Social Partners and Gender Equality: Change and Continuity in Gendered Corporatism in Europe 3030811778, 9783030811778

Table of contents :
Preface
Praise for Social Partners and Gender Equality
Contents
Notes on Contributors
Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Tables
Introduction
Gender, Power and Corporatism
Introduction
The Complex Relationships Between Gender Equality and Social Partners
Shifting Political Context: Neoliberalisation, Crises and Transnationalisation
Gender, Power and Corporatism: Different Analytical Perspectives
Content of the Book
References
Collective Bargaining and Gender Equality
The Gendered Nature of Pattern Bargaining: Leeway for Change?
Introduction
Collective Bargaining, Institutional Regulation and the Gender Pay Gap
The Norwegian Case
Method and Material
Labour, Wage Formation and Equality
The Role of Pattern Bargaining in the Norwegian Economy and the Gender Pay Gap
How Do LO Documents Discuss or Problematise ‘Value’?
How LO Problematises the Gender Pay Gap: The Underlying Problem Is Individual Behaviour Rather Than a Structural Issue
Conclusion
References
Conflicts Over Gender Equality Bargaining: The Introduction of a Gender Equality Fund in Sweden
Introduction
Trade Unions and Gender
The Swedish Case
Methodology: Understanding Underlying Problem Constructions Related to Class and Gender
Social Partners and Lines of Conflict in the Course of Events
Analysing Divergent Problem Constructions in the Debate
Proponents of the GEP: The Problem of Value Discrimination Regarding Women’s Work
Opponents of the GEP: The Problem of Women Working in Low-Income Sectors
Class and Gender: Understanding the Conflict Over the GEP
Conclusion
References
Negotiating in a Highly Feminised Sector: The French Domestic Work and Home-Based Care Sector
Introduction
Background
Analysing Collective Agreements Through a Gender Lens
An Unfinished Standardisation of Home-Based Care/Domestic Work
A Precarious Feminised Workforce
Incentives to Declare Domestic Workers and Carers
Inclusive Coverage Provided by the Collective Agreements
Analysis
Inclusion but Incomplete Standardisation
Income Security
Access to Training Opportunities
Fair Treatment
Recognition of Life Beyond Work
The Balance of Power Between the Social Partners
Fragmented Social Partners
Negotiating the SPE Collective Agreement
Negotiating the BAD Collective Agreement
Negotiating the SAP Collective Agreement
Defending the Interests of Undocumented Migrant Domestic Workers and Carers
The Influence of the Institutionalised Industrial Relations System on the French Social Partners
Institutional Influence on the Extension of the Collective Agreements
Ensuring the Social Partners Are Active Representatives
Codetermination Funds
Conclusion
References
Social Partners and Equality Bargaining in France: A Blunt Tool for Reducing Gender Pay Gaps
Introduction
Dialogue or Bargaining? The French Context
Collective Bargaining on Gender Equality in France: The Legal Framework
Collective Bargaining on Gender Equality in France in Practice
Conclusion
References
Is Finnish Corporatism Reconfiguring, and Is It Good for Gender Equality?
Introduction
Finnish Corporatism and Its Reconfigurations
Advancing Gender Equality Through Collective Bargaining
Labour Market Organisations Shaping Gender Equality Policy
Cases and Materials
Reconfigurations and Continuity in Peak Corporatism: Struggles Over the Value and Cost of Feminised Work
The Competitiveness Pact: Trading Gender Equality for the Institutional Continuity of the Corporatist System
Sectoral Bargaining for Nurses’ Wage Increases in the Context of COVID-19
Civil Society Challenge to Unequal Pay Practices in the Finnish Local Government Sector
Reconfigurations in Routine Corporatism: The Government Takes the Lead in Gender Equality Policy
Conclusion
References
Social Partners’ Influence on Gender Policymaking and Framings of Equality
EU Neo-Corporatism and Gender Equality Policy: Disappearing Partnership?
Introduction
The Emergence and Institutionalisation of the EU Gender Equality Policy: A Relationship of Mistrust (1970s–1980s)
Collective Absence, Individual Alliances
A Policy that Is Too Costly and Too Elitist?
Being in and Out: Social Partners in the EU Gender Equality Neo-Corporatist Governance (1990s–2000s)
The Development of European Social Dialogue: The Social Partners, Unwilling Actors in European Gender Equality Policy
A Compatible Gender Regime, a Separate Identity
Troubled Times: Facing the Double Bind of the Critical Transformation of EU Gender Equality Policy and of Social Governance (2010s–)
EU Gender Equality Policy Is Not a Social Policy Anymore? Social Partners as Interest Groups Among Others
Gender Equality at the Margins
Conclusion
References
European Social Partners: Advancing and Opposing European Union’s Gender Equality Policies
Introduction
European Social Partners Influencing EU Gender Equality Policy
Research Material and Methodology
European Social Partners’ Internal and Policy-Oriented Activities for Gender Equality
Gender Equality Issues and Constructions of Gender Equality
Actors and Policy Measures for Gender Equality
Conclusion
References
Converging and Conflicting Perspectives on Gender Equality Amongst Spanish Social Partners
Introduction
Social Partners and Gender Equality Policy
Social Partners and Gender Equality Policy in Spain
The Spanish Social Partners
Gender Equality Policy: Work-Life Balance and the Gender Pay Gap
Material and Methods
Converging Conceptions of Equality in the Work-Life Balance Policy Debate
Different Conceptions of Equality in the Gender Pay Gap Debate
Conclusion
References
Gendered Patterns of Representation in Trade Unions
Trade Unions, Collective Bargaining and Gender in Germany
Introduction
The Economic and Political Context: The German System of Industrial Relations and the Development of Women’s Employment
Measures to Advance Women at IG Metall and ver.di—Women’s Quotas and Structures
Current Collective Bargaining Policy on Gender-Relevant Issues
IG Metall: Between the Claim to Gender Democracy and the Practice of Male-Dominated Organisation Culture
Ver.di: Upgrading Female Care Work and the Feminisation of Labour Unrest
Conclusion
References
From Feminised to Feminist? Trade Union Campaigns for Early Years Educators, Nurses and Midwives in Ireland
Introduction
Ireland: Gendered Employment and Unionisation
Trade Unions: Gendered Work and Gendered Organising
Research Material and Methodology
Big Start: Together for Early Years
Nurses and Midwives: From Anti-Austerity to Frontline ‘Heroes’
Conclusion
References
Selecting Social Partners: Collective Bargaining for Gender Equality in the Shadow of Political Polarisation and Ideology in Turkey
Introduction
Corporatist Arrangements and Gendered Interests
Corporatist State and Gendered Practices of Trade Unions in Turkey
Analysis on the Impact of Political Polarisation on Collective Bargaining
Conclusion
References
Conclusions on Social Partners and Gender Equality in Europe
Introduction
Collective Bargaining and Gender Equality
Social Partners’ Influence on Gender Policymaking and Framings of Equality
Gendered Patterns of Representation in Trade Unions
Finishing Thoughts and Future Research Agendas
Index

Citation preview

GENDER AND POLITICS SERIES EDITORS: JOHANNA KANTOLA · SARAH CHILDS

Social Partners and Gender Equality Change and Continuity in Gendered Corporatism in Europe

Edited by Anna Elomäki · Johanna Kantola · Paula Koskinen Sandberg

Gender and Politics

Series Editors Johanna Kantola, University of Tampere, Tampere, Finland Sarah Childs, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK

The Gender and Politics series celebrated its 7th anniversary at the 5th European Conference on Politics and Gender (ECPG) in June 2017 in Lausanne, Switzerland having published more than 35 volumes to date. The original idea for the book series was envisioned by the series editors Johanna Kantola and Judith Squires at the first ECPG in Belfast in 2009, and the series was officially launched at the Conference in Budapest in 2011. In 2014, Sarah Childs became the co-editor of the series, together with Johanna Kantola. Gender and Politics showcases the very best international writing. It publishes world class monographs and edited collections from scholars - junior and well established - working in politics, international relations and public policy, with specific reference to questions of gender. The titles that have come out over the past years make key contributions to debates on intersectionality and diversity, gender equality, social movements, Europeanization and institutionalism, governance and norms, policies, and political institutions. Set in European, US and Latin American contexts, these books provide rich new empirical findings and push forward boundaries of feminist and politics conceptual and theoretical research. The editors welcome the highest quality international research on these topics and beyond, and look for proposals on feminist political theory; on recent political transformations such as the economic crisis or the rise of the populist right; as well as proposals on continuing feminist dilemmas around participation and representation, specific gendered policy fields, and policy making mechanisms. The series can also include books published as a Palgrave pivot. For further information on the series and to submit a proposal for consideration, please get in touch with Senior Editor Ambra Finotello, [email protected]. This series is indexed by Scopus.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14998

Anna Elomäki · Johanna Kantola · Paula Koskinen Sandberg Editors

Social Partners and Gender Equality Change and Continuity in Gendered Corporatism in Europe

Editors Anna Elomäki Tampere University Tampere, Finland

Johanna Kantola Tampere University Tampere, Finland

Paula Koskinen Sandberg Tampere University Tampere, Finland

ISSN 2662-5814 ISSN 2662-5822 (electronic) Gender and Politics ISBN 978-3-030-81177-8 ISBN 978-3-030-81178-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: dancingfishes/Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

This edited book has only been possible because of the hard work of the chapter authors. We would like to thank all of them for joining the book project, writing such interesting and important chapters, and revising them so patiently on the basis of our comments. Thank you Ingrid Artus, Berfin Çakın, Pauline Cullen, Josefina Erikson, Judith Holland, Sophie Jacquot, Rachel Krupka, Clémence Ledoux, Susan Milner, Armi Mustosmäki, My Rafstedt, Sophie Pochic, Burcu Ta¸skın, Mari Teigen and Ines Wagner. The idea for this book started to materialise with a one-day workshop Social Partners, Power and (In)Equalities in the European Union organised at the Université Saint-Louis-Bruxelles in Brussels in February 2020, just before the Covid-19 pandemic closed European borders. We were already using a lot of hand sanitizer and looking nervously around when eating in full restaurants but did not yet have any idea of the full meaning that the pandemic would have on our lives and work. The workshop was co-organised with Sophie Jacquot (Université Saint-Louis-Bruxelles), Clémence Ledoux (Nantes University), Josefina Erikson (Uppsala University) and Christina Bergqvist (Uppsala University), whom we would like to thank for inspiring cooperation. The workshop was first planned in the European Conference on Politics and Gender (ECPG) in Amsterdam in 2019. Our heartfelt thanks to everyone who participated in the workshop and in organising it in the pre-pandemic world.

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PREFACE

Our work on gender, social partners and corporatism arises from an Academy of Finland funded research project Gender, Power and Reconfigured Corporatism in Finland (GePoCo, 2016–2020). This work was initially supported by the University of Helsinki Research Funds (2015– 2017) and subsequently by the Academy of Finland for Paula Koskinen Sandberg’s postdoctoral research (Neoliberalizing Welfare State Employment 2018–2022). We thank all the funding agencies and instruments most profoundly. Thank you to all our wonderful GePoCo colleagues with whom our thinking and research on these topics has evolved over the years: Julius Hokkanen, Ville Kainulainen, Miikaeli Kylä-Laaso, Armi Mustosmäki and Milja Saari. Special thanks to Miikaeli for providing us with important feedback on our own chapters. We would also like to thank our research assistant Meredith Chuzel-Marmot whose work was crucial for putting the final version of the manuscript together for the publisher. We have also greatly benefited from the supportive research environment of Gender Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, and would like to thank all our colleagues. At Palgrave, we’d like to thank Ambra Finotello and Arun Kumar Anbalagan for guiding us through the publishing process and its many details. We also thank Sarah Childs as the Series Editor of Gender and Politics for her support throughout the project, as well as the anonymous reviewer whose comments helped us to shape the main argument of the book. When doing research on the Finnish corporatist system in the framework of the GePoCo project, we first felt we were alone working on this topic in the gender and politics community. We soon realised, of course, that there was a wealth of research on gender and trade unions as well as on gender and collective bargaining across disciplines. Yet these international debates were scattered in different places, and it took us a long time to find our way around them. Navigating this literature while doing our own research on Finland also made us understand that the big picture about gender, social partners and corporatism was still missing. Although a lot had been written about women, trade unions and gender equality, as well as about gender in collective bargaining, in particular equality bargaining, we felt that these debates remained somewhat isolated. Like our own work, this research too often took the form of national case studies. While each text we read shed a particular light onto the macrolevel questions about gender, power and changing corporatism we wanted

PREFACE

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to better understand, we felt something more overarching was needed. And we were not able to do this alone. We therefore began to think about creating an international network on research on gender, corporatism and social partners. We also felt there was a need for a volume that would bring all these different debates together for a gender and politics audience and highlight their significance for gender and politics research. Through our own research on Finland and the European Union we had come to understand the crucial role that labour market organisations played in reproducing (and sometimes challenging) the persistent undervaluation of women’s work and other inequalities in the labour market and influencing the adoption and implementation of gender equality policy. Yet social partners had received very little attention from gender and politics scholars. The Brussels workshop we co-organised with Sophie, Clémence, Josefina and Christina and the excellent papers presented there confirmed to us that the volume was indeed needed. Many of the chapters of this volume were first presented in this workshop, other authors got on board later. This book has been written during the global pandemic of Covid-19, which has made our academic work at times extremely difficult at other times just boring, and lonely. We all having made it this far and the book existing testifies of the strength of feminist research and collaborations. Berlin, Germany Helsinki, Finland Helsinki, Finland June 2021

Anna Elomäki Johanna Kantola Paula Koskinen Sandberg

Praise for Social Partners and Gender Equality

“This book offers a collection of insightful and important studies of a long neglected area in gender and politics research. It spans from case studies of gender equality in national trade unions in Europe to the role of social partners in the European Union. A must-read for everyone who wants to understand more about the recent development of gender, power and corporatism in Europe.” —Christina Bergqvist, Professor of Political Science, Uppsala University “This volume will interest politics researchers/students as well as those in other fields including sociology, employment relations, business and management studies. Its focus on gender and social partners and how they both shape and challenge gender inequalities is more than timely, it is absolutely essential for understanding how a better world can be built post-pandemic. Individually the chapters address a wide range of pressing issues situated in context of European countries which the editors pull together analytically and theoretically in their overview chapter. Highly recommended reading.” —Gill Kirton, Professor of Employment Relations, Queen Mary University of London

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Contents

Introduction Gender, Power and Corporatism Anna Elomäki, Johanna Kantola, and Paula Koskinen Sandberg

3

Collective Bargaining and Gender Equality The Gendered Nature of Pattern Bargaining: Leeway for Change? Ines Wagner and Mari Teigen

29

Conflicts Over Gender Equality Bargaining: The Introduction of a Gender Equality Fund in Sweden Josefina Erikson

49

Negotiating in a Highly Feminised Sector: The French Domestic Work and Home-Based Care Sector Clémence Ledoux and Rachel Krupka

71

Social Partners and Equality Bargaining in France: A Blunt Tool for Reducing Gender Pay Gaps Susan Milner and Sophie Pochic

97

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CONTENTS

Is Finnish Corporatism Reconfiguring, and Is It Good for Gender Equality? Paula Koskinen Sandberg, Anna Elomäki, Armi Mustosmäki, and Johanna Kantola

121

Social Partners’ Influence on Gender Policymaking and Framings of Equality EU Neo-Corporatism and Gender Equality Policy: Disappearing Partnership? Sophie Jacquot

149

European Social Partners: Advancing and Opposing European Union’s Gender Equality Policies Anna Elomäki and Johanna Kantola

171

Converging and Conflicting Perspectives on Gender Equality Amongst Spanish Social Partners My Rafstedt

197

Gendered Patterns of Representation in Trade Unions Trade Unions, Collective Bargaining and Gender in Germany Ingrid Artus and Judith Holland

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From Feminised to Feminist? Trade Union Campaigns for Early Years Educators, Nurses and Midwives in Ireland Pauline Cullen

245

Selecting Social Partners: Collective Bargaining for Gender Equality in the Shadow of Political Polarisation and Ideology in Turkey Burcu Ta¸skın and Berfin Çakın Conclusions on Social Partners and Gender Equality in Europe Anna Elomäki, Johanna Kantola, and Paula Koskinen Sandberg Index

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Notes on Contributors

Ingrid Artus is a Professor of Comparative Social Analysis at the Institute of Sociology, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany. She is an expert in the Sociology of Work and Industry. Berfin Çakın is a PhD Candidate at Istanbul Medeniyet University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Turkey. She holds a master’s degree in Public Administration from University of Twente and her research interests include political psychology and gender politics. Her publications appeared in Journal of Liberal Thought and Political Studies Review. Pauline Cullen is an Associate Professor in Sociology and Politics in the Department of Sociology, Maynooth University, National University of Ireland, Ireland. Her work examines civil society mobilisation on social justice and gender equality at the national and European Union level, women’s movements and feminist analysis of politics and policy. Her work was been published in the Journal of Civil Society, Social Movement Studies, Gender Work & Organization, Politics & Gender; Policy and Society; Media, Culture & Society and European Politics and Society. She is co-editor of Producing Knowledge Reproducing Gender in Contemporary Ireland University College Dublin and University of Chicago Press. Anna Elomäki is a Senior Researcher in the Faculty of Social Sciences at Tampere University, Finland. Her research focuses on the interconnections between economy, politics and gender in Finland and in the xiii

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

EU, for example, neoliberalisation of gender equality policy and the gendered impacts and practices of economic governance. Her work has been published, for example, in Journal Common Market Studies, Gender Work and Organization, Social Politics and International Political Science Review. Josefina Erikson is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government, Uppsala University, Sweden. Her most recent research addresses gender and parliaments, feminist institutionalism, as well as gender in relation to the workplace. Judith Holland is a Research Associate at the Institute of Sociology, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany. Her research profile is largely Comparative Social Analysis, Gender Research, Sociology of Work and Organisation, and Reconstructive Social Research. Sophie Jacquot is a Professor of Political Science at the Université Saint-Louis, Bruxelles. Her research activities are concerned with the transformation of EU public policies, especially in the fields of gender equality, social policy and antidiscrimination. She currently works on the role of opinion survey and EU-level social partners in the shaping of EU gender equality policy. She has authored the book Transformations in EU Gender Equality. From emergence to dismantling (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). Her work has been published in Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Public Policy, European Journal of Politics and Gender, among others. Johanna Kantola is a Professor of Gender Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Finland. She has published extensively on gender and politics including the monographs Gender and Political Analysis (Palgrave 2017, with Emanuela Lombardo) and Gender and the European Union (Palgrave, 2010), and edited volumes Gender and the Economic Crisis in Europe (Palgrave 2017, with Emanuela Lombardo), The Oxford Handbook on Gender and Politics (OUP, 2013, with Georgina Waylen Karen Celis, Laurel Weldon). She directs the European Research Council Consolidator Grant project EUGenDem (2018–2023). Paula Koskinen Sandberg is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Gender Studies in the Faculty of Social Sciences at Tampere University, Finland. She has published on topics such as gender relations within the Finnish

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corporatist regime, gender inequalities in pay systems, the institutionalised undervaluation of women’s work, and the social partners’ role in drafting gender equality policy and legislation. Her current research interests include gender and welfare state employment, activism around equal pay, gender impacts of neoliberal economic and labour policies, and corporatist politics. Rachel Krupka studied social law and legal history at the University of Nantes, France. As a research assistant working with Clémence Ledoux in 2019, she analysed the status of migrant domestic workers in France from a legal perspective and the meaning of the social rights contained in collective agreements covering the personal services sector in France. Clémence Ledoux is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Nantes, France. She is a former Fellow of the HanseWissenschaftskolleg (HWK—Institute for Advanced Study) in Delmenhorst, Germany. Her work concentrates on the dynamics of the homebased service sector in Europe and, more recently, on the role of employers’ organisations and civil servants in the structuring of this sector. Susan Milner is a Professor of European Politics and Society at the University of Bath, United Kingdom. She has published widely on women and employment and on comparative employment relations. She leads a GW4 research team on pay equality in the UK and is currently engaged in a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship investigating British policy on women and employment since 2004. Armi Mustosmäki is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at University of Jyväskylä, Finland. Her research has focussed on changing working life in a comparative perspective, Nordic model and corporatism as well as organisation of work. Sophie Pochic is a Professor of Sociology of Work and Gender and head of the PRO (Professions, Networks and Organisations) research team at the Centre Maurice Halbwachs, École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France. She is a member of the editorial committee of the journal Travail, Genre et Société, and sat on the National Council for Workplace Equality between 2006 and 2019. She led a major project investigating gender equality plans and agreements, funded by the French Ministry of Labour, which was reported in 2019.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

My Rafstedt is a Doctoral student in Political Science at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the University of Oslo, Norway. Her research interests encompass economic inequality and the gendered effects of legal change. In her doctoral thesis she examines the gendering of labour reforms in the political responses to these measures, adopted by Spanish governments in 2010 and 2012. Burcu Ta¸skın is an Assistant Professor at Istanbul Medeniyet University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Turkey. Her areas of interest are political representation of minorities, democratisation, gender studies, voter behaviour, Turkish–Greek relations and Balkan politics. She is the author of the book Political Representation of Minorities in Greece and Turkey: Nationalism, Reciprocity and Europeanization, released in March 2019 by Libra Publisher. She has published several related articles in the Journals Turkish Studies and Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. Mari Teigen is a Research Professor at the Institute for Social Research in Oslo and Director of CORE—Center for Research on Gender Equality, Oslo, Norway. Her research engages with change and stability in gender relations, through analysis of gender equality policy; social elites, gender segregation in the labour market and in academia. Ines Wagner is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Social Research in Oslo, Norway. Her research looks at gender and work, labour and capital mobility in the EU and the future of work.

Abbreviations

AENC AKAVA ASTI BAD

BANK-SEN CBA CCOO CEEP

CEOE CEPYME CES CFDT CFE CGC CGT CNPF ˘ DEV-SAGLIK I˙ S—DISK ¸ DG

Agreements on Employment and Collective Bargaining Confederation of Unions for Professional and Managerial Staff in Finland Association of Secondary School Teachers of Ireland Branche de l’aide, de l’accompagnement, des soins et des services à domicile (Care, supervision and domestic services sector) ˙ sçileri Sendikası Devrimci Banka ve Sigorta I¸ Collective Bargaining Agreement Workers’ Commissions European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Public Services and Services of General Interest Spanish Confederation of Employers’ Organizations Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium-Size Enterprises Spanish Economic and Social Council French Democratic Confederation of Labour The French Confederation of Management General Confederation of Executives General Confederation of Labour National Council of French Employers Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey Directorate-General xvii

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ABBREVIATIONS

DGB DISK EEC EIGE EK EPSR ETUC EU EWL FEPEM GEP GP HAK-I˙ S¸ ˙ HIZMETI˙ S¸ ICTU ILO INMO INTO JDP KAMU-SEN KESK KIT KT LO LO MEMUR-SEN NGO NHO NMP OECD PDP PHS PROPAM PSOE RPP SAK SAP SIPTU SNL

German Union Federation Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions European Economic Community European Institute for Gender Equality Confederation of Finnish Industries European Pillar of Social Rights European Trade Union Confederation European Union European Women’s Lobby Federation of Private Domestic Employers of France Gender Equality Pot Good Party Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions ˙ sçileri Tüm Belediye ve Genel Hizmet I¸ Irish Congress of Trade Union International Labour Organisation Irish Nurses and Midwives Organisation Irish National Teachers Organisation Justice and Development Party Confederation of Public Employees Unions of Turkey Confederation of Public Employees’ Trade Unions Commission for Church Employers Finnish Local Government Employers Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions Swedish Trade Union Confederation Confederation of Turkey Public Employees’ Trade Unions Non-Governmental Organisation Confederation of Norwegian Enterprises Nationalist Movement Party Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Peoples’ Democratic Party Personal and household services Process and Project Alignment Methodology Spanish Labour Party Republican People’s Party Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions Entreprise de services à la personne (Business offering personal services) Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union Confederation of Swedish Enterprise

ABBREVIATIONS

SPD SPE STTK TFEU TÜRK-I˙ S¸ UEAPME UGT UK UNICE UNSA UNSA-SNAP-SPE Ver.di VTML

xix

Social Democratic Party Salarié du particulier employeur (Private domestic employee) Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Turkish Confederation of Workers’ Unions European Association of Craft, Small and MediumSized Enterprises Workers’ General Union United Kingdom Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe National Union of Autonomous Trade Unions Syndicat National des Auxiliaires Parentales et Salariés du Particulier Employeur Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft—United Services Union Office for the Government as Employer

List of Figures

Trade Unions, Collective Bargaining and Gender in Germany Fig. 1

Share of women among the recipients of strike pay by ver.di, 2008–2018 (Source ver.di; calculations and presentation from Dribbusch, 2020)

236

Selecting Social Partners: Collective Bargaining for Gender Equality in the Shadow of Political Polarisation and Ideology in Turkey Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Changes in membership of labour confederations (Source Calculated by the authors based on data from the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services) Changes in membership of public servants’ confederations (Source Calculated by the authors based on data from the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services [The beginning date of the data is 2013, because official unionisation rates were misleading due to the failures on calculations between 1983 and 2012. In 2012, these miscalculations were eliminated by the government but renewed official data is available starting from 2013])

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List of Tables

Negotiating in a Highly Feminised Sector: The French Domestic Work and Home-Based Care Sector Table 1 Table 2

Declared PHS workers by applicable employment status Social Partners by Collective Agreement, 2019

79 84

Social Partners and Equality Bargaining in France: A Blunt Tool for Reducing Gender Pay Gaps Table 1

The evolution of legal duties on French companies

106

EU Neo-Corporatism and Gender Equality Policy: Disappearing Partnership? Table 1

The relationships between European social partners and gender equality policy

166

European Social Partners: Advancing and Opposing European Union’s Gender Equality Policies Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

Research material Categories of analysis Gender equality profiles of EU social partners

177 178 189

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LIST OF TABLES

Converging and Conflicting Perspectives on Gender Equality Amongst Spanish Social Partners Table 1

Overview over the research data

205

From Feminised to Feminist? Trade Union Campaigns for Early Years Educators, Nurses and Midwives in Ireland Table 1 Table 2

Framing female dominated care work Framing gender and care in union campaigns

252 253

Selecting Social Partners: Collective Bargaining for Gender Equality in the Shadow of Political Polarisation and Ideology in Turkey Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

Membership rates in labour confederations—January 2021 Number and percentage of women union members in Turkish labour confederations Number of women and men confederation members with decision-making roles

280 281 287

Introduction

Gender, Power and Corporatism Anna Elomäki , Johanna Kantola , and Paula Koskinen Sandberg

Introduction This book breaks new ground in gender and politics research by studying the multiple ways in which gender and intersectional inequalities shape and are shaped by social partners representing employers and employees, and their relationships in Europe. Rather surprisingly, to date, volumes such as this one have not been published, indicating a serious gap in research. Yet, as this volume illustrates, social partners or labour market organisations are important actors in European countries as well as at the European Union (EU) level in relation to gender and other equalities. The chapters of this volume show the multitude of issues, perspectives and approaches that became relevant in the political context of the 2000s,

A. Elomäki (B) · J. Kantola · P. Koskinen Sandberg Tampere University, Tampere, Finland e-mail: [email protected] J. Kantola e-mail: [email protected] P. Koskinen Sandberg e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5_1

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shaped by neoliberalisation and austerity and, more recently, the Covid-19 crisis. Gendered inequalities in the labour market, such as the gender pay gap and the persistent undervaluation of feminised reproductive work and care work in particular, and the policies to tackle these inequalities are at the heart of gender and politics research. Gender and politics scholars have explored how women’s movements and other feminist actors put forward demands and collaborate to advance them (Banaszak, 2010; Outshoorn & Kantola, 2007; Woodward, 2004); how political parties advance or oppose policies on equal pay, gender discrimination, sexual harassment, work-life balance and gender balance in corporate decisionmaking (e.g., Bergqvist et al., 2016); and how these policies are later implemented (Engeli & Mazur, 2018). National gender regimes (Walby, 2020) differ in tackling these issues, and various factors that advance and stall policymaking and implementation have been discerned in feminist research. This volume adds a crucial dimension to these studies: focussing on social partners representing employees and employers provides important insights for explaining the persistence of gendered inequalities and problems in policy adoption and implementation. Gender and politics research has tended to pay little attention to social partners and to focus on other actors, such as women’s and feminist movements, gender equality machineries such as women’s policy agencies, gender experts, governments, political parties and, most recently, anti-gender movements. Yet, the literature on gender and labour market organisations has pointed out the significance of social partners, their relationships and power balance for advancing gender equality. Already, the term social partners suggests that trade unions and employer organisations are not just any societal interest group: they have a special standing in policymaking and, in many cases, significant power to influence wages and working conditions as well as employment and social policy more broadly. Unpacking their role in maintaining and addressing inequalities is all the more important in the current political context, where traditional gender equality actors, such as women’s movements, gender experts or women’s policy agencies, have been losing ground due to the predominance of economic concerns and increasing anti-gender sentiments in Europe. Labour market organisations have a unique power to set wages and other terms of employment through collective bargaining—negotiations between trade unions and employers or their representatives at

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different levels—and thereby influence key gender equality issues, such as the gender pay gap (Dickens, 2000; Koskinen Sandberg et al., 2018; Pillinger & Wintour, 2019). Depending on the national context, these bargaining processes may be more or less regulated and take place at the national level between peak labour market organisations, at the sectoral level (e.g., technology industry, private services sector), the regional level, or at the company level. Each system poses different possibilities and hurdles for gender equality. In addition, in corporatist (or neo-corporatist) regimes where the representatives of trade unions and businesses are integrated in the state, policymaking is often characterised by collaboration and negotiation between trade unions, employer confederations and the government in economic, employment and social policy (Christiansen, 2020; Vesa et al., 2018). These social dialogue processes guarantee social partners significant influence on gender equality policies too. In many countries, as well as at the EU level, social partners have been key power players in shaping gender equality policy, either by advancing or opposing new initiatives (Elomäki & Kantola, 2020; Koskinen Sandberg, 2016). Social partners therefore often have better access to decision-makers than traditional gender equality actors. Like gender regimes, corporatist regimes vary depending on the national context and have different implications for gender equality. In Europe, corporatism in the broad sense of covering union membership, type of wage bargaining, industrial structure, work councils at the company level and social partners’ influence in policymaking, has been strongest in Austria, Norway and Sweden, followed by the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Finland and Belgium. In contrast, Ireland, the UK and Italy are examples of weakly or only somewhat corporatist countries (Siaroff, 1999). France, in turn, represents a statist country where most initiatives come from the state and social partners have found themselves obliged to use actions, such as strikes and demonstrations, rather than negotiations, to make their views heard (Ledoux & Krupka, in this volume). In Eastern Europe, corporatist institutions and processes are more recent and ‘illusory’ (Ost, 2000). Turkey represents an authoritarian variety of corporatism, characterised by strong links between the Islamist ruling party and unions that are ideologically linked to it (Ta¸skın & Çakın, in this volume). Similarly to gender regimes, corporatist regimes change over time. Since the 1960s, economic restructuring, economic crises and processes of neoliberalisation, including the deregulation of labour markets, have

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weakened corporatist policymaking processes and decentralised collective bargaining (Christiansen, 2020; Marginson, 2015). The economic crisis of 2007–2008 and the ensuing austerity policies that had a significant impact on gender equality across Europe have also further reconfigured corporatist relationships. Nevertheless, labour market organisations still play an important role in wage-setting and policymaking in many countries, and they have found new ways to compensate for the weakening of corporatist channels, such as media and direct lobbying (Christiansen, 2020, p. 8). Previous research on social partners and gender equality in Europe has focussed on trade unions. This has entailed investigating the representation of women and minorities in trade unions either in a single national context (e.g., McBride, 2001) or from a comparative perspective (Colgan & Ledwith, 2002; Kirton, 2013; Ledwith & Hansen, 2017). This scholarship addressed leadership roles and equality strategies and asked how trade unions represent the interests of different groups of women and advance gender equality in collective bargaining. Despite the significant body of research on the role of collective bargaining in advancing gender equality (Colling & Dickens, 1998; Dickens, 2000; Heery, 2006; Pillinger & Wintour, 2019; Williamson & Baird, 2014), feminist literature on corporatist institutions and practices, as well as the struggles between trade unions, employer organisations and governments has been somewhat less systematic and rarely comparative in character. The aim of this volume is to broaden the research agenda on gender and social partners to corporatist systems as a whole. We distinguish between three partly overlapping dimensions of study that are, in our view, necessary for understanding the complex relationships between social partners and gender equality: 1. Collective bargaining and gender equality; 2. Social partners’ influence on gender policymaking and framings of equality; and 3. Gendered patterns of representation in trade unions. By bringing together these three dimensions, which are often discussed separately, this book provides a comprehensive approach for understanding the fundamental role of social partners in achieving gender equality and the genderedness of corporatist dynamics. The volume

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argues that social partners should be seen as important, although not necessarily benevolent, actors for gender equality with powers to advance and oppose gender equality through collective bargaining and social dialogue. Moreover, corporatist systems, practices and institutions are gendered in their functioning and create gendered effects, for example, by upholding rather than contesting the systemic undervaluation of feminised work.

The Complex Relationships Between Gender Equality and Social Partners The relationships between social partners, corporatism and gender equality have traditionally been complex. Previous literature has already shed light on tensions, possibilities and challenges with regards to the three dimensions of these relationships explored in this volume—trade unions, collective bargaining and social partners’ influence on policy. The chapters in this volume further deepen our understanding of these dynamics. Starting with the most studied of the three dimensions, trade unions have been overwhelmingly white and male both in terms of their membership and leadership (see Bergqvist, 1991; Colgan & Ledwith, 2002; Guillaume, 2015; Kirton, 2013; Kirton & Greene, 2002; Ledwith & Hansen, 2017). Cynthia Cockburn (1996) termed this the ‘gender democracy deficit’ in trade unions to place it in the context of representative democracy and not just lack of equal opportunity. Over the years, women’s trade union membership has increased together with their participation in the workforce and unions have increasingly recognised that their future strength requires recruiting and paying attention to previously marginalised groups, such as women. Yet, women remain under-represented in trade union leadership, with large differences between European countries. Thanks to feminist activism within trade unions, unions have developed gender equality and diversity strategies, such as applied quotas, and created specific bodies for women (see Artus & Holland, in this volume). More attention has recently been given to gender equality in unions’ internal policies and interest representation (e.g., Dawson, 2014; Kirton, 2017). In some contexts, such as the UK, equality is combined with diversity policies with the aim of advancing racial equality, increasing the representation of people of colour in the top

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echelons of trade unions and eradicating racism in unions and workplaces (Kirton & Greene, 2002). Trade unions and feminist movements share some goals, and in this sense, trade unions could be considered as a part of the ‘velvet triangle’ of feminist actors aiming at policy change (see Jacquot, in this volume). Yet, as many chapters in this book illustrate, unions are still struggling to incorporate gender and feminist perspectives as well as other equality issues, and gender equality policies may remain separate from their core business (Artus & Holland; Cullen; Erikson; Wagner & Teigen, in this volume). Traditionally, trade unions have protected the interests and wages of male workers (Colgan & Ledwith, 2002). For example, in previous decades, trade unions in many countries actively promoted the so-called family wages for male breadwinners, while women’s earnings were viewed as supplementary. Male unionists often participated in exclusionary strategies since women’s employment threatened their position in both the labour market and the domestic sphere (e.g., Guillaume, 2015; Rose, 1988; Walby, 1990). In both areas, it was in the interest of men that women remain in subordinate roles, and in that of employers, who received cheaper female labour. To some extent, trade unions still struggle with these issues and it is not self-evident that women’s and feminist objectives are advanced in these contexts. Collective bargaining has been seen as a key avenue for trade unions to advance women’s interests and gender equality (Dickens, 2000; Pillinger & Wintour, 2019). Some scholars have used the concept of equality bargaining to refer to collective negotiations about provisions likely to facilitate gender equality of particular interest to women (Colling & Dickens, 1998; Heery, 2006; Williamson & Baird, 2014; see also Milner & Pochic, in this volume). Equality bargaining has often focussed on specific measures, which risks compartmentalising gender equality into a separate agenda and to allow the bargaining process and the main issues to remain gender-blind (Dickens, 2000, p. 38). Previous research has also shown that even if successful initiatives exist (Erikson, 2021; Erikson, in this volume), implementation often remains patchy (Saari et al., 2021). In practice, however, gender issues are still marginalised in collective bargaining. Often, both trade unions and employers contribute to the de-legitimation of equality issues due to their vested interests and male-dominated unions still continue to prioritise class over gender (Dawson, 2014, see Erikson, in this volume). When present, gender equality may become a point of contention, as trade

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unions and employers representing different sectors of the economy hold different understandings of gender equality and prefer different solutions to tackle inequalities (see Elomäki & Kantola; Milner & Pochic; Rafstedt, in this volume). Including gender equality in collective bargaining is also linked to the question of bargaining power. While this varies in different national contexts, it is often the case that male-dominated industrial unions are stronger and have more power in the collective bargaining process than unions representing feminised sectors, which impacts bargaining outcomes, such as wages. Some feminised sectors, including the private service sector, typically have a lower level of union membership, which also impacts bargaining power when compared to highly unionised sectors. In some countries, including the Nordic countries, the feminised public sector has a high level of union density but its bargaining power is hindered by other factors that limit labour costs, such as competitiveness policies and austerity (Kylä-Laaso et al., 2021). As the result of less bargaining power, strikes in feminised sectors have tended to be less common, even if there are signs of increased politicisation (see Artus & Holland, in this volume). On a more systemic level, collective bargaining processes are themselves gendered and have gendered effects. As explained by Dickens (2000, p. 36): ‘collective bargaining is a gendered process and collective agreements may embody, reflect and perpetuate discriminatory practices.’ Centralised and regulated wage-setting systems have been associated with better outcomes for equal pay (e.g., Colling & Dickens, 1998), but such systems too have been found to institutionalise gender inequalities (see Koskinen Sandberg et al., in this volume). Forms of sectoral bargaining, where the male-dominated manufacturing or export sector set the ceiling for wage increases in other sectors—including the female-dominated care sector—have also been shown to be problematic from a gender perspective (Wagner & Teigen; Koskinen Sandberg et al., in this volume). The collective agreements that emerge as the result of negotiations may be explicitly discriminatory or institutionalise inequalities in subtle ways (Koskinen Sandberg et al., 2018). A further structural problem is that much of the precarious and informal work often performed by women and marginalised groups, such as domestic work, is not included in collective bargaining in most countries (see Ledoux & Krupka, in this volume). Both trade unions and employers have been unwilling to reflect on the

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problems of collective bargaining systems, which are the key locus of their societal power (Wagner & Teigen, in this volume; Elomäki et al., 2019). Finally, as mentioned above, labour market organisations often play a privileged role in policymaking in the field of social policy, including gender equality policy, and they have been able to shape gender equality legislation and policies at the national and EU levels. The picture that emerges from extant literature is that trade unions have often been supporting or even pushing for stronger gender equality legislation, but employer organisations have tended to oppose or water-down gender equality and anti-discrimination policies (e.g., Elomäki et al., 2021; Koskinen Sandberg, 2016). Resistance is connected to organisations’ interests: employers often consider new legislation and policies, such as better parental leave provisions or the right to flexible working time, as too expensive for companies and public budgets or otherwise burdensome for businesses (Elomäki & Kantola, 2020; Elomäki et al., 2021; Koskinen Sandberg, 2016; Lammi-Taskula & Takala, 2009). Yet, the chapters in this book show that employers’ support for public gender equality policies—as well as company-level initiatives—has increased, at least where these yield business benefits or are in line with economic goals, such as increasing labour market participation (see Rafstedt; Elomäki & Kantola, in this volume). Social partners’ influence on gender equality policy extends beyond specific gender equality initiatives. In many national contexts, social partners have better access to policymaking in the fields of economic, employment and social policy than traditional gender equality actors and can therefore play a role in the (non)integration of gender perspectives in these policies. Social partners also shape the meaning of gender equality in political and public debates at different levels by constructing gender equality and inequality in specific ways. For example, employers tend to address gender equality from the perspective of diversity management or through the business and economic cases for gender equality that emphasise the benefits of gender equality for business and the macroeconomy (Dickens, 2000; see also Elomäki & Kantola; Milner & Pochic; Rafstedt, in this volume). Employers’ gender equality discourses have been criticised for obscuring inequalities, individualising problems and solutions and legitimising capitalist accumulation and hegemonic economic goals.

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Shifting Political Context: Neoliberalisation, Crises and Transnationalisation In addition to being complex, the relationships between social partners, corporatism and gender equality are constantly changing. The shifting political context, including processes of neoliberalisation and the different crises that have shaped the past decades, has exacerbated existing gendered inequalities and affected gender equality policies. These developments have influenced corporatist processes and power dynamics too, with implications for gender equality, and pose new questions with regards to social partners and gender equality. The neoliberal austerity policies and labour market reforms that intensified in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial and economic crisis and the Eurozone crisis exacerbated intersectional gender inequalities. Austerity cuts in welfare benefits and public services have reduced the income of women and minority women in particular, and the femaledominated public sector workers have been impacted through lay-offs, pay decreases, worsening working conditions and lack of resources (Bassel & Emejulu, 2017; Kantola & Lombardo, 2017a; Karamessini & Rubery, 2014). Cuts in public services have also intensified the longstanding care crisis by increasing the need for unpaid care work within households and transferring care into formal and informal work in the market where it can be bought by those who can afford it (Dowling, 2021; Fraser, 2016). Austerity policies also weakened gender equality policies and institutions and sidelined traditional gender equality actors from policymaking across Europe exactly at the moment when they would have been most needed (Karamessini & Rubery, 2014). In many countries, austerity policies have been complemented with neoliberal labour market reforms, which have deregulated and added flexibility to labour markets, weakened working conditions and cut the costs of work to increase national competitiveness (Kylä-Laaso et al., 2021; Kylä-Laaso & Koskinen Sandberg, 2020; see Artus & Holland, Rafsted, in this volume). Moreover, neoliberal reforms that have extended market practices to the public sector and public care provision and aimed to make these services more effective, have affected working conditions in the feminised care sector and increased the pressures put on this undervalued work. The Covid-19 pandemic, which has simultaneously made the value of care work visible and exhausted female frontline workers, and has hit the female-dominated private services sector particularly hard

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in many countries, may shift or intensify existing trends (see Cullen, in this volume). The long-standing processes of neoliberalisation and the recent crises have opened up new questions with regards to how trade unions represent the interests of women and marginalised groups. In many countries, trade unions have been at the forefront of contesting austerity and competitiveness policies, but their willingness to integrate feminist concerns into their critique has varied (e.g., Cullen & Murphy, 2017; Elomäki & Kantola, 2017). Trade union policies and actions are deeply embedded in neoliberalism and associated austerity politics and may end up contributing to their gendered logic and inequalities instead of challenging them (Kylä-Laaso & Koskinen Sandberg, 2020; Kylä-Laaso et al., 2021). An important new question related to representation and shifts in care provision is how trade unions address the needs of new groups of care workers emerging due to the commodification of care, such as domestic workers and home-based carers who are predominantly women, often have migrant backgrounds and are in a precarious position (see Ledoux & Krupka, in this volume). The Covid-19 pandemic has made it all the more important for trade unions to tackle the devaluation of care work (see Cullen, in this volume). Meanwhile, corporatist processes and power relations in Europe are changing in ways that may have effects on intersectional gender equality. In terms of collective bargaining, in the face of employer pressure, there has been a trend towards decentralisation that has shifted bargaining from the cross-sectoral to the sectoral level in countries with central agreements, and from the sector towards the company (Christiansen, 2020). Centralised bargaining has come under further threat following the economic crisis. The Eurozone crisis and the EU’s strengthened economic governance intensified this development in Northern countries and put many governments in the South under pressure to reform collective bargaining systems and privilege companies over sectoral agreements (Marginson, 2015; van Gyes & Schulten, 2015; see Rafsted, in this volume). As the chapters of this volume show, this EU-enhanced shift towards sectoral and local bargaining has gendered impacts (see Koskinen Sandberg et al.; Wagner and Teigen). At the same time, the relative power balance between trade unions and employers has changed to the benefit of employers and unions’ influence has decreased (see Culpepper & Regan, 2014; Rafstedt, in this volume). This has been attributed, among other things, to EU-level pressures

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to increase cost competitiveness through wage moderation and labour market flexibility (Rathgeb & Tassinari, 2020). Countries across Europe have adopted wage moderation policies and other policies weakening working conditions despite opposition from trade unions, and sometimes with their consent. Such policies often have gendered impacts (KyläLaaso & Koskinen Sandberg, 2020; Kylä-Laaso et al., 2021). There are also examples of a more general bypassing of labour market organisations in policymaking in corporatist countries, including in the field of gender equality (Elomäki et al., 2021). The new situation has influenced the power dynamics between trade unions, employer organisations and governments, and labour market organisations’ strategies to influence policymaking. Finally, due to processes of transnationalisation, the possibilities and challenges in relation to social partners, corporatist processes and gender equality are increasingly shared in different European countries. Tripartite cooperation in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has a long history, including on the rights of female workers on issues such as equal pay or home-based work (Prugl, 1999, p. 201). With transnationalisation, we also draw attention to the interconnections between different European countries and the ways in which the social and political processes surrounding these issues are not insulated. Both good and bad practices are passed along across borders. For instance, Cullen’s chapter in this book shows the significance of Irish society being at the nexus of tensions of EU integration, austerity, Brexit and US corporate globalisation, which all create significant challenges for trade unions. The EU, in particular, is a source of both hard and soft law, norms and discourses, funding and political opportunity structures, which all influence gender equality, labour markets and surrounding actors in member states. As mentioned above, the strengthening of the EU’s economic governance processes has pushed collective bargaining systems in EU member states in the same direction and weakened trade unions’ powers. At the same time, EU-level collaboration of national trade unions and employer organisations influences national organisations’ policies and approaches to gender equality through the exchange of good practices and diffusion of policy ideas and framings (see Elomäki & Kantola, in this volume). While differences in national gender regimes, corporatist regimes and their entanglements remain, the interconnections between the national and supranational levels influence the relationship between social partners and gender equality in different ways.

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Gender, Power and Corporatism: Different Analytical Perspectives Research agendas and questions about gender and equality and labour market organisations, social partners and corporatism vary and are shaped by different theoretical, conceptual and methodological traditions, which relate to the ways in which gender is conceptualised. We draw here on a framework presented by Kantola and Lombardo (2017a, 2017b, 2019) to distinguish between five approaches that also underpin the analyses of this volume’s chapters. These include women, gender, deconstruction, intersectionality and post-deconstruction. Each use of the concept of sex and gender highlights power relations, institutions and structures surrounding corporatism in different ways. The women’s perspective entails asking where women are in political processes and theory (Kantola & Lombardo, 2019, p. 65) or analyses of European corporatism. Hence, the perspective of women illustrates the marginal position of women and the dominant position of men in the key corporatist places, processes and institutions. Critiques have pointed out, however, that these approaches risk reducing the category of gender to the category of women, which in turn is seen as a unified and stable category with common interests (Haastrup & Kenny, 2016, p. 204). A focus on women in this way presumes that they share common interests to be represented in corporatist processes. This, in turn, masks differences between women shaped by class, race and ethnicity, sexuality and age. Furthermore, as Cullen’s chapter in this volume demonstrates, the women’s perspective can result in ‘feminised’ approaches, as opposed to feminist approaches, where women’s presumed interests are inserted into existing structures without necessarily transforming them to advance gender equality. By contrast, in the gender approach, gender is the analytical category. This shifts scholarly attention to gendered structures: how gender shapes socially constructed roles assigned to women and men in political or corporatist processes, placing the former in a position of disadvantage with respect to the latter; how gender power reflects unequal gender relations; and how different values attached to masculinities and femininities underpin processes and structures, such as those related to corporatism (Kantola & Lombardo, 2019, p. 65). This approach can demonstrate how the historical exclusion of women from key positions in labour market organisations has meant that masculine practices have become

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the dominant norms and logics of these institutions. Theoretically and methodologically, this expansive notion of gender requires rethinking the very concepts used to analyse political processes and institutions. One example is the notion of power, which can be defined too narrowly by omitting broader notions of power, which, according to feminist theory, is a relation between diverse embodied people rather than just between institutions or polities, and which not only constrains women’s opportunities by dominating them but also empowers gendered subjects through their resistance to domination (Kantola & Lombardo, 2019, p. 66). While the approaches of women and gender dominate many analyses of gender and politics as well as those of gender and corporatism, Kantola and Lombardo (2017a, 2017b, 2019) discerned three additional feminist approaches. The concept of ‘deconstruction’ exposes the dominant gendered discourses and norms that underpin not just gender (Butler, 1990), but also political processes and institutions and have powerful effects on people. Three issues are central to this approach: how processes and institutions are shaped by social constructions, the ways in which structures and agency are mutually constituted and the role of norms and discourses (Lombardo, 2016, p. 124). Feminist policy analyses inspired by these approaches have illustrated how the problem of gender inequality and its solutions can be represented in different ways. A fixed conceptualisation or solution to the perceived gender inequality simultaneously silences other representations of the problem and its solutions, with gender and intersectional effects on people (e.g., Kantola & Lombardo, 2017b, 2019, p. 66; Rolandsen Agustín, 2013; Verloo, 2007). This approach is used, for instance, in the chapter by Cullen, analysing which ideas about gender and care work are produced in trade union campaigns in Ireland. Elomäki and Kantola, in turn, analyse the ways in which the European social partners construct gender equalities and Erikson examines the competing constructions of a specific solution to the gender pay gap in Sweden. Together, these analyses show the power that social partners exert in discursively framing gender equality, thereby both enabling and constraining its achievement. Gender and politics debates and analyses have been strongly influenced by feminist debates on intersectionality, which shows how gender intersects with other inequality categories such as race, ethnicity, class, disability or sexuality, and the power hierarchies, privileges and exclusions that are produced between embodied people (Crenshaw, 1991; Hill Collins, 1990). Power, in this approach, is related to the interacting

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dynamics of sexism, racism, homophobia and classism and other privileging or marginalising inequalities that people experience and politics produce (Kantola & Lombardo, 2019, p. 66). Structures of inequality shape the lives of different people (structural intersectionality) and inform the policies put forward by states (political intersectionality) (see Crenshaw, 1991). One of the key intersectional issues discussed in a number of chapters in this book is the relationship between class and gender (see, e.g., Artus & Holland; Erikson; Ledoux & Krupka, in this volume). Ledoux and Krupka discuss the ways in which the precarious position of home care workers, predominantly women often with migrant backgrounds, has been addressed in French collective bargaining processes and collective agreements. Post-deconstruction is a novel approach in gender and politics research that is widely debated in feminist theory and cultural studies but is still not employed in gender and political analysis. Post-deconstruction approaches ‘are interested in understanding what affects, emotions and bodily material do in gender and politics’ (Kantola & Lombardo, 2017b, p. 43). According to these perspectives, significant social change cannot be achieved solely by deconstructing discourses: we need to understand and alter the material conditions, affect and interests that these discourses serve (Coole & Frost, 2010, p. 25). Affect and emotions are perceived as shaping individual and collective bodies, cementing sexed and raced relations of domination, and as collectively organised around particular figures (for example, the asylum seeker), by attaching emotions of disgust or empathy to people who are constructed as ‘the other’ (Ahmed, 2004; Pedwell, 2014). Post-deconstruction approaches have been marginal in gender and politics research. However, these approaches are relevant for understanding how emotions and affect shape the politics around labour market organisations, social partners and corporatism. For instance, KyläLaaso et al. (2021) show how in Finland, problem representations about national competitiveness constructed the feminised public sector as a source of potential crisis and a threat to the masculine export sector. These affective constructions served to exacerbate gender inequalities in the labour market and the primacy of neoliberal economic and governmental policies—with the consent of trade unions. Affects and emotions were a key to understanding how this could happen.

