Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities [1st ed.] 9783030617646, 9783030617653

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xix
Conflicts and Divisions of Urban Space. Linking Post-socialist and Global Discourses (Valentin Mihaylov)....Pages 1-20
Front Matter ....Pages 21-21
The Role of the State Border in Socio-Cultural Changes of a Divided Town. Cieszyn/Český Tĕšín in a Regional Context (Jerzy Runge, Anna Runge)....Pages 23-39
Divided Towns on the Polish-German Border—Dissimilar Sisters? (Katarzyna Kulczyńska)....Pages 41-56
Kosovska Mitrovica as Two Parallel Cities in the Twenty-First Century (Danijela Vukoičić, Miroljub Milinčić)....Pages 57-72
Front Matter ....Pages 73-73
Divided Space or Divided Society? The Case of Vukovar (Marta Zorko)....Pages 75-89
Ethnoterritorial Divisions and Urban Geopolitics in Post-Yugoslav Mostar (Valentin Mihaylov)....Pages 91-110
How Do State and Military Borders Divide the Urban Spaces of Donbas? Cases of Milove/Chertkovo and Zolote (Roman Slyvka, Iryna Zakutynska)....Pages 111-128
Front Matter ....Pages 129-129
Cultural Atavism in the Face of an Environmental Disaster: Skopje 2014 in the limelight (Mirek Dymitrow)....Pages 131-149
(Not) Our Heritage: Cultural Milieu and Urban Space of Lviv (Natalia Otrishchenko, Inga Kozlova)....Pages 151-170
Ideologic Storms in the Still Waters: Postrevolutionary Life of Urban Spaces in Vinnytsia, Ukraine (Oleksiy Gnatiuk, Anatoliy Melnychuk)....Pages 171-188
Front Matter ....Pages 189-189
The Multiplication of Inherited Defects and Its Impact on the Emergence of New Spatial Conflicts. Evidences from Post-socialist Sofia (Kosyo Stoychev)....Pages 191-209
Spatial Segregation of Roma Settlements Within Serbian Cities. Examples from Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Kruševac (Zlata Vuksanović-Macura)....Pages 211-224
Globalisation, Social Polarisation and Conflicts in the Urban Space of a Post-socialist City: The Case of Kielce, Poland (Stanisław Sala)....Pages 225-242
Conclusion (Valentin Mihaylov)....Pages 243-248
Back Matter ....Pages 249-257

Citation preview

The Urban Book Series

Valentin Mihaylov   Editor

Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities

The Urban Book Series Editorial Board Fatemeh Farnaz Arefian, University of Newcastle, Singapore, Singapore; Silk Cities & Bartlett Development Planning Unit, UCL, London, UK Michael Batty, Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis, UCL, London, UK Simin Davoudi, Planning & Landscape Department GURU, Newcastle University, Newcastle, UK Geoffrey DeVerteuil, School of Planning and Geography, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK Andrew Kirby, New College, Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, USA Karl Kropf, Department of Planning, Headington Campus, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK Karen Lucas, Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK Marco Maretto, DICATeA, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Parma, Parma, Italy Fabian Neuhaus, Faculty of Environmental Design, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada Steffen Nijhuis, Architecture and the Built Environment, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands Vitor Manuel Aráujo de Oliveira , Porto University, Porto, Portugal Christopher Silver, College of Design, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA Giuseppe Strappa, Facoltà di Architettura, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Roma, Italy Igor Vojnovic, Department of Geography, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA Jeremy W. R. Whitehand, Earth & Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK Claudia Yamu, Department of Spatial Planning and Environment, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

The Urban Book Series is a resource for urban studies and geography research worldwide. It provides a unique and innovative resource for the latest developments in the field, nurturing a comprehensive and encompassing publication venue for urban studies, urban geography, planning and regional development. The series publishes peer-reviewed volumes related to urbanization, sustainability, urban environments, sustainable urbanism, governance, globalization, urban and sustainable development, spatial and area studies, urban management, transport systems, urban infrastructure, urban dynamics, green cities and urban landscapes. It also invites research which documents urbanization processes and urban dynamics on a national, regional and local level, welcoming case studies, as well as comparative and applied research. The series will appeal to urbanists, geographers, planners, engineers, architects, policy makers, and to all of those interested in a wide-ranging overview of contemporary urban studies and innovations in the field. It accepts monographs, edited volumes and textbooks. Now Indexed by Scopus!

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14773

Valentin Mihaylov Editor

Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities

Editor Valentin Mihaylov University of Silesia in Katowice Sosnowiec, Poland

ISSN 2365-757X ISSN 2365-7588 (electronic) The Urban Book Series ISBN 978-3-030-61764-6 ISBN 978-3-030-61765-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

In 2018 and 2019 I worked on the scientific project ‘Externalisation of ethnic identity in the landscape of selected cities in the Western Balkans’, supported by Polish National Research Centre. During the implementation of this project, I had the opportunity to conduct fruitful terrain research in four contested, multicultural cities of former Yugoslavia. I held discussions with colleagues showing a keen interest in dividied and contested cities. The idea to write this book arose during these discussions. It brings together the efforts of seventeen authors interested in urban spaces of Central, Eastern Europe and Southeastern Europe. The geographical focus of the book is limited to post-socialist East-Central European space. Until the beginning of the 1990s, socialist cities had a monolithic structure and their space organisation was dominated by the totalitarian state. Uniformed cities spontaneously and irrevocably were reshaped by new values, new configurations, asymmetrical conflicts and divisions. They were caused by simultaneously occurring, although different in their nature processes, e.g. globalisation, war violence and destructions, new spatial planning practices, privatisation, individualisation and re-sacralisation of space. One can agree that the number of conflicting situations in post-socialist cities is growing, but this research issue is still not adequately reflected in both domestic and international literature. Trying to rethink the heritage of the last 30-years of transformation, the contributors of this collective work exemplify cases of geopolitical, social and ethnic conflicts and disintegration of post-socialist cities and towns. The book comprises the results of original studies carried out by specialists in urban studies—human geographers, sociologists, a political scientist, and an architect. They apply various research conceptions and methods to study cases of mild, moderate, or violent conflicts in urban space. Various kinds of spatial conflicts and divisions in 24 cities and towns located in Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia are discussed by contributors. The book was written in the late 2019 and in the first half of 2020. The set of questions that constitutes its content is organised into four parts. Most of contributions are directly or indirectly related to lasting transformation from centralised state system to democracy and market economy. Because the urban conflicts and divisions v

vi

Preface

in East-Central Europe vary according to scale and social sphere, separate parts are ordered from “sharp” to “soft” issues. The first one includes studies on the historical genesis, development, and contemporary discrepancies of cities and towns divided by political and state borders, while the second contains insights on war conflicts and post-war ethnic and political urban divisions. Most of the cases discussed in ˇ the first two chapters represent border and multicultural cities: Tˇešín/Ceský Tˇešín, towns along the Polish-German border, Mostar, Vukovar, and Kosovska Mitrovica. Among these cases is also a little-known example of a hard spatial conflict which is taking place in Donbas, in border settlements Milove, Chertkovo, and Zolote. Despite Skopje, the last two parts chiefly deal with towns and cities, which after 1990 are not familiar with hard (political or ethnic) conflicts and division. The chapters comprising the third part deal with ongoing problems of the politics of cultural heritage, identity and historical memory. Further, tensions revolving around contradictory socio-economic interests and spatial planning are rarely addressed in works by scholars from post-socialist countries. For that reason the last, fourth part of the volume is devoted to challenges for spatial policy in chosen ‘regular’ cities, in which, however, there are significant conflicts and manifestations of spatial segregation oscillating around socio-economic consequences of transformation of economic and spatial order. Being prepared in an interdisciplinary manner, this book is intended for a wide scope of readers interested in the problems of contemporary cities and their neighbourhoods, especially those affected by significant spatial conflicts and divisions. Taking into account the thematic composition of contributions as well as various perspectives and research methods applied in the book, the editor hopes it would be of interest for scholars, students and other readers interested in urban, cultural and political geography, sociology, political science, and international relations. Apart from scientists, academic teachers and students, the book would also be useful for politicians and local self-government managers which may find knowledge on ethnopolitical and socio-economic problems of transformation in East-Central Europe after the fall of socialist system. The beginning of that transformation is already distant in time, but still visible in landscape and felt in various spheres of urban life. Sosnowiec/Katowice, Poland August 2020

Valentin Mihaylov

Acknowledgments

This volume represents a joint work. Its creation was possible due to common efforts of contributors who share the editor’s conception. Thanks to their enthusiasm and commitment, the contours and the final thematic structure of the collected book appeared. The editor is grateful to the team of Springer Nature who helped to provide the volume through all the stages of the book production process, especially Yuliana Pitanguy, Publishing Editor, and Sanjievkumar Mathiyazhagan. A valuable support was also provided by Bhagyalakkshme Sreenivasan and Corina van der Giessen by Springer Publishers. Thanks to the patience and assistance of all mentioned, the final shape of the book was achieved in a smooth manner. My thanks go also to unanimous reviewers. In particular, their constructive comments were valuable for the optimisation of the thematic framework of the book. Many thanks go to Vesna for patience during my work and for valuable comments on the manuscript. I am grateful to Prof. Jerzy Runge and my colleagues from the Institute of Social and Economic Geography and Spatial Organisation at the University of Silesia in Katowice for the great working environment and excellent conditions for academic work.

vii

Contents

1

Conflicts and Divisions of Urban Space. Linking Post-socialist and Global Discourses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Valentin Mihaylov

Part I 2

3

4

Geopolitical Conflicts and Divisions in Urban Space. Between Past and Present

The Role of the State Border in Socio-Cultural Changes ˇ of a Divided Town. Cieszyn/Ceský T˘ešín in a Regional Context . . . . Jerzy Runge and Anna Runge

23

Divided Towns on the Polish-German Border—Dissimilar Sisters? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Katarzyna Kulczy´nska

41

Kosovska Mitrovica as Two Parallel Cities in the Twenty-First Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Danijela Vukoiˇci´c and Miroljub Milinˇci´c

57

Part II

Military Conflicts and Post-war Divisions in Urban Space. Between Hard and Soft Power

5

Divided Space or Divided Society? The Case of Vukovar . . . . . . . . . . Marta Zorko

6

Ethnoterritorial Divisions and Urban Geopolitics in Post-Yugoslav Mostar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Valentin Mihaylov

7

1

75

91

How Do State and Military Borders Divide the Urban Spaces of Donbas? Cases of Milove/Chertkovo and Zolote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Roman Slyvka and Iryna Zakutynska

ix

x

Contents

Part III Historical Turning Points and Contested Urban Spaces. Between Multicultural Heritage and National Ideology 8

Cultural Atavism in the Face of an Environmental Disaster: Skopje 2014 in the limelight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Mirek Dymitrow

9

(Not) Our Heritage: Cultural Milieu and Urban Space of Lviv . . . . . 151 Natalia Otrishchenko and Inga Kozlova

10 Ideologic Storms in the Still Waters: Postrevolutionary Life of Urban Spaces in Vinnytsia, Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Oleksiy Gnatiuk and Anatoliy Melnychuk Part IV Urban Planning, Conflicts and Polarisation of Space. Between New Possibilities and Old Limitations 11 The Multiplication of Inherited Defects and Its Impact on the Emergence of New Spatial Conflicts. Evidences from Post-socialist Sofia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Kosyo Stoychev 12 Spatial Segregation of Roma Settlements Within Serbian Cities. Examples from Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Kruševac . . . . . . . . . 211 Zlata Vuksanovi´c-Macura 13 Globalisation, Social Polarisation and Conflicts in the Urban Space of a Post-socialist City: The Case of Kielce, Poland . . . . . . . . . 225 Stanisław Sala 14 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 Valentin Mihaylov Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

Editor and Contributors

About the Editor Valentin Mihaylov is employed in the Institute of Social and Economic Geography and Spatial Organisation at the University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland. He holds a Ph.D. in Human Geography from the Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bulgaria. His current research are chiefly connected to ethnonational and territorial identities, urban studies, political and cultural geography, geopolitics. He has over 60 scientific publications, including books Regional Geopolitical Studies (2009, as coauthor); Civilisational geopolitics. Conceptual and theoretical bases (2012); Territories and Identities in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (2014)—editor; Poland. Spatial culture and culture of space (2017). A member of the international editorial boards of Journal of Geography, Politics and Society and Przestrze´n Społeczna/Social Space journal.

Contributors Mirek Dymitrow Department of Human Geography, Lund University, Lund, Sweden; Department of Economy and Society - Unit for Human Geography, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden Oleksiy Gnatiuk Department of Economic and Social Geography, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine Inga Kozlova Department of Sociology, Ukrainian Catholic University, Lviv, Ukraine Katarzyna Kulczynska ´ Faculty of Socio-Economic Geography and Spatial Management, Adam Mickiewicz University, Pozna´n, Poland Anatoliy Melnychuk Department of Economic and Social Geography, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine xi

xii

Editor and Contributors

Valentin Mihaylov Institute of Social and Economic Geography and Spatial Organisation, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Silesia in Katowice, Sosnowiec, Poland Miroljub Milinˇci´c Faculty of Geography, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia Natalia Otrishchenko Centre for Urban History of East Central Europe, Lviv, Ukraine Anna Runge Institute of Social and Economic Geography and Spatial Organisation, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Silesia in Katowice, Sosnowiec, Poland Jerzy Runge Institute of Social and Economic Geography and Spatial Organisation, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Silesia in Katowice, Sosnowiec, Poland Stanisław Sala Institute of Geography and Environment, Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Kielce, Poland Roman Slyvka Department of Geography and Natural Sciences, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine Kosyo Stoychev Regional and Political Geography Department, Faculty of Geology and Geography, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia, Bulgaria Danijela Vukoiˇci´c Department of Geography, University of Pristina with a Temporary Seat in Kosovska Mitrovica, Kosovska Mitrovica, Serbia Zlata Vuksanovi´c-Macura Geographical Institute “Jovan Cviji´c”, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, Serbia Iryna Zakutynska Department of Geography and Natural Sciences, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine Marta Zorko Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Fig. 2.2

Fig. 2.3

Fig. 2.4

Fig. 2.5

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2

Contested territories in Cieszyn Silesia in 1918–1920. a—Czech territorial claims in 1918 (left); b—Polish territorial claims in 1919 (right). 1—border of the region, 2—scope of territorial claims, 3—railway lines; 4—rivers; 5—cities and towns. Source Authors elaboration based on Borák, 2011: 452 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Periodisation of socio-cultural and economic connections ˇ of Cieszyn and Ceský T˘ešín with their surroundings in 1920–2020. 1—before 1920; 2—1920–1989; 3—1989– 2004; 4—after 2004; B—border. Elaborated by the authors . . . . ˇ The Town Hall in Ceský T˘ešín built in 1928 (left) and the medieval Town Hall in Cieszyn (right). Photos V. Mihaylov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Components of real increase/decrease in population of Cieszyn (2000–2018). a—natural increase/decrease; b—net migration Source Elaborated by the authors on the basis of Local Data Bank website . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Components of real increase/decrease in population ˇ of Ceský T˘ešín (2000–2018) a—natural increase/decrease; b—net migration Source Elaborated by the authors on the basis of: Demografická roˇcenka mˇest, Tab. 71, ˇ Ceský T˘ešín . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Border towns on the Polish-German border Source Kulczy´nska (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . German-language tobacco shop signboards c–e, and bilingual a and German-language b information boards presenting services offered in Gubin. a and b—Obro´nców Pokoju Street, c and d—Chopina Street in the proximity of Obro´nców Pokoju Street, e—Chopina Street, by the national border Source Kulczy´nska (2019) . . . . . .

26

30

32

35

35 43

51

xiii

xiv

Fig. 3.3

Fig. 3.4

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2

Fig. 4.3

Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5

Fig. 4.6 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2

Fig. 5.3

Fig. 5.4 Fig. 6.1

List of Figures

Permanent bilingual wayfinding signs and signage in Frankfurt (Oder): a—Holzmarkt, b—Heilbronner Straβe/Karl-Marx-Straβe, c—Groβe Oderstraβe/Regirungsstraβe, d—Groβe Oderstraβe/Bischofstraβe, e—stop nr 3 ‘Park by St. Gertrude’s Church’ in Gartenstraβe/Paul-Feldner-Straβe Source Kulczy´nska (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The influence of foreign language wayfinding signs and signage on the ease of movement in Słubice and Frankfurt (Oder) Source Kulczy´nska (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kosovska Mitrovica—northern and southern part of the city Source Authors’ own elaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a Kosovska Mitrovica; b Northern Kosovska Mitrovica; c Southern Kosovska Mitrovica Source Authors’ own elaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dynamics of population of municipality and the city of Kosovska Mitrovica in the period 1948– 2011 Source Authors’ own elaboration based on Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia website; http://pop-stat.mashke.org/kosovo-census-ks.htm . . . . . . . . . . . . a Albanian and b Serbian national symbols in divided Mitrovica. Photos D. Vukoiˇci´c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a and b Road signs in the southern part of Mitrovica (all in Latin Alphabet); c Road sign in North Mitrovica (in Serbian/Cyrillic and English); d Bilingual commercial signs (in Albanian and Serbian) in North Mitrovica (Bosnjak mahala district). Photos D. Vukoiˇci´c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a Orthodox cemetery in South Mitrovica; b Muslim cemetery in North Mitrovica. Photos D. Vukoiˇci´c . . . . . . . . . . . . Vukovar and occupied territories in 1991. Elaborated by M. Zorko and V. Mihaylov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Removed bilingual (written in Latin and Cyrillic version) sign from the police station facade in Vukovar. Photo M. Zorko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Project “Water Tower Memorial” (Memorijal Vodotoranj 2015)—left, and Water Tower during reconstruction—right. Authored by Radionica arhitekture, Zagreb (F. Frkovi´c, S. Jurinˇci´c, T. Kneževi´c, D. Krušelj, M. Mišan, K. Nikši´c, J. Prokop, G. Rako, A. Ranogajec, J. Saboli´c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The memorial cemetery of the victims of the homeland war in Vukovar. Photo M. Zorko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marshal Tito Street on the Muslims’ side of the city—graves of died Muslim Mostarians during the war on the background of the still unreconstructed building. Photo V. Mihaylov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

53 60

61

62 64

65 67 78

82

83 86

94

List of Figures

Fig. 6.2

Fig. 6.3 Fig. 6.4

Fig. 6.5

Fig. 6.6

Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 7.3 Fig. 7.4

Fig. 7.5 Fig. 7.6 Fig. 8.1

Changes in the ethnic structure of the three largest cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1991–2013, in %. Legend: 1—Muslims/from 1993—Bosniaks; 2—croats; 3—Serbs; 4—Yugoslavs; 5—Others; 6—Capital; 7—City; 8—State boundary; 9—Boundary between federal entities. Source elaborated by the author on the basis of data from www.statistika.ba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main actors in Mostar’s urban geopolitics after the civil war. Source Author’s own elaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Symbols of cultural influence of Islamic states in the Mostar’s urban space: The Turkich Junus Emre Institute (above); The Saudi King Fahd Islamic Cultural Centre (below). Photos V. Mihaylov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The rivalry of religious symbols in the urban landscape—Hadzi Kurt mosque in the Muslim part of Mostar and the cross erected by Croats on the Hum hill (in the background). Photo V. Mihaylov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Symbols of ethnoterritorial divisions in Mostar: The Croatian Home of Culture and flags (from left to right) of the Croatian Defence Council, Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovia (above); The building of the Croatian National Theatre (below). Photos V. Mihaylov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Zolote and Milove / Chertkovo on the map of Donbas. Source Authors’ own elaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Map of Milove/Chertkovo. Source own elaboration . . . . . . . . . . . Turn to right sign before Ukrainian-Russian border, Milove. Photo Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Monument devoted to the memory of fallen in Second World War, Milove. Photo private archive of M. Skuridin (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Divided by military border town of Zolote (April 2020). Source Authors’ own elaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Patriotic wall art manifests Ukrainian iconography in Zolote. Photo Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pollution in Skopje: a thick smog over the city; b industrial smoke exuded into the atmosphere; c water and soil pollution; d AirVisual app scan revealing Skopje as the world’s most polluted city on 14 December 2017. Photos M. Morell and S. Arsovski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xv

95 97

99

103

105 112 115 116

117 123 125

135

xvi

Fig. 8.2

Fig. 8.3

Fig. 8.4 Fig. 8.5 Fig. 9.1

Fig. 9.2

Fig. 9.3

Fig. 10.1

Fig. 10.2

Fig. 10.3 Fig. 10.4 Fig. 10.5 Fig. 11.1 Fig. 11.2

List of Figures

Some oeuvres of Skopje 2014. Top left: Museum of the Macedonian Struggle and Equine Fountain on the Philip II Square; top right: a fake river galley; bottom left: the Constitutional Court, the State Archives and the Archaeological Museum; bottom right: façade replacement using faux-baroque pillars and entablature. Photos S. Arsovski and B. Blazhevski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Some oeuvres of the Skopje 2014 urban development project. Top left: Monument of the Fallen Heroes of Macedonia; top right: Government House in borrowed plumes (new façade); bottom left; Memorial House of Mother Teresa; bottom right: Triumphal Arch “Porta Macedonia”. Photos S. Arsovski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Substandard dwellings in central Skopje. Photos S. Arsovski and Z. Jordanov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Horse and cart in the centre of Skopje. Photo S. Arsovski . . . . . . Different ways of dealing with Soviet heritage: Partially destroyed mosaics (right) and elements of the monument of Glory preserved in the museum “Territory of Terror” (left). Photos N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jewish past in urban space of Lviv: Broken matzevah in the hospital’s courtyard on the place of old Jewish cemetery (4) and the commemorative public space—the Space of Synagogues. (5). Photos N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . City as Palimpsest—restored multilingual inscriptions from interwar period on Tyktor Street. Photo N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Multiply street signs on the same street: a new official name below the old “communist” name; b new official name and a “popular” alternative applied with a stencil. Photo O. Gnatiuk and A. Melnychuk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Soviet memorial in European Square: a central figure of the composition; b corrected dates of the First World War. Photo O. Gnatiuk and A. Melnychuk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contemporary commemoration in European Square. Photo Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Official monument to Shevchenko on the former Museum Square. Photo Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “The Tree of Freedom” installed instead of Shevchenko monument on the former Teatralna Square. Photo Authors . . . . . City centre (in red colour). Source Author’s own elaboration . . . Lylin, Drujba, and Mladost dormitory neighbourhoods (in red colour). Source Author’s own elaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . .

137

138 143 143

160

162

163

177

180 181 184 185 194 195

List of Figures

Fig. 11.3 Fig. 11.4 Fig. 11.5 Fig. 11.6

Fig. 11.7 Fig. 11.8

Fig. 11.9

Fig. 12.1 Fig. 12.2 Fig. 12.3 Fig. 12.4

Fig. 12.5

Fig. 13.1

Former small settlements absorbed into Sofia (in red colour). Source Author’s own elaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Intersection of Simeonovsko Shosse Blvd. and the Southern arc of the Sofia ring road. Source Google Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sofia Airport is located just 4.8 km in a straight line from the Sofia city centre. Source Google Earth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Off-road landscape between newly erected housing estates in Sofia—an example of defects in planning of urban infrastructure. Photo K. Stoychev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Student’s campus city (in red colour) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Places of evidence of the new aesthetical and functional (dis)order in Sofia’s Student City: trade facilities located in very close distance to student dormitories: a grill bar and pizza, b two-floor bar and night club “Harem”; c car wash; d a restaurant located under the stairs of an entrance of the Winter Sports Palace. Photo K. Stoychev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a–c New residential buildings in the Student City for ordinary residents were erected mainly in green areas; c and d last free spaces disappear under construction of buildings with non-academic functions. Photo K. Stoychev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spatial distribution of Roma settlements in Serbia. Source Adapted from Jakši´c and Baši´c (2005: 38) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ziganskamala (Roma settlement) on the 1827 map of Belgrade. Source Macura (1983: 36) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Roma settlement in Novi Sad. Photo V. Macura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Planned public utilities and educational facilities covering the Roma settlement in Novi Sad. Source Adapted from Official Gazette of the City of Novi Sad, 43/2018 . . . . . . . . Construction of the wall around Roma settlement Marko Orlovi´c in Kruševac (left) (Photo TV N1) and anti-racist protests by NGOs (right) (PhotoBeta News Agency/Jelena Božovi´c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Location of selected areas and places in Kielce. 1—Disscussed places: (I—Echo shopping centre, II—Korona shopping centre, III—The market square, IV—The St. Mary square, V—Targi Kielce, VI—The Kielce park of technology); 2—Inner suburbs; 3—Outher suburbs; 4—Sienkiewicza street; 5—Administrative boundary of the city of Kielce; 6—Rivers; 7—Reservoirs; 8—Forests and inner-city parks. Source Author’s own elaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xvii

196 198 200

202 204

205

206 213 215 216

217

219

229

xviii

Fig. 13.2

Fig. 13.3

Fig. 13.4 Fig. 13.5

List of Figures

Polarisation and privatisation in the urban space of Kielce: a gated community complex (Osiedle Południowe, Dyminy neighbourhood) in the city’s outskirts (top) and “privatised” local street and socialist multi-family residential block fenced in the years of market economy on The Targowa Street (down). Photos S. Sala and V. Mihaylov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Effects of hypermatysation—crisis in traditional trade in central streets of Kielce: trade places for rent located in: Sienkiewicza street (above) and Du˙za street (three trade objects located about 50 m from Sienkiewicza are seeking for tenants) (below). (Photos V. Mihaylov) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Market square in Kielce after revitalisation—an example of cementification of urban space. (Photo V. Mihaylov) . . . . . . . St. Mary square before (2007–left) and after (2020–right) revitalisation. Photos V. Mihaylov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

231

236 237 238

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 8.1

ˇ National structure of Ceský T˘ešín in 2001 and 2011 . . . . . . . . . . Population changes in divided towns of the Polish-German border area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Scenarios of geopolitics of dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Scenarios of geopolitics of confrontation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Specification and costs of Skopje 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34 46 106 107 139

xix

Chapter 1

Conflicts and Divisions of Urban Space. Linking Post-socialist and Global Discourses Valentin Mihaylov

Abstract This chapter justifies the topicality and relevance of spatial conflicts and divisions in cities from the viewpoint of human geography and other branches of science dealing with spatial facets of urban development such as sociology, political science, and economics. Based on the analysis of publications regarding post-socialist cities, the author outlines the main themes in this well-developed interdisciplinary discourse. The author also stresses that despite its high research potential, we lack a separate domain that generates knowledge about conflicts in cities of East-Central Europe. Particular attention is paid to the global discourse of knowledge on contested and divided cities and the variety of currents and problems raised by scholars. The merits of the current book and its contribution to the process of maturing from conflicts and divisions in post-socialist cities as a prospective direction of future research are highlighted. Issues with high research potential include geopolitically- and ethnonationally-motivated conflicts and divisions, as well as topics related to current disputes about the heritage of multicultural cities, conflicts caused by competing interests in spatial planning under conditions of post-socialist transformation, globalisation, and European integration. Conflicts and divisions caused by post-socialist transformation and its long-lasting socio-spatial consequences make the missing link between post-socialist urban change and global discourses on contested and divided cities. Keywords Spatial conflicts and divisions · Post-socialist cities · Contested cities · Divided cities

V. Mihaylov (B) Institute of Social and Economic Geography and Spatial Organisation, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Silesia in Katowice, Sosnowiec, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_1

1

2

V. Mihaylov

1.1 Introduction East-Central Europe is a civilisational cross-roads which developed in the borderland of several former empires during the last 100–120 years. It was at the epicentre of the two World Wars. Nations from the region underwent the experiment of communism, founding and collapse of multinational states, and, lastly, a difficult social and economic transformation. Along with various urban traditions and urban cultures, all these factors have determined the formation of specific regional and national characteristics of urban spaces. They were profoundly affected by revolutionary changes in ownership forms, social stratification, and ideology of public space organisation. Post-socialist transition caused by 1989 peace revolutions is considered ‘a completely new circumstance in time and space’ (Kovács 1999: 5). The unique historical transition from a centrally-controlled economy to a free market, from socialism to capitalism, from a one-party system to a democratic model has been realised in the vast majority of cities but inherited socio-economic and spatial structures are in constant transformation. The very term ‘post-socialist city‘ remains in the research agenda in urban studies, as evidenced by current publications in which authors employ the postsocialist city as a key research concept (Ilchenko and Dushkova 2018; Kazimierczak and Szafra´nska 2019; Tuvikene et al. 2019). The number of actors having a real impact on the organisation of urban space, despite sometimes conflicting interests, has significantly increased during the years of transition from state socialism to capitalism (Andrusz et al. 1996). Spatial rivalries and disputes concern the ways of developing or controlling buildings or technical infrastructure elements, street names, politics of memorialisation, etc. In the period after 1989, similar issues were present in almost every city in the area we are interested in. In the culturally and economically diverse group of post-socialist cities, conflicts and divisions of high scientific relevance emerged with potential to be included in the international discourse of contested and divided urban spaces. The existence of spatial divisions and boundaries in cities (i.e. clearly separated residential, industrial, recreational, cultural, transport, business etc. zones) is a natural element of spatial and functional urban governance. This fundamental feature of urban organisms does not itself determine the existence of the disputes which appear when conflicting interests and visions for city development collide. The creation of this volume has been inspired by and revolves around two currents in interdisciplinary research on urban space. The first concerns the transition and transformation of post-socialist cities. Since it predominantly covered the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, this trend is geographically narrower, but practically concerns the entire social and spatial spectrum of urban development. The second trend is more specific and deals with the problems of divisions and conflicts in urban spaces. Research in this area has broader geography, including empirical examples from around the world, but is narrower in terms of the research problems it addresses. Therefore, this chapter has two main purposes: (1) a concise overview of main research priorities on post-socialist urban transformation, and (2) placing the collected volume in ongoing scientific literature on post-socialist cities and in world literature on conflicts and divisions in urban space.

1 Conflicts and Divisions of Urban Space. Linking Post-socialist …

3

1.2 Studies on Post-socialist Cities. Outlining the Research Priorities Urban planning concepts in socialist cities (Fisher 1962; Szczepa´nski 1991; Smith 1996) reflected the nature of the system whose main slogans emphasised the classless society, social equality of citizens, and social ownership of means of production, including land (Liszewski 2001: 114). The most important processes characterising the post-socialist city included: return of land rent and other market mechanisms; decentralisation of state power and transfer of absolute control over space from the centre to local authorities; reduction in employment in industry and growth of those working in services; and socio-spatial polarisation. In addition, the political position has decreased in importance in the competition for a favourable location in urban space, as the most important asset has become the economic position (W˛ecławowicz 2003: 145). Due to the fall of centralised system in East-Central European cities, urban spaces which inherited the modernist structures of industrial society regressed. Apart from public institutions, several new actors such as political parties, spatial planners, private entrepreneurs, formal associations or informal groups of residents, and, in some cases, military and paramilitary organisations have emerged at the scene of urban life. These various stakeholders meet, cooperate, compete, and disagree with one another, changing the face of post-socialist urban spaces in constructive or destructive ways. Despite the passage of many years, at the beginning of the third decade of the twenty-first century, the question remains whether post-socialist cities constitute an independent research discourse because of their geographical location alone, or rather due to the intertwining of certain characteristics found only in cities that have undergone transformations after downfall of communism (Hirt et al. 2017). Taking into account the subject matter of this volume, it is necessary to pose this question in a different way: do the conflicts and subdivisions arise directly from the conditions of the post-socialist transition, or are they based on similar mechanisms and factors, as in other regions of the world? However, before I try to answer this question, it is first necessary to carry out a general review of the main research currents in the transformation of urban spaces in East-Central Europe and to reflect on urban divisions and conflicts on an international scale. Apart from theoretical insights on post-socialist cities cities (Musil 1993; Andrusz et al. 1996; Sailer-Fliege 1999; Sagan 2000; Stanilov 2007; Sýkora and Bouzarovski 2012; Hirt et al. 2017; Ilchenko and Dushkova 2018), scholarly literature is also rich with contributions on specific facets of urban transformation (spatial, economic, social, demographic, cultural, etc.). A great deal of publications have been devoted to multidimensional economic changes in urban space: restructuring of industry (Krzysztofik et al. 2012), changes in property ownership (Górczy´nska 2017), spatial expansion of retail networks (Yaakov and Dybicz 2006; S˘ageat˘a 2008; Pojani 2011; Axenov et al. 2018), and development of creative and knowledge-based industries

4

V. Mihaylov

(Stryjakiweicz 2010; Ivanovi´c-Vojvodi´c and Stupar 2015), to name a few. The combination of local circumstances and the impact of globalisation led to some cities being the winners, while others came out of the reforms as losers, as pointed out by Nagy (2001), Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic (2006), Mykhnenko and Turok (2008), amongst others. Different ways of adapting to the principles of a market economy have influenced the physical transformation of residential and economic urban spaces (Kovács 1998; Nuissl and Rink 2005; Stanilov 2007; Göler et al. 2012; Sagan and Grabkowska 2012; Szafra´nska 2013; Axenov 2014; Šimáˇcek et al. 2015; Holm and Kuhn 2018; Krzysztofik et al. 2019; Vukmirovic 2020). Most cities in East-Central Europe have gone through urban shrinkage (Stryjakiweicz et al. 2012; Haase et al. 2016; Radzimski 2016; Kazimierczak and Szafra´nska 2019) and demographic crisis (Runge 2008; Ilie¸s and Wendt 2011; Mihaylov 2011; 2012). After the collapse of the socialist model of full employment, income stratification and inequalities in access to jobs have been the cause of a deepening spatial polarisation (W˛ecławowicz 2003; Kotus 2005; Daskalova and Slaev 2015; Runge 2017). Along with spatial dimensions of the political and economic turn, researchers have also paid attention to re-evaluation and de-ideologisation of urban cultural landscapes (Bitušíková 1998; Czepczy´nski 2008; Diener and Hagen 2015), reframing of the identity of urban communities (Young and Kaczmarek 2008; S˘ageat˘a 2014; Melnychuk and Gnatiuk 2019; Mihaylov et al. 2019), and resacralisation of cities (Przybylska 2015). Turbulent times for the cities of East-Central Europe were accompanied by the break-up of socialist multinational states and rise of neoliberal globalisation. These conditions were conducive to a number of new types of urban contradictions and disputes. Nevertheless, publications devoted to the conflicts and divisions of postsocialist cities in the strict sense of the word rarely appear in scientific literature. Some publications on geography, planning, economics and sociology of urban development implicitly contain elements of conflict, but most of them are not articulated as part of an overall research discourse on contested and divided cities.

1.3 Global Studies on Contested and Divided Cities. Highlighting the Core Concepts In international literature, or more precisely, in the international English language publications, these questions are developed through concepts of contested and divided cities. As regards the concept of contested cities, Rokem and Boano (2017) claim that it ‘contains some form of dispute, conflict and violence’. These authors suggest that nearly all cities that contain ethnic and racial minorities as well as social and economic inequalities are contested. As claimed by Gentile (2019: 132), urban conflicts may appear anywhere with just about anything: the demolition of a cherished heritage building, the yuppification of a traditional working-class neighbourhood, or the establishment of an environmentally hazardous new coal power plant. In the most common sense, uneven access to public spaces serves as a reason

1 Conflicts and Divisions of Urban Space. Linking Post-socialist …

5

for banal contestation practices among drivers and cyclists, locals and tourists, or entrepreneurs investing in greenfield constructions and environmental activists. Conflicts and spatial divisions occur between antagonised groups in cities all around the world (Hepburn 2004; Bollens 2007; Gaffkin and Morrisey 2011; Rokem and Boano 2017), hindering the daily functioning of the economy and the lives of their inhabitants. The practices of division and segregation can serve as a warning to local communities and those ruling in post-socialist cities. The past segregation patterns can serve as a warning to local communities and to ruling politicians in post-socialist cities. As Calame and Charlesworth pointed out (2009: 2): ‘In each city, urban managers under-estimated growing inter-ethnic tensions until it was so late that violence spread and resulted in physical segregation. Though the walls, fences, and no man’s lands that resulted were generally designed to be temporary, they have considerable staying power, forcing divided residents to grapple with life “under siege”’. The classic cases of urban conflicts and divisions include cities located on geopolitical or civilisational borderlands and cities in disputed states and territories, e.g. Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Lebanon, Palestine (see Zetter 1985; Anderson 2008; Calame and Charlesworth 2009; Abujidi 2014; Fregonese 2020). Under certain circumstances, political and economic rivalry evolves into armed conflicts. They are frequently manifested in a phenomenon of urbicide which is commonly understood as violent politics towards buildings and other elements of urban material environments. In the international scientific literature, researchers have focused the greatest attention on cases that form the group of post-war and/or post-conflict cities. Knowledge of conflicts in urban space also develops through the application of other terms. In contrast to contested and divided cities, the term wounded cities (Schneider and Susser 2003) is slightly different. It has rarely appeared in literature. Its application allows scholars to include in the academic debate cities across the globe which are not necessarily arenas of ethnopolitical or religious tensions, but which have passed through or are objects of terrorist attacks, armed conflicts, drug trafficking, overbuilding, etc. There are different voices in the current discussion on the diversity of urban divisions and their typology. Concerning divisions in highly contested cities, Gentile (2019), for example, notes distinct ethnonationally divided cities that are split legally or in terms of group identities, and geopolitical fault-line cities whose residents are divided by (geo)political orientation or identity. As a whole, the views of scientists most often revolve around the question: are all cities divided? Is the presence of urban divisions, apart from the obvious cases of cities divided by a national border or between conflicted ethnopolitical groups, necessarily associated with significant social conflicts? These seemingly easy questions become more difficult to answer the closer we bring the divisions in different types of cities. Much also depends on the research perspective—geographical, geopolitical, ethnonational or socio-economic. ‘A river that separates cities in two halves, avenues, different urbanistic solutions or even the difference between old and new town could be called divisions, but that does not make a city divided in its core. For instance, Budapest and Istanbul are divided by

6

V. Mihaylov

separate settlements or even different continents but are not divided into geo-political terms’ (Zorko and Novak 2019: 163). One can agree that from the point of view of administrative-political and geopolitical unity, not all cities are divided. However, this is only one of the criteria used in spatial research as different parts of the city can be separated from the others on the basis of administrative, morphological or functional criteria (such as housing, production, or recreation zones). Gentile (2019: 126) has indicated that ‘intense residential segregation or long-term violence is not a necessary condition for the emergence of polarising divisions in cities’. Thus, a list with criteria applied into various practices of division and contestation of urban space is long. It includes socio-economic conflicts related to social class divisions and spatial segregation (Borjas 1998; Hamnett 1994; Freeman 2009), especially on ethnic principle (Marcuse and van Kempen 2002; Nightingale 2012; Pullan and Baillie 2013; Del Romero 2016), ethnic-based divisions and/or conflicts in housing (Sarre et al. 1989; van Kempen and Özüekren 1998) or in marketplaces (González 2018). All these phenomena are typical for cities from the various political ranks or population size located all over the world. Another research direction is economic, political, ideological, and class conflicts related to spatial segregation of social groups. Radical criticism of neoliberal practices in cities in terms of class struggle, social justice, and uneven spatial development is presented in the works of Harvey (1973; 2012), Mitchell (2003), Purcell (2003), and many other authors. Major cities as the place of social movement activities form another topical issue that is often visible in scholarly literature. These movements not only change the face of cities, but also increase their potential to put pressure on governments, international organisations, and corporations in matters affecting the inhabitants of cities, countries, and the entire human community (Uitermark and Nicholls 2012; Beier 2018). The growth of international tourism on a global scale has caused the intensification and concentration of tourist traffic in many cities, leading to many critical studies on space. Touristification could be defined as both a process and the resulting state is a definite space, in which relatively spontaneous, unplanned massive development of tourism leads to the transformation of this space into a tourism commodity itself (Del Romero 2018). This process causes social conflicts, divisions, and justified disapproval among the local inhabitants (Colomb and Novy 2016). Only selected examples of research on conflicts and divisions in urban spaces are discussed in this chapter. They focus on extremely divided and contested cities, which are also part of the contemporary geography of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Some post-socialist cities, which almost exclusively belong to ex-Yugoslav space, have found themselves in the global discourse of urban spaces of (geo)political, ethnic, and religious conflicts Sarajevo (B˘adescu 2015, 2017; Aquilué and Roca 2016), Kosovska Mitrovica (see Chap. 4), Vukovar (see Chap. 5), and Mostar (see Chap. 6), Skopje (Véron 2016). Fortunately, they represent a relatively small group, but their problems have a broad resonance in geopolitics and international relations.

1 Conflicts and Divisions of Urban Space. Linking Post-socialist …

7

1.4 Studies on Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities. Searching for Research Gaps The basic types of conflicts observed in the urban spaces of various regions of the world also occur in post-socialist cities. What is more, their supralocal importance is confirmed by the appearance of several cities from East-Central Europe in leading international journals. Even so, publications on urban conflicts rarely appear in scientific literature, especially among researchers from post-socialist countries. One aspect of this research gap is the question to what extent conflicts, antagonisms and divisions in this area after 1990 have been caused by a combination of regional and local events, and to what extent they are phenomena of a universal nature. The author will risk the claim that most types of conflicts and divisions are closely linked to the post-socialist transformation, which is still not fully completed in some cities. While the inevitable social heterogeneity of cities has violated the existing, uniformed, and symmetrical socio-spatial order, apart from the new solutions of space structuring, there are still old places and zones not fully adapted to the conditions of capitalist society. Many of the current conflicts have arisen on the long road to reconfiguration of the old structures and the creation of a new spatial order through the clash of different visions of stakeholders regarding the organisation of urban space. In this direction of thinking, Hirt et al. (2017: 17) noted: ‘…studies of postsocialism have stressed the importance of continuities in addition to change; that is, the ways in which the present is intermixed with socialism and how the past has importance in that hybrid mix of elements from different times and places. The past remains a legacy that is often still visible in the physical space of cities inscribed in urban form or manifested in architectural elements. Moreover, legacy elements are entangled with contemporary processes’. When looking at urban divisions from the perspective of the multiplication of historical factors, frequent changes of political borders must be taken into account. More than once state borders was drawn through the middle of unitary urban organisms in East-Central Europe. Despite the fact that all cities and their spaces are in some way socially contested and spatially divided, not all the cities are divided between sovereign states as in the case of border-crossing cites (Buursink 2001). As a result of geopolitical conflicts during the twentieth century, the largest number of contested and divided cities in Europe are concentrated in post-socialist countries. As a result, interest in the problem of cities divided by political/state borders on ethnic and national borderlands in this part of the world is very high (Kaczmarek 1999; Buursink 2001; Kłosowski 2001; Kulczy´nska 2014, 2018; Zenderowski and Krycki 2014). Paradoxically, this kind of urban splitting is usually skipped in classifications of spatially divided cities in the mainstream international discourse. One can be tempted to separate out four uneven waves in the formation of geopolitically divided cities during the twentieth century. The first wave includes the cities and towns divided as a result of the peacekeeping provisions after the First ˇ ˇ World War: Cieszyn / Ceský Tˇešín, Komárno/Komárom; Gmünd/Ceské Velenice; Bad Radkersburg / Gornja Radgona.

8

V. Mihaylov

The second wave took place as a consequence of the decisions after the Second World War, which led to new urban divisions (towns on the Polish-German border; Nova Gorica/Gorizia). Their division and further socio-economic development contributed to the formation of social, economic and political differences. A common feature for the vast majority of these cities is the national homogenisation in the period after their division. The post-socialist turn, however, brought positive changes in this regard. Despite the passage of years and integration within the EU, when the conditions for reconciliation of constructive cooperation were created, there remain greater or lesser disparities in socio-economic development. Nowadays, most cities of this category are disputed primarily in the historical memory of local communities. Thanks to the European integration, old tensions as well as revisionist sentiments were minimised. More, a soft reintegration of divided urban spaces occurred within Polish-German, Polish-Czech, Slovak-Hungarian, Italo-Slovenian, and Estonian-Latvian borderlands. The next, third wave of urban divisions occurred during the break-up of the multinational states after 1991. Today’s independent cities of Narva and Ivanogród were divided in 1944 between Estonia and Russia as republics of the Soviet Union, but it was only after the break-up of the USSR that they found themselves in two separate states. As far as urban divisions in connection with conflicts in Yugoslavia are concerned, the only new cities divided by a state border are Slavonski Brod (Croatia) and Bosanski Brod (Bosnia and Herzegovina). A slightly different case is the separation of the parallel city of Serbs in the eastern suburbs of the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina—East (Serbian) Sarajevo (Aquilué and Roca 2016). Another kind of geopolitically divided city represents the ethnic-geographical division of Kosovska Mitrovica. The last, fourth wave of divided cities (simultaneously contested and wounded by war destructions) is emerging within the Russia-Ukrainian borderland (Luhansk, Donetsk, Slavyansk, etc.). During the military conflict in Donbass, some urban settlements like Zolote and Milove were divided by political and military borders. Due to the freezing of the conflict, at this stage, it is difficult to predict the permanence of these borders and, consequently, of the urban divisions. Intergroup competition evolved in armed conflicts after 1990, in which many cities and towns played a strategic role. Factors that shaped specific models of city transformation in some parts of ex-Yugoslav and ex-Soviet space were not only civil wars but also economic sanctions and long international isolation. In such conditions, the economic development and modernisation of the urban landscapes slowed down. A number of cities and towns became arenas of ethnic violence, human rights abuses, urbicide, and forced splitting of urban space based on ethnic or religious criteria. Another type of division is represented by monolithic cities in politicaladministrative terms, but within which inhabitants are divided by physical or mental boundaries. Cities such as Mostar, Vukovar, Kosovska Mitrovica, Skopje, and Novi Pazar are places of conflict in geopolitics, local self-government, everyday life, or religious practices. In some cases, armed conflicts were over, but wars over the memory of the contested near past continued in full force.

1 Conflicts and Divisions of Urban Space. Linking Post-socialist …

9

The aforementioned multi-ethnic ex-Yugoslav cities have already been subjected to spatial analyses dealing mainly with inter-ethnic relations, urban regeneration, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping. These cities are conceptualised in the light of attempts towards reintegration and normalisation of socio-cultural and economic ties. Despite the tendency towards political stabilisation (as in the case of Vukovar), efforts to return these cities and towns to the category of ‘normal’, ‘regular’, or ‘ordinary’ urban spaces in terms of human relations met a series of obstacles. In some cases, ethnoterritorial and ethnopolitical divisions still became the main determinants of relations of urban societies. In conditions of balkanisation (Bobi´c 2019), these urban spaces host nations and ethnic groups divided by formal physical borders or invisible lines of mutual intolerance and exclusion, but without a clear boundary between them. There are also multinational and multi-religious cities, in which ethnic districts have not been formed. They are not in danger of either political break-up or the outbreak of armed conflicts. However, tensions can be observed regarding identity, management of key spaces, and externalisation of particular values in the urban landscape. The socio-spatial divisions of cities may be symbolic or related to the segregation of entire ethnic and religious groups. From the viewpoint of conflicts and divisions, Roma neighbourhoods are relatively often approached by scholars who have raised issues as informal neighbourhoods (Tsenkova 2012; Vuksanovi´c-Macura 2012), housing exclusion (Berescu et al. 2012), or school segregation (Ravnachka et al. 2020). A fairly large number of publications are also devoted to the issues of ideologisation and de-ideologisation of street names commemorating past events and figures (Czepczy´nski 2008; Foxall 2013; Zhurzhenko 2015). This type of conflict occurs in most cities in East-Central Europe, mainly due to the decommunisation or the treatment and commemoration of disputed historical events and figures in urban space. Nevertheless, most conflicts in the post-socialist period revolve around ideological aspects of urban toponymy (Palonen 2008; Stani´c and Sakalja 2009; Marin 2012; Light and Young 2014; Er˝oss 2017). Apart from ethnically divided and post-war cities, considering the emerging single publications on post-socialist cities, it is easy to point to an exceptionally wide range of socio-economic conflicts that attract the attention of researchers. Szczepa´nski (1991) signalled an emerging conflict between owners of increasing numbers of cars and other users of space due to the cars blocking of pavements and roads. Gradual changes in housing, employment structure, and incomes have caused ethnic segregation (Vendina 2002) and socio-spatial polarisation (Marci´nczak et al. 2013); socio-economic divisions associated with unattractive residential districts (Gentile 2015); and conflicts of interest in restitution and privatisation (Dawidson 2014). On the way to transforming cities into a sustainable path of development, there are problems with the lack of space for new construction and the reduction of green areas (Kolosov 2013; Badiu et al. 2019). Recent publications have discussed activity of urban grassroots movements against ineffective reforms, economic marginalisation, social exclusion, and negative processes in post-socialist Czech cities with ˇ examples of Jablonec nad Nisou, Ceské Budˇejovice, Prostˇejov, and Prague (Pixová 2020). Another kind of controversy is linked to overtourism and touristification that

10

V. Mihaylov

accelerates conflicts between tourists and public and private interests. This tendency finds a place in publications with cases such as Prague (Pixová and Sládek 2016), Kraków (Wójtowicz 2016), or Dubrovnik (Panayiotopoulos and Pisano 2019). Cities and their housing estates have also become contested spaces in connection with the implementation of projects threatening the ecological state, in which local authorities, investors and developers, more and more ecologically aware local inhabitants, social movements, NGOs, and local media take part (Bartłomiejski 2015). Another theme that attracts attention of scholars is the struggle for public resources in cities from East-Central Europe. A special role in this process has played new urban movements of a diverse social kind (Pickvance 1996; Jacobsson 2015). In this respect, some successes can be noted in halting megalomaniac projects. For example, the role of urban movements in residents rejecting Kraków’s application to host the 2020 Winter Olympic Games in a referendum. An important role was played by the social movement ‘Kraków against Games,’ which fought for Kraków to be a city where the needs of its inhabitants, rather than developers, lobbyists and politicians, are the chief priority (Łab˛ed´z 2017: 194). This success is an example of the implementation of global civil society practices in the social relations of a post-socialist city. However, this was unthinkable in the pre-1989 era. The city movements provoked many critical discussions, but they did not always manage to block projects that were controversial from the social interest point of view. Among contested practices of urban planning, two projects carried out in post-socialist cities from East-Central Europe stand out: Skopje 2014 (see Chap. 7) and the Belgrade waterfront. The latter project is seen as the first contemporary large strategic urban project in Serbia (Lalovi´c et al. 2015: 35). Planning for the Belgrade Waterfront Project was carried out so far without substantial participation by professionals and the general public, and is more oriented towards the business elite of international big business rather than towards democratic and participatory methods of decision making with local communities and citizens of Belgrade (ibid.: 44–45). In summary, it can be pointed out that the various conflicts and divisions in Central and Eastern European urban spaces have arisen as an outcome of the post-socialist transformation and the difficult process of adapting old social structures to the rules of the market economy, European integration, and globalisation. There is a lack of synchronicities, with a few exceptions, between the increasing kind of conflicts and the relatively small number of studies in this area. The existing research gap is a challenge for current researchers interested in matters of political, cultural and economic developments of post-socilist urban reality.

1.5 The Aim and Scope of the Book. Making a Step Forward Despite an enormous number of publications in post-socialist urban transformation, conflicts and division of cities and towns rarely appear in international and domestic

1 Conflicts and Divisions of Urban Space. Linking Post-socialist …

11

academic debate. Thus, 30 years after the fall of communism, contested urban spaces shape a topical issue which is not well-developed and which has been waiting for its thematic framing, systematisation, and conceptualisation. A step towards this direction was undertaken in the book ‘Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-Socialist Cities’. It contains analyses and syntheses of chosen examples presented in the light of geographical, geopolitical, and sociological research concepts. Taking into account the existing research gap and ongoing challenges faced by urban communities in post-socialist Europe, the aim of the volume is to discuss relevant cases of military, ethnopolitical, social, and economic conflicts in cities from East-Central Europe and evoked by their more or less extended spatial divisions. After the collapse of the centralised model, conflicts among various social actors arose because of discord about an existing urban order, competition for limited resources of cities, and the ways of their political (re)organisation. In the introductory chapter Valentin Mihaylov makes a short overview of previous publications in the field of transformation of post-socialist cities, focusing on its main research streams. On that basis, the author tries to place the issues of divided and contested cities in East-Central Europe in this larger academic debate. The author places this contributed volume in the international debate on urban spaces of contested and divided cities, and argues the need for scientific research on conflicts and divisions in post-socialist urban spaces. The first part raises the issue of genesis, development, and contemporary discrepancies of cities divided by geopolitical borders in Central and Southeastern Europe. ˇ Presented studies of Cieszyn/ Ceský Tˇešín and divided towns at the Polish-German border confirm this trend. Part One opens with the chapter by Jerzy Runge and Anna Runge. The authors take as an example of two contemporary towns located on the Polish-Czech border— ˇ Cieszyn and Ceský Tˇešín. Attention is drawn to various identification criteria and possible divisions of divided urban units depending on the political, economic, sociocultural, or spatial features. In each case, exogenous factors and endogenous features of local urban space play a significant role in the periods of transformation. The choice ˇ of Cieszyn and Ceský Tˇešín as a model of divided urban space is not accidental. On the one hand, it results from the impact of changes on the political map of Europe after both the First and Second World Wars and the regional specificity of this geographical borderland. Katarzyna Kulczy´nska’s chapter identifies and evaluates chosen similarities and differences of cities divided by a state border. The contemporary Polish-German borderland is an area of high concentration of such cities, having been shaped as a result of geopolitical changes after the end of the Second World War. The new state border was established along rivers dividing the number of cities and towns, including Frankfurt (Oder)/ Słubice, Görlitz/ Zgorzelec, Guben/ Gubin, and Bad Muskau / Ł˛eknica. Both post-war division and further urban development, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall and unification of the two German states, led to the formation of social, economic, and political differences. The last chapter in Part One is devoted to one of the newest politically divided cites—Kosovska Mitrovica. Unlike the previous cases, it lies in the territory of a

12

V. Mihaylov

single, but partially recognised, state. Kosovska Mitrovica stands as a new and at the same time specific case of the division of a city arising during ethnopolitical conflict. After the withdrawal of the Serbian administration and army from the city after the war in 1999, the reasons for permanent division of the city appeared. In accordance with the Brussels Agreement (2013), two municipalities and two settlements emerged: North Mitrovica with Serb majority and South Mitrovica with Albanian majority. Danijela Vukoiˇci´c and Miroljub Milinˇci´c, the authors of this chapter, stress the influence of geopolitical conflict on the physical and symbolic division of the city. They emphasise the strategic importance of North Mitrovica as the informal capital of the Serbian community in Kosovo, which is in direct conflict with the Albanians. Part Two addresses the issue of the impact of ongoing geopolitical divisions, wars, and ideologies on the social and political tensions as well as their polarising effect on urban territory. The authors explore new forms of uneasy coexistence in a culturally different environment discussing experiences of Vukovar, Mostar, and the Donbass towns of Milove, Chertkovo, and Zolote. The Croatian city of Vukovar, located at the very border with Serbia, is known for the most destroyed settlements during the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. This small city occupies an extraordinary place in the national memory of Croats. Marta Zorko focuses on practices of urban divisions in everyday life in Vukovar. The author tries to answer the question of whether Vukovar is a spatially or socially divided post-conflict city in which there are no clear spatial lines of ethnopolitical division between local Croats and Serbs. This chapter emphasises existing divisions in Vukovar separating them into three groups: formal and administrative divisions; political divisions; and informal and mentally perceived divisions. On the example of the post-socialist Mostar, Valentin Mihaylov takes up the topic of urban geopolitics in an ethnically divided local community, which reflects the spirit of division in post-Yugoslav Bosnia and Herzegovina. The author discusses not only the political rivalry between local entities but also stresses the importance of the symbolic sphere in these never-ending struggles. After the war in the 1990s, hard geopolitics is increasingly complemented by ethnocentric rivalry for values as well as symbols and places reserved exclusively for one ethnic community. The author outlines various scenarios for the development of a local ethnopolitical situation in which variants of the geopolitics of dialogue and confrontation are possible. Unveiling some cases unfamiliar to the international public is among the advantages of this volume. One of them is raised by Roman Slyvka and Iryna Zakutynska in the last chapter of Part Two. Their contribution concerns political divisions of cities on the front line of the War in Donbass. The chapter focuses on the twin border towns of Milove (Ukraine) / Chertkovo (Russia), and Zolote (Ukraine). The authors take on a difficult task—to describe divisions in a barely accessible area that were evoked by hybrid war which is still in progress. The state and military borders change conditions of urban life, providing the new lines of spatial and social divisions. Part Three comprises reflections on controversial relations of ethnic and national culture with urban space. A few extraordinary cases of spatial disputes related to architectural projects, renaming of streets, and policy towards both national and multicultural heritage in more or less “ordinary” cities are discussed. Considering the

1 Conflicts and Divisions of Urban Space. Linking Post-socialist …

13

new cultural and ideological environment, the authors explore ways of dealing with multicultural past preserved in the material urban environment or in the memory of the citizens of Skopje, Lviv and Vinnytsia—all ‘ordinary’ post-socialist cities which were not an arena of armed conflict. Mirek Dymitrow develops the concept of cultural atavism and its manifestations in the urban environment. After 1991, the official concept of Macedonian identity mixed Slavic and ancient elements. In the context of this complex identity, Dymitrow discusses the expensive ‘Skopje 2014’ Project as an example of the externalisation of national identity in the space of a post-socialist capital city. The author also draws attention to the dissonance between great historical aspirations and pressing problems including spatial segregation, high unemployment, and the environmental pollution of Skopje and the entire North Macedonia. As a result of this policy, the boldest, largest, and most courageous project of national ideologisation of urban space in Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century was created, based on an eclectic imaginary identity by absorbing real, huge financial resources. The next chapter focuses on the rich material and spiritual heritage of Lviv— a city which over the past one hundred years has belonged to several states. The ethnic composition of its inhabitants has also changed, especially after the Second World War. Today, it is one of the main centres of the Ukrainian nation with a multicultural heritage including Polish, Jewish, Austrian, and Soviet cultures. Natalia Otrishchenko and Inga Kozlova approach this issue and provide results of in-depth interviews with Lviv’s decision-makers and opinion leaders. Oleksiy Gnatiuk and Anatoliy Melnychuk present how the Ukrainian 2014 revolution impacted the transformation of the country’s urban spaces that is far from the frontline in Donbass. The authors discuss the spatial dimension of post-revolutionary life in the city of Vinnytsia. They also highlight the impact of ongoing ideological changes on the urban landscape of Vinnytsia. This Central Ukrainian city serves as an example of a city lying far from the major revolutionary events in 2014 and the further war in the eastern part of the country. Part Four deals with socio-economic transformation of post-socialist cities which went through a transition away from old patterns of spatial planning and towards attempts to establish more rational and justice spatial order. But, along with seized possibilities for modernisation, areas of ethnic and social exclusion were shaped. This part contains the following issues: the defects of urban space organisation exemplified by social conflicts in the years of transformation of Sofia’s Student City into a regular neighbourhood; formation of spaces of socio-economic segregation of the Roma population in chosen Serbian cities; and soft conflicts and divisions of the urban space of Kielce as shaped by forces of globalisation and internationalisation of the urban environment. Research results suggest that the scale of economic conflicts and spatial segregation by income or social class in “ordinary” cities could sometimes shape even larger internal contrasts than in ethnically- and internationally-contested cities. In Chap. 11, Kosyo Stoychev addresses the common problem of social and economic conflicts for post-socialist countries related to restitution, privatisation, restoration of private property, and multi-stakeholder urban space management. The

14

V. Mihaylov

author presents spatial conflicts in post-socialist Sofia as a result of the multiplication of legacy defects in socialist urban planning. Conflicts and numerous divisions occur in formal and informal relations, and with no strategic approach, result in inconsistencies and imperfections of reforms. Particular attention is paid to the large Student City, an area of Sofia that is little known outside Bulgaria and practically unexplored by scientists. In the years of chaotic transition, Sofia’s chief student campus lost its exclusively academic function becoming a place of social tensions between students, local administration, owners of restituted lands, and investors. In the years of transition to a market economy, many post-socialist cities from East-Central Europe face the growing problem of the spatial segregation of the Roma population. Chapter 12 raises various kinds of socio-economic conflicts between the Roma population, central and local government, and public opinion. Serbia is among the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe with a high concentration of this ethnic group occupying large and poor neighbourhoods. Zlata Vuksanovi´c-Macura raises the issue of Roma neighbourhoods in the chosen Serbian cities of Belgrade, Kraljevo, and Novi Sad concerning the ethno-social, institutional, and legislative segregation of Roma population. As in the case of socio-economic development on larger spatial scales, the impact of globalisation on the transformation of post-socialist cities manifests itself in both positive and negative ways. Through the example of the city Kielce in Southern Poland, Stanisław Sala addresses a kind of spatial conflicts which are not easy to be quantified. The author discusses chosen negative effects that show how the opening of a post-socialist city through the processes of globalisation and internationalisation transforms its traditional spatial order and socio-economic structures.

1.6 Closing Remarks To summarise this introductory chapter, it is worth mentioning the chief peculiarities of the collected volume regarding both post-socialist and global discourses on contested urban spaces: (1) Problems of divisions and conflicts in cities from East-Central Europe are not limited to economy, demography, and spatial planning, which since the early 1990 s have dominated the discourse of post-socialist urban transformation, particularly in scholarly publications by East-Central European authors. The contributors also undertake the investigation of underrepresented issues in the sphere of urban geopolitics, security, war and peace, identity transformation, and the exercise of power which uses urban space for the purposes of exclusive nationalism. (2) From the other side, in contrast to other international contributions, the current volume tries to overcome the limitation of approach which concentrates on a few European and Near East cities which experienced armed conflicts and are places of difficult coexistence and physical divisions between two or more ethnic groups. For this reason, an attempt was made to focus attention on soft conflict

1 Conflicts and Divisions of Urban Space. Linking Post-socialist …

15

issues related to economic interests, cultural values, or historical memory in urban space.

References Abujidi N (2014) Urbicide in palestine: spaces of oppression and resilience. Routledge, London Anderson J (2008) From empires to ethnonational conflicts. A framework for studying ‘divided cities’ in ‘contested states’—Part I”. Conflict in cities and the contested states. Working Paper, 1. www.conflictincities.org/PDFs/WorkingPaper1_5.8.08.pdf. Accessed: 25 June 2020 Andrusz G, Harloe M, Szelényi I (eds) (1996) Cities after socialism: urban and regional change and conflict in post-socialist societies. Blackwell, Oxford Aquilué I, Roca E (2016) Urban development after the bosnian war: the division of Sarajevo’s territory and the construction of East Sarajevo. Cities 58:152–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cit ies.2016.05.008 Axenov K (2014) Between degradation and gentrification in a post-transformational metropolis city center: the case of St. Petersburg. Eurasian Geogr Econ 55(6):656–673. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 15387216.2015.1041540 Axenov K, Krupickait˙e D, Morachevskaya K, Zinovyev A (2018) Retail sprawl in post-soviet urban residential communities: case studies of Saint-Petersburg and Vilnius. Moravian Geogr Rep 26(3):210–219. https://doi.org/10.2478/mgr-2018-001 B˘adescu G (2015) Dwelling in the post-war city: urban reconstruction and home-making in Sarajevo. Revue d’études Comparatives Est-Ouest 4:35–60 Badescu G (2017) (Post) Colonial Encounters in the Postsocialist City: Reshaping Urban Space in Sarajevo. Geogr Ann: B Hum Geogr 98(4):321–329. https://doi.org/10.1111/geob.12107 Badiu DL, Onose DA, Nit, a˘ MR, Lafortezza R (2019) From “red” to green? A look into the evolution of green spaces in a post-socialist city. Landscape Urban Plan 187:156–164. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.landurbplan.2018.07.015 Bartłomiejski R (2015) Mieszka´ncy osiedla w sytuacji konfliktu ekologicznego w mie´scie. Scholar, Warszawa Beier R (2018) Towards a new perspective on the role of the city in social movements. City 22(2):220–235. https://doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2018.1451135 Berescu C, Petrovi´c M, Teller N (2012) Housing exclusion of the Roma: living on the edge. In: Hegedüs J, Lux M, Teller N (eds) Social housing in transition countries. Routledge, New York, London, pp 98–113 Bitušíková A (1998) Transformations of a city centre in the light of ideologies: The case of Banská Bystrica, Slovakia. Int J Urban Reg Res 22(4):614–622. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.00165 Bobi´c N (2019) Balkanization and global politics: remaking cities and architecture. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315162065 Bollens SA (2007) Comparative research on contested cities. Lenses and scaffoldings. Crisis States Research Centre, London Borjas GJ (1998) To ghetto or not to ghetto: ethnicity and residential segregation. J Urban Econ 44(2):228–253. https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.1997.2068 Buursink J (2001) The binational reality of border-crossing cities. GeoJournal 54(1):7–19 Calame J, Charlesworth E (2009) Divided cities. Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar and Nicosia. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia Colomb C, Novy J (eds) (2016) Protest and resistance in the tourist city. Routledge, London. https:// doi.org/10.4324/9781315719306 Coward M (2009) Urbicide. The politics of urban destruction. Routledge, Oxon Czepczy´nski M (2008) Cultural landscapes of post-socialist cities. Representation of powers and needs. Ashgate, Adlershot

16

V. Mihaylov

Daskalova D, Slaev AD (2015) Diversity in the suburbs: socio-spatial segregation and mix in postsocialist Sofia. Habitat Int 50:42–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.07.007 Dawisdon KK (2014) Conflicts of interest in the restitution and privatisation of housing since the fall of socialism: the case of central timigoara city—a problem of democracy? Eur-Asia Stud 56(1):119–141. https://doi.org/10.1080/0966813032000161464 Del Romero L (ed) (2016) Conflicts in the city: reflections on urban unrest. Nova Publishers, New York Del Romero L (2018) Touristification, Sharing Economies and the New Geography of Urban Conflicts. Urban Science 2:104. https://doi.org/10.3390/urbansci2040104 Diener AC, Hagen J (eds) (2015) From socialist to post-socialist cities: cultural politics of architecture, urban planning, and identity in Eurasia. Routledge, London. https://doi.org/10.4324/978 1315742342 Er˝oss Á (2017) Politics of street names and the reinvention of local heritage in the contested urban space of Oradea. Hung Geogr Bull 4:353–367 Fisher JC (1962) Planning the city of socialist man. J Am Inst Plan 4:251–265 Foxall A (2013) A contested landscape: monuments, public memory, and post-Soviet identity in Stavropol’, Russia. Communist Post-Communist Stud 46:167–178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pos tcomstud.2012.12.012 Freeman L (2009) Neighborhood diversity, metropolitan segregation and gentrification: what are the links in the US? Urban Stud 26(10):2079–2101. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098009339426 Fregonese S (2020) War and the city: urban geopolitics in Lebanon. Bloomsbury Academic Gaffkin F, Morrisey M (2011) Planning in divided cities: collaborative shaping of contested space. Wiley-Blackwell, West Sussex. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444393200 Gentile M (2015) The post-Soviet urban poor and where they live: Khrushchev-era blocks, “bad” areas, and the vertical dimension in Luhansk. Ukraine, Ann Assoc Am Geogr 105(3):583–603. https://doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2015.1018783 Gentile M (2019) Geopolitical fault-line cities in the world of divided cities. Polit Geogr 71:126–138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.03.002 Göler D, Martinovic M, Ratkaj I, Santic D (2012) Informal housing as routine? Multiple urban transitions in the Belgrade metropolitan area (with kaluderica as an example). Mitteilungen Der Osterreichischen Geographischen Gesellschaft 154:212–234 González S (2018) Contested markets, contested cities: gentrification and urban justice in retail spaces. Routledge, Abingdon Górczy´nska M (2017) Mechanisms of property ownership change and social change in inner-city Warsaw (Poland). Urban Stud 55(13):2803–2820. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098017730006 Haase A, Rink D, Grossmann K (2016) Shrinking cities in post-socialist Europe: what can we learn from their analysis for theory building today? Geogr Ann: B Hum Geogr 98(4):305–319. https:// doi.org/10.1111/geob.12106 Hamnett C (1994) Social polarisation in global cities: theory and evidence. Urban Stud 31(3):401– 424. https://doi.org/10.1080/00420989420080401 Harvey D (1973) Social justice and the city. Edward Arnold, London Harvey D (2012) Rebel cities. From the right to the city to the urban revolution. Verso, New York Hepburn AC (2004) Contested cities in the modern West. Palgrave Macmillan, New York Hirt S, Ferenˇcuhová S, Tuvikene T (2017) Conceptual forum: the “post-socialist” city. Eur Geogr Econ 57(4/5):497–520. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2016.1271345 Holm A, Kuhn A (2018) Squatting and gentrification in East Germany since 1989/90. In: Anders F, Sedlmaier A (eds) Public goods versus economic interests: global perspectives on the history of squatting. Routledge, pp 278–304 Ilchenko M, Dushkova D (2018) Editorial: in search of the postsocialist urban geography. How do we see the post-socialist city today? Belgeo. Revue belge de géographie 4:1–6 Ilie¸s A, Wendt J (2011) Process of Romanian cities depopulation at Banat, Cri¸sana, Maramure¸s and Transylvania Regions. In: Runge A, Kuczabsky A (eds) Medium-sized towns of Central-Eastern Europe in the period of economic system transformation and social changes. Kharkiv, pp 8–19

1 Conflicts and Divisions of Urban Space. Linking Post-socialist …

17

Ivanovi´c-Vojvodi´c J, Stupar A (2015) Knowledge-based innovation and the city: the case of Belgrade. Spatium 34:35–45. https://doi.org/10.2298/spat1534035i Jacobsson K (2015) Urban grassroots movements in Central and Eastern Europe. Ashgate, Farnham Kaczmarek T (1999) Frankfurt nad Odr˛a i Słubice—formy symbiozy miast przygranicznych. In Przestrze´n miejska, jej organizacja i przemiany, XII Konwersatorium Wiedzy o Mie´scie. Łód´z: Wyd. Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, pp 133–141 Kazimierczak J, Szafra´nska E (2019) Demographic and morphological shrinkage of urban neighbourhoods in a post-socialist city: the case of Łód´z, Poland. Geogr Ann: B Hum Geogr 101(2):138–163. https://doi.org/10.1080/04353684.2019.1582304 Kłosowski F (2001) Usługi w miastach granicznych Cieszyn i Czeski Cieszyn (Services in ˇ the borderland towns of Cieszyn and Ceský Tˇešín—in Polish). In: Runge J, Kłosowski F ´ aska (eds) Problemy społeczno-demograficzne pogranicza polsko-czeskiego na przykładzie Sl˛ ´ aski, Katowice, pp 189–213 Cieszy´nskiego. Uniwersytet Sl˛ Kolosov V (2013) Will city limits expansion solve Moscow’s problems? Ukrainian Geogr J 3:3–8 (In Russian) Kotus J (2005) Społeczne dylematy w przestrzeni miejskiej. Bogucki Wyd. Naukowe, Pozna´n Kovács Z (1998) Ghettoisation or Gentrification? Post-socialist Scenarios for Budapest. Neth J Hous Built Environ 13(1):63–81 Kovács Z (1999) Cities from state-socialism to global capitalism: an introduction. GeoJournal 40:1–6 Kulczy´nska K (2014) Miasta podzielone w Europie. Studia Miejskie 15:101–119 Kulczy´nska K (2018) Miasta podzielone na granicach Polski. Bogucki Wyd. Naukowe, Pozna´n Krzysztofik R, Runge J, Kantor-Pietraga I (2012) Paths of environmental and economic reclamation: the case of post-mining brownfields. Pol J Environ Stud 21(1):219–223 Krzysztofik R, Kantor-Pietraga I, Spórna T, Dragan W, Mihaylov V (2019) Beyond ‘logistics sprawl’ and ‘logistics anti-sprawl’. Case of the Katowice region, Poland. Eur Plan Stud 27(8):1646–1660. https://doi.org/10.1080/09654313.2019.1598940 Łab˛ed´z K (2017) Nowe ruchy społeczne w przestrzeni miejskiej (na przykładzie Krakowa). Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, Sectio K: Politologia 24(2):187–204. doi:https://doi.org/ 10.17951/k.2017.24.2.187 Lalovi´c K, Radosavljevi´c U, Ðukanovi´c Z (2015) Reframing public interest in the implementation of large urban projects in serbia: the case of belgrade waterfront project, Facta Universitatis. Architect Civ Eng 13(1):35–46 Light D, Young C (2014) Habit, memory, and the persistence of socialist-era street names in Postsocialist Bucharest, Romania. Ann Am Assoc Geogr 104(3):668–685. Doi: https://doi.org/10. 1080/00045608.2014.892377 Liszewski S (2001) Przestrze´n miasta post-socjalistycznego. Program bada´n. In: Korus B (ed) Człowiek i przestrze´n. Instytut Geografii i Gospodarki Przestrznnej Uniwersytetu Jagiello´nskiego, Kraków, pp 114–120 Marci´nczak Sz, Gentile M, St˛epniak M (2013) Paradoxes of (post)socialist segregation: metropolitan sociospatial divisions under socialism and after in Poland. Urban Geogr 34(3):327–352. https:// doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2013.778667 Marcuse P, van Kempen R (eds) (2002) Of states and cities: the partitioning of urban space. Oxford University, Oxford, New York Marin A (2012) Bordering time in the cityscape. Toponymic changes as temporal boundary-making: street renaming in Leningrad/St. Petersburg. Geopolitics 17(1):192–216. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 14650045.2011.574652 Melnychuk A, Gnatiuk O (2019) Public perception of urban identity in post-Soviet city: the case of Vinnytsia, Ukraine. Hung Geogr Bull 68:37–50. https://doi.org/10.15201/hungeobull.68.1.3 Mihaylov V (2011) The medium-sized towns in Bulgaria: the difficult way to their adjustment to conditions of post-socialist development. In: Runge A, Kuczabsky A (eds) Medium-sized towns of central-eastern Europe in the period of economic system transformation and social changes. Charkiv, pp 45–65

