growing demands for extra protection which leads to isolation. This doctrine of national security is characterized by its expansiveness and has a tendency to push security outwards “to encompass more and more geography and more and more problems” (Neocleous, 2000: 10). This chapter argues that the UK government provides ghost security, security which is illusionary and ever-​expanding but is only partially able to prevent or protect us from the very security threats they intend to keep us safe from, because the very causes that lead to these breaches in security in the first place are not addressed. While earlier reiterations of CONTEST acknowledged that there are socio-​economic and political issues which need to be tackled to reduce breaches of security (HM Government, 2009, 2011), there has now again been a shift away from tackling so-​called “root causes.” As a result, UK security politics alienate and marginalize large parts of civil

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society and even create spaces where the very same behaviors and beliefs that lead to a breach in security can flourish (Greer, 2015; Skoczylis, 2017).

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The legal and policy context Throughout Britain’s colonial history to the present day, it has had to tackle security challenges such as organized crime and terrorism. Violence and torture were common features of counter-​terrorism across many parts of the British Empire and its territories such as Palestine, Kenya, Malaysia, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland (Carruthers, 1995). Although less coercive and repressive the counter-​terrorism campaigns in Northern Ireland were often still counter-​productive. It was not until the early 2000s that the importance of addressing issues such as inequality between communities was recognized as an important aspect of counter-​terrorism (Neumann, 2003; Dixon, 2009). Despite this, violence and complicity with torture and rendition remain part of the UK’s counter-​terrorism approach abroad (Drone Wars UK, 2018; Intelligence and Security Select Committee, 2018) and domestically government counter-​terrorism policy has tended to extend the powers of executive branch and the criminal justice agencies (Walker, 2006; Skoczylis, 2015). Based on the Lloyd Report (1996), the UK government introduced the Terrorism Act 2001, which was meant to be both effective and proportionate to the threat from all forms of terrorism –​Irish, international, and domestic –​which is sufficiently flexible to respond to a changing threat, which ensures that individual rights are protected and which fulfills the United Kingdom’s international commitments (Home Office, 1998: para. 8). To this day, this act provides the legislative foundation for the UK’s counter-​ terrorism laws. Indeed, following the landmark events of 9/​ 11, there was no rush to legislate. It is the London bombings in 2005 that led to numerous amendments to the existing legal framework (Walker, 2016). New acts include the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006, the Counter-​Terrorism Act 2008, the Justice and Security Act 2013 –​­introducing closed material procedures –​and the Counter-​Terrorism and Security Act 2015. This legal framework provides the state with comprehensive new powers and a tranche of new criminal offenses that allow the authorities to deal with individuals and groups engaged in the spreading of extremism and/​or terrorism. This legislative framework is designed to cope with the “ever-​ evolving” threat of terrorism and technological advances (Houses of Parliament, 2018). The Investigatory Powers Act 2016, for example, strengthened and extended the electronic surveillance powers of the intelligence community and police. There are some official oversight mechanisms that include the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism

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Legislation (2018), who issues an official report on the operation of the terrorism legislation to parliament and the Home Office, and to some extent the Commission for Countering Extremism (HM Government, 2018a). The Counter-​Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 further enhanced the state’s power and created additional offenses that “criminalise information-​seeking and the expression of opinion, divorced from the intention to harm or act in pursuit of actual terrorism” (Liberty, 2018). Max Hill QC, a former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, stated that: our legislators … have provided for just about every descriptive action in relation to terrorism [and need to] pause before rushing to add yet more offences to the already long list … thought without action should not be criminalised. Though without action or preparation for action may be extremism, but it is not terrorism. (Press Association, 2017)

Each reiteration of legislation appears to tip the balance in favor of more aggressive security measures, chipping away at our civil liberties. It is noteworthy that legislation passed since 2000 has often combined matters of terrorism with other security issues such as crime, hostile state activities, immigration, and organized crime. For a comprehensive overview of UK counter-​terrorism legislation and practices read the work by Jameson and Parson (2019) or Walker (2016). In the context of this chapter, there are two further laws worth mentioning as they either grant the state extensive emergency powers or attempt to depoliticize the work of civil society and civil society organizations.1 These are the Civil Contingency Act 2004 and the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-​Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 –​or Lobbying Act. The Civil Contingency Act 2004 sets out a framework for how authorities can respond to threats of national security, in its broadest sense, including terrorism, and the powers the authorities have at their disposal. Of particular relevance is Part 2 of the Act, which provides governments with powers far exceeding those found in the counter-​terrorism legislation. If certain conditions are met, the Act allows the government to temporarily suspend all legislation including Habeas Corpus, although it may not suspend the Human Rights Act 1998 or amend Part 2 of this Act. These temporary powers remain in place for thirty days, although this time period can be extended by parliament. To date the powers in Part 2 of the Act have not been used. The Lobbying Act is relevant in so far that it restricts activities and spending of civil society organizations including charities during elections if this is intended to influence voting behavior. The MP Angela Eagle noted it “seeks to silence critics of Government in the run-​up to the election while letting vested interests operate out of sight” (Houses of Parliament, 2013: col.

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257). In a joint letter to the Department for Digital, Culture and Sports, charities warned of a chilling effect on their activities as it is confusing, burdensome, and weakens democracy, rather than strengthens it. This Act disproportionately impacts on civil society organizations working with already marginalized and underrepresented communities, potentially shutting them out of wider political debates (Bond, 2017; O’Dowd, 2017). National security policy choices can be stark. These choices can “range from the rules of war and legal states of emergency through to nuanced versions of criminal justice” (Walker, 2016: 1). These policy choices can determine the nature of society. The UK’s national security framework is set out within a number of documents, which include CONTEST, the National Security Strategy, the National Cyber Security Strategy, the Serious Organised Crime Strategy, and the Strategic Defence and Security Review. The issue of security has been broadened to include economic security: “Our vision is for secure and prosperous United Kingdom, with global reach and influence … Economic security goes hand-​in-​hand with national security” (HM Government, 2015b: 9). This is again reiterated in the National Security Capability Review: “we will integrate economic goals and capabilities throughout national security” (HM Government, 2018d: 4). It should not escape the reader that austerity is partially framed as a national security issue. As a political narrative, austerity depoliticizes the management of socio-​economic issues. “The austerity story is a powerful narrative that is embedded in the public consciousness” (NEF, 2013: 2). Ironically, the very attempts at depoliticization have been attributed to the rise of extremism across the political spectrum due to disenfranchisement and a feeling of being left behind by society (MacCartney, 2013; Burnham, 2017; JRF, 2018; Mounk, 2018). Security policies target Muslim and ethnic minority communities as well as “left behind” white communities. These are the same groups which have become politically marginalized and disenfranchised by socio-​economic and security politics (Carter, 2016).

Security politics Security is not an absolute or a concrete thing. Rather, it is socially constructed and relies on intersubjective perceptions of threat, with political issues being named as existential threats requiring extraordinary measures (Buzan et al., 1998). Balzacq (2011) understands this “securitization” as an “assemblage of practices,” which include the use of emotive and strategic language, physical action, and political movements, used to prompt an audience to consider a referent object as existentially vulnerable to a particular threat. The generative fear of loss after a successful securitizing move thereby

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necessitates extraordinary action in the protection of that object, removing it from the political sphere and into a technocratic, ends-​driven space. The political nature of these acts means they are not self-​referential: securitization requires the consent of an audience and as such draws on national contexts and ontological meaning in order to create an interested collective. At the very least, formal support of institutions is required to change policy, and frequently moral support of a wider social audience is required to sustain actors beyond the politics of the immediate (Léonard & Kaunert, 2011). While civil society mobilizations are one way in which the populace challenges such acts outside of the ballot box, there is, of course, power imbalance in securitizing or desecuritizing issues, as the state has a privilege in the speech acts it makes. We can see this imbalance in the mass mobilization of civil society against the Iraq war, which subsequently went ahead anyway (Massoumi, 2015), and in the case of counter-​terrorism, the various social movements which seek to challenge the securitization of education, health, and social care relations (NUS Connect, n.d.; Together Against Prevent, 2015; Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2016). While many of these movements gained wide support, the strength of the state in making securitizing speech acts is evident in the fact that it acts anyway and en masse we tend to fall into line –​the significant propaganda and ideological resources of the state in backing up the securitization move are hard to resist (Eagleton, 2007; Althusser, 2014). As the nature of the move relates to intersubjective interpretations, the securitizing actor seeks to create a “truth” which does not simply imply a certain logic or necessity to action, but rather requires it –​as the securitization move is one which removes an issue from democratic politics, then a level of certainty must be understood in the threat. Foucault recognizes truth as being held in relation to power, in that “Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault, 1980). In each case, power has privilege, in either creating fact to back up the truth, or by laying the foundations for our understanding of truth prima facie. In attempting to securitize an issue, governments will draw on these “truths,” usually in the form of expert knowledge, in an attempt to convince their audience of the veracity of their claim and the need for extraordinary action (Stampnitzky, 2013). Wæver writes that this kind of “[s]‌ecurity knowledge is always knowledge about dangers, about what and how we should fear” (1995: 56). These moves always draw on context and intersubjective meaning and locate themselves within the real world of political difference (Wæver, 2011). This world of difference is one of identity difference, politics, and resource competition (Balibar et al., 2011; Laclau & Mouffe, 2014). Territory, constitution, and identity become politicized (Rumelili,

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2015), while the underlying causes leading to the insecurity in the first place become depoliticized. A prime example is the framing of the “Muslim problem” in Britain and the anxieties associated with it. These manufactured anxieties not only stoke the far right in the UK but also impact civil society’s views on necessary security measures (Ali & Whitham, 2018; Skoczylis & Andrews, 2021). Identity presupposes that there is the “Other.” There remains an: always latent, and often actual, threat in late modernity that the paradox of identity/​difference, in which every identity depends upon difference, and every difference upon identity, can be short-​circuited by fundamentalist drives to guarantee the truth and certainty of dominating identities. (Howarth, 2008)

The danger of security to democracy is that this “truth” of identity becomes exclusionary when attached to a securitized Other.2 “In order for the subject of security to be secured, it must be named, represented, and given an identity” (Stern, 2006). The fact that identity is not an absolute and is a product of constant renegotiation between subjects (Rumelili, 2015) further means that securitized exclusion makes difficult the possibility of an Other asserting themselves as a subject worthy of mutual recognition (Fraser, 2013). Challenging this “Otherness” is a difficult task, as not only is the security technology of the state mobilized against you, but the also the “truth” of the state as backed up by experts. Security professionals’ institutional knowledge about threats and the technological means to deal with such makes them impermeable to the criticism of “amateurs” within civil society (Aradau, 2004). One of the core dangers of securitization to democracy and civil society is that of differentiation between people. The danger of securitization in any form comes when it is used in conjunction with the kind of latent ontological fear bubbling underneath liberal democracies (Croft, 2012; Rumelili, 2015). Aside from seeking to protecting its citizens, states also seek to protect the status quo from threats, which drives its action and choices (Mitzen, 2006). This type of ontological insecurity, where one experiences a “state of disruption where the Self has lost its anchor for the definition of its identity and, consequently, its ability to sustain a narrative and answer questions about doing” (Howarth, 2008), is something written into modern Western democracies and exacerbated by neoliberal global politics. This is characterized by the marketized individual, upward capital flow, and subsequent migration from the global South to the North (Dardot & Laval, 2013; Ayers & Saad-​Filho, 2015). Wæver (1995: 56) observes that “[s]‌ecurity knowledge is always … about what and how we should fear.” According to this understanding of ontological security, therefore, the true danger of security to democracy is the destruction of the legal and/​or constitutional foundation

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of the democratic order. There is also the latent danger of inequality and othering rooted in our ontological and ideological sense of self.

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Counter-​terrorism Policies in the UK and the Other Not all security policies cause racism –​many politicians and practitioners take great pains to differentiate between the few “bad apples” who are the real targets and the community at large. However, because of the nature of security politics, these policies draw on, strengthen, and exist within an ideological framework which sees the nation “in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations” (Anderson, 2016). The essence of this argument is that nations are already in the business of creating an us versus them dynamic, but security actualizes it into concrete policy and homogenizes diverse groups of people into Other. This functions to marginalize those who are “Othered” and strengthen the position of those who are constructed as being in the “In” group. Within the terms of the relation between the state and civil society, it can create a dynamic where a group’s interests and identity is excessively scrutinized or placed outside the bounds of possibility, as alien or extremist (Kamans et al., 2010). This depends on how deeply the logic of security penetrates into civil society and national identity debates. Civil society’s criticism has focused mainly on the Prevent strand of CONTEST, but also on aspects of Pursue. Much of this critique is that the counter-​terrorism laws create a “suspect community” –​stigmatization that colors a certain person as a possible enemy or risk, which then comes to affect their own choices about social and political participation (Awan, 2012). This critique mainly focuses on how Muslim communities are targeted in counter-​terrorism policy, and how this targeting affects their perception across the wider British community (O’Toole et al., 2016). Kundnani argues that the way that counter-​terrorism and extremism are practised and spoken about in the UK in counter-​terrorism and government discourses consistently give the impression that it is Muslims who commit terrorism, with little focus on other perpetrators (Kundnani, 2015). While this may have changed recently –​and will be explored in a subsequent section –​this construction has managed to stick, to the point where people most readily associate terrorism with Muslims or Islam (Andersen & Mayerl, 2018). The suspicion cast on Muslim communities as a result of counter-​ terrorism powers arguably does create the kind of Othering dynamics within civil society theorized above. There has been evidence, for instance, that counter-​terrorism powers have had an impact on Muslim civil society organizations in particular (Quigley & Pratten, 2007: 6). A similar

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argument was made by Kundnani, writing, “to make radical criticisms of the government is to risk losing funding and facing isolation as an extremist” (Kundnani, 2009: 6). Walker (2018b) argues this approach has had unexpected consequences which have severely hampered charitable work in conflict zones and fragile states. Comparatively, the far-​right is thought to be part of “a now powerful anti-​extremism industry linked to government-​ orientated NGOs” (Fekete, 2017). Such allegations, and related suspicions of sympathies with or involvement in terrorist groups, have fallen disproportionately on the Muslim community since 9/​11 (Abbas & Awan, 2015). Such scrutinizing not only means Muslims will face difficulty in organizing themselves, but also that scrutinization feeds into the “truth” of otherness –​ seeing repeated investigations into Muslim organizations has a “no smoke without fire” effect, reinforcing the securitizing truth which places Muslims outside of civil society (Spalek & Imtoual, 2007). The aforementioned is, as Richards argues, inherent to the radicalization model of British counter-​terrorism which emphasizes risk and vulnerability, meaning that the scope of the policy is almost unlimited for targeted groups (Richards, 2011). The undermining of civil society occurs here when British Muslims are no longer able to effectively organize because of security interference and when their interests and their ability to advocate for them are denied because they are too “Other,” which may lead to self-​policing because of fear of stigma. However, it must again be pointed out that it is less so the policy itself which creates this effect –​Prevent referrals, for instance, are scrutinized by a multi-​agency panel which classes most referrals as “no further action” (HM Government, 2018c). It is more the reflection and amplification of wider attitudes in British society, and in Western society, which has long seen the Muslim as “Other” (Said, 2003) and has long had anxieties about cultural loss or an ontological insecurity posed by those who are “outsiders” (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). While such accusations have been common since CONTEST was created, those who work in counter-​terrorism are aware of the value of civil society to counter-​terrorism efforts. Part of the work of Prevent focuses on building community organizations. In 2017 and 2018, 181 community projects were delivered or funded by Prevent, with over 80,000 people taking part in some way (HM Government, 2018c). The Home Office states that through Prevent they “reach out to civil society groups who share our common values and want to challenge extremism” (Home Office, 2018). The services offered by the Home Office to these civil society groups include media and public relations assistance, funding, business planning, training, and help with reaching out to people in the right networks. The latest CONTEST strategy clearly outlines this, naming civil society groups as key partners in the fight against terrorism, stating that

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civil society groups provide a credible voice for counter-​terrorism work (HM Government, 2018b). However, the involvement of counter-​terrorism officers in civil society work arguably has some negative effects. In the first instance, it violates the maxim that civil society is separate or opposed to the state (Hegel & Dyde, 2005). That an organization can become close to the state through some kind of assessment of their utility to the security state gives undue –​ and unstable –​power to those organizations. Groups and organizations who fall foul of government “norms,” often linked to British values and its extremism definition, can find themselves marginalized or stigmatized. It is not “civil society” that is supported by Prevent –​rather, it is the right kind of civil society, as understood by Prevent officers. Organizations opposing Prevent have been characterized by the Home Secretary as being “on the side of the extremists” (Hymas, 2018). As of 2011, Prevent no longer engages with organizations deemed to have, share, or support ‘extreme’ views. STREET, once a recipient of government funding, found itself with this label largely because many of the staff were Salafi Muslims, and were seen as too religiously conservative (O’Toole, 2012). Here, policy draws a line between “acceptable” and “unacceptable” civil society organizations, with the latter not just being shut out of funding but also being labeled as a security risk. Furthermore, accusations have been made that some of the organizations funded or promoted by the government for the purposes of counter-​terrorism operate with continuous intrusion by counter-​terrorism police, in order to “check-​up” on the people using the services of the organization (Qurashi, 2018), even though this is not accurate, this perception creates anxiety in those using and operating the services. This anxiety, coexisting with knowledge of the “Muslim problem” discourses in the UK, operates to create a “bad” and “good” Muslim dichotomy which forms the basis of acceptable identities (Elshimi, 2015). It is not just that civil society is damaged because some organizations receive preferential treatment by government policy. It is that the security politics of this treatment creates an insider and Other, which feeds off and reinforces the same fears and stigma within wider society. In these models, the “truth” of the outsider originally constructed to sell a security policy becomes a wider social truth about ontological identity and who belongs.

The far-​right and environmental protestors: a new outsider? The government acknowledged the threat of the far-​right as early as 2015, something reiterated in its updated CONTEST strategy which named the far-​ right as a growing terrorist threat to the United Kingdom (HM Government,

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2015a, 2018b). Statistics released indicated that between March 2017 and April 2018, 44 percent of referrals to Prevent were related to Islamist extremism, and 18 percent were related to the far-​right. Of those referred on to Channel (the government’s deradicalization program), 45 percent were related to Islamist extremism and 44 percent related to the far-​right (HM Government, 2018c). There has been a steady increase of referrals relating to the far-​right, and an even larger growth in far-​right cases being seen as enough of a threat to be referred on to Channel. Netpol revealed that Prevent officers were actively referring anti-​fracking groups and protestors, due to the perceived terrorism threat, to be monitored and reported to Prevent (Netpol, 2018). The government views fracking in terms of long-​term economic security, and acts of civil disobedience are perceived as undermining this (Priestly, 2020). It is not a surprise then that anti-​fracking protesters have at times fallen under the auspices of Prevent and have been punished with excessive prison sentences (Lucas, 2018). The statistical reports from the government do not mention environmental or left-​wing extremism in the statistics (HM Government, 2018c). However, reports from activists have indicated that some protestors have experienced police harassment including warnings to their employer that they might be involved in “extremism,” and referrals to Prevent being revealed to associates without the consent of those referred (Netpol, 2016). Clearly, these actions intend to undermine legal protest. The securitization of protest was pushed further in 2018 when the “Stansted 15” were found guilty of terrorism offences for blocking the deportation of migrants on a Home Office chartered flight (Taylor, 2018), setting a precedent for future direction action. Neocleous (2006) outlines how the use of emergency powers to curtail protest and control labor has a long history beyond the 9/​11 environment. Counter-​terrorism powers and policies originally designed to combat terrorism have now expanded to include more issues that the government deems a threat. While it is certainly troubling that environmental activists are being targeted by counter-​terrorism police, it is currently unlikely that this will cause mainstream activists to be “Othered.” Britain has a long history of environmental activism, and “green” politics has returned one MP and 176 local government councillors (Open Council Data, 2018). Opposition to fracking is also a mainstream opinion (Association, 2016) and there has been none of the violent and vitriolic language posed against activists seen in anti-​Islam movements, and no suggestions that anti-​fracking is somehow anti-​British in mainstream institutions. On the far-​right, veteran anti-​Islam campaigner Stephen Yaxley-​Lennon has lunched in parliament at the invite of Lord Pearson (Walker, 2018a). Indeed, with the strength of the following of many of the contemporary anti-​Islam right, it is difficult to think

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they would too experience an “Othering” because of counter-​terrorism targeting. The far-​right has become increasingly mainstream and the framing of anti-​Islam protest as a “free speech” issue, therefore fitting in with the framework of ‘British values’ protected by counter-​terrorism policy, has seen success (Fekete, 2017). Whether or not there is even a far-​right “community” to target is also a matter for debate –​while Muslims experience interventions in mosques and madrasas, which remind them of their special status as a possible suspect. Interventions not specifically targeted at Muslims tend to be in schools, in hospitals, and in community centers which are rather more general in their demographic (Fernandez et al., 2018). Some practitioners have recognized this and spoken of the need to remove the idea of “community” from policy entirely, as it cannot realistically be actioned across disparate groups like the far-​right, who are only a group in so far as they share “family characteristics” (Baldet, 2018; Limbada & Davies, 2018). While the history of British anti-​fascism means those on the far-​right who adhere to an explicitly neo-​Nazi ideology are likely to be shunned, the rebranding of fascist organizations as nativist has had some success (Trilling, 2013). Framing white nationalism as “identitarianism” has also begun to see some acceptance, with Generation Identity (GI) flags being visible at UKIP rallies and GI leaders being hosted in the EU parliament by British MEPs (Mason, 2018; Mouvement pour une Europe des Nations et des Libertés, 2018). The far-​right’s ability to rebrand a less palatable ideology into something which is acceptable evidence that it is difficult to “Other” something which is both disparate but embedded within British nationalism –​the idea of the white, British native (Tyrer, 2013).

Conclusion The spectacle of ghost security is ever present with an ever-​expanding security framework which continues to marginalize civil society because, prima facie, security politics are divisive, although the impact is not equality shared by society. The nature of security is that it removes certain issues from the democratic space, hobbling civil society organizations (Neocleous, 2000). The paradox identified by Howarth of identity/​ difference feeds into this securitized space, creating Others and an in-​group which is typically colored by the kind of myths, historical truths, and material realities of nations which, historically, are racialized. This is because while some nations demand total allegiance to national identity (e.g., France) and others are more accepting of difference, national identity nonetheless requires internal unity and external differentiation (Anderson, 2016). The

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national construct, therefore, contains within itself a contradiction in that the demands of nationalism require some form of supremacy to make it an overarching and primary political identity even as it formally allows for multiple identities and espouses equality. The British reality, for instance, is one where racism and hate speech is criminalized and people of color are formally accepted into the nation, and yet white British people refuse to integrate with the “Other” people of color as they see themselves as the primary referent for national identity (Runnymede Trust, 2018). One need only browse social media after a non-​white British person criticizes British policy to find the typical comments telling them to “go home,” with the assumption that home is not Britain, because they are not white. If “politics is the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a collection of people who, in respect of their common recognition of a manner of attending to its arrangements, compose a single community” (Oakeshott, 2005: 83), then what needs to be tackled to properly democratize security are the very identities we hold in the first place. This is possibly an impossible task. As such, the only other option is casting the eye of suspicion back on security politics itself. The spectacle of ghost security with its features of ever-​expanding security frameworks and the marginalization of minority groups is occurring across Europe, Israel, South Africa, the United States, and many other nation states (Neocleous, 2006). Across Europe and the United States the immigration discourse has been securitized and migrants have been marginalized and explicitly blamed for rises in crime and terrorism (Wike et al., 2016). The slow but steady shift over the last century to increase the ever-​expanding security arrangements placing the state of exception at the heart of the rule of law as a means of administering capitalist modernity (Scheuerman, 1999; Neocleous, 2006) has been accelerated by the othering of migrants, Muslims in particular. This increase in securitization has not increased citizens’ feelings of safety, rather created a space where concerns about Muslims and migrants have become more common (Banai & Kreide, 2017). Across Europe and the United States, ghost security has been accompanied by a parallel rise of the far-​right and nationalistic political parties, espousing anti-​Islamic rhetoric and promising ever more illusionary security (Ahmed, 2018; Mounk, 2018).

Notes 1 In the context of this chapter, civil society is defined as “a web of autonomous associations, independent of state, which bind citizens together in matters of common concern, and by their existence or actions could have an effect on public policy” (Taylor, 1990: 98). Civil society organizations therefore encompass all

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organizations and associations existing outside the state including political parties and charities. The premise on which civil society is based may differ, but civil society and its organizations can be undemocratic and a strong civil society does not necessarily ensure strong democracy, or economic success (Dunn, 1996; Carothers, 2000). 2 “Otherness is the result of a discursive process by which a dominate in-​group (Us, the Self) constructs one or many dominated out-​groups (Them, other). By stigmatising a difference –​real or imagined –​presented as a negation of identity and this a motive for potential discrimination … Differences belong to the realm of fact and otherness belongs to the realm of discourse. Thus, biological sex is difference, whereas gender is otherness” (Staszak, 2020: 27).

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Greer, S. (2015). “The myth of the ‘securitized Muslim community’: The social impact of post 9/​11 counter-​terrorist law and policy in the West,” in C. Walker & G. Lennon (eds.), Routledge handbook on law and terrorism. London: Routledge. Hegel, G. W. F. & Dyde, S. W. (2005). Philosophy of right. Mineola: Dover Publications. HM Government. (2009). The United Kingdom’s strategy for countering international terrorism. London: HMSO. HM Government. (2011). CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s strategy for countering terrorism. London: HMSO. HM Government. (2015a). Counter-​extremism strategy. London: HMSO. HM Government. (2015b). National security strategy and strategic defence and security review 2015: A secure and prosperous United Kingdom. London. https://​assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/​government/​uploads/​system/​uploads/ ​attachment_​data/​file/​478933/​52309_​Cm_​9161_​NSS_​SD_​Review_​web_​only.pdf HM Government. (2018a). Commission for countering extremism. www.gov.uk/​ government/​news/​commission-​for-​countering-​extremism-​publishes-​plans-​for-​ wide-​ranging-​study-​into-​extremism HM Government. (2018b). CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s strategy for countering terrorism. London: Stationery Office. HM Government. (2018c). Individuals referred to and supported through the 18. Prevent programme, April 2017 to March 2018. Statistical bulletin 31/​ London: Home Office. HM Government. (2018d). National security capability review. Cabinet Office. https://​assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/​government/​uploads/​system/​uploads/​ attachment_​data/​file/​705347/​6.4391_​CO_​National-​Security-​Review_​web.pdf Home Office. (1998). Legislation against terrorism: A consultation paper. London. https://​assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/​government/​uploads/​system/​uploads/​ attachment_​data/​file/​265689/​4178.pdf Home Office. (2018). Factsheet: Prevent and Channel statistics 2017/​ 2018. https://​ h omeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/ ​ 2 018/ ​ 1 2/​ 1 3/​ f actsheet-​ p revent-​ a nd-​ channel-​statistics-​2017–​2018/​ Houses of Parliament. (2013). Daily Hansard. https://​publications.parliament.uk/​pa/​ cm201314/​cmhansrd/​cm131009/​debtext/​131009–​0003.htm#13100979000736 Houses of Parliament. (2018). Counter-​ terrorism and border security bill: Explanatory notes. https://​publications.parliament.uk/​pa/​bills/​lbill/​2017–​ 2019/​0131/​18131en03.htm Howarth, D. R. (2008). “Ethos, agonism and populism: William Connolly and the case for radical democracy,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 10(2): 171–​193. Hymas, C. (2018). “Prevent critics ‘on side of extremists,’ says home secretary Sajid Javid,” The Telegraph. www.telegraph.co.uk/​news/​2018/​12/​01/​ prevent-​critics-​side-​extremists-​says-​home-​secretary-​sajid-​javid/​ Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. (2018). Reviewer’s role. https:// ​terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/​about-​me/​ Intelligence and Security Select Committee. (2018). Detainee mistreatment and rendition: Current issues. London: House of Commons.

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Jameson, B. & Parson, N. (2019). Terrorism law and practice handbook. London: Bloomsbury. JRF. (2018). Austerity. www.jrf.org.uk/​society/​austerity Kamans, E., Otten, S., Gordijn, E. H., & Spears, R. (2010). “How groups contest depends on group power and the likelihood that power determines victory and defeat,” Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 13(6): 715–​724. Kundnani, A. (2009). Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism. London: Institute of Race Relations. Kundnani, A. (2015). A decade lost: Rethinking radicalization and extremism. London: Claystone. Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (2014). Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics (2nd edn). London: Verso. Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011). “Reconceptualising the audience in securitization theory,” in T. Balzacq (ed.), Securitization theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve (pp. 57–​76). Abingdon: Routledge. Liberty. (2018). Liberty’s second reading briefing on the counter-​terrorism and border security bill 2018. London: Liberty. Limbada, Z. & Davies, L. (2018). “If there is a Muslim community, is there a ‘far right’ community when it comes to preventing extremism?” www.connectfutures. org/​if-​there-​is-​a-​muslim-​community-​is-​there-​a-​far-​right-​community-​when-​it-​ comes-​to-​preventing-​extremism/​ Lloyd Report. (1996). Inquiry into legislation against terrorism. London: HMSO. Lucas, C. (2018). “The jailing of fracking protesters tells us we are winning this fight.” www.theguardian.com/​commentisfree/​2018/​sep/​26/​jailing-​ fracking-​protesters-​fight-​caroline-​lucas MacCartney, H. (2013). The debt crisis and European democratic legitimacy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mason, P. (2018). “Ukip’s turn to the alt-​ right is a warning sign: We need to fight back.” www.newstatesman.com/​politics/​uk/​2018/​06/​ukip-​s-​turn-​alt-​ right-​warning-​sign-​we-​need-​fight-​back Massoumi, N. (2015). Muslim women, social movements and the “war on terror.” Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Mitzen, J. (2006). “Ontological security in world politics: State identity and the security dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations, 12(3): 341–​370. Mounk, Y. (2018). The people vs. democracy: Why our freedom is in danger and how to save it. London: Harvard University Press. Mouvement pour une Europe des Nations et des Libertés. (2018). MEGA TV episode 9: Conversation with Tom Dupre from Generation Identity, UK. Make Europe Great Again TV. Brussels. www.youtube.com/​watch?v=RyDGjvYtknQ NEF. (2013). Framing the economy: The austerity story. London: New Economics Foundation. Neocleous, M. (2000). “Against security,” Radical Philosophy, 100(March/​ April): 7–​15. Neocleous, M. (2006). “The problem with normality: Taking exception to ‘permanent emergency’,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 31(2): 191–​213.

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Netpol (2016). Protecting the protectors: Monitoring the policing of anti-​fracking protestors ce 2014. London: Netpol. Netpol (2018). “Victory for Netpol in legal challenge over scale of surveillance on anti-​ fracking campaigners.” https://​netpol.org/​2018/​06/​11/​prevent-​tribunal-​victory/​ Neumann, P. (2003). Britain’s long war. London: Palgrave Macmillan. NUS Connect. (n.d.). Preventing Prevent: We are students not suspects @ NUS connect. www.nusconnect.org.uk/​campaigns/​preventing-​prevent-​we-​are-​ students-​not-​suspects Oakeshott, M. (2005). “Political education,” in P. King (ed.), The study of politics: A collection of inaugural lectures (pp. 73–​94). London: Frank Cass. O’Dowd, A. (2017). “Is lobbying legislation chilling public debate on health?” BMJ, 358(4225). Online version. Open Council Data. (2018). Open Council Data UK: Compositions councillors parties wards elections. www.opencouncildata.co.uk/​index.php O’Toole, T. (2012). “The new Prevent: Will it work? Can it work?” Arches Quarterly, 5(9): 56–​62. O’Toole, T., Meer, N., DeHanas, D. N., Jones, S. H., & Modood, T. (2016). “Governing through Prevent? Regulation and contested practice in state-​Muslim engagement,” Sociology, 50(1): 160–​177. Press Association. (2017). “UK terrorism law expert warns government over plans for new legislation,” The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/​politics/​2017/​oct/​24/​ uk-​terrorism-​government-​plans-​new-​legislation-​laws-​max-​hill Priestly, S. (2020). Shale gas and fracking. Briefing Paper CBP 6073. London: House of Commons. Quigley, N. & Pratten, B. (2007). Security and civil society: The impact of counter-​ terrorism measures on civil society organisations. London: National Council for Voluntary Organisations. Qurashi, F. (2018). “The Prevent strategy and the UK ‘war on terror’: Embedding infrastructures of surveillance in Muslim communities,” Palgrave Communications, 4(1): 17. Richards, A. (2011). “The problem with ‘radicalization’: The remit of ‘Prevent’ and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK,” International Affairs, 87(1): 143–​152. Royal College of Psychiatrists. (2016). Counter terrorism and psychiatry: Position statement PS04/​16. London: Royal College of Psychiatrists. Rumelili, B. (2015). “Identity and desecuritisation: The pitfalls of conflating ontolo­ gical and physical security,” Journal of International Relations and Development, 18(1): 52–​74. Runnymede Trust. (2018). Integration for all: Why race equality matters. London: Runnymede Trust. Said, E. W. (2003). Orientalism. Repr. with a new preface. London: Penguin Books. Scheuerman, W. (1999). “Globalization and exceptional powers: The erosion of liberal democracy,” Radical Philosophy, 93: 14–​23. Skoczylis, J. (2015). Local prevention of terrorism: Strategy and practice in the fight against terror. London: Palgrave.

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Skoczylis, J. (2017). “Counterterrorism and society: The contradiction of the surveillance state –​understanding the relationship among communities, state authorities, and society,” in Scott Romaniuk, D. Irrera, S. Webb, & F. Grice (eds.), Palgrave handbook of global counterterrorism (pp. 117–​134). London: Palgrave. Skoczylis, J. & Andrews, S. (2021). “A conceptual critique of Prevent: Can Prevent be saved? No, but …” Critical Social Policy, 40(3): 350–​369. Spalek, B. & Imtoual, A. (2007). “Muslim communities and counter-​ terror responses: ‘Hard’ approaches to community engagement in the UK and Australia,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 27(2): 185–​202. Stampnitzky, L. (2013). Disciplining terror: How experts invented “terrorism.” Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press. Staszak, J. (2020). “Other/​Otherness,” in International Encyclopaedia of Human Geography (pp. 25–​31). Amsterdam: Elsevier. Stern, M. (2006). “ ‘We’ the subject: The power and failure of (in)security,” Security Dialogue, 37(2): 187–​205. Taylor, C. (1990). “Modes of civil society,” Public Culture, 3(1): 95–​118. Taylor, D. (2018). “Stansted 15 activists vow to overcome ‘dark, dark day for the right to protest’,” The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/​uk-​news/​2018/​dec/​10/​ stansted-​15-​activists-​vow-​to-​overcome-​dark-​dark-​day-​for-​the-​right-​to-​protest Together Against Prevent. (2015). Supporters. http://​togetheragainstprevent.org/​ supporters/​ Trilling, D. (2013). Bloody nasty people: The rise of Britain’s far right. London: Verso. Tyrer, D. (2013). The politics of Islamophobia: Race, power and fantasy. London: Pluto Press. Wæver, O. (1995). “Securitization and desecuritization,” in R. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security (pp. 45–​67). New York: Columbia University Press. Wæver, O. (2011). “Politics, security, theory,” Security Dialogue, 42(4–​5): 465–​480. Walker, C. (2006). “Clamping down on terrorism in the United Kingdom,” Journal of International Criminal Justice, 4(5): 1137–​1151. Walker, C. (2009). Blackstone’s guide to the anti-​terrorism legislation (2nd edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Walker, C. (2016). Human rights and counterterrorism in the UK. www.ohchr.org/​ Documents/​Issues/​RuleOfLaw/​NegativeEffectsTerrorism/​Walker.pdf Walker, P. (2018a). “Bercow calls Tommy Robinson ‘repellent’ after Ukip Lords invite,” The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/​uk-​news/​2018/​oct/​24/​ john-​bercow-​calls-​tommy-​robinson-​repellent-​ukip-​lords-​invite Walker, C. (2018b). “Terrorism financing and the governance of charities,” in C. King, C. Walker & J. Gurulé (eds.), The Palgrave handbook of criminal and terrorism financing law (pp. 1085–​115). London: Palgrave. Wike, R., Stokes, B., & Simmons, K. (2016). “Europeans fear wave of refugees will mean more terrorism, fewer jobs,” Pew Research Center. www.pewglobal.org/​2016/​ 07/​11/​europeans-​fear-​wave-​of-​refugees-​will-​mean-​more-​terrorism-​fewer-​jobs/​ Zedner, L. (2003). “Too much security,” International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 31(3): 155–​184.

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Repressive security and civil society in France, post-​9/​11 Priya Sara Mathews and Richard McNeil-​Willson

Introduction France has undergone a process of securitization highly colored by its colonial experience. Counter-​terrorism –​whilst deeply racialized in all European states –​has been acutely felt by French Muslims, who have faced a coalescence of factors: a more aggressive Catholic-​secularism coupled with increasingly narrow and highly-​policed definitions of “national values”; counter-​terror concerns which explicitly target and problematize Muslim and minority communities; and a growing environment of far-​right racism and Islamophobia. This set of processes –​along with the counter-​terror laws propagating elements of it –​has roots in the French colonial and post-​ colonial eras, and examination of contemporary approaches to security should account for the early start that French authorities had on conceptualizing a so-​called “Islamic terrorism.”

The colonial and post-​colonial periods The history of Muslims and Islam in France is intricately linked to its colonialism in North Africa. France is one of the EU countries with the highest Muslim population, the most recent data show there are 5.7 million Muslims living in France –​about 8.8 percent of the population (Hackett, 2017) –​ with the first significant Muslim communities immigrating from colonized states (Miské, 2014).1 The French government of the time tended to frame the colonization of North Africa as a civilizing mission (Bertheleu, 1997; Silverstein, 2008), with native populations (particularly in French-​occupied Algeria) differentiated from European colonizers through a racially hierarchical system of laws. This legal division was not geographically contained but continued even when North African Muslims immigrated to France, denied access to French citizenship until 1958 (Cesari, 2002; Silverstein,

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2008). The system of governing North African colonies viewed Muslims as unassimilable, in contrast to, for instance, Berber communities, who were considered the more secular of the North African Muslims, and Jews, who were viewed as easier to assimilate (Silverstein, 2008). The first major immigration of Muslims to France were the colonial soldiers who fought along with the French during the World Wars, followed by a second wave in the 1970s, whereby 1.5 million were encouraged to immigrate to respond to labor shortages in France. This immigration from the Maghreb was looked at with suspicion and the discourse of the time generally viewed it as an “invasion” (Silverstein, 2008; Miské, 2014). The 1970s also marked the beginning of a series of economic crises in France and the end of the “30 glorious years,” leading to an increase in xenophobia and anti-​migrant hostility (Gastaut, 1993; “Marseille, quarante ans après les ratonnades de 1973, peu de lecons ont été tirées,” 2012). Events throughout the twentieth century in France indicated a hostility by national authorities toward French Algerians. On October 17, 1961, between 100 and 300 French Algerians were massacred in Paris after the French National Police attacked a demonstration of around 30,000 French Algerians in support of the Algerian National Liberation Front (NLF). Violence and discrimination from French police persisted throughout this period, with around 300 Algerians injured and fifty killed in 1973 alone. French Algerians faced severe racial profiling by the police (Miské, 2014), coupled with laissez-​faire policing against race-​based attacks –​typified in the ratonnade (or the “rat hunt”) that developed around Marseille, whereby immigrants were routinely singled out for assault by bands of locals (Gastaut, 1993; Silverstein, 2008; “Marseille, quarante ans après les ratonnades de 1973, peu de lecons ont été tirées,” 2012). In legal cases, perpetrators of such violence were largely either acquitted or pleaded guilty to lesser charges (Cesari, 2002; Silverstein, 2008; Xavier, 2010; Miské, 2014). Within this climate, the Beur movement developed.2 Echoing the civil rights movement in the United States, it aimed to unite immigrants from across religious backgrounds to build a movement against such structural discrimination and physical attacks. The movement culminated in the Marche pour l’ègalité et contre le racism,3 which left from Marseille on October 15, 1983 and reached Paris on December 3 of the same year with roughly 100,000 participants (Silverstein, 2008; Genériques, 2009; Miské, 2014). Such movements helped bring about a wider consciousness of a religious “other” subsequently put to the test with the Headscarf Affair of 1989. In a lower secondary school in Creil, three Muslim girls of North African origin were asked to remove the veils covering their hair. On refusing to remove them, the three girls were eventually expelled. This set the tone for a wider debate in the country –​one that national discourse has

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often taken pride in its tradition of secularism or laïcité –​about minority rights and integration. The headscarf has come to be the visible symbol of Islam and, in many instances, framed as a threat to a constructed French of way of life, with the debate continuing to today. Discussing the place of a woman in the Islamic society and perceived oppression, it has been critiqued as having very few women involved and engaged in the debate (Killian, 2003; Marranci, 2004; Geisser, 2010). Securitization of Muslims in France was already beginning to take shape during this period. The civil war in Algeria had substantial effects on the French Algerians, and the hostility of the French authorities toward violent groups led to a normalization of surveillance of Algerians, the centralization of belief in their lack of assimilability, and brought about questions, once again, about the adaptability of Islam to laïcite.4 Moreover, the discourse in the media and by politicians served only to reiterate the stereotype of the banulieu and cité5 youth as violent and unruly, exacerbated by widespread racial profiling by police and authorities, ultimately fueling a cycle of racialized violence (Murray, 2006; Silverstein, 2008; Geisser, 2010). The events of 2001 only escalated an already securitized environment for the Muslims in France.

Early security laws Legal counter-​terror structures in France, whilst boosted following 2001, are differentiated from many other European states through their formation and their explicitly racial slant against Muslim minority communities as existing long prior to the start of the twenty-​first century. A history of strong police and army repression against threats in France from communities linked to the Maghreb can be traced from the Algerian War of Independence (1954–​ 1962) and the subsequent creation of the Cour de Sûreté de l’État (State Security Court), which operated until 1982, significantly reducing human rights of minority communities suspected of involvement in violence. Since this period, there have been three subsequent milestones in terms of the development of French counter-​terror structures: 1986; 1993–​1996; and 2001 (Oehmichen, 2009). The first development saw the introduction of the first specific anti-​terror legislation which, rather than creating any new crimes, put certain criminal acts in a terrorist context and introduced new legal procedures for prosecution. The second set of measures occurred in the early 1990s: waves of terrorist attacks in 1993–​1994 and 1995–​1996 in France, spilling over from the Algerian civil war, led to the plan vigipirate, which enhanced authority powers at ports and enabled greater powers of detention. Finally, the third development that took place in the

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immediate aftermath of the 2001 attacks in the United States –​as with most Western states –​included the creation of new terrorist offenses, as well as the extension of coercive and covert tools for investigation which made use of advances in video surveillance, DNA storage, and tracking. The post-​ 2001 security paradigm has bolstered the powers of police, prosecution, and secret service, whilst substantially diminishing the powers of the judiciary (Oehmichen, 2009). As such, whilst 9/​11 represented a shift in counter-​ terrorism discourse and an increase in state power, France is differentiated in Europe through its long held and significant counter-​terror powers which have consistently emphasized the potential “threat” of Muslim minority communities. Specific current counter-​terror laws which are being utilized within the current long War on Terror context therefore have significant roots in colonial and post-​colonial security. A state of emergency has dominated French responses to Islamic State in recent years since the so-​called Bataclan attacks of 2015; however, it constitutionally draws upon Article 16 of the French Constitution (extraordinary powers of the president in the case of emergency) and was first applied against Algerian communities in l’hexagone in response to the military putsch in Algeria between April 23 and September 30, 1961. The plan vigipirate, introduced in the second tranche of modern French counter-​terror legislation, has continued to be applied in recent years, allowing the mobilization of civilian and military resources in sensitive areas –​such as national entry points (such as borders, ports) and public institutions (such as educational establishments). This, and highly similar seminal approaches, have been enacted in 1978, 1985, 1986, 1991, 1995, 1996, and 1998, prior to 2001 and, in the years following the start of the War on Terror, was reinforced in 2003, 2004 following the Madrid bombings, and 2005 following the London bombings (Oehmichen, 2009). Such laws have resulted in significant actions which have been critiqued as violations of human and civil rights. As Foley (2013: 61) states: Rather than highlighting the importance of more proportionate responses to terrorism [as with Britain in Northern Ireland], the Algerian experience has more likely reinforced the importance of the “security first” norm for French society.

Authority actions of 1993 and 1994 demonstrate a series of mass detentions against French Algerians, including “Operation Chrysanthemum” on November 9 and 10, 1993, in which eighty-​seven people were detained. French authorities also dismantled the Chalabi network during this period, targeting an important support group for the Groupes Islamiques Armée (GIA) by arresting ninety-​three people –​an action answered by the GIA with the hijacking of an Air France flight from Algiers to Paris. A further

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ninety-​three individuals were arrested in France in June 1995, which led to another set of terrorist attacks between July and October that year. It is within such a context of the focus on Algerian (and, to a lesser extent, other Maghrebi-​heritage) communities in France that marks the country out as one of the earliest Western states to introduce the concept of “Islamic terrorism” as part of the counter-​terror laws in 1986. This categorization specifically singled out Muslim communities as linked to de-​territorialized terrorism emanating from a Middle Eastern and North African context.

Counter-​terrorism in the current security paradigm The current paradigm of counter-​terror approaches started in the West with the attacks on the United States on 9/​11, which ushered forward a new antagonist to global stability, President George W. Bush almost immediately calling a for a comprehensive “War on Terrorism.” He added, “I will keep my focus to make sure that not only are these brought to justice, but anybody who’s been associated will be brought to justice” (“Remarks by the President Upon Arrival,” 2001).6 This signaled the start in the shift of targets of international security measures –​Muslims, more specifically Arabs and those suspected as being Muslims, became the symbol of the new global threat. This has ushered in the so-​called “new terrorism” paradigm, in which terrorism has been reconceptualized as something “particularly savage and relentless” in its aims (Ilardi, 2004; Enders & Sandler, 2005). Such Manichaean underpinnings create the conditions for another key feature: that of “terrorism” as constituting existential harm to “every free society” (Trent, 1980; Brachman, 2009). The state itself –​and not just the individual –​becomes a potential victim of those poised to destroy what are framed as “our” freedoms, democracy, and value for life (Jackson et al., 2011). From this discursive justification, a massive centralization of powers has coalesced, resulting in the implementation of sweeping counter-​terror legislation throughout Western states (Buzan, 2006). Whilst much of the current French counter-​terrorism laws are built upon France’s close links to post-​colonial Algerian politics, 2001 was nevertheless a pivotal movement in the perception and treatment of Muslims in France (Cesari, 2002; Murray, 2006; Vanparys et al., 2013). In the aftermath of the September attacks, Islamophobic incidents such as racist graffiti or attacks with Molotov cocktails against mosques, desecrations of Islamic graves, and attacks on women wearing headscarves spiked (Geisser, 2010; Amireux, 2014). In March 2004, a law was put forth banning the veil from schools and high schools and in October 2010, the headscarf was outlawed from all public spaces. Such an approach, besides being discriminatory in nature,

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has been widely criticized as erecting barriers for Muslim women and girls to access mainstream education and society (Killian, 2003; Amireux, 2014). Such approaches have increased hostility, exacerbated economic and social disparity, and sparked a downward trend in police–​minority relations, culminating in the riots of November 2005. The riots were triggered by the deaths of two banlieue youths who were fleeing from the police. The riots, which, quickly spread, led the government to declare a state of emergency (Murray, 2006). During the tensions in the banlieues and cités, Nicolas Sarkozy, the then minister of interior and later president of France, paraphrased a right-​wing slogan of “La France tu l’aimes ou tu la quittes”7 (“Pour Nicolas Sarkozy, ‘si certains n’aiment pas la France, qu’ils ne se genent pas pour la quitter’,” 2006; Gay, 2015). All this only served to exacerbate tensions between French Muslims and mainstream society, creating a feeling of second-​class citizenship in France. And this situation has only worsened. Every terrorist incident that is caused by a Muslim perpetrator, no matter where in the world it occurs, leads to an increase in Islamophobia and the 2015 attacks in France were no different (Murray, 2006; Vanparys et al., 2013). On January 6, 2015 the office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo was attacked for its irreverent depiction of the Prophet Mohammad, leading to the deaths of twelve people. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks people all over the world stood in solidarity with Paris with the slogan “I am Charlie.” However, in France, to not be Charlie signified that you were “counter”-​French values and were failing to condemn terrorism. Charlie Hebdo is a magazine that has been known for a severely Islamophobic brand of humor and for many Muslims to say “I am Charlie,” despite being shocked or outraged by the attacks, was a difficult thing to do (Kleinfeld & Blumenthal, 2015; Todd, 2015). The physical manifestations of Islamophobia increased in the first three months after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, whilst Islamophobic violence increased six-​ fold (“Islamophobia soars in France since Charlie Hebdo,” 2015). On July 24, 2015, the French government adopted a law expanding the ability to conduct surveillance. The law permits government intelligence agencies to collect vast quantities of communication data and personal information, requiring only the authorization of the prime minister. Although the law established an independent commission for the gathering of intelligence –​the Commission for Oversight of Intelligence Gathering Techniques –​whose approval is needed for the authorization of these surveillance activities, the prime minister may decide to ignore these recommendations (Moreno, 2017; Freedom in the World 2018: France, 2018). The law also allows that: authorities could install recording and filming devices in people’s homes or cars or private space, as well as bug computers,

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cell phones and other digital devices; associates of people under surveillance could also have their communications monitored, regardless of whether they are implicated in potentially illegal acts; and the authority’s right of surveillance would also apply to people in France communicating with someone outside the country (Rubin & Sanger, 2015). On November 13, 2015, several attacks took place in Paris and its suburbs leading to the death of around 130 people in what became known as the “Bataclan attacks,” after the nightclub in which the largest proportion of victims were killed. Following the attacks, the French government declared a state of emergency. The state of emergency allows the French Ministry of Interior and police force an indiscriminate amount of powers. The state of emergency initially declared for twelve days was then extended six times, finally expiring in November 2017. There were severe violations of the rights of minorities during this period (Amnesty International, 2016; HRW, 2016; Osborne, 2017). These abuses of the civil liberties led to a decline in France’s civil liberty rating in the Freedom House: Freedom in the World Report in 2017 from 1 to 2. The reported cited, “infringements on personal autonomy, particularly controls on dress and religious symbols, that disproportionately focus on women” as the reason for this change (Freedom in the World: France, 2016; Freedom in the World 2017: France, 2017). Furthermore, in June 2017 the then newly elected prime minister, Emmanuel Macron, formed a counter-​terrorism taskforce which would have around twenty people from different security services and would operate twenty-​four hours a day, seven days a week (Chrisafis, 2017; Jarry, 2017). During the emergency, powers were expanded to include giving the Interior Minister the ability to put anyone who could be constituted as a threat under house arrest –​however, the definition of what constitutes a threat is vague, leading to the house arrest of 350–​400 people. The enforcement of this law has also seen the raids of around 3,200 houses, places of worship, and restaurants of minorities. Most of these raids were conducted with little concrete evidence against the victims, led to severe damage of property and, in many cases, psychological trauma to the victim and their families. Moreover, discussion has recently expanded to debate the stripping of French citizenship from those who are considered to be a security threat, thus concretizing the fear of the immigrants as of an unequal status in French society –​a debate that has also arisen in other European states such as the UK and Denmark (McNeil-​Willson, 2017a, 2017b). This has helped to foster a situation of fear and mistrust toward the government and law for the Muslim population. House arrests have led to many being unable to go to work and thus losing their jobs, disadvantaging an already disadvantaged

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population, with unemployment among French Muslim undergraduates at 26 percent (Murray, 2006; HRW, 2016). A reduced Freedom House rating was maintained in 2018 due to the state of emergency being replaced by a permanent antiterrorism legislation containing several of the controversial measures: governmental representatives rather than judges have the authority to confine individuals; prefects will continue to be able to give orders for house searches (albeit with the permission from a judge); and police are able to set up security parameters and search people at events considered high risk. Moreover, the emergency rule allowing border check controls to extend to some highways, train stations, airports, and harbors would continue (“France approves tough new anti-​terror laws”, 2017; Freedom in the World 2018: France, 2018; Louis, 2017).

Religion and criminality One of the defining characteristics of the French government’s counter-​ terrorism approaches over the past decade has been the link drawn by authorities between criminality and terrorism, which has seen authorities focus on criminality as being a key component of radicalization. This emphasis on the crime–​terror nexus differs from, for instance, the UK’s CONTEST strategy, which has largely sought to delineate terrorism as a very separate set of processes from criminality. This has led to gang crime becoming framed as a form of “gateway drug” for greater radicalization, and the identification of two main physical sites of contestation as key areas for deradicalization: the prison and the banlieue. Between 2015 and 2018, three significant deradicalization programs were introduced which targeted French prisons, including the creation of 1,500 places in separate prison wings in 2018 “especially for radicalised inmates” (FRANCE 24, 2018). This is despite a widespread sense that previous interventions in prisons were unsuccessful, whilst linked deradicalization centers have proven a chimenea –​most notably, the flagship Centre for Prevention and Integration and Citizenship, which closed less than a year after opening in September 2016, which “failed to deradicalise a single individual” (Fillion, 2017). Security, as seen from a French governmental perspective, has long been described as “contaminated by crime, tribalism and the use of terror,” terrorists as “part criminal, part ‘political’ ” (Haut, 2006). From this framework has developed more recent iterations on terrorist actors as being “criminals, religious extremist and psychologically disturbed people” (D’Amato, 2019). The emphasis of the role of criminality within radicalization processes has become combined with discussions on national identity

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and the conceptualization of the terrorist threat as both highly racialized and primarily ideological. Whilst 2001 represented an important moment in the development of counter-​terror law in France, D’Amato finds the events of 9/​11 did not seem to represent a pivotal moment in the conceptualization of the terrorist threat in France, with debate on terrorism only increasing from 2004 onwards –​a trend also found in studies of UK debate on perceived extremist groups (D’Amato, 2019; McNeil-​Willson, 2019). Furthermore, only since 2010 have religious connotations and associations with terrorism –​ illustrated in the use of terms such as jihad, jihadism –​become dominant within French discussion on the national level (D’Amato, 2019). Since then, terrorism in France has become increasingly framed as a domestic, internal problem –​rather than a process occurring primarily beyond national boundaries –​as well as a specific threat to “national values,” French identity, and culture. The “Us vs. Them” rhetoric characterizing the long War on Terror, which, in the United States, has been framed so tightly around the interests of US capital (Lea & Hallsworth, 2012), in France has been reconceptualized as a fight to save and safeguard secularism: Europe is a target and France even more as we embody everything that our enemy wants to fight: human and civil rights; freedom of thought and expression; equality between men and women. Secularism and, in the end, the art of living with a certain idea of civilisation. The French Republic is in danger because it is completely and totally incompatible with the pan-​Islamist project of a worldwide Caliphate. (D’Amato, 2019)

Republican values, norms, and identity, built around a devotion to state secularism, have been mobilized in the response against terrorism in France, leading to the development of a specific national formula for understanding terrorism as the result of religion when added to criminality. Such a conceptualization was given further impetus with the Charlie Hebdo attack –​a publication singled out by violent actors because of its religious irreverence –​leading to a hardening of opinion that French national secularism represents the incompatible counterpoint to extremist, religious (Islamic) values. This has had a significant impact not only on the development of counter-​terror responses but has also dictated to some extent the response of French civil society to terrorism and counter-​terrorism.

