Changing Neighbourhoods: Social and Spatial Polarization in Canadian Cities 0774862025, 9780774862028

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Figures and Tables
Foreword • Janet L. Smith
Preface
Acknowledgments
Part 1: Exploring Neighbourhood Change
1 Inequality and Neighbourhood Change: Context, Concept, and Process • Larry S. Bourne and J. David Hulchanski
2 Plus ça Change: Neighbourhood Inequality in Canadian Citiessince 1900 • Richard Harris
3 Using Social Dimensions and Neighbourhood Typologies to Characterize Neighbourhood Change • Ivan Townshend and Robert Murdie
Part 2: Investigating Neighbourhood Change in Canada
4 Inequality and Neighbourhood Change in the Greater Toronto Region • Alan Walks
5 Montreal: The Changing Drivers of Inequality between Neighbourhoods • Xavier Leloup and Damaris Rose
6 The Social Geography of Uneven Incomes in Metropolitan Vancouver • David Ley and Nicholas Lynch
7 Hamilton: Poster Child for Concentrated Poverty • Richard Harris
8 Halifax: Scaling Inequality • Jill L. Grant and Howard Ramos
9 Neighbourhood Change in Calgary: An Evolving Geography of Income Inequality and Social Difference • Ivan Townshend, Byron Miller, and Derek Cook
10 People, Policies, and Place: Indigenous and Immigrant Population Shifts in Winnipeg’s Inner-City Neighbourhoods • Jino Distasio and Sarah Zell
Part 3: Understanding the Implications of Neighbourhood Change
11 Mapping Canada’s Fragmented Social Policy Space: Plotting Ways to Reverse Trends in Inequality and Segregation through Coordinated Poverty Reduction • Scott Graham, Stephanie Procyk, and Michelynn Laflèche
12 Evaluating Neighbourhood Inequality and Change: Lessons from a National Comparison • Jill L. Grant, Alan Walks, and Howard Ramos
References
Contributors
Index

Citation preview

CHANGING

NEIGHBOURHOODS

CHANGING NEIGHBOURHOODS Social and Spatial Polarization in Canadian Cities

Edited by Jill L. Grant, Alan Walks, and Howard Ramos

© UBC Press 2020 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission of the publisher. Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: Changing neighbourhoods: social and spatial polarization in Canadian cities / edited by Jill L. Grant, Alan Walks, and Howard Ramos. Names: Grant, Jill, editor. | Walks, Alan, 1968- editor. | Ramos, Howard, 1974- editor. Description: Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20190239727 | Canadiana (ebook) 20190239808 | ISBN 9780774862028 (hardcover) | ISBN 9780774862042 (PDF) Subjects: LCSH: Neighborhoods – Canada – Case studies. | LCSH: Cities and towns – Canada – Case studies. | LCSH: City planning – Canada – Case studies. | LCSH: Equality – Canada – Case studies. | LCSH: Polarization (Social sciences) – Canada – Case studies. | LCGFT: Case studies. Classification: LCC HT127 .C496 2020 | DDC 307.3/3620971–dc23

UBC Press gratefully acknowledges the financial support for our publishing program of the Government of Canada (through the Canada Book Fund), the Canada Council for the Arts, and the British Columbia Arts Council. This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. UBC Press The University of British Columbia 2029 West Mall Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2 www.ubcpress.ca

Contents

List of Figures and Tables / viii Foreword / xiii Janet L. Smith Preface / xvii Acknowledgments / xix

Part 1: Exploring Neighbourhood Change / 1 1 Inequality and Neighbourhood Change: Context, Concept, and Process / 5 Larry S. Bourne and J. David Hulchanski 2 Plus ça Change: Neighbourhood Inequality in Canadian Cities since 1900 / 31 Richard Harris 3 Using Social Dimensions and Neighbourhood Typologies to Characterize Neighbourhood Change / 53 Ivan Townshend and Robert Murdie v

Part 2: Investigating Neighbourhood Change in Canada / 75 4 Inequality and Neighbourhood Change in the Greater Toronto Region / 79 Alan Walks 5 Montreal: The Changing Drivers of Inequality between Neighbourhoods / 101 Xavier Leloup and Damaris Rose 6 The Social Geography of Uneven Incomes in Metropolitan Vancouver / 127 David Ley and Nicholas Lynch 7 Hamilton: Poster Child for Concentrated Poverty / 149 Richard Harris 8 Halifax: Scaling Inequality / 171 Jill L. Grant and Howard Ramos 9 Neighbourhood Change in Calgary: An Evolving Geography of Income Inequality and Social Difference / 193 Ivan Townshend, Byron Miller, and Derek Cook 10 People, Policies, and Place: Indigenous and Immigrant Population Shifts in Winnipeg’s Inner-City Neighbourhoods / 215 Jino Distasio and Sarah Zell

vi

Part 3: Understanding the Implications of Neighbour­hood Change / 235 1 1 Mapping Canada’s Fragmented Social Policy Space: Plotting Ways to Reverse Trends in Inequality and Segregation through Coordinated Poverty Reduction / 239 Scott Graham, Stephanie Procyk, and Michelynn Laflèche 12 Evaluating Neighbourhood Inequality and Change: Lessons from a National Comparison / 252 Jill L. Grant, Alan Walks, and Howard Ramos References / 281 Contributors / 311 Index / 314

vii

Figures and Tables

Figures 1.1 Gini coefficient for fifteen OECD countries, 2017 or latest year / 8 1.2 Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, fifteen OECD countries, 2016 / 10 1.3 Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, Canada and three groups of countries, 1965–2017 / 10 2.1 The relative frequency of the word “neighbourhood” in the Globe and Mail, 1900–2009 / 35 2.2 The geography of Toronto’s slums, 1944 / 37 2.3 Share of annual market income earned by the top 1%, Canada and United States, 1920–2015 / 41 2.4 Immigrant population in Canada, 1871–2016, and projection to 2036 / 42 2.5 The growth of urban homeownership, 1901–2011 / 48 3.1 Census tract typological transition matrix, joint CMA and time analysis / 66 4.1 Occupational income polarization in the Toronto CMA / 83 4.2 Relative incomes of visible minorities and recent immigrants, Toronto CMA / 83

viii

4.3 Income inequality (Gini coefficients) among individual earners (non-spatial), Toronto CMA and GTA regions, 1980–2015 / 84 4.4 Average individual income by census tract in the Toronto CMA, 1980 / 86 4.5 Average individual income by census tract in the Toronto CMA, 2015 / 87 4.6 Average individual income ratio (compared with GTA average), City of Toronto and 905 regions, and former municipalities within Toronto, 1970–2015 / 90 4.7 Socio-spatial income inequality (segregation) among census tracts (Gini coefficients), Toronto CMA and GTA regions, 1980–2015 / 91 4.8 Change in average individual income by census tract in the Toronto CMA, 1980–2015 / 93 5.1 Average individual income by census tract in the Montreal CMA, 1980 / 108 5.2 Average individual income by census tract in the Montreal CMA, 2015 / 110 5.3 Change in average individual income by census tract in the Montreal CMA, 1980–2015 / 113 5.4 Gini indexes of individual income inequality, Montreal CMA, 1980–2015 / 120 6.1 Average individual income by census tract in the Vancouver CMA, 1980 / 132 6.2 Average individual income by census tract in the Vancouver CMA, 2015 / 135 6.3 Change in average individual income by census tract in the Vancouver CMA, 1980–2015 / 138 7.1 Districts in the Hamilton census metropolitan area / 153 7.2 Change in neighbourhood income distribution in the Hamilton CMA, 1970–2015 / 154 7.3 Average individual income by census tract in the Hamilton CMA, 1980 / 156 7.4 Average individual income by census tract in the Hamilton CMA, 2015 / 158

FIGURES AND TABLES

ix

7.5 Change in average individual income by census tract in the Hamilton CMA, 1980–2015 / 160 7.6 Recent immigrants, 2006–16 arrivals, Hamilton CMA / 162 7.7 Change in neighbourhood income in the Hamilton CMA, 2005–15 / 167 8.1 Average individual income by census tract in the Halifax CMA, 1980 / 174 8.2 Average individual income by census tract in the Halifax CMA, 2015 / 176 8.3 Change in average individual income by census tract in the Halifax CMA, 1980–2015 / 183 9.1 Average individual income by census tract in the Calgary CMA, 1980 / 198 9.2 Average individual income by census tract in the Calgary CMA, 2015 / 199 9.3 Change in average individual income by census tract in the Calgary CMA, 1980–2015 / 202 9.4 Census tract average individual income ratios in 1980 and 2015, and change in CT average individual income ratios, 1980–2015, Calgary CMA / 203 9.5 Census tract transitions by three income categories for three income change categories, Calgary CMA / 205 10.1 Average individual income by census tract in the Winnipeg CMA, 1980 / 218 10.2 Non-spatial and spatial Gini coefficients for the Winnipeg CMA, 1980–2015 / 219 10.3 Average individual income by census tract in the Winnipeg CMA, 2015 / 220 10.4 Change in average individual income by census tract in the Winnipeg CMA, 1980–2015 / 221 10.5 2016 Aboriginal population by 2015 average individual income in the Winnipeg CMA / 226 10.6 2016 recent immigrant population by 2015 average individual income in the Winnipeg CMA / 230

x

FIGURES AND TABLES

12.1 Non-spatial income inequality among working-age individuals in the metropolitan areas under study (Gini coefficients), 1980–2015 / 258 12.2 Spatial income segregation in study CMAs, 1970–2015 (Gini coefficients) / 261

Tables 1.1 Characteristics of the seven study cities and Canada / 23 3.1 Distribution of neighbourhood (CT) types within each CMA in 2006 / 60 3.2 Distribution of neighbourhood (CT) change types within each CMA in 2006 / 62 4.1 Key characteristics of Toronto CMA neighbourhoods with improving, stable, and declining incomes, 2016 / 95 5.1 Individual after-tax income of the population aged 15 years and over (both sexes): Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver CMAs, 2015 / 104 5.2 Household after-tax income, Montreal CMA, 2015 / 106 5.3 Selected characteristics of zones experiencing relative income growth, stability, or decline between 1980 and 2015, Montreal CMA / 115 6.1 Selected correlates of relative income change, Vancouver CMA, 1980/81–2015/16 / 141 8.1 Gini coefficients for Halifax, 1980–2015 / 178 8.2 Halifax peninsula: proportion of census tracts with low or high average individual incomes relative to CMA overall, 1970–2015 / 178 8.3 Off-peninsula (Halifax mainland): proportion of census tracts with low or high average individual incomes relative to CMA overall, 1970–2015 / 179 8.4 Proportion of Halifax census tracts in areas that were gaining ground, holding ground, or losing ground from 1980 to 2015, compared with the CMA overall / 184 8.5 Socio-demographic characteristics of different neighbourhood types, Halifax CMA, 1981, 2006, and 2016 / 186 9.1 Social indicators for census tracts in the Calgary CMA, 1981 and 2016 / 197

FIGURES AND TABLES

xi

9.2 Census tract average individual income ratios, 1980 and 2015, Calgary CMA / 200 10.1 Demographic shifts in immigrant, Aboriginal, and visible minority populations in Winnipeg CMA and its inner city, 1996, 2006, and 2016 / 224 12.1 Change in Gini coefficients for income inequality (non-spatial, among individuals) and income segregation (spatial, measured for individual income among census tracts) / 262 12.2 Change in income distributions: percentage of census tracts in each CMA grouped by change in the ratio of average individual income for the CT relative to change in average individual income in the CMA overall, 1980–2015 / 265 12.3 Average individual income and range (related to CMA average), 1970 and 2015 / 273 12.4 Percentage of census tracts holding ground (within 10% of CMA average individual income), using different end-date income data / 275

xii

FIGURES AND TABLES

Foreword Janet L. Smith

This book brings new perspectives on the multicultural, ethnically diverse, economically dynamic, and still relatively segregated urban space of early twenty-first-century Canada. It was no small task to put together! Not just because it involved a large number of researchers and volumes of data but also because it aims to understand how and why local neighbourhoods change in the context of a fast-moving, globalized world. A hundred years ago, a small cadre of sociologists at the University of Chicago (the Chicago School) took on a similar challenge, seeking to give neighbourhood work “a scientific basis” (Park, Burgess, and Mackenzie 1925). In their framework, neighbourhoods were natural sites for investigating the modern city. Driven by industrial development and the growing material wealth it generated, the titans of industry were building up cities with the help of a seemingly endless influx of migrants from overseas and the rural hinterlands. The order and chaos observed were great fodder for scholars in the burgeoning field of urban sociology, and specifically human ecology, which sought to explain the spatial patterns of cities as an extension of human nature. Their conclusion: it was natural to segregate by race, ethnicity, and class. Moreover, they suggested, as urban growth continued, the state of equilibrium required sustained differentiated space to sort and separate where people lived. While many urban scholars trace contemporary thinking about neighbour­ hood change back to the Chicago School, the dominant narrative has shifted toward explanations that emphasize political economy and the social production

xiii

of space. Still, the assumption that differentiated space in which people live segregated by race, ethnicity, and/or income has been more or less sustained. Even political economists and critical spatial theorists who argue that urban segregation, particularly by class, is not natural but rather the result of sociopolitical forces assume that the nature of capital accumulation itself helps to produce economically stratified urban areas (Betancur and Smith 2016). It’s hard to argue the contrary, given the documented spatial patterns and growth in spatial economic inequality in cities today. What is different now that requires new ways of studying how and why neighbourhoods change? For one thing, while migration continues to transform urban landscapes, it now occurs at a much faster pace, as evidenced by the exponential growth in mobility worldwide. Whether seeking economic opportunity or escaping political tyranny, many more people are relatively footloose. More people are also living precariously: we seem to be in a permanent crisis of housing affordability that keeps many lower-income families moving as housing costs rise while paycheques stay flat. And helping to drive up the price of housing is large-scale investment in high-end housing in city centres. In Chicago and Toronto, for example, tens of thousands of high-rise apartments have been built since the early 2000s, signalling a significant change in the role of the city centre as a place to live, work, and play. As more upper-income people move downtown, poverty in surrounding suburbs has been rising. Looking at the data for US and Canadian metropolitan areas, many are asking, “Where are middle-class people living?” In most cases, the answer is, “not in the city centre.” The same can be asked of immigrants; while still attracted to urban areas, many are bypassing the traditional ports of entry to settle in suburbs closer to jobs. This includes a growing number of refugees and asylum seekers. And what about families? It’s a good question, considering that the number of people with dogs has surpassed the number of families with children under the age of eighteen in many cities in the United States, Canada, and the European Union.1 A further complication is the growing commodification of neighbourhoods, which are being transformed by investment and gentrification. No longer solely a product of young professionals or “mom-and-pop” developers, gen­ trification is now an industry that is generally supported – even encouraged – by local policy makers and planners, and facilitated by the fast flow of capital. As a result, neighbourhoods have become a commodity to be consumed. Yet the occupants are also the consumed, especially those who are displaced and replaced through private investment in large-scale and often high-density projects xiv

FOREWORD

for upper-income consumers. As this process continues, many are asking who has a right to the city. While we have paid significant attention to gentrification, we must also understand what is happening in other parts of our cities, including many areas that for decades have gone untouched by investment. For those neighbourhoods, it is often the spatial stigma – the negative identity – that may best explain what is or is not happening, including the presence or absence of police, the limited availability of services, and the amount of vacant land and buildings. This includes large-scale social housing developments where efforts have been made to generate new mixed-income neighbourhoods. However, the fear that a culture of poverty persists because poor people are concentrated in space has justified limiting the number of low-income families in the new mix, which pushes many into the private market to rent with a housing subsidy. While this policy has the potential to integrate people, it falsely assumes that discrimination and housing affordability are not barriers. Whether it is gentrification or social housing transformation, both types of neighbourhood change have usually been at the expense of the poor, even when intended to benefit them (J. Smith 2015). As this book illustrates, neighbourhood change is a knotty problem, neither easy to analyze nor to interpret. Assuming that neighbourhoods continue to resonate with the people living in them, and perhaps more importantly, that the neighbourhoods where people live can significantly impact their lives and opportunities, this book provides a well thought out means to investigate what is happening in Canadian cities and why it matters. Utilizing a sound methodology, the research helps to answer simple but fundamentally complex questions about change in urban areas that is just as relevant in the United States and Europe as it is in Canada. How do we interpret the decline or increase in a neighbourhood’s population? What does the change in median income reveal, yet simultaneously hide, if we do not look at the extremes on either side? How do we accurately map out income to document spatial inequality? How do we interpret spatial segregation, whether by class, race, or ethnicity, in today’s mobile and globalized world? The quantitative and qualitative data that are the foundation for the rich analysis in the chapters that follow make clear that income inequality and income segregation are both growing in Canadian cities, though not in the same manner or necessarily for the same reasons. Looking beyond the moral and social values that have driven efforts to address spatial segregation in the past, it’s important to consider how, when compounded by income inequality, the self-reinforcing cycle of segregation begets further income inequality. While FOREWORD

xv

there are no easy fixes, mounting attention to the growing divide between rich and poor by academics and policy makers provides some hope. This truly is an interesting and important moment, and one that will greatly benefit from the nuanced approach found in this book and the insights that contribute significantly to contemporary explorations of neighbourhood change. Note

1 For example, in the United States in 2016, nearly 60 million households had a pet (American Pet Products Association 2017–18 Report), yet only 38 million had children under eighteen years of age (US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2016 Annual Social and Economic Supplement).

xvi

FOREWORD

Preface

The chapters in this book are the outcome of a high-profile collaborative research project: the Neighbourhood Change Research Partnership (NCRP), led by David Hulchanski at the University of Toronto. Scholars around the world have documented increased income polarization and ethno-cultural divides in large cities. These trends are known in the research literature as divided cities, dual cities, polarized cities, and the like. Though many of the trends are global, they play out at the local level. The NCRP seeks to understand these trends by examining inequality, diversity, and change at the neighbourhood level in Canada’s metropolitan areas, where local research teams have carried out city-specific studies. This collection presents the project’s findings from each city, bookended by chapters that place these findings in their broader context and draw out their implications for both scholarship and policy. The book is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the trends, theory, and methodological puzzles that motivated the research and guided its development. In the contextual introduction (Chapter 1), two of the team’s intellectual leaders (Larry Bourne and David Hulchanski) identify the diversity of theories and concepts that guided our research on neighbourhood change and explain the kinds of research questions that the team has been exploring in our analyses of the transformations that occurred in Canadian cities between 1980 and 2015. Next, in Chapter 2, Richard Harris provides a brief history of neighbourhood and income inequality in Canada to lend background depth to the contemporary studies that appear later in the book. In Chapter 3, Ivan Townshend and Bob Murdie describe the team’s efforts to develop descriptive xvii

typologies of neighbourhood change to facilitate comparisons across the case study cities. They also introduce some of the methodological tensions we faced. Part 2 contains the empirical content of our national comparison. Chapters 4 to 10 present seven city case studies. Alan Walks writes about the Greater Toronto Region in Chapter 4, showing that it exhibits the highest levels of income inequality in Canada as well as the greatest ethnic and visible minority diversity of the cities examined, and has become increasingly socially differentiated over time. Xavier Leloup and Damaris Rose document neighbourhood change in Montreal in Chapter 5, arguing that the traditional dichotomy of Francophone/Anglophone is losing its saliency as new forms of income inequality have emerged. In Chapter 6, David Ley and Nicholas Lynch discuss Vancouver, a city where high rates of immigration and gentrification have contributed to a new geography of rising income inequality and polarization, even as overall indices of the latter are increasing more slowly in Vancouver than in some other cities. Richard Harris profiles Hamilton in Chapter 7, calling it the poster child for concentrated poverty, as it deindustrialized over the study period; recently, though, it has been increasingly drawn into the commuter orbit of Toronto. In Chapter 8, Jill Grant and Howard Ramos describe neighbourhood change in Halifax, the smallest city in the study: like the other cities, Halifax experienced growing income inequality and segregation over the period, but at a smaller scale than seen in the larger cities. Ivan Townshend, Byron Miller, and Derek Cook discuss neighbourhood change in Calgary in Chapter 9: like Toronto, Calgary has extremes of income inequality and has seen stark differences emerge over the study period. Chapter 10, by Jino Distasio and Sarah Zell, reflects on the extremes of inner-city poverty and suburban affluence that characterize Winnipeg, a city with a substantial Indigenous population and sprawling development patterns. Each of these chapters presents a robust picture of the kinds of changes that occurred over three decades and tries to account for the patterns that emerged. The third and final part of the book offers reflections on the lessons learned from our research and the implications of the work for theory and practice. Chapter 11 provides an opportunity for our community partners – represented by Scott Graham, Stephanie Procyk, and Michelynn Laflèche – to offer suggestions about what the research may mean to policy makers, and to consider future strategies for reducing inequality. In Chapter 12, the editors – Jill Grant, Alan Walks, and Howard Ramos – discuss some of the challenges the research identified and consider the empirical and theoretical contributions this work makes to contemporary understandings of neighbourhood change. xviii

PREFACE

Acknowledgments

A project of this scope involves many people and organizations: too many to name, despite our deep gratitude for their support and contributions. We are grateful to all those who care about neighbourhoods and cities and who have worked with us on this book, on the larger project from which it derived, and in other contexts related to issues of urban inequality. First and foremost, the editors and authors thank David Hulchanski (the principal investigator of the project) and Emily Paradis (project manager until late 2017) for their work in organizing our large team on an ambitious initiative to map and interpret neighbourhood change in Canada. Without the significant contributions of Richard Maaranen, project data analyst and mapmaker, we would not have had such ready access to the data necessary to produce the results found here. The research would not have been possible without support from the “Neighbourhood Inequality, Diversity, and Change: Trends, Processes, Consequences, and Policy Options for Canada’s Large Metropolitan Areas” Partnership Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (grant number 895-2011­-1004). We and the researchers contributing to this book also acknowledge with gratitude additional funding and other support received from our universities and employers, and from the Awards to Schol­ arly Publications Program. Second, we thank our project partners across the country: these organizations allowed their staff to participate in team meetings, research initiatives, and dissemination activities, and in many cases provided other substantive supports to the project. Staff participants helped to ground the team’s work in xix

the daily practicalities of working with communities and individuals living with the effects of neighbourhood change. Without them our findings would be less substantive and useful. We’d like to especially acknowledge the contributions of the United Way agencies and municipal governments and NGOs of the cities under study that allowed their staff members to join our research advisory groups. Third, we appreciate the contributions of our many colleagues on the research teams in the seven cities, and the countless student research assistants and support staff who assisted us with data collection, analysis, and presentation. Through the last seven years the team has had several opportunities to gather together to debate our findings and work toward advancing our understanding of the processes of change going on in our cities. This book is a collective product of that collaboration. Finally, we want to thank James MacNevin and Holly Keller of UBC Press and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions as we prepared the manuscript, and Emma Kay for her assistance in compiling and formatting the reference list.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

PART 1

Exploring Neighbourhood Change

Cities are continually changing as people are born and die, as households form and dissolve, as buildings rise and fall. Our research seeks to profile the ways in which neighbour­ hoods are changing in some of Canada’s key cities. The objectives of the project on which we report have been fourfold: (1) explore trends in urban and neighbourhood change; (2) understand the processes responsible for these changes; (3) identify the consequences of changes that lead to inequality and polarization; and (4) consider policy and program options to address inequality. This book focuses on the first two objectives as we describe changes occurring between 1980 and 2015 and seek to understand and theorize the processes and factors driving change. Inequality is not a new phenomenon. We all know the expression, “The poor will always be with us.” Cities often reflected considerable inequality through history: the affluent in their mansions or palaces, the enslaved in their servant quarters, and the masses confined to modest homes. Yet in contemporary Western society we are acutely

PART 1 aware of the inequities that surround us and concerned about what can be done to safeguard cities for the future. Our research emerges from a normative position that holds that greater equality can not only produce a more just society – where all residents can have healthy and meaningful lives – but also enhance economic productivity and national prosperity. A society divided by vast gaps in opportunity generates insecurities that can threaten the long-term health of the body politic. The rise in autocratic populism in so many democratic countries reflects a common recent response to growing inequities and the political fallout that can result when a substantial subset of the population lacks the means to live well. Our focus on the neighbourhood as a unit of study reflects our interest in understanding how inequality is distributed in space. Until the late nineteenth century, the rich and poor often lived side by side in cities, as their work and their means of transportation kept them proximate. Neighbourhoods thus would have been mixed in income, although many cities segregated some populations into quarters by religion or ethnicity. The development of streetcar and subway systems allowed new patterns of

2

spatial separation to develop, with those of means able to sort themselves into upscale suburban areas. Widespread access to automobile ownership in the mid-twentieth century led to more distributed residential growth – “sprawl” – that continued to rearrange patterns of spatial inequality. Our research focuses on the period from 1980 to 2015, as the postwar period of prosperity-induced welfare state programs designed to address inequality – through social programs, educational investments, social housing, and so on – began to unwind under attack by political parties and politicians on the right of the spectrum. We ask three key questions: How have urban neighbourhoods changed over this period, including by income? What factors help to account for the changes that we see? What are the implications for the spatial structuring of inequality in Canadian cities? Part 1 contains three chapters. Chapter 1 establishes the theoretical grounding of the research in the divided cities literature; Chapter 2 provides historical background on our understanding of neighbourhood inequality in Canada; and Chapter 3 presents analyses that seek to describe the types of neighbourhoods seen in Canadian cities.

3

4

1 Inequality and Neighbourhood Change: Context, Concept, and Process Larry S. Bourne and J. David Hulchanski

Scholars around the world have documented increased income inequalities and social polarization, as well as enhanced ethno-cultural divisions, in the world’s large cities. Although the basic parameters of inequality are global, they play out most intensely and visibly at the local level (Polèse 2009; OECD 2018). Researchers and policy makers generally agree that neighbourhoods, the relatively small spatial subdivisions of a city with diverse sets of physical and socio-economic characteristics, are the primary setting for these local effects, and offer direct links to other dimensions of work and social well-being. Neighbourhoods shape people’s routines and quality of daily life, affect levels of access to public and market services, and influence long-term employment opportunities and overall well-being. While the precise nature and extent of these effects are still widely debated in the scholarly literature, the existence of neighbourhood-based effects and the centrality of neighbourhood differences in defining the fabric of urban living are not in question (Galster 2008; van Ham and Manley 2009; Slater 2013). For these reasons, this book examines the dimensions and impacts of increased economic inequality and urban socio-spatial polarization in Canada. These trends are reshaping the social landscape of Canada’s metropolitan areas, changing neighbourhoods, and affecting  the lived  realities of increasingly diverse urban populations. The focus of the research discussed here, a product of the Neighbourhood Change Research Partnership (NCRP), is on the intersection of broad societal trends and the location-specific dimensions of those trends. The research challenge is twofold: first, to sort out the causes and consequences 5

of broad societal drivers of change from those that reflect factors operating at the city and neighbourhood level; and second, to document the varied expressions of these factors from city to city. In so doing, we also compare and critically evaluate alternative conceptual and theoretical paradigms relating to neighborhood change and social inequalities. The empirical evidence is provided through case studies of changing levels and patterns of inequalities in income in seven metropolitan areas in Canada: Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Calgary, Hamilton, Winnipeg, and Halifax. Neighbourhoods, however defined, serve as a critical “scale of urban analysis” between the level of the individual or household and the larger collectives of the city and the nation state. Neighbourhoods offer context to the routines of daily life, provide access to important social supports and public services, and influence real and perceived well-being. They serve as consumption niches for marketers and developers, and spaces that play vital specialized roles as local social networks. They may also be viewed in economic theory as bundles of spatial externalities in which the behaviour of real estate and housing markets, and the quality of social services and housing stocks, are closely interdependent, for better or worse. Our focus on the intensely local level is important, for both theory and practice, because socio-economic inequality, augmented by neighbourhood conditions, has a deeply corrosive impact on all aspects and levels of society. An improved appreciation of how and why neighbourhoods are changing and, in turn, how these changes influence people’s lives, and how public policies foster, reinforce, or mitigate neighbourhood inequalities, is essential in developing appropriate urban policies and strategies for more inclusive and just cities. The required policies must be based on a clearer understanding of both local and global trends and on a solid base of information. A better-informed public, with access to the kind of research published here, will contribute to enriched debates on policy options that are both relevant to and feasible for each city. Our socio-spatial analysis draws primarily on the scholarly literature on divided cities (Harloe, Fainstein, and Gordon 1992; Marcuse 1993; Marcuse and van Kempen 2000) and on inequalities and social polarization (Hamnett 1996a; Ley 1996; Marcuse 1997) that emerged in the 1990s. The hypotheses and some of the initial observations in this literature suggest that although divided or fragmented cities are not new, a new socio-spatial order within cities has been developing, with stronger and more rigid divisions based on greater inequality. Moreover, those divisions are, or appear to be, highly correlated with particular disadvantaged social groups, such as ethno-racial minorities 6

LARRY S. BOURNE AND J. DAVID HULCHANSKI

and recent immigrants. The kind of neighbourhood change taking place in such divided cities has been characterized as “strengthened structural spatial divisions with increased inequality among them and increasing walling between each” (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000, 249). Scholars increasingly document divided cities where issues of social exclusion, affordability, and income inequality enhance the risk of greater social injustice. In this introduction, we briefly address the global context for Canadian cities, describing comparable levels and trends in inequality for cities in Western countries as well as examples of the wide variations in government responses to those inequalities. We then highlight the literature on divided cities, comment broadly on the kinds of neighbourhood dynamics and transitions that underpin what we have been observing, and then set this discussion in the broader context of structural changes in the Canadian urban system. We outline the ways in which the NCRP has contributed to the international and comparative literature on divided cities and social inequalities, and to current debates on theory and practice in urban analysis. Next, we address the rationale for using census data and the time periods involved, our selection of case study cities, and our choices of analytical methods, measures, and indicators. Finally, we draw out briefly some of the implications and lessons learned from the empirical analysis and pose challenges for further analysis. These same themes are picked up again in more detail in Chapter 12, while the parallel public policy challenges are addressed in Chapter 11.

The Changing Global Context There is widespread agreement and rising public awareness that the distribution of income in Canada and within its larger cities has become increasingly unequal in recent years. There is now considerable empirical evidence supporting these concerns (Corak 2013; Procyk 2014; Walks 2011, 2017; Breau, Shin, and Burkhart 2018). Yet Canada is not alone in witnessing rising in­ equality. The same trend has been observed in cities in most countries of the developed world, but notably in the United States and United Kingdom. Con­ sequently, the issue of rising inequality has drawn persistent social and academic interest and research, as well as intense political debate at the inter­national scale (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015; OECD 2011, 2015, 2018; Piketty 2014). This commonality suggests that similar forces, including but not limited to the effects of globalization, financial instability, technological innovation, demographic shifts, and rising levels of immigration, underlie the changing distribution of INEQUALITY AND NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE

7

income and wealth in market economies across all nations and their major cities. The complex relationships between these effects and inequalities can be teased out only through detailed empirical research. Where does Canada fit in the international arena with respect to levels of inequality? Figure 1.1 shows the 2015–17 levels of income inequality, measured through the standard Gini coefficient (the most common and accepted measure of income inequality, where a score of 1 would represent extreme inequality and 0 complete equality), for a sample of Western nations (members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]) that are among Canada’s usual comparators. Levels of inequality vary widely among these countries, as might be expected, depending on national circumstances, including their histories and political ideologies. There are, however, sufficient similarities to group the countries into three broad clusters: the Nordic countries, other Western European countries, and an Anglo-American group. The first group has the lowest Gini coefficients, the second group has marginally

FIGURE 1.1 Gini coefficient for fifteen OECD countries (in three groups), 2017 or latest year

Notes:  New Zealand refers to 2014. The Gini coefficient takes values between 0 for a perfectly equal income distribution, where every person has the same income, and 1, which refers to a situation of maximum inequality where all income goes to one person. OECD average = 0.30. Source:  OECD (2018).

8

LARRY S. BOURNE AND J. DAVID HULCHANSKI

higher coefficients, while the third has the highest levels of inequality. Canada, with a Gini coefficient of 0.307, sits squarely in the third group, although slightly lower than the levels in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Coincidentally, Canada’s Gini coefficient in 1988 was 0.28, roughly the same level as that of the Nordic countries today; inequality in Canada has increased significantly over the last few decades. One explanation for these differences is that the countries in each of the three clusters tend to have roughly similar approaches to the role of governments, including the design of the tax system and attitudes toward redistributive economic policies and progressive social programs. To illustrate the point, Figure 1.2 plots total tax revenue for 2016 as a percentage of gross domestic product for the same OECD countries. The relationship is consistent and roughly the reverse of the graph in Figure 1.1. Tax revenue is highest in the Nordic countries and lowest in the Anglo-American world, including Canada. Figure 1.3 then graphs the trend line for the same measure from 1965 to 2017 for the three clusters, with Canada separated for comparison. Two points stand out here. First, there are obvious differences in political ideologies, from the welfare state to unfettered capitalism. Second, the ability of a nation to respond to rising inequality and at the same time to meet varied social needs reflects the financial resources available and how wisely (or unwisely) they are used and allocated. Nordic countries use the web of tax regimes, social benefits, and transfer payments to limit or reduce the inevitable inequalities in market incomes. In Canada, this capacity is limited and, as Figure 1.3 shows, has been declining over time (OECD 2017). Until the 1990s, government policies in Canada played a similar role of largely compensating for market inequalities, but since then that contribution has been reduced. The effect is evident in the widening gap between rich and poor in Canada’s major cities (Hulchanski 2010; Ley and Lynch 2012; Leloup and Rose 2018; United Way Greater Toronto 2014, 2015; Breau, Shin, and Burkhart 2018). As expected, there are ongoing debates about the nature and consequen­ ces of this widening gap and the spatial separation of income classes that accompanies it. For example, Ray Forrest and Ade Kearns (2001) point to ongoing dis­cussions regarding the long-term strains that inequalities impose on the rate of economic growth, levels of social cohesion, intergenerational mobility, and political stability. Others debate the mix of basic determinants of inequalities at the national scale (Green, Riddell, and St-Hilaire 2016) and the precise nature of neighbourhood effects (Oreopoulos 2008). Part of the challenge for researchers, then, is to identify and evaluate the drivers of increasing INEQUALITY AND NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE

9

FIGURE 1.2 Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, fifteen OECD countries (in three groups), 2016

Source:  OECD (2018).

FIGURE 1.3 Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, Canada and three groups of countries, 1965–2017

Notes:  Nordic countries include Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway. Western European countries include France, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, and Germany. Anglo-American countries include the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, and Australia. Group percentages are unweighted averages. Data for Australia not yet available for 2016. Source:  OECD (2018).

10

LARRY S. BOURNE AND J. DAVID HULCHANSKI

inequalities and to explore how macro-scale trends translate into local or place-based differences in income and well-being. The local scale is not simply a mirror image of the national scale.

Growing Inequality: Implications for Cities and Neighbourhoods Why worry about increased economic inequality and urban socio-spatial polar­ ization? Richard Wilkinson (2005, 22) provides perhaps the best one-sentence answer: “Inequality promotes strategies that are more self-interested, less affiliative, often highly antisocial, more stressful, and likely to give rise to higher levels of violence, poorer community relations, and worse health.” Furthermore, unequal societies are socially unhealthy for all, not just for the poor and disadvantaged. “Most of the important health and social problems of the rich world are more common in more unequal societies,” according to Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett (2010, 173). Increasing inequality, in short, tends to produce increasingly dysfunctional societies, albeit with widely varying experiences from place to place. As overall inequality increases, cities invariably become more spatially segregated on the basis of socio-economic and ethno-cultural divisions (Bunting and Filion 2010; Marcuse and van Kempen 2000). The research presented here starts with the premise that neighbourhoods are the newest fault lines of social isolation and spatial segregation. Although we know that inequality is most evident within and between certain types of neighbourhoods, it is only through the kind of comparative case studies reported in this book that we can better understand how broad socio-economic trends are affecting neighbourhoods generally, how different kinds of neighbourhood changes affect the lives of the people who live in them, and how public policies reinforce or reduce inequalities and influence access to employment opportunities at this scale. Cities have long been divided into distinctly different kinds of neighbourhoods or distinct social enclaves. What differs from previous periods is the nature, extent, and intensity of changes in these social and spatial divisions, and the increasing diversity and complexity of their causes, consequences, and policy implications. We have already witnessed some of the effects of growing inequality in other nations. Urban riots in London (2011) and Paris (2005), the rapid spread of the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations (2011–12), and the growing political strength of nationalist “alt-right” political movements illustrate what happens when growing economic inequality produces increasingly divided societies INEQUALITY AND NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE

11

(Body-Gendrot 2013; Pickerill et al. 2016; Slater 2016). Divided societies tend to produce divided cities – and vice versa, in a self-reinforcing fashion – as well as heightened socio-spatial polarization. In a divided city, lower-income households are increasingly concentrated in more intensely poor neighbourhoods, some of long-standing duration but others that were once home to a middleincome majority. Or these households are pushed to the older suburbs, where social, educational, and employment opportunities are now increasingly limited or inaccessible. Though poverty will continue to be a problem for specific groups in any society, deepening income and wealth inequality and polarization ultimately affect all members of society (Dinca-Panaitescu and Walks 2015). Occasional riots, demonstrations, and divisive political movements may seem to be isolated local events, but they signal wider societal failures experienced where people live within urban regions and especially within disadvantaged and marginalized neighbourhoods. These, in turn, become the emblem for polarization of an entire society. Patterns of concentrated urban advantage and disadvantage can affect the life chances of urban residents in terms of health, housing, education, and employment (Myles, Pyper, and Picot 2000; Hou and Myles 2005; Anyon 2005; Galster 2008; van Ham and Manley 2009). These effects ultimately influence overall levels of economic growth, prosperity, and general well-being. To thrive, democracies must provide people with an economy that delivers a deep sense of shared security, opportunity, belonging, purpose, and well-being. Since the 1980s, for too many, life has become a desperate uphill struggle: thwarted, stalled, and hampered by an unequal, increasingly globalized and financialized economic system, and in some instances by overt discrimination. This need not be the case if governments are motivated to act. Our research then responds to the urgent need to better understand the nature of contemporary patterns of the urban socio-spatial restructuring taking place in Canada’s major metropolitan areas in order to provide a well-grounded and systematic basis for analyzing the implications for both theory and public action.

Divided Cities Cities with particularly sharp socio-spatial dichotomies, such as those in Europe and North America, have often been called divided cities (Harloe et al. 1992), dual cities (Mollenkopf and Castells 1991), polarized or fragmented cities (Burgers and Musterd 2002; Walks 2001), partitioned cities (Marcuse 2002; Marcuse and van Kempen 2002), and unequal or unfairly structured cities 12

LARRY S. BOURNE AND J. DAVID HULCHANSKI

(Bad­cock 1997; Hamnett 2003). Urban case studies of divided cities have become more common over time (e.g., Hanlon and Vicino 2007; Musterd and Ostendorf 2013; O’Loughlin, Vianney, and Friedrichs 1996), as have nationwide typologies of metropolitan areas (e.g., Hanlon 2009). Less is known, however, about how and to what extent intervening factors, including public policies, might explain differential outcomes in various countries and cities. In their overview of the divided cities research, Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen (2000, 272) warn that, if trends continue, we can expect to see strengthened structural spatial divisions among the quarters of the city, with increased inequality and sharper lines of division among them; wealthy quarters, housing those directly benefiting from increased globalization, and the quarters of the professionals, managers, and technicians that serve them, growing in size; ... quarters of those excluded from the globalizing economy, with their residents more and more isolated and walled in; ... continuing formation of immigrant enclaves of lower-paid workers.

Our research has confirmed much of this scenario. In Canada, research examining social divides points to growing evidence of inequality and polarization (Walks 2011; Walks and Bourne 2006; Walks and Maaranen 2008a). Reports (available on the NCRP website, http://neighbourhoodchange.ca/) prepared by the research team on the cities in the study – Toronto (Hulchanski 2010), Vancouver (Ley and Lynch 2012), Montreal (Leloup  and Rose 2018), Halifax (Prouse, Grant, et al. 2014), Hamilton (Harris, Dunn, and Wakefield 2015), Winnipeg (Distasio and Kaufman 2015), and Calgary (Townshend, Miller, and Evans 2018) – show that neighbourhoods of lower than average incomes and higher than average incomes have increased in number over the last four decades, while neighbourhoods of average income have diminished. The middle is disappearing in our cities. For a nation that had benefited from a growing middle class in the postwar period, and from the opportunities provided by middle-income neighbourhoods, rapid declines in levels of equality hold significance for long-term social mobility and stability, and thus are especially troubling.

Processes of Neighbourhood Change The issues surrounding divided cities, and segregated cities in general, reflect – indeed, assume – the existence of an underlying set of processes that together INEQUALITY AND NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE

13

drive neighbourhood and, more broadly, community change. These processes are many and varied, as are the lenses through which we observe and interpret the outcomes. In broad outline, neighbourhoods undergo change over time in response to both exogenous (external) and internal (local) factors. Some of these transitions are slow; others are relatively rapid. Some drivers of change lead to a complete transformation of physical and social characteristics; others contribute to stability and continuity in terms of that neighbourhood’s relative position within the broader social fabric of the city. Measured in terms of their average or median income as an indicator of socio-economic status, some neighbourhoods move up in the ranking (or hierarchical scale) of social status over time, some stay more or less the same, while others may show relative or absolute decline in their position within the city. The first process is often referred to as upward filtering (through a combination of redevelopment, revitalization, incumbent upgrading, and gentrification), the third as a process of downward filtering or simply decline and disinvestment, often leading to social exclusion, marginalization, and the loss of a sense of community. The social characteristics of neighbourhoods are historically contingent. They reflect, among other factors, the history, style, and organizational structures of residential development, the myopic operation of competitive land markets, and systems of homebuilding and housing provision generally. In cities in the developed world, and especially North American cities in the postwar period, new housing supply is typically mass-produced by private firms in relatively homogeneous blocks, by structure type and price level. These simple attributes define the initial distribution of housing opportunities and prices, and thus the characteristics of residents who live in that housing and in particular neighbourhoods. The composition of the stock is largely dictated by the objectives of developers and builders, based on perceived profit levels and enforced (or in some instances countered) through land-use, building, and zoning regulations, as well as planning practices. This generalized supply process tends to produce neighbourhoods that are more or less homogeneous in terms of both the building stock and an urban social landscape that is correspondingly homogeneous. Consequently, the social geography of urban neighbourhoods, at least initially, can be seen to be designed and produced by market forces in ways that encourage fragmentation (indeed, segregation) of the urban landscape into distinct residential zones according to social status. Most of these processes of change are not neutral in their consequences for individual people and places. Some changes augment and accelerate the uneven imprint of global, national, and citywide forces on conditions of everyday 14

LARRY S. BOURNE AND J. DAVID HULCHANSKI

life. Such local differentiation is especially evident, however, when measured, as in the following case studies, by income differences and related social inequalities. Income is, of course, only one possible measure among many of the degree and extent of urban inequality (McMullin 2004), but it is likely the single best composite index in the absence of consistent long-term data on wealth and social mobility. At the very least, income captures linkages to local labour and housing markets. Moreover, the embeddedness of neighbourhoods in their particular urban landscapes, and in associated social and cultural networks, may make solutions to the negative effects of neighbourhood transition, especially growing social inequalities, even more challenging. The literature offers multiple approaches to and models of how and why neighbourhoods change – indeed, far too many to outline in detail here. In effect, there is no single concept of what a neighbourhood is, nor a dominant theoretical argument or analytical model that outlines the complex mechanisms and processes that move neighbourhoods in one direction or another relative to a regional or metropolitan average. For over a century, academics have tried to understand and explain neighbourhood change, but with only middling success – from studies in sociology and classical urban ecology (e.g., Park, Burgess, and Mackenzie 1925; Smith 1964) and demography (e.g., Clark and Dieleman 1996), to mainstream urban economics (e.g., Grigsby 1963; Segal 1979), and to research by geographers and other scholars (Galster 2001; Slater 2013). Some of these earlier models, as well as historical conceptual­ izations of neighbourhoods, are reviewed by Richard Harris in Chapter 2, and need not be repeated here. Chapter 3 then develops typologies of neigh­ bourhood change based on merging data from the case study cities, further illustrating the diversity of social change in urban Canada. This combination of complexity and local variability argues for the undertaking of comparative urban research as reported in this volume. Despite the complexity, several genres of conceptual models of change are relevant to and underpin, explicitly or implicitly, most empirical studies. Rather than review a sample of these approaches here, the following discussion builds on and then integrates the ideas contained in an extensive body of scholarly literature into a set of generic clusters or categories that are relatively comprehensive but specific to none.1 This approach provides the most flexible framework for the individual case studies to follow. In this framework, some of the traditional approaches are essentially deterministic in seeing neighbourhoods as progressing though a more or less regular life cycle over time as the population and housing stock age and the city grows INEQUALITY AND NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE

15

and expands. At each stage in the life cycle, different factors and pressures for or against change come into play. Conventional economic thought assumes that older dwellings typically depreciate over time, while newly built housing tends to be of higher quality and price, on average. The reality, of course, is much more complicated, especially as individuals may attach differing values to investing or renting in older versus newer housing. Moreover, preferences for particular locations, environmental amenities, and residential settings may change over the life course (or housing career path) and as a city grows (Miron 1993). Other theories emphasize the role of agency in competitive markets for land and housing. These theories usually combine in varying degrees the effects of capital inflows and outflows, speculative real estate behaviour, household mobility decisions, and the role of public institutions. In this cluster, neighbourhoods change through decisions made by a multiplicity of households, institutions, and other agents (such as realtors, landlords, speculators, and investors), in response to external stimuli and local circumstances, and subject to constraints on choice. In such markets, however, not all actors have equal resources at their disposal or necessarily operate with the same objectives and decision criteria. Most obviously, higher-income households can outbid middle- or lower-income households with respect to choices of housing and location, depending on their preferences at any given time. With fewer resources and constrained choice, lower-income groups are assigned to the remaining locations in their search for affordable housing. Through this self-reinforcing process, low-income populations often become increasingly concentrated in the most marginal locations. These locations typically have fewer environmental and social amenities, often lower levels of accessibility, and housing of lower quality. The latter housing stock may be located in the inner city or the suburbs, or both, depending on local physical geographies, the socio-economic and labour market conditions prevailing in any particular city, and – equally important – the differential growth rates of higher- and lower-income groups. Bringing together two of the earlier lines of argument, the tendency for different income groups and classes to separate themselves (by choice or not) within urban space is facilitated and enhanced by increasing income inequality at the larger citywide scale. The tendency to spatial sorting (or enforced segregation) is then further reinforced by rising housing and property prices set within a highly segmented housing market driven largely by the demands of the higher-income households and the actions of financial lending institutions. All of this takes place on a platform of the private ownership of urban land, itself a vehicle for generating social inequalities. 16

LARRY S. BOURNE AND J. DAVID HULCHANSKI

Differences in the aggregate growth rates of income groups are in turn linked to other conceptualizations that emphasize the importance of externally driven employment and occupational changes within the urban economy and their expression in restructuring of local labour markets. Different kinds of employment in both production and consumption spheres have varying wage profiles and location requirements (such as for space and transportation). Some employment sectors, such as manufacturing, logistics, and distribution industries, favour low-density suburban locations that offer more space, lower costs, and highway access. Other sectors – notably high-order services and high-tech firms – are attracted to more central locations. As these sectors grow at different rates – for example, through deindustrialization on the one hand and growth of the service sectors on the other – the job/residence link pulls people in contrasting directions. In conventional economic theory, people follow jobs and neighbourhoods change accordingly. In practice, empirical research over the last several decades in numerous disciplines shows that jobs follow people as frequently as the reverse. The result is neighbourhoods strongly differentiated by their employment and occupational linkages and by changing needs for accessibility to work (Scott 2012; Florida 2017; Miron 2017). Neighbourhoods can also be viewed as collective spatial entities: in effect, as localized baskets of public goods. Such theories – common in economics, sociology, and planning – typically emphasize the role of state institutions and public policies in influencing change through the provision (or lack thereof) of social services, and in the degree that governments offer and then maintain the quality of essential public goods. For most residential areas, the crucial examples of such collective goods include schools, parks, and policing. In urban situations where public services and goods are limited and/or unevenly distributed, neighbourhood quality becomes increasingly unequal. As an additional dimension to this institutional framework, some scholars focus on the complex and often perverse effects of specific public policies: for example, zoning bylaws, related tax and housing policies, and development controls. Zoning, in this context, can be viewed as a public good, yet often is used by those with power and influence to resist change (e.g., NIMBYism) and/or to exclude other groups from specific neighbourhoods, thus limiting housing opportunities (for instance, residents may resist the siting of higher-density and/or affordable housing, homeless shelters, and rental units in communities). Still other approaches to understanding and theorizing neighbourhood change focus specifically on correlated changes in demography and lifestyle, and on the population dynamics of neighbourhoods. Change, according to this INEQUALITY AND NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE

17

set of approaches, then occurs through the intersection of two processes. One is through in situ demographic change (e.g., population aging) and shifts in choices of living arrangement (e.g., household size and composition) among existing residents. The second process combines quantitative and qualitative differences in mobility: that is, the differences between the attributes of people (by age, income level, household status, lifestyle, ethnicity, race, and so on) moving into the neighbourhood and those of people leaving. Despite the relative lack of comparable time-series data on such localized mobility flows, it is evident that how a neighbourhood evolves over time depends on the balance or net effects of these local-area flows. Such flows in turn are linked through complex relationships to broader external forces, such as immigration, that are currently adding to the rate of social transition. In many urban neighbourhoods located in immigrant destination cities, immigration has become a dominant driver of social change in combination with an aging population. In most Canadian cities, the postwar demographic transition, incorporating age cohorts of widely varying size (the result of the baby boom, bust, and echo) largely accounts for the decline in fertility and an aging population, as well as much smaller (especially one-person) households and more diverse families. Households of different size, composition, and incomes have differing housing, service, and locational needs. The result of such transitions has been an urban landscape that is becoming increasingly sharply divided by age cohort (for example, contrasting the young and the elderly), and thus by lifestyle, status, and income. Finally, these changes intersect with broader spatial processes that have altered, and continue to alter, urban form and neighbourhood composition. Undoubtedly, the dominant process in most cities over the postwar period has been suburbanization: growth on the urban fringe. This process is both a cause and a consequence of the factors of change described briefly above. The overwhelming majority of new housing supply and population growth in Can­adian cities has been accommodated in newly built suburbs. Each new suburban development, in theory, alters the relative position of existing neighbourhoods within a city, depending on the strength of submarket effects and changes in residential preferences. The second and parallel process within the built environment is one of the continual rebuilding, redevelopment, and replace­­ ment within the existing housing stock and inherited neighbourhood fabric of physical facilities. Examples of this process are evident in the earlier (1960s) apartment boom in most cities and the explosion in condominium construction since the 1970s. Over time, the pendulum of residential investment and 18

LARRY S. BOURNE AND J. DAVID HULCHANSKI

reinvestment activity shifts repeatedly (e.g., through a process of capital switching) between these two processes, especially in the rapidly growing and larger urban areas. This shift depends in part on aggregate rates of demographic change, alternative lifestyle choices, and changing levels of profitability (and rates of return) in real property investment. The shift also depends in part on community resistance to change and on public policy, including zoning and infrastructure provision. A third spatial process overlays these two physical processes within the built environment and combines with the effects of changes in social status in which one social class replaces another. One form of this process is gentrification, or social upgrading as higher-income groups displace and replace middleand lower-income groups in selected (usually older) neighbourhoods (Ley 1996; Walks and Maaranen 2008a, 2008b; Walks 2014). This transition is most evident in some of the larger, service-based, and growing cities. The contrasting process, involving a marked decline in the social status of neighbourhoods, is reflected in decreasing incomes, disinvestment, and deterioration as middle- or medium-income groups are replaced by those of lower income. The result is that neighbourhoods are driven further apart. Each of the case study chapters to follow illustrates, implicitly or explicitly, different amalgams of these processes as they apply to the individual metropolitan areas under study. Over time, theories and models of neighbourhood change have tended to become more complex, nuanced, and multi-scalar in the sense of incorporating a diverse set of determinants and processes of change operating at different spatial scales. They have, on the one hand, become more inclusive of alternative research paradigms and, on the other, more focused on relatively specific issues and outcomes, such as residential displacement and racial discrimination. Some approaches have become more cultural in the sense of focusing on social norms, networks, and identities, while others, in contrast, have become more abstract and statistical, as in the example of simulation and associated evolutionary models (Byrne 2018). Nonetheless, the basic processes of interest remain much the same. Neighbourhood change is not by definition a problem. As argued above, the empirical evidence and the relevant theoretical propositions demonstrate that neighbourhoods are always changing, evolving, and adapting to changing contextual environments. Change is the rule, not the exception, as the authors of Chapter 3 and the individual case study chapters in this book clearly show. Nor are relatively homogeneous neighbourhoods a problem per se, even among lower-income households. There are clearly some benefits for residents living INEQUALITY AND NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE

19

in more or less homogeneous neighbourhoods – for example, in offering support through kinship ties, social networks, shared information on lived experiences and on housing and employment opportunities, and access to appropriate public and private services. Problems arise, as demonstrated in the divided cities literature, when change is too rapid, uneven, and destabilizing, and when it works to augment existing levels of spatial polarization, social alienation, and economic marginalization. Homogeneous neighbourhoods can also become problematic when they concentrate poverty and disadvantaged populations, and thus limit the residents’ social mobility; when they concentrate the wealthy (what Marcuse [1997] calls the “citadels”), thus working to enhance the status and prestige of their inhabitants, often at public expense; and if and when they become a source of and vehicle for exclusion, uneven service provision, and/or loss of community. Finally, the dynamics of neighbourhood change and the reality of divided cities are often associated, as both cause and effect, with the process of segregation, on which there is a massive and complex literature (e.g., Carr and Kutty 2009; Bourne and Walks 2011; Nightingale 2012; Byrne 2018). Indeed, there is often overlap in the literature from which both concepts derive. For example, the most recent OECD study of urban inequalities is set explicitly within the divided cities paradigm and draws on theories of segregation as the primary driving force of change (OECD 2018). Yet the concepts, although complementary, are different. Segregation as a process of separation and exclusion is much broader in the sense that it can apply to separation in the varied spheres of labour markets, employment, education, and social services, among others. It is, in effect, both a process and an outcome. Although segregation as a process of spatial separation can result from preferences and choices, it is more frequently equated with intentional exclusion, overt discrimination, and involuntary choices (or no choice). This is especially the case for vulnerable population groups and minorities. As such, identifying and evaluating segregation processes provides an additional component in understanding the unequal outcomes often associated with neighbourhood change processes.

