Suicide Bombers: the Psychological, Religious and Other Imperatives [1 ed.] 9781607503507, 9781586038861

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SUICIDE BOMBERS: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL, RELIGIOUS AND OTHER IMPERATIVES

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NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

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Suicide Bombers: The Psychological, Religious and Other Imperatives

Edited by

Mary Sharpe

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St. Edmunds College, University of Cambridge, UK

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

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Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Suicide Bombers: The Psychological, Religious and other Imperatives Cambridge, UK 10–12 December 2006

© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-58603-886-1 Library of Congress Control Number: 2008929433 Publisher IOS Press Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected]

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Foreword Fathali M. MOGHADDAM Director, Conflict Resolution Program, Department of Government Professor, Department of Psychology Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

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A man borrowed some money from Nasrudin. The Mulla thought that he would never get it back, but gave the money nevertheless. Much to his surprise, the loan was promptly repaid. Nasrudin brooded. Some time later the same man asked for a further sum, saying: “You know my credit is good, I have repaid you in the past.” “Not this time you scoundrel!” roared Nasrudin. “You deceived me the last time when I thought that you would not return the money. You won’t get away with it a second time. Well before I attended school to begin my formal education, first at elementary school in Tehran and then at boarding school in London, I was informally trained by my family through Sufi tales, such as the one above.1 One interpretation of this particular tale focuses on how humans sometimes misjudge the actions of others, and proceed to make mistake after mistake through continued misperceptions. Nasrudin began by expecting the borrower not to return his money. When his expectation proved to be incorrect, Nasrudin used this as evidence that the borrower had deceived him, because he had acted against expectations and actually returned the money. The borrower could not be trusted at all: he had proved to be reliable when he was expected to be unreliable. This very timely edited volume exploring the context and nature of “Suicide Bombers” provides wisdom and insight in an inter-group situation characterized by huge gulfs and misperceptions. The Western media has focused on fundamentalists as the voice of Islam, and helped to shape a warped stereotype of the vast majority of Muslims – who are actually moderate in attitudes.2 This volume provides a ‘corrective’, by explaining how de-radicalization programs are being spearheaded by Muslims themselves, and also by exploring the best strategies for understanding and dealing with Islamic fundamentalism and suicide terrorism. The chapters reflect the international, interdisciplinary nature of the workshops that served as the launching pad for the project. Mary Sharpe must be commended for the superb way in which she has both managed the workshops and edited this volume. Underlying the varied discussions in this volume is a historically important but implicit theme: the relationship between the West and Islamic societies of the Near and Middle East. Just as many Westerners have tended to perceive Islamic fundamentalists as the face and voice of Islam, many people in Islamic societies have tended to visualize the West as represented by extremist voices and actions, particularly associated with ‘pro-war, pro-torture’ factions in the administration of President George W. Bush and his allies, notably the former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. This volume reflects

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a more positive trend; it is an indication that researchers can lead societies to accurately pinpoint the nature and role of fundamentalists, and differentiate between destructive elements and the majority who are moderates and seek to achieve constructive, peaceful inter-group relations. At a deeper level, this volume points to a major challenge that confronts Western societies, and particularly the United States, still the sole ‘superpower’ on the global stage. This challenge is the New Global American Dilemma,3 which arises out of the contradiction existing between Western and particularly American support for, on the one hand, select dictatorships in the Near and Middle East and, on the other hand, freedom and democracy throughout the Near and Middle East. The New Global American Dilemma was not created by President George W. Bush, but his ‘pro-freedom’ rhetoric and ‘pro-dictatorship’ policies (e.g. his continued support for the Saudi regime) brought this dilemma into the spotlight. The first American dilemma was identified by the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal (1898–1987), in his seminal study of race-relations in the United States published under the title of An American Dilemma4 (1944). Myrdal correctly pointed out that even after the official end of slavery in the United States there continued to be a monstrous contradiction between the American rhetoric of equality of opportunity and freedom, on the one hand, and the actual mistreatment of African Americans, who continued to suffer discrimination and segregation. This dilemma was eventually resolved through massive reform movements, which came to a climax in the late 1960s and finally resulted in serious movement toward desegregation in America. Of course, the reform movements have been costly and painful, and marked by many deaths along the way, such as the assassination of Martin Luther King (1929–1968). The resolution of the New Global American Dilemma is more doubtful, and involves injuries and deaths on a larger, catastrophic scale. The rhetoric of freedom, equality, and democracy emanating from the George W. Bush White House, as well as from 10 Downing Street during the premiership of Tony Blair, had a powerful impact on two groups in the Near and Middle East. First, the vast majority of Muslims, and Muslim intellectuals in particular, immediately recognized the basic contradiction between the ‘democracy and freedom’ rhetoric of the West, and the actual practice of continued support for dictatorships in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan (under the rule of General Parvis Musharaf), Kuwait, and some other countries in the region. The vast majority of Muslims recognize that it is only American-led support that allows dictatorships in the Near and Middle East to crush secular opposition groups, and prevent women and other minorities from gaining greater freedom and equality. A second group influenced by the ‘democracy and freedom’ rhetoric of President George W. Bush and his allies are Islamic Fundamentalists, who are fearful of any change that gives greater freedom to ordinary people, particularly women. As discussed in a number of chapters in this volume, Islamic fundamentalists have generally adopted an ‘anti-progress’ position. But why, then, do fundamentalists manage to gain sympathy and on some issues even some support from the majority of Muslims, in both Western and non-Western societies? Given the moderate positions of most Muslims, why would they sympathize with fundamentalists at least on some issues? The New Global American Dilemma is at the heart of this question. Four related facts must be kept in mind. First, the U.S. and its allies continue to support dictatorships in the Near and Middle East. Second, dictatorships in the Near and Middle East refuse to allow the growth of secular, democratic opposition groups. Third, this means that the only avenue open for collective activism

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in the Near and Middle East is the mosque – no dictator has the power to close mosques, although all dictators attempt to control what happens in mosques. Fourth, fundamentalists use the mosque, and religious traditions broadly, to take up positions as the vanguard of opposition to pro-American dictatorships. This is exactly what happened in Iran in the late 1970s, and in Algeria in the 1980s, and in a number of Islamic countries more recently. The threat of fundamentalist groups is real and imminent in Egypt, Pakistan, and some other major Islamic societies. How will the New Global American Dilemma be resolved? Will the U.S. and its allies drop the rhetoric of freedom and democracy, and unquestioningly continue the practice of supporting dictatorships? Or, will the U.S. and its allies recognize that by actively supporting democracy both in rhetoric and action, the West will gain the backing of the vast majority of Muslims in the fight against fundamentalism and their extremist tactics, including suicide terrorism? This volume makes an important contribution in the context of the broader struggle ahead, to resolve the New Global American Dilemma in favor of freedom and democracy. Although there is considerable diversity among the chapters, a shared theme is the contextual approach to understanding extremism and suicide terrorism. Rather than become seduced by reductionist explanations, to do with assumed intra-personal characteristics of suicide terrorists, the authors focus on the characteristics of groups and contexts. Moreover, these chapters represent serious efforts to locate the current ‘troubles’ within cultural and historical context, a highly valuable and valiant effort that I believe has had considerable success.

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References [1] P. 102, Shah, I. (1993). The pleasantries of the incredible Mulls Nasrudin. New York: Penguin. [2] See Esposito, J. L., & Mogahed, D. (2008). Who speaks for Islam? What a billion Muslims really think. Washington, D.C.: Gallup Press. [3] The idea of the ‘New Global American Dilemma’ was first introduced in Moghaddam, F. M. (2008). How globalization spurs terrorism. Westport, CT.: Praeger Security International. [4] Myrdal, G. (1944). An American dilemma: The Negro problem and modern democracy. (2 vols). New York: Harper and Bothers.

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Contents Foreword Fathali M. Moghaddam

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Introduction Mary Sharpe

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Identifying Young Muslims Susceptible to Violent Radicalisation: Psychological Theory and Recommendations Jose Liht and Sara Savage British Muslims Musa Admani et al.

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Mad, Bad or Freedom Fighters: The New Challenges of Terrorism Max Taylor

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Suicide Bombing: A Possibility for France? François Géré

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Female Suicide Bombers: Victims or Murderers? Fatima Lahnait

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Psychological Prerequisites and Consequences of Suicide Terrorism: The Russian Experience Valery N. Krasnov

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Suicide Bombing as Deluded Self-Enhancement Kristján Kristjánsson

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Let the Sane of Saudi Arabia Unite Tarek Heggy

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Hotwiring the Apocalypse: Apocalyptic Elements of Global Jihadi Doctrines Reuven Paz Understanding the Psycho-Social and Political Processes Involved in Ideological Support for Terrorism Anne Speckhard

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Islamic Jihad in Iraq: Suicide or Martyrdom Basim Hameed

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The Drama of the Suicide Terrorist Ofer Grosbard

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Putting the Umm Back in the Umma – Suicide Attack: Understanding the Terrorists’ Deepest Terrors Nancy Hatveldt Kobrin

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161

Author Index

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Break Out Group Conclusions

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Introduction The purpose of this book is to offer academics and practitioners some insight into the psychological, religious and other imperatives that appear to be driving suicide bombers in various regions around the world. It contains chapters by academics and professional practioners from a number of countries and disciplines. As a result there are some variations in style of presentation and spelling. This includes the spelling of the Holy Qur’an and certain other Arabic words, which have been written in different ways depending on how they have been transposed from the Arabic. Armed with such knowledge it is hoped that policy makers and decision takers will be in a better position to direct their resources to find ways within our communities to reduce the violence, hatred and disturbed mindset that fuels such activity. The answer does not have to be a struggle to the death between two equally pernicious ways of life, with unbridled and almost militant materialism on the one hand and the increasingly life-restrictive practices of fundamentalist religion on the other. A balance between the two has to be found and the excesses of both weeded out and replaced with an educated and informed view of life where religion can benefit from scientific discovery and secular society can be respectful of the numinous and sacred. This requires a better understanding by politicians and we, as citizens, of ourselves and others as ordinary human beings in the social arena and better education about what makes us function well and flourish as individuals and in our relationship with others. Whilst the underlying ideology of the jihadists is in essence the same – the ultimate triumph of an Islamic State and Caliphate over the ‘infidel’ – the circumstances and drivers that give rise to suicide bombers appear to differ depending on the social and political conditions in which the perpetrators live. Even after the rude awakening of the spread of suicide terrorism to the West with the attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001, its spread to the UK and Europe in the past few years has raised its profile and intrusion even further. It is an issue of concern now not only for those living in the Middle East and the United States, but lurks also at the front door of citizens in Europe and the former Soviet Union. Differing political and social conditions are nonetheless providing a convenient excuse for adherence to a globally recognisable identity based on grievance, grief and a sense of injustice. Certain individuals have arisen throughout history who set out practices that aim to heal the mind, body and broken spirit of the individuals they see around them. Their aims are always for peace, reconciliation and improvement in the practice of humanitarian values that are beneficial for all in society. It is a sad fact of life that the essence of their teachings have so often been suppressed or distorted for political purposes by people who thrive on engendering separateness, moral superiority and ignorance. To a great extent jihadists have a deep fear of progress and its effect on the social order, particularly on how education affects the role of men and women in society and the resulting economic power structure. They have taken the religious precepts of the Qur’an, such as ‘jihad’ and mixed them with and exploited the more primitive characteristics of tribal society that promote heroism and physical male dominance over

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M. Sharpe / Introduction

intellectual development, particularly that of women. They have thus produced a form of neo-Islam that is devoid of the universal humanitarian values that undergird authentic religion and progressive society. If we can have a better understanding of human beings through the findings of social scientists and the wisdom of genuine religious scholars and spiritual guides, then we stand a chance of turning the tide in favour of producing more peaceful societies. It means finding the practices, skills and language that calm the fears and insecurities particularly of young people today, develop the will to cooperate, foster respect for others, and build the inner resilience to face the enormous changes, mistakes and doubts that face us all. The contributors draw on their rich experience of living in the midst of such conditions, or from their knowledge of human behaviour in the religious domain or psychological arena. Suicide terrorism is just one tactical weapon in the armoury of the jihadists, but its use is increasing, particularly in the Middle East where life appears to be cheap and plentiful while armaments are conversely expensive and in short supply. We cover the subject from the historical, cultural and gender perspectives as well as from the religious and political dimensions and seek to gain a multi-dimensional perspective that is sufficiently deep to yield helpful solutions. In the opening chapter, social psychologists Jose Liht and Sara Savage do a thorough analysis of the social psychological research relevant to understanding Islamic terrorism beginning with the wider societal forces impinging upon individuals in postmaterial societies and the processes that increase the possibility of terrorism. This is followed by Sheikh Musa Admani who focuses on how Muslim communities in the UK require a new method of education to defuse the extremists. In particular he emphasises that the universal human values that underpin the Qur’an are the same humanitarian values that British society is based on, namely the rule of law, equality, social justice, peace and human autonomy. His chapter is supplemented with the testimony of two former Islamists whose personal journeys were leading them to ‘jihad’ in the Middle East and who were turned around by this newer method of teaching of Qur’anic values by Sheikh Admani. To understand the historical context particularly in regard to the United Kingdom and Ireland, criminologist Max Taylor draws comparisons between former terrorist activity, notably that of the Provisional IRA, and that of the extreme Islamic variety. He asks how the ‘new terrorism’ differs from the ‘old terrorism’. He recommends that the best approach in the long term is likely to be the growth of civil society. France, with its colonial history in North Africa and in Algeria in particular, does not regard itself as immune to terrorist attack. François Géré sets out the background and the current challenges. A French scholar with dual nationality (Moroccan), Fatima Lahnait, describes the trajectory of women suicide bombers and their activities in terrorist locations around the world. Their reasons for committing these acts of violence appear on the surface to be the same as those of the men, but on closer examination reveal more gender-specific motivations and even poorer societal standing. Some of these women suicide bombers, the Black Widows, took centre stage at the theatre in Moscow and at the school in Beslan, Russia in protest at the military activities in the Chechen Republic. Psychiatrist Valery Krasnov has treated many of these people and casts light on their background and state of mind. As morality and an attempt to gain the moral high ground in a fast changing modern world appears to play a large part in the jihadist ideology, Krisjan Kristjansson

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draws on sociology, philosophy and the history of ideas to question this mindset. He explains that what he sees as “acts of deluded self-enhancement” have to be understood against the backdrop of the Western liberal conception of the self. He makes some suggestions for moral education. The focal point for suicide terrorism is undoubtedly the Middle East, especially Iraq since the present conflict started in 2003. Accordingly, we have some contributions from those who are engaged more specifically with that region. As so many books of this type focus on the Palestine-Israel conflict in particular, in this book we have looked at the wider issues in the Middle East and beyond that tend to receive less attention in general. Tarek Heggy is a highly respected liberal Arab thinker and sets out the development of one of the most important historical alliances that has laid the ideological foundations for the extremism current in the Middle East today, and being spread worldwide with the help of extensive oil revenues. He shows how, in 1744, an alliance was forged between Mohamed ibn-Saud and Mohamed ibn-Wahab whereby the former agreed to rule according to the doctrine of the latter, i.e. Wahhabism. He offers suggestions on the reform the Saudi Arabian heads of government might wish to consider today to turn the tide. Leaping ahead by contrast to the sharp end of modernity with the internet, Reuven Paz explains how successfully extreme jihadist propaganda is disseminated worldwide and currently focuses on the ‘apocalyptic’ elements of their doctrine. He considers whether the strong, religiously-distorted, jihadist desire to kill all infidels and gain martyrdom in paradise through ‘hotwiring the apocalypse’ could predict an escalation in activity from suicide bombing to the use of weapons of mass destruction. In her chapter, psychologist Anne Speckhard analyses four levels of terrorism: the group; the individual; the sympathisers or supporters, and the ideology. Through interviews with the families and friends of suicide bombers, she reveals the human side and the extent of the pain and suffering that exacerbate the desire for revenge for kin, so easily taken advantage of by jihadists with larger political aims in mind, as well as revenge for their ‘fictive kin’. How is life for the civilian security services in the furnace that is Iraq? Former senior police officer, Basim Hamid, explains day-to-day life from his own personal and professional perspective in Baghdad under US occupation and gives his view on the factors influencing the escalation in suicide bombings. Israeli psychologist Ofer Grosbard writes that Muslim societies tend to be traditional-collectivist in mindset. In order to understand the motivations of potential suicide bombers, and to have any hope of dissuading them, Westerners must learn to think and communicate in ‘collectivist’ terms, as suitable for Islamic societies, rather than in the ‘individual’ modes of Western discourse. Changing from a social psychological perspective to a psychoanalytic one, Nancy Kobrin examines the suicide bomber through the lens of Freud and his latter-day disciples, Melanie Klein and others. She examines the mother-child dyad and speculates about the nurturing practices in Arab-Muslim tribal (collectivist) communities. Can male children properly develop into individuated, mature, responsible adults in the world, and respect their women as partners, when there is such a bond to their ‘ummi’ who, at the same time, as a female, is so denigrated in their patriarchal societies? Are men taught how to love women or only how to work hard, be strong and, perhaps, to pray?

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M. Sharpe / Introduction

The Justice, Freedom and Security Directive General of the EC Commission is closely involved with this matter also. During the workshop we had a presentation by Andre Rizzo who summarised the work of the EC Commission in three areas: i. it organizes events to bring together experts to discuss various aspects of the security issues ii. as they affect citizens within and between individual member states iii. it funds projects for education and development iv. it commissions unique comparative studies to support future policy. The Commission is looking now to introduce three strands to its work on statedriven and non-state driven terrorism. These are:

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i. ideology ii. places of vulnerability iii. how to strengthen resilience. For more information see (http://www.ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/intro/ funding_intro_en.htm) The book includes some suggestions for action discussed in break out groups during the workshop by the participants who come from a range of occupations in the public sector and from a variety of academic disciplines in the social sciences. This is in keeping with the focus of the Human Societal Dynamics strand of funding within the NATO Science Programme through which the workshop and book are supported. To pull the ideas together and situate the chapters in the context of current social science research, Fathali Moghaddam has kindly written the Foreword. He has contributed his excellent analysis to two subsequent NATO workshops (also within this Human Societal Dynamic strand) and his approach and perceptions are always most enlightening. I would like to thank Professor Fernando Cavalho Rodrigues from the Public Diplomacy Unit at NATO in Brussels for his encouraging me to run this workshop and prepare this book. I was not able to go into some of the more controversial areas we discussed such as the effect of sexual segregation on the behaviour of primarily Sunni suicide bombers, but that will form the basis of another publication. I would also like to thank Liz Cowan for her patience and guidance through NATO administration; Denis Collins and Stacey Gutowski from Cambridge University for their help in editing and formatting the book; and my friends Marnia Robinson, her husband Gary Wilson, and Andrew Grove, for their unstinting support throughout the workshop and the editing of this book. Mary Sharpe Cambridge, 2008

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Identifying Young Muslims Susceptible to Violent Radicalisation: Psychological Theory and Recommendations Jose LIHT 1 and Sara SAVAGE 2 Psychology and Religion Research Group, University of Cambridge

Abstract. Much of the psychological debate on European home-grown Islamic terrorism leaves out the wider societal context from which the phenomenon arises. In this essay we examine the social psychological research relevant to understanding Islamic terrorism, beginning with an explanation of the wider societal forces impinging upon individuals in post-material societies. We then discuss the social psychological processes – congruent with this wider societal context – that increase the possibility of terrorism. In line with the evidence that terrorists who self-radicalise or are recruited come from ordinary social strata [1], these processes are very much part of universal human social and psychological functioning. We also consider how young Muslims draw upon available religious resources to actively construct their identities and choose courses of action. Both the structuralist approach (in which social processes are seen to impinge upon individuals) and the phenomenological approach (in which individuals are seen to construct their own identities and world views) are utilised. Research from both traditions intersects when thinking complexity is considered, and both approaches feed into our recommendations for identifying the social niches vulnerable to violent radicalisation.

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Keywords. Psychology, ingroup, outgroup, worldviews, Islamists, neo-Islam, young Muslims

1. Introduction: The Wider Societal Context Over the last four decades, a substantial amount of empirical data has accumulated from over 80 countries to reveal that the two defining cultural changes of modernity/post-modernity, (a) secularisation and (b) emancipation from authority, are clearly linked to a particular economic base [2]. For the first time in the whole of human history, advanced industrialisation is freeing human societies from the existential threats to survival [3]. The majority of people living in advanced industrialised societies now take for granted the absence of fear of economic hardship. Moreover, economic prosperity has fostered the specialisation of human activity and the creation of the welfare state, post-material society,3 affording individuals an unprecedented degree of freedom from socially prescribed roles and obligations. In the West (and other post-material societies), most relationships and roles are now those of choice, not of need. 1

Faculty of Divinity, West Road, Cambridge, CB3 9BS, UK; E-mail: [email protected]. Faculty of Divinity, West Road, Cambridge, CB3 9BS, UK; E-mail: [email protected]. 3 Post-material societies are those based on information and service sectors. 2

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J. Liht and S. Savage / Identifying Young Muslims Susceptible to Violent Radicalisation

Collective liberation from existential insecurity, brought about by limited but successful subjugation of nature, has made belief in supernatural forces (believed to control nature) peripheral to society’s functioning. As supernatural forces are no longer needed as guarantors of security, the secularisation of institutions and culture invariably occurs [2]. Moreover, the autonomy brought about by post-material specialisation and the welfare state has resulted in the rejection of truths emanating from traditional sources of authority. These are perceived to be at odds with internal subjective experience. And so, modern culture has taken a ‘subjective turn’, and institutional religion is in sharp decline. Nevertheless, the increased cultural capital within wealthy, autonomyloving societies fosters individuals’ search for meaning. Along with this search for meaning is a revival of an individualised spirituality. This guarantees the survival of the religious niche, albeit within a non-authoritarian framework [4]. The road towards secularisation and the subjective search for meaning do not occur simultaneously; they are to some extent successive. In short, the cultural changes brought about can be conceptualised as value changes in two dimensions: (a) traditional vs. secular rational and (b) survival vs. self-expression values. In all, these processes do not bring about massive cultural changes unless they become the norm for the majority of the population within a nation state [2]. In this sense Marx was right: the cultural and political institutions that organise and legitimise human activity are subject to changes brought about by economic conditions. Institutions in Western culture have had to become increasingly secular (rational and technological), while becoming more responsive and less authoritarian towards the people they serve. A great deal of evidence points out that most of these institutional changes are produced, not by the elites in charge of those institutions, but by the cultural-social capital of the wider public [3]. Thus, we can speak of a tension between widespread social values brought about by economic changes, and the position of the institutions serving the public. Traditional religious institutions are forced to change in order to adapt to those trends. Broadly, where economic changes have brought about freedom from famine, fostered relationships of choice, and produced emancipation from authority, mainstream religious institutions have felt the need to: (a) transfer their prior organising role to the more scientific-technological domain, thus becoming marginal as conductors of society, (b) acknowledge the discoveries of science and the systematic examination of texts and reformulate their dogmas in relation to these, and lastly (c) become tolerant of non-traditional lifestyles and personal choices like homosexuality, abortion, and single parent families prevalent in post-industrial societies. This is the story of most mainline Christian denominations, and Reform Judaism in the West. Nevertheless, in post-material societies, there are strong reactions to these accommodations. Significant numbers of people have come to adopt extreme (fundamentalist or conservative) religious positions in regard to how religious texts should be interpreted, and how much personal freedom individuals should enjoy. At times, this is enjoined with a degree of conservatism that surpasses the standards of antiquity. However, all in all, most mainstream religious institutions have been adapting to the new conditions, and in some minor ways benefiting from the increased preoccupation with meaning and significance in post-industrial societies. Even so, the surge towards postmaterial spirituality contrasts, at a deep level, with the survival-oriented religiosity of less developed societies. We posit that the two consecutive phases of modernisation (secularisation and emancipation from authority) correspond to two discernible phases in the development

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of fundamentalist movements in the most prosperous Western societies, particularly the US. The first wave came about as a reaction to the critical examination of sacred texts in the late 19th and early 20th (and coincides with widespread elimination of the fear of starvation). This first wave of fundamentalism was preoccupied mainly with the order of creation in Darwinian theory and with Biblical source criticism. The second wave has been, until now, an unexplained resurgence in the 1970’s and 80’s. This we understand as a reaction to the ‘subjective turn’, the increase of choice within post-industrial lifestyles, and the secular humanist morality that underpins it. This second wave of fundamentalism also coincides with the rise in the service sector and information technologies that are foundational to the self-expression values of post-materiality. It is clear from data obtained by Inglehart over the past four decades that globalisation has not resulted in the spread of western values across the world. Rather, it is the level of a nation state’s economic development that is the important determinant of a society’s moral and cultural values. In fact, it points out that the greater the disparity between how Western Europe, the US, and successful Asian economies grow in relation to developing economies, the more the gap in values between developed and developing nations becomes apparent [2]. It is from this historical process that the potential for an economically driven ‘clash of civilisation’ occurs. The values adhered to by the populations in developing countries that have not experienced widespread security (or, even more powerfully, have not experienced the emancipation from established roles and dependence on authority), do not show significant change. In contrast, the values of countries that are continuing to grow in GDP and in the expansion of their service sector show value change at an accelerated pace.

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1.1. Muslims in Relation to the West In our view, this empirically supported model provides a good basis from which to analyse the vicissitudes of the Muslim world in relation to the West. It is not surprising to find a clash of values between the institutions of Islamic societies and those of the West, considering that most nation states with a majority of Muslim populations have not experienced significant economic security and diversification of their economies. This contrasts with, for example, patterns in Latin America, whose institutions (such as the Catholic Church) originate from the West. In contrast, institutions in Islamic nations are functionally independent of the West. Thus, changes brought about in the West do not necessarily impact those in Muslim societies, even if they do impact other places in the ‘Western’ Third World such as Latin America. This heightens the differential effects brought about by economic change between the West and Islam. For example, in most Muslim countries, politics, science, and all creative endeavours are clearly subject to the weight of religious authority. As Shahrur [5] documents, there is nothing comparable to the intellectual emancipation from religion and liberalisation of politics and social organisation in most of the Islamic world. In the scientific sphere, it is hard for an institution or individual to publicly deny basic faith tenets within an Islamic society and continue to find a niche from which to operate. Politically, the failure to develop secular sources of legitimation for the state, and to develop governmental accountability, have resulted in the collusion of authoritarian regimes and religious authority, each buffering the other from the challenges of modernisation [6]. As such, intellectually and politically, the prevailing atmosphere in Islamic societies contrasts with the secularisation and emancipation from authority prevalent in the West.

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Although western inspired secular progressive initiatives have remained in political control in most of the Islamic world, the proponents of those changes lack legitimacy as they are widely identified with an elitist westernisation that has failed to deliver [7]. This failure increases the fantasy that a return to pristine Islamic religion is the only chance for improvement. When presented as a stark choice between failed westernisation (and its secular values), Muslims increasingly value the meaning and identity that derives from their religious world view – a world view in which God is at the centre, from which all authority and esteemed social roles are seen to flow. Meaning, stable family patterns, and a sense of the sacred are preferred to westernisation. As more Muslims are born within the West and are shaped by the economic forces that bring about security and autonomy from authority (with its ensuing rationality and personal freedom), we posit that European Muslims experience an acute heightening of tension owing to this dissonance of values. Government initiatives have sought to help immigrant Muslims integrate within their adopted country through the development of indigenous Muslim organisations – but without great success. In the UK, the emphasis on political correctness and Muslim cultural sensitivity appears to have unintentionally exacerbated feelings of ‘difference’ and separation [8]. The UK government’s hope that these supported Muslim organisations will marry the values of Islam and those of a liberal western democracy have been disappointed, as these associations have not developed their own intellectual capital. They have remained in the shadow of foreign sources, such as the Saudi Salafist establishment, that subsidise literature, Internet sites, and the education of imams. A few European and US Muslim scholars advocate a progressive form of Islam, but their influence in the academic world tend hardly touches the mainstream Muslim community. They have little capacity to counterbalance the regressive quality of the imported literalist neo-Islam on the grass-roots level [9]. The ethos of Islamic institutions and networks (backed by oil-rich Middle Eastern rent economies) sit uncomfortably with the values of western personal choice. Yet these Islamic imports comprise a pervasive intellectual, religious and political presence among Muslim communities across Europe. It might be tempting to think that young (often second generation) European Muslims should simply override their inherited religious tradition. However, it should be noted that the burden Western society places on the individualised self as a source of morality and meaning is not without complication. Europeans, too, can find it an onerous task to create a meaningful identity in the midst of an intellectual climate where the rationally based claims of Enlightenment have been seriously undermined, and where a firm basis for goodness and value has been delegated to the subjective self. European Muslims (and some Europeans) are understandably attracted to an intensified Islamic tradition untouched by textual criticism – one that provides a firm basis for personal morality, strong family values and a transnational community of belonging [10]. Second generation European Muslims inhabit two cultures, each with its deeply felt pros and cons. It is clear that the values of personal choice that originate within post-material European economies are diametrically opposed to the values propounded by the Islamic Middle Eastern institutions inserting themselves in the European landscape. These factors combine to create a problematic tension. We argue that many Muslim individuals experience this tension as self-definitional uncertainty. Among young (second or third generation) European Muslims, a solution to this uncertainty is available through an intensification of Islamic identity. Interestingly, this does not signify a wholesale return to the traditional religion of their parents [8]. Paradoxically, as the threats to survival that in earlier eras motivated much

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religious commitment fade away in post-material societies, yet questions of meaning intensify in affluent societies, many young European Muslims soul-search beyond their ethnic and familial inheritance. As ‘good post-moderns’, they seek spiritual nourishment in a selective, post-modern way. Ironically, they are turning to institutions that, while standing in diametric opposition to Western culture, simultaneously foster a kind of post-modern identity construction by way of a symbiotic nemesis with the West. In Britain, Muslim young people are, on the whole, eschewing the ethnic and local communal roots of their parents’ Muslim faith. They wish to live out their (often literalist and politicised) Islam in ways that are quite distinct from their parents. A 2007 national study on British Muslims commissioned by Policy Exchange [8] shows that 37% of 16–24 year olds (compared to 24% of 45–54 year olds) now prefer an Islamicbased religious education (as opposed to British state mixed schools). Follow-up interviews revealed that this preference has grown because the mixed secular schools do not provide young people with clear direction concerning moral values. Similarly, 37% of young people prefer to have Sharia law in the UK. The reasons centre on issues to do with purity: the wearing of headscarves, modest dress, separation of the sexes, halal meat, and blasphemy. These indicate a desire make visible key markers of Islamic identity, and to return to clear-cut gender and family roles, organised around an idealised male family ‘head’. Traditional forms of authority and social roles are being reasserted, yet in a pick-and-mix way that avoids former ethnic, communal roots. Similarly, there is a strong affinity with the suffering of Muslims touched by Western-led operations across the globe, although with surprisingly little knowledge about those conflicts, while non-Western-related conflicts involving Muslims are altogether ignored [8]. The new, intensified Islamic identity of young people selectively functions to distance them from the inferior immigrant status of their parents, while bolstering a sense of shared identity across a transnational umma, and freeing them from the complexities of conflicting values. Similar patterns occur when British young people convert to fundamentalist Christianity. They distance themselves from their nominal Christian parents, and adopt the counter-cultural characteristics of Christian fundamentalism and construct a new identity in a similarly post-modern way. While many of the young people with intensified commitment to neo-Islam are enabled to live more coherent lives bolstered from definitional uncertainty, this is at the cost of full civic participation in wider society, and at the risk of further radicalisation. 1.2. Outline of the Literature Review We have argued that while many young European Muslims are experiencing some of the West’s economic certainty, they are also predisposed to experience a greater degree of self-definitional uncertainty. The social psychological theories we will refer to in this essay are congruent with this starting context, and, we argue, are relevant to providing ways of identifying the niches where violent radicalisation will be more likely. While our own research focuses on the UK context, we think much of our model will be applicable to Muslims in other Western post-material countries. The social psychological theories relevant to understanding terrorism, elaborated upon in Section 2.1, are: Terror Management Theory, Uncertainty Reduction Theory, and Social Identity Theory. Terror Management Theory has a track record of evidence showing that challenges to a cultural worldview provoke existential anxiety. A cultural worldview provides individuals in their day-to-day experience with a robust defence from death anxi-

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ety. When a cultural worldview is undermined, death anxiety becomes harder to manage. Thus we argue that measures of Mortality Salience will provide a good indicator of the degree of tension Muslims are experiencing in a Western context, in that their ability to maintain a cultural worldview that defends against death anxiety is under threat. Uncertainty Reduction Theory provides evidence that self-definitional uncertainty is highly disturbing for individuals. The normal response to this is a desire to identify with a group that provides clear group identity prototype, and requires obedience and homogeneity among its members. Totalist groups are attractive to young people with uncertain identities as they provide the young person with a new social identity formed around a clear group prototype – often exemplified by the group leader. We argue that measuring the degree of ingroup identification, as well as loss of complexity in regards to conceptions of self and other, will be effective measures of vulnerability to the influence of extremist groups. Social Identity Theory shows that as groups are formed and individuals base their self-definition on their group identity (and less on their unique personal characteristics and achievements), the likelihood of comparison between groups arises. Perceptions of social reality are shaped by the stories people tell about the groups concerned. For example, accounts of Islam’s Golden Age in the light of colonial and current perceived subordination to Western domination elicits perception of an illegitimate group status hierarchy. As people are motivated to achieve a positive, distinctive, ‘good’ group status, groups will tend to compete. However, groups are often by definition ‘closed’ or impermeable to individual members of other groups. When upward mobility between groups is not possible, a group strategy, rather than an individual attempt at upward migration, will be adopted. Social Identity Theory research shows that when the prevailing status hierarchy of the groups is viewed as illegitimate and unstable, inter-group conflict and group mobilisation occurs. Measuring these perceptions of social groups can form the basis of a mobilisation potential index.

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The path to radicalisation these bodies of research can be summarised as such: Path to Radicalisation: • • • • • •

Tension (stemming from the juxtaposition of pre- and post-material values) is internalised as self-definitional uncertainty. Uncertainty is experienced as a deficit of a functional cultural worldview. The deficit results in an increased motivation to identify with fringe totalist group in order to withstand the dissonance with the host society. As the social identity of individuals becomes salient over personal identity, perceptions concerning the status of the ingroup vis-à-vis other groups become important. Current and historical factors contribute to the perception of cognitive alternatives and delegitimization of the outgroup. The resulting increase in mobilisation potential fosters attraction to radical ideologies and vulnerability for violent confrontation with the outgroup.

The social psychological processes mentioned so far play key roles in the formative stages of radicalisation, but nevertheless are always accompanied by subjective perceptions that may or may not cohere with impinging structural forces. Thus these

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two methodological approaches (structural and phenomenological) need to be taken in concert. In Ssection 3, the essay takes a phenomenological perspective to consider how people draw upon the available religious resources to construct a radical worldview. Parallel to the structural forces impinging upon social actors, people choose courses of action that are consonant with their constructed worldviews. This qualitative data will also provide validation to the level of radicalisation and likelihood of violence established through structural (objective) assessments. Building blocks of a worldview include narratives, categories, rhetorical strategies, emotion, and the cognitive structure of the belief system. These constructs are useful to apprehend how the structural forces translate into the subjective experience of our population of interest in order to establish a dialogue with identified niches. Qualitative analysis of these subjective constructs will be especially useful to inform initiatives to help disaffected young Muslims re-frame their grievances and aspirations within the context of British society. Integrative complexity, a measure of structure of thought independent of specific content, will provide a bridge in regards to the ‘mobilisation potential’ across both structural approaches (Section 2) and phenomenological approaches (Section 3). The essay concludes with recommendations based upon these bodies of research (Section 4).

2. Review of Social Psychology Literature Relevant for Identifying Muslims Vulnerable to Radicalisation for Terrorism

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Structural theories are those that can be construed as causal forces affecting the individual independent of his immediate awareness. These processes can be assessed quantitatively and form the basis of our research programme for identifying the social niches vulnerable to violent radicalisation. Given the wider societal context (Section 1), we argue that the most important psychosocial structural processes impinging upon self-definitional uncertainty leading to violent radicalisation are processes elucidated within the scope of Terror Management Theory, Uncertainty Reduction Theory, and Social Identity Theory. 2.1. Terror Management Theory Human beings, unlike animals, know that they will die. Yet like the animals, human beings share a drive to survive. The tension created by these contradictory realities inevitably produces a state of hyper-vigilance. Without some buffering, this hypervigilance is unsustainable. Terror Management Theory (TMT) advances the idea that a shared worldview provides individuals, in their day-to-day experience, with a defence from inevitable existential anxiety: the fear of death. Fear of death is often unconscious, but can become conscious – sometimes painfully so – when death is made salient in some way. A large body of research shows that subtle reminders of death increase they way people defend their cultural worldview [11]. A cultural worldview minimises death anxiety by providing an understanding of the universe that has order, meaning, and standards of acceptable behaviour. The latter, when upheld, confers self-esteem. Worldviews promise death transcendence to its members, for example, through religious beliefs in an afterlife, or through one’s creative contributions transmitted through culture. Even death transcendence through extending one’s family line requires a worldview that supports family as an institution, and the handing on of family or socially shared memories. The defence a worldview provides acts not only to postpone

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death anxiety (as in the temporary proximal relief achieved through suppressing or distracting thoughts of death from conscious awareness), but to dissipate death related thoughts altogether [12]. In short, TMT maintains that if death is made salient, people will intensify strivings for self-esteem and will respond positively towards people and ideas that support their cultural worldview. Conversely, they will respond negatively towards those people and ideas that undermine their worldview. The second main hypothesis derived from Terror Management Theory is that when self-esteem is lowered or the validity of a cultural worldview is damaged, then death anxiety will increase – a highly aversive experience, priming the search for a solution. Terror Management Theory is relevant for understanding religiously motivated terrorism in the UK (and other western or European countries) in that our group of interest, young British Muslims, often experience conflict between their post-material, secular British versus their traditional Muslim worldviews and identities. We argue that for young Muslims in Britain, their native cultural defence against death anxiety is undermined by the western, secular worldview and its contradictory sources for self-esteem. This tension is doubly exacerbated by the (real and/or imagined) exclusion and subordination that young Muslims experience within the dominant British secular culture. The resultant state of lowed self-esteem and anxiety has two effects. One, according to Terror Management Theory, is that young British Muslims are likely to respond negatively towards the dominant western culture that excludes or subordinates them (and damages their Muslim cultural world view). Two, they are primed to find a solution to the anxiety and lowered self-esteem. The solution, it is observed, is occurring through an intensification of religious (rather than ethnic) identity. Well-intentioned government policies that have emphasised sensitivity towards the cultural differences of the Muslim community in the UK (rather than shared citizenship) have inadvertently heightened feelings of difference and exclusion [8]. These sentiments readily connect with an imported radical Islam that emphasises the differential status of large social groups (the West vs. Islam), resentment over past and present political wrongs, and the formation of a new morally superior social identity through an intensification of Islamic belief and practice. Religious and political aspects of Islamic identity are thus intensified for second and third generation young Muslims in the UK, in contradistinction to the more ethnically based, communal, and traditional identity of their parents. The new Islam achieves a number of aims: young people can ‘divorce’ themselves from their parent’s inferior status, they can enjoy can enhanced self-esteem through their Islamic identity (with a moral superiority over the decadent West), and death anxiety is buffered by a robust worldview and through their participation in a transnational ‘umma’, with its overtones of eventual supremacy. Thus, the lowered self-esteem and damaged worldview resulting from un-buffered death anxiety are effectively rebuilt by a new radical Islamic worldview. In line with Terror Management Theory, research has shown that judgments against transgressions (perceived to contravene the values and standards of a particular worldview) are more severe when death is made salient, although this was so only when the aspect of death (intrapersonal, interpersonal, or transpersonal) that was made salient coincided with the type of transgression and the aspect of death that the participants most feared [13]. Moral outrage and punitive judgments against transgressions amongst young British Muslims are particularly evident in relation to headscarves, sexual mores, halal meat, and blasphemy. These can be understood to concern interpersonal, social aspects of identity in that they are to do with honour and purity issues. While social identity may be most salient on a day-to-day basis (particularly to do with

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purity issues) for young Muslims in the West, it appears that the new Islam assuages all three aspects of fear of death. Our argument thus far is that the post-material condition of Britain presents young Muslims with value conflict and identity uncertainty, and thus challenges to their cultural worldview and self-esteem. The neo-Islamist worldview provides individuals, in their day-to-day experience, with a robust defence from the existential anxiety that results. Thus, we argue that measures of Mortality Salience (across intrapersonal, interpersonal, and transpersonal domains) will provide a good indicator of the degree of tension Muslims are experiencing in a Western context, in that their ability to maintain a cultural worldview that defends against death anxiety is under threat.

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2.2. Uncertainty Reduction Theory Uncertainty reduction research derives from the finding that most people do not categorise themselves into groups unless there is a motive to alleviate uncertainty in the first place. Uncertainty is said to arise from instability, as in economic crises or war, and from the inability to obtain confirmation for one’s beliefs and attitudes from objective criteria. If this occurs, there is the need to find a group that verifies these elements of one’s cultural worldview [14]. The fit with European Muslims is apparent. Self-categorisation research defines the existence of a group in terms of people sharing a self-conception defined by a representation of the group. The representation takes the form of a prototype – a fuzzy set of features that captures ingroup similarities and intergroup differences regarding beliefs, attitudes, behaviours, and feelings [15]. Similarities among ingroup members and differences between the ingroup and all other outgroups are typically exaggerated, as this helps to maintain clear category boundaries, and enhances identity clarity. As people shift from a more personal, individualistic self-representation to a group oriented self-categorisation, their attitudes, behaviour, and self-construal will be more influenced by the group’s prototype. Group-based self-categorisation (defined by the group prototype) will result in depersonalisation of the self and others: people will selfdefine and behave in ways that match the prototype and will perceive outgroup members in terms of what makes them different from the group prototype. Thus, perception of self and other is organised, and simplified, by the group prototype [15]. For example, as young British Muslims experience self-definitional uncertainty from the conflict between their British and Muslim values and identities, they will be motivated to join groups with which to identify. This process is already heightened in adolescence as part of normal socio-psychological development, as ‘adolescents are primarily concerned with what they appear to be in the eyes of others compared to what they feel they are’ [16]. The unique, complex features of threatened young Muslims’ personal identity will subside in preference for identification with the group prototype. By categorising the self as a group member akin to the group prototype resulting in a degree of depersonalisation, a well-delineated self-concept achieved free from uncertainty. Self-categorisation in a group that has a clear, simple prototype will be more effective in alleviating self-definitional uncertainty than a less well-differentiated group prototype. In contexts of particularly high uncertainty, there will be an upsurge in the formation of, and identification with, highly homogeneous groups that (a) enforce strong conformity to the group prototype, and (b) that maximally differentiate themselves from other groups in uncertainty relevant dimensions. As such, groups that are highly homogeneous and intolerant of internal diversity will be attractive to people undergo-

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ing extreme levels of uncertainty. Although the depersonalisation resulting from selfcategorisation in terms of the group does not necessarily entail total deindividuation (the total loss of previous self-definition) or the dehumanisation of outgroup members, we posit that under group pressure it can very well lead to these states. These latter states, we will argue later on, can legitimate violence against the faceless, hated ‘other’. The uncertainty reduction hypothesis has been tested in minimal group experimental studies as well as with correlational survey methodology [14]. The main design for the minimal group experiments was one in which participants were randomly subjected to one of two conditions: (a) they were made to perform a task involving uncertainty (e.g. judging what was happening in a series of ambiguous pictures) or (b) a task that did not involve uncertainty (e.g. judge what was happening in unambiguous pictures). Then, each participant was put in a group based on trivial considerations criteria (e.g. receiving either a blue or a red tag) and asked to distribute goods and to answer selfreport measures about their feelings towards members with the same and different colour tags. Results of this type of study consistently show that it is only under uncertainty that group identification develops and when a marked favouritism bias towards the members of the ingroup – an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ mentality – develops. Moreover, when information about the group’s responses is disclosed, the more identification and group bias is geared towards homogeneous ingroups. Correlational naturalistic research has also supported the uncertainty reduction hypothesis. In a study on motivation to join university clubs, the participants who where less certain about their self-concept were the most motivated to join clubs that were distinctive (and had an unambiguous prototype). Moreover, once they joined, the prototypicality of the group was related to their level of identification with it, and a posterior sense of certainty about their self-concept [14]. In another naturalistic study with Australian university students, there was a positive relationship between the levels of selfconceptual uncertainty and the degree to which participants identified with highly prototypical and ethnocentric political parties and the endorsement of their worldview [14]. Thus, totalist (extremist) groups are well able to assimilate members’ uncertain personal identities to a clear group identity, which is often exemplified by the group leader (usually male). Personal doubt and ambiguity about the world are replaced by group beliefs – and group beliefs (particularly religious beliefs) are much better equipped to withstand threats to convictions and worth than are individual’s beliefs. Such groups are effective in reducing the experience of uncertainty caused by threats to the beliefs and worth of individuals. The process leading towards terrorism can unfold as follows: • • •

Personal identity is assimilated to the totalist group identity. The individual can lose their sense of personal responsibility, enabling the planning of terrorist acts without incurring regret. Members of outgroups can be viewed, not as individuals, but as an amorphous, homogeneous, dehumanised mass viewed in simplified and negative terms.

Prior research with incarcerated terrorist indicates that their personal identity is assimilated to their group identity (and is thus simplified) to the point of being fused, and that their perceptions of the hated outgroup undergo simplification and stereotyping [1]. Consequently, the way is paved for the abrogation of normal moral revulsion towards killing; moral responsibility is bequeathed to the group leader. In this way, totalist groups have been found to play a pivotal role in preparing of young people for acts of terrorism. Thus, we argue that measuring the degree of loss of complexity in regards to

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conceptions of self and other will be an effective measure of an individual’s (or group) vulnerability to the influence of extremist groups.