Civil society France has made more draconian legal and organizational responses to terrorism than many other European states (Foley, 2013) and, with thirteen

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new anti-​terror laws put in place between 2001 and 2017 and more than fourteen counter-​ terrorism operations conducted abroad, French policy-​ making has been focused on the threat of terrorism since the start of the long War on Terror (D’Amato, 2019). However, there has been a marked shift in the way in which civil society has interpreted and reacted to processes of securitization, and this is largely based upon the normalization of a value-​based interpretation of security. Pre-​2001 instances of terrorism and political violence were marked by heavy-​handed approaches toward dissidents and elicited strong civil society reactions and movement actions against the extension and enaction of counter-​terror law. Since 2001, however, discussion of terrorism in France has taken on an increasingly value-​laden tone, as a growing overlap has developed between French republican values and internal security, against the dangers of “jihadism.” Meanwhile, the way in which French authorities and national discourse has stressed links between terrorism, religiosity, and crime has de-​politicized discourse on terrorism, as it is increasingly conceived as the replacement of French secular values with religious conservativism, mixed with exposure to the criminal elements of the French lower/​ under-​classes. Prior to 2001, French civil society seemed to have engaged in broad coalitions against the encroachment of state security and counter-​terror law into the civil sphere. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of Operation Chrysanthemum and the dismantling of the Chalabi network in the early 1990s, during a period of high levels of political violence in l’hexagone perpetrated by Algerian groups, civil society organizations developed significant methods of pushback against growing counter-​terror legislation. Despite there being clear interplay of attack and response between violent groups and French authorities, a clear civil rights agenda was set across a broad coalition of French society: elements of the judiciary enabling counter-​terror laws were attacked by the media and public opinion; and human rights groups publicly attacked the links between judges and the domestic intelligence service, the Direction de la surveillance du territoire (Oehmichen, 2009: 306). Indiscriminate detentions were particularly singled out for attack by civil society organizations, with “sweeps” representing the worst excesses of this newly centralized state power. However, in the years following 2001, there has been a widespread consensus in France that, with respect to security approaches, “the criticism of the system … in French civil society has been rather tepid” (Shapiro, 2008). Human Rights Watch has raised the same point, stating, “France has not experienced the same public debate or media scrutiny [on counter-​terrorism as a repressive act] as have Germany and the UK” (HRW, 2010). This represents a marked shift from the highly reactive civil society in France of the

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1990s that sought to challenge the expansion of the state security apparatus, toward a largely pacified civil rights movement that has modified and institutionalized its outlook toward counter-​terrorism. French counter-​terror law has been more integrated into the wider French judiciary system than, for instance, is the case in Britain (Foley, 2013). Again, this reflects the assumed criminal element of terrorism, in contrast to the Anglosphere which has been more inclined to treat terrorism as a “special case,” which operates beyond the confines of normal law where “the norms of prosecution and punishment no longer apply” (Wintour, 2004). This may shield French counter-​terror laws from the levels of criticism seen in Britain, as the UK government’s reliance on atypical forms of judicial responses to terrorism and the “external” nature of counter-​terror courts, convictions, and programs tend to single them out for criticism from a wide variety of civil society actors. The actors that have sought to push back against counter-​extremism in France in the post-​2001 environment have increasingly become limited to anti-​Islamophobia organizations that have problematized links drawn between religious conservativism and violence. Civil society groups that have raised concerns about French counter-​terrorism and its focus on promoting secularism and problematizing minorities have, in fact, been singled out for targeting across French media, politics, and from other civil society organizations. The Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France, for instance, has faced numerous high-​level security threats from actors motivated by their open criticism of structural Islamophobia within counter-​terrorism. Such racialized attacks are, of course, not limited to France –​UK-​based Muslim organizations that have critiqued the Islamophobic and racialized articulation of counter-​terrorism have similarly faced sustained attack, such as CAGE or Muslim Engagement and Development. However, such attacks have largely been directed by explicitly right-​ wing actors: Conservative MPs; elements of the right-​wing national media; or “counter-​extremism” think-​tanks or lobbies operating as “front groups” for governments, part of the strategic communication component of UK government counter-​terror policies (Miller & Sabir, 2012; Smyth, 2009). The left and center-​left in the UK have generally taken an approach challenging –​or at the very least, seeking to publicly check –​significant elements of the expansion of counter-​ terrorism in some way. Far more traction has also been gained by human rights and civil society organizations critiquing counter-​terror laws in the UK than in France, with non-​Islamic groups such as Liberty, Human Rights Watch or Hacked Off able to mobilize significant mainstream political support at an institutional level. Thus, we see an implicit racialization and classism within the enaction of French counter-​terror law and practice: by framing terrorism not as the

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result of political opposition –​as was the case with early articulations of counter-​terrorism during Algerian unrest –​but as the result of ideological and specifically quasi-​religious opposition to French values, counter-​ terrorism approaches have isolated French civil society groups that have sought to challenge the government. Meanwhile, classes and communities more likely to be exposed to street or gang crime –​such as minority communities with more limited access to education, employment, and mainstream societal engagement –​are now conceived as being those communities at risk from terrorism.

Conclusion French counter-​ terrorism represents a class and racial bias that, whilst clearly seen in other European states, is overtly articulated in the French case. France’s late and post-​colonial experience has, according to Foley, created a sense in government that the state is a potentially fragile polity, uniquely vulnerable and at risk from internal threats (Foley, 2013). Partly due to the Algerian experience, Muslim and minority groups have been problematized through definitions of so-​called “Islamic terrorism” in France long before 2001, and many of the current implementations and articulations of counter-​terror laws reflect this structural-​racial bias. The year 2001 represents the start of a process by which French authorities further securitized Muslims, something that has only gained pace following more recent mainstreaming of specific discourses framing terrorism as the result of the interweaving of religious conservativism and criminal activity. Not only has this created inappropriate and ineffective responses to narrow issues of terrorism, it has led to the wider problematization of minority identity and faith markers, reproducing institutionalized Islamophobia. The long War on Terror has also created significant changes on a civil society level, leading to the limiting of minority and lower-​class civil society actors to build wider coalitions against counter-​terrorism expansion and the disengagement of majority-​community French civil rights organizations in tackling abuses or excesses of counter-​terrorism. As such, not only has counter-​terrorism been increasingly predicated on racialized and classist lines, but so has civil society response, becoming dulled as greater focus is placed on Muslim minority communities as ideologically threatening the values of Republican France. As such, not only has security increasingly become a set of repressive processes against Muslim minority communities, but so has civil society itself, castigating and isolating Muslim organizations seeking to challenge the dangerous confluence of vast counter-​terror powers within the French state.

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Notes 1 The EU nation with the largest number of Muslims is Germany with 4.8 million –​ 5.8 percent of the population. However, these data were collected in 2010 before the oft-​termed “refugee crises” and hence current values may vary. 2 Beur is slang for Arab. 3 March for equality and against racism. 4 Laïcité is the French understanding of secularism. Born out of the separation of the Catholic church from the French republic, laïcité is, theoretically, a set of laws drawing the line between religion and polity. However, it has grown to be an ideology, a fundamental way of identifying oneself as French. The aim of this secularism is to ensure religion remains in the private sphere and defines a clear distinction between private and public space. 5 Banlieue and cité: banlieue has both geographical and social connotations, geographically it is housing developments, usually outside the city. However, socially the term has been used to refer to an area with a “social problem.” These areas are usually known for their high rate of crime and unemployment. Cité is a term used to signify ghetto. 6 Emphasis added. 7 “France, you love it or you leave it.”

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Repressive security and the unmaking of civil society in contemporary Russia Sarah L. Henderson, Scott N. Romaniuk, and Aliaksandr Novikau Introduction When Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia, he immediately sought to reverse Russia’s dramatic decline in the 1990s by recentralizing state power and more forcefully projecting this power at the domestic and international levels. The 9/​11 terrorist attacks against the United States provided further rationale for restoring political order at home and reasserting Russia’s national interests on the world stage; centralized power was the antidote to Chechen terrorism within Russia, and at the international level, Russia could increase its power as a key player in the US-​led War on Terror (WoT). However, many of the actions flowing from the Bush administration’s subsequent WoT challenged Russian interests, leading to Putin’s further disillusionment with the United States and its European allies. These events fed a historical Russian narrative of Russia as a “besieged fortress,” surrounded by enemies actively seeking Russia’s decline and the eventual development of a narrative in which non-​state actors such as civil society organizations (CSOs) would be portrayed and subsequently treated as “foreign agents” interfering in the affairs of the sovereign Russian state. Paradoxically, the US-​led WoT as a macro-​securitization program brought civil society and CSOs along with numerous other elements into the line of fire in a manner that would eventually aid Putin in his “besieged Russia” narrative. As this narrative became more entrenched, so too did the belief that Western liberalism, rather than the threat of international terrorism, represented the most significant threat to Russia’s national (i.e., internal) security. This shift had dramatic repercussions for Russia’s already weak civil society. Putin’s focus on the recentralization of state power led to significant structural and regulatory changes that substantially weakened civil society’s ability to check the government’s power under Putin; his view of the West as a hostile and dangerous influence was translated into policies that effectively silenced the Westernized, pro-​democracy elements of civil

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society (Hille, 2015; Loftus, 2019). The Kremlin simultaneously rewarded elements of civil society seen as government partners (International Crisis Group, 2018) to the state in its efforts to restore Russian power and prestige, domestically and internationally, and turn on those that were seen as the bad elements assisting in Russia’s perceived “vulnerability.” Thus, the Kremlin has selected and engaged in the systematic repression of organizations discordant with a national security policy committed to supporting the Putin government in its pursuit against perceived domestic threats to Russia’s internal stability. Specifically, there was a deepening suspicion of the West as an entity wanting to undermine that sovereignty at both the domestic and international levels, using instruments like CSOs and civil society interests with reach into other states and their societies. Putin presented this view publicly and dramatically in February 2007 at the Munich Security Conference, a gathering of heads of state and other important members of the administration. In this speech, Putin pronounced that international affairs were governed by a unipolar system dominated by the Americans, who resorted to the “uncontained hyper use of force” to achieve its aims, ignoring international law and trampling state sovereignty in the process (President of Russia, 2007: n.p.). As a result, the world overall was less safe. In particular, he charged the West with infiltrating international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and turning them into anti-​Russian organizations, and that this strategy was also being used through Western democracy assistance to CSOs, commenting thusly: NGOs are also being used by individual governments for such purposes despite their so-​called formal independence. Thus, revolutions in former CIS countries are fomented from abroad and elections there often are masquerades whereby the West intervenes in their internal affairs. (Quoted in Blank, 2008: 500)

This chapter contributes to existing literature connecting counter-​terrorism policy and CSOs within the context of terrorism in Russia.

Shifting dimensions of civil society From the beginning of Putin’s time in office, Russia’s economic, political, social, and international decline were all seen as threats to Russia’s very survival. The key player to strengthening Russian performance in all of these policy arenas, according to Putin, was the state. Therefore, recentralizing power and authority in the hands of the state in all areas of policymaking became the key to safeguarding Russia’s national security. 9/​11, which allowed Putin to frame the Chechen war as part of the larger global fight

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against terrorism, initially provided further rationale for why it was critical to empower the state and ensure stability. A number of subsequent changes –​ the creation of seven federal districts, to be overseen by a directly appointed presidential envoy (2000), more stringent regulation of political parties, the switch to a proportional representation voting system (2003), and the removal of the popular direct election of governors (2004) all facilitated the reestablishment of a “power vertical” to politics, with power more clearly flowing to the Kremlin. Moreover, through the selective use of law, or threat of the use of law, Putin was able to sideline several key oligarchs who used their wealth to publicly criticize the president. Their assets, whether media holdings, as was the case with Boris Berezovsky and Mikhail Friedman, or Yukos oil, as was the case with Mikhail Khodorkovsky, reverted either directly or indirectly to Kremlin or Kremlin-​friendly control (see Sixsmith, 2010). These policies had an indirect effect on civil society, both by dampening criticism of authority and by diminishing the capacity of the media to serve as a pluralistic medium to encourage accountability. Across the various policy arenas, Putin adhered to several key strategies to recentralize state power and authority, raise the costs for defying the state, and remove uncertainty of political outcomes. One key strategy has been the establishment of an uneven playing field in part, to guarantee the certainty of outcome. High entry barriers have also been put in place to enhance the difficult of political outsiders or non-​Kremlin sanctioned actors to access power, thereby insulating his position and increasing the possibility of him retaining it for a prolonged period of time. Another key strategy is the use of metaphorical carrots to reward loyalty and the selective use of sticks to punish detractors. Thus, for example, political allies are placed at the helm of stated-​owned or dominated companies such as Gazprom; opponents, such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, of Yukos Oil, are sidelined through the selective use of laws. The third and final component of the Putin model rests on maintaining high levels of popular support to legitimize the actions of the Kremlin. Throughout the rest of this chapter, we explore how these strategies were employed against civil society.

Impacts on civil society Putin also implemented policies that directly shaped civil society as part of his larger efforts to recentralize power. If the Yeltsin administration presided over a benignly negligent state vis-​à-​vis civil society by, for the most part, leaving it alone, Putin established a far more vigilant state. Over his first two terms, Putin’s overall statements reflected, like other areas of his political vision, a different view of civil society and democracy, in which he

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wanted to both join Europe while maintaining a commitment to so-​called Russian cultural values and traditions of centralized power and paternalism, despite the tension between these two. Putin’s vision of civic activism, for example, is one in which “people, participating in civil society, will regard as of primary importance not so much the idea of freedom, not so much the idea of interests, as the idea of service to a certain common cause” (quoted in Evans, 2004). In his view, civic groups can create unity and overcome distrust among social groups while serving as a force to pull together the nation in agreement on the main strategic tasks facing the country. This can be accomplished, however, while the various mechanisms of such a process are well managed and supervised by the state. As such, the value of various actors within civil society are in their abilities to serve as potential helpmates and midwives to the state. Putin’s vision emphasized patriotism rather than political protest as a mobilizing theme. Thus, in speeches since 1999, he has simultaneously bemoaned the underdevelopment of civil society and the inability of various organs of the state to effectively communicate and collaborate with it. This interest in harnessing Russia’s social organizations working primarily on issues to improve the direct quality of people’s lives has been coupled with a suspicion of those Russian organizations working on larger democracy themed issues such as anti-​corruption, government transparency and accountability, democratization, anti-​patriarchy, development, social welfare, human rights, that have found support from the myriad of Western organizations and foundations promoting civil society and democracy in Russia. Putin addressed this issue in his State of the Union address of May 2003; some CSOs, he maintained, were primarily concerned with obtaining financial resources from abroad, or serving “dubious groups and commercial interests” (President of Russia, 2004: n.p.). As a result, he argued, these civic groups do not serve the real interests of the people, in contrast to the thousands of organizations on the ground who continue their work unnoticed. As Semenova (2006: 323) writes, “[b]‌y these words he gave a signal to bureaucrats that they should distinguish NGOs, but leave the freedom to interpret what are ones to obtain help, and what are the others to be excluded and isolated.” The contrast between the “fake” non-​profit sector, which is motivated solely by money and career aspirations, and the “real” non-​profit sector, toiling away out of patriotic concern for the fate of the country, was reinforced in a meeting with the Kremlin-​friendly youth group, “Nashi.” Putin declared: [w]‌e need a civil society, but it must be permeated by patriotism, concern for one’s country, and should do things not for money but from the heart, eager to put right those problems that we indeed have and do this, I repeat, not for money but as the heart dictates. (BBC Monitoring, 2004)

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This suspicion of Western donors soon turned to hostility as a result of the color revolutions in the neighboring countries of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan in 2003–​2005. In each country, massive protests, in reaction to disputed elections, led to the resignation or overthrow of the previous, more authoritarian leadership. Western-​funded pro-​democracy CSOs often led the opposition forces, and were widely credited with playing a pivotal role in pushing for a more democratic (and pro-​Western) electoral outcome. Suspicion of Western donor motivation in Russia soon turned to hostility against Western interference in Russia’s informal “sphere of influence” as well as Russia’s “sovereign affairs.” As a result, Putin launched substantive policy changes, which reflect an “import substitution” model of civil society development. Civil society programs and policies embodied a nationalist approach to reducing foreign dependency through the “local” production of advocacy, which is driven by an active and interventionist state. For example, the government attempted to erect barriers to slow the flow of funds from the West to Russian CSOs with the intent of strangling the life source of entities existing and functioning within the Russian state that had negative impacts on the state. Putin’s policies essentially depicted CSOs as parasitic entities within the Russian body. Foreign and international organizations wishing to make tax-​exempt grants to Russian citizens or non-​profit organizations (NPOs) must be on an approved list compiled by the Russian government –​ a practice that emerged in European and non-​European states by way of infamous laws describing and treating CSOs as “foreign agents.” In 2008, by decree, the government reduced the number of preapproved grantors before, in 2009, ruling that only the organizations already mentioned in the decree could be on the list. While this did not directly limit the work of organizations, it did mean that grants from organizations not on the list were considered by the Russian Ministry of Finance as taxable income, a significant problem for many cash-​strapped CSOs. Furthermore, in 2008, Putin steadily increased and formalized corporatist mechanisms of communication between CSOs and the state. Putin revived the Yeltsin-​era idea of civic chambers as a way to facilitate state–​society collaboration, although this time at the federal level. In 2001, the Kremlin organized the Civic Forum, a conference that brought together 5,000 civic activists and representatives of CSOs from across Russia and key government personnel –​a maneuver of strategic co-​option and management of the thousands of civil groups existing and operating throughout Russia (Radio Free Europe, 2001; Alexeeva, 2002). This was the first time that government officials and civil society representatives from different regions of Russia met to discuss various pressing social issues in an effort to create more channels of communication and a

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potential for greater CSO–​state cooperation. In November 2004, the government unveiled legislation to create a Public Chamber at the federal level in order that “citizen’s initiatives could be presented and discussed” (BBC Monitoring, 2004). This legislation was subsequently passed and went into effect on July 1, 2005. The key function of the Chamber is to submit recommendations to members of the Duma about domestic policy, proposed legislation, and request investigations into potential breaches of the law as well as request information from and monitor state agencies (Evans, 2008). The members of the Chamber also serve on one of eighteen commissions examining bills or providing advice and expertise to the Duma on a variety of pressing issues, such as public control over the activities of law enforcement and reforming the judicial system, communications, information policy and freedom of expression in the media, culture, health care, environmental policy, and so on (Public Chamber, 2008). Reflecting the centralizing trends of Putin’s other reforms, membership is driven from the top down; the president designates one-​third of the membership, and those appointed members will, in turn, appoint another third of the members. The two-​thirds then will pick the final third nominated by regional social groups. This federal-​level Public Chamber has been replicated in most of Russia’s eighty-​nine territorial units. In 2002, the president reconfigured the existing Commission on Human Rights to create the Presidential Council on Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights, with thirty-​three members drawn from human rights, and broad-​based social organizations as well as individuals from other institutions of civil society (Stanovaya, 2012). While some feared this was an attempt to dilute the human rights element of the committee, the administration pointed out it already had the equivalent of a Human Rights Commissioner (and resulting policy machinery) with the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (which, as of 2007, was fielding 48,235 complaints) (Henderson, 2011). Finally, and perhaps most controversially, in 2006, the Duma passed ­legislation –​the Federal Law No.18-​FZ in 2006 also known as the “NGO Law” and the 2012 Foreign Agent Law (Federal Law No. 121 FZ) –​that increased the regulatory framework within which CSOs operate (Skokova et al., 2018; Watson & Burkes, 2018). Four existing laws governing the non-​ profit sector were subsequently amended. It introduced several new requirements for public associations, non-​commercial organizations, and foreign CSOs. The new requirements restrict anyone who may form an organization in the Russian Federation, expand the reasons for which registration may be denied, and increase the supervisory powers of the state (Bourjaily, 2006). This signaled a major implementation of state power instruments to fundamentally alter the operational capacity of CSOs without engaging each and very CSO directly.

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Of particular concern is the stipulation that CSOs may be denied registration if their “goals and objectives … create a threat to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, unique character, cultural heritage and national interests of the Russian Federation” (Henderson, 2011: 23). Furthermore, foreign CSOs can be barred from transferring funds or other resources to recipients for purposes of “protecting the basis of the Constitutional system, morality, health, rights and lawful interests of other persons, and with the aim of defending the country and the state security” (Henderson, 2010: 269). Finally, the law increases the number of documents that the government can request from organizations, and allows the government to send a representative to an organization’s meetings and other events. In sum, the law expanded the grounds upon which an organization can be denied registration and deepened government supervisory powers over both domestic and foreign CSOs, tightening the space around CSOs and making them feel the pressure of merely existing as a CSO in Russia. Thus, some maintain that while previous legislation, though confusing, unclear, and poorly drafted, and not particularly proactive, was guided by the principles of information, the current legislation is inspired by the principle of permission (Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2014). In other words, the government now has the ability to more selectively pick and choose who can operate and under what conditions. The creation of the Civic Chamber, the reconfiguration of the Presidential Council on Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights, expansion of the Human Rights Ombudsman’s office, increased government funds for CSOs, legislation allowing for social service subcontracting, as well as the Law on Local Self-​Governance all establish or further delineate formal mechanisms of communication and financial support between the state and society. Further, the Duma passed additional legislation regulating the non-​profit sector. These changes at the federal level have led to the replication of these efforts throughout Russia’s eighty-​nine territorial units at the regional level. At the federal level, these changes have been met with dismay among academics and policy practitioners interested in promoting democratic development in Russia (Stoner-​Weiss, 2007; USAID, 2007). Yet, these changes, rather than eradicating the space for autonomous citizen activism, reshape that space, and often in interesting and unexpected ways. Legislation governing CSO organization and registration, state support and funding for CSOs, and the establishment of formal channels for citizen input in and of themselves are not unusual in advanced industrialized (and stable democratic) societies (Salamon et al., 2003). Thus, the question lies in the design and implementation of these policies within a weakly democratic state or a state with authoritarian or dictatorial remnants that would grease the process of centralizing power over such elements in society as CSOs (as the case

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would be in some European states) or other entities branded as potentially dangerous to the state’s political and societal conceptions, rather than necessarily the presence or absence of them (Romaniuk, 2021).

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Putin 2.0: national security as regime survival In 2012, for the second time in his career, Vladimir Putin moved from the prime minister’s position to the presidency; however, he was leading a dramatically different country from the one he inherited in 2000. When he began his third presidential term, he has presided over policy changes in which citizens operate within a much more constrained environment, whether in regard to formal organization in CSOs, in their abilities to assemble in protests, or to exercise free speech through access to and dissemination of information through various media sources. One has only to look at the number of laws impacting civil society, whether by regulating the non-​ profit sector, or broader civil rights and liberties, to see the dramatic change. For example, in the Yeltsin era, only four relevant national level laws and regulations affecting civil society were passed adding to the basic rights and liberties outlined in the 1993 constitution. During Putin’s first eight years in office, five measures were enacted, the last in 2006. Since Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, thirty-​five federal laws and administrative orders have been enacted, with an additional bevvy of pending legislation and regulatory initiatives in the offing (ICNL, 2019). This increasingly repressive legislation was accompanied by policies designed to impact civil society overseas; the recent interference in the US presidential election campaign is but one of many examples of Russia’s efforts to influence civil societies in other countries in order to pursue Russian objectives. These developments all fall within a larger narrative in which the West, and Western liberalism, pose a threat to Russia’s existence. Putin’s triumphant return to the presidency was marred at the domestic level by a heretofore unprecedented level of protest, and ushered in a period of worsening US–​Russia relations, after the Medvedev and Obama administrations failed to improve relations in the aftermath of the 2009 “reset.” For example, in 2012, both legislatures passed laws placing sanctions on nationals from the opposite country who were associated with human rights abuses; the Magnitsky Act was passed by US Congress in response to the death of Russian anticorruption whistleblower and tax lawyer Sergei Magnitsky while in custody, while the Duma quickly approved the Dima Yakovlev law after a Russian orphan adopted by an American family died of heatstroke after being left in a locked car. But this was one piece in a larger set of laws and regulations designed to limit the influence of the West

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on elements of civil society under the argument that Western support is a threat to national security. The above influenced the establishment of the 2012 “foreign agent” law; it requires NPOs receiving foreign donations and engage in “political activity” to register with the Ministry of Justice. On the law regulating the activities of CSOs acting as “foreign agents,” Putin (2012) remarked: My position was that everything not directly related to politics should be excluded [from this law]. The only purpose of this law after all was to ensure that foreign organizations representing outside interests, not those of the Russian state, would not intervene in our domestic affairs. This is something that no self-​respecting country can accept.

The national security strategy of the Russian Federation claims the importance of civil society in providing security in Russia. Although civil society is assigned a (mainly) supportive role. Russian authorities have repeatedly called for the forging of a comprehensive security policy integrating military, socio-​economic, and political measures. In practice, however, it has prioritized policies built on the use of force and repression as emphasis is placed on military and police operations, rather than social and economic measures (Omelicheva, 2017). In addition to registering, CSOs are subject to additional audits and are required to disclose all information related to the organizations, including any that would label them a “foreign agent” –​a term most Russians associate with “spy” or “traitor” (Fix, 2018). This law tended to impact elements of civil society disproportionately, however; groups working on democracy, human rights, environmental, gender, and LGBTQ issues, for example, among other areas mentioned previously, are the ones most likely to work with foreign donors such as USAID, the Ford Foundation, the EU, and other critical providers of democracy assistance. While this law did not ban the groups themselves from working, it effectively stigmatized these organizations, a trend intensified by smear campaigns waged by a Kremlin-​ friendly media and a primary mechanism in a process seen in numerous other countries discussed in the other chapters of this volume (Amnesty International, 2015). The law also made CSOs’ work from an administrative angle far more difficult and cost-​prohibitive. CSOs also protested the broad definition of “political activity,” which covered almost all aspects of advocacy and human rights work. Groups also complained about the lack of an appeal process, or process to remove one’s organization from the list if it no longer received funding from abroad. The legislation was subsequently amended (in 2014) to authorize the Ministry of Justice to register groups as “foreign agents” without their consent (HRW, 2018). As of January 31, 2019, 177 entities were registered as foreign agents, only twenty-​two of

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them voluntarily (ICNL, 2019). Groups on the list include ones engaging in election monitoring, advocacy for refugees and migrants, pursuit of peace in the Caucasus, and the collection and display of documents related to Stalinist era purges. In a speech to Russia’s Federal Security Service officers, Putin defended the “foreign agents” law, stating, “any direct or indirect interference in our international affairs, any form of pressure on Russia, our allies and partners is unacceptable” (Winning, 2013: n.p.). The Kremlin also worked to limit the ability of foreign donors to provide financial support to Russian groups. For example, USAID had been one of the most prominent supporters of Russia’s transition; since it began work in Russia in the 1990s, it had spent around US$2.7 billion in a wide range of programs ranging from health, agriculture, and the economy, to civil society development (BBC, 2012). However, in 2012, USAID was expelled from Russia on allegations that it had meddled in Russia’s politics through its grant-​making activities to CSOs, rather than the “stated goals of development and humanitarian cooperation,” according to the Foreign Ministry. The loss of such a prominent development player was a significant blow to many CSOs; nonetheless, many other related US-​funded non-​profits and also private foundations continued to work in Russia. However, in 2015, the Duma passed further legislation popularly known as the “Russian undesirable organizations law” (Amnesty International, 2019; Davidis, 2019). Citing national security, the law gives prosecutors the power to declare foreign and international CSOs presenting a “threat to Russia’s defense capabilities, security, public order, [or] public health” as “undesirable” and shut them down (Amnesty International, 2015). The law would eventually be copied in elsewhere, including within Europe, notably Hungary (Romaniuk, 2021). Individuals or organizations found guilty of “carrying out the activities of an undesirable organization” on the territory of Russia can be jailed for up to six years if found guilty (Davidis, 2019). This includes organizations working with migrants or working in the area of ­immigration –​ a sensitive topic for Russia in which migration and the threat of violent extremism or jihadist terrorism have been fused. Organizations declared undesirable include prominent organizations involved in democracy promotion such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Open Society Foundation (OSF), the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the International Republican Institution, and Open Russia. In 2018, the law was amended to expand the list of grounds by which organizations can be declared “undesirable,” citing political activities related to supporting particular political candidates, or other advocacy related activities attached to issue campaigns. Similar to the “foreign agents” law, the wording is vague enough to encourage wide latitude in interpretation or what constitutes a threat, allowing prosecutors to

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shut down organizations involved in almost any kind of advocacy activity. While the list of undesirable organizations is relatively short –​as of January 31, 2019, the Registry included fifteen organizations –​the impact of the law is substantial (ICNL, 2019). Many bilateral and international organizations chose to cease their work in Russia out of fear of prosecution, not only of themselves, but also of domestic Russian organizations of individuals that had worked for or with them. Furthermore, critics argue that the Russian state already has tools in place to combat terrorist, extremist, and/​or nationalist organizations. The Kremlin since turned its attention to potential foreign influence on the media. In 2014, the Duma passed a law barring foreign investors from owning greater than a 20 percent stake in the country’s media outlets, a change from previous legislation setting the limit at 50 percent (this was in the midst of the Ukraine crisis) (Luhn, 2014). In 2017, the Duma passed an amendment to the 2012 “foreign agents” law, allowing authorities to list international media outlets such as Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/​ Radio Liberty as “foreign agents,” requiring them to label all information they broadcast as the product of a “foreign agent” and submit extensive financial reports (Reuters, 2017). This, in part, was prompted by the US implementation of a similar policy regarding Russia’s state-​run news outlets such as Russia Today News. However, in a media environment dominated by the Kremlin or Kremlin-​friendly news, it squeezes out additional sources of alternative information and perspectives informing the public in the civic sphere, broadly defined. The overall impact of these laws is to essentially stigmatize any element of civil society that has ties to, works with, or receives financial support from any Western entity. Furthermore, it made it much more difficult for certain elements of civil society that received little domestic support to do their work. Thus, the types of civil society that tended to support a more open, transparent, democratic, and sustainable Russia –​human rights groups, environmental groups, and others –​were also ones that often stayed alive as a result of Western grants. While they could, in theory, still accept financial support, doing so essentially branded them as traitors to their own country. Additionally, those organizations that received support from donors that were eventually placed on the undesirable organizations list could be held liable for the assistance, either by paying hefty fines or through potential prison time. In essence, groups promoting democracy were equated with being Western agents, and because they were Western agents, they were anti-​Russian and therefore threats to national security. Depending on their specific work, they could also be tied together with terrorist organizations or be implicated in the financing of terrorism depending on the services they offer or facilitate. Therefore, from the Kremlin’s point of view, they need

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to be weeded out. The Ministry of Justice has nearly unchecked power in terms of engaging in highly intrusive forms of scrutiny, from demanding large amounts of paperwork, which impedes on the operational capacity of CSOs, to altering their programs, to sending a representative to an organization’s events, and to review an organization’s activities. The Kremlin has also enacted a number of barriers to speech and assembly in the wake of the spate of protests in 2011 and 2012. In 2012, fines for breaching the rules governing public assemblies, or protests, were increased by several hundred times over for individuals and organizations (HRW, 2012). Those fines have since increased after Putin signed further restrictive laws managing civil society and activists in Russia (The Moscow Times, 2018). Individuals can face fines up to US$5,000 and organizations up to US$16,500 for violating regulations. Defamation was reintroduced in 2012 as a criminal offense in Russia; further, media outlets face heavy fines for producing defamatory public statements. Moreover, the Russian government has wide latitude to interpret what constitutes extremism, and to act accordingly. While the Russian Constitution prohibits associations aimed at seeking forcible change to the constitutional system of the Russian Federation, and bans activities related to promoting or instigating social, racial, national, religious, or linguistic supremacy. One method it has employed is its selective use of rule by law to target and intimidate critics. Thus, blogger and anticorruption activist Alexei Navalny, protestors from the 2011 known as the Bolotnaya 12, members of the punk rock/​performance art collective Pussy Riot, and self-​mutilating Russian/​performance artist Pyotr Andreyevich Pavlensky (who once nailed his scrotum to Red Square to protest Russia’s descent into a police state, in his view) are all high-​profile arrests and convictions used to serve as examples to others of what could happen if the state decided to use the full force of its authority to enforce the law.

Conclusion Relationships between security and civil society have received special interest in recent decades. Although it is obvious these relationships do exist, the concrete mechanisms of the relationships between civil society and security in different societies remain largely unclear and explored through informally collected information or unscientific data. In addition to different security threats societies face, the role of civil society in many societies, and its inclusion in political life, can also vary widely. Thus, the relationships between security and civil society in a concrete society depends on threats to security and the nature of civil society in that country. The type of political regime,

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such as democratic, authoritarian, or hybrid, is one of the main factors determining the role of civil society institutions. Hybrid regimes represent a most complex case of the place of civil society. Although most of the institutions typical for democratic countries, including institutions of civil society, do exist formally in hybrid regimes, they often do not function in a same fashion as in democratic states. The Russian Federation represents a classic example of a hybrid regime and therefore can play a critical role in building an understanding of relationships between security and civil society in such regimes. The case of Russia demonstrates that links between civil society and security are both mutual and complex. On one hand, the underdevelopment of civil society in Russia undermines security given that the public, especially in its organized form, is not involved in governmental security measures, and therefore does not support or even confront them. Examples: not reporting security threats, not supporting and even sabotaging. Governmental agencies suffer from a lack of information and feedback from the public. Yet, in some cases, the underdevelopment of civil society allows governmental security organizations to be more effective in security measures because they are not closely monitored by civil society and therefore operate unchecked or unencumbered. The ascension and election of Putin to the presidency in 2000 afforded a new opportunity to address the issue of Russian national security, and by extension, Russian identity. 9/​11 had a significant impact on Russian national security policy in several ways. First, it assisted in the legitimization of Putin’s increasing focus on quelling the Chechen crisis through any means necessary, and on his larger goals of restoring power and authority in a centralized state. Second, the much hoped for rapprochement between Putin and Bush failed to materialize. Rather, Bush launched his Freedom Agenda, in which he reaffirmed the US mission to spread democracy to all corners of the world, and launched two wars to depose the oppressive regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, installing weak, but nominally democratic, governments in their stead, much to the consternation of many US allies and foes. Over time, this resentment crystallized into an articulated foreign policy to oppose Western-​style liberalism and serve as an alternative power or counter-​weight to Western hegemony. Thus, the shifts in US foreign policy that resulted from 9/​11 had significant direct and indirect impacts on Putin’s own decision-​making regarding Russian national security. Given that Putin has been in power, either as president (2000–​2008, 2012–​) or prime minister (1999; 2008–​2012) for almost two decades, while checks on his power have steadily eroded, his vision of Russia’s national security interests, and the domestic and international policies flowing from that, have been easily translated into his policy preferences.

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Much of Russia’s national security has been reactive –​responding to Russia’s lack of influence in events in which it had an interest. For example, the 2000 Security Concept and military doctrine were used following NATO airstrikes on Serbia; the White Paper, “Current Tasks of the Russian Armed Forces,” came out after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the possibility of the Baltic countries joining the alliance; the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept was quickly issued after the possibility was floated of a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia; the 2009 National Security Concept was published after Russia’s quick and decisive war with Georgia (Giles, 2009). NATO expansion is not to ensure European security but to divide Russia and threaten Russia (Blank, 2008). National security becomes about regime survival and protecting against internal anarchy. Russia defines its national security/​interests in such a way that it assumes, perhaps requires, an adversarial relationship with the West. The threat from terrorism was downgraded, to be replaced by the internal and external threat presented by the West, and people linked to it in one way or another. Increasingly, US and/​or CSO efforts to promote democracy were treated as forms of informational warfare (Blank, 2005). A new type of warfare was being waged in the post-​ Soviet space, based on “networks of organizations.” Civil organizations, movements, foundations, human rights activists, and the mass media are all named as actors that, through staging protests and pickets, conducting seminars and publishing articles and reports, seek to “deliberately destabilize the situation” in the Russian state.

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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2013, February 18). “Concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.” mid.ru/​en/​foreign_​ policy/​official_​documents/​-​/​asset_​publisher/​CptICkB6BZ29/​content/​id/​122186 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2016, December 1). “Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016).” mid.ru/​en/​foreign_​ policy/​official_​documents/​-​/​asset_​publisher/​CptICkB6BZ29/​content/​id/​2542248 The Moscow Times. (2018, November 1). “Putin signs law increasing fines for violating protest rules.” www.themoscowtimes.com/​2018/​11/​01/​putin-​ signs-​law-​increasing-​fines-​for-​violating-​protest-​rules-​a63364 Omelicheva, M. Y. (2017). “Russia’s counterterrorism policy: Variations of an imperial theme,” in S. N. Romaniuk, F. Grice, D. Irrera, & S. Webb (eds.), The Palgrave handbook of global counterterrorism policy (pp. 515–​533). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. President of Russia. (2004, May 26). “Annual address to the federal assembly of the Russian Federation.” http://​en.kremlin.ru/​events/​president/​transcripts/​22494 President of Russia. (2007, February 10). “Speech and the following discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy.” http://​en.kremlin.ru/​events/​president/ ​transcripts/​24034 Putin, V. (2012, November 12). “Meeting of Council for Civil Society and Human Rights.” http://​en.kremlin.ru/​events/​president/​news/​16791 Radio Free Europe. (2001, November 22). “Russia: Forum aims to foster conditions for civic society.” rferl.org/​a/​1098064.html Reuters. (2017, November 25). “Russia’s Putin signs ‘foreign agents’ media law.” www.reuters.com/​article/​us-​russia-​usa-​media-​restrictions/​russias-​putin-​signs-​ foreign-​agents-​media-​law-​idUSKBN1DP0I2 Romaniuk, S. N. (2010). “Europe’s ‘dual’ challenge: The shifting frontiers of NATO and the EU,” Research Journal of International Studies, 13: 4–​16. Romaniuk, S. N. (2021). Under siege: Counter-​ terrorism and civil society in Hungary. Lanham: Lexington Books. Semenova, T. (2006, January). “Russian civil society and governmental policy,” UNISCI Discussion Papers. www.ucm.es/​data/​cont/​media/​www/​pag-​72531/​ SEMENOVA-​%20RUSSIAN%20CIVIL%20SOCIETY.pdf Sixsmith, M. (2010). Putin’s oil: The Yukos affair and the struggle for Russia. London: Continuum. Skokova, Y., Pape, U., & Krasnopolskaya, I. (2018). “The non-​profit sector in today’s Russia: Between confrontation and co-​optation,” Europe-​Asia Studies, 70(4): 531–​563. Stanovaya, T. (2012). “The Human Rights Council Deprived of its Rights,” Institute of Modern Russia. https://imrussia.org/en/politics/258-no-rights-leftfor-the-human-rights-council Stevens, D. (2010). “Osama or the Georges: Shifting threats and state policy towards civil society in Uzbekistan,” Development and Change, 41(2): 355–​374.

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Sarah L. Henderson et al.

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Stevens, D. & Jailobaeva, K. (2010). “False choice? The war on terror and its impact on state policy towards civil society in Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan,” in J. Howell & J. Lind (eds.), Civil society under strain: Counter-​terrorism policy, civil society and aid post 9/​11. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. Watson, S. & Burkes, R. (2018). “Regulating NGO funding: Securitizing the political,” International Relations, 32(4): 430–​448. The White House. (2001, June 16). “Press conference by President Bush and Russian Federation President Putin.” https://​georgewbush-​whitehouse.archives.gov/​news/​ releases/​2001/​06/​20010618.html Winning, A. (2013, February 14). “Putin warns against foreign ‘interference’ at FSB meeting,” The Moscow Times. www.themoscowtimes.com/​2013/​02/​14/​ putin-​warns-​against-​foreign-​interference-​at-​fsb-​meeting-​a21562

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Regional challenges, national responses: the impact of counter-​terrorism policy on civil society in the EU Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr Introduction On March 22, 2016, terrorists serving the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, hereafter ISIS) attacked two sites in the Belgian capital, initiating attacks at Brussels airport, and the Maelbeek metro station in central Brussels (murdering thirty-​two people), ripping the political heart of Europe. Located at the entrance to the European Commission building, Maelbeek station is a prominent transportation hub for people entering the European quarter of Brussels. The Brussels attack also centered on Zaventem Airport in northeast Brussels, a hub airport through which European travelers frequently pass, and brought into focus the threats facing the European Union from terrorist organizations such as ISIS. Thus, counter-​terrorism has become a more significant discussion for governments across Europe coalescing with the EU as a means of providing shared safety from terrorism. The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, commonly referred to as Europol, and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency known as Frontex provide examples of Europe-​wide mechanisms to tackle security related issues. Following the 9/​11 terrorist attacks and subsequent bombings in London on July 7, 2005 (7/​7) and Madrid on March 11, 2004 (11-​M), the EU established new counter-​terrorism mechanisms with the primary aim of supporting the United States in fighting terrorism and also curbing the rise of terrorism in Europe. This led to the establishment of the Action Plan for Combating Terrorism and subsequent strategies established in 2004 and 2005 aimed at providing a platform for effective collective efforts in addressing the rise of terrorism. Political actors and experts within and outside the EU realized that to efficiently curb terrorist attacks one has to follow the money. In other words, combating terrorist financing was seen as central to effectively defeat

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Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr 161 the proliferation of terrorist groups across Europe and in other political contexts:

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As international terrorists are often assumed to be very mobile, it is thought that their financial transactions may uncover their identity and location prior to a terrorist act. Moreover, financial transactions may reveal to whom terrorists are (financially) connected. By following the “money trail” financial investigators claim to be able to disrupt entire terrorist networks. (Wesseling, 2013: 13)

This led to the implosion of various counter-​terrorism financial surveillance mechanisms. However, these measures have been criticized because they impinge on the fundamental rights and civil liberties of individuals, most notably privacy rights and capacities to engage in financial transactions or freely donate money to charities (Vleck, 2007). However, while much discourse has revolved around the effect of EU counter-​terrorism measures (CTMs) on human rights and civil liberties, in this chapter, however, we examine the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) across Europe in countering terrorist attacks, as well as the implications of counter-​terrorism on these organizations. Specifically, we investigate four countries in Central Europe as a means to viewing their actions toward counter-​terrorism and briefly explore a fifth case in southeastern Europe. The four primary countries provide a sense of procedures and effects in vulnerable European countries. They include: Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania. Interestingly, three of the four countries joined the EU in 2004 with the EU-​25 enlargement; the fourth, Romania, in 2007 with the EU-​27 enlargement. This chapter builds upon comparative work linking counter-​terrorism and CSOs also examining multiple case studies, across different parts of the world (see Fowler & Sen, 2010; Howell & Lind, 2010; Sidel, 2010; Bloodgood & Tremblay-​ Boire, 2011). This chapter seeks to answer two central research questions: first, what are EU-​level counter-​terrorism and security policies, and how, if at all, are they related to negative impacts on CSOs, particularly in the four countries in Central and Eastern Europe? Second, what is the role of CSOs at the EU level, especially connected to the development of post-​9/​11 changes on national security and counter-​terrorism? These questions require in-​depth investigation of the overlap between government counter-​ terrorism and CSOs and are addressed through an exploration of the national security environments and post-​9/​11 security climate, and empirical support through government and CSO interviews.

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Methodology To find the limited overlap space between CSOs and formal, governmental counter-​terrorism, a research approach featuring triangulation (see Yin, 2017) is important given the limitations of finding concrete answers with any one methodology. The best mechanism through which to gain a critical understanding, and a highlight of this chapter, is specific elite-​level interviews among CSOs, the EU, and national governments. These interviews are then cross-​checked via interviews with counter-​terrorism government officials, and then referenced with a collection of archival resources as well as formal government documents at the national and EU levels. Employing elite interviews in the four countries across Central and Eastern Europe, this chapter provides a comparison of counter-​terrorism and security measures as applied from the EU. In total, sixteen elite interviews were conducted in Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania. One interview was conducted via government officials in each country, and an additional three interviews in each country with CSO experts. The methodology is specifically structured to examine the impact of counter-​terrorism policies on CSOs, and vice versa, especially where government has not consulted with civil society (Bloodgood & Tremblay-​Boire, 2011: 146; Howell & Lind, 2010: 281).

EU-​level counter-​terrorism and security policies Modern counter-​terrorism at the EU level has emerged from this backdrop of terrorism being a long-​standing issue in Europe with terrorism incidents that occurred in the 1880s marking the beginning of the first wave in Rapaport’s (2006) description of four waves. Today, Europe contends primarily with fourth wave (religious) terrorism, typifying Islamic terrorism in the post-​9/​11 environment. Madrid and London were among the most prominent targets of al-​Qaeda in 2004 and 2005 respectively. This style of terrorism was further compounded with ISIS attacks on Paris, Brussels, Nice, Berlin, Manchester, Barcelona, and London, among other targets. Given the growth and development of the EU, counter-​terrorism is now a pan-​European issue given that terrorists often plan, develop, and attack targets across national borders in order to best evade security and police personnel. Even before the 9/​11 terrorist attacks against the United States, the EU along with its constituent member states acted on the common understanding that efforts to combat global terrorism must be taken collectively and that states need to act in concert with international organizations

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Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr 163 such as the UN as well as smaller but equally important sub-​state actors like CSOs, research institutes, and agencies, communities of experts, and social advocates. Efforts to reach a harmonized approach to countering terrorism and securing Europe from terrorist attacks have continued over previous decades though not all institutions and not all national actors have worked collaboratively. This is partly so given that countries within the EU have differentiated experiences. Terrorist threats and attacks on countries can thus bring about a spectrum of responses due to the variation in threat level, attacks, impacts, and other conditions associated with a threat, such as persistence, the threat in relation to the ethnic or religious composition of a country, and the country’s geographical location within a given region. This section illustrates the evolution of the EU’s counter-​ terrorism regime. The events of 9/​11 and concern over attacks by al-​Qaeda cells lying dormant throughout Europe and ready to strike at any given time boosted the evolution of the EU’s counter-​terrorism agenda and program almost overnight. The immediate effects could be seen in the EU’s efforts to improve coordination and collaboration among EU member states on matters of policing, intelligence, and data-​sharing (e.g., tracking of terrorist financial data, sharing travel information of people traveling by airline), tightening cross-​national law enforcement partnership and efforts, and surveillance. Efforts were far-​reaching and affected the lives of every European in some form. The exigency of formulating and implementing further counter-​terrorism programs in and across Europe was buttressed by further deadly attacks that occurred in the heart of Europe’s biggest cities: Madrid (2004), London (2005, 2017), Brussels (2006, 2014, 2016), Stockholm (2010, 2017), Toulouse/​ Montauban (2012), Copenhagen (2015), Berlin (2015, 2016), Paris (2015), Nice (2016), Manchester (2017), Hamburg (2017), Saint Petersburg (2017), Barcelona/​Cambril (2017), and Strasbourg (2018).1 Argomaniz (2009: 153) argues that with these key events, “counter-​ terrorism [within the EU] has materialised as a major multi-​dimensional policy domain within the broader JHA pillar institutional space.” In a few years, the EU put together a common definition of terrorism, EU interior and justice ministers agreed upon and created a Europe-​wide arrest warrant (2002) –​considered one of the most critical instruments in the EU’s fight against terrorism –​created a list of terrorist and organizations (December 2001 and part of common position 2001/​931/​CFSP), the Framework Decision on Joint Investigation Teams (2002) facilitating investigation across EU member states’ borders. The events of 9/​11 also led to the establishment of the Council’s various working groups on matters pertaining to terrorism: the Council Working Group on Terrorism and Counter-​ Terrorist Working Group.

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The Madrid (11-​M) bombings redirected the EU’s counter-​terrorism trajectory in a profound way with a shift of focus away from a major terrorist event that occurred thousands of kilometers beyond the shores of Europe to an equally coordinated attack in the heart of Europe against Spain’s most populous city. In addition to the creation of the Declaration on Combating Terrorism and a surfeit of internal transformations that saw the creation of new protocols, special investigation teams, and terrorist/​ism evaluation instruments, 11-​M was a pivotal event in that it entrenched religious terrorism within the framework of the “War on Terror” in Europe while revealing that any country within Europe could possibly be a target of religious terrorism including suicide bombings fueled by religious fanaticism. 11-​M and 7/​7 jointly fostered a paradigm of mutual exclusivity (see Sanadjian, 2006), cutting a line through society and effectively separating Muslims and non-​Muslims. Such divisions assisted to no little extent in the fomentation of public abhorrence (in sections of European societies) toward Muslims as the “Other” who became ideologically correlated with terrorism and terrorist atrocities. The 2005 subway attacks in London fed the momentum of European efforts against terrorism, with a view to affording law enforcement authorities and their partnerships a new range of powers to prevent imminent threats from enacting any economic and human costs of the UK and other European countries. The attacks necessitated a fine-​tuning of the EU’s existing program to combat terrorism, enhancing the precision of its efforts and initiatives. Counter-​intuitively, this general movement also precipitated a broadening of perspectives related to terrorism and terrorist threats, to bring further elements into the center of interest. In the UK, the 7/​7 bombings gave rise to the UK’s counter-​terrorism strategy named CONTEST, which remained preoccupied with the prevention of terrorist attacks inside the United Kingdom itself through its 4Ps structure (Pursue; Prevent; Protect; Prepare). The strategy sought to preserve the daily routine of life within the UK though through congruence with the evolving (as is changes and how it may change) threat of terrorism and its potential impacts. Accordingly, while CONTEST, for example, has helped fuel the evolution of EU counter-​ terrorism policy, its broadness can be criticized from legitimizing the establishment of broad and vague counter-​terrorism policies elsewhere in Europe and beyond the European continent. Furthermore, following 9/​11 the EU formed an Action Plan for combating terrorism. Various actors within the EU realized that money is central to the success of terrorist acts and effective counter-​terrorism strategies premised on the obstruction of the flow of illicit transfers of funds for terrorist groups (Wesseling, 2013). This influenced the expansion of counter-​ terrorism financing strategies in 2004 and 2005. For instance, the 2005 EU

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Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr 165 counter-​terrorism strategy entails “intelligence-​led approach and improved information sharing within and between government and the private sector” (Council of the EU, 2005: 12). The EU counter-​terrorism financing regulation is tied to the guidelines of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) special Recommendation 8 and later 9. The FATF as well as its regional body in Europe –​the Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-​Money Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL) –​direct states within the EU to regulate all types of financial transactions within their countries as a way of detecting, preventing, and curbing the financing of terrorist activities globally (FATF, 2001). The EU incorporated the FATF directives into its law on anti-​money laundering and terrorist financing laws (Wesseling, 2013). FAFT and MONEYVAL directives facilitated the institutionalization of various surveillance mechanisms in financial transactions of citizens and foreign nationals as proactive measures of identifying terrorist groups before they carry out any attacks. However, the increase in and institutionalization of counter-​terrorism financial surveillance instruments in different part of Europe has been criticized because it creates difficulty in financial transactions and impinges on the fundamental rights of citizens and non-​citizens alike such as privacy rights, unlawful proscription, and detention (Vleck, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). For instance, Vleck (2007: 100) stated: the EU’s counter-​terrorism financial measures affects individuals in a variety of ways, including the opening and maintaining of a bank account, when transferring money between accounts and across borders, when securing a home mortgage, and even when deciding which charity to support.

While many efforts have rightly been directed toward understanding the adverse effects of EU CTMs on human rights and civil liberties, little is known about the impact of EU counter-​terrorism financing measures on the operational capacities of CSOs, including local and transnational development and humanitarian organizations operating in conflict zones or areas affected by terrorism and those engaging in activities in countries with sizable Muslim populations.2 In the age of globalization, the non-​governmental sectors –​international and local CSOs, think-​tanks, and other sub-​state actors –​play key roles in overseas development and humanitarian efforts. These organizations are closer to the individuals, can listen to them, and can cooperate with them to fight radicalization, extremism, and terrorism.3 The EU advocates to put the importance of the cooperation with the non-​governmental sector on the international agenda by acting as a positive example. However, while the above is desired and advocated, international and local CSOs have faced a number of administrative and financial or operational challenges following

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the implementation of EU CTMs. In this chapter, we use four case studies, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, to empirically highlight these issues.