The Canadian Urban Context Part of the external context necessary for understanding neighbourhood dynamics is the country’s emerging national urban fabric. Neighbourhood change in any city is both set within and a reflection of the broader context of structural changes within the Canadian urban system writ large. By urban system here we 20

LARRY S. BOURNE AND J. DAVID HULCHANSKI

mean the set or network of cities that interact with each other to collectively organize the economy and social fabric of the country. It is largely through this system that trade, technology, and other global influences are imported, shaped, filtered, and then redistributed among urban centres. The primary conduits for importing and then reallocating these elements are typically the largest metropolitan areas at the top of the urban hierarchy. An extensive international literature now elaborates on these concepts at the global scale (Pumain and Reuillon 2017) and outlines the view of urban Canada that they represent (Bourne et al. 2011; Filion et al. 2015; Bourne and Simmons 2018). Where cities are situated within the Canadian urban system matters for understanding change at the intra-urban scale and specifically for neighbourhood change, precisely because this situation influences the scale and impacts of external sources of change. No local communities exist in isolation. Within the broad urban system framework outlined above, each of the following seven case studies (Chapters 4 through 10) systematically identifies specific properties of the individual metropolitan areas under study and considers how local histories, geographies, politics, and demographics influence neighbourhood transitions. As part of this context, it is useful here to examine, at least briefly, how the continual reorganization of the Canadian urban system over the last few decades may or may not be reflected in localized changes within cities. It would, of course, be surprising if trends operating at larger spatial scales were not related to local neighbourhood transitions, albeit in complex ways over time and in varying degrees across the country. The Canadian system of cities has evolved substantially over the last three or four decades in response to city-specific attributes in tandem with external or macro-scale factors and drivers of change. The latter include the imprints of economic restructuring and social change contingent on shifts in the national economy and social fabric and by heightened global interdependencies generally. Specifically, and with respect to Canada, such changes reflect shifting trade and capital flows, new labour market and employment dynamics, increased immigration and demographic transitions, as well as volatile commodity prices and rapid technological innovation, to name but a few (Wolfe and Gertler 2016). The evidence to date suggests that these drivers in combination are creating new forms of difference, even new fault lines, within the urban system overall and within individual cities (Bourne and Simmons 2003; Walks 2011; Simmons and Bourne 2013). Canadian cities and their metropolitan areas differ widely in attributes: population size, historical inheritance, regional culture, economic base, and INEQUALITY AND NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE

21

relative position and ranking within the urban system. Table 1.1 provides selected comparative indices for the seven case study metropolitan areas, to highlight the differences and similarities among places. The most obvious difference is the immense range in population size: from 400,000 in Halifax to over 6.4 million in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Some cities in the study have highly specialized economies, others are more diversified. Some are growing relatively rapidly, others are not. Growth rates over the study period (1980– 2016) ranged from 33% in Winnipeg and 38% in Hamilton to nearly 135% in Calgary. Some cities have older and rapidly aging populations, others remain relatively youthful. Some have a greater ethno-cultural mix, including large visible minority populations. The latter index varies from 11.4% in Halifax and 17.8% in Hamilton to 48.9% in Vancouver and over 51% in Toronto in 2016. Immigration levels vary in tandem, from just 9.4% in Halifax and 23.4% in Montreal to nearly 41% in Vancouver and over 46% in Toronto. Note also the uniquely high concentration of Indigenous populations in Winnipeg. More­ over, not all cities have witnessed the same mix of growth factors or felt similar impacts from recent global and structural changes. Some cities have benefited more from these shifts than others, reflecting their history, economies, social structure, and most obviously their location and functional role within the broader urban system. These differences, in turn, are reflected both directly and indirectly in the wide variety of neighbourhood-level changes in inequalities analyzed in the case studies in this book. Perhaps the most obvious prominent structural change in the national ur­ ban system over the last few decades is the continued concentration of population, wealth, and the levers of economic (financial and corporate) power in the country’s larger metropolitan areas, notably in Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and Calgary (and in other large cities – Edmonton, Ottawa, Quebec City – not included in the case studies). This concentration process obviously mirrors a broader global trend in heightened urbanization and the rapid expansion of large metropolitan regions. Traditional development theory suggests that concentration of growth in large cities reflects the continued importance of agglomeration and localization economies in mature market economies, and thus the benefits for producers, workers, and consumers of concentration within larger urban centres (Polèse 2009; Scott 2012). Such cities also enjoy strong connections to the global stage. These connections include economic (firm-based, and sector- or cluster-based) interdependencies, the attraction of substantial inflows of capital investment, and high levels of immigration. As a result, the

22

LARRY S. BOURNE AND J. DAVID HULCHANSKI

5,905.8

7,127.1

1,371.9

5,306.8

5,110.2

2,882.7

Toronto CMA

Toronto GTA

Hamilton

Winnipeg

Calgary

Vancouver 24,342,875

1,268,183

592,743

584,842

542,095

3,417,700

2,998,947

2,828,349

277,727

Population, 1981

35,151,728

2,463,431

1,392,609

778,489

747,545

6,417,516

5,928,040

4,098,927

403,390

Population, 2016

44.4

94.2

134.9

33.1

37.9

87.8

97.7

44.9

45.2

Population growth, 1981–2016 (%)

4.9

2.5

3.0

12.2

2.0

0.9

0.8

0.9

4.0

Aboriginal identity, 2016 (%)

21.9

40.8

29.4

23.9

24.1

44.1

46.2

23.4

9.4

Immigrants, 2016 (%)

22.3

48.9

33.7

25.7

17.8

48.8

51.4

22.6

11.4

Visible minorities, 2016 (%)

2.5

2.5

2.6

2.5

2.5

2.7

2.7

2.3

2.3

Mean household size, 2016

Notes:  CMA = census metropolitan area; GTA = Greater Toronto Area; n.a. = not applicable. Toronto GTA calculated from City of Toronto, Peel, York, Durham, and Halton regional totals. Source:  Statistics Canada, Census of Canada data for 1981 and 2016.

n.a.

4,604.3

Montreal

Canada

5,496.3

Halifax

CMA geographic size, 2016 (km2)

Characteristics of the seven study cities and Canada

TABLE 1.1

40.6

41.0

37.4

39.8

41.6

39.8

39.7

40.6

40.9

Median age, 2016

larger cities tend to have a different mix of activities and proportionally more high-order (or specialized) economic functions (e.g., finance, logistics, culture, new media, information technologies) and newer employment groups (e.g., the creative classes) than do smaller places (Wolfe and Gertler 2016; Florida 2017). These, in turn, produce sharper labour market cleavages and more polarized occupational structures within larger cities, characterized by more of the higher- and lower-income cohorts, and on average more diverse population and demographic profiles. As working hypotheses, we might then expect to observe higher income inequalities, both citywide and spatially, in those cities that on average have larger populations, are growing more rapidly, and have service-based rather than manufacturing economies, proportionally more recent immigrants and minority groups, and younger populations, as well as stronger global ties through global capital flows and corporate interdependencies (Pumain and Reuillon 2017; Rosenblat, Pumain, and Velasquez 2018). The latter set of factors, as in­ dictors of globalization, are the most difficult to measure and evaluate, and aside from differences in levels of immigration are not directly addressed here. The empirical evidence offered in the case study chapters generally supports these hypotheses, but with considerable variation from place to place. Income inequalities have been increasing almost everywhere, and most prominently at the local or neighbourhood scale. Indeed, inequalities measured at different spatial scales have been increasing faster than at the aspatial or structural scale, especially since the 1990s. The importance of place and neighbourhood in discussions regarding macro-level inequalities has thus been confirmed. The greatest increase in inequality has been in the rapidly growing and relatively wealthy cities of Toronto and Calgary, while smaller increases in inequality typically appear in slower-growing cities (Halifax, Winnipeg, Hamilton). The highest levels of inequality are associated with cities that are the dominant addresses of high-order economic establishments and professional occupations, and that are the primary destinations of recent immigrants. The latter cities have on average younger population profiles and different workforce com­positions, which add to the economic contrasts between urban places and among neighbourhoods.

Crafting a National Study: Issues, Themes, and Methods The research reported in this book builds on previous work that, with the assistance of community partners, identified and mapped trends in neighbourhood 24

LARRY S. BOURNE AND J. DAVID HULCHANSKI

inequality and polarization in Toronto since the early 1970s (Hulchanski 2007, 2010). The same analysis was then carried out for Montreal and Vancouver, and subsequently for Halifax, Hamilton, Winnipeg, and Calgary. This work has been extensively analyzed and widely taken up in the mass media, teaching, public policy discussions, and community programs. Bringing to bear additional data sources, expertise from multiple policy areas, and qualitative case study data, our multidisciplinary seven-city partnership provided the opportunity to consolidate and build upon current neighbourhood-focused research and interventions by municipalities and non-governmental organizations across Canada. Prior to this research partnership, little was known about how neighbourhoods were changing in the broader Canadian urban context. Our research focused on the nature, causes, and consequences of socio-spatial inequality and polarization. We selected the seven metropolitan areas to include the largest urban regions and to ensure regional representation from Atlantic and Western Canada. In 2016, the seven census metropolitan areas (CMAs) had a combined population of over 15.8 million (45% of the national population) and registered 62% of Canada’s population growth between 2011 and 2016. Together the CMAs received 920,000 (71%) of Canada’s immigrant arrivals (permanent residents) between 2011 and 2015. Working with local community partners (including NGOs and local governments), teams of researchers in the seven metropolitan areas faced two major challenges: a research challenge concerning identification of the trajectories, causes, and consequences of neighbourhood trends, and a policy challenge with respect to responding to social change at the neighbourhood level. To answer our key questions about neighbourhood change trends, we use census tract–level data to track where and how change is occurring in each of the case study metropolitan areas. While George Galster (2001), Ivan Town­ shend (2002), and Ivan Townshend and Wayne Davies (1999), among many others, offer varying definitions of neighbourhood, to facilitate data collection and analysis we chose to consider a neighbourhood as a geographic area defined statistically as a census tract (CT): an average of about 4,500 people in the Canadian census. We acknowledge the limitations of using census tracts as a proxy for neighbourhoods. On the one hand, a standardized statistical unit does not always approximate a meaningful social and spatial unit for both residents and policy makers. Nor is the uniform population size of census tracts equally appropriate for analyses of metropolitan areas of differing sizes and social complexity. On the other hand, census tracts offer the benefits of spatial units based INEQUALITY AND NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE

25

on uniform definitional criteria that are generally consistent over time – both essential components for long-term time-series analysis. They provide by far the largest and most comprehensive data source available for small-area urban research. The research in the following chapters provides narratives and sets of maps that show how each census tract in a CMA changed in average individual income between 1980 and 2015. At the outset of the project, we had to make numerous decisions as to what measures and timeframe to use. The income data refer to total income from all sources reported for the year before the census (i.e., 1980 income from the 1981 census). We decided to use average individual income instead of median income because of its availability back to the 1971 census (offering a longer period of analysis for the largest cities). Use of the average as the basic metric is necessary for most inequality measures (e.g., Gini coefficients), which cannot use the median; the average also has the benefit of being sensitive to the proportions of very high and very low incomes. We use individual income instead of household income primarily because of complexities introduced by the substantial decrease in average household size (from 3.5 people per household in 1971 to 2.4 in 2016), as well as dramatic changes in household composition over the decades being studied (Statistics Canada 2014). Households changed markedly in terms of the number of workers and dependents over the period. Individual income also has the advantage of linking directly to labour market performance and thus better reflecting the socio-economic status of individuals residing in a neighbourhood. A household may, for example, have several people working at low-wage jobs, thereby appearing collectively to be middle or even high income, and, by implication, of middle or high socio-economic status. Finally, the most rapidly increasing type of household in urban Canada is the single-person household (the equivalent of the individual). A decrease in the average size of households, even without population increase, requires more housing supply for a given population size, which can in turn drive neighbourhood change. We use before-tax income as the basic metric because data on after-tax income (although also desirable as a metric) are not available prior to the 2006 census, which poses severe limitations for any long-term time-series analysis. Use of before-tax income means that the inequality trends observed here reflect labour market forces as well as government interventions through benefit and transfer payments, but exclude the effects of differential tax rates. Finally, we use average individual income of the entire CMA (rather than national averages)

26

LARRY S. BOURNE AND J. DAVID HULCHANSKI

as the benchmark of comparison for neighbourhoods, despite the potential biases it introduces, because it relates most effectively to the local CMA cost of living and local labour market and employment conditions. Our research focused on understanding which neighbourhoods have experienced the greatest change, at least in terms of income, and measuring the extent of that change. For the empirical analysis, the team grouped neighbourhoods based on their “relative” income level, and then constructed standardized income measures that are comparable across CMAs and over time. To facilitate comparison, given that CMAs vary widely in their income level, we converted actual average (individual) income in each census tract to income ratios. These ratios were calculated for each census year for each CT relative to – that is, as a ratio of – the overall average income for their CMA. For example, an income ratio of 1.00 indicates that a CT has the same average income as the CMA of which it is a part, at that point in time. A ratio of 1.40 indicates that the tract has an average income 40% higher than the CMA average, or 140% of its CMA average. While such categories are necessarily arbitrary, we used trial and error to develop a consistent way of classifying neighbourhoods across CMAs and over time. Five basic categories were developed. Tracts with average incomes 140% of the average of the CMA in which they are located, or higher, were classified as “very high income.” Tracts whose average incomes range from 120% of the CMA average up to (but less than) 140% were classified as “high income.” Tracts whose average income is only 60% or less were classified as “very low income,” and those whose income ranged from 60% to 80% were defined as “low income.” Tracts were defined as “middle income” if their average income was between 80% and 120% of the relevant CMA average. Neighbourhoods that transition from one category to another (especially when middle-income neighbourhoods shift into other categories) provide one clear indication of the scale and direction of neighbourhood change. Finally, through analysis of neighbourhood change, we then classified neighbourhoods into three broad groups, following the discussion of neighbourhood dynamics outlined earlier in this chapter. Neighbourhoods that have seen their income ratios rise substantially over time are described as upgrading or “gaining ground.” Neighbourhoods that have witnessed substantial relative decline in their income ratios are obviously “losing ground.” Neigh­ bourhoods that have seen little substantial change in their income ratios over time are defined as stable or “holding ground” within that CMA. This simple

INEQUALITY AND NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE

27

but robust framework for charting neighbourhood trajectories over time has both facilitated and animated comparison of the case studies of neighbourhood change to follow.

Looking Ahead: Ideas, Implications, and Lessons Learned The research presented in this book is the first and most thorough documentation and comparative analysis of long-term socio-spatial trends in income inequalities for Canadian metropolitan areas. As such, it provides a broad basis for an improved understanding and critical analysis of urban dynamics generally, and for addressing specific questions of theoretical and practical import regarding the causal factors and implications of neighbourhood change and deepening social inequalities. The primary research questions revolve around the need to document empirically and then analyze the nature and origins of neighbourhood change in urban Canada and the consequences of those changes. Our analyses reaffirm the importance of incorporating a neighbourhoodscale focus in discussions of inequalities writ large. While structural (societal) inequalities seem endemic in market-based or capitalist economic systems, localized or neighbourhood inequalities are not simple mirror images of those broader trends. Indeed, while neighbourhood inequalities are on average lower (as measured by Gini coefficients) than those experienced by households, they have been increasing at a faster rate than either individual or household-level inequalities, and at the national or regional (e.g., provincial) scale. People, it seems, continue to sort themselves – through a process of selective spatial sorting or through intentional exclusion and segregation – into parallel but separate and unequal universes of urban residential space. Thus, urban areas in Canada, as elsewhere in the developed world, are becoming more emphatically partitioned or divided into relatively homogeneous zones, not only by income and class but also by ethnic origin, race, immigration status, and age. The importance of these divisions lies in their substantial impacts on the quality of urban life, social mobility, and the sustainability of political and institutional systems. Despite the multiplicity of conceptual and analytical frameworks through which to study neighbourhood change, a degree of commonality appears in the underlying dynamics, notably the dominant role of competitive real estate and housing markets. Those dynamics are shaped by factors deriving largely from

28

LARRY S. BOURNE AND J. DAVID HULCHANSKI

exogenous sources, such as economic restructuring, globalization, and national policy regimes, but they intersect with the decisions of myriad households and decision agents at the local level. That decision landscape is not equal, however. Our research demonstrates, for instance, that the well-to-do have the power to influence and shape change in directions that suit them and reflect their social status and preferences. This power is often aided and abetted by institutional practices such as exclusionary zoning, regressive tax policies, and the biased and uneven provision of public goods and services. One outcome of the intersection of economic restructuring and spatial sorting appears to be that middleclass or middle-income neighbourhoods are being squeezed between increasing concentrations of marginalized populations and lower-income groups and expanding elite and newly gentrified areas. In some cities, disadvantaged populations (often visible minorities) are concentrated in the traditional inner-city neighbourhoods; in other cities, especially the larger and more rapidly growing cities, they are concentrating in the mature inner suburbs, where older and frequently deteriorating housing offers at least some relief from mounting affordability pressures, but at a cost in terms of access to jobs and social services. The case studies illustrate the complexity and diversity of changes in social structure, residential land use, and social polarization within Canadian cities, even though those cities share a common space of the national economy, cultural norms, and political institutions. Cities are shaped both by their relative position within the larger Canadian urban system and by their contrasting social attributes, economic structures, and labour markets. Especially important in the process of neighbourhood differentiation in Canada is the city’s recent experience (e.g., level and sources) of immigration and the associated growth of visible minority and culturally distinct populations. One further challenge for research and policy is that these attributes vary so widely across the country. It is important to impose a critical interpretive lens on any conceptual models or policy frameworks when these are applied to cities of differing size, histories, and inherited social geographies. Understanding local geographies, then, is an important part of the search for answers and potential solutions to existing and emerging inequalities, and is also important for achieving more just and equitable cities. Even if most drivers of inequality originate primarily at the global, national, or citywide scale, local governments still have a critical role in mitigating these inequalities. Govern­ ments can do so through their influence over and controls on, for example, land-use regulation, housing supply processes, employment lands designation,

INEQUALITY AND NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE

29

inclusionary zoning, immigrant and refugee services, and the provision of public goods and infrastructure generally. To what extent municipalities use these tools to reduce growing neighbourhood inequality remains to be seen. The study results highlight the necessity of grounding what are often abstract theoretical discussions of globalization writ large with parallel studies of local places. Neighbourhoods, even if subject to frequent transitions, are the lived-in reality for most people, affecting access to jobs, services, and social networks. Place and process matter. Furthermore, the resulting analyses contribute directly to the international scholarly literature on divided cities and our understanding of spatial inequalities by offering an additional set of examples that are comparable – for better or worse – to cities in other Western market economies, with different geographical conditions and political systems. Can­ adian cities offer concrete examples of progress (or lack thereof) in acknowledging and addressing inequalities, but equally likely examples of problems that need to be examined through further research and public policy initiatives. In addition, the case studies offer examples of the constantly shifting balance of global factors and locally based processes of change. Finally, the empirical analyses themselves should contribute to better-informed and evidence-based policies and programs aimed at reducing socio-spatial inequalities and thereby enhancing both social justice and economic inclusiveness. In sum, this study raises as many issues and questions as it answers. Note

1 For a detailed bibliography on divided cities and neighbourhood change, see Hulchanski (2018).

30

LARRY S. BOURNE AND J. DAVID HULCHANSKI

2 Plus ça Change: Neighbourhood Inequality in Canadian Cities since 1900 Richard Harris

Lately, many Canadians have begun to worry about the way the poor are increasingly concentrated in our cities, and, in particular, about its effects on the lives of those who live in such areas. Social workers, educators, police, planners, politicians, researchers, and residents are all affected. In a general way, we understand that several social trends have contributed to the problem. Of prime importance have been the growth of income inequality and the reemergence of precarious labour markets. These developments have coincided with high levels of immigration, so that large numbers of newcomers have found it difficult to get work that fits their training and skills. Racism, often subtle, has also played a part in the rental market. It may seem that these are the issues that policy makers, among others, need to address. It may also seem obvious that this perfect storm is new. After all, two generations ago, secure lifetime employment was a plausible dream, at least for men, and Canadian incomes were more equal. Even a generation ago, most immigrants could find decent work, get ahead, and acquire homes. Times have indeed changed. But if we take a longer view, it becomes less clear which period we should regard as exceptional: today or the 1950s. Taking the long view, we can see another time in Canada’s history when social observers and politicians wrung their hands about living conditions and economic prospects within urban neighbourhoods that included the ghettos and slums of the immigrant poor. Those observers, too, worried about the dysfunctional effects of concentrated poverty, and the barriers of adjustment to

31

Canadian ways, expressed in terms often guided by crude cultural stereotypes. Welcome to the 1910s. In this chapter, I consider how, once before, we witnessed great income and neighbourhood inequality, to illustrate how things have changed. It is useful to adopt a long-range view to bring to the surface those elements that shape the neighbourhood experience but are less immediately apparent and taken for granted. This, in turn, can suggest policies that might otherwise have been overlooked.

The Challenges of Historical Comparison Social inequality, and its expression in residential areas, has various dimensions, including housing conditions, health outcomes, and educational opportunity. The most fundamental, however, are income and wealth, for they shape the experience of other social distinctions, notably those of gender, ethnicity, and race. Neighbourhoods are tricky to define and identify. Most observers agree that they can be distinguished along two dimensions: social and physical (Keller 1968; Galster 2001). These often coincide, but not always, and neither routinely points to clear boundaries. Except where there are prominent physical features, one residential area often shades into the next, so that residents and outsiders may differ as to where to draw boundaries. In the late 1960s, for example, residents of the working-class area just east of Toronto’s downtown referred to their neighbourhood as “East of Parliament,” but outsiders knew it as Cabbagetown (Lorimer and Phillips 1971). Indeed, because people define their vicinity egocentrically, those who lived on or near Parliament probably saw that street as the spine of their neighbourhood, those living further away as its boundary. Most residents see themselves as living in several zones, one nested within the other. Current residents of Halifax’s West End recognize several smaller communities, including Ardcrest, Ardmore, and Westmount (Mason 2011). In Kingston’s North End in the 1960s, locals acknowledged subareas such as the Near North, Kingscourt, and Rideau Heights (Harris 1988, 61–63). We commonly identify several scales: the block, or voisinage; a larger area extending over several blocks; and beyond that a whole district (Downs 1981). And then, of course, there are the territories defined by government agencies, such as school catchment areas. Since the late 1940s, when provincial governments compelled municipalities to develop comprehensive zoning plans, the most important bureaucratically defined areas have included planning districts. These often-used boundaries were at first irrelevant to residents, with names locals 32

RICHARD HARRIS

did not recognize. And so outside agencies have often further complicated the ground-up, nested way that urban Canadians have viewed their home turf. One other context shapes the scale, character, and salience of neighbourhoods: city size. Small cities offer fewer opportunities for subgroups to segregate, thereby creating defined residential areas. A nice illustration is provided by Galt, Ontario, which grew from a population of 7,535 in 1891 to 11,852 in 1915. The small subdivision of Dickson’s Hill, which accommodated the town’s elite, absorbed some growth (Hagopian 1999). Individual blocks were homogeneous but the neighbourhood overall was mixed, the southern half being working class. Because towns and small cities lacked public transit and every part was reachable on foot, residents had few reasons to distinguish one area from another. The reduced salience of neighbourhoods in smaller places is one reason why it is unfortunate that most researchers have spoken only about large urban centres. It is also why we need to be careful when making historical comparisons. Canadian cities are far larger now than a century ago. In 1901, at a quarter of a million, the population of Montreal, the largest Canadian city, was half that of modern-day Hamilton. Even in Montreal, segregation was often small-scale: income and wealth varied greatly from block to block (Olson and Thornton 2011, 258). The potential for and possible scales of neighbourhood inequality were more limited in those smaller centres.

Cycles of Neighbourhood Inequality Neighbourhood inequality matters chiefly because it adversely affects the lives and life chances of those who live in the poorest districts. Inequality has two aspects: degree and location. Both have changed over the past century. A Rise and Fall, and Rise Again

In most Canadian cities, neighbourhood inequality increased in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The best evidence comes from case studies of residential segregation, which are meaningful because if segregation exists, then neighbourhoods must differ. Since early census counts did not collect income data, researchers have used property assessment records to identify a related variable: occupation. They have employed a segregation index that, like a percentage, ranges from 0 (no segregation) to 100 (complete). A study of Montreal showed that between 1861 and 1901 the segregation of skilled workers jumped from 17 to 26, with more modest increases for semi-skilled (18– 20) and unskilled (24–29) workers (Lewis 1991, 139). This sort of trend was PLUS ÇA CHANGE

33

apparent in smaller centres too: Alan Artibise (1975, 151) suggested that in the 1880s “a series of distinctive residential environments” developed in Winnipeg. The trend toward segregation continued as cities boomed after the depression of the 1890s. In Winnipeg, occupational segregation increased between 1901 and 1921 (Hiebert 1991, 63, 70). The index value for the most segregated groups, managers/professionals and unskilled workers, rose from 28 to 36 and from 24 to 31, respectively. The evidence for Hamilton covers the longest period and is available at two scales: ward and block. At the latter scale, which is more socially meaningful, occupational segregation fell in the 1880s and 1890s but rose steadily into the Great Depression (Doucet and Weaver 1991, 451). Then, between the 1930s and 1960s, block-scale segregation stabilized: it increased for those at each end of the occupational spectrum (professionals, proprietors, and unskilled labourers) but declined for most wage earners. Hamilton was growing rapidly, with the potential for social segregation increasing. There is no way of knowing whether the mixed pattern in mid-century Hamilton was typical. Because occupational categories and scales of analysis differ, none of these historical studies are comparable with research on the postwar period, which relies on census data. There is abundant evidence, however, that residential inequality has been rising since the 1970s, just as it did a century ago (Walks 2013b). Statistically, then, we find historical precedent for the current experience. The precedent is confirmed, and its character clarified, by considering shifts in the public conversation. This is apparent in usage of the term “neighbourhood” in newspapers. As Figure 2.1 shows, a keyword search of the digital archive of the Globe and Mail shows that after 1901 the frequency of use of “neighbourhood” in the titles of articles peaked twice: first in the 1910s and 1920s and then, more strikingly, since the 1970s. There are several reasons why such usage has risen since the 1970s, including a surge in grassroots activism, but a long-term cycle in residential inequality has also played a part. The difficulty is that the word “neighbourhood” has varied connotations, which have changed over time. Some linked terms remained positive, such as community, reciprocity, and a degree of enclosure. But in the early twentieth century, more negative ones became common. “Neighbourhood” was used to refer to inner-city districts with many low-income immigrants. These districts were seen as “neglected” (James 2001, 16), in need of what Mariana Valverde (1991, 134) called “the sunlight of knowledge.” Settlement houses, many established by churches, provided a local base for neighbourhood workers, commonly middle-class female volunteers, who offered instruction in literacy, 34

RICHARD HARRIS

FIGURE 2.1 The relative frequency of the word “neighbourhood” in the Globe and Mail, 1900–2009

Note:  To compensate for variations in the number of words in the newspaper, the usage frequency of “neighbourhood” was standardized relative to the decade 1960–69 by comparing with usage of “and.” Source:  Compiled from Micromedia Proquest, The Globe and Mail Canada’s Heritage from 1844.

hygiene, and organizational skills. When J.S. Woodsworth (1911), the Meth­ odist founder of Canada’s first settlement house in Winnipeg, called attention to the problems faced by poor immigrants, he titled his book My Neighbor. Similarly, in 1918, Toronto volunteers formed a Neighbourhood Workers’ As­ soci­ation (my emphasis). In Canada, “neighbourhood” often signified places occupied by poor immigrants. The Depression changed the conversation. Incomes fell, poverty rates rose, and conditions in some neighbourhoods deteriorated so that the districts were seen to pose a health hazard. In Montreal in 1921, infant mortality rates per thousand live births were five times higher in the poor immigrant areas of Ste-Marie (214) and St-Henri (213) than in St-George (44) or Westmount (55) (Copp 1974, 94). The working-class Francophone areas that Herbert Ames (1972) called the “city below the hill” were little better. The Depression underlined geographical contrasts. Among housing activists and social reformers, such as those with the League for Social Reconstruction (1975, 451–63; orig. pub. 1935), “slum” and “blight” became operative terms. Slum neighbourhoods then connoted poor housing and low incomes, rather than immigrants. An official slum report in Montreal used the language of race, but only to distinguish English from French; its references to slum residents separated only the deserving from the undeserving poor (Montreal Board of Trade 1935, 8). New to the 1930s was an understanding that slums were an economic and social liability. Blighted areas discourage investment, reduce tax revenues, and PLUS ÇA CHANGE

35

harbour deviance, and so impose net costs on the municipality. Here, thinking in Canada was shaped by the arguments of Henry Whipple Green, who in 1934 drafted a report on Cleveland that calculated that slum clearance and redevelopment made economic sense (Navin and Associates 1934). The argument was picked up in Montreal and Toronto, shaping discussions about public housing into the 1950s (Montreal Board of Trade 1935, 5, 22; Rose 1958, 202– 6). In his study of the Strathcona area of Vancouver, for example, Leonard Marsh (1950, ix, 23–32) argued that, because “social ills cost money,” this “deficit area” was costing the City of Vancouver twice as much as property owners returned in taxes. Experts came to see slums as being connected to other neighbourhoods through the housing market. The mechanism became known as filtering, whereby dwellings erected for the middle class deteriorated, declined in value, and were occupied by households with successively lower incomes (Harris 2012). Belief in this mechanism was used to justify the growing assumption that neighbourhood decline was inevitable, a decline that the Depression had merely hastened. In Montreal, for example, the influential Dozois report spoke of “degrees of deterioration,” recognizing a dynamic continuum of housing that was expressed geographically (City of Montreal 1954, 4). If decline was inevitable, the policy prescription seemed clear: slum clearance. Clearance was the policy established in Britain since the 1870s and adopted in the United States from the 1930s (Harris 2020). Toronto was the first Canadian city to act. In the 1940s, the Toronto City Planning Board (Toronto [Ont.] Planning Board 1943) declared much of the city south of College Street ripe for demolition (Figure 2.2). By 1949, the municipality started to obliterate part of Cabbagetown to create Regent Park, Canada’s first public housing project (Rose 1958). New federal legislation facilitated the process, and a year later Marsh (1950) recommended that it be used in Strathcona (Murray 2011). The new type of public recognition presumed that neighbourhood inequality had become widespread. Postwar prosperity changed the conversation again. The main urban story of the 1950s and 1960s was of suburban growth on an unprecedented scale (Harris 2004). The prominence of slums in public discourse waned; by the late 1960s, the term was falling out of favour in Canada, partly because many of the most deteriorated areas had been eliminated but also because it is pejorative. To some, “slum” denigrates local residents; to others it now refers to shantytowns in the Global South (Davis 2006; Mayne 2017). Instead, as residential inequality has surged since the 1980s, researchers, planners, and politicians have employed

36

RICHARD HARRIS

FIGURE 2.2 The geography of Toronto’s slums, 1944

Source:  Lemon (1985, 105).

other terms, such as “quartiers défavorisés” (disadvantaged), “neighbourhood improvement areas,” “areas of concentrated poverty,” “strong neighbourhoods,” or “priority neighbourhoods.” As noted in Chapter 4, variants of these terms are still used, but each soon acquires negative connotations, prompting a neverending search for something new and unsullied.

PLUS ÇA CHANGE

37

And so everywhere the language has changed. A century ago, “neighbourhood” was used as an adjective to refer to the community houses or volunteers found in the poorest areas of the city; today, it is a noun with positive connotations that requires other adjectives to signify deprivation. But in both periods significant inequality was acknowledged. A Geography Turned Inside Out and Outside In

If inequality has reappeared, it is not doing so in the same sorts of places. For the first half of the twentieth century, the best-documented experience was that of Toronto (Harney 1985; Harris 1996; Lorinc et al. 2016). There, low-income immigrants settled in two types of areas: the inner city and the suburban fringe. These were affordable in different ways. Downtown, in districts such as The Ward, households crowded into cheap, poorly maintained dwellings (Lorinc et al. 2015). Single people boarded or lodged; families took them in to help cover the mortgage or rent (Harris 1996, 116–22). In suburbs such as Earlscourt, families bought cheap, unserviced lots and built shacks or modest homes. The inner neighbourhoods invariably attracted attention, in part because of their location but mainly because they were occupied by “foreigners”: mostly Jews and other European immigrants. The more numerous British immigrants settled the suburbs. Toronto’s experience was distinctive in the number and proportion of British immigrants that it received, and in the extent of their suburban settlement. Other cities, notably Winnipeg, received proportionately more Euro­pean immigrants, some finding their way into parts of the North End that were effectively suburban. British immigrants built their homes in the east end of Hamilton, in the Winnipeg suburb of Elmwood, and in South Vancouver. European immigrants crowded into “plexes” (one apartment over another) on either side of Montreal’s St-Urbain corridor, and in smaller clusters in many other cities. A dual inner city/outer suburban concentration of poverty was the norm. But around many cities most suburbs were not poor. The 1920s saw the growth of planned, affluent suburbs. Some were laid out before the First World War: Victoria’s Uplands, Shaughnessy in Vancouver, Tuxedo in Winnipeg, Law­­­ rence Park in Toronto, and Montreal’s Westmount and Mount Royal (Bérubé 2015; Harris 2004, 99–100; McCann 2017). These filled out during the interwar period and were joined by others: Westdale in Hamilton, Kingsway Park outside Toronto, and the British Properties in West Vancouver. Innumerable, less distinctive but attractive middle-class subdivisions also appeared. Homeowner­ ship became the middle-class Canadian norm, and developers obliged, thereby 38

RICHARD HARRIS

helping to establish a city/suburban divide that postwar urban researchers eventually came to view as standard. Suburban poverty declined for other reasons during the Depression. In the owner-built suburbs, most families had no mortgages and hung on by growing vegetables and scrimping on necessities. But some failed. Men lost their jobs, and families their homes. Properties were purchased by those who had steady work and could cover the costs of taxes, maintenance, and improvement: some areas modestly gentrified (Harris 1996, 254–55). Thus, as low-income suburbs improved, by the mid-1930s poverty became associated chiefly with the inner city. The distinguishing feature of the inner cities had ceased to be their cultural differentiation, however, and was now their state of physical decay and presumed social disorder. The inner city remained the focus of concentrated poverty through the 1960s and, in many cities, beyond. The postwar boom produced extensive suburban development. At first, a surprising amount was owner-built, but this time with help from building suppliers and sometimes the government. Shacktowns of the sort that dotted the suburban landscape in the 1900s were rare, although for a time parts of Montreal’s South Shore constituted a notable exception (Harris 1996, 263). In general, however, suburban development served the middle class, which included a wide range of people in clerical, professional, skilled, and even semi-skilled occupations. There were two, novel exceptions. A surge in apartment building during the 1960s and early 1970s was opposed by resi­ dents of older neighbourhoods, and much construction was channelled into the suburbs. Initially, apartments served young singles and couples who hoped to eventually acquire homes (Holdsworth and Simon 1993, 196–97). At the same time, a short-lived boom in the construction of public housing, much taking the form of high-rise towers, occurred. In Toronto, 15,000 units were erected in the suburbs of Etobicoke, North York, and Scarborough (Frisken 2008, 98–100). On a smaller scale, decentralization of privately and publicly owned apartments occurred in many other Canadian cities. The 1970s were a turning point. The decade, which saw the tentative re-emergence of neighbourhood inequality, was also when more people began to re-evaluate inner-city living. Lacking the racial tensions of their American counterparts, Canadian inner cities had remained attractive for middle-class families, including those with children. But in the early postwar decades, most who could afford to buy left for the suburbs. In the 1970s, with gathering momentum, couples, some with children, decided that the inner city was an attractive option (Ley 1996). Gentrification – a term that came into widespread PLUS ÇA CHANGE

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use in the late 1970s – influenced some cities much earlier than others. A force in Toronto and Vancouver by the early 1980s, and in Halifax by the 1990s, it became apparent in Hamilton and Winnipeg only two decades later (Grant and Gregory 2016; Walks and Maaranen 2008a). By the 2010s, albeit in varying degrees, gentrification was having some influence everywhere. There is a debate as to whether gentrification displaces tenants, but there is no question that it has reshaped the geography of affordability. In Trinity-Bellwoods, west of Toronto’s downtown, rising property values encouraged Portuguese Canadian homeowners to sell out and move to the suburbs (Murdie and Teixeira 2011). Lower-income tenants, who move often, are leaving the area. As house prices and rents rise, the area has become unaffordable for many. Gentrification removes many inner-city neighbourhoods from the range of options available to low-income households, including immigrants. In this manner, poverty has moved out of the city, not as a century ago to the suburban fringe, but to what is now known as the early postwar inner suburbs. The existence of these extensive territories with their own ecological character reflects the growth of cities over the past century. In 1901, Toronto was still young; its city and suburbs combined had a population of barely 210,000. It was possible to distinguish inner-city neighbourhoods from suburbs, but there was no popular concept of a zone in between. Today the Greater Toronto Area is home to twenty-five times the number of people, spread over a far greater territory, with residential densities that vary greatly. As Chapter 4 suggests, city and suburb do not capture the range of diversity in any large metropolitan area. Neighbourhood inequality, and especially the concentration of poverty, is an issue in the 2010s, as it was in the 1910s, but its geography has transformed. No longer a distinctive feature of the inner city or the suburban fringe, poverty and the settlement of lower-income immigrants increasingly characterize the zone in between.

Causes of Rising Neighbourhood Inequality Many forces have shaped the changing geography of inequality in Canadian cities, but two that have had a direct impact stand out: the inequalities in income associated with the structure of the labour market and changing waves of immigration. Fluctuations in income inequality have surely been most important. Avail­able data show that income inequality rose in the United States in the late nineteenth 40

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FIGURE 2.3 Share of annual market income earned by the top 1%, Canada and United States, 1920–2015

Sources:  World Top Income Database (WTID), 1920–2010; Statistics Canada, Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD), 1982–2015, CANSIM Table 204-0001.

century and peaked in the early twentieth before falling during the Second World War. It bottomed out in the 1950s and 1960s but has risen since the late 1970s. Canadian data are available only from the 1920s, but Figure 2.3 shows a pattern of change that closely parallels that of our southern neighbour, albeit at a lower level. The share of employment income earned by the top 1% was 17– 18% in the early 1920s, had fallen to 8% in 1979, and has since climbed back to at least 12% (Heisz 2015, 87). Lately, intergenerational mobility has declined. When viewed historically, then, the temporal association between income and neighbourhood inequality has been striking and, in causal terms, vital. Behind this cycle of inequality lies a complex evolution of labour markets. In the early decades of the twentieth century, manual workers comprised a large proportion of the labour force. Many workers had limited skills, enjoyed little or no job security, and earned low and irregular wages. The 1940s brought full employment and the growth of unions, setting the scene for a postwar boom that brought well-paid, stable employment to millions. Along with deindustrialization and the rise of a service and then knowledge economy, this arrangement began to fray in the 1980s. Recently, part-time, precarious employment has increased. The impact of immigration, and recently of internal migration, has been complex in terms of magnitude and cultural meaning. Over the past cen­tury, the proportion of first-generation immigrants in the Canadian population has sometimes exceeded 20% but never fell below 15%, a low point reached at PLUS ÇA CHANGE

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FIGURE 2.4 Immigrant population in Canada, 1871–2016, and projection to 2036

Sources:  Created by Richard Maaranen from census and Statistics Canada projections.

mid-century (Figure 2.4). Ethnic segregation helped define the character of Canadian cities, including the poorest neighbourhoods. This was never truer than in the first quarter of the twentieth century. In absolute terms, the numbers of immigrants who arrived during the Laurier boom has never been equalled. In 1911, immigrants constituted 22% of the population; for three successive years, more than 300,000 arrived each year, peaking at 400,000 in 1913. Although some became farmers, most settled in the cities. They came with little or nothing. The influx defined the character of neighbourhood inequality in that era, in city and suburb. In Winnipeg between 1901 and 1921, for example, the segregation of those of Eastern European origin, arriving in large numbers, jumped from 44 to 63 (Hiebert 1991, 63, 70). In Vancouver, the Chinese were the most segregated minority, ghettoized in what other Canadians called China­ town (Anderson 1991). In Halifax, an older immigrant community of Black Loyalists also felt the effects of enforced segregation, notably in Africville, although some lived downtown in the racially mixed but desperately poor “upper streets” downtown (Fingard 1989, 19; Clairmont and Magill 1999). The numbers of immigrants fell during the First World War but picked up again in the 1920s, despite tightened immigration controls that especially 42

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targeted the Chinese. Immigration then dropped precipitously after 1930 because of the Depression and then the Second World War. Ethnic issues played only a minor role in public debates about slums from the 1930s through the 1950s. Immigration picked up after 1945, but triggered fewer anxieties than in the settlement house era. It helped that unemployment was low, and southern Europeans brought construction skills during a building boom. To be sure, most newcomers were poor, faced prejudice, and made their first homes in affordable, inner-city neighbourhoods (Iacovetta 1992, 102–18). But hard work in an era of postwar growth meant that they prospered, as their incomes enabled them to join the suburbanizing middle class. Since the 1970s, immigration has coloured the character and experience of growing neighbourhood inequality. The annual number of arrivals fluctuated for two decades, but from the early 1990s they have been consistently high, averaging a quarter of a million. Equally important, the mix of national and cultural origins has changed dramatically. As late as 1971, when immigrants accounted for 15% of Canadian residents, most came from Britain, Europe, or the United States. By 2010, when the proportion had reached 21%, the plurality of recent arrivals came from Asia, with others from Africa and Latin America (Kobayashi, Li, and Teixeira 2012, xvii, xxviii). The norm of multiculturalism, articulated by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1971, has become more than an official veneer but less than a consensus. As Irish Catholics, Jews, Hungarians, and then Italians earlier became Canadian, now Vietnamese, Indians, Hong Kong Chinese, and Ghanaians are joining the Canadian community. But the process has not been smooth. Some groups, notably those from the Caribbean, still face discrimination in labour and housing markets: rather than creating enclaves, they have been in some degree ghettoized. As the income distribution has polarized, many racialized groups have found it difficult to gain a solid foothold in the labour market, instead slipping into expanding districts of concentrated poverty (Hiebert 2000a; Hiebert and Mendez 2008). Here, too, contemporary divided neighbourhoods are echoes of the past. Recent immigrants have favoured Canada’s three largest urban centres, where concentrated poverty has attracted greatest attention. An interesting exception is Calgary, whose oil industry has attracted skilled visible minorities. The better-off can buy into gated communities while those on modest incomes have occupied or hosted secondary suites, which the city has been encouraging (Townshend 2006; van der Poorten and Miller 2017). On a smaller but still significant scale, a different trend has affected smaller and mid-sized centres in PLUS ÇA CHANGE

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the Prairies. Historically, Indigenous Canadians chose, or were compelled, to live on reserves. Since the 1960s, however, they have been urbanizing in unprecedented numbers so that today more than half live in urban areas (Peters 2014, 183). One Canadian city, Winnipeg, contains a census tract in which the Indigenous population is in the majority, while several contain significant concentrations. Indigenous Canadians have faced discrimination and experienced poverty at more than twice the rate for other Canadians: some of the worst effects of racialized, concentrated poverty thus appear in cities such as Winnipeg and Regina. Another new element today is the settlement of affluent newcomers directly into the outer suburbs (Ley and Smith 2000; Walks and Bourne 2006). Because the point system under which they have been admitted to Canada rewards education and needed skills, a significant minority of recent immigrants are middle class or even rich. Many have purchased homes in prosperous outer suburbs. In the Toronto area, Chinese Canadians have concentrated in Mark­ ham and South Asians in Brampton (Qadeer, Agrawal, and Lovell 2010). Around Vancouver, the same groups have found their way to Richmond, Sur­ rey, and Abbotsford (Teixeira 2010). Clearly, these are voluntary enclaves. In counterpoint to their lower-income compatriots, constrained to make homes in the inner suburbs, immigrant elites have introduced ethnicity across the spectrum of neighbourhoods.

Consequences The segregation of rich and poor has consequences, and beyond a certain point neither is desirable. But today, as in the past, the growing degree of concentrated poverty has drawn attention, for its effects both on people and on the wider polity. Many concerns expressed in the 1910s and 1930s are echoed by those articulated today, but the effects are different because the context has changed. Some Effects of Concentrated Poverty

Some segregation is good, especially for recent immigrants and when it is voluntary. It can enhance contact among members of the group that is segregated. Observers have spoken eloquently about the forms of community and mutual support that have developed in working-class and ethnic neighbourhoods. Speaking about Strathcona, one of Vancouver’s poorest neighbourhoods in the interwar period, John Atkin (1994, 45) observes that “residents went about 44

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their daily lives in what was, for the most part, a close-knit, family-based neighbourhood.” Newcomers have always sought enclaves where they could find people who speak, worship, eat, and act in similar ways. As Robert Harney (1975, 208) puts it, “the ethnic neighbourhood was more than a geographic fact; it was the ambiente of a social and cultural transition.” The voluntary element in ethnic segregation has apparently increased since the 1960s, arguably reflecting a growing tolerance of diversity (Breton et al. 1990, 126–27). The concern of many outsiders was that the transition would stall: that concen­ tration would validate and maintain cultural practices that others found strange, unwelcome, or deviant, preventing residents from joining the Canadian mainstream. Such unease always has a class dimension. Outsiders fret about the social disorganization and criminal activity that might be fostered in working-class, and especially poor, districts. Before the First World War, it was just as important that settlement workers be middle class as that they be Anglo-Canadian (James 2001). A century later, gun murders in inner-suburban districts goaded the city of Toronto into developing a “strong neighbourhood” strategy (Horak and Moore 2015, 184). Less dramatically, sympathetic outsiders have assumed that concentrated poverty has harmed adult residents and the life chances of their children. Such concerns motivated neighbourhood workers in the 1910s as they did politicians in the 2010s. International debates indicate that the nature and magnitude of neighbourhood effects are difficult to nail down (van Ham et al. 2013; Oreopoulos 2008). One obvious consequence of income and class segregation is mutual ignorance. When abetted by media coverage, crime, or the threat of political unrest, segregation can awaken politicians and the electorate (Jargowsky 2015). Middle-class fears of social disorganization and sepia images of com­mun­ ity life are easily overdrawn. Speaking about nineteenth-century New York City, Kenneth Scherzer (1992) argues that ethnic and working-class life was never tied to specific neighbourhoods. Indeed, he claims that the very concept of neighbourhood was a middle-class invention. That is surely going too far. But many have commented, in effect, that life in the areas of what we now call concentrated poverty was always less cozy or dramatic – was, in a word, more mundane – than some have supposed. Many Italian immigrants who lived in The Ward a century ago were sojourners; they found little community (Zucchi 1985, 124). The historian of Hamilton’s working class suggests that residents “later recalled ... neighbourliness all around them,” but then adds that it had narrow limits: “relatives and neighbours could usually help out only for short PLUS ÇA CHANGE

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spells or in limited ways” (Heron 2015, 175). Closer to our own time, when Peter Lorimer and Myfanwy Phillips (1971, 8) moved onto a downtown block of working people, they found neither social disorganization nor a vibrant community life. Riverdale, another working-class area in Toronto, contained stable families, but only 4% of the residents reported that their “closest informal associates” lived in the area (Crysdale 1970, 103). These fragmentary insights drawn from varied neighbourhoods at different times permit no definitive conclusion, but they do suggest that we should not romanticize or demonize concentrated poverty in any historical period. Changing Contexts

Some effects of segregation transcend time while others do not. If the character of concentrated poverty has changed, so has its significance because of important changes in technological, social, economic, and governmental contexts. Technological change has transformed how most urban residents get around the city, how they acquire information, and how they communicate. The automobile has enabled them to travel far beyond their residences, often compelling them to do so because of its effects on the scale and form of metro areas. It has made neighbourhoods less important for everyday life: work, shopping, and leisure. But low-income households without cars, and their neighbourhoods, now stand out in ways that once they did not. Changes in information technology and media have also mattered. The diffusion of radio from the 1930s, of television from the 1950s, and of the Internet from the late 1990s increased the amount of information available. Rich and poor know more about how the other half lives. And from the 2000s the spread of cell phones and social media has enabled people to maintain contacts and friendships over long distances. Psychically and physically, for most people neighbourhoods matter less. This is especially true for women. A century ago, many women spent most of their lives in and around the home. They shopped and socialized nearby, and only a minority – 14% in 1901 – officially worked for pay. Since 1945, women’s labour force participation rate has increased steadily, from 24% in 1951 to 82% in 2014. Today, women spend less time than ever in the home neighbourhood, and when they do, they have responsibilities that keep them indoors. In part because of delayed age at marriage, they have fewer children, always an important reason to know the neighbours. For children, too, neighbourhoods matter less because parents now enable and encourage them to engage in sports and in educational and leisure activities further afield, while 46

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discouraging unsupervised play in public spaces nearby. These trends have been most apparent among the (upper) middle class. For such reasons, some fear that modern life has eroded the sense of community. It is an old lament. In the 1920s, Ernest Burgess (1925a, 154) claimed that “the social forces of city life seem, from our studies, to be destroying the city neighborhood.” In Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam (2000) repeated this refrain. In 1948, writing for the Citizens Advisory Committee of Toronto, Hugo Wolter (1948) declared that “the geographic unity of neighbourhoods no longer exists.” A year later, the Toronto City Planning Board (1949, 11) lamented that “the residential parts of the city threaten to become merely the place of residence ... of individuals”; it expressed the hope that the neighbourhood might be made into “a community for self-protection and improvement.” Vain hope. Research in East York confirmed that neighbours do little socializing and rarely depend on one another in times of need (Wellman 1979). People find community in other ways and places, a process only slightly affected by the advent of social media (Mok, Wellman, and Carrasca 2010). In relative terms, then, the media’s impact on the significance of concentrated poverty has mattered less than the simple fact of the physical isolation of the poor. Of particular significance in the larger metropolitan areas is the increasing relegation of the poor to inner suburbs that are not easily navigable on foot or by public transit (Toronto Public Health 2012, 9). Because communications technology has changed rapidly, we are aware of, and may overstate, its significance. Conversely, a striking economic shift evolved earlier and more slowly, such that we take it for granted. In 1900, over two-thirds of urban householders were tenants, while others shared homes as boarders or roomers (Harris and Hamnett 1987, 177) (Figure 2.5). Since then, the proportion has reversed: homeowners are in the majority, at 68% in 2016. After becoming a middle-class norm in the 1920s, homeownership was promoted by the real estate industry and federal governments through mortgage insurance and long-term amortization; since the 1980s, the search for capital gains solidified aspirations for the Canadian dream (Bacher 1993). Ownership is subsidized by legislation that exempts primary residences from capital gains tax and owners from paying income tax on imputed rent (Clayton 2010). Since the 1970s, these subsidies have contributed to the boom in condominiums (Rosen and Walks 2015). Although the stereotypical condominium is a downtown high-rise, many are suburban Common Interest Developments (CIDs) (Grant, Greene, and Maxwell 2004). In western cities such as Calgary and Kelowna, many are gated, though enclosure is less common in central Canadian cities PLUS ÇA CHANGE

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FIGURE 2.5 The growth of urban homeownership, 1901–2011

Source:  Dominion Bureau of Statistics, and Statistics Canada: Census of Canada (various years).

such as Hamilton (Harris and Rose 2019; Townshend 2006). Every­where, condominiums have defined spaces that blur the line between public and private. One consequence of the rise of home ownership and CIDs, particularly since the 1970s, has been the social and economic marginalization of tenants. Average incomes of owners and tenants have diverged, as has their social status (Suttor 2015). There has been particular stigmatization of public housing tenants, including those in large high-rise projects dating from the late 1960s (August 2014). Tenants and their dwellings now stand out more than ever. These changes have affected the significance of the neighbourhood and, indirectly, of concentrated poverty. Whereas the average residential area used to be dominated by tenants, it is increasingly one of homeowners. Even in the city of Montreal, historically dominated by tenants, by 2011 homeowners accounted for 55% of households. This transition has important ramifications. Owners develop a greater stake in their neighbourhood because they move less often – about five times less – and because they have a double commitment: as residents and as investors. Typically, the home is the largest investment people ever make. Owners are more likely than tenants to join residents’ associations, which mobilize when redevelopment threatens the quality of the neighbourhood and, potentially, property values (e.g., Cox 1982). Not-in-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) resistance is typically the practice of property owners. Areas of concentrated poverty stand out, not only because of financial disadvantage but in terms of their dominant tenure. Because this would not have been true a century ago, those areas are now in effect doubly stigmatized, adding a new aspect to the ways in which neighbourhood inequality matters. 48

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Equally important has been the rise of formal education. Schooling has long helped reproduce class distinctions. In the early 1900s, the social elite in neighbourhoods such as Vancouver’s West End or Toronto’s Rosedale sent their children to private schools (Ley 1993, 220–21), which were out of reach of the professional middle class. Working-class parents were often indifferent to the education that their children received because it had little effect on job prospects. In Hamilton, for example, Craig Heron (2015, 134) observes that “few working-class parents ... saw secondary schooling as a valid avenue for their children’s upward mobility.” Things changed after the Second World War. Between 1945 and 1963, the proportion of Ontario adolescents in high school jumped from 35% to 74%. Graduation rates rose and became important in the job market. By 1970 in Lawrence Heights, a high-rise public project, W.R. Delegran (1970, 84–85) found that “practically all respondents believe that a good education is essential to getting ahead.” Since then, it has become a cliché that a college or university degree is the new high school diploma. The importance of formal qualifications has raised the stakes for neighbourhoods. In Canada, even more than in Britain or the United States, most parents send their children to local publicly funded schools. The quality of a school, and of its pupils, helps define good neighbourhoods, a fact built into house prices (Boisvert 2017). The children of those who cannot buy into such areas face challenges. International surveys indicate that the public school system in Canada does well at educating pupils from diverse backgrounds (OECD 2016); nonetheless, those growing up in areas of concentrated poverty face disadvantage. This is a contrast that would once have mattered less. Perhaps the greatest change to affect neighbourhoods is governmental (Hasson and Ley 1994). In the early decades of the twentieth century, beyond the enforcement of building and health by-laws, the state did little to shape neighbourhood inequality. Limited social assistance was provided by churches and other voluntary organizations, as shown by Judith Fingard’s study (1989) of downtown Halifax in the late nineteenth century. Slowly, however, a welfare state emerged: unemployment insurance, welfare, disability supports, public health care, an extended, mandatory school system, and various social services. Supporting it was an expanding, progressive tax regime: together, taxes and services reduced income inequality and the incidence of poverty. Meanwhile, housing programs and municipal planning reshaped the geography of inequality. Piecemeal actions in the early twentieth century affected patterns of development, for example, through the exclusion of apartments from “single-family” areas (Hulchanski 1981, 190–91; Moore 1979). The Depression PLUS ÇA CHANGE

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prompted debates about public intervention and brought the federal government onto the housing scene (Bacher 1993). More sweeping changes came after 1945. Central (now Canada) Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), established in 1946, developed subdivision and financing guidelines that encouraged specific forms of residential development (Harris 2004, 123–25). Soon, provincial planning acts compelled municipalities to develop comprehensive zoning plans consistent with CMHC requirements (Bottomley 1977; Gunton 1981; Hulchanski 1981). Planning and development practices generated largescale segregated and auto-oriented land uses that froze social inequalities in urban space. These patterns came to frame the modern urban landscape. Specific programs had more localized effects. In the 1960s, with federal support, concentrations of public housing were created in Canada’s major cities, and in the 1970s the Neighbourhood Improvement Program (NIP) aimed to stabilize inner-city neighbourhoods. The NIP was inspired in part by initiatives in the United States and by the first stirrings of gentrification in Toronto and Vancouver, signs that neighbourhood decline was not inevitable. In some cities, NIP areas themselves became sites of gentrification, nudging lowerincome households and immigrants to the suburbs (Patterson 1993). From the early 1990s, the federal and most provincial governments withdrew from the social housing arena, with negative effects on the poorest neighbourhoods (Suttor 2016). In a neoliberal political context, it has fallen to the larger municipalities to take important initiatives. These include the targeting of assistance to areas of concentrated poverty. The resources of municipalities are far greater than those of settlement houses: through investment in schools, transit, social housing, and community programming, municipalities can influence the geographical correlates of concentrated poverty. But, as Chapter 11 in this book shows, those efforts have fallen far short of what is required to change the absolute level and experience of poverty. Hence, various private and public/private initiatives have been launched; one example involves recreational facilities built in Toronto by Maple Leaf Sports and Entertainment, with the support of beer companies, banks, and Tim Hortons (Brady 2017). In new, corporate forms, charitable efforts are again being called into play.