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Content of the Book The chapters of the volume address the nexus of power, (in)equalities and corporatism in local, national and supranational contexts. The country cases cover different corporatist and gender regimes that range from Nordic welfare states with strong corporatist traditions (Sweden, Norway and Finland) to more familialist gender regimes with relatively moderate corporatist regimes (Germany) and neoliberal gender regimes where social partners have a weaker position (Ireland). The book also addresses the ways in which these traditions have been institutionalised in EU policymaking. The chapters are organised around the three key dimensions in which social partners and corporatist processes influence gender inequalities and measures to tackle them. The distinctions are, however, not always clear cut and each chapter speaks to more than one dimension. Together, the chapters provide a multifaceted understanding of how these dimensions and their interconnections play out in Europe, enabling comparisons of actors, processes and institutions between countries and at the EU level. After the introduction, the second part of this volume focuses on gendered institutions and practices of collective bargaining and their outcomes for gender equality. The cases of Norway, Sweden, France and Finland shed light on the gendered implications of both centralised and company-level bargaining systems. Ines Wagner and Mari Teigen’s chapter, ‘The Gendered Nature of Pattern Bargaining: Leeway for Change?’ analyses how the Norwegian pattern bargaining model is understood and problematised by the central trade union association, which aims to represent all workers’ interests but has also evolved around the notion of the male breadwinner. The pattern bargaining model is a centralised collective wage formation system in which the sector exposed to international competition sets a labour cost norm that other industries follow. The pattern bargaining model plays a main role in wage growth in the male-dominated export industry and the female-dominated public sector. The chapter analyses how a country famous for gender equality advances deals with potential friction between its collective bargaining model and the gender pay gap. The findings indicate that while the pattern bargaining model is beneficial for low-wage sectors, it is not beneficial for the higher-educated feminised public sector that is not part of these low-wage sectors. However, this gendered aspect of the pattern bargaining model remains silenced. The chapter contributes to

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the discussion on strong unions, centralised wage bargaining and how these institutions reduce inequality. Josefina Erikson’s chapter, ‘Conflicts over Gender Equality Bargaining: The Introduction of a Gender Equality Fund in Sweden,’ is a case study of an important Swedish attempt to advance equal pay through collective bargaining. The case study is called the Gender Equality Pot. It was applied to the blue collar sector with the aim of decreasing the gender pay gap in 2007. It was highly controversial from the start, yet pushed through in the negotiation processes and resulted in a relatively higher increase in salaries in women-dominated sectors. Erikson focuses on the intersectional axes of class and gender and the actors’ divergent constructions of them to explain the conflicts that surrounded the Gender Equality Pot and the fact that it has never been used again. The chapter provides new insights into obstacles to gender equality investments in collective bargaining. Clémence Ledoux and Rachel Krupka’s chapter, ‘Negotiating in a Highly Feminised Sector: the French Domestic Work and Home-based Care Sector,’ focuses on the feminised and precarious sector of domestic work, which can be considered particularly difficult for trade unions to represent. The chapter, however, shows how in France, over the last thirty years, governments have implemented policies to respond to the demand for domestic work and home-based care services. These have been accompanied by the development of collective agreements covering domestic workers and carers, who are mainly women, often migrants and in precarious employment. Generous subsidies encourage the declaration of these workers and have led to the formalisation of their status. This parallels the development and extension of national collective agreements negotiated by trade unions and employers’ representatives, although some regulations that apply to these workers differ from general employment law. This chapter shows how the institutional context in France has contributed to making this social dialogue inclusive and encouraged the social partners to engage in collective negotiations, even if many domestic workers and carers remain in precarious situations. Susan Milner and Sophie Pochic’s chapter, ‘Social Partners and Equality Bargaining in France: A Blunt Tool for Reducing Gender Pay Gaps,’ examines the French model of gender equality bargaining. The chapter focuses on the issue of the gender pay gap in France. It suggests that its persistence raises questions about the efficacy of collective bargaining as a policy solution. Successive French governments extended

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the scope of equality bargaining and introduced sanctions. The chapter explains why equality bargaining has failed to make headway in tackling gender pay gaps in France despite this high level of policy attention. It suggests that failures to address the weaknesses of collective bargaining as a regulatory tool and giving insufficient attention to transparency leave significant discretion in the formulation of published indicators. The analysis also shows the institutional and judicial obstacles to promoting an intersectional approach to gender equality in France. Paula Koskinen Sandberg, Anna Elomäki, Armi Mustosmäki and Johanna Kantola’s chapter, ‘Is Finnish Corporatism Reconfiguring, and Is It Good for Gender Equality?’ focuses on the recent developments within the Finnish corporatist system and whether these have implications for gender equality. While reconfiguration, such as decentralisation of collective bargaining, might entail some risks for gender equality, the authors argue that more traditional Finnish corporatism has not been purely beneficial for gender equality either. It has maintained the status quo and many of the gendered hierarchies and inequalities within the labour market, including the gender pay gap. The authors find change in Finnish corporatism was caused by the rise of neoliberal ideas and primacy of national competitiveness and austerity, but also remarkable stability and continuity. The social partners are still an important part of policy formulation and strong coordination typically emerges during collective bargaining rounds that are supposed to be union level. The reconfiguration in the power balance between the government and social partners can potentially also mean more progressive and effective gender equality policies implemented in the future. The third part of this volume provides insights into the ways in which social partners influence policymaking and frame gender equality. Two of the chapters focus on the issue at the European Union level and one on Spain. Sophie Jacquot’s chapter, ‘EU Neo-Corporatism and Gender Equality Policy: Disappearing Partnership?’ focuses on the role of social partners in the governance of gender equality policy at the EU level. Its contribution is discerning three periodisations of the social partners’ participation and role in EU gender policy. The periods include, first, until the late 1980s, an era of collective mistrust between gender equality policy actors and EU social partners and individual—as opposed to institutionalised—support. Second, from the 1990s onwards, social partners started to play a central role in the construction of EU legislation on gender equality at work but did not want to be considered as ‘any other

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partners.’ Third, since the 2010s, there has been a transformation of EU neo-corporatism and gender equality governance, and both social partners and most other gender equality actors have lost a significant part of their influence. Overall, the chapter shows that EU social partners need to be given a more important analytical role than has hitherto been accorded to them in the literature on EU gender and politics. Anna Elomäki and Johanna Kantola’s chapter, ‘European Social Partners as Gender Equality Actors: Activities and Constructions of Gender Equality,’ asks how European social partners frame their message about gender equality in their public statements and documents and what political struggles this implies on gender equality. It analyses the differences between social partners’ framings of gender equality problems and the proposed solutions. The analysis shows how the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) is an active and proactive advocate of gender equality whose gender equality agenda has expanded over the years. It maps the vehement opposition to gender equality by employers’ organisations BusinessEurope, SMEunited and the SGIEurope, and their aims to reframe the contents of gender equality in the narrowest possible ways to limit EU action in the field. However, it also pays attention to the differences between the three employer organisations. Overall, as social dialogue has somewhat diminished in the EU, the social partners have put more effort into lobbying the Commission, Parliament and member state governments. Through lobbying, they can push for their understanding of gender equality problems and of how expansive or limited EU gender equality policies should be, which makes the analysis provided in the chapter particularly relevant. My Rafstedt’s chapter, ‘Converging and Conflicting Perspectives on Gender Equality Amongst Spanish Social Partners,’ explores how Spanish trade unions and employer organisations address two important gender equality policy issues: work-life balance and the gender pay gap. The chapter shows that the social partners presented share conceptions of gender equality and policy solutions in the context of work-life balance policies, while their perspectives differ with respect to the gender pay gap. The chapter further argues that conflicting perspectives on gender equality are not the only or even primary obstacle for reaching agreements between social partners in this field. Conflicting understandings of the power balance between workers and employers often represent a more significant bottleneck. The chapter provides a nuanced understanding of when conflicting perspectives on gender equality become an obstacle to

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social partner agreements on gender equality and sheds light on how the shifting power balance between trade unions and employers and social partners’ conflicting perspectives of this balance may hinder agreements. The fourth part focuses on gendered patterns of representation in trade unions and unions’ abilities to take into account the needs and interests of women, marginalised groups and feminised care workers in a changing labour market and political context. The chapters focus on Germany, Ireland and Turkey. Ingrid Artus and Judith Holland’s chapter, entitled ‘Trade Unions, Labour Conflict and Gender in Germany,’ evaluates the current state of gender equality within the German labour movement and asks whether the ‘union patriarchy’ in Germany has moved towards a greater feminisation of the workers’ movement. The chapter, which focuses on Germany’s two biggest unions, the male-dominated IG Metall and ver.di, the latter of which represents feminised services sectors, analyses measures to promote women’s representation as well as integration of gender perspectives in collective bargaining and strike action. It finds that whereas IG Metall tends to frame its collective bargaining policy as a gender-neutral matter of social justice, ver.di explicitly emphasises women’s interests. It also draws attention to an increased visibility of unionised striking women in the German trade union movement in the context of the current care crisis. The chapter shows that trade unions do not become more gender equal automatically as the number of women in employment increases, but that this requires active commitment and sometimes results in conflicts within the organisations. Moreover, it is important for the unions to link gender equality issues to their core business of collective bargaining instead of outsourcing them to a special department. Pauline Cullen’s chapter, ‘From Feminised to Feminist? Trade Union Campaigns for Early Care Educators, Nurses and Midwives in Ireland,’ examines union approaches to organising female-dominated care sectors. It asks which specific ideas about gender and care work are produced in trade union campaigns for female-dominated care occupations and with what consequences. Cullen distinguishes between feminised framing of gender and care that valorises care work yet may risk reinforcing its undervaluation, and feminist framing that makes visible the gendered organisation of work and calls for the cultural, social and economic valuation of both paid and unpaid care work. The chapter argues that feminised and feminist framing both feature in campaigns, alongside anti-austerity

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and anti-marketisation messaging that defines care as a public good. Feminist framing is rarely public-facing, reflecting a long-standing ambivalence of trade unionism towards the gendering of paid care work. The chapter suggests that the Covid-19 pandemic, which has simultaneously exalted and exhausted female frontline care workers, may create the impetus for a feminist trade union agenda. Burcu Ta¸skın and Berfin Çakın’s chapter, ‘Selecting Social Partners: Collective Bargaining for Gender Equality in the Shadow of Political Polarisation in Turkey,’ examines how political polarisation inhibits the representation of women’s interests in the collective bargaining process in Turkey. The Turkish context has some specific features that distinguish it from many other European countries: it has one the lowest trade union density rates in Europe, both overall and for women. Turkey ranks 130th in gender equality out of 153 countries despite having the 17th biggest economy in the world. The chapter focuses on political polarisation between unions and the symbiotic relationship between conservative unions and Turkey’s ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP). The authors refer to this symbiotic relationship as authoritarian corporatism. There are only a few women in leadership positions in Turkish trade unions. However, two female unionists have been selected in 2017 and 2018 for executive positions in trade unions that oppose the pro-Islamist government ideologically. The authors do not, however, find a clear link between union leaders’ gender and unions’ gender policies. The concluding chapter by Anna Elomäki, Johanna Kantola and Paula Koskinen Sandberg brings together the findings of the other chapters to consider their significance for gendered collective bargaining, social partners influencing policymaking and framing gender equality and gendered representation in trade unions.

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Collective Bargaining and Gender Equality

The Gendered Nature of Pattern Bargaining: Leeway for Change? Ines Wagner

and Mari Teigen

Introduction This chapter investigates the relationship between gender pay equity and coordinated collective bargaining. It contributes to the discussion on strong unions and centralised wage bargaining and how these institutions reduce inequality (Traxler et al., 2007). We acknowledge previous findings show that coordinated bargaining and regulated industrial relation systems lead to more egalitarian wage outcomes than market-based wages (Colling & Dickens, 1998). At the same time, we seek to disentangle how central actors in the labour market discuss this egalitarian system of wage formation in relation to the gendered labour market and the gender pay gap. We start from the premise that the way the gender pay gap is problematised by policy actors plays an important role in how policies to curtail the gender pay gap are subsequently implemented or challenged. The literature has approached the gender pay gap in different ways. For

I. Wagner (B) · M. Teigen Institute for Social Research, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] M. Teigen e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5_2

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example, studies have regarded it as a problem with the gender-segregated labour market (if men and women made different choices, the gender gap would disappear); as related to comparable worth (the implementation of job evaluation schemes will reduce the gender pay gap); as an issue of low pay (the pay for low-paid female-dominated jobs needs to increase); and finally as less of a problem and more of a reflection of market value (the gender pay gap is a reflection of what employers are willing to pay for different jobs) (see Holst, 2015). In this chapter, we examine the gender pay gap in relation to the collective wage-setting system in Norway, the so-called wage leadership model, and hereafter referred to as the pattern bargaining model. We look specifically at how the gender pay gap is problematised in the statement documents of the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, hereafter referred to as LO (Landsorganisasjonen i Norge/Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions ), a key actor in the collective wage formation system in Norway. LO organises almost 1 million people in a country of 5 million. The total collective agreement coverage is 67%. The public sector is exhaustively covered, while the private sector is about 50% covered (NOU, 2013, p. 13). Systematically analysing the yearly policy statements of LO from 2008 to 2019, we ask the following questions: How is the problem of the gender pay gap in the Norwegian labour market understood? What does LO consider to be the main causes of the gender pay gap problem? To what extent does it consider the pattern bargaining model a problem for diminishing the gender pay gap? What is understood as the leeway for making changes in the pattern bargaining model? The pattern bargaining model is a collective wage formation system in which the sector exposed to international competition (manufacturing) sets a labour cost norm, usually a percentage increase, which other industries follow. Multi-employer bargaining is the dominant model of collective bargaining in Norway. The running period for collective agreements is two years, although wage rates are re-negotiated after one year. The pay rounds always start out with the export industries, and no agreements will be signed before a settlement is reached for the industries that set the wage norm (Anderson et al., 2015). The Norwegian system of bargaining and income policies is anchored in tripartite committees and state-supported mediation (ibid.). The focus on the relationship between the pattern bargaining model and the gender pay gap is meaningful in two respects. First, it contributes

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to research on pattern bargaining and the gendered nature of institutions in industrial relations (Ibsen, 2015). While much of the literature on pattern bargaining studies varieties in power relations between the state and the organised employers and organised labour, we study how this wage formation system is being discussed by LO within the context of a highly gender-segregated labour market and the resulting gender pay gap. This is important because the pattern bargaining model plays a main role in wage growth in the male-dominated export industry as well as in the female-dominated public sector—one important example of a persistent gender pay gap between sectors. We do not want to advocate for a change towards market-determined wages. Rather, it is important to study different wage formation systems, such as the pattern bargaining system, in order to understand their gendered effects. For one, feminist scholarship suggests that men benefit more than women from collectively negotiated wages (Hayter & Weinberg, 2011). Second, it contributes to an emergent field of studies on gender equality policy under conditions of corporatism (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019; Saari et al., 2019). We contribute to this field by interrogating a particular part of the corporatist regime, namely, the pattern bargaining model, and how it is understood in the context of today’s gendered labour market with a persistent sectoral gender pay gap. The findings point to a strong belief in, and defence of, the Norwegian collective bargaining model, which undermines a serious public assessment of how to ameliorate or even eradicate the gender pay gap in relation to the pattern bargaining model.

Collective Bargaining, Institutional Regulation and the Gender Pay Gap Collective bargaining is at the heart of industrial relations. However, there has long been a lack of gender analysis of collective bargaining, which has only recently gained some attention (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019; Saari et al., 2019; Williamson & Baird, 2014). Institutionalist research shows those labour markets without institutional regulation, both legal and collective, are far from egalitarian, and the main purpose of institutions that influence wage setting is to increase fairness and reduce potential inequality (Hayter & Weinberg, 2011). Collective bargaining is needed to promote transparent and fair systems for pay determination by establishing ‘going rates’ for categories of labour, the common

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rule proposed by Webb and Webb (1987), rather than leaving pay decisions to managerial discretion under the guise of the market. The balance of evidence suggests that both collective bargaining and legal minimum wages reduce wage inequality (Barth et al., 2014; Hayter & Weinberg, 2011; Rubery & Johnson, 2019), but do they also reduce gender pay inequality? According to Webb and Webb (1987), collective bargaining promotes fair wage systems because it raises the wage floor. It thereby reduces inequalities within sectors. Importantly for the context of this paper, however, inequalities between sectors may remain stable or even widen. It is important to note that there are risks of gender inequality in both regulated and less regulated wage bargaining contexts. With regard to the former, it should be noted that the way trade unions bargain collectively for wage increases developed under the notion of the male breadwinner model (Williamson & Baird, 2014). While there is recognition that collective bargaining has been oriented towards the white, full-time male workforce, there is less awareness of possible conflicts between the interests of women and ‘mainstream’ union activities, pay decisions and habits of organising the labour market (Wajcman, 2000). To a certain extent, this has been discussed under the term and practice of ‘equality bargaining’—the practice of advancing workplace gender equality through collective negotiation (Williamson & Baird, 2014). However, here the focus is on negotiating special measures to benefit female employees, who are seen to have different needs than men. This can lead to women’s issues being compartmentalised within the negotiation process, effectively making the collective bargaining process itself gender blind (Dickens, 2000). Rubery and Hebson (2018) show that trade unions in the Nordic countries have taken action on gender pay issues, even in the context of high collective bargaining coverage. However, here too the collective bargaining system evolved within the context of the male breadwinner model. In the context of equal pay discussions in the 1960s in Norway, LO, a trade union umbrella organisation, first and foremost represented the interests of male industrial workers—‘his’ rights and ‘his’ collective bargaining model (Skjeie & Teigen, 2003). As Forrest (1997) writes, the development of collective bargaining was premised on the assumption that workers or the breadwinners were men, and thus the right to ‘free’ collective bargaining was shaped by the needs of workers, or men, for whom collective bargaining was both necessary and legitimate.

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Forrest (1997) refers to this system of collective bargaining as a ‘male model’ of collective bargaining, by which she means that this institution, along with its rights and privileges, developed a particular form of collective bargaining that institutionalised the rights and privileges designed to protect and advance the economic interests of working-class men by excluding and marginalising women. Much of today’s knowledge on wage formation is based on the dominance of white and privileged groups of industrialised male workers. These frames disregard or downplay structural inequality when considering fundamental research questions, such as how wages are set in advanced political economies. Recent studies in the Finnish context show that, in a country with strong gender equality norms, institutionalised undervaluation of women’s work through pay negotiations goes unchallenged (see Koskinen Sandberg et al., 2018, 2017; Saari et al., 2019). Given that wage setting is always inherently political and never a technical matter (Rubery & Johnson, 2019, p. 2), it is important to develop comprehensive approaches to address the gender pay gap. How can we explain that, even in a context characterised by a dual commitment to upholding both collective pay bargaining and gender equality, there is a hierarchy of norms? We therefore ask how central actors in pay negotiations and the policy setting agenda itself are positioned in this discourse. While the gendered nature of the pattern bargaining model is little studied, it thematically fits into feminist scholarship on comparable worth (England, 1992): the tendency for female-dominated jobs to pay less than male-dominated jobs, even when their competence requirements are similar (e.g. education level). Hence, comparable worth raises an issue akin to equal pay for work of equal value, but it emphasises structural features that transcend individual discrimination. Comparable worth concerns pay differences that appear to result from gender bias rather than other job characteristics (England, 1992). The central proposition is that ‘cultural processes of valuation are gendered; because women are devalued, social roles (including occupations) and skills that are associated with women are culturally devalued relative to those associated with men’ (Kilbourne et al., 1994, p. 694). The argument here is that past and present discrimination ‘by employers and male-dominated trade unions resulted in sex-segregated jobs and wage rates for female-dominated jobs that are systematically lower than wage rates for jobs of similar complexity usually held by men’ (Acker, 1989, p. 6). With this comparable worth perspective, the way in which jobs are evaluated and wages are set comes

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into focus. However, so far we have little insight into how the particular institutional mechanisms of pattern bargaining contribute to the gender pay gap in feminised areas of work. This is important because scholarship in industrial relations has established that the pattern bargaining model is the most effective system for establishing an equal wage structure. The aim of this chapter is thus to provide an initial analysis of how LO discusses the wage formation system—and the pattern bargaining model in particular—in relation to the gender pay gap and to point out how it understands the relationship and what is silenced in this process.

The Norwegian Case Employment is high and almost equal among men and women in the Norwegian labour market. Still, the Norwegian labour market is characterised by persistent gender segregation, as men and women typically work in different sectors and occupations. Admittedly, the gendered division in the Norwegian labour market is decreasing (Østbakken et al., 2017). In recent years, the Norwegian labour market has gone from being one of Europe’s most gender segregated to one of the least. This change is partly due to the fact that women, to a somewhat greater extent, are choosing male-dominated occupations and education and partly because the gender division in several European countries has been increasing (Reisel et al., in press). Nevertheless, the persistent gender division in the Norwegian labour market constitutes an important context for examining these persistent pay differences between women and men. Average hourly wage differences show that women earn 89 percent of what men earn. Until the beginning of the 1990s, the gender differences in wages were significantly decreasing, while the rate of change has moved slowly in the direction of reduced gender differences in recent years. The persistent gender differences in wages are related to structural factors, where the gender-segregated labour market and pay differences between the public and the private sectors are particularly important. Occupations in the public sector where women dominate are generally paid less than occupations in the private sector where men dominate. The wage gap between the public and private sectors is larger in occupations with the same requirements for human capital (length of education) (16.5%) than the average wage gap in the entire labour market (10.8%) (Wagner et al., 2020).

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In Norway, collective agreements are the principal sources of wage determination. Central to the Norwegian pattern bargaining model, also called the Aukrust model (1977) or the wage-leadership model, is the distinction between tradable and non-tradable sectors. Tradable sectors, such as manufacturing and finance, sell most of their produce on the world market and encounter foreign competition. Non-tradable sectors, such as health and education, consist of locally rendered services. During sectoral wage negotiations, a tradable sector—in reality, the maledominated manufacturing sector—bargains first. In Denmark and Sweden as well, pattern bargaining results in wage restraint for the sheltered sectors, which are brought in line with the exposed ones (Ibsen, 2015). The wage outcome in the competition-exposed sector forms a norm for wage growth, which forms the basis for wage setting in the rest of the economy. In fact, wage growth should not exceed what the tradable sector can handle, thus sustaining a sufficiently large internationally competitive sector. This coordinated wage settlement mitigates wage differentials between workers across firms and industries, establishing an egalitarian wage structure (Barth et al., 2014). However, this Norwegian wage regime was developed under the male breadwinner model and implicitly values male- and female-dominated sectors differently, which undermines women in the labour market (Skjeie & Teigen, 2003). Pattern bargaining thus implicitly values male-dominated sectors more highly in terms of value creation when it comes to wage formation.

Method and Material We employ a document analysis drawing on Bacchi’s (1999) policyconstructivist approach for studying policy responses: ‘What is the problem represented to be?’ Bacchi claimed that the way in which a social problem is defined largely determines the relevant policy response. In other words, every policy proposal contains an explicit or implicit diagnosis of the problem. Here, we are interested in how the gender pay gap problem is presented in relation to the gendered labour market, how the pattern bargaining model is presented as a solution or a hindrance and which discourse dominates the other. We approach this from the point of view that the way in which the problem is defined determines its solutions (Bacchi, 1999). We base our insights on a document analysis of LO’s ‘decisions and statements’ documents, which are published annually and present

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the outcome of LO’s most important internal (and not the members’ representations) discussions on wages, or the basis on which LO negotiates with the employers’ association NHO (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon/Confederation of Norwegian Enterprises ). We analyse these key annual documents from 2008 to 2019. The authors translated the text from Norwegian to English. Using the qualitative analysis software tool NVivo, we looked for problem representations of the following topics: collective wage increases and the gender-segregated labour market, value in relation to the gender pay gap and the collective wage formation model as well as how the pattern bargaining model is seen in relation to correcting the wages of feminised sectors. We analysed how these relationships were discussed in relation to each other in the documents. Hence, we study how the problem is presented, what remains unproblematic and which effects are produced by the particular representation. Trade unions constitute an important political arena for advancements towards a more gender-equal labour market (Eurofound, 2014). Especially through their role in collective bargaining, unions are able to influence and improve pay, working conditions and work–family reconciliation. For the purposes of this paper, we define these trade unions as central actors in the policies related to the gender pay gap. The problem representations in these key documents make the vested interests—as well as politics of these key actors—visible.

Labour, Wage Formation and Equality The Role of Pattern Bargaining in the Norwegian Economy and the Gender Pay Gap LO describes pattern bargaining as important for the competitiveness of the Norwegian economy, a pillar of the wage formation system that ensures economic growth and competitiveness. For example, one LO document states the following: This model has so far placed the Norwegian economy at the top of the world in terms of productivity, employment, distribution and economic solidity. This emphasises the importance of LO continuing to fulfil its role by emphasising fair distribution and overall financial responsibility. (LO, 2016)

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In this way, LO presents Norwegian pattern bargaining as key to explaining the competitiveness and success of the Norwegian economy. Simultaneously, LO emphasises in this statement its own role and importance in achieving an equitable distribution of pay between sectors through pattern bargaining. The quote underscores how LO sees itself as an integral actor in protecting this particular model of collective wage formation. The organisational identity of LO is linked to the institutional setup of the pattern bargaining model in Norway through which LO ensures the sustainability of the Norwegian economy. Besides addressing the importance of the pattern bargaining model for the whole economy, the yearly statements also address its relation to particular sectors. The business sector and top leaders in state administration do not follow the norms set by the pattern bargaining system, mainly by paying exorbitant bonuses on top of regularly paid wages. This is what LO criticises and refers to as disproportionate wages, which are seen as inconsistent with the wage formation set through pattern bargaining: LO cannot accept that CEOs and top managers consistently receive a higher salary development than state employees in general. New figures for wage growth for top managers in the industry show that the growth is far above the pattern bargaining framework, and the growth is increasing. The norm set by the industry exposed to competition shall apply to everyone. (LO, 2019)

The statement criticises the horizontal inequality created by deviation from the wage norm establsihed by the pattern bargaining model for top managers in the business sector and in state administration. In a similar vein LO states: The dividends must be kept at a reasonable level, managers’ pay development kept in check and other areas of negotiation placed within the pattern bargaining framework. The financial sector, which until now has risen above the collective reason in wage development, especially for the upper strata, must take responsibility for solvency and its influence on e.g. of the [sic] wage culture in business. (LO, 2016)

These statements criticise the wage development that goes beyond the wage norms set through pattern bargaining and call for understanding wage developments in a collective way. While LO criticises the finance industry for its high wages, it also criticises one of the parties in the

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tripartite arrangement for pushing the norm set by the pattern bargaining model to benefit those at the top in the state sector: An important premise for the wage setting model is coordination in the public sector. It is the competition-exposed industries (frontfaget ) that set the limit for the wage increase there as well. Without this, it is difficult to imagine how the competition-exposed industries should be able to set the norm for wage growth for the economy as a whole. However, in the state sector, the government pushes to change the determination of job codes, general rules for wage determination and the wage distribution for local negotiations without the right to strike. (LO, 2016)

In this way, LO argues that the state sector has to follow the pattern bargaining model; in other words, that wages in the public sector, including those of top leaders, have to follow the pattern bargaining model. Crucially, LO argues that the pattern bargaining model is beneficial for those at the bottom of the wage distribution. LO illustrates the relationship between pattern bargaining and the gender pay gap by pointing to the fact that wage development for women is best achieved through central collective bargaining. Accordingly, a close connection is made between low pay and the gender pay gap: For LO, distributive concerns are important. In collective bargaining at a central level, low wages and equal pay can be taken care of to a greater extent than if everything is left to the market. The benefits of coordination must be distributed through small wage differences. (LO, 2018, 2019)

This statement emphasises the importance of the pattern bargaining model because it ensures a rise in wages through stable, collectively bargained increases as opposed to a potentially volatile market-based system. Nevertheless, there is no reflection on the system itself and whether it reasonably addresses diversity among women within the labour market and their class-based needs. Instead, women’s wage development—and women as an overall group—appear to benefit on a general level from collective bargaining: Women’s wage development is best ensured through collective, central bargaining. Equal pay profile on centrally and locally agreed supplements must be continued and supported by structural measures to combat gender segregation and for more gender equality in working life. (LO, 2018)

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LO emphasises the role trade unions have carved out for themselves within the corporatist system as actors regulating the market and ensuring that market forces do not result in a downward spiral of wages. This also means that LO avoids a problem presentation of the gender pay gap that cannot be solved outside of the realm of the pattern bargaining model. Moreover, it does not suggest solutions or adjustments that could compensate for the lower pay of feminised sectors that follow the wage norms of the pattern bargaining model. LO presents pattern bargaining as an unassailable model to advance the wage development of women’s groups but fails to differentiate the challenges and needs that exist within the confines of gender, work and pay. How Do LO Documents Discuss or Problematise ‘Value’? With regard to the gender pay gap in relation to the gender-segregated labour market, LO makes reference to the different valuation of female- and male-dominated sectors in its statements. The relationship between value or comparable worth between gendered professions is first mentioned in LO’s statement from 2017. In order to resolve the gender pay gap in connection to how jobs are valued, the LO documents suggest addressing it mainly through individual-level measures. LO addresses this in its recent statements from 2019: Equal pay profile through on centrally and locally agreed supplements must be continued and supported by structural measures against gender segregation and for more gender equality in working life. Different valuations of women’s and men’s work must be counteracted through equal pay for work of equal value. (LO, 2019)

In this quote, LO first argues that equal pay should be advanced through efforts to desegregate the labour market. Their meaning is unclear, however, because it is not discussed any further in the document. Does it mean that sectoral pay differences are less of a problem to LO if they are not gender differentiated? Second, LO argues that equal pay refers to work of equal value, with no reference to what is meant by ‘equal pay for work of equal value’. Equal pay for equal value may mean that different occupations that are similar with respect to the required educational level should have equal pay, but it might also mean that work of

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equal value within a company or a sector should have equal pay, although not necessarily across sectors. Accordingly, LO acknowledges the gender-segregated labour market as a main barrier to equal pay and a main reason for the slow reversal of unequal pay, but only partially: However, equalisation between men and women’s average wage levels is slow. Half the difference is due to a gender-segregated working life, and the other half there is no other explanation than that women are women and men are men. (LO, 2019)

LO points out that part of the gender pay gap is related to the differences between the sexes themselves. It is unclear what LO means by for ‘… the other half there is no other explanation than that women are women and men are men’ (2019). Does it mean that unequal pay for work of equal value is not considered relevant to the gender pay gap? Or, is wage discrimination considered irrelevant as an explanation for the gender pay gap? At the same time, LO states in its 2017 and 2018 statements that it will explicitly strive for ‘higher valuation of womendominated occupations’ (LO, 2018) and that a ‘main task for LO is to contribute to long-term sustainable job growth, while ensuring a fair share of employees value creation and that wages and other income are distributed fairly’ (LO, 2017). However, there is no specific discussion in the statements regarding how this shall be translated into policy or how LO will contribute to this as a main actor in the wage-setting process. How LO Problematises the Gender Pay Gap: The Underlying Problem Is Individual Behaviour Rather Than a Structural Issue The LO documents mainly present the problem of equal pay as stemming from the gender-segregated labour market, which emerges because men and women choose different occupations. In the 2019 statement, LO points out the importance of measures intended to reverse gender segregation in the labour market, focusing on the pay gap between high-income and low-income groups. It highlights that maledominated groups are overwhelmingly present at the high-income level, while women dominate the low-wage sector (LO, 2019). The document states that the underlying reasons for this are individual-level issues. For example, changes need to be promoted in individual working life, such as

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the development of adequate skills and the professional development and full-time promotion of women in order to move more women into higher paid positions (LO, 2019). Here, LO presents the problem as one where men and women are pooled (or pool themselves) into different occupations. The feminised jobs mentioned here are in the low-wage sector, while the male-dominated sector is highly paid. The presented solutions involve changing the behaviour of individual workers. The problem is thus portrayed as one that is related to individual behaviour rather than structural inequalities: The equal pay problem must be solved both in terms of collective bargaining and politically. This should be the basis for strategic and systematic efforts for equal pay. Several measures are needed in working life. Adequate staffing, skills development and full-time promotion will help to lift women’s occupations. Stimulation for shared parental leave is also important. Both the government and employers have a responsibility here. It can be more demanding to get results in distributive policies in times of upswing and the room for wage growth is higher. This applies in general and to the wage relationship between women and men in particular. From experience, male-dominated groups on the top run away, while in several female-dominated industries there is a downward pressure in wages and conditions. (LO, 2019)

LO thus points to several approaches that may have an impact on the equal pay problem but fails to include those related to the pattern bargaining model. In addition, emphasis is placed on factors that work against LO’s equal pay efforts, such as the fact that moderate wage development is less likely during an upswing. In this sense, it will be interesting to follow developments in both discourses and relative wages in light of the enormous economic crisis created by COVID-19.

Conclusion The aim of this chapter is to examine the discourse on the relationship between the gender pay gap and the Norwegian wage-setting system. We do this by examining how LO, the main employee organisation in Norway, presents the gender pay gap problem and its solutions. These insights contribute to our understanding of the dynamics behind the persistence of the gender pay gap in a Nordic country with a compressed

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wage structure and a highly gender-segregated labour market. Womendominated occupations, typically public sector occupations, are valued lower than those in sectors dominated by men with comparable levels of education. The wage-setting system in Norway is understood to create a more egalitarian wage structure overall than most other advanced industrial countries. In particular, the pattern bargaining model of the wage formation system and regulated industrial relation systems have been associated with more egalitarian wage outcomes (Colling & Dickens, 1998). However, we have little insight into how this system, which establishes a more egalitarian wage structure, creates gendered effects. While this chapter cannot provide such a wholesome evaluation, it aims to start the discussion by taking an initial look at how the relationship between pattern bargaining and the gender pay gap is problematised by LO. The findings from the document analysis reveal the following. The yearly statements illustrate the importance of pattern bargaining as a crucial building block for wage formation and for the sustainability of the Norwegian economy in general. Pattern bargaining is also regarded as the best way to reduce rather than widen the gender pay gap. At the same time, the annual LO statements present the gender-segregated labour market as the main cause of the gender pay gap. They suggest that the underlying causes of the gender-segregated labour market are related to individual choice, and this in turn is mainly related to low pay for those who chose to work in the respective sectors. The reason that pattern bargaining is beneficial for the low-pay sector is because it generally lifts the wage levels of all groups of workers. While we do not dispute the importance of increasing wages for this sector, our findings show that the relationship of pattern bargaining to other feminised sectors is silenced. For example, the higher-educated female-dominated public sector is not part of the low-wage sector but has to follow the wage norms set by the male-dominated manufacturing sector. Hence, there is a relationship between pattern bargaining and gendered sectors, which is not acknowledged by LO. Because gendered sectors are locked into different bargaining areas, and as the female-dominated public sector cannot go beyond the established wage norms, the gender pay gap between the sectors is kept constant (Wagner and Teigen forthcoming). This is similar to Dawson’s (2014) argument that women’s interests tend to become marginalised in collective bargaining, albeit in a different way. Women working in lower-pay positions are acknowledged by LO as an important group to focus on when discussing the gender pay gap and the wage

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formation system. However, other groups, such as higher-educated public sector workers, who are also part of lower- (but not low pay) remunerated sectors, are not part of the discussion on ways to increase wages. In this way, LO acknowledges the problem of the gender pay gap, but only partly, and only for specific groups. Focusing on the low-pay sector in the problem formulation also allows LO to advocate for closing the gender pay gap through the mechanism of the pattern bargaining system. Solutions to address the gender pay gap between the sectors (locked in different bargaining areas) will likely involve adjustments to the pattern bargaining system. For example, a gender equality fund could be introduced that would increase the wages of the female-dominated sector above the wage norm (see, e.g., Erikson, 2021). As long as the solution to the problem is compatible with the existing approach to how wages are formed, LO continues to discuss it in its yearly policy statements. Using Bacchi’s (1999) terminology, the gender pay gap is not understood as a problem requiring policy solutions targeting the way wages are set for men and women working predominantly in different sectors with similar levels of education. Again, in Bacchi’s (1999) terminology, the problem is largely defined as one of individual choices, meaning that solutions should focus on ways to encourage individuals to make less gender-typical choices. The possibility that the causal chain is the opposite—that the gender-segregated labour market is, at least to some extent, caused by occupation- and sector-based pay differences—is not addressed. While the yearly statements acknowledge a need to address the gender pay gap, no particular solution is mentioned to address this problem structurally or by altering the pattern bargaining model itself. In other words, the statements do not display much willingness to adjust the pattern bargaining model to combat the gender pay gap, reflecting the assertion raised in previous studies that wages in feminised sectors are undervalued (Austen et al., 2013; Koskinen Sandberg, 2017). To be sure, we do not discuss this issue in order to show that a system based on individual rather than collective wage negotiation will be more beneficial to female-dominated sectors. However, the focus of LO’s problem formulations and its silences have important consequences for different groups of women, locked in different sectors and occupations. Moreover, trade unions, more than employer associations, have integrated gender equality as a formal part of their agenda and have institutional mechanisms dedicated to this issue. For example, LO has a special gender

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equality committee that meets six times a year. Without highlighting the issues LO silences, we will not see theoretical or practical progress in the way the gender pay gap develops. LO, as a trade union confederation, voices workers’ concerns as part of industrial democracy, but it is also an organisation that is made up of trade unions with individual interests and needs. LO thus has to balance its role as a promoter of ‘swords of justice’ with maintaining its power bases within the production system that provides the bread and butter of union funding and activism (Rubery & Hebson, 2018). At times, this may mean prioritising certain members’ interests to the detriment of groups that are currently underrepresented among their members. The reason trade unions have been reluctant to press for a radical revaluation of jobs may in part reflect caution. Challenging existing collectively regulated differentials questions not only past trade union actions but also the trade unions’ traditional defence of customs and practices. With regard to the analysis of the documents in question, these fears are not specifically raised, but they are alluded to in LOs reference to the importance of collective wage setting (as well as the support for pattern bargaining as collective wage-setting formation). With regard to changing the status quo, Hyman (1999) proposed that, although the emergence of multiple identities may undermine the current model of trade unionism (based on traditional male manual workers’ solidarity), a new model of trade unionism may yet emerge ‘based on “organic solidarity” and the reconciliation of new and more diverse interests grounded in gender, ethnicity, and other social identities’ (Heery, 2003, p. 279). However, the Covid-19-related health and economic crisis has painted a different picture. During the pandemic, the inequality that exists between tariff areas—and not within them—has become more apparent. Frontline workers, publicly praised and collectively applauded, are not appreciated in terms of salaries and wages. Unio, the trade union association in Norway consisting mainly of employees in the public sector, believes the pattern bargaining system does not work, for example, for the municipal sector, which is dominated by women: ‘the market does not work for these groups. When there is demand for an engineer, the salary for this group rises. When there is a demand for nurses and kindergarten teachers, employers do not compete for wages’ (Unio, 2020). Unio stresses that the requirement for competence is disregarded, which might lead to the pattern bargaining system and the Norwegian model losing credibility with large occupational groups. Within the larger trade

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union movement, there is a difference in opinion regarding the pattern bargaining system in relation to the gender pay gap and the need for considering changes to the system. Future studies are needed to explore this friction further. However, LO has the primary responsibility for negotiating the main wage settlement with NHO, and therefore the power relations between LO and different members as well as those between LO and other trade union associations require further exploration. Is a discussion possible, at least internally, within the trade union movement? This chapter points to this trade-off as a reduction of equal pay and as an important societal problem, but discussion on this issue is lacking. A limitation here is that we only look at the discursive element of the discussion. More research needs to be conducted examining the material consequences for different groups of female workers.

References Acker, J. (1989). Doing comparable worth: Gender, class, and pay equity. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Anderson, J., Hegewisch, A., & Hayes J. (2015). The union advantage for women. Institute for Women’s Policy Research. Aukrust, O. (1977). Inflation in the open economy: A Norwegian model. In L. B. Klein & W. S. Sâlant (Eds.), World wide inflation: Theory and recent experience. Brookings. Trykket i Artikler fra Statistisk sentralbyrå, nr. 96. Austen, S., Jefferson, T., & Preston, A. (2013). Contrasting economic analyses of equal remuneration: The social and community services (SACS) case. Journal of Industrial Relations, 55(1), 60–79. Bacchi, C. (1999). Women, policy and politics: The construction of policy problems. London: Sage. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446217887 Barth, E., Bryson, A., Davis, J., & Freeman, R. (2014, September). It’s where you work: Increases in earnings dispersion across establishments and individuals in the U.S. (NBER Working Paper, 20447). Colling, T., & Dickens, L. (1998). Selling the case for gender equality: Deregulation and equality bargaining. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 36(3), 389–411. Dawson, T. (2014). Collective bargaining and the gender pay gap in the printing industry. Gender, Work and Organization, 21(5), 381–394. Dickens, L. (2000). Collective bargaining and the promotion of gender equality at work: Opportunities and challenges for trade unions. Transfer, 6(2), 193– 208. England, P. (1992). Comparable worth: Theories and evidence. Walter de Gruyter.

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Erikson, J. (2021). A special fund for gender equality? Institutional constraints and gendered consequences in Swedish collective bargaining. Gender Work & Organization. https://doi.org/10.1111/gwao.12645. Eurofound. (2014). Social partners and gender equality in Europe. Publications Office of the European Union. Forrest, A. (1997). Securing the male breadwinner: A feminist interpretation of PC 1003. Relations Industrielles/industrial Relations, 52(1), 91–113. Hayter, S., & Weinberg, B. (2011). Mind the gap: Collective bargaining and wage inequality. In S. Hayter (Ed.), The role of collective bargaining in the global economy. ILO. Heery, E. (2003). Trade unions and industrial relations. In P. Ackers & A. Wilkinson (Eds.), Understanding work and employment (pp. 278–304). Oxford University Press. Holst, C. (2015). Institutional variation and normative theory: Lessons from a local equal pay controversy. In I. F. Engelstad & A. Hagelund (Eds.), Cooperation and conflict the Nordic way: Work, welfare, and institutional change in Scandinavia. De Gruyter. Hyman, R. (1999). Imagined solidarities: Can trade unions resist globalization? In P. Leisink (Ed.), Globalization and labour relations (pp. 94–115). Edward Elgar. Ibsen, C. L. (2015). Three approaches to coordinated bargaining: A case for power-based explanations. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 21(1), 39–56. Kilbourne, B., England, P., Farkas, G., Beron, K., & Weir, D. (1994). Returns to kill, compensating differentials, and gender bias: Effects of occupational characteristics on the wages of white women and men. American Journal of Sociology, 100, 689–719. Koskinen Sandberg, P. (2017). Intertwining gender inequalities and genderneutral legitimacy in job evaluation and performance-related pay. Gender, Work & Organization, 24(2), 156–170. Koskinen Sandberg, P., & Saari, M. (2019). Sisters (can’t) unite! Wages as macropolitical, and the gendered power orders of corporatism. Gender, Work & Organization, 26(5), 633–649. Koskinen Sandberg, P., Törnroos, M., & Kohvakka, R. (2018). The institutionalized undervaluation of women’s work: The case of local government sector collective agreements. Work, Employment and Society, 32(4), 707–725. LO. (2016). Uttalelser fra representantskapsmøte. LO. (2017). Uttalelser fra representantskapsmøte. LO. (2018). Uttalelser fra representantskapsmøte. LO. (2019). Uttalelser fra representantskapsmøte. NOU. (2013). Lønnsdannelsen og utfordringer for norsk økonomi.

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Østbakken, K. M., Reisel, L., Schøne, P., & Barth E. (2017). Kjønnssegregering og mobilitet i det norske arbeidsmarkedet (Institute for Social Research Report 2017:9). Institute for Social Research. https://samfunnsforskning.brage.unit. no/samfunnsforskning-xmlui/handle/11250/2467872. Reisel, L., Barth, E., Schøne, P., & Østbakken, K. M. (in press). Changing gender segregation in the Norwegian labor market. Work, Employment and Society. Rubery, J., & Hebson, G. (2018). Applying a gender lens to employment relations: Revitalisation, resistance and risks. Journal of Industrial Relations, 60(3), 414–436. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022185618766680. Rubery, J., & Johnson, M. (2019). Closing the gender pay gap: What role for trade unions? (ILO ACTRAV Working Paper). https://www.ilo.org/ wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---actrav/documents/publication/ wcms_684156.pdf. Saari, M., Kantola, J., & Koskinen Sandberg, P. (2019). Implementing equal pay policy: Clash between gender equality and corporatism. Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, 28(2), 265–289. https:// doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxz020. Skjeie, H., & Teigen, M. (2003). Menn imellom. Gyldendal Akademisk. Traxler, F., Brandl, B., & Glassner, V. (2007). Pattern bargaining: An investigation into its agency, context and evidence. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 46(2), 33–55. Unio. (2020). Interviews with Unio representative. Wagner, I., Fjell, L. K., Frisell, M., & Østbakken, K. (2020). Likelønn og det kjønnsdelte arbeidsmarkedet: Individuelle preferanser eller strukturelle begrensninger? (Institute for Social Research Report 2020:4). Institute for Social Research. https://samfunnsforskning.brage.unit.no/samfunnsfors kning-xmlui/handle/11250/2641600. Wajcman, J. (2000). Feminism facing industrial relations in Britain. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 38(2), 183–201. Webb, S., & Webb, B. (1987). Industrial democracy, II (1st ed.). Longmans, Green & Co. Williamson, S., & Baird, M. (2014). Gender equality bargaining: Developing theory and practice. Journal of Industrial Relations, 56(2), 155–169. https:// doi.org/10.1177/0022185613517468.

Conflicts Over Gender Equality Bargaining: The Introduction of a Gender Equality Fund in Sweden Josefina Erikson

Introduction An increased interest in gender equality and feminist awareness can be noted in recent years within the trade union movement. Not only have women become a larger segment of trade union membership and increased their numbers among trade union leaders and ombudspersons, but such new issues as childcare and parental leave have also been incorporated into union agendas (Bergqvist, 2004; Curtin, 2018; Ledwith & Hansen, 2012). Nevertheless, introducing a gender perspective into the labour movement—where the class perspective is the self-evident starting point—has been both challenging and controversial (Hirdman, 1998; Mahon, 1996). The trade union movement has been described in this regard as a male bastion dominated by the norm of a male family provider and a masculine-coded ideal of leadership (Ledwith & Hansen, 2012). This chapter investigates a case of collective bargaining in which the conflict between class and gender came to the fore. In 2007, a gender

J. Erikson (B) Department of Government, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5_3

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equality fund was included in collective bargaining in the blue-collar sector in Sweden. The so-called Gender Equality Pot (GEP) was unusual in the sense that it explicitly targeted women-dominated sectors. In addition to the general pay increase addressed in collective bargaining, a special increase was calculated for particular sectors on the basis of the percentage of women with wages below 20,000 SEK/month (2,000 EUR). The explicit intention was to equalise the gender pay gap in Sweden’s gender-segregated labour market. The GEP was controversial from the beginning, and its critics included employer organisations as well as the male-dominated metal workers’ union. In spite of the fact that the GEP had the intended effect—women-dominated sectors received between 4.3 and 4.8% wage increases, with male-dominated sectors receiving 3.4% (SvR, 30 May 2008)—it has never been utilised again. Erikson (2021) argues that institutional shifts in a neo-liberal direction after 2007 have significantly hampered further attempts to make such gender equality investments. The aim of this chapter is to explore the underlying conflicts in the debate centring on the Gender Equality Pot in order to further understand the obstacles to gender equality investments in collective bargaining. There is a particular focus on the challenges associated with divergent understandings of class and gender, not least because opposing interests and lines of conflict become evident in a case of collective bargaining where wages are at stake. Two research questions are explored in this chapter: (1) How did actors’ understandings of the gender pay gap influence the debate concerning the GEP? (2) How did different understandings of gender and class shape the debate? The study contributes new knowledge concerning, in particular, why the GEP was so controversial and, in general, the obstacles to incorporating gender equality issues into trade union agendas. The findings reveal that the controversy in respect to the GEP regards not only the inclusion of gender as a relevant category in collective bargaining, but also how to understand the gender pay gap in the labour market—whether it is caused by an undervaluation of women’s work, or is a gendered consequence of women working in low-qualified jobs. While this conflict reflects in part the diversity of union memberships and realities, it also displays signs of the institutionalised undervaluation of women’s work in certain sectors as something natural and taken for granted (Koskinen Sandberg et al., 2018). Such findings imply that unions can indeed serve as promotors of gender equality, but they also

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highlight that it is imperative to reach agreements that take into account the divergent realities and interests of individual unions. It has proven difficult in practice, however, to include a multilayered and intersectional perspective concerning inequalities in the labour market (Erikson, forthcoming).

Trade Unions and Gender Trade unions and feminist movements share the goal of universal social, economic, and political rights for everyone (Curtin, 2011, p. 310). Relations between feminists and trade unions have nonetheless been complex, and even hostile at times. On the one hand, union representatives have been suspicious of women’s interests, viewing them as a potential threat to a unified class struggle. On the other, feminists have regarded trade unions as ‘patriarchal’ institutions that reproduce gender injustice, viewing ‘male’ union culture as a hindrance to change towards a more equitable society (Curtin, 2011; Hirdman, 1998; Mahon, 1996). An obvious and complex tension between feminism and unionism is reflected in the debate concerning ‘the primacy of class oppression versus patriarchal oppression’ (Curtin, 2011, p. 310). In spite of such tensions, Briskin (2011) argues that trade unions indeed possess the capacity to work as ‘equality vehicles’ that empower women to work collectively for their own interests. This is evident, for instance, in the inclusion of ‘an equality agenda’ in collective bargaining (Briskin, 2011, pp. 214, 226). Studies comparing union and nonunion workplaces further underscore the importance of trade unions as promoters of gender equality. Not only do women employees who are represented by a union enjoy better terms and conditions than those who are not, but they also have better job protection (Booth, 1995; Martin & Roberts, 1984; Millward & Woodland, 1995). The presence of women within trade unions has indeed been identified as an important prerequisite for the inclusion of gender equality concerns in collective bargaining (Gregory & Milner, 2009; Heery, 2006). In this respect, Curtin finds that even if obstacles and successes vary across countries, women trade unionists have been able to influence trade union agendas, making them more inclusive of the interests of women workers (Curtin, 2018). Notwithstanding the necessity and possibility of pursuing genderrelated issues within trade unions, questions of how to incorporate a gender perspective in union agendas entail a number of difficulties and

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challenges. While women and men share common interests in the workplace, such as the need for income, employment security, and tolerable working conditions, ‘women also have distinctive needs and priorities’ (Cunnison & Stageman, 1993, p. 220). Lawrence argues that trade unions comprise an area in which it has been easier to pursue a feminist agenda that emphasises solidarity and similarities between male and female workers rather than the differences (Lawrence, 2016, p. 4). In much the same vein, a number of studies have shown that it has proven difficult to include and accept issues which explicitly target gender inequalities. For instance, Dawson finds in her study of the gender pay gap in the U.K. printing industry that the de-legitimisation of issues of importance to women, including the roles of women officials, serves to exclude or rapidly dismiss questions of equal pay from the bargaining agenda insofar as ‘it prioritises an agenda predicated on traditional lines of class struggle’ (Dawson, 2014, p. 392). Furthermore, even where women have managed to include gender equality issues on the agenda, employers have trivialised them, rendering such claims invisible while prioritising highly skilled male workers in the negotiation process (Dawson, 2014). Another difficulty with incorporating gender equality issues into collective bargaining agendas involves the diversity within the group of women workers—the intersection of different social cleavages can make it difficult to talk about women’s shared interests. For example, the Finnish nurses’ industrial action in 2007 for equal pay sheds light on the conflict between class and gender (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019; Saari et al., 2019). This case illustrates how a wage initiative intended to target the gender pay gap resulted in the magnification of class-based wage differences among women employees (Saari et al., 2019, p. 17). Briefly stated, while trade unions can serve an important function as promotors of gender equality, there are obstacles and challenges associated with incorporating the gender perspective in trade union agendas.