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Insights from interviews with counter-​terrorism nationals/​institutes/​CSOs Slovenia General security environment and post-​9/​11 change in national security Despite the enhanced security challenges that the post-​9/​11 world brought to the EU, terrorism and terrorist-​related activities are not on the top of the security agenda of Slovenia (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010). In October 2018, Slovenia’s Interior Minister Boštjan Poklukar stated the need to “overhaul” Slovenia’s national security strategy while attending National Security Day in Ljubljana to meet the emerging and evolving security challenges of contemporary Europe. At the same time, Defense Minister Karl Erjavec noted that Slovenia was unprepared for current and future challenges (The Slovenia Times, 2018). Within the context of the changing security environment and calls for Slovenia to make necessary adjustments to its security posture to account for these changes, the state has undertaken no significant modifications to its security policy. As this case study of Slovenia will show, the Western Balkan country does contribute to European and NATO cooperation against terrorism, and its contribution plays an important role in the common European security framework. Slovenia joined NATO in March 2004 and the EU in May 2004. The post-​Yugoslavian, Western Balkan country’s population is two million, hence Slovenia’s contribution due to its size and economic resources is limited. After 9/​11, Slovenia joined the ranks of countries taking actions against the threat of terrorism. NATO and EU membership accelerated the process of law harmonization; however, the first legislative steps were taken only after 2008 when the new Civil Law entered into force.4 Slovenia’s capacities are limited, nevertheless, the government endeavored to participate in international missions. However, Slovenia’s contribution to the Western Balkans’ security framework exceed its efforts observed at the international level.5 During the 2015–​2016 migration crisis, the Western Balkans was a crucial component in European security overall. Nowadays, Slovenian police forces support North Macedonian6 forces for controlling the migration movements and for border control.7 After the construction of the Hungarian border fence and Germany’s shift in its migration approach, Slovenia moved to the stronger protection of external borders from its

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Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr 167 previous humanitarian approach. The country’s capacity did not make the crisis management possible on its own as one-​fifth of the Slovenian population went through the country during the crisis.8 Hence, international support is necessary for the country to tackle greater security crises. After the Slovenian parliamentary elections of June 2018, the country’s approach to external border protection was further emphasized. Slovenia’s value-​ based foreign policy, and its continuity over governments has remained. This Western Balkans country’s approach will follow its Western European and Atlantic allies’ rhetoric, which is desirable as Slovenia’s core economic interest is to preserve the free movements of people, capital, goods, and services made possible vis-​à-​vis a borderless EU under Schengen cooperation exclusively.9 Slovenia is a participating member of the Berlin Process; the diplomatic cooperation aim of which is to ease or facilitate future Western Balkans EU integration by creating a less bureaucratic framework for integrational talks. Among many important topics, crucial areas of security, such as cyber-​security, radicalization, violent extremists, migration, steps against illegal arms trafficking, or enhanced security cooperation with countries on the Western Balkans are on the agenda of the Berlin Process.10 Activities related to terrorism concentrate on drug and arms trafficking to and from Asia via the Western Balkans and on human trafficking. These activities can gain support from terrorist groups, therefore taking counter steps is highly important to Slovenian security.11 The current security situation in Slovenia remains positive from the democratic perspective in Slovenia given that the country has not implemented strong or repressive security measures to address the perception of an imminent terrorist threat that erodes the free and open civic space.12 The lack of any such policy parallels the lack of real, not perceived, terrorist threat in or against the country.13 As the National Security Strategy of Slovenia states, “the threat posed to the Republic of Slovenia by terrorist organizations and groups is at present relatively low” (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010). The Resolution and the Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy emphasize the new security challenges and highlight the importance of a holistic approach to relevant counter steps (Slovenia, The National Assembly of, 2015). Far-​right paramilitary groups have emerged in recent times (BBC, 2018), however, they do not represent the mainstream Slovenian attitude, which is rather moderate.14 State–​civil society interplay Public control in policymaking and transparency are furthered in Slovenia. CSOs can work in a safe environment, however, anti-​CSO, populist views emerged after the migration crisis, and their legitimacy is being questioned

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as in other Eastern European countries (Wolff, 2018; Malkova, 2019; Romaniuk, 2021). The director of a CSO focused on peacebuilding and development in Slovenia explained that: after the refugee crisis (2015–​16) a negative campaign has spread that people working in NGOs don’t really work, they just use public money, are funded by foreign agents such as Soros (even though almost no one in Slovenia is funded by Soros foundation –​OSF), they lack legitimacy (“who voted for you?”) and should be closed down. So, a similar trend is being observed as in some other Central and Eastern European countries.15

The idea of “safe” in this capacity is derived from the lack of any negative consequences stemming from misguided interpretation of the existence and function of CSOs, their external/​foreign connections, and potential impact on the national security of the Slovenian state. The operation of CSOs are not influenced by counter-​terrorism legislation and were not affected by the challenges of the post-​9/​1116 world, despite policies with the primary objective of preventing money laundering and the financing of terrorism (Romaniuk, 2021). Concerning the possibility of counter-​terrorism policies after 9/​11 burdening CSOs in terms of operational costs, peacebuilding, and development CSOs elaborated: They [counter-​ terrorism policies] are definitely not in public discussion. I assume that if there is anything, it is the intelligence services that are preparing such policies away of public sight, and they do not influence the daily life of people in any way. [On CSO compliance of counter-​terrorism laws] there are no such requirements. Except for the policies in the field of prevention of money laundering and financing terrorism (including criminal provisions in this field), which are mostly relevant for the banking/​financial sector that might apply to the NGO sector as well, to the same extent as all the other sectors.17

The call for greater transparency emerged after the migration crisis and not after the terrorist attacks of 9/​11. However, CSOs working in the field of integration of refugees have difficulties when they try to open bank accounts for those who come from countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan18 involved in financing terrorist organizations (see Isaacs et al., 2018). Therefore, refugees have continued to face difficulty in receiving financial support provided by the state, regardless of their granted refugee status. This is the case given that banks deny opening bank accounts for people who are blacklisted or come from blacklisted countries.19 One CSO representative said: Our main goal is to bring down the existing barriers for refugees, asylum seekers, or displaced persons that face irregular exclusion. Seeing the financial

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institutions, NGOs, and government working on the same page is always a challenge –​as it would be really anywhere –​but actually it has been, I wouldn’t say such a smooth process, but I should rather say a functioning process. There’s a favorable reception to speak of with processing times for document that enables those coming into the country to access financial resources. Wait times can be long yet outcomes are usually positive.20

Another interviewee from a CSO assisting with migrant processing noted the absence of government strategies and guidelines hindering the process allowing “vulnerable arrivals” to access funds. She also drew particular attention to the fact that CSOs working in this specific area operated unencumbered and free from the injurious effects of slanderous and unjust policies by the government: Perhaps one of the most factors has been government and societal support in general, which has granted us the space to do what has to be done. It definitely shows that there’s a mutual-​dependability and trust –​all strong support in part without social hostility, aggression, all while enjoying the ability to rely on mix of funding sources.21

An analogous account was given by a representative of a service and development CSO based in Ljubljana: Our work is recognized by private donors, the government, and praised from outside Slovenia. The state has worked directly and closely with organizations like ours. Our work progresses in a fairly consistent political and social atmosphere and not much has changed suddenly … No major campaign like the ones next to us in the region have happened. But the conditions can always change no matter where you are. This is what happened in Russia, in Hungary, and in Poland. One day things were alright and then suddenly without notice, organizations realized they’re operating in what looked like and entirely different place. We’re thankful that isn’t the case in Slovenia.22

The general portrait of government counter-​ terrorism policy and CSOs in Slovenia shows that in addition to the fact that CSO establishment did not change at all in the post-​9/​11 security environment in Slovenia, neither new or existing organizations have been significantly affected by Slovenian counter-​terrorism policies, no cases exist in which a CSO has taken the government or other agencies in Slovenia to court due to counter-​terrorism policies or operational burdens, nor is there any evidence to support government co-​option of CSOs by changing their mandates, programs, or assigning a specific role to CSOs regarding counter-​terrorism. It was further noted that “no changes” have taken place with respect to CSOs being able to preserve their independence or non-​governmental nature in the post-​9/​11 world in Slovenia.

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General security environment and post-​9/​11 change in national security Hungary has remained out of the general terrorism spotlight as compared to other European countries in Western Europe (i.e., the UK, Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway), with the exception of an isolated incident on September 24, 2016, involving a crudely-​ made nail bomb detonated at Oktogon, a major public square in Budapest, with the aim of killing two police officers. There were no fatalities and only two were injured. The perpetrator of the attack, twenty-​four-​year-​ old László Gergely P.,23 was apprehended by Hungary’s Counter Terrorism Centre (Terrorelhárítási Központ, TEK), convicted by Hungary’s Fővárosi Ítélőtábla (Budapest Court of Appeals), and handed a life sentence for having arranged and committed an act of terrorism. The case was an isolated incident and disconnected from the broader terrorism incidents taking place across Europe at the time (Romaniuk, 2021). The only other identifiable act of terror dates back to 1991 and was carried out by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. Other than these two “minor” or “isolated” incidents, the majority of notable violent incidents in Hungary are related to organized criminal activity. At the height of the 2015 “migrant crisis” (migrációs válság), Hungarian officials in power noted the Hungarian state was at risk of terrorist activity due to the possibility of terrorists sneaking into the country along with hundreds of thousands of migrants who were mainly coming from Syria and the immediate vicinity. Hungary moved to enhance its counter-​terrorism and security shield through the creation of multiple counter-​terrorism institutions and agencies, and through the construction of its security fence (határvédelmi kerítés) along the Hungarian–​Serbian border and eventually the Hungarian–​Croatian border as well. The creation of TEK received much criticism within Hungary for its lack of transparency and questions about the extent of its powers, in addition to the border fence, which was widely condemned across the EU but was enormously effective in essentially halting the illegal crossing of migrants into Hungary and the EU overnight. State–​civil society interplay An important element in state approaches to civil society in Central and Eastern Europe has been Hungary’s adoption of the Russian-​style “foreign agent” law in June 2017 –​what is officially called “On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Regulation of the Activities of Non-​profit Organisations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent.” Hungary’s version is known as the Act on Transparency of Organizations Receiving Foreign Funding (2017. évi LXXVI. törvény. a

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Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr 171 külföldről támogatott szervezetek átláthatóságáról, Magyar Közlöny 2017/​ 12, 19 June 2017) (“the NGO Law”) of June 13, 2017. The 2015 waves of migration coming into Europe saw Hungary play non-​ consensual host to thousands of irregular migrants for which the country was largely, and rightfully, unprepared. Exacerbating existing tensions between the government and civil society in Hungary, migration intermingled national security concerns, the threat of terrorist and extremist violence, with constitutional freedoms, and attacks against domestic (i.e., Hungarian) organizations characterized by the government as nefarious foreign entities. Migration was not the exclusive basis, but rather a facilitating factor, in the escalation of hostility that turned into outright aggression and predatory policy toward the third sector in Hungary. As the new epicenter of state–​ civil society conflict in Central and Eastern Europe, government enmity expanded to include the infamous and unpopular NGO law requiring CSOs to register and expose their financial support or donor information to the government. The ruling Fidesz party, which enjoyed a two-​thirds majority, published the villainous “blacklist” of organizations24 tied to concerns over foreign meddling and conspiracy style perceptions of CSOs acting as the organs of Soros and the OSF, of which insidious and tentacular plots against sovereign states in the region have been their modus operandi. For several years, Budapest (and other cities across the country) were peppered with the familiar billboards featuring the EU-​blue background –​ the “Tudta…?” (“Did you know…?”) billboards attacking Soros, migrants, and the EU. The billboards fused the threat of terrorism, migration, and foreign interest, promulgating, ironically enough, a Hungarian-​style “fake news” to the Hungarian public. Following a protracted exchange between the government and the Soros-​ founded and backed Central European University (CEU) (Közép-​európai Egyetem, KEE), the educational institution was forced to accept the need to relocate to Vienna in neighboring Austria. Nearly all of CEU’s academic operations in Budapest will be discontinued by 2021 and continue across the border (Romaniuk, 2021). CSOs were indeed resilient during government attacks against organizations. However, a coordinated approach to the reduction of CSO capacities in the country have had a serious impact in a number of ways. Foremost, the government’s efforts have done much to deplete both monetary and human resources of organizations. In tandem, the government smear campaigns across the country resulted in the cultivation of a social hostility and disturbing events enacted against either individuals on the streets of Budapest (although this was rare) and acts undertaken by private citizens against CSOs. In addition to physical attacks by some against people wearing the “#aCEUvalVagyok” (“#IstandwithCEU) lapel pins, government security

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personnel are documented shutting the offices of CSOs or forcing them to amend their programs (Romaniuk, 2021). The instrumentalization of policy into anti-​ CSO weaponry entails a range of measures and CSOs’ capacities to operate have been stretched thin. This was interpreted by numerous CSOs as a deliberate policy to engage in a “war of attrition” with organizations that lacked the necessary resources to hold out in such a prolonged engagement. Two CSO leaders who were targeted in a well-​known case described the construction of a government-​ friendly, CSO-​hostile environment as follows: Hungarian government tends to centralize and nationalize most of the country’s institutions and structures, creating huge state-​based or state-​friendly systems that include not only the corporate or business world but also the major structures such as education and health, etc., and also to create their own civil society in a way. In this system, the very centralized system, those NGOs that coordinate criticism about any government policies are viewed as opposition interfere with politics and they are said to go beyond their competencies by meddling in politics and state business. So civil society is kind of crushed nowadays in Hungary. Under these circumstances there is a feeling of intimidation by the government and also a polarization of the civil sector which is pretty much a consequence of the events that took place in 2014.25

The leaders of the CSO added, as a matter of describing a changing civil society environment, that: In the past you could make an equation between the two. But CSO as the organized part of civil society is certainly the most visible one. That has a structure and an identity and whatever. But under the present circumstances, when there is this very visible shrinking space for civil society, which is pretty apparent in Hungary, and as I say, there is an atmosphere of intimidation and fear, what you also see is more and more informal groups like talking clubs and other forms of organized movements, whatever, which don’t take the shape or the role of a structured organization.26

In an interview with the executive director of a CSO working in the area of human rights education and protection, and government transparency, the interviewee responded to a question about the Hungarian government using security and counter-​terrorism policy and frameworks to assaults CSOs. Beginning with the supposed relationship between the NGO laws in Russia and Hungary, it was stated: So, the rhetoric is strikingly similar with the Hungarian government naming NGOs as foreign agents. The Russian legislation speaks about political activity and those organizations need to be labeled or registered as foreign agents who are carrying out political activity and receiving foreign funds. These are

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exactly the elements that are represented in statements by Fidesz officials … Or the other example with striking similarities is the Israeli one. The government definitely used the security and counterterrorism policy and frameworks like that. NGOs, especially George Soros’ foundation and the NGOs that are supported by them are also portrayed as fueling the migrant crisis and some people within the government have gone as far as saying that these NGOs are orchestrating the migrant crisis and that of course plays into this counterterrorism and security agenda. So, it is definitely true that this government’s main goal, or so they say, is the protection of the nation, the protection of the country, and that is kind of the main agenda. And then there are various groups that impose the threat to the government that are the migrants, NGOs, and even Brussels meaning the European Union.27

Slovakia General security environment and post-​9/​11 change in national security Similar to Hungary, Slovakia’s security landscape is relatively calm with almost no terrorist incidents to speak of. Mustapha Labsi, a man suspected of engaging in terrorist activity, was held in Slovakia where the Supreme Court decided he could be extradited to Algeria, the country in which he had been convicted in absentia and given a life sentence (Algeria-​Watch, 2010). Labsi fled a detention center on December 19 and made his way to Austria. There is a general understanding that Slovakia has handled its national security policies amid waves of terrorist attacks within Europe since 9/​11 rather well. With a pre-​existing unit focusing on criminal offences and activity related to terrorism –​the Counterterrorism Unit (Jednotka Boja Proti Terorizmu, under which falls the Centrálne Bezpečnostné Sily or Central Security Forces), Slovakian security politics have worked more cordially with other societal bodies, including civilian organs and civil society. However, Slovakia was among Europe’s more vocal countries, speaking against migration and accepting migrants, at the apex of the migrant crisis, eventually taking the EU to court over obligatory migrant quotas, which were seen as tremendous violations of member state sovereignty by some governments. During Slovakia’s status as 2019 OSCE Chair, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Lukáš Parízek, referred to the OSCE as the developer of “powerful, human-​ rights compliant counter-​terrorism programmes, as well as platforms and mechanisms for government and civil society co-​operation to disengage individuals from violent extremism and terrorism” (OSCE, 2019: n.p.). While Slovakia has also worked closely with other nations and institutions on matters related to terrorism and counter-​terrorism, and engaged with

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CSOs within its own borders, its recent engagement with CSOs has raised questions of selectivity, conflating matters of migration, Muslim identity, and terrorism and violent extremism, as well as national security issues and threats.

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State–​civil society interplay The government sought to augment its oversight of the third sector with greater transparency, looking into the histories, funding, programs, staff complements, founders, etc. While this type of information is available to governments in many other countries, the government’s position that CSO data should be brought together under a single list elevated the government’s watch over the third sector to a new level, appearing to have drawn much inspiration from the Hungarian government’s initiatives in these areas. Bratislava Policy Institute’s Viera Zuborova (quoted in Civic Space Watch, 2018: n.p.) explained: In general, this draft law should not be so suspicious as it looks on the first view and in the context of the recent development. According to the draft law, the NGOs, and other organisations or foundations, should be registered under one common list with all information about the structure of the organisation, their financial transaction, their members and founders.

Highlighting that the information sought was already made available in public reports and records, Zuborova noted: The bill raises concerns because legislation adopted in recent years and in particular the latest amendment in May 2018, the transparency of NGOs and especially foundations is already stricter than the transparency requested to budgetary organisations, contributory organisations and public institutions.

Of the third sector’s position in Slovakia, an analyst from one of the most well-​known CSOs in the country had this to say: The situation is not the same here as it is in Hungary. I think we’re probably still safe. The relationship depends and it varies from topic to topic. I have to say that sometimes the prime minister is publicly criticizing NGOs and other people in the government and 445 parliament openly criticize NGOs and also see them as enemies of the people. This is very similar to what Donald Trump says about the media. It’s not a declaration of war but it’s sort of giving people the sense that NGOs are doing something that is not in line with Slovak interests and foreign policy.28

For now, “pressure from the government,” asserts a senior member of the Slovak Non-​Profit Service Center, “can be considered very limited. It is more visible on the verbal level rather than in practical steps and –​it has no impact on legislative changes, there is no ‘special’ state control.”29 These statements precede renewed attention to putting the spotlight on

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Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr 175 CSOs in Slovakia, where smear campaigns followed in step with those seen in Hungary during 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and ongoing government efforts to link CSOs with philanthropist George Soros, migrants, the possibility of terrorist infiltration of Europe, and reductions in the national security capacities of states, particular those receiving attention from Soros and the Open Society Foundation (OSF) in Central and Eastern Europe. In Slovakia, the familiar language rings: “foreign agents,” “foreign funding,” “migrants,” “George Soros,” “foreign influence,” and so on. The government’s direct and indirect strikes against the third sector suggest incremental strengthening and intensification. The process, though slow, has been one bearing striking similarity to the incrementally hostile position assumed against specific sections of civil society in Slovakia’s neighboring countries. Similar to a shift in public attitudes (at least in part) in Romania, public attitudes show strong and definite signs of a negative shift in Slovakia as well, bringing direct pressure against CSOs as a result of government campaigns of libel and slander. This has affected the relationship of different types of CSOs, including ones that work with the government on issues of security policy but are basically left alone to do their work and also receive funding from state authorities. In an interview with an analyst of a CSO focusing on security and defense policy and strategy, that individual stated: I don’t think the government helps much in communicating the value of NGOs to the public. So, if we have a prime minister who often relies on our papers and strategies, then says publicly that NGOs and the media are against him, then that really doesn’t help us. It would be much better if the government would basically either shut up or help us because we are allies in this, although we’re not necessarily or always on the same side. Sometimes if it fulfills the needs of the government, then they just say bad thing about us and that fits well into the narrative that people already have in their heads about NGOs being some sort of secretive third sector, and when we call it the “third sector,” it comes across as something very ambiguous and secretive that’s funded by the West or foreign countries.30

When asked about the use of security instruments in “countering” the influence and role of CSOs in Slovakia, a representative of the Slovak Republic Government for the Development of Civil Society and senior member of the Slovak Non-​Profit Service Center simply stated, “No, I don’t think so … we have not recorded any such activities or acts. From time to time, there might appear a ‘not so friendly’ media article from the government representatives toward CSOs/​civil society.”31 Where an acute point of strain between the government and CSOs exists is on matters pertaining to migrations and human rights and their

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intersection with Slovakian values, characterized by a member of a human rights CSO in Bratislava as a:

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Soft coercion: applying pressure on one side by the government using political discourse to tarnish the image of some working on refugee or humanitarian crises issues, and stoking of public distrust and suspicion for those who probably did not even have such preconceived notions about civil society actors, in the first place. (Original emphasis)

Where funding is scarce, CSOs have found that the already challenging environment has become replete with restrictions that hamper CSO efforts by constructing an unnaturally hostile policy environment of anfractuous intimidation. As such, government policy action, though it may be subtle and slight at times, in conjunction with the creation of a climate of public suspicion featuring public threats sent to CSOs, equates to an erosion of independence of both the organizations and those working for them.

Romania General security environment and post-​9/​11 change in national security Romania’s strong internal structures and instruments set in place to counter and combat terrorism, with updates strengthening existing structures even further, imply that the state holds a much stronger position in an ill-​balanced relationship with other bodies in the country that exist outside of government structures. In recent years, the Romanian government ratified existing EU-​ level conventions and frameworks concerning the threat of terrorism within Europe and against European nations. These have included, among other initiatives, the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, the Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, and the Council of Europe Convention on laundering, search, seizure, and confiscation of the proceeds from crime and on the financing of terrorism. Romania lies on the edge of the EU, and plays an important function in the policing and security of the Union’s external borders, presiding over potential terrorist and terrorist networks, including asymmetric security threats, and organized criminal activity such as trafficking in people and objects. Romania has been just one among many states across Europe and the world that demonstrated its assumed understanding of the need to strengthen national provisions related to terrorism in the aftermath of 9/​ 11 (for a full account, see Degeratu, 2005). Domestic efforts in Romania have seen the emergence of a holistic approach in which a key security mantra holds, “security is everyone’s business.” This general disposition

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Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr 177 has brought basically every governmental and private actor into the state’s security matrix, including CSOs, the media, private research institutes, and scholars. In part, this interaction has helped the Romanian government in overcoming many of the challenges it faces in its overall counter-​terrorism and security composition and practice, though issues of reach, impact, and abuse of developed powers persist.

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State–​civil society interplay Focus has increasingly been placed on anti-​ corruption protestors and NGOs and entities that turn their attention to the government and attempt to reform corrupt activities of the state. Protestors and supporting NGOs have been labeled “paid protestors” of George Soros, presenting civil society in Romania, as it has been in Poland, North Macedonia, and Russia, as conspirators of Soros anti-​state, anti-​government, and over-​liberalization agendas. Strong anti-​civil society rhetoric has been supported by the government with the state making similar statements in a fashion that can act as a champion of anti-​civil society sentiment and activity. This sort of rhetoric fortifies the field of legitimacy with respect to such activity in the country. Further, and in addition to its existing rhetoric, efforts on the part of the Romanian government have sought to stifle the funding fountain for NGOs in the country, to dwindle their critical monetary lifelines to the external, non-​Romanian world, where funding is more abundant than inside a relatively resource-​scarce environment particularly for NGOs and third sector actors. In 2017, Romania followed in the footsteps of its Hungarian neighbor and adopted its own measures to force NGOs to expose their donors. Liviu Pleşoianu, Social Democracy Party (PSD) deputy and Şerban Nicolae, a PSD senator and politician who proposed changes to Romania’s Pardon Bill, introduced the bill to parliament. A worker at a development and advocacy NGO in Bucharest called the move “an insidious attempt to make us reveal our source of funding and in doing that somehow making this look like a covert game on NGOs’ parts to accrue resources to be used against the government.”32 Indeed, this has clearly spawned concern about the intentions on the part of the government when calling into question the motivations, intentions, and covert-​style operations of NGOs against the tacit process through which the law in Romania was passed –​“no debate, no deliberation, and consultation of any kind,” stated an NGO leader of a government watchdog organization in the country’s capital.33 “Transformative,” is how an executive-​level member of an advocacy group in Bucharest described the government’s efforts: How the government speaks about civil society can fundamentally alter the people’s perception about what we do and why. We see our relationship with

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the government as a fight simply because we find ourselves under attack. They accuse the civil society of this country as holding bad intentions, threaten violence against protestors, and strive to pick away at the ground beneath our feet. They try to cut us off and then they try to isolate us, and then they try to shield themselves, all while effecting inelegant attempts to turn the opinions of its own people against a section of society that is essential to Romania’s democratic future.34

Romania’s 2017 anti-​NGO law was a near carbon copy of the Hungarian government’s own NGO law, which was inspired by Russia’s law against NGOs that present a barrier to the Putin government’s policies. Subsequent emergency ordinances that the government attempted to pass met with stark criticism and backlash from Romanian society, and culminated in mass protests in Bucharest with tens of thousands of people taking to the streets in freezing cold temperatures at the end of January. Corruption was the focal point concerning government attempts to pass further legislation that would protect politicians against investigations regarding corruption. The government has attempted to tie together the funding of NGOs in Romania with the vulnerability of the country and national security concerns, as the funding law would have the potential to “weed out” funders of NGOs in the country with intentions to “undermine national security,” stated a member of the current government.35 A member of Romania’s opposition party remarked: the security concerns of the government has pulled civil society further and further into the open … I am fully aware of their regard for those groups of people who protest and advocate for change in government … Speaking from experience, many of the party members have associated NGOs in Romania with some of the greatest threats a nation can face.36

This arrangement has also illustrated the government’s preference for NGOs and their funders with acceptable intentions to operate without seeking to undermine current government practices. Responding to the controversial law, one senior member of a transparency NGO in the country explains: The bill holds a dual-​purpose: show with full description those behind the organizations and offering the supported need to sustain essential operations; failing to achieve this end, nullify an organization’s legal right to function for a period of 30 days. Within that period though lies the question about the future of the organizations –​will its license be renewed, will it be shut down entirely, or what? Further exposure rests with the condition of renewal for a five-​year period contingent upon acceptable and appropriate activities and all background about the NGO. This means funding, unquestionably. We can see in the bill where the government priorities lie and in fact, they did themselves a disfavor in doing so … The public funding categorizes

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Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr 179 NGOs according to an activities-​preference with the most funding possible going to the so-​called non-​invasive NGOs or those with neutral operational outcomes.37

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A view to the Balkans: impacts in North Macedonia Civil society has also come under pressure in North Macedonia and elsewhere in the Balkan countries, with pledges by North Macedonian Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski, in early 2017 to “cleanse” (Blazhevski, 2017; European Digital Rights [EDRi], 2017; Ifex.org, 2017) the civil society sector in the country and carry out a program of “de-​Sorosization” (Knezevic, 2017). In North Macedonia’s evolving efforts to counter terrorism and extremism, civil society and CSOs have occupied a peculiar position and one of interest for social researchers. CSOs can play an important role in government efforts of countering terrorism but they also need to be officially recognized and incorporated into the formal process possibly leading to the establishment and implementation of effective CTMs. CSO involvement in CTM processes in North Macedonia is virtually non-​ existent. At the same time, civil society and CSOs, both of which can be valuable assets when it comes to combating violent extremism and countering terrorism, have also become the focus of repressive government measures. The term terrorism has also become a critical part of the readily available language with which to frame other elements within North Macedonian society that can threaten the government, and there is always the risk of combining the concepts of terrorism and violent extremism with civil society to build an image that CSOs in particular pose a serious threat toward the state.38 Inextricably connected to the uptake of CTMs, the possibly conflation of terrorism and violent extremism, and a growing antagonism toward CSOs or organizations commonly termed “foreign agents,” is the lack of qualitative and quantitative about individual and community level knowledge and understanding of civil society and CSOs operating in different fields. Understanding of CSOs, specifically what they are, what they do, how they operate, and what sort of connection they have, are informed by stereotypes, or are generated by the so-​called “rumor mill” in a way that can have destructive effects on CSO capacities, and lead to individual and group violence against CSOs or supporters of CSOs in a given country. Such has been the case in Hungary, where instances of physical violence have been reported against supporters of independent organizations that may or may not receive their funding from abroad, or may be acting in the interest of many Hungarians (Romaniuk, 2021).

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Violent attacks have also been recorded in North Macedonia and there is growing fear about the rise of attacks. Government initiatives to curb the funding and foreign support of CSOs, like North Macedonia’s “Stop Operation Soros (SOS)” and the “Movement Tvrdokorni” (Hard Liners), illustrate government attempts to mobilize people as “civic movements to intimidate independent civil society groups that are critical of the government.” The emergence of GONGOS or what are also known as “patriotic” NGOs (i.e., “Lavovi” [Lions], “Metodija Patce,” and “Nepokor” [Ubowed]), have begun to legitimize government assaults on CSOs, using the language of security and preservation of the state, and even terrorism, that helps to mobilize people further (Jordanovska, 2017).39 These types of organizations are akin to organized crime and sanctioned by the government. They can be examined further as linkages between the state and criminal networks, as Benedek et al. (2010: 357) articulate, “in times of emergency.”

Discussion and conclusion This chapter analyzed the impact of CTMs on CSOs in the EU with a focus on four EU member-​states and a fifth case lying just beyond the EU and in southern Europe. Our focus on specific case studies rather than the EU as a whole is drawn from the view that many EU countries experienced different levels of terrorism threats and have responded in somewhat different ways even though we notice some levels of similarities. We are equally conscious of how contextual factors aid in various manifestations of CTMs and its impact of counter-​terrorism policy and CTMs on the operation of CSOs (Howell & Lind, 2010). The above has been reiterated by van der Borgh and Terwindt (2012: 1065), who charge: to understand the actual impact of these restrictions on NGOs, it is important to distinguish between the very different challenges and threats that specific civil society organisations are facing in different political contexts and the way in which these affect their operations.

Thus, we examine the central issue of this chapter by highlighting the experiences of CSOs in Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and North Macedonia. Irrespective of the views that these states have collectively contributed to the EU’s counter-​terrorism policies, we highlight the uniqueness of their various counter-​terrorism regulatory styles, the direct and indirect impacts that they have on civil society more broadly within the respective countries and CSOs, in particular in various operations fields.

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Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr 181 First, we observed similarities in state–​ CSOs relations in Hungary, Romania, and North Macedonia, where the regulation of CSOs have been more intense than in the other cases. As part of state efforts to curb the rise of terrorism, these governments established a wide range of laws regulating CSO financing or support from foreign donor countries, and drawing inspiration from previously established laws. For instance, Hungary and Romania established a Russian-​style Foreign Agents Law restricting CSOs’ access to finances, which greatly impeded essential financial operations, and especially more so given the resource-​scarce environments in which CSOs function in all five cases. This has amplified the administrative and thus operational burden of organizations. Another similar trend unearthed through the analysis and discussion is that of government efforts of de-​legitimizing CSOs before the public in these countries, discrediting them through the use of injurious political rhetoric, which can require tremendous time and effort to mend. The government evokes narratives such as “foreign agents,” “foreign funding,” “migrants,” “George Soros,” and “foreign influence” to depict CSOs as agents of foreign governments working to undermine their respective countries, national security, and the public interest as a whole. Government-​supported campaigns have committed to identifying and highlighting the so-​called “Sorosization” effect that has taken form in all the cases, with some, notably North Macedonia’s previous autocratic leader, Nikola Gruevski, calling for the “de-​Sorosization” of society. We thus contend that the concerted efforts of governments dichotomize two naturally bonded parts: civil society and the public. The aforementioned is tied to ongoing conversations on the constraints and repression of CSOs and the closing of civic spaces in the enforcement of counter-​counter-​terrorism in both advanced democracies, and hybrid and authoritarian regimes (Daucè, 2014; Dupuy et al., 2014; Howell, 2014; Krasnopolskaya et al., 2015; Brechenmacher, 2017; Bolleyer & Gauja, 2017; Skokova et al., 2018; Watson & Burkes, 2018; Njoku, 2021a, 2021b). Watson and Burkes (2018), for example, argue that the Russian government established the Federal Law No.18-​FZ in 2006 also known as the “NGO Law” and the 2012 Foreign Agent Law (Federal Law No. 121 FZ). These laws placed administrative burdens on CSOs and also further de-​legitimized them before the people, as many of those local CSOs that received foreign funding from foreign donors were labeled foreign agents. Furthermore, CSOs critical of the Russian government, particularly human rights and advocacy groups, were key targets of the government (Skokova et al., 2018). Indeed, the government’s position toward such CSOs and actors in these crucial fields experienced an about-​face by the Russian government overnight, waking-​up to a hostile environment that became more caustic as time went on. Moreover, the US Patriot Act and UK counter-​terrorism laws

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impose strict financial restrictions on the operations of CSOs, particularly transnational Muslim and local organizations in the United States (Sidel, 2010; Watson & Burkes, 2018). In the UK, many Muslim charities have felt excessive state regulations as the narrative equating terrorism with Islam holds sway and reflects in the counter-​terrorism practices of the government as was discussed previously in the section about the three phases of counter-​terrorism evolution (O’Toole et al., 2016). In developing countries such as Afghanistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, CSOs faced increasing financial and operational constraints due to state counter-​ terrorism enforcement (Rubongoya, 2010; Howell, 2014; Brechenmacher, 2017; Njoku, 2020a, 2020b). Second, Slovenia and Slovakia represent unique cases of states in which CSOs did not face state regulations via the implementation of counter-​ terrorism but instead those states chose to support CSOs, particularly in the case of Slovenia. Despite Slovenia’s contributions to the EU’s efforts in tackling terrorist financing by adopting the directives of FATF and MONEYVAL, the Slovenian government has not imposed restrictions on CSOs as we have observed in Romania, Hungary, and North Macedonia. Perhaps, the low level of terrorist threats the state faces provides a rationale for the lack of intensive regulations on the operations of CSOs. However, the terrorist threat in and against Hungary has remained comparably low with virtually no cases of terrorism having been documented in the country, while in Romania, the government has spoken of a deep understanding of terrorist issues and has experienced terrorism throughout its history. Slovenia’s case, which can be described as “politics as usual” finds relevance with Colas’ (2010) conclusion that in Spain, despite the 11-​M attacks in Madrid, the Spanish government eschewed the creation of new laws that would target and ultimately repress CSOs. Recognizing the importance of CSOs in mitigating the rise of terrorism in the country, Spanish authorities sought to work with CSOs as partners in addressing the challenge. Finally, the Slovakian case shares similarities with Slovenia, as CSOs have not experienced excessive regulations as compared to other countries in East and Central Europe, Hungary, Russia, as well as the West, with the exception of a few states. However, we argue that previous events feeding into a growing trend of practice have established the bases for increasing uptake in regulatory policy against CSOs in manifold form. This includes baldly aggressive rhetoric by state actors describing the activities of CSOs, such as “foreign agents,” “foreign funding,” “migrants,” “George Soros,” “foreign influence.” The Slovakian government’s stalwart opposition to immigration portends an emerging confrontation between these particular governments and CSOs, specifically those fighting for the rights of immigrants. Moreover, despite the subtle nature of state regulations of CSOs in

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Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr 183 Slovakia, the rising state interest about the finances of CSOs also show that the intensity of state regulations may increase in the near future. Moreover, the Slovakian case speaks to the arguments made by scholars in countries such as New Zealand, Australia, and Ireland, where the governments have formed policies to regulate CSOs even though the laws do not bear the same intensity (Bolleyer & Gauja, 2017). It also finds relevance to the cases in the US, UK, Russia, Australia, Egypt, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Bahrain, where government-​financing regulations are increasingly weakening the ability of CSOs to operate in a civic space while at the same time that space has seen drastic reductions in terms of size and resource measure (Bayas & Green, 2017; Skokova et al., 2018; Watson & Burkes, 2018; Lind & Howell, 2010; Bloodgood & Tremblay-​Boire, 2011; Howell, 2014; Brechenmacher, 2017).

Notes 1 These attacks represent only a fraction of the numerous Islamic terrorist attacks and plots planned and carried out in Europe and the EU, but carry the highest numbers of fatalities and deaths. 2 Authors’ interview with a senior member of the European External Action Service (EEAS) –​Counter-​Terrorism Division (Brussels, Belgium, October 12, 2018). 3 Authors’ interview with a senior member of the European External Action Service (EEAS) –​Counter-​Terrorism Division (Brussels, Belgium, October 12, 2018). 4 Authors’ interview with a researcher at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) (Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, KKI) (Budapest, Hungary, November 13, 2018). 5 Authors’ interview with a researcher at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) (Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, KKI) (Budapest, Hungary, November 13, 2018). 6 We employ the name “North Macedonia” following the country’s name change in February 2019. 7 Authors’ interview with a researcher at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) (Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, KKI) (Budapest, Hungary, November 13, 2018). 8 Authors’ interview with a researcher at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) (Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, KKI) (Budapest, Hungary, November 13, 2018). 9 Authors’ interview with a researcher at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) (Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, KKI) (Budapest, Hungary, November 13, 2018). 10 Authors’ interview with a researcher at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) (Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, KKI) (Budapest, Hungary, November 13, 2018).

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11 Authors’ interview with a researcher at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) (Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, KKI) (Budapest, Hungary, November 13, 2018). 12 Authors’ interview with a researcher at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) (Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, KKI) (Budapest, Hungary, November 13, 2018); authors’ interview via email with the director of a CSO working in the fields of peacebuilding and development (Ljubljana, Slovenia, October 11, 2018). 13 Authors’ interview with a researcher at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) (Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, KKI) (Budapest, Hungary, November 13, 2018). 14 Authors’ interview with a researcher at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) (Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, KKI) (Budapest, Hungary, November 13, 2018). 15 Authors’ interview via email with the director of a CSO working in the fields of peacebuilding and development (Ljubljana, Slovenia, October 11, 2018). 16 Authors’ interview via email with the director of a CSO working in the fields of peacebuilding and development (Ljubljana, Slovenia, October 11, 2018). 17 Authors’ interview via email with the director of a CSO working in the fields of peacebuilding and development (Ljubljana, Slovenia, October 11, 2018). 18 Authors’ interview via email with the director of a CSO working in the fields of peacebuilding and development (Ljubljana, Slovenia, October 11, 2018). 19 Authors’ interview via email with the director of a CSO working in the fields of peacebuilding and development (Ljubljana, Slovenia, October 11, 2018). 20 Authors’ interview via Skype with a program officer of a CSO operating in the area of education and training (Ljubljana, Slovenia, December 13, 2018). 21 Authors’ interview via Skype with an employee of a CSO addressing migration (Ljubljana, Slovenia, December 2, 2018). 22 Authors’ interview via email with an analyst working with a CSO in the area of development (Ljubljana, Slovenia, December 16, 2018). 23 The perpetrator’s surname was replaced with only the first letter to protect his identity. 24 The Prime Minister’s Officer blacklisted: Transparency International Hungary, K-​Monitor, Asimov Foundation, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, Roma Press Center, Krétakör Foundation, NaNe Women’s Rights Association, Foundation for Democratic Youth, Hungarian Women’s Lobby, Labrisz Lesbian Association, PATENT –​Association Against Patriarchism, LiFE –​Association of Young Liberals, and Szivárvány Misszió Foundation (Romaniuk, 2021). 25 Authors’ interview with two directors of a CSO focusing on democratic development and sustainability, and active citizenship (Budapest, Hungary, September 26, 2016). 26 Authors’ interview with two directors of a CSO focusing on democratic development and sustainability, and active citizenship (Budapest, Hungary, September 26, 2016).

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Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr 185 27 Researcher’s interview via Skype with the executive director of an NGO working in the area of human rights education and protection, and government transparency (Budapest, Hungary, March 24, 2017). 28 Authors’ interview via Skype with an analyst of an NGO focusing on security and defense policy and strategy (Bratislava, Slovakia, June 16, 2017). 29 Authors’ interview via Skype with a Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Republic Government for the Development of Civil Society and senior member of the Slovak Non-​Profit Service Center (Bratislava, Slovakia, June 29, 2017). 30 Authors’ interview via Skype with an analyst of an NGO focusing on security and defense policy and strategy (Bratislava, Slovakia, June 16, 2017). 31 Authors’ interview via Skype with a Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Republic Government for the Development of Civil Society and senior member of the Slovak Non-​Profit Service Center (Bratislava, Slovakia, June 29, 2017). 32 Authors’ interview via Skype with member of a development CSO (Bucharest, Romania, September 18, 2018). 33 Authors’ interview via Skype with a senior policy officer of a CSO acting as a government watchdog (Bucharest, Romania, October 2, 2018). 34 Authors’ interview via Skype with a senior policy officer of a CSO acting as a government watchdog (Bucharest, Romania, October 2, 2018). 35 Authors’ interview with via Skype with an official of a Romanian security institute (Bucharest, Romania, August 7, 2018). 36 Authors’ interview via Skype with a politician from the Social Democrat Party (PSD) (Bucharest, Romania, November 22, 2018). 37 Authors’ interview via email with member of a transparency and accountability CSO (Bucharest, Romania, August 14, 2018). 38 Author’s interview via Skype with a program officer of an NGO focusing on transparency, democratic governance, and human rights (Skopje, North Macedonia, May 2, 2017). 39 Author’s interview via Skype with a program officer of an NGO focusing on transparency, democratic governance, and human rights (Skopje, North Macedonia, May 2, 2017).

References Algeria-​Watch. (2010, April 28). “Slovakia: Expulsion of Mustapha Labsi violated international law.” https://​algeria-​watch.org/​?p=3679 Argomaniz, J. (2009). “Post-​ 9/​ 11 institutionalisation of European Union counter-​ terrorism: Emergence, acceleration and inertia,” European Security, 18(2): 151–​172. BBC. (2018, September 4). “Slovenia politician’s masked militia sparks alarm.” www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​europe-​45407773 Benedek, W., Daase, C., Dimitrijević, V., & van Duyne, P. (eds.). (2010). Transnational terrorism, organized crime and peace-​building: Human security in the western Balkans. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Bloodgood, E. A. & Tremblay-​Boire, J. (2011). “International NGOs and national regulation in an age of terrorism,” VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 22(1): 142–​173. Bolleyer, N. & Gauja, A. (2017). “Combating terrorism by constraining charities? Charity and counter-​terrorism legislation before and after 9/​11,” Public Administration, 95(3): 654–​669. Brechenmacher, S. (2017). “Civil society under assault: Repression and responses in Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC. Colas, A. (2010) “An exceptional response? Security, development and civil society in Spanish policy after 11-​M,” Development and Change, 41(2): 313–​333. Council of the European Union. (n.d.). “EU terror list.” consilium.europa.eu/​en/​ policies/​fight-​against-​terrorism/​terrorist-​list/​ Daucé, F. (2014). “The government and human rights groups in Russia: Civilized oppression?” Journal of Civil Society, 10(3): 239–​254. Degeratu, C. (2005). “Romania’s participation in the fight against international terrorism: Implications for civil-​military relations and the security sector reform,” in P. H. Fluri, G. E. Gustenau, P. I. Pantev, E. M. Felberbauer, & F. Labarre (eds.), The evolution of civil-​military relations in south east Europe (pp. 185–​196). Heidelberg: Physica-​Verlag HD. Duerr, G. (2017). “Independence through terrorism? The linkages between secessionism and terrorism in the Basque Country,” in S. N. Romaniuk, F. Grice, D. Irrera, & S. Webb (eds.), The Palgrave handbook of global counterterrorism policy (pp. 459–​478). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Duerr, G. (ed.). (2018). Secessionism and terrorism: Bombs, blood and independence in Europe and Eurasia. London: Routledge. Dupuy, K E., Ron, J., & Prakash, A. (2014). “Who survived? Ethiopia’s regulatory crackdown on foreign-​funded NGOs,” Review of International Political Economy, 22(2): 419–​456. Euractiv. (2010, January 29). “EU adopts arrest warrant.” www.euractiv.com/​section/ ​security/​news/​eu-​adopts-​european-​arrest-​warrant/​ European Commission. (2000). “Commission decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to directive 95/​46/​EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce.” http://​eurlex. europa.eu/​LexUriServ/​LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000D0520:EN:HTML European Commission. (2005, May 26). “Approval of new directive will boost fight against money laundering and terrorist financing,” Press Release, IP/​05/​616. http://​europa.eu/​rapid/​pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/​05/​616&format= HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en European Digital Rights (EDRi). (2017, February 22). “Illegal surveillance against civil society continues in Macedonia.” https://​edri.org/​illegal-​surveillance-​against-​ civil-​society-​continue-​in-​macedonia/​ Fowler, A. & Sen, K. (2010). “Embedding the war on terror: State and civil society relations,” Development and Change, 41(1): 1–​27.

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Scott N. Romaniuk, Ákos Baumgartner, and Glen M. E. Duerr 187 Howell, J. (2014). “The securitisation of NGOs post-​9/​11,” Conflict, Security & Development, 14(2): 151–​179. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2010). “Securing the world and challenging civil society: Before and after the ‘war on terror’,” Development and Change, 41(2): 279–​291. Ifex.org. (2017, March 3). “Civil society under pressure in Macedonia.” www.ifex. org/​macedonia/​2017/​03/​03/​civil-​society-​pressured/​ Isaacs, L., Hugo, S., Robson, G., Bush, C., Issacs, P., & Martinez, I. M. (2018, July). “Impact of the regulatory environment on refugees’ and asylum seekers’ ability to use formal remittance channels,” Knomad Working Paper 33. knomad.org/​sites/​default/​files/​2018–​07/​KNOMAD_​WP_​Impacts%20of%20the%20 Regulatory%20Environment%20on%20Refugees’%20and%20Asylum%20 Seekers’%20Ability%20to%20Use%20Formal%20Remittance%20Channels. pdf Jordanovska, M. (2017, March 13). “ ‘Patriotic’ NGOs crowd out Macedonian civil society,” Balkan Insight. www.balkaninsight.com/​en/​article/​patriotic-​ngos-​ crowd-​out-​macedonian-​civil-​society-​03–​22–​2017 Knezevic, G. (2017, January 19). “Macedonian witch hunt targets George Soros,” Radio Free Europe/​ Radio Liberty (RFE/​ RL). www.rferl.org/​a/​george-​soros-​ macedonia-​witch-​hunt/​28243738.html Krasnopolskaya, I., Skokova, Y., & Pape, U. (2015). “Government-​nonprofit relations in Russia’s regime: An exploratory analysis,” VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 26(6): 2238–​2266. Lind, J. & Howell, J. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the politics of aid: Civil society responses in Kenya,” Development and Change, 41(2): 335–​353. Malkova, P. (2019). “A qualitative study of the interaction between human rights defenders and society in Russia: Assessing the impact of the ‘foreign agents’ law,” Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 11(2): 1–​20. Njoku, E. T. (2020a). “Politics of conviviality? State-​civil society relations with the context of counter-​terrorism in Nigeria,” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations, 31(5): 1063–​1076. Njoku, E. T. (2020b) “Making sense of state service-​delivery oriented partnership with civil society organisations in counter-​terrorism context in Nigeria,” Development Policy Review: 1–​16, https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​dpr.12524 Njoku, E. T. (2021a). “Strategic exclusion: The state and the framing of a service delivery role for civil society organizations in the context of counterterrorism in Nigeria,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 44(5): 410–​430. Njoku, E. T. (2021b). “The state and the securitization of civil society organisations in Nigeria,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​ 08997640211003256 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia. (2010). “Resolution on the national security strategy of the Republic of Slovenia.” www.mo.gov.si/​fileadmin/​mo.gov. si/​pageuploads/​pdf/​ministrstvo/​RSNV2010_​slo_​en.pdf OSCE. (2019, March 25). “As terrorism trends are evolving, we need to work together to stay one step ahead: Main message from opening of OSCE conference in Bratislava.” www.osce.org/​chairmanship/​415163

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Rapoport, D. C. (2013). “The four waves of modern terrorism,” in J. G. Horgan & K. Braddock (eds.), Terrorism studies (pp. 63–​82). London: Routledge. Romaniuk, S. N. (2021). Under siege: Counter-​ terrorism and civil society in Hungary. Lanham: Lexington Books. Rubongoya, J. B. (2010). “The politics of Uganda’s anti-​terrorism law and its impact on civil society,” in J. Lind & J. Howell (eds.), Civil society under strain: CT policy, civil society and aid post-​9/​11 (pp. 209–​226). Sterling: Kumarian Press. Sidel, M. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the regulation of civil society in the USA,” Development and Change, 41(2): 293–​312. Skokova, Y., Pape, U., & Krasnopolskaya, I. (2018). “The non-​profit sector in today’s Russia: Between confrontation and co-​optation,” Europe-​Asia Studies, 70(4): 531–​563. The Slovenia Times. (2018, October 18). “Defence minister calls for national security strategy overhaul.” sloveniatimes.com/​defence-​minister-​calls-​for-​national-​ security-​strategy-​overhaul van der Borgh, C. & Terwindt, C. (2012). “Shrinking operational space of NGOs: A framework of analysis,” Development in Practice, 22(8): 1065–​1081. Vlcek, W. (2005, September). “European measures to combat terrorist financing and the tension between liberty and security,” Challenge Working Paper. www.lse.ac.uk/ ​ i nternationalRelations/ ​ c entresandunits/ ​ E FPU/ ​ E FPUpdfs/​ EFPUchallengewp1.pdf Vlcek, W. (2006). “Acts to combat the financing of terrorism: Common foreign and security policy at the European Court of Justice,” European Foreign Affairs Review, 11: 491–​507. Vlcek, W. (2007). “Surveillance to combat terrorist financing in Europe: Whose liberty, whose security?” European Security, 16(1): 99–​119. Vlcek, W. (2008). “A Leviathan rejuvenated: Surveillance, money laundering, and the war on terror,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 20 (1–​4): 21–​40. Vlcek, W. (2009). “Hitting the right target: EU and Security Council pursuit of terrorist financing,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2(2): 275–​291. Watson, S. & Burkes, R. (2018). “Regulating NGO funding: Securitizing the political,” International Relations, 32(4): 430–​448. Wesseling, M. (2013). The European fight against terrorism financing: Professional fields and new governing practices. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. Wolff, J. (2018). “The delegitimization of civil society organisations: Thoughts on strategic responses to the ‘foreign agent’ charge,” in C. Rodríguez-​Garavito & K. Gomez (eds.), Rising to the populist challenge: A new playbook for human rights actors (pp. 129–​137). Bogota: Dejusticia. Yin, R. K. (2017). Case study research and applications: Design and methods. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

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Part IV

Civil society and security in Africa

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Nigeria’s counter-​terrorism policy: paradox or (sp)oiler of civil society activism? Olajide O. Akanji

Introduction One of the fundamental points of debate in the world since 9/​11 has been that of counter-​terrorism. The events of 9/​11 no doubt ushered the international community into a new realm of collective actions against terrorism, with the United Nations, European Union, United States, and many other states along with multilateral actors acting collectively, and individually, to combat international terrorism. At the national level, many countries, particularly those in the throes of terrorism, have developed and introduced counter-​terrorism policies with the goal of confronting and combating the problem headlong within their territorial boundaries. In doing this, however, civil society,1 referred to in this chapter as registered and unregistered non-​ governmental not-​ for profit groups/​ movements, is often implicated, as a collaborator with governments and multilateral actors in the development and/​or implementation of counter-​terrorism strategies, and as a major recipient, either negative or positive, of the impacts of the counter-​terrorism measures. Though this underlies the nature of counter-​terrorism in many regions (see for example, Guinane & Sazawal, 2010; Pettitt, 2010; Sidel, 2010; Howell, 2014; Skokova, 2018), including Africa, where civil society organizations (CSOs) in countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, and Uganda have experienced government constraints as a result of the enforcement of counter-​terrorism measures (Howell & Lind, 2010; Lind & Howell, 2010; Dupuy et al., 2014, Brechenmacher, 2017). In Nigeria, while studies have focused on the effects of counter-​ terrorism measures (CTMs) on CSOs (Njoku, 2020a, 2020b, 2021), this chapter instead looks at how terrorism and counter-​terrorism practices in Nigeria influenced the mass mobilization of CSOs as advocates and the effects on CSOs despite their level of contributions. The chapter uses two case studies, youth vigilante groups (known collectively as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)) and the Bring Back Our Girls movement, to highlight the experiences of the civil society groups in counter-​terrorism in Nigeria.

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This chapter hypothesizes that a robust counter-​ terrorism approach, involving all segments of the society including civil society groups, is pivotal for effectively combating against terrorism, as the ability of a state to successfully combat or address any societal problem, particularly a security/​crime-​related issue, depends on the level of cooperation received from members of its civil society. This necessitates a number of questions with respect to counter-​terrorism in Nigeria: what is the nature of Nigeria’s counter-​terrorism framework? To what extent is Nigeria’s counter-​terrorism framework implicated in the ability or otherwise of civil society groups to contribute to the fight against terrorism in the country? What are the prospects of a mutually beneficial relationship between the Nigerian state and the country’s civil society over and around the issue of counter-​terrorism? This chapter adopts a qualitative research approach, relying on secondary literature, government publications, and internet resources. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first discusses Nigeria’s counter-​terrorism framework, and its local and global linkages and complexions. The second section examines Nigeria’s counter-​terrorism framework in relation to civil society activism, and provides explanations for its impacts. The third and concluding section explores the prospects for a mutually beneficial relationship between civil society groups and the Nigerian state with respect to counter-​terrorism.

Nigeria’s counter-​terrorism framework Nigeria is one of many countries in West Africa contending with the ongoing problem of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and recently the Islamic State of West African Province. These groups have perpetrated premeditated attacks on government institutions, private businesses, police and military agents/​posts, foreigners and civilians; and disrupted and paralyzed socio-​economic activities in the northeast states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. The group carried out a deadly bomb attack on the UN office building in Abuja in August 2011, killing twenty-​seven people and wounding several others (Akanji, 2015; Otto, 2015). To combat terrorism within its territory, the Nigerian government has developed and introduced a counter-​terrorism framework comprising military and non-​military approaches, and a legal framework. The military approach revolves around the deployment and use of government security agencies, namely, the army, navy, and air force, as well as the police and civil defense corps, in collaboration with CJTF/​youth vigilantes (International Crisis Group, 2017). The non-​military approach involves amnesty for and

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dialogue with Boko Haram (Agbiboa, 2015). The enactment by the National Assembly of a number of legislations, including, in 2011, the Terrorism Prevention Act, amended in 2013, constitutes the legal context of Nigeria’s counter-​terrorism framework. While any attempt to historicize the country’s counter-​terrorism framework may be somewhat remiss, as its components run concurrently, it is important to note that the Nigerian government first used the military approach in dealing with terrorism. This is underscored by the violent crackdown on Boko Haram in July 2009 by operatives of state security agencies, leading to the arrest of some Boko Haram members, including its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, who later died in police custody (International Crisis Group, 2017; Otto, 2015: 34). Since then, however, the Nigerian state has combined all the strategies, using them concurrently. For instance, as government security operatives engaged Boko Haram in armed confrontations in various parts of the north, the federal government under President Goodluck Jonathan established an Amnesty Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of the Security Challenges in the North in April 2013 (Agbiboa, 2015). The mandate of the committee was to come up with recommendations for a solution to insecurity in the north, including dialogue with Boko Haram with the general aim of convincing its members to surrender their arms in exchange for state pardon, and to provide financial compensation for the victims of violence in the region. However, Boko Haram rebuffed government attempts at dialogue, increasing instead its terror activities and amplifying its violent operations across the northeast and the adjourning areas. As a result, Goodluck Jonathan and his government declared a state of emergency in the three most-​affected northeast states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in May 2013, which lasted until November 2014 (Agbiboa, 2015). Under the state of emergency, the full weight of the military was deployed by the government with an inter-​agency special Joint Task Force (JTF) comprising military and police units established to flush out the terrorists from the region (Agbiboa, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2017). The JTF was later reorganized into the 7th Division of the Nigerian Army, reporting to the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), due in part to the need for improved coordination and performance, and as a result of an avalanche of accusations that trailed its operations –​the JTF was severally accused of perpetrating human rights abuses (Agbiboa, 2015: 12–​13). In view of the failure of the state of emergency, President Muhammadu Buhari, on assumption of office in 2015, declared his administration’s determination to end Boko Haram’s terrorist activities. The government therefore rejigged the military hierarchy. Apart from appointing new leaders to the country’s military, the military hierarchy, especially the COAS, was mandated to relocate to Borno state –​the major theater of Boko Haram

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operations. The move was made in order to facilitate more effective coordination and implementation of military strategies. The decision resulted in tremendous success, as the Sambisa forest –​Boko Haram’s base and stronghold –​and the swathes of territories earlier seized and controlled by the group were retaken. The overall success in this regard was made possible as the Buhari administration, with the assistance of foreign partners, including the US and UK, continued to reinforce its counter-​terrorism team with upgraded military hardware. This was unlike the Jonathan presidency (2009–​2015) when the country’s Western foreign partners, especially the US, refused to sell essential military equipment to Nigeria on account of allegations of human rights abuses perpetrated by the Nigerian military (Blanchard & Cavigelli, 2018) and corruption in government (Akanji, 2015). However, since assuming office, President Buhari has shown his strong anti-​ corruption posture, subsequently endearing the government to the international community and steering world leaders, including US President Donald Trump, British Prime Minister Theresa May, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, to become more aligned with assisting Nigeria in its fight against terrorism within its borders. In August 2017, the US government approved the sale of about US$496 million worth of military hardware to Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2019: 435). Countries such as Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, and the UK have also contributed or pledged assistance to Nigeria’s counter-​ terrorism efforts in the areas of training, supply of munitions, and funds. Nigeria and many foreign partners have held bilateral and multilateral meetings, and entered into some agreements over terrorism and terrorism-​ related issues, such as money laundering. For example, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger collectively established a multilateral relationship on counter-​terrorism, with the establishment of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat terrorism in the Lake Chad region (Obamamoye, 2017; Eme, 2018; Akanji, 2019). In addition to Nigeria being a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) counter-​terrorism efforts, it is also a member of the ECOWAS Inter-​government Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa (GIABA) –​an institution established to combat money laundering and terrorism financing (Akanji, 2019). Under the umbrella of ECOWAS, the African Union, and the UN, Nigeria ratified a number of sub-​regional, regional, and international instruments on terrorism, such as the UN Conventions on Terrorism, and those ancillary to terrorism, including the December 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention). This has contributed to Nigeria’s counter-​terrorism efforts given that the international instruments provide the legal basis for the emergence and implementation of

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local as well as national counter-​terrorism policies, legislations, and institutions, and equally strengthen them. Furthermore, to complement its coercive approach, Nigeria has enacted many forms of counter-​ terrorism legislation, particularly the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act of 2013 (hereafter the Act), first enacted in 2011, and established institutions, the primary objectives of which are related to counter-​terrorism, such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). While the EFCC, as an institution, was established to, among other things, combat money laundering and terrorism financing, the Act remains a piece of government legislation dealing primarily with terrorism. By its core provisions, the Act identifies and delineates the specific roles and functions of the various counter-​terrorism agencies of government, including the Nigeria Police, the Ministry of Justice, the office of the Attorney General of the Federation, and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC). The Act stipulates punishments for those who have been proved guilty of acts of terrorism. To underscore the criticality of ending terrorism in Nigeria, the Act specifies the use of the death penalty for anyone convicted of committing, attempting to commit, or facilitating acts of terror. In relation to the civil society, the Act recognizes that law enforcement agencies should partner with CSOs and the Nigerian public in a coordinated effort to the eliminate acts of terrorism. This is in addition to permitting security agents to arrest, detain, and prosecute terror suspects. For the effective and efficient management of resources, the Act empowers the country’s Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA) to coordinate the counter-​terrorism activities of all the security and law enforcement agencies of government. Based on the Act, the ONSA introduced in 2014 a national counter-​terrorism policy document, the National Counterterrorism Strategy, which was revised in 2016, and established a number of counter-​terrorism units/​centers to initiate and coordinate the counter-​terrorism program, including the countering violent extremism (CVE) program that focuses on de-​radicalization, rehabilitation of victims of terrorism, and restoring community cohesion, among others (Eme, 2018). However, a major deficiency of the Act can be found in its definitional treatment of terrorism. The Act is rather blank on what terrorism actually is and what constitutes acts of terrorism within the Nigerian context. Other than mandating the Attorney General of the Federation to ensure that the implementation and administration of the country’s counter-​ terrorism laws and policies are in line with international standards as well as UN Conventions on Terrorism, the Act fails to provide any further clarification or guidance. One other counter-​ terrorism legislation in Nigeria is the Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act 2012 (hereafter Money

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Laundering Act), first enacted in 2011. The Money Laundering Act prohibits money laundering in Nigeria by any person or body corporate in or outside of the country, and specifies sanctions, including 7–​14 years’ imprisonment and the withdrawal of licenses for individual and body corporate offenders respectively. Also, the Money Laundering Act has a broad scope of offenses that constitute money laundering in Nigeria. These include the concealment by any person or body corporate of the origin of any fund or property that is or is part of the proceeds of an unlawful act such as terrorism, terrorist financing, kidnapping, and hostage taking. However, a drawback of the Money Laundering Act is its draconian posture, particularly as it stops the court from entertaining any application for a stay of proceedings in respect of any money laundering offense until judgment is delivered.