18

V. Mihaylov

Mihaylov V (2012) Changes in the number population of large cities in post-socialist countries from Central and South-Eastern Europe. Probl Geogr 3(4):29–50 (In Bulgarian) Mihaylov V, Runge J, Krzysztofik R, Spórna T (2019) Paths of evolution of territorial identity. The case of former towns in the Katowice Conurbation. Geogr Pannonica 23(3):173–184. https://doi. org/10.5937/gp23-22018 Mitchell D (2003) The right to the city: social justice and the fight for public space. Guilford Press, New York. https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087404269422 Musil J (1993) Changing urban systems in postcommunist societies in Central Europe: analysis and prediction. Urban Stud 30(6):899–905. https://doi.org/10.1080/00420989320080841 Mykhnenko V, Turok I (2008) East European cities—patterns of growth and decline, 1960–2005. Int Plan Stud 13:311–342. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563470802518958 Nagy E (2001) Winners and losers in the transformation of city centre retailing in East Central Europe. Eur Urban Reg Stud 8(4):340–348. https://doi.org/10.1177/096977640100800406 Nightingale CH (2012) Segregation: a global history of divided cities. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago Nuissl H, Rink D (2005) The production of urban sprawl in eastern Germany as a phenomenon of postsocialist transformation. Cities 22: 123–134. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2005.01.002 Palonen E (2008) The city-text in post-communist Budapest: street names, memorials, and the politics of commemoration. GeoJournal 73(3):219–230. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-0089204-2 Panayiotopoulos A, Pisano C (2019) Overtourism dystopias and socialist Utopias: towards an urban armature for Dubrovnik. Tourism Plan Dev 16(4):393–410. https://doi.org/10.1080/21568316. 2019.1569123 Pickvance CG (1996) Environmental and housing movements in cities after socialism: the cases of Budapest and Moscow. In: Andrusz G, Harloe M, Szelényi I (eds) Cities after socialism: urban and regional change and conflict in post-socialist societies. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 232–267. https:// doi.org/10.1002/9780470712733.ch8 Pixová M (2020) Contested Czech cities: from urban grassroots to pro-democratic populism. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9709-8 Pixová M, Sládek J (2016) Touristification and awakening civil society in post-socialist Prague. In: Colomb C, Novy J (eds) Protest and resistance in the tourist city. Routledge, London, pp 73–89 Pojani D (2011) Urban and suburban retail development in Albania’s capital after socialism. Land Use Policy 28(4): 836–845. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2011.02.001 Przybylska L (2015) Between sacralization and festivalization of public spaces: a case study of the cavalcade of the Three Kings in Poland. Bull Geogr Socio-Economic Ser 27:171–180. https:// doi.org/10.1515/bog-2015-0011 Pullan W, Baillie B (eds) (2013) Locating urban conflicts: ethnicity, nationalism and the everyday. Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137316882 Purcell M (2003) Citizenship and the right to the global city: reimagining the capitalist world order. Int J Urban Reg Res 27(3):564–590. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.00467 Radzimski A (2016) Changing policy responses to shrinkage: the case of dealing with housing vacancies in eastern Germany. Cities 50:197–205. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2015.https://doi. org/10.005 Ravnachka A., Kazakov B, Ilieva N, Asenov K (2020) School segregation of the Roma Ethnic Group: a Case Study of Harman Mahala Roma Quarter, Plovdiv. In: Nedkov S et al (eds) Smart geography: 100 Years of the Bulgarian Geographical Society. Key Challenges in Geography (EUROGEO Book Series). Springer, Cham, pp 201–216 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28191-5_16 Rokem J, Boano C (2017) Introduction towards contested urban geopolitics on a global scale. In: Rokem J, Boano C (eds) Urban geopolitics. rethinking planning in contested cities. Routledge studies in urbanism and the city. Routledge Runge J (2008) Population transformations in traditional economic regions of Central Europe. Struct Approach Bull Geogr 10:63–74. https://doi.org/10.1515/v10089-008-0013-7

1 Conflicts and Divisions of Urban Space. Linking Post-socialist …

19

Runge J (2017) Przestrze´n społeczna miasta—dylematy geograficzno-metodologiczne. Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Geographica Socio-Oeconomica 27:99–109. https://doi.org/10. 11089/22103 Sagan I (2000) Miasto Scena konfliktów i współpracy. Rozwój miast w s´wietle koncepcji re˙zimu miejskiego. Wyd. Uniwersytetu Gda´nskiego, Gda´nsk Sagan I, Grabkowska M (2012) Urban regeneration in Gda´nsk, Poland: local regimes and tensions between top-down strategies and endogenous renewal. Eur Plan Stud 20(7):1135–1154. https:// doi.org/10.1080/09654313.2012.674347 S˘ageat˘a R (2008) The recent development of commercial services in the context of globalization. Case study: Bucharest. Hum Geogr—J Stud Res Hum Geogr 2(2):73–88 S˘ageat˘a R (2014) Globalization and new ethnic minorities in Romania. In: Mihaylov V (ed) Territories and Identities in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Institute of Geopolitics, Cz˛estochowa, pp 258–270 Sailer-Fliege U (1999) Characteristics of post-socialist urban transformation in East Central Europe. GeoJournal 49:7–16. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1006905405818 Sarre P, Phillips D, Skellington R (1989) Ethnic minority housing: explanations and policies. Avebu, Aldershot Schneider J, Susser I (2003) Wounded cities: destruction and reconstruction in a globalized world. Bloomsbury Academic, London Šimáˇcek P, Szczyrba Z, Andráško I, Kunc J (2015) Twenty-five years of humanising post-socialist housing estates: from quantitative needs to qualitative requirements. Geogr Pol 88(4):649–668. https://doi.org/10.7163/GPol.0038 Smith DM (1996) The socialist city. In: Andrusz G, Harloe M, Szelényi I (eds) Cities after Socialism: Urban and Regional Change and Conflict in Post-Socialist Societies. Oxford, Blackwell, pp 70–99. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470712733.ch3 Stani´c J, Šakaja L (2009) Preimenovanja zagrebaˇckih ulica i trgova. Migracijske i etniˇcke teme 1(2):89–124 Stanilov K (2007) The post-socialist city: urban form and space transformations in Central and Eastern Europe after socialism. Springer, Dordrecht Stryjakiewicz T (2010) Location factors of the creative and knowledge-intensive industries in European metropolitan regions. Geografický cˇ asopis 62(1):3–19 Stryjakiweicz T, Ciesiółka P, Jaroszewska E (2012) Urban shrinkage and the post socialist transformation: the case of Poland. Built Environment 38(2):196–213. https://doi.org/10.2148/benv. 38.2.196 Sýkora L, Bouzarovski S (2012) Multiple transformations: conceptualising the post-communist urban transition. Urban Stud 49:43–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098010397402 Szafra´nska E (2013) Large housing estates in post-socialist poland as a housing policy challenge. Eur Spat Res Policy 20(1):119–129. https://doi.org/10.2478/esrp-2013-0006 Szczepa´nski M (1991) „Miasto socjalistyczne” i s´wiat społeczny jego mieszka´nców. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warszawa Tsenkova S (2012) Urban planning and informal cities in Southeast Europe. J Archit Plan Res 29(4):292–305 Tsenkova S, Nedovic-Budic Z (2006) The post-socialist urban world. In: Tsenkova S, NedovicBudic Z (eds) The Urban mosaic of post-socialist Europe: space, institutions and policy. PhysicaVerlag, Heidelberg, pp 349–366. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-7908-1727-9_18 Tuvikene T, Sgibnev W, Neugebauer CS (2019) Post-socialist urban infrastructures. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.1694956 Uitermark J, Nicholls W (2012) How local networks shape a global movement: comparing occupy in Amsterdam and Los Angeles. Soc Mov Stud 11(3–4):295–301. https://doi.org/10.1080/147 42837.2012.704181 van Kempen R, Özüekren AS¸ (1998) Ethnic segregation in cities: new forms and explanations in a dynamic world. Urban Stud 55(10):1631–1656. https://doi.org/10.1080/0042098984088

20

V. Mihaylov

Vendina O (2002) Social polarization and ethnic segregation in Moscow. Eurasian Geogr Econ 43(3):216–243. doi: https://doi.org/10.2747/1538-7216.43.3.216 Véron O (2016) Contesting the divided city: arts of resistance in skopje. Antipode 48(5):1441–1461. https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12269 Vukmirovic M (2020) Belgrade’s waterfront revitalization. In: Arandelovic B, Vukmirovic M (eds) Belgrade. The 21st century metropolis of Southeast Europe. The Urban book series. Springer, Cham, pp 145–167. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35070-3_4 Vuksanovi´c-Macura Z (2012) The mapping and enumeration of informal Roma settlements in Serbia. Environ Urbanization 24(2):685–705. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247812451809 W˛ecławowicz G (2003) Geografia społeczna miast. Wyd. Naukowe PWN, Warszawa Wójtowicz B (2016) Mi˛edzynarodowe uwarunkowania negatywnych konsekwencji ruchu turystycznego w Krakowie. Prace Komisji Geografii Przemysłu Polskiego Towarzystwa Geograficznego 30(4):174–186 Yaakov G, Dybicz T (2006) The retail revolution in post-socialist Central Europe and its lessons. In: Tsenkova S, Nedovic-Budic Z (eds) The Urban Mosaic of Post-Socialist Europe: Space, Institutions and Policy, pp 231–252. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-7908-1727-9_12 Young C, Kaczmarek S (2008) The socialist past and postsocialist urban identity in Central and Eastern Europe: the case of Lodz, Poland. Eur Urban Reg Stud 15(1):53–70. https://doi.org/10. 1177/0969776407081275 Zetter R (1985) City profile: Nicosia. Cities 2(1):24–33 Zenderowski R, Krycki M (2014) Public diplomacy w miastach podzielonych granic˛a pa´nstwow˛a. ˇ Przykład Cieszyna i Czeskiego Cieszyna (Ceský T˘ešín). Pogranicze. Pol Borderlands Stud 2(2):206–227 Zhurzhenko T (2015) Erinnerungskonflikte Gedenkpolitik im postsowjetischen Charkiv. Osteuropa 4:153–171 Zorko M, Novak N (2019) Classifying divided cities: the need for geopolitical perspective. Sociologija i Prostor 57:159–171. https://doi.org/10.5673/sip.57.2.3

Part I

Geopolitical Conflicts and Divisions in Urban Space. Between Past and Present

Chapter 2

The Role of the State Border in Socio-Cultural Changes of a Divided ˇ Town. Cieszyn/Ceský T˘ešín in a Regional Context Jerzy Runge and Anna Runge Abstract The chapter presents an attempt to identify the genesis and socio-cultural effects of the occurrence of the state border on the Olza River in 1920 which divided the town of Cieszyn and Cieszyn Silesia between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Indication of the consequences of division, especially in the context of cross-border connections, allowed to carry out periodisation of socio-cultural and economic links ˇ of the towns of Cieszyn and Ceský T˘ešín with their surroundings. Attention is drawn to the historical variability of the ethno-national and religious structure of this area. While until the early twentieth century we can speak of a large diversity of ethnic and religious structure of the town, the introduction of the state border in 1920 and the Second World War caused a clear difference in this respect on both the Polish and Czech side. ˇ t˘ešín · Cieszyn silesia Keywords Divided towns · State border · Cieszyn · Ceský

2.1 Introduction There have been and there still are cases in history when homogeneous geographicalhistorical or socio-economic regions, as well as networks of cities and towns, are divided by national borders. Individual towns have also been separated by borders. In scholarly literature on towns adjacent to the border (border towns) or divided by the border (cross-border towns), the most often raised issues are as follows: (1) application of a particular theoretical concept allowing to characterise the genesis and transformation of the border (cross-border) area (Rykiel 1985; Martinez 1994; Komornicki 1999; Hooper and Kramsch 2004); J. Runge (B) · A. Runge Institute of Social and Economic Geography and Spatial Organisation, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Silesia in Katowice, Sosnowiec, Poland e-mail: [email protected] A. Runge e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_2

23

24

J. Runge and A. Runge

(2) presenting similarities and differences in socio-economic transformation of the neighbouring towns (Hartshorn 1933; Ziemba 1973); (3) analysing the spatial-functional and socio-cultural specificity of the border (cross-border) centre (Gwosdz and Murzyn 2003; Ciok 2003); (4) identification of town relations with its closer and further surroundings (Dziemianowicz and Herbst 2002; Dołzbłasz and Raczyk 2012; Antoniuk and Papish 2014); (5) indicating perspectives for cooperation between urban centres and their regions (Sitek 2016). Political, economic, socio-cultural and spatial factors are the most common factors of occurrence of borders between towns or cities. The first one is a consequence of changes of political and administrative borders; the second one occurs due to diversification of economic processes and structures in the space; the third one is a derivative of the diversity of the socio-cultural space; and the fourth one refers to the features of the physical space itself, i.e. occurrence of rivers, water reservoirs or orographic barriers separating both towns or cities. Not only one factor is decisive for the cross-border nature of towns—there can be more of them. Changes of borders of some countries in the twentieth century meant that in Central Europe there were and still are many towns on the border of two countries, and even three state organisms (e.g. Mysłowice1 until the First World War). Such a situation has led to the division of one coherent urban organism into two separate towns on both sides of the border. Basing on the evolution of border (cross-border) towns, it is possible to distinguish different types of socio-economic changes—from full compatibility of transformations to completely different courses of changes in economic, social and spatial development. The scale and dynamics of centralisation and decentralisation processes (Colby 1933) can also change over time, depending on changing external or internal conditions. In some cases, these changes may induce spatial integration, while in others—disintegration. In 2020, exactly 100 years have passed since the appearance of the Olza border dividing not only the town of Cieszyn (Teshen), but also the region of Cieszyn Silesia (Teshen Silesia). It is a sufficiently long period of time to look at the shaping of the socio-cultural processes and structures in the analysed town and its surroundings, as well as their mutual relations. Cutting off a part of the city—its western periphery—by the new state border between Poland and Czechoslovakia caused that this periphery ˇ was transformed into a separate urban centre of Ceský Tˇešín. It is a sufficiently long period of time to look at the shaping of the socio-cultural processes and structures in the analysed towns and their surroundings, as well as their mutual relations. Hence, the purpose of this study is to indicate socio-cultural changes of a town divided by a state border. Based on a long-term analysis and taking into account a broader regional 1 Mysłowice is a city of today’s Katowice conurbation in the Silesian Voivodeship in Poland. Before

First World War, parts of today’s Mysłowice belonged to Austro-Hungary, Prussia and the Russian Empire.

2 The Role of the State Border in Socio-Cultural Changes …

25

context, an attempt to conceptualize this issue was made. This allowed to carry out a model of changes in socio-cultural and economic links between two divided towns with their surroundings.

2.2 Division of the Town in Historical, Political and Ethno-National Context ˇ Cieszyn and Ceský T˘ešín, which constituted one urban entity until 1920, are an example of towns divided by a state border. They are located in the central part of Cieszyn Silesia—an ethnically and religiously diverse land located between the historical German-Austrian border to the north and the Czech-Slovak border to the south as well as between the cities of Bohumín, Ostrava and Frýdek (in the Czech Republic) to the west and Bielsko (in Poland) to the east. The establishment of the stronghold in Cieszyn was aimed at ensuring the security of the southern borders of the Polish Piast state. Striving to develop the state borders, local rulers conducted a settlement campaign in Cieszyn Silesia attracting not only Polish settlers but also those who came from outside Poland. Thus, Polish, Czech and German settlements were developed here. Today’s Cieszyn Silesia belonged to the Kingdom of Poland until the end of the thirteenth century. In the early fourteenth century, the dukes of Cieszyn became a vassal of the Czech king. Until the mid-seventeenth century, Cieszyn Silesia was ruled by the Polish Piasts. Later, this area came under the direct authority of the Habsburgs, who had previously conquered the Czech throne. The area remained within the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918. According to the Austrian census of 1900, the Duchy of Cieszyn had 360 700 inhabitants of which 61% were Poles, 24% Czechs, 14% Germans and 1% Jews (Eberhardt 1996: 92). The development of Cieszyn was facilitated by its location on important trade routes (the Amber Route, the Salt Route, the Copper Route, and in the seventeenth century, the cattle trade route). The development of the commercial function was positively influenced by the construction in 1775 of The Imperial Road connecting Cieszyn with Vienna, Kraków, and Lviv. Initially, trade relations with Kraków, Moravia and Vienna were dominated by Jews merchants, but in the eighteenthcentury Italian merchants from Lombardy took over the commercial interests. The situation of the Jewish people gradually improved after the announcement in 1781 of the Patent of Toleration for Jews by Emperor Joseph II. At the beginning of the twentieth century, about four thousand Jews lived in Cieszyn Silesia. About ¾ of them lived in Cieszyn. After the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy, Poland and Czechoslovakia had claims to Cieszyn Silesia. The Czech claims regarding the eastern border of the region reached as far as the Vistula line and the city of Skoczów (Fig. 2.1). The Czech army invaded the right bank of Cieszyn Silesia and occupied the town of Cieszyn. The Polish-Czech battle took place near Skoczów. The armed conflict in 1919 lasted

26

J. Runge and A. Runge

Fig. 2.1 Contested territories in Cieszyn Silesia in 1918–1920. a—Czech territorial claims in 1918 (left); b—Polish territorial claims in 1919 (right). 1—border of the region, 2—scope of territorial claims, 3—railway lines; 4—rivers; 5—cities and towns. Source Authors elaboration based on Borák, 2011: 452

from January 23 to January 31. Finally, the decision to set the border was passed in 1920 to the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, which set the border on the Olza River and the Czantoria Mountain Range. The newly formed Czechoslovak state took the western part of the region, situated between the Olza and Ostravice rivers. The new state border on Olza divided the region into two halves. In 1910, 47.6% of the Polish-speaking population, 38.5% of the Czech-speaking population, 12.8% of the German-speaking population lived in that part which later fell to Czechoslovakia. ˇ In the municipalities of Fryštat and Ceský T˘ešín2 language declarations were as follows: Poles (69.2%), Czechs (18.3%) and Germans (12.5%). After the division of the region, about 12–14 thousand Poles emigrated to Poland from the Czech part. In addition, to ‘secure’ the Czech national interests on the right bank of Olza, the share of ethnic minorities in Zaolzie was artificially reduced by introducing categories of regional groups in the censuses. For example, the Silesian dialect was regarded as a dialect of the Czech language. Till the beginning of the Second World War, the ethnic structure remained almost unchanged (Nowak 2011: 251). The demarcation of the borderline caused dissatisfaction on both sides. Aggressive German policy towards the Czechoslovak state caused a crisis in 1938, which prompted the Polish authorities to capture Zaolzie. In the background of the genesis of the Polish-Czech conflict, there was the temptation to take over the Zaolzian industry by Poland, in particular the metallurgical plant in Tˇrinec and 15 active coal mines (Januszewska-Jurkiewicz and Nowak 1996: 202). The Czech aggression in 1919 and the Polish aggression in 1938 were not conducive to establish cooperation ˇ municipalities of Fryštat and Ceský T˘ešín, inhabited by Poles, began to be called in Polish terminology Zaolzie (Kaˇnok & Siwek 2001: 119). 2 The

2 The Role of the State Border in Socio-Cultural Changes …

27

between the newly emerged Czechoslovak state and the revived Polish state. At the local level, on both sides of the border, there still were numerous family and cultural ties. During the Nazi occupation (1939–1945), the state border did not formally exist, ˇ and Cieszyn and Ceský T˘ešín as one city (Teschen) were incorporated into the Reich (Zenderowski 2002: 52). The tragedy of the Second World War, intensive migrations during the period of socialist indoctrination, integration with the European Union and the passage of time gradually alleviated mutual animosities. The historical as well as central location of Cieszyn almost in the middle of Cieszyn Silesia made it become a border and simultaneously divided town. Its western suburb remained on the Czech side and was transformed into the independent town ˇ of Ceský T˘ešín. Therefore, this town represents a multidimensional quintessence of the complexity of socio-cultural issues of the whole region.

2.3 Changes in the Function of the State Border ˇ and Evolution of Relations Between Cieszyn and Ceský T˘ešín with Their Surroundings In the interwar period, R. Hartshorne (1933) distinguished two types of borders— antecedent and subsequent. The first type is primary in relation to the area development process, while the second one divides the already inhabited area. Subsequent borders lead to spatial and socio-economic disintegration and force reorientation of territorial ties. The issue of the typology of borders is not simple, as it can be observed in the formation of the border between Czechoslovakia and Poland after First World War. While the border in Cieszyn itself should be considered antecedent, but outside the town—on the border of the Silesia voivodeship and the Moravian-Silesian region it was rather a subsequent border. The specific character of Cieszyn results from the fact that until 1920 the left bank part of the town had been really poorly developed, constituting mainly a peripheral suburb. After the border was formalised, the Czech ˇ authorities decided that a separate town of Ceský T˘ešín should be established on the Olza’s left bank. Therefore, the emergence of the state border became an impulse for the formation of a new urban centre. The criterion of spatial development cannot be the only one in the typology of borders. Taking into account genetic criteria (political, economic, socio-cultural, and spatial), several paradoxes can be found here: (1) Existence of a tight border after 1945 was in conflict with the declared cooperation of countries that were members of the political and economic alliances (Warsaw Pact, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance); (2) From the economic point of view, the border divided economically similar areas (coal mining, power industry); (3) Despite the political division of Cieszyn Silesia between Poland and Czechoslovakia, cross-border family ties were maintained thanks to the local border traffic

28

J. Runge and A. Runge

which generally included Polish-Polish ties and contacts (Zenderowski and Krycki, 2014: 212); (4) The only conformity between the political border and the geographical element of the area has been achieved in the course of the borderline, because it runs along the Olza riverbed. However, the scale of cultural diversity decreased. As noted by Siwek (1997), ‘replacement’ of Germans and Jews by the Slovak population significantly weakened the dominant of the Polish community in Zaolzie. At the same time, anti-clericalism of the Czechoslovakian state policy appeared in place of the religious diversity. The formalisation of the border at the Olza in 1920 cut many social and economic links and ties. The border duality mentioned at the beginning should also be seen in the internal context, i.e. the relationship of the urban centre with the surroundings. As stated by R. Szul (2014: 378–381), eight types of relations between a town and the surroundings can be distinguished: (1) Isolation of a town, when we note a low level of contact with the surroundings, especially in terms of the labour market or the number of mixed marriages. For example, small Jewish towns in Central and Eastern Europe before the First and the Second World Wars; (2) Implantation of a town, appearing when the import of immigrants with different than local socio-cultural features occurs; (3) Draining the surroundings by a town, which occurs when an intensive influx of inhabitants of the surroundings into the urban centre and their assimilation there can be observed, which helps the urban centre to develop in this way; (4) Expansion of a town—that is, territorial expansion of the town and development of the suburbs; (5) Radiation of a town—intensification of socio-cultural ties with the surroundings; (6) Implosion of a town—increase of the socio-cultural influence of the surroundings on the town. People with non-local cultural standards start to prevail in the town; (7) Unstable balance and competition—such situation occurs when the features of expansion and implosion are balanced in a conflicting form, or—which is less common—in a non-conflicting form; (8) Absorption of a town by its surroundings, mainly through intensification of the immigration influx (including an increase of the number of mixed marriages) when the socio-cultural standards of the surroundings are transferred to the town. It is rare that belonging of a town to one type of a relation with the surroundings can be permanent. It is subject to changes over time along with the variability of external and internal development conditions, especially in the area of the economic base of the town. When considering the proposal of Roman Szul (2014), it should be noted that the ties of a town with its close and distant surroundings should be understood more widely, in many aspects. For example, from the point of view of the capital of the country, its political-administrative or economic authorities, towns or border regions

2 The Role of the State Border in Socio-Cultural Changes …

29

are the periphery of the country, usually treated as a specific problem of changes. On the other hand, from the point of view of the local or regional authorities or the communities of the area, it is important to recognise the possibilities of location in creating development (benefits from trade, cross-border connections). A similar problem is related to Cieszyn Silesia. On one hand, the area has been the periphery of the country for the central government, while on the other hand, it was an important socio-cultural area of religious freedom and educational traditions. Cutting it by the state border in 1920 paradoxically at first increased the conflicting interest of the capitals of both neighbouring countries in the area, which has been gradually decreased over the years. For the Polish part of the town, establishing the border meant cutting off from the communication hub (the railway station remained on the Czech side) and the need to build its technical infrastructure. Despite the strongly formalised state border in the early post-war years, the local border traffic kept ties between communities on both sides of the Olza. Weakening of the border function after the accession of Central European countries to the EU has paradoxically reduced attractiveness of the town, especially in terms of the benefits resulting from the crossborder trade. It can be clearly proved by liquidation or reduction of infrastructure supporting functioning of such trade (e.g. marketplaces, halls and shops targeted on buyers from the other side of the Olza). One of the elements of creating a new dimension of attractiveness of the town and region is the Cieszyn Silesia Euroregion established in 1998. The initiated cultural activity is directed mainly at the local and regional communities on both sides of the border and its goal is to integrate the communities. There is a lack of cultural events on a supra-local and supra-regional scale. The decline of attractiveness of Cieszyn has become the reason for marketing problems of the town. Differences in the perception of the town and its surroundings by Czechs and Poles are also significant. The Polish part of the town is perceived significantly better in terms of the labour market, housing conditions, more attractive historical monuments, a better commercial and service base, less polluted environment, a higher standard of living, or more complete satisfaction of social needs. Local consciousness of ˇ the inhabitants of Ceský T˘ešín has been mainly a derivative of constructing a new town in a short time in conditions of significant social changes (Kantor-Pietraga and Runge 1999: 103). Pressure on the construction of infrastructure, on the other hand, a significant migration turnover, especially after 1945 caused weak socio-cultural ˇ ‘rooting’ of the inhabitants of Ceský T˘ešín. Even the contemporary strong position of educational function does not help as the lack of attractive job places causes emigration of residents, mainly high school graduates, to other towns in Moravia— especially Ostrava and Brno. The economic position of Polish Cieszyn in relation to its surroundings is more competitive. Stronger labour market, location of the Branch of the University of Silesia in Katowice and development of new housing estates stimulated the influx of migration. In the difficult period of economic transformation, these factors reduced the scale of emigration. The political-historical, economic and socio-cultural dimension of dualism of both towns and their surroundings outlined above means that the proposal of Szul (2014) should be looked at as follows: first—we can note time and spatial variability

30

J. Runge and A. Runge

of occurrence of certain types of the town-surroundings relations; second—not all types of the town-surroundings relations are represented here. According to the research on connections on the Polish-Czech border in the context of the territorial social system (Prokop 2003; Prokop and Runge 2003), it should be noted that weak external connections of Cieszyn historically occurred the earliest (Fig. 2.2). The first phase, lasting until 1920, was characterised by occurrence of local and regional connections of Cieszyn with its closer and further surroundings. From the Middle Ages to the beginning of the twentieth century, Cieszyn was an important economic, administrative and cultural centre. Its location in the centre of Cieszyn Silesia was contributed to the strong economic and socio-cultural ties in the region. The second phase lasted from 1920 to 1989. The appearance of the PolishCzechoslovakian border changed the geopolitical situation of Cieszyn. From the position of a regional centre located within the Habsburg Monarchy, Cieszyn was ˇ transformed into a border town. As mentioned previously, Ceský T˘ešín emerged from a fragment of its territory on the left bank of the Olza River. The border on Olza, especially just after the war, became a barrier to economic links and contacts

ˇ Fig. 2.2 Periodisation of socio-cultural and economic connections of Cieszyn and Ceský T˘ešín with their surroundings in 1920–2020. 1—before 1920; 2—1920–1989; 3—1989–2004; 4—after 2004; B—border. Elaborated by the authors

2 The Role of the State Border in Socio-Cultural Changes …

31

between the inhabitants of both towns. Links with closer and further surroundings became more significant. The third phase covers the period of post-socialist transformation (1989–2004). As a consequence of the socio-economic transformation, the border weakened as a ˇ barrier in shaping connections between Cieszyn and Ceský T˘ešín. The intensification of cross-border traffic was due to price differences for food and industrial products or shortages of some products on the Polish market. The development of marketplaces on both sides of the border was visible during this period. The fourth phase took place after 2004. Accession to the EU and then to the Schengen area (2007) enabled the free movement of people and goods. At the same time, equalisation of prices caused a decrease in Cieszyn’s attractiveness for crossborder trade. As a result, connections between the inhabitants of both towns weakened due to the strengthening ties of more remote areas. Traffic at marketplaces has decreased significantly and Cieszyn itself has become a transit area for tourist traffic heading to the south of Europe. The last period is not reflected in the typology of relations by R. Szul (2014). While the connections in all previous periods concerned development-oriented conditions, nowadays depopulation tendencies and weakening of trade functions are noted. The newest type of relationship between the towns and their regional environment results from the increased transborder road connections bypassing the urban space. Referring to the periodisation of Cieszyn’s economic and socio-cultural connections in 1920–2020 with the theoretical types of “town-surroundings (Szul 2014), it should be stated that until the appearance of the border in 1920 we may speak of implantation and expansion. Implantation was manifested in the influx of settlers from different sides leading to the differentiation of Cieszyn’s national and religious structure. In turn, the expansion was visible when the city buildings crossed the Olza ˇ River creating suburbs later transformed into the city of Ceský T˘ešín. Radiation concerns only Polish Cieszyn, while unstable balance and competition should be noticed on two levels: first—between Polish and Czech Cieszyn, and secondly—between each of the towns and their surroundings. While the unstable balance and competition were noted between the towns in the 1950s–1980s, that type of relationship was less important in the ‘town-surroundings’ system due to numerous cross-border social ties that still preserved after the division of Cieszyn Silesia. Other types of relations, i.e. implosion and absorption of the town by the surroundings have not occurred there so far.

2.4 Consequences of Division. Socio-Cultural Changes ˇ in Urban Space of Cieszyn/Ceský T˘ešín The formation of the socio-cultural structure of cities is a derivative of two elements: the location of the city and city-forming processes (Rusek 2000: 147). The location ˇ of Cieszyn/Ceský T˘ešín on historical, geographical and political borderland where

32

J. Runge and A. Runge

a few trade routes intersect as well the demand for labour resources causes the formation of a specific socio-cultural structure initiating spatial, economic and also cultural divisions. Each social group historically „marked” its place in the urban space according to legal regulations and social norms in force at a given period. At the same time, according to Manuel Castells (1982), each social group structures the urban space depending on its purpose. Therefore, economic, cultural and political spaces are visible in the studied settlements. The division of economic space with a state border caused a disproportion in the location of industrial plants, infrastructure management and the breaking of economic ties between companies as well as between companies and consumers. While offices, cultural facilities, restaurants and hotels remained in the Polish part, there was a transport infrastructure on the Czech side—a railway station built in 1869 on the left bank of the Olza River and some industrial enterprises (e.g. printing houses and gasworks). The division of the town for the inhabitants of its Polish part meant being cut off from the communication node (the railway station remained on the Czech side) and the need to build technical infrastructure. In the case of Cieszyn, the most durable and the oldest is the political space, existing in two places—on the Castle Hill and at the Market Square. In terms of urban morphology, Market Square also lies on a hill, which further emphasizes the importance of the town’s political space. Dividing the town with a state border meant that on the Czech side the space of power had to be created from scratch. The Market Square and the street network were designed, the Town Hall, offices, trade and service institutions were built. The historical urban space of Cieszyn is characterised by centuries-old, orderly urban structure. Only after the town’s division, a square with the Town Hall (Fig. 2.3) and the planned street layout appeared in its Czech part.

ˇ Fig. 2.3 The Town Hall in Ceský T˘ešín built in 1928 (left) and the medieval Town Hall in Cieszyn (right). Photos V. Mihaylov

2 The Role of the State Border in Socio-Cultural Changes …

33

Cultural space is a derivative of the historical process of shaping the local community enriched by subsequent segments (ethnic and religious groups). As mentioned earlier, at the beginning of the twentieth century the town was inhabited by a large Jewish community. With the outbreak of the First World War, and then after the division of the Cieszyn, the majority of Jews moved to the left bank (Czech) part of the city or went deep into Czechoslovakia or abroad. The magnificent synagogue built-in 1878 was burnt down shortly after the Germans seized Cieszyn in 1939. The Jewish quarter located north of the Castle Hill ceased to exist. Traces of the Jewish community are the Jewish cemetery and the name of a street (Singera Street). Along with the Reformation, the creation of Protestant cultural space in Cieszyn began. A Protestant district of Nowe Miasto was established together with the Evangelical Church of the Holy Trinity. The arrival of the Jesuits in the city in 1671 marked the beginning of the Counter-Reformation. Another important date in the cultural history of both towns is the year 1861 when the emperor announced the Tolerance Patent for Protestants, representatives of various denominations (Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism) could have coexisted in the town and in the whole region learning mutual tolerance. Till the beginning of the twentieth century, apart from two large religious groups (Catholic Church and Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession), Jews and atheists had also lived in Cieszyn Silesia. Both the region and its central urban settlements were rare cases on a European scale of a socio-cultural space formed at the meeting of different cultures. Despite the existence of a political border, this space preserved its specific character (Siwek 1997: 12; Prawelska-Skrzypek and Doma´nski 1997: 42; Prokop 2001). Due to large migratory flows in Central Europe during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, Cieszyn Silesia became a kind of political and religious refuge during the formation of nation-states (Błahut 2010: 57), which was conducive to integration processes. ˇ As stated before, the area of Ceský T˘ešín had been a thinly populated suburb of Cieszyn inhabited by German, Czech, Polish and Jewish communities characterised by a strong socio-cultural diversity. The diversity was slightly smaller in the right bank part of Cieszyn (Zahradnik 1991). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Cieszyn is inhabited almost exclusively by the Polish population (99.0%), while the ˇ contemporary ethnic structure of Ceský T˘ešín is more diversified. Apart from the Chech population, it is composed of Poles, Slovaks, Silesians, Moravians, and other, less numerous ethnic groups (Table 2.1). The state border separated the more culturally diverse left bank part of the city from the right bank part dominated by the Polish community. Ethnic diversity (religious diversity has largely been preserved), was replaced by diversity of population according to place of origin as an effect of internal and external migration. Intensive intra-regional migrations, which took place directly in the post-war years, as well as the influx of people from outside of Cieszyn Silesia, caused a decline or even total degeneration of the local folklore, language and culture, which in many cases led to complete disappearance of the Silesian regional identity (Kaˇnok and Siwek 2001: 122).

34

J. Runge and A. Runge

ˇ Table 2.1 National structure of Ceský T˘ešín in 2001 and 2011 Nationality

2001 In persons

2011 In percent

In persons

In percent

Czech

19,716

74.6

14,043

57.6

Polish

4,257

16.1

3,333

13.7

Slovak

1,155

4.4

729

3.0

Silesian

390

1.5

390

1.6

Moravian

219

0.8

364

1.5

German

69

0.3

23

0.1

Vietnamese

23

0.1

46

0.2

Gypsy

22

0.1

21

Other and unknow

578

2.1

5,445

22.3

Total

26,429

24,394

100.0

100.0

0.1

Source Authors’ elaboration based on data from The Czech Statistical Office website

Identification of all distinguished categories of the urban space diversity is an indication of its scalar features. In addition to this, vector features are also extremely important, i.e. internal as well as external interactions (directed to the surroundings of the town) between the residents and also the users of the urban space. The sociocultural space of a town is built by national and ethnic or religious minorities residing in the town, as well as material and intangible cultural values. While the origin and the course of the historical socio-economic changes in the Cieszyn Silesia region were similar in their morphology or a functional structure, in terms of the sociocultural structure, the Olza River began to play a substantial role for differentiation of regional consciousness and identity in the nineteenth century. If Cieszyn is treated as a social territorial system (Chojnicki 1988), then in 1920, not only the system was divided into two separate subsystems (progressive division), but at the same time differentiation of both of them in demographic, social and cultural terms occurred. Changes in the components of each of the subsystems and ˇ weakening of social ties have become visible, especially in Ceský T˘ešín. One of the important factors affecting the openness of Cieszyn is the Branch of the University of Silesia, which promotes the development of cross-border and border connections. ˇ While the system connections of Ceský T˘ešín are centrifugal, directed mainly towards jobs outside the town, in the case of Polish Cieszyn the connections are centripetal. The town is both an important local labour market on a poviat (district) scale and an attractive tourist space, and it also creates connections with other towns. Thus, the two territorial social systems analysed here are characterised by the lack of isomorphism, which means diversity in shape and forms of socio-cultural processes and structures. Despite distinct socio-cultural differences, the demographic processes have been running similarly in both cities. Depopulation and demographic ageing caused by

2 The Role of the State Border in Socio-Cultural Changes …

35

natural decline of population and a negative migration balance have been their characteristic features (Table 2.1, Figs. 2.4 and 2.5). As regards the number of population, ˇ in 2018 Cieszyn has 34,6 thousand inhabitants, while Ceský T˘ešín 25,8 thousand. The scales of natural movement of population and migration balance have been similar in Polish Cieszyn. But, in Czech Cieszyn, the rate of natural increase periodically retained slightly positive values until 2012/2013, and later the values turned into negative ones. In a result of continuous depopulation tendencies, Cieszyn lost 2078 ˇ inhabitants in the period of 2000–2018 (population drop by −5.7%), while Ceský T˘ešín recorded a loss of 1030 people in the same period (decrease of population by −3.8%). On the Polish side, the decrease of the population resulted from both the natural loss and the negative migration balance, while on the Czech side, mainly from the migration outflow. Regardless of the difference, the trends have pointed out the growing demographic problem in both towns.

Fig. 2.4 Components of real increase/decrease in population of Cieszyn (2000–2018). a—natural increase/decrease; b—net migration Source Elaborated by the authors on the basis of Local Data Bank website

ˇ Fig. 2.5 Components of real increase/decrease in population of Ceský T˘ešín (2000–2018) a— natural increase/decrease; b—net migration Source Elaborated by the authors on the basis of: ˇ Demografická roˇcenka mˇest, Tab. 71, Ceský T˘ešín

36

J. Runge and A. Runge

2.5 Conclusion The town of Cieszyn, which until 1920 had been one urban organism with a diverse national structure, has been the essence of the socio-cultural complexity of Cieszyn Silesia. After dividing the urban space by the state border, the western suburbs on the left-hand bank of the Olza, constituting a transport hub, were developed by the Czech authorities and transformed into an independent city due to a large migration ˇ influx. However, it weakened the local identity. Ceský T˘ešín is an important transport hub facilitating commuting to work in the mines in North Moravia and in the steel plant in Tˇrinec. For the Polish part of Cieszyn, establishing the border meant cutting off from the communication hub (the railway station remained on the Czech side) and the need to build its technical infrastructure. However, the local identity remained strong there. Tensions associated with the new state border was gradually replaced by border trade and search for economic cooperation. With the emergence of Cieszyn Silesia Euroregion, joint projects are being realised on both sides of Olza. Cieszyn has gone through a complex path: (1) from administrative-territorial unity in the period of the Habsburg Monarchy, characterised by complex ethno-cultural structure, (2) through the political division into two urban organisms with a significant unified national structure, especially in Polish Cieszyn; (3) to the neighbourhood cooperation within the EU structures, in new social and cultural conditions. ˇ While in Ceský T˘ešín the national structure of the population is still diversified, in Polish Cieszyn it is an almost homogenous one. Traces of the multicultural past are recorded in the urban space through Catholic, Evangelical and Jewish cemeteries and religious objects. Numerous museums and educational institutions positively influence the remaining of strong local identity and consciousness. The proposition of Szul (2014) concerning the separation of types of spatial relations should be supplemented by at least one regression type, reflecting the loss of population in both towns and their surroundings. Demographic changes that result in decrease of population recorded not only on the Polish-Czech border but also in many other countries of Central and Eastern Europe are the premise for that. The reduction of coal mining on the Czech side and depopulation tendencies on both sides of the border have affected development perspectives of both towns and their surroundings. At the same time, the decline of importance of the cross-border trade in Polish Cieszyn has led to peripheralisation of the town in terms of socio-cultural links and ties. Historical changes in the shaping of inner-city and inter-city connections of Cieszyn with the closer and further surroundings indicate that disappearance of the border function resulting from joining the European Union by Poland and the Czech Republic has resulted not only in reduction of the interest in the town, bypassing it in transit traffic (border crossing in Boguszowice), but it also brought problems with defining a new vision of the town in shaping attractiveness of Cieszyn Silesia.

2 The Role of the State Border in Socio-Cultural Changes …

37

References Antoniuk N, Papish N (2014) Współpraca transgraniczna jako czynnik transformacji mi˛edzynarodowych funkcji granicy ukrai´nsko-polskiej. Pogranicze. Polish Borderlands Sudies 2(1):61–73 Błahut G (2010) Wielokulturowo´sc´ cieszyna jako miasta pogranicza. In: Rusek H, Pie´nczak A, Szczyrbowski J (eds) Dziedzictwo kulturowe jako klucz do to˙zsamo´sci pogranicza polskoczeskiego. Cieszyn–Katowice–Brno, pp 52–65 ´ ask Cieszy´nski. W czechosłowackiej i czeskiej historiografii. In: Borák M (2011) Konflikt o Sl˛ ´ aska. Polityka, gospodarka i Bahlcke J, Gawrecki D, Kaczmare R (eds) Historia Górnego Sl˛ kultura europejskiego regionu. Gliwice, Wyd. Dom Współpracy Polsko-Niemieckiej, pp 451–455 Castells M (1982) Kwestia miejska. PWN, Warszawa Chojnicki Z (1988) Koncepcja terytorialnego systemu społecznego. Przegl˛ad Geograficzny 4:491– 509 Ciok S (2003) Konsekwencje ustalenia granicy pa´nstwowej dla rozwoju pogranicza na przykładzie granicy polsko-niemieckiej. In: Runge J (ed) Granice Obszary przygraniczne. Euroregiony, Katowice, pp 131–141 Colby CC (1933) Centripetal and centrifugal forces in urban geography. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 23(1):1–20 ˇ Demografická roˇcenka mˇest, Tab. 71, Ceský T˘ešín. www.czso.cz/csu/czso/mesta-v-cr-pism-c-azg-bjbiikx5c9. Accessed: 25 Feb 2020 Dołzbłasz S, Raczyk A (2012) Transborder openness of companies in a divided city. Zgorzelec/Görlitz case study. Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geographie 103(3):347–361. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9663.2011.00688.x Dziemianowicz W, Herbst W (2002) Rola granicy pa´nstwa w rozwoju obszarów przygranicznych— przykład Terespola. Studia Regionalne i Lokalne 2–3:111–127 ´ Eberhardt P (1996) Mi˛edzy Rosj˛a a Niemcami. Przemiany narodowo´sciowe w Europie SrodkowoWschodniej w XX w. Wyd. Naukowe PWN, Warszawa Gwosdz K, Murzyn M (2003) Dylematy rozwoju sudeckiej gminy przygranicznej na przykładzie Lubawki. In: Runge J (ed) Granice Obszary przygraniczne. Euroregiony, Katowice, pp 186–200 Hartshorne R (1933) Geographic and political bolundaries in Upper Silesia. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 23(4):195–228 Hooper B, Kramsch O (eds) (2004) Cross border governance in the European Union—introduction. London Januszewska-Jurkiewicz J, Nowak K (1996) Zaolzie w granicach województwa s´l˛askiego. In: Serafin F (ed) Województwo s´l˛askie (1922–1939). Katowice, Prace Naukowe US´ 1555, pp 196–211 Kantor-Pietraga I, Runge J (1999) Wybrane aspekty przestrzennego zró˙znicowania stanu s´wiadomo´sci społeczno-ekonomicznej mieszka´nców czeskiego i polskiego Cieszyna. In: PełkaGo´sciniak J, Rz˛etała M (eds) Górno´sl˛asko-ostrawski region przemysłowy: wybrane problemy ochrony i kształtowania s´rodowiska. Wydział Nauk o Ziemi, Sosnowiec, pp 99–104 ´ aska Cieszy´nskiego w s´wiadomo´sci mieszka´nców—mapa Kaˇnok J, Siwek T (2001) Czeska cz˛es´c´ Sl˛ mentalna. In: Runge J, Kłosowski F (eds) Problemy społeczno-demograficzne pogranicza polsko ´ aska Cieszy´nskiego. Prace Naukowe US, ´ Katowice, pp 119–130 czeskiego na przykładzie Sl˛ Komornicki T (1999) Granica polski—analiza przenikalno´sci w latach 1990–1996. Geopolitical Studies, 5. Warszawa, IGiPZ PAN Local Data Bank website (https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start). Accessed: 25 Feb 2020 Martinez OJ (1994) The dynamics of border interaction. In: Schofield DH (ed) Global boundaries. World boundaries, 1. London, pp 1–15 ´ aski Cieszy´nski (1920–1938). In: Bahlcke J, Gawrecki D, Kaczmarek R (eds) Nowak K (2011) Sl˛ ´ aska. Polityka, gospodarka i kultura europejskiego regionu. Gliwice: Dom Historia Górnego Sl˛ Współpracy Polsko-Niemieckiej, pp 250–254

38

J. Runge and A. Runge

Prawelska-Skrzypek G, Doma´nski B (1997) Zró˙znicowanie przestrzenne postrzegania własnego ´ aska Cieszy´nskiego. In: Bukowska-Flore´nska I, Rusek H (eds) regionu przez mieszka´nców Sl˛ ´ ask Cieszy´nski i inne pogranicza w badaniach nad Studia etnologiczne i antropologiczne, 1. Sl˛ ´ Katowice, pp. 42–52 to˙zsamo´sci˛a. Prace Naukowe US, Prokop R (2001) Regionální závislosti národnostních a etnických struktur ceského Tˇešínska. In: Runge J and Kłosowski F (eds) Problemy społeczno-demograficzne pogranicza polsko-czeskiego ´ aska Cieszy´nskiego. Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Sl˛ ´ askiego 2013, Katowice, na przykładzie Sl˛ pp 61–80 Prokop R (2003) Pojem a funkce hranice na Tˇešínsku—s pˇrihlédnutím k urbanizaˇcnímu vývoji. In J. Runge (Ed.), Granice. Obszary przygraniczne. Euroregiony. Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu ´ askiego, Katowice, 2154:23–29 Sl˛ Prokop R, Runge J (2003) Identyfikacja składowych struktury przestrzenno-funkcjonalnej czesko´ aska Cieszy´nskiego i przyległych północno-wschodnich polskiego pogranicza na terenie Sl˛ Moraw. In: Runge J (ed) Terytorialny system społeczno-ekonomiczny pogranicza województwa s´l˛askiego i Północnych Moraw oraz strategie jego rozwoju. Katowice: Prace Naukowe ´ askiego 2136, 201–233 Uniwersytetu Sl˛ Rusek H (2000) Pogranicze etniczne—wielokulturowa przestrze´n. In: Bukowska-Flore´nska I (ed) Przestrze´n kulturowego współistnienia. Studia Etnologiczne i Antropologiczne, 4. Katowice, pp 145–154 Rykiel Z (1985) Zagadnienia regionalnych systemów osadniczych. Studia KPZK PAN, LXXXVIII. Pa´nstwowe Wyd. Ekonomiczne, Warszawa Sitek S (2016) Uwarunkowania rozwoju lokalnego na obszarach przygranicznych. Prace Naukowe ´ askiego, Katowice Uniwersytetu Sl˛ Siwek T (1997) Specyfika to˙zsamo´sci etnicznej na Zaolziu. In I. Bukowska-Flore´nska, & H. Rusek ´ ask Cieszy´nski i inne pogranicza w badaniach (Eds.), Studia etnologiczne i antropologiczne, 1. Sl˛ ´ pp 11–15 nad to˙zsamo´sci˛a. Katowice, Prace Naukowe US, Szul R (2014) J˛ezykowe historie miast—próba teorii. In: Ku´c-Czajkowska K, Sidor M (eds) Miasta. Społeczne aspekty funkcjonowania. Wyd. UMCS, Lublin, pp 365–382 The Czech Statistical Office website. www.czso.cz/staticke/sldb/sldb2001.nsf/obce/598933_ope ndocument; www.czso.cz/staticke/data/2000013/MESTA/Cesky_Tesin/SPME152_598933.pdf. Accessed: 2020.06.14 Zahradnik S (1991) Struktura narodowo´sciowa Zaolzia na podstawie spisów ludno´sci: 1880–1991. Trzyniec Zenderowski R (2002) Stosunki mi˛edzy mieszka´ncami miast podzielonych granic˛a pa´nstwow˛a ˇ na przykładzie Cieszyna i Czeskiego Cieszyna (Ceský T˘ešín). Studium socjologiczne. Studia Regionalne i Lokalne 1(8):49–78 Zenderowski R, Krycki M (2014) Public diplomacy w miastach podzielonych granic˛a pa´nstwow˛a. ˇ Przykład Cieszyna i Czeskiego Cieszyna (Ceský T˘ešín). Pogranicze. Polish Borderlands Studies 2(2):206–227 Ziemba J (1973) Po obu stronach Brynicy. Społeczno-polityczne zwi˛azki Zagł˛ebia D˛abrowskiego ´ askiem w okresie kapitalizmu. Sl˛ ´ aski Instytut Naukowy, Katowice z Górnym Sl˛

Jerzy Runge obtained Ph.D. (1988) and habilitation (1998) from the Jagiellonian University, Poland. He is a full professor employed at the University of Silesia in Katowice. A member of the Committee on Demographic Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. His main scientific interests include methodology of human geography, social and demographic changes of industrial and post-industrial economic regions, borderland regions and settlements. The author of more than 200 scientific publications, including 10 books. He is an editor of the collective monographs Socio-demographic problems of the Polish-Czech border area on the example of Cieszyn Silesia (2001): Borders. Border-areas. Euroregions (2003, in co-editing with F. Kłosowski); and Territorial social-economic system of the borderland of Silesian Province and Northern Moravia and

2 The Role of the State Border in Socio-Cultural Changes …

39

strategies of its development in the period of political and economic changes of Central European countries (2003). Anna Runge gained her Ph.D. from the Pedagogical University in Kraków, Poland in 1995. She is an Associate Professor at the University of Silesia in Katowice. An expert of the Regional Strategic Centre at the Marshal Office of the Silesian Voivodeship. Her research interests include socio-demographic issues, especially in terms of the labour market and demographic aging, and settlement issues, especially the role of medium-sized towns in the national settlement system, and urbanisation. Among her scientific publications are books: The Dictionary of Notions in SocioEconomic Geography (2008, in co-authorship with J. Runge; Medium-sized towns of CentralEastern Europe in the period of economic system transformation and social changes (2011— in co-editing with A. Kuczabski), The role of medium-sized towns in the development of the settlement system in Poland (2013).

Chapter 3

Divided Towns on the Polish-German Border—Dissimilar Sisters? Katarzyna Kulczynska ´

Abstract The aim of the study is to describe differences slowing down the integration of divided towns in the Polish-German border area in three aspects: demographic situation, the knowledge of the language of the neighbouring country and its presence of the wayfinding signs and signage. As the research results show, demographic processes in towns on the Polish side are slightly different. They have experienced a visible population loss, but not as large as that recorded in German towns, caused alternately by a natural decline or a negative migration balance. Despite the fact that the communities on both sides of the border have been getting closer for three decades, the knowledge of the Polish language among Germans is still low. The presence of foreign language signage in divided towns also plays an important role in their mutual relations. However, there is a strong asymmetry, which is reflected in little signage in Polish on the German side and quite common bilingualism or the exclusive use of German language signage in Polish towns. These and other tendencies indicated in the chapter confirmed that divided towns in the German-Polish border area still have to overcome numerous barriers and restrictions. Keywords Divided towns · Polish-German border · Socio-cultural differences · Asymmetry

K. Kulczy´nska (B) Faculty of Socio-Economic Geography and Spatial Management, Adam Mickiewicz University, Pozna´n, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_3

41

42

K. Kulczy´nska

3.1 Introduction Divided towns are a special type of border towns1 which are artificially divided ‘(…) by political decisions taken far away from them and by people often unaware of the everyday consequences of the existence of borders’ across ‘individual towns’ (Zenderowski and Brzezi´nska 2014: 163–164). The separation of the already formed urban structures into two parts contributed to the breaking of the existing functional and spatial connections and consequently forced the new urban organisms to become independent. The degree of border permeability has a significant impact on the development of divided towns. The larger it is, the greater the opportunity for spatial, social and economic integration of these towns. On the European continent, there are 18 pairs of divided border towns, most of which occur in Central and Eastern Europe, and their largest concentration is on the border with Germany. Divided towns on the Polish-German border date back to the Middle Ages, but their division by the state border took place only in the first half of the twentieth century after the national borders were redrawn following the Second World War (by the decision of the Potsdam Conference in 1945). The westward shift of the state border between Poland and Germany, which was designated along with the Lusatian Neisse (Nysa Łu˙zycka) and the Oder (Odra), led to the division of as many as seven towns (Küstrin, Frankfurt Oder, Guben, Muskau, Görlitz, Forst, and Zittau), but currently, only four pairs are towns (Frankfurt Oder—Słubice, Guben—Gubin, Bad Muskau2 —Ł˛eknica and Görlitz—Zgorzelec) (Fig. 3.1). Among these eight divided towns, only three are medium-sized (20–100 thousand inhabitants), namely: Frankfurt Oder, Zgorzelec and Görlitz, and the remaining five are small-sized (below 20 thousand inhabitants). The years 1945–1989 witnessed several phases of changes in the conditions of coexistence between both parts of the divided towns that experienced the border shift, although the borders splitting these towns were barriers of low permeability for the majority of this period (Ciok 1992). It was not until the turn of the 1980s and 1990s that significant changes were initiated, resulting from many new and favourable legal regulations, as well as the signing of treaties creating the basis for good-neighbourly relations, which influenced the intensification of cross-border contacts, primarily in the sphere of trade and services and in the area of official relations of municipal authorities and institutions. Thus, the increase in border permeability has become an important stimulus for the development of these towns and entire border regions. The next stage on the road to their integration was Poland’s accession to the European Union and then joining the Schengen area. This changed the limitations 1 Border towns are towns whose administrative borders partly coincide with the state border, hence—

given the criterion of the genesis of towns neighbouring across the state border—two basic types of towns can be distinguished, namely: (a) divided towns (split-up or split border towns), and (b) adjacency towns that, as a result of changes in the state border, did not split, but found themselves in the zone of direct influence of the border or were developed on the state border of a more or less stable nature as independent urban organisms (Kulczy´nska 2018). 2 The name Bad Muskau has been in use since 1961, earlier the city was called Muskau.

3 Divided Towns on the Polish-German Border—Dissimilar Sisters? Fig. 3.1 Border towns on the Polish-German border Source Kulczy´nska (2018)

43

44

K. Kulczy´nska

resulting from the peripheral location of divided towns into opportunities, stemming from a new, central location in the united Europe. The most visible change was the disappearance of enormous queues of cars and frequent queues of people at border crossings in towns divided by the state border. This was mainly due to the abolition of border controls, but also a significant decrease in border traffic, which stabilised at a level typical of each pair of towns. Once separated by the state border, divided towns have been consolidating after the fall of communism. As the integration process advances within the European Union, the processes of functional merging of towns located on the administrative borders of neighbouring countries can be observed. Towns divided by state (and administrative) borders, which rapidly lose the power of impenetrable barriers as a result of integration treaties, are a characteristic example of the creation of translocal spaces (Matykowski et al. 2017: 133). According to Kaczmarek (2005), erosion of state borders and integration processes in Europe will eventually lead to amalgamation of divided border towns, but this is a long-term process. Although the opening of borders has caused intensification of social, cultural and economic contacts, still a number of differences are visible between neighbouring towns, which despite the passage of years are still present within the town space or town communities. Gundlach and Matzke (2014) claim that peripherally located pairs of towns are like dissimilar sisters. They differ, for example, in their population and demographic structure, language, political system and the level of socio-economic development. Long-term observation and analysis of the social and economic development of divided towns in the Polish-German border area shows that despite three decades of functioning in an environment conducive to integration, there is still a significant asymmetry of salaries, prices and living standards on both sides of the border, which directly affects all spheres of life in these towns. Cross-border differences in the level of salaries and prices are particularly important, especially if they are intensified by exchange rate fluctuations, which generate streams of people, goods and money, stimulating the creation of a local cross-border market (Szul 2001). This market is characterised by the fact that labour and cheap goods move from towns of a poorer country (Poland) to a richer one (Germany), and money flows in the opposite direction. The economy of these towns is mainly based on services, including primarily retail trade. The main shopping places—for consumers living on the other side of the border—are supermarkets on the German side, and marketplaces on the Polish side. Cross-border differences are also visible in the standard of living of the border area inhabitants measured by the value of GDP per capita according to purchasing power parity (EU27_2020 = 100, Eurostat). In the years 2010–2018, there was an increase in income in all German states in the vicinity of the state border. However, on the Polish side, it always reached on average half of the level recorded on the German side (West Pomerania Province—32% in 2010 and 36% in 2018, Lubusz Province— 32 and 35%, Lower Silesia Province—43 and 47%, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern—86 and 92%, Brandenburg—89 and 96%, Saxony—92 and 101%). Therefore, it can be argued that town pairs function in conditions conducive to integration, but the discrepancies between them do not indicate that there will be

3 Divided Towns on the Polish-German Border—Dissimilar Sisters?

45

significant changes in the near and even further future leading to their unification. Thus, the main aim of the study is to demonstrate differences delaying the integration of divided towns in the Polish-German border area. This aim is limited to describing three aspects of these differences. The first one concerns the demographic situation of divided towns, with particular emphasis on immigration, which affects both the size and structure of the population of these towns. The second aspect is related to the knowledge of the language used in the neighbouring country, the creation of a new language quality due to the mixing of German and Polish, and finally the differentiation of languages due to immigration. The third aspect pertains to the occurrence and intensity of wayfinding signs and signage in the language of the neighbouring country. The study is based on the research performed to date, and as regards the chapter describing the population potential of the towns analysed—on statistical data downloaded from the websites of the Statistical Offices of Poland and Germany, town offices or City Population.

3.2 Population Potential of Divided Towns The number of inhabitants determines the dynamics and specificity of a town’s development, which is particularly important for divided towns due to the mutual relationship between the potentials of both parts of such towns, including their population potential (Doli´nska et al. 2018). The process of depopulation of Europe observed today applies to divided towns as well, but it is characterised by differing intensity in towns on the German and Polish sides. On the eve of the Second World War, Frankfurt (Oder), Guben, and Görlitz were medium-sized towns (20–100 thousand inhabitants by Polish standards), and Muskau was a small-sized town (fewer than 20 thousand inhabitants). When comparing data from 1939/1940 and 2018, we can observe a clear decrease in the population of urban complexes except for Muskau (Table 3.1). The years 1990–2018 were a particularly important period for population changes. At that time, there was a significant decrease in the number of inhabitants in towns on the German side, which was directly associated with the unification of Germany in 1990 or the political and economic changes taking place in the former GDR and the subsequent population outflow (primarily young and qualified people) to more economically developed West German states (Gruchman et al. 2002). Currently, this factor plays a much smaller role, and the population reduction is mainly due to a natural decline. Görlitz is an exception in this group of towns, where an increase in the population has been observed since 2014 under the influence of controlled deployment of emigrants from Asia and Africa. It can be seen that Europe has been experiencing a real immigration boom in recent years, which has been particularly strong since 2013. ‘New Europeans are coming from ravaged countries, and it is not yet known for sure whether they will be able to resist the current and not sink’ (Schlögel 2005). The main migration streams originate in the Middle East and North Africa and are directed primarily to highly industrialised Western European countries, such as Germany, Austria or Sweden

4.51

Muskau

3,716 2,483

2,6062

Ł˛eknica

30,521

56,324

3,8872

36,103

Zgorzelec Bad Muskau

72,237

Görlitz

16,687

18,6722

Gubin

6,493

108,340

49,463

102,200

1990

6,199

86,845

33,620

74,646

2018

1990 = 100% 104.4 55.0 89.4 78.0 84.5 95.6 95.3

+704 −1,985 −15,913 −5,582 −171 −123

67.2 −13,858

−28,258

Changes in the number of inhabitants in the years 1990-2018

Source own elaboration based on the Statistics Poland website, Website of the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, websites of divided towns’ offices; Digitales Historisches Ortsverzeichnis von Sachsen; www.citypopulation.de; www.gemeindeverzeichnis.de/gem1900/gem1900.htm?schlesien/rothenburg.htm

1 —1910, 2 —1995

95.5

Görlitz

16,933

30,791

16,773

57,873

Guben

16,069

45.9

Guben

2018

Total population Słubice

87.4

Frankfurt (Oder)

1990

Number of inhabitants

86,131

Town name

Town name

Frankfurt (Oder)

After division

Number of inhabitants (in thousands) in 1939/1940

Before division

Table 3.1 Population changes in divided towns of the Polish-German border area

46 K. Kulczy´nska

3 Divided Towns on the Polish-German Border—Dissimilar Sisters?

47

(Zupanˇciˇc and Wilczy´nski 2017). It seems that these countries experience a rapid change in the national or ethnic structure of the population. As shown by Kulczy´nska and Piwnicka (2016), the number of foreigners registered in Görlitz as of 2015 was 4,266 and increased compared to the previous year by as much as 1,339 individuals (dynamics index 145.7). Syrians were the second-largest group of foreigners there, after Poles (who were the most numerous group), and were first included in the town’s statistics as foreigners in 2010, i.e. even before the outbreak of the civil war in Syria (March 15, 2011). Similar changes took place also in other divided German towns (Dachówna 2016; Kurowicki 2017; Lepiarz 2019). Another issue that cannot be overlooked is that more and more Poles are now settling on the German side of the border, and they are the largest minority there, which, as Jonda (2010) notes, is one of the most spectacular processes in the Polish-German border area. Moreover, according to the research conducted at the Institute of Public Affairs, a large group of Polish emigrants are re-emigrants from West Germany, who ‘are usually welleducated and know the language well, which enables them to quickly join the local elites’ (Wesołowska 2012). Demographic processes in towns on the Polish side are slightly different. The towns have experienced a visible population loss, but not as large as that recorded in German towns, caused alternately by a natural decline or a negative migration balance. The exception is Słubice, whose population increased from 4.4% (Table 3.1). Polish towns have also witnessed a massive influx of migrants from Ukraine, who are eager to choose towns on the border with Germany as places of their temporary residence. However, it is difficult to determine the scale of this phenomenon due to Ukrainian migrants’ widespread involvement in unregistered employment, an undefined number of undocumented stays, as well as the use of alternative channels of entering and staying in Poland, both legally, e.g. Pole’s card or student status at a Polish university, and illegally, e.g. undertaking work having only a tourist or visitor visa (Brunarska 2014). Nonetheless, according to the Office for Foreigners in Poland, as many as 51.4% of immigrants of all nationalities in 2019 were immigrants from Ukraine. In the years 2010–2019, their number increased 17 times and currently amounts to 416.3 thousand people. The main reasons for coming to Poland are an unsatisfactory level of remuneration (40.3%) and a lack of jobs (37.1%) in the country of origin (Górny et al. 2013).

3.3 Knowledge of the Language Used in the Neighbouring Country An important aspect shaping mutual relations between the inhabitants of divided towns is the proficiency in the language of the neighbouring country (Pfeiffer and Opiłowska 2005; Opiłowska 2019). A study by Kaczmarek (1999) carried out in the late 1990s in the Słubice-Frankfurt (Oder) town complex showed that 91% of the inhabitants of Słubice declared they had knowledge of German to a degree enabling

48

K. Kulczy´nska

communication. Meanwhile, the vast majority of Frankfurters (75%) admitted they did not speak Polish, as they did not see the need to learn it. Slightly more extensive research on the proficiency in the language of the neighbouring country is divided border towns was carried out by Kulczy´nska (2019). It focused on: (a) general proficiency in the language of the neighbouring country, (b) the degree of written and oral proficiency in the language of the neighbouring country and (c) the rationale for learning that language. It turned out that the number of Poles knowing German was far greater (79.2% of Słubice inhabitants and 76.2% of Zgorzelec inhabitants surveyed) than the number of Germans knowing Polish (57.9% of Görlitz inhabitants and 44.6% of Frankfurt inhabitants), which corroborated the findings obtained by Kaczmarek (1999). The higher the level of language proficiency, the lower the number of people knowing the language in each town, and the higher the number of respondents who had better knowledge of the language in speech than in writing. At the same time, the number of respondents who declared advanced knowledge of the neighbouring country’s language, both in speech and writing, was the lowest. The answers to the question about the rationale for learning the language used in the neighbouring country proved to be very interesting. It turned out that many Poles saw the benefits of learning German (85.3 and 81.0% of Słubice and Zgorzelec inhabitants, respectively). Their arguments were most often economic, i.e. the possibility of taking up a job in Germany, which is much better paid than in Poland (43.5 and 33.2% of respondents from Zgorzelec and Słubice, respectively), or social—better communication with neighbours from the other side of Oder and Lusatian Neisse (30.5 and 30.6% of Słubice and Zgorzelec residents, respectively). Meanwhile, 42.2% of the inhabitants of Frankfurt and 38.2% of Görlitz believed learning Polish was unnecessary, because most Poles living in border towns speak German. Poles perceive the knowledge of German as a great advantage. Even though Germans learn Polish, they think learning English is much more important for them (Pfeiffer and Opiłowska 2005). To conclude, it can be stated that communities living in divided towns learn the language of the neighbouring country, although with varying degrees of commitment, which is probably dictated by economic reasons. Hence, there is a visible asymmetry manifesting itself in the fact that the number of Poles who know German, mainly at a basic level enabling communication, is greater than the number of Germans who know Polish. Thus, one can agree with Wróblewski (2018: 81) who wrote that ‘in the Polish-German borderland, there is poor knowledge of the language of the neighbouring country or even a lack of it’. The integration processes in Europe also produce changes associated with the emergence of a cross-border segment of consumers who create a new language quality (Ja´nczak 2015, 2017). The research conducted by the author of this paper in Słubice and Frankfurt (Oder) on communication strategies, based on the ways German consumers and Polish sellers established a conversation in a marketplace showed that borderlands is a place with a great potential for creating a new language space. The linguistic behaviours of Polish sellers show that national borders are conducive to creating a new language quality, consisting of mixing German and Polish, e.g. Prosz˛e bardzo, bitte schön, Käseschinetschken, Lachsschinken, ja bitte.

3 Divided Towns on the Polish-German Border—Dissimilar Sisters?

49

(.) Was wollen Sie, bitte? (Ja´nczak 2015). Thus, in borderlands, where two different languages meet, new and unique qualities are born. What is also worth attention is the mechanism of German and Polish differentiation under the influence of immigration to the divided towns. As noted by Szul (2013: 63) ‘in extreme cases of a rapid influx of people who use different languages into a town, communication difficulties may arise within the town’s population (the Babel Tower effect—a synonym of a multitude of languages in one place)’. Both Polish and German towns experience immigration, which is either permanent or temporary. It seems that immigrants who seek permanent residence are more important for shaping the language situation, but the importance of temporary residence cannot be marginalised. The towns on the Polish side, as already mentioned, have experienced an intense influx of economic immigrants from abroad, mainly from Ukraine, who take legal or illegal jobs in Poland. Thus, Ukrainian is a commonly heard language there, mainly in retail outlets. A number of self-service stores employ Ukrainians as cashiers because working in this position does not seemingly require the knowledge of Polish. However, the lack of communication between the customer and the seller within the same language sometimes leads to conflicts. Employing immigrants, even those without the command of Polish, is the result of a difficult situation in the Polish labour market. Employers, wanting to fill vacancies that Poles are not interested in, are recruiting immigrants from Ukraine, without paying attention to their knowledge of Polish. This applies primarily to the aforementioned retail, but also to other services or the construction industry. Meanwhile, German towns have witnessed an influx of immigrants who mainly speak Arabic. This group is internally diverse, as it consists of better-educated refugees and typical low-skilled economic migrants (Aksoy and Poutvaara 2019). The latter usually do jobs that do not require good language skills. They find employment in gastronomy and the hotel industry as well as other service companies specialised in cleaning, logistics or security (Niemcy. Co czwarty uchod´zca ma ju˙z prac˛e 2018).

3.4 Wayfinding Signs and Signage in the Language of the Neighbouring Country Apart from the language, signage is another means of communication and establishing contact in a town. In divided border towns, along with the increase in border traffic, information in the language of the neighbouring country has appeared on signs, banners, and advertisements. The very idea of signage, also known as the ‘information environment’ (Przyszczypkowski 1991) or ‘urban information‘(Mozer 2001), comes from the original concept of the Polish sociologist Wallis (1977; 1979). It means visible markings that are a carrier of various information in urban space, which are an essential means of communicating with the users, providing them

50

K. Kulczy´nska

with content that facilitates movement in that space (Matykowski and Kulczy´nska 2008; Matykowski et al. 2017). The bilingualism of the signage in towns and crossborder areas ensures greater effectiveness of information transfer, and thus encourages and facilitates users to reach desired destinations on the other side of the border (Matykowski et al. 2017). Although the foreign language signage is to some extent varied and quite ephemeral, it is certainly useful to foreigners visiting numerous divided towns, facilitating the perception of the urban landscape and getting around the town. Its intensity on both sides of the border varies greatly, which is of great importance. There is a strong asymmetry, manifested by the existence of few signs in Polish on the German side and fairly common bilingualism or only German-language signage in Polish towns (Dołzbłasz and Raczyk 2012; Matykowski et al. 2017; Kulczy´nska 2019). German-language information appeared much earlier in the Polish towns than Polish language signage did in Frankfurt(Oder), Guben, Bad Muskau or Görlitz. Its largest concentration covers the area explored by German consumers, i.e. border marketplaces, large supermarket complexes, and city centres adjacent to the state border, and therefore the content appearing on signboards, advertisements or information boards is related to the commercial and service functions of these towns (Fig. 3.2). In towns on the German side, the Polish language signage is much more limited. In Frankfurt, Guben and Bad Muskau, it is mainly concentrated in city centres and is mainly associated with the developing tourism function which uses historical and cultural values, e.g. the educational path located on both sides of the Oder (Słubice and Frankfurt (Oder) connected with the famous German poet Heinrich von Kleist and his cousin grandfather Ewald Christian von Kleist, or appears on the occasion ´ zka’ walking route in Gubin of joint, cross-border projects, e.g. the ‘Zielona Scie˙ and Guben (Fig. 3.3). In Görlitz, on the other hand, Polish can usually be found in shop windows, as well as on posters and signs of catering establishments and recreational facilities. The main concentration of urban information signs in Polish is the area extending from Postplatz along Berliner Straβe and Hospitalstraβe, the streets constituting the main commercial routes, where catering establishments can be found. A survey conducted by Kulczy´nska (2019) on the impact of foreign language wayfinding signs and signage on the freedom of movement in Słubice and Frankfurt (Oder) constituted a supplement to the above research (Fig. 3.4). The results showed clearly that for 82.7% of Frankfurters, environmental information in their mother tongue allows for freer movement in Słubice, mainly to a large (52.1%) and moderate (23.9%) degree, which is related to the high intensity of such information on the Polish side. Unhampered movement around Polish towns, as indicated by the respondents, is also facilitated by the knowledge of the German language by staff working in shops, catering establishments and other service outlets. They try to understand German and give information to the customers in their own language. This does not work the other way round, as Germans do not try to understand Polish, which probably results from the lack of knowledge of their neighbours’ language. On the other hand, 36.9%

3 Divided Towns on the Polish-German Border—Dissimilar Sisters?

51

Fig. 3.2 German-language tobacco shop signboards c–e, and bilingual a and German-language b information boards presenting services offered in Gubin. a and b—Obro´nców Pokoju Street, c and d—Chopina Street in the proximity of Obro´nców Pokoju Street, e—Chopina Street, by the national border Source Kulczy´nska (2019)

of Poles stated that the signage in Polish helps them move around Frankfurt, but only to a moderate (34.4% of responses) and low (25.6%) degree. Thus, the foreign language signage makes the perception of the urban landscape and moving around the town on the Polish side easier for Germans. In contrast, Poles exploring the space of German towns feel quite alienated there, which is due to the low intensity or the lack of urban information signs in Polish.