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2.3. Social Identity Theory Once groups are formed to resolve the uncertainty that motivated their existence, groups will compete for status. Social identity theory, deriving from the minimal group experiment, posits that once groups are formed, there will be a competitive relationship between groups that is motivated by the need to derive a positive self-evaluation from one’s group membership [15]. Social identity combines two normal human processes. The first process concerns the categories people use to simplify the flow of stimuli that makes up our experience of the world. Exaggerating differences between one’s ingroup from other groups, while minimising differences among one’s own ingroup members, helps people to maintain clear social categories. The second process concerns the ongoing need for positive self-esteem. It is normal for people to favour their own group (their ingroup), and to enhance its image. The flip side of this is that by comparison, other groups (outgroups) are often denigrated. The minimal group experiments show that this occurs even when group membership is somewhat arbitrary and without a past history [17]. The minimal group experiments are now legendary in social psychology research, revealing profound, robust aspects of human nature. In a minimal group experiment, a group of strangers is divided in two subgroups by a researcher based on a trivial characteristic like eye colour, preference for a particular painting over another, or simply on the basis of a purely random process. Individuals are then given an amount of money to distribute to others in the group. Even though participants are constrained by a widespread tendency to avoid gross injustice, there is a strong preference to favour members of the ingroup vs. outgroup with more money. Interestingly, participants distribute the money in such a way so that the ingroup does better than the outgroup, even if that means that the ingroup receives less money overall. What matters the most is to do better than the others (entailing ‘doing the other group down’). Surprisingly, the members of the group had not met before and where not benefiting personally from the money distributed [15]. These landmark experiments reveal the stark way humans categorise people as ‘us’ and ‘them’, and how an immediate ingroup preference takes place. The continued replication of the findings cross-culturally has prompted the hypothesis with an evolutionary origin. A psychological mechanism is hypothesised to have evolved to enable hominids to identify good and bad reciprocators. In brief, the evolutionary explanation involves a limited amount of resources to invest in collective enterprises like hunting, so that hominids developed a way to differentiate who to collaborate with, and whom to exclude, on the basis of maximising the potential benefit of collaboration [18]. Social Identity Theory has built upon the minimal group experimental findings to the wider arena of intergroup conflict and collective mobilisation. This is where Social Identity Theory becomes particularly relevant to the study of Islamic terrorism in the wider context of post-material Western society. The main points are that belonging to groups, and the value one attaches to different groups in society, will reflect in part the value and prospects of the individual: the individual’s social self-concept. As such, people feel strongly motivated to achieve a positive and superior performance of their group vis-à-vis other groups. Thus they are prepared to behave in a way that increases the likelihood of that happening [19]. It is the subjective perception of the group’s

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status that matters to individuals. The individual will construct the image of a group based on personal experiences, choice, and, on ‘what is out there’ in the theatre of intergroup ideology communicated by elites and the media. Although not all our bases for self-enhancement comes from belonging to a group, an important part of our selfevaluation will be based on our membership in groups. (For example, the importance of our group-based self-evaluation vs. our individual based evaluation can shift. A deficit in personal positive self-evaluation might motivate a shift to a more group-based search for self-enhancement [20]). Interestingly, social groups will not only seek to be positively evaluated, but to be distinct and identifiable from other groups. Groups will create distinct identities in order to be differentiated from other existing groups and to have a particular self-concept. Groups will adopt identity markers and ideologies that stand out in some way and make them salient in what would otherwise be an undifferentiated social perceptual field, an observable tendency among neo-Islamists in Europe [21]. It is clear that groups stand in varying power and prestige relationships to each other [22]. Some group memberships will be open to incorporate members of other groups, while other memberships are closed. Skilled individuals from a subordinate group to whom dominant group membership is closed will tend to mobilise others in their own group in order to improve the group’s status as a whole: a group strategy (rather than an individual strategy) will be taken. Conversely, when upward mobility between groups is possible, the motivation to adopt a group strategy by members of subordinate groups diminishes. The more dominant, resourceful groups will have better chances of disseminating their own version of who is better and why, and will seek to perpetuate their dominant position. Members of groups in a disadvantaged or minority position (such as young British Muslims) will have a dissonant view of their group and how it is constructed in wider society. Members of such groups comparing adversely with other ‘dominant’ groups will be motivated to change the perception of their subordinate status. However, members of the dominant group will want to resist that. Consequently, conflict over group status will be an integral part of dynamic intergroup situations. The nature of Islamic terrorism that seeks to alter the symbolic status of groups on the world stage, more so than seeking to achieve particular discrete goals, fits in well with these research findings. Even though members of groups that compare negatively to other more dominant groups find that this impacts their self-concept negatively, it is only when other alternatives are subjectively entertained and deemed possible that group members will venture into trying to achieve a revision of the hierarchy. When groups see the status relationship situation as non-permanent and unstable, together with the perception that the current situation is illegitimate and unfair, these perceptions combine to catalyse collective mobilisation to bring about change. In this vein, 9/11 introduced perceptions of new possibilities for a sweeping revision of global group status hierarchies. When a group stops seeing itself as inevitably subordinate to another, and when altering its inferior status becomes a realistic possibility, a radical shift in ideology will be needed in order to challenge the hierarchy of the dominant group. Ideologies designed for this task will include a justification for using different means of challenging the status quo, whether peaceful resistance (as in Gandhi’s satyagraha) or terrorism (distorting and over-extending concepts of jihad). Moreover, the historical fact of the past grandeur of Islam and the popularity of ‘illegitimate subordination’ in the writings of a host of Islamic intellectuals and popular culture [10] combine in the widely avail-

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able neo-Islamic discourse to reinforce the motivation to revise the current status hierarchy of Islam vis-à-vis the West. Interestingly, when the possibility of challenging the dominant group is very unrealistic, groups will tend to become creative – in that they will try to redefine what makes a group fare better when compared another group (‘Black is beautiful’) [22]. For example, a group might try to propagate a message to the effect that money is not what is important, but having strong family values is, thus seeing itself as outdoing a dominant group in terms of being family oriented. However, dominant groups will try to keep the popularity of these alternative versions in check through their own communicational apparatuses. Dominant groups will resist the redefinition of what should be considered as evidence of the status of a group. Experimental group and real group based evidence for Social Identity Theory has accumulated for several decades making it one of the most successful research programs in social psychology, profusely summarised elsewhere [23]. Both experimental and real group research has confirmed that subordinate groups take very different actions depending upon whether they perceive that the dominant group allows individuals from lower status to gain access to higher status groups. Moreover, the perception that the status of the dominant group can be challenged will result in a shift from non-status relative dimensions in which comparison can be beneficial to subordinate groups to status-relevant ones. Thus a direct confrontation between groups to revise existing status hierarchies occurs [24]. Social Identity Theory has proven useful in predicting how low and high status groups behave both through survey [24], in experimental research using a bio-medical measure [25], in archival research [26], and in the minimal group situation [22]. However, not all studies support Social Identity Theory. For example, studies that examine conflict over tangible resources such as land or water are less well supported. It is studies that focus on ‘prestige’ and other symbolic struggles, not simply in individual terms but as a social construction between groups, that are robust [17]. Thus, we argue that the social identity tradition is well suited to our purposes as it is particularly the conflict over ‘prestige’, status and other symbolic group struggles that pertain to Muslims in Britain and other Western nations. Social Identity Theory’s emphasis on subjective perceptions and the construction of social identity is particularly useful in a post-material context where group membership is not a ‘given’, but a matter of active identification. In this understanding, groups perform, as it were, in front of a ‘global’ audience. Their actions are staged not only for the ingroup, but also to get recognition by the outgroup, a perspective particularly useful for understanding the symbolic role of religiously motivated terrorism and its near-instant coverage by worldwide media. Thus, we argue that measures of perceptions of relevant group status hierarchies (such as Muslim vs. Western), and their perceived impermeability, legitimacy and stability will be useful in our proposed multi-stage, multi-variate method to identify young people vulnerable to terrorist actions. 2.4. Integrative Complexity (IC) and Violence Any occurrence in the social world can engender a wide range of perceptions. How complex these perceptions are comprise a powerful predictor for intergroup violence. Integrative complexity is a measure of individual or group information processing [27]. Integratively complex thinking recognises the legitimacy of different evaluative viewpoints, and is capable of higher order synthesis of these viewpoints. Low integrative

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complexity thinks in terms of, for example, binary, black and white contrasts with little or no integration of the perspectives. In previous research, IC analysis has predicted the course of major international crises leading to either the outbreak of war or to peaceful compromise [28,29], and thus provides a relevant validation measure for open-ended survey items. High levels of IC are predictive of conflict resolution in mediated negotiations [30]. When government officials of countries involved in a confrontation maintain or increase baseline levels of IC, a peaceful resolution of the dispute typically ensues. A drop in IC levels has been associated with conflict intensification and eventual military action [31]. Because integrative complexity cannot be ‘faked’, we argue that this will provide a robust measure to validate identified clusters of young people ripe for religiously-motivated violence. In the Recommendations Section, we outline how IC serves as a dependent variable and non-fakeable means of validating our findings on how young Muslims perceive groups’ status hierarchies in terms of impermeability, illegitimacy, and instability, and thus their vulnerability to mobilisation.

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3. Phenomenological Approaches As it appears that young Muslims are eschewing their ethnically based traditional Muslim identities in favour of a politicised, neo-Islamic identity, it is clear that participants are not just cultural dupes, but are actively constructing their own identity and world view in order to serve valued ends. There is little doubt that Saudi Salafist neo-Islamic discourse is a major resource for this task. People are attracted to ideologies that answer some compelling need. Ideologies (or discourses, bodies of spoken or written text) ‘speak’ to people when they mirror something of their own worldview. ‘The rhetoric (discourse) which reaches us contains something which speaks straight to our own construction of meaning, while the rhetoric we ignore either has no connection with our structure of meaning or would affect us so profoundly that we must defend ourselves against it’ [32]. People choose courses of action that make sense given the ‘logic’ of their worldview. In light of this, we think that understanding how world views operate, and what actions make sense within them, will provide valuable markers for a composite mobilisation index identifying young people on the road towards terrorism. The components of a worldview are of interest across fields of sociology, theology, philosophy, literature and cognitive psychology. A number of models are proposed, and the one used here accords with a critical-realist perspective used across a number of these fields [33]. Building blocks of a worldview include, first of all, narratives. The telling of stories brings worldviews into articulation. ‘Worldviews provide stories through which human beings view reality… from these stories one can in principle discover how to answer the basic questions that determine human existence: who are we, where are we in the story-line, what is wrong, and what is the solution?’ Wright and others argue that a major purpose of a world view is to address these basic, existential questions of human life [33]. We have so far discussed how the neoIslamic discourse provides a way for young western Muslims to answer the ‘who are we?’ question concerning identity: self-definitional uncertainty is answered via group categorisation around a group prototype (discussed in Section 2.2). The neo-Islamic discourse also concerns ‘what is wrong’ with the social world, and does so in terms of unequal, illegitimate, and unstable group hierarchies (Section 2.3). The neo-Islamic discourse presents an array of ‘solutions’, including violent intergroup conflict in the

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name of jihad, deployed through suicide terrorism. Along with the stories and existential questions that a worldview addresses, worldviews also contain symbols and practices. These four elements of a worldview, stories, questions, symbols and practices, operate ‘in dialogue’ with the each other. Symbols (such as the Kabba circumambulated by pilgrims in Mecca) visually encapsulate stories, and enable people to actively participate in the worldview’s foundational narratives. Pilgrimage to Mecca is a practice that makes sense in the light of Islam’s basic story of Mohammed’s victorious entrance into Mecca; it is an action that answers existential questions and fosters intense emotion. The death of Hussein is also a symbol that can provide meaning for the death of contemporary martyrs. Thus, stories, symbols and practices interpenetrate and provide ways of expressing emotions that arise from current experience interpreted within a given framework. And emotions, because they motivate action, are important to consider as part of a mobilisation index. Finally, world views comprise a set of beliefs that are organised in a particular way. And so, in the next section, we consider (a) stories, (b) the management of emotions through symbols and practices, (c) the cognitive organisational structure of the belief system, and (d) rhetorical strategies that flow from the cognitive structure to legitimate the worldview. All of these can be assessed in terms of their complexity, either on a cognitive (IC) or affective basis as part of a mobilisation index. To recap, these are relevant to a phenomenological investigation concerning how people construct their world views from which to decide courses of action.

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3.1. Stories Stories are a major cognitive tool that people use to make sense of the world. Stories account for the links between events (causation), and provide a sense concerning the way life should unfold (teleology). Children (of all ages) are gripped by a good story, and are frustrated if the ending is missed out, or is somehow incongruent. Stories work by building up a dramatic tension, and providing a resolution. In Section 2.3, we argued how perceptions of illegitimate group status hierarchies form the basis of a ‘counter-narrative’ to oppose the dominant culture’s narrative [34]. This story intensifies perceptions of injustice, and requires a resolution, one that is equally dramatic. Literary studies argue for a finite set of narrative structures (for example, used in comedy and tragedy) that lead to appropriate resolutions that ‘make sense’, both morally and dramaturgically. We argue that understanding the narrative structure that is being used within an individual or groups’ world view can provide a useful measure of radicalisation. Current radicalising discourse presents itself as ‘true’ Islam, but we argue that the underlying narrative structure fosters a state of ‘splitting’ where the ingroup is seen as all good, and the outgroup as all bad. This extreme lack of integrative complexity promotes the use of violence: it is necessary to exterminate the bad in order to preserve the good. This accords with ancient narrative structures like the one described by Ricoeur as ‘the myth of redemptive violence’. In this narrative structure, violence is seen as necessary and redemptive [35]. The myth of redemptive violence is rooted in the ancient Babylonian myth of creation: the Enuma Elish. In this myth, chaos and evil are seen as primordial and absolute, and must be continually conquered by force. This myth voices the struggle of the ancient empires to impose their control. All crimes against the polity are thus crimes against heaven, and are violently crushed for threatening the cosmic order. As chaos and evil are understood as the basic substratum of reality, pre-emptive force is continually required to keep it at bay. Violence is redemp-

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tive: it is the only way that good can be maintained. Our argument is that the threat to western Muslim’s cultural world view predisposes young Muslims to the logic of the ancient story-line of ‘redemptive violence’ in which the ‘enemy’ must be destroyed. This narrative structure screens out the more peaceful, integratively complex and universalising aspects of Islam. Another ancient narrative structure is described by Girard, who argues that the myth of the violent sacred has surfaced at times of crisis throughout the process of hominisation [36,37]. In the myth of the violent sacred, the substitutionary death of a scapegoat is required in order to save the social group. Girard argues that this basic scapegoating narrative underlies the three monotheisms, and can be activated in times of threat. This narrative, along with its urge towards a violent resolution, comes into play in times of extreme rivalrous crisis between social groups. When groups are locked in a rivalry so advanced that the existence of all is threatened, if a scapegoat can be found (usually randomly selected but having some odd or distinctive features), and violence enacted upon it, the ensuing catharsis saves the wider society from selfdestruction. Both the powerful drive to kill the enemy and preserve the group are realised through scapegoating. In radicalising discourse, suicide bombers are exhorted to expunge evil through the killing of random targets. We think that the degree to which the logical structure of primitive narratives such as the myth of redemptive violence or the violent sacred (or others) are experienced as compelling to users of the discourse can provide an indication of mobilisation. In extreme cases, the end of the ‘story’ has already been decided upon.

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3.2. Management of Emotion Through Symbol and Practice It is widely accepted that religious discourses impinge upon the ‘heart’ (emotions) as well as the ‘head’ (mind). We argued earlier that symbols and practices are aspects of a worldview that evoke and express emotion. Religious knowing is a complex process that relies on two cognitive subsystems to do with meaning: (a) a word-based, propositional knowing to do with linear processing and rationality, and (b) implicational knowing to do with latent, dense meanings not easily translated into language. Implicational knowing has to do with deeply felt meanings that synthesise input from sensory perception, bodily states, and emotions. It is a more holistic and integrative process. Its content is articulated in symbol, metaphor, art, myth or ritual [38]. Religious knowing draws upon propositional discourse and implicational symbols and practices. These ideally function as a holistic system: propositional statements are not understood in an implicational contextual vacuum, nor are ritual practices devoid of the rational understanding provided by the tradition. Religious devotees thus possess a reservoir of wordbased and implicational knowledge with which to understand the multiple meanings of religious content. Under these ideal conditions, polarised conclusions from religious discourse are usually avoided. However, religious discourse can be manipulated to isolate implicational from propositional content, thus destroying the polyvalent nature of religious knowing and promoting extreme conclusions. For example, a paucity of implicational processing may make religious knowing more ‘literalistic’ and inflexible. Too much implicational knowing, without a balance of rational, word-based knowing, can prevent intelligent analysis of a religious discourse. We posit that religious discourses that give the appearance of strict rationality while evoking intense emotion may make control of basic emotions like rage and fear more difficult. And so the degree to which neo-Islamic discourse is processed by individuals or groups along ex-

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tremes of propositional or implicational knowing may be significant. Given that basic emotions like fear or rage galvanise unreflective action, we think that individuals and groups using extremes of propositional or implicational processing of religious discourse will be more vulnerable to seeking violent resolutions.

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3.3. Cognitive Organisation of Belief Systems World views, particularly religious world views, comprise a set of beliefs. Whether a belief system is organised in a closed or open way has systematic cognitive consequences [39]. A closed belief system is one that is organised around a central authority belief. For example, fundamentalist Christianity is organised around the literal interpretation of the sacred Scripture deemed inerrant. In a closed system like this, the validity of all other beliefs logically descends from the inviolate, sacred authority belief. Beliefs are true because, for example, ‘the Bible tells me so’. Disconfirming evidence is not allowed to modify the authority belief, and is systematically screened out. As conflicting perspectives are routinely excluded, arguments within a closed belief system can show lower integrative complexity. Hood, Hill & Williamson argue that the prevailing Islamic belief system is organised in this way, intratextually, around a central authority belief (the revelation of the Qu’ran) [40]. The sacred text is deemed to be the only source of absolute truth, therefore all other beliefs must be validated in a one-way direction from the authority belief to peripheral beliefs. Peripheral beliefs may ‘talk to each other’, but there is no ‘talking back’ to the sacred text. Thus any danger of the authority belief being modified is prevented. Once the initial premise is accepted, reasoning within a closed system can proceed in a rationalistic way; indeed ‘rationalism’ is a feature of both Christian and neo-Islamic fundamentalist discourse. Whereas religious closed belief systems are, in the first instance, motivated to defend the fundamentals of the faith, they can provide ideologues with handy rhetorical strategies that forbid questioning or alternate perspectives. It is a malign coincidence that a closed system is precisely what a recruiter could wish for in a successful, obedient terrorist who does not ask questions or entertain alternate perspectives. Therefore, of interest is the degree to which users of neo-Islamic discourse have internalised the habit of ‘closed’, one-directional reasoning as part of a composite mobilisation index. 3.4. Rhetorical Strategies It is not incidental that radical neo-Islamic discourse purports to connect people to God. If you are going to mobilise people to kill themselves and others, people are reluctant to venture into that territory unless they believe they have God on their side. The way radicalisers have harnessed religious belief to political ends is through rhetorical strategies. We have already discussed at length ‘us and them’ binary thinking in Section 2.2. We have discussed the intensification of perceptions of inequality and injustice (Section 2.3), how narrative structures can promote violence (Section 3.1), and how emotions are managed (Section 3.2). We have discussed how the authority beliefs of a closed system legitimate other beliefs in a one-way direction (Section 3.3). These are part and parcel of known rhetorical strategies that combine to make a particular worldview seem self-evidently correct, and that are difficult to argue against. Other widely used rhetorical strategies to legitimate a world view are: ‘thin end of the wedge’ (acceptance of any Western value will lead to total moral decay), ‘foot in the door’ (quota-

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tions from the Qu’ran open the door), black and white contrasts followed by a threepart list, (‘we are right, they are wrong, here are three reasons why), caricatures (‘the Great Satan’) and appearance of rationality. When these strategies are framed within religious content, the moral authority of religion is harnessed to spurious ends. Religion as a legitimator of a discourse is a powerful tool because religion provides people with a comprehensive meaning system, a complete and accessible worldview. Religious belief fosters a sense of connection with the transcendent, personal significance, efficacy, self-worth, and a community of belonging. A religious worldview protects from the intrapersonal fear of death (the destruction of one’s own body) and provides assurances of an afterlife and of the honour of a martyr’s death. Whatever mixed motivations may have led up to radicalisation, once God is in the picture, God is very hard to remove. Sincere religious belief, once harnessed, has a life of its own. We think that the degree to which young people process the rhetoric of radical Islam as authentic religious belief, yet in a cognitively simple way, provides another mobilising factor. To conclude our literature review (Sections 2 and 3), the tragic reality is that the neo-Islamic discourse serves a dual purpose: it provides a religious solution to the selfdefinitional uncertainty experienced by many European Muslims, but is also one in which terrorist actions ‘make sense’ in its highly simplified world view. If radicalisers themselves are politically motivated, but suicide bombers are ‘religiously’ motivated, this comprises the ultimate in religious abuse: a relationship with God is promised, but at the cost of complex reality being destroyed. The fully radicalised person may be one who has moved from value conflict and uncertainty to a new coherence. This person may display a sort of bizarre purity, a simplicity arising from having perfected a binary vision of the universe.

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4. Recommendations Based on our analysis of the psychological literature, this four-stage research design aims to identify social niches vulnerable to religiously motivated violent radicalisation on the basis of participants strength of identification with a social group and on perceptions of ingroup status standing in relationship to outgroups, beliefs on the legitimacy of this standing, and beliefs about the stability and likeliness of achieving a shift in the power hierarchy. Once we identify the demographic and socioeconomic niches of those scoring high on socio-cognitive predictors of collective mobilisation within a representative sample within the Muslim community, and obtain in depth information gathered by running group within identified niches, we will be able to point out the characteristics of the most vulnerable social niches from which terrorists might arise – and consequently the most urgent to attend to. Moreover, the qualitative group generated data will reveal the subjective discourse that frames particular niches’ grievances and motivation to act. This will be useful in any initiatives that involve engagement with these subcultures. In a summary way, we recommend a research program with the following phases. 4.1. Uncover Clusters of Young People Vulnerable to Violent Radicalisation In the first phase, clusters across a broad representative sample of British Muslims (aged 18 to 35), will be identified via survey, on the basis of socio-cognitive processes known to precede intergroup conflict: the categorising of the social world into a sharply Suicide Bombers: the Psychological, Religious and Other Imperatives, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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demarcated, impermeable ingroup and outgroup, the assignment of a lower status to the ingroup, the belief that the prevailing status hierarchy is illegitimate, and the perception of an opportunity for changing it. The survey data will be submitted to statistical analysis for identifying meaningful subgroups within a larger population. 4.2. Profile the Clusters Profiling will take place by testing for discriminating differences in regards to age, sex, socioeconomic status, ethnic identity, immigration history, religiosity, acculturation level, geographic location of residence, and conditions of social segregation across clusters. Once a thorough description of each cluster is complete, a label that captures the social type of each cluster will be assigned. A mobilisation index, an ‘at risk’ score, will be assigned to each cluster, to aid prioritising suggested intervention strategies. 4.3. Assess the Validity of Clusters on the Basis of Cognitive and Attitudinal Correlates of Intergroup Violence Measure participants’ group interview data in terms of degree of integrative complexity (the degree of cognitive simplification by which, for example, outgroup members are perceived as a simplified, stereotyped, homogeneous entity). These scores will be correlated with the mobilisation index scores in order to validate the cluster solution with this independent and social desirability-resistant measure.

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4.4. Gain Phenomenological Understanding via Group Interviews Through group interviews with identified clusters of young people, gain deeper understanding into how each cluster uses narratives that undergird accounts of self, social world and God. Examine how rhetorical strategies harness religious motivation, and how emotions are managed. An examination of integrative complexity (assessed using structured interview tasks) will provide understanding about how people build up and intensify a world view in which terrorist actions are legitimated and how these can be resisted (by comparing with the data from ‘low risk’ clusters). 4.5. Develop Prevention and Community Building Initiatives Arising from the Research Findings Our review of the literature argues for initiatives that enable young Muslims to deal with the pervasive problems of self-definitional uncertainty. As Mirza et al. [8] have argued, the diversity among Muslim communities necessitates a variety of programmes tailored to specific groups. Our analysis of qualitative data derived from group interviews within each identified niche will be useful for Imams and community leaders to better understand the burgeoning neo-Islamic youth subcultures that gratify identity needs. We aim to understand how to promote the emergence of leaders who can provide young Muslims with a new group prototype – marrying the attractiveness of European post-material humanistic values while fostering European-born Islamic cultural capital. We think such leaders can have a good chance of replacing foreign grown neoIslamic models until there is a reduction both in Muslims’ achievement gap and to their collective sense of grievance. Our qualitative analysis will also reveal the legitimate

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political and moral demands of young Muslims, and how current framing of those demands interferes with their engagement in legitimate political activity that strives for change. The group interview data will help to inform curriculi for de-radicalising programmes that enable young Muslims to see through the way radicalisers employ narrative, emotions, and rhetorical strategies in order to legitimate the neo-Islamist view of reality and occlude alternate perspectives and creative solutions. In order for young people to forego simplistic reactions to post-materialism, such as that provided by neo-Islam, the ability to develop the capacity for higher order synthesis of competing Islamic and post-material values (without privileging one set over the other) will help young Muslims to move beyond the forced choice of assimilation vs. radicalisation. Our results will help inform programs that aim to develop the cognitive habit of taking multiple perspectives when assessing information (integrative complexity). Strengthening integrative complexity within secondary education will soften the culture of dogmatism prevailing within Islamic religious schools, yet without provoking the defensiveness caused by threatening Muslims’ valued worldview.

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References [1] Post, J.M., When hatred is bred in the bone: Psycho-cultural foundations of contemporary terrorism. Political Psychology, 2005. 26(4): p. 615-636. [2] Inglehart, R. and C. Welzel, Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence. 2005, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. [3] Norris, P. and R. Inglehart, Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide. Cambridge studies in social theory, religion, and politics. 2004, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. [4] Heelas, P., The spiritual revolution: Why religion is giving way to spirituality. Religion and spirituality in the modern world. 2005, Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub. [5] Baktiari, B. and A.R. Norton, Voices within Islam: Four perspectives on tolerance and diversity. Current History, 2005. 104: p. 37-43. [6] Kepel, G., The war for Muslim minds: Islam and the West. 2004, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. [7] Amirpur, K., The changing approach to the text: Iranian scholars and the Quran. Middle Eastern Studies, 2005. 41(3): p. 337-350. [8] Mirza, M., A. Senthilkumaran, and Z. Ja’far, Living apart together: British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism. 2007, Policy Exchange: London. [9] Nettler, R.L., M. Mahmoud, and J. Cooper, Islam and modernity: Muslim intellectuals respond. 2000, London: I. B. Tauris. [10] Moghaddam, F.M., From the terrorists’ point of view: What they experience and why they come to destroy. 2006, Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International. [11] Bassett, J.F., Does threatening valued components of cultural worldview alter explicit and implicit attitudes about death? Individual Differences Research, 2005. 3(4): p. 260-268. [12] Greenberg, J. and E. Jonas, Psychological motives and political orientation: The Left, the Right, and the Rigid (Comment on Jost et al.). Psychological Bulletin, 2003. 129(3): p. 376-382. [13] Florian, V. and M. Mikulincer, Fear of death and the judgment of social transgressions: A multidimensional test of Terror Management Theory. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 1997. 73(2): p. 369-380. [14] Hogg, M.A., Uncertainty and extremism: Identification with high entitativity groups under conditions of uncertainty, in The psychology of group perception: perceived variability, entitativity, and essentialism, V. Yzerbyt, C.M. Judd, and O. Corneille, Editors. 2003, Psychology Press: New York, NY. [15] Hogg, M.A. and D. Abrams, Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations and group processes. 1988, London: Routledge. [16] Erikson, E.H., Childhood and society. 1993, New York: Norton. [17] Taylor, D.M. and F.M. Moghaddam, Theories of intergroup relations: International social psychological perspectives. 2nd ed. 1994, Westport, Conn.: Praeger. [18] Abrams, D., M.A. Hogg, and J.M. Marques, The social psychology of inclusion and exclusion. 2005, New York: Psychology Press.

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[19] Hornsey, M.J. and M.A. Hogg, The effects of status on subgroup relations. Br J Soc Psychol, 2002. 41(Pt 2): p. 203-218. [20] Abrams, D. and M.A. Hogg, Metatheory: Lessons from social identity research. Pers Soc Psychol Rev, 2004. 8(2): p. 98-106. [21] Hogg, M.A., et al., Uncertainty, entitativity, and group identification. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2007. 43(1): p. 135-142. [22] Jackson, L.A., et al., Achieving Positive Social Identity: Social Mobility, Social Creativity, and Permeability of Group Boundaries. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 1996. 70(2): p. 241-254. [23] Hogg, M.A. and J. Cooper, The Sage handbook of social psychology. 2003, London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. [24] Mummendey, A.l., et al., Socio-structural characteristics of intergroup relations and identity management strategies: Results from a field study in East Germany. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1999. 29(2/3): p. 259-285. [25] Scheepers, D. and N. Ellemers, When the pressure is up: The assessment of social identity threat in low and high status groups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2005. 41: p. 192-200. [26] Douglas, K.M., et al., Understanding cyberhate: Social competition and social creativity in Online White supremacist groups. Social Science Computer Review, 2005. 23(1): p. 68-76. [27] Suedfeld, P., K. Guttieri, and P.E. Tetlock, Assessing integrative complexity at a distance: Archival analyses of thinking and decision making, in The psychological assessment of political leaders: With profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, J.M. Post, Editor. 2003, University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor. p. 246-272. [28] Satterfield, J.M. and M.E.P. Seligman, Military aggression and risk predicted by explanatory style. Psychological Science, 1994. 5(2): p. 77-82. [29] Tetlock, P.E. and A. Tyler, Churchill’s cognitive and rhetorical style: The debates over Nazi intentions and self-government for India. Political Psychology, 1996. 17: p. 149-169. [30] Liht, J., P. Suedfeld, and A. Krawczyk, Integrative complexity in face-to-face negotiations between the Chiapas guerrillas and the Mexican Government. Political Psychology, 2005. 26(4): p. 543-552. [31] Suedfeld, P., P.E. Tetlock, and S. Streufert, Conceptual/integrative complexity, in Motivation and personality: Handbook of thematic content analysis, C.P. Smith, Editor. 1992, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. p. 393-400. [32] Rowe, D., Wanting everything. 1994, New York: Harper Collins. [33] Lupfer, M. and K. Wald, An exploration of Adults’ religious orientations and their philosophies of Human Nature. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1985. 24(3): p. 293-304. [34] Casebeer, W.D. and J.A. Russell, Storytelling and terrorism: Towards a comprehensive counternarrative strategy. Strategic Insights, 2005. 4(3): p. 16-31. [35] Ricœur, P., Fallible man. Rev. ed. 1986, New York: Fordham University Press. [36] Girard, R., Violence and the sacred. 1977, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. [37] Girard, R., The scapegoat. 1986, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. [38] Watts, F., Implicational and propositional religious meanings, University of Cambridge: Cambridge. [39] Rokeach, M., The open and closed mind: Investigations into the nature of belief systems and personality systems. 1960, New York: Basic Books. [40] Hood, R.W., P.C. Hill, and W.P. Williamson, The psychology of religious fundamentalism. 2005, New York: Guilford Press.

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Suicide Bombers: The Psychological, Religious and Other Imperatives M. Sharpe (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-886-1-27

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British Muslims Sheikh Musa ADMANI1 et al The Luqman Institute of Education and Development, London, UK

Abstract. A new method of education is required in Muslim communities to defuse the radicals. Such a method, based on Qur’anic teachings and espousal of bedrock Western values, can be effective. Keywords. British Muslims, education, testimony of former extremists

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Introduction We are living in exciting times, where history is being made before our very eyes. The events surrounding Muslim communities in the UK are being closely monitored by other minority groups, anxious to see the practical outcomes of modern day British pluralism. This makes it all the more important, I feel, that we as a society must get it right. We cannot afford to misinterpret our current situation nor undermine its importance to the future development of not only British society, but of the wider Western world and beyond. The issues of radicalism and extremism have come abruptly to the fore particularly after September 11th. However, as far back as the late eighties and early nineties there have been distinctive undercurrents at work in certain sections of the Muslim community. In this paper I will take the opportunity to explore how such influences have shaped the current outlook of British Muslims and how we, as concerned citizens, can work together in the interests of security and social harmony. I believe there is an underlying crisis of belonging amongst a great number of second and third generation British Muslims. While they are proud of their Islamic legacy they will openly question the wisdom of specific aspects of cultural import of religious orientation or parental heritage which may interfere with their freedoms. This critical attitude can be accredited to their British educational background from which many have benefited. Therefore one would have thought an attachment to a British heritage may have ensued from such a generation, but the reality is starkly different. Most view the environment of the British establishment as being un-Islamic and find no tangible motivation for loyalty to it. The presence of the extremist undercurrent has further increased this perception. The challenge for us is to question those elements that keep pushing the idea that British society is a “Kufr” (infidel) system. The London bombings in 2005 left over fifty British citizens dead, hundreds injured and a whole nation in shock – they are all victims of ideologically-driven terrorism. It is therefore incumbent upon us to critically examine these ideas that not only promote segregation but also drive a wedge between 1

The Luqman Institute of Education and Development, Toynbee Hall, 28 Commercial Street, London E1 6LS Email: [email protected]

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the native society and Muslims in Britain. It is this ideological challenge that we face today and tomorrow. First of all we need to question the concept that British society (like the rest of Europe) is Kuffar (i.e. an infidel society) and Muslims cannot partake in such a society. We need to explore what is Islam and what constitutes Islamic societies? If Islam is simply a religion of certain rituals and pronouncements then the British society would not be a society whose foundations are based on values that Islam recognises. On the other hand if the foundations of the British society which are based on the rule of law, equality, social justice, peace, security and human autonomy have an expression in Islamic scripture and literature then it is recognised by Islam. With different languages and perhaps differing emphasis, where people can live in harmony and benefit each other then it may not be a society that is founded on the religious line of, say, the Ottoman Empire or the first caliphate, but it is a society where these values are practised. The least we could say is that Britain is a non-Muslim society with values that are recognised in Islam and therefore as Muslims it is our duty to participate fully as its citizens. In fact the Qur’an tells us emphatically not to create mayhem on the earth and to work with those who try to reform society and to work for the betterment of all. Even in a society that is not recognised as Islamic or even a hostile society, the Qur’an guides its readers to participate in goodness, creating a harmonious society and refrain from creating chaos. Of course where the society’s fundamental values have their expressions in the scriptures then it is all the more important for Muslims to do their utmost for the betterment of all. Clearly the current state of affairs is not acceptable, as it is not conducive to the future harmony of inter-ethnic, inter-cultural and inter-religious relations in Britain. We need to challenge these ideas head on not only in Britain but perhaps through a Europe-wide effort by Muslims and non-Muslims to question the inwardly diffident and outwardly expressive assertive attitude that is hollow at its heart and antiprogressive in nature. This is the antithesis of Islam that was presented to the world 1400 years ago. Therefore if non-Muslims study the Qur’an and also raise these issues from time to time it would help those Muslims who are working within the communities to break out of the strangleholds of radical ideologies. This, in my view, will be a remarkable achievement for the Muslim communities in Europe and perhaps beyond. It is the Muslim orthodox that can be instrumental in breaking the shackles of radical and extremist ideology that suffocate Muslim communities in the UK. The question may arise how this group can be effective in this regard when they are characterised by narrowing perspectives on issues related not only to the wider British society but to the diversity of Muslim communities. However it is precisely here that I feel real progress can be achieved for a number of reasons. It is this moderate section that has the authority to reclaim the religious ground away from the radicals, whose legitimacy is reliant on the silence of the orthodox. Whereas the political radicals have an understanding of the Western philosophy, the orthodox communities have not yet been exposed to such knowledge in order to evaluate and make an informed opinion. With the exposure to critical examination and confidence the orthodoxy can achieve a change in direction for Muslim communities in the UK. In order to express themselves Muslims would not need to give up their practices but would need to participate in wider society. Many Muslims have little understanding of secular values. Islam is a non-hierarchical faith where knowledge and

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reasoning are the driving factors rather than authority or influence. This is the root, in my opinion, of conveying the message of humanity, temperance and respect through knowledge and education. Further and higher educational establishments should be our starting points extending that to wider communities focussing on parents and young people. It is an uphill struggle but with persistence we will triumph. A lot of initiatives have been put in place both by some sections of the Muslim communities and by the security agencies. What we need to do is to reorient the Muslim communities to a form of European life that is rooted in British culture and draws its references from the Qur’an and tradition.

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The question is how can we do this without alienating others?

First of all we need to recognise that Islamic literature is rich on the subject of moderation. European values are not alien to Islam. The Qur’an is the principle source of that tradition of security and social harmony. Islam is not, in my view, a geographical, imperial (though that is not to deny that the sociological history of past imperial activities of Muslim rulers has not created a social psychology of imperial nature) or racial religion. Rather it is a faith that puts humans at the centre of all activities and is deeply committed to improving the quality of the human condition. It is therefore very easy to come up with answers to problems of intellectual emptiness that give birth to envy, hatred, fear and insecurity. This is the challenge that faces us and we must not shy away from it. Certain unintended outcomes of Modernity have become causes of the politically motivated violence by these angry young men. The fact is that these people are also the direct beneficiaries of it at the same time. While we cannot turn the clock back we can try to educate them about the benefits of engagement and encourage them to contribute to the debate and struggle to better humanity’s well-being. We should work hard to put our resources into eliminating poverty, injustice, lack of human dignity and corruption wherever it exist in the world. We must expose the inconsistency of their arguments and psychological imbalances and how they are acting against the Islamic teachings that they have claimed to love and promote. We can win this battle by exposing and arguing against the hideous ideology that nurtures such inhumane behaviour and instead promote an Islam that articulates the spirit of compassion, love and care in spite of the bumpy ride that we may face in the short term.

Annex: The testimonies of two former Islamic extremists 'A' I was born and brought up in the UK until the age of eleven when my family moved to Pakistan in 1986 with the aim of learning the language, culture and religion. My father was concerned that the negative aspects of British culture could potentially affect us, for instance the immoral relationships, drugs, clubs, etc. In Karachi I studied the Quran at the local mosque, which taught an anti-shia ideology. My parents believed in living harmoniously with everyone in society, morals and manners were instilled in us at home. From an early age I started fasting and was enthusiastic about prayers. In 1992

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we moved back to the UK so I could pursue higher education. At that point my practice of Islam was the basics of prayer, fasting and reading the Quran in Arabic, though I could not understand it. The initial influence towards religion was from my paternal uncle who is very traditional and strict in his views. Having moved back to the UK we spent much time with him and his family. The five lots of daily prayers in congregation were a must. Later the need for segregation and Hijaab (headscarf) for women was a recurring issue - something resisted by my family. I initially went to Acton College where my cousin was also studying. There I made some friends and was impressed by Muslims practising Islam in a western setting. I continued to study my A-levels at Brentside High School. There I recall we arranged a special room for prayers during Ramadan. It was during that year that I met a Muslim called Zaheer (a Hizb-Ut-Tahrir2 activist) at a bus stop and we started talking about Islam. He had an intellectual viewpoint that was very appealing to me. He saw Islam as a complete way of life, addressing all social and political issues. He used to hold weekly study circles at his home in Perivale and invited me along. It was a nice social gathering where, alongside some of my cousins, I made many friends and started to learn about Islam. The Sunnah (example and ways) of the Prophet were taught. Other themes were: Muslims are one Ummah (community), divine fate and destiny, God’s pleasure, and the hereafter. The superiority of Islamic society and the inferiority and superficial nature of the Kuffar (infidel) society, with its numerous vices, was emphasised. There was a disregard for the British law and Shariah law was taught. For instance, car insurance was forbidden (Haraam) because of some contractual issue. Hizb-Ut-Tahrir (HT) emphasised that monetary interest was Haraam - therefore loans and mortgages were not allowed nor credit cards. The importance and obligation of gaining knowledge with a group was emphasised. The working towards re-establishing the Khilafah (Islamic state, caliphate) was an obligation more important than any other, such as duties and responsibilities to parents, and education was belittled. We were then encouraged to attend regular talks and engage other Muslims with these ideas. In those days there were weekly circles at the old Hounslow mosque. There were many debates in those days between HT and high profile opponents. They were highly publicised and very appealing because of the charismatic speakers and HT would capitalise on this and recruit new people. The influence from my cousins coupled with the HT culture created narrowness in my views and antagonism in my nature. My attendance at these talks worried my parents. There was a disparity in views between my family and myself that caused much discord. I would preach at home about the need for regular prayers, the evils of watching TV (especially Indian films) and the necessity for females to wear the scarf. I know a few families who are very resentful of Hizb-Ut-Tahrir and the like because they indoctrinated their children, dampening their academic aspirations and reducing their potential. I did not do well in my A-levels and took a gap year in which I got my first office job. It was a market research company in Ealing where I worked with people of different European nationalities and I learned new skills. I remember an English person working there who was married to a Spaniard. He was very different to 2 Hizb-Ut-Tahrir calls for the total destruction of the existing political order, particularly in Muslim countries, and for the establishment of a Caliphate (an Islamic state run on Shariah law) in its place. It “…believe[s] that the Muslim ummah [i]s in a state of war with the west, particularly Britain, France, Russia and the United States. Besides… their enemies [a]re kafir not deserving of honesty or integrity.” (The Islamist, Ed Husain, Penguin 2007).

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the others in character. It heartened me that although he was not a believer (i.e. not a practising Christian, Muslim or Jew) he did not drink alcohol or eat pork and was virtuous. Although he did not prescribe to a faith he was “good” and it made me wonder what would be the fate of such a person in the hereafter. Hellfire for such a person was difficult for me to accept. It was perhaps during this year that we stopped seeing our religious uncle and his family. There were many reasons, foremost being their strict practise of Islam and disrespect for others, including us. For instance my uncle disliked my oldest uncle’s wife and would curse her; she had arthritis - a punishment from God, according to him. However if any difficulty were to come to him or his family it would be a trial from God because they were pious. This is how he treated his neighbours and other acquaintances. His children would visit our house and dictate shariah, for instance segregation and the need for everyone to pray in congregation without showing respect for elders. They had overstepped the mark and in the end we had to amicably distance ourselves from them. In 1996 I joined the University of Westminster to study Biotechnology, a subject of which I was very fond. Because of my enthusiasm I excelled in my first year. At the same time I got a job at JJB Sports on the weekends and shortly after became the fitness specialist. I therefore had less time for talks and other activities. In those days Omar Bakri Mohammed (leader of HT in the UK) was the group leader. There were also regular circles at the Tandoori Kebab Centre in Southall, Thames Valley University, Brunel University and Regents Park Mosque. At the University there was an Islamic Society which was controlled by Hizb-Ut-Tahrir. I fitted in well, as I was a familiar face. There were regular weekly talks at the university as well as other Universities. The Friday Khutbah (sermon) would focus on the state of the Muslim Ummah (Community) and would inevitably come round to the importance of establishing the Khilafah (Islamic state). Many students were fed up of the same rhetoric week-in, week-out. However they would not make an issue of it, as they just wanted to fulfil their obligation and get back to lectures. I was sympathetic towards their view but not as active as many of them. The social aspect was enjoyable and in my view I was doing my bit as a “Practising Muslim”. However I did feel that I was better than other Muslims, especially those who were secular, from Tableeghi Jamaat (Muslim missionaries) and Wahabis (religious fundamentalists). I was very sociable at university and was a student representative. I enjoyed the company of fellow Muslim (non-HT) and nonMuslim students, both male and female. This is something that Muslims from the Society tolerated, I guess, since I was regularly praying at my university, local mosque and attending talks. I remember growing a beard that academic year, attempting to fulfill my obligation and fit in amongst the brothers. At the local mosque I gained much respect for it and, although I was younger than most of the worshipers, I was allowed to lead the prayers. I kept it for a few months and then shaved it off because of pressure from my family and to fit in with fellow students (and a particular girl whom I liked!). In the summer of 1997 I worked most days of the week at JJB. The second year was an important one as it counted towards the final grade. This year passed quickly, as I was busy with studies and work, not having much time for other activities. The summer of 1998 (after my 2nd year at university) was a defining period in my development and my first encounter with the Christian faith. I was selected by my professor (through the Socrates Programme) to carry out research work in Viterbo, Italy (the old city of the Popes, which is about an hour from Rome). Prior to this I had

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never been away from home or had the opportunity to travel, so it was an exciting prospect. Initially I felt very isolated as I missed my close friends and the mosque despite having made many Italian friends who were very keen to learn English. However, shortly after a friend of mine managed to find a mosque in Rome. So on Fridays I would wind up my work early and head for Rome for Friday prayers. Thereafter I really settled in well and enjoyed the Italian culture and the caring nature of the Italian people, something that is not found in urban London. After several weeks I did not even miss my family and close friends anymore. I was there for approximately four months and during the course of my travels to Rome and Florence I made some good friends (from Pakistan, Latvia, Sweden, Mexico and Greece). Coming back to London was painful and departing from my new friends tearful. Looking back, during that period I had really matured and my personality mellowed. On my return even my mum was taken back by the change in me. I remember during my travels throughout Italy I would look forward to going to church. I admired the architecture and the countless beautiful paintings on the walls and ceilings. But there was also a sense of security and peace and I would sit down on the bench for a while to relax and pray to God. The final year was demanding and hectic. I remember in the last year there was a struggle between HT and the Wahabis for control of the Islamic Society. I remember talking to HT and trying to persuade them to share and work together. They were not willing to do so and in the end they lost all control to the Wahabis. I graduated in June 1999 with a 2:1 honours degree. I decided not to pursue my study in the discipline further as I was not keen on working in laboratories - I wanted to work with people rather than bacteria. Until now the influences of HT and others were kept in check and balanced by pressure from home, by my interaction at university with a variety of people, through working for JJB, and my short stint in Italy. The period from June 1999 – Dec 2001 was an emotional time, one of great confusion and struggle with no clear direction. I mixed with Muslims of different inclinations (Wahabi, Tahleeghi Jamaat, Hizb-Ut-Tahrir and Sufis) and took from each what I found acceptable. I read many books from Islamic bookshops on various issues. After having graduated I carried on working full time for JJB sports and at the same time applied for various jobs. A few months had passed and though a graduate I was still working in a retail outlet, which was frustrating. I wanted to make use of the knowledge and skills I had worked so hard to acquire. Now that I had more time I was a regular at the local mosque and attended a variety of talks where I sought comfort and support. In December 1999 (Ramadan) I did Ittikaaf (ten day seclusion – a “highly rewarding act” on behalf of the community) at Hayes mosque, something usually performed by retired elderly people. Because of my youth I received much praise. I started going to my local mosque in 1996 and the culture there was different to other mosques. The Imam there was welcoming and engaged the youth. But over the years there has been a stark change in culture, shifting to the right. Actually, much of the sentiment has always been there, but in a very subtle form. The dominant ideas are: - Islam versus the rest of the world (infidels), with only the Muslims attaining paradise and the rest being condemned to Hell - an emphasis on the superiority of Islam, claiming to be the most enlightened, the founders of the sciences and innovative as contrasted with the “European dark ages” - hostility and suspicion towards the west, modernity and Judaeo-Christian people - attacking the west and its institutions

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- constant emphasis on the conflict hotspots around the world - the importance of Jihad and the need for one to be prepared - detachment from life and a focus on the hereafter - disregard for man-made law and promotion of the divine shariah law. - Muslims residing in Britain should only do so if they are actively preaching Dawah, otherwise they would be sinful for residing in Darul Kuffar (the land of the infidels). There have been many controversial speakers at the centre, such as Sheikh Faisal, Abu Hamza and Dr. Al Masry. Nowadays the Wahaabi ideology seems to be the popular culture at the mosque. These people also seem to be very influential in the colleges and universities. (A local and promising young man, Irfan, completed his law degree earlier than his contemporaries. He had a promising career ahead of him as a barrister. Unfortunately the mosque and Sheikh Faisal, who was a regular visitor to the mosque, influenced him. He recently ended his career and moved to Saudi Arabia for Shariah studies.) In August 2000 prior to leaving for my one-month holiday I received a job offer. I went on holiday to Egypt and during this trip I also went across to Saudi Arabia to pay pilgrimage to the holy places in Mekkah and Medinah. Whilst in Cairo I also desired to visit Jerusalem (Islam’s third Holiest site). I did so cautiously and whilst I was there I witnessed the plight of the people at firsthand and this disturbed me. This experience gave importance to studying with HT. I started fulltime work in September 2000, a position with which I was very pleased. At the time a good friend would chat about our lack of participation in the Dawah (preaching), etc; a likeable brother, Rizwan lived in Hayes. Rizwan was a member of Hizb-Ut-Tahrir and encouraged us to attend his private weekly class to study the party literature. We were regulars over many months yet progress on my part was lacking. This was partly because I was not entirely convinced of their approach and was not critical of other denominations, but rather tolerant. They were very systematic in their approach to recruitment and would target schools (6th forms), colleges and universities. They were also very persistent in trying to recruit people who had contacts in the governments or the armies of Muslim countries. Nowadays it seems that they are taking up posts in educational institutions to facilitate their influence and continued recruitment. I read the biography of Muhammad and could see a wide gap in the approach and attitude of the Prophet in contrast to HT. After failing to become actively involved (and after spending some time with the Sufis!) my friend and I were summoned and told that due to our lack of commitment and participation we could no longer study with HT. I can’t remember exactly when, but perhaps it was during this year there were differences among HT members. Omar Bakri Mohammed then formed Al-Muhajiroon (more radical approach) and some HT people joined him. However many people became discontented and drifted away from both groups. HT also lost their grip at Brunel University Islamic Society and it is now being run by Wahabis, who are the new menace. In December 2000 (Ramadan) I did Itikaaf at Hounslow mosque. This was organised by the Sufi-inclined light study group. We were taught the importance of seeking knowledge in the traditional way. It was a gruelling ten days of jam-packed sessions on Hanafi Fiqh (social injunctions) taught by a scholar called Naeem Abdul Wali (an American convert). The atmosphere was “authentic” with very humble bearded brothers dressed in white with turbans and beads. I too was persuaded to keep the beard to fulfill my obligation and gain piety (also to be accepted into the new circle). These ten days left a deep impression on my mind and it seemed to be what I

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had been searching for for a long time. Asif Iqbal (a Tel Aviv Cafe suicide bomber) was also there for the duration and was assisting with teaching the recitation of Arabic. He had spent a year or two in Damascus studying Arabic and Qirat (recitation). He came across as a humble and dedicated person. Initially I was quite surprised to see him in the media as one of the bombers, but in hindsight I could understand how he might have been led down that path. From my experience and observation it seems that the underlying sentiments are common to the various strands of Islamic groups and denominations. These sentiments, the culture and atmosphere, create a fertile ground for one to be manipulated, recruited and trapped into a closed mindset, consequently leading to people migrating abroad to fight Jihad in many hotspots – or, in Asif’s case, to perpetrate what he did in Tel Aviv. In January 2001 I went to Istanbul on holiday and stayed at Brother Naeem’s residence. Spending time with him deepened my desire for gaining true knowledge. He confided in me something that I did not expect. He received many complaints from females related to the brothers (from their wives and sisters) in the Ittikaaf about mistreatment with regard to behaviour and rights. The pious image I had about those people was shattered and the importance of seeking knowledge for myself was reinforced. Over the months the desire was simmering and in November 2001 (Ramadan) I did Ittikaaf at Hayes mosque once again. During the year the desire to sacrifice my worldly ways and to migrate abroad to gain knowledge grew stronger. By Ramadan my close friend and I were very enthusiastic about the idea of ultimately attaining God’s pleasure. We were talking about moving to Damascus as the Arabic there was of a high standard and many of the people from the light study group had recommended this destination. I met Musa Admani in December 2001 through this close friend. I remember talking to him about this move abroad and him suggesting learning Arabic from within the Quran as the Arabic outside was not of a similar standard. We then embarked on the exploration of the Quran and after a few sessions my need to move abroad had dissipated and for the first time in many years I was sure of myself. There was a sense of achievement as I had worked towards gaining the knowledge and there was no doubt as it was from the scripture itself. Over the weeks and months I started to mellow again as a person and started to put things into prospective. Shortly afterwards I shaved off my beard, realising that my focus should be inward rather than outward. It was a relief as I was under pressure from home for a while and other people’s attitudes troubled me. On the one hand amongst Muslims I was given an elevated status as a pious and knowledgeable person, and on the other hand I could see non-Muslims were uncomfortable with me – the decision was easy. I reduced my visits to the mosque to the occasional Friday prayer, stopped going to talks and put aside all the books I had collected. The Quran was now the focus through which I would view everything. As a result my relationship at home has improved remarkably and I spend more time with my family (previously I was too preoccupied with the mosque, talks etc). I learned that Islam from the Quran was very different to the Islam in the literature and the way in which it was practised and preached. One of the first ideas we explored was the nature and psyche of humans. This helped me to understand others and myself in developing an attitude of patience, forgiveness and caring. The inclusiveness of all and the humanitarian aspect were very enlightening, creating a significant shift in attitude towards working with everyone in a common direction. Whereas previously I argued, now I listen and try to understand the other’s view. I have attended a few interfaith dialogue gatherings and have realised the benefit of discussing and sharing. It has

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cleared all the misconceptions and ideas I previously held. Rather than focusing on what’s happening abroad, I now look at my local community and wonder how I can get involved and benefit others with what I have learned. I am very proud to be British and admire the western institutions of education, research and justice. I now have a desire to achieve more academically and I am enthusiastic about working with others for the common good.