Civil society activism and Nigeria’s war on terrorism Apart from being affected by terrorist activities, civil society in Nigeria, including charities, development NGOs, community groups, women’s organizations, faith-​ based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, social movements, coalitions and advocacy groups, all have all been critical elements in Nigeria’s fight against terrorism. Terrorism has gone far in reducing the space in which free and safe movement can take place, and has undermined the ability of members of the civil society in the affected area to exercise and enjoy their liberty, freedom, and rights, as several thousands of people in those states have either been killed or been displaced as a result of violence by Boko Haram and its offshoot, the Islamic State West Africa (ISWA). However, an important twist to terrorism in Nigeria is that it has given rise to increased civil society mobilization against terrorism in the northeast and surrounding areas. This mobilization has been observable in various forms, including the emergence of youth vigilantes (or community vigilantes2) in Nigeria’s northeasterly states and the Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG) movement across the country, including Abuja, Lagos, and Osogbo (in Osun state, southwest Nigeria). Civil society mobilizations against terrorism in Nigeria first became evident in 2013, as youth vigilante groups emerged in Borno, and later in Adamawa, Bauchi, Taraba, Gombe, and Yobe, due largely to the destructive impacts of terrorism on their communities and the inability, or rather the failure, of government law enforcement agencies to effectively end it. Armed with the knowledge of the terrain and landscape, and of members of their communities, and with machetes, sticks, daggers, swords, charms, and local guns, the youth vigilantes provided security for their communities by identifying and arresting, and in some cases inflicting punishments, including

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the death penalty, on Boko Haram members (Metro News, 2014; Agbiboa, 2015: 14; International Crisis Group, 2017). It is important to note that the youth vigilante groups were at inception largely informal, characterized by violent methods of crime control, and collectively known/​referred to as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) to suggest they were a counterpart of the government’s JTF comprising military, police, and other security units fighting Boko Haram (International Crisis Group, 2017). However, interactions and relations with government and state security agencies subsequently provided official recognition to the youth vigilantes/​CJTF. For instance, the Borno state government formally incorporated the youth vigilantes/​CJTF in September 2013 into the Borno State Youth Empowerment Schemes, subsequently providing them with uniforms, cars, identification documents, and a stipend, while the Nigerian army-​led JTF organized the CJTF according to its own command structure, established a CJTF unit for each of Maiduguri’s ten security sectors, and provided combat training and standard military training to selected CJTF members (International Crisis Group, 2017). The implication, however, of the interactions with government was that the youth vigilantes in each state became organized and structured, with identifiable cadres of leadership, and their methods of crime control less violent, as well as the fact that they became part of government’s counter-​terrorism efforts by assisting state security forces in combat support and intelligence gathering. As one might expect, youth activism against terrorism in the northeast has placed them in the line of Boko Haram fire. A number of the members of youth vigilantes/​CJTF have been killed during the course of violent clashes with Boko Haram, and many others maimed and permanently incapacitated (Agbiboa, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2017). In an incident in January 2018, a civilian JTF was among four Nigerian soldiers killed by terrorists in Tunbum Ndjamena (Nigerian Army, 2018). According to Jubrin Gunda, the legal officer of the CJTF in Maiduguri, the CJTF loses at least one member every time an attack is made by Boko Haram (Akinwale, 2017). Government counter-​ terrorism operatives have, on a number of occasions, attacked members of youth vigilantes/​CJTF. There have been reported cases of members of youth vigilantes/​CJTF being brutalized by state security operatives in the course of counter-​ terrorism operations (Agbiboa, 2015). In an incident in 2014, two members of youth vigilantes/​ CJTF were killed, and a number of others sustained injuries during protests against soldiers who shielded five people suspected to be members of Boko Haram (Agbiboa, 2015: 15). In another incident, five members of the CJTF/​ youth vigilantes were killed by state security operatives in Maiduguri during a melee in 2015 that started when the members of the youth vigilantes/​CJTF insisted on searching a military vehicle carrying munitions (Ilo, 2015). The

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series of attacks on members of the CJTF, in spite of the recognition of the CJTF by the government, shows a lack adequate synergy between the CJTF and counter-​terrorism operatives of government and the absence of trust between the two. Another example of civil society mobilization against terrorism in Nigeria is the BBOG movement. Formed in 2014 in Abuja as a response to Boko Haram’s abduction of 276 girls of the Government Secondary School in Chibok, Borno state on April 14, and as a response to the perceived failure of the Nigerian government to secure the timely release of the girls, the BBOG garnered support outside of Nigeria and in a relatively short period time. The goal of the movement was twofold: first, that the Nigerian government safely return the Chibok schoolgirls; and, second, greater government accountability to Nigerians on security issues, particularly in the northeast (#Bring Back Our Girls Now, n.d.). The fact that the action of Boko Haram in abducting innocent schoolgirls was abhorrent and the fear that the girls are susceptible to all kinds of exploitations, including sexual abuse by militants, compelled the global community, including the UN, African Union, EU, and many notable and eminent figures to align with the primary objective of the BBOG to rescue the girls. Then-​UN Secretary-​General, Ban Ki-​ moon, the US president and his wife, and Pope Francis were among the more notable people who supported the BBOG movement; with each one of them having publicly condemned the abduction and demanded action on the part of the Nigerian government to secure the release of the girls (King, 2014; The Telegraph, 2014; UN News, 2014). In Nigeria, the leadership of the country’s National Assembly (the federal legislature), including the Senate (Upper Chamber) President, Bukola Saraki and Speaker of House of Representatives (Lower Chamber), Yakubu Dogara, associated with the movement; they were part of the movement’s first rally on April 30, 2014, sixteen days after the abduction (Sahara Reporters, 2018). The BBOG movement created the hastag #BringBackOurGirls to raise global awareness about the abduction. The hashtag #BringBackOurGirls has consequently become popular across social media, with world leaders using it in their messages and tweets about the abduction. Pope Francis, for example, used the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls in his tweet on May 8, 2014 (King, 2014). Apart from the use of social media with #BringBackOurGirls, which has sensitized and mobilized Nigerians communities abroad, the BBOG tactics have included various social events including daily rallies in Abuja, and weekly events in Lagos and Osogbo (#Bring Back Our Girls Now, n.d.). During the events, often with speakers addressing the public, members of the movement carry posters and placards calling the public’s attention to the plight of the abducted girls and their parents, and government’s general lack of

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response to the abduction. With these strategies, the BBOG movement has been able to attract the attention of the media, both locally and globally, shedding much-​needed light on the issue, prompting other similar rallies and marches elsewhere beyond Nigeria, including London on May 3, 2014 (Channel4 News, 2014) as well as New York and Los Angeles in May 2014 (The Guardian, 2014). A notable consequence of the BBOG movement is that it kept the Chibok girls issue alive, since 2014, through its various rallies and events, and social media and internet engagements. The movement succeeded in building local and international pressure on the Nigerian government to strive for the release of the girls and in raising global awareness about the importance of education for girls, especially in Nigeria. In 2016, Michelle Obama established the “Let Girls Learn Initiative” –​a project to promote girls’ ­education –​in response to the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls, which the BBOG movement came to popularize (McKelvey, 2016). Similarly, the leadership of the movement has interacted over the issue of the abduction with the Nigerian government, including, for example, President Buhari on July 8, 2015 (#Bring Back Our Girls Now, n.d.). It is important to note that the resilience of the BBOG movement in keeping alive the issue by drawing local and international attention to it has contributed significantly to Nigeria’s counter-​ terrorism efforts, particularly in increasing global attention on terrorism in the country, as some countries, including the US, UK, France, and Germany, renewed their commitment to assist Nigeria in defeating Boko Haram. The US, for example, sent teams of technical experts to help with the search for the girls (Klein, 2014; The Telegraph, 2014). The assistance from the international community and the continued persistence of the movement compelled the Nigerian government to secure the release of 103 of the abducted Chibok girls between October 13, 2016 and May 6, 2017, albeit through a swap deal with Boko Haram (Punch, 2017). However, despite its non-​violent nature and global recognition, the BBOG movement has suffered as a result of the Nigerian government’s repression and crackdown. On a number of occasions, BBOG rallies, marches, and abstention from certain activities have been hampered or disrupted by government law enforcement agencies, including accusations of the movement’s lack of permit to hold events, and on suspicion of being sponsored by the opposition political parties with the aim of discrediting the government. In 2014, for example, the Abuja command of the Nigeria Police Force, under the leadership of Commissioner of Police Joseph Mbu, banned all BBOG public rallies and protests (Premium Times, 2016a). A similar incident occurred on August 25 and September 6–​7, 2016, when the Abuja police interrupted a peaceful demonstration by BBOG members. The 2016 incidents occurred in spite of a court judgment, obtained by the group in 2014,

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which averred that the authorities do not have the right to outlaw peaceful protests by citizens (Premium Times, 2016b). Similarly, a BBOG rally held in April 2018, to commemorate its four-​year anniversary, was systematically disrupted by the Nigeria Police. The police cordoned off the venue of the movement in Abuja on April 23, removing its chairs and physically assaulting and dispersing members of the group using teargas (Egbas, 2018).

Conclusion This chapter has explored Nigeria’s approach to counter-​terrorism, the role that civil society in the country has played in counter-​terrorism, and how government counter-​ terrorism approaches and practices have impacted civil society mobilization against terrorism. Through the analysis of the relationship between government law enforcement agencies and the BBOG movement and youth vigilantism in the northeast, it is evident Nigeria’s counter-​terrorism framework/​policy poses a deep contradiction. Whereas the overarching goal of the policy is to counter/​combat terrorism, its execution has alienated and frustrated as well as undermined civil society mobilization and thus concerted efforts to curb terrorism in the country. This has cast serious doubt on the validity of the government’s commitment to address terrorism in Nigeria, especially in the northeast, as a vital element of the Nigerian state has been left out. This oversight has engendered a situation whereby government counter-​terrorism agencies receive little or no support, including the divulging of information regarding terrorists, from the civil populace. This explains, at least in part, why government counter-​terrorism efforts have yielded little positive result, as shown in the proliferation of terrorist groups and their increasing capacity and audacity to perpetuate violence, despite the state’s attempt to fully deploy the country’s military and resources. What is therefore required is the Nigerian ­government’s –​in its counter-​terrorism initiatives –​full embrace of the centrality of the civil society.

Notes 1 Civil society refers to “the space for collective action around shared interests, purposes and values, generally distinct from government and commercial for-​profit actors. Civil society includes charities, development NGOs, community groups, women’s organizations, faith-​ based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, social movements, coalitions and advocacy groups” (World Health Organization, 2007).

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2 Community vigilantes may be the appropriate appellation because the vigilantes in some cases comprise youth, retired military men, and local hunters (see Premium Times, 2014), as well as male and female members (BBC News, 2017).

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Howell, J. (2014). “The securitisation of NGO post-​ 9/​ 11,” Conflicts, Security &Development, 14(2): 151–​179. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (eds.). (2010). Civil society under strain: Counterterrorism policy, civil society and aid post 9/​11. Sterling: Kumarian Press. Human Rights Watch. (2019). World report 2019: Events of 2018. www.hrw.org Ilo, M. (2015). “Five youths killed in clash with soldiers,” International Centre for Investigative Reporting (ICIR). www.icirnigeria.org/​five-​youths-​ killed-​in-​clash-​with-​soldiers/​ International Crisis Group. (2017). “Double-​edged sword: Vigilantes in African counter-​ insurgencies,” African Report No. 251. www.crisisgroup.org/​africa/​west-​africa/​ sierra-​leone/​251-​double-​edged-​sword-​vigilantes-​african-​counter-​insurgencies Klein, K. (2014, May 10). “First lady: ‘Outrage’ over mass abduction,” VOA News. www.voanews.com/​a/​michelle-​obama-​outraged-​over-​nigeria-​kidnapped-​girls/​ 1911782.html Lind, J. & Howell, J. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the politics of aid: Civil society responses in Kenya,” Development and Change, 41(2). McKelvey, T. (2016, April 14). “Michelle Obama’s hashtag quest to rescue Nigerian girls,” BBC News. www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​us-​canada-​35948362 Metro News. (2014, April 29). “Civilian JTF in Borno restates commitment to assisting military to end insurgency.” www.informationng.com/​2014/​04/​civilian-​ jtf-​in-​borno-​restates-​commitment-​to-​assisting-​military-​to-​end-​insurgency.html Nigerian Army. (2018, January 16). “Update on operation Deep Punch 2 by troops in operations Lafiya Dole.” www.army.mil.ng/​update-​on-​operation-​deep-​ punch-​2-​by-​troops-​in-​operation-​lafiya-​dole/​ Njoku, E. T. (2020a). “Politics of conviviality? State–​civil society relations within the context of counter-​terrorism in Nigeria,” International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 31(5): 1063–​1076. Njoku, E. T. (2020b). “Investigating the intersections between counter-​terrorism and NGOs in Nigeria: Development practice in conflict-​affected areas,” Development in Practice, 30(4): 501–​512. Njoku, E. T. (2021a). “Strategic exclusion: The state and the framing of a service delivery role for civil society organizations in the context of counterterrorism in Nigeria,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 44(5): 410–​430. Obamamoye, B. F. (2017). “Counterterrorism, multinational joint task force and the missing components,” African Identities, 15(4): 428–​440. Otto, F. O. (2015). “Changing the pattern of warfare in Africa: Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria,” Conflicts Studies Quarterly, Special Issue: 3–​40. Pettitt, A. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism policing in Australia: Impacts on civil society,” in J. Howell & J. Lind (eds.), Civil society under strain: Counterterrorism policy, civil society and aid post 9/​11 (pp. 75–​91). Sterling: Kumarian Press. PM News. (2018, February 19). “Boko Haram attacks Dapchi in Yobe.” www. pmnewsnigeria.com/​2018/​02/​19/​boko-​haram-​attack-​dapchi-​yobe/​ Premium Times. (2016a, September 7). “#BringBackOurGirls vows to continue rally despite police ban.” www.premiumtimesng.com/​news/​headlines/​209984-​ bringbackourgirls-​vows-​continue-​rally-​despite-​police-​ban.html

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Premium Times. (2016b, September 6). “Again, Nigerian police move against Bring Back Our Girls protesters.” www.premiumtimesng.com/​news/​more-​news/​ 209897-​breaking-​nigeria-​police-​move-​bring-​back-​girls-​protesters.html Punch. (2017, December 10). “Buhari paid Boko Haram €3m for release of Chibok girls –​report.” www.voanews.com/​a/​michelle-​obama-​outraged-​over-​nigeria-​ kidnapped-​girls/​1911782.html Punch. (2019, January 23). “80,000 displaced from Northeast since November –​ UN.” https://​punchng.com/​80000-​displaced-​from-​north-​east-​since-​november-​un/​ Sahara Reporters. (2018). “#Bringbackourgirls advocacy: Reflections on a four year journey by Olatunji ‘Lanre-​ Baruwa.” http://​saharareporters.com/​2018/​ 04/​ 3 0/​ b ringbackourgirls-​ a dvocacy-​ r eflections- ​ f our- ​ y ear- ​ s ojourn- ​ o latunji-​ %E2%80%98lanre-​baruwa Sidel, M. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the regulation of civil society in the USA,” Development and Change, 41(2): 293–​312. Skokova, Y, Pape, U., & Krasnopolskaya, I. (2018). “The non-​ profit sector in today’s Russia: Between confrontation and co-​optation,” Europe-​Asia Studies, 70(4): 531–​563. www.tandfonline.com/​loi/​ceas20 The Telegraph. (2014, May 7). “US President Barack Obama: Nigeria schoolgirls kidnapping is ‘outrageous’.” www.telegraph.co.uk/​news/​worldnews/​africaand indianocean/​nigeria/​10812728/​US-​President-​Barack-​Obama-​Nigeria-​schoolgirls-​ kidnapping-​is-​outrageous.html UN News. (2014, April 16). “UN calls for immediate release of abducted schoolgirls in northeast Nigeria.” https://​news.un.org/​en/​story/​2014/​04/​ 466312-​un-​calls-​immediate-​release-​abducted-​school-​girls-​north-​eastern-​nigeria World Health Organization. (2007). “Social determinants of health: Civil society.” www.who.int/​social_​determinants/​themes/​civilsociety/​en/​

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12 The securitization of civil society organizations, Islamism, and counter-​terrorism in Kenya: a case study of MUHURI and HAKI Africa Oscar Gakuo Mwangi Introduction Kenya began prioritizing counter-​ terrorism efforts following the 9/​ 11 attacks. The implementation of post-​9/​11 repressive state-​led measures have led to the securitization of civil society organizations (CSOs) involved in counter-​terrorism efforts in Kenya. The state socially constructs CSOs that advocate the rights of communities affected by the Global War on Terror (GWoT), particularly Muslims, as existential threats to national security. While existing studies have looked at the effects of the GWoT on CSOs in Kenya more broadly (Howell & Lind, 2010; Lind & Howell, 2010; Ruteere & Ogada, 2010; Howell, 2014), this chapter provides a contextualized knowledge of the issue by paying attention to two prominent human rights CSOs in Kenya: MUHURI and HAKI Africa. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section surveys Kenya’s pre-​and post-​9/​11 counter-​ terrorism frameworks. The second examines securitization of CSOs in the context of Islamism and counter-​terrorism. The third analyzes the relationship between the implementation of state-​led counter-​terrorism measures (CTMs) and CSO responses to these measures. The conclusion offers recommendations to the problem of securitization of CSOs in Kenya.

Pre-​and post-​9/​11 counter-​terrorism frameworks in Kenya Kenya has been subjected to several terrorist attacks due to its proximity to Somalia, its role in the US-​led GWoT and its military intervention in Somalia on October 16, 2011, initially as Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) and later as a military component of the African Union Mission in Somalia. The nature of the terrorist threat is largely transnational, emanating from the Somalia-​based Al-​Shabaab terrorist group. The major attacks,

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staged by Al-​Shabaab, that have occurred in Kenya since October 2011 are the Westgate Mall attack of 2013, the Mpeketoni attacks of 2014, the Garissa University attack of 2015, and the DusitD2 Complex attack, in which 72, 60, 152, and 21 people died respectively (Mwangi, 2017: 311; Mutambo, 2019). Terrorist attacks date back to 1975 but counter-​terrorism was not a high priority in the pre-​9/​11 period. Kenya, however, worked closely with the United States on counter-​terrorism policies and was added to the US Anti-​ Terrorism Assistance Program, due to the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi (Prestholdt, 2011: 8). Kenya began prioritizing and intensifying counter-​ terrorism efforts in the country following the 9/​ 11 attacks. The attacks resulted in the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which committed UN member states to become parties to, cooperate and implement, the relevant terrorism-​related international conventions and protocols, among others (UNSC, 2001: 3). At the regional level, the African Union (AU) adopted the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in September 2002. In regard to the 9/​11 attacks and ensuing counter-​terrorism frameworks, Kenya began prioritizing counter-​terrorism efforts (Musau, 2018: 8–​9). Coupled with international pressure to act on anti-​terrorism legislation, the government introduced The Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003, which immediately came under attack from CSOs arguing it violated the rights of Muslims. It was also perceived as a rudimentary replica of the US Patriot Act (Kamau, 2006: 134). The Bill was eventually rejected in 2005. The government tabled a new version of the Bill, renamed the Anti-​Terrorism Bill in 2006, but with few changes to the terrorism legislation discourse. Similarly, the Bill was perceived as US replicated and anti-​Muslim (Bardudeen, 2018: 117–​118). After a decade of debate, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 30 of 2012, was enacted, marking a critical legislative development in the war on terror (US, 2013: 20). The legislation of the Act subdued criticism from the US and other Western governments that had pressured Kenya to enact counter-​terrorism legislation (OSF/​MUHURI, 2013). Since then Kenya has enhanced existing and introduced new counter-​ terrorism efforts. These efforts have primarily focused on legislations, law enforcement, border security, countering the financing of terrorism, countering violent extremism (CVE), and regional and international cooperation (US, 2017: 30–​33). The Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 2010, and Proceeds of Crime and Anti-​Money Laundering Act of 2009 Revised Edition 2016, for example, have also reinforced the legal framework under which to prosecute terrorist acts. The Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014 aims at further consolidating the country’s legislative framework to prevent and combat terrorism (Kenya, 2014: 139–​140; US, 2017: 35). State-​driven CTMs that employ

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the use of force are divided among three national security organs: the Kenya Defence Forces, the National Intelligence Service, and the National Police Service. These agencies have the constitutional mandate to conduct punitive counter-​terrorism measures aimed at safeguarding the country’s national security. Security agencies work with regional organizations and the broader international community to increase their counter-​terrorism capacity (Mwangi, 2017: 309; US, 2017: 35–​36).

Securitization, counter-​terrorism, Islamism and civil society organizations in Kenya: the case of MUHURI and HAKI Africa The relationship among securitization, Islamism, and CSOs in the context of post-​9/​11 counter-​terrorism is best understood within the framework of the securitization theory. The theory examines the processes that produce an “intersubjective and socially constructed” security, whereby security or the logic of security is not actually constructed, but objectively defined. Threats, as constructions, are based on the way those constructing interpret their reality (Ciuta, 2009: 301–​326). CSOs advocating the rights of individuals and groups affected by the GWoT, especially Muslims in Kenya, are socially constructed by the state as advocates of Islamism hence existential threats to national security. Islamism refers to the use of Islam by individuals, groups, and organizations as an instrument to pursue political objectives. Islamism is a political ideology and not a theological construct. Its main role is not to offer spiritual solace to its followers but more importantly to provide answers to their contemporary political and social predicaments. Al-​Shabaab advocates Islamism (Mwangi, 2012: 514). The aim is to frame CSOs as supporting terrorism so as to legitimize norm-​violating counter-​terrorism measures toward them and Muslims in the country. The adverse effects of Islamist extremism upon national security in Kenya date back to the 1980s. The country’s implementation of post-​9/​11 CTMs, however, has had a significant impact on the formation of suspect communities, primarily of Muslim origin (Bardudeen, 2018: 115–​116). Kenyan Muslims of Arab and Somali origins including Somalis from Somalia who reside in Kenya are socially constructed as a “suspect c­ ommunity”1 in the state discourse on terrorism in Kenya (Mwangi, 2018: 6–​10). The construction of Muslims as terrorists on religious grounds, emanates from Al-​ Shabaab’s use of Islamism as an ideology. The group propagates Islamism, at the national and transnational levels, to gain legitimacy and create a regional Islamic Caliphate. Al-​Shabaab perceives itself as a Jihadi-​Salafi, movement making it extremist and intransigent in pursuit of its socio-​ political objectives. It has formal links with al-​Qaeda, and some of its

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factions have established links with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Mwangi, 2012: 514–​520; 2017: 310). This has paved the way for the state’s justification to implement norm-​ violating CTMs, subjecting Muslims to arbitrary counter-​terrorism operations (Bardudeen, 2018: 115–​ 116; Mwangi, 2019: 303–​306). It is in the context of the foregoing arguments that this chapter examines CSOs that advocate the rights of Muslims affected by CTMs in Kenya. The chapter pays attention to two prominent human rights CSOs: MUHURI and HAKI Africa. MUHURI and HAKI Africa, based at the coastal city of Mombasa, were initiated in 1997 and 2012 respectively with the aim of safeguarding human rights in the country. They address national human rights issues by promoting the struggle for human rights among marginalized groups. They also promote partnership between state and non-​state actors aimed at improving human security, respect for human rights and rule of law by all. They are both registered under the NGO Coordination Act of 1990 (HAKI Africa, 2017; MUHURI, 2018). The two CSOs have an intricate conflictual and symbiotic relationship with the state and security agencies in the Coastal region. Though MUHURI and HAKI Africa engage in national issues, the main focus is on strengthening human rights and CVE in the Coastal region (Corneliussen, 2018: 7). The construction of MUHURI and HAKI Africa as advocates of Islamism hence existential threats to national security is a response to their role in demanding transparency and accountability in state-​ led CTMs that indiscriminately target Muslims particularly in the Coastal region. HAKI Africa identifies terrorism as the greatest form of human rights violation in society. The CSO recognizes and supports global efforts to combat terrorism and promote human rights. It also supports efforts by the government to combat terrorism in Kenya (HAKI Africa, 2018: 1). HAKI Africa documents the widespread extrajudicial killings and disappearances perpetrated against Coastal Muslims perceived by state authorities to be actual or potential terror suspects. The extrajudicial killings and disappearances, HAKI Africa contends, fall within a wider set of “iron fist” protracted tactics deployed by counter-​terrorism agencies. Many Muslims, therefore, perceive themselves as victims of a violent practice of collective punishment meted out by counter-​terrorism agencies on behalf of the state. This has eroded trust between Muslim communities and state authorities. According to HAKI Africa, Muslims in Kenya are increasingly caught between state violence meted out indiscriminately by counter-​ terrorism agencies, and the threat of violence by non-​state extremist groups. Attacks by extremist groups, particularly Al-​Shabaab, on Muslims who they believe to be apostates are increasing (HAKI Africa, 2016: 3–​5). Similarly, MUHURI advocates for the rights of Muslims affected by state-​led CTMs. One of MUHURI’s key projects is Peace and Security for

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Development, whose goal is to safeguard human rights in the fight against terrorism and to promote partnership between local-​level communities and security authorities in counter-​terrorism efforts. Its objectives are to educate the public on the adverse effects of terrorism and how they can assist counter-​ terrorism; create grassroots state–​society linkages in the fight against terrorism; advocate for the rights of suspects as provided for by the Constitution of Kenya; and ensure local-​level grievances are addressed by state authorities whenever they arise (MUHURI, 2018). Hence a key counter-​terrorism agency that MUHURI constantly monitors is the Antiterrorism Police Unit (ATPU), which has been particularly active in the coastal region of Kenya. The CSO points out that the ATPU’s regular perpetration of human rights abuses include the use of excessive force during house raids; torture and ill-​treatment of detainees; arbitrary detentions; forced disappearances; and renditions (OSF/​MUHURI, 2013: 18–​19). MUHURI emphasizes that the ATPU abuses undermine the aims of effective CTMs, since violent extremists use human rights violations as radicalization and recruitment tools. According to MUHURI, the Unit’s counter-​terrorism strategy is extremely flawed and exacerbates rather than mitigates terrorism. For both CSOs, the tension between many Muslims and counter-​terrorism agencies has, therefore, been on the rise (OSF/​MUHURI, 2013: 47). The two CSOs, therefore, offer appropriate recommendations to the state for action. They recommend that CTMs must genuinely support the wider Muslim community to participate in dealing effectively with the causes of radicalization, rather than the state officials constructing them as abetting terrorism. Both CSOs also recommend that the rule of law and the rights enshrined in the country’s Constitution must extend to all Kenyans in order to guarantee true security for all. This also involves greater youth participation in state and non-​state CVE programs as a way of preventing the violation of their rights. They further recommend it is vital that investigations into human rights abuses must meet international standards (OSF/​ MUHURI, 2013: 24; HAKI Africa, 2016: 3–​4; 2018: 1–​2).

The effects of state-​led CTMs on MUHURI and HAKI Africa in Kenya Kenya’s new conflict and security actors, goals, and methods of its counter-​ terrorism efforts are products of the intended and unintended consequences of the GWoT. The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012, in spite of its relevance, has been criticized on conceptual and viable grounds. The Act lacks conceptual clarity on key concepts of terrorism, related offenses with an expanded sphere and altering acrimoniously, the harmony between

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security and human rights. The Act has also been criticized for extending and providing vague periods of detention of terror suspects as it restored the detention-​without-​trial provisions (Bardudeen, 2018: 115–​118; Musau, 2018: 9). Similarly, the Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014 introduced ninety-​seven provisions aimed at further consolidating the country’s legislative framework to prevent and combat terrorism. Although the High Court struck down eight of the ninety-​seven provisions of the Act as unconstitutional in February 2015, the Act retained slightly over 90 percent of the provisions. This provided the Act the legitimacy to introduce and effect new repressive methods that did not exist before, such as covert “special operations” aimed at neutralizing threats against national security (Mwangi, 2017: 310). It is under such vague counter-​terrorism legislation that MUHURI and HAKI Africa, as key players in counter-​terrorism, have been subjected to state-​led norm-​violating CTMs. As already indicated, this is largely due to securitization and their criticisms of the GWoT. Notable is when they were listed under the Prevention of Terrorism Act as entities supporting terrorism. In a Gazette Notice No. 2326 of April 7, 2015, Notice of Intention to Specify, the Inspector-​General of Police (IGP), in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, notified the entities listed of his intention to recommend to the Cabinet Secretary (CS) for Interior that an order be made declaring each of the entities named as a specified entity. In accordance with subsection 2 of section 3 of the Act, the IGP notified the entities to demonstrate within twenty-​four hours why they should not be declared as a specified entity. The list comprised five terrorist organizations, Al-​Shabaab being one of them, and eighty-​five entities suspected to be associated with Al-​Shabaab. HAKI Africa and MUHURI were listed as numbers 45 and 46 respectively. Several CSOs that have been active in seeking accountability for human rights violations by counter-​terrorism security agencies were included in the list (Kenya, 2015a: 807–​808). Consequently, on April 8, 2015, the National Treasury Principal Secretary announced at a press conference that the government had frozen the bank accounts of people and institutions suspected to be funding terrorists pending investigations before action can be taken against them. MUHURI and HAKI Africa found out on the same day that they could not access their funds as their bank accounts had been frozen. One of the banks informed the CSOs the same day that their respective accounts had been suspended indefinitely and referred them to the Bank Supervision Department of the Central Bank of Kenya for further information (Kenya, 2015b: 2). The adverse implications of being declared a “specified entity” has broader ramifications beyond freezing bank accounts, as “specified entities” are equated with “terrorist groups” (OHCR, 2015: 1–​2).

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The Gazette Notice, though issued under section 3(1) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, contravened section 3(2) of the Act. In the Notice, the IGP notified the entities to demonstrate within twenty-​ four hours why they should not be declared as a specified entity, yet section 3(2) of the Act clearly stipulates, “[b]‌efore making a recommendation under subsection (1), the Inspector-​General shall afford the affected entity reasonable opportunity to demonstrate why it should not be declared as a specified entity” (Kenya, 2012: 8; emphasis added). Both organizations only learnt of the existence of the Gazette Notice through the media after their respective bank accounts had already been frozen on April 8, 2015 and could therefore not submit the requested information within the required twenty-​four hours. Both CSOs were unable to access the funds in their bank accounts. On the same day, both organizations wrote separately to the IGP, protesting their inclusion in the Notice, denouncing the baseless allegations of their links with Al-​ Shabaab, and also provided relevant documentation related to their work, including audited accounts, program descriptions, lists of board members and donors. They had their bank accounts frozen as a result of their legitimate human rights activities in Kenya (OHCR, 2015: 1–​2). MUHURI and HAKI Africa were also subjected to physical harassment and intimidation. On April 20, 2015 Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) and National Police Service officers raided the premises of HAKI Africa in Mombasa and seized computers, hard disks, documents, and financial files. The officers, who produced a court order, claimed to be investigating allegations of tax evasion. The same happened to MUHURI, at their premises, on the following day. Officers of the KRA presented a warrant mentioning also claiming to be investigating possible tax evasion. They also seized documents and dismantled the office server (International Federation for Human Rights, 2015: 2). The two CSOs were also subjected to administrative-​ legal harassment under the NGO Coordination Act. On April 30, 2015 the NGO Coordination Board accused the HAKI Africa of operating without valid registration, in violation of Section 22 of the NGO Coordination Act. It was also accused of operating through unregistered bank accounts. HAKI Africa responded, explaining its legal status as a project of HAKI Centre, which was duly registered by the NGO Board in 2012 (International Federation for Human Rights, 2015: 1–​2). Despite the cooperation of the CSOs, the Executive Director of the NGOs Coordination Board wrote to the two organizations on May 12, 2015, giving them fourteen days’ notice of intention to cancel their registration certificates on the alleged grounds of violating the provisions of the NGO Coordination Act. MUHURI responded on May 15, 2015 requesting details on the areas and provisions of the law and regulations violated but received no response from the Board. MUHURI dispatched a follow-​up letter to the Board on May 25, 2015 (KHRC et al.,

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2015: 1). On May 27, 2015, however, the NGO Board issued a decision to de-​ register HAKI Africa and MUHURI and to cancel their licenses (International Federation for Human Rights, 2015: 1). The two CSOs, which were informed of the decision through the media, subsequently wrote to the NGO Board to request information on the motivations of the decision taken by the Board. In a letter dated May 28, 2015, the NGO Coordination Board justified the decision with a change in the composition of MUHURI’s board members without notification to the NGO Board, as well as with allegations of tax evasion and of employment of foreign personnel (International Federation for Human Rights, 2015: 1).

The responses of MUHURI and HAKI Africa to state-​level CTMs in Kenya Civil society responses to Kenya’s repressive post 9/​11 counter-​terrorism legislation range from non-​legal to legal ones. These include written and verbal condemnations, reminding the state of the complementary role they play in counter-​terrorism efforts, particularly CVE, and most significantly, adopting legal action. Several peer human rights CSOs condemned the state’s response toward MUHURI and HAKI Africa’s role in demanding accountability and transparency in Kenya’s counter-​terrorism efforts. In particular they condemned the way in which the two CSOs were listed in the Gazette, how and why their accounts were frozen, and their attempted de-​registration. They also condemned the undue intimidation and interrogation of the staff and board members of the two CSOs as well as the confiscation of their crucial records, data, and information by officers drawn from the DCI and the KRA under the guise of tax evasion. They emphasized that the actions of the state contravened several existing laws, including the Prevention of Terrorism Act, hence were illegal (KHRC et al., 2015: 1–​2). The peer CSOs also pointed out the significant role both organizations play in counter-​terrorism efforts particularly in CVE. They argued that because the Gazette Notice list was long and the organizations whose names form the list appeared unrelated, the list was a futile attempt to bring under one label different organizations, many of which may be innocent. The CSOs emphasized that the terrorist label attached did not in any way relate to the valuable work of MUHURI and HAKI Africa in CVE and improving security in the Coastal region. They also emphasized that both organizations work responsively and peacefully, advocating for constitutional means of ensuring countering terrorism while also observing human rights. They also pointed out that both CSOs were nationally

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and internationally recognized and respected, noting that the Executive Director of HAKI Africa, Hussein Khalid, was one of two Kenyan civil society leaders who was invited to participate in the White House Summit in Washington, DC on CVE in February 2015 (KHRC et al., 2015: 1–​2). Hence, the failure to give the organization an opportunity to defend itself was inherently prejudicial and transgressed all notions of fairness. The listing of the two CSOs by the state was a tactless reaction to intimidate not only the two CSOs but all civil society. Such actions devalued the state’s efforts to fight terrorism. Peer human rights CSOs underscored that counter-​terrorism can only succeed if both civil society and the state work together. Continuous antagonism of civil society would only aggravate the situation. Hence there was no justification for the inclusion of these two organizations in the list (KHRC et al., 2015: 1–​2). On their part, MUHURI and HAKI Africa filed a petition in the High Court in April 2015 on grounds that the Gazette Notice contravened fundamental rights as enshrined in Kenya’s Constitution and also sections of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Their Notice of Motion dated April 13, 2015, sought the orders of the court to unfreeze MUHURI and HAKI Africa’s bank accounts as well as an injunction to restrain both the IGP from recommending to the CS for Interior and the CS from declaring the CSOs as specified entities. The Motion was premised on the grounds that the Respondents were, by their actions of publishing the Notice and freezing the Petitioners’ accounts, in breach of the Petitioners’ rights under the Constitution and the applicable law. The Petition claimed that as a result, the CSOs had suffered public anger, ridicule, and stigma; the lives of their officials and staff had been endangered; and they had been unable to continue with economic and social operations. The Petition sought among other reliefs a declaration that the actions of the Respondents were unconstitutional, an order unfreezing their accounts, and an injunction restraining the IGP and the CS from proceeding any further or declaring them as specified entities (Kenya, 2015a: 2–​3). On June 11 the judge issued an injunction restraining the IGP from recommending to the CS for Interior to declare MUHURI and HAKI Africa as specified entities until the hearing and determination of the Petition. An injunction restraining the CS from declaring the two CSOs as specified entities was also issued (Kenya, 2015a: 2–​3). The Petition was determined on November 12, 2015. The judge issued orders declaring among others that: (1) the Gazette Notice particularly those parts purporting to notify of intention to recommend to the CS for the Interior that an order be made declaring MUHURI and HAKI Africa as specified entities were made in violation of the Constitution and the applicable law; (2) the IGP acted ultra vires the Constitution and the law and in

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excess of his powers in purporting to publish those parts of the Notice particularly those parts purporting to notify of intention to recommend to the CS for Interior that an order be made declaring MUHURI and HAKI Africa as specified entities; (3) the freezing of accounts of MUHURI and HAKI Africa was unconstitutional, illegal, and in violation of their fundamental rights and freedom to own property; and (4) the freezing of MUHURI and HAKI Africa accounts in their respective banks be lifted forthwith. The High Court decision was commended by both CSOs and their peers (Kenya, 2015b: 56–​58).

Conclusion The securitization of CSOs is a key feature in post-​9/​11 Kenya. MUHURI and HAKI Africa, key actors in counter-​terrorism efforts, have been subjected to state-​led norm-​violating CTMs due to their criticisms of the GWoT. Civil society responses to Kenya’s repressive post-​9/​11 CTMs range from non-​legal to the more successful legal actions. Scholars who examine the impacts of CTMs on CSOs in Kenya look at these issues more broadly. This chapter, however, contributes to the literature through a case study of the two CSOs revealing their experiences of state repressive counter-​terrorism approaches. This is important as it provides a contextual understanding of the challenges of CSOs face in the context of CTMs in Kenya. There is need to mitigate the effects of securitizing CSOs under the guise of the GWoT. Meaningful CTMs that do not securitize CSOs and produce suspect communities, should be formulated and implemented taking cognizance of the violent nature of the GWoT. This should involve wider community participation in the formulation of such legislation. Though the state and civil society have commentary roles to play in counter-​terrorism efforts, preference must be given to the latter since its methods are informal and process-​oriented rather than the formal and fear-​based goal-​oriented methods of the state. Informal and process-​oriented methods are more legitimate among communities than formal and fear-​based goal-​oriented methods.

Note 1 A “suspect community” is a group of people, or a subgroup of the population constructed as “suspect” by actions pursued by the state to safeguard national or state “security” and enhanced by societal responses and social practices. Once constructed, the “suspect community” becomes the target of social exclusion and state led norm-​violating CTMs (Smyth, 2014: 231–​233).

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References Bardudeen, F. A. (2018). “Socio-​legal implications of the laws to combat religious extremism in Kenya,” in M. C. Green, T. J. Gunn, & M. Hills (eds.), Religion, law and security in Africa (pp. 111–​130). Matieland: African Sun Media. Ciuta, F. (2009). “Security and the problem of context: A hermeneutical critique of securitisation theory,” Review of International Studies, 35(2): 301–​326. Corneliussen, H. (2018). “Review of MUHURI and HAKI Africa Agreements 2015–​ 17,” Norad Collected Reviews 02/​2018. HAKI Africa. (2016). “What do we tell the families? Killings and disappearances in the coastal region of Kenya, 2012–​2016.” HAKI Africa. (2017, September 30). “HAKI Africa.” http://​hakiafrica.or.ke/​ HAKI Africa. (2018, July 29). “Statement to the UN Member States by Hussein Khalid, Executive Director of HAKI Africa.” United Nations High Level Conference of Heads of Counter Terrorism Agencies of Member States, United Nations Offices in New York. Howell, J. (2014). “The securitisation of NGOs post-​9/​11,” Conflict, Security & Development, 14(2): 151–​179. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2010). “Securing the world and challenging civil society: Before and after the ‘war on terror’,” Development and Change, 41(2): 279–​291. International Federation for Human Rights (fidh). (2015, December 23). “Kenya: Court decision to unfreeze the bank accounts of HAKI Africa and Muslims for Human Rights.” www.fidh.org/​en/​ Kamau, C. (2006). “Kenya and the war on terrorism,” Review of African Political Economy, 33(107): 133–​141. Kenya. (2012). Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 30 of 2012, Revised Edition 2015. Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting. Kenya. (2014). The Security Laws (Amendment) Act, No. 19 of 2014. Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting. Kenya. (2015a). Notice of Intention to Specify, Gazette Notice No. 2326. The Kenya Gazette, Vol. CXVII –​No. 36, 7 April: 807–​808. Kenya. (2015b, November 12) Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) & another v Inspector-​General of Police & 5 others. Petition 19 of 2015. http://​kenyalaw. org/​kl/​ Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) et al. (2015). “Human rights organisations are not terrorist organisations,” Civil Society Organisation in Kenya Press Statement, April 13. www.khrc.or.ke/​2015-​03-​04-​10-​37-​01/​press-​releases/​371-​ human-​rights-​organizations-​are-​not-​terrorist-​organizations.html Lind, J. & Howell, J. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the politics of aid: Civil society responses in Kenya,” Development and Change, 41(2): 335–​353. Musau, S. (2018, January 21). “Combating terrorism and upholding human rights in Kenya,” APCOF Research Paper. Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI). (2018, March). “About us.” www.muhuri. org/​muhuri/​ Mutambo, A. (2019, January 25). “Kenya asks UN to finance Somalia war against Shabaab.” www.nation.co.ke

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Mwangi, O. G. (2012). “State collapse, Al-​Shabaab, Islamism and legitimacy in Somalia,” Politics, Religion & Ideology, 13(4): 513–​527. Mwangi, O. G. (2017). “The dilemma of Kenya’s new counter-​terrorism and asymmetric warfare,” Peace Review, 29(3): 307–​314. Mwangi, O. G. (2019). “The ‘Somalinisation’ of terrorism and counter-​terrorism in Kenya: The case of refoulement,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, 12(2): 298–​316. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCR) (2015, April 20). Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the situation of human rights defenders; and the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. Open Society Foundations (OSF)/​ MUHURI (2013). “We’re tired of taking you to the court”: Human rights abuses by Kenya’s anti-​ terrorism police unit. New York: OSF. Prestholdt, J. (2011). “Kenya, the United States and counter-​ terrorism,” Africa Today, 57(4): 3–​27. Ruteere, M. & Ogada, M. (2010). “Regional challenge, local response: Civil society and human rights in US-​Kenya counter-​terrorism cooperation,” in J. Howell & J. Lind (eds.), Civil society under strain: Counter-​terrorism policy, civil society and aid post-​9/​11 (pp. 227–​247). Sterling: Kumarian Press. Smyth, M. B. (2014). “Theorising the ‘suspect community’: Counter-​ terrorism security practices and the public imaginations,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7(2): 223–​240. United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (2001). Resolution 1373(2001). S/​RES/​ 1373(2001). United States (US). (2013). Country reports on terrorism 2012. US Department of State Publication. United States (US). (2017). Country reports on terrorism 2016. US Department of State Publication.

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A shrinking space: state security and its effects on civil society in Uganda David Andrew Omona and Scott N. Romaniuk

Introduction The world has seen a drastic increase in the number of countries passing and implementing restrictive and offensive laws and security measures in the past three decades concerning civil society organizations (CSOs) with varied purposes and mission statements. The formulation and implementation of restrictive and offensive CSO laws has been particularly stark following the 9/​11 attacks against the United States in 2001. In many cases, laws and measures have been tightly knitted together with new national counter-​ terrorism strategies and policies designed to contest new and complex forms of international terrorism, including existential threats to national security. Uganda was one of the first African nations to publicly voice its commitment to the United States and the Bush administration’s “War on Terror,” endowing the ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) under Yoweri Museveni, with a prodigious infusion of power and support from the West. Following his pledge of support to a wounded America, the Museveni regime began to recast its approach to internal security threats, thereby establishing a firm justificatory basis for pursuing threats that were hoisted to monumental new levels of menace and paralleled with global terrorism. Museveni’s guileful tactics were part and parcel of the creation of a national anti-​terrorism disposition and image that certified firm support from the US irrespective of the internal actions undertaken by the NRM regime. Behind Uganda’s budding counter-​terrorism/​security veil lay policies of human rights abuses, attacks against political opponents and opposition, offensives against the media, a thrust against liberal ideals, and a systematic crackdown on civil society and CSOs, all under the cloak of fighting terrorism. Socio-​political developments that have taken place within Uganda since 9/​11 have steadily eroded the operational space of CSOs. Under the guise of maintaining law and order, and through political discourse that prioritizes national security interest, Uganda’s government has enacted several

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restrictive measures for the purpose of monitoring, controlling, and subsequently restricting the operations of CSOs throughout the country. The laws enacted have invariably been used by state security agents to disperse, arrest, and torture anyone seen acting contrary to the established law; thus, infringing on the basic democratic rights of citizens and deeply impacting their security. This chapter examines the closing space for CSOs in the pre-​and post-​9/​11 security environment in Uganda with the aim of illustrating the implications of such security frameworks on the operational space for CSOs, and their relations with the state. It further assesses CSO responses to the closing civic space within Uganda. The chapter engages with the topics of civil society and counter-​terrorism through a qualitative lens of analysis, employing secondary literature, including government laws and policies, and grey literature.

The pre-​and post-​9/​11 security environment in Uganda Not surprisingly, Uganda’s security challenges pre-​date the violent attacks of 9/​11 and can be said to lay the groundwork for the upshot in post-​9/​11 security measures and securitizing processes throughout the country that have deeply affected the operational capacity of CSOs. Uganda’s security challenges, in fact, reach back to the colonial days, when the colonial administration governed with an iron fist to suppress the emerging security threats. Aside from the two immediate years following Uganda’s independence, the country became embroiled in a myriad of conflicts that coalesced to create a fragile peace and security within the country (Omona, 2015: 17). As such, Uganda’s security situation was delicate and favored hard and fast rule to maintain peace and order. This dynamic thus resulted in a situation that favored state strength, placing the ruling government in a natural position of advantage. Successive governments in Uganda placed special premium on issues of security and developed various security frameworks (Mbabazi, 2003) to address any emerging security concern. While some of the security frameworks assisted in maintaining peace and order in the country, others that targeted CSOs curtailed their operations and compromised their security greatly. Although control measures have maintained a considerable presence, no stringent legal and security frameworks were introduced to restrict CSOs and their operations. In the 1950s and 1960s, when there were very few CSOs in the country, no stringent legal and security frameworks were introduced to restrict their operations. Thus, many CSOs in form of NGOs at the

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time were allowed to freely play the role of relief and emergency assistance. Perhaps this was because CSOs were very few and mainly concentrated their activities in the health, education, and emergency relief sectors. Besides, the government saw their work as “temporary and transitional, pending government takeover when resources allowed” (Muhangi, 2004: 11). Hence, in areas where the government could not reach, they gave CSOs the liberty to fill the gap of service provision. As time went by, however, the initial relaxed operational space for CSOs started to change. The security challenges that emerged after the military coup of 1971 that brought Idi Amin to power enacted restrictive measures against any self-​governing organizations because they were perceived to be anti-​government. The new strategy for controlling the operations of CSOs during the match of Amin’s presidency somewhat restricted CSOs from doing their work. However, after the overthrow of Amin’s regime in 1979, a new era was ushered in for CSOs. The devastation caused by the war of liberation gave rise to a surge in the numbers of NGOs in the early and mid-​ 1980s. These organizations were delivering services the government was ill prepared to provide. Moreover, during this time, CSOs that focused on development projects were co-​opted by the government in the guise of encouraging public–​private partnerships. However, those that tried to extend their tentacles to issues of governances, democracy, and accountability had their operations under surveillance. To further operationalize this control, the government came up with the Non-​Governmental Organization Registration Statute (No. 5 of 1989), and the accompanying Statutory Instrument, the Non-​Governmental Regulation (No. 9 of 1990) that established a Board to register and monitor activities of NGOs (Muhangi, 2004: 16). To facilitate a closer monitoring of CSOs’ activities, the Secretariat of the Board was strategically located under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a ministry that is in charge of law, order, and internal security. Besides, the composition of the Board was securitized in that it has two people from the public and one person from each of the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Relief and Social Rehabilitation, Foreign Affairs, Local Government, Women in Development, and representatives from the Office of the Prime Minister, Internal Security Organization, and External Security Organization (Muhangi, 2004: 16). In executing their role of considering applications of NGOs for registration, approving or rejecting such applications, keeping a register of registered organizations, and granting or revoking certificates of registration, the board became a pain in the lives of CSOs. Once a CSO’s work is suspected to be challenging government policies, they are either deregistered or their license registrations are not renewed. Such presumptive operations across the board made members of the CSOs like Asiimwe

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Mwesigye (2003) openly argue against the existing regulatory mechanism of the government with respect to CSOs. The grip on CSOs was tightened after the 9/​11 terror attack on the United States. When President George W. Bush sounded his rhetoric on a war against terrorism Uganda became one of the first countries in the world to support it. This facilitated the listing of the Lord’s Resistance Army/​Movement (LRA/​M), a rebel group in Uganda, as a terrorist organization. That achieved, the government of Uganda moved swiftly to introduce obstructive legislations that, after enacting into laws, worked to fundamentally narrow the space and freedom of CSOs in Uganda. Among others, we shall concern ourselves to look at the Anti-​Terrorism Act, 2002 (as amended 2017), the Anti-​Money Laundering Act, 2013, the Uganda Communications Act, 2013 (as amended 2017), the Public Order Management Act, 2013, and the Non-​Governmental Organizations Act, 2016, alongside the Statutory Instruments 2017 No. 22, the Non-​ Governmental Organizations Regulations, 2017 (Under Section 55 of the Non-​ Governmental Organizations Act, 2016). One may therefore ask, given these, how are CSOs surviving? To answer this, let us turn to look at the implications of these Acts and statutory instruments on the operation of CSOs and their relation with the state in Uganda.

The impact of counter-​terrorism security frameworks on CSOs and CSO–​state relations in Uganda The 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (as Amended) explicitly provides under Articles 29 and 38 for the Freedoms of Expression, Assembly and Association, and the right to participate in the affairs of government respectively (Constitution, 1995, Art. 29 & 38). Besides, whereas Uganda has ratified various human rights treaties and instruments that protect human rights (Global Rights Alert, 2017: 1), the challenging civic space in the country has a lot of implications for the operation and security of CSOs. Although one could say that the current restriction to CSOs has been conditioned by the global war against terrorism, using the threat of terrorism as a convenient means of undermining civil liberties has impacted their operations to a serious degree. While the restriction of CSOs is as old as the state, and as noted earlier, in Uganda since the 1970s, the situation is getting worse by the day. Whereas the security measures introduced helped to curb threats in the state, the measures that were introduced by the Ugandan government after 9/​11 to curtail CSOs’ operation had implications for their security and their relations with the state.

