Stages of Industrial Development in Asia: A Comparative History of the Cotton Industry in Japan, India, China, and Korea [Reprint 2016 ed.] 9781512803488

Table of contents :
Foreword
Preface
Contents
I. The Rise and Development of the Modern Cotton Industry in Japan
II. Labor Supply and Labor Policy in the Japanese Cotton Industry
III. The Socio-economic Background of the Development of the Modern Cotton Industry in India
IV. A History of the Cotton Trade Between India and Japan
V. The Beginning and Growth of the Modern Cotton Industry in China
VI. A History of the Cotton Trade Between the United States and the Far East
VII. The Place of Korea in the History of the Early Cotton Industry in the Far East
VIII. A History of the Cotton Trade Between Korea and Japan
Appendix
Index

Citation preview

Stages of Industrial Development in Asia

Stages of Industrial A Comparative History in Japan, India,

Development in Asia of the Cotton Industry China, and Korea

by Sung Jae Koh

University of Pennsylvania Press

© 1966 bv t h e T r u s t e e s of t h e University of P e n n s y l v a n i a L i b r a r y of Congress C a t a l o g u e C a r d N u m b e r : 65—22081

Published in Great Britain, India, a n d Pakistan by the O x f o r d University Press London, Bombay, a n d K a r a c h i

7495 Printed in U n i t e d States of America

Γο Professor H a r o l d F .

Williamson

Foreword I T IS A P L E A S U R E TO INTRODUCE T H E W O R K OF D R .

SUNG-JAE

Koh to Western readers. As a professor of Economic History at Seoul National University, DR. Koh became widely known in Korea for his Kundae Hanguk Sanop-Sa Yongu (A Study of the Industrial History of Modern Korea) (Seoul, 1959). He has also published a number of smaller studies in his own language. However, his production in English has hitherto been limited to two short articles which are not easily obtainable, and the present volume may therefore be considered his launching on the sea of Western scholarship. Dr. Koh has worked long and arduously to bring this about, overcoming financial, linguistic, and many other obstacles. He has had about this study a real sense of scholarly mission to bring what he has discovered about economic development in Asia to the attention of American and other English-speaking scholars. And indeed he has thrown new light on some of the mysteries and anomalies in Asian economic development. For example, there has been the curious disparity in analyses of Japanese economic development between supporters of the /fcaibatsu (financial clique) control thesis, which was so much favored before the Pacific W a r that it was thought by some 7

8

STVGES OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

to explain the origin of that conflict, and the revisionist thesis of William W. Lockwood and others that small business has been the backbone of modern Japan. E>r. Koh shows clearly and specifically with reference to the history of the cotton industry in Japan that the weaving part of that industry has remained small, traditional, and simple while the spinning part became big, modern, and complex. Another interesting finding is that Korea had a leading place in the Asian cotton industry, far surpassing Japan and exporting to Japan. But it was brought to ruin, and the Korean economy with it, by such oppressive devices as a "military cloth tax" and other anti-mercantile measures of the later Yi government. Regarding Manchuria and North China he argues that American success in winning a market there from the English East India Company helped to maintain the cotton industry in the Southern United States, and then, after 1890, the Japanese capturing that market was an important factor in the rise of American-Japanese antagonism. Similarly Japanese competition challenged Indian cotton trade with Far Eastern countries, especially China, and Dr. Koh discusses the reverberations of this in India with discernment. And the author's general analysis of the strong and weak points, the similarities and the differences in the cotton industries of Japan, India, China, and Korea (taken in order of ultimate degree of development) is extremely perspicacious. Dr. Koh brings to his task academic competence and research experience of a high order. Born in Seoul, Korea, on February 5, 1917, he received his college education in Japan, where he was graduated from Rikkyo (St. Paul's) University in Tokyo in 1940. Subsequently he was associated with the Yamasaki Asian Economic Institute in Tokyo (1941-1942) and the Oriental Economic Institute, also in Tokyo (1942-

FOREWORD

9

1945). After that he returned to Korea, where he taught at Korea Christian University (1945-1950) and at Seoul National University (1950-1960). In 1960, in recognition of his aforementioned study of the Industrial History of Modern Korea, he was awarded the Ph.D. degree by the Graduate School of Seoul National University, the first such degree granted. Subsequently he served as chairman of the Department of Economics at Seoul National University, and in 1961 he came to the United States as Senior Research Associate in the Industrial Countries Workshop at Columbia University. Since 1963 he has been at the University of Pennsylvania, where he has been completing his research with the aid of an American Philosophical Society grant and a University of Pennsylvania Post Doctoral fellowship. One further word seems appropriate in introducing this work to Western readers. It should be noted that it is in a format much used in the East but not so well known in the West, especially the United States. The following "chapters" were composed as a series of "papers," related in general theme, but each comprising a complete topic in itself and not directly or specifically tied together in the usual fashion of chapters in a monograph. In considering the format, some may prefer closer linking, but such was not congenial to Dr. Koh's style of presentation, and rather than impair the originality and vigor of his contribution it has seemed wise not to tamper with his organization. In fact, it may be an additional virtue of the study that it will acquaint American readers with an Asian approach to organization as well as subject. Hilary Conroy, Professor of Far Eastern History University of Pennsylvania

Preface THE

FOLLOWING IS A STUDY OF T H E COMPARATIVE

HISTORY

of the industrialization in Japan, India, China, and Korea upon which I have been at work for more than three years. It was begun at Columbia University and completed at the University of Pennsylvania. First drafts of the papers were prepared at Columbia and these were criticized, revised, rewritten, and brought up to date at the University of Pennsylvania. T h e aim of this book may be briefly described. It would appear that many Asian countries have tended to neglect their own experiences in industrial development, looking instead to the rather more extreme idealized models of economic growth in advanced Western nations. Yet the history of industrial development in Asian countries reveals their own peculiar circumstances, which resulted in substantial differences among these countries. This may be demonstrated with regard to the modernization of the cotton industry. As is well known, one characteristic of the earlier industrial revolution in Westen nations was the leading role played by the cotton industry and cotton goods export trade. Similarly, since the middle of the nineteenth century, the cotton industry 11

12

STAGES O F INDUSTRIAI. D E V E L O P M E N T

IN A S I A

has led industrialization in Asian countries out of a policy known as "textile first." Howevei, the complex, interwoven "Asian" factors have changed the tempo, altered the direction, and limited the extent of such industrial development in Japan, India, China, and Korea and left it at different levels. These factors relate to the prior economic experience, the social organization, and the political institutions of the several countries. Here we shall discuss these matters, with special reference to the cotton industry. T h e present work could not have been carried out without the help of numerous scholars whose valuable contributions I wish to acknowledge. For unlimited inspiration and encouragement I am indebted to Professor Harold F. Williamson of Northwestern University; Professor Carter Goodrich, formerly of Columbia and now of the University of Pittsburgh ; Professor Thomas C. Cochran of the University of Pennsylvania; Professor Bert F. Hoselitz of the University of Chicago; Professor Coran Ohlin, formerly of Columbia University and now of the University of Stockholm; and Professor Wilfred Malenbaum of the University of Pennsylvania. In the execution of this work I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Professor F. Hilary Conroy of the University of Pennsylvania, under whose unfailing encouragement I carried on the work; and also for his readily agreeing to write the Foreword. I am greatly indebted to Professor Alan Heston of the University of Pennsylvania, who discussed with me the various chapters, offering invaluable criticisms and suggestions. I have had further help and advice from the following scholars : Professors Joseph Dorfman and Julius Rubin of Columbia University; Professor Morris David Morris of the University of Washington; Dr. Chong Sik Lee of the University of Pennsylvania, and Dr. David Novack of Cornell University who went through several chapters at various stages of my research work.

13

PREFACE

It is not possible to thank adequately all persons who have helped me in correcting my English and in retyping. Mrs. F. H. Conroy, Miss M. L. Arnott, Mrs. Leigh Kagan, Miss Bessie Hawk, and Miss M. F. Pond gave me wonderful assistance in these. Also my thanks to Mr. Jesse M. Phillips of Stanford, California, who went through all the papers with a very keen and generous interest and completed the editing of the work. The staffs of the East Asiatic Library at Columbia University, the Chinese-Japanese section of the Harvard-Yenching Library, the South Asia Regional Studies Library and Charles Patterson Van Pelt Library of the University of Pennsylvania helped me in every possible way, for which I am sincerely thankful to them. M y thanks are also due to Mr. Thomas Yoseloff, the Director of the University of Pennsylvania Press, for the care taken in the printing of the book. Finally, it is my pleasant duty to conclude the preface by offering respectful thanks to the American Philosophical Society and the University of Pennsylvania for financial support of my reasearch. SUNG-JAE

December, 1964 Philadelphia

KOH

Contents Foreword Preface I

II

The Rise and Development of the Modern Cotton Industry in Japan 1 Introduction 2 The Structural Peculiarity of the Japanese Cotton Industry 3 The Meiji Government and the Development of the Modern Cotton Industry 4 The Merchant Class and the Rise of the Cotton-Spinning Industry 5 The Wealthy Peasants and the Modernization of the Cotton-Weaving Industry 6 Summary Labor Supply and Labor Policy in the Japanese Cotton Industry 1 The rise of Wage Labor and Characteristics of Labor in the Japanese Cotton Industry 2 The Employment of Cotton Industry Labor and the Farming Communities in Japan 3 Labor Conditions in the Japanese Cotton Industry 15

7 11 21 21 22 26 35 42 52 57 57 62 74

16

III

IV

V

S T A G E S OF I N D U S T R I A L D E V E L O P M E N T IN ASIA

The Socio-economic Background of the Development of the Modern Cotton Industry in India 1 Introduction 2 The Parsi Merchants and the Rise of the Modern Cotton Industry 3 The Managing-Agency System and the Development of the Cotton Industry 4 Peculiarities of Labor Supply and Labor Policy 5 Summary and Conclusion A History of the Cotton Trade Between India and J a p a n 1 Indian Raw Cotton and the British Cotton Industry 2 The Indian Cotton and the Japanese Cotton Industry 3 Severity of Competition in the IndoJapanese Trade in Cotton Goods 4 The Competitive Advantages of Japan against the Indian Cotton Industry 5 The New Phase of Postwar IndoJapanese Trade in Cotton Goods 6 Summary and Conclusion The Beginning and Growth of the Modern Cotton Industry in China 1 Introduction 2 The Cotton Industry Before the Opium War 3 The Slow Modernization of the Chinese Cotton Industry 4 The Chinese Bureaucrats and the Development of the Modern Cotton Industry in China 5 Summary

86 86 88 100 112 125 133 133 138 147 157 166 174 181 181 183 190 202 221

CONTENTS

VI

VII

Λ History of the Cotton Trade between the United States and the Far East 1 Introduction 2 The Beginning of the American Cotton Trade with China, and Its Development 3 The American Cotton-Goods Trade in Manchuria 4 The Position of the United States in the Development of the Japanese Cotton Industry 5 Summary and Conclusion The Place of Korea in the History of the Early Cotton Industry in the Far East 1 Introduction 2 Socio-economic Backgrounds of Development of the Cotton Industry in Tokugawa, Japan 3 Limitations of Development of the Chinese Cotton Industry in the Ming and Ch'ing Periods 4 Causes for the Continual Decline of the Korean Cotton Industry under the Yi Dynasty 5 Summary

VIII A History of the Cotton Trade Between Korea and J a p a n 1 Introduction 2 The Beginning and Development of Cotton Trade Between Korea and J a p a n 3 The Causes for the Decline of KoreanJapanese Trade on Cotton Textiles 4 The Opening of Korean Ports to Trade and the New Development of Cotton Trade Between Korea and J a p a n 5 Development of the Modern Cotton-Spinning

17 228 228 230 238 246 254 260 260 263

267 272 281 285 285 288 291

298

18

S T A G E S OF I N D U S T R I A L D E V E L O P M E N T IN A S I A

Industry in Japan, and of Raw Cotton Cultivation in Korea

306

Appendix

317

Index

457

Stages of Industrial Development in Asia

I The Rise and Development of the Modern Cotton Industry in Japan 1.