The Swedish Case From an international perspective, Sweden is one of the leading countries today in respect to gender equality. The labour market is characterised by a high percentage of women in the workforce, a high level of unionised women, and extensive day care provisions (SOU, 2015, p. 151; see also SCB). Separate wage lists for men and women workers were abolished in the 1960s, and the Equal Pay Act, which banned wage discrimination

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within occupations and establishments, was passed in 1980. In addition, a strong norm of wage solidarity has historically shaped collective bargaining in Sweden. Insofar as this norm has led to conscious efforts to minimise wage differences between groups of workers and institute the principal of equal pay for equal work, it has also been beneficial for gender equality (Meyersson et al., 2001). While this norm was particularly strong between the 1950s and the 1980s, it has continued to play an important role in Swedish collective bargaining. In spite of such positive developments, however, gender inequalities continue to exist in the labour market. Women earned on average 89.3% of men’s salaries in 2018 (MI, 2018) and women-dominated sectors had significantly lower average wages than male-dominated sectors (SOU, 2015, p. 168; LO Fakta). An important cause of this state of affairs may be that gender equality issues continued to take second place to malecoded class interests in the labour movement (Bergqvist et al., 2016; Ekström, 2012). The relation between class and gender has historically been a sensitive issue within the Swedish labour movement. As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, the prominent social democratic leader Hjalmar Branting declared that ‘class comes before sex’ (as quoted in Curtin & Higgins, 1998, p. 79). Against this background, it was an important statement when the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) published their report Class and Sex in the 1990s to highlight the work–life of women and their exclusion from union organisations (Curtin & Higgins, 1998). Such developments pressed forward, leading LO to elect their first women leader in the 2000s and proclaim themselves a feminist organisation. This chapter focuses on the 2007 collective bargaining process in the blue-collar sector. LO organises 14 affiliated unions with almost 1.5 million members, including such classic working occupations as construction workers, janitors, cooks, and shop assistants, as well as public service workers in the fields of child and elderly care. Most of these unions have either a female or a male majority, which reflects the existence of a very gender-segregated labour market. For example, approximately 78% of the membership of the metalworkers’ union, IF Metall, are men, while women comprise about 80% of the municipal workers’ union, Kommunal. LO’s counterpart is the employers association, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (SNL). SNL is Sweden’s largest and most influential business federation, representing 49 member organisations and 60,000 member companies with over 1.6 million employees (SNL homepage).

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While statistics on the gender balance in these organisations and companies is not readily accessible, a recent study of 1,000 large companies indicates that men still dominate the leading positions, with only 19% of large companies having a gender-balanced management team (DI , 200301). Given that Sweden is characterised by a high level of gender awareness in general, it is likely that obstacles to gender equality policies that emerge in the present study are also relevant in other contexts.

Methodology: Understanding Underlying Problem Constructions Related to Class and Gender Inspired by Carol L. Bacchi’s WPR approach (Bacchi, 2009), which sets off from the assumption that problem representations are implicit elements of all (policy) solutions, the analysis is guided by two questions: (1) How is the problem of the gender pay gap constructed in the narratives expressed by supporters and opponents of the Gender Equality Pot? (2) How do actors conceive of gender and class (or other social identities) and the relations between them? This approach is useful for identifying the inequalities that actors regard as problematic along with their underlying assumptions, such as those concerning class and gender. On the basis of our analysis, the chapter will address obstacles to the incorporation of gender equality initiatives in collective bargaining. The analysis is based upon original interviews with 18 respondents—6 women and 12 men—who represented trade unions as well as employer associations. The respondents were selected either because they were directly involved in the GEP case, or because they worked with gender equality issues in their respective organisations. The interviews, approximately one hour in duration, were conducted between June 2019 and February 2020. The interview questions revolved specifically around the collective bargaining process in 2007, including the introduction of the GEP, and more generally around gender equality in the labour market and gender equality work in collective bargaining. The interviews were recorded and transcribed, and all interviewees were anonymised with a number between 1 and 18 (see list after References). In addition to the interviews, more than 200 news articles published in several different newspapers in 2006 and 2007 were analysed in order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the debate concerning

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the GEP at the time. While the analysis of the 2007 collective bargaining process was based on all of this material, I do not explicitly refer to all of the sources in the text. The examples used in the text were selected because they are representative of particular positions in the debate. They are referred to by abbreviations of the newspapers’ names and the dates of publication, with full information provided after References.

Social Partners and Lines of Conflict in the Course of Events Before presenting the analysis of the problem constructions, I will briefly summarise the process through which the Gender Equality Pot was implemented in 2007 in order to identify the social partners involved and the lines of conflict in the debate (see Erikson, 2021 for a more detailed description). The 2007 bargaining process affected almost 3 million employees in blue-collar, white-collar, and academic professions, with 500 of the labour market’s 600 collective agreements being up for negotiation. While almost all unions and employer organisations were involved in the bargaining process, the present chapter focuses on the blue-collar sector. The issue of gender equality had already been on the bargaining agenda for some time. The 2001 and 2003 agreements in the bluecollar sector had explicitly included the intention to equalise wage levels through targeted investments in low-wage sectors, which included many women-dominated sectors (Interviews 12, 6, 16). At the time, however, there was frustration within LO since these investments were regarded as having been not sufficient, which gave rise to the view that more radical measures were needed to address the persistent gender pay gap. A Gender Equality Pot model was launched within this context as a means for specifically targeting gender inequalities (Interview 12). It was constructed as a mathematical formula that calculated an extra pay increase for low-wage and women-dominated sectors that would supplement the general wage increase—the higher the percentage of women in a given sectors, the greater the amount of extra money. It was a collective model in that it did not specify how to distribute the pot on the individual level. For instance, a sector consisting of 100% women with salaries below 2,000 EUR/month would generate approximately 20 EUR/month extra per woman employee, while a sector having no women with such a salary would receive no extra funding (MI, 2007,

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p. 113). The GEP was controversial from the very beginning, not only because it favoured low-wage women-dominated sectors at the expense of other groups, but also because of its technical construction that provided less room for negotiation (Interviews 16, 10, 2). Sweden has a system of multi-employer bargaining such that both unions and employer associations coordinate their own positions and activities on a central level (Traxler & Mermet, 2003, p. 233). The GEP was included in LO’s joint list of demands in the 2007 bargaining process, albeit not without difficulty. IF Metall was reluctant from the beginning to accept the agreement, but they agreed to do so if they were not obligated to apply the GEP in their own agreements or undertake sympathy actions in support of other unions that did (Interviews 9, 16; LO-Tidningen, 061201). LO’s final list of demands included a one-year agreement with a general wage increase of 3.9%, or 825 SEK (85 EUR), which was supplemented by the GEP (MI, 2007, p. 113). In the actual bargaining process, each union negotiates their own agreement with their employer counterpart. Subsequent to the 1997 Industrial Agreement, the agreement reached in the industrial sector establishes the level of the ‘cost norm’ for the entire labour market on the basis of productivity growth. In line with this model, the industrial sector reached the first agreement by the middle of March 2007—the total value of the 3-year agreement was calculated to be 10.2% (MI, 2007, p. 117ff.). This was intended to serve as the ‘mark’ for the rest of the labour market. The industrial unions had decided not to implement the GEP, but its estimated cost was included in their agreement and designated to be used for an extra pay increase for those with the lowest wages (Handels, 2019, p. 24). Shortly after this agreement was reached, the bargaining process continued in the commercial sector between the Union of Commercial Employees (Handels ) and the corresponding employers’ association, the Swedish Trade Federation (Svensk Handel ). Insofar as this was a womendominated and low-income sector, the collective bargaining process was decisive for how to interpret and apply the GEP in the negotiations that followed in other sectors. The parties in the trade sector managed to reach a three-year agreement rather smoothly, with a total wage increase of 12.6% including the GEP. But the bargaining process took an unexpected turn when the agreement was about to be formally accepted. In spite of the informal agreement between the sectorial parties, it was rejected by the SNL and Svensk Handel was not permitted to sign it (DN , 070326). Not only did

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the SNL maintain that the wages were too high and not in line with the ‘mark’, but they also disliked the GEP and similar investments for designated groups (OpO, 2007, p. 31; Interviews 8, 18, 17). After a turbulent public debate, a strike declaration, and the involvement of the Swedish National Mediation Office, the SNL found themselves defeated and the initial agreement was finally signed. The contract for retail workers resulted in a 13% wage increase because of the adoption of the GEP (MI, 2007, p. 248). This agreement was of great significance for the rest of the bargaining process, particularly for other women-dominated areas, which also adopted contracts that included the GEP (OpO, 2007, p. 33). After the employers’ initial defeat, the rest of the bargaining proceeded without further conflict. While the representatives of women-dominated unions described the outcome of the bargaining process as a victory (LO, 070525), IF Metall declared that they would not support a GEP again (LO-Tidningen, 070926). Erikson (2021) has found that the flexibility of the institutional framework for collective bargaining at the time explains in part the implementation of the GEP. However, that framework changed in a neo-liberal direction after 2007, with a strong industry norm and increased coordination among employers playing key roles in restricting further attempts to implement gender equality investments. We will now take a closer look at the different positions within this debate, particularly how key actors conceived of gender, class, and the gender pay gap.

Analysing Divergent Problem Constructions in the Debate While unions and employers agree that everyone, regardless of gender, should have the same rights, including pay, there are fundamental differences regarding how they conceive of problems in respect to the gender pay gap and gender equality in the labour market. Proponents of the GEP: The Problem of Value Discrimination Regarding Women’s Work Some of the most outspoken proponents of the GEP were the womendominated unions in LO, such as the Union of Municipal Workers and the Union of Commercial Employees. The LO board also promoted the GEP.

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The need for a Gender Equality Pot was motivated on the basis of a detailed problem construction regarding the value discrimination of women’s work and gendered power hierarchies in the labour market. A leading representative of LO at the time drew a distinction between two types of gender inequalities regarding salaries (Interview 12) that resembles Grimshaw and Rubery’s (2007) discussion of the undervaluation of women’s work. The first concerned wage inequalities within the same branch, that is, women being paid less than men for the same efficiency in the same job. Discrimination law prohibits this type of inequality, and representatives of both unions and employers agreed that we have come a long way towards abolishing it in Sweden—it is no longer a major problem (Interviews 8, 12). The second type of gender wage gap is caused by the fact that women are employed in jobs or occupations that are themselves undervalued. An LO representative maintained that such undervaluation remains problematic: ‘If you make a chart with the proportion of women and salaries, it’s like a shotgun that shoots in only one corner—the more the women, the lower the salary in the branch’ (Interview 12). This inequality concerns the ‘relative salary position of a given sector’ (Interview 12). Several GEP proponents remarked that there is a problem of value discrimination regarding ‘typically feminine’ professions and branches: ‘[Women] often have another type of work, more often with a social aspect. It does not involve nuts and bolts, but rather taking care of people or serving people. That kind of work has been devalued’ (Interview 16). Proponents also spoke of women as being ‘mispaid’ (felavlönade) (LO, 070309; Interviews 6, 12). One LO representative addressed this point at length: We have different criteria for whether people should or should not get paid well. We have education, work environment, dirt, heavy lifting, and responsibility. Take an assistant nurse and a worker running a small excavator on a construction site. He’s in a machine with ventilation and is using a joystick. His work requires an education of hardly one year. Compare that with the assistant nurse who has to lift people like me [a heavy man], handle urine and feces—it’s not dust, but you have to say that it affects the work environment. She has a three-year education as well as being responsible for people, which should be valued at least as high as a machine. According to all these traditional criteria, she should have a higher salary than him, but he still had 2,000 SEK (200 EUR) more per month than her. (Interview 12)

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Proponents of the GEP often observed that gendered structures in society are the cause of value discrimination in respect to womendominated professions (Interviews 5, 9; SD, 070410; SIF , 071003). For example, one LO representative argued that ‘we have to account for the value discrimination that follows from the masculine structures that value women-dominated branches and professions lower than male ones’ (LO-tidningen, 060616). Another LO representative who supported the GEP stated that it is a question not only of the number of women and men within a sector, but also of whether the character of a job is gendered as masculine or feminine. She noted that more men in a sector would not automatically increase salaries. This view was also expressed by a representative of one of the women-dominated unions, who remarked that ‘[t]he solution is not that more men enter women-dominated sectors. The job as such must be upgraded’ (SD, 070410). While proponents agreed that low-income investments would also target many women to a certain extent since many women-dominated sectors were among those that were the lowest-paid, they recognised the need to explicitly acknowledge gender. One respondent thus maintained that ‘a low-wage investment targets maybe 80% of women because women are low-paid. But women are low-paid not only because they have jobs with low salaries, but also because they have jobs that are wrongly valued’ (Interview 6). In brief, proponents of the GEP expressed a problem construction that highlighted value discrimination in respect to women-dominated sectors as the main reason for pay inequalities in the labour market. This problem construction recognised the existence of gendered structures in society that subordinate typically feminine branches and professions. The need for a contract model that explicitly acknowledged gender was therefore viewed as necessary. Opponents of the GEP: The Problem of Women Working in Low-Income Sectors The most outspoken opponents of the GEP were employer organisations as well as IF Metall and its allies among the other industrial unions (Erikson, 2021). While opponents claimed to be in favour of gender equality, and recognised gender inequalities in the labour market as problematic, they did not share the proponents’ problem understanding

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concerning the undervaluation of women’s work. They were also negative to introducing gender as a relevant category in collective bargaining. A common objection was that there was no value discrimination concerning women’s work in general, even if opponents acknowledged there were certain problems with gender equality. As one opponent remarked, If you make comparisons between education and salary, then you can see that in many women-dominated sectors you do not get the same salary for the same level of education [as in male-dominated sectors]. Of course value discrimination exists.... But that doesn’t mean that all women are subject to value discrimination—although some are. (Interview 10)

Another opponent argued in a similar manner: There are probably incorrectly paid women, but I cannot say that this is true for the labour market as a whole. We have not yet evaluated the entire labour market. Nevertheless, they [GEP proponents] want to push forward a principle based on the idea that women are ‘mispaid’ everywhere. (Kommunalarbetaren, 070926)

From this point of view, there was a need to present some type of empirical facts to support the claim of value discrimination in respect to particular sectors or professions: ‘you have to dare to be precise when speaking about the actual people who are subject to value discrimination’ (Interview 10). The critique was even more pronounced among employers, who did not agree at all that women-dominated sectors were negatively valued. A central SNL representative stated that he was completely against salary differences between men and women doing the same job. But when it became a question of how branches or groups were valued, he strongly opposed evaluations of the ‘correct’ level of a profession’s salary. His understanding was that salaries were set by the market, and that it was neither possible, nor desirable to interfere in that process: ‘We can only conclude that it is a market economy. In other words, you, me and all of us who remunerate, buy and pay - if everyone thought it was worth more, then we would be willing to pay more’ (Interview 8). This view resembles arguments that employers have used in other contexts to call into question whether there is even a problem with a gender pay gap (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019).

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While opponents from the unions were reluctant to accept that there was a general value discrimination concerning women-dominated sectors, they did regard the gender-segregated labour market as problematic. A representative from IF Metall argued, for instance, that ‘I think that we talk far too little about the gender-segregated labour market’ (Interview 10). He further maintained that it was an issue of ‘getting men and women to work in the same workplaces… trying to make sure that we don’t have women dominance in one union and male dominance in another’ (Interview 10). From this perspective, the gender pay gap would have been driven primarily by class differences, being a consequence of women working in low-income sectors. The emphasis on class as the primary basis for the gender pay gap was further underscored by opponents arguing in favour of low-income investments as a solution to the problem. Representatives from IF Metall maintained that low-income investments were ‘important for gender equality’ and ‘target women very well’ (Interview 10). In addition, they argued that such investments were ‘more fair’ than a gender-based model (SD, 070926). It is also evident that the primary concern of IF Metall was the class perspective—especially the position of the working class in relation to that of white-collar workers. This is clear from the following statement: You cannot link salary to gender in such a way. After all, there are femaledominated white collar areas where the average salary is 25,000 SEK (2,500 EUR). Should they have more than our members [blue collar workers] just because there are more women in those areas? (DA, 071101).

One representative from IF Metall claimed that there had been too great a focus on gender during the 2000s, which was the period when LO, ‘without much discussion, left the class struggle for the gender struggle’ (Interview 10). Another example of the class perspective that IF Metall’s representatives repeatedly brought up in their critique of the GEP was the ‘laundry workers’ group, which comprises a low-paid sector in their contract area that did not benefit from the GEP. One representative stated that while the percentage of women was lower among laundry workers than in a women-dominated area such as assistant nurses, the salary of laundry workers—including women—was even lower. Nevertheless, implementing the GEP model would give assistant nurses a higher

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pay raise than laundry workers because the percentage of women was higher in that sector. He remarked that ‘it is clear that this makes it very difficult for us to say that ‘now we will go out and support the assistant nurses’ (Interview 10). We must note, however, that proponents of the GEP often referred to assistant nurses as comprising a valued discriminated profession that—if correctly valued—would not be a low-income profession comparable to other low-qualified professions. We should also add that the IF Metall discussion of laundry workers and assistant nurses did not at all address the character of the different jobs or how the two professions are valued, instead conceiving of both as comparable low-income sectors. In contrast to the question of the undervaluation of women’s work, this understanding constructs the gender pay gap as primarily a question of class inequalities that had gendered consequences insofar as women were overrepresented among the lowest-paid—and least-qualified—workers. This is a different type of inequality, although it is also gendered. An LO representative described this inequality in the following terms: You could say that there are not as many incorrectly paid women in industry. Women instead get stuck in the lowest-paid jobs, but maybe it’s not wrong that these jobs are lower paid than jobs that demand more. [The problem is that] women remain there. (Interview 6)

In contrast to opponents of the GEP from the unions, who supported class-based models, the employer representatives were opposed to all types of ‘group-based’ models, including both the GEP and low-wage investments. One SNL representative remarked that [A] big difference between us and the unions is that we are more interested in individuals, not collectives. I think you should keep that in mind.... Why should individuals—men, women, or whatever you like—get something regardless of whether they, as individuals, have done anything? (Interview 8)

A traditional employers’ perspective describes wage distribution as something positive. Employer representatives thus argued that a more differentiated wage setting ‘strongly fosters gender equality’ (Interview 8), and that the distribution of salaries between branches was ‘too small in Sweden’ at the time (Interview 17).

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In summary, opponents of the GEP not only questioned it as a solution to the gender pay gap, but they also questioned in various ways the problem understandings expressed by the proponents. First and foremost, they did not agree that there was value discrimination concerning womendominated sectors in general, although some of the unions representatives agreed that it might exist for a given profession or sector. Opponents from the unions understood the gender pay gap as a problem primarily caused by a gender-segregated labour market that could be resolved by low-income investments and through a better mix of men and women in low-income and high-income sectors. They did not view upgrading traditional ‘feminine’ sectors and professions as necessary. Both employer and union opponents dismissed gender as a relevant category in collective bargaining. While the employers distanced themselves from all ‘group-based models’, the unions were positive to ‘income-based models’. Unions maintained that low-income investments would target the gender pay gap as well since many women were lowpaid, arguing that gender was an unfair principle in setting wages. This view implicitly expressed a problem understanding that class differences were the primary reason for the gender pay gap insofar as women were overrepresented in the lowest-paid and least-qualified jobs.

Class and Gender: Understanding the Conflict Over the GEP The GEP was unique in the sense that it acknowledged that gender is a relevant category in collective bargaining. In contrast to salary investments that prescribe how to distribute the pay raise on the individual level, the GEP was constructed as a collective model that generated additional funds for distribution on the basis of the percentage of women within a given sector. It was thus a solution aimed at gendered sectors, not individuals. Although its expressed goal was to decrease the gender pay gap, men and women with similar jobs within a women-dominated sector could thus get the same pay raise. It should also be noted that the GEP had a ‘low-income’ component since it only targeted women-dominated sectors with salaries below 20,000 SEK/month. It was nevertheless controversial to include gender as a relevant category in collective bargaining, where class has traditionally been the primary concern. In addition to divergent understandings of the gender pay gap, a key dividing line between proponents and opponents of the

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GEP was whether they regarded gender or class as the primary basis of wage inequalities. The problem construction of value discrimination regarding women’s work is also important for understanding the controversy regarding the GEP. Proponents of the GEP maintained that such discrimination was a principal cause of the fact that women-dominated sectors and professions are low-income sectors, while opponents questioned this explanation of the pay gap between women-dominated and male-dominated sectors. Union members who opposed the GEP acknowledged that some sectors might be wrongly valued, but they strongly rejected the view that this was the case with all women-dominated sectors. They also demanded ‘empirical facts’ that would demonstrate the existence of such discrimination. An implicit assumption in their arguments, which was clearly stated by an opponent from the SNL, was that (most) women-dominated sectors are low-paid because the jobs are low-qualified. Pay inequality would thus be primarily a problem of class with gendered consequences in the sense that women workers happened to dominate these sectors. This assumption becomes clear in the opponents’ proposal to solve the gender pay gap through ‘low-income investments’. Such investments could admittedly reduce the gender pay gap since many women would get a higher raise, but they also rendered the gender element invisible. Referring to general low-wage investments as gender equality investments legitimises the view that women are low-paid because they have lowqualified jobs. Lumping all low-paid jobs together—as in the example of laundry workers and assistant nurses—hides the problem of low wages as based on the undervaluation of women’s work. Income or class then becomes the primary concern. Opponents of the GEP among employers dismissed all ‘group-based claims’. Although they expressed a certain concern regarding genderbased pay inequalities, they maintained that the market principle is the one and only ‘correct’ way to set wages. In a manner similar to lowincome investments, this understanding serves to legitimise and justify the gender pay gap between sectors as a correct and natural difference between sectors that is caused by a neutral market. These opponents did not address the issue of whether wage determination is a practice that can be influenced by gendered norms and by stereotypes with negative biases regarding the evaluation of women-dominated branches and professions. That is to say that employers opposed to the GEP not only explicitly dismissed gender as a relevant category in collective bargaining, their

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views also tended to trivialise the gender pay gap as primarily a problem of women working in low-qualified jobs. We should note that the GEP did not recognise the possibility of pay differences between various women-dominated jobs and sectors. As one respondent remarked, there are gender inequality problems with women getting stuck in the most low-qualified jobs, perhaps particularly in industry (Interview 6). One may then argue that the low-wage component of the GEP helps prevent such consequences. In addition, both the problem of value discrimination and the case of low-qualified jobs may lead to gender inequalities, with the former primarily concerning gender and the latter being primarily class-related. The union critics of the GEP also highlighted the problem of inequality in respect to the wage gap between blue-collar and white-collar workers, regardless of gender. Their view was that it would not be fair to give a higher pay raise to white-collar women than to blue-collar men. But while it is obviously problematic from a class perspective for the pay gap between white-collar and blue-collar sectors to increase, it is also necessary to problematise the salaries of white-collar women in relation to those of white-collar men. In short, although the GEP is an important tool for addressing value discrimination based on gender, it runs the risk of overlooking differences within the group of women-dominated professions. Such divergent understandings of the gender pay gap and the role of class and gender have two implications for gender equality bargaining. First, the conflict over the GEP in part reflected differences in respect to union membership and union realities, which in turn demonstrates that gender-based and class-based inequalities intersect and overlap in multiple ways in the labour market. It is important to note that unions in a gendersegregated labour market are gender-segregated in a manner that reflects the divisions in the labour market, and that this is also the case with the realities they face and with how they view various issues. The present study displays how that becomes a hindrance to efficient gender equality work. Second, employer justification of the gender pay gap as legitimate and natural is an obvious obstacle to gender equality improvements through collective bargaining.

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Conclusion In comparison to gender pay initiatives that target specific womendominated professions, such as the recent Finnish case of ‘Nancy the Nurse’ (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019), the GEP is exceptional in the sense that it included the category of gender in a collective bargaining model that encompassed all blue-collar sectors. The GEP also stands out as unique because it was successfully implemented and diminished the gender pay gap, in contrast to other cases in which the implementation of gender equality initiatives has been flawed (Colling & Dickens, 1998; Saari et al., 2019). In the Finnish initiative, for instance, the gender pay gap remained untouched while the pay gap between different categories of nurses increased. But although the institutional context at the time when the GEP was implemented was flexible enough to allow for the inclusion of a gender equality investment (Erikson, 2021), the model was controversial from the beginning and has never been implemented again. Insofar as this chapter casts a new light on the underlying conflict between social partners in regard to the GEP, it sheds light on some of the difficulties associated with adding gender equality to the bargaining agenda. The conflict over the GEP in fact involved more than the GEP as such—it rather manifested fundamental differences in how actors conceived of the gender pay gap and in how they constructed genderbased and class-based inequalities. While proponents argued that value discrimination in respect to women’s work was the main cause of the gender pay gap, opponents from the unions instead maintained that the gender pay gap was a gendered consequence of the gendersegregated labour market, where many women work in low-income (and low-qualified) jobs. In contrast, employers not only dismissed the proponents’ problem understandings, but they also argued that there was no problem of value discrimination insofar as the market constituted a neutral mechanism for determining wages. We can understand the opponents’ arguments against the GEP in the light of an institutionalised undervaluation of women’s work, that arises from gendered conceptions of appropriate wage levels for work conducted by men and women, and have become part of the formal structure of wage determination (Koskinen Sandberg et al., 2018). The employers’ critique of the GEP explicitly legitimised the gender pay gap as based on a natural and legitimate wage determination, and IF Metall’s demand to

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see ‘empirical facts’ concerning undervaluation was also an indication that the gendered nature of wage determination was to a great degree taken for granted and viewed as normal. It is also important to take into consideration how the gendered contours of union organisations become obstacles to gender equality initiatives as a consequence of a highly gender-segregated labour market and institutionalised undervaluation. Unions are not purely ‘idea-based’ organisations. They rather comprise interest groups who bear a responsibility to their members, and it is difficult for them to accept agreements that do not advance their members’ interests. The divergent problem constructions that appeared in the case of the GEP were in part reflections of the very different realities and challenges, gendered to varying degrees, that different unions face. For instance, it is no surprise that IF Metall continues to prioritise class over gender given its male-dominated membership, while the women-dominated Union of Municipal Workers feels it necessary to include a gender perspective in their activities since that coincides with the interests of its membership. Furthermore, the case of Nancy the Nurse is an example of divergent interests and realities based on class differences even between women-dominated unions (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019). For such reasons, while it is important to work to raise awareness and knowledge of structural and institutional gender inequalities, it is also necessary to account for the specific challenges facing gender equality work in different sectors. Otherwise, conflicts between unions are likely to hamper gender equality initiatives. Erikson (forthcoming) argues in this regard that although it is necessary to adopt an intersectional perspective, efforts to do so within the context of collective bargaining have proven difficult in practice. In spite of the differences between various union actors, they all share a concern with inequalities in the labour market and seek to equalise wages. In that sense, there are good possibilities for them to take up the role of ‘equality vehicles’ (Briskin, 2011). A key to the successful implementation of the GEP was the fact that the unions were united behind it (Erikson, 2021). This contrasts with the failed Finnish case, in which unions chose divergent strategies (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019), and show the possibility to overcome differences. Funding This study is funded by Forskningsrådet om Hälsa, Arbetsliv och Välfärd, Grant/Award Number: 2018-00467.

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References Bacchi, C. L. (2009). Analysing policy: What’s the problem (represented to be)? Pearson. Bergqvist, C. (2004). Gender (in)equality, European integration and the transition of Swedish corporatism. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 25(1), 125–146. Bergqvist, C., Bjarnegård, E., & Zetterberg, P. (2016). When class trumps sex: The social democratic intra-party struggle over extending parental leave quotas in Sweden. Social Politics, 23(2), 169–191. Booth, A. L. (1995). The economics of the trade union. Cambridge University Press. Briskin, L. (2011). Trade unions, collective agency, and the struggle for women’s equality. In. M. Moghadam, S. Franzway, & M. M. Fonow (Eds.), Making globalization work for women: The role of social rights and trade union leadership (pp. 213–243). State University of New York Press. Colling, T., & Dickens, L. (1998). Selling the case for gender equality: Deregulation and equality bargaining. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 36(3), 389–411. Cunnison, S., & Stageman, J. (1993). Feminizing the unions: Challenging the culture of masculinity. Avebury. Curtin, J. (2011). Ne’er the twain shall meet? Reflections on the future of feminism and unionism. In V. M. Moghadam, S. Franzway, & M. M. Fonow (Eds.), Making globalization work for women: The role of social rights and trade union leadership (pp. 309–324). State University of New York Press. Curtin, J. (2018). Women and trade unions: A comparative perspective. Routledge. Curtin, J., & Higgins, W. (1998). Feminism and unionism in Sweden. Politics & Society, 26(1), 69–93. Dawson, T. (2014). Collective bargaining and the gender pay gap in the printing industry. Gender, Work & Organization, 21(5), 381–394. Ekström, L. (2012). Jämställdhet–för männens, arbetarklassens och effektivitetens skull?: En diskursiv policystudie av jämställdhetsarbete i maskulina miljöer. Stockholms universitet. Erikson, J. (2021). A special fund for gender equality? Institutional constraints and gendered consequences in Swedish collective bargaining. Gender, Work & Organization. https://doi.org/10.1111/gwao.12645. Erikson, J. (forthcoming). Class and gender in conflict? Exploring intersectionality in practice in Swedish gender equality bargaining. Politique Européenne. Gregory, A., & Milner, S. (2009). Trade unions and work-life balance: Changing times in France and the UK? British Journal of Industrial Relations, 47 (1), 122–146.

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Grimshaw, D., & Rubery, J. (2007). Undervaluing women’s work. Equal Opportunities Commission. Handels. (2019). Handels syn på lönebildningen. Handels rapporter 2019:03. Heery, E. (2006). Equality bargaining: Where, who, why? Gender, Work & Organization, 13(6), 522–542. Hirdman, Y. (1998). Med kluven tunga. Atlas. Koskinen Sandberg, P., & Saari, M. (2019). Sisters (can’t) unite! Wages as macropolitical and the gendered power orders of corporatism. Gender, Work & Organization, 26(5), 633–649. Koskinen Sandberg, P., Törnroos, M., & Kohvakka, R. (2018). The institutionalised undervaluation of women’s work: The case of local government sector collective agreements. Work, Employment and Society, 32(4), 707–725. Lawrence, E. (2016). Gender and trade unions. Routledge. Ledwith, S., & Hansen, L. L. (2012). Gendering and diversifying trade union leadership. Routledge. LO Fakta. Landsorganisationen. Retrieved January 2020. www.lo.se. Mahon, R. (1996). Women wage earners and the guture of Swedish unions. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 17 (4), 545–586. Martin, J., & Roberts C. (1984). Women and employment, a life time perspective: The report of the 1980 DE/OPCS women and employment survey. Stationery Office (TSO). Meyersson Milgrom, E. M., Petersen, T., & Snartland, V. (2001). Equal pay for equal work? Evidence from Sweden and a comparison with Norway and the US. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 103(4), 559–583. MI (Medlingsinstitutet). (2007). Avtalsrörelsen och lönebildningen 2007. Medlingsinstitutet. MI (Medlingsinstitutet). (2018). Löneskillnaden mellan kvinnor och män. Medlingsinstitutet. Millward, N., & Woodland, S. (1995). Gender segregation and male/female wage differences. Gender, Work & Organization, 2(3), 125–139. OpO (Opartiska Ordföranden). (2007). Avtalsrörelsen 2007 . Industrirådet. Saari, M., Kantola J., & Koskinen Sandberg P. (2019). Implementing equal pay policy: Clash between gender equality and corporatism. Social Politics (online first). SCB (Statistiska centralbyrån). Retrieved January 2020. www.scb.se. SNL (Svenskt Näringsliv). Retrieved January 2020. www.svensktnaringsliv.se. SOU. (2015). Forskarrapporter till Jämställdhetsutredningen. SOU 2015:86. Traxler, F., & Mermet E. (2003). Coordination of collective bargaining: The case of Europe. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 9(2), 229–246.

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List of News Articles Dagens Arbete (DA), 071101. “Lön efter kön inget för IF Metall.” Dagens Industri (DI), 200301 “Unika listan: Endast 194 av 1.000 storbolag har en jämställd ledningsgrupp.” Dagens Nyheter (DN), 070326. “Handels varslar om strejk i påsk.” Kommunalarbetaren, 070926. “Inga fler kvinnopotter för IF Metall.” LO, 070309. “Jämställdhetsfrukost på LO 8 mars.” LO, 070525. “Rejält höjda löner en seger för Kommunal.” LO-Tidningen, 060616. “Könsmaktsordningen splittrar facket.” LO-Tidningen, 061201. “Alla LO-förbund eniga om samordning för satsning på felavlönade kvinnor.” LO-Tidningen, 070926. “IF Metall bojkottar jämställdhetspott.” Siftidningen (SIF), 071003. “Kvinnolöner i fokus när parterna möttes.” Svenska Dagbladet (SD), 070410. “Tempot trappas upp.” Svenska Dagbladet (SD), 070926. “IF Metall säger nej till kvinnopotten.” Svenska Dagbladet (SD), 070927. “Löfven krävs på svar om kvinnopott.” Sveriges Radio (SvR), 080530. “Fortsatt strid i LO om jämställdhetspotter.”

Interviews Interview 1: Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO), Swedish Trade Union Confederation, June 3, 2019 Interview 2: LO, June 3, 2019 Interview 3: Svenskt näringsliv (SNL), Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, February 3, 2020 Interview 4: Kommunal, Union of Municipal Workers, August 21, 2019 Interview 5: Kommunal, September 26, 2019 Interview 6: LO, October 4, 2019 Interview 7: Handelsanställdas förbund (Handels), Union of Commercial Employees, October 9, 2019 Interview 8: SNL, October 22, 2019 Interview 9: Kommunal, November 18, 2019 Interview 10: IF Metall, Metal Workers’ Union, November 15, 2019 Interview 11: Elektrikerna, Union of Electricians, October 29, 2019 Interview 12: LO, December 19, 2019 Interview 13: Medlingsinstitutet, National Mediation Office, December 4, 2019 Interview 14: Svensk Handel, Swedish Trade Association, November 4, 2019 Interview 15: Installatörsföretagen, Association of Electrical, Plumbing and Heating Contractors, December 2, 2019 Interview 16: LO, November 20, 2019 Interview 17: Industriarbetsgivarna, Swedish Association of Industrial Employers, December 9, 2019 Interview 18: SNL, December 10, 2019

Negotiating in a Highly Feminised Sector: The French Domestic Work and Home-Based Care Sector Clémence Ledoux

and Rachel Krupka

Introduction For a long time, domestic work and home-based care services have been considered as feminised, undervalued, unpaid and the result of the patriarchy’s exploitation of women (Ciccia & Sainsbury, 2018; Daly & Rake, 2003). Domestic work was progressively commodified and became a status symbol for rich families in nineteenth-and-twentieth-century Europe. While this has continued for domestic work in the twenty-first century, today, care workers are also employed in the homes of middleand-low-wage families with young children or elderly dependants. In the early years of this century, the commodification of this work has been boosted by the intervention of European welfare states, which finance, regulate and legitimise the sector (Ledoux et al., 2021b). Nevertheless, workers in this sector remain excluded from much of the labour and social-security law that protects workers in other sectors (Blackett, 2019; Poblete, 2018; Shire, 2015; Van Hooren, 2018).

C. Ledoux (B) · R. Krupka University of Nantes, Nantes, France e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5_4

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The sector is considered as an important source of new jobs in Europe (European Commission, 2012; Carbonnier & Morel, 2015), and its workers remain overwhelmingly female and precarious in many countries. Many of these workers have migrant backgrounds (Farvaque, 2015; Van Hooren et al., 2019). They are paid less than other workers in the EU, are eligible for fewer social-security benefits, work fragmented and atypical hours and find it difficult to make plans for their future (Farvaque, 2015; Pulignano, 2019). Many of them work more or less than typical working hours with insufficient rest periods and temporary contracts (when declared) (Ramos & Belen Munoz, 2020). Undeclared work is still very common: in 2016, the European Commission estimated that this sector was the third-most-common sector for undeclared work (European Commission 2016). Working ‘behind closed doors’ in private homes, domestic workers are vulnerable to physical, verbal, or even sexual abuse (Lutz, 2011). The precarious nature of domestic work is, in part, due to the lack of labour and social-security laws covering it. In many countries, ‘industrial relations’ is defined as the relationship between representatives of employees and their employers, and does not cover domestic work (Ramos & Belen Munoz, 2020, p. 42). By contrast, home-based carers in some countries have been able to benefit from some industrial-relations coverage, although many loopholes remain (Apitzsch & Shire, 2021; Van Hooren, 2021). Belgium, Italy and France are exceptional regarding this situation. In Belgium, trade unions and employers’ representatives have negotiated collective agreements covering domestic workers employed by service providers. Non-binding collective agreements have existed in Italy for more than 40 years for workers directly employed by households (Borelli, 2020). However, in France, collective agreements—all now legally binding—covering domestic workers and carers employed by households and service providers have existed for more than 40 years too, making France the only country in Europe where a wide range of homebased care and domestic work is covered by binding collective agreements (Ledoux et al., 2021a). This chapter will therefore focus on France and ask: have social partners been able to protect domestic / home base care workers against precariousness and why? It is based on 33 interviews done between 2004 and 2011 with trade-union officials, representatives of employers’ organisations and civil servants, between 2004 and 2020; 7 between 2013 and

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2014 and 15 between 2018 and 2020, this last group as part of the PHSQuality and PROPAM research projects. We also analysed administrative and legal archive documents, such as the French Labour Code (Code du Travail ), plus the three different collective agreements that have covered this sector since the 1980s. The chapter is divided into two main sections: Background and Analysis. In the first section, we look at how collective agreements have been analysed in the literature on gender, collective agreements and social partners. We underline how the analysis of collective agreements has to be linked with the long history of inequalities and discrimination against female, marginalised groups, especially domestic workers and carers. We then examine the characteristics of the workers and how the social partners in France negotiated and made binding collective agreements covering this sector and how these collective agreements interact with labour law. In the second part, we analyse the extent to which the agreements have responded to the four key needs of domestic workers and home-based carers. We also ask how they express the balance of power between trade unions and employer’s organisations and the influence of the French system of institutionalised industrial relations on this.

Background Analysing Collective Agreements Through a Gender Lens Historically, in France (and in many other countries) national sectorial collective agreements have institutionalised differences between workers by setting different levels of pay for different categories of workers, who are classified into hierarchies of skills. An important feature of these agreements is that they under-value work predominantly done by women and its associated skills as ‘natural’. In her pioneering study on the Parisian metal-working industry, Madeleine Guibert showed how skills acquired by women working at home could be used by industrial employers without being recognised: ‘it is because women have the ability to perform several operations at the same time, have dexterity, speed and meticulousness, that they are hired for fragmented and repetitive work and not recognised for it’ (Maruani & Rogerat, 2006). The same applies to domestic work, which, even as late as 2000, was still considered by many employers to be ‘natural’ women’s work (Dussuet, 2005) that was of low value.

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In questioning whether and how the interests of women and marginalised groups were taken into account in collective agreements (Rubery et al., 2018), four types of individual needs can be distinguished: (i) income security during working and non-working periods, (ii) access to opportunities for training and career progression, (iii) fair treatment and (iv) recognition of life beyond work. All these needs can be covered by different policy instruments. Income security can be provided by a statutory minimum wage, minimum hours of work and social-security benefits. Access to opportunities requires the provision of training to acquire skills and qualifications and grants for living expenses while training. Fair treatment can be achieved by the institutional embedding of employment rights and mechanisms to allow workers to voice their opinions and grievances. Recognition of a life beyond work implies a clear division between work and non-work. In this sector, all these criteria may apply to formal (declared) work, informal (undeclared) work and ‘light formal’ work (Jaehrling, 2020). Although social dialogue is an adversarial process of negotiation, which brings together representatives of the workers and their employers to overcome the social conflicts opposing their interests, neither side has automatically defended the interests of women (Elomäki & Kantola, in this volume; Pochic & Milner, in this volume). Historically, trade unions were made up of male workers who shared the same qualifications and wanted to protect them and their wages. In many cases, employers exploited divisions in the workforce and took advantage of gender inequalities, to separate female and male workers and to pay women less than men (Colgan & Ledwith, 2003). Industrial-relations systems differ widely in Europe, where the role of the state and the autonomy of the social partners can diverge (VaughanWhitehead, 2018). In neo-corporatist countries, the social partners enjoy delegated power, while in more statist countries, such as France, most initiatives come from the state, which selects the groups it wants to hear from before adopting rules. This means that social partners in France have found themselves obliged to use actions, such as strikes and demonstrations, rather than negotiations, to make their views heard. But such actions are difficult to organise for home-based carers and domestic workers because they tend to work more alone than other workers and some carers are legally obliged to remain with the people they are caring for.

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The positions of social partners towards home-based carers and domestic workers during actions and campaigns have been studied much more than their positions during the negotiation of collective agreements. Local actions to unionise workers have been studied at sub-national and national (Avril, 2009; Béroud, 2013; Garabige, 2017; Van Hooren et al., 2022), regional (Poblete, 2018) and global (Blackett, 2019) levels. Female domestic workers have organised themselves and built alliances with trade unions, in particular within the preparation of the 2011 International Labour Organisation (ILO) conference, where they successfully lobbied for the creation of ILO Convention 189 (ILO 189) on rights for domestic workers. ILO 189 demands decent working conditions, a minimum wage, rest periods and other rights for domestic workers. On the contrary, even though some employers’ representatives were at the conference that adopted ILO 189, very little research has been done into their opinions (Triandafyllidou & Marchetti, 2015), nor their collective actions, with some exceptions (Meagher & Goodwin, 2015; Ledoux et al., 2021a). The development of rights for domestic workers and home-based carers in France also depends on the balance of power between them and their employers. This sector is characterised by a variety of employment relationships, each with a different status in law (Lefebvre, 2013). Domestic workers can be employed by individual households, by forprofit or non-profit service providers, by public bodies or they can work as informal self-employed workers. Nearly all declared domestic workers and carers in France are either covered by public law (when they are civil servants) or by collective agreements. An Unfinished Standardisation of Home-Based Care/Domestic Work In France, most domestic workers and carers are women, some of whom are migrants, and many of whom are in precarious situations. Nevertheless, more domestic workers and carers are declared, and more benefit from basic employment rights in France than in other countries. This is directly related to the policy of incentivising employers to declare these workers and to the collective agreements covering nearly all workers in this sector. This section first describes the social characteristics of these workers and then the incentives to declare them. It ends by examining the inclusive coverage the collective agreements provide.

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A Precarious Feminised Workforce In France, declared domestic workers and carers are placed in the administrative and statistical category of services aux personnes (equivalent to ‘personal and household services’, ‘PHS’). This category also includes domestic work predominantly done by men, such as home IT technicians, so the feminisation of domestic work and care is, in fact, higher than the PHS statistics show. In 2015, 87.3% of French PHS workers were female (compared to 50.1% of all employees). They were also more likely to have been born abroad (14.5%, compared to 5.5% of all employees). Christelle Avril and Marie Cartier noted that the 2011 Labour Force Survey found that 40% of the domestic cleaners in France employed by households were immigrants (Avril & Cartier, 2014). Moreover, the PHS workers held fewer recognised educational qualifications than the rest of the population: only 7.5% had a post-baccalaureate diploma, compared with 38.4% of all workers (Kulanthaivelu & Thiérus, 2018). They were also paid much less than the rest of the working population: on average e8,200 net per annum, compared to an average of e19,400 for all workers. They are also more prone to health problems (ibid.) and experience a higher-than-average number of accidents at work. While the statistical populations do not correspond exactly with those cited above, 9.86% of domestic carers (national economic activity classification category 8810A) reported suffering an accident at work, compared with 3.34% of the entire working population. Finally, most domestic workers and carers are obliged to work part time (ibid.). Incentives to Declare Domestic Workers and Carers While the undeclared employment of domestic workers and carers remains illegal, the French tax incentives and benefits of declaring them has reduced the comparative advantage of undeclared employment (Farvaque, 2015) and indeed made it ‘unprofitable’. The main incentive for employers is a generous income tax credit, covering 50% of the amount spent on employing a domestic worker or carer, up to a basic ceiling of e12,000 per annum, which can be increased depending on individual needs and circumstance. An additional incentive is the system of vouchers which households receive and use to pay their employees or service providers. In the situation of employment by the households, they simplify the calculation and payment of the social-security contributions. A reduced VAT rate (10 or 5.5%) also applies to service providers. For people requiring care at home,

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the main care allowance, the Allocation Personnalisée d’Autonomie, is only paid if the claimant declares the carer(s). These policy instruments can therefore be considered as incentivising the declaration, but this could only cause ‘light formalisation’ if it was not accompanied by employment regulations (Jaehrling, 2020). Nevertheless, the precarity of the workforce can only slightly be explained by the informality of their work. Before analysing the content of the collective agreements, we have to understand how the collective agreements complement the general labour law regulations. Inclusive Coverage Provided by the Collective Agreements The collective agreements cannot be interpreted without understanding how they complement the provisions and coverage of Employment Law. In France, the social partners have succeeded in making these agreements binding and more inclusive than the general provisions of the Labour Code. The employment regulations that apply to workers depend on the nature of their employment relationship. For the domestic workers and carers covered by this chapter, there are two main types of such relationship and associated rights: employment by a private individual or employment by a service provider. Self-employment is marginal among French domestic workers and carers (accounting for only 0.40% of all PHS hours worked). While the general provisions of the Labour Code exclude workers employed by households from many employment rights, this is not the case for those employed by service providers (Kroos & Gottschall, 2012). When the employer is a private person, his/her employee is categorised as a private domestic employee (salarié du particulier employeur, ‘SPE’) who is still today excluded from most of the protective provisions in the Labour Code: Article 7221-2 states that the only provisions applicable to these employees are those pertaining to sexual harassment, psychological harassment, the Labour Day (1 May) public holiday, paid holiday leave, special leave for family reasons and medical supervision. Case law has extended this list to include the statutory minimum wage, severance pay and the prohibition of ‘clandestine work’ (Ledoux & Krupka, 2020). These workers have also been declared subject to the jurisdiction of employment tribunals. However, SPEs remain excluded from other rules of the Labour Code, like the definition of ‘effective work’, working

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hours, part-time work, night work, overtime, rest periods, health and safety at work and redundancy. The social partners have added the benefits of collective-bargaining agreements to the employment rights of SPEs defined in the Labour Code. The Federation of Employers of Household Staff (Fédération des Employeurs des Gens de Maisons ), a federation of private-individual employers who were mostly Roman Catholic women, did succeed in negotiating some collective agreements at local and regional levels for domestic workers and carers in the 1950s, and successfully lobbied for the first national collective agreement covering the sector in 1951, but this agreement was never implemented. It was not until the 1980s that Federation’s successor, the Federation of Private Domestic Employers of France (Fédération des Particuliers Employeurs de France, ‘FEPEM’) managed to renegotiate this national agreement and to have the state extend it in order to cover, at least in theory, every private domestic employeeemployer relationship anywhere in the metropolitan territory (overseas territories were excluded). FEPEM also contributed to the creation of complementary social protection for SPEs. The national collective agreement of 1980 was superseded in 1999 by a new collective agreement for private domestic employees (SPEs), which was then extended to cover the entire sector in metropolitan France. In July 2017, the social partners agreed to extend the provisions of the collective agreement to cover French Overseas Territories. In Spring 2021, a new version of the collective agreement, merging SPEs and childminders who care for children in their own homes was negotiated but has still not been adopted or extended. Domestic workers and carers can also be employed by a private household or employed by a private-sector (non-profit or for-profit) or public-sector service provider. Each of these types of employer confers a different employment status on workers (see Table 1). Employees of nonprofit organisations are covered by the common provisions of the Labour Code and the majority of them by the collective agreement covering care, supervision and domestic services (branche de l’aide, de l’accompagnement, des soins et des services à domicile ‘BAD’) and employees of for-profit service providers are covered by the collective agreement covering businesses offering personal services (entreprises de services à la personne ‘SAP’).

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Table 1

79

Declared PHS workers by applicable employment status

Employer type Private domestic employers (direct) Private domestic employers (through agency) Public bodies

Percentage of all hours worked, 2016 50 6

4.1

Labour Code applies in full?

Applicable collective agreement

No (employees are covered only by Part VII of the Labour Code)

SPE collective agreement

No (employees are civil servants) Yes

Public law

Non-profit service providers

24

For-profit service providers Self-employed Total

15.5

Yes

0.4 100

No

BAD collective agreement, or other agreements which are more generous SAP collective agreement None

Sources Ledoux and Krupka (2020) and Kulanthaivelu and Thiérus (2018)

These collective agreements are inclusive in the sense that they cover all the employees and employers within their defined scope, but there is still no single collective agreement covering all domestic workers and carers. Other collective agreements1 apply to workers in the home care subsector, but, for clarity, have not been included in this analysis. The BAD and SAP collective agreements have been extended to cover all individuals working in their fields, not just to members of the signatory trade unions. In addition, all the workers covered by the collective agreements applying to service providers are covered by the common provisions of the Labour Code, in contrast to SPEs (see Table 1). Self-employed domestic workers and carers are not covered by these regulations, but they currently make up only a very small part of the total workforce. Undeclared domestic workers and carers are also not covered, but they also currently make up a small part of the workforce, because of the very strong incentives to declare them discussed above. Consequently, the precarious condition of the workers cannot be totally explained by the informality of their work or by their exclusion from employment regulations: collective agreements apply to all of those who are declared.

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Analysis Inclusion but Incomplete Standardisation The social partners have managed to achieve inclusion within collective agreements for domestic workers and carers, composed of a majority working-class female workforce in which migrants are over-represented. What have their outputs been, in terms of the rights obtained for the workers? Our analysis is based on the four needs identified above: income security, access to opportunities, fair treatment and recognition of life beyond work. Income Security In the collective agreements, the social partners defined basic rights, some of which are more generous that those defined in the Labour Code, but with many loopholes and grey areas. In general, domestic workers and carers working for service providers are given more income security than those working for private households. The collective agreements contain wage-grid classifications and seniority rules, but the options for increasing average wages above the minimum wage are limited. In addition, the dividing lines between work and non-work are not clear, generating grey areas. This has consequences for both income security and of recognition of life beyond work. The definition of ‘effective work’ in the common rules of the Labour Code does not apply to SPEs, but does apply to BADs and SAPs. The SPE collective agreement defines three types of remuneration at below the statutory minimum wage for activities defined as ‘responsible attendance’, ‘night attendance’ and ‘nursing duties’. This means that SPEs have to work many more hours than other workers to earn decent wages, and puts them at risk of impoverishment: the minimum wage does not apply for these hours since they are not considered as ‘work’. The two other collective agreements (covering BADs and SAPs) do not include these specific rates and they use the definition of ‘effective work’ provided in the common rules of the Labour Code. Difficulties can also be found in the regulations applied to travelling between homes. For SPEs, the time spent travelling between locations when working for two different employers is not considered as working time and therefore is not paid, nor are expenses reimbursed for it. By contrast, travelling time for employees of service providers (i.e. BADs

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and SAPs) can theoretically be considered as working time, although it is subject to conditions (Ledoux & Krupka, 2020). Income security can also be difficult to achieve for part-time workers. In principle, there is a minimum part-time working week of 24 hours, except where a collective agreement over-rides this. The principle does not apply to SPEs. The collective agreement for BADs makes it easier for employers to limit weekly hours to 17, and the collective agreement for SAPs has no clauses derogating from the 24-hour minimum working week. Nevertheless, both collective agreements permit derogations from the minimum working week agreed between employers and workers. This shows that the social partners in the non-profit service-provider sector have seized the opportunity to ignore the general legal minimum wage and working hours, thus increasing the precarious status of domestic workers and carers. The high poverty rate among domestic workers and carers in France is therefore explained by their limited working hours. Income security can also be provided by social-security benefits. If they are declared, domestic workers and carers are eligible to receive basic sick pay, and are covered by supplementary insurance covering sickness, incapacity for work and disability, as agreed by the social partners in all three collective agreements. In 2021, these provisions made it possible for domestic/ care workers to receive replacement wages if they tested COVID-positive and their healthcare expenses were also covered. The situation is worse as regards unemployment benefits and the state pension because many SPEs fail to register for unemployment benefits. The situation for SAPs and BADs is better (Ledoux & Krupka, 2020). However, the social partners negotiated the provision of a supplementary pension scheme for SPEs, although this only paid out an average of e112 per month in 2018 (ibid.). Access to Training Opportunities The three collective agreements all include professional training opportunities funded through specific levies over and above the legal minimum. Adding these additional agreed levies to the legal minimum levy for professional training results in overall levies of 0.35% for SPEs, 2.04% for BADs and 1.40% for SAPs. This means that in all three sub-sectors, the discourse on professionalisation has been transformed into a policy: the social partners no longer consider that the work done by the mostly female workforce is ‘natural’ women’s work, and they have acted to promote training.