Looking Back, and Then Forward As most of the chapters in this book show, neighbourhood inequality has grown in recent years. Current levels are perhaps not the highest ever seen, but

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inequality is certainly occurring at unprecedented scales. A hundred years ago, individual income inequality was even greater than it is now: in absolute terms, poverty was deeper and the segregation of the poor very apparent. Neighbourhoods were at least as unequal then as they are today. But the scale and patterning were different. Cities were far smaller; the differentiation of neighbourhoods was finer-grained, and, except for some outer suburbs, the poor lived close to the centre, near stores, jobs, and community institutions. Today segregation – by income and by ethnicity – occurs at a larger scale and the emerging areas of concentrated poverty – most notably in Toronto but also in smaller centres such as Hamilton, Calgary, and Halifax – are more isolated. This may not matter greatly for those with cars, but those without vehicles struggle, pushing strollers across multi-lane arterials to reach mini-malls or remote bus stops from which, with subsequent transfers, they might reach a regional mall, a government office, or an employment centre. In their geographical challenges, modern areas of concentrated poverty are worse than those of the past. To be sure, in material terms residents are generally better off than their predecessors of a century ago: they enjoy income support programs and social services, public health care, and free education to grade 12. Relative to others in society, however, they may be worse off. The walking city was accessible to almost everyone. Since 1945, however, urban areas have been designed around a private mode of transportation that some cannot afford, exacerbating inequality (Walks 2015a). The rise of homeownership, too, has marginalized those who cannot buy in. The poor live in types of public or market housing seen as inferior: the apartment buildings, their residents, and the areas they occupy become stigmatized for falling outside the property-owning mainstream. And the children who grow up in such areas find themselves disadvantaged. Not all neighbourhoods, peer groups, or schools offer the same opportunities to get ahead, a fact that matters more than ever. Plus c’est la même chose, plus ça change. Inequality has always been with us; its present level has earlier parallels, but contexts have changed and the issues we face today are different. The forces driving inequality are daunting: labour markets are becoming more precarious, while automation-driven tech change promises more of the same. Mechanisms of social mobility, notably the school system and social services, are potential casualties of the fiscal pressures on provincial governments. The gulf between owners and tenants grows wider as house prices and rents are reaching new heights, above all in Vancouver and

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Toronto. Condominiums help to bridge the gap, but few are designed for families with children. In terms of jobs and homeownership prospects, immigrants can no longer expect to prosper as they did in the early twentieth century and during the postwar boom. How people respond, and whether changes will challenge Canada’s much-vaunted tolerance of diversity, only time will tell. What we can say is that people’s responses, and the nature of the challenge, will depend on where and how much they are concentrated, how much choice they are able to exercise, and the extent to which – as in the 1910s – poverty and immigrant status go together. For those interested in current prospects, the value of viewing the matter historically is not to seek lessons in the past, still less to suggest that since things generally worked out all right before, they will do so again. The point is to clarify the novelty in our present predicament. That may, in turn, inform policy, or at the very least enrich our understanding of how neighbourhoods change. Acknowledgments

I would like to thank David Hulchanski for inviting me to be part of the Neighbourhood Change Research Partnership project; Alexandre Maltais, William Gregory, Emily Hawes, and Amy Shanks for help in tracking down material on Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver; and the project for financial support. I also thank the editors and two anonymous referees for valuable comments on earlier drafts.

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3 Using Social Dimensions and Neighbourhood Typologies to Characterize Neighbourhood Change Ivan Townshend and Robert Murdie

Canadian society has changed dramatically over the past three decades, with a corresponding transformation in the internal structure and social geography of metropolitan areas (Filion et al. 2015). Changes in the social character of neighbourhoods have often been extreme: they reflect an array of political, economic, and social processes, and reveal the key currents of social structural change. It seems clear, however, that change associated with the post-industrial and neoliberal city has produced new kinds of spatial shifting and sorting of the population in what is often known as the “Divided City” (Marcuse 1993, 1997; Marcuse and van Kempen 2000). Indeed, inequality at a neighbour­hood scale is generally rising faster than inequality at a structural scale (Chapter 1). In this chapter we provide an overview of the methods and contributions to the study of urban social description and change and the ways in which typologies of urban neighbourhoods have been developed. This is accompanied by detailed analyses of the changing social geography of the eight Canadian census metropolitan areas (CMAs) (the seven in this book plus Ottawa) that are included in the Neighbourhood Change Research Partnership (NCRP) project. Much of the material reports on studies done during the initial stages of the NCRP project that provided a catalyst and context for the individual case studies that are based on income ratios and consider income inequality/polarization. It is not the aim of this chapter to establish a methodology that will be used throughout subsequent case study chapters in this volume. Rather, the aim is to underscore that there is a long, and sometimes methodologically complex, history of attempts to quantify and synthesize neighbourhood differences and 53

neighbourhood change. Many of these ideas represent important conceptual and methodological milestones in urban studies and are still taught in foundational courses in urban geography. Therefore, while the material presented below may seem like a map of the road not taken in the rest of the book, it is an important backdrop and counterpart to the subsequent chapters. The typologies provide a broad perspective on the changing social geography of all eight CMAs considered jointly rather than singularly, and include various census variables related to economic status, family and household status, ethnic origin, immigrant status, and housing. The chapter also highlights new methodologies for generating typologies of urban social structure and change made possible by enhanced computer power and more sophisticated multivariate statistical techniques. We begin with a brief discussion of early methodologies, especially social area analysis (SAA), that are precursors to recent analyses of urban social structure and change based on an increasingly wide set of variables and more sophis­ ticated statistical methods such as factor analysis. Using examples from the NCRP project, we highlight the idea of a “joint analysis” whereby all census tracts (CTs) from eight CMAs are included in a single analysis. This enhances comparability of the results across CMAs. Initially, we undertake the analysis for a single point in time (2006), and then expand the analysis to consider a “joint analysis” of change in the census characteristics using two ways of adding time to the studies. The first approach is based on the analysis of a measure of change itself over a twenty-five-year period – 1981 to 2006 – using data that were available in 2013, when the analysis was conducted. The second, more sophisticated approach uses “joint CMA and joint time,” whereby all CTs for the eight CMAs are included twice in the same analysis, once for 1981 and once for 2006. This approach permits analysis of CMA-specific as well as systemwide transitions of CT types through time. These analyses, as well as other recent studies, reflect a renewed interest in neighbourhood typologies and methodologies for generating them.

Background: The Neighbourhood and Early Social Description The development of neighbourhood typologies dates to the work of Charles Booth (1893, 1902) in London and Ernest Burgess (1925a, 1925b) in Chicago in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Booth mapped socioeconomic data for London, producing not only detailed street-by-street observations but also a map and typology of the social character of London (Davies 54

IVAN TOWNSHEND AND ROBERT MURDIE

1978a; London School of Economics and Political Science 2017), and advocated for including a range of social indicators in official censuses. In the United States, Burgess (1925b) and colleagues’ work in Chicago led to the development of the first spatial model of socio-economic status in cities: the widely referenced concentric zone model (Knox and Pinch 2010). The precursor, however, of contemporary single-point-in-time studies of the spatial structure and typologies of urban neighbourhoods is the social area analysis of Eshref Shevky and Wendell Bell (1955). As noted in Chapter 1, there is no single concept of what a neighbourhood is, nor the exact spatial scale that best describes a neighbourhood as a territorial unit. The meaning of the term has also changed, as it has gained positive connotations (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, it is necessary to define boundaries when studying neighbourhoods. There is a long tradition of using the census tract as a surrogate for neighbourhood (see Chapter 1), as is the case with social area analysis. Social area analysis provides a systematic classification of residential areas within cities using census tracts as the unit of analysis or as surrogates for neigh­bourhoods. SAA was based on the grouping of census characteristics according to three hypothesized indexes – economic status, family status, and ethnic status – drawn from existing theories of social change related to hypothesized relationships between residential differentiation and modernization. Scores on the three indexes can characterize each census tract and therefore be individually mapped. The scores can also be grouped into relatively uniform social areas. A good example of this approach is Shevky and Bell’s study (1955) of areas in San Francisco. Empirical evaluation of the validity of SAA initially took place in the 1960s and 1970s with the development of faster computers and the use of multivariate statistical techniques, such as factor analysis. At the same time, critiques of the SAA methodology appeared, particularly the a priori assumption that three dimensions were adequate to summarize urban social structure. Similarly, critics questioned the rationale for the choice of three indicators to index each of these constructs. In this context, factorial ecology (FE), an extension of SAA ideas, became prominent (Davies 1984; Johnston 1976).

Single-Point-in-Time Studies In the methodologies and contributions of single-point-in-time studies, we can distinguish between those that focus on neighbourhoods (typically CTs, but SOCIAL DIMENSIONS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD TYPOLOGIES

55

other spatial aggregations are also potentially useful) in single cities and those that include neighbourhoods from multiple cities. Single-City Studies at One Point in Time

The factorial ecology approach is a two-stage process: first identifying the factorial structure (i.e., dimensions) in a dataset using factor analysis methods, and then mapping or describing the geographical patterns (ecology) of each of the derived factors (Davies 1984). Factor analysis is a multivariate statistical technique used to identify key dimensions among interrelated variables. In city studies, these variables are typically social indicators derived from the census and measured at the CT scale. Unlike the SAA approach, where three dimensions of social structure were defined a priori, the FE approach allows the number and character of the dimensions to be defined by the factor analysis technique: it does not impose the social dimensionality a priori. FE studies both reinforced and added to the SAA approach. They suggested that the three indexes described by Shevky and Bell (1955) are necessary but not sufficient to describe the more complex social differentiation within modern cities. This resulted in the inclusion of more variables in subsequent analyses and the development of several methodological refinements. In particular, specific variables such as gender and ethnicity were added to the variable mix to better understand the complexity of a city’s geography. Robert Murdie’s analysis (1969) of the socio-spatial structure of Toronto in 1951 and 1961 is an early example of this approach. The 1961 study clearly identified the classic economic and family status dimensions, but two ethnic status factors emerged, reflecting the spatial separation of the Jewish and Italian communities. From a common core in the traditional central-city reception area, the more affluent Jewish group diffused northward, remaining segregated largely by choice, while the more recently arrived and relatively lower economic status Italians had more limited residential choice and moved through an existing lower-income economic sector of the city. A lasting contribution of Murdie’s study was the recognition that the ecological patterns of three main dimensions of social structure generally exhibited different spatial patterns: a sectoral pattern for socio-economic status, a concentric zonal pattern for family status, and a multiple-nuclei pattern for ethnicity. T.R. Balakrishnan and George Jarvis (1979) found similar spatial patterns, but also changes in the patterns through time. The Murdie model is still widely used in urban social geography texts (e.g., Knox and Pinch 2010, 72).

56

IVAN TOWNSHEND AND ROBERT MURDIE

A study of Calgary using 1971 data (Davies 1978b) identified separate economic and family status dimensions and two ethnic status factors, one highlighting the spatial segregation of Eastern European groups in Calgary. In both the Toronto and Calgary studies, two other dimensions emerged, reflecting the increased social complexity of major Canadian urban areas and the introduction of more variables to the analysis. These included dimensions measuring residential mobility and non-affluent populations. The latter, independent of economic status, includes persons of limited education with high levels of unemployment living in older substandard dwellings, a precursor to lingering concerns of impoverishment in Canada’s large cities. Peter Foggin and Mario Polèse (1977) similarly identified the importance of the dimensions and the kinds of social regions in Montreal in 1971. The early FE studies were instrumental in pointing out that the social structure of cities was more complex than that conceived by the SAA approach, and that increasing social structural complexity was likely a product of greater social complexity in the post-industrial city (Davies 1984). Early users of the FE approach extended their analyses by deriving typologies of neighbourhoods (for example, CTs), using multivariate objective grouping procedures such as hierarchical cluster analysis (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984) to generate groupings of neighbourhoods based on socio-structural similarities. Generally, procedures are based on factor scores derived from the factor analysis, although the variables used for input can be clustered directly. An early Canadian example of this approach was Wayne Davies’s study (1975) of community areas in Calgary. Although FE studies generally fell out of favour in the 1980s with rise of humanistic approaches that saw FE as too quantitative, atheoretical, and lacking in human focus, there now seems to be a renewed interest in this approach, particularly within fields such as social work and health (Chow 1998). Multiple-City Studies at One Point in Time: The Idea of Joint Analysis

A problem with single-city studies is that the datasets used are typically not directly comparable across cities. In these studies, the factorial structure was derived only from neighbourhoods (typically, CTs) found within a particular CMA at a given time. Therefore, only generalized conclusions could be reached about the similarity or comparability of the results across cities because it was not possible to compare individual CTs across them. Since the 1980s, attention

SOCIAL DIMENSIONS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD TYPOLOGIES

57

has turned to ways of comparing the consistency of social dimensions across cities using the same variables, a strategy commonly referred to as a “joint analysis.” One of the first Canadian examples of a joint analysis was by Davies and Murdie (1993), involving a factor analysis of neighbourhoods, with CTs from twenty-four Canadian metropolitan areas used as proxies for neighbourhoods. In this approach, variables derived from the census for all of the CTs from the different CMAs are concatenated into a single data file. The factor analysis is then performed on this concatenated dataset as if the CTs were all part of one large city, essentially deriving a joint urban social structure. The nine factors that emerged include the dimensions identified earlier in the Toronto and Calgary studies – economic status, impoverishment, family and age, ethnicity, and residential mobility – and additional dimensions summarizing new forms of social complexity. The joint analysis approach allows for the measurement of every CT, for each separate dimension, on a common scale (called factor or component scores). In the joint analysis approach, the mean score is a joint system-wide, not city-specific, benchmark, which makes it possible to determine how a CT in one city compares with another in a different city on the same social dimension. Joint Analysis at One Point in Time: An Example from the NCRP Project

As part of the NCRP project, Robert Murdie, Jennifer Logan, and Richard Maaranen (2013a, 2013b) created a typology using 2006 CT data for eight Canadian CMAs: Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Hamilton, Winnipeg, Calgary, and Vancouver. The objective was to identify dimensions of social differentiation in a joint analysis approach, but also to develop a system-wide or joint typology of neighbourhoods. The analysis used thirty census variables related to economic status, age, family and household status, immigrant and ethnic status, migrant status, and housing status. Five factors were identified. The loadings for each factor were labelled as: (1) economic status, (2) family/ housing status, (3) immigration/ethnic status, (4) residential mobility, and (5) immigrant disadvantage. The results are generally similar to the findings from previous FE studies of individual Canadian CMAs, as well as the Davies and Murdie (1991, 1993) joint analysis studies. The last two factors reflect the increased social complexity of many metropolitan areas following changes in immigration policy in the 1970s.

58

IVAN TOWNSHEND AND ROBERT MURDIE

From their hierarchical cluster analysis of the five sets of factor scores, Murdie, Logan, and Maaranen (2013a) identified fifteen clusters of CTs, representing distinct types of urban neighbourhoods. Maps of the groupings suggested that the fifteen clusters could be aggregated into six larger groups representing a higher level of generalization: A Older Working Class – predominantly inner-city neighbourhoods and older suburbs B Urban/Suburban Homeowner – primarily stable post–Second World War residential areas C Old City Establishment – predominantly older high-income, innercity gentrified areas, especially in Ottawa and Toronto, and to a lesser extent Montreal D Young, Single, and Mobile Renters – central areas of many CMAs E Disadvantaged – a complex distribution that varies by CMA F Family Ethnoburbs – primarily in the suburbs of Toronto and Vancouver, and to a lesser extent Calgary and Ottawa. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of each of these six types within the eight CMAs. In all CMAs except Toronto, the majority (>50%) of neighbourhoods are defined by two types: the Older Working Class – predominantly inner-city neighbourhoods and older suburbs (Type A) – together with the Urban/ Suburban Homeowner group (Type B), which are primarily stable postwar residential areas. Not all clusters or types appeared in all CMAs. For example, Family Ethnoburbs (Type F) neighbourhoods were not present in Halifax, which has received fewer recent immigrants, whereas such neighbourhoods represented more than a quarter of the CTs in Vancouver and Toronto, two ethnically diverse cities that receive the bulk of new immigrants. Larger and more socially complex CMAs generally exhibited the largest number of clusters, and greater diversity in the representation of neighborhood types. For instance, all the types are represented in Toronto, where no single type includes more than 27% of CTs. Smaller, less socially complex CMAs exhibit fewer clusters and less diversity across clusters. For instance, only five of the six types are found in Halifax, where the majority (83%) of CTs are defined by only two types. The joint analysis approach is useful in portraying the complex systemwide social geography of CTs in multiple CMAs simultaneously. It enables

SOCIAL DIMENSIONS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD TYPOLOGIES

59

TABLE 3.1 Distribution of neighbourhood (CT) types within each CMA in 2006   Type

Percentage of CTs within CMA Vancouver Calgary Winnipeg Hamilton Toronto Ottawa Montreal Halifax Total

A

25.9

25.2

29.5

29.7

17.1

26.2

24.3

32.2 23.2

B

29.1

44.6

48.2

53.1

25.8

44.8

33.9

50.5 34.5

C

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.6

5.3

6.9

3.8

2.3

3.6

D

11.3

12.4

5.4

3.4

3.7

6.0

15.0

10.3

8.8

E

4.8

3.0

15.7

10.9

21.4

8.1

21.4

4.5 15.7

F

27.8

13.9

1.2

2.3

26.6

8.1

1.6

0.0 14.2

Note:  CT = census tract; CMA = census metropolitan area. Source:  Murdie, Logan, and Maaranen 2013a, 16.

comparative neighbourhood studies across CMAs. The details of Table 3.1 reveal generalized trends in the distribution of types, but also important CMAspecific attributes. For example, Toronto and Vancouver differ in that they have much higher prevalence of Family Ethnoburbs (Type F) than other CMAs. Similarly, we can see that Disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Type E) are only a minor type in Calgary (3%), compared with Toronto and Montreal, where more than one in five CTs are of this type. Early joint analysis studies, however, were based on a single point in time, using data from only one census period. To describe and understand the changing character and complexity of Canadian CMAs, we would need to analyze change by combining data for two or more census years.

New Methods That Include Time- or Change-Based Typologies Relatively few studies have evaluated change by combining data for two or more census years. Such analyses are more challenging than studies conducted for a single point in time because it becomes necessary to identify variables that are consistent over time, an appropriate time period, and a suitable measure of change (e.g., Murdie 1969; Perle 1983; Le Bourdais and Beaudry 1988). Time can be included in two ways in either single-city studies or joint analysis studies. The first is to employ a measure of change itself, so the analysis

60

IVAN TOWNSHEND AND ROBERT MURDIE

is based on the difference in the attributes of CTs between time periods. The second way to include time is to carry out an analysis based on the original data with the same tracts appearing twice (or more if more years are included) in a concatenated data file of tract-year observations (Morenoff and Tienda 1997). The two examples below are based on joint analyses and reflect the different ways that time can be included. Multiple Cities and Time: Joint Analysis of Change in Social Attributes

In the first approach to adding time to a joint analysis, the variables used are measures of change or difference itself and the input file is a concatenated data file of all CTs in multiple CMAs. There are only single observations of each CT, and the factor analysis derives a joint structure of change in social character. Factor scores then index how much a specific CT has changed relative to the system-wide average level of change, rather than to the city-specific average level of change. Maps of factor scores illustrate change through time. However, in this approach the maps are directly comparable across cities (CMAs) because the structure is derived from a system-wide common benchmark. An example of this approach is presented below. The analysis of Murdie, Maaranen, and Logan (2014) depends on measures of change over a twenty-five-year period, 1981–2006. It derived twenty-four comparable variables at each time point. These related to economic status, family status, immigrant and ethnic status, migrant status, and housing status. Change was measured by subtracting the percentage value of a variable for 1981 from that for 2006. A joint analysis approach was adopted, with CTs being analyzed in a single concatenated data file, and a factor analysis carried out on the twentyfour measures of change. Five major factors were identified: (1) Family Status Change, (2) Economic Status Change, (3) Movers and Stayers, (4) New East Asian Immigrants, and (5) South Asian/Caribbean Immigrants (see Murdie, Maaranen, and Logan 2014 for more detail). Factor scores were computed for each factor. In this type of analysis, factor scores index how the tract compares with the average level of change of all tracts in the joint analysis. Tracts within and between CMAs can be directly compared with the system-wide benchmark of change. Rather than describe the patterns of factor scores, the study sought to produce a typology of CTs based on change – that is, similar neighbourhoods with respect to all five dimensions of change. A hierarchical cluster analysis of the factor scores

SOCIAL DIMENSIONS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD TYPOLOGIES

61

identified seventeen clusters, which could be organized into six larger groups representing higher-level generalization. The types and general patterns can be summarized as follows: G Aging in Place – Suburbs of all CMAs. Greater representation of adults 65+ in the inner suburbs. Adults aged 50–64 in the outer suburbs. H Immigrant Minorities Lagging Behind – Especially evident in Toronto. Traditional central-city immigrant reception areas. Also newer areas of younger immigrants and second-generation immigrants. I

Increased Socio-Economic Status – Predominantly eastern Canadian CMAs. Older central-city areas. Areas of gentrification and displacement.

J

Embedded Economic Status – Evident through all CMAs. Areas of stable educational attainment, occupational status, and income.

K Increased Asian – Prominent in Vancouver and Toronto. L Increased South Asian – Prominent in Toronto and Vancouver. Table 3.2 illustrates the distribution of the six groups by CMA and reveals some important differences in how the system-wide dimensions of change are differentially manifest in the CMAs. More typological variation is evident in the larger CMAs: Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, and Ottawa include all the groups noted above, while Halifax, the smallest CMA in the study, has only three. Table TABLE 3.2 Distribution of neighbourhood (CT) change types within each CMA in 2006   Type

Percentage of CTs within CMA Vancouver Calgary Winnipeg Hamilton Toronto Ottawa Montreal Halifax Total

G

16.0

55.6

41.8

36.2

11.4

43.4

38.1

52.9 28.6

H

5.2

7.7

0.6

4.0

21.4

2.6

8.3

0.0 10.6

I

6.6

6.5

4.4

13.2

13.1

15.3

26.7

23.5 15.6

J

31.4

29.6

53.2

46.6

24.0

33.6

24.8

23.5 29.2

K

35.4

0.6

0.0

0.0

17.4

4.7

1.8

0.0 11.2

L

5.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

12.7

0.4

0.2

0.0

Note:  CT = census tract; CMA = census metropolitan area. Source:  Murdie, Maaranen, and Logan 2014, 26.

62

IVAN TOWNSHEND AND ROBERT MURDIE

4.8

3.2 also shows differences in the prevalence of neighbourhood types by CMA. For example, in both Halifax and Calgary, the majority of CTs are defined by Aging in Place (Type G) – neighbourhoods in which in situ aging has been a defining trait. Toronto stands out as very different in terms of the prevalence of Immigrant Minorities Lagging Behind (Type H) areas, with more than one in five CTs experiencing worsening conditions for immigrants and minorities. Increased Socio-Economic Status (Type I), primarily associated with the upgrading of older inner-city areas, has been a dimension of change that is more important in Halifax and Montreal than other CMAs. Winnipeg stands apart from other CMAs for its stability and predominance of CTs with stable educational attainment, occupational status, and income characteristics – more than half of CTs in Winnipeg are Embedded Economic Status (Type J) areas. The In­ creased Asian social character of neighbourhoods through time (Type K) is most pronounced in Vancouver and Toronto, while a substantial share of Toronto CTs is defined by the Increased South Asian cluster (Type L). As seen above, this method can successfully produce neighbourhood typologies based on change itself, rather than on the social attributes of the neighbourhood. Other approaches include time as well as social attributes of the neighbourhood. Multiple Cities and Time: Joint Analysis of Tract-Year Observations

The second way of adding time in a joint analysis approach uses both joint CMA and joint time. The input file concatenates CTs from multiple CMAs, and time, because every CT is observed more than once (i.e., tract-years). The subsequent factor analysis then identifies a joint social structure through time. Indi­ vidual CTs can be separated by time and/or by CMA afterwards. This approach allows not only for direct comparison of every CT (within and between cities) at each point in time but also for understanding how each CT changes through time by comparing the factor scores for time t1 and t2. An example of this approach is presented below. Thirty variables derived by the NCRP team for 1981 and 2006 were arranged into a joint CMA and joint year data file for eight CMAs, with each tract appearing as two observations (1981 and 2006). The data input matrix consisted of 5,974 observations (i.e., each of 2,987 tracts from eight CMAs observed twice) by thirty variables. Six joint social structure through time dimensions were identified (Town­ shend 2014): (1) Family Status, (2) Socio-Economic Status, (3) Immigrant, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD TYPOLOGIES

63

(4) New Community Migrant vs. Old Stayers, (5) Poverty and Precarious Hous­ ing, and (6) Substandard Housing. Because the analysis is both joint CMA and joint time, the dimensions described reflect metropolitan system-wide social structures through time. Fol­ low­ing the analysis, the CTs can be separated by time, and then analyzed for how much they have changed through time on each dimension, using a common scale (factor scores). Moreover, every CT in the joint analysis is directly comparable with every other because of the common benchmark. The method enables mapping the social ecology of each dimension at time t1 and time t2, and, by computing differences in factor scores, mapping of change in social structure. A typology of neighbourhoods was derived, based on the factor scores of the six dimensions. A hierarchical cluster analysis of 5,974 tract-year observations by six factor scores produced a seven-cluster solution. Each CT is represented twice in the generalized typology. The following labels were then applied, based on an interpretation of cluster characteristics and differences: M Non-Family Mixed Social – Young adults and middle-aged people aged 50–64, and highest share of seniors aged 65+. Areas with small one- and two-person households. N Professional and Managerial – University education, managerial and professional occupations, high incomes. O Established Blue Collar – Stable blue-collar workers, low levels of educational attainment, manufacturing occupations, high rates of unemployment; rental and substandard housing is prevalent. P Established Middle-Class Completed Families – Low residential mobility, little/no rental housing, few young adults aged 25–34, mixed occupational profiles and educational levels, high proportion of middle-aged. Q Immigrant Impoverishment and Service Sector Workers – Immigrants and recent immigrants; East Asian, South Asian, and Latin American and Caribbean origins; non-English or French mother tongues. Employment in sales and service occupations. Prevalence of lowincome families and housing affordability stress. R Socially Diverse Middle Class – Diverse social attributes. Diverse educational background, diverse employment sectors, diverse household sizes and composition, diverse housing stock. Few recent immigrants. Affordable housing. 64

IVAN TOWNSHEND AND ROBERT MURDIE

S Suburban High Family Status – Socially mixed. Diverse educational backgrounds, diverse employment sectors. Mixed immigrant, ethnic, and language characteristics. Prevalence of children aged 0 to 14 years. Large households and newer housing stock in good repair. This approach to deriving a social structure through time typology does not appear to have been attempted elsewhere, although others have employed joint space and time cluster analyses of neighbourhoods in order to understand how neighbourhoods are stable or changing in type (Wei and Knox 2014) or how pathways or sequences of change are evident (Wei and Knox 2014; Morenoff and Tienda 1997). Because this is a joint analysis through time, however, only those CTs that existed in both 1981 and 2006 are included in the analysis. The approach allows for system-wide analysis of transitions of CT types through time, as well as CMA-specific neighbourhood type transitions through time. Scholars have shown renewed interest in analyzing neighbourhood transitions through time in recent years (Delmelle 2015). Several studies have used joint space and time approaches not only to generate typologies of neighbourhoods but also to study transition sequences and indeed even typologies of transition sequences (Ling and Delmelle 2016), both at a system-wide level as well as within CMAs (Morenoff and Tienda 1997; Wei and Knox 2014; Delmelle 2016). Elizabeth Delmelle (2017) has taken these analyses even further to examine whether types of transition sequences are random or are spatially clustered within cities. Since our analysis of transitions for the eight CMAs involves only two time-points, we do not employ the complex transition sequence methodologies described above. Because each CT in the eight-CMA analysis is observed twice, its group (cluster) membership may stay the same (stability through time) or it may socially morph into a different type (change through time). A typical example of the latter would be a neighbourhood that underwent extensive gentrification between 1981 and 2006. By constructing a type-transition matrix, either for the joint CMA system as whole or for each CMA, we can identify some structural and local aspects of change in the period studied. In Figure 3.1 the main diagonal represents typological consistency, while off-diagonal cells represent typological change through time. Figure 3.1 shows absolute data in terms of frequency counts, although we can infer relative change from the data. Summing the elements of the main diagonal shows that only 239 of 2,987 (8%) of CT types remained in the same type during the twenty-five-year period, 1981–2006, although there is considerable variation SOCIAL DIMENSIONS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD TYPOLOGIES

65

FIGURE 3.1 Census tract typological transition matrix, joint CMA and time analysis To (2006 CT type) Neighbourhood (CT) typology M Non-Family Mixed Social

M

O Established Blue Collar P Established Middle-Class Completed Families Q Immigrant Impoverishment and Service Sector Workers R Socially Diverse Middle Class S Suburban High Family Status

From (1981 CT type)

N Professional and Managerial

M

N

O

P

Q

R

S

42

86

2

6

29

0

0

165

N

0

81

0

12

0

0

0

93

O

218

184

113

22

226

0

0

763

P

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

Q

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

R

344

46

0

838

378

2

0

1,608

S

11

0

0

243

103

0

0

357

615

397

115

1,122

736

2

0

2,987

by CMA, and some of the types (for instance, Type R in 1981 and Type P in 2006) appear to fulfill similar neighbourhood functions and thus might represent evolution more than change. Older central and eastern CMAs such as Winnipeg (18.4%), Montreal (12.7%), and Hamilton (9.8%) showed the most consistency (CT types remaining in the exact same type), whereas rapidly growing western CMAs such as Vancouver (6.9%) and especially Calgary (1.8%) showed the greatest change. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to deal with change within the individual CMAs. Here we limit our discussion to Figure 3.1, which shows for the joint analysis of all eight CMAs the number of CTs of each cluster remaining the same between 1981 and 2006, and the trajectory of the other CTs as they transitioned into other cluster types. Relative changes among the different neighbourhood types can be determined from the main diagonal of Figure 3.1. Only three cluster types contained a substantial number of CTs that remained exactly the same. Type N neighbour­ hoods (Professional and Managerial) were the most stable, since 81 of 93 (87%) of the CTs in this neighbourhood type remained the same between 1981 and 2006. Stability is not surprising given the desirability of these high-status neighbourhoods and their financial and political ability to resist change. Of the Type M neighbourhoods (Non-Family Mixed Social) 42 of 165, or one-quarter, of the CTs remained stable between 1981 and 2006. These neighbourhoods with small households, few children, a large proportion of seniors, and a relatively large percentage of rental dwellings serve a particular demographic profile and, except when faced with severe development pressure, tend to remain 66

IVAN TOWNSHEND AND ROBERT MURDIE

relatively stable. Type O neighbourhoods (Established Blue Collar), with only 113 (15%) of CTs remaining in the same cluster type, exhibited considerably less stability than Types N or M. Otherwise, the remaining clusters on the surface appear to have changed dramatically, with only one or two CTs remaining in each cluster, although again, in some cases the changes would appear to represent evolution instead of wholesale transformation. In addition to information on stability and relative change in the clusters, Figure 3.1 provides insights into the trajectories of neighbourhood change. Three types changed relatively little over time. All twelve Type N neighbourhoods that changed position transitioned into Type P (Established Middle-Class Com­ pleted Families) neighbourhoods. This suggests aging in place since these neigh­ bourhoods, while remaining only slightly below Type N neighbourhoods in social status, experienced a low level of residential mobility, an increased concentration of persons aged 50–64, and fewer children and young adults. A relatively large proportion of people of European ethnic background characterizes these neighbourhoods, as well as housing that was constructed during the early postwar era. These well-established postwar suburbs contrast with Type N neighbourhoods that tend to be in older parts of the city. Type M (Non-Family Mixed Social) neighbourhoods transitioned primarily into two neighbourhood types, Type N (86 CTs) and Type Q (29 CTs). These two cluster types represent polar opposites of the economic status spectrum, and so Type M changes involved both upward and downward filtering. Type N (Professional and Managerial) neighbourhoods represent areas with the highest socio-economic status, while Type Q (Immigrant Impoverishment and Service Sector Workers) neighbourhoods reflect the opposite. This suggests a further polarization of neighbourhoods into “haves” and “have-nots.” Type O (Established Blue Collar) neighbourhoods transitioned primarily into three neighbourhood types: Type Q (226 CTs), Type M (218 CTs), and Type N (184 CTs). These changes partially mirror those found for Type M (Non-Family Mixed Social) neighbourhoods and further accentuate sociospatial divisions that occurred between 1981 and 2006, especially between Type N (Professional and Managerial) neighbourhoods and Type Q (Immigrant Impoverishment and Service Sector Workers) neighbourhoods. The latter underscores the deepening racialization of poverty and the movement of poor visible minorities into former blue-collar neighbourhoods. The transition of Type O neighbourhoods into Type M neighbourhoods suggests a further upward shift in socio-economic status or upward filtering, since CTs in Type M exhibit higher educational levels, occupational status, and income. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD TYPOLOGIES

67

Of the remaining neighbourhood types, Types P (Established Middle-Class Completed Families) and Q (Immigrant Impoverishment and Service Sector Workers) were not evident in 1981 but emerged by 2006. Conversely, Types R (Socially Diverse Middle Class) and S (Suburban High Family Status) were prominent in 1981, but by 2006 had transitioned into other neighbourhood types. More than half the CTs were categorized as Type R in 1981, indicating no major extremes in economic and family status and the lowest share of recent immigrants among the groups. By 2006, however, 838, or three-quarters, of the CTs in this group had become members of the Type P (Established Middle-Class Completed Families) group. The latter category hardly existed in 1981. While there are some differences between Types R and P (Type R has fewer immigrants, while Type P has higher socio-economic status and much less turnover, indicating aging families), in some ways they are similar in function. If so, the fact that 838 tracts transitioned from Type R to Type P would imply that 37.5% of tracts maintained such a function. However, not all R types transitioned to P types. A further 378 joined Type Q (Immigrant Impoverishment and Service Sector Workers) and 344 joined Type M (Non-Family Mixed Social). Thus, while 52% of Type R tracts remained in a neighbourhood type with similar functions (Type P), just under a quarter of Type R neighbourhoods filtered downward and no longer fulfilled a family-residential function. Type S (Suburban High Family Status) neighbourhoods became part of two major neighbourhood types in 2006, Type P (Established Middle-Class Com­ pleted Families) (243 CTs) or Type Q (Immigrant Impoverishment and Service Sector Workers) (103 CTs). These shifts reflect both the aging of the 1981 suburbs (from Type S to Type P) – which is more a process of evolution – and the movement of a new immigrant population, often of relatively lower economic status than previous residents, to the suburbs (especially in Toronto and Van­ couver). The latter suggests a more profound transformation of the functions played by the suburbs, particularly in these CMAs. The method used here also enables the identification of backward change combinations. We cannot describe all of these in detail here. To illustrate, however, we will focus on one of the types: Type Q (Immigrant Impoverishment and Service Sector Workers). This type did not exist in 1981, but there were 736 such CTs in 2006. We can ascertain what types of neighbourhoods morphed into Type Q. Of the 736 Type Q in 2006, 4% were formerly Type M (Non-Family Mixed Social), 31% were formerly Type O (Established Blue Collar), 51% were formerly Type R (Socially Diverse Middle Class), and 14% were formerly Type S (Suburban High Family Status) neighbourhoods. The increasing prevalence of 68

IVAN TOWNSHEND AND ROBERT MURDIE

Type Q neighbourhoods is a cause for concern and is linked to the changing income distributions in Canadian CMAs and the declining shares of middleincome neighbourhoods, as illustrated in other chapters in this volume. But the above example illustrates that different trajectories of change have produced Type Q neighbourhoods, and the explanations for their emergence must be more complex than simply one type of neighbourhood evolving into another. When interpreting the results from typologies based on change measures, it is crucial to recognize that these typologies based on a joint analysis of change in social attributes or a joint analysis of tract-year observations do not always translate easily into an understanding of the social fabric of the neighbourhood. Analytically they work well, but it is often difficult to communicate the results to others.

Limitations of Typologies Based on Census Variables There are some limitations inherent in the approaches to studying neighbourhood change described here. These can be summarized in terms of two sets of issues: technical and urban social reality issues. Much of the empirical “reality” being described in the examples cited is conditioned by issues such as variable selection, methodology, and spatial scale. Variables need to be chosen to adequately index the key features of the urban society being analyzed, as well as characteristics of hypothesized social change. Different methodologies related to factor structure and clustering can affect the results and hence the interpretation of the results. Furthermore, the interpretation of urban social structures and the nature of neighbourhood types are partly a function of the spatial scale (such as CTs) chosen for analysis. Finally, regardless of scale, when comparing typologies across cities we acknowledge the potential for the characteristics of smaller places to be muted by the dominance of large CMAs in the analysis. This applies to the joint analysis methods described here, where Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver represent the majority of CTs in the analysis. Despite the utility of quantitatively derived typologies of neighbourhoods, these approaches may not capture the social reality of urban areas. A few of these issues relate to: the use of CTs as surrogates for neighbourhoods; the choice of social indicators used in the analysis; interpretations and perceptions of neighbourhood structure and change; and the need to consider experiential typologies as part of the lived reality of cities. The CT has become the de facto surrogate of neighbourhood, and while the analysis has to assume that CTs are SOCIAL DIMENSIONS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD TYPOLOGIES

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socially homogeneous neighbourhoods, this is not always the case (Myers 1954; Gauvin et al. 2007). Furthermore, CTs are not always good surrogates for neighbourhoods in smaller CMAs (Prouse, Ramos, et al. 2014), and, as described in Chapter 1, the CT does not always approximate a meaningful social and spatial unit for residents and policy makers. The CT may also not be the optimal scale for understanding inequality, as shown in the Halifax case study (Chapter 8). In short, reliance on the CT as a spatial data unit requires compromises (see Chapter 12). Neighbourhood interpretation is another issue. Official neighbourhood boundaries do not necessarily conform to the cognitive scale of the neighbourhood of residents (Coulton et al. 2001), and in many cases areas smaller than CTs are what people understand to be their neighbourhoods or local communities (Davies and Herbert 1993; Grant 2006; Davies and Townshend 2015). The choice of social indicators is also linked to issues of social reality. The “objective” census indicators used in most neighbourhood typologies do not include perceptions of neighbourhood structure and change, and may not match personal experiences of change. For example, Megan Gosse and colleagues (2016) pointed out that people seem to perceive physical infrastructure change in their neighbourhoods but do not notice social, economic, or cultural changes to the same extent.

Understanding the Results in Terms of Neighbourhood Change Given the twenty-five-year time span of the two analyses of neighbourhood change, it is not surprising that many neighbourhoods in the eight Canadian CMAs experienced substantial demographic change between 1981 and 2006. The first analysis focuses on structural change, including in situ aging, especially in the inner suburbs, areas of increased economic status particularly as a result of gentrification in older parts of the central city, and changes in immigrant status, including lower levels of economic status among many newer immigrants, while the second analysis uses a transition matrix to identify the specific changes of CTs between 1980 and 2006. In this section, we focus on general issues resulting from the studies. The two case studies point to some common features of change. For example, both illustrate that changes in family and age characteristics, socioeconomic status, and ethnic or racial characteristics have been three dominant aspects of change in the social characteristics of the CMAs. Not only do these 70

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features continue to be important kinds of social differentiation in Canadian cities, but they represent dramatic kinds of socio-spatial transformation. One of the most important transitions has been a change related to age and family characteristics. The change typology indicated that almost onethird of CTs could be classified as aging in place. This is not surprising, given that Canadian society is aging, and that many suburbs from the 1960s through to the 1980s are now populated by completed families. Declining family and household size is a related theme. The rise of non-family singleperson households in Canada has been well documented. The neighbourhood transitions study revealed a dramatic rise in the share of non-family neighbourhoods with mixed social attributes. In the early 1980s, these areas were predominantly concentrated in the inner city, but by 2006 they were more typically located in post-1960s suburban areas, often near commuter arterials and rapid transit lines. Cities such as Toronto and Calgary are spatially polarizing into higher- or lower-income neighbourhoods (see Chapters 4 and 9). Not surprisingly, the typologies described above show that a second major change concerns socioeconomic changes characterized as either upward or downward filtering of neighbourhoods. Upgrading, often linked to gentrification and the professional and managerial labour force attributes of gentrifiers, is evident in some typologies. The change typology showed that 16% of the CTs in the study were defined by rising socio-economic status. These CTs are predominantly located in older central cities, often in areas undergoing gentrification. The transitions study identified a similar type of change, showing that the share of high-income neighbourhoods populated by professional and managerial people rose dramatically between 1981 and 2006. This change has mostly occurred through formerly blue-collar neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification and upward filtering. These CTs are concentrated in the central cities and inner suburbs of some metropolitan areas and represent an increase in and regionalization of gentrification in Canadian cities. A third major feature is the ethnic, racial, and visible minority connection with declining socio-economic status. The typologies indicate that socioeconomic decline is linked closely to immigrant, ethnic, and racial status and the worsening income situation of many visible minorities (Galabuzi 2006). The typologies reveal this in several ways. The change typology identified three distinctive ethnic and racial CT types: the immigrant lagging behind CTs; the rising Asian CTs, and the rising South Asian CTs. Together, these represent over one-quarter of neighbourhoods in the study. The transitions study SOCIAL DIMENSIONS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD TYPOLOGIES

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identified a type that combines immigrant and visible minority status with rising impoverishment. This set of CTs, populated by immigrants, visible minorities, and service sector workers, underscores the link between declining incomes and ethno-racial change. They have arisen primarily as a result of two transitions: the downgrading of formerly socially diverse middle-class neighbourhoods, and the downward filtering of formerly blue-collar neighbourhoods. There is a complex geography associated with these immigrantimpoverished neighbourhoods. In most CMAs, they can be found in selected suburban neighbourhoods, often in larger regions defined by contiguous CTs, and in inner-city areas that still represent classic inner-city reception areas. They are also found in formerly blue-collar neighbourhoods. In summary, the two analyses underscore three socio-spatial formations that are important indicators of change in the structure of Canadian CMAs: (1) gentrified neighbourhoods, whereby former central-city working-class areas are upgraded physically and socio-economically; (2) exclusionary enclaves, including elite areas that have benefited from processes of globalization; and (3) new ethnic enclaves, especially in the suburbs. Not all these changes occurred to the same degree in each CMA. Regardless, such changes have important implications for the lives of people living in the CMAs. To paraphrase Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen (2000), there is not a new spatial order in Canadian cities, but important visible changes impact the lives of persons living in eight of Canada’s largest CMAs. The analyses highlighted in this chapter were based on census data from 1981 and 2006, making the typologies time-sensitive. Because the typologybuilding stage of the NCRP project finished in 2014, and given the complexity of the analyses, it was not feasible to rerun the analyses to create updated typologies using 2016 census data. Although some changes may have occurred between 2006 and 2016, it is not clear whether the overall results would be much different from the 2006 or 1981–2006 analyses. Future researchers might want to rerun the analyses using 2016 data.

Black Box Neighbourhoods and Beyond Nationwide typologies of metropolitan areas have become more common over time (Chapter 1) and, as can be seen in this chapter, the methods and techniques used to derive these typologies have become more complex. Some may criticize the approaches used above because these typologies do not capture on-theground experience and may be difficult to translate into the mobilization of 72

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communities. Researchers need to question the “black box” characteristics of neighbourhoods (i.e., neighbourhood as a set of statistical traits with assumed causal effects) identified by sophisticated statistical techniques, and explore the limits of CT-based indices (Germain and Gagnon 1999). We need to be cautious that CT-scale analyses are not masking important forms of inequality and change that might be occurring at a finer scale (see Chapters 8 and 12). However, we concur with Michael Reibel (2011) that there is still a place for quantitative descriptions of urban social structure and objective typologies of neighbourhoods, even those based on CT-scale indicators. Moreover, we see benefits to incorporating time into these analyses. As Delmelle (2017) and others have shown, we need to understand how neighbourhood typologies can help us comprehend complex forms of social transformation and trajectories of neighbourhood change. Indeed, her work shows that many identifiable pathways of neighbourhood change are socio-spatial outcomes of an increasingly divided and income-polarized society. Certainly, we face challenges in producing typologies when including diverse sets of cities in the analysis because the social characteristics of the larger places may have a weighting effect on the results. There are also challenges in developing universal methods or sets of social indicators to include in such analyses. In different countries, indicators should reflect particular societal characteristics and sources of social variation, and the typologies need to be interpreted within such contexts. The case studies in this volume (Chapters 4 to 10) adopt a simpler univariate classification of neighbourhoods based on change in income ratios. It is worth considering, however, whether the more complex kinds of typologies described above are beneficial in helping us to understand how divided cities are manifest in metropolitan space, and whether typologies can help to theorize the evolution of divided cities. We note renewed interest in recent years in the kinds of methods described here. According to Reibel (2011, 309), “factorial ecology has made a small comeback in recent years. Unlike the first-generation work, recent studies applying factorial ecology generally use factor analysis of urban neighborhoods as a means to some other theoretical or analytical end, rather than as an end in itself.” And Julian Chow (1998) suggests that the multivariate-structural approach, typified by both factorial ecology and cluster analysis, is the most methodologically appropriate to further advance knowledge in these areas. In short, neighbourhood classification and the development of typologies has a great deal of relevance to understanding the new forms of the divided city. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD TYPOLOGIES

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This chapter has demonstrated that urban social typologies can help de­ lineate the changes that have taken place in cities, and the ways in which the divided city is becoming manifest through new forms of social segregation, neighbourhood transitions, and neighbourhood types. They are tools that can be used to foster discussion, debate, and more socially just cities. Acknowledgments

We appreciate the assistance of Howard Ramos in offering suggestions and reviewing/ editing this chapter.

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PART 2

Investigating Neighbourhood Change in Canada

To address questions surrounding neighbourhoods and neighbourhood change, we need to understand how Canadian cities have been changing, as well as the trajectories of income inequality writ large. The seven metropolitan areas examined here involve slower- and faster-growing cities, although none of those examined are among Canada’s slowest-growing cities, and none are shrinking. The process of identifying metropolitan areas to include in our national study unfolded in stages. The research on neighbourhood change began with an evaluation of the City of Toronto, conducted through a Community-University Research Alliance project in the 2000s (Hulchanski 2007, 2010). The second phase, initiated shortly thereafter, applied the same methods to examine Montreal and Vancouver (Ley and Lynch 2012; Rose and Twigge-Molecey 2013). Finally, with Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Can­ada Partnership funding in 2012, the analysis expanded to include a regionally representative selection of Canadian metro­­politan areas: additions included Calgary, Winnipeg, Hamilton, and Hali­­fax. Although the team considered adding other cities

PART 2 (such as Ottawa and Edmonton), the final se­lection reflected compromises among several fac­tors, including geographic distribution, available team members, and projected costs. With regional economic hubs from six provinces, the sample may not be fully representative of the diversity of Canadian cities but includes a significant proportion of the national population and a glimpse of what might be occurring in other cities in the nation. To measure demographic change or income inequality in a metropolitan region, we required a clear and consistent definition of the metropolitan area. The central municipal­ ities at the core of each of Canada’s metropolitan areas make up only a minority of the population, and most growth since the 1970s has occurred outside their borders. In smaller metros, there is often only one statistical definition of the metropolis: the “census metropolitan area” (CMA) created by Statistics Canada to delineate each metro, based on commuting flows. However, the metropolitan region for the larger cities can often be defined in more than one way. The decision of how to bound the region has implications for the population analyzed. For example, Statistics Canada’s definition of the Toronto CMA involved a population of 5.9 million in 2016, but the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) includes other districts, which brings the population to 6.4 million. In our analysis, we used the GTA concept for analysis of inequalities within each region, while using the CMA for comparisons with other metropolitan areas. For the other metropolitan regions studied, we used the CMA boundaries to define the metropolitan areas.

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With a project of this scale, conducted over several years, methods changed over time. The initial studies of Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver used 1971–2006 census data, which reported 1970 and 2005 incomes. Subsequent studies for Halifax, Winnipeg, Hamilton, and Calgary began with 1981 census data because the cities were smaller and less developed in 1971. Reliance on census data presented a challenge to the team, especially when the federal government cancelled the 2011 census and substituted a voluntary National Housing Survey, which proved inaccurate or inadequate for many measures (Hulchanski et al. 2013). The research team purchased taxfiler data from Canada Revenue Agency to obtain more accurate income information for 2010, the end date for the initial studies for Halifax, Winnipeg, Hamilton, and Calgary. We later updated analyses with 2012 taxfiler data and now 2016 census data. Until the 2016 census data were released, the team had to rely on 2006 census data for variables other than income: hence the large multi-city multivariate studies of neighbourhood change reported in Chapter 3 examined 2006 data. Although all teams were provided with similar data­sets and analytical maps, local teams had the latitude to determine how to approach their investigation of the types of changes occurring and the factors responsible for explaining them. Consequently, the initial reports presented by the teams varied considerably in format and findings. The seven chapters in Part 2 present findings from our study cities. Each covers the same period, but the approaches used to discuss the findings vary, as do the cities covered.

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Toronto has experienced significant neighbourhood change, including that related to gentrification and immigration. Photo by Alan Walks

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4 Inequality and Neighbourhood Change in the Greater Toronto Region Alan Walks

With Canada’s largest city (2.73 million people in 2016) at its centre, the greater Toronto region is Canada’s largest metropolitan region: its population varies from 5.92 million to over 8 million people, depending on how the region is defined. Toronto is Canada’s premier destination for new immigrants, absorbing approximately 36% of newcomers to the country between 2001 and 2011, roughly double its share of the national population. As a result, it is among the country’s most diverse metropolitan areas. Of the 255 categories for ethnicity tracked by Statistics Canada in the 2016 census, for example, someone from every single one is found in the Toronto census metropolitan area (CMA). The average Canadian CMA is much less diverse. The Toronto region also varies in terms of economic activities: it is not only Canada’s financial centre, with the nation’s greatest concentration of banks and other firm headquarters, and hence highly paid executives, but also where most automobiles are manufactured in the country and where a significant industrial workforce remains. On several metrics, including those related to income, greater Toronto is among Canada’s richest, but also most socially unequal and segregated, metropolitan areas. The region has grown more unequal over the last half-century. Trends toward socio-spatial concentration and polarization are worrisome, with an increasing overlap between processes of racialization, wage and occupational polarization, and neighbourhood-based income segregation. This chapter examines the trajectories of social inequality and neighbourhood change in greater Toronto since the 1970s. It begins by defining the region under study and providing historical context to the region’s growth. It then 79

examines changes in levels of income inequality across households and within neighbourhoods. The processes occurring within neighbourhoods are analyzed, and the major explanatory factors responsible for producing sociospatial income inequality are discussed. The public policy context is outlined, and the case made for lost opportunities in relation to policies that would have helped mitigate the trends toward socio-spatial inequality.