52

K. Kulczy´nska

Fig. 3.3 Permanent bilingual wayfinding signs and signage in Frankfurt (Oder): a—Holzmarkt, b—Heilbronner Straβe/Karl-Marx-Straβe, c—Groβe Oderstraβe/Regirungsstraβe, d— Groβe Oderstraβe/Bischofstraβe, e—stop nr 3 ‘Park by St. Gertrude’s Church’ in Gartenstraβe/PaulFeldner-Straβe Source Kulczy´nska (2019)

3.5 Conclusion The cross-border differences between towns located on both sides of the PolishGerman border, presented as three aspects, i.e. the demographic situation, the knowledge of the language of the neighbouring country and the presence of the signage in a town in the language of the neighbouring country, divide these towns rather than connect them. The most important problem in shaping cross-border relations are language differences. Despite the fact that the communities on both sides of the border have been getting closer for three decades, the knowledge of the Polish

3 Divided Towns on the Polish-German Border—Dissimilar Sisters?

53

very big 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

very small

small

big

moderate

Polish-language wayfinding signs and signage in Frankfurt (Oder) German-language wayfinding signs and signage in Słubice Fig. 3.4 The influence of foreign language wayfinding signs and signage on the ease of movement in Słubice and Frankfurt (Oder) Source Kulczy´nska (2019)

language among Germans is still low. Poles are much more likely to have the knowledge of German, which helps them find or start work in Germany. At border marketplaces, a new linguistic quality has been created due to the mixing of Polish and German as a result of poor knowledge of the latter. What can also be observed is the diversification of languages under the influence of immigration from outside the EU. German towns are experiencing a massive influx of refugees, mainly from the Middle East and North Africa, while Polish towns are receiving economic immigrants from Ukraine. Immigration also impacts population growth and the differentiation of the nationality structure in these towns. The presence of foreign language signage in divided towns also plays an important role in their mutual relations. However, the intensity of this phenomenon varies greatly on both sides of the border. There is a strong asymmetry, which is reflected in little signage in Polish on the German side and quite common bilingualism or the exclusive use of German language signage in Polish towns. Thus, divided towns in the German-Polish border area still have to overcome numerous barriers and restrictions. Therefore, it can be said that these towns coexist rather than integrate. Indeed, they try to implement joint projects such as Muskauer Park: protection, development and promotion of the European cultural heritage (Bad Muskau–Ł˛eknica) or the Gubin-Guben wastewater treatment plant. However, it seems that these projects are motivated solely by the benefits related to the considerable subsidies from the European funds used to reduce the inequality in the border areas, which does not translate into mutual relations between the towns at all. Another example of illusive integration between divided cities is Eurocities or Europe-cities

54

K. Kulczy´nska

such as Słubfurt, Gubien, Zgorzelic or Mueknica3 . They are illusory forms of cultural initiatives (e.g. living for a couple of hours in a loggia set up on a metal structure in the city centre, which was supposed to draw attention to the lack of flats in Słubice and the existence of vacant ones in Frankfurt), financed by the EU, which over time and with generational and mental changes may turn into real actions leading to joint management. Although the national border is not visible today, it still divides these towns, and little has changed in this regard. Divided towns will become real ‘information transmitters’ (Buchhofer 1995), when their inhabitants realize that the formation of new economic and socio-cultural characteristics necessitates overcoming mental, cultural and linguistic barriers and that ‘it is necessary to bring these inhabitants closer together on an emotional level’ (Kaczmarek 1999: 139).

References Aksoy CG, Poutvaara P (2019) Refugees’self-selection into Europe: who migrates where? European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Working Paper, 226 Brunarska Z (2014) Ukrai´nscy imigranci zarobkowi w Polsce—dlaczego tak trudno ich policzy´c? Studia BAS 4(40):155–174 Buchhofer E (1995) Polska—wschodni s˛asiad Niemiec. In: Buchhofer E, Kortus B (eds) Polska i Niemcy. Geografia s˛asiedztwa w nowej Europie. UNIVERSITAS, Kraków, pp 55–71 Ciok S (1992) Polska granica zachodnia. Zmiana funkcji granicy. In: Kurcz Z (ed) Problemy społeczno-gospodarcze miast pogranicza polsko-niemieckiego. Wyd. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław, pp 9–21 Dachówna R (2016) Oswajanie l˛eków. www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/oswajanie-lekow/. Accessed: 07 May 2020 Digitales Historisches Ortsverzeichnis von Sachsen. https://hov.isgv.de/G%C3%B6rlitz_(1). Accessed: 08 May 2020 Doli´nska K, Makaro J, Nied´zwiecka-Iwa´nczak N (2018) Cud pogranicza Zgorzelczanie, gubinianie i słubiczanie o z˙ yciu w miastach podzielonych. Nomos, Kraków Dołzbłasz S, Raczyk A (2012) Transborder openness of companies in a divided city: zgorzelec/görlitz case study. Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie 103(3):347–361. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9663.2011.00688.x Eurostat website. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. Accessed: 07 May 2020 Gundlach M, Matzke M (2014) Goerlitz-Zgorzelec: dwie niepodobne siostry. www.dw.com/pl/goe rlitz-zgorzelec-dwie-niepodobne-siostry/a-17877917. Accessed: 07 May 2020 Górny A, Kaczmarczyk P, Napierała J, Toru´nczyk-Ruiz S (2013) Raport z badania imigrantów w Polsce. www.nbp.pl/badania/seminaria/17i2014.pdf. Accessed: 07 May 2020 Gruchamn B, Nowi´nska-Ła´zniewska E, Parowicz I, Kötzle A, Huskobla G, Osiecka A (2002) Współpraca transgraniczna przedsi˛ebiorstw na pograniczu polsko-niemieckim na przykładzie województw zachodniopomorskiego i lubuskiego oraz landu Brandenburgii. Studia Regionalne i Lokalne 4(10):23–48 Ja´nczak B (2015) German-polish border: language contact and language use on the example of forms of address of polish vendors from Słubice Bazaar. VAKKI Publications, 4, Vaasa, pp 117–126

3 The

terms result from a combination of parts of the neighbouring town names: Słubice and Frankfurt (Oder), Gubin and Guben, Zgorzelec and Görlitz, Bad Muskau and Ł˛eknica.

3 Divided Towns on the Polish-German Border—Dissimilar Sisters?

55

Ja´nczak B (2017) Deutsch-polnische grenzschaft: sprachgebrauch im transnationalen Raum der Gernzmärkte im deutsch-polnischen Grenzland? In: Tölle A, Wehrhahn R (eds) Translokalität und lokale Raumproduktionen in transnationaler Perspektive, 30. Logos Verlag Berlin, Berlin, pp 119–131 Jonda B (2010) Nowe formy relacji polsko-niemieckich na terenach przygranicznych ze szczególnym uwzgl˛ednieniem sytuacji w okolicach Szczecina. Transgraniczno´sc´ w perspektywie socjologicznej, VII, pp 41–59 Kaczmarek T (1999) Frankfurt nad Odr˛a i Słubice—formy symbiozy miast przygranicznych. In: Kaczmarek J (ed) Przestrze´n miejska, jej organizacja i przemiany. Katedra Geografii Miast i Turyzmu, Uniwersytet Łódzki, Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe, Łód´z, pp 133–141 Kaczmarek T (2005) Struktury terytorialno-administracyjne i ich reformy w krajach europejskich. Wyd. Naukowe UAM, Pozna´n Kaczmarek J (2011) Gubin i Guben—miasta na pograniczu. Socjologiczne studium s˛asiedztwa. Wyd. Naukowe UAM, Pozna´n Kulczy´nska K (2018) Miasta podzielone na granicach Polski. Bogucki Wyd. Naukowe, Pozna´n Kulczy´nska K (2019) Zachowania przestrzenne konsumentów w podzielonych miastach polskoniemieckiego i polsko czeskiego obszaru przygranicznego. Naukowe UAM, Pozna´n, Wyd Kulczy´nska K, Piwnicka K (2016) Foreigners in the Zgorzelec-Görlitz border urban complex. Studia Miejskie 24:73–90 Kurowicki M (2017) Frankfurt nad Odr˛a. Wie˙zowce pustoszały, a˙z zjawili si˛e uchod´zcy. https:// plus.polskatimes.pl/frankfurt-nad-odra-wiezowce-pustoszaly-az-zjawili-sie-uchodzcy/ar/120 70108. Accessed: 07 May 2020 Lepiarz J (2019) Dla uchod´zców i polskich imigrantów. O´srodek we Frankfurcie nad Odr˛a. www. dw.com/pl/dla-uchod%C5%BAc%C3%B3w-i-polskich-imigrant%C3%B3w-o%C5%9Brodekwe-frankfurcie-nad-odr%C4%85/a-48465418. Accessed: 07 May 2020 Matykowski R, Kulczy´nska K (2008) Społeczno-kulturowe i przestrzenne aspekty szaty informacyjnej miasta przygranicznego. In: Orłowska E (ed) Kulturowy aspekt bada´n geograficznych. Studia teoretyczne i regionalne, 1. Polskie Towarzystwo Geograficzne—Oddział Wrocławski, Wrocław, pp 141–157 Matykowski R, Kulczy´nska K, Tobolska A (2017) Informationsgewand als Ausdruck der Herausbildung transnationaler Räume in benachbarten Grenzstädten. In: Tölle A & Wehrhahn R (eds) Translokalität und lokale Raumproduktionen in transnationaler Perspektive, vol 30. Tölle A, Wehrhahn i R. Logos Verlag Berlin, Berin, pp 133–162 Mozer A (2001) J˛ezyk informacyjny wielkiego miasta na przykładzie centrum Warszawy. Studia Regionalne i Lokalne 2–3:127–148 Niemcy. Co czwarty uchod´zca ma ju˙z prac˛e (2018). www.dw.com/pl/niemcy-co-czwarty-uchod% C5%BAca-ma-ju%C5%BC-prac%C4%99/a-44019424. Accessed: 07 May 2020 Opiłowska E (2019) Narracje o granicy w dokumentach strategicznych polsko-niemieckiego pogranicza. In: Kurcz Z (ed) Polskie pogranicza w procesie przemian. Wyd. Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa, pp 98–112 Office for Foreigners in Poland (Urz˛ad do Spraw Cudzoziemców). https://udsc.gov.pl/ Przyszczypkowski K (1991) Funkcje systemów informacyjnych wielkiego miasta wobec migrantów. Wyd. Naukowe UAM, Pozna´n Pfeiffer S, Opiłowska E (2005) Zwei Seiten einer Stadt. Dwie strony miasta. Görlitz-Zgorzelec. Dresdner Verlaghaus Technik GmbH, Dresden ´ Schlögel K (2005) Srodek le˙zy na wschodzie. Europa w stadium przej´sciowym. Oficyna Wydawnicza, Warszawa Statistics Poland website. www.stat.gov.pl. Accessed: 08 May 2020 Szul R (2001) Uwarunkowania lokalnej współpracy transgranicznej. Polski Przegl˛ad Dyplomatyczny 1(2):89–98 Szul R (2013) Miasto a j˛ezyk. Rola miast w kształtowaniu sytuacji j˛ezykowej. Studia z Geografii Politycznej i Historycznej 2:63–85 Wallis A (1977) Miasto i przestrze´n. Pa´nstwowe Wyd. Naukowe, Warszawa

56

K. Kulczy´nska

Wallis A (1979) Informacja i gwar—o miejskim centrum. Pa´nstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa Website of the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. www.destatis.de/DE/Home/_inhalt.html. Accessed: 08 May 2020 Wesołowska E (2012) Osiedlamy si˛e we wschodnich Niemczech. Rzeczpospolita 04(05) Wróblewski ŁD (2018) Powi˛azania społeczno-gospodarcze na pograniczu polsko-niemieckim w warunkach rynku wewn˛etrznego Unii Europejskiej. Studia Regionalne i Lokalne 4(74):75–88 www.gemeindeverzeichnis.de/gem1900/gem1900.htm?schlesien/rothenburg.htm www.badmuskau.de/ www.citypopulation.de/ www.frankfurt-oder.de/ www.goerlitz.de/Die-Stadt-Goerlitz.html www.guben.de/ www.gubin.pl/ www.leknica.pl/leknica.pl/index.html www.slubice.pl/ www.zgorzelec.eu/index.php Zenderowski R, Brzezi´nska M (2014) Miasta podzielone granic˛a pa´nstwow˛a w nowych pa´nstwach członkowskich UE: od separacji do integracji. Pogranicze, Polish Borderlands Studies 2(2):164– 183 Zupanˇciˇc J, Wilczy´nski PL (2017) Fala imigracji do Europy z perspektywy krajów tranzytowych. Przegl˛ad Geopolityczny 19:70–83

Katarzyna Kulczynska ´ dr hab., a socio-economic geographer employed at the Faculty of SocioEconomic Geography and Spatial Management at Adam Mickiewicz University, Pozna´n. The author and co-author of 2 scientific monographs and over 50 articles published in both domestic and foreign journals. Member and juror of the Regional Committee of the Polish Geography Olympiad in Pozna´n at the Polish Geographical Society. Her current research interests include socio-economic changes taking place in divided towns in the Polish-German and Polish-Czech border areas, with a special focus on cross-border consumer behaviour, the occurrence and intensity of foreign language signage in the urban landscape.

Chapter 4

Kosovska Mitrovica as Two Parallel Cities in the Twenty-First Century Danijela Vukoiˇci´c and Miroljub Milinˇci´c

Abstract After the war in 1999, Kosovska Mitrovica located in the north of Kosovo, became a part of the group of politically and ethnically divided cities. The process of division began in June 1999 when Serbs from the parts located south of the Ibar River were forced to flee. In the following years, antagonism between local Albanians and Serbs intensified. Since 2000, the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica and later the whole municipality has been developing rapidly, becoming an administrative, educational and cultural centre for the Serbian community in Kosovo. In accordance with arrangements of the Brussels Agreement (2013), two municipalities and two settlements emerged: North Mitrovica with Serb majority and South Mitrovica with Albanian majority. The Ibar River is a natural boundary of the two cities. This study deals with the causes and the consequences of the splitting of Kosovska Mitrovica, which has been developing into two separate (parallel) cities since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Spatial divisions of post-war development of the Kosovska Mitrovica’s urban space are discussed in their symbolic, ethno-demographic and institutional dimensions. Keywords Parallel cities · Ethnic tensions · Kosovska mitrovica · North mitrovica · South mitrovica · Brussels agreement

Danijela Vukoiˇci´c: According to the Author’s declaration. Eventually, we may give only information about the city – Kosovska Mitrovica D. Vukoiˇci´c Department of Geography, University of Pristina with a Temporary Seat in Kosovska Mitrovica, Kosovska Mitrovica, Serbia e-mail: [email protected] M. Milinˇci´c (B) Faculty of Geography, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_4

57

58

D. Vukoiˇci´c and M. Milinˇci´c

4.1 Introduction The concept of ‘divided cities’ is a useful characterisation of spatial segregation of urban space. The concept implies that cities have clear spatial divisions. Other terms such as polarised cities, dual cities (Mollenkopf and Castells 1991; Marcuse 1989), fragmented cities, partitioned cities (Marcuse and van Kempen 2002), have been used to refer to the existence of segregated cities divided into quarters. Partitioned/divided cities constitute a culmination form of social, economic and political segregation of cities. Social ethnic and racial segregation still remain important features of contemporary cities (Smith 1989). Most of these cities are situated in Europe, Middle East and alongside the former empires’ borders (Anderson 2008). These cities are a product of inter-ethnic conflicts, constant violence or general unrest. Cities may be divided in both the ethno-national sense and in relation to the geopolitical identities manifested by their inhabitants, divisions that may well evolve hand in hand. In classical divided cities the character and origin of the conflict are largely endogenous, being related to social and spatial justice concerns, discrimination, security and political representation (Allegra et al. 2012; Boal 1999). This makes it somewhat predictable (Calame and Charlesworth 2009) or amenable to interpretation in the light of evolutionary conflict development models (Kliot and Mansfield 1999). In geopolitical fault-line cities, on the other hand, conflict centres on issues located at a different scale, specifically on the geopolitical alignment, the foreign policy direction, and on the overall character of government (Gentile 2019). At the end of the twentieth century, ethnic tensions occurred on the territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with the consequent breakup of the state. The conflicts resulted in the withdrawal of the internal borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its consequences were reflected in the urban and regional development, whose example is the city of Sarajevo. The split of Sarajevo has changed the Eastern suburb area due to the creation of Eastern Sarajevo, a new city in the Republika Srpska (Gül and Dee 2015; Aquilué and Roca 2016; Pobric and Robinson 2019). Immediately after that, the same situation occurred on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. On the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, the hostilities between Albanians and Serbs escalated significantly in 1998. Kosovska Mitrovica became a scene of the Kosovo Liberation Army’s terrorist actions, which resulted in a considerable number of victims and the population displacement. In 1999, because of the violent ethnic tensions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) decided to conduct a military intervention, following which, by the United Nations Council 1244 Resolution, the territory of Kosovo and Metohija was pronounced as a mandated territory, namely the territory under the control of the International Forces which operate within their mandate (Milentijevi´c and Stankovi´c 2017). The frictions between different ethnic communities were increasing and therefore, in March 2004, the second biggest exodus of the Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija occurred at the hands of the Albanian extremists. On that occasion, the Serbian communities were attacked and many cultural and historic monuments were

4 Kosovska Mitrovica as Two Parallel Cities …

59

destroyed or damaged. Over 100 Christian Orthodox churches and monasteries were destroyed or severely damaged (Risti´c et al. 2019). Post-independence ethno-political turmoil, violence, and displacement have contributed to the widespread tenure of insecurity and land disputes between Serbs and Albanians. Kosovska Mitrovica currently has all the socio-political features typical for geopolitically divided cities, but also has its own specificity. These are actually two entities, the inhabitants of which live not only in separate administrative units, but also in the financial, political and cultural systems of two countries. In 2008, the Parliament of Kosovo declared unilateral independence. The Republic of Serbia as well as other 95 countries have not recognised Kosovo as an independent country. The status of Kosovo is indefinite (Bhaumik et al. 2006) and Serbia has been trying to protect the remaining Serbs by making numerous agreements with the Albanians. South Mitrovica de facto is a part of the second state with Albanian majority in the Balkans. Bearing in mind these circumstances, the aim of this chapter is to show the inequalities in divided urban space of Kosovska Mitrovica in their spatial, ethno-demographic and institutional dimension.

4.2 Geographical Outline The name of Kosovska Mitrovica was first mentioned in written documents in the Middle Ages and is one of the most ancient settlements in Kosovo and Metohija. Situated near the Kopaonik mountain, rich in lead and silver, from Ancient to Medieval times, Kosovska Mitrovica represented a centre of commercial, political and social life. During the Nemanji´c Dynasty’s reign, the mining activity significantly grew, and the Trepˇca mine was first mentioned. After the Second World War the city’s name changed and it became Titova Mitrovica in accordance with the rule that, in every Republic and Province of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there should be a city bearing the name of the then President Josip Broz Tito. In 1991, the city was given its former name, Kosovska Mitrovica. Kosovska Mitrovica (in Albanian Mitrovica) is an urban settlement that has developed in the far north of Kosovo and Metohija, at the foot of the Zveˇcan volcanic cone, next to the confluence of the Sitnica and Ibar rivers, at an altitude of 500–520 m (Stamenkovi´c 2001). Three rivers flow through the city: the Ibar which splits the city into the northern and the southern part, the Sitnica and the Ljušta. The Ibar gorge starts from the city towards the north and the Ibar flows northwards up to Kraljevo city, where it flows into the Zapadna Morava (Western Morava) river. Kosovska Mitrovica has an important geographical and traffic communication position, as it is situated between Belgrade in the north, Skopje and Thessaloniki in the south, Niš and Sofia in the east, and Podgorica and Bar in the west (Bara´c et al. 2010). It is 37 km away from Pristina, and 390 km away from Belgrade. Also, the railroad was built alongside the Ibar motorway up to Kosovska Mitrovica and further on to Pristina and Skopje.

60

D. Vukoiˇci´c and M. Milinˇci´c

4.3 The City’s Division Following the bombing in 1999, the Serbs were expelled towards the north of Kosovo and Metohija and towards Serbia from all Kosovo and Metohija cities (Sre´ckovi´cJerosimi´c, 2009). The Ibar River was the natural border in the ethnic division of Kosovska Mitrovica before the war. The residents from the northern part managed to resist the cruel ethnic cleansing after the bombing. This bridge linking both sided of Kosovska Mitrovica became a symbol of division and focal point of conflicts between Serbs and Albanians. The provocations were frequent on both sides of the river, and the situation in the city itself was very strained so the KFOR and UNMIK police troupes took over the control of the bridge itself in order to prevent further conflicts. Violence and provocations continued on both sides so the checkpoints were set up in the city as well. Its consequence is the city’s division into two separate entities that function independently from each other. Thus the city and the Municipality of Kosovska Mitrovica were divided into two de facto entities: South Mitrovica with Albanian majority (right side of the Ibar River) and North Mitrovica with Serbian majority (left side of the river) (Fig. 4.1). The river splits the city into two substantially and functionally unequal part— the southern and the northern one (Fig. 4.2). Throughout history, the city developed alongside the Ibar, on its southern alluvial plateau as it was the more favourable terrain for construction. Therefore, the central segment of the city, industrial, residential and

Fig. 4.1 Kosovska Mitrovica—northern and southern part of the city Source Authors’ own elaboration

4 Kosovska Mitrovica as Two Parallel Cities …

61

Fig. 4.2 a Kosovska Mitrovica; b Northern Kosovska Mitrovica; c Southern Kosovska Mitrovica Source Authors’ own elaboration

recreational areas are situated in this part, which made it easier for the southern part to function independently (Fig. 5.2c). The northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica city was created by the extension of the residential area on the northern bank of the Ibar River and alongside the traffic zone which connected the city centre to Zveˇcan and the Trepˇca holding. The area of North Mitrovica Municipality occupies 20% of the total urban space and contains three cadastral areas: North Mitrovica, Gornji Suvi Do (Upper Suvi Do) and Donji Suvi Do (Lower Suvi Do). North Mitrovica represents the administrative, business, university and cultural centre to the Serbian community in Kosovo and Metohija. The newly created circumstances are accompanied by the impossibility of organising daily life in the northern part of the city, whose purpose had always been monofunctional (Brdarevska 2013). This situation has caused spontaneous and unplanned construction, which has transformed the city into an independent urban entity. Because of the need for space, urban planning has been disrupted and the green areas have been suppressed and the consequence is the decline in the quality of living (Mileti´c 2013). In 2013, an agreement regarding the principles that address the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina was signed in Brussels. According to the agreement, Northern Mitrovica is meant to be the centre of the Serbian Municipalities Community in Kosovo and Metohija. It is planned for the Serbian Municipalities Community (SMC) to have the President, the Vice President, the Council and the Parliament that consists of representatives of ten municipalities (Northern Kosovska Mitrovica, Zveˇcan, Zubin Potok, Leposavi´c, Parteš, Ranilug, Novo Brdo, Graˇcanica, Štrpce, and Klokot). According to the agreement, the Serbian community has to take full control over the economy, education, health, urban and rural development (Government of the Republic of Serbia website). To the beginning of 2020, no Serbian Municipalities Community plan has been implemented. So now, on the territory of North Mitrovica Serbs have full power and exclusive competencies in conducting affairs of local importance.

62

D. Vukoiˇci´c and M. Milinˇci´c

4.4 Uncertain Statistics. How Many People Live in Kosovska Mitrovica? Determining the number of population—a general, but chief indicator for spatial planning and urban policies—is something obvious for “ordinary” cities. In Kosovska Mitrovica, however, this is a difficult issue that is part of the ethno-political games not only between local Albanians and Serbs but also between Pristina and Belgrade. According to the 1991 census, Kosovska Mitrovica Municipality covered an area of 335 km2 , which included the city of Kosovska Mitrovica as well as 48 rural settlements. The biggest settlement in Kosovska Mitrovica stretches on the area of 9.77 km2 (Stamenkovi´c 2001). The overall number of inhabitants had been increasing up to 1991. Population development was characterised by an essential growth, due to a high birth rate. Other population features are high percentage of young population, high population density per km2 , heterogeneity of national, educational and economic structure, which is the result of various historical, ethnocultural, political and economic factors. The 2011 census results showed a significant population decrease in the municipality and in the city itself (Fig. 4.3). Because of the systematic expulsion organised by the Kosovo Liberation Army, during the first three months of the KFOR Administration in Kosovska Mitrovica in 1999, of 27 thousand Serbs only 15 thousand remained in the city, in its northern part (Sre´ckovi´c-Jerosimi´c 2009). After the war, Albanians continue to live in the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica, while almost 4000 Serbs and about 6500 Roma fled from areas south of the Ibar ´ 2017). River (Cup In 1991, during the last census before the war (not recognised by Albanians), 64.3 thousand inhabitants were registered in the city of Kosovska Mitrovica. Data about 104,885 87,531

84,235

71,357 50,747 38,716

64,323

32,800

52,866 46,230

42,160 26,721 13,901 1948.

17,195 1953.

1961. Municipality

1971.

1981.

1991.

2011.

Urban se lement

Fig. 4.3 Dynamics of population of municipality and the city of Kosovska Mitrovica in the period 1948–2011 Source Authors’ own elaboration based on Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia website; http://pop-stat.mashke.org/kosovo-census-ks.htm

4 Kosovska Mitrovica as Two Parallel Cities …

63

ethnic structure of the population at the beginning of 1990s are available for the entire municipality, where Albanians represented 78%, while Serbs above 10%. Due to the fact that Albanians boycotted the census, these figures are also not entirely accurate. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the roles were reversed. In new political conditions, the 2011 census in Kosovo was boycotted by the Serbian population. For this reason, accurate data are only known about the southern part of the city. Based on data from the Albanian authorities of Kosovo, the northern and southern parts of the Kosovska Mitrovica municipality have 84.2 thousand inhabitants (Fig. 3). In South Mitrovica municipality, there were 71.9 inhabitants of which 33.9 thousand in the urban settlement. While the number of Albanians is 69.5 thousand. At the same time, only 14 Serbs (Orthodox priests with their families) live in South Mitrovica. More numerous minorities are Ashkali, Roma, Turks and Bosniaks (OSCE website). Ethno-demographic data for the north area are even less clear. In 2011, according to the evaluations of the Kosovo-Albanian authorities in Pristina, North Mitrovica is inhabited by 12.3 thousand people. The category “Serbs and other nationalities” dominates. This common category covers a total of 11.4 inhabitants (93%). The Albanians, in turn, are represented by 867 citizens (7%) in North Mitrovica (Procena Stanovništvo Kosova 2011). Because North Mitrovica is also place of residence for other ethnic groups, the exact number of Serbs or Albanians cannot be defined from these data. According to the rough estimations by the Serbian community, the number of population in North Mitrovica is 15–20 thousand (Kosovska Mitrovica Municipality website).

4.5 Life in Parallel Cities 4.5.1 Symbolic Divisions Kosovska Mitrovica is divided by the feeling of fear from a possible renewed outbreak of violence, which provokes anxiety towards Others and insecurity about being on their side of the river (Legnér et al. 2019). As stated by Maciulewicz (2019), a large part of North Mitrovica society has never had any contact based on mutual coexistence with South Mitrovica inhabitants. This conclusion is made on the base of data of the survey by United Nations Development Programme. Its results show that 67.4% of Serb residents of North Mitrovica did not live in the city before 1999, while 19.8% of Albanians declared themselves to be newcomers. 57.3% of Albanian respondents stated they had lived in Mitrovica before 1999. About 30% of representatives of all ethnic groups declared that they had been displaced from one to another side of the city (Maciulewicz 2019). Before Kosovska Mitrovica’s division, all administrative and cultural facilities were located in the southern part of the city. They fell to the Albanian community, while the Serbs in the north had to build their parallel cultural institutions from scratch. In 2004, the only Orthodox church (St. Sava) in this part of the city was burned

64

D. Vukoiˇci´c and M. Milinˇci´c

and a large part of the Orthodox cemetery was devastated. Since the mid-2000s, religious life is slowly resumed. According to one of Orthodox priests, in liturgies, most the believers come from the northern part, by taxi or on foot. Depending on the holy days, sometimes there are 10 or 20 believers. The priest and his family became accustomed to the conditions in which they live and so far had no problem with Albanians. Their children go to school in the northern part and he itself works in North Mitrovica where he teaches religion in Serbian school (Svešteniˇcka porodica—jedini Srbi u južnom delu K. Mitrovice). As in the case of other divided cities, residents use urban space and representative places to demonstrate their national and religious values (Fig. 4.4). This applies to both the space of power and communication, as well as symbolic and sacred spaces. Legnér et al. (2019) provided some evidences that the ethnic interactions are very limited due to both physical and psychological obstacles. As already pointed, the New Bridge has remained the physical symbol of the deep ethnopsychological division for over 20 years. In 2011, by the initiative of the Serbian authorities of North Mitrovica, barricades were erected to block border-crossing at the bridge. Three years later, they were replaced by a civilian initiative named “Peace park” located on the north side of the bridge. It was demolished in 2015. The New Bridge is passable for pedestrians, but it has not forested the social interactions between inhabitants living on the two sides of the river. The bridge is crossed mainly by a few commuters from North Mitrovica employed in the southern part—both Albanians and very few Serbs who work at the international organisations located there (Legnér et al. 2019). In 1992, the names of more than 10 streets referring to the socialist past and Yugoslavian ideology were changed. They were replaced by names of events and characters from Serbian history and national mythology (Petrovi´c 2016). In South Mitrovica, the symbols of Albanian statehood are present on the streets, shops and all public institutions. This applies to both official flag and other symbols of KosovoAlbanian state and fraternal Albania, which has underlined the supralocal, geopolitical importance of Mitrovica. The most representative monument in the southern part is the one dedicated to Isa Boletini, an Albanian national hero. The largest stadium in Kosovo, located in South Mitrovica, until 1999 bore the name “Trepˇca”. After the war, this public object was renamed in honour of fighter Adem Jashari, one of the founders of the Kosovo Liberation Army. At the same time, in the public space of

Fig. 4.4 a Albanian and b Serbian national symbols in divided Mitrovica. Photos D. Vukoiˇci´c

4 Kosovska Mitrovica as Two Parallel Cities …

65

South Mitrovica symbols of Serbian statehood and political graffiti was widespread. Here there are two monuments with a strong symbolic message: the monument of Serbian victims of the NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999 and a new monument to the Serbian prince Lazarus, who died in the battle of Kosovo in 1389. Following the NATO bombing and the city’s division, the removal of everything that was Serbian from the southern part of Kosovska Mitrovica began. The Serbian language and alphabet, the names of the streets, squares, establishments and facilities were removed. Albanian politics of street names strive to externalize the memory of fighters from the Kosovo Liberation Army. The situation is more specific in the Bosnjak mahala neighbourhood located north of the Ibar River. This is only multiethnic part of both cities inhabited by Serbs and Bosniaks and has bilingual signs in all shopping facilities (Albanian and Serbian) (Fig. 4.5). Pavlovi´c (2016) argues the Albanians’ desire to erase all traces of Serbianism in Southern Mitrovica is not only due to the desire for post-war revenge. More, the Albanians from Mitrovica found themselves on the borderline with the Serbs. The desire to build and affirm the identity of the second Albanian state was present in other cities and towns in Kosovo, but in Mitrovica, this phenomenon is more visible. Until the unilateral self-proclamation (2008), in the southern part of Kosovska Mitrovica there were 17 mosques, and in 2014, on the premises of a former, wardamaged Isa Beg mosque, the new Bajram Pasha mosque was built, which is the biggest mosque in Kosovo and Metohija (Sandzacke Web Portal). As the access to the Saint Sava church was restricted for safety reasons to the Serbs from the northern part of the city, a new temple was built in 2005 on the mount above the northern part

Fig. 4.5 a and b Road signs in the southern part of Mitrovica (all in Latin Alphabet); c Road sign in North Mitrovica (in Serbian/Cyrillic and English); d Bilingual commercial signs (in Albanian and Serbian) in North Mitrovica (Bosnjak mahala district). Photos D. Vukoiˇci´c

66

D. Vukoiˇci´c and M. Milinˇci´c

of Kosovska Mitrovica and dedicated to the Saint-martyr Dimitri, the Patron Saint of Kosovska Mitrovica, celebrated on the 8th of November. The artificiality of the current division is shown by the location of the cemeteries (Pinos 2016). The Orthodox cemetery is located in the southern part of the city, now inhabited only by Albanians, while the Muslim cemetery is in the north, predominantly Serbian part of Mitrovica. Since the 1999 war, Serbs have not been buried in this graveyard. Their security is not guaranteed when they visit the graves of their relatives. Albanians have rarely been buried in the cemetery in northern Mitrovica. While the Muslim cemetery was maintained and preserved, the Orthodox cemetery in South Mitrovica was largely destroyed by Albanian extremists (Fig. 4.6).

4.5.2 Economic and Institutional Divisions Spatial division affects all aspects of daily life. Telecommunications, water and electricity supply, and even football and basket-ball teams that play in different leagues. Ironically, the most important clubs (Trepˇca) share the same name (Pinos 2016). The city’s division into two unequal territorial entities and their development into parallel administrative, economic, educational, healthcare and political centres in Kosovo and Metohija resulted in illegal construction. It is impossible to meet all the growing needs through institutional socio-economic action. Facing the sustainable development challenges, with the help of the Republic of Serbia and the Office for Kosovo and Metohija, more than twenty years after the war, North Mitrovica has a new look. All public buildings have been rebuilt, green public areas and new flats have been constructed for the temporarily displaced and socially deprived people; streets and pedestrian areas have been reconstructed and a new bus station which regulates the city traffic has been built. From the north of the city, one can travel to cities in Serbia and ethnic enclaves in Kosovo (Pinos 2016). Traffic connections between the northern part of Kosovo and Metohija and central Serbia have been functioning well, the same as before 1999. Regular bus lines from Kosovska Mitrovica and Zubin Potok, and the Serbia Railways go through Kraljevo. Because of the lack of space in the northern part of the city, after the war most cultural establishments were located on the premises of the then TechnicalMetallurgical Faculty which was part of the University of Pristina. Today, the “Dragica Žarkovi´c” Cultural Centre with its activities is available to all the Northern Kosovska Mitrovica’s citizens, students in this city as well as to the Serbian population of Kosovo. The “Vuk Karadzi´c” city Library with 114 thousand books was located in the southern part of the city until 1999; with the International Peacekeeping Forces entry, the Serbs are prevented from accessing its premises (“Vuk Karadži´c” City Library website). Today the Library in North Mitrovica is furnished in a modern way with a renewed book fund. The city Museum was also located in the southern part of the city and used to house exhibits from the first half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Today the Museum is located in a renovated residential space and, according to its possibilities, has organised and established

Fig. 4.6 a Orthodox cemetery in South Mitrovica; b Muslim cemetery in North Mitrovica. Photos D. Vukoiˇci´c

4 Kosovska Mitrovica as Two Parallel Cities … 67

68

D. Vukoiˇci´c and M. Milinˇci´c

a permanent exhibition on the contemporary Serbian painting. The art works are donations from renowned artists from Serbia. Problems arising from the division of the city manifest in other areas of life such as property ownership, economy, water and energy supply. As for the water and electricity supply, the consequences of the Kosovska Mitrovica’s division have been mostly felt by the inhabitants of the northern part of the city, because urban water and electricity supply is managed by the Albanians in South Mitrovica. Kosovska Mitrovica is the heart of the most economically developed region of Kosovo. Until the breakup of Yugoslavia, Trepˇca Mining and Metallurgical Combine with the lead-Zinc and silver smelter in Zveˇcan (the northern suburbs of Mitrovica) was regarded as the largest producer of these metals in Europe (Spremo 2011). Following the war and the city division, all state-owned companies were controlled by UNMIK and most of these companies did not operate due to outdated technology in production halls (Vasi´c 2006). Because of the unclear ownership situation, few foreign companies dared to invest in this area. Economy in the southern part of Kosovska Mitrovica deteriorated, and its population survived mostly thanks to the international aid and the Albanians living abroad. The Serbs who live northwards from the Ibar River are in a somewhat better position as they are directly connected to the central Serbia. A higher qualification structure of professional staff and a better entrepreneurial initiative also contributed to a higher economic standard. Nevertheless, prolonged political instability and institutional and legal uncertainty have prevented major investments in manufacturing in this area. The absence of investments caused stagnation in the economy, which was reflected in high unemployment rate. The Trepˇca mining holding remains the most important company in this area. The plans of ownership transformation by the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo is a source of social tensions and they raise concerns among the Serbian population. Main economic activities in North Mitrovica include small shops that are supplied in goods from central Serbia. In 2018, in the economic structure of South Mitrovica municipality, trade had leading positions (27.3%), followed by manufacturing (11.4%), and accommodation and food service activities (9.3%). (Plani Zhvillimor Komunal Mitrovica Jugore 2019–2027). Besides small businesses, there are also ETC and Emona City shopping malls that are supplied with goods from the surrounding countries. Both South and North Mitrovica are university centres with many students from Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and central Serbia. Education in South Mitrovica is provided by public and private educational institutions. Among them are three higher education institutions operating under the Kosovo higher education law subject to regular accreditation by the Kosovo Accreditation Agency. In 2013, the Albanian authorities in Pristina established the Public University of Mitrovica with six faculties. Several study programs at the private FAMA College were accredited by the Kosovo Accreditation Agency. Mitrovica International Business Faculty (IBCM) was founded by the Dutch SPARK Foundation in 2010 with two campuses, one in northern and the other in southern Mitrovica (www.umib.net/en/). The university operating in North Mitrovica, has a longer and more complicated history. Following the 1999 expulsion from Kosovo’s capital, the University of

4 Kosovska Mitrovica as Two Parallel Cities …

69

Pristina with several faculties was temporarily relocated to Kruševac (central Serbia). Some faculties performed their activities in Kosovska Mitrovica, Leposavi´c, Vranje, and some other settlements. At the end of 2001, the headquarters of the university was relocated to the city with the name University of Pristina with temporary seat in Kosovska Mitrovica. In this way Kosovska Mitrovica became an academic centre for Serbian community in Kosovo. Faculties were located in other settlements in northern Kosovo (Zveˇcan, Leposavi´c, and Lešak). The university is a member of the Universities of Serbia Conference (USC) and the teaching curricula which are aligned with the Bologna Educational System (The University of Pristina Kosovska Mitrovica website). This university has over 10 thousand students, while in the newly opened Albanian University the number of students is about 4000. The displaced university actively participates in resolving all matters related to the survival and future of the Serbian population in Kosovo. As the economic growth and development represent one of the most important matters, the university has founded an Entrepreneurship Academy in order to give an opportunity to young people to acquire basic knowledge of small, medium and big business management principles, through direct contact with successful entrepreneurs from central Serbia. Complex interactions around territory and ethnic identity as well as political violence contribute to the long-term displacement process. The return of Serbs to South Mitrovica and Albanians to the north part, already an independent city, is impossible. In 1999, the Serbs lost their right to live, work, heal, and educate in the South and Albanians in North Mitrovica. Most expelled and displaced persons of both nationalities failed to regain their property. More than two decades after the war, alternative views on and concrete plans for the future have not been created.

4.6 Conclusion The analysis of potential conflict drivers as well as critical points, and the risks identification in Kosovo and Metohija and in the Balkans, is becoming an increasingly important topic for experts in all spheres of social life. The process of returning life to normality, i.e. prior to the conflict and the ethnic cleansing, is slow and difficult and has been creating high unemployment, social unrest and discontent with the political situation. Any idea of reaching an agreement that envisages normalisation of relations between the Serbs and the Albanians is met with dissatisfaction in both nations. Therefore, trade and economic consequences have negative effect on both sides. This situation results in migrations of population from both sides of the Ibar River (from South and North Mitrovica). The population of North Mitrovica migrates toward central Serbia, whereas the population of South Mitrovica migrates toward the EU countries. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Mitrovica has “the honour of joining the league of divided cities” following similar patterns of violence, physical segregation and institutionalisation of ethnic conflict and spatial division (Pinos 2016).

70

D. Vukoiˇci´c and M. Milinˇci´c

Comparing to divided cities in ex-Yugoslav republics, Kosovska Mitrovica represents a model of spatial division that took place in extremely complex geopolitical circumstances. First, the city lies in the territory of Kosovo—a republic of the Albanian majority proclaimed in 2008. Second, the Republic of Serbia considers Kosovo and Metohija as its integral autonomous province, which is enshrined in the state constitution. The Serbian government does not recognise the state of Kosovo, still considering it as an issue of domestic policy. In turn, In Kosovo, North Mitrovica functions de facto as a city independent from the central authorities in Pristina, receiving narrow relations as well as political and financial support from Belgrade. Because around half of UN member states recognise Kosovo’s independence, while the rest of them support the position of Serbia. This means that the local cultural and political divisions between the South and North Mitrovica are not only “harder” than in Mostar or Vukovar, but their relations take place in a more complex and not fully clarified international situation. According to Pavlovi´c (2016), the position of the Serbs in Kosovska Mitrovica is described as ambivalent, in discordance among the inhabitants’ wishes to remain a part of the Serbian state and the “reality” dictated by the international community and the Pristina authorities, the latter intending to integrate Kosovska Mitrovica within the self-proclaimed independent Kosovo. The bridges over the Ibar River have not been destroyed, but bridges between the people from the north and the south of Mitrovica have been demolished. For this reason, one popular saying “united city on the Ibar” is now just a history (Spremo 2011). Despite that Kosovska Mitrovica has throughout centuries developed as a single urban system, the time has shown that two parallel cities have been formed on the ethnic fissure basis and that they are currently functioning independently from each other. Because of the constant crisis in this territory, these two cities are considered as sites of potential conflict. As in cases from the Western Balkans, socio-economic, legal, political and cultural factors had a devastating influence on the creation of democratic and civil society. The most important question probably is whether the implementation of concepts of dialogue and collaboration may change this stereotype or the conflicts and divisions will remain a basic feature of sociopolitical development.

References Allegra M, Casaglia A, Rokem J (2012) The political geographies of urban polarization: a critical review of research on divided cities. Geogr Compass 6(9):560–574. https://doi.org/10.1111/j. 1749-8198.2012.00506.x Anderson J (2008) From empires to ethno-national conflicts: a framework for studying ‘divided cities’ in ‘contested states’—part I. In Divided cities/contested states: working paper, 1. www. conflictincities.org/PDFs/WorkingPaper1_5.8.08.pdf. Accessed: 29 Mar 2020 Aquilué I, Roca E (2016) Urban development after the Bosnian War: The division of Sarajevo’s territory and the construction of East Sarajevo. Cities 58:152–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cit ies.2016.05.008

4 Kosovska Mitrovica as Two Parallel Cities …

71

Bara´c M, Staniši´c S, Parli´c M, Bukumiri´c Z, Vitas N, Manojlovi´c P (2010). Lokalni ekološki akcioni plan Severne Kosovske Mitrovice – monografija. Opština Severna Kosovska Mitrovica, Fakultet tehniˇckih nauka, Kosovska Mitrovica i Medecinski fakultet, Kosovska Mitrovica Bhaumik S, Gang I, Yun M-S (2006) Ethnic conflict and economic disparity: serbians and albanians in Kosovo. J Comp Econ 34:754–773 Boal FW (1999) From undivided to undivided cities: assimilation to ethnic cleansing. Hous Stud 14(5):585–600. https://doi.org/10.1080/02673039982623 Brdarevska M (2013) Prilog prouˇcavanju procesa urbanizacije severnog dela Kosova i nastanka - Kosova i Metohije—istorijske tekovine Srbije na grada Kosovske Mitrovice. Kulturno naslede Kosovu i Metohiji i izazovi budu´cnosti, Zbornik 2. Kosovska Mitrovica: Kancelarija za Kosovo i Metohiju, Univerzitet u Prištini Calame J, Charlesworth E (2009) Divided cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia ´ A (2017) Život na manjinski naˇcin u Severnoj Mitrovici. http://gracanicaonline.info/2017/04/ Cup 29/zivot-na-manjinski-nacin-u-severnoj-mitrovici/. Accessed: 18 Apr 2020 Gentile M (2019) Geopolitical fault-line cities in the world of divided cities. Polit Geogr 71:126–138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.03.002 Government of the Republic of Serbia website. www.srbija.gov.rs/specijal/283757. Accessed: 15 Apr 2020 Gül M, Dee J (2015) Sarajevo—a city profile. Cities 43:152–166. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities. 2014.11.018 Kliot N, Mansfield Y (1999) Case studies of conflict and territorial organization in divided cities. Prog Plan 52:167–225. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-9006(99)00010-0 Kosovska Mitrovica Municipality website. www.kosmitrovica.rs/demografija/. Accessed 15 Mar 2020. Accessed: 12 Apr 2020 Legnér M, Ristic M, Bravaglieri S (2019) Contested heritage-making as an instrument of ethnic division: Mitrovica, Kosovo. In: Ristic M, Frank S (eds) Urban heritage in divided cities: contested pasts. Routledge, pp 35–52 Maciulewicz M (2019) Newcomers and locals. invisible boundaries among inhabitants of a divided city in the balkans. Colloquia Humanistica 8:203–220. https://doi.org/10.11649/ch.2019.013 Marcuse P (1989) Dual city: a muddy metaphor for a quartered city. Int J Urban Reg Res 13(4):697– 708. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.1989.tb00142.x Marcuse P, Van Kempen R (2002) Of states and cities: the partitioning of urban space. Oxford University Press, Oxford Mileti´c M (2013) Urbanitet podeljenog grada—Kosovska Mitrovica; tretiranje javnog gradskog - Kosova i Metohije—istorijske tekovine prostora u cilju urbane regeneracije. In Kulturno naslede Srbije na Kosovu i Metohiji i izazovi budu´cnosti, Zbornik 2. Kosovska Mitrovica: Kancelarija za Kosovo i Metohiju, Univerzitet u Prištini Milentijevi´c N, Stankovi´c M (2017) Znaˇcaj kumanovskog sporazuma u rešavanju sukoba na Kosovu i Metohiji. Kultura polisa 34:79–91 Mollenkopf J, Castells M (1991) Dual city: restructuring New York. Russell Sage Foundation, New York OSCE website, Municiapl Profile: Mitrovicë/ Mitrovica Region. www.osce.org/mission-in-kosovo/ 122118?download=true. Accessed: 12 Apr 2020 Pavlovi´c A (2016) Svakodnevni život stanovnika Severne Kosovske Mitrovice. Doktorska disertacija. Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Beograd Plani Zhvillimor Komunal (PZHK) Mitrovica Jugore 2019–2027. Komuna e Mitrovicës Jugore, Plani Zhvillimor Komunal Pinos JC (2016) Mitrovica: a city (re)shaped by division, In: Ciardha ÉÓ, Vojvoda G (eds) Politics of identity in post-conflict states: The Bosnian and Irish experience. Routledge, pp 128–142 Pobric A, Robinson MG (2019) Recent urban development and gentrification in post-Dayton Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cities 89:281–295. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2019. 03.001

72

D. Vukoiˇci´c and M. Milinˇci´c

Procena Stanovništvo Kosova 2011. Februar 2013, Priština Risti´c D, Vukoiˇci´c D, Nikoli´c M, Božovi´c S, Milinˇci´c M (2019) Tourism value assessment model of ‘UNESCO-listed’ monasteries: Kosovo and Metohija. Curr Issues Tourism. https://doi.org/10. 1080/13683500.2019.1622657 Sandzacke Web Portal. www.sandzacke.rs. Accessed: 16 Mar 2020 Smith S (1989) The Politics Of ‘Race’ And Residence: Citizenship, Segregation And White supremacy in Britain. Polity Press, Oxford Spremo D (2011) Kosovska Mitrovica—jedan grad, dva sveta. www.nspm.rs/pdf/kosovo-i-met ohija/kosovska-mitrovica-%E2%80%93-jedan-grad-dva-sveta.pdf. Accessed: 18 Apr 2020 Sre´ckovi´c-Jerosimi´c J (2009) Prinudne migracije sa Kosova i Metohije u centralnu Srbiju. Srpskogeografsko društvo, Beograd Stamenkovi´c S (2001) Geografska enciklopedija—Naselja Srbije, Knjiga II (LJ–Ž). Geografski fakultet, Beograd Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia website. https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G1991/Pdf/G19 914009.pdf. Accessed: 15 Apr 2020 Svešteniˇcka porodica—jedini Srbi u južnom delu K. Mitrovice. www.dnevnik.rs/drustvo/sveste nicka-porodica-jedini-srbi-u-juznom-delu-k-mitrovice-03-02-2019. Accessed: 18 Apr 2020 The University of Pristina Kosovska Mitrovica website. https://pr.ac.rs. Accessed: 14 Apr 2020 Vasi´c M (2006) “Ekonomska (ne)održivost Kosova i Metohije”. In: Eri´c S (ed) Kosovo i Metohija— argumenti za opstanak u Srbiji. Beograd “Vuk Karadži´c” City Library website. https://gbvkkm.rs/. Accessed: 2020.03.16. http://pop-stat. mashke.org/kosovo-census-ks.htm. Accessed: 15 Apr 2020

Danijela Vukoiˇci´c is an associate professor at the Department of Geography at the University of Pristina with a temporary seat in Kosovska Mitrovica. She received her Ph.D. in 2013 from the University of Belgrade. She is engaged in research in the field of tourism, environment and sustainable development and social geography. She is the author of two monographs, and more than 60 other scientific papers. Miroljub Milinˇci´c is a full professor of Environmental Sciences and Applied Geography at the Faculty of Geography, University of Belgrade. He completed Master’s and Ph.D. studies of Geography at the Faculty of Geography at the University of Belgrade. His research fields are Environment protection, human and social ecology and applied geography. Milincic has participated in realisation over 20 national research projects. Furthermore, he has published five scientific monographs and over 200 scientific articles in several national and international journals. Additionally, he is a Planet Earth’s Serbian Committee member and a member of the editorial board of number of scientific and professional publications.

Part II

Military Conflicts and Post-war Divisions in Urban Space. Between Hard and Soft Power

Chapter 5

Divided Space or Divided Society? The Case of Vukovar Marta Zorko

Abstract This chapter focuses on practices of divisions in everyday life in Vukovar, Eastern Croatia. This city was an arena of destroyed armed conflict at the beginning of the 1990s. The main thesis of the author is that divisions are not geographically visible, but they mainly occur in public and ‘private’ spaces. The model of four-level divisions of urban space is developed. It comprises the following groups: formal, political, informal and symbolic divisions. The formal divisions could be seen in a form of separated schooling and the educational process. The second group also concerns formal division connected to the right to use minority language and script in some parts of Croatia. This possibility became the reason for political divisions and served as a forum for political games between political parties at both the local and national level. The informal divisions are deeply rooted in society and show similarities and differences in most plausible ones. In the chapter, the last group is illustrated by examples of divisions in the sphere of housing and commerce. The last group concerns places of symbolic divisions as religious objects and memory sites that underline divisions in public space even more. Keywords Vukovar · Divided city · Divided society · Urban public spaces

5.1 Introduction The division of Vukovar is the central part of the narratives which refer to the city as a symbol of war and as a symbol of multiculturalism. In both cases, division is being rebuilt daily through the media and political speeches, different agendas and policies (Zorko and Novak 2020: 14). This study deals with practices of urban space divisions in everyday life in Vukovar. As a Croatian town on the very border with Serbia (on the Danube River, as bordering river between the two countries), Vukovar suffered the most damage in Croatian Homeland War in the 1990s. The aim of the author is to elaborate and discuss a model of social and spatial divisions in Vukovar. M. Zorko (B) Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_5

75

76

M. Zorko

Here, four groups of divisions are distinguished: (1) formal and administrative; (2) political; (3); informal and mental divisions; (4) symbolic divisions. Formal and administrative divisions will be explained through the case of educaˇ tion, and rely upon state-of-the-art in this fieldset by Corkalo and Biruški Ajdukovi´c and their researches on schooling system in Vukovar and the city as a traumatised community (2007, 2008a, b, 2009). Political divisions in urban space are exemplified by disputes regarding the use of Cyrillic alphabet in public life and attempts to implement The Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minoritiesin the Republic of Croatia (2002), both from the national and local policy perspectives. The explanation of informal and mental divisions will use examples from everyday life. According to the author, visual differences in housing and architecture do not matter as much to serve as identifiers of ethnic and spatial divisions. Therefore, research on everyday life of (non)belonging includes particular practices in the use of private and public spaces and places. Symbolic divisions will be exemplified by public places, which represent memorials and monuments commemorating events and conflicts from the middle and the end of the twentieth century. The author develops previously conducted field research dealing with mental borders in Vukovar as seen by its inhabitants (Zorko and Novak 2020). In this publication it has been proven that Vukovar is a divided city, but without formal and visible spatial borders of division. Division is therefore based on ethnic identity and personal experience. Unlike Mostar, Kosovska Mitrovica, Skopje or other ex-Yugoslav cities, divisions in Vukovar are not geographically embedded. And yet, mental borders are the most complex ones: on the one hand invisible, and on the other the hardest to pass by. Physical borders, no matter the regime, are always to some extent permeable. Mental borders are hard to detect and passing them depends on individual experience (in this case often trauma). The key issues with these borders are the mental structures they create. Depending on which “side” of the border you are on, there is always a binary logic of us/them, and this mindset and community work in a way that legitimates the border (Paasi 2011). Although invisible in geographical sense, mental borders exist in public space, dividing it, territorializing it, and creating it in everyday practice. The theory of place creation (Urry 1995) is often used for tourist destinations. Nevertheless, the mechanism for creation of new maps for spaces with added values or deprived meanings through the processes of place creation and place consumption could be applied in non-tourist sense as well.

5.2 Geographical, Political and Historical Background as Prerequisites for Narratives of Division The city of Vukovar stands as a symbol of devastation during the war in the 1990s and brings up different kinds of discourses and narratives in media and everyday life in Croatia (Vladisavljevi´c 2019; https://balkaninsight.com). Vukovar was an early

5 Divided Space or Divided Society? The Case of Vukovar

77

example of open aggression and siege on Croatian territory during the Homeland War. There are neighbouring villages that are strictly divided as Serb or Croatian, which is not the case in Vukovar. However, those divisions are also seen in urban space of Vukovar since those villages incline towards the city for different reasons and especially influence urban public spaces of leisure and entertainment. The city of Vukovar became a symbol for the entire region and even the whole Croatian nation. Nevertheless, it is impossible to describe only the situation in Vukovar. For this reason, the peaceful reintegration of all occupied parts of Eastern Slavonia during the war is also being considered. The Battle of Vukovar began in the summer of 1991, in full swing of a moratorium imposed by international community on proclaimed dissolution of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia. While negotiating on possibilities and options for potential peaceful dissolution, Yugoslav People’s Army along with Serb rebellions in Croatia already started military aggression against the republics of the federation. In 1990, population census showed that Vukovar already had the potential for division. Its ethnic composition consisted of 47.2% of Croats, 32.3% of Serbs and 18.8% declared other identification, mainly Yugoslavian (Official Website of the city of Vukovar). To a high extent, economic well-being pushed aside to ethnic differences. In the 1990s Croats plead for the idea of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, while Serbs were mainly aspiring for the preservation of the federation (or for the creation of Greater Serbia). During the siege of Vukovar, citizens were cut off supply, civilian targets and city were heavily bombed every day. On November 18th, 1991, after 87 days of siege, the city fell under occupation. The fall of the city is honoured nowadays as a Remembrance Day of the Sacrifice of Vukovar and being celebrated throughout Croatia). After aggressors entered the city, crimes against humanity took place in a form of mass murders and executions. The exact numbers of killed people are still in question. The issue of missing persons remains one of open issues between Croatia and Serbia. According to estimates, 2 800 people were killed and 7 000 people were captured after the siege. There are 292 persons on the list of missing persons only in the city of Vukovar and 402 in Vukovar-Srijem County (Bradri´c 2018). Solely in Ovˇcara (former industrial complex located a few kilometres out of the city) over 250 people from Vukovar hospital were executed and buried in a mass grave. The killed persons were not only Croats but also those taking the Croatian side. The often mentioned problem of co-existence in contemporary Vukovar is the fact that a lot of crimes remained unprosecuted leaving victims and aggressors living together in reconciled neighbourhoods and seeing each other in sharing public places in the city. The city and its surroundings became part of self-proclaimed Serbian Autonomous Territory of Krajina (SAO Krajina) (Fig. 5.1). Later self-proclaimed Republic of Serb Krajina on the territory of Croatia had two territorial parts—Eastern Croatia and the so-called Croatian soft belly, which includes cities as Karlovac, Sisak, Zadar, etc. After the Croatian military actions, Bljesak (Flash) and Oluja (Storm) in 1995 most of the occupied territory was regained by Croatia. The only exception was Podunavlje (Croatian Danube Region) or Eastern Croatia, which is not a historical or administrative region. It covers parts of three historical regions, namely Eastern

78

M. Zorko

Fig. 5.1 Vukovar and occupied territories in 1991. Elaborated by M. Zorko and V. Mihaylov

Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Syrmia and embraces territories located on the west bank of the Danube River. It is a geographical region defined by rivers Drava and Danube and occupation in the 1990s made it a political region since it was a barrier or a frontier of demarcation between Croatia and Yugoslavia (Serbia). During late 1995 and beginning 1996 it was a self-governing entity until provisions from Erdut Agreement (1995) and UN Resolution 1037 (1996) entered into force in a form of UN peacekeeping mission UNTAES1 (Klein 2010). Mandate of UNTAES lasted until 1998 when the occupied territory was peacefully reintegrated into Croatia. Mission tasks were oriented towards “demilitarisation of the area, formation of police forces for transit period, help in demining processes, oversight of return of refugees and returnees, reconciliation, civil management and public services, organisation of local elections, and providing help in coordinating plans for restoration and development” (Jakeševi´c 2012: 195). This mission succeeded two prior UN missions in this area—UNPROFOR2 and UNCRO.3 Jakeševi´c (2012: 186) finds it as one of “the rare examples of successful application of the second generation of UN peacekeeping missions, but also of peacekeeping missions in general”. This occupied territory had its own political and security structures, its currency and institutions. The key challenge was peaceful reintegration and return of refugees. After almost ten years of being out of Croatian system and institutional reach, this region started the process of reintegration and reconciliation. This is a still-ongoing process and,

1 United

Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium. Nations Protection Forces. 3 United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia. 2 United

5 Divided Space or Divided Society? The Case of Vukovar

79

according to results of our field research in 2018, divisions have various dimensions: ethno-national, ethno-religious, religious, geographical, educational, political, economy-determined, sociological/psychological, etc. (Zorko and Novak 2020). Today the ethnic structure of the city is consisted of 57.37% Croats and 34.87% Serbs, while the 7.76% are counted by statistics as “Others” (Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 2011). The city and its surroundings are devastated from the armed conflicts, its consequences and war and war-related actions as well as postwar “economies”. The citizens, no matter ethnic problems and divisions believe that they were betrayed by politics, on national and local levels by poor governing and devastating economic decisions. Moreover, Vukovar and surrounding rural areas suffered from intensive depopulation processes. The majority of emigrants leave the city not because of ethnic reasons, but of lack of economic perspectives. Skoko and Bagi´c (2007) pointed out that even 15 years after the war, Vukovar still remains a symbol of war for most of the Croats. This unifying symbolism, however, is nourishing local divisions and making this city a playground for populist political parties. The key argument in this chapter is that Vukovar, although recognised as a divided city is not divided in a classical way or by classical definition of divided cities, rather traumatised multiethnic space divided by policies and politics. New urban divisions emerging in Vukovar and Eastern Slavonia are those of wealth and status in ongoing depopulation and impoverishment process in Croatia. Zorko and Novak (2020: 14) concluded that “there are two main narratives in Croatian contemporary history that influence and fold geopolitical imaginations of Vukovar as a divided city. The first one refers to the city as a symbol of war, keeping the painful collective memories alive. The second refers to the city as a symbol of multiculturalism but in a divided form and as a city of co-existence rather than a functioning local entity”. Consequences of both narratives have the same effect on local population—binary imaginations in community formation. Constant reminder of suffering and horrors through prism of heroism serves as an everyday reminder of the need of taking sides in victim-blaming process. Also, a constant reminder of being a successful story of reintegration and special case nurture differences and emphasize divisions in need for co-existence of two different entities.

5.3 Four-Level Model of Divisions of Urban Space in Vukovar As indicated in the introduction, divisions in urban space of Vukovar could be divided into four groups. First one refers to formal and administrative divisions. Such divisions could be seen in a form of separated schooling and educational process. Second one was also formal division (in a sense of by law guaranteed right to use minority language and script in some parts of Croatia). Unfortunately, this possibility became the reason for political divisions that went far beyond ideology of citizens or local political parties and served as a forum for political games between political parties on

80

M. Zorko

national level. The third group of divisions is those mentally perceived or informal. Following examples on how public or public ‘private’ spaces is being used will show the roots of divisions in everyday practice in the city of Vukovar. Finally, symbolic divisions are those embedded in monuments and memorial sites. Being geographical locations of remembrance, such sites represent symbolic forms of divisions between inhabitants and their different memory lanes.

5.3.1 Formal and Administrative Divisions: The Case of Education The case of education is an important element of social division because it allows separation on ethical principle from the earliest days (pre-school). Such formal aspect of division, legally insured and socially and politically upheld on the national level, disables contact between new generations. This way kids and youth are learning about other ethnic groups not through their own experience and social interactions, but through family memories. Lack of experience in personal contacts with others and repeating the learned behaviour just deepen the division in the city further. The Croatian Constitution, The Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minoritiesin the Republic of Croatia and The Law on Education in the Language and Script of National Minorities guarantees the right for education in minority languages and script. There are three education models (A, B and C). Model A presumes that complete schooling is done in national minority language and script; Model B presumes bilingual education, while Model C stands for schooling in the Croatian language with extra courses on language and culture of specific national minority (Office for Human Rights and Rights of National Minorities 2018). Models A and C are the most common ones and similarly popular in primary and secondary school, while model B is not a usual choice. Adding to this legislation Erdut Agreement (1995) assured the special form of schooling for pupils in Eastern Croatia (Croatian Danube Region) by dividing them ethically and therefore separating them ˇ (different schools, different timetables, divided classrooms). Corkalo Biruški and Ajdukovi´c (2008a) criticised such a practice since division enables the only possibility of contacts of children in school which is the most natural environment for inter-ethnic communication. Moreover, they argue: “the region of Vukovar suffered tremendous destruction, massive losses, atrocities and traumatisation during the war. The atmosphere of mutual distrust and social division that does not encourage social contacts between members of different ethnic groups still prevails. In such an environment children do not have the opportunity to meet their peers from ‘the other ˇ side’, not even in school” (Corkalo Biruški and Ajdukovi´c 2007: 95). In Vukovar, the divisions take place even before a school contact (divided preschool institutions) unable the possibility of learning about others from the firstˇ hand experience and through social interaction. In traumatised communities (Corkalo

5 Divided Space or Divided Society? The Case of Vukovar

81

Biruški and Ajdukovi´c 2009), this kind of distancing from an early age deepens divisions and delay social reconstruction process. A project of an Intercultural School “Danube” was introduced in 2014. It was funded mainly by the government of Norway. Numerous administrative and political obstacles have not been fully clarified and the project has completely failed. It is not quite clear what has happened with the project since all the presumptions have been met few years ago. The main problems regarding this intercultural program might be found in local politics of “keeping the spirit of division alive by people not wanting the war to end”, as explained by the ex-major of Vukovar Željko Sabo (Patkovi´c et al. 2018). The project was ended without success and a procedure of returning funds to donators has been initiated.

5.3.2 Political Divisions: The Case of Language vs. Script The case of a language is important because it enhances political divisions on both the national and local levels as well as it has been an ongoing question for almost twenty years. It seems that national minorities’ right to use mother tongue (or Cyrillic script) in this divided city stops at doorsteps: between a private and public sphere. The idea of introducing Cyrillic signs in public spaces still entails a high potential for conflicts among the local population. In Croatia, the issues connected with language minorities are regulated by The Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities (2002). Attempts to their implementation led to demonstrations and social tensions in Vukovar. According to the law, in municipalities of local governments where national minorities represent thirty percent of population, official use of the language and script of that minority is obligatory. Due to the results of population census in 2011, the prerogatives for such official use were fulfilled in 27 municipalities in Croatia, including two cities – Vukovar and Vrbovsko. Another 27 municipalities decided to go along with this practice on their own. Those rights are defined in municipality statutes either for the entire administrative unit or for individual settlements. The law has not caused important controversies in case of other national minorities in the country, including Serbian minority rights in other regions. In turn, in Vukovar the issue of bilingual rights became highly troubled. A still ongoing and huge debate in Croatia is whether this place should make an exemption regarding this law. The arguments for not obeying the law perpetuate from geopolitical discourses of heroism—Vukovar as a place of remembrance and piety should be an excluded space in the case of this law. Tensions around bilingual signs are an excellent example of how geopolitical discourses create divisions putting Vukovar on the spot of being special place, different and even excluded from Croatian legislative acts in this case. The chief argument for such a legislation decision in respect to victims that might re-live the war since the Cyrillic signs can be a reminder for occupation and war crimes. Law proposes a set of rights for national minorities to use their language. There is a possibility of issuing bilingual personal documents, all kinds of official forms,

82

M. Zorko

different proceedings, etc. But, the most questionable rights for the majority of residents seem to be the ones that interfere in public space. Bilingual or multilingual names for geographical locations and traffic signs (Article 10), as well as names of official Croatian institutions (Article 8), led to massive demonstrations ended with the physical removal of those signs by protesters and government moratorium on implementation of the law in the Danubian city (Fig. 5.2). Quite opposite to the situation with international school project, where centreright Croatian political party obstructed the project on local political level together with the party representing Serbs, the debate about language rights in Vukovar in the first place was created on the national level between two major Croatian parties. The question about Cyrillic signs in Vukovar became national issue between two major Croatian parties, involving SDSS (Independent Democrat Serb Party) on national

Fig. 5.2 Removed bilingual (written in Latin and Cyrillic version) sign from the police station facade in Vukovar. Photo: M.Zorko

5 Divided Space or Divided Society? The Case of Vukovar

83

level as well. This is an evidence that local issues have also national importance, and, in some cases, even international in terms of bilateral relations with Serbia.

5.3.3 Informal and Mental Divisions: Everyday Life of (Non)belonging Since ethnic divisions in architecture and housing are ambiguous for any kind of conclusions, this part of the chapter will analyse the use of public spaces and potential divisions in everyday life and habits. Housing and architecture in case of Vukovar serve only partly as evidence of division. The local inhabitants know and understand which parts of the city belong to a given ethnic group, but to the slightest detail of a particular house or family name. It is extremely hard to generalize in any way as an outsider, and even local population could not define the range or boundaries of such divisions (Zorko and Novak 2020). The only visible architecture signs are unreconstructed houses that belonged to the Serbs expatriated after the war. But, on the other hand, some municipal property was left intact as well to serve as reminder of wartime. Even water tower, a true symbol of Vukovar resistance, will be renewed leaving the bomb scars intact (Fig. 5.3). Public spaces are dynamic matrix of a place and its beneficiaries. As Alvares and Balboa (2018: (2) argue, “true geographies of perception, are established in places, a perception that permeates the individual’s cultural universe, his or her psychological and historical conditions, and the image construction of place imposed on the self”. People–place interaction is cyclic process that leads to simultaneous creation of meanings. Baerenholdt et al. (2017) explains “making sense of places” as process of putting people’s interactions with the place(s) in the middle of tourism space creation. Rewriting that thesis towards local interactions, one may argue that Vukovar is a case of divided society rather than a divided city. Urry (1995) links the consumption of goods and services with the consumption of place. Although he is writing about

Fig. 5.3 Project “Water Tower Memorial” (Memorijal Vodotoranj 2015)—left, and Water Tower during reconstruction—right. Authored by Radionica arhitekture, Zagreb (F. Frkovi´c, S. Jurinˇci´c, T. Kneževi´c, D. Krušelj, M. Mišan, K. Nikši´c, J. Prokop, G. Rako, A. Ranogajec, J. Saboli´c)

84

M. Zorko

tourist places, in a case of divided urban communities such consumption might serve as evidence of division. Thus, specific places become symbols for (non)belonging as well as places of cohesion for one group and distancing towards others, too. The place is a context of/for consumption: “places are increasingly being restructured as centres for consumption, as providing the context within which goods and services are compared, evaluated, purchased and used” (Urry 1995: 1). In this case, place serves as a framework for content. In Vukovar, different bars, restaurants and places create content for division through products and music. Different places presuppose specific inherent goods and services. For instance, there are bars, clubs, restaurants, and public ‘private’ places that serve only products imported from Serbia, opposite to those serving only the Croatian brands of goods. Best examples to find out local patriotism in general or divisions in particular places are beer commercials on tents followed by product placing in premises (either shop or gastronomic services). Although foreign beer commercials are common in Croatia, places that import Serbian beer present a message of the owner’s identity or belonging rather than a commercial benefit. This kind of “sent messages” of belonging in gastronomic services is visible in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. Basing only on maps and statistical data, it is hard to understand ethno-national divisions and belongings. Nevertheless, local population knows which part of the cities or villages belongs to which nation and ‘side’. While travelling, changes in internal territorial organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be detected by following beer commercials along the road. In Republika Srpska there are commercials for Jelen or Lav beers, while in Croatian parts of the federation for Ožujsko beer. Simultaneously, in Bosniak (Muslim) parts of federation there are no beer commercials at all. Similar to this kind of division, although not formally recognised in any way, in Vukovar Serb places and locals are portended with Jelen beer, while Croatian places are announced by either Ožujsko or Karlovaˇcko beer commercials. This kind of divisions in gastronomic offer is followed by particular performers and types of music playing on sites and clearly distinguishing Croatian from Serbian places. One may even claim over-distinguishing it since in both examples music is often treated as a “radical” expression of belonging through specific genre or specific performers. Getting back to the concept of Urry (1995), it is worth mentioning that geographical, historical and cultural preconditions and forms postulate potential and generate expected content. By generating such content, individual places serve as podiums for specific audiences and group cohesion on ethnic basis. Another example of different perception in using urban public space concerns the Christmas market in the centre of Vukovar. A big tent, decorations, Christmas carols and mulled wine are being appreciated only from Croats since Catholic and Orthodox holidays differ in calendar. Although there are not many events in the city, Serbs usually avoid socializing in the tent and eventually participate in winter sports ice-skating ring next to the tent (Zorko and Novak 2020). This example of public ‘private’ space and exclusion is similar to summer parties at Vukovar River Island on Danube. This island along another 145 kms of state border is being contested on national level between Croatia and Serbia. Not as a part of war legacy, but as a part of bilateral relations between two internationally recognised states, open border

5 Divided Space or Divided Society? The Case of Vukovar

85

issues distort their already fragile relations (Zorko 2011). The fact that dispute partly tackles the shores where the city of Vukovar is situated makes this situation even more intense. There has been evidence of incidents long after the end of the war. In 2002 a delegation consisted of majors from bordering towns both in Croatia and Serbia tried to make a trip towards Danube islands, particularly Šarengrad River Island. After they were shot at by Serbian (at that time still Jugoslavian) border guards, they were imprisoned for a day in military facilities. Since there were children in this delegation, the whole story echoed beyond the region (see Tešija 2002). After that incident, two countries have agreed that during summertime Danube islands will be open to citizens from both countries no matter unsettled border issues. However, the concessionaire and liable party for taking care of the small Vukovar Island and the biggest Vukovar beach is NGO, which provides everyday transport to the island, but for its members only. Although this NGO is provided by excellent caretakers, the question is whether this public place discussed is really being public and whether equal access for all interested visitors is guaranteed, since the NGO consists mainly of war veterans and defenders of Vukovar. Above described case presented a behaviour that may seem radical, but serves as an example that social distancing from others is best shown in public places. ˇ As Ajdukovi´c and Corkalo Biruški (2008b: 337) defined, there are “three roots of ongoing ethnic division … the feelings of being betrayed by significant others at lifeimportant situations; massive suffering and traumatisation; and lack of compassion and acknowledgment of the victimhood. They also influence the inner dynamic of the divided community in which the strong social norm is not to cross the ethnic lines”. This non-crossing lines in public principle is maybe the best example of artificial separation and segregation imposed on each other by two ethnic groups since the lines, in this case, refer to personal interpretation of social interactions and imaginative lines in space(s) that differ from person to person.