Introduction

I T I S U N I V E R S A L L Y RECOGNIZED T H A T J A P A N A C H I E V E D INDUS-

trialization with amazing speed and from economic conditions less advantageous than those of the Western economies at their start of modernization. One characteristic of the earlier industrial development both in Japan and in the United States and in England has been the leading role played by the development of the cotton industry and the cotton-goods export trade. Japan's pattern of economic development, however, is essentially a deviant from the Western case. Even in industries that are conducted mainly in factories which in mechanical equipment, size, and internal organization closely resemble those of the United States or England there still remains a place for the small producers. For this reason, accounts of the Japanese economic system present the reader with two apparently inconsistent interpretations of her industrial organization. Some writers observe that the general trend toward large-scale industry has proceeded at least as far in Japan as in Western countries. Some others insist that large21

STAGES OF INDUSTRIAL

22

OF.VF.LOPMENT

IN ASIA

scale industry constitutes an alien superstructure that bears little relation to the main fabric of J a p a n e s e industrialism and point out that the greater part of J a p a n e s e industry is conducted on a small scale with relatively primitive equipment. In order to analyze the most significant features of the J a p a n e s e system, we must take into consideration the historical development of the cotton industry. It has long occupied the most important and vital position in the industrial system in J a p a n and it consists of large-scale firms in the spinning section and numerous medium-sized or small concerns in the weaving section. Previous studies of the J a p a n e s e pattern of industrial development do not explain how private capital formation

was

possible without the assistance of government. T h i s omission results from overlooking the existence of the wealthy classes, from which private savings and capital were obtained. It was from these classes that the new industrialists recruited

the

capital needed for the modernization of the spinning

and

weaving sections of the J a p a n e s e cotton industry. In analyzing this point, we must give a great deal of attention to the capital-formation problem and the evaluation of the role of government. T h e misinterpretation of the J a p a n e s e process of industrialization arises from faulty evaluation of the role of government investments and the lack of knowledge of the historical significance of the modernization of J a p a n ' s monetary and financial system. 2.

The Structural

Peculiarity

of the Japanese

Cotton

Industry

A peculiarity one can find in the modern cotton industry in Japan

is that

produced

cotton

yarns and

cotton

by two entirely separate

have

been

industrial groups.

cloths

This

peculiarity has played a key role in determining the characteristics of the system and the organization of the industry.

T H E MODERN C O T T O N I N D U S T R Y IN JAPAN

23

Chronological differences in the introduction of machine methods in cotton spinning and cotton weaving provide an interesting clue to their different courses of development. Cotton spinning by machinery was introduced in J a p a n as early as 1866, whereas no machine method was adopted in cotton weaving until 1888. T h e pace of employment of machinery in the cotton weaving industry was so slow that in 1894, at the time of the Sino—Japanese War, which opened a new era in the industrial development of J a p a n , there were only 4 2 0 power looms in the entire country.' It was only in the period of World War I that the cotton weaving industry completed the establishment of a modern system of industrial organization and could adopt large-scale production methods, although it had begun to use machine-made yarns, either imported or produced in J a p a n , around 1888, when the oldestablished domestic hand-spinning was beginning to decline. 5 T h e spinning industry, in contrast, rapidly expanded during the late 1880's. In 1886 there were 81,000 spindles in operation, producing 16,000 bales of yarn per annum. By 1890 there were 358,000 spindles, producing 108,000 bales of yarn. By 1896 there were 959,000 spindles, turning out 428,000 bales of yarn. This was a tremendous achievement in a remarkably short space of time. On the testimony of Kentaro Kaneko, the Vice Minister for Agriculture and Commerce at that time, machine spinning superseded the indigenous hand-spinning industry about 1896. In an article published in that year, he said : The hand-spun thread used heretofore in the various localities now gives place to machine-spun thread on account of the cheaper price of the latter; and, as it is said that hand spinning had decreased by 70 per cent throughout the country in 1892, it is safe to say that it has almost gone out of use by this time. Such being the condition of things, we may assume that the whole consumption in the country is, practically, supplied by machine-spun thread.3

24

S T A G E S OF I N D U S T R I A I . D E V E L O P M E N T IN ASIA

Meanwhile, the spinning industry grew to the point where it was able to drive Indian cotton yarn out of the domestic market. In 1887 Indian and British yarns comprised, respectively, 50.8 per cent and 49.2 per cent of yarn imports. In 1898 India supplied 0.7 per cent and England 99.3 per cent.' T h e glaring discrepancy in productivity between the spinning industry and the weaving industry made overproduction of cotton yarn inevitable and created an over-all economic depression in 1890. As a means of alleviating the effects of the depression, some cotton yarn was exported to the China market. Exports of Japanese cotton yarn were 108 bales in 1890, 1,053 bales in 1892, and 11,796 bales in 1893. The S i n o - J a p a n e s e W a r had an important influence on the J a p a n e s e cotton-spinning industry. As a result of the war, the development of the markets of China and Korea implanted optimism in the industry. As early as 1897, exports of cotton y a r n exceeded imports, and the goal of self-sufficiency in cotton y a r n was attained. T h e J a p a n Cotton Spinners' Association reported that there were 20,431 power looms in operation in the cotton-weaving industry as of the end of 1911. This shows that remarkable progress was made in the employment of power looms. However, the economic significance of the power looms was still less than that of the hand looms. Of 338,440,400 pounds of yarn consumed in the year 1911, only 82,432,236 pounds were used by the power looms.' In 1912 hand looms still outnumbered power looms by 621,582 to 111,686." The substantial decrease in the number of hand looms took place in the years following World W a r I. In 1923 the number of power looms reached 246,298 while that of hand looms decreased to 159,400. T h e number of hand looms decreased to 98,520 in 1928 and 59,312 in 1933/ These figures indicate that in the 1920's the power loom became dominant a n d

THE

M O D E R N C O T T O N I N D U S T R Y IN J A P A N

25

the modernization of the Japanese cotton industry was fully accomplished. Along with the above facts, the organizational aspects of the cotton industry should be examined. In terms of organization, there was a considerable difference between the cotton-spinning industry and the cotton-weaving industry. Enterprises in the field of cotton spinning had started as joint-stock companies, and their expansion was usually accomplished by merging smaller firms. It has often been said that the history of the J a p a n e s e cotton-spinning industry is a history of enterprise, merger, and amalgamation. T h e development of the industry was sustained by the strength accumulated in the firms surviving the weeding-out of the misfits. This should explain why the number of cotton-spinning enterprises remained unchanged during the period 1924-34, the decisive decade in the modernization of the industry, while the number of spindles doubled." T h e lag in the development of industrial organization of the cotton-weaving industry was a burning question in those days. It was absolutely essential to develop export markets for cotton cloth. Unless the export markets for cotton cloth were captured, the expansion in spinning did not make sense. It is said that the Shibuya Cotton Weaving Mill set up by K u m a gaya Norimasa in 1885 was the first enterprise to do weaving on Western lines. Thereafter, the weaving industry was to some extent modernized by the use of machines; nevertheless, it was still only a household industry and very far indeed from being as modern as the spinning industry. Even as late as 1934, about 90 per cent of the weaving mills were equipped with less than ten looms and the majority had only two or three looms." Although the large-scale spinning mills began about 1890 to do some weaving in order to establish a base for adjusting

26

S T A G E S O F I N D U S T R I A I . D F . V F I O P M F . N T IN ASIA

to the changing demand for cotton yarns and produced about half of the cotton cloth during the 1920's, the gap in the tempo of development of these two industries could not easily be bridged.'" T h e main concern of the joint spinning and weaving companies was to produce double-width

cloth to meet

the

demands of the foreign markets. Only the small-scale weaving companies which employed narrow looms could satisfy the domestic market. T h u s the greater part of the cotton-weaving industry was and is still being carried on by small- to mediumsized companies,

ranging from handicraft

to more or less

modernly organized factories." W h y , in J a p a n , did the cotton-spinning and weaving industries follow different

courses of development

despite

their

inseparable relationship ? W h y was there a gap in their stages of development ? Modernization was accomplished in cotton spinning in the World W a r I period; yet why has the cottonweaving industry remained at its pre-modern stage of development, while the cotton-spinning industry has reached the stage of capital c o n c e n t r a t i o n ;

and why has the

industry not yet been able to get beyond the

weaving

pre-modern.

small-to-medium scale? Moreover, why has the cotton-weaving industry survived by being dependent upon and under the control of the cotton-spinning industry? All these questions b e a r upon the structural peculiarity of the J a p a n e s e cotton industry. In an attempt to find answers, we are confronted with the necessity of explaining the birth processes of the cotton-spinning and cotton-weaving industries. At this point, it would be well to examine the role of the M e i j i government in the development of the J a p a n e s e cotton industry. 3.

The

Meiji

Modern

Government

Cotton

and

the

Development

of

the

Industry

Since the modernization of the J a p a n e s e cotton industry is

T H E MODERN C O T T O N I N D U S T R Y IN JAPAN

27

an integral part of the over-all industrialization of the J a p a n e s e economy, a critical examination of the forces of industrialization will help to clarify the peculiar features of the development of the J a p a n e s e cotton industry. Whenever an attempt is made to analyze the characteristic features of the industrialization of Japanese economy, the role of the Meiji government is usually given primary importance. Although this subject has been widely discussed, there are as yet no definite conclusions about it. There is, however, a certain commonly accepted interpretation, which may be represented by Professor Uyeda's standpoint, as it is presented in a comment on Mr. M a s a n a M a e d a ' s "Observations on the Development of Industry" (in J a p a n e s e ; Tokyo, 1884). This governmental report, by the Vice Minister for Agriculture and Commerce of that time, is one of the most important documents for the study of industrial conditions in the early days of the Meiji era. In his article, Uyeda mentions that the industrial revolution in J a p a n was the product of an energetic striving toward industrialization by the new political power and not the result of natural self-development of the national economy. Therefore, there was no foundation upon which an ideology of industrial capitalism could grow. 11 All the necessary measures for J a p a n ' s advance into the industrial era were, Uyeda remarks, taken by the Meiji government. T h e principal industrial establishments were erected by the government, and they were, accordingly, under the supervision and management of the governmental bureaucrats." According to this statement, before the Meiji Restoration of 1868, there existed neither the socio-economic potentialities nor any accumulation of common wealth which could be utilized for the industrialization of the economy. If this statement is valid, then we have no way to explain the fact that the industrialists who played most of the important roles in the