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Nevertheless, the lack of a career structure and hierarchy in much of the domestic work and care sector (and especially for SPEs) means that, even if they take advantage of the training opportunities available, most workers cannot gain promotion and better pay, which raises the question of whether they are real opportunities. In addition, the fact that a worker can simultaneously be employed by a private household and a service provider, and thus falls under two, incompatible, collective agreements and thus two training systems, makes it more difficult to access training opportunities. Fair Treatment In most sectors, the workers elect their trade-union representatives to negotiate collective agreements, but this electorate is limited to workers who pay employee social-security contributions. In contrast to employees of medium-sized or large organisations, very few SPEs are trade-union members in regular contact with trade-union officials in the workplace, so it is more difficult for them to benefit from trade-union protection. Similarly, as employment inspectors do not have the right to enter private homes without the household’s permission, SPEs cannot benefit from workplace inspections either. Recognition of Life Beyond Work In the three collective agreements, the recognition of life beyond work is less developed than in other sectors, and the trade unions have not managed to defend the interests of the workers in this area. Definitions of working hours differ widely between the collective agreements. For SPEs, the 40-hour definition of a full-time working week is five hours more than the legal norm specified in the Labour Code of 35 hours, meaning that paid overtime only begins after 40 hours have been worked. For BADs and SAPs, the 35-hour working week is the full-time norm. None of the three collective agreements completely cover all the tasks related to work, so the time spent by workers preparing for work and for co-ordinating with colleagues, professionals and families remains a grey area. For the providers, the trade unions agreed to flexibility in return for the workers’ benefits obtained. For example, in 2021, the BAD collective agreement allows 4 unpaid breaks per working day of more than 4 hours, and the SAP collective agreement allows 5, whereas the Labour Code

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specifies one 2 hours unpaid break per day, although it does permit collective agreements to derogate from this rule. In this sub-sector, the social partners have reduced the recognition of life beyond work for a largely female workforce, thus increasing their availability for work. To conclude, the analyses of these three collective agreements have mixed conclusions. Although the social partners have achieved minimum rights for workers in a sector where there are no such rights in many other countries, these rights are fragmented and no clear definition has systematically been made of ‘effective work’, no clear delineation between work and non work, so that employment contracts call for ‘permanent availability’ of the workers which is common for a feminised workforce (Avril & Ramos Vacca, 2020). This has consequences for the workers, who are only paid (part-time) wages for the hours they work, despite being away all day. On the other hand, the social partners have managed to introduce supplementary social-security contributions for complementary social protection and training. We will see now how the unequal balance of power between social partners contributed to this situation. The Balance of Power Between the Social Partners The characteristics of the three collective agreements can be explained by the unequal balance of power between the social partners who negotiated them. In all three sub-sectors both employers’ organisations and trade unions are fragmented. We will first explain this fragmentation, before analysing the negotiation of each of the three collective agreements. Finally, we will examine the defence of undeclared domestic workers and carers. Fragmented Social Partners The fragmentation is the result of the evolution of each partner’s identity over time. The three distinct employer types had their own collective agreements by the 2010s: the private households (with their SPE agreement), the non-profit service providers (with their BAD agreement) and the for-profit organisations (with their SAP agreement). The trade unions are equally fragmented, as the three collective agreements fall under the auspices of different component federations within the national tradeunion confederations, just as they do within the employers’ federations (see Table 2). The collective agreements can be seen as defining the

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Table 2

Social Partners by Collective Agreement, 2019

Collective agreement

Legal status of agreement

Trade-union federations

Employers’ organisation(s)

Private Domestic Employees (SPEs), 1999

Extended sub-sector-wide in 2000

– FEPEM (100%)

Non-profit Home Carers (BADs), 2010

Approved in 2011, Extended sub-sector-wide in 2012 (Approval of the Minister of Social Affairs required before extension procedure) Extended sub-sector-wide in 2014

– CGT Commerce (39.24%) – CFDT Services (20.05%) – FGTA-FO (19.51%) – FESSAD UNSA (21.20%) – CFDT Public Health (47.42%) – CGT Social Action (38.46%) – FDTA-FO (14.11%)

– CGT Commerce (15.63%) – CFDT Services (39.45%) – FDTA-FO (14.29%) – CFTC Public Health (30.63%)

– SESP (44.3%) – FEDESAP (32.3%) – SYNERPA (13.7%) – FFEC (9.8%)

For-profit Service Providers (SAPs), 2012

– USB Domicile (100%), made up of: • ADMR • UNA • Adessadomicile • FNAAFP/CSF

Source Ledoux and Krupka (2020)

identities of the social partners involved in negotiating them (Lefebvre, 2013). This fragmentation also entails a sort of competition between the three sets of social partners who negotiated the three collective agreements. In some cases, this competition has led to a ‘race to the bottom’, where the employers’ representatives’ main objective is to reduce the employers’ costs as much as possible. However, the representatives of the non-profit organisations (in the BAD sub-sector) try to claim that they concluded the most protective collective agreement towards their workers.2 All the social partners now recognise the feminisation of the workforce, the necessity to ‘professionalise’ it and that the skills required to do the work are not mere ‘natural’ female skills.

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Negotiating the SPE Collective Agreement In this sub-sector, although the social partners are not very representative since very few people took part in the elections or were members of the unions or employers’ federations, they have managed to agree to add new workers’ rights to the collective agreement and its codicils from which the workers are excluded in the Labour Code. On some points, they went beyond the provisions of the Labour Code, especially for social protections, although they have failed to amend the collective agreement to keep up with developments in employment law (Kerbourc’h, 1999). The balance of power between FEPEM (the organisation representing private-households employers) and the trade unions is firmly in favour of FEPEM, as it is the sole representative of employers, whereas there are four trade unions representing the workers. The trade unions are thus unable to negotiate any improvements to the very basic rights provided in the Labour Code without FEPEM’s agreement. The FEPEM also had an interest in some of the concessions made to the trade unions on improved social-security rights and better access to training opportunities: first, they are implemented by satellite organisations related to the FEPEM. 3 Second, FEPEM tries to maintain specific tax breaks for private households. Talking about its social commitment can help. Third, the FEPEM has relatively few members, who have little control over the negotiators (Ledoux & Krupka, 2020). For FEPEM, the improvements in social-security protection were easier to accept since the increased contributions to be paid by employers are largely offset by income tax breaks. By contrast, FEPEM has found it much more difficult to accept a definition of ‘effective work’ as it is committed to preserving the freedom of employers to only pay their workers when they require them. The trade unions are aware of the difficulties encountered by the declared workers they represent. But their position seems to be somewhat fatalistic, as if they would have accepted they couldn’t afford to demand more. They know that they cannot push FEPEM too far, and therefore have only made incremental demands for improvements. Negotiating the BAD Collective Agreement The non-profit service providers as employers in this sub-sector talk a lot about their attachment to social values. Some of their representatives are former trade-union officials. 4 Nevertheless, the employers’ organisations in this sub-sector have little room for manoeuvre as they depend

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very much upon the government for their financing (Garabige, 2017). Besides, the employers sometimes presented proposals of trade unions they opposed as being to the detriment of the vulnerable and disabled people domestic workers and carers work for, their social values been the justification of the limitations of workers’ rights. This explains why certain codicils to the BAD collective agreement make the availability of public funding a condition for their implementation, and also why the trade unions accepted clauses in the collective agreement which reduce working conditions and benefits below the minimums in the Labour Code, as if they had no choice (in the case of the wage, the legal minimum wage nevertheless applies: the superior regulation prevails). During the negotiations on the BAD collective agreement, some of trade unions attempted to include a ban on work sessions of less than 30 minutes for workers. A petition was even started to put pressure on employers, but the unions lost this particular battle, as well as one to obtain pay for travel time between two non-continuous sessions until these parts of the collective agreement were overturned by case law from litigation by the Labour Inspectorate. However, the proximity of employers’ federations and the trade unions in this sub-sector did create an opportunity to secure some protection for night workers. Even though the president of the ADESSA employers’ network declared in 2009 being opposed to night work at the full rate, this was subsequently agreed, and the employers stated they were proud to be ‘more social’ and providing ‘better workers’ rights’ than their counterparts in the other two sub-sectors. Negotiating the SAP Collective Agreement The employer’s representatives in this sub-sector negotiated their agreement lately and were inspired by the SPE agreement, but they came up against experienced and professional trade-union representatives who were able to block their proposals, either during the negotiations or by litigation. Initially, during the negotiation of the agreement, one of the employers’ organisations tried to introduce a form of flexible part-time employment contract with a defined minimum number of working hours and an option for the worker to take on additional work above that threshold if they wished (Ledoux et al., 2021a). This proposal was rejected by the trade unions, who threatened not to sign the agreement if the clause was retained. In other respects, the SAP collective agreement took the

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SPE collective agreement as a model, in an attempt to start a race to the bottom. For example, one provision transposed from the SPE collective agreement—covering night attendance—was adopted and extended to the whole sub-sector before being struck down and deleted as the result of litigation by the CGT. This demonstrates that a trade union which rejected an agreement signed by the other trade unions was able to use the courts to remove clauses it considered unfair. The federal CGT representative told us, ‘As an example, I have on file the case of someone who worked 400 hours a month, day and night. She was exhausted. This was not acceptable, so we took the decision to bring a case before the Council of State, which cost e11,000 in lawyers’ fees. We would have liked to have had everything quashed, but on two points we did succeed’ (Interview in 2019). This ‘judicialisation’ can be explained by three factors: the much more hostile relationships between the unions (especially the CGT) and the employers’ organisations in the SAP sub-sector, the existence of basic protections provided by Labour Law and the resources of trade unions. Some of the CGT officials we interviewed stated quite frankly that they opposed the very existence of for-profit domestic work and care providers (Interviews in 2006 and 2019), but, on this point, the CGT is in a minority among the trade unions. In fact, the CGT withdrew from the negotiations at one point, and only returned after reforms to the representation process offered participants more resources. Nevertheless, Labour Law gave the possibility to judicialise its opposition and to succeed in court. Defending the Interests of Undocumented Migrant Domestic Workers and Carers Trade unions encountered more difficulties in defending the rights of undocumented migrant domestic workers and carers, but they did manage to include this group in some of their actions. In 2008, some CGT local officials worked with NGOs to unionise undocumented migrant workers in specific workplaces, but these were nearly all male workers in other sectors, though a few female domestic workers were included (Barron et al., 2011). In parallel to this, in the 2000s, Ms Z, a Filipina migrant domestic worker who had been helped to escape from a modern slavery situation by NGOs and the CFDT, joined the CFDT and became an official. She attempted to get undocumented domestic workers to join the CFDT in Paris and founded an association to support her fellow Filipinas (Ito,

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2016). However, she had resigned from the CFDT by 2020. Another organisation representing the interests of home-based care workers (auxiliaires parentales ), the UNSA-SNAP-SPE also took action in support of undocumented care workers. These trade unions, associated with NGOs, organised some demonstrations and petitions, but with limited impact (Van Hooren et al., 2022). In summary, the trade unions did defend workers’ rights in all three sub-sectors. Conscious of the highly feminised character of the workforce, their representatives used ‘she’ when talking about individual domestic workers and carers. Nevertheless, they mostly used traditional trade-union tactics and actions to defend them. They tried to bring the workers’ rights closer to those of the rest of the workforce, but in some cases, they failed to be heard by the employers. In other cases, such as the SPEs, they simply did not dare to ask for major changes. Besides, some trade unions also agreed to sign agreements which worsened the rights of the workers in comparison to labour law. These cases mostly concern the regulation of working hours. They also found it difficult to recognise the other needs of the workforce, particularly those of the undocumented migrant workers. The collective agreements reflect different balances of power, within each of the social partners and between them, and between the different subsectors. Nevertheless, the fact that these negotiations could take place and that the social partners were equipped to negotiate them reflect the institutional features of the French system. The Influence of the Institutionalised Industrial Relations System on the French Social Partners The French institutionalised industrial-relations system has an important influence on the positions and actions of the social partners who negotiated the three collective agreements, and this section explores three aspects of this influence. First, how did it allow the agreement covering the sub-sectors to be extended? Second, how did it make it possible for the trade unions to be active representatives of the workers, even though hardly any of the workers were active trade-union members? Third, how were the dialogues between the social partners professionalised by a system of codetermination funding?

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Institutional Influence on the Extension of the Collective Agreements The habit of the French Ministry of Employment to extend collective agreements and make them legally binding for all employers and workers in a sub-sector is a very powerful means of achieving inclusiveness as it means that the coverage of the agreement is not limited to the members of the organisations that elected the social partners (Van Hooren et al., 2022). Such an extension was more difficult for the BAD collective agreement because the social partners had first to obtain approval from the Ministry of Solidarity before approaching the Ministry of Employment to request the extension. Through a lobbying campaign they succeeded in gaining this approval and then the extension, but after 2010, the wage increases obtained were very modest. Ensuring the Social Partners Are Active Representatives Domestic workers and carers are a difficult group for trade unions to reach and unionise (Garabige, 2017; Van Hooren et al., 2022), but the very small numbers in this group of workers who are union members did not hinder the election of workers’ representatives, because the electors did not have to be union members under the French system. The new system defining the social partners, which has been implemented gradually since the reforms of 2008 and 2014, established a ‘presumption of representativeness’ using ‘audience measurements’, with different criteria for trade unions and employer organisations. For the trade unions, representativeness is established by means of ‘mechanisms which borrow from the procedures of political democracy, in particular the election and the majority’ (Andolfatto, 2014). The seven criteria used include ‘audience’, established at sector level by a trade union’s performance in the elections of employee representatives and work councils. In small and medium-sized businesses and the SPE subsector, there is a specific electoral system with online and postal voting. To be adopted, a collective agreement or one of its codicils must be signed by trade unions representing at least 30% of the votes cast for recognised organisations in the sub-sector and must not be formally opposed by trade unions that won at least 50% of the votes cast. For the employers, an organisation’s representativeness is established using six criteria which also include ‘audience’. This criterion is measured by the number of companies that are voluntary members of the organisation or by the number of declared persons they employ. In practice, this

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means an organisation must represent either at least 8% of employers or at least 8% of workers counted in the procedure in order to be recognised as representative. This system made it possible for FEPEM to be considered as representative of, and to speak on behalf of the 3.4 million households who employ domestic workers and carers in France, despite not having many members. This system also enabled the use of the resources of the biggest trade-union confederations to be used to defend the rights of domestic workers and carers and it also enabled the social partners to gain specific resources through their negotiations. Codetermination Funds Many authors have suggested that the changes within trade unions towards a better defence of female workers could be explained by the feminisation of the trade-union memberships and elected officials or by material reasons (Colgan & Ledwith, 2003; Guillaume, 2018). We would rather suggest that the institutionalised industrial-relations system and public policies have also encouraged this change (Van Hooren et al., 2022). The existence, inclusiveness and content of the three collective agreements covering domestic workers and carers depend on the vested interests of the social partners, but also on their capacity to negotiate, which, in turn, depends on their resources and knowledge. In France, the ability of the social partners to use the negotiation of collective agreements to generate financial resources for themselves has been significant, especially in the SPE sub-sector. A national codetermination fund was set up in 2014–2015, to make grants to the social partners, but they are also able to secure sub-sectorial funds. The social partners involved in negotiating the three collective agreements examined here have negotiated additional financial resources, paid for by additional social contributions. The rates at which these additional contributions are set vary in the three sub-sectors: from 0.22% in the SPE sub-sector to 0.04% in the BAD sub-sector and 0.10% in the SAP sub-sector. For each pair of social partners, these resources are allocated roughly 50–50. They are supposed to be used to improve structures in the sub-sector, improve understanding of the collective agreements and to develop social dialogue. They are typically used to finance academic studies, pay officials, hire lawyers and rent offices, all of which have helped both trade unions and employers to adopt a more professional approach.

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Conclusion In France, social partners have negotiated collective agreements which have been extended to include nearly all declared domestic workers and carers, who are not civil servants. Although both trade unions and employers in the three main sub-sectors of home-based care and domestic work are fragmented, these collective agreements have introduced minimum rights, regulations and protections where previously there were none. Nevertheless, the precarity of these workers was not ended, since regulations concerning income security and recognition of life beyond work remain limited and part-time work remains the norm. In this sector, the question of the availability of the female workforce and the acknowledgement of its value and work remains unanswered—especially for the SPEs—, even if some progress has been made, especially in comparison with other countries (Van Hooren et al., 2022). The positions of, and balances of power between, the three sets of social partners differ: in the SPE sub-sector the employers’ federation has relatively few members, giving it considerable room to manoeuvre; in the BAD sub-sector the employers’ federations’ actions are limited by state intervention and their claims that they are defending social values, and in the SAP sub-sector the employers’ federations’ attempts to transfer clauses from the SPE sub-sector’s collective agreement have been prevented by opposition and/or litigation by the trade unions. The institutional context has encouraged the social partners to participate in the negotiations, without having many workers or employers as members. Nevertheless, the French system has created a group of elite negotiators, who sometimes have found it difficult to understand the needs of the workers or employers they officially represent and to go beyond the traditional repertoire of social partners. Acknowledgements We would like to thank the French National Research Agency (CNRS Research Project PROFAM, ANR-17-CE26-0019) and the PHSQuality European Research Project (VS/2018/0041) for their support which made our research possible. We would also like to thank Johanna Kantola and Anna Elomäki for their advice and suggestions on the draft version of this chapter.

Notes 1. Three other specific collective agreements exist and could be applied: the Convention collective du Personnel salarié de la Croix

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Rouge; the Convention collective des établissements pour personnes inadptées et handicapées and the Convention collective des établissements privés d’hospitalisation, de soins, de cure et de garde à but non lucrative, but they fall outside the scope of this study. 2. This claim has also justified their lobby to obtain welfare policies which could be more advantageous for their structures. 3. IPERIA (Institut au service de la professionnalisation de l’emploi à domicile), institute for training and IRCEM (Groupe de protection sociale des emplois de la famille) for pensions. 4. For example Yves Verollet, who left a senior role at the CFDT in 2012 to become director of the large non-profit service provider’s federation UNA.

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Social Partners and Equality Bargaining in France: A Blunt Tool for Reducing Gender Pay Gaps Susan Milner

and Sophie Pochic

Introduction Gender equality bargaining has long been promoted as a policy tool by the European Union, as it is seen as a way of raising the pay floor and providing equitable pay systems (Rubery & Johnson, 2019) and of increasing pay transparency, which in turn is necessary to make equal pay legislation effective in practice (Dickens, 1998; Pillinger, 2014; Weber et al., 2014). Equality bargaining is widely understood to encompass ‘collective negotiation of provisions that are of particular interest or benefit to women and/or are likely to facilitate gender equality’, sensitivity of negotiators to how the object of bargaining (such as pay) affects women, and the integration of a gender perspective into the negotiation of changes such as workplace restructuring or reforms of pay grading

S. Milner (B) University of Bath, Bath, UK e-mail: [email protected] S. Pochic École Normale Supérieure Paris, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5_5

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systems (Colling & Dickens, 1998, p. 390). This broad definition effectively covers any purposively gendered aspect of collective bargaining aimed at equalising pay and working conditions for men and women (see Williamson & Baird, 2014), but the form, substance and outcomes of equality bargaining depend on institutional features of employment relations practices as well as on policy design, where public policy explicitly aims to further it. In France, collective bargaining has since 1983 been placed at the centre of government efforts to reduce the gender pay gap. As we show in this chapter, policy has become increasingly prescriptive and enforced through a mixture of ‘naming and shaming’ reputation pressures and financial penalties for non-compliance. It also sets out a comprehensive framework for reducing gender pay inequalities, paying attention to representation of women and men at all levels and to a range of work– family measures, as well as to quantification of pay disparities. However, despite such efforts, the gender pay gap in France stood at 25.7%, for all employees, including full-time and part-time employment (Chamki & Toutlemonde, 2015). In the private sector, the gender pay gap stood at 28.5% in 2017 (including full-time and part-time employment) (GeorgesKot, 2020). For the same job and equivalent hours, the gap between men’s and women’s pay is estimated at 9.5% overall. Although the gap narrowed in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, it has stagnated since 2000. This glacial progress caused the European Trade Union Confederation in presenting the findings of a 2020 survey to argue that France would take the longest of all EU countries to reach gender pay equality (ETUC, 2020). The gender pay gap has persisted despite a relatively high level of subsidised childcare provision (Courtioux & Erhel, 2019) and a range of other supportive public policies introduced since the 1980s such as comparatively generous maternity leave. The gender pay gap in France exhibits two significant features: first, occupational segregation and the way in which it has contributed to increased polarisation of women’s economic situation, including on the basis of hours worked; second, a high ‘unexplained’ pay disparity, suggestive of discrimination. Wider economic changes have no doubt contributed to the first factor, whilst as we outline in this chapter a relatively weak legal framework helps to explain why discrimination continues to go unchallenged. In this chapter we consider why equality bargaining, although relatively well developed in France compared to many other European countries,

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has failed to make headway in reducing the gender pay gap at national level. Criticisms have been made repeatedly by academics and by equality campaigners, including within the trade union confederations, focusing particularly on weak capacity and motivation of the social partners, particularly at times of economic crisis when other priorities prevail (Cristofalo, 2013). Whilst acknowledging the belated efforts of trade unions to feminise their leadership and bargaining structures, we and others have in addition highlighted institutional features which undermine more recent efforts by female union leaders to promote a more active and egalitarian bargaining structure (Milner et al., 2019). Attention has also been paid to policy design: the narrowly quantitative scope of the mandatory duties underpinning bargaining made it a technical exercise rather than an impetus for transformative action (Chappe, 2019a, 2021). In the context of a weak bargaining culture at enterprise level, such duties have therefore become in practice a managerial tool rather than an aid to dialogue and negotiation, in many cases (Chappe & Pochic, 2021). The chapter sets out first the features of collective bargaining in the French context, showing how it is shaped by the legal framework, in successive iterations of policy. As we argue, the transformative potential of equality bargaining has been repeatedly undermined by its institutional configuration and the weak regime for legal enforcement, as well as its instrumentalisation by policymakers. In this analysis we draw on existing research evaluating equality bargaining in the private sector, including a project in which we participated, and which analysed plans and agreements made in 2014–2015 based on textual analysis of a representative sample of 184 and twenty organisational case studies (Pochic et al., 2019a, 2019b). We argue that the institutional configuration of the French model has also shaped the way in which workplace gender equality is defined, whereby trade unions have sought to integrate class into discussion of gender equality, with limited success, but been much less active in promoting a broader intersectional approach. In conclusion we reflect on ways in which the French model could be extended and strengthened in order to enhance its transformative potential. In so doing, we follow Linda Dickens’ (1994) argument that equality bargaining not only needs to rest on a gender-equal way of working at all levels (bargaining equity), but also needs to be buttressed by strong and responsive legislation.

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Dialogue or Bargaining? The French Context The term ‘corporatism’ has little purchase in the French context. Although the label ‘micro-corporatism’ has been applied to successive moves since the 1980s to improve social dialogue in the workplace by strengthening representative structures, on the one hand, and encouraging decentralised collective bargaining on the other, the term is misleading because it fails to take account of two distinctive, inter-linked features which persist despite these initiatives (Howell, 2009). The first feature is the weakness of representative actors in the workplace, notably trade unions, which remain mobilising rather than membership organisations: the latest official study of overall union density (in 2013) placed it at 11%, and only 8.7% in the private and voluntary sector (Pignoni, 2016). The second feature is the central role played by the state in organising workplace representation and bargaining (Bisignano et al., 2018). One reason for the persistence of these features is that change has until recently been largely incremental rather than systemic. Even since 2017, however, an avowedly systemic overhaul of the system has undermined rather than strengthened the actors and institutions of workplace bargaining. Thus, although decentralised collective bargaining may appear to have been revitalised in 2019, the increased number of agreements signed at local level (over 100,000 for the first time) is largely explained, first, by the prevalence of agreements on savings schemes linked to company performance or profit-sharing. These schemes, which are a form of pensions savings in many cases, have proliferated in smaller companies especially (Ministère du Travail, 2020). Second, greater engagement with collective bargaining, particularly in smaller companies, has also been associated with new procedures on redundancy which require plans to be presented to representative bodies. In other words, collective bargaining is still to a considerable extent dependent on state initiatives which include bargaining mechanisms either as a backstop limiting arbitrary employer action (on redundancy) or in sensitive areas of pay determination (company savings schemes): the state steers the bargaining agenda. Third, increased incidence of bargaining reflects a new feature of the institutional landscape encouraged by the Macron reforms: employers’ ability to conduct bargaining with non-union actors, including by direct consultation with employees (referendums), and to enact unilateral (employer-only) texts which are henceforth classed as ‘agreements’; these new forms of agreement represented around 40% of the total texts in

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2019 (Ministère du Travail, 2020, p. 19). In all respects, decentralisation is driven by the state in pursuit of its own objectives, which are oriented largely towards employment deregulation (Béthoux & Mias, 2021). Rather than ‘corporatism’, the term ‘social dialogue’ is most commonly used in the French case. This term covers a complex multi-level system of involvement of social partners in public policy relating to the world of work, and in areas of employment regulation within work organisations (Courtioux & Erhel, 2019; Milner, 2015). At national level, it includes institutionalised consultative bodies (such as commissions and committees) as well as ad hoc, semi-formalised consultations on specific areas of policy, as well as the governance of the social security system (healthcare, pensions and unemployment benefits, as well as family benefits and formal childcare provision). At all levels (national, sectoral and local), it provides forums for discussions which in certain circumstances are expected to result in formal processes of bargaining. At sectoral level, social dialogue in the form of collective bargaining still plays an important role in establishing wage classification structures, but this function has been eroded by the growing capacity of employers to use decentralised (enterprise) bargaining to undercut sectorally agreed norms, enabled by the 2017 reforms (Mias et al., 2016). Equality bargaining has in theory been protected from such erosion, thanks to large-scale mobilisation by unions and feminist organisations in 2017 (Binet, 2021). Nevertheless, at local (enterprise) level, the consequence of this statedriven model is a very high level of variability of outcomes. This pattern follows that observed in other countries but with more pronounced exclusionary effects, due to the weakness of workplace representative actors overall: that is, very low levels of union presence and employer investment in collective bargaining in small companies, and in those sectors where there is intense price competition and low wage practices such as retail, accommodation and catering, which also happen to be those employing a majority of women. A high degree of variability in turn makes it easier for employers to evade compliance. At the same time, the use of decentralised bargaining to undercut sectorally agreed norms means that it is being used as a managerial tool, whilst the widespread use of individualised pay mechanisms has eroded it further (Giraud & Ponge, 2016). This does not always result in the same outcomes. State-driven processes are played out in different sectoral and organisational-institutional contexts (such as organisational size and structure, the presence and form of

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workplace representative structures and configurations of trade union representation) (Béthoux & Mias, 2021). At all levels, the form and direction of state-driven bargaining have effectively instrumentalised it to suit policymakers’ and employers’ preferences. Instrumentalisation does not in itself preclude the development of egalitarian agendas but, as in the case of equality bargaining, it narrows the available options and makes it easier for transformative programmes to be hollowed out and emptied of possibilities for substantive change. Bargaining does not follow a pre-ordained linear pattern but a more differentiated and contingent process, depending on the resources and capacity of local actors, as well as existing cultures of collective actors and workplaces.

Collective Bargaining on Gender Equality in France: The Legal Framework As noted above, French trade unions were relatively slow to feminise their leadership structures, in comparison to Scandinavian countries and the UK. Despite moves towards gender-balanced executive structures in 1982 by the CFDT and 1999 by the CGT,1 the confederations have proved reluctant to introduce more stringent quotas or other measures (Guillaume et al., 2015). However, by 2020, France stood in a leading position in the EU for the percentage of women in union leadership positions (42.7%, compared to an EU-27 average of 31.8%), according to EIGE’s power index (EIGE, 2020). The feminisation of unions’ leadership structures responded not just to an increasingly female membership, with women making up over half the members of the largest union, the CFDT, for the first time in 2020 (and 46% in its closest rival the CGT),2 but also to a strategic push within the large unions to bring their executive posts in line with membership composition, which the government sought to encourage in its reforms of workplace representation (Lescurieux, 2019). Feminisation has inflected the traditional class orientation of French trade unions, resulting in an egalitarian approach to gender equality by socio-economic status. Thus, the CGT’s fourth key demand (of 36, originally adopted in 2009 and last updated in 2018) dealing with workplace gender equality focuses on women’s disproportionate exposure to lowpaid jobs and occupations, and to insecure contracts (CGT, 2020). For the CGT, women’s position in the workforce ‘is increasingly differentiated by their position at the top or bottom of the pay scale and the

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labour market. […] Administrative workers, manual workers, women in managerial or technical posts, are all as women victims of discrimination which take different forms’ (CGT, 2020, p. 4, our translation). The position of women in managerial or technical posts has improved compared to previous generations, but they are still paid less than their male counterparts and encounter glass ceilings limiting their career potential; the CGT’s action therefore focuses on reducing the negative impact of individualised pay systems on women and the need to curb cultures of presenteeism and gender stereotypes. In contrast, women in manual and administrative jobs are often located in occupations characterised by low pay and poor career progression, and the CGT’s action targets the use of precarious contracts and low pay in those occupations. The CFDT’s action similarly focuses on the need to broaden action to cover all aspects of working life for women, rather than focus on women’s representation in higher-level posts. Confederal Secretary Dominique Marchal argued in an interview in 2019 that workplace gender equality policy placed too much emphasis on women leaders: ‘A gap has been created between women managers who have reached decision-making posts and all the others. […] In enterprise-level bargaining, the glass ceiling is often the first subject raised, it’s the most visible, the best known and recognised, and often the glass floor is forgotten, and the fact that there are more than one levels of glass ceiling, not just the very top’ (Marchal, 2021, p. 177). French trade unions have not however adopted an explicitly intersectional approach to gender equality. In this they have been strongly influenced by the national non-discrimination framework which was developed only recently, in a largely passive way, that is, without provision for active duties (Simon, 2008), and in a piecemeal way which in some respects even allows discrimination to remain unchallenged: for example, the widespread acceptance of age discrimination is enshrined in laws giving differential rights by age, which allows discrimination on other grounds to be hidden and pass unchallenged (Doytcheva, 2020). The result is a highly fragmented legal regime with various sources, strengths and enforcement mechanisms (Inghilterra, 2018). Unsurprisingly, then, discrimination in the labour market on grounds of race and ethnicity, age, disability, and gender identity remains rife in France (Carcillo & Valfort, 2020).

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As Vincent-Arnaud Chappe (2019b) has argued, the French emphasis on trade unions as representatives of workers who are victims of discrimination and inequality represents a form of delegation of the state’s duty of enforcement of rights, leaving individual employees doubly vulnerable: first, because the legal mechanism is weak, and second, because trade unions are also relatively weak actors with limited and variable capacity to defend them. The lack of strong enforcement mechanisms applies particularly to discrimination on grounds of race and ethnicity, where even in the most recent policy initiative anti-discrimination law depends on an anonymous reporting system aimed at identifying the most egregious abuses, rather than the recognition of individual and collective rights (Eberhard, 2010). But even the law on discrimination on grounds of gender, which is the longest-established legal framework, remains largely passive in the way individuals and groups representing them can seek to enforce rights. French law distinguishes between non-discrimination, which relates to men and women employed in comparable work, and equal treatment in the workplace, which has a narrower basis and applied to men and women working in the same job (CGT, 2020, pp. 26–27, based on Miné, 2016). The most positive definition for women seeking to prove workplace discrimination therefore applies only in the narrowest context. Working with the CGT union, the economists Rachel Silvera and Séverine Lemière developed an approach which allows for systematic comparison between women’s and men’s pay based on a dynamic understanding of how women’s work is under-valued throughout their career rather than at a given point (Silvera, 2014; Lemière & Silvera, 2021). Based on an approach initially devised in the 1990s by François Clerc (a Peugeot metalworker and CGT representative who later became the CGT’s antidiscrimination officer) in support of his claim of discrimination due to trade union activities, this method compares an individual claimant’s pay with that of a panel of employees who were appointed to an identical job around the same time, in order to arrive at a pay gap for a tribunal’s consideration (Chappe, 2011). The compilation of panel data is a powerful demonstration of pay inequality which has proved successful in several cases (following a highly publicised case involving a bank in 2007), most recently in another highprofile case of a female insurance employee. However, it is a highly technical exercise requiring access to real individual data, and therefore can only be undertaken with the help of experienced trade unionists

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and/or legal advisors (CGT, 2020, pp. 110–111). Consequently, its impact has been relatively limited in the broader economy. A law introduced in November 2016 opened the possibility of class actions by unions on grounds of discrimination, but the failure of the initial case lodged by the CGT against aeronautics company Safran on grounds of anti-union discrimination made it less likely that this approach would be used to effect reparative justice for sex discrimination in other cases (Peyronnet, 2021). Nevertheless, the CGT with a network of lawyers launched the first class action on behalf of a group of women employees, in this case claiming discrimination by an insurance company (Caisse d’Épargne). In the absence of a viable litigation route to enforcement of the principle of equal pay, French unions have placed most of their effort in pursuing the opportunities made available by the legal duties placed on private-sector employers, particularly larger companies, to engage in collective bargaining on gender equality. The legal duties give unions some resources in these efforts, in particular the expertise and information resources provided by bargaining at sectoral level, and the possibility of calling on independent technical experts. As summarised below (Table 1), a succession of legal initiatives has since 1983 sought to extend the scope of equality bargaining and to strengthen enforcement. As this list indicates, in French labour law, gender equality is defined in broader terms than pay (although pay gaps stand at the centre of equality bargaining), to include also recruitment, gender workforce composition and gender balance, training and career progression, working conditions (covering working time and the use of part-time work, as well as health and safety). Work–life balance was also included in the list of subjects for equality bargaining, although in 2015 the Rebsamen law separated it from gender equality and made it a new heading under the ‘Quality of life’ rubric. The logic of this broad definition, and the leeway afforded to local bargaining in the determination of the choice of subjects, based on the Rapport de situation comparée (RSC), rests on a recognition of variation in sectoral patterns of pay inequality. However, the danger of such an approach is that companies are able to cherry-pick actions in their reports and particularly in the areas chosen for follow-up action, as we discuss further below. The effect of successive extensions to the legal duty to bargain on gender equality has also been to increase complexity. Complexity is problematic in three ways: first, it creates a certain opacity and illegibility which makes it easier for lip-service compliance to exist unchallenged; second, it

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Table 1

The evolution of legal duties on French companies

1983 Roudy law

1991 Génisson law

2006 law

2012 decree

2014 law on ‘real’ gender equality

2015 Rebsamen law

2017 Macron decrees

2018 Gender equality index

Duty placed on all companies with 50+ employees to produce an annual gender equality report, the Rapport de Situation Comparée (RSC) Duty placed on all companies with 50+ employees to engage in collective bargaining on gender equality (every three years) Duty placed on all companies with 50+ employees to engage in collective bargaining to identify ways of eliminating their gender pay gap within five years Financial penalty of up to 1% of total wage bill applicable to companies with no collective agreement or unilateral (employer-only) annual plan on gender equality (five-year deadline for elimination of gender pay gap is removed) Requirement for submission of gendered data on health and safety and career progression in the RSC; access to public contracts made conditional on demonstration of compliance with labour code relating to equality bargaining Integration of RSC indicators into broader set of required data in new Economic and Social Database, subsuming gender equality into ‘Quality of working life’ indicators Retention of principle of ‘more favourable treatment’ for sectoral-level bargaining in the case of gender equality, but at local (organisational) level requirement to bargain is extended from every year to every three years (wage bargaining remains annual) Points-based set of indicators which companies must publish annually, demonstrating a score of at least 75 points (out of 100); companies failing to publish index are ‘named and shamed’; those scoring under 75 points must produce plan to achieve improvements within 3 years; subject to financial penalties of up to 1% of total wage bill

is likely to demotivate actors in an area which already struggles to compete with other concerns; third, it puts a premium on knowledge, which in turn is often dependent on financial and other material resources, further weakening trade unions where they are in a precarious position in relation to management or to competing unions (Pochic & Chappe, 2019). For these reasons, the CFDT’s Dominique Marchal (2021) argued, it would

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have enhanced bargaining if the government had chosen to strengthen enforcement, rather than make the existing duties more complex. The final stage to date in the development of legal duties was marked by the introduction of the ‘equality index’, applicable from 2019 to the largest companies and now extended to all companies with 50 or more employees. The index was introduced in 2018 as a flagship policy of President Macron, who had pledged to make gender equality the great cause of his administration. It was largely the brainchild of the Employment Minister Muriel Pénicaud, a former human resources director at the multinational company Danone, and strongly promoted by the then secretary of state for equalities Marlène Schiappa, a former public relations consultant who made her name as a blogger advocating gender equality and female corporate leadership. With the aim of increasing transparency, the index created a new duty on private-sector companies (initially covering those with at least a thousand employees, then in 2019 those with 250 or more, and finally from 2020 all those with 50 or more) to publish a set of indicators: the gender wage gap, in quartiles (40 points); wage increases by gender (20 points); promotions rate by gender (15 points); wage increases following maternity leave (15 points)3 ; having at least four women in ten top-paying posts (10 points). By reducing managerial discretion on the indicators, the index has apparently reduced complexity; however, it has been criticised for falling short on the transparency which had been promised, since although the index must be published, companies do not need to show the full set of information which led to scores, particularly on the first two indicators which carry a heavy weighting (Tahri, 2021). In terms of policy design, the equality index is innovative but is widely seen as only a partial success, at best. Although the biggest companies have improved their score over three years, and the number of noncompliant firms initially decreased, large companies have used it in some cases as a public relations exercise without revealing the methodology used for calculating their high scores. It is possible for companies to receive a high score whilst still having a large gender pay gap and low numbers of women in decision-making posts (Breda et al., 2020; Tahri, 2021). As the threshold for the publication of the index has progressively dropped (originally applying to companies with over a thousand employees, then in 2019 those with 250 or more, and finally in 2020 those with 50 or more), compliance has weakened. Although the trade union confederations welcomed the introduction of the index, they have

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since expressed disappointment with the level of transparency in the calculation of the pay figure, and organised a rare show of unity in calling on the government to refine the legislation and make it harder for companies to adjust data (Binet, 2021). The index exists alongside collective bargaining at local level which must take place every three years (or four, by agreement). Bargaining is automatically linked to the index in cases where the equality score falls below 75 (out of 100), in which case the company must engage in bargaining—or submit a unilateral plan if no bargaining counterparts— setting out actions which result in the score rising to 75 or more, within three years. If not, the company faces prosecution and fines of up to 1% of the total wage bill. The index therefore introduces a new duty to produce evidence of an outcome in the form of an action plan, with a specific target and timeframe, and it is subject to inspection and enforcement by the state. In this sense it responds to some, but not all, earlier criticisms of the design of previous duties. However, whilst the latest political and media attention has focused on companies poor performance on the last criterion (women in top posts), trade unions and equality campaigners have argued that it pays insufficient attention to women on the lowest wages and those on insecure and part-time contracts (Tahri, 2021).

Collective Bargaining on Gender Equality in France in Practice As noted above, state-driven decentralisation of collective bargaining in France has resulted in a broad set of common trends which are shaped by existing institutional dynamics at local level. Using RESPONSE data (workplace panel surveys similar to the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys in the UK) for 2010–2011, Élodie Béthoux and Arnaud Mias (2021) mapped bargaining outcomes onto social dialogue indicators for a range of companies, where social dialogue is measured by a range of indicators including formal representative bodies and subjective assessments of the quality of management–employee relations by management and unions. They found four main clusters of organisational employment relations as characterised by the relationship between law and practice: pro-active (where representative structures were relatively strong and dialogue described as positive), informal (which they termed ‘a-legalistic’, largely characterised by management prerogative, in the

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absence of strong representative institutions), formalistic (where representative structures were weak and management used the law as a screen) and locally focused (where social dialogue remained largely informal and the law was followed but did not substantively guide practice). Organisational size and structure had a bearing on these clusters, with smaller companies more likely to fall into the second and third clusters, and fast-growing companies in new sectors more prevalent in the fourth. Béthoux and Mias also found that whilst these dynamics characterised local practice, outcomes also varied according to the subject of bargaining promoted by the state and the incentives this provided. Building on these findings, we argue that equality bargaining follows the broad logic of state-driven decentralisation of collective bargaining, but with specific features which relate both to legislative design (as shown above, strong incentives but considerable latitude of interpretation) and local receptiveness (fit with existing preferences and orientations on the part of both management and unions). Our study of agreements and plans concluded in 2014–2015, based on case studies in 20 selected organisations in six sectors (banking and insurance, food production, information technology and communications, health, manufacturing and retail) found three main types of equality agreement or plan, each representing a different approach to employment relations and the law. The first resembles the ‘informal’ category identified by Béthoux and Mias, where there was little difference between unilateral plans and bargained agreements; texts were typically brief and referred to a minimum of actions, following closely the letter of the law. The second type corresponds roughly to the ‘formalistic’ category described by Béthoux and Mias, where texts did not go beyond ‘box-ticking’ and human resources managers expressed a low degree of engagement with equality, as typified by a (female) HR legal specialist in an industrial bakery: ‘we work with the standard wage classifications so I don’t really see what we can do’ (Pochic et al., 2019b, p. 16). Although trade unions were present in some of these companies (typically, one main union) they expressed frustration at their lack of ability to raise workforce demands such as childcare support, but often also a sense of resignation. The third fits the Béthoux and Mias’s ‘pro-active’ category, but only loosely. Located largely in the growth sectors of finance and information technology (both highly gender-segregated both horizontally and vertically), these agreements often revealed divergences between the management and union position, with locally varied outcomes.

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We found evidence in our case studies that the managerialist agenda of diversity identified in other studies (Bereni, 2009; Pochic, 2021) fed into the organisational approach to gender equality, raising awareness among senior managers, particularly in larger and multinational companies, but also helping to steer actions away from pay and towards ‘softer’ measures which cost less to implement and more difficult to measure and monitor. The development of voluntary charters has had a double-edged impact: on the one hand, helping to unblock managerial resistance to measures aimed at tackling gender inequalities and to empower local equality activists; on the other, limiting the range of actions and particularly closing off more binding and more costly measures. This is particularly true because the charters themselves are loosely formulated with a broad range of measures advocated. The diversity charter, introduced in 2004 by a group of business leaders and signed by some 3500 organisations, have been promoted in different ways by different employer groups and forums for social dialogue, resulting in competition between types of disadvantage (in particular between racial or ethnic origin and other characteristics such as age, gender and disability) and ‘a lack of clear principles for action’ (Bussat & Soleymani, 2015, p. 72). It contains no requirement to monitor or evaluate or even to formulate an action plan, and there is no link to annual financial reporting by businesses (as in the Anglo-American approach). Instead the charter focuses on awareness-raising. In practice, this means that employees who find themselves victims of discrimination have no means of redress (Bussat & Soleymani, 2015, p. 78). The other relevant charter is the workplace family and parenting charter (Charte de la parentalité en entreprise) launched in 2008 by L’Oréal, the ministry of labour and an NGO representing parents of premature babies. It was developed by a consultant through a new Observatory of Family and Parenting (renamed the Observatory of Quality of Working Life in 2015). Around 600 companies have signed the charter to date, around half of these larger companies with over 1,000 employees. Although France has a long-established history of policy to support women on maternity leave, it has been more timid in promoting rights for fathers and for couples wanting to share leave more equally, leaving a significant space for potential innovation at company level (Milner & Gregory, 2012). However, in practice employers have proved reluctant to introduce measures which would add financial costs, for example by increasing the rate or duration of paid leave for fathers (Grésy, 2020), allowing fathers to take leave flexibly, as trade unionists have advocated,

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or subsidising childcare. The charter focuses on the idea of recognising family responsibilities in the organisation of working time schedules. In the evaluation of gender equality plans and agreements signed in 2014–2015, very few texts mentioned charters (only seven out of a sample of 186 texts), even where companies were signatories. However, several texts referred to in-house (not nationally managed) charters such as ‘ethical’, ‘recruitment’, ‘working time’ or ‘conduct of meetings’ charters. In such cases the language of ‘charters’ was used to designate ‘soft’ measures setting out principles for action or statements of intent rather than concrete, quantifiable measures. In all cases where texts referred to either in-house or externally managed charters, the actions presented referred to awareness-raising activities. Such companies were likely to be in finance and information technology sectors (Pochic et al., 2019a, pp. 77–78). The prevalence of the managerialist agenda is shown in the fact that 60% of companies in the 2014–2015 sample, particularly those at the smaller end, failed to provide pay data. The preference for ‘soft’ actions has repeatedly been highlighted in studies of gender equality agreements (Giordano & Santoro, 2019; Laufer, 2014; Laufer & Silvera, 2006; Pépin et al., 2008). Companies appear reluctant to publish data on pay, complying with the law requiring them to address pay disparities in agreements and plans by referring in the main either to specific target groups (often women in managerial posts) or only in general terms to the existence of a headline pay gap. Instead, companies preferred to set aspirational targets for recruitment of women into male-dominated occupations and sectors, or to present policies on support for working parents (the latter particularly in the growth sectors of finance and IT). In this sense the gender equality index provides more precise focus on quantitative indicators, including on pay. The introduction of the index of gender equality has already had an impact on the process and content of bargaining, even at an early stage of its implementation. At local level (company or workplace) the number of collective agreements on gender equality remained roughly stable in 2019, at 5,606 (6.9% of the total number of agreements). Most of these referred to the index not only for information but as the justification of the need for remedial action. The hard-discount supermarket Costco (a US-headquartered multinational only recently operating in France, with currently just one outlet and 250 employees) and the aeronautics service company Derichebourg Atis (1,370 employees) were singled out in 2020 as being among the

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first companies to respond to a low index score in 2019 by consulting their workplace representative bodies and agreeing a wages policy aimed at correcting gender wage imbalances, with specific budgets allocated to this exercise (Ministère du Travail, 2020, pp. 285–286). Costco’s agreement, signed by the CGT and the smaller, reformist Christian confederation CFTC (which holds three quarters of seats on the workplace representative body, with the CGT also recognised at 17%), sets out a range of actions including a budget for adjusting women’s salaries to bring them in line with male equivalents, and a monitoring process based on quantitative indicators including numbers of women and men recruited, trained and promoted each year, with specific attention to higher grades. Under the heading ‘quality of working life’ (in line with the changes introduced by the 2015 Rebsamen law: see Table 1) it also provides for monitoring of access to remote working and sets guidance for managers about reasonable hours during which employees may be contacted (Costco, 2019). This agreement responds to trade union demands for quantitative monitoring and for wage compensation for female employees, but is largely focused on gender equality for managerial grades. The second gender equality agreement highlighted by the ministry of labour was signed in November 2019 by the management of Derichebourg Atis and three reformist trade unions (FO, the managerial and technical staff union CFE-CGC and UNSA, the left-leaning ‘autonomous’ union), applicable to only workers in head office. The agreement sets out a number of initiatives aimed at encouraging female recruitment in a heavily male-dominated industry, making access to parttime working and remote working easier and increasing wages for women in four wage categories where disparities are widest (relating to a small number of women in practice, at relatively high levels of responsibility) (Derichebourg Atis, 2019). Taken together, these two agreements give an indication of the likely direction of future travel for equality bargaining, in response to legislators’ incentives. Concluded under threat of financial penalties, the agreements focus strongly on wage adjustments for women in relatively highly paid roles where a significant gap in relation to male counterparts has been identified. Although it is too early to draw wider conclusions from these examples, the agreements nevertheless fit the thrust of government pronouncements which have highlighted stronger incentives for organisations to promote women to top positions. At the G7 summit

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chaired by France in 2019, the then equalities minister Marlène Schiappa announced that a new law on ‘women’s economic emancipation’ would be introduced in 2020, aimed at encouraging women’s participation in strategically important sectors such as IT and sciences. Delayed by the pandemic, it was presented to parliament in April 2021 in the form of a bill on ‘accelerating economic and career equality’. It focuses on setting quotas for women’s entry into prestigious universities and on extending the 2011 Copé-Zimmerman law (which set a 40% quota for women’s representation on the boards of companies with 250 or more employees) to include a 30% quota of women in the 10% top-paying posts within five years, and 40% within eight years. Trade unions and equality campaigners on the other hand have expressed concerns that the focus on high earning women risks leaving behind the much greater numbers of women in low-paid, insecure jobs (Pochic, 2021), whose contribution to economic and social well-being has been highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic. There is little sign that such an approach will be followed in the context of the economic crisis caused by the pandemic, either in the private sector where job losses started to accelerate in 2020, or in the public sector where the spending squeeze will intensify.

Conclusion This chapter set out to explain why equality bargaining in France, although strengthened by law under successive governments and supported by a range of private (such as consultants and pay specialists) and public (such as regional development agencies, health and safety experts and labour inspectors) actors, has to date failed to provide the ‘magic formula’ for tackling gender inequalities and pay disparities in the workplace. We argued that the statutory underpinning for equality bargaining has broadened and deepened but retained a large degree of discretion which not only enables lip-service compliance but thereby actively encourages it. The mechanisms for extending good practice beyond a few large companies remain weak. Although in more recent years governments have sought to strengthen them by ‘naming and shaming’ the most egregious cases of non-compliance or poor performance (as measured by exceptionally large gaps), this still allows the majority of companies to ‘hide in the herd’, in the absence of more thorough-going enforcement.

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Nevertheless, in some cases, equality bargaining can address the gender pay gap through direct attention to the classifications and modes of pay determination, as well as through attention to the underlying factors such as working time, gendered recruitment and promotions procedures, access to training and support for career progression and other aspects of the organisation and culture of working life. Above all, perhaps, successive attempts to tackle the gender pay gap have kept awareness of gender inequalities alive, albeit at the risk of compliance fatigue. However, whilst initiatives have occurred in some (particularly very large) companies to deal with such issues, at least in part, a number of obstacles characterise bargaining processes which neither the legal incentives nor the changes taking place in management practices have adequately addressed. Above all, transparency remains elusive in the French context. The lack of consistency in approach has had a destabilising effect on collective bargaining. Although over the years expertise has been built up in trade unions and employer associations, and a regional infrastructure of support for bargaining was developed after the 2012 law, much more could be done to provide resources to bargaining parties in the form of information and expertise. Finally, the need to understand inequality as intersectional has still to be acknowledged and addressed.

Notes 1. Respectively, Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (French Democratic Confederation of Labour) and Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labour). The largest confederations comprise sectoral federations and regional groupings and are broadly identified by ideological orientation, although one of the main five federations Confédération Générale des CadresConfédération Française de l’Encadrement or CGC-CFE (French Confederation of Managerial Staff) represents only technical, supervisory and managerial staff. They are all present in both the public and private sectors, although to differing degrees. 2. The CGT and CFDT are the largest of five union confederations recognised by the French state as representative at national level, according to procedures laid down by law; they have around 640,000 members each. Recognition opens the way for presentation of union candidates at workplace representative elections and recognition of collective agreements, based on unions’ election scores.

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Taking into account votes in workplace elections, the CFDT is the largest confederation. It should be noted that confederations are positioned differently ideologically and in their relations with management, as reflected in propensity to sign workplace agreements. The CFDT was signatory to 95% of agreements concluded in 2019 in organisations where it had representatives (58% of the total number of agreements), the CGT 85% (44% of the total). The third largest confederation, Force Ouvrière, has around 300,000 members and signed 90% of agreements in organisations where it had representatives (33% of the total) (Ministère du Travail, 2020, p. 233). 3. Since 2006 companies have a legal duty to provide wage compensation to mothers returning from maternity leave for any loss of earnings or wage-related benefits incurred during the period of leave.