A History of Unequal Growth Like many other metropolitan areas in Canada, the Toronto region was built on lands traditionally occupied by First Nations communities, including Wyan­ dot (Huron), Iroquois, and Algonquin peoples. The “Toronto purchase,” still contested today, saw the British colonial authorities pay the Algonquin Mis­ sissaugas First Nation ten shillings (roughly Cdn$60 in contemporary value) in 1787 for a large part of what is now greater Toronto (Mississauga News 2010), after which these local First Nations communities were compelled to move elsewhere. Colonial settlement dates to the eighteenth century, with the establishment of the City of York in 1793 and its designation as the capital of Upper Canada by Governor John Graves Simcoe. Despite its burning and destruction by American invaders during the War of 1812, the settlement continued, attracting United Empire Loyalists from the United States and New Brunswick. When the city was renamed Toronto in 1834, it had a population of roughly 9,200 (Bradburn 2014). From these beginnings grew a metropolitan region that by 2016 would house well over 6 million people, albeit with less than 1.3% of the population self-identifying as having Aboriginal ancestry. In 1953, faced with growth outside of Toronto’s boundaries, the province created a two-tier metropolitan government structure for governing the then-region, which was further restructured in 1964 (see Frisken 2001; White 2003). This led to six lower-tier municipalities – the former cities of Toronto, York, Scarborough, North York, and Etobicoke, and the borough of East York – and one single upper-tier Regional Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (usually called Metro Toronto). In the 1970s, similar two-tier municipal government structures were adopted for Halton, Peel, York, and Durham (locally known as the suburban “regions”). Although cumbersome and sometimes fraught with political conflicts between the tiers, the governance structure helped oversee the growth of the greater Toronto region. Then in 1998 the Ontario government under Premier Mike Harris amalgamated the six lower-tier municipalities with the upper-tier Metro 80

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Toronto, forming a new City of Toronto (Boudreau 2000). Collectively, the areas outside of the new City of Toronto, where amalgamations did not occur, are often referred to as the “905 suburbs,” after the telephone area code introduced in the early 1990s. Since the 1970s, most population growth has occurred in Toronto’s 905 suburban regions. Indeed, over 82% of the population increase between 1971 and 2016 (2,968,315 of the 3,613,921 new residents in the Greater Toronto Area [GTA] over this period) occurred in the 905 suburbs. While migration from elsewhere in Canada into what Harold Innis called Canada’s heartland has fuelled population growth in Toronto, immigration has been even more important. Immigrants have been arriving from all areas of the globe since the federal government changed to a point-based immigration system in the late 1960s. No other place in Canada has both the high levels and diversity of origins of immigrants that Toronto has. Indeed, the Toronto CMA is well known globally for having a very high foreign-born population, at 46% of the total population in 2016, up from 34% in 1971. The levels of ethnic and racial diversity generated by high levels of immigration have changed the “face” of Toronto, which is now a “minority-majority” metropolitan area: self-identified visible minorities constitute 51.3% of the Toronto CMA population. The largest self-identified visible minority categories are South Asian (often tracing their origins to India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) at 16.6% and East Asian at 13.7% (Chinese alone are 10.8%), while 7.5% self-identify as “Black” (including those with African, Caribbean, and African Canadian/American origins), 4.3% are Filipino, 3.9% are Arab or West Asian, and 2.3% are Latin American. Whereas many cities experienced booms and busts associated with the rise and fall of specific industries, greater Toronto continued to grow through changing economic circumstances. With a large industrial sector, it suffered from the incremental deindustrialization of the country, but with concentrations in competitive higher-technology subsectors (such as pharmaceuticals and automobile manufacturing) as well as trade agreements that maintained trade access to foreign markets (such as the Auto Pact until 1994, and provisions in free trade agreements that protect nationally important industries since then), the Toronto region has not suffered to the same extent as cities elsewhere in Canada. Furthermore, Toronto was the main beneficiary of the movement of national headquarters out of Montreal after the election of the separatist Parti Québécois in 1976. And as the nation’s financial centre, the Toronto region has benefited from the general trend toward financialization of the economy, enabling Toronto to continue growing even in the face of the global financial crisis and of the oil price slumps that hurt Calgary’s economy (see Chapter 9). GREATER TORONTO REGION

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Employment growth in the Toronto region, like that occurring in other global cities, has been characterized by increasing functional specialization and wage polarization, as seen in Figure 4.1. Whereas those working in managerial, business, and administrative occupations have seen real incomes rise rapidly since 1990 (to more than double the average CMA income), those working in manufacturing occupations and related industries (such as utilities, construction, and transportation), as well as those working at traditionally lower-paid jobs (in sales, services, clerical, arts, literary, and recreational occupations), experienced a slow yet consistent slide in their incomes relative to the average. Those working in traditional middle-class occupations related to health, education, engineering, law, religion, or other science- or social science–based jobs have seen real incomes remain flat at just above the average. These trends are similar to those seen in other Canadian cities, but at least until the mid-2000s only in Calgary was the degree to which incomes had widened among occupational categories greater (Walks 2011). Although the Toronto region is globally recognized as one of the world’s most successful cities in accepting racial diversity and welcoming and integrating immigrants (and a “minority-majority” metropolitan region by 2016), new immigrants and racial minorities to the region have fared worse with each passing decade between 1980 and the 2000s and the position of immigrants and visible minorities changed little from their already low levels between 2005 and 2015. Figure 4.2 demonstrates a high level of correlation between the relative incomes of immigrants and racial minorities, suggesting that race is a factor in widening income gaps. By 2016, recent immigrants (arriving in the previous ten years) had incomes under 55% of those of non-immigrants, while visible minorities in 2015 had incomes under 65% of those of whites. Immigrants’ skills are not being used to full potential (Reitz 2007), and since the 1990s it has been taking longer for immigrants to close the income gap with non-immigrants (Wang and Lo 2005). One result is that each cohort of new immigrants to Can­ ada has had a more difficult time than previous cohorts in becoming homeowners (Mok 2009). Declining incomes among minorities are partly due to discrimination in hiring, and partly due to occupational restructuring. Such declining incomes are a factor in the increasing racialization of poverty in the Toronto region (Galabuzi 2006; Reitz 2007; Premji and Shakya 2017). Despite this, there is no evidence of ghetto formation in Toronto (Walks 2015b). These income trends by occupation and minority status have been reinforced by a tax and transfer system that since the mid-1990s has not been offsetting growing wage inequality (Frenette, Green, and Milligan 2009; Heisz 82

ALAN WALKS

FIGURE 4.1 Occupational income polarization in the Toronto CMA

Note:  The graph shows the ratios of the average individual incomes for each broad occupational category compared with the Toronto CMA average for all occupations/employment. Sources:  Calculated by the author from Census of Canada, Public Use Microsample Files 1981 and 1991 (with help from Richard Maaranen); Census of Canada, Special Purpose Tabulations for the 2001 and 2006 Census; and the Data Tables for the 2016 Census (http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016).

FIGURE 4.2 Relative incomes of visible minorities and recent immigrants, Toronto CMA

Notes:  The graph shows the average income of recent immigrants as a percentage of the average Toronto CMA income of non-immigrants, and the average income of visible minorities as a percentage of the average Toronto CMA income of whites (non–visible minorities). Sources:  Calculated by the author from Census of Canada, Public Use Microsample Files 1981 and 1991 (with help from Richard Maaranen); Census of Canada, Special Purpose Tabulations for the 2001 and 2006 Census; and the Data Tables for the 2016 Census (http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016).

GREATER TORONTO REGION

83

2007). The Progressive Conservative provincial government led by Mike Harris – first elected in 1995 – sought to reduce both income taxes and government spending, while shifting the burden of paying for many local and provincial services to lower-income households (Keil 2002; Walks 2004). These changes helped produce an increase in income inequality over time, as measured by the Gini coefficient. Figure 4.3 graphs the Gini coefficient in the City of Toronto and each of the 905 suburban regions, measured among individuals aged 15 and older. This is the primary measure of income inequality among people (not neighbourhoods). Among the various subregions, the City of Toronto – the central city of the region – reveals both the highest levels (Figure 4.3, left) and most rapid increase (Figure 4.3, right) of individually based income inequality. Although income inequality is lower in the 905 regions, it increased there at similar rates to those seen in the GTA overall, particularly during the 1990s and early 2000s. The suburbs in York and Halton regions show the highest levels and most rapid increases among the 905 regions, while Durham region experienced lower levels and slower increases. Over the period, levels of income inequality across the Toronto region increased by 27% among households, and by over 18% among individuals. FIGURE 4.3 Income inequality (Gini coefficients) among individual earners (non-spatial), Toronto CMA and GTA regions, 1980–2015

Sources:  Calculated by the author (with help from Dylan Simone) directly from the long-form census data for each census year. Data accessed through the Toronto Statistics Canada Research Data Centre (RDC).

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A Region Dividing: Socio-Spatial Inequalities By the end of the Second World War, during which many houses were converted into multiple dwellings, the bulk of rental units and the poorer residents they accommodated were concentrated in the inner core. As the regional population exploded through the postwar period – first into the inner/older suburbs of Etobicoke, North York, and Scarborough during the 1950s and 1960s, followed by growth in the outer/newer suburbs beyond Metro’s boundaries after this – demand for rental and owner-occupied housing soared. Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1990s, federal and provincial social housing programs and federal incentives for private rental construction (such as the limited dividend housing program) funded construction of many new social and private rental housing units (Suttor 2016). A significant proportion of the new social housing ended up in less accessible areas of the inner suburbs containing highdensity private rental apartments, partly a result of the availability of cheaper land in such locations, and partly because of the animosity toward urban renewal and project housing within the inner city in the late 1960s and 1970s. Social housing built in the 905 suburbs made up a much smaller proportion (around 3.4%) of the total stock than in the inner suburbs (over 8%), partly due to the reluctance of municipalities outside Toronto to accept large social housing communities. Coupled with the rapid decline in the building of new social housing during the 1990s, the result was increasing concentration of lower-cost rental housing within the amalgamated City of Toronto, particularly certain neighbourhoods in the inner suburbs. The suburbanization of wealth that occurred throughout the postwar period and the gentrification of the inner city since the late 1970s are reflected in the patterning of incomes across the metropolitan region. As shown in Figure 4.4, in 1980 those with lower incomes were disproportionately concentrated within the inner core and neighbourhoods in what is referred to as the “U” of poverty along the Grand Trunk Railway corridor, particularly those stretching from the down­town to northwest North York. Yet most neighbourhoods in the suburbs had incomes within 20% of the CMA average income. Metro Toronto (which became the new City of Toronto after amalgamation) was then, as now, home to some of the highest-income neighbourhoods in the region, many clustered in the centre of Metro, or nearby areas developed in the early postwar period (such as in central Etobicoke). Oakville, Aurora, and Markham also contained high-income clusters.

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FIGURE 4.4 Average individual income by census tract in the Toronto CMA, 1980

East Gwillimbury

Newmarket

WhitchurchStouffville

East Gwillimbury Aurora

King Caledon

Newmarket

Vaughan

Aurora

King

Richmond Hill

WhitchurchStouffville

Markham

Caledon Vaughan

Richmond Hill

Pickering Markham

North York

Brampton

Ajax Pickering

Scarborough

Etobicoke

North York

Brampton

Scarborough

Toronto

Mississauga

Toronto

1980

North York York

North York

Oakville

Scarborough East York

York

Oakville

Scarborough East York

Etobicoke 6

3

6

0

3

Kilometres

6

0

6

Etobicoke

Census tracttract average Census average income compared with the individual individual income compared with Toronto CMA average of $14,384

the Toronto CMA average of $14,384 Very High – 140% to 401% High – 140% (50Very CTs, 8% of the region)to 401% (50 CTs, to 8% of the region) High – 120% 140% (47High CTs, 8% of the region) – 120% to 140% Middle – 80% to 120% (47 Income CTs, 8% of the region) (391 CTs, 65% of the region)

Toronto

Toronto

Kilometres

Municipalities (1981) Municipalities

(1981)

Major Highways (2011)

Major Highways (2011)

Subway (2011)

Subway (2011)

Markham Name of Municipality (1981)

Markham Name of Municipality (1981)

Middle Income – 80% to 120% Source: Statistics Canada, Low – 60% to 80% (391 the region) Census Profile Series, 1981. (107 CTs,CTs, 18% 65% of the of region) Low to60% 80% Very Low––60% 42% to (4 CTs, of the region) (1071% CTs, 18% of the

Source: Statistics Canada, Census tract and municipal boundaries are for 1981.

Census Profile Series, 1981. region) Average individual income is for persons 15 and over and includes income from all sources, NotVery Available Low – 42% to 60% Census tract and municipal boundaries are for 1981. before tax. (4 CTs, 1% of the region) individual income is for persons 15 Source:  Created by Richard Maaranen using data from Average the 1981 Census of Canada. and over and includes income from all sources, Not Available before tax.

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ALAN WALKS

1980

Ajax

Mississauga Etobicoke

FIGURE 4.5 Average individual income by census tract in the Toronto CMA, 2015

East Gwillimbury

Newmarket

WhitchurchStouffville

East Aurora Gwillimbury

King Caledon

Newmarket

Vaughan

Aurora

King

Richmond Hill

WhitchurchStouffville

Markham

Caledon Vaughan

Richmond Hill

Pickering Markham

North York

Brampton

Ajax Pickering

Scarborough

Etobicoke

North York

Brampton

Ajax

Mississauga Etobicoke

Scarborough

Toronto

Mississauga

Toronto

North York York

North York

Oakville

2015

Scarborough East York

York

Oakville

2015

Scarborough East York

Etobicoke 6

3

6

0

3

6

0

6

Etobicoke

Toronto

Toronto

Kilometres

Kilometres

Census tract average Census tract average individual income compared with the individual income compared with the Toronto CMA average of $50,479 Toronto CMA average of $50,479

Municipalities (2016) Municipalities

(2016)

Major Highways (2011)

Major Highways (2011)

Very High – 140% to 831% Subway (2011) Very to 831% (139 CTs,High 12% – of 140% the region) Subway (2011) Name of Municipality (2016) (139 CTs,to12% High – 120% 140%of the region) Markham Name of Municipality (2016) Markham (81High CTs, 7% of the to region) – 120% 140% North York Former Municipality (1996) Middle – 80% to 120% (81 Income CTs, 7% of the region) NorthCity York Former Municipality (1996) Former of Toronto (1996) (483 CTs, 42% of the region)

Middle Income – 80% to 120%

Low – 60% to 80% (483 the region) (335 CTs,CTs, 29% 42% of the of region) Very Low––60% 42% to Low to 60% 80% (107 CTs,CTs, 9% of29% the region) (335 of the region) NotVery Available Low

Source: Statistics Canada, Census Profile Series, 2016.

Former City of Toronto (1996)

Census tract and municipal boundaries are for 2016. Source: Statistics Canada,

Census Series, Average individual incomeProfile is for persons 152016. and over and includes income from all sources,

– 42% to 60% before tax. Census tract and municipal boundaries are for 2016. (107 CTs, 9% of the region) Average individual income is for persons 15 Source:  Created by Richard Maaranen using data from and theover 2016 Canada. andCensus includes of income from all sources, Not Available before tax.

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Changes occurring since 1980 have produced a more variegated neighbourhood distribution of income (Figure 4.5). In both the City of Toronto and the 905 regions, high-income areas spread and consolidated into significant clusters of neighbourhoods, in many cases forming large high-income districts. Within the City, these expanded outward from the traditionally wealthy neighbourhoods highlighted in Figure 4.4, but also developed with the gentrification of formerly poorer inner-city neighbourhoods that saw the older high-income sector extend down the lake (see Walks and Maaranen 2008b). In the 905 suburbs, clusters of neighbourhoods in Oakville, Halton Hills, Caledon, Vaughan, King, Aurora, Whitchurch-Stouffville, and Uxbridge grew into higher-income suburban communities. Meanwhile, many neighbourhoods built in the postwar period in the former inner-suburban municipalities filtered down over many decades (Bourne 1993; Walks 2001; Hulchanski 2010). These trends result from many factors, including changing household formation dynamics, the growth of single-parent households, the aging of postwar suburban residents, and most importantly the establishment of suburban immigrant reception areas. By 2015, the greatest concentrations of low-income neighbourhoods were in this inner-suburban zone, including north Etobicoke, west North York, and Scarborough. Low-income areas are also found within some of the 905 suburbs, particularly in Oshawa, southern Markham, central and northeastern Mississauga, and many tracts in Brampton. One of the factors characterizing neighbourhood change in the Toronto region is the spread of condominium tenure, with the rise of new neighbourhoods made up of “condos” (Rosen and Walks 2015). The first condominium legislation was passed in Ontario in the late 1960s, and condominium tenure grew through each subsequent decade. In 1981, there were 85,728 completed condo units in the Toronto CMA, either owner-occupied or rented (City of Toronto 1982). Of these, 54,580 (63.6%) were located within the City of Toronto (then called Metro Toronto). In 2016, there were 445,595 condo units in the Toronto CMA, comprising over 20% of the total housing stock, and 292,135 (65.6%) of these were located within the boundaries of the City of Toronto. In 1981, there were only three census tracts where condominium units made up more than half of housing units in the tract, all of them found in the northern portion of the former municipality of Etobicoke. By 2016, condo units made up more than half of the total housing stock in 110 census tracts, which is just over 10% of all CTs. Of these, 30 CTs (27.3%) are clustered within the inner city (former municipalities of Toronto, York, and East York), and another 42 (38.2%) are located within the inner suburbs of the amalgamated City of Toronto (Etobicoke, North 88

ALAN WALKS

York, Scarborough). The other 38 CTs (34.5%) are located outside the City in the 905 (outer-)suburban municipalities. Overall, such condo neighbourhoods have incomes similar to those of their non-condo counterparts (their average income in 2015 was $50,385, versus $52,240 for neighbourhoods with fewer than 50 condo units), but they have fewer families (32.5% versus 50.7%) and far more visible minorities (58.7% versus 47.6% for areas with less than half their units in condo form). By facilitating intensification, the spread of condominium tenure has allowed the Toronto region to become denser over time even under conditions of continued suburbanization, from 801 people per square kilometre in 1981 to 1,004 people per square kilometre in 2016. Neighbourhood change has not only been characterized by the suburbanization of wealth but as well by new evidence of suburban decline. Figure 4.6 shows the trajectories of income across the five broad suburban regions since the 1970s. Although the 905 suburban regions remained richer on average than the amalgamated City of Toronto, the trajectories of change are quite dramatic and different among them (Figure 4.6, left). Durham region to the east of Toronto has traditionally housed households with lower income than other 905 regions due to the historical dominance of working-class employment in Oshawa, and its larger rural population. However, it has seen many new commuter subdivisions built since the 1980s that have countered declines in poorer neighbourhoods, such that average individual income has remained stable at just below the CMA average. Meanwhile, after remaining stable between 1970 and 1990, Halton (the westernmost region) has seen its average incomes increase to a level 28% higher than the CMA average, the highest of the 905 regions. In contrast, both Peel and York began as middle-class suburban regions with a growing mix of employment types but have seen their average incomes fall. Average individual incomes in Peel (Mississauga, Brampton, and Caledon) peaked in 1970 and have been falling relative to the CMA ever since: by 2015, average incomes had fallen to roughly 96% of the GTA average. York region (Markham, Richmond Hill, Aurora, Newmarket, Vaughan, King), located north of the City of Toronto, saw average household incomes rise as it developed into a middle-class suburban region through the 1970s and 1980s. However, incomes peaked in 1990, and by 2015 average incomes were back down almost to where they began in 1970. Peel and York regions have, notably, attracted the greatest shares of new immigrants among the 905 regions. Although average incomes remained stable in the amalgamated City of Toronto overall, considerable changes occurred among constituent former municipalities (Figure 4.6, right). The pre-1945 inner-city municipalities (the GREATER TORONTO REGION

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old City of Toronto, York, and East York) began the period with incomes well under the CMA average, while the inner suburbs of Etobicoke, North York, and Scarborough revealed the highest incomes (with North York and Etobicoke above the GTA average, and Scarborough just under). Over time, all the former inner-suburban municipalities saw relative incomes drop, in some cases precipitously. Gentrification made the old City of Toronto the richest of the six former areas, displacing many with lower incomes into other neighbourhoods within the suburbs. A similar but more muted process occurred in East York, which by 2015 had become richer than North York. If municipal amalgamation had not occurred, Scarborough would have been the poorest municipality in the GTA by 2015. The regional shifts in average incomes provide the context for understanding neighbourhood change and the resulting rise of income segregation between neighbourhoods in the GTA (Figure 4.7). Within the City of Toronto, the level of income segregation increased at the fastest rate, to the highest level in the GTA, partially as a result of the gentrification of older neighbourhoods, coupled with rising incomes in already rich neighbourhoods and the filtering down of many neighbourhoods in the inner suburbs. Levels of neighbourhoodbased income segregation have grown more slowly in most of the 905 regions, and to lower levels than the City (even slightly reversing since the global financial FIGURE 4.6 Average individual income ratio (compared with GTA average), City of Toronto and 905 regions, and former municipalities within Toronto, 1970–2015

Source:  Calculated by the author using the census tract profiles from the Census of Canada, 1971–2016.

90

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crisis, as evident in changes between 2010 and 2015, particularly when individual incomes are the units of measurement). One reason for the overall growth in income segregation is the general downward trend in average incomes in the 905 regions. Over half (58.4%) of neighbourhoods (census tracts) in the 905 witnessed a decline in real income (relative to the CMA average) of at least 10% between 1980 and 2015, a trend that was stronger in the 905 than in the City of Toronto (45.5%). Yet there is significant variation across 905 neighbourhoods. Whereas almost fourth-fifths of neighbourhoods in Peel experienced income declines (79.4%), a small proportion (6.3%) of neighbourhoods in Halton did. Likewise, 39.5% and 32.3% of neighbourhoods in York region and Durham region, respectively, revealed relative income declines. By contrast, 22% of neighbourhoods in the 905 had experienced income increases of at least 10%, varying from a high of 62.5% in Halton to a low of 11.3% in Peel (and 17.6% in Durham). In York, 32.6% of neighbourhoods experienced increases, not far behind the City of Toronto at 37%. Increasing numbers of high-income neighbourhoods in Halton help explain more rapid increases in income segregation there, while increasing proportions of low-income neighbourhoods dominate the trends toward increasing segregation in Peel. York has both more high-income and more low-income neighbourhoods. FIGURE 4.7 Socio-spatial income inequality (segregation) among census tracts (Gini coefficients), Toronto CMA and GTA regions, 1980–2015

Source:  Calculated by the author using the census tract profiles from the Census of Canada, 1981–2016.

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Mapping those neighbourhoods that have seen income increases or decreases of 10% or greater reveals an incredible spatial clustering of neighbourhood changes in disparate areas (Figure 4.8). Neighbourhoods that are gaining ground (with significantly improving incomes relative to the CMA) are found across the inner city and in southern and central portions of the amalgamated City of Toronto, as well as along the lake in Halton, and in many northerly areas of York region. To a large extent, these areas extend the sectoral trends established in earlier periods. Meanwhile, throughout many inner suburbs, and in outer-suburban municipalities closest to the City of Toronto boundary (including Brampton, Mississauga, Markham, and Oshawa), many neighbourhoods have lost ground (with income declines of at least 10% in relative terms). These areas are among the places receiving the most recent immigrants in the Toronto region, who, as noted above in Figure 4.2, have lost considerable ground relative to native-born Canadians since the 1980s. But the patterns are even more worrisome. Almost 70% of the neighbourhoods that have lost ground in this fashion had low or very low incomes by 2015, while the other 30.6% had middle or higher incomes. That is, already poor neighbourhoods have been twice as likely as other neighbourhoods to have become even poorer. Another clear trend is toward a polarizing of formerly middle-income areas. Almost two-thirds (237, or 61%) of the 389 formerly middle-income neighbourhoods (with incomes within 20% of the CMA average) are no longer in this category. The trend is starkest within the City of Toronto, where 123 tracts (49% of the City’s middle-income neighbourhoods in 1980) slipped from middleincome (within 20% of the CMA average) to lower-income status (over 20% lower than the CMA average). Yet at the same time 43 tracts (17% of the City’s formerly middle-income neighbourhoods) moved upward to higher-income categories, leaving a minority of such neighbourhoods (33%) still middleincome. Middle-income neighbourhoods have also started disappearing in the 905. Almost half (177 tracts, or 46% of the total) that had middle incomes in 1980 saw their incomes slip sufficiently that they became low-income neigh­ bour­hoods in 2015, whereas 60 tracts (15%) of formerly middle-income neighbourhoods moved up into higher-income categories. In 1980, 65.7% of tracts had middle incomes – within 20% of the CMA average – but by 2015 only 40% of tracts fit this category. While the proportion of tracts with average incomes 20% or higher than the CMA average rose slightly from 15.4% to 17.3%, the proportion of tracts with incomes at least 20% lower than the CMA average increased from less than one-fifth (19.6%) to 42.6% of neighbourhoods. This is among the more 92

ALAN WALKS

FIGURE 4.8 Change in average individual income by census tract in the Toronto CMA, 1980–2015 (1981 CMA boundaries)

East Gwillimbury

Newmarket

WhitchurchStouffville

Aurora

East Gwillimbury

King Caledon

Richmond Hill

Newmarket

Vaughan Aurora

King

Markham

WhitchurchStouffville

Caledon Vaughan

Pickering

Richmond Hill

Markham North York

Brampton

North York

Brampton

Ajax

Mississauga

1980–2015

Scarborough Toronto

Etobicoke

Mississauga

1980–2015

Toronto

Oakville

North York York

North York

Scarborough East York

York

Oakville

Scarborough East York

Etobicoke 6 6

Ajax Scarborough Pickering

Etobicoke

3

3

0

0

Etobicoke 6

6

Kilometres

Change in census average Change in census tract tract average individual income compared individual income compared with thewith the Toronto CMA average, 1980–2015 Toronto CMA average, 1980–2015

Gaining Ground Gaining Ground

Income increase of 10% to 589% Income increase of 10% to (33% of the region's CTs)

(33% of the region's CTs)

Toronto

Toronto

Kilometres

NotorAvailable Not Available in 1980 2015

in 1980 or 2015

Municipalities (1981) Municipalities

(1981)

Major Highways (2011)

589%

Holding Ground

increase or decrease is less HoldingIncome Ground than 10% (18% of the region's CTs)

Subway (2011)

Major Highways (2011) Subway (2011)

Markham Name of Municipality (1981)

Name of Municipality (1981) Source: StatisticsMarkham Canada, Census Profile Series, 1981 and 2016.

Income increase or decrease is less Census tract boundaries are held constant for 1981.

Losing Ground than 10% (18% of the region's CTs) Income decrease of 10% to 58% are low/very low income Losingand Ground in 2015 (34%decrease of the region's CTs) to 58% Income of 10% Income decrease of 10% to 176% and are low/very low income and are middle/high/very high income in 2015 the region's CTs) in 2015 (15%(34% of the of region's CTs)

Income decrease of 10% to 176%

Source: Statistics Canada, Census Profile Series, 1981 and 2016.

Average Individual Income is for persons 15 and over and includes Census tracttax. boundaries are held constant income from all sources, before

for 1981.

Change is in terms of percentage points. Income The 2015 is average individual Average Individual for persons 15 and over and includes income of the census tract is divided by the metropolitan income from all sources, before area tax. average for that year and the same is done for 1980. The difference (2015 minus 1980) is multiplied by 100 to produce the percentage point Change is in terms of percentage points. The 2015 average individual change for each census tract.

income of the census tract is divided by the metropolitan area average for that year and the same is done for 1980. The difference (2015

are middle/high/very high income Source:  and Created by Richard Maaranen from the 1981 and ofby Canada. minus2016 1980) Census is multiplied 100 to produce the percentage point in 2015 (15% of the region's CTs)

change for each census tract.

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worrisome trends and could portend the rise of concentrated poverty along the lines uncovered in the United States (Wilson 1987; Downs 1994; Smith and Ley 2008). In many US cities, concentrated poverty is a long-standing feature, particularly of the inner-city landscape, with upwards of 25% of census tracts falling into the category of “extreme” poverty in the 1990s and early 2000s (with >40% low income/living under the poverty line) (see Downs 1994; Jargowsky 2003). In the Toronto CMA, there has been only a slight change in the number of high-poverty tracts over time. In 1981, 20 tracts (3.3% of tracts) had rates of low income that were 30% or more, and in 4 of these (0.7%) the rates of low income were 40% or more. By 2015, there were 42 tracts (3.7%) with lowincome rates of 30% or more, and 8 of these (0.7% of tracts) had rates of 40% or more. This places Toronto at the low end for rates of concentrated poverty in the North American context and suggests that the increase in socio-spatial inequality is due not to the emergence of deep-seated concentrated poverty but to the incremental disappearance of erstwhile middle-income neighbourhoods and their shift into either higher- or lower-income status. Table 4.1 provides information on the differences in social composition between those neighbourhoods witnessing improving incomes, those experiencing long-term income stability, and those experiencing income declines. The latter can be further divided into those with average incomes still above the CMA average in 2016 (thus, middle- or higher-income but still losing ground) and those where incomes were below the CMA average (thus, poor and losing ground). Of course, there is significant variability within each category, but examining the average proportions of key population characteristics facilitates comparison of different neighbourhood clusters. Poor tracts that have been losing ground clearly contain proportionately less single-family detached housing and more high-rise apartments, but otherwise have levels of tenancy similar to areas that have been gaining ground (the latter are more likely to be found in the gentrifying inner city). While there are greater proportions of multi-family households in tracts that are losing ground, and more families with children at home, the proportion of seniors is roughly similar across the four neighbourhood types. Trajectories of neighbourhood income change depend more on the class, race, and immigration status of inhabitants. Residents of neighbourhoods gaining ground are more likely to have a university degree and be employed in managerial or administrative jobs, and less likely to be foreign-born or a visible minority. Neighbourhoods marked by long-term income decline, meanwhile, are significantly more likely to house visible minorities, particularly South Asians and African Canadians (“Blacks”), and more than twice the proportion 94

ALAN WALKS

TABLE 4.1 Key characteristics of Toronto CMA neighbourhoods with improving, stable, and declining incomes, 2016 Gaining ground1

Holding ground2

Richer but losing ground3

Poorer and losing ground4

Dwelling characteristics

Rented Single detached houses Apartments >5 storeys

32.6 43.6 21.2

26.5 50.4 18.4

20.1 56.6 18.8

34.9 34.4 31.7

Family status

With children aged 6 or under Seniors (aged 65+) Multi-family households

42.2 15.0 2.0

50.7 14.7 4.3

52.7 15.6 5.2

52.8 14.2 7.4

Educational status

Less than high school With university degree

5.3 54.2

8.7 40.9

6.5 46.2

13.7 32.9

Occupational status

Managers/administrators In manufacturing jobs

16.6 1.7

12.6 3.5

13.7 3.3

8.0 7.9

Race/immigration/ Aboriginal status

Aboriginal identity Foreign-born Visible minorities Chinese South Asian African Canadian Other visible minority

1.0 31.3 27.6 7.2 5.7 3.6 11.1

0.8 44.4 42.7 10.9 9.2 6.0 16.6

0.6 46.3 49.2 15.1 14.5 4.2 15.4

0.6 57.6 71.8 12.3 27.0 11.9 20.0

Poverty status

With incomes 10% 2 Incomes within ± 10% 3 Incomes lower by >10% (above-average income in 2016) 4 Incomes lower by >10% (below-average income in 2016) 5 Low-income cut-off (represents a level below which a person or family is said to have low income) Source:  Calculated by the author from the 2016 Census of Canada.

of immigrants as neighbourhoods that are gaining ground. Stable-income neighbourhoods tend to take the middle ground between these trajectories. Neighbourhoods that are losing ground, but nonetheless with middle or higher incomes (at least 90% of the CMA average), share many similarities with stableincome neighbourhoods, including family status, dwelling characteristics, and immigrants, but have more Chinese and South Asians. The most worrisome neighbourhoods – those that are not only losing ground (10% or greater decline) GREATER TORONTO REGION

95

but also poorer (with incomes less than 90% of the CMA average in 2015) – are distinguished by lower levels of education, greater reliance on manufacturing employment, significantly higher rates of low income, and significantly higher proportions of all visible minority groups except Chinese. Notably, only this latter category of poor neighbourhoods, which is losing ground, has minoritymajority populations.

Addressing Socio-Spatial Inequality In Ontario, although the province remains the main driver and funder of policies and programs affecting inequality and poverty, a larger proportion of state spending occurs at the municipal level than in other provinces. Although this only partially translates into greater local unevenness in social spending compared with other large metropolises (Walks 2017), it means that policies are often not coordinated across Toronto-region municipalities. While some policies and systems are developed by the lower-tier municipalities (including, for instance, local public transit), the upper-tier Regional Municipalities (Durham, Halton, Peel, York) and the City of Toronto manage most municipal-level government policies and programs related to addressing social inequality, including those related to housing, education, welfare support, public health, shelters and supports for the homeless, and other social services. The City and each of the 905 regions have developed their own policies and spending priorities, and the province of Ontario has not usually imposed regional coordination. Even Metrolinx, the provincial agency in charge of coordinating the “GO” (Government of Ontario) regional rail and bus services, has limited power to compel municipalities to coordinate local transit services. As a general rule, municipalities in the Toronto region have targeted policies at specific social problems, like homelessness, leaving most issues related to inequality, health, education, and the like to the province. There have been, however, a few direct attempts to address neighbourhood inequalities and issues related to concentrated poverty. While most policies and programs addressing poverty have been people-based (targeted at individuals and households, through welfare benefits or universal programs), the City of Toronto is notable for experimenting with place-based targeting through its Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (SNS). SNS provided funds for additional policing, education, and community programming in “priority neighbourhoods,” all found in the “low/very low income and losing ground” category in Figure 4.8 (for details and critical analysis, see Horak 2010; Leslie and Hunt 2013; Sharpe 96

ALAN WALKS

2013). Despite mixed evidence of success in addressing specific issues (such as crime, youth delinquency, and social problems in schools), the SNS has not noticeably affected the trend toward income segregation. Thus far, none of the 905 suburban regions has attempted a similar strategy. Overall, programs like employment insurance, welfare benefits, programs for refugees, pension benefits, tax benefits, and retraining programs have been the most important interventions for (indirectly) affecting rising socio-spatial inequalities in the greater Toronto region, and to a degree, they have had an effect in shaping the underlying income distribution articulated among neighbourhoods. Two potential policy interventions merit mention. Both are related to provision of affordable housing, and both might be categorized as lost opportunities in the battle against growing neighbourhood segregation. These are in addition to potential lost opportunities of higher minimum wages, better welfare supports, stricter labour standards, and better coordination across jurisdictions, all of which would have helped reduce poverty and hence gone some way toward reducing general income inequality (see Chapter 11). The first concerns funding for social housing in Ontario and the pooling of funds for social housing across the GTA. One characteristic that differentiates the City of Toronto from surrounding suburban regions is the higher proportion of social/subsidized housing. When the Ontario government under Harris amalgamated the lower-tier municipalities into a new City of Toronto, it simultaneously restructured the property tax system (to a market-value assessment regime) and downloaded the costs of many programs, including social housing, onto municipalities (Keil 2002; Walks 2004; Hackworth 2008). To help prevent an adverse effect on the City of Toronto’s budget, social housing costs were pooled from provincially imposed regional (municipal) taxes. However, the funds have not been sufficient to pay for the building of new social housing communities. As a result, little new social housing has been built since the early 1990s (Walks 2006; Walks and Clifford 2015), contributing to the incremental concentration of the existing stock in specific neighbourhoods and municipalities. Furthermore, funds have not ensured timely maintenance of Toronto’s social housing stock, which has rapidly fallen into disrepair (Murdie 2012), making neighbourhoods containing such housing less desirable and exacer­ bating neighbourhood-based sorting by income. If the province had, either directly or via reinvigorated pooled revenues, built new affordable housing in neighbourhoods with little social housing, it would have gone some way toward reducing and perhaps even reversing the trends toward greater socio-spatial inequalities. Pooling was wound down by the Liberal provincial government GREATER TORONTO REGION

97

under former premier Dalton McGuinty. However, with little other funding for social housing for over two decades, this opportunity was clearly lost. Another intervention for dealing with a lack of affordable housing for lowincome households is inclusionary zoning. Municipalities do not have many policy levers, but they could (and should) use their control over land-use planning to reduce neighbourhood segregation, although they seldom do. The On­ tario provincial government when led by the New Democratic Party (1990–95) passed legislation requiring 15% of units in new private apartment buildings to be cross-subsidized by the other 85%. This led to the growth of affordable units without requiring any state subsidy. However, the legislation was repealed by the Conservatives under Harris. In 2016, the Ontario Liberal government under Premier Kathleen Wynne passed legislation allowing municipalities to develop inclusionary zoning policies if they choose. By 2018, only the City of Toronto had developed a policy, but under previous legislation. Toronto’s “large sites policy” allows the City to require large new developments to make provisions for affordable housing, either directly or by requiring developers of private market housing to grant land or units to the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC, Toronto’s social housing provider). The City applied the policy to the Concord-Adex development begun in the early 2000s to the west of downtown, but by 2016 the TCHC had produced only 137 new rent-geared-toincome units (Rosen 2016). Given the huge number of condominium units built within the city since 2000 (Rosen and Walks 2015), the lack of a universal inclusionary zoning policy represents a lost opportunity. Indeed, if the NDP’s original policy had been allowed to remain in place and been applied to these condominium buildings, it would have generated tens of thousands of new affordable units, many in highly accessible higher-income neighbourhoods, significantly reducing neighbourhood-based income segregation. Of course, the most ideal outcome would have been a continuation of the province’s social housing programs.

Toronto: A Region Dividing The greater Toronto region is becoming more unequal in terms of income, both among those who live and work within its boundaries and among the neighbourhoods where individuals and households are found. The greater Toronto region has become the most unequal and income-segregated urban region in the nation. Furthermore, while regions like Montreal (Chapter 5) and Vancouver (Chapter 6) have been able to slow or nominally reverse patterns of rising socio-spatial inequalities, in Toronto (and particularly in the City of Toronto) 98

ALAN WALKS

these have continued in step. No single factor is driving income inequality; instead, a slow polarization of wages among different jobs as a result of economic restructuring, the rise of single-parent households, declining income support from redistributive programs such as employment insurance and provincial welfare benefits, and declining employment opportunities and wages for recent immigrants (particularly racialized persons) explains these shifts. These processes have led to greater income segregation as those with sufficient funds outbid others for the most desirable neighbourhoods within the capitalist housing market. As gentrification makes the inner city more desirable, and leads to the deconversion of rental housing, lower-income residents and tenants are displaced into less accessible suburban neighbourhoods with more affordable rental housing, particularly in the inner suburbs, as well as to Hamilton (see Chapter 7) and Oshawa at the western and eastern fringes of the Toronto region, respectively. The result is a region dividing. The inner core and selected areas in the outer suburbs (particularly in Halton and a few other suburbs of the GTA) have become richer over time, while the inner suburbs within the boundaries of the amalgamated City of Toronto and the inner ring of the outer suburbs bordering the City have experienced relative income declines. This is leading to a restructuring of the social geography of the Toronto region. Importantly, those areas that are witnessing the greatest relative income declines are those places with the highest concentrations of immigrants and visible minorities. While some such areas still have incomes around or above the average for the GTA, it may not be long before they also fall below the regional average. Socio-spatial inequalities in the Toronto region thus are characterized by overlap between racialization processes, occupational wage polarization, family restructuring dynamics, and neighbourhood-based income changes. While the Toronto region is not as segregated by income as New York (the most income-segregated US urban region), or as segregated by visible minority status as Chicago (one of the most racially segregated urban regions in the United States), the Toronto region’s trajectory is the most stark in Canada, and the pace of change is not dissimilar to what has occurred in Chicago over time (Smith 2014). Existing public policies need to be strengthened, and new policies need to be developed to ameliorate income and wealth inequalities and socio-spatial inequalities before they become permanently entrenched in the social space of the city. Not only is there a need for subsidized housing and inclusionary zoning, more equitable public schooling, and greater accessibility through the extension of public transit, but employment/industrial policies need to support and protect the hiring of those with a diversity of skills, experience, and backgrounds. GREATER TORONTO REGION

99

Avenue Saint-Viateur in Mile End, 2017. The arrival of Ubisoft, one of the world’s premier video game developers, in 1997 was a catalyst for the trans­formation of the neighbourhood’s old industrial district into a hipster hub and has accelerated gentrification of local commercial streets. Photo by Damaris Rose

100

5 Montreal: The Changing Drivers of Inequality between Neighbourhoods Xavier Leloup and Damaris Rose

Montreal is located at the crossroads of many trends and features that characterize Canada. It inherited a complex history, as a French missionary colony that was an incursion into Iroquois lands, a mercantile hub, and industrial city. This no doubt explains why some authors saw the city as unique – its development taking place between European and American influences – and encompassing an unstable equilibrium between socio-cultural segmentation and a livable social mix (Germain 2013). Inequality in Montreal is not only the product of the rise of the so-called 1% or of professional elites, as implied by theories of social polarization in global cities (Hamnett 1996b; Sassen 2001). Comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon also needs to consider the characteristics of the other 99%, their labour conditions and the places where they live (Bolton and Breau 2012; Breau 2014; Myles 2015; May et al. 2007). Notably, the dynamics generating the rise of a precarious workforce – what can be seen as a polarization from below – need to be examined in different kinds of urban context. Interpreting recent economic and urban change in Montreal is made more complex because of the turmoil caused by the Quebec independence movement. Montreal, as one of the main points of contact between Francophone and Anglophone, has frequently been at the forefront of linguistic tensions. Policies to create a modern welfare state and an interventionist provincial government, beginning with the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, enabled a massive expansion of the Francophone middle class and a series of language laws culminating in Bill 101 in 1977 that greatly eroded the historical place of the Anglophone business 101

class in Montreal’s economic affairs. One important consequence was the relocation of a large proportion of the Anglophone middle class and business elite to the Toronto region and, to a lesser extent, Calgary (Germain and Rose 2000; Polèse 2018). The early 1980s were a turning point as the provincial and city governments and organizations representing the business community sought to revive Montreal’s weakened economy by carving out a new niche for the city that capitalized on its linguistic and cultural uniqueness. Montreal was for many decades notorious as a deeply divided city in which, with a few exceptions, the linguistic divide largely coincided with the socioeconomic map of its neighbourhoods: Anglophone and middle class or affluent to the west, Francophone and poor to the east. The multi-ethnic immigrant corridor following the boulevard Saint-Laurent axis historically acted as a buffer between the “two solitudes,” but also as a meeting place. However, in the last few decades, French/English divisions have been losing their saliency as a factor in the spatial patterning of income inequality in Greater Montreal. Many Francophone families were attracted to the traditionally Anglophone West Island suburbs in the 1980s and 1990s, while gentrification has attenuated the economic and linguistic boundaries between eastern and western portions of the central city. Postwar rental housing districts in majority-Francophone sectors of eastern and northeastern Montreal are now home to large immigrant and visible minority populations. Above all, the massive suburban development beyond the Island of Montreal has been largely fuelled by the growth of the Francophone middle class (Germain and Rose 2000; Rose and TwiggeMolecey 2013). The region’s main socio-cultural divide is thus now between the Island (the agglomeration), comprising a socio-economically and linguistically diverse core city and older suburbs, and an outer ring of mostly middle-class and predominantly Francophone suburbs, with the City of Laval falling between these two profiles.

Montreal’s Economic Restructuring: 1980 and Beyond The major structural shock of losing its top place in Canada’s urban hierarchy largely overshadowed the impacts of other, classic processes that were simultaneously shaping the socio-spatial patterning of employment and incomes in Montreal in the 1970s, as in other older North American cities: suburbanization of industry and population, the beginnings of welfare state retrenchment, and the growth and diversification of immigration. Yet by the beginning of the

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XAVIER LELOUP AND DAMARIS ROSE

1980s, Montreal’s economic recovery was beginning to take shape around a new role as the main regional hub for the Francophone population. It provided private and public services in a wide range of sectors, from banking, insurance, engineering, and accounting to health, education, and public broadcasting, all activities favoured by cultural and linguistic proximity between providers and clients (Polèse and Shearmur 2004). Overall, however, Montreal’s economy remained relatively stagnant and its unemployment rates high until after the generalized recession of the early 1990s. Concomitantly, population growth rates were low and took place mainly in the expanding outer suburbs. The largest traditional manufacturing sectors – mostly in labour-intensive consumer goods industries – shed jobs steadily with various forms of restructuring and, increasingly, the effects of globalization, which accelerated in the mid-2000s when a new round of international trade agreements removed the remaining tariff barriers that had partially protected Montreal’s clothing industry (Fortin and Meloche 2004). The region was somewhat protected from the devastating effects of deindustrialization experienced in many other old industrial cities because a tradition of government incentives to invest in research and development– based manufacturing (aerospace, pharmaceuticals, and so on) had helped diversify its manufacturing base. Yet there were major impacts on the labour force. Many of the defunct low- and semi-skilled jobs were unionized, and those that were not nevertheless provided steady work, notably for recent immigrants facing language barriers, whereas jobs in the burgeoning consumer services sectors mostly pay minimum wage. As Montreal’s economy has restructured toward high-value-added production, R&D, and cultural industries, obtaining a “good job” now requires professional and technical credentials – ideally obtained in Canada – and strong language skills in French (and often English as well). Employers place a high value on Quebec/Canadian experience, to which access is difficult for newcomers. Thus, even though most recent immigrants to Montreal arrive with high levels of education and French competency, they often face access barriers to dynamic sectors of the economy (Boulet 2016; Boudarbat and Connolly 2013). Some sectors of Montreal’s economy have important connections with globalized, especially European, commerce. First, Montreal is integrated into the global logistics industry as a major transhipment node in the North Amer­ ican freight transportation network. And with the development of highly automated multimodal systems, its port remains one of the busiest on the east coast (Polèse 2018). Second, the province, the city, and regional business associations

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have successfully used infrastructure-building and fiscal incentives to reinforce and increase existing concentrations of international NGOs (Germain and Rose 2000). Third, assisted by proactive provincial government measures, the city and local organizations have succeeded in building the international reputation of Montreal’s “creative” niches. For instance, Montreal was designated a UNESCO International Design capital in 2005, the Cirque du Soleil has been exported around the globe, and the city’s numerous festivals are major contributors to revenues from international tourism. Five of Canada’s ten “most artistic” neighbourhoods were located in Montreal in 2006, and local initiatives to protect artistic assets from gentrification have met with some success (Rantisi and Leslie 2010; Hill 2010). As of 2015, Montreal was the world’s fifth-ranked video game development centre and the foremost Canadian hub for the related niche of post-production special effects (Nordicity 2016; Montréal International 2015). For many decades, the Mile End neighbourhood, comprising the north end of the old immigrant corridor, had the city’s highest concentration of clothing and textile jobs. Today a large French video game developer uses several of these industrial buildings, employing over 3,000 young software engineers and related specialists – a transformation that has greatly accelerated the neighbourhood’s gentrification (Solyom 2017). An adjacent old industrial district, re­ baptised “Mile-Ex,” is the heart of a fast-growing artificial intelligence research cluster (Keating 2018). With such international linkages, a reputation for creativity, urbanity, and livability (Stolarick and Florida 2006), and a large and research-intensive university sector, Montreal can function as a gateway to North America for European companies and professional and skilled technical workers, favoured TABLE 5.1 Individual after-tax income of the population aged 15 years and over (both sexes): distribution, mean, and median values for Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver CMAs, 2015 Less than $20,000 (%)

$20,000– $39,999 (%)

$40,000– $59,999 (%)

$60,000– $99,999 (%)

$100,000 and over (%)

Median income ($)

Mean income ($)

Montreal

31.2

32.0

18.8

15.3

2.7

29,665

36,157

Toronto

33.2

24.1

16.2

21.9

4.6

29,242

40,565

Vancouver

33.1

25.2

16.8

20.7

4.2

29,422

38,512

Source:  Statistics Canada, Census Profile, 2016 Census (Statistics Canada 2017).

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XAVIER LELOUP AND DAMARIS ROSE

by provincial immigration policies. Yet partly because it is a bilingual and bicultural city where French must predominate, its position in the financial and associated sectors that define the pace of globalization is more precarious. Montreal thus seems to have a somewhat less dynamic economy and does not offer as wide a range of work or jobs that are as high paying to highly qualified personnel as do cities of global stature. We can infer from Table 5.1 that this has a dampening effect on income inequality compared with Toronto and Van­cou­ ver. These features have also cushioned the impact of global recessions and financial crises, such as that of 2007–08 (Polèse 2018). After surviving economic, political, and cultural shocks during the 1960s and 1970s, Montreal began to regain a degree of normalcy in the 1980s, with a period of economic development that would accelerate after the mid-1990s. In terms of urban change, strategies initiated in the 1980s to prime revitalization of areas located near the city centre intensified in the 1990s, following a period of suburbanization and urban sprawl. By the late 1990s, the housing market had begun to recover (Engeland et al. 2004), including in the inner city. Until then, for example, gentrification had been largely contingent on municipal incentives to developers and purchasers, and funding to the non-profit sector had played an important role in revitalizing low-income central neighbourhoods (Rose 2010; Walks 2013b). A “condo boom” mainly targeting one- and twoperson households gained traction in several neighbourhoods, boosting homeownership rates in what was traditionally a “city of tenants.” In the core city, population finally stabilized after decades of decline. Outer suburbs continued to grow and diversify their housing supply for different segments of the middle and upper-middle class. In contrast, there was little investment in the maintenance of the poorer sections of the inner suburbs. However, the CMA remains a slow-growth region, with less net immigration and in-migration than other major Canadian cities. Although our discussion of income change at the neighbourhood scale will necessarily be based on individual-level income, bear in mind that the distribution of individuals across various forms of family and household also affects income inequality and polarization. Table 5.2 shows the after-tax income distribution across various household types in Greater Montreal in 2015. The region has a high proportion of non-family households (these are mainly one-person households) with low to modest incomes, whereas high incomes are most prevalent among two-parent families with children. There is a broad income spectrum among lone-parent families, which comprise more than one-quarter

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TABLE 5.2 Household after-tax income, Montreal CMA, 2015

Type of household Total

%

Less than $30,000 (%)

$30,000– $49,999 (%)

$50,000– $99,999 (%)

$100,000 and over (%)

Median income ($)

100.0

22.6

23.5

36.5

17.5

53,738

Couples without children

22.4

7.4

25.0

49.6

17.9

63,566

Couples with children

26.2

3.6

9.7

47.1

39.6

88,563

Lone-parent families, total

10.0

20.7

32.1

40.9

6.3

48,328

2.2

16.4

26.9

46.0

10.7

54,650

Female parent

7.8

22.0

33.6

39.4

5.1

46,809

Other census family households

4.2

3.5

10.5

48.8

37.2

86,537

Male parent

One-person households

33.0

50.7

31.6

15.7

1.9

29,617

Non-census family households (includes one-person households)

37.3

47.6

31.4

18.6

2.4

31,303

Note:  Household after-tax income includes earnings of household members aged 15 years and over. Source:  Statistics Canada, 2016 Census of Population, Catalogue nos. 98-400-X2016098 and 98-400-X2016131.

of family households with children, but they are rarely found in the ranks of high-income households. A major social trend of the past three decades has been the growth of the two-breadwinner couple (with and without children). Overall, international and national studies show that this has reduced overall income inequality as female domestic partners’ earnings are crucial to helping many families avoid working poverty (Morissette and Johnson 2004). However, since people tend to partner with those of similar educational and occupational status, the growth of dual-professional couples (associated both with newer upper-middle-class suburbs close to amenities and with gentrification of housing suitable for families) can contribute significantly to income polarization between households if it occurs in conjunction with the growth of workingpoor couples or low-income individuals. While we lack recent data on the occupations of dual-earner couples in Montreal, a more general comparison of income trends by economic family type over the decades suggests that this potential driver of neighbourhood-scale inequality warrants further study. For instance, the ratio of median after-tax incomes of dual-earner couples with children to those of unattached non-elderly male earners increased from 2.17 in 1980 to 2.58 in 2011.1 While these time-series data are not available for years after 2011, we can compare recent trends in the median after-tax incomes of

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dual-earner couples with children to those of single-earner one-person households of any age: in Montreal, the gap grew from 2.36 in 2005 to 2.46 in 2015. Interestingly, the gap between these two household-type/income configurations is wider than in Toronto or Vancouver, but it has increased faster in those cities (Toronto, from 1.97 to 2.17; Vancouver, from 2.01 to 2.28).2

Neighbourhood Income Changes: 1980–2015 Taking 1980 as a starting point and continuing through to 2015 (after the most recent recession), we now examine how these changes in the region’s economy, combined with changes in population and urban form, have played out in terms of the spatial patterning of income changes across the metropolitan area. At the beginning of the 1980s, Montreal’s socio-spatial structure displayed a pattern frequently observed for Canadian cities (see Figure 5.1). The central area was mainly occupied by low- and very-low-income neighbourhoods but included some established elite neighbourhoods (Germain and Rose 2000; Ley 1993). The poor neighbourhoods formed a spatial pattern identified by Montreal social agencies in the 1960s as an inverted “T” of poverty. It extended southwest of the downtown to the ethnically diverse nineteenth-century industrial districts along the Lachine Canal, and northeast of downtown into the old industrial neighbourhoods of the Francophone east end. Both areas were already affected by deindustrialization but had been the scene of extensive urban renewal schemes in which old private housing in poor condition was torn down and replaced by low-income public housing. To the north, the low-income area included most of the emblematic Francophone working-class neighbourhood of the Plateau Mont-Royal east of Rue Saint-Denis (Benali 2017) as well as some adjacent sectors. The stem of the “T” included the immigrant corridor neighbourhoods of Saint-Louis and Mile End, just west of Rue Saint-Denis and bisected by Saint-Laurent Boulevard (“The Main”), where a mainly Franco­ phone working class coexisted with Portuguese and Greek immigrants. This zone extended northward to the mid-twentieth-century inner suburb of ParcExtension, initially built as a lower-middle-class alternative to the adjacent Town of Mount Royal. It became the cultural heart of the Greek community in the 1960s and 1970s but had become one of the city’s main immigrant reception areas by the 1980s (Germain, Rose, and Richard 2017), along with the postwar low-rise apartment sector of the Côte-des-Neiges district, located north­west of the Mountain and encircled by middle- and higher-income sectors.