‘B’ I am originally from Pakistan and have lived most of my life in Islamabad. I have three sisters. I completed my BSc. in Mathematics, Physics and Statistics from the University of Punjab in 1998. Soon afterwards I moved to the United Kingdom with my family. Since then I have been living with my parents and sisters in Hayes. I have been working and studying full time and have recently completed my degree in Information Systems from Brunel University. I have been working in accounts for the last four years and have recently been offered a job in IT support in a company based in Slough. My family background is not very religious and has been very moderate when approaching and dealing with different issues in life. I can remember that I had a strong inclination towards religion (in my understanding it consisted of the creator and his commandments) from my early childhood. I started reading prayers when I was seven and used to go to the local mosque quite often. As I grew older and learned to recite the Quran I came to know more and more about Islam and was known as a religious and pious child within an unreligious family. I always loved to read the Quran the way I was taught by my teacher. I would spend hours and hours reading it and performing my prayers, and can remember having an emotional relationship with its commandments (i.e. as I would read verses I would start weeping and would concentrate more on my prayers and rituals). This feeling used to be at its peak during Ramadan and I would never miss even a single fast from my very early childhood onwards. I always believed Ramadan to be a very special time as it always strengthened me and I used to finish reciting the whole Quran during Ramadan; but I had an emotional relationship with its verses rather than thinking deeply about its subjects and relating it to family and society. I was very much like a traditional Muslim who is born into a Muslim family and would consider certain issues and actions to be Islamic - as elders of the family would believe them to be Islamic without investigation. I had few friends. We used to play and study together but most of my time was spent with my family. I also used to listen to English music and liked to watch English comedy and adventure movies. I can remember that sometimes I used to have questions and serious concerns about family rituals but was afraid to ask questions of my elders. Just before I moved to the UK with my family one of our relative’s sons, who used to live in the UK, came to our house. I asked him about British society and its practices. He portrayed British society as wholly evil and warned me that I would not be able to practice Islam if I were to live there permanently. I was very much afraid as it was a great threat to my so-called Islamic thoughts and prayers. I can never forget that moment when I prayed to God and begged him to keep me on the right path and help me to maintain my prayers so I would deal with any challenge. Living in the UK has been a great learning experience for me and my family.

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British society initially looked very strange; people were independent and would do whatever they liked, whenever they liked, and wherever they liked, without even asking their parents. Frankly I was a bit afraid and would go out only when I needed to go to work or study. I did not make any friends for the whole first year and spent most of time with my family. I used to go to the local mosque only for Jummah prayer and used to pray my regular prayers at home or at work. It was 1999 when I started my degree in information systems at Brunel University. The time I spent at university and the things I experienced were very interesting and crucial to my whole life up until this point. It was the Freshers' Day when I saw a stall with a sign for Brunel Islamic Society. I was very happy to see that and was very keen to find out more about it. I started asking questions about the Islamic Society and their activities. I was told that they arrange for various Islamic events on the campus and also arrange for Jummah Prayer. I had many questions and was told that if I became a member of the society and left my contact number someone would call me and arrange a meeting to answer my questions. These people were very polite and caring and left a very good impression on my mind. It was my second day at university when I was contacted and was told that two people would be coming to see me. I met them, was shown where the mosque was and was warned to be very careful about non-Muslim university students - I should not mix with them as they would harm my faith and damage my Islamic identity. Finally they asked me if I was willing to spend some time in helping them in arranging Islamic events and spreading the word of God. I promised them my support and we exchanged phone numbers for future contact. I was very happy that I had found very good Muslim brothers who wanted to do something for Islam. On the other hand I was also very happy to start my degree and was looking forward to acquiring new knowledge and achieving good grades. I was a very motivated student, never used to miss any lectures and was trying to learn and grasp new concepts in IT - a totally new field to me. I used to see those Islamic Society brothers quite often. They used to appear sometimes when I was going to my lectures or if I went to mosque I would find them sitting there, discussing Islam. They would always try to engage me in their discussion and would ask me for my views on different issues. These brothers were in different years doing various courses. It was the middle of my first semester at university when two of them came up to me and asked me to spare some time at the end of the day as they wanted to have a word with me in private and said the matter was important. As I already knew these brothers and thought them trustworthy I agreed a time and location and departed. We met in the late afternoon and one of the brothers, who was a representative of the Islamic Society, took me to his room along with his friend. He started by saying that we could clearly see what was happening with the Muslim Ummah today - we have been dishonoured everywhere and the west has started a war against Islam. I remember him getting emotional and putting great stress on the Islamic way of living, which he believed to be a system which is purely from God while on the other hand he explained that non-Muslim systems are totally un-Islamic and the work of man. He gave democracy as an example of such an un-Islamic system. He said that some of the brothers in the university were non-practising as they would not come to the mosque and would always be very busy with their studies. He claimed that the people of the west were portraying all Muslims as terrorists and fundamentalists, while they were killing Muslim children in Palestine and raping our mothers and sisters - while we were just watching and sitting and doing nothing. He said it was the duty of Muslims to protect each other throughout the Ummah, like under

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the old Caliphate. He said we should make sure that each system (i.e. economic, educational, social, judicial, etc.) that was to be implemented in an Islamic state was purely a system from God (i.e. a human being is not allowed to put anything according to their will and is not allowed to alter it in any way). His friend then joined in, saying that we spend so much time studying these man-made subjects and systems but have never spared time to do something really great for Islam and the Ummah. Very annoyed, he told me that though I had started my degree that would just teach me things I needed to earn a lot of money once I graduated, by working for non-Muslims who always hate Muslims anyway and would always try to discriminate against them in their companies. He said that he considered me to be a very sincere brother and a good practicing Muslim who would do anything for Islam and would make sure that the Ummah is safe under the umbrella of one khilaifh, and who would contribute something great to Islam before it is too late. He said it is the duty of all Muslims to work to revive the Islamic state based on God’s commandments and the sunnah (the way) of his Prophet Mohammed. This couple of hours' talk received all my attention and these concepts and ideas seemed very interesting and Godly in their essence. After this these brothers asked me if I could support them and all other Muslims in the noble cause of re-establishing an Islamic state for the sake of God, so that we could all live a life that is purely Islamic and full of peace and security. He said there were so many non-practising Muslim brothers on the university campus and we should try our best to spread this message to them as well. He quoted me a verse from the Quran that said ‘there will be a group of people who would always do good and forbid evil and these are the people whom God likes most’ - he identified this group as his own, of course. I was already feeling very lonely in the UK, I was looking for the company of good Muslim brothers and always wanted to learn more about Islam. I always used to beg God to use me for some noble cause so that could earn His pleasure, so that I could enter paradise. I was so happy that day - I felt that God had listened to my prayers and had placed me with the right people to work with. I offered them my sincere support and we planned for our next meeting. I was thinking and asking myself: 'What have you been doing for the last twenty-two years, just studying for the world and not doing anything for Islam?'. I thought I had wasted most of my life doing nothing and made a sincere vow to do whatever I could for Islam and the Muslim Ummah. From now on I used to meet these people from Hizbut Tahrir very frequently, at least two or three times each week. They slowly started opening up about their secret agendas and would take me to their regular talks and meetings. They would discuss many concepts, such as God being unlimited in everything while humans were limited in every aspect of life, or an Islamic state being the embodiment of an Islamic way of life and politics while bureaucracy and westernisation were non-Islamic and evil. Having been born and brought up in a society that consisted mostly of Muslims, I'd had almost no contact or experience with people of other cultures and faiths, I was very shallow in my thoughts and would consider all non-Muslims to be the enemies of Islam and God. I always accepted the claims and ideas of the Hizbut Tahrir and never questioned their views as they would support it by cutting and pasting different Quranic verses out of their context and provide them as evidence. Despite this I always used to respect my non-Muslim colleagues and fellow students and would show them civility and good manners, as the concept of Islam being the blessing and guidance for the whole of humanity has always been very much ingrained in my thinking, so I would always try to set an example to any person I interacted with.

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After a couple of weeks I was told that a knowledgeable person higher up in the Hizbut Tahrir organisational structure had been specially assigned to me and another Muslim brother to teach us the Islamic concepts, so that we could learn the Islamic teachings and then go into society to teach about the re-establishment of the Islamic Khilafah (state). We were strictly advised not to reveal the location and the name of the teacher. I was very regular in attending these study circles and had an attitude of always accepting whatever was said rather than questioning these teachings, since the teacher seemed a very knowledgeable person who would always quote the name of his Sheikh as being his source for a necessary teaching to act upon in any specific case. Along with these study circles there used to be always two or three other study circles going on at different locations, such as Brunel University, Hounslow mosque and Regent's Park mosque, to name a few. All the members of Hizbut Tahrir were strictly warned not to miss these regular circles as these meetings were used as a device to recruit new members. After a couple of months of Hizbut Tehrir Islamic tuition I was placed with a group to work at Brunel University and, due to my ability to speak good Urdu, my important mission was to go and have a chat with other overseas newcomers from Pakistan and convince them about Hizbut Tehrir ideas and concepts. We were told to be very careful and prioritise students who were from a strong political, military, religious or educational background and whose parents and relatives were in powerful positions in Pakistan. The idea was to use these students to approach and establish a good relationship with the people in authority and power to use them to spread Hizub Tahrir ideas and concepts in powerful Pakistani institutions, and to take over the authority and power to re-establish the Islamic state. These ideas used to always come somewhere from the top in the Hizbut Tahrir organisational structure but we were never told about these people. I recall one student being on the top of the priority list as his father held a high post in the Pakistani military and was serving Pakistan Inter-services Intelligence in a sensitive post. We would visit students on our list in pairs so that if one person got stuck the other would be able to handle the situation. My life became very busy as I was studying, working, trying to give time to my family and trying to keep in touch with relatives, but now most of my time was spent attending talks and study circles and it became very difficult to manage all these things together. This affected my health and my family life badly. My parents would complain that I was not giving enough time, care and attention to them or my studies and began warning me about the consequences. My party fellows used to tell me similar stories about their parents and used to curse them as a hindrance to their work for Islam. As things began getting worse and worse I started thinking seriously about issues within the party culture. I always used to tell myself that working for Islam and Islamic teachings should put things right and should show love, mercy and consideration for others, yet party Islamic teachings seemed to be very tunnelled and shallow in their approach and practice. I started thinking deeply about all life-related issues but was not sure what to do at this stage. I surely had a feeling that something is not right, and why we Muslims have been divided into so many different factions with different beliefs even though we share the same book called the Quran. At this stage there was a significant Hizbut-Tahrir party split and many prominent members joined another party called Al-Muhajroon. I would now think and discuss issues with one of my other close friends, who also used to attend study circles with

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me. We both became slowly less active in party activities and at one stage were told that we were no longer party members as the people from the top (whom we never got to know) had issued orders to end our membership due to our failure to actively participate and take responsibility. We both were very surprised with this decision and left our teacher’s home very discouraged, thinking: 'Is that it? Have they forgotten all our service and contributions?'. We accepted it and motivated ourselves by thinking that whatever we did we did for the sake of God so we should have no worries. We now had some serious concerns about the party approach and methodology in preaching Islam. I was in a continually seeking state and was again looking to find the truth, the right path. All this happened in my first year at university and during a year out when I was working fulltime as an accounts assistant. There were some other things happening in parallel. I started going to my local mosque in Hayes for Jummah sermons and sometimes for regular prayers. The Imam of the mosque seemed to be a very nice person due to his humbleness, love and welcoming behaviour towards young people. Many of the congregation praying in the mosque were also were very sociable, loving and caring people from various Muslim countries (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Pakistan, Libya) and backgrounds. The atmosphere of this mosque was different to that of other mosques and appealed to me. The sermons by the Imam used to be on different subjects and issues affecting and concerning the Ummah: Muslims are the only true candidates for paradise and all non-Muslims are going to hell; Islam is the foundation of all scientific development happening in today’s age; the importance of performing Pilgrimage before old age; of trying to practice daily, monthly and yearly rituals according to the way of the Prophet; of focussing on the hereafter and trying not to engage in worldly things; and how important Jihad is for a Muslim and his duty to be always prepared for it. The Imam would always urge the people present to pray regularly and engage in Islamic rituals to strengthen their faith and deal with their problems. The sermons were sometimes very emotional. Well known scholars such as Sheikh Faisal, Abu Hamza and Dr. Al Masry were occasionally invited and all of them had different point of views in approaching and tackling Muslims’ problems. I remember them giving talks on very controversial issues. As a result some people would engage them in argument and so conflict with their fellow Muslims due to their different points of view. NonMuslims and people from the west were held responsible most of the time for all the problems facing the Ummah. Any human being who did not believe in God and the Quran was the biggest enemy of Islam and should be treated as the enemy of God. These topics were interesting and I started spending more and more time in the mosque socialising and discussing issues with my Muslim brothers. They would all engage very well and my views about Islam slowly started to form. I remember going home and discussing these issues with my parents and sisters. They always told me not to spend so much time in the mosque and instead give time to myself and take care of my health, as the talks would go on for hours and hours and I would not even come home to have my dinner. On the other hand whenever I mentioned something unjust happening to Muslims they seemed to be concerned but would not engage much in discussion and would soon get back to their busy lives. At this point I came to know one Muslim brother very closely and as he was also a good friend of the Imam he brought us closer together. We were spending a lot of time with the Imam and other Muslim friends, organising events, serving food to the people when there was a talk, cleaning the mosque and so on as all these chores, to us, were purely for the sake of God. We were

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used to being called any time, often on weekends, to arrange things related to the mosque or Imam and we never refused, even at the expense of our families, as these actions were understood to be noble deeds purely for the sake of God. We would eat together, go to talks together, regularly visit each other and were often invited to the Imam’s residence for eating and discussions. These discussions would occur often and sometimes would go on for too long. I started coming home very late and my mother and sisters had a serious concern about this. My father would not say anything to me but my mother used always to mention him being worried about my late homecoming and becoming so religious in my views and actions. I started discussing different religious issues at home with my parents and sisters. My father had a mortgage and my religious views were now totally against mortgages (i.e. usury). I always used to insist that my father get rid of this mortgage as soon as possible otherwise God might curse the whole family or may send a great punishment on him. On the other hand I also used to insist my sisters follow shariah (Islamic Law) and would always insist they wear the Hijab, not listen to music, be very strict about their prayers and avoid watching Indian movies. Whenever there was an Islamic talk (e.g. arranged by Salafi or Hizbu-tahrir) I would try to convince my sisters to go with me and learn more about Islam. They would say that whatever they were doing was nothing but Islam too, that they thought that God and Islam were not so strict and allowed flexibility according to a person’s circumstances. I would always ignore their views and used to pray to God to make them more aware about Islam and make them practicing Muslims. This was the time when I was given different recommendations on growing a beard by my Muslim friends and thought it to be a very pious thing to have. My parents, sisters, and other family members had serious concerns about me growing a beard and tried their best to convince me not to keep it. I was very firm in my decision since I had all the quotations given by my friends and would always try to convince my family through my religious knowledge. People from my family and beyond started calling me Molana sahib and would present me with religious problems and ask for the solution. Rumours began to circulate among my family back home in Pakistan and I was thought to be associated with a religious group. I did not care about the views of my family or others and remained very firm in practicing Islamic values passed on to me by the Imam and my other Muslim friends. My university exams were fast approaching but all my focus was on learning Islamic knowledge and practising it. At this time I was in my second semester and was very afraid of failing some modules as all my time was spent with my fellow Muslims from the mosque. I was giving very little time to my studies and would only work hard just a few days before the exams. My exams did not go well and I only barely passed all the modules. My second year at university began in a similar manner, my studies continued to be affected through lack of time devoted to them. I was once again not prepared enough for my exams. The second year was harder than the first and this time the pressure was so much that I could not cope with it. On the day of my first exam I was outside the examination room very much perplexed: should I go in for the exam or should I leave it? I was either going to just pass the exams again or maybe fail some of them. I felt that I had put myself in a very difficult situation. On the one hand I could see my father getting older and, as he was the only breadwinner for the family, I felt the need to finish my degree as soon as possible. On the other hand I had put my whole degree results in danger as if I were again to have bad grades it would affect the overall

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grade for my degree; looking at employers' requirements I knew I would not be able to get a good job. This thought made me so afraid that I could not face my exams and decided to take a year out. I remember how I convinced my father and other family members by giving them an excuse of not being able to continue my second year due to financial problems. My father tried his best to convince me to continue with the second year as he had struggled the whole of his life to support me and was looking forward to seeing me graduate and take responsibility as soon as possible. Unfortunately he did not know that I had already missed my first semester exams and so could not continue my second year at university. This was 2001 and the rest of my year was mostly spent working, attending Islamic talks and spending time with my friends from the mosque. It was during these days when I again started reading the Quran in translation as I used to have many questions in my mind, but was unable to find answers. My experience with Hizubut Tahrir left me even more confused at this stage. I began regularly attending morning and evening prayers at the mosque. I remember always having the intention in Ramadan to read the whole Quran in translation, but was only able to recite it without understanding. This was due to the concept of earning as much reward as I could by reciting it as many times as I could, thus earning a greater reward from God. I finally began to read the whole Quran with translation. As my quest for Islamic knowledge grew I used to meet with a friend of mine and discuss the Hadith and Quran regularly after the Morning Prayer. He was of pure salfee thoughts and learned the whole Quran by heart and also was knowledgeable in Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Mohammed). This friend also taught me how to read the Quran properly. We both used to discuss and make plans to go abroad to study the Quran and Hadith so that we could teach Islam to other Muslims and contribute towards Islam with our Islamic knowledge. We both had commitments with work and studies, so these things would stop us to from going abroad. I also mentioned this idea to another close friend. He had recently graduated from Oxford and he also had a strong inclination towards religion and learning Islam and wished to go abroad to study. It was the month of September 2002 when I restarted my second year at university. I should have remembered at this stage why I took my year out and was supposed to spend most of my time studying. Unfortunately this did not happen as this time the quest to go abroad and learn Islamic knowledge was so strong that I still could not concentrate on my studies. I was losing interest in my degree and planned to leave. I could not stop myself and would go to my parents to try to convince them about this. I would ask them emotionally if they would not like their child to learn Islam and teach it to other people? Was this not the best thing to do on this earth? Would they not be proud of their son in this world, while he will become a source of forgiveness for the whole family on the day of judgement? My father always used to ask me who was going to take responsibility for the family income. I always used to give him the answer that I am planning to do a thing that God likes most; God is the main source of sustenance, so don’t worry, he will definitely take care to provide our whole family with sustenance as a reward for this noble deed. My father had serious concerns at this stage and warned me not to go ahead as this would cause great damage to the family. Some moderate friends of mine also had serious concerns about my idea of leaving university so I decided to delay going abroad till the completion of my degree. I bought many Islamic books on History, the Prophet’s Sunnah, Hadith and Quranic commentary from different scholars. I still had many questions in my mind and started giving more and more time to reading the Quran and other Islamic books so at least I

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could increase my Islamic knowledge while I was still in the UK. I can never forget November 2002 as this was a life-changing time for me. One day, before Ramadan started, I came to attend the Morning Prayer in the local mosque. After the prayer ended a man whom I used to know, who would always like to discuss the Quran, came forward and started reading and explaining some verses. He was very motivated and tried his best to explain the verses according to his understanding. I felt very sorry for him when, after five minutes of his talk, he was forcefully stopped by some other people in the mosque who claimed that he was not qualified to talk thus and might lead people astray. This man seemed very disappointed and discouraged. Soon after I finished with my prayer I saw another person who seemed to be new to this mosque sitting next to him and discussing the Quran. He had a long beard and looked a person of knowledge to me. He was trying to encourage the other man to keep on reading the Quran and not to take the comments of other people too seriously. This person with the beard was very polite in his approach and looked very perceptive and understanding of the other man. The latter would ask him questions and he would answer them very wisely. I kept on listening to their discussion and the way the person with the beard was discussing the Quran seemed to me very interesting and captured my attention. I also had many questions in my mind and immediately decided to see him after he finished his conversation. We met outside the mosque and I introduced myself: "I am Musa.", he replied. I told him that his discussion of the Quran interested me and would he mind if I asked him some questions? He invited me to go for a walk with him and asked me to introduce myself in more detail. I told him about my circumstances, and Musa told me that he was new to the area and had recently moved there with his family. He then prompted me to ask my questions. I told him that I was not sure whether I should continue my university studies as I thought it to be doing something only for this world. I told him that I felt guilty that I had spent all my life studying worldly subjects but had never especially spared time to acquire Islamic knowledge. I told him that it is due to this thinking that I could not concentrate on my university studies and planned to go abroad to acquire Islamic knowledge. Musa then asked why I did not stay in the UK and learn Islamic knowledge here? My answer was that it is not an Islamic country and we Muslims can only live here if we come to give Dawah (Islamic preaching) or to establish an Islamic state. (These views were put into my mind by the people from the Hizub-tahrir and Salafee groups.) I also told him that I read the Quran with translation and commentary, I was on chapter 14 but still not able to find answers to my questions. I then requested him to provide me with his opinion on these issues. He did not provide me with the answers but instead advised me to read Chapter 12 from the Quran (the story of Joseph) and try to understand each verse on my own, and I should be able to find answers to my questions there. I remember him advising me not to read any commentary with translation and just to establish my own understanding; don’t rush, write down any other questions and when I had finished we can meet up and discuss them. I can never forget that moment when Musa gave me a direction to my quest - he acted like a lighthouse in a lost sea and I could give weight to his advice as it was from a pure source, the Quran. We decided to meet up again after some days. From that moment onwards I regularly started reading Chapter 12 and looked for answers. The task was not easy as before I always used to read the commentary and try to understand the translation, but this time I was to only read the translation and to think independently and establish an understanding that was purely my own. I spent many hours every day reading chapter 12. As days passed my struggle to find answers became stronger, but even after spending so many hours every day I

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was only able to find some clues to my questions. I met Musa once again in the mosque and we then went to his residence after the prayer. I explained to him what I understood from chapter 12 and again asked him for his opinion. Musa did give me his opinion that day but in less detail. I still remember him asking my understanding of each verse and then making a point that would come purely from that verse from the Quran. His way of reading the Quran seemed to be very sensible and made be keep thinking about my answers. I was still not given the answers to my questions but was told that I would soon find them as we went along. I had previously always been taught not to open the Quran and try to understand it on my own and without any commentary, since I could go astray and lead other people astray. I always use to wonder why God had made the Quran so difficult to understand and only clear to the scholars, so that no-one else could just read and understand it. I used to complain to God for not giving me the chance to live in the age of the Prophet Mohammed as then I could go and ask him about the Quran any time I had a problem. All this thinking process evoked a very strong feeling and gradual awareness about myself and I was starting to develop confidence in reading the Quran on my own. We used to meet up regularly but I was still a bit wary, and examined Musa very carefully due to my previous experience with other groups. After a couple of meetings I soon realised that Musa was not with any group. He told me he was an Islamic scholar who graduated in India, had memorised the whole Quran by heart, and had been reading and trying to understand the Quran for the last fifteen years. I used to read the Quran alone and then write down any questions to ask Musa. We would then meet up and discuss verses. I was so pleased to know that he was not just any person but a person who has knowledge of the Quran. I was so excited and so pleased that God had again listened to my prayers and had introduced me to someone who is a teacher of the Quran, the Quran that I always used to love to read and spend many hours with and with whom I used to have a strange relationship of trust and piety. Soon after the end of my second meeting with Musa I told him about my friend, the Oxford graduate who wished to go abroad to study Islam, and asked for his permission to introduce him. Musa gave it so I contacted my friend and told him about Musa. I still remember the way I talked to my friend. I said God had listened to our prayers and I had found a person who is a scholar and who is willing to teach us Islam, so now we won't have to go abroad to do so. At first he was a bit hesitant to accept my offer due to his own personal experiences, but he was my very close friend and would trust me if I told him something. I was finally able to convince him and he was willing to see Musa. We met Musa in the evening and my friend was very pleased to meet him and was ready to study the Quran with us. I remember these Quranic sessions were very open, where you could ask any question and express yourself in any way. For the very first time I felt completely free from the strict religious atmosphere I had grown up in, in which you were not allowed to even recognise your own identity. We used to meet up regularly and firstly read Chapter 12 (the story of Joseph). We would try to explore different issues and subjects within the Quran as we went through the chapters. We covered many subjects, such as the human ability to do things, human strengths and weaknesses, cosmology, justice, peace, etc. Reading, discussing and trying to understand all these subjects clarified many things that had not been clear to myself and erased many misconceptions in my mind. Previously my understanding was that God is only for the Muslims and all the non-Muslims are enemies and should be treated accordingly, but reading the Quran taught me that the Islam is for the whole of

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humanity and is not exclusive to Muslims. As I moved on and started reading the Quran on my own I clearly understood that it always emphasises the importance of independent thinking, pondering and contemplation and warns against the consequences of stagnation in utilising the key human faculties. The Quran pushes mankind in the direction of discovering the cosmos and at the same time directs him to fully understand his own role within this universe and his community; in fact the Quran gives us the philosophy of the whole universe and humanity within it. We would try to understand each word first and then try to understand each verse in its context within the Quran. This exercise was intense but started opening my mind and stimulated my thinking. I used to be very shallow in my thinking and had a very tunnelled and limited vision when keeping the company of other religious group-fellows. Now I would not accept anything until I had examined it from all angles and would think carefully before performing any action. It was only after some weeks that things started becoming clear. My awareness about myself and my surroundings began to increase very much. I now wish every moment for all my fellow human beings to read the Quran, acquire an understanding and live a life independently, as unfortunately I could feel the taste of Muslim slavery under the state of Islamic Feudalism. I now would always like to talk to my friends and non-Muslims and would like to spread the teachings of the Quran very carefully without mentioning it, and if I see any sincere human being I would urge him to at least taste the real teachings of Islam. This cause is due to the fact that the Quran has blessed me with so many good things - so why should I not also try my best to pass this message on to my fellows in humanity? My studies at university were so much improved, I could now understand and appreciate the importance of my studies. My results for the second semester were significantly improved. My fellow students were also surprised and this was the opportunity for me to pass the credit on to the Quran. I talked to one of my very good university friends who had already been reading the Quran for some time but was also not very clear about many things. I discussed with him the methodology of our Quranic reading a couple of times. This interested him and he was willing to come and explore the Quranic platform. He told me about his two cousins who were in the same boat and were looking for the truth. I met them and explained our methodology of reading the Quran. Soon after our last meeting we met again at Musa’s house and we all started reading, sharing and understanding the Quran together. This proved to be very useful as now there were six of us and if each one could contribute to our understanding then all of us would benefit. Another friend of mine whom I used to know from the mosque was also contacted and after a couple of readings and discussions he was now also willing to come and explore the Quranic teachings. Every person would understand how important it was to pass this message on to the other people and would try his best to save other people by discussing and passing on the teachings of the Quran and convincing them to explore and contribute in this great cause of serving humanity. Musa, with his knowledge and wisdom, has always been a role model to represent the Quran, and therefore played a vital role in the development of all the other members of our Quranic forum. We studied together, did community projects together, and each person would try to contribute something according to his ability. The study of the Quran improved so many things in my life and taught me how to value and respect other human beings. My parents are now very happy as they see their son a different human being who

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is very much changed in his views and practices. My father was especially happy and one day, sitting with Musa, he acknowledged his great contribution to saving his family's future. He looked very much relieved and was looking forward to my graduation. I was on my placement year when my father had a severe heart attack and two major strokes which he hardly survived. I remember this time was very difficult for me to cope with as I had to support my family by showing them great strength and patience. Quranic teachings provided me with so much strength at this point that without it I would not have been able to handle the situation. I had to work in the day and then had to attend the hospital during the evening, and also had to make sure that my mother and sisters were strong enough to cope even if my father were to pass away at this stage. The time passed very quickly and my father came home, was back on his feet and able to manage everything on his own. This was the start of my final year at university. My father spent a couple of weeks with the family and started having some breathing problems. He was taken to hospital where, after some days, he passed away. This was the toughest time in my life as the loss of my father had a great effect on the whole family. I had to handle the situation very carefully and I have to admit that at this point the teachings of the Quran gave me so much strength, patience and vision to deal with the situation and guided me to make firm decisions and comfort my family. I was very much surprised to feel my strength and improvement in thinking independently and making decisions on my own. Very honestly, all this credit should go to the teachings of the Quran as it had a great effect on my intellectual development. The year of 2004 tested me in so many ways that I could really feel that God had put me in a situation where there was a clear test to manage so many things at one time. But at the same time he also equipped me with the abilities to tackle this difficult situation, and I am very grateful to him for his blessings and helping me with the strength to deal with these difficult times. This was indeed the time to apply all the concepts and principles that I learnt from the Quran and to have a vision and understanding under the light of the Quran about different facets of family and societal issues. I believe that a human is not just a person of flesh and bones but a real living being with different roles in his family, society and the world, and he needs to be excellent in all his roles by showing love, care and good moral values. The understanding of the Quran has provided me with a consciousness of myself, critical analysis, and has contributed to developing moral values and responsibility towards all other creatures. I have now successfully completed my degree and all other family projects are going well. I strongly feel that this was not possible without the Quranic teachings and its practice in my life. The Quran, Musa and my fellow brothers in the Quranic group contributed very much to my development and elevated my personality to make me able to deal with these difficult tasks. I am very much obliged to pay them my sincere thanks and appreciation for their continuous support and guidance at every stage. My utmost thanks to God for all his mercy and blessings for placing me with these people of knowledge and providing me with an environment of continuous learning and development. I feel that I still need to spread this knowledge of truth and justice and need to contribute a lot to my society. I pray for the whole of humanity to be guided towards the truth that they are looking for.

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Mad, Bad or Freedom Fighters: The New Challenges of Terrorism Max TAYLOR Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews

Abstract. The ‘new’ terrorism differs from the ‘old’ in important ways, but they are ultimately similar. The best counter to terrorism in the long-term is likely to be the growth of civil society, which is best pursued by non-military means. Keywords. terrorism, suicide bombers, PIRA, Al Qaeda, civil society

Introduction

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This paper will explore some of the conceptual and practical issues related to our understanding of terrorism, taking a longer-term perspective. It assumes some knowledge of the area, and will argue for a broadening of our understanding of terrorism away from a particular national perspective, and for locating our understanding of terrorism (and efforts to counter it) based on an understanding of the terrorist in his or her political context, emphasising civil society responses that recognise cultural, political and social diversity as the central platform from which to address the problem of terrorism. 1. Analyses of Terrorism Contemporary analyses of terrorism increasingly tend to adopt a short-term, single dimension, state perspective related to national interest. By this I mean that terrorism is frequently seen as a problem inflicted on a state by someone or something essentially outside of, or in opposition to, that state even though the individuals opposing it may be a part of the citizenry; in a sense something “other” than the state, even if a part of it. Terrorism therefore is seen as something generated by “others”, the actions of outside groups or individuals in opposition to the state. Characterising the terrorist as “evil” or “deranged” in some sense, as so frequently happens, reinforces the sense of “otherness” and deflects attention from the social and political context in which terrorism occurs. The language of psychology is often drawn on to characterise the terrorist in negative terms and again to distance him or her from normal society. Indeed, if we were to try to understand these kinds of views from a psychological perspective, the process in psychology known as the “fundamental attribution error” seems appropriate. This is a well established social psychological process that suggests whenever people are making attributions about an action of others in contrast to themselves, they tend to over-emphasise dispositional factors about the actor and under-emphasise situational factors, in contrast to accounts about our own motivations.

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Thus “we” respond to circumstances; “they” are mad or bad! But with respect to terrorism, the implication of this is that the illegitimacy of terrorism lies not simply in the act of violence per se, but also in the nature of the individuals committing the violence and also in the challenge to the interests and objectives of the state attacked. The result of psychological processes like this are necessarily complex, and do not readily reduce to meaningful policy initiatives; yet simplistic solutions to such complex ways of structuring the problem are often offered, characterised at the moment in simple terms of “war” or “fight”, implying defeat and victory as possible outcomes. In the heightened emotional state of the “war on terrorism”, even questioning the legitimacy of conventional analyses of this kind can seem almost traitorous, and dissent can be regarded as unpatriotic. Furthermore given this simple view it is often implicitly assumed that when the problem of terrorist violence is solved through victory, the issues associated with terrorism will also be solved, or at least become manageable. Therefore, analyses of terrorist risk, for example, tend to focus on the terrorism threats to the state as a whole, variously conceptualised as threatening the state itself, the social fabric of society, or critical economic installations. Even when the threat relates to potential civilian casualties, the problem is conceptualised as primarily a state security issue where civilian casualties are regrettable “collateral damage”. The response to such analyses is action in some form; perhaps in terms of increased surveillance, reduction of civil liberties and putative improved protection, and the development of response capacity. However, increasingly in the modern world, such responses are not confined to reactive, protective measures, but also involve preemptive measures (sometimes referred to as the precautionary approach). If risk can be identified, the imperative of risk reduction to protect national security logically implies pre-emptive action to diminish risk, in effect (it may be argued) stopping a threat from becoming an event. However such pre-emptive action rarely extends to the causes of terrorism, addressing rather the immediate short-term threat of a particular action or event. There are at least three problems with this approach.

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1. The first and obvious point is that for threat and risk analysis to be effective analysis has to be accurate. Inaccurate analysis, and consequent inappropriate pre-emptive action, can add to rather than diminish risk (although a further problem is that single dimension analyses may not even recognise the significance of this if risk extends outside of a narrow sense of national interest). Unfortunately recent events are replete with examples of failed and inaccurate analysis. 2. The second related problem is that risks are rarely self-contained and limited to specific foci. Risks generally occur in clusters, and can rarely be conceptualised in just single terms. Dealing with one threat may not necessarily address other collateral and dependent threats, which when viewed from a broader perspective outside of a narrow national security view may in fact be of greater significance than the original threat. For example, the growth in willingness to engage in suicide bombings, whilst it may not have been possible to anticipate, is probably of greater long-term significance as indicative of motivation and commitment associated with what has been termed the new terrorism, than threats to immediate national security caused by suicide bombers. The fundamental problem presented by suicide bombers

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may be protection from attack in the short term, but the longer-term issue of understanding what motivates so many young people to kill themselves for a cause is of much greater ultimate significance. 3. The third, and perhaps most significant, issue is that by focussing on immediate threats from the perspective of a state, there is often a failure to recognise that states in responding to terrorism may also themselves cause further terrorism either in that state or others by way of response. A further weakness in the current focus on threat analysis and precautionary preemptive action that can be identified is that there are often implicit assumptions embedded in proposed solutions that direct responses down at times inappropriate directions:

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1. As we have noted, defining terrorism as a national security problem can emphasise dispositional qualities of perpetrators (as opposed to a response to circumstances), narrow analysis, and tends to imply that in principle a solution can be found. Furthermore such analyses also imply that solutions will lie outside of existing state structures, and relate to the qualities of the terrorist and how he or she constructs the world. The assumed “otherness” of terrorism deflects attention from the causal role of the state in question, its political and financial processes and its responses. Also implicit in this is that when the “otherness” problem is fixed the problem of terrorism will then be solved and will go away. If the analysis presented here is correct, this is unlikely to happen. 2. Finding solutions generally implies action; and because terrorism often involves violent action, so solutions tend towards solutions involving violent action. However action can have illusory qualities – as Conrad says in Nostromo, “Action is consolatory. It is the enemy of thought and the friend of flattering illusions". Indeed, action not only affects the object of action, but it also has a reciprocal effect on the political and psychological needs of the people undertaking action. Put simply, action might make you feel better when you are doing it, but feeling better doesn’t necessarily have the desired effect on the object of the action, and in this context may not solve the problems that give rise to terrorism. The short-term consequences of responding and doing something may not be in the long-term a productive response. Loss of civil liberties seems to be the most immediate casualty of this approach, which when lost rarely seem to be reinstated. Failures to put immediate security-based responses into a meaningful social context are most likely to generate these problems. At a political level experience in Northern Ireland, for example, suggests that high troop levels and coercive action yields little by way of reduction in terrorism; dialogue and meaningful political progress provides the key to initiating and sustaining change. The same may well apply to Iraq. 3. A further variant on this is the inappropriate use and dependence on securitydriven technical solutions to problems. For example, complex systems of biometrics proposed for use in identity cards are unlikely to have any significant effect on terrorism – biometrics are of no value in identifying people you don’t already know - yet they have a short-term political attraction

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because it involves doing something that looks complex and sophisticated.

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In my view, many of these problems arise because of faulty conceptual analysis. A terrorist act is not an event, disconnected from history and context; it is part of a process, and understanding terrorism requires that recognition. The very essence of a process is that it implies in some measure a degree of reciprocity between the various elements. Put simply, action begets action, which in turn begets further action. Cycles of reciprocity can be broken, but only when the nature of relationships can be seen, understood and addressed; in pharmacological terms, to break the cycle the rate limiting quality needs to be identified. The nature of the forces involved in terrorism is that they are not just military or political; they involve at one level social, economic and cultural factors, and at another level involve psychological and behavioural factors. A failure to address both these factors on a broad front will not address, let alone resolve, the problem of terrorism. Recent experience in Iraq and Ireland, to name but two locations, suggests that these lessons have not yet been learned. With reference to Iraq, this quotation from Stern (2003) sums up the situation which many people will feel is accurate: “If bin Laden were writing a script for George Bush and Tony Blair to follow, would he not command them to attack and occupy a Muslim country in defiance of the international community and in violation of international law? And would it not be his fondest wish to see the ‘new crusaders’ humiliate those Muslims, and themselves, in the most graphic possible way. Having those soldiers then photograph their crimes might have seemed too much to ask for” [1]. This analysis suggests it is not necessary to attribute sophisticated powers of analysis to bin Laden to explain the persistence and significance of the war in Iraq. With respect to the situation in Ireland, this wall painting was photographed in Cork in May 2005.

Figure 1 It suggests that as far as the Real IRA (the authors of this wall painting) is concerned, the Good Friday Agreement signed in 1998 has yet to have a meaningful effect on the underlying causes of the conflict in Ireland, although it has undoubtedly reduced levels

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of violence. As in Iraq, the momentum of political aspiration is not in itself sufficient to resolve the problems. Indeed all the evidence indicates it is indeed not over yet in Ireland for the Real IRA, given the scale of largely under-reported current paramilitary criminal activity, preparation and recruitment, and punishment beatings. In a statement in Dáil Éireann1 in June 2005, the Irish Minister for Justice suggested active Provisional IRA membership stood at between 1,000 and 1,500 people, with lesser groups commanding memberships of around 100. These figures are broadly comparable to similar estimates made over the past decade. Recent declarations of an end to the conflict by the PIRA remain to be evaluated, and in light of past performance might initially be viewed with a justifiable degree of cynicism if power sharing arrangements collapse.

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2. Terrorism as a Process I have essentially argued above that if we think of terrorism as something conducted by evil people whose intention is to destroy “our” way of life, we make serious errors of analysis that will deflect policy down flawed paths. As an alternative, I have suggested that we might see terrorism as a process [2]; if so, then at least from a psychological perspective, the kinds of questions we might ask about determinants, effects and consequences of terrorism change. We might, for example, at a macro level address issues such as how do terrorist cycles begin, develop and end, and how does the individual engage with these processes, through particular kinds of terrorist groups or organisations focussing on political and social context; this leads to analyses related to becoming involved in political groups and violence, remaining a terrorist, and leaving terrorism. At a micro level, we might focus on opportunities for individual terrorist acts, and their determinants. This implies a clearer psychological understanding of the terrorist, and significantly a much more explicit bringing together of political and psychological analyses. In doing this, we might then be drawn into developing a clearer but inevitably complex sense of the relationship between political context, organisational framework and the individual by breaking down the process into parts, and examining the relationship between them, through social, political, civil society and temporal frames of reference. It is important to stress that in adopting one “lens” through which to view the problem, we cannot ignore other equally legitimate “lenses”. Given the above, temporal dimensions are critical to any exploration of process variables. Developing this perspective into what will be a complex multilayered analysis is a major endeavour, but we can by way of illustration at least explore some of the implications in simpler forms. As a starting point, in the following we will explore an aspect of terrorist process that seem to follow from the agenda set above – frameworks to understand engagement with terrorism. This aspect of a process approach illustrates important practical as well as conceptual qualities. But before developing the argument further we have to note that a serious limiting factor is the lack of empirical knowledge about the area, and about the individuals concerned. There is a striking absence of firm evidence on which to base discussion. Considerable effort has gone into the development of chronologies, and into the construction of very general case studies; but neither yield the kind of information that might illustrate the issues of concern here. However, by outlining a conceptual discussion in potentially empirically verifiable 1

Irish Parliament

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terms, we can at least contribute to the creation of a systematic research agenda.

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2.1. Frameworks of Engagement with Terrorism Given the lack of sound empirical knowledge, we need to be explicit about assumptions made. Perhaps the starting point for what follows is the assumption that terrorists are ordinary people who make choices in the contexts in which they find themselves (discussed at length by Taylor (1993)) [3]. One of the great challenges when thinking about the terrorist and terrorism is that despite identifying potential broad putative predisposing factors in terms of educational attainment, income levels, and other potential causal agents (e.g. these correlated qualities in themselves do not account for why, given apparent commonalities of experience, one individual engages with the process of terrorism and another does not). This represents an absolutely critical failure to address what must be the central rate-limiting factor in the core quality of terrorism and its expression – regardless of ideology, politics or social processes, terrorism necessarily has to involve an individual with the opportunity to engage in terrorist behaviour, however we define it. The answer to why one person and not another becomes involved in terrorism is not simply a matter to dismiss as a technical psychological issue, and therefore of less significance. The answer to why one person as opposed to another becomes involved in terrorism presumably lies within the psychological and emotional context of the individual on which these bigger and essentially non-psychological forces of opportunity and context operate. But the critical point to make is that it is in our answer to this that our understanding of terrorism as well as the terrorist needs to begin. How then do we understand that facilitating context to terrorism? This has been discussed at length by Taylor and Horgan (2006) [2]. In one sense what terrorists do can be seen as an example of a form of problematic and perhaps abnormal (viz relatively uncommon) behaviour. This is not to say that the terrorist is abnormal in a clinical sense, but rather that he (or she) does things that are unlikely and unusual – terrorist violence is relatively rare - and also something generally not approved of. Not only terrorists engage in violent behaviour, of course, and sometimes it might be difficult to distinguish between terrorist violence and criminal violence as Schmid notes. This also suggests that the frame of reference for understanding at least the violent elements of terrorism may be shared with other kinds of violence, and therefore we might benefit from looking at terrorist violence in the way we look at other forms of problematic behaviour. A further important point to note is that engaging with terrorist behaviour may involve some risk for the individual, but equally that person also gains some benefit. Benefit need not be seen in financial terms, but might include, amongst other things, peer or significant other approval, a sense of satisfaction or a sense of personal agency. Again, this is not unique to terrorists; we are quite familiar with other examples of problematic behaviours that involve risk, but where the risk is outweighed by personal benefit. Driving fast might be one such example; downloading child pornography from the Internet might be another. Furthermore, not even the way terrorist violence is instrumental is unique in this sense, for our society is replete with examples of the use of instrumental violence for financial gain (armed robbery), sexual gain (rape), personal power (domestic violence) and entertainment (boxing). Other examples could be developed to illustrate the point that in many, if not all, respects what terrorists actually engage with is not in itself unique, although in contemporary examples the

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scale and extent of the mayhem caused is. Even instrumental mass deaths occur outside of terrorism (in the actions of an army at war, as for example in Iraq, or in the use of genocide as an instrument of policy as in the war in Bosnia). It is of course the focussed non-state political instrumentality that is critical, and which we normally identify as one of the defining qualities of terrorism. But a sensible question to ask is does this political context come before engagement with terrorism, or is this political instrumentality (as distinct from a more general recognition of the instrumentality of violence) a product of, rather than a cause of, continued terrorist activity? Or, more likely, does the answer to questions like this change over time, dependent on degree of exposure and involvement with terrorist life styles and activities? 2.2. Pathways Implicit in the above discussion of process is the notion of a pathway. The two diagrams below illustrate potential qualities of the processes involved in the formation of terrorism and the terrorist, expressed as the pathway individuals might take to and with terrorism; the first illustrates forms of initial involvement and the second later involvement. Although using similar constructs, the use of two diagrams emphasises the temporal and developmental context to the processes involved. Both illustrate the potential relationship between three critical process variables that might relate to both the development of and engagement with terrorism:

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1. Distal factors 2. Personal factors 3. Social/ political/ organisational context. Other factors may well be relevant, but these three seem to encompass most significant variables. Distal factors relate to essentially past contextual influence. These influences are effectively unchangeable, in that they have happened as part of the individual’s socialisation into family, work, religion, society and culture. They represent the context from which the individual comes, and may in part correspond to the sort of correlational factors identified in surveys and the like that look for commonalities of experience between terrorists. In a sense these factors are the precursors of immediate causal influences, but tend to be so general as to have little predictive value. They clearly contribute to the behavioural choices of an individual, and may provide important direction and motivation, but they cannot be said in any meaningful way to “cause” a particular set of actions. They relate to involvement rather than event. An important point relevant to this has been made by Clarke and Felson (1993) who make a distinction between “criminal involvement” and “criminal events” [6]. “Criminal involvement refers to the processes through which individuals choose to become initially involved in particular forms of crime, to continue and to desist from that involvement. The decision processes at these three stages of involvement are influenced in each case by a different set of factors and need to be separately modelled. In the same way, the decision processes involved in the commission of a particular crime (i.e. the criminal event) are dependent upon their own special categories of information. Involvement decisions are characteristically multistage

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and extend over substantial periods of time. Event decisions, on the other hand, are frequently shorter processes, utilising more circumscribed information largely relating to immediate circumstances and situations” [6]. Although these distinctions were made with respect to criminal behaviour, they clearly are relevant to our consideration of terrorist behaviour. The Distal factors identified here as elements of the terrorist’s decisional pathway are essentially similar to Clarke and Felson’s concept of criminal involvement factors. Personal factors relate to the psychological and environmental context the individual experiences at the time of whatever quality of involvement he or she has. Critical elements might include an individual’s emotional state (perhaps as an element in its own right, or as below as an element of what is described in the diagrams as “disaffection” or distance from social constraints relating to immediate political or ideological contexts), immediate experiences (such as perceived negative contact with security forces), or peer pressure. The precise factors will presumably vary from individual to individual, and furthermore will change as a result of the individual’s experiences and continued involvement with terrorism and its consequences. Social/political/organisational context refers to a feature of the individual’s external context that is specifically concerned with political expression and ideology, and/or the organisational expression of that ideology. Given that both political and organisational qualities impinge on the individual’s experience of social context, some elements of this may be included in, or at least influence, the individual’s Distal context, and similarly they may also impinge on personal factors (in the sense, for example, of joining an organisation to acquire status). However, there is a clear sense in which political, ideological and organisational issues come together in terrorism to form a distinctive and critical quality. Evidence suggests that this is the most significant factor that distinguishes terrorist from criminal violence, and accessing this quality may reveal the process that changes the disaffected and troubled individual into a terrorist. The relative influence of these factors will vary between individuals, and as the individual becomes involved in his or her particular pathway to terrorism. What this therefore points to is a focus on the individual in context, and a concern with the experiences of the individual as the processes impinge on him/her. In practical terms, it may offer opportunities for structured intervention related to particular processes, or events; but what it also serves to do in conceptual terms is offer a systematic means of identifying process variables, and aiding exploration of how these variables might interact given the individual's particular circumstances. Perhaps most significantly, it addresses at least one of the rate-limiting elements in the dynamic of terrorism. 2.3. Involvement Figure 2 schematically describes how we might conceptualise the factors at work in an individual’s initial pre-involvement with terrorism.

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Initial stages: pre-involvement

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Figure 2

At this stage in development, the two factors of distal and personal seem likely to be most influential (indicated by the solid colour of the relevant boxes). Distal factors may provide the context to choices made in terms of involvement with, knowledge of, and access to ideologies and organisations involved in terrorism, but the critical element that distinguishes those who engage actively with terrorism relates to the particular personal context the individual finds him- or herself in, and the interaction of that with distal factors and the social/political/organisational context. It is these circumstances that describe the involvement factors referred to by Clarke and Felson (1993) [6]. The pathway taken might be structured (as in the case, for example, of a highly organised terrorist group like PIRA) where initiates and new recruits are exposed to a probationary period, are tested and assessed, and where recruit involvement might be shaped by formal training activities (through attendance at training camps and programmes, for example). Alternatively it might be more informal, in some cases

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involving almost a form of apprenticeship training. It is important to note however that case studies of terrorist involvement, such as there are, suggest that in all cases, an important developmental element is ideological and political exposure. Whilst action and activity might be the route by which people initially engage with terrorism, the recruit has to learn about the particular ideology and “meaning” their behaviour has within the terrorist organisation’s context; and it seems to be that sense of meaning that strengthens the process of involvement and gives it direction. Evidence suggests that the short training programmes for suicide bombers serve this purpose. The use of intensive video presentations, discussion and peer pressure spread over two or three days serves to engage the initiate with the process of further involvement. Comparison might be made with other similar processes that serve to initiate individuals into high risk and socially problematic behaviour – the ‘grooming’ process used to initiate children into sexual behaviour by paedophiles, for example, might draw on similar processes although spread out over longer time periods. We might hypothesise therefore that over time, the relative weight of influence between “personal” and “social/political/organisational” changes, and the origins in personal disaffection may be lost, or at least diluted. Parallel (and perhaps replacing this) there is a rise in explicit political and ideological involvement and activism, which has the effect of “institutionalising” and internalising the social/political/organisational factors, bringing those more clearly and firmly within the individual’s decisional calculus. This is illustrated in the “Later stages: involvement” Figure 3, again emphasised by the changing box colours.

