The Cotton Textile Industry of Fall River • Massachusetts: A Study of Industrial Localization 9780231892834

Table of contents :
Foreword
Table of Contents
List of Tables
List of Graphs and Maps
Chapter I. The Rise of the Factory Town
Chapter II. The Emergence of the Industrial City
Chapter III. Fall River and the South, 1875-1914 Inter-Regional Competition in the Print Cloth Industry
Chapter IV. Collapse and Survival
Glossary of Terms
Bibliography

Citation preview

The C o t t o n Textile Industry of Fall

River*Massachusetts

The Cotton Textile Industry of Fall River • Massachusetts A Study of Industrial

By T H O M A S

SUBMITTED THE

IN

Localization

RUSSELL

PARTIAL

REQUIREMENTS

FOR

SMITH

FULFILLMENT THE

DEGREE

OF OF

DOCTOR OF P H I L O S O P H Y , UNDER T H E J O I N T COMMITTEE

ON

GRADUATE

COLUMBIA

INSTRUCTION

UNIVERSITY

KING'S CROWN

PRESS

N E W YORK : M O R N I N G S I D E 1 9 4 4

HEIGHTS

Copyright,

, by

Thomas Russell Smith Manufactured. In the United States of America

King's Crown Press la a division of Columbia University Press organized for the purpose of making certain scholarly material available at minimum cost. Toward that end, the publishers hare adopted every reasonable economy except such as would interfere with a legible format. The. work is presented substantially as.submitted by the authors, without the usual editorial attention of Columbia University Press.

FOREWORD A study of the rise and decline of the textile industry in Fall River presents a succession of problems for the geographer interested in analysis of the areal distribution of economic activity. During the first half of the nineteenth century local capitalists, technicians, and entrepreneurs played a much larger part in the early development of Fall River than was the case in most of the other large mill towns in Mew England. Consequently there was a direct transfer of funds and efforts from the previous commercial-agricultural economy to the local cotton mills. This was accompanied by a shift in the geographic pattern of economic activity in the vicinity of Fall River, a development closely related to the details of local geography and the attendant competitive relationships between the neighboring villages. The areal scope of the study is broadened by the rapid growth of Fall River in the two decades following the Civil War. This development, considered In Chapter II, changed considerably the pattern of the New England textile industry. Its analysis naturally involves a consideration of the intraregional competition between the major mill centers. Inter-regional competition, resulting from the rise of the industry in the South, provides an even broader theme for Chapters III tod IV. Here the problem is considered in terms of the reaction of a single textile center to increasingly critical competition, and the analysis of the nature and effectiveness of its adjustment to the new forces affecting the localization of the textile industry. The author's interest in the problem of industrial location, originally aroused in the course of graduate work at Columbia, was quickened by a several weeks' trip touching many of the industrial centers of southern New England during the summer of 1939. Fall River was selected as the area for special study and more intensive field work was done during parts of the following two summers. Interviews were secured with persons active in Fall River industry and visits were made to ten plants representing the city's major preeent-day Indus-

vi

FOREWORD

tries. Other persons were interviewed, "both in Fall River and elsewhere, who were in a position to give further information concerning industrial problems. These included local business men, officials in the Chamber of Commerce, labor and trade association leaders, and persons connected with the textile machine industry. The business experience of several of the individuals interviewed extended over a period of fifty years. At the Fall River Public Library, Miss Marjorie Wetherbee, Librarian, and Miss Mary McDermott and Miss Mary Welch of the Reference Department were helpful in many ways. Miss Winslow, Librarian at the Fall River Historical Society, made available certain records of early Fall River companies. Mr. Roswell G. Phelps,.Director, Division of Statistics in the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries, placed many of the records of his division at my disposal, while Mr. Joseph C. King, Statistician for Manufactures, and Mr. Lester Archibald, Statistician for Labor, were generous with their time and counsel regarding the use of the data in this office. I am indebted to ther Bureau of the Census in Washington for the special tabulations which appear in Table 25, and especially to Mr. T. J. Fitzgerald, Chief Statistician for Manufactures, and Dr. Alfred Cahen, Economic Analyst, for consultation upon a number of questions relating to the Fall River textile industry. The study was started under the direction of Professor John E-. Orchard whose advice and criticism were most helpful prior to his departure for Washington. I have profited much from the advice and suggestion of Professor Herman F. Otte, who showed a friendly interest in the project from its inception and supervised the later stages of its preparation. Of longer standing is my indebtedness to my father, Professor J. Russell Smith-, who also contributed many helpful suggestions to the present work. To Professor Carter Goodrich I am indebted for stimulating my interest in the general problem as well as for a careful reading and criticism of the final manuscript. My thanks are also due to Professor Thurman W. Van Metre of Columbia and Dr. John K. Wright of the American Geographical Society for valuable comments. Thomas R. Smith July 5, 19^3 Falls Church, Virginia

TABLE OP CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES LIST OF GRAPHS AND MAPS CHAPTER

I. THE RISE OF THE FACTORY TOWN . . . . The Early Nineteenth Century Econcogr of the Lover Taunton Valley . . . . . The Factory Comes to Fall River . . . Local Contributions to the Industrial Economy The New Metropolis of the Taunton Valley . II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY . The Competitive Position of Steam and Water Pover for Cotton Mills The Civil War and Fall Elver's Textile Industry . . . . . . . . . . Fall Diver's Locatlonal Advantages Changing Urban and Industrial Structure .

1 2 19 29 36 UO Ul 1*8 53 71

III. FALL RIVER AND THE SOUTH, 1875-1911* - INTERREGIONAL COMPETITION IN THE PRINT CLOTH INDUSTRY 80 Rise of Print Cloth Production in the South . 80 Southern Advantage in Labor Costs . . . 86 Comparative Transport Costs . . . . 97 Technological Advanae in the South . . 99 Fall River's Adjustment to Southern Competition lOfc Indications of Crisis, 1910-llv . . . 1 1 9 IV. COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL The Collapse . . . . . . . Characteristics of the Liquidating Corporations

122 123 127

TABLE OF CONTENTS

vi i i

Basis for Survival -- Internal Factors BasiB for Survival -- External Factors Prospects for the Industry GLOSSARY OF TERMS BIBLIOGRAPHY

LIST OP TABLES Table 1 - Place and Period of Construction of VesaelB Built Along the Taunton and Registered at Dighton-Fall River . . . . . . . .

5

2 - Hailing Porta of Taunton River Vessels Regiatered at Dighton-Fall River . . . .

6

3 - Tonnage of VesBels Owned in Taunton River Ports and Massachusetts

.

.

.

.

.

.

U - Population of Selected Bristol County Towns

7 .

8

5 - Geographic Origin of Capital in Early Fall River Mills According to Residence of Stockholders

30

6 - Leading Stockholders in Early Fall River Mills Holdings, Residence, Function

33

7 - Capacity of Prime Movers in New England Cotton Mille

Ul

8 - Major Water-powered Cotton Textile Centers of New England . . . . . . .

k2

9 - Average Relative Humidity, Selected New England Mills, July - August, 1890 . . . .

59

10 - Average Relative Humidity, Selected New England Stations . . . . . . . .

60

11 - Geographic Distribution of Print Cloth Capacity and Printing Machines, 1880 . . . .

65

12 - Breakdown of Print Cloth Costs - Percentage of Total Cost of Production . . . .

67

13 - Value of Leading Types of Cotton Textile Products, New England and the South, 1889 . .

82

1U - Print Cloth Production, Selected Areas, 18891939

8k

X

LIST OF TABLES

Table 15 - Wages and lours for Certain Classes of Textile Operatives in Massachusetts and South Carolina, 1890-1932

88

16 - Wage Cost Comparison between Print Cloth Mills in Fall Elver and Columbia, South Carolina, 1903-05

90

17 - Weaving Rates for Print Cloth Woven on Automatic Looms, 1903-05

92

18 - Labor Cost in Print Cloth Production, 1888-89 .

101

19 - Aggregate Spindleage of Pall iver Corporations Grouped According to Type of Product . .

109

20 - Plain Cloths for Printing and Converting, Millions of Yards Produced . . .

112

.

21 - Capacity Changes in Fall River Cotton Mills

.

125

22 - Classification of the Twenty-six Liquidated Corporations on the Basis of Type of Product in 1925

128

23 - Weaving Equipment, Fall River Corporations, 1921*

130

2h - Average Dividend Rates, Fall River Corporations, 1911-25

132

25 - Value of Leading Textile Products Manufactured in Fall River, 1925, 1935, and 1939 26 - Weaving Equipment in Surviving Mills

.

.

136

.

.

1^8

27 - North-South Differential in Average Hourly Earnings . . . . . . . . 28 - Fall River Tax Rates and Valuations, 1913-36

152 .

159

LIST OF GRAPHS AND MAPS I - Map of Southern Massachusetts, l8W* .

.

.

5

II - Map of Fall River, l8l2 I H - Fall River Textile Trends, 1850-19^0

10 .

.

17 - Map of Fall River, 188U V - Evolution of the Mill Pattern, 1850-1920 . VI - Print Cloth Production and Capacity, 1875-1951

12 15

.

75 106

Chapter I THE R I S E

OF THE FACTORY TOWN

In 1800 Fall River was a village of less than one hundred inhabitants, smaller in size and less important in function than most of the neighboring villages along the Taunton River. By 18^5 It had outstripped these rivals and become a factory town of about 9,000 persona, its mills employed 2,000 workers, and its harbor was the focus for a large proportion of the traffic along the Taunton. This change was part of the larger shift in which commerce was being replaced by manufacturing as the dominant interest in the New England economy. After the war of 1812 the maritime and commercial interests recovered rather slowly from the virtual stagnation of the legitimate carrying trade during the preceding five years. Although the tonnage of vessels owned in Massachusetts customs districts doubled between 1810 and 1850, this expansion was overshadowed by the rise of the cotton industry. In 1810, Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, reported that the cotton mills of the nation, mostly concentrated in New England, contained 80,000 Bpindles and represented a capital investment of 800,000.' By 18^0 there were 1,700,000 spindles in New England alone, representing a capital investment of $3^,931,000, of which $17,^1^,000 was in Massachusetts.2 With this expansion a new group became important whose influence was reflected in the shift of the majority of the New England delegations in Congress from a free trade position in 1824 to the support of protection in 1828, a change made more noteworthy by the historic about-face of Daniel Webster.3 This shifting balance between industry and commerce was accompanied by changes in the geography of economic activity. Many of the coastal centers noted for their maritime activity 1. Gallatin, "Manufactures," American State Papers, Finance, II, 427. 2. twelfth Census of the United States: 1900• Manufactures, III, 543. Lodge, Daniel Vebster, pp. 165, 167.

2

THE RISE OF THE FACTORY TOWN

declined in relative and absolute Importance, while towns and later cities mushroomed beside the waterfalls of the New England streams. This geographic relocation by no means severed the connection "between the two economies. To the industrial age the commercial one contributed three basic elements: capital, entrepreneurial ability, and the mechnical and mechanical skills of its iron workers and other artisans. Within the valley of the Taunton River we find a localized, small scale example of this transformation and the attendant relocation of economic activity, carried out under conditions which gave lasting character to the industrial structure of Pall River. The Early Nineteenth Century Economy of the Lower Taunton Valley The Taunton River, together with Mount Hope Bay into which it flows, forms the northeastern arm of Narragansett Bay stretching toward the center of the Old Colony. Taunton lay Just above the head of navigation, fifteen miles northeast of Fall River. On the west side of the stream in l800 were the towns of Dighton, Somerset and Swansea. On the eastern shore were Berkley and Freetown, the latter including the villages of Assonet, Steep Brook and Fall River. South of Freetown was Tiverton, Rhode Island, on the eastern shore of the Bay. (See Figure I.) Settlement had begun in this area in the middle of the 17th century, and in the intervening century and a half there had developed in these towns an amphibious economy in which agriculture was combined with maritime activities and was supplemented by the beginnings of manufacturing. Agriculture was made somewhat more attractive in portions of thiB area than in other parts of New England by the presence of a milder climate. Also, the soils developed upon the sedimentarles of the Narragansett Basin were somewhat more fertile than those derived from the crystalline rocks of the New England Upland. Coastal location allowed the easy transport of agricultural surpluses to the larger towns of the Bay and this local market WBB supplemented by export of agricultural products — particularly from the island of Rhode Island.

Map of Southern Massachusetts, 1 8 W Photostat of Massachusetts General Court, Topographic Map of Massachusetts, Complied from Various Sources by Simeon Borden, Boston, 18M*. Scale: 1:158,000

THE RISE OF THE FACTORY TOWN

4

Regarding the Fall River area it haa been stated "Every farmer of importance in these days was a ship carpenter and had his own vessel, usually a sloop of thirty-five or forty tons, ... in which he and hie family made their trips to Providence, Newport and even New York."4 The general difficulties of New England agriculture, however, operated to limit the possibilities of this activity. Non-agricultural income was sought by the farmers in the local towns, many of whom struggled with rocky, infertile soil; consequently the sloops running from Taunton to Providence and Bristol often carried fire wood or lumber rather than agricultural produce. Shipbuilding and Commerce. The maritime portion of the Taunton Valley economy had developed considerable local significance during the l8th century. Shipbuilding had been stimulated by the ample supply of white oak timber along the shores of the Taunton to which some of the shipbuilders of the lower Bay had been attracted as their own supplies became less adequate. Quiet harbors, small water privileges along tributary streams, and several iron furnaces near Taunton were additional factors favorable to the development of this industry. Quantitative data is fragmentary, but the records of the Dighton-Fall River customs district, compiled by the National Archives Project, provide information on both shipbuilding and ships registered in the area. Available data on the number of vessels constructed in Taunton River towns is given in Table 1. The list is not complete because the records covered only those vessels which were at some time registered at the local customs house. The total of 236 vessels must therefore be regarded as a minimum, of which l6l, over two-thirds of the total, were built during the first three decades. After l8l0 a decline in the number of ships built accompanied the rise of Fall River cotton mills and the general changes in New England maritime activity. The yards met the needs of the time, however. Sailing vessels "of nearly all types were built, including ships as large as the 200-ton "Merry Quaker" launched at Dighton in 1795.s Freetown, with a total of a hundred vessels, 4. Fenner, History

5. Morison,

of Pall River,

Maritime

History

p. 12.

of Massachusetts,

1783-I860,

P- 106.

THE RISE OF THE FACTORY TOWN

5

was clearly the leader and the Inclusion of the thirty-two boats built In Fall River after Its separation from Freetown In 1803 6 would constitute a total greater than that of the remaining towns combined. Table 1 Place and Period of Construction of Vessels Built Along

1781-

90

1791I8OO

180I10

18II20

Swansea Somerset Dighton

10

2

1

k k

12 11

11 12

Taunton Total

_2

20

_k 29

28

9 3 _1 13

Freetown Fall River

20

33

- -

- -

40

62

25 _6 59

lk 12 39

Total

1821-

I831-

30

40

Total

__ 7

__

13 45 33 13 104

2 - -

2

1 _2

9

5

k

k

_9

5 lk

22

100 32 236

»Source: W.P.A. National Archives Project, Ship Registers of Dighton~ fall River, p. ix. (Until 1834, Dighton was the port of entry for the Customs District which comprised the Taunton River-Mount Hope Bay waterfront. After 1834, Pall River was the port of entry for the same district. ) The development of Bhip building in an area so centrally located was naturally accompanied by the growth of shipping and commerce. During the latter part of the l8th century a modest merchant fleet sailed from the local ports and engaged 6. In 18CE, 150 citizens of Pall River petitioned for separation fran Freetown on the ground that the town hall, eight miles distant at Assonet, was too far for such poor people with so few horses. Despite a rather acrimonious rejoinder to the latter point by citizens in the northern part of tcwn, the Legislature granted the petition and in 180B the southwestern portion of Freetown was set off to form Pall River. (Penner, op. cit., pp. 20-22.) The new town included the villages of Fall River (called Troy until 1834) and Steep Brook, leaving Assonet and Furnace Village in Freetown. These geographic relationships can be seen in Figure I.

THE RISE OF THE FACTORY TOWN

6

in the far-flung trade carried on by the New England Bhlp captains and merchants. In Somerset the Bowers family amassed several fortunes and a considerable fleet, while Dighton flourished as the port of entry. The tabulation in Table 2 shows that Freetown led also in the number of ships registered at the local customs house, but itB margin over Dighton and Somerset was much less in this phase of maritime activity than in shipbuilding. Table 2 Hailing Ports of Taunton River Vessels Registered at Dighton-Fall River8 1789-1800 Swansea Somerset Dighton Berkley Taunton Total Freetown Fall River Total

19 2k

27 17 6 93 31 - -

12

l801-icf l8ll-20b 1821-30

2

1 7

2

6

3 3

1

16 1U 6 5 10

2

_2

18

11

16 3 62

7 _5 30

9 _9 29

2

a. Computed from National Archives Project, Ship River. fall b. Data for 1807-12 are lacking.

Registers

1831-UO Total 3 1 1 1 6

23 52 57 23 16 171

1

6k

- -

ih

21 of

31 266 Dighton-

In comparison with the traditional shipbuilding and commercial centers of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the Taunton Valley was of distinctly minor importance. The River was relatively small, but, more importantly, its tributary area was pinched between the hinterlands of Providence on the west, Boston to the north, and New Bedford on the southeast. Consequently, as Table 3 indicates, the tonnage of vessels owned in these ports was only two or three, percent of the Massachusetts total which gave the district a rank of only ninth among the twelve Massachusetts customs districts. However unimportant these activities were in comparison to the other

THE R I S E OF THE FACTORY TOWN

7

maritime centers of Nev England, their local Importance was real and significant. Table 3 Tonnage of Vessels Owned In Taunton River PortB and Massachusetts*

Taunton Elver ports Massachusetts

1800

1810

1820

1840

1850

5,996 231,258

7,126 316,069

6,353 329,^

3,661 536,526

8,815 685,1*37

» Source: Morison, op. cit.,

p. 378-

The Place of Fall River In the Taunton Valley Economy. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the village of Fall River played a relatively modest role In this agriculturalmaritime economy, despite the leadership of Freetown. Examination of Tables 1 and 2 shows that In the decade 1800 to l8l0 Fall River was far below Freetown and also surpassed by both Dlghton and Somerset In the number of ships built and those registered at the customs house. The fact that figures for Fall River were Included with those for Freetown until after 1802 might change the numbers slightly but not the conclusion) and the tables show that it was not until the decade of the 1820's that Fall River began to move ahead of the other towns in these activities. Population figures also are evidence of the Village's relative lack of development. According to school district records there were 30U families in Freetown in 1791. Of these 160 were in the districts comprising Assonet Village and immediate vicinity, eighty were in the eastern districts, and only sixty-four were in the approximate area later set off as Fall River. 7 On the basiB of Freetown's total population of 2,202 in 1890 this would give the Fall River area about 1*50 persons. This figure may be somewhat low, but an error of 100 percent can be allowed without bringing it much 7. A History

of

Freetown,

pp. 56-57.

8

THE R I S E OF THE FACTORY TOWN

above half the population figure for the rest of Freetown, Dighton, or Swansea. The Census of 1810, the first enumeration subsequent to the separation, gives Fall River a population 30-35 percent below any one of these three towns. Table 4 Population of Selected Bristol County Towns* 1790

1800

1810

1820

1830

1850

1870

1890

1781+ 1151 1793 1850 6578

1741 1232 1666 1013 5652

1839 1199 1639 1011+ 5691

1933 1116 1607 1060 5716

1678 1023 1723 907 5331

15511166 161+1 908 5269

1291+ 1776 1817 71+1+ 5631

11+56 2106 1889 891+ 631+5

Freetown Fall River

2202

2535

1878 1296

1863 1909 1615 1372 11+77 159I+ 1+158 11521+ 26766 71+399

Taunton New Bedford

2801+

3860 1+362

3907 5651

1+520 601+2 101+1+1 18629 251+1+8 391+7 7592 161+1+3 21320 1+0733

Swansea Somerset Dighton Berkley Total

3313

* Sources: Chickering, A Statistical

fieu of the Population of Massa-

chusetts fro• 1705-18140, PP- 30-31; also the following volumes of the Census of the United States: Seventh: 1850. Population, p. 50; Sighth: 1880• Population, p. 206; Thirteenth:

1910• Population, II, 858.