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The very first legal instrument that made operational ground for CSOs tricky was the Anti-​Terrorism Act, 2002. One could say there was such a hurry with this legislation in order to, perhaps, position Uganda in the global fight against terrorism. In actualizing this Act and the provision in the other Acts, state agents have instituted philanthropic protection, stringent regulation for registration, criminalization and stigmatization of human rights awareness, and restriction of freedom of expression. More so the state agents started to intimidate and violently attack CSOs and civil society in a more general sense, restrict online communications for the people securitize CSO donors, exclude CSOs from running financial institutions, all meant to capture the space that was traditionally occupied by civil society. Although one could blame the fluidity of interpretation this Act gives, some state parties and security agencies, seizing the opportunity, have made it their mandate to link any person or organization they deem suspicious to terrorist acts. As a result, many CSO leaders and organizations found themselves caught up in the mess, especially when they attempted to participate in programs that state agents considered to be anti-​establishment. This means that CSOs no longer have the liberty to do whatever they are meant to do without due restrictions. Using Part VII of the Anti-​Terrorism Act 2002, under interception of communications and surveillance, and the Uganda Communication Act, 2013, state agents intercepted communications of individuals and organizations who they suspect to be supporting groups that are anti-​establishment. A 2015 report by Privacy International (PI) entitled “For God and My President: State Surveillance in Uganda” gives a detailed narrative on how officials of the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence, acting on presidential orders, used an intrusion malware to infect the communication devices of key opposition leaders, media, and establishment insiders. The secret operation was codenamed Fungua Macho (“open your eye” in Swahili): “Once infected, a person’s computer or phone can be visible. Passwords, files, microphones and cameras can be viewed and manipulated without the target’s knowledge” (PI, 2015: 6). To execute this, operatives bribed people close to their targets to get access to personal phones and computers on which they install the malware. Obtaining personal information to use as blackmail was an explicit goal of the operation (PI, 2015: 7). Covert FinFisher access points in the form of fake Local Area Networks (LAN) were installed within parliament and key government institutions. Actual and suspected government opponents were targeted in their homes. Fake LANs and wireless hotspots were set up in apartment estates and neighborhoods where many wealthy Ugandans and expatriates live (PI, 2015: 7). The security operatives expanded their operation areas even to hotels. As such, according to the 2015 Private International Report, twenty-​one

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hotels in Kampala, Entebbe, and Masaka were also used in the infection of Operation Fungua Macho targets. The management of hotels collaborated with the operation to install fake WiFi portals and install FinFisher on desktop computers in the hotel business centers. Besides, all major conference hotels in Kampala where high level events such as heads of state meetings and political party conferences occur and business transactions are negotiated were included in the target list (PI, 2015: 7). Although what the security agencies were doing was illegal under the Regulation of Communication Interception Act, 2010, given such interceptions were not sanctioned by a competent court of law, the Anti-​Terrorism Act, 2002, in a way gives almost unfettered discretion to intercept communication and carry out surveillance without judicial authorization and oversight (PI, 2015: 8). Whereas at first the parliament had refused to pass the 2007 Regulation of Communication Interception Bill, after the 2010 Al-​Shabaab attacks in Kampala, the parliament passed the bill into law in 2010. In fact, those aside, although many people got to know the act of illegal surveillance recently, wire-​tapping phones has been going on since the mid-​2000s. To the extent, foreign numbers calling certain parts of the country was also monitored (PI, 2015: 14). The Uganda Communications Act, 2013, helped to buttress and operationalize the Anti-​Terrorism Act, 2002 (as amended) in the area of restriction of information flow. However, the Uganda Communications Act, 2013 is meant to: consolidate and harmonize the Uganda Communications Act and the Electronic Media Act; to dissolve the Uganda Communications Commission and the Broadcasting Council and reconstitute them as one body known as the Uganda Communications Commission; and to provide for related matters (Preamble).

Article 41, 1c, of the Act under suspension and revocation of license empowers the commission to “suspend or revoke a license issued … where the operator is engaged in or is supporting activities amounting to a treasonable offence under the Penal Code Act.” This article was used by state agents against CSOs, especially the media fraternity. Whereas sharing and dispensing information was instrumental to the daily operation of CSOs, unfortunately on several occasions, they were denied this opportunity. It suffices to qualify here that denying the liberty to free communication to CSOs in Uganda is not a new phenomenon. Even before the promulgation of the Uganda Communications Acts, 2013, there were instances of state censure, especially in the area of media and communication. For example, on September 10, 2007, the Broadcasting Council, using whatever law there was, closed Central Broadcasting Service. Not only did they close the station

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but they also revoked its license of operation due to a purported “breach of minimum broadcasting standards and inciting bloody pro-​Kabaka riots in and around Kampala” (Mwanze & Butagira, 2010). Yet this radio station was used by Buganda Kingdom to mobilize resources for its development projects. The closure of the station affected the Kingdom’s resource mobilization, thereby greatly affecting its relation with the state. It should also be noted here that the closure of the radio did not only affect the Kingdom alone but also other private sectors since they also used to use the same station to pass vital information to the public. Subsequently, the enactment of the Uganda Communication Act, 2013, greatly narrowed press freedom and freedom for CSOs to share information. The state parties made use of Article 41, 1c, under suspension and revocation of license to clamp down on media groups that share programs involving CSOs with the general public. Using the provision of this article that states that, “[t]‌he commission may suspend or revoke a license issued under this Act … where the operator is engaged in or is supporting activities amounting to a treasonable offence under the Penal Code Act” (TUCA, 2013, Art. 41, 1c), the commission, using “order from above,” as they usually say, applied the Act to restrict media freedom in the country. Since a treasonable offense under the Penal Code Act is subject to interpretation, this implies, for whatever reasons, the commission is at liberty to suspend or revoke the operational license of a radio. The Act was used at the time to frustrate the efforts of CSOs who were using such facilities to reach out to people. To facilitate a stringent grip on the media, the government submitted the Uganda Communications (Amendment) Bill to parliament toward the 2016 general elections. The bill sought to amend section 92(1) of the 2013 Uganda Communications Act, so to revoke requirement for parliamentary approval of the regulations put forward by the Minister of Communication, implying that, “the minister is at liberty to control regulations and state of communications free from parliamentary oversight” (Kode & Vlamings, 2007: 3). While this amendment that the government sought angered CSOs across board and made some to devise means of deliberately go against the requirements of the law, the government got whatever they wanted. After amending the Act, the situation got worse. It gave the government latitude to use it to censor and silence the media and other CSOs. Such acts by the state parties greatly curbed the flow of information to the public. On November 27, 2015, the Electoral Commission, presumably with orders from above, ordered the Citizen Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda to stop broadcasting its voters’ education campaign, codenamed “TOPOWA.” Yet, this voters’ education campaign was meant to encourage

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citizens to vote during the 2016 elections. Whereas free access to information is a fundamental right, as enshrined in the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (Art. 41, 1), the application of this law encumbers independent media houses from doing their work. The situation deteriorated further still when the military and police physically assaulted journalists, shooting several during the course of the attack, and grabbed or destroyed their cameras (Kode & Vlamings, 2017: 6). On three separate occasions, between October 15 and November 16, 2015, three journalists were shot while covering political events. After these incidences, journalists were banned from covering certain political events so as to prevent information from flowing to and among communities, thus preventing the country’s citizenry from gaining an awareness of current affairs in the country. The Uganda Communication Commission (UCC) blocked access to social media from February 18–​20 and on May 26. Though widely criticized by CSOs, President Museveni cheered the UCC for its efforts and stated that he ordered the action as Ugandans were using social media for the purpose of disseminating misinformation (Kode & Vlamings, 2017: 6). President Museveni further cited security reasons to justify the switching off of social media on the day of his inauguration, yet journalists used social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp to circulate news. Even after the elections, the crackdown on the media and the population continued. For instance, on February 27, 2016, eighteen people, six of whom were journalists, were arrested while covering the arrest of opposition leader Kiza Besigye. The reasons given for their arrest were simply “security reasons” and “inciting violence” (Kode & Vlamings, 2017: 6). Security forces allegedly tortured the journalists while being held inside the police van. After covering the tension that ensued, the media was officially banned from covering political activities in support of the defiance campaign initiated by the Forum for Democratic Change just before the swearing in of President Museveni (Kode & Vlamings, 2017: 7). As a means of intimidation, the “authorities threatened to extend the ban to social media if media houses use the platform, and to revoke the license of all media companies that gave live coverage to the defiance campaign” (Kode & Vlamings, 2017: 7). The stringent Uganda Communication Commission Act, 2013, was also extended to clamp down on private radio station and radio journalists, especially when they host activists, opposition politicians, and others whose concern focuses on human rights and advocacy (Kode & Vlamings, 2017: 7). Possibly it was meant to prevent people from listening to programs that promotes human rights awareness, good governance, and community development. Given this harsh experience:

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Government agents, in some instances, closed down Radio Stations and captured their equipment just because they were purportedly siding with the opposition politicians who the authorities regard as agents of foreign enemies to the State. A case in point was on 21st January 2016, two days after the station hosted Amama Mbabazi –​an opposition political leader, the UCC revoked the license of Endigyoto FM and confiscated its broadcasting equipment. (Kode & Vlamings, 2017: 8)

The above act prevented CSOs from exercising their fundamental rights even though the ruling party deemed them necessary for safeguarding its hold on power. The act held severe consequences beyond those directly targeted by preventing the general population from accessing live broadcasts and information that challenged the ruling party’s hold on power and lent support to opposition politicians’ views, which might have appeared to be a logical concern given the historical conditions of Uganda’s security situation. On February 13, 2016, the police stormed Radio North FM in Lira, arrested the radio presenter and detained seven members of the opposition politicians while holding a discussion about the presidential debates. To justify their brutal action, government agents and members of the ruling NRM party at times label domestic political opposition leaders as terrorists and individuals challenging government or party interests as security threats, politically deviating attention and resources from pursuing core counter-​terrorism goals (US Department of State, 2017). The state not only labeled opposition politicians as agents or foreign enemies of the state, but also targeted CSOs that support democracy, ascribing them the same label. Such careless lambasting of any opposition to the state as agents of foreign enemies led CSOs and opposition politicians to devise another way of reaching the public with whatever message they packaged for them. Through the application of the Public Order Management Act, 2013, state agents also clamped down on the activities of CSOs. State agents used the act to regulate public meetings, although the act is intended to: provide for the regulation of public meetings to provide for the duties and responsibilities of the police, organizers and participants in relation to public meetings; to prescribe measures for safeguarding public order; and for related matters. (POMA, 2013, Preamble)

Its requirement for organizers of public meetings to inform the police in advance has given the police the upper hand in deciding which public meetings should go ahead, thus restricting freedom of assembly that the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda gave citizens and citizen organizations. To make matters worse for the CSO fraternity POMA, 2013, empowers the Inspector General of Police or an authorized officer with “powers to

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regulate the conduct of all meetings in accordance with the law” (POMA, 2013, Sec. 3). The Act’s prohibition of “gathering, assembly, processions, or demonstrations in public places or premises held for the purposes of discussing, acting upon, petitioning, or exposing views on a matter of public interest” (Sec. 4, 1) is an affront to progressive societies. Besides, to have the organizer or his or her agent seek permission from an “authorized officer of the intention to hold meeting at least three days but not more than fifteen days before the proposed date of the public meeting” (Sec. 5 (1)) so as to make a gathering legal is equally challenging. The restrictions of this Act relate to “all public meetings and assemblies, with exception of town hall meeting, which ought to be held between 7:00 am and 7:00 pm” (POMA, 2013, Sec. 5, {2} c). Unfortunately, “No such meeting is allowed in restricted areas such as: Parliament building, State House, International Airport, and the Courts” (POMA, 2013, Schedule 3, Sec. 13). POMA authorizes officers to disperse spontaneous meetings if they deem the venue is not suitable for such meeting. In January 2016, a new stringent NGO Act was signed into law by President Yoweri Museveni. Section 44 of the Act imposes special obligation on CSOs requiring them to get approval from the District NGO Monitoring Committees, Local Government, and NGO Bureau before extending activities to a new geographical area. Section 44 of the Act further stipulates that “CSOs must be non-​partisan and not engage in acts prejudicial to the security or interest and dignity of the people of Uganda.” Such “provisions are very broad and have considerable scope for selective and politicized interpretation by the state officials” (Kode & Vlamings, 2017: 8). The Statutory Instruments 2017 No. 22 on the Non-​Governmental Organizations Regulations, 2017 (Under Section 55 of the Non-​Governmental Organizations Act, 2016) lays even stricter requirements right from registration, permission to operate, and requirements to be monitored by the district NGO monitoring team of the area of operation. With the above Acts and statutory regulation in operation, the over 11,500 registered CSOs working on a range of issues across the country became a target of government security agents. The ground became extremely unstable for CSOs working on issues of human rights, democracy, corruption, media rights, the role of law, governance, and election reforms. Government agents and security operatives began double-​checking any organization that tries to empower people to know their rights. Premium was laid on CSOs trying to intervene in human rights abuses like “land grabbing, unlawful eviction, compensation irregularities, lack of participation in exploitation and governance of natural resources (and) lack of transparency in the oil sector” (Global Rights Alert, 2017: iii). Instead of the government supporting the efforts of such CSOs in protecting the rights of the vulnerable

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citizens from the hands of such compradors, but they join hands with the wrong people to torture the poor. During the precarious state that ensured, some targeted CSOs unfortunately had their offices broken into and their premises vandalized just because the government considers what they do to be security sensitive. Consequently, from September 2012 to the time of writing, the security operatives had broken into over thirty CSO offices in Kampala. For example, on May 24, 2016 the Forum for African Women Educationists’ office was broken into and a server, laptop, and computers were not just taken, but stolen. On June 29, 2015, the Human Rights Network for Journalists Uganda offices were broken into and sensitive pieces of information were stolen. On May 22, 2016, the premises of the Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum were vandalized, and several documents were taken and the guard was killed in the process. This action preceded break-​ins at the home of Forum’s head of advocacy and deputy director during which backup hard drives and other essential information were stolen. In a related scenario, thugs who broke into the premises of the Uganda Land Alliance killed the guard before ransacking the area. Whereas these incidences were reported to the police, they have not come up with any credible information leading to the identity of the burglars (Kode & Vlamings, 2017: 4–​5). The Anti-​ Money Laundering Act, 2013, gave credence to the Anti-​ Terrorism Act, 2002 (as amended) in monitoring and controlling transaction of funds. Key points one can hone in on from the preamble of the Anti-​ Money Laundering Act, 2013, are prohibition and prevention of money laundering through: (1) imposing duties on institutions and persons; (2) making orders in relations to proceeds of crimes and properties of offenders; (3) cooperating in doing so with other states; (4) instituting legal processes to prohibit the crime. In a way, the security forces were able to use this to ransack the premises of targeted CSOs and NGOs. A case in point are the storming of the office of Action Aid, the Global Institute for Security Studies, the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative, the Human Rights Network for Journalists-​Uganda, and the Uhuru Institute by security agents (Nalubega, 2017; Nassaka, 2017), purportedly to remove monies sent to these organizations by foreign enemies for destabilizing peace and security in the country. More worrying for civil society actors involved in development is the shift in donor aid policies toward budget support, whereby funds are given directly to national governments or particular sectors of government. This shift, which will reduce the amount of direct funding from donors to CSOs, is poignantly exemplified in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Howell et al., 2006: 18).

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Push back: CSOs’ response to the closing civic space in Uganda In any state of nature when threats are advanced to any individual, the natural response is either fight or flight. The same is true with CSOs in Uganda. Whereas some of them responded to the state virulence by fighting to regain their rights, others chose to impose self-​censorship. Those who chose to fight to retain their space took to legal battles by challenging laws that are not favorable to their operations. This is because they knew that the available legislative framework governing their operations has generated several stumbling blocks that have become a source of frustration to fulfilling their mandate (Global Rights Alert, 2017: iii). Such battles started right from 2006 when the government, through parliament, attempted to introduce stringent laws to control CSO activities, which eventually was amended in 2016. The CSOs questioned the legality of the need to amend the Non-​Governmental Registration Act, 1989, into the eventual Non-​Governmental Organization Act, 2016, and its Statutory Instruments 2017 No. 22 on the Non-​Governmental Organizations Regulations, 2017. CSOs opined that the law was not necessary and therefore a clear violation of freedom of association as well as expression (Global Rights Alert, 2017: iii) as enshrined in the constitution. As part of this legal battle, with reference to the NGO Registration (Amendment) Bill, 2003, Mwesigye (2003: 10) asserts: The present bill treats NGOs as a security threat, provided for an excessive degree of state control and interference in the activities of NGOs and makes registration and revocation or registration of NGOs dependent on government policy, plan or in public interest. The bill makes no attempt to lay the ground for constructive relationship between NGOs and Government, for example by institutionalizing channels of communication and cooperation.

The assertion came to be true when the bill was passed into an act in 2016. It introduced a lot of restrictions on CSOs during registration, renewal of license, geographical area of operation, declaration of sources of funding and budget to the district NGO monitoring team, and so forth. Equally, other members within the third sector have expressed concern about the legal regime under which CSOs operate. They feared that the ripple effect of this will be organizations resorting to self-​censorship out of fear of reprisal or prosecution (Human Rights Watch, 2012: 43; Global Rights Alert, 2017: iii). Given the heavy-​headed tactics by state and security agents, the use of surveillance technology has curtailed free speech and legitimate expression of political dissent, and ordinary citizens have devised ways of beating the government at their own game by switching to using Virtual Private Network

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(VPN) for communication through social media. Since many CSOs intend to see democratic principle manifest in the country, yet the covert extrajudicial surveillance projects have contributed to making Uganda a less democratic country, they try as much as possible to counter whatever measures the government attempts to put in place. On the other hand, those who know what the government is capable of doing decided not to allow members of the political opposition and human rights advocacy organizations access to airwaves. Fortunately, radio stations such as Freedom Radio provided a platform for those who were denied access at stations sympathetic to the government, to disseminate their messages (Kode & Vlamings, 2017: 7). Moreover, due to the difficult operational space, other private radio stations resorted to self-​censorship to avoid reprisals from the state (Kode & Vlamings, 2017: 8). Though a dangerous move, the radio stations felt it was the right thing to do. In this, the people bore the brunt of the information gap that was created.

Conclusion The discussion presented in this chapter reveals that CSOs in Uganda do go through a lot of hurdles in fulfilling their roles contrary to what both local and international legal instruments provide. Starting with the declared war on terror by the US government, the government of Uganda, like other governments around the world, uses the guise of counter-​terrorism to craft laws that have become an impediment to the operation of CSOs. Through use of the Anti-​Terrorism Act, 2002 (as amended), the Anti-​Money Laundering Act, 2013, the Uganda Communications Act, 2013 (as amended 2017), the Public Order Management Act, 2013, and the Non-​ Governmental Organizations Act, 2016, alongside the Statutory Instruments 2017 No. 22, the Non-​Governmental Organizations Regulations, 2017 (Under Section 55 of the Non-​Governmental Organizations Act, 2016), state agents squeezed CSOs to the walls. These laws gave the state leverage to instituted philanthropic protection, stringent regulation for registration, criminalization and stigmatization of human right awareness, and restriction of freedom of expression. Besides, it gave state agents the liberty to intimidate and violently attack CSOs, restrict online communications for the public, securitize CSO donors, exclude CSOs from running financial institutions, and thereby capturing the space that was traditionally occupied by CSOs. Yet, a robust CSO in any country helps to augment government in service delivery and also make the government accountable to the people of the country. Arguably their participation in conscientizing the population also enables people to be aware of their rights.

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References Asiimwe-​M., J. (2003). “The situation of human rights and governance in Uganda today: A civil society perspective,” in “Voices for the public good”: Civil society input into the 2003 consultative group meeting. Uganda National NGO Forum, Kampala, Uganda. Global Rights Alert. (2017). “The Non-​Governmental Organisations (NGO) Act, 2016: Impact on operations of NGOs in Uganda’s oil and gas sector.” www. globalrightsalert.org/ ​ s ites/ ​ d efault/ ​ f iles/ ​ I MPLICATION%20OF%20NGO% 27S%20ACT%20REPORT.pdf Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2012, August 21). “Curtailing criticism, intimidation and obstruction of civil society in Uganda.” www.hrw.org/​report/​2012/​08/​ 21/​curtailing-​criticism/​intimidation-​and-​obstruction-​civil-​society-​uganda Kode, D. & Vlamings, L. (2017, February). “Addressing civic space restrictions in Uganda: What role for the universal periodic review?” www.Kode&Vlamings. org/ ​ i mages/ ​ A ddressing_​ C ivic_​ S pace_​ R estrictions_ ​ i n_ ​ U ganda_ ​ P olicyBrief_​ Feb2017rf.pdf Mbabazi, A. (2003). Defense policy of the Republic of Uganda. Kampala: Ministry of Defense. Muhinga, D. (2004, December). Study of civil society organizations in Uganda: Phase II Report. Kampala: UPHOLD. http://​uphold.jsi.com/​Docs/​Resources/​Research/​ CivilSociety/​civil_​society_​organisation_​mapping_​study_​phase2.pdf Mwanje, R. & Butagira, T. (2010). “CBS closure breaks Mengo’s back,” The Daily Monitor. www.monitor.co.ug/​News/​National/​688334–​865010-​c9d7c3z/​index. html Nalubega, L. (2017). “Govt tasked to probe raid on rights group offices,” Daily Monitor. https://​mobile.monitor.co.ug/​News/​Govt-​tasked-​to-​probe-​raid-​on-​rights-​group-​ offices–​/​2466686–​3217734-​format-​xhtml-​kj5xfbz/​index.html Nassaka, F. (2017). “Uganda: Fear of NGO big money,” The Independent. www. independent.co.ug/​uganda-​fear-​ngo-​big-​money/​ Omona, D. A. (2015). “Management of postcolonial intrastate conflicts in Uganda: A case of northern Uganda,” PhD thesis. Kenyatta University, Nairobi, Kenya. Privacy International. (2015). “For God and my president: State surveillance in Uganda,” Privacy International. www.privacyinternational.org The Anti-​Money Laundering Act, 2013. Entebbe: UPP. The Anti-​Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2017. Entebbe: UPP. The Anti-​Terrorism Act, 2002. Entebbe: UPP. Governmental Organization Registration Statute, 1989, No. 5. The Non-​ Entebbe: UPP. The Non-​Governmental Organizations Act, 2016. Entebbe: UPP. The Public Order Management Act, 2013. Entebbe: UPP. The Regulation of Communication Interception Act, 2010. Entebbe: UPP. The Statutory Instrument 1990 No. 9, the Non-​Governmental Regulation, 1989. Entebbe: UPP.

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The Statutory Instruments 2017 No. 22, the Non-​Governmental Organizations Regulations, 2017 (Under Section 55 of the Non-​Governmental Organizations Act, 2016). Entebbe: UPP. The Uganda Communications Act, 2013. Entebbe: UPP. US Department of State (DoS). (2017). Uganda: Country report on terrorism 2016. US State Department, Bureau of Counter Terrorism.

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Part V States of emergency and civil society in North Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia

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Shrinking civic space: Egypt’s counter-​ terrorism policy post-​9/​11 and beyond Bassant Hassib

The political and security developments of the post-​Arab uprisings, specifically in Egypt, give credence to an “excessive” securitization approach toward the broader civil society, in comparison to the impact of the post-​9/​11 domestic and foreign context. These developments constituted a web of interrelated external and internal determinants that chiseled away at the capacity of Egyptian civil society organizations (CSOs)1 to survive or adapt as they were stripped of any form of international, state, or societal support. I argue that these determinants are: first, the rise of “populist leadership” after 2011, which gained significance through fostering the dichotomy between the “Egyptian people” and “independent CSOs” by associating CSOs with national security threats; i.e., terrorism. Hence, under the umbrella of counter-​terrorism citizens allow, cheer, and encourage the state’s extraordinary measures to crack down on CSOs. Correspondingly, securitization of CSOs is no longer solely state-​ driven, but also “non-​ state driven”; society practices self-​policing. Second, the high incidence of national and regional terrorism post-​2011 provided not only national but also international legitimacy to the excessive securitization of civil society. As the US and EU experienced their own rise of populism,2 the hard-​line security approach to counter-​terrorism was heavily advocated. Egypt’s comprehensive and cooperative counter-​terrorism efforts became indispensable for the US and the EU foreign policy in the Middle East. Resultantly, Egypt’s crackdown on CSOs and their exclusion from the governance process was largely ignored in favor of securing Egypt’s continued cooperation. This in turn led to a severe government mass crackdown, thereby shrinking the civic space in Egypt. Under the pretext of national security, the government employs two main mechanisms to enforce this crackdown: the institutionalization of state security control over CSOs (through the introduction of a set of restrictive legal reforms related to counter-​terrorism to facilitate the interrogation, freezing of assets, travel ban, shutdown of NGOs, and imprisonment); and the

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targeting of foreign-​funded human rights CSOs through defamation campaigns portraying them as recipients of terrorist financing and as a door for foreign intervention. Besides a thorough analysis of Egypt’s legal framework and reports of local and international NGOs, this research relies on interviews conducted with local civic actors, NGOs’ representatives, Egyptian government officials, and EU officials.

Mubarak’s Egypt in the context of the “war on terror” post-​9/​11: targeted repression The events of 9/​11 intensified Egypt–​US relations, placing Egypt as an indispensable regional ally for countering terrorism, especially because Egyptian militants serve in al-​Qaeda leadership positions, and that an Egyptian was among the nineteen terrorists who executed the 9/​11 attacks (CNN, 2018). This was evident in Egypt’s own internal anti-​terrorism war and Mubarak’s assertion of Egypt’s solidarity with the United States in countering terrorism via intelligence sharing and granting US warplanes over-​flight rights (Al-​ Sayyid et al., 2002: 75; Tankel, 2018: 276). However, Egypt witnessed a lack of democracy and human rights under the pretense of countering terrorism. Nevertheless, this did not threaten Egypt–​US relations, which are reinforced by mutual interests. First, Egypt’s role in regional security is manifested in its normalization efforts and maintaining peace with Israel since the 1978 Camp David Accords. In 2007, Egypt imposed an economic blockade on Gaza after the terrorist-​declared Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian elections (Selim, 2013: 84), which highlighted Egypt’s critical role to the EU as well, especially with the rise of fear of radical Islamists following the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London attacks. Second, Egypt was a key destination for “outsourcing” US torture, according to the so-​called “torture report” of the United States Senate (2014), through the CIA’s “rendition” program since 1995, under which terrorist suspects were transferred to Egypt for interrogation, and thereby Egypt gained access to its al-​Qaeda suspected members. Rendition had massively expanded in the post-​9/​11 war on terror, with 100/​ 150 people being rendered to/​from Egypt (Malsin, 2014). Third, Egypt is the second largest recipient of US annual military aid of c.$1.3bn, which allows Egypt to purchase US military weapons, equipment, training, and maintenance kits. Fourth, Egypt’s Suez Canal facilitates the passage of US naval vessels (Brechenmacher, 2017: 57; Tankel, 2018: 276). In effect, Egypt toes the US/​EU line in its regional counter-​terrorism policy; and on the other hand, it turns a blind eye to the regime’s human rights violations. Despite the US–​Egypt division over the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and US calls for democracy post-​9/​11, it has little leverage to alter

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the position of Mubarak’s regime, with limited cosmetic political liberalization (Tankel, 2018). Thus, though the post-​9/​11 Egypt witnessed some opening to the political space, it did not change the regime’s targeted repression of the MB as an opposition group. In fact, the global war on terror equipped the regime with the legal framework to practice such repression. This was manifested in Egypt’s legislative and policing measures post-​9/​11. As Mariz Tadros (2011) contended, the securitization of civil society by the State Security Investigations (SSI) of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) became more visible since the mid-​2000s, despite international pressures for political reforms. First, CSOs’ activities were regulated under the “Law on NGOs. 84/​ 2002.” This was following the 2001 UNSC’s Financial Action Task Force (FATF) IX Special Recommendation on Terrorist Financing,3 under which Recommendation VIII on non-​profit organizations requested countries to “review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-​profit organisations are particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused.” In response, the Egyptian government domesticated Recommendation VIII and the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS) was assigned the responsibility of regulating CSOs’ finances. Thus, all CSO activities and funds are coordinated through state institutions. Later, the 2004 Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (MENAFATF)4 –​of which Egypt is a member –​adopted the FATF recommendations, thus, giving further legitimacy to the law. Second, in 2007, Article 179 of the 1971 Constitution was amended to allow the legislation of counter-​terrorism law, which suspends the constitutional provisions that guarantees judicial orders for arrests, detention, surveillance, and violating privacy of communications. Moreover, it allowed the trial of terrorist suspects under military courts, thus infringing upon the rules of the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (International Federation for Human Rights, 2010: 11). This came in response to the FATF’s Recommendation II, requesting countries to “criminalise the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organisations.” Third, Mubarak had been countering terrorism through the “Emergency Law 162/​1958” since the 1981 assassination of former president Sadat by Islamists, giving the state extensive powers to detain suspects, try civilians in military courts, prevent public gatherings, and monitor private communications. In 2006, the state of emergency was renewed for another two years, following the MB’s unprecedented win in the 2005 parliamentary election by eighty-​eight seats (20 percent), after a brief moment of political liberalization (Brown et al., 2007: 2). In 2008, it was renewed again until

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2010 under the pretext of counter-​terrorism (International Federation for Human Rights, 2010: 11). Pointing to the chaos in Iraq and the Hamas taking over Gaza after elections, Mubarak was sending a message warning to the United States of the consequences if Islamists took over. Thus, despite several attempts by the United States to withhold military aid, the funding continued out of fear of jeopardizing their relations with an ally government and of the consequences if the MB took power (Tankel, 2018: 276). Despite a noticeable decrease in terrorism in the 2000s, Egypt was still subject to occasional attacks, especially in Sinai. Such incidents provided national and international support to the regime’s counter-​terrorism policy. The main threat to Mubarak’s regime was violent Islamist groups, but also non-​violent Islamist opposition, like the MB, which demands political reform, but also more conservative changes mirroring restrictive Islamic order. Also, because of the involvement of the Sinai Bedouins in smuggling activities across the borders with Gaza and Israel, most of the inhabitants of Sinai were stereotyped by the state as criminals and terrorists. They were economically and educationally marginalized, arrested by the state, and not integrated. Thus, the radicalization and crimes continued as the reasons behind their involvement in the smuggling or the attacks were not adequately addressed (Tankel, 2018). Furthermore, the regime targets several secular CSOs who are vocal in disclosing the regime violations. Regarding the MB, in December 2001, MB members were sentenced to 3–​5 years in prison by military courts after protesting the US military strikes in Afghanistan. This was locally perceived as a targeted crackdown on Islamists under US pressure in the wake of the 9/​11 attacks (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 433). The Court in 2008 ruled against twenty-​five MB leaders with imprisonment and confiscating their financial assets. Regarding professional syndicates, the Syndicate of Journalists reported that 1,000 journalists were summoned for investigations for disturbing public stability, and that Ibrahim Eissa, the Editor-​in-​Chief of Al-​Dostour independent newspaper was sentenced to two months in prison for publishing false news and undermining public security (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2009). With respect to secular CSOs, manifestations of a securitized civic space were crystal clear. As Tadros (2011: 80) stressed, the SSI “has become a parallel state in Egypt, governing virtually all non-​ governmental actors working in the political and civil arena.” The SSI, outside its authorization, vetted and rejected human rights and pro-​democracy NGOs’ applications for registration, funding, and operations, with systemic intervention in their activities (Brechenmacher, 2017: 38). Only secular and CSOs not tackling sensitive issues have been eligible for funds (Behr & Siitonen, 2013: 20). This was evident in some cases. In 2001, a voter awareness project by the Ibn

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Khaldoun Centre for Development Studies –​founded by American-​Egyptian Dr. Saad Eldin Ibrahim –​led to the imprisonment of twenty-​seven workers in the NGO for receiving external funds without authorization. Despite US and EU denouncement and threats to withhold aid over the case, in January 2003 the US announced an accelerated assistance plan of US$959 million to support Egypt’s efforts in preventing the flow of money to terrorists, coupled with US and EU silence on the wave of MB arrests, especially after the 2005 parliamentary elections (Human Rights Watch, 2003, 2005, 2006). Hence, assistance to the regime is not conditional upon respecting human rights. Later, in 2008, Ibrahim was sentenced to two years in absentia and a 10,000EGP bail, for publishing articles opposing the regime in international newspapers (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2009). The government refused to register the Centre for Trade Unions and Workers Services in 2007, the Land Centre for Human Rights, the New Woman Research Centre, and the Egyptian Association Against Torture for “security concerns” in 2004, and dissolved the Association of Human Rights Legal Aid in 2007 for receiving foreign funding without authorization. Moreover, security authorities banned some NGOs’ seminars like the New Woman Foundation and the Arab Centre for the Independence of Judiciary and Legal Profession and denied some NGOs’ participation in international conventions. For example, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights was officially ordered not to attend the UN General Assembly Meeting on HIV/​ AIDS in June 2008 (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2009). This repression had several implications for CSOs. Some NGOs operated illegally while awaiting registration or funding approval for months or even years. Others circumvented the harsh law by registering as civil or law companies, which allowed them to access foreign funding without authorization (Brechenmacher, 2017: 100). Many CSOs were reluctant to apply for foreign funds for fear of being perceived as having “foreign agendas” and thus losing domestic support. In parallel, external donors limited their funding to secular or pro-​government CSOs, fearing that they might support MB-​ related CSOs (Behr & Siitonen, 2013: 21). Despite such incidents, in general the civic space was not completely closed, dissent, freedom of press, academia, and think-​tanks were permitted to some extent, and CSOs were given some space to operate. The purpose of this cosmetic reform was to evoke international acceptance, while not posing a threat to regime stability (Tadros, 2011: 82). This was evident in the emergence of new forms of resistance. Connections occurred between NGOs, political movements, trade unions, and bloggers by utilizing cyberspace to assemble and organize their resistance within non-​ hierarchical structures or defined leadership, thus representing a challenge

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for the regime to control them. For example, the Facebook page of the April 6 Movement led Al-​Mahalla protests in 2008. These new forms of resistance mobilized public opinion and paved the way to the 2011 uprising (Selim, 2014: 103ff.).

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Post-​2011 political and security developments: the NGO crisis of foreign funding With the lifting of the state of emergency in the wake of the 2011 uprising, CSOs were full of hope that they could become a driving vehicle for a successful democratic transformation. With expectations to revoke the restrictive legal framework for foreign funding and strengthening the capacities of NGOs, civil society would deliver the desired change. Indeed, international donors pumped funding to democracy and human rights CSOs, resulting in an increase in the number of NGO staff. For example, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights staff tripled. However, these ambitions were smashed by several realities. A vocal and strong civil society represented a clear threat to the security apparatus, which survived relying on repression for over thirty years, under the auspices of preserving national security (Brechenmacher, 2017: 39f.). While overall significant progress has been made in the dimension of free and fair elections, other elements for “deep democracy” such as civil and political rights or liberties and a strong civil society, were sidelined by those who believe in an omnipotent, populist leader and those who perceive CSOs as a threat to national security. The undermined civic and social cohesion (between secular and Islamist groups), combined with the outstanding security situation and the rise of populist leadership in the post-​ 2011 regime, which feeds on/​exploits this sense of security crisis, reinforced such realities. As a founder of a local NGO stated, “it is the Arab uprising that opened the door for regimes to crackdown on the broader range of civil society under the name of counterterrorism.”5 Thus, Mubarak’s legal and policing measures of repression remained intact and even intensified. This was reflected in the restrictions imposed on foreign funding of NGOs In July 2011, the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Fayza Aboul Naga, created a Fact Finding Committee tasked with listing NGOs receiving foreign funding, and the unlicensed national and foreign NGOs (Carr, 2013). The Cabinet announced that it opposed foreign funding for CSOs, considering it an intervention in domestic affairs (Al Marikhi, 2011). Aboul Naga stated: “the cabinet’s decision to form this committee comes to meet the requests of the Egyptian public who refuse such foreign funding, as it is considered an intervention in our internal affairs” (Maher, 2011). This came after the remarks of then US ambassador Anne Patterson,

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that the United States had given US$40 million to NGOs within five months to promote democracy (Sharp, 2011: 2). The Egyptian National Council –​ a coalition of independent civic and political activists –​issued a statement entitled “No to Foreign Funding, No to Foreign Intervention,” skeptical of foreign-​funded NGOs for purposes of compromising Egypt’s stability, requesting from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to list such CSOs (Al Marikhi, 2011). This highlights the division among civil society itself. In light of this campaign, the Cairo Criminal Court ordered banks to disclose all transactions of sixty-​three human rights NGOs. Thirty-​nine Egyptian and foreign organizations were accused of operating without registration; twenty-​eight Egyptian CSOs were accused of receiving unauthorized foreign funding; and some foreign organizations were accused of carrying out political activities (Abu El Ezz & Tohamy, 2011). Accordingly, on December 29, 2011, the offices of various Egyptian and foreign NGOs were raided by security forces, where seventeen NGOs have been shut down. These NGOs include: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), Freedom House, and International Centre for Journalists (ICFJ) (Human Rights Watch, 2011). State media were ambiguous in covering the shutdowns to reduce public sympathy toward NGOs, and reinforce fear and hate toward them (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Also, a project by a local NGO on improving women’s electoral participation was stopped in February 2012, after no response from the MoSS to their EU funding request. As explained by two staff members of the NGO:6 The ministry did not adhere to the stipulated 60 days period for decision in to the law and kept sending a letter every 59 days to the NGO to not proceed with the project activities –​without giving any justification. This was due to the new political and security environment, including the crisis of foreign funding and the fierce campaign against democracy and human rights CSOs. On the other hand, the EU did not play an enough role to alter the government’s agenda regarding NGOs.

Consequently, forty-​three employees from the NDI, IRI, Freedom House, ICFJ, and KAS were referred to the Cairo Criminal Court (Spencer, 2012). Although the US threatened to withhold its annual aid over the case and Egyptian authorities released only the European and American NGO workers, whom were extracted, the court case proceeded. Then Prime Minister Kamal El Ganzouri stated, “Egypt will not kneel” (quoted in Kirkpatrick, 2012). Nevertheless, the United States released the aid; the Department of State released a statement stressing, “a huge number of interests and equities at stake … rather than talking about leverage, we’re talking about

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partnership” (Nuland, 2012), referring to joint counter-​terrorism efforts to maintain regional security. The Pentagon in particular insisted on maintaining deals of US arms manufacturers (Myers, 2012). Similarly, the German government continued aid flows to Egypt (Brechenmacher, 2017: 59f.). In parallel, Egyptian Judge Sameh Abu Zeid stressed that the groups did not qualify as CSOs since their purpose is to influence the political situation in Egypt (Kirkpatrick, 2012). Thus, there is an insinuation that foreign-​funded NGOs threaten Egypt’s national sovereignty and stability. Such rhetoric led to an antagonizing perception of society on NGOs. “The crisis had negatively influenced the image of CSOs in the society, they started questioning their integrity and credibility, and view them as holding ‘foreign’ agendas and a threat to national security.”7 Similarly, despite the rise of the MB and Morsi to power in 2012 through democratic elections, they consolidated authoritarianism and betrayed liberal CSOs who opposed their agenda. In fact, MB leaders echoed the SCAF’s narrative on foreign-​funded NGOs in undermining Egypt’s stability. This was evident when the forty-​three NGOs’ employees were tried and sentenced to five years in prison, partly in absentia, in addition to the closure of most of the implicated international NGOs (Brechenmacher, 2017: 41). Furthermore, the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) drafted a more restrictive NGO bill than its earlier version. The bill imposed complete state control over NGOs’ resources and activities under the pretext of “meeting the needs of the Egyptian society.” The bill aimed to ensure full security control over CSOs’ operations through a committee, which would include intelligence bodies, and would treat NGOs’ assets as “public funds” (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2013). The MB’s demonization focused on women’s rights NGOs. Dyer (2013: 12) highlighted that “women’s rights NGOs were heavily stigmatised as having a ‘Western’ agenda and were therefore portrayed as a threat to Egyptian national and religious identity and values.” Their official statement on March 14, 2013 decried NGOs who support the UN declaration on women’s rights (IkhwanWeb, 2013). This antagonizing rhetoric caused a division among the civil society. Four staff members and directors of local secular NGOs8 have asserted that these Islamists’ fundamental voices deformed the image of secular NGOs and led people to view women’s rights related projects and NGOs as “evil,” which was clearer in governorates with more deteriorating economic and educational levels. They further added that such views impeded the implementation of their project activities, as they were often met with strong resistance from the parts of the society who are affiliated to the MB/​Islamists or believe their populist rhetoric, where they acted like a current moving in the opposite direction of their objectives. One staff member of a local women’s rights NGO explained:

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Awareness seminars in governorates like Fayoum and Bani Sweif on the constitutional amendments of 2012 were interrupted and attacked by the MB and the Salafis affiliated participants and thus they did not want to discuss the rights of women in the constitution. Furthermore, Islamists groups and individuals attacked the celebrations of the International Women’s Day by the secular NGOs and activists, on 8 March 2012 in Tahrir Square.9

The above is in tandem with Njoku’s (2021) findings that in Nigeria, women CSO groups mitigating the effects of counter-​terrorism in the northeastern part of the country were among the most repressed CSOs due to their advocacy activities regarding justice for vulnerable women and girls in terrorism and counter-​ terrorism operations. Continuous harassment and smear campaigns had a “chilling effect.” Some NGOs refused foreign funding; those working on political issues refocused on noncontroversial issues; and foreign donors froze funding to NGOs’ democratization projects (Brechenmacher, 2017: 42), while projecting their support toward MB-​ affiliated NGOs.10 Furthermore, foreign actors, like the EU, despite placing these issues on the agenda of its political dialogue with the government, found that their efforts were futile and were powerless to alter the regime’s approach towards secular NGOs, especially women’s rights NGOs.11 On the other hand, the undermining security situation and the clashes between secular and Islamist forces led to the closing of NGOs’ offices several times –​ located near protests or clashes, especially in Tahrir Square area –​or stalling the activities of their projects.12 Nevertheless, new forms of resistance emerged. The Copts, feeling targeted by Islamists due to the preponderance of hate speech and church attacks, formed for the first time civic and political groups, such as “Copts for Elections” and “Copts for Egypt” (Abdel Moneim, 2012). Similarly, lack of youth inclusion led to the emergence of an anarchist/​violent youth group “the Black Bloc” to counter the MB (Abdel Halim, 2013). Additionally, civil and political forces, like the “National Salvation Front,” started protesting the MB’s democratic and human rights violations. Accordingly, in January 2013, Morsi re-​introduced the emergency law for thirty days to curb frequent protests and opposition (Al Jazeera, 2017). Inevitably, the “Tamarrod Movement” mobilized a second mass uprising on June 30, 2013, with military support, ousting Morsi.

Al-​Sisi’s regime: crippling civil society under comprehensive counter-​terrorism efforts The deteriorating security situation helped the military garner support. Police stations, Coptic churches, and other public institutions had been constantly

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attacked in revenge by the MB or by ISIS’s Sinai-​based branch Ansar Beit al-​Maqdis –​currently named by ISIS as its Sinai Province. Furthermore, terrorist operations intensified in across the country starting in 2012, such as the assassination of Prosecutor General Hisham Barakat on June 29, 2015, the 2017 deadly attack on Al Rawda Mosque in North Sinai, and even extending beyond Egyptian targets by bombing the Russian Metrojet Flight 9268 after departure from Sharm El Sheikh by ISIS. Hence, Sinai started to emerge as a hub for militant Islamists. Similarly, by moving to the western border of Egypt with Libya, al-​Qaeda and other jihadists have experienced significant growth since Qaddafi was toppled. This has led to an increased flow of arms into neighboring countries including Egypt (Federal Research Division, 2012; Gartenstein-​Ross, 2014; Tankel, 2018: 281). Thus, as Tankel (2018: 281) elaborated, for Egyptian security authorities the MB were decidedly a security threat and no longer a competing political player. Accordingly, the state of emergency was reinforced several times, most recently on January 13, 2018. Critics emphasized that under the pretext of the Emergency Law, authorities cracked down on non-​violent dissent, including CSOs (Egypt Independent, 2018). Amr El Shobaky, an expert at Al Ahram Centre for Strategic and Political Studies, contended that terrorism is a fact in Egypt, however the emergency law is often exploited to crack down on dissent (Reuters, 2017). Terrorism was exploited to legitimize government actions. TV anchor Ahmed Moussa emphasized the need for military leadership to restore national security, even at the expense of human rights. Public opinion was shaped to perceive civic activism as a non-​nationalistic endeavor that hinders the government’s counter-​terrorism efforts. Insecurity diminished CSOs’ role as a watchdog on government power and led to the election of Field Marshal Sisi as president in 2014 by a landslide, amassing 96.91 percent of the vote. The reality that among those who escaped during the prison break in the 2011 uprising were forty members of Hamas and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, as well as more than thirty leaders of Egypt’s MB, including the later president Mohamed Morsi, reinforced the populist rhetoric espoused by the post-​2013 media (Hendawi, 2013; Levitt, 2014: 30f.). The initial crackdown targeted the MB, where in 2013–​2014 more than 40,000 MB affiliates were arrested and the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters in September 2013 banned all their activities and froze their assets. The government later declared the MB as a terrorist organization, closing hundreds of MB charities and NGOs (Brechenmacher, 2017: 43). This echoes the FATF’s Recommendation III to freeze and confiscate terrorist assets. Such developments impacted the societal perception of the MB. A survey conducted by the Egyptian Centre for Public Opinion (Baseera) in September 2013 contended that 46 percent of Egyptians believed that Egypt should

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be a military state. In addition, by October 2013, 70 percent of the citizens disagreed that the MB should return to political life (Osman, 2016). The idea of securitizing the civic space extended beyond targeted Islamist organizations to include a wider range of civil society actors, including activists, journalists, lawyers, local and international NGOs. This has a debilitating effect on the potential of such organizations to counter extremism and radicalization (Tankel, 2018: 284). Renewed apprehension was evident in new legislation. First, in September 2014, Article 78 of the Penal Code was amended to ban foreign funding for any activity deemed a threat to “national interests” or “national unity,” imposing life sentences for noncompliance. The vaguely defined “national interest” limits not only terrorists but also human rights NGOs’ access to foreign funding, making them subject to prosecution as terrorists. Consequently, many human rights activists fled the country in fear of prosecution. Second, “Terrorist Entities Law 8/​2015” –​despite CSOs’ official objections to its provisions (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, 2015) –​specified that those “infringing on public order and harming national unity” would be listed and prosecuted as terrorists. This vague phrasing places dissident CSOs on this list and arguably violates Article 95 of the 2014 Egyptian Constitution on the principle of legality. Third, “Counter-​Terrorism Law 94/​2015”13 allows the imposition of heavy sentences, including the death penalty, for terrorist crimes. However, crimes were defined imprecisely, which runs contrary to the UN’s principles of precision and clarity in General Comment no. 34 on Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As Nadim Houry, the director of Human Rights Watch’s (2015: n.p.) terrorism and counter-​ terrorism program, stressed, “the government has equipped itself with even greater powers to continue stamping out its critics and opponents under its vague and ever-​expanding war on terrorism.” Terrorism is defined under the law as the use of violence or threat to “disrupt general order,” “endanger the interests or security of society,” and “harm national unity,” without defining what constitutes a threat to national unity or interests of the society. This definition exceeds the 2004 UNSC’s definition. Additionally, it levies equal penalty for any form of public or private incitement to commit any terrorist crime, whether or not it had an effect, as the crime itself. Here, many MB members were prosecuted on terrorism charges for engaging in sit-​ ins or blocking roads during protests (Human Rights Watch, 2015: n.p.). It also criminalizes disseminating “false” news on terrorist attacks or counter-​ terrorism operations if they contradict the Defense Ministry’s statements. Furthermore, it expands security control over digital media to the extent of shutting down websites and monitoring online communication.

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Fourth, “Media Regulation Law 92/​2016,”14 allows the Supreme Council for the Regulation of Media to block media content and websites that may harm national security, and control their funding. Fifth, Sisi ratified a new “Law on NGOs 70/​2017,”15 despite CSOs’ concerns that it will “eliminate all but regime supporters from the public sphere” (Rizk, 2014). The government’s justification was that the law ensures transparency regarding sources of funding and activities of NGOs, so they will not be used to conduct illegal/​ terrorist activities. Echoing the FATF’s Recommendation VIII on terrorist funding to NGOs, Social Solidarity Minister Ghada Wali stated, “we cannot deny [Egypt] is subject to foreign interference and NGOs are fertile land for that” (Rizk, 2014). Similarly, Secretary General of the Tahya Masr fund, Tarek Mahmoud, accused a number of local NGOs of presenting false documents on human rights’ status in Egypt in order to divert foreign funds from state institutions to their organizations, to bring down state institutions, and that most of these organizations receive foreign funds illegally to facilitate foreign interference (Nader, 2015). Besides the old provisions of the 2002 law, the 2017 law further cripples CSOs’ capacities. It establishes the National Authority for Regulation of Foreign NGOs, under which they must be registered. It formalizes security agencies’ oversight over CSOs’ funding and activities by establishing the National Authority for the Regulation of (local) CSOs, which included representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Justice, the Interior, International Cooperation, Social Solidarity, the General Intelligence Services, the Central Bank of Egypt, and the government’s anti-​money laundering unit. Also, any donations to CSOs that exceeds 10,000EGP must be pre-​approved, and money transfer transactions between bank accounts are subject to audits by Egypt’s Central Bank. It prohibits CSOs from carrying out or publishing studies/​surveys without security authorization. It penalizes anyone who cooperates with foreign organizations or works in civil society without a state permit. Moreover, relocating a CSO headquarters without permission results in dissolving it. It furthermore bans CSOs from “interfering” with professional syndicates and trade unions, thereby weakening CSOs through disrupting the links/​ networks between them. There is also imprecision and ambiguity in defining CSO illegal activities by anything that “threatens national unity, national security, contradicts public order or morals, and incites hatred.” It also limits CSOs work to “development and social objectives” without defining what such objectives entail. Sixth, “Anti-​ Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law 175/​ 2018”16 was issued as a necessary intervention to combat cyberterrorism. The provisions of the law are embedded within regional and international counter-​terrorism cooperative frameworks. First, it mirrors the

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2010 Arab Convention on Combating Cybercrime,17 which urges Arab member states to adjust their national legislation and measures to combat cyberterrorism, and imprecisely defines any speech that encourages discrimination, hostility, disorder, and attack on religions and beliefs as cyberterrorism. Second, Egypt joined KSA and the United States in launching a multilateral initiative to combat cyberterrorism and cyber-​ extremism by establishing the Global Centre for Combating Extremist Ideology named Etidal18 (moderation) in mid-​2017. The initiative follows suit of regionally and internationally enforced rhetoric of countering cyberterrorism (Mohamed, 2017) to validate increased cyber control, heavy censorship, and high content filtering, complemented with punitive actions. The law does not offer precise and clear definitions of cyberterrorism, which gives a leeway for penalizing any cyber activity by any dissident individual/​group, in addition to penalizing the use of ICTs and not the crime. As Patricia Bauer (2011: 428) contended, Egypt exploits its active cooperation with the EU in countering terrorism in order to acquire control over cyberspace to crack down on (critical) CSOs in the name of “national security.” Such populist acts were mirrored by populist rhetoric that portrays any opposing opinion as treason. As Sisi stated publicly, “I want to tell the media if someone insults the army or police they are defaming all Egyptians and that is not freedom of opinion” (Reuters, 2018). Also, Egypt’s chief prosecutor described foreign media outlets as “forces of evil” that undermine Egypt’s national security. On a different note, the state has called on individuals to boycott the BBC for its documentary on Egyptian prisoners (Walsh, 2018). A number of cases illustrate the government’s crackdown on CSOs. Regarding religious affiliated CSOs, in May 2016, seventy-​five NGOs and 121 childcare centers were shut down for being MB affiliates and receiving foreign funding, while channeling some of their finances to the MSS fund to support “legally recognized” NGOs. The government froze the assets of an Islamic-​based charity organization, El-​Gameya El-​Shareya, for terrorism accusations and spreading radical ideologies. Despite re-​operating after winning a court case, it lost a third of its capacity, since the terrorism accusations have smeared its local and international reputation (Brechenmacher, 2017: 52). Regarding secular CSOs, some have been awaiting the state’s approval for EU funds since 2011, for three reasons: (1) the project is tackling sensitive issues like torture or assistance to prisoners; (2) the NGO’s director is critical of the government; and (3) the NGO has not submitted all or incorrect documents.19 This includes the application of the Arab Organization for Penal Reform’s (AOPR) project to help prisoners (Rizk, 2014). The

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government stopped an EU “Regional Capacity Building Programme for Civil Society Facility” in 2013.20 The scope of crackdown extended beyond human rights and democracy NGOs –​some social development and cultural CSOs were also targeted. Security forces shut down all branches of Al-​Karama public library, since the rights activist Gamal Eid, the director of the Arabic Network for Human Rights, founded it. Similarly, in May 2014 security forces raided Belady Foundation for street children, where the two co-​founders got arrested on accusations of operating without license and sexually abusing children (Brechenmacher, 2017: 54). Furthermore, sports groups like the “Ultras” were criticized for their strong role in mobilizing protests and inciting violence. The pro-​Sisi lawyer and president of Zamalik sports club, Mortada Mansour, accused them of being “terrorists” (Abd El-​ Hameed, 2014). Mansour later filed a law case to ban the group and list them as terrorists. Accordingly, a court ruling was issued to ban the group (Gamal El-​ Din, 2015). The re-​opening of Case 173 in 2016 for “receiving foreign funding” resulted in the travel ban and/​or freezing assets of several activists and their NGOs including Mozn Hassan, founder of Nazra for Feminist Studies; Azza Soliman, founder of the Centre for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance (CEWLA); Gamal Eid; Hossam al-​ Din Ali, director of the Egyptian Democratic Academy; Hossam Bahgat, the founder of the EIPR; Bahey El-​din Hassan, the director of Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS); Abd al-​Hafiz Tayel, the director of the Egyptian Centre for the Right to Education; Mustafa al-​Hassan, the director of the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre; Ahmed Samih, the director of the Andalus Centre for Tolerance and Anti-​Violence Studies; and the shutting down of Al Nadeem Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence in 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2016; Michaelson, 2016). Moreover, a number of international NGOs were prevented from entering the country. Later, more than twenty human rights NGOs were accused of tax evasion and money laundering. Also, the digital communications of CSOs, implicated in Case 173, were compromised by two state phishing attacks. These attacks were tricking the recipients into giving their personal information and passwords to their work emails and file-​sharing accounts. The first wave of attacks phished by impersonating the NGO “Al Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence.” The second wave phished by sending a link for updates pertaining to Case 173, for example detainees’ whereabouts or arrest warrants (Scott-​Railton et al., 2017). Similarly, the government intercepted the two-​step verification process on social media and email accounts to gain access to activists’ communication, as one of the mass and targeted surveillance methods (Raoof, 2016). Moreover, two researchers at the Egyptian Commission for Rights

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and Freedoms were charged with terrorist crimes, following their campaign to “stop enforced disappearances” (Brechenmacher, 2017: 45f.). Regarding freedom of thought, expression, and assembly, by the end of 2016, the MoI shutdown 163 Facebook pages and arrested fourteen Facebook page administrators, as a result of mass and targeted surveillance on online communication. By early 2018, the total number of blocked websites and platforms reached 496, mainly news and media webpages21 critical of human rights’ status (Amnesty International, 2014; El-​Sheikh, 2016; Association of Freedom of Thought and Expression, 2018). The pro-​ government newspaper Al-​Masry Al-​Youm published an official report in May 2017, justifying the blockade of only twenty-​one websites,22 based on alleged terrorism and violence-​inciting content given their affiliation to Qatar, following other regional countries in blocking Qatari media and news outlets amid the Gulf Crisis. The report refers to various governments’ efforts in censoring the internet –​from the United States to China –​as examples of global measures to combat cyberterrorism (Al-​Masry Al-​Youm, 2017). The excessive securitization was not limited to NGOs, but also included academia and think-​tanks. Following the June 2013, think-​tanks were targeted because many high-​profile academics in Egypt began to debate the legitimacy of the movement to oust President Morsi, as they vacillated between calling it a coup or a revolution. The purpose was to reshape the academic/​intellectual dialogue through fear and self-​censorship. These political think tanks were becoming increasingly problematic for the government and instructions were given to shut them down. The government perceived them as a threat to the army’s authority in Egypt, and it was imperative that they be silenced. At Cairo University, the orientation of several research centers was forcibly reformed as they were considered hubs of extremist and terrorist ideologies. Academics were prohibited from discussing any anti-​government sentiment or content inside lecture halls, conferences or seminars in national and private universities, under the pretext that any such sentiment is a threat to national security and stability. The role of the intellectual is at an end and university professor were being arrested for the first time; this was unprecedented under Mubarak’s regime. For example, Amr Hamzawi, a professor at Cairo University, was fired in 2016, after he published an article in al-​Shorouk newspaper on authoritarianism.23

Some CSOs stopped applying for foreign grants, resulting in downsizing their professional employees and accordingly impacted their scope of activities in terms of geographical coverage and number of targeted beneficiaries.24 For example, with their assets frozen, EIPR downsized from eighty to forty staff members, and CEWLA is struggling to pay its twenty-​one employees (Brechenmacher, 2017: 51). Others completely stopped their civic work, as Mohamed El-​Zarie, the AOPR director, stated, “I will completely stop

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working in human rights advocacy. I have no desire to operate on illegal terms or to spend the rest of my life in a struggle” (Rizk, 2014). The Ma’an for Developing Slums Foundation, after the enactment of the NGO law, announced that it would close down. Similarly, Al-​Mawred Al-​Thaqafy and El-​Gora Community Development Association suspended their work. Other NGOs continue their activism, with the risk of being targeted by state security. Some relocated their offices abroad like the CIHRS. On the other hand, external donors became hesitant to offer grants not to get the NGOs’ activists in trouble with the authorities, as well as not to be accused of illegally supporting NGOs. In addition, their limited funding was projected to NGOs working on non-​critical/​non-​controversial areas. As a consequence of the travel bans, networking with international and regional organizations is hampered (Brechenmacher, 2017: 51ff.).