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2.4. Later stages: involvement

Figure 3 In the later development of terrorism, perhaps mediated by personal responses to

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individual involvement in terrorism, we might hypothesise that the significance of social/political/organisational context grows in importance in the individual’s decisional calculus, and the influence of personal and distal factors diminishes. Indeed, our knowledge of terrorist formation suggests that explicitly (through training) and implicitly (through attribution of meaning) political ideology and organisational factors become increasingly influential in determining the individual’s behaviour and the choices made, and this might also be described as reflecting a growing sense of meaning and action. What we might also see is a growing together of political and personal factors, in the sense that individual qualities absorb and become part of the ideological and social context; in the diagram, personal factors and social/political/ideological context become merged. The processes outlined above broadly describe what we know about terrorist engagement and involvement and might be represented as a kind of “psychology of terrorism”. Individual terrorists do not appear “fully fledged” as terrorists; to become terrorists, they have to be trained both in terms of what they do (the mechanics of their trade as it were) and in terms of how they make sense of what they do (ideological formation). The aspirant terrorist comes from somewhere physically and psychologically, and he belongs in a social context that is outside of terrorist life (if only by virtue of not having “crossed the boundary” to illegality). The committed terrorist, in contrast, has already crossed that boundary, has acquired skills and knowledge that binds him or her closer to illegality and to the terrorist organisation, and these factors weigh heavily in the decisional calculus. Incidentally, the influence of the organisation and ideology can also be seen in the way in which political involvement in the later stages of development can represent a form of exit from terrorist violence, where engagement in the political process can substitute for terrorist engagement (as in the case of PIRA for example). In summary, the following points can be made:

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1. The above discussion makes the point that there isn’t one route to terrorism, but rather that there are individual routes, and furthermore that routes change over time (hence the idea of a process). One further important route about which we know relatively little may be exit from terrorism, particularly in the early formative stages of involvement. 2. The model assumes terrorism works at both an individual and political level, through acting on the environment, and the effect of that on subsequent behaviour. Regrettably, events seem to sustain this assertion. 3. The significant element in strengthening engagement with terrorism and giving it direction is the increased role for social/ political/ organisational context in the control over behaviour. This account is closely allied to that which might follow from an analysis based on the Rational Choice Perspective as applied to terrorism (see for example Taylor (2003) and Harrison (2004)) [7]. It emphasises the role of consequences to behavioural choices as the central determinant to behavioural change, and as noted earlier also draws on more traditional Cognitive Behavioural models of understanding behaviour. Taylor (1993) explored the use of Rational Choice concepts in terrorism, and other authors have extended this, drawing primarily on economic contexts, rather than psychological [3]. A central research issue emerging from the above relates to how we

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might understand the effects of ideology and organisational influences on the individual. Explorations of accounts grounded in empirical evidence, such as rule governance, may offer fruitful avenues for further conceptual development. The analysis presented here is not just an account of a psychology of terrorism. It also offers a way of analysing and understanding terrorism and the actions of the terrorist within a political, ideological and temporal framework. It recognises that individual experience is necessarily unique, but offers a framework for understanding that uniqueness within a broader context. What is even more important, however, is that by improving our understanding of the processes involved we may begin to develop empirically-based strategies to interfere with and change those processes to result in activities other than terrorism.

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3. A New Terrorism? The above account offers us a way of thinking about terrorism and the terrorist that does not need to create special accounts to deal with particular circumstances – the value of a theory lies in its capacity to deal with different situations, and the above account is offered as a start at such a general understanding. Yet something has changed in the terrorism world, and the nature of terrorism seems to be different now from ten or twenty years ago. Whilst September 11th may be seen in the U.S. as a watershed (as indeed it was for U.S. policy), there are good grounds for suggesting that the changes in terrorism we now see predate September 11th, and relate more to the changing nature of global politics after the demise of the Soviet Union, and in particular the increasing globalisation of economic and political activity. How can we characterise this change in terrorism? One answer might lie in the nature of the underlying ideologies that are associated with contemporary terrorism, and the social and environmental context in which they are expressed. Rauffer (2003) captures this in his description of the features of the new terrorism [8], and the following (based on Rauffer’s analysis) describes six broad qualities that might characterise the new terrorist threat. Not all terrorism necessarily shares all these qualities and of course old terrorist conflicts (such as in Northern Ireland) remain; but taken together they do seem to capture the qualities of difference new terrorism implies. Lack of specific territorial base, and/or location in inaccessible areas (geographically and socially). The new terrorism tends to be either physically or socially focused in areas that are difficult to access. The most obvious example is physical inaccessibility, which may result when, despite modern transport, the geography of terrorist locations reduces and limits access (through geographical isolation as in Afghanistan for example, or through the inaccessibility in the vast unplanned urban areas that characterize the major cities of many developing countries). Social inaccessibility, in parallel with geographical inaccessibility, refers to the social “grey areas” and the growing underclass of modern urban areas, where social and political poverty and exclusion as much as economic poverty and exclusion create a fertile environment for dissent. Ironically, as Castells notes, exclusion from the new technologies might also fall within this category of social exclusion [9]. Absence of third party state control through sponsorship. A feature of much of the terrorism of the 1980s and 90s was its surrogate quality. Terrorist groups had sometimes explicit, but more often covert relationships with third party governments, who supported their activities, and gave them direction. Of course state support for

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terrorism remains in the modern world, but its significance seems to be reduced, and in particular terrorist organizations seem to show reduced dependence on a single source of funding. We should note that old terrorist groups, such as the Provisional IRA, never had the close ties to governments that Middle Eastern groups did, and had a much more populist approach to fundraising. The significance of this in terms of government analyses is that contemporary groups appear less predictable, because their actions are outside of the framework of government interactions and the implicit rules that govern those interactions and shape policy. Absence of structured command hierarchy and management system. Perhaps the greatest difference between the contemporary terrorist world and the past is the changed nature of terrorist organizations. Direction in the past came from hierarchically structured organizations, which despite local operational cell structures, maintained close control over action and planning. Through such hierarchical structures, sponsoring states could of course exercise control. In the contemporary world, terrorist organizations seem to have the following characteristics: dispersed, flat, cellular structure and decisions resulting from informal hierarchy based on trust. This is not to suggest that hierarchical control no longer exists, but rather that in operation it is much more dispersed, and local activists are less tightly tied to the centre– indeed there may not be a centre in any conventional management sense, but rather networks of networks. Contemporary terrorist organizations do not need a home base from which to operate. They have adopted a globalised agenda, and are moving towards the creation of what in Information Technology terms is a form of virtual organization, which at times has informal qualities. Perhaps the most significant factor that enables this structure to be sustained is the use of low tech and personal trust communication. Communication between groups and individuals seems to have reverted to forms of communication dependent on personal contact, and knowledge and trust of individuals. This is not a phenomenon unique to contemporary terrorism; many groups and organizations whichh place a premium on confidentiality and certainty have in the past, and currently, used such communication structures for secure communication. Hasidic diamond traders in New York and Antwerp, businesses in industrial areas in Northern Italy and overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, for example, use similar techniques dependent on personal contact, passage of written communication and reliance on word of mouth in negotiating business deals. Such communication is, however, inconvenient for the security services, and of course simply bypasses the structures of interception and surveillance. As a result it of course exposes the weakness of dependence on high tech surveillance for intelligence gathering. Hybrid ideological character - partly “political” or religious-fanatic, partly criminal. Along with changes in the organizational structure of terrorist groups have come changes in the nature of their membership related to changed ideology. These changes can be characterized as:

• • •

highly motivated membership significance of local context range of attacks, range of targets

They also have the ability to rapidly mutate or change direction, to exploit lowfrequency high-impact action and to show a broad target range. This suggests a much

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more pragmatic approach to target selection where symbolic targets and practical targets might be equally likely to be addressed. It is also noteworthy that despite fears raised about the use of unconventional weapons, contemporary terrorist groups are very conservative in their choice of weapons, relying almost entirely on personal placement of bombs rather than other forms of sophisticated weaponry. However, in this context we can identify two major differences between the contemporary terrorist group and its ancestors. The first is the capacity and willingness to deploy and use enormous killing potential, compared with Cold War symbolic terrorism. The ideological agonizing that characterized the Baader-Meinhof Group, for example, in its choice of tactics seems totally absent now, replaced by a much more pragmatic and ruthless form of terrorism, where the risk of civilian casualties seems to have no moral role in decisions about targets and casualties. The second major difference is the nature of the ideological context to contemporary terrorism. The strength of contemporary ideological commitment can be seen in the willingness of young people to present themselves as suicide bombers (as noted earlier I would suggest this is a measure of commitment rather than psychopathy). In terms of the process diagrams presented earlier, this is a particularly important issue. State funding of terrorism seems to have been replaced by funding derived from other, often criminal, activity. But whilst many commentators predicted the growing absorption of terrorist groups into criminal activity with the demise of communism and the bi-polar conflict, the ideological and religious context to contemporary terrorist organization seems to be able to sustain a terrorist agenda as well as to engage in criminal fundraising. However, it is important to note that this is not new – the Provisional IRA has always engaged in criminal fundraising. What is new is the use of such tactics by terrorist groups that address transnational agendas. In ways that I do not think are yet clear, I believe that two of these qualities of new terrorism have had significant effects that more than anything accounts for the change in terrorism we now experience. The changes in organizational structure, allied to the changed hybrid ideological character seems to me to have had profound psychological and political consequences. In terms of the process outlined in Figures 2 and 3, the new terrorism has changed the dynamic and structure of the social, political and ideological factors. In particular it seems to have created forces that are enormously powerful once an individual becomes engaged with them. We might understand this as bringing together all three factors of distal, personal and organizational influence to create something that promotes behaviour change. It may be that associating religious indoctrination with alternative means of communication, not dependent on what we have come to regard as the usual communication processes, is a significant element of this. A brief comparison of an old (Provisional Irish Republican Army) and new (Al Qaeda) type of terrorist group will perhaps help illustrate the contrast between old and new terrorism. As far as Irish terrorism is concerned, there are several paramilitary groups that either claim or have claimed the title Irish Republican Army (IRA). The basic central quality of all of these groups, however, is the limited objective of seeking to create a unitary Irish state with no constitutional ties to the United Kingdom. Although at times present, more sophisticated or ambitious political analyses have had relatively little influence. All the different variants claim their origins from the first Irish Republican Army, the army of the Irish Republic declared by Dáil Éireann in 1919. In so far as contemporary events are concerned, the Provisional IRA (PIRA) split from the IRA in 1969 and has developed into what is probably the most effective

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contemporary paramilitary organisation in the world. The Official IRA, formed by the remainder of the IRA after the Provisional IRA seceded from the IRA in 1969, is largely inactive, but was for a short period also an active terrorist group. The 'Real' IRA, broke away from the PIRA in the 1990s as did The Continuity IRA. Both split from PIRA over differences related to strategy and to the extent to which there should be negotiation with the British state to resolve the conflict in Ireland. PIRA explicitly adopts the language of the military to describe its structures, reflecting of course its supposed origins as the “legitimate” army of the Irish Republic, as well as being a pragmatic response to circumstances. Military titles are used to describe functions (brigadiers, officers commanding), and its organisational structure, which at ground level is expressed in cells, has a clear and explicit hierarchical character (see Horgan and Taylor (1997)) [10] – terms such as Units and Brigades are used which have a geographical base. An “Army” Council controls and authorizes activity. Uniforms, parades, marching – all the trappings of a military organization - are deployed when necessary to give the impression of legitimacy as an army for both political and historical reasons. The objectives of PIRA are explicit, and at least ostensibly its targets are the British state and its military presence in Ireland. Warnings are given (in the main) for bombings. At one level PIRA has developed a highly sophisticated structure with elaborate support, finance and internal control mechanisms, but in operational terms it is relatively limited in the tactics it deploys. Its methods are relatively stereotypical, and whilst it has developed extremely efficient and sophisticated techniques and support structures, its primary weapons are cheap and readily available. Above all, however, it has maintained its regional character, and despite occasional training excursions into South America as advisors to FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revoluciones de Columbia - Erjercito del Pueblo - Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia - People's Army) for example, its focus is clearly on the British presence in Northern Ireland. If we take Al Qaeda as an example of new terrorism, we can immediately see differences as well as some similarities. Al Qaeda does not explicitly adopt the trappings of a military organization, and does not seem to see the need to make these claims for political legitimacy. Its members may wear what look like uniforms (in terms of commonality of dress) but they are not the uniforms of armies. Whilst the West seeks to characterize Al Qaeda as an organization with a clear hierarchy (controlled by bin Laden) the reality is that it is simply not that kind of organization. Like PIRA it seems to use low tech bombs and its most spectacular actions have been well-coordinated suicide-based bombings. However, it is dispersed, decentralized, and capable of functioning in the absence of explicit leadership. Like PIRA, however, it seems to have a well-developed intelligence and planning network, with the capacity to activate members not known to the security services as need requires, which implies functional coordination and structure. However, perhaps most important of all, unlike the PIRA, Al Qaeda does not draw from a single ethnic or national base. Its dispersed membership seems to be global in character, reflecting the spread of its religious base, Islam. But despite the problems this may produce for coordinated action, it has maintained the capacity for secure and effective communication. And because it has global affiliations (if not membership) so its operations can be mounted almost anywhere. Its targets seem to be equally diffuse, and whilst the war in Iraq has provided a focus, its ideological character is not grounded in the Iraqi experience, or any other particular national experience: its agenda transcends the nation state, drawing on the rich philosophical and theological bases of radical

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Islam. This, more than anything, perhaps gives the key to understanding the difference between the national and regional terrorist structures we are used to from the Cold War days, and the contemporary terrorist structures. In cultural terms the terrorist groups of the late twentieth century were familiar to Western audiences. They could be understood from a Western cultural perspective, and their actions, although reprehensible, were understandable from the Western historical and social context. Modern Islamic terrorism in particular is not familiar to the Western world-view. Ideological concepts like “jihad” are not familiar to Western audiences, and the assumptions of Islam are not necessarily at all obvious to non-Muslims. Structures, agendas and the logic of action that draws on these cultural roots do not easily fit into Western thinking (but see Taylor and Horgan (2001) [11]). In particular, the lack of separation between theology and politics and the nature of the aspired-for Islamic state is particularly difficult for the Western audience to understand. Yet paradoxically, as noted earlier, instead of recognizing our weaknesses and taking a broad cultural perspective to understanding this new terrorism, we in the West have moved towards an increasingly ethnocentric approach to responding to it, focusing on threats to essentially local national security agendas, rather than developing an understanding of the broader global forces driving the new terrorism. It is, however, important to note that there remain significant points of similarity between PIRA and Al Qaeda, and it would in my view be an error in analysis to suggest Al Qaeda constitutes something in principle different from what has gone before. What we are experiencing may not be so much as a “Clash of Civilizations” (with the implication of inevitable violence) but more a failure to understand cultural and associated ideological assumptions. And at its most benign this failure results in efforts to impose the values of one culture and tradition on another, perhaps inadvertently, perhaps deliberately, thereby exacerbating the problem. Qutb’s exhortation to Islam that “We need a unified ideology to confront life and its problems, an ideology that will solidify our strength against our foreign and domestic enemies”, when expressed in practice should perhaps be taken much more seriously by the West than hitherto it has in the light of current experience. In this may lie the key to understanding the relevance of the war in Iraq to the growth of terrorism, and similarly the irrelevance of that war to the defeat of the new terrorism.

4. Ways forward All is not gloom and despair. New forms of terrorism will adapt and change to circumstances, but it does not necessarily follow that the world cannot respond. We too, as the unwilling victims and spectators of terrorism must also adapt and change. However, responses will need to be much more sophisticated than those currently deployed, and in particular, the emphasis on military responses as core long-term policy support will have to be re-assessed. I believe policy needs to focus on a twin track approach at two rather obvious levels:

1. addressing the immediate ideological and personal context to terrorism and its management

2. and concurrently addressing the causes and sustaining features of social, Suicide Bombers: the Psychological, Religious and Other Imperatives, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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economic and political dysfunction that support the emergence of terrorism. The first addresses the short term by dealing with the problems that face us now; the second represents an investment for the future. Both together are necessary to give hope for a more peaceful world, and it seems to me that failure to implement both in tandem will not yield expected benefits. It may well be argued that this analysis is not new, and that current policy objectives include these; if so, then they are not effective and they need to be re-assessed. To respond to the contemporary threat, more innovative approaches than hitherto utilised need to be developed to address the new problems. 4.1. The Immediate Context to Terrorism In addressing (1) above, the immediate context to terrorism, in my view the core effort needs to be at two levels: through the development of civil society structures drawing on local and regional contexts to increase understanding of social tensions, to offer alternatives for political expression, to enable local views to be expressed and to influence both political dissidents and government; and through preventative intervention based on an understanding of the psychological processes involved. Neither of these efforts is necessarily based on the actions of law enforcement or security responses, but utilise the deployment of a coordinated range of skills and knowledge.

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4.1.1. Civil Society Initiatives All too often in the interest of visible action, military and law enforcement responses impede the emergence of civil structures. Experience in Northern Ireland and latterly in Iraq suggests in particular that the logic of the military creating the conditions for civil society to develop is flawed. However, few resources have been put into understanding the role of civil society in the management of terrorism, and it seems to me that this needs much greater investment to explore models, processes and techniques to gain maximum effect. Evidence-based policy development in this area needs to be encouraged and sustained to support the emergence of short- and medium-term policy. In my view, it is only through civil society structures that the cultural and social context that supports terrorism can be addressed. Regardless of any ideological context, in simple, practical terms this seems a reasonable way forward. An important element of any civil society response will be to use new technology to support and develop initiatives. When facing decentralized terrorist systems, the power of many can combat decentralized foes:

•

• •

As we have noted, contemporary terrorist networks are highly decentralized and distributed with global outreach. A centralized, government-dominated effort by itself cannot effectively fight this kind of terrorism, nor can it address the global character of contemporary ideologies. Terrorism is everyone's issue and the Internet connects everyone. Use of new technology enabling a connected citizenry is the best defense against terrorist propaganda, which matches the global outreach of the new terrorism. As we saw in the aftermath of the March 11th bombing in Spain, the response was

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spontaneous and rapid because citizens were able to use the Internet to organize themselves. As we are seeing in the distributed world of weblogs and other kinds of citizen media, truth emerges best in open conversation among people with divergent views. But the corollary of this is that truth can sometimes be challenging and uncomfortable; it may well expose some of the contradictions that lie at the heart of not only terrorist ideology, but also flaws that lie at the heart of some contemporary state structures and approaches to terrorism. I suppose the most obvious form of civil society structure relates to the expression of political views. Necessarily organizations of this kind will at times challenge existing political structures and parties, and it might be unrealistic to expect the emergence of democratic representative structures in circumstances of conflict and heightened tensions. However experience in Northern Ireland suggests that organizations that emphasize human rights as a unifying theme can sustain themselves and develop as effective voices and outlets for non-violent dissent. But perhaps this raises an absolutely critical point – elimination of the dissent expressed by terrorists should not be the policy intention, but rather its expression through non-violent means. But to sustain this agenda there needs to be the possibility of political change to address the causes of that dissent.

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5. Conclusion The above offers a wide-ranging conceptual analysis, much speculative and largely lacking empirical verification. It is offered as a base from which further questions can be asked, in the hope that it might lead towards the development of more empirically based policy. Some of the issues raised may challenge the policy assumptions adopted by some states; but through constructive analysis I believe we can also address the second policy focus of addressing the causes and sustaining features of social dysfunction that support the emergence of terrorism. Perhaps we should explore more the role of the Internet in this regard, for whilst the Internet is not the panacea for all the ills of society, the strength of resistance to it from states that fear openness is a measure of the potential they see in it for generating change. We may never eliminate terrorism, but we can certainly strive to reduce and contain it. But to achieve that end there will need to be substantial changes in the nature of governance in many states towards openness and a functioning civil society.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]

Stern, J. (2003). "Fearing Evil." Social Research 71: 1111-1126. Taylor, M. and J. Horgan (2006). "A Conceptual Framework for addressing Psychological processes in the Development of the Terrorist." Terrorism and Political Violence 18: 585-601. Taylor, M. (1993). The Terrorist. London, Brassey's Defence Publishers. Krueger, A. B. and J. Maleckova (2002). "Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" NBER Working Paper(Paper No. 9074). Testas, A. (2004). "Determinants of Terrorism in the Muslim World: An Empirical Cross-Sectional Analysis." Terrorism and Political Violence 16: 252-273. Clarke, R. V. G. and M. Felson (1993). Introduction: Criminology, Routine Activity, and Rational Choice. Routine Activity Theory and Rational choice: Advances in Criminological Theory Volume 5. R. V. G. Clarke and M. Felson. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction: 1-14.

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Harrison, M. (2004). "An Economist looks at Suicidal Terrorism." http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/harrison/papers/terrorism.pdf [8] Rauffer, X. (2003). "Al Qaeda: A Different Diagnosis." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26: 391-398. [9] Castells (2000). The Information Age. Economy, Society and Culture. . Oxford, Blackwell. [10] Horgan, J. and M. Taylor (1997). "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure." Terrorism and Political Violence 9: 1-32. [11] Taylor, M. and J. Horgan (2001). "The Psychological and Behavioural bases of Islamic Fundamentalism. ." Terrorism and Political Violence 13: 37-71.

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Suicide Bombing: a Possibility for France? François GÉRÉ Président, Institut Français d’Analyse Stratégique, Paris

Abstract. So far there have been no instances of suicide bombing on French soil. Does this mean that for some obscure reason France has been spared? Is it a sanctuary protected by some covert governmental leniency towards terrorist organizations? Or is this due to French refusal to participate in military operations in Iraq? A short review of the past and the present situation demonstrates that France has been and still remains a major target which has to be protected from the kind of attack suffered in both Spain and the United Kingdom. The current situation must be attributed to an accurate assessment of the adversary, persistent effort by the security forces (police, gendarmerie, DGSE) and, so far, a jolly good piece of luck. Keywords. suicide bombers, French anti-terrorist policy, France as an Islamist target, French terrorists

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The Legacy and Evolution of Ideology In 1981, the Abu Nidal group, an extremist Palestinian organisation with connections to Iraq, waged an attack on the historic Jewish area of Paris. It was not a suicide attack but deliberate mass, indiscriminate killing of civilians. At that time groups such as this one, whose ideology was a combination of nationalism and MarxismLeninism, had no cultural reference for suicide attacks. A brief overview of the past twenty years suggests an absence of “self sacrifice” ideology among such groups. The first instance of a deliberate operation occurred in December 1994 with the hijacking of an Algiers-Paris Airbus by members of an Algerian Islamist Group. In order to punish France for its alleged support of the Algerian government, the attackers had planned to crash the plane in Paris. However, once they uncovered the terrorist plot, French forces successfully took control of the plane by force. Interestingly, the 1995 suicide bombing campaigns in Israel and Palestine had no significant impact on the spread of suicide attacks to Europe. By contrast, operations by the former Afghan mujahedin in Bosnia were more influential, creating a genuine vehicle for sacrifice, which in turn put the possibility of suicide attacks in Europe to the fore for the first time. The progress of violent Salafist ideology, which espouses an interpretation of Jihad which makes suicide attack a legitimate and valuable activity, began to spread within Europe and North Africa (Maghreb). In this respect, September 11th was much more of a “prestigious” or iconic symbol than a trigger. Indeed, from the statistics compiled by Western security services in all countries, including the United States, it appears that the most important trigger was the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and subsequent related events. No one had been able to predict that Iraq would become a venue for suicide terrorism on such an unprecedented scale.

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1. France, a high ranking target France remains a key target for Al Qaeda. In 2006, nine out of fourteen speeches delivered by Ahman al Zawahiri designated France as an enemy which should be punished for its hostility to Islam. Indeed the reasons given were many. Among them were the outlawing of the hijab, March 2004; the French military contribution to the fight against terrorist organizations operating in the Middle East such as the stabilisation operations in Afghanistan; participation in Task Force 150; patrolling the Red Sea and surrounding areas; hosting United States Marine units in Djibouti; and participation in selected PSI (proliferation strategic initiative) activities. These have been deliberately manipulated by al Zawahiri in order to misrepresent French policy towards Islam. Additionally, French engagement in Lebanon aimed at restoring democracy and stability is often presented as tacit support for Israel although it is a neutral pursuit. 2. The Threat Level

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Is it possible to evaluate the quantity and quality of potential suicide bombers? There are some estimates. For example, French official services estimate that there are limited numbers of potential candidates, possibly 100-500 in total. Other evidence suggests: • Very few operations: only three French suicide operations in Iraq • A potential reserve not only against Iraq, but in France and in Europe • A flow of well trained suicide operators who could come back to Europe. So far the main threat comes from the Groupement Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). It is descended from the GIA (Groupement pour l’Indépendence Algerienne) and was created in 1998 by Hassan Hattab. He was killed by the Algerian armed forces in autumn 2003. Many GSPC leaders have been killed or jailed (with some degree of uncertainty) in a very confusing environment. The group has been weakened by the infiltration of the Algerian security forces and violent internal rivalry. For instance Mokhtar Ben Mokhtar, head of the 9th region (South Sahara, about 1000km from Algiers) and Afghan veteran, had rejected Zitouni’s authority (GIA) preferring to rally around Hattab in late 1999. Under the authority of another self proclaimed ‘Abderazzek’, called “el Para”, the group tried to expand its activity into the Sahara in order to penetrate Chad. A major combined operation by Chadian, French and American forces crushed that effort, and Abderazzek was arrested by Algerian security forces. Internal rivalries and competition persisted pitching a new character Mohamed Droukal against Ben Mokhtar. As a result, in 2004 the GSPC appeared to be near collapse. This would explain why he sought the support of Al Qaeda in early 2004. In 2006, the GSPC obtained official recognition by Ayman al Zawahiri and changed its name to “Al Qaeda in the Maghreb”. Under a more disciplined command, it has reorganised its forces and operational teams and would seem to be prepared to undertake suicide operations.

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3. The Nature of the Present Danger At the time of publication, nine French citizens have been killed in terrorist operations in Iraq. In 2006, French citizens conducted three suicide operations. Experts estimate that there are potentially 200 volunteers willing to do so in the future. To this estimate it is possible to add a small number of Belgian citizens, as indicated by, for example, the case of Muriel Dejauque who committed suicide-bombing in Iraq. However, these figures are only projections. Many cases, particularly the most dangerous, continue to catch the security forces unawares. Take the case of Tours, a quiet town in the midst of traditional France. Three young men from different origins travelled to Syria for the purpose of Jihad. The trip was poorly organised and subsequently they were arrested a few days after their arrival in Damascus. This was an astonishing example of the self-building mimetic martyrdom ideology found even among those who are regarded as wellintegrated young people, a situation which echoes the July 2005 suicide bombings in London. Recent French converts to Islam represent a major threat; they are often zealots, eager to demonstrate their engagement with what they perceive to be the cause. As holders of an EU passport, they can travel easily since they do not need a visa to enter countries with high numbers of French tourists, such as Tunisia, Morocco, or Egypt. Among some sections of French youth, from the suburbs and the so-called “Maghreb second generation”, becoming a “fighter” in Iraq, fighting against the Americans, has become prestigious, even fashionable in several communities in France and throughout Europe.

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4. Conclusion With only three exceptions, among those arrested since 2002 (slightly more than 350), the overwhelming majority were from low-income and disadvantaged backgrounds, with poor educational attainment. This basic fact is not insignificant, because it demonstrates that these individuals also may have a poor knowledge of Islam and of the Qu’ran. Notably, there are no indications that women are being recruited. The Belgian case mentioned above so far appears to be the exception. At present, the ongoing hostilities in Iraq seem to provide strong motivation for those looking to fight. However, overall, in the absence of a deeply-rooted culture of self-sacrifice both in the Maghreb and within French society, the profound cultural impetus for suicide operations remains limited.

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Female Suicide Bombers: Victims or Murderers? Fatima LAHNAIT Member of 'Coup de soleil', French think tank on European and MENA issues

Abstract. In recent years an increasing number of women have volunteered for suicide missions. Generally they do so because they are of low status and see little future for themselves. The organizations that exploit them prefer to claim they are serving their religion or nations, or even women’s liberation. Keywords. oppressed women, female suicide bombers, terrorism, gender inequality

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Introduction The participation of women in terrorism is not a recent development as women have taken part in terror attacks since at least the nineteenth century, and have played a role in the modern wave of terrorism that has gained momentum since the 1960s. Classic examples include the female participants in the campaign waged by the FLN (Front di Liberatiōn Nationale) during the Battle of Algiers in the late 1950s and early 1960s [1]; the terror campaigns of the Baader-Meinhof gang (1968-1977) in Germany with Ulrike MEINHOF; the Palestinian hijackings at the end of the 1960s to the mid-1970s; and the Italian Red Brigades in Italy from the 1970s to the mid-1980s. Nor is female participation in suicide bombings a new phenomenon. Women have numbered among its ranks almost since it first appeared in the Middle East in the early 1980s, especially in Lebanon. Their participation has played a key role in the use of shahid martyr. In October 1983 a male suicide bomber of the Hezbollah Shi’ite party killed 241 American marines. Two months later President Ronald Reagan removed his troops from Lebanon. The impact and the effect of this action was felt all around the world and this event is still often cited by al-Qaeda. The first female suicide bomber was Sana KHYADALI, a young Lebanese woman. On 9th April 1985 she successfully targeted an Israeli military convoy in Lebanon leaving five soldiers dead. Between 1982 and 1986 her action was imitated by five other women dispatched in Lebanon. The following decades witnessed the spread of female suicide bombers to other areas around the globe. Groups from Sri Lanka, the Palestinian territories, Chechnya, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Iraq, and elsewhere emulated the Lebanese example and operated female suicide bombers along with their male counterparts. Recent prominent women suicide bombers include the Chetyen Hawa BARAYEV who killed 27 persons in June 2000 in a Russian military camp in Chechnya; a

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Palestinian who blew herself up in Jerusalem in January 2002; a member of the Turkish Workers Villagers Independent Army who detonated her bomb at the entrance to a mosque in April 2006; the Sri Lankan Black Tiger Kanapathipillai MANJULA DEVI, 34 years old, who blew herself up near a Colombo army base on 25th April 2006, wounding the commander of the Sri Lankan armed forces; the Iraqi terrorist Sajida Moubarak Atrous al-Richaoui who failed to blow herself up at the Radisson’s hotel in Amman, Jordan, on 9th November 2005 (in the same operation the other terrorists, among whom was her husband, blew themselves up and killed 57 persons); the same day, Muriel DEGAUQUE, a Belgian woman convert to Islam, blew herself up near Baghdad; two Iraqi female members of the police academy of Baghdad who blew themselves up in December 2005 in their academy killing 36 policemen and wounded 72 persons; and Sonja B., a German convert to Islam who was seized in Germany on June 2nd 2006 before her planned suicide attack in Iraq. Between 1985 and 2006, there have been more than 220 women suicide bombers, representing nearly 15 percent of the overall number of successful suicide bombers around the world along with those intercepted in the final stages before their attack [2]. The enlistment of women from Belgium, India, Iraq, Turkey, and the West Bank territories for suicide attacks in 2006 indicates that their role continues, and may in fact represent a growing phenomenon.

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1. To recruit suicide bombers, the terrorist or rebel organizations have to develop the cult of martyrdom In Muslim societies the martyr is a figure who stands midway between the hero and the saint, the one who dies ‘in the path of God’ by taking part in a jihad (holy war). The martyr who is on the offensive is inspired by a desire to destroy the enemy by resorting to a legitimate form of violence that is sanctioned by religion. The struggle implies killing the infidel and oppressive adversary. This idea, which is the inspiration behind both Muslim martyrdom and that found in other religions, can also inspire nationalism, as with the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, in the patriotism of the First World War, or the revolutionary phenomena of 1789. In the Sikh religion martyrdom has undeniable similarities with Islamic martyrdom. The term used to designate Sikh martyrdom is the same as the Arabic expression, which is also used in Persian: shahid (plural: shuhada). The shahid gives his blood in order to preserve justice in tragic circumstances and to bear witness to the truth of his religion. The ideal of resistance is extended to mean death in the service of a sacred cause. The expression ‘martyrdom’ (shahada) has had a strange destiny in Islam. In the Qur’an the word means bearing witness and not dying a holy death. Whenever dying for Allah is mentioned, expressions such as ‘slain in the cause of God’ ( II:154 ), ‘fight for the cause of god’ ( IV: 74 ) are used. ‘The cause of God’ ( Sabil ellah ) is the major expression used to designate what will subsequently become known as martyrdom [3]. 2. The exclusion of women from martyrdom Although a few Palestinian women have taken part in suicide bombings in recent years, the same cannot be said of either the Iranian martyrs or the members of al-Qaeda. The exclusion of women is deliberate, and not of their own making. Their exclusion does however often go hand in hand with a more or less tacit acquiescence on their part, and

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it can take novel forms. Al-Qaeda supporters who have lived for several years in modern Western societies have been able to espouse cutting-edge technology, such as information technology, and have studied modern engineering, but they trail behind the West in terms of relations between men and women. At this level they deliberately keep themselves apart from the West: ‘the family is one of the places where it is possible to construct an Islamic identity that is profoundly different to Western identity’ [3]. The sexes are complementary, but not equal. A woman’s mission is to perpetuate her family, and a man’s mission is to provide her with a decent life in material terms and a dignified existence in which she lacks for nothing. A woman’s place is in the home, a man’s place is in the public space. Women should be chaste and modest. Men should be virile and should protect the family’s honour. There is nothing specifically Islamic about this ideology which is as primitive, tribal and as old as the world itself. Why do relations between men and women remain unchanged? The absence of change is in fact more apparent than real. What we find here is regression, pure and simple, an identity reflex, a refusal to change and a new rigidity rather than the preservation of a traditional attitude. Women are the Achilles’ heel of Muslim civilisations undergoing profound and critical transformations. Relationships between men and women in contemporary Muslim societies are governed by a dialectic in which women who were once mothers, sisters, daughters or wives are gradually becoming individualised and challenging men’s status as the sole social actors in the public domain. One of the domains to which women are denied access in Muslim societies undergoing modernisation is martyrdom. The refusal to allow them to put their lives at risk in fact denies them the right to individuation through a baptism of fire. Sacrificing one’s life for a noble cause implies that others recognise one’s social pre-eminence. The ‘heroic individual’ breaks into the social field and then becomes a true individual thanks to its secularisation. At this level women are denied access to martyrdom because of an unbreakable social taboo rather than for political reasons. In Palestine and Chechnya this assumption is now being challenged by some women. This tendency may be reinforced as women aspire to being men’s equals. Putting their own lives at risk may guarantee them the equality they have been denied for so long. Women’s martyrdom still has no role to play in any jihad, and this makes them second-class citizens. Being unable to put their lives at risk, they are placed ‘under the protection’ of men who thus deny them the right to self-determination in the domain of the profane. Be it in Iran, Algeria, Egypt or Afghanistan, the refusal to allow women access to martyrdom means that they cannot dispose of their lives and deaths in the same way that men can. At this level, social asymmetry is perpetuated, if not exacerbated. Yet many women would like to take their place in the pantheon of martyrs and thus win collective recognition of their citizenship and equal dignity in society. In Iran, one of Hezbollah’s slogans was ‘The modesty of women is guaranteed by the blood of martyrs’ [4]. The refusal to grant women access to the public space and keeping them under male domination are, in other words, sanctioned by the blood men spill as martyrs. Men thus acquire a legitimate status that women cannot attain because they do not have access to holy death.

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3. How to understand the death-wish of women who are willing to be slain and who also aspire to slaying others? “If you blow yourself up and kill enemies of Islam you will have lunch with the Prophet” is one of the arguments used in Muslim countries to convince men, and women, to be candidates for a suicide attack. There are many factors to take into consideration in the individual’s decision to volunteer ‘to die-to-kill’: psychological disorders, societal pressure, religious ideology, fear of dishonor if they refuse to become one, economic reasons, financial aspects (the organizations will sustain their families), the repressive conditions of life. The appearance of the shahidat, young women suicide bombers, was a glorified, but also a demonized, phenomen. It commanded the interest of analysts all around the world and especially in the Middle East. On 27th January 2002, when Wafa IDRIS blew herself up on a main street of Jerusalem, killing an Israeli citizen and wounding ninety people, she became the first Palestinian female suicide bomber [5]. The testimony of her friends and family suggests that the motivation for her suicide was personal rather than national or religious: Wafa IDRIS was 27 years old, divorced by her husband (who was also her cousin) after nine years during which she failed to have a child. Her status as a divorced and barren woman, and her return as a dependant to her parent’s home where she became an economic burden, put her in what is a dead end situation in a traditional, patriarchal society. Her only way of redeeming herself from the inferior status ordained by her environment was by choosing to become a shahida for the sake of her nation [6]. Did Wafa Idris, a paramedic in the Red Crescent, commit suicide because her life was miserable? She was crowned a hero throughout the entire Arab world and was portrayed as a symbol of the new Muslim feminism. She became famous as a noble and heroic expression of the collective desire of Muslim women in general, and of Palestinian women in particular, to enlist in the struggle against the enemies of the nation of Islam, chief among them Israel. Women like Wafa IDRIS were easy targets for recruiters who preferred childless, divorced, raped, separated, or unwed women, those who had had a love affair or personal distress. According to Yoram SCHWEITZER’s study, Palestinian female suicide bombers: reality vs myth, between Wafa Idris’s action in January 2002 and the end of May 2006, sixty-seven Palestinian women were counted as planning to carry out suicide attacks (eight of the women blew themselves up; the other women were arrested at various stages of planning) [2]. The interviews carried out by SCHWEITZER with many unsuccessful men and women bombers constitute a key resource to the understanding of the global phenomenon of female suicide terrorism [2]. In contrast to the enthusiasm with which they defended the right and duty of men to volunteer for actions against Israel, a decisive majority of the men interviewed by SCHWEITZER contended that there was no need to employ women as suicide terrorists and expressed opposition to women’s involvement in this type of action. Their opposition was not due to a principle of moral denial of the religious and national right of women to carry out the action. It mostly reflected their fear of possibly degrading the honor of Palestinian women, which as such would be personally damaging to their honor as men. Schweitzer argues that while feminist mantras were proclaimed proudly after each

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event by external supporters, they were hardly evident from the beginning. They indicated that they regarded themselves as fulfilling the function of ‘publicizing nationalistic messages’. This theme often contradictes the personal interviews that they granted soon after their arrest. They explained their volunteering for missions in terms of equal participation in the national struggle of their people. Among SCHWEITZER’s interviews the most significant were with three female suicide terrorists, aged twenty to twenty-six, all unmarried, who were caught before they carried out their plans. The women related different and sometimes contradictory versions of their motives and the circumstances in which they volunteered for their missions: - Thouria Khamour was arrested on 2002 at home, before embarking on the mission she had volunteered for. She gave different versions of her motives and the way she was recruited for her mission and claimed that she had in any case never intended to carry out the mission and that she feared “that God would not regard it [personal circumstances] as a worthy motive, and would therefore not consider her a shahida” [2]. The first interview took place ten days after her arrest. She said that she had volunteered for the mission out of personal motives, explaining that “sometimes a person is subject to such great pressure and mental distress that it leads to an explosion” [2]. In fact, she suffered from her family’s objections to a man who wished to marry her. Thouria related that her father had destroyed her only chance of getting married and that she had therefore decided to take revenge on him by becoming a shahida. In a later interview, after spending a long time in prison with her cellmates, a more belligerent Thouria appeared. She transformed herself from a girl whose personal motives dominated to a flag bearer for the Palestinian and Islamic national struggles against the Zionist enemy. She added, on a selfless, socially conscious note: “I asked that if I succeeded in carrying out my mission, my reward would go to Palestinian orphans. I wanted to sacrifice myself for my country and God” [2]. Thouria’s interviews demonstrate the phenomenon of female suicide terrorists undergoing indoctrination in prison. During their imprisonment they construct, accept, or adapt the national and religious narrative, and shape their story to explain their motives for volunteering for their missions. Sometimes, they go from personal explanations for suicide terrorism to adopting national and religious explanations, full of altruism and heroism against a demonized enemy, whose deeds justify every kind of action, including indiscriminate murder of innocent people [2].

- Arin Ahmad, twenty years old, unmarried, was arrested on the way to a suicide terrorist attack in 2002. She volunteered to take part in a double suicide terrorist attack, but at the last minute, when she was near the target, she decided that she did not want to carry it out. Arin assumed that the process of volunteering would take a long time, during which they would gradually prepare her for the mission. Instead, however, the process moved ahead at a dizzying pace. In one of her first interviews Arin claimed in her defense that she had abandoned her intention when it came to the moment of truth. Her motive was personal. The Israelis had killed the man who had been her boyfriend for a year and a half. “I was in distress, and I was depressed,” she said [2]. Afterwards, she asserted that Israel bore exclusive responsibility for her volunteering for a suicide mission. “How can I

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condemn suicide terrorist attacks when I myself went on such a mission? ” [2]. - Wafa al-Bas had been badly burned in an accident in late 2004. She was treated at the Soroka Medical Center. Seizing this opportunity, the people who sent her attempted to have her carry out a suicide terrorist attack at the hospital where she had a medical check-up scheduled. She did not succeed. She was caught by Israeli security who safely detonated the explosives tied to her undergarments. Shortly after, the print and broadcast media were allowed to conduct interviews with her, during a single day, before she was brought to the prison facility with her compatriots and before she underwent any process of indoctrination and preparation for interviews. In contrast to her compatriots, who were more personal in their initial interviews, Wafa’s initial interviews were of a demonstratively belligerent nationalistic character. Only in later interviews on the same day, when her demonstrative singlemindedness begin to dissipate, did she express her realization that her handlers had exploited her disability and resulting poor mental state. The many versions she gave to the media, during a brief period, represented the typical fluctuating and contradictory versions of their motives (personal, political and religious reasons, financial compensations for the families) given by female suicide terrorists. The women’s contradictory versions of their stories appeared also in other interviews with the media, especially in the personal interviews conducted in the earlier stages of their imprisonment, before they were briefed by their domineering cellmates. In these personal interviews the women expressed a strong feeling that their difficult personal situation had been exploited to lead them to volunteer for their mission, without their having fully thought through the deed they planned to commit. In contrast, personal remarks were generally absent from the media interviews conducted with them after they had spent time in prison. The latter interviews were primarily products of an indoctrination process, formal or informal, in prison. They bore a dominant nationalistic character, and reflected the uniform dogmatic messages that the organizations wished to deliver [2].

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4. How much have the women seen their actions as acts of feminism? To Clara BEYLER, “when women become human bombs, their intent is to make a statement not only in the name of a country, a religion, a leader, but also in the name of their gender” [7]. In the Arab media female suicide bombers are marketed as independent and determined women with strongly held opinions, who decided to take their fate into their hands with a feeling of completeness and destiny. They are portrayed as having special, noble personal qualities, and are also used to motivate men to follow their example. Yet a more thorough examination of the interviews with the female Palestinian suicide terrorists, which to a large extent has defined the image of female suicide terrorists around the world, is likely to paint a more complete, complex picture of reality [8]. The statements as to their motivation to be a martyr, made by both Palestinian and other female suicide bombers worldwide, may reflect their authentic need to take part in fighting against their people’s enemy, but it does not in any way change their unequal and inferior social status as well as the reluctance of their traditional societies to include women in these operations. This discriminatory opinion is also reflected in the stance of the Palestinian

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organizations, which for a long time refrained from employing women as suicide terrorists. Terrorist groups use personal distress to recruit women, because female suicide bombers receive immense media coverage. They are a tactical advantage which enable them to bypass security measures and don’t really have an impact on the ‘struggle for emancipation’. Even though those sending the women may be exploiting the modern cry for emancipation of women, proving that women are equally eligible to die alongside men for a nationalist or religious cause indicates an equivalency of value. If the women themselves attribute any feminist goals to their actions, this is a rationale imposed after the fact, far from being the primary reason that launched them on their mission. Advancing gender interests is sometimes an imported cause meant to redeem the aberration of a female suicide bomber.

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5. A propaganda weapon? Thus, along with smart use of human resources, women’s participation in suicide bombings has been used as a propaganda tool by their organizations. They served the dispatchers’ drive to project an image of participation by all segments of their respective societies in the ethno-national and/or religious struggles. Yet despite the rhetoric and the temporary honor these women enjoy in implementing their tasks, they have not succeeded in promoting any of the egalitarian issues that hovered around them. Therefore the concept of dying for equality translates into negative gains on both levels: it has neither achieved by, nor apparently was it the main purpose of, the volunteering participants, albeit it was at times explicitly or implicitly attributed to the female suicide bombers by those who sent them. The cult fostered by the Arab media around the image of Wafa IDRIS and the expressions of identification with her among the Palestinians have created a new model for Palestinian girls and women, as well as for Muslim women beyond the theater of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seeking to follow the same path [9]. The highly emotional parades in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in memory of the female suicide terrorists who blew themselves up, together with hymns of praise for them in the Arab media, have created the impression in the global media that the female suicide terrorists were a band of independent women, fully aware of what they were doing, who were trying to take an active and equal part in the armed struggle and were fully supported by Palestinian society, as well as elsewhere. The question arises whether this one-dimensional image portrayed in the media is grounded in fact. Or does a gap exist between the myth surrounding female Palestinian suicide terrorists and the personal and social reality in which they operated, which may have pushed many of them into volunteering for their missions [10]? Immediately after Wafa Idris’s attack in 2002, the Arab media extensively debated the question of the legitimacy of women’s involvement in suicide attacks. While the responses of the secular terrorist organizations were enthusiastic, Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, head of the most prominent religious terrorist organization, sounded more ambivalent. He explained why, from a religious and operational standpoint, there was no need for women to be involved in terrorist attacks, and why such involvement was completely undesirable. He said that “The Islamic movement cannot absorb all the Palestinian men demanding to participate in jihad and acts of self sacrifice and we have no real need for them” [11]; and “Ensuring the nation’s existence is important many times over” [12].

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But, in 2004, Sheikh Yassin himself gave a religious approval to Rim Riashi’s suicide attack, the first by a woman under Hamas sponsorship, with a fatwa: “Women who commit suicide attacks and kill Jews are rewarded in Paradise by becoming more beautiful than the 72 virgins promised to the men suicide bombers/shahid” [11]. Rim Riashi, 22 years old and the mother of two children, was supposed to have had a love affair with a senior operative of Hamas and had to die to save her husband and family’s honor. While a feminist perspective was featured in the Arab and Palestinian media, this attitude has also drawn some criticism. The sympathy expressed by some of the Arab media has sparked dialogue and debate on the issue. “On the basis of which passages in the Qur’an and the Hadith does a young mother abandon her true jihad role, which is raising two children, one of whom needs her milk ?” [13]. Other the last few years women suicide bombers have earned the distinction of appearing more newsworthy than their male counterparts. The media in general like female suicide terrorists. The Israeli version of reality perpetuates the chauvinism in Arab Islamic society and focuses on personal and social aspects and ignores nationalist motives. Meanwhile, the Arab media develops the feminist dimension, portraying the Palestinian female suicide terrorist as a full partner in the national and religious jihad. The Israeli press describes them as women with difficult social backgrounds who come from the margins of Palestinian society and have problems at home, mostly relating to their family situation. But they are not particularly different from male suicide terrorists. As presented in the remarkable movie ‘Paradise Now’, male suicide terrorists also usually come from the margins of Palestinian society, and have various personal problems that make it easier to recruit them for suicide terrorism [14]. In the case of men, however, the media mostly comments on the revenge motive – family members of the terrorist who were killed – or their difficult economic backgrounds, hinting that the male terrorist had nothing to lose. Men are ostensibly driven solely by motives of security and economics, and the journalists rarely ask any questions about the social status of an involuntarily unwed Muslim man. 6. Strong enough to die, not to command! Despite whatever social and political advances they have made, women are still regarded as the ones- in Muslim societies- who have ‘paradise under their feet’, as the gentler sex whose innate maternal nature makes them far less likely candidates for suicide bombers, an unfeminine act. So, their role in the suicide bombing arena has been characterized as shocking, if not outright inconceivable. Since in many cultures women are perceived as the gentle and naive creators of human life, their participation in acts of carnage and devastating pain has aroused a mixture of surprise and repulsion and elevated the level of public interest [13]. The study directed by Yoram SCHWEITZER in 2006 revealed that ‘despite their high profile, women play a marginal role in their organizations, both numerically and in the corporate structure (even if in some areas such as Turkey they comprised around 40 percent of all the suicide bombers; in Sri Lanka 20-25 percent, and in Chechnya 43 percent)’ [15]. They are definitely not the leaders in their organizations, but serve rather as pawns and sacrificial lambs. They are not responsible for the planning of the operations and are dispatched to

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the missions with barely any say as to their targets, the timing of the bombing, and the way the operation should be conducted. For the most part, they have not otherwise been trained as fighters, and a suicide mission in itself requires little investment in job training, in terms of either time or money (typically less than 150 US dollars) [16]. Indeed, for many of the women the contribution of a suicide mission to their national or religious struggle is precisely that: a form of employment in the male-dominated domain of suicide bombing.

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7. A Chechen exception ? The role of women in the Chechen organizations is almost the same as in the Palestinian ones. The organizations are male-run with women serving in traditional roles. Yet, Chechen women are more emancipated than their ‘Arab sisters’, studying and having full time jobs [17]. But the last two wars in Chechnya (1994-6 and 19992000) have disrupted people’s hopes for economic or academic success. So by blowing themselves up, the Chechen female suicide bombers looked rather for revenge than for the equality of men and women. The suicide bombers have earned a prominent role in Chechnya’s terrorism campaign against the Russian occupation. The use, from the start, of women bombers by the Chechen rebels is due to their willingness, availability, high motivation, and greater emotional impact on their target audience. Nonetheless, most of Chechen society is opposed to suicide terrorism. On 7th June 2000 the chakidki (Russian version of the Arabic word shahidat) Khava BARAYEVA and Luisa MAGOMADOVA attacked the headquarters of a Russian detachment in Chechnya: the result was two dead and five wounded. According to Anne SPECKHARD and Khapta AKHMEDOVA, who studied the case of the Black Widows, since 2000, “the Chechen female terrorists have been involved in 22 of the 27 suicide attacks attributed to Chechen rebels” [17]. The media and the Russians named the Chechen female bombers “the Black Widows” when it appeared that many were acting in revenge for the death of their family members (husband, sons, brothers). They have carried out the most risky operations [17]. On 26th October 2002 nineteen female bombers, dressed in black mourning clothes with bombs strapped to their bodies, participated in the Dubrovka theater takeover. 129 hostages lay dead after the subsequent military assault. What drives Chechen women to such desperate measures? For SPECKHARD and AKHMEDOVA, their main motivation resides in the personal traumatization they suffered. Most of them are self-recruited and only a few were coerced by a member of their families. They justify their action by glorifying the ‘wahhabist jihadist ideology’, used in Chechnya to justify terrorism (being chakidki will allow them to get together with loved ones in paradise), and by their will to restore social justice, fight the invaders and avenge their family members killed by the Russians. In Chechnya, the wahhabist ideology of jihad glorifies martyrdom and promotes jihad with a view to creating a global Muslim caliphate. This type of Islam was not present prior to the first war in Chechnya. It was imported from Arab regions, through al-Qaeda-type terror networks that were active in building mosques and madrassas. The Russian government often claims that the Chechen terror movement exists due to outside funding and forces, but this ignores the very real human rights abuses occurring in Chechnya that continue to fuel terror acts as well as the nationalist separatist dream. Thus, as for the Palestinians, there are operational exigencies that

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have dictated the use of female suicide bombers, despite religious or cultural constraints. Women arouse less suspicion and are better able to clear checkpoints and other security obstacles. In addition they do not need to undergo special training or possess specialized combat skills, and therefore they offer an efficient use of human resources. Moreover, the fact that a woman attracts greater media attention is an asset in and of itself to the organization that sent her. The organization and its particular cause or grievances will almost automatically enjoy greater exposure, which is an immediate aim of the bombing itself. In turn, morale and enthusiasm among the rank and file are heightened [13]. Female suicide bombers appear almost exclusively in societies that are heavily traditionalist and conservative, where women lack equal rights and their status in society is much lower than that of their male counterparts. In some of the dispatching organizations, such as the Kurdish PKK and the Sri Lankan LTTE, leaders promised that women participating in such operations would pave the way for other women to enjoy an equal status and to be emancipated. Although women were already integrated into the army, they did not hold commanding positions, and hence the promise of gender advancement for their female colleagues if they volunteered for suicide operations.