28

S T A G E S O F I N D U S T R I A I . D E V E L O P M E N T IN ASIA

industrialization of J a p a n , not only of the cotton industry but also of all other fields, c a m e from the merchant class which had

emerged

in the p e a c e f u l T o k u g a w a

period

and

had

enjoyed prosperity at a relatively more a d v a n c e d stage than that of any other countries in the F a r East. Naturally, without this merchant class, J a p a n would not have been able to a d v a n c e into the industrial era a h e a d of her neighbors. H e r e we m a y cast a g l a n c e at the progress of commercialization of the J a p a n e s e e c o n o m y during the T o k u g a w a period. With the establishment of the T o k u g a w a feudal regime the s a m u r a i were concentrated into joka-machi,

or "castle t o w n s , "

leaving their land to be cultivated by the peasantry. Receiving their income in rice, the f e u d a l lords h a d to convert their rice into money. R i c e a n d other products of the lords' fiefs were consigned to O s a k a for sale a n d , as a result, an organized market a p p e a r e d there." T h u s , the rapid growth of cities and the rapid development of transportation greatly facilitated the development market

of

production

a

money of

the

economy. industrial

In

addition,

crops b e c a m e

the

highly

developed. A m o n g these, cotton w a s one of the most important. By the middle of the T o k u g a w a era ( 1 6 8 8 - 1 7 4 0 ) , cotton production w a s fairly localized in particular districts or provinces. In those days, the K i n a i (provinces of Settsu, K a w a c h i , and Izumi), Setonaikai (coastal provinces along the Inland Sea), a n d T o k a i (provinces of M i k a w a a n d O w a r i ) districts were especially f a m o u s as centers of cotton growing. At O s a k a there was already a highly developed trade in raw cotton a n d ginned cotton by the early p a r t of the T o k u g a w a era. D u r i n g the period from 1624 to 1643 the cotton market w a s opened, a n d during the period 1661 to 1672 the cotton wholesale merchants formed kabunakama,

a sort of c o m p a n y which had

fairly

close resemblance to the E u r o p e a n merchant g u i l d . " Consequently, production for sale increased rapidly in all the chief

T H E M O D E R N C O T T O N I N D U S T R Y IN J A P A N

29

cotton-growing districts. Cotton growing was carried on by most peasants, and even the small tenant farmers produced more or less for the market. The ever-increasing volume of trade in raw cotton, cotton yarn, and cotton cloth provided such an opportunity for profits that even the landlords began to leave their traditional profession to engage in trade and manufacturing. As will be seen later, those landlords soon took the lead in the development of the modern cotton-weaving industry in the rural areas and some of them became the leading industrialists in the cotton-spinning industry during the post-Restoration period. The Meiji Restoration and the transition from a feudal to a modern industrial society were not the result of the pressure from the Western nations but the outcome of industrial and commercial progress in the Tokugawa era. The pressure was not the cause of, but merely the occasion for, the Meiji Restoration. Then what role could the Meiji government play in the modernization of the Japanese economy? Rather, was the government the only available force for Japanese industrialization ? This question can be legitimately raised when one examines systematically the relevant historical facts, especially in the context of the history of the modern cotton industry. The Meiji government in its initial phase was in such great distress because of internal disturbances and external affairs that it could hardly have initiated any positive actions for the modernization of the economy. Internally, the power struggle among the four clans of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen had created a continuing political crisis, and there was discontent among the former feudal lords who had suffered failure in the power struggle. These problems could not easily be solved. Although the centralization of political power was achieved by the establishment of the Meiji government, four major rebellions against the new government took place within

30

S T A G E S O F I N D U S T R I A L D E V E L O P M E N T IN ASIA

five years, between 1873 and 1877. Externally, the expense of the military expeditions to Formosa in 1874 and to Korea in the following year had caused serious financial troubles.'" Therefore the Meiji government was largely deprived of its opportunities, up to 1877, to undertake a policy of encouragement for the growth of modern industries. Soon after J a p a n opened its doors to the West, the need for the introduction of a modern cotton industry was keenly felt, despite the fact that the foundation for it was unstable. Only thus could the economy maintain its independence against the inflow of foreign cotton products. Nariakira Shimazu, the famous feudal lord of the Satsuma clan, foresaw this problem as early as a few years before the opening of the country. Taheiji Hamazaki, a wealthy merchant of Satsuma, obtained 40 count of cotton yarns made by the throstle in the Ryukyu Islands to present to the lord Shimazu. T h e yarns were shipped as far as Nishijin, Kyoto, the silk-manufacturing center, with a request for an expert opinion. It was found that they were silk-cotton yams. This interested Nariakira Shimazu in cotton yarns, and he decided that the production of cotton yarns could be exploited to win the J a p a n e s e people to his favor in the future. H e finally made up his mind to establish a spinning mill in his province but he died before he could realize his dream. However, his idea was developed by his son, Yoshimitsu, and eventually the Kagoshima Cotton Spinning Works was founded in 1867 at Isonohama on the outskirts of Kagoshima in southern Kyushu. T h e mill was equipped with machinery manufactured and supplied by Plott Brothers and Company, of Oldham, Lancashire, England. There were 3,648 spindles altogether, including three sets of mules with 600 spindles each and six frames of throstles with 300 spindles each." After a government decree in 1871 abolished the clan system

T H E M O D E R N C O T T O N I N D U S T R Y IN J A P A N

31

and set up the prefecture system instead, the Kagoshima Mill was separated from the Shimazu family and reorganized into a firm, and its operation was put under the superv ision of the prefectural government. The history of the Kagoshima Mill shows a chain of continuous managerial difficulties. After going through several financial crises, the firm was finally dissolved in 1897. During the thirty years of its history, its ownership changed several times. Prince Shimazu Tadayoshi, another son of Shimazu Nariakira, erected the Sakai Spinning Mill. However, it soon faced a severe setback owing to a profligate management policy. The Meiji government purchased the mill and designated it as a model mill, but later put it up for auction ; and it was sold to Kawasaki, a merchant, who combined with fifteen other local merchants to expand it and equip it with more than 20,000 spindles." T h e histories of the Kagoshima mill and the Sakai mill are cited as examples showing that the task of modernization of the Japanese economy could not be carried out by the feudal bureaucratic class, even with continual support by the Meiji government. Japan has had to depend upon an entirely different group of industrialists to accomplish the establishment of her modern cotton industry. Confronted with the problem of introducing a modern industrial system into Japan, the Meiji government chose the development of a modern cotton industry as a major premise for that task ; but despite the enthusiasm that it applied to the promoting of the cotton industry, it was unable to bring about the desired results. In 1878 the government imported two spinning machines of 2,000 spindles each from Manchester, England, and two model mills were set up in Aichi and Hiroshima. However, the Hiroshima mill was sold, upon its completion, to a private company; the president of the company was Kameoka, who was also president of the Japanese

32

STAGES OF INDUSTRIAL

DEVELOPMENT

IN ASIA

Chamber of Commerce at that time. The Aichi mill was operrated, without much success, under government supervision until 1886, when it was finally turned over to private ownership at a substantial loss. In 1879, the government importecd ten machines of 2,000 spindles each from Manchester anad sold them to those who applied to the prefectural governmemt. Repayments were made in installments over a period of tern years without interest. Nine spinning mills and the Saga Bussain Company came into being in this way. Three other mills werre built through loans by the government and were put intto operation between 1880 and 1885. As most of those mills haad a capacity of 2,000 spindles, they were called jukki bosekki, or 2,000 spindle spinners." It is noteworthy that the 2,00)0 spindle spinners were confronted with many difficulties. Thetir business was poor, and they were operated at a loss. It may be asked why the model mills, or govemmenutsponsored mills, did not succeed despite the government t's every effort to promote their growth. Or, what was the reasoDn for the failure of the Meiji government in its effort to promoMe new industries by the introduction of Western machinery ? 0 ) n the surface, the modern system seemed to have made a starrt, but it soon faced a severe setback in all phases of the industry. Professor Ohara offers three reasons : (1) The Japanese lackeed technical know-how; (2) the mills were very small and thhe locations were unfavorable; and (3) the farmers who corrnprised the bulk of the population were in difficult circumstancces and lacked purchasing power. " This explanation, howevenr, does not seem to be adequate. If Ohara's view is valid, it is impossible to explain the very successful operation of thhe Kashima Cotton Spinning Works, the first strictly private milill, established in 1872 at Takinogawa, near Tokyo. This mill w?as exceedingly small, having only 576 spindles. The location w?as not favorable in respect to the recruiting of a labor force, thhe

T H E M O D E R N C O T T O N I N D U S T R Y IN J A P A N

33

most important factor in the operation of' a cotton-spinning mill at that time. Moreover, with regard to technical knowhow, the model mills or government-sponsored mills, both before and after the establishment of the mills, had the benefit of technical experts sent from time to time by the government to give guidance and of various measures to encourage technical improvements. There is, on the other hand, no evidence to show that the government paid any attention to the improvement of techniques in the private cotton mills. In retrospect, it can be said that the Meiji government in this period merely directed the industrialization from a patriotic standpoint and, in its hasty effort, made idealistic plans and fell short of developing realistic policies. The government was unable to grasp the rationale of the cotton industry and did not know the actual state of the Japanese economy. The managers who operated the model or sponsored mills were unable to implement the various new measures adopted by the government; also they approached their tasks with the heated patriotic ardor of the former samurai and were far from able to operate in an efficient manner. After several years of reflection, the government began to realize the futility of idealistic planning, and started to encourage the new industrialists, who were economic rationalists, and to establish a firmer foundation based on sound judgments. In 1881 the new Minister of Finance, Count Matsukata, pointed out the inefficiency of the governmental policies toward the model or sponsored mills. T h e government decided to stand behind the front line, substituting the indirect method of assistance through a monetary and fiscal policy for direct governmental participation in promoting new industries. In 1880 the reorganization of paper currencies, the establishment of the Bank of J a p a n as a currency-issuing bank, and

34

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the change of the national bank into a deposit acceptancc bank were the first among many financial changes to take place. In 1886 a conversion system of currencies was adopted, and loans of deposits in ordinary commercial banks and postal savings were permitted. Furthermore, the Bank of Japan was now able to lend far more than the deposits in its custody by the adoption of the gold reserve system. The industries soon were humming with activity owing to these monetary and fiscal measures. In 1888 the total of currency in circulation amounted to 120,000,000 yen and issues based on gold reserves were 35,000,000 yen; in 1887 bank deposits were 25,000,000 yen and postal deposits 18,500,000 yen. The low rate of bank interest for loans proved to be a great incentive for fostering the promotion and the operation of new industries in general During this period, there was a gradual tendency toward inflation which prompted investment. Inflation almost always results in a sudden rise in commodity prices and has an adverse effect on the balance of international payments. For a period of fifteen years, from 1882 to 1897, the international price of silver decreased about 40 per cent; and as this period was before Japan's adoption of the gold standard, the value of the yen vis-à-vis foreign currencies was lowered considerably to stimulate exports. Until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the balance of the international payment was well maintained. The export trade in general, and the silk and cotton yarn trade in particular, was greatly fostered by this favorable trade condition. The Yokohama Specie Bank started to engage in foreign exchange banking to facilitate transactions." After the Sino-Japanese War, the indemnity of 360,000,000 yen acquired by Japan became the reserve fund for the future adoption of the gold standard and also proved to be a great stimulant in the so-called postwar industrialization. It can be said, therefore, that the cotton-spinning industry during this

35

T H E MODERN COTTON I N D U S T R Y IN J A P A N

period financial

was

assisted

by

the

revision

of

the

monetary

and

systems; and the cotton industry, in turn, contributed

to the d e v e l o p m e n t of m o d e r n monetary and

financial

institu-

tions in J a p a n .

As has been stated, the cotton-spinning industry expanded rapidly during the last two decades of the nineteenth century; the output of cotton yarns rose from 16,217 bales in 1886 to 108,374 bales in 1890 and jumped to 304,584 bales in 1894. T h e number of spindles almost doubled — f r o m 687,000 to 1,350,900-between 1895 and 1899. These figures leave no room for doubt that the monetary and fiscal policies affecting industrialization were successfully implemented during that period, the most significant period in the development of the Japanese cotton industry. A t the same time, the cotton industry, liberated from the direct guidance of the government, entered the era of the so-called transformation, or noninterference. T h e civilian entrepreneurs of various industries, particularly of the cotton-spinning industry, were forced to go through an arduous period without any direct outside help. T h e y now had to import new technical methods and improve business operations on their own initiative. N o story of an industry can be without ups and downs, pioneering vision, boldness, and rashness. T h e history of the modern cotton industry of Japan reflects the contradictions that abound in the process of growth.