5.3.4 Symbolic Divisions: Exclaves of Memories Geographical locations of different memorials evoke the remembrance from the latest war making them the exclaves of memories separated from the everyday life practice, as well as tourist attractions or occasional places for commemoration. At the same time, the monuments and memorials are inseparable parts of urban space, but they are isolated places or, as we can name them, exclaves of memories. Symbolic divisions of urban space refers to historic and cultural objects and sites, which “belong” either to Croats or Serbs. Traditionally, symbolic divisions concern foremost Catholic and Orthodox churches and monasteries. Other elements of divisions visible in the physical space are monuments and places of memory located in the city or its surroundings. Such institutions or objects may contain elements of all three previously discussed divisions. They could be formal and administrative in case of ceremonies, weddings for example; political in case of messages being sent from particular and specific locations and imaginative in case of being places of

86

M. Zorko

memories on previous events of division. But due to the fact that this category intercrosses the previous ones, it is separated because it has a specific characteristic—the geographical location of memory. The Memorial Centre of Homeland War Vukovar is among the newest sites of historical memory. This is a public institution of national importance, which takes care of three locations related to the war in the 1990s: museum in former army barracks; The Memorial Home of Croatian War Veterans in Borovo naselje (next to the site of the former local community building where the command headquarters were located during the war and along Trpinjska street that became famous because of tank vehicles destruction); and The Memorial Home Ovˇcara. At the same time, places of memory belonging to the Serbian community refer mainly to memories of the Second World War. The Memorial Park “Dudik” (Mulberry Trees) is commemoration site for Partisans killed during and after the Second World War. Under those trees were shot 455 victims (mainly civilian) from Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Website of the General Consulate of Republic Serbia in Vukovar). After the end of the Second World War, those victims were exhumed and buried in a common tomb. A monument to victims of Dudik murders and killed fighters from 5th Vojvodina Strike Brigade and Red Army near Vukovar city centre was erected. The Memorial Park was also built in Mitnica/Dudik. During the war in the 1990s that park was devastated. Among numerous sites of memory in the city belonging to Croats is the Memorial Cemetery of The Victims of the Homeland War (Fig. 5.4). The cemetery was built in 1998 when a grave near old city cemetery was exhumed and bodies were buried in the new part of the cemetery now being memorial. An interesting fact is that in an older part of cemetery there are Latin and Cyrillic signs laying one next to the other. The four-meter-high monument in the central part of the cemetery divides public and memorial cemetery showing the background of pre-war unifications and post-war divisions in the most morbid way.

Fig. 5.4 The memorial cemetery of the victims of the homeland war in Vukovar. Photo M. Zorko

5 Divided Space or Divided Society? The Case of Vukovar

87

5.3.5 Conclusion Presented research on Vukovar has shown a few basic kinds of ethnosocial divisions and their spatial dimension. As the previous section showed, there are old and new places in the city which divide the historical memory of Croats and Serbs. In the meanwhile, there is a lack of common memorials in the public space and sites of historical reconciliation. It was also evidenced by the unsuccessful attempts to introduce bilingual plaques in public buildings in Vukovar. The ambitious project for an intercultural school has also failed. The author tries to answer the question whether in the case of Vukovar we are dealing with a divided urban space or a divided society (primarily on ethnic grounds) and whether its perception as a divided city is not really overrated. The field research and observations carried allow us to draw the following conclusions. The majority of local citizens argue that Vukovar is a divided city. But, they are not firm when answering about the lines of division. Finally, talking further with people brings up knowledge about their unique experiences, traumas and hopes. In spite of ethnic origin and identity, each person shares a unique story of everyday life, experience of co-existence, destiny, worries and remembrances. The intention of this chapter was to show dilemmas of everyday life in spatial and social divisions in this post-conflict local community. The examples of administrative, political, mental and symbolic divisions given in the chapter show that sharing public or public ‘private’ spaces in divided cities and divided societies is never easy. On the other hand, starting from the point of (co)existence, not co-existence, all actions might be interpreted as a path to reconciliation. In studies on identity (Cerutti 2006), the main factor for identification to common/similar identity for a group of people is the question of driving force of insecurity. The factor of insecurity in Vukovar was and still is based on ethnic principles. Nevertheless, and unfortunately, raising economic insecurity, job market and depopulation may serve as a positive integration factor in this post-war space.

References Alvares LC, Balboa JL (2018) A multidimensional frame for analyzing urban public spaces policies and politics. In: Alvares LC, Balboa JL (eds), Urban public spaces (pp 1–24). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74253-3_1 Baerenholdt JO, Haldrup M, Larsen J, Urry J (2017) Performing tourist places. Routledge, London and New York. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315247106 Bradri´c B (2018) Samo u Vukovaru na popisu nestalih nalaze se 292 osobe. https://lokalni.vec ernji.hr/zupanije/samo-u-vukovaru-na-popisu-nestalih-nalaze-se-292-osobe-10673. Accessed: 27 May 2020 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings (2011) Croatian Bureau of Statistics. www.dzs. hr/Eng/censuses/census2011/censuslogo.htm. Accessed: 27 May 2020 Cerutti F (2006) Identitet i politika. Politiˇcka kultura, Zagreb

88

M. Zorko

ˇ Corkalo Biruški D, Ajdukovi´c D (2007) Separate schools–a divided community: the role of the school in post-war social reconstruction. Review of Psychology 14(2):93–108 ˇ Corkalo Biruški D, Ajdukovi´c D (2008a) Stavovi uˇcenika, roditelja i nastavnika prema školovanju: što se promijenilo tijekom šest godina u Vukovaru? Migracijske i Etniˇcke Teme 24(3):189–216 ˇ Corkalo Biruški D, Ajdukovi´c D (2008b) Caught between the ethnic sides: children growing up in a divided post-war community. Int J Behav Dev 32(4):337–347. https://doi.org/10.1177/016502 5408090975 ˇ Corkalo Biruški D, Ajdukovi´c D (2009) Od dekonstrukcije do rekonstrukcije traumatizirane zajednice: primjer Vukovara. Revija Za Socijalnu Politiku 16(1):1–24. https://doi.org/10.3935/rsp.v16 i1.774 Jakeševi´c R (2012) Mirovne misije Ujedinjenih nacija i rješavanje etniˇckih sukoba: studija sluˇcaja Istoˇcne Slavonije. Politiˇcka Misao 49(2):186–203 Klein JP (2010) UNTAES – sažeto izvješ´ce misije // Mirna reintegracija Hrvatskoga Podunavlja – znanstveni, empirijski i iskustveni uvidi. Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, Vukovar Office for Human Rights and Rights of National Minorities, Government of the Republic of Croatia. Izvješ´ce o provodenju Ustavnog zakona o pravima nacionalnih manjina i o utrošku sredstava osiguranih u Državnom proraˇcunu Republike Hrvatske za 2018. godinu za potrebe nacionalnih manjina (2019). https://pravamanjina.gov.hr. Accessed: 27 May 2020 Official website of the City of Vukovar. https://vukovar.hr/255-nekategorizirano/2814-stanovnis tvo-grada-vukovara. Accessed: 27 May 2020 Official website of the Memorial Centre of the Homeland War Vukovar. www.mcdrvu.hr. Accessed: 16 June 2020 Paasi A (2011) A Border Theory: An unattainable dream or a realistic aim for border scholars? In: Wastl-Walter D (ed) The ashgate research companion to border studies. Ashgate, London, pp 11–31 Patkovi´c, N., Lilek, M., & Bari´c. V. (2018). Škola koja je trebala biti primjer integracije i dijaloga nema ni jednog uˇcenika, Jutarnji list, 22(10). https://euractiv.jutarnji.hr/PiD/obrazovanje/skolakoja-je-trebala-biti-primjer-integracije-i-dijaloga-nema-ni-jednog-ucenika/7965822/. Accessed: 16 June 2020 Skoko B, Bagi´c D (2007) Image Vukovara u hrvatskoj javnosti—15 godina nakon stradanja. In: Živi´c D, Žebec I (eds) Vukovar – hrvatska baština i perspektive razvoja. Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, Vukovar, pp 167–180 Tešija V (2002) Oružani napad na Dunavu. Glas Slovonije Newspaper 29(06) The Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia (2002). www.vsrh.hr/CustomPages/Static/HRV/Files/Legislation__Constitutional-Law-on-theRights-NM.pdf. Accessed: 27 May 2020 Urry J (1995) Consuming places. Routledge, London & New York Vladisavljevi´c A (2019) Vukovar suffering from media’s ‘war and division’ narrative. https://balkaninsight.com/2019/01/15/vukovar-suffering-from-media-s-war-and-divisionnarrative-01-15-2019/. Accessed: 16 June 2020 Website of the General Consulate of Republic Serbia in Vukovar. www.gk-srbije-vukovar.hr/mem spomenici.html. Accessed: 16 June 2020 Zorko M (2011) Boundaries of Countries of former Yugoslavia: case studies on open border issues, PhD. thesis, Zagreb: Faculty of Political Science Zorko M, Novak N (2020) Deconstructing the discourse of divisions: mental boundaries in the divided city of Vukovar. Belgeo Revue Belge De Geographie 2. https://doi.org/10.4000/belgeo. 38904

Marta Zorko is an associate professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Croatia. She holds PhD in the area of International Relations and National Security with thesis on

5 Divided Space or Divided Society? The Case of Vukovar

89

open border issues of Republic of Croatia. She teaches Political Geography, Geopolitics, Migrations, Geopolitics and Security. She served as Vice Dean for Academic and Student Affairs (2014– 2017) and as Deputy Graduate Chair for MA in Security Studies (2010–2014). An executive editor of specialised yearbook Forum for Security Studies and a Board Member of Research Committee 15 (Political and Cultural Geography 2018–2020) of the International Political Science Association.

Chapter 6

Ethnoterritorial Divisions and Urban Geopolitics in Post-Yugoslav Mostar Valentin Mihaylov

Abstract The ethnic and religious composition of Mostar, the capital of Herzegovina, changed significantly after the collapse of Yugoslavia. The urban space was re-fragmented and divided spatially and politically between the Croats and Bosniaks while the Serbian community, relatively large before the war, reduced its share in total population by 15.0%. The chapter’s structure follows formulated basic features of the Mostar urban geopolitics model, i.e., demographic and political asymmetry, multi-stakeholder geopolitics, permanent temporality, and territorial ethnocracy. The discussion is centred around the following issues: the causes and effects of the conflicting interests of the political parties of the two dominant ethnic communities formed after the civil war in the first half of the 1990s; the importance of their policy for formal and informal spatial divisions of the urban space; the internationalisation of the Mostar’s sociopolitical life. Taking into account the complex ethnopolitical and international context around Mostar and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, the author discusses various scenarios for the evolution of the urban space’s organisation and stresses that both geopolitics of confrontation and geopolitics of dialogue are possible. Keywords Mostar · Urban geopolitics · Post-Yugoslav transformation · Ethnic conflict · Territorial divisions

This chapter contains the results of the author’s research conducted in the project ‘Externalisation of ethnic identity in the landscape of selected cities in the Western Balkans’, supported by Polish National Research Centre (Miniatura-2, nr 2018/02/X/HS6/01,272, 2018–2019). V. Mihaylov (B) Institute of Social and Economic Geography and Spatial Organisation, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Silesia in Katowice, Sosnowiec, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_6

91

92

V. Mihaylov

6.1 Introduction In the general public awareness, geopolitics is perceived as a domain of science and practice, which prioritizes discourses as large spaces, spheres of influence and greatpower competition. Thanks to appearance and development of internal geopolitics (Lacoste 1986; Bailoni 2014; Mihaylov and Sala 2018), urban geopolitics (Hulbert 1994; Douzet 2001; Yacobi 2009; Rokem and Boano 2017),local geopolitics (Subra 2012) and microgeopolitics (Potulski 2014; Zorko and Nowak 2017) research in this field goes beyond traditional levels of territorial analysis. Urban geopolitics is a stream, which was emerged on the basis of interlinks between urban studies, political geography and spatial planning. This trend is more explicitly addressed in the relevant English- and French-language literature. Its current development includes various research accents. The most frequently addressed are the problems of organisation and management of multiethnic cities, especially divided and/or militarised ones (Calame and Charlesworth 2009; Fregonese 2012a, b); rebuilding cities after urbicide (Coward 2004, 2009); terrorism in the city (Graham 2004); geopolitics of everyday life (Fregonese 2015; Carabelli 2018; Laketa 2019); segregation and mobility in divided cities (Rokem and Vaughan 2018), etc. Particular direction in urban geopolitics concerns the growing importance and influence of large agglomerations on a global scale (Hulbert 2009). The destiny of numerous wonded cities from the former Yugoslavia is an essential part of international research on urban geopolitics. In the case of Mostar, the capital of Hercegovina, changes in ethnic and religious composition of population and ethnopolitical relations are reflected in the new spatial, social and political divisions. They are a token of overt and hidden problems emerging in the post-Yugoslav development of a disintegrated Mostar. Academic discourse in which its urban space is compared with highly contested cities as Jerusalem, Belfast, Beirut, Nicosia, or Sarajevo was shaped. The image of mentioned cities becomes synonymous with ethnic and religious clashes, wars, segregation, spatial disintegration, and divisions. All these issues require international attention and diplomatic efforts (Carabelli et al. 2019: 117–118). Being treated as divided (Calame and Charlesworth 2009) and post-conflict city (Laketa 2016, 2018), Mostar is associated with failed institutions and divisions (Zdeb 2017), and an environment where different practices of peacebuilding , state-building, and reconciliation is tested (Carabelli et al. 2019: 118). It is a typical case of spatial and social friction. Björkdahl and Gusic (2016: 85) identified three cites of friction: friction between democracy and ethnocracy, civic identity and ethnonationalist identity; the peacescape and the ethnoscape. Despite that the policy of various domestic and foreign entities towards Mostar’s urban space is rarely approached under the concept ‘urban geopolitics’, similar optics are not completely distant for researchers of contested cities. A number of studies have emerged, highlighting problems such aspeace-building and urban reconstruction (Bing 2001; Calame and Charlesworth 2009; Björkdahl 2012; Carabelli 2018), competition of different visions of reorganisation of the city (Makaš 2006), urban geopolitics towards youth citizens (Laketa 2015), etc.

6 Ethnoterritorial Divisions and Urban Geopolitics …

93

The fundamental aim of the chapter is to define the main features of a geopolitical model of a city divided among ethnoterritorial communities that have consolidated in the post-war era. Focusing on Mostar, this case study seeks an answer to the question of how ethnoterritorial divisions and varying geopolitical approaches of dominating ethnic groups determine the functioning of a post-socialist city and shape the geopolitical visions of its future. By providing empirical evidence for a long-running division, the author considers the identified features of this model: demographic and political asymmetry, internationalisation of urban geopolitics and its multi-stakeholder character, permanent temporality as well as Mostar’s territorial ethnocracy. Likewise, the author seeks to outline the possible scenarios of geopolitical future of the city, without understatements and without attempts to embellish reality.

6.2 Demographic and Political Asymmetry For most of its history, Mostar has been part of multhiethnic states. Not just the Ottoman Empire, but Austria-Hungary and Yugoslavia as well have left their peculiar influence on the urban landscape and mentality of citizens. During the Second World War, the city was a part of Independent State of Croatia, allied with Nazi Germany. This short-lived entity, despite multiethnic structure of its population, pursued an extremely nationalist policy. Until the beginning of 1990s, Mostar was seen as an exemplary multicultural city, with Croatian, Bosniak (Muslim) and Serbian ethnic groups residing in common neighbourhoods. The degree of ethnic tolerance and mutual acceptance continuing over the past several decades of the Second Yugoslavia (Mihaylov 2011) is reflected in the fact that in 1991, over 15.0% of the city’s population declared Yugoslav nationality, nearly 3% higher than in the capital of Sarajevo. At the beginning of the civil war, the Yugoslav People’s Army, backed by the joint forces of Croats and Bosnian Muslims, made several failed attempts to cease control over Mostar. Many Serbs were forced to flee the city. The Orthodox Cathedral was destroyed, many mosques and the Franciscan monastery were also severely damaged. It soon turned out that Mostar was still too small for a peaceful coexistence. Fights broke out between the Croatian Defence Council and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The leaders of Croats in Mostar and in Herzegovina openly claimed that the city should belong to their ethnic community. An unrecognised separatist Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was proclaimed during the fights, defined as the political and cultural capital of the Croatian people in this ex-Yugoslav republic. During the second phase of the civil war, the eastern part of Mostar, inhabited mainly by Muslims, was besieged for 10 months (Fig. 6.1). This has resulted in isolation and ghettoisation of this neighbourhood. In the western part of the city, which was larger and included more of modern residential buildings, the Croatian forces forced around 15 thousand of their fellow citizens with a different religious and ethnic background and identity to abandon their homes. A ‘borderline’ between the conflicted parties was demarcated along with the Bulevar Street, Aleksa Šanti´c

94

V. Mihaylov

Fig. 6.1 Marshal Tito Street on the Muslims’ side of the city—graves of died Muslim Mostarians during the war on the background of the still unreconstructed building. Photo V. Mihaylov

Street, and the Neretva River. From the point of view of urban planning or in the eyes of foreign tourists, the Bulevar is a regular city street which does not have extraordinary architectural qualities, but it still remains an important mental barrier for most residents of the city despite many years after the war. How has the overall ethnic and political situation changed in the post-Yugoslav Mostar and throughout the country? Bosnia and Herzegovina is a multinational state composed of three constitutional nations—Bosniaks, Croas and Serbs. According to the post-war constitutional order, the three major nations are to have equal political and cultural rights throughout the federation and at the local level. But, as Savi´cBojani´c stresses, the centrifugal forces of ethnic policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina leave its mark on everyday life, decision-making and participation. The dominant ethnic groups are saturated with stories of their own people’s discrimination in areas where they represent themselves as a territorial minority. They use all the privileges of the leading position in their majority areas and create a situation in which one group is the ruler of all others (Savi´c-Bojani´c 2015: 478). Croats are more numerous and have better economic standing in Mostar and in Herzegovina, whereas Muslims are more prominent in the administrative structures of the federation. The political and demographic asymmetry can be attributed to the model of three constitutional nations in two federalist units. In the post-war division of the state into two federal units (Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and

6 Ethnoterritorial Divisions and Urban Geopolitics …

95

Herzegovina), Croats were deprived of their own entity and were forced to coexist - c (2009), the state division into with a more numerous Muslims. According to Andeli´ two federal units increasingly indicates that the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided between Serbs and Muslims. Bosniaks prevail in the capital city of Sarajevo, while Serbs are dominant in ‘their’ entity and its capital, Banja Luka. Although Sarajevo is the capital of the entire multinational federation, Serbs and Croats often perceive it as a city governed by Bosniaks (Palmberger 2012: 15). Like many other cities, villages, municipalities and regions across Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mostar underwent the period of national homogenisation as a result of ethnic cleansing or forced migration in the face of extreme nationalism and violence. Unlike Sarajevo and Banja Luka, no ethnic group succeeded in achieving full supremacy in Mostar (Fig. 6.2). However, the war fundamentally altered the ethnic structure of the city. While the Croats increased

Fig. 6.2 Changes in the ethnic structure of the three largest cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1991–2013, in %. Legend: 1—Muslims/from 1993—Bosniaks; 2—croats; 3—Serbs; 4—Yugoslavs; 5—Others; 6—Capital; 7—City; 8—State boundary; 9—Boundary between federal entities. Source elaborated by the author on the basis of data from www.statistika.ba

96

V. Mihaylov

their share in the population (from 28 to 49%), the percentage of Serbs declined by around 15%. In addition, the demise of pre-war multicultural Mostar became evident in the fact that the residents who declared themselves as Yugoslavs have completely disappeared from the population statistics. Spatial asymmetry between the demographic weight and participation in public institutions is also confirmed by other data. Of 808 employees of the Tax Administration Office of the Republika Srpska in Banja Luka, only six are Bosniaks, six are Croats, and four are members of national minorities. In the Government of the Canton of Sarajevo, 96% of all employees are Bosniaks. A similar situation is also in Mostar where only a few Bosniaks and, especially Serbs, work in the public sector (Savi´c-Bojani´c 2015: 461). Almost thirty years after the outbreak of war, as a result of apparent territorialisation, Mostar became a completely different city in ethno-demographic and ethnopsychological terms. As a consequence of intensive migration inflows and outflows, the urban community was ideologically transformed from socialist, altruist multiculturalism to ethnic nationalism prevailing in the two ‘ethnically clean’ city sections. This is reflected in the social and demographic fragmentation of the population coupled with political and demographic asymmetry throughout the city. 1. Individuals who resided in Mostar in the days of the former Yugoslavia and during the war. This population includes both criminals and victims of persecution and tortures, who often times meet each other face to face at public institutions, in the streets and in shopping centres. 2. Refugees from other war-stricken areas of Bosnia and Hezcegovina and Croatia in the period 1992–1995. A number of refugees, both Muslims from other parts of the republic, and Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Croatia controlled by Serbs have fled to Mostar. 3. A new generation of Mostarians who do not remember the realities of former Yugoslavia or the civil war but were brought up in a climate of a clear division of the city into ‘us’ and ‘the others’. What was unimaginable for generations brought up in the second Yugoslavia and is unimaginable in other ‘ordinary’ cities became commonplace for the residents of Mostar.

6.3 Internationalised and Multi-Stakeholder Geopolitics Contested and divided cities are characterised by specific hybridisations between state and non-state sovereignty called by Fregonese (2012a: 294) hybrid sovereignties. This concept was of high relevance during the civil war when the presence of two parallel structures—which de facto and de iure controlled one or the other part of the city—had a decisive impact on the actual division of urban space. The Croatian separatism clashed with integralism and political loyalty towards Sarajevo which were preferred by the Muslim residents. In the post-conflict era, the governance of the city was to a large extent shaped by the EU Special Representative for Mostar, although his policy of rebalancing the interests of two conflicted communities faced

6 Ethnoterritorial Divisions and Urban Geopolitics …

97

Fig. 6.3 Main actors in Mostar’s urban geopolitics after the civil war. Source Author’s own elaboration

deep disapproval of the Croats. Nowadays, the High Representative of the International Community enjoys the highest authority among foreign actors of the urban geopolitics. As it was presented in the author’s concept of urban geopolitics in the Introduction, most divided cities are characterised with a high degree of internalisation. Figure 6.3 displays the actors that play a key role in the governance and development of a multiethnic city in a federal state. In the city of Mostar which is spatially divided and goes through a post-conflict period, geopolitics is multifaceted and attracts specific interests and policies of a number of states and international institutions. The headquarters of five ministries of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is located in Mostar. This fact not only indicates the importance of Mostar for the Bosnian-Herzegovian state but further increases the geopolitical rank of the city. The internationalisation of relations between local ethnic communities, which is a quintessential characteristic of many divided cities, is an inseparable feature of the Mostar’s model of urban geopolitics. Both the Washington Agreement of March 18, 1994, as well as Dayton Peace Accords signed at the end of 1995, were became possible thanks to the decisive role of the United States. Except that, the Washington Agreement was signed by the then prime ministers of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the leader of the Herzegovinian Croats. In the mid-1990s, the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosnia sought to set up its own territorial entity independent from Sarajevo. However, under the pressure of international factors, this separatist entity was dissolved.

98

V. Mihaylov

The process of involvement of non-domestic actors in Mostar’s local affairs continued immediately after the war. Due to the policies of EUAM and the Office of High Representative Mostar became a cite of European civilising mission through top-down processes of reunification and urban planning (Laketa 2019). In the mid90s, the United States played a decisive role in the truce achieved between Muslims and Croats in Mostar. In turn, the European Union undertook the difficult task of postwar reintegration and reconstruction of the city and also deployed police forces in Mostar. The European Union administration of Mostar (EUAM) was established and began its activities on 23 July 1994. Its efforts for dialogue between feuding groups took place in difficult political conditions and even hostility of most radical groups. Just in 1995, the European Union spent 100 million US dollars for the purposes of rebuilding the city. More than 60 medium-sized and 450 smaller companies received financial support (Väyrynen 1997: 171). As was the case with the Br´cko district (Dahlman and Toal 2006) and the two federal units of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the High Representative of the International Community is purported to play an essential role in the balancing between individual interests of the nations of Mostar, supervising the preservation of peace and implementation of the Dayton Accords. Some decisions imposed on Mostar by the High Representative have caused considerable controversy, as in the case of persisting voting crisis discussed in the next section. Mostar is a city that the Muslims, and especially Turks—who portray themselves as the rightful heir of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans—perceive as a focal point that is home to the most precious monuments of the Islamic culture in Europe, and is in the spotlight of Muslim states and organisations. Mostar is home to two key cultural institutions—the Turkish Junus Emre Institute and the King Fahd Islamic Cultural Centre at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fig. 6.4), both funded by two powerful Islamic states. These institutions are located in east Mostar. The Croats and the Serbs, which are less numerous after the war, count on the support of their ‘home’ communities. The University in Mostar in the western part of the city is financially and academically supported by Croatia. Hundreds of students from Croatia begin their studies at this university each year. Reconstruction of an orthodox church which was destroyed during the war and is now being rebuilt with the financial contribution of the Republic of Serbia is another example of “support for own people”. Several dozen political parties, organisations of veterans and former prisoners of concentration camps—all ethnically divided—are involved in the urban geopolitics at the local level. Two political parties—the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ1 ) and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA2 ) play a predominant role in the political life of the city and strive to maintain the model of ethnic and territorial division which lasts for over a quarter of a century. All ethnic groups of Mostar have their specific interests. The strength of their impact on the development of local political

1 Hrvatska 2 Stranka

demokratska zajednica. demokratske akcije.

6 Ethnoterritorial Divisions and Urban Geopolitics …

99

Fig. 6.4 Symbols of cultural influence of Islamic states in the Mostar’s urban space: The Turkich Junus Emre Institute (above); The Saudi King Fahd Islamic Cultural Centre (below). Photos V. Mihaylov

100

V. Mihaylov

and symbolic landscape largely depends on the positions achieved and the losses suffered during the civil war. The geopolitics of Croats strives to maintain the positions achieved during the war in the urban space and attempts to advance the development of western Mostar according to their own vision. There is no scarcity of nationalists, supporters of the rebirth of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia with capital in Mostar. The topic of Herzeg-Bosnia is covered in the Croatian media operating at the local and regional level. Some believe that Croats are not entitled to enjoy political equality since the dissolution of their self-proclaimed entity. Until there is a real danger that Croats might become second class citizens in their ‘own’ homeland by having their representation in state institutions reduced, they will have no other choice but to revive the idea of Herzeg-Bosnia (Gudelj 2018). Since the beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the strategic goal of Bosniaks geopolitics was to keep Mostar within the borders of sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another objective of this community was to promote multicultural characteristics of the city and to prevent the outbreak of another war. After the war, the main clash was between Croatian separatism on the one hand and the integralism of Bosniaks on the other hand. Some observers of the local political scene, however, argue that the configuration of interests of both communities has changed, especially in terms of the conditions of elections. Unlike in the previous decades, the representatives of Croats strive to re-establish a single voting unit in Mostar. Muslims feel that their position is threatened by their minority status and the preponderance of Croats and would welcome re-establishment of the post-war division of the city into independent municipalities (Seferovi´c). The geopolitics of Serbs, or the “geopolitics of an urban minority”, boils down to escaping marginalisation and ensuring equal treatment in the city governance and on the labour market. A pessimistic view is that, in numerical terms, the postwar population of Serbs only slightly exceeds a statistical error and is slightly less than a national minority (Raˇci´c 2017). Serbs often complain of unequal treatment in public life in a state where they form a constitutional nation. They are faced with the arguments of Croats or Bosnian Muslims, who claim that they have a comparably weak and unequal position in the political and public life of Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2011, the seat of the Eparchy of Zahumlje, Herzegovina and the Littoral of the Serbian Orthodox Church was once again relocated from Trebinje to Mostar. Considering this event and the reconstruction of the Orthodox Cathedral in the eastern part of Mostar, one may expect revival of the Orthodox Church traditions in the city, although its significance remains largely symbolic.

6 Ethnoterritorial Divisions and Urban Geopolitics …

101

6.4 Permanent Urban Transition and Permanent Temporality The development and current status of urban geopolitics in Mostar are embodiments of the model of permanent urban transition (van Boxtel and Koreman 2019). Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, Mostar is in the time of permanent temporality (Seferovi´c). Permanent urban transition and permanent temporality covers the period of long transition from centrally controlled economy to the free market economy, and the twofold transition from war to peace, from peace to power-sharing, and from socialism to neoliberal democracy (Carabelli et al. 2019: 118). The elections held in Mostar in June 1996 resulted in a victory for the ethnic parties deepening the division of the city (Väyrynen 1997: 172). During the period of 1996 to 2004, the city was divided into six administrative districts, three of which were located on the Croatian side of the city, and the remaining three were situated on the Muslim side. Some argued that the informal relationships between local Croatian and Bosnian leaders were consolidated, which translated directly into non-transparent allocation of international economic and humanitarian aid during the post-war reconstruction of the city, nepotism, and lawlessness of the city authorities (Seferovi´c). The first decade of the twenty-first century brought the economic and social life back to normal, but was also marked by the first indications of the election crisis continuing to this day. In 2004, Paddy Ashdown, the then High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, imposed a new City Statute of Mostar with the intention to more effectively unite and integrate the city. City municipalities were abolished and replaced by six voting districts. According to the new rules, each district elects three representatives to the City Council, and the remaining councillors are elected from a joint list. This was to the disadvantage of Croats because some election districts were inhabited by several times more voters than the smallest ones. Bosniaks keep the same number of municipal councilors. Residents of the central zone, which was not an independent municipality under the previous administrative and territorial system, do not have the right to elect their representatives to the City Council. Due to this fact and the violation of the democratic principle of “one voter—one vote”, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed in 2010 that some provisions of the City Statute were unconstitutional. In 2012, the term of office of the President and the City Council—elected in the last free elections in 2008—expired. The High Representative decided that the President of Mostar would remain in his office until new elections, the City Council was dissolved, which paralysed the decision-making process concerning investments and spatial planning (Seferovi´c). This deadlock of the urban geopolitics has been continuing for eight years, since the expiry of the term in office of the freely elected President and the City Council. The leading poli tical parties are not able to reach any consensus on the establishment of a new network of election districts, ethnic quotas, and the general rules of election. What is more, in conditions of permanent temporality informal relationships between the leaders of Croat and Bosnian parties have strengthened.

102

V. Mihaylov

6.5 Territorial Ethnocracy Mostar is a city in which geopolitical divisions overlap with ethnic exclusivity. This is the axiom most frequently repeated by researchers when referring to the spatial and political situation in the post-Yugoslav period (Zdeb 2017; Makaš 2012). Unfortunately, the empirical facts convincingly demonstrate that this is true: Mostar is a city with two power companies, two post stations, two bus stations, two football clubs, two universities, and two separate school curricula, amongst others. All these examples demonstrate the essence of social relationships which logic is subordinated to territorial ethnocracy. Its essence is formulated by Toshchenko (2003) as instrumentalisation of national identity to achieve political goals, the appropriation of the right to speak and act on behalf of the ethnic group in accordance with particular interests of this group or its leaders. The established ethnocratic model of spatial polarisation is supported by an increasingly stronger externalisation of the religious identity across the city. As was the case with the majority of mosques, the Saints Peter and Paul Church at the Franciscan Monastery was ruined during the war. When the war was over, an over 100-m-high bell tower was erected to symbolically mark domination over the numerous minarets in the urban space. The bell tower is currently the highest building in Mostar. A 33-m-high Millennium Cross on the Hum Hill is another symbolic building that has aroused controversy and was rejected by the Muslim community of Mostar (Fig. 6.5). Symbolic divisions are particularly evident during public holidays. In West Mostar the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina is displayed only on official governmental buildings (a new practice fostered by the international community) and on the buildings of international organisations, while on the east side the Bosnia and Herzegovina flag can be seen on many public and private buildings and on small shops (Palmberger 2012: 14). A survey amongst Croatian and Muslim college students confirms the thesis of ethnically divided city. 26% of them declared that they never visit and do not intend to visit any clubs and cafes on the ‘other’ side of the city. The same number of respondents declared to rarely visit cafes outside their district, while 8% of residents never go the other side of the city, and 39% of respondents do it only occasionally (Pili´c and Bošnjak 2011: 113). What are the concrete reasons for the deep symbolic divisions of this relatively small urban space and where exactly these divisions could be experienced? Croats and Muslims have their own representational practices in the urban landscape, i.e. names of streets, monuments to their particular heroes, and iconic landmarks. Apart from the ‘universal’ bones of contention attributed to the specific history of Mostar as a city of several multinational states, a peculiar subject of disputes is the tangible and intangible Ottoman heritage. While it is positively perceived by Muslims, many Croats treat it rather indifferently. There are few symbolic places of reconciliation of various ethnic groups in the public space of Mostar. One such place is the Old Bridge, which was destroyed during the war and later reconstructed thanks to the city budget allocations and financial contributions of other states and international

6 Ethnoterritorial Divisions and Urban Geopolitics …

103

Fig. 6.5 The rivalry of religious symbols in the urban landscape—Hadzi Kurt mosque in the Muslim part of Mostar and the cross erected by Croats on the Hum hill (in the background). Photo V. Mihaylov

institutions. After the bridge was reopened, it became UNESCO’s world heritage site due to its symbolic value. In the international Old Bridge discourse, the reconstruction of the bridge in the Muslim part of the city is recognised as a success of reconciliation of the divided city and a return to multiculturality. The symbolic reinterpretation of the bridge is an adaptation of a central landmark to the present to counter ethnic nationalism and to achieve social stability Grodach (2002: 77). In reality, the bridge is not quite as important as it may seem from the point of view of identification of many Mostar’s Croats, the majority of whom perceive the Old Bridge as an Ottoman heritage belonging to the culture of “others”. Moreover, the aftermath of the Second World War, the Socialist era and the civil war are often interpreted from conflicting ethnopolitical points of view. The post-war relationships between the three major communities in the city have been evolving in an outstanding manner. Attitudes to the Second World War and the Socialist era have shaped the Croatian nationalist narrative, which is defied by both Muslims and Serbs. For example, a cemetery opened in 1960s (the Partisan Memorial Cemetery— Partizansko groblje) to commemorate the communist guerilla is a meaningful place uniting Muslims and Serbs, but not for Croats who oppose to the commemoration of the Second World War guerilla, irrespective of the fact that a large number of Croats died fighting against fascism.

104

V. Mihaylov

The new odonyms introduced in western Mostar, changed by the Croatian authorities, are the bone of contention between the two nationalisms. The names of the streets are an undeniable symbol of territorial ethnocracy. Altogether 72 urban names were changed in 1995. Paradoxically, it took place in the period of post-war reconstruction and attempts to reintegrate conflicted communities. The names of streets and squares no longer commemorate some of distinguished figures in the history of the city or the former Yugoslavia regardless of their national or religious belonging (Deutsche Welle…). Apart from the notable Croatisation of the urban space of Mostar (Fig. 6.6), several streets were named after the prominent figures in the fascist Independent State of Croatia. The consequences of unilateral decisions concerning changes in the names of streets have not been abated, despite protests of Muslims, Serbs and anti-fascist organisations or the acts of governmental institutions. “Is Mostar a part of the Independent State of Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina?”—this is the title of an article in Radio Free Europe for Former Yugoslavia. After the war, a committee was established and operated at the City Council for two terms in office; its task was to change the names of these streets, but nothing has really been done (Behram 2016). The discourse of the Mostar territorial ethnocracy includes frequent manifestations of the profanation of memory symbols of the ‘opposite party’, such as monuments dedicated to members of the Croatian Defence Council on the one hand, and of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other hand. These manifestations take place also in Mostar’s Central Zone established by international administration, which was intended to play a key role in a space integrator and a seat of joint public institutions. The jointly controlled Central Zone was carefully protected as ‘neutral’. Construction of buildings linked exclusively to one particular group was forbidden in this area (Makaš 2006). In 2013, a monument to commemorate members of Bosnia and Herzegovina who died during the civil war, erected next to the City Council, was demolished.

6.6 Perspectives on Mostar’s Urban Geopolitics. Dialogue vs. Confrontation Based on the existing ethnoterritorial divisions and paths of spatial segregation, the author made an attempt to present the possible scenarios of the geopolitical future of Mostar. The author relies on the established relationships between ethnopolitical parties of the conflict in Mostar. The international situation and its foreseeable impact on the urban geopolitics were also taken into consideration, and vice versa. As claimed by Calame and Charlesworth (2009: 117), “the international community has treated Mostar as a barometer of political conditions in Bosnia since the outbreak of hostilities in 1992”. The geopolitics of dialogue is the first direction of future development (Table 6.1). Here, two scenarios are envisaged. The first one (status quo) means preservation of

6 Ethnoterritorial Divisions and Urban Geopolitics …

105

Fig. 6.6 Symbols of ethnoterritorial divisions in Mostar: The Croatian Home of Culture and flags (from left to right) of the Croatian Defence Council, Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovia (above); The building of the Croatian National Theatre (below). Photos V. Mihaylov

106

V. Mihaylov

Table 6.1 Scenarios of geopolitics of dialogue Model

International conditions

Local conditions

1. Preservation of status quo

• Decisive role of • Continuous of cold international actors peace • Preservation of in strategic issues • Local ethnic parties territorial remain decisive role ethnocracy model • Continuation of in operational permanent problems city temporality in the government city government

• Forced dialogue • Slow economic changes • Unattractive environment for foreign investors

2. Spatially and politically integrated city

• Decreasing role of international actors in strategic and operational issues

• Favourable investment climate • Historical reconciliation • Development of a common model of historical memory

• Resignation from the division into electoral districts, the border between which overlaps the demarcation line from the war period • Self-dissolution of ethnic parties

Consequences

post-war cold peace based on sociopolitical and spatial divisions against ethnic and religious background. In this setting, a model of peaceful coexistence is preserved— imposed by foreign actors but maintaining peace as the core value. This will still entail slow economic changes, including the scarcity of foreign investors, or leaving the economic and sociopolitical potential for the development of the city unexploited. The last variant is more likely as no one openly encourages or quietly considers direct confrontation. As part of the geopolitics of dialogue, the option of sociopolitical and spatial integration is also acceptable, based on bottom-up dialogue of communities who actually speak the same language. There are also residents who believe and strive for the restoration of Mostar as a multicultural city where pluralistic identity will dominate social relations. These residents are a minority and do not identify as any real political force as they risk being stigmatised and excluded from the own ethnic group. One variant of the geopolitics of dialogue means abolishing the division into election districts which reflect the demarcation line during the war; reconciliation and development of a joint model of historical memory; or setting up of a civic party uniting residents who believe in ‘supraethnic’ and ‘suprareligious’ values. This is a very daunting task for politicians and spiritual leaders of the two communities. This concerns not only Mostar, but also ethnic relationships in many cities and regions of the former Yugoslavia, where the war has left deep marks. At least to options are possible in the model of geopolitical confrontation (Table 6.2). The first option makes room for a new conflict. This option is only possible if the international community withdraws from its mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and if this country is left outside the EU; the domino effect (new conflicts and the breakdown of the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and North Macedonia).

6 Ethnoterritorial Divisions and Urban Geopolitics …

107

Table 6.2 Scenarios of geopolitics of confrontation Model

International conditions

Local conditions

1. Political disintegration and administrative division of the city

• Withdrawal of the international community from its mission in BiH • No clear prospect of EU membership for the BiH state • Greater involvement of some exYugoslav countries in the city’s geopolitics • The domino effect (new conflicts and border changes in BiH, Kosovo, Macedonia)

• Preserving • Spatial disintegration sociopolitical and • Problems with the spatial divisions functioning of the based on ethnic and city in terms of religious criteria economic, • The Croatian part of infrastructure and the city forms a transport Croatian republic or organisation joins Croatia • The Muslim part of the city remains an exclave of the BiH state

2. Domination of one community

• New civil war • Ethnic cleansings

Consequences

• One community imposes its ethnocratic model on the whole city • Further ethnic segregation and homogenisation

Source Author’s own elaboration

6.7 Conclusion One of the paradoxes of the decomposition of Yugoslavia was that the borders of new states remained the same as the borders of federal republics before the breakout of the bloody civil wars. Although the borders between former republics remained unaltered, the acts of war, ethnic cleansing and incidents of genocide have left a mark on the ethnic composition and landscape of hundreds of cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo. Some of them have survived urbicide (Coward 2004, 2009) and the massive material damage which still persists at the beginning of the third decade of the twenty-first century and symbolizes the period of unfinished transformation and lasting cold peace. Scenarios of the future of Mostar discussed here—both optimistic and pessimistic—were presented in the context of urban geopolitics. It is a matter of fact that the city will never return to the pre-war state because of the firmly established social relationships. The structure of the city population has changed considerably. A multinational state that combined all areas and all members of the Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian communities have disappeared. After the war, the multiculturality of Mostar vanished with the disappearance of the multinational Yugoslavia. An internal ethnic, political and religious consolidation of constitutional nations took place. A new symbolic mythology was established, in which members of competing groups are stereotyped and stigmatised (Mihaylov 2014). Croats identify themselves more

108

V. Mihaylov

with Zagreb and their Croats compatriots than with those residents of Mostar who represent a different cultural and historical background and political preferences. Serbs seek to restore position in the public sphere of Mostar, but are offered more support, recognition and understanding by Banja Luka and Belgrade. In consideration of the field studies and literature review concerning the not yet fully integrated Mostar, it is perhaps worthwhile to share a reflection on the specifics of geopolitics on a micro-scale. Taking into account that a fair definition of the subject of urban geopolitics is missing from previous publications, based on an analysis of past research and the prevailing research problems addressed in these studies, the author defines urban geopolitics in the following way: scientific direction which includes interdisciplinary studies on the geopolitical (spatial) competition for domination or influence in urban space or city districts between conflicted social, ideological, ethnic or religious communities, accompanied by a high degree of internationalisation of relationships among them and involving matters of strategic urban governance. Urban geopolitics is policymaking pursued by local actors in a small physical space, but which is overloaded with substantial disputes over ideology, historical memory, and cultural values. Unlike classical geopolitics, states and governments are not necessarily the main actors in the local skirmishes for the urban space. As is the case with Mostar, the enemies, rivals or opponents in the battle for spatial influence and externalisation of own national symbols are not so distant, as in case of relations between great powers and their leaders. Organisations and supporters of one or the other ethnopolitical option reside in the neighbouring district, street or even in the same building. They must come together to discuss the budget of the city or to work on local plans and strategies. Because of immediate physical co-presence and of the joint use and management of common spaces and public services, the tone and rhetoric of urban geopolitics must be balanced and often also consistent with the principles of political correctness.

References - c I (2009) Hrvatska zajednica Herceg Bosna 1997–2009. Mostar: HZ HB Andeli´ Bailoni M (2014) Les évolutions du modèle énergétique britannique face aux enjeux géopolitiques internes. VertigO—la revue électronique en sciences de l’environnement 14(3). https://doi.org/ 10.4000/vertigo.15550. https://journals.openedition.org/vertigo/15550. Accsessed: 03 Oct 2019 Behram M (2016) Je li Mostar u NDH ili u BiH? https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/je-li-mostaru-ndh-ili-u-bih/27813829.html. Accessed: 09 Dec 2019 Bing J (2001) Ideas and realities: rebuilding in Postwar Mostar. J Archit Edu 54:238–249. https:// doi.org/10.1162/10464880152474556 Björkdahl A (2012) The EU Administration of Mostar: Implications for the EU’s evolving peacebuilding approach. Aus New Zealand J European Stud 4(1):2–17 Björkdahl A, Gusic I (2016) Sites of friction: governance, identity and space in Mostar. In: Björkdahl A, Höglund K, Millar G, van der Lijn J, Verkoren W (eds) Peacebuilding and friction: global and local encounters in post conflict-societies. Routledge, New York, pp 84–102

6 Ethnoterritorial Divisions and Urban Geopolitics …

109

Calame J, Charlesworth E (2009) Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia Carabelli G (2018) The divided city and the grassroots: the (un)making of ethnic divisions in Mostar. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore Carabelli G, Djurasovic A, Summa R (2019) Challenging the representation of ethnically divided cities: perspectives from Mostar. Space Polity 23(2):116–124. https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576. 2019.1634467 Coward M (2004) Urbicide in Bosnia. In: Graham S (ed) Cities, war and terrorism: towards an urban geopolitics. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 154–171 Coward M (2009) Urbicide. The politics of urban destruction. Routledge, London and New York Dahlman C, Toal G (2006) Bosnia’s Third Space? Nationalist Separatism and International Supervision in Bosnia’s Brˇcko District. Geopolitics 11(4):651–675. https://doi.org/10.1080/146500406 00891063 Deutsche Welle: Ulice u Mostaru i dalje nose imena ustaških cˇ elnika. https://www.nezavisne.com/ novosti/bih/Deutsche-Welle-Ulice-u-Mostaru-i-dalje-nose-imena-ustaskih-celnika/529863. Accessed: 30 May 2019 Douzet F (2001) Pour une démarche nouvelle de géopolitique urbaine à partir du cas d’Oakland (Californie). Hérodote 101:57–75 Fregonese S (2012a) Beyond the ‘weak state’: hybrid sovereignties in Beirut. Environ Plann D: Soc Space 30(4):655–674. https://doi.org/10.1068/d11410 Fregonese S (2012b) Urban geopolitics 8 years on. Hybrid sovereignties, the everyday, and geographies of peace. Geo Compass 6(5):290–303. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2012. 00485.x Fregonese S (2015) Everyday political geographies. In Mamadouh V, Agnew J, Sharp J, Secor A (eds), The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Political Geography. Wiley-Blackwell, pp 493–506 Graham S (2004) Cities, war and terrorism. Blackwell, Oxford. https://doi.org/10.1002/978111872 5771.ch36 Grodach C (2002) Reconstituting identity and history in post-war Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina. City 6(1):61–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/13604810220142844 Gudelj J (2018) Ideal slobode. Što danas simbolizira Herceg Bosna? https://www.dnevnik.ba/teme/ ideal-slobode-sto-danas-simbolizira-herceg-bosna (18.11.2019). Accessed: 30 May 2019 Hulbert F (1994) Essai de géopolitique urbaine et régionale. La comédie urbaine de Québec. Méridien, Québec Hulbert F (2009) L’espace politique de la ville: plaidoyer pour une géopolitique urbaine. L’Espace Politique 8(2). https://doi.org/10.4000/espacepolitique.1330. https://journals.openedition.org/ espacepolitique/1330. Accessed: 02 Oct 2019 Laketa S (2015) Youth as geopolitical subjects: the case of Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In: Kallio K, Mills S, Skelton T (eds), Politics, citizenship and rights. Geographies of children and young people, Vol. 7, pp. 153–169. Singapore: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-458557-6_6 Laketa S (2016) Geopolitics of affect and emotions in a post-conflict city. Geopolitics 21(3):661– 685. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2016.1141765. Accessed: 18 Dec 2019 Laketa S (2019) The politics of landscape as ways of life in the ‘divided’ city: reflections from Mostar Bosnia-Herzegovina. Space Polity 23(2):168–181. https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2019.163 5444 Lacoste Y (ed) (1986) Géopolitique des régions françaises. Fayard, Paris Makaš EG (2006) Competing visions of Mostar’s Postwar identity. Unpublished paper delivered at Urban Europe in Comparative Perspective: European Association for Urban History 8th International Conference, Stockholm. https://www.academia.edu/2211321/Competing_Visions_of_P ostwar_Mostar_EAUH_Stockholm_2006_. Accessed: 18 Dec 2019 Makaš EG (2012). Rebuilding mostar: international and local visions of a contested city and its heritage. In: Ruggles D (eds) On location. New York, NY: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/9781-4614-1108-6_8. Accessed: 20 Dec 2019

110

V. Mihaylov

Mihaylov V (2011) Zasady etnopolitycznej i terytorialno-politycznej organizacji Jugosławii: geneza, ewolucja, współczesne konsekwencje. Sprawy Narodowo´sciowe. Seria Nowa 39:51–70 Mihaylov V (2014) Territorial Consciousness as an Identity Component of the National and Ethnic communities. In: Mihaylov V (ed) Territories and Identities in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Institute of Geopolitics, Cz˛estochowa, pp 97–119 Mihaylov V, Sala S (2018) Subnational identities in the context of the changing internal geopolitics. The case of post-revolutionary Ukraine. Bulletin of Geography. Socio-Eco Series 39:79–96. https://doi.org/10.2478/bog-2018-0006 Pili´c Š, Bošnjak M (2011) Will Mostar remain communication-divided town? Informatologia 44(2):101–114 Raˇci´c M (2017) Mostarski Srbi nekad i sad. http://www.tacno.net/sarajevo/mostarski-srbi-nekad-isad/. Accessed: 19 Dec 2019 Rokem J, Buano C (eds), (2017) Urban geopolitics. Rethinking planning in contested cities. Routledge Studies in Urbanism and the City. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315659275 Rokem J, Vaughan L (2018) Segregation, mobility and encounters in Jerusalem: the role of public transport infrastructure in connecting the ‘divided city.’ Urban Stud 55(15):3454–3473 Subra Ph (2012) Geopolitics: a unique or multidimensional concept? Place, issues and tools of local geopolitics. Hérodote 3:146–147 Palmberger M (2012) Renaming of public space: a policy of exclusion in Bosnia and Herzegovina. MMG Working Paper 12-02. Potulski J (2014) Mikrogeopolityka – lokalno´sc´ we współczesnych analizach geopolitycznych. Prace i Studia Geograficzne 54:107–123 Savi´c-Bojani´c M (2015) Minority Discontent as an Internal Destabilisation Factor: The Issue of Territorial Minorities in Bosnia and Hercegowina. In: Głowacki A, Szczesio SŁ (eds) Bałkany Zachodnie w systemie bezpiecze´nstwa euroatlantyckiego. Wyd. Uniwersytetu Łodzkiego, Łód´z, pp 459–483 Seferovi´c O (2013) Dosije Mostar: Grad u vremenu permanentne privremenosti https://www. tacno.net/slideshow/dosije-mostar-grad-u-vremenu-permanentne-privremenosti/. Accessed: 15 Oct 2019 Toshchenko ZhT (2003) Etnokratiya: istoriya i sovremennost’ (sociologicheskie ocherki). Rosspen, Moskva van Boxtel E, Koreman K (2019) City of permanent temporality incomplete and unfinished. Rotterdam: Nai010 Publishers Väyrynen R (1997) Economic incentives and the Bosnian peace process. In: Cortrigh D (ed), The price of piece incentives and international conflict prevention (pp. 155–180). Lanham, Boulder, New York Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Zdeb A (2017) Facing institutional change in Mostar: A litmus test for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nat Papers 45(1):96–113. https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1235142. Accessed: 12 Oct 2019 Zorko M, Novak N (2017) Micro-geopolitical borders of divided cities: the case study of Mostar. In: Gjurovski M (ed.), International scientific conference Security concepts and policies—new generation of risks and threats (pp. 95–102). Skopje Yacobi H (2009) Towards urban geopolitics. Geopolitics 14:576–581. https://doi.org/10.1080/146 50040802694091 https://www.statistika.ba. Accessed: 25 May 2020

Chapter 7

How Do State and Military Borders Divide the Urban Spaces of Donbas? Cases of Milove/Chertkovo and Zolote Roman Slyvka and Iryna Zakutynska

Abstract Since 2014, the Donbas region has become the front line of an armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia-backed separatists. This chapter shows how alienating once unified urban communities occur during an armed conflict in Donbas. The line of armed confrontation divided the few Donbas cities and towns. One of them is Zolote, a typical mining town. The military actions resulted in significant destruction of the urban environment and habitual way of life of th population. Part of the town is in the so-called “grey zone”, which was established in 2015. Over the following years, the grey area decreased and the likelihood of fire contact between the parties to the conflict increased. Another element that is the focus of this chapter is the town of Milove, which is located in the agrarian part of Donbas on the UkrainianRussian border. Mivole and Chertkovo (a town located on the Russian side) is an example of twin-towns. In Soviet times, the administrative frontier ran along the main street of Friendship of Peoples. After the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian border conflict, a fortified border appeared in the middle of this street. The population of Milove and Chertkovo felt isolated in terms of socio-economic ties. Keywords Divided towns · Military borders · Donbas war · Milove · Chertkovo · Zolote

7.1 Introduction The fluctuating military conflict that began in 2014 is still ongoing in Ukraine today. As of 2020, it has become clear that the parties to the conflict are the separatists of self-proclaimed and internationally unrecognised Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR), controlled and backed up by the Russian R. Slyvka (B) · I. Zakutynska Department of Geography and Natural Sciences, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] I. Zakutynska e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_7

111

112

R. Slyvka and I. Zakutynska

Federation in terms of military, information, diplomatic and economic support on the one hand and the sovereign state of Ukraine on the other. The war in Donbas should be considered not only in the context of internal political struggle within Ukraine and as an effect of the Revolution of Dignity of 2013–2014 but also in the broad sense as the part of Russia’s long-term strategy aimed at restoring its international influence in the post-Soviet space (Slyvka et al. 2017). Armed violence takes place in a densely populated urban area. Here favourable conditions for the division of cities by military borders have emerged. Gentile (2019) indicates that most of the divided cities in Europe or in the Middle East are located along the outskirts of former empires or along cultural disintegration line. Series of researches illustrate the way in which geopolitical rivalries can lead to a rupture of urban spaces (Zeido and Ibold 2019; Zorko and Novak 2019). Kuromiya (1998), Zimmer (2007), Zhurzhenko (2010) describe the peculiarities of social and ethno-cultural environment of Ukrainian eastern border regions and their “transit” Ukrainian-Russian character. Mykhnenko (2020) shows the Ukrainian Donbas to be a typical shrinking old industrial region. Reasons for the conflict in Eastern Ukraine are highlighted by Shevel (2015), Zhurzhenko (2015), Kuzio (2017), Horbulin (2017), Lennon and Adams (2019), D’Anieri and Kuzio (2019). The purpose of this chapter is to reflect how emerging state borders and line of confrontation lead to deep transformations of the urban space and way of life of citizens in Donbas towns Zolote and Milove / Chertkovo (Fig. 7.1). Zolote is a typical mining town, which, due to the war in Donbas, has been separated by a line of armed confrontation. However, it should be a pioneering example for future reconciliation and demilitarisation. In the event of freezing the conflict, it will remain a “gateway” between the government-controlled and uncontrolled territories of Donbas. It is an example of acquired border status due to an armed conflict. Ukrainian town Milove and Russian town Chertkovo are typical twin towns on the state border. Despite the geographical proximity, separate districts of Zolote and Milove/Chertkovo become more and more remoted from each other.

Fig. 7.1 Zolote and Milove / Chertkovo on the map of Donbas. Source Authors’ own elaboration

7 How Do State and Military Borders …

113

7.2 Frontier Twin Towns Milove and Chertkovo The town of Milove is located in Luhansk region, the frontier region with Russia. It is described in all school textbooks in Geography as the easternmost settlement in Ukraine. During the Soviet period of 1919–1992 Luhansk region was a part of various administrative entities within Soviet Ukraine. In mass media, there is a tradition to refer Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine to a single historical region of Donbas. In fact, the territory of Luhansk and Donetsk regions occupies three ethnographic regions—Donbas (coincides with a number of industrial agglomerations of Donetsk-Makiivka, Rubizhne-Lysychansk-Severodonetsk, and so on), Pryazovia (seaside regions of the Azov Sea with the centre in Mariupol) and Slobozhanshchyna (agricultural northern part of Luhansk region). Ukrainian town of Milove, which is the object of our study, is located in the agricultural northeastern part of Luhansk region directly in the frontier zone opposite to the Russian town of Chertkovo. It is here where a conventional border between historical regions of Donbas, Slobozhanshchyna and Donshchyna is located. Chertkovo appeared due to the construction of the North Caucasian railway in 1869 and for a long time, it used to be a railway station. This railway route performs important transport tasks, ensuring the access of cargo traffic to Russian Black Sea ports. The agricultural settlement of Milove (1872) appeared next to it. During the Russian Empire, both settlements belonged to different provinces of the Russian Empire—Milove used to be a part of Kharkiv province, and Chertkovo belonged to the Province of the Don Cossack Host. At the same time, the Ukrainians prevailed in the ethnic structure of both towns and of surrounding territories. Their share in the 1920s was estimated at 70–80% of the population (Boiechko et al. 1994: 155). After the foundation of the Soviet Union, Chertkovo became a part of the North Caucasian region (in 1924) of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The administrative boundary between the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR separated these two towns. The railway station remained on the Russian side. This caused problems with the organisation of trade, storage and transportation of agricultural products by railway. In the 1920s, there were boundary disputes between the governing bodies of neighbouring towns (Boiechko et al. 1994: 59, 153–155). In this regard, Ukrainian and Russian sides claimed for the transfer of adjacent areas to their entities (Krinko and Tatarinov 2014). The population of both towns felt the effects of the Soviet policy of forced collectivisation, Great Famine, Sovietisation and Russification. Boundary disputes remained in the past; de facto, the two towns merged into a single settlement. Only invisible and formal administrative borderline ran between two towns. Nowadays, Milove has the status of an urban-type settlement, rayon centre, with a population of 5840 people. Meanwhile, Chertkovo is a settlement that corresponds to the Russian status of an urban settlement and an administrative centre of the eponymous rayon. According to Russian source, “Chertkovo district is the territory of traditional compact residence of Don Cossacks” (Website of the Consultant Plus company). This contradicts 1926 data when 64.2% of the population of

114

R. Slyvka and I. Zakutynska

Chertkovo declared Ukrainian ethnicity (Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva… 1984: 3735). According to the Russian census of 2002, 11 thousand people lived in the settlement (85.9% Russians and only 11.1% Ukrainians) (Chertkovo, Wikipedia). These data present vivid evidence of the change in ethnic identity of the population in the frontier regions towards the acquisition of Russian identity. As far as Luhansk region of Ukraine is concerned, here, according to Melnyk (2017: 125), a dual Russian-Ukrainian consciousness, or a specific regional identity of the population with the mentality, stereotypes and behavior of the “Soviet man” was formed Kuzio (2017). Pointed out that Donbas regional identity was combined with a high level of commitment to Soviet culture. Describing the geographical location of Chertkovo, Russian official documents say that currently, the state Russian-Ukrainian border passes directly along the outskirts of Chertkovo (Website of the Administration of Chertkovsky district of the Rostov region). According to Ukrainian sources, the Ukrainian urban settlement of Milove together with the Russian urban settlement of Chertkovo constitute a whole—the borderline runs along the street with a symbolic name—Druzhby Narodiv (Friendship of Peoples Street). The appearance of the customs post “Milove” and Border Inspection Post between two new sovereign states in 1992 marked a new historic period in the development of the two towns. Labour migration to major urban centres, small-scale cross-border trade, services, and smuggling typical of porous borderlands have become new kinds of economic activity in the event of a protracted economic crisis during the market transformation of the post-Soviet states.

7.2.1 War and Border Strengthening in Milove/Chertkovo At the beginning of August 2014, Pro-Russian militants launched rocket-propelled grenades at the administrative building of Milove Border Guard Service department (Bozhko 2014). The fact that even during the conflict, Ukrainian-Russian border remained transparent during 5 years, not interfering with the development of social and trade contacts between the population of the surrounding towns, is worth mentioning. The shared Dryzhby Narodiv Street was marked only with signboards notifying the passage of the border (Fig. 7.2). It was conventional for local residents, they used to cross it without any formalities. The years of cross-border cooperation brought residents so close to each other, that even after the Donbas war exploding, the border seemed to be a rather conventional margin. By 2014, approximately 500 Ukrainian and Russian citizens had been living on both sides of shared street. Such large Russian enterprises as Chertkovo grain elevator, railway station, as well as no longer functioning meat processing plant, are all located in this street. The Ukrainian side of the street houses Milove Refinery, an energy provider, and a large market where residents of neighbouring towns have the opportunity to buy necessary goods.

7 How Do State and Military Borders …

115

Fig. 7.2 Map of Milove/Chertkovo. Source own elaboration

However, escalation at the front and lack of progress in Ukrainian-Russian relations resulted in the complications of the border-crossing regime. The distance from Milove to the current line of contact is approximately 120 kms, so Ukrainian border guards have significantly increased control over compliance with the legal regime of the state border. Since 2015, citizens crossing the street illegally have been arrested and fined. Only Russians with international passports were allowed by Ukrainian border guards; special deliberate attention was paid to Russian men, who seemed like potential militants. This brought difficulties to the local cross-border trade. Since January 1st, 2018, entry of citizens of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine has been taking place according to new rules, which includes passing the biometric control. Russian citizens may stay in Ukraine for three months over a period of six months. Such rules affected families with members of different nationalities. Many of them were obliged to register the right for permanent residence in Ukraine and Russia. It should be taken into account that Ukraine does not legally recognize dual citizenship. As of 2020, two out of three border-crossing points have remained—foot-borne and automobile (Bukhtiiarov and Rieutskyi 2018). In 2018, Russian border guards constructed a fence separating the central street of both settlements—Milove and Chertkovo (Figs. 7.2 and 7.3). Since that time, the border between two countries is clearly located in the middle of the road. The name of the divided street, symbolizing the friendship of people, sounds ironic today. Only with the erection of this apparently “new Berlin Wall” the Milovians have felt where the edge of peoples’ friendship is (Magazova and Dubchak 2019). The Russian side has reasoned the high fence-net construction by the possibility of spreading Ukrainian conflict to Russia. This is despite the fact that the latter fueled the conflict by supplying weapons to instructors and volunteers. Now, this street is under the control of numerous border patrols. Border demarcation has caused a significant reconfiguration of urban space. Paradoxical situations have appeared in Chertkovo when the whole microdistrict with 116 citizens of the Russian Federation found itself cut off from the rest of the territory

116

R. Slyvka and I. Zakutynska

Fig. 7.3 Turn to right sign before Ukrainian-Russian border, Milove. Photo Authors

of the Russian Federation by railway, with no entrance for emergency services. The communications to the houses belonged to different countries. Boundary agencies and enterprises also have economic losses. A number of shops and a dental clinic on the Russian side of Druzhby Narodiv Street are planning to close as most of their clients live in Milove (Bukhtiiarov and Rieutskyi 2018). Nowadays, foot-borne and automobile border-crossing points are the only convenient ways to get to the territory under governmental control for the majority of people residing on the uncontrolled Ukrainian territories in Luhansk region, since it is the only way to get there by car, because on the line of contact between the Ukrainian security forces and secessionist rebels of Luhansk there is only one footborne border-crossing point in the village of Stanytsia Luhanska. The most common phenomenon is pension tourism, during which the residents of occupied territories of so-called “LPR” go by way of Russia in order to receive their retirement pension

7 How Do State and Military Borders …

117

in Ukrainian banking centres. This flow of retired people from occupied Donbas facilitates local trade. Since March 1st, 2020, the situation for local entrepreneurs has become more complicated as a new procedure of crossing the border with Russia for Ukrainian citizens was introduced. Now pensioners from occupied territories of Ukrainian Donbas will have to apply for a Ukrainian international passport in order to enter the territory of the Russian Federation legally, but this will be possible only through legal border-crossing points at the Ukrainian-Russian border. Entry with such a passport going by way of Russia through border-crossing points closed by the government on the uncontrolled part of the border will result in considerable penalty charges (V Ukraini zminylysia pravyla… 2020). After 2014, symbolic changes in the cultural landscape have taken place. Ukraine has generously decorated the buildings in Milove with national symbols, streets renamed and a monument to Vladimir Lenin was dismantled as part of a nationwide decommunisation movement. In 2018, a memorial to the most famous Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko was erected in the yard of the school in Milove. At the same time, monuments devoted to the memory of fallen in the Second World War have remained intact in both bordering towns, which is an important link that unites the historical memory of residents on both sides of the border about the severe battles of the Second World War, when Milove became the first Ukrainian town liberated from the German occupation in 1943 (Fig. 7.4).

Fig. 7.4 Monument devoted to the memory of fallen in Second World War, Milove. Photo private archive of M. Skuridin (2016)

118

R. Slyvka and I. Zakutynska

Geopolitical interests require spending money on economic support of the occupied regions in Donbas and the Crimea. This includes the illegal construction of a bridge from the Taman Peninsula to the annexed Crimea, as well as the construction of a railway line bypassing the territory of Ukraine. In 2018, Russia stopped the passenger service on the North Caucasian railway section, three segments of which with a total length of 26 kms enter the territory of Milove district in Ukraine. Instead, Russia built a railway branch to bypass the Ukrainian territory. Russia’s reluctance to depend on the transit through Ukrainian territory was caused by the fact that rail traffic could be blocked at any time. The bypass road was built by Russian military railroad workers. It was a sort of the military operation, testified by “Order of Zhukov” award. This award is usually handed out for “the skilful organisation and conduct of operations of troops (forces) in strategic areas (theatre of war) or military operations” (Website of the Consultant Group Company). Since September 20th , 2017, the first two-track electrified railway line Zhuravka-Millerovo, 137.5 km of length has begun operating serving the first trains bypassing the Russian station Chertkovo. To build such a bypass Russia has spent a billion dollars (Kolbasin and Golovanov 2015). The transfer of railway traffic has caused the loss of economic importance of Chertkovo railway station. Today, in order to travel by train beyond the boundaries of the region, residents of Chertkovo/Millerovo can only use stations located 27 km (Kuteinikovo station in Russia) or 100 km away (Starobilsk station in Ukraine). In the past, Chertkovo station provided steady income not only to Russian railway workers but also to local residents engaged in commercial activities at the railway station when the trains stopped. Today, this type of income has disappeared as the station serves only local trains to the regional centres of Rostov-on-Don. There is a likelihood that Chertkovo will decline as an urban settlement due to reduced employment and benefits from cross-border trade with Ukraine, but Ukrainian residents of Milove will not benefit from it either.

7.3 Zolote—The Urban Heart of Donbas Industrialisation Town of Zolote is one of the Donbas mining towns. It is located 60 km westward from the regional centre of Luhansk and not far from the administrative border of Donetsk region. The town originated within Donetsk Coal Basin, shortly Donbas, which gave its name to the entire region. The word “Donetsk” is derived from the name of the Siverskyi Donets River, which is a part of the basin of the Don river. In Donbas, there was a conventional frontier between Ukrainian and Russian zones due to agrarian colonisation of the steppe by both peoples in the period between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries. The region is the main fuel base and the most important industrial region of Ukraine with a powerful coal industry, metallurgy, heavy machinery and chemical industry. In 1968, at the peak of the post-war reconstruction of the Soviet Union, the number of population of Zolote reached 27.7 thousand. Later, the town’s development was accompanied by depopulation. At the end of 2010, it had 13.5 inhabitants.

7 How Do State and Military Borders …

119

The density of population and the level of urbanisation in Luhansk region is higher in comparison to the rest of Ukraine. Zolote is a historical core of the Soviet industrialisation. This process took place in the second half of the nineteenth century when the Russian Empire attracted English, French and Belgian investors who built the first coal mines and factories here (Matychak 2019). Because the “Zolote” mine has been operating since 1905, it has of historical significance not only for the town but for the whole Donbas. The emergence of working settlements near coal mines or industrial enterprises was a typical feature of the settlement process in Donbas during the industrialisation. The intensification of coal production was accompanied by population growth, while the decline of mines meant the outflow of population to other cities and towns of the region (Alforov 2012; Kulchytskyi and Yakubova 2015). By the degree of diversification of economic structure, the level of innovative development, density of population and urban settlements, Luhansk region is significantly inferior to Donetsk region. The vast majority of cities and urban-type settlements of the region gained their urban status during the Soviet era. A characteristic phenomenon of the region is the spread of single-industry towns, among which “resource” (i.e. mining) settlements prevail (Melnyk 2017: 122). The town of Zolote has never been a single settlement area because it originated as a result of an administrative unification of five settlements (Karbonit, Rodina, Stakhanovets, Partyzanske, and Mariivka) into one urban settlement in 1938. Zolote, as well as the neighbouring towns of Girske, Toshkivka and Komyshevakha, belong to the Central Luhansk agglomeration with the population of 445 thousand inhabitants (Alforov 2012), extending 45 km from the north to the south of the region. This area, with its mines, rising waste banks, miners’ settlements, workers’ settlements, plants and factories, as well as developed railroad network, is real Donbas. It is so densely populated that it is difficult to say where exactly one town ends and another one begins. This mosaic of cities, settlements, mines, and plants stretches from Donetsk to Luhansk, creating the appearance of a whole region. On the other hand, Luhansk region consists mostly of rural areas devoid of industry (Osipian and Osipian 2006: 497). Several researchers single out an incomplete nature of urbanisation, particularly A. L. Osipian and A. L. Osipian (2006) indicate that living conditions are not much different from those in the countryside and are often lower, depending on environmental conditions. Today, Zolote is a typical mining town of Donbas, where there are three operating mines “Zolote”, “Karbonit” and “Pervomaisk” and one closed mine “Rodina” as well as a central enriching factory. “Karbonit” (founded in 1947) and “Pervomaisk” (founded in 1975) are the most dangerous from the point of view of exploitation, since coal dust and methane release from the environment create explosive conditions.

120

R. Slyvka and I. Zakutynska

7.4 Phases of the Conflict in the Urban Space of Zolote The town of Zolote and its outskirts, like many other towns in Donbas, has been a battlefield between the parties to the conflict for a long time. Its population was obliged to adapt to the conditions of constant uncertainty and constant threat to lose its property, health and even life. On the example of Zolote, conflict dynamics can be described in several phases. In this section, the key events that mark the political turmoil and military actions from 2014 to the beginning of 2020 are presented. The first phase lasted from thebeginning of armed opposition to the unilateral ceasefire by the Ukrainian forces on July 15th, 2014. During this period, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine observed early signs of rapid deterioration of the security situation as in April 2014. Initially, demands from protestors in the east were a referendum on the federalisation of Ukraine and the recognition of the Russian language as a second State language. Groups of armed men in a wellorganised and coordinated fashion unlawfully seized public buildings and police and security facilities in cities and towns across Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 15 December 2014: 3). On April 14th , the Government launched an anti-terrorist operation (ATO) to re-establish control over those territories.1 Two weeks later, the self-proclaimed “Luhansk People’s Republic” was announced to have been established, contravening the constitution of Ukraine and international norms and standards (Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 15 December 2014: 3). From April till August 2014, the town of Zolote was under the actual control of the militants of the self-proclaimed LPR. Then-mayor of Zolote V. Kochevenko actively supported and implemented the ideas of the “Russian world”. He organised illegal “referendum” in the town to support the act of establishing LPR. Between May and mid-August, Zolote was under the control of paramilitary groups of “Don Cossacks”, most of which were Russian citizens. They established their anarchic regime here and conflicted with the authorities of the self-proclaimed LPR in Luhansk and other paramilitaries. At this stage, the illegal armed groups focused their activities on capturing key administrative structures, establishing control over military units and divisions of power structures. Ukrainian armed groups, involving the army, military police (National Guard), the National Security Service (NSS) and volunteer battalions, opposed them. The second phase lasted from the middle of August to September 5th, 2014 when the tripartite Minsk Agreement was signed. The second phase of the conflict is associated with successful actions of Ukrainian Armed Forces and other armed groups. On August 15th, Zolote-5 was retaken. During the reporting period, front line moved to the suburbs of the nearest town of Pervomaisk, which became an arena of fighting (Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 17 August 2014: 7). In mid-August, Ukrainian forces managed to separate the LPR and DPR and created a corridor between them. At that time the two sides of the conflict used more and more heavy armament, including artillery, missiles, tanks, military aviation and helicopters. This immediately caused the destruction of the urban environment. Besides, 1 In

2018 it was renamed Joint Forces Operation (JFO).

7 How Do State and Military Borders …

121

UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine confirms that current intense fighting using heavy weaponry in and around populated areas has devastated towns and villages, demolishing residential buildings and killing an increasing number of their inhabitants (Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 15 December 2014: 3). There has been deliberate targeting critical public utilities like water, electricity and sewerage plants by the armed groups to shut down essential supplies to the residents. Public and private properties were illegally seized and residences destroyed. Banks were robbed and coal mines attacked. Railways were blown up. Hospitals and clinics were forced to shut down and essential medicines and emergency medical services became scarce or totally unavailable. The period ended in a counterattack of illegal armed groups of DPR and LPR, supported by military forces, equipped with weapons Russian citizens (Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 15 December 2014: 3). In the first half and the middle of September, intense fighting took place every day. Ukraine lost its control over Pervomaisk and Zolote-5 (Shtohrin 2019). Political arrangements resulted in the ratification of Minsk Protocol on September 5th, 2014, the main item of which was “complete ceasefire” (Memorandum… 2014). Besides, the cease of units and force modules of the parties on the line of their contact as of September 19th, 2014 have been introduced. The third phase began in the autumn of 2014 and lasted until November 2019. On the territories of Popasna, Zolote and Pervomaisk a relatively constant line of confrontation has been formed between the Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian formations of territorial defense “Prizrak” and individual Cossack paramilitary units. It was then that the town of Zolote was finally divided into four government-controlled districts and one non-controlled Zolote-5. Well-defined geographical parameters of this confrontation have been documented: 1) the confrontation line; 2) line of separation of heavy weapons. De facto, the confrontation line ran along the railroad; between the checkpoints and positions of Ukrainian forces and separatists, the informal “grey zone”, i.e. the territory controlled neither by Ukrainian nor by the so-called LPR authorities, has been formed. It is within this zone that the “war of small sabotage groups” began in 2015. The activities of these groups included intense shelling of Ukrainian positions by means of grenade launchers and mortars. This “war of small groups” was accompanied by active bilateral mining of “diversionally dangerous” areas and directions (Tymchuk et al., 2016: 122). For instance, local population has not been able to reach the town cemetery since 2016—it has been mine-studded (Zolote: vid pochatku viiny… 2020).