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8. Tamil women offering The female suicide bomber’s covert function is a liberating tool that challenges the inequality and subordinate status of women in Muslim society. How far is that true in the Tamil society, which is conservative and traditionalist and somewhat similar to Muslim society ? According to Arjuna GUNAWARDENA, in Sri Lanka, “self-sacrifice has become a norm rather than an exceptional act”; the supportive collective environment and the social conditioning of Tamil society produced this rather than religion, cause or mystic indoctrination. The first successful female Black Tiger operation was the assassination of Indian prime minister Rajiv GHANDI on May 21, 1991, in India. The bomber was portrayed as a victim of a rape by Indian soldiers. In the context of the Black Tigers, female suicide bombers have more than a political and organizational basis. The social and cultural context has to be taken into consideration to understand the phenomenon. “The self-sacrifice of the female bombers is almost an extension of the idea of motherhood in the Tamil culture. [...] Acting as a human bomb is an understood and accepted offering for a woman who will never be a mother”, reports Arjuna GUNAWARDENA [18]. There is no appreciable difference between the male and the female Black Tigers in Sri Lanka, but the female suicide bombers have not been a greater threat compared to the males. The Black Tigers are the suicide terrorists within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE; it is the generic designation of all suicide cadres of the LTTE, those who set out intentionally to sacrifice their lives. They started operating in July 1987 and more than 316 Black Tigers have been killed over the years; 24% of them were women [18]. The LTTE women’s cadres were already involved in active combats units like the men, they received the same training and were expected to perform equally well. Therefore, the Black Tigers women don’t need to prove that they are equal to men.

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9. A desperate struggle for recognition? According to Hegel, the struggle for recognition implied a confrontation between master and slave, but not death [19]. If the slave died, the master would be unable to exercise his hegemony and dominance over him. Modern martyrdom opens up a new space of intelligibility. The appeal to the sacred means that the struggle for recognition can now involve death to a great extent. The demography of Muslim countries allows them to mobilise part of their youth for that purpose and to gain imaginary dignity in a world that denies them any real dignity1. Recent decades have proven that under certain circumstances women can behave and fight as their male counterparts, and aspire to the status of shahidat. Nonetheless if the involvement of women in suicide terrorist attacks, carried out by various organizations around the world, is an established fact, at the same time their numbers are small compared with the number of male suicide terrorists. Furthermore, their role in the suicide terrorist apparatus is limited. They do not manage the organizations, hold command positions, or send other people on suicide terrorist missions. The fact remains that whether driven by society, exploited by organizations, suffering from their personal situation, or obeying or defying patriarchal norms, women are no longer only the mothers of those who dare to give up their life killing others. Some of them have now become ‘emissaries of death’ [20]. References [1] [2]

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[3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

[9] [10] [11] [12]

[13]

[14] [15] [16] [17]

Monique GADANT, Le nationalisme algérien et les femmes, L’Harmattan, 1995, 302 pages. Yoram SCHWEITZER, Palestinian female suicide bombers: reality vs myth, pp. 25 to 41, in Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?, edited by Yoram SCHWEITZER, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, August 2006. Farhad KHOSROKHAVAR, Les Nouveaux Martyrs d’Allah, Flammarion, Paris, 258 p.. See Farhad KHOSROKHAVAR, L’Islamisme et la mort, le martyr révolutionnaire en Iran, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1995. Alia TABAÏ, Une kamikaze au-dessus de tout soupçon, Jeune Afrique, février 2002. Barbara VICTOR, Shahidas - Les femmes kamikazes de Palestine, Flammarion, Paris, 2002. Clara BEYLER, Messengers of death: Female suicide bombers, Herzliya : ICT, 2003. Avi ISSACHAROFF, The Palestinian and Israeli media on female suicide terrorists, p.43 to p.50, in Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?, edited by Yoram SCHWEITZER, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, August 2006. Documentary film by Hesi CARMEL and Amal HAMELIN, Femmes kamikazes, les vierges du Djihad, 2004. Yasmina KHADRA, L’attentat, Julliard, Paris, 270 p. Pierre CONESA, Aux origines des attentats-suicides, Le Monde Diplomatique, Juin 2004, pp.12-14 Mira TZOREF, The Palestinian Shahida, p.13 to p.22, in Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?, edited by Yoram SCHWEITZER, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, August 2006. Avi ISSACHAROFF, The Palestinian and Israeli media on female suicide terrorists, p.43 to p.50, in Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?, edited by Yoram SCHWEITZER, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, August 2006. Movie produced by Hany Abu-Assad, Paradise now, Warner Independent Pictures, 2005, USA. Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?, edited by Yoram SCHWEITZER, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, August 2006. Robert PAPE, Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism, Random House, 352 p., 2005. Anne SPECKHARD and Khapta AKHMEDOVA, Black widows: The Chechen Female Suicide

1

In North Africa, teenagers are now indoctrinated to commit suicide attacks. Recently in Algeria, on 8th September 2007, Nabil BELKACEMI, 15 years old, drove a truck filled with 800kg of explosives into a coast guard barracks near Algiers: there were 34 victims.

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Terrorists, p.69 to p.78, in Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?, pp. 25 to 41, edited by Yoram SCHWEITZER, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, August 2006. [18] Arjuna GUNAWARDENA, Female Black tigers: A Different Breed of Cat?, pp. 81 to 90, in Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?, pp. 25 to 41, August 2006, edited by Yoram SCHWEITZER, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. [19] Axel HONNETH, The struggle for recognition: the moral grammar of social conflicts, MIT Press Ed., 240 p., 1996. [20] Yoram SCHWEITZER, Introduction, in Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?, p.12, edited by Yoram SCHWEITZER, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, August 2006.

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Psychological Prerequisites and Consequences of Suicide Terrorism: the Russian Experience Valery N. KRASNOV1 Moscow Research Institute of Psychiatry, Russia

Abstract. In recent years multiple acts of terrorism have occurred in Russia, mainly in connection with military actions in the Chechen Republic (North Caucasus). In some cases suicide bombers have been responsible. In the aftermath of these traumatic events, (which have included explosions in metro stations, the capture of hospitals, a theatre complex in 2002, and the capture of a school in Beslan in 2004) witnesses have emerged who can comment indirectly on the psychological and other characteristics of the suicide bombers. Interestingly, most of these witnesses have been young women recruited by older “mentors”. Many of these young women have undergone some profound psychological crisis in the past, a crisis which has led to episodes of frustration and depression. Also, within a terrorism context, these young women have been called “widows”, even though only one of them was in fact a close relative of a victim. Keywords. Traumatisation, pre-suicidality, mentorship, gender, ethnocultural specificity

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Introduction Suicide terrorism has become a key component of political life worldwide. It is not a new phenomenon in human history, but never has it appeared on such a large scale and in such a variety of forms. It is very difficult to strictly define who suicide terrorists might be because the identity of suicide terrorists differs between different countries and time periods. For example, terrorists in Russia, particularly in the Chechen Republic, and terrorists in Palestine are not the same, and both are quite different from Iraqi suicide bombers. Certainly they do not belong to the category of “lone fanatics”. Also, the term “kamikaze” would be a misnomer for modern suicide terrorists. Unlike the Japanese kamikaze, they do not often differentiate between military and civilian targets, and are indeed more likely to choose civilians as targets. Individual fanaticism should not be over-emphasized. Although we do not know much about the individual personalities of suicide bombers, we do know something about their leaders and teachers. Their goal is quite clear: to provoke fear among the general population and to exert influence on political opponents, primarily through the mass media. 1

Correspondence: Valery N. Krasnov, MD, Director of the Moscow Research Institute of Psychiatry of the Ministry of Public Health, 107076, Poteshnaya 3, Moscow, Russia. E-mail:[email protected] Suicide Bombers: the Psychological, Religious and Other Imperatives, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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The rank and file do not understand the intricacies of this overarching goal. They are only the means, a kind of weapon themselves. In many cases suicide terrorists are doubly victimized, i.e. traumatized within military conflict and then exposed to brainwashing in special conditions or camps.

1. Suicide terrorism in Chechnya in an Individual, Gendered Context During the recent past many acts of terrorism have occurred in Russia, mainly in connection with government military action in the Chechen Republic (North Caucasus). In some cases suicide bombers have taken part in such acts of terrorism, and these bombers have been both male and female. However, there are some important differences between female and male suicide terrorists in the Chechen context. Cases of suicide terrorism involving women (for example, Chechen women who took part in terrorist attacks in Russia) require special attention. It seems that for a woman to become a suicide terrorist there must be a concurrence of three main, contextual factors:

• •

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A past “frustration experience” accompanied by depressive features – for example, loss of meaning, aversion to life, and suicidal thoughts; The context of strict religious and ethno-cultural prohibition of suicide within traditional, North Caucasian family life; Consistent training or direct coercion to sacrificial terrorism by a “mentor”, an older relative, usually an older brother but occasionally an older woman.

These young women are quite vulnerable and dependent, with little social experience, very restricted from contact with others, and socially immature. Most of them have never been outside of the Chechen Republic or even their local district. They just happen to become figures on the world stage because television has translated their actions for a global audience. As noted, many of those young women have undergone some psychological crisis marked by a frustration experience with depressive features. Within the terrorist context they have been called “widows”, in theory of Chechen soldiers killed by government forces, but in actuality only one of them had been married in the past. Usually they were recruited for jihad by elder brothers or other “mentors” during a particularly frustrating time in their lives, were isolated from their family and other contacts for a period of intensive training involving psychological pressure. The trauma is usually related not only to the death of relatives and/or a personal threat to life but also to humiliation, not only personal but also the perception of a slight against ethnic/national dignity. Common approaches to this training involve intimidation, repetitive talking about their losses of family members, and encouraging the need for revenge. This training preys on the individual’s traumatic experience and hidden suicidal tendencies, using these to bring about a psychological transformation in which martyrdom seems appealing. Preparation for the terrorist act itself includes basic weapons training and, of course, the introduction of a special dress code, known as “black widow” clothes. In general the older male members of terrorist groups rarely become suicide terrorists; more typically young women and teenagers of both genders are. They do it in

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extraordinary circumstances, and each case requires its own explanation. However, there is some indirect data to suggest that psychological trauma is an obligatory component. Humiliation from outsiders, especially the perceived attack on an individual’s ethnic affiliation, is intolerable. Ideas of revenge arise from such painful experiences. Also, pseudo-heroic motives of self-sacrifice for the family, for wider kinship networks and “for freedom” are also influential factors among adolescents in particular. Suicide terrorism thus becomes a simple means of group and individual identification for young people who lack opportunities to find themselves through some other constructive and creative activity. However, in the particular case of young men, the traditional model of upbringing espoused by the highlander peoples is relevant: according to the clans’ codes of honor men have chivalrous qualities and cannot allow themselves to be humiliated. By extension, in traditional male behavioral codes, humiliation can be avenged through open combat. If open combat is impossible due to circumstances, another option can be suicide terrorism. However, these codes of honour do not apply traditionally or directly to women.

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2. Wider psychological influences on suicide terrorists Although we have so far emphasized individual psychology, terrorism has an aesthetic of its own which seems to take form not spontaneously but systematically, taking into account the influence upon people of modern means of information delivery. Television is the most persuasive medium of influence as written and oral statements decrease in value in the condition of relative freedom of speech. However, this comes with its own dangers, and the media bears some responsibility for the perpetuation of terrorism. The written and spoken word have been replaced increasingly by bright, spectacular images on TV. This combines the aesthetic of destruction, complete with large-scale explosions, fires and building crashes with the aesthetics of theatric tragedy. This is embraced by terrorists. One example of this was the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11th 2001, which was clearly intended to be broadcast all over the world, as indeed it was. Another expressive picture was painted during the Moscow theatre centre siege in October 23-26th 2002 by a group of Chechen terrorists, both men and women. The main characters in the Moscow theatre siege were young women elegantly dressed in the costumes of a mourner, a nun and a secret cult follower. The “producers” of the action or drama had not only the possibility of displaying themselves to the world but also had the chance constantly to correct or refine the images of themselves that would be projected to the world by the media. In fact, this “scenario” had been intricately prepared more than nine years before, when Basaev’s militants had captured the General Hospital in Budennovsk, in southern Russia. Nearly 1,800 people were treated aggressively and cruelly during this incident.

3. Policy proposals for the mass media Finally, dramatization and a flair for the aesthetics of terrorism are typical of today’s terrorist leaders and are being applied in a quite sophisticated way in the planning of

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these actions. Modern information technologies have exponentially increased the potential impact of terrorism on the public. The events of September 11th 2001 in the USA and the hostage-taking at the theatre centre in Moscow from October 23-26th 2002 are clear examples of this. It is no secret that the capture during the musical “Nord –Ost” had been planned as a TV event broadcast via the networks. Therefore, the mass media have a unique opportunity and indeed responsibility to neutralize, in the immediate context, the effect of terrorist acts. The following are proposed guidelines for the media. Adherence to these principles or something like them is quite within the capacity of the mass media in order that they might meet some kind of humanistic minimum for the professional activities of journalists. First, introduce ethical principles for the coverage of acts of terrorism. Such principles should include provisions for well-balanced information about what happens, the “de-heroization” of terrorists, and the identification of examples of the constructive, rational behavior of people who have become the victims of terrorist acts. Second, provide professional training for official “communicators”, i.e. those representing authorities and rescue services who are authorized to inform the public about what happens. The scale of effect, its minimization or, on the contrary, its intensification, depends to a great extent on those who present the latest information about the terrorist attack. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the media should identify and support public psychological resources for both individuals and groups. One of these resources is positive media coverage itself. Examples worthy of media coverage include instances where individuals have stood up to terrorists and also where individuals have shown note-worthy levels of self-control and mutual support. These examples should also be the subject of further research in order to make well-grounded recommendations regarding the prevention of social and psychological trauma. One final caveat must be mentioned. According to data from mental health studies of the Chechen population living in this long-term emergency situation, many people have been personally exposed to life-threatening events. Thus, there is a high risk of stress-related disorders and depression among the population. For some people such traumatic experience can be one of the prerequisites for their turning towards suicide terrorism, when trauma is accompanied by special training in terrorism. This is why appropriate psychological and psychosocial support should be offered to the most vulnerable members of the Chechen population at the earliest opportunity.

4. A word on sources The information discussed above has been obtained from different sources, including recent books on related problems (see references 1, 2, 7 and 10 below); information obtained by the Moscow Research Institute of Psychiatry whilst providing aid for victims of large scale terrorist acts (see references 5 and 6 below); and from our cooperative work with specialists, psychiatrists and psychologists from the Chechen Republic (see references 1, 3 and 4 below).

References [1] Akhmedova Kh. Fanaticism and idea of revenge in persons with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

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[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]

Social and Clinical Psychiatry 2003; 13 (2): 15–23 (in Russian). Chlebnikov P. The talk with barber. Moscow: Detective-Press, 2004, 282 p. (in Russian). Idrisov K. PTSD dynamics in civilians that experienced life-threating situations in a local military conflict. Social and Clinical Psychiatry 2002; 12 (3): 34–37 (in Russian). Idrisov K, Krasnov V. Mental health of the Chechen Republic population in the long-term emergency situation. Social and Clinical Psychiatry 2004; 14 (2): 5–12 (in Russian). Kokhanov V, Krjukov V, Kibrik N. Specific features of mental disorders in the victims of the terroristic act in Budennovsk. Disaster Medicine 1995; 11–12 (3–4): 64–67 (in Russian). Krasnov V.N. Acute stress disorders as a problem the psychiatry of disasters: clinical and organizational issues. Social and Clinical Psychiatry 2004; 5-12 (in Russian) Olshansky D. The psychology of terrorism. S-Petersburg: Piter, 2002, 286 p. (in Russian). Popova T. Nord-Ost in the eyes of hostage. Moscow: Vagrius, 2002, 238 p. (in Russian). Soldatova G, Shaygerova L. Psychological adaptation of forced migrants. Psychol. Journal 2002; 23 (4):66–81 (in Russian). Psychological Responses to the New Terrorism: A NATO-Russia Dialogue (Eds. S.Wessely, v.Krasnov). –Amsterdam etc. IOS press, 2005

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Suicide Bombing as Deluded Self-Enhancement Kristján KRISTJÁNSSON 1 Faculty of Philosophy, Iceland University of Education, Reykjavik

Abstract. The failure of pure psychological profiling to capture the identities of suicide bombers should prompt moves towards a more interdisciplinary approach, which would avail itself of insights from disciplines such as sociology, philosophy and the history of ideas, as well as from psychology. This chapter aims in that direction by exploring ‘traditional’ versus ‘Western liberal’ conceptions of the self, with special emphasis on their possible pathologies. It then aims to integrate those pathologies with insights from Durkheimian suicidology. It is hypothesised that suicide bombers in the West are typically callow, malleable young men targeted by terror merchants, and that their suicide missions are, first and foremost, acts of deluded self-enhancement, which need to be understood against the backdrop of the Western liberal conception of the self. Finally, some implications for moral education are suggested. Keywords. Self-conceptions, suicidology, self-enhancement, moral education

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1. Two Conceptions of the Self Considerable attention has been paid recently to the psychological and social profiling of suicide bombers. My hypothesis in the present chapter is that a look at the prevailing self-conceptions available in the societies from which these bombers hail may help us considerably to understand what entices them towards these acts of violence. Indeed, this chapter primarily constitutes an exploration of the concept of self (in traditional versus Western liberal societies) and the psychological and educational implications of these conceptions for the matter at hand. Put simply, the concept of the self refers to certain characteristics – beliefs, aspirations, inclinations, commitments and traits – that make people what they truly are. Cross-cultural data indicate that people in different kinds of societies show systematic variation in the way they perceive themselves and their relationship to the rest of the world [1]. Although no two societies, and perhaps no two individuals, perceive the self in exactly the same terms, the most conspicuous differences arguably can be found between traditional societies, on the one hand, and Western liberal societies, on the other. It is easy to forget that the Western conception of the self currently dominant is relatively new, harking back, as it does, only to the Enlightenment. For present purposes, all pre-Enlightenment Western societies and all current non-Western societies will count as ‘traditional’. Let me begin with a table (Table 1) which summarises some 1

Corresponding Author: Kristján Kristjánsson, Professor of Philosophy, Iceland University of Education, Reykjavik, Iceland. E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]. Suicide Bombers: the Psychological, Religious and Other Imperatives, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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Table 1. Contrasts between the traditional and the Western/liberal conceptions of the self Traditional self

Western/liberal self

a) Formation/nature

Relational; other-entwined; embedded

Unitary; other-independent; disembedded

b) Development

Outwardness; towards a mixture of heteronomy and autonomy through cultural submersion

Inwardness, towards full autonomy through crisis, selfexploration and selfenhancement

c) Relation to the good

Appreciator of external values; thick notion of the good

Creator of own values; thin notion of the good

d) Ultimate goal

Self-respectful harmony

Self-expression; self-esteem

e) Pathology

Hyper-identity; excessive self-respect

Self-fragmentation; loss of meaning and self-esteem

f) Beneficiaries

Traditionalists; monoculturalists; religious fundamentalists

Therapists; spin-doctors; big businesses and other ‘merchants of happiness’

of the contrasts that I expand upon in the following. The listings are selective, to say the least. I have simply singled out for consideration those contrasts that I deem most valuable in helping me to develop my hypothesis about suicide bombers, East and (especially) West.

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a) Formation/Nature According to a traditional understanding, a person’s self is formulated within and through a web of relationships, especially kinship. Its nature is defined by this web rather than by a unique autobiographical history. The self is thus considered ‘otherentwined’ and culturally-embedded from its first moments of self-awareness. There is no way – either psychologically or ontologically speaking – to set those relationships aside and still to retain one’s identity. This does not mean that particular ends, commitments and attachments acquired through the communal genesis of the self cannot later be reflected upon by the individual, called into question and perhaps revised. It simply means that, without irreparable psychological damage, one cannot achieve independence from the totality of one’s existential connections. There is a gaping gulf between this traditional conception and the Western liberal conception, which stresses other-independence: that we are essentially on our own. The idea is not so much – at least not in subtler versions of liberalism – that unchosen and unexamined personal attachments do not enter into the formation of individual identity in childhood, but rather that any such attachments can be voluntarily eradicated as individuals find their own bearings within themselves. b) Development If all goes well, in the traditional conception, the self develops towards a stronger and stronger sense of its relational nature by strengthening its outward ties to family, culture and tradition. Traditional self-development is an ‘interdependent pathway’ [1].

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There is no greater joy in life than being initiated into worthwhile communal projects that facilitate social harmony and that obliterate rather than reinforce the distinction between the individual and the group. No fate is more tragic than ostracism. Compare this idea of an ‘interdependent pathway’ with the Western conception of the self’s ‘independent pathway’ to maturity. In a Western conception of the self, individuals are encouraged to realise an autonomously arrived-at life plan by gradually cutting ties to both tradition and significant others and by ‘finding themselves’ through an inward gaze. To do so they must attend to their private beliefs, hone their critical faculties and nourish their suspicions of dependency. They must not only locate their proper place in the moral space but radically re-orientate themselves and invent their own space. Modern liberals have exalted the notion of ‘leaving home’ to a cultural icon and a measurement of individual salvation [2]. All healthy young people must leave their parental and cultural backgrounds to make their ‘authentic’ ways in the world. In order to ‘redeem’ oneself in due course, one must first experience a ‘fall’ from cosy but mistaken grace and must suffer through a period of self-diminution (nagging self-doubt and drastic self-exploration) before one can convalesce, reaffirming and enhancing the self.

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c) Relation to the Good The traditional self is a self that learns to recognise, appreciate and identify with the good as an objective, inter-human reality. By the ‘good’ I refer not only to the common social good qua the value of public institutions and communal enterprises, but also the moral good which comprises universal virtues such as personal justice, honesty and sympathy. In contrast, the currently dominant kind of liberalism is ‘minimal’ liberalism which posits a conception of the good which, apart from subjective values (chosen by but not constitutive of the self), comprises only ultra-thin universal values (procedural values of majority rule, basic human rights, freedom and private property) that bind all rational agents as the formal conditions of choice. The whole world becomes a marketplace of values between which we can reasonably choose more or less at random, as long as those values are consistent with one another and are instrumentally conducive to our overall chosen life-plan, and as long as they are not harmful to other people’s life-plans. d) Ultimate Goal As can be inferred from the above, the traditional self has realised its full potential when it has found its proper place within the web of existential connections that create and sustain it. ‘Self-respectful interpersonal harmony’ and ‘group solidarity’ are the terms most apt to describe this goal. By contrast, in default of a thick substantive notion of the moral good, the litmus test of success for the liberal self is the feel-good factor: if you feel good about yourself, then you are doing well. After people have ‘found themselves’ (see above), they need to learn to accept what they have found and to express it. Western culture is a culture of ‘expressivism’ [2]. Through self-expression, we re-enhance the self, which inevitably shrank during the period of self-discovery. At best, we do something earth-shattering, perhaps on the sports field, which guarantees a Warholian fifteen minutes of fame. Otherwise, we merely ‘amuse ourselves to death’ [3]; or, if the self is still shaky, undergo therapy and achieve redemption. Instead of self-respect, we learn self-esteem.

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e) Pathology Both the traditional and the Western self have their potential pathologies. The possible perversion of the traditional self into hyper-identity – loss of individuality, uncritical conformism, susceptibility to authoritarianism – has been well documented by liberals. The danger here is that the self starts to live not only in but for the community. The liberal self, on the other hand, runs the risk of an irrevocable loss of meaning. Once bases of communal identification have been eroded, the liberal self becomes vulnerable to fragmentation; the power to deconstruct previous allegiances and to engender (temporary) alienation may spiral out of control and foreclose any attempts to carve out a new core that is ‘truly yours’. f) Beneficiaries Who benefits most from those two respective conceptions of the self? In the case of the traditional self, the beneficiaries are obviously the custodians of the cultural order with which that self identifies. If anyone is going to abuse the benefits accruing to them from the traditional conception, it will more likely be the religious fundamentalists and bigoted traditionalists. Who benefits, on the other hand, from the Western cult of the vulnerable and diminished self? First in line are the therapists and the counsellors, taking care to portray every stage in the life-course of the self as presenting such grave risks that constant therapeutic intervention is required. Another group of beneficiaries are the politicians, whose lives are made considerably easier by being able to treat people as clients rather than citizens [4]. The third beneficiary is big business, selling us happiness to mend our broken selves, while preferring, of course, a weak self.

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2. Suicide Bombers and the Self Before spelling out my hypothesis about suicide bombers, a few words about suicidology. Suicidology has an interdisciplinary focus. This is particularly noticeable in the landmark work of the discipline’s founding father, Émile Durkheim [5]. Durkheim did not deny the psychological nature of the decision to terminate one’s own life, but he clearly considered the psychology of suicide to sit atop more fundamental social causes. Durkheim categorised different types of suicide according to the social factors which allegedly unleashed them. One of the types was what he called ‘altruistic suicide’, a phenomenon in which individuals sacrifice themselves for the interests of the group. Durkheim viewed this type as emerging from excessive social integration and insufficient individuation, whereby individuals have dissolved their personal identity into a larger whole. When Durkheim’s analysis is mentioned in the context of suicide bombings, altruistic suicide is the type that tends to be invoked [6]. To be sure, such an analysis resonates well with the pattern traced above concerning the ‘traditional’ conception of the self and its potential pathology. To revert to an earlier conceptualisation, we could say that Durkheim’s ‘altruistic suicide’ constitutes an extreme articulation of hyper-identity. What is more, fieldwork in places such as Palestine and Iraq suggests that this may indeed by a plausible categorisation of much of Eastern-based suicide terror [7–9]. Consider a place such as Palestine, where constant struggle and the corrosive effects of fear and oppression have helped individuals’ already other-entwined and culturally embedded selves to merge into a single hyper-identity.

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Hany Abu-Assad’s film, Paradise Now, paints a vivid picture of that scenario [10]. Saïd and Khaled, two disgruntled car mechanics-cum-layabouts, are handpicked by the local community activists to carry out a ‘martyr operation’. Toeing the community line at the outset, they both assume this task as a fact of life: unquestioningly and uncritically. As Saïd sees it, ‘the occupation defines the resistance’, and Khaled remarks that, in any case, ‘under the occupation, we’re already dead’. Khaled eventually backs off. However, for Saïd, the suicide operation, which he carries out, presents an opportunity to atone for the sins of his father, who was a collaborator. Speak in Durkheimian terms about an individual’s absorption in the whole, and there it is it in the persona of Saïd. As apt as conceptualisations of (misplaced) altruism and hyper-identity are for an understanding of Eastern-based suicide terror in the context of the traditional conception of the self, they provide scant guidance as to the motivations of Western-based suicide bombers. Why should second-generation immigrants in a country such as the United Kingdom, people who have been educated in British schools and presumably socialised through the media and the social environment into a Western conception of the self, be susceptible to the same considerations that spur Eastern-based suicide bombers? Again, Durkheim’s insights may give us some clues [5]. Among the non‘altruistic’ types of suicide he analyses are ‘egoistic suicide’ and suicide based on ‘chronic economic anomie’. What these two latter types have in common is the longterm diminution of social integration which has eroded communal regulators without replacing them. Persons committing egoistic suicide are not sufficiently bound to social norms and values and, left with little support or guidance, suffer from a pervasive loss of meaning. I explained earlier how this sort of vulnerable self in the West may find solace in quick external remedies of self-enhancement. Consider, more specifically, a character type which seems to correspond to recent rudimentary profiles of Western-based suicide bombers: young Muslim men, aged 15–25, raised in Western society but not feeling totally integrated into that society. Prevailing social forces encourage them to ‘leave home’ and embark on a mission of self-exploration to discover their own values and to learn to express those freely. They engage in self-exploration to be sure, but while their non-Muslim peers re-enhance themselves through art, sport, hedonistic quick fixes or, if all else fails, therapy, the young Muslim men come from a family background that considers such solutions alien and unsatisfactory. Torn, on the one hand, between the demands of a society that champions self-discovery and self-expression, and, on the other hand, the norms of their families and religion which are unsympathetic to typical Western forms of selfenhancement, those young men become easy bait for the merchants of terror, namely the recruiters, who promise them the best of both worlds: Western-style selfexpression, glamour and self-esteem combined with a religious framework of selfrespect and meaning. What a potentially lethal mixture! The recruiters penetrate to the core of loneliness in the Western self and speak to that; they goad the disenfranchised self to self-destruct and thereby achieve lasting glory. This is, in effect, my hypothesis about the social forces breeding Western-based terror: that suicide bombers in the West are typically callow, malleable, frustrated young men targeted and groomed by terror merchants, and that their suicide missions are, primarily, acts of deluded, hyperbolic self-enhancement which need to be understood against the backdrop of the Western liberal conception of the self.

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3. Moral Education If my hypothesis holds true, there is a world of difference – social, ideological, psychological – between Eastern-based and Western-based suicide terror. Similarly, if we ask about possible educational interventions – what can be done, for example, through systematic moral education to stem the tide of terror – we will in fact be asking about different malaises and different measures. Given the absorption of the individual into the whole, the context which underlies Eastern-based terrorism, the educational issue there must be addressed at the level of the extended self rather than the individual self. It is a truism – although it seems sometimes to be underplayed in the Western media – that the majority of devout Muslims are peace-loving people who forswear religiously inspired suicide terror and consider it to be based on mendacious readings of the Koran. Those peaceful Muslims must be encouraged to engage in debate with the loud-spoken ‘mavericks’ and ‘heretics’, starting from the school years, when the minds of the young are still most open and penetrable to reason. Tellingly, in the movie, Paradise Now, Khaled is finally persuaded to cancel his plans for a suicide mission by the young Palestinian woman, Suhu, who uses arguments that are internal to the Palestinian cause: suicide terror is detrimental to the interests of the Palestinian people – indeed, to the interests of all people. As suggested, the Western liberal notion of a vulnerable self that needs to reenhance itself plays into the hands of recruiters who offer malleable young Western Muslims an ‘easy’ route to self-redemption. What can we do to attenuate the sense of self-diminution from which the young so often suffer? How can we disarm their temptation to fall prey to the siren song of the terrorists’ fix-it-all and show them that deluded self-enhancement is more immediately harmful than even the quick fixes offered by Western hedonism and therapy culture? Perhaps we cannot do anything about it unless we release ourselves from the liberal self-conception which permeates Western society. That, for many people, would be a sobering thought; for others, one bordering on the naïve or totally unrealistic. Whether or not the Western conception of the self can be radically changed, through moral education or other forms of consciousness-raising, is an important question. For those who would exclude that possibility, it may be worth recalling the historical recentness of this conception. Some parts of it are newer than others; the mantra of self-esteem was rarely heard in the public media until the 1990’s [4]. A deeper question still is whether we really want to renege on the Western liberal conception of the self and return to the embrace of a traditional conception. Without prejudging that question, I simply note here, at the end, that the choice may not be ‘either–or’. We may not need to choose between the spiritual straitjacket of hyper-identity and the excessive anomie of a shrunken self in need of healing. Giving up on those items of the liberal self that make it most vulnerable to abuse may not require us to consign Western liberalism and individualism to the scrapheap. Consider John Stuart Mill’s brand of ‘maximal’ liberalism, espoused in such classic works as Utilitarianism and On Liberty [11]. His clarion call for liberal freedoms of speech, conscience and individual development is combined with an acceptance of non-subjective essential goods, including the universal moral virtues, as well as substantive moral demands to further those goods. A system of moral education that ceased to be neutral with regard to different conceptions of essential goods might give young people in the West the sense of rootedness so badly lacking in their current self-conceptions – without falling back on the holism of the traditional self – and help some of our most vulnerable individuals to resist the al-

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lure of the ‘merchants of happiness’, be they dope pedlars, spin-doctors, quack therapists or terrorist recruiters.

References

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[1] Wang, Q. and Chaudhary, N. (2006). The self. In K. Pawlik and G. d’Ydewalle (Eds.). Psychological concepts. An international historical perspective (pp. 325–358). Hove: Psychology Press. [2] Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self. The making of modern identity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. [3] Postman, N. (1985). Amusing ourselves to death. Public discourse in the age of show business. Harmondsworth: Penguin. [4] Furedi, F. (2004). Therapy culture. Cultivating vulnerability in an uncertain age. London: Routledge. [5] Durkheim, E. (1951[1897]). Suicide. A study in sociology. Glencoe: The Free Press. [6] Gould, H. (2003). Suicide as a weapon of mass destruction. Emile Durkheim revisited. Retrieved from http://www.counterpunch.org/gould11282003.html, August 2006. [7] Maiese, M. (2005). Suicide bombers. Retrieved from http://www.beyondintractability.org/essays/ suicide_bombers/, August 2006. [8] Pedahzur, A. and Perliger, A. (2006). The changing nature of suicide attacks: a social network perspective. Social Forces, 84(4), 1987–2008. [9] Brym, R. J. and Araj, B. (2006). Suicide bombing as strategy and interaction: the case of the second Intifada. Social Forces, 84(4), 1969–1986. [10] Abu-Assad, H. (2005). Paradise now (feature film). Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. [11] Mill, J.S. (1931). Utilitarianism, liberty, representative government. London: J.M. Dent and Sons.

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Let the Sane of Saudi Arabia Unite Tarek HEGGY Member of the Advisory Board of The Institute for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, Washington D.C. (USA)

Abstract. Over the last two hundred years Saudi Arabia has experienced long periods of domination by Islamic extremists. This has led to the current intellectual climate which produced most of the 9/11 suicide bombers. The Saudi government must introduce a range of reforms to reverse this worrying trend. Keywords. Saudi Arabian history, Wahhabi, Ikhwan, Hanbalite, Islamic jurisprudence, terrorism, political reform

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Introduction A little over two hundred and fifty years ago, in 1744 to be precise, an alliance was forged between Mohamed ibn-Saud and Mohamed ibn-Abdul Wahab, whereby the former agreed to rule according to the doctrine preached by the latter. A succinct statement made by Mohamed ibn-Abdul Wahab shortly after the deal was struck expresses the essence of his doctrine, which is known as Wahhabism: “Blood, blood, destruction, destruction”. These four simple words summarize what was and what continues to be the message of Wahhabism. The partnership between the two men led to the first incarnation of the Saudi-Wahhabi state. Anyone who has read the nineteen books written by Mohamed ibn-Abdul Wahab will realize that he belongs more to the realm of proselytism than to that of Islamic jurisprudence. The first Saudi state lasted from 1744 until 1819, when Ibrahim Pasha, Mohamed Ali’s eldest son, led a military expedition which destroyed the state, razed its capital, Al-Dir’iyah, to the ground and captured its prince, Abdullah ibn-Saud, sending him first to Cairo then on to the capital of the Ottoman state (modern-day Turkey), where he was executed. 1. Early jurists and the Hanbalite School The first Saudi state banned what it considered to be heretical practices, including the building of tombs, music, singing, dancing and any other manifestation of un-Islamic conduct. Members of other faiths were hated and despised as “unclean”. Such was the hatred of foreigners that European consultants brought in by King Abdul Aziz at the beginning of the twentieth century were spat upon by the Ikhwan, members of an ultraorthodox offshoot of the original Wahhabi movement. The presence of non-Muslims on the sacred ground of the Arabian Peninsula was seen as a desecration, as was any hint of modernity even when it came to such trivial matters as the shape of beards and moustaches. To the theologians of the first Saudi-Wahhabi state the only rightful interpretation of Islam lay in the Hanbalite school of law (founded by Ahmed ibnHanbal and further elaborated on by his two main disciples, ibn-Taymiyah and ibnQaiym al-Juzeya) even though it is by far the weakest of the four Sunni schools of law

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(the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafite and Hanbalite). To this day, Saudi jurists remain committed to the version of Islam propounded by ibn-Hanbal, ibn-Taymiyah and ibnQaiym Al-Juzeya, even though they rank far lower in stature than such towering Islamic jurists as Abu Hanifa Al-No’man, Malik Ibn Anas, Jaafar Al-Sadiq and Ibn Rushd (the second teacher after the first, Aristotle). Where jurists like Abu Hanifa and Ibn Rushd relied on the tools of rationality and deductive reasoning, compilation was the hallmark of the Hanbalite School, which allowed no scope for reason or independent thinking but insisted on a dogmatic interpretation of holy texts. Thus while Abu Hanifa relied on istihsan (using few traditions and extracting from the Qur’an by reasoning the rulings which fitted his ideas) and Ibn Rushd on ta’weel (deductive reasoning), Ibn Hanbal insisted on a literal interpretation of holy texts. This led him to accept over ten thousand of the Prophet’s Hadith as apostolic precept. It also bred a climate which favoured unquestioning adherence to tradition over the use of critical faculties, creating generations of followers and imitators and leading Islamic societies to the point at which they find themselves today: sidelined from history, science and the march of human progress. The Hanbalite School has turned the Muslim mentality into a passive recipient of answers instead of one that asks questions, let alone one that engages in critical thinking, the main engine of human progress.

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2. The rise of Abdul Aziz ibn-Saud Following Ibrahim Pasha’s defeat of the first Saudi-Wahhabi state, the Saudis, with their Wahhabi partners, entered into an alliance with the al-Rashid family, who ruled the eastern region of the Arabian Peninsula from their capital Ha’il. The alliance between the al-Rashids and what can be called the second Saudi state continued until the al-Rashids turned on the al-Saud family and sent them into exile in Kuwait in 1891. In 1901, the young scion of the Saudi family, Abdul Aziz son of Abdul Rahman son of Faisal al-Saud, born in 1875 and endowed with the quality of leadership, seized Riyadh in a nighttime raid. From 1902 until 1925 he waged a campaign to assert his dominion over the Arabian Peninsula and, after seizing Mecca then Medina in 1925, proclaimed himself the ruler of Najd and other provinces now known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Actually, the name only came into use seven years after Abdul Aziz ibn-Saud became Sultan of Najd and King of Hijaz in 1925. In the course of a historical journey that has no parallel in history, the actions, policies, words and deeds of Abdul Aziz between 1902 and 1925 not only confirmed his exceptional leadership qualities but bespoke a profound understanding of the nature of power, both in absolute terms and as exercised by the Great Powers, whether the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire or the empire that was to emerge later, the American Empire. Abdul Aziz ibn-Saud played his role with great skill, using all his acumen to achieve the goal he had set himself during the years of exile in Kuwait as the guest of the al-Sabbah family in general and of the ruler of Kuwait, Sheikh Mubarak alSabbah, in particular. 3. The Early Days of the Ikhwan Long before the Americans used the Islamists during the Cold War to help them defeat the Soviet Empire (notably after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979), Abdul Aziz ibn-Saud used Islamists to consolidate his power. In 1912, he founded and also Suicide Bombers: the Psychological, Religious and Other Imperatives, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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financed a movement known as the Ikhwan, a forerunner of the Islamists/jihadists deployed by the Americans against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The symbiotic relationship between Abdul Aziz and the Ikhwan ended in 1930 with a ferocious battle between the erstwhile allies when the Saudis, led by King Abdul Aziz, crushed the Ikhwan, led by Faisal al-Dawish. The Ikhwan’s religious views were so extreme that they considered any sign of modernity or progress the work of the Devil. As their alliance with Ibn Saud coincided with a period of great scientific advances, they had plenty of abominations to contend with: the telegraph, cars, telephones then radios were all regarded as sinful and anyone who did not resist them was regarded as a heretic. Such was the fanaticism of this lunatic fringe that one of its members advanced on the Sultan (Abdul Aziz ibn-Saud) with a pair of scissors and proceeded to shorten Ibn Saud’s robes in full view of his entourage, thereby driving home the message that the principles of Wahhabism were stronger than the authority of the Saudis. Apparently short robes are a basic tent of Wahhabism and failure to observe this essential requirement of orthodoxy is heresy. As Ed Husain says in The Islamist (2007):

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The importance of short robes comes from the life of the Prophet. It was pagan Arab custom to wear long, flowing robes to display wealth and status. To remove feelings of superiority, haughtiness, and one-upmanship in new Muslim hearts, the Prophet requested that his followers wear shortened robes. But when he saw his humble friend Abu Bakr in such a garment he said, 'Not you, Abu Bakr. For arrogance is not within you.' Wahhabis fail to understand this context of the Prophet's teachings, and adhere to his sayings literally. Worse, by shortening their robes in false imitation of the Prophet’s teachings, while most Muslims do not, many harbour the very feelings of religious arrogance the Prophet sought to heal. Abdul Aziz, first as prince, then sultan then king, used the Ikhwan when he needed them to further expand his sovereignty. For like all those who welcome death as a passport to paradise, they were fearless fighters. The problem was that they were equally fearless in standing up to Abdul Aziz whenever they considered him to have deviated from the true path. During the years of their increasingly uneasy alliance (from 1912 until he succeeded in asserting his dominion over most of the Arabian peninsula in 1925), fierce clashes often broke out between them. For example, they lashed out at him when he stopped riding camels and took to riding cars, publicly berating him when “he left Riyadh in 1925 on the back of a camel and returned in a Cadillac!” This was the last straw for the sultan, who could not countenance any challenge to his authority as the undisputed leader of most of the Arabian Peninsula. He barely had time to bask in the glow of his hard-won victory over the Hashemites and the expansion of his dominion over lands previously under their control before the Ikhwan forced his hand. The final showdown came in a battle between Abdul Aziz and the Ikhwan. They were routed and their leader, Faisal al-Dawish, was captured and imprisoned, dying in captivity a few years later. 4. The Ikhwan Today The question now is whether the Saudi state, successful though it may have been when it came to defeating its enemies in the past (from the Hashemite al-Rashids to Faisal alDawish), has been equally successful in ridding itself of the fanatical ideas propounded

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by the Ikhwan of Najd, who militate against the use of cars, telegrams and radios, and for the shortening of robes, the shaving of moustaches and the growing of beards. The truth is that the Saudi state, whether in its first, second or third incarnations, has never been free of the pernicious effects of the doctrine preached by the Ikhwan. Today the Saudi state resists the education of women, frowns on television broadcasts, bans women drivers and considers music and singing sinful. The underlying logic behind these anomalies is not very different from that which informed one of the most heinous crimes in the history of Islam, the takeover of the masjid alharam (the sacred mosque which is home to the Ka’ba) at the beginning of the fifteenth century of the Hejira calendar. All attest to the continued influence of Ikhwani ideas in the Kingdom, as do the ban on teaching music and philosophy in Saudi schools and the refusal to appoint women to the Shura Council or in cabinet posts. There is also the spate of fatwas inspired by this folly, like the fatwa in which Ibn al-Baz concludes that the earth is not round and the one proscribing the sending of flowers to the sick! To stop the madness, the Saudi establishment must take a firm stand, preferably accompanied by a psychological campaign. Having said that however we must, in all fairness, distinguish between Wahhabism, its Ikhwan offshoot and the Saudi family. The truth is that not one of the nineteen books written by Mohamed ibn-Abdul Wahab calls for any of the excesses required by the Ikhwan. Also, even though the Saudi family entered into an alliance with the Wahhabis at a certain political stage and with the Ikhwan at another, it does not necessarily share their views. As a student of Saudi history of the last three centuries, I believe the House of Saud has reached a watershed in its relationship with both the Wahhabi school and the remnants of the Ikhwan. I think that when it transpired that most of the criminals of September 11th were Saudi nationals, the Saudi family realized it was time for a showdown with the Wahhabis and the Ikhwan (the Nejdi, not the Egyptian, variety). There is, after all, a historical precedent on which to draw, namely, the stand taken by the father of their oldest prince, King Abdul Aziz ibn-Saud, who took on the Ikhwan in the nineteen thirties, despite the undeniable role they played in his triumphant career, defeating the army led by Faisal al-Dawish. 5. A Call to Action The House of Saud, which is not ideologically implicated in the ideas of Wahhabism and the Ikhwan, is today called upon to do the following: 1.

Stand up to extremist elements in the country like their forefather did eight decades ago.

2.

Remove Wahhabi and Ikhwan zealots from influential positions in the institutions of education.

3.

Remove Wahhabi and Ikhwan zealots from influential positions in the Ministry of Wakf (religious endowments), Da’wa (the call to Islam), and Hajj.

4.

Abolish the system of state-sponsored religious vigilantes like the motawa’een and the al-amr bel ma’rouf wal nahy ‘an al-monkar who patrol the streets and

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mete out instant punishment for any perceived violation of strict Islamic practices, in total contradiction to the concept of the modern state. 5.

Reduce the huge budget allocated by the Kingdom to the religious establishment (nearly three billion US dollars) and reallocate it to the fields of education and health.

6.

Encourage moderate professors of Islamic jurisprudence to set a timetable for introducing their students to Hanafi, Maliki and Shafite sources in place of the Hanbalite sources now exclusively in use so that in time the people of Saudi Arabia reach a stage of religious maturity in which they recognize that the doctrine of Wahhabism is not the only, or even the major, model of Islam.

7.

Launch an offensive against the Ikhwani obduracy on such issues as the appointment of women ministers, the inclusion of women in the Shura Council, allowing women to drive, allowing male teachers to teach female students and female teachers to teach male students, in order to promote a climate favourable to enlightenment and progress in place of the current reactionary climate.

8.

Given that hundreds of Islamic centres established by Saudi Arabia throughout the world have become a breeding ground for fanaticism and extremism and crucibles for violence, blood lust and terrorism, an alternative plan must be laid down to transform them into community service centres rather than allow them to continue disseminating obscurantist ideas that spawn a mentality of violence which has distorted the image of Islam in the eyes of the world over the last few decades.

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6. Final thoughts The opinions expressed in this article are motivated not by enmity for Saudi Arabia but by concern for its future. I firmly believe that unless the descendants of the great King Abdul Aziz ibn-Saud follow the example he set with his stand against the Ikhwan of Najd and their leader, Faisal al-Dawish, eighty years ago, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is headed for a highly detrimental confrontation with advanced societies. I also believe that the collapse of the Saudi regime, whether in favour of the extremists or as part of the trend calling for the country’s partition and division would represent a great strategic danger to all the countries in the Gulf and the wider Middle East. As reform in Egypt is a thousand times better than its takeover by any of a number of alternatives, so too is reform in Saudi Arabia a thousand times better than its takeover by alternatives that could plunge the entire region into unprecedented chaos. Maintaining the stability of Saudi Arabia and all its neighbours is imperative. But I believe guaranteeing stability is impossible in the absence of a historical operation like the one undertaken by King Abdul Aziz ibn-Saud against the extremists between 1925 and 1930. The question is whether the sane elements in Saudi Arabia will follow a course similar to the one taken by their famous forebear eighty years ago or whether they will continue to coexist with the modern-day disciples of Faisal al-Dawish until the ship sinks with everyone on board.