It is not surprising then, that among the villages of Freetown Just before its division "Assonet...was the metropolis... with Steep Brook a close rival, which at one time attained the dignity of no less than six grocery stores."8 At that time there were only eighteen houses in Fall River Village (in the succeeding pages the term "the Village" will designate the nucleus at the falls of the Quequechan). Even after the separation the Village did not Immediately become the dominant center of the new town, for Steep Brook remained a rival to that position for some years. The post office, at first located in the Village, was moved in l8ll, to a "more central location" at Steep Brook. Although it was moved back again five years later, it was not until 1825 that the town 8. Fenner, op. cit., p. 13.

THE R I S E OF THE FACTORY TOWN

9

hall was moved from ite original location at Steep Brook to a point about halfway between the two villages, and not until 1836 that one was built near the center of the present city.9 The Bases for Fall River'a Minor Position. The local geography plays an important part in explaining this relative unimportance of the Village in comparison with its rivals along the Taunton. In the first place here was the least protected harbor along the Taunton. A glance at Figure I will show that the shore line at the Village was more open to westerly and southwesterly winds off Mount Hope Bay than was the case at any of the other waterfront villages. The site features at the Village are shown in greater detail in the Map of Fall River in 1812 (Figure II). Here 1b it seen that some protection is offered by the small indentation at the mouth of the Quequechan "River" (the unnamed stream flowing northwest from Watuppa Pond to the Taunton River) where two wharves were located. The indentation is small, however, its mouth narrow, and its shallowness is suggested by the vessel "waiting for the tide." In fact, the chief landing place within the new town was at Miller's Cove Just north of Steep Brook near the northern border of the town.10 In contrast to the harbor at Fall River, the one at Assonet was well protected since it was located on the Assonet River, a short distance above its confluence with the Taunton. There were five wharves in the Village itself and two more Just below it on the Assonet River. The lower ones could be reached by vessels drawing eight feet of water, and the upper ones by boats with a seven-foot draft. Any vessel that could enter Mount Hope Bay could proceed to Assonet Bay, where part of the cargo from some of the larger vessels vae lightered to allow them to reach the Assonet wharves. Location nearer the head of navigation gave Assonet an additional advantage over Fall River, for in the early nineteenth century "vessels took their cargoes as far inland as 9. Philip D. Borden, "Rambling History of the Pall River Iron Works," Pall River Historical Society, Proceedings, p. 82. 10. Ibid., p. 81.

Map of Fall River in l8l2 Photostat of map in Earl, A Centennial History of Pall Slyer (1877), facing page 13. No date given for the map. Cook Borden, the author, was a civil engineer and surveyor who lived in Fall River until his death in l880.

THE RISE OF THE FACTORY TOWN

IX

possible, after which the merchandise was sent to its destination by teams, mostly ox teams. For this reason the head of navigation on a river easy of approach and assent was quite likely to become an important and busy trading point. Such was Assonet...[and] it was no unusual thing to see more than a score of vessels tied to the wharves and anchored in the Bay." The dominance of this village in the foreign shipping along the Taunton was attested by G. H. Hathaway, son of a West Indies trader, when he said that he "paid more duty in Dighton customs house in one year than was paid by any other three towns in the Dighton Customs District." Even after the beginnings of industry in Fall River the local manufacturers apparently used the harbor at Assonet in preference to their own, for the same historian speaks of "long strings of teams coming in from Fall River, Taunton, and Middleboro and other places with manufactured articles, wood and farm produce, for shipment to Providence, Newport, New York, or foreign ports."11 The relative poorness of the harbor was not the only geographic influence limiting Fall River's importance. The very factors which provided the excellent water power for the early mills, a steep slope down which tumbled the Quequechan River from its source, the Watuppa Pond, interfered with the land connections of the Village and placed it at a further disadvantage in the agricultural-maritime economy of this period. Fall River lies astride the geologic contact which marks the eastern rim of the Narragansett Basin. This contact closely parallels the eastern shore line of Mount Hope Bay, Taunton and Assonet Rivers. East and southeast of this line is the ancient, hard granitic complex of the New England Upland. To the west and northwest the more recent, less resistant sedimentarles of the Basin have been more easily eroded to form a topographic as well as a. structural basin.12 As a result the 11. History of Freetown, pp. 192-93, 209. The quotations refer to a period "seventy or more years ago," which would therefore be prior to 1832. 12. For a general discussion of the topography of the area see Shaler, Woodworth and Poerste, Geology of the tarragansett Basin, U. S. Geological Survey, Monograph No. 33. Brief mention also in Fenneman, Physiography of Eastern United States, p. 371.

o § •9 *-'

& fc t» «i »H > «J k. ta o •p C ,o -H •tí (-> o .O ja

o JOn

ä 4)

O CO

U M V. u •tí -C a> o

.9 e

5 fe « * -p o S

e E-i M o >•

6 •

"fi

I -

•tí «-< p o

&

. cit., p. 58, quoting a "well known cotton manufacturer." 44. Clark, op. cit., I, 396. 45. Massachusetts General Court, Souse Document, 18U2, «4, p- 2.

THE R I S E OF THE FACTORY TOWN

37

1814-0 was greater than the combined total of the five neighboring villages to the north and west, and "by 185O it was to surpass Taunton. In l8V?, two thousand persons were employed in the mills which occupied the available power sites on the Quequechan - chief among which were six cotton mills, two calico printing establishments, and the Iron Works. This industrial development provided the necessary incentive and funds to overcame the transport difficulties which had interfered with Fall River's early growth. The improvement of land communications in the later 1820's has already been noted (see above p. 1^). Harbor improvements included the extension of made-land west of the mouth of the Quequechan and the building of wharves and piers. Improvements of streets and roads to the waterfront provided the necessary link between the two modes of transport. Maritime activities along the Taunton reoriented themselves, to these new facilities and to the demands of the Iron Works and mills for the transport of building materials, coal, iron, cotton, and finished products. With this increase in traffic and the establishment of regular service to Providence and New York, Fall River became the leading port in the district to which the customs house was moved in 183^ and where the railroad from Boston found its local terminus in 1846. The change in the nature of economic activity along the Taunton was, therefore, accompanied by a change in its geographic pattern. The incidence of geographic factors shifted with the change in the regional economy and the relativelyunimportant village of the maritime economy became the dominant industrial center to which capital, entrepreneurial effort, and labor were increasingly attracted. Recognition of the geographic advantages upon which this metamorphosis was based was expressed in an advertisement for the sale of the Troy Mill, experiencing temporary difficulties in 1827. The advertisement stated, "To those who wish to engage in manufacturing, this establishment holds out peculiar inducements. It is situated on one of the most lasting streams in New England. The reservoir by which it is supplied contains an area of about four thousand acres. The

38

THE R I S E OF THE FACTORY TOWN

surrounding country abounds in such kinds of laborers as are vanted in the manufacturing business. And its nearness to the waters of Narraganset Bay, gives it many advantages over more inland establishments."46 Both water power and coastal location are mentioned. The most significant geographic fact influencing Fall River's early industrial growth is this combination, not the excellence of either. As a port Fall River was completely outclassed by many. As a textile center it still was inferior to Lowell, Manchester and Chicopee. But here, tributary to Long Island Sound, between Boston and New York, was the beBt natural water privilege at tidewater anywhere south of New Hampshire. This combination influenced the character and circumstance a of industrial expansion as well as providing the basis for the early factories. In the first place, coastal location and attendant maritime activities provided same of the indigenous capital to the local entrepreneurs. In the second place, the Quequechan was the right size. It was large enough to operate mills of the Rhode Island type. It was small enough to be first developed by the modest amounts of capital available along the Taunton. It was too small to be very attractive to the Boston capitalists whose attention was largely fixed on the ten-thousand-horsepower privileges of upper New England and the Connecticut River.47 Finally, the success of the Iron WorkB was even more closely related to the duality of Fall River's geographic basis than was that of the textile industry. Without it a smaller amount of local capital would have been available for expansion, and the control of local manufacturers over real estate would have developed less rapidly and probably have been 46. fall fiver Monitor, July 7, 1827, quoted in Ware, op. cit., Appendix C. 47. The only easily available record of activities of the Boston group in the vicinity of Pall River, was the interest which its members obtained in two small mills in Taunton, apparently during the 1820's (see Shlakman, op. cit., pp. 39-42). Whether they made any gestures tcward the Quequechan is not evident. But by this time control of the Quequechan was tightly held by the Boc asset and Iron Works groups, which may have been an additional factor discouraging the larger outside interests.

THE RISE OF THE FACTORY TOWN

39

less complete. In addition, the Iron Vorks strengthened and diversified the industrial structure and aided in the development of the machinery industry which grew to be an important adjunct to the textile industry. The first thirty years of Fall Elver1a industrial history has thus been presented as a local example of the general transition that was occurring in the New England economy. In this instance, influenced by a unique combination of geographic conditions, the new economy evolved within the geographic orbit of the old. Aided by these same conditions the local capitalists and technicians, activated by the general economic trends and stimulated by the nearby example of the Blackstone, were able to take the initiative in developing the favorable water power site that was at hand. Here lay the basis for the tradition of resident ownership, control, and management which characterized Fall Biver's industry at least until the end of the century. By 18U5, these local entrepreneurs had developed a closely knit factory town in which the cotton manufacturing was supported by a cloth printing industry, an iron industry, and the beginnings of the textile machine industry. Although still of secondary importance, a firm basis had been created for the rapid growth that was to accompany the changing conditions of the succeeding thirty years and was to make Fall Biver the leading textile center in New England.

Chapter I I THE

EMERGENCE

OF THE

INDUSTRIAL

CITY

In 18U5, Fall River was a factory town tied to the falls of the Quequechan. By l875> it had become an industrial city whose forty-two cotton mills contained 1,268,000 spindles, almost exactly twice the number in Lowell, the nearest rival, overtaken in the late l860's. During this period the city achieved industrial maturity and there emerged the major outlines of geographical pattern and industrial structure which were to characterize its growth in the years to come. Fall River's rise to the position of the leading textile center in New England was the beginning of the shift of the locational center of gravity in the industry toward the southern coast of New England. This was in large measure made possible by the changing competitive position of coal and water as sources of power for the expanding industry. On a quantitative basis steam did not displace water as the chief source of power for the New England textile industry until the late l880's. As shown by Table 7, in 1870 steam provided only 25 percent of the motive power capacity. But this represents the cumulation of previous growth rather than the competitive position of steam and water in 1870. Our particular concern is to determine the date when large steam mills could be profitably built and form the basis for a textile center which would compete with established centers based on water power. The data in Table 7 clearly show the more rapid expansion of steam after 1870, for during the next decade the increase in steam capacity was double that of water. This difference in absolute expansion suggests that competitive equality between the two a.8 source a of power for new plants had been reached before 1870. This was the result of two closely related developments which took place during the twenty years prior to the Civil War. The first of these was the increasing scarcity of large, easily developed, conveniently located

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

41

water privileges upon which such an important part of the tertile capacity of

I85O

had been based. The second was the

improvement of the steam engine and its more successful adaptation to the power requirements of the tertile industry. Table 7 Capacity of Prime Movers in New England Cotton Mills* Water H.P.

1870 1880 1890 1900

80,271 116,851+ 1^5,563 162,619

Steam f>

75 56 U9 33

H.P. 26,763 90,521 15^,286

32U,162

t

25 51 67

* Sources: Compiled from the following volumes of the Census of the United States: tinth: 1870. Statistics of Wealth and Industry, p. 596; Tenth: 188C. "Statistics of Power Used in Manufactures," pp. 12-13; tleventh: 1890. Manufacturing Industries, F&rt I, pp. 760-81, 814-15, 822-23, 846-47, 8 K - 8 3 , 892-83; Twelfth: 1900. Manufactures, Part I, p. 600.

The Competitive Position of Steam and Water Power for Cotton Mills Evidence on the first point can be gained by considering the development of the important textile centers in which large water powers were initially a significant factor. There are fifteen such centers in New England which are listed in Table 8. Ten of these are from the list of "large developed water powers of the United States" (having at least 2,000 horsepower of installed capacity), given in the 1880 Census Report on water power.1 Five other textile centers have also been included on the basis of an eventual capacity of 100,000 spindles and an available water privilege of 1,000 horsepower. Data on the period of development in Table 8 show that five of these centers had been started in the early l820's,

of

1. Tenth Census of the United States: 1880. Report, the United States, Rirt I, pp. xxx-xxi.

XVI, Water

Power

42

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

Table 8 Major Water-Powered. Cotton TeTtlle Centers of New England8

Center Lowell b Springfield 0 ) Chicopee b ) Nashua b ~ c Dover b " c Great Falla b Manchester11 Saco-Blddeford Suncook c Lawrence b Holyoke Lewleton Augusta Brunawlck Wateryllle Taftv!Ile c

River

Period of Initial Dev.

l880 Water Power Available Utilized

ll,8i+5d

11,81+5 (S)

Merrimac

1821-39

Chlcopee

1822-1+1

3,368(s)

Merrimac trlb. Salman Falls tt

1823-28 182318231831-37 1831-50 181+5-1+7 181+5-60 181+7-51+ 1850-65 1850-68 18501871+ 1865-70

2,300(S) i,ooo(s) 2,1+75(S) 12,000(S) l+,600 1,850 11,909(S) 12,250 f

Merrimac Saco Merrimac trlb. Merrimac Connecticut Androecoogln Kennebec Androecoogln Kennebec Thames

12,000d 1,700® ll,000d

21+, 000 ll,900 d 3,500 9,000e 3,000

11,000

900

1,750

2,000 1,500(S)

a. Sources: Tenth Census of the United States: 1880. Report, XVI, Hater Power in the United States, I&rt I, pp. xxx-xxi; Shlakman, Economic History of a Factory Town, pp. 39-42; Starwood, "Cotton ifenufacture in New England," The Mew England States, ed. W. T. Davis, I, 155-73. b. Centers where the "Lcwell Group" participated in early development. c. Centers not included in the Census list of "large developed water powers." d. Minimum during working hours. e. Continuous during low season ordinary dry year. f. Mostly paper mills, only two cotton mills. (S). Steam capacity installed by 1880.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

43

chiefly under the direction of the "Lowell Group" of Boston capitalists. A second and final period of rapid initial development came in the decade 181*5-55 when six new centers were started, four of which were in New Hampshire and Maine. By 1855 therefore the initial period of development was over for all hut two of the fifteen; that is, control of the water privilege had been consolidated and at least the early mills had been built. In Lowell, Nashua, and Chicopee the limit of expansion on the hasis of water power had about been reached, but at Lawrence and Lewiston there waB to be considerable further development. In the group as a whole, however, expansion became more expensive as installations began to press against the margin of available stream flow, making necessary the Installation of steam engines, beginning in the l850's. By i860, steam equipment at eight of these cities ranged in amount from a 250-horsepower stand-by engine at the Ponama Mills at Taftville to the 13,890 horsepower installed at Lowell. The fifteen sites in Table 8 by no means exhaust the list of New England water powers. The census list of "large developed water powers" included twelve others, chiefly utilized for lumber mills, and there was an additional list of sixteen "large undeveloped water powers."2 With the exception of three sites in Connecticut, all of these twenty-eight were along the upper portions of the Maine Elvers, the Merrimack and its tributaries above Manchester, and the Connecticut above Springfield. None of these was ever to become important as a textile center. With most of the more modest privileges In lower New England already developed by 1855, the general expansion of water power for the textile industry was progressively limited by the increasing costs incident to the development of marginal capacity at already developed privileges or of the initial Installations at lees convenient locations. This is reflected in the declining rate of increase in installed water power capacity shown in Table 7. Improvement of Steam Engines for Textile Mills. This slowing rate of expansion was not solely due to the lowered quality of 2. Ibid.,

p. xxxiii.

44

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

available vater power. In the various fields of resource utilization, technological advance in e competitive area tends to contract the margin and limit the range of possible expansion in the established type of production, whether it be in mineral raw material, power, or agriculture. The improvement of the steam engine had a sinllar effect upon water power in the New England textile industry. Increased availability of an alternative source of energy reduced the necessity for the development of additional capacity at more isolated sites. Less necessary also was tfce expansion of capacity at already developed centers. Thus the explanation for the slowing rate of water expansion after 1855 is in terms of the increasing effectiveness of steam as well as the diminishing number of good water privileges. Anticipating Fall River's subsequent success by several decades, Slater experimented with steau power and coastal location in Providence. Referring to this enterprise, a contemporary engineer reported, "A cotton mill intended for operating 7 or 8 thousand mule spindles with the preparation and looms, was erected in 1827» as an experiment of the practicability of employing Steam Power. Anthracite coal from the Schuylkill is successfully used in the furnace of the Steam Engine of Mill."3 The movement gained no headway for nearly a decade, but between 1835 and 1850 six steam mills were built along the coast north of Boston, four at Hewburyport, and one each at Salem and Portsmouth. These developments elicited considerable interest and kindled a controversy concerning the relative merits of steam versus water power and coastal versus interior location which was to recur intermittently for half a century? Few persons were willing to recognize these struggling steam mills as the prototype of a new industrial location,.for water was still the dominant.source of power for new as well as established plants, and the steam engine was in a rather crude stage of development. At this very time, however, developments of major importance 3 . A l l e n , Science of Mechanics, p. 332. 4 . For i n s t a n c e , see the debate c a r r i e d on in Bunt's Merchants Magazine, 1849-50.

HIE EMERGENCE OF IKE INDUSTRIAL CITY

45

vere Imminent, far in 18U8 George Corliss completed his improvements which "revolutionized, steam engine power."5 His chief Innovation waB a more accurate control of the Bpeed of the engine in response to changes in load. This resulted in a great saving of fuel costs. In litigations concerning the extension of his patents in 1870, Corliss testified that one cotton mill had saved $228,^80 in twenty-two years and another had saved $190,705 in fourteen years by the UBe of hie invention.4 At first he had some difficulty in getting his engines adopted and in the early years "often agreed to take in payment the savings effected In cost of fuel in two and a half years as compared to the cost with engines replaced; ... Another guarantee, made when necessary, was for regularity of speeds, a merit In this engine of almost as much value in cotton mills as the saving of fuel."7 This Improvement, with its twin advantages, allowed the steam engine to he widely used in cotton mills when previously ltB chief usee had been in less competitive and exacting pursuits such as transport and mine pumps. As far as the cotton manufacturers were concerned the decade of the 1850's brought to a close the "frontier days" of New England water power. But the new path was already marked for the industrial pioneer. Steam had become a feasible alternative source of power for new mills. Steam and Water Power In Fall River. The duality of Fall Elver's environmental basis enabled the town to take advantage of these changing conditions. By 1850, the available power of the Quequechan had been virtually developed. The earliest available estimate of the capacity of the Quequechan 1b found in the 1880 Census report. On the basis of 128.7 feet of fall and a flow of 122 cubic feet a second "commonly stated as the amount used during working hours" the report calculates that 1,310 horsepower were available.8 In 1852 this power was used by seven mills on the stream, with a 5. Thurston, History

of

the

Growth

6. Van Slyck, op. cit., 7. Thurston, op. cit.,

I, 178. p. sae.

8. Tenth

United

Census

of

the

States:

of

the

1680,

Steam

op.