4.

The Merchant

Class and the Rise of the

Cotton-Spinning

Industry W e have seen that, in the promoting of new industries, direct governmental participation and bureaucratic management had, in most cases, undesirable results. Then what social groups, if not the governmental bureaucrats, played a leading role in the advancement of the modern cotton industry in

36

S T A G E S OF I N D U S T R I A L D E V E L O P M E N T IN ASIA

J a p a n ? To mention the conclusion first, the merchant class played the leading role in the advancement of the modern cotton-spinning industry and the wealthy peasant class in the case of the cotton-weaving industry. Needless to say, the differences in these new industrial groups led to unbalanced development of the cotton-spinning and weaving industries. We shall attempt to clarify this point. As we stated earlier, the first successful cotton-spinning mill to be founded without governmental aid was the Kashima mill. It was promoted in 1872 by Manpei Kashima, a cotton merchant in Tokyo. Kashima was a son of a rice merchant and, after his father's death, became a cotton merchant, engaged in trading raw and ginned cotton. He was the founder of the Tokyo Merchants Association and the first to introduce Japanese raw cotton to the foreign market. In the latter part of the Tokugawa period, his trade thrived, and his wealth was such that at one time he made a loan of 2,000 ryo to Kihachiro Okura, the founder of the Okura Company, which had large interests in trade, mining, and textiles.1* There is a record of the mental agitation which preceded the flotation of his spinning mill. In 1864 when soaring commodity prices in the castle town of Edo (Tokyo) placed citizens under the goad of poverty, the Shogunate asked the wholesalers of Edo to tell him how to cut prices. Kashima suggested that prices for cotton cloth be cut by introducing foreign-style machines to help save labor. The following year, the Shogunate informally ordered a cotton spinning mill built and enlisted his friends as sponsors to make it a reality. But the task of establishing a foreign-style cotton mill involved much difficulty and the sponsors sloughed off one by one during the disturbances of the Restoration. In 1867 a shipment of 576 spinning machines arrived at Yokohama from an American company and were to be installed at Kashima's plant. He was then in financial distress.

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37

Financial support was given by the House of Mitsui and finally, after several failures, the machines were successfully installed in 1872 by Stevenson, an American engineer, who was the third foreigner hired for the job.'4 After the machines were set up, Kashima himself spent days and nights at the mill, devoting his best efforts to raising the efficiency of the operation. Unlike the model mills or government-sponsored mill, the Kashima mill thrived and established a pattern for the future development of the cotton-spinning industry.15 A decade elapsed between the time when the Kashima Spinning Mill was established and another private spinning mill was founded. This, in Osaka, was the Osaka Spinning Company, the predecessor of the Toyo Spinning Company. The company was the idea and project of Eiichi Shibusawa, a pioneer and leader in the Meiji era, and was undertaken with ambitious plans and ample preparations. In July, 1883, the mill was completed; it was equipped with 10,500 spindles. As is well known, it was the first mill in J a p a n to adopt a modern large-scale production method. Eiichi Shibusawa, the founder, was born in the merchant class. At the age of fourteen, he entered business and built up a trade in dyestuffs on his own account. In 1873 he became the president of the First National Bank of Tokyo after serving in the Ministry of Finance. Being the president of the bank, he was able to interest ten important cotton merchants of Osaka and Tokyo in contributing to the establishment of the company. These were Fujita, Densaburo, Matsumoto, Chutaro, Satsuma, Chihei, Komuro, Nobuo, Kakinuma, and Danio. Fujita, who was engaged in the brewing of "Sake," the national liquor made from rice, with his father, built up a large trade in Osaka after the Restoration. Beginning in 1873, he established several Westem-style business companies, including a hydroelectric company. As the largest investor, he was

38

S T A G E S OF I N D U S T R I A I . D E V E L O P M E N T IN ASIA

appointed the first president of the Osaka Spinning Company. Matsumoto was engaged in the importation of foreign goods and had become an expert on Western business methods; later he established the 130th National Bank and was president of several railway companies. H e was appointed the president of the Osaka Spinning Company in 1881. Satsuma and K a k i n u m a were well-known cotton merchants of Tokyo. K o m u r o was a son of a textile wholesaler * In addition to these and the other merchants, several feudal aristocrats made a considerable investment. This does not mean that the feudal aristocrats became industrialists in the cotton industry; rather, a group of them let Shibusawa invest their savings at his discretion, and he invested their funds in the Osaka Spinning C o m p a n y . " T h e managerial staff of the company was composed of traders who were exporters of cotton goods and engineers who were specialists in cotton spinning machinery. From the outset the Osaka Spinning Company avoided the economic disadvantages of small-scale operation. This was at a time when the majority of J a p a n e s e mills were equipped with only 2,000 spindles, in sharp contrast to the British mills, which were equipped with 10,000 spindles. T h e Osaka Spinning Company started with 10,500 spindles and achieved success through large-scale operation. According to records released by the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, the Osaka Spinning Mill distributed dividends based on the following yearly profit percentage; 6 per cent in 1883, 18 per cent in 1884, 11 per cent in 1885, 30 per cent in 1887, 33 per cent in 1888, and 20 per cent in 1889. 7 * This successful operation encouraged other industrialists to expand the scale of operation of their mills. In 1914 the Osaka Spinning C o m p a n y and the Miye Spinning Mill were merged and became the T o y o Spinning

T H E MODERN C O T T O N I N D U S T R Y IN J A P A N

39

Company. The Miye Spinning Mill was one of the ten mills founded initially by the government between 1880 and 1885. The mill was handed over to a private group, composed of three merchants named Ito, under the condition that the original capital invested in the mill by the government should be repaid within a ten-year period. One of the merchants, R. Ito, resigned his post in order to concentrate on his raw-silk exporting trade. The Miye Mill was then operated by the other two, who acquired their wealth in the rice-wine business, a booming industry in the latter part of the Tokugawa period. In 1887 Manpei Kashima and some other cotton merchants in Tokyo established the Tokyo Spinning Company, with capital of 500,000 yen; it had 10,000 spindles. At that time, there were two groups among the Tokyo cotton merchants, one composed of those who had operated their businesses since the Tokugawa period and the other of those who had entered commercial life in the Meiji era. In the former group were Manpei Kashima and his son, and the Oju, Hasekawa, Kawakita, Nishikawa, Aoki, and Seki firms. In the latter were the Mitsukoshi Cotton, Arao, Okuda, and Yamamoto firms. In 1887 merchants belonging to the latter group established the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company, with capital of 1,000,000 yen." The Kanegafuchi company erected its first mill, with 29,000 spindles, near Tokyo. Six years later, another mill was erected at Kobe. By 1899 the Kanegafuchi company had a capacity of 83,640 spindles. At the end of 1903 it emerged as the leading cotton spinning company in Japan, with a capacity of 218,080 spindles.10 Finally, we would like to touch upon the formation of the Dai Nippon Spinning Company, which became one of the three giant spinning companies in Japan, the other being the Kanegafuchi company and the Toyo company (formerly the Osaka Spinning Company). A cotton merchant named Yokei

40

S T A G E S O F I N D U S T R I A I . D E V E L O P M E N T IN ASIA

Nakatsuka organized the Ozaki Spinning Company at Ozaki, Hyogo prefecture, with financial investments from twenty-four merchants and landlords and loans from four banks in Osaka. In 1890 the first mill was erected, with 9,216 spindles; three years later, a second mill, with 20,612 spindles; and then four years later, a third mill, with 19,064 spindles." In 1908 the Ozaki Spinning Company absorbed the Toyo Textile Company. Later, in 1914, it absorbed the Tokyo Spinning Company, which was founded by Manpei Kashima and other cotton merchants in Tokyo. Further, in 1916 it absorbed the Nihon Spinning Company and in 1918 the Settu Spinning Company. Upon the completion of these mergers, the Ozaki Company changed its name to the Dai Nippon Spinning Company." One of the reasons for the rapid expansion of the Dai Nippon company was that the first president of the company was a very industrious and influential person in the financial and business circles in Osaka. Since the officers of the company were wealthy merchants and bankers, it was in a favorable financial position for successful performance. In reviewing the histories of the first private cotton spinning mill and the three giant cotton spinning companies, we find that the purely private companies of the merchant class, standing on their own feet, prospered to such an extent that they became outstanding and important industries. It is to be remembered that landlords and bankers also invested money in the cotton spinning industry. In order to clarify the social character of the pioneering industrialists in the Japanese cotton spinning industry, a few words should be added as to the backgrounds of the landlords and bankers of the early days of the Meiji era. We shall begin with the case of the landlords. About the middle of the Tokugawa era, many successful merchants began to penetrate the rural economy. They started to manage agriculture on the reclaimed fields (shinden) and

THE MODERN COTTON I N D U S T R Y IN J A P A N

41

in this they made great advances. As the area of cultivated land was expanded, the influence of the merchants was also increased through their control of the land. By 1853 merchants controlled more than 30 per cent of the cultivated land." The Osaka merchants were particularly active in reclaiming fields and becoming landlords. They were content to remain rentreceivers, seldom interesting themselves directly in agricultural matters. The Konoike family, one of the old-established commercial families of Osaka, was well known as a landowner among the Osaka merchants; the Mitsui family was the largest landowner in Mikawa Province."4 In this respect, as a social class they might be called merchants. Next we shall consider the background of the bankers in the early Meiji era. In November, 1872, the National Bank Act was promulgated. As a result of the promulgation, four national banks were established by high-ranking samurai and wealthy merchants such as the House of Mitsui and the Ono Kumi (the well-known silk exporters). It is noteworthy that all of the investors in the Second National Bank were merchants who since the opening of Japanese ports to foreign commerce had been engaged in international trade in Yokohama. According to Professor Sugano's investigations, after 1876 there were fourteen national banks established in Tokyo by sixty-two entrepreneurs, of whom thirty-nine were highranking samurai and twenty-three were prominent merchants. In contrast, in Osaka ten national banks were established by fifty-three entrepreneurs, of whom forty-three were merchants and only eleven were former samurai." From these facts, it can be seen that the merchants played a decisive role in the development of the early banking business. As the histories of the Osaka Spinning Company and the Dai Nippon Spinning Company show, the merchants, having established themselves as bankers, launched out successfully as industrial pioneers.