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Hotwiring the Apocalypse: Apocalyptic Elements of Global Jihadi Doctrines Reuven PAZ The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM), Herzliya, Israel

Abstract. Various Islamic groups see recent events as presaging an ‘apocalypse’ that will see the destruction of the West. Some of these groups believe they can ‘hotwire’ this, i.e. bring it about through the use of WMD in anti-Western attacks. However, their ability to do so is doubtful. Keywords. Islamism, apocalypse, terrorism, suicide bombers, WMD

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Introduction The most important theme within the culture of “global jihad” since the start of the century has been that of the coming Apocalypse (the catastrophic end of the world when the wicked will be punished by God while the righteous are saved). Jihadi apocalyptic discourse, either by Jihadi-Salafi scholars or clerics, or by supporters of global jihad, is one of the main discursive innovations that followed the September 11th attacks. Apocalyptic discourse is not a new phenomenon in the modern Arab Islamic world. It has accompanied almost every major war or disaster that has occurred in the Arab World in modern times. Such major events include the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the last Muslim Caliphate in 1922–1924; the 1948 war—the so-called “disaster” or Nakbah—which resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel; the 1967 war—the so-called “calamity” or Naksah—which resulted in the Israeli occupation of Palestine, including Jerusalem, and the Al-Aqsa mosque; and the first Gulf war in 1991, following the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, which marked the first round of massive American military involvement in the Middle East. These wars, and some more minor events (such as “Black September” and the sudden death of the widely admired Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Naser in September 1970; the Islamic revolution in Iran in February 1979; the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement the same year; the IranIraq war between 1980–1988; and the Israeli occupation of South-Lebanon in June 1982) created waves of apocalyptic discourse. They also gave rise to increased religious sentiment among the wider population. People began to take an interest in apocalyptic Arab Islamic literature, such as the famous book Interpretation of Dreams by Arab Mediaeval scholar Ibn Sirrin [1]. Interpretation of visions—Tafsir or Ta’wil al-Ru’a—is a legitimate science in Islam, and in difficult times or “historical earthquakes” people have been known to consult ancient literature as well as prominent living scholars. This desire to consult usually arises within the context of feelings of crisis, insecurity, instability or fear of the future. Since the instances mentioned above were a series of either instances of defeat, periods of political instability, or moments of national and personal disaster, a fear of

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doomsday, or the “Day of Judgment” in its Islamic meaning, became widespread among Muslims. In modern times there are only a few individuals who claim to be able to interpret visions according to Islamic criteria. However, perceptions of the September 11th attacks, unlike those of the aforementioned events, did not conform to this pattern. This was the first time in modern Islamic history in which the West had been humiliated, first by such a sophisticated attack and second, on its own soil. In many Islamic and Western eyes it became a turning point in the relations between the two parties, a continuation of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan in 1988–1989 and its final collapse in 1990. For the first time in modern history Muslims felt as if a reconstruction of the spread of Islam of the 7th century and the defeat of the Crusaders in the 12th century was possible. The subsequent American response was seen to ignite a global war and was seen to be an indication of the global conspiracy against Islam and the Muslims in general, not just the “terrorists” among them. Arab rulers have always sought to link their wars to past Islamic glory. Saddam Hussein did so in 1980–1988, 1991 and 1998. Osama bin Laden did so in his declaration of war against the Jews and the Crusaders in February 1998. Conversely, even Arab secular regimes have sought to link their countries to pre-Islamic history—ancient Egypt, Babylon, or the Phoenicians—in order to provide their nationalism with a long and glorified historical dimension. The late Iranian Shah linked himself to Koresh and celebrated this fact in 1970, with the most spectacular festival ever seen in the Middle East. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is shaped by claims and aspirations derived from the Jewish Bible (the Christian Old Testament), the Qur’an, and the early history of both sides. Palestinian secular scholars draw a connection between themselves and the Kananites who lived in Biblical Palestine before the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt, thus “proving” their right to the territory. In addition the current global war against jihadi terrorism, led by the United States, bears the mark of a fundamentalist Christian construction of Good versus Evil, a kind of reflection of the Divine eternal struggle. Fundamentalist Christian preachers in the U.S. also characterize the global war against jihadi terrorism within the context of an apocalyptic worldview. There is a kind of reflexivity to the mutual jihad/crusade, in which history, religion, and myth, play major roles. Such an atmosphere is an ideal greenhouse for the growth of apocalyptic discourse, especially among young supporters of global jihad, who sense that the turning point of history is in their favour. Elements of this culture lie in the connection and integration between apocalyptic discourse and militant and violent jihadist activity by discussing the potential for Jihadis to “hotwire” the Apocalypse in such a jihadi culture. How are Muslim clerics and scholars, past and present, propounding a hotwired Apocalypse? How do jihadis see themselves as activators of the Apocalypse, and would they for example be tempted to resort to weapons of mass destruction? Consequently, how do WMD factor into jihadi discussions that suggest such hotwiring may occur?

1. September 11th Attack by “Programmed Terrorists” The September 11th attacks, the current highpoint for the jihadi mindset, were carried out by a group of Arab jihadis who thought they were going to touch the “wings of early Islamic history”. They acted as if they had been programmed to enter this state whilst living in the “world of the ‘infidels’ ”, and they would see the culmination of

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these efforts on the last day of their lives. Right after the attacks, three copies were found of a hand-written letter in Arabic with instructions for the attackers. The detailed instructions aimed at shaping their behaviour during their last day on earth. The letter reminds us in this context of the description of the recruitment of Japanese suicide pilots during World War II. The pilots crashed their planes into the American naval ships in the Pacific Ocean in 1944 when the United States attempted to invade the Philippines, which signified to the Japanese the beginning of their eventual defeat. The description goes as follows:

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“There was no lack of volunteers, and there was even a waiting list… It was the desire to win while striking the enemy, which brought about the decision to die voluntarily. The enthusiasm for self-sacrifice merged with cold, calculated logic. This was the basis for their recruitment and training. The battle was already lost, but the desire to die willingly was ensconced. A senior officer would gather about thirty officers, and speak to them movingly about the homeland and about the need to sacrifice for its sake. He would ask to hear their answers that very evening, each officer individually. Only infrequently did one of the officers defer the honor being offered to them. It is possible that more courage was required to stand up against this appointment than to agree to volunteer… In letters, which they left for their parents, they generally referred to their predicament by saying such things as: Do not mourn us; we die happy and proud for the sake of the Emperor and victory.” [2]

One of the Japanese suicide pilots, Kosonuki Masashiga, even wrote that “he hoped to be reborn several times over in order to relive the same life he lived during the war”. One cannot help but be reminded of the same tradition put forward in the Hadith by the Prophet Muhammad, of which there are several versions. According to this tradition, the “Shahid’s [martyr’s] most fervent will is to be reborn several times over in order to reenact the same deeds”. The identity of the author of the letter is unknown but FBI investigators assume it was Muhammad Atta. However, regardless of the author, the letter provides us with one of the most vivid and penetrating glimpses into the mind of the planners of the attacks, and the mental state of the suicide hijackers themselves. The main purpose of the letter is to instill in the hijackers’ mind the notion that there is a direct line between them and the companions (Sahabah) of the Prophet in the 7th Century. During both their preparations for the attack and the takeover of the aircraft, they should behave as if they were fighting alongside their ancestors. They were instructed to tie their clothes “in the same manner our good predecessors had done before”; to be courageous, “as our predecessors did when they came to the battle”; to press their teeth together “as the predecessors used to do”; and to recite “other similar verses that our predecessors used to mention in the battlefield”. They were instructed “not to forget to take some booty, even a cup or a glass of water”. Taking of booty was an important element in the norms of fighting in early Islamic history. Another important theme within the writings of such Islamist groups is to look for death and forget this world. This is important not only for the success of the fight and the acceptance of death, but also in order to prove the cowardice of the enemy. Enemies are those who prefer the present world to the other one, or those who became the agents of the Devil. They are those that “admire the civilization of the West and drink their love and their worship with cold water”. This is the perception of the true believers versus the Party of the Devil. The same as the view of death in battle and becoming a martyr (Shahid) as marriage. This theme is repeated in the wills of Palestinian suicide bombers, and is likely one of the elements of self-persuasion used prior to the operation. Another form of persuasion is the beautiful ever-virgin women who wait for them

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in Paradise. However, this tact was originally targeted at people who were going to a real battle with an armed enemy, and not those facing innocent, unarmed civilians in a plane. The definition of the enemy is dynamic and changing, and includes the growing influence of Takfiri (a new generation of Wahabi Salafists) doctrines, almost all of which do not adhere to the jihadi interpretations. 2. The War in Iraq and Apocalyptic Visions The war in Iraq and the Jihadi insurgency therein are the natural objects of interest to Al Qaeda, its front groups, and its many supporters and sympathizers in the Arab and Muslim world. The conflict serves also as an important element in recruiting and creating more anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Jewish feelings among much wider circles of Arabs and Muslims. The war also inspires apocalyptic visions for many Muslim youngsters, who express their views freely through the “virtual global jihad” of the Internet. Many of these supporters look at Al Qaeda and the Taliban, as “those who raise the black banners” (Ashab al-rayat al-sud), that would come from the East on the eve of the Islamic victory and proclaim the end of the world, to pave the way for the appearance of the Mahdi (a saviour figure). The longest article on this topic, based on many Islamist sources, was posted on the net in March 9th 2003, by its author Osama Azzam [3]. The author based his conclusions on primary sacred Islamic sources, but also on the writings of contemporary scholars, mainly Abu Qutadah al-Filastini—one of the leading scholars of Global jihad in the Arab world and Europe—and his famous book Ma’alim Al-Tai’fah al-Mansurah (Characteristics of the Secured Community) [4]. Azzam’s main conclusions are:

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•

•

We are facing the end of the world: “Following the above, is there anyone that still doubts that we are approaching the end of the world? Does anyone think that the hour is far? We are on the eve of the total dismantling that would be followed by our clear victory”. The characteristics of “the owners of the black banners and the secured community” are identical to Al Qaeda and the Taliban: “I have no doubt that the leaders of the Mujahidin of Al Qaeda, and the Taliban are the owners of the black banners who will assist the Mahdi”.

The reader must decide whom to support – Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Mujahidin? The Arab and Muslim governments and their clerics and Islamic establishments, which insist on calling themselves Muslims? Or the Crusader West and the enemies of Allah on earth? “Who is going to support the Mahdi except these men and clerics, and their followers? After this war, which has no precedence in human history and in the fight between the community of the believers and the Devil and its followers, does anyone doubt that these are the days of the Mahdi?”

An on-line forum of “the Jinn and the Demons” is another platform for these apocalyptic views that attracts many Muslim youth [5]. It includes a special section for interpretations of dreams and visions [6]. The forum is full of apocalyptic descriptions related to the war in Iraq and growing anti-American sentiments in the Arab world.

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Many of these visions deal with the end of the United States, as the Saudi supervisor of the sector wrote: “These visions and their like, of which many were sent to me, propagate the destruction of this evil country and the punishments, disasters, and dismantling, that will occur there. This is the way Allah deals with oppressors… The punishment of this super oppressor is very close. We ask Allah to heal the hearts of the believers from its influence, and grant the Muslims all of its finance and equipment as booty”.

However, the notion of apocalyptic visions is denied by Al Qaeda’s Salafi scholars. In an unsigned article published in February 2003 on what has been Al Qaeda’s main website in the past, the Center for Islamic Studies and Research, there was an attempt to undermine these ideas. The article—“Allah has not assigned our nation to know the person of the Mahdi prior to his appearance”—criticized those who were looking for the Mahdi to establish the Islamic State, but in the meantime do nothing to promote its establishment [7]. Those that believe in this Islamic principle “have fallen into a lot of exaggerations… and base […] their religion on false issues, until their religion turn[s] feebler than the nest of a spider”. Moreover, the anonymous author who officially wrote on behalf of Al Qaeda, attacked the theories of “the Black Banners that will appear from the East”, as based on very weak Hadith stories. His main source of support was Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi of the 14th Century, one of the leading authorities for the Wahhabi and Salafi doctrines. In general, some Islamic scholars throughout the centuries—the most prominent of them was famous historian Ibn Khaldun—have argued that the Mahdi was a myth and a superstition. Nonetheless, most Muslims throughout history have accepted the idea of an eschatological deliverer known as the Mahdi. The article by Al Qaeda mentioned the name of Osama bin Laden in relation to these false theories only once, but its message was clear:

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“We recommend our brothers not to twist the texts and mix the weak and the well-based [Hadith], in order to make them suit reality. We also recommend all our brothers to act and say what might benefit the nation… You should support the Jihad against Allah’s enemies rather than harm the Jihad and the Mujahidin by nonsense ideas, which have no benefit”.

Yet, this opposition is perceived as an attempt to prevent the glorification of persons not the ideas. Apocalyptic visions and a sense of Armageddon might be natural on the eve of and during the war in Iraq and the subsequent Jihadi insurgency. This war is perceived by many in the Arab and Muslim world, primarily youngsters whose knowledge of Islam is quite poor, as a global attack against Islam and an integral part of a global conspiracy. These youngsters’ expectations that Al Qaeda will launch further attacks on American soil are enormous. The search for a new Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi to confront the Crusaders plays an important role in the imagination of Arab Islamists. Yet, the more interesting issue is the denial of such aspirations by Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The denial might be first of all a result of the pure Wahhabi nature of the Saudi element of the organization. Another reason could be the personality of Bin Laden, who has not so far made any attempt to create for himself the image of an Islamic savior. His goal for Al Qaeda is to establish a solid, practical foundation for a new generation which is not dependent upon individuals or miracles but instead on a united strategy, hard work and community struggle. However, the idea of the Mahdi has not died yet. Many books speculating on the Mahdi, and precisely when he will emerge to deliver the Islamic community from its

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dire straits, have been published in the Sunni Arab world in the last several decades. Most of them have appeared since 1979—the date not only of the Islamic Revolution in Iran but also of the abortive attempt to overthrow the Saudi regime.

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3. Jihadi Apocalyptic Discourse During the events following the September 11th attacks—the collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the declaration of a global war against jihadi terrorism, the American occupation of Iraq, and the jihadi Sunni insurgency there—there was a major development in apocalyptic jihadi discourse. Jihadi scholars and sympathizers have viewed this historic moment as a clear sign that the start of the process that will lead to the Day of Judgment or Resurrection is at hand, complete with all the apocalyptic events that should precede it according to the Islamic belief. Traditional Islamic terms became commonly used on jihadi online forums: Dulab (the cycle of a century between each Mahdi); the Mahdi; Mujaddid al-Zaman (the person who renews the apocalyptic signs); Al-Masih al-Dajjal (the false Messiah or Anti-Christ that would appear before the Day of Resurrection); Al-Rayat al-Sud (the black flags that will come to fight from Khorasan in the East); Armageddon; many Ru’yah (visions); Ahlam (dreams). We should also bear in mind that all this started only a short while after the new millennium. At that time apocalyptic interpretations swept the whole world, brought on by religious emotion or fear of the collapse of global computer systems. Quite a lot of authors have posted on jihadi forums their dreams and visions of the Salaf, the Prophet, historic events from early Islamic history, and all kinds of other visions, asking for solutions, interpretations, and explanations that would prove that Bin Laden, Zarqawi, Al Qaeda, modern jihad, the September 11th attacks and other jihadi terrorist operations, are all signs of the coming apocalypse. One Saudi scholar— Abu Bashir al-Najdi—became the “leader” of the interpreters of jihadi visions. There are several Islamist websites and sections of Islamist forums, which are dedicated to dreams and visions. All of them are related somehow to Al Qaeda, global jihad and the rise of Jihadi “forces” to confront the “Evil West”. Two of the more popular of these websites are the “forum of Hermageddon” [8] and the website and forums of the “Charms and Wars” [9]. This phenomenon is interesting for another reason, which is the spread of apocalyptic visions by Jihadi-Salafis, primarily Saudi supporters of global jihad who were educated under a Wahhabi educational system. Wahhabis have long resisted these apocalyptic visions, fearing the deviant effect they might have. Islamist millenarianism in Saudi Arabia around the year 1400H (1978) was one of the reasons for the seizure of the Ka‘bah by Juhayman al-‘Utaybi and his group of followers, a deep trauma to the kingdom. Yet the apocalyptic writings of Al-‘Utaybi found a respected place in the largest “library” of Jihadi-Salafi, that is the website of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi [10]. The ‘Utaybi affair is also used as a legitimate defence against the “apostate Saudi kingdom”. Al-Maqdisi is one of the most prominent Jihadi-Salafi scholars to attack the Saudi apostasy, and his fundamental book AlKawashef al-Jaliyyah fi Kufr al-Dawlah al-Su‘udiyyah (The Clear Signs of the Apostasy of the Saudi State) is very popular among supporters of global jihad (as evident in the fact that it has been downloaded from the Internet 53,039 times). In his analysis of the ‘Utaybi affair, Al-Maqdisi forgave ‘Utaybi and his group, whom he admitted to knowing personally.

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The apocalyptic aspirations of supporters of global jihad, especially as they appear in jihadi websites and forums, are all intertwined with ideas about Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, the “new Crusaders,” the wish to reconstruct the victory of Salah al-Din alAyyubi, and the use of WMD. There is also a clear yearning for the creation of a state of symmetric war between the Muslim world and the West. Between the lines one senses that equality and symmetry between the two civilizations is the ultimate target. Another element present is the eager search for Islamic heroes and war heritage, which would renew the spirit of the Salaf—the first generation of Muslims and the companions of the Prophet. This element is not just a result of Islamic influence or religious sentiments, but also a result of social factors and segments of Arab culture. One of the principal books that reflects these apocalyptic aspirations was written by the Saudi scholar Abu Jandal al-Azdi—Fares bin Shawwal al-Zahrani—one of the leading younger scholars of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, under the title Bin Laden – the Renovate of Times and Oppressor of the Americans [11]. The 606-page book uses terms and superlatives that place Bin Laden in a direct line from the greatest Islamic scholars of history, such as Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab and Hasan al-Bana, even though Bin Laden is not a cleric or a scholar, far from it. Yet, his ability to create a tremendous turning point in Islamic history makes him a candidate for such a position in the eyes of the Jihadi-Salafists. From time to time we can see in jihadi forums persistent posts about the connection between Al Qaeda, and recently the Taliban as well, and the Islamic prophecies of the apocalypse. In a post from March 6th, 2006, the author tries to prove through a very detailed analysis of the Islamic prophecies and traditions on the issue and the present confrontation between the mujahidin and the West, that we are witnessing the signs of the apocalypse, and Osama’s army is the army of the Mahdi [12]. This army will conquer Iraq, Syria, and Palestine (Bayt al-Maqdis) and will give the authority to the Mahdi, then to Jesus/Issa and from here the defeat of the enemy (Al-Dajjal) is secured. No one in the forum opposed his analysis. One of the most enthusiastic, long-term supporters of this practice of looking for apocalyptic signs is the Saudi sheikh Sulayman al-‘Alawan, another one of the leading Saudi clerics supporting global jihad. In an article entitled “The Disputes over the Mahdi”, which was also viewed as a fatwa, he encouraged the mujahidin to deal with the subject [13]. “Dealing with [the issue of] the Mahdi and the signs of the hour—a‘lam al-Sa‘ah—is one of the most important elements to encourage innovative effort of thinking—Ijtihad—and to sail on the boat of salvation… It is the best thing to do in order to spread religion, to prepare the soul for meeting Allah, and to promote the Divine Law.”

This Jihadi-Salafi encouragement in addition to the sense of being at a historic impasse, plus the great expectations created by Al Qaeda, have created a crucible for various apocalyptic views. The ongoing jihadi insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, and worldwide jihadi terrorism, has encouraged this notion.

4. Jihadi Perceptions of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) In recent years, Al Qaeda and affiliated groups have issued only a few pronouncements in which they threatened the use of weapons of mass destruction. The first direct reference appeared on December 26th, 2002. Abu Shihab al-Kandahar, the then moderator

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of the Islamist Internet forum www.al-mojahedoon.net, published a short article titled “Nuclear War is the Solution for the Destruction of the United States”. The article could be viewed as a simple threat, exploiting a number of rumors from various sources. It might also have been deliberate disinformation regarding Al Qaeda’s possession of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. However, it could also have been a form of propaganda aimed at encouraging Islamists. Regardless of its ultimate aim, al-Kandahari’s article marked the first time that such a threat had been publicly issued by supporters of Al Qaeda, or at least by a figure known to have been close to the propaganda apparatus of global jihad. The article was short and lacked the sweeping theoretical elements typical of the writings of Islamist scholars of jihad against the United States or the West. Yet, even though this could have been a false alarm, it did seem to mark another stage in the escalation of the tone of Al Qaeda’s propaganda. As such, it could raise the expectations of Islamists for an apocalyptic “mega-operation” using WMD against the United States or Russia. Thus far, the modus operandi of Al Qaeda has been suicide or martyrdom operations. Martyrdom attacks are not only a tactical tool; they have also played a central role in the indoctrination of Al Qaeda recruits. Over the past decade, the propaganda machine of Al Qaeda and the global jihad has persistently asked the question posed by one of their adherents in an article titled “Has the Global Crusader Alliance Learned the Lessons of the Mujahidin?” The author wrote, “We are really puzzled to see the Americans and their followers in the Western world think that they are able to confront people who wish to die more than they [the Americans] want to live”. This theme of self-sacrifice has since been reinforced not only by the spread of the phenomenon of suicide operations across the globe, but also by the increased support of Muslim publics for suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. It is significant to note that this method, which was once controversial among Islamic clerics and scholars, enjoys growing support within religious and political communities alike. Thus far, in fact, it seems that radical Islam’s focus has been not on murder on a grand scale, but primarily on self-sacrifice and on the proliferation of its attacks to different regions and places across the globe. The focus on personal martyrdom and suicide attacks among the groups that adhere to the culture of global jihad— including Al Qaeda, as well as groups with local and national aspirations, such as the Chechen Islamists and Arab volunteers there, Kashmiri groups, the Kurdish Ansar alIslam, or the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—might explain why these groups have so far refrained from any large-scale use of WMD. Very rarely do clerics, scholars, or Islamist intellectuals who supply the ideological and doctrinal support for the culture of Global jihad mention the issue of WMD. Given the central role played by this ideological network, the relative absence of discussion over WMD is significant.

5. Shaykh Nasser al-Fahd’s Fatwa on WMD Some recent Islamist pronouncements indicate that this past emphasis on personal sacrifice and martyrdom operations may be changing to include increased demand to acquire and use WMD. On May 21th 2003, the Saudi Shaykh Nasser bin Hamad al-Fahd published the first fatwa on the use of WMD. The author is 40 years old and one of the younger leading clerics of the Saudi Islamist opposition that support the culture of global jihad. To date, Shaykh al-Fahd has published dozens of militant books and arti-

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cles, some of which are viewed by the followers of global jihad as religious rulings that legitimate the fight against the United States. Because of his preaching against the Saudi monarchy, Shaykh al-Fahd was arrested in June 2003 by the Saudi authorities and is still being held without trial. Later he was forced, along with two of his colleagues, to publicly renounce several of his rulings against the Saudi government. In January 2005, while in prison he issued a renunciation through his supporters on Islamist internet forums. Shaykh al-Fahd has been at the forefront of a new effort to rethink the strategy of asymmetric warfare shared by many Islamists. For example, on September 21st, 2002 al-Fahd published an article titled “The Divine Verses about the September Attack” in which he praised the execution of the September 11th attacks, especially their technical sophistication and use of planes. One of his arguments was that the September 11th attacks were an air battle or “dogfight” of sorts. “If the Americans are using F-15 or Tornado [and they are allowed], then if the Mujahidin used Boeing or AirBus are they not allowed?” Shaykh al-Fahd has repeatedly used such analogies with the West to provide Islamic legal justification for terrorist tactics. When asked, for example, by an anonymous person whether the use of WMD is allowed, his answer was straightforward: “Yes, it is allowed”: “If the Muslims could defeat the infidels only by using these kinds of weapons, it is allowed to use them even if they kill them all, and destroy their crops and cattle”. Following the answer, Shaykh al-Fahd wrote a long and detailed memorandum on the relevant Islamic sources that he used as the basis for his ruling. First, he disqualified any international legal terms used by the West, since they are not part of the Islamic Divine Law. Second, he claimed (somewhat erroneously) that those countries that lead the campaign against the use of WMD—the United States and the United Kingdom—have already used WMD in the past against their enemies, not to mention that they, plus “the Jews,” possess these weapons. Third, he based his arguments on the saying of the Prophet in the Hadith: “Allah has ordered you to do everything perfectly. Hence, if you kill, do it perfectly, and if you slaughter, do it perfectly. Everyone should sharpen his blade and ease his slaughter”. He also referenced another saying of the Prophet: “If you are ordered to do something—do it according to your best ability”. According to al-Fahd, this principle is essential. If there is no other way the mujahidin can defeat the enemy, then they should kill them, all of them, by every means possible. This principle is valid even if they have to kill women and children, or even Muslims. In al-Fahd’s eyes, the principles governing the use of WMD are divided into two categories. The first category concerns the general acceptance of their use in the case of jihad. The second category concerns the legitimacy of the use of WMD in a certain period against a certain enemy—an enemy that, in al-Fahd’s eyes, clearly means the Goliath, the United States. One issue that has become controversial among Saudi scholars following the attacks against “infidels” in Riyadh in May and November 2003, and the attacks in Istanbul in November 2003—not to mention the murderous ongoing attacks in Iraq—has been the fact that innocent Muslims have also been killed in these attacks. Suicide operations are also controversial. Al-Fahd unambiguously believes, however, that if the killing of Muslims is necessary and there is no other choice, then this is permissible. In his view, which is based on previous rulings of Islamic scholars such as the fourteenth century theologian Ibn Taymiyyah, there are no limits at all to using WMD against the Western “infidels”.

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The ruling of Shaykh Nasser al-Fahd set a precedent for the Islamist debate on the use of WMD. Since this was an answer to a question from an anonymous source, we cannot know if the question was sincere, or whether it was planted by the Shaykh or another element linked to Al Qaeda. Yet, the clear acceptance of the use of WMD is very significant. It is interesting to look also at the timing of the ruling by Shaykh Nasser al-Fahd. Taken together with the declarations issued by Ayman Zawahiri, the ruling might constitute a campaign of threats or disinformation. Such a link, if it indeed constitutes a carefully planned campaign, does not necessarily mean that Al Qaeda is already planning such an attack by using WMD, or that it has already acquired such weapons. Were Al Qaeda or any affiliated Islamist group planning to use WMD, however, they would by now have received the necessary endorsement to do so from an Islamic point of view.

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6. The Islamist Reaction to Shaykh al-Fahd Shaykh al-Fahd’s ruling was not followed up by any type of dispute or discussion. In fact, those who follow the many radical jihadi websites, forums, and chat rooms—the main arena of discourse for radical Islamists—may well have been surprised by the absence of any coherent debate on WMD of any kind among Islamists. In some cases, Islamists expressed their hopes and desires that Al Qaeda use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons (CBRN) against the West. These expressions, however, must be seen within the context of the apocalyptic imagery aroused by Bin Laden, the fall of Saddam Hussein, the occupation of Iraq, and the Islamist insurgency there. Some Islamists described WMD as “doomsday” weapons that would accompany the end of the world. Moreover, to date neither bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, nor any other leading figure of Al Qaeda has directly mentioned such WMD threats—even though these individuals can publicize their world-views and doctrines virtually limitlessly, given that their first audience is not the West, but the Islamic world. Since the ruling of Shaykh al-Fahd in May 2003, Al Qaeda and affiliated groups have carried out major terrorist operations throughout the world. These include attacks in Riyadh, Istanbul, Casablanca, Madrid, London and twice in Egypt/Sinai, in addition to numerous attacks against the American and allied troops in Iraq, and against the Iraqi Shi’is and Iraqi officials of the newly elected regime. Most of these operations were suicide attacks, with the sole exception being the Madrid bombings, where remote controlled devices were used. Millions of Islamist supporters, as well as Western security and intelligence services, anticipated a “Mega-Attack” on Christmas and New Year 2003. Still, the Islamist discourse on the topic has not mentioned one word about the use of WMD against the United States or the West. The strongest evidence pointing towards the relatively low regard for WMD within Islamist radical discourse comes from military manuals distributed on the Internet by various global jihadist groups. In the Arabic-language manuals or directories written by Islamists, or in those translated from other languages to Arabic, only a handful of references indicate planning for the use of such weapons. In the instances where the manuals do refer to WMD, the emphasis is on the use of chemical weapons, which at any rate are easy to obtain and can be created with relative ease, even in home laboratories. Indeed, Islamist websites contain numerous instructions on how to make homemade bombs using chemicals. Yet, we should ask ourselves

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whether such chemical bombs, as dangerous as they may be, fall under the category of WMD. Ultimately, the ability of Islamist terrorist groups to kill hundreds of people by conventional means through martyrdom operations might be more attractive to them, as it provides an opportunity to demonstrate their heroism. One military-related Islamist web site, which was shut down in February 2004, contained information on how to develop weapons and ammunition (Mawqi‘ al-aslihah wal-dhakhaer). Even on this website, however, references to WMD were rare. In October 2005 an 80-page document with a detailed “encyclopedia” on how to build a nuclear bomb appeared on several jihadi forums [14]. The document generated lot of enthusiastic responses, but remained “wishful thinking” rather than a real basis for developing such a weapon at home.

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7. Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and “The Call for Islamist Global Resistance” In December 2004, a new attitude about asymmetric warfare has emerged within Islamist discourse, one that challenges global jihad’s emphasis on “heroism” and its relative lack of emphasis on acquiring and using WMD. Mustafa Sit-Maryam—also known as Omar Abd al-Hakim, but better known as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri—a former leading trainer and scholar of Al Qaeda, published two significant documents calling for a new organization of global jihad, “the Islamist Global Resistance”. One was a 9-page letter published in December 2004, and the other was a huge book totaling 1,600 pages about the strategy of global jihad. In many ways, Al-Suri elaborated along familiar lines of Islamist criticism of Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups, primarily in the Iraqi arena. Al-Suri in fact returns to the original jihadi doctrines of Abdallah Azzam, the spiritual mentor of Al Qaeda, and criticizes some of the strategies that have been adopted by the new generation of jihadists, saying that they prefer to “jump” into holy war without first completing the long stage of ideological indoctrination (Tarbiyyah). Al-Suri also uses the same term that Azzam did—“the solid base”—to define the model of the jihadi group and, like Azzam, he emphasizes the quality of the mujahidin, not their quantity. In his open letter to the State Department, Al-Suri talks at length about the importance of using WMD against the United States as the only means to fight it from a point of parity. He even criticizes Osama bin Laden for not using WMD in the September 11th attacks: “If I were consulted in the case of that operation I would advise the use of planes in flights from outside the U.S. that would carry WMD. Hitting the U.S. with WMD was and is still very complicated. Yet, it is possible after all, with Allah’s help, and more important than being possible—it is vital”. Al-Suri states, “the Muslim resistance elements [must] seriously consider this difficult yet vital direction”. Al-Suri also surprises his readers by sending requests to North Korea and Iran to continue to develop nuclear weapons. It is most unlikely for a Jihadi-Salafi scholar to hint at possible cooperation with countries like Shi’ite Iran or Stalinist North Korea, both of which are generally regarded as infidel regimes. However, Al-Suri seems to advise that jihadi Sunni readers should cooperate with the devil to defeat the “bigger devil”. Al-Suri does not see much benefit to be gained from Al Qaeda waging guerrilla warfare against the U.S. in Iraq. Hence, “the ultimate choice is the destruction of the United States by operations of strategic symmetry through weapons of mass destruction, namely nuclear, chemical, or biological means, if the Mujahidin can achieve it

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with the help of those who possess them or through buying them”. One other option, he says, is by “the production of basic nuclear bombs, known as ‘dirty bombs.’ ” The focus on the use of WMD as the “ultimate choice” of the mujahidin is also a significant feature in Al-Suri’s book. Al-Suri sketches his jihadi military strategy over the course of 100 pages, which he sees as the core of the book. One of his most significant recommendations is the need to divide the mujahidin into four different kinds of groups: squads of popular resistance (al-Muqawamah al-Sha‘biyyah) with limited training and facilities, military squads (al-Saraya al-‘Askariyyah al-‘Ammah) with limited training in light weapons, and squads of quality resistance (al-Muqawamah alNaw‘iyyah), which are well-trained for both terrorist operations and guerrilla warfare. The fourth type of squad is for strategic operations (al-‘Amaliyyat al-Istratijiyyah). Members who fully understand the strategic goals of the resistance should command these elite squads. They should have plenty of financial support and good knowledge of using WMD “when there is a need to counter attack or to achieve strategic symmetry with the United States”. Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s pronouncement on WMD marks a new phase in the overall development of the Islamist discourse on the issue. However, there is a question as to whether or not his book is intended merely as a platform for better-organized global jihad, or if there is already an organization or group behind him. Yet, his focus on wellplanned, strategic operations should be noted. His favoured example is the Madrid bombings on March 11th 2004, in which a small squad of operatives created a larger strategic effect across Europe. Ultimately, the question that we should ask ourselves is “why are there so few references to WMD within the Islamist discourse of Al Qaeda or related groups?” Although there is no single, satisfying explanation, several assessments can be made:

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•

•

•

WMD did receive some attention prior to October-November 2001, when Afghanistan, under the Taliban, served as a greenhouse and safe haven for Al Qaeda and other Islamist groups. Until that time, Al Qaeda maintained good relations with regimes and scientists involved in developing WMD such as Pakistan, Sudan, the Islamic republics of Central Asia, and perhaps with Iraq. After November 2001, however, most of the Al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan were destroyed or seized by the United States or Pakistan under President Musharraf, and Islamist forces were pushed into eastern Afghanistan. It is possible that the culture of global jihad embraced “heroism” and the tactics of martyrdom operations as a result of these setbacks. When they had a base in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda’s attempt to acquire CBRN facilities was handled in secret by a small group of operatives, the vast majority of which did not possess the capabilities of dealing with CBRN, except for crude homemade bombs. Due to the loss of their Afghan safe haven, and due to the difficulties of handling such weapons in occupied Iraq, only one arena remains where such weapons can be handled—namely, among Muslim communities in the West, especially in Europe. Notably, in many Islamist writings, the term “WMD” refers to a broad array of social and moral diseases associated with the West, such as AIDS, cigarette smoking and drug use. It is not presented as part of the Islamist struggle, but rather as a term denoting the destructive diseases that will eventually ruin Western societies from inside.

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Following the above analysis, we should ask ourselves whether or not the threat posed by Islamist terrorist groups acquiring and using CBRN or WMD is real. Before the war in Iraq, much information was circulated about attempts by Al Qaeda to develop such capabilities. The American insistence both that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was developing such weaponry and that the Iraqi regime was linked to Al Qaeda contributed to the impression of an active threat. In the past year, meanwhile, some terrorism experts have become more skeptical about the extent to which a CBRN threat emanates from these groups. They cite four main causes for such skepticism: • • •

•

The occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq prevented the continuance of earlier attempts by Islamist groups to develop or acquire such weapons. Islamist scholars, clerics, intellectuals and even most ordinary Islamist extremists seem to refrain from supporting the use of WMD by Islamist groups, fearing the consequences of such use for the entire Muslim world. Al Qaeda and affiliated groups, as well as Islamist scholars, tend to focus their ideology and doctrines on self-sacrifice and technical sophistication, and hence they tend to endorse terrorist tactics like suicide operations. So far, the world has no answer to the threat of such martyrdom operations. Martyrdom operations need no technical training at all and perfectly suit the relative lack of technical infrastructure available to the Islamists in the postSeptember 11th era. Islamists also use the idea of martyrdom for the purpose of indoctrinating their ranks and implanting in the minds of Muslim youngsters the myth that the battle against America is a glorious and heroic one, similar to David’s fight against Goliath.

If our main criterion for assessment is the mentality of the present generation of Islamists, modeled on Al Qaeda, then the threat of an immediate use of WMD is low. Yet we should bear in mind two other factors:

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•

•

Al Qaeda is mutating against the backdrop of Iraq, and we are now facing a new generation of Islamists, who are not part of “the Afghan Alumni” but are “Iraqi Alumni”. The war and continuing insurgency in Iraq have possibly improved the ability of Al Qaeda, as well as of other groups such as the Algerians, or the Jordan-influenced Tawhid groups, to recruit a new generation of operatives from among Muslim communities in Europe. This new generation of recruits is not necessarily under the control of Saudi clerics or scholars, and might reveal itself to possess fewer reservations about the acquisition and use of CBRN or WMD. From what we can see from the Madrid bombings, perhaps this new generation will also be less willing to carry out martyrdom operations. A new generation of Islamists or Islamist groups might be more willing to cooperate with non-Islamic groups on one hand, or with Iran and Shi’ite groups such as Hizbollah, on the other. Al-Suri hints at such a possibility in his book, and even points to North Korea as a possible strategic partner. Additionally, a new generation of Islamist scholars might follow the fatwa of Shaykh al-Fahd or the book of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, and encourage the use of such weapons if and when the mujahidin find they have no other alternative.

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These developments could accelerate attempts made by Islamist groups to acquire and use WMD, although it is unclear how feasible this will be in the short term. We should, therefore, bear in mind that the will might be there, but the facilities and abilities, so far, are not.

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8. Conclusion Images of WMD as “doomsday” weapons are an integral part of the apocalyptic aspirations of the “audience” of global jihad, but not necessarily of its clerics or scholars. Yet it seems that the decision to use such weapons, whether nuclear, biological, or more likely chemical, would not necessarily be subjected to religious rulings or authorization by leading Salafi clerics. In addition to operational calculations or considerations, such a decision might also arise out of apocalyptic expectations. Such expectations have slowly increased with the ongoing insurgency in Iraq and the threats made by bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. In the past year there has been an escalation of these threats, which creates among the supporters of global jihad a sense of an imminent “explosion”, either in Iraq, Europe, or the United States. This sense takes apocalyptic form, whether in accordance with Islamic prophecies and traditions or not. We can cautiously state that the effect of religiously-based debates among jihadi scholars or between scholars and Islamic institutions is weakening. Supporters of global jihad, especially those that have access to the Internet, are more “thirsty” for video clips that document beheadings, bombings, or terrorism against their various “enemies” than for innovative Islamic rulings. Hence, apocalyptic aspirations, Islamist or otherwise, as linked to individual “candidates” for Mahdism, might increase. So far it seems that leaders such as bin Laden or Zawahiri do not encourage such a development. There is no sign that might show that they perceive themselves as future Khalifah or even that they might lead a Khilafah. This is typical for Sunni radical leaders or scholars. Hasan al-Bana or Sayyid Qutb did not do it either. However, Al Qaeda continues to mutate and on the margins of Jihadi-Salafiyyah there might emerge individuals or groups that might develop into a new Juhayman al-‘Utaybi. The “thirst” for a Mahdi is there, as a result of many factors. A self-pronounced Mahdi might decide to use non-conventional means, but his chances of becoming an influential leader of the “mainstream” Jihadi-Salafiyyah are very low. An important question to note here is to what extent does a sense of the apocalypse drive jihadists to act now, and not to “wait for the Mahdi to appear”. This is a significant question in light of the number of Arab volunteers joining the insurgency in Iraq, as well as in light of the reasons that drove nineteen Arabs to carry out the September 11th attacks. Before dealing with the possible effect of apocalyptic imagery on the use of WMD, we should look to the mythology surrounding suicide terrorism, to the existence of blind discipline that drives Sunni jihadists to mass killings of Shi’is, and to the growing hatred and demonization of the “enemy,” in whatever form. The horrors showcased on the Internet may significantly contribute to this growth in willingness. Bloody video clips, demonizing graffiti, as well as the total freedom of speech on this medium, also contribute. Here again, the Islamic nature or rules of the apocalypse are secondary to the power of demonization.

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References

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[1] Muhammad Ibn Sirrin, Tafsir al-Ahlam al-Kabir. Ibn Sirrin lived in the 8th century and is regarded as the greatest authority in Islamic history for interpretation of dreams and visions, after the Prophet. [2] Maurice Pinguet, Voluntary Death in Japan (Cambridge; Polity Press, 1993), pp. 229-230. [3] Osama Azzam, Hal Taliban wal-Qa’idah hum Ashab al-Rayat al-Sud? 9 March 2003. www.dawh.net/ vb/showthread.threadid?php=12125. [4] http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=733. [5] Muntada al-Jinn wal-‘Afarit: http://www.jazanvoice.net/vb/index.php?s=d6e3962ff3363e10e6ffa799fdc8e284. [6] www.jazanvoice.net/vb/forumdisplay.php?s=09676bd441afa83467c79a96220906c1&forumid=32. [7] The Center for Islamic Studies and Research, Nahnu Ummah lam yukallifna Allah bi-ma‘rifat al-Mahdi qabla khurujihi, February 2003. www.conrado.net/_vit_inf/print.php?id=989&ty=pr&img=no (The address of this web site changes frequently. This address was valid in 2003.). [8] See Muntada Hermageddon: http://hrmageddon.com/vb/index.php. [9] See Muntada al-Malahem wal-Fitan: http://alfetn.net/vb3/index.php?. [10] http://www.tawhed.ws/a?i=90 It should be noted that most of his writings were posted on this site in 2005. [11] Fares bin Shawwal al-Zahrani, Osama Bin Laden Mujaddid al-Zaman wa-Qaher al-Amrikan. www.tawhed.ws/r?i=972. [12] http://www.alhesbah.org/v/showthread.php?t=56593. [13] Sulayman bin Naser al-‘Alawan, Al-Naza‘at fi al-Mahdi, published in 23th January 2003 on his web site www.al-alwan.org. [14] http://alfirdaws.org/forums/showthread.php?t=5268&page=1&pp=10.

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Understanding the Psycho-Social and Political Processes Involved in Ideological Support for Terrorism Anne SPECKHARD 1 Georgetown University Medical Centre, USA Abstract. Suicide bombers have become ever more common in recent years due to a combination of trauma felt by occupied/oppressed populations and the wellorganized propaganda of Islamist groups using modern media such as the Internet. Without understanding the causes of their hatred and disaffectedness there is little hope of countering them. Keywords. Suicide bombers, Al Qaeda, psychology, trauma, Islamism, fictivebrotherhood, justifications of terrorism

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Introduction In recent years the world has witnessed a proliferation of global terrorism, much of it carried out by groups ideologically connected to each other by their common reliance on a shared (although individualistically, and often nationalistically, expressed) militant jihadist ideology which makes use of distorted tenets of Islam. This militant jihadist ideology claims that Islam is under attack around the world, and rallies its adherents to join the global jihad—a war in defense of Islam. It makes a global call to Muslims to place their religious allegiances above all others (i.e. familial, national, etc.), and to consider themselves as the “fictive kin” or “Muslim brothers” of all Muslims everywhere. Disturbing events in conflict zones—Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya and Afghanistan, for example—are offered by these groups as concrete and alarming evidence for advancing their ideology, with its core theme that Islam is under attack, and that therefore extreme and violent methods are justified to defend Islam and Islamic people and values everywhere. Calling their adherents’ attention to these ills, these groups promise to rectify the situation and to not only end this suffering but to bring about a new world order, one that promises social justice and moral living in accordance with the tenets of the Qur’an. Terror groups promote a militant jihadist ideology2 that rallies their forces, 1 E-mail: [email protected]. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism Conference – Lessons Learned and Future Policy: International/Regional, Interdisciplinary and Theological Perspectives, September 14, 2006, Garmisch, Germany. 2 The author makes use of the term “militant jihad” and “militant jihadist” in this paper as a shorthand reference to the common usage found among terrorists groups themselves in referring to their militant activities waged in the name of Islam, who in the name of Islam carry out militant attacks primarily against civilian, but also military targets. In doing so she means no disrespect to Islam nor to the original meaning of the word ‘jihad’ contained in the Qur’an in which the greater jihad is explained as the constant and ever vigilant need for an inner struggle to master oneself and attain a moral lifestyle, and the lesser jihad as the duty to defend Islamic lands under attack by engaging in military struggle.

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increases their pool of sympathizers, raises funds and operational support and, most importantly, motivates their members and new recruits to enact suicide attacks, the most lethal of the weapons in the terrorists’ arsenal. Relying upon cadres of “martyrs” who carry out suicide missions, these groups have managed to put themselves centre stage on the current global security scene. Through continuous campaigns of striking civilian and military targets, both in conflict zones and outside of them, they strike fear into civilian populations as well as into their much better armed military foes. Moreover, they also disturb efforts to bring about much-needed reform, peace and democratization in the Middle East, foil reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan (while claiming to be fighting the occupation), and fuel a backlash of military strikes and civil confusion that contributes to a “clash of cultures” that might not have occurred without their provocation. Terror groups achieve these ends by promoting a mindset that seeks to legitimize the use of political violence and terrorism against civilians in order to achieve their political objectives. This essay examines how it is that the militant jihadist ideology appeals to terrorist recruits, members and sympathizers of terrorist groups and explores reasons why the global militant jihadist ideology appears to be spreading instead of diminishing. Examining the motivations, responses, and modus operandi of the groups themselves, their supporters, and their membership, this paper offers potential means of creatively engaging these populations in order to combat the ideological basis of terrorism. As such, it hopes to point a way towards winning back the hearts and minds of people who in the past might have willingly embraced Western democratic values, and might do so again.

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1. Analyzing Terrorism In addressing the challenge of how to counter ideological support for terrorism, we must first accept that terrorism is essentially a psychological tool used by terror groups to manipulate the political processes of the government(s) from whom they hope to extract concessions. By most generally accepted definitions, terrorism involves the targeting of civilians by non-state actors in an effort to strike terror into a wider witnessing audience in order to influence the target government to change its policies and practices. This audience is substantially larger than the victim group itself, due to the media amplification [1]. If we begin from that definition, it is clear that there are four levels of analysis to consider when one attempts to come to answers about how best to de-legitimize the use of terrorism by politically-oriented groups of non-state actors. These levels include: the group, its motivations, and its goals; its individual actors and their individually-defined motivations and goals; its sympathizers/supporters and the factors that make their support either wax or wane, and the drivers that move supporters into more active roles (or, conversely, persuade its members to disengage from active roles); and, lastly, the ideology of the group, which ties the four units together. 1.1. The Group At the level of the group we must be clear in our understanding that terrorism is essentially a political activity. Terror groups exist generally as a reflection of difficult political situations in which perceived or real grievances—often surrounding nationalist efforts to obtain independence from a much stronger military occupier or other ruling

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nation—have resulted in the group turning to the use of politically-motivated violence against civilians. Even the current militant jihadi Al Qaeda-type groups and their affiliates operating globally have their origins in nationalist struggles, whether to liberate themselves from oppressive regimes (for example in Egypt, a situation that gave rise to the Muslim Brotherhood) or to remove foreign forces from holy soil (for example, the presence of United States troops on the Arabian Peninsula). Realizing that fighting the battle on their own lands was not productive and ended ultimately in severe repercussions against and persecution of their membership, these groups moved their operational bases out of their homelands. They were fueled as well by the Afghan jihad against occupation by the Soviet Union, a struggle that led many to begin to believe that militant jihad could even triumph over the world’s greatest superpowers. In exile these groups greatly transformed their ideology, since they realized that they could not create fundamental changes in their own societies through violence aimed at their own governments. As a result they continued to endorse violence by working through domestic political channels, but they expanded their scope, becoming international in their objectives. They began to strike at what they perceived as foreign support by the West (in general, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Europe) for oppressive regimes and immoral practices back home. A similar militant jihadist ideology is used to fuel political violence and terrorism in purely nationalistic struggles as well, as in the case of groups active in Chechnya and Palestine. However, in these cases the ideology remains limited only to the struggle at hand, and is not claimed as a global, Islamic ideology. Nor until very recently have such groups made claims regarding the necessity to strike at second-level powers seen to be backing the so-called “occupying” forces (for example, Russia or Israel). In general, these groups confine their attacks to representatives and assets of the occupying nations themselves. Such terrorist groups often claim it is necessary and justifiable to attack civilians because the enemy is so much better equipped and so ruthless in its “occupation”. Ahmed Sadat, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, speaking to the author from his jail cell in Jericho in November 2004, said: “The reason the Palestinians have more and more of these guys [suicide bombers] is that the Israelis are well trained; they have high tech equipment, Apache missiles. These volunteers are volunteers to go and be Palestinian Apache missiles. They go and search for their targets. It hurts that a person dies this way, but we have no alternatives. No one likes his Army to die. Any Army likes to keep its soldiers but we have no alternative”. When asked if the strategy works, he answered, “It makes some kind of balance in losses. If you calculate losses of Israeli occupation to martyrdom you will see it is the most effective thing to cause losses… In our conflict the ratio of deaths is one Israeli to every three Palestinians. We have a political goal to achieve… When a person gets killed in his own city, in his own house, in his own bedroom… when women, children are victims, when they burn his land, uproot his trees, destroy his homes. Even Nazis did not make these massive destruction of houses. …Rage builds when the world looks at us as criminals and blames us. It’s because of the occupation and it’s against all international law and human rights” [2]. The war in Iraq and the occupation by U.S. and coalition forces there also fuels political sentiments in many parts of the Arab world (and in Muslim thought worldwide) that the militant jihadist claims about Western imperialism are true. This opens up a

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discourse among militant jihadists which justifies terrorism as the proper response to foreign occupation. When considering terrorist acts from the terror group’s perspective we must also be aware of the theatrical nature of terrorism. Nowadays terror acts are dramas played out on a world-wide stage. The direct effects of terrorizing relatively small groups of victims are greatly amplified by the media (including the Internet), thereby creating anxiety within a much wider audience that begin to fear that they, too, could suffer such a fate. In terms of theatre, terror groups generally play to four audiences: • •

•

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•

their own constituents, who they attempt to convince they can represent well by engaging in political violence; the opposing government, which they hope will respond with either political concessions or with such brute counter-force that it ultimately de-legitimizes their moral authority and creates public sympathy for the terror group’s demands; the victim audience, who also witness the counterattack if it occurs, and who the terror group hopes will become anxious enough to put pressure on their governments in order to respond positively to its demands; foreign funders and sympathizers, who the terrorists must impress in order to win financial and logistical support [3].

As we have seen in the case of Palestinian terrorism, where multiple terror groups compete among themselves, as well as with their own state actors, violence can greatly escalate as the groups fight to establish themselves. In the Palestinian case violence has escalated to the point where all terror groups use suicide terrorism. The struggle in this case is not merely against Israel. It is between the various groups to prove themselves to be the best and most committed representative of the Palestinian people against Israeli occupation (i.e. willing even to martyr themselves) [3]. Interestingly, with the evolution of the Internet over the last two decades, we see that nearly all terror groups active today have established a presence on the Internet, most with well designed Web pages that offer their unique worldview, ideology, and spin on news events that pertain to their political concerns. These websites generally contain apologetics for the group’s participation in terrorism, citing the necessity of resorting to these methods in order to achieve the group’s political aims. In such arguments they make ample use of photos and video footage (actual or doctored) that shows the brutality of the opposing side, which is then used to justify counter-attacks on civilians. Likewise, these websites make bids to engage potential supporters and recruits for the group. Such bids include operating chat rooms, publishing online journals, and even targeting children with the offer of games and entertainment (as a means of indoctrination). These issues will be discussed in more detail later. 1.2. The Individual Individuals join terror groups for multiple reasons, including psycho-social, economic, religious, nationalistic, and political causes. The motivation and objectives on the individual level must of course converge at some point with the group’s ideology, but they may also diverge and vary considerably from the goals or motivations of the group. It is clear that individual motivations for carrying out terrorist acts, particularly suicide attacks, vary considerably, depending on whether the individual is living within or outside of a conflict zone [4].