Sngine,

cit.,

p. 501.

pp. 16-17. The

report adds the qualification that "in some years full capacity is ob-

TOE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

46

total of 88,650 spindles and 2,1^5 looms driven exclusirely by water.9 Calculations at Lowell in the late 1820's indicated that It,000 spindles with preparatory machinery and loams necessary to convert cotton into cloth required fiftysix horsepower.10 On this basis the machinery in the mills on the Quequechan would require 1,232 horsepower. The actual requirement may have been somewhat less, since the mule spindles used in Fall River required less power than the throstle spindles used to spin the coarser goods at Lowell. Making allowances,,however, it is clear that by 1850 the capacity of the wheels about equalled the available power in the Quequechan. Unused privileges were no longer available and the last two water-power mills, built in 18U6 and 18^8, occupied sites that had previously been used by other e s tab1i shments. The first steps in the utilization of steam power had already been taken by the Iron Works group. This was natural since members of the group owned considerable land along the waterfront which did not have the added advantage of water power, and they had for some time been importing coal for use in the Iron Works and the print works. They had also been in close touch with Slater and were doubtless familiar with his early experiments with steam cotton mills. The tained all the time, but it would seem that not over 4 0 percent of that amount can be safely counted on as permanently available." Regardless of whether this refers to a twenty-four or to a ten-hour day this measure of potential is an extremely rigorous one. The storage capacity of the Watuppa reservoir (between high and low water, as controlled by regulating the gates in the dam) is given as 700.000,000 cubic feet or sufficient to provide 122 cubic feet a second for nearly 1,000 hours. From this it seems likely that periods of drastically curtailed operations due to low water would be of short duration. Similarly, flowage of more than 122 feet per second would also be relatively infrequent so that there would not be the incentive to install additional wheels to utilize "surplus water" as was done along the Merrimac. 9. Bristol County Almanac,

1852, pp. 63-64. Water power was expressly

stated as the motive force in all mills except the Troy for which no such information was given. Since that mill had only 6,468 spindles there is no reason to suppose that its original privilege had becone inadequate . 10. Allen, op. cit., p. 148.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL

CITY

47

continued expansion of the Iron Works was made difficult by the small amount of level land and the limited water pover at its original site on the lower falls. Between 18^0 and l8UU, they constructed a new plant, powered by steam, on a waterfront property enlarged by filling Just west of the Quequechan. The iron industry with its requirements for large amounts of power, for planned layouts on relatively large sites, and for water transport.and economic handling of bulky materiale was therefore the first industry to move from a water power location. The cotton industry was not long in following suit, for in l8kj the Iron Works group was faced by the expiration of a lease which they had held on one of the Pocasset Company's buildings on the upper Quequechan. They removed their machinery and in that year built the Massasoit Steam Cotton Mill, the first of its kind in Fall River, located on the waterfront Just north of the Quequechan. In 1852, another steam mill was built near the waterfront south of the Quequechan, and in 1859, a third, powered by a Corliss engine, waB erected beside the ponded portion of the stream above the Troy dam. In i860, these three mills contained 1*0,000 spindles, slightly less than a quarter of the total number in Fall River. A beginning had been made, the invasion of the Corliss engine had begun, and further expansion on the falls of the Quequechan itself was to be based on steam. By 1870, the seven mills along the stream had increased their spindleage to 15^,784, but five engines with an estimated 1,000 horsepower nearly equaled the capacity of the water wheels.11 Five years later there were in the mills of the entire city only eleven water wheels with a nominal horsepower of 1,056, almost insignificant beside the nominal 1^,673 and the actual 27,992 horsepower of eighty-one steam engines.12 1 1 . Armstrong, fall River: An Historical Sketch, pp. 9-23. 12. Census of Massachusetts: ]875. II, Manufactures and Occupations, 329. In his description of the individual plants at about this time, Earl mentions twenty-four engines of which twenty-three were Corliss. The list is obviously incomplete but serves to show the importance of this type of engine in the cotton industry.

48

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL

CITY

The Civil War and Pall River's Textile Industry The number of spindles In Pall River mills doubled between 1855 and 1865 and quadrupled during the following decade. The basis for this historic spurt was the changed competitive position of steam and water-power which, as has been shown, crystallized during the 1850's. The timing was due to the general conditions affecting the textile Industry rather than to local Influences. The local advantages which functioned during the 1865-75 boom were present during the late 1850's, hut there was lacking the stimulating Influence of the Civil War and the post-war boom. The war years constitute a period of profitable confuBlon for Important parts of the New England cotton Industry, despite the difficulties of obtaining cotton, shortage of labor, and disruption of the market. Abnormally large purchases of cotton in anticipation of a short crop in l86l enabled many mills to continue at least partial operations through most of 1862. Same additional cotton trickled in from various sources, but during the last two years of the war only about one-fourth of pre-war supplies were available, sufficient to keep onethird of the spindles in operation.13 An added difficulty waB the shortage of labor which became increasingly acute and remained so during 1865 and 1866.14 Markets were also disrupted, particularly the southern market for coarse goods. Exports of the same type practically ceased during the war and were slow to recover. To some extent this was counteracted by government contracts for coarse goods, but Lowell, where in 1863 "proportional stoppage has been the largest, from the mills being nearly all on heavy goods," was completely shut down in 1864.1S Fall River, on the other hand, benefited from the fact that the market for print cloths was not so much affected. Production increased late In 1863 and this type of goods "continued to be manufactured in considerable quantities."16 Although 13. 14. 15. 16. 1864,

Boston Beard of Trade, Annual Report, 1863, p. 96; 1864, p. 112. U. S. Comnissianer of Revenue, Special Seport, 1867, p. 22. Boston Board of Trade, Annual Deport, 1863, p. 4. Clark, op. cit., II, 29; Boston Board of Trade, Annual Seport, p. 111.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

49

the price of cotton skyrocketed to an annual average of 101.5 cents a pound in 1864, cloth prices about kept pace. Consequently the margin between the selling price of a given quantity of print cloth and the price of the amount of cotton necessary to construct it remained at about the pre-war level of Just under 200 cents (see Figure III), except for a temporary drop to 156 in 1863. This margin represents the spread between the cost of raw material and finished product and from it must come the manufacturer's costs of production and profit, if any. It is calculated on the basis of the annual average prices during the various years and therefore greatly understates the possibility for profit in a rising market, particularly since relatively little cotton was purchased at these high prices in the. later yearB. A manufacturer engaged in processing cotton purchased at price levels of i860 and l86l would therefore profit enormously from the rise in cloth prices. Some idea of the possibilities can be gained by noting that in l86? it was still possible to make a profit on the basis of the cotton prices then prevailing, which were several times those of i860. 17 The Union Mills Company provides a good example of the tenor of the times. Incorporated in 1859, its fifteen thousand spindle print cloth mill began operation the following year, the first to be located above the dam at the head of the Quequechan. During the war the enterprise was sufficiently profitable to allow the construction of mill #2 (with thirty thousand spindles') in 1865 "without any increase in capital or assessment of the stockholders." During the first ten years of operation, the corporation paid to its twenty-odd stockholders "dividends amounting to several times the original subscription, and the stock increased more than fivefold in value." Following this example, the Granite Mill was organized in 1863 and despite uncertainties enlarged its plans, increased its capitalization, and constructed a thirty18 five thousand spindle mill which began operations in 1865. The local metal industry was also thriving. The Iron Works 17.

Ibid.,

1863,

p.

95.

18. E a r l , op. cit., pp. 121-23,

131-32.

so

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

and several machine shops held government contracts for arms and other metal manufactures .19 This provided further source of profit and contributed additional stability for the city's industries. Post-war Booms. If expansion of capacity could continue and profits be made during the turmoil of war and curtailment of the cotton manufactury it is natural that Fall River Bhould share in the general boom which followed the cessation of hostilities. Cotton reached a comparatively low price in June 1865 and "for some months subsequently [New England] manufacturers were only able to supply to a moderate extent the orders fbr goods they received."20 In the country as a whole "the stocks of cotton were completely exhausted and had to be replenished; clothing of the people was worn out and needed to be replaced. The Civil War had brought about, for the purposes of both revenue and protection, a higher tariff than ever, and the foreigner was completely excluded from the market for any goods which American manufacturers had prepared their mills to produce. This too was an era of 'inflation of currency' and trade was so active that the priceB of all commodities were high."21 In Fall River, the response to these conditions was immediate. Cotton prices declined more rapidly than print cloth prices and the margin shot up to 325 in 1866. Under this stimulus five new corporations were formed in 1865 with an additional one in 1868. (These relationships are shown in Figure III.) A natural reaction cut short this period of expansion, the margin on print cloths declined, no new mills were built, production was curtailed, and wages reduced. The slump was temporary, however, for late in 1870 the depletion of stocks of goods and recovery of prices initiated a twoyear period of rising prices and firm demand in the textile 19. Secondary sources give no indication of the amounts of these contracts. The history of the Pall River Iron Works is yet to be written from the voluminous records in the Baker Library at Harvard. 20. Boston Board of Trade, Annual Deport, 1866, p. 72. 21. Stanwood, "Cotton Manufacture in New England," The lew Sngland States, ed. W. T. Davis, I, 171. See also: Taussig, Tariff Bistory of the United States, p. 198, and Appendix, Table II, p.454.

THE EMERGENCE O F

THE

INDUSTRIAL

CITY

51

Industry. This amiable combination again boosted the print cloth margin above two hundred during 1871 and l8Y21 a comforting return to the pre-war level, which it was not to reach again until 1917. Money was easy and a speculative fever was growing In the land. Fall River mills old and new were making money. Even during a strike In August 1870 the mills made profits In cotton and cloth, according to several treasurers who added, "with a gain of a million In so short a time It Is not a matter of surprise that new mills are now building or about to be built."22 Once more the response was Immediate and this time overwhelming. Between February 1871 and March 1872, fifteen corporations were chartered and during these two years twenty new mills were built. The Dominance of the "Tortile Complex." By 1875, over fourteen thousand of the city's sixteen thousand wage earners were employed In cotton mills. This dominance of textiles in the city was equalled by the dominance of print cloth In the Industry. Twenty-six of the thirty-three corporations listed this as their only product, and on a splndleage basis the specialization is seen to have been even more complete (note Table 19). The Iron Works employing about five hundred persons was the only significant industry not directly connected with textile production and it was to disappear from the scene within the next decade. Eyeing and finishing together with the manufacture of textile machinery and parts employed only about one thousand persons but were important adjuncts to the cotton millB and an integral part of the textile complex. Specialization of such a large capacity on print cloth production required the development of a significant printing and finishing industry, which had started in the l820's and grown to substantial size. The American Printing Company, under the management of members of the Iron Works group, had doubled its capacity in 18U0 and built a large new building during the first post-war expansion. It thus became the largest print works in the country with twenty machines and an annual capacity of 80,000,000 yards. The Bay State Print Works located on the 22. fall giver

Daily

Evening

feus, April 29, 1871.

52

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

site of the old Globe Mill came under the control of the American Printing Company in 1857. The two plants together could process 100,000,000 yards of cloth a year, an amount equal to about a third of the city's print cloth production. The finishing capacity was increased in 1872 when the Pall River Bleachery was organized and built in the southern section of the city to take advantage of a supply of particularly pure water frcm one of the ponds tributary to the Watuppa. The increasing local demand for textile machinery, particularly after 1850, was the basis for the growth of a textile machine industry which became rather highly specialized. The technicians who worked in the machine shops of the early textile millB sometimes set up separate machine shops. At first specialization was impossible and these shops produced a great variety of machinery. Ultimately the better ones began to specialize in textile machinery and even in particular types of textile machinery.23 These tendencies are exemplified by the development of the machine industry in Fall River. In 131+0, W. c. Davol Joined Haves, Marvel and Company (whose beginnings in the 1820's have been noted above, p. 35) bringing to the company his considerable technical skill and firsthand knowledge of an improved self-acting spinning mule, "smuggled out of England. Haves, Marvel and Davol produced these machines in increasing numbers, improved the models from time to time, and thereby reduced spinning costs in Fall River by about a third.24 An even better example was the Kilbum Lincoln Company, started in 1814-5 by several mechanics particularly interested in building the Kilburn Water Turbine. They also declared themselves ready to build and install a vide variety of textile and iron making machinery, but as time vent on the company specialized in cotton machinery, particularly a high speed plain loom. In 23. For a more complete discussion of these stages in the development of the textile machine industry of New England, see J. T. Lincoln, "The Cotton Textile Machine Industry," Barvari Business Xeviev, XI, 8B-96. J. T. Lincoln was a member of one of the last textile machine companies in Pall River and subsequently wrote several articles on the history of this industry. 24. Earl, op. cit., p. 58; Bagnall Papers, p. 181.5.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL

CITY

53

1866, a large loom works was built and the company's catalogue of 187^, In contrast to earlier editions, had little to say at)out the turbine wheel and devoted most of its thirty-nine pages to looms.25 These two textile machine companies formed the backbone of this industry in Fall Elver, the one specializing in spinning and the other in weaving equipment, though neither company limited itself exclusively to its specialty. Other establishments, for the most part smaller in size, manufactured machine parts and equipment, such as loom reeds and harness, card clothing, leather belting and roll covering, etc. In spite of these developments, however, the 1865-75 building booms outran the productive capacity of the local machine industry, and, in fact, that of the country at large, for much English machinery was importedespecially spinning and carding equipment. The rapid evolution of Fall River's "textile complex'' was the outstanding feature of the New England textile industry in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. A quarter of the spindles installed in New England during this period were located here. As has been shown, this concentration was favored by economic conditions and by the presence of an aggressive, closely knit group of local entrepreneurs, with funds previously accumulated in textiles and iron at their disposal. These men operated a Bmall number of mills, geared for the production of a favored type of goods and strengthened by at least the beginnings of subsidiary print works and textile machine industry. To these economic advantages must be added the influence of a favorable location, development of which was made possible by the use of steam power. Fall River's Locatlonal Advantages The growth of the industry in Fall River, supplemented by that of New Bedford, starting in the l880's, clearly made southeastern New England the major locus of the industry in America. Location on the Narragansett shore gave to the mills 25. Lincoln, "Material for a History of American Textile Machinery," Journal of icononic and Business History, IV, 259-81.

54

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL

CITY

in Fall River three advantages over the mills north of Boston, the major centers of the industry in the l850's, First, transportation costs for coal and cotton were somewhat lower than at interior points, or even on the waterfront of New Hampshire and Maine. Secondly, climatic conditions, more even temperature and slightly higher relative humidity, favored the production of print cloths and finer goods in this area. Thirdly, the location was convenient to major cloth markets in New York and Philadelphia as well as Boston and to the print works in Rhode Island, New York, and Pennsylvania. The first two of these advantages have frequently been mentioned in the discussions of the New England textile industry,26 tut no attempt has been made to evaluate them quantitatively or in terms of the period during which they were operative. Transport Costs on Coal and Cotton. In the late l860's, Fall River displaced Lowell as the largest cotton mill center in the country.27 This turn of events caused considerable concern among the manufacturera of the latter city and directed their attention toward lessening the advantage which the seaboard mills enjoyed. In 1871, a representative of seven Lowell corporations filed a protest with the Massachusetts Railroad Commissioners regarding the high charges and poor services on the Boston and 9alem Railroad, particularly in regard to the transport of coal to Lowell. The Commissioners elicited further information from the corporations and published this together with the original complaint and further comments of their own in their Third Annual Report.28 The complaint called the Board's attention to "the continued 26. Burgy, The Hew Sngland Cotton Textile Industry, Chapter-s I and III; Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, pp. 2930; Clark, op. cit., II, 106-06; Keir, American Manufacturing Industries, pp. 158-6327. Cotton mill spindles in Fall River rose from 241,218 in 1865 to 506,739 in 1870, while comparable figures for Lowell were 385,412 and 414,292. Secretary of the Caimonwealth, Statistical Information Relating to Certain Branches of Industry tn Massachusetts, 1865, pp. 90, 302; Dockhau's Textile Directory, 1870-71. 28. Massachusetts Board of Railroad Commissioners, Third Annual Report, pp. clx-clxii, ccxxiii-ccxlv.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL

CITY

SS

neglect of the Boston and Lowell R. R., lessees of the Salem and Lowell Railroad, to provide proper facilities for the transportation of coal frcm Salem to Lowell, and as results of such neglect the large sums paid by these corporations as demurrage, the increased cost to them of coal,...the consequent inability of Lowell to compete in cheapness of manufacture with Fall River, and other manufacturing towns." Jefferson Coolidge, Treasurer of the Lawrence Manufacturing Company (at Lowell), added further information in his answer to the Board's questionnaire. This company, a large one with 60,1*12 spindles manufacturing print cloths and hosiery, 2 9 consumed about 2,500 tons of coal and 11,000 bales of cotton a year. During the two previous years coel had averaged $8.Ul a ton, of which $1.25 represented railway freight from the wharf to the station at Lowell. Demurrage charges for the year ending October 1871 had averaged an additional 67 cents a ton. For total transport on cotton, coal, and raw materials, the company had paid $30,152.92 a year to the railroads and $31,960 to vessels. At the prevailing rates from Boston or Salem to Lowell of $2.00 a ton for cotton and $1.25 a ton for coal plus demurrage, the amount of these materials used by the company could have been moved from the seaboard for about $10,000. Consequently, a considerable though unspecified portion of the total paid to the railroads must have been charges for cotton moving overland from interior southern markets - a movement that had been expanding since the war. None the less, the railroad charges from harbor to Lowell was an expense which seaboard mills would not have to meet and in answer to the Board's inquiry as to what effect a reduction in charges on coal transport would have, Mr. Coolidge answered, "the cost of this transportation is of most vital Importance to enable us to compete with mills more favorably located.... I think the price of coal has alone enabled Fall River to outstrip Lowell." The Treasurer of the Hamilton Company also believed "a considerable reduction in coal freights would enable Lowell to increase steam powers in effective competition with the seaboard." 2 9 . Dockhan's

Textile

Directory,

1870-71,

p.

56.

56

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL

CITY

The Commissioners, not having such direct interest in the reduction of coal rates on the Boston and Lowell, were more cautious in their statement for they "by no means wish to be considered as expressing an opinion that it is to the more reliable and cheaper supply of coal that the recent remarkable development of Fall River is due; it is probably attributable in at least equal degree to other causes connected with the organization of its industry. At the same time they are led to believe that this proximity has been, and is, one essential without which it would not have taken place." The actual saving on coal transport for one of the larger mills in Fall River would be between $4,500 and $10,000 a year or between 1 and 3 percent on an investment of about $400,000. The saving on cotton would be somewhat less because Fall River mills would save only on that portion of their cotton brought directly by boat from the South or by New York steamers. The leading manufacturers of Fall River, having no particular ax to grind and being rather reticent in regard to discussion of business matters, left little on record in this connection. Earl, the historian of Fall River, himself a director of several corporations there, provides the only available discussion of the reasons for the city's industrial growth by a person connected with the local cotton industry.

He Btated, "The coal absolutely necessary for the fuel of the mill engines and the iron worked up in its machine shops and foundaries are conveyed from the mines, in most cases, entirely by water carriage, reducing the cost of freightage to the minimum figure and giving the hive of industry on Mount Hope Bay a superiority over manufacturing towns situated inland and obtaining their supplies by railroad."30 Coal could also be delivered to Fall River mills somewhat more cheaply than to mills in coastal centers northeast of the Cape. This can be seen from the statement of the Railroad Commissioners that coal "rates from mine to Boston are materially higher than to Providence."31 Some time before 1879, Samuel Webber, a textile engineer of note, made 30. Earl, op. cit., p. 96. (Earl's italics.) 31. Massachusetts Railroad Coomissioners, op. cit.,

p. clxiii.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

57

stuUes of operating coatB of ateam engines In coastal mills. Three mills in Fall River showed operating coats averaging about 13 percent per horsepower year below that for three mills east of Boston where "coal was higher."32 Webber's objective waa to show that water power along the Merrimac was cheaper than steam power at coastal points, a somewhat academic argument since expansion along the Merrimac was by this time dependent on coal, but hie statement is additional evidence of the fact that Fall River's advantage in coal transport was recognized during the l870's. Climatic Advantage of Coastal Location. Less variable temperature and a slightly higher relative humidity along the southern coast provided better natural conditions for the manufacture of medium and fine yarns than in the inland, more northerly centers. Proper moisture conditions aid the manufacturing process in several ways; the amount of frictional electricity is reduced, allowing the cotton to run more smoothly particularly in the preparatory processes; elasticity and breaking strength of the fibre is increased, reducing yarn breakage and stoppages of machinery in weaving and spinning;33 less "fly" is created to fill the air and lodge on machinery and goods; less evaporation of hygroscopic moisture reduces the loss of weight in cotton; and delicate adjustments of machinery are less liable to change. In short, the result is lower labor cost, smoother operation, and fewer stoppages of machinery with a larger production of a higher quality product. These advantages have become fully understood only withthe development of modern humldification equipment which began to show real progress in the late l880's. In 1879 the Garland Atomizer, the fjrat spray type humidifier, was described at a meeting of the New England Cotton Manufacturers' Association. Ten years later the Sturdevant system of central 32. Webber, Historical Sketch of Counenceuent and Progress of Cotton Manufacture in the United States, pp. 70-80. 33. Kier has said that spinning room output varies 5-10 percent with changes in humidity, while yarn breakage in a weave room nay cost as much as $150 a day if humidity is too low. (Op. cit., p. 161. )

58

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

station humidification was presented, and between 1890 and 1895 papers describing several improved spray types were read.34 This sequence not only shows the timing of the innovations, hut reflects the interest of the cotton manufacturers in the problem. Opinions as to the influence of atmospheric conditions and the best methods of control were by no means unanimous as indicated by long and spirited discussion of the question, "how to improve the running of cotton mills during dog days." 35 Prior to the introduction of mechanical humidifiers, American manufacturers had recognized the natural advantages of Lancashire and had attempted by various crude methods to increase the humidity In their mills, particularly In the weave rooms. Increasing evaporation by frequently sprinkling floors or setting open containers of water throughout the room was one method. More widely practiced, first in this country and then in England, was injection of steam directly into the room with resulting unpleasantness and injury to the health of the operatives. This seems to have been the prevalent practice in Fall River, for in 1882 the operatives complained "concerning the use of hot steam in weave rooms, where windows were kept closed in order that warp and filling might be kept damp. The heat was said to be insufferable in summer and some of the operatives regretted that their millB were not supplied with the new device that was in operation in Granite Mill #2, where, it was said, the pipes throughout the room, in summer, emitted Jets of cold vapor which not only dampened the warp and made the work go smoothly but kept the room cool."36 From this it would seem that an improved humidifier, probably the Garland, was Just 34. Garland, "Remarks," New England Cotton Manufacturers' Association, Transactions, XXVII (1879), 30-36; Foss, "The Sturdevant System," ibid., XLVI (1889), 57-87; KLaber, "Manipulation of Atmosphere in Mills," ibid., XLIX (1890), 18-30; Wallace, "Humidification," ibid., XLVIII (1890), 33-45; Hoffman, "Humidifying airi Ventilating Mills," ibid., LVIII (1896), 256-65. 35. Ibid., XXXV (1883), pp. 6-32. 36. Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor, Thirteenth Annual Report, (1882), p. 222.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

59

beginning to be introduced. Consequently, during the previous quarter century, when Fall River was achieving ascendancy in the textile industry, the less effective methods, if any, were used. Under these circumstances natural conditions of moisture had greater influence on the manufacturing process than would have been the case with modern apparatus. Earl, writing in 1876, again provides the only mention of this locational advantage by a Fall Biver person. In his discussion of the reasons for the city's rapid expansion he sayB "In the relation of fall River to the sea exists likewise a circumstances favorably affecting the manufacture of cotton. One of the traditional claims of England to an advantage over other countries in this pursuit has been its 'sea-girt' position, which assures a constant humidity, that is an essential, in a greater or less degree, in all the stages of production."37 Although Earl does not carry the parallel further or make comparisons with other New England centers the statement recognizes the existence of a favorable climatic factor resulting from coastal location. Table 9 Average Relative Humidity, Selected New England Mills, July - August, 1890* Wamsutta - New Bedford Suffolk - Lowell Pacific Hamilton - " Tremont "

62.3 61.1 53.8 53.7 50.0

* Source: Saunders, "Rsrcent Variation of Water Vapor in Grains, Loss and Gain in Cotton," New England Cotton Manufacturers' Association, transactions, XLVIII (1890), 10.