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FIGURE 5.1 Average individual income by census tract in the Montreal CMA, 1980

S

1980

y1 Hw

Hw

r Ri ve

Boucherville

Longueuil

y 19

5

Montréal (Ville)

Hwy 112

St.

3

Longueuil Sh er b

roo

ke

40

St.

ce St Ri . La ve w r ren

Lac Saint-Louis

ce

Lac Saint-Louis

3 3

1.5

1.5

0

Kilometres

0

3

3

Kilometres

Census tracttract average Census average individual income compared with the individual income compared with Montreal CMA average of $13,117

the Montreal CMA average of $13,117 Very High – 140% to 287% Very 140% to 287% (510 CTs,High 8% of–the region) (510 CTs,to8% of the region) High – 120% 140% (44High CTs, 7% of the region) – 120% to 140% Middle – 80% to 120% (44 Income CTs, 7% of the region) (382 CTs, 58% of the region)

Regional Municipalities (1981) Regional Municipalities

(1981)

Highways and Major Roads (2011)

Highways and Major Roads (2011)

Subway (2011)

Laval

Subway (2011)

Name of Municipality (1981)

Laval

Name of Municipality (1981)

Middle Income – 80% to 120% Source: Statistics Canada, Low – 60% to 80% (382 the region) Census Profile Series, 1981. (161 CTs,CTs, 25% 58% of the of region) Very Low––60% 43% to Low to60% 80% (19(161 CTs, 3% of 25% the region) CTs, of the

Census tract and municipal boundaries are for 1981. Source: Statistics Canada,

Census Profile Series, 1981. region) Average individual income is for persons 15 and over and includes income from all sources, NotVery Available Low – 43% to 60% Census tract and municipal boundaries are for 1981. before tax. (19 CTs, 3% of the region) individual income is for persons 15 Source:  Created by Richard Maaranen using data from Average the 1981 Census of Canada. and over and includes income from all sources, Not Available before tax.

XAVIER LELOUP AND DAMARIS ROSE

0

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Brossard

20 Hwy

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Brossard

Point Cham plain

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Hwy 112

Point Champlain

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Saint-Eustache

40

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Montreal’s old-established elite neighbourhoods are concentrated on the slopes of Mount Royal to the north and northwest of downtown. Westmount, on its southern and western flanks, was traditionally home to the Anglophone elite, while the Francophone bourgeoisie was mainly concentrated in the upper part of Outremont, on the northern and eastern flanks. Another group of affluent older suburbs, north and west of the Mountain, includes two that were developed on the garden suburb model: Town of Mount Royal and Hampstead. At the western tip of the island are several affluent neighbourhoods forming part of a large block known collectively as the West Island, whose urban development began in the form of waterfront summer communities for upperincome Anglophones before expanding into commuter suburbs after rail and then major highway (Autoroutes 20 and 40) infrastructure was put into place. The Auto­route 40 corridor would become a major hub of light industry, including pharmaceuticals, and associated office employment. All these high-income communities on the Island developed as independent municipalities from the City of Montreal, and most remain so today after a tortuous process of forced mergers followed in some cases by demergers (de-amalgamations) in the 2000s, while forming part of an island-wide governance structure among the various cities of the Island (Trent 2012). South of downtown, the beginnings of high-income reinvestment in Old Montreal around the Old Port, primed by a revitalization plan, are visible on the 1980 map. An affluent townhouse and apartment neighbourhood emerged on the formerly undeveloped Île-desSoeurs, made accessible to downtown with the construction of the access roads to the Champlain Bridge in the early 1960s. The remaining high-income neighbourhoods were mainly newer suburbs located on the South Shore, which often attracted upper-middle-class Francophone families; expansion followed new high­way infrastructure providing good transportation links to the downtown employment core. They included Brossard, a planned community at the south of the Champlain Bridge, Saint-Bruno, and Boucherville (Highway 25). A final important feature of the Montreal region’s social fabric in 1980 was the overwhelming presence of middle-class households in the suburbs east on the Island of Montreal and in parts of the outer (“off-Island”) suburbs. Suburbanization of these areas began after the Second World War and greatly accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s. It was fuelled by federal and provincial housing programs, aimed at supporting access to homeownership for middle-income families, as well as by major provincial investments in high­ way development and by municipal financing that encouraged urban sprawl. Consequently, Montreal’s outer suburbs are lower-density than those of other MONTREAL

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FIGURE 5.2 Average individual income by census tract in the Montreal CMA, 2015

y6 Hw

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l

y1 Hw

Hw

e S t.

0

She rb

ro ok

Hw y4

Boucherville

Montréal (Ville) Boucherville

Longueuil

y 19

5

Montréal (Ville) Hwy 112

St.

3

Longueuil roo

ke

40

Sh er b

Hwy 112

ce St Ri . La ve w r ren

Lac Saint-Louis

ce

Lac Saint-Louis

3 3

1.5

1.5

0

Kilometres

0

3

3

Kilometres

Census tract average Census tract average individual income compared with the individual income compared with Montreal CMA average of $44,742

the Montreal CMA average of $44,742 Very High – 140% to 956% High – 140% (86Very CTs, 9% of the region)to 956% (86 CTs, to 9% of the region) High – 120% 140% (73High CTs, 8% of the region) – 120% to 140% Middle – 80% to 120% (73 Income CTs, 8% of the region) (535 CTs, 56% of the region)

Regional Municipalities (2016)

Regional Municipalities (2016)

Highways and Major Roads (2011)

Highways and Major Roads (2011)

Subway (2011)

Laval

Subway (2011)

Name of Municipality (2016)

Laval

Name of Municipality (2016)

Middle Income – 80% to 120% Source: Statistics Canada, Low – 60% to 80% (535 the region) Census Profile Series, 2016. (224 CTs,CTs, 24% 56% of the of region) Very Low––60% 36% to Low to60% 80% (33(224 CTs, 3% of 24% the region) CTs, of the

Census tract and municipal boundaries are for 2016. Source: Statistics Canada,

Census Profile Series, 2016. region) Average individual income is for persons 15 and over and includes income from all sources, NotVery Available Low – 36% to 60% Census tract and municipal boundaries are for 2016. before tax. (33 CTs, 3% of the region) individual income is for persons 15 Source:  Created by Richard Maaranen using data from Average the 2016 Census of Canada. and over and includes income from all sources, Not Available before tax.

XAVIER LELOUP AND DAMARIS ROSE

0

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St Ri . La ve w r ren

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0

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Point Cham plain

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y1 Hw

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y1 Hw

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0

St .L aw ren r

Hw y2

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40

Laval

Saint-Eustache

40

ive

0

St .L aw ren

Terrebonne

y4 Hw

y6 Hw

Varennes

e S t.

a

40

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d

0

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2015

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Canadian metro­politan areas (Filion et al. 2010). Upwardly mobile Franco­ phone families were thus able to become homeowners by moving out of a city known for its low homeownership rate. The growth in the dual-earner family contributed to these families’ ability to afford homeownership in a suburban setting (Rose and Villeneuve 1998). When we look at the patterning of neighbourhoods of high, middle, and low income three and a half decades later (see Figure 5.2, based on current expanded metropolitan area boundaries), we see a relatively straightforward evolution in the outer suburbs but a much more complex and variegated picture on the Island of Montreal. In the outer suburban ring and Laval, existing high-income sectors have expanded. Significant new zones of affluence have emerged on the North Shore in several communities located east of Autoroute 15 (which connects Montreal with the Laurentians resort communities), on the South Shore, around the newly developed Dix/30 mega-mall/lifestyle centre, and in Vaudreuil-Dorion, off the western tip of the Island. Some of these are lavish housing developments characterized by large detached houses at low densities and/or luxury condos clustered around leisure facilities such as a golf course. They are close to transportation infrastructure such as highways, or, more recently, are within easy driving distance to a commuter train station. Such developments draw wealthy households away from the Island of Montreal. The rest of the outer suburban ring is solidly middle income, including neighbourhoods that formed part of the CMA in 1981 and more recent suburbs or former satellite cities that are now part of the CMA. On the Island of Montreal, the old elite and upper-income areas remain stable in economic status, but their ethno-cultural and linguistic make-up has diversified. The West Island’s high-income zone has expanded around the highamenity waterfront sectors while shrinking elsewhere. In the downtown and its southwest fringes and Old Montreal, new condominium development on former industrial lands as well as the refurbishment and upgrading of buildings occupied by earlier generations of wealthy residents have contributed to marked expansion of the high-income zone. Intensified gentrification in recent years has pushed a few of the Plateau Mont-Royal’s census tracts beyond middleto high-income status. A new affluent pocket has emerged further into the East End, due to a major redevelopment project on a former railway works site. The most striking changes, however, are twofold. First is the shift of significant parts of the old “T” of poverty into middle-income status due to a more gradual process of gentrification affecting most of the Plateau Mont-Royal and Mile End and spreading into adjacent sectors of Rosemont and Villeray as well as MONTREAL

111

substantial pockets of the old industrial districts to the southwest and northeast of downtown. Second is a major, though not contiguous, expansion of the lowincome zone in the northeast of the Island, as well as in LaSalle, a more distant sector of southwest Montreal developed as a modest-income apartment district in the 1960s. As well, new low-income pockets have emerged within the overall middle-class suburbs of Laval and Longueuil on the South Shore. We expand on these changes below. Figure 5.3 enables us to visualize the spatial patterning of relative income growth and decline from 1980 to 2015. (Since the map is based on the 1981 boundaries of the CMA, it excludes many of the new middle-income suburbs.) We apply a 10% threshold to classify income stability or change in average individual incomes by census tract relative to change in the CMA as a whole. Overall, income stability was slightly more prevalent (29% of tracts) than income increase (28%). While 43% of tracts experienced relative decline, in only slightly over half of these cases did this trajectory of decline bring them into low-income status or deepen their existing low-income status. In order to synthesize and interpret the income change patterns, we have also, as far as data limitations permit, calculated changes in socio-demographic indicators for the average of the census tracts falling into each of the four types of zones in Figure 5.3. These are presented in Table 5.3, along with the percentage value of the indicators for 1980/81 and 2015/16. The demographic profile varies considerably among the zones comprising the four income change types. A recent analysis shows that Montreal’s neighbourhoods display a variety of trajectories since 1980 with regard to the relative concentration of seniors (65 and over), with a marked aging of inner-ring suburbs (Séguin et al. 2016). Table 5.3 shows that zones with rising incomes now have a slightly lower percentage of seniors than the CMA overall, whereas in 1981 they had a much higher relative share of seniors. This is undoubtedly an effect of gentrification. Zones of income stability also had a slightly lower share of seniors than the CMA in 2016, but with less marked change since 1981. Con­ versely, an aging population was associated with an income decrease, especially in the zone that retained mid- to high-income status notwithstanding relative income decline. This association can be related to the succession processes taking place in some mid-twentieth-century suburban neighbourhoods. Some formerly affluent households would be aging in place and living on more modest resources, while others would be leaving and making room for other population groups, such as younger families or middle-income immigrant families. As well, infill housing construction of townhouses and apartments increased 112

XAVIER LELOUP AND DAMARIS ROSE

FIGURE 5.3

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Ri ve r

Change in average individual income by census tract in the Montreal CMA, 1980–2015 (1981 CMA boundaries)

Lac Saint-Louis

3 3

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0

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Kilometres

Kilometres

Changeinin census average Change census tracttract average individual income compared with the individual income compared with the Montreal average, 1980–2015 MontrealCMA CMA average, 1980–2015

Available Not Available Not in 1980 or 2015 in 1980 or 2015 Regional Municipalities Regional(1981) Municipalities (1981)

Gaining Ground

Gaining Ground

Highways and Major Roads (2011)

Highways and Major Roads (2011)

Income increase of 10% to 669% Income of 10% to 669% (28% of theincrease region's CTs)

(28% of the region's CTs)

Holding Ground

increase or decrease is less HoldingIncome Ground than 10% (29% of the region's CTs)

Income increase or decrease is less

Losing Ground than 10% (29% of the region's CTs)

Losing

Income decrease of 10% to 56% Ground and are low/very low income inIncome 2015 (23% of the region's CTs) decrease of 10% to 56% Income decrease of 10% 66% and are low/very lowtoincome and are middle/high/very high income in 2015 (23% of the region's CTs) in 2015 (20% of the region's CTs)

Income decrease of 10% to 66%

Subway (2011)

Laval

Subway (2011)

Name of Municipality (1981)

Name of Municipality (1981) Laval Source: Statistics Canada, Census Profile Series, 1981 and 2016. Census tract Source: boundaries are held constant 1981. Profile Series, 1981 and 2016. Statistics Canada,forCensus Average individual income for persons 15 andheld overconstant and includes Census tractisboundaries are for 1981. income from all sources, before tax.

individualpoints. income for average personsindividual 15 and over and includes Change is in Average terms of percentage Theis 2015 fromisall sources, tax. area average income of theincome census tract divided by thebefore metropolitan for that year and the same is done for 1980. The difference (2015 minus 1980) Change is multiplied 100 to produce the percentage is by in terms of percentage points.point The 2015 average individual change for each census income of tract. the census tract is divided by the metropolitan area average for that year and the same is done for 1980. The difference (2015

and are middle/high/very high income Source:  Created by Richard Maaranen using data fromminus the1980) 1981isand 2016byCensus of Canada. multiplied 100 to produce the percentage point in 2015 (20% of the region's CTs)

change for each census tract.

MONTREAL

113

the income mix in some affluent suburbs. Individuals born outside Canada were increasingly overrepresented in the neighbourhoods in this zone. Lan­ guage is a salient factor distinguishing the four types of income change zones. Those with rising incomes over our study period are today somewhat more Franco­phone than Greater Montreal as a whole, but also somewhat more Anglo­phone, whereas other mother-tongue populations are increasingly under­­ represented. While Montreal’s immigrant population has increased markedly over the timeframe, modest incomes predominate among the region’s immigrants – except among the sizeable number of European French-speaking newcomers who have contributed to the gentrification of the Plateau MontRoyal. In the income-stable zone, Francophones predominate, as we would expect from the location of most of the census tracts comprising these zones either in outer suburbs massively invested in by the growing Francophone middle class, or in older modest-income neighbourhoods of Montreal not affected by gentrification. In the declining but still mid- to high-income zone, allophones (i.e., those with a mother tongue other than English, French, or an Indigenous language) are overrepresented, as are Anglophones, though to a lesser extent. Both in the suburbs and in the central area, some of the increase in incomes has taken place in districts that were already affluent. However, gentrification is the driving factor behind the increase in average incomes over many census tracts in central Montreal (Fig. 5.2), virtually obliterating the stem of the old inverted “T” of poverty running northward and making major inroads in its southwest-to-northeast axis. Zones with rising relative incomes were strongly associated with an overrepresentation of university degree holders and those in occupations in social science, education, government service, and the artistic and cultural sectors – characteristics strongly associated with gentrification (Ley 2003; Walks and Maaranen 2008b). In 2016, 48.2% of residents of zones gaining ground had at least one university degree, compared with one-third for the CMA (1981 boundaries). Montreal’s gentrification began gradually in the 1970s and 1980s, mainly in the Plateau Mont-Royal, with middle-class reinvestment in older housing, including conversions of rental flats into an “informal” type of condominium tenure; municipal incentives helped to prime the process (Germain and Rose 2000). Since the mid-1990s, condominium construction in various price brackets, both on small infill sites and on large tracts of formerly industrial land, has transformed the social and visual landscapes of the inner city (Rose 2010). This has significantly affected the old industrial districts in the South-West borough, around the Lachine Canal and Atwater 114

XAVIER LELOUP AND DAMARIS ROSE

18.2%

Other

15.2%

44.8%

Visible minority

Rented dwellings

n.a.

n.a.

10.0%

80.2

77.5

37.8%

16.5%

16.8%

17.5%

17.2%

82.8

69.4

87.3

69.3

67.6

89.1

n.a.

n.a.

58.8

53.4

72.8% 117.3 109.9

0.96 75.0

93.5

79.2

37.2%

81.6

26.2% 110.3

15.3%

28.3% 112.1

72.6

n.a.

n.a.

97.7

29.0% 113.8 101.9

88.5

16.1% 129.2 123.6 54.9%

2016

18.9%

2016

0.67

0.90 97.8

69.3

94.3

91.1 104.6

99.2

n.a.

n.a. 70.5% 154.7 124.8

43.9% 185.1

24.1% 125.0

42.3% 167.3 156.6

45.2% 177.6 154.8

43.4%

11.4%

16.5%

2016 1981

Zone/CMA

24.8%

1981

Low-income status in 2016

1.16 $30,128

2016 1981

Zone/CMA

23.8%

1981

20.2% 121.3

1.00 $43,165

91.8 100.0

1.00

2016

24.1%

2016

Mid-to-high-income status in 2016

Losing ground: declining average individual incomes, 1980–2016

1981

45.6%

23.7%

19.3%

25.3%

25.5%

62.1%

12.5%

16.6%

$45,130

2016

58.3%

n.a.

n.a.

16.0%

6.1%

74.0%

19.9%

9.20%

$37,646

1981

3,254,855 2,828,349

2016*

Total CMA (1981 boundaries)1

Notes:  Due to census tract boundary incompatibilities, about 10% of the census tracts included in Figure 5.4 had to be excluded from the calculations of zone characteristics presented in this table. Since the excluded tracts are distributed between the four income change categories in about the same proportions as the included tracts, their exclusion does not create systematic errors. 1 The CMA values for 2016 correspond to 1981 boundaries. The numerous new census tracts created since then consist of middle-class outer-suburban developments, predomin­ antly Francophone, non-immigrant, non-visible minority, homeowners aged 50%) populations. The geography of visible minorities is considerably more heterogeneous now than it was in the early 1980s. In 1981, higher than average concentrations of visible minorities appeared in a few CTs in the city core and an outer ring of mostly post-1970s CTs on the suburban periphery. Three weak nodes of concentration could be identified: (1) one in the central-city areas of Downtown Centre, Eau Claire, and China­ town; (2) one CT on the northern periphery of the newly developing suburban communities of the late 1970s (Beddington and Sandstone area); and (3) a set of somewhat discontiguous CTs in the far northeast of Calgary, including community districts such as Castleridge, Falconridge, and Temple, and others such as Rundle, Marlborough Park, and Penbrooke Meadows. By 2016, changes to this pattern were evident. Above-average concentrations were still found in CTs in the central city, coinciding with districts such as Downtown Centre, Eau Claire, and Chinatown, and four relatively distinctive nodes appeared on the sub­ urban periphery. The dominant node of visible minority concentration occurs in the northeast of the city. In 2016, this area included tracts ranging from 35% to 90% visible minority. Moreover, “majority-minority” status was evident in the region: twenty-two of the thirty-eight CTs in Calgary with >50% visible minority populations appear in this area of northeast Calgary. In the Calgary CMA, 29% of visible minorities in 2016 lived in newer (post1981) suburban CTs (or in other municipalities within the region) that were not included in the income change analysis. Only 15% resided in income-gaining areas, 6% in income-holding areas, and 51% in income-losing areas. However, of those visible minorities residing in the gaining-, holding-, or losing-ground CTs, there are differences in prevalence. Losing-ground CTs averaged 38% visible minority populations, compared with 22% for the gaining-ground CTs. Although a significant minority of recent immigrants to Canada are middleclass or even rich, and some may be “millionaire migrants” (as in Vancouver – see Chapter 6), most are not. In the CMA in 2016, 25% of recent immigrants lived in the region not included in the change analysis, while 18% were in gaining-ground, 6% in holding-ground, and 51% in losing-ground CTs. Within these regions, differences are also found. Losing-ground CTs average 7.6% recent immigrants, compared with 5.1% for gaining-ground tracts. Clearly, losingground tracts are the dominant reception area for recent immigrants to Calgary. Rather than clustering in extremely high concentrations in only a few CTs, recent immigrants are dispersed throughout the losing-ground neighbourhoods. 208

IVAN TOWNSHEND, BYRON MILLER, AND DEREK COOK

High concentrations are now also found in the post-1981 outer-suburban metropolitan neighbourhoods (Filion et al. 2010) that were not included in the joint geography used to define the gaining-, holding-, and losing-ground CTs. Recent immigrants and visible minorities are not equitably integrated into the labour market (Bloom, Grenier, and Gunderson 1994), and manifest higher levels of residential segregation (Balakrishnan, Maxim, and Jurdi 2005; Bauder and Sharpe 2002; Myles and Hou 2004). Their overrepresentation in the losingground CTs of Calgary is a broader-scale spatial manifestation of inequality. Not surprisingly, the ethnic compositions of gaining- and losing-ground tracts differ. For instance, losing-ground CTs average higher shares of East Asians (10% versus 7%), South Asians (9% versus 4%), and Latin American and Caribbean groups (4% versus 3%). In contrast, gaining-ground CTs average higher shares of Western European ethnic groups (48% versus 37%). Language barriers are also more prevalent in losing-ground areas, where the CTs average 19% whose mother tongue is neither English nor French – almost double the average of gaining-ground CTs (10%). Housing Tenure and Housing Affordability Differences

Gaining-ground and losing-ground CTs differ in several housing attributes. The latter have lower average rates (27%) of rented dwellings compared to the gaining-ground CTs (33%). They also differ with respect to the age of the housing stock: on average they have simultaneously higher rates of pre-1960s housing (19% versus 6%) and higher rates of housing constructed in the last decade (16% versus 7%). The gaining-ground CTs represent the old and the new juxtaposed (Filion and Bunting 1990), a reflection of the central-city gentrification, redevelopment, and housing and condominium boom of recent years. Losingground CTs are predominantly postwar suburbs built between the 1960s and 1980s, and do not contain the old/new housing mix or the intensity of low-rise or high-rise apartments found in the inner-city areas that are gaining ground. They are generally characterized by single-detached dwellings that are largely owner-occupied. Interestingly, tenure does not differ significantly between losing- and gaining-ground CTs, with similar rates of rental housing (26% and 33%, respectively). Housing affordability stress is a problem in urban Canada (Bunting, Walks, and Filion 2004), and is not simply limited to renters but is also true of homeowners struggling with high mortgage debt loads (see Chapters 1 and 6). In Calgary, it is slightly more problematic in losing-ground CTs. In these neighbourhoods, on average 15% of households experience housing affordability CALGARY

209

stress (income share spent on shelter costs), as opposed to only 12% in gainingground CTs. Residential Mobility Differences

Scholars have shown great interest in how the return to the city centre, innercity gentrification, and the condominium boom are transforming urban landscapes in Canada (Bain 2010; Lo 1996; Walks and Maaranen 2008a, 2008b). Of all “recent movers” (i.e., moved within the previous five years) in the Calgary CMA in 2016, 68% lived within the region included in the income change analysis. Gaining-ground CTs were home to 24% of recent movers, holdingground areas were home to 7%, and losing-ground CTs were home to 36% of recent movers. The suburbs are still claiming the larger share of mobility in Calgary. Although average levels of recent mobility are high (44%) across all CTs in the CMA, the gaining-ground CTs have higher average rates of mobility than the losing-ground CTs (49% versus 40%). Mobility is thus an important correlate of income-gaining neighbourhoods in the central city.

Summary and Outlook As Canada’s highest-income CMA, Calgary is one of the prime examples of a dividing city in the country, often competing with Toronto in terms of income segregation (see Chapter 4). This chapter has illustrated how income inequality is part of the restructuring of the social ecology of the city and has provided an overview of how key characteristics of urban social structure have changed during a period of rapidly rising inequality. Most marked is the changing geography of incomes, and the intensification of very high-income areas in a few central-city neighbourhoods, and to a lesser extent in a few neighbourhoods on the suburban or exurban periphery. The east-west gradient of income inequality has intensified in Calgary, while at the same time there have been income gains in the inner city and relative income decline in the suburbs. Age, family, and household changes showed continued suburban concentrations of families with children, and high rates of in situ aging in established neighbourhoods. As in other cities, the youthification of the central city and surrounding gentrifying neighbourhoods is evident in Calgary. The social ecology of Calgary has seen profound intensification of visible minorities in the northeast sector, with such intensities that many neighbourhoods now have majority-minority status. There is little doubt that spatial separation and segregation according to visible minority status has intensified in Calgary. 210

IVAN TOWNSHEND, BYRON MILLER, AND DEREK COOK

Classifying Calgary’s neighbourhoods as gaining, holding, or losing ground in terms of income changes relative to the CMA average is a simplistic rubric that warrants further methodological considerations (see Chapter 12). How­ ever, this coarse rubric also helped to portray generalized patterns of change in what may be considered an increasingly divided city. The patterns associated with this classification revealed that the socio-spatial pattern of income change in Calgary, as in Toronto (Chapter 4), is not randomly distributed. Rather, it manifests in distinctive regions of change, suggesting a spatial response and form to rising income inequality (Ades, Apparicio, and Séguin 2012; Badcock 1997; Chen, Myles, and Picot 2012). Focusing on income inequality, income segregation, or divided cities is important itself, but there is clearly a need to understand how other social attributes are changing in tandem with evolving patterns of income inequality. Chapter 3 discusses methods for deriving rather complex multivariate typologies of change that include a wide array of in­ dicators simultaneously, including income and income change characteristics. How­ever, the case study chapters in this volume (Chapters 4 through 10) adopted a more simplistic univariate classification of neighbourhoods based on income change. By comparing neighbourhoods classified as gaining ground against those classified as losing ground, we were able to isolate numerous social attributes that appear to parallel the geography of income change. Some of these social indicators are the key features underlying the differences in the typologies discussed in Chapter 3. Furthermore, as these indicators closely parallel changing geographies of income in the divided city, they will also be characteristics that are linked to neighbourhoods transitioning from one type to another through time. Perhaps the most concerning of these are the linkages between losing-ground neighbourhoods and ethno-racial characteristics, particularly the link with recent immigrants and visible minorities (Galabuzi 2006; Pruegger, Cook, and Richter-Salomons 2009). However, all the social attributes linked to rising income inequality should be a source for concern, for discussion, and for policy attention. Some of these issues are already well recognized in Calgary, as they are in other cities discussed in this book. The city and numerous NGOs and community organizations attempt to intervene to empower marginalized communities and neighbourhoods. For example, the City of Calgary Community and Neighbourhood Services department worked with United Way to develop the Strong Neighbourhoods initiative. This ten-year initiative targets eight communities that represent some of the most extreme cases of what we described as losing-ground neighbourhoods. The objective of the program is to increase CALGARY

211

community capacity, increase social and individual capital, and decrease pov­ erty. A second example is the Enough for All strategy developed by the City of Calgary in collaboration with United Way (Calgary Poverty Re­duction Initiative 2013). This strategy grew out of the Calgary Poverty Reduction Initiative begun in 2011, which conducted extensive consultation with a constellation of groups and stakeholders. The Enough for All strategy, which centres on the idea that “my neighbour’s strength is my strength,” developed concrete goals to reduce poverty in Calgary’s neighbourhoods. In 2015, the implementation of the strategy become the mandate of Vibrant Communities Calgary, another non-profit that works to achieve a substantial and sustained reduction in the number of Calgarians living in poverty. As Calgary attempts to find ways to address some of the issues raised in this chapter, it will be worth reflecting on the extent to which public planning policy has been able to preserve or enhance affordability and equity of access. Indeed, planning policies may have had the opposite effect, or may have exacerbated some of the problems discussed in this chapter. For instance, planning policies in Calgary since the 1990s have avidly promoted intensification and new urbanism approaches, and these may have had a role in driving neighbourhood change in some parts of the city, in particular the transition of middle-income neighbourhoods to high-income neighbourhoods. Similarly, investments in light rail transit and associated developments such as transit-oriented development may have had the desired transportation and mobility outcomes but may have increased the relative desirability of some neighbourhoods and added to the growing socio-spatial income divide. Other developments, such as the federal decision to release Canadian Forces base lands for redevelopment stimulated complete rebuilding and gentrification in several CTs with prime accessibility to the central business district, making these neighbourhoods some of the most sought-after in the city (Davies and Townshend 2015). It is a positive sign that Calgary’s problems associated with poverty and inequality are being seriously considered and strategies for action have been developed. However, there is certainly room for more policy attention in areas related to the social correlates of poor neighbourhoods. Housing is one of these areas where policies and investments in affordable or subsidized hous­ ing, whether direct or through inducements, should be considered. Issues involving secondary suites and revised by-laws to legalize secondary suites are already being discussed. Enabling rather than constraining secondary suites will increase the supply of affordable housing options for those struggling with affordability. 212

IVAN TOWNSHEND, BYRON MILLER, AND DEREK COOK

Many other kinds of inequalities parallel income inequality within a society (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). Much needs to be done to alleviate what Peter Marcuse (1993) identified as the “invidious differentiation” that is part of rising income segregation and increasingly divided cities. The social correlates of losing-ground neighbourhoods and disadvantage in Calgary that we have discussed here represent timely information that should inform future policy interventions (see Chapter 11). Whether the available policy tools are sufficient, and the political will can be found to address these increasingly pressing problems, is an open question.

CALGARY

213

In Winnipeg’s inner city, the Central Park neighbourhood with its dense, high-rise apartment buildings continues to be an important initial settlement area for recently arrived immigrants. Photo by Elisa Contreras

214

10 People, Policies, and Place: Indigenous and Immigrant Population Shifts in Winnipeg’s Inner-City Neighbourhoods Jino Distasio and Sarah Zell

Winnipeg’s neighbourhood structure reflects a history of socioeconomic division and ethno-cultural inequalities, with both becoming increasingly spatially entrenched and visible over time. This is perhaps most evident in the symbolic line separating vastly more affluent areas from a cluster of innercity neighbourhoods. Many inner-city neighbourhoods remain characterized by concentrated poverty, high unemployment, and poor-quality housing, which have necessitated substantial and sustained government and community-led interventions. In this chapter, we set a contextual background through a brief overview of Winnipeg’s historical development. We then discuss the broad patterns of income inequality, both non-spatial and spatial, in the metropolitan area. Over the 1980–2015 period, we examine the extent to which pre-existing patterns of socio-spatial segregation have been reinforced, and we note emerging geographies of income inequality and segregation. We find that the relative gap between rich and poor neighbourhoods has increased over time, but not to the same extent as seen in other major Canadian cities. While economic and cultural factors contribute to neighbourhood change in Winnipeg, we focus on how demographic change as well as urban policies and community-led interventions have contributed to socio-spatial patterns in Winnipeg and its inner city.

Winnipeg’s Historical Context and Evolution Winnipeg is a mid-sized Prairie city with a unique and dynamic urban structure. The city is located in Treaty 1 territory, in the traditional lands of Anishinaabe, 215

Cree, Oji-Cree, Dakota, and Dene peoples, and the homeland of the Métis Nation. A confluence of trading outposts, early settlers, Indigenous communities, and the Red River Colony evolved into an incorporated Winnipeg in 1873. Spurred by strong economic investment in core industries, the city grew rapidly to become Canada’s third-largest city by 1911 (Artibise 1977). Following the economic boom of the early 1900s, slow and stagnant growth largely defined Winnipeg’s trajectory (Leo and Anderson 2006). Through the twentieth century, the urban structuring of Winnipeg’s neighbourhoods exhibited patterns more in line with those of post-industrial cities (such as Detroit or Baltimore) than other major Canadian centres. In the post–Second World War period, Winnipeg experienced deindustrialization, with inner-city factories (including those in the garment industry) closing, and the downtown shifting to financial and service sector jobs. Through the 1950s and 1960s, Winnipeg underwent significant periods of economic and demographic restructuring, the inner city fell into decline, and the city suburbanized. In 1972, the municipal government of Unicity was established through the amalgamation of twelve distinct municipalities into the City of Winnipeg. Demands for equitable service provision encouraged continued fringe development, which contributed to the clustering of wealth in the suburban and peri-urban areas of the city. Suburban political dominance on City Council and active lobbying by developers also led to support for largescale development projects, often at the expense of the inner city and downtown (see Distasio and Kaufman 2015). These policy shifts contributed to patterns of socio-spatial income inequality and polarization emerging from the 1970s onward. Winnipeg continued to struggle with bouts of slow growth, economic stagnation, and increased population outflows. Large tripartite interventions changed the course of redevelopment and policy for subsequent decades. Beginning with the Core Area Initiative (CAI) in 1981, Winnipeg was unique among Canadian cities for maintaining a strong governmental presence in the reconstruction of blighted neighbourhoods and the deep subsidization of capital projects in the downtown. While addressing urban blight became a significant policy thrust, the flight of wealth contributed to a spatial restructuring as capital flowed outward toward peripheral suburban areas and beyond. It was not until the mid-2010s that Winnipeg ushered in a stronger period of balanced growth and development in the downtown and many of its shoulder neighbourhoods.

216

JINO DISTASIO AND SARAH ZELL

Patterns of Income Inequality and the Growth of Poverty in Winnipeg The Winnipeg census metropolitan area (CMA) consists of the City of Winni­ peg and the ten rural municipalities (RMs) and the Brokenhead Indian Reserve that surround it. To examine trends in neighbourhood income inequality between 1980 and 2015, we use measures of individual pre-tax income for those aged 15 and older at the census tract (CT) level, using census and income taxfiler data. We find a growing gap between the minimum and maximum average incomes for the CMA. In 1980, the maximum average income for a CT was $29,007, for the historically affluent Tuxedo neighbourhood just south of the Assiniboine River in the southwest of the city, as seen in Figure 10.1. This was 4.5 times higher than the lowest average income of $6,406, in an inner-city CT in the North End. The tract is in an area characterized by mixed industrial activities, immediately to the north and west of the city centre. These same two CTs were at the high and low ends of the range of average individual incomes in 2015, with the relative gap climbing to 6.5 ($125,137 versus $21,098). Analy­ sis of Gini coefficients for the Winnipeg CMA points to this moderate increase in income inequality over time. Figure 10.2 shows that the non-spatial Gini co­efficient for individual income has remained relatively stable since 1980. How­ ever, the spatial Gini coefficients point to a moderate increase in income segregation over time, rising from 0.113 in 1980 to 0.166 in 2015. Mapping socio-spatial income inequality in Winnipeg in 2015 (Figure 10.3), three distinct patterns emerge. First, a segment of below-average income clusters in the downtown core and radiates northwest as well as due north through the inner city and outward toward the periphery. Second, a concentration of above-average income extends westward from the central River Heights area, just south of the Assiniboine River, through the Tuxedo neighbourhood and out to Charleswood and Headingley. Third, in 2015, an increasing band of higher-than-average income circled most of the city, including the RMs of Macdonald and Headingley to the south and west and West and East St. Paul and Springfield to the north and east. To compare average income change across CTs over time, Winnipeg’s CTs were divided into three income categories: higher income (tracts greater than 10% above the CMA average), middle income (tracts ±10% of the CMA average), and lower income (tracts greater than 10% below the CMA average). In

WINNIPEG

217

FIGURE 10.1 Average individual income by census tract in the Winnipeg CMA, 1980

1980

West St. Paul

Winnipeg

West St. Paul

Ritchot

der son H

wy

1980

Springfield

Old Kildonan R iv er

odie Lag im

Re d

St Ma in

lv d

odie Lag im

Portage Ave

W i n n i p e g

St. Boniface Transcona

River Heights

Tuxedo

Portage Ave

Charleswood

Fermor Ave

St. Boniface

River Heights Fermor Ave

Tuxedo

r ive dR

ive

2

Perimeter Highway

Perimeter Highway

Census tracttract average Census average income compared with the individual individual income compared with Winnipeg CMA average of $12,468

the Winnipeg CMA average of $12,468

Springfield

Re

Pembina Hwy

Fort Garry

r

Vital Fort St. Garry

dR

Gil Mc

Re

d

St. Vital

St. Mary

Blv

Springfield

lv d

's Rd Pembina Hwy

ay livr

B ay liv r

St. Mary 's Rd

Charleswood

Gil Mc

1

0

2

Kilometres

Municipalities (1981) Municipalities

(1981)

Highways and Major Roads (2011)

Highways and Major Roads (2011)

Very High – 140% to 233% Very2% High – region) 140% to 233% (3 CTs, of the Former City of Winnipeg (1971) (3–CTs, of the region) Former City of Winnipeg (1971) High 120%2% to 140% Community Name Transcona (12High CTs, 9% of the region) – 120% to 140% Transcona Community Name Middle – 80% to 120% (12 Income CTs, 9% of the region) Springfield Name of Municipality (1981) (94 CTs, 70% of the region) Middle Income – 80% to 120% Name of Municipality (1981) Springfield Source: Statistics Canada, Low – 60% to 80% the region) Census Profile Series, 1981. (20(94 CTs,CTs, 15% 70% of the of region) Very Low–– 60% 51% to Census tract andSource: municipalStatistics boundariesCanada, are for 1981. Low to60% 80% Census Profile Series, 1981. (3 CTs, of 15% the region) (20 3% CTs, of the region) Average individual income is for persons 15 NotVery Available Low

and over and includes income from all sources,

– 51% to 60% Census tract and municipal boundaries are for 1981. before tax. (3 CTs, 3% of the region) individual income is for persons 15 Source:  Created by Richard Maaranen using data from Average the 1981 Census of Canada. and over and includes income from all sources, Not Available before tax.

218

Transcona

re B

East Kildonan

North End

St. James - Assiniboia

Headingley

East Kildonan North Kildonan

St. James - Assiniboia

Assiniboine River

Headingley

Riv er

North End West Kildonan

W i n n i p e g

Perimeter Highway

Perimeter Highway

Old Kildonan

Inkster Blvd

North Kildonan East St. Paul

Ma H in

endSt ers on H

West Kildonan

Re d

Inkster Blvd

wy

West St. Paul

Ritchot

Assiniboine River

East St. Paul

Hen

Winnipeg

lv d

West St. Paul

St. François Xavier

Springfield

re B

St. François Xavier

JINO DISTASIO AND SARAH ZELL

2

1

0

Kilometres

2

FIGURE 10.2 Non-spatial and spatial Gini coefficients for the Winnipeg CMA, 1980–2015

Source:  Created by the authors from Census of Canada and National Household Survey data provided by Alan Walks.

addition, areas were classified based on whether their average income relative to the CMA average was gaining ground, holding ground, or losing ground, and whether this change moved the CT from one income category to another (see Lorch 2015; Hulchanski 2010). Analyzing the relative income change between 1980 and 2015, we find that 15% of CTs had an income increase of 10% or more relative to the CMA average, whereas 38% were holding ground or relatively stable (Figure 10.4). Just under half (47%) of CTs saw income drops of greater than 10% below the city’s overall average. (In Winnipeg, a cut-off of 10% identified the percentage of change between the neighbourhood classifications. Note that if a higher cut-off, such as 20%, were used, the number of CTs experiencing a rise or fall relative to the CMA mean would decrease substantially.) Comparing average incomes in CTs in 2015 with those in 1980, we generally see that lower incomes remained concentrated in the inner city and expanded northwest, while areas with higher-than-average incomes continued to expand into the urban fringe. Perhaps most important is the hollowing out of the proportion of CTs classified as “middle income” – this category described 70% of the region in 1980 but only 54% in 2015. Moreover, between 1980 and 2015, increases in the proportion of CTs designated as having “very high” and “very low” incomes occurred. The spatial data presented in Figures 10.2 and 10.4 point to growing income segregation across the city’s CTs. For example, in our analysis, of the tracts that remained in the high-income category, nearly three-quarters (73%) saw a rise relative to the CMA average. The most WINNIPEG

219

FIGURE 10.3 Average individual income by census tract in the Winnipeg CMA, 2015

2015

Brokenhead

St. Clements

West St. Paul

West St. Paul

Rosser

East Kildonan

odie

North End St. James - Assiniboia

W i n n iRiver p eHeights g

re B odie

Lag im

St. Boniface

Transcona

St. Boniface

River Heights Fermor Ave

r ive dR

ive

2

Perimeter Highway

Perimeter Highway

Census tracttract average Census average income compared with thewith individual individual income compared Winnipeg CMA average of $46,029

the Winnipeg CMA average of $46,029

Very High – 140% to 272% High – 140% (16 Very CTs, 9% of the region) to 272% (16 CTs,to9% of the region) High – 120% 140% Transcona (17 CTs, 10% of the region) High – 120% to 140% Middle Income – 80% to 120% (17 CTs, 10% of the region)Springfield (93 CTs, 54% of the region)

Springfield

Re

Pembina Hwy

Fort Garry

r

Fort St. Garry Vital

dR

Gil Mc

Re

d

Pembina Hwy

Blv

Springfield St. Vital

St. Mary 's Rd

ay livr

ay liv r

d B lv

St. Mary 's Rd

Charleswood

Gil Mc

1

0

2

Kilometres

Municipalities (2016) Municipalities

(2016)

Highways and Major Roads (2011)

Highways and Major Roads (2011)

Former City of Winnipeg (1971) Community Name

Former City of Winnipeg (1971)

Name of Municipality Community Transcona or Equivalent (2016)

Name

Name of Municipality Income – 80% to 120% Source: Statistics Canada, LowMiddle – 60% to 80% Springfield or Equivalent (2016) 54% of the region) Census Profile Series, 2016. (34 (93 CTs,CTs, 20% of the region) Very Low – 42% to 60% Census tract and municipal boundaries for 2016. Source: Statisticsare Canada, Low – 60% to 80% (12 CTs, 7% of the region) Series, Average individualCensus income isProfile for persons 15 2016.

(34 CTs, 20% of the region) and over and includes income from all sources, before tax. Very Low – 42% to 60% Census tract and municipal boundaries are for 2016. (12 CTs, 7% of the region) individual income is for persons 15 Source:  Created by Richard Maaranen using data from Average the 2016 Census of Canada. and over and includes income from all sources, Not Available before tax. Not Available

220

Transcona

Fermor Ave

Tuxedo

Tuxedo

Headingley

Lag im

Portage Ave

Charleswood

lv d

wy

HeM ndae inrsoS ntH Riv er

Ma in

W i n n i p e g

Portage Ave

Headingley

East Kildonan North Kildonan

St

West Kildonan

St. James - Assiniboia Assiniboine River

East St. Paul

North End

Inkster Blvd

Perimeter Highway

Perimeter Highway

Old Kildonan Taché

North Kildonan

Re d

West Kildonan

Springfield

Ritchot

R iv er

Inkster Blvd

lv d

Winnipeg Headingley

Assiniboine River

West St. Paul

Ritchot

Rosser

re B

West St. Paul

Macdonald

Macdonald

der son H

Old Kildonan

Taché

St. Clements St. François Xavier

East St. Paul

Hen

Springfield

Headingley

wy

2015

Brokenhead

Winnipeg

Re d

St. François Xavier

JINO DISTASIO AND SARAH ZELL

2

1

0

Kilometres

2

FIGURE 10.4 Change in average individual income by census tract in the Winnipeg CMA, 1980–2015

West St. Paul

Winnipeg

1980–2015

Springfield

West St. Paul wy

Ritchot

Old Kildonan

West St. Paul

West Kildonan deM rsaoin n HS wty Hen

odie Lag im

Riv er Re d

West Kildonan

North Kildonan

lv d re B

East Kildonan

St. James - Assiniboia North End

St. Boniface

Lag im

odie

Portage Ave

W i n n iRiver p e Heights g Tuxedo

Transcona

Fermor Ave

St. Boniface

Charleswood River Heights

Springfield

Fermor Ave

Tuxedo

St. Vital

Fort Garry r ive dR

Re

2

Perimeter Highway

2

Perimeter Highway

Change in census tract average Change in census tract average individual income compared individual income compared with thewith the Winnipeg CMA average, 1980–2015 Winnipeg CMA average, 1980–2015 Gaining Ground

Income increase of 10% to 91% Income increase of 10% (15% of the region's CTs)

to 91%

(15% of the region's CTs) Holding Ground

increase or decrease is less HoldingIncome Ground than 10% (38% of the region's CTs)

Springfield

dR

ive

r

Fort Garry

Pembina Hwy

St. Vital

St. Mary 's Rd

ray

Gil Mc

Pembina Hwy

liv Gil Mc

d Blv

ay liv r

d B lv

St. Mary 's Rd

Charleswood

Re

Assiniboine River

Gaining Ground

Transcona

St

W i n n i p e g

Portage Ave

Headingley

East Kildonan

Ma in

Perimeter Highway

Inkster Blvd

St. James - Assiniboia

Headingley

East St. Paul

North End

Perimeter Highway

Assiniboine River

Old Kildonan

North Kildonan

lv d

Inkster Blvd

Ritchot

East St. Paul

Hen

1980–2015

Springfield

R iv er

Winnipeg

Re d

St. François Xavier

der son H

West St. Paul

re B

St. François Xavier

1

0

2

Kilometres

1

0

2

Kilometres

Not Available in 1980 or 2015

Not Available in 1980 or 2015

Municipalities (1981) Municipalities

(1981)

Highways and Major Roads (2011)

Highways and Major Roads (2011)

Former City of Winnipeg (1971) Transcona

Community Name

Former City of Winnipeg (1971)

Community Name Transcona of Municipality (1981) Springfield Name

Canada, Census Profile Series, 1981 and 2016. (1981) Name of Municipality Income increase or decrease is lessSource: StatisticsSpringfield are held constant for 1981. than 10% (38% of the region's CTs) Census tract boundaries Source: Statistics Canada, Census Profile Series, 1981 and 2016.

Losing Ground

Income decrease of 10% to 31% are low/very low income Losing and Ground in 2015 (23% of the region's CTs) Income decrease of 10% to 31% Income decrease of 10% to 37% and low/very low and are are middle/high/very highincome income 2015 the region's CTs) in in 2015 (24%(23% of the of region's CTs)

Average Individual Income is for persons 15 and over and includes income from all sources, before tax.

Census tract boundaries are held constant for 1981.

Change is in terms of percentage points. The 2015 average individual Average Individual is for persons income of the census tract is divided by theIncome metropolitan area average 15 and over and includes for that year and the same isfrom done all for 1980. The difference (2015 income sources, before tax. minus 1980) is multiplied by 100 to produce the percentage point change for each census tract.is in terms of percentage points. The 2015 average individual Change

Income decrease of 10% to 37%

income of the census tract is divided by the metropolitan area average

in 2015 (24% of the region's CTs)

change for each census tract.

year and the same is done for 1980. The difference (2015 Source:  Created by Richard Maaranen using data from for thethat 1981 and 2016 Census of Canada. and are middle/high/very high income minus 1980) is multiplied by 100 to produce the percentage point

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noticeable among these are West St. Paul, East St. Paul, and Springfield, where low property tax rates have contributed to the expansion of large-lot, lowdensity development. By contrast, lower-income tracts tended to lose ground, declining further below the CMA average. This trend was most prominent in the inner city and neighbourhoods to the northwest of downtown. As seen in Figure 10.4, a few neighbourhoods exhibited more sizeable change. Income in the city’s downtown East Exchange District, to the immediate north of the centrally located, iconic Portage Avenue and Main Street intersection, was only one-half of the CMA average in 1980 but rose to nearly 1.9 times the CMA average thirty years later (Lorch 2015). Following a period of low to modest investment, from about 2004 onward this downtown area experienced a surge in development of luxury condominiums on Waterfront Drive along the Red River, aimed at dual-income, young professional households. These changes were due in large part to policy interventions, including changes to zoning by-laws and tax-based initiatives (McCullough, Distasio, and Werner 2015). In contrast, an area that experienced extreme income drops relative to the CMA average is the Fort Richmond area, in east Fort Garry west of the Red River and just south of the University of Manitoba’s Fort Garry campus. Its decline in relative income is likely the result of an increase in rental properties and a growing international and domestic student population, as well as a rise in the concentration of public housing. There is a relatively stark income gap between the inner-city neighbourhoods and the rest of the metropolitan area. Over time, this gap has intensified, with incomes in Winnipeg’s capital region reaching 1.5 times those of the inner city in 2015. The wealthy enclave of Tuxedo continued to report the highest average income in the CMA, some five times higher than those of inner-city neighbourhoods. Many inner-city neighbourhoods have incomes that are well below the CMA average and falling, while new developments on the periphery show incomes that have gained ground, rising well above the metropolitan average. In general, between 1980 and 2015, Winnipeg experienced a modest increase in income polarization, with a pattern of income growth in the urban fringe. The ratio between Winnipeg’s highest- and lowest-income CTs remained relatively stable over the period, similar to that seen in smaller urban centres such as Halifax (Chapter 8) but contrary to the extreme disparity of Toronto (Chapter 4) (see also Lorch 2015, 18; Prouse, Grant, et al. 2014; Hulchanski 2010). In addition, our analysis confirms what has been said previously about Win­ nipeg – that there is a large income gap between inner-city neighbourhoods,

222

JINO DISTASIO AND SARAH ZELL

including the North End, and the rest of the city (Lezubski, Silver, and Black 2000; Carter, Polevychok, and Sargent 2003; Distasio and Kaufman 2015). While the income gap is smaller than that of larger Canadian cities (see Chapters 4 and 6), the bottom-income neighbourhoods have been and remain hardest hit by chronic low income and the sheer scale of poverty within the inner city of Winnipeg, which contains some 18% of the city’s population. These divisions have ethno-cultural dimensions, and we focus specifically on the role that In­ digenous and newcomer population growth in the inner city has had in shaping Winnipeg’s patterns of neighbourhood change.

Winnipeg’s Indigenous population Indigenous and recent immigrant populations have been the primary drivers of population growth in the city from the late 1990s onward. In 2011, both remained disproportionately concentrated in the inner city and were more likely to be struggling. The pathway into Winnipeg remains distinct for Indigenous persons, with patterns primarily fuelled by a period of hypermobility that is complex and tied to many factors on reserves and in rural, northern, and remote regions that have both pushed and pulled people into cities. The push factors relate to poor-quality housing, crowded conditions, and limited edu­ cation and training and employment opportunities. Cities have increasingly attracted Indigenous persons seeking housing, education, jobs, and family connections (Distasio et al. 2004). The population flows into Mani­toba communities, based on these factors, have made Indigenous migration to cities distinct from that of other peoples, especially because of the high level of return migration that occurs (Clatworthy and Norris 2007; Distasio, Sylvestre, and WallWieler 2013). The result is often referred to as residential churn, with mobility patterns reconnecting people back to home communities while also establishing an urban link. A historical distinctiveness is strongly rooted in colonial histories, interactions with child and family services, racism, and traumas related to the legacy of residential school systems (Nagler 1973; Sorkin 1978; Newbold 2004). For cities like Winnipeg, the future demographic trends include strong growth within the Indigenous population, influenced by both the natural rate of change as well as the continued migration of Indigenous persons into cities. In the 1950s, Canada’s Indigenous urban population was below 7%, with little change until well into the 1970s. By the 2000s, just over half of Canada’s

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Indigenous population had urbanized, with Prairie cities like Winnipeg increasingly becoming home to a growing population (Peters 2015). In 2016, about 12% of Winnipeg’s population identified as Aboriginal.1 Overall, as seen in Table 10.1, the number of Aboriginal persons living in Winnipeg experienced substantial but somewhat uneven growth. Between 1996 and 2016, the CMA population of those identifying as Aboriginal grew from 45,750 to 92,810, yet the inner-city population remained more stable, rising from 21,200 to 27,350. While the overall Aboriginal population is growing, much growth is occurring outside of the inner city. Figure 10.5 shows the distribution of Aboriginal persons by neighbourhood in 2016. What is evident is the concentration of lower incomes within the inner city, with generally higher incomes in more suburban areas. This trend is consistent within the inner city, where the Indigenous population is overrepresented among those living in poverty or experiencing homelessness (Peters and Christensen 2016). According to the most recent data, Aboriginal persons make up roughly 22% of the population in the inner city, but in neighbourhoods with extremely low average incomes, the percentages are much higher – for example, 40% in William Whyte and 55% in Lord Selkirk Park in the heart of the city’s North End. These two neighbourhoods also have higher rates of unemployment and lower incomes compared with non–inner-city locations. In contrast is the neighbourhood of West Broadway, just to the southwest of downtown (just south of Portage Avenue and north of the Assiniboine River). TABLE 10.1 Demographic shifts in immigrant, Aboriginal, and visible minority populations in Winnipeg CMA and its inner city, 1996, 2006, and 2016 Winnipeg CMA 1996   Population Recent immigrants Immigrants

2006

2016

CMA total

% of CMA total population

CMA total

% of CMA total population

CMA total

% of CMA total population

667,209

100%

694,668

100%

761,540

100%

16,080

2.41%

24,115

3.47%

52,460

6.89%

111,690

16.74%

121,255

17.46%

181,965

23.89%

Aboriginal population

45,750

6.86%

68,385

9.84%

92,810

12.19%

Visible minority population

73,310

10.99%

102,935

14.82%

195,370

26.65%

Average individual income (range)

224

$24,184 ($10,704–$57,378)

JINO DISTASIO AND SARAH ZELL

$33,838 ($16,427–$88,905)

$46,029 ($19,106–$125,137)

Winnipeg – inner city (2016 inner-city boundary)

Population

1996

2006

2016*

% of Innerinner-city city total population

% of Innerinner-city city total population

% of Innerinner-city city total population

122,035

100%

121,474

100%

126,160

100%

6,100

5.00%

7,820

6.44%

12,385

9.82%

Recent immigrants Total in inner city Inner-city total as % of CMA total recent immigrants

37.94%

32.43%

23.61%

Immigrants Total in inner city

28,100

Inner-city total as % of CMA total immigrants

25.16%

23.03%

27,445

22.59%

22.63%

36,520

28.95%

20.07%

Aboriginal population Total in inner city

21,200

Inner-city total as % of CMA total Aboriginal population

46.34%

17.37%

24,750

20.37%

36.19%

27,350

21.68%

29.47%

Visible minority population Total in inner city

22,445

Inner-city total as % of CMA total visible minority population

30.62%

26.93%

21.42%

$17,696 ($10,704–$29,066)

$24,763 ($16,427–$43,643)

$34,102 ($19,467–$62,620)

Average individual income (range)

18.39%

27,725

22.82%

41,845

33.17%

Notes:  “Population” refers to all persons in private and collective dwellings. Immigrant, Aboriginal, and visible minority populations are reported only for private (non-collective) households. The concept of visible minority is not applicable to the Aboriginal population. “Recent immigrants” includes those immigrants arriving in the five years since the previous census. Average individual income is for persons aged 15 years and over, and includes income from all sources, before tax. * Inner-city data are based on the 2016 inner-city boundary, which is a custom geography produced by Statistics Canada. Sources:  Statistics Canada, Census Profile Series and Custom Tabulation (custom geography), 1996, 2006, and 2016.