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Is Finnish Corporatism Reconfiguring, and Is It Good for Gender Equality? Paula Koskinen Sandberg , Anna Elomäki , Armi Mustosmäki , and Johanna Kantola

Introduction Corporatism refers to a societal system where the social partners have significant power over legislation and policymaking (e.g., Bergqvist, 2006; Koskinen Sandberg, 2018; Siaroff, 1999; Vesa et al., 2018). This chapter focuses on recent developments and changes within the Finnish corporatist system and how these changes are connected to other societal developments, namely, changes within the broader gender equality context and policymaking in Finland. We coin the term reconfigured corporatism to refer to the changes in two key aspects of corporatism: collective bargaining on wages and working conditions and the strong collaboration

P. Koskinen Sandberg · A. Elomäki (B) · J. Kantola Tampere University, Tampere, Finland e-mail: [email protected] P. Koskinen Sandberg e-mail: [email protected] J. Kantola e-mail: [email protected] A. Mustosmäki University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5_6

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between labour market organisations and the state in all policymaking, that is, peak corporatism and routine corporatism (Vesa et al., 2018). In addition to the reconfiguration, we also analyse the resilience and continuity of Finnish corporatism and how it impacts gender equality goals. The Nordic model of employment relations, characterised by centralised collective bargaining and strong collaboration between social partners and the state, has been widely admired. The Nordic model has often been linked with positive outcomes for society and the labour force (e.g. Kettunen, 2012), as well as positive impacts on gender equality (e.g. Grönlund et al., 2016). Indeed, compared to countries where union density has dramatically declined and collective bargaining has weakened and decentralised, the Nordic model may seem ideal for achieving higher gender equality. In practice, however, the picture remains more complex, and the positive impacts of gender equality are not self-evident in all cases. While collective bargaining has declined in several national contexts over past decades and there has been a trend towards greater decentralisation (Marginson, 2015; Schnabel et al., 2006; van Gyes & Schulten, 2015), the Finnish industrial relations system has remained surprisingly stable. Even during the current period, characterised by the rise of neoliberal ideas, the primacy of national competitiveness and austerity rather than traditional Nordic welfare state policies and solidarity in wage bargaining, the corporatist system has prevailed (e.g. Bergström & Styhre, in press; Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019; Vesa et al., 2018). Nevertheless, there have been several examples of turmoil that suggest that corporatism and corporatist power relations are also reconfiguring in Finland (Jonker-Hoffrén, 2019, 2020; Kylä-Laaso et al., 2021). The main employers’ federation has withdrawn from centralised, cross-sectoral bargaining (Jonker-Hoffrén, 2020), and more recently, some sectoral industry confederations have also withdrawn from sectoral bargaining (Liiten et al., 2020, October 1). Moreover, there are examples of the government taking a stronger policymaking role in fields where policies have previously been negotiated between labour market organisations and the government, including gender equality policy (e.g. Elomäki et al., 2021). Trade union confederations, in particular, are worried about losing their power positions due to these reconfigurations. The 2010s oversaw several changes to gender equality and gender equality policy. An increasing emphasis on neoliberalism, visible in gendered austerity and competitiveness policies, as well as the rise of

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conservative views and right-wing populism pushed gender equality goals aside from the political agenda (Elomäki & Kantola, 2018; Kantola et al., 2020). However, gender equality concerns regained political visibility in 2019 with Sanna Marin’s internationally renowned female-dominated and even feminist government. This change has had implications for policymaking, where the social partners have had to adapt to a new, sometimes less powerful, role. In this chapter, we examine the implications of the Finnish corporatist system and its recent reconfigurations for gender equality. Building on our own previous research on gender, power and the Finnish corporatist system, we focus on four case studies from the 2010s that illustrate the gender equality outcomes of the Finnish corporatist system and its shifting power dynamics. These cases illustrate how the two key aspects of the Finnish corporatist system—collective bargaining and policymaking participation—impact gender equality. The cases also exemplify recent changes in dynamics and power relations within the corporatist system, both in terms of collective bargaining and policymaking. Based on our cases, we ask: How is the Finnish corporatist system gendered, and what are the impacts on gender equality? How has this system been reconfigured recently, and with what implications for gender equality? We argue that despite its positive reputation, Finnish corporatism has not always been particularly positive for gender equality: centralised collective bargaining has not been able to tackle the gender pay gap and has indeed in some cases maintained the gap, and labour market organisations have watered-down state gender equality policies. Recent shifts in corporatist dynamics and power relations have made it possible to address some of these problems, but the changes have also created new challenges. For example, the current emphasis on the export industry-driven model of collective bargaining permanently positions the feminised public sector behind male-dominated industries (Kylä-Laaso et al., 2021; see also Erikson, in this volume, Wagner & Teigen, in this volume). This chapter contributes to discussions about gender and corporatism by providing a broad overview of the gender equality implications of corporatist systems by considering two key aspects of corporatism: collective bargaining and the influence of labour market organisations in political decision-making. Furthermore, the chapter provides a reflection on how recent changes in corporatism and corporatist power relations also identified in other countries influence gender equality.

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Finnish Corporatism and Its Reconfigurations Finland can be defined as a strongly corporatist country according to various economic and political criteria: high union density, interest groups’ active involvement in policy formation and decision-making and relatively centralised wage bargaining (e.g. Kauppinen, 2005; Kiander et al., 2011; Vesa et al., 2018). To better understand the dimensions of Finnish corporatism and its implications for gender equality, we distinguish between collective bargaining (peak corporatism) and the representation of labour market organisations’ interests in policy formulation (routine corporatism) (see Vesa et al., 2018). In terms of collective bargaining, for several decades the defining feature of the Finnish system was centralised agreements, the so-called incomes policy agreements, that set the framework for wage increases in industry-level collective agreements and also entailed initiatives on social policy, taxes and occasionally gender equality (Martikainen, 2000). In terms of policymaking, Finland, like other Nordic countries, has a long tradition of giving labour market organisations a privileged role in policy formulation (Elomäki et al., 2021; Koskinen Sandberg, 2016; Vesa et al., 2018). Employment and social policies have often been negotiated through tripartite working groups between the state, employers’ organisations and trade unions and labour market parties participate in various committees and councils where policies are drafted. This system has given central labour market organisations a dual role in shaping gender equality outcomes: they have a role in institutionalising wage relativities between the male- and female-dominated sectors in the labour market, and they protect their vested interests in gender equality policy. As in many other countries (Brandl & Bechter, 2019; see Rafstedt, in this volume), there has been a shift towards decentralisation in collective bargaining in Finland in recent years (e.g. Jonker-Hoffrén, 2019; Kiander et al., 2011; Visser, 2016). In 2008, the Confederation of Finnish Industries (the biggest employers’ organisation) announced that it would no longer negotiate centralised incomes policy agreements, and in 2015, it formally changed its rules and withdrew from centralised negotiations, leaving centralised trade union confederations without a negotiating partner (Jonker-Hoffrén, 2019). Since 2015, Finland has followed the example of other Nordic countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, and taken up an industry-level model of collective bargaining (see Wagner & Teigen, in this volume, Erikson, in this volume). In this model, each

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sector negotiates its own agreements, and the export industry acts as a pacesetter for wage increases for the entire labour market. In parallel, employers and the political right have pushed for local bargaining, and in 2020 and 2021, important sectoral employer organisations (the forestry and technology industries) announced that they would begin to agree on working conditions at the company level. In past decades, state intervention to reshape employment relations has become a key feature of capitalism, and states have taken an active role, particularly in the context of economic crises (Howell, 2021). Paradoxically perhaps, this has sometimes involved externalising difficult decisions to social partners (Bergström & Styhre, in press). This has been the case in Finland too. In the aftermath of the 2007–2008 economic crisis, the state pushed labour market organisations to adopt a competitiveness-enhancing social pact (our Case 1) that shifted costs from employers to employees and weakened working conditions by threatening even harsher legislative measures (Adkins et al., 2019; Kylä-Laaso & Koskinen Sandberg, 2020; Kylä-Laaso et al., 2021). Routine corporatism also shows some signs of reconfiguration in Finland, as governments have taken a stronger role in policymaking vis-a-vis labour market organisations. On the one hand, the Finnish government has pushed labour market organisations to adopt neoliberal reforms regarding pensions and unemployment benefits and thereby externalised decisions on restructuring the welfare state to labour market organisations. On the other hand, the government has implemented ‘activating’ cuts in unemployment benefits despite trade unions’ opposition, pushing them into a more consultative role. Finnish governments have also played a stronger role in tripartite working groups in the field of gender equality policy (Elomäki et al., 2021). In Finland, employer organisations have historically been supportive of—or at least consented to—the corporatist system and have not tried to demolish it (Korpi, 2006). A central reason for this is that the system has mainly been beneficial for them. It has been argued that employers have been able to use corporatist processes as tools to advance neoliberal ideas and welfare state reform since the 1990s and even earlier (Wuokko, 2019; see also e.g. Boumans, in press). Some have read the withdrawal of employers from centralised negotiations as a sign of them giving up power. We suggest, however, that their use of power might have become more covert. For example, the sectoral bargaining round of 2019–2020 (Case 2) witnessed strong employer coordination that shaped outcomes,

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even when formally this was supposed to be a union round of collective bargaining. Further, we argue that employers and business-interest organisations are still interested in being involved in tripartite policy processes and representing their interests. Altogether, there are seven central labour market organisations in Finland, three for employees and four for employers. The three trade union confederations are the Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK), the Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees (STTK) and the Confederation of Unions for Professional and Managerial Staff in Finland (AKAVA). The four employer organisations are the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK); Local Government Employers (KT); the Commission for Church Employers (KIT), representing the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland; and the Office for the Government as Employer (VTML). Although the number of women in key positions in labour market organisations has increased, these organisations remain highly gendered, masculine institutions, and ‘women’s interests’ may be perceived as separate from or even contrary to key interests (e.g. Saari, 2016).

Advancing Gender Equality Through Collective Bargaining All Nordic countries have high levels of gender segregation in the labour market, but Finland has the highest (Grönlund et al., 2016). In Finland, women tend to work in the public sector, while men typically work in the private sector, specifically in the construction and export industries. Due to neoliberalism and austerity, public sector services at the core of the Finnish and Nordic welfare state models have been placed under strict budgetary control (e.g. Adkins et al., 2019; Kylä-Laaso & Koskinen Sandberg, 2020). The welfare state had a role in creating a secondary position for women in the labour market by employing women within public services. The welfare state has relied—and still relies—heavily on inexpensive female labour (see Hernes, 1987; Koskinen Sandberg, 2018, 2021). It is therefore no surprise that the gender pay gap in Finland, at 16.6 percentage points in 2019, is high compared to the remainder of Europe (EIGE, 2019). In some countries, gender equality issues are advanced through equality bargaining, which refers to advancing gender equality within collective bargaining (e.g. Colling & Dickens, 1998; Martikainen, 2000;

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Williamson & Baird, 2014, Milner & Pochic, in this volume). The concept of equality bargaining is not in active use in Finland, although some issues linked to gender equality are negotiated at the collective bargaining table, such as details of parental leave within a specific collective agreement. In addition, feminised occupations, such as nursing, frequently bring the question of equal pay to the collective negotiations (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019; Saari et al., 2021). In the late 1980s and 1990s, however, gender equality and equal pay were acknowledged in the negotiations of the incomes policy agreements, and specific ‘gender equality supplements’ were allocated several times to narrow the gender pay gap (Martikainen, 2000). Although not specifically targeting women, ‘low pay supplements’ were already allocated in the 1970s. While some small progress was made, these supplements were mostly symbolic. The Finnish solidaristic wage policy has aimed at producing ‘fair outcomes’ for the labour force, but it has been relatively gender blind and has not acknowledged the structural features of the Finnish labour market and collective bargaining system that negatively affect wage levels for feminised occupations. From the perspective of a large body of earlier scholarship, critiquing the Finnish centralised collective bargaining system might seem odd. Earlier scholarship indicates that centralised and regulated industrial relations systems are often associated with smaller average gender pay gaps (e.g. Colling & Dickens, 1998; Mandel & Semyonov, 2005; Rubery et al., 1997). From the perspective of countries where union density has dramatically declined and collective bargaining has weakened and become very decentralised, the Nordic model may sound ideal. In practice, the picture is more complex. While collective agreements have typically been viewed as gender neutral, closer examination reveals that they are gendered and can have gendered consequences for the working conditions and wages of men and women. The complex structure of Finnish collective agreements and centralised bargaining has maintained the historical gendered hierarchy between male-dominated and female-dominated jobs and occupations and offered legitimacy for gender-based wage disparities (e.g. Koskinen Sandberg et al., 2018). The difficulties in changing these structures are illustrated by the wellknown case of Nancy the Nurse in 2007. On the surface, the nurses’ union’s actions in 2006–2007 were a victory and resulted in the government and employers’ organisations giving in to their demands for wage increases (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019; Saari et al., 2021). The

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conservative National Coalition Party had taken a political role by making an election pledge to increase the underpaid women’s sector wages, and the party was held to account for its election promise by nurses’ unions once in government. This was later rejected as a dangerous example. However, research has since pointed to the persistence of gendered structures and shows that the pay increases evaporated (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019; Saari et al., 2021). In 2007, the male-dominated export sectors also negotiated the same level of pay increases. This is an interesting contrast to Sweden, where a one-off initiative to increase low-paid public sector salaries was successful (see Erikson, 2021; Erikson, in this volume). In Finland, in contrast, despite the failure to increase nurses’ relative wages and diminish the gender pay gap, Nancy the Nurse was blamed in public discourse for Finland’s loss of competitiveness because of the excessive wage increases on the eve of the financial and economic crisis of 2008 (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019; Saari et al., 2021).

Labour Market Organisations Shaping Gender Equality Policy For decades, Finland has had an active state gender equality policy and relatively strong gender equality institutions. This policy has, however, suffered from the weakness of the chosen instruments and implementation problems (Holli & Kantola, 2007). Active collaboration between state gender equality actors, women’s organisations and women and feminists across political parties has played a key role in advancing specific gender equality initiatives, such as children’s universal right to day care (Holli, 2008). However, tripartite collaboration between the state, employers’ organisations and trade unions has played at least as important a role in shaping policy outcomes (Elomäki et al., 2021; Koskinen Sandberg, 2016; Salmi & Lammi-Taskula, 2014). This has often—but not always—posed barriers for policy adoption and implementation. In past decades, several key gender equality reforms have been agreed upon between the labour market organisations and the state, either as part of the incomes policy agreements or in tripartite working groups. This has meant that reforms have been negotiated behind closed doors and had to be approved by both the government and the labour market parties (Koskinen Sandberg, 2016; Saari, 2016; Salmi & Lammi-Taskula, 2014). Tripartite negotiations are always compromises between the interests of the different parties, and the results might be disappointing from

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a gender equality perspective. For example, in the early 2000s, efforts to increase parental leave earmarked for fathers were stalled in corporatist negotiations. Employers especially resisted father’s quotas due to the high costs (Lammi-Taskula & Takala, 2009). In past years, however, all labour market organisations, including employers, have expressed their support for fathers’ quotas (Elomäki et al., 2021). Furthermore, pay equality reforms, such as the guidance for pay comparisons included in the Gender Equality Act, have been watered down in corporatist policy processes. Employers have managed to suppress issues that threaten their interests, such as comparing wages across sectors or between collective agreements (Koskinen Sandberg, 2016). In the 2010s, Finnish labour market organisations took a more proactive and publicly visible role in gender equality policy, partly in response to the temporary U-turn in governmental gender equality policy due to austerity and the rise of conservatism and right-wing populism (Elomäki et al., 2019). Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s right-conservative-populist government (2015–2019) adopted several austerity and competitiveness measures that had negative impacts on gender equality (see Case 1) and significantly weakened Finnish gender equality policy (Elomäki & Kantola, 2018; Kantola et al., 2020). Even in this context, labour market parties’ constructions of gender equality and inequality, as well as their proposed solutions, remain entangled in their own vested interests. The gender equality positions of Finnish labour market organisations focus mainly on labour market issues and try to advance the interests of the organisations’ own membership rather than broader gender equality goals (Elomäki et al., 2019). Raising certain issues onto the agenda has also been used to distract public attention from other issues that could potentially be equally relevant but which the labour market organisations wish to avoid.

Cases and Materials We explore the complex relationships between gender, power and the Finnish corporatist system and its recent reconfigurations through four case studies from the 2010s—a time of turmoil in both Finnish corporatism and the gender equality context. Most of our cases are linked to wages, equal pay and collective bargaining, while one is on parental leave reform. We analyse some central trends in how Finnish corporatism is changing and how it has become challenged by several actors, including

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not only the government but also civil society. We also analyse how reconfiguring corporatism is linked to central gender equality goals and the reasons why the Finnish corporatist system is currently facing challenges. Furthermore, we analyse continuity in the corporatist system, as continuity can be equally significant for reaching (or not reaching) gender equality goals. We have studied most of these cases in depth in our earlier research, and here our aim is to go beyond them and draw broader conclusions about gender, power and Finnish corporatism. The four cases are the following: 1. Policy debates and negotiations on the ‘Competitiveness Pact’, a neoliberal policy reform that aimed at lowering labour costs and targeted the feminised public sector in particular (based on Kylä-Laaso & Koskinen Sandberg, 2020, and Kylä-Laaso et al., 2021). 2. Sectoral and local bargaining for nurses’ pay increases in the context of the Covid-19 crisis (a more recent case we have not previously analysed). 3. Civil society challenging established actors in local government sector wage determination, using the case of the NoPlayMoney social movement as an example (based on Koskinen Sandberg, 2021). 4. The failed attempt to reform the Finnish family leave system that took place during the right-conservative Prime Minister Sipilä’s government in 2017–2018 (based on Elomäki et al., 2021). All these cases rely on different datasets. The research data consisted primarily of documentary material, which included public statements (e.g. position papers, press releases and blogs) of labour market organisations and other key actors (Cases 1, 2, and 4), parliamentary debates (1), government documents (1 and 4), as well as media articles (2 and 3). In Cases 3 and 4, documentary material was complemented with interviews with key actors involved in the process. The analysis of all the cases relied on deconstructive feminist policy analysis, which understands the meaning of gender equality as an outcome of constant political struggles (Kantola & Lombardo, 2017). Our analyses were informed by a study of policy processes that emphasises the actors involved, as well as negotiations, resistance and opposition (Bergqvist

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et al., 2016; Engeli & Mazur, 2018). This includes struggles in framing policy problems and solutions (Bacchi, 2009) and tactics of non-decisionmaking to limit the scope of the policy process to noncontroversial issues and keep gender equality issues or specific policy measures off the political agenda (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963) in the agenda-setting and adoption phases, as well as different strategies of resistance during implementation (Engeli & Mazur, 2018). Our analyses paid particular attention to the power relations and conflicting interests that shape the policy process, the ways in which the actors involved in the processes tried to influence the outcomes, as well as in the shifting forms of public governance that influence policy processes and policy measures (Elomäki & Ylöstalo, in press). In the analysis that follows, we first discuss the first three cases, which are connected to peak corporatism or collective bargaining. We then move on to routine corporatism and labour market organisations’ role in policymaking.

Reconfigurations and Continuity in Peak Corporatism: Struggles Over the Value and Cost of Feminised Work This section elaborates on the recent reconfigurations of peak corporatism, notably the government’s efforts to challenge the corporatist system with the aim of increasing the cost competitiveness and decentralisation of collective bargaining. It also addresses some of the central challenges of Finnish corporatism from a gender perspective: the question of the undervaluation of feminised public sector work and the growing dissatisfaction of the employees of this sector with the collective bargaining system. The Competitiveness Pact: Trading Gender Equality for the Institutional Continuity of the Corporatist System The Competitiveness Pact was a neoliberal policy reform that aimed at lowering labour costs and targeted the feminised public sector in particular. It was also an attempt to change power relations within Finnish corporatism by forcing trade unions to agree to weakening working conditions and restricting the right to bargain collectively, as the government planned to implement binding legislation instead. The Pact was

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initiated by the centre-right-populist PM Sipilä’s government (2015– 2019) and negotiated with the social partners. In 2015, in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the newly elected PM Sipilä stated that something needed to be done to ‘save the country’. Austerity measures and national competitiveness were also central in the strategic government programme Finland – Land of Solutions (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015). The Pact’s central aim was to increase the competitiveness of the Finnish economy. This aim could be achieved by either lowering labour costs by 5% or increasing work hours by 100 h a year without pay increases. These demands were hard for the trade unions to accept. When the long and difficult negotiations did not produce results, the government started to plan an alternative competitiveness package to enforce its goals. The package would have prevented the labour market parties from negotiating some terms normally agreed upon in collective agreements. The labour market parties reached a consensus on the Pact in Spring 2016. The Pact entailed cuts in certain pay components, such as cutting the holiday pay of public sector employees for three years (approximately half a month’s extra salary that is paid annually), shifting social insurance contributions from employers to employees by 1.20%, shifting social security payments from employers to the state by varying degrees but at least by 0.58% and adding 24 unpaid extra annual working hours. In the policy debate, the negative gender equality impacts of the Competitiveness Pact became a central argument for resisting these policy measures. Still, the trade union confederations ultimately gave in to the policy measures demanded by the government. This case shows that relatively gender-equal states with strong corporatist traditions, such as Finland, may align with neoliberal austerity policies with gendered implications (for details, see Kylä-Laaso et al., 2021). In this context, trade unions are forced to adapt to the neoliberal logic of policy formulation to retain the institutional continuity of the corporatist system. The legacy of the Competitiveness Pact is controversial. It had severe impacts on the feminised public sector, which were visible in the statistics soon after the Pact’s implementation. Wages stagnated, especially in the already low-paid local government sector, and cutting 30% from the holiday pay of the public sector employees also impacted annual earnings (Official Statistics of Finland). Even with its negative gender impacts, some, including several economists and politicians, consider the Competitiveness Pact a success. It might be partly the result of lucky timing, but there were some positive developments observable in the Finnish labour

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market; for example, the employment rate rose significantly. Still, the Pact was very unpopular among the Finnish people, and it took a toll on Prime Minister Sipilä’s political career and the popularity of his Centre Party, which suffered a rather dramatic defeat in the 2019 parliamentary elections. Sectoral Bargaining for Nurses’ Wage Increases in the Context of COVID-19 Our second case—bargaining for wage increases and COVID-19 bonuses for nurses in the context of the COVID-19 crisis—addresses the reconfiguration of Finnish corporatism through the decentralisation of collective bargaining and the implications of this key reconfiguration of Finnish corporatism for pay equality and feminised healthcare workers. As discussed above, collective bargaining in Finland has moved to the industry level, and in the new model, the export industry sets the pace for wage increases (Jonker-Hoffrén, 2019). The 2019–2020 collective bargaining round began in autumn 2019, when the male-dominated export industries negotiated a salary increase of 3.3% over two years. The negotiations of the feminised local government sector began in January 2020. Nurses’ unions had four key demands: removal of the additional unpaid hours included in the Competitiveness Pact, salary increases at least as high as those of the export industry, nurses’ own collective agreement and a state-funded pay equality programme (Tehy and Super, 2020, January 14). The unions argued that nurses’ salaries should increase 1.8 percentage points more than those of male-dominated sectors for 10 years and that the state should commit 100–150 billion euros a year for this purpose (Tehy and Super, 2020, March 19). The Covid-19 pandemic, which hit after the start of the negotiations, significantly increased the burden on nurses and other healthcare workers. The state of emergency made it possible to cancel and postpone holidays and force healthcare workers to work, and the lack of protective gear was a pressing problem. This led to an additional demand: a e1000 Covid-19 bonus for nurses to be funded by the state (Tehy and Super, 2020, May 25). During the difficult negotiations, nurses’ unions appealed to the government several times but with no result. Agreement was finally reached after more than four months of negotiations. The unpaid working hour provision was scrapped and the nurses were promised a separate collective agreement, but the deal was disappointing regarding money.

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Nurses’ pay increases remained below those of export industries, and the worsened economic situation postponed discussions about the long-term pay equality programme. Moreover, the government refused to fund the Covid-19 bonuses. Nurses continued to push for Covid-19 bonuses after the bargaining round was concluded, but with little impact. The pandemic made explicit that work done within the feminised public sector is vital, but unlike many other countries, Finland has not provided additional compensation for healthcare workers. We suggest that shifting corporatist power dynamics played a role. Trade unions argued that the state should provide the funding, but according to the government, the responsibility was on the labour market parties. The government’s position was opposite its stance in the Competitiveness Pact, as stated by Prime Minister Marin in a television debate: ‘The government and the parliament are not labour market parties. We do not negotiate salaries and working conditions. It is very important to make clear that labour market parties negotiate these questions. We cannot go down the road of political auctioning on people’s salaries’ (MTV, 2020, December 8.) Like the NoPlayMoney case (case 3), local government employers escaped responsibility by arguing that the issue should be tackled at the workplace level (YLE, 2020, December 16). However, local bargaining for Covid-19 bonuses has proven remarkably ineffective: only a few municipalities and private healthcare companies have provided bonuses. The decentralised bargaining for nurses’ wage increases and coronabonuses shows the effects of recent shifts in corporatist power relations on gender equality. The incomes policy agreements, despite maintaining gendered hierarchies and wage relativities, allowed the state to push for equal pay initiatives. The shift to industry-level bargaining has meant that the state has withdrawn from equality bargaining, both in terms of political support for feminised sectors and providing the funding. Unlike in the 2007 Nancy the Nurse case (Saari et al., 2021), the government did not support nurses’ demands. It also seems that, after the significant pressure exerted by Prime Minister Sipilä’s government on the Competitiveness Pact (as well as Prime Minister Antti Rinne’s efforts to prevent the Finnish Post from weakening the working conditions of some of its workers, which resulted in his resignation in December 2019), governments have been reluctant to interfere in labour market affairs. As the Covid-19 bonuses show, this also applies when the purpose of interfering would be to advance gender equality. While the case illustrates changes in Finnish

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peak corporatism, it also reveals continuity in how feminised care work remains undervalued in corporatist negotiations—whether these negotiations take place at the cross-sectoral, sectoral or local level—and even in the context of a pandemic that revealed the necessity of this work for society. Civil Society Challenge to Unequal Pay Practices in the Finnish Local Government Sector The third case focuses on a ‘wage cartel’ regarding early education teachers’ wages, activism around the wage question and the inability of the Finnish local government sector collective bargaining system to produce fair and equal wages. The case is part of the broader challenge that Finnish corporatism is facing, namely, the growing dissatisfaction of feminised, undervalued occupational groups of the public sector. In 2018, the Finnish media revealed that several municipalities in the Finnish capital area had secretly agreed not to compete with each other by paying higher wages for early education teachers, even though there was a severe shortage of labour. Instead, the three cities decided to pay the minimum wage set within the collective agreement, which was low by Finnish standards. The minimum level represents a wage that the trade union representing early education teachers agreed upon as a suitable wage level for these teachers. The revelation resulted in public outrage and the rise of the NoPlayMoney social movement, which demanded higher wages for early education teachers. The social movement, initiated on social media, mobilised thousands of people in only a few days. What is significant in this case is that civil society actors came together to challenge and resist employers and trade unions and were successful in helping obtain wage increases for early education teachers within the Finnish capital area. The question of low pay for early education teachers is part of the broader question of the undervaluation of feminised work and the resulting gender pay gap that is institutionalised within the Finnish collective bargaining system. In the 1960s and 1970s, the women’s employment rate in Finland grew simultaneously with the expansion of the welfare state. The welfare state employed women at wage levels that were thought to be appropriate for women at the time (e.g. Kettunen, 2012). For example, after being in effect for decades, the widespread practice of paying men and women different wages had just become illegal during the growth period of the welfare state (Bergholm, 2005;

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Nummijärvi, 2004). Wages for feminised occupations within the welfare state, such as nurses and early education teachers, came to reflect this institutionalised practice. As collective agreements form a strong, rather stable structure in the Finnish labour market, this institutionalised practice has not been significantly challenged until rather recently. Wages are often thought of as reflecting market factors, such as supply and demand. Thus, the wage cartel case went against everything commonly thought about how wages are determined and how labour markets work. It became clear that market forces do not determine wages in welfare state employment. Instead, there were actors who had deliberately kept the wage levels of early education teachers low. After the wage cartel was made public, there were heated discussions in the Finnish media over early education teachers’ wages. The traditional actors emerged as expected, with employer cities denying the existence of the cartel and trade unions seemingly appalled by the revelation. The three cities claimed that they had simply followed the wage levels set by the collective agreements. New subject positions also emerged. Among those who were angry were ordinary citizens who wanted to do something concrete to change the situation. NoPlayMoney used a combination of traditional and innovative means to claim higher wages for early education teachers. In March and April 2018, it held two demonstrations in which trade unions participated and politicians spoke. There was also a so-called Ask for a Pay Raise Day, when thousands of early education teachers simultaneously handed in wage requests to their employers in which they demanded a reasonable living wage of e3000. There was clear momentum for wage increases for early education teachers, and results were achieved relatively quickly. Many cities in the Finnish capital region and surrounding areas gave pay raises of between e145 and e225 to early education teachers. In terms of percentages, these raises are quite substantial, but the wages remain low in absolute terms and are significantly less than the e3000 target. The significance of this case is the fact that unequal wage bargaining practices, in which the unions had participated, were exposed and that civil society reacted in a way that produced results.

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Reconfigurations in Routine Corporatism: The Government Takes the Lead in Gender Equality Policy Our fourth case is the failed attempt to reform the Finnish family leave system, which illustrates reconfigurations in routine corporatism. The need for family policy reform, especially the aim of increasing the quota for father’s leave, has been on the policy agenda during several consecutive governments. Although Finland has a reputation as a gender-equal country with strong supporting policies, the level of family allowances is small in comparison with other Nordic countries, care responsibilities are unequally divided between the parents, and leave take-up is affected by social inequalities in the structure of Finnish society. However, the reform of the family leave system has proved notoriously challenging due to ideological differences between the political parties, compounded by the interests of central labour market organisations that have participated in the reform efforts (Lammi-Taskula & Takala, 2009; Salmi & Lammi-Taskula, 2014). The attempt to reform the family leave policies took place during Prime Minister Sipilä’s right-conservative government (2015–2019). The family leave reform was not in the government programme that prioritised implementing austerity measures and raising the employment rate, and it did not include any gender equality measures. Perhaps surprisingly, the labour market organisations took a proactive role in raising the reform to the agenda as a question of improving gender equality in the labour market. However, many key actors focused on public finances. Eventually, the reform was raised to the government agenda with strict framework conditions: the family leaves should be reformed with the aim of raising employment rates and without any increases in public spending. Compared to earlier corporatist policy processes around gender equality and family leave, labour market organisations were given less leeway in the negotiation, as the government not only set the strict framework conditions but also took charge of steering this politically difficult reform. These strict conditions reflecting the neoliberal austerity paradigm sidelined and narrowed the gender equality goals. In practice, this excluded measures that would most effectively ensure equal division of care responsibilities in a family-friendly way by extending paid parental leave to increase fathers’ quota. Furthermore, during the negotiations, it became evident that the only model that would satisfy the strict

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conditions would cut the benefits commonly used by mothers, especially less-educated mothers in precarious labour market positions. After half a year of heated negotiations, the Centre Party minister responsible for the reform unilaterally halted the policymaking process. Although negotiations had been difficult, the decision to use its veto surprised and disappointed the other parties. Stalling the reform could also be interpreted as the government using its power instead of waiting for and accepting the result of negotiations reached by the labour market organisations. A cutting model was perceived as politically difficult to implement by the Centre Party and the populist the Finns Party, as well as some trade unions. On the other hand, the cutting model would have served the interests of certain actors, especially the right-wing parties, as well as the employers and business-interest organisations, given their unwillingness to increase social security contributions. Overall, the failed reform showcased the government’s aim of disrupting the corporatist tradition and pushing labour market organisations, especially trade unions, to a more consultative role. The employer and business-interest organisations seemed to have better connections to the government, as their interests aligned with the neoliberal agenda. Although gender equality initiatives have often been diluted in corporatist policy processes, this time sidelining those organisations and the tighter steering of the government did not produce a long-awaited reform or make its adoption easier. The no-cost and workfare approach sidelined gender equality and eventually the power struggles between key actors led to the stalling of the reform.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have explored the characteristics of Finnish corporatism and its implications for gender equality. In addition, we aimed to evaluate whether Finnish corporatism is changing and whether this change is positive or negative from the perspective of gender equality. For these purposes, we coin the term reconfigured corporatism, which refers to changing practices and power relations in Finnish corporatism, both at peak and routine. Since the global economic crisis in 2008, institutional structures of collective bargaining and corporatist political processes have become increasingly contested in Europe, subject to deliberate interventions with the aim of decentralisation, liberalisation and pushing social partners

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towards a more consultative role in policy processes. However, it has been argued that at times of financial crisis, states call for social partners to negotiate pacts and externalise policymaking to social partners. By doing so, they aim to reduce the burden on government expenses during the economic crisis, thus reducing the need for major structural reforms (e.g. Bergström & Styhre, in press). The role of the state during crises has been perceived as active in the implementation of austerity and decentralisation (Howell, 2021). We argue that this externalisation and decentralisation are also visible in the reluctance of the government to push forward wage policies that could promote gender equality, even during the Covid-19 crisis, which made the value of feminised work visible in an unprecedented way. Although the Nordic model of employment relations has maintained stability even during the economic crisis, the Finnish labour market was faced with similar neoliberal pressures for change, liberalisation and decentralisation and ideas on the necessity of internal devaluation to restore the national economy, as most European countries did quite shortly after the crisis. Indeed, one obvious reconfiguration in Finnish corporatism is the trend of decentralisation, gradually moving from centralised collective bargaining to sectoral bargaining and even local, company-level bargaining. The typical argument is that centralised models of collective bargaining are beneficial for gender equality. However, in Finland, where collective bargaining has traditionally been centralised, the gender pay gap is wider than the EU average. Historical gender inequalities and the undervaluation of feminised work have been found to be institutionalised within collective agreements, which often gave unwarranted legitimacy for unequal pay practices (e.g. Koskinen Sandberg et al., 2018). While this is true, decentralisation does not mean an increased level of gender equality, including equal pay, just more variation in bargaining practices, pay practices and conditions of work in both directions. The current sectoral bargaining model and emphasis on export industry-driven wage bargaining freeze the pay gap between the male-dominated export industries and the feminised public sector. There are, however, also good examples of how wage increases have been obtained at the local level as a combination of civil society activism and local bargaining, despite national collective agreements with lower wage levels (Case 3). In Finland, governments are reluctant to interfere with labour market questions, leaving them for social partners to resolve. The state has

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attempted to avoid responsibility for gender equality, especially equal pay, by outsourcing the question to the labour market parties (Saari, 2016). There are some recent examples of state interventions in labour market issues, also discussed in this chapter: the case of wage increases for nurses and related industrial action just before the 2008 economic crisis (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019; Saari et al., 2021) and the Competitiveness Pact that lowered labour costs (Case 1). Both cases have a certain level of notoriety and act as justifications for governments not interfering in labour market questions. This evading responsibility is also present in the case of Covid-19 bonuses for healthcare staff, which the government left to be resolved at the local level. The Finnish labour market has structural problems linked to high levels of gender segregation and the undervaluation of feminised work. This inequality has led to increasing dissatisfaction among the public sector labour force, exemplified by nurses’ constant claims for wage increases and equal pay, and the wage cartel on early education teachers’ wages and the wage increases that followed the exposure of such ill treatment of these employees. The public sector has also faced weakening working conditions in the form of austerity, cuts and outsourcing. There has been turmoil in the feminised local government sector. One example is the case of the NoPlayMoney social movement (Case 3). Its significance is in the fact that wage increases were obtained immediately after the collective bargaining round, which did not produce these increases, had ended and during a time when the Competitiveness Pact that aimed to cut labour costs was still in effect. The fact that an outside actor could interfere put the trade unions representing early education in an awkward position. In tripartite policy formulation, state officials are increasingly frustrated with the social partners that have so far often been able to stall or water down important policy measures. Thus, in some recent cases, such as the parental leave reform and pay transparency legislation, social partners are given less power over policy formulation and are given a more consultative role instead. Time will tell whether this will be a permanent change in Finnish corporatism or a link to recent governments. While there is indeed a change in Finnish corporatism, there is also remarkable stability and continuity. Social partners are still an important part of policy formulation. Moreover, while moving towards local bargaining seems to be an objective shared by many actors in Finnish society, somehow strong coordination emerges in collective bargaining during collective bargaining rounds that are officially supposed to be

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at the union level. Finland’s export industry-driven model is also an example of coordination, not decentralisation. The public sector is not free to bargain wage increases greater than those obtained by the export industries. Finally, as mentioned before, decentralisation can pose risks for gender equality, as it leaves more discretion at the local level and fewer tools to implement labour market-wide gender equality policies. However, we also argue that more traditional Finnish corporatism has not been purely beneficial for gender equality either. It has maintained the status quo and many gendered hierarchies and inequalities within the labour market. Thus, we do not see reconfigurations as purely negative. The reconfiguration in the power balance between the government and the social partners can potentially also mean a more progressive and effective gender equality policy to be implemented in the future.

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J. Waddington (Eds.), Collective bargaining in Europe: Towards an endgame (Vol. I, pp. 197–216). ETUI. Jonker-Hoffrén, P. (2020). Decentralisation in the context of competitiveness discourse: The Finnish labour market relations system since 2008. In N. Foulkes Savinetti & A. J. Riekhoff (Eds.), Shaping and re-shaping the boundaries of working life (pp. 159–180). Tampere University Press. Kantola, J., Koskinen Sandberg, P., & Ylöstalo, H. (Eds.). (2020). Tasaarvopolitiikan suunnanmuutos. Gaudeamus. Kantola, J., & Lombardo, E. (2017). Gender and political analysis. Palgrave Macmillan. Holli, A. M., & Kantola, J. (2007). State feminism Finnish style: Strong policies clash with implementation problems. In J. Outshoor & J. Kantola (Eds.), Changing state feminism (pp. 82–101). Palgrave. Kauppinen T. (2005). Suomen työmarkkinamalli. WSOY. Kettunen, P. (2012). Reinterpreting the historicity of the Nordic model. Nordic Journal of Working Life Studies, 2(4), 21. Kiander, J., Sauramo, P., & Tanninen, H. (2011). Finnish incomes policy as corporatist political exchange: Development of social capital and the social wage. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 17 (4), 515–531. Korpi, W. (2006). Power resources and employer-centered approaches in explanations of welfare states and varieties of capitalism: Protagonists, consenters, and antagonists. World Politics, 58(2), 167–206. Koskinen Sandberg, P. (2016). Non-decision making in the reform of equal pay policy: The case of Finnish gender equality legislation. Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: An International Journal, 35(4), 280–295. Koskinen Sandberg, P. (2018). The corporatist regime, welfare state employment, and gender pay inequity. NORA-Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research, 26(1), 36–52. Koskinen Sandberg, P. (2021). Wage politics and feminist solidarity: The case of a cartel regarding early education teachers’ wages in the Finnish capital area. Gender, Work & Organization, 28(3), 973–991. Koskinen Sandberg, P., & Saari, M. (2019). Sisters (can’t) unite! Wages as macropolitical, and the gendered power orders of corporatism. Gender, Work & Organization, 26(5), 633–649. Koskinen Sandberg, P., Törnroos, M., & Kohvakka, R. (2018). The institutionalised undervaluation of women’s work: The case of local government sector collective agreements. Work, Employment and Society, 32(4), 707–725. Kylä-Laaso, M., & Koskinen Sandberg, P. (2020). Affective institutional work and ordoliberal governance: Gender equality in the parliamentary debates on the Competitiveness Pact in Finland. NORA-Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research, 28(2), 86–98.

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Kylä-Laaso, M., Koskinen Sandberg, P., & Hokkanen, J. (2021). Gender equality and the feminised public sector in the affective struggles over the Finnish Competitiveness Pact. Gender, Work & Organization, 28(4), 1507–1523. https://doi.org/10.1111/gwao.12693. Lammi-Taskula, J., & Takala, M. (2009). Negotiating tri-partite compromises. In S. Kamerman & P. Moss (Eds.), The politics of parental leave policies: Children, parenting, gender and the labour market (pp. 87–102). Policy Press. Liiten, M., Muhonen, T., & Hakkarainen, K. (2020, October 1). Tes-järjestelmä lyötiin rikki, sanoo SAK. Helsingin Sanomat. https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/ art-2000006654863.html. Mandel, H., & Semyonov, M. (2005). Family policies, wage structures, and gender gaps: Sources of earnings inequality in 20 countries. American Sociological Review, 70(6), 949–967. Marginson, P. (2015). Coordinated bargaining in Europe: From incremental corrosion to frontal assault? European Journal of Industrial Relations, 21(2), 97–114. Martikainen, R. (2000). Equal pay through collective bargaining? Experiences from Finland. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 6(2), 227– 241. MTV. (2020, December 8). Pitäisikö hoitajille maksaa koronabonusta? Suurimpien puolueiden johtajien kädet eivät nousseet MTV:n tentissä: Näin Marin, Halla-aho, Orpo ja Saarikko selittävät. Retrieved on 4 March 2020, from https://www.mtvuutiset.fi/artikkeli/pitaisiko-hoitajille-maksaakoronabonusta-yhdenkaan-puoluejohtajan-kasi-ei-noussut-nain-marin-hallaaho-orpo-ja-saarikko-selittavat/8007392#gs.2tujx1. Nummijärvi, A. (2004). Palkkasyrjintä: Oikeudellinen tutkimus samapalkkaisuuslainsäädännön sisällöstä ja toimivuudesta. Edita. Official Statistics of Finland (OSF). Index of wage and salary earnings [e-publication]. ISSN=1798-7814. Helsinki: Statistics Finland [referred: 29.5.2021]. Access method: http://www.stat.fi/til/ati/index_en.html. Prime Minister’s Office. (2015). Finland, a land of solutions (Government Publications 12/2015). https://vm.fi/julkaisu?pubid=6407. Rubery, J., Bettio, F., Fagan, C., Maier, F., Quack, S., & Villa, P. (1997). Payment structures and gender pay differentials: Some societal effects. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 8(2), 131–149. Saari, M. (2016). Samapalkkaisuus–neuvoteltu oikeus: Naisten ja miesten palkkaeriarvoisuus poliittisena ja oikeudellisena kysymyksenä korporatistisessa Suomessa. Valtiotieteellisen tiedekunnan julkaisuja (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Helsinki. Saari, M., Kantola, J., & Koskinen Sandberg, P. (2021). Implementing equal pay policy: Clash between gender equality and corporatism. Social Politics, 28(2), 265–289.

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Salmi, M., & Lammi-Taskula, J. (2014). Policy goals and obstacles for father’s parental leave in Finland. In G. B. Eydal & T. Rostgaard (Eds.), Fatherhood in the Nordic welfare states, comparing care policies and practices (pp. 303–324). Policy Press. Schnabel, C., Zagelmeyer, S., & Kohaut, S. (2006). Collective bargaining structure and its determinants: An empirical analysis with British and German establishment data. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 12(2), 165–188. Siaroff, A. (1999). Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 36, 175–205. Tehy and Super. (2020, January 14). Tehy ja Super: kärkitavoitteina palkankorotukset, tasa-arvo-ohjelma ja kiky-tuntien poisto. Retrieved 4 March 2020, from https://www.tehy.fi/fi/mediatiedote/tehy-ja-super-karkitavoitteina-pal kankorotukset-tasa-arvo-ohjelma-kiky-tuntien-poisto. Tehy and Super. (2020, March 19). Tehy ja Super: palkkatasa-arvo ei etene ilman rahaa. Retrieved 4 March 2020, from https://www.superliitto.fi/viestinta/ tiedotteet-ja-kannanotot/super-ja-tehy-palkkatasa-arvo-ei-etene-ilman-rahaa/. Tehy and Super. (2020, May 25). Vetoomus maan hallitukselle. Retrieved 4 March 2020, from https://www.tehy.fi/sites/default/files/vetoomus_maan_hallitu kselle.pdf. van Gyes, G., & Schulten, T. (Eds.). (2015). Wage bargaining under the new European economic governance—Alternative strategies for inclusive growth. ETUI. Vesa, J., Kantola, A., & Binderkrantz, A. S. (2018). A stronghold of routine corporatism? The involvement of interest groups in policy making in Finland. Scandinavian Political Studies, 41(4), 239–262. Visser, J. (2016). What happened to collective bargaining during the great recession? IZA Journal of Labor Policy, 5(9). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40173016-0061. Williamson, S., & Baird, M. (2014). Gender equality bargaining: Developing theory and practice. Journal of Industrial Relations, 56(2), 155–169. Wuokko, M. (2019). The curious compatibility of consensus, corporatism, and neoliberalism: The Finnish business community and the retasking of a corporatist welfare state. Business History, 63(4), 668–685. https://doi.org/10. 1080/00076791.2019.1598379. YLE. (2020, December 16). Hoitajien koronakorvauksista ei ole tehty päätöksiä kevään palkkakierroksella eikä hallituksessa – sovitaanko rahoista nyt paikallisesti? https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-11701795.

Social Partners’ Influence on Gender Policymaking and Framings of Equality

EU Neo-Corporatism and Gender Equality Policy: Disappearing Partnership? Sophie Jacquot

Introduction At the European level, there is, at least since the mid-1980s, a desire to reproduce the institutional arrangements that characterise industrial relations in the countries of continental and northern Europe. In the European Union (EU), these arrangements can be characterised as neo-corporatist, with an institutionalisation of the mechanisms of concertation, negotiation and political transaction but a limited autonomy of the social partners. These arrangements combine bipartite relations between employers and trade unions and tripartite relations between these actors and the European institutions—mainly the European Commission—to regulate working and pay conditions at company, sectoral and crossindustry level. Even if neo-corporatism, in the form in which it exists at European level, remains very fragmented, the organisations representing capital and labour, i.e. the social partners, occupy an important place in the European socio-economic regulatory system (Streeck & Schmitter,

S. Jacquot (B) Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles, Bruxelles, Belgium e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5_7

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1991). The main organisations representing the social partners at crossindustry level in the EU are the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) on the employees’ side, and the Confederation of European Business (BusinessEurope, formerly UNICE), the Association of Crafts and SMEs in Europe (SMEunited, formerly UEAPME), and SGI Europe (services of general interest, formerly CEEP) on the employers’ side. In so far as the Treaty of Rome introduced, as early as 1957, powers for the Community and then the European Union with regard to equal pay, and later equal treatment, between women and men on the labour market and beyond, the European social partners are central actors in gender equality policy at this level of government. However, as Anna Elomäki and Johanna Kantola have expressed recently ‘gender and EU scholars have paid virtually no attention to social partners’ (2020, p. 1000). More precisely, we could say that while social partners have been considered in the literature on the EU gender equality policy and its transformations, however, they have undoubtedly been included in this literature as actors more marginal than others, and they have never been really considered as the focal point of the analysis. An illustration of this can be found in one of the central analytical concepts of gender and EU scholarship, that is Alison Woodward’s ‘velvet triangle’: ‘Designed as a metaphor to help understand the importance of informal ties in European transnational gender equality policy making. It identified the special networks of actors (politicians, femocrats, women’s movement/academics, and consultants) from both within and outside the state that interacted in a multi-layered formation’ (Woodward, 2015, pp. 9–10) and as such it contributed to characterise a specific type of governance, unique to EU gender equality policymaking, constituting both its strength and weakness. What is interesting here is that even if we know that social partners have played a part in the trajectory of the EU gender equality policy, they tend to be seen as not important enough to be considered as being part of the velvet triangle. However, this leaving aside is not explained or analysed, they just appear less important than other actors—which is counter-intuitive for a policy which has emerged and flourished for more than 30 years as a social policy in a political system which acknowledges the special role of the social partners in this framework (art. 152 TFEU). In this context, this chapter aims at putting some light on what largely remains a blank spot within the literature on EU public action aimed at combating gender inequalities, i.e. the role that social partners take in the

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advancement or potential setting back of gender equality at the EU level. More precisely, its objective is to adopt a long-term longitudinal perspective in order to trace the part played by these specific actors since the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome. In parallel to this empirical analysis, this chapter also pursues a conceptual objective with regard to gender and politics research: focusing on their role and the evolution of their role within the changing governance of the EU gender equality policy, we will also ask if the social partners should be ‘reintegrated’ into the velvet triangle alongside the women’s movements, the academics and the consultants and if they should be granted (or not) a more important part than that which has been given to them until know. From an analytical point of view, two main factors will be highlighted in order to understand the links between labour market organisations as actors on the one hand and gender equality policy on the other. Firstly, we will look at the institutional arrangements that govern the participation of these organisations in the governance of European gender equality policy. In this context, the condition or status of social dialogue plays a key role. Its existence first of all, and then its more or less strong dynamism, offers a place, and therefore power, to the social partners in the regulation of many areas that make up this policy (pay, working conditions, dismissal, leaves, etc.). The procedural channels of social dialogue thus give them the opportunity to participate directly in the development of gender equality policy, but also to contribute to its orientations, its progress or even to oppose it. Secondly, the cognitive dimensions, the main representations and the role of collective identity frameworks in the organisations studied will be examined. As Lisa Vanhala (2009) has pointed out in her work on interest groups mobilising at European level in favour of the fight against discrimination, the cognitive dimension of an organisation’s identity is essential because it has an impact not only on the way in which the European social partners perceive their role and their place within the European political system and its different sectors of public action such as that of gender equality, but also on the type of collaboration that they will favour or the type of issues that they will choose to put forward (or not). From a methodological point of view, this chapter draws on previous analysis of the transformation of EU gender equality policy and, especially on the empirical material gathered at the time between 2000 and 2014 (Jacquot, 2015). It is also based on original documentary analysis and interview material: eight additional interviews were carried out in 2019

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with (ex-)policy officers in charge of gender equality in labour market organisations at the EU level.1 In order to study the evolution of the relationship between the European social partners and gender equality policy, this text is organised around three main analytical sequences. The first part will therefore focus on the period of emergence and institutionalisation of equality policy, from the mid-1950s to the late 1980s. The second part will focus on the consolidation phase of this policy, which is also the phase of the ‘invention’ and subsequent implementation and development of institutionalised social consultation arrangements at European level, from the late 1980s to the late 2000s. The third part will focus on the period from the end of the 2000s to the end of the 2010s, which is a critical period both for gender equality policy and for European social governance.

The Emergence and Institutionalisation of the EU Gender Equality Policy: A Relationship of Mistrust (1970s–1980s) When they met in Rome on 25 March 1957 to sign the Euratom Treaty and the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), the foreign ministers of the six founding countries approved a treaty which established the ‘principle of equal pay for equal work’ for men and women. The story is well known: French industrialists in economic sectors with a large female workforce, such as textile factories, who, notably through the Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPF), mobilised their government from the start of the negotiations in order to obtain, in exchange for their support for economic integration, a certain number of compensation clauses and the harmonisation of social legislation with French standards, particularly with regard to equal pay. Transnational trade union actors have also been vocal in defending this principle. The inclusion of Article 119 in the Treaty of Rome and the mobilisation of labour market actors in favour of it could lead one to believe that a fruitful partnership was being established, with employers and trade unions accompanying, or even supporting, the implementation of action in favour of the fight against gender-based discrimination on the labour market at Community level. However, a closer look at the situation refutes this view. First of all, the French industrialists called for the harmonisation of social costs, primarily in order to avoid any risk

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of social dumping and to guarantee equal conditions of competition in sectors with a high consumption of female labour. Secondly, employers in the other future Member States were strongly opposed to the principle of equal pay. Finally, there was little consultation with trade union actors and their demands on this point remained limited, supporting for example a gradual implementation of the principle (Hoskyns, 1996, pp. 49–51; van der Vleuten, 2009, pp. 33–67). Thus, contrary to the superficial image that the discussions on Article 119 may give, it is a completely different relationship that is being established, or rather that is not being established for several decades: first, the lack of involvement of labour market organisations in the development of equality policy due to the weakness of consultation structures relating to social Europe until the end of the 1980s, and, second, the establishment of unfavourable representations regarding gender equality regulations within these organisations. Collective Absence, Individual Alliances The first Member States of the European Economic Community are countries where neo-corporatist systems of social regulation exist. However, such a dynamic of institutionalised negotiation between employers’ organisations and trade unions did not emerge at European level until the late 1980s and early 1990s (Falkner, 1998). During the period that saw the emergence of a European gender equality policy from the mid-1970s onwards in the social policy arena, there were therefore no consultation structures formally associating organised trade unions and employers at European level with the political initiatives that would lead to the adoption of six directives between 1975 and 1992, two funding programmes in favour of equal opportunities and about ten non-binding legal instruments dealing with women’s vocational training, sexual harassment in the workplace or women’s unemployment. The first European femocrats, Jacqueline Nonon and Fausta Deshormes La Valle in particular, who helped to put gender equality issues on the Community agenda and to establish the fight against gender discrimination as a legitimate policy at this level, will, in a classic neo-functionalist approach (Mazey, 1995), seek to establish links and gather support outside the European institutions in order to give weight to their objectives. However, they will only find such support within labour market organisations from women who are individually committed

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(Pillinger, 1991). Indeed, until the early 1990s, employers’ and trade union organisations, including at EU level, were hostile environments for women who had to fight primarily for representation and presence, to the detriment of their ability to impose a gender perspective in dealing with labour market issues: ‘mainly men pursuing a male agenda’ (Cockburn, 1997, p. 461; see also Lovenduski, 1986). As a result, the women in these organisations who have been involved in gender equality policy initiatives at European level have done so mainly in a personal capacity, based on their specific experience and expertise, at specific times and on an ad hoc and informal basis, rather than in an organised way (Cichowski, 2007, pp. 177–184 and pp. 187–194). This is for example the case, on the trade union side, of Emilienne Brunfaut who was part of the ‘Article 119 Group’ in the 1960s, or of Maria Weber who was in charge of the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the 1975 proposal for a directive on equal pay. However, while some alliances are forged at the individual level, this is not the case at the collective level, and trade unions and employers keep a distance from what is being done to promote gender equality in employment and on the labour market at Community level. This distance was confirmed when the first official structure linked to European gender equality policy was set up in 1981. Indeed, the decision setting up the Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men stipulated that representatives of the social partners at Community level could participate in the Committee’s meetings, but only ‘as observers’. A Policy that Is Too Costly and Too Elitist? The distance that could be observed at the institutional level throughout the 1970s and 1980s was then coupled with a distance that went as far as mistrust at the ideological level. Trade unions and employers agreed on one point: they were not in favour of challenging the regulations on equal pay and equal treatment at work brought about by Community policy in this area, since their member organisations were responsible for the actual structuring of wages and practices in the workplace and thus for the discrimination included in the collective agreements that they themselves had negotiated and signed in their respective Member States. As far as employers are concerned, the position in relation to EU gender equality policy is no different from that expressed during the Article 119 negotiations: like equal pay, equal treatment and then

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equal opportunities initiatives are too costly. Ideological and economic reasoning come together. Discrimination is then considered useful for the functioning of the market in the sense that it can constitute a competitive advantage for companies. The prohibition of such discrimination can therefore allow the free movement of factors of production within an open market without the risk of distortions, but it is a question of limiting it to this strict minimum. From a trade union perspective, the concerns about the emerging gender equality policy are of two types. Firstly, the values promoted by this policy run counter to conservative representations that are still very dominant within these organisations. As Anna van der Vleuten (2009, p. 35) reminds us, the Second World War made a number of prejudices and stereotypes about women’s work untenable, which explains why the World Federation of Trade Unions put the issue of equal pay on the agenda of the United Nations Economic and Social Committee as early as 1948. However, the idea that the principle of equal pay would above all prevent employers from preferring to continue to pay cheap women at the expense of the men they had replaced during the war was widely held. It is mainly a question of defending the interests of the father of the family in the logic of the breadwinner model. In an opinion sent to the negotiators of the Treaty of Rome, the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions states that equal pay must be accompanied by measures to prevent women from performing ‘improper’ tasks (quoted by van der Vleuten, 2009, p. 50). Secondly, trade unions are opposed to a policy that they describe as elitist, as it is too oriented towards middle-class, wage earner and professional women (Cockburn, 1997, p. 469; Hoskyns, 1996, pp. 203–204). Indeed, only certain discriminations affecting certain women were targeted by the Community public action of the time, depending on the competences available to the EEC at the time. More fundamentally, from the point of view of collective identity frameworks, the trade union organisations were opposed to a policy that gave precedence to gender-based solidarity over class solidarity. These different conceptions were at odds with the gender regime that was established at Community level from the 1970s onwards, which was based on the principle of equality (equal treatment and then equal opportunities) and the promotion of women’s participation in the labour market through the elimination of discrimination against them (access to employment, pay, working conditions, dismissal, access to vocational training, social security, etc.).