7.5 Socio-Economic and Human Consequences of Divisions in Zolote Armed clashes and shelling in the area of Zolote continued for 6 years. Periods of relative hush interchanged with periods of firing activation. From October 2014 to March 2020, based on long-term reports of the National Security and Defense

122

R. Slyvka and I. Zakutynska

Council of Ukraine (Sytuatsiia v zoni… 2015), it is possible to identify 15 periods of a prolonged escalation of shelling. Ukrainian authorities linked the activation of militants to the arrival of ammunition from Russia under the guise of a “humanitarian convoy” or on the eve of important diplomatic negotiations over the future of Donbas (Luhanska oblasna derzhavna administratsiia: … 2014). Human rights groups (Asieiev et al. 2018; “We live like in a reservation” 2017) have documented evidence of the location of military units of the Armed forces of Ukraine, as well as LPR militants, near residential buildings and social infrastructure. Residential areas have become targets for shelling. That is why relations of local residents and militants were not always good, which was explained by difficulties to come to an understanding under conditions of hostilities and restrictions the latter imposed on the life of citizens (Zolote: vid pochatku viiny… 2020). According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Group, indiscriminate shelling has reportedly resulted in civilian causalities. During 2014–2018, 20 people were killed and the other 23 injured in Zolote (“We live like in a reservation”, 2017:18). Shelling resulted in the damage of 2 mines, 187 private residences, 159 buildings of communal property including schools, a post office, St. Nicholas’ Church and others (“We live like in a reservation” 2017: 17, 37). The largest number of damaged houses was in Zolote-3 and Zolote-4 (Voronova 2016). Shelling destroyed power lines, gas pipelines, and water pipes, supplying water from the town of Popasna. Since September 2015 a coal mine located in the controlled by LPR town of Pervomaisk has been flooded due to shelling. As a result, water flows from inactive mines in the uncontrolled area to inactive mine “Rodina” and operating mine “Zolote” in the controlled area (Tereshchenko 2019). Due to the presence of mines on the roadsides, access to some parts of the town is limited, which leads to the isolation of people and cuts off access to basic services. Injured or sick residents are not often able to use emergency medical services. In such conditions, the work of local civil-military humanitarian organisations on the reconstruction of housing and provision of humanitarian assistance is extremely important. Many people live in the occupied part, but they have to get to work in a controlled area where two mines are still operating. In the village of Rodina, as of 2015, there was a single unofficially (Pietsukh 2020) operating checkpoint in Luhansk region, but it was constantly shelled. From July 2015, bus communication between the towns Zolote-4 and Lysychansk was resumed. By April 2016, local people used to cross the line of collision through hidden paths, thereby risking to be fired on or blown up by a land mine. However, “food tourism” and “pension tourism” succeeded and 400–500 people crossed the railway track every day. During the first two years of the war, there were cases when volunteer battalions facilitated smuggling through a confrontation line for selffinancing (Moskal… 2015). In January 2017, the Ukrainian military unexpectedly blocked the illegal footpath with barbed wire. Two months later, the government’s decision terminated the transport connection with the uncontrolled territories, and the economic blockade began simultaneously. The local population was forced to switch to the use of Russian imported products. On the occupied part of Donbass, the Russian ruble has actually displaced the Ukrainian Hryvnia. The unrecognised

7 How Do State and Military Borders …

123

governments created their own banks and began to issue payment cards to residents of the occupied territories. The intensive distance of the region from Ukraine and approaching Russia began. In Donbass, Ukraine and Russia are competing for school leavers from the occupied territories by providing substantial benefits. The Ukrainian biometric passport is an element of “soft power” as it is ranked higher in the global ranking than the Russian one and allows travel across the EU (Global Passport Power Rank 2020). Ukraine is overdue, but has begun the restoration of dilapidated road infrastructure in the Luhansk region as part of the government’s large-scale “Greate construction” project announced by the government at the beginning of 2020 (“Velyke budivnytstvo”… 2020). Even more important is the maintenance of the state mines in Zolote, which influences the socio-economic situation in the mining town, and the uninterrupted payment of salaries. To improve the humanitarian situation along the demarcation line, Ukrainian government has organised a number of entry-exit check-points on the confrontation line with LPR. On March 31st, 2016, car and foot crossing check-point Zolote was established, intended to relieve a single pedestrian check-point in StanytsiaLuhanska. However, it operated for a very short time because of militants blocking its work insisting on establishing a checkpoint near the town of Shchastia. This, in its turn, does not satisfy the Ukrainian side in terms of security situation. So, only local residents of the “grey zone” are allowed to pass the checkpoint in Zolote (Fig. 7.5). From April 2018 till March 2019, to confront the secessionists the government Joint Forces started applying the so-called salami-slice strategy. Its purpose is gradual improving the position of Ukrainian forces in the “grey zone” by aligning the front

Fig. 7.5 Divided by military border town of Zolote (April 2020). Source Authors’ own elaboration

124

R. Slyvka and I. Zakutynska

line and occupying certain settlements (Katerynivka village, Zolote-4, and small neighbourhood Khutir Vilnyi). This contributed to a PR campaign aimed at forming the image of the president Petro Poroshenko as a strong leader. Another aspect was the fact that in such a way, the territory that used to be a “grey zone” turned into a battlefield (Zolote: vid pochatku viiny... 2020), as the LPR militants also set up their positions near the Katerynivka and fired on new positions of Ukrainian forces. Many families have left this part of Zolote due to such events. Volodymyr Zelensky’s victory in the 2019 presidential election in Ukraine was due to the slogan of reconciliation in the Donbas and criticism of President Poroshenko’s mistakes. Upon taking office, Ukraine’s newly elected political leader sought to propose peacekeeping initiatives to accelerate the Normandy Format summit in Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France. The town of Zolote became one of three points on the line of confrontation, where the idea of breeding the opposing parties was realised. The consequence was the demilitarisation of a small area in the socalled “grey zone” (Fig. 7.5). Ukrainian veterans and volunteers have always tried to prevent the withdrawal of troops from Zolote-4. There were fears that separatists would occupy the abandoned areas. The pro-Russian separatists also did not stop any shelling. Zolote has become a central element of domestic confrontation, which is widely broadcast by the media. Finally, forces and hardware have been withdrawn on November 26, 2020. The Normandy Format summit was held in December of the same year. However, neither the first nor the second event brought a definitive end to the confrontation. On February 18, 2020, a violent escalation of violence took place again (Enemy offensive in Donbas, 2020). The prospect of reunification and removing the dividing line is uncertain. Russia is putting heavy pressure on Ukraine to recognize the LPR and the DPR. At the same time, in May 2019 began the mass provision of residents of unrecognised republics of Russian citizenship (Executive order… 2019). As of 2020, 250 thousand passports have been issued. The situation is exacerbated and confirmed by the most gloomy assumptions and the fact that the Ukrainian identity (Fig. 7.6) is completely squeezed out in these territories and the Russian mercenaries no longer hide their plans (Loseva 2018). In the case of reintegration of Donbas territories into Ukraine, a large group of persons with dual citizenship will find themselves within its boundaries. They may be used for further Russian intervention in the internal affairs of Ukraine.

7.6 Conclusion On the example of divided urban space of Milove/Chertkovo and Zolote, this chapter shows that the war in the Donbas has increased the economic, social distance between citizens. Additional legal and material boundaries were established. These towns have become a fortified gateway to the exchange of people between Ukraine, Russia and the self-proclaimed republics. In the first stage of the conflict, characterised by the aggravation of armed bloody confrontation, the physical and legal boundaries were not so peremptory in dividing the common urban spaces. The last years of the conflict

7 How Do State and Military Borders …

125

Fig. 7.6 Patriotic wall art manifests Ukrainian iconography in Zolote. Photo Authors

were characterised by a steady decrease in economic, communication and transport interdependence. Damaged and reconstructed buildings, as well as new ideological symbols, have filled the cultural landscape of divided towns. So far, people are still united by family ties, education, business earnings and the belief in peace. Up to now, there is no consensus on what basis will be built this peace. Will it not become the so-called “hybrid” peace as the war that started it? The President of Ukraine has demonstrated the prospect of reconciliation to citizens, which eliminates the contradictions, losses and insults that have accumulated not only during the war but long before it in Soviet and independent periods of Ukrainian history. This is a difficult task. Russia’s unprecedented stance on supporting quasi-state projects in the post-Soviet space calls into question the effectiveness of peaceful dialogue. The civil society of Ukraine continues to debate what way the implementation of steps to reconcile and return the Donbas would change Ukraine. Due to the longterm fall in global energy prices, we may expect a reduction of the power potential of Russia and strengthening of Ukrainian positions. The fate of divided cities, therefore, depends not only on the strategy and tactics of diplomats and the military but also on the “black swans” of the oil market prices. Immersed in its internal problems, Russia probably will no longer be able to support separatists. Ukraine has to offer a project of an attractive future to Donbas, such kind as “Great construction” project for modernisation of Ukrainian cities. And the first beneficiaries should be the inhabitants of Zolote and Milove.

126

R. Slyvka and I. Zakutynska

References Alforov M (2012) Urbanizatsiini protsesy v Ukraini v 1945–1991. Skhidnyi vydavnychyi dim, Donetsk Asieiev Yu, Yehorova A, Ye Z, Pylaiev S, Smelianska Ya (2018) Dopovid pro vtraty tsyvilnoho naselennia, ruinuvannia zhytla ta infrastruktury vnaslidok zbroinoho konfliktu na Skhodi Ukrainy. Prava liudyny, Kharkivska pravozakhysna hrupa, Kharkiv Boiechko V, Hanzha O, Zakharchuk B (1994) Kordony Ukrainy: istorychna retrospektyva ta suchasnyi stan. Osnovy, Kyiv Bozhko Y (2014) Na Luhanshchyni pochaly vidnovliuvaty zruinovanyi terorystamy prykordonnyi punkt “Milove”. www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1374110-na-luganschini-pochali-vidnovlyuvati-zru ynovaniy-teroristami-prikordonniy-punkt-milove. Accessed: 01 June 2020 Bukhtiiarov I, Rieutskyi K (2018) “Nache u viaznytsi”: yak parkanom na kordoni rozdilyly simi v Milovomu na Luhanshchyni. https://hromadske.ua/posts/parkan-u-milovomu-iak-na-luhanshch yni-rozdilyly-simi-kordonom-z-rosiieiu. Accessed: 06 June 2020 Chertkovo Wikipedia. Accessed: 24 Apr 2020 D’Anieri P, Kuzio T (2019) Ukraine after five years of conflict, Journal. Eurasian Geogr Econ 60(1):1–5. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.1635512 Enemy offensive in Donbas: Ukraine loses ground near Zolote—media (Video), UNIAN 18 (February 2020). www.unian.info/war/10878740-enemy-offensive-in-donbas-ukraine-loses-gro und-near-zolote-media-video.html. Accessed: 07 June 2020 Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva. Slovnykova chastyna (EU-II) (1984) T. 10. Pairs, New York Executive order on certain categories of foreign citizens and stateless persons entitled to fast-track procedure when applying for Russian citizenship (2019). https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ news/60429. Accessed: 03 June 2020 Gentile M (2019) Geopolitical fault-line cities in the world of divided cities. Polit Geo 71:126–138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.03.002 Global Passport Power Rank (2020) www.passportindex.org/byRank.php Horbulin V (2017) The World Hybrid War: Ukrainian Forefront. Monograph, Kharkiv, Folio Kolbasin V, Golovanov R (2015) Rossiyskiye poyezda v obkhod Ukrainy uzhe idut. Khronologiya. https://sneg5.com/obshchestvo/transport/rossiyskie-poezda-v-obhod-ukrainy.html. Accessed: 2019.06.01 Krinko E, Tatarinov I (2014) We are Russia and you are Ukraine and we don’t care about you ...: Territorial Disputes within the Priazov Area and Donbas in 1920s, Bylye Gody 34(4):639–644 Kulchytskyi S, Yakubova L (2015) Donechchyna i Luhanshchyna u XVII–XXI st.: istorychni faktory y politychni tekhnolohii formuvannia osoblyvoho ta zahalnoho u rehionalnomu prostori. Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy Kuromiya H (1998) Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s– 1990s. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Kuzio T (2017) Putin’s war against Ukraine. Revolution, Nationalism, and Crime. Toronto, University of Toronto Lennon O, Adams G (2019) All is quiet on the Russian front: ceasefires and the pursuit of legitimacy by self-proclaimed “republics” in Ukraine. Eurasian Geogr Econ 60(6):656–683 Loseva O (2018) Kreml postavyv khrest na sprobakh Ukrainy povernuty Donbas, viddanyi nakaz: “Do 1 travnia...”, Politeka (20.02.2018). https://politeka.net/uk/politics/252948-kreml-postavilkrest-na-popytkah-ukrainy-vernut-donbass-otdan-prikaz-do-1-maya. Accessed: 03 June 2020 LODA: U somomu rosiiskomu “humkonvoi” buly tilky boieprypasy (2014). https://dt.ua/ UKRAINE/loda-u-somomu-rosiyskomu-gumkonvoyi-buli-tilki-boyepripasi-156725_.html. Accessed: 01 June 2020 Magazova A, Dubchak A (2019) Melovoe v Luhanskoi oblasty: konets Druzhby narodov. https:// ru.krymr.com/a/melovoe-konec-druzhby-narodov/29698105.html. Accessed: 01 June 2020

7 How Do State and Military Borders …

127

Matychak T (2019) Europe’s Donbas: How Western Capital Industrialized Eastern Ukraine. https://ukraineworld.org/articles/ukraine-explained/europes-donbas-how-western-cap ital-industrialized-eastern-ukraine. Accessed 07 June 2020 Melnyk I (2017) Miski poselennia Luhanshchyny: novi vyklyky na foni starykh problem. In: Mezentsev K, Oliinyk Y, Mezentseva N (eds), Urbanistychna Ukraina: v epitsentri prostorovykh zmin (pp. 121–142). Kyiv: Feniks, 121–142 Memorandum of 19 September 2014 outlining the parameters for the implementation of commitments of the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014. www.osce.org/home/123806. Accessed: 03 June 2020 Moskal vysunuv ultymatum biitsiam “Tornado” (2015). https://web.archive.org/web/201506181 71420/http://www.ukrinform.ua/ukr/news/moskal_visunuv_ultimatum_biytsyam_tornado_2 065374. Accessed: 03 June 2020 Mykhnenko V (2020) Causes and consequences of the war in Eastern Ukraine: an economic geography perspective. Europe-Asia Studies 3(72):528–560. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2019. 1684447 Osipian AL, Osipian AL (2006) Why Donbass Votes for Yanukovych: confronting the ukrainian orange revolution. Demokratizatsiya, the Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 4:495–517 Pietsukh M (2020) Dirky na linii frontu, abo Yak pratsiuiut nelehalni tropy v zoni ATO. www.pra vda.com.ua/articles/2017/06/9/7146187/. Accessed: 03 June 2020 Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine (2014). www.un.org.ua/images/stories/OHCHR_ Report_on_Ukraine_15_December.pdf. Accessed: 03 June 2020 Shevel O (2015) Russia and the Near Abroad. Great Decisions 5–16 Shtohrin I (2019) P’iat rokiv pidpysanniu Minskykh uhod: pastka dlia Ukrainy chy mekhanizm strymuvannia Rosii? www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30146733.html. Accessed: 03 June 2020 Slyvka R, Atamaniuk Y, Slyvka L (2017) Transformations of the cultural landscape of Donbas during the armed conflict 2015–2017. Studia Z Geografii Politycznej I Historycznej 6:305–326 Sytuatsiia v zoni boiovykh dii na Donbasi (lypen – serpen 2014 r.) (2015). www.radiosvoboda.org/ a/26969959.html. Accessed: 07 June 2020 Tereshchenko O (2019) Ekolohichna katastrofa: chomu polovyna terytorii Donbasu mozhe staty neprydatnoiu dlia zhyttia. https://hromadske.radio/publications/ekologichna-katastrofa-chomupolovyna-terytoriyi-donbasu-mozhe-staty-neprydatnoyu-dlya-zhyttya Accessed: 01 June 2020 Tymchuk D, Karin Yu, Mashovets K, Gusarov V (2016) Vtorhnennia v Ukrainu: Khronika rosiiskoi ahresii. Brait Star Pablishynh, Kyiv Ukrinform: Chernyshov says Great Construction project is important regional development tool (2020). www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ukrinform-chernyshov-says-great-construction-pro ject-is-important-regional-development-tool.html. Accessed: 07 June 2020 Velyke budivnytstvo pochynaietsia zi Stanytsi Luhanskoi (2020). https://lg.ukravtodor.gov.ua/ press/news/velyke_budivnytstvo_pochynaietsia_zi__stanytsi_luhanskoi.html. Accessed: 01 June 2020 Voronova Y (2016) Bez kryshy nad holovoi: kak pomohaiut, ostavshymsia bez doma zhyteliam Luhanshchyny. https://tribun.com.ua/38314. Accessed: 01 June 2020 V Ukraini zminylysia pravyla peretynu kordonu z Rosiieiu (2020). https://zmina.info/news/v-ukr ayini-zminylys-pravyla-peretynu-kordonu-iz-rosiyeyu/. Accessed: 01 June 2020 Website of the Administration of Chertkovsky district of the Rostov region. https://chertkov.don land.ru. Accessed: 02 June 2020 Website of the Consultant Plus company. www.consultant.ru. Accessed: 03 June 2020 We live like in a reservation. The humanitarian situation and the plight of civilians in territories adjacent to the contact line in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions (2018). https://civicmonitoring.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Web_Human-rights-monitoring2017_en.pdf. Accessed: 01 June 2020 Zhurzhenko T (2015) Ukraine’s Eastern Borderlands: the end of ambiguity? In: Wilson A (ed) What Does Ukraine Think? ECFR, London, pp 45–52 Zeido Z, Ibold N (2019) The division of Aleppo city: Heritage and urban space urban heritage in divided. Cities 87–104. 10.4324/9780429460388-6

128

R. Slyvka and I. Zakutynska

Zhurzhenko T (2010) Borderlands into bordered lands: geopolitics of identity in post-Soviet Ukraine. Ibidem Verlag, Stuttgart Zimmer K (2007) Trapped in Past Glory: Self-Identification and Self-Symbolisation in the Donbass. In: Swain A (ed) Re-Constructing the Post-Soviet Industrial Region The Donbas in Transition. Routledge, London, pp 97–121 Zolote: vid pochatku viiny i do ostannoho boiu (2020). https://truth-hounds.org/zolote-obstril-1802-20/. Accessed: 01 June 2020 Zorko M, Novak N (2019) Classifying Divided Cities: the Need for Geopolitical Perspective. Sociologija I Prostor 57:159–171. https://doi.org/10.5673/sip.57.2.3

Roman Slyvka holds a PhD in human geography from Ivan Franko National University of Lviv. He currently works as an Associate Professor at the Department of Geography and Natural Sciences at the Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine. His research interests include theory of geography of conflicts, political and territorial conflicts in Donbas and Crimea, urban political geography, ethnic geography. Iryna Zakutynska holds a PhD in human geography from Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine where she currently works as an Associate Professor at the Department of Geography and Natural Sciences. Her research interests focus on urbanisation and suburbanisation processes in Ukraine and throughout the world, as well as arrangement of public space in Ukrainian cities.

Part III

Historical Turning Points and Contested Urban Spaces. Between Multicultural Heritage and National Ideology

Chapter 8

Cultural Atavism in the Face of an Environmental Disaster: Skopje 2014 in the limelight Mirek Dymitrow

Abstract Great social challenges of today, and the conflicts arising therefrom, no longer come one by one. What makes them great is their entanglement in one other and across multiple levels. Similarly, spatial conflicts seldom arise in isolation, but result from simmering tensions that may manifest in a more insidious fashion, namely by appealing to intangible values. This chapter looks into one such spatial project in Skopje, which by its scope and content transpires as less spatial than ideological, yet which nonetheless affects space in a negative way. How could Skopje, a vibrant Balkan city spared by the Yugoslav Wars, turns into the world’s most polluted city and a “megalomaniac Disneyland” on the canvas of geopolitical disrepute, staggering corruption and ethnic tensions? To explain the situation, this chapter makes use of the concept of cultural atavism. Its preposition is that when a population’s fundamental existential values are threatened, co-existent tame problems may be left behind in pursuit of primordial yet abstract values. Such dispersion of priorities, however, may create a great social challenge in itself. In Skopje, this was characterised by a pursuit of identity politics in the face of much more tangible problems, like an impending environmental disaster. Keywords Spatial conflict · Identity politics · Great social challenge · Wicked problem · Cultural atavism · Skopje 2014

8.1 Introduction Spatial conflicts are a staple of modern societal organisation, luring at the intersection of planning, power and politics (Najjar 2019). A spatial conflict, in the most general sense, is a struggle for the control of space. Spatial conflicts are thus competing quests for order, in which two or more parties fight to establish spatial order to M. Dymitrow (B) Department of Human Geography, Lund University, Lund, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] Department of Economy and Society - Unit for Human Geography, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_8

131

132

M. Dymitrow

their own advantage (Biagini 1993). Spatial conflicts may unfold in an uncontrolled fashion, creating war and destruction, but, more often than not, they are fought within institutional frameworks, under the guise of spatialised projects (Dymitrow and Brauer 2016; Dymitrow and Ingelhag 2020). For a conflict to become spatial, it needs to be borne out of a spatial project. Almost all societal projects are spatialised, i.e. restricted to some form of spatial focus. However, what “spatial” may mean in any particular context varies, as “space” itself is a very wide designator. There are spatial projects referring to the geographical scale of the project, such as global, local or regional projects. There are spatial projects referring to hierarchies of political entities, such as state, county or municipal projects. There are spatial projects referring to the character and quality of the area of deployment, such as rural, urban or nature projects. There are spatial projects referring to the relations between the involved actors, such as national, international or supranational projects. Finally, there are spatial projects referring to specific administrative or functional units, such as the City Park, Warsaw, Lake Balaton or the Danube (Dymitrow 2020a). But there are also spatial projects, which by their scope and content transpire as less spatial than ideological, yet which nonetheless affect space, although in a more insidious fashion. They creep in on you, without public consent or a transparency, they appeal to the most important you have—your identity, and then, out of the sudden, they hit you in the face with an end product you didn’t see coming. In this chapter, I look into one such instance of a “controlled” spatial conflict, which, while sanctioned institutionally, has contributed to a series of, much more serious, spatial conflicts that have careened out of control. We are in North Macedonia, a small landlocked country in the Balkans that has hit the headlines many times recently, unfortunately for all the wrong reasons: meddling in US elections with fake news, political corruption, abject poverty, extreme pollution and a hardfought naming dispute (Markovi´c and Nikolov 2017). The last one forms the point of entry for this chapter’s orientation, as it was decisive for much of the orientation of Macedonia’s identity-centred path of development and the spatial conflicts that arose therefrom.

8.2 Contextual Background Since this chapter deals with spatial conflicts embroiled in a national identity controversy, some background is necessary for context. The area that takes up the parameters of modern-day North Macedonia (25,713 km2 and 2 million people) is a product of Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980)—the Father of Socialist Yugoslavia. Initially part of what was then the Vardar Province, after the Second World War, it became the Socialist Republic of Macedonia within the Yugoslav Federation. A major reason for this was Tito’s wish to wipe out the remnants of Bulgarophile sentiments of those who did not wish to become part of Yugoslavia. Notable here is that Macedonisation, a nation-building process, started only in the

8 Cultural Atavism in the Face of an Environmental Disaster …

133

late nineteenth century among separatists seeking the autonomy of the region of Macedonia from the Ottoman Empire. Prior to that, the Macedonian language was widely considered a western dialect of Bulgarian (Mazon 1923: 4), while the notion of Macedonians as a separate community has been shaped by a language shift and population displacement in the twentieth century (Stern and Voss 2006). In 1991, Yugoslavia broke up after the Yugoslav Wars, and a series of conflicts erupted in the 1990s due to unresolved tensions between ethnic minorities (Dérens 2017). Macedonia was the only former Yugoslav republic to gain independence without any bloodshed, although it did experience an Albanian-instigated insurgency in 2001 (Pajaziti 2012). After the transition of the political system to parliamentary democracy, SR Macedonia changed its official name to Republic of Macedonia and declared itself an independent country on 8 September 1991. This is when the modern political mess with Greece alit. The dispute arose from the ambiguity in nomenclature between the independent Republic of Macedonia and the adjacent Greek region of Macedonia with regard to the connotations to the ancient Hellenic Kingdom of Macedon, to which Greeks claims the sole right of heritage. Greece opposed the use of the name “Macedonia” by the new country without adding a geographical qualifier (such as “Northern” or “Upper”). Since over 2 million ethnic Greeks identify themselves as Macedonians, Greece further objected to the use of the term “Macedonian” for the neighbouring country’s largest ethnic group and language. Greece accused the Republic of Macedonia for appropriating symbols and figures historically considered part of Greek culture, but also of promoting the irredentist concept of “United Macedonia”, with claims to territories scattered across Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, Kosovo and Serbia. Whilst Macedonia remained a federal subject of Yugoslavia, the name—while opposed by Greece even back then—was not as conspicuous as when the subject became independent, with international recognition and representation (Götz et al. 2017). The period that followed was one of hostility and acrimony between the two countries, with Greece being the unwanted spiritus movens for the direction of Macedonia’s post-independence development. In 1994–95, Greece imposed a trade embargo on Macedonia, which greatly affected its economy. Since the lifting of the Greek embargo, Greece has become the country’s most important business partner; however, the geopolitical situation has remained tense and relations cold-shouldered. Most importantly, Greece, as a member state of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, has unequivocally exercised its right to veto Macedonia’s accession to the EU and NATO (processes initiated in 2004 and 1999) in the absence of a resolution to the naming dispute (Tziampiris 2012). Ever since, the country was called the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYRoM), a phrase considered offensive to Macedonians due to its identity-depriving reference to a collapsed socialist state. Greece’s steadfastness has been relentless. For instance, despite Macedonia’s reluctant decision to change its national flag and ensign in 1995 by replacing the contested Vergina Sun with the current eight-rayed ‘new sun of Liberty’, Greece sustained its position about Macedonia’s place on the international arena.

134

M. Dymitrow

8.3 Identity Pursuit Amidst an Environmental Crisis The identity conflict that arose soon translated into a spatial conflict, the epicentre of which became Skopje, North Macedonia’s capital. Being the country’s primate city with more than 500 thousand inhabitants, Skopje was perfect for the identity experiment also in other ways. The city’s history of spatial development has experienced a slew of fragmented projects in the wake of the 1963 earthquake that destroyed almost 80% of the urban area, leaving over 150 thousand inhabitants without a place to live (cf. Koželj and Stefanovska 2012). And while the disaster became a unique opportunity to rebuild the city from scratch, the opportunity has been partially lost when the city was sacrificed at the hands of experimental urban planning that virtually cut off free air circulation through the city streets. This, in combination with Skopje’s gorge-like topography between two mountain ranges, has given rise to extremely poor mixing of ambient air and thus acute pollution (Stafilov et al. 2003): You just cannot live in Skopje from October to March (Hotel manager, male, 32). The problem escalates every winter due to unregulated industrial and agricultural emissions, smoke from wood-burning stoves and exhaust fumes from old and overabundant cars (Anttila et al. 2016). According to EU standards, the environmental situation in North Macedonia remains totally incompatible with the community acquis (EC 2018). Unsurprisingly, in December 2017 and January 2020 Skopje spiked up as the world’s most polluted city (Arsovski et al. 2018). Underdeveloped local transport, insufficient parking places, and illegal and uncontrolled landfills exacerbate the situation, with air pollution in Skopje exceeding acceptable levels 269 days per year, causing 1,300 premature deaths annually (Georgievski 2017) (Fig. 8.1). Macedonia is choking in with the increasingly polluted air, and SDSM’s1 government still has not come out yet with measures for its prevention. Do people have to die in order for them to come out with certain measures? The whole responsibility and all of the institutions that have to react are in the hands of SDSM (Press release of VMRO-DPMNE,2 7 November 2017).

The above quote, while factually correct, came from VMRO-DPMNE, a rightwing nationalist party that has been in opposition since the 2016 Macedonian parliamentary election, which they eventually lost to the social democrats, SDSM, despite winning the popular vote (SDSM came to form a coalition with the Albanian-interest party amidst a crass election scandal). What is controversial about VMRO-DPMNE’s sudden onset of concern for SDSM’s measure for pollution prevention is the criticising party’s pattern of expenditure during its long reign since 2009. In spite of severe environmental and socio-economic problems, this period saw Macedonia’s scarce resources spent on an array of controversial ventures, the flagship being Skopje 2014.

1 Social

Democratic Union of Macedonia. Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation—Democratic Party for Macedonian National

2 Internal

Unity.

8 Cultural Atavism in the Face of an Environmental Disaster …

135

Fig. 8.1 Pollution in Skopje: a thick smog over the city; b industrial smoke exuded into the atmosphere; c water and soil pollution; d AirVisual app scan revealing Skopje as the world’s most polluted city on 14 December 2017. Photos M. Morell and S. Arsovski

8.4 Enter Skopje 2014 Skopje 2014 was an urban development project, launched in 2009 to give Skopje a classical, monumental, metropolitan and visually more pleasing image (West, 2015). The official aim of the endeavour was to equipoise Skopje’s mostly plain modernist architecture that sprung up in the wake of the 1963 Skopje earthquake, which destroyed most of its neoclassical buildings (Petrovi´c 2016). A posterchild of the emboldened former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, the project was part of his government’s wider “antiquisation” policy that had sought to attach the history of the ancient kingdom of Macedon to the newly formed (1991) Republic of Macedonia. This included usurping, by way of propinquity, famous figures like Alexander the Great and Philip II of Macedon, their names given to airports, stadiums and main roads. At the height of the antiquisation movement, a high delegation of the Hunza tribe from Northern Pakistan was invited to Skopje for a two-weeks visit in mid-2008 (BIRN 2008). The Hunza people claim to be descendants of the army of Alexander the Great as a result of his kingdom’s furthest expansion by 323 BC. The move was therefore a further, albeit highly controversial, step towards fortification of the ancient bloodline narrative by claiming consanguinity between the Hunzas and the Slavic Macedonians.

136

M. Dymitrow

Moreover, with the Republic of Macedonia being mostly a Slavic country, the project was seen as politically controversial in that it tried to further impose the narrative of Macedonian history, by promoting a Macedonian identity through unbroken continuity from antiquity, over the Middle Ages, to the modern times (Janev 2017a). Because of the specific timing of the project, the pseudo-nationalistic appeal of the project was quickly interpreted as an act of retaliation (or political pressure) towards neighbouring Greece for blocking Macedonia’s access to the EU and NATO over the ongoing name dispute (Georgievski 2009). And while some appreciated its classical nod to the past, many saw as the reason behind the project a wish to restore the missing sense of national pride for a people without (generally accepted) prior history of independence or even a general recognition as a distinctive people (cf. Brown 2003). In that sense, Skopje 2014 was an embodiment of nationalism by a conservative government, which focused as much on giving the metropolis a facelift as changing the nation’s history (Tanuszewska 2017). The stubbornness of the famous “Balkan mentality” (Kitromilides 1996; Todorova 2004) has not helped ease the zeal.

8.5 The Aesthetics of Ancient Belongings In terms of apparition, Skopje 2014 rivals perhaps only Pyongyang (North Korea) and Ashgabat (Turkmenistan) for eccentricities and has been described as a “miniLas Vegas” and a “megalomaniac Disneyland”. Involving massive construction of governmental buildings, museums and monuments depicting historical figures and artefacts from the wider region of Macedonia, the project was heavily criticised as geopolitical suicide, but also as pure kitsch. Assembled in the vein of the past hubristic endeavours in line with Albert Speer’s Welthauptstadt Germania or Nicolae Ceaus, escu’s Project Bucharest, its contemporary equivalents are largely regarded as anachronisms that should have been avoided (cf. Gold 2009). In urban renewal, three conditions need to be fulfilled (Dymitrow 2014). First, the intervention needs be consistent with the inferred logic about what “urban” is thought to be. Second, the intervention must respect the scale, individuality and social context of the place of deployment. Lastly, the intervention needs to focus on the basics rather than the details to align with its goals. In view of the deluge of criticism the project has received, none of these conditions has been fulfilled. Instead, the project has defied the basic academic principles of architecture and functionality (Arsovski 1994) by thwarting regional specificity, imposing historical discontinuity and galvanising mistrust in the authorities for mismanaging social life (Pojani 2018). Quoting Dragan et al. (2019), the project turned into a “confusing component of a troubled history in an even more confusing contemporaneity”. As the bizarre nation-building endeavour it was, the project involved a number of curiously cosmopolitan additions (Graan 2013; Gillet 2015). Replete with romantic gazebos, statues and a full-scale Paris—style Triumphal Arch— “Porta Macedonia” (Fig. 8.3d), the project has been criticised for mixing different styles (classicism, baroque, colonialism, romanticism, futurism) and points of mimicry (Paris, Berlin,

8 Cultural Atavism in the Face of an Environmental Disaster …

137

Athens, Vienna, Havana) in cumbersome proportions and with slipshod finishes, using cheap, easily degradable materials (cf. Petrovi´c 2016). The cityscape of Skopje amidst the implementation of the project Skopje 2014 not only involved pseudonationalistic structures but also a plethora of other far-going visions. Among them were the three fake conquistador-inspired galleys in best Christopher Columbus style, ornamented with gilt figureheads at the prow, “anchored” in shallow water while exposing a bedding of litter and plastic bottles at low tide (Fig. 8.2b). Another quirk of the project is the (still unfinished) Prater-style Ferris wheel to be erected on a specially constructed bridge across the river Vardar, its refurbished quays equipped with a beach volley court and a boardwalk adorned with imported palm trees, which withered the very same year they were planted. Survived the winter, though, did the three willows planted in giant metal containers in the middle of the Vardar, at 317 thousand euro the most expensive project in the competition of the Ministry of Culture, apart from Porta Macedonia (Fig. 8.3d). Another quirk of Skopje 2014 was the Eye Bridge (2,75 million euro), a simulacrum aspiring to the Charles Bridge in Prague with its avalanche of sculptures (28!) yet being at less than 1/5 in size of the Bohemian masterpiece (talk about being eyed at!—at least the name of the bridge rang true); unfortunately, its marble railings, just two years later after construction had cracked. Illuminated fountains, a mountain tower, decorative fences, hollow gilded bridge railings and a carousel (mounted at the

Fig. 8.2 Some oeuvres of Skopje 2014. Top left: Museum of the Macedonian Struggle and Equine Fountain on the Philip II Square; top right: a fake river galley; bottom left: the Constitutional Court, the State Archives and the Archaeological Museum; bottom right: façade replacement using faux-baroque pillars and entablature. Photos S. Arsovski and B. Blazhevski

138

M. Dymitrow

Fig. 8.3 Some oeuvres of the Skopje 2014 urban development project. Top left: Monument of the Fallen Heroes of Macedonia; top right: Government House in borrowed plumes (new façade); bottom left; Memorial House of Mother Teresa; bottom right: Triumphal Arch “Porta Macedonia”. Photos S. Arsovski

narrowest point of Skopje’s liveliest promenade, blocking free pedestrian passage) were yet other additions to the oeuvre. Perhaps the most conspicuous thorn in the eye of Skopje was the systematic covering of world-renowned Kenzo Tange brutalist architecture with façades made of cheap plaster and ill-fitted caryatids and atlantes, only rivalled by the colonnade-garbed parking houses and the baroque Water and Sewage Tower across the river. This concoction has proven explosive, swiftly becoming the target of destruction, with protesters throwing permanent dye at the project’s main works (Reef 2017). The project was also accused of imposing an aura of monoculture in a country of many minorities, particularly the Albanians (25% of the population). All this made Skopje 2014 a faux-baroque mascaron in the face of its former beauty.

8.6 The Price of It All More importantly than lack of taste or finesse, the immense cost of the project has made it a white elephant in the face of Macedonia’s many pressing socio-economic problems. From the initially announced price tag of 80 million euro, the cost of giving the Macedonian capital a “new/old” look has risen to 684 million euro (Table 8.1). Add to that maintenance costs of the unfinished scaffold-clad constructions that

8 Cultural Atavism in the Face of an Environmental Disaster …

139

Table 8.1 Specification and costs of Skopje 2014 Type of construction

Number

Minimum cost, in euro

Buildings

28

429,611,313

% of total cost 62.8

Multi-level garages

6

56,898,845

8.3

Façades

6

43,363,275

6.3

Monuments

34

33,620,457

4.9

Squares

5

32,205,924

4.7

Ferris wheel

1

19,757,416

2.9

Tower on Vodno mountain

1

18,547,089

2.7

Underground garages

2

11,499,954

1.7

Bridges

4

7,953,388

1.2

Sculptures

39

6,498,946

0.9

Landscape design

1

6,327,849

0.9

Triumphal arch

1

6,313,526

0.9

Maintenance, security and illumination of monuments

-

4,741,941

0.7

Fountains

2

3,391,598

0.5

Pedestals

39

753,427

0.1

Fence

1

706,607

0.1

Bridge railings

1

557,967

0.1

City beach

1

379,113

0.1

Gazebo

1

351,603

0.1

Carousel

1

162,600

0.0

683,642,838

100.0

Total Source USAID and BIRN (2020)

weather in the wind under fluttering tarpaulins (like the City Hall on the Main Square), constant costs of repairing the breaking, cracking and disintegrating cheap materials used, as well as the burden of presumed exchange of unaccounted-for money, and the final price will rise significantly. Some reports have indicated that the project had run up spending up to 800 million euro, i.e. ten times its initial budget. Apart from the (still climbing) final price tag of the revamp, one of the conundrums is the sums awarded as fees for the authors of the monuments and sculptures (Jordanovska 2015). In this department, sculptor Valentina Stevanovska has left the biggest mark on Skopje 2014. She designed not least than 7 structures, including the euphemistically labelled sculptures “Warrior” (standing in for Philip II, at 1,5 million euro) and “Equestrian Warrior” (standing in for Alexander the Great, at 656 thousand euro), the aforementioned Triumphal Arch (304 thousand euro) and Eye Bridge sculptures (304 thousand euro). All in all, this unknown sculptor received just short of 3,0 million euro for her work (USAID and BIRN 2020).

140

M. Dymitrow

Additional controversy surrounds the procurement of four lions cast in bronze and placed on postaments at the entrance to the Goce Delcev Bridge. Instead of procuring one design and quadruplicating it, two pairs of ill-fitted lions were ordered by two sculptor teams (Taseva/Malinovski and Janev), making them the most expensive sculptures of Skopje 2014, at almost 2,6 million euro. Moreover, lack of match between the two designs instigated harsh public criticism, especially Janev’s rendition, which drew comparison to transformer robots. Among other quirks of Skopje 2014 is the Brandenburger Tor-inspired “Monument of the Fallen Heroes of Macedonia” (2,4 million euro), replete with staggering horses, a Vienna-style (Johann Strauss-esque) golden Prometheus in a fountain, a misspelled Latin inscription, a dangerous banister-less death-drop pit and a switched-off “eternal” flame (Fig. 8.3a). There is also the faux-baroque Museum of the Macedonian Struggle (17,0 million euro), displaying 13 exhibits featuring wax figures that depict elements from the beginning of the Macedonian resistance movement against the Ottoman rule, until its independence from Yugoslavia (Fig. 8.2a). The name of the museum is controversial in that the term “Macedonian Struggle” historically refers to a series of social, political, cultural and military conflicts fought between Greek and Bulgarian subjects of Ottoman Macedonia at the fin-de-siècle. A special element of the museum’s nationalism is that it double-charges non-Macedonian citizens, a practice long-abandoned in Western contexts. Cladding existing buildings with faux-baroque façades was another recurring trait of Skopje 2014. And while putting façades on prefabricated, mass-produced tower blocks of the Tito era (to obtain a sense of uniformity with the rest of the project) raised moderate objections, doing so with award-winning buildings, like the Government House, attracted a lot of criticism (Fig. 8.3a). Façading this original modernist oeuvre by Petar Mulickovski (17,7 million euro) involved the government running a public online poll to choose a new design, yet the public was left with limited, similar options, a smokescreen to justify the changing of this widely praised original work. The practice of façading soon became a safety issue as well due to poor attachment methods, with chunks of expensive low-quality material falling directly onto the sidewalk. This happened, for instance, with the façade of the MEPSO headquarters (11,0 million euro) in February 2020 (Fig. 8.2d). The most expensive building of Skopje 2014, however, is the Parthenon-inspired, multi-functional building housing the Constitutional Court, the State Archives and the Archaeological Museum (Fig. 8.2c). This centrepiece of Skopje 2014 cost nearly 43 million euro.

8.7 “If It Weren’t for the Christian Cross, It Could Be a Disco or Casino” In the realm of Skopje 2014 quirks, perhaps the most negative addition drew the Memorial House of Mother Teresa (Fig. 8.2c). Mother Teresa was born in 1910 in

8 Cultural Atavism in the Face of an Environmental Disaster …

141

Skopje, or Üsküp—as it was known back then, being part of the Kosovo Vilayet, a province of the Ottoman Empire. An Ethnic Albanian and a posterchild for Roman Catholicism globally, this famed nun’s place within the nationalistic project Skopje 2014, both in terms of ethnicity and religion, has been disputed. Neither was any of her nine consecutive nationalities Macedonian. Still, on her 100th birthday anniversary, the Memorial House of Mother Teresa was added to Skopje 2014. Built on the location of the former Sacred Heart Catholic church (the nun’s place of christening), the building sparked controversy over its design. Having announced an international competition for the project, the Macedonian Ministry of Culture declared a Portuguese architect the winner. Soon, however, the government overrun this decision, choosing a design previously commissioned from a local architect team (Penci´c 2009). Critics were not slow to react. Harnack noted that the building “does not symbolize Mother Teresa’s life and her renunciation of material goods”, while Raith characterised the structure as “designed very perfunctorily, with too many stories to tell, but without any essential message to give”. Raith concluded that “if it weren’t for the Christian cross, it could be a disco or casino” (in Penci´c 2009). Penci´c (2009), in turn, called the building “a tactless and tasteless homage to Mother Teresa” and “a depressing example of political meddling”: [It] is like someone tastelessly dressed, arrayed in gumboots, lace stockings, a brocade skirt and a Chinese silk shirt, all heavily accented with bling and what appears to be a cosmonaut’s helmet.[…] If it weren’t designed to commemorate such an important figure, this building might have gotten away with its inoffensive zaniness. But, as it turns out, it is hugely offensive. It offends with its skewed selection procedure, with its pretentiousness, with its arrogance, with its tastelessness. But, most of all, it offends by totally ignoring any architectural correlation with the life and work of Mother Teresa. Will Skopje get another chance? After this, it does not deserve one.

However, one of the architects behind the Memorial House is of a different opinion: I admit that some critiques about Skopje 2014 are reasonable. But the critiques about the Mother Teresa House are totally ungrounded and not professionally presented.[…]. The Memorial House is built according to the principle of a cenotaph, that is, a monument which calls for the soul of the deceased to return back home. The Pope approved for one bone from Mother Teresa’s finger to be brought in from the Vatican to the House. This made it a sanctuary.

And so the building received its controversial cultural heritage status (cf. Dymitrow 2013).

8.8 Skopje 2014 Versus Socio-Economic Development Critics of Skopje 2014 saw it not only as nationalist kitsch, geopolitical suicide and a venture for money laundry, but also as a distraction from more pressing problems (Jakov Marusic 2012). Just as SR Macedonia was the least developed of the six Yugoslav republics, so has its post-independence development indicators remained

142

M. Dymitrow

equally problematic (Kowalczyk 2017). Since its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, Macedonia has become one of the most economically challenged countries in Europe, exhibiting major inequities and inequalities (SSOM 2017). As Mattioli (2016) observes, a series of failing financial processes, which included the use of illiquidity, created the material and moral conditions for subjugation to a system of power that monopolised the Macedonian market, “forcing companies either to become its cronies or systematically lose money by accepting partial or no payment for the work they provided”. All this resulted in high unemployment of 27.3%, with a quarter of the population at risk of acute poverty (World Bank 2017; Eurostat 2017). In the fall of 2018, a Swedish team of journalists arrived in Demir Kapija in Macedonia, only to discover a cesspit of gloom and despair (Björk 2018): Urine and faeces on the floor. Cockroaches on the walls. Some scream in frustration. Others have solidified in foetal position. In the midst of today’s Europe, 200 people with different disabilities live in severe misery, in a country struggling to become part of the EU.

One must not go to Demir Kapija to find standards unbecoming modern human beings. Skopje’s public hospitals are infamous for not providing hot water to their patients, with visitors obliged to bring in jugs of heated water for bathing. Broken windows, strewn cigarette butts and impolite personnel are some of the other oftmentioned imperfections. The introduction of Skopje 2014 onto this canvas was therefore far from unproblematic with regard to what public funds have been spent on. Indeed, in between the overwhelming “anciently urban” constructions, in the strict city centre, emerged the many pockets of poverty untouched by the mega project (cf. Krzysztofik et al. 2017; Dymitrow et al. 2018; Biega´nska et al. 2019). Among them are rustic houses dating back to the Ottoman Empire or improvised substandard constructions of slab and carton (Fig. 8.4), especially in the Roma quarters, with no running waters (the river is used) or heating (wood and plastic are burned), where people raise animals for consumption (chickens, ducks, coypus, goats, sheep) and transport (horses) (Fig. 8.5). Had the project’s initiators truly meant launching a project that would instill a sense of national cohesion (cf. Cote and Levine 2002), they would be better off departing from the current needs of the city, launching a more functional and inclusive solution (cf. Melucci 1995; Dymitrow and Brauer, 2014). After all, healthy institutions and reciprocity between people and power or some of the most important characteristics of a strong country (Anholt 2014; de Botton 2017). Instead, ancient pseudo-Hellenic mastodons came to fulfil a political agenda by enclosing and thus hiding away what was considered ugly, embarrassing and undesirable. Effectively, the 800-million euro Ersatz-antiquisation project not only depleted the underdeveloped Macedonian countryside of due resource allocation but also reinforced the existing socio-economic problems in Skopje. Instead of evening out spatial disproportions, the propulsion of national schemata created a mosaic of inner peripheries within the city core, creating grave material and socio-economic contrasts that prevail to date despite a change of government (Dymitrow 2020b).

8 Cultural Atavism in the Face of an Environmental Disaster …

143

Fig. 8.4 Substandard dwellings in central Skopje. Photos S. Arsovski and Z. Jordanov

Fig. 8.5 Horse and cart in the centre of Skopje. Photo S. Arsovski

8.9 Further Developments In 2018, the situation in Skopje began changing drastically. A change of government in both Greece (2015) and Macedonia (2017) has led to socialist politics and an

144

M. Dymitrow

eventual thaw in the conflict between the two countries. The long talks came into fruition with the Treaty of Prespa signed on 12 June 2018, initiating the resolution of the long-standing dispute over Macedonia’s name. The two Prime Ministers, Zoran Zaev and Alexis Tsipras, were even nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize later that year for this unexpected extraordinary achievement. In September 2018, a namechange referendum was held in Macedonia, and while the turnout was only 36%, 94% of the voters were for the name change. In November 2018, the deposed Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski (the initiator of Skopje 2014) secretly fled to Hungary to seek asylum amidst a crass wiretapping scandal, facing corruption charges and imminent jail sentence for illegal procurements of luxury items. On 25 January 2019, the Greek Parliament voted to accept the new name “North Macedonia”, and later that month the Macedonian government announced it will change the constitution to facilitate the name change (a move that spawned considerable protests in both Greece and Macedonia). The renaming came into effect in February 2019, and one year later (March 2020) North Macedonia entered NATO. The past-2017 events enabled the ruling social-democratic party (SDSM) to commence a rapid process of reversing policies and removing (or downplaying the prominence of) artefacts introduced earlier by VMRO-DPMNE. This included renaming Skopje’s main airport (from “Alexander the Great” to “International”), main road (from “Alexander of Macedonia” to “Friendship”) and stadium (from “Philip II” to “Toše Proeski”), as well as abandoning several ongoing Skopje 2014 constructions (like the City Hall, the Mother Teresa monument and the façading of socialist-era buildings). It also included removing the most blatant symbols and inscriptions from the public spaces of Skopje, most notably abrasing the Vergina Sun from all metal manhole covers throughout the city. At one point, there were even rumours that the giant Warrior on a Horse impersonating Alexander the Great and the triumphal arch Porta Macedonia were to be removed (a crane suspiciously arrived one night). These events have certain, yet still unknown, bearing on the findings of this paper in two dimensions. Firstly, the “de-antiquisation” process is costly and one could argue that the money spent on demolishing things, which many Macedonians by now have come to accept, could be spend more wisely, e.g. by improving the environmental condition (cf. Krzysztofik et al. 2015). Secondly, a strategical move towards EU accession is at the same time a (prospective) guarantor that radical developmental measures will have to take place to be granted accession. In that context, France’s controversial veto against EU accession negotiations with North Macedonia in October 2019 has been said “to be remembered as a historic mistake that weaken[ed] Europe and undermine[d] its aspirations to become a geopolitical power” (FT 2019). What remains unanswered is how the recent developments in Skopje have affected the identity-building process that has suddenly come to a halt. Have the Macedonians abandoned their dreams of being the true descendants of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians?

8 Cultural Atavism in the Face of an Environmental Disaster …

145

8.10 Cultural Atavism With regard to cultural contingents, the Macedonian phenomenon can be explained through the concept of atavism. The concept of atavism comes originally from biology, where it denotes the recurrence of traits of an ancestor in a subsequent generation. More recently, this concept has come to adopt sociological meaning, namely that “the more ‘civilised’ a society seems to be, the more susceptible it is to its buried atavism” (Bilderberger 2016). In other words, humans are biological creatures, no matter how “cultured” or freed from the fetters of biology we may see ourselves to be. The problem is that human nature takes centre stage when we lose our dignity as culture only remodels, adjusts, disciplines and shames our “human, all too human” (Nietzsche 1878) emotions into a workable collective interface. The preposition of cultural atavism is thus basically this: When a population’s fundamental existential values are threatened, co-existent tame problems may be left behind in pursuit of primordial yet abstract values; such dispersion of priorities, in turn, creates a wicked problem (Dymitrow 2018). In Skopje, this was characterised by a pursuit of identity politics in the face of much more tangible problems, like, for instance, failing health due to extreme pollution. Even though prospects of rapid development by promises of entering the EU and NATO were tempting, the sheer thought of abandoning the closest thing we humans have—our identity—through the necessity of changing the country’s name was too hard to swallow (cf. Rykiel 2014). This, in turn, gave way for Macedonians to engage in a preposterous identity project (cf. Muratovski 2013). And even though the national elections of 2017 brought forth a new (socialist) government amidst crass controversy, the ensuing name-change referendum (30 September 2018), while in favour of the name change, attracted only a fraction of voters. The boycott was formative, with most Macedonians feeling betrayed, shunned and duped, even more so in view of the rising Albanian nationalism in Macedonia, politically supported by the socialist rule (cf. Janev 2017b). Indeed, the summer of 2019 brought forth new, even more serious allegations of blackmail and corruption within the country’s judicial system, with implications of foul play leading up to the (socialist) government (Dymitrow et al. 2019). On the other hand, the many recent developments in North Macedonia, such as the country’s name change in 2019, de-escalation of interior and international tensions, as well as promises of EU accession, are seen by many as positive and potentially beneficial to both the Macedonian society and—by way of inference—to the world community. North Macedonia has gone to extraordinary lengths to get to this point, further than most countries would care to venture, even changing its name to settle a two-decade long dispute. If nothing else, it is a display of great courage and an unprecedented investment in political capital. If North Macedonia would be relegated from the future now the EU has reneged on its side of the bargain, it would be an unforgettable double backstab. With all this put into the equation, North Macedonia, has come to represent a miniature crucible where the difficult first battle against unsustainability (Dymitrow and Halfacree 2018) could eventually be won.

146

M. Dymitrow

8.11 Conclusion Spatial conflicts seldom arise in isolation, but stem from simmering tensions that create so-called conflict zones. Conflict zones, however, “require fast-changing spatial policies accompanying the creation of irreversibly altered urban fabrics that generate in many cases drastic challenges for inhabitants” (Najjar 2019). In the case of Skopje, however, the fast-changing policies have affected space in ways that have raised more questions than provided answers. How could this vibrant city in the thenprosperous Yugoslavia, largely spared by the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s, turn into the world’s most polluted city and a “megalomaniac Disneyland” on the canvas of geopolitical disrepute, acute poverty, staggering corruption and ethnic tensions? How could Skopje, a victim of an earthquake-induced urbicide in the 1960s come to experience yet another urbicide in the 2010s, this time prompted by a creative alchemy of identity politics, questionable aesthetics and shady procurement processes? Was it just a spate of bad luck or a series of slow-moving cultural turns that crept silently onto its countenance? One thing is sure: culture matters, simply because culture is the primary source of both social progress and regression (Hirsi Ali 2016). Yet, sometimes the line between progress or regression can be imperceptibly thin. In Skopje, an onset of regressive politics in fear of losing national identity made politicians reach for powerful concepts from the past by building “cities of splendor” from the period of historically questionable heydays of the Ancient Macedon. This brand of teleported identity, however, created pockets of abject poverty, retrofitted into skewed imaginaries of questionable aesthetics in the strict centre of the capital. North Macedonia is not an isolated case of this form of development; it is, however, haplessly surrounded by neighbours, who all have some kind of grievance with it. Many Bulgarians do not recognise Macedonians’ ethnic distinctiveness. Serbians fail to recognise the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Albania does not recognise the country’s western border nor its national ambitions to promote a Slavic-Macedonian monoculture, while Kosovars have been seen unfavourably to repopulate the Republic with Albanians, and, by so doing, also undermining the country’s raison d’être. Lastly, many Greeks still unconditionally oppose the Republic’s usage of the title “Macedonia”, claiming its historical inseparability from Greek heritage. Such an unfortunate hotchpotch of precarities confirms that when a population’s fundamental existential values are threatened, co-existent tame problems may be left behind in pursuit of primordial yet abstract values. Such dispersion of priorities, however, creates a wicked problem—a cultural dilemma that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognise (Rittel and Webber, 1973). However, as Haslanger (2017: 3) put it, “[t]he fact that we rely on cultural schemas to interact not only with each other, but also the world, changes the world to conform to the schemas we bring to it. This has significant epistemic effects: the schemas we employ to interpret the world are confirmed by the world they have shaped. Thus it becomes difficult to change schemas, for they appear to have epistemic warrant”. With this chapter, I wanted to highlight the

8 Cultural Atavism in the Face of an Environmental Disaster …

147

epistemic warrant of the case of Skopje and the important contribution it can make to the world of identity politics, as well as the debate about spatial conflicts that rests upon it.

References Anholt S (2014) Which country does the most good for the world? TED, Berlin Anttila P, Stefanovska A, Nestorovska-Krsteska A, Grozdanovski L, Atanasov I, Golubov N, Ristevski P, Toceva M, Lappi S, Walden J (2016) Characterisation of extreme air pollution episodes in an urban valley in the Balkan Peninsula. Air Qual Atmos Health 9(2):129–141. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/s11869-015-0326-7 Arsovski S (1994) Renoviranje i dogradba na Ribarski Institut. Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje Arsovski S, Kwiatkowski M, Lewandowska A, Jordanova Peshevska D, Sofeska E, Dymitrow M (2018) Can urban environmental problems be overcome? The case of Skopje—world’s most polluted city. Bulletin of Geography. Socio-Economic Series 4:17–39. https://doi.org/10.2478/ bog-2018-0012 Biagini E (1993) Spatial dimensions of conflict. GeoJournal 31(2):119–128. https://doi.org/10. 1007/BF00808684 ´ Biega´nska J, Dymitrow M, Grzelak-Kostulska E, Sroda-Murawska S (2019) From policy to misery? The State Agricultural Farms vs. ‘the rural’. Quaestiones Geographicae 38(4):77–90. https://doi. org/10.2478/quageo-2019-0043 Bilderberger C (2016) The real Ernest Hemingway. National Vanguard 19(06):2016 BIRN (2008) Hunza delegation travels to Macedonia. BalkanInsight 11(07):2008 Björk E (2018) Here live Europe’s weakest. Göteborgs-Posten 08(10):2019 Brown K (2003) The past in question: Modern Macedonia and the uncertainties of nation. Princeton University Press, Princeton Cote JE, Levine C (2002) Identity formation, agency, and culture. L. Erlbaum Assoc, Mahwah de Botton A (2017) The perfect country. School of Life, London Dérens J-A (2017) The Balkans and Europe at the challenge of Macedonia. Études 6:7–18 Dragan W, Dymitrow M, Krzysztofik R (2019) Between history, politics and economy: the problematic heritage of former border railway stations in Poland. Mitteilungen Der Österreichischen Geographischen Gesellschaft 161:229–250. https://doi.org/10.1553/moegg161s229 Dymitrow M (2013) Degraded towns in Poland as cultural heritage. Int J Heritage Stud 19(7):613– 631. https://doi.org/10.1080/13527258.2012.681681 Dymitrow M (2014) The effigy of urbanity or a rural parody? A visual approach to small-town public space. J Cultural Geo 31(1):1–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/08873631.2013.873298 Dymitrow M (2018) New developments on the concept of “wicked solution.” MUF & Chalmers, Gothenburg Dymitrow M (2020a) The spatial dimension of project-making. In: Dymitrow M, Ingelhag K (eds) Anatomy of a 21st-century sustainability project: The untold stories. MUF & Chalmers, Gothenburg, pp 71–77 Dymitrow M (2020b) Begrepp som skadar: Exempel från inre periferier i Polen, Nordmakedonien och Sverige. Ymer 140:49–72 Dymitrow M, Brauer R (2014) Social deprivation and urbanity as the elephant in the room. In: Efe R, Onay TT, Sharuho I, Atasoy E (eds) Urban and urbanization. St. Kliment Ohridski University Press, Sofia, pp 381–395 Dymitrow M, Brauer R (2016) Land or people? On the iatrogenesis of conflation. Acta Geobalcanica 2(2):63–75. https://doi.org/10.18509/AGB.2016.07

148

M. Dymitrow

Dymitrow M, Halfacree K (2018) Sustainability–differently. Bulletin Geo Socio-Eco Series 40:7– 16. https://doi.org/10.2478/bog-2018-0011 Dymitrow M, Ingelhag K (eds) (2020) Anatomy of a 21st-century sustainability project: The untold stories. MUF & Chalmers, Gothenburg Dymitrow M, Biega´nska J, Grzelak-Kostulska E (2018) Deprivation and the rural-urban trap. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 109(1):87–108. https://doi.org/10.1111/tesg. 12263 Dymitrow M, Brauer R, Arsovski S, Biega´nska J (2019) Atavism, layering and subversion: Understanding great social challenges of today through the lens of cultural contingents. Geo Rev 52:157–170. https://doi.org/10.37658/GR19520157d EC, (2018) FYROM 2018 report. European Commission, Strasbourg Eurostat, (2017) Key figures on enlargement countries. Publications office of the European Union, Luxembourg FT, (2019) Emmanuel Macron’s EU accession veto is a historic mistake. Financial Times 21(10):2019 Georgievski B (2009) Ghosts of the past endanger Macedonia’s future. BalkanInsight 27(10):2009 Georgievski B (2017) Skopje: Welcome to Europe’s most polluted city. Deutsche Welle 10(01):2018 Gillet K (2015) How Skopje became Europe’s new capital of kitsch. the Guardian 11(04):2015 Gold JR (2009) Modern city. In: Kitchin R, Thrift N (eds) International encyclopedia of human geography. Elsevier, London, pp 150–156 Götz I, Roth K, Spiritova M (eds) (2017) New nationalism in Eastern Europe: Cultural perspectives. Transcript, Bielefeld Graan A (2013) Counterfeiting the nation? Skopje 2014 and the politics of nation branding in Macedonia. Cultural Anthropol 28(1):161–179. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1360.2012.011 79.x Haslanger S (2017) What is a social structure? The Royal Institute of Philosophy, London Hirsi Ali A (2016) Why don’t feminists fight for Muslim women? Prager University, USA Jakov Marusic S (2012) Skopje 2014: The new face of Macedonia, updated. BalkanInsight 11(05):2012 Janev G (2017a) ‘Skopje 2014’: Erasing memories, building history. In: Couroucli M, Marinov T (eds), Balkan heritages: negotiating history and culture (pp 111–130). London: Routledge. https:// doi.org/10.4324/9781315562872-6 Janev G (2017b) Serious past: Questioning the socialist legacy of Macedonia. Studia Ethnologica Croatica 29(1):149–169 Jordanovska M (2015) True cost of ‘Skopje 2014’ revealed. BalkanInsight 27(07):2015 Kitromilides PM (1996) ‘Balkan mentality’: history, legend, imagination. Nat Nation 2(2):163–191. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.1996.00163.x Kowalczyk M (2017) Between wealth and poverty. Former Yugoslavia 25 years after the breakup. Obserwator Finansowy. Accessed: 05 June 2017 Koželj J, Stefanovska J (2012) Urban planning and transitional development issues: the case of Skopje Macedonia. Urbani Izziv 23(1):91–100 Krzysztofik R, Dymitrow M, Szmytkie R, Kantor-Pietraga I, Pełka-Go´sciniak J, Spórna T (2015) Environmental hazards and urban abandonment: case studies and typological issues. Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography 97(4):291–308. https://doi.org/10.1111/geob.12082 Krzysztofik R, Dymitrow M, Grzelak-Kostulska E, Biega´nska J (2017) Poverty and social exclusion: An alternative spatial explanation. Bull Geo Socio-Econo Series 35:45–64. https://doi.org/10. 1515/bog-2017-0004 Markovi´c N, Nikolov M (2017) Aspects of the name dispute between Macedonia and Greece: symbols, conflict and economic costs. CEA J Econo 12(2):85–98 Mattioli F (2016) Losing values: Illiquidity, personhood, and the return of authoritarianism in Skopje, Macedonia. City University, New York Mazon A (1923) Contes slaves de la Macédoine sud-occidentale. Champion, Paris Melucci A (1995) The process of collective identity. Temple University Press, Philadelphia

8 Cultural Atavism in the Face of an Environmental Disaster …

149

Muratovski G (2013) The use of built environments in the formation and change of national identities: The case of Macedonia and ‘Skopje 2014’. Postcolonial Europe 23(4) Najjar R (2019) Planning, power, and politics (3P): Critical review of the hidden role of spatial planning in conflict areas. In: Loures LC (ed) Land use: Assessing the past, envisioning the future. IntechOpen, London, pp 217–239 Nietzsche F (1878), (1996) Human, all too human: A book for free spirits. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Pajaziti A (2012) Capital-division and ethno-urbanization in Macedonian way: Case of “Skopje 2014.” In: Pajaziti A (ed) Culturological studies: Education, politics, identity. Dauti Foundation, Skopje, pp 159–177 Penci´c D (2009) A tactless and tasteless homage to Mother Teresa. Archit Rev 1(8):18–24 Petrovi´c B (2016) The Haussmannian Paris and the neoclassical Skopje. Belgrade J Med Commun 9(5):23–33 Pojani D (2018) Cities as story: redevelopment projects in authoritarian and hybrid regimes. J Urban Affairs 40(5):705–720. https://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2017.1360737 Reef P (2017) Macedonia’s colourful revolution and the elections of 2016. A chance for democracy, or all for nothing? Südosteuropa 65(1):170–182. https://doi.org/10.1515/soeu-2017-0009 Rittel HW, Webber MM (1973) Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sci 4(2):155–169 Rykiel Z (2014) Territorial identity in sociology and human geography. In: Mihaylov V (ed) Consciousness and identity of human communities in a geospatial dimension. Institute of Geopolitics, Cz˛estochowa, pp 67–82 SSOM (2017) Poverty line. Available at https://www.stat.gov.mk. Accessed: 24 Jan 2018 Stafilov T, Bojkovska R, Hirao M (2003) Air pollution monitoring system in the Republic of Macedonia. J Environ Protect Ecol 4(3):518–524 Stern D, Voss C (Eds) (2006) Marginal linguistic identities: studies in Slavic contact and borderland varieties. Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz Tanuszewska L (2017) Zaprojektowana to˙zsamo´sc´ „Nowomacedo´nczyków”. In: Majdzik K, Zarek J (eds) To˙zsamo´sc´ Słowian zachodnich i południowych w s´wietle XX-wiecznych dyskusji i ´ Katowice, pp 359–364 polemik. Wyd. US, Todorova M (2004) What is or is there a Balkan culture, and do or should the Balkans have a regional identity? Southeast Euro Black Sea Stud 4(1):175–185. https://doi.org/10.1080/146838 50412331321788 Tziampiris A (2012) The Macedonian name dispute and European Union accession. Southeast Euro Black Sea Stud 12(1):153–171. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2012.661225 USAID and BIRN (2020) Skopje 2014 uncovered. Available at https://skopje2014.prizma.birn.eu. com. Accessed: 02 Feb 2020 West L (2015) Memento Park and Skopje 2014: Transitions, monuments, and memory. University of Georgia, Athens World Bank (2017) Country poverty brief: Macedonia, FYR. World Bank, Washington

Mirek Dymitrow holds a PhD in human geography from the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, where he is a guest researcher. He currently works as a research fellow at Lund University, Sweden. His research interests include critical, historical, political, social, and cultural geography, as well social psychology and sociology of science. His main areas of concentration are the effects of formalised uses of concepts on societal development and research practices, as well problems and causes of social deprivation in the face of overarching sustainability goals. His current research project deals with great social challenges of today brought on by cultural contingents, with a focus on Skopje, North Macedonia.

Chapter 9

(Not) Our Heritage: Cultural Milieu and Urban Space of Lviv Natalia Otrishchenko and Inga Kozlova

Abstract In 2017, the city of Lviv adopted the Cultural Strategy 2025 with “responsible treatment of cultural heritage” as one of the aims. However, the definition of cultural heritage is broad and still can be a source for potential conflicts, especially in relation to the city’s multiethnic past and Soviet heritage under the decommunisation laws. This study relies on the conceptual ideas of Edward Soja and Henri Lefebvre and focuses on heritage as it is described by the actors from the cultural milieus of Lviv. What actually is heritage and how is it perceived, conceived, and lived? What arguments are mobilised by different experts? What are the lines of division and the spaces for dialogue? What are the ruptures and conflicts in dealing with cultural heritage? How it can be articulated, interpreted, used, and protected? The authors are going to elaborate on physical and material spaces, their conceptualisations, and social functioning. The chapter is based on the conversations with the representatives of Lviv cultural milieu (artists, managers, heads of institutions, educators, creative businessmen, and administrators)—a total of 30 in-depth interviews that were recorded by the Institute of Cultural Strategy in 2019 and 2020. As they are often decision-makers and opinion leaders, their ideas and actions could shape the larger discussion about heritage preservation and actualisation. Keywords Cultural milieu · Decommunisation · Ethnic diversity · Heritage · Lviv · Production of space

N. Otrishchenko (B) Centre for Urban History of East Central Europe, Lviv, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] I. Kozlova Department of Sociology, Ukrainian Catholic University, Lviv, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_9

151

152

N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova

9.1 Introduction French historian François Hartog states that three concepts are important in order to understand the current “regime of historicity”, expressed and organised experience of time: memory, heritage, and commemoration. Together they are oriented towards the fourth one: identity (Hartog 2015: 119). According to another French researcher, anthropologist Maurice Godelier, every society distinguishes between three categories of things: those to be sold, those to be given, and those to be kept; then the modern cult of heritage would result from a transfer of sacredness: patrimonial artefacts would take the place of previous “treasures”, religious or royal, in the symbolic system of modern societies confronted with the “disenchantment process” (Godelier 1996). The past, therefore, is one of the key reservoirs for a community to define itself in the present and orient towards the future. It is not only a narrated story, presented in history textbooks and reinforced by the state institutions, but also material environments that reflected personal stories of people, political changes, infrastructural, and technological developments, but also conflicts and divisions. This chapter will focus on one of the keywords proposed by François Hartog, and one of the ideas of Maurice Godelier—heritage, namely—and zoom into a specific case where the past has left numerous traces in the urban environment, and those traces are sources for tensions and discussions. We are going to take you to Lviv—since 1991 one of the regional centres of Western Ukraine. During the twentieth century, this city belonged to different states and had been ruled from different capitals—Vienna, Warsaw, Kraków, Moscow, and Kyiv—and shortly was capital itself. Lviv experienced two world wars, Nazi occupation, and extreme violence during the Holocaust, radical post-war Soviet transformation. It was a contested city, where different national and ideological projects clashed and where the shift from multiethnic Eastern European city into monoethnic Soviet one unfolded (Amar 2015; Czaplicka 2005; Mick 2016; Risch 2011). Given its history, Lviv was inhabited by the representatives of various ethnic groups, i.e. Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, Germans, and Armenians; it was also part of Soviet project, where a specific “Soviet community” was aimed to be assembled. Each of these groups in one way or another contributed to the development of the urban landscape. As the social space of the city was radically transformed due to wars, mass killings, and forced migration, a number of links between people and spaces were shattered. Are contemporary citizens of Lviv living among the “Ghosts of Others” (Blacker 2013), actively inventing, commodifying, and consuming heritage (Narvselius 2015), and developing various personal connections or distances to build environments and former inhabitants of the city (Otrishchenko 2019)? What is “our” and “not our” heritage in the case of Lviv? How is the heritage perceived, conceived, and lived (Lefebvre 1991)? What are the main lines of division and the spaces for dialogue? Who is responsible for heritage preservation? In November 2018 within the framework of the “ReHERIT” project, the Centre for Urban History of East Central Europe in cooperation with the Ukrainian Centre for Public Opinion Research “Socioinform” conducted a sociological study about

9 (Not) Our Heritage: Cultural Milieu and Urban Space of Lviv

153

attitudes towards the cultural heritage in Lviv.1 The report states that the legacy of the pre-twentieth century is perceived as rather unifying and conflict-free, while the main clashes mainly occurred during the last century. Among the key problems, pointed out by the authors of the report are “discomfort with the Soviet [heritage] and invisibility of the Jewish heritage”. Our chapter is going to build on this statement and elaborate in more details about visible or latent conflicts connected with cultural heritage embodied in the space of the city.

9.2 Theoretical Background, Questions, and Methodology Lviv urban space is the main arena, where our story takes place. In our conceptualisation, we are following the ideas of Edward Soja, who discusses two persistent illusions of the space—its opaqueness (fixed superficial materiality) and transparency (pure ideation and representation)—that block the possibility for a third vision: spatiality as a simultaneously social outcome and shaping force in social life (Soja 2010: 7). Therefore, the main challenge for researchers is to see beyond the immediate surface and avoid either reducing to physical objects or to their cognitive perception and illusionary form. The duality of the relation between space and social life Soja describes in the following way: “If spatiality is both outcome/embodiment and medium/presupposition of social relations and social structure, their material reference, then social life must be seen as both space-forming and space contingent, a producer and product of spatiality” (ibid.: 129). This thesis is one of the basic ideas behind our study. We believe that urban space is both an inherited material structure and constantly reconstructed, re-evaluated, and reshaped environment. It is both a limit and a possibility for the actions of a number of different actors with access to different resources. While discussing the production of space, we rely on Henri Lefebvre’s spatial triad, which combines perceived (spatial practice), conceived (representations of space), and lived (representational spaces) space (Lefebvre 1991). Spatial practice, according to Lefebvre, embraces production and reproduction, and the particular locations and spatial sets. Representations of space are tied to the relations of production and to the “order” which those relations impose, and they are conceptualised images created under certain regimes of power. Finally, representational spaces embody complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not (ibid.: 33). Therefore, spatial practice is perceptible through the senses; representations of space are produced by technocrats: architects, engineers, urbanists, and planners but also artists with a scientific bent; and representational spaces overlay physical space and

1 The

research is based on focus group discussions with experts working with heritage (teachers, guides, museums employees, and representatives of authorities). The report is available at: https://reherit.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ReHERIT_Presentation-of-Sociological-sur vey-on-Heritage-in-Lviv-2018.pdf. Accessed 20.05.2020.