One of Winnipeg’s most contested neighbourhoods and an area that was synonymous with poverty, gangs, and disorder in the early 1990s, West Broadway has experienced a significant turnaround over the last thirty years that has impacted marginalized populations (Anderson et al. 2005; Silver 2006). The story of West Broadway is that of deepening social division and income inequality throughout the 1980s and 1990s that has shifted to a more recent discourse around gentrification and displacement. While gentrification remains less of an issue in Winnipeg than in larger Canadian cities (e.g., Leo 2013), we see emerging evidence of the displacement of the Indigenous population in WINNIPEG

225

FIGURE 10.5 2016 Aboriginal population by 2015 average individual income in the Winnipeg CMA

Brokenhead

St. Clements St. François Xavier

West St. Paul

West St. Paul Brokenhead

wy

Rosser

Hen

West St. Paul Old Kildonan

Headingley St. François Xavier West St. Paul

SpringfieldInkster Blvd

Old Kildonan

West Kildonan

River Heights

St. James - Assiniboia Portage Ave

Tuxedo

Lag im

lv d

Lag im

odie

re B

Transcona

Transcona

St. Boniface

W i n n i p e g

Portage Ave

St. Boniface

Fermor Ave

River Heights

Charleswood

Fermor Ave

Tuxedo

Charleswood

St. Vital

r ive dR

r

Pembina Hwy

St. Mary 's Rd

St. Vital

Fort Garry

Fort Garry

Census tract 2015 average Census tract 2015 average individual income compared with with the the individual income compared Winnipeg CMA average of $46,029 Winnipeg CMA average of $46,029 High Income – 120% to 272% High Income to 272% Aboriginal 7% of – the120% population (33 CTs, 19% 7% of the Aboriginal ofregion) the population

(33 CTs, 19% of the region) Middle Income – 80% to 120% Aboriginal 11% of the population Middle Income – 80% to 120% (93 CTs, 54% of the region)

Aboriginal 11% of the population

Low – 42%oftothe 80% (93Income CTs, 54% region) Aboriginal 20% of the population (46 CTs, 27% of – the region) Low Income 42% to 80%

Aboriginal 20% of the population (46 CTs, 27% of the region)

Springfield

Re

il d Blv Mc G

Springfield

lv d

St. Mary 's Rd

ray

B ay liv r

2

PerimeterPerimeter Highway Highway

Not Available

re B odie

St

East Kildonan

i n n i p e g

St. James - Assiniboia

liv Gil Mc

Not Available

lv d

R iv er Re d

North Kildonan East Kildonan

Ma in

North EndW

ive

Headingley

North End

dR

Headingley

West Kildonan

Pembina Hwy

Assiniboine River

Inkster Blvd

Re

Perimeter Highway

Assiniboine River

Perimeter Highway

Ritchot

North Kildonan

Ma in

Taché Macdonald

East St. Paul

St

MacdonaldWinnipeg Ritchot Headingley

Hen Re derso dR nH ive w y r

Taché

Rosser

1

0

2

Kilometres

Aboriginal population percentagepercentage Aboriginal population by census 2016 bytracts, census tracts, 2016

No Dot Shown

Below CMA Average (< 12%)

Below CMA Average (< 12%) No (93Dot CTs, 53% of the region) Shown (93 CTs, 53% of the region)

Average to 50% Above Average Average 50% Above Average (47 CTs, 27% of the to region) (47 27% of the region) Above 50% of CTs, the CMA Average (34 CTs, 20% of the region) Above 50% of the CMA Average

Source: Statistics Canada,(34 Census Profile Series, 2016.

CTs, 20% of the region)

Source: Statistics Canada, Census tractCensus and municipal are for 2016. Profileboundaries Series, 2016. Average individual income is for persons 15 and over and includestract income all sources, Census andfrom municipal boundaries are for 2016. before tax.

Average individual income is for persons 15

and2016 over and includes from all sources, Source:  Created by Richard Maaranen using data from the Census ofincome Canada. before tax.

226

East St. Paul

der son H

St. Clements Winnipeg Springfield

JINO DISTASIO AND SARAH ZELL

2

1

0

Kilometres

2

West Broadway. The proportion of the population identifying as Aboriginal in the neighbourhood dropped from around 25% in 1996 to less than 13% in 2016. Understanding what contributed to the change in West Broadway is difficult and has not been adequately examined in the literature. Certainly, the question of whether gentrification or broader socio-economic change (rising incomes and overall housing values) has impacted the displacement of In­ digenous and marginalized populations requires more careful study. This brief overview shows several important trends with respect to the Indigenous population in Winnipeg. First, the urban Indigenous population is growing because of multiple factors, including increased self-identification, the rise in natural rates of growth, and the mobility of persons into the city. Second, persons concentrated in the inner city face a deep economic divide. Additionally, data show the displacement of Indigenous persons in neighbourhoods experiencing turnaround, such as West Broadway. These trends require more careful analysis to better understand the complexity of mobility and settlement patterns into and within Prairie cities. This type of research is critical given continued Indigenous urbanization and the growing Indigenous population in Winnipeg.

Winnipeg’s Immigrant Population Winnipeg was built largely through waves of immigration following the colonial settlement of the West, but after the World Wars it lost its status as an immigration magnet. The city’s population growth through the late 1980s and 1990s was entirely due to growth of the Canadian-born population. While immigration to Canada increased over this time, both the size and proportion of Winnipeg’s immigrant population remained relatively stable – falling slightly from 112,680 in 1986 to 109,390 in 2001 (Citizenship and Immigration Can­ada 2005). This contrasts with the large growth in the number of new immigrants arriving in the urban gateway cities of Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver, where newcomers tend to settle (Price and Benton-Short 2008; Carter, Morrish, and Amoyaw 2008). In 1998, Manitoba became the first province to launch a Provincial Nom­ inee Program (PNP) (Carter, Morrish, and Amoyaw 2008). At the time, Winnipeg had labour shortages and inexpensive housing stock, and the city supported the province’s aggressive immigration promotion and retention strategy. Fewer than 3,000 newcomers arrived in Manitoba in 1998, but in 2011 that number had grown to 15,962, with 77% of migrants arriving through the PNP. The PNP’s diversity of entry streams, including those for trades and WINNIPEG

227

lower-skilled workers as well as family members, combined with a localized provincial settlement model, made the program responsive to local needs and contributed to its high levels of immigrant retention (Clement, Carter, and Vineberg 2013). Between 1996 and 2012, 141,134 immigrants moved to Manitoba. Most settled in Winnipeg, which in 2011 ranked fourth among top destination cities in Canada, behind only Toronto, Montreal, and Calgary. As immigration increased, the composition of the city’s newcomer population shifted, with Asian countries such as the Philippines, India, and China outpacing traditional source countries such as the United Kingdom. These demographic shifts have recast Winnipeg as an emerging gateway city, and the diversity of this new population is reflected across the city’s neighbourhoods, many of which have become new or reinvigorated areas of reception. Between 1981 and 1996, over one-quarter of Winnipeg’s newcomers arrived as refugees (27%, compared with 14% for Canada as a whole). Many settled in neighbourhoods in the inner city, a traditional reception area because of its lower-cost housing and proximity to settlement services and public transit (Carter 2015). By the late 1990s and through the 2000s, however, there were shifts in where recently arrived immigrants were settling. As Table 10.1 shows, while the proportion of the inner city composed of immigrants and visible minorities over the 1996–2016 period remained higher than that of the CMA, it decreased over time. One-quarter (25.1%) of the city’s immigrant population and close to one-third (30.6%) of its visible minorities resided in the inner city in 1996, compared with 20.0% and 21.4%, respectively, in 2016. The decrease is even greater for recent immigrants (those arriving in the previous five years) – in 1996, 37.9% of the CMA’s recent immigrants settled in the inner city, compared with 23.6% by 2016. This indicates that, as in many other cities, immigrants were increasingly settling in neighbourhoods outside the inner city. From 1996 to 2016, while a steady 17–18% of the overall CMA population resided in the inner city, the proportions of recent immigrants, total immigrants, and visible minorities all decreased. Table 10.1 shows that the Winnipeg CMA had a larger immigrant population in 2016 than in 1996, with a slightly smaller proportion residing in the inner city. As the overall number of immigrants grew, the proportion of the inner city’s population composed of recent immigrants and visible minorities also grew. However, while the proportion of immigrants within the inner city grew only slightly, from 23% to 29%, its proportion of recent immigrants nearly doubled (from 5.0% to 9.8%), indicating that it still operates as an important

228

JINO DISTASIO AND SARAH ZELL

initial reception area. At an even smaller scale, the importance of specific neighbourhoods as initial reception areas is more evident. A prime example is Cen­ tral Park, situated in the very heart of downtown, just west of the Portage and Main intersection. The CT of Central Park stands out as unique in the Prairie context as an area of recent immigrants in dense, high-rise apartments. In an analysis classifying neighbourhood types in Winnipeg, Andrew Kaufman (2015) found Central Park to have the lowest average individual income, the highest number of households below the low-income cut-off, the top unemployment rate, the greatest dependency on government transfer payments, and the highest concentration of single-parent families. Census data for the tract indicate that its recent immigrant population nearly tripled (from 10.7% to 30.2%) between 1996 and 2011, dropping slightly to 20.0% in 2016. Visible minorities grew from around one-third to about half (54.8%) of its population between 1996 and 2016. The data suggest that the inner city continues to be an important initial settlement area for those who may not be able to afford housing elsewhere or who wish to benefit from proximity to transit and supports. Populations in many inner-city tracts are more highly mobile than elsewhere in the city – for example, in Central Park over half (56.1%) of residents did not live at the same address in 2016 as five years earlier. Some studies indicate that many newcomers leave the inner city as soon as they can find accommodation elsewhere (e.g., Carter 2015). As immigration through the PNP surged, other areas became primary destinations. Visualizing the distribution of recent immigrants in the Winnipeg CMA (Figure 10.6), we see a continued high concentration of immigrants with lower incomes in the downtown and inner city (in areas such as Daniel McIntyre, West Alexander, Sargent Park, and Spence as well as Central Park). This spreads into the northwest quadrant of the city over time, stretching from the inner city into the West and Old Kildonan areas and westward, where neighbourhoods such as The Maples and Tyndall Park have become significant reception areas for newcomers from the Philippines and India. A few CTs in the south of the city, particularly in East Fort Garry near the University of Mani­toba, continued to be primary settlement areas. There was also a growing concentration of recent immigrants with higher incomes in new suburban developments in the south of the city in Fort Garry. Generally, the data show two basic trends. First, there is a continued clustering of recent immigrants with lower incomes in the downtown, evidence that the inner city remains an important reception area. At the same time,

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FIGURE 10.6 2016 recent immigrant population by 2015 average individual income in the Winnipeg CMA

Brokenhead

St. Clements St. François Xavier

West St. Paul

West St. Paul Brokenhead

St. FrançoisHeadingley Xavier West St. Paul

Springfield

West St. Paul Old Kildonan

MacdonaldWinnipeg Ritchot Springfield Inkster Blvd

Headingley

West Kildonan

R iv er

River Heights

Portage Ave

Tuxedo

lv d odie

re B

Transcona

St. Boniface

St. Boniface

Fermor Ave

River Heights

Charleswood

Fermor Ave

Tuxedo

Charleswood

St. Vital

r ive dR

r ive

Pembina Hwy

Fort Garry

St. Mary 's Rd

St. Vital

Fort Garry

Census tract 2015 average Census tract 2015 average compared with with the the individual individualincome income compared Winnipeg CMA average of $46,029

Winnipeg CMA average of $46,029

2

Recent immigrants 10% of the pop.

Low – 42%oftothe 80% (93Income CTs, 54% region) Recent immigrants 21% of the pop. Low Income 42% to 80% (46 CTs, 27% of – the region)

Recent immigrants 21% of the pop.

Not Available (46 CTs, 27% of the region)

1

0

2

2

Kilometres

RecentRecent immigrant (arrived 2006–2016) immigrant (arrived 2006–2016) percentage by census 2016tracts, 2016 percentage bytracts, census No Dot Shown

High Income – 120% to 272% High immigrants Income – 120% to 272% Recent 4% of the pop. Recent immigrants 4% of the pop. (33 CTs, 19% of the region)

(33 CTs, 19% of the region) Middle Income – 80% to 120% Recent immigrants of the pop. Middle Income 10% – 80% to 120% (93 CTs, 54% of the region)

Springfield

Re

d il Blv Mc G

Springfield

lv d

St. Mary 's Rd

ray

B ay liv r

PerimeterPerimeter Highway Highway

Below CMA Average (< 12%)

Below CMA Average (< 12%) No Dot (117 CTs, 67% of the region) Shown (117 CTs, 67% of the region)

Average to 50% Above Average Average 50% Above Average (19 CTs, 11% of the to region) (19 11% of the region) Above 50% of CTs, the CMA Average (38 CTs, 22% of the region) Above 50% of the CMA Average

Source: Statistics Canada, (38 Census Profile Series, 2016.

CTs, 22% of the region)

Source: Statistics Canada, Census tract and municipal are for 2016. Census Profileboundaries Series, 2016. Average individual income is for persons 15 Census andfrom municipal boundaries are for 2016. and over and includestract income all sources, before tax.

Average individual income is for persons 15 and over and includes income from all sources,

Source:  Created by Richard Maaranen using data from the 2016 before tax.Census of Canada.

230

Transcona

odie Lag im

W i n n i p e g

St. James - Assiniboia

lv d

East Kildonan

i n n i p e g

St. James - Assiniboia Portage Ave

Lag im

Ma in

North EndW

liv Gil Mc

Not Available

re B

Re d

North Kildonan East Kildonan

St

North End

dR

Headingley

West Kildonan

Pembina Hwy

Headingley

Inkster Blvd

Re

Assiniboine River

Perimeter Highway

Perimeter Highway

Assiniboine River

North Kildonan

Ma in

Taché Ritchot

East St. Paul

St

Old Kildonan

H Reender d Rson iveHw y r

Taché

Rosser

Macdonald

East St. Paul

Hen

St. Clements

Winnipeg

der son H

wy

Rosser

JINO DISTASIO AND SARAH ZELL

1

0

Kilometres

2

though, there has been an increased suburbanization of overall immigration to the CMA, as recent immigrants with higher average incomes settled further out of the city. While many immigrants arriving in the 2000s have settled in “multicultural, older working-class” neighbourhoods and “multicultural, middleincome suburbs,” they are also contributing to the establishment of fringe “ethnoburbs” (Murdie, Logan, and Maaranen 2013a; Kaufman 2015). These patterns of neighbourhood creation and immigrant suburbanization – whether they continue, and their associated implications – merit further in-depth exploration.

Role of Policy and Community-Based Organizations in Addressing Inequalities To varying degrees, cities throughout North America have experienced dramatic change in their central cores and surrounding neighbourhoods. In many cases, this was marked by an outward flight of both population and capital, with the downtown and inner-city areas enduring depopulation and a reduction in economic influence. Many cities rebounded, with growth and pros­ perity returning as growing populations sought central locations and often higher-density housing options. For Winnipeg, many factors contributed to the patterns of income distribution seen in the city over the 1980–2015 period. In addition to major demographic shifts involving the city’s Indigenous and immigrant populations, a policy context that supported both suburbanization and downtown revitalization within a slow-growth environment has influenced Win­nipeg’s neighbourhood trajectories and modest growth trends. Winnipeg’s development has been characterized by a unique set of policy interventions aimed at addressing inequality and particularly the entrenchment of poverty in the inner city. From the 1980s onward, Winnipeg experienced a significant period of slow growth that included low rates of population change, weak economic activity, and a suppressed housing market (Leo and Anderson 2006). This led to a highly localized set of policy responses that focused attention on inner-city neighbourhoods and the downtown (Distasio 2015). Beginning in 1980 and lasting for over thirty years, all three levels of government contributed to a range of programs and initiatives aimed at revitalizing, stimulating, or redeveloping declining areas of concentrated poverty in the downtown and inner city. Beginning in 1981, the Core Area Initiative ushered in a new era of heavy government involvement in addressing urban decline in the inner city. When the CAI ended in 1992, it was estimated that WINNIPEG

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close to $1 billion had been invested and leveraged in a range of projects. The CAI approach had a unique delivery model that saw each level of government contribute equally to funding and governance. The CAI eventually gave way to similar programs (although with lower funding), including the Winnipeg Development Agreement, the Winnipeg Partnership Areas, and the Winnipeg Housing and Homelessness Initiative. The intent of each program was to support positive change in the downtown and inner city (Distasio 2015; Layne 2000). Perhaps one of the most significant but unintended outcomes of the various intervention programs was the emergence of stronger community-based organizations (CBOs), which leveraged seed funding and developed strong community-oriented solutions to problems associated with poverty and the needs of marginalized populations. Many CBOs came to play a key mitigating role in addressing socio-economic inequality and polarization, while also struggling for ongoing funding and support (Silver 2002). Since the turn of the century, Winnipeg has experienced substantial demographic shifts, with two populations – Indigenous peoples and immigrant newcomers – driving population change and impacting spatial patterns of income distribution. The inner city remains an area characterized by concentrations of poverty, low-quality housing stock, and a high concentration of Indigenous and other visible minority populations. Data collection flaws notwithstanding (Hulchanski et al. 2013), the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS) reports that two of the three poorest postal codes in Canada were found in Winnipeg’s inner city. Spatial divisions in Winnipeg fall along ethnic lines, with primarily ethnically European populations in the affluent south, suburban, and fringe areas of the city and a clustering of non-white and Indigenous populations in the inner city (Kaufman 2015; Lezubski and Silver 2015). While change has defined Winnipeg’s trajectory, an important constant has been the role of CBOs and government-led interventions that have targeted significant policy and program support. Much of this has focused on the inner city, but increasingly also on the more spatially dispersed newcomer population. Government involvement has been a central feature of Winnipeg’s development, and provincial government spending has been a primary driver in downtown revitalization efforts (McCullough, Distasio, and Werner 2015). Since the mid-2000s, Winnipeg has refocused efforts to increase residential development downtown, initiating incentive-based programs aimed at leveraging private investment. In 2004, the city made changes to the Downtown Winnipeg Zoning By-law, which eased redevelopment of heritage buildings. In 232

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addition, tax increment financing (TIF)–funded initiatives (as in Hamilton; see Chapter 7) have supported residential development and a focus on improving downtown amenities (e.g., through the Sports, Hospitality and Entertainment District Initiative). These changes have contributed to shifts in the demographics of certain downtown neighbourhoods, and to smaller-scale income segregation trends such as those noted in the East Exchange along Waterfront Drive. Educational institutions have also emerged as important catalysts in downtown and inner-city development, with the innovative Merchant’s Corner redevelopment project in the North End as one example. The 2016 Census of Canada saw high population increases in the rural municipalities surrounding the city, where lower tax rates have fuelled new development. That same year, the city imposed growth fees on suburban development, designed to offset associated increases in service costs. It remains to be seen what impact these recent government policies, combined with the continued work of CBOs, will have on the patterns of growing socio-spatial income inequality in Winnipeg.

Concluding Remarks Winnipeg remains a mid-sized Canadian city with a history of slow growth (like Halifax; see Chapter 8) and lower overall incomes. Winnipeg’s growth pattern does not fully align with the experiences of larger cities such as Toronto (Chapter 4) and Vancouver (Chapter 6). Although its patterns of socio-spatial income inequality and polarization are not as extreme as those of other Can­ adian cities (such as Calgary; see Chapter 9), there is a growing gap between the inner city and the highest-income areas on the periphery (as in Hamilton; see Chapter 7), and significant challenges associated with poverty and increasing income polarization remain. Winnipeg’s emergence from the postwar period during the 1950s onward led the city down a distinctive pathway that remains unique in Canada. As economic stagnation and low population growth took hold throughout the 1970s, there was a heightened awareness of the need for government intervention policies aimed at both supporting suburban expansion and trying to stave off inner-city decline. Spatially, Winnipeg remained distinct in having an extensive area, known as the inner city, requiring ongoing program and policy intervention. At the census tract level, evidence of socio-spatial income inequality and segregation is masked by the social and economic transformations of particular neighbourhoods, which have occurred slowly, generating lower levels of WINNIPEG

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disparity that are more in line with those seen, for example, in Halifax (Prouse, Grant, et al. 2014). The scale of analysis is important, and at smaller scales we see emerging pockets of inequality. One example is the wealthy downtown Waterfront area, which has an average income level that vastly eclipses those of nearby neighbourhoods (such as Point Douglas and Lord Selkirk Park). We also note the changing characteristics of neighbourhoods such as West Broadway. In Winnipeg, socio-economic boundaries continue to entrench much of the inner city in poverty while concentrating higher incomes away from the city centre. Despite the challenges, Winnipeg is distinguished by the tremendous community capacity that emerged over thirty years of state-led interventions that helped build a solid foundation for CBOs to grow and flourish. Between the work of a range of CBOs, many Indigenous-led, and the increasing surge of immigration, Winnipeg’s legacy of resiliency remains rooted in the effectiveness of communities, in concert with local and provincial governments, in creating the conditions necessary for ongoing and positive change. While Winnipeg in many ways remains a divided Prairie city, it has slowly evolved and begun to redefine itself. Note

1 We use the term “Indigenous” as a more inclusive (if still imperfect) term, and one less rooted in a particular historical and colonial understanding. The census uses the term “Aboriginal,” however, and we retain this usage when referring to census data.

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PART 3

Understanding the Implications of Neighbourhood Change

Some trends are clear across the cities profiled in this book. In the period from 1990 to 2015, socio-spatial inequality increased in Canada. The gap between the most affluent and the poorest census tracts grew in all the cities. The geography of poverty and affluence was redistributed, with central neighbourhoods often experiencing significant gains in average individual income while inner suburbs lost ground. Overall the pattern is one of increasing income segregation, especially in the largest and most economically robust cities. Canadian cities are increasingly divided cities. Part 3 considers the policy and scholarly implications of our findings. How and why does the kind of neighbourhood change we document matter? As noted in the introductory chapter, not only are divided societies difficult to control (Woods 2006) but they also can breed intolerance, present threats to local and global security, and provoke populist political movements that could threaten democracy (Sellers et al. 2013; Bricker and Ibbitson 2018). Poverty and

PART 3 inequality can strip people of opportunity, hope, and the innovative capacity necessary for societies to achieve their full promise. After 2015, the federal government – the Liberals under the leadership of Justin Trudeau – announced initiatives on child benefits, housing, and poverty reduction that suggest that it takes issues of inequality seriously. Many see this as a promising moment when the neoliberal faith in letting markets rule may be yielding to a renewed commitment to social justice and investments that can reduce inequality. Yet such programs can readily be expunged under different political leadership. Indeed communities, provinces, and nations have often witnessed the ruthless gutting of progressive initiatives as voters elect right-of-centre governments committed to cost cutting and deregulation. The political consensus across party lines that enabled the development of ameliorative social and health programs in Canada in the decades following the Second World War – the welfare state – has dissipated since the 1980s. In recent years, political parties and candidates for political office increasingly seem polarized on social issues and strategies

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for dealing with inequity and social injustice. Policy efforts to reduce inequalities thus seem more precarious and tied to the political fates of specific parties or leaders. In Chapter 11, Scott Graham, Stephanie Procyk, and Michelynn Laflèche offer a perspective from the not-forprofit sector. Across Canadian cities, NGOs work tirelessly to manage the externalities of an economic and social system that produces poverty and inequality. The authors reflect on recent social policy initiatives and offer their suggestions for good policies and processes that have the potential to reduce inequalities and enhance opportunities for all Canadians. The final chapter considers the contributions of the Neighbourhood Change Research Partnership research – especially that covered in this book – to the broader understanding of neighbourhood change in Canada and beyond. The scope of the study – seven cities over thirtyfive years – offers a significant window into the nature of change and the forces driving it, and a guide for future exploration of urban inequalities.

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Mapping Canada’s Fragmented Social Policy Space: Plotting Ways to Reverse Trends in Inequality and Segregation through Coordinated Poverty Reduction Scott Graham, Stephanie Procyk, and Michelynn Laflèche

As policy and planning practitioners working for non-governmental organizations in two of Canada’s most diverse and polarized cities, Vancouver and Toronto, we are concerned by the growing gap between rich and poor, stubbornly high rates of poverty, and prohibitively high costs of housing. We are also concerned about the shrinking of middle-income groups and the spatial patterning to inequities as shown in the case studies presented in this book and the broader work of the Neighbourhood Change Research Partnership (NCRP). Among us, we have over fifty years of experience working at addressing issues of income inequality, poverty, and housing affordability. Through our work, we have seen inequalities grow in magnitude over the last three decades, despite strong and consistent local efforts to mitigate them. Part of that trend is the result of dramatic shifts in policy and funding programs to redress these issues, and a shrinking role of the federal government in promoting affordable housing and combating poverty. In 2017, the federal government announced the first-ever National Housing Strategy to address these trends. Shortly thereafter, in 2018, it announced Canada’s first-ever Poverty Reduction Strategy. While these documents amount to promising new policy directions, it is still too early to tell what will be achieved. Policy is slippery and ever-changing, and at the same time driven by incrementalism. Canada needs to better coordinate poverty reduction strategies across jurisdictions given the presence of provincial poverty reduction strategies and affordable housing plans, combined with the federal government’s new role in addressing problems of poverty and long-standing housing issues. In this 239

chapter, we discuss social policy changes and highlight the focus of poverty reduction strategies to identify gaps that can bridge and better coordinate Canada’s fragmented social policy. We will also suggest places where policy and practice fail to align and point to them as gaps that identify actionable places for change.

Current Canadian Social Policy We begin by reviewing the dynamics of federal-, provincial-, and local-level social policy, with a focus on recent social policy directions we see in our work for United Way Greater Toronto and for the Social Planning and Research Council of British Columbia. Drawing from our experience, government documents, and publications from service and advocacy organizations, we offer a portrait of the Canadian social policy landscape. We adopt an approach to critical policy analysis similar to previous policy analyses (e.g., Vanhercke and Read 2015; Boychuk 2012; Bakvis and Skogstad 2012) to show that Canada’s social policy has lost national scope. Canada has, in large part, an uncoordinated patchwork of universal and targeted strategies punctuated by episodic, short-term “social innovation” efforts. Although provinces have held responsibility for employment services, education, and health since Confederation, a central story about contemporary social policy is the federal government’s adoption of austerity policies, beginning in the 1990s, that led to a devolution of responsibility for social programs. The increasingly decentralized nature of Canada’s social policy means that few pan-Canadian social policy elements exist. Limited attempts to develop a multilateral framework across levels of government have left Canadian social policy in an ad hoc state with limited institutional support (Bradford 2008; McIntosh 2004; Verdun and Wood 2014). Despite federal proclamations, a national housing strategy will face obstacles due to decades of budget cuts, privatization, and elimination of policy scope. Change will require building new institutions and policy from scratch and maintaining public commitment and investment over decades. Local municipal governments and First Nations are the grassroots part of any multilevel system and the sites where social issues materialize and responses are implemented (Graham, Swift, and Delaney 2012). The growing scale of social issues has prompted communities to demand greater authority over social issues and to seek the required resources to develop local responses. The relationships between Canadian cities and other levels of government are 240

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often tense due to decades of erosion of funding to provinces from the federal government through health and social services transfer payments. They are also tense because provincial governments have followed suit and adopted austerity measures, which led to downloading of social programs to local municipal governments (Banting 2005). Exacerbating the problem, however, are restrictions on the collection and use of tax revenues by municipalities, which prevent city governments from generating the resources needed to adequately invest in local social service infrastructure and take on the problems foisted on them by federal and provincial budget cuts. This often means that cities look to revenue from private development to fund infrastructural renewal and options for “affordable” housing. Overall this has led Gerard Boychuk (1998, 41) to argue that Canada looks “like a patchwork of ... provincial/territorial variants [rather] than a national system” of social welfare, with cities currently carrying the most tattered patches without the resources to make it work. It will take years to reverse decades of decentralization and devolution of responsibilities. Social Policy on the Federal Level

The Government of Canada has diverse social programs that engage issues of poverty, including housing programs through the Canada Mortgage and Hous­ ing Corporation, employment insurance benefits, programs for seniors, tax and other benefit programs for children, savings programs for education and retirement, funding for homelessness prevention, and social research funding to engage all these issues. In light of persistent poverty and income inequality, years of cutbacks and downloading of responsibility, and pressure from everyday Canadians and advocacy groups, the federal government recognized that it needed to work toward a poverty reduction strategy and started community consultations in 2017. It likewise recognized that poverty reduction work requires partnership with stakeholders such as other levels of government, communities, and NGOs (Government of Canada 2016). This issue is especially important given the multiple poverty reduction efforts taking place across Canada without a coherent and coordinated national strategy. Canada’s first Poverty Reduction Strat­ egy is a welcome social policy addition, setting out aggressive targets and some mechanisms for poverty reduction (Employment and Social Development Can­ ada 2018; Government of Canada 2016). Prior to the creation of Canada’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy (Employ­ ment and Social Development Canada 2018), the federal government outlined a series of complementary strategies to be pursued, which have a semi-buttressing MAPPING CANADA’S FRAGMENTED SOCIAL POLICY SPACE

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effect for Canada’s overarching poverty reduction strategy. One set of recent policy directions, introduced in 2017, focuses on specific populations, notably the National Early Learning and Child Care Framework and an Indigenous Early Learning and Child Care Framework. The federal government also introduced a tax-free Canada Child Benefit as an initial effort to address issues of poverty and opportunity. It announced an investment of $7 billion over ten years, starting in 2018–19, to support and create more high-quality, affordable child care spaces (Morneau and Department of Finance Canada 2017). The Government of Canada also began working on creating a “Social In­ nov­ation and Social Finance Strategy,” with the investments providing funding for programs and community organizations (Employment and Social De­velop­ ment Canada 2016). This type of investment direction is geared to encouraging experiments in social policy. The government has responded to the call of housing advocates to create a National Housing Strategy, announced in fall 2017 (Government of Canada 2017). The strategy was advocated by many across the housing spectrum, including the National Housing Collaborative, an alliance of social, non-profit, and private housing associations and foundations formed in 2016. The strategy emerged in the wake of a multi-decade erosion of affordable rental housing stock in many parts of Canada, and a stagnation of social housing investments, as a result of the federal government’s withdrawal from housing in the 1990s. This strategy marks an end to that withdrawal, with a commitment of federal leadership on housing. It includes $40 billion in investment over the course of ten years, a Canada Housing Benefit to supplement rent for low-income Canadians, and investments in 6,000 new affordable units annually and funding for the provinces to repair 500,000 units of existing affordable housing (Suttor 2017). Although this is a step in the right direction, some advocates are concerned about the details and implementation, which remain vague. There is some concern among social justice advocates that the National Housing Strategy may not engage enough with the enormity of the housing affordability problem in Canada. For example, some advocates are concerned that it does not adequately address the challenges of having the private sector acting as a major partner in tackling housing affordability. To date, the private sector has exacerbated the housing affordability problem, not solved it. Social Policy on the Provincial Level

Canadian provinces and territories have considerable autonomy over social policy, including poverty reduction. Although poverty reduction approaches 242

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vary across provinces, we note some commonalities among the strategies. All provincial poverty reduction strategies involve public consultation, focus on a limited number of strategies that are thematically organized, and often include a goal, target, or pillar of focus. Some of the more commonly mentioned areas of focus are housing, income support, employment, education, and early childhood development. Most provinces are working on their first poverty reduction strategy, but some (e.g., New Brunswick, Ontario, and Quebec) have now developed their second poverty reduction strategy. Some provinces and territories have been diligent about monitoring and reporting on poverty reduction progress, especially Newfoundland and Labrador as well as Ontario (Minister of Housing and Minister Responsible for the Poverty Reduction Strategy 2017; Newfoundland and Labrador 2017). However, because these are largely new strategies, the impacts are not yet clear. Although provincial poverty reduction strategies have positive features, several gaps remain. Perhaps the most notable area of neglect is income assistance. For almost every demographic group in nearly every province, the social assistance income rates are well below the poverty line across measures like the Market Basket Measure, Low-Income Cut-off, or Low-Income Measure (Tweddle, Battle, and Torjman 2015). Provincial minimum wages remain low in many provinces and there have been limited efforts to consider adopting a basic income. Another gap is that most provinces have not invested in examining the spatial distribution of poverty across and within cities. The NCRP research program reveals the ways in which income inequality articulates in urban spaces over time, leading to pronounced spatial segregation between lower- and higher-income groups. Provincial policy has not yet been influenced by these findings, and provincial social policy work does not address how to identify or create a healthier mix of income groups across neighbourhoods in Canadian cities. We seldom hear politicians worry about income inequality unless crime becomes an issue. In general, any cities that have addressed issues of poverty, income inequality, and segregation have tended to do it in a way that targets crime and drugs in poor neighbourhoods (with things like “Safer Neigh­bour­ hoods Strategies”). These types of local strategies deal more with the symptoms of the problems than with the causes. Provincial poverty reduction strategies need to better attend to the local manifestations of poverty and how it is linked to neighbourhood income in­ equality. They need to provide local stakeholders with capacity to co-create inclusive neighbourhoods with healthy income mixes. The work of the provinces MAPPING CANADA’S FRAGMENTED SOCIAL POLICY SPACE

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to reduce poverty should be regularly monitored to ensure that it is on track and to keep government accountable for its promises. Monitoring of poverty reduction strategy indicators can help reveal which spending priorities may be most needed for poverty reduction. Unfortunately, many provinces have not produced regular reports on poverty reduction progress and few have taken steps that see strategies materialize into regulations that raise incomes for people living with low income. An understanding of the challenges faced by community residents trying to live in our cities on very low income can be filled by researchers, as seen by the work of the NCRP in all the case study chapters of this book, along with service organizations who work on the ground documenting people’s lived experiences. Social Policy on the Municipal Level

In response to downloading of social responsibility at the federal level and gaps at the provincial level, community-based organizations and local governments in Canada have been increasing their leadership role in responding to poverty and income inequality (Karabanow 2003). These organizations have become responsible for providing responses to emerging social problems (Bellefeuille and Hemingway 2005) and local development needs (Shragge and Toye 2006). The trend toward adopting place-based approaches to social issues has a short history in Canada. In the late 1990s, the negotiation of the Social Union Framework Agree­ ment (SUFA) provided guidance toward shared governance within Canadian federalism. Signed by the federal government and the provinces and territories (except Quebec), it paved the way for intergovernmental collaboration (SaintMartin 2004). SUFA provided a multilevel governance framework related to social issues; however, the omission of a clear and supported role for local government and community voices drew strong critiques from local stakeholder organizations and resulted in a call for more inclusive directions. A partial response came with the 2000 Voluntary Sector Initiative and the 2004 New Deal for Cities and Communities (Bradford 2008). Both these initiatives, and the many related local and regional efforts, suggest that effective and culturally appropriate responses must include local leaders and people with lived experience. To this end, several key initiatives have emerged in Canada that amount to a diverse patchwork of place-based frameworks for action on poverty. Canadian cities, local businesses, and collaborating non-profit organizations have built from this momentum, advancing new ways to address social 244

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and economic issues at the local level. Municipal governments are increasingly stepping into new service delivery roles, which can vary between jurisdictions and include responsibility for the provision of child welfare services, housing and homelessness-related services, as well as child care and other human services (Graham, Swift, and Delaney 2012). Cities continue to play a critical role in shaping urban spaces not only through service provision but more importantly through their role in approving neighbourhood and area designs. Tools shaping city spaces include Official Community Plans, Local Area Plans, and other land-use plans and policies. Planners in cities such as Vancouver, Montreal, and Toronto increasingly work with developers on creating “affordable” market-based units in new developments. Such innovations share responsibility for affordable housing with the private sector. In this sense, local governments in Canada are at the forefront of defining the spatial character of cities, although they often cater to developers with resources and political acumen. To their credit, most cities make efforts to develop inclusive neighbourhoods with healthy income mixes by negotiating community amenity contributions from developers, but that is not the practice everywhere. The scale of amenity contributions often falls short of meeting local needs for services, space, or housing, as can be seen in the growing income inequality illustrated across the case study cities discussed in Chapters 4 to 10. While cities can play a role in shaping neighbourhood spaces, they have few tools for addressing the root causes or consequences of income inequality. The capacity of cities is being harnessed toward social justice outcomes, under the leadership of Vibrant Communities Canada and its Cities Reducing Poverty initiative. This pan-Canadian effort plays a national leadership role in promoting partially coordinated, connected, comprehensive, people-centred, place-based approaches to addressing poverty. The work of Vibrant Commun­ ities Canada has influenced many cities and regions to frame their approach to improving quality of life in terms of poverty reduction by making the case that “poverty is better addressed when reduction, not alleviation, is the goal” (Cabaj and Leviten-Reid 2006, 16). The focus on poverty reduction, through investments in prevention and transitional programming, is over and against other possible theoretical orientations for poverty work, which include poverty alleviation (e.g., charity model giving) and poverty elimination (e.g., universal programs that lift the whole population out of poverty) (City of Toronto 2015). Added to this focus is emerging work led by United Ways from across Canada: they are exploring how to develop a national framework for poverty reduction that could help inform and influence federal policy. Within this context, local MAPPING CANADA’S FRAGMENTED SOCIAL POLICY SPACE

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communities and the organizations and groups therein have emerged as leading advocates in the effort to address poverty.

Getting to an Effective Mix of Coordinated Strategies: Toward Common Purpose and Alignment among Change Agents Despite current progressive policy-making activity across Canada’s social policy landscape, the problems of income inequality, polarization, neighbourhood segregation, and poverty remain pronounced. There is an overall lack of coherence and coordination within the multilevel social policy framework and an absence of attention to several key social policy areas. Overall, we observe a series of social policy initiatives that address the concept of poverty, but at the same time see only limited policy attention paid to income inequality. The gap between the two means that despite the optimism of new, more coordinated initiatives, uncoordination is likely to remain. In this final section, we bring together our collective policy and practice experience in working with individuals and communities struggling with pov­ erty, income inequality, and neighbourhood segregation to propose recommendations that address the social policy issues reviewed above. Informing this work is our experience participating in and contributing to the NCRP research program, which has confirmed our shared perspective that the problems of poverty and income inequality, and the local manifestation of these issues, have grown in Canadian cities in recent decades. Although the following recommendations emerge from both the NCRP findings and our policy review work, they are not detailed policy proposals. Instead, they offer descriptions for new social policy directions that aim to guide senior levels of government and other stakeholders in deciding how to invest public resources to address issues of income inequality, poverty, and neighbourhood segregation in Canada. The four policy ideas discussed below are avenues of change leading our senior government social institutions and community organizations to respond to the needs and challenges identified in the NCRP research program. Coordinating and Monitoring Canadian Social Policy

The absence of clear process and investment plans for bringing national, provincial, and local social policy directions into alignment puts Canada’s social policy landscape at risk of continuing a trajectory of policy fractures and erosion. We recommend working to build up a national consensus that everyone 246

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matters in Canada, and our national social policies should make sure no one is left behind. To this end, we see promise in the development of a made-inCanada version of the open method of coordination for the social policy dimensions of our federation, which would borrow best practices from the European Union (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010; Tömmel and Verdun 2009; Verdun and Wood 2014). Under this model, a council of ministers would be established to set goals, guidelines, and indicators that are co-shaped by all levels of stakeholders, especially those groups traditionally excluded from the policy-making process (e.g., people with lived experiences of poverty). Given the National Housing Strategy focus on enhancing federal/provincial/territorial partnerships, as well as the focus on collaboration among provincial and territorial ministers in Canada’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy, there are presently in place enabling policy frameworks and joint statements that can support and rationalize having Canada’s governments work together better to address pov­erty issues. Another way to improve coordination and monitoring of Canadian social policy would be to increase resources to local governments to enable them to play more substantial roles in defining and addressing issues of inequality and poverty. The idea would be to include the ongoing implementation of evidence-based and culturally responsive place-based actions (Bradford 2002), which translate into lessons learned that form the basis of successive rounds of investment. This could involve setting up a Canadian Social Impact Fund that could animate good practices such as Comprehensive Community Initiatives (Sirianni and Friedland 2001) and support the implementation of existing local poverty reduction plans (which have few sources for funding recommended actions). Investing in a national income inequality, housing stress, and poverty-monitoring observatory that builds on the work of the NCRP to produce regular reports would help drive policy dialogues, with an ongoing focus on the relationships among income, wealth, and debt across geographies and population groups. Part of this work should include ongoing efforts to support methodological innovations and insights born out of the NCRP project, as seen in Chapter 3, or the insights gleaned on how to study neighbourhood inequality in Chapter 12. This would ideally take place through an open method of coordination among governments. Improving Economic Security for Individuals and Families in the Labour Market

Labour market dynamics have been the source of much of the growth in income inequality among individuals and households, and are seemingly seen as MAPPING CANADA’S FRAGMENTED SOCIAL POLICY SPACE

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part of the solution. Though the current social policy discourse of the federal government includes many encouraging elements, the Government of Canada could be bolder in influencing labour market policies currently set by the provinces, territories, and private businesses. Setting a national minimum wage of $15 or more and aggressively promoting living wage policies such as those advocated by NGOs like Living Wage Canada (2017) would make a big difference in reducing income inequality. Continued efforts could push governments and businesses to at least consider, and ultimately adopt, a Living Wage Policy.1 The City of Vancouver (along with many other employers) has adopted a living wage campaign as an employer (Britten 2017). Improvements to the Working Income Tax Benefit (WITB) could also be addressed. The WITB is a refundable tax credit intended to provide tax relief for eligible working low-income individuals and families who are already in the workforce, and to encourage other Canadians to enter the workforce.2 It is an earnings supplement structured to support low-wage workers. While the benefit is a good start, the government should increase the amount of the benefit proportionate to wages earned, meaning that the closer one is in earnings to middle-income group status, the greater the tax benefit, which would help close the lower-/middle-income gap more quickly. Building Income Security

In considering its many opportunities to introduce a stronger social policy framework that provides well-being to individuals and families in a constant and accessible way, the government must first ensure that adequate fiscal capacity is in place to make necessary investments. This could include an ongoing focus on how to make the tax system fairer, including personal and business taxes, tax credits, and exemptions. While the government is engaged in tax review work, it can re-examine the threshold for income-tested refundable tax credits and the income-graduated format for families to enable more upper low-income groups to be shifted into middle income through tax benefit transfers. We see opportunity to address poverty by implementing and researching the impacts of basic income pilot projects, especially given the positive outcomes of the Manitoba Guaranteed Annual Income pilot in the 1970s, and some promising initial impacts resulting from Ontario’s basic income pilot project before the change in government in 2018. Government could use the evidence generated from these pilots to drive new social policy for Canada’s

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low-income earners. Any implementation of this direction would require caution so as to not have a negative economic impact on populations already receiv­ ing conditional income benefits. Canada’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy will need to ensure a coherent and reinforcing relationship with the poverty reduction plans of provinces and cities. As part of this alignment work, ministers are increasingly well positioned to work together to coordinate income assistance programs in a way that immediately raises income assistance rates to meet the cost of living and links income assistance rates to the rate of inflation. While it is encouraging to read bold statements about reducing poverty and building affordable housing, actually translating these ideas and investments into action will require new forms of working together across the country. Without alignment between these bold new policy directions and collaboration among our senior government leaders, we risk more failure in our collective efforts to improve the quality of life of Canadians who live in poverty and struggle to make ends meet. Addressing the Impacts of Income Inequality, Polarization, and Neighbourhood Segregation

Some factors exacerbating the challenges of income inequality and polarization at a neighbourhood level in Canada include the lack of affordable housing and the lack of mechanisms that could help limit segregation of neighbourhoods. The federal government could set more aggressive social housing targets so lower-income households have resources to pay for life’s essentials (Hulchanski 2010) and so the dwelling types available within neighbourhoods reflect the diverse incomes and household characteristics of residents. It could provide more support to local governments to develop and implement housing action plans, especially those related to local poverty reduction strategies. The 2017 National Housing Strategy provides an opportunity to takes steps in that direction. Such plans and strategies could take into consideration the diversity of needs in the community, with a focus on housing for low-income and vulnerable individuals and families. Another way for all levels of government and civil society to support inclusion and cohesion is to consider the process by which neighbourhood redevelopment occurs in our cities. Because the spatial distribution of people living in poverty is often a product of government income and housing programs, as well as forces operating across labour and housing markets, all new neighbourhood redevelopments should include a healthy combination of tenure type and

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housing costs that reinforces inclusive neighbourhood principles and social cohesion across diverse populations (Suttor 2015). Local governments have powers to guide neighbourhood developments through local area plans and official community plans. Some provinces have enabled inclusionary zoning, which permits municipalities to require affordable housing in projects that meet certain criteria. Governments have the capacity to ensure that new developments have affordable housing units set aside in ways that align with the interests of residents; they can include community amenity contributions that improve the spaces where people live, work, and play. However, local governments rarely have the required resources to drive locally defined improvements. Senior levels of government could assist by coming to local leadership tables with resources to fill in the missing investments needed to implement locally defined housing and neighbourhood goals. Our senior levels of government could also support more inclusive neighbourhoods by further advancing the communities agenda of the community economic development network (Torjman 2007) and providing resources to local civil society organizations to develop neighbourhood collective agency (Carrière, Howarth, and Paradis 2016). Collective agency could be deployed to lead local programs that address neighbourhood inequalities, segregation, and issues of poverty, as well as inform social policy futures through active coordination among governments (the open method of coordination). Given that the issue to mobilize this type of direction is often blocked by the argument that there are no resources to support it, our governments have the capacity to adjust taxation policies to generate new resources, so these issues can be sustainably addressed.

Time for Action The NCRP has uncovered many issues and challenges facing Canadians living in cities. Through our review of selected current social policies, we observe a strong level of interest in social policy, and at the same time an overall omission of discourses and specific investment strategies geared toward reducing the intensifying pattern of socio-spatial inequality and segregation in Canadian cities. While our recommendations around social inclusion and cohesion, neigh­ bourhood collective agency, and its relation to the open method of coordination aim to focus policy attention on the spatial dimensions of income inequality and poverty, we focus most of our recommendations at senior levels of government and on universal policies. If local manifestations of poverty and income 250

SCOTT GRAHAM, STEPHANIE PROCYK, AND MICHELYNN LAFLÈCHE

inequality are partly a product of poor social policy choices of senior levels of government in the past, then part of the solution rests with these same senior levels of government. With the findings and guidelines provided in this book, they will be better equipped with evidence and strategies to reverse trends in income inequality and poverty, and to consider the spatial dimensions of these problems. We all have a role to play in supporting, engaging with, and building awareness of neighbourhood challenges and the policy solutions that can address them. By supporting better coordination and alignment of government, universal and targeted social policies, and attention toward social inclusion and cohesion, we have the opportunity to build a better Canada with less poverty and reduced patterns of socio-spatial income inequality and neighbourhood segregation. Acknowledgments

The authors thank Howard Ramos, Jill Grant, Alan Walks, and Paul Shakotko for their thoughtful reviews of earlier versions of this chapter. Notes

1 For details, visit the Living Wage Canada website at http://www.livingwagecanada.ca/. 2 For details, visit https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/child-family-benefits/ canada-workers-benefit.html.

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12 Evaluating Neighbourhood Inequality and Change: Lessons from a National Comparison Jill L. Grant, Alan Walks, and Howard Ramos

In this chapter, we reflect on the findings of the case studies of neigh­ bourhood change in seven Canadian cities presented throughout the book to answer the key questions driving the team’s research: does the evidence indicate that Canadian cities are increasingly divided by inequalities or other sociodemographic characteristics, and how is neighbourhood change characterized among Canadian cities? By engaging these questions, we offer conclusions and reflect on some of the methodological challenges involved. In evaluating neighbourhood change, we recognize that the choice of measures used influences not only interpretations of outcomes but the ease of comparison across cases, and the policy and theoretical implications of the findings. Nonetheless, the general patterns and interpretations of inequality and neighbourhood change uncovered apply regardless of which variables we use to measure them, and regardless of the ways they are measured. Here we address the underlying issues that drove our approach and influenced interpretations of the data. Canadian cities have always demonstrated complex patterns of intra-urban variation (Bourne 1993). We set out to see how that variation has changed and whether recent conditions present distinct patterns. We also wanted to see how changes in Canadian cities compare with those seen in other cities around the world. Finally, we examine the practical and theoretical implications of the findings of our national investigation. Neighbourhoods are dynamic places (Zwiers et al. 2016) that are constantly changing as people are born, age, and die, and as customs of working, building, and living shift. The chapters in this collection and our broader study provide a 252

thirty-five-year window on neighbourhood change in large Canadian metropolitan areas. This period saw Keynesian-inspired welfare state policies give way to neoliberal practices and provides a timeframe that saw the baby boom generation age into retirement. We set out to examine whether and how cities are becoming increasingly unequal and divided. To do so we relied on comparing census tract (CT) average individual incomes to the census metropolitan area (CMA) average individual income in each census year. Our measures show that many neighbourhoods gained in relative income over the years, while others declined, in the process producing rising income segregation within cities. We might be cautious, however, about interpreting changes within a normative framework. Are some kinds of neighbourhood change “good,” while others should worry us? The answers to these questions partly depend on the analyst’s political orientation and the ordering principles that guide the analysis. Local political leaders and planners point to new condos or apartment towers and the arrival of cafés and wine bars as evidence of urban revitalization and competitive success. Municipal budgets benefit from rising incomes and property taxes. Others may see the preservation of middle-income neighbourhoods, holding ground against the CMA average over the decades, as a reasonable objective. Neighbourhood residents may believe that “stability” is good, and planners idealize mixed-income neighbourhoods whose incomes approximate the metropolitan average, but others may hold quite different views. Some studies suggest, for instance, that low-income people can build strong social networks of mutual support (e.g., August 2014; Gans 1962), challenging the assumption that concentrated poverty is always “bad.” We can imagine scenarios where declining income ratios reveal concentrating poverty, aging working-class neigh­bourhoods, or increasing disinvestment, but we can equally imagine a case where low rents attract communities of recent immigrants, Indigenous peoples, or artists and musicians, trends that could reduce income ratios while simultaneously producing vibrant and compelling neighbourhoods that protect rather than threaten the needs of their residents (including the demand for affordable housing). Stability, reflected in neighbourhoods that are holding ground, may indicate conditions where middle-income residents resolutely maintain their commitment to the neighbourhood through the decades, or might reveal a segregated community unable to break free of imposed stigma, or alternatively an affluent enclave that has been successful in preventing the building of significant amounts of affordable housing within its boundaries. Determining the most appropriate interpretations of changing patterns also depends on how the research is designed and how inequality, change, and EVALUATING NEIGHBOURHOOD INEQUALITY AND CHANGE

253

neighbourhoods are defined and measured. Any effort to categorize neighbourhood change, including one depending primarily on the key variable of average individual income in a census tract compared with the city’s average, necessarily simplifies a more complex reality, as noted in Chapter 1. Many factors other than income influence neighbourhood health and residents’ success. Nevertheless, our analysis of income trends reveals growing patterns of income inequality that policy makers need to understand if they wish to prevent the problems caused by economic extremes seen in other global cities (Musterd et al. 2017; Lewis 2017; Sassen 2018). Mitigating income polarization can help ensure that most Canadians can achieve their potential regardless of where they live, and that we create more equitable cities in which neighbourhoods do not enhance the life chances of only the rich, or significantly detract from the life chances of the poor. At its heart, our research derives from a critical urban theory approach that desires a just city (Fainstein 2014; Brenner, Marcuse, and Mayer 2012). Such a city is defined as an urban environment that improves quality of life for the disadvantaged and holds that all people, regardless of their means or characteristics, have a right to the city (Marcuse 2009). Ideally, neighbourhood environments would work to equalize and mitigate pre-existing class differentiation and unequal life chances. As the literature has found, more unequal societies and cities are associated with lower levels of trust, health, and social tolerance (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010), and more extreme and divisive politics, including the kind of anti-social populism that has become increasingly common in the 2010s (Sellers et al. 2013; Woods 2016). Our focus has been on exposing, through empirical analyses, the spatial and social inequities revealed in Can­ adian cities in recent decades. In this concluding chapter, we examine some of the key factors driving or impeding neighbourhood change. We begin by briefly reviewing the types of changes that occurred between 1981 and 2016. We then reflect on some of the methods used in our study to consider how choices we made about how to collect information and measure change shaped the kinds of interpretations that we make. A national study of this scope offers important opportunities to draw critical methodological lessons that can inform future research. We then summarize some of the key empirical findings of the project and chapters presented in the book and try to account for some of the similarities and differences in the results across the cities by identifying the drivers of neighbourhood change. In the final sections, we consider the contributions of our research to theories about neighbourhood change and to the pursuit of “just cities.” 254

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Types of Neighbourhood Change In Chapter 2, Richard Harris explained that in some ways the inequality found in Canadian cities in the 2010s mirrors conditions seen in the 1910s. With neighbourhoods sorted by proximity to noxious industries and access to streetcars and mass transportation networks, early twentieth-century cities already possessed “have” and “have-not” districts. After the Second World War, however, planning and welfare state policies, suburbanization, and government investments had major impacts on the social and spatial distributions of income. Urban renewal programs in the 1950s and 1960s removed some low-income districts from urban cores, while large public housing projects fixed low-income housing in place in some cities. By the 1970s, due in part to the success of government welfare state initiatives, neighbourhoods seemed more homogeneous than they had been decades earlier. As Harris reminds us, neighbourhood change is not a recent phenomenon, though many of the types of changes occurring since 1970 reflect new patterns and processes at work. In Chapter 3, Ivan Townshend and Robert Murdie described the results of a joint analysis of neighbourhoods in the seven cities studied (plus Ottawa), to determine whether neighbourhood types and patterns of neighbourhood change could be identified. Their analysis showed that in 2006 all the cities had “Older Working Class” districts and “Urban/Suburban Homeowner” districts: these dominated the distribution of neighbourhood types in all the cities except Toronto and Vancouver. As the authors noted, larger cities and smaller cities differed in the overall distribution and frequency of neighbourhood types, with, for instance, Toronto and Vancouver containing “Family Ethno­ burbs” with significant concentrations of immigrants from Asia, while Halifax (a city receiving relatively few immigrants) had no CTs with that profile. The proportion of census tracts showing forms of disadvantage differed across metros as well. For instance, in 2006, Calgary, Vancouver, and Halifax had fewer than 5% of CTs qualifying as “Disadvantaged,” while Hamilton had 10.9%, Win­ nipeg 15.7%, and Toronto and Montreal had 21.4%. What is remarkable about the typological work, however, is how much neighbourhoods changed over time. Across all the neighbourhood types, only 8% of neighbourhoods remained in the same category in 2006 as in 1981. The other 92% of census tracts changed categories. Not all neighbourhood changes are equally desirable or equally lamentable. Our investigation of neighbourhood change was largely motivated by evidence of declining affordability, increasing homelessness, and signs of gentrification EVALUATING NEIGHBOURHOOD INEQUALITY AND CHANGE

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and displacement in downtown areas. The cost of purchasing a house more than doubled in constant 2015 dollars from values in 1981 (Carrick 2015), and rents simultaneously became less affordable. Canada’s first food bank opened in 1981, the year that we chose to begin our analysis: by 2018, Canada had over 700 food banks feeding 850,000 people a month (Food Banks Canada 2018). Homelessness was first recognized as a serious problem in the 1980s and grew increasingly problematic through the years (Hulchanski et al. 2009). Key affordable housing types, such as rooming houses or single-room occupancies, became increasingly scarce (Campsie 1994, 2018; Grant, Filion, and Low 2018; Kaufman and Distasio 2014). Canada has not seen substantial additions to the social housing stock for families since the early 1990s (Walks and Clifford 2015), and most governments withdrew support for private market rentals in the 1980s. Yet the number of poorer households looking for rental housing has continued to increase (Suttor 2015). As Greg Suttor (2015) notes, rental housing is increasingly located in declining inner suburbs, and exhibits lower quality than other housing stock. Many indicators of inequality are correlated with worsening housing and health conditions. Not all changes are equally noticeable. As Megan Gosse and colleagues (2016) discovered in their survey of Halifax residents, people notice physical changes but may be less aware of social or economic changes in their neighbourhoods. Except for some neighbourhoods in central Winnipeg that retained concentrations of low-income residents and vacant structures, the inner districts of the study cities were substantially different in 2016 from 1981. Although the central areas retained swathes of office space and commercial development, they experienced substantial infill of residential units since the 1990s. Many inner-city neighbourhoods showed signs of gentrification, upgrading, or “revitalization,” with condominium towers, cafés, restaurants, and other services, leaving lowerincome residents to look elsewhere for affordable housing. As inner cities trended upward in costs and incomes, studies of some Canadian cities have suggested that inner-suburban areas revealed evidence of decline in housing quality and value (Pavlic and Qian 2014). The focus of our study, then, was to document and try to explain the changes underway in Canadian cities. Research teams in Vancouver, Calgary, Win­ ni­peg, Toronto, Hamilton, Montreal, and Halifax each set about understanding the transformations occurring in their cities. To explain patterns of change across Canadian cities, we examined comparable measures of income inequality and the factors that might be driving it.