42

S T A G E S O F I N D U S T R I A L D E V E L O P M E N T IN ASIA

Consequently, the cotton spinning industry was financially in a favorable position. For instance, the total amount of fixed capital in cotton spinning companies in 1919 was 143 million yen; by 1923 it had tripled; and by 1931 it had increased fourfold to 563 million yen." T h e financial position of the Japanese cotton spinning industry then was far above that of any Asian competition and was even superior to that of the Lancashire spinning mills. 5. The Wealthy Peasants and Cotton-Weaving Industry

the Modernization

of the

As was stated earlier, the rise of the mercantile system of economy during the Tokugawa period created a new social and economic force, the merchant class. It is also noteworthy that commercial developments stimulated the agricultural sector of the nation's economy. T h e peasants began to seek profits in the commercial centers to which they brought their crops. T h e importance of the cotton industry is especially to be noted in the context of these new economic phenomena. A great number of the middle-level cotton-cultivating farmers became the local cotton traders." T o those who could afford to change their professions, the cotton trade offered the greatest chance for the accumulation of wealth. Thus, the raw cotton, cotton yarn, and cotton cloth were brought in to Osaka and Edo through the watakai, or cotton dealers, from the districts of Kinai, the Setonaikai coast, and Tokai, which were centers of cotton producing and weaving. T h e goods thus brought in were again distributed by the cotton tonya, or wholesalers, to the markets all over the country. T h e cotton trade had thus enriched not only the city merchants but also the provincial cotton merchants. Among the successful provincial cotton merchants, Genzo Shono can be indicated as a typical example. One of the Omi

T H E M O D E R N C O T T O N I N D U S T R Y IN J A P A N

43

merchants, Shono made a great fortune out of the cotton trade with the Shinetsu and Kanto districts. He was able to invest a substantial amount of capital in the Osaka and Kyoto areas." For the purpose of our study, it is necessary to examine the effects of the mercantile system on the rural economy. First, the new economic opportunities attracted the interest of the wealthy farmers. A great number of them came to participate in trading and manufacturing enterprises, which seemed to promise new sources of profits, while they still practiced their traditional occupations. Those were called, as a group, the Gono." Through their participation, the rural cotton industry made a shift from the cottage to the domestic system. Here it should be noted that the cotton industry in the rural areas was mainly concerned with the weaving of cloth. Second, the prosperous new mercantile economy caused the emergence of wage laborers, recruited among poor peasants who owned a small piece of land or none at all. T h e separation of the poor peasants from agriculture was more evident in the areas of cotton growing and weaving than in the areas devoted to other crops. For instance, in 1854, out of twenty-three families in Watamura village, Nigata Province, where rice growing had been dominant, only two families became wage laborers, while in Otorimura village, one of the well-known cotton growing and weaving centers in the Kinai district, forty-three families, or 35 per cent of the total population, became wage laborers.10 The same phenomenon occurred in other cotton growing and weaving areas. In the Bisai district, one of the main cotton growing and weaving areas, next to the Kinai district in importance, 160 persons became wage laborers in the same year." These wage laborers worked in the cotton-weaving workshops established by the Gono. So far, we have seen that the structural foundations for the

44

STAGES OF INDUSTRIAL D E V E L O P M E N T

IN ASIA

modernization of the Japanese cotton-weaving industry were already well established before the Meiji Restoration. Nevertheless, under the new economic conditions prevailing after the Meiji Restoration, the development of the cotton-weaving industry did not keep pace with that of the cotton-spinning industry. What were the factors making for slowness in the modernization of the Japanese cotton-weaving industry ? With regard to this question, an examination of the cases of three main cotton-weaving districts may prove useful. In Mikawa Province, mostly depressed small-scale farmers inhabited the district, the reason being that the arable lands were quite limited in extent. Being unable to raise necessary living expenses by crop cultivation, the small-scale farmers kept cotton weaving as their subsidiary occupation. Therefore, the emergence of professional cotton weavers could hardly be expected. These unspecialized cotton weavers generally were peasant householders. Lacking organizational and financial independence, they were under the control of the provincial merchants through whom they could sell their products. T h e transactions were carried on through the "putting out" system. Under this system, the provincial merchants made some advance payments to the weavers who needed them as production funds, but they were not in a position to supply them with cotton yarn, the most important material in weaving cotton cloth. That was the situation before the Restoration, and even in the first decade of the Meiji era no noticeable changes took place in the structure of the cotton-weaving industry of the district. But as the shiromomen, or dyed cloth, was in great demand from local consumers, the provincial merchants (mostly of wealthy peasant origin) could gradually liberate themselves from the city merchants and exert their own independent influences in the newly expanded markets. Because of

T H E M O D E R N C O T T O N I N D U S T R Y IN JAPAN

45

the increasing demand for dyed cotton cloth, some provincial merchants began to install workshops in the back yards of their houses for weaving with a small number of Jacquard looms, first introduced from Europe in 1874.'" Employing wage laborers, the workshops produced a substantial volume of dyed cotton cloth. This was a new phenomenon, from the structural aspect of the cotton-weaving industry. It is noteworthy that the cotton-weaving industry in Mikawa Province entered upon a manufacturing system between domestic industry and the factory system through the efforts of provincial merchants." While these changes were taking place, a similar change had occurred in the use of cotton yarns. Weavers in Mikawa Province began to use imported machine-made yarn about 1885. On the other hand, owing to the rapid development of the foreign-style cotton-spinning industry, hand-spun yarns virtually disappeared from the markets about 1896. The provincial merchants could for the first time supply yarn to the weavers along with their orders for cotton cloth. The direct transactions between the provincial merchant and the weavers, however, were always accompanied by inefficiencies and inconveniences, and out of the necessity for overcoming these ill effects there emerged a group of people who came to assume the intermediary function between the merchants and the weavers. The intermediaries were called "merchant clothiers," and most of them came from the wealthy peasant class. In certain villages, the number of merchant clothiers reached about forty or fifty." During the Sino-Japanese War, when the cotton industry enjoyed a great boom, many of the merchant clothiers established their own small-scale workshops, equipped with twenty to forty sets of weaving looms." About 1910 the merchant clothiers began to employ power looms and by 1916 some weaving mills thus equipped were in operation under the modern factory system*

46

STAGES OF INDUSTRIAL

DEVELOPMENT

IN

ASIA

Now we shall examine, secondly, the development of the cotton-weaving industry in the Kinai district, which included Kochi, Izumi, and Y a m a t o provinces. In this district, the division of labor in the cotton industry was already fairly well established in the 1830's. Each of the processes of cotton farming, ginning, cleaning, spinning, reeling, and weaving was carried out by different groups of people. Accordingly, the cotton merchants could easily penetrate the industry in the early stages of its development. Later on, the cotton merchants organized monopolistic guilds in accordance with their specialities, such as raw cotton, ginned cotton, cotton yarn, and cotton cloth. As a result, cotton transactions were handled exclusively by them." As in other weaving centers, the merchants controlled the weavers by providing production funds. Since the division of labor was customary, those funds were generally distributed to the group of master weavers, who used them to buy looms that were " p u t o u t " among the weaving farmers. In Izumi Province there appeared forty master weavers between 1840 and 1844, each of whom could put out about 1,000 looms.4* From the master weavers came many of the merchant clothiers of the post-Restoration period. As to the use of yarns, the Kinai district began to use imported machine-made yarns relatively earlier than other weaving centers. By 1874 the use of both imported y a m s and domestic hand-spun yarns was common." At the same time, the looms were improved, being changed from the handoperated to the foot-operated type. The credit for this is due largely to the merchant clothiers, although the cotton merchants made a considerable contribution. Also, to the early development of the merchant clothiers in the weaving industry of the Kinai district is due the early introduction of machinem a d e yams. Moreover, the cloth made of machine-made yarns was so far superior in quality that it completely superseded the

T H E MODERN COTTON I N D U S T R Y IN J A P A N

47

popular maoka cotton cloth which was made of hand-spun yi yarns. Finally, wc shall examine the development of the cottonweaving industry in the Owari district. Chita Province was a well-known weaving center in this district. The annual cotton cloth p 1 oduction of Chita Province rose from about 20,000 tons in 1830 to 500,000 tons in the period 1847-53. These figures indicate how prominent the Owari weaving district was during the later Tokugawa period. One of the important reasons for the rapid development of the Owari weaving industry was its adoption of machine-made yams. When the weavers began to use both the machine-made yarns produced by domestic spinning mills and the imported yarns, merchant clothiers developed the home manufacturing system by supplying yarns and looms to the weavers, who were paid wages. The social and economic position which the wealthy fanners had come to occupy may be illustrated by the following example. In Bisai Province, one of the main weaving centers in the Owari district, a certain village composed of forty-five fanning households had only three households which produced more than five koku of rice; there were thirty-five households of small-scale farmers who produced less than five koku; the remaining seven households had no land of their own and engaged in wage labor. Whereas in other weaving districts, it usually was the wealthy farmers who rose to the status of master weavers, in the Owari district it was the small-scale peasants who later became master weavers, giving up crop farming. This is rather a peculiar feature, found only in the weaving industry of this district. After 1897 the small-scale peasants began to occupy the status of "merchant-manufacturers," and as industrialization proceeded they became the owners of foreign-style weaving mills which were equipped with power looms."

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STAGES OF INDUSTRIAL D E V E L O P M E N T

IN ASIA

It would be instructive to cast a glance at the story of the old-established maoka cotton-cloth-weaving industry. The maoka cloth was produced in Ibaraki Province, near Tokyo, and before the Meiji Restoration it enjoyed utmost popularity. The challenge of the new cloth made from the machine-made yarns resulted in the decline of the maoka-weaving industry and finally in its fall in 1877." This unfortunate fate of the maoka weaving industry probably was aggravated by the fact that the wealthy peasants had not been given a chance to participate in the industry.. The revival of the cotton-weaving industry in this district had to wait until the power loom began to be employed in 1912. By 1916, the industry was again thriving, equipped with power looms. It is to be noted that more than 80 per cent of the owners of the new weaving mills were merchant clothiers, of wealthy farmer origin.53 It is quite easy to see from the preceding examples that the wealthy and middle-scale farmers played a decisive role in the modernization of the cotton-weaving industry in Japan. In the case of the silk-reeling industry, on the contrary, landlords from among the former samurai class, with sufficient capital, began to invest and became industrialists. Among them, Hayami Kenso of the Maebashi clan and Chojun Sasaki of the Fukui clan were leaders in contributing to the modernization of the industryHowever, we could not find any evidence showing that former samurai became the masters of industry in the field of cotton weaving. Despite the progress that was taking place in the cottonweaving industry in various places, it was only in the second decade of the twentieth century that hand operation was completely supplanted by mechanical power in some of the advanced weaving mills. Hand looms were still widely in use as the important tool for the production of cotton cloth. In number, hand looms were dominant. In 1900 there were more

THE MODERN COTTON I N D U S T R Y IN J A P A N

49

than 700,000 hand looms, while the total number of power looms was only 32,000." Even in the Chita district, the most advanced of all in mechanical establishments, power looms numbered not more than 76 per cent in 1912." Only in 1923 did the number of power looms become nearly equivalent to that of hand looms on a national scale. In that year, there were 159,000 hand looms and 146,598 power looms. By 1928 the number of hand looms had declined to 98,520 and represented only 27 per cent of the total, as compared to 271,427 power looms." Incidentally, it is to be noted that, after the First World War, both the production and the export of Japanese cotton cloth increased in importance. For instance, the value of cotton cloth exports rose from 35,845,000 yen in 1913 to 76,746,000 yen in 1918 and from 105,035,000 yen in 1923 to 213,465,000 yen in 1928." The value for 1928 was nearly six times that of 1913. Until the beginning of the 1920's, finished cotton cloth —such as bleached cloth and printed cloth, the main products of the large-scale spinning-weaving companies—was mostly exported. After the war, however, the gray clothes, the main products of the rural weaving industry, began to be exported owing to the opening up of markets in India and the South Sea Islands. As a result, the rural weaving industry which had been developed with single-breadth weaving machines took up manufacturing for export by the use of double-width weaving machines. Thus, the opening up of these markets led to the modernization of the rural cottonweaving industry. In view of the facts set forth here, we are not in a position to accept the assertion of some Japanese scholars that the industrial revolution of the Japanese economy was initiated during the period 1882-1895 and reached its peak in 1905, the year of the Russo-Japanese War."