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Finally, it should be noted that this mistrust extends beyond community structures and will have consequences for the dynamics of interest organisation. Collaboration between the unions and the women’s movement is difficult to achieve. In addition to oppositions between feminist and more traditional organisations, union activists consider that women activists are not aware of the reality of the labour market and working conditions on the ground. These different tensions were strongly felt at the Bonn conference in 1982 (Strid, 2009). This conference, attended by members of the ETUC Women’s Committee (Degryse & Tilly, 2013), was the first attempt, financially supported by the European Commission, to bring together and organise a comprehensive and integrated movement representing women’s interests at European level, an attempt that only came to fruition with the creation of the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) in 1990. All in all, a relationship of mistrust was established between labour market organisations and European gender equality policy during this initial period, from the start of the Treaty of Rome negotiations in the mid-1950s and then during the development and institutionalisation of the latter from the 1970s and during the 1980s. On the employers’ side, this mistrust even took the form of resistance, with the main aim of limiting the economic costs of equal pay initially and then of equal treatment. On the trade union side, too, mistrust is strong and the concern that is sometimes expressed in favour of women workers’ interests is mainly rhetorical (van der Vleuten, 2009, p. 66), combining traditionalist views of the family, sexist stereotypes and reticence about a policy that is considered elitist.

Being in and Out: Social Partners in the EU Gender Equality Neo-Corporatist Governance (1990s–2000s) As we have just seen, the place of the social partners in European gender equality policymaking remained relatively marginal due to the weakness of the consultation bodies until the late 1980s. The period from around the signing of the Maastricht Treaty to the end of the 2000s is different. The development of a structured social dialogue at European level is a major change in terms of institutional arrangements. The formal role granted to the social partners transforms them into de facto actors of the gender

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equality policy insofar as the latter is then fully integrated into the political space of social Europe (Majone, 1996). We shall see, however, that although labour market organisations will contribute to the production of central norms in the fight against inequalities in employment and on the labour market, this involvement has been forced rather than determined. Moreover, the role conferred on the social partners by the Maastricht Treaty in the establishment of a neo-corporatist regulatory system has had an effect on the dominant collective identity frameworks. In contrast to the previous period, the European social partners have therefore come to claim a specific place within the governance of gender equality policy: their institutional legitimacy makes them partners ‘like no other’. This specific position does not, however, lead them to commit themselves as strongly involved actors. As the social partners gain more competences in the field, they grow jealous of their prerogatives and they prove reluctant to participate in the ‘velvet triangle’ and to collaborate with other actors of the policy community. The Development of European Social Dialogue: The Social Partners, Unwilling Actors in European Gender Equality Policy The period is characterised by the reinforcement of the institutionalisation of the European Social Dialogue with the Maastricht treaty and its Protocol on Social Policy which introduced mandatory consultation of the social partners on legislation in the area of social affairs, but also gave them a possibility to negotiate framework agreements at Community level (Crespy, 2019; Pochet, 2019). European social dialogue includes potential delegations of legislative powers from the European institutions to the social partners and these delegations have been fruitful in the field of gender equality. Two directives have directly resulted from these provisions: on parental leave in 1996 and on part-time work in 1997.2 The negotiations on these two texts had stalled for some time in the Council and the Protocol on Social Policy opened up the door for them to be proposed by the Commission to the European social partners for collective negotiations. It is the resulting framework agreements between them that have been transposed into directives. Consequently, the fact that European social partners have been involved in these texts does not stem from a particular interest in gender equality. Instead, it has more to do with seizing the opportunity of an issue blocked in the Council and an opportunity for the Commission and

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the social partners to show the usefulness of the social dialogue at the European level. Gender equality here has been envisaged as a tool to promote collective negotiations rather than an end in itself. Indeed, in substance, both directives include only minimal requirements and protection and their results in terms of gender equality are limited since the issue as such was only minimally taken into account and the gender dimension disappeared almost completely from the directive on part-time work. However, these two texts and their negotiations have contributed to install the social partners as gender equality policy actors. Second, gender equality issues have been part of most of the plans for EU multiannual programmes in social policy. Indeed, the integration of concerns linked to gender inequalities is one of the distinctive traits of the European Employment Strategy from 1997, of the social inclusion process, and from 2000 on of the Lisbon Strategy (Rubery et al., 2005). Here, the dynamic undertaken at the United Nations Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, the political changes linked to ‘pink Europe’ of the second half of the 1990s (i.e. the consecutive election of social-democratic governments in countries such as France, Germany and the UK), and the determination of social actors from within the European institutions have created a supportive window of opportunity for gender equality concerns (Jacquot, 2015, pp. 117–120). Following this wave, the 2005–2009 Framework of Actions for Gender Equality has been a crucial step. This document is a joint policy commitment from the European cross-industry social partners to tackle together some issues linked to gender inequalities in the labour market and to have some actions implemented by their member organisations at national level.3 The Framework of Actions is part of the European social dialogue. The document is non-binding, but this initiative was important from the point of view of the interaction between social partners and gender equality policy at the European level. Indeed, its very existence signalled, first, that gender equality was an issue of common interest and that points of convergence could be found; second, it also underlined the fact that trade unions but also employers’ organisations recognised the fact that they had a role to play in the European policy process on these issues and that they were willing to play it.

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A Compatible Gender Regime, a Separate Identity From the 1990s onwards, the conception of the principle of gender equality and the European gender regime will evolve and will allow a more obvious concordance between the objectives of the European gender equality policy and the dominant representations within the labour market organisations, which will facilitate the positioning of the latter as actors of this policy. Their role as social partners, however, complicates their full participation in the ‘velvet triangle’. From the point of view of the gender regime, the conception of the role of discrimination in the functioning of the market undergoes a reversal of perspective (Jacquot, 2015, pp. 132–135). The discriminatory behaviour of an economic agent is now considered to be the result of prejudice or the consequence of gender inequalities being embedded in social structures. Gender-based discrimination is thus seen as the result of an irrational attitude and no longer of an economic interest. Discriminatory behaviour is seen as irrational because it is inefficient or even economically counterproductive. The advent of the ‘business case’ for equality (Dickens, 1994; Elomäki, 2015) contributes to a shift in arguments that leads to anti-discriminatory policies being seen as economically sound and useful for achieving macro-economic goals (under-utilisation of human resources, wasted investment in education and training), but also more micro-economic goals (reduction of labour shortages, improvement of employee participation or reduction of staff turnover). This reorientation of the EU gender regime facilitates the participation of social partners, including employers’ organisations, in the development of EU gender equality policy. It can be noted that this shift has contributed to a reorientation of the centre of gravity of European equality policy towards measures consistent with this cognitive framework, such as parental leave or gender stereotypes. Issues such as work-life balance, for example, have become central to the quest to increase female employment rates (Jenson, 2008). Other issues, however, are being overlooked, such as sexual harassment or quality of work. However, this reorientation has also consequences on the participation of the social partners in the ‘velvet triangle’ of the gender equality policy sector. As we have just seen, the EU social partners have contributed to some of the main policy outcomes in the field of gender equality during the 1990s until the beginning of the economic crisis at the end of the 2000s. They also continue to participate in structures such as

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the Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men which assists the European Commission in formulating and implementing legislative proposals and policy initiatives aimed at promoting gender equality. Ties with femocrats in charge of gender equality within the European Commission, but also with members of the European Parliament and the FEMM committee develop. In this sense, they have become major actors in the galaxy of EU gender equality policy-making. However, the question of the full participation of the social partners in the ‘velvet triangle’ remains, especially because social partners and NGOs develop different policy agendas. At some points these different interests meet and actions are developed together, joining the NGOs and the trade unions. One such example can be found during the negotiations of the Amsterdam Treaty when a large coalition was gathered in order to lobby for a revision of the treaty that included new and stronger provisions in terms of social policy and gender equality. However, and even if the preAmsterdam lobbying proved successful since important new provisions have indeed been included in the new version of the treaty, these joint campaigns tend to remain occasional, as expressed by this gender equality specialist who both worked for the EWL and the Women’s Committee of ETUC: ‘[There has been this alliance for Amsterdam] but we did not learn much and we don’t really work together, even if ETUC is a member of the EWL’.4 This difficulty to work together and the cautiousness of the social partners to be fully invested as members of the EU gender equality policy community can be explained if we consider the collective identity variable. In the case of the European social partners, their collective identity frame, whether for employees or employers’ organisations, could be summarised as follows: social partners are not just any partner. This is clearly formulated by persons in charge of gender equality issues within European social partners organisations: Trade unions have always considered that they have a special place in the treaty, so why sharing this power with NGOs?5 We are not civil society, we are stakeholders in the labour market, it is important to make the difference, we are part of the solution.6

This means that even when women’s groups start to become organised inside the labour market organisations with specific structures starting

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from the 1990s, they do not consider that they are necessarily ‘natural allies’ of civil society organisations when it comes to advancing and supporting gender equality policy. The ‘we are not just any partner’ logic induces a conception of legitimacy, and it also means that some gender equality issues are ‘more legitimate than others’ and should be put on top of the agenda. This helps to understand why the social partners are both in and out when it comes to gender equality policy during this period. They take part in the governance of the policy, they have influence on the content of the policy, but they do not participate actively, or as actively as other actors, or as much as their institutional position would allow them to, to the gender equality policy community.

Troubled Times: Facing the Double Bind of the Critical Transformation of EU Gender Equality Policy and of Social Governance (2010s–) We are going to see now that since the beginning of the 2010s, the interactions between the EU social partners and gender equality policy have taken place in a difficult context: economic and budgetary constraints and institutional restrictions on the existence of the European social dialogue have contributed to a less and less favourable political space. The role and place of the social partners in the advancement (or blocking or stalling) of gender equality concerns have been impacted by these troubled times, contributing to the marginalisation of these concerns in the European social partner’s agenda. EU Gender Equality Policy Is Not a Social Policy Anymore? Social Partners as Interest Groups Among Others In February 2010, the second Barroso Commission initiated a new distribution of portfolio which created a position of vice-president of the Commission, responsible for justice, fundamental rights and citizenship. This political and symbolic change was materialised by an administrative transfer, following which the Directorate for equality and the fight against discrimination, including the Equal Opportunities Unit, which used to be part of DG Employment, became part of DG Justice. The portfolio for gender equality and anti-discrimination as well as the accompanying services and budget lines thus left their traditional base as well as the

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heart of EU expertise in the area of gender equality until then. For many actors, and especially members of the ‘velvet triangle’, the action of the EU against gender inequalities was strongly linked to the social domain and to labour market discrimination. This transfer from DG Employment from DG Justice, which is the sign of a new understanding of the place, role and content of EU gender equality policy and of its definition as being part of the EU social policy, is of course very important with regard to the relationship with the social partners. Whether from a policy or a relational point of view, the transfer was destabilising, and especially for those working on gender equality issues in these organisations. We see here that this extension outside of the social domain, the evolution of the centre of gravity of the policy and its formal distancing from DG Employment was destabilising for EU social partners. It potentially implied both a loss of consideration for social dimension in gender equality policy and a loss of gender mainstreaming in EU’s social initiatives. In the following years, indeed, the focus was mainly on issues more directly linked to fundamental rights (such as female genital mutilation), and social initiatives had a hard time including a transformative gender perspective (such as the work-life balance directive or the European pillar of social rights, see Collombet & Math, 2019; Plomien, 2018). Also, it induced a stretching of the ties that developed during the previous period. Institutional developments over the past decade have thus contributed to making it more difficult for the social partners to participate in the orientation and development of gender equality policy due to changes in the policy itself, but also as a result of the weakening of the procedural framework of European social dialogue. The obstacles that Social Europe in general and the European social dialogue more particularly have had to face since the aftermath of the 2008 crisis have been analysed in detail by specialists of EU social policy (Crespy, 2019; Degryse, 2018; Pochet, 2019; Prosser, 2016). According to them, it is possible to characterise these obstacles and difficulties as a decline of European social dialogue which has been impeded by the focus on soft law and by the mirroring falling off of legislative initiatives and activity in the social field since the European Employment Strategy and the Lisbon Strategy. This decline has been accentuated by the 2007–2008 economic crisis and austerity politics which have followed, and the Juncker’s ‘triple A’ social Europe7 has not stopped it. In this context, the path chosen is not a relaunch of social integration but rather a reinforcement of fiscal discipline and a

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dismantling of social protection and national welfare states. Employers harden their positions and emphasise the need for a deregulation of the labour market for the sake of increasing international competitiveness, especially through the reduction of social norms, wage moderation and the lowering of the taxation of labour. The European Commission itself contributes to this decline by adopting a less and less active role in support of social concertation, and even by opposing its development (Tricart, 2020). What is important here is the consequences of this situation on European social partners in their role as gender equality actors. The first obvious consequence is that gender equality as a policy issue has taken a back seat in the social partners’ agenda. Symbolically, the Framework for Actions on Gender Equality jointly signed in 2005 after two years of negotiations is not renewed after 2009. Only some elements of this initial document are included in the social partner’s joint programme for 2012– 2014. Concretely, it only gave birth in 2015 to a non-binding ‘Toolkit for gender equality in practice’ which gathers 100 ‘good practices’ from 25 member states on the four priorities singled out in the 2005 Framework for Actions. More generally, the difficult climate implies distrust and reluctance to work together, by fear that it could downplay past results and achievements, especially on the issue of gender equality, as expressed by a member of the ETUC’s Women’s Committee: ‘Employers are reluctant to invest on gender equality at the European level […]. Reopening the negotiations is extremely difficult. The common Framework was ambitious, but now, you are not sure what you can get’.8 Consequently, the social partners are back to influence through lobbying activities rather than through collective negotiations (Pochet, 2019) and the recent directive on work-life balance is a perfect example of this. Initially, after the failure of the maternity directive in 2015, the idea to work on a legislative text on conciliation between work and private life is part of the Juncker’s Commission European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) in 2017. The initiative starts with a public consultation and a two-stage consultation of the European social partners, which is in accordance with Article 154 TFEU. Within this framework, European social partners have the possibility to decide to open negotiations on the issue at stake, and indeed as we have already seen, the previous directives on parental leave were based on the agreements concluded previously by the social partners in 1995 but also in 2009. However, in 2017, no negotiations can be initiated: ETUC is very much in favour of negotiating and

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addressing carer’s leave and parental leave, but BusinessEurope refuses any discussion and, above all, any new legislative provision. As soon as the EPSR has been presented, the president of BusinessEurope issued a statement on the work-life balance initiative in which he expresses its total opposition to any measure that would imply social spendings such as parental leave (Pochet, 2019, p. 169). This failure of the negotiation process then leaves the way clear for the Commission to issue a legislative proposal which is presented as exemplifying its desire to relaunch social Europe (Collombet & Math, 2019). Collective negotiations being impossible, social partners have tried to influence the legislative process as any other interest group through ‘classical lobbying’,9 contradicting their own will to not be ‘just any partner’, impeded in their role as gender equality actors. Gender Equality at the Margins The impeded relationship of the social partners to European gender equality policy is also linked to the transformation of the EU gender regime and an increasingly restricted conception of the gender equality principle that appears as an entirely secondary priority in the European political system, with no more autonomy and that can only exist in spite of the dominant economic norm, insinuating itself into a few spaces at the margins and adapting in minimal terms, with reduced ambitions. Minimalism has become the only possible option in order to aggregate the broadest possible interests to reach a decision (Jacquot, 2015, pp. 170– 172). Resonating with this minimalist gender regime, Anna Elomäki and Johanna Kantola (2020) speak of the ‘narrowness’ that characterises the European social partners’ conception of the equality principle by privileging an ‘economised’ understanding of gender inequalities. Similarly, a Eurofound study on this issue formulates one of its main conclusions as follows: ‘social partners activities in the area of gender equality often revolve around campaigns and education and are mainly focused on issues such as work-life balance rather than being “transformative” in terms of addressing some of the root causes of gender inequality. While addressing the root causes of gender equality may lie partly outside the remit of social partners organisations, they can certainly have an extremely important role within their remit of responsibility and action’ (Weber et al., 2014, p. 2).

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In this context, the issue of work-life balance has become the minimum (almost exclusive) point of agreement to which employment and workplace equality issues between the social partners are reduced, and it is addressed with an emphasis on flexibility and without questioning the imbalances in power relations between women and men, both at work and in the family. Similarly, the gender pay gap is addressed mainly in terms of access to childcare, individual education, training and career choices, and gender stereotypes, without interrogating the effects of structural discrimination or the gendered classification of professions (Weiler, 2013). Over the past decade, institutional constraints and obstacles on the one hand, and a narrowing cognitive framework on the other, have combined to make the relationship between the European social partners and gender equality policy an impeded one. The social partners have lost their capacity to play a key role in policy-making and the prevailing conceptions of the objectives of gender equality policy also work against ambitious action, preventing any involvement beyond this framework.

Conclusion This text has hopefully shown the importance and need for increased research on the role of social partners as gender equality actors at the European level. Many dimensions still need to be explored. It has highlighted three distinct sequences of public action within which institutional and cognitive variables form a system and provided elements for understanding the positioning of the European social partners with regard to gender equality policy, more precisely their capacity but also their willingness to define themselves and to behave effectively (or not) as fully fledged actors of this policy. Table 1 gives an overview of the specificities of each of these sequences (Table 1). While the relationship between the European social partners and gender equality policy has changed in nature over time, it is also clear that this relationship and the positioning of these organisations have strongly contributed to shaping, directly or indirectly, European action to combat gender inequalities, in the past and still today, even if this is done less directly through the institutionalised channels of European social dialogue and more indirectly by influencing, in particular, the orientations of European economic governance (Elomäki & Kantola, in this volume). It is therefore important to develop work on these issues, especially in a period of reconfiguration of interactions. Many dimensions of the relationship

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Table 1 The relationships between European social partners and gender equality policy Period

Institutional arrangements

Cognitive structures Role of the and collective identity European social frames partners vis-à-vis gender equality policy

From the negotiations of the treaty of Rome to the end of the 1980s From the 1990s to the end of the 2000s

The social partners as collective non-actors in European gender equality policy The social partners, actors (in spite of themselves) of the European gender equality policy

Opposing a policy that is too costly (employers) and elitist (trade unions)

2010s

The social partners as actors among others of the European gender equality policy

Claiming a special place

Agreeing only on a minimalist conception of the principle of gender equality

A relationship of mistrust: limiting the effects of economic integration A constrained relationship: participating (a minima) in the promotion of gender equality in the labour market and in employment An impeded relationship: acting on gender inequalities at the margins

between the social partners and gender equality policy still need to be explored, such as the importance of women’s institutional representation in trade unions and employers’ organisations, or the role, beyond crossindustry organisations, of European sectoral federations and their modes of action, which still remain largely blind spots. Furthermore, at a time when bipartite and tripartite consultation bodies have been weakened and the weight of labour market organisations depends more strongly than before on their capacity to influence, the analysis of the differences between trade unions and employers’ organisations on the one hand, and within employers on the other, is becoming crucial in order to understand the mechanisms at work and the substance of the role of the social partners in the making of European gender equality policy.

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Notes 1. Interviews have been carried out with members and ex-members from BusinessEurope (the confederation of employers), the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the European Public Service Union (EPSU) and the European Trade Union Institute. 2. Women being overwhelmingly in majority in this type of contract, it is thus possible to consider that the directive concerns them more particularly. 3. The four priorities chosen for these joint initiatives were: addressing gender roles, promoting women in decision-making, supporting work-life balance and tackling the gender pay gap. 4. Interview, ETUC, 11/11/2019 (my translation). 5. Interview, ETUC, 11/11/2019 (my translation). 6. Interview, Business Europe, 04/11/2019 (my translation). 7. In his presentation speech to the European Parliament in October 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, future president of the European Commission, explained that his ambition for the EU was to achieve what he called a ‘triple-A on social issues’, in parallel to being ‘tripleA’ rated in the financial sense. The idea beyond this phrasing was to underline his will to put social issues further up on the agenda. 8. Interview, ETUC, 15/10/2019. 9. Interview, BusinessEurope, 04/11/2019 (my translation).

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European Social Partners: Advancing and Opposing European Union’s Gender Equality Policies Anna Elomäki

and Johanna Kantola

Introduction The role that social partners play in shaping European Union’s (EU) gender equality discourses and policies has received little scholarly attention considering their historical and current impact at this transnational policy-making level. At the theoretical level, trade unions were excluded from Alison Woodward’s notion of the ‘velvet triangle’ that describes informal ties between femocrats, women’s movements and academics/consultants in gender equality policy-making, as explained by Sophie Jacquot in this book. Focus on social partners has also been missing in empirical analyses on EU’s gender policies (Abels & Mushaben, 2012; Jacquot, 2017; Kantola, 2010; Kantola & Lombardo, 2017a), in gendering theories of integration (Abels & MacRae, 2016), or gendering key political decision-making and policy-making institutions and processes

A. Elomäki (B) · J. Kantola Tampere University, Tampere, Finland e-mail: [email protected] J. Kantola e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5_8

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at the EU level (Abels et al., 2021). Yet, as Jacquot’s chapter shows, especially trade union activists and feminists within them have historically played a crucial role in advancing EU gender policy agendas. A very different albeit important role is played by employers’ organisations which seek often to undermine progressive gender equality initiatives at EU level (see also Elomäki & Kantola, 2020). In this chapter, we analyse how European social partners’ constructions of what is relevant and desirable—and what is not—in EU gender equality policies. We ask: how do European social partners construct their message about gender equality in their public statements and documents? What are the political struggles about gender equality that this implies? What differences are there between social partners’ constructions of gender equality problems and the proposed solutions? These questions imply addressing both trade unions and employers’ organisations. We focus on four cross-sectoral EU-level peak organisations: the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), BusinessEurope, SMEunited (formerly known as UEAPME), and SGI Europe (formerly CEEP). Our research material consists of all official statements of these organisations in relation to gender equality from 2010 to 2021 and background interviews. Our focus on the 2010s and beginning of 2020s is important in our view as this was a period when traditional gender equality actors were sidelined in EU policy-making, gender equality institutions were dismantled and access reduced to women’s organisations. We argue that European social partners’ constructions matter. The European social dialogue empowers social partners in a number of gender equality policy fields and they can either advance progressive gender equality frames and solutions to inequalities, or hinder progress. In the first part of the chapter, we discuss previous research findings on what the social partners at EU level are and what they do. We also contextualise this work in the shifting EU gender equality policies. In the second part, we outline our methodological approach and research material. The rest of the chapter presents our analysis focusing on (i) social partners’ activities in the field of gender equality; (ii) prioritised issues and constructions of gender equality, (iii) favoured actors and policy measures for equality.

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European Social Partners Influencing EU Gender Equality Policy The four cross-sectoral EU social partners discussed in this chapter represent specific interests. ETUC speaks on behalf of all European workers and its members consist of 90 national trade union confederations from 38 European countries and 10 European trade union federations. BusinessEurope is the representative of business interests, whose members consist of 35 national business federations. SMEunited is the European umbrella organisation for small and medium sized enterprises, and its 65 member organisations consist of national SME federations from over 30 countries and European level sectoral organisations. SGI Europe represents the interests of enterprises and associations providing services of general interest, such as healthcare, education, water, waste management, energy and aims to make the importance of public services visible. In addition to representing their members’ interests at EU-level, the European social partners facilitate exchanges between national organisations and disseminate expertise and ideas from EU-level to the national level. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) established a new playing field for trade unions and employer organisations through the practice of European social dialogue (Falkner, 1998; Gold et al., 2007). Under social dialogue, the European Commission must consult the social partners before submitting proposals in the field of social policy through a two-stage consultation procedure, and social partners are given the opportunity to negotiate framework agreements that can be turned into EU law. Social partners also participate in regular talks with EU institutions. Finally, they take autonomous actions in the framework of their own bipartite work programmes. Social dialogue gives the EU social partners an institutionalised role in EU policy-making and a unique position to shape policy, including in the field of gender equality. Social partners also influence EU policies by lobbying the different EU institutions, and they are among the most powerful interest groups in Brussels (Diogini, 2017; Treib & Falkner, 2009). Lobbying has become more important as the social dialogue has weakened in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial and economic crisis (Pochet, 2019; Prosser, 2016). Despite the weakening of the social dialogue (see Jacquot, in this volume), social partners’ possibilities to influence EU policy remain significantly higher than those of women’s organisations and other feminist actors. This is particularly true in what comes to economic policy—an

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important field from a gender perspective where gender equality actors have had difficulties to be heard (Cavaghan, 2017). For example, there are mechanisms to involve European social partners in the EU’s economic governance and its key governance tool the European Semester (Sabato et al., 2017, pp. 8–18). The power wielded by employees’ and employers’ representatives has not been balanced, and shifts in the political context, such as the economic crisis, have influenced their relative power balance further. There has been an observable bias towards business interests in EU decision-making (e.g. Hix, 2005, p. 215), and employers have been able to constrain the European social dialogue through turning it from a process for adopting new European norms into a forum for exchanging good practices (Pochet & Degryse, 2016). The fact that EU gender policy focused on issues related to the labour market for a long time has given a (natural) role to the labour market organisations. Since 1970s gender equality directives, dominant issues in relation to gender equality in the EU have included equal pay; outlawing gender-based discrimination in working life, including on basis of pregnancy; part time work; maternity and parental leaves; and work– life balance. There has been a gradual expansion in EU gender equality politics to other issues, for example to LGBTQI rights and gender-based violence. The period under study in this chapter (2010–2021) was characterised, first, by the economic and Eurozone crisis and gendered austerity policies as well as the sidelining of gender equality from the EU’s agenda and the intensified dismantling of the EU’s gender policies (Jacquot, 2015, 2017). The only major gender equality initiative in the first part of the 2010s was the Commission’s draft directive on gender balance in corporate boards in 2012 that was halted in the Council. The weight of gender equality issues on the EU’s agenda began to increase on the second half of the decade, first through the gender equality principles and the work–life balance directive included in the European Pillar of Social Rights during Jean-Claude Juncker’s Commission (Plomien, 2018) and then through Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission’s renewed commitment to gender equality (Abels & Mushaben, 2020). The last years have been characterised by the Covid-19 crisis with its well-documented gendered impacts as well as the EU’s historical 750-billion-euro recovery plan. The multitude of these issues gives ample space for social partners to influence gender issues with either direct or indirect constructions of what is relevant and desirable—and what is not.

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European social partners influence EU gender equality policy in different ways. Firstly, they are in a position to advance, block or water-down specific policies through the legislative power they exert through European social dialogue. For example, social partners’ Framework Agreement on Parental Leave adopted in 1995 and revised in 2009 was implemented as a Council Directive. In the 1990s, social dialogue emerged as a way to move gender equality issues forward when they were blocked in the Council (see Jacquot, in this volume). In the 2010s, social partners’ powers to negotiate EU legislation have turned into a hindrance to gender equality, due to employers’ opposition to any new legislation, as shown by the employers’ refusal to enter negotiations about new forms of leave to improve work–life balance (Elomäki & Kantola, 2020). However, the work–life balance directive—eventually proposed by the Commission in 2017 without social partners’ participation—and the 2021 proposal for a pay transparency directive illustrates the Commission’s willingness to act also when employers oppose new legislation. Secondly, social partners play a role in the (non)integration of gender perspectives in the EU’s economic and social policies, for instance in key social policy initiatives like the European Pillar of Social Rights or in the EU’s economic governance. As noted above, they have better access than traditional gender equality actors to policy-making processes in these fields and are therefore in a position to shape these policies in a more gender equal direction. Thirdly, European social partners’ shape the meaning of gender equality in EU-level debates through constructing gender equality and inequality in specific ways and paying attention to specific topics that fit their interests. Promoting gender equality has been part of European social partners’ bi-partite activities too. In 2005, BusinessEurope, ETUC and the former UEAPME and CEEP adopted the Framework for Actions on Gender Equality to be mainly implemented by national social partners. Some of its priorities (addressing gender roles, promoting women in decisionmaking, supporting work–life balance and tackling the gender pay gap) were later integrated in social partners’ multiannual work programmes, which set joint action at national and EU levels. The 2012–2014 work programme renewed the commitment to the priorities of the Framework for Actions and resulted in a toolkit on social partners’ practices for advancing gender equality at work (Eurofound, 2014; Weiler, 2013). The 2015–2017 work programme promised to address work–life balance with

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a fact-finding seminar, exchange of good practices, and joint conclusions (BusinessEurope et al., 2015, June 14, p. 6). European social partners’ joint work on gender equality has been weak and focused on awareness-raising and dissemination of good practices, in other words, measures that do not aim at societal transformation or imply costs or responsibilities for companies. In this way, social dialogue has offered the employers a chance to dilute gender equality initiatives (Elomäki & Kantola, 2020). Moreover, social partners’ joint gender equality work is suffering from a backlash. The organisations have not renewed their commitment to the Framework of Actions due to lack of agreement, and gender equality was omitted from the latest work programme (2019–2021). The programme only made a passing reference to childcare, which, as we argue below, is one of the rare consensual themes between the organisations.

Research Material and Methodology In this chapter, we analyse the official statements of the social partners on gender equality. Our approach is both discursive and constructivist and draws on the well-established tradition of focusing on the discursive politics of gender equality (Kantola & Lombardo, 2017b; Lombardo et al., 2009). In relation to social partners, this implies asking how the social partners construct gender equality, with what effects, whose gender equality is advanced and whose is excluded, and which actors are called to act to advance gender equality (Elomäki et al., 2019; Saari, 2016). In discursive approaches, such statements about gender equality are not taken to reflect an objective reality of gender equalities and inequalities, their causes (diagnosis) and solutions to them (prognosis) (Bacchi, 2009; Verloo, 2007). Rather such statements reproduce realities of gender equality and construct them, which makes it important to analyse and understand the work that they do. Ultimately, such discourses about gender equality are about power and power struggles too: who gets to define the political agenda of gender equality and in which way. The statements about gender equality by the social partners can be seen as gender equality performances, conscious attempts to portray the organisations as actors in the field of gender equality (Elomäki et al., 2019). Performative iteration of gender upholds the unity of gender as a category and the norms about gender, including heterosexuality (Butler, 1990). Similarly gender equality performances construct the social partners as

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certain kinds of gender equality actors. At the same time the gender equality performances reproduce understandings of gender equality and ways to advance it. The statements direct attention to certain themes and away from others—narrowing the gender equality conversation to themes that do not threaten social partners’ interests. This way, certain aspects of gender equality and ways to advance it can be kept off the political agenda. (Koskinen Sandberg, 2018.) Our research data (see Table 1) comprises written positions of the ETUC, BusinessEurope, SMEUnited and SGI Europe on gender equality from years 2010–2021 (until 15 April 2021). The research data of 143 documents covers position papers, resolutions, press releases, public letters, statements, consultation replies and other documents that reflect the voice of the organisation, as well as studies published by the organisations. We have also included social dialogue work programmes and joint statements. The material was collected from organisations’ websites in April 2021 with the help of keyword searches (e.g. gender, gender equality, women, work–life balance, childcare). As Table 1 shows, the ETUC was the most active of the four organisations in gender equality matters. Employer organisations address gender equality relatively rarely, each in only 15–20 documents in the past 11 years. The documentary material is complemented with five interviews with persons working on gender equality within the organisations, conducted between September 2018 and January 2019. We use the interviews as sources of background information. Table 1 material

Research

Organisation

ETUC BusinessEurope SMEUnited (former UEAPME) SGI Europe (former CEEP) Employers together All social partners together

Number of documents

Number of background interviews

91 20 15

2 1 1

15

1 (group interview)

1 8

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Table 2

Categories of analysis

Activities Issues Approaches Actors Measures

Proactive; reactive; supportive; opposing Narrow scope; medium scope; extensive scope Valuable in itself; rights; business and economic benefits; cost or burden; intersectionality; diversity EU; national governments; social partners; workplaces; individuals Legislation; public services; social benefits; awareness-raising; good practices

We analysed the material in terms of the activities taken by organisations, the gender equality issues discussed, constructions of gender equality, preferred actors and proposed policy solutions. Within each category, we identified—both deductively based on earlier literature and inductively based on the data—several subcategories (see Table 2). We coded the material with the help of the analysis programme Atlas.ti. The analysis relies on discursive close reading of the research material. Our analysis is divided into three parts. We first look at EU social partners’ activities in the field of gender equality, both in terms of internal gender equality practices and their advocacy work. We then discuss in more detail the issues the social partners engage with and their constructions of gender equality and inequality. Finally we examine who EU social partners believe should be responsible for addressing inequalities and what kind of measures should be taken (see Table 2). In each case, we pay attention to convergences and conflicts between the trade unions and the employers as well as between the three employer organisations.

European Social Partners’ Internal and Policy-Oriented Activities for Gender Equality An analysis of the activities of the ETUC on gender equality since 2010 illustrates an active commitment to gender equality. At the moment, this is formally shown in its constitution, the preamble of which states that the ETUC ‘works for the elimination of all forms of discrimination, based on sex, age, colour, race, sexual orientation, nationality, religious or philosophical beliefs or political opinions; and: the promotion of equal opportunities and equal treatment between men and women’ (ETUC,

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2019, May 24, p. 6). The constitution makes other significant provisions for gender equality, too. First, it formally includes the Women’s Committee, which makes the position of the committee official and institutionalised (see also Jacquot, in this volume). The Women’s Committee has three representatives on the Executive Committee (as does the Youth Committee). Second, the constitution has a rule for gender balance for the representatives to Congress sent by ETUC member organisations with the provision that they must ‘reflect the composition of the membership they represent’ (ETUC, 2019, May 24, p. 11). There is also a sanctioning mechanism of reducing proportionally the delegation’s votes if it is not gender balanced. In addition to the formalised Women’s Committee, the ETUC has an LGBTQI* Rights Trade Union Network. Other ETUC’s activities on gender equality include a commitment to improving the gender balance in trade unions’ decision-making bodies, and collecting sex-disaggregated data on affiliates’ membership and decision-making positions (annual gender equality survey) (Eurofound, 2014, p. 11). The ETUC had two action programmes on gender equality during the period studied in this chapter. The action programmes set specific areas for action including: (i) implementing gender mainstreaming in all policies; (ii) promoting equal economic independence for men and women, eliminating gender pay and pensions gaps; (iii) work–life balance; (iv) overcoming gender representation gap in trade unions’ and companies’ decision-making bodies; and (v) combating sexual harassment and violence at work (ETUC, 2012, March 7; 2016, June 8; see also Eurofound, 2014, p. 11). The five areas have stayed the same between the programmes and over the past ten years with the addition that in the Action Programme on Gender Equality (2016–2019), the ETUC made combating sexual harassment and violence at work one of its top priorities (ETUC, 2016, June 8). These action areas translate to policy commitments to gender equality (including LGBTQI rights) in numerous resolutions, statements and press releases, where the ETUC pushes the EU institutions to do more for gender equality. The ETUC proactively raises new issues on the EU’s agenda and its statements often go beyond EU gender equality policy-making. Employer organisations’ internal practices and bodies for gender equality are weaker and they engage more rarely with gender equality in their policy work. Measured in the amount and length of output, BusinessEurope is the most active employer organisation in the field of gender

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equality. In what comes to internal structures, it has an Equal Opportunities Network composed of experts nominated by member federations, which prepares positions on gender equality and non-discrimination. Unlike the ETUC Women’s Committee, the Network cannot decide on positions, which are adopted by the Social Affairs Committee. (Interview 1.) In its policy work on gender equality, BusinessEurope reacts to Commission’s proposals but also tries to proactively influence the EU’s gender equality agenda with position papers (e.g. BusinessEurope, 2011, May 11; BusinessEurope, 2015, June 23) and public activities, like events. According to our analysis, BusinessEurope’s activities mainly stem from seeing gender equality either as a threat to business interests, or as instrumental to its economic goals, such as increasing labour market participation. It opposes specific proposals, but it also strategically works to transform the concepts, framings and knowledge of EU gender equality policy (see next section). Facts and knowledge have an important role in its positions. SMEunited is the least invested employer organisation in gender equality. It has no specific structures for gender equality, which both reveals the insignificance of gender equality to the organisation and maintains its silence on these issues. BusinessEurope’s gender equality positions mainly consist of reactions to Commission’s proposals, which it categorically opposes. SMEunited shows very little concern for gender equality and portrays itself as an actor who defends small businesses against burdensome and costly policies and knows—unlike the Commission—the reality and the practicalities of the workplace. Until recently SMEunited had no own-initiative policies on gender equality, not even in the field of entrepreneurship that is close to its interests. The first such document, a publication with national best practices to promote women’s entrepreneurship, was published in 2021 (SMEunited, 2021, February 15). The public statements of public service providers express more commitment to gender equality than those of private employers. The interviewees too portrayed SGI Europe as ‘very committed’ to gender equality (Interview 2). SGI Europe does not have quotas to advance gender equality in internal decision-making, but it claims to practice gender mainstreaming (interview 2; see also CEEP, 2016, May 25). It has an informal expert group on gender equality, which prepares organisations’ gender equality positions. These positions are then approved by the Social Affairs Board or the General Assembly. (Interview 2.) The

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self-declared commitment to gender equality does not show in a large number of policy-related activities—which can be partly attributed to the organisations’ small size—but SGI Europe has a proactive approach visible in own-initiative position papers (CEEP, 2016, May 25). Although SGI Europe too often opposes Commission’s proposals, it also raises gender issues in a positive manner, for instance through calling for gender budgeting in EU policy-making (CEEP, 2019, April 26). Although the overall picture that emerges is that the employer organisations are less committed than the ETUC to gender equality in both internal practices and policy work and often oppose the Commission’s proposals, there are differences between the employers too. Whereas BusinessEurope discusses gender equality proactively with the aim to transform the EU’s gender equality agenda into a less threatening direction and the SMEunited is a categorical blocker without a proactive agenda, the SGI Europe is more supportive of gender equality.

Gender Equality Issues and Constructions of Gender Equality There are significant differences between the trade unions and the employers as well as between the employer organisations also as regards the gender equality issues they prioritise and the way they construct gender equality. The scope of gender equality issues the ETUC focuses on is extensive. These relate to gender inequalities in the labour market including the gender pay gap, part time work, precarious work contracts, and occupational segregation, but extend to sexual harassment and violence against women at work. In some statements, gender equality is also understood intersectionally, for instance in relation to age and the situation of young women or in calls for LGBTQ protection to be stepped up. In the 2010s, the ETUC expressed solidarity with LGBT workers to mark the International Day against Homophobia and Transphobia, issued joint statements with ILGA-Europe, and in the 2020s condemned Poland’s LGBT free zones. The first part of the period studied in this chapter was dominated by the ETUC speaking about the gendered impact of the economic crisis and critiquing how gender equality had dropped off the EU political agenda. Economic concerns as opposed to social issues and rights or gender equality dominated the EU crisis response and policy-making

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at the time (Cavaghan, 2017; Elomäki & Kantola, 2020; Kantola & Lombardo, 2017a). In this context, the ETUC constructed ‘Social Europe’ and the strengthening of social rights and gender equality as a solution to the problems caused by the economic crisis. A central EU level issue which the ETUC lobbied for was the European Pillar of Social Rights. This included pushing for better maternity, paternity and parental leave and work–life balance provisions (Elomäki & Kantola, 2020). The ETUC also called for public investment in care services—both for children and the elderly—and flexible working time based on workers’ needs. It emphasised the importance of division of care responsibilities between women and men (Elomäki & Kantola, 2020). In relation to EU’s economic governance mechanisms, the ETUC pushed for the inclusion of indicators for social rights within for example the European Semester, which is highly dominated by economic performance indicators. However, as we have suggested elsewhere, during the economic crisis, the struggle was so harsh, that siding with the social did not always leave space for gender equality which at times disappeared from ETUC’s agenda too (Elomäki & Kantola, 2020). Even after the immediate crisis years, the EU’s economic governance is constructed as having a negative impact on advancing women’s rights in the labour market (wages, working hours, training etc.) through collective bargaining. The gender pay gap has consistently been an important issue for the ETUC during the period analysed. According to the ETUC, the gender pay gap is the result of ‘systematic undervaluation of women’s work’, inequalities and discrimination. Over the recent years, pay transparency has become an important lobbying point for the ETUC: ‘Pay transparency means that gender biases and discrimination, even if unconscious, are stripped away as everyone can see their effects laid out numerically in the cold light of day’ (ETUC, 2019, October 23, p. 1). The Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the necessity for more equal pay for all front-line workers including nurses according to the ETUC. The centrality and visibility of gender-based violence in the workplace as an important issue has increased over the years for the ETUC. As mentioned above, tackling sexual harassment occupies a central place in the ETUC Action Programme for Gender Equality since 2016. The defence of the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention in the face of anti-gender and anti-gender equality attacks is surprisingly strong in the ETUC statements and it calls for the Commission to ensure member state

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ratification and EU accession to the Istanbul Convention. The ETUC, for example, condemned Turkey’s withdrawal from Istanbul Convention. In the context of bodily rights, which are being challenged with the spread of radical right populism in Europe, the ETUC Women’s Committee in particular issued statements defending women’s fights for their reproductive rights across Europe. The ETUC also took a stance to defend the LGBTQI Strategy of the Commission. The trade unions are even constructed as pioneers in tackling violence: ‘Trade unions should be pioneers in introducing new initiatives (and reinforcing existing ones) to combat gender-based violence at work, including domestic violence at work, by drawing up policies, procedures and measures of support that workers trust’ (ETUC, 2017, December 12, p. 33). In addition to these issues which dominate the agenda, the ETUC stresses the importance of such gender equality policy-making tools as gender mainstreaming in the processes of its member organisations, including in collective bargaining both to assess the gendered impacts of collective bargaining and to ensure gender balance in negotiation processes. Finally, the ETUC makes openings towards new issues such as being concerned that Artificial Intelligence will reinforce gender inequality and stereotypes by building existing biases and prejudices into its algorithms and programmes. Employers still understand gender equality narrowly as a labour market issue, as was the case when the EU began to develop measures in this field in the 1950s (Jacquot, 2015). BusinessEurope, SMEunited and SGI Europe portray women’s low labour market participation, gender segregation and gender stereotypes as the main gender equality problems. These issues can be seen as non-threatening to employers’ interests or even supportive of them. Whilst all employer organisations discuss issues that go beyond the labour market, such as work–life balance, they mainly frame these issues as means to bring more women into the labour market. Only SGI Europe draws consistent attention to inequalities at home, speaking about ‘interconnections between working conditions and living conditions’ (CEEP, 2016, May 25, p. 5). Employers are completely silent about harassment and gender-based violence, thereby implicitly constructing this issue as irrelevant for EU gender equality policy. The gender pay gap is a particularly difficult issue for EU-level employer organisations, and they use different strategies to steer the debate away from the problem or to reframe it in a manner that shifts responsibility away from employers (see Elomäki et al., 2019; Koskinen

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Sandberg, 2018 on similar tactics in national contexts). Firstly, employer organisations disconnect gender pay gap from discrimination. As BusinessEurope argues in a letter to the Commission: ‘the gender pay gap does not mean discrimination, or an absence of equal pay for equal value work’ (BusinessEurope, 2015, November 30). Similarly, SMEunited emphasises that ‘it is important to avoid equating the gender pay gap with pay discrimination’ (SMEunited, 2020, January 30). BusinessEurope also attacks Commission’s indicators to measure the pay gap. It calls for ‘busting myths related to the unadjusted gender pay gap’ and stresses that even the unexplained gender pay gap should not be interpreted as discrimination (BusinessEurope, 2019, December 16). The second strategy is to move the focus from the pay gap to segregation and stereotypes, described as ‘the real causes’ (BusinessEurope, 2015, June 23) or the ‘root causes’ (CEEP, 2020, June 26) of wage differences. The focus on segregation and stereotypes highlights individuals’ behaviour and choices as the heart of the problem, shifts responsibility to individuals, for instance, through encouraging women to work in more well-paid sectors, and makes legislation appear as an unsuitable solution. BusinessEurope explicitly speaks about individuals’ choices and behaviour to further individualise the problem. The interviews confirm the strategic goal to shift the focus and concepts of the debate (Interview 1). This strategy has turned out to be partly successful. Although the von der Leyen Commission proposed new legislation on equal pay, it also made challenging gender stereotypes a priority of EU gender equality policy (European Commission, 2020, pp. 5–6). In contrast to the ETUC, employers rarely criticise economic policies from a gender perspective. Only SGI Europe, which represents the interests of public service providers and is therefore critical of cuts in public services, acknowledges that economic crises and austerity had gendered impacts. Rather, economic policies and priorities, which employers tend to prioritise above social goals (Elomäki & Kantola, 2020), shape employers’ gender equality positions. BusinessEurope in particular argues that economic priorities come before gender equality, and it criticises the Commission’s gender equality proposals for contradicting with economic goals: ‘The Commission needs to demonstrate how its proposed agenda on reconciliation matches its priorities in the context of the European Semester, where it encourages Member States to engage more forcefully in structural reforms leading to more growth and jobs, and to achieve fiscal consolidation.’ (BusinessEurope, 2015, December 15). Moreover,

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building on the business case for gender equality typical for employers (Dickens, 2000; Elomäki et al., 2020) and the economic case used by EU institutions (Elomäki, 2015), employers frame gender equality as a tool for business productivity and macroeconomic goals, such as economic growth and increasing the employment rates. SGI Europe even represents the development and sharing of the business case for gender equality as one of its gender equality priorities (CEEP, 2016, May 25, p. 4). Employer organisations can therefore be seen as key actors in the increased economic framing of the EU’s gender equality policies and discourses, a development, which has been criticised for depoliticising gender equality and the economy, as well as for legitimising the EU’s gendered economic policies (Elomäki, 2015). The lack of intersectional approach further illustrates the narrowness of employers’ constructions of gender equality. Instead of acknowledging the different labour market positions and multiple discrimination faced by different groups, the employers use the concept of diversity to emphasise the positive outcomes that employees and leadership representing people from different backgrounds can bring for companies (e.g. BusinessEurope, 2011, May 11; CEEP, 2016, May 25). This approach typical for employers in other contexts too has been criticised for sidelining structural inequalities (e.g. Kirton et al., 2007). The diversity framing has succeeded in influencing EU-level debates, in particular with regard to gender balance in corporate boards (Elomäki, 2018). To summarise, whereas the ETUC extends the narrow understandings of gender equality implied in the EU gender equality policy, employers push for an even narrower understanding with the aim of limiting the scope of this policy. There is one issue on which the social partners find common ground, namely childcare (Elomäki & Kantola, 2020). It is in SGI Europe’s interests to stress the role of public services, and childcare is a non-threatening issue for private employers, as it places responsibility and costs on national governments rather than employers and increases labour supply. The social partners’ common position on childcare adopted in 2020 (ETUC et al., 2020, December 12) illustrates this convergence.

Actors and Policy Measures for Gender Equality In ETUC’s statements, gender equality is a concern for all. EU-level and national political actors are often called to take action, and the ETUC calls for a strong regulatory framework for gender equality to outlaw genderbased discrimination and to positively advance gender equality. Regulation and legal frameworks by the EU are constructed as particularly important

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(ETUC, 2015, June 17). The ETUC places a lot of responsibility on the Commission to act and to take an active and expansive role in relation to gender equality. It also stresses the executive role of the member state governments in implementing for example the work–life balance directive. For example, in relation to the gender pay gap, the ETUC argues the EU and the Commission should play a crucial role in increasing pay transparency (ETUC, 2019, October 23). The ETUC issued many statements holding the Von der Leyen Commission accountable to its delayed action on the pay transparency directive. The directive was supposed to be in the Commission’s first 100 day programme, but the proposal came after 460 days in office, the ETUC points out. The Commission was argued to be dragging its feet on the topic. Another example comes from the way in which the ETUC (2020, September 23) continues to demand binding legislative measures at European level for gender balance in company boards and a coherent comprehensive approach. Employers, in contrast, argue that the main responsibility for advancing gender equality belongs to national governments, workplaces and individuals. They often evoke the principle of subsidiarity to oppose EU-level action, in particular when it comes to regulation. For example, SGI Europe (2020, June 25) noted on von der Leyen Commission’s pay transparency measures that ‘the proposed actions […] fall in the remit of the Member States and the national social partners’ competences and are not issues to be addressed at EU level’. In employers’ view, the Commission’s role is to raise awareness, produce (right kind of) knowledge and share good practices. Private employers in particular see the workplace as the preferred level of action. Company-level solutions are framed as practical, effective and realistic and attuned to companies’ and employees’ needs. At the same time, the employers stress that any workplace-level actions should remain voluntary. In some matters, like reducing the gender pay gap, responsibility for gender equality is dispersed even further and placed on individuals. In terms of measures, employers strongly oppose new EU legislation. They rejected all three gender equality directives (gender balance in corporate boards, work–life balance, and pay transparency) proposed in the analysis period on the basis of costs for companies and public finances, negative macroeconomic consequences, administrative burdens, and subsidiarity. The frame of business and economic benefits is therefore complemented with another economic framing, that of gender equality as a costly burden. Instead, employers favour awareness-raising

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and the sharing of good practices—non-costly measures that do not set new requirements for companies. Childcare investments are an exception to the employers’ no-cost approach, and private employers increasingly joined SGI Europe in calling for public investments in care infrastructure. In line with the social investment paradigm that represents some types of social spending as ‘productive’ and others as consumption (Nolan, 2013), employers are in favour of public spending seen to increase labour supply and human capital, but oppose other types of social spending important for gender equality, such as improvements in parental leave. What unites the ETUC and the employers is the important role given to social partners, social dialogue and collective bargaining in advancing gender equality. This, we suggest, reflects their shared interest in maintaining their power as well as that of their members’. Involving workers and trade unions is a frame which shapes the ETUC discussion of all gender equality issues (ETUC, 2020, March 3). The ETUC places a lot of responsibility on its member organisations and national trade unions and commits to providing an exchange of good practice. In contrast, ETUC constructs reluctant ‘employers’ as a key hindrance to gender equality, who need to be persuaded to work for gender equality. The ETUC also gives a central role to collective bargaining and social dialogue and makes pledges to keep gender equality issues on the agenda of the EU social dialogue. For instance in tackling gender-based violence it is stated that ‘[t]he ETUC is convinced that social partners play a crucial role in preventing and tackling the consequences of violence and harassment in the workplace’ (ETUC, 2017, December 12). More recently, in relation to the pay transparency directive, an ETUC policy paper emphasises lobbying the Commission and the Parliament, as well as member states, and only mentions ‘putting’ pay transparency on the agenda of social dialogue (ETUC, 2019, October 23, p. 3). For the employers, emphasising EU social dialogue and social partners’ work programmes has across the 2010s been a strategy to oppose EU action on gender equality. In the case of the work–life balance directive, BusinessEurope and SMEunited opposed the Commission’s plans on the basis that they ‘interfered’ with European social partners’ plan to address the issue in their work programme through weak measures. Employers also argued that the work–life balance directive, which replaced social partners’ framework agreement on parental leave, undermined European social dialogue and the autonomy of social partners (BusinessEurope, 2015, December 15; UEAPME, 2016, September 1). The autonomy

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of national social partners and collective bargaining systems, in turn, has been used as an argument to oppose measures to tackle the gender pay gap, including the 2021 pay transparency proposal. Although the autonomy of European social partners and EU social dialogue is important for the ETUC too, it prioritises good gender equality outcomes over social dialogue. In the case of the work–life balance directive, the ETUC was frustrated with the employers’ unwillingness to negotiate about binding measures and encouraged the Commission to by-pass EU social dialogue and propose a directive (Elomäki & Kantola, 2020).