Conclusion It is evident that the post-​Arab uprising developments paved the way for an “excessive” securitization of civil society in Egypt. In comparison to the post-​9/​11 landscape, we see the developed of securitization practices and actions from targeted crackdowns under Mubarak’s regime to mass crackdown under that of Sisi. Given the threat posed by CSOs –​who had a role in mobilizing the 2011 and 2013 uprisings –​on authoritarian regimes, a populist and securitized approach was adopted to foster societal distrust in CSOs by portraying them as national security threats. In effect, they have a carte blanche in adopting extraordinary measures to restrict CSOs –​in terms of access to funds and operational capacity –​under the pretext of counter-​ terrorism. There is a growing tendency to claim that foreign funding cannot be trusted. As such, society has become increasingly self-​policing, which went hand-​in-​hand with state securitization of NGOs, and which exacerbated the crippling of civil society and the shrinking of the civic space. In parallel, the post-​2011 rise of terrorism worldwide provided domestic and international legitimacy for Egypt’s extraordinary securitization measures. This speaks to the conclusions by scholars in this book and in other works that CTMs became a cover for political actors in hybrid and authoritarian regimes to stifle CSOs in other African countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda (Lind & Howell, 2010; Howell, 2014; Brechenmacher, 2017). With populism on the rise in the EU and United States, hard-​line security approaches to counter-​terrorism became the norm, which reinforced Egypt’s own measures. In effect, Egypt became an integral partner in regional and international counter-​terrorism efforts. In this regard, Western actors turned a blind eye to Egypt’s crackdown on CSOs in order to maintain Egypt’s

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continued cooperation. This highlights the idea of “upgrading authoritarianism” by Steven Heydemann (2007). Breaking this vicious cycle of “the more populist and less democratic Europe/​US, the more populist and more autocratic Arab world” remains the main question.

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Notes 1 The spectrum of civil society this research covers is not limited to the conventional definition of civil society captured by Diamond (1994). It encompasses a wider range of civic actors that deliver the same functions as CSOs, including individual thinkers, artists, religious reformers, academics, etc. 2 Francisco Panizza (2005: 3–​4) conceptualized populism as “an anti-​status quo discourse that simplifies the political space by symbolically dividing society between ‘the people’ (as the ‘underdogs’) and its ‘other’.” In this regard, it is the defeat over “the other” –​portrayed as the enemy/​threat –​that shapes the forms and content of populist demands. FATF 9 Special Recommendations: www.un.org/​sc/​ctc/​news/​document/​ 3 fatf-​9-​special-​recommendations-​on-​terrorist-​financing/​ 4 MENAFAT overview: www.menafatf.org/​about 5 Interview, founder of local NGO (Cairo, December 13, 2018). 6 Interview with two staff members of CSOs (Cairo, January 26, 2016). 7 Interview with a local CSO staff member (Cairo, January 26, 2016). 8 Interview with four staff members and directors of local secular CSOs (Cairo, January 26, February 18 and April 3, 2016). 9 Interview with a staff member of local women’s rights CSO (Cairo, January 26, 2016). 10 Interview with a local CSO representative (Cairo, January 26, 2016). 11 Interview with a director of a local CSO (Cairo, February 18, 2016). 12 Interview with the directors of two local CSOs (Cairo, November 25, 2015 and February, 18 2016). terrorism law: www.atlanticcouncil.org/​images/​ 13 Full text of the counter-​ EgyptSource/​Egypt_​Anti-​Terror_​Law_​Translation.pdf 14 Full text of the Media Regulation law: goo.gl/​cQ6tuw 15 Full text of the 2017 NGO law: www.icnl.org/​research/​library/​files/​Egypt/​ law70english.pdf 16 Full text of the 2018 Cybercrime law: https://​drive.google.com/​file/​d/​1ra7Nl Kn7Uh_​YU5fL7NBKt18JE2mKAKm8/​view 17 Full text of the Arab Convention: https://​bit.ly/​2KP4ExU 18 Etidal Mission and Vision: https://​etidal.org/​en/​about-​etidal/​ 19 Interview with an official at the Delegation of the EU to Egypt (Cairo, November 19, 2015). 20 Interview with an official at the Delegation of the EU to Egypt (Cairo, November 19, 2015). 21 Full list of blocked websites: https://​afteegypt.org/​blocked-​websites-​list?lang=en

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22 The report falls short of mentioning the remaining 400 websites blocked in 2017. 23 Interview, prominent Egyptian intellectual and academic (Cairo, October 23, 2018) 24 Interview, local NGO representative (Cairo, January 26, 2016).

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Defense of Democracies. http://​oversight.house.gov/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2014/​ 05/​Gartenstein-​Ross-​Statement-​5-​1-​Benghazi-​Libya.pdf. Hendawi, H. (2013, May 23). “2011 jail breaks become political issue in Egypt,” The Associated Press. http://​bigstory.ap.org/​article/​2011-​jail-​breaks-​ become-​political-​issue-​egypt. Heydemann, S. (2007). “Upgrading authoritarianism in the Arab world,” The Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, 13. www.brookings.edu/​wp-​content/​ uploads/​2016/​06/​10arabworld.pdf Howell, J. (2014). “The securitisation of NGOs post-​9/​11,” Conflict, Security & Development, 14(2): 151–​179. Human Rights Watch. (2003). World report 2003. www.hrw.org/​legacy/​wr2k3/​ Human Rights Watch. (2005). World report 2005: Events of 2004. www.hrw.org/​ legacy/​wr2k5/​wr2005.pdf Human Rights Watch. (2006). World report 2006: Events of 2005. www.hrw.org/​ legacy/​wr2k6/​wr2006.pdf Human Rights Watch. (2011, December 22). “Egypt: National and international human rights organizations are under attack.” www.hrw.org/​news/​2011/​12/​29/​ egypt-​national-​and-​international-​human-​rights-​organizations-​are-​under-​attack. Human Rights Watch. (2012, February 5). “Egypt: Rights activists at risk of prison.” www.hrw.org/​news/​2012/​02/​05/​egypt-​rights-​activists-​risk-​prison. Human Rights Watch. (2015, August 19). “Egypt: Counterterrorism law erodes basic rights –​broad ‘terrorist acts’ list may criminalize civil disobedience.” www. hrw.org/​news/​2015/​08/​19/​egypt-​counterterrorism-​law-​erodes-​basic-​rights Human Rights Watch. (2016, June 28). “Egypt: Travel ban on women’s rights leader –​ongoing repression against civil society.” www.hrw.org/​news/​2016/​06/​ 28/​egypt-​travel-​ban-​womens-​rights-​leader IkhwanWeb. (2013). Muslim Brotherhood statement denouncing UN Women Declaration for violating Sharia principles. The Muslim Brotherhood. www. ikhwanweb.com/​article.php?id=30731 International Federation for Human Rights. (2010). Egypt: Counter-​terrorism against the background of an endless state of emergency (No. N°534a). http://​ hrlibrary.umn.edu/​research/​Egypt/​Counter-​terrorism%20against%20the.pdf Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2012, February 8). “Egypt’s premier vows not to yield in prosecuting 19 Americans,” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/​2012/​02/​09/​world/​ middleeast/​egypts-​premier-​vows-​to-​prosecute-​19-​americans.html?_​r=0. Levitt, M. (2014). “Hezbollah’s man in Egypt,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(2): 24–​35. Lind, J. & Howell, J. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the politics of aid: Civil society responses in Kenya,” Development and Change, 41(2): 335–​353. Maher, H. (2011, July 12). “Justice minister to form fact-​finding committee over NGO funding in Egypt,” Al Ahram. http://​english.ahram.org.eg/​NewsContentP/​ 1/​16254/​Egypt/​Justice-​minister-​to-​form-​factfinding-​committee-​ove.aspx. Malsin, J. (2014, December 9). “Egypt’s rights groups view report on CIA torture with weary familiarity,” Time. http://​time.com/​3626526/​egypt-​human-​rights-​ cia-​torture-​senate/​

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Michaelson, R. (2016, December 7). “Arrest of leading Egyptian feminist Azza Soliman sparks anger,” The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/​world/​2016/​dec/​ 07/​womens-​rights-​activist-​azza-​soliman-​arrested-​in-​egypt Mohamed, A. Z. (2017). “Saudi Arabia’s Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology: An exercise in futility?” Gatestone Institute: International Policy Council. www.gatestoneinstitute.org/​10484/​saudi-​arabia-​extremist-​ideology Myers, S. L. (2012, March 23). “Once imperiled, U.S. aid to Egypt is restored,” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/​2012/​03/​24/​world/​middleeast/​once-​ imperiled-​united-​states-​aid-​toegypt-​is-​restored.html Nader, E. (2015, May 6). “Tahya Misr Fund’s head claims NGOs aim to ‘bring down state organisations’,” Daily News Egypt. https://​dailynewsegypt.com/​2015/​05/​ 06/​tahya-​misr-​funds-​head-​claims-​ngos-​aim-​to-​bring-​down-​state-​organisations/​ Njoku, E. T. (2020c). “Investigating the intersections between counter-​terrorism and NGOs in Nigeria: Development practice in conflict-​affected areas,” Development in Practice, 30(4): 501–​512. Nuland, V. (2012, March 23). Quoted in “U.S. to continue aid to Egypt after NGO crackdown,” All Things Considered (NPR). www.npr.org/​2012/​03/​23/​ 149244026/​u-​s-​to-​continueaid-​to-​egypt-​after-​ngo-​crackdown Osman, M. (2016). “Values as drivers for social innovation: The case of Egypt,” lecture held on April 11, German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), Cairo. Panizza, F. (2005). Populism and the mirror of democracy. London: Verso. Raoof, R. (2016, April 7). “Two-​step verification in Egypt: Strength or weakness for online security?” Global Voices. https://​advox.globalvoices.org/​2016/​04/​07/​ two-​step-​verification-​in-​egypt-​strength-​orweakness-​for-​online-​security/​ Reuters. (2017, October 12). “Egypt announces again the state of emergency for three months starting Friday.” https://​ara.reuters.com/​article/​ME_​TOPNEWS_​ MORE/​idARAKBN1CH182 Reuters. (2018, March 1). “Egypt’s Sisi says defaming army or police is treason.” www.reuters.com/​ a rticle/​ e gypt-​ p olitics/​ e gypts-​ s isi-​ s ays-​ d efaming-​ a rmy-​ o r-​ police-​is-​treason-​idUSL4N1QJ4A6 Rizk, M. (2014, September 22). “Egypt’s NGOs continue struggle with restrictive draft law,” Ahram Online. http://​english.ahram.org.eg/​NewsContent/​1/​64/​ 111294/​Egypt/​Politics-​/​Egypts-​NGOs-​continue-​struggle-​with-​restrictive-​dra. aspx Scott-​Railton, J., Marczak, B., Raoof, R., & Maynier, E. (2017). “Nile phish large-​ scale phishing campaign targeting Egyptian civil society,” University of Toronto. https://​citizenlab.ca/​2017/​02/​nilephish-​report/​. Selim, G. M. (2013). “Global and regional approaches to arms control in the Middle East: A critical assessment from the Arab world,” SpringerBriefs in Environment, Security, Development and Peace 4. Selim, G. M. (2014). “Global civil society and the Egyptian 2011 uprising: Assessing the boomerang effect,” Mediterranean Review, 7(2): 83–​112. Sharp, J. M. (2011). Egypt in transition. Report for Congress: Congressional Research Service. www.refworld.org/​pdfid/​4f842ccb2.pdf

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Safeguards or infringement? Counter-​terrorism policies, the state and civil society in Pakistan1 Zoha Waseem Introduction Despite its position as a principal actor in the global war on terrorism since 2001, Pakistan has not adequately implemented counter-​ terrorism and security policies. Following the attacks on the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar in 2014, Pakistan’s first official counter-​terrorism policy, the National Action Plan (NAP), was criticized for being militaristic in nature, limited in content and selective in implementation. In essence, NAP mirrored the unofficial security policies already in place, which favored militarized responses to security threats, curtailed civil liberties, meted out different treatment to religious and secular civil societies. Over the past two decades, Pakistan has drafted or amended existing legal frameworks to address terrorism and terrorism-​related crimes using draconian measures, such as the Anti-​Terrorism Act of 1997. These frameworks complement the state’s reliance upon anti-​terrorism courts and military courts, the latter having come about through a constitutional amendment in the aftermath of the APS attack. Although these frameworks have collectively led to a decline in terrorism-​related violence in Pakistan since 2015, they have had dire implications for the society at large. This chapter examines Pakistan’s counter-​ terrorism frameworks and measures and delves into the implications these have had for its civil society (CS). Pakistan’s CS, including activists, non-​ governmental organizations, religious organizations, social movements, journalists, academics, and trade unions, amongst others, is divided on religious and secular lines. I focus on secular CS entities that have most actively interfaced with the state apropos to its terrorism and counter-​terrorism policies since the APS attack. This chapter draws upon some of the relevant international scholarship that has examined the links between security, terrorism, and CS (Howell & Lind, 2009; Howell, 2011; Verkoren & Leeuwen, 2014). Most relevant to

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this chapter is the idea of the “securitization of civil society.” Howell (2011) explains that the securitization of CS refers to:

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[T]‌he increasing absorption of civil society actors in global and national security agendas. Specifically, this refers to the dual processes of containment and engagement, whereby elements of civil society become the subjects of surveillance, control and prohibition, and/​or strategic actors to nurture, engage with and support. Civil society thus becomes a strategic battlefield in the pursuit of national and global security objectives. (Howell, 2011: 2)

Drawing upon this, I suggest that Pakistani CS has been securitized in two ways. First, the state has attempted to contain sections of CS on grounds of “national security,” especially where groups have been seen protesting against the state’s security policies and practices or criticizing them. Second, CS has been seen adapting to and adopting the state’s counter-​terrorism structures (such as the courts and legal mechanisms) as a result of both their own vulnerabilities and insecurities following incidents of terrorism, as well as their diminishing trust in civilian institutions that they consider politicized and corrupt.

Development of Pakistan’s security environment (1970s–​2000) This section focuses on the primary developments from the 1970s that have contributed to Pakistan’s present-​day security challenges. Terrorism came into the national consciousness in the 1970s when the government began viewing political violence and opposition as acts of “terrorism.” In the mid-​ 1970s, the government of prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto enacted the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Court) Act of 1975. Bhutto’s government labeled opposition and nationalist movements as terrorism and the 1975 Act was stated to be for the “suppression of actors of sabotage, subversion and terrorism” (Fayyaz, 2008). The 1975 Act was replaced by the Anti-​Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997, the brainchild of the then government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The Act created a parallel legal system and special “anti-​terrorist courts” (ATCs) that remain in place today (Kennedy, 2004). After Bhutto, Pakistan’s military dictator General Zia-​ ul Haq’s Islamization agenda and involvement in the Afghan “jihad” against the Soviet Union, led to state suppression of secular, liberal civil society and support for Islamic groups, factions, and militants (Rehman, 2006). The consequent mushrooming of state-​supported militant religious seminaries (madrassas) within Pakistan later exacerbated sectarian and sub-​sectarian tensions within the country (Rana, 2005; Fayyaz, 2010; Syed et al., 2016).

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According to Fayyaz (2010: 104), Pakistan’s success in ousting the Soviet forces and installing a pliant Islamist regime in Afghanistan “was achieved at the cost of the shearing of its domestic social fabric by the extremist networks and their vision of [a Holy Jihad] at home and abroad. By the end of 2000, Pakistan was home to fifty-​eight religious parties and twenty-​ four armed religious militias.” Following the 1999 coup by General Pervez Musharraf, the state continued to support the Afghan Taliban and religious forces within Pakistan, until the events of September 11, 2001 forced the government to revise its policies (Aijazi, 2017; Rehman, 2006). According to Rana (2005) and Hussain (2007), after 9/​11, due to external pressure (primarily from the United States), Pakistan’s policy shifted to selectively opposing certain religious militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, causing resentment within those militant circles and sections of the religious civil society that had previously been patronized by the state. This resulted in a violent backlash from those local and regional militants that had become a “strategic liability” for Pakistan’s internal security (Fayyaz, 2010; Aijazi, 2017). This was most crucially demonstrated in the siege of one of Pakistan’s most notorious mosques, the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), which played a critical role in sending mujahideen to Afghanistan. The mosque’s leading cleric, Maulana Abdul Aziz, issued a fatwa against soldiers participating in military operations against terrorists in Pakistan and called for suicide attacks. In 2007, members of the Lal Masjid became a hub for violent subversive activity against the state. In a bid to restore the writ of the state, Musharraf launched a bloody military operation that was widely criticized and mobilized an organized backlash against the state, including the formation of the Tehreek-​e-​Taliban Pakistan (TTP) –​an umbrella organization of various militant groups in Pakistan that announced its establishment months after the Lal Masjid operation (Hussain, 2017). The TTP would carry out some of the most violent terrorist attacks in Pakistan, including the attack on the APS on December 16, 2014. It is against this backdrop that Pakistan’s environment of national and regional security (and insecurity) has to be understood, especially in the context of religious militants associated with groups such as the Afghan Taliban, al-​Qaeda, and the TTP.2 In the post-​9/​11 security environment, Pakistan’s national and internal security policies became even more intimately connected to regional security, especially after militants from Afghanistan, including al-​Qaeda leaders, began to take refuge in Pakistan’s tribal areas (Hussain, 2007). Today, Pakistan’s security culture is grounded in the aftershocks of Zia’s Islamization agenda, the patronage of the Afghan Taliban, the abandonment of the militant groups once patronized, the nexus between the state and the religious CS, and the internal instability that was exacerbated by CTMs after 2001.

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Contemporary CTMs and practices Following its alliance with the US in the “Global War on Terrorism,” civilian and military regimes in Pakistan have undertaken numerous official CTMs between 2001 and 2018. These include lifting the moratorium on the death penalty in 2014, the 21st constitutional amendment of 2015 that allowed the establishment of military courts to expedite trials of alleged terrorists (which supplemented pre-​ existing anti-​ terrorism courts), and periodic amendments to legal frameworks that legalized counter-​terrorism practices, empowered security forces, and increased state penetration into civilian lives through surveillance, detention, and use of force (e.g., ATA 1997, Protection of Pakistan Act 2014–​2016, and Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016). Pakistan’s CTMs have included security policies such as the National Internal Security Policy (NISP) of 2014 and 2018 (both of which remain unimplemented thus far) and the National Action Plan (NAP) of 2014 (International Crisis Group, 2015; Parvez & Rani, 2015; Rumi, 2015; Waseem, 2018a; for a discussion on ATCs see Yusuf, 2010).3 Pakistan’s CTMs have received criticism from civil society organizations and academics alike. Aijazi (2017) argues that “Pakistan’s counter-​terrorism policies risk being formulated solely based on oversimplified narratives of national security and increasing state legibility without a deeper appreciation of the social, political, and intellectual lives of its citizens, and their aspirations for the future.” These measures have further been criticized for being militaristic in nature, whilst neglecting the socio-​economic causes behind militancy (Siddiqa, 2011). Others criticize recent legislation and judicial decisions, including amendments to the ATA of 1997, that expand the definitions of “terrorism” and associated crimes and further empower security forces.4 According to a human rights lawyer and activist based in Lahore: Legislation such as ATA which promise quick prosecution and bypass important procedural safeguards, erode trust in normal criminal justice system which guarantees protection of the rights of the accused. These legislations promote the idea that law enforcement agencies including paramilitary forces must be granted more unfettered powers for search and seizure, and even shoot-​at-​sight. Such legislation also allows longer detentions which is seen by some as a panacea for law and order-​related issues. There is a trickle-​down effect of anti-​terrorism legislation. Cases which deserve to be dealt with by the ordinary courts of sessions are thrown into anti-​terrorism courts because they spread “insecurity or fear” even when they are not intended to overawe the government, nor are they ideologically driven. This happens arbitrarily and is discriminatory.5

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Due to the fact that CTMs are connected to national security narratives, criticisms against state policies and practices tied to counter-​ terrorism have not been tolerated. This intolerance has manifested itself through the suppression and harassment of journalists including Taha Siddiqui who received multiple threats from the security establishment for frequently criticizing state security policies and survived an attempted abduction in 20186 (Abbas & Safi, 2018), and Saleem Shahzad who was killed in custody in 2011 for exposing links between al-​Qaeda and Pakistan’s intelligence agencies (Cheema, 2011). Connected with these CTMs is the phenomenon of the “missing persons.” In Pakistan’s context, “missing person” describes an individual who has been allegedly taken by security agencies (including intelligence agencies, the police, or paramilitary forces) to unknown locations, with the intent of being interrogated for activities that are considered anti-​state (these individuals include political opponents, critics, and activists). In 2017, five civil society activists and bloggers critical of the Pakistani state and military were “disappeared” by state security agencies (BBC, 2017; Hashim, 2017). These disappearances came after 700 similar cases were reported in 2016 (BBC, 2017). According to a legal specialist who focuses on South Asia, security agencies in Pakistan tend to link those who have been forcibly disappeared to terrorism. But CS, on its part, has not taken a unified stance against such practices: The definition of terrorism has been broadened to cover pretty much anyone. When I started working on cases of disappearances, there was a debate even within human rights groups that we can talk about [disappearances or missing persons from] Balochistan, but not about religious terrorists. It seemed like it was okay for “terrorists” to be disappeared. The Balochistan struggle was viewed as legitimate and religion-​based struggle was seen as illegitimate. In the civil society, we have a narrative that persists that the missing persons problem is a Baloch problem, in spite of the fact that the largest numbers of disappearances have been from Pakistan’s northern, tribal areas where people have been picked up in relation to terrorism by intelligence and security officials [but not necessarily tried]. We [in Pakistan] have seen a double standard in the civil society on the issue of missing persons. The civil society has these double standards due to a lack of trust in and frustration with existing civilian structures.7

In certain aspects, therefore, we have seen that CTMs have not been confronted by a united opposition from CS groups. A similar “double standard” was seen in CS responses to the 21st constitutional amendment that established military courts in Pakistan.

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When the military courts were being established, we saw elements within the civil society supporting them. They thought that military courts would only apply to terrorists. It’s surprising, for me, to see the kinds of violations that are going on –​in a democratic country, military courts are doling out death sentences to civilians. Our secular civil society, human rights groups, did not take a principal view. They thought these courts should apply to religious terrorists. This civil society is driven by fear and revenge.8

Similarly, Pakistani CS has responded with mixed reactions to the state’s clampdown on local and international non-​ governments organizations since 2015. Pakistan’s NGO sector first came under threat from terrorism in February 2007 when the Pakistani Taliban spread the notion that the government’s polio vaccination campaigns were American plots to sterilize Muslim children (Fayyaz, 2010). These rumors would later be fueled after it was revealed that an employee of Save the Children, Dr Shakil Afridi, was involved in providing information that enabled US Navy Seals to confirm the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and carry out the raid in Abbottabad in 2011 that ultimately led to bin Laden’s death. The distrust that this incident created in Pakistani society eventually delegitimized and threatened NGO workers in Pakistan, including polio vaccination teams affiliated with the Rotary International, the World Health Organization, and UNICEF. In 2015, former Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar would begin an official crackdown on internationally supported NGOs on suspicion of espionage that threatened “national security.” The campaign would further delegitimize both local and international NGOs in Pakistan. According to one CS activist, “A lot of NGOs are involved in indirect espionage activities in collecting data on people and passing them on. The state has the right to catch those doing this and pack up their camps.”9 Pakistani CS has thus been largely silent on this issue, often following the state narrative that international NGOs (and local NGOs that rely on international funding and support) are compromising national security.

The securitization of civil society Whether a state is empowering CS to further national security agendas, silencing or harassing it to prevent it from criticizing state policies, or increasing surveillance to prevent dissent that can endanger the state’s narratives on national security issues, these are practices that fall under the process of “securitization of civil society.” In Pakistan’s case, this securitization led to the suppression of sections of CS which are believed to be “anti-​state” or suspected to be associated with militant organizations. Second, the securitization of civil society has led some of these groups to endorse and utilize

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counter-​terrorism structures –​such as ATA 1997 and ATCs –​to further their own causes and interests (such as in case of CS activism against Maulana Abdul Aziz in 2014 and Shahrukh Jatoi in 2017). Specifically, Pakistan security forces are routinely known to carry out fake encounters, often in a bid to instantly reduce crime and terrorism (Waseem, 2018b). Fake encounters are part of the state’s informal policies and militarized practices that are tolerated, if not encouraged, as part of its larger CTMs and zero-​tolerance policies. The victims of encounter killings have no access to fair trials and are often presented as “criminals,” “terrorists,” or “anti-​state elements.” Investigations into police encounters are seldom successful and the guilt of their victims seldom challenged. The Pashtun population in Pakistan has frequently suffered the brunt of encounter killings. In January 2018, an aspiring Pashtun model, Naqeebullah Mehsud, was one of the victims in a fake police encounter10 in Karachi. Mehsud’s death triggered not only a national debate on police encounters and extrajudicial killings in Pakistan, it also sparked the beginnings of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) or the Pashtun Protection Movement. For the Pashtuns (chiefly in Pakistan’s tribal areas and Karachi), Mehsud’s death symbolized the long-​standing suffering of Pashtuns, many of whom have been subjected to extrajudicial killings, torture, and enforced disappearances (Kugelman, 2018). Aijazi (2017: 605) explains: The Pashtun ethnic group has been the target of discriminatory practices intuitive to Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy. Pashtuns, particularly those from the FATA region, are routinely denied services such as bank accounts, face frequent harassment from law enforcement agencies … They have borne the brunt of the Pakistani state’s newfound vigilance following the Peshawar school attacks and have been unfairly subjected to police raids, interrogation, arrests, and even deportation (for Afghan refugees).

Whilst a reaction to Mehsud’s death, the PTM was the product of long-​ standing grievances against discriminatory CTMs within the Pashtun community. Since January 2018, the PTM organized multiple demonstrations and protests across Pakistan. The PTM is led by a young man named Manzoor Pashteen, who marched from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Islamabad, gathering thousands, before staging a sit-​in in the capital. The movement swelled in size, drawing support from activists and civil society groups (Sevea, 2018). The PTM and its followers have demanded independent judicial inquiries into extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, the clearing of land mines from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), equal rights and representation for residents of tribal areas. In general, the movement demands better treatment for the Pashtun community, which has been traumatized by the state’s securitization policies.

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The PTM has not been well-​received by the Pakistani military, which has been the subject of much criticism from the PTM. The army’s spokesperson Major General Asif Ghafoor, in an attempt to delegitimize the PTM, publicly stated that the movement was influenced by “enemies of Pakistan” (Arab News, 2018). In another instance, army chief General Bajwa claimed that PTM had been “engineered” to weaken Pakistan (Kugelman, 2018). During its biggest gathering in Karachi, the state attempted to undermine the protest by detaining Pashteen to prevent his participation at the protest (Kazi, 2018). Furthermore, PTM activists and followers have routinely been harassed by security agents who have been known to detain activists prior to or during previously organized protests and meetings (Sayeed, 2018). State security agencies have also been pressurizing the Pakistani media not to provide coverage to the PTM, and newspapers have been known to refuse contributions from prominent columnists voicing support for the movement.11 Post-​9/​11, the PTM forms the first organized resistance by CS (cutting across socio-​economic backgrounds) against the human rights violations and abuses suffered by Pakistanis due to the state’s CTMs and the militarized security culture. It is also the starkest demonstration of the securitization of CS in Pakistan, both in terms of its emergence from among those most affected by Pakistan’s patronage of militants as well as its CTMs against militants and its attempted delegitimization by the state on grounds of “national security.”

An aggrieved but divided civil society’s response to extremism As mentioned above, Maulana Abdul Aziz has been a controversial imam (cleric) of the Lal Masjid in Islamabad. Known for preaching extremist sermons through loudspeakers even after the siege of Lal Masjid in 2007, Aziz’s statements in December 2014 aggravated pockets of society that was still reeling from the aftershocks of the APS attacks. As civil society organizations held vigils for the APS victims, Aziz refused to condemn the attack, leading CS activists to protest in the capital outside the mosque, resulting in a stand-​off between protesters and students of the seminaries attached to the mosque. According to one activist present at these protests, CS was angered by the inflammatory statements made by Aziz. The protests fueled civil society groups in Lahore and Karachi, encouraging them to similarly join hands against the extremist narratives propelled by the cleric: But it became difficult to sustain the momentum. Activists were divided over whether the army should be criticized for its security policies. In-​ fighting resulted. Unfortunately, in civil society circles such as these there is also no culture of a broad-​based consensus, no discipline. This section of the civil

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society did not have the machinery and structure it needed. Their momentum was driven to an extent by the civil society elites, and elites get fatigued quickly. These protests had the beginnings of a movement, but before it could sustain itself, in-​fighting, ideological differences and fatigue set in. The affluent sections of Pakistan’s civil society do not have the same stakes. Their lives are not at stake.12

The protests against Abdul Aziz were a product of grief and insecurity felt by CS activists following an event connected to Pakistan’s counter-​terrorism policies (the military operations that led to the APS attack and an event that could not be respected by a cleric patronized by the state). Although the movement against Aziz diminished due to lack of consensus between the various CS actors who had come together in protest of the state’s patronage of religious clerics, nevertheless CS did demand the application of the ATA of 1997 in order to get non-​bailable arrest warrants for Aziz (Shakeel & Butt, 2014), without questioning the merits of this controversial and draconian law. The same activist who led the case against Aziz in 2014 would join other members of CS to advocate for the hearing of a criminal case in an antiterrorism court (ATC) following the murder of Shahzeb Khan in Karachi.

An insecure civil society’s endorsement of counter-​terrorism structures In December 2012, a politically connected young man from a feudal background, Shahrukh Jatoi, shot and killed a university student, Shahzeb Khan, in Karachi’s affluent neighborhood, following a personal dispute. The case was moved to an ATC that awarded Jatoi the death penalty. Khan’s family granted an official pardon to the accused, which was approved by civilian courts, but because the case had been tried under terrorism charges, the death penalty was upheld (Baloch, 2018). In 2013, Jatoi’s council applied for the case to be transferred out of the ATC on grounds that it did not fall under the category of “terrorism.” The Sindh High Court held that indeed the case did not fall under the ATA, and that it should be tried in regular courts. The sentences of the accused were reversed and the court maintained that the crime was motivated by “personal enmity” which did not fall under the definition of terrorism (Ashfaq, 2018). What followed demonstrated CS’s continued reliance on and endorsement of the state’s problematic counter-​terrorism structures and a broad reading of “terrorism.” CS activists filed a petition in the Supreme Court arguing that Shahzeb’s murder fell under the ATA. The petition, submitted to the Supreme Court

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on January 9, 2018, a copy of which was shared with this author, read that “The incident resulted in striking terror, fear, panic, sensation, helplessness and insecurity amongst the people residing in that vicinity and the public in general and sparked countrywide outrage against the abuse of power by the wealthy people in Pakistan.” Based on this CS petition, the apex court nullified the decision of the High Court, restoring terrorism charges against Jatoi. The decision by a select group of CS activists to rely on counter-​terrorism structures and laws in pursuance of justice left CS divided, with some representatives maintaining that equating murder with terrorism on the grounds that murder creates “fear and insecurity” is based on a “faulty logic” (Ashfaq, 2018). According to one lawyer based in Lahore: It seems that a lot of liberal civil society activists are fine with the abuse of the law so far as it is not against liberals or certain civil society activists. What they don’t understand is that abuse once allowed will have a spill-​over effect.13

Furthermore, according to Karachi-​based journalist, the CS was motivated by the desire to prevent the accused, Jatoi, from getting bail: The civil society had initially criticized counterterrorism structures for creating parallel structures and not reforming the existing system. In the Shahrukh Jatoi case, the civil society felt that there was a fear that the accused would be granted bail. Therefore, they preferred that it be tried in the ATC. The ATCs are thus being used strategically for harsher punishment and speedy judgements.14

According to one activist who signed the petition: The debate on ATCs in Pakistan is limited to human rights organizations and some NGOs. It is not a problem of the ordinary people. Ordinary people want to see the culprits dead immediately. Overall population demands that justice be done by ATCs or military courts. When it came to Shahrukh Jatoi, even the intellectual civil society opted for ATCs. Initially, there was a view that ATCs are not good, but when it came to this case, we all wanted the case to be tried in ATCs for prompt justice. It is true that the ATCs are not transparent, but here, in Pakistan, they are a necessity. After 9/​11, the state has weakened and the society has become weaponized. Law enforcing bodies have not necessarily improved much. They are still serving the elites primarily. In this context, ATCs can become a necessity.15

The aforementioned views demonstrate the extent to which, first, the CS is divided on counter-​terrorism structures in Pakistan, and, second, the extent to which certain sections within CS feel justified in strategically employing controversial sections of counter-​terrorism laws and structures to their own advantage.

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Conclusion The cases of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, the protest against Maulana Abdul Aziz, and CS action against Shahrukh Jatoi, together demonstrate that Pakistani CS has not formed a united opposition or resistance to the state’s CTMs, in spite of the ways in which the CS has been securitized. The state has suppressed secular CS in Pakistan due to a security culture that has developed in Pakistan in response to state policies on religious militancy pre-​and post-​9/​11, and has not tolerated CS criticism of, or resistance to, the state’s CTMs. Some CSOs have adapted to and even endorsed certain CTMs resulting from Pakistan’s security culture during the ongoing war on terrorism. This, as I have demonstrated in this chapter, can be seen through civil society’s dependency on the ATA of 1997. The above finds relevance to ongoing discourses on the lack of collective resistance by CSOs to repressive CTMs in the US, UK, Kenya, and Nigeria (Lind & Howell, 2010; Sidel, 2010; Njoku, 2020a). For instance, Howell and Lind (2009) assert mainstream CSOs did not resist CTMs during the early phases of its enforcement because it did not affect them. Only minority organizations resisted the CTMs. Mainstream CSOs started opposing CTMs when it began to affect their operations. In conclusion, it can be stated that Pakistan’s CTMs and policies are unlikely to evolve in ways that take into account the country’s social dynamics, unless the fragmentation within its CS can be addressed. The variations in the responses by secular CS to counter-​terrorism practices and policies are, to an extent, a product of the variations in Pakistan’s own implementation of ambiguous counter-​terrorism policies and frameworks. Further research into the implementation of these policies, and a critical review of Pakistan’s counter-​terrorism strategies more generally, must thus be encouraged in order to understand the complexities associated with CS responses to state policies and practices.

Notes 1 I am grateful for my discussions with civil society activists, journalists and lawyers based in Pakistan and the United Kingdom, without whose insights this chapter would not have been possible. 2 Pakistan’s patronage of militants fighting the Indian state in Jammu and Kashmir is intimately connected to the network of militant groups that operated between the Pak-​Afghan region. Kashmiri militant groups such as Lashkar-​e-​Taiba and its political and charity wings, most notably Jamaat-​ud-​Dawa, have penetrated Pakistan’s social fabric and religious CS. However, a detailed investigation into the conflict in Kashmir, state patronage of Kashmiri militants, and the influence

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of these actors on Pakistani CS is a mammoth task and beyond the scope of this chapter. 3 The National Action Plan (NAP) was a twenty-​point counter-​terrorism policy created in the aftermath of the APS attacks of December 2014. NAP is limited scope and has been criticized for its selective implementation (Zahid, 2016). The National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 2014 revised in 2018 offers a far more comprehensive framework for countering terrorism and religious extremism but remains unimplemented at the time of writing. 4 Based on interviews with legal specialists in London and Lahore in November 2018. 5 Interview with a human rights lawyer based in Lahore, November 12, 2018. 6 Based on personal discussions with journalists in November 2018. 7 Interview with a Pakistani legal advisor based in the UK, November 13, 2018. 8 Interview with a Pakistani legal advisor based in the UK, November 13, 2018. 9 Interview with a civil society activist based in Karachi, November 9, 2018. 10 A “fake encounter” refers to police killings in Pakistan and India reported as police shootouts with alleged criminals or terrorists but are actually deaths that result from police firing, often while the individual is in police custody. 11 Interview with a journalist in Karachi, November 12, 2018. 12 Interview with a Pakistani civil society activist based in London, November 11, 2018. 13 Interview with a human rights lawyer and activist based in Lahore, November 12, 2018. 14 Interview with a journalist based in Karachi, November 12, 2018. 15 Interview with a civil society activist based in Karachi, November 9, 2018.

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Cheema, U. (2011, June 11). “Dying to tell the story,” New York Times. www. nytimes.com/​2011/​06/​12/​opinion/​12Cheema.html?_​r=1&ref=opinion Fayyaz, S. (2008). “Responding to terrorism: Pakistan’s anti-​ terrorism laws,” Political Violence and Terrorism, 2(6): 10–​19. Fayyaz, S. (2010, May). “Pakistan response towards terrorism: A case study of Musharraf regime,” thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Political Science and International Studies, The University of Birmingham. Hashim, A. (2017, January 21). “Disappeared: Silencing Pakistan’s activists,” Al Jazeera. www.aljazeera.com/​indepth/​features/​2017/​01/​disappeared-​silencing-​ pakistan-​activists-​170121074139848.html Howell, J. (2011). “The securitisation of civil society post-​9/​11,” draft paper, ECPR Joint Session, St Gallen, April. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2009). Counter-​terrorism, aid and civil society: Before and after the war on terror. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hussain, Zahid (2007). Frontline Pakistan: The struggle with militant Islam. New York: Columbia University Press. Hussain, Zahid (2017, July 9). “The legacy of Lal Masjid,” Dawn. www.dawn.com/​ news/​1344098 International Crisis Group. (2015). “Revisiting counter-​ terrorism strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and pitfalls,” Asia Report No. 271, ICG, Brussels, Belgium. Kazi, M. (2018, May 13). “PTM rally concludes in Karachi,” The Express Tribune. https://​tribune.com.pk/​story/​1709184/​1-​ptm-​rally-​underway-​karachi/​ Kennedy, C. H. (2004). “The creation and development of Pakistan’s anti-​terrorism regime, 1997–​2002,” in Robert Wirsing & Mohan Malik (eds.), Religious radicalism and security in South Asia (pp. 387–​411). Honolulu: Asia-​Pacific Centre for Security Studies. Koo, J.-​W. & Murdie, A. (2018). “Liberty or security: Do civil society restrictions limit terrorism?” Centre for Strategic and International Studies. www. csis.org/ ​ b logs/ ​ i nternational- ​ c onsortium- ​ c losing-​ c ivic-​ s pace/​ l iberty-​ o r-​ security-​do-​civil-​society-​restrictions Kugelman, M. (2018, April 29). “Why Pakistan’s Pashtuns are pushing back,” The National Interest. https://​nationalinterest.org/​feature/​ why-​pakistans-​pashtuns-​are-​pushing-​back-​25609 Lind, J. & Howell, J. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the politics of aid: Civil society responses in Kenya,” Development and Change, 41(2): 335–​353. Mirahmadi, H., Ziad, W., Farooq, M., & Lamb, R. D. (2015). “Empowering Pakistan’s civil society to counter global violent extremism,” The Brookings Project on US Relations with the Islamic World, US-​Islamic World Forum Papers 2014, Centre for Middle East Policy at Brookings, Washington, DC. Njoku, E. T. (2020a). “Politics of conviviality? State-​civil society relations within the context of counter-​terrorism in Nigeria,” Voluntas: International of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 31(5): 1063–​1076. Parvez, T. & Rani, M. (2015). “An appraisal of Pakistan’s anti-​terrorism act,” Special Report 377, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC.

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Rana, A. M. (2005). The seeds of terrorism. New York: New Millennium. Rehman, A. (2006). “Dynamism of Pakistan’s civil society: Religious-​secular rivalry and its resources,” Journal of International Development and Cooperation, 12(56). Rumi, R. (2015). “Charting Pakistan’s internal security policy,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report 368, May. Sayeed, S. (2018, May 17). “Founded to protest Pakistan ‘disappearances’, group now sees supporters go missing,” Reuters. https://​uk.reuters.com/​article/​uk-​ pakistan-​pashtuns/​founded-​to-​protest-​pakistan-​disappearances-​group-​now-​sees-​ supporters-​go-​missing-​idUKKCN1II075 Sevea, I. S. (2018). “The Pashtun protection movement in Pakistan: The Taliban, the military and the fragmentation of authority,” ISAS Working Paper No. 298, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Shakeel, Q. & Butt, A. (2014, December 26). “Arrest warrant issued for Lal Masjid cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz,” Dawn. www.dawn.com/​news/​1153286 Siddiqa, A. (2011). “Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy: Separating friends from enemies,” The Washington Quarterly, 34(1): 149–​162. Sidel, M. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the regulation of civil society in the USA,” Development and Change, 41(2): 293–​312. Syed, J., Pio, E., Kamran, T., & Zaidi, A. (2016). Faith-​based Violence and Deobandi militancy in Pakistan. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Verkoren, W. & Leeuwen, M. (2014). “Civil society in fragile contexts,” in M. Kaldor & I. Rangelov (eds.), The handbook of global security policy. Sussex: John Wiley and Sons Ltd. Waseem, Z. (2018a, June 8). “National internal security policy in review,” The Friday Times. www.thefridaytimes.com/​tft/​national-​internal-​security-​policy-​in-​review/​ Waseem, Z. (2018b, January 26). “Karachi’s cops celebrated for faking it till they make it,” The Friday Times. www.thefridaytimes.com/​tft/​ karachis-​cops-​celebrated-​for-​faking-​it-​till-​they-​make-​it/​ Yusuf, H. (2010). “Pakistan’s anti-​terrorism courts,” CTC Sentinel, 3(3): 22–​25. Zahid, F. (2016, July 19). “Counter terrorism policy measures: A critical analysis of Pakistan’s national plan,” Mackenzie Institute. http://​mackenzieinstitute. com/​counter-​terrorism-​policy-​measures-​a-​critical-​analysis-​of-​pakistans-​national-​ action-​plan/​

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“Who becomes the threat?” Counter-​terrorism financing and civil society organizations in Bangladesh Scott N. Romaniuk, Emeka Thaddues Njoku, and Arundhati Bhattacharyya Introduction and background Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Western governments have primarily seen Bangladesh in the context of counter-​terrorism and anti-​terror activities. The growth of radical religious groups in Bangladesh has also become a matter of concern. Moreover, since the 1980s, Bangladesh has been a destination for aid from the oil-​rich countries in the Middle East, that have also attracted a free flow of labor, which has further raised concerns about Bangladeshis engaging in terrorist activities. Bangladesh’s vibrant civil society has also been contributing to the development of the country, with the assistance of aid and remittances. In 2001, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental organization, promoted the narrative that terrorist organizations have utilized civil society groups in transferring funds for terrorist activities. It thus directed states –​including Bangladesh –​ to take further actions to restrict the financial operations of civil society organizations (CSOs). In response, the Bangladeshi government established the Money Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA) of 2002 and expanded it in 2009. However, in a renewed interest to strengthen its counter-​terrorism measures (CTMs) to meet international standards, the government repealed the MLPA of 2009 and established the MLPA of 2012. Also, the 2009 Anti-​ Terrorism Act (ATA) was amended in 2012 and 2013 (Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit, 2013). As stated earlier, the narrative that terrorist groups use CSOs to raise and transfer funds, recruit and to provide logistical support for their operations influenced the establishments and amendments of these CTMs in Bangladesh. These measures were captured in section 23 of MLPA, 2012 and section 15 of the ATA, 2009 (as amended). The state claim that these measures were geared toward supporting NGO/​NPOs to combat the use of their organizations to launder money or finance terrorist activities (Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit, 2013: 3). Furthermore, in

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2016, the government enacted the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act. Section 14 of the Act empowers state officials to withhold registration of foreign-​funded CSOs and monitor their financial transactions. This regulation significantly lifts the constraints on government to act against organizations in the country without having in place credible information. The Bangladeshi government stated that counter-​ terrorism initiatives restricting operations of CSOs (such as access to foreign funding) were aimed at ensuring that Bangladesh becomes terror-​free by the year 2021 (Koo & Murdie, 2018). However, the enforcement of these measures is adversely impacting on the activities of many CSOs in Bangladesh. In many cases these organizations have had their bank accounts frozen as part of CTMs in Bangladesh, thus creating a financial and administrative burden and limiting the capacity of these organizations to engage in philanthropic activities (Green & Bayas, 2017; Koo & Murdie, 2018). The enforcement of CTMs created an atmosphere wherein the CSOs were treated as suspect communities, consequently hindering them from functioning effectively and fulfilling their public mandates of which the Bangladeshi government is fully aware. These CTMs also have socio-​economic and political implications. A robust, legitimate, and independent civil society is the mark of a vibrant democracy. When the finances and other restrictions handicap CSOs, this has repercussions on the socio-​economic and political arenas necessary for the functioning of a democracy. This chapter explores the discourse and application of CTMs within the country and the effect on CSOs after 9/​11. Specifically, it examines the impact of state-​level countering of terrorism-​financing measures on CSOs in Bangladesh with a look at the reach of the government’s CTMs into other facets of Bangladeshi society that is critical for the upholding of democracy. We show that competing discourses of CTM-​implementation and achievement are put forward by both the government and CSOs with different operational foci. As the space in which civil society operates is diminished, that space can be seen as shrinking inasmuch as legitimate CSOs independent of the stringent powers of the state are concerned while government-​ influenced CSOs and their voices are assuming positions within that space.

The emergence of CTMs in Bangladesh: divergent perspectives The Bangladeshi government under Sheikh Hasina stated that it has a zero-​ tolerance policy toward terrorism. The government has realized that neither terrorist footprint should be allowed to expand, nor should the territory of Bangladesh become a springboard for transnational terrorist activities

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(Gohel, 2014). Though there have been several violent attacks by Islamic extremists, Bangladesh has officially denied the presence of international jihadist forces (Roy, 2017). In aligning itself to a zero-​tolerance policy, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina reiterated that Bangladesh does not allow its territory to be used by any terrorist individual, group, or entity against the state or the people (Zero tolerance for terrorism, 2018). The Bangladesh government has illustrated that Bangladeshi militants have been featured in several publications, videos, and sites of other terrorist organizations like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS) and al-​Qaeda, which is a serious matter of concern for Bangladesh both directly and indirectly. Thus, the Bangladesh government claimed that it is taking serious steps to arrest terrorism by enacting the necessary policy (i.e., laws and measures) from the state-​level to have a downward-​effect on all of Bangladeshi society to protect the people, national security, and national interests. An interview with a government security official speaking about the official position of the Bangladeshi government described a situation in Bangladesh whereby the presence of persistent terrorist groups necessitated holistic security coverage over society. The interviewee’s response would eventually attempt to confute the position of CSO workers in the country. As he expressed: We have the presence of serious terrorist groups in Bangladesh and a large number of people to protect, this is important to realize. Security services in Bangladesh behave properly to respond to our situation that is improving. We have come from a long way. Why we should not use our security to cover society as a way to protect them? ISIS, al-​Qaeda, Ansar Bangla, Islamic group[s]‌ too, well known and that is very dangerous … and they communicate with the Bangladeshi people too. They want to create a Bangladeshi state with the government by Islamic law. This is why the Bangladeshi government work together with the UN, USA, UK, our internal structures to protect against these serious threats to this country. Hence our zero-​tolerance policy on these issues and everything … and they are deep, not just one part of the society, but going to all parts. That is why this is how we treat with such threats.1

The government also claimed that it had developed an alert list of terrorists with the assistance of the United States. The Bangladesh government stated that a collective government effort would be required and agencies, like the police, counter-​terrorism unit, Rapid Action Battalion, intelligence agencies of the Directorate of General Forces and National Security Intelligence are all contributing for successful implementation of counter-​terrorist activities. As part of efforts to curb the rise of terrorism in Bangladesh, the government established the ATA in 2009. It was further strengthened to meet international standards through an amendment process in 2012 and 2013 (Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit, 2013). Specifically, the Act allows

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Bangladesh to implement the United Nations Security Council resolution 2178, which directs member states “to take certain steps to address the FTF (Foreign Terrorist Fighters) threat, including to prevent suspected FTFs from entering or transiting their territories and to have laws to prosecute FTF” (UNSCR 2178). The ATA outlaws the membership and support of terrorist organizations, including organizations that are listed in the UN Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and al-​ Qaeda sanctions regime. The Bangladeshi government also directs banks to publish lists of domestically designated and UN-​sanctioned individuals and groups on its website (US Department of State, 2018). Furthermore, due to the government claim that the primary terrorist financing threat comes from the small groups operating in the domestic sector where they exploit microfinancing, the ATA prohibits microfinance agencies, particularly when the government has reasonable evidence regarding these agencies using the money, material, and services for terrorist activities (US Department of State, 2017). Furthermore, the US government is assisting the Bangladeshi government in areas of training the youth of Bangladesh to build the resilience of the mechanism of anti-​ terrorism. Anti-​ Terrorism Assistance Program is a leading counter-​terrorism capacity building program for law enforcement of selected partners (US Department of State, 2018). However, the International Federation for Human Rights (IFHR) and its member organisation, Odhikar, criticizes the government’s enforcement of the ATA, claiming that the government does not abide by international human rights norms and standards (HRW, 2018). They were critical of the death penalty as punishment for financing terrorist activity. Also, they stated that the vague definition of “terrorist activities” and “terrorism” may further open platforms for abuse or violation of human rights (Fabe, 2017). When governments and their people act without care to the way information is put to use, everybody becomes a target. The Bangladeshi government has committed itself very determinedly to protect, but what this word means, ok? … Urgently we know that such vague language brings very colourful consequences. The illogical qualities of what is seen against those people who did not violate what is perceived of Bangladeshi law is profound, nothing less than this. It is equivalent to arbitrary movements by this government; however, the situation may appear. When can we say this or that, how can we say it, who is it to be spoken to? I see a lack of definition or clarity, and with it, I see the great opportunity of abuse. The government has grant itself provisions for turning to activists, businesswomen or men, government people, and ordinary people from one day to another, acting against what they say, how they say it, you see? The problem is this; the Bangladeshi government cannot pass bills that contradict the state constitution.2 Is this penetrating rhetoric and policy done in haste and lacking the precision of information damaging in Bangladesh? It is

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of an epic problem, a threat to the Bangladeshi people, not those who seek to harm the country from the outside –​I’m speaking here of terrorist groups, and so forth. Who then becomes the threat?