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STAGES OF INDUSTRIAL D E V E L O P M E N T

IN ASIA

If we follow the reasoning of Western historians who regard the British industrial revolution in the cotton-weaving industry as having been accomplished in the 1860's, when hand looms were finally superseded by power looms, we can say that the Japanese industrial revolution in the same field was accomplished in the 1920's. W e shall now touch upon the reasons for the severe disparity in tempo of development between the cotton-spinning industry and the cotton-weaving industry in J a p a n . As we have seen, the traditional cotton industry in J a p a n , having been displaced in the spinning operation first through the competition of imported machine-made yarns and later through the domestic machine-made yarns, directed its activities to the weaving process. At the same time, the advances of the provincial merchants in the field of the rural weaving industry offered a challenge to the city merchants. Being no longer assured of their rural interests, the city merchants turned to the cottonspinning industry and found in it prospects of new and greater profits. T h e tendency of the city merchants to launch out as industrialists in the spinning industry was apparent in Osaka and Tokyo (formerly Edo). T h e freeing of agricultural land ownership created other new industrialists among landowners who came from the merchant class; being free from feudalistic land taxes, they were able to invest in the spinning industry by raising sufficient funds from their lands. In addition, many bankers, with sufficient capital, started to invest in the spinning industry. As a result, the cotton-spinning industry came to be separated from the cotton-weaving industry and followed its own course of rapid development. O n the other hand, the industrialists who guarded the cotton-weaving industry and were responsible for its modernization were mostly the wealthy farmers. Thus, the capital for the modernization of the cotton-

THF. MODERN COTTON I N D U S T R Y IN J A P A N

51

spinning and weaving industries came from quite different economic groups. The rural weaving industry under the management of the wealthy farmers was always operated on a small scale, even after the power loom was introduced, because their accumulated capital was very meager. We are told that in a certain village in the Mikawa district, in 1907, there were three weaving mills employing twenty to twenty-four weavers each, another three mills employing fifteen to nineteen weavers each, and twelve mills employing ten to fourteen weavers each; in 1910 there were four weaving mills employing twenty to twenty-four weavers each, six employing fifteen to nineteen weavers each, and eight employing ten to fourteen weavers each." In 1927, Professor Orchard described the situation in the Nagoya district, one of the main cotton weaving centers, as follows : About half of the output of cloth is for export and the other half is for consumption in Japan. There is one large factory of 2,000 looms for the weaving of export cloth, but the average size of these factories is 20 to 30 looms. The largest factory weaving cloth for Japanese consumption has only 30 looms, and most of them have only 10. A large quantity of yarn is also sent to domestic workshops with one to three looms." According to the returns from the Department of Commerce and Industry, at the end of 1927 the total number of weaving looms in Japan was 369,072. Out of this total, 71,794 belonged to the associated spinning companies; the rest represented small weavers of all kinds.'2 It is evident from the above figures that the vast majority of weaving mills in Japan were of small dimension. How, then, did the small-scale weaving industry come to retain such an important position in the Japanese cottonweaving industry ? Some think that overpopulation is the chief factor in the continuation of small industries as well as poor

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STAGES OF INDUSTRIAL D E V E L O P M E N T

IN ASIA

peasant farming." In the case of Japan, a connection between small industries and overpopulation cannot be denied. T h e pressure of population influences industry as a whole. But the true reason should be sought within the process of industrialization. As we have seen, the huge accumulated wealth in the hands of merchants, landlords, and bankers was invested in the cotton-spinning industry during the post-Restoration period, while the cotton-weaving industry has been operated on the limited capital of the wealthy or middle-scale farmers, plus the boundless drudgery of this group. Granting that population pressure exists, we can see that the pressure has been aggravated by the meager supply of industrial capital. This is the reason why the small-scale cotton-weaving industry continued to grow side by side with the large-scale cotton-spinning industry. 6.

Summary

In J a p a n sizable wealthy social classes already existed by the end of the Tokugawa period, and the wealth accumulated in their hands provided an important source of investment funds for the modernization of the Japanese cotton industry. Prosperous merchants and big landlords mobilized their savings for the modernization of the spinning section of the cotton industry. On the other hand, wealthy farmers were able to utilize limited amounts from their savings for the modernization of the weaving section. There appeared an ever growing gap in the stages of development between the spinning and weaving sections of the industry. Owing to these differences in capital accumulation, small-scale enterprises have been dominant in the weaving section and large-scale enterprises in the spinning section. It is important to bear in mind this dual character of the industrial organization in the Japanese cotton industry in order

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53

to understand the present features of the Japanese industrial system in general and to see why the small-scale industries are still today holding a crucial position in the Japanese economy. The existence of the wealthy classes such as merchants, landlords, and wealthy farmers was one of Japan's initial conditions for industrial development, and as such is not to be seen as part of the initial condition of other Asiatic countries. Needless to say, the wealthy classes were, certainly, a source from which it was possible for the government to obtain capital for its sponsored enterprises, and it is to be granted that the government enterprises played an important role in the industrial development of Japan. But it must be emphasized that the role of the government as a direct investor was insignificant compared to the establishment and maintenance of a monetary and fiscal structure conducive to industrial development. Finally, without the existence of the wealthy classes and without the establishment of the monetary and fiscal institutions, the heights of Japan's industrialization could not have been reached.

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Notes 1. Clark, W. A. Graham, Cotton Goods in Japan, United States Department of Commerce (Washington: 1914), p. 118. 2. Iijima, Banji, Nihon Boseki Shi (History of the Japanese Cotton Industry) (Tokyo: 1949), pp. 112-113. 3. Kaneko, Kentaro, "Recent Condition of the Cotton Spinning Industry in J a p a n , " The Far East (Kokumin-no-Tomo), Volume I, No. 2 (March 20, 1896), p. 11. 4. Ohara, Keishi, Japanese Trade and Industry in the Meiji- Taisho Era, (Tokyo: 1957), p. 341. 5. Clark, op. cit., p. 116. 6. Kado, Z., Kajinishi, M., Ouchi, J., and K o j i m a , K., Nihon Shihonshugi no Hutsden (Development of the Japanese Capitalist Economy) (Tokyo: 1961), I, 267. 7. Iijima, op. cit., p. 116. 8. Mitsubishi Economic Research Bureau, Japanese Trade and Industry (London: 1936), p. 237. 9. Ibid., p. 24. Also see Orchard, John E., Japan's Economic Position (New York: 1930), p. 117. 10. Utley, Freda, Japan's Feet of Clay (New Y o r k : 1935), pp. 7879. 11. Aonuma, Yoshimatsu, "Ziho Sangyo no G e n j o " (Position of the Small and Middle Sized Weavers in Japan's Cotton Industry), Mita Gakkax Zasshi (Mita Journal of Economics) ( J a n u a r y : 1956), p. 17. 12. Ueda, Deijiro, " T h e Japanese Economic Policy in 1884," Kokumin Keizai Zasshi (Journal of Economics and Business Administration), (April: 1914), p. 2. 13. Okuma, Count, " T h e Industrial Revolution in J a p a n , " North American Review (November, 1900), p. 632. 14. Miyamoto, Mataji, Economic and Social Development of Osaka in the Tokugawa Era, Osaka Economic Papers, edited by Osaka University, Vol. I l l , No. 1, pp. 11-28. 15. Koda, Shigemoto (ed.), Osakashi Shi (History of Osaka), 191114, I, 309, 409, 1084, 1086-1087. 16. Kobayashi, Ushisaburo, War and Armament Loans of Japan (New York: 1922), pp. 5-6. 17. Iijima, op. cit., ρ 14. 18. Kinukawa, Taichi, Nihon Manshi Boseki Shi (History of the Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry) (Tokyo: 1937), I, 118-122. 19. The Imperial Japanese Commission, Japan in the Beginning of the 20th Century (Tokyo: 1904), p. 415. 20. Ohara, op. cit., pp. 330-331. 21. Allen, G., A Short Economic History of Modern Japan (London: 1956), p. 48. 22. Sarasa, Phra, Money and Banking in Japan (London: 1940), pp. 137, 158-159.

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55

23. Iijïma, op. cit., pp. 298, 312. 24. Smith, Thomas C., Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan (Stanford: 1955), p. 61. 25. Iijima, op. cit., p. 25. 26. Sugano, Wataro, Nihon Kaishakigyoshi (History of WesternStyle Business Companies in Japan) (Tokyo: 1930), pp. 657-658. Also Shibusawa Denkishiro (Records and Documents for the Biography of Eiichi Shibusawa) (Tokyo: 1956), X , 13-15. 27. Kinukawa, op. cit., X I , 371-372. 28. Ibid., pp. 4 2 3 - 4 2 4 . 29. Ibid., pp. 3 1 6 - 3 1 8 . 30. Clark, op. cit., p. 57. 31. Dai Nippon Spinning Company "Dainippon Boseki Kabushikikaisha 50 nen S h i " (Fifty Years of the Dai Nippon Spinning Company) (Osaka: 1941), pp. 7 - 9 , 33, 3 6 - 3 7 , 38. 32. Ibid., pp. 6 2 - 7 7 . 33. Tsuchiya, T a k a o , The Development of Economic Life in Japan, (Tokyo: 1936), p. 25. Also Sheldon, Charles D., The Rise of the Merchant Class in Tokugawa Japan (New York: 1958), p. 97. 34. Sugano, op. cit., pp. 502, 505. 35. Ibid., pp. 609, 611, 617. 36. Uyeda, Teijiro, The Small Industries of Japan (London : 1933), p. 69. 37. Kitashima, M., The Edo Period (Edo Jidai) (Tokyo: 1958), p. 142. 38. Nishikawa, Yoshio, " T h e Trend of the Early Capitalism in the Period of Genroku-Kyoho Era-Case of Genzo Shono in Hino of O m i " (in Japanese), Journal of History (September, 1959), p. 95. 39. Shoji, K., " T h e Existing Form of Capital in Fukushima in the Early period of M e i j i , " Rekishigaku Kenkyu (Journal of Historical Studies), C L X X (1954), 2. 40. Takasawa, Y., " T h e Differentiation of the Peasantry and Landlord System," Nihonshi Kenkyu (Studies in Japanese History) (March, 1960), pp. 3 3 - 3 6 . 41. Nakamura, T . , " T h e Rural Industry in the Later Tokugawa Period," Nihonshi Kenkyu (Studies in Japanese History) (March, 1960), p. 42. 42. Suzuki, Tetsuzo, "Higashimikawa ni okeru Menorimonogyo no Hatten" (The Development of the Textile Industry in Eastern Mikawa District), Keizai Sirin (Economic Review), Vol. 19, No. 1 (January, 1951), pp. 108-109. 43. Kajinishi, Mitsuhaya, Nihon ni okeru Sangyoshihon no Keisei (The Rise of Industrial Capital in Japan) (Tokyo: 1949), p. 159. 44. Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 116-117. 45. Kajinishi, op. cit., p. 162. 46. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 120. 47. Kajinishi, op. cit., pp. 136.

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DEVELOPMENT

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48. Asada, Κ. and Nakamura, S., Nihon Shihonshugishakai Ketseishi ( T h e Development of Capitalism in J a p a n ; ( T o k y o : 1947 . ρ 140. 49. Kajinishi, op. cit., p. 139. 50. Ibid., pp. 1 5 1 - 1 5 2 . 51. Nakamura, T . , op. cit., p. 42. 52. Seki, Junya, "Development of Cotton Spinning Industry in the Early Years of M e i j i " (in Japanese), Keizai Ronso (Economic Review) (September, 1961), p. 3. 53. Kajinishi, op. cit., p. 142. 54. Ohara, op. cit., p. 221. 55. Allen, op. cit., p. 67. 56. Asada and Nakamura, op. cit., p. 279. 57. I i j i m a , op. cit., p. 167. 58. Ohara, op. cit., p. 356. 59. Kajinishi, M., K a d o , T . , O j i m a , K . and Ouchi, T . , Nihon ni okaru Shihonshugi no Hatten ( T h e Development of Capitalism in J a p a n ) ( T o k y o : 1961), pp. 5 3 - 5 4 . 60. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 124. 61. Orchard, op. cit., p. 117. 62. " J a p a n ' s Spinning Industry in C h i n a , " The Japan Magazine, Vol. X X , No. 4 (January, 1930), p. 182. 63. Yamanaka, Tokutaro, " T h e Nature of Small Industries," Annals of the Hitotsubashi Academy, V o l . V I , No. 1 (October, 1953), p. 6.