Conclusion Our chapter has contributed to efforts to put social partners to the research agenda of gender and EU studies (see also Jacquot, in this volume; Elomäki & Kantola, 2020). Whilst their policy-impact on EU gender equality policies has been studied more extensively elsewhere (see e.g. Elomäki & Kantola, 2020), we have analysed the ways in which the social partners shape the EU’s gender equality policy through constructing gender equality in a certain way and representing certain issues and actions as relevant and desirable, as well as how they construct their own and EU role in advancing gender equality. Such constructions matter for various reasons. First, as social dialogue has somewhat diminished, the social partners have put more effort into lobbying the Commission, the European Parliament and member state governments. Through lobbying they can push for their understandings of gender equality problems and of how expansive or limited EU gender equality policy should be. Second, the social partners are privileged actors in terms of resources when compared to for example women’s or feminist organisations and many other civil society organisations. They have a self-evident right to be heard on a variety of issues related to the economy and the labour market, all of which are of central importance to gender equality. The findings of the chapter illustrate the very different profiles the social partners have in relation to gender equality (see Table 3). The ETUC is a proactive advocate of gender equality whose gender equality agenda has expanded over the years. The ETUC defends a number of issues such as social rights, which are highly compatible with gender concerns. The cross-sectoral employers’ organisations, in contrast, oppose any extensions to the EU gender equality agenda and aim to reframe the contents of gender equality in the narrowest possible ways to limit

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Table 3

Gender equality profiles of EU social partners ETUC

Activities

Proactive; supportive Issues Extensive scope: gender pay gap; harassment and gender-based violence; work–life balance; atypical work; childcare; gender impacts/gender mainstreaming; emerging issues (AI, Covid) Approaches Valuable in itself; rights; intersectionality Actors EU; national governments; social partners

Measures

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BusinessEurope

SMEunited

SGI Europe

Proactive; opposing Narrow scope: women’s employment; segregation; stereotypes

Reactive; opposing Narrow scope: women’s employment; segregation; stereotypes; entrepreneurship

Proactive; opposing/supportive Medium scope: women’s employment; segregation; stereotypes; work–life balance; gender impacts/gender mainstreaming

Cost or burden; business and economic benefits National governments; social partners; workplaces

Business and economic benefits; valuable in itself; diversity National governments; social partners; EU;

Awarenessraising; good practices; public services

Public services; awareness-raising; good practices

Cost or burden; business and economic benefits; diversity National governments social partners; workplaces; individuals AwarenessLegislation; social benefits; raising; good public services; practices; public good practices; services awarenessraising

EU action in the field. However, there are differences between the three employer organisations with SMEunited being the least and SGI Europe the most invested in gender equality. BusinessEurope, in turn, puts the most energy in strategically reframing the EU’s gender equality issues in a direction less threatening to business interests. These efforts have been partly successful. Diversity approaches and the business case for gender

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equality have a visible role in EU policy, and employers’ priority issues, such as segregation and stereotypes, have become more visible too. Our chapter also reveals the key conflicts and convergences between the ETUC and the employer organisations that have consequences for EU gender equality policy and EU social dialogue. Whereas gender pay gap is a particularly conflict-ridden issue and EU legislation is the most disputed policy solution, social partners increasingly find common ground on the need for more public investment in childcare. Although both the ETUC and the employers give social partners and social dialogue an important role in the promotion of gender equality, the difficult position of gender equality in the EU social dialogue has led the ETUC in some cases to prefer lobbying over autonomous social dialogue. We conclude that paying closer attention to the role and impact of social partners would bring interesting political dynamics and power plays into the fore when studying the EU’s gender policy. A future research topic involves the relationships between European social partners and national labour market organisations and the significance of transnational relationships for gender equality at both EU and national levels. Collaboration between EU-level and national organisations and among national organisations may be important for the ability of social partners to stall or advance EU gender equality policy. Moreover, sharing of good practices has been a key aspect of EU social partners’ gender equality work, and issues (e.g. gender-based violence), constructions (e.g. the economic case) and strategies (e.g. diverting attention away from the gender pay gap) are likely to travel from national to EU level and back. Tracing these processes would provide new understandings of the complex and changing relationships between social partners and gender equality in Europe. Acknowledgements We would like to thank Sophie Jacquot for her valuable feedback on the chapter. This study has received funding from the Academy of Finland project funding (GePoCo) and H2020 European Research Council (ERC) Consolidator Grant funding (Grant number 771676).

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Gold, M., Cressey, P., & Léonard, E. (2007). Whatever happened to social dialogue? From partnership to managerialism in the EU employment agenda. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 13(1), 7–25. Hix, S. (2005). The political system of the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. Jacquot, S. (2015). Transformations in EU gender equality: From emergence to dismantling. Palgrave Macmillan. Jacquot, S. (2017). A policy in crisis: The dismantling of the EU gender equality policy. In J. Kantola & E. Lombardo (Eds.), Gender and the economic crisis in Europe: Politics, institutions and intersectionality (pp. 27–48). Springer. Kantola, J. (2010). Gender and the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. Kantola, J., & Lombardo, E. (Eds.). (2017a). Gender and the economic crisis in Europe: Politics, institutions and intersectionality. Palgrave Macmillan. Kantola, J., & Lombardo, E. (2017b). Gender and political analysis. Palgrave Macmillan. Koskinen Sandberg, P. (2018). The corporatist regime, welfare state employment, and gender pay inequity. NORA—Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research, 26(1), 36–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/08038740.2018. 1424726. Kirton, G., Greene, A. M., & Dean, D. (2007). British diversity professionals as change agents: Radicals, tempered radicals or liberal reformers? The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 18, 1979–1994. https:// doi.org/10.1080/09585190701638226. Lombardo, E., Meier, P., & Verloo, M. (2009). Stretching and bending gender equality: A discursive politics approach? In E. Lombardo, P. Meier, & M. Verloo (Eds.), The discursive politics of gender equality: Stretching, bending, and policymaking (pp. 1–18). Routledge. Nolan, B. (2013). What use is ‘social investment’? Journal of European Social Policy, 23(5), 459–468. Plomien, A. (2018). EU social and gender policy beyond Brexit: Towards the European Pillar of Social Rights. Social Policy and Society, 7 (2), 281–296. Pochet, P. (2019). À la recherche de l’Europe sociale. PUF. Pochet, P., & Degryse, C. (2016). Dialogue social européen: une relance ‘de la dernière chance’? (Observatoire social européen, Opinion Papers No. 17). Retrieved on 25 May 2021, from http://www.ose.be/files/publication/OSE PaperSeries/Pochet_Degryse_2016_OpinionPaper17.pdf. Prosser, T. (2016). Economic union without social union: The strange case of the European Social Dialogue. Journal of European Social Policy, 26(5), 460–472. Saari, M. (2016). Samapalkkaisuus – neuvoteltu oikeus. Naisten ja miesten palkkaeriarvoisuus poliittisena ja oikeudellisena kysymyksenä korporatistisessa Suomessa. (PhD dissertation). Department of Economic and Political Studies, University of Helsinki. University of Helsinki. http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978951-51-1096-1.

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Sabato, S., & Vanhercke, B., with Spasova, S. (2017). Listened to, but not heard? Social partners’ multilevel involvement in the European Semester (OSE Paper Series, Research Paper No. 35). SGI Europe. (2020). CEEP at the European commission’s hearing on pay transparency 25 June. https://www.ceep.eu/ceep-at-the-european-commissionshearing-on-pay-transparency-on-25-june-2020/. Treib, O., & Falkner, K. (2009). Bargaining and lobbying in EU social policy. In D. Coen & R. Richardson (Eds.), Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, actors and issues (pp. 256–276). Oxford University Press. Verloo, M. (Ed.). (2007). Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe. Central European University Press. Weiler, A. (2013). Social dialogue and gender equality in the European Union (Working Paper No. 44). ILO.

Cited Research Material BusinessEurope. (2011, May 11). Towards gender-balanced labour markets— A business case for equality between women and men. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.businesseurope.eu/sites/buseur/files/media/ imported/2011-00873-E.pdf. BusinessEurope. (2015, June 23). Addressing the gender pay gap—A BusinessEurope position paper. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.businesse urope.eu/sites/buseur/files/media/imported/2015-00575-E.pdf. BusinessEurope. (2015, November 30). European Equal Pay Day on 2 November 2015—Reply from Markus J. Beyrer to European Commission Vera Jourova. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.businesseurope.eu/sites/bus eur/files/media/public_letters/social/2015-11-30_mbe-v.jourova_-_reply_ on_gender_pay_gap.pdf. BusinessEurope. (2015, December 15). Addressing the challenges of worklife balance faced by working parents and caregivers—BusinessEurope response to first-stage social partner consultation. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.businesseurope.eu/publications/addressing-challe nges-work-life-balance-faced-working-parents-and-caregivers. BusinessEurope. (2017, June 22). Work-life balance for working parents and carers—A BusinessEurope position paper. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.businesseurope.eu/publications/work-life-balanceworking-parents-and-carers-businesseurope-position-paper. BusinessEurope. (2019, December 16). Key issues to strengthen gender equality in Europe. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.businesseurope. eu/sites/buseur/files/media/position_papers/social/gender_equality_pos ition_paper.pdf.

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BusinessEurope, CEEP, ETUC, & UEAPME. (2015, June 14). The 2015– 2017 work programme of the European Social Partners. “Partnership for Inclusive Growth and Employment”. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.ceep.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/BROCHUREWP-Business-Europe-5-2.pdf. BusinessEurope, ETUC, CEEP, & SMEunited. (2020, December 3). European Social Partners joint statement on childcare provisions in the EU . Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.etuc.org/en/document/european-socialpartners-joint-statement-childcare-provisions-eu. CEEP. (2016, May 25). Gender equality: “Progressing to 2020”. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from http://www.ceep.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/16o pinion05_Gender-Equality.pdf. CEEP. (2019, June 24). Gender budgeting on the agenda of the informal EPSCO and in a new EIGE report. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.ceep.eu/gender-budgeting-new-eige-report-andon-the-agenda-of-the-informal-epsco/. CEEP. (2020, June 26). CEEP at the European Commission’s hearing on pay transparency 25 June. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.ceep. eu/ceep-at-the-european-commissions-hearing-on-pay-transparency-on-25june-2020/. ETUC. (2012, March 7). ETUC Action Programme on Gender Equality 2010– 2015. Adopted at the Executive Committee on 6–7 March 2012. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-actionprogramme-gender-equality. ETUC. (2015, June 17). Resolution: Collective bargaining—Our powerful tool to close the gender pay gap. Adopted at the Executive Committee meeting 17–18 June 2015. Close the gender pay gap. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.etuc.org/en/document/resolution-collective-bargainingour-powerful-tool-close-gender-pay-gap. ETUC. (2016, June 8). ETUC action programme on gender equality 2016– 2019. Adopted at the Executive Committee 7–8 June 2016. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-action-pro gramme-gender-equality-2016-2019. ETUC. (2017, June 30). European trade union confederation—LGBTQI* rights trade union network. Madrid declaration on the rights of LGBTQI* people in the workplace. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.etuc.org/en/ document/madrid-declaration-rights-lgbtqi-people-workplace. ETUC. (2017, December 12). Gender-based violence at work and at home—A trade union issue. Adopted at the Executive Meeting of 13 and 14 December 2017 . Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.etuc.org/en/doc ument/gender-based-violence-work-and-home-trade-union-issue.

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ETUC. (2019, May 24). ETUC constitution. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/publication/file/2019-07/CES14e%20Congrès-Statuts-UK.pdf. ETUC (2019, October 23). ETUC resolution on gender pay transparency directive. Adopted at the Executive Committee Meeting of 22–23 October 2019. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.etuc.org/en/document/ etuc-resolution-gender-pay-transparency-directive. ETUC. (2020, September 23). Enhancing gender balance in company boardrooms. ETUC Resolution Adopted at the Executive Committee Meeting of 23 September 2020. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.etuc.org/ en/document/etuc-position-new-eu-framework-information-consultationand-board-level-representation. ETUC. (2020, March 3). Artificial Intelligence: Will it make bias against women worse? Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.etuc.org/en/public ation/artificial-intelligence-will-it-make-bias-against-women-worse. ETUC. (2020, April 30). Women’s Committee 2020: Women’s human reproductive rights and lives at risk: The ETUC Women’s Committee calls for the rejection of all restrictions to women’s human rights and rights to safe and quality healthcare. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.etuc.org/en/document/womens-human-reproductive-rig hts-and-lives-risk-etuc-womens-committee-calls-rejection-all. SMEUnited. (2021, February 15). SMEunited best practices to support women’s entrepreneurship. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.smeunited. eu/admin/storage/smeunited/12022021-smeu-best-practices-to-supportwe.pdf. SMEUnited. (2020, January 30). SMEs support gender equality in the labour market. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from https://www.smeunited.eu/news/ smes-support-gender-equality-in-the-labour-market. UEAPME. (2017, April 26). The social pillar should better respect SME needs: Work-life balance directive will create high burdens and costs for SMEs. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from http://www.ueapme.com/IMG/pdf/170 426_-_pr_EPSR_package.pdf. UEAPME. (2016, September 1). UEAPME position on challenges of work-life balance. Retrieved on 15 April 2021, from http://www.ueapme.com/IMG/ pdf/UEAPME_position_on_challenges_of_work-life_balance.pdf.

Interviews Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview

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BusinessEurope, October 28, 2018 CEEP, January 6, 2019 UEAPME, September 26, 2018 ETUC, November 2, 2018 ETUC, October 19, 2018

Converging and Conflicting Perspectives on Gender Equality Amongst Spanish Social Partners My Rafstedt

Introduction How social partner representatives conceptualise gender inequality plays an important role in how they address gender inequality (Brochard et al., 2020; Heery, 2006; Saari, 2013). Trade unions are considered better at identifying the structural roots of gender inequality than the employer organisations (Brochard et al., 2020; Greene et al., 2005), which feminist scholars consider essential to tackle gender inequality (Elomäki, 2018; Roberts, 2015). We know less about how the social partners’ understanding of gender (in)equality manifests itself differently by policy area. Gender equality is a heterogeneous issue, and actors may support some gender equality measures whilst simultaneously opposing others (Htun & Weldon, 2018). Gender equality policy issues may also be framed differently and contain diverse understandings of the concept of gender equality (Lombardo & Meier, 2008). The literature on how trade unions and employer organisations address gender equality often focuses

M. Rafstedt (B) Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5_9

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on one policy area per study. This makes it difficult to systematically examine whether the social partners’ understandings of gender equality vary depending on the policy area in question. In this chapter, I analyse differences in how gender equality is discussed by trade unions and employer organisations in Spain between 2010 and 2020, across two policy areas of central importance to gender equality; work-life balance policies and the gender pay gap.1 I examine these policy areas because both receive significant attention when the social partners address gender equality, and because they have been central to Spanish debates on gender equality in the labour market. Whereas worklife balance policies have received significant attention in the political debate in Spain during the last decades (León et al., 2019), the gender pay gap has been subject to recent initiatives from Spanish governments. The time frame is chosen to capture the social partners’ gender equality policies during a decade where the balance of power between the trade unions and employer organisations in Spain was significantly altered. Drawing on an analysis of in-depth interviews and policy documents, I show that trade unions and employer organisations present a shared understanding of how the uneven distribution of caring responsibilities between women and men produce unequal access to salaried work and that this is rooted in societal structures that must be addressed through a shared responsibility by men and women to provide care. I argue that the primary bottleneck2 to reaching agreements in this policy area is the social partners’ conflicting perspectives on the power balance between workers and employers, a balance that has been upset during the past decade, not conflicting ideas about gender equality. In the context of the gender pay gap debate, I demonstrate that the social partners have conflicting perspectives on the role played by the undervaluation of women’s work, which has been shown to be of great importance to the gender pay gap (Koskinen Sandberg et al., 2018), and on the power balance between workers and employers. My contribution to the existing literature on social partners and gender equality is to demonstrate the importance of disaggregating the study of gender equality across different policy areas. This allows for a more nuanced understanding of when trade unions and employer organisations’ conflicting ideas about gender equality represent an obstacle to reaching agreements on gender equality measures in the labour market. It also brings into light another bottleneck that may represent a substantial barrier to agreement, such as their distinct understanding of the power

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balance between workers and employers. Building on Cavaghan’s (2017) argument that people’s approach to gender equality is informed by the interaction between their ideas about gender equality and their knowledge and expertise of other policy areas, I argue that when we examine social partners’ gender equality policies we must pay careful attention to how their conceptions of gender equality interrelate with their distinct ideas about the employer–employee relationship and the power balance in the labour market. I begin by discussing the relationship between social partners’ gender equality conceptions and their gender equality policies, and then provide an overview of the Spanish social partners and the two gender equality policy areas I will analyse. I describe my empirical data and methods and analyse this in two separate sections, one that compares the social partners approach to work-life balance policies and another that examines their position on the gender pay gap. I conclude with some brief reflections on how this chapter contributes to the effort to understand the conditions under which social partners commit to gender equality.

Social Partners and Gender Equality Policy Trade unions have often been critiqued for being patriarchal institutions that prioritise male employees (Elomäki & Kantola, 2020, p. 5; Quinn, 2004, p. 648), but during the past decades unions have made efforts to integrate gender equality onto their agendas and female members into their organisations (Greene & Kirton, 2002; Kirton, 2010, 2015; Munro, 2001; Yates, 2010). Employer organisations are often found to instrumentalise gender equality for the purpose of economic growth and to individualise the problem of gender inequality, which makes the structural barriers faced by women invisible (Elomäki, 2018; Elomäki & Kantola, 2020; Roberts, 2015, pp. 210–212). How social partners frame gender equality matters because it informs how they address gender inequality (Brochard et al., 2020; Pontón Merino & Pastor Gosálbez, 2014, p. 132; Saari, 2013, p. 51). Employer organisations and businesses often approach gender equality from the perspective of diversity management (Cullen & Murphy, 2018; Greene et al., 2005; Kirton et al., 2007) and the business case for equality (Colling & Dickens, 1998; Elomäki, 2018, p. 63; Roberts, 2015). The business case for equality has flourished since the 1980s and encompasses the idea that gender equality is a good investment because it

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creates economic growth by using an ‘underutilised resource’ to expand ‘the pool of talented workers and consumers’ (Roberts, 2015, pp. 210– 212). Roberts (2015, p. 212) argues that this framework instrumentalises gender equality for a higher (financial) purpose, in which ‘the market is emptied of power relations and there is an erasure of the historical and structural conditions that have created and sustained inequalities between countries and between groups of people over time’. Diversity management is based on the idea that businesses with a diverse employee pool will be more adaptable and better prepared to handle change, which motivates the hiring of both women and men (Greene et al., 2005). The emphasis on diversity shifts the debate from a focus on gender equality to economic concepts (Elomäki, 2018, p. 64). If economic concerns such as increasing the employment rate and avoiding costly gender equality policies are at the centre of the debate, other aspects such as the equal sharing of caring responsibilities often become side-lined (Elomäki et al., 2021, p. 309). Employers have increased their support for gender equality measures over time. Skorge and Rasmussen (2021) find that both employers and trade unions in advanced democracies have increased their support for work-family policies since the 1960s, and they attribute the employers’ growing approval to their wish to attract the increasing share of high-skilled female workers. Employer organisations and businesses tend to have a limited understanding of the societal structures that produce and maintain gender inequality, and prefer to promote gender equality measures that require little resources on their part (Brochard et al., 2020; Brochard & Letablier, 2017, p. 665; Elomäki & Kantola, 2020, p. 14). Brochard et al. (2020) find that French companies tend to not acknowledge the gender pay gap in their own companies, and when they do, they consider it the result of sectoral patterns or gendered preferences. These employers struggled to identify the structural roots of gender inequality, although larger firms with designated human resources personnel had a better grasp of the gender pay gap (Brochard et al., 2020, p. 108). Similarly, the European employer organisations explain the gender pay gap with reference to how women and men choose different jobs, and how this individual choice is related to gender stereotypes (Elomäki & Kantola, 2020, p. 13). In comparison, the European Trade Union Confederation attributes the gender pay gap to discrimination (Elomäki & Kantola, 2020, p. 13).

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Trade unions tend to be better at identifying structural gender inequality than employer organisations. British trade unions were sceptical of the turn towards diversity management because they worried it would shift the focus to individuals rather than structural inequality and depoliticise the equality discourse (Greene et al., 2005, p. 188; Kirton & Greene, 2006, p. 439). Trade union representatives’ willingness to prioritise gender equality in collective bargaining is closely related to their knowledge about and training in matters related to gender equality (Heery, 2006). In a study of union officers in the UK, Heery (2006, p. 539) finds that the union officials who are most likely to address equal pay during collective bargaining are the officials who express higher degrees of commitment to equal pay and those who have had training on equal pay. Female officers were only minimally more likely to engage in equality bargaining than their male counterparts (Heery, 2006, p. 533). Brochard et al., (2020, p. 103) similarly found that trade union representatives who had training in gender equality issues tried to make the gender pay gap a priority during collective bargaining, but that the varying interest in gender equality policy amongst the union representatives made it difficult to create a united front against the employers. Ideas about gender and gender inequality must compete as well as comply with existing priorities and norms within a given policy area (Cavaghan, 2017).The social partner representatives’ perspectives on gender equality intersect with their expertise, knowledge and experiences from other policy areas. The power balance between trade unions and workers on the one hand, and employer organisations and employers on the other, is of central importance to the social partners as it is determinant of what they can achieve in negotiations. Earlier research from Spain demonstrates how union representatives consider that the unions need greater control over how work is organised at the workplace, and that this is central to the implementation of work-life balance measures (Miguélez et al., 2007, p. 43). Concerns regarding the power balance between the Spanish social partners are related to the deregulation of working conditions (Miguélez et al., 2007, p. 55), and these concerns became acute with the labour reform introduced in 2012 that shifted the power balance between workers and employers further in favour of the latter.

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Social Partners and Gender Equality Policy in Spain The Spanish Social Partners The most important social partners at the national level in Spain are the trade unions Comisiones Obreras (Workers’ Commissions, CCOO) and Unión General de Trabajadores (Workers’ General Union, UGT), and the employer organisations Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (Spanish Confederation of Employers’ Organizations, CEOE) and Confederación Española de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa (Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium-Size Enterprises, CEPYME). CCOO and UGT are responsible for negotiating with the Spanish government, a privilege accorded to unions with more than 10% of the workers’ vote nationally (Aguilar, 2020, p. 434).3 UGT has 978.622 members and 40% of these are women (UGT, 2020a), whilst CCOO has 972.639 members and 47% of these are female (personal correspondence, 2021).4 The female labour force in Spain was 46% of the total labour force in 2019, a number that has risen significantly since the early 1990s when women made up 35% of the labour force (World Bank, 2021). CEOE was founded in 1977 and represents 2 million businesses. CEPYME is a member of CEOE since 1980 (Aguilar, 2020, p. 434) and the president of CEPYME is one of ten vice-presidents who sits on CEOE’s board of directors. Historically, the drivers behind the promotion of gender equality policy in Spain have been feminists working within the Spanish state, trade unions and political parties, more so than the feminist movement (Valiente, 1998, p. 468). The social partners can affect government policy through tripartite social dialogue and the advisory body Consejo Económico y Social (Economic and Social Council, CES). The CES is composed of representatives from the social partners, experts chosen by the Spanish government and research staff. The institution evaluates the government’s law proposals on labour market issues and publishes studies on this topic. The tripartite social dialogue between the government, trade unions and employer organisations suffered during the economic crisis in Spain, and few agreements were signed when the conservative party governed from 2011 to 2018 (Aguilar, 2020, p. 435). The Spanish government adopted severe austerity measures in response to the financial crisis, including a labour reform that shifted the power balance between

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workers and employers further in favour of the employers by prioritising collective bargaining at the level of the businesses rather than sectorwide bargaining, making it more difficult to negotiate work-life balance measures in the workplace (Martínez Veiga, 2016; Pérez Infante, 2015, pp. 255, 280; Verge, 2020, p. 623). Efforts have been made to reactivate the social dialogue since PSOE leader Pedro Sánchez came into office in 2018, and the social partners have met with the government in 2019 and 2020 to discuss the gender pay gap, work-life balance, workplace equality plans, and equal opportunities in the collective bargaining. The current Minister of Labour, Yolanda Díaz from the populist left party Unidas Podemos, has particularly been lauded as important to the reactivation of the social dialogue (La Vanguardia, 2021; Mantilla, 2020). Trade unions and employer organisations also affect the implementation of gender equality measures in the workplace. Collective bargaining takes place on three levels; the inter-confederal, the sectoral and the business level. The social partners have signed four inter-confederal Agreements on Employment and Collective Bargaining (AENC) between 2010 and 2020, which outline overarching guidelines for the collective bargaining between the social partners for a period of two or three years. All four agreements address gender equality (AENC, 2010; AENC II, 2012; AENC III, 2015; AENC IV, 2018).5 Collective bargaining acts as a counter-weight to the employers’ power over their employees by attempting to ensure that working conditions are protected or improved beyond the letter of the law and that the legal framework is adapted to the workplace, that gender equality measures are implemented, and that workers are made aware of their rights (Lousada Arochena, 2008, pp. 28–29; Miguélez et al., 2007, pp. 44–45, 49–50). The ability of collective bargaining to make a difference in terms of ensuring gender equality at work depends on the interest and capability of the negotiating partners (Lousada Arochena, 2008, p. 29). Although the number of collective agreements that mention gender equality has grown during the last decade, they often tend to copy the legal framework without proposing concrete measures (Miguélez et al., 2007, p. 50; Pontón Merino & Pastor Gosálbez, 2014, p. 133). Earlier research on Spanish trade unions’ approach to gender equality have found that gender equality measures often do not reach the top priorities in collective bargaining, where issues such as job creation are considered more important (Miguélez et al., 2007, p. 43). The conceptualisation of gender equality also varies within unions, and union workplace representatives

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often envision work-life balance as a women’s issue compared to staff working in gender equality secretaries that consider it important to all workers (Miguélez et al., 2007, pp. 46, 50). Spanish employer organisations and businesses have been found to have narrow conceptualisations of gender equality, to propose individualising measures aimed at developing female workers’ skill set, and to promote female leadership and entrepreneurship (Pontón Merino & Pastor Gosálbez, 2014, p. 117; Verge & Lombardo, 2019, pp. 7, 10). Particularly small, masculinised workplaces without a gender equality plan are likely to have a genderblind approach to collective agreements (Pontón Merino & Pastor Gosálbez, 2014, p. 130). Gender Equality Policy: Work-Life Balance and the Gender Pay Gap Spanish parties have adopted an increasingly progressive approach to family policy since gender equality started to become salient in electoral competition in the 1990s, focused on the promotion of childcare services and parental leave for both mothers and fathers (León et al., 2019, pp. 3, 9, 13; Valiente, 2008, p. 111). The concept of work-life balance (conciliación)6 was first introduced in Spanish labour law in 1999 to protect women who fall ill during their pregnancy (León et al., 2019, p. 7). Important developments since include the Equality Law from 2007 that introduced the individual right to two weeks of paternity leave and compulsory equality plans for private businesses with more than 250 employees, as well as Law 39/2006 that aimed to improve access to public care for dependent people, despite its poor implementation due to insufficient funding (Bustelo, 2016, p. 116; Lombardo, 2017, p. 24; Verge, 2020, p. 616). Gender equality policy lost momentum following the financial crisis and the conservative party’s entrance into government in 2011, and public spending cuts resulted in women taking on more care work (Bustelo, 2016, p. 118; Verge, 2020, p. 623). Still, work-life balance was one of the few gender equality policy areas that received some attention during this period (Alonso, 2015, p. 39). Parental leave policy, for example, was an important topic in the political debate, although few developments took place until 2017 when the paternal leave was extended to four weeks (Meil et al., 2019, p. 35). Since 2018, Pedro Sánchez’ first and second governments have made gender equality a priority, and they have adopted measures such as making paid paternity leave equitable with maternity leave (16 weeks each).

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Spain ratified the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) convention on equal pay in 1967, and the Spanish constitution prohibits salary discrimination (Viña & Rodríguez-Diosdado, 2014, p. 115). The unadjusted gender pay gap in Spain is 11.9% (Eurostat, 2020).7 Although the Spanish legal framework includes the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, the lack of clear criteria for how to determine the equal value of different jobs have made it difficult to apply the concept (Poquet Catalá, 2015, p. 145). Recent legal changes have been adopted to address this. In 2019, the Spanish government proposed law RDL 6/2019 that requires businesses to document salaries according to professional classifications, lowers the number of employees required for businesses to have an equality plan that includes a salary audit to 50 employees, as well as demanding businesses to justify salary discrepancies between women and men that exceed 25%. This was approved by the Spanish lower chamber in April 2019. To ensure the effective implementation of this law, the government met with the social partners in 2020 to discuss the adoption of regulations on pay transparency and equality plans. In October 2020, the government adopted regulations 901/2020 and 902/2020, which are discussed further in the analysis.

Material and Methods The research data consists of interviews with key representatives from CCOO, UGT, CEOE, CES and the Ministry of Labour and Social Economy, and publications by the social partners including policy reports that outline the organisations’ stance on gender equality, newsletters to union members and bipartite agreements published between 2010 and 2020 (see Table 1). The documents were collected from the social partners’ webpages, and a majority were published after 2015. I was not Table 1

Overview over the research data

Interview participants Documents Shared agreements (AENC)

CEOE

CCOO

UGT

2 6 4

4 32 4

3 32 4

CES 3 – –

Ministry of labour and social economy 1 – –

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granted an interview with CEPYME and have therefore not included them in the analysis. The interviews were conducted from 2019 to 2021, and I interviewed people who held senior positions within these organisations, including members from the trade unions’ executive committees, and people who worked on gender equality policy within the organisations. I also conducted interviews with other key actors that could provide insight into how the Spanish social partners work on gender equality issues, including staff at the CES and the current Minister of Labour and Social Economy, Yolanda Díaz.7 All interviewees provided informed consent to participate and be cited in my work. The interviews were semi-structured, and covered the organisations’ gender equality priorities, the tripartite negotiation with the government on gender equality in the labour market during the spring of 2020, the labour reforms introduced in 2010 and 2012 as part of the Spanish governments’ austerity measures in response to the financial crisis and their relation to gender equality. My analysis focused on the two policy areas introduced in the previous section, work-life balance policies and the gender pay gap. I looked for causal logics, silences and patterns of concepts and themes in the data. I understand ‘causal logics’ according to Lee Ann Fujii’s (2018, p. 81) conceptualisation of the term: how people construct meaning of events, ‘explanations for why something happened the way it did’ and what people think will/would/could/should happen. I examined the way in which different actors explain ideas and events, whilst paying careful attention to how their narratives may present different versions of the same event and trying to make sense of the conflicting understandings that result in these ‘different kinds of truths’ (Fujii, 2018, pp. 78–79, 82).

Converging Conceptions of Equality in the Work-Life Balance Policy Debate My analysis of the Spanish social partners’ work-life balance policies reveals that they share a similar understanding of how the uneven distribution of caring responsibilities represents an important challenge to female employment, and that this inequality is the result of historical patterns that must be addressed by men taking on a greater share of the caring tasks. They agree that this requires improved public care services and for women and men to distribute caring responsibilities equally, promoted by equal and non-transferable parental leaves (AENC IV, 2018). These measures target state provisions and the division of labour at home, and

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there is broad political support for these policies in Spain (León et al., 2019). However, when it comes to work-life balance policies that impact directly on who has the power to organise the workday, the employer organisation and the unions are further apart. The employer organisation CEOE identifies the uneven share of caring responsibilities carried out by women as an important obstacle to female labour force participation and the importance of promoting work-life balance policies is a central theme in their policy reports on equality (CEOE, 2017, 2019; CEOE/CEPYME, 2015). When asked what CEOE considers to be the most significant challenge to female employment in the Spanish labour market today, a senior representative argued that ensuring shared caring responsibilities between men and women was the most important challenge to address the gender pay gap, women’s access to employment and senior-level positions (Interview 24.11.2020). The representatives from CEOE emphasised that work-life balance policies must rest on the idea of shared caring responsibilities, and not depend on women’s ability to reconcile work and care (Interview 12.03.2020; Interview 24.11.2020). In CEOE’s reports on equality and female employment, work-life balance measures targeted primarily at women are critiqued for ‘contributing to the perpetuation of the social perception of women as the main and almost sole responsible for tasks related to child and family care’ (CEOE, 2017, pp. 1–2; CEOE/CEPYME, 2015, pp. 5, 13; CEOE/PwC, 2019, p. 58). Unlike much of the existing literature on employer organisations and gender equality, which argues that employers fail to understand the structural inequality experienced by women, this data indicates that, at least in the case of care-taking and its relation to female employment, representatives and policy reports from the Spanish employer organisation CEOE identify societal structures that produce gender inequality in the labour market. CEOE uses ‘business case for equality’ arguments to motivate the importance of shared caring responsibilities to ensure female employment, arguing that ‘diversity provides opportunities for talent, and talent is a factor in competitiveness’ (Interview 12.03.2020; CEOE/CEPYME, 2015). The fact that the employer organisation motivates the importance of gender equality measures with economic gains may be indicative of their priorities, and that the employers prioritise financial growth higher whilst the trade unions value social policy more, as Elomäki and Kantola (2020) argue is the case of the European social partners. When we examine what type of work-life balance measures that the Spanish social

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partners propose, they agree on the importance of developing the public care services and achieving a more equal sharing of parental leaves and reduced working hours (AENC IV, 2018, p. 72471), whilst they diverge more on measures that involve giving workers more control over the organisation of their workday, such as flexible working arrangements. The trade unions UGT and CCOO consider work-life balance measures such as promoting shared caring responsibilities, including incentivising the use of paid leave by men, and strengthening the public care services for children and dependent adults to be important to achieve gender equality in the labour market (CCOO, 2012, p. 4, 2018a, p. 5; CCOO & UGT, 2012, 2014, 2020; UGT, 2018a, 2020b, p. 4). The unions also argue that flexible working arrangements are important to ensure that workers can attend to their caring responsibilities without taking time off from work, in addition to better public care services (Interview 24.01.2020). In a report published by UGT (2020b), the union urges that Spain immediately adopts the measures on flexible working arrangements outlined in the EU work-life balance directive adopted in June 2019. This includes working remotely and having a flexible schedule for parents and carers, issues that were also addressed in law RDL 6/2019 adopted by the government in March 2019. A senior representative of CCOO pointed out her scepticism towards work-life balance policies that include time off from work, and critiqued employers for often focusing on measures such as leave of absence and shorter work days (Interview 21.01.2021). The employer organisation representatives also expressed concern for measures that require employees to be absent from work (Interview 12.03.2020; Interview 24.11.2020) and in their report from 2019, CEOE (2019, p. 58) suggests that more flexibility in the organisation of employees’ work time is a measure that allows for better work-life balance. However, the flexibility desired by the worker is strongly conditioned upon the needs of the business in CEOE’s policy reports. In the reports published by CEOE, collective bargaining is highlighted as an important instrument to ensure work-life balance, where ‘a transaction’ takes place as the flexibility desired by the business is exchanged for the flexibility desired by the male or female employee (CEOE, 2017, p. 15; CEOE/CEPYME, 2015, p. 7). Whereas CEOE paints a picture of collective bargaining as an agreement between two parties to each part’s mutual benefit, the trade unions highlight workers’ vulnerability by referring to the power employers have over employees, which in turn affects

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the implementation of gender equality measures such as work-life balance policies. The policy documents published by CEOE emphasise that the negotiation over work-life balance measures must adapt to the local needs of the businesses, which vary depending on size and sector. Although employees’ needs for work-life balance should ‘be taken into account and respected’ they must not result in a subordination of the interests of the business (CEOE, 2017, pp. 14, 16–17; CEOE/CEPYME, 2015, p. 13). The report goes on to argue that it may be particularly challenging to provide workers with the flexibility that they desire if they are employed in small businesses, given the difficulty to organise this flexibility if there are few other employees, or in the service sector, which is dictated by the customers’ demand for the workers’ presence (CEOE, 2017, pp. 10, 16– 17). Given that 95% of Spanish businesses are small, with between one to nineteen employees,9 and that the Spanish service sector is one of the largest sectors in the country, this difficulty affects a large proportion of Spanish workers. Concerns about the shifting power balance between employers and workers in the Spanish labour market have been central to the trade unions’ advocacy following the adoption of the labour reform in 2012 that gave collective bargaining at the business level priority over sectoral level bargaining. According to UGT (2018b, p. 3), ‘bargaining cannot be fair without equity between the negotiators, and this equity was broken by the labour reform’. The unions consider that this change weakened the collective bargaining ‘by increasing the employer’s discretionary power and flexibility in favour of the business’ and that this was in opposition to the aim of improving work-life balance (UGT, 2018c, pp. 17–18), because ‘when you negotiate agreements at the company-level […] they can put a lot more pressure on you, they can threaten you a lot more, and that is the effect of the labour reform’ (Interview 05.11.2019). The Spanish social partners’ have converging conceptions on how the unequal care burden creates gender inequality and share the perspective that this must be tackled with investment in public care services and the promotion of an equal sharing of leave by men and women. Work-life balance measures that require giving employees more control over the organisation of their workday are however a source of more tension. This suggests that the primary bottleneck for Spanish social partners to reach agreements on work-life balance policies is their different conceptualisations of the power balance between workers and employers, rather than conflicting ideas about gender equality.

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Different Conceptions of Equality in the Gender Pay Gap Debate In the spring of 2020 the Spanish government invited the social partners to the negotiation table to discuss two regulations, one addressing the gender pay gap and one gender equality plans. The coalition government composed of the Spanish labour party PSOE and the populist left party Unidas Podemos had entered government in January that year, and the Ministries of Labour and of Equality were for the first time led by female politicians representing the radical left, with a strong focus on promoting gender equality and improving working conditions in Spain. The negotiations resulted in the Agreement for the real equality between women and men at work, which only the unions and the government signed, whilst the employer organisations chose not to. This informed the government’s adoption of two regulations: on pay transparency (RD 902/2020) and equality plans (RD 901/2020). According to the Spanish Equality Law of 2007, equality plans are considered the ideal instrument for promoting gender equality in the workplace and they must address salary differences between men and women (BIE, 2020, p. 2). The regulation on pay transparency specifies how the concept of work of equal value should be understood and how employers should comply with the obligation to have a salary registry and carry out salary audits as part of their gender equality plans (BIE, 2020, p. 21). CEOE insisted that their motivation for declining to sign the agreements was unrelated to ‘the aspects that had to do with equality directly’, but that they disagreed with a clause in the agreement on the gender equality plans and that they found the salary registry to be complex (Interview 24.11.2020; CEOE & CEPYME, 2020). The clause specified that in businesses in which the workers do not have legal representation, the equality plans must be negotiated with the most representative union. The clause resulted from an amendment requested by the trade unions, who argued that ensuring union representation in negotiations over the equality plans with employers was imperative for sitting down at the negotiation table (Interview 21.01.2021). The CEOE representative critiqued the insistence on union representation in the negotiations of gender equality plans for reflecting a lack of faith in the ability of employees to negotiate on their own behalf and argued that employees are well positioned to negotiate given their familiarity with their workplace. She said, ‘in a way, it is like doubting the ability of the workers themselves

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to negotiate in absolute freedom within the company and presuming that the company is coercing or manipulating the workers in that negotiation’ (Interview 24.11.2020). The social partners’ conflicting views on how to regulate the negotiation of the equality plans, reflect contrasting views on the power balance between workers and employers within the Spanish labour market. If CEOE primarily took issue with one clause in the agreement regarding equality plans, why did they not sign onto the agreement that addressed pay transparency? Their report on the gender pay gap published in 2019 states that they support increased pay transparency in businesses, although they do not suggest concrete measures for how to achieve this (CEOE/PwC, 2019, p. 57). According to the Minister of Labour, they could have chosen to sign the agreement on pay transparency and not the other on equality plans (Interview 28.01.2021). Although we cannot know their motivations for not signing the agreements, beyond the explanations they have provided, their unwillingness to sign onto an agreement on gender equality issues that they purportedly support, suggests that their resistance is grounded in more than their disagreement with one clause. The Minister of Labour found it striking that the employer organisations chose not to sign the agreements given that they had participated in the entire negotiation process (Interview 28.01.2021). She considered that if this formal motive was the main reason, the employer organisations would have signed onto the agreement on pay transparency. The Minister highlighted the complicated nature of dealing with the topic of equality in the corporate world and argued that the employer organisations ‘haven’t said a bad word about pay transparency, but it is true that they’re kind of reluctant, this thing about accessing salary according to gender and so on, they don’t like that at all’ (Interview 28.01.2021). One of the senior trade union representatives complained that it is difficult to get businesses to provide them with pay transparency information, and ‘that is when companies are always very resistant, and always have been very resistant in our country, to being transparent’ (Interview 24.11.2020). The social partners present the gender pay gap as an important issue. They agree that the uneven care burden and the glass ceiling affect the gender pay gap, and in their joint inter-confederal agreement signed in 2018, they decided that a study into the gendered impacts of salary supplements should be carried out (AENC IV, 2018, p. 72472). However, the CEOE and the unions diverge on the topic of the undervaluation of female work (CCOO, 2018a; CEOE, 2019; CEOE/PwC,

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2019; UGT, 2017, 2019). CEOE defend the principle of equal pay for equal work as a ‘logical and essential objective’, but express scepticism towards the idea of equal pay for work of equal value (CEOE/CEPYME, 2015, p. 6; CEOE/PwC, 2019, pp. 7, 39). Their policy documents on the gender pay gap underline that gender-based salary discrimination must not be mistaken for differences between what men and women earn, as there may be individual differences justifying this discrepancy (CEOE, 2019, p. 17; CEOE/CEPYME, 2015, pp. 6, 9). In a more than 60 pages long report on the gender pay gap, commissioned by CEOE from the consulting firm PwC, the idea of equal value and the undervaluation of female-dominated sectors is mentioned briefly once. Phrased passively and urging care in the use of ‘equal value’, the report states: ‘In some cases, it is argued that certain ‘masculinised’ activities have higher salaries than others that are considered equivalent, but which have a greater female presence. These inequalities are much more difficult to detect, so care must be taken not to identify activities or professions as equivalent when they are not’ (CEOE/PwC, 2019, p. 39). Despite recognising that the gender segregation of the labour market and the higher propensity of male-dominated professions and sectors to receive salary compensations contribute to the gender pay gap, they do not problematise the higher value ascribed to male-dominated sectors as reflected in their higher salaries (CEOE/PwC, 2019, pp. 8, 32–34, 46). Specifying and making applicable the concept of work of equal value is central to the regulation on pay transparency adopted by the government. The concept of equal pay for work of equal value rests on the idea that female labour has and continues to be undervalued, and it makes it easier to go beyond the idea of the gender pay gap as the result of women and men’s professional choices and rather identify its structural roots (Koskinen Sandberg et al., 2018; Saari, 2013, p. 51). The trade unions consider the undervaluation of female work to be important to the gender pay gap. In a letter declaring a general strike on 8 March 2018 in protest against gender inequality and the gender pay gap, UGT and CCOO stress that they ‘depart from the assumption that the whole gender pay gap is discrimination’ (UGT & CCOO, 2018, p. 16). They point out how masculinised traits such as physical strain and availability are more likely to be rewarded with salary supplements than feminised traits such as accuracy (CCOO, 2017, p. 34; UGT & CCOO, 2018, p. 5). In comparison, CEOE (2019, p. 8) recognises that male-dominated sectors often receive more salary supplements but stress that these supplements are not

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discriminatory per se. CCOO (2018a, pp. 7, 9, 13, 2019a) promotes the use of the concept of equal pay for work of equal value, and addresses the undervaluation of female labour as an important challenge that must be addressed through the ‘recognition and social and economic valuation of the work carried out by women (feminised sectors and occupations), especially those linked to the care or assistance of people, highlighting the contribution to social welfare’. UGT’s reports on the gender pay gap also point to the undervaluation of female work, and they argue that ‘the working world assumes a socially accepted conception that devalues women’s work in relation to that of men’ (Casas Baamonde, 2015; UGT, 2017, 2019, p. 38, 2020c). In a published interview, the head of the department of gender equality at CCOO points out how ‘sexist policy marks both the valuation of jobs, tasks and professional categories, as well as the bonuses and salary complements that make up the working reality of men and women’ (CCOO, 2018a, p. 9, 2018b, pp. 29–30, 2019b, p. 5). It was important for the Minister of Labour to ensure that the measures adopted were effective (Interview 28.01.2021). The union representatives consider that employers struggle to identify gender inequality in their own workplaces (Interview 21.01.2021, Interview 24.11.2020), and this was an important motive for the pay audit to be an obligatory part of the equality plans (BIE, 2020, p. 22). CEOE motivated their opposition to signing the tripartite agreement on real equality between women and men at work with reference to their discontent with the requirement that businesses without legal representation of the workers must negotiate with the most representative union. However, a closer examination of their conception of gender equality in the context of the gender pay gap demonstrates the discrepancy between the social partners both with respect to their perspectives on the role played by the undervaluation of female work in explaining the gender pay gap, and their conflicting ideas about the power balance in the employer–employee relationship and how this relates to negotiation requirements.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have argued that Spanish social partners present similar conceptions of gender equality in the context of work-life balance policies, whilst these differ with respect to the gender pay gap. I suggest that conflicting perspectives on gender equality may represent a bottleneck to

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agreements in some policy issues, such as the gender pay gap, but that it does not necessarily hinder agreements on work-life balance policies. Rather, I have shown that the social partners’ conflicting perspective on the power balance between workers and employers may represent a more significant bottleneck than conflicting perspectives on gender equality. This implies that when we examine social partners’ conceptualisation of gender equality, we must pay careful attention to how ideas about gender equality interact with distinct ideas about the employer–employee relationship and the power balance in the labour market. In the context of the past decade, in which the power imbalance between the Spanish social partners increased as a consequence of the legal changes adopted in response to the economic crisis, it becomes particularly clear how the regulation of this power equilibrium is closely related to the social partners’ advancement of gender equality policies. The Spanish coalition government aims to address this power balance in tripartite negotiations addressing how to change the labour reforms. This may provide an opportunity for the social partners to advance more similar perceptions of how the power balance between workers and employers should be regulated, which could play an important role not only for the future of collective bargaining in Spain but also for the promotion of shared gender equality policies. Acknowledgements The research was conducted with support from the Norwegian Research Council (project number 250753). I am grateful to the participants who generously shared their knowledge and time. I thank Ana Segura Badía and Ana Ortega García for assistance with the interview transcripts, and José Manuel Martínez Escribá for introducing me to the world of Spanish trade unions. The chapter benefitted from comments by the book editors, Francesca Refsum Jensenius, Alba Alonso Álvarez, Lea Börgerding, Charline Kopf, Frida Bjørneseth and participants in workshops at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the University of Oslo.

Notes 1. In this chapter, I have not been able to account for the response of the Spanish government and social partners to the Covid-19 pandemic, such as the negotiation on remote work in September 2020. These developments will be considered in future research.

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2. I take the term bottleneck from Alisha Holland’s book Forbearance as Redistribution (2017). 3. CCCOO and UGT together have 75% of the workers’ vote on the national level (Aguilar, 2020, p. 434). 4. Both unions represent workers of any profession. 5. Equal opportunities between men and women are also mentioned in earlier inter-confederal agreements published between 2002 and 2008 (Lousada Arochena, 2008, p. 29). 6. In Spanish, the concepts conciliación and corresponsabilidad are central in the debate about gender equality in the labour market and care responsibilities. I translate conciliación as work-life balance and corresponsabilidad as shared caring responsibilities, as the term is used to denote the shared responsibility by adults to undertake their families’ caring responsibilities. 7. Eurostat (2020) calculates the unadjusted gender pay gap for enterprises with ten or more employees, defined as ‘the difference between the average gross hourly earnings of men and women expressed as a percentage of the average gross hourly earnings of men’. 8. The Minister was appointed third vice-president of Spain in March 2021 but maintained her position as Minister of Labour and Social Economy. In the text, I use the title she had at the time the interview was conducted. 9. Small businesses are here defined as businesses with 1–19 salaried employees and calculated as a percentage of the businesses with one or more employees.

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Mantilla, J. R. (2020, November 22). Yolanda Díaz: la ley del acuerdo. El País. Madrid. Retrieved on 24 May 2021, from https://elpais.com/elpais/2020/ 11/19/eps/1605778798_957515.html. Martínez Veiga, U. (2016). La reforma laboral de 2012 y el aumento del despido y desempleo en España. Revista Andaluza de Antropología, (11), 44–66. https://doi.org/10.12795/RAA.2016.11.03. Meil, G., Romero-Balsas, P., & Rogero-García, J. (2019). Spain: Leave policy in times of economic crisis. In P. Moss, A.-Z. Duvander, & A. Koslowski (Eds.), Parental leave and beyond: Recent international developments, current issues and future directions (pp. 21–38). Policy Press. Miguélez, F., Antentas, J. M., Barranco, O., & Muntanyola, D. (2007). Los sindicatos ante la conciliación de la vida laboral y familiar-personal. Papers: Revista de Sociologia, 83, 37. https://doi.org/10.5565/rev/papers/v83n0. 1136. Munro, A. (2001). A feminist trade union agenda? The continued significance of class, gender and race. Gender, Work & Organization, 8(4), 454–471. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0432.00141 Pérez Infante, J. I. (2015). Las reformas laborales en la crisis económica: su impacto económico. Ekonomiaz, 87 (1). Pontón Merino, P., & Pastor Gosálbez, I. (2014). Los convenios colectivos como herramienta para alcanzar la igualdad de género en el trabajo: Estudio de caso: la industria química en tarragona. Revista Castellano-Manchega De Ciencias Sociales, 18, 113–136. Poquet Catalá, R. (2015). El tratamiento legal de la discriminación salarial por razón de sexo en los momentos actuales. In Revista del ministerio de empleo y seguridad social: Economía y Sociología (pp. 135–155). Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social. Quinn, M. (2004). Trade unions, gender and claims under Irish employment equality legislation. Gender, Work & Organization, 11(6), 648–667. Roberts, A. (2015). The political economy of ‘transnational business feminism’: Problematizing the corporate-led gender equality agenda. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 17 (2), 209–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/146 16742.2013.849968 Saari, M. (2013). Promoting gender equality without a gender perspective: Problem representations of equal pay in Finland. Gender, Work & Organization, 20(1), 20. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0432.2011.00554.x Skorge, Ø. S., & Rasmussen, M. B. (2021). Volte-face on the welfare state: Social partners, knowledge economies, and the expansion of work-family policies. Politics & Society. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292211014371 UGT. (2015a). Trabajar igual, cobrar igual. UGT. (2015b). Trabajar igual, cobrar igual, conciliar igual. UGT. (2016). La igualdad salarial, un objetivo pendiente.