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The impact of CTMs on CSOs in Bangladesh The enforcement of CTMs in Bangladesh, such as the ATA of 2009 (as amended) and the passage of the 2016 Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Bill which requires CSOs, particularly those receiving foreign funds, to make available comprehensive information about their activities and funding are affecting CSOs. Specifically, as part of efforts to curb terrorism in Bangladesh, the government enhanced its scrutiny of the financial transactions of financial institutions, while also regulating the foreign funding for CSOs particularly those involved in human rights activities and political advocacy (Green & Bayas 2017). For example, Koo and Murdie (2018: 1) stated that human rights organizations, like HRW, decried the law as “stifling freedom of expression,” designed to make an “authoritarian regime proud.” As I understand, the situation has very much changed, and I had foreseen far more than a fringe problem when speaking of who belongs and who does not. Decisions for this come from a very high level of the government, but for many years we did not have this problem. It has surely grown over much time. So the government speaks in different ways. It looks at organizations, and it sorts them according to, we can say it is a security palatability. They do this as part and process to expel those not worth having for the government and keep a close watch on those that do stay by the will of the government, like an ethnic-​ cleansing in a way of speaking. What one must realize is the Bangladeshi government speaking against itself … they are saying we will protect, we will accept, we will support, but then it send some away.3

Another policy officer working for a human rights foundation said: I don’t think that the government wishes to look like it works against its own constitution. Actually, it gives us the impression of recognizing it but then drafting its own laws that say it allows that. In the case of the constitution, it fails to protect. Perceptions are very, very opposed. You should also see the dialectic within the society: that is what the government deliberately does against what people are entitled (according to the constitution) to do. The government will turn to organizations that are trying to help others, within the constitutions, and are being accused of so-​called controversial undertakings. NGOs can be accused of having suspicious motive when working together with certain peoples, you know, those living on the inside of Bangladesh like Islamic peoples.4

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Thus, the above advances the narrative that often links terrorism to Islam (O’Toole et al., 2016) is also evident in Bangladesh, where Muslim communities have become targets of state CTMs or are treated as suspect communities in the enforcement of CTMs in the state (Howell, 2014). The repression of human rights or advocacy groups and Muslim organizations in the enforcement of CTMs in Bangladesh is consistent with conclusions by scholars in other political contexts such as Russia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Australia, Kenya, Nigeria, the US, and the UK, that while CTMs affect various CSOs, human rights and Muslim groups and communities experienced more threats and repression than others (Fowler & Sen, 2010; Sidel, 2010; Dupuy et al., 2015; Howell, 2014; Brechenmacher, 2017; Skokova et al., 2018; Njoku, 2020a, 2021a). Human Rights Watch (HRW) has been critical of Bangladeshi government CTMs, particular in terms of its impacts on CSOs, its method of selection, and justifications employed to support their application. Specifically, HRW stated that the laws expose “non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) to comprehensive and arbitrary government control over their activities, stifling freedom of expression and other rights” (HRW, 2016: 1). Furthermore, it reported that the laws are being used by the state to turn CSOs into agents of the state. In other words, the laws are not only used to repress CSOs but also to co-​opt them into serving state’s interest or forced CSOs to focus on only those activities that are sanctioned by the state (HRW, 2016). Similarly, the press in Bangladesh is also under constant threat. Journalists frequently face criminal defamation and sedition cases. The Foreign Donation (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act controls the freedom of information of CSOs, particularly the press in an increasingly excessive manner (Choudhury, 2019). The Bangladeshi government’s control over the free press is a defeat of the functioning of democratic institutions. Therefore, the space for CSOs to criticize government policies has also been closed by government restrictions of press freedom under the guise of implementing the CTMs in the country. A development agency policy executive explains: Press freedom is a fountainhead of expression, and expression or communication, a mechanism of collaborative efforts, coordination of interests, and is able to identify those sources of support, need, ability, and so on. Stifle or end the flow of that fountainhead, and you will see the immediately extensive and exponential silencing of voice as opposition, that is, dangers presented to states’ power structures. I say states due to our ability to observe this process elsewhere.5

CSOs in Bangladesh are prohibited from criticizing the laws or the policies and practices of the government, with punishment for such criticism

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including the imposition of fines, disciplinary action, or de-​registering the organizations (HRW, 2016). Committees in government call for the identification of groups supporting, working with either people or other organizations with relations to issues with which Bangladesh seeks to eliminate its relations. Pause and think about how difficult the task is to address thousands or hundreds of thousands of people opposed to tackling just the representative parties of those many people. None of those in power will allow the state to become a victim of the machinations of “foreign instruments.” Members of the military here in this country are also involved with the leaders to preclude such action.6

Koo and Murdie (2018) stated that the government justified or provided a rationale for the implementation of CTMs specifically regarding the targeting of the finances of NGOs in the country. The state claims that many of these measures were aimed at protecting national security or ensuring that Bangladesh is free from terrorist groups making inroads in the country. According to the Asia Director of Human Rights Watch, Brad Adams, “the government claims it is committed to freedom of expression and pluralism, but then passes a law that would make an authoritarian regime proud” (HRW, 2016). The practice of closing access to information or platforms for dialogue of engaging the government in the context of counter-​terrorism finds relevance in another political context where counter-​terrorism laws are being enforced. For instance, in the United States and Nigeria, as part of efforts to curb terrorism, these governments restrict CSOs’ access to information on counter-​terrorism operations despite requests for this information under the Freedom Information Act. Both governments often cite national security expectations as a rationale for denying or restricting CSOs’ access to information (Sidel, 2010; Njoku, 2020a, 2021a). In response to the counter-​ terrorism financing regulations and the increasing closing of the civic space in Bangladesh, many local, national, and international CSOs have come together to reach consensus on the need to protest or challenge government CTMs in the country (OHCHR, 2019). Reiterating this, Mehtta (2016) asserted that the once-​fractured nature of civil society is being amended to fight for the common cause against the restrictive CTMs of the state. Interestingly, the above contrasts with extant discourses on the responses of CSOs to counter-​terrorism, as scholars have argued that in Western states and nascent democracies such as the US, the UK, Russia, Kenya, and Nigeria, as well as across many others in different regions of the world, many mainstream organizations were completely silent during the initial phases of the enforcement of CTMs. However, they began to criticize these measures when it began to affect them.

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In response to the abovementioned notions, a CSO officer with an advocacy group emphasized that: When discussing organizations and government relations, we need to first look to the “landscape” around in which they exist. Now governments will work very hard to protect against of any changes in the landscape but let me tell you that in this particular case the government would like [original emphasis] to fundamentally alter the landscape, contour it with the intention of setting the features it likes … There need not be a credible confirmation of threat inherent in organizations, networks, etc. The government will almost certainly detemine the genuineness of the threat. Yes, it is still fractured, but I would add a compartmentalized landscape. Not all groups, working groups/​organizations were completely silent, but you do know what will happen when you are the to the first to speak against of government policies –​it’s like turning the spotlight to yourself and calling for harmful attention.7

Only human rights and Muslim organizations have been critical of CTMs of the government the countries mentioned above (Howell & Lind, 2010; Sidel, 2010; Bloodgood & Tremblay-​Boire, 2011; Howell, 2014; Skokova et al., 2018; Watson & Burkes, 2018; Njoku, 2020a, 2021a).

Conclusion Antagonistic politics in Bangladesh opened up options for jihadists to utilize the resources for reaching their ends. When actions are taken, allegations are made by the opposition that torture, harassment, and other forms of reprehensible treatment of others are perpetrated against innocent people. It has been alleged that “jihadists” built a safe haven in the landscape of Bangladesh. Political polarization has indirectly contributed to the rising of militancy. Internal security has been a matter of primary concern. The Bangladeshi government has been facing several challenges to scale up the initiatives in developing the capacity of the country in many sectors, and while CSOs are important actors in the capacity building of any state, the Bangladeshi government has approached civil society as an appendage to the asymmetric threat posed by existing problems such as terrorism. The government and the CSOs are like two wheels in a chariot, where they need to support each other. The cross-​currents between them actually become detrimental to the socio-​economic development of the public. Bangladesh’s poverty rate, according to the World Bank, is consistently decreasing. But, even now, the CSOs have a big task of addressing the needs of the poor population in the country. The CSOs have greater access to societal

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strands, and that needs to be recognized by the state (Bangladeshi Enterprise Institute, 2014) One of the indicators of the vibrancy of democracy is the flourishing role of the CSOs. The events of 9/​11 have brought in tectonic shifts in the manner the democratic governments dealt with the CSOs. The imposition of drastic financial regulations on CSOs has affected their efficiency. An environment of fear has gripped many of them. It is the hard reality that for curbing the menace of terrorism, the Bangladesh government has created some financial restrictions on the CSOs, but this impact has broader implications on the civic space. Their rights get hampered. The time-​and resource-​consuming administrative processes limit their independence in addressing the more significant issues, like poverty, health, and so on. Moreover, when the members of the CSOs are illegally harassed it has a negative impact on the socio-​ economic and political environment of the country. From the perspective of Bangladesh, it has illegalized the receipt and collection of money, services and material support of those CSOs, where the Bangladesh authorities had ground to believe that the money has been or may be used by terrorist entities. The state of Bangladesh needs to have an inclusive approach toward the CSOs, as partners. Attention toward prevention of diversion of funds of CSOs toward feeding terrorist needs is of primary concern for the government of Bangladesh. But, in this process, it has to be aware that if silence is imposed on the legitimate protests of the CSOs regarding voicing their opinions and financial restrictions, democracy is strained. An umbrella outlook toward all CSOs in governmental actions regarding counter-​terrorism needs to be handled cautiously. Media freedom and security are ways to countering terrorism as the new brand of terrorism is engaging in using the social media for propagation and recruitment, hence, the state should engage CSOs as partners in the process rather than repressing them. Addressing counter-​terrorism should not, in any way, affect the socio-​economic and political development of Bangladesh as a democracy.

Notes 1 Authors’ interview via email with a Bangladeshi government and security official (Dhaka, Bangladesh, May 2019). 2 Authors’ interview via email with a policy officer and activist working for a welfare and charity CSO (Dhaka, Bangladesh, July 2019). 3 Authors’ interview via Skype with program officers of a social advancement and rights CSO (Dhaka, Bangladesh, July 2019).

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4 Authors’ interview via Skype with program officers of a human rights society CSO (Dhaka, Bangladesh, June 2019). 5 Authors’ interview via email with a planning member of a communications CSO (Dhaka, Bangladesh, October 2019). 6 Authors’ interview via Skype with a legal practitioner and member of a refugee organization (Dhaka, Bangladesh, July 2019). 7 Authors’ interview via Skype with a member of a religious advancement network (Dhaka, Bangladesh, May 2019).

References Bangladeshi Enterprise Institute. (2014, September). “The role of civil society in countering radicalization in Bangladesh.” http://​bei-​bd.org/​wp-​content/​uploads/​ 2015/​05/​The-​role-​of-​civil-​society-​in-​countering-​radicalization.pdf Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit. (2013). “Guidelines on prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing for NGO/​NPO sector,” Bangladesh Bank. Bloodgood, E. & Tremblay-​Boire, J. (2011). “International NGOs and national regulation in an age of terrorism,” VOLUNTAS, International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 22(1): 142–​173. Brechenmacher, S. (2017). Civil society under assault: Repression and responses in Russia, Egypt and Ethiopia. Massachusetts: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Choudhury, K. F. (2019, March 7). “Bangladesh’s media under siege,” The Diplomat. https://​thediplomat.com/​2019/​03/​bangladeshs-​media-​under-​siege/​ Dupuy, K. E., Ron, J., & Prakesh, A. (2015). “Who survived? Ethiopia’s regulatory crackdown on foreign-​funded NGOs,” Review of International Political Economy, 22(2): 419–​456. Fabe, A. P. H. (2017). “Countering terrorism in Bangladesh,” in S. N. Romaniuk, F. Grice, D. Irrera, & S. Webb (eds.), The Palgrave handbook of global counterterrorism policy (pp. 621–​634). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Fowler, A. & Sen, K. (2010). “Embedding the war on terror: State and civil society relations,” Development and Change, 41(1): 1–​27. Front Line Defenders. (2016, May 25). “Bangladesh: Parliamentary body proposes to deregister NGOs commenting against authorities.” www.frontlinedefenders. org/​en/​statement-​report/​bangladesh-​parliamentary-​body-​proposes-​deregister-​ ngos-​commenting-​against Gohel, S. M. (2014). “Bangladesh: An emerging centre for terrorism in Asia,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(3): 1–​4. Green, S. N. & Bayas, L. (2017). “Counter-​terrorism measures: Pretext for closing the space for civil society,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. csis.org/​analysis/​counterterrorism-​measures-​pretext-​closing-​ space-​civil-​society Howell, J. (2014). “The securitisation of NGOs post-​9/​11,” Conflict, Security & Development, 14(2): 151–​179.

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Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2010). Civil society under strain: Counterterrorism policy, civil society and aid post-​9/​11. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. HRW. (2016, October 19). “Bangladesh: New law will choke the civil society.” www.hrw.org/​news/​2016/​10/​19/​bangladesh-​new-​law-​will-​choke-​civil-​society HRW. (2018, December 22). “ ‘Creating panic’: Bangladesh election crackdown on political opponents and critics.” www.hrw.org/​report/​2018/​12/​22/​creating-​panic/​ bangladesh-​election-​crackdown-​political-​opponents-​and-​critics Koo, J. W. & Murdie, A. (2018). “Liberty or security: Do civil society restrictions limit terrorism?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. csis.org/​blogs/​international-​consortium-​closing-​civic-​space/​ liberty-​or-​security-​do-​civil-​society-​restrictions Njoku, E. T. (2020a). “Politics of conviviality? State-​civil society relations within the context of counterterrorism in Nigeria,” VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 31(5): 1063–​1076. Njoku, E. T. (2021a). “Strategic exclusion: The state and the framing of a service delivery role for CSOs in the context of counterterrorism in Nigeria,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 44(5): 410–​430. OHCHR. (2019, July 10). “FATF’s recommendation 8 on non-​ profit organizations: A new tool to unfairly and dangerously shrink civil society space.” ohchr. org/​Documents/​Issues/​Terrorism/​SR/​Submissions/​OMCT_​GA74CT.pdf O’Toole, T., Modood, T., Meer, N., Dehanas, D. N., & Jones, S. H. (2016). “Governing through Prevent? Regulation and contested practice in state–​Muslim engagement,” Sociology, 50(1): 160–​177. Roy, S. (2017). “A year of Bangladesh’s war on terror,” The Diplomat. https://​ thediplomat.com/​2017/​07/​a-​year-​of-​bangladeshs-​war-​on-​terror/​ Sidel, M. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the regulation of civil society in the USA,” Development and Change, 41(2): 293–​312. Skokova, Y., Pape, U., & Krasnopolskaya, I. (2018). “The non-​profit sector in today’s Russia: Between confrontation and co-​optation,” Europe-​Asia Studies, 70: 531–​563. UNSCR. (2014). “United Nations Security Council resolution fact sheet: UN Security Council Resolution 2178 on Foreign Terrorist Fighters.” www.google.com/​url?sa =t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwiD5ZaK5t3oAhUK 3IUKHcosC2MQFjAAegQIBxAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.justice.gov%2 Ffile%2F344501%2Fdownload&usg=AOvVaw1ZRLK_​rlZj8CWz87btqlbK US Department of State. (2017, July 19). “Country reports on terrorism 2016: Bangladesh.” www.refworld.org/​docid/​5981e45113.html US Department of State. (2018, September). “Country reports on terrorism 2017.” www.state.gov/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2019/​04/​crt_​2017.pdf Watson, S., & Burkes, R. (2018). “Regulating NGO funding: Securitizing the political,” International Relations, 32(4): 430–​448.

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Part VI

Closed or closing: security policy and civil society in the Asia-​Pacific region

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Civil society and the security sector in the Philippines after 9/​11: tensions between democracy and homeland security Aries A. Arugay Introduction The Philippines has one of the most vibrant, robust, dynamic, and politically active civil societies in the world (Clarke, 1998). Several cases have proven its efficacy in providing policy inputs, delivering social services, pursuing socio-​economic development, and generating accountability. With its deep affinity with democracy, Filipino civil society1 has become a reliable bulwark against abuses of state power and endemic corruption in government (Lopez & Wui, 1998). Philippine civil society was a product of the country’s struggle against Marcos’ constitutional authoritarian regime from 1972 to 1986. Civil society was significantly shaped by the “dangerous, heady experience of organizing oppressed people under martial law” (Racelis, 2000: 172). Despite these repressive conditions, civil society organizations (CSOs) steadily flourished, extending their networks and incrementally building an infrastructure of political contention against the government. A glaring display of civil society’s power was demonstrated in a grand display of nonviolent collective action, known as the 1986 People Power revolt, which ended Marcos’ dictatorial regime (Thompson, 1995). The 1987 Constitution and subsequent legal instruments provided civil society access to important policy processes. However, the policies and practices of the government that emerged after 9/​11 threatened the agency of CSOs and their earlier successes in their engagement with the state. Specifically, in 2001, the Philippines became a frontline state in the fight against terrorism in Southeast Asia (Radics, 2004). Multiple bombings in urban areas as well as in Mindanao caused the government to take terrorism seriously as a homeland security threat. The links between al-​Qaeda and local secessionist movements such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) became so obvious that the US State Department listed it together with the communist New People’s Army (NPA) as a foreign terrorist

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organization. The Philippine government under Arroyo became a willing member of the US-​led Global War on Terror (Collier, 2006). Thus, the Philippine participation in the Global War on Terror revitalized cooperation with the United States against regional terrorism. However, this relationship has caused an erosion in democracy and civil liberties such as the declaration of emergency rule, extrajudicial killings, and a crackdown on dissent and protest mobilizations (Whitaker, 2007). And while this was justified to defend the homeland, it also was used to safeguard the survival of sitting governments against oppositional elites and their partners in civil society.

Civil society under threat: the establishment of anti-​terrorism laws and the impact on civil society in Philippines For decades, the Philippines has been fighting a Muslim secessionist group in the southern island of Mindanao. It has also the longest running Maoist-​ inspired communist insurgency in the world as the NPA continues to fight a protracted guerrilla war in the countryside. As the Philippine government under the Arroyo presidency strived to maintain peace and security given these homeland security threats, it has become a willing member of the US-​led War on Terror. First, it has deployed its own military forces in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, it has allowed US anti-​terrorism programs to operate in the country’s soil by activating the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement between the two countries. Foreign troops have not been allowed in the country’s territory since 1992 (De Castro, 2003). Third, it has passed wide-​reaching anti-​terrorism policies that made terrorism a grave crime and defined it comprehensively to include not just enemies of the state but possible adversaries of the sitting government, many of whom come from civil society.

The anti-​terrorism framework: the “Human Security” Act of 2007 It was not a surprise that the government was able to pass an anti-​terrorism law. As early as 2003, the Macapagal-​Arroyo administration has promised to enact legislation that will help curb terrorism. What became a surprise is how Republic Act No. 9372 signed on March 6, 2007 was able to be named as the “Human Security Act of 2007.” By being an “An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,” this law provides not only the weapons for the government in general and the security forces in particular in order to sanction acts of terrorism, it also allows the possible

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suppression of previously respected rights and intrusion into the lives and activities of the Filipino people. With the exception of its title, this statute has never again used or mentioned the term “human security.” Furthermore, it also conspicuously did not provide a definition of security. However, it is noteworthy that it stated some principles that are connected to the human security framework. For example, it recognizes that terrorism “requires a comprehensive approach … including conflict management and post-​conflict peace-​building.” This even includes improving “state capacity and promoting equitable economic development.” Finally, the anti-​terrorism law also categorically stated that it shall not “prejudice respect for human rights.”2 For civil society advocates and academics, the title of the law is not just a misnomer but also casts the concept of human security in a negative light. It is very evident that the incorporation of human security in a law that significantly arms the state to combat terrorism has negative implications on the attempt to mainstream this concept. In the end, it also has repercussions on security sector governance in the Philippines. The law did not elaborate on how the government can address the root causes of terrorism and conflict in the country. This could have been the most significant contribution of this legislation to mainstreaming human security in the Philippines. What the law was very clear on is the substantial role given to the security sector in implementing the law and curbing terrorism. While it explicitly stated that the police would be the main implementing institution, this is irreconcilable to existing realities in the Philippines. Internal security remains the purview of the military with the police often playing a secondary or supporting role as they continue to suffer from institutional and resource deficiencies. Among others, this could be seen in the involvement of both the agencies within the Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP) and the Department of National Defence in the Anti-​ Terrorism Council, the primary body created by the law to implement anti-​terrorism policy. Analysts are also examined the power given to the government, particularly the executive branch, in labeling possible organizations as terrorist or conspiring with terrorists (Hilbay, 2007). This is dangerous on two fronts. On the one hand, the current administration (and probably future ones) can use this to stifle dissent, suppress political opponents, or intimidate legitimate organizations. On the other hand, this power to label will open the gate to violation or disrespect for certain rights. The institutional challenges and problems currently faced by the Philippine National Police (PNP) bolstered this argument. One could also imagine that the military would definitely implement the law in areas where the police does not even fully control the peace and order situation such as areas controlled

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by communist insurgents and Muslim separatist movements in Mindanao (Eadie, 2011). Finally, while the law provides for a grievance mechanism and an oversight body in the implementation of the law, it is observed that there is a noteworthy absence of civil society participation or involvement. These functions are totally given to government institutions such as the Ombudsman and Congress. Given the similar institutional challenges, deficits, and transparency gaps of these oversight institutions over the security forces, one can question their ability to carry out effective and strict oversight. The law could have been more inclusive by creating a grievance board, oversight agency, and an evaluation or review mechanism that has a broader composition that includes civil society, media, and the academe.

Insurgents as terrorists: rogue civil society As insurgents are considered as rogue elements of Filipino civil society, the Arroyo government and the AFP have been implementing what is called the National Internal Security Plan (NISP) since 2001. Its details have remained classified but it is in essence the government’s ultimate strategy to defeat insurgency and armed challenges to the Philippine state. Having a comprehensive and holistic perspective, it seeks to address security threats through the promotion of good governance, alleviation of poverty, peace advocacy, and combat operations. This is based on the realization that insurgency as a source of insecurity and under-​or uneven development in the country necessitates a multi-​dimensional approach. The military defeat of insurgent groups for the government is necessary for the country to achieve peace and development (Esperon, 2007). The military component of the NISP, called Bantay Laya (Freedom Watch), actively sought the assistance of state agencies, government institutions at the local level, and even civil society organizations. The NISP is conceived as the government’s ultimate strategy to defeat insurgency and armed challenges to the Philippine state. It is composed of four main components: (1) political, legal, and diplomatic; (2) socio-​economic/​psychological; (3) information; and (4) peace and order/​security. Adopted in 2001, this plan seeks the cooperation and allows the coordination of agencies and institutions within the executive branch, both uniformed and civilian. As having a comprehensive and holistic perspective, it seeks to address security threats through the promotion of good governance, alleviation of poverty, peace advocacy, and combat operations. Bantay Laya’s strategic goal “is to decisively defeat the insurgents’ armed groups in order to obtain and maintain peace for national development.” This goal reflects

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the victory and institutional positions rolled into one, with the logic that victory is necessary for national development to take place (Hernandez, 2005: 15). In some cases, there have been good results in local communities where insurgent activity has dramatically decreased, paving the way for economic development (Arugay, 2008). However, the military’s dominant role in the implementation of the NISP has dangerous ramifications for democratic civilian control. First, the AFP assumed responsibilities that are supposed to be performed by civilian institutions –​executive agencies and local governments –​such as the delivery of basic social services. A military-​oriented campaign against insurgency has allowed the military to carry out developmental functions and take on non-​combat roles. Moreover, this campaign also gives the military a free hand in organizing cooperatives and providing micro-​credit –​a major source of non-​traditional revenue. The above reiterates Howell and Lind’s (2009) argument on the use of military instruments to carry out development projects alongside CSOs in Afghanistan. They assert that such an approach impinges on CSOs’ principles of independence and impartiality while simultaneously presenting risks to CSOs due to perceived ties with the military. Second, the NISP has also provided the military with the framework in dealing with organizations that have indirect relations with rebel movements. The AFP claimed that some civil society groups, non-​governmental organizations, and even party-​list legislators have linkages with the NPA. These front organizations receive foreign aid and public funds that support insurgent activities. Clear evidence to support this has not been provided but what is evident is that these groups are the most vocal critics of the Arroyo administration and the military’s approach to dealing with the communist insurgency. These pieces of information are disseminated to all military units, government agencies, and local communities (Holden, 2011). The loss of key civil society leaders in her cabinet that pushed for a more peaceful resolution to the country’s communist insurgency and separatist movements in Mindanao affected the country’s peace policy. Arroyo pursued a more “military” oriented approach and gave the military a lot of room to design the specific details of her government’s policy against the NPA and the MILF. However, an offshoot of such policy is an increased military autonomy as regards to peace and security policies. This is worrying as the AFP and other members of the security forces assume responsibilities that civilian institutions such as executive agencies and local governments are mandated to perform. By usurping these functions, the security sector veers away from its supposed role and may undermine its professionalism (Arugay, 2012a).

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The impact of counter-​terrorism measures on civil society in Philippines It is not coincidental that this approach to defeating insurgency and fostering security generated collateral damage in the area of human rights observance by the military. It was in the second half of the Arroyo administration that extrajudicial killings of left-​leaning or militant activists, progressive civil society leaders, and journalists occurred. This “crackdown” has caught international attention and even compelled the United Nations to send a special rapporteur, Mr Philip Alston, to visit the country and conduct a fact-​finding mission. Other transnational human rights non-​governmental organizations also followed suit (Human Rights Watch, 2007; Human Rights Now, 2008). Also, international actors such as the European Union also expressed concern over the persecution of members of the press and civil society and the impunity that perpetrators seem to enjoy (Sales, 2009). It was in the year 2006 that the height of extrajudicial killings or involuntary executions was witnessed. Depending on who is counting, the number could range from 250 to 835 people.3 Also, there are individuals that have been abducted or involuntarily disappeared while performing their line of work as activists or journalists. The reports of the UN special rapporteur and the independent commission formed by the government both concluded that the government, particularly the military, is responsible for the majority of these incidents. Not only was this received with denial and discontent from the country’s armed forces, the government is also being made accountable for its inability to bring the perpetrators of these deaths and disappearances under the fold of the law (Holden, 2009). Not included in the extrajudicial killings is a related trend in the Philippines that pertains to the murder of a large number of journalists and media personnel. Whether as news reporters or political commentators, members of the press have been killed with increasing frequency. Reports estimate that, from 2003 to 2006, the number ranged from seven to ten each year.4 Similarly, perpetrators of these executions enjoy a great degree of impunity. In a recent study of the Committee to Protect Journalist (CPJ), the Philippines was ranked sixth in its Impunity Index which calculates the unsolved murders of journalists as a percentage of the country’s population. Interestingly, the countries that received higher ranks are Sri Lanka, Colombia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Iraq (CPJ, 2008). To a large extent, it is not coincidental that the intensified military approach to the insurgency in the Philippines happened side by side with the increase of human rights violations mainly directed against political activists and members of the press. This spate of “extrajudicial killings” reached a record high in 2006. The reports of the UN special rapporteur

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and a fact-​finding body formed by the government both concluded that the military is responsible for the great number of these incidents:

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However, there is certainly evidence pointing the finger of suspicion at some elements and personalities in the armed forces … as responsible for an undetermined number of killings, by allowing, tolerating, and even encouraging the killings. (Melo Commission, 2007: 50)

Despite these findings, the military has categorically denied any involvement and culpability to the multitude of involuntary disappearances unseen since the martial law era. They argued that these executions are the by-​product of internal purges within insurgent groups. A report repudiated this claim and expressed concern over the inability of the AFP and the Arroyo government to differentiate between insurgents, terrorists, and political dissidents (ICG, 2008). By not having enough sensitivity to the critical distinctions, it is likely that insurgent movements which have legitimate political demands are reduced to terrorists that must be crushed immediately. Not only would this approach fail, but it will also increase the “collateral damage” by contributing to more violations of human rights in conflict-​torn communities in the country. In the end, the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of these killings, among others, was a major factor in the downgrade of the Philippines from “free” to “partly free” in the 2007 survey of democracy around the world conducted by Freedom House (Puddington, 2008). The quality of the country’s institutions, specifically those that perform functions related to law enforcement and the rule of law, is a facilitative factor for this wave of extrajudicial killings. Scholars have observed that this “democratic recession” across a so-​called “third wave democracies” is manifested by the struggle to secure freedom and uphold the rule of law. Countries where widespread human rights violations occur often are “blighted by multiple problems of bad governance –​abusive security forces, corrupt and constrained judiciaries, and clientelist parties. Most likely, the root of this phenomena lies on the deficits of its institutions of accountability and the rule of law” (Diamond, 2008). Filipino civil society attempted to resist the crackdown on civil liberties by the Arroyo government. It staged major mobilizations across the country. While previous governments have implemented maximum tolerance, Arroyo commanded the security sector to prevent major protests from happening in the country. For example, permits to stage demonstrations are now the sole prerogative of local mayors in urban centers. Moreover, the police and military have arrested tens of protesters for unlawful assembly. Other civil society actors attempted to challenge the legality of counter-​ terrorism policies in the courts but they also failed to get favorable results.

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From 2008 onwards, civil society actors shifted their energies from resisting the Arroyo government to laying down the infrastructure to prevent her party from winning in the 2010 national elections. The electoral arena was where civil society became effective. With the help of its political allies, CSOs that resisted counter-​terrorism policies in the Philippines also became the catalysts for the political coalition responsible for the victory of the most anti-​Arroyo presidential candidate in the 2010 elections (Arugay, 2017). President Benigno Simeon Aquino won by a landslide and promised to put in place democratic reforms.

Conclusion and prospects This chapter discusses the impact of 9/​11 and the US-​led War on Terror in the Philippines as a small state beset not only by terrorist threats but other homeland security challenges such as insurgency and internal conflict. While insecurity has always been one of the perennial political problems in the country, it became a top concern of the Arroyo administration. By allowing the Philippines to take part in the global campaign against terrorism, the country was further embroiled in insecurity both at the domestic and foreign frontier. As President Arroyo herself was beleaguered in political legitimacy issues, she used terrorism as a convenient alibi to implement draconian policies that stoked violent skirmishes with communist insurgents and Muslim secessionist groups. Furthermore, security policies became the weapon to stifle political dissent, curtail civil liberties, and even persecute political enemies. Leaders of civil society, members of the press, and political activists became victims of a government that prioritized homeland security to the detriment of democracy for its own political survival (Arugay, 2012b). The above speaks to existing debates on how in many hybrid or authoritarian regimes such as Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, Afghanistan, and Nigeria global efforts to defeat terrorism was used as a cover to repress opposition groups, CSOs, and activists critical to states’ policies (Howell & Lind, 2010; Lind & Howell, 2010; Brechenmacher, 2017; Njoku, 2020a, 2020b). Almost two decades after 9/​11, the Philippines continues to grapple with terrorism and other security issues. Under President Rodrigo Duterte, the country is again in a dilemma between democracy and homeland security. His successful campaign was anchored in providing peace and order and finding a permanent and lasting solution to lingering internal conflict. There is increasing evidence to suggest that his government’s reliance on the security sector, just like the Arroyo administration, has securitized governance.

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While pursuing peace with Muslim secessionist groups, Duterte is adamant in implementing a militaristic approach with communist insurgents that are now deemed as enemies of the state. Finally, he has embarked on a bloody yet popular war on drugs that resulted in thousands of extrajudicial killings, mostly from the poor and marginalized sectors of society. As a known defender of the democratic regime, Philippine civil society is expected to resist and mobilize against the erosion of human rights in the name of homeland security. This was observed in their resistance to President Arroyo’s counter-​terrorism policies. However, unlike other forms of resistance by CSOs, through the courts, particularly in countries such as the US, Egypt, and Kenya (Lind & Howell, 2010; Sidel, 2010; Brechenmacher, 2010), CSOs in the Philippines resisted through the ballot. They ensured candidates that do not share similar ideals with them were not re-​elected. However, CSOs are currently weak relative to the highly popular Duterte government and have failed to rally mass support toward social resistance actions. It remains to be seen whether Duterte can succeed in solving insecurity and conflict in the Philippines and whether civil society will become collateral damage in the future. The Philippines is not alone in Asia in facing these kinds of challenges. Civil society is also being undermined in countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In Thailand, the military junta is still in power and has vowed to stifle civil society forces that will challenge the existing political order. Indonesia is currently experiencing a dangerous and illiberal wave of conservatism that is also undermining its growing civil society. With the assent of its own government, more conservative policies have penalized for example homosexuality, free speech, and other political freedoms. As democracy continued to erode worldwide, the recent developments in the Philippines represent a dangerous trend of shrinking civil society space in Asia as a result of putting more premium toward national and homeland security.

Notes 1 Civil society in the Philippines is comprised of a myriad of non-​governmental organizations and people’s organizations. These collective manifestations of Filipino civil society would be integrated with the extant hegemonic power bloc composed of economic elites, transnational actors, and the Catholic Church. In other words, civil society in the country helped uphold a democratic order characterized by moderation, liberalism, and a tolerance to inequality and the oligarchy (Hedman, 2006).

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2 Republic Act No. 9372, “Human Security Act of 2007,” Section 2. 3 The lack of consensus on the actual number of victims is due to limits posed by the definition provided by each group providing the figure. Government accused some CSOs of exaggerating the number of actual extrajudicial killings. 4 Actual figures could be drawn from the websites of the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, the National Union of Journalists in the Philippines, and the Committee to Protect Journalists.

References Arugay, A. A. (2012a). “The military along the security-​ development frontier: Implications for non-​traditional security in the Philippines and Thailand,” NTS-​Asia Research Paper No. 10, Singapore: RSIS Centre for Non-​Traditional Security Studies in Asia. Arugay, A. A. (2012b). “From state to human security: Implications for security sector reform in the Philippines,” in Chantana Banparasichote, Philippe Doneys, Mike Hayes, and Chandan Sengupta (eds.), Mainstreaming human security: Asia perspectives (pp. 30–​44). Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University. Arugay, A. A. (2017). “The Philippines in 2016: The electoral earthquake and its aftershocks,” in Daljit Singh and Malcolm Cook (eds.), Southeast Asia affairs 2017 (pp. 277–​296). Singapore: ISEAS-​Yusof Ishak Institute. Brechenmacher, S. (2017). Civil society under assault: Repression and responses in Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Massachusetts: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Clarke, G. (1998). The politics of NGOs in southeast Asia: Participation and protest in the Philippines. London: Routledge. Collier, K. (2006). “Terrorism: Evolving regional alliances and state failure in Mindanao,” in D. Singh & L. C. Salazar (eds.), Southeast Asian affairs 2006 (pp. 26–​38). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists) (2008). “Getting away with murder.” https://​ cpj.org/​reports/​2008/​04/​getting-​away-​with-​murder/​ De Castro, R. C. (2003). “The revitalized Philippine-​ US security relations: A ghost from the Cold War or an alliance for the 21st century?” Asian Survey, 43(6): 971–​988. Diamond, Larry (2008). “The democratic rollback: The resurgence of the predatory state,” Foreign Affairs, March–​April. Eadie, P. (2011). “Legislating for terrorism: The Philippines’ Human Security Act 2007,” Journal of Terrorism Research 2(3): 24–​33. Esperon, H. C. (2007). “Progress in counter-​terrorism: The Philippine experience,” paper delivered at the 6th Shangri-​la Dialogue organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies held in Singapore. Hedman, E. L. (2006). In the name of civil society: From free election movements to people power in the Philippines. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

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Hernandez, C. G. (2005). “Institutional responses to armed conflict: The armed forces of the Philippines,” background paper for the Philippine Human Development Report 2005: Peace, Human Security, and Human Development in the Philippines, Manila: Human Development Network, 1–​33. Hilbay, F. (2007, July 15). “RA9371 will make our rights insecure,” Philippine Daily Inquirer. Holden, W. N. (2009). “Ashes from the Phoenix: State terrorism and the party-​list groups in the Philippines,” Contemporary Politics, 15(4): 377–​393. Holden, W. N. (2011). “Neoliberalism and state terrorism in the Philippines: The fingerprints of Phoenix,” Critical Studies in Terrorism, 4(3): 331–​350. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2009). “Manufacturing civil society and the limits of legitimacy: Aid, security and civil society after 9/​11 in Afghanistan,” European Journal of Development Research, 21: 718–​736. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2010). Civil society under strain: Counter-​terrorism policy, civil society and aid post 9/​11. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. Human Rights Now. (2008). “Report on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the Philippines,” Tokyo, Japan. Human Rights Watch. (2007). Scared silent: Impunity for extrajudicial killings in the Philippines. New York: Human Rights Watch. ICG (International Crisis Group) (2008). “The Philippines: Counter-​insurgency vs. counterterrorism in Mindanao,” Asia Report No. 152, Jakarta: ICG. Lind, J. & Howell, J. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the politics of aid: Civil society responses in Kenya,” Development and Change, 41(2): 335–​353. Lopez, M. G. S. & Wui, M. A. (eds.). (1998). Philippine democracy agenda, volume 2: State-​civil society relations in policy-​making. Quezon City: Third World Studies Center. Melo Commission. (2007). “Report of the independent fact-​finding commission to address media and activist killings,” Administrative Order 157. Njoku, E. T. (2020a). “Politics of conviviality? State-​civil society relations within the context of counter-​terrorism in Nigeria,” Voluntas: International of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 31(5): 1063–​1076. Njoku, E. T. (2020b). “Investigating the intersections between counter-​terrorism and NGOs in Nigeria: Development practice in conflict-​affected areas,” Development in Practice, 30(4): 501–​512. Puddington, A. (2008). “Freedom in retreat: Is the tide turning?” Findings of freedom in the world 2008. New York: Freedom House. Racelis, M. (2000). “New visions and strong actions: Civil society in the Philippines,” in Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers (eds.), Funding virtue: Civil society aid and democracy promotion (pp. 159–​187). Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Radics, G. B. (2004). “Terrorism in southeast Asia: Balikatan exercises in the Philippines and the US ‘war against terrorism’,” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, 4(2): 115–​127.

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Sales, P. M. (2009). “State terror in the Philippines: The Alston report, human rights and counter-​insurgency under the Arroyo administration,” Contemporary Politics, 15(3): 321–​336. Sidel, M. (2010). “Counter-​terrorism and the regulation of civil society in the USA,” Development and Change, 41(2): 293–​312. Thompson, M. R. (1995). The anti-​Marcos struggle: Personalistic rule and democratic transition in the Philippines. New Haven: Yale University Press. Whitaker, B. E. (2007). “Exporting the Patriot Act? Democracy and the ‘war on terror’ in the third world,” Third World Quarterly, 28(5): 1017–​1032.

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Securitization of aid and counter-​terrorism in Indonesia Senia Febrica

Introduction The 9/​11 attacks marked the return of the securitization of aid. After 9/​11 donors began to discuss concerns about “security spill-​ overs” and the risks of developing countries becoming safe havens for terrorist (Brown & Gravingholt, 2016: 1). Foreign donors’ focus on Indonesia progressed rapidly as the US Defense Department affirmed Southeast Asia as a crucial front in the War on Terror (WoT). The Principal Director for South and Southeast Asia in the US Department of Defense, Marine Brig. Gen. John Toolan, suggested that to win the fight against terrorism, Southeast Asia “has emerged quietly, but it is a crucial front in the long war” (US Department of Defense, 2007). Under this circumstance, the cooperation of Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia, with almost 90 percent of its population of 210 million being Muslim, was deemed crucial to ensure the success of the US WoT campaign. Donor countries such as the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom began to link their development assistance with counter-​terrorism efforts. This chapter will explain the securitization of aid in Indonesia, its impacts, and the responses of civil society.

Foreign aid and counter-​terrorism in Indonesia After 9/​11, the 2002 bombings in Bali that killed 202 people including 88 Australians, and subsequent bombings between 2003 and 2005, a major change took place in donor countries’ discourses and policies in delivering development aid in Indonesia. Donor countries such as Australia, the UK, and the US began to use development aid as an instrument of diplomacy to reduce poverty, halt radicalism, and undermine anti-​Western sentiment that has been on the rise following the Afghanistan and Iraq wars (see Schiller, 2012). Although poverty is not necessarily linked to terrorism, aid

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for poverty reduction “can help to deny radical groups the opportunity to gain support through charitable endeavours” (Schiller, 2012: 92). Indonesia is the fifth largest country with concentrated poor population in the world (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015: 5). Foreign aid is deemed useful to fill the void of Indonesia’s low coverage of a social safety net (Schiller, 2012: 92). For instance, in the fight against terrorism in Indonesia donor states implement “whole-​of government approaches” that integrate policy across departments or ministries (see Brown & Gravingholt, 2016: 2). The UK government decision to include the Department for International Development (DFID) in the National Security Council, for instance, shows the clear linkages between the country’s aid and security objectives (Wild & Elhawary, 2016: 46). The UK aid policy discourse highlights that promoting development can build peace, and building peace requires collaboration across development, defense, and diplomacy (Wild & Elhawary, 2016: 46). Furthermore, in 2001, Australia, regarded as the largest foreign aid donor to Indonesia with an annual average of Official Development Assistance (ODA) of AU$320 million for the first time, categorized the counter-​terrorism aid to Indonesia as part of the ODA (Howell & Lind, 2009: 1284; Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015: 3). The Australian parliament pointed out that “building on the links established through … joint investigations” of terrorist attacks in Indonesia, “cooperation now involves wide-​ ranging cooperation including” in the area “of Australian aid” (Australian Parliament, 2010: 18). The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade highlights that as part of Australia’s aid program to Indonesia, Canberra works “in an economic partnership, supporting Indonesia’s efforts to tackle inequality … and counter violent extremism” (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018). Australia’s Aid Investment Plan in Indonesia also states that the Australian government supports works that are “important to promoting stability and prosperity in the region, will support … shared interests in counter-​ terrorism, transnational crime” (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015: 5). Another example of the linking of development assistance with security, particularly counter-​terrorism by donor states, can be found in the US. The US government has been implementing various measures to identify, monitor, and counter support for Islamic terrorism through its intelligence agencies, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (US General Accounting Office, 2005: 11 as cited in Sudarman & Febrica 2017: 142). USAID became more engaged in the US counter-​terrorism efforts in various countries including Indonesia after the 9/​11 Commission reported to

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Congress that the population of the largest recipients of US foreign aid expressed very strong anti-​ American sentiment (Sudarman & Febrica, 2017: 144). USAID then established the State-​USAID Policy Council and a public diplomacy working group to improve the publicity of the US government humanitarian and aid programs in 2004 (Epstein & Mages, October 31, 2005: 2 as cited in Sudarman & Febrica, 2017: 144). The linking of development assistance with security facilitated the securitization of aid and civil society organizations (CSOs) (Howell & Lind, 2009). The securitization of aid changes the dynamics of donors and Indonesian civil society interactions. To secure better cooperation with the Indonesian government in counter-​terrorism foreign donors have increasingly “coordinated their aid programs with the Indonesian government and moved away from the civil society support” (Aspinall, 2010: 21 as cited in Mietzner, 2012: 219–​220). The Indonesian government, as pointed out by Mietzner, has discouraged donors from working with CSOs and asked them instead to provide funding directly to state agencies (Mietzner, 2012: 220). This request was made in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration. The Declaration is seen as a triumph of recipient countries in their relations with donor countries (Virgianita, 2018: 56). Under the Paris declaration donor countries are required to “link funding to a single framework of conditions … derived from” the recipient countries’ national development strategy, and use recipient countries’ “own institutions and systems” to “provide assurance that aid will be used for agreed purposes” (OECD, 2005: 3–​4). The declaration defined that a recipient country’s own “systems and procedures include, but are not restricted to, national arrangements and procedures for public financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring” (OECD, 2005: 4). On January 12, 2009 the Indonesian government issued an aid implementation roadmap for development partners, namely the “Jakarta Commitment: Aid for Development Effectiveness” (UNDP, 2009). The “Jakarta Commitment” has been adopted by twenty-​six development partners. This document stated that the Indonesian government “will articulate, and development partners will support the achievement of, capacity development objectives and targets within sector plans and thematic strategies” (UNDP, 2009: 2). It requires development partners to “align themselves more fully with the government programmes and systems” (UNDP, 2009: 2). Keen to secure Jakarta’s full cooperation in the war against terrorism and maintain good political and economic relations most foreign donors have accepted the terms set by the “Jakarta Commitment” (see Mietzner, 2012: 220). Consequently, donors are currently working more closely with the Indonesian government, rather than CSOs. However, donors have

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expressed difficulties in dealing with the Indonesian government due to the lack of coordination between the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Planning Agency. The above is due to the time consuming bureaucracy; and the general lack of consensus between governmental agencies regarding principles and aims (Edi & Setianingtias, 2007: 18). Even prior to the introduction of the “Jakarta Commitment” foreign donors have avoided any possible conflict with the Indonesian government. Mietzner claimed that the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) “has instructed its employees to shun politically sensitive activities” (Mietzner, 2012: 220). The AusAID program is designed to be aligned with Indonesian government systems (Tapp, 2011: 10). Tapp reported that in 2011 over 30 percent of the AusAID development aid was funded directly through the Indonesian government budget system and 20 percent of it uses Jakarta’s procurement systems (Tapp, 2011: 10). In 2013 the proportion of aid that was funded through the Indonesian government budget system increased to 40 percent (Tapp, 2011: 10).

Securitization of aid in Indonesia: phases and key features When the US began its WoT campaign in 2001 Indonesia was in the process of democratic transition. This puts Indonesia not only at the crux of the global campaign to win the hearts and minds of people in the WoT but also as a possible example that democracy can succeed in a Muslim-​majority country. During the early stages of the WoT in Indonesia, especially from 2001 to 2004, securitization of aid has led to two key developments. These are: first, the burgeoning of development programs aimed to promote “moderate” Islam in Indonesia, and second, the proliferation of donor countries’ support for good governance reform in Indonesia. First, in terms of the promotion of moderate Islam in Indonesia, AusAID, USAID, and the UK DFID have administered a remarkable array of counter-​ radicalism and outreach programs to Muslims (US Department of State, 2002; Bullock, 2005; United States Government Accountability Office, 2006; USAID, 2006; Antara, 2009; Higgins, 2009; Tapp, 2011). Counter-​ radicalism and outreach programs administered by donors are designed to involve well-​known religious figures, Islamic organizations, Islamic scholars, and Islamic boarding schools (madrasahs) (Febrica, 2010). In Indonesia the US DoS and USAID play an active role in delivering aid and public diplomacy in general (see Sudarman & Febrica, 2017: 144). The US DoS and USAID have implemented a range of aid programs including the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Muslim World Outreach, and the

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South Asia Regional Programmes to improve US image in Muslim countries (Sudarman & Febrica, 2017: 142). At the USAID Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid Public Meeting on May 25, 2005, Ann Phillips, Senior Political Economist, Policy and Program Coordination Bureau of USAID, pointed out that “USAID has worked in predominantly Muslim countries for years, but recognises that it does not know everything about them” (USAID, 2005: 20–​21). Therefore, “to better understand the dynamics including grievances, at work in many of these societies … USAID, US government agencies, and the US NGO community must expand their circle of partners and interlocutors in the Muslim world in order to reach broader segments of those societies” (USAID, 2005: 20–​21). For this purpose, after 9/​11 in order to “amplify the voice of moderates” in Indonesia, the US sent hundreds of Indonesian clerics to undertake courses that “taught reform-​ minded reading of the Koran,” funded the publication of a handbook for preachers that offered tips on what to preach, and expanded its aid to support Islamic education and mainstream institutions (Higgins, 2009; Aglionby, 2006). Since 2004 Australia through its Learning Assistance Program for Islamic Schools, has provided strong support to Islamic schools in Indonesia (Tapp, 2011: 16). In 2011 this program sought to support 1,500 private Islamic schools to improve the quality of Islamic education, and achieve national accreditation. Tapp highlighted that assistance from Australia to Islamic schools, the majority of which are located in the poorest part of Indonesia, will “reduce dependency on external funding, such as that coming from the Middle East” (Tapp, 2011: 16). AusAID also works closely with Islamic based civil society beyond improving education quality in Islamic schools. The Australian government’s partnerships with Indonesia’s mainstream Islamic CSOs were integrated into the existing aid program and new activities were developed (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005: 68). In 2004–​2005 funding for Islamic organizations totaled AUD$7.5 million (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005: 68). The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade reported that some of these fundings were allocated to implement the Learning Assistance Program for Islamic Schools, co-​host the International Dialogue on Interfaith Cooperation in Yogyakarta in December 2004, support the people’s Voter Education Network (Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih untuk Rakyat), and assist Aisyiyah, the wormen’s arms of Muhammadiyah (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005: 68). The securitization of UK aid is reflected in the allocation of development aid for counter-​terrorism purposes, including those that are aimed to promote moderate Islam. Most of the DFID counter-​terrorism programs

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involved not only the Indonesian government but also civil society. UK DFID sponsored programs include, for example, programs to tackle radicalization and extremism in Indonesia, reform Indonesia’s prisons to minimize conditions enabling the spread of violent extremism, and equip police operating at community level to recognize violent extremism. In regards to the promotion of moderate Islam in Indonesia, DFID had sponsored programs to enhance Islamic education standards in Islamic schools and universities, support Islamic schools in Indonesia to promote human rights, and initiate dialogue on moderate Islam through exchanges between British and Indonesian Muslim educational practitioners, teachers, academics, and young activists to counter extremism and radicalism. The securitization of aid in Indonesia also led to the proliferation of donor countries’ support for CSOs’ work in promoting governance reform in Indonesia. Governance reform includes programs aimed “at institution building, securing human rights, reducing corruption, judicial reform and other measures for improving law and order” (Edi & Setianingtias, 2007: 3). The success of governance reforms especially in corruption reduction, judicial and law and order reform, are crucial to strengthen Indonesia’s capacity to capture and prosecute terrorists. This could be seen from the proliferation of donors’ projects in Indonesia’s governance reform from 2000 to 2005 (see Edi & Setianingtias, 2007). The increase of projects and donor agencies’ growing contributions on governance reform is important because during this period major terrorist attacks took place in Indonesia including the 2002 bombings in Bali, a bomb attack against the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003, a car bomb outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004, and the second Bali bombings in 2005. The number of funded projects during this period for governance reform increased by more than 30 percent, from thirty-​five funded projects in 2000 to 127 projects in 2005 (Edi & Setianingtias, 2007: 9). In 2000 there were twelve foreign donor agencies providing assistance for governance reform in Indonesia and by 2005 this number had grown to eighteen agencies (Edi & Setianingtias, 2007: 9). Sectors of governance reform that received most aid from donors were civil service reform, anti-​corruption, decentralization, and law and legal reform. These top four sectors of governance reform achieved 56.5 percent of projects funded by donors (Edi & Setianingtias, 2007: 9). In comparison, the empowerment of CSOs, media and democracy, gender equality, human rights, and parliamentary reform received far less attention. Empowerment of CSOs only accounted for 7.5 percent of the total number of projects supported by donors, whereas media and democracy made up merely 5 percent of funded programs (Edi & Setianingtias, 2007: 9). Human rights and parliamentary reform received an even smaller

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proportion of funding, as each of these sectors only gained 1 percent out of the total aid (Edi & Setianingtias, 2007: 9). The focus on strengthening government and judiciary reform were seen as priorities as they were deemed as most useful to enable Indonesia to deter, detect, and prosecute terrorists (Backwell, 2004).

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Implications and responses from civil society In Indonesia donor countries mainly “provided financial support rather than expertise, training, or capacity building” assistance to civil society (Virgianita, 2018: 56). As explained in the previous section donors’ growing focus on counter-​terrorism has led them to invest more funds in the promotion of moderate Islam in Indonesia. As a result donors allocate less support for CSOs working in the area of democratic consolidation, including those that focus on security sector reform, voters’ education, and election monitoring. For instance, Tapp’s (2011) report to the panel conducting the independent review of AusAID’s effectiveness, concluded that Australia’s attitude toward democracy and the use of aid in support of CSOs in Indonesia is deemed ambivalent (Tapp, 2011: 18). He pointed out that “AusAID needs to assess both its views on the funding of democracy and also how it seeks to make use of civil society in the programme” (Tapp, 2011: 18). Although democracy remains a major focus for the Indonesian people, and some parts of the government would welcome Australia’s support in this sector, however, Australia’s focus on efforts to combat radicalism and terrorism seem to outweigh concerns over impediments to democracy (Tapp, 2011: 18). To quote Tapp: It is unclear whether AusAID sees civil society as an important actor in generating demand for better governance, as an advocate and monitor, or as a provider of service delivery. Civil society can be all of these, but AusAID does not yet have any clarity in its position in any of areas and civil society is mostly supported in a somewhat ad-​hoc manner in individual sector.

The change in the relations between donors and civil society posed challenges to the activities of Indonesian CSOs that focus on democratic reform, some of whom rely on international assistance to fund their programs (Aspinall, 2010; Virgianita, 2018: 56). Elections monitoring and voters’ education were among the key activities funded by donors since the end of the Suharto authoritarian regime in 1998 (see Virgianita, 2018: 56). For Indonesian CSOs the lack of funding brings negative implications. As noted by a leader of a CSO, “budget constraints had reduced the level of cooperation and their ability to carry out regular meetings, mobilise a network,

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and coordination with other organisations” (Virgianita, 2018: 56). Others suggested that each CSO now focuses on its own initiatives and does not put cooperation with others as a key aspect of its program (Virgianita, 2018: 56). The lack of donor support also badly affected security sector reform in Indonesia. After 1998 donor countries such as the US, UK, and Australia provided generous financial assistance for civil society focusing on human rights based security sector reform. These CSOs have been active in promoting reform agenda in Indonesia’s security sector, reformulating and proposing a range of legislation in the security sector, and encouraging transparency and monitoring of the implementation of state security policies (Maakarim, 2009 in Bhakti, 2009: iv). As donors shifted their priorities not much support has been given to improve security reform in Indonesia. A former leader of a CSO focusing on security sector reform claimed that in recent years there has been a lack of funding from foreign donors to support civil society working on security sector reform in Indonesia.1 After the 9/​11 attacks and the 2002 bombings in Bali concerns over Indonesian intelligence and security agencies’ transparency or their behavior toward human rights protection is no longer a key priority for donor countries. As Friedman pointed out, in the post-​9/​11 era, donor countries such as the US “let the war on terror supplant democracy promotion as their top foreign policy priority” (Friedman, 2015). In response to the new security environment Indonesian CSOs have done what they can to adapt. CSOs focusing on domestic election monitoring, for instance, managed to reduce their reliance on assistance from donor countries. In order to adapt some individual organizations reduced their activities due to financial constraints, and others are forming coalitions or networks to pool resources or generate funding (see Virgianita, 2018: 59). According to Virgianita, the coalition of CSOs working on elections monitoring “have been finding financial resources, and no longer rely on international assistance” (Virgianita, 2018: 59). Despite facing a decline of support from donor countries CSOs in Indonesia have been resilient in facing financial constraints, and have exposed and undermined numerous attempts by conservative elements within Indonesia to roll back democratic reforms (see Aspinall, 2010: 33; Mietzner, 2012: 221). As an example, a strong opposition from civil society has successfully prevented the attempts to undermine the effectiveness of the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission. Since the establishment of the Commission in 2002 until 2013, it has made 385 arrests –​one-​third of which have been politicians –​and won guilty verdicts in all 236 cases it has fought (Reuters, 2013). In 2009, Indonesia’s Minister for Communication and Information, Tifatul Sembiring, and anti-​reformist legislators proposed

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to amend the anti-​corruption legislation in order to limit the Corruption Eradication Commission’s wire-​ tapping powers (Mietzner, 2012: 214; Reuters, 2013). This amendment proposal was revoked due to strong opposition from civil society, and public outcry (Mietzner, 2012: 214; Reuters, 2013). In 2011, the Indonesian parliament proposed another change to the anti-​corruption act that would reduce the legal penalties for corruption from four years’ imprisonment to one year (Saenong, 2011). Due to the strong opposition from civil society the draft was not passed as legislation (Saenong, 2011). Although CSOs have had some success in opposing anti-​reformist forces in Indonesia, there is a crucial need for donors’ support to strengthen civil society in Indonesia. Indonesia still faces a number of challenges that may lead the country into democracy recession if not full democratic roll-​back. In recent years we have witnessed increased vigilantism, regression of minority rights, and stagnation in security reform. Paramilitary and gangster groups that have flourished in the post-​authoritarian Indonesia do not hesitate to use violence to advance their objectives. A number of groups including the Islamic People’s Forum (Forum Umat Islam), the Indonesian Muslim Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia), the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam), Hizbut-​Tahrir Indonesia, and the Islamic Reformist Movement (Gerakan Islam Reformis) have participated or supported attacks against minorities (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Setara Institute reported that from 2010 to 2012 there were 724 cases of violent attacks on religious minorities in Indonesia (Setara Institute, January 20, 2012 as cited in Human Rights Watch, 2013). The above discussion shows stagnation and setback in Indonesia’s democratization. Currently, “strengthening civil society remains the best option to protect democratic achievements” in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2012: 224). Donors’ securitization of aid and the decline of support for civil society that follows has halted Indonesia’s democratic consolidation (see Aspinall, 2010: 32–​34; Mietzner, 2012: 224).