154

N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova

value places in ways that run counter to the dominant representations of space— imaginative and lived space (Leary 2009, 2013). Based on these ideas, we could conclude that some parts of urban space are perceived and conceived by various groups as more valuable than the other, and we are going to show what arguments are mobilised in order to describe them. The Cultural Strategy 2025 adopted by Lviv City Council in Summer 2017 defines a set of priorities and aims which need to be accomplished. One of them is “responsible treatment of cultural heritage”.2 In the overview of this goal, the strategy claims that “Lviv is the city where the most tangible and intangible cultural monuments in Ukraine are concentrated” but “Lviv residents lack a responsible and conscious attitude to the ‘inherited’ cultural environment. Many residents and city guests have no idea about the richness and diversity of urban culture”. However, the document does not clarify what should be treated as “cultural heritage”; therefore, it opens the stage for a larger discussion and different opinions. Within the monitoring of the implementation of the Cultural Strategy, a set of quantitative and qualitative surveys was carried out. It included in-depth interviews with experts in the field of culture and representatives of cultural milieus—artists, managers, heads of institutions, educators, creative businessmen, and administrators. In this chapter, we aim to outline how the representatives of Lviv cultural milieu perceive and articulate the cultural heritage of the city, as well as to trace the sources of potential conflict and tension between various narratives. This expert group is the one who appeals to the topics related to cultural heritage, creates descriptive language, and is often responsible for heritage preservation and management. In terms of Lefebvre, they could develop both dominant and alternative representations of space. Our text is based on the analysis of 30 semi-structured in-depth interviews: seven with the heads of cultural institutions (with municipal, regional, and national founding); six with cultural managers who are self-employed or working in the third sector; five with individual artists; five with representatives of business, namely event agencies and cultural industries; four with officials whose direct responsibilities used to or currently include the development of the cultural sphere in Lviv and the region; three with educators in the field of formal cultural education on different levels (primary and high). Some conversations were recorded with two or more persons (these could be the heads of institutions together with their deputies or communication managers, or people working on the project together). Soft quotas, which ran through all categories of experts, were the cultural sector in which the participant of interview works—we diversified each subgroup as much as possible in order to represent different areas and types of art. We also interviewed people of different ages and genders, with different professional backgrounds. We are aware that some narrators fall into different categories at the same time, but when quoting specific conversations in order to maintain confidentiality, we will use only one category, defined mostly by place and content of work. The main part of fieldwork was conducted between January and April 2020 (to test the methodology, 2 The document is available on the webpage of the Cultural Strategy Institute: https://isc.lviv.ua/wp-

content/uploads/2019/02/strategiya-rozvytku-kultury-2025.pdf. Accessed 20.05.2020.

9 (Not) Our Heritage: Cultural Milieu and Urban Space of Lviv

155

three pilot interviews were recorded in October 2019). The fieldwork was funded by the Cultural Strategy Institute and the International Renaissance Foundation. During the interviews, we discussed a number of topics related to the aims and priorities of the strategy, and one of the last sets of questions was dedicated to cultural heritage. These conversations are our primary source material. We are mainly interested in the points of ruptures and how they are defined by our narrators. Through them, we are going to talk about the key lines of division and the possibilities for dialogue. However, before talking about cultural heritage in the urban space of Lviv and the points of potential conflicts, we would like to provide some official definitions and then move on to the narratives of our experts.

9.3 Defining Heritage According to the World Heritage Convention adopted by UNESCO in 1972 and ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR in 1988, the cultural heritage should be understood as separate objects and their groups. The heritage comprises artefacts (architecture, monuments, paintings; architectural elements and sites, inscriptions, caves, and other elements that have universal value in terms of history, art or science); ensembles (groups of several isolated of attached buildings; architecture, which, together with the landscape, has universal value in terms of history, art, or science); and sites (natural and anthropogenic and areas comprising architectural sites that have universal value in terms of history, esthetics, ethnology, or anthropology) (Konventsia 1988). This definition given by UNESCO was focused on physical heritage and the notion of “universal value”, which means the existence of actual artefacts and the agreement of the community and professionals—historians, ethnologists, and anthropologists—regarding their value. The discussion of the intangible cultural heritage that broke out in the 1990s contradicted this idea. Intangible cultural heritage came to comprise customs, forms of representation and expression, knowledge, and skills—as well as tools, artefacts, and cultural spaces that relate to them—which unions, groups and, in some cases, individuals consider part of their cultural heritage (Konventsia 2008). The dichotomy of tangible and intangible heritage remains in many official documents. The law of Ukraine on the protection of cultural heritage that had been adopted before Ukraine ratified the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage gives the following definitions: the cultural heritage is the entirety of all objects of the cultural heritage that humanity inherited from previous generations. The objects of cultural heritage are sites, construction, ensembles, their parts, and associated objects, as well as spaces and water sites, other natural, natural anthropogenic, and anthropogenic objects that, regardless the preservation, sustained their authenticity and value from the viewpoint of archaeology, ethnology, history, architecture, art, or science (Zakon Ukrainy 2000). This definition, just like the definition offered by UNESCO in 1972, focuses on actual material artefacts and their value,

156

N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova

which is determined by notions such as authenticity and value usually defined within one of the professional fields, for example, art or science. The concept of the national policy regarding the preservation of cultural heritage insists on the link between the physical form and the realisation of an idea. It proposes considering the artefact as a unified object that comprises material and spiritual value (Oliinyk 2014: 28). Nonetheless, the laws that regulate the protection of cultural heritage remain focused on physical objects; thus, it frames the perception of heritage as a primarily physical one. In case of Lviv, the list of architectural sites consists of over 2000 addresses (updated 12 May 2020); the list of historical artefacts and monuments has 293 objects—separate buildings, their fragments, architectural ensembles, separate monuments and graves; and the list of archaeological artefacts names 11 locations.3 Among the definitions of heritage that we have received during the discussions with actors of the cultural milieu of Lviv, we can single out objects-oriented (operate on the ideas of both physical and intangible objects) and process-oriented ones (emphasise certain practices, actions, and styles of life that emerge from the previous experience and are actively constructed today). The first type of definition is optimal in terms of codification and regulation (this might be the reason why it is prevalent in the Ukrainian legislature); the second proposes a wider view on the heritage. Often, the reflections of our experts combine the two approaches. Here are the examples of rather object-oriented definitions: “[Cultural heritage] are material and non-material forms of art in the historical context: this is our architecture, achievements of creators in various genres; these are also people who can preserve this, reproduce this, and who find interest in this. Lviv is, basically, a city of cultural heritage” (representative of cultural industry, female; recorded 24.02.2020); “What I understand as heritage is material and non-material objects that serve to keep the memory of an actual cultural process or phenomenon for future generations… Now, in our yet outdated view of the heritage, what is it? Cultural heritage is something we can touch, right? A sculpture, a book, anything. But we now live in the world of live performance, yes, the observed performance. It is another part of cultural heritage. But it cannot be touched, alas. I mean, there are many things that challenge the understanding of the cultural heritage” (cultural manager, male; recorded 11.02.2020).

Process-oriented definitions use the notions of memory, past, environment, identity, and values; they are more abstract: “The heritage is the memory. This is the culture of memory. For me, the heritage is something, which has already passed” (cultural manager, male; recorded 22.02.2020); “It is largely related to our identity, which is constructed from this cultural heritage, right?” (representative of cultural industry, male; recorded 27.02.2020); “For me, cultural heritage is a value which is largely encrypted in us… Not only a violin or a brush but something more. Some kind of production of culture” (educator, male; recorded 14.02.2020); “These traditions, this mixture of Polish, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, Soviet. All this is a cultural 3 Information

about the architectural sites and artefacts of the historical, archaeological, and artistic value can be accessed from the lists available at https://city-adm.lviv.ua/lmr/pamiatky-lvova/ 2477-perelik-pamiatok-arkhitektury-mistobuduvannia-istorii-mystetstva-ta-arkheolohii. Accessed 20.05.2020.

9 (Not) Our Heritage: Cultural Milieu and Urban Space of Lviv

157

heritage. This is something that influenced us. This is also an environment, this multiculturality of Lviv, this is also a cultural heritage” (artist, female; recorded 25.02.2020). Such definitions offer a specific framework for the context, in which we should consider the heritage: as part of commemoration practices, the identity policies, the specifics of the local urban environment. The last cited definition appeals to the image of the multicultural city that comprises the heritages of diverse epochs and political regimes. The narrator does not differentiate among them, but enumerates them, thus, showing what she values the combination of various traditions rather than any particular heritage. Although the division of heritage into material and non-material (present in the official documents of UNESCO and Ukrainian legislation) was present in some responses, it was mainly mentioned to be challenged. For example, intangible heritage is still mediated through material objects, for example, books, or, as ironically noted by one of the respondents, souvenirs: “We have such a habit: when we speak about heritage, we mean the material heritage in the first hand. Intangible heritage is much more complex. But these things are, of course, very interrelated. If no one cares about the intangible heritage, it will be difficult to find motivation, to motivate to preserve the material one. And vice versa. But we often forget about the intangible [heritage]. Examples of intangible heritage can be historical figures, texts that require a new reading, republishing and simple sharing, promotion using modern means” (artist, male; recorded 04.03.2020).

This is why the connection between the tangible and intangible heritage is vital: one cannot exist without the other. In the centre, there is always a creation—an architectural site, a melody, and a text. It can be seen that our experts tend to interpret the phenomenon of a cultural heritage wider than an official Ukrainian legislation, incorporating into their definitions social and intangible components, which are difficult to evaluate and to measure, yet, which are real and which represent an important part of the studied phenomenon. Thus, the heritage in our case is the mixture of physical and social, material and non-material elements, where the non-material ones tend to be underappreciated and under-protected. Defining certain objects as a cultural heritage is possible on condition of cooperation of the audiences with diverse memories, historical backgrounds, opinions on what deserves to be passed on to the future generations, and expert communities (professionals from various spheres of culture that define the value of artefacts and artistic practices, explain the context of their creation and potential importance). This audience should communicate with the government to develop effective means of managing the achievements of the past. It should also communicate with education to pass on the knowledge and ensure its relevance.

158

N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova

9.4 Ruptures and Conflicts in Dealing with Cultural Heritage While talking about connections between tangible and intangible heritage, one of our narrators mentioned a more general problem related to “non-integrated versions” of Lviv’s past: “Overall there is a need for some integration of different versions— versions of this city—because Lviv is still not integrated in that respect: we have essentially several different histories of the city, intellectual histories of Lviv” (ibid.). Therefore, one of the key topics we would like to discuss in this chapter is continuance and rupture in relation to cultural heritage in the urban space of Lviv. In this particular case, it includes two interrelated aspects: maintaining continuance in the description of urban history, in particular the inclusion into the narrative of the cultural heritage the discussion about legacies of different political regimes and the representatives of different national groups; and social rupture, when a significant change in the ethnic composition of the city’s population occurred during and after the Second World War. While the materiality of space survived during the war, people and communities did not. Furthermore, a rapid urban development happened during the post-war decades under Soviet rule, but the legacy of this period has not been fully discussed yet. Online research “Cultural Landscape of Lviv: Institutions, Activities, Interactions”, conducted by the Cultural Strategy Institute in February–May 2019, shows that the majority of cultural institutions—57.3%—were established between 1939–1940 and 1944–1990, thus appeared as elements of the Soviet cultural infrastructure. It includes libraries, cinemas, and cultural centres in various districts of the city as well as some theatres. 6.3% of surveyed institutions were established between 1870 and 1938, so they have experienced the largest number of changes of political regimes in Lviv.4 They are located mainly in the central part of the city, which was claimed as the State Historical and Architectural Preserve in 1975 and as the UNESCO World Heritage site in 1998. The discussion about different versions of Lviv’s past and their incompatibility could mobilise arguments from works of French historian Pierre Norra. Within the concept of “decolonisation of memory”, he defines three types: international, which has allowed societies previously experienced colonial rule to develop their historical memories; domestic, when different social groups (i.e. ethnic, local, religious, sexual) integrated their memories into the mainstream narrative; and finally, ideological, which followed the collapse of totalitarian regimes, and “which has helped reunite these liberated peoples with traditional, long-term memories confiscated, destroyed, or manipulated by those regimes: this is the case with Russia and many countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Latin America, and Africa” (Nora 2002). The diversity of different narratives about cultural heritage sometimes is described by our narrators from this perspective. At the same time, they are also referring to creative strategies of incorporation of various traditions: “Culture is a set of possessions [nadban’], it is 4 The research is based on the self-filled online form. Overall, 98 institutions took part in the survey.

Response rate was 35%. The report is available at: https://isc.lviv.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ kulturnyj-landshaft-lvova_-instytucziyi-aktyvnosti-vzayemodiyi..-1.pdf. Accessed 20.05.2020.

9 (Not) Our Heritage: Cultural Milieu and Urban Space of Lviv

159

practically your genetic code, the genetic code of your country, your people, and you understand that there are a lot of gaps in that set of possessions, because the previous country and previous empires were different, not all possessions that could become a set of that Ukrainian culture—something we took from one empire, something from another, something we kept in our identity” (head of institution, male; recorded 13.04.2020). The only heritage he is very critical towards is Soviet: “We can hardly take anything very positive from the previous empire, the Soviet one, except total lack of culture” (ibid.). The narrator feels connected to pre-Soviet time; therefore, he creates a link to the environment that existed before the Second World War, and at the same time this comment makes visible the rupture, when Soviet heritage is almost wiped up. People whose professional biographies are related to specific institutions often speak about heritage in relation to the history of their institution and thus build connections. Thus, speaking of the Lviv National Academy of Arts, the narrator recalls the School of design and drawing and the Lviv State Institute of Applied and Decorative Art (educational institutions founded in Austria–Hungary and the Soviet period, respectively). In the case of a centralised library system, interviewees talk about the legacy of the 1970s (USSR), which they are now seeking to modernise. During the conversation with the head of the institution, her colleague, the project manager, spoke about the complexity of the relationship with the legacy from Soviet organisation, which was located in the same space: “I believe that our or rather not our cultural heritage is directly this building and the history that took place in this building. And we don’t really have anything to do with this cultural heritage right now, so we know it exists, but we have a very weak connection with it” (cultural manager, female; recorded 04.10.2019). The conversation continues with the idea that, on the one hand, the new team does not want to continue certain traditions, but it is important for it to understand the past. They agreed that they have inherited the space with all its complexities and investment needs as well as with stories and memories of people. Thoughts about connections and gaps are most common among cultural managers: “This is a very important aspect of creating this particular continuity, which is completely natural for the countries in Western Europe, where one way or another, this continuity, it somehow remained. We do not have this continuity, it is interrupted. Therefore, we have, we know before the Soviets there was one tradition, then it was all destroyed, physically destroyed. And after the Soviets, we again had such a period of cardinal denial of everything, in general, that was connected with the Soviet period” (cultural manager, male; recorded 31.01.2020). The narrator speaks of at least two important ruptures—between pre-Soviet and Soviet and between Soviet and post-Soviet—through which it is necessary to reconnect to better understand the context of the city and its cultural heritage. Speaking of these at least two gaps, we are dealing with the consequences of ideological decolonisation of memory in both cases. At first, the Soviet government tried to erase or at least rhetorically devalue the contribution of other political regimes and ethnic cultures to urban development of Lviv, then these processes, but on the contrary, with the erasure of Soviet heritage, began during the independence of Ukraine. They became especially visible after the

160

N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova

adoption of the laws on decommunisation in 2015 (“On the condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and the ban on propaganda of their symbols”). Recognising the need to rethink the Soviet past, the participants ask questions about the methods by which it was carried out and which deepened the gap between different generations and their experiences: “The process of decommunisation affected whole generations, which were simply crossed out and no one counted on them, no one asked them and they were practically leveled, because they lived in the Soviet period and it should be thrown away… This is very negative” (cultural manager, male; recorded 22.02.2020). His argument is that “Decommunisation is, first of all, mental changes. It’s a work with education, it’s a work with memory. Decommunisation is an analysis at the national level” (ibid.). The narrator also emphasises the growing interest in the Soviet heritage from “generations of grandchildren, who now have such pixelated images from the past, which, in fact, correspond to their idea of some standards” (ibid.). Thus, such fragmented vision could lack general picture and critical questions and might be a result of failed communication about the Soviet past. Speaking about the legacy of the Soviet period (Fig. 9.1), the narrators mention specific objects that have artistic value: “We return to the understanding that during the Soviet period a number of those monumental works, mosaics or architecture were of super high quality, super interesting and very valuable from artistic point of view, and this must be preserved” (cultural manager, male; recorded 31.01.2020). This point could be addressed to the preservation of certain infrastructural assets as well. That is why the conversation about heritage must also include a deep reflection on the Soviet past and the methods of decommunisation, which is currently almost absent. Another narrator in the field of cultural management suggests looking from the perspective of an individual and his family, where the Soviet was one of the periods, but not the only one.

Fig. 9.1 Different ways of dealing with Soviet heritage: Partially destroyed mosaics (right) and elements of the monument of Glory preserved in the museum “Territory of Terror” (left). Photos N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova

9 (Not) Our Heritage: Cultural Milieu and Urban Space of Lviv

161

In both cases, political decisions—the erasure of Lviv’s Austro-Hungarian and Polish past during the Soviet period and the process of decommunisation— contributed to the creation of historical gaps in the assessment of cultural heritage. These ruptures could be overcome through the process of ideological decolonisation of memory and the development of alternative representations of space. Lviv cultural milieus are working with various legacies and occupy locations and institutions created under different political systems. They are constantly encountering heritage in the urban space of the city and could create a new framework and language in order to describe it. During the interviews, the difficulty in development of connections to build heritage was explained due to the fact that many residents do not feel involved in the creation of the space of Lviv (both material and cultural): “Two thirds, and maybe more, who live here have nothing to do with those who created this city … Very often people who live in this place feel that it is not their (heritage). This is the main challenge: how to make what they feel as ‘not theirs’—‘theirs’? … The biggest challenge in culture is to make out of what is “our” and “not-our” something “common”, to appreciate something not for who did it, but for what thoughts were behind, for action, for deeds, for something human that is hidden in it. This is a problem of education such a basic” (cultural manager, male; recorded 03.10.2019). He stresses the importance of connection between the current population and the pre-war heritage, which should be perceived through universal values behind it. Education is a key tool for him. A similar problem is addressed by cultural managers from the other sphere: “Structurally Lviv has changed a lot after the Second World War, yes. And here a large number of languages were lost, a large number of artistic environments and people, in general, were lost … Perhaps, now it is important for us to discover them, understand them, and continue their experience … We had newly developed experiences that were formed after the Second World War. There are the generations of the seventies [simdesiatnyky], the nineties [devianostnyky]; the nineties have gradually opened up what was in the 1930s. Here everything is mixed up and… without knowing [previous] ones, we will not be able to understand the others” (cultural manager, female; recorded 09.02.2020). According to her narrative, the gaps are overcome by different generations in cultural milieus, when each new one opens some legacies from the past. An important point is the perceived distinction between “our” and “not our” heritage, when objects and spaces marked as “other”—in terms of religion, ethnicity, ideology—gradually become abandoned. In this context, to manage the heritage means reworking and accepting different aspects of the past: “A Uniate [Greek-Catholic] church and a Catholic chapel used to be on one yard and still share one little fence. Now, they are separated. The Uniate church is groomed; there is an entry and a metal fence. And this, Catholic one—the roof is broken, because these are Catholics… And this is a very nice metaphor. It often happens like this in Lviv. Put a fence through the yard: ‘It belongs to them, let it be’. Who are they? They are gone, these are ours” (cultural manager, male; recorded 03.10.2019).

162

N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova

Fig. 9.2 Jewish past in urban space of Lviv: Broken matzevah in the hospital’s courtyard on the place of old Jewish cemetery (4) and the commemorative public space—the Space of Synagogues. (5). Photos N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova

The opinion of an artist and translator that “truly effective researcher of the intellectual history of Lviv can be a person who speaks at least a couple of languages: Ukrainian, Polish, German, Yiddish, Hebrew” (artist, male; recorded 04.03.2020) is notable here. This way, the reconstruction of the lost continuity requires substantial intellectual skills. This expert also mentions the quotation from Maurycy Szymel (Mosze Schimel) that he saw carved on the Space of Synagogues Memorial (Fig. 9.2), “At least in some way, at least through the stone that carries his quotation, this author is rescued… here, in Lviv, there are a few people who could work with the Jewish history of the city, who would at least know some Yiddish and Hebrew” (ibid.). Histories of various ethnic groups in Lviv are part of its multinational heritage, and they could be brought back through small interventions into urban space (Fig. 9.3). The need to preserve the multinational heritage of the city provokes a series of questions; in particular, how should it be preserved? Some participants of our study are critical about the idea of commemoration that presupposes formal practices of commemoration and preservation without a reflection, “Just to raise monuments, this makes no sense… The management of the heritage should not be limited to installation of memorial boards or, I don’t know, apartment-museums with the preserved dust from the 1970s. The heritage should be managed in the way that would show its current relevance” (cultural manager, female; recorded 09.02.2020). Marking of the space has a sense only when it presupposes the deeper consideration and is part of the wider strategy of the management of the past, “I think that a memorial board— also a bit about “install and forget” (laughing)—is something needed to keep things going… It is important that it says: we didn’t forget; we remember about this place… For example, there is still no memorial board on the [Stanislaw] Lem’s home… On the building where [Gabriela] Zapolska lived on Verhratskoho [street], there is nothing too, not a single notice. These things can be enumerated for very-very-very long time; I mean 80–90% of Lviv as a city of culture is not marked” (artist, male; recorded

9 (Not) Our Heritage: Cultural Milieu and Urban Space of Lviv

163

Fig. 9.3 City as Palimpsest—restored multilingual inscriptions from interwar period on Tyktor Street. Photo N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova

04.03.2020). When asked about the more effective ways to manage heritage, this expert mentions public events, discussion boards, performances, visual art projects, or festivals.

9.5 Connecting Past, Present, and Future: Overcoming the Ruptures Participants to our study emphasised the relationship between the past, the present, and the future with cultural heritage as an important link between them. In this context, there are two simultaneous processes: the preservation (or reconstruction) of continuity and management of the current ruptures and their creation. One of our narrators, when speaking about this peculiarity of the heritage, uses the metaphor of a book, “Imagine that you are an author of one’s own book that has been started before by someone else. To make any person understand what you are talking about, you need to read everything that has already been written. And it would be very unwise to take only your part and the rest of the book—to tear away and to burn, because such are your ambitions, because you are that cool, yes?” (representative of cultural industry, male; recorded 27.02.2020). He continues saying that heritage is

164

N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova

simultaneously a burden and an opportunity, “On the one hand, we are hostages to this, because we are somehow doomed to tell the story created earlier, right? It puts us into the frame. On the other hand, it is a great gift to us, because we own this, right? And we can tell this story. Well, this cultural heritage is sometimes full of such dualism for me.” (ibid.). It is notable that the interviewee mentions the idea of the duality, which Soja used to describe the space—the heritage exists simultaneously as an outcome and a medium, as an embodiment and presupposition. It is something received, as the head of the institution described it, “Heritage is a cultural product, a cultural product with a quality that we got for free. I didn’t buy anything in Lviv in the old town. It has been passed down from generation to generation” (head of an institution, male; recorded 04.03.2020). And, at the same time, it is something constantly reconstructed and re-evaluated. Awareness of the heritage often begins within the physical space where the cultural institution is located. According to Jorge Otero-Pailos, Spanish artist, “Preservation is central to every cultural institution. An institution is by definition a society organised around a particular object: a religious institution is organised around religious objects, art institutions around art objects, cultural institutions around preserved objects” (Otero-Pailos 2016). Thus, we can cite the motto of the historical movement and grassroots memorialisation, “Dig where you stand”, that is start research from where you are. This resonates with the idea voiced in one interview, “Around us, there are many buildings that have historical and architectural value… We are part of this heritage, we live in it. Considering this material part, it is all around us and we just observe it. We understand that this should be changed, all this is… I mean, we need to reconsider old things, give new meaning to it. Well, not old things, but these historical ones” (head of an institution, female; recorded 03.03.2020). Connection to the past is constructed through a definite place and its history. As a large part of the city’s cultural infrastructure was developed in the previous century, the study of this history may be an important way of transition from “not our” to “common” heritage. Preservation and reconstruction of continuity correspond to the ideas of Lefebvre on the space of representation (lived space)—perceived, articulated, accepted, and integrated into the common view of the heritage of the city. This way, we can see the transition from the representation of space and exclusive narratives that are created and exist independently from the actors, to the space of representations as lived, perceived, and integrated into human experiences. Therefore, heritage becomes an integral part of daily spatial experiences. Management of the heritage can be analysed on four levels. The first basic level is comprehension that is understanding what is meaningful and why. During the interview with the head of an institution and her colleague, the following ideas were voiced, “The heritage, it should be reconsidered, right. Maybe, not all the heritage should be carried on your shoulders despite pain and tears” (head of an institution, female; recorded 04.10.2019); “In our case, the heritage should first be excavated from beneath various painted elements, and then think about how to comprehend it and how to manage it further” (cultural manager, female; recorded 04.10.2019). The lack of the professional discussion is also noted by the cultural manager who refers to an example of an actual museum collection, “This is something underexposed,

9 (Not) Our Heritage: Cultural Milieu and Urban Space of Lviv

165

underrepresented, unordered and underinventorised, because no one even researched it” (cultural manager, male; recorded 03.03.2020). Research is the first step, on which the following one can be based. After creation of the working definitions and getting ideas about the actual artefacts, objects, practices that are valuable achievements of the past, the next step— preservation of the heritage—should be taken. “We have a mission to preserve, not ruin, and not to let ruin what we have. We cannot speculate these things and turn them into commercial projects… There should be an overarching vision of the city and all the demands should be strictly followed, as it is in most of the cities” (representative of cultural industry, female; recorded 24.02.2020). In this case, the narrator is speaking about the architecture of the city; still, expanding this conversation, representatives of various communities believe that management of the past should comprise not only and not so much the conservation, but also an actualisation, “Preservation means not just a conservation, closure of everything, putting it into the basement and waiting for better times. Preservation means the usage, the development, because it is not possible to conserve it” (educator, female; recorded 27.03.2020); “Because often when we speak about the heritage, everything automatically leads to some kind of ‘museumification’, that everything should remain as it is, should not be taken or touched; it should be put under the glass bell, plunged in formaldehyde, and that’s it” (artist, male; recorded 31.01.2020). This way, the experts contrast passive conservation and active comprehension of the heritage. One of the narrators uses the metaphor of a chest, which should be kept open, “A heritage is not some kind of a chest, that remains closed, and we, when interested, can come and look inside; it should be presented to public in the right way, so that it is remembered and developed” (representative of cultural industry, male; recorded 06.03.2020). Actualisation of the achievements of the past reconstructs the continuity by “the creation of new works of art, that in some way allude to this old heritage, any heritage, of any period. This way, we reconstruct the continuity of art, rebuild it; on the other hand, we create a new basis for contemporary art” (artist, male; recorded 31.01.2020). Reconstruction of practices can also happen via the creation of certain spaces: “We have founded our platform to pass on the experience of this institution, which has been lost. This link between the older and the new generations” (head of an institution, female; recorded 03.03.2020). Furthermore, the heritage is creatively comprehended by businesses working in the sphere of culture, “Lviv is prominent for its history of artistic tempered glass. And we wanted to tell people who come to the city, who live here, more about these artists, about this art” (representative of cultural industry, female; recorded 14.02.2020). Risks associated with the actualisation of the heritage are instrumentalisation, commodification, and creation of kitsch traditions that do not have any historical basement in them. These challenges are especially visible in the tourist industry: “There is too much history everywhere. I mean even if you observe tourists, everything that is going on… The more legends, the better; the actual history is, in fact, not that relevant” (cultural manager, male; recorded 03.03.2020). This is why research and professional discussion should be the first stage carried out before effective management. Participants of our research agree that to keep this heritage alive, it

166

N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova

should be made part of the present, discussed, and questioned. After all, the discourse over the cultural heritage is part of a larger discourse about the current culture of the city and what it takes into the future: “The heritage is something we received from the past; something, which remained from the past. And something we consider important for us, for our lives. And this is something we would be ready to pass on to our children. Not what we are ready to pass on—what we want to pass on. This “we” should be understood in different ways. This subject could be a state, and it should be a state, local government, communities, and individuals. Right, I mean is that there is no one subject, it is complex, and this is also a great challenge and issue for Ukraine, because for us, this subject is often associated with the state” (educator, female; recorded 27.03.2020); “There are such centres of culture… There is a philharmonic hall, a great opera and ballet theatre. I mean they exist. These centres. They are not built by contemporary society, they were built by the previous one, by responsible people, indeed. Who also worked in the Soviet times and managed to protect some factors of the culture, torches, or culture that still exist in our free times. They exist. And we need to develop them” (educator, male; recorded 14.02.2020).

Speaking about the heritage of the city, a logical question would be who should be responsible for its preservation, at least, for the preservation of its physical component. According to the results of the survey conducted in November 2018 in the framework of the project ReHERIT,5 62% of the respondents agreed with the statement that the responsibility for the maintenance of the sites created by particular ethnic groups lies on both the community and the government of the city. In our study, narrators hold the same point of view: both the citizens and the governmental bodies are responsible for the preservation of the heritage. The governmental bodies, in this case, can perform the functions of strategic vision, legal support, and consolidation, “There should be a strategy if we speak about the preservation of the heritage… NGOs may take part in this, but this is a local government that should come up with a strategy because this is part of the public responsibility of the government. For sure, such a strategy should include different things: integration, cooperation with NGOs, educational establishments, cultural centres, independent researchers” (artist, male; recorded 04.03.2020); “All of us, all Ukrainians [are responsible for the heritage]. It is not that there is some man or woman in the city council that is responsible for this. Are we all not responsible? Everyone is” (head of an institution, male; recorded 20.02.2020). However, the narrators emphasised that it is rather an aspiration than an actual situation. The expert from the side of business says that management of the heritage (especially its architectural dimension) needs a strict legal frame that would be independent of personal views of certain individuals: “This should be the matter of the law. Because if you decide this, in our city, such decisions are taken subjectively. There are some people who say, ‘Today I like or I don’t like this’. As a result, if you are not 5 The

survey was conducted by the Ukrainian Centre for Public Opinion Research “Socioinform”; n = 800, quota sampling, representative by age and gender. The report is available at: https://reherit.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ReHERIT_Presentation-of-Sociological-sur vey-on-Heritage-in-Lviv-2018.pdf. Accessed 20.05.2020.

9 (Not) Our Heritage: Cultural Milieu and Urban Space of Lviv

167

allowed anything, you get absolutely ugly buildings in the city centre” (representative of cultural industry, male; recorded 27.02.2020). This is the result of the lack of distinction between or overlapping of the spheres of responsibility when several institutions manage the same thing and there are no regulation mechanisms. In many interviews, experts underline the important role of the city administration. Some of them believe that the members of the city council and the city architects should bear the responsibility. The governors, in their turn, believe that their role is coordination: “It is not our task to repair gateways or windows; our task is to talk about it, to educate, to inform” (city official, female; recorded 28.02.2020). Besides, there is an emphasis on the administrative divisions that are often artificial and complicate the work because of the lack of coordination between various branches. The heads of institutions that state that they have “inherited” certain buildings and traditions are also aware of their personal responsibility for the preservation and management of this legacy, “Well, this [heritage] is my responsibility now (laughing). Every employee of this establishment was responsible for the preservation of the building as a cultural heritage.” (head of an institution, female; recorded 04.10.2019). Paraphrasing the motto of the lower commemoration, “Appreciate where you stand”.

9.6 Concluding Remarks Based on interviews with representatives of cultural milieus of Lviv, we discussed the attitudes towards the heritage embedded in urban space. Thus, according to our respondents, heritage is both object-oriented and process-oriented, i.e. it has physical (material) and social (intangible) aspects which are interconnected. The latter, in turn, does not appear in the field of legislative definitions; therefore, it is invisible and unprotected. In the analysis of interviews, we understand that the heritage is often divided into “ours” and “not ours”, which determines the distance to it. Working with cultural heritage often begins at the level of organisation where the narrator works—understanding the history of a particular institution is the first step in building connections with the past. Based on recorded conversations, we offer a four-level model for working with heritage. The initial level is (1) research and professional discussion on what achievements of the past should be actualised. This phase should include not only professionals but also different publics, so the links with heritage could be constructed. The next step includes (2) responsible preservation and (3) codification, which becomes the basis for (4) various actualisation practices because heritage lives when it is worked with (in our interviews, passive conservation is opposed to active rethinking). In fact, actualisation itself is possible through events and practices, through the connection with contemporary questions and issues. Interviewees are also aware of the challenges of instrumentalising heritage and turning it into a commodity. To avoid this, a culture of responsibility needs to be developed at various levels, from clear legal regulation to the day-to-day practices of caring for the city’s environment.

168

N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova

A key challenge in dealing with heritage is the latent conflict of various ideological, political, and, in part, national narratives, which has led to a gap in the articulation and talk about heritage. In fact, there are two gaps: between pre-Soviet and Soviet and between Soviet and post-Soviet. Also, based on the reflections of representatives of Lviv cultural milieu, the article proposes ways to overcome these gaps, namely the logical chain of actions, which includes comprehension, preservation, actualisation, and restoration of connections. In Lefebvre’s terms, working with heritage requires a transition from the representation of space to the space of representation, from defining gaps to overcoming them.

References Publications Amar TC (2015) The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv. A borderland city between Stalinists, Nazis, and Nationalists. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY & London Blacker U (2013) Living among the Ghosts of Others: Urban Postmemory in Eastern Europe. In: Blacker U, Etkind A, Fedor J (eds) Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp 173–193 Czaplicka J (ed) (2005) Lviv: A City in the Crosscurrents of Culture. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts Godelier M (1996) L’Énigme du don. Fayard, Paris Hartog F (2015) Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time. Columbia University Press, New York Konventsia (1988 (1972)) Pro ohoronu vsesvitnoi kulturnoi i pryrodnoi spadshchyny. Ukaz Prezydii Verhovnoi Rady № 6673-XI (6673–1) vid 04.10.88 Konventsia (2008 (2003)) Pro ohoronu nematerialnoi kulturnoi spadshchyny. Vidomosti Verhovnoi Rady (VVR), № 16, st. 153 Leary ME (2009) The production of space through a shrine and Vendetta in Manchester: Lefebvre’s spatial triad and the regeneration of a place renamed castlefield. Plann Theory Practice 10(2):189– 212 Leary ME (2013) A Lefebvrian analysis of the production of Glorious, Gruesome Public Space in Manchester. Progress Plann 85:1–52 Lefebvre H (1991) The Production of Space. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford Mick C (2016) Lemberg, Lwów, L’viv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City. Purdue University Press, West Lafayette, IN Narvselius E (2015) Spicing up memories and serving nostalgias: thematic restaurants and transnational memories in east-central European borderland Cities. J Contemp Eur Stud 23(3):1–16 Nora P (2002) Reasons for the current upsurge in memory. Eurozine, Available at: https://www. eurozine.com/reasons-for-the-current-upsurge-in-memory/. Accessed: 25 May 2020 Oliinyk OP (red.) (2014) Kontseptsia natsionalnoi polityky shchodo zberezhennia kulturnoi spadshchyny v Ukraini [proekt] Arkhitektura i prestyzh, Seredniak T. K Kyiv

9 (Not) Our Heritage: Cultural Milieu and Urban Space of Lviv

169

Otero-Pailos J (2016) Experimental preservation. Places J. Available at: https://doi.org/10.22269/ 160913. Accessed: 25 May 2020 Otrishchenko N (2019) Between anonymity and attachment: remembering others in Lviv’s Pidzamche district. J Soviet Post-Soviet Politics Soc 5(2):87–120 Risch WJ (2011) The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv. Harvard University Press, London Soja EW (2010 (1989)) Postmodern geographies: the reassertion of the space in critical social theory. Verso, London and New York Zakon Ukrainy (2000) Pro ohoronu kulturnoi spadshchyny. Vidomosti Verhovnoi Rady (VVR), № 39, st. 333

Interviews Artist, female (2020). Interview recorded on 25 February 2020 Artist, male (2020). Interview recorded on 4 March 2020 City official, female (2020). Interview recorded on 28 February 2020 Cultural manager, male (2019). Interview recorded on 3 October 2019 Cultural manager, female (2020). Interview recorded on 9 February 2020 Cultural manager, male (2020). Interview recorded on 31 January 2020 Cultural manager, male (2020). Interview recorded on 3 March 2020 Cultural manager, male (2020). Interview recorded on 11 February 2020 Cultural manager, male (2020). Interview recorded on 22 February 2020 Educator, female (2020). Interview recorded on 27 March 2020 Educator, male (2020). Interview recorded on 14 February 2020 Head of institution and cultural managers, females (2019). Interview recorded on 4 October 2019 Head of institution, female (2020). Interview recorded on 3 March 2020 Head of institution, male (2020). Interview recorded on 20 February 2020 Head of institution, male (2020). Interview recorded on 4 March 2020 Head of institution, male (2020). Interview recorded on 13 March 2020 Representative of cultural industry, female (2020). Interview recorded on 14 February 2020 Representative of cultural industry, female (2020). Interview recorded on 24 February 2020 Representative of cultural industry, male (2020). Interview recorded on 27 February 2020 Representative of cultural industry, male (2020). Interview recorded on 6 March 2020

Natalia Otrishchenko is a research fellow at the Centre for Urban History of East Central Europe (Lviv, Ukraine). She obtained PhD from the Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. She is interested in methodology of sociological research, oral history, urban sociology, spatial and social transformations during and after socialism. Natalia participated in international projects “Region, Nation, and Beyond” (University of St. Gallen), “Memory of Vanished Populations” (Lund University), “Historical Cultures in Transition” (Collegium Civitas, Warsaw). Together with Inga Kozlova she developed methodology and prepared reports for monitoring the Lviv Cultural Strategy realisation (2018–2020). In 2019 she started a post-doc project “Urban Experts and Changing Cities: Reshaping Professional Field (1970s–2010s)” within the frame of the “Legacies of Communism?” interdisciplinary research network coordinated by the Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History in Potsdam.

170

N. Otrishchenko and I. Kozlova

Inga Kozlova Ph.D. in Sociology, an associate professor, Head of the Sociological Laboratory at the Department of Sociology, Ukrainian Catholic University (Lviv). Her research interests focus on urban sociology, sociology of space, qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. She was involved in a number of projects: “Quality of life in the city. Social monitoring 2013” (Lviv city council, MATRA), International research program “Religion and Human Rights” (University of Würzburg), “Women and war: everyday life on the occupied territories” (CIUS grant, 2017); “Ukrainian Christianity in USA: integration, social belonging and belief” (Ukrainian Catholic University, 2019).

Chapter 10

Ideologic Storms in the Still Waters: Postrevolutionary Life of Urban Spaces in Vinnytsia, Ukraine Oleksiy Gnatiuk and Anatoliy Melnychuk

Abstract The chapter focuses on the city of Vinnytsia, representative of the central, “pro-European” part of Ukraine, which is unique and specific at the same time. On the one hand, it is a regular second-order Ukrainian city, but on the other—one of the most economically affluent Ukrainian cities, experiencing rapid changes of urban landscape, being an economic and political domain of key Ukrainian power holders immediately after the Euromaidan Revolution. In order to demonstrate hybrid and ambiguous axiology of transforming urban space, both intangible changes (renaming of streets) and attempts to revisit urban materiality on the examples of most striking instances are discussed. The Euromaidan Revolution broke the trend to focus solely on the city’s “Golden Age” and induced a revision of the city’s role in national history as well as revealed often problematical coexistence of different ideological symbols and values in the urban space. The possibility of making purely compromise decisions has its limitations, which leads to contemporary ongoing re-evaluation of the urban space. By accumulating new, incompatible symbols, urban space is challenging the modern and future generations to make increasingly complex decisions about its perceptible use. Keywords Urban space · Decommunisation · Memory policy · Commemoration · Vinnytsia · Ukraine

10.1 Introduction Existing literature on contested urban spaces in Ukraine, especially after the Euromaidan Revolution, typically refers to geopolitically divided (fault line) cities from the eastern and southern part of the country, where pro-Russian sentiments and O. Gnatiuk (B) · A. Melnychuk Department of Economic and Social Geography, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] A. Melnychuk e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_10

171

172

O. Gnatiuk and A. Melnychuk

nostalgia for the Soviet era are strong so far (Gentile 2017, 2019). However, ideological rivalisation of urban space in Ukraine comes to pass in rear of geopolitical frontier as well. In this chapter, we focus on the city of Vinnytsia, located in the southwestern Ukraine within the historical region of Podolia, representing the central part of Ukraine with dominating Ukrainian ethno-cultural component in identity. In this chapter, we show that rethinking of Soviet legacy and symbols inscribed in the city text is ongoing and sometimes painful process even in this part of the country. However, recent transformation of urban space in Vinnytsia was significantly influenced not only by officially launched decommunisation process and revisited historical memory policy, but by the role of the city in the country’s political life as well. Volodymyr Groysman, Ukrainian Prime-Minister (2016–2019), previously, was a mayor of Vinnytsia (2006–2014) and managed to implement a series of successful municipal reforms, which brought Vinnytsia to the top of Ukrainian best for life cities. Soon after that, the city turned into an economic and political domain of key current Ukrainian power holders. The wave of revolution has not only brought the former mayor to the highest posts in parliament and government, but also made Petro Poroshenko, several times before elected to the parliament from the city and having strong business interests there, a President (2014–2019). All of that contributed to formation of a strong local urban identity, which was largely based on the local success story, contrasting the “advanced” city to the rest of Ukraine. In this line, attempts have been made by joint efforts of local government, historians, and activists to actualise several exclusively local contexts of memory. At the same time, local political opposition, criticising the authorities for corruption and other faults, often automatically condemned administration-driven transformation in urban symbolic space, criticising them as anti-Ukrainian intrigues of rogue power brokers. In this way, the case allows to depart from purely Ukrainian-Soviet or Ukrainian-Russian opposition and pay more attention to interdependence (manifested in both conflicts and synergism) of national and local political actors trying to codify certain values in the urban space. To demonstrate hybrid and ambiguous axiology of transforming urban space, we discuss both intangible changes (renaming of streets) and attempts to revisit urban materiality on the examples of most striking instances.

10.2 Memory Politics and Identity Building Before and After the Euromaidan Revolution Transformation of symbolic urban space in Vinnytsia over the pre-revolutionary decade fits well with the search for pre-socialist “Golden Age” (Young and Light 2001), which was invented in the form of the so-called Optimism Age, a period of rapid development of the city in late nineteenth–early twentieth centuries, when the ordinary district town quickly turned into a powerful regional centre. The “Optimism Age” was ruthlessly terminated by the First World War and the advent of communist rule (to the contrary, in Soviet tradition, that period was regarded as an era of growing

10 Ideologic Storms in the Still Waters: Postrevolutionary Life …

173

stagnation and decay). The campaign was triggered by local history experts popularising the legacy of Hryhorii Artynov, a chief city architect in 1900–1919, who had factually designed the architectural face of the modern city centre. For the city government, actualisation of that historical background was quite lucrative due to the possibilities of drawing parallels with the present and further legitimising itself as a worthy assigner of the successful predecessors. In particular, achievements of acting mayor were compared in media to the progress under the rule of Mykola Ovodov, a mayor during the “Optimism Age”. Numerous references to and narratives of the “Optimism Age” were widely used while celebrating the main annual city holidays—the City Day and the Europe Day, as well as establishment of monuments and renovation of historical buildings. The Euromaidan Revolution had threefold influence on rethinking and contesting urban identity in Vinnytsia. First, it shifted the focus from a purely local aspect (Vinnytsia in itself) to the role of the city in national development (Vinnytsia in/for Ukraine). The “Optimism Age” as a key reference epoch was supplemented and even supplanted by the following Ukrainian struggle for the independence (1917–1922), when Vinnytsia twice (in February–March of 1919 and in May–June of 1920) was a temporary capital of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR). Previous commemoration of these events was limited to installation of several memorial plaques, in particular at the former Savoy Hotel, the UNR government headquarters. However, ongoing conflict with Russia led to rethinking of the relevant pages of history and the extraordinary role of the city. In 2018, a first in Ukraine full-size memorial to Simon Petliura, the UNR’s Head of the Government and Chief Ataman of the Army, was unveiled near a mansion where he lived in Vinnytsia. Since 2016, the Military Historic Reconstruction Festival “Vinnytsia—UNR Capital” has been held annually in the city’s Central Park, offering a colourful show of the Ukrainian army’s struggle against the Reds and Whites in 1919. The festival is typically accompanied by a parade of infantrymen and an exhibition of rare military equipment. The theme of city holidays has also changed with greater attention to the military struggle of Ukrainians for independence. Several memorial plaques were installed: at the railway station in honour of a meeting between Symon Petliura and Jozef Pilsudski on May 1920, on the building hosting the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1919, in honour of UNR Army captain Semen Yakerson and Central Council member Kostiantyn Vasylenko, etc. Since 2016, the Museum of Ukrainian postage stamps has been operating with UNR stamps as a tricky part of the collection. The second implication of Euromaidan was the official start of decommunisation process. As in most cities of central Ukraine, erasing of communist legacy in Vinnytsia until 2014 was selective and limited largely to the central part of the city. In particular, only ten objects, including main square and street, were renamed during this period, while Soviet symbols in built environment remained almost intact. As a result, for two decades, the city comprised an untouched ocean of typical Soviet toponymy surrounding isolated decommunised islands. This situation has not satisfied all the locals, and since the 2000s, almost every year, various public initiatives have independently renamed some of the unacceptable streets using stencils,

174

O. Gnatiuk and A. Melnychuk

paint cans, and stickers. The city administration, although announcing a course on the implementation of democratic values and integration into the European cultural space, was reluctant to solve the problem. After the official start of decommunisation in 2015, the elimination of communist toponymy in Vinnytsia became systemic. Specially created working group, headed by the deputy mayor, included six historians, three deputies of the city council, the chief architect of the city, the chairman of the association of self-organisation bodies, and the chief of technical inventory bureau. The changes touched both tangible and intangible environment. Several dozens of memorial plaques, commemorating communist functionaries, and military men have been dismantled, the images of the sickle and hammer on buildings and constructions were removed or replaced by the Ukrainian coat of arms, and approximately 150 streets were renamed. Third, urban space has become an arena for the perpetuation of modern national heroes of the Euromaidan and Donbas military conflict. Dozens of streets were renamed in their honour, and dozens of plaques and memorials were opened. Thus, the symbolic space of the city became actualised and speaks not only of the past but also of the present. However, the trend that remains unchanged before and after the Euromaidan is “Europeanisation”. It can be most briefly characterised as defining everything new, advanced, and promising as “European”, making a fetish of Europe and often resulting in talking about Vinnytsia as a European city at the drop of a hat. Symptomatically, Europe Day is typically celebrated with a grander scale than the City Day or Independence Day. However, Europeanisation is also manifested in promotion of European culture and values. In application to urban public spaces, it means creating European-style built environment, making it inclusive and comfortable, promoting street art, as well as adoption of typical European behaviour and mobility patterns, e.g. cycling, visiting Christmas fairs, or coffee shops.

10.3 Locals, Local Über Alles: Renaming of Streets Renaming of streets was the largest and most systematic change in the axiological space of the city after the Euromaidan Revolution. Since 2013, 149 objects have been renamed, and the official interpretation for five toponyms has been changed; in this way, decommunisation covered 19% of the city’s toponymic system. The procedure and ideology of toponymic change were exactly the main item on the agenda of the working group on decommunisation, which identified and published in the media a list of streets requiring renaming in accordance with the package of decommunisation laws and began collecting and analysing proposals for new names. The main stated purpose of the working group was to “create a unique image of the city that would fit into the historical past and the national context”. In view of the public pressure and the political situation in the country, historians tried to work respecting the principles of tolerance (respect for different canons of historical memory), historical gravity (appealing not only to the past but also to the

10 Ideologic Storms in the Still Waters: Postrevolutionary Life …

175

trends of the present and the goals for the future), education (promoting dialogue and collective memory of different social groups), and integrity (creation of an integral city image/brand). Commemoration policy was aimed at formation of national-state identity, but appealing to the identity of the local urban community on a first-priority basis. Considering each place name, proposals were discussed roughly as follows: (1) attempt to restore the historical name; (2) attempt to reflect local features of the area or people associated with it; (3) attempt to extend the logic of the surrounding place names, building an associative series; (4) appeal to local and regional identity; (5) search among the names of prominent Ukrainians (Karoyeva 2017: 200–201). A distinctive feature of decommunisation process in Vinnytsia was the refusal to return the names of the pre-communist era due to overwhelming connotations of historical toponymy with the Russian imperial colonial period. Only five historical names, politically neutral and tied to the local context, were returned to the city map. Another characteristic feature is that only a few figurative names related neither to the local landscape no to the commemoration appeared in Vinnytsia, although many requests for ideologically neutral street names were received from the public. Instead, a large number of streets (about 14% of all renamed) were given descriptive names, indicating the location of the street in relation to certain landmarks or a certain neighbourhood. Several streets were named after no longer existing historic sites, e.g. Mahistratska St. (from the XVII century town hall), Striletska St. (from the XIX century military barracks), and Zamkova St. (from the XVI century castle that gave the start for the city development). These street names serve as memorials to these sites, restoring the memory of them in the minds of the people and enriching the city’s mental map. However, the absolute majority of new street names in Vinnytsia is commemorative (83%). According to the professional character of the perpetuated personalities, they divide as follows: 18 military men, 14 scientists, eight writers, five statesmen, three religious figures, four actors, one teacher, one mayor, one athlete, etc. Thus, military and political names constitute just under half of all commemorative toponymy. Efforts to promote the city’s past by perpetuating Vinnytsia-related figures have led to 26 such street names, while only 17 figures are not directly related to the city. In result, Vinnytsia appears in the top of Ukrainian regional centres by the proportion of new street names tied to the local and regional context (Gnatiuk 2018: 130–131). Almost a third (31.4%) of the new military and political commemorative names is related to Ukraine’s struggle for independence in 1917–1922. In this way, the role of Vinnytsia as a temporal UNR capital in 1919–1920 was stressed. Despite rich local historical heritage related to Cossacks, respective toponymy composes only 14.3%, which is even less than proportion of street names related to the Euromaidan and the conflict in the Eastern Ukraine (25.7%). All these historical contexts are the pillars around which modern Ukrainian national identity is built and so are prevalent in most of Ukrainian cities (Gnatiuk 2018: 127). However, new toponymy in Vinnytsia shows up with high proportion of connotations with the Polish-Lithuanian period (when the city was founded) and the period of the Russian Empire (due to the “Optimism Age”). On the other hand, the working group tried to avoid any radical political influences on

176

O. Gnatiuk and A. Melnychuk

the renaming process. As a result, Vinnytsia has no streets named after the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA) leaders (Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych), whose names are uncompromisingly debated in contemporary Ukrainian society, cutting down to colonel Omelian Hrabets, the organiser and commander of the local UIA military district. Although the right wing activists had long insisted on renaming Red Partisans St. in honour of the UIA heroes, and left wing politicians pointed out that anti-Nazi fighters are protected by the law, the working group decided to give it the name of Władysław Horodecki, the “Gaudi of Kyiv”, an architect originally from the Vinnytsia region, well-known mostly due to famous “House with chimeras” in Ukrainian capital. The perceived significance of a certain person, historical event, idea, or geographic object generally correlates with the adequate size, length, and location of a street (Crljenko 2012: 233), and the most important and most reputable persons in the hierarchy of values receive street names in the best locations (Azaryahu and Kook 2002). That is why it is interesting to look at the centre–peripheral distribution of the major categories of new place names, as well as the dependence of the renaming policy on street status. In the case of Vinnytsia, topographic names are concentrated in the central part of the city and more typical for the main streets than the minor ones. The same pattern is characteristic of military and political commemorative names. In terms of individual historical contexts, the historical centre concentrates toponymy related to the “Optimism Age”, the Euromaidan Revolution and subsequent military conflict, and the Polish-Lithuanian period; names from these categories tend to gravitate more to the main streets than to the minor ones. Conflict situations have occurred when renaming individual streets, and some of them are quite illustrative: 1. One of the key streets of the historic centre of the city, former Kozytsky St., was proposed to be renamed either in honour of Petliura or the Heavenly Hundred. However, finally, it was named after Ovodov, the mayor during the “Optimism Age”. The remnants of that toponymic war still remain on the facades. Somewhere one may see not only several new names (official and alternative), but also the liquidated Soviet name, which was temporarily left for the period of habituation to the new toponymy, but remains for more than 3 years (Fig. 10.1). Petliura also got a more modest street near the house where he lived, while Teatralna Square, where the main events of the Revolution of Dignity took place in Vinnytsia, was renamed after the Heavenly Hundred. 2. In the other case, the main option to commemorate was Nathan Altman, Soviet avant-garde artist, Cubist painter, stage designer, and book illustrator, born in Vinnytsia. An unexpected alternative was Oleksandr Solovyov, a teacher that in Soviet times for the forty years headed the leading secondary school in the city, Physics and Mathematics Gymnasium No. 17, which is located on the street. When one of the alumni asked in social networks for support, hundreds of emails were sent to the working group asking to commemorate their teacher. The school administration, teaching staff, and parents also supported the idea. Despite some fears that a teacher and a communist will not be honoured in today’s Ukraine,

10 Ideologic Storms in the Still Waters: Postrevolutionary Life …

177

Fig. 10.1 Multiply street signs on the same street: a new official name below the old “communist” name; b new official name and a “popular” alternative applied with a stencil. Photo O. Gnatiuk and A. Melnychuk

the renaming has taken place. However, some citizens are still dissatisfied with this decision, as Altman’s name was given to a small peripheral street. This case illustrates the considerable pressure on renaming decision-making and search for non-controversial decisions, which sometimes results in rather ambiguous results of the renaming process. 3. Discussions percolated on the advisability of renaming Mykhailo Stakhursky St. The former Communist Party functionary made a lot of efforts to electrify the settlements in the region and to develop sports associations in rural areas, but

178

O. Gnatiuk and A. Melnychuk

his name apparently came under decommunisation. The discussion on the new name was an example of growing religious community influence on toponymic policy and simultaneously illustrated the successful search for compromise. The Roman Catholic community proposed to name the street in honour of Pope John Paul II and collected more than 500 signatures in support. In turn, an initiative group of Orthodox parishioners of the St. Apostle Andrew Church, located on the street, collected more than 2000 signatures in support of renaming in honour of the Apostle Andrew. The working group, in order to avoid interdenominational confrontation, proposed its own variant—Zghody St.[Concord St.]. However, finally, the Roman Catholic community agreed to the proposal of the Orthodox, virtually demonstrating agreement and interdenominational understanding. This is a precedent in Vinnytsia (and a rare case in Ukraine) when a biblical figure is written in the name of the street. In broad terms, decommunisation of street names in Vinnytsia was balanced compared to other Ukrainian cities. On the one hand, the city rejected the strategy of extreme toponymical deideologisation typical for the southeast of the country. Simultaneously, it managed not only to perpetuate the memory of prominent Ukrainians, especially fellow countrymen, but also to leave room for names reflecting the attributes of the urban space and its parts, related to the local history and conveying local flavour. Despite the controversy of individual decisions, all historical contexts present in the local, regional, and national dimension of historical memory were reflected on the city map.

10.4 Europe in Budenovka: Hybrid Axiology of Cityscape in Post-Soviet Transition The practical implementation of decommunisation has revealed several problems of urban space semiotics that previously remained unperceived but simultaneously not ready to be resolved yet due to the lack of interpretative traditions (Foote 1997: 294). Such cases of negotiating unresolved meaning (Šakaja and Stani´c 2017: 159) are illustrative examples of sometimes ambiguous and hybrid nature of commemoration places in Vinnytsia. On 28 November 2013, an extraordinary session of the Vinnytsia City Council adopted a decision to support the European course of Ukraine, raising the flags of the European Union in front of the city hall and renaming Kozytsky Square, located in the very heart of historical area, to the European Square. The very next day, a sign with a new name and the EU symbols were placed there on the water tower, one of the city’s landmarks, and the green area of the square was called the European Garden. In this manner, the city protested against President Yanukovych’s refusal to sign an association agreement with the EU in Vilnius. The new name clearly emphasised the European aspirations of urban community and was a precursor for the following wave of decommunisation (Kozytsky headed provincial Revolutionary Committee in

10 Ideologic Storms in the Still Waters: Postrevolutionary Life …

179

1920). However, this long-expected rebranding was only the beginning of rethinking the square’s image, appearance, and functions. Since the Soviet times, the square hosts a memorial to the victims of the Second World War, with 79 buried Red Army soldiers, and the carved names of 6486 locals killed by Nazis. However, communists fighting against supporters of Ukrainian independence in the 1920s are also buried there, and the monument itself has the appearance of three soldiers in budenovka and the Red Army uniform of the early XX century. After the Euromaidan Revolution, both administration and citizens started to reflect over having a memorial in the city’s core glorifying not only the fighters against the Nazi, but also the executioners of the Ukrainian people. A petition demanding the demolition of the “monument to the men in budenovka” was published in 2018 on the site of the city council. Although the petition did not gather the requisite number of votes to be considered, it became a red flag for the city administration. The director of the Vinnytsia History Centre, Oleksandr Fedoryshen, noted that this issue was repeatedly raised during the decommunisation process, but the active law protects the burial places; at the same time, the presence of such a memorial in the city centre provokes and will provoke a discussion: “We can clearly state that this memorial place reflects our view of our past, and this view is partly changing” (Kachor 2018). This change is currently reflected by the adjustment of the dates on the ceiling from “1941–1945” (chronological framework of the so-called Great Patriotic War in Soviet historiography) to correct dates “1939–1945” and represents an example of resemiotisation of memorials, attained by appending, removal, or replacement of some elements on an already existing monument (Fig. 10.2) (Till 1999; Azaryahu 2003; Palonen 2008: 226–227; Light and Young 2010; Šakaja and Stani´c 2017: 161). Even besides the specific nature of the memorial, there is a growing conflict between the two functions of the square: commemorative and recreational. Since the 2000s, the square has been actively used as a venue for mass events, including fairs and festivals held on city and national holidays. According to Alina Diachenko, director of the municipal enterprise “Institute for Urban Development”, the potential of the square as a European model for recreation and entertainment is extremely high, but nothing can be dramatically changed now due to the presence of the memorial: “The square is used to host festive and public events, and at the same time houses an object that needs peace and quietude”. Diachenko believes that “in the medium term, one way or another, it will be necessary to discuss with the residents what exactly a modern European square in a European city might look like here” (Kachor 2018). Meanwhile, the commemorative function of the square after 2014 has only enhanced by the installation of new acute memorials (Fig. 10.3). The first, dedicated to the heroes of the Heavenly Hundred and the current conflict in Eastern Ukraine, looks like a bird crashing to the ground, resembling the silhouette of a trident—the Ukrainian national emblem. The second is a granite slab on which an electronic screen is installed, showing portraits of fellow countrymen killed in the conflict and information about them. The distance from the Soviet memorial to these modern is about ten metres. Recently installed tourist information board tells about the defenders of the country during Second World War, as well as new monuments, diplomatically leaving out the events of the 1920s. In this way, European Square

180

O. Gnatiuk and A. Melnychuk

Fig. 10.2 Soviet memorial in European Square: a central figure of the composition; b corrected dates of the First World War. Photo O. Gnatiuk and A. Melnychuk

currently experiences secondary sacralisation as covering new signs in a place that is already sacral (Šakaja and Stani´c 2017: 161). The other remnant of communism, violating “Europeanness” of the European Square, is a mosaic on the wall depicting several Soviet symbols and bearing a motto “Be worthy of an era, comrade!” After the start of decommunisation, it was

10 Ideologic Storms in the Still Waters: Postrevolutionary Life …

181

Fig. 10.3 Contemporary commemoration in European Square. Photo Authors

covered with the Ukrainian flag. Since then, discussions have begun on the artistic and historical value of the mosaic to understand if it needs to be destroyed or moved to another place. Meanwhile, the mosaic remains hidden from the visitors’ eyes with periodically changing banners. In particular, in 2016, the mosaic was closed by a banner with the inscription “Vinnytsia is the capital of the UNR”, and in 2017 it was

182

O. Gnatiuk and A. Melnychuk

replaced by a canvas depicting famous buildings in Vinnytsia, which quickly became one of the most popular photo locations. Summing up, nowadays European Square is transforming into a comprehensive palimpsest of senses, complementary for some people and contradictory for the other. This multiply semantics probably will be only growing on a short-term horizon: in our survey, only few respondents noted commemorative function of the European Square, in particular the present of Soviet memorial, as a problem (Gnatiuk and Melnychuk 2019: 22). It is worth mentioning that the city already has an example of the additional legitimisation of Soviet memorials by incorporating the discourse of anti-Nazism struggle into the modern national historical narrative. In 2016–2017, the monument to Soviet pilots–liberators the city from the Nazis was rebuilt in accordance with modern architectural concept and the surrounding square was named in honour of Kostiantyn Mohylko, a pilot who heroically died in 2014 at Donbas, directing his burning plane far away from the residential neighbourhoods, preventing in this way mass victims among civilians. However, this is a quite simple and already completed story, while some other memorial places are still waiting on rethinking. For example, Central Park, partially located on the graves of NKVD victims, which got rid of Maxim Gorky’s name but steel keeps a monument to that “Stormy Petrel of Revolution”. There were proposals to rename the park after composer Mykola Leontovych, the author of the famous Carol of the Bells, born in Vinnytsia region, or even to consider the monument to Gorky to be a monument to Mark Twain (due to similar visual appearance of both figures). In our opinion, these cases point to the limitation of the possibility of making purely compromise decisions. By accumulating new, incompatible symbols, urban space is challenging the modern and future generations to make increasingly complex decisions about the perceptible use of the territory and to preserve a wide range of historical information, with a focus not only on real events but also on their perception.

10.5 Inspired by the Soviet: Echoes of Beatlemania and Lenin Portrayer Erasing communist ideology from the cityscape, decommunisation in Vinnytsia did not mean total rejection of all Soviet-related contexts. To the contrary, some Soviet era legacies recently served to amplify and strengthen local urban identity. In 2018, the unnamed square in the city centre was given somewhat strange official name of “Liverpool”. The year before, a sculptural composition depicting legendary the Beatles on a yellow submarine background was unveiled there. The band’s songs are transmitted on the square from the set speakers, and thematic concerts are held periodically. In this way, the city administration legalised and strengthened one of the urban Soviet era legends: the square was unofficially called Liverpool since the 1970s. Two mutually reinforcing stories say that (1) locals often gathered on the square to sing compositions of the famous band from the city of Liverpool, while (2)

10 Ideologic Storms in the Still Waters: Postrevolutionary Life …

183

a closely spaced canteen sold quite tasty liver cakes. Although the Beatles formally had nothing common with the communist regime, and Beatlemania in the USSR factually was a form of a youth protest against the political system, both legends and senses of place have a strong connection exactly with the Soviet era. Further, since 2016, the city administration, inspired by the positive experience with architect Artynov, is trying to find a place in a cityscape for other revived genius loci, the already mentioned artist Nathan Altman. Currently, it is planned to arrange a square devoted to him (so-called Altman Square project). However, these attempts will lead to commemoration of … a Lenin portrayer. After the Bolshevik coup in October 1917, Altman sided with the new government and participated in the decoration of new revolutionary holidays in Petrograd and Moscow and, in order to make a career under communist rule, created several portraits of Lenin, including his bust in a quite realistic manner. However, the artist’s contribution to the formation of local urban identity, in particular, a series of graphic works “Vinnytsia in cartoons”, as well as the filming episodes of “Jewish Happiness” (1925) in Vinnytsia, became an ample excuse for inclusion of Altman into local pantheon of genii loci.

10.6 Colliding Local and National: “Paris”, “Sheva”, and Revolution Unlike geopolitical fault line cities of the south-eastern Ukraine, where the most violent conflicts concern the Soviet heritage and Russian-Ukrainian relationships, the most violent ideological rivalisation in Vinnytsia, being generated by a conflict between local and national identities, leaves the Soviet and Russian aside. Teatralna Square [Theatre Sq.] belongs to key urban public spaces in the historic centre of Vinnytsia. Named after Dzerzhinsky in Soviet times and returned original name in the 1990s, it was informally known as “The Paris of Vinnytsia” since the beginning of the XX century. There are several versions on this name origin: one tells about the café of the same name, while the other about the specific surrounding architecture. Probably, a large number of elegant old buildings, located not far from each other, caused association with the capital of France, known for its cultural and educational successes, traditions, and fashion. During 2000s, the city administration actively promoted this image and used the square as a place for public entertainment, in particular jazz and rock festivals. In 2008, the square was renovated with a place dedicated for Taras Shevchenko monument (by then Vinnytsia remained the only regional centre in Ukraine without the full-sized monument to Shevchenko). However, many citizens considered this plan incompatible with the already shaped place identity (hypothetical monument was ironically referred as “Sheva in the Paris”) and proposed to find another location, more so that the podium on which Shevchenko was supposed to stand spontaneously got another use as an improvised scene during the city holidays. These arguments were heard by the administration, which soon began polling on the suitable site for

184

O. Gnatiuk and A. Melnychuk

the monument and was, in turn, accused by local political opposition of seeking to push a monument to the national prophet on the outskirts of the city. This story became nationally known, and even now living relatives of the poet became involved in the dispute. In 2014, Teatralna Square became a main place in the city for political rallies and consequently was renamed after the Heavenly Hundred. Proponents of the Shevchenko monument received an additional argument in their favour because they believed that Shevchenko as a national prophet and visionary of public unrest had every right to be commemorated there. In February 2014, a plaster bust of Shevchenko on a plasterboard pedestal was placed on the square by protesters. It looked almost like an insubordination action by the opponents of the city mayor Groysman—as a continuation of a long-standing debate over where Shevchenko should stand. Meanwhile, in March 2014, an official monument to Shevchenko was opened on Museum Square, which was officially renamed after Shevchenko on that occasion. The monument turned out to be unusual: typically the poet is depicted as an already aged man in a felt cloak, a sheepskin hat and boots, but here Shevchenko appears at the age of 35, surrounded by two children asking him questions (Fig. 10.4). It was supposed that the poet is pictured during his trip across Podolia, linking him in this way to local context. However, the opposition criticised the official monument, calling it nothing more than a sculptural composition that humiliates the great Kobzar. In this

Fig. 10.4 Official monument to Shevchenko on the former Museum Square. Photo Authors

10 Ideologic Storms in the Still Waters: Postrevolutionary Life …

185

Fig. 10.5 “The Tree of Freedom” installed instead of Shevchenko monument on the former Teatralna Square. Photo Authors

way, two Shevchenko’s monuments, official and people’s, coexisted in the city for 4 years. In 2018, the Heavenly Hundred Square, being already unofficial place for commemorating Maidan and Anti-Terrorist Operation victims, was designed as a place for a monument (“The Tree of Freedom”) to the Heavenly Hundred (Fig. 10.5). At the start of its construction, the “illegal” Shevchenko monument was dismantled. Outraged opponents took to the square with a protest claiming that it was a people’s monument that did not need legitimisation from the authorities, a symbol of the Maidan and the heroism of those escorted from the square to Maidan and to the East. The topic was picked up by the media, including some reports telling that Shevchenko monument was dismantled in Vinnytsia for the first time in world history. The city administration responded by announcing that the information was untrue, and the official monument was in place. These events demonstrated the ability of politicians to use local and national identity for their own purposes. The city officials promoted themselves as “defenders of urban identity against ill-considered interference”, while opposition of all stripes accused them of disrespecting the Ukrainian national idea. Thus, those residents, who perceive the square primarily as a local “Paris”, were indirectly blamed in the national unconscious, and their desire to preserve the authenticity of the urban space was branded as serving “anti-Ukrainian Jewish administration” (hint of Groysman’s

186

O. Gnatiuk and A. Melnychuk

ethnicity). Anyway, two city squares have lost their historic names and original sense of place. Although “Sheva” did not hold the “Paris”, the “Paris” was also forced to leave a place for revolution. One may argue that Euromaidan and commemoration of its victims united all conflict parties; however, neither side of the conflict had the absolute legitimacy of (re)naming the square in the minds of the whole urban community. The square still remains symbolically divided questioning the legitimacy of (re)naming—who and under what conditions do receive and retain it (Rose-Redwood et al. 2017)?

10.7 Conclusion Transformation of symbolic space in Vinnytsia after the Soviet regime collapse reflected an attempt to create comfortable urban environment rather than ideological reorientation (Melnychuk and Gnatiuk 2019: 48). This circumstance was all the more accentuated by outburst of local urban identity obscuring the national one in times of deeply contingent and deeply contradictory politics of memory (Portnov 2013: 233). Focusing on revitalisation of its own “Golden Age”, the city disengaged itself from the ideological disputes in the country. Nevertheless, axiological problems related to the Soviet ideological legacy were only frozen but did not disappear. The Euromaidan Revolution induced a revision of the city’s role in national history as well as revealed often problematical coexistence of different ideological symbols and values in the urban space. However, even now, in contrast to the West and East of Ukraine, Vinnytsia represents rather inclusive than exclusive approach to writing its new city text realised through simultaneous blurring and linking of different historical contexts, including Soviet-related, legitimising some of them by accentuating their localness or interrelating them with definitely reputable concepts. Sometimes, in cases of conflicting senses of the same place, this inclusiveness fails to work, and such contestation, together with resemiotisation and secondary sacralisation, drives contemporary ongoing re-evaluation of the urban space in the city. Anyway, inclusive memory politics, revealed in Vinnytsia, represents a good idea to be realised at the national level for creation of the all-Ukrainian project, involving the synthesis of ideas, values, symbols, and traditions from different Ukrainian regions (Mihaylov and Sala 2018: 92).

References Azaryahu M (2003) RePlacing memory: the reorientation of Buchenwald. Cult Geogr 10(1):1–20. https://doi.org/10.1191/1474474003eu265oa Azaryahu M, Kook R (2002) Mapping the nation: street names and Arab-Palestinian identity: three case studies. Nations Natl 8(2):195–213. https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8219.00046 Crljenko I (2012) The renaming of streets and squares in post-Socialist Croatian towns. Lang Soc 3:230–241

10 Ideologic Storms in the Still Waters: Postrevolutionary Life …

187

Foote K (1997) Shadowed ground: America’s landscapes of violence and tragedy. University of Texas Press, Austin Gentile M (2017) Geopolitical fault-line cities. In: Pikulicka-Wilczewska A, Uehling G (eds) Migration and the Ukraine crisis: a two-country perspective. E-International Relations, Bristol, pp 6–24 Gentile M (2019) Geopolitical fault-line cities in the world of divided cities. Polit Geogr 71:126–138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.03.002 Gnatiuk O (2018) The renaming of streets in post-revolutionary Ukraine: regional strategies to construct a new national identity. Acta Univ Carol Geogr 53(2):119–136. https://doi.org/10. 14712/23361980.2018.13 Gnatiuk O, Melnychuk A (2019) Place identity of selected locations in the city of Vinnytsia. Herald Kherson State Univ Ser Geogr Sci 11:16–24 (in Ukrainian) Kachor A (2018) Dosi shanujemo herojiv imperiji? U Vinnyci zarejestruvaly petyciju pro demontazh Memorialu Slavy. https://vezha.vn.ua/dosi-shanuyemo-geroyiv-imperiyi-u-vinnytsi-zareye struvaly-petytsiyu-pro-demontazh-memorialu-slavy/ Karoyeva T (2017) Abstract of practical activity of a workgroup on “decommunization” of public area of the town of Vinnytsia: historian’s view. City Hist Cult Soc 1:196–206 (in Ukrainian) Light D, Young C (2010) Political identity, public memory and urban space: a case study of Parcul Carol I, Bucharest from 1906 to the present. Europe-Asia Stud 62(9):1453–1478 Melnychuk A, Gnatiuk O (2019) Public perception of urban identity in post-Soviet city: the case of Vinnytsia, Ukraine. Hungarian Geogr Bull 68:37–50. https://doi.org/10.15201/hungeobull.68.1.3 Mihaylov V, Sala S (2018) Subnational identities in the context of the changing internal geopolitics. The case of post-revolutionary Ukraine. Bull Geogr Soc-Econ Ser 39:79–96. https://doi.org/10. 2478/bog-2018-0006 Palonen E (2008) The city-text in post-communist Budapest: street names, memorials, and the politics of commemoration. GeoJournal 73(3):219–230. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-0089204-2 Portnov A (2013) Memory wars in post-Soviet Ukraine (1991–2010). In: Blacker U, Etkind A, Fedor J (eds) Memory and theory in Eastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp 233–254. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137322067_12 Rose-Redwood R, Alderman D, Azaryahu M (2017) Contemporary issues and future horizons of critical toponymy. In: Rose-Redwood R, Alderman D, Azaryahu M (eds) The political life of urban streetscapes: naming, politics, and place. Routledge, Abingdon, pp 309–319 Šakaja L, Stani´c J (2017) The spatial codification of values in Zagreb’s city-text. In: Rose-Redwood R, Alderman D, Azaryahu M (eds) The political life of urban streetscapes: naming, politics, and place. Routledge, Abingdon, pp 151–167 Till K (1999) Staging the past: landscape designs, cultural identity and Erinnerungspolitik at Berlin’s Neue Wache. Ecumene 6(3):251–283 Young C, Light D (2001) Place, national identity and post-socialist transformations: an introduction. Polit Geogr 20(8):941–955. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-6298(01)00039-7

Oleksiy Gnatiuk is an assistant professor at the Department of Economic and Social Geography, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. In 2015, he defended Ph.D. thesis dedicated to territorial identity of the population of Podolia, Ukraine. After that (2015–2017) he worked as a research fellow at the lab “Regional problems of economics and politics” and participated in several domestic and international research projects. His principal interests are urban geography with specific foci on suburban development and transformations of post-Soviet cities, local and regional identity, critical place name studies, perceptual and cultural geography, issues of effective urban and regional planning.