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1.2.1. Inside Conflict Zones Within conflict zones, the main motivation for individuals to become suicide bombers tends to be trauma/revenge-based, nationalistic, and related to very strong psychological needs that occur following traumatic experiences of living under occupation or conflict circumstances [4]. One must remember that, if a conflict has gone on for any substantial length of time, there are likely to be a large group of young people present in the conflict zone who have not developed normally and often suffer from posttraumatic stress and dissociative disorders from all that they have experienced. Likewise there is often a pool of disillusioned individuals who have lost jobs and educational opportunities, who have been otherwise humiliated, and who struggle to meet their basic, daily security and subsistence needs. While the majority of traumatized individuals in conflict zones will not become suicide bombers, even if they are invited to do so, an extremely small group will become vulnerable to terrorist ideologies that promote this tactic. Indeed, in these cases the ideology of the terror group often functions as a type of short-lived (literally) psychological first aid for them. Feeling constantly agitated by traumatic flashbacks, unable to avoid daily reminders of their losses, and feeling constantly threatened, bereaved, angry, and impotent, these individuals ultimately become so dissociative—i.e. separated from normal thoughts, perceptions, and emotions—and emotionally numb that they often refer to themselves as “already dead”. In actuality, for them, dying is no longer a feared outcome. They already have psychologically and emotionally numbed themselves to human suffering, yet it keeps mercilessly and painfully intruding into their thoughts. For people under these conditions, death may seem to be a welcome release. Embracing it and exerting some control over when and how it occurs is (sadly) often an opportunity that these traumatized individuals embrace. For instance, one can see how easy it might be for a terror group to manipulate one particular Gaza youth, who grew up amidst long-term societal conflict, within the context of a violently abusive family, and who lives with general hopelessness. He wrote the following words to myself in September 2006 during heavy Israeli incursions in Gaza: “Am writing to you in the time that I feel dead. Again and again, I can’t scream. I can’t shout or cry. The amount of anger inside me, is just inside. I can’t release it. I thought writing will help, but it didn’t. I am just clicking and pressing small dumb things that transfer what I feel in one way or another to you. Signals, ain’t truth, electronic signals, not real feelings, Anne. My heart is so, so, so tired. I don’t know what to do or what to say… I am living in the worst place in the world. I feel like I’m choking inside, like I can hardly breathe…”. This same young man wrote earlier in the year (6th January 2006): “I discovered I wish two things in my life, first to live far away from the so-called ‘my family,’ or I really wish to die in a very tragic way but not to suffer much”. While this young man does not endorse suicide terrorism, it is clear that if a terror group using the current militant jihadist ideology somehow got hold of him and manipulated his loyalties, they would not have too much work to do in order for him to be willing to give up his already hopeless life. Individual motivations within conflict zones are also nearly always couched in terms of self- and community-defense. Those actors coming from within conflict zones who enact suicide terrorism are often doing it knowing full well that their acts may bring overwhelming retaliatory actions, a prospect that should rationally deter them. They likewise often concede that their acts of self-martyrdom may yield very little in the way of political results. Yet because they have experienced and witnessed—both

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firsthand and over the television—their family members, loved ones and neighbours being humiliated, injured, and killed by what they view as an occupying force, and because many have grown up witnessing countless acts of violence, they are willing to martyr themselves, sometimes purely for the expressive aspects of the act. They regard their actions as a means of expressing outrage and meting out some small measure of justice to the enemy occupier. In this case, revenge is a strong motivator. An equally powerful motivator in such cases is the belief that something sacred has been trampled upon by the enemy: loved ones have been killed, land has been taken (especially if it is holy land), or the occupier is of another religion [5]. Suicide bombers from within conflict zones are often as well or better-educated and less poor than their peers, and in other circumstances might have been leaders in their communities [6]. They are acutely sensitive to their own suffering and that of those around them, and wish to make a difference, but—much like normally depressed and suicidal persons—they are unable to see any other avenues of action. They want to escape their psychic pain, but wish to do so honorably and to use their lives (even if it means dying) to help their communities. They are uniquely vulnerable to an ideology that promises that they will be heroes for the cause, and that they can make a difference in the socio-political situation their communities face. They believe that their deaths are only a doorway to a better place. By making the supreme sacrifice they can change things both now and in the afterlife, being reunited with those gone before and, later, bringing with them relatives that they left behind. Vulnerable and in pain, they succumb to an ideology that seduces them into sacrificing themselves for what they believe is a greater cause. Just like us, they hope for a more just world, one in which human dignity and rights will be upheld. However, unlike us, they have been deluded into believing that killing innocent civilians might bring this world into being—and for this they sacrifice themselves.

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1.2.2. Non-Conflict Zones In non-conflict zones, the motivations for choosing to be involved in terrorist groups and to become a suicide terrorist appear much more driven by the ability of terrorist ideology to play upon personal issues of social alienation, marginalization, the need for positive identity, a desire for a meaningful life, impulses toward heroism, and instances of acting out of strong feelings of secondary traumatization. While an individual who has seen a family member killed in front of his eyes and feels his country has been occupied might be understood for seeking revenge, one must ask what can possibly motivate immigrant and even non-immigrant Europeans—Turks, Moroccans, Uzbeks, Saudis, and others—to join terrorist groups and agree to kill others or martyr themselves. In their cases the most receptive audience to the terrorist ideology appear to be vulnerable individuals who are exposed to other individuals within a terror network through kin and friendship groups or through Internet and informal recruiting [7]. In most cases these individuals are marginalized, frustrated, and without hope. In Europe, such recruits are often first-, second-, or third-generation immigrants or converts to Islam who feel deep sympathy and even kinship (i.e. as “Muslim brothers”) for those in conflict zones. Within the first to third generation immigrant community in Europe there is often a deep sense of alienation, with no secure sense of identity or belonging either to their country of origin or to their host culture, which is often felt to be openly hostile. Facing discrimination, these individuals are sometimes welleducated but still face poor job prospects. Without any positive identity or sense of

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meaning for their lives, and having little else to make of themselves, these young people are especially attracted to an appeal to become heroes for a cause. In these cases, the sponsoring organization nearly always makes use of five powerful motivators. The first two are the notions of belonging and identity—the sense of belonging to an important cause and group—and the appeal of taking on a heroic identity. The third is the use of pictures and graphic video footage of conflict zones that are shown to the potential recruit and interpreted as atrocities against innocent victims (in earlier years mainly featuring Chechen and Palestinian suffering, but now including footage from Iraq and Afghanistan as well). Just as relief organizations in Western societies often use pictures and video footage of human suffering to motivate their audience to give to worthy causes these organizations do the same, playing upon the emotional reactions of their audiences to find the individuals vulnerable enough to respond to their calls to action. Thus we find that, in non-conflict zones, the traumas that are occurring in conflict zones are being used to motivate potential recruits. This tactic makes use of the concept of secondary traumatization, in which film clips or photos of real or misconstrued injustices are used to create a traumatic state in the viewer, so much so that the outrage and trauma can motivate them to take action on behalf of the victims of such injustice. The words of a disillusioned radical living in Brussels illustrate how he was first radicalized and then found his way back to the mainstream. This young man (age 24 years) was adopted from Rwanda by white Belgian parents. Growing up as the only black person in his community he was alienated and confused about his identity. In search of his “African” roots he found Islam, converted at age fifteen, and started attending a radical mosque where he fell under the influence of extremist militant Wahhabi teachers. Speaking about how media exposure along with radical preaching moved him to the point of becoming ready to martyr himself, he explained: “When I went to Morocco with my wife to her mother’s house I saw Al Manar—Lebanon TV. They have a way to mix religion and politics. I can understand it because there is a true crisis in Palestine. …What I saw on the television was two Israeli soldiers taking big stones and breaking the bones of a Palestinian man, breaking his arm bones, his shoulders, all the bones in his hands, all the bones in his feet, his ribs, smashing them with a big rock. I’m sure they killed him or left him to die. I couldn’t understand all of the Arabic but I didn’t need language to understand—it was all there in the pictures. Imagine, people see that in the morning, get breakfast and see that on their television. When you see that you feel there is a unity of Muslim people. I decided to go there [to become a fighter]. I was completely crazy. I had a wife and baby but I thought I would go anyway.” [8]

In European countries, where distorted Islamic ideologies are being used to attract adherents, often those individuals who become terrorist recruits are sensitive and care about the conflicts they learn about but are not able to read in Arabic. They then fall prey to teachers who tell them they know and can interpret the Qur’an better for them and teach them the proper Islamic response to such suffering. This is not to say they are simple minded—quite the contrary. Often it is the better-educated and sensitive individuals who read the news and care about the world that are attracted, people who would be leaders if they felt they had a way of participating in their society and its political discourse. Frustrated by a lack of opportunities to help others in need, and needing a meaningful role and identity, they find answers in terrorist groups.

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The young Belgian convert to radical Islam quoted above recalled, “At that time I was a believing radical. For a radical you can die and kill for God no problem. I can die or be killed at any time. I knew people who went to Afghanistan as bombers, the people who killed General Masood. To get the connections to go, here in Brussels, is no problem”. Reflecting on how he got out he explained, “The problem is you see all the people, politics, everything—you see through the Qur’an and it’s your perspective”. Likewise, he recalls that at the time “I was completely lost”, and reflected that it is difficult to question what is being taught if one does not know Arabic. “If you say to yourself this thing is God’s will, you have to do it. It’s simple. If you can’t read in Arabic and people tell you that you cannot understand you have to do it. I tried very sincerely to do so. I followed everything, the prayer schedule, eating and way of drinking all in the Sunnah. But there are also ideas about jihad. At age nineteen I was ready to go to Lebanon and fight for my brother Palestinian. I didn’t know politics but I had an idea we had some Muslim community, our brothers that we must defend”. Thankfully, this young man found his way out of the radical groups by studying Arabic and religion intensively until he found his own answers independent of the militant teachers whose influence he had fallen under. Looking back at how close he came to going to be a “martyr”, he reflected, “The difference between me and the others [who remain in the radical groups] is my [language and religious] studies”. The fourth and fifth motivators used by Islamist extremists in attempting to recruit adherents in non-conflict zones are the ideas often taken from religion: that one ought to sacrifice on behalf of the brotherhood of believers and not tolerate assaults against sacred values, even going as far as being willing to die for the sacred. In this manner, the ideas of “fictive kin”, cosmic warrior-hood, and martyrdom are instilled [9]. The individuals who respond to such appeals to action are called upon to depart from the frustrations of this life, reject the society that has marginalized or frustrated them, and join a group following a path that promises eternal rewards. Suddenly, the individual who previously felt frustrated, worthless, and without hope begins to feels a sense of belonging, a firm identity and purpose in what will soon turn out to be a foreshortened life. 2. Dynamism in the Individual Response to the Terror Group An individual’s reasons for becoming involved in a terror group are likewise not static, but change considerably over time depending in large measure upon the person’s level of engagement and role or roles played within the group. For instance, a person living in a conflict zone who has lost a family member may be motivated in the first instance by deep pain over a personal loss or trauma to seek out membership in a terror group in order to enact revenge and fight for social justice. Once he is engaged in the group, however, he may find that the “fictive kin” and familial loyalties in the group deeply engage his needs to belong while also replacing lost family ties. Over time, this same person may find that the sense of positive identity and feeling of having some control over negative events (especially in a chaotic conflict zone) becomes more powerful. Developing a means to express his pain and to make the enemy feel his pain—even without achieving any real political gain or advance in social justice—may also become much more important than the original feelings of outrage and desire to avenge the traumatic loss, although these initial impulses may also continue to be operative. Likewise, economic gains from various roles in the group may grow in importance over time, having played at least a minor role for those concerned about leaving family

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members behind after martyring themselves. Similarly, taking on or deepening radical religious beliefs may lead a person who joined a terror cell outside of a conflict zone originally for non-religious reasons (such as to gain a sense of belonging, achieve a positive identity or satisfy a desire for adventure) gradually to begin to consider what previously may have been unthinkable: taking on a self-martyrdom operation.

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3. Group Dynamics: Individuals Inside Groups Social psychology research on group dynamics finds that, at least in experimental settings, individuals in small, cohesive groups often find it difficult to voice dissent when all other group members agree on something, even when the item in question is clearly objectively untrue. Instead of dissenting about the obvious untruth, individuals in such groups often begin to doubt themselves and acquiesce to the group’s views. This finding is less strong when the group is not cohesive and there are others voicing dissent in the group. Hence we can assume that individuals who belong to small, cohesive terror cells that place a high value on respect for the leadership’s views may over time begin to agree with many aspects of a terror group’s ideology because they find it too difficult to dissent. This takes place more as a result of the group’s dynamics rather than as a product of having been objectively persuaded of the correctness of the group’s beliefs regarding the use of violence or targeting of civilians. This of course brings up the question of the usefulness of introducing dissenting views inside terror cells. It also poses the question, when that is not possible, of at least gaining a thorough knowledge of the ideology that is being spun inside of such groups and providing exposure to dissenting views in the broader social context. Likewise, social psychologists have also observed that individuals appear to more easily engage in anti-social behaviors, including violence, when acting as a group than when acting on their own (particularly if they can hide their identities while doing so). Thus we must keep in mind that individual reasons for approaching and joining a terror group are often multiple; some may become more important over time once a new recruit has forged bonds of loyalty to the other members. The group’s goals and ideology likewise need not be identical to the individual’s ideals on every point, but need only to resonate with the individual’s psychosocial needs and everyday sense of reality. Over time it is likely that the individual will find it harder to doubt the correctness of the group if the group is small and cohesive, as most terror cells are. In addition, in a group setting an individual who at first may not have endorsed violent solutions may over time become much more willing to engage in violence as an answer to the problems that originally motivated him or her to join the group in the first place.

3. Social Support for Terrorism 3.1. Terrorist Ideology and Social Resonance The social and psychological resonance between the objectives of a terror group and its potential members occurs on multiple levels. Within conflict zones the ideology of militant jihadist terror groups is often spread throughout society by word of mouth, through preaching in mosques, through social networks, and by posters, films, songs, websites and video downloads, and so on. Inside conflict zones, the populations undergoing daily traumas, hardships, and humiliations are searching for ways to explain their

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difficult circumstances to themselves. Often such zones feature a foreign occupation, loss of homes, and struggles over territory, ethnicity, religion, and political independence. Solutions to these problems are debated throughout society, and those options promoted by the terror groups mix with those circulating in the public sphere. In these cases, when terror groups take hold of ideas—such as in Palestine, when those killed during the First Intifada were celebrated as martyrs for the cause—it is not hard to take these ideas to the next level. In the Palestinian case this involved celebrating and promoting those who were willing to martyr themselves for the cause, so much so that we began then to see a spate of posters, film clips, and songs celebrating self-martyrdom. Often in conflict zones the terror group’s ideology begins to permeate the culture more thoroughly, such as during the Second Intifada in Palestine, when one could say that there was a culture of martyrdom that pervaded society. Videos, public art, popular songs, poems, and other texts in praise of martyrs (including those who carried out suicide attacks) permeated the culture so completely that it was impossible not to be aware of societal admiration for those who chose the path of self-martyrdom on behalf (as they saw it) of society. In these cases, terror groups do not have to work hard to convince potential recruits, but can simply wait for those who are the victims of trauma or are in a bad state psychologically to present themselves as potential suicide attackers. In non-conflict zones terror group ideology is generally transmitted out into the society (via the Internet, networks of individuals and preaching) to see what kind of resonance the message has in the daily life and realities of potential members, resulting in a synergistic relationship between the audience and message. We see this occurring in Europe, where militant global jihadist websites spin their ideology and disperse it over the Internet to vulnerable populations. In this case claims are made about Islam being under attack, with video footage of events portrayed inside conflict zones “proving” the case globally. When these reach disillusioned young men and women of Muslim background and immigrant descent in Europe, they may touch them in a way that resonates with them personally. Finding themselves unemployed, the object of discrimination, and feeling no positive identification with the nation they live in nor any sense of belonging and usefulness to it, they may begin to be persuaded that their real loyalties should be to their religion and to the global brotherhood of “real” Muslims (with “real Islam” operationalized as the group defines it) and to changing their world order by resorting to violence. While at first these potential recruits may not necessarily be open to violent action, they may become more so as their primary psychological needs are met and they are drawn further into accepting suggestions that violence is an acceptable response. Indeed, as potential recruits meet and discuss solutions to their own individual problems, and mix these solutions with those offered by the terror groups, some are drawn into the terror group’s ideology, and therefore the ideology of the group also advances. At the level of societal support, any analysis must remain constantly aware of the existence of real and perceived grievances on the part of constituents that the group purports to represent, as well as the presence of a failed political process in which these groups or its members/supporters were unable to achieve their objectives. Both of these factors play into the constituent group beginning on a grassroots level to accept the terror group’s claims to represent them politically. This also helps explain the ideological support that begins to spread within the wider social group on behalf of a terror group’s use of violence against civilians, including martyrdom operations. There is also a contagion effect that occurs, even with normal (non-terror related) suicide—those who are in the family and friendship network of a suicide bomber are often so deeply

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affected by the act that they too begin to consider similar actions. We have found countless examples of radicalization proceeding through close friendship and family networks, as have other authors [7]. Thus radicalization can increase exponentially once it gets going, if societal conditions are such that many see no hope in engaging in peaceful political means of enacting change and see the terror groups as offering a viable alternative. 3.2. Top-Down/Bottom-Up Social Resonance

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It is clear that the needs within society—both within conflict zones and outside of them—mesh with the objectives of the terrorist groups. It is tempting to think that terrorist ideologies are “imposed” upon societies in a top-down fashion, but that is not really the case. We see clearly how the Palestinian conflict has evolved over time, with the broader Palestinian society being frustrated with violence and hoping for real solutions while terror groups vie with the Palestinian Authority for power, derailing the peace process and then competing in the ensuing conflict for societal support. A similar debate occurred within the militant global jihadist groups concerning suicide terrorism. This debate was conducted among the leadership and membership of these groups (and even includes individuals on the periphery of the groups) and globally across many Internet forums. The crux of the debate has been an effort to decide on a societal and group level if suicide terrorism is acceptable. It has generally been accepted among many Muslims worldwide that suicide terrorism is an acceptable form of resistance in the Palestinian territories—that is, for Palestinians to engage in while fighting “military occupation”. Some even believe that the use of suicide terrorism is permitted in any struggle against occupation. Fewer Muslims, however, believe that it is an acceptable method to use outside of conflict zones, but clearly we see an ever-growing societal acceptance in Islamic communities that suicide terrorism may be a valid response to certain conditions. A similar debate has occurred regarding the use of women as suicide bombers, with an increased acceptance of female involvement in this type of terrorism starting to emerge.

4. Opening Pathways to Accepting Aggression Against Civilians The psychosocial variables that open the pathways for aggression in human beings are understood only up to a point. Indeed, militaries that wish to maximize the efficacy of their soldiers have studied and make use of some of this knowledge, and terror groups do so as well. One known way to encourage an individual to kill is to dehumanize his enemy, which substantially changes the moral tenor of the act and the culpability for killing. Western militaries generally refer to enemy combatants in a manner that dehumanizes them, at a minimum referring to those who are to be killed as “the enemy”. Militaries often also use nouns (“the enemy”) versus pronouns (“them”, “him”), which tends to objectify enemy combatants rather than making it clear they are referring to people. Another tactic is to demonize the enemy—to highlight his inhumanity to others. Militant jihadist terror groups use the same psychological tactics, referring to enemies as “infidels” and pointing out clear and disturbing human rights abuses by their adversaries.

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Western militaries have likewise long known that soldiers are more likely to kill in defense of their group or unit than they are to kill in pure aggression or self-defense; thus it is common for units to go out into battle together, and for soldiers to be told that they are responsible for each other, in an extreme form of the “buddy” system. Militant jihadist terror groups are no strangers to this tactic, and often refer to their actions as being in defense of their fictive kin—that is, the global Muslim community. They also make specific pledges of brotherhood in their terror cells, and value loyalty to these “brothers” far and above actual familial blood ties. As Marc Sageman points out, today’s militant jihadists recruit within familial and friendship networks [7]. If this is truly the case, they are simply deepening already-existing group ties of loyalty in their terror cells. To understand how a terror group’s ideology resonates within societies and individuals it is useful to ask oneself the questions, “For what cause are you willing to die?” and “For what are you willing to kill?” Many would die to defend loved ones, family members, home, territory, and even their country. Others would kill to defend their homeland and to protect against threats to their loved ones; some would be willing to kill out of revenge. Terrorists are no different, and this nearly universal willingness to resort to aggression in defense of family and home is manipulated by terrorist ideologies that claim that home, family members and loved ones are under threat. For instance, claims that Islam is under threat, appeals to Muslim “fictive kin”, and outrage over atrocities, were all evident in a new release by “Azzam the American”, a purported American-born member of Al Qaeda who has acted as a spokesman for the group. Speaking on a recent Al Qaeda tape, Azzam argues for American Muslims to now join the global militant jihad. He begins by stating, “It’s crucial for Muslims to keep in mind that the Americans, the British, and the other members of the coalition of terror have intentionally targeted Muslim civilians and civilian targets, both before, as well as after September 11th. In both the first and second Iraq wars, as well as in their forays into Somalia, the Sudan, and Afghanistan, just to give you a few examples”. He continues: “They have targeted civilians for assassination and kidnapping. They kidnapped any nonAfghans they found, and shipped them off to Guantanamo or worse. Many were handed over to the American and British-backed despotic regimes of the Islamic world, to be brutally interrogated. And with the blessing and support of that notorious Afghan-killer Hamid Karzai, they’ve murdered thousands of Afghan civilians as they slept in their beds, traveled on the roads, attended weddings, and prayed at the mosques. I know they’ve killed and maimed civilians in their strikes because I’ve seen it with my own eyes. My brothers have seen it. I’ve carried the victims in my arms, women, children, toddlers, babies in their mothers’ wombs. You name it, they’ve probably bombed it. I could go on and on—and that’s just Afghanistan. We haven’t talked about American and British atrocities in the two Iraq wars. Let’s take a look at the latest to be revealed. In Mahmudiya, five American soldiers gangrape an Iraqi woman, and then, to hide the evidence, murder her and three members of her family, and burn her body. Then, when our mujahedin take revenge on the unit which committed this outrage, and capture and execute two of its members, they’re called terrorists, and Muslims are supposed to disown them or face the consequences.”

He also offers a justification for targeting civilians: “So after all the atrocities committed by America and Britain and their allies, which constitute terrorism in every sense of the word, you want us to observe restraint and civility in our response, or better yet—not respond at all? You want us to target their soldiers and tanks only, which as we’ve seen, still makes us terrorists in their eyes. And why should we target

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their military only—because to do otherwise would violate the precepts of that idol, that false god called international law, which, we’ve conclusively shown, they themselves violate? No thanks, we have our own law, the law of God, who says in His book: ‘And if you punish, let your punishment be proportionate to the wrong that has been done to you.’ And we have the Sunnah, the example of our Prophet, peace be open him, who erected catapults against the people of Qaif, despite the presence of women, children, and non-combatants among them, and who excused the inadvertent killing of the unbelievers’ women and children in night raids. I’m not saying that we should go and slaughter their women and children one by one, like they did ours, at Haditha, and Ishaqi, and Mahmudiya, and God knows where else, even if some of our legal experts have permitted that, and even if it is hard to imagine that any compassionate person could see pictures, just pictures, of what the Crusaders did to those children, and not want to go on a shooting spree at the Marines’ housing facilities at Camp Pendleton. But what I am saying is that when we bomb their cities and civilians, like they bomb ours, or destroy their infrastructure and means of transportation, like they destroy ours, or kidnap their non-combatants, like they kidnap ours, no sane Muslim should shed tears for them.” [10]

5. Jihadist Militant Ideology and the Role of Religion

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5.1. Constructing a Cosmic Warrior While Islam is currently being misused to promote suicide terrorism, it is not in itself the problem. The problem is the powerful links terrorist groups are able to make between individual inclinations toward self-sacrifice, societal circumstances that lead to despair and defiance, and a hijacked version of Islam that twists messages from sacred scriptures promoting self-sacrifice on behalf of the group. Any distorted mainstream religion can become an ideology used to motivate members to volunteer for suicide terrorism. Currently, the main ideology in use among the most active suicide terrorist groups—i.e. the generically-affiliated grouping of Al Qaeda, global Salafi extremist organizations, and other nationalistic, jihadist-linked groups—is a distorted version of Islam that calls for would-be martyrs from around the world to sacrifice themselves on behalf of a worldwide or nationalist jihad. Regarding the involvement of this deformed version of Islam in the majority of the most current cases of suicide bombing, we must acknowledge two things. First, Islam is a religion that has always valued the struggle for three basic values: justice, morality, and human dignity. It is only natural that, when a terror group is attempting to motivate recruits, it would try to structure its call to action by appealing to Islamic traditions on behalf of these fundamental values (especially if the group can argue that its members are acting in defense of self and community). Indeed, this idea of self- and communitydefense has been the basis of nearly all fatwas in support of martyrdom attacks (i.e. suicide missions). Second, a majority of the world’s Muslim population lives under corrupt and autocratic regimes and face numerous human rights violations, territorial occupation, and/or discrimination. Hence there are many political reasons that Muslims might gravitate toward a terrorist ideology that shares with them the political goals of fighting for justice and human dignity. Religion is simply the vehicle for uniting them and giving them the courage to fight (in whatever mistaken or brutal ways they choose) for the political goals they share. When we mistakenly construe Islam itself as the problem, and begin to assault deeply-valued religious traditions and beliefs, we only fuel the fires of the terrorist ideologies that are currently “in vogue”.

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6. The Fight Against Ideological Support for Terrorism 6.1. Addressing Societal Support and Lessening the Pool of Recruits There will likely always be fringe groups that promote suicide missions in order to slaughter enemies—dying to kill, in short. And there will also always be individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment by these groups. However, we unwittingly create circumstances that greatly expand the pool of potential recruits when we fail to address the societal factors leading to individual vulnerability and societal support that make these groups impossible to extinguish, and in fact seems to make them replenish themselves faster than we can stop them. Then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s famous words about being unable to kill terrorists as fast as they regenerate may be coming true. In the case of the new type of global militant jihadist groups, their pool of recruits has become so large that the terror groups could go on forever. Likewise, we must begin to address and take apart the rhetoric of organizations that sponsor terror, addressing their ideologies by engaging with them in a discourse that can perhaps lead to more, instead of fewer, people believing that political solutions do exist, and that terror acts are neither necessary nor useful in bringing about a just, moral, and dignified existence.

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Conclusion Whether or not we can overcome the new breed of terrorism is uncertain. Most counter-terrorism experts would agree, however, that the threat continues to grow, and that measures must be taken to contain the threat. The ideologies of terrorism, particularly those espousing suicide operations, spread like a virulent virus, especially in states that have been weakened by corruption, conflict, and ethnic and religious discrimination. The spread of global terrorism must be contained. To do so, we must aim to form a better understanding of the types of terrorism that exist, the methods of attack that are used, the recruitment strategies that have proven most effective, and the fit between ideology and individual vulnerabilities that leads people to fall prey to these ideologies (or worse, to seek them out). Terrorist organizations are constantly evolving, and our responses must do the same. Unless we take the time to understand the threat we are dealing with and its origins—on the organizational, ideological, societal, and individual levels—we are unlikely to find good solutions. We must do all we can to de-legitimize terrorist ideologies and offer potential recruits and sympathizers reasons to place hope in the political process and in better solutions than violent ones. One can only trust that such efforts will succeed in creating a world in which potential suicide bombers will find more for which they wish to live than for which they wish to die. Those who are willing to die in order to kill only serve to point out our failures in offering everyone in the world a life that is worth living. References [1] For more on definitions of terrorism, see: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism (Washington, D.C., 2001), available at: http://jackson.fbi.gov/cntrterr.htm; United States Laws: Cases and Codes: US Title 18: Section 2331 (19 January 2004), available at: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecode/ uscodes/18/parts/i/chapters/113b/sections/section_2331.html; and National Counterterrorism Center, A

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[2] [3] [4]

[5]

[6] [7]

Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for 2004 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2005), available at: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/18/parts/i/chapters/113b/ sections/section_2331.html. Speckhard, Anne. Unpublished Palestinian Militant Interview. November 2004. See M. Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). See A. Speckhard and K. Akhmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism”, Journal of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29:5 (2006); Speckhard and Akhmedova, “Black Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists”, in Female Suicide Terrorists, Y. Schweitzer, ed. (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center Publications, 2006). See Speckhard and Akhmedova, “Talking to Terrorists”; A. Speckhard, “Suicide Terrorism – Genesis of”, in Encyclopedia of Stress, G. Fink, ed. (Oxford: Elsevier Ltd., 2006); R. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); and S. Atran, “Devoted Actor Versus Rational Actor Models for Understanding World Conflict”, Edge (14 September 2006), available at: http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/atran06/atran06_index.html. See S. Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism”, The Washington Quarterly 27:3 (2004): 67–90; and A. Merari, Suicide Terrorism, unpublished manuscript (2003). See M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). In Brussels we have found that there are Internet cafes where, if one logs on for a half hour or so, pop-up ads appear inviting one to join the worldwide jihad. A. Speckhard,– radical interviews in Brussels, November 2005. See S. Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism”, Science 299 (2003). Middle East Research Institute (MEMRI), “American Al-Qaeda Operative Adam Gadahn, Al Qaeda Deputy Al-Zawahiri,and London bomber Shehzad Tanweer in New Al-Sahab/Al Qaeda Film marking the first anniversary of the 7/7 bombings”, Special Dispatch series (2006).

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[8] [9] [10]

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Islamic Jihad in Iraq: Suicide or Martyrdom Basim HAMEED Formerly of Baghdad Police (writing here in a personal capacity)

Abstract. The epidemic of suicide bombings in Iraq under the US occupation is largely funded, organized and carried out by foreign governments and Jihadist groups. Some Iraqis have aided this cause but most see the suicide-bombers as anti-Iraqi due to their indiscriminate killing of civilians alongside US troops. The response to these attacks has been inadequate, both on the part of the US military and the Iraqi police.

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Keywords. Iraq, suicide-bombers, Jihadists, Islamic State, Sharia, Iraqi Police, US Army

Martyrdom in Iraq is not a new phenomenon. Despite its rarity in Iraq’s contemporary history, its effect is still imperishable in Iraq’s history pages and Iraq streets’ sidewalks. I remember that in the early 1980s, during Iraq and Iran’s eight year war, a military spokesman appeared on Iraqi television to announce that one of the brave Iraqi Air Force pilots, Abdullah Luaiby, chased an F15 Iranian warplane which attempted to attack vital sites in Suleimaniyah Province, 400 km north of Baghdad. When the ammunition in his plane ran out during the air engagement he decided to stop the Iranian plane and prevent the pilot reaching targets in Iraqi territory. He decided to use the last weapon he had – which was flying his own plane into the Iranian plane. This cost him his life. Local and international channels covered this story. Iraqi television broadcast the conversation between the pilot and his airbase when they tried to dissuade him from his decision to hit the Iranian plane with his. They tried to convince him that another air defence system would be used to stop the air raid. The pilot refused to obey the orders and hit the plane with his last weapon – putting his soul before his body. Abdulla Luaiby did what he believed was right at that moment and crashed the two planes. Their wrecks spread over the Iraqi lands, mixed with the bloods of the two martyrs – the Iranian pilot was Muslim too and he is also considered a martyr in the eyes of his people and government. After this heroic martyrdom operation Iraqi people kept on telling this story. When they walked in front of the Iraqi Air Defence Headquarters they would look proudly at the statue of the Iraqi pilot martyr. The statue was built when the Iraqi military leadership decided to collect the remains of the Iranian airplane and build from it a statue of the pilot standing on the wreckage with his face looking to the sky with pride. Since then this statue stood in one of the most beautiful squares in Baghdad until its ‘disappearance’ one day after the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003. I am sure that the Iraqi people know, and probably the Iraqi government also, who stole the statue of that brave pilot and why they did so.

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This is the only story I remember (and I suspect this is true of most Iraqis) which narrates the story of a pure Iraqi hero who voluntary offered his life for a noble cause. The other stories of the Iraqi martyrs’ groups (‘Fedayeen’) in Iraq are, I think, no more than political ‘one-upmanship’ and a media show. They are simply too far away from any Islamic or religious principles. Those who joined these groups were afraid of a tyrannical ruler who also was a perfect catalyst for hundreds of martyrdom seekers. The wave of suicides or martyrdoms which were brought to Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 military operations is a new product smuggled in broad daylight into Iraq. This new religious ‘culture’ was exploited by some organizations using the chaos in Iraq where there is a dangerous mix of politics, religion and nationalism to tempt the hopeless, the jobless, and revenge seekers. Some countries sought to gain political advantage from Iraq’s instability by recruiting suicide-bombers there. This new form of attack put the US in a politically and militarily unstable situation among both its allies and among the American people. The increasing number of US soldiers killed by the suicide bombers had a negative impact on the soldiers’ morale which consequently led some young Americans to abandon thoughts of joining the US army, as well as fuelling the disagreements inside the US administration about the security situation in Iraq. Additionally the suicide bombings gave the US administration pause to think twice before they attempted to invade another country in the Middle East. The religious dreams of the Fedayeen (Iraqi martyrs’ groups), on the other hand, were merely furthering the goals of the Bin Laden-led Al Qaeda and its supporters such as Al Zawahiri, Abu Aiyoub Al Masri, and Abu Musa’ab Al Zarkawi. These people failed to make real their dream of creating a new Islamic state led by a ‘Caliph’ (a Muslim prince or emir) similar to the state during the era of Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him – pbuh), in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt. They found that Iraq under the US occupation has become the most fertile land to implant the seed of their dream. After the toppling of Saddam’s statue on April 9th 2003, the US administration in Iraq failed to create a politically-balanced government which included representatives of all of Iraq’s ethnic and religious components: Sunnis, Shi’ites, Kurds and Turkamen, in addition to the other minorities. This failure led to a de facto division of Iraq into three major parts: Kurds who enjoy relatively stable circumstances and have had semiindependence since 1991; Shia Arabs who co-operated with the coalition forces before and after the occupation, and led the post-Saddam government; and Sunni Arabs who suffered from the oppression of the new government in addition to the termination of their political and other positions of power, by either the government or the US army. The suicide bombing operations in Iraq were adopted by the third group only, the Sunni Arabs. The Kurds were pleased to co-operate fully with the Americans both before and after the occupation. The Shias were generally happy with the presence of the soldiers in Iraq. We have not witnessed any single Shia armed group emerge to fight the Americans for purely religious or political motivations. What Moqtada Al Sadir and his so-called Al Mahdi Army did against the Americans and the Iraqi government was, rather, devoted to two aims. Firstly he wanted to embarrass the government in order to obtain more political power in Iraq and, secondly, to please his ‘mother’ and ‘shepherd’: Iran. It has become clear that the Sunnis or what has become known as the ‘Sunni Triangle’ was the ‘nursemaid’ for Al Qaeda in Iraq. Al Anbar province in general and Fallujah in particular became the first ‘nucleus’ which polarised the Arab and foreign fighters when they were smuggled into Iraq via Syria before the fall of Baghdad. Fal-

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luja is known as the City of Mosques since it has very many mosques and religious schools despite its small size and population. This city is considered one of the places which produced the most distinguished Imams in the Islamic world. As mentioned earlier, Iraq was never previously known as an area for martyrdom operations despite the three wars Iraq had fought during the past 25 years. Arab and foreign fighters who were mostly Syrians, Saudis, Egyptians, and Afghanis carried out operations such as car-jacking and highway thefts against the US army convoys that came from Jordan heading to Baghdad. The length of the highway which links Baghdad and Amman is 750 km. This beautifully designed highway was built by Saddam’s regime during the 1980–1988 war with Iran to keep the military supplies flowing to the eastern front. The cargo carried by the trucks that were attacked were taken to the warehouses of the ‘Mujahedeen’. They considered them legally obtained by holy military operations. They depended on certain verses in the Qur’an to support their operations and to encourage some Iraqis to do the same. They sought the support of the Iraqi tribes and the young men to join them. The Sunni Arabs in Anbar, Mosul, Diyala, and Salhuldeen lost hope of getting a fair representation in the political process in Iraq. Their efforts to convince the Americans and the Shia government to give up their insistence of implementing the ‘Debathification’ process were in vain, alongside their efforts to put an end to the assassinations and kidnappings that were carried out by the Shia militias against former Iraqi Army leaders. These provinces accordingly became centres for tens of thousands of unemployed men. The only dream they had at that time was to see the Americans and the Iraqi government fail and suffer. Therefore, the people of these provinces began to sympathise and bless any operation carried out against the Americans and the government. Initially the ‘Emirs’ of the Arab fighter groups carried out their operations separately without any support provided by the Iraqis, except maybe for issues related to accommodation or food supplies. These groups consisted of elements which would conduct different kinds of duties such as surveillance, information-gathering, arming, and a form of administration. Iraqi young men admired the well-organised Arab fighters. They also admired their ‘blind’ loyalty to the Emir. We heard stories about their zealousness and the competition they had to win the right to carry out the next suicide mission against the Kaffirs (the US troops) or the ‘treacherous Muslims’ (the Iraqi police). They competed among themselves without any hesitation or fear of death. This competition was raising the morale of the Arab fighters’ new recruits, but at the same time it was reflecting signs of shame, dishonour, humiliation, and confusion among the Sunni young men. They were trapped between following and obeying an Islamic obligation of fighting an occupier (which in this case has the most powerful and advanced weapons in the world), or else to just keep on waiting for a fair decision coming from the Sunni politicians to find an outlet for them to save their lives and their honour too. The Arab fighters showed throughout their operations that they are very brave and enjoy a fearlessness that Iraqis have never witnessed before. Some of the operations aimed to capture a few US soldiers alive. They created a religious court led by the Emir who would announce only one decision – the death sentence. He, the Emir, would also decide that the execution should be by cutting off the prisoner’s head and should be recorded on video tapes to be distributed among young men to raise their morale and obtain more public support. These operations were carried out on US soldiers only. The public reaction towards them divided into two groups. The first were completely against these killings because they believed that they were in a fight against the Ameri-

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cans so therefore any soldier who was captured must be treated as a war prisoner, and killing prisoners of war is totally against the principles of Islam. Thus beheading US war prisoners and then broadcasting the execution would certainly distort the image of the whole Islamic nation. The second opinion supported the practise and manner of killing and considered it a kind of justice in relation to the chaos and destruction caused by the US policy in Iraq. The decisions to execute did not depend on a personal whim of the Emir; rather they were based on some Qur’anic verses and the Prophet Mohammad’s (pbuh) ‘hadiths’ (the speeches given by the Prophet). The men who carried out the execution were initially members of the Arab fighters’ groups. This foreign domination put the Iraqi fighters in a very weak position to the extent that they were labelled as cowards or of being scared. This attitude was changed when the Iraqi fighters began to kill and execute with the blessing and encouragement of the Arab fighters. The religious coverage and the dream of creating an Islamic State in Iraq was the lighthouse for the Mujahedeen ship. The main pillar of creating an Islamic State is to have an Emir or Caliph who must be followed by all other Muslims. Also, Qur’anic verses were used to convince Muslims to follow the Caliph without discussion. God says: “O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you” (An-Nisa, 59).

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So when the Emir decides to cut off this or that person’s head… it must be done. After the killing of several US soldiers another ‘Fatwa’ (religious authority given to some Imams to guide and advise Muslims in certain issues or problems) was announced by the Emirs. This time all the Iraqis, Muslim and non-Muslim, would face the same penalty (beheading) if they worked for, dealt with, or co-operated with the US troops or the Iraqi government. By then the practise of kidnapping and then killing the translators and even the service workers had just begun. The images of the beheaded bodies spread throughout the Sunni neighbourhoods in Baghdad and the rest of the Sunni provinces. These bodies were in most cases covered by newspapers with pieces of white papers stacked up on them with a few words written in Arabic. Most of these papers quoted a verse of the Holy Qur’an: “O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors: they are but friends and protectors to each other. And amongst you that turns to them is of them. Verily Allah guideth not a people unjust.” (Al. Maeda, 51)

Also there would be some information about the group which carried out the killing along with a warning for the rest of the people. The warning also included a threat to whoever removed the body from the street. The Qur’anic verses are God’s own words. This claim is not controversial among Muslims all over the world. What is controversial is the interpretation of some of the verses. The verses used by the Mujahedeen to justify their killings are a hundred percent correct and they are from the Qur’an; however, they use only the verses that serve their cause which, as we saw earlier, was more political than religious. According to Islam Jihad is not a game. It should be announced by very highly respected Imams who have the right to evaluate the situation from different angles. Events developed very quickly in Iraq. The first government after Saddam Hussein was founded with a Shia majority. The political parties who dominated the government tried to influence their followers and supporters within the new Iraqi police and army.

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They wanted to guarantee that the power, weapons, money, and young men would be always on their side. Observers might know that the Wahhabists’ hatred of Shias goes back through hundreds of years of religious disagreement. It is a culture exported to Iraq after the US occupation. Iraqis, both Sunnis and Shias, never knew this kind of hatred before. They lived together in perfect harmony, and the only disagreement that we witnessed during the past few decades was between the ruler and some of the Shia religious symbols. The co-operation between the US troops and the Iraqi police was obvious. Recruiting, training and equipping were mostly carried out in the US bases. The image of the joint patrols by Iraqi police and US vehicles was normal in the Iraqi streets. Raids and anti-terrorism operations carried out by the police to arrest the ‘terrorists’ and then hand them over to the US troops were one of the normal daily Iraqi police activities. What the Iraqi people did not know at that time was that the police stations and other security institutions were not qualified and ready to accommodate detainees in high profile cases such as terrorism. The new Iraqi police and its detectives had no previous experience of handling such kinds of cases. For this reason the Iraqi police continued to investigate the minor or normal crimes while the US troops kept the detainees for major crimes in their detention cells. What the Iraqi people were seeing from a distance was that the Iraqi police were implementing the US plans for arresting the Sunnis and the Mujahedeen and then handing them over to the ‘infidels’. This close co-operation between the police and the Americans encouraged the Emirs to issue another ‘fatwa’: they announced that the Iraqi police should face the same penalty as the US troops, i.e. death. The Emir depended on a verse from the Holy Qur’an “He who follows them is one of them” to ensure the approval and acceptance of the people. Initially the Mujahedeen concentrated their operations on targeting the top figures serving in the Ministries of Interior and Defence who lived in the Sunni provinces and neighbourhoods. They started to send warning letters to some police stations to leave them empty and to ignore any laws or instructions set by the central government in Baghdad. When the ‘warning time’ expired the Mujahedeen began to set bombs and explosives in every police station and blew them up one by one. In these areas the police and other security entities were disbanded and replaced by groups of Iraqi fighters, the Mujahedeen. The oppressive laws of the new Iraqi Islamic State were imposed by force in the Sunni provinces. When the Sunni provinces fell into the hands of the Mujahedeen among both the Arab and Iraqi fighters the dream of invading Baghdad grew. The growth of this dream came to match the growing numbers of the Iraqi Police and Army. The required Qur’anic verse to support their dream was there; the Caliph who issued the ‘fatwa’ of killing the police and who must be followed was also there; therefore, police stations in Baghdad were the most vulnerable targets among all governmental institutions. Who was working there did not matter since the “label” of ‘Kafir’ police was more dominant than the label of Sunni police or Shia police. Throughout my experience in Baghdad Police HQs we received reports about police stations destroyed by suicide bombers. These police stations were far away from the centre in isolated areas, to the extent that we sometimes made jokes about them by saying that these police stations had no idea that Saddam Hussein was removed from power! This means that the Mujahedeen did not care whether this or that police station was a threat, they just wanted to die while killing at least one police officer. Due to the joint patrols Al Qaeda in Iraq and the rest of the Mujahedeen considered the Iraqi police the ‘legs’ that were used by the Americans to move in Iraq. They believed that the best way to paralyze the Americans was by cutting off the legs. Police stations received the most pow-

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erful attacks by the suicide bombers after the Emirs’ ‘fatwa’ that the Iraqi Police are infidels. The suicide bombers preferred to blow themselves up among tens of police officers on a payday, rather than a possible single US soldier, to get a higher reward in Heaven. The situation in Iraq developed very quickly to include not only the police but also the queuing new recruits who could not find any source of money for their families except this ‘bloody’ opportunity. Thousands of young men died at the hands of idiotic Saudi or Afghani suicide bombers. Those bombers did not know anything about Islam – except following the order of an Emir who tied them up behind the steering wheels of suicide car-bombs prepared to kill innocents. In 2003 I worked closely with the Baghdad Chief of Police. Late in that year I received four reports from four different police stations, two in the East and two in the West: Khadra, Baiya, Sha’ab, and New Baghdad. They were attacked by four car bombs at the same time, 8.30–9.00 am. Three of the four stations were completely destroyed. More than 100 policemen died immediately and hundreds of police and civilians were injured that morning. The fourth (non-destroyed) station was New Baghdad in Rusafa area, East Baghdad where I served from 1992 until 9th April 2003. The station’s security guards were alert and mindful to such an attack so they reacted quickly and shot the driver who approached the back entrance. The car swerved and hit the concrete barriers and stopped. Ignoring all the safety instructions, the guards rushed towards the car and found that the driver was still alive behind the steering with several minor wounds from the crash. The chief of police asked me to accompany him to visit the station to see the suicide bomber who was kept in the station when they knew that the Chief of Police was coming. When we arrived the Chief of Police asked the station commander whether he had gotten any information from the suicide bomber. The answer was: nothing. All the suspect was repeating was: “You are traitors!! You are Kafirs!!”. When he was searched they found he was a Yemeni holding a Syrian passport. He confessed that he got this forged passport just to cross the border to Iraq to join his brothers in PARADISE! The number of suicide bombings against the police stations increased and the number of casualties among the innocent civilians reached horrific numbers. Other ‘targets’ attacked included the crowded local markets, places of worship, hospitals, schools, gas stations, and the country’s infrastructure. People began to have suspicions about the truthfulness and credibility of the Mujahedeen and their desire to liberate Iraq from the occupiers. Iraqis came to see that there was no distinction between fighting the Americans by carrying out suicide operations against their bases and detonating a TNT-loaded car in a local market in an area of Shia majority, or blowing up a church or a Shia mosque. According to the Mujahedeen the blood of Iraqis was very cheap. I, along with most other Iraqis, remember the bloody story of a suicide bomber who killed himself among fifty children. The US soldiers used to stop and talk to the people or give the children some sweets or toys when they drove in any routine patrol. In early 2006, one of the US soldiers stopped his vehicle in one of New Baghdad’s streets to play with the children who gathered around him without knowing that this moment would be their last moment. More than 50 children whose ages did not exceed thirteen or fourteen surrounded the soldier who was carrying a box of toys and sweets. They were fighting and laughing to get as much as they could. When the US vehicle was about to leave a speeding car came from the opposite side of the road and smashed the soft bodies of the poor children before it blew up. Twenty-five children died at the scene and tens of others were badly injured. “What kind of Jihad was that?”, the people began to ask. This and tens of similar incidents triggered the panic in Iraq’s streets.