II Labor Supply and Labor Policy in the Japanese Cotton Industry 1. The Rise of Wage Labor and Characteristics the Japanese Cotton Industry WAGE

of Labor

in

LABOR HAS PLAYED QUITE AS IMPORTANT A ROLE AS

other factors in the rapid development of the Japanese cotton industry during the past century. By examining the historical process of the rise of wage labor in the industry, the basic peculiarity of labor policy in Japan, and the root cause of the cheapness of Japanese labor, one may understand more fully the historical contribution of wage labor toward the development of the Japanese cotton industry. By reviewing the historical relation of wage labor to the cotton industry, one may also find how mistakenly the Japanese scholars as well as businessmen had interpreted the existence of her competitive advantages in the world market. They had contented themselves with their conclusion arrived at solely from the comparative study of unit costs of production between the Japanese cotton industry and that of other countries. Another element that cannot be belittled of its importance in this study is the overwhelming percentage of female workers 57

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S T A G E S O F I N D U S T R I A I . D E V E L O P M E N T IN ASIA

in the labor composition in the cotton-spinning and weaving industry in J a p a n . This labor composition, producing different problems of female workers, is closely related to the problems of overpopulation and will be extensively analyzed in the context of the objects of the present study. In the course of study, comparisons were frequently drawn with Indian cases, not for the sake of a comparative study, but to point out more clearly the peculiarities of labor supply and labor policy in the Japanese cotton industry. It has been generally believed that there had been four distinct social classes during the infant phase of industrialization in J a p a n : (1) dispossessed peasantry; (2) artisans; (3) lower ranked Samurai or fighting soldiers, who suddenly plunged into the depths of poverty after the Meiji Restoration of 1868; and (4) the urban fluid group.' However, the female labor of the farming communities, more than any other class, has constituted the most important source of labor supply in the Japanese cotton industry ever since the beginning of its development. The samurai, or the warrior class, who traditionally belonged to their feudal lords, lived on hereditary pensions. But, after the Restoration, the feudal pension for the samurai class was stopped altogether and the lower-ranked samurai, numbering about two million including dependents and families, consequently suffered great hardships. 1 The Meiji government, in order to moderate the mounting discontent of the displaced people, had granted them about two million yen and furthermore stimulated them to be the masters of the silk industry. However, they were not experienced in their new trade, and mostly failed. Thus, although they added to the potential of wage labor, there is not sufficient evidence to indicate that they formed the dominant source of labor supply in the cotton industry. Although there are some scholars who claim that the

LABOR S U P P L Y AND LABOR

POLICY

59

young girls of samurai had supplied the wage labor in silkreeling factories, there is no evidence permitting the conclusion that they supplied the wage labor in cotton spinning and weaving. 3 Thus, from the time of its emergence, the cotton industry of Japan had an unique labor composition in which young female labor occupied a remarkably dominant position. There are two aspects that are closely related to this unique labor composition : the fact that the cotton mills in Japan had especially welcomed the young female workers and the fact that the farming villages constituted the main source of wage labor in the cotton industry. Before discussing these matters further, it may be worth noting here that the "all nightwork" system is believed to have been practiced in Japan. The Kawahara Spinning Mill was erected on a hill in order to utilize the water power, but it was found that the problem of securing female labor was more difficult in the hill areas than in the plain sections. Thus when the mill was out of operation for 150 days, due to a machinery breakdown, the girls continued to be paid instead of being sent home if they were housed in the dormitory. The Hiroshima Spinning Mill was also erected on a hill for the benefits of water power; however, the problem of female labor recruitment was greater due to the inadequate transportation system.4 Thus, it has been generally thought that during the period of 1877-86, it was the relative ease of recruiting female workers that determined the profitability of cotton mills. Moreover, according to the reports submitted by three cotton mills operating in Tokyo to the J a p a n Cotton Mill Owners Association for the month of November, 1896, the Kanegafuchi Mill employed 1,763 female workers against 568 male operatives, the Onakigawa Mill employed 240 female against 56 male operatives, and the Tokyo Mill employed 1,214 female against 357 male operatives.' This fact alone may be sufficient evidence for the point that was made above.

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Coming back to the discussion of the popularity of female labor, Mr. Shindo claims that Basically, the w o r k required in the cotton spinning a n d w e a v i n g mills consists of simple repetitive o p e r a t i o n s calling for m a n u a l dexterity r a t h e r than craftsmanship, a n d so the technical structure can be sufficiently met by f e m a l e labor."

A significant point that should be made here is that the percentage of female workers employed in the Japanese cotton industry had increased steadily. For instance, they occupied 86.2 per cent of the total number of workers in the industry in 1914, and 81.7 per cent in 1931.' Compared with this, the ratio of female to male laborers in Bombay, India, was 20.5 per cent in 1921 and 22.1 per cent in 1928.' Thus, if what Mr. Shindo pointed out was the only reason for female labor in the cotton industry, the dominant proportion of workers in India should be female. This was not the case, however. Consequently, there must be other reasons in addition to the point of Mr. Shindo's statement. The Japanese cotton-spinning industry, from its infant days, has been devoted to the production of coarse cloth rather than of finer cloth, and the ring frame rather than the mule frame was installed in most spinning mills in J a p a n . Both machines draw out the roving and employ a revolving spindle to twist into yarn. The difference between them is simply that the mule frame produces finer cloth and the ring frame produces coarse cloth. In Japan, the mule frames had been more widely used than the ring frames till 1888, but from 1891 even the mills which previously used the mule frame began to install the ring frame. By 1897, when Japan began to export her cotton goods on the world market, the number of mule frames became almost negligible. For instance, in 1936, there were 1,200 million ring frames against 7,920 mule frames. Just to see briefly the comparative figures in England, the ratio of the

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61

number of mule frames to the number of ring frames in 1930 was 42.1 million to 13.1 million.' T h e Indian cotton industry, like the Japanese, concentrated on coarse cloth rather than fine; however, in 1929, there were 50,913 mule frames in J a p a n at the time. 10 Compared with the mule frame, the ring frame is a simple spinning machine and has advantages in two respects. In the first place, it has greater productive capacity. Secondly, its simplicity of construction and operation, as compared to the mule, calls for less skill and training on the part of the operatives who tend it." Thus, basically, the suitability of female labor for the Japanese cotton industry was heightened due to the rapidly increasing use of the ring spindles. This is also the basic factor behind the export dominance in the world market which has been the long-sought ambition of the Japanese cotton industry. The fact that the cotton industry was supplied with a great number of female workers from the fanning village was an indirect consequence of the government policy. The Meiji government since the middle of the Tokugawa period attempted to legalize the private ownership of land. For instance, in 1871 an act of free cultivation and the act of the removal of the ban against the sale of land were legislated, thereby reflecting the initial intention to introduce a modem land tax system. Finally, early attempts resulted in the landtax revision of 1873." Such historical change is significant in that it defined the policy framework for the modern Japanese agrarian system, and furthermore it provided land-tax revenue that served as financial capital toward the growth of the modern manufacturing industry. The inducement of the landlord system had resulted in the rapid increase in farm lands occupied by the new landlords. In 1865, the percentage of farm land owned by the govern-

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ment was 25 per cent while that owned by landlords was 43 per cent and that cultivated by tenant peasantry was 32 per cent. In 1880, the percentage of farm land occupied by landlords increased to 57 per cent." This historical process of the growing landlord system resulted in a large increase of dispossessed peasantry and also caused the divorce of the tenant peasants from the farming land. Thus the number of dispossessed peasants increased rapidly and the average annual rate of population growth increased, resulting in increases in the rate of rent and also tending to atomize the unit of land cultivated. Under these conditions, the peasants had to take up some side jobs besides farming because they could not support their families by depending on their own farms. This tendency was remarkable in the case of the dispossessed peasants, fanners who owned under 10 tan (2.45 acres), and tenant peasants. Thus many of them were forced to become out-migrants, and a great number of them, especially the young females, consequently became factory workers. According to the government document published in 1885, most of the wage laborers who worked in factories early erected in Osaka were believed to be the dispossessed peasants of the surrounding farm villages." Furthermore, since 1887, many country girls before their marriages who formerly engaged in hand-spinning became factory workers and they occupied 7 0 - 8 0 per cent in number of the total operatives in cotton mills." 2.

The Employment of Cotton Industry Farming Communities in Japan

Labor

and

the

The Japanese cotton industry began to develop in earnest around 1887 and by 1894 it had become the dominant manufacturing industry in the scale of industry, the consumption of its product, and in the number of its workers. However, from

LABOR

SUPPLY

AND L A B O R P O L I C Y

63

the time of its industrial peak, the Japanese cotton industry has faced the problem of labor piracy among the cotton mills. According to Mr. Kinukawa's vivid description of the labor conditions in the cotton industry since 1894, there were still a relatively small number of cotton mills and therefore no compelling reason to send the recruiting agents to distant farming villages." He goes on to say that consequently expenses for recruiting and for room and board for the female workers were minimal, and there were no welfare programs set up for employees. Despite such conditions, female workers were very submissive and contented with lower wages. Thus we may safely conclude that there existed no significant labor problems in the Japanese cotton industry prior to the year of 1894. However, as the new cotton mills were erected in increasing number, the problem of labor shortage became more severe, and it was not uncommon for one factory to steal the female workers of others. Just to mention a few cases, the two big companies, the Osaka Cotton Spinning Mill and the Kanegafuchi Spinning Mill in Tokyo became involved in a severe dispute because of two or three girls in the Osaka Mill who sought other jobs in the latter firm." In around 1899, the female workers in the Osaka area made a habit of running away to other mills; and it is believed that about 1,000 girl operatives had moved away within a year, thereby compelling the employer to recruit about 1,200 female workers per year for replacement. 1 ' The cause of the general tendency of shifting from one cotton mill to another seems to have been closely related to the wage differential. Although the wage level was generally low, there were sharp differences in the wage paid to the female workers according to geographical regions or even among different firms in the same region. For instance, the girl workers of the Aichi Mill were paid from 3 sen to 20 sen per

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day while the O k a y a m a paid their girl workers only 0.5 sen per day. T h e Kanegafuchi Mill paid its girl workers 8 sen per day and the rest of the cotton mills paid on the average of 6 sen to 7 sen a day." T h e average wage of 6 - 7 sen a day was hardly enough for a day's living for a single female worker. While the city wages were low, wrages in other localities were substantially higher, thereby inducing shifts from one mill to another for higher wages. T h u s the labor problem of the early Japanese cotton industry was mainly the frequency of the shifting of workers among the mills, which created difficulties of labor management, recruiting, and training. Consequently, the business prosperity of the industry as a whole at the time was

primarily

affected

by

the

instability

of

the

labor

condition." T h e Indian cotton industry also experienced a similar labor condition since its infant days. M r . M e h t a gives a vivid description of it : T h e industry chronically faced problems of labor shortage despite a very high proportion of the job being of an unskilled character and requiring the minding of relatively simple types of machinery. But the long unregulated hours of work, the high disease and mortality rate of the bigger Indian towns of the nineteenth century, and the vastly different modes of urban living were factors continually retarding the industrial intake of new workers.11 A difference that can be observed between the labor conditions of these countries is that in India in the period under consideration even the dispossessed peasants' daughters did not aspire to be mill workers. T h e girls in India at that time sought jobs or became mill workers only when their living was unbearably depressed. According to " M e n s h i Boseki Shoko J i z o " (Survey on the Condition of the Cotton Mill Workers), the health condition of the female workers was greatly impaired because they were

LABOR

S U P P L Y AND L A B O R

POLICY

65

paid low wages, worked nights, and lived like prisoners in company dormitories. According to the report made by the Japan Cotton Spinners' Association, during the period of a year from October, 1896, to September, 1897, there were 44,270 workers, or 84 per cent of the total number of workers, in the cotton mill who had diseases incurred in the line of work." This is indeed an astonishing figure. Thus, living conditions and the standard of sanitation were the direct cause of the continued problem of labor shortage in Japan. The girl workers frequently were lured away from one mill compound to another for better and more comfortable living and working conditions, as well as for better wages. Mr. Porter, who was then editor of the Cleveland World (U.S.A.) spent several months in Japan in 1896, and made a sensitive and acute observation on the labor conditions in Japan, describing them as follows : Japan must have good factory laws at once; it is folly to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. That is what the employment of small children and growing girls for twelve or fourteen hours in a factory will do. There is neither sense, humanity, nor economy in such a course. It will destroy the stamina of the people. Long hours and no regular cession of work on the seventh day are bad anyhow.13 Mr. Porter went on to say that working conditions in Japanese cotton mills were such that they were destructive to health, and it would be healthier and more efficient if work were performed in the field or by the open door of a cottage. T h e female workers usually were locked behind the barred gates of the mill premises as if they were purchased slaves, and the Japanese industrialists seldom cared to mend the real roots of the labor shortage or of the problems of shifting labor. The superficial measure of locking the gates soon became an obsolete policy, as it was found that the problem could not be solved individually by owners.