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Measuring Income Inequality To evaluate changes in income across the case study cities, we used the Gini coefficient, often considered the gold standard of inequality measures. Values range between 0 (which represents perfect equality in a distribution of income) and 1 (complete inequality). Figure 12.1 describes income inequality among the working-age population across the seven cities analyzed. Whereas some smaller CMAs, such as Halifax, demonstrate slow increases in income inequality over time, some larger, fast-growing CMAs show higher levels and more rapid increases. Many factors (including technological development, trade agree­ments, government policies, geographic location, social and cultural affinities, and quality of life) affect the patterns and levels of population growth and income distributions. In Canada, immigration has been the primary force providing new residents to the largest cities. Immigrants to metropolitan areas, however, have been experiencing declining incomes in relation to the metropolitan averages. Labour market discrimination is one factor at work (Walks 2011, 2014; Reitz 2007). Faster-growing cities receiving many new immigrants, such as Toronto and Calgary, have among the highest levels of inequality, and have seen rapid increases in inequality since the late 1980s. Immigration does not account for rising inequality everywhere, however; smaller cities with lower immigration levels have also experienced rising inequality. Meanwhile, income inequality has grown more slowly in Vancouver, a metropolitan area with a significant immigrant population. This region is popular among retirees, who may have considerable wealth but who draw only average incomes that do not drive up measures of income inequality. Vancouver has seen a slight drop in measures of non-spatial income inequality in recent times, as have Calgary, Montreal, Hamilton, and Halifax, but only from their peaks in 2006, whereas Toronto and Winnipeg have continued to witness rising inequality (Figure 12.1). Despite the most recent period, the overall trend since 1990 is one of rising income inequality. The challenges associated with measuring income inequality writ large, and those associated with measuring change in income inequality, are well known. One obstacle relates to the kind of income source. We could focus on employment income to get a picture of inequalities deriving from the labour market, but this would omit the equalizing effects of government transfers and social assistance, such as employment insurance, pensions, Old Age Security payments, and taxes, as well as the effects of income from investments, which

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FIGURE 12.1 Non-spatial income inequality among working-age individuals in the metropolitan areas under study (Gini coefficients), 1980–2015

Note:  The units of analysis are working-age persons (aged 15 and older), and the form of income analyzed is total before-tax income. Source:  Values are Gini coefficients, calculated by Alan Walks with the help of Dylan Simone, within the Statistics Canada Research Data Centre, using the raw census data for each census year.

tend to drive up inequality. The ideal form of income to use in measuring income inequality is therefore after-tax total income. Statistics Canada began collecting information on taxes paid only in the early 2000s, however, so there is no historical equivalent to compare against. The next-best alternative for examining whether income inequality is increasing or declining is to use before-tax total income. Before-tax income produces a more conservative view of changes in income inequality over time. If after-tax income had been available to measure changes in income inequality, it would likely have shown even greater increases in income inequality than revealed by Figure 12.1, since income taxes and other kinds of taxes were reduced in the 1990s: they became less progressive, which meant they were less able to counter the effects of rising labour market inequalities (Frenette, Green, and Milligan 2009; Fortin et al. 2012).

Measuring Neighbourhood Change and Spatial Inequality: Understanding the Challenges In addition to understanding general trends in the distribution of income, our study of neighbourhood change examines how patterns of income inequality, 258

JILL L. GRANT, ALAN WALKS, AND HOWARD RAMOS

and different types of inequalities, may be distributed in urban space. The contributors to this volume acknowledge the difficulty in defining the neighbourhood as a unit of analysis. As George Galster (2001, 2112) notes, “neighbourhood is the bundle of spatially based attributes associated with clusters of residen­ ces, sometimes in conjunction with other land uses.” Neighbourhoods are both social and spatial units, sources of identity and community, and commodities for real estate marketing. Because we have ready access to data at the census tract level, we used CTs as proxies for neighbourhoods. Sometimes CTs prove a good fit for neighbourhood-level analysis, as Statistics Canada uses well-known physical and social buffers and barriers (such as main roads, rivers, and railway tracks) to delimit CT boundaries. But the way CTs are built means that their geographic size reflects population density. In dense areas, CTs are geographically small, but in low-density areas, boundaries can span large territories. Some­ times a CT is too small to represent a neighbourhood in the densest parts of large cities, but even more often it is too large to represent a neighbourhood in low-density suburbs and in smaller cities. Furthermore, some CTs do not have stable geographies over time, since Statistics Canada may reorganize them as urban growth or decline occurs. Reliance on the CT as a spatial data unit thus required compromises. Neighbourhood analysis, whether using CTs or some other spatial unit, creates challenges related to the measurement of spatial income distributions. Census tracts, neighbourhoods, municipalities, and even provinces are spatial aggregations of many individuals and households. The income reported for each place represents the central tendencies of everyone in those places, but not the full distribution of income within each place. Spatial analysis derived from the central tendencies of individuals or households aggregated within spatial units like CTs thus provides a picture of the degree of income segregation in a city, but, like all such measures, is necessarily partial. The central tendency, measured by the average or median of individual income of CTs, can mask significant differences in internal structure. For instance, an average income of $60,000 could be the product of a population where everyone earned that income, or where the population was split evenly among people earning either $10,000 or $110,000: one CT would be equal while the other would be polarized. The same issue applies whether average or median income is used. Similarly, changes in household composition or ethnicity in a CT could mean that a stable income average masks differences in structure, opportunity, and access. Despite the many challenges associated with them, CTs are the best geographical approximation of neighbourhoods available, especially for larger, EVALUATING NEIGHBOURHOOD INEQUALITY AND CHANGE

259

established cities. We calculated spatial Gini coefficients showing neighbourhood-based income inequalities, using CTs as the unit of analysis, in similar fashion to the non-spatial Ginis discussed above. When spatial units such as neighbourhoods are the units of analysis, the results indicate income segregation. An equivalent term that we use is “socio-spatial inequality,” given that CTs are both spatial and social aggregations. For an indication of the degree to which a metropolitan area has been more or less segregated by income, the spatial Gini coefficient in a recent year may be compared with one in the past (Figure 12.2). When measured by using spatial units such as CTs, the resulting Gini coefficients are, unsurprisingly, much lower than those calculated using individuals, given that the spatial Ginis are comparing the central tendencies in neighbourhoods. Although the Gini coefficient can range from 0 to 1.00, typically Ginis calculated among neighbourhoods (spatially) range from 0.05 to 0.25, which is less than half the usual range of values of Ginis calculated among individuals or households (non-spatially). Useful information can be derived from comparing spatial measures across cities, and the same measures over time for the same city. Graphing trends in the spatial Gini coefficients across our seven metropolitan areas indicates that income became more segregated at the neighbourhood scale in every CMA over time, especially during the 1990s, after experiencing stability, or even slightly declining levels of segregation, over the 1970s. The 1990s witnessed a recession during the first half, followed by a credit-led growth period that continued through most of the 2000s, and resumed with a vengeance after the global financial crisis of 2008–09 (see Walks 2013a, 2014). In this period, federal and provincial governments scaled back many aspects of Canada’s welfare state, including state subsidies for building social/non-market forms of housing. The Toronto CMA led the way in the growth of income segregation, followed by Hamilton, Calgary, and Vancouver, although in Calgary and Vancouver segregation has not increased since 2006. Toronto emerged as the most income-segregated metropolitan area in Can­ ada. Winnipeg, Halifax, and to a lesser extent Montreal (historically the most income-segregated metro in Canada) saw income segregation rise during the 1990s in a similar pattern, but at lower rates and levels than other cities in the study. Across all cities in the analysis, as seen in Table 12.1, the resulting Ginis when measured between neighbourhoods have risen at faster rates than Ginis measured non-spatially among all individuals or households, despite the higher values for the latter. Indeed, our case study metros revealed Gini coefficients for income inequality that were on average 8.5% higher in 2015 than in 1980. 260

JILL L. GRANT, ALAN WALKS, AND HOWARD RAMOS

FIGURE 12.2 Spatial income segregation in study CMAs, 1970 –2015 (Gini coefficients)

Note:  The units of analysis are census tracts, and the form of income analyzed is the average total annual individual before-tax income for working-age persons (aged 15 and up) by census tract. Source:  Values are Gini coefficients, calculated by Richard Maaranen using data from the Census of Canada for years 1971 through 2016.

At the same time, however, our case study metros saw levels of income segregation as measured by the spatial Gini coefficients rise by over 52% on average. Such a scenario indicates that individuals or households are actively segregating – i.e., spatially concentrating in neighbourhoods with others more like themselves – more quickly than incomes are becoming less equally distributed across the population. If this trend continues, Canada will have more incomesegregated cities in the not so distant future, even if we can rein in underlying in­ equalities in the household- or individual-level distribution of income. Among the mechanisms behind this spatial sorting is the gentrification of the inner cities, in which middle-class and elite whites concentrate in older neighbourhoods close to downtown. Such a trend can push younger people out of the downtowns, along with those who face economic precarity and who traditionally benefited from an inner-city location. Such a trend could also promote urban sprawl and suburbanization, although since the early 2000s provincial and municipal governments have sought to curb sprawl and promote the intensification of the central cities. One result has been the development of condominium units, which have disproportionately concentrated near the downtown (Rosen and Walks 2013). The data suggest that a trend toward greater segregation EVALUATING NEIGHBOURHOOD INEQUALITY AND CHANGE

261

could continue even if inequalities among individuals or households do not increase, because individuals are increasingly living with others who have similar incomes. The discussion of rates of changes highlights another challenge we faced in conducting comparative trend analysis, namely, the appropriate time frames for analyses. Change is a continual process that can be measured from various starting and ending points. At different times, and for different city studies or purposes, the team used a range of time frames: 1970–2005, 1970–2010, 1980– 2010, 1980–2012, and 1980–2015. Analyzing changes between 1971 and 2006 (for the Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver original studies) covered a period during which social, physical, cultural, and economic changes transformed Canadian cities, and during which governments began dismantling some components of the welfare state. Selecting 1971 as the initial period for studies of the cities other than the three largest would have meant including fringe areas that were then undeveloped. Thus, for the analyses in this book, the research team determined that 1981 was a more appropriate start date to show how developed neighbourhoods had changed. The end date of various studies reflected data availability as the study proceeded.

TABLE 12.1 Change in Gini coefficients for income inequality (non-spatial, among individuals) and income segregation (spatial, measured for individual income among census tracts) Non-spatial Gini (income inequality)

Spatial Gini (income segregation)

CMA

1980

2015

% change, 1980–2015

1980

2015

% change, 1980–2015

Halifax

0.450

0.459

2.0

0.091

0.125

37.4

Montreal

0.453

0.473

4.4

0.139

0.172

23.7

Toronto

0.462

0.548

18.6

0.132

0.226

71.2

Hamilton

0.460

0.481

4.6

0.098

0.163

66.3

Winnipeg

0.453

0.460

1.5

0.113

0.166

46.9

Calgary

0.467

0.550

17.8

0.118

0.212

79.7

Vancouver

0.464

0.512

10.3

0.115

0.164

42.6

Average

0.458

0.498

8.5

0.115

0.175

52.4

Source:  Calculated using the Gini coefficients graphed in Figures 12.1 and 12.2. The final row shows average values across the cities studied.

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Depending on measures used and how they are applied, we might reach different conclusions. For instance, in an earlier study, Ian MacLachlan and Ryo Sawada (1997) noted that the proportion of Canadian households in census tracts with average incomes within 10% of the median household income grew from 1971 to 1991, but the proportion within 25% dropped. Which measure and which conclusion would be most meaningful? Our team faced a significant question concerning how much income change should be considered “substantial.” The latter is important not only because of the arbitrary nature of any such cut-off points but also because of our desire to produce theoretically informed research that can speak to scholarship on the divided city and the just city. The original study of Toronto by David Hulchanski (2010), classified CTs into “three cities” using a 20% cut-off of difference from the average to indicate “substantial” change. Tracts where the average individual income ratio rose by 0.20 or more (meaning there was a gain of 20% of the CMA average income or more) were classified as “City 1,” indicating the improving-income city (what we call “gaining ground” in this book). Tracts in which the income ratio declined by 0.20 or more (meaning there was a loss of 20% of the CMA average income or more) were classified as “City 3,” the declining-income city (“losing ground”). Tracts whose income ratios changed less than 0.20 in either direction over time were placed in “City 2,” the stable city (“holding ground”). Thus, Hulchanski (2010) argued that the City of Toronto was dividing into three distinct kinds of “cities” within the larger city, in which life experiences and life chances were moving further apart. The terms “City 1,” “City 2,” and “City 3” provided heuristic devices meant to accentuate the stark spatial clustering of different neighbourhood trajectories. Indeed, the original maps of the City of Toronto illustrated how the spatial trajectories of neighbourhoods could be perceived as leading toward the creation of separate social environments within the larger city. The study received considerable national and international attention as another empirical illustration of the “divided cities” problem occurring in Europe and major cities around the world (Musterd et al. 2017; Sassen 2018). The issue of cut-points and definitions, however, presented practical problems of comparability across diverse Canadian metropolitan areas. The local teams from Montreal, Halifax, and Winnipeg (see Chapters 5, 8, and 10) found that the “three cities model” did not work as well in describing neighbourhood change in those metropolitan areas (see also Distasio and Kaufman 2015, 11; Prouse, Grant, et al. 2014; Rose and Twigge-Molecey 2013). The extent to which neighbourhoods had changed in income was lower in other CMAs than in

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263

Toronto. The initial Montreal and Vancouver studies used a cut-off of 15% change to capture neighbourhood income transitions between 1970 and 2005, because researchers found that using the 20% cut-off employed for Toronto did not reveal enough change in neighbourhood economic status to account for local perceptions of change. The definition of “important” neighbourhood changes differed based on local context. Spatial patterns of neighbourhood change in these cities, while often clustered, were not so extreme as to suggest three separate and distinct “cities” as in Toronto. Smaller CMAs used an even narrower 10% cut-off to identify changes, because few neighbourhoods would appear to change using larger cut-offs (partly because of lower urban densities). The cut-offs we choose as researchers to classify neighbourhoods have effects on the resulting distribution of neighbourhood types or categories and influence our interpretation of the extent of change occurring. Table 12.2 shows the proportion of each study CMA’s CTs that get categorized into each of the three types using both a cut-off of 10% and a cut-off of 20% (for changes from 1980 to 2015). If the higher 20% cut-offs are used, the majority (58–78%) of tracts in every CMA except Toronto and Calgary are classified as “holding ground.” However, when we use the lower 10% cut-offs, a minority of tracts in each CMA are classified as holding ground, while significant numbers are classified as either gaining or losing ground. The methodological choice of cut-offs makes a difference in the story of change or relative stability that the data tell. Although the teams in various cities worked with comparable census datasets and maps, no strict research protocols were applied in the city studies. We see greater similarity in the results for the larger metros, where reports covered common themes, but the case studies of the other cities often varied, reflecting the different issues facing each of the smaller metros. Some teams did surveys, workshops, ethnographic studies, or interviews to flesh out stories reflected in the census data. What degree of uniformity in research approach does a team need for strict comparability of results across cities? For the reporting in this book, we used comparable data and provided authors with guidelines on proposed chapter content, but the chapters emphasize different issues and offer distinct analyses that reflect local priorities and concerns. Some of the differences among cities suggest that the implications of a divided city or the strategies that could help achieve a more just city depend on local context. For instance, researchers describing Winnipeg (Chapter 10) report on a central city where large Indigenous populations suffer significant poverty, disinvestment, and disadvantage. Hamilton (Chapter 7) and Halifax (Chapter 8) have experienced 264

JILL L. GRANT, ALAN WALKS, AND HOWARD RAMOS

TABLE 12.2 Change in income distributions under low cut-off and high cut-off methods: percentage of census tracts in each CMA grouped by change in the ratio of average individual income for the CT relative to change in average individual income in the CMA overall, 1980–2015 % distribution using low cut-off CMA

Gaining ground1

Holding ground2

Losing ground3

% distribution using high cut-off Gaining ground4

Holding ground5

Losing ground6

Halifax

24

39

37

8

77

15

Montreal

28

29

43

18

58

24

Toronto

33

18

49

25

43

32

Hamilton

14

25

61

8

63

29

Winnipeg

15

38

47

10

78

13

Calgary

34

17

50

26

39

35

Vancouver

33

30

37

23

61

16

1 Census tract average income increased 10% or more compared with the CMA average income. 2 Census tract average income changed less than 10% compared with the CMA average income. 3 Census tract average income decreased 10% or more compared with the CMA average income. 4 Census tract average income increased 20% or more compared with the CMA average income. 5 Census tract average income changed less than 20% compared with the CMA average income. 6 Census tract average income decreased 20% or more compared with the CMA average income. Census tract boundaries are held constant for 1981. Source:  Calculations by Richard Maaranen using Statistics Canada data from the 1981 and 2016 Census of Canada. In some cases, totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

gentrification, with decreasing affordability in central neighbourhoods. Com­ plex problems of growing inequality will require locally appropriate solutions. Methodological choices about the measure of income used, the unit of analysis, the time frame used for analyzing change, and the degree to which change is measured all affect how we interpret neighbourhood change and consequently how we understand socio-spatial inequality in Canada. Engaging team members with differing expertise and research approaches influenced interpretations and outcomes, but ultimately offered more robust analyses by engaging problems from multiple angles and perspectives.

Interpreting Neighbourhood Change Another challenge in analyzing neighbourhood income change is interpret­ ing the results. Earlier reports by the case study teams used different language to describe methods to generate income change data (compare Harris, Dunn, and Wakefield 2015, 22; Hulchanski 2010, 1–2; Ley and Lynch 2012, iii; Prouse, Grant, et al. 2014, 31; Rose and Twigge-Molecey 2013, iii; Townshend, Miller, EVALUATING NEIGHBOURHOOD INEQUALITY AND CHANGE

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and Evans 2018, 11). This reflected differences in disciplinary background, area expertise, methodological training, and the lived experiences of being in different cities. The case studies in Chapters 4 through 10 demonstrate that forms and patterns of neighbourhood change are as varied as Canadian CMAs. Differences in size and demographic characteristics among the cities investigated complicate explanations of change and the factors responsible for patterns observed. The largest metropolitan area examined (Toronto) has almost fifteen times the population of the smallest (Halifax). During the study period, Calgary transitioned from a mid-sized city to a large city of over 1.2 million. The CMAs differ in growth rates, age profiles, and household sizes, and in the proportion of visible minorities, Indigenous residents, and immigrants. Many factors influence the nature of neighbourhood change and explanations for it. The seven cities analyzed differ considerably in demographic characteristics (Statistics Canada 2013, 2015, 2017). Calgary had the lowest median age, a by-product of attracting record numbers of young workers to energy sector jobs; Halifax, with its relatively low growth rate, and Vancouver with its desirability for retirees, had median ages older than the national average. As Markus Moos (2014a, 2014b) demonstrated, young people are moving to larger cities and favouring dense downtown areas, with significant implications for neighbourhood change. Household sizes showed some variation: smaller in Halifax and Montreal and larger in Toronto and Calgary. The growing trend to homogamy – that is, marriage within class, education level, or income group (Hou and Myles 2008) – alongside high levels of female labour force participation can generate households with divergent income distributions: either very high or quite low. Toronto and Vancouver have large populations of people identifying as visible minorities. Winnipeg has a substantial Indigenous population, while Halifax has a small but historically important African Nova Scotian (Black) population. Whatever the size of the visible minority population, however, it was often higher in low-income areas or CTs that were losing ground than in those gaining ground. Studies in several of the CMAs showed that CTs with high proportions of Blacks, Indigenous persons, and new immigrants often lost ground. Despite this, we find no evidence of ghettos forming in any Canadian city, and most of the poorest tracts show a high level of ethnic and racial diversity (Walks 2014; Hiebert 2015). The housing stock differs across the cities. The proportion of dwelling units in detached homes was less than half of units in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver in 2011, ranging from a low of 32.6% in Montreal to a high of

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62.9% in Winnipeg. Montreal had the highest proportion of renters, with only 55% of the population owning homes in 2011; in contrast, 73.9% of Calgary households owned their housing (CMHC 2014). Differences in economies and transportation networks helped explain some patterns that emerged. Large numbers of jobs in high-income sectors such as finance, knowledge industries, and energy, alongside growth in lowpaid service jobs, help explain higher levels of income inequality and polarization in Toronto, Vancouver, and Calgary (Walks 2011). Cities perceived as successful attract migrants and investment that stimulate further growth. Until recent years, weak economic growth in Hamilton and Winnipeg helped account for relatively small numbers of CTs gaining ground since 1980. Subway, light rail transit (LRT), and streetcar networks in Toronto, Vancouver, Mont­ real, and Calgary had some influence on where CTs showed increasing income ratios over time, although in Vancouver the SkyTrain runs through some CTs that remain lower-income (Jones 2015). With high housing costs in Toronto, Hamilton has become increasingly integrated into the Toronto economy through commuting and supply chains, facilitated by the “GO” (Government of Ontario) commuter train and major highways, a sign that affordability issues may be pushing people to secondary centres such as Hamilton (see Chapter 7). But most of the cities have natural boundaries and topographic features that constrain expansion opportunities and make some neighbourhoods more physically desirable than others. Development patterns are structured by natural features, such as ocean, lake front, or mountain; infrastructure, such as transit systems, bridges, or highways; or designated protection areas. CTs near major water features and attractive views have generally experienced increases in income ratios, while many CTs with poor transportation connectivity have seen decreases in income ratios. The increasing cultural preference for inner-city living contributes to making central areas seem attractive, even in inner-city Winnipeg. For most CMAs, data indicate increasing income ratios in central neighbourhoods as gentrification proceeds, with deleterious effects on lowerincome groups who have relied on high-accessibility locations and who are increasingly displaced to less-accessible suburban neighbourhoods.

The Drivers of Change Neighbourhood change reflects a wide range of processes and practices operating in our cities. Three key categories of factors – demographic, economic,

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and policy – played central roles in driving change in Canada in recent decades. Several significant demographic transitions influenced neighbourhood trajectories. In 1981, the baby boom cohort had already reached adulthood and was forming households and purchasing housing (often, but not only, in the suburbs). Fertility rates were already declining while divorce rates were rising. During subsequent decades, marriage rates declined, educational achievement levels increased, and the number of seniors ballooned. By 2016, 28.2% of Canadians lived in one-person households, with even higher concentrations of small households in city centres; at the same time, a growing proportion of young adults continued to live with their parents in the suburbs because they could not afford to obtain their own housing (McGillivray 2017). Whereas earlier generations preferred suburban living, the millennials reaching adulthood in the 2010s showed a growing preference for the city centre, stimulating demand for multi-family housing units (Moos 2015, 2016). The number of immigrants coming to Canada grew over the period: whereas 128,600 arrived in 1981, an average of 235,000 immigrants a year have come to Canada since the 1990s (Statistics Canada 2016b). By the 2000s, urban growth reflected the ability of particular cities to attract immigrants, with the majority going to the three largest cities (Filion 2010), and often co-locating with fellow countrymen to form “ethnoburbs” (Murdie, Logan, and Maaranen 2013a, 2013b; Walks 2014; also see Chapter 3, this volume). Whereas visible minorities comprised 4.4% of the population in 1981, by 2016 they made up 22.3%, with even larger concentrations of visible minorities in the largest cities (Grenier 2017). Recent immigrants and persons identifying as visible minorities increasingly experienced economic disadvantage in the 2000s (Lightman and Good Gingrich 2018), and increasingly concentrated in low-income CTs. Canada’s economy changed in many ways between 1981 and 2016, as governments shifted from traditional welfare state supports to neoliberal policies and practices (Filion 2010). Trade liberalization contributed to losses in manufacturing jobs and an end to federal programs trying to attract industry and jobs to disadvantaged regions. Auto sector jobs declined 36% between 2005 and 2009 (Rutherford and Holmes 2014), and many textile and clothing industries in Montreal closed (Bernard 2009), while the staples economy based on energy and mining re-emerged (Stanford 2008). Deindustrialization left working-class Canadians struggling to maintain their standard of living while releasing urban warehouses and factory sites for redevelopment and gentrification. Waterfront areas were cleaned up and “revitalized.” Services and the “knowledge economy” provided a growing share of jobs, drawing more Canadians to cities to find 268

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work. Construction, real estate, and finance became increasingly important to the Canadian economy over the period, especially for large Canadian cities (Canadian Press 2017; Christophers 2015; Tencer 2018; Rosen and Walks 2015). After the global financial crisis of the late 2000s, low interest rates and federal government support for mortgage lending stimulated a real estate bubble that increased consumer debt levels (Walks 2013a, 2014). As housing prices rose during the period, an increasing proportion of new residential units consisted of small condominiums or apartments, especially in central neighbourhoods, yet buyers in suburban areas continued to prefer detached houses that were becoming increasingly unaffordable. Public policy and government decisions – at all three levels of govern­ ment – played key roles in the transformations that occurred in neighbourhoods between 1981 and 2016. This is discussed in Chapter 11 by Scott Graham, Stephanie Procyk, and Michelynn Laflèche, who work in the not-for-profit sector navigating those policies and changes to them. By the 1980s, the federal government was moving away from many of the welfare state policies of the postwar era, eventually reducing transfer payments for social programs such as housing, social assistance, and education, and tightening requirements for Canadians to qualify for Employment Insurance and other income security programs (Shier and Graham 2014). Most provinces followed suit by freezing or reducing social assistance benefits, downloading responsibilities to municipalities, and removing or reducing rent controls. The non-profit sector was left to pick up the slack, which explains the proliferation of food banks and emergency shelters from the 1980s onward. Many government policies affected what was built in neighbourhoods. Until the 1970s, federal programs supported the building of affordable housing in Canada (Suttor 2015), but growing faith in the market to address housing needs undermined commitment to such investments. By the 1990s, responsibility for social housing was transferred to the provinces, many of which lacked the resources and the political commitment to invest in social housing for any groups other than seniors: only Quebec continued to develop programs for housing affordability, although the British Columbia government purchased some rundown single-room-occupancy hotels to preserve affordable units around the time of the Vancouver Winter Olympics in 2010. In Manitoba, the provincial government closed and sold off some social housing units, reducing supply in a time of desperate need (Grabish 2018a), while Winnipeg’s city council declined to enforce requirements for affordable units in major new projects (Grabish 2018b). As Alan Walks (2014, 273) notes, “Canada’s metropolitan areas EVALUATING NEIGHBOURHOOD INEQUALITY AND CHANGE

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went from having some of the most affordable housing markets on the globe to the least affordable between the late 1990s and late 2000s.” With local governments in Canada heavily reliant on property taxes for their revenues, and with increasing responsibility for managing social housing formerly funded by higher levels of government, promoting urban growth and redevelopment remained a top priority. A handful of cities, such as Vancouver and Montreal, used planning policies to generate revenues for social housing, but most turned a blind eye to unmet needs while encouraging private market activity. Public investment also stimulated change. For instance, funds for waterfront cleanup transformed industrial lands in cities such as Montreal, Halifax, and Vancouver into urban parks and boardwalks that reinvigorated investment and development potential in those areas. Government decisions to sell former industrial lands to major development companies for new residential projects contributed to rapid gentrification in Vancouver and Toronto. Public investments in rapid transit in Vancouver and Toronto not only enhanced access to city centres but expanded development opportunities in ways that transformed neighbourhoods, leading to concentrations of affluence in new high-rise towers. Craig Jones (2015) has described the way that zoning changes and transitoriented development led to significant loss of affordable rental housing and incipient gentrification along the SkyTrain route in Vancouver. Planning policies and regulations played a key role in driving neighbourhood change. By its nature, planning seeks to influence urban trajectories, with the implicit goal of aiming for “improvement.” As early as the 1970s, Toronto and Vancouver were encouraging urban infill and intensification in downtown areas (Punter 2003; Sewell 1993), while programs from the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) supported neighbourhood improvement in declining districts, thereby inadvertently stimulating gentrification. By the 1990s, Canadian planners were actively promoting urban revitalization and regeneration, supported by planning philosophies associated with new urbanism, sustainability, social mix, and smart growth (Grant 2003). Entrenching policies that facilitated higher densities, heights, and mixed uses in neighbourhoods meant altering land uses and urban form, both in urban cores and, by the 2000s, also in suburban areas (Grant 2006). Programs to “renew” public housing by creating mixed-income and mixed-tenure communities, as Toronto initiated in Regent Park, applied a mix of neoliberal and new-urbanist ideas to generate massive neighbourhood change (August 2014; Dunn 2012). Provincial policies forcing or encouraging municipalities to plan for urban growth at a regional scale increased pressures on local governments to adapt policies to facilitate 270

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neighbourhood change in ways that would accommodate more (middle-class) people in well-serviced areas. In Hamilton and Winnipeg, municipal authorities went even further, reviving the once-discredited language of “urban renewal,” while offering incentives and tax rebates to developers and/or home­buyers to move into downtown neighbourhoods (Bennett 2015; Schlesinger 2015). Although plans for Canadian cities often included aspirations for greater housing affordability, and political leaders recognized that the lack of affordable housing had become a crisis, municipal plans have done little to address the problem. By mandating that developers include affordable units (or cash in lieu of them) in new projects (City of Vancouver 2018; Moore 2013), Vancou­ ver, Montreal, and Toronto have demonstrated the role that municipalities can play, but the need for affordable housing far exceeds the means at cities’ disposal. Condominium ownership, which was a small part of the housing market in 1981, skyrocketed to dominate construction in Canada’s largest cities by the 2010s, increasing the density of many neighbourhoods (Rosen and Walks 2013, 2015). Through the 2000s, planners became increasingly concerned about im­ proving urban quality through enforcement of design guidelines that influenced the aesthetics of neighbourhoods – for instance, by stipulating building mass, relationship to the street, and materials. As critics argued, neoliberal ideology led local governments to employ planning as a tool for reshaping cities to provide fertile ground for market investors (Keil 2002; Kelly 2013; Weber 2002). Zoning changes that increased heights and facilitated mixed land uses handed property owners significantly enhanced land values and led to major changes in the neighbourhoods affected. Thus, a primary outcome of planning policy since the 1980s has been forms of gentrification that exacerbated inequality and displacement of lower-income residents from central neighbourhoods.

Are Canada’s Cities Dividing? Did our study of neighbourhood change in Canada find divided cities? The gap between the most and least affluent CTs across cities is certainly wide and growing. A geography of poverty and affluence is well established and increasingly pronounced, particularly in the largest metropolitan areas. Indeed, both the poorest and richest urban neighbourhoods in the country are found in Canada’s largest cities. Canada’s highest-income neighbourhood in 2016 (West­ mount in Montreal) had an average per capita individual annual total income of $427,949 (before taxes). Toronto’s highest-income neighbourhood (Rosedale) in 2016 was not far behind, with an average individual before-tax income of EVALUATING NEIGHBOURHOOD INEQUALITY AND CHANGE

271

$419,676. Meanwhile, the poorest reported neighbourhood in Montreal (containing Les Habitations Jeanne-Mance, a large social housing community down­ town) had an average annual income of only $16,202 before taxes. Montreal’s wealthiest CT is over twenty-six times richer than its poorest. Toronto’s poorest tract includes part of the Oakridge community in the Toronto CMA, with before-tax annual individual incomes of $18,757. People in Toronto’s richest tract receive over twenty-two times more annual income per person than those in its poorest tract. Even after taxes were paid, and with higher tax rates for highincome earners, residents of poor areas ended up with less than 10% of the resources available to them, on average, than those living in the nation’s richest neighbourhoods. Comparing average incomes and extremes in average individual income by CTs over the period from 1970 to 2015 shows some variation across cities (Table 12.3). Although levels of inequality at the CT scale increased in all the cities, this is more related to the rapid increase in the incomes of the rich and in rich neighbourhoods than to declining incomes among the poor or in poorer neighbourhoods, although the latter did occur to some extent relative to the CMA average change. The average income of Halifax’s highest-income CT rose considerably over the period, but the city still had no CTs that fell below 60% of the CMA average individual income. While Hamilton and Halifax had no very low-income tracts in 1970, in 2015 the poorest CT in Hamilton had just over half the CMA average income, while the poorest tracts in Montreal and Toronto had incomes just over one-third of the CMA average, down considerably from their situations in 1970. The CTs with the highest average incomes in all CMAs except Winnipeg were notably better off in comparison with the CMA average in 2015 than they were in 1970. Also, in most CMAs, the neighbourhoods with the lowest incomes in 2015 were different from the neighbourhoods with the lowest incomes in 1970: to some extent, poverty had relocated, often to suburban locations. The exception was Vancouver, where the Downtown Eastside has remained that CMA’s poorest neighbourhood for many decades and is an obvious target of policies attempting to address concentrated poverty. In trying to explain why some areas change more than others, scholars have looked at factors that may enhance stability or impede change. In their study of two neighbourhoods in Toronto, Alan Walks and Martine August (2008) found that continuing nuisance uses, strong ethnic networks, and some municipal policies inhibited gentrification. Merle Zwiers and colleagues (2016) noted that the quality of the housing stock, the share of owner-occupied housing, and the share of social housing affected neighbourhood trajectories in the 272

JILL L. GRANT, ALAN WALKS, AND HOWARD RAMOS

TABLE 12.3 Average individual income and range (related to CMA average), 1970 and 2015 1970

2015

CMA average individual income

Highest CT income ratio

Lowest CT income ratio

CMA average individual income

Highest CT income ratio

Lowest CT income ratio

Halifax

$5,249

1.62

0.65

$46,429

2.36

0.60

Montreal

$5,043

3.58

0.41

$44,742

9.56

0.36

Toronto

$5,756

3.96

0.52

$50,479

8.31

0.37

Hamilton

$5,186

1.53

0.61

$48,455

2.13

0.53

Winnipeg

$4,902

2.76

0.57

$46,029

2.72

0.42

Calgary

$5,637

1.88

0.50

$69,117

3.71

0.49

Vancouver

$5,220

2.15

0.27

$46,821

4.63

0.41

CMA

Note:  Census tract boundaries are for Census 1971 and 2016. Source:  Statistics Canada, 1971 and 2016 Census of Canada. Analysis courtesy of Richard Maaranen.

Netherlands. David Ley and Corey Dobson (2008) similarly found that high crime rates and concentrations of social housing and low-cost housing discouraged investment and impeded gentrification in some areas of Vancouver. A common assumption in the scholarly and popular literature is that social problems such as crime and substance abuse tend to concentrate in the lowestincome CTs, contributing to concern over concentrated poverty (see Kazemi­ pur and Halli 2000, 369). Yet, as Peter Marcuse (1989) argued, we should not simplify complex realities, and should be careful about assuming that neighbourhood concentrations of people of specific income categories, ethnicities, immigrant status, or other social characteristics constitute a “problem.” In a social context where residents may choose to co-locate with others who share cultural practices, language, or access to resources (services, jobs, housing), we should be cautious about labelling communities in ways that may undermine their self-efficacy or political capital. Yet we also need to ascertain whether income segregation acts as a barrier to the life chances of the poor. This discussion naturally leads to questions about whether and how it might matter if poverty and affluence are increasing in our cities, or if neighbourhoods are losing, holding, or gaining ground. Do neighbourhoods in Can­ adian cities affect the life chances of those who inhabit them? For many dec­­­ades, the “neighbourhood effects” literature calculated the reduced opportunities and life outcomes of those who grew up in disadvantaged neighbourhoods EVALUATING NEIGHBOURHOOD INEQUALITY AND CHANGE

273

(Ellen and Turner 1997), but recent critiques have challenged that approach, arguing that people end up living in poor neighbourhoods because that is what their life chances permit (Slater 2013), and that neighbourhoods matter in different ways to different people (Sharkey and Faber 2014). Certainly, poverty and social inequality are not new, and yet the data that we present show that conditions are changing dramatically and rapidly as the gaps between rich and poor widen, and the geography of affluence and disadvantage is rewritten in our cities. Among the most interesting findings of our study is evidence that points to how rapidly inequality is growing in some cities. Table 12.4 indicates the proportion of census tracts that remain within 10% of the CMA average in each of the cities, using recent data points: these are the neighbourhoods “holding ground,” or relatively “stable” neighbourhoods. The table provides a window into how quickly the central category of CTs is declining in some cities, while the extreme ends of the income spectrum are increasing. We see that different patterns emerge in the study cities depending on the timeframe of the analysis. If we had used 2010 as the end period for our analysis, we would have found that the percentage of CTs in the “holding ground” category ranged from 21% in Calgary to 46% in Winnipeg. Using a date just two years later as the endpoint indicates that only Winnipeg and Halifax showed no loss in the stable tracts, while Hamilton and Montreal lost a significant proportion of such CTs. Taking 2015 as the endpoint for the analysis, as we do throughout this book, we find that only Halifax has stayed constant across the most recent five-year period, with 39% of CTs holding ground. All the other cities lost such tracts, with Winnipeg and Hamilton showing significant drops, perhaps coincident with public policies that reduced support for affordable housing (Winnipeg) or increased incentives to market developers to build in specific areas (Hamilton). Table 12.4 illustrates the way that selecting different endpoints for analysis can tell quite different stories. Furthermore, it shows just how recently some changes have been affecting Canadian metropolitan areas. Overall, the table illustrates the fluidity of transitions underway in our cities as CTs hovering around the CMA middle shrink in number while the low and high ends of the income distribution grow. Behind those statistics are individuals and families relocating in the search for affordable housing and urban amenities. Both the long-term trends observed in Canadian cities and the recent decline in stable neighbourhoods highlighted above provide reason for worry to those concerned about social justice in the city. While Canadians pride themselves on having a more just and fairer society and less segregated cities than 274

JILL L. GRANT, ALAN WALKS, AND HOWARD RAMOS

TABLE 12.4 Percentage of census tracts holding ground (remaining within 10% of CMA average individual income), using different end-date income data CMA

1980–2010

1980–2012

1980–2015

Halifax

39

39

39

Montreal

35

30

29

Toronto

24

22

18

Hamilton

39

33

25

Winnipeg

46

46

38

Calgary

21

19

17

Vancouver

33

32

30

Note:  Census tract boundaries are held constant for 1981. Source:  Canada Revenue Agency taxfiler data 2010 and 2012; Statistics Canada, Census 1981 and 2016.

the United States, recent trends in income inequality and income segregation uncovered through the case studies and through the team’s broader work suggest that metropolitan areas in Canada are in some ways coming to resemble their counterparts south of the border. For instance, if we consider some older data, we see that the level of non-spatial income inequality, as measured using the Gini coefficient of household income, for the Toronto CMA in 2005 (Gini = 0.469) was higher than those found in both the Chicago (0.456) and Philadel­ phia (0.462) metropolitan areas in 2000, but lower than for New York (0.535) or Miami (0.509) (see Kim and Jargowsky 2005). The level of income inequality in the Vancouver CMA in 2005 (0.452) was higher than those in the Detroit (0.444) and Atlanta (0.440) metros in 2000, while the level of income inequality in the Montreal CMA in 2005 (0.436) was similar to those in Baltimore (0.438) and Seattle (0.436) in 2000. And the average change in the Gini coefficient of income inequality across our Canadian metros between 2000 and 2015 (3.3%, for an annual rate of increase of 0.22 per year) is not dissimilar in annual terms to the average increase in the Gini coefficient of income inequality that Paul Jargowsky and Christopher Wheeler (2017, Table 2) calculate for all US metropolitan areas (2.6% between 2000 and 2010, for an annual rate of change of 0.26). In other words, Canadian cities cannot claim to have changed in substantially more just ways than their American counterparts on these measures. Although Canadian cities are not as racially segregated as those in the United States (Walks and Bourne 2006), they are becoming as segregated by income as their US counterparts. For instance, the levels of income segregation EVALUATING NEIGHBOURHOOD INEQUALITY AND CHANGE

275

among census tracts in the Toronto CMA, with spatial Ginis of 0.22 in 2005 and 0.23 in 2010, and in the Calgary CMA, with Ginis of 0.21 in both 2005 and 2010, were higher than the levels of income segregation uncovered in the second and third most income-segregated US metropolises in 2000: Los Angeles (0.19) and Philadelphia (0.18) (see Kim and Jargowsky 2005, Table 2), and not far from the most segregated US metro (0.25), the New York metropolitan area. Jargowsky and Wheeler (2017) calculate that US metropolitan areas saw income segregation, as measured by the spatial Gini coefficient, rise by 7.18% on average over the 2000 to 2010 period. If this rate of change is applied to Los Angeles and Philadelphia, their resulting Gini values, estimated at 0.204 and 0.193, respectively, are still lower than the recent values for either Toronto or Calgary. Using this same methodology, Montreal, Vancouver, and Winnipeg are all more segregated by income than either Atlanta or Boston, whether in the early 2000s or (using the average rate of change in the United States since 2000) after 2010. Whereas US cities have always experienced relatively high levels of income segregation, including during the early postwar period, in Canadian cities the rise in income segregation to these levels has largely occurred since 1990. The evidence suggests that income segregation is proceeding apace in Canada. The Gini coefficient summarizes the level of income inequality or segregation in a single measure for the entire income distribution in a place, which means it cannot tell what is happening in a subset of the income distribution. US metros do have greater levels of concentrated poverty than most Canadian cities, and in some cases have witnessed more rapid declines in middle-income neighbourhoods. Using the same methodology as our study but for the City of Chicago, Lauren Nolan (2015) identified increasing levels of inequality and polarization, along with high levels of racial segregation. In Chicago, 46% of census tracts were middle-income in 1970, but that proportion decreased to 16% by 2010, a time when the City of Toronto had 30% middle-income tracts. Mean­while, the City of Toronto and the Chicago metropolitan area were similar in their proportions of low- and very low-income tracts: 49% and 46%, respectively. While Canadian cities do not have ghettos (that is, neighbourhoods formed due to racial discrimination) like those found in the United States and the United Kingdom (Walks and Bourne 2006; Hiebert 2015), signs of a growing relationship between immigration status, visible minority status, and sociospatial income inequality in our largest and wealthiest cities are nonetheless disturbing to those who may have thought that Canada was different.

276

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Learning from the Research Neighbourhood change is not a uniform process in Canada, as the cities analyzed illustrate. Although we can identify general trends toward increasing concentrations at either end of the income spectrum, the way individuals and households are distributed in neighbourhoods within cities varies considerably. Particularly in the larger CMAs studied, neighbourhoods that are gaining ground differ from other kinds of neighbourhoods in important ways: they have remained “whiter,” have fewer immigrants, have lower rates of unemployment and low income, have higher levels of educational attainment, and generally have more young adults and working-age residents. One trend evident in each of the case study cities is gentrification, which is reducing the availability of affordable housing in highly accessible locations. Meanwhile, patterns among neighbourhoods that are holding ground or losing ground are less consistent across CMAs. In some CMAs, neighbourhoods that are losing ground have more rental housing or much higher rates of immigration, for instance, but this is not the case in every CMA. Our results suggest that one reason that metropolitan areas in Canada are becoming more segregated by income is that wealthier and whiter populations are self-segregating into specific neighbourhoods, leaving the remaining neighbourhoods for everyone else. In conducting a study of neighbourhood change in Canada, we have contributed to the international debate on how and why cities are transforming. What factors may be relevant in Canada? Economic restructuring, deindustrialization, weakening unions, lagging wages among the working classes, real estate speculation, and financialization all played roles in driving increasing inequalities, both socially and spatially. More specific processes related to Can­ adian cities included immigration, reduced financial transfers from upperlevel governments, and regressive changes to federal and provincial taxation systems. Among the city-specific factors affecting the rate and location of change were the development of the energy sector in Calgary, the flight of financial firms from Montreal to Toronto during separation referenda debates, the urbanization of Indigenous peoples in Winnipeg, aging in Halifax, extensive immigration to Toronto and Vancouver, and the increasing integration of Hamilton with Toronto. Planning and economic development policies have hastened change. All our cities have witnessed some level of gentrification and are showing signs of decline in their older postwar suburbs. While Canada’s largest cities have many neighbourhood types, smaller cities have less diversity,

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either because of scale issues or because they have been less likely to attract immigrant communities. Some types of change occurring in Canada clearly parallel international trends of the kind discussed in Chapter 1. For instance, inner-city areas with good transit access have gentrified in other cities in the West, illustrating the influence of public investments in driving spatial inequality (Slater 2017; Zuk et al. 2015). Financialization and the proliferation of real estate investment trusts have led to growing concentration of ownership and rising rents in the rental housing sector in many locations (Fields and Uffer 2014; Walks and August 2008). Visible and ethnic minorities are experiencing increasing inequality and segregation everywhere. Among the less common patterns featured in Canadian cities are the suburbanization of immigrant communities and the urbanization of Indigenous populations in western cities. While Canada has largely been spared the xenophobia associated with inequality and discrimination that troubles many parts of the world, the trends toward segregation are not promising. Canadian cities are not characterized by increasing social justice – at least in income distribution – but rather increasing disparities between the lowestand highest-income neighbourhoods. Disparities reflect the simultaneous operation of several processes. Governments have failed to preserve social safety nets that ensure full participation and reasonable quality of life for all Canadians; moreover, regressive taxation policies adopted since the 1990s have weakened the economic position of Canada’s poorest residents. Meanwhile, local governments have often overtly promoted transformation of central neighbourhoods to attract affluent residents and dilute or displace populations of lower-income residents. All our cities have witnessed some level of downtown gentrification and are showing signs of declining incomes in some of the older postwar suburbs. Social and demographic processes are producing smaller households with members of similar income levels. Market processes have reordered income profiles and are linked to the rapidly rising cost of housing, especially in the country’s largest cities. Affordability issues are increasing everywhere, particularly in the inner cities that traditionally provided the best combination of access to jobs and services for lower-income households. In the context of worrisome economic trends and evidence that disadvantage is tightly aligned with visible minority and ethnicity status, the research reported in this book presents a stark warning for Canadian scholars, communities, and governments. Preventing further economic polarization and the social consequen­ ces that can accompany it will require a concerted policy response for decades to come. 278

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Growing inequality undermines the prospect of creating just cities, wherein all Canadians can meet their basic needs and achieve their potential. Enabling the potential of those increasingly relegated to disadvantaged neighbourhoods requires that we find ways to foster greater social and economic justice across the city. Understanding the depth and breadth of the problem is an important step, but only political and social action can ensure that troubling trends do not worsen over time.

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Contributors

Larry S. Bourne FRSC, FCIP, Professor Emeritus of Geography and Planning at the University of Toronto, is past director of the Cities Centre and the Graduate Planning Program. His research interests include the dynamics of urban systems, urban social change and spatial inequalities, and residential development and the housing sector.

Jino Distasio is Vice President of Research and Innovation and Professor of Geography at the University of Winnipeg. He has led many projects examining housing markets, homelessness, and poverty. Primary research areas include urban Aboriginal mobility, homelessness and mental health, urban revitalization, and urban economics.

Derek Cook serves as the director of the Canadian Poverty Institute at Ambrose University in Calgary, Alberta. His research interests include a focus on socioeconomic inequality and community resilience. Derek holds a BA in Political Studies and an MSc in Community Planning and is a Registered Social Worker (RSW).

Scott Graham is Associate Executive Director and Manager of Research, Planning and Community Development at the Social Planning and Research Council of British Columbia (SPARC BC). His research focuses on poverty, spatial distributions of income, debt, and wealth; and the design of communitybased, participatory action research projects promoting social justice outcomes.

311

Jill L. Grant is Professor Emeritus of Planning at Dalhousie University. Her research explores the complex relationships between planning theory and practice, with a focus on community design, residential neighbourhoods, plan coordination, and planning history. She has published widely on issues related to new urbanism and gated communities.

Xavier Leloup is an associate professor at INRS-UCS in Montreal. His research interests include social and affordable housing and its effects on well-being, inequality and working poverty, immigration and neighbourhood social dynamics, and patterns of ethno-racial diversity and concentration. His main area of specialization is in urban and housing studies.

Richard Harris, a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, teaches urban geography at McMaster University. He has written about the history of housing, neighbourhoods, and suburbs in Canada, the United States, and British colonies. His latest book, with Charlotte Vorms, is What’s in a Name? Talking about Urban Peripheries.

David Ley is Professor Emeritus of Urban and Social Geography at the University of British Columbia. Research interests include gentrification, immigration, and housing markets. His most recent book, Millionaire Migrants, assessed the experiences and impacts of business immigrants from East Asia in Canada. Currently he is examining housing bubbles in five gateway cities.

J. David Hulchanski holds the Chow Yei Ching Chair in Housing in the Factor-Inwentash Faculty of Social Work at the University of Toronto. His research interests focus on housing and community development, human rights and social justice, urban income inequality and segregation trends, and homelessness and housing instability.

Nicholas Lynch is Assistant Professor of Geography at Memorial University of Newfoundland. His research explores the politics of consumption and cultural change in the city. Current interests include processes of adaptive reuse and housing sustainability in Canada and the United Kingdom.

Michelynn Laflèche is an independent advisor on strategy development to support social change. At the time of writing, she was Vice-President of Strategy, Research and Policy at United Way Greater Toronto. Her research and policy interests focus on the impacts of poverty, income inequality, and the changing labour market on individuals, families, and communities. 312

CONTRIBUTORS

Byron Miller Byron’s recent work focuses on the spatial constitution of social movements, urban governance and governmentality, urban inequality, and the politics of urban and regional sustainability. He is Professor of Geography and Coordinator of the Urban Studies Program at the University of Calgary.

Robert Murdie is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Geography, York University. His research interests include the housing experiences of immigrants and refugees, ethnic segregation, and neighbourhood change. He has undertaken studies concerning immigrant experiences in Toronto and comparative studies of social differentiation and change between Toronto and other Canadian CMAs.

Janet L. Smith is Professor of Urban Planning and Policy and Co-Director of the Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and Community Improvement at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Her research, teaching, and practice broadly focus on community development, with attention to understanding and mitigating negative effects of neighbourhood change.

Stephanie Procyk is Manager of Research, Public Policy and Evaluation at United Way Greater Toronto. She is interested in how the changing labour market and growing income inequality are impacting people’s lives, and in developing policies to best support those most affected by these changes.

Ivan Townshend is Professor of Geography, University of Lethbridge, and a research affiliate of the Prentice Institute for Global Population and Demography. His research interests in human geography include urban social geography, rural geography, and the role of community life in geographies of health, wellbeing, and resilience in disaster communities.

Howard Ramos is Professor of Sociology at Dalhousie University. He researches issues of social justice and examines issues around perceptions of change in small and medium cities as well as Atlantic Canadian cities. He also researches and publishes on social movements, human rights, Indigenous mobilization, environmental advocacy, ethnicity, and race.