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UGT. (2017). La falta de políticas de igualdad en el empleo incrementa la brecha salarial. UGT. (2018a). Permiso de paternidad. UGT . Retrieved on 27 May 2021, from https://ugt.es/sites/default/files/infografia_permiso_paternidad_julio_208_ ugt.jpg. UGT. (2018b). Comunicación: Huelga general para el 8 de marzo. UGT. (2018c). La corresponsabilidad en las tareas de cuidados, una cuestión sin resolver. UGT. (2019). Reducir la brecha salarial, la prioridad. UGT. (2020a). Transparencia: ¿Cómo somos? Retrieved on 12 May 2021, from https://www.ugt.es/portal-de-transparencia/C%C3%B3mo%20Somos. UGT. (2020b). Balance de la situación del empleo de las mujeres 2018/2019. UGT. (2020c). Es urgente legislar sobre la discriminación salarial hacia las mujeres. Retrieved on 27 May 2021, from https://ugt.es/sites/default/files/ informe_brecha_salarial_2020_-_ok_finalpru.pdf. UGT, & CCOO. (2018, February 19). A la ministra de empleo y seguridad social. Valiente, C. (1998). An overview of the state of research on women and politics in Spain. European Journal of Political Research, 33(4), 459–474. https:// doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00391 Valiente, C. (2008). Spain at the vanguard in European gender equality policies. In Gender politics in the expanding European Union: Mobilization, inclusion, exclusion. Berghahn Books. https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/handle/10016/5340. Accessed 26 May 2021. Verge, T. (2020). Gender policy. In D. Muro & I. Lago (Eds.), The oxford handbook of Spanish politics (pp. 614–630). Oxford University Press. Verge, T., & Lombardo, E. (2019). The contentious politics of policy failure: The case of corporate board gender quotas in Spain. Public Policy and Administration, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076719852407. Viña, J. G., & Rodríguez-Diosdado, P. B. (2014). Igualdad de remuneraciónsalarios-protección de los salarios. In Revista del ministerio de empleo y seguridad social: Revista del ministerio de trabajo, migraciones y seguridad social (pp. 97–127). Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social. https://dia lnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4966393. Accessed 26 May 2021. World Bank. (2021, January 29). Labor force, female (% of total labor force)— Spain | Data. Retrieved on 18 February 2021, from https://data.worldbank. org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.FE.ZS?locations=ES. Yates, C. A. (2010). Understanding caring, organizing women: How framing a problem shapes union strategy. Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 16(3), 399–410. https://doi.org/10.1177/1024258910373870.

Gendered Patterns of Representation in Trade Unions

Trade Unions, Collective Bargaining and Gender in Germany Ingrid Artus and Judith Holland

Introduction The German trade unions have their roots in the socialist labour movement and are—following such figures as August Bebel and Clara Zetkin— committed to the goal of gender equality. They have fought for many emancipatory achievements (also) for women. At the same time, they are still mostly institutions of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995; Podann, 2012). This finding is not new, as historical and current research have proven it many times (for example Streichhahn & Jacob, 2020). Gender policies thus remain a ‘contested terrain’ within unions. Despite their increasing role on the labour market, women stay underrepresented in trade unions, both in terms of their organisational presence, leadership positions filled by women, but also in the degree to which trade union policies reflect the interests of women (Colgan & Ledwith, 2002; Dean, 2006; Donlevy, 1996; Fernie & Gray, 2000; Garcia & Dumont,

I. Artus (B) · J. Holland Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany e-mail: [email protected] J. Holland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5_10

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2003; Ledwith, 2012, 2016; Ledwith & Hansen, 2013; Silvera, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2012). This is true for most European countries, especially Germany. A comparison of ten countries in Western Europe by Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick and Richard Hyman (2013, p. 54) showed that Germany occupied the inglorious top position as to the difference in the degree of unionisation among men and women. While in Sweden, Denmark, the UK and Ireland women were even more union-organised than were those countries’ men, the degree of female organising in Germany was only about half as high as that of men.1 The historically difficult and currently still ambivalent relationship between unions and women is thus rightly the subject of numerous measures implemented to promote gender equality within German unions. As examples, we will look closer at the two largest German trade unions, the German Metalworkers’ union (Industriegewerkschaft, IG Metall) and the United Service Sector union (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, ver.di), taking into account women’s representation as well as unions’ policies to advance gender equality. Due to their different organisational areas, the unions differ greatly in their genderspecific membership structure. IG Metall is with 2.21 million members (DGB, 2021) Germany’s biggest union. It organises mainly the maledominated metal and electrical industry presumably the most important sector of Germany’s export-oriented economic model. Ver.di emerged from the fusion of several service sector unions in 2001. With 1.94 million members (DGB, 2021) it is the most influential union in public services, retail and care sectors. Thus, IG Metall and ver.di are interesting cases to compare, as they are decidedly the most important of the overall eight sector unions within the German union federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB). With regard to gender issues, they have different context conditions, but similar strategies: They aim to increase quantitatively the proportion of women in union membership and leadership positions and to consider qualitatively gender-political issues in a more decided way. Although both unions were partly successful in respect of these goals, women’s and gender-political content still remains to some extent marginalised within the organisations. This is mainly due to their lack of integration into collective bargaining as one of the trade unions’ core tasks, as well as the difficulty of anchoring trade union gender policy at the workplace level. We will illustrate this with some cases from the recent past. The collective agreement reached by IG Metall in 2018 aims to improve the

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compatibility of family and work with more flexible working hours. It shows that this issue is now being widely discussed and solutions sought within the organisation. The collective agreement on the reduction of working time implies potential for the realisation of more gender democracy; at the same time, however, it demonstrates an unbroken orientation towards the (male) standard employment relationship. In the organisational area of ver.di there is today a considerable industrial action dynamic in mainly female-dominated employment areas, especially care work, against the invisibility and systematic undervaluation of female work. This is true for example in the social and educational services (Sozial- und Erziehungsdienste) sector and in hospitals. The background to this is the union’s new organising strategy, which is more grassroots-oriented, but also a new self-confidence among female workers. In the wake of the care crisis, they are demanding recognition for their work, which is widely supported by the public. Our findings are based on qualitative interviews and analysis of trade union materials. The data have been collected during many research activities in the metal and electrical industry, care work and precarious service work sectors (Artus et al., 2015, 2017, 2020). As part of a FrancoGerman PhD project in 2014/2015, Judith Holland (2019a) conducted twenty interviews with trade union officers involved in gender equality policy, retail and cleaning sectors. In order to reconstruct typical understandings of trade union equality policy, she also examined trade union statutes, programmes and websites. We begin with a brief overview of the economic and institutional context of trade union gender policy in Germany over the past decades, i.e. the development of the industrial relations system as well as women’s employment. Then, we evaluate the current state of gender equality within the German labour movement. First, we discuss policy measures to promote women’s representation in IG Metall and ver.di. These have been quite controversial within the unions, also with regard to their implementation and effects. In the second step, we analyse the already mentioned examples of current collective bargaining policies and strike action that directly refers to gender issues. A summarising section unites the essential aspects and asks whether there is evidence to suggest that ‘union patriarchy’ in Germany has undergone a change, that is, a move towards a greater feminisation of the workers’ movement.

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The Economic and Political Context: The German System of Industrial Relations and the Development of Women’s Employment The German trade unions have gone through difficult times in the past 30 years. Their membership has almost halved from its peak (at over 11 million) after the integration of East-German members in 1991 to 5.85 million in 2020 (DGB, 2021). In Germany, industrial relations are arranged through a dual system of interest representation. On the one hand, trade unions and employers’ associations negotiate collective agreements at sectoral level (Flächentarifverträge), which are binding regionally or nationally for all companies that are members of the employers’ association. Collective bargaining includes primarily wage issues, but also working hours, leave and training. On the other hand, the employees have the right to elect works councils in all private enterprises with at least five employees to represent their interests at company level. In practice, works councils exist only in around 10% of all these companies, mainly the bigger ones. They are elected by the entire workforce. Senior executives and senior management are not represented in the works council. The works councils have a lot of information, consultation and codetermination rights, but are not entitled to collective bargaining (e.g. concerning wages or working hours) and have no right to strike. However, they are responsible for implementing collective agreements, concluded between unions and employers’ associations, at workplace level. There is no formal link between trade unions and works councils, but the latter are often organised in trade unions (Birke & Dribbusch, 2019). In the meantime, questions of equality and the compatibility of work and family are also gaining importance in collective bargaining. Overall, gender equality issues and especially the issue of equal pay are nevertheless neglected. This is due, firstly, to the fact that too few women participate in collective bargaining processes. Moreover, only large trade unions have approaches to monitor discrimination in collective agreements or gender quotas in collective bargaining committees (Ranftl, 2016). Since the mid-1990s, both the employees covered by collective bargaining and the share of employees working in an establishment with works councils have been declining (Ellguth & Kohaut, 2020). Rising unemployment figures and the neoliberal restructuring of the economy in international competition have been undermining the trade unions’ basis of power in the workplace. With rise of the private service sector industrial

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relations have become even more differentiated, fragmented and precarious. Thus, the formerly stable system of industrial relations in Germany has been undergoing massive upheaval (Behrens & Dribbusch, 2019). A significant turning point with regard to labour and social policy, and thus the system of industrial relations, was the deregulation of the labour market by the red-green coalition government in 2004. The measures (colloquially named the ‘Hartz laws’ after Peter Hartz, chairman of the concerned expert commission, member of the social democratic party SPD and IG Metall) should reduce the number of unemployed, but also dismantled redundancy protections, enabled temporary employment and agency work in new dimensions, reduced unemployment benefits and created a low-wage sector on a previously unknown scale. The term ‘precariat’ is also making inroads in Germany—this group works predominantly in the service sector, is younger than average, often of migrant background and disproportionately female. The new precariat works often beyond the traditional places of trade union strength. The introduction of a legal minimum pay in 2015, formerly unknown in Germany, is a reaction to this development. In the meantime, the German trade unions have reacted to the dwindling membership and the threat to their power base by making the recruitment of new members a top priority. The new discussions within the unions are centred on catchwords like ‘union organising’, ‘organising through conflict’ (Dribbusch, 2016) or ‘conditional collective bargaining’ (bedingungsgebundene Tarifarbeit ). Their aim is, on the one hand, to increase the democratic involvement of workers in trade union collective bargaining politics, and on the other hand, to raise conflict orientation—especially in companies, sectors and regions where trade unions are relatively weak. In order to expand their influence on workplace level, but also to gain and empower new members such as women, some trade union campaigns rely on labour conflicts with employers rather than traditional social partnership (see i.e. the ver.di campaign for a collective bargaining contract with Amazon accompanied by continuing strike action since 2013). Women are today more integrated into the labour market than ever before in Germany. In particular the integration of East-German women, most of whom had a full-time employment in the GDR and whose labour force participation rates almost matched those of men, into the all-German labour market in the 1990s reinforced this development. The current female employment rate (74.9% in 2019) differs from men’s

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(83.5% in 2019) by 8.6% points, while the difference was 11.5% points in 2010 and 15.8% points at the turn of the millennium (Eurostat, 2021a).2 Important reasons for this development are the massive increase in the job qualifications of women and girls—who have even overtaken boys in school performance—and the growth of the service sector with its ‘typically female’ employment segments. Despite the modernisation of gender relations in Germany, which were culturally dominated by a male breadwinner model (Pfau-Effinger, 2012), the employment history of many mothers can still be described by a threephase model. While they often work full-time up to the birth of their first child, many women interrupt their professional career for several years of childcare, after which they return to gainful employment, usually part-time. This reflects the high part-time rate for German women in international comparison: 46% in 2019, while the rate is 31.2% in the European Union of 28 member states (EU-28) (Eurostat, 2021b).3 Parttime employment, which is also often involuntarily in some sectors such as retail, is one of the causes of the relatively high gender pay gap in international comparison.4 The gender pay gap in Germany is the fourth highest in the EU at 19.2%—around 4% points higher than in the EU-28 (Eurostat, 2021c). This can be attributed to the lack of women in management positions, but above all to the fact that the labour market is horizontally segregated by gender. Especially occupations in female-dominated service sectors, such as education, health and care, retail or cleaning, are relatively low paid and often go hand in hand with precarious employment conditions. In light of the persistent structural discrimination against women on the labour market, the question arises of which (collective) actors (should) stand up for their interests. In the following, we examine this by looking at the examples of IG Metall and ver.di, considering both, their organisational structures as well as their policies to advance women and their interest representation. The pronounced gender inequality on the labour market is reflected in the gender-specific composition of union membership. Since 1945, non-partisan trade unions have prevailed in (West) Germany, because a labour movement less divided by political differences might have been more likely to prevent the dictatorship of the National Socialists (Birke & Dribbusch, 2019). These so-called unitary trade unions organise their members by sectors, so that there are male-dominated sectoral unions and to a lesser extent, female-dominated ones. Partly due to the growing service sector, the proportion of women in almost all trade unions has

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risen in recent years. However, this is also because more men than women leave the organisations due to age. With an overall decline in membership, ver.di has the most female members in absolute terms with over one million in 2020—its female membership share of 52.5% is only surpassed by the Education and Science Union (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft, GEW) with 72% women. The proportion of women in all other unions in the DGB is below 50%. Because of its structural basis, Germany’s largest trade union IG Metall is the most male-dominated union with a female membership share of only 18.2% (DGB, 2021). Nevertheless, it organises more than 400.000 female employees. Against the background of the still relatively poor representation of working women, both as members and in leadership positions in German trade unions, the advancement of women plays a central role in their equality policies.

Measures to Advance Women at IG Metall and ver.di---Women’s Quotas and Structures To address the poor representation of women within their organisations, many trade unions have introduced women’s or gender quotas, especially for union leadership positions. IG Metall and ver.di apply quotas which are not abstractly conceived for the minimum representation of one gender, but which explicitly protect and promote the union presence of women. IG Metall enshrined the minimum quota for women in the organisation’s statutes in 1999: ‘Women must be represented in the bodies and committees of IG Metall at least in proportion to their share of union membership’ (IG Metall Vorstand, 2020b, 19; Translation I. A. and J. H.). When ver.di was established in 2001, the statutes included the socalled quota paragraph §20.3: ‘Women must be represented in all organs, decision-making bodies and in delegate elections at least in proportion to the share of their respective union membership’ (ver.di, 2019, p.16; Translation I. A. and J. H.). Union quota rules are mostly applied in the highest leadership positions. Although the first chairpersons on the executive boards of IG Metall and ver.di have so far always been male, in 2020 both unions have women as vice-chairpersons. At IG Metall, two of the seven elected executive board members were women. To improve the proportion of women in full-time management positions, IG Metall decided on a 30% quota for this field. The proportion of women in full-time management

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positions rose from 13.7% in 2010 to 24.8% in 2019, in order to which the representation now even exceeds the female membership (IG Metall Vorstand, 2020a, p. 10). The same is true for the elected executive board of ver.di, where in 2019 six out of nine members were women. At ver.di, the organisation is not only structured locally, but also professionally: the trade groups, the so-called Fachbereiche, take over the representation of interests of the individual branches and occupational groups. The minimum women’s quota is implemented in the highest national leadership positions and in the governing bodies at the regional (Länder) level. By contrast, in some local leadership positions and the leadership of the 13 trade groups women are still under-represented. Furthermore, exclusive women’s bodies have a long tradition in German trade unions and are more or less institutionalised there. At IG Metall these are the women’s committees (Frauenausschüsse), at ver.di, women’s councils (Frauenräte). These voluntary women’s bodies, open only to women, have rights guaranteed by the union statutes and can be set up at all (local, regional and national) organisational levels, at ver.di also in any of its 13 trade groups. In addition to trade union educational work, processes of women’s political position-formation also take place in these structures. Delegates participate in regional and national women’s conferences, which always take place before the organisation-wide trade union congresses. Women’s officials (Frauensekretärinnen) are responsible for the supervision and coordination of these voluntary women’s structures. While IG Metall has executive board administration members responsible for women’s and equality policy only at the national level, ver.di has them at the local, regional and national levels. However, the regional and local women’s officials at ver.di are often much fewer in number than at the national level. At this point, we can note that the traditional, but also structurally conditioned low presence of women in membership as well as in the leadership of German trade unions has led to various measures to explicitly promote women like women’s quotas and women’s bodies. However, these institutional frameworks still say relatively little about how individual organisation members perceive and bring to life these measures trying to put women’s interest representation into practice. When trade union officials are asked about their understanding of gender equality in a broader sense and the role it plays in their everyday practice, there are big differences in their answers depending on their position in the organisation structure. In the course of interviews with

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union representatives from ver.di and IG Metall in 2014 and 2015 (Holland, 2019a) women’s and gender equality officials tend to emphasise the differences between women and men, and accordingly focus on measures to promote women’s equality within the organisation. The issue of resolving the conflict between work and family life leads their interest agenda. However, these priorities are by no means shared across organisations. For example, instruments for the advancement of women, such as quotas, that increase only the proportion of women are controversial among many trade union officials. While some are unaware of the existence of women’s quotas or openly reject them, others – tending to be younger union officials – call for an intersectional approach. One retail official from ver.di asks in this context ‘whether limiting union equality policy to the women’s quota is actually still o.k., because I have the impression that social and ethnic origin point to opportunities and limitations just as strongly as gender, if not more strongly’. In line with an intersectional understanding of inequality, disadvantages should be considered not only in terms of gender, but also in terms of class, migration status and other diversity dimensions. A similar picture emerges with regard to the acceptance of women’s committees. Women’s officials, such as one national-level women’s official at ver.di, regard women’s committees as places for networking and mutual encouragement among women, without which ‘many women don’t dare to express the way they see things – the male position is too dominant’. Women’s structures are thus interpreted as a prerequisite for cross-gender solidarity ‘at eye level’. However, the traditional belief that colleagues are already ‘equal’ is widespread in many unions. The supporters of this view reduce women’s structures to ‘coffee break gossip’ or ‘street theatre’ (Interview / IG Metall women’s official), perceive them as irrelevant, or even see a certain danger of division. Others criticise the fact ‘that we are basically dealing with self-contained systems that are not anchored in any way, either in the company or in trade union policy or in sociopolitical terms, and that do not initiate processes’ (Interview / ver.di retail official). Due to the separate representation of women’s interests in specialised women’s structures, women’s policy has so far been rather poorly anchored in the trade groups of ver.di and in the corresponding collective bargaining structures at IG Metall, both in terms of personnel and thematically. Women’s and gender equality policy takes place organisationally largely in isolation from collective bargaining policy, which is

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the actual core business of trade unions. This shows also the fact that some of the trade union officials interviewed differentiate conceptually between ‘interests’ and ‘issues’. When asked what she understood by representing women’s interests or by women’s policy, another ver.di retail official answered that for her these were two different things. I think for many it is the same thing, but for me it is completely different, because a member must feel that he or she directly benefits from it. If we organise women, they have to feel it first in the workplace through collective agreements and things like that. And only secondarily, how are the framework conditions, how are the political aspects [such as family leave or the question of the quota; I. A. and J. H.], which is of course also important for us as an organisation.

Interests, such as classic wage demands, are anchored at workplace level, supported by the trade union rank and file, and are the object of collective bargaining. Women’s policy by contrast appears as a topdown issue. Issues such as work/family compatibility or the upgrading of social professions is considered as being too complex for effective mobilisation at the workplace level (Holland, 2019b). However, recent bargaining policy campaigns and successes contradict this view. They show the attempt to integrate gender-relevant issues into ‘regular’ collective bargaining policy and that woman’s specific interests can be very effective mobilisers.

Current Collective Bargaining Policy on Gender-Relevant Issues Studies on gender equality in and by trade unions suggest that gender policy needs to be integrated as an agenda into trade union bargaining policy if it is to be successful (Briskin, 2014a, 2014b; Contrepois, 2014; Gärtner et al., 2015; Milner & Gregory, 2014; Ranftl, 2016; Williamson & Baird, 2014). In the following, we give some current examples of how the two largest German trade unions, IG Metall and ver.di, take up gender-relevant issues in the context of their bargaining strategies. Both examples show the virulent and increasing importance of union activities, which are focused on gender-related issues.

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IG Metall: Between the Claim to Gender Democracy and the Practice of Male-Dominated Organisation Culture IG Metall, in whose organisational area of the metal and electrical industries women are clearly in the minority, operates a very professional internal gender monitoring (Banos, 2017). In the ‘core business’ of collective bargaining policy however, women’s policy interests hardly appear explicitly as such. Rather, they are framed as gender-neutral issues of social justice. At the same time, it is conveyed that what is good for women is also good for male employees. For example, in the past the demand for a minimum wage only gained majority support at IG Metall when it was no longer discussed primarily as in the interest of (predominantly female) low-wage workers, but instead focused on equal pay for the heavily male-dominated group of temporary workers (Henninger, 2017). In 2018 IG Metall concluded a collective agreement with the corresponding employers’ associations at sectoral level (Flächentarifvertrag ) that gives employees the right to reduce their working time from 35 h (in western Germany; 38 h in eastern Germany) to as few as 28 h per week. This collective agreement is innovative, because it ensures more self-determination for employees with regard to their working time— at least in companies covered by this collective agreement and where works councils can implement its complex rules. This so-called shortened full-time entitles every full-time employee to reduce their weekly working hours to as little as 28 over a period of six to 24 months, after which they return to full-time—or can apply for a repeated reduction. The company may refuse the reduction if the contracts with reduced working time exceed a certain proportion. IG Metall promotes the new collectively agreed right to reduce working hours as ‘one building block […] enabling both genders to better combine gainful employment and family situations’ (Zitzelsberger, 2018, p. 328, Translation I. A. and J. H.). In addition to the right to ‘shortened full-time’, shift workers as well as workers with care responsibilities (e.g. children up to the age of eight or a care case in the family) were given the opportunity to receive eight days off in exchange for parts of the collectively agreed wage increase. According to initial IG Metall surveys on the use of the new rules, the option to choose extra days off was much more popular than the shortened full-time work. While a total of around 190,000 workers (mainly shift workers) wanted to make use of their right to get days off instead of money only 8,000

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workers intended to make use of their right to shortened full-time at the end of 2018 (IG Metall, 2018). Here is the catch to the new regulation: the shortened full-time is not paid as actual full-time (no full-time compensation), so it is less attractive to low-wage earners especially. Besides, part-time workers are not entitled to this option in the agreement. In other words, those who have already reduced their working hours to part-time because of care responsibilities for example, are excluded from the new freedom of choice. Since women in the metal working industries are also disproportionately more frequently classified into lower pay grades and often work part-time anyway, the new collective bargaining achievement is rather unsuitable for female employees in particular. Once again, the crux of gender inequality in collective bargaining is shown to be the orientation towards the (male) ‘normal worker’. IG Metall’s advertising slogan ‘Shorter full-time helps women as well as men’ (Zitzelsberger, 2018) is therefore not wrong, because shorter working hours are certainly good for everyone. The socio-political argumentation that shorter working hours makes it easier to care for relatives at home, alleviates the care crisis and enables more egalitarian gender arrangements, cannot be contradicted for the time being either. The gender-policy result of the new collective agreement is however still ambivalent. Particularly female employees—as lower paid and working more frequently part-time—are rather less likely to make use of or be able to benefit from the new freedom of choice. The improved compatibility of gainful employment and care work is likely to be used by higher-level earners (in view of the lack of material compensation), so that there will be little change to traditional role models in society as a whole. Although at first glance IG Metall’s collective bargaining policy seems to benefit everyone, its supposedly gender-neutral programme also means that gender-specific differences in gainful employment are not taken into account—and thus ultimately preserves a male bias in collective bargaining policy. This is confirmed by an overall picture, as can also be found in the relevant research: IG Metall’s organisational self-perception is explicitly characterised by a gender-democratic self-image (Schreyer, 2020). However, the union’s rhetorical opening to gender and diversity in its self-perception as well as external presentation is fragile; equality semantics can only be equated with gender competence to a limited extent. Organisational culture and representational practice remain predominantly male-oriented in many respects.

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Ver.di: Upgrading Female Care Work and the Feminisation of Labour Unrest The trade union policy situation in the service sector is somewhat different—and with good reason. There are many female-dominated areas here, such as retail, education, care of the elderly and nursing. The membership of the service union ver.di is today already majority female. And the continuing decline in membership can be stopped only if female employees are successfully mobilised and organised for trade union politics. Disputes in the field of personal social service work are currently playing a key role in Germany, the so-called Sorgekämpfe or care struggles (Artus et al., 2017). Similar developments are also perceptible in many other countries as international literature on strikes and campaigns in female dominated care sectors show (Briskin, 2012; McAlevey, 2014; Saari et al., 2019). The new care struggles are taking place at the intersection of two parallel developments. On the one hand, the German welfare state over the past twenty years has been comprehensively reorganised according to neoliberal concepts and partially dismantled. Formerly state-provided services in the areas of care, healthcare and education have been subjected to profit-oriented logics, privatised and economised. On the other hand, the readjustment of the gender arrangement has led to women not assuming, as a matter of course, as much unpaid care work as before in the family context. The current Covid-19 pandemic has now brought to a head what has long been known: there is an acute nursing care emergency in Germany—a care crisis (Winker, 2015). Improving working conditions in the care sector is not only crucial for care workers, but also for the health and well-being of clients—as well as for making care professions attractive again and thus effectively combating the acute shortage of care workers. The labour struggle in the care-work sector, with the aim of hiring more staff, limiting the intensity of job performance, better healthcare management and—last but not least—higher wages, thus currently has a high moral legitimacy among the public. With such a socio-political tailwind, it has come in recent years to various spectacular confrontations of a thoroughly offensive character. This can also be illustrated by a brief look at the strike statistics in ver.di’s organisational area (Fig. 1). Figure 1 shows that within the bargaining area of ver.di in most years since 2004, the majority of those involved in industrial action have been men—even though they represent a small minority of ver.di members.

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Fig. 1 Share of women among the recipients of strike pay by ver.di, 2008–2018 (Source ver.di; calculations and presentation from Dribbusch, 2020)

This situation has much to do with traditional notions of workers’ ‘strike capability’ in certain strongly male-dominated sectors (e.g. utilities, telecommunication, rubbish collection or public transport). Historically new are the current exceptions to this rule: in 2009, 2013, 2015 and 2017, the strikers were predominantly female. Specifically, there were strikes in retail (2013 and 2015), social and educational services (2009 and 2015), and in the healthcare sector (2017, among others). Strike researcher Heiner Dribbusch (2020) interprets this trend as a current indication of a historically protracted ‘history of women becoming visible’ in the struggles for better working conditions and recognition of the value of their work. In 2009 and 2015, the collective bargaining disputes in municipal, social and educational services (Sozial- und Erziehungsdienste) sector, also known as the nursery strikes (Kita-Streiks ), attracted considerable media attention. Mainly local public-operated childcare facilities were struck. The first nursery strike in 2009 with rolling strike days was followed in 2015 by a four-week full strike in almost all German states with more than 50,000 strike participants, of which 90–95% were women (cf. Artus & Pflüger, 2017). The aim of both strikes was the sustainable upgrading of educational work—both in material and symbolic terms. There were

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explicit calls for the value of women’s work to be equalised with men’s—as well as for better working and child care conditions (cf. various contributions in Artus et al., 2017). After four weeks of strike, the employers’ side still had not presented a satisfactory negotiation offer. It turned out that the strike did have a significant impact on the parents whose children were temporarily not being looked after; however, the strike’s consequences for the the municipal employer associations’ economic interests and therefore, the pressure exerted, were marginal. In some cases the municipalities even saved on personnel costs, since the strike days weren’t paid. The search for an acceptable compromise eventually led to considerable friction between the strikers and the ver.di negotiators, who ironically—but perhaps not entirely coincidentally—were all male. Only after months of wrangling, which included the rejection of a conciliation proposal by the strike delegates’ conference, a membership poll that also rejected the proposal, and the submission of a revised proposal, was the negotiated outcome finally accepted by a narrow majority of 57% of the membership. Although the new collective bargaining contract included relevant wage increases especially for certain groups of employees, most strikers held this result overall as not satisfactory. The aftermath of this difficult and ultimately only provisionally successful conflict continues to this day and an honest reassessment of it is still lacking. Labour struggles in new sectors and areas of activity are necessarily always experiments. There are no traditional formulas or proven strategies. Care work in many ways does not follow the classical logics of factory work—and what that means for strike strategies obviously needs to be learned. However, the nursery strikes showed emphatically that female workers can be mobilised en masse, and are forceful, vocal and militant in their demands for the upgrading of their work. This is also true for the hospital sector. The struggles for improved staffing and so-called staffing-relief collective agreements (Entlastungstarifverträge) in German hospitals meanwhile have a long history. Europe’s largest university hospital, the Charité in Berlin, led the way. There, under the slogan ‘the more of us, the better for all’, starting in 2011 many essential elements of a movement have been developed and tested, which now have an impact nationwide (Kunkel, 2016; ver.di, 2016). It was and is important, for example, to build up grassroots delegate models, to conclude emergency services agreements in order to avoid endangering patients in the case of strikes, and to support strike activities through alliances with workers and social movements elsewhere. After

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various warning strikes and an open-ended ‘enforcement strike’ lasting almost two weeks in July 2015, a first-ever collective agreement with the Charité hospital was concluded in 2016 that set minimum staffing standards there. International comparisons (Koskinen Sandberg, 2018) show that the German sectoral bargaining (and union) system in this case is advantageous as it aligns the interest of different types of workers. Ver.di represent all kinds of nurses (those with higher and lower qualification). Only the doctors are predominantly unionised in a separate professional union, the Marburger Bund. Henceforth, the example of the Charité has set the trend for collective bargaining policy in the whole German healthcare sector. In the run-up to the 2017 federal elections, ver.di called on hospitals in seven federal states to engage in collective bargaining on the issue of work load reduction and additional staff recruitment. Strikes followed in many places and new forms of work action were also experimented with first threatening and then implementing a kind of ‘work by the book’ if acute overload situations and staff shortages were not remedied. After the new German government of 2018 had decided on a reform of hospital financing, ver.di was able to push through further collective agreements on staffing standards, partly under threat of strike action. For about the last ten years there has been tough collective bargaining for better working conditions and more pay, but above all for more time for individual patients and against a healthcare system oriented towards profits rather than the well-being of clients and employees. Even if some successes have had ‘feet of clay’—for example when staffing standards promised in collective agreements have not been met in practice—a lot has been achieved and experience gained, and ver.di has had by far the strongest (primarily female) growth in membership in the hospital sector. The feminised labour struggles in the day-care sector and in hospitals have a number of things in common: they are at the centre of the current care crisis, address emergency situations in society as a whole—and at the same time have a clearly offensive character. These are labour struggles in new places and under new conditions, and in this respect, are also a laboratory in the search for new strike strategies. An interesting question is what consequences the increasingly female-dominated strikes will have for the organisational culture of ver.di—and perhaps in general for the hegemonically masculine German trade union landscape. It is certain that today’s women’s strikes have at least consequences on a symbolic level for gendered patterns and images of labour struggles (Einwohner

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et al., 2000). The rebellious preschool educators and nurses have established themselves as prototypes of militant activism in union and social consciousness. There is a new visibility of unionised, striking women—in workplaces as well as public spaces, within ver.di and in the German trade union movement as a whole.

Conclusion We have given an insight of the state of gender equality in the German trade unions IG Metall and ver.di. As collective organisations representing the interests of waged workers, they were and are historically more maledominated, as are the structures of paid work itself. That trade unions become feminised as the number of women in employment increases is not an automatism, but requires active commitment, many-faceted discussions and sometimes also conflicts in order to implement genderequitable strategies and representation policies within the organisation. In the German trade unions, measures for the promotion of women (women’s quotas and exclusive women’s structures) have proven their worth. But it seems important that unions link gender-relevant issues directly to their core business of collective bargaining policy—instead of outsourcing them to special target-group-oriented departments. Of course, trade union gender equality policies always reflect the sector-specific conditions in the respective organisational area. IG Metall, as a trade union with a predominantly masculine membership, does have a gender-democratic self-image and meanwhile a significant proportion of full-time female staff; however, in collective bargaining practice and everyday organisational culture, it is still considered a locus of hegemonic masculinity. The services union ver.di, on the other hand, organises mainly women, including various strongly feminised occupational fields such as childcare and hospitals. In view of the virulent care crisis, these areas are at the centre of social disputes and offensive female trade union organising. Considering the sector-specific conditions it might appear rational that IG Metall tends to frame its collective bargaining policy as genderneutral and matters of social justice; whereas ver.di emphasises women’s interests more explicitly as such. The feminised strikes in the education and healthcare sectors anyway seem to be an expression of a new female self-confidence (not only) in gainful employment; they are also a source of experiences of emancipation by which the individual life and work situation can be changed collectively through solidarity-based organising.

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These experiences may shake up not only the usual gender-specific hierarchies in the workplace and in trade unions, but perhaps also in so-called private life and in society as a whole. If a lot has started moving in the last twenty years, it is ‘gender trouble’ in the most positive sense. Acknowledgements We would like to thank Sissi Banos (formerly gender mainstreaming officer at IG Metall), strike expert Heiner Dribbusch as well as the editors of this volume for many valuable critical comments and a lot of additional information.

Notes 1. Data derived from European Social Surveys 2002-08. 2. The employment rate corresponds to the share of the 15–64-yearold labour force (employed and unemployed) in the population of the same age group by gender. It does not distinguish between fulltime and part-time employment. 3. Part-time employment is reported as a percentage of total female employees of working age 15–64. Within the European Union, it is only higher in the Netherlands and Austria. By contrast, only 9.9% of men are employed part-time in Germany and 8.7% in the EU 28 (Eurostat, 2021b). 4. The gender pay gap to the disadvantage of female employees is reported by Eurostat (2021c) unadjusted as a percentage of the average gross hourly earnings of male employees in enterprises of ten or more employees.

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From Feminised to Feminist? Trade Union Campaigns for Early Years Educators, Nurses and Midwives in Ireland Pauline Cullen

Introduction Unions have attracted increasing numbers of women members and commitments to gender equality are evident in how unions have worked on issues including sexual harassment, domestic violence and the gender pay gap (Greene, 2020; Rubery & Hebson, 2018). However, feminist trade unionists have struggled to maintain the visibility of gender in union strategies a function in part of the enduring centrality of class in framing union mobilisation (Kirton, 2019, p. 351). Given the traction that some gender equality issues have gained, it seems timely to re-assess how gender features in contemporary union campaigns. I examine union approaches to organising female dominated sectors through analysis of how gender and care are framed in campaigns. I draw on feminist perspectives on knowledge production, policy and politics (Bacchi, 2009; Cavaghan, 2017; Kantola & Lombardo, 2018)

P. Cullen (B) Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5_11

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to examine how union campaigns on care work act as forms of knowledge production about gender and care. Drawing on two case studies of union organising for female dominated care work occupations in Ireland, in early childcare and nursing and midwifery, I ask: what ideas about gender and care work are produced in trade union campaigns and with what consequence? Campaigns are understood as epistemological sites where competing ideas about gender and care are used to elicit worker and public support. Two modes of knowledge about gender and care are understood as feminist and feminised feature in trade union campaigns. Feminised frameworks rely on a valorous coding of supposed female qualities and virtues as a way to secure their valuation. Feminist frameworks centre the recognition of the social and economic value of unpaid and paid care work: acknowledge men’s and women’s different structural positions in the economy and society and treat care as an integral part of the economy. Questions motivating the analysis include how such campaigns may have capacity to disrupt the consensus on care work and how unions might change to enhance their representation of feminist ideas. A contribution then is to revisit arguments for a gendered social unionism (Briskin, 2014) and a feminist trade union agenda (Munro, 2001) that gauges the purchase of feminist ideas in unionism alongside other competing forms of knowledge (Cavaghan & Kulawik, 2020). Given the racialised and ethnic distribution of care work the presence or absence of intersectional framing is also relevant. This research also adds to debates on the value and risks of making gender visible in employment relations (Rubery & Hebson, 2018) and how the Covid-19 pandemic which has simultaneously exalted, and exhausted female frontline care workers (Branicki, 2020) may shift or intensify existing trends. The gendered effects of the pandemic, especially for female workers, as well as the gender-blind response to its management (Cullen & Murphy, 2020) reveal resistances to acknowledging the gendered penalties of care work yet may also create the impetus for a renewed feminist trade union agenda. Irish society sits at the nexus of tensions in the European project, around austerity and fiscal policy, Brexit, and US corporate globalisation that pose significant challenges to organised labour. Union recognition is not a right in Ireland1 and a June 2020 High Court ruling struck down legislation that protected sectoral agreements for low paid workers (Wall, 2020, June 23). In the midst of ongoing decline unions struggled

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to protect low paid workers exposed to the depth of Ireland’s economic recession and austerity measures (Murphy et al., 2019). Ireland is in turn a conservative gender regime that operates a modified male breadwinner employment model and a marketised approach to public services. It lags behind developments in other European Union and OECD countries to develop public care infrastructure which results in a reliance on low paid care workers and unpaid care that maintains low female employment rates (Sweeney, 2020). Ireland is then an interesting hard case to examine how unions organise for female care workers in unfavourable conditions and to assess how knowledge about gender and care operate in trade unionism in Ireland and beyond. In what follows I detail the context for the cases including an overview of gendered employment in Ireland and shifts in trade unionism. I follow with an account of the methodology and theoretical framework. Next, I outline campaigns for early childhood educators and nurses and midwives. I conclude with a discussion of the cases and reflection on the potentials and limits of union mobilisation to reframe and revalue female dominated care work.

Ireland: Gendered Employment and Unionisation A study of gender equality in the Irish labour market (1966–2016) found that while there had been distinct change in the normative culture, a major upward shift in the scale of female employment, and a decline in gender segregation, women’s and men’s employment remained strongly gendered and care burdens remain absorbed by women (Russell et al., 2019). This creates many social welfare, tax and pension gender gaps including on average 12% in labour force participation, 14% gender pay gap and a 26% gender pension gap. 55.3% of those on minimum wage are women (CSO, 2019). Sectors where women predominate have been at the frontline of job and wage erosion, with low pay compounded by precarious work and non-fixed hour contracts (Russell et al., 2019). These occupations have also been most adversely affected by Covid-19 shutdowns as low paid women perform 70% of jobs in the essential economy (CSO, 2020). Other trends include a professionalisation of care work without accompanying increases in pay. Limited state-funded childcare and crisis-related labour market policy responses have also heightened the likelihood that women are locked into combining unpaid care work and

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low pay. This is particularly the case for single parents, for migrant women and for young women (Russell et al., 2019). Relative to many other European countries, Ireland’s employment protection regime greatly limits the right to collective bargaining. While there is a right to association there is no attendant right to union recognition in Ireland. Collective agreements exist in the public sector, with negotiated pay deals with unions in the private sector or by industry. In the private sector, unions operate in a much more hostile environment, low levels of unionisation have pushed them beyond the workplace to seek a regulatory route (Geary & Gamwell, 2019, p. 197). From 1986 to 2007 Ireland followed a process of social partnership with national wage agreements for both public and private sectors. This collapsed in the early years of the economic crisis to be partially replaced with interim public sector wage agreements and local level private sector wage bargaining. During the crisis, many ‘anchor points’ of Irish employment protection were downgraded or removed with a reform of employment regulations, industrial relations bodies (Joint Labour Committees), and wage-setting mechanisms (Hickman & Dundon, 2016, pp. 205–206). Union density declined from a peak of 62% in the early 1980s to 27% following the economic crisis. Union density in the private sector is 16% (Murphy & Turner, 2016). The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) is the umbrella organisation for all public and private sector unions. The Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU) remains the largest. Forsa and two teachers’ unions the Irish National Teachers Organisation (INTO) and Association of Secondary School Teachers of Ireland (ASTI), alongside the Irish Nurses and Midwives Organisation (INMO) represent the majority of female public sector workers. Up to the late 1980s, Irish trade unions’ main concern was the creation of full-time male jobs in manufacturing industries. Women activists began to gain some influence with the growth in female employment and membership. Although increasingly female, trade unions have had poor levels of female leadership and have operated in the context of economistic redistributive demands that sit uneasily with gendered, racial and ethnic realities of low paid female care work (Murphy et al., 2019). Interviews with feminist trade unionists indicate that union involvement in casting sexual violence and reproductive health as workplace issues faced resistance and indifference and required significant activism: Gender issues ‘are not emerging from the shop floor but were engineered in a top-down

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way’ (Interview with female trade union official, 2020). There has been no clear ‘feminist network’ in Irish trade unions, rather an informal coalition of women working in tandem but often with individual employers to secure change. Union membership and density remain strong in the health and education sectors, however, these sectors have also been subject to marketisation. This includes 70% of childcare and 80% elder care provided by the private sector (Russell et al., 2019). While unions representing frontline occupations in health and education (nurses and teachers) have managed to secure some elements of pay restoration through collective bargaining with the state, they have not been able to stop privatisation of services, including the use of agency staff (Murphy et al., 2019). This has undermined unions efforts to protect the most peripheral of workers. As is explored below, most recent campaigns reflect a sectoral approach to female dominated occupations using ground level mobilisation. Antiausterity framing in these campaigns has evolved into a broader antimarketisation approach that links wage demands to better public services. Given the connective tissue between the economic, climate and public health crises, the Covid-19 pandemic has further highlighted the relationship between systemic underinvestment in public services, the marketisation of core pillars of social and personal services and pressure on frontline female dominated care work occupations.

Trade Unions: Gendered Work and Gendered Organising Munro (2001, pp. 457–459, 468) advanced a feminist trade union agenda to counter women’s exclusion from unions and highlight the gendered nature of the labour market, gendered definition of skills and gendered wage structures. A feminist trade union agenda includes a commitment to making gender visible in trade union campaigns. It also underlines the importance of intersectional initiatives that help reconceptualise union solidarity and challenge the notion of the generic worker with homogenous self-evident (class) interests (Briskin, 2014, p. 124; Munro, 2001, pp. 468–470). Such engagement could help upend gendered segmentation of the labour market, undermine the legacy of union support for traditionalist ideologies about women’s work, alongside structures that marginalised women inside unions (Greene, 2020; Rubery & Hebson, 2018).

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However even an implicit commitment to feminist frameworks has had mixed outcomes. In her study of a feminist identified trade union in France, Guillaume (2018) found it exhibited less hierarchy and incubated feminist consciousness among its members. However, it did not escape the enduring centrality of class in framing union struggle nor a lack of gender parity in senior decision-making roles. While women trade unionists operated nuanced and often implicit feminist identification the union was met with indifference and hostility from large trade unions (Guillaume, 2018, pp. 566–569). Scholars have also gendered social mobilisation approaches to better understand how unions organise women workers (Baines & Cunningham, 2017; Briskin, 2014; Cox et al., 2007; Healy & Bergfeld, 2016). Healy and Bergfeld’s (2016) overview of union mobilisation on women’s work found that where gender was emphasised it was often in instrumental ways rather than framed as a gender equality issue. In their analysis, they outlined how unions used relational organising that drew on the social ties found in women’s occupational roles especially in social and healthcare. They draw attention to how these forms of organising informed by ideas about female workers’ subjectivities can help to mobilise unorganised sectors, yet may also fail to confront gendered power relations. Overall, they argue that changes for women workers require unions to make gender equality explicit in campaigns in ways that move beyond shortterm and instrumental approaches to feminised workplaces (Healy & Bergfeld, 2016). Briskin (2014, pp. 125–127) argued that linking social unionism and gender in gendered social unionism offers a contrast to how gender has often operated in disguise in collective bargaining. Gendered social unionism provided a radical frame for trade unions to challenge how austerity measures invoked outdated and conservative views of women’s place and had contributed to women’s return to the household (Briskin, 2014, pp. 125–127). Eschewing gender essentialism, GSU embraces a feminist framing of care and work and links bargaining for women’s economic equality to a more inclusive, and intersectional defence against austerity (Briskin, 2014). A focus on women’s paid and unpaid work and the gendered relations of exploitation are central elements of gendered social unionism. This framing has relevance for the gendered consequences of Covid-19 for women workers, especially women’s ‘retreat’ from the labour market to absorb care needs (OECD, 2020).

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Care has been used to found oppositional worker identities especially in gendered resistance to austerity and precaritisation. These campaigns have had success for some nursing unions where power resources and a robust occupational identity were present (Baines & Cunningham, 2017, pp. 445–447; O’Sullivan et al., 2020). Nursing in particular has been examined in-depth as a terrain where professionalisation sits in tension with valorisation. Analysis of nurses trade union mobilisation does indicate how wage determination reflects the institutional undervaluation of female dominated work and the broader gender power order (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019). Care work remains saturated with gendered expectations held by female workers, states and management (Baines & Cunningham, 2017). Naturalised expectations that female-majority workforces can provide care (paid and unpaid) under any circumstance is a specific feature of austerity and now pandemic crisis management. The institutional undervaluation of female care work is embedded in gendered (racialised and classed) understandings of care (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019). Unless contested, these gendered understandings remain invisible and unrecognised as they are reproduced by employers, governments, trade unions and other social actors (Koskinen Sandberg et al., 2018, p. 709, 712).

Research Material and Methodology A case study approach is used as a ‘bounded entity’ (Yin, 2014, p. 6) to generate knowledge about the broader social phenomenon in a specific context. Two case studies of union campaigns for female dominated paid care work provide the empirical basis. These are Big Start for early childcare educators launched by SIPTU in 2016 and INMO campaigns for Nurses and Midwives between 2017–2021 inclusive of both organisations responses to the Covid-19 pandemic. The case studies were chosen to represent the evolution of trade union’s approach to sectoral based mobilisation in feminised workplaces (see Table 1). The cases offer a contrast between low paid and largely privatised childcare as opposed to nursing and midwifery with strong public sector membership although increasingly challenged by private sector agency recruitment. Unionisation in these sectors also varies with nurses with the strongest membership but with growing rates of membership for early childcare workers. Nurses possess a robust occupational identity buoyed by claims of specialised

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Table 1

Framing female dominated care work

SIPTU Early Care Big Start 2016–present INMO Nurses and Midwives 2015–present

Occupational identity

Framing

Intersectional

Allies

Nascent

Feminised Feminist Implicit

Sublimated

Robust

feminised Feminist Inward facing

Emergent

Women’s rights Parents Small employers Women’s rights Allied health professionals

knowledge and campaigns to assert their professional status. Early care educators, in contrast, possess weak occupational and associational power and emergent efforts to attain professional status. Although nurses have endured the highest rates of exposure to Covid-19, early years educators occupy care roles that also placed them in the frontline. Analysis includes desk research and semi-structured interviews with eight trade unionists including senior officials, as well as equality or gender equality officers and self-identified feminist trade unionists working at national level. Interviewees were accorded anonymity and or confidentiality and lasted between one and three hours. Some quotations were approved for attribution. Interviews and empirical data relate to campaigns conducted in the period between 2018 and 2021. Interviews focussed on the union’s approach to gender equality and questions about strategies and frameworks used in campaigns and provide context to the analysis. Desk analysis included a purposive sampling of materials on the case study campaigns, understood as strategic communications targeted to the general public and organisations’ members and political elites. Campaign materials assessed included outputs from annual general meetings, women’s committee events of the SIPTU and ICTU and joint events held by the Irish Labour Party and the SIPTU as well as SIPTU monthly webinars held between July 2020 and March 2021. Materials were also drawn from the INMO newsletters, social media communications and website. Other desk research included, newspaper editorials, member newsletters including Liberty Magazine published by SIPTU and worker fronted testimonies contained in videos and in social media campaigns.

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Frames were derived from thematic analysis of campaign slogans, content of campaign demands, social media hashtags, video clips and the visual representation of women’s bodies in street demonstrations. The analytical approach is one where campaign materials are analysed to reveal how different ideas about gender and care privilege different representations of the ‘problem and solution over others, and by doing so, construct[s] subjects in specific gendered ways’ (Bacchi, 2009, p. 9; Kantola & Lombardo, 2018, p. 331). Taking this perspective, I revisit research that gendered ‘social mobilisation’ and recognised the influence of feminist ideas in discourse and framing of campaigns (Briskin, 2014; Greene, 2020; Kirton, 2019). Rather than the elements required for collective action or the outcome of campaigns, the analytical focus then is on the framing used and what it reveals about the forms of knowledge about gender (Cavaghan, 2017) and care that are circulated and communicated to diagnose the problems in low paid care work and propose solutions (Bacchi, 2009). Analytically campaigns are assessed for how campaign frames presented problems and solutions which may challenge dominant ideas of care and or leave the complexity of gender, race or ethnic power relations unexamined. Salient quotations from interviewees and from campaign communications, are included to illustrate how gender and care were represented with categorisations made to identify feminised and feminist alongside anti-marketisation frames (see Table 2). These are interpreted by the understandings of care work communicated (as a public good, vocation, professional status, soft skills or credentials) how the carer and care recipient experience is naturalised as valorous and or valued and how the gender of workers is operationalised as maternal, sacrificial or source of exploitation alongside the presence or absence of intersectional analysis. Table 2

Framing gender and care in union campaigns

Care work as

Public good

Professional soft skills and credentials (valorous and valued)

Vocational clients come first (valorous)

Natural carers/front line heroes Covid-19(valorous)

Essential service Covid-19 care economy (valued)

Frames

Feminist Anti-Market

Feminised Feminist

Feminised

Feminised

Feminist Anti-Market

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I identify two forms of knowledge2 about gender and care in trade union campaigns that I refer to as feminist and feminised and that operate discursively as campaign frames. Feminised messaging includes gender essentialist ideas and valorises female dominated care work yet may risk reinforcing its undervaluation, especially when absent strong feminist messaging about the value of care. When feminised framing is dominant it may also result in gendered and intersectional inequalities remaining unacknowledged. Feminist framing makes visible the gendered organisation of work and calls for the cultural, social and economic valuation of unpaid and paid care work.3 Feminised and feminist framing both feature in campaigns, alongside anti-austerity and anti-marketisation messaging that defines care as a public good. Overall feminist framing is rarely public facing reflecting a longstanding ambivalence of trade unionism towards the gendering of paid care work. However, calls to value care as a public good and care work as skilled and valuable suggest a coincidence with feminist argumentation. Trade Union campaigns for female care workers do reflect the influence of feminist ideas especially when they attend to the gendered power relations that organise work. However, feminist frames are most often accompanied by feminised representations that sentimentalise care and reinforce gender stereotypes. This framing can be used in campaigns as ‘strategic essentialism’ where gendered constructions of vocation and empathy are conveyed to secure public support for Union demands and align with aspects of female workers’ subjectivities. Using this form of knowledge about gender and care can promote resonance and create solidarity but it may also mean that gender features obliquely at best as a power relation.

Big Start: Together for Early Years Ireland has the highest level of private provision of early years education in the OECD, along with relatively low government investment, low wages for educators and high fees for consumers (Oireachtas Library, 2020, p. 4). Early years educators are the main feminised occupation targeted by SIPTU in a campaign that ties quality care to well-paid committed workers. Anti-marketisation framing is evident and aligned with feminised constructs of care work that reject monetisation and carelessness of for-profit services alongside feminist frames of care as a public good.

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A campaign launched as Big Start in 2015 framed the early years sector as one in crisis where state investment was required. SIPTU’s campaign statement read: ‘Parents are paying too much for childcare. Workers are paid too little to make ends meet. Providers are struggling to break even. Everyone is getting a raw deal. A responsible government that values every child would recognise every Early Years professional’ (Big Start, 2020a), This campaign involved an expansive recruitment effort among this low paid female dominated occupational sector and mobilised in coalition with parents and smaller employers.4 Female care workers are featured in social media testifying to struggling on low pay while prioritising child welfare: ‘working so hard to provide a home away from home, putting children first’.5 The pinnacle of the campaign came on 5 February 2020 with a national rally involving an alliance of childcare providers (private and public sectors), early years educators, professional associations and parents (who had to agree to lose service for the event). The ‘Together for Early Years’ protest required regional organising committees that bused parents, children, workers and employers to the capital city (SIPTU, 2020, May 1). The protest was overwhelming female, led by a line of mothers pushing children in prams with slogans including ‘Valuing Us is Valuing Children.’6 Asked about the public protest dimension of the campaign a trade union official stated that ‘it was essential to have women and children with their prams stationed outside of the union headquarters “Liberty Hall” for the media to give a powerful message’ (Interview with SIPTU official, 2020). Here a conscious framing exercise relied on deeply maternalist and familial and as such feminised messaging. For this official it was also essential to build solidarity between mothers and carers captured in the following statement: ‘And the mothers themselves know there is a major problem; they are aware of workers’ poor working conditions and are asking themselves why fees are so high. The interests of the childcare professionals, and the mothers coincide.’ This framing aimed to reveal gendered ‘bargains’ that women workers enter into by paying other women to care for low wages. At the same time the predominantly female populated protest (mothers and workers) communicated an implicit feminist message about the gender imbalance in care work. Campaign materials invoked the developmental benefits for children of excellent public childcare