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As early as August, 1882, upon the initiative of Mr. Okadi, manager of a cotton-spinning mill in Mikawa Province, representatives of some of the small mills met in Osaka to form an association with the objective of putting a stop to price cutting competition and labor piracy. As the problem of labor shortage became more difficult, this group was found to be meager and consequently reorganized as the J a p a n Cotton Spinners' Association (Dai Nippon Menshi Boseki Dogyo Rengokai). As is widely known, the association made many major contributions to the industry, among which were the directing and assisting of the industry on the raw materials programs, and the joint purchasing and transporting of raw cotton. It brought about improved trade practices for both raw cotton and cotton goods, and it strengthened and improved techniques for the quality inspection of cotton goods." But, it must not be forgotten that it attempted to play a speculative part in solving the labor shortage problems. A general meeting of the association was held in 1887 and sixteen agreements were reached, four of which dealt with the recruiting of workers, and aimed at prohibiting the workers from shifting immediately from one factory to another." In addition to the trade association, the Meiji government also enacted the Factory Worker Act (Shoko Hoan) in 1897 in order to prevent the frequent rise of disputes in the matter of recruiting of workers; however, the act was never enforced." T h e effectiveness of legislation by the Meiji government, and of the efforts of nation-wide organization such as the J a p a n Cotton Spinners' Association against the continued problem of labor shifting was extremely limited. As long as the girl workers were considered the most important source of labor supply by the J a p a n e s e cotton industry, the instability of labor conditions seems to have been perpetuated. The peculiar characteristics of labor problems in the Japanese cotton industry

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67

that we have previously examined did not only exist at the end of the nineteenth century but also throughout the 1910's, 1930's, and even after the World War II period. There are a number of reasons, among which overpopulation is one. Mr. Clark gave the following view as to the labor problem in 1912-13 faced by the Japanese cotton industry: The employees in the mills are mainly country girls of the peasant class. . . . The population of Japan is growing rapidly, and there would seem to be little necessity of severe competition for labor, but the wages are not high enough to attract those living in the cities, except a small percentage of the poorer classes, and the long continuous work indoors is not attractive to peasant girls." There had been indeed a stagnant overpopulation in the Japanese farming community and it formed the reservoir of labor force for the cotton industry. Paradoxically, the Japanese cotton industry has been unable to escape the problem of labor shortage since the infant stage of its development. The fundamental reason for this problem lies in the general labor conditions where the practices of extremely long hours of work and of very low wages have prevailed. Professor Orchard also gave a view on the labor problem, especially on the common practice of labor piracy around 1926-27 : The girls were not permitted to leave the factory grounds except on holidays and with permission. I n a fourth large spinning mill, it was stated that the girls and women were permitted to go beyond the factory gates only if the local labor union assumed the responsibility. In this particular mill, the dormitories and the factory are surrounded by a high board fence, the gates are locked at night, and the only exit to the outer world is through a turnstile by the office." Professor Orchard's observation is indeed astonishing. As in the early period, the difficulty in securing female labor was still acute in the years of 1926 and 1927. Accordingly, the recruit-

68

S T A G E S OF I N D U S T R I A L D E V E L O P M E N T IN ASIA

ing of labor was a significant problem for the Japanese mill owners. For example, in December 1925, there were 19,935 persons engaged in labor recruitment. Of these, 13,398 persons were recruiting workers for the silk industry, 4,363 persons for cotton-spinning mills, and 1,744 persons for the apparel industry.™ The tactics of the recruiting agents in the farming villages as described by Mr. Harada in 1928 are quite interesting to note : The recruiting agents visit peasants' homes; make presents to parents and to girls; speak of the charm of city life; show pictures of factories which certainly look magnificent to a person who lives in a peasant's clumsy hut. They even go further and advance money. The display of such elaborate tactics in recruiting girl workers is decreasing but such practices are still extensively used." There is no doubt that the expenses incurred by the wide practices of the recruiting of labor were substantial. However, the advance for carfare and the loans made to the parents or to the girl herself generally were recovered by the company in periodic deductions from the wages of the worker, whereas the commissions to the recruiting agents and some of the presents made were expenses borne by the companies.*1 Moreover, one of the features of Japanese industry was the accommodation of operatives in the factory compound. Especially, in the case of the textile industry, the factory dormitory system grew quite rapidly, unlike any other manufacturing industry. At the end of 1925 there were 9,830 dormitories, of which 5,931 belonged to the textile industry. 53 Such a rapid growth of the dormitory system in the textile industry was considered the best means to protect the girl workers from being abducted to other mills. It can be said that, as far as the girl workers were concerned, the cause of the chronic problem of labor shortage and of the recruiting and securing of female workers by the

LABOR S U P P L Y AND LABOR POLICY

69

Japanese cotton industry lies in the demand-supply pattern of the labor force. The demand-supply pattern probably finds no equivalent in other domestic industries or in the cotton industry abroad. The demand-supply pattern involves at least two factors which have promoted the development of the Japanese cotton industry : (1) the girl workers could not enter the labor market as a normal labor force because of their social character; and (2) the Japanese cotton industry traditionally has been dependent upon so-called cheap labor. In considering the social character which has prevented the entry of female workers as a normal force into the labor market, first we should note Mr. Adachi's survey. While surveying the problem of overpopulation in the Ehima prefecture, one of the main recruiting areas, Mr. Adachi classified the reasons for out-migrations into seven categories, a few of which are : the pressure of overpopulation accounting for 28.5 per cent of the reasons; the desire to support their families accounting for 19.4 per cent; their wishing to be self-supporting accounting for 31.2 per cent.3* These three reasons alone accounted for 79.1 per cent. An additional factor behind these reasons is that because their income from farming was meager, living was difficult, and so a great number of families were in need of having some of their members migrate to the cities and towns for the purpose of earning extra income to add to the family income as well as "reducing mouths to feed." The young daughters of the peasants were faced with extreme difficulty in finding appropriate side jobs within the scope of the meager farm economy. It is therefore only natural that they should be inclined to leave their villages to find a temporary job in the cotton industry.31 The figures just indicated imply that the recruitment activity was largely concentrated on the poor peasants in certain provinces. T h e most outstanding district was the southern part of Kyushu Island with Kagushima

70

S T A G E S OF I N D U S T R I A L D E V E L O P M E N T IN A S I A

prefecture, Okinawa, and M i y a z a k i prefectures. In the 1930's, these three provinces supplied more than one-fifth of the total number of girl workers in the Japanese cotton industry'. The second province of importance was Niigata prefecture, which supplied 7,000 girl workers, Nagoya, Gifu, Shizuoka, and other prefectures. The third source was comprised of Shimane, O k a y a m a , Hiroshima, Kochi, and Tokushima prefectures." Professor U y e d a depicts Niigata prefecture after it was drained of its young girls, where poorer peasants were concentrated and which supplied the largest number of the girl workers to the cotton mills located in the central part of J a p a n : We might take the small village of Ikazawa in the mountainous southern part of Niigata prefecture as an example. There are only 773 families with a total population of 4,816, including 2,477 males and 2,339 females. From this village 216 girls have gone out to work in cotton-spinning mills, and 170 girls to silkreeling mills, making a total of 386. This means that one girl for every two families has left home to work, and it is said that there are no young girls of tender age remaining in that village." W e may thus safely conclude that economic pressure had been the predominant cause of the out-migrating of young girls for employment in the textile mills. M r . Adachi also claimed that some of them left because they did not like to live in the country. Sometimes they left on the suggestion of friends and relatives. The latter reason, however, related closely to the "economic cause." Some also left with the hope of saving money for their wedding. As it was previously mentioned, some of these girls were reluctant to leave home to work in the mills. One reason for this was that most parents of country girls kept their daughters at home to take care of domestic affairs unless extreme poverty befell them, in which case there was no other alternative. In other words, the backwardness of the social structure in the rural communities narrowed the activities of women to the

LABOR S U P P L Y AND LABOR P O L I C Y

71

limited sphere of farming life and thus obstructed their going into the cities or towns as workers. Secondly, the girls could not be expected to act of their own free will but were in a position to be completely dictated to by their parents. Under these circumstances, the closed-in social concept, common to farming villages, acted as a condition directly hampering the employment of females in the cotton industry. The third reason was the poor facilities of the dormitory system which gave rise to severe criticism and by some Japanese writers were likened to prison compounds. Even in the 1930's, all the girl workers who flowed out of the farming villages into the cotton mills lived in the factory dormitories where the living conditions were no different from that of the Meiji period. Dr. Utley, who spent two years in Japan, observed the real situation of the girl workers in the dormitory as follows : It certainly is not true, as the Japanese propagandists and their foreign spokesmen contend, that conditions of life in the factories are very good, that food is adequate, that the reason for lower wages in Japan is merely the lower cost of living, while the standard of living is perfectly satisfactory. The diet, though better than the girls received in their peasant homes, is quite inadequate for the strain of modern industrial conditions. It is in particular almost entirely deficient in fats. Hence the terrible prevalence of tuberculosis and the large percentage of girls who return to their villages after two or three years ruined in health for life." This was the direct observation that Dr. Utley made in 193334 and it was true that no parents would have wanted to submit their young daughters to the misery of this life —unless their poverty on the farm was unbearable. Fourth, when the girl workers were recruited for cotton-spinning mills, they were customarily required to have diplomas from primary school and two or three additional years of education in junior high school. If they could send their daughters to junior high school, they were usually of the middle-class farms and in

72

S T A G E S O F I N D U S T R I A L D E V E L O P M E N T IN ASIA

that case they would have adequate means to retain their daughters at home." In spite of such difficulties in selecting the girl workers, once employers hired the girls, they completely ignored the welfare of the girls. The reason for such treatment is somewhat obvious in that employers were aware of population growth and its consequent economic pressure, which would compel most of the young unskilled girls, if not all, to seek jobs in the cotton industry. The uniqueness of the labor turnover in the Japanese cotton industry was also brought about by the unique phenomena of the demand-supply pattern; which has been previously cited in respect to the recruiting of girl workers. The labor turnover in the infant stage of the cotton industry was almost 100 per cent; it has decreased in later years. First, according to an investigation made in 1919 by the J a p a n Cotton Spinners' Association, 45 per cent of the operatives remained with the mills less than one year, and only 21 per cent of the labor force remained over two years. The average length of stay was one year and five months." Secondly, according to the report published by the government's Bureau of Social Affairs, the labor turnover for 1925 was 58 per cent in the textile industry, 42 per cent in the machine and tool industry, and 34.8 per cent in the chemical industry. •a

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