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Sunnis, Shias, Christians and other sects condemned this crime. Children must be safe under any circumstances. The people began to raise questions about the alleged Islamic State and its laws that must be followed. They began to ask questions about the ‘Islamic Sharia’ or the Jihadists’ ideology which gave them the right to kill more than 25 children to hunt down one US soldier. They also began to ask questions about what they were going to achieve after all this violence. Islam should never be a cover for these crimes. In Al Anbar and other Sunni provinces the people began to suffer from the bad treatment they received from the Mujahedeen, especially the Arabs who were carrying out the operations one after another without even expressing their sadness about the casualties among the innocent civilians. Accordingly some religious figures and mosque Imams attempted to put an end to this phenomenon of killing innocents, and tried to uncover the political goals behind these supposedly ‘religious martyrdom’ operations. They tried to tell the people that what the Mujahedeen have been doing so far, such as killing children and innocents or bombing Baghdad’s streets, has no basis in God’s orders or Islam’s principles. The Mujahedeen revealed their real plans when they began to kill the neutral Imams who invited the Iraqis to wake up to face this critically dangerous threat. I remember one dramatic incident which might be the turning point towards the collapse of Al Qaeda and the practise of suicide bombing in Al Anbar. In one of the biggest mosques in Ramadi, Anbar’s biggest city, the Imam during Friday prayers was talking to the Mujahedeen in general, asking them to spare the blood of innocent people and carry out their operations against the Americans alone. While he was talking a group of masked men rushed into the mosque, dragged the Imam from the rostrum, took him outside the mosque and killed him, under the pretext that he was encouraging the people to give up the Jihad and follow the occupiers. The method of killing was particularly horrific so as to terrorise the crowd and the rest of the people. This incident was repeated the next Friday when some other Imams condemned the killings of the previous week. Some of those Imams suffered the same way of killing while the rest just disappeared from the city. Death became the only fate for anyone who disagreed with creating the new Islamic State. The materials and other means that are required for such suicide-bombing operations were easily available in Iraq. Cars were available in local markets at very cheap prices. Explosives were available, especially after the former Iraqi Army munitions warehouses were looted following the invasion. In addition external financial support was unbelievably easy to obtain. Most importantly, the queues of young men seeking to join the martyrdom operations were increasing day by day especially when the Iraqi Police, Army, translators, Shia, and members of the new government were added to the target-list of the supporters of the Islamic State. The average number of car-bombings in Iraq reached four per day. This ridiculous number is not a joke if we imagine the number of casualties caused by more than a hundred cars detonated each month. Then there are the other kinds of suicide bombing, such as suicide-vests, suicide-belts, or committing suicide inside a minibus just because it was headed to a Shia neighbourhood or to one of the southern provinces. These kinds of suicide operations caused the death of hundreds of innocents. Blowing up a hundred cars every month for five years demonstrated certain facts. We became confident that what has happened in Iraq is bigger than a few fighters wishing to achieve their dream and become martyrs. It has become clear that these operations are organised by foreign states providing terrorist activities with the money and materials it requires. It is illogi-

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cal to say that all the bombs’ materials have been collected from the former Iraqi Army warehouses after April 2003. As a very quick calculation to estimate the quantity required to carry out the suicide operations in Iraq during the past five years, we can say that each car would be filled by 300–500 kg of explosives. Accordingly, every day the terrorists required between 1500–2500 kg. If we say that approximately 2000 kg are required every day this means a total of 60 tons every month, or 720 tons every year, or 3600 tons during the past five years. The reports and statistics indicate that the real figure is even higher than the above calculation indicates. So it is illogical to believe that all of this material was collected from the former Iraqi Army warehouses. These calculations were the subject of daily conversations between many Iraqis, especially the young who had become confident that the suicide operations would only serve a number of foreigners seeking personal advantage. Accordingly, many young Iraqis decided to abandon the Jihad and Mujahedeen due to the murky view ahead. The view was clearer for some police officers due to the evidence they had collected. We were confident that the martyrdom operations were devoted to serving some neighbouring countries that were taking advantage of a collapsing security situation in Iraq. The Iranian and Syrian support given to the fighters was obvious. We believed that the US administration in Iraq would put an end to this support either by diplomacy or by some other application of pressure. I remember very well in late 2003 I received a phone call from the chief of Major Crimes Unit in Baghdad to tell me that his office had just been attacked by two car bombs driven by suicide bombers. The first one exploded at the main entrance to open the gate for the second car to approach the main offices about 100 meters ahead. The plan succeeded and the first car blew up while the second car stopped just few a meters from the Chief’s office but, fortunately, it did not explode due to a wiring failure. The driver was able to escape while the police officers were focusing on evacuating their dead and injured colleagues. The bomb squad finished their job of cutting all the wires in the second car, a white Land Cruiser. I and some Iraqi and US officers were watching the experts disarming the car. The car was loaded with TNT bags, igniters, and Iranian marine torpedoes. The torpedoes had manufacturing words written in both English and Farsi. The question all of us raised at that time was: how were these Iranian torpedoes brought into Baghdad? A quick look at a map shows that the only deep waters in Iraq are in Basra, 750 km south of Baghdad. If these torpedoes were obtained during the 1980–1988 war with Iran it would be logical to keep them in Basra in one of the Iraqi Navy ports. On the other hand, even though I am not an expert, the period between 1980 and 2003 is 23 years; I do not think that these explosives will still be useful after 23 years. The alternative explanation was that these torpedoes were sent to Iraq after the US invasion to carry out this kind of mission. After this and other similar incidents we have become more confident that the suicide attacks against the police and the civilians are a political game which is beyond the police’s capabilities to stop. We wished that the US would use its advanced technology to discover in advance and respond faster to such daily blood shedding. The Iraqi Police under the Ba’ath Party regime led by Saddam Hussein from 1968 was not designed to investigate politically motivated crimes which aimed to politically destabilise the internal security. The police did not get involved in issues related to fighting opposition political parties such as the banned Iranian Da’wa Party or the Communist Party in the 1970s and early 1980s. The Ba’ath Party had other, very tough, security systems to ensure its safety. The main security institutions designed for this purpose were the General Security Directorate (in Iraq we call it Moderiyat Al Amin Al Aam), and the

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Iraqi Intelligence Agency. These two institutions were normally headed by the closest relatives of Saddam Hussein such as his brothers or cousins. Merciless oppression was used against any person or party who attempted to provoke the public against the head of power or the government. Accordingly, none of the opposition parties succeeded in facing Saddam Hussein inside Iraq while he was in power. They resorted to neighbouring countries, the US and the UK to form opposition blocks in exile, ready to take power after Saddam Hussein’s fall. The officers and investigators in the two previously mentioned directorates had long years of experience of facing and fighting the politically motivated cells. They also had enormous numbers of documents and classified papers about the religious parties inside and outside Iraq. They had minutely detailed dossiers, including names and long- and short-term targets, for organisations such as Al Qaeda, Ansar Al Islam, and Ansar Al Sunna. The decision of the US Ambassador in Iraq, Paul Bremer, to disband the officers serving in the former security agencies came at an inappropriate time. This decision left Iraq with a total vacuum of experienced investigators, especially of the kind of crimes that widely spread after April 2003 such as suicide bombings. This decision also gave these investigators the required justification to resort to the leaders of the political parties and some other organisations that were against the US presence in Iraq. They also resorted to neighbouring countries that used their experience to carry out harmful and perfectly designed operations. The US Ambassador’s decision also put another burden on the shoulders of the newly-born Police. Most police officers who returned back to their duties after May 2003 used to work in local police stations, as traffic police, or in some administrative task. The level of this problem of inexperience was immediately apparent when the first explosion took place in Baghdad. Investigators in local police stations left in confusion because they did not know where to begin the investigation. They devoted their time just to taking the dead and injured to the hospitals. The forensic evidence that might lead to the group behind this explosion being identified was simply brushed into Baghdad’s sewers. This was the way the Iraqi police investigated or dealt with car bombs or suicide bombings. Lifting fingerprints, DNA analysis, or criminal photography only existed in the Police College’s textbooks. Neither the US investigators nor the Iraqis carried out a truly professional deep investigation. During the first two years after the fall of Saddam’s regime neither the Ministry of the Interior nor the Ministry of Defence had any official spokesmen. Iraqis were waiting for an official spokesman to give a brief statement after any explosion. They were waiting to know who was behind all the chaos and the dramatic casualty figures or, at least, they wanted to know that a proper investigation was carried out and led to uncovering the organisation behind this or that explosion. Accordingly there was a suspicion that the reason behind this governmental silence was either that the Americans and the Iraqi security agencies were unable to deal with and uncover these bombs; or else they knew who was behind them and yet were satisfied with all the occurring mess and casualties…in both cases... it was a disaster.

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Suicide Bombers: The Psychological, Religious and Other Imperatives M. Sharpe (Ed.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-886-1-145

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The Drama of the Suicide Terrorist1 Ofer GROSBARD Psychology lecturer at Haifa University and at the Academic Arab College for Education, Israel

Abstract. Muslim societies tend to be traditional-collectivist in mindset, unlike the west which fosters a more individualist outlook. Islamic suicide-bombers feel they, as part of their own societies, have been humiliated by the west, and the only way to regain their personal honour is through martyrdom fighting the oppressor. In order to understand the motivations of potential suicide bombers, and to have any hope of dissuading them, westerners must learn to think and communicate in ‘collectivist’ terms, as suitable for Islamic societies, rather than the ‘individual’ modes of western discourse. Keywords. suicide bombers, Islamists, collectivist societies, cross-cultural communication

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Introduction On the television screen appears the suicide terrorist. Holding a Qu’ran in one hand and a Kalashnikov in the other, wearing military clothes against the background of a flag of his country, he declares that the enemy has humiliated his people and violated their honor. He is going to retaliate and bring back their lost honor. The western viewer is struck by two things. First of all, the fact that this young fellow speaks about national feelings with a pain as if someone hurt him personally. Secondly, the importance he attributes to feelings like humiliation and honor. Our westerner has never thought to identify so deeply with his country, especially with its honor and insults. We have to remember that we are speaking about a traditional-collectivist society in which people think not in "I" terms but in "We" terms. It means that these collectivist people will be careful of using "I" too much in their speech (there is an idiom in Arabic asking Allah to keep a person from using the word “I” too much). They refrain from saying "according to my opinion" or simply "I think" because they really do not think their opinion is so important. In sum, they really experience themselves as a part of a group and not as an individual. The westerner, who was directed all his life to independent thinking, who was encouraged to separate from his family and act as an individual, will have a hard time in grasping this. His ancestors stopped thinking in that way a long time ago. The centrality of honor is incomprehensible to our westerner. Honor in collectivist society is a question of life or death. Why? This is because all the emotional refueling in collectivist societies is coming from outside. Honor is also coming from outside and not from inside. In collectivist societies the conflict tends to be interpersonal and not 1

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intrapersonal. It is hard for traditional-collectivist people to look inside and engage in introspection. They tend to experience the world in terms of shame, honor, mercy, envy, flattering, begging, fear and power - all feelings with an external locus of control. By comparison in the west one finds more depression, loneliness, emptiness, guilt and boredom, which have an internal locus of control. Honor, for example, in modernindividualistic society turns on self-fulfillment by which the person refuels himself. In this way shame turns to guilt. In order to feel shame one has to be seen doing something wrong but guilt is an internal feeling one carries within oneself everywhere. In one instance a teacher had a hard time trying to explain to a father belonging to a collectivist society that he had to send his little child to school every morning on time. But when the teacher told the father "we honor you and your family and we expect you to honor school as well", the father changed his conduct immediately and the child started to get to school on time. Westerners usually do not feel comfortable using collectivist vocabulary such as honor, mercy, shame, flattery, threatening, begging, revenge, etc. It often reminds them of feelings from their childhood in which they were really a more collectivist, still inseparable part of their family. But in order to bridge the cultural gap westerners - who are usually modern-individualist people who went through a separation process to independence - should learn anew the "forgotten language." The division that makes sense to us is between modern-individual societies and traditional-collectivist ones and not between the west and the Arab world. The phenomenon of Suicide Terrorism has been for many years a part of various traditional-collectivist societies and not a part of modern-individual ones. This phenomenon is not connected directly to a specific religion but to a collectivist, tribal state of mind. Let us come back to our suicide terrorist. Before he decided to carry out this mission, usually he has been in a bad mood. Often still a young man in his twenties, or even younger, he has not found his place in his family and society. There may be many reasons for this. But at the moment he decided to carry out the mission he felt euphoric. Everything now falls in to place for him and his world is ordered and organized. His life has meaning. In order to understand this cognitive-emotional turnover (cognitive – because he now has answers to his questions; emotional – from 'down' to 'high' feelings) we have to comprehend that in some collectivist societies humiliation is often an inescapable part of the educational process of the child. The adults want him "to know his place." Fear of the authority which aims to make him honorable is established from the beginning of life. There is no freedom of speech and the child is not allowed to say what he wants nor is every question permitted. In the same way not every thought is permitted (heretical thoughts, for example, are forbidden). The punishment often comes before the sin, adopting in this way the biblical assumption that people have a bad character by their very nature (i.e. Original Sin). The fearful child is punished by the feeling in order that he does not dare to do something wrong. From the same line of thought women have to cover themselves, erasing their identity in this way. This is also the case within Orthodox Jewish society (as mentioned above, it is not the particular religion that makes the difference but the traditional-collectivist aspects of the wider society), prior to any probable temptation on her part. The punishing parent is not obliged to explain to the child the reason for their punishment; in this way he keeps control over his child. In order for a westerner to understand what it means to grow up in a traditional-

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collectivist society with an authoritarian father one has to think about his relationship with God. This is the best way for the westerner to understand this kind of relationship. God is always right and when he punishes us he doesn't have to explain the reason for it. Identifying with the aggressor is a well known defense mechanism and is the cornerstone of a collectivist society’s children’s attitudes towards authority. This is the mechanism whereby the beaten child or the raped woman justifies the aggressor and thinks they deserved it. In admiring a dictator who brings suffering to his people the same mechanism is at work. When the Jews, after the Holocaust, said they deserved that punishment but just did not know what they had done wrong, again the same universal mechanism of identifying with the aggressor was at work. The fact that God in our mind is always right invites identifying with his deeds even if it hurts us seriously. This defense mechanism of identifying with the aggressor and the state of mind that accompanied it characterizes many people belonging to traditionalistcollectivist societies. More than that, we punish ourselves in different ways in order to make clear our surrender to God, who is not unlike any authority figure in this regard. (The parent is the little child's God because the child depends on his or her completely.) We fast, inflicting suffering upon ourselves imagining that this is God's will; beat ourselves (Jews in a symbolic way during prayers, the Shia in a concrete way actually wounding themselves); circumcise (symbolic castration we imagine the authority figure demands from us in order to get his love); literally sacrificing our children to God in ancient times, etc. All are ways of accepting what we think is God's will – inflicting suffering upon ourselves as is the case in those with masochistic tendencies. (The meaning of Islam is ‘surrender to Allah’). This is the basic structure of the hierarchical authoritative family in which the parent often does not want his children to be better than him, and thereby lose his control over them. This humiliating position usually doesn't have a specific end because the child has to obey his father as long as he has a father and has to obey the political/religious leader and God throughout his entire life. Our potential suicide terrorist feels humiliated. His deepest humiliation is not from the enemy but probably from his father. But he cannot say anything to him. The frequent adolescent rebellion that we witness in the west virtually does not exist in this sense in traditionalist-collectivist societies. In traditional cultures often the parent decides who his child is going marry and what occupation he will have. This tends to turn the adolescent years of traditional people into a calm time. There is no individual identity search, and usually rebellion which defines the self is out of the question. Our suicide terrorist's second source of humiliation probably emanates from his repressive society. The suicide terrorist, as any person would, feels it too. But again rebellion against authority in collectivist society is very dangerous and therefore rare. And here comes the solution that makes him solve the problem and feel "high". He will be greater than his father2. He has an outlet, but only this one. He cannot overcome the humiliation because as a collectivist person he is going to obey his father throughout his life. Now he imagines his family mourning him but telling the media that they are proud of him and distributing candies to the guests. Now he is greater than his father, holier than him and he brings honor to his family. He is a Shahid, a martyr. The honor he had dreamed of gaining instead of the humiliation throughout his life was finally achieved. Even his father could not say anything bad about him anymore. His family 2 Although I write in masculine the same dynamics hold for women suicide terrorists who feel humiliated and try to overcome it in this way.

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might get money from a regime which supports terror. The western authorities might investigate his family, retaliating against them in this way or some other, but no one will take from him his honor any more. The society that humiliated him granted him a solution too. They encouraged him with the aide of their interpretation of the Qu’ran to become a martyr, promising him 72 virgins in heaven. He, as a young fellow in a traditional society who is not married and therefore has never experienced sexual relations, wraps up his genitals carefully before going on the mission in order to keep them safe for the virgins. He will also call the suicide act his wedding, equating it in this way to the happiest moment in his life. Wedding in traditional societies is a passage ritual transferring the young man from childhood to maturity, granting him honor through his wife and future children. From now on he will not suffer any further humiliation. He has found a relatively easy and possible way to free himself of humiliation and to gain eternal honor. If he were an individual who went through a separation process from his family and developed his own self and independence he could have found many solutions to his state besides committing suicide. For example, he might try to fulfill himself in different ways. But he is a collectivist person with external locus of control and his solution has to come from the outside world. Also he has never explored his inner feelings in order to deal with humiliation. It is not surprising that in his tradition to kill the enemy and to die with him is considered a higher degree of heroism than to kill the enemy and to survive. This is because you have to prove to the authority your total loyalty. The final proof is your willingness to die for the authority and its people. An ordinary soldier wants to kill the enemy and to survive. A precondition to it is often an individuated society in which you agree to fight for your country, usually on the assumption that you will survive. That is what most soldiers think before going into battle. This is because they are separate persons contemplating their independent future. But the suicide terrorist feels he always will be humiliated by the authority and the only way to get out of it is his death along with the enemy. He gets to the place and could - with little effort - leave the bomb and run away. At this moment he makes a different decision from his individual society counterpart – he remains with the bomb. His body will be mixed together with the blood and flesh of his enemy and they will remain in the collectivist memory together, forever the victim and the perpetrator. He has never achieved separation, either from his family and people or from the enemy. Actually he cannot believe he might win against either his enemy or his authority because he has never won. In this way the suicide act serves the emotional needs of the terrorist in relation to his authority and not vice versa. Indeed, he speaks about the ‘humiliating enemy’ - and maybe it is also true - but his real concern is with what happens within his home and not outside of it. The enemy in this way is not so important, serving only a role in the internal emotional dynamic of the traditional-collectivist society. Most people in these societies deeply identify with this kind of solution, telling us in this way that they may imagine themselves doing the same even if in reality they are far from acting in this way. Finally, the leader of the traditional-collectivist society does not have any interest in stopping this demonstration of loyalty to him. For him all these suicide terrorists are proof of a united country and regime. What can the west do in this difficult situation? Trying to win by killing the suicide terrorist is almost a paradox because that's exactly what he wants.

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1. How can we, as westerners, use our understanding of the suicide terrorism phenomenon to diminish it? We could use the media in order to transfer messages to the targeted traditionalcollectivist people who might engage in suicide terrorism, letting them know how much we honor them and their cultures and nations. For the westerner it might seem a false declaration, but here is the problem. Their's is a different way of thinking; what may look phony to the westerner is, for the collectivist person, full of meaning. If the potential suicide terrorist gets his honor from his enemy - and there is no greater honor than getting it from your enemy - his need to prove he deserves this honor diminishes. Individualist people, as was said, have to get used to speaking in collectivist terms. A whole collectivist society is humiliated in their encounter with the powerful west. We could not control their family constellation but granting them honor and appreciation might change their motivation to die in order to achieve honor. Just listening to the terminology of the Arab leaders throughout the years reveals the secret. Yasser Arafat spoke about the "Peace of the Braves" between him and Yitzhak Rabin, granting his people their honor as a brave nation together with a compliment to the enemy [1]. Hafez al-Assad said the same thing about Ehud Barak when he wanted to make peace with him, declaring ‘he is a brave leader’ [2]. Why can western leaders not learn something by listening carefully to their Arab counterparts who know something about the "collectivist language"? Jimmy Carter was one of the few western leaders who succeeded in establishing close relations with an Arab leader, Anwar El Sadat - calling him "my brother". Sadat replied "My people admire you. I shall always be proud of our friendship, of our brotherhood" [3]. Just listening to what Arab leaders say in the media and being aware of their particular choice of vocabulary reveals their different way of thinking and offer the listener many examples. It is not the vocabulary of democracy but that of the family which works. We are dealing with collectivist people who think with the aid of the family model, of brotherhood, calling each other as a sign of closeness, "my brother". But we individualist people again have a hard time changing our individualist terminology that we acquired throughout our personal, as well as cultural, process of development. In sum, the ability to grant honor and warmness rather than equal rights or empathy to the enemy is the best way of disarming it. The former makes sense to collectivist people while the latter sounds to them cold and distant, if not ‘superior’. This is because separation and individuation is felt by them as an insult. The ability to use the family model and not the democratic one is the right frame of thinking and speaking in relation to a society that did not go through the separation/individual independence process that the west experienced . Another way of granting honor, in this case specifically to a Muslim society, is respecting the Qu’ran and using its benevolent and warm attitude towards human relations on different occasions. Citing the Qu’ran is seen as deeply honoring what Muslims have contributed to humanity. Going to them and using their benevolent teachings is better than waiting until they ‘get to’ us. In addition it will pull the carpet from under the feet of those terrorists who use it for their own benefit. What I suggest might seem simple and straightforward – to speak to the other side

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in his language and to try to understand the way he thinks – but is really quite a difficult challenge because it forces the west to give up its ethno-narcissistic position. We are dealing with collectivist societies in which everything starts and ends with relationships and not with individuation [4].

References

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[1] On 21.6.2003 Arafat spoke again about the "Peace of the Braves” http://www.hagada.org.il/hagada/html/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=1073) [2] Al-Hayat (London), July 23, 1999. [3] Brzezinski, Z. (1985). Power and Priniciple. p. 284. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. [4] Chaleby K. , S. MD & Racy J. MD, (1999). Psychotherapy with the Arab Patient, Book Design & Publication by Shawn McLaughlin/QSOV. [5] Dwairy M. (2006) Counseling and Psychotherapy with Arabs and Muslims, Teachers College, Columbia Univ. [6] Grosbard, O. (2007). Cracking the Cultural Code. Ben Gurion Univ. Publishing House. (Hebrew). [8] Grosbard, O. (2007). Dialoge – 123 Therapeutic Stories from Traditional Society and their Solution. Ben Gurion Univ. Publishing House (Hebrew). [8] Grosbard, O. (2008). The Quran for Educating the Child accompanied by Examples and Psychological Explanations. Ben Gurion Publishing House. (Hebrew, in print). [9] Hofstede G. H. (20001). Culture's consequences - comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, Calif. [10] Pedersen P. B. (Ed.) (2002). Counseling across cultures, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, Calif. [11] Sue D. W. & Sue D. (1999). Counseling the culturally different - theory and practice, J. Wiley & Sons, New York.

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Putting the Umm Back in the Umma – Suicide Attack: Understanding the Terrorists’ Deepest Terrors Nancy HATVELDT KOBRIN Psychoanalyst, Hennepin-Regions Psychiatry Training Program, St. Paul-Minneapolis, Minnesota, U.S.A.

Abstract. This paper attempts to outline how the projected image of the female suicide bomber is directly linked to the prenatal mother. We are all aware how violence is viciously cruel. Terror is different from fear. It is nonverbal and left over from early childhood where it has not been put into words and then acted out nonverbally. This contribution explores the role which the mother plays in the early life of a child. I refer mainly to the works of Melanie Klein who shed light on how we relate to the world nonverbally through the use of objects. She took up where her mentor, Sigmund Freud, had left off by taking the emphasis away from the father to the importance of the bonding relationship between the infant and the “good breast.”i Nowadays neuroscience teaches that the mother-infant relationship is crucial for the development of a healthy well-adjusted child who can grow to trust his own perceptions of the world surrounding him. What does this say about terrorists?

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Keywords. suicide bombers, jihadists, psychoanalysis, mother-child bonding, imagery

How This Work Began When I was eight years old I first learned about the Golden Age of Spain where Christians, Jews and Muslims lived together in convivencia; I was fascinated. I went on to study the languages and cultures of medieval Iberia with a passion. However, my unconscious agenda was a wish to understand how very different people negotiated the same geo-political space, be it Iberia or under the roof of a home. I began working on terrorism then but it was the summer before September 11th when I was invited by a leading psychoanalyst, Dr. Joan Lachkar,ii to participate in a human rights seminar on the suicide bomber. She asked me to provide a psychohistorical backdrop because of my doctoral work on aljamia and the expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain.iii My work had been written up in German in the mid 1980’s because of the Gastarbeiter problem.iv While training clinically I turned from trauma survivors to undertake the actual study of perpetrators, the terrorists themselves. I began to see a sadomasochistic dance as in Shakespeare’s Othello. The constant cycling of projection-rage-shame-blame translated into a kind of sexual obsession/addiction, bonding to pain rather than pleasure. Could the banality of murder-suicide be driving a significant part of the suicide attack’s alleged political violence?

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Let us say, it all begins in utero when the prenatal environment creates the “motherboard” for the baby’s mind. This is a fragile maternal womb, which becomes exposed to a postpartum environment where the female instead of being valued and cherished is denigrated, abused and pathologically controlled from day one. There is no regard for the mother’s stress hormone level or her devotion to her newborn. Ultimately, this not only jeopardizes the infant’s health but can lead to severe ego dysfunction as well as cognitive impairments, such as flying planes into buildings rather than just fantasizing about it.v The mother-child relationship is key to understanding any culture. According to the British-trained Iraqi child psychiatrist Dr. Sami Timimi, in Arab Muslim culture the child is never permitted to separate psychologically from Ummi, that is ‘mommy’ in Arabic.vi The baby becomes an appendage to the mother in a state of fusion (a problematic bond). The mother is over-idealized yet the female is denigrated. The only way she obtains power is by giving birth to a male baby. Ummi comes from the same root as Ummah – so that the Arab Muslim communal self-perception is linked to the maternal. Berko reports that Ummi is the only one who could have stopped her child from becoming a suicide bomber.vii The Saudis repeatedly sent Umm Usama to the Sudan and Afghanistan in order to get her son to behave.viii In Western terms, this could mean a complete loss of self or self-identity. The constellation of devalued female, venerated mother with a rigid honor code is not a far cry from Asian cultures – Japanese, Vietnamese and Hindu.ix According to the kamikaze’s training manual, it guided him not to fear death because when he was within two meters of his target, the face of his mother would appear and he would be rejoining her.x Nor is western culture immune. In patriarchal families, be they Catholic, Lutheran, Mormon or Jewish, ergo a greater possibility for such problematic bonding exists. This is prevalent also in cults, clans, secular or a single parent family, the bond may be too much, or what is known as traumatic bonding.xi To make sense of this, one might view the horrific holocaust of the suicide attack by “reading” its mute imagery. This unseverable bond is reflected in the suicide attack’s imagery.xii My theory is not meant solely to provide a psychological profile for the suicide bomber, rather to provide understanding of how the rise of suicide bombers has spread throughout diverse cultures and is now at the global level. It is also not meant to blame the mother but to understand how she finds herself and her baby in a hostile social environment. The imagery holds a clue to a predominant psychological problem concerning maternal attachment, its pathological suffocating bond and its attendant psychological fusion which causes developmental arrest, called neotenation, i.e. not being permitted to grow up.xiii For a certain segment of this population, the only way one can liberate him or herself from such bonding is through murder, suicide or becoming a suicide bomber whereby paradoxically one seeks a reunion in death and the fantasy of rebirth. In psychological terms re-bonding through bombing is the only way one liberates oneself. Sadly murder, suicide bombing, terrorism becomes the replacement for normal separation individuation from mother, blowing oneself up paradoxically is far less painful than having to leave the mother and to suffer the pain of separation and become an individuated, responsible adult. The suicide bomber finds consolation in knowing that death provides a reunion with mother in her purest state.

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There are four things to keep in mind: 1. 2. 3. 4.

All behavior is potentially meaningful.xiv People are more alike than they are different.xv Violence is violence. It does not care how we humans label it. Everybody has a mother.xvi When a suicide attack happens, we are hot-wired back to mama.

A Picture Speaks a Thousand Words – The Importance of Imagery Let us take a look at what is meant by imagery. Ninety percent of our emotions are communicated nonverbally, especially visually. “Nonverbal behavior is farther removed from consciousness.”xvii How do we understand the pantomime of explosive pandemonium? By returning to the scene of the crime, I asked “What do we have here?” – murdered people, a suicide terrorist, and body parts. Where else do we find this? Murder-suicide in domestic violence, the murder of one’s “own” as in the honor killing, plus serial killing’s body parts. I analyzed its graphic materiality as an unconscious explicit message sent by the terrorists. In classic forensic psychiatry murdersuicide is referred to as a death fusion.xviii Imagine a spectrum of fusion images. On the far left, 180 degrees opposite or mirror image to the death fusion, we encounter the first image in life, that of the prenatal mother carrying the fetus – the life fusion.xix The next image is that of the postpartum mother nursing the infant a la the Madonna and child.xx

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• • •

The prenatal mother The postpartum mother The terrorizing sexual mother

The third fusion is sex, but beyond sex is the terror of dependency needs and abandonment. The hidden wishes in the couple are not dying alone and being completely taken care of as if one were a baby. When this cycle is disruptedxxi aggression escalates, even to murder-suicide. It is less painful to die than to have to face the dread of separation, loss and mourning. A good example is the sexual fusion in the Arab Kama Sutra. It is crucial to suicide terrorism because of its honor code – “A man’s honor lies between the legs of a woman.” Its image graphically depicts a sadomasochistic fusion in a culture which is sexually repressed. It is surprising more scholars have not referenced this in this context before.xxii To continue along the spectrum, the next is a mixed fusion of life and death. In Christianity it is the Pieta, the Mother cradling Christ. There is also an Islamic Pieta because the Prophet dies in the arms of his beloved Aisha (Arabic: ‘life’). Everything concerning the life of the Prophet is to be imitated.xxiii One asks – where is the father? The father’s absence seems to reflect the frequently heard complaint in the interview literature of terrorists that their fathers were absent.xxiv We might conclude that the reason terrorists remain forever tied into their mothers is precisely because of the absence of a father in Islamic regimes. The trend continues, the father is tied into his mother, the terrorist’s grandmotherxxv It should come as no surprise then that there would be a Hamas “Jadda” bomber, a postmenopausal grandmother.xxvi

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But a suicide attack’s imagery does not just relate to fusion. There are also the body parts, where “the bad mother” parts get translocated into the object world as in serial killing. The crime scene is often a horrific scene of body parts strewn all over, organized or chaotic. It is noteworthy that if chaotic, it is considered more psychotic reflecting the killer’s mind. Serial killers are known to have disturbed relations with their mothers. They often look like “normals” because their psychosis is buried in the personality.xxvii But what do these body parts mean psychologically? Could they be part object representation of the early mother – the breast, the nipple, etc.? I believe so. When a baby is first born he/she does not perceive the mother as a separate person. A baby can grow into looking like an adult but with a shaky insecure maternal experience.xxviii This is part of the reason, it is suggested, that terrorists plug into a charismatic leader or a gang in order to feel excitingly alive and stabilized as a way of compensating for traumatic bonding.xxix The female suicide bomber speaks to such bonding. Accompanying her image is the myth of the womb’s pure, blissful paradise. She is a concrete hallucination of the terrorists’ fantasy about their maternal love-hate relationship at first presented in an idealized way as heroine and then blown to hell. Why must they do this? The prenatal mother arouses in the male terrorist’s mind and in all of us what we may have not gotten from our own mothers – i.e. physical and emotional deprivation. The image arouses envy whose response is to attack and destroy.xxx All the terrorist organizations, which have consciously deployed her, reveal unconsciously, it is suggested, their murderous wishes for their own mothers. The splitting is so profound between conscious and unconscious behavior in terrorism, that we are not even aware of it. Yet together it carries a powerful psychological punch because the chaos seems impossible to make sense of – terror which cannot be explained and put into words holds us psychologically hostage. The deployment of the female suicide bomber signals a psychotic regression on the part of the terrorist organization.xxxi She destroys herself and her womb because she feels devalued. She has internalized male hatred for her as self-hatred. By killing herself she will be appreciated in this perverse male world. Just as the philosopher of war, Sun Tzu, wrote that one must know the enemy xxxii so too must we know their core terror – dependency on the mother. They hide their unconscious rage against their mothers in plain sight by means of the female suicide bomber. While she is proffered as a quest for equality,xxxiii this is only the surface story. The other half cycles around the quest to be liberated from the mother. It is fallacious and naïve to buy into the argument that gender equality is being sought in a male dominated social environment which creates and sends out female suicide bombers; they simultaneously and unconsciously communicate the male’s wish to annihilate the prenatal mother. The terrorists have not been able to reconcile the idea that they are born from a denigrated humiliated female. It leaves them feeling contaminated and obsessed with female sexual purity to the point of delusional thinking, that if it is not pure then, blood must be willfully spilled in order to cleanse honor.xxxiv But I am not one to cast stones at glass houses as it is very dangerous to be a prenatal mother in the West. The leading cause of death is murder by her spouse or partner.xxxv Could this be the hidden problem functioning behind the scenes of suicide terrorism? Could this be both her allure and her terror? Is the suicide attack tapping into our maternal wi-fi? Think of the tragic murder of the pregnant Laci Peterson by her

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husband Scott.xxxvi Her murder shared many similarities with the suicide attack’s ideological fantasies. A forensic psychiatrist wrote that Peterson acted out a rebirth fantasy by killing off his wife. He felt himself to be an orphan.xxxvii The orphan is very important in Islam.xxxviii In Jihadi Islam the 72 virgins syndrome functions literally as a rebirth fantasy. Jihad holds tremendous appeal to Western converts to Islam too and yet there is an entire body of literature on the psychology of conversion which points to it as an attempt to repair the maternal bond.xxxix Then there is the problem of explaining the “homegrown” jihadis, 2nd and 3rd generation. But weren’t most of their mothers brought over as child brides? Haven’t the grandmothers been providing daycare from birth to age three, when the need to hate and have an enemy is learned in the home?xl How westernized were they really? And as I have just shown, even then that is no guarantee. Bonding with a baby is a labor-intensive experience which must be set in a viable social environment where the female is valued. Terrorists manifest highly dissociated behavior. They are terrified.xli They harbor intense feelings of victimization because they were, in fact, victimized as little children. They dissociate from their terrors and transform them into a heroic badge of false pride. They not only feel rage and terror, they become the rage and the terror. Their selfrighteous beliefs drive their behavior, which is concrete and literal. While they may use metaphor, such as Usama uses in his poetry, it is superficial because they lack empathy for the enemy. They speak as if they do not have a filter, blurting out their poor perceptions. Try stepping back and pretend that you are a pre-school teacher, trying to make sense out of a hysterical toddler’s behavior, even though it could be so inhumanely gross as a beheading. Like Freud’s famous question, “What do women want?”, I ask “What is it that these terrorists really want?”. Are we mind readers? I believe they want nothing more than a genuine human connection. Why? Because my hunch is, that they have rarely experienced it. While it will always be important to “read their lips”, it will also become increasingly important to “read” all their other sensory perceptionsxlii, in addition to imagery as I am suggesting. We are only in the opening phase of understanding the phenomenon.

References i

ii

iii

Freud struggled to understand the female in part because he was too close to his own mother. On Freud’s relationship with his mother, see L. Breger. (2000). Freud: Darkness in the Midst of Vision. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Elsewhere I have argued that Freud had a profound identification with the Golden Age of medieval Spain. His thinking was quite Sephardi and that this is something, which “Reb” Derrida understood. It was Western philosophical tradition which appropriated psychoanalysis. Klein followed in this “non” Western aspect of psychoanalysis. Cf. “Uriel Acosta, J.M. da Costa, M.D. “What’s Freud got to do with it? or How Ladino and Sephardic Culture inform psychoanalysis and trauma studies,”, ed. D. Bunis, Conference Languages and Literatures of Sephardic and Oriental Jewry, ed. by David M. Bunis, Yaakov Benttolila and Efraim Hazan. Proceedings of the Misgav Yerushalayim’s Sixth International Congress, June 11-16 2000. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Press. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Press, in press. J. Lachkar. (1998). The Many Faces of Abuse: Treating the Emotional Abuse of High Functioning Women. Northvale, New Jersey/London: Jason Aronson Inc.; J. Lachkar, (1993). Paradox of peace: folie a deux in marital and political relationships. Journal of Psychohistory 20(3): 275-287. N. Kobrin, Moses on the Margin: A Critical Transcription and Semiotic Analysis of Eight AljamiadoMorisco Legends on the pre-Islamic Figure of Musa. 2 volumes, Minneapolis, 1983, Ph.D. Thesis.

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iv

v

vi vii

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N. Kobrin, (1988) Die psychoanalytische Ubertragung al historisches Symptom: Freud und seine fueros. In Materialitat der Kommunikation, ed. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 94-105; (1986) Aljamía – Lebenstil und Gruppenbindung am Rande des christlichen Europ, transl. by Ludwig Pfeiffer, in Stil: Geschichten und Funktionene eines kulturwissenschaftlichen Diskurselements, eds. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 463-474; (1985) das sprachproblem: kreolisierung, kulturpluralismus und das beispiel der morisken. übersetzung – ursula link-heer. kultuRRev olution: zeitschrift für angewandte diskurstheorie. 10 fata morgana multikultur? nr. 10 oktober, 63-66.k. S. Rose, The 21st Century Brain: Explaining, Mending and Manipulating the Mind, London: Vintage, 2005; A. Schore. (1994). Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The Neurobiology of Emotional Development. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associatees, Inc., Publishers; F. de Waal. (2005). Our Inner Ape, New York: Riverhead Books; R. M. Sapolski. (2005). Monkeyluv, New York: Schribner; R. M. Sapolsky. (1998). The Trouble With Testosterone: And Other Essays on the Biology of the Human Predicament, New York: Simon & Schuster; D. Prince-Hughes. (2004). Songs of the Gorilla Nation: My Journey Through Autism, New York: Three Rivers Press; D. Niehoff. (1999). The Biology of Violence: How Understanding the Brain, Behavior and Environment Can Break the Vicious Circle of Aggression, The Free Press; A. Raine. (1993). The Psychopathology of Crime: Criminal Behavior as a Clinical Disorder, New York: Academic Press. S. Timimi. (2002). Pathological Child Psychiatry and the Medicalization of Childhood, New York: Brunner-Routledge, p. 22. A. Berko, A. (2002). The moral infrastructure of chief perpetrators of suicidal terrorism: Cognitive and functionalist perspectives. Unpublished dissertation, Bar Ilan University. (in Hebrew); A. (2004). The Path to the Garden of Eden: The World of Female and Male Suicide bombers and their Dispatchers. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Press. (in Hebrew); (2006). On The Way to Paradise: Inside the Mind of the Female and Male Suicide Bombers and Their Dispatchers. New York: Praeger Publishers; Berko, A. and E. Erez, “Ordinary People” and “Death Work”: Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizers and Victims, The Journal of Violence and Victims, Volume 20, Number 6, December 2005; Berko, A. Wolf, Y & M. Addad. (2005). The moral infrastructure of chief perpetrators of Palestinian suicidal terrorism, Israel Studies in Criminology, 9, 10-47. “The Saudi Government continued its dialogue and sent many delegations to bin Laden and tried to persuade him to retreat from his jihadist policies. This was because of the strong relations between the bin Ladin family and the ruling House of Saud. Sometimes they sent his brothers [half-brothers, technically] and sometimes they sent his mother. At one time, the Saudi Government sent his mother and his half-brother on the maternal side by a special Saudi plane that landed at Kandahar airport. When they arrived there, they tried to convince him. Sheikh Osama said: “This is a principle. I keep it in my heart and I have promised God not to abandon it. Like one of the Companions of the Prophet, who said: “By God, you will not be able to deviate me from my path even if you have one thousand souls and these souls are given up one by one unto death.” Yet he was very kind to his mother and he treated her well and used his own methods to convince her. She returned empty-handed.” (as related by bin Laden’s bodyguard, Abu Jandal.) P.L. Bergen. (2006). The Osama Bin Laden I Know. New York: Free Press, p. 239. The mother has been used as bait in the case of the engineer, Yehiya Ayyash, as well as the Pakistani practice of stripping the mother naked in front of her jailed terrorist son in order to get him to talk as reported by R. Gunaratna, “The Brain: Khalid Sheikh Muhammad”, Playboy, June 2005, p. 169. S. Katz writes: “There had always been certain unwritten rules etched in the Shin Bet’s playbook as to what they would or wouldn’t do in counterterrorist operations. Suspects, informants, or any of the other characters that came across their path could be manipulated, threatened, roughed up, and in some cases, tortured; but a different set of rules had always applied to women, especially Muslim women. In a region of the world where butchery was an accepted practice of settling disputes, sexual respect had remarkably been maintained. Israeli troops and Shin Bet had a markedly superior record to their Palestinian counterparts who, according to claims made by Amnesty international, had routinely threatened male prisoners that their wives, mothers, and sisters would be raped before their eyes if they did not cooperate, confess or compromise fellow operatives.” S. M. Katz. (2002). The Hunt for the Engineer. New York: The Lyons Press, p. 204. Bouyeri was his mother’s favorite; she died of cancer and then six months later he murdered Van Gogh. Cf. I. Buruma. (2006). Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance. New York: The Penguin Press, p. 207. Similarly, Zarqawi’s mother, Umm Sayel, died on February 29, 2004 from leukemia. He mourned her the traditional 40 days and then abducted Nicholas Burg on April 9 taking him hostage and beheaded him on May 11. This inaugurated his rampage of beheadings. J.-C. Brisard. (2005). Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda. New York: Other Press, p.131. This is a common phenomenon seen clinically where the loss of the mother

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will precipitate more aggressive, even violent behavior. Law enforcement might benefit from tracking the health of the mother for detainees. I found that when I asked specifically about the mother, hoyoo, in Somali, the detainee opened up and revealed important insights. J. Miller, God Has Ninety-Nine Names: Reporting from a militant Middle East, Touchstone/Simon and Schuster, p. 118. The Saudis commissioned a 17 member team which assessed 2800 jihadis just returned from Afghanistan in the early 1990s and the psychological profile which came into focus is that many had experienced child abuse and had witnessed the abuse of their mothers. Their fathers were violence and absent. Many jihadis had developed addictions which are known to be related to maternal attachment and traumatic bonding. To the best of my knowledge, no counter terrorist expert has ever referred to this study. I have not been able to locate it either to substantiate Miller’s report. It could be a virtual goldmine for understanding the mindset of the jihadis and the Saudi understanding of that phenomenon back then. To attempt suicide one must become habituated to it. It is a slow evolving process. To what extent have these suicide bombers been family scapegoats? Cf. T. Joiner. (2005). Why People Die By Suicide, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard University Press, p. 143. D. Dutton and S.L. Painter. (1981). Traumatic bonding: the development of emotional attachments in battered women and other relationships of intermittent abuse. Victimology: An International Journal 6:139-155. D. Dutton (1995). The Domestic Assault of Women. Vancouver: UCB Press. There is an entire body of literature on maternal bonding and addictions. While the focus is on the mother, it is not meant to blame her, if anything to further explain the hostile social environment in which she finds herself with her child. T. Grandin. and C. Johnson. (2005). Animals in Translation: Using the Mysteries of Autism to Decode Animal Behavior. New York: Scribner. Howell refers to cultures such as this as dissociogenic. E.F. Howell. (2005), p. 263. The Dissociative Mind. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press, “Dissociation is the one way that the psyche modifies its own structure to accommodate interaction with a frightening but needed and usually loved, attachment figure [the mother].’ (Howell, p. 3) J. Zulaika. (1984). Basque Violence. Reno/Las Vegas, NV: University of Nevada Press, detailed these phenomena, noting that journalists characterized ETA terrorists as lacking verbal skills. “Current thinking concerning highly dissociated, traumatized behavior stresses the concrete, its literal use of language, narrative rigidity and lack of metaphor, common to the sociopath.” (Howell, p. 257). Ibid. This was the header for the New York Times Magazine on Zacarias Moussaoui, Dominus, 2003, Everybody has a mother, The New York Times Magazine, 9 February. S. Nowicki, Jr., and M. Duke. (2002). Will I Ever Fit In?, New York: The Free Press, p. 14: “Nonverbal communication is further removed from awareness than verbal language.”; “The initial and most important significant other from whom we receive feed back about what we are like is our mother… Since we do not begin to develop effective verbal language until we are about 18 months to 2 years of age, our initial reflected appraisals are communicated and secured nonverbally.” P. 41; “Nonverbal language is the language of how we feel about ourselves.” p.47. “Nonverbal behavior takes place outside of awareness, p. 56. S. Orgel (1974). Sylvia Path: Fusion with the victim and suicide, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 43: 272-273. K. Ablow, (2005). Inside the Mind of Scott Peterson. New York: St. Martin’s Press. A. Falk. (2002). Political Assassination and Personality Disorder: The Cases of Lee Harvey Oswald and Yigal Amir, Mind and Human Interaction, 12 (1): 2-34. The Sheikh’s New Clothes: The Naked Truth About Islamic Suicide Terrorism was in press and pulled from production in September, 2006 by www.looseleaflaw.com because of the comments made by Pope Benedict XVI concerning Islam and the ensuing violence. The publishing house felt that they could not protect themselves or their staff against Islamist violence. Martin-Barbero, The West’s Moral Weakness, 10 October 2006, www.frontpagemag.com and A. Taheri, Preemptive Obedience: The West’s Self-Imposed Censorship, Gulf News, 13 October 2006, http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/ ReadArticle.asp?ID=24903. Ummi’s lap is of particular importance in Arab Muslim culture and most especially for the terrorists. Mohammad Atta sat in his mother’s lap until he went to college and he witnessed his father’s physical abuse of his mother and experienced it himself. Ummi’s lap is found in martyr’s wills and testaments, cf. M. M. Hafez. (2006). Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, p. 87: “I write to you my last will and testament while I am alive, before my martyrdom (God willing). I write it with my tears, not with the ink of my pen. I write it with my tears not out of fear for myself, but in sadness for my mother, whom I urge not to cry when she hears the news of my meeting my Lord. I ask her to rejoice and raise her head high in

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the sky. O Mother, I know that being nestled in your lap [my emphasis] is gentler and kinder on me than my burial grave, but this is God’s calling and the calling of my country…” Via projection, shame and blame. The imagery calls to mind the Hindu Kamasutram which influenced Arab eroticism. See M. Chebel. (2006). Le Kama-Sutra Arabe: Deux mille ans de littérature érotique en Orient, Paris: Pauvert. A. Bouhdiba. (1998). Sexuality in Islam, London: Saqi Books, 1998. Lest we forget the Tamil Tigers are raised Hindu and there is the custom of sati, burning the wife on the husband’s funeral pyre. This ‘mixed fusion’ is also found in Shiite Islam but it quickly shifts into a double death. Initially, Baby Ali is shot through the heart by an arrow while being held in the arms of Hussein who in turn is killed on the battlefield of Karbala. Baby Ali is literally described as going “from cradle to grave” in the passion play. K. Scot Aghaie. (2004). The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi’I Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran. Seattle: University of Washington Press, cf. insert of photograph with the caption: “Women carrying the cradle of Ali Asghar… in that the infant Ali Asghar went directly from cradle to grave.” No page cited. This is a good example of transgenerational transmission of trauma through neglect. Cf. A. A. Schützenberger (1998). The Ancestor Syndrome. London: Routledge. A. Berko, A. and E. Erez, “Ordinary People” and “Death Work”: Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizers and Victims, The Journal of Violence and Victims, Volume 20, Number 6, December 2005; Berko, A. Wolf, Y & Addad, M. (2005). The moral infrastructure of chief perpetrators of Palestinian suicidal terrorism, Israel Studies in Criminology, 9, 10-47; J. Lachkar, (2006). Terrorism and the borderline personality, The Journal of Psychohistory, vol. 33, no. 4, spring. The sons are essentially married to their mothers psychologically so their unconscious murderous rage gets acted out in a concrete manner in the case of 57 year old Fatma Najar sent by Hamas. H. Greenberg, (2006) “Woman suicide bomber’s family: We’re very proud,” 23 November, http://www. ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3331878,00.html. B.M. Biven. (1997). Dehumanization as an Enactment of Serial Killers: A Sadomasochistic Case Study, Journal of Analytic Social Work, 4(2) 23-49.; R. I. Simon, Bad Men Do What Good Men Dream: A Forensic Psychiatrist Illuminates the Darker Side of Human Behavior, Washington, D.C. & London: The American Psychiatric Press, Inc., 1996. M. Mahler; The Internal Mother: Conceptual and Technical Aspects of Object Constancy, ed. By S. Akhtar, S. Kramer, and H. Parens, Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson Inc., 1996. P.A. Olsson. (2005). Malignant Pied Pipers of Our Time: A Psychological Study of Destructive Cult Leaders from Rev. Jim Jones to Osama bin Laden. Baltimore: Publish America; I. Schiffer. (1973) Charisma. Toronto/Buffalo: The University of Toronto Press and The Free Press. See also E. V. Welldon. (2000). Mother, Madonna, Whore: The Idealization and Denigration of Motherhood. New York: Other Press; R. Morgan. (1989); and The Demon Lover: The Roots of Terrorism. New York: Washington Square Press. Regression is “a return to a more developmentally immature level of mental functioning.” “Regression” in Moore and Fine. (1990). Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, p. 164: “It usually occurs when a phase-appropriate mental organization is substantially disrupted. Regression is regarded as one of the mechanisms of defense.” Sun Tsu, The Art of War, ed. J. Clavell, New York: Delacorte Press, 1983. Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?, Ed. Y. Schweitzer, Memorandum 84, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Israel, August 2006. F. I. Khuri. (2001). The Body in Islamic Culture, London: Saqi Books. G. Pingree and L. Abend, Spain’ lessons in fighting spousal abuse, The Christian Science Monitor, 26 November 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1127/p06s01-woeu.htm B. Nacos. (2002). Mass-Mediated Terror. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. See (Ar. Yatiim) “Orphans,” in The Dictionary of Islam, ed. T. P. Hughes, Chicago: Kazi Publications, 1994, p. 448. Osama bin Laden felt himself to be orphaned, cf. J. Burke, 2003, p. 43-44. J. Lachkar, (1983). The Arab-Israeli conflict: a psychoanalytic study. Doctoral dissertation. Los Angeles, CA: International College. N. Kobrin, Psychoanalytic Explorations of the New Moors: Converts for Jihad, Clio’s Psyche, 9(4) 171-187, 2003. V. Volkan. (1988). The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson. M. Klein. (1940). Mourning and its relation to manic-depressive states. In Contributions to PsychoAnalysis, 1921-1945, pp. 311-338. London: Hogarth, 1950; (1949). Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, 1921-1945. London: Hogarth; (1952). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. In Developments in Psy-

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choanalysis, ed. J. Riviere, pp. 242-321. London: Hogarth; (1957). Envy and Gratitude. New York: Basic Books; (1975). Love, Guilt, and Reparation and Other Works, 1921-1945, ed. R.E. Money-Kyrle. New York: Free Press. Sensorium: Embodied Experience, Technology, and Contemporary Art, ed. C. A. Jones,Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 36. The eight senses are: visual, auditory, motor, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, thermal and pain. It will be necessary for a comprehensive exploration of these eight senses in different configurations, for a more accurate understanding of the mindset of the terrorist and the different psychological states for suicide terrorism.

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Break Out Group Conclusions Groups A & B suggested the following proposals:

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A. 1. Greater information exchange and operational best practice exchange between NATO and Interpol, Europol and European Countries. 2. International applicable law on terrorism with regard to internet issues and the radicalisation process. 3. Support cultural education for out of area operations. 4. A dedicated psychological operations unit for NATO. 5. Greater operational research into future indicators of attack. 6. Examination of disengagement and de-radicalisation processes. B. 1. More intellectual theological debate (this would need some resourcing) to enable debate to take place amongst Muslims and others. It needs to be done internally, to pinpoint where the ideology is coming from and produce the cognitive tools to deal with it. 2. Prisons: act early on, before fused into totalist groups; need criteria for judging imams, has to be a one-on-one process, it’s the human contact that makes the change. 3. Women’s groups: helping them to develop. 4. Understanding the ideology as a form of totalitarianism, not equating the ideology with Islam. There is a role for the media in that, we need to educate journalists how to communicate more effectively to prevent and not contribute to the social and religious polarization, to not legitimize the binary ideological thinking. 5. The basic issue is injustice. 6. Sheik Musa suggested a youth program building on work he has done for years. A ten week course on youth empowerment, developing the course, train 20–30 high level Muslim leaders to work in the universities, to seed the idea for it, run it separately for men and women, to include addressing the following issues: a. b. c. d. e. f. g.

Identity. Honour and shame. Problem solving. Addressing binary thinking and integrative complexity to see a problem from many different perspectives. Ability to separate thought from emotion. Resourcing for relationships, the couple, group, family. Communication – looking at underlying narratives that drive some to violence, myth of redemptive violence, scapegoating.

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Break Out Group Conclusions

h.

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i. j.

Break away weekend with physical challenge breaking passivity, connecting with emotions, giving young people a safe group to belong to that understands the limits of safe group dynamics. Spiritual inspiration – its aesthetics, art, literature. Values of peace, justice, freedom.

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163

Author Index 27 67 145 135 151 97 83 89

Lahnait, F. Liht, J. Moghaddam, F.M. Paz, R. Savage, S. Sharpe, M. Speckhard, A. Taylor, M.

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Admani, M. Géré, F. Grosbard, O. Hameed, B. Hatveldt Kobrin, N. Heggy, T. Krasnov, V.N. Kristjánsson, K.

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71 5 v 103 5 1 119 47

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