Conclusion This chapter shows that the global WoT has changed the interactions between Indonesian CSOs and donor countries. After 9/​11 donor countries changed their discourses and policies in delivering their development aid in third world countries, including Indonesia. The securitization of aid in Indonesia can be observed from the changes in discourses, and aid flows. From 2001 to 2004 the securitization of aid in Indonesia shows two key features: first, the increase in support for the promotion of “moderate”

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Islam; and, second, the proliferation of governance reform programs. In terms of donor countries’ programs to promote “moderate” Islam in Indonesia development agencies such as AusAID, USAID, and the UK DFID have administered an array of counter-​radicalism and outreach programs to Muslims in Indonesia. Counter-​ radicalism and outreach programs administered by donors are designed to involve well-​known religious figures; Islamic CSOs, Islamic scholars, and Islamic boarding schools. Although democracy remains a major focus for the Indonesian civil society, and civil society in Indonesia would very much welcome donor countries’ assistance in this sector, however, donor countries’ –​such as the US, Australia, and the UK –​focus on counter-​terrorism seem to outweigh their concern over impediment to democracy. The changes in donors’ policies bring negative implications to the activities of Indonesian CSOs that focus on democratic reform. Budget constraints led to a reduction in the ability of some CSOs to carry out day-​to-​day functions, including regular meetings, coordination with other elements of civil society, or mobilize their networks. This is relevant to other conclusions by scholars in diverse countries, particularly in conflict-​affected areas. For instance, in Afghanistan, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Egypt, donors are re-​ directing their aid to CSOs through their respective governments due to fear of criminal liabilities of the laws of the countries. Government officials in aid-​recipient states have, in turn, distributed foreign aid strategically by favoring co-​operative CSOs or those that are not critical of the state (Howell & Lind, 2009; Dupuy et al., 2015; Brechenmacher, 2017; Njoku, 2020a). In response to the changes in the new security environment Indonesian CSOs have adapted either by reducing their activities or forming coalitions or networks to pool resources or generate funding. Indonesian CSOs have been resilient in facing the challenges. Despite the decline in international assistance CSOs, together with the media, have had some successes in preventing the roll-​back of democracy in Indonesia. This finds relevance in Njoku’s (2021b) argument that, in Nigeria, the change in donor perceptions of CSOs, and the increased counter-​terrorism regulations, forced CSOs to close operations or form alliances with bigger organizations. Democracy in Indonesia, however, continues to face the challenge of increased vigilantism, abuses against minority groups, and stagnation in security sector reform. Under these circumstances, there is still a pressing need to strengthen Indonesian civil society. The securitization of aid, however, brings the opposite result. Donors’ change of policies toward a young democracy such as Indonesia contributes to stalling democratic consolidation in this country.

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Note 1 Interview with a former leader of a CSO focusing on security sector reform, Jakarta, August 25, 2015.

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Edi, J. & Setianingtias, A. (2007). “Donor proliferation and donor coordination in Indonesia: The case of governance reform,” paper prepared for the Centre for the Future State, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. www2.ids. ac.uk/​gdr/​cfs/​pdfs/​Donor%20proliferation%20and%20coordination%20in%20 Indonesia%20-​%20Gov%20Reform.pdf Febrica, S. (2010). “Securitizing terrorism in southeast Asia: Accounting for the varying responses of Indonesia and Singapore,” Asian Survey, 50(3): 569–​590. Friedman, T. L. (2015, February 18). “Democracy is in recession,” New York Times. www.nytimes.com/​2015/​02/​18/​opinion/​thomas-​friedman-​democracy-​is-​ in-​recession.html Higgins, A. (2009, October 25). “As Indonesia debates Islam’s role, US stays out: Post-​9/​11 to boost moderates gives way,” The Washington Post. Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2009). “Changing donor policy and practice in civil society in the post-​9/​11 aid context,” Third World Quarterly, 30(7): 1279–​1296. Human Rights Watch. (2013, February 28). “In religion’s name: Abuses against religious minorities in Indonesia.” www.hrw.org/​report/​2013/​02/​28/​religions-​name/​ abuses-​against-​religious-​minorities-​indonesia Mietzner, M. (2012). “Indonesia’s democratic stagnation: Anti-​reformist elites and resilient civil society,” Democratization, 19(2): 209–​229. Njoku, E. T. (2021b). “The State and the Securitization of Civil Society Organizations in Nigeria,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 1–26, doi. org/10.1177/08997640211003256. OECD. (2005). The Paris declaration on aid effectiveness and the Accra agenda for action. www.oecd.org/​dac/​effectiveness/​34428351.pdf Reuters. (2013, November 18). “Special report: Indonesia’s graftbusters battle the establishment.” www.reuters.com/​article/​us-​indonesia-​graftbusters-​ specialreport/​special-​report-​indonesias-​graftbusters-​battle-​the-​establishment-​ idUSBRE9AG00V20131118 Saenong, I. B. (2011, July 22). “Manager of anti-​corruption information center, Transparency International Indonesia report: Indonesian NGOs protest an unnecessary revision of anti-​corruption laws.” http://​blog.transparency.org/​2011/​07/​ 22/​indonesian-​ngos-​protest-​an-​unnecessary-​revision-​of-​anti-​corruption-​laws/​ Schiller, A. (2012). “Can foreign aid be an instrument of counter-​ terrorism? Exploring Australian aid to Indonesia,” PhD thesis, University of South Australia. http://​search.ror.unisa.edu.au/​record/​UNISA_​ALMA11146593240001831 Sudarman, S. & Febrica, S. (2017). “Psychological warfare: US paramilitary operations in Indonesia and Iraq,” in S. N. Romaniuk & F. Grice (eds.), The future of US warfare (pp. 137–​158). Abingdon: Routledge. Tapp, C. (2011). “Study of Australia’s approach to aid in Indonesia.” www. aidreview.gov.au/​publications/​study-​indonesia.doc United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2009, January 12). “Jakarta commitment: Aid for development effectiveness.” http://​mdtf.undp.org/​document/ ​download/​9714

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United States Government Accountability Office. (2006, May). “U.S. public diplomacy: State Department efforts to engage Muslim audiences lack certain communication elements and face significant challenges.” www.gao.gov/​new.items/​ d06535.pdf USAID. (2005). Advisory Committee on Voluntary Aid Public Meeting, May 25. www.usaid.gov/​sites/​default/​files/​052505_​fullreport.pdf USAID. (2006, March 31). “USAID Indonesia press release: Indonesian Islamic leaders to gather in Washington to discuss and strengthen U.S.-​Indonesian relations.” http://​indonesia.usaid.gov/​en/​Article.116.aspx US Department of Defense (DoD). (2007, April 11). “DoD news briefing with Brig. Gen. John Toolan from the Pentagon.” www.defenselink.mil/​transcripts/​transcript. aspx?transcriptid=3927, 15 January 2015. US Department of State. (2002, June 27). “New program to introduce Islamic school leaders to U.S. system,” State Department Fact Sheet. www.america.gov/​st/ ​washfileenglish/​2002/​June/​[email protected] Virgianita, A. (2018). “Donors, government and society in Indonesia’s democratic elections,” Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, 36: 51–​62. Wild, L. & Elhawary, S. (2016). “The UK’s approach to linking development and security: Assessing policy and practice,” in The securitization of foreign aid (pp. 42–​63). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Conclusion: counter-​terrorism as insecurity Emeka Thaddues Njoku and Scott N. Romaniuk

The post-​9/​11 counter-​terrorism policy facilitated a rising global backlash on civil society organizations (CSOs), which is precariously transforming the structure and character of CSOs. After the 9/​11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent establishment of counter-​terrorism measures (CTMs), scholarship has been directed at the impact of these policies on human rights and civil liberties. However, in almost two decades, there is a growing number of studies on the intersections between counter-​ terrorism policy and CSOs in different regions of the world. Despite these research works, there is no theoretical framework that can help us understand the dynamics of CTMs. Scholars have attributed this difficulty to the context-​ specific nature of the impact of counter-​terrorism on CSOs, particularly the nature of the government and civil society in the country, its historical trajectory of state–​civil society relations, the foreign relations of the state and a host of other circumstances (Howell & Lind, 2010a, 2010b). Hence, Van der Borgh and Terwindt (2012: 1066) assert that “to understand the actual impact of these restrictions (CTMs) on NGOs, it is important to distinguish between the very different challenges and threats that specific CSOs are facing in different political contexts and the way in which these affect their operations.” Thus, this book set out to analyze the legacies of the post-​9/​11 global war on terror, underscoring the impact of the counter-​terrorism policy it produces on the operationality of CSOs. It examines countries that have been understudied despite their having one of the most repressive CTMs. It also re-​examines other countries, while documenting unique issues that have emerged over the years as a result of the increasing pressures of counter-​ terrorism policy on CSOs, which was not captured by previous works. The book is also concerned about how CSOs made sense of and reacted to these new government’s security measures. We discovered from the contribution of authors specific underlying themes that illuminate states’ increasing constraints and exploitation of civil society organization in the Americas, East and Western Europe, South East Asia, MENA, and the Sub-​Saharan region.

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Thus, in this concluding chapter, we re-​examine these themes highlighted in the introduction as way of summarizing the importance of the discoveries of this book in aiding our thoughts on the intersections between CTMs and CSOs in various parts of the world.

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The diverse manifestations of counter-​terrorism laws and policies Skoczylis and Andrew termed UK CTMs as “ghost security” because they are illusionary, broad and discretionary, as the government failed to address the root causes of insecurity. Hence, these laws created more problems. For instance, newly established laws such as the Justice and Security Act of 2013, the Counter-​Terrorism and Security Act of 2015, privileges aggressive style enforcement, expands state powers, and erodes civil liberty. The implementation of counter-​terrorism influenced the emergence of new laws, such as the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-​Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 –​or the Lobbying Act. On the surface, the law seems not to have a connection with terrorism but is used by state actors to silence charities critical of government policies. Furthermore, the UK’s CONTEST counter-​ terrorism policy has been criticized because it marginalizes and treats Muslim groups as suspect communities. The laws and policies are entrenching identity politics and charities are forced to support it or risked being labeled unpatriotic. Through speech acts, political actors created and ingrained a “state of exception,” where particular groups (in this case Muslim communities) are seen as synonymous with terrorism or at best contributing to its growth. This creates “group consciousness” among the British people and an “us” versus “them” narrative. Thus, the UK is creating a relatively false state of fear and insecurity that turn groups against one another. Similarly, in France, Priya Sara Mathews and Richard McNeil-​Willson argue that counter-​terrorism policies were established and sustained around race, religion, and criminality. Specifically, the state associated Muslim communities and religious ideology with criminality. The above further exposes the inherent institutional racial bias of minority groups in France. In the name of security, the French established counter-​terrorism policies by advancing the narratives that French values and societies were under threat from Muslims who are driven by their jihadist objective of establishing a global caliphate. Thus, securitizing a whole community due to their religious beliefs. In the United States, drawing parallels between pre-​9/​11 and post-​9/​11 security regimes, William Taylor illustrates how national security structures contribute to advancing democratic principles, human rights, and civil

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liberties or facilitate its decline. In other words, the former signaled an era of associational growth and the latter saw an increase in the closing of civic space by state actors in the name of countering terrorism. Thus, Taylor provided clarity on the extent of the impact of counter-​terrorism policy on the operational capacities of non-​profit organizations (NPOs) in the US. Explicitly, 9/​11 transformed US security infrastructure. Some NPOs were labeled terrorist financiers due to the narrative that NPOs are channels for terrorist funds, a situation facilitating the securitization of NPOs in the US and altering state–​NPO relations. Perhaps the Russian case represents one of the most repressive counter-​ terrorism policies in Europe. Henderson, Romaniuk, and Novikau explain that the decline in the engagement of civil society in counter-​terrorism issues has deeply impinged on the capacity of security agents to function optimally in addressing terrorism and reinforces mutual suspicions in state–​civil society relations in the country. In the Americas, the WoT provided a new discursive framework for political actors to tap into in addressing internal security challenges such as violence by guerrillas and drug lords. However, using the narrative of counter-​terrorism to curb internal threats further posed new challenges to CSOs, as with other countries, it gave the state the leverage to repress organizations unsupportive of government policies. Camila de Macedo Braga and Ana Maura Tomesani explain how the Brazilian government established the 2016 anti-​terrorism law and other security measures as part of global efforts to curb terrorism and specifically inherent security threats in parts of the state. However, the terrorism law was so broad that it defines, for instance, xenophobia or discrimination based on sex, color, ethnicity, and religion as terrorism. Many CSOs in Brazil have been vocal in resisting the ambiguous laws raising fears that counter-​terrorism laws criminalize political expression and assembly. In Colombia, the global urgency to curb terrorist movements following the 9/​11 terrorist attacks in the US provided an opportunity for the government to amplify its voice for support to curb guerrilla and insurgent movements causing havoc in the political trajectory of the country. Consequently, in 2002, President Alvaro Uribe established the Democratic Security Policy (DSP) to curb the violence. The policy, which his predecessor Juan Manuel Santos also adopted, was effective in curbing the activities of insurgent groups, particularly the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), and forced them into peace negotiations. However, the policy was also used to target and repress CSOs in the state and political opponents. Perhaps the repressive style of counter-​terrorism enforcement is characteristic of political actors in Southeast Asia and in the MENA region, where hybrid and authoritarian regimes domesticated international

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counter-​terrorism resolutions to consolidate power in their respective states. In other words, CTMs became an instrument for illiberal political leaders to repress political opponents or human rights activists or groups critical to state policies. For instance, Aries A. Arugay explains how the Philippines prides itself on having vibrant CSOs, following its political trajectory characterized by intense political contestations and the defeat of dictatorship. However, the post-​9/​11 counter-​terrorism environment increasingly altered the success of democratic consolidation in the country and led to the attrition of civil liberties. The state established the Human Security Act in 2007. The laws were projected as efforts by the government to secure the state and the people from the proliferation of terrorism, but in reality, it was used to crackdown on CSOs and credible opposition. In Pakistan and Egypt, Zoha Waseem and Bassant Hassib documented how security situations prepared fertile ground for the domestication and enforcement of government post-​9/​11 global counter-​terrorism laws, policies, and institutions from advanced Western countries to flourish. In Pakistan, many of the secular CSOs critical of state policies were a key target for the state’s repression. Moreover, organizations suspected to be associated with militant groups in the country faced an increased level of state cruelty. Similarly, in Egypt, the state went after foreign-​funded human rights organizations by freezing their assets and finances, imposing travel bans, and carrying out smear campaigns by depicting them as terrorist beneficiaries. Comparably, in Indonesia, the 9/​11 terrorist attacks and the 2002 Bali bombings led to the securitization of aid, as international development agencies began to change or rethink their relations with CSOs in the country. The aforesaid was predicated on the idea that Indonesia could become a haven for terrorist groups if appropriate measures were not put in place to address institutional weakness and governance challenges. First, foreign donors began to pay more attention to Muslim groups and promote programs of moderate Islam. Furthermore, they worked with the state to initiate programs on anti-​corruption and reforms in the judiciary and police. However, foreign donors ignored CSOs focusing on democracy consolidation, and human rights and civil liberties. In Sub-​Saharan African countries, such as Nigeria and Kenya, Oscar Gakuo Mwangi and Olajide O. Akanji use case studies of specific CSOs to highlight the impact of CTMs. For instance, the challenges of Boko Haram and later the Islamic State of West African Province (ISAWP) terrorism led many CSOs to be involved in mitigating the effects of terrorism through capacity building, technical assistance, and tactical efforts to defeat terrorist groups. However, CSOs have faced an increasing level of government regulations on their operational space despite their contributions in addressing

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terrorism. Many political advocacy groups were key targets of government repression. A good example is the Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG) movement advocating for the return of the Chibok girls kidnapped by Boko Haram and the rights of women in counter-​terrorism operations. However, these groups have come under government repression as a way of silencing their international advocacy on the lackadaisical approach of the government in protecting the rights of vulnerable women and girls in counter-​terrorism operations. Furthermore, non-​state actors such as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) emerged to assist government security tactically in defeating terrorism. However, there has also been a rise in government antagonism due to the lack of synergy in counter-​terrorism operations. Similarly, in Kenya, Oscar Gakuo Mwangi examined the impact of CTMs on CSOs with a focus on the MUHURI and the HAKI Africa CSOs. These organizations are primary advocates for the rights of Islamist groups and demanded transparency and accountability in the enforcement of CTMs. However, the state considered MUHURI and the HAKI Africa as national security threats and subsequently listed these organizations and other human rights organizations as supporters of terrorism in Kenya. Their corporate banks accounts were frozen, government security agents raided their offices and seized their documents. Moreover, these organizations faced all manner of administrative-​legal harassments due to their being listed as terrorist groups. One fundamental approach of the state’s repression of CSOs in the context of counter-​terrorism is the limitation of access to information by controlling or manipulating the communication infrastructures. This gives the state the power to control public knowledge on counter-​terrorism (Njoku, 2020a). Andrew David and Scott N. Romaniuk’s study of the effects of CTMs in Uganda elaborates on these increasing tactics by state actors. Under the guise of curbing the rise of terrorism, most notably the Lord’s Resistance Army, President Yoweri Museveni used the counter-​terrorism laws to go after credible opposition and CSOs critical to state’s polices. Since the anti-​terrorism laws were established in 2002, other laws and policies have also been formed to consolidate extant terrorism laws. For instance, the 2013 Uganda Communication Act is one of such laws reinforcing restrictions of CSOs’ access to information and spaces for political dialogue and socialization. Museveni’s government also used the law to control the media effectively. In terms of responses of CSOs to CTMs, the contributions of the book aid in validating and advancing extant discourses on the diverse ways CSOs responded to counter-​terrorism. Specifically, while many CSOs were supportive of these measures, as we have seen in France and Pakistan, others were antagonistic, as we have seen in Brazil, Kenya, human rights

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Emeka Thaddues Njoku and Scott N. Romaniuk

313

communities in the US, and secular groups in the case of Pakistan. In the book, another underlying theme not also captured in the literature is the rise of non-​state actors in counter-​terrorism enforcement, or what we term combative CSOs. Oliver Lewis highlighted that non-​state counter-​terrorism efforts manifest in several ways but are all aimed at resisting or fighting back against terrorist groups and the fear they try to create and nurture in public. For instance, resistance can come in the form of an individual family member reporting a radicalized member to state authorities, media organizations’ usage of their platforms to project messages and visual images on the benefits of curbing terrorism or the danger it poses to society. The media can also be used to spread information on the whereabouts of a known terrorist group. Resistance can also come in the form of repelling the fears that terrorist groups aim at creating in the minds of the populace and thus influence their behavior and ultimately the polity. Perhaps another excellent example of non-​state actors’ resistance of terrorist groups is in the Nigerian case, where the rise of Boko Haram and ISWAP terrorist acts saw the emergence of the CJTF. The CJTF emerged, arguably, as a result of the discontent, frustration, and anger over the destruction of lives and properties by Boko Haram and ISWAP. The community members in the northeast of the country formed a vigilante group or combative group supporting the Nigerian security agencies in counter-​terrorism operations in the region. Moreover, CSOs have also resisted repressive counter-​terrorism and CTMs through the ballot box as captured by Arugay in the case of the Philippines. Many CSOs were, however, unsuccessful in challenging repressive CTMs in the law courts and re-​strategized by supporting candidates who shared similar ideals. They succeeded in removing President Arroyo by facilitating a coalition of opposition presidential candidates. Thus, securing victory for President Benigo Simeon Aquino in the 2010 national elections. The importance of context regarding the intersection between CSOs and counter-​terrorism laws, policies, and measures cannot be overemphasized, as it helps to unravel the various ways in which counter-​terrorism efforts have manifested. Contributors to this book have shown how their respective states’ socio-​political, economic, and cultural terrain influenced the enforcement CTMs, underscoring how it impacts on the spaces and actors of CSOs. Thus, this book justifies furthering critical debate and empirical research on the significance of untangling the many façades of the post-​9/​11 global CTMs.

References Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2010a). “Securing the world and challenging civil society: Before and after the ‘war on terror,’ ” Development and Change, 41(2): 279–​291.

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Howell, J. & Lind, J. (eds.). (2010b). Civil society under strain: Counter-​terrorism policy, civil society and aid post-​9/​11. Sterling: Kumarian Press. Njoku, E. T. (2020a). “Politics of conviviality? State-​civil society relations within the context of counter-​terrorism in Nigeria,” VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 31(5): 1063–​1076. Van der Borgh, C. & Terwindt, C. (2012). “Shrinking operational space of NGOs: A framework of analysis,’ ” Development in Practice, 22(8): 1065–​1081.

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Index

Abou-​Elmaati, Ahmad 65 accountability 5, 69, 80, 145, 146, 198, 207, 209, 211, 218, 283, 289, 312 Afghanistan 14, 23, 56, 155, 168, 182, 236, 257, 284, 287, 290, 295, 304 African Union (AU) 198, 205 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 204 Aka Mono Jojoy 103 Akanji, Olajide O. 311 al-​Din Ali, Hossam 246 Algeria 38, 65, 68, 127, 129, 130, 173 Algerian National Liberation Front (NLF) 128 al-​Hafiz Tayel, Abd 246 al-​Maqdis, Ansar Beit 242 al-​Marayati, Salam 59 Al Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence 246 al-​Qaeda (AQ) 17, 52, 65, 68, 71, 162, 163, 206, 242, 257, 259, 271, 272, 283 Al-​Shabaab 205, 206, 207, 209, 210 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 57, 59 American Muslim communities 56 Amnesty International 24, 65, 151, 247 Andrews, Sam 8 Anglosphere 137 anti-​civil society 177 anti-​corruption 300, 303

anti-​CSO 167, 172 Anti-​Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law 175/​2018 244 anti-​fascism 119 anti-​Islamophobia 137 Anti-​Money Laundering Act, 2009 205 Anti-​Money Laundering Act, 2013 219, 226, 228 anti-​monument 37 anti-​Muslim 52, 205 anti-​Russian organizations 144 anti-​terror legislation 129 Anti-​Terrorism Act (ATA) 62, 63, 64, 68, 219, 220, 221, 226, 255, 256, 269, 271 Anti-​Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 1996 50 Anti-​Terrorism Assistance Program 205, 263, 272 Anti-​Terrorism Bill in 2006 205 Antiterrorism Police Unit (ATPU) 208 Anti-​Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-​ Based Charities 51 Arab Centre for the Independence of Judiciary and Legal Profession (ACIJLP) 237 Arabic Network for Human Rights (ANHR) 246 Arab-​Muslim communities 23 Arab Organization for Penal Reform (AOPR) project 245

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316 Argentina 82 Argomaniz, J. 163 Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP) 97, 285, 286, 287, 289 Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) 170 Army Public School (APS) 255, 257, 262, 263 Arrubla, Jaime 101 Arugay, Aries A. 9, 311 #aCEUvalVagyok 171 #IstandwithCEU 171 Ashcroft, John 54 Australia 6, 7, 183, 274, 295, 296, 299, 301, 302, 304 Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) 298, 299, 301, 304 Authoritarian Curse, The 100 authoritarian regimes 23, 24, 25, 26, 181, 248, 275, 283, 290, 310 autocratic states 14 Axis of Evil 23 Aziz, S. F. 56 Bahgat, Hossam 246 Ballot box 9 Balzacq, T. 112 bandwagoned effect 82 Bangladesh counter-​terrorism and anti-​terror activities 269 CSOs 270, 277 CTMs 273, 274, 275, 276 emergence of CTMs 270, 271, 272 Financial Action Task Force 269 foreign-​funded CSOs 270 media freedom and security 277 Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2009 269 political polarization 276 Bantay Laya (Freedom Watch) 286 Barakat, Hisham 242 Baron, Barnett F. 50

Index Bataclan attacks 130, 133 Bejarano, Ramiro 101 Belgium 22, 170 Benedek, W. 180 Berbers communities 128 Berda, Yael 27 Berezovsky, Boris 145 Besigye, Kiza 223 Betancur, Belisario 98 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali 256 Bill C-​25 (Canada Business Corporations Act) 64 Bill C-​36 (Anti-​Terrorism Act) 63 Bill C-​51 (Anti-​Terrorism Act) 68, 69, 70 Bill C-​59 (Liberal Party of Canada) 70 bin Laden, Osama 260 the Black Bloc 241 Bloodgood, E. A. 6 Blunkett, David 16 Bogotá 37, 101, 103 Boko Haram 9, 192, 193, 196, 197, 198, 199, 311, 313 Bolotnaya 12 154 boomerang effect 27 Borno State Youth Empowerment Schemes (BOYES) 197 Braga, Camila 310 Brazil 4, 80, 81, 310, 312 Anti-​Money Laundering Act 82 Antiterrorism Act, 2016 89 bandwagoned effect 82 Bretton Woods systems 78 case of Rio de Janeiro 89 civil society organizations 79, 80 critical scholars 76 global security framework 77 Human Rights organizations 84 in domestic agendas, policies and practices 81 international development agenda 85, 87, 88, 89 internationalization of public policy 81 long-​war formulation 78 macrosecuritization 76, 82

713

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Index mano dura (tough on crime) policies 89 new global security framework 78–​80 NGOs 80 non-​transparent/​regularized financial systems 82 Official Development Assistance 81 Organization and Management of the ‘New Model’ Pacification Programme 79 PL 5065/​2016 and PL 272/​2016 84 poor and non-​democratic spaces 79 post-​9/​11 security environment 80 Primeiro Comando da Capital 83 series of interlocking programs 80 social engineering 78 SSR Programs, 2004–​2014 86 state policy and practice 90 terrorism 80 ungoverned areas 90 US government operations, Central America and Vietnam 79 War on Drugs 81 xenophobia/​discrimination 84 Brechenmacher, S. 56, 59 Bretton Woods systems 78 Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG) movement 9, 191, 196, 198, 199, 200, 312 Britain’s Terrorism Act 2000 15 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 24, 152, 245 British civil society 109 Buhari, Muhammadu 193, 194 Burke, Edmund 34 Bush Doctrine 51 Bush, George W. 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 143, 155, 219 Cabinet Office, The 22 Cabinet Secretary (CS) 209 CagePrisoners 24 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) 246

317

Cambodia 291 Canada Canada Revenue Agency 62 CTMs 63 global-​local engagement phase 67–​71 Rapid Engagement Phase 63–​67 Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy 62 Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) 62 Canadian Bar Association (CBA) 63, 69, 70 Canadian Council on American-​Islamic Relations (CAIR-​CAN) 66 Canadian Criminal Code, 2014 66 Canadian Muslim Lawyers’ Association (CMLA) 69 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 68, 70 Cano, Alfonso 103 Carthage Film Festival 32 CCTV networks 20 Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) 209 Central Broadcasting Service (CBS) 221 Central European University (CEU) 171 Centre for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance (CEWLA) 246 Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular 102 Chalabi network 130, 136 charities 5, 8, 24, 50, 53, 54, 55, 63, 64, 66, 82, 111, 161, 182, 196, 242, 309 Charities Registration (Security Information) Act 62 Charlie Hebdo attack 132, 135 Chief of Army Staff (COAS) 193 Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI) 220 China 24, 247 chuzadas 100 citadelization 21 Citizen Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CEDU) 222

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318

Index

Civil Contingency Act, 2004 111 civil liberties 2, 3, 21, 33, 57, 68, 109, 111, 133, 161, 165, 219, 255, 284, 289, 290, 308, 310, 311 civil society organizations (CSOs) 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 53, 66, 84, 88, 102, 147, 148, 149, 151, 161, 162, 163, 165, 168, 169, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 191, 195, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 247, 248, 269, 270, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 283, 287, 291, 297, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313 civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) 8, 191, 192, 197, 198, 312, 313 civil-​military regime 82 Clinton, Hillary R. 55 Collacott, M. 67 Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France (CCIF) 24, 137 Collins, Audrey B. 57 Colombia Cold War in Western hemisphere 93 democratic security policy and civil society 99, 100, 101, 102, 103 post 9/​11 period 94, 104 security policies 96, 97, 98, 99 war on drugs 93 weak civil society 94, 95, 96 Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) 37, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, 102, 103, 310 colonialism 13, 27, 127 Comando Vermelho (CV) 83 Comisión Colombiana de Juristas 102 Comité Interamericano contra el Terrorismo (CICTE) 81 Comité Permanente por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos en Colombia 102

Committee to Protect Journalist (CPJ) 288 Conference on Public Security (CONSEG) 88, 89, 90 Conseil National des Musulmans Canadiens (CNMC) 66 Conservative Party 67 CONTEST Strategy 15, 16, 22, 112, 115, 116, 117, 134, 164, 309 conveyor belt of radicalization 17 conveyor belt theory 17, 18 Copts for Egypt 241 Copts for Elections 241 Coronell, Daniel 101 corruption 82, 146, 177, 178, 194, 225, 283, 300, 303, 311 Council on American-​Islamic relations (CAIR) 66 Council Working Group on Terrorism (TWG) 163 counter-​extremism measures 24 countering violent extremism (CVE) 56, 59, 179, 195, 205, 207, 208, 211, 212 counter-​insurgency 79, 93, 96, 97, 99, 100, 103 counter-​jihad 19 counter-​terror experience 22 Counter-​Terrorism Act, 2008 110 Counter-​Terrorism and Border Security Bill, 2018 111 Counter-​Terrorism and Security Act, 2015 110, 309 counter-​terrorism architectures articulations of colonial violence 27 contemporary political science 27 democratic states 26 direct legacy of international colonialism 27 “far colonialism” 27 swathes of contemporary research 26 trading counter-​terrorism and counter-​extremism practice 26 Counter-​Terrorism Law 94/​2015 243 counter-​terrorism measures (CTMs) 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 54, 57,

913

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Index 63, 64, 66, 161, 165, 179, 180, 191, 205, 207, 208, 213, 248, 258, 259, 261, 262, 265, 269, 270, 274, 275, 308, 309, 311, 312, 313 counter-​terrorism policy emerging vs. established democracies 6, 7 identity consciousness and politics 4, 5 immediate and protracted effects of CTMs 6 neo-​patrimonial relationship 5 smear campaigns 4 vagueness of 4 WoT 3 Counterterrorism Unit (CTU) 173 Counter-​Terrorist Working Group (COTER) 163 Cour de Sûreté de l’État (State Security Court) 129 Crimean Tatar communities 25 Criminal Code Offences 64 criminality 81, 88, 90, 134, 135, 309 cyberterrorism 244, 247 Cyprus 110 Daase, C. 180 Davies, C. 62 Dean, Christopher 17 defense, diplomacy and development (3Ds) 53, 55 Deflem, M. 49, 57 de Kerchove, Gilles 25 de Menezes, Jean Charles 26 Democratic Security Policy (DSP) 93, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 310 democratic states 6, 7, 16, 27, 51, 155 Denmark 26, 133, 170 Department for International Development (DFID) 296, 298, 299, 300, 304 Department of Defense (DoD) 296 Department of National Intelligence (DAS) 101 Department of State (DoS) 296, 298

319

de-​politicization 18 de-​radicalization 118, 134, 195 de-​sorosization 181 Diab, Hasan 70 Dima Yakovlev law 150 Dimitrijević, V. 180 Direction de la surveillance du territoire (DST) 136 Dogara, Yakubu 198 Donetsk People’s Republic 38 Duffield, Mark 81 DusitD2 Complex attack 205 Duterte, Rodrigo 290 Eagle, Angela 111 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 195 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 194 Egypt 4, 182, 183, 191, 274, 290, 291, 304, 311 Al-​Sisi’s regime 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248 CSOs 233, 248 post-​2011 political and security developments 238, 239, 240, 241 securitization 248 upgrading authoritarianism 249 War on Terror post 9/​11 234, 235, 236, 237 Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) 237, 238, 246, 247 Eissa, Ibrahim 236 Elhawary, S. 97, 100 El Sheikh, Sharm 242 El Shobaky, Amr 242 Emergency Law 162/​1958 235 Environmental Conference Rio +20 83 Erdogan regime 25 ERG22+ study 18 Erjavec, Karl 166 Ethiopia 8, 182, 183, 191, 248, 274, 290, 304 Etidal 245 EU28 economies 22 European Commission 16, 160

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320

Index

European Union (EU) 191, 288 Central and Eastern Europe 162 counter-​terrorism and security policies 161, 162–​166 CSO 180, 181, 182, 183 fundamental rights and civil liberties 161 impact of CTMs 180 Law Enforcement Cooperation 160 Maalbeek metro station 160 political actors and experts 160 Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania 161 terrorist attacks 161 Europe-​wide arrest warrant (EAW) 163 Evaluation of Anti-​Money Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL) 165, 182 extra-​judicial killings 13, 27, 284, 288, 289, 291 extremism 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 59, 67, 71, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 137, 152, 154, 165, 173, 179, 206, 243, 245, 296, 300 Facebook 223, 238, 247 faulty inferences 32, 33 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 66 Federal District Court of Manhattan 57 Federal Law No.121-​FZ in 2012 148 Federal Law No.18-​FZ in 2006 148 Federal Security Service (FSB) 152 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 261 Feldstein, Steven 56, 59 Fidesz party 171 Filipino civil society 283 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 1, 58, 82, 89, 165, 182, 235, 242, 244, 269 FinFisher 220 For God and My President: State Surveillance in Uganda 220 Forcese, Craig 69 Ford Foundation 53

Foreign Agent Law, 2012 148 foreign agents 143, 147, 151, 152, 153, 168, 170, 172, 175, 179, 181, 182 Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act, 2016 270 foreign funding 4, 58, 175, 181, 182, 237, 238, 239, 241, 243, 245, 246, 248, 270, 273 foreign influence 153, 175, 181, 182 Foreign Policy Concept, 2008 156 Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) 272 Forum for African Women Educationists (FAWE) 226 Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) 223 Foucault, M. 27, 113 Fővárosi Ítélőtábla (Budapest Court of Appeals) 170 Fowler, Alan 7, 53, 54 France 5, 8, 22, 34, 71, 85, 119, 170, 194, 199, 309, 312 civil society 135–​138 current security paradigm 131–​134 early security laws 129–​131 French Muslims 127 Islamic terrorism 138 racism and Islamophobia 127 religion and criminality 134–​135 repressive security 135–​138 WoT 138 Freedom House: Freedom in the World Report, 2017 133 Freedom House, and International Centre for Journalists (ICFJ) 239 Friedman, Mikhail 145 Front islamique du salut (FIS) 65 Frontex 160 Fuller, William P. 50 Garissa University attack of 2015 205 general politics 113 Germany 15, 22, 85, 136, 166, 170, 194, 199 Ghafoor, Asif 262

123

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Index Ghost Security, UK civil society 117 counter-​terrorism policies 115–​117 far-​right and environmental protestors 117–​119 legal and policy context 110–​112 prima facie 119 primary political identity 120 securitization 120 security politics 112–​115 spectacle 120 Glasgow city airport 15 Global Institute for Security Studies (GLISS) 226 Global Non-​Profit Coalition on Financial Action Task Force 58 Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) 85 Global War on Terror (GWoT) 49, 63, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 88, 89, 93, 96, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 204, 206, 208, 209, 213, 258, 284 Brazil see Brazil Goodstein, L. 55 Government Actions in Terror Environments (GATE) 71 government’s de-​radicalisation programme 118 Green Party 68 Groupes Islamiques Armée (GIA) 65, 130 Gruevski, Nikola 181 Gunning, J. 16 HAKI Africa 204, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 312 Hallsworth, S. 21 Hamburg Cell 15 Harkat, Mohamed 65 Harper, Stephen 65 Harper, Steven 69 Hasina, Sheikh 270 Hassib, Bassant 311 határvédelmi kerítés 170 Henderson, Scott N. 310

321

Henry Jackson Society 18, 24 Heydemann, Steven 249 Hezbollah 38, 83, 242 Hizbut-​Tahrir Britain 18 Hizbut-​Tahrir Indonesia 303 Holy Land Foundation (HLF) 54, 55, 66 Homeland Security Act, 2002 51 Howell, J. 1, 3, 6, 7, 26, 54, 95, 96, 256, 265 human rights 2, 4, 8, 18, 24, 58, 63, 65, 71, 79, 88, 94, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102, 129, 136, 137, 146, 148, 150, 151, 153, 161, 165, 172, 175, 181, 194, 204, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 216, 219, 223, 228, 234, 238, 239, 241, 242, 244, 246, 247, 248, 258, 262, 272, 273, 274, 276, 285, 288, 289, 291, 300, 308, 309, 311, 312, 313 Human Rights Act, 1998 111 Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum (HRAPF) 226 Human Rights Network for Journalists Uganda (HRFJU) 226 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 25, 101, 133, 136, 137, 151, 154, 243, 272, 273, 274, 275 Human Security Act of 2007 284, 285, 286 human trafficking 167 Hungary 152, 161, 162, 166, 169, 173, 174, 175, 179, 180, 181, 182 national security 170 state-​civil society interplay 170, 171, 172 Hussein, Ed 18 hybrid regimes 8 Iddi Amin Dada 218 identitarianism 119 Iguarán, Mario 101 Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation 111 India 7

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322

Index

Indonesia 291, 301, 302, 303 after 9/​11 303 civil society 301, 302, 303, 304 CSOs 304 democracy 304 foreign aid and counter-​terrorism 295, 296, 297, 298 “moderate” Muslim 304 securitization of aid 298, 299, 300, 301 “security spill-​overs” 295 Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission 302 Indonesian Muslim Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia) 303 Inspector-​General of Police (IGP) 209, 210, 212 Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) 62 Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 50 International Center for Not-​for-​Profit Law (ICNL) 52 International Criminal Court (ICC) 101 International Federation for Human Rights (IFHR) 272 International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy (IRFAN-​ Canada) 66, 67 International Republican Institution (IRI) 152, 239 internationalization of public policy 81 Investigatory Powers Act, 2016 110 Ipsos Reid survey 68 Iranian mullah Mohammad Tabataei Einaki 83 Iraq 14, 23, 38, 56, 113, 155, 156, 160, 168, 236, 271, 284, 288, 295 Irish 110 ISIS 68, 160, 162, 242, 271 Islamic caliphate 5 Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam) 303 Islamic People’s Forum (Forum Umat Islam) 303

Islamic Reformist Movement (Gerakan Islam Reformis) 303 Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) 67 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 160, 207, 272 Islamic State of West African Province (ISAWP) 9, 192, 311, 313 Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) 196 Islamic terrorism 127, 131, 138, 162, 296 Islamism 8, 204, 206, 207, 208 Islamophobia 127, 132, 138 Israel 7, 22, 25, 26, 38, 120, 234, 236 Israel Aerospace Industries 23 Israel-​Argentina Mutual Association (AMIA) 83 Iván Duque Márquez 37 Jackson, R. 16 Jakarta Commitment 297, 298 Jameson, B. 111 Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih untuk Rakyat 299 Jarvis, L. 16 Jatoi, Shahrukh 263, 264, 265 Jihadi-​Salafi movement 206 jihadism 135, 136 Joint Task Force (JTF) 193, 197 Jonathan, Goodluck 193 Justiça Global 87 Justice and Security Act, 2013 309 Kamal El Ganzouri 239 Kashmiri Canadian Council/​Kashmiri Relief Fund of Canada (KCC/​ KRFC) 67 Kazakhstan 24 Kenya 4, 24, 110, 182, 183, 213, 248, 265, 274, 275, 290, 291, 304, 311, 312 MUHURI and HAKI Africa 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213 pre-​and post-​9/​11 counter-​terrorism frameworks 204, 205, 206 Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) 206

323

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Index Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) 210, 211 Khalil Meek 55 Khan, Shahzeb 263 Khodorkovsky, Mikhail 145 Komer, Robert W. 79 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) 239 Koo, Jeong-​Woo 275 Korean War 96 Kosovo 38 Kovach, G. C. 55 Közép-​európai Egyetem (KEE) 171 Kremlin 144, 145, 147, 152, 153 Kyrgyzstan 8, 147 Lafer, Celso 82 La France tu l’aimes ou tu la quittes 132 laïcité 129 Lake Chad region 194 Lal Masjid 257, 262 Lancero School, 1955 96 Lasmar, Jorge Mascarenhas 77 Latin America 79, 81, 83, 94, 95, 97 Lavovi (Lions) 180 Law on NGOs 70/​2017 244 Lea, J. 21 Levant 38, 160 Lewis, Oliver 3 Liberal Party of Canada 63, 67, 70 Lind, J. 1, 3, 6, 7, 26, 265 Liviu Pleşoianu 177 Lloyd Report 110 Lloyd, Monica 17 Lobbying Act, 2014 111, 309 Local Area Networks (LAN) 220 Lord’s Resistant Army/​Movement (LRA/​M) 219 Luis Ignacio 82 Maalbeek metro station 160 MacFarquhar, N. 54 Macron, Emmanuel 133, 194 Magnitsky Act 150 Malaysia 110 Marche pour l’ègalité et contre le racism 128

323

Marrero, Victor 57 Martin, Paul 62 Maulana Abdul Aziz 257, 261, 262, 263, 265 May, Theresa 16, 194 Mayer, Sharaz 18 McDonough, S. 49, 57 McLellan, Anne 63 Media Regulation Law 92/​2016 244 Mehsud, Naqeebullah 261 Merkel, Angela 194 Meryam Joobeur (film) 32 Metodija Patce 180 Metropolitan Police 22, 26 Mexico 51 migrációs válság (migrant crisis) 170 military detention 13 Millennium Challenge Corporation 51 Miller, D. 18 Ministry of Interior (MoI) 235, 247 Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS) 235, 239 Molano, Alfredo 101 Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act, 2012 195 Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (MENAFATF) 235 Money Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA) 269 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 283, 287 Morris, Hollman 101 Morro de Santa Marta, 2008 85 Movement Tvrdokorni (Hard Liners) 180 Mpeketoni attacks of 2014 205 Murdie, Amanda 275 Museveni, Yoweri 216, 223, 312 Muslim Association of Canada (MAC) 67 Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 234, 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245 Muslim communities 5, 8, 19, 21, 82, 115, 116, 127, 131, 207, 208, 274, 309

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324

Index

Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND) 24, 137 Muslim Public Affairs Council 59 Muslims 4, 5, 7, 17, 19, 21, 24, 25, 54, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, 82, 112, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 138, 164, 182, 204, 205, 206, 207, 260, 274, 284, 286, 290, 291, 295, 298, 299, 304, 309, 311 Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 312 Mwangi, Oscar Gakuo 311 Mwesigye, Asiimwe 219 National Action Plan (NAP) 258 National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) 66, 69 National Council on Public Security (CONASP) 88, 89, 90 National Counter Terrorism Security Office 22 National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST) 195 National Cyber Security Strategy 112 National Democratic Institute (NDI) 152, 239 National Intelligence Service (NIS) 206 National Internal Security Plan (NISP) 258, 286, 287 National Liberation Army (ELN) 94 National Offender Management Service (NOMS) 17 National Planning Agency 298 National Police Chiefs’ Council 22 National Police Service (NPS) 206, 210 National Resistance Movement (NRM) 216, 224 National Salvation Front 241 national security 19, 22, 50, 51, 53, 56, 57, 58, 70, 77, 79, 83, 89, 109, 144, 151, 152, 153, 161, 166, 168, 171, 173, 175, 178, 204, 206, 207, 216, 233, 238, 245,

248, 256, 258, 259, 260, 275, 309, 312 National Security Act, 1947 51 National Security Agency (NSA) 51 National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) 70 National Security Capability Review 112 National Security Concept, 2009 156 National Security Doctrine 97, 98 National Security Strategy (NSS) 51, 81, 112, 167 national values 127, 135 Natsios, Andrew S. 51, 53 Navalny, Alexei 154 Nawaz, Maajid 18 negacionismo politics 77 Neocleous, M. 118 neo-​liberal Quilliam 24 neo-​patrimonial state-​CSOs relations 5 Nepokor (Ubowed) 180 Netherlands 22, 170 New Democrat Party (NDP) 68 New People’s Army (NPA) 284, 287 new terrorism 13, 21, 22, 25, 131 NGO Law 148, 171, 181 Nigeria 8, 9, 24, 182, 196, 241, 248, 265, 274, 275, 290, 304, 311 BBOG movement 200 Boko Haram 193 civil society activism 192, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200 COAS 193 counter-​terrorism policies 191 CSOs 191 ECOWAS 194 EFCC 195 Joint Task Force 193 military and non-​military approaches 192, 193 Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act 2012 195 ONSA 195 US and UK 194 war on terrorism 196, 197, 198, 199, 200

523

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Index Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) 195 Nisar, Chaudhry 260 Njoku, E. T. 26, 241, 304 non-​authorized acts 39 non-​combatant immunity 37 non-​democratic states 6, 7, 26, 27 Non-​Disclosure of Information–​Canada Evidence Act 64 Non-​Governmental Organization Act, 2016 227 non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) 18, 24, 54, 79, 80, 82, 84, 87, 88, 89, 95, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 146, 177, 178, 180, 196, 217, 218, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 274, 308 Non-​Governmental Organizations Act, 2016 219, 225, 228 Non-​Governmental Organizations Regulations, 2017 219, 225, 227, 228 Non-​Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act, 2014 309 nonprofit organizations (NPOs) 147, 310 non-​state counter-​terrorism definition, counter-​terrorism 34, 36 definition, non-​state 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 definition, terrorism 34 formal conceptualizations 32 Meryam Joobeur (film) 32 political violence 42 pseudo-​counter-​terrorism 42 social role 42 state of the art 33 state officials 42 typologies 41 use of violence and threats of violence 40 veritable 40 non-​states actors (NSAs) 3, 9, 313 North Macedonia 179, 180

325

Northern Cyprus 38 Northern Ireland 14, 22, 27, 110, 130 Novikau, Aliaksandr 310 NTEST Strategy 109 Obama, Barack 55, 56 Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA) 195 Official Development Assistance (ODA) 81, 85, 88, 296 Olympic Games, 2016 77 ONG por la Transparencia 102 Open Society Foundations (OSF) 175 Operation Chrysanthemum 130, 136 Operation Linda Nchi 204 organised crime 110, 111 Organization and Management of the ‘New Model’ Pacification Programme 79 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 71, 81 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 144 Othering minorities 19 pacification policy 76, 79, 90 pacification programs 77 Pakhtunkhwa, Khyber 261 Pakistan 5, 63, 67, 68, 168, 311, 312 civil society 255 contemporary CTMs and practices 258, 259, 260 counter-​terrorism structures 263, 264 CTMs 265 extremism 262, 263 NAP 255 national security 256 Pashtun Tahafuz Movement 265 pre-​ and post-​9/​11 265 securitization of civil society 260, 261, 262 security environment, 1970s–​2000 256, 257

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326

Index

Palantir 26 Palermo Convention 194 Palestine 14, 27, 66, 110 Palestine Liberation Organization 38 Paraguay 82 paramilitary operations 38 Paris Declaration, 2005 297 Parson, N. 111 Partner Vetting System 53 Pashteen, Manzoor 261 Pashtun Protection Movement 261 Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) 261, 262 Patriot Act 54, 57 Pavlensky, Pyotr Andreyevich 154 Peace and Security for Development (PSD) 177, 208 peacebuilding 168 Penal Code Act, 2013 221, 222 People Power revolt, 1986 283 Philippine National Police (PNP) 285 Philippines 9, 311, 313 anti-​terrorism laws and impact 284 challenges 291 CTMs on civil society 288, 289, 290 Duterte, Rodrigo 290, 291 Filipino civil society 283 Global War on Terror 284 the Human Security Act of 2007 284, 285, 286 hybrid/​authoritarian regimes 290 MILF 283 People Power revolt 283 rogue civil society 286, 287 US-​led War on Terror 290 Plan Colombia policy 93, 97, 98, 99 Plan Lazo 97 plan vigipirate 129, 130 police databases 20, 26 POL-​INTEL 26 political activity 151, 172 political geography 33 political regime 155 political sociology 33 political violence 26, 34, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 136, 256

Pollara Strategic Insights for CBC 68 Polo Democrático Alternativo parties 101 post-​9/​11 counter-​terrorism policy 7, 8 Ballot box 9 international advocacy and physical combat 8 repressive 8 post-​9/​11 global security regime 78, 85 Post-​Communist Countries 6 post-​emotional society 3 Pour Nicolas Sarkozy (si certains n’aiment pas la France, qu’ils ne se genent pas pour la quitter) 132 pre-​crime arrests 13, 26, 27 pre-​emptive arrests 21 Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 2010 205 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 205 prima facie 113, 119 Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) 83 Privacy International (PI) 220 Proceeds of Crime Act 64 Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act 68 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 53 pseudo-​counterterror 35, 36 Public Order Management Act, 2013 219, 228 Public Private Partnership (PPP) 218 Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) 62 Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare (4Ps) structure 164 Putin, Vladimir 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 150, 151, 155 Quadrennial Defense Review 55 Quilliam 18 Rabbani, Moshen 82 racism 13, 14, 88, 115, 120 radicalism 20, 295, 298, 300, 301, 304

723

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Index radicalization 17, 18, 19, 20, 69, 77, 116, 134, 165, 167, 208, 236, 243, 300 Rapid Engagement Phase (2001–​2010) –​9/​11 63–​67 reconstruction 56, 79, 97 regulated violence 34 Regulation of Communication Interception Act, 2010 221 Relief Organization for Kashmir Muslims (ROKM) 67 rendition sites 27 resilience 20 Rigspolitiet 26 Rio de Janeiro 77, 83, 85, 89, 90 Rio de Paz 87 Roach, Kent 69 Rockefeller Foundation 53 rogue civil society 286, 287 Romania 161, 162, 166, 175, 180, 181, 182 national security 176 state-​civil society interplay 177, 178, 179 root causes 109, 285 Roussef, Dilma 84 Rubongoya, J. 26 rumor mill 179 Russia 8, 14, 24, 26, 68, 169, 172, 177, 178, 182, 274, 275 civil society 144–​150, 154 national security 150–​154 networks of organizations 156 Russian cultural values 146 Russian Metrojet Flight 9268 242 Russian national security 144, 151, 155, 156 Russian undesirable organizations law 152 Rutzen, D. 52 Sabir, R. 18 Salced, Doris 37 Sameh Abu Zeid 240 San José de Apartadó 102 Sarah L. 310

327

Saraki, Bukola 198 Sarkozy, Nicolas 132 Saudi Arabia 194 secret courts 27 secretive courts 13 Secure Air Travel Act 70 “securitisation of the life-​world” 21 securitization 27, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 89, 90, 112, 113, 114, 118, 143, 206, 207, 208, 213, 247, 248, 256, 260, 261, 262, 295, 297, 310, 311 civil society 13 counter-​terrorism models 13 cross-​national counter-​terror security structures 13 democratic and non-​democratic regimes 23–​26 democratic, authoritarian and hybrid states 13 discursive structures 17–​19 economic structures 21–​23 military structures 14–​17 physical structures 19–​21 racism and colonialism 14 Security and Counter-​Terror Expo (SCTX) 22 Security Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014 205, 209 Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act 70 Security of Canada Information Sharing Act (SCISA) 69, 70 security sector reform 41, 85, 301, 302, 304 Security, Public Health and Emergency Preparedness (SPHEP) 62 Seguridad Humana desde abajo 102 self-​delusions 32 Semenova, T. 146 Sen, Kasturi 7, 53, 54 Serious Organised Crime Strategy 112 settler-​colonialism 14 Shahzad, Saleem 259 Siddiqui, Taha 259 Sidel, M. 6, 53, 57, 104

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328

Index

Skoczylis, Joshua 8 Slovakia 161, 162, 166, 180, 182, 183 national security 173, 174 state-​civil society interplay 174, 175, 176 Slovenia 161, 162, 166, 167, 180, 182 national security 166, 167 state-​civil society interplay 167, 168, 169 Smyth, M. B. 16 Soccer World Cup, 2014 83 social media 26, 63, 120, 198, 199, 223, 228, 246, 277 Soros, George 173, 175, 177, 181, 182 sorosization 181 South Africa 14, 120 South Asia Regional Programmes 299 Spain 9, 164, 170, 182 spurious ex-​post facto charges of Islamist involvement 25 Sri Lanka 26, 288 State Security Investigations (SSI) 235, 236 state-​led CTMs 204, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213 Stop Operation Soros (SOS) 180 Strategic Defence and Security Review 112 Stronger Cities Network (SCN) 20 Suarez, M. A. G. 82, 83 Summer Olympics, 2016 83 Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003 205 suspect communities 4, 5, 7, 19, 24, 115, 206, 213, 270, 274, 309 Synagogue bombing, 1980 70 Syria 25, 65, 68, 170, 271 Terrorelhárítási Központ (TEK) 170 Terrorism Act, 2001 110 Terrorism Act, 2006 110 Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013 193, 195 terrorist attacks 1, 15, 22, 54, 77, 83, 129, 131, 143, 160, 162, 164, 168, 173, 204, 243, 257, 296, 300, 308, 310, 311

9/​11 49, 50, 52 Canada 68 pan-​Europe 161 Terrorist Entities Law 8/​2015 243 Terrorist Resourcing Model (TRM) 69 Terwindt, C. 180, 308 Thailand 291 Tiger Tiger plot 15 Tomesani, Ana Maura 310 Tony Blair Institute 18, 24 Transatlantic Aeroplane plot 15 transparency 5, 80, 88, 146, 167, 168, 170, 172, 174, 178, 207, 211, 225, 244, 286, 302, 312 Transparency of Lobbying, Non-​Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act, 2014 111 Tremblay-​Boire, J. 6 Trump, Donald 59, 194 Turkey 25 Twitter 56, 223 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 51, 53, 59, 149, 151, 152, 296, 298, 299, 304 Uganda 24, 182, 191, 224, 225, 227, 228, 248, 312 and CSO-​state relations 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226 civic space 227, 228 civil society 216 CSO 216 NRM 216 pre-​ and post-​9/​11 security environment 217, 218, 219 Uganda Communication Commission Act, 2013 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 228, 312 Uganda Communications Act, 2013 219 Ukraine 25, 147, 153 ungoverned areas 76, 80, 90 Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) 85, 87, 89, 90

923

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Index

329

van der Borgh, C. 180, 308 van Duyne, P. 180 Velásquez, Iván 101 Vietnam 99, 291 violence 14, 19, 27, 34, 37, 110 violent terrorist threat 16 Virtual Private Network (VPN) 228 Voter Education Network 299 vulnerability 1, 18, 57, 63, 80, 116, 144, 178

United Kingdom (UK) 4, 5, 7, 8, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 26, 62, 66, 85, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 133, 135, 136, 137, 164, 170, 181, 183, 194, 199, 265, 271, 274, 275, 295, 296, 298, 299, 302, 304, 309 United Nations (UN) 71, 101, 191, 205, 272, 288 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 71 United States (US) 1, 4, 14, 51, 58, 59, 67, 81, 93, 128, 131, 143, 160, 191, 204, 216, 234, 271, 284, 296, 298, 309 9/​11 terrorist attacks prompted 49–​52 macrosecuritization 49 securitization 49 state counter-​terrorism policies 56–​58 Uribe, Alvaro 93, 94, 97, 100, 101, 102, 310 US Patriot Act 205 USA PATRIOT Act, 2001 50 USAID Advisory Committee 299 Uzbekistan 8, 24

Yaxley-​Lennon, Stephen 118 Yusuf, Mohammed 193

vagueness, counter-​terrorism laws 4 Valencia, César Julio 101

zakat committees 55 Zia-​ul Haq 256

Wæver, O. 113, 114 Walker, C. 111, 116 War on Terror (WoT) 2, 6, 14, 15, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 130, 131, 135, 136, 138, 143, 295, 310 Waseem, Zoha 311 Washington, DC 53 Weberian 37 Western or British norms 19 Westgate Mall attack of 2013 205 WhatsApp 223 World Cup, 2014 77 World Health Organization 260

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