Actual data on the difference in humidity conditions between various New England textile areas allow a contrast between the southern coastal sections and inland areas to the north, although specific humidity records for Fall River 37. Earl, op. cit.,

p. 95.

60

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

are not available. In an Investigation carried out at the request of the Manufacturers' Association, relative humidity readings

(8 a.m. and 8 p.m. ) were taken at the Wamsutta Mill

in Nev Bedford and at four mills in Lowell during one month in the summer of 1890. Average relative humidity for all of these observations in each m i l l is given in Table 9. With the exception of the Suffolk, all the Lowell mills are narkedly below the Wamsutta, no explanation being given for the results at the Suffolk. The only other available data bearing on this question is a collection of official and unofficial humidity records for several inland and coastal points given in Table 10. The relative humidity at New Bedford, Nantucket, Table 10 Average Relative Humidity - Selected New England Stations*

8

a.m.

Noon

8

p.m.

North-

Bur-

field,

lington,

NanBos- Provi-

Vt.

Vt.

ton

80

76

73

61

66 - -

78

dence

tuck-

a.m.

Noon 8 p.m.

Bedford

Ik

86

61

76

79 68

90.5

63 71

71

84

3U

15

30

16

33

3

3

3 30

3 16

3

}k

- -

New

port

Years of Observation

8

New-

et

33

80 2 2 2

75 91

5 5 5

* Sources: Data for New Bedford from private records of observations taken by the Rodmans at 7 a.m., 2 p.m., and 7 p.m. Quoted by Atkinson in his "Cotton Manufacturing in the United States," New England Cotton Manufacturers' Association, Transactions, XLVII (1889), 46. Data for Newport are from the- same source but refer to a government station. Other data from U.S. Weather Bureau: Bulletin V, "Climatological Data," 2nd Edition, (1326), III, Rirt 106 , 24.

and Newport are considerably higher than those at the other stations, even Boston and Providence. This Is particularly the case for midday humidities which would be of greater

THE EMERGENCE OF

THE I N D U S T R I A L

61

CITY

sigr.ifIcance to the manufacturer since they reflect conditior.a during regular working hours. On the basis of location, the conditions at Fall River might be expected to be somewhat leas humid than at New Bedford and somewhere within the marked contrast between Newport-Nantucket and Providence. If, however, one were to assume an equally marked contrast between Boston and Lowell, then Fall River would retain a considerable advantage over the Merrimac centers. The evidence of the available records is thus consistent with the conclusion that atmospheric conditions in Fall River were somewhat more humid than in inland and northern cities, although the data do not provide complete proof. In later years came further recognition of the influence of this factor on Fall River's growth. In a long paper before the Manufacturers' Association, Edward Atkinson, manufacturer, mill underwriter, and enthusiastic believer in the New England textile industry, attributed the rapid rise of the industry in the coastal centers in part to the fact that "It is along this shore that the Gulf Stream exerts an influence somewhat like that of Lancashire, although perhaps less in degree. The humidity of the atmosphere is more constant and more nearly consistent with the best conditions for spinning than in any other section of this country within my knowledge." In support of this position he quoted a letter from A. W. Greeley, meteorologist with the Signal Corps, in response to an inquiry regarding the influence of these factors on the cotton industry. Greeley wrote, "it is possible that this condition [greater range of temperature at inland points] has tended to drive the cotton mills toward the south coast of New England where they are more completely covered by vapor-laden winds from neighboring waters, causing a reduced diurnal range in temperature and a more constant relative humidity."38 In a later discussion, Atkinson Illustrated the advantages of coastal location for weaving by pointing out that "managers of duck factories in Maryland spinning all yarns in the interior, but weaving 38. Atkinson, "Cotton Manufacturing in the United States," New England Cotton Manufacturers'Association,

Transactions,

XLVII (1889),

39-A2.

62

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL C3TY

only a part at the spinning mill, the reBt by the margin of the sea at Baltimore, observed a more even ant larger product per loom even in coarse duck."39 During the first decade of Fall River's rap.d expansion, before the development of efficient humidifiers, the climatic advantage would have been a significant consideration, particularly for the production of the medium count print cloths and the finer goods produced here and later at New Bedford. Although print clothe were produced in the mills north of Boston, the major product was of coarser cloth. As a matter of fact, the superintendent of a nill in Maine told an Englishman visiting mills in this country that the dry climate of upper New England was better for weaving coarse goods than a damp one. Subsequently, the Englishman wrote, "How this may be I do not know but I have not found drills being woven in those parts of New England where the climate most nearly resembles that of Lancashire."40 There is no way of estimating the actual saying. The manufacturers themselves probably could not demonstrate it on the basiB of the incomplete cost accounting which characterized the industry at that time. But it is not logical to suppose that this factor escaped the notice of Fall River mill men who were well aware of England's advantage in this regard and, if Earl's statement is at all representative, recognized that Fall River approached these conditions. Other economic and locational factors were of greater positive importance in influencing the post-Civil Wer growth of the industry and were the bases for more easily demonstrable savings, but to these were added the additional locational influence of a climatic advantage. Market Orientation. Nearness to cloth markets and finishing plants was the third geographic advantage which location con39. Atkinson, ibid., LXIII (1897), 225. Clark was apparently Influenced by Atkinson's opinions in his tvn conclusion that climactic conditions "eventually became a controlling influence not onlj o v e r the growth of cotton manufacturing in this vicinity, but also over the special branch of the industry which was to develop there." (See Clark, op. cit., II, 105.) 40. Young, The American Cotton Industry, p. 49.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL

63

CITY

ferred upon the mills In Fall River. Since 1815 New York had been the chief center for the distribution of Imported fabrics and, as the years passed, buyers from Interior points began to find It Inconvenient to make the additional Journey to Boston to purchase the product of the New England mills. 41 As late as 1850, however, New York was distinctly of secondary Importance as a market for domestic goods with only four large Jobbing houses in this trade. During the next twentyfive years the great increase in demand for domestic textiles was accompanied by a spectacular rise in the Importance of New York as the selling market. By 1865 there, were at least "thirty Jobbing houses of national Importance in New York" in addition to the branch offices which Boston manufacturers and merchants had found It expedient to establish there.42 Under these circumstances location convenient to the newly Important center beceme an additional consideration for the textile manufacturer. By means of the Fall River line, goods leaving the mills and print works at Fall River in the late afternoon could be delivered next morning on lower Manhattan, convenient to the textile merchandising and garment districts. Before the development of truck transport, a half century later, only a few mills in the vicinity of Providence and later those in New Bedford could equal the ease, speed, and cheapness with which Fall River products could be delivered in New York. This did not escape the notice of the New York Tribune which commented, "The fact that [Fall River] has direct water communication with New York and that it is the terminus of a large steamboat line is of much advantage in furnishing ample facilities for shipment." 43 The city, it should be added, was at no disadvantage in its location relative to Boston, to which it was no less convenient than the other centers and more convenient than those farther away than Lowell. Fall River's position relative to print works was an equally Important part of its locational advantage. Print cloth 4 1 . A l b i o n , Rise of the Port of Hew Tork, p . 0 3 . 4 2 . Dry Goods Sconovist, Jubilee Issue, 1896, 1 0 3 - 0 4 . 4 3 . Quoted i n t h e Boston Commercial Bulletin, A u g u s t 17,

1872.

64

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL

CITY

in Fall River was produced almost exclusively in mills which made no other type of goods and sold their product in the grey (i.e., unfinished) to print works and converters. The cloth was usually sold f.o.b. mill and the manufacturer's responsibility ceased with the shipment. Nevertheless, transport charges were part of the cost of the finished article and consequently the general pattern of the printing industry becamea a significant consideration. Calico printing, b y hand and by machine, had become important in the early nineteenth century around such importing centers as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and even Baltimore. During the 1820's and l830's several of the corporations along the rivers "north of Boston" started print works in conjunction with their cloth manufacture. They were also established in Rhode Island and in Fall River, where the two print works kept well ahead of the local production of print cloth for some years, thus providing the possibility for a local market in the early stages. It was not until 1855 that production of print cloth balanced the printing of calico at Fall River, about 19,000,000 yards each, 44 and after that date the rapidly multiplying mills became increasingly dependent on outside finishing capacity. Table 11 gives the regional distribution of the industry as it had evolved b y 1880 and, by providing a rough indication of the balance between cloth and printing capacity in the major textile areas, suggests conclusions concerning the direction of movement of the grey goods. Clearly shown is the outstanding importance of southeastern New England where 57 percent of the spindles in mills making print cloth and 37 percent of the printing machines were concentrated. The importance of this district in print cloth production is understated because the table includes a number of spindles producing other types of goods in mills outside of Fall River. (See note b, Table 11.) The million and a quarter spindles in Fall River's mills could produce 155,000 pieces of cloth per week, but the American Printing Company, 44. Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth, op. cit., 1855, p. 60.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL Tati le Geographic

11

D i s t r i b u t i o n of P r i n t

and Printing Machines, Mills

Cloth

Cotton Cloth

Total Spindles 1,239,000

Pieces

per

WeekL 155,000

Printers

Pieces per

Capacity-

Other

Capacity

1880 a

Producing

Print Cloth

Fall River

65

CITY

Number Machines 20

week

Capacity Printed 33,000

Woven0 —

South-

eastern 125,000

115

173,000

39,000

2,223,000

280,000

135

206,000

39,000

9^,000

105,500

86

102,000

55,000

Vermont

300,000

37,500

15

25,000

8,000

Hudson-Mohawk

326,000

1+1,000

58

88,000

1+0,000

97,000

2,000

N.

E? Total

North

981+, 0 0 0

of

Boston Western Mass. and

Philadelphia and Vicinity Grand Total

100,000

12,500

3,893,000

1+76,500

61+ 358

5 1 8 , 0 0 0 ll+l+,000

a. Sources: Mjntoer of spindles and printing machines calculated frtm Dochhax's Directory, 1880. Weekly capacity of printing canpanies and Fall River print cloth mills fran Earl, fall River and Its Manufactures, 7th ed. (I860). b. Nate on method: Earl gives data of spindles and weekly capacity of Fcill Riwer print cloth mills. Frcm these a ratio was calculated and applied to the spindle totals far the ether areas to give the figures for capacity. This results in seme overstatement because mills outside of Pall River, particularly "north of Boston," have been included which produce other constructicns as well as print cloth and there is no way of determining what portion of their capacity was used fcr print cloth production. A total figure of 400,000 pieces per hcek would be more accurate for the national capacity. A "piece" is the length of cloth woven en a loom, about fifty yards for print cloth at this time. c. The capacity listed here is included in the second colunn and is thus not in addition to that already given. It merely indicates the extent to which the printing canpanies in the various areas produced cloth in their cvn mills. d. This area includes all of Rhode Island, eastern Connecticut, and adjacent ftessachusetts (outside of Fall River).

66

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

at that time owning no cloth mills, could handle only 20 percent of the amount. Part of this "excess" could be printed in plants in the surrounding area where nine print works with 115 machines had a capacity of 173,000 pieces. Although these print works controlled relatively little cloth production, independent mills within the area had a capacity of nearly 1?3,000 pieces so there was a considerable excess of grey goods in the area aB a whole. Not much of this could be handled by the print works north of Boston because cloth and printing capacity about balanced in this area, although the estimate of 105,000 pieces of print cloth per week is generous. In addition, print works themselves operated sufficient weaving capacity to produce half of their requirements, further restricting their purchases in the open market. The environs of New York and Philadelphia were much more important as outlets for excess print cloth from Fall River. The 122 machines in these two areas could process 185,000 pieces while local cotton mills there produced a maximum of only 53,500 pieces a week. Most of this capacity was at the Harmony Mills (236,000 spindles) in Cohoes, New York, about the same distance from New York City as was Fall River. Here also the printing companies controlled relatively small amounts of print cloth capacity, the Garner Company controlling Harmony and two large print works being the exception. The attraction of New York as the major textile market was thus reinforced by the existence there and around Philadelphia of a number of print works for which local sources of supply or subsidiary mills were relatively unimportant. Unfinished as well as finished goods could, therefore, gravitate naturally toward these centers which lay conveniently along the route to the ultimate consumer in the middle Atlantic, southern, and middle western states. Print cloth mills as well as print works in Fall River profited, in contrast to the northern centers, by their more convenient location and easy communication with these important foci of the textile industry. Evaluation of the Locatlonal Advantage - Savings in Relation to Total Costs. The importance of the savings attribu-

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

67

table to locational advantages are often evaluated In relation to the total costs of production. When compared in this way Fall Elver'B advantage due to savings in transport costs and labor costs affected by climatic conditions appear small indeed. The earliest available cost breakdown for print cloth is given in Table 12 and is computed frcm the average cost of twenty-three print cloths produced in fourteen northern mills in the period 1888-89. Within what Table 12 Breakdown of Print Cloth Costs - Percentage of Total CoBt of Production» Materials labor Salaries Fuel, Power, Light Taxes Other

55-2 34.8 1.6 3.0 1.6 3.8

100.0 » Source: U.S. Commissioner of Labor, Pt. I, pp.

Seventh

Jnnual

Report,

1891,

82-83.

proportion of these total costs did the advantages of Fall Biver's location operate? Cottcn was about nine cents during these years and the cost of transport was considered to be between three-fourths and one cent per pound, roughly 10 percent of the cost of cotton. Transport charges on cotton thus represented 5-l/2 percent of total cost of production. The transport charges on fuel amounted to 60 to 70 percent of the cost of this item and would constitute another 2'percent of total cost of production. Making a generous allowance to include that portion of labor costs affected by humidity conditions, it would seem that the combined savings incident to locational advantages would operate within only a 10 to 12 percent segment of total costs (not including transport costs on finished products). This might seem relatively unimportant, particularly since the actual savings would constitute only a portion of this sentient.

68

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL

CITY

Savings Related to Costs Which Vary with Location. The above considerations, however, should not lead to an underestimation of the Importance of locatlonal factors in Fall River's rapid advance. Savings which appear small when compared with total costs of production may appear in a different light in relation to that portion of total costs which varies in response to location. To the extent that locatlonal factors are rationally considered and evaluated, the entrepreneur is more interested in the amount of these anticipated savingB in relation to that portion of costs which vary from place to place rather than in their relation to total costs; or, better still, in relation to d percent profit. This consideration may be analyzed by raising the converse question: what portion of total cost did not vary in response to location within New England during the period 1865 to 1890? Obviously the price of cotton in the south, comprising about 50 percent of cost of production (on the basis of the 188889 figures), was stable in so far as mill location was concerned. Considering the various elements of labor cost, wage rates also showed little variation from place to place within New England. After 1850, the industry had been chiefly dependent on Immigrant sources of labor, English, Irish, French Canadian, and by 1880 the beginnings of the movement from Azore Islands and Portugal. This labor supply was notoriously fluid, French Canadians and Azore Islanders coming and going with changing conditions in the mills. In 187^, the Mule Spinners Union of Lowell even offered to pay the passage home to England for any of the striking members who wished to return. Under these conditions no center had a particular advantage in terms of a labor supply and even new centers could attract a sufficient number of workers. As a consequence, wage rates were relatively uniform and Fall River manufacturers could maintain that local rates were higher while the unions claimed they were lower than elsewhere in New England. 45 The fluidity of the labor supply also tended to equalize the Bkill of the labor force in the 45. Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics, lleventh 1880, pp. 54-55.

Annual

Retort,

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

69

various centers, particularly for the production of coarse and medium goods, a condition which was further aided by the scattered location of the textile machine industry with plantB in the major centers from Providence to Lewiston. In one respect Pall River came to be considered at something of a disadvantage due to the greater frequency of labor disturbances, generally recognized as resulting from the necessity of utilizing union-conscious English mule spinners to operate the large amount of English machinery installed during the great expansion.46 The continued expansion of Fall River in spite of this condition indicates that it was more than balanced by compensating advantages. Except for the influence of humidity conditions labor costs were essentially stable and a further 29 percent of total cost of production can be considered to have been essentially static as between centers. Among taxes, salaries, and "other" elements of cost, only the first showed any locational variation, due to differences in municipal tax policies.. Fall River's tax burden was distinctly below that of Lowell - but the differential narrowed as Fall River expanded and between 1865 and 187^, Fall River mills paid 2k cents per spindle per year, while in Lowell the figure was 29 cents. Salaries and "other" costs did not vary regionally and therefore added an additional 5 or 6 percent to the total portion of stable costs. From this it is seen that about 85 percent of the total cost of print cloth production showed little tendency to vary due to locational influences within Hew England. This places greater emphasis upon the 10 or 12 percent segment of cost that our analysis has shown to be variable within Hew England, for in each of the components of this variable segment the advantage was seen to have been in Fall River's favor. The sum of these advantages was insufficient to dis46. Strikes occurred in Pall River in 1868, 1870, 1874, and 1879, some spreading to other centers. In 1882, the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor devoted two hundred pages of its Thirteenth Annual Report to a comparison of Lcwell, Lawrence, and Pall River in an effort to explain the greater unrest among the operatives of the last named city.

THE

70

EMERGENCE O F

THE

INDUSTRIAL

CI IT

place the industry from northern or inland locations in the same way that the textile industry of the southern Piedmont was later to displace that of the North. It was sufficient, however, to attract an increasing proportion of the additions to the industry's capacity. On this basis, despite continued expansion in upper New England, the locational center of gravity within the industry shifted toward the more highly favored southeastern areas. Inducements to Industry in Upper New England. Whether or not the causes of this shift were understood or evaluated, the results received frequent comment at the time. During 1872» the Boston Commercial Bulletin, which carried frequent notice of the progress of new mills in Fall River, also noted that the virtual depopulation of some areas in the north and east had led towns and cities to attempt to attract industries. Heavy investment of town funds in railway construction was one method. "Another great inducement which is being held out to manufacturing capital is its proposed entire exemption...from local taxation. Most of the principal Eastern cities have already taken action on this subject, and almost every day we hear of new ones being added to the lists. With this special encouragement thus afforded we understand that several companies of capitalists, organized in this city and New York, have lately sent their agents into New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Maine to look out for favorable locations for new woolen, cotton...mills and to confer with local authorities in regard to the measure of their proposed cooperation."47 Portland, Bangor, and lesser cities were active in this campaign and, while shoe factories were most frequently mentioned in this connection, the Bulletin reported that the "town of Bridgeton [Me.] has voted to exempt from taxation the capital stock of a cotton mill of from $75,000 to $200,000 for ten years."48 These practices as well as the conditions which gave rise to them stood in sharp contrast to the recurring periods of spontaneous expansion which swept Fall River forward during the postCivil War decades. 47. Boston

Commercial

48. Ibid.,

April 27, 1872.

Bulletin,

April 13, 1872.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL

CITY

Declining Importance of Fall River's Locatlonal Advantage It.must be noted that the locatlonal advantages which aided the growth of Fall River's Industries while other cities lees favorably situated were offering inducements, became less effective with the passage of time. Increased efficien cy and lower rates in rail transport narrowed Fall River's advantage in the transport of raw materials and finished products. The growing overland shipment of cotton and the increasing concentration of coastwise shipments in the larger ports of Providence, New Bedford, and Boston reduced the advantage in this-regard. The development of artificial humidification reduced the advantage of coastal location during the period that it was becoming recognized. The fact that the Globe Yarn Mills making medium and fine yarns in Fall River was one of the first to install the Sturdevant system in the middle l880's indicated the trend. These locatlonal advantages, then, significant in the years of rapid expansion after the Civil War, became less important as the industry developed; but during the l890's the question of competitive advantage within New England was to become increasingly academic in the face of southern competition. Changing Urban and Industrial Structure Important changes in the city's pattern and in the composition of its industrial population accompanied the metamorphosis from factory town to industrial city. During the quarter century of expansion which ended about 1875, the major outlines of the city'B present-day occupance pattern were established. Subsequent expansion, which tripled Indus trial capacity and population, resulted in further elaboration of this pattern rather than basic changes in it. Evolution of the Major Industrial Pattern. Instead of water power sites, land for mills and tenements, relatively level and in sufficiently large parcels together with ample industrial water supply, -became the chief environmental factors influencing the location of the new mills. Both of these elements were present in abundance. The ponds and

72

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL

CITY

streams provided large amounts of surface water in addition to the ground water that was easily reached by wells, particularly where bedrock lay at depths of more than fifty feet. Only along the slope facing the waterfront was the lack of level land a limiting factor. These general topographic relationships of the city's site as well as the urban pattern of the early l880's 49 is shown in Figure IV. As expansion away from the Falls of the Quequechan progressed, three new types of location provided the level land and water supply necessary for the new mills. These were (l) the level land near the waterfront, particularly north of the Quequechan, (2) the area along both sides of the ponded portion of the Quequechan above the dam, eventually including the west shore of South Watuppa, and ( 5 ) in the southern part of the city, the area around Cook Pond (sometimes called Laurel Lake) and the stream flowing northwest from it into Mount Hope Bay. The actual expansion of the mill pattern into these areaB is better shown on Figure V, which omits the detail of the topographic map and gives the period within which the individual mills were built. Six of the eight cotton factories built before 1850 lined the Falls, with another on the stream flowing from Cook Pond and the eighth (the Maseasolt Steam Mill) on the waterfront Just north of the Quequechan. It is natural that the first expansion away from water power should have taken place along this section of the waterfront and by 1855 most of the available land had been utilized. The substantial dwellings of some of the older residents were demolished or moved to make way for the Iron Works, the Print Works, two machine companies, and the American Linen Company whose first mill was built in 1 8 5 2 , southwest of the Quequechan (indicated by an open triangle on Figure V). The railroad with its terminals, connections with wharves and 49. The survey for this map was made in 1885, a decade after the close of the period under consideration. The only other map shewing the urban pattern at about this time is one in Beers, Atlas of Bristol County, published in 1871. Since sixteen newly organized corporations built mills between 1870 and 1875 and only five between 1875 and 1880 (see Figure III), the 1885 map is the better representation of the industrial pattern of the middle 1870's.

EVOLUTION OF THE I/ILL PATTERN IN FALL RIVER, 1850-1920 Mills built• before 1830 4 1850-1809 » 1870-1679 *

1 8 8 0 - 1 8 8 9

D

1 8 9 0 - 1 8 9 9

• 1900-1920

*

Contour linea ™ Dam MECHANICSVILLE

JJ

Sesia:! mile

MOUNT HOPE BAY

GLOBE VILLAGE

FIGURE V Evolution of the Mill Pattern, 1Ô50-1920 Base map: Enlargement from the map used in Figure IV. Mill construction dates the same as in Figure I.

74

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

warehouses, together with the tenements to house the workers, created further demands for land already pinched between tha Hill and the Bay. Consequently, further development along the waterfront took place to the north. In 1868, the Mechanics Mill was built Just south of Sladee Ferry. Since this was the end of the first post-Civil War boom, further development of this area was delayed for two years, after which five corporations quickly built mills (solid triangles on Figure V) a little to the north of the Mechanics. Level land, some of which was made by filling coastal marsh, water supply from wells and in one instance piped from Steep Brook a mile to the north, were significant locational features. In contrast to most of the other mills, which were built of Fall River granite, brick was used in the construction of these five, it being more convenient to bring this material by boat or rail from Taunton than to bring granite by cart two and a half or three miles from the quarries in the eastern part of the city. Several of the mills immediately on the waterfront maintained wharves for handling coal and sometimes cotton, although this does not seem to have given them any considerable advantage over the other mills in the city. The second area, along the ponded portion of the Quequechan, was more important than the waterfront in providing sites for new mills. A woolen mill had been erected Just above the Troy dam in I8U9 and ten years later the Union Cotton Mill was built on adjoining property. Nine of the ten mills built during the l860's were located in this area, north and south of the stream. During the boom of 1871-72, several more mills were added by these corporations. Other corporations were also started farther to the east in Flint Village, along the north shore of the Quequechan and convenient to the New Bedford Road. Again the local advantages were level land, some of it filled, and water supply. Mills whose property fronted on the Quequechan could obtain water directly from it, and canals were dug connecting some of the mills a short distance back from the stream. Wells were sometimes used and granite was quarried in the immediate vicinity, in some cases actually on the mill property.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

75

After 1870 the third, area for new mills 1)6081116 important. Around Cook Pond and the stream flowing from it, locational factors were much the same as those on the upper Queq.uech.an. The Globe Mill had been built on this stream in l8ll and. in the l840's several small thread mills had been constructed. But the small volume and the absence of concentrated falls made this a relatively poor power privilege and so development of this section waited for the permissive influence of steam and the stimulation of the post-war expansion. Between 1871 and 1875 five mills were built in this section, and others were to follow. After 1875 no new type of location was developed, although some expansion of the pattern can be noted. During the l880's building was particularly active around Cook Pond and along its outlet. Between 1890 and 1910 the west side of South Pond was developed and several mills were built near the Narrows in Flint Village. Other mills, as Figure V indicates, were built on available sites in already developed sections, by both new and existing corporations. Most notable of the former was the Fall River Iron Works Company, already mentioned in this chapter. The cluster of five mills begun in 1889 and located on the site of the old iron factory west of the Quequechan, together with two more built in 1906 and 1907 along the. lower part of the stream, comprised this project of M. C. D. Borden. Symbolically enough, the Fall River Manufactory was razed to make way for Iron Works #6, thus compleliing a cycle.begun nearly a century earlier. Development of the Won-industrial Pattern to 1875. The residence and street pattern naturally expanded in response to the requirements of the growing city and the expanding industrial pattern. Blocks of working class houses were rapidly built. Company housing was the general rule at this time and an incomplete listing in 1875 indicates that twentyone of the thirty-three corporations owned over 12,000 dwelling units, "tenements" as they are called.50 The attractive New England cottages that still delight the eye in some of the smaller mill villages of Rhode Island were not suited 50- Earl, op. cit., p. 112.

76

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIO. CI IT

t o the acale of F a l l R i v e r nor t o the r a p i d i t y of i t a expans i o n . Instead, rows of m u l t i - f a m i l y , frane b u i l d i n g s with t i e r s of porches became the p r e v a i l i n g tyie i n t h i s a s i n other of the l a r g e r f a c t o r y towns of New England. A l a r g e a r e a of t h i s type of housing grew up arouid each group of m i l l s . Thus the s c a t t e r of the m i l l c l u s t e r s r e s u l t e d i n a s i m i l a r s c a t t e r of the r e s i d e n c e p a t t e r n Into r a t h e r c l o s e l y b u i l t up areas separated by c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r e t c h e s o f leBs densely occupied vacant land. This c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the p a t t e r n i s c l e a r l y shown i n Figure IV. Glabe V i l l a g e , Mechani c s v i l i e , and F l i n t V i l l a g e (named on Figure V but not on Figure IV) comprised b u i l t - u p a r e a s adjacent t o groups of m i l l s , but r a t h e r separate from the cento- of the c i t y which includes the l a r g e s t m i l l group. The s c a t t e r of the urban p a t t e r n r e s u l t e d i n heavy demands upon t i e c i t y f o r road c o n s t r u c t i o n , school b u i l d i n g s , and the j r o v i s i o n of other public u t i l i t i e s . As a r e s u l t , the f i n a n c i a l burden waB r a t h e r c r i t i c a l p a r t i c u l a r l y during the jeriods of rapid expansion. The development of F a l l R i v e r ' s p o r t f a c i l i t i e s and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n p a t t e r n were c l o s e l y connected with i t s i n d u s t r i a l expansion. The c i t y ' s l o c a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o Long I s l a n d Sound placed i t i n a s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n for a combined landwater route between New York and Boston. The success of Sound steamers on the New York-Norwich and New York-Stonington runs must have Impressed members of -.he Iron Works group with these p o s s i b i l i t i e s , f o r i n the middle IÌ&O'b they were instrumental i n e s t a b l i s h i n g r a i l connection w i t h Boston and steamboat s e r v i c e t o New York. In F a l l River, the New York and Providence steamers berthed a t adjoining p i e r s Just north of the Iron Works p r o p e r t y . Here, where r a i l r o a d and water t r a n s p o r t met, was the f o c u s of the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n p a t t e r n . F r e i g h t boats t o New York and, a f t e r 1876, the Clyde Line steamers t o southeastern and Gulf p o r t s docked a t theBe and nearby p i e r s . Immediately t o the north, c o a l pocke t s formed another important p a r t of waterfront f a c i l i t i e s where Maryland and West V i r g i n i a , bituminous was brought by schooner f i r s t from the Potomac R i v e r porta and toward the end of the period from Norfolk and Newport News.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL

CITY

77

These developments by no means made Fall Elver Independent of other harbors. Providence, New Bedford, and Boston were Important receiving points for cotton and improved communication with these centers became increasingly necessary. In 1865> the Fall River and Warren railroad established connection with Providence from a point on the west bank of the Taunton Elver, reached by a ferry from Fall River. Construction of the Slades Ferry bridge across the Taunton in 1875 brought this line directly into Fall River and replaced the ferry which had been in operation for nearly two centuries. Meanwhile the development of mills on the upper level led to the building of the Fall River-New Bedford Railway with terminals In the center of the mill cluster above the dam. In years to come there was intermittent discussion of connecting the two rail lines separated by the slope which had originally interfered with early land communications. The project never materialized, however, and the transport pattern remained essentially as it was in the late 1870's. Enlargement of the Entrepreneurial Group. Another direct result of the growth of industry and the spread of the urban pattern was a considerable change in the composition of the entrepreneurial group. In the 1850's, the two original groups still maintained their almost exclusive control over the local industry based on their original ownership of land and water power. Although they divided the textile industry about equally (the Pocasset interests controlled 55>000 spindles while the Iron Works group managed 53»000) the latter was clearly the dominant interest in the town due to its important holdings In other industrial and commercial interprisea as well as real estate.51 Industrial expansion, particularly that after 1870, worked considerable change in this. Although Bordens, Durfees, and Chaces continued to play leading roles in Fall Elver industry until the collapse during the 1920's, the dominance and homogeneity of the two original groups was undermined by division of control and internal friction and also by the rise of new 51. lamb, op.

cit..

Chap. XII, p. 26.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

78

entrepreneurs. Like the original promoters, the personne. and capital of the new group was largely from Fall River and immediate environs. The spread of the mills away fron the falls of the Quequechan raised the value of many acres of farm land, owners of which could then play a part in industrial promotion. Some of this land was owned by the established first and second generation mill men but by no means all of it. A parcel of land in the "suburbs" sold for $1,?00 in 1855 and $13,000 in 1870. Another farm bought for $20 an acre in the l820's sold for $2,000-$2,500 in the early l870'e. Against this background several mills were built largely for speculative purposes, to increase real estate values.52 The growth of industry itself provided an increasing number of sources of capital in addition to the profits accruing to the limited group of original entrepreneurs and their immediate associates. Agents and superintendents in the mills acquired experience and accumulated capital with which they in turn engaged in new ventures. The servicing of the industry was also a Bource of new capital. Commercial interest transferred from general shipping and whaling to the coal and cotton trade of the industrial period ultimately found its way into the mills. The building and equipping of new mills was sometimes paid for in stock and members of machine companies both in Fall River and elsewhere became stockholders in the mills. Merchants and tradesmen in the rising industrial city accumulated capital and invested in the mi lie. Methods of financing were altered to take advantage of these new sources. Between 1820 and i860, mills had been privately financed by a few individuals holding relatively large amounts of stock. In 1859, the Union Mill was the first to be financed by general subscription although the subscribers were "gentlemen" twenty in number, whose individual holdings ranged from $1,000 to $20,000. A more definite break with the earlier methods came in 1868, when the Mechanics Mill divided its $750,000 capital into $100 shares which were held by 328 subscribers of whom 188 held ten 52. Hid.

, Chap. XIII, p. 24.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

79

shares or less.53 In the years to come a number of m l l l B followed this type of financing. The net result of these additional sources of capital and less restricted type of financing was a complication of the entrepreneurial group by the beginnings of a third generation of "upstart promoters and landed farmers." They developed their own banking facilities, promoted some of the smaller mills, participated with their first and second generation predecessors in some of the larger mills, and caused a somewhat wider dispersion of ownership and control.54 In addition to these local interests the rapid expansion attracted capital from outside. The amount of this outside interest is impossible to estimate but in certain enterprises such as the Fall River Bleachery it was considerable. In years to come it increased in importance but did not remove the tradition of local ownership and management which continued to differentiate Fall River mills from those in upper New England. By 1875, Fall River had become an industrial city. The major outlines of its present-day pattern developed, the influx of immigrants provided the necessary labor supply and changed the character of the population, and basic changes had occurred in the composition of the entrepreneurial group operating the city's industry. The rapid industrial expansion which had brought these changes had been based on the supremacy of steam as the source of power for new textile mills and had been occasioned by the condition of the textile market which favored the expansion of print cloth production. Under these circumstances, Fall River had definite locational advantages in comparison with most other New England textile centers. These continued to operate in same degree as long as this industry expanded in New England. But after 1890 their significance was hidden by the rapid rise of print cloth mills in the South.

53.

Earl,

54.

Iamb, op.

op.

cit.,

p.

cit.,

Chaps. X I I I ,

188. XIV.

Chapter III F A L L RIVER AND THE SOUTH, 1875-1914 I N T E R - R E G I O N A L C O M P E T I T I O N IN THE PRINT CLOTH INDUSTRY In 1875, Fall River was unquestionably the leading textile manufacturing center in the country. Half a century later, with spindleage and population tripled, it stood at the apex of its development and on the brink of an historic industrial and municipal collapse. The record levels of production, employment, wages, and profits of the early 1920's were quickly followed by the collapse of the city's major industry, the rapidity and extent of which revealed the fundamental weakness of Fall River's competitive position. During that prosperous half century the New England cotton manufacturer was faced with the necessity of adjusting to two basic developments in the industry. First and most important was the rise of competitive productive capacity in the South. Closely related to this was the marked technological advance Implicit in the perfection of high speed ring spinning in the l870's and the success of the automatic loom after 1895• The present chapter will deal with these developments as they affected the print cloth industry and analyze Fall River's reaction to the problems posed. RlBe of Print Cloth Production in the South The year 1880 marks the real beginning of modern textile mfmufacturing in the South. Although such persons as William Gregg, pioneer cotton manufacturer in South Carolina, and General C. T. James, who had built one of the early steam cotton mills at Newburyport, had been staunch advocates of industrialization in the ante-bellum South, their voices had been overwhelmed by the rising clamor of sectional dispute. The ravages of the war and the disorganization of the reconstruction caused the South to fall even further behind the rest of the country until the boom in the textile industry, beginning in 1878, stimulated expansion in the South as

FALL RIVER AND THE SOUTH,

1875-1914

81

well as in New England. The Republican victory in the national election of 1880 convinced, many southern leaders of the futility of seeking to achieve southern regeneration merely through the instrument of national politics and there was a noticeable quickening of interest in mill promotion in the months immediately following.1 Concrete measure of the South's advance is found in the Census of Manufactures for 1889 which, for the first time, gave a regional breakdown for the product of this industry. Total value of southern production was about a quarter of New England's (see Table 13). As is to be expected in a newly industrialized area, the South concentrated on the coarser fabrics: sheetings, shirtings, drills, duck, ginghams, and yarn. In fact, 95 percent of all the yarn spun in the South was coarser than 21's while only 36 percent of the yarn spun in New England was of this grade.2 The table shows that even in its leading products the South was not yet a rival to the established area. Only in yarns for sale and the relatively unimportant categories of ginghams and duck did the value produced in the South amount to more than one-half of that in New England. Northern manufacturers who took a complacent attitude toward this relatively undeveloped state of the industry in the South and its concentration on coarser materials were destined for a rude awakening. The competitive relationship between the two sections in the decades to follow is characterized by a sequence of southern supremacy, both in quantity and value, in an ever-increasing list of the industry's products. As early as 1899 southern production, measured by value, exceeded New England in brown and bleached sheeting and shirting, duck, drills, cottonades, yarns for sale, and twine. By 19CA, ticks, denims and stripes, towels and toweling had been added to the list; bags and bagging in 1909; and, finally, print cloth in 1919. In the years to follow, the South exceeded New England in an increasing number of medium and fine constructions as well as fancy goods, and by 1929 was producing a greater 1. Mitchell, Rise

of Cotton

Mills

in the South,

2. See Glossary for definition of yarn numbers.

pp. 80-08.

82

FALL RIVER AND THE SOUTH, 187S-1914 Table 13 Value of Leading Types of Cotton Tortile Producta, New England and the South, 1889* South ae a New England ($1,000'b)

Total Cotton Manufactures Brown or Bleached Sheeting and Shirting Plain Cloths for Printing and Converting Drill, Twills, Sateens Yarns for Sale Ticks, Denims, Stripes Ginghams Duck

The South ($1,000'b)

181,122

Percent of New England

23

37,785

12,729

33-7

36,811

1,117

3.0

18,^53 15,380

3,651 11,312

19.8

13,516 9,976 2,836

1,213 5,570 1,570

73.5 9.0 55.8 55.3

* Source: Eleventh Census of the United States: 1890• Manufactures, Part III, pp. 202-06.

quantity of yarns above ^0's. Technical advantage In the North for the production of fine goods has mostly disappeared and some manufacturers with experience In both North and South say that southern mills and operatives are capable of producing any cloth that can be manufactured in New England. In a consideration of Fall River's relationship to this general picture of southern expansion and the sequence of southern supremacy, our Interest naturally centers on the rise of print cloth production. Being a medium grade product, finer than the traditional sheetings, shirtings, and drills, print cloth was not one of the first constructions to assume

FALL R I V E R A N D THE SOUTH,

1875-1914

83

importance in the South. In 1889, as Table 13 indicates, it was not among the first five southern products and the amount produced was only 3 percent of the value of New England's print cloth production. In 1893, only one mill in the South produced print cloth3 hut that same year W. C. Lovering, treasurer of the Merrimac Mills in Lowell, pointed to the rise in average count of y a m produced in the South and stated that he knew of no reason why the area could not compete in production- of finer types of goods.4 Five years later the superintendent of a southern mill, himself a northerner, estimated the southern production of print cloth at ^0,000 pieces a week (about 2,200,000 yards) and prophesied "that the South will in ten years from now produce with its native operatives the bulk of the seven year standard prints."5 the turn of the century, Davison's Textile Blue Book listed fourteen southern corporations as print cloth producers and the Census of Manufacturers credited the South with a production of 260 million yardB, about 20 percent of the New England figure and 16 percent of the national total (the general trend of regional production of these goods is given in Table 14). Between 1889 and 1909, the trend in both New England and the South was upward but the much more rapid rate of increase in the South added to its relative importance and by 1909 it produced 36 percent of the national total, although still behind New England. Comparison during the next ten years is difficult because of a refinement in the census classification. Beginning in 1919, finer goods such aB lawns, nainsooks, muslins, etc., previously included in the "plain cloths for printing and converting" classification, were enumerated separately. By removing these finer goods from the classification the relative position of the South naturally improved and in 1919 southern production of "print cloths," as the new classification was called, ex3. Davison's Blue Book Textile Directory, 189Q-&4. 4. 53rd 5. land

U. S. Congress, House Coranittee on Ways and Msans, Tariff Hearings, Congress, 1st Session (1893), House Misc. Doc. #6, p. 713. Edward B. Wilbur, "Southern Cotton Mills and Manufacture," New EngCotton fbnufacturers* Association, Transactions, DCV (1896), 158.

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FALL RIVER AND THE SOUTH.

1875-1914

89

categories, but even the loom-fixera in South Carolina worked for rates a quarter to a third below those in Massachusetts. Among the other operatives, down to 1900, South Carolina wages ranged from one-third to one-half of those in Massachusetts. After 1900, the differential narrowed as wages in the South rose, labor became more skilled, and its product increased in fineness. In 1920, due to the impact of war on industry, the southern wages were from 75 to 80 percent of those in Massachusetts, but in the years to follow they dropped more rapidly than did those in Massachusetts and the spread again widened until South Carolina wages were only 50 to 60 percent as high in 192U and 1926. Wages in print cloth mills in the two states would approximate these figures, particularly between 1900 and 1920, when this construction was an important part of the production in each. There might have been some narrowing of the differential due to the fact that Fall River wage rates tended to be slightly below certain other Massachusetts centers -but this would not be important. This is indicated by the comparison of wage rates and work loads in a Fall River mill in 1901* with a Columbia, South Carolina, mill in 1905. The data given in Table 16 show that in all processes except weaving and warping the work loads were approximately equal. Weekly wages in the Columbia mill were about 60 percent of those in the Fall River mill for drawing, spinning, and slashing, 80 percent in roving. Weekly earnings for warping were about equal, but the work load in the Columbia mill was from a third above to double that in Fall River. The comparison in the weave room is complicated by the fact that the Columbia mill used automatic looms for the production of a cloth somewhat wider than that produced on the ordinary looms in Fall River. Calculated weaving costs per square yard at Columbia were only 1*1 percent of Fall River. This important difference naturally reflects the greater efficiency of the automatic loom as well as the contrast in wage rates. Manufacturers generally attempted to set a piece rate on cloth woven on the automatic loom which would allow a weekly wa«e about equal to that of the operative operating

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i g 000,000 pieces, a figure "about equal to production."32 But this figure was considerably below capacity, for in 1875 there were about 27,000 print cloth looms in Fall Hiver.33 Assuming a production of five and a half pieces per loom per week this number of loams would produce 7*^25,000 pieces in fifty weeks. This level of production was reached in 1878-79 in response to the revival of the textile industry in the late 1870*s. Consequently, much of the increase in print cloth production prior to 1880 represents the more complete utilization of existing equipment more than the expansion of print cloth capacity. During the l880's, however, there was considerable expansion of capacity. But after 1890 more rapId increase in the number of Installed looms Indicates that an increasing proportion of the new capacity was for other types of cloth. The increase in looms continued until 1913, although at a less rapid rate, while the trend of print cloth production started downward at the turn of the century. Diversification was thus proceeding at a more rapid rate 32.

leu Tork Chronicle, XDC (1874), 5ie. 3 3 . Calculated from Earl, op. cit., p. 112. Total loons in Fall River were 30,144 of which 26,732 were in mills making only print cloth are! an additional 918 in one which made sheetings and shirtings as well as print cloth.

108

FALL RIVER AND TOE SOUTH, 1875-1914

suggesting a net decrease in print cloth capacity in the years prior to World. War I. Examination of the changes in type of product of the various corporations throws further light upon the nature and extent of the diversification. Until 1925» most of the corporations can be grouped in one of three classifications on the basis of their products: corporations producing only print cloth (Group I), those producing print cloth and also other constructions (Group II), and those producing fine or fancy goods (Group III). In 1875, as Table 19 indicates, Group I mills clearly dominated the industry, 87.8 percent of the spindles were in corporations producing print cloth only. Diversification during the next twenty years was represented by a notable increase in Group II, spindles increasing from 37)000 to 773,000 while the percentage rose from 2.9 to 27.8. The building of specialized print cloth mills had become less attractive after 1873 with the manufacturer's margin fluctuating around one dollar instead of around two dollars as it had prior to that date (note Figure III). Consequently, most of the new corporations were designed for the production of other constructions as well, while some of the older corporations changed over part of their capacity or built new mills for the production of other cloths, thuB changing from Group I to Group II. The "other goods" most frequently mentioned were twills and sateens, as well as sheetings and shirtings. For the most part, these goods were made from medium count yarn, little if any finer than print cloth yarns, spun and woven on machinery that could fairly easily be changed over from one type to the other. Consequently, thiB development marked no drastic change in the nature

or competitive position of Fall River's industry and was, in fact, more of a response to general market conditions than to any competitive pressure from the South. A more marked departure from the traditional type of cloth production occurred after 1895. Total capacity in Group I corporations remained almost constant during the next fifteen years, while that of Group II continued to increase. Actual production of print cloths in these two types of mill rose to

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pH 000 spindles. Thus, only 20 percent of the total liquidated spindleage was in corporations which made no print cloth. Mechanical Equipment of Liquidating Corporations. Since emphasis has been placed upon mechanical efficiency as a factor affecting the competitive position of Fall River mills, it is necessary to examine the condition of the liquidating corporations in this regard. Again the purchase of Northrop looms provides the most important available data. Between 1910 and 1921+ Fall River had spent considerable sums on equipment and the number of Northrops rose from h,100 to 18,650, amounting to 21 percent of the total looms in the latter year. Of these 13,8^7 were in corporations manufacturing print cloth where they comprised 22.3 percent of the total. However, in the South Carolina corporations manufacturing the same goods, 88.6 percent of their 57,582 looms were Northrops.11 The deficit had been too great, and Fall River's efforts to modernize its weaving equipment during the years of abnormally profitable operation had obviously fallen far short of what was necessary to catch up with the South. Within Fall River the proportion of Northrops in the 11. Draper Corporation, Cotton Textile Blue Book, 19E5.

Chats,

»255, September 19E4;

Davison's

130

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

liquidating corporations was about the same as that for the entire group, although considerably below the corporations which continued under their own management (see Table 23). Table 23 Weaving Equipment in Fall River Corporations -- 1924a Number of CorLoams in Place poratlons Total Northrops Corporations which liquidated: Manufacturing print cloth Manufacturing fine goods Corporations taken over by outside management

Northrops as Percent of Total

19

48,431

10,881

22.5

5

9,004

246

2.7

8

15,1+02

2,005

13

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13,929

5,507

39.5

38

86,766

18,639

21.5

Corporations continuing under same management Totalb

a. Sources: Draper Corporation, Cotton Chats, *255, September 1834; Davison's

Textile

Blue

Book, 1925.

b. Including an additional corporation in existence in 1940 but not operating, which in 19E4 contained 1,464 looms, including one Northrop.

These looms were not distributed at all evenly, but were concentrated in a few of the mills. The Iron Works, for instance, contained 7>756 Northrops, or 70 percent of those owned by liquidating corporations. Four other corporations had replaced from 20 to 50 percent of their ordinary looms, but eleven out of the nineteen had purchased, at the most, a handful for experimental purposes. Among these were eight

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

131

mills specializing in print cloth production which contained only 257 Northrope out of a total of 17,530 looms. Seme of these corporations made a considerable effort to modernize after 1924,12 but it was then too late to cope with the twin burden of inefficient equipment and a highly competitive staple product. The fine goods corporations which liquidated had only 2k6 Northrop looms all told, a much lower percentage than the print cloth producing corporations Just discussed. Technical considerations are Important here for, although three of these corporations were built between 1903 and 1911, North.rops were not adapted to the production of lawns and similar fine fabrics until after 1910.13 Also the tie between the Fall River machine companies and the fine goods mills was particularly close. As a matter of fact, in 1911, the Draper Corporation found it necessary to finance and organize the Pilgrim Mills which was equipped with 1,178 Northrop looms, the first fine goods mill in Fall River to use a significant number. Dividend Records of Liquidating Corporations. Dividend records are at best a rough indication of a corporation's condition. But in conjunction with the other material at our disposal they throw some light on the reasons for liquidation and the basis for survival in Fall River. The use of this material is further Justified by the fact that we are dealing with a group of mills characterized by a high degree of geographic localization, specialization in the production of a few types of goods, and many close interconnections of management. Financial policy could, therefore, be expected to be somewhat more uniform than in a widely scattered and diversified group of mills. 12. Che of these print cloth mills without Northrops in 1924 is said to have spent so much on equipment that a shortage of working capital contributed to its closing in 19129 (Keith, financial Sistory of Two Textile Towns, Chapter IX). In this connection i.t is interesting to note that this corporation paid an average annual cash dividend of 12.6 from 1916 to 1320. 13. Stern, Mechanical Changes in the Cotton Textile Industry, ¡91036, p. 19.

132

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

The liquidating corporations differ rather sharply from the two groups of surviving mills in regard to dividend disbursements. This is shown in Table 24 where cash dividends for each group of corporations are averaged for three successive five-year periods: 1911-15> a period of difficulty and depression: the war boom of 1916-20; and the 1921-25 period prior to the beginning of the collapse. It should Table 24 Average Dividend Rates, Fall River Corporations, 1911-25« 1911-15 Liquidating corporations (21) Corporations reorganized by outside interests (9) Corporations continuing under same management (6) All above corporations

(36)

1916-20

1921-25

5

17.3

5.4

3

12.2

4.0

7.1

22

4.8

16.5

12.7 6.6

* Source: Calculated from Sanford and Kelley, fall River, Massachusetts. Statistics Relating to Its Cotton Manufacturing Corporations, various years.

be remembered that during this last period the capitalizaof many of the corporations had been increased by stock dividends and therefore the percentage rates understate the actual disbursements in terms of the 1920 capitalization.14 From this table the general comparison between the groups is clear. Dividends of liquidating corporations -- well over half of the total number -- were about the same as the average for all those listed. The nine reorganized corporations had records markedly below the average, while the six continuing companies were well above it. 14. Oi the basis of Sanford and Kelley's data, dividends averaged 6.8 percent per year, 19B1-25, for the corporations making public their returns. Calculating the cash disbursements as a percentage of the total 1980 capitalization, the average figure is raised to 7.7 percent which represents a considerable difference figured on the basis of a $36,000,000 total investment.

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

133

Dividend records of the liquidating corporations differed widely, a few of them paying at extremely high rates. The Union Mills, producing print cloth only, paid cash dividends which averaged 20.7 percent between 1911 and 1925. Only one other Fall River mill equalled this record. Seven corporations in Fall River paid out an annual average of over 12 percent during these years. Four of these, the Union, Cornell, Tecumseh, anú Flint, were print cloth mills which subsequently liquidated. With a total of about 8,600 looms, these four had installed exactly fifty-one Northrops by 192k. Modern weaving equipment was by no means a prerequisite to a high rate of dividends. In fact, it almost seems that the most successful mills paying highest dividend rates were the ones which apparently invested least for new machinery. Two of these mills were under the direction of two of the most aBtute of the last generation nill men in Fall River. On his retirement in the early 1920's, Thomas E. Brayton, treasurer of the Union, is said to have argued that the days of print cloth manufacture were over in Fall River and to have urged the liquidation of the Union, which hie successors delayed until 1929. S. B. Chase, treasurer of the Tecumseh, also gave evidence of his conviction that the time had come to get out from under print cloth production by selling this mill to the Davol Mills, largely for cash. In view of the success of the Tecumseh, the opinion at the time was that S. B. Chase had at last made a mistake. But the Davol soon found itself embarrassed by shortage of working capital. It seems likely that a decision may have been made in these and other corporations to run the mills as long as possible without substantial renovation, pay large dividends, and then either change over or liquidate. When the time came liquidation was generally the only possible alternative. It is, of course, impossible to demonstrate this motivation in actual operation without more detailed material on the inner workings of the corporations than is available in Fall River. However, there is widespread opinion among Fall River business men today that such was the practice. Then, too, such motivations are known to have operated in other textile

134

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

mills in New England.15 Fall River manufacturers were obviously aware of the seriousness of the situation in their industry despite the high returns of 1915-20. In the face of this situation, a policy of little re-investment and high dividends in anticipation of ultimate liquidation while seme equity remained was widely considered to have been in the heat interests of the stockholders. There is, therefore, no ccmmon characteristic that provides a glib explanation for the failure of the twenty-six corporations to meet southern competition. Nineteen of the twenty-six produced print cloth. Among these were four corporations which had been highly successful in print cloth manufacture from the point of view of dividends, hut had made little effort at either modernization or diversification. Five other corporations producing print cloth had attempted some diversification and Installed Northrops amounting to from 20 to 50 percent of their weave room capacity. But none of the latter had been among the extremely "profitable" liquidating mills. Among the liquidating corporations there was thus a distinct cleavage between those attempting significant loom replacement and those declaring the highest dividends.16 The remaining ten print cloth producing corporations emerge as a rather homogeneous core of mills producing print cloth and other slightly different fabrics, without the sairing grace of high dividend payments, or the excuse of expenditures on new loams. This was a sizeable group of mills, containing 815,000 spindles, about a third of the number in the liquidating corporations. In addition to the nineteen print cloth producing mills, five fine goods corporations also liquidated. Although four of these had been built since 1900, the dividend rate (8 percent between 1911 and 1925) was about on a par with the 15. See, for instance, the article by Alan Sweezy, "The Amoskeag Manufacturing Company," Quarterly Journal of Scononics, LII (1938), 473-512. 16- It must be remembered that dividend records are not available for the Iron Works, a privately cwned corporation, which purchased the largest number of Northrop looms. The highest average 1911-25 dividend among mills purchasing Northrops was 9.3 percent.

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

135

less successful print cloth mills. The two remaining mills which closed were yarn mills for which neither equipment nor dividend data is available. Basis for Survival -- Internal Factors Catastrophic as the collapse was, both in its extent and its effect upon the city, Fall River's textile industry has by no means disappeared. The city remains the leading textile center in New England and, although no longer a oneindustry town, textiles are the largest single industry and provide employment for about one-half of the labor force. This survival required drastic readjustments within the industry. These were facilitated by the liquidations just considered, which resulted in the almost complete disappearance of specialized print cloth capacity, the removal of large amounts of antiquated machinery, and withdrawal of a portion of the management unwilling or unable to make the necessary changes. These processes continued within those corporations which survived and the industry, as it emerged in 19^-0, contrasted markedly with that of 1925 in the type of its product, the efficiency of plant, and the infusion of a considerable amount of outside management and capital. Changes in Type of Product. The changes in the product of the city's textile industry are shown by special tabulations of the Bureau of the Census given in Table 25• This information is supplemented by the data used in Chapter III showing total capacity of corporations grouped according to type of product. Referring to this latter material (see Table 19), it is seen that in 1925, 3? percent of the 4,000,000 spindles were in Group I corporations producing print cloth only, while 31 percent were in Group II corporations producing other constructions as well as print cloth. This same year print cloth, including tobacco and cheesecloth, was the leading product with 27 percent of the total value of cotton manufactures.17 Second place was held by twills, sateens, 17. In Table 25 the types of cloth produced by less than three corporations cannot be shown separately without revealing data for individual firms. Consequently, the sum of items listed separately does not equal the value of cotton manufacturers as given in the published census material ( compare lines 12 and 13).

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sheetings, and shirtings with 22 percent of the total. Much of this group were staple fabrics from medium count yarns such as would he produced in the Group II mills. Thus about half of the value of product is shown to have been of the type produced in the first two groups of mills which included 63 percent of the industry's capacity. Had similar value of product figures been available for the early 1920's, a greater relative and absolute importance of the staple fabrics would have been shown because print cloth sales dropped from 8,200,000 pieces in 1922 to 3,000,000 pieces in 1925 (Figure VI). Fine goods mills with 25 percent of the spindles produced lawns, nainsooks, muslins, and rayon and cotton mixtures amounting to 11 percent of the total value of product. Mills containing 2^2,000 spindles produced nearly $8,000,000 worth of yarn and thread, about 10 percent of the total cotton goods. Nearly half of these spindles were in the Kerr Mills of the American Thread Company which produced fine sewing thread and yarn, which would be comparable with the spinning in the finer cloth corporations in the city. In 19^0, no mill listing print cloth among its products remained in production in Fall River. The Bourne Mill, specializing in staple twills and sateens, continues to operate as the only staple goods mill in Fall River but, since the mill building is across the line in Rhode Island, its product is not included in Table 25, although the spindles are included under Group V in Table 19. The production figures for 1939 mirror the change. The staple fabrics, which amounted to more than 50 percent of the value produced in 1925, accounted for only 6 percent, incidental production by mills emphasizing other lines of goods. Conversely, fine goodB rose from 11 to 51 percent of total value of product and the spindleage in these mills increased relatively from 25 to 69 percent. Part of the relative increase in fine goods production and capacity resulted from the decline in other lines, but was also due to the doubling of the absolute value of fine goods

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

139

from $9,13^,000 to $18,023,000 between 1925 and 1939.18 Value of yarn and thread declined only slightly, although aplndleage of these mills dropped from 2^2,000 to 131,000. The Kerr Mills remained without essential change In capacity and the production of this corporation 1s responsible for the stability in this branch of the industry. Striking as is this relative and absolute change In the major categories of the cotton mill product, there were also important qualitative changes within the fine goods classification itself. In both this and the preceding chapter it has been noted that fine goods mills shared at least some of the difficulties of the print cloth mills. This was due to the unsatisfactory conditions in the market for plain, narrow white goods, their chief product. Spindleage statistics in Table 19 show that, although this is the branch of the industry which survived in Fall River, there was a net reduction of about a third in its capacity from 977>000 spindles in 1925 to 690,000 in 19^0. Actually, of the spindles in 1925 fine goods mills, only 267,000 remained in 19^0, the balance being made up by the mills which changed over to fine goods from other types of product. Although the old Btyle fine fabrics are still important, the goods now produced in Fall River include a greater variety of fine cotton fabrics and also mixtures of cotton with rayon and silk. In addition, nearly $3,000,000 worth of Bilk and rayon goods were produced in 1939 by several of the larger cotton corporations in addition to smaller, more specialized mills. Most of the production is carried on in plants that originally produced cotton goods, and so this expansion is a part of the diversi18. A portion of the increase in fine goods production may be attributed to the broadening of the federal census classification to include the finer grades of twills, sateens, and shirtings which in 19E5 had been grouped with the coarser numbers of their respective constructions. However, persons familiar with the industry and its equipment in 1925 are of the opinion that relatively little of these constructions produced in Pall River mills in 1325 could be classified as fire goods. This is borne out by the fact that only two cloth mills in Pall River listed combs as part of their equipment in 1925, while seven of the ten cloth corporations in 1999 were so equipped. Davison's Textile Blue Book, 19B5, 1940.

140

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

fication toward finer and more highly styled types of textile production. Another example of the changes within the fine goods branch of the local industry is the increased production of marquisettes, largely used for curtain material and produced by at least four Fall Biver corporations. This type of goods has woven patterns and is, therefore, styled in wearing more than in finishing. Much of this can he done on plain (i.e., not fancy) automatic looms with various attachments. By adjusting the motions of the loom or the number and movement of the harnesses or by adding "spots" of yarn to the cloth, "beat up" and "clipped spot" marquisettes can be produced in a great variety of patterns. In a weave room working on this type of goods a number of patterns can be in process at any given time — each being made on a relatively small number of looms. The yardage of each pattern is therefore smaller than in the dayB when print cloth and other staple fabrics were turned out in large quantities with virtually no change in the details of the construction. This emphasis on variety instead of "staple" fine goods has been accompanied by a change in marketing technique. As late as 1925» only five corporations listed offices outside of Fall River, four in New York and one in Providence, and three additional corporations named New York selling agents. The remainder sold "direct" (twenty-nine corporations) or through unnamed agents or brokers (nine) apparently at the mill office. In 19^0, nine corporations listed New York offices, one listed a New York selling agent, and only four sold direct with no outside connection. 19 Long gone are the days when the superintendent set up the machinery to run on one or two types of print cloth or fine goods while the treasurer sat in the mill office, purchasing cotton and receiving cloth brokers. The Influx of Outside Management. The greater importance of outside capital and management was another way in which the industry of 19^0 contrasted with that of 1925. For half a century the interest of outsiders as stockholders and 19.

I bid.

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

141

directors in Fall River milla had been increasing. Selling agente had also increased control in a few of the corporations. Consolidations of yarn and thread mills in the early part of the present century had brought controlling interest of outside groups into this branch of the local industry. However, most of the actual management of Pall River mills was still resident in the city in 1925 - and a good portion of the control rested in the hands of men whose family connection with the Industry dated back at least to the building booms of 1866 to 1873. In the years following 1925 this situation was greatly changed. Management as well as mills and spindles disappeared from the scene and outside interests took over eight corporations which had operated twenty mills with 757*926 spindles in 1920. Although these are classified as "surviving mills" consolidations and reduction of capacity had cut the number of mills and spindles in half by 19^0 (Table 21). The most important of these outside interests were the Pepperell Company, the United Merchants and Manufacturers, and the Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates, each of which took over one or more Fall River plants as part of a large and scattered textile manufacturing organization. A consideration of Fall River's locational position for present-day textile manufacture must take Into account the motivation which led these organizations to choose it as a site for their operations in so far aB these motivations can be ascertained. The Pepperell Corporation, with a 200,000 spindle plant at Biddeford, Maine, had long been a successful producer of coarser goods -- sheetings, drills, sateens, etc. In 192^, Russell Leonard, one of the more able of the present generation textile executives, became treasurer and inaugurated a policy of expansion and diversification both of product and location. The following year a small plant was built in Opelika, Alabama, to manufacture coarse grey goods and also the outstanding shares of the Lewiaton [Maine] Bleachery were purchased to give the corporation complete control of facilities for finishing cloth from both mills. During 1926-27, the Pepperell Management by means of an exchange of stock assumed

142

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

control of the Massachusetts Mills with plants at Lowell (175,000 spindles) and Lindale, Georgia (102,000 spindles). The mills at Lovell, which also Included a dyeing, bleaching, and finishing plant and produced a variety of coarse and medium goods, had shown an operating loss of $1,065,690 In the two years following January 1, 192b, while the Llndale plant, producing the traditional coarse goods of the export trade, had returned an operating profit of $650,000.20 In reporting on the merger to his stockholders, Leonard pointed to the diversity of product since there was l i t t l e duplication between the two organizations and to the "diversity of risk In the geographic location of plant," particularly the increase in "our southern production at a strategic time." Although he expressed the hope of operating both units 31 despite the disparity between their operational returns, the Lowell plant waB liquidated within the next three years, the machinery sold or transferred to Pepperell's other mills and most of the real estate and water power sold. Reduction in plant had also begun at Biddeford and in 1936 there were only 100,000 spindles operating chiefly on wide sheetings and blankets, 32 machinery for the latter having beeen transferred from Lowell. The treasurer's reports continued to speak of necessity of cost reduction In this plant as v e i l as In the bleachery in Lewiston and listed high freight charges, heating costs, and local property taxes as disadvantages of location in Maine.23 I t was against this background of expanding control together with a southern shift in productive capacity within the corporation that Pepperell purchased the Granite Mills in Fall Elver in 1930. The Granite, consisting of three mills containing 120,9^ spindles and 2,938 looms producing a variety of plain and fancy goods,24 had been in d i f f i c u l t i e s for several years. Although a portion of the equipment was antiquated as suggested by the presence of 22,k00 mule spindles, 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

Boston lews Bureau, November 20, 1926. Ibid., December 1, 1926. Pspperell Company, Treasurer's Report, 1986, p. 6. Ibid., 1940, p. 5. Davison's Textile Blue Book, 1825.

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

143

there were 1,096 Draper loans and acme capacity for the production of finer goods in vhlch Pepperell was apparently Interested. Considerable reduction in capacity took place as the lees efficient machinery was removed 25 and Mill #1, a narrow, four-story structure built in 1864 and several hundred yards away from the more modem units, was quickly disposed of. As It developed the reorganized plant contained slightly over 40,000 spindles and 1,500 looms manufacturing combed broad cloth, marquisette, and fine sheetings -- goods which averaged seven yards to the pound in contrast to the coarser goods in the corporation's southern plants averaging 2.5 at Opelika and 2.1 at Lindale." The local officials were well satisfied with the operations at Fall River and in 1935 commented that "when the corporation started its fine goods business here the immediate outlook did not warrant it, but the turn came and the cotton mill, known ao Plant B, has proved eminently successful."27 Pepperell*s production at Fall River was further diversified by the setting up of a rayon weaving division completed in 193 ^ and comprising 725 looms weaving rayon goods from purchased yarn. The Granite, though reduced in size, thus became an integrated unit of a large, well-managed organization. It apparently is the most stable of the company's northern holdings in view of the liquidation of the Lowell mill together with the reduction in capacity and continued complaint concerning high costs in the Maine plants. The location of Fall River, the nucleus of good machinery in the Granite, and the price at which it could be obtained have been sufficiently attractive to Pepperell to provide the basis for the fine cotton and rayon unit which fitted into the larger plans of the company. The United Merchants and Manufacturers was a more ambitious project under the direction of Homer Lorlng, former president 25. Some of this machinery may have been installed in the *2 mill at Opelika being built at this time — for the 19E9 treasurer's report (p. 4) said that it was being equipped by machinery "purchased from a Pall River plant." 20. Interview, January 1941. 27. fall

River

Berali

feus,

February 15, 1935.

144

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

of the Boston and Maine Railroad, backed by Kidder & Peabody, Boston investment bankers, and having as its object a vertical organization which included not only textile mills and finishing plants, but also merchandising firms and cutters up. Although the first action of these interests in 1927 was the purchase of the Page Mill in New Bedford, the real impetus resulted from the acquisition during 1928 of four important New York converting houses which handled women's wear, drapery, and wash fabrics. During the next two years, considerable productive capacity was added to these merchandising organizations. Three mills in South Carolina totaling 102,260 spindles were purchased and a finishing plant built at the one in Clearwater, South Carolina. A fine goods mill in Connecticut was purchased and a finishing plant added while a silk mill and finishing plant were constructed in Canada.2* No other plan for the rehabilitation of the New England textile industry aroused such interest and hope as did this merger. Fall Elver was particularly stirred because here was a project which promised to link a rehabilitated textile manufacturing and finishing industry with the newly important garment industry, whose plants were beginning to move in from New York. These expectations appeared to be in process of realization when the Loring interests embarked on a rather ambitious program in Fall River. Two cotton mills which had been idle and were In need of considerable rehabilitation were acquired at a bargain price of Just under $2.00 per spindle at a time when new mills were costing $20.00 to $25.00 per spindle. The Arkwright, a 68,k}2 spindle mill equipped for medium count goods, was purchased for $175»000 and re-equipped as Arkwright #1 for the production of fine goods, lawns, and voiles. Only $135,000 was paid for the Chase (86,192 spindles for the manufacture of sateens and shade cloth) which, as Arkwright #2, was changed over for production of clipped spot marquisettes, and finishing equipment, including five printing machines, was installed. 28. Discussion of the financial and managerial details of this merger as well as those of the Berkshire and General Cotton to be discussed below can be found in Kennedy, op. cit., Chaps. V and VI.

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

14S

Further activities of the United in Fall River consisted of setting up the United Rayon Mills in part of the original Globe Yarn Corporation's plant and also of obtaining control of several Fall River clothing and curtain manufacturers." However, the full anticipations of Fall River citizens were not to be realized. Somewhat embarrassed by losses following the 1929 crash and also resulting from too hasty purchases, the United was reorganized in 1933 and its security values scaled down. In Fall River, there were reductions and changes in capacity. The printing machines in Arkwright #2 were removed either to the corporation's plant in South Carolina or to a new enterprise started in Argentina in 193^. Arkwright #1, producing lawns and voiles, was eventually closed which cut the cloth capacity by about half. Little came of the early interest of the corporation in the local cutting up trades. In 19^0, the United plants in Fall River consisted of the Arkwright #2 with 36,792 spindles and 1,0^8 looms producing marquisettes, Arkwright # 1 operating as a finishing plant for marquisettes, the Midland Print Works with five machines, and the United Rayon Mills (40,000 spindles), silk throwing and winding. 30 While it failed to "save" Fall River and actually has somewhat contracted its operations, the United controls a significant and varied group of enterprises. The Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates was the third large organization which came into Fall River. This had begun in the spring of 1929 as a horizontal merger of five New England fine goods mill organizations located in western Massachusetts, Vermont, and Rhode Island. Slightly more than half a million spindles had been brought together in an effort to rationalize the fine goods industry which had been badly disorganized by style changes and competitive selling by a number of separate mills.31 To these in 1930 were added about 300,000 spindles in three Fall River fine goods corporations 29. Ibid., pp. 79-80. 3 0 . Davison's Textile Blue Book, 1940. 3 1 . Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 0 6 - 7 0 .

146

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

together with a 600,000 spindle mill In Warren, Rhode Island, belonging to one of them. Two of the three, the Parker and Hargraves, had poor dividend records since at least 1910 and had been merged in 192k without signal success. The King Philip, by way of contrast, had a long history of successful operation and, under the able management of S. B. Chase, had paid cash dividends averaging 17 percent per year between 1911 and 1925. This disbursement was comparable to those of the most liberal print cloth mills and had not been made at the expense of plant equipment. Berkshire interests paid net price of $9.51 a spindle for the King Philip and only $3.7^ a spindle for the Parker-Hargraves.32 This was an Indication of the relative efficiency of the two organisations and Is further borne out by the fact that by 19^0, capacity of the King Philip had been reduced only 12 percent to 116,000 spindles, while Parker-Hargraves had been cut U0 percent to 98,280 spindles, and the Warren plant closed entirely. Two objectives were thus gained by Berkshire — efficient units were added to the organisation's productive facilities and Inefficient equipment in a weak organization was removed from the industry. In a mare forthright attainment of this second objective, Berkshire Joined with the United, which as we have seen was also chiefly Interested in fine goods, In forming the General Cotton Corporation. The purpose of this corporation was to further stabilize the fine goods industry by an orderly liquidation of fixed assets of unprofitable mills throughout New England. In Fall Biver, General Cotton took over the Lincoln Corporation and the Davis Mills in 1930, the Laurel Lake (1931), the Davol (1935)> and the Charleton (1939) --a total of approximately 530,000 spindles and 11,670 loams, mostly on fine goods. The motives which led these outside organizations to take over mills In Fall River are thus seen to have been mixed and, for the most part, not specifically stated. Locational 32. Ibid., pp. 74-75. Net price represents "cost price of stock with net quick assets subtracted." Figures include the Parker Mill in Warren, R. I.

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147

factors would necessarily differ fren those which influence the building of new planto. Yet the fact that opportunities for such acquisitions presented themselves throughout New England and in various parts of the South lends considerable importance to geographic factors. Fall River, as has been shown in Chapter II, was in that section of New England which had shown the most recent expansion of the textile industry. Locational factors were thus as favorable as in any other center in new England, and more favorable than in most. A situation between the Boston and New York markets and convenient to finishing plants in southern New England continued to be advantageous, particularly for the necessary production of diversified market-oriented goods. Such considerations had apparently played a part in Pepperell's decision to come to Fall River at a time when the recently acquired mill in Lowell had Just been liquidated and productive capacity in Biddeford was being reduced. In addition, the United limited its holdings in the north to this southern section of New England. It is probable, however, that purely geographic considerations were less Important as an attractive Influence than such factors as the condition of the plant and Its equipment, the state of the balance sheet, the type of goods which the mill produced or could be made to produce, the price at which it could be obtained, and, most Important of all, the manner in which the particular plant fitted into the general plans and policy of the larger corporation. In view of the general condition of the Industry in the North, intensified by the difficulties of the depression, only organizations with considerable financial backing and well defined operational policies could take over these mill bargains with any hope, of successful operation. The reduction in splndleage in these reorganized mills from 667,000 in 1925 to 355,000 in 19U0 suggests that considerable difficulties faced the new owners. The net result of this development has been the strengthening of Fall River's textile Industry. Participation of outside financial interests was able to effect a reorganization and continuance of a portion of the local industry and to provide an infusion of new managerial talent. Only the King

148

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

Philip had any real chance of survival among the eight mills taken over. This vas a hit hard on the traditional local pride In the dominance and effectiveness of indigenous management and ownership, hut It was the natural result of longterm policies of local management as veil as the Increasing difficulties which had heset the industry since the early 1920's. Improvement In Mechanical Efficiency. Closely related to both the change in type of product and the infusion of outside capital and managerial talent was the improvement in mechanical efficiency. In the negative sense this was, in part, the result of the removal of large amounts of antiquated machinery due to the liquidation of 2,500,000 spindles and the UO percent reduction in capacity of the corporations which survived. The competitive conditions of the 1930's also required the positive purchase of more modem equipment and replacement of old machinery in these continuing corporations. The most striking, as well as the only available, quantitative measure of this Improvement is found In the great increase in the proportion of automatic looms. Table 26 shows that the number of Northrop looms in the surviving mills more than doubled while the percentage rose from 25.6 to 79-6 — aided by a 26.8 decrease In the total number of looms. (There Table 26 Weaving Equipment in Surviving Mills* 192U Total looms Northrops Other automatics

29,331 7,512 (25.6$) not given

19^0 21,^9 17,083 (79-6%) 1,812 (8.9^)

• Sources: For 1084 data, see Table 23. 1940 data supplied by Draper Corporation.

was no net increase In the number of Northrops because a substantial number of these in 1925 were in place in mills which liquidated.) In 19^0, 1,812 of the looms were automatics of other makes, especially Stafford Looms, a shuttle changer no

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149

longer manufactured. Most of the remaining 2>500 looms vere old, non-automatic, plain looms; at least 1,500 vere In two corporations which had not operated them for years, and there was no sign of their going Into production even under the stimulus of war-time demands.33 Aside from replacement of plain looms, the greatest mechanical improvement for the Industry at large has been In the carding and In the spoollng-varplng departments. Improved openers and single process picking have been chiefly responsible for Increases In man-hour output ranging from 8l to 112 percent In carding departments of the best run mills during the period 1910-36. In the spooling and warping departments Increase in output ranged from 120 to 172 percent, depending on the type of cloth being manufactured.34 Inclusive data on changes of equipment in these departments In Fall River mills Is not available, but men acquainted with the industry state that much improvement has occurred. Four mills visited in 19^0 all had single process picking and two were installing the latest type of Barbour-Coleman high speed spooling and warping equipment. In addition to new machinery, an Important source of improved equipment was the secondhand market which flourished as a result of the two-thirds reduction in capacity of the New England cotton industry. The greater part of this equipment vas destined for the scrap heap (with Japan as an important market) or for sale to less highly developed areas, particularly South America. In some Instances, machinery merely moved from one Fall Biver mill to another as was the case when a surviving corporation was able to re-equip one floor of its weave shed vlth automatic looms from one of the more recently liquidated fine goods mills. A superintendent well acquainted with local mills could sometimes pick up bargains in machinery, one instance being mentioned in which machinery was purchased for $75 which had a few months previously been bought new for $1,500.3S Machinery was also 33. Interviews, Pall River, 1940. 3 4 . Stern, op. ext., p. 5. 35. Interview, Pall River, 1940.

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COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

obtained from liquidations In otner northern centers. An example Is the Sagamore vhlch In 1933 was reported to hare Installed 1,200 Draper loams purchased from the Harmony Mills In Cohoee, Nev York.36 Dealers In secondhand machinery and liquidation concerns provided an important market for this equipment. Such organizations as the Crescent Corporation and General Cotton, both active In Fall River, purchased entire mills and later disposed of the machinery and real estate. Some of this machinery changed Its character In process of renovation and rebuilding. Narrow looms could be converted Into broad and attachments could be added. Spinning frames vere rebuilt, lengthened, and equipped with long-draft attachments. Considerable profit could be made by these means, particularly If the mill In question liquidated under pressure and was purchased at a low figure. One Fall River mill which closed down and disposed of Its machinery In an orderly fashion over a period of years was said to have realized several tlmeB as much by this method as It was offered for the entire lot of machinery at the time the mills closed.37 The larger corporations, such as Pepperell and Berkshire, carried on these functions within their own organizations. The Berkshire operated a large machine shop yhere equipment from the mills taken over could be repaired and rebuilt. Basis for Survival -- External Factors Changes In the external factors affecting the competitive position of Fall River accompanied these Internal modifications of the city's Industrial structure. These external changes have greatly enhanced the chances for the Industry's survival by lessening three disadvantages of which Fall River manufacturers had long complained: (l) after 1925 there was a considerable narrowing of the Important differential In wages between North and South, (2) there was also some relaxation of the Massachusetts restrictions governing 36. Textile for Id, March 1933. 37. Interview, Fall River, 1940.

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151

night vork for women, and (3) the tax burden on Fall River corporations was lightened. Narrowing Wage Differential. Comparative Worth-South wage levels, important In the decline of Fall River Industry, were n a t u r a l l y significant to Its partial survival. The United States Bureau of labor Statistics data on average weekly earnings provide a rough measure of the changes In this regional differential. This Is shown in Table 27 In which average of weekly earnings for textile operative in Hew England is expressed as percentage of similar earnings for operatives in the South Atlantic states. From 191^ to 1921*, with the exception of the years 1918-20," the differential Increased as earnings in New England rose more rapidly or fell more slowly than those in the South. The peak was reached In 192k when the weighted average for earnings In New England stood at 64.3 percent above the southern figure. The difficulties which then beset the Industry In the North naturally caused a downward movement during a period when wages In the South were relatively stable. The differential, therefore, narrowed and by the early 1930's had returned to the 1912-13 level. Since 1932, Federal regulation and the setting of minimum wages have tended to reduce further the southern advantage. Although the differential received official recognition under the NRA code which set an hourly minimum of thirty cents in the South and thirty-two and a half cents In the North, the legislation caused a much more marked Increase in southern wages. The resulting sharp drop In the differential between July and August, 1933, lo clearly shown In Table 27, both In weighted and unweighted figures. While the code was operative, the trend continued downward and In August, 193^, Hew England earnings were only 18.5 percent above those of the South. Voluntary efforts to maintain the provisions of the code after the abandonment of the NRA did not prevent a widening of the differential. Northern wage increases in 1936 and 1937 were not matched in the South but the result21-26 percent differential was well below the high level of the years 1922-26.38 36. U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor teview, January 1938, pp. 38-39.

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COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

Table 27 Worth-8outh Differential In Average Hourly Earnings* New England Mills as a Percentage of South Atlantic Mills Weighted Unweighted Average Averageb 1912 1913 191U 1916

1918

1920 1922 192k 1926 1928 1930 1932 1933, 1933, 1934, 1935 1936, 1937, 1938 1939 19U0 19U1 191+2

July August August July July

137.7 137.* 137 A 158.7 157.5 126.7 157.1 16U.3 151.7 1U3.6 139.0 125.8 138.5 115.9 117.6

1M*.3 1U.2 135.1 13^.6 121.9 118.5 121.2 120.7 125.9

Northern Mills as a Percentage of Southern Mllle c

121.6 122.1 119-7 120.1 120.3

a. Sources: Bureau o f Labor S t a t i s t i c s , Monthly Labor Beview, May 1933, p. 1173; January 1938, p. 38. A l s o data supplied by the Bureau. b. 1912-18 based on hourly earnings i n s i x occupations i n cotton t e x t i l e m i l l s . A f t e r 1918 based on twenty occupations, "Average r a t i o s o f northern t o southern earnings in each occupation and sex, weighted by the average numbers o f workers in the sane c l a s s as found in the Bureau's f i e l d studies f o r 1824 t o 1930." c. Computed from data on o v e r a l l averages f o r northern and southern s t a t e s supplied by Bureau o f Labor S t a t i s t i c s , March 1, 1943, and "not s t r i c t l y comparable t o each other or t o those" in the r e s t o f the t a b l e , because o f changes i n the sample. Based on averages f o r the f o l l o w i n g months: 1938, July, September, December; 1939-41, March, July, September, December; 1942, March, July, September.

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153

Under the Wages and Hours Administration, the subject of the differential in minimum wages again became Important. After careful study the Textile Industry Committee recommended a 32.5 cent minimum for the entire industry.39 During the opening hearings on these recommendations in June and July, the unions and northern manufacturers were Joined in their opposition to the differential by important segments of the southern branch of the industry, although vociferous opposition to the single minimum continued to came from the South. In September, 1939> a minimum of 32.5 cents an hour was set for the entire industry, the differential was discarded, and this principal has been maintained in the successive Increases to 37.5 cents in June, 19^1, and to cents in April, 40 19^2 Although the data for 1938 to 19^2 in Table 27 are not strictly comparable with those for earlier years, they suggest that the differential dropped somewhat from the peak in July, 1937, and maintained a position comparable to the 1933-3^ level. It continues to exist, however, since a larger proportion of the southern operatives work for wages at or near the minimum level. This is partly the result of historic differences in the wage levels of the two areps, and partly to the fact that a larger proportion of northern operatives are engaged.in the production of finer grades of goods. In 1939, for instance, 22.7 percent of the 16^,000,000 pounds of yarn spun in Massachusetts was 1+0's and finer, while the comparable ratio for South Carolina was only 8.5 percent of a total production of 632,000,000 pounds.41 Mills In a particular center such as Fall River naturally benefited frcm the general decrease in this major southern advantage. Even the rapid liquidation of print cloth mills was temporarily slowed during the period of NRA and business revival of 1933 and 193*+. The general narrowing of the regional differential, however, was not sufficient to allow 3 9 . The Keu fork Times, March 2 2 , 1939, 3 2 : 7 7 . 4 0 . Monthly Labor Review, December 1939, p. 1 4 4 6 ; J u l y 1941, pp. 1 7 0 71; May 1942, p. 1190. 4 1 . Sixteenth Census of the United States: 19U0. Manufactures, CottQn Manufactures, p. 17.

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COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

the survival of this branch of the Industry in vhlch competition continued to be keen and the differential mare significant than In finer goods. In this connection, the testimony of an official of Pacific Mills at the Wages and Hours hearings on June 19, 1939» indicates the continuing difficulties which have faced print cloth mills In the North. Pacific vas at that time manufacturing print cloth at its mill in Dover, Hew Hampshire, (one of the last large units to operate on these goods in the North) and also at a newer mill In Columbia, South Carolina. Discussing the various elements of cost^ the official testified that' there was no difference In cost of cotton — cotton from Texas gulf ports being cheaper in Dover early In the year, while Columbia had a Blight advantage on cotton from the Mississippi Valley. Local cotton vas almost never used at the southern plant. In wages the excess at the Dover plant above Columbia was as follows for several operations, including those with the highest and lowest spread: speeder tenders, 10.7 percent; weavers, 14.U percent; loom fixers, 25 percent; spinners, 32.9 percent; and sweepers, 39.9 percent. For staple goods of this type, such differences in wages were not compensated by any northern advantage in efficiency. Weavers in both mills, for example, tended the same number of loans, running at the same speed and without appreciable difference in stopping time. The difference in wages was, therefore, reflected in a difference In labor costs which gave the southern mill a 19 percent advantage. This represented one-half cent a yard on 80x80 print cloth or 7.5 percent of the price of these goods.42 This differential is not strictly comparable with the regional one discussed above based on average v«»ekly earnings, but it is low enough to be in line with the general trends suggested. However, at the time of the hearing, Pacific had already decided to liquidate its print cloth capacity in the North, a change-over to rayon had begun at Dover "thereby eliminating a large part of the print cloth 42. Information from interview, Boston, October 1941, and a copy of the brief filed by Pacific at the Wage-Hour hearing, June 19, 1989.

COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

15S

formerly made there," and the liquidation was completed In April, 19^0.43 Unfortunately, such detailed comparative data for the later years of print cloth manufacture In Fall River are not available. It is clear, however, that the narrowing of the general regional differential in wages was insufficient to allow print cloth mills to continue In Fall Elver or elsewhere In New England, although It was sufficient to ease the internal transformation within Fall River's industry so necessary to its survival. Easing of Massachusetts Labor Legislation. The Massachusetts "six-o'clock law," prohibiting the employment of women and children under sixteen between the hours of 6 p.m. and 6 a.m., had been strongly opposed and heavily criticized by cotton manufacturers. The Importance of women in the working force made it Impossible to run the mills more than one full shift in view of this restriction. Southern manufacturers, as well as those in some other New England states, could reduce overhead cost and Increase production by two and even three shift operation. late in 1930 the Cotton Textile Institute had led In an effort to abolish night work for women and minors by voluntary agreement among textile manufacturers. The movement received considerable support In the South as well as the North, gained the adherence of mills representing over 80 percent of the capacity In the industry, and an agreement went into effect early in 1931.44 By November of 1932, however, defections In the narrow sheeting and print cloth branches of the Industry, particularly In the South, caused a virtual abandonment of the effort.45 These developments seemed to Increase the demand for relaxation of labor laws in Massachusetts. At a meeting of the New England Council In November, Governor Ely said that if other 43. Pacific Mills, Annual Befiort for the Tear gnding December 31, 1938; and Report for the Six Months Ending June 20, 19t044. Monthly Labor Kevieu, XXXI (October 1930), 1114-15; Textile Vorld, LXXIX (August 30, 1930), 967. 45. Business Veek, November 9, 1938, p. 26; and November 23, 1982, p. 8.

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states did not raise their labor laws to the level of Massachusetts, his state would be forced to bring ltB laws Into conformity with others.46 Passage of the NRA Codes, which envisaged mill operation on a basis of two forty-hour shifts per week, brought matters to a head. Manufacturers became more Insistent, and labor leaders gave their support. NRA Administrator Johnson urged enough relaxation of the laws to permit two shift operation and Massachusetts Commissioner of Labor Edwin S. Smith regretfully agreed that a "suspension of the 6 o'clock law" was necessary If Massachusetts mills were to compete with mills In other sections.47 In July, 1933» the law was suspended for two years with the provision that women could be employed until 10:00 p.m. If they did not constitute more than 45 percent of the working force, but work after 6:00 p.m. was still prohibited for minors under 16. Management was also urged to make every effort to Increase the number of male employees.48 This suspension has since been extended whenever it was about to expire, the last occasion being In the spring of 19^1 for a further two-year period. Under this relaxation of the hour restrictions, twoshift operation became common In Fall River. No actual cost data illustrating the resulting savings are available, but manufacturers ascribe a considerable Importance to the measure. Changes in State and Municipal Taxation. Industrial crises in Fall River brought renewed efforts aimed at the reduction of what mill men had long considered to be the disproportionately heavy tax burden. Massachusetts manufacturers were subject to a corporate excise tax composed of a 2.5 percent levy on net income together with a levy of $5.00 per $1,000. of "corporate excess." The latter was derived from a calculated "fair value of capital stock" from which certain deductions were made, chiefly the value of buildings, real estate, machinery, and other Items subject to local taxation.49 Particu48. the lev fork tines, November 18, 1932, 15:1. 47. Ibid., July 10, 1933, 15:4. 48- htessachusetts Department of Labor and Industries, tews Release, July 27, 1933. 49. National Industrial Conference-Board, the fiscal Problem in Massachusetts, pp. 109-10.

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lar criticism, however, was leveled at the machinery tax. This, like taxes on buildings and real estate, was a property tax to local communities vlth the local authorities making the assessments and setting the rates within the general purview of the state tax commissioner. As early as 1897, a state commission considering the revision of tax legislation acknowledged the criticism of this measure and said that "changes In invention, changes In fashion, In demand for goods made, in the general state of trade make It almost impossible to ascertain that fair cash value [of machinery] which the tax law contemplates." The example of the Lawrence mills in Lowell was cited In which 1*0,000 spindles, assessed at $6.U3 per spindle in 1895, were sold in 1896 for 62.5 cents per spindle "because the company found it unprofitable to make four yard sheetings at Lowell." The Commission, therefore, urged that machinery be exempted from taxation, not immediately, but as soon as alternative sources of revenue could be found.50 Forty years were to elapse before this recommendation was finally carried out. In the meantime, the campaign for change in the law grew In intensity as the situation In the New England textile industry grew worse. In Fall River in 1926, the valuation on textile machinery was $56,125,950, slightly less than twice the valuation on textile real estate and buildings. At the 1926 rate of $28.1*0 per thousand,51 the total tax against the machinery would have been $1>595>976. Cash dividends paid out by Fall River mills for 1926 were $1,31*6,000 (not including three corporations which did not make public their disbursements), a fact which is helpful In estimating the Importance to the mill owners of the removal of the machinery tax. Nevertheless the next year, the Massachusetts special commission on taxation recorded its opposition "to the radical change in the corporation tax law which has been suggested" involving the elimination of 50. Massachusetts, Report of the Commission to Inquire into the txpediency of Revising and Amending the Laws of the Connonwealth Relating to Taxation, pp. 55-57. 51. Pall River Board of Finance, Second Annual Report, 1S33, p. 7.

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COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

the machinery tax and an Increase In the corporation Income tax to compensate the local communities.*2 The campaign continued hut it was not until 1936 that action was taken along the lines of the above suggestion. Machinery was to he no longer subject to local property tax assessment. Instead, the value of machinery was to he Included In the "corporate excess" (i.e.,.Its value was no longer to he deducted from the value of capital stock). Machinery has thus to he taxed at the flat rate of $5.00 per $1,000, Instead of the average rate [throughout the state] of $33.38 as of 1936.53 A considerable portion of the Increased state corporation tax was to he turned back to the municipalities to make up for their loss of property tax. As the State Commissioner pointed out, "this hill In substance shlftB the taxation of machinery used In manufacturing from the fluctuations of local values and rates to a stable value and rate centrally administered."*4 In Fall Elver the effort to remove the machinery tax was closely related to the general tax situation. The policy of the city officials had been to hold down tax rates while Increasing the valuations to provide for Increased municipal expenditures. Between 1913 and 1921, rates had Increased about 20 percent while valuations had nearly doubled and textile valuations had Increased by 130 percent so that they amounted to 52.U percent of the city total Instead of the previous ^2.6 percent (see Table 28). This process had continued, with slightly less emphasis on the textile corporations, at least until 1926. Commenting on this policy In 1933» the commissioner of taxes for the state of Connecticut wrote, "The officials of Fall River today are frank to admit that assessments were kept on an artificially high base, increasing annually In the years from 1920 to 1926, for the distinct purpose of maintaining a favorable rate of tax for election purposes and to provide a display of city 52. Massachusetts General Court, Report of the Special Commission Appointed to Investigate...the Subject of Taxation, House Document »490 (19E7), pp. 34-35. 53- Business teek, June 27, 1936, p. 18. 54. Massachusetts Tax Coomissioner, Press Release, February 28, 1906.

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159

asseta against which municipal loans might te made."51Based on valuations that vere to become Increasingly fictitious, particularly In the case of textile corporations, tax returns fell far below estimates, despite the sharp Increase In rates and decrease In valuations after 1926. The city debt "snov-balled" and the refusal of banks to grant further credit In November, 1930, precipitated the city's appeal for aid and the action by the state legislature which placed the city's finances under the ten-year control of the Fall River Finance Board, appointed by the governor. Table 28 Fall River Tax Rates and Valuations, 1913-36»

1913 1920 1921 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1936

Total City Valuation ($1,000)

Tax Rate

$100,057 178,739 192,159 176,819 214,087 161,682 149,014 112,360 100,l4l

$20.30 25.40 24.20 29.80 28.40 l+o. 80 38.80 43.70 1+2.00

$

Textile Valuations Valuation per $1,000) Percent Active Spindle of Total $ $1+2,667 98,31*2 100,653 76,704 85,285 5^,665 43,915 15,654

42.6 55.0 52.4 43.4 39.9 33.8 29.5 13.9 —

11.29 25.86 26.45 19.95 22.90 16.32 16.40 9.77 - -

* Source: Pall River Board of Finance, Second Annua I Report, pp. 7, 9; lighth Annual Report, p. 26.

This tax policy as It affected the mills had been heavily criticized by the manufacturers. "As early as 1921, mill owners made protest against what they termed the excessive valuation of their plants, machinery, and equipment. Such protests, growing annually, appeared to be without result. Taxes were paid under protest, payment of others was 55. Blodgett, Causes of Financial Breakdown of the local Government of Fall River, p. 17.

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COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

refused, adjustments were demanded. This situation culminated in 1925 In a series of suits against the city in which tax refunds were directed by the court and settlements were made In pending cases to thirty-four factories totalling $1,066,100.1,56 The assessors were apparently unconvinced for mill assessments were Increased In 1926. In the face of this the Fall Fiver Cotton Manufacturers' Association passed a resolution claiming the burden of titration due to "false valuations especially In the present year Is a serious menace to the Industry" and recommended that corporations pay only amounts which they thought Just? 7 While all this appears on the surface as a simple case of blind over-assessment dictated by political motives, It must be remembered that cash dividends paid by the local corporations during the four years ending with 1920 had totalled 75 percent and had averaged 7 percent annually from 1921 through 192U (see Figure III), with generous stock dividends In addition. These conditions naturally affected the valuations, and as long as the dividend rate stood above the magic 6 percent the municipal officials doubtless found It easy to believe that the manufacturers were merely crying "wolf." Events soon took matters from the control of the mill men as well as the assessors. Shutdowns, Idle machinery, and liquidations caused the drastic scaling down of textile assessments while the tax rate rose above $U0.00 per $1,000. The reduction of assessments, however, did not keep pace with the collapse of actual valuations and as a result, by the end of 1931» abatements of taxes and refunds of taxes already paid "on account of the uncollectibllity of large sums on destroyed or removed machinery" amounted to $6,196,000 on the taxes of 1925 to 1931.58 Tax relief had been sought by the textile corporations in two ways (aside from the campaign against the machinery tax), by pressing for a reduction in the assessments and by seeking abatements and refunds on taxes which they regarded as being 56. Ibid., p. 0. 57. the lew fork Tines,

October 17, 1826, 11:15:2.

56. Blodgett, op. cit.,

pp. 25-28.

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COLLAPSE AND SURVIVAL

beyond their ability to pay. This process continued under the administration of the Finance Board, but no data as to the total refunds or abatements are available since such material is not made public. After 1932, despite the board's unpopularity In City Hall, the manufacturers gained considerable Indirect benefit from its administration. The financial stability resulting from drastic cuts in municipal expenditures, decrease in municipal debt, and a more realistic policy of assessment removed much of the uncertainty as well as decreasing the actual burden of the tax situation. Once again it Is impossible to measure the quantitative influence of this change upon the location of industry, but it undoubtedly had a favorable influence upon the survival of the cotton corporations as well as upon the attraction of new industries to the city. The survival of Fall River's cotton textile industry is thuB the result of adaptation within the local mills together

with the lessening of several of the external disadvantages under which they had operated. Both developments were necessary -- without the former no mills would have survived

—

without the latter the rate of survival would certainly have been lower. Prospects for the Industry The year 19^0 marks the end of the period covered in de tail by this study. Available census material stops with 1939. Except for a brief visit in the fall of 19^2, field work was completed in 19^1. At that time, the city's major industry appeared to be reasonably well stabilized. The catastrophic decline In capacity had been slowed and employment was relatively stable despite the liquidation of two corporations between 1938 and 1939« The changes in internal and external factors affecting industrial survival had shown results.s9 59. No consideration is given here to the prospects for the new industries which have come into Pall River following the decline of the textile industry. These have been chiefly manufacturers of clothing and curtains, attracted by the low rents and available labor supply in

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A favorable evaluation of the industry's prospect on the basis of these conditions must now he modified In the light of changes brought about by the war. During 19^0 and 19^1, there was a rapid rise in textile machinery prices -- both new and secondhand. The high Immediate return from the sale of mill machinery thuB offered a temptation to liquidate at a good price and thereby avoid the problems of post-war readjustment, still fresh in the minds of the community, low much influence such consideration had it is impossible to say, but in 19^1» the Algonquin Printing Company liquidated, removing the last large finishing plant in Fall River. More surprising was the liquidation of Pilgrim Mills in the spring of 19^2. This was a "Draper Mill," one of the last fine goods mills to be built (see above p. 131). It was purchased and liquidated by a group in which the Berkshire organization had a large interest. The opportunity was taken to remove another unit competitive with the Berkshire, despite the increasing government demand for the goods which the mill could produce. A more significant development has been the trend toward coarBer goods in many mills as a result of war demands. Fine carded and combed fabrics are less in demand than medium to coarse sheetings, shirtings, bandage cloth, mosquito netting, drills, and twills. The production of these has increased in Fall River, marking a return toward the type of production which had proved so disastrous for large sections of the local Industry. The post-war period will, therefore, find a city so conveniently located in relation to the New York and Boston markets. In 1989, average employment in the city's cotton mills was 12,581 persons with an additional 1,147 in the other branches of the textile mill industry. Similar figures for the leading new industries were: women's clothing, 4,240; men's clothing and shirts, 2,301; arri curtains, 866. (Data supplied by the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industry, Division of Statistics.) Separate census figures were not available for the largest of the new plants, the Firestone Rubber and Latex Corporation which had taken over the large waterfront properties previously cwned by the Pall River Iron Works Company and the American Printing Company. Operations in this plant were expanding rapidly a»J, by the end of 1939, employment was in the neighborhood of 2,000.

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163

the local mills geared to the production of goods which have proven unprofitable In the past and operating machinery which will prohahly show the Ill-effects of continuous operation with insufficient replacement. Whether or not the manufacturers will he willing to undertake another readjustment will depend upon their estimate of the competitive situation. This, in turn, will he strongly influenced hy government policy in regard to southern wage rates, prices, and profits. In the light of the experience of the past decade it seems unlikely that such a period of readjustment would pass without still further reduction in the city's textile capacity.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS Several technical terms used In the tert are briefly defined below: Cotton Mill Processes. Doffing -- Removing full bobbins from spindles and replacing them with empty bobbins. Drawing -- Tending the machines which attenuate the cotton fiber and impart a slight twist, preparatory to spinning. Warping — The machine-winding of hundreds of "ends" of yarn from individual spools onto warp beams for the loom. The "warps" are then run through the "slasher" to be coated with sizing material. They are then ready to be placed in the loom. Loam Filing -- Adjusting and repairing looms in the weave shed. Yarn Count. The number of hanks, 8^0 yards in length, which are necessary to weigh a pound. The higher the number, the finer the y a m . In general practice, yarns below 20's are considered coarse; 20'B to UO's, medium; and above ^O's, fine. Mule. Cotton-spinning machine in which the spindles are on a moving frame which moves forward and backward, spinning the yarn on the outward run and winding it on the spindle during the inward run. In this country, a few mules are still in use for the spinning of very fine counts, but during at least the past half of a century, mules have been less economical than rings for the great majority of yarns spun. Ring. Spinning machine which spins continuously, winding the yarn at the same time. The bobbin is driven by power and revolves within a circular ring. The traveller, through which the yarn passes, revolves on the ring, thus imparting twist to the yarn.

166

CLOSSARY OF TERMS

Plain Loom. A loom for vearlng plain cloth (i.e., not fancy weaves). Ordinary Loom. A non-automatic loom for either plain or fancy weaves. Automatic Loom. A loom built with an automatic stop motion and shuttle changer (these accessories are sometimes attached to ordinary looms).

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VITA Thomas Russell Smith vas born In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on December 15, 1910. He prepared at George School, Pennsylvania, for entrance Into Haverford College In September, 1929. After the freshman year he transferred to Svarthmore College, from which he received In 1933 the degree of Bachelor of Arts, with Honors In Economics. From 1933 to 1936 he attended Columbia University as a graduate student In the Department of Economic Geography. During the summer of 1935 he continued his study of Geography at the University of Chicago. Upon completing his graduate residence, he was appointed Lecturer in Economic Geography in the School of Business at Columbia University. He resigned in February, 19^3, to take a position as Associate Divisional Assistant in the Office of the Geographer, United States Department of S£ate. An article entitled "The World Wheat Surplus" appeared in the Geographical Review, January, 1935•