188

O. Gnatiuk and A. Melnychuk

Anatoliy Melnychuk is an associate professor at the Department of Economic and Social Geography, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. He has been working at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv since 2003 as a research fellow. Head of the scientific lab and an Associate Professor (Ph.D.) in 2004 on the regional aspects of natural and man-made safety in Ukraine and was involved in more than 20 research projects. His current researches are focusing on urban spatial transformations, historical geography, regional identity, locations of memory and regional management. Since 2015, he has been involved as a scientific expert into Ukrainian decentralisation reform.

Part IV

Urban Planning, Conflicts and Polarisation of Space. Between New Possibilities and Old Limitations

Chapter 11

The Multiplication of Inherited Defects and Its Impact on the Emergence of New Spatial Conflicts. Evidences from Post-socialist Sofia Kosyo Stoychev Abstract This chapter is devoted to presenting and discussing new spatial conflicts in the urban area of a large post-socialist city which arose due to imperfections of socio-economic transition. In the urban area of Sofia, which already has over 1.3 million residents, there are conflicts and divisions with different social background. The chapter provides some empirical evidences that particular interests of all basic stakeholders engaged in living, using, planning, and managing the urban area intersect and collide in the Bulgarian capital. The growing multiplicity of sociospatial conflicts is presented on the basis of two examples. The first one is more general and concerns the problems related to lack of space for expansion of the city in terms of housing, business, and technical infrastructure. Ineffective urban policies and main defects of urban planning are discussed in the light of some contradictions in the national Law on the Structure of the Territory. The second example of multiplication of spatial conflicts concerns the Sofia Student City—a capital’s municipality which, due to the restitution of lands after 1990, completely changed its original function as academic neighbourhood. Keywords Urban area · Spatial conflicts · Growth · Zones for development · Sofia · Student city

11.1 Introduction In the period of post-socialist transformation, the Bulgarian capital’s economic and social role in the development of national territory increased significantly. The spatial evolution, the conditions of fundamental political and economic transformation, and the restoration of private initiative caused a number of essential spatial issues, including large-scale conflicts concerning organisation of the urban space as a whole and separate neighbourhoods in particular. Various problems of K. Stoychev (B) Regional and Political Geography Department, Faculty of Geology and Geography, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia, Bulgaria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_11

191

192

K. Stoychev

Sofia’s post-socialist transformation in broader geographical context have already been approached in international scholar literature: issues of spatial planning (Hirt 2007; Slaev and Nedovic-Budic 2017), emergence of gated communities (Hirt 2012; Smigiel 2014), transformation of residential space (Hirt and Stanilov 2007), challenges to market reform in housing (Tsenkova 2009), unevenness in the development of public transport (Plevris 2019), barriers to cycling in the urban space (Barnfield 2016), etc. The growth of Sofia, however, was not a result of successful implementation of smart policies, high labour productivity, or high quality of living environment, but due to the relative backwardness of other cities and regions of Bulgaria. This was the reason why, despite the negative national trend in the demographic development, Sofia continued to grow mainly due to migration influx. The Bulgarian capital became the most densely populated and “highly developed” urban centre of the country. As a consequence, however, several questions arise: How the urban space affects the economic development, whether it contributes to the socio-economic and demographic growth of the city, and does it create additional (un)desirable effects of urbanisation? The answers to these and other questions require to trace the process of spatial policies applied. The main question remains to what extent economic growth at national and regional level overlaps and how habitat-workplacebusiness-environment connections are realised? In fact, Sofia resembles a modern and fast-growing city, marked by many elements typical of a highly developed urban environment, but nevertheless, the city remains a small, densely built, with poor infrastructure and formed “gaps” of poverty and marginalisation. What are the directions for development, including improving the living environment, infrastructure, conditions for safe childcare and upbringing, the role of access to jobs, property speculation, and more? All these dilemmas are implicated in social relations in Sofia’s urban area. For that reason, the chapter deals with factors such as nationalisation in the late 1940s, disadvantages of Sofia’s socialist spatial planning, post-socialist restitution of buildings and lands, and the ineffective urban policies during transition. The mentioned factors all together influence the shaping of contemporary urban landscape of Sofia. Apart from providing a short historical outline, the selected treats are discussed in the light of some contradictions of the territory’s spatial structure. The second example of multiplication of spatial conflicts concerns the Sofia Student City. The restitution is Bulgaria was based on two normative acts adopted in 1991 and 1997. The restitution process ended at about the year 2000. The chapter presents some empirical evidences about space where the particular interests of all basic stakeholders engaged in living, using, planning, and managing the urban area in Sofia intersect and collide.

11 The Multiplication of Inherited Defects and Its Impact …

193

11.2 Multiplication of Defects in Sofia’s Spatial Planning. Historical Outline By the end of the Ottoman rule, Sofia was not an important city for Bulgaria. Because of the high proportion of Turkish population, the city did not participate in the Bulgarian spiritual and cultural Renaissance (Vazrajdane). By the end of this period, it is unknown that an architectural or any other regulation spatial plan exists. In general, the feudal Ottoman Empire did not plan its European territories in urban terms, neither made any investments or any other long-lasting policies, unless military. Bulgaria and the other contemporary Balkan states were continental colonies of the Ottoman Empire, source of resources, taxes, and human beings. This situation has changed since the Liberation of Bulgaria in 1878. On 3 April 1879, Sofia was proclaimed the capital of Bulgaria. So far, the population of Sofia was about 12 thousand. For 140 years, its population reaches 1.32 million (2018) (National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria Website). Compared to the beginning of the 1990s, based on official data, the population of Sofia increased with about 240 thousand residents, but it must be taken into account that many people from the Bulgarian province who work in the capital are not registered, so the real number of population is even higher. Urbanists and architects accept the existence of several periods in urban planning of Sofia, which are strongly influenced by changes in the social and political conditions in Bulgaria. The first regulation plan was created in 1880, while the first General Urban Plan in 1938 (Stoycheva 2017). Since 1990, Sofia’s planning process has entered into a phase that caused some disadvantages and various social and economic conflicts. The state’s policy has changed and has prioritised values as democracy, private property, entrepreneurship, free trade, etc. The Bulgarian post-socialist society had many defects that converted freedom and democracy to anomies in some terms, under the mask for “recovery of justice”. In the period 1944–1949, the Bulgarian socialist state organised massive nationalisation of arable lands, cattle farms, factories, and properties that the national elite possessed before (houses, restaurants, villas, flats, etc.). Since 1990, there was a process of restitution the properties to the antecedents. Both processes were controversial and caused deep and serious social, economic, and demographic conflicts over less than 50 years. The period 1990–2020 was a time of redistribution of political and economic power. A new Bulgarian elite which needed to accumulate the capital for a short period of time was formed. The spatial planning of Sofia played an important role in that accumulation. Sofia’s public properties and private restitution played an extremely important role in the real estate market and the establishment of the first cluster of owners. The private interest for getting rich prevailed the proper public spatial planning. Nowadays, three major types of urban planning are presented in the city. The first type represents urban environments and buildings created by the early 1940s. Today these properties are in the centre of Sofia radially distributed along the main streets and their intersections—Vitosha Blvd., Rakovski Str., Simeon Str., Oborishte Str.,

194

K. Stoychev

Tsar Osvoboditel Blvd., and others, which today form the city centre (Fig. 11.1). These are the most prestigious properties in Sofia holding the highest market price. Most of them host head offices of companies, banks, foreign embassies, and elite restaurants. Some others, which have obscure owners sink into ruin. As indicated, before 1944 such properties belonged to wealthy Bulgarians, later they were nationalised against the owner’s will, and after the democratic changes very often the heirs could not be found or another event with legal consequences happened, which cannot be resolved without the sanction of the court. The second type of urban environment is the one that took place in the period of the socialist economy and political system. The leading role of state capitalism required the rapid industrialisation of Bulgaria, including Sofia. This affected enormous internal migrations. Bulgarians who were willing to live in the capital should have worked there for minimum 5 years in order to get “Sofia citizenship”. It was an administrative tool to control the internal urban migrations. The industrial growth was needed to enlarge labour-class and many new machine-building industries and services that have been located in Sofia city. The “dormitory cities” were planned and constructed. New inhabitants were settled in an environment with underdeveloped technical infrastructure and social services. The most typical in this respect are the residential complexes Lyulin, Druzhba, and Mladost (Fig. 11.2). These complexes

Fig. 11.1 City centre (in red colour). Source Author’s own elaboration

11 The Multiplication of Inherited Defects and Its Impact …

195

Fig. 11.2 Lylin, Drujba, and Mladost dormitory neighbourhoods (in red colour). Source Author’s own elaboration

are built on previously arable lands and created the first outer city centre quarters. The constructions are a type of multi-family residential, prefabricated buildings. The typical building is eight storey with four entrances and four flats per floor. Another feature was that the state controlled the level of motorisation and there were up to 40 car parking spaces in front of these buildings. After the transition to market economy and the increase in the number of cars per household, this problem worsened the quality of life in these neighbourhoods and created several difficulties and conflicts. Nowadays, the availability of car parking spaces in Sofia is highly restricted. Another utility made in those times is the communal heating. Several district heating plants were built to supply these complexes with heat and warm water, which, to date, are located near residential areas. They cause serious air pollution in the winter, as well as in the days with fog and low atmospheric pressure over Sofia, which naturally occupies the valley floor. Also, the socialistic period was mainly focused on industrial zones development. Therefore, the city centre and the closest areas were used for households, cultural buildings (e.g. theatres, libraries, cinemas), education, medical service buildings, etc., but no business buildings and business services. That is the reason why Sofia does not have a typical business city centre. As a result, many companies, e.g. notary

196

K. Stoychev

and lawyers’ offices, dentists, advertising or interpreter agencies, are located in multifamily buildings and share space with families and old individuals. It is a very conflict situation, because for some the buildings are home, while for others—jobs’ location. The third urban environment is presented by the nearby villages which joined Sofia and it grew up, both through migration and through the inclusion of small settlements (e.g. Kokalyane, Pancharevo, Simeonovo, Vladaya, Svetovrachene, Negovan, etc.) and their belonging lands around (Fig. 11.3). The development in these neighbourhoods is less favourable, for a long time they have been the extreme periphery, surrounded by villa zones, and arable lands. In some cases, they have their industrial zones with localised small-scale industries. They do not have a central district heating system and are heated by solid fuels (wood, coals), which are an extremely unacceptable solution to date. Some of the old villages (now quarters of the capital) still do not have a central sewer system and experience problems with the quality of the electricity supply. These infrastructure disadvantages impair the quality of life and reduce investment opportunities. In the 1970s, a chance for their development was the Sofia ring road project, which was a major alternative to the radial boulevards leading to downtown Sofia. Today, the ring road has some sections that still have not been reconstructed to a modern facility. This fact continues to play a negative role in the development of urban functions in some city districts and suburban areas. The

Fig. 11.3 Former small settlements absorbed into Sofia (in red colour). Source Author’s own elaboration

11 The Multiplication of Inherited Defects and Its Impact …

197

psychological division of “backward pockets” and “developed poles” is obtained. The dominant buildings and type of construction from this period (except Boyana neighbourhood) are single-family houses and residential buildings with extremely simplified architecture. In principle, the living space is small, and the quality of the input materials is poor and energy inefficient.

11.3 Adoption of the Law on the Structure of the Territory—Planned Contradictions Since 1990, emergence of a new elite that has its specific economic interests has been one of the remarkable changes in the socio-economic life of Sofia. This situation has created good conditions for rapid real estate transactions and fast growth in the real estate market. At the same time, there were an inadequate spatial planning regulation and legislation as well as an institutional crisis typical for the transition period. Also, there was no secure property register, digital cadastre, notary system, etc. These were the perfect conditions for the redevelopment of specific regulated properties throughout Sofia for activities that either do not comply with the general planning or with basic construction and urbanisation rules. Afterwards, any kind of economic activities has emerged in residential areas: car services, storage facilities, open space construction materials shops, shopping malls, supermarkets, etc. These phenomena generate industrial waste and noise. In some areas of Sofia, even warehousing and office buildings coexist with large multi-family residential buildings and complexes, using the same traffic and parking infrastructure, which degrades the quality of both types of activities. Certainly, this is a conflict in construction zoning and planning, which has already received a significant amount of inherited defects. However, if a family or a company invests in a property, they cannot be sure what type of building may appear in the next plotted land. In 2001, a Law on the Structure of the Territory was adopted. This law concerns foremost the construction process, but not the spatial planning and development. The reason for this is that it declares territorial development policies and it applies within the specific regulated landed property. This makes many sites or complexes completely legal, but does not positively affect the functions/arrangements of the territories and urban zones. The law ensures operational independence precisely within the bounds of the plot of lands but neglects the public policy issues. This creates conditions for all the conflict points that subsequently arise in Sofia, from the construction over terrains with the status of parks, to the high-rise construction of business buildings in residential areas. In certain cases, plotted lands which have been privatised are so well protected in an irresistible way, so even public infrastructure and investment process projects, funded by European grants and of national importance cannot change the private spatial plan. An example is the intersection Simeonovsko Shosse Blvd. and the

198

K. Stoychev

Fig. 11.4 Intersection of Simeonovsko Shosse Blvd. and the Southern arc of the Sofia ring road. Source Google Maps

Southern arc of the Sofia ring road (Fig. 11.4). Within the project, the private terrains are so close to the ring road that it is impossible to develop a standard clover and the architectures and design engineers are forced to implement a simple traffic light intersection, causing additional huge traffic jams. Another example of contemporary conflict is the “leakage” of information when designing public transport infrastructure. Even at the stage of feasibility studies, when it is not clear to the general public where a main road or another type of infrastructure will be located, business lobbies somehow gather information about the possible routes. Officially, the administration denies such claims, but they are fact for many projects. The lobbies take actions to buy at a low price all terrains beside the future infrastructure at the times when they are arable lands and then take advantage of a provision in the law stating that all owners who are estranged along the linear infrastructure must be compensated at market rates. Of course, when the planning process takes place and it becomes clear that a new part of the boulevard or city main road will go by, the market prices reach their theoretical maximum. Besides, after the construction of the infrastructure, the new linear partial regulation provides to the new owner’s lands (plotted lands) the best location and access. This allows them to play a leading role in the property market and speculatively influence property prices. For this reason, extremely high real estate prices on the market are due to locations with poor infrastructure, no regulation, no clear features, but within a community of owners (owner’s clusters). These circumstances cause a very negative

11 The Multiplication of Inherited Defects and Its Impact …

199

impact on the investment process and the poor maintenance activities on private plot lands around the city. The described situation mainly concerns the ring road projects and main boulevard connections of Sofia. The law defines five types of construction categories, requiring the participation of four stakeholders. From the fourth to the first category, the stakeholders are the investor, the designers, the builder, and the construction supervisor. Public control is exercised by the administration of the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works through the authority of the directorate of National Construction Supervision as well as the municipality’s chief architects. The law works mainly on the unit regulated property (plot land), and the investor’s interests have a full advantage. For this reason, in areas of the city that previously were allocated to housing, public functions, recreation, and green system, the investors’ interest is mainly to construct buildings that have nothing to do with the housing functions or create inconvenience for the already allocated ones. All is done with the presumption of commercial proximity to consumers who should improve their quality of life. There are a lot of such examples in Sofia which have no architectural value. They have a long history and, often gone through court decisions, their status do not satisfy the public interest and do not improve the urban environment. Since this objects are legitimate, they will, therefore, remain there until the end of the physical building life, which is 100 years as a standard. An example in this regard is the “dormitory cities” of Lyulin, Mladost, and Druzhba where in the spaces between the panel multi-family buildings and the construction of numerous commercial, warehouse, and industrial sites, residential buildings of another architectural type was allowed. The choice of Sofia’s spatial planning management is due to the general vision for further city consolidation, as its spatial expansion requires much more investment and planning which will generate significant public costs (Urban Masterplan of Sofia Municipality). In this respect, new buildings, residential, and business complexes are based on infrastructure— roads, heat, electricity, water, and communications of the already existing residential complexes planned in the former period. A classic example is Sofia Business Park in Mladost 4 district, where panel dwellings are located less than 100 m away from business buildings, competing for the same road infrastructure and facilities.

11.4 The Construction and Investment Boom. Conflicts Between Spatial Limits and Social Needs After Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in 2007, a gradual process of a more efficient form of capital accumulation began. On the one hand, the business climate in Bulgaria has strengthened, and, on the other hand, a large part of migrant workers in EU started to make savings. It should be noted that the psychology of the Bulgarian family necessarily includes owning a home. Bulgarians make great efforts to own the property they live in at the cost of serious deprivation concerning other social values such as education, health care, lifestyle, or travel. This behaviour, combined

200

K. Stoychev

with a good pace of economic growth, personal savings, expanded and active bank lending led to a significant increase in housing. Analysing the data on the number of households, the number of permits issued for new residential buildings and the realised ones shows a faster pace of the construction and investment process established concerning the real socio-demographic needs. The reason for this is the lack of alternative investment of citizens’ savings in other economic sectors, but housing, especially flats in multi-family buildings. This is a type of investment with a rate of return of about 5% per year. This model of construction of unnecessary, mediocre residential buildings is highly multiplied. According to the National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, 24% of flats in Sofia are uninhabited. On the other hand, the permits for construction of new homes in Sofia for 2019 are for one million square metres. In addition, the current Urban Masterplan of Sofia Municipality was elaborated for a period of almost 10 years and in that period has created many conflict situations, not based on subordination of the plan. This means that for some reason, the market does not fulfil its regulatory function on the property and housing market in Sofia, which would give another direction to the investments. Prices remain high, inaccessible to many households, the city is tightening, the quality of the environment is deteriorating, but this does not affect market supply, nevertheless, the demand stays stable (Stoychev 2012). According to Sofia Municipality, the vacant plots, with no modern designation, have an area of about 684 ha (1.4% of the city area). In their structure, 444 ha are plots located in areas of former industrial (transportation and storage) application, and the rest are areas around train tracks and stations (Gencheva 2020). This area is comparable to Lyulin, one of the largest Sofia’s neighbourhoods. The purpose of this policy vision is to further consolidate the city of Sofia and enforce the concept of the “compact city”, as an antithesis to the processes that began in the last 10 years, namely the emergence of residential complexes outside the city—Lozen, Bistritsa, Malinova Dolina, and Gorna Banya. It should be noted that Sofia is the only capital city in which the airport is located within the inner city and the city ring road, just 5 km in a straight line from city centre (Fig. 11.5). The conflict situation is because the jets

Fig. 11.5 Sofia Airport is located just 4.8 km in a straight line from the Sofia city centre. Source Google Earth

11 The Multiplication of Inherited Defects and Its Impact …

201

are generating strong vibrations and noise for the close located buildings, and for the reason that the runway orientation, the jets are landing and taking-off over the most densely populated quarters. This is a profoundly serious security issue in a world of terrorism and conflicts. After the start-up of Istanbul new international airport, all the other Balkan states airports including this of Sofia remain local. Because of that Bulgarian government is planning concession of Sofia Airport for 30 years. It means that this situation will last for a long time (www.concession-sof.bg/en/). The average density of buildings in Sofia is below the average for most major European cities, but the quality of life is severely impaired for several reasons. The number of cars is extremely high, as a rate to number of people, because of Bulgaria’s tax policy, which stimulates the purchase of second-hand cars. In the socialist period, initial projects were for a hundred cars for every one thousand inhabitants, later the plans were updated to about 400 cars, but the capital already has somewhere between 550 and 600 cars per thousand people. For comparison, the same indicator in Vienna is 367/1000 (Sofia and cars: when there is no movement). As the number of parking spaces is extremely limited, they occupy most of the streets and impair their permeability. This worsens traffic, and it can take up to an hour to travel 5 km on a business day. This fact further stimulates citizens to search for homes within central locations, close to schools, shops, and more to manage the time spent on daily commuting. The process accelerates in a negative direction, compacting the central locations that are most desired, most expensive, and with worst traffic issues and air pollution. The only parking option in the city centre public areas is the paid parking zones. The system exists since 2005 and accumulates high incomes, nevertheless, floor parking lots are not planned for construction and the main solution is the cars to stay in the streets. One possible solution is private companies to invest in floor parking lots, but the measure should be combined with a city parking ordinance that would encourage the cars owners to use the parking lots. All problems mentioned above directly or indirectly influence the quality of life of citizens. In terms of spatial planning, better conditions may be achieved by improving the transfer boulevards. New style of urban masterplan and spatial planning division is needed, including development of integrated urban transport. The size of the city of Sofia supposes intensive option for use of personal sustainable mobility, including bicycles, scooters, etc. The length of bicycle lines in Sofia is growing but remains far below the average for big European cities—only 60 km in 2019 (https://velobg.org/ infrastructure/bikelines-sofia). There have been several attempts on central streets in Sofia (Rakovski Str.) to separate sections of the roadway designated for bicycles, but this does not lead to a significant increase of individuals with sustainable individual mobility. The main reasons are that the infrastructure outside these areas is poorly developed, and, last but not least, cycling in Sofia can be considered as dangerous. The subway project created a network of buffer underground parking lots, but at this stage, citizens are not fully utilising them, because in parallel there is a possibility for parking almost anywhere in the urban environment, and in the central part of the city there is a prepaid parking system based on a mobile application. Therefore, despite the prepaid parking, the urban environment remains congested with cars. The low taxes for cars owners and the poor environmental requirements made it

202

K. Stoychev

possible for almost every household to maintain several cars that occupy multiple public parking spaces in residential neighbourhoods during non-business days. Another serious problem is the poor quality of construction that dominates the market. This issue affects both, public infrastructure projects and most residential and administrative buildings. This impairs their performance, energy efficiency, and disaster resilience and ultimately affects the quality of life. Bulgaria lacks a legal framework to indicate that an area must have some rate of multifunctionality. That is why certain areas are overbuilt with one-of-a-kind, impractical, low-functioning buildings. Thus, they affect the nature of services, jobs, commuting, parking, and so on. The main attraction for new investments is the subway main routes and the proximity of the stations. Intuitively, residents try to replace the use of the car with the subway, but their cars remain frequently used and mostly parked in public places. The lack of sufficient parking lots and garages pose a serious threat to the quality of the urban areas, the environment, and security (Fig. 11.6). The problem is obvious even in new residential and office building projects. For example, building with 120 flats has 36 garages and 30 parking places, but the actual number of cars of residents is more than 140 and a minimum 70 cars stay outside, very often in places not designated for car parking.

Fig. 11.6 Off-road landscape between newly erected housing estates in Sofia—an example of defects in planning of urban infrastructure. Photo K. Stoychev

11 The Multiplication of Inherited Defects and Its Impact …

203

In some other cases, the number of parking spaces is up to 30% in comparison with the number of dwellings, which is an extremely negative phenomenon. There is also not well-organised school transportation for children, which leads to the accumulation of many vehicles in school areas and may give an impression that Sofia is a congested city. But, the problem is rather organisational than technological one.

11.5 The Student City. A Quintessence of Spatial Conflicts in Post-socialist Sofia The previous sections of the paper showed some public conflicts in Sofia’s urban area and the difficulties of settling them. Although the long-standing consequences of the controversial and indecisive reforms are noticeable in the area of most urban districts of the Bulgarian capital, it will not be risky to say that their quintessence is the Student City located in the south-eastern part of Sofia. It is represented in the administrative system of Sofia as one of its 24 municipalities. The Student City has its own local municipality mayor and administration. The area has become the scene of various conflicts between universities, business owners, real estate investors, new residence families, commuters and students. Despite the rapid diversification of residents by age and social class, the last group still prevails in the neighbourhood’s socio-demographic structure. The most acute controversy is the change in the functions of the original student campus and the process of its conversion to ordinary “dormitory neighbourhood” typical for Sofia. Sofia’s student campus is one of the most peculiar projects carried out during the socialism. The quarter started to function in December 1975. It is built of expropriated lands in the southern, peripheral in geographic terms parts of Sofia (Fig. 11.7). The typical constructions are panel prefabricated blocks with small rooms. In the late eighties of twentieth century after 20 years of project lifespan, the blocks are 61 in total and they could host about 50 thousand students. The Student City was designed for students of the capital’s universities and academic staff with no accommodation in Sofia who received comfortable conditions for studying, work, sport, and recreation. Student City concentrates several national universities,1 two sports facilities (Winter Sports Palace and Hristo Botev Sports Hall), as well as a large fund of panel residential buildings with small rooms for the needs of students, together with adjacent social and health infrastructure and services. This leads to both, an increase in the population of Sofia with young and educated residents and an increase of domestic consumption. In the past, the Student City has been served entirely by public transport, and the number of students owning a private car was extremely limited.

1 National

Sports Academy, University of National and World Economy, Technical University, University of Forestry and University of Mining and Geology.

204

K. Stoychev

Fig. 11.7 Student’s campus city (in red colour)

Suddenly, in the 1990s, land was restored and universities were granted autonomy and the right to operate the land use. With the recovery of private property, a wave of land sales and rentals began. Not only the private owners, but also the municipality, the universities, and the new student councils continue to play a major role in this process. As a result of socio-economic transformation, space in the Sofia’s student neighbourhood has been mastered by the power of market logic (Dinev 2018). Actually, this is a process of full conversion of the Student City to an ordinary quarter, but without a proper spatial planning. Therefore, in this neighbourhood you could see fully controversial buildings and economic activities, but both are legal and may exist for a long time. Another issue is the local environment conditions in which the students are participating in the education process. As more than 100 objects are opened after 10 p.m., the lack of calmness destroys the main function of Student City and removes the possibility for proper education of the students. There is an increasing contrast between modern housing estates, intended for ordinary residents of the capital and already old, often in poor technical conditions student dormitories. This is a sign of spatial segregation of students in the quarter, which was built especially to meet their needs of space for living and studying. According to 2012 data, in the Student City there are 42 cafés, 22 disco and nightclubs, 33 restaurants, three casinos, three pastry shops and four street bars. The library is a public space with a small park and a Student History Centre built

11 The Multiplication of Inherited Defects and Its Impact …

205

voluntarily by students (Dinev 2018). Nowadays, the number of trade and service facilities is even higher, and the distribution is everywhere. Any student dormitory, new residential building, business centre, or sport facility is host provider of coffee, disco club, casino, restaurant, or another commercial facility which has no relation to the academic function of the Student City. Some events in local nightclubs are advertised on posters and billboards displayed in many key streets and public places throughout the capital. The concentration of many popular entertainment sites that attract residents from all parts of Sofia, in combination with the use of alcohol and drugs, often leads to serious criminal offenses. At the end of 2008, a student of pharmacy was killed in front of a local disco club. This incident provoked a series of student protests which aimed at attracting the attention of authorities and emphasising the need of restoring the academic character of the neighbourhood. Under the pressure of public opinion, this disco club was closed, but the phenomenon itself was not rooted out (Fig. 11.8). Due to the active construction, the number of residential buildings is growing rapidly in the neighbourhood, occupying mostly part of the vast green spaces inbetween the student dormitories (Fig. 11.9). The total number of the new buildings is about 100. Among them are residential buildings, private hostels, ten hotels (including four stars), supermarkets, shopping malls, and so on. In addition, a ghetto of disco clubs coexists in the areas in-between the dormitories. For example, the

Fig. 11.8 Places of evidence of the new aesthetical and functional (dis)order in Sofia’s Student City: trade facilities located in very close distance to student dormitories: a grill bar and pizza, b two-floor bar and night club “Harem”; c car wash; d a restaurant located under the stairs of an entrance of the Winter Sports Palace. Photo K. Stoychev

206

K. Stoychev

Fig. 11.9 a–c New residential buildings in the Student City for ordinary residents were erected mainly in green areas; c and d last free spaces disappear under construction of buildings with non-academic functions. Photo K. Stoychev

sport facility Winter Sports Palace hosts two disco clubs and a restaurant under the stairs of one of the entrances. The reason for the construction of new residential buildings in the Student City is the relative lower price rates per square metre, the good public infrastructure and transport connectivity, well-organised public transport, many sport facilities, parks, attractive night life, to name a few. Many of shops, fast food stands, and other services work 24 h per day. Therefore, the process is accelerating and now the price rates are like in some other parts of Sofia but the spatial and social structure are difficult to change. After the mass student protests in the end of 2000s, there was a moment of time in which the Student City could have a special statute and spatial plan that would ensure the initial academic function of the quarter, mostly to create a positive and creative studying environment. However, this moment passed, and now commercialisation and more non-students inhabitants are still a main socio-economic trend.

11 The Multiplication of Inherited Defects and Its Impact …

207

11.6 Conclusions and Prospects This chapter presents selected evidences of complex, multidimensional spatial conflicts in the urban area of post-socialist Sofia. Their solution requires coordination of a number of spatial and sectoral policies of the state and the Sofia authorities. Because of the scale and depth of the problems in spatial planning caused by defects inherited from the communism and their combination with ineffective and chaotic spatial policies during transition period, one may expect that the attempts to improve the situation could last for decades. In terms of possible solutions of conflicts related to the limits of space and the growing social needs for space, a few conclusions and recommendations can be presented: 1. Sofia city needs to be open to the suburban neighbourhoods with a new wellorganised public infrastructure. Most of the conflicts are a consequence of badly planned and maintained urban space, mixture of residential, retail, industrial, utility services, and other functions, which compromise the urban zones and neighbourhoods as well as the quality of life. If the infrastructure gets open to the surroundings, many households will be relocated in a single-family houses and the life in the multi-family residential blocks could be also improved. 2. The suburbs as a choice for a place to live and work will put a strain on the city’s entrance and exit boulevards. The construction of high-speed tangents, overpasses, roundabouts fostering the traffic will be a key issue to the lifestyle of the city. This would make the suburbs more attractive as the time to reach them will be acceptable for households. Today, reaching the suburbs requires spending an hour in the car and that fact is blocking the investment process. To a large extent, this delay in building the necessary infrastructure is due to lobbying interest of downtown builders who try to “lock-in” customers owing to the inconvenience of traffic. According to the Urban Masterplan of Sofia Municipality, more dense construction in all the districts of Sofia is projected. In a single decade, this may cause emigration of residents because of compromised living conditions. If this situation gets worse, Sofia’s current dormitory neighbourhoods will be marginalised, neither will be desirable for life nor for business. 3. Sofia is in dire need of developing zones with functions other than residential and business locations. A good example in this regard is the previously established inner city parks, which have a strong environmental effect on the air of the city— Borisova Garden, South Park, and West Park. The expansion of this type of park space, together with additional services, recreation areas, and public events could improve the quality of life (Urban Masterplan of Sofia Municipality). Apart from the common tendencies, in the chapter it was proved that Sofia has its socio-spatial pattern of concentrating all basic disadvantages of post-socialist transformation of urban space in its Bulgarian version. This is the Student City where architectural eclectic, functional chaos, degradation of large green areas, permanent tensions among basic stakeholders as well as other negative trends have been

208

K. Stoychev

observed. Until 2020, this unique according to its scale complex has become just one of the many “regular” neighbourhoods of the Bulgarian capital. According to the author, there are several possible development scenarios for the Student City: 1. The first one is related to the continuation of the current policy and the final conversion of the neighbourhood into an ordinary dormitory quarter. This is the scenario with the highest degree of probability as it preserves the current direction of development and implies the highest degree of administrative indifference. 2. The second possible scenario is to identify a part of the Student City that will restore its educational and social functions and limit all other activities there. 3. The third scenario, the least likely to happen, is related to investing in a brand new student campus elsewhere under strict development conditions. 4. A fourth option is also possible, in which the student neighbourhood would be completely abolished, the dormitories would be destroyed, and each university itself would look for a solution for its students. An optimisation in the number of universities in Bulgaria can lead to the realisation of this fourth scenario, which would allow students to live in new buildings. It would also be an example of how existing prefabricated blocks which are throughout Sofia can be handled and the housing problem re-established.

References Barnfield A (2016) Cycling in the post-socialist city: on travelling by bicycle in Sofia, Bulgaria. Urban Stud 53(9):1822–1835. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098015586536 Dinev I (2018) In the city of boredom. In: Fights without time. Sofia, pp 19–26 (in Bulgarian) Gencheva B (2020) Sofia “white” spots. Capital 2020.03.22. Available at www.capital.bg/biznes/ imoti/2020/02/28/4034775_belite_petna_na_sofiia/. Accessed: 26 Mar 2020 (in Bulgarian) Hirt S (2007) The compact versus the dispersed city: history of planning ideas on Sofia’s urban form. J Plan Hist 6(2):138–165. https://doi.org/10.1177/1538513206301327 Hirt S (2012) Iron curtains. Gates, suburbs and privatization of space in the postsocialist city. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford Hirt S, Stanilov K (2007) The perils of post-socialist transformation: residential development in Sofia. In: Stanilov K (ed) The post-socialist city urban form and space transformations in Central and Eastern Europe after socialism. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 215–244 Law on the Structure of the Territory (2001) State Gazette, 1 National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria Website. www.nsi.bg. Accessed: 26 Mar 2020 Plevris K (2019) A path for connecting flows of value and forms of urbanization in post-1989 Balkans. ACME Int J Crit Geogr 18(6):1234–1260 Raymond W (1985) [1976] Capitalism. In: Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society. Oxford University Press, New York Slaev AD, Nedovic-Budic S (2017) The challenges of implementing sustainable development: the case of Sofia’s master plan. Sustainability 9(15). https://doi.org/10.3390/su9010015 Smigiel C (2014) Reprint of “The production of segregated urban landscapes: a critical analysis of gated communities in Sofia.” Cities 36:182–192

11 The Multiplication of Inherited Defects and Its Impact …

209

Sofia and cars: when there is no movement. www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/ 2018/02/23/3134331_sofiia_i_avtomobilite_kogato_niama_murdane/. Accessed: 26 Mar 2020 (in Bulgarian) Stoychev K (2012) Localization approaches for regional development. St. Kliment Ohridski University Press, Sofia (in Bulgarian) Stoycheva J (2017) Sofia city planning in transition (1990–2010). Stefan Dobrev Publishing House, Sofia (in Bulgarian) Tsenkova S (2009) Housing policy and reforms in post-socialist Europe. Springer, Heidelberg Urban Masterplan of Sofia Municipality. https://sofproect.com/en/portfolio/urban-masterplan-ofsofia-municipality/. Accessed: 20 May 2020 www.concession-sof.bg/en/. Accessed 20.05.2020

Kosyo Stoychev holds a Ph.D. in Social and Economic Geography from Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bulgaria. Currently, he works at Sofia University as an Associate Professor and Head of Regional and Political Geography Department. Vice Chairman of the Bulgarian Regional Science Association, ERSA section in Bulgaria. His research interests include economic geography of the world economy, urban geography, location analysis and geography of industrial investments, spatial planning, cost-benefit analysis. His current works are dedicated to the energy transition process in Bulgaria, spatial planning and urban investments, industrial organisation, investments and regional development.

Chapter 12

Spatial Segregation of Roma Settlements Within Serbian Cities. Examples from Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Kruševac Zlata Vuksanovi´c-Macura

In the Balkans, racism is not measured by the attitude to black people – as there are no black people here. It is measured by the attitude to our brothers – the Roma. How many Roma do you know personally? How many of them are your friends? Antonije Puši´c alias Rambo Amadeus, musician from Belgrade www.facebook.com/antonije.pusic.7/posts/3381925411826404. Accessed: 2020.06.03

Abstract This chapter focuses on the spatial segregation of Roma settlements within Serbian cities, shaped by the long-standing ethnic distance and social exclusion. In order to understand the broader context, the historical background against which Roma settlements emerged in Serbia, as well as their current demographic, legislative, and urban characteristics, are briefly presented. Several forms of segregation of Roma settlements are analysed, including segregation as a consequence of racist hostility, institutional discrimination by city administration, and development-based conflicts. Examples of setting up a wall enclosing a Roma settlement in Kruševac, racist pressures that prevent the construction of housing for Roma in Belgrade and the reluctance to improve and legalise Roma settlements in Novi Sad, illustrate the various manifestations of segregation and division of urban space in Serbia. Keywords Roma settlements · Residential segregation · Urban planning · Serbia · Belgrade · Novi Sad · Kruševac

12.1 Introduction: A Glimpse of Reality This chapter deals with urban planning aspects of the spatial segregation of Roma settlements in Serbian cities. Segregation has mainly been studied through the attitude of society towards the Roma (Petrovi´c 1992; Várady and Baši´c 2019), while its spatial and urban planning aspects have rarely been the focus of research (Macura Z. Vuksanovi´c-Macura (B) Geographical Institute “Jovan Cviji´c”, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, Serbia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_12

211

212

Z. Vuksanovi´c-Macura

2016). Roma are the second largest ethnic group among the twenty national minorities in Serbia. Recent research shows that about 250 thousand people live in Roma settlements, while about 150 thousand Roma live scattered within the urban fabric (Jakši´c and Baši´c 2005: 43). This makes a total of about 400 thousand Roma, which is in line with earlier international estimates (Liegeois and Gherghe 1995: 7). It is estimated that Roma account for approximately 6% of Serbia’s population and more than 60% of them live in Roma settlements. Such a high concentration of a national minority in segregated parts of cities indicates the complexity of the ethnic and socio-spatial inequality faced by Roma. Anyway, this chapter will discuss neither the phenomenon of self-segregation, nor the issue of spatial segregation of the poor non-Roma settlements. Furthermore, the general term Roma used in this study covers various Roma groups that have some specific features, which may also be reflected in their housing and lifestyle (Ashkali, Balkan Egyptians, and so on). Not all Roma settlements have the same characteristics, and their typologies usually rely on three criteria: demographic, legislative, and urban planning. Roma settlements in Serbia are small in terms of size and population, compared to the neighbouring countries, such as Bulgaria or North Macedonia (Vuksanovi´c-Macura and Macura 2007). A research conducted in 2002 enumerated 593 Roma settlements in Serbia (not including Kosovo; Jakši´c and Baši´c 2005) (Fig. 12.1). Another study, conducted a decade later, mapped almost the same number of the so-called - c 2015). According to substandard Roma settlements—583 (Živkovi´c and Ðordevi´ the mentioned research, Roma settlements had about 420 inhabitants on average. Most settlements, 314 (53%), had up to 200 inhabitants; 179 (30%) of settlements had up to 300 inhabitants (Jakši´c and Baši´c 2005). According to the legislative criteria, Roma settlements are divided into spontaneous, planned, and illegal. Spontaneous settlements are located in rural and suburban areas where, at the time of their formation, there was no obligation to obtain a building permit to build a house. Planned and illegal settlements emerged on locations covered by urban plans, where a construction permit is required. The 2002 study identified about 220 spontaneous Roma settlements (37%), and 166 (28%) settlements developed according to a plan. There were 207 illegal settlements, which accounted for 35% of all Roma settlements. The typology from an urban planning perspective is determined based on the settlement morphology, the quality of houses, streets, and infrastructure. Out of a total of 593 settlements, only 65 (11%) had the characteristics of a standard settlement, because houses were solidly built and the settlements had a standard infrastructure and streets. There were 409 (69%) unserviced settlements—where houses were relatively solid, but the settlements were partly lacking communal infrastructure and road pavement. In 119 (20%) slum-type settlements, living conditions were extremely difficult; houses were built of non-building materials and conventional streets and infrastructure did not exist (Vuksanovi´c-Macura 2012). Roma settlements were marked by the low quality of the spatial and physical environment in the past, as well (Vuksanovi´c-Macura and Macura 2018). The Roma emancipation movement in Serbia emerged at the turn of the twentieth centuries, and its primary goals were to ensure elementary education and preserve the Roma tradition and customs. The idea of helping the Roma population overcome poverty

12 Spatial Segregation of Roma Settlements Within Serbian …

213

Fig. 12.1 Spatial distribution of Roma settlements in Serbia. Source Adapted from Jakši´c and Baši´c (2005: 38)

was first and foremost advocated by Roma intellectuals (Ackovi´c 2009). Socialist Yugoslavia, guided by the principle of equality and equity, improved the economically difficult position of a small part of the Roma population (Raki´c-Vodineli´c 1998). The socialist government was primarily focused on the education of Roma and the related acquisition of occupational competencies (Mitrovi´c and Zaji´c 1998). However, the national government and municipalities completely neglected the issue of housing, Roma settlements and living conditions in those settlements. Until the early 1980s, these issues were shunned, only to be raised as a problem of illegal construction, and not as the housing problem of a vulnerable minority (Bobi´c and

214

Z. Vuksanovi´c-Macura

Vujovi´c 1985). As far as the housing policy is concerned, a system of mass housing was developed, where each ‘self-managed enterprise’ was obliged to provide hosing to the employees. This housing option was available to a small number of Roma families due to their under-representation in formal employment (Vujovi´c 2017). During the 1990s, more than 98% of housing units in Serbia were privatised through extremely cheap purchase. The opportunities for Roma to use this scheme were limited as the majority of them were not accommodated in socially owned housing (Macura 2010). In the early 1990s, some Roma leaders and NGOs launched various actions to address Roma housing, which unfortunately remained in the realm of failed attempts.

12.2 Segregation and Urban Space The term Roma settlement, which designates a neighbourhood predominantly inhabited by Roma, has emerged fairly recently, and it is used in academic literature and administrative practice in Serbia. The terms most commonly used in informal everyday conversation are ciganmala or ciganska mahala (Mitrovi´c and Zaji´c 1998). They reflect the specific socio-spatial features of Roma settlements, which are clearly distinguished in the image of the city. How did the terms mahala or mala come to designate a Roma settlement? The Ottoman organisation of the city, which was present in the territory of today’s Serbia between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, was based on the mahala (Turkish: mahalle) as the basic housing, ethnic and confessional unit (Koji´c 1976). Just like in other areas throughout the Ottoman Empire, there were Turkish, Greek, Jewish, Armenian, Serbian and other mahalas (neighbourhoods) in large cities in the Balkans. Mahalas disappeared in the process of Europeanisation in Serbia, in the nineteenth century (Maksimovi´c 1978; Macura 1983). The only ethnic group who retained or were forced to keep a mahala way of life, were the Roma (Fig. 12.2). According to late nineteenth-century travel writers, Roma neighbourhoods were segregated in Serbian towns (Kanic 1986). The spatial segregation inherited from the Ottoman period persisted during the modernisation of Serbia only in the case of ciganmala. This Ottoman residue did not have the same characteristics as during Ottoman rule. Namely, Serbia, which aspired to Europe, pursued a population policy of accepting all those who were willing to settle down in its territory. Members of the new multiethnic population accepted each other as equals, basing this relationship on similar social statuses, the same religion, and similar occupations. The Roma did not fit into that context; although a part of them were Orthodox Christians, they did not share the other characteristics typical of the non-Roma population. They were different in terms of occupation, - c education, culture, customs, language, material status, and the lifestyle (Ðordevi´ 1933). Segregation, exclusion, physical dislocation of the homes of those who were visibly different was the “Gypsy destiny” (Ðuri´c 1988: 18). In the current academic and professional idiom, the terms ghetto (Berescu 2011), enclave (Vujovi´c 2017) or slum (Vuksanovi´c-Macura and Macura 2007), which

12 Spatial Segregation of Roma Settlements Within Serbian …

215

Fig. 12.2 Ziganskamala (Roma settlement) on the 1827 map of Belgrade. Source Macura (1983: 36)

emphasize socio-economic and ethnic segregation as a feature, are also used to designate Roma settlements. Generally speaking, segregation is an act or practice of spatial separation or isolation of different social groups. “One of the most distinct and most apparent disjunctive processes is residential (spatial) segregation. […] This situation is marked by the existence of a dominant majority and a subordinate minority.” (Mitrovi´c and Zaji´c 1998: 61). Spatial isolation may negatively affect the access of minorities or disadvantaged populations to the labour market, adequate housing conditions, and other cultural and social resources (Musterd 2005).

12.3 The Types of Segregation of Roma Settlements The insight into the existing cases of segregation reveals its dimensions and various manifestations. They range from covert non-acceptance of Roma settlements as part of the urban system to overt forms of ghettoisation, such as the construction of walls separating Roma settlements from the rest of the city. Furthermore, the study presents the typical forms of segregation of Roma settlements and the related manifestations and consequences that adversely affect the life of Roma. The analysed cases show the situation in Serbia, but such and similar phenomena can also be found in the other countries in Europe with Roma populations (FRA 2009; Suditu and Vâlceanu 2013). We discuss the forms of segregation of Roma settlements in Serbia, resulting from the specific attitude and behaviour of various stakeholders and parts of the majority

216

Z. Vuksanovi´c-Macura

community towards them. These are: persistent institutional threats of demolition; racist pressures and preventing the construction of settlements for Roma; building a fence around a Roma settlement; and avoiding the obligation to maintain and improve settlements.

12.3.1 Persistent Institutional Threats of Demolition Mali Beograd—Veliki Rit is an illegal Roma settlement in Novi Sad, Vojvodina, in the northern part of Serbia (Krišanovi´c 2009). According to Roma leaders, there currently live between 2500 and 3000 inhabitants (Fig. 12.3). It was established in the mid-twentieth century on an uninhabited terrain on the northern outskirts of the city, close to the main road to the town of Temerin. Over time, the urban fabric of Novi Sad expanded to incorporate the settlement of Mali Beograd—Veliki Rit. The growth of the total, primarily non-Roma population of the area was accompanied by a growing need for healthcare, educational, recreational, service, and other amenities. The initial step taken by the city authorities was to develop urban plans that provided for the construction of the required services. According to the authorities, the site of the Roma settlement was identified as a convenient location, because the authorities

Fig. 12.3 Roma settlement in Novi Sad. Photo V. Macura

12 Spatial Segregation of Roma Settlements Within Serbian …

217

treated it as an empty plot, as Roma houses had been built illegally. From a bureaucratic point of view, they did not even exist. Several master plans of Novi Sad and detailed regulation plans covering the Roma settlement were adopted in 1963, 1972, 1992, 1994, 2000, 2006, 2009, 2010, and 2016. None of these plans envisaged that the site of the existing Roma settlement should remain a Roma settlement, but something else was planned. For example, the plan from 2010 envisaged the demolition of the settlement and the construction of a hospital complex, a library, a healthcare centre, sports grounds, and a park on this site. This ambitious undertaking was passed from one term to another, without initiating the planned construction. While the Roma settlement was growing (in 2004 it had 140 houses, and 347 in 2009), the urban planning service continued to design plans as if the site had been undeveloped land. The 2016 Masterplan reduced the ambitious programme to services of local importance (Macura 2016). Anyhow, the subsequent detailed regulation plan, adopted in 2018, foresees the construction of educational facilities and public utilities buildings over the existing Roma settlement (PDR 2018) (Fig. 12.4). Simultaneously, this plan has recognised surrounding illegal houses built by non-Roma as single-family residential zoning. Now, the questions arise: Why the city authorities, from socialist to post-socialist, for more than half a century, harass Roma families with threats of demolition? How long and how many generations of Roma will have to fight for fundamental human rights, for a roof over their heads?

Fig. 12.4 Planned public utilities and educational facilities covering the Roma settlement in Novi Sad. Source Adapted from Official Gazette of the City of Novi Sad, 43/2018

218

Z. Vuksanovi´c-Macura

12.3.2 Racist Pressures and Preventing the Construction of Settlements for Roma Since the end of the 1990s, racist outbursts occurred almost regularly when local authorities in Serbia announced the relocation of a group of Roma families from one site to another. The reaction of the potential host community was usually turbulent. Mass demonstrations in 2005 halted the construction of a settlement consisting of prefabricated housing units intended for the relocation of Roma from one part of New Belgrade to another, from the slum near the Gazela Bridge to the block close to Dr. Ivana Ribara Street. The reason for the relocation was the reconstruction of the bridge in the vicinity of the illegal Roma settlement. The implementation of the project had just been announced and protests organised by a part of the majority population escalated to prevent it. The protest leaders told the Belgrade authorities that they were ready to use weapons to stop the planned construction (Divjak 2017). Despite the international recommendations for local governments regarding the handling of such actions (UN-Habitat 2005), the measures taken by the Belgrade authorities to calm down the protests were inadequate in all these cases, suggesting to the opponents of the Roma settlement schemes that “there was an understanding for their dissent” (Ili´c 2012: 398). This “dissent” reflected a much deeper gap, and the city authorities gave up the intended relocation. In 2007, there was another plan to relocate Roma from the settlement under the Gazela Bridge, this time to a new site close to the Belgrade neighbourhood of Ovˇca. Extensive resettlement preparations, which reached the stage of obtaining a permit to build new houses, were again interrupted by protests by the non-Roma population “based on prejudice, stereotypes, discrimination and racism” (Divjak 2017: 131) and disguised behind common demands to ensure an overall communal infrastructure for the entire area. The Roma settled near the Gazela Bridge were displaced in 2009. Part of the families were moved to nonresidential metal containers (with 20–30 families in one container group) on several peripheral sites in Belgrade, while the others were dislocated to those municipalities in Serbia from which they had come to Belgrade. Over the following several years, the Belgrade authorities, exposed to pressure from international and local human rights organisations, built social housing for the Roma from the newly established “container settlements” or purchased houses for them in the countryside, where they were eventually relocated. Under the circumstances, Roma usually do not have the opportunity to choose the locations, the settlements or the flats to move in, and they often do not have the opportunity to improve their living conditions by moving (Praxis 2013).

12.3.3 Building a Wall Around a Roma Settlement In the city of Kruševac, in central Serbia, in the autumn of 2016, the construction of a wall along the street side of the Marko Orlovi´c Roma settlement was undertaken

12 Spatial Segregation of Roma Settlements Within Serbian …

219

Fig. 12.5 Construction of the wall around Roma settlement Marko Orlovi´c in Kruševac (left) (Photo TV N1) and anti-racist protests by NGOs (right) (Photo Beta News Agency/Jelena Božovi´c)

and completed. This is an old settlement, established in 1860–1870 on land allocated by the then authorities to Roma (Vuksanovi´c-Macura and Macura 2007). During the twentieth century, its inhabitants were exposed to various threats of demolition. Numerous urban plans relevant for the territory of the Roma settlement envisaged land uses or urban planning parameters that completely disregarded the situation on the site. Just before the end of the twentieth century, the settlement included about 315 houses with approximately 1800 inhabitants. At that time, a new urban plan was adopted, which accepted and legalised the existing Roma settlement. However, a new shock for its inhabitants was the construction of a two-metre high concrete wall enclosing a part of the settlement. “The Roads of Serbia Company claims that the wall is there to protect the settlement from traffic noise, and part of the Kruševac’s citizens believe that it was built to hide the Roma settlement from the investors across the road” (TV N1) (Fig. 12.5). The protests which put forward the slogans “Stop racism”, “Racism is a crime”, “Prevent fascism” clearly expressed the reactions some of the citizens of Kruševac—not only Roma. Representatives of a local NGO highlighted that it was the only such wall in Kruševac, and it was built in such a way as to conceal the Roma settlement. A Roma woman living in the settlement expressed her perception of the situation as follows: “We feel like living in a cemetery; we are isolated, the children are scared and they feel rejected by all other residents of this city […] now, they feel different in school because they come from behind a wall, as if they were from another planet” (Barjaktarevi´c 2016). Despite protests by the residents, local and other NGOs, part of the citizens of Kruševac, the Committee for the Study of Roma Life and Customs of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the two-metre-high and more than one-hundred-metre-long wall encloses the settlement along Blagoja Parovi´ca Street and side buildings and passages. The Roma settlement that has existed in Kruševac for more than 150 years is now hidden behind the wall. On the other side of the street, opposite the wall, there is a newly built shopping centre, which has created a social and, above all, a sharp ethnic divide in the urban space of Kruševac.

220

Z. Vuksanovi´c-Macura

12.3.4 Avoiding the Obligation to Maintain and Improve Settlements The Roma settlements where living conditions are the worst (slums) are usually located on peripheral sites, but close to the places where their inhabitants work, or within the city, on previously unoccupied land where development is planned. In 2002, 29 slum-type Roma settlements were mapped in Belgrade, i.e. 23% of the total of 125 settlements. Over the following 15 years, seven slums with a population of about 1200 were displaced, and only a small number of their inhabitants were ˇ provided with alternative housing (Macura 2016). The slums Antena and Cukatiˇ cka šuma, formed in the late 1990s, were not among the displaced settlements. Together they have about 90 households and 460 people. Mud instead of streets, water canisters instead of water pipes, cardboard, plastic, and rotten planks instead of brick walls, leaking canopies instead of roof tiles, and almost 90% of households with less than ˇ c Damjanovi´c 2016). The residents 10 m2 per person (Vuksanovi´c-Macura and Coli´ are involved in the informal collection of secondary raw materials, which are often stored next to their homes. The aforementioned facts contribute to an air of deprivation that marks the entire settlement’s environment, which clearly distinguishes, separates, and stigmatizes it with respect to the surrounding residential fabric inhabited by the majority population. The city authorities usually close their eyes to the fact that the worst type of housing is built and present in the territory under their jurisdiction. At the same time, the authorities do not take any measures to improve, at least temporarily, the communal and housing conditions of the inhabitants. It is assumed that the “helpless” group of Roma will be displaced by the investor who purchases the plot on which the settlement is located.

12.4 Discussion and Conclusions Segregation begins with prejudice rooted in the belief that people are different—that some are worse than others. Prejudice and segregation are usually associated with the situation in poor Roma settlements. In reality, there is also a segregation of standard settlements inhabited by wealthier Roma. Roma settlements facing such problems can be found in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Nis, Požarevac, Vranjska Banja, Leskovac, in Vojvodina, where local authorities have been refusing to undertake interventions on the communal infrastructure for decades, as reflected in the proverbial situation of “an asphalt road stopping where a Roma settlement begins” (Turudi´c 2007). The ethnic distance research has shown that Serbs, Hungarians, Roma, and Albanians are statistically relevant ethnic communities in Serbia. In general, there is a high aversion of Serbs towards the Roma, but antipathy to Roma is also present among the other three ethnic minorities in Serbia. According to some interpretations, this aversion is associated with the fact that the Roma came with the conquering troops of the Ottoman Empire and that this was imprinted in the memory of the Balkan peoples

12 Spatial Segregation of Roma Settlements Within Serbian …

221

(Ðurovi´c 2002). However, segregation exists throughout Europe, and it can certainly be found in the countries that the Ottoman armies did not reach. Accordingly, it may be assumed that it is underlain by other, primarily racist reasons disguised by various pretexts (Liegeois and Gherghe 1995), tied with elaborate ways of harassing the Roma population. As a consequence, “the housing situation for Roma in many participating States continues to be characterised by a lack of secure tenure and access to basic infrastructure, discrimination in social-housing schemes, residential segregation, high vulnerability to forced eviction, and conditions that pose health risks” (OSCE/ODIHR 2013: 9). Segregation, as well as discrimination, becomes multi-layered when it infiltrates into the formal institutions of a society, whose employees, at different hierarchical levels, implement their own informal segregationist and discriminatory practices, regardless of the fact that they are prohibited by law in Serbia (Petruši´c 2014). “Though discrimination takes place in institutions, in public or private life, only a few court proceedings have been initiated. This does not only lead to a sense of impunity, but also to the acceptance of discrimination of Roma by Roma and nonRoma alike” (Civil Rights Defenders 2018: 6). Among other things, this attitude prevents Roma from exercising their rights provided by the social system, including the right to personal documents, qualitative education, employment opportunities, health and social insurance, and adequate housing. The study shows how the behaviour of various stakeholders in urban space— residents, authorities, and urban planning services—leads to the spatial segregation of Roma settlements. The analysed examples show that the behaviour of individual groups of stakeholders is very similar, regardless of the city, and that the final outcome, as a rule, has negative consequences for the inhabitants of Roma settlements. The strategy of long-standing threats of demolition, used by the city authorities in Novi Sad, as well as the avoidance of Belgrade’s authorities to maintain and improve the poorest settlements in its territory, has had as an effect the gradual expansion, in terms of space and population, of slums, which are clearly distinguished in urban areas, whereas their residents are stigmatised as “undesirable”. It has also been observed that both overt and covert institutional discrimination and segregation towards Roma settlements foster overt and covert racist behaviour of a part of the general population towards Roma. In this way, an “ethno-spatial distance is established […] due to prejudice, distrust towards members of other ethnic groups and races and their way of life. This is an expression of the unwillingness to live together or of the rejection of the Other and Different, who is not understood as a human being but rather as a representative of an ethnic group that is considered undesirable.” (Vujovi´c 2009). Residential segregation leads to discrimination, which further leads to growing poverty; poverty leads to new and more pronounced prejudices that underlie an even more profound division. The connection between these phenomena can be presented as a circular series of negative states and practical actions which begins with prejudices (Ðurovi´c 2002) fostering segregation (Vujovi´c 2017), which gives rise to discrimination in resource use (Petruši´c 2014), ending up in poverty (Mitrovi´c 1990), which is, in a nutshell, a life below the average possibilities of a society. Poverty

222

Z. Vuksanovi´c-Macura

encourages new prejudices against Roma, initiating a new cycle of rejection. Furthermore, poverty initiates another unfavourable cycle. Due to poverty, Roma suffer from homelessness (Feantsa 2005). Homelessness forces them into self-building that is not regulated by Serbian laws (Ferenˇcak 2006), which further leads to the illegal status of their homes and the adjacent structures (Davini´c 2016). This set of circumstances is based on the non-acceptance of Roma by the general society because “they” are not “us”.

References Ackovi´c D (2009) Romi u Beogradu [Roma in Belgrade]. Rominterpres, Beograd Barjaktarevi´c R (2016) Protesti u Kruševcu: Pod hitno srušiti zid oko romskog naselja [Protests in Krusevac: demolish the wall around the Roma settlement urgently]. https://informer.rs/vesti/srb ija/304457/protest-nvo-krusevcu-pod-hitno-srusiti-zid-oko-romskog-naselja. Accessed: 23 May 2020 Berescu C (2011) The rise of the new European Roma ghettos: a brief account of some empirical studies. Urban Res Pract 4(3):344–352 Bobi´c M, Vujovi´c S (eds) (1985) Krov nad glavom—Ogledi o stambenoj bedi i siromaštvu [Roof over the head—essays on housing misery and poverty]. Zavod za izdavaˇcku delatnost Filip Višnji´c, Beograd Civil Rights Defenders (2018) The wall of anti-gypsyism—Roma in the Republic of Serbia. https://crd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/The-Wall-of-Anti-Gypsyism-%E2%80% 93-Roma-in-Serbia-Eng.pdf. Accessed: 04 June 2020 Davini´c M (2016) The legalization of informal Roma settlements in the Republic of Serbia—a necessary step prior to legitimation. Anali Pravnog Fak Beograd 64(1):132–153 Divjak L (2017) Pokušaji preseljenja stanovnika novobeogradskog romskog naselja „Gazela“ 2004–2009: promašaji, sukobi, rezultati i posledice. In: Várady T, Vuksanovi´c-Macura Z (eds) Stanovanje Roma u Srbiji: stanje i izazovi [Roma housing in Serbia: current situation and challenges]. Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, pp 131–150 - c TR (1933) Naˇcin života u Cigana [The way of life of gypsies]. Naš narodni život 7:58–67 Ðordevi´ Ðuri´c R (1988) Cigani sveta [Roma of the world]. Duga, Beograd Ðurovi´c B (2002) Social and ethnic distance towards Romanies in Serbia. Fact Univ Ser Philos Sociol Psychol 2(9):667–681 Feantsa (2005) ETHOS—European typology on homelessness and housing exclusion. www. feantsa.org/en/toolkit/2005/04/01/ethos-typology-on-homelessness-and-housing-exclusion. Accessed: 30 May 2020 Ferenˇcak M (2006) Regularization and upgrading of informal settlements. In: Garau P (ed) Four strategic theses for the housing policy in Serbia. UN-Habitat, Belgrade, pp 11–26 FRA (2009) Housing conditions of Roma and travellers in the European Union comparative report. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Vienna Ili´c M (2012) Preseljenje Roma ispod Gazele u politiˇckom diskursu: primer društvene (ne)odgovornosti i reprodukcije rasizma. In: Várady T, Baši´c G (eds) Promena identiteta kulture i jezika Roma u uslovima planske socijalno-ekonomske integracija. Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Beograd, pp 391–416 Jakši´c B, Baši´c G (2005) Umetnost preživljavanja—Gde i kako žive Romi u Srbiji [The art of survival—where and how Roma live in Serbia]. Institut za filosofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd Kanic F (1986) Srbija, zemlja i stanovništvo [Serbia, country and population]. Rad, Beograd Koji´c B (1976) Stari Balkanski gradovi, varoši i Varošice [Old Balkan cities, towns and small towns]. Institut za arhitekturu i urbanizam Srbije, Beograd

12 Spatial Segregation of Roma Settlements Within Serbian …

223

Krišanovi´c T (2009) Studija stanovanja za generalni plan Novog Sada [Housing study for the masterplan of Novi Sad]. JP „Urbanizam“, Zavod za urbanizam, Novi Sad Liegeois JP, Gherghe N (1995) Roma/gypsies—an European minority. Minority Rights Group International, London Macura V (1983) Urbano planiranje u Srbiji 19. i 20. vek [Urban planning in Serbia 19th and 20th century]. Beograd project. Centar za planiranje urbanog razvoja, Beograd Macura V (2010) Roma settlements in Serbia: current state of affairs and future goals. EU-ROMA project. Roma housing development in Europe. Available at https://issuu.com/euroma/docs/3macura_serbia_final_300_eu_roma_150709_2335. Accessed: 30 May 2020 Macura V (2016) Urbanism and Roma settlements in Serbia. Report for ERRC. Brussels. www.res earchgate.net/publication/338610799_Urbanism_and_Roma_Settlements_in_Serbia. Accessed 30 May 2020 Maksimovi´c B (1978) Idejni razvoj srpskog urbanizma—Period rekonstrukcije gradova do 1914 [Conceptual development of Serbian urbanism—period of reconstruction of cities before 1914]. Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade Mitrovi´c A (1990) Na dnu: Romi na ivici siromaštva [At the Bottom: Roma on the edge of the poverty]. Nauˇcna knjiga, Beograd Mitrovi´c A, Zaji´c G (1998) Social position of Roma in Serbia. In: Roma in Serbia. Centre for Anti-War Action & Institute for Criminological and Sociological Research, pp 9–68 Musterd S (2005) Social and ethnic segregation in Europe: levels, causes, and effects. J Urban Aff 27(3):331–348. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0735-2166.2005.00239.x OSCE/ODIHR (2013) Implementation of the action plan on improving the situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE area. OSCE/ODIHR, Warsaw PDR (2018) Plan detaljne regulacije poslovanja i porodiˇcnog stanovanja na prostoru “Mali BeogradVeliki Rit I” u Novom Sadu [Detailed regulation plan of commercial and individual housing in the area “Mali Beograd-Veliki Rit I” in Novi Sad]. Official Gazette of the City of Novi Sad, 43/2018 Petrovi´c Ð (1992) Nauˇcna istraživanja Roma u Jugoslaviji [Gypsies (Roma) in Yugoslavia as subjects of scientific research]. In: Macura M (ed) Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji. Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, pp 61–85 Petruši´c N (2014) Tipologija sluˇcajeva diskriminacije roma u pravnoj praksi poverenika za zaštitu ravnopravnosti [Classification of cases of discrimination against Roma in the legal practice of commissioner for protection of equality]. In: Várady T, Djordjevo´c D, Baši´c G (eds) Prilozi strategiji unapredenja položaja Roma. Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, pp 73–91 Praxis (2013) Analysis of main obstacles and problems in access of Roma to the right to adequate housing. Praxis, Belgrade Raki´c-Vodineli´c V (1998) The legal status of Roma in the FR Yugoslavia. In: Roma in Serbia. Centre for Anti-War Action & Institute for Criminological and Sociological Research, Belgrade, pp 93–131 Suditu B, Vâlceanu DG (2013) Informal settlements and squatting in Romania: socio-spatial patterns and typologies. Hum Geogr J Stud Res Hum Geogr 7(2):65–75 Turudi´c M (2007) Dokle su asfalt i kanalizacija [As far as asphalt and sewage go]. www.vreme. com/cms/view.php?id=502873. Accessed: 30 May 2020 UN-Habitat (2005) Forced evictions—towards solutions? First report of the advisory group on forced evictions to the executive director of UN-HABITAT. UN-Habitat, Nairobi Várady T, Baši´c G (2019) Trideset godina rada odbora za prouˇcavanje života i obiˇcaja roma 1989– 2019 [Thirty years of work of the committee for the study of Roma life and customs 1989–2019]. Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade Vujovi´c S (2009) Grad za preživljavanje [A city for survival]. www.politika.rs/sr/tags/articles/2212/ vujovic-sreten. Accessed: 30 May 2020 Vujovi´c S (2017) Stanovanje Roma u socijalistiˇckoj Srbiji [The housing of Roma in socialist Serbia]. In: Várady T, Vuksanovi´c-Macura Z (eds) Stanovanje Roma u Srbiji: stanje i izazovi [Roma

224

Z. Vuksanovi´c-Macura

housing in Serbia: current situation and challenges]. Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, pp 169–187 Vuksanovi´c-Macura Z (2012) The mapping and enumeration of informal Roma settlements in Serbia. Environ Urban 24(2):685–705. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247812451809 ˇ c Damjanovi´c VM (2016) Socijalno stanovanje u Srbiji [Social housing Vuksanovi´c-Macura Z, Coli´ in Serbia]. Palgo centar, Beograd Vuksanovi´c-Macura Z, Macura V (2007) Stanovanje i naselja Roma u Jugoistoˇcnoj Evropi: prikaz stanja i napretka u Srbiji [Roma housing and settlements in South-Eastern Europe: profile and achievements in Serbia in a comparative framework]. Društvo za unapredivanje romskih naselja i Institut za arhitekturu i urbanizam Srbije, Beograd Vuksanovi´c-Macura Z, Macura V (2018) The right to housing: squatter settlements in interwar Belgrade—defence and demolition of Jatagan-mala. J Urban Hist 44(4):755–774. https://doi. org/10.1177/0096144216632747 - c A (2015) Basic characteristics of substandard Roma settlements in Serbia. Živkovi´c Lj, Ðordevi´ OSCE Mission to Serbia, Belgrade

Zlata Vuksanovi´c-Macura is Ph.D. in Architecture obtained from the University of Belgrade, Serbia. She works in the Geographical Institute “Jovan Cviji´c” of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Her research interests include the history of urban planning, urban history, as well as social housing, with a particular emphasis on the settlements and housing of the Roma population. She acquired an abundant experience in urban and strategic planning and their implementation while working in various environments, ranging from local NGOs to a public urban planning company (Belgrade Urban Planning Institute), and the UN-Habitat. She was also an expert-consultant on urban planning policy and housing to national institutions and international organisations. Her papers have been published in international journals, such as Environment and Urbanization, Sustainability, Journal of Urban History.

Chapter 13

Globalisation, Social Polarisation and Conflicts in the Urban Space of a Post-socialist City: The Case of Kielce, Poland Stanisław Sala Abstract Cities play a special role in globalisation processes. The main aim of the study is to identify new conflicts and opportunities for socio-economic development in the urban space of Kielce in the context of globalisation. In condition of globalisation, post-socialist urban space became the reason for numerous disputes, which are based on the conflicting interests of various social groups or individuals. Similar processes are noticeable in Kielce, a city of 200 thousand inhabitants in southern Poland, which has experienced a number of quantitative and qualitative changes in its spatial organisation. In the period of political transformation, globalisation became a factor of both positive changes and innovations in the social and economic life of the city, as well as a number of new conflicts between participants of public life visible in the city space. Part of these phenomena and their impact on the spatial relocation of certain activities, i.e. the appearance of closed housing estates, new business institutions, the displacement of traditional trade in the city centre by large shopping centres, the process of revitalisation through “cementification”, has been critically discussed. Keywords Globalisation · Urban space · Spatial conflicts · Cementification · Kielce

13.1 Introduction The processes of globalisation reorganize the existing spatial order at global, national and local level. The concept of globalisation is one of the most commonly used terms in the scientific literature (Sala 2008, 2014). Initially, globalisation was considered to be a homogeneous process. Conversely, at present, one recognises the fact that it is multifaceted phenomenon. Globalisation involves the development of the unrestricted free market in the range of the transnational (multinational) corporations, S. Sala (B) Institute of Geography and Environment, Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Kielce, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_13

225

226

S. Sala

telecommunications, as well as the modern means of transport. The above-mentioned processes, as described in the literature, allow to express the effect of the so-called Global Village or time-space compression (McLuhan 1962; Harvey 1990; Robertson 1992). Regardless of various views, conceptual disputes and attitudes found presently, globalisation has profound effect on individuals’ lives of the vast majority of the world population. Some inhabitants live in poverty, while others at or below the poverty line. At the same time, others live life to the utmost by exercising privileges, capitals and connections (Czerny 2005). Globalisation has also a strong impact on the local and regional development (Sala 2008), and predominantly on cities, which join the global network of connections in a dynamical way (Zborowski 2001; Sala 2006; Czerny et al. 2007). Moreover, intensification of international economic relations has led to the development of new industrial districts, poles of technology, technological parks or centres of innovation (Wdowicka 2012). The processes of globalisation that have been in progress since the 1990s offer opportunities and threats to the urban space. On the one hand, the global tendencies are increasingly interlinked with local issues, but on the other hand, some areas are eliminated from the main globalisation trend (Kukli´nski et al. 2000). In these conditions, access to urban space is also the cause of numerous disputes and conflicts (Castells 1989; Bauman 1996; Hall 2000). Conflicting interests of various social groups or individuals are at the core of the disputes and conflicts concerning the urban space. The gist of this conflict was very succinctly expressed by Harvey which claims that the freedom to make and remake cities is one of the most precious yet most neglected of human rights. According to the author, the right to the city is a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanisation (Harvey 2008). It is difficult to reconcile the freedom of self-expression by individuals with the needs of the general population of residents in a limited urban space as social tensions emerge sooner or later. In general, two types of urban conflicts can be distinguished. The first one applies to public resources, and the other one refers to specific systems of values, such as authority, religion or aesthetics. The direct sources of conflict are highly diversified. The disputes may be triggered by access to streets, playgrounds, urban greenery on the one hand, but on the other hand, administrative decisions on development conditions or land-use plans may also provoke tensions. The local conditions coincide with globalisation processes that contribute to the overlap of various types of conflicts (Klasik 2009; Kukli´nski et al. 2000; Parysek). Globalisation also creates development opportunities that transform cities through the activities of transnational corporations. New structures emerge included in the global networking system. The scientific literature dedicated to the influence of globalisation on Polish cities is general and fragmentary. Most of them concern positive influence of globalisation on modernisation and internationalisation of urban economy. Individual studies focus their attention on the importance of transnational corporations and their contribution to the development of global functions (Wdowicka 2012) and emphasise new tendencies such as the development of a market economy, transfers of capital through

13 Globalisation, Social Polarisation and Conflicts in the Urban …

227

the borders between countries, the competitiveness or the new pattern of localisation based on a human factor (Kochanowska and Kochanowski 2000). There are studies which undertake the issue of inequality in the access to the urban resources, the rights to the city or conflicts in spatial planning (Grochowska 2015). Particular publications concern the influence of globalisation on new spatial practices related to conflicts and divisions in urban space, mainly privatisation and disintegration of space as well as ´ ezak-Tazbir shaping gated community estates (Jałowiecki 2007; Szczepa´nski and Sl˛ 2007; Tobiasz-Lis 2010; Szczepa´nska 2012). Kielce is a typical post-industrial city in Poland, with 200 thousand residents, and a centre of an emerging metropolitan area. After the fall of communism, it tries to find its way in the new economic reality (Tkaczyk 2003). This study describes how globalisation processes reorganised the local spatial arrangements in Kielce and defines selected spatial conflicts within the city. The social and economic conflicts related to the post-socialist evolution of residential space and conflicts between localisation of traditional and modern, globalised forms of trade are discussed. Another question arisen in by the author concerns controversial policies of revitalisation and especially the so-called cementification of the Kielce’s city centre. Before all, the last practices were possible due to financial support of EU funds and were influenced by the patterns of modernisation of old urban quarters in the EU member countries from Western Europe. This research was based on primary and secondary sources of information. Primary sources of information are understood as participatory observation of postsocialist changes of the urban space as well as statistical data from secondary sources of information (research papers, monographs, statistical data and Internet sources).