Alan Walks is Professor of Geography and Planning at the University of Toronto. His research examines aspects of urban social and political inequality. He is editor of The Urban Political Economy and Ecology of Automobility: Driving Cities, Driving Inequality, Driving Politics, and co-editor of The Political Ecology of the Metropolis.

Damaris Rose is Honorary Professor of Urban Studies and Social Geography at the Urbanisation Culture Société research centre of Quebec’s Institut national de la recherche scientifique. Recently retired from her full professor position, she remains active in research on housing, immigration, and social change in the neighbourhoods of large cities.

Sarah Zell is Senior Research Associate at the Institute of Urban Studies at the University of Winnipeg. Her research focuses on transnational migration, with interests in settlement patterns, immigration policy and borders, labour mobility, and qualitative methodologies. Current projects examine homelessness, housing affordability, and housing policy. CONTRIBUTORS

313

Index

A Abbotsford, BC, 44, 134 Aboriginal persons: ancestry, 80, 224; as census category 224, 227, 234; income distribution in Winnipeg, 226. See also First Nations; Indigenous persons; Métis nation Action for Neighbourhood Change, 190 affordability, 7, 29, 40, 140, 193, 267; declining, 144, 177, 190, 255, 256, 265, 270; diversity and, 145, 278; high cost of housing or land and, xiv, 143, 145, 239, 267; housing, 128, 209, 239, 242, 271; policy and, 97–99, 123, 212, 250, 269, 274; and rental housing, 121, 245 African Canadians, 81, 94, 95, 173, 185, 266. See also Blacks Africville (Halifax), 42, 173 aging: areas of, 210, 253; in Halifax, 172, 185, 277; in Montreal 117, 118; in place, 62–63, 67, 70–71, 112, 139, 184; population, 18, 68, 88, 112, 134; rapid, 22 Airbnb, 145 amalgamation of municipalities: in Halifax, 171, 172, 175, 177; in Hamilton, 151, 163; in Montreal, 109; in Toronto, 80–81, 85, 88, 90, 97; in Winnipeg, 216 amenities, 189, 195; in the downtown, 233, 274; environmental, 16; and gentrification, 106, 111, 122, 188; and quality of life, 128; social, 16

314

Anglophone, xviii, 101–2, 109, 114. See also language; mother tongue Anglo-Canadian, 45, 118 apartment boom, 18, 39, 164 apartments: for affluent residents, 109, 137, 180, 184; high-rise, 94, 159, 164, 168, 209, 229, 253; as inferior option, 39, 49, 51, 85, 145, 180; low-rise, 107, 117; rent controls on, 269; subsidized, 39, 98, 173 artists, and neighbourhood change, 168, 175, 188, 253 Asia, 43, 128, 161 Asia Pacific investors, 143 Asian migrants to Canada, 44, 61–64, 71, 255; in Calgary, 209, in Toronto, 81, 94, 95; in Vancouver, 117, 128, 129, 134, 136, 142; in Winnipeg, 228 Atlanta, GA, 275, 276 automobiles, 3, 131, 151, 169; commuting, 46; manufacturing, 79, 81

B baby boom, 18, 253, 268 Baltimore, MD, 216, 275 Blacks, 42, 81, 118, 187, 266. See also African Canadians; visible minorities Boston, MA, 133, 276 Brantford, ON, 168 Britain, 36, 43, 49, See also United Kingdom

brownfield redevelopment, 111, 131, 145, 165, 270. See also urban redevelopment; waterfront redevelopment bubble in real estate, 133, 140, 169, 269 Burnaby, BC, 132, 134, 135, 138; declining incomes in, 136, 139, 147; inexpensive rentals in, 130; policy interventions in, 144 by-laws, 17. See also zoning

C Cabbagetown (Toronto), 32, 36 Calgary, 192–213; comparison with Halifax, 171, 188, 189, 190; comparison with Hamilton, 157, 166, 169; comparison with other case cities, 252–80; extreme inequality, 24, 51, 71, 81, 152, 196, 210– 12; gated condominiums, 47; gentrification, 195; growth, 22, 193, 194, 266; housing, 209–10, 212; inequality index, 119; migration from Quebec, 102, 277; neighbourhood types, 57–60, 62–63, 66; population profile, 194; skilled immigrants, 43; visible minorities in declining areas, 207–9, 210; wealth, 22 Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC, earlier Central Mortgage and Housing Corpora­ tion), 50, 173, 241, 270 capital, 120, 123, 128, 175; accumulation, xiv, 139; flight, 231; flows, xiv, 16, 21, 22, 24, 216; gains, 47, 140, 143; global flows, 128, 143, 144; switching, 19. See also disinvestment; financialization; investment capitalism, 9, 28, 99 Caribbean migrants to Canada, 43, 61, 64, 81, 117, 209 central business district (CBD), 130, 171, 195, 212 central city. See inner city Chicago, 54, 55, 56, 99, 275, 276 Chicago School, xiii child benefits, 236, 242 child care. See daycare China, 128, 129, 228 Chinatown, 42, 131, 201, 207, 208 Chinese migrants to Canada: concentrations of, 44, 95, 142; immigration controls on, 42–43; in Toronto, 81, 96; in Vancouver, 42, 129, 131, 142

Cleveland, OH, 36 cluster analysis, 57, 59, 61, 64, 73 commercial use, 51, 100, 111, 116, 168, 173, 256; big box stores, 159; corner stores, 169; cafés and restaurants, 166, 169, 253, 256; downtown mall, 155, 157; retail area, 131 Common Interest Development (CID) model, 195 community-based organization (CBO), 232, 233, 234, 244, 250. See also non-governmental organization (NGO) community benefits agreement, 116 concentrated affluence: in Calgary, 197, 203, 204, 210, 212, 219; in Halifax, 173, 175, 177, 179, 188; in Hamilton, 154; as high-status area, 64, 66, 68, 72, 111, 201; in Montreal, 102, 109, 111; as neighbourhood type, 59, 71; in Toronto, 85, 88, 91–92, 94, 98–99, 111, 271; in Vancouver, 128, 133, 134, 136– 37, 139, 146; and wealthy neighbourhoods, 13, 20, 90, 140, 182, 197, 271–73; in Winnipeg, 216, 217, 222, 234, 271. See also Rosedale; Shaughnessy; Tuxedo; Westmount concentrated poverty, xv, 12, 51, 197, 272, 271; effects of, 20, 44–46, 48, 253; in Calgary, 196; in Halifax, 177, 180, 181, 184, 188, 189; in Hamilton, 149, 154, 155, 159, 161, 163; in immigrant neighbourhoods, 31, 38, 40, 43, 117, 130, 142, 146, 276; in Indigen­ ous neighbourhoods, 232; in inner city, 34, 39, 107, 232, 234, 256; in largest cities, 43; link to disadvantage, 20, 49, 161, 255; link to dysfunction, 31, 273; in Montreal 48, 102, 105, 111, 116, 117, 120; policies to address, 243; in racialized areas, 44, 276; in Toronto, 85, 88, 90–92, 94, 96–97, 99; in US, 94, 276; in Vancouver, 130–31, 134, 136, 142, 146, 272; in Winnipeg, 215, 217, 219, 223, 224, 225, 231. See also Lower City; North End; Strathcona concentric zone model, 55, 56, 130, 146, 196. See also ecological model condominiums (condos), 48, 52, 253, 256, 261, 269; boom in, 18, 47, 98, 105, 209, 210; in Calgary, 195, 200, 201, 209, 210; in Halifax, 180, 181, 184; in Hamilton, 157, 165, 168; in Montreal, 111, 114, 123; as tenure type, 88, 114, 271; in Toronto, 88– 89, 98; in Vancouver, 130, 134, 136–37, 140, 144– 45; in Winnipeg, 222 INDEX

315

Conservative government, 84, 98, 143 Core Area Initiative (CAI, Winnipeg), 216, 231–32 creative class, 24, 194; and creativity, 104 crime, 11, 39, 45, 97, 163, 273; drug, 131, 243; gang, 225 cultural industries, 24, 103, 114 cultural networks, 15, 273 cultural relationships: in Hamilton, 147; in Winnipeg, 215, 223 cultural stereotypes, 32 cultural workers, 168 culture, 19, 169, 194, 247, 262; change, 43, 45, 70, 257; in Montreal, 101–5, 107, 121, 125; national, 29, 41, 267; of poverty, xv; regional, 19, 21

D Dartmouth (Halifax), 171, 172, 173, 190; experiencing income decline, 175, 180, 182, 188, 190; and suburbanization, 173, 175 daycare, 124, 242, 245 debt risk for homeowners, 143, 209, 247, 269 decline of middle-income areas, 13, 94, 121, 239, 274, 276; in Calgary, 203, 204; in Halifax, 177, 179; in Hamilton, 152, 154, 155; in Toronto, 92, 94; in Winnipeg, 219 deindustrialization: as driver of economic change, 17, 81, 155, 216, 277; in Hamilton, xviii 150, 152, 155; and job loss, 41, 150, 152, 216, 268; in Montreal, 100, 103, 107, 117; and urban redevelopment, 107, 131, 134, 268; in Vancouver, 131, 133, 134. See also brownfield redevelopment; False Creek; former industrial land deinstitutionalization, 152 demographic change, 17, 70, 71, 112, 266; in Calgary, 206; as driver of neighbourhood change, 7, 267, 268; in family characteristics, 71, 99, 278; measuring, 76, 139; in Winnipeg, 215, 223, 224, 228, 231– 33. See also household composition density, 85, 109, 214, 229, 231, 264; in Calgary 210, 212; in Halifax, 175, 180, 189, 190; in Hamilton, 165; high, in projects, xiv, 17; low, in suburbs, 17, 111, 151, 173, 222, 259; in Montreal, 111, 114, 117, 122, 123; policy of increasing (intensification), 165, 175, 190, 212, 270; process of increasing, 122, 316

INDEX

145, 190, 195, 201, 26; in Toronto, 40, 89; in Vancouver, 145; in Winnipeg, 222 depression of the 1890s, 34 Depression (The) of the 1930s, 34, 35, 36, 43; distribution of poverty during, 39; effect on policy, 49–50 detached housing, 266; in areas gaining ground, 111, 185, 209; in poor areas, 94; in suburbs, 131, 269; value in Vancouver, 129, 143, 144, 145; zoning changes for areas with, 145 Detroit, MI, 216, 275 developers, 14, 38, 123, 144, 245; downtown, 157; facilitating gentrification, 105, 123; incentives for, 165, 216, 271, 274; of neighbourhoods, 6, 133; providing affordable housing, 98, 122, 245, 271; smallscale, xiv, 118; suburban, 133, 189, 195, 216 disinvestment, 14, 19, 216, 231, 253, 264. See also capital; financialization; investment diversity, 40, 59, 204, 228, 249; in Canadian cities, xviii, 15, 29, 76; ethnic, 59, 81, 134, 142, 266; in housing stock, 145; increasing, 11; of origins, 81, 99, 130, 228; racial, 81, 83, 266; in skills, 99; in smaller cities, 189, 277; tolerance for, 45,52; visible minority, xviii. See also ethnicity; racialized populations; visible minorities divided cities, 53, 73, 263; in Calgary, 205, 210, 211, 212, 213; in Canada, 28, 30, 235, 252, 253, 271–76; change in, 7, 20, 74, 203; in Hamilton, 157; income polarization in, 82, 106, 118, 149, 222, 233, 254; in Montreal, 102, 119, 120, 127; problems in, 20, 264; social polarization in, 5, 6, 29, 101, 189, 190; theory of, 3, 6, 11–13, 203, 26; in Toronto, 239; in Vancouver, 147, 239; in Winnipeg, 223, 225, 234. See also segregation downloading, 122, 241, 244, 248, 257, 269 Downtown Eastside (Vancouver), 130, 131, 136, 272. See also inner city driver of change, 6, 9, 13–14, 99, 254, 267–78; demographic composition as, 18, 71, 106, 266, 268; immigration as, 18, 71, 223, 232, 257, 266; at macro-level, 17, 21, 24, 29, 51, 268; in Montreal, 101, 112, 114; public policy as, 17, 121, 212, 232, 269–70; rising income inequality as, 48–49, 139, 196; rising Indigenous population as, 223, 232, 266 dual-professional couples, 106, 119, 143, 177, 262, 278

E ecological model, xiii, 15, 40, 64, 112, 210. See also concentric zone model Edmonton, AB, 22, 76 education: as driver of change, 268, 277; as factor in neighbourhood typologies, 63, 64, 65, 67; in Halifax, 181, 188; as mechanism to reproduce class, 49, 57, 96, 99, 161, 206; in Montreal, 104, 106, 124; opportunities for, 12, 20, 83; as qualification for immigrants, 44, 103; as a social service, 51, 96, 103, 240, 243, 269; in Winnipeg, 222, 223, 233 empty-nesters, 145 enclave, 11, 146; ethnic, 72, 142; exclusive, 72, 195, 222, 253; immigrant, 13, 43, 44, 45, 129 ethnic diversity, xiii, 2, 59, 107; mix of, 22, 111, 117, 194, 266 ethnicity: in Calgary, 196, 207, 209; and debates about neighbourhoods, 43, 45; in Montreal, 101, 111, 115; and neighbourhood effects, 45, 273; and neighbourhood types, 56, 57, 64, 67, 70, 71; in Toronto, 79, 81, 83; in Vancouver, 129, 130, 134 ethnoburb, 142, 144, 231, 255, 268; as neighbourhood type, 59, 60. See also segregation ethno-cultural divide, xvii, 11, 28, 44, 232; implications for inequality, 215, 223; in large cities, 5, 142 ethno-racial minority, 6, 72, 211. See also minorities; racialized populations; visible minorities Europe: cities in, 12, 122, 263; as design inspiration, 133; economic connections to, 103, 104; inequality in, 8–10; as source of immigration, 43, 129, 159 European migrants to Canada, 67, 114, 118; as dominant group, 129, 142, 209, 232; in early twentieth century, 38; and segregation, 42, 57; skills of, 43; in suburbs 131, 146 European Union, xiv, 247

F factor analysis, 54–58, 61, 63, 73 factorial ecology, 55, 56, 73, 196. See also social area analysis False Creek (Vancouver), 126, 131, 134, 137. See also brownfield redevelopment; deindustrialization; former industrial land

filtering (in housing market), 36, 67, 68, 71, 72, 204; down-, 14, 67, 88, 90, 137 finance, 24, 79, 194, 206, 267, 269 financialization of real estate, 12, 81, 216, 277, 278. See also capital; disinvestment; investment First Nations, 80, 101, 161, 240. See also Aboriginal persons; Indigenous persons; Métis nation food bank, 256, 269 food desert, 163 former industrial land, 111, 112, 114, 123, 270. See also brownfield redevelopment; deindustrialization; False Creek Francophone, 101–2, 107, 109, 111, 114, 118. See also language; mother tongue

G Galt, ON, 33 garden city, 109, 195 gated communities, 43, 47 gateway city, 104, 128, 227, 228 gentrification, 63, 277, 278; and affordability, 40; in Calgary, 195, 200, 204, 209, 212; and conversion of housing, 99, 106; and cultural workers, 104, 168, 175; and deindustrialization, 268; and demographic change, 70, 112, 171; during the Depres­ sion, 39; and displacement, 40, 62, 190, 225, 227, 271; and filtering, 63, 67, 71–72, 90, 140; and government policies, 105, 212, 270, 271, 272; in Halifax, 175, 180, 182, 188; in Hamilton, 150, 166, 168, 169; impact on the poor, xv, 277; implications of, 255–56, 261, 264–65, 267, 271; in the inner city, 39, 85, 94, 142, 201, 210; in middle-income areas, 114, 116, 120; in Montreal, 102, 104, 111, 114, 116, 123; and Neighbourhood Improvement Program, 50, 164, 175; during the 1970s, 40, 131, 175; and polarization, xviii, 184; as a process, 14, 19, 122; in the suburbs, 130, 144; in Toronto, 88, 99; in Vancouver, 136, 139, 146, 273; in Winnipeg, 225, 227; in working-class areas, 122. See also revitalization gentrified area, 29, 59, 62, 65 geography, 29, 56, 189, 247, 257; of affordability, 40; in Calgary, 193, 196, 201, 205, 210; in Halifax, 180, 189; in Hamilton, 150, 157, 166, 169; of income INDEX

317

change, 38, 200, 210, 211; of inequality, 37, 40, 49, 127, 142, 188; of immigration, 72; of investment, 145; physical, 16, 21, 151, 172, 189, 267; of polarization, 146, 188, 215, 235, 271, 274; social, 14, 53, 54, 56, 59, 127; in Toronto, 37, 99; in Vancouver, 127, 128, 134, 137, 142, 147; of visible minorities, 208 Gini coefficient: comparing case cities, 258 260, 261, 262; comparison with other countries, 8–9, 275–76; in Calgary, 196; in Halifax, 177–78; in Hamilton, 152; as measure of inequality, 26, 257; in Montreal, 119, 120; spatial, 28, 177–78, 260, 261; in Toronto, 84, 91; in Vancouver, 137; in Winnipeg, 217, 219. See also index (indices) global city, 83, 101, 120, 254 global financial crisis, 81, 128, 166, 196, 260, 269; and recession, 107, 122; impact of, 90–91, 105 global trend, 6, 22 globalization, 5–8, 12, 21, 23, 30; effect of, 72, 103, 105; as force for change, 7, 13, 29, 194; indicator of, 24; in Vancouver, 128, 144, 146 grassroots activism, 34, 164, 190, 240, 242, 247 Greater Toronto Area (GTA), 22, 40, 76, 81, 150; and Hamilton (GTHA), 150 Greater Toronto Region, 78–99. See also Toronto greenbelt, 165

H Halifax, 32, 170–91; and African Nova Scotians, 42, 185, 266; aging population, 63, 185, 207, 277; amalgamation, 171, 172, 175; comparison with other case cities, 23, 255–58, 260–66, 270, 272–75, 277; drivers of change for, 173, 175, 270; gentrification in, 40, 63, 180, 182, 264–65; Gini coefficients for, 177–78, 262; growth of, 24, 182, 233, 266; immigrants in, 22, 42, 185, 255; neighbourhood types in, 59, 62–63, 66, 70, 75, 77; during the nineteenth century, 49; polarization in, 51, 184, 188, 190–91; scale issues in, 70, 171, 180–81, 188–89, 234; as a small city, 22, 51, 62, 171–72, 222; urban renewal in, 173; visible minorities in, 22, 185. See also Dartmouth Hamilton, 48, 77, 148–69; comparison with other case cities, 23, 255–58, 260–62, 264–65, 267, 271–75; 318

INDEX

concentrated poverty in, 51, 149, 155, 159, 161, 163; contrast with other cities, 139, 155, 157, 166, 169, 188; economic change, 150–52; gentrification in, 40, 150, 164, 166, 168, 265; geography of, 150, 151, 169; Gini coefficient for, 152, 260, 262; growth of, 22, 24, 267, immigrants to, 38, 159; influence of Toronto on, 99, 150, 166, 168, 189, 267, 277; neighbourhood types in, 60, 62, 66; polarization in, 152, 155, 169, 233; segregation in, 34, 51, 154; suburbs, 38, 151; urban renewal in, 163–66, 271; working class in, 45, 49, 150, 169. See also Lower City Harris, Mike, 80, 84, 97, 98 health: by-laws, 49; effects of neighbourhoods on, 35, 157, 161, 254; influence of inequality on, 2, 11, 12, 32, 254, 256; occupations, 83, 151, 206; sector, 49, 51, 96, 103, 124; services, 152, 190, 236, 240, 241 hierarchical cluster analysis. See cluster analysis high-rise towers, xiv, 161, 270, 276; apartments in, 94, 159, 164, 168, 209, 229, 253; condominiums in, 47, 123, 200, 201, 253, 256; in Calgary, 200, 201, 209, 214; in Halifax, 175, 189; in Hamilton, 159, 161, 164, 168; in Montreal, 123; social housing in, 39, 48, 49; in Toronto, 39, 94; in Winnipeg, 229 homeless people, 96, 190 homeless shelter, 17, 96, 269 homelessness, 255, 256; in Halifax, 190; among Indigenous persons, 224; policies and programs to address, 96, 190, 232, 241, 245; in Toronto, 96; in Winnipeg, 224, 232 homeowners: absentee, 128 143; in Calgary, 209; as dominant resident type, 47, 48; as factor in neighbourhood types, 59, 255; and gentrification, 39, 105, 271, 272; grants for, 143; in Halifax, 173, 175, 184–85, 186; in Hamilton, 152, 163, 166; immigrants as, 31, 44, 52, 83; in Montreal, 48, 105, 109, 111, 122; in Toronto, 88; in Vancouver, 129, 140, 143, 145; wealth of, 40, 128, 129, 152, 209, 271. See also homeownership homeownership, 271, 272; costs of, 140, 256; as norm, 38, 47, 48, 51; programs affecting, 109, 143, 144; rates, 48, 105, 111, 140, 184–85; suburban, 39, 44, 59, 111, 268. See also homeowners homogamy. See dual-professional couples

household composition, 18, 26, 64, 66 249; in Calgary, 196, 206–7; implications for neighbourhood change, 259, 268; in Halifax, 185, 186; in Montreal, 105, 106, 119; in Toronto, 94 household size, 18, 23, 266; in Calgary, 206; decreasing over time, 26, 71, 172, 206; in Halifax, 172; in Montreal, 119; in neighbourhood types, 64, 65, 66; single-person only, 26, 71, 105, 107, 206, 268 housing conditions, 32, 175, 256, 272; good repair, 65; poor quality, 15, 16, 97 118, 227, 232; in Winnipeg, 215, 223, 227, 256 Housing First, 190 housing market, 6, 14, 28, 105, 270, 271; bubble in, 133, 140, 169, 269; in Calgary, 209; and filtering, 36; in Hamilton, 161, 163, 169; and labour market, 15, 43, 128, 249; in Montreal, 107, 118, 122; rental, 31, 256; and segregation, 16, 43, 99; in Toronto, 85, 88; in Vancouver, 128, 130, 131, 143, 144, 145; in Winnipeg, 227, 231, 232; and young adults, 129 housing strategy: municipal, 144; national, 145, 239, 240, 242, 247, 249; in Vancouver, 144, 145, 146

I immigrants, 23, 24; changing origins of, 117, 118, 130, 134, 161; and inequality, 40, 52, 83, 94, 119, 268, 276; in neighbourhood types, 61–64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 72; and segregation, 28, 34, 35, 44, 277; and visible minority status, 29, 124. See also Asian migrants to Canada; Caribbean migrants to Canada; ethnoburb; European migrants to Canada; millionaire migrants immigration, 22, 43, 102; to Calgary, 194, 207, 208, 209, 211, 214; as driver of change, 18, 71, 223, 232, 257, 266; to Halifax, 185, 187, 255; to Hamilton, 149, 157, 159, 161, 162; high rates of, 7, 21, 22, 31, 81, 129; impact of, 41, 43, 81; to Montreal, 103, 107, 112, 114, 115, 116; policy on, 42, 44, 58, 81, 105, 134, 143; to Toronto, 79, 82, 83, 92, 94, 99; to Vancouver, 129, 139, 141, 142, 146, 147; to Winnipeg, 223–25, 227–31, 232 immigration program: Business (BIP), 128, 130, 143; Provincial Nominee (PNP), 227, 228, 229 incentive(s): in Halifax, 173, 175; in Hamilton, 165, 271, 274; for infrastructure, 104, 173, 175; in

Montreal, 103, 104, 105, 114, 271; for redevelopment, 105, 164, 165, 232, 271, 274; for rental properties, 85, 114; for social housing, 260; and subsidies to real estate, 47, 114, 123, 144, 269. See also resources index (indices), 15, 22, 61, 69, 73; of inequality, 119, 152; of segregation, 33, 34; and SSA, 55, 56. See also Gini coefficient; Theil index Indigenous persons, 227, 242, 253, 266; communities, 216, 234; concentration in Winnipeg, 22, 232, 266; growth in population of, 161, 223, 227; mobility of, 131, 223, 277, 278; and poverty, 44, 130, 224, 262; and reserves, 44, 13; in Vancouver, 130, 131; in Winnipeg, 215–27, 232–34. See also Aboriginal persons; First Nations; Métis nation industrial city, 101, 133, 157, 255; Hamilton as, 150, 152, 157; Toronto as, 79, 81, 83; Vancouver as, 130, 146 industrialization, 109, 150, 152, 173 infrastructure: community attitudes to, 19, 70; impact on development, 109, 111, 122, 123, 173, 267; incentives for, 104, 173, 175; and inequality, 30, 241 inner city, 169, 209, 210, 267, 269; Aboriginal status in, 224; in Calgary, 195, 200, 201, 209; change in, 39, 40, 105, 216, 261, 268; condominiums in, 88, 105, 114, 195, 256; gentrification of, 50, 85, 102, 175, 278; in Halifax, 171, 177, 181, 184, 189; housing costs in, 16, 188; as immigrant reception area, 34, 38, 43, 56, 62, 72; income growth in, 200, 210; inequality in, 84, 157, 227, 234, 264; in neighbourhood types, 59, 62, 63, 70, 71, 72; planning for, 164, 270; poverty in, 38, 39, 40, 155, 159, 222; revitalization of, 105, 164, 216, 256; in Toronto, 85, 88, 92, 94, 99; in Vancouver, 131, 139, 140, 142, 146; visible minorities in, 29, 208, 228; in Winnipeg, 215, 217, 219, 222–25, 228–34. See also Downtown Eastside; Lower City innovation: and affordability, 245; as driver of change, 7, 21; in neighbourhood design, 134, 195, 233; social, 124, 240; technological, 7, 21 intergovernmental activities: through collaboration, 236, 244, 247, 249; through policy and programs, 216, 231, 240, 241; through spending, 216, 232, 240, 241, 250 INDEX

319

investment: in Calgary, 195, 212; by developers, 22, 123, 128, 175, 267, 269; in Hamilton, 164, 165, 169; home as, 48; impact of government on, 145, 255; limited, 16, 35, 105, 273; in Montreal, 109, 116, 120, 122; properties, 168; public, 50, 216, 240, 242, 246, 270; to reduce inequality, 245, 247, 250; shifting patterns of, 18–19, 165; in Vancouver, 130, 140, 143, 144, 146; in Winnipeg, 222, 231, 232. See also capital; disinvestment; financialization

J joint analysis studies, 54, 57–69, 255. See also typologies just city, 6, 74, 254, 263, 264, 279. See also right to the city just society, 2, 22 K Kelowna, BC, 47 Kingston, ON, 32 knowledge economy, 41, 116, 194, 268

L labour force participation, 46, 124, 266 labour market: in Calgary, 195, 206; change in, 17, 21, 41, 83, 117, 118; and deskilling, 31, 143; discrimination in, 43, 130, 209, 257; in Halifax, 184, 188, in Hamilton, 150, 159; and housing market, 128, 129; and income, 26–27, 40, 71, 194, 248; in Montreal, 101, 102, 103, 114, 116; polarization in, 24, 79, 82, 83, 258; policies for, 144, 248, 258; precarity in, 31, 51; and segregation, 16, 20, 33, 34, 99; and social differentiation, 29, 39, 71, 247; structure of, 46, 193–94; in Toronto, 83, 94, 97; in Vancouver, 128, 131, 133, 136, 140, 142; in Winnipeg, 223, 227 land-use regulations, 29, 123. See also zoning land-value tax, 145 language, 35, 273; barriers, 103, 130, 209; Chinese, 129; and disadvantage, 102, 114, 161; and income, 114, 209; law in Quebec, 101. See also Anglophone; Francophone; mother tongue Liberal government, 97, 98, 144, 236 life chances, 12, 33, 254, 263, 273, 274

320

INDEX

life cycle, 15–16 London, UK, 11, 54, 145 Los Angeles, CA, 276 Lower City (Hamilton), 148, 151; change in, 157, 159, 165, 169; as a disadvantaged area, 157, 161, 163; as a working-class area, 155 low-income cut-off (LICO), 95, 229, 243

M majority-minority status, 81, 83, 96, 208, 210, 268 marginalization, 14, 249; of areas, 12, 16, 20, 211; and housing tenure, 48, 51, 144; of minorities, 20, 29; of populations, 29, 225, 227, 232; of young adults, 129 McGuinty, Dalton, 98 median household income (MHI), 128, 196, 197 methodology: for comparing Canadian and US cities, 276; for conducting the research, 7, 24–27, 75, 77, 219; for critically evaluating the study, 253, 254, 257–65, 266; for generating typologies, 53–74, 76–77; of the Theil index, 119; used in Calgary, 205, 211; used in Halifax, 180–82, 184, 189 Métis nation, 161, 216. See also Aboriginal persons; First Nations; Indigenous persons Miami, FL, 275 migration: within Canada, 41, 188, 193, 194; out-, 129, 185; to and from reserves, 44, 131, 223; secondary, 130; to urban centres, 81, 105, 128, 267. See also immigration Mile End (Montreal), 100, 104, 107, 111 millionaire migrants, 130, 143, 208 minimum wage, 97, 103, 124, 130, 243, 248 minorities: and disadvantage, 6, 278; and discrimination, 20, 83; ethno-racial, 45, 70, 71, 72, 211; in Montreal, 117, 124, 125; as variable in typologies, 62, 63, 67. See also etho-racial minorities; majorityminority status; racialized populations; visible minorities missing middle. See decline of middle-income areas mixed-income neighbourhoods, xv, 2, 243; in history, 33, 34; in new housing projects, 114, 270; as planning ideal, 245, 253, 270. See also social mix mixed tenure areas, 122, 175, 209, 249, 270

mixed use, 121, 145, 175, 270, 271 mobility: flows, 18, 227; household, 16, 223; hyper-, 223; intergenerational, 9, 41, 49, 51; residential, 18, 57, 58, 64, 67, 210; social, 13, 15, 20, 28, 51, 124; transportational, 169, 212. See also immigration; migration Montreal, 13, 23, 99–125; amalgamation, 109; comparison with other case cities, 262–67, 270–77; concentrated poverty in, 35, 107, 114, 117; contrast with another city, 98, 104, 119, 130, 136, 146; economic change in, 81, 102–5, 107, 268, 277; former industrial land, 111, 112, 114, 123, 270; gentrification in, 104, 111, 112, 114, 116, 123; geography of, 107; Gini coefficient for, 119, 120, 137, 152, 260– 61; growth of, 22, 33, 105, 116; health status in, 35; housing tenure in, 48, 102, 105, 195, 245, 266–67; immigrants to, 22, 102, 103, 118, 124, 227–28; linguistic tensions in, 38, 101–2, 105; neighbourhood types in, 59, 60, 62, 66; polarization in, 102, 118, 146, 189, 255, 271–72; segregation in, 33, 101, 119, 260, 276; suburbs, 102, 105, 109, 111, 117, 121; urban renewal in, 36, 63; working-class areas in, 122, 124. See also Mile End; Westmount mortgage, 38, 47, 143, 209, 269. See also debt risk for homeowners mother tongue, 64, 114, 115, 209. See also Anglophone; Francophone; language multiculturalism, 43, 134, 231 multi-family housing, 94, 95, 268. See also high-rise towers multi-nodal cities, 196, 207 multivariate statistical techniques, 54, 55, 56, 57, 73, 211

N National Housing Collaborative, 242 neighbourhood definition, 32, 69–70; census tract as proxy, 25–26, 58, 181, 259; issues of scale in, 55, 73, 180, 181, 189; role of boundaries in, 55 neighbourhood effects, 5, 9, 45, 273 neighbourhood improvement, 37, 270 Neighbourhood Improvement Program (NIP), 50, 164, 166, 175

neighbourhood unit, 164, 195 neoliberalism, 53; effect on government, 50, 124, 146, 253, 268, 269; effect on inequality, 50, 142–43, 236; effect on urban planning, 270, 271 New Brunswick, 80, 243 New Deal for Cities and Communities, 244 New Democratic Party (NDP), 98, 133, 144; coalition with Greens, 144 new urbanism, 195, 212, 270; and neotraditionaldesign, 195; and smart growth, 195, 270 New York (City), 45, 99, 169, 275, 276 NIMBY, 17, 48 non-governmental organization (NGO): addressing poverty, 237, 241, 246, 248; in Calgary, 211; international, 103; in Montreal, 103, 121, 123, 124; as partner, 25, 244. See also community-based organization (CBO) non-profit sector (organizations, housing), 105, 118, 122, 237, 242, 269 North American cities, 12, 14, 102, 122, 133, 231; contrast within, 124, 128, 143, 196; as gateways, 104, 129; poverty in, 94, 146; transport networks linking, 103 North End (Winnipeg), 217, 223, 224, 226, 230, 233

O Occupy Wall Street, 11 OECD countries, 8, 10 oil and gas industry, 43, 194; in Calgary, 193–94, 195, 266, 277; economic downturn in, 81, 193 one-person households, 18, 26, 268; in Calgary, 207; in Halifax, 185, 186; in Montreal, 105, 106, 107; in typologies, 64 open method of coordination, 247, 250 Ottawa, ON, 22, 255; in neighbourhood typology analysis, 53, 58, 59, 60, 62, 76 P Paris, France, 11 Parti Québécois, 81 partnerships across organizations, 124, 190, 194, 232, 241, 247

INDEX

321

perceptions of neighbourhood change, 70, 180, 181, 189, 256 Philadelphia, PA, 275, 276 plan(s), 32, 49–50, 165, 245, 250, 271; for affordable housing, 122, 239, 249; in Halifax, 172, 175; in Hamilton, 157, 164, 166, 168; in Montreal, 109, 123; urban renewal, 131; in Vancouver, 134, 144. See also planning planning, 239, 245, 253, 270; for affordable housing, 98, 212, 245; in Calgary, 194, 212; as driver of change, 123, 144, 175, 222, 270, 277; in Halifax, 175, 190; in Hamilton, 164, 165, 172, 173; in Montreal, 123; to promote investment, 175, 271, 278; in Toronto, 96, 98, 99. See also plan(s); policy; zoning policy, 239–51; to address inequality, 1, 9, 80, 101, 211, 231; to address polarization, 142, 216, 248, 278; analysis, 240; in Calgary, 212, 213; challenges, 25, 29, 212, 239, 246, 277; in Halifax, 172, 173, 175, 189, 190; in Hamilton, 163, 164; on housing, 97, 116, 122, 145, 274; on immigration, 58, 143; implications of, 11, 19, 172, 267, 271, 272; for land clearance, 36, 144, 216; in Montreal, 101, 116, 118, 121, 122, 124; to promote mix, xv, 243, 246; public, 13, 17, 25, 99, 212, 269; regimes, 29, 144; research to inform, 6, 29, 30, 52; in Toronto, 96, 97, 98; in Vancouver, 127, 142, 143, 144, 147; in Winnipeg, 216, 222, 231, 232, 233. See also planning; poverty reduction strategies; tax system policy makers, 249, 250; and concerns about in­ equality, xvi, 49, 243, 247; in Hamilton, 155, 164; in Halifax, 172, 175; and interest in neighbourhoods, 5, 25, 70; and issues to address, 3, 31, 190, 249, 254; supporting change, xiv, 116, 144, 253, 262, 271 populism, 2, 235, 254 post-industrial city, 53, 57, 134, 216 post-industrial economy, 128, 133, 146, 150; workers in, 79, 140, 142 post-secondary institutions, 49, 104, 117, 151, 185, 194; and effects on neighbourhoods, 175, 179, 188 poverty reduction strategies, 212, 236, 239–51 Prairie cities, 215, 224, 227, 229, 234 precarity, 31, 41, 64, 101, 105, 136, 261 322

INDEX

private market housing: and affordability, 98, 242, 245, 270; conditions, 85, 107, 256; effect of government policy on 107, 116, 144, 270 private schools, 49 property market, 14, 16; in Hamilton, 165, 166, 168, 169; international, 128, 195; in Vancouver, 128, 129. See also real estate market property tax: deductions and refunds, 47, 143, 165; effects of, 97, 144, 222, 233; and municipal budgets, 35, 36, 253, 270. See also tax system public/private initiatives, 50, 241 public housing. See social housing public services: access to, 17, 20, 29; city-wide, 103, 233; erosion of, 241, 245, 278; as neighbourhood amenities, 5, 6, 190, 228; in welfare state, 49, 51, 96, 278

Q quality of life: for all, 254, 257, 278; and liveability in Vancouver, 128, 133; and poverty reduction, 245, 249 Quebec City, QC, 22

R racialized populations, 18, 32, 70, 81, 196; in Calgary, 194, 196, 207; declining incomes for, 83, 94; discrimination against, 19, 43, 44; and diversity, 42, 81, 194; and labour market, 43, 99; in Montreal, 35; and racism, 31, 223; and segregation, xii-xv, 28, 71, 142; in Toronto, 94, 99. See also African Canadians; Blacks; ethno-racial minorities; Indigenous persons; majority-minority status; minorities; racialization of poverty; visible minorities racialization of poverty, 67, 79, 83, 181, 190, 194 real estate market, 28, 47, 120. See also property market recession of the 1990s, 103 refugee, xiv, 30, 97, 117, 130, 228 Regent Park (Toronto), 36, 270 Regina, SK, 44 regional governance, 96, 97, 121, 134, 194; and planning, 121, 175, 189, 194. See also amalgamation of municipalities

renters: and affordability, 40, 152, 163, 168, 209, 256; and displacement, 40, 99, 116, 163, 168, 277; in Hamilton, 185, 186, 188; and housing need, 124, 152, 190, 269, 270, 278; and landlords, 16, 168; and marginalization, 17, 31, 48, 51, 129; in Montreal, 102, 114, 115, 117, 118; as proportion of households, 47, 48, 105, 152, 267; in Toronto, 85, 94, 95; in typologies, 59, 64, 66; in Vancouver, 130, 140, 144, 145; in Winnipeg, 222, 242 resources, 9, 240, 250; charitable, 124; federal, 246, 247; municipal, 50, 124, 157, 166, 241, 245; provincial, 269. See also incentives retirees, 136, 180, 257, 266. See also seniors revitalization: of central areas, 105, 166, 253, 256; and gentrification, 14, 200; in Hamilton, 166; incentives for, 105, 232; plans for, 109, 175, 231, 27; of poor neighbourhoods, 175, 231; of waterfronts, 268. See also urban redevelopment; urban renewal right to the city, xv, 254. See also just city rooming houses, 38, 47, 131, 256, 269 Rosedale (Toronto), 49, 201, 271

S San Francisco, CA, 56 scale: of analysis, 234; census tract, 56, 70, 73, 118, 171, 272; of change, 14, 27, 28, 29, 39, 43; citywide, 16, 34, 121; of inequality, 106, 184, 209, 223; as methodological issue, 19, 180; in Halifax, 180, 181, 188, 189; macro-, 11, 21; national, 9, 11, 21, 28; neighbourhood, 6, 11, 24, 53, 105, 124; of segregation, 33, 51, 233, 260; spatial, 55, 69–70, 121. See also small cities Seattle, WA, 275 sectoral model of urban growth, 130 segregation, 20, 74, 250, 253, 274; in Calgary 194, 195, 197, 211, 213; in Canadian cities, 207, 275, 276, 277, 278; by income, 51, 98, 154, 260, 261, 273; and inequality, 11, 13, 211, 233, 243, 246; by ethnicity, 2, 42, 44, 45, 56; in labour market, 34, 209; by land use, 50; in Halifax, 177, 180; in Hamilton 154, 163; in Montreal, 33, 119, 120; programs to address, 249, 251; racial, 99, 275, 276, 277; through spatial sorting, 16, 28, 29, 261; in

Toronto, 79, 90–92, 97, 99, 260; in Vancouver, 137; in Winnipeg, 215, 217, 219. See also ethnoburb seniors, 64, 66, 94, 112, 161, 184–85; in Calgary, 207; increasing numbers of, 268; living alone, 172; programs for, 241. See also retirees sense of community, 11, 34, 44, 45, 46, 163; loss of, 14, 20, 47 service economy, 24, 41, 142, 216. See also knowledge economy service sector: consumer-, 83, 103, 117; high-tech, 17; workers in, 64, 66, 67, 68, 72, 206 settlement house, 34, 35, 43, 45, 50 Shaughnessy (Vancouver), 38, 133 single-city studies, 56–57 single-parent households, 105, 106, 186; growth in number of, 88, 99, 206; in losing-ground neighbourhoods, 184, 207, 229 single-person households. See one-person households single-point-in-time studies, 54, 55, 56–57, 58–60 slum clearance. See urban renewal slums, 37, 42, 43, 83, 142; and blight, 35, 163, 216, and ghettos, 31, 266, 276; as pejorative term, 36; as shacktown, 38, 39; as shantytown, 36. See also urban renewal small cities, 33, 51; and implications for study methods, 59, 69, 70, 264 smaller and mid-sized cities, 24, 180, 255, 257, 277– 78; Calgary as, 266; Halifax as, 171, 185, 188, 189; and Indigenous persons, 43–44; and low densities, 180, 189, 259; and slow growth, 233, 257; Winni­ peg as, 215, 222, 233 social agency, 16, 163, 250; and self-efficacy, 273 social area analysis (SAA), 54–55, 57 social assistance, 49, 51, 96, 257; low supports for, 97, 99, 190, 243, 269; and income security, 97, 248, 269; and loss of safety net, 269, 278; and the service-dependent poor, 152, 157, 229; and related programs, 9, 240, 241, 245, 249 social capital, 163, 212, 273; political, 273 social cohesion, 9, 249, 250, 251 social housing, 48, 51, 85, 256; in Halifax, 173, 175, 177, 179, 180, 188; in high-rise towers, 39, 48, 49; in Montreal, 117, 118, 121, 122, 123, 271; and neighbourhood change, 116, 179, 272, 273; policies and INDEX

323

spending for, 242, 249, 260 269, 270; Regent Park, 36, 270; in Toronto, 85, 97, 98; and urban renewal, 36, 50, 107, 131, 173, 255; in Vancouver, 130, 143, 145; in Winnipeg, 222 social indicators: in Calgary, 197, 211; of divided cities, 55, 205; in Hamilton, 161; for neighbourhood typologies, 55, 56, 69, 70, 73 social justice: enhancing, 7, 30; and inclusiveness, 6, 30, 278, 279; and public policy, 6, 242, 245; and reducing inequality, 236, 274–75 social mix, 42, 71, 101, 134, 169, 270; among ethnic groups, 142; in neighbourhood types, 65, 66, 67, 68. See also mixed-income neighbourhoods social networks: for housing, 130; neighbourhoods as, 6, 15, 20, 30, 253; and neighbourhood change, 19, 250, 272 social services. See public services Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA), 244 sprawl, 3, 261; in Calgary, 194, 195; in Hamilton, 165; in Montreal, 105, 109. See also suburbanization stability, 253, 260, 264, 272; in Halifax, 179, 180, 182; in Hamilton, 154, 164; of income, 94, 112, 115, 139, 184; and lack of change, 63, 204, 227; in Montreal, 105, 111, 114, 119; of neighbourhoods, 14, 59, 66, 67, 255, 274; and social mobility, 13, 41, 46; in Toronto; 89, 95; in Vancouver, 137, 146, 147 St. Catharines, ON, 168 Stelco, 148, 150 stigma, xv, 51, 116, 152, 157, 253; and social housing, 48; and stereotyping, 163 Strathcona (Vancouver), 36, 44 strong neighbourhoods, 211, 243; Strategy (SNS), 45, 96, 97 suburbanization: in Calgary, 195, 196, 201, 208, 209, 210; in Halifax, 188; of minorities, 208, 228, 231, 278; of poverty, 38, 39, 40, 50, 120, 196; in Toronto, 85, 88, 99; in Vancouver, 136, 143; in Winnipeg, 216, 219, 224, 233; of wealth, 44, 85, 89, 90, 222, 232. See also suburbs suburbs: 905-region, 81, 84–85, 88–92, 97, 166; in Calgary, 200, 201; and decline, 89, 146, 179–80, 200; and gentrification, 130, 201, 270; in Halifax, 175, 181, 182, 188, 189; in Hamilton, 150, 151, 159, 161, 164, 166; inner, 45, 47, 85, 235, 256, 267; 324

INDEX

middle-class, 106, 112, 131; in Montreal, 111, 114, 117, 118, 120–24; new-build, 18, 171; older, 12, 85, 102, 109, 146, 184; postwar, 36, 38–40, 173, 277, 278; preferences for, 268, 269; in Toronto, 88, 99; in typologies, 59, 65–68, 70–72; in Vancouver 134, 136, 137, 139, 143, 147; in Winnipeg, 216. See also ethnoburbs; suburbanization Surrey, BC, 136, 137, 139; immigrants in, 44, 142 sustainable development, 28, 123, 195, 250, 270

T tax increment financing (TIF), 165, 233 tax system, 9, 83, 84, 248, 257; for property, 36, 97, 144, 253, 270; regressive, 29, 277, 278; and social policies, 49, 124, 250, 258. See also property tax technology: as driver of neighbourhood change, 21, 51, 257; and high-tech sector, 17, 81, 103; information, 24, 46, 47, 194; innovation in, 7, 21, 46 tenants. See renters Theil index, 119 theory, 6, 101, 254, 263; on divided cities, 3, 6, 11–13, 20, 203, 263; economic, 16, 17, 22, 30; and implications of the study, 12, 252; of neighbourhood change, 18, 19, 28, 73, 245. See also concentric zone theory “Three Cities” model, 182, 263 time-series analysis, 18, 26, 106 Toronto, 78–99; comparison with other case cities, 23, 189, 257, 262–67, 270–73; concentrated poverty in, 45, 51, 94, 272; concentrated wealth in, 24, 38, 85; condominiums in, 88–89, 195, 271; contrast with Montreal and Vancouver, 104, 105, 107, 119, 120; contrast with US city, 99, 276; cost of definition of, 76, 80–81; economic change in, 22, 79, 81, 83, 99, 277; gentrification in, 40, 50, 88, 90, 146, 169; Gini coefficient for, 137, 196, 262, 275–76; growth of, 40, 80, 165, 267; housing in, 51–52, 97, 166, 167, 245, 267; immigrant enclaves in, 44, 99, 255; immigrants to, 22, 79, 81, 227, 228; inequality in, 38, 83, 84, 210, 222, 263; influence on Hamilton, 150, 166, 168, 277; mix in, 22, 270; neighbourhood decline in, 47, 85, 90, 92, 159; neighbourhood types in, 56–57, 58–60, 62–63, 68–69; polarization in, 25, 71, 92, 146, 188; segregation in, 51, 79, 90–91,

98, 142, 260; social housing in, 39, 85, 97, 98; suburbs, 40, 47, 81 89; urban renewal in, 36; visible minorities in, 81, 82, 83, 94, 96, 266; working class in, 46, 89, 255. See also Regent Park; Rosedale Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC), 98 trade practices, 21, 81, 103, 257, 268 transit, 121, 189, 255, 267, 278; bus, 51, 96, 145, 169; and development, 122, 130; investments in, 50, 120, 212, 270; public, 33, 47, 96, 99, 159, 228; rail, 85, 96, 109, 111, 133, 267; rapid, 71, 134, 145, 147, 270; streetcar, 2, 255, 267; subway, 2, 123, 267 transit-oriented development, 270; in Calgary, 195, 212; in Montreal, 121, 122, 123; in Vancouver, 130, 144, 145 Trudeau, Justin, 236 Trudeau, Pierre, 43 Tuxedo (Winnipeg), 38, 217, 222, 226, 230 type transitions, 63–69, 70, 204, 205, 211. See also typologies of neighbourhoods typologies of neighbourhoods, 53–74; historic studies of, 13, 14, 15; implications of, 255, 265; by income change, 27, 211. See also type transitions

U unemployment, 103, 140, 151, 184, 229, 277; and employment insurance, 49, 97, 99, 241, 269; in poor areas, 43, 57, 206, 215, 224 unions, 41, 103, 123, 150, 152, 277 United Kingdom: colonial legacy in Canada, 80, 129, 134, 172; developers from, 133; immigrants from, 38, 134, 228; and rising inequality, 7, 9, 276. See also Britain United States: decline of cities in, 146, 155, 157, immigrants from 43, 80; influence on Canada, 101, 275; racial differences in, 39, 196, 275; and rising inequality, 7, 9, 40–41, 94, 117, 276; schools in, 49; urban development practices in, 14, 36, 50, 55, 122, 133 United Way, 124, 190, 211, 212, 240, 245 urban redevelopment, 249, 268, 270; in Calgary, 201, 209, 212; and gentrification, 14, 18, 130, 144, 145, 190; in Halifax, 173, 175, 190; in Montreal, 111, 123; and slum clearance, 36, 173; and tax revenues, 35, 165; and threats to the neighbourhood, 48, 164;

in Vancouver, 130, 134, 144, 145, 146; in Winnipeg, 216, 233. See also brownfield redevelopment; revitalization; waterfront redevelopment urban renewal: and gentrification, 165, 166, 271; in Hamilton, 149, 155, 163–65, 166, 271; plans for, 131, 164; and slum clearance, 36, 163, 173; and social housing, 85, 107, 255 urban riots, 11, 13, 166 urban system, 7, 20–22, 102, 252

V vacant land or structures, xv, 256 Vancouver, 126–47; Chinese migrants to, 44, 129, comparison with other case cities, 23, 152, 255–58, 260–77; concentrated poverty in, 36, 131, 136, 272; concentrated wealth in, 22, 38, 129, 136, 140; condominiums in, 134, 137, 140, 144, 145, 195; contrast with American city, 275, 276; contrast with Canadian city, 98, 104, 107, 120–22, 147; cost of housing in, 51, 128, 129, 140, 143, 271; economic change in, 133, 262; ethnocultural mix in, 142; gentrification in, 40, 50, 131, 136, 139, 142; geography of, 127, 137, 145; Gini coefficient for, 119, 137, 262; growth of, 133, 134, 257; immigrants to, 38, 59, 63, 128, 130, 227; inequality in, 128, 147, 257, 267, 275; influence of policy, 134, 143–46, 245, 248, 270; neighbourhood types in, 59–60, 62–63, 66; polarization in, 127, 134, 142, 145, 188– 89; segregation in, 42, 137, 260, 273; social housing in, 130, 143, 145, 273; suburbs, 68, 133, 136, 137, 143, 146; urban renewal in, 131, 134; visible minorities in, 22, 142, 266; working class in, 131, 140, 255. See also Downtown Eastside; False Creek; millionaire migrants; Shaughnessy; Strathcona; Surrey Victoria, BC, 38, 128 visible minorities, 23, 266, 276, 278; in Calgary, 194, 201, 207–11; concentrated in inner city, 29; declining incomes, 71, 72, 82, 268; in Halifax, 181, 184, 185; in Hamilton, 161; in Montreal, 102, 115, 116, 118; skilled, 43; in Toronto, 81, 82, 83, 89, 94, 99; in Vancouver, 134, 142, 147, 266; in Winnipeg, 224, 228, 229, 232. See also majority-minority status; minorities; racialized populations INDEX

325

W Washington, DC, 122 waterfront redevelopment, 137, 188, 268, 270. See also brownfield redevelopment; False Creek; urban redevelopment welfare state: development of, 3, 49, 255; policies of, 101, 255, 269; as political ideology, 9, 268; roll back of, 102, 143, 236, 253, 260, 262 western Canadian cities, 47, 195, 278 Western nations, 7, 8, 30 Western society, 1, 278 Westmount (Montreal), 35, 38, 109, 271 Winnipeg, 214–34; comparison with other case cities, 23, 188, 228, 255, 263; concentrated poverty, 155, 223, 234, 255, 256; concentrated poverty among Indigenous residents, 44, 223–27, 264; concentrated wealth in, 38, 217; contrast with another city, 272, 276; economic change, 215, 216, 267; gentrification in, 40, 225; Gini coefficient for, 217, 262; growth of, 22, 24, 189, 216, 233, 267; Indigenous populations, 22, 44, 161, 232, 266, 277; influence of policy, 216, 231–33, 274; immigrants to, 38, 227–31, 232; inequality in, 157, 222, 231, 233, 257; neighbourhood types in, 60, 62, 63, 66, 229; polarization in, 222; segregation in, 34, 42, 219, 260; suburbs, 38, 216, 231, 233; urban renewal in, 216, 271. See also Core Area Initiative; North End; Tuxedo workers: blue-collar, 64, 96, 118, 133, 140, 141; cultural, 168; and de-skilling, 130, 143, 150; in Hamilton, 150, 168; high-paid, 155; inequality among, 99; and large cities, 22; low-paid, 13, 248;

326

INDEX

managerial, 83, 95, 141, 206; neighbourhood settle­ ment, 34, 35, 45; number in household, 26, 106, 143; in resource industries, 131, 266; semi-skilled, 33, 39, 103; service-sector, 64, 66, 67, 68, 72, 206; skilled, 33, 104, 228; unskilled, 33, 34, 41; whitecollar, 133, 140, 188, 206. See also working-class areas; working-class residents working-class areas, 32, 44, 46, 89, 231 253; and gentrification, 71, 72, 122, 169, 188; and low income, 45, 89, 107; in Montreal, 35, 107, 122, 124; in Toronto, 32, 46, 89; and typologies, 59, 66, 67, 255 working-class residents, 32, 45, 49, 175, 268, 277 working poor, 35, 43, 45, 116, 248; as the deserving poor, 35; in dual-income households, 106; with newcomers and minorities, 117, 124, 130 Wynne, Kathleen, 98

Y young adults: and gentrification, xiv; affected by high housing costs, 129, 261, 268; and high-density living, 39, 172, 222, 268; and inequality, 18, 24; and inter-provincial migration, 194, 266; as millennials, 168, 268; in neighbourhood typologies, 59, 62, 64, 67, 207, 277; preferences for urban living, 188, 207, 268; professional, 104, 194 young families, 112, 143 zoning: and planning, 32, 49–50, 164; effect on housing, 14, 122, 145, 270; exclusionary, 29; inclusionary, 29, 98, 99, 250; influence on neighbourhood change, 17, 19, 175, 233, 270, 271; in Montreal, 122, 123; in Winnipeg, 222, 232–33. See also landuse regulations; planning

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