13.2 Positive Effects of Globalisation on the Spatial and Economic Transformation As emphasised in the introduction, most theoreticians in the sphere of globalisation are of the same view that the process of globalisation causes both new social and spatial conflicts, as well as it also initiates new models of managing in the range of social and economic space that can allow to overcome the backwardness and prevent from the downfall of the post-socialist cities. Some positive phenomena can be attributed to globalisation and the new perspectives for development: Kielce Trade Fair (Targi Kielce) as an example of an economic success in conditions of globalisation of economic relationships; Kielce Technology Park as an example of a successful model of knowledge exchange and innovation transfer, and institutions working to promote and develop Kielce as a creative city. Targi Kielce Exhibition and Congress Centre which has operated since 1992 are now the second largest establishment of this kind, second to the MTP Pozna´n Expo only, in terms of the exhibition area and the number of visitors in Central and Eastern Europe. This organisation belongs to the dynamically developing local growth poles,

228

S. Sala

as evidenced in the number of exhibitors and the countries that participate in the trade events. It is now the fastest growing exhibition centre in Poland and in Central and Eastern Europe, offering state-of-the-art exhibition facilities. During the time period of 2007 and 2018, the core trade fair rates increased by 30% on average. The highest progress over this period was reported for the contracted exhibition space (by 57%), which reflects the dynamically growing popularity of the city’s exhibition centre. In 2018, there were over 7 thousand exhibitors. The events attracted over 240 thousand visitors (www.targikielce.pl/o-firmie/historia). It is worth mentioning that Targi Kielce attracts a higher or similar number of visitors annually as similar exhibition centres in Bratislava, Bucharest, Budapest, Kyiv or Plovdiv. Among many events staged at Targi Kielce, the International Defence Industry Exhibition MSPO organised since 1993 counts among the key events of the defence industry trade fairs worldwide (third in Europe, following London and Paris). This event is strategic for the Polish government and is co-organised by the Ministry of National Defence. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Targi Kielce is one of the main driving forces of the economic growth of the city. In order to create conditions for business development, the City Council initiated the establishment of the Kielce Technology Park in 2007, co-funded by the European Union. The park is located in the north-western part of the city (Fig. 13.1), in a post-industrial area. It has around 29 thousand square metres of useful floor area and is located in seven buildings, offering rooms of 13 to 245 square metres. This institution hires 42 individuals who provide services to over 160 businesses, most of which based on Polish capital. The Kielce Technology Park is also home to foreign businesses (mainly from Germany, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Scandinavian countries) and puts a strong emphasis on the development of startups that create new products in a risky environment. This entity offers support to young people with ideas for an innovative business. It also provides comprehensive range of advisory services and helps verify business ideas and identify sources of financing. In 2016 and 2017, the most advanced start-ups after a period of incubation (34 companies) were offered a non-refundable grant of up to 800 thousand PLN from the Operational Programme for Eastern Poland (www.technopark.kielce.pl/). The growth of creative knowledge sector is one of contemporary trends in the development of urban space (Florida 2005; Klasik 2009). Knowledge-based activities are currently undergoing intensive development in Kielce, which is now becoming a creative city. It is worth mentioning the implementation of Smart City project based on an integrated approach to planning and management. The project is performed by the City Council in cooperation with the Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce and the Kielce University of Technology with a grant awarded in a competition Human Smart Cities organised by the Ministry of Investments and Development (https:// idea.kielce.eu/). The underlying assumption of this project is to introduce city governance based on standardised and regularly updated data. Residents will participate in the city governance based on jointly developed indicators. Within the framework of this project, an online platform for cooperation with local residents was launched in

13 Globalisation, Social Polarisation and Conflicts in the Urban …

229

Fig. 13.1 Location of selected areas and places in Kielce. 1—Disscussed places: (I—Echo shopping centre, II—Korona shopping centre, III—The market square, IV—The St. Mary square, V— Targi Kielce, VI—The Kielce park of technology); 2—Inner suburbs; 3—Outher suburbs; 4— Sienkiewicza street; 5—Administrative boundary of the city of Kielce; 6—Rivers; 7—Reservoirs; 8—Forests and inner-city parks. Source Author’s own elaboration

2015. The platform is a space for social consultations and for the planning and implementation of participatory budgeting. Shared decision-making by residents and city councillors is conducive to decentralisation of power and promotes innovativeness and entrepreneurship. During the period 2014–2018, funds from the participatory budgeting plan were allocated to the renovation of sports grounds, playgrounds, cycle paths, outdoor gyms and safe pedestrian crossings (117 projektów zgłoszonych do bud˙zetu obywatelskiego w Kielcach). The higher education establishments in Kielce, two of which are most prominent, also play an important role in the development of a creative city. The Kielce University of Technology has been operating since 1975 and now includes the Centre for Laser Technologies of Metals launched in 1996. Another prominent institution is the Jan Kochanowski University established in 2011 as a result of reforme of the

230

S. Sala

local pedagogical academy. The relatively young higher education establishments in Kielce are dynamically developing, especially with the aid of EU funds, but have to face increasing by demographic challenges. Local universities attempt to fill this void by students from abroad, mainly Ukrainians, Belarusians and Kazakhs.

13.3 Post-Socialism, Globalisation and Polarisation of Residential Space There are many conflicts of diversified origins in the post-1990 urban space of Kielce, which have caused to its reorganisation. In a very large extent, changes are influenced by penetration of global patterns of organisation of housing areas. This section presents the types of conflicts which revolve around the relationship between the functioning of old housing estates and gated residential communities, the construction investment and green areas and between the city centre and the periphery.

13.3.1 Gated Communities, Individualisation and Privatisation of Urban Space The new gated estates erected in Kielce according to the trends from the West have been provided to increasing social stratification. Osiedle Południowe residential estate (Fig. 13.2) located on the southern slope of the hill of Dymi´nska Góra is one of the largest gated communities in Kielce, composed of 182 terraced and detached residential buildings. Bilcza 2–121 is another gated estate in Kielce (https:// inwestycje.kielce.pl/echo-investment-osiedle-bilcza-etap2/) which is popular among the wealthy and middle-class residents. The mentioned districts as well as most of the remaining estates of this type (e.g. Zalesie, Podkarczówka, Nowy Folwark) are located in the inner suburbs of Kielce. Recently, the fragmentation and privatisation of the space contributing to the Polish cities have taken place (Jałowiecki 2007) as well as the creation of the so-called ´ ezak-Tazbir 2007) can be also spotted now. ghettos of prosperity (Szczepa´nski and Sl˛ In the post-communist country, such as Poland, the popularity of gated communities can be understood as satisfying the needs for owning the property and “being among people of the same social and economic status”. Such needs in the previous political system could not be fully met. It was the common practice to locate people of different status and cultural background in the same block of flats or in the same residential area (Szczepa´nska 2012). The new forms of urban space arrangement usually become the shelters for middle- and upper-class residents. These residential estates are located at the outskirts of the city or in near out-of-town areas and are erected on the cheapest plots of land so that the developers can make considerable profit. Also, small gated residential estates are located in the city centre in the places where old buildings

13 Globalisation, Social Polarisation and Conflicts in the Urban …

231

Fig. 13.2 Polarisation and privatisation in the urban space of Kielce: a gated community complex (Osiedle Południowe, Dyminy neighbourhood) in the city’s outskirts (top) and “privatised” local street and socialist multi-family residential block fenced in the years of market economy on The Targowa Street (down). Photos S. Sala and V. Mihaylov

232

S. Sala

are demolished. Gated residential estates do not create favourable conditions that would stimulate social life in the urban space; instead, they create many spatial conflicts. Gated housing estates increase the risk of social divisions as they are associated with luxury and prestige for richer and more resourceful people who want to surround themselves people of a similar social and material status. Liaising with neighbours within a fenced-off area helps establish more intimate neighbourhood relations. Unlike traditional forms of residential multi-family housing in Poland, the advantages of gated residential estates include lack of anonymity, higher sense of security and exclusivity and absence of fast vehicle traffic; disadvantages include lack of privacy, limited contact with the outside world, a false sense of security and isolation. The problem of isolation of residents from their neighbours is particularly painful for small children who cannot play with their peers from the neighbouring blocks of flats. Parents often do not allow their children to leave the fenced-off area in order to avoid potential threats. Narrowing the circle of friends has a negative impact on the mental development and specifically on the development of soft skills among these children. This form of residence also entails a lifestyle which involves progressive individualisation and privatisation of behaviours.

13.3.2 Construction Investments as a Source of Local Conflicts The modern multi-storey flat complexes have recently appeared in Kielce. They are certainly most welcome by residents. However, their inappropriate location is most frequently in conflict with nature. The local authorities tend to neglect their duties due to the lack of clear legislation, i.e. precise legal regulations, which do not allow the city council to refuse the implementation of the investments located in flood risk areas. The obvious example appears in case of the modern building constructions along the areas called “Planty” and Kaczmarka Street located within floodplain zones, where, according to the applicable laws, no one is allowed to construct any buildings. Taking into account the less frequent atmospheric precipitation, however, much heavier rainfalls, such buildings are at risk of being flooded. The valley of the Silnica River, which flows through the city centre, is very narrow. Therefore, it is the main reason for the further rise in the water level during the floods. The last cases of flooding took place in 2014, 2016 and 2019 when the streets around the Silnica River were paralysed. The two main roundabouts in the city centre, which deal with the most heavy traffic, were also flooded. Thus, such situation can cause the complete paralysis of the road traffic. Furthermore, bearing in mind the fact that the areas along the Silnica River (Fig. 13.1) are very attractive to developers, and the local authorities have the knowledge of the possible flood waves, they should not issue the written consents to any investments. Additionally, it must be indicated that considering geological aspects of the layer structure of the ground, i.e. the area created during the Holocene Epoch (floodplain), such location is geologically

13 Globalisation, Social Polarisation and Conflicts in the Urban …

233

unstable. Although buildings’ foundations are individually reinforced and structured, buildings are exposed to tectonic shocks that can happen in Kielce. It is caused by the fact that the unstable geological formations intensify the tectonic shock wave. Interestingly, particularly creative are the developers interested primarily in constructing multi-family flat buildings, i.e. the developers, who have been continuously searching for the new areas so as to build multi-family houses (interested in generating the highest profits). Yet the management of the space in Kielce has its specifics. The old downtown is surrounded by the single-family housing residential areas. However, the new residential areas are gathered in the western and northern parts of the city. The developers often decide to construct multi-family buildings in the areas where there are low single-family housing developments. One of the most numerous conflicts seems to appear in Zgórska Street in the Zalesie residential area. In this part of the city, the single-family houses are built on the narrow plots. They are situated very close to the main road (namely, ranging from 6 to 10 m). The local authorities want to force through the road reconstruction project based on its widening in order to considerably increase the road capacity. This would allow to create an easy access to the already planned single-family housing estate located nearby. However, a much better solution is to rely on constructing a totally new road that would go through the planned housing estate in the middle, since no buildings have been constructed there yet. Nevertheless, the local authorities suggest expropriating from 4 to 5 m of the built-up plots, resulting in the fact that the existing buildings would be just next to the main road. Derived from the conversations with the local residents, it can be concluded that the local authorities’ strong suggestion is caused by lobbying of the influential citizens of this area, who want to protect their plots in Zalesie so as to have this new road far away from the planned arterial roads.

13.3.3 Growing Polarisation Between the City Centre and the Periphery There is a clear social and spatial conflict between the city centre and the peripheries. The city has limited public resources and mainly invests in the central area to the disadvantage of more peripheral districts. The contemporary development of Kielce reflects the American model of the Edge City (Garreau 1992) and is under a strong influence of the existing networks of public and private transport. More and more residents leave the city centre and the surrounding housing estates (blocks of flats built from concrete slabs, erected mainly in the period 1960–1980) to live in less urbanised areas. The dynamic development of private transportation has led to the formation of internal and external suburbs. The “bedroom” peripheral districts of Kielce have emerged as a result of urban population relocation from the city centre in search for better living conditions in locations within the administrative boundaries of the city (inner suburbs) or suburban areas (outher suburbs).

234

S. Sala

In the outskirts of the city, there has been an increase in the conflict intensity dealing with the use of the agricultural land for the new housing purposes. More and more new agricultural land is dedicated to the construction development due to the strong urban development pressure. The problem generally involves the areas located in the west and east of the city, where there is a characteristic compact settlement structure of the buildings, i.e. the areas located in the Kielce-Łagów Depression. According to the Polish Spatial Planning and Land Development Act, the agricultural land must be protected; however, the local authorities avoid respecting the applicable regulations. The suburbs of Kielce are situated in two areas of a more or less round shape. The first area is located within the city, near the administrative borders of Kielce (e.g. Zalesie, Dyminy, Ostra Górka, Zagórze, D˛abrowa). The second zone includes the area of Bilcza, Kowala, Zagrody, Zagórze, Zelejowo, Miedziana Góra, Mójcza, Kostomłoty and other rural areas and is located outside the city (Fig. 13.1). Suburbs are at different stages of development. The majority of the suburbs are in their infancy, but there are also well-developed residential districts, such as Kowala, Dyminy, Ostra Górka and D˛abrowa. In the village of Piekoszów, there is a well-developed residential estate adjacent to a newly built shopping centre with popular supermarkets, which adds to the attractiveness of this area. Suburbs provide a striking contrast with old buildings that date back to the Socialist era. An increasing conflict of residents with the municipal authorities is the consequence of the development of suburbs in the course of globalisation. The homes of families who move out of the city are a place to sleep and rest, while family members still work and study in the city. The residents of suburbs continue to use the urban infrastructure and contribute to its faster wear and tear, but are not forced to bear the cost of its maintenance as they pay their taxed in the suburban municipalities, which poses a considerable financial burden on the city budget. On the other hand, it is also argued that suburban families usually work in Kielce, and they do the shopping there and eat in local restaurants and thus make their financial contribution to the city budget.

13.4 Traditional and Contemporary Forms of Retail Locations. Sienkiewicza Street in Kielce Versus New Shopping Centres The development of transnational corporations or, as is the case here, retail companies is one of the main aspects of globalisation. The Echo and Korona shopping malls, both located in Kielce, are home to over 300 and 160 shops, respectively (www. galeriakorona.pl). With the dynamic development of peripheral areas of Kielce in the district of Niewachlów and Czarnów, retail corporation have begun to locate shopping centres in western and north-western part of the city. The establishment of new hypermarkets (8 until 2018) and supermarkets (43 in total) has changed

13 Globalisation, Social Polarisation and Conflicts in the Urban …

235

the structure of retail market in Kielce. Residents have switched from small shops located in housing estates, some of which have gone bankrupt. The structure of large shops has changed. There is a stagnation in the development of hypermarkets and shopping centres, but the number of supermarkets is on the rise. Only during the period between 2014 and 2018, their number rose by over 16% (www.um.kielce.pl). Another conflict is clearly visible in the main pedestrian zone of Kielce, the Sienkiewicza street, commonly referred to as Sienkiewka, where vehicle traffic is banned along the distance of 1300 m (Fig. 13.1). As Radziszewska (2013: 137) pointed out, Sienkiewiczastreet is even more important for the residents than The Market Square. Traditionally, it was and still is the axis of the city concentrating its social and commercial life. The city authorities have made attempts to promote this promenade by staging a series of events under the common denominator of Sienkiewka Revival. The residents of Kielce show little interest in the Sienkiewicza street because of its proximity to two largest shopping centres in Kielce, which are now also used for relaxation and recreation. These shopping malls offer over 252 thousand square metres of space where the local residents can spend their time irrespective of the weather (159 thousand sqm at the Echo shopping centre and 93.5 thousand sqm at the Korona shopping centre) (Galeria Echo website). Hence, the retail structure at the Sienkiewicza street has changed. Academic bookshops have closed because of the rising rents and the wide accessibility to ebooks. Food establishments and small shops have been replaced by banks, currency exchange bureaus and points of sale offering mobile telephones. Revitalisation of the city centre combined with extended opening hours of shops did not produce the desired results. Sienkiewka is no longer a popular place for shopping or leisure. Modern shopping malls have a negative impact on the transformation of the central part, and this trend is also noticeable in other Polish cities. In the case of Katowice, Twardzik (2016) concluded that the competition of modern trade significantly affects the economic condition of enterprises operating in the streets of the centre, systematically depriving them a part of sales revenues. A high rotation of tenants is also visible. Empty, non-rented commercial premises appear more and more often (Fig. 13.3). In similar conditions, local entrepreneurs in Kielce are increasingly disappointed and close their businesses. As part of the city centre revitalisation efforts, vehicle traffic has been restricted, which has also contributed to a drop in consumer interest as it limited access to the promenade for motorised customers. Only one multilevel car park is now being built in the city centre as part of urban investments. As with the majority of contemporary European cities, Kielce suffers from the scarcity of parking spaces. However, it appears that the lack of pubs, cafes or restaurants is one of the main reasons why the local promenade is so unpopular. At this point, it is worth mentioning that, apart from the Polish food establishments, the promenade is home to a variety of dining options serving Italian, Vietnamese, Greek, Turkish or Spanish cuisine, which is a token of progressive internationalisation of Kielce. Despite the diversified foodservice facilities, the food establishments are mainly located near the Sienkiewicza street (side streets, gateways, courtyards), which does not contribute to the revival of the promenade. In general, however, tourists are captivated by the

236

S. Sala

Fig. 13.3 Effects of hypermatysation—crisis in traditional trade in central streets of Kielce: trade places for rent located in: Sienkiewicza street (above) and Du˙za street (three trade objects located about 50 m from Sienkiewicza are seeking for tenants) (below). (Photos V. Mihaylov)

13 Globalisation, Social Polarisation and Conflicts in the Urban …

237

beauty of this street and its architecture; it is beautifully lit in the evening and has many charming places and intimate cafés.

13.5 Disappearing of Green Areas and “cemetification” of Key Public Places. Pro Et Contra ´ aska, Łom˙za, and Białystok), Similar to other Polish cities (e.g. Włocławek, Ruda Sl˛ in Kielce, there is a significant public conflict between those in favour of preserving urban green areas and the local authorities, which, for many years, have seemed to approve of the policy referring to covering many places with concrete. This phenomenon was popularised in the 2000s. Apart from Sienkiewicza Street, The Market Square (Fig. 13.4) as well as the Square of Freedom and the St. Mary’s Square (Fig. 13.5) were covered with granite plates or cement cobblestones to reflect contemporary planning trends, thereby eliminating the existing greenery. The supporters of the new philosophy concerning the particular appearance of the key space elements of the important areas in Kielce rely on the aesthetic coherence of places, which are significant to the public life, and moreover, maintain the modern appearance. However, such attitudes, in many cases, tend to break with the traditional

Fig. 13.4 Market square in Kielce after revitalisation—an example of cementification of urban space. (Photo V. Mihaylov)

238

S. Sala

Fig. 13.5 St. Mary square before (2007–left) and after (2020–right) revitalisation. Photos V. Mihaylov

appearance and its function to which the residents were used to. It must be emphasised that in the case of The Market Square (Rynek), its character was certainly changed during the period of the Second World War. The Germans built a fire water storage tank in the middle of The Market Square which survived until the revitalisation, i.e. till the end of the 2000s. This square seemed to be a place of many contradictory trends that occurred there. On the one hand, the benches situated around the water storage tank encouraged city residents to get some rest and the asphalt alley around this tank encouraged them to walk. On the other hand, there was a very busy roundabout preventing the access to the scarce green area from people. Furthermore, the alcohol abusers seemed to be the main users of this particular place, which further discouraged the city residents from visiting this place. The designers of the revitalised old city, i.e. The Market Square in Kielce support their claims that the modernisation can restore its former function by relating it to the old Gothic market place that still existed at the beginning of the twentieth century. The historical aspect is determined by some symbolic associations. In the middle of The Market Square, the place where the former old town hall was located is marked in a different colour. The stones in other colours, however, demonstrated the previous medieval routes from Kraków to Bodzentyn as well as from Piotrków to Bodzentyn (https://inwestycje.kielce.pl/mzd-kielce-rewitalizacja-srodmiescia-kielc-rynek/). The city squares that have been revitalised in this way are the places suitable for organising public events and concerts. Nevertheless, considering the recent time of the climate crisis, in the summer, such concrete squares can further increase the already high temperature in the city. The creation of the concrete squares is also associated with the economical factor. Namely, the revitalisation projects were realised as a result of co-financing from the relevant EU funds. The revitalisation of The Market Square costs 14 million euro. Over 10 million euros referred to the financial assis´ etokrzyskieVoivodship tance from the Regional Operational Programme for the Swi˛ for the years 2007–2013. The paradox of such policy, however, appears to refer to the money. Specifically, there was money for the investment itself, on the other hand, there was lack of money to maintain the green infrastructure. Consequently,

13 Globalisation, Social Polarisation and Conflicts in the Urban …

239

no money was to contribute to the sphere of looking after the green areas, since they required special activities, such as pruning and fertilising. As happened in Kielce, spending money on maintaining the green areas was avoided by covering the squares and streets with concrete. Residents disapprove of this trend. On the one hand, the concreting of many emblematic streets and squares was intended to make these places more accessible to the residents. On the other hand, however, it has contributed to many negative developments, such as temperature increase in the city, or absence of rainwater runoff into soil and the resulting exposure of lower areas to flooding with precipitation water. In relation to the sociological studies conducted by Piłat–Borcuch and Borcuch (2016), the residents of Kielce specified some of the most significant problems associated with the infrastructure. Specifically, they referred to covering the land with concrete (33%), the limited access to the public health care (27%) and the poor technical condition of the roads (26%). Consistent with the respondents, the improvement and development of the public space in Kielce require the specific accomplishments, among which the most important appeared to be getting rid of concrete surfaces (42%), which most obviously confirm the significance of the analysed problem. Further responses referred to the better access to the public health care (40%), improving the technical conditions of roads (36%), improving the technical conditions of pavements (31%) and the development of cycling routes (27%). The inhabitants are involved in the process of revitalisation in terms of architecture and technical infrastructure. The direct consultations with the residents that were carried out in the first half of the 2000s demonstrated that the majority of people approved of the city renovation. According to the respondents, 92% wanted to reconstruct Sienkiewicza Street, 81% supported the initiative of building a multi-storey car park in the city centre instead of maintaining the green areas, and 65% of people were in favour of building the new football stadium (Kowalik 2004). However, the respondents were not aware of the amount of work that had to be performed and the degree of its interference in the green areas, which were replaced by concrete surfaces. The location of the football stadium in Kielce is also very problematic. Obviously, the football stadium, which increases the prestige of the city (importantly, the first modern football stadium in Poland after the democratic changes), was built too close to the already crowded old town. In Kielce, the green areas are mainly situated along the Silnica River and in the old housing estates surrounding the Old Town Centre—The Market Square. There are also large forest areas in the southern parts of Kielce (Baranowski Park, Park of Culture and Recreation), including sports and recreation sites predating the Second World War (Adamczyk 2014). Apart from the famous cafes, this area also houses an athletics stadium, a football stadium, a large hotel and a sports hall of the handball team Vive Tauron Kielce (winner of the Champions League in 2016). Local developers feel tempted by these valuable nature, sports and recreation areas. Multifamily residential construction is now entering this district. The recent developments in Kielce also include the closure of a locally popular Stangret restaurant, where a multi-family residential building is to be erected.

240

S. Sala

13.6 Conclusion The clash of globalisation with the local conditions of Kielce creates new opportunities for growth and development. As a whole, the city gain from internationalisation and globalisation as the quality of the public space has changed for the better, and the functional and spatial structure has been modernised. Kielce was incorporated in the system of global economy. Transnational corporations operating in Kielce have brought in many positive outcomes, including the influx of capital and modern technologies, revival of the local market or improvements in the work organisation. This study identified the existing spatial conflicts in Kielce in the context of globalisation processes after the fall of the socialist model of spatial planning. Such conflicts have first and foremost “soft” character, and in a high degree, the relations between main subjects are regulated by norms of democratic society. They are directly or indirectly associated with the impact of globalisation, the European integration and the internationalisation of the spatial planning practices. The new trends profoundly impinge on the city structure and have shaped its appearance and functional structure, as well as the spatial habits of inhabitants. Referring to the words of Harvey (2008) cited in the Introduction, Kielce seems to provide individual freedom of access to urban resources. Considering the present conditions of the increased subjectivity and liberalisation of the economy, sometimes conflicting interests are often pursued by the local authorities, entrepreneurs, owners of attractive investment plots and residents of individual neighbourhoods. To be precise, such conflicts tend to occur mainly in the process of preparation of urban planning documents where the parties to the disputes are the institutions responsible for the development, evaluations and the process of agreeing upon the spatial development plans. In combination with local conditions, globalisation contributes directly and indirectly to some negative phenomena, such as social polarisation, tax evasion, profit transfer outside the administrative boundaries of the city and loss of jobs in companies being taken over. Taking into account the specifics of the post-socialist transformation of Kielce, at least several aspects of ongoing conflicts can be distinguished: (1) A progressive division of residential space based on income segregation occurred. This division manifests itself in the ghettoisation through the construction of gated communities. The area of suburbs and closed residential estates generates conflicts between the urban space and the “imprisoned” residents in the relatively small area. The so-called imprisoned residents, on the one hand have difficult contacts with the outside world and, on the other hand, the false sense of security and isolation. (2) The pressure of expanding growth of the urban residential developments on the green areas appears as the common phenomenon. Considering the interests of the local businesses, the green areas are often limited. Despite the legal protection of such green areas, the business does everything to ignore the national legislation or misinterpret the existing regulations.

13 Globalisation, Social Polarisation and Conflicts in the Urban …

241

(3) A spatial redistribution is observed in the sphere of consumption between globalised and local forms of trade. Because of changed spatial set of consumption behaviour of citizens, the collapse of small retail businesses and traditional shops in the Sienkiewicza street and the near streets was replaced by network commerce, mainly by big shopping centres located close to the very centre of the city. (4) The revitalisation of the main street of the city and dedicating it only to the pedestrians caused many problems not only to the drivers (disturbance in the range of driving and significant obstruction to the traffic in the old city), but also for small businesses. In the range of the revitalisation, covering of the main squares with concrete surfaces significantly reduced the occurrence of the green areas. Moreover, covering the surfaces with concrete has a negative impact not only on water circulation systems, but it also raises the temperature to a dangerous extent especially for the older people.

References Adamczyk JL (ed) (2014) Kielce przez stulecia. Jedno´sc´ , Kielce Bauman Z (1996) O ładzie co niszczy i chaosie, który tworzy, czyli o polityce przestrzeni miejskiej. Kultura i Społecze´nstwo XI (4) Castells M (1989) The informational city. Information technology, economic restructuring and the urban—regional process. Oxford: Basic Blackwell Publishers Czerny M (2005) Globalizacja a rozwój. Wybrane zagadnienia z geografii społeczno-gospodarczej s´wiata. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa Czerny M, Łuczak R, Makowski J (2007) Globalistyka. Procesy globalne i ich lokalne konsekwencje. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa Florida R (2005) Cities and the creative class. Routledge, New York, London. https://doi.org/10. 4324/9780203997673 Galeria Echo website. www.galeriaecho.pl/. Accessed 21 Jan 2020 Garreau J (1992) Edge city: life on the new frontier. Anchor Books, New York Grochowska A (2015) Konflikty przestrzenne w procesie planowania na przykładzie gmin powiatu trzebnickiego. Studia Miejskie 20:179–189 Hall P (2000) Creative cities and economic development. Urban Stud 37(4):639–649. https://doi. org/10.1080/00420980050003946 Harvey D (1990) The condition of postmodernity: an enquiry into the origins of cultural change. Blackwell, Cambridge, MA Harvey D (2008) Right to the city. New Left Rev II 53:23–40 Jałowiecki B (2007) Fragmentacja i prywatyzacja przestrzeni. In: Jałowiecki B, Łukowski W (eds) Gettoizacja polskiej przestrzeni miejskiej. Scholar, Academica, Warszawa, pp 11–28 Klasik A (ed) (2009) Kreatywne miasto—kreatywna aglomeracja. Wydawnictwo UE w Katowicach, Katowice Kochanowska D, Kochanowski M (2000) Polskie miasta w procesie globalizacji. Studia Regionalne i Lokalne 1:47–53 Kowalik J (2004) Raport z konsultacji programu rewitalizacji miasta z mieszka´ncami. Fundacja Rozwoju Demokracji Lokalnej, Urz˛ad Miasta Kielce, Kielce Kukli´nski A, Kołodziejski J, Markowski T, Dziemianowicz W (red.) (2000) Globalizacja polskich metropolii. Europejski Instytut Rozwoju Regionalnego i Lokalnego: Warszawa

242

S. Sala

McLuhan M (1962) The gutenberg Galaxy: the making of typographic man. University of Toronto Press, Toronto Parysek J (2005) Miasta polskie na przełomie XX i XXI wieku. Rozwój a przekształcenia strukturalne. Bogucki Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Pozna´n Piłat-Borcuch M, Borcuch A (2016) Sytuacja społeczno-gospodarcza Kielc w kontek´scie problemów i potrzeb mieszka´nców. Raport z bada´n ankietowych. Kielce: Fundacja „PEStka” Radziszewska JZ (2013) To˙zsamo´sc´ miasta w kontek´scie przemian politycznych, ekonomicznych i społecznych we współczesnej Polsce. Przypadek Kielc. Kwartalnik Kolegium EkonomicznoSpołecznego “Studia i Prace” 3(15):125–146 Robertson R (1992) Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture, London Sala S (2006) Procesy globalizacji a obszary metropolitalne. In: Makieła Z, Fedan R (eds) Rzeszowski i Krakowski obszar metropolitalny. Kraków. pp 27–42 Sala S (2008) Wybrane problemy metodologiczne bada´n procesów globalizacji. In: Zioło Z, Rachwał T (eds) Problematyka badawcza geografii przemysłu, Prace Komisji Geografii Przemysłu PTG, 11. Warszawa-Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe AP. pp 107–115 Sala S (2014) Procesy globalizacji istota i geograficzne implikacje. Instytut Geografii UJK w Kielcach, Kielce ´ Szczepa´nska M (2012) Osiedla grodzone: Swiadomo´ sciowe aspekty podziałów społecznoprzestrzennych i wi˛ez´ s˛asiedzka. Przestrze´n Społeczna/Social Space 1:102–125 ´ ezak-Tazbir W (2007) Mi˛edzy l˛ekiem a podziwem: getta społeczne w starym Szczepa´nski M, Sl˛ regionie przemysłowym. In: Jałowiecki B, Łukowski W (eds) Gettoizacja polskiej przestrzeni miejskiej. Warszawa: Scholar The Kielce fair trade website. www.targikielce.pl/o-firmie/historia. Accessed: 21 Feb 2020 The official website of the city of Kielce. www.um.kielce.pl. Accessed: 21 Jan 2020 Tkaczyk P (2003) Kielce historia, kultura, sztuka. Jedno´sc´ , Kielce Tobiasz-Lis P (2010) Osiedla grodzone w Łodzi form˛a dezintegracji terytorialnego systemu społecznego miasta. In: Suliborski A, Przygodzki Z (eds) Łódzka metropolia. Problemy integracji społecznej i przestrzennej. Łód´z: Wydawnictwo Biblioteka. pp. 23–40 Twardzik M (2016) Oddziaływanie galerii handlowych na s´ródmiejskie ulice handlowe Katowic. Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Geographica Socio-Oeconomica 23:67–85 Wdowicka M (2012) Miasta w dobie globalizacji: korporacje transnarodowe w polskich miastach a dost˛epno´sc´ nowoczesnej przestrzeni dla biznesu. Studia Miejskie 5:105–113 Zborowski A (2001) Procesy globalizacji w mie´scie postsocjalistycznym. In: Ja˙zd˙zewska I (ed) Miasto postsocjalistyczne: organizacja przestrzeni miejskiej i jej przemiany: XIV Konwersatorium Wiedzy o Mie´scie, cz.2. Łód´z: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe. pp. 94–106 117 projektów zgłoszonych do bud˙zetu obywatelskiego w Kielcach. www.portalsamorzadowy.pl/ prawo-i-finanse/117-projektow-zgloszonych-do-budzetu-obywatelskiego-w-kielcach,131156. html. Accessed: 21 Jan 2020. https://idea.kielce.eu/. Accessed: 20 Jan 2020 www.inwestycje.kielce.pl/echo-investment-osiedle-bilcza-etap2/. Accessed: 20 Jan 2020 www.portalsamorzadowy.pl/prawo-i-finanse/117-projektow-zgloszonych-do-budzetu-obywatels kiego-w-kielcach,131156.html. Accessed: 20 Jan 2020

Stanisław Sala Ph.D., employed in the Institute of Geography and Environment at the Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Poland. He is particularly interested in globalisation and its social and economic consequences, regional and political geography. The author of more than 60 scientific articles and two monographs (Globalisation processes. Essence and geographical implications and Consequences of globalisation processes).

Chapter 14

Conclusion Valentin Mihaylov

Abstract Based on the results of twelve case studies on divided and contested cities in post-socialist countries, the chapter presents some general trends and perspectives highlighting the chief conceptual contribution of the volume. Urban spaces in EastCentral Europe host diverse paths of spatial confrontation and fragmentation differ in terms of intensity, depth and lasting. Obtained results concern conflicts in ethnically and/or geopolitically cities as well as cultural, social and economic conflicts and divisions in cities and neighbourhoods which are rather not endangered by political disintegration. Despite many East-Central European cities face obstacles in their road to return to normal and regular urban spaces, examples of successful cooperation of cities divided by a state border testify that optimistic scenario is also possible. In concluding part, some general findings concerning the complex nature contested urban spaces are drawn by the author. It is also underlined that further research in this domain could contribute not only to a better understanding of the causes and state of conflicts and divisions, but also to delineate the ways of dialogue and possible conflict resolution. Keywords Urban conflicts · Divided cities · Soft reintegration · Conflict resolution Conflicts and divisions are inherent in the contemporary development of cities, especially post-socialist ones. They occur between economic entities as well as social, ideological, and ethnic groups and may be formal or informal, more or less articulated in the public space. The conflicts can be rooted in relations of local stakeholders, while in other cases, they also involve national or international actors. In terms of the intensity of spatial disputes, cities are divided into “regular” and extraordinary ones with far-reaching conflicts, balancing on the red line of war and peace. The research problems undertaken in the book and the case studies carried out show the typological diversity of conflicts in post-socialist cities in East-Central Europe. The inherited socio-spatial structures of each city are directly linked to the V. Mihaylov (B) Institute of Social and Economic Geography and Spatial Organisation, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Silesia in Katowice, Sosnowiec, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3_14

243

244

V. Mihaylov

political and cultural past and to the individual path of transformation. In some cases, this path led to conflicts and new divisions (Vukovar, Mostar, Kosovska Mitrovica), while in others, it led to alleviation of old antagonisms and effective cooperation (towns at the Polish-German borderland). The case studies presented in this monograph show how diverse the space of post-socialist cities is in terms of divisions and conflicts. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, everyone spoke with enthusiasm about the unification of Europe. The reunification of a divided Berlin became a symbol of this historical process. Paradoxically, however, during the process of European integration, globalisation, and increased cooperation, the number of politically divided cities increased, especially in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The combination of old and new challenges for post-socialist urban communities requires new insights and attempts to define ongoing processes in spatial differences, conflicts, and divisions. Regarding the future of conflicts in ethnically and/or geopolitically divided cities, results of the authors’ studies imply both optimistic and pessimistic views of their possible evolution. In divided Mostar, an imperfect state of affairs has been achieved. It is accompanied by political defects and social limitations, both hindering economic development. A deeper historical perspective to ˇ Cieszyn and Ceský Tˇešín, presented in the chapter by Jerzy Runge and Anna Runge, shows how far-reaching positive changes in the relations of divided urban communities can be. On the one hand, the authors’ model of the evolution of divided towns with the regional environment to which this once united city was strongly connected presents the weakening of these ties after the introduction of a state border. On the other hand, the general trends in the evolution of these settlements give rise to hopes and optimistic assumptions about the future of cities that were divided during the Yugoslav wars or in the Donbass conflict. The inhabitants of such cities in Central Europe have experienced a soft reintegration after many decades, thanks to the integration into the European Union. It is not out of the question that cities divided in the former Yugoslavia will follow the same path. However, as the results of the research presented by contributors have shown, there remains not only the very complicated geopolitical situation as a serious obstacle to reconciliation, but also confrontational thinking and a lack of willingness to make serious concessions and compromises by the questioned parties. The lack of a strong EU policy and lack of clear perspective towards membership of the Western Balkan countries will postpone the resolution of deep conflicts not only on a national and regional scale, but within divided cities as well. In particular, this concerns the case of Mostar with its almost hopeless conditions of “permanent temporality” and “permanent urban transition”. Since divided and contested cities and urban spaces engage also external actors, some authors have also pointed out the role of supra-local factors and the importance of cities for the stability of larger spatial units and even international relations (cases of Kosovska Mitrovica, Vukovar, Mostar, and Skopje). For instance, the internationalisation of socio-political and cultural life of Mostar is impacted not only by the government in Sarajevo and the High Representative of the international community for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also by separate states and cultural and religious organisations with specific interests in the city.

14 Conclusion

245

By introducing a new definition of urban geopolitics, Valentin Mihaylov suggests that the combination of the terms “geo” and “politics” does not necessarily mean that relations between geopolitical actors on a global or local scale must be based on rivalries, battles, and striving to fight opponents. Despite the continuing importance of Realpolitik among analysts and national strategists, models of dialogue and cooperation are not completely unknown in geopolitical history, particularly between EU countries. Without the geopolitics of cooperation and dialogue, peace would also be impossible in divided cities, i.e. in the case of Cieszyn or the towns on the PolishGerman border. However, this peace is often forced and achieved thanks to mediation by third parties. Since the scale of conflict-related issues in East-Central Europe after the breakup of socialism has increased significantly, the research results obtained not only can inspire further theoretical and empirical studies on conflicts and divisions in urban spaces, but may also be of importance for practice. The majority of cities and towns in this region have managed to take the path of peace transformation and socio-economic modernisation, so the sharp divisions are fortunately not the main developmental trend. However, the trajectory of relations among some nations highly depends on their further coexistence in contested urban spaces. The last concerns the relations of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovska Mitrovica, Croats and Serbs in Vukovar, Bosniaks and Croats in Mostar, and Ukrainians and Russians in urban spaces of Donbass. In relations between different social groups in the urban space, various conflicts arise about access to specific places as well as decisions regarding their development or re-evaluation of their ideological/cultural purpose. Such phenomena accompany the development of contemporary cities in the world and in Europe too, especially in post-socialist countries which went through or are still undergoing political and economic transformation, in addition to the conditions of globalisation and European integration. The fallen communist ideology created an ideological vacuum which was reflected in the architecture and organisation of public spaces, but it was quickly and spontaneously filled with new values and meanings. This process and its consequences are accompanied by a clash of different opinions and visions for treating the disputed heritage, as shown by the cases of Vukovar, Mostar, Lviv, or Vinnytsia. Postsocialist cities have become an arena of uncontrolled globalisation, revived private initiative, privatisation, and the return of ethnic/nationalist and religious accents in public spaces and places. In his contribution, Mirek Dymitrow emphasises how the imagined national identity significantly affects not only the appearance of the central, representative space of the capital city, but also of the entire modern Macedonian state. By application of the concept of cultural atavism, Mirek Dymitrow makes an important contribution to the debate on spatial conflicts that occur as a consequence of constructivist politics of national identity. On the example of Vinnytsia, Oleksiy Gnatiuk and Anatoliy Melnychuk prove that transformation of symbolic space of some cities in the post-Soviet period reflected an attempt to create comfortable urban environment rather than ideological reorientation. But the situation with treating the cultural heritage in postSoviet societies and its re-evaluation may be more complex. Based on their results obtained from the conducted sociological survey in Lviv, Natalia Otrishchenko and

246

V. Mihaylov

Inga Kozlova argue that cities with a rich multicultural past are characterised by latent conflict of various ideological, political, and national interpretations of the value of various spaces and places. Unfortunately, the ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine has continued to expand the list of divided urban spaces in East-Central Europe. The cases of Kosovska Mitrovica, Vukovar, Mostar, and divided towns on Ukrainian-Russian borderland are presented as examples of ethnopolitical communities divided by formal physical borders or by invisible lines of exclusion. Despite relative political stabilisation (as in the case of Vukovar) attempts to return these cities and towns to the category of “normal” and “regular” meet many obstacles. While Mostar is in a phase of cold peace, the residents of Milove, Chertkovo, Zolote and other fault-line cities and towns find themselves in the centre of turbulence of continuing warm conflict in Donbass. In addition to the practices of forcible expulsion and creation of ethnically pure neighbourhoods in war and post-conflict transition, East-Central European cities have become an arena for two growing types of spatial segregation related to the (self-) isolation of both rich and poor social groups. The new social contrasts are a direct effect of income stratification in the post-socialist period. This trend is reflected in divisions and the formation of large urban areas of exclusion. On the one hand, gated communities have emerged. Stanisław Sala discusses both the positive and negative social consequences of these communities through the example of Kielce. On the other hand, the conflicts around infrastructure shortage, housing conditions, and overall physical appearance of areas with a high concentration of poverty and social exclusion have deepened. Zlata Vuksanovi´c-Macura discusses this problem with the example of Roma settlements in selected Serbian cities. There are residents and social movements who oppose discrimination of this ethnic group. Yet, the problem is too deep to easily solve in the near future and requires huge political, economic, and social resources. The Students’ City of Sofia is one rather unusual example of a legal, planning, architectural, and functional chaos which caused multidimensional conflicts and irreversible changes in the urban landscape during the transition period. An informal division between divided and common cities in the scientific literature can lead to misleading conclusions. Cities divided by a state border have gone through an uneasy, multi-stage path to soft reintegration. Although the current period of turbulent global change means there is no guarantee that these borders will forever remain only a formal remnant of old geopolitical confrontation, residents on both sides of the dividing line can move around freely as well as shop, work, or visit recreation sites in the neighbouring city. In turn, in many regular, culturally homogeneous cities, as in the case of Kielce, there are more substantial social and physical borderlines. In addition to the new gated communities for richer residents, the process of spatial segregation has even included former socialist housing estates. Their residents are separated in order to increase safety or secure access to parking spaces from “outsiders”. An interesting topic is undoubtedly the further evolution of the conflict between modern shopping malls and traditional small trade in city centres, which Stanisław Sala explores. Their revitalisation and gentrification through refreshing the physical appearance of city districts does not always contribute to deep social changes

14 Conclusion

247

primarily having an external effect. Paradoxically, however, Kielce’s commercial life is experiencing a period of stagnation. At this stage, it is impossible to predict the exact development of the situation. Nevertheless, changes are taking place in the spatial culture of consumers, but their impact on resolving the conflict between large scale, globalised trade and small shops in city centres is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. To conclude, some general findings can be drawn regarding the development of scientific thought to date on conflicts and divisions in cities and the diagnoses made by the contributors of their occurrence in selected post-socialist urban spaces: (1) All cities are spatially divided into administrative districts, representative zones, cultural-historical, industrial, service, and commercial areas, and so on. (2) Not every city, even those clearly divided into two or more parts (e.g. separated by a river), hosts significant conflicts and socio-spatial antagonisms. (3) Not every city with a clear social or ideological division is accompanied by corresponding spatial divisions, e.g. lack of clearly marked ethnic or culturalhistorical districts related to the material heritage of a nation or a religious community. (4) Not all cities are divided between state entities or ethnopolitical communities. (5) All geopolitically divided cities are the result of deep conflicts and historical antagonisms, but some of these communities have managed to achieve reconciliation and soft reintegration. (6) In some “regular” and “ordinary” cities which are geopolitically homogeneous and which are not threatened by disintegration, there are islands of conflicts that can be more intense than those in cities that have entered the academic canon of divided and contested cities. (7) Contested and divided cities are concepts applied chiefly to city space as a whole. In many cases, however, smaller units such as districts, neighbourhoods, or other formal or informal spatial units may be an arena of the coexistence of conflicted social groups, ethnic exclusion, poverty, or (auto)segregation of richer inhabitants. Hence, the entire city in which they are located is not considered contested or divided. All of the above outlined features of conflicts and divisions are universal in nature and can be taken into account in research beyond that of post-socialist cities. However, as the original studies collected in this volume have shown, urban spaces in EastCentral Europe have a very high research and application potential. The editor hopes that more researchers of post-socialist cities will address these issues in the future. This could contribute not only to a better understanding of the causes and state of

248

V. Mihaylov

conflicts and divisions, but also to their further problematisation and systematisation. What is undoubtedly meaningful is that such research can also push forward the development of solutions to resolve conflicts and, most importantly, to make contested urban spaces into more people-friendly places.

Index

A Accession of Central European countries to the EU, 29 Africa, 45, 53, 158 Agrarian colonisation, 118 Albanian majority, 12, 57, 59, 60, 69 Albanians, 12, 57–60, 62–66, 68, 69, 134, 138, 141, 145, 146, 220, 245 Aleksa Šanti´c Street, 94 Alexander the Great, 135, 139, 144 “Alexander the Great”, airport, 144 Antagonisms -historical, 247 -socio-spatial, 247 Antena, 220 Antiquisation, 135 “Antiquisation” policy, 135 Archaeology, 155 Architecture, 76, 83, 135, 136, 138, 155, 156, 160, 165, 183, 197, 198, 237, 239, 245 Armed conflict, 5, 8, 9, 13, 14, 25, 75, 79, 111, 112, 246 Armed opposition, 120 Armenians, 152, 214 Ashdown, Paddy, 101 Asia, 45 Athens, 137 Austria, 13, 25, 45 Austria-Hungary, 93, 159 Austro-Hungarian Empire, 25 Auto-segregation, 247

B Bad Muskau, 11, 42, 46, 50, 53, 54 Balkanisation, 9

Balkans, 59, 69, 70, 91, 98, 131, 132, 136, 158, 193, 201, 211, 212, 214, 220, 244 Banja Luka, 95, 96, 108 Baranja, 78 Baranowski Park, 239 Battle of Vukovar, 77 Beatlemania, 182, 183 Beatles, 182, 183 Beirut, 92 Belfast, 92 Belgrade, 10, 14, 59, 61, 62, 70, 108, 211, 218, 220, 221 Bielsko, 25 Bilingual education, 80 Boguszowice, 36 Bohumín, 25 Border crossing, 36, 44, 64 Border-crossing cities, 7 Border function, 29, 36 Borderland, 2, 5, 7, 8, 11, 31, 48, 49, 114, 246 Border towns, 12, 23, 30, 42–44, 48, 49, 123 Border traffic, 27, 29, 44, 49 Bosnia and Hezregowina, 5, 8, 12, 58, 84, 86, 91, 93–98, 100–102, 104–107, 244 Bosniaks, 63, 65, 84, 91, 93–96, 100, 101, 107, 245 Brandenburg, 44 Br´cko district, 98 Brno, 29 Brussels Agreement, 12, 57 Budapest, 5, 228 Bulevar, 94 - street, 93 Bulgaria, 14, 133, 192–194, 199–202, 208, 212

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 V. Mihaylov (ed.), Spatial Conflicts and Divisions in Post-socialist Cities, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61765-3

249

250 Bulgarians, 133, 140, 146, 191–194, 199, 201, 203, 207, 208

C Castells, Manuel, 32, 57, 226 Castle Hill, 32, 33 Catholicism, 33, 141 Cementification, 225, 227, 237 Central and Eastern Europe, 28, 36, 42, 227, 228 Central and Eastern European urban spaces, 10 Central Europe, 24, 33, 244 Central Luhansk agglomeration, 119 ˇ Ceské Budˇejovice, 9 ˇ Ceský T˘ešín, 23, 25–27, 29–36 Chertkovo, 12, 111–115, 118, 124, 246 Cieszyn, 11, 23–25, 27, 29–36, 244, 245 Cieszyn Silesia, 23–27, 29–31, 33, 34, 36 Cieszyn Silesia Euroregion, 29, 36 Ciganmala, 214 Cities of splendor, 146 Civilisational cross-roads, 2 Civil society, 10, 70, 125 Coal industry, 118 Cold peace, 106, 107, 246 Collectivisation, 113 Communal property, 122 Communism, 2, 3, 11, 44, 169, 180, 207, 227 Communist guerilla, 103 Communist Party, 177 Communist regime, 183 Communist toponymy, 174 Confrontation -armed confrontation, 111, 112, 124 -bloody confrontation, 124 -domestic confrontation, 124 -geopolitical confrontation, 106, 246 -inter-denominational confrontation, 178 Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, 76, 80, 81 Constructivist politics of national identity, 245 Contested cities, 4–6, 11, 13, 92, 152, 244, 247 Conventional frontier, 118 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 27 Counter-Reformation, 33 Croatia, 8, 75–81, 84–86, 88, 89, 96–98, 105, 107 Croatian Defence Council, 93, 104, 105

Index Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), 98 Croatian soft belly, 77 Croats, 12, 77, 79, 84–87, 91, 93–98, 100– 103, 107, 108, 245 Cross-border towns, 23 Cross-border traffic, 31 Creative city, 227–229 ˇ Cukatiˇ cka šuma, 220 Cultural heritage, 53, 141, 151, 153–159, 161, 163, 164, 166, 167, 245 Cultural-historical districts, 247 Cultural institutions, 63, 98, 154, 158, 164 Cultural milieu, 151, 154, 156, 161, 167, 168 Cultural space, 33, 155, 174 Cyprus, 5 Cyrillic - alphabet, 76 - script, 81 - signs, 81, 82, 86 - versions, 82 Czarnów, 234 Czechoslovakia, 23–27, 33 Czech Republic, 25, 36 Czechs, 9, 23, 25–27, 29, 31–36 Czech-Slovak border, 25 D Daily spatial experiences, 164 Dayton Accords, 98 “De-antiquisation”, 144 Decolonisation of memory, 158, 159, 161 Decommunisation, 9, 117, 151, 160, 161, 172–175, 178–180, 182 Democracy - neoliberal, 101 - parliamentary, 133 Demographic and political asymmetry, 91, 93 Demographic crisis, 4 Demographic growth, 192 Demographic processes, 34, 41, 47 Demographic situation, 41, 45, 52 Demography, 14 Depopulation, 31, 34–36, 45, 79, 87, 118 Depopulation and demographic ageing, 34 Dialogue, 12, 70, 91, 98, 104, 106, 125, 155, 175, 245 Discrimination, 58, 94, 211, 218, 221, 246 Divided cities, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 53, 57, 58, 64, 69, 76, 79, 81, 83, 87, 92, 96, 97, 102, 103, 112, 125, 244, 245, 247 Divided towns, 11, 25, 27, 41, 42, 44–50, 53, 54, 125, 244, 246

Index Donbas, 8, 12, 13, 111–114, 117–120, 122– 125, 128, 182, 244–246 Donbas military conflict, 174 Donetsk, 8, 111, 113, 118–120 Donetsk Coal Bassin, 118 Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), 111, 120, 121, 124 Donetsk region, 113, 118, 119 Donji Suvi Do, 61 Don River, 118 Downtown, 196, 207, 233 Drug trafficking, 5 Dual cities, 57 Dubrovnik, 10 Duchy of Cieszyn, 25

E East-Central Europe, 1–4, 7, 9–11, 14, 243, 245–247 East-Central European cities, 3, 246 Eastern Croatia, 75, 77, 80 Eastern Europe, 14, 152, 158 Eastern Slavonia, 77–79 East (Serbian) Sarajevo, 8 Economic crisis, 114 Edge City, 233 Emigration, 29, 207 Epistemic warrant, 146, 147 Erdut Agreement, 78, 80 Ersatz-antiquisation project, 142 Ethnic minorities, 26, 133, 220 Ethnic nationalism, 96, 103 Ethnic segregation, 9, 107, 215 Ethnology, 155 Ethnopolitical communities, 246, 247 Ethnoterritorial divisions, 93, 104, 105 Ethnopsychological division, 64 Eurocities, 53 Euromaidan, 171–176, 179, 186 Euromaidan Revolution, 171–174, 176, 179, 186 Europe, 6, 7, 11, 13, 31, 44, 45, 48, 53, 58, 68, 98, 104, 112, 142, 144, 152, 159, 169, 174, 178, 214, 215, 221, 227, 228, 244, 245 European city, 174, 179, 201, 235 European Garden, 178 European integration, 1, 8, 10, 240, 244, 245 Europeanisation, 174, 214 European Square, 178–182 European Union, 27, 36, 42, 44, 98, 133, 178, 228, 244

251 European Union Administration of Mostar, The, 98 Europe Day, 173, 174 Everyday life, 8, 12, 75, 76, 83, 85, 87, 92, 94, 170 Exclaves of memories, 85 Ex-Soviet space, 8 Ex-Yugoslav republic, 69, 93 Ex-Yugoslav space, 6 F Fault-line cities, 5, 58, 183, 246 Federalisation, 120 Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 95, 97 First World War, 7, 24, 27, 33, 172, 180 Forced migration, 95, 152 Frankfurt (Oder), 11, 42, 45–48, 50–54 Freedom, 29, 50, 193, 226, 237, 240 Frontier, 78, 111, 113, 114 Frontier town, 113 Frontier zone, 113 Frýdek, 25 Full employment, 4 G Gated communities, 192, 227, 230, 231, 240, 246 Gated estates, 230 Gentrification, 246 Geographical location, 3, 80, 82, 85, 86, 114 Geopolitical approach, 93 Geopolitical frontier, 172 Geopolitics, 6, 8, 12, 89, 91, 92, 97, 100, 104, 106–108, 245 German-Austrian border, 25 Germans, 25, 26, 28, 33, 34, 41, 44, 45, 47–51, 53, 117, 152, 162, 238 German state, 11, 44, 45 German towns, 41, 47, 49, 51, 53 Germany, 42, 44–48, 53, 124, 228 Ghettoisation, 93, 215, 240 Girske, 119 Globalisation, 1, 4, 10, 13, 14, 225–227, 230, 234, 240, 244, 245 Görlitz, 11, 42, 45–48, 50, 54 Gornji Suvi Do, 61 Grassroots memorialisation, 164 Grassroots movements, 9 Greater Serbia, 77 Greece, 133, 136, 143, 144 Greek culture, 133

252 Greeks, 133, 140, 144, 146, 161, 214, 235 Green areas, 9, 61, 178, 206, 207, 230, 237–241 Green public spaces, 66 Green system, 199 “Grey zone”, 111, 121, 123, 124 Groysman, Volodymyr, 172, 184, 185 Guben, 11, 42, 45, 46, 50, 53, 54 Gubien, 54 Gubin, 11, 42, 46, 50, 51, 53, 54 H Havana, 137 Henri Lefebvre’s spatial triad, 153 Herzeg-Bosnia, 93, 100 High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 101 Holocaust, 152 Homelessness, 222 Housing, 6, 9, 75, 76, 83, 122, 191, 192, 199, 200, 208, 211–214, 218, 220, 221, 230, 232, 234 Housing conditions, 29, 215, 220, 246 Housing estates, 10, 29, 202, 204, 225, 230, 232, 233, 235, 239, 246 Human rights organisations, 218 Hum Hill, 102, 103 Hypermatysation, 236 I Ibar River, 57, 59, 60, 62, 65, 68–70 Identity -Donbas regional, 114 -ethnic and national, 13, 80, 102, 132, 146, 175, 183, 185 -local, 36 -local urban, 172, 175, 182, 183, 186 -Macedonian, 13, 133, 136, 145 -place, 183 -pluralistic, 106 -regional, 33, 34, 114, 175 -religious, 93, 102 -Ukrainian, 124 Imagined national identity, 245 Immigration, 45, 49, 53 Immigration influx, 28 Imperial Road, 25 ‘Imprisoned’ residents, 240 Independent cities, 8, 36, 69 Independent State of Croatia, 93, 104 Individualisation, 230, 232 Industrialisation, 118, 119, 194

Index Industry, 3, 26, 27, 49, 118, 119, 154, 156, 163, 165, 167, 194, 196, 228 Inequalities, 4, 53, 59, 142, 212, 227 Infrastructure -communal, 212, 218, 220 -cultural, 158, 164 -health, 203 -parking, 197 -poor, 192, 198 -public, 197, 202, 206, 207 -road, 123, 199 -social, 122 -technical, 2, 29, 32, 36, 191, 194, 239 -transport, 32, 198 -urban, 49, 50, 202, 234 Inherited defects, 197 Institutional crisis, 197 Integrated approach, 228 Interdisciplinary research on urban space, 2 Inter-ethnic -communication, 80 -conflicts, 58 -relations, 9 -tensions, 5 Internal geopolitics, 92 Internationalisation, 13, 14, 91, 93, 97, 108, 226, 235, 240, 244 International organisations, 6, 64, 102 International relations, 6, 88, 244 International tourism, 6 Istanbul, 5, 201 J Jablonec nad Nisou, 9 Jerusalem, 92 Jewish cemetery, 33, 36, 162 Jewish heritage, 153 Jewish people, 25 Jews, 25, 28, 33, 152 Judaism, 33 K “Karbonit”, mine, 119 Karlovac, 77 Kielce, 13, 14, 225, 227–240, 246, 247 Knowledge-based industries, 3 Komyshevakha, 119 Komárno, 7 Komárom, 7 Kopaonik Mountain, 59 Kosovo, 5, 12, 57, 59, 62–66, 68–70, 106, 107, 133, 141, 212

Index Kosovo and Metohija, 58, 59, 61, 65, 66, 69 Kosovo Liberation Army, 58, 62, 64, 65 Kosovska Mitrovica, 8, 11, 12, 57–66, 68– 70, 76, 244–246 Kozytsky Square, 178 Kraljevo, 14, 59, 66 Kruševac, 68, 211, 218, 219 Kyiv, 152, 176, 228

L Labour market - local, 34 Land use, 204, 219 Language skills, 49 Law on Education in the Language and Script of National Minorities, 80 Law on the Structure of the Territory, 191, 197 Lebanon, 5 Lefebvre, Henri, 151–154, 164, 168 Ł˛eknica, 11, 42, 46, 53 Lenin, 117, 182, 183 Leskovac, 220 Ljušta, 59 Local communities, 5, 8, 10, 12, 33, 86, 87 Local geopolitics, 92 Lower Silesia Province, 44 Low-skilled economic migrants, 49 Lubusz Province, 44 Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR), 111, 116, 120–124 Luhansk, 8, 116, 118–120 Luhansk region, 113, 114, 116, 119, 120, 122, 123 Lusatian Neisse, 42, 48 Lviv, 13, 25, 128, 151–159, 161, 162, 164, 165, 167–170, 245 Lysychansk, 113, 122

M Macedonia, 107, 132–138, 140–146 Macedonian Orthodox Church, 146 Macedonian resistance, 140 Macedonians, 133–136, 138, 140–142, 144– 146, 245 Mariivka, 119 Market economy, 4, 10, 14, 101, 195, 226, 231 Market Square, Cieszyn, 32 Market Square, Kielce, 237–239 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 44

253 Memorial House of Mother Teresa, 138, 140, 141 Memory policy, 172 Microgeopolitics, 92 Migration, 27, 29, 33, 35, 36, 45, 69, 89, 95, 96, 114, 152, 192, 194, 196 Migration balance, 35, 41, 47 Migration outflow, 35 Migration turnover, 29 Milove, 8, 12, 111–118, 124, 125, 246 Mining, 27, 36, 59, 68, 119, 121, 203 Mining towns, 111, 112, 118, 119, 123 Minsk Agreement, 120 Modernisation, 8, 13, 125, 214, 226, 227, 238, 245 Montenegro, 68 Monuments, 29, 58, 64, 76, 80, 85, 86, 98, 102, 104, 117, 136, 138–141, 144, 154–156, 160, 162, 173, 179, 182–185 Moravia, 25, 29, 36 Moravians, 33, 34 Moravian-Silesian region, 27 Moscow, 152, 183 Mostar, 8, 12, 70, 76, 91–108, 244–246 Mother Teresa, 140, 141, 144 Mueknica, 54 Multicultural city, 1, 93, 106, 157 Multicultural heritage, 12, 13 Multiculturalism, 75, 79, 96 Multicultural past, 13, 36, 246 Multi-family -blocks, 207, 231 -buildings, 196, 199, 200, 233 -flat buildings, 233 -houses, 233 -residential block, 207, 231 -residential construction, 239 -residential, prefabricated buildings, 195 Multinational and multi-religious cities, 9 Multinational states, 2, 4, 8, 94, 102, 107 Multi-stakeholder geopolitics, 91, 96 Museum of Macedonian Struggle, 137, 140 Muslim cemetery, 65–67

N National homogenisation, 8, 95 Nationalism, 14, 95, 104, 136, 140, 145 National Security Service, 120 Nazi Germany, 93 Nazi occupation, 27, 152 Neoliberal globalisation, 4

254 New Bridge, Kosovska Mitrovica, 64 Nicosia, 92 Niewachlów, 234 Niš, 59 Normandy Format summit, 124 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 58, 64, 133, 136, 145 North Macedonia, 13, 68, 106, 132, 134, 144–146, 149, 212 North Mitrovica, 12, 57, 60, 61, 63–70 Novi Sad, 14, 211, 216, 217, 220, 221 O Odonyms, 104 Old Bridge, Mostar, 102, 103 Olza River, 23, 26, 28, 30–32, 34 ’Ordinary’ cities, 96 Orthodox Cathedral, 93, 100 Orthodox cemetery, 63, 65–67 Orthodox church, 58, 63, 85, 98, 100 Ostrava, 25, 29 Ottoman Empire, 93, 133, 141, 142, 193, 214, 220 Ottoman heritage, 102, 103 Ottoman Macedonia, 140 Overbuilding, 5 Ovodov, Mykola, 173, 176 P Paramilitary -groups, 120 -organisations, 3 -units, 121 Paris, 26, 136, 183, 185, 186, 228 Park of Culture and Recreation, 239 Partitioned cities, 57 Party of Democratic Action (SDA), 98 Partyzanske, 119 Patent of Toleration, 25 Peace, 2, 14, 64, 97, 98, 101, 106, 107, 125, 144, 179, 243, 245, 246 Peace-building, 92 Peaceful - coexistence, 93, 106 - dissolution, 77 - reintegration, 77, 78 Peacekeeping missions - UN peacekeeping missions, 78 Peacekeeping provisions, 7 “Peace Park”, Kosovska Mitrovica, 64 Permanent temporality, 91, 93, 101, 106, 244 Permanent urban transition, 101, 244

Index Pervomaisk, 120–122 “Pervomaisk”, mine, 119 Petrograd, 183 Poland, 14, 23–27, 36, 42, 44–49, 225, 227, 228, 230, 232, 239 Polarised cities, 57 Poles, 25, 26, 29, 33, 47–49, 51, 53, 152, 197, 226, 227 Polish-Czech border, 8, 11, 25, 26, 30, 36 Polish-German border, 8, 11, 42, 43, 48, 52, 244, 245 Polish-German border area, 11, 41, 44–47 Political border, 7, 11, 28, 31, 33 Political correctness, 108 Political defects, 244 Political space, 32 Poroshenko, Petro, 124, 172 Post-conflict city, 5, 12, 92 Post-socialism, 7, 230 Post-socialist cities, 1–7, 9–11, 13, 14, 93, 191, 227, 243–245, 247 Post-socialist period, 9, 246 Post-socialist transition, 2, 3 Post-socialist urban reality, 10 Post-Soviet space, 112, 125 Poverty, 132, 142, 146, 192, 212, 221, 222, 226, 246, 247 Požarevac, 220 Prague, 9, 10, 137 Pre-communist era, 175 Pristina, 59, 61–63, 68, 70 Private property, 13, 121, 193, 204 Privatisation, 9, 13, 227, 230–232, 245 Property -communal, 122 -private, 13, 121, 193, 204 Property ownership, 3, 66 Pro-Russian formations, 121 Pro-Russian separatists, 124 Prostˇejov, 9 Protestant cultural space, 33 Protestantism, 33 Prussia, 24 Psychological division, 197 Public policy, 197 Public space, 2, 4, 64, 75–77, 81–84, 87, 102, 128, 144, 162, 174, 183, 204, 239, 240, 243, 245

R Reconciliation, 8, 78, 87, 92, 102, 103, 106, 112, 124, 125, 244, 247

Index Reformation, 33 Refugees, 49, 53, 78, 96 Regional Operational Programme for the ´ etokrzyskie Voivodship, 238 Swi˛ Regulated landed property, 197 Regulation plan, 193, 217 Reintegration, 8, 9, 78, 79, 98, 124, 244, 246, 247 Religious diversity, 28, 33 Religious institution, 164 Republika Srpska, 58, 84, 94, 96, 100 Resacralisation, 4 Residential area, 60, 122, 195, 197, 230, 233 Residential space, 66, 192, 227, 230, 240 Restitution, 9, 13, 191–193 Retail networks, 3 Reunification, 98, 124 Revisionist sentiments, 8 Revitalisation, 186, 225, 227, 235, 237–239, 241, 246 Rights -bilingual, 81 -cultural, 94 -human, 8, 80, 120–122, 170, 217, 226 language, 82 -minority, 81 Rights to the city, 226, 227 Road traffic, 232 “Rodina”, mine, 119, 122 Rodina, settlement, 119, 122 Roman Catholic community, 178 Roma population, 13, 14, 212–216, 218, 221 Roma settlements, 211–221, 246 Russia, 8, 12, 111–113, 115–118, 122–125, 158, 173 Russian Empire, 24, 113, 119, 175 Russian Federation, 112, 115–117 Russians, 111–118, 120–124, 156, 171, 172, 175, 183, 245, 246 Russian-Ukrainian relationships, 183 S Saints Peter and Paul Church at the Franciscan Monastery, 102 Sarajevo, 58, 92, 93, 95–97, 244 Saxony, 44 Second World War, 8, 11, 13, 23, 26–28, 42, 45, 59, 86, 93, 103, 117, 132, 158, 159, 161, 179, 238, 239 Segregation -ethnic, 9, 107, 215 -ethno-social, institutional, and legislative segregation income, 14

255 -physical, 5, 69 -residential, 6, 221 -school, 9 -socio-economic, 13 -socio-spatial, 212 -spatial, 6, 13, 14, 57, 104, 204, 211, 212, 214, 221, 246 Self-segregation, 212 Serbia, 10, 12, 14, 58, 59, 61, 62, 66, 68–70, 75, 77, 78, 83–86, 98, 133, 211–216, 218–221 Serbian Autonomous Territory of Krajina, 77 Serbian majority, 60 Serb Krajina, Republic of, 77 Serbs - Serbian population, 66, 68, 69 -Serbian population, 62 Shchastia, 123 Shevchenko, Taras, 117, 183–185 Sienkiewicza Street, 229, 234–237, 239, 241 Sienkiewka, 235 Sienkiewka Revival, 235 Silesian dialect, 26 Silesians, 33, 34 Silesia voivodeship, 27 Silnica river, 232, 239 Single-family houses, 197, 207, 233 Single-family housing, 233 Single-industry towns, 119 Sisak, 77 Sitnica, 59 Skoczów, 25 Skopje, 8, 13, 59, 76, 131, 134, 135, 137, 138, 141–147, 149, 244 Skopje 2014, 10, 13, 134–142, 144 Slovaks, 8, 28, 33, 34 Słubfurt, 54 Słubice, 11, 42, 46–48, 50, 53, 54 Smart City project, 228 Social class divisions, 6 Social division, 12, 80, 87, 232 Socialism, 2, 7, 101, 169, 203, 245 Social life, 59, 69, 101, 136, 153, 232 Social movement, 6, 10, 246 Social movement “Kraków against Games”, 10 Social needs, 29, 199, 207 Social polarisation, 240 Social space, 152 Social stratification, 2, 230 Socio-cultural space, 24, 33, 34 Socio-economic conflicts, 6, 9, 14

256 Socio-economic development, 8, 14, 44, 141, 225 Socio-economic disintegration, 27 Socio-spatial structures, 243 Sofia, 13, 14, 59, 191–208, 246 Soja, Edward, 151, 153, 164 South Mitrovica, 12, 57, 59, 60, 63, 64, 66–69 ‘Soviet community’, 152 Soviet heritage, 151, 159, 160, 183 Soviet regime, 186 Soviet Ukraine, 113 Soviet Union, 8, 113, 118 Space, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 24, 31–34, 44, 48, 50, 51, 61, 64, 66, 75, 76, 79, 81, 83–85, 87, 92, 104, 108, 131, 132, 146, 151–155, 158, 159, 161, 162, 164, 165, 170, 174, 191, 192, 195– 197, 199, 201–207, 221, 225–230, 233, 235, 237, 244–247 Space of representation, 153, 154, 161, 164, 168 Spaces for dialogue, 151, 152 Spatial conflicts, 1, 11, 14, 131, 132, 134, 146, 147, 191, 192, 203, 207, 227, 232, 233, 240, 245 Spatial development, 6, 24, 27, 134 Spatial development plans, 240 Spatial disintegration, 92, 107 Spatial divisions of urban space, 91 Spatial influence, 108 Spatiality, 153 Spatially divided cities, 7 Spatial planning, 1, 13, 14, 61, 92, 101, 192, 193, 197, 199, 201, 204, 207, 227, 234, 240 Spatial polarisation, 3, 4, 9, 102 Spatial redistribution, 241 Stakhanovets, 119 Stanytsia-Luhanska, 123 St. Apostle Andrew Church, 178 State border, 7, 8, 11, 23–27, 29, 32, 33, 36, 42, 44, 50, 84, 112, 115, 244, 246 State capitalism, 194 Status quo, 104, 106 Strategic approach, 14 Street names, 2, 9, 65, 175, 176, 178 Student City, 13, 14, 191, 192, 203–208 Suburbs -inner, 229, 230, 233 -outher, 229, 233 Superficial materiality, 153 ´ etokrzyskie Voivodship, 238 Swi˛

Index Symbolic divisions, 12, 63, 75, 76, 80, 85, 87, 102 Symbolic mythology, 107 Symbolic space, 172, 174, 186, 245 Symmetrical socio-spatial order, 7 Syria, 47 Syrians, 47 T Teatralna Square, 176, 183–185 Territorial development policies, 197 Territorial ethnocracy, 91, 93, 102, 104 Terrorist attacks, 5 Tito era, 140 Tito, Josip Broz, 59, 132 Titova Mitrovica, 59 Tolerance - ethnic, 93 Tolerance Patent for Protestants, 33 Toponymical deideologisation, 178 Toponymic policy, 178 Toponymic war, 176 Toponymy -commemorative, 175 -communist, 174 -historical, 175 Toshkivka, 119 Touristification, 6, 9 Transition, 2, 13, 14, 101, 133, 164, 168, 169, 178, 191, 192, 195, 197, 207, 246 Translocal spaces, 44 Transnational corporations, 226, 234, 240 Traumatised community, 76, 80 “Tree of Freedom, The”, 185 Trepˇca holding, 60 Triumphal Arch, 136, 138, 139, 144 Twain, Mark, 182 Twin towns, 112, 113 U Ukraine, 12, 47, 49, 53, 111–115, 117–125, 128, 152, 154, 155, 159, 160, 166, 169, 171–173, 175, 176, 178, 179, 183, 186, 246 Ukrainian Armed Forces, 120 Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 176 Ukrainian legislation, 157 Ukrainians, 8, 13, 47, 49, 111–118, 120–125, 128, 152, 155, 156, 159, 162, 166, 170–176, 178, 179, 181, 185, 186, 230, 245, 246 UNESCO, 103, 155, 157

Index UNESCO World Heritage site, 158 UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 120, 121 Unitary urban organisms, 7 United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), 78 United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR), 78 University of Pristina, 66, 68, 69 Urban community, 4, 11, 84, 96, 111, 178, 186, 244 Urban environment, 13, 111, 120, 152, 157, 186, 192–194, 196, 199, 201, 245 Urban geopolitics, 12, 14, 91–93, 97, 98, 101, 104, 107, 108, 245 Urbanisation, 119, 128, 192, 197, 226 Urban landscape, 8, 9, 13, 50, 51, 93, 102, 103, 152, 171, 192, 246 Urban life, 3, 12 Urban managers, 5 Urban Masterplan of Sofia Municipality, 199, 200, 207 Urban reality, 10 Urban settlement, 8, 33, 59, 63, 113, 114, 118, 119 Urban shrinkage, 4 Urban space, 2–9, 11–15, 31, 32, 34, 36, 49, 57, 59, 61, 64, 75–77, 79, 85, 87, 91, 92, 96, 99, 100, 102, 104, 108, 112, 115, 120, 124, 153–155, 158, 161, 162, 167, 171, 172, 174, 178, 182, 185, 186, 191, 192, 207, 211, 214, 219, 221, 225–228, 230–232, 237, 240, 244–248 Urban studies, 2, 92 Urban transformation, 2, 3, 10, 14 Urban-type settlement, 113, 119 Urban zones, 197, 207

V Vardar, 137 Vardar Province, 132 Vehicle traffic, 232, 235 Veterans, 85, 86, 98, 124

257 Vienna, 25, 137, 140, 152, 201 Vinnytsia, 13, 171–176, 178, 179, 181–183, 185, 186, 245 Vinnytsia region, 176, 182 VMRO-DPMNE, 134, 144 Vojvodina, 86, 216, 220 Volunteer battalions, 120, 122 Von Kleist, Ewald Christian, 50 Von Kleist, Heinrich, 50 Voting crisis, 98 Vranjska Banja, 220 Vukovar, 8, 9, 12, 70, 75–87, 244–246 Vukovar River Island, 84, 85

W War in Donbass, 12 Warsaw, 132, 152, 169 Warsaw Pact, 27 Washington Agreement, 97 Western Morava, 59 Western Syrmia, 78 West Germany, 47 West Pomerania Province, 44 Wonded cities, 92 World Heritage Convention, 155

Y Yugoslavia - second Yugoslavia, 93, 96 Yugoslav People’s Army, 77, 93

Z Zadar, 77 Zaolzie, 26, 28 Zelensky, Volodymyr, 124 Zgorzelec, 11, 42, 46, 48, 54 Zgorzelic, 54 Zolote, 8, 12, 111, 112, 118–125, 246 Zolote-4, 122, 124 Zolote-5, 120, 121 “Zolote”, mine, 119, 122 Zveˇcan, 59–61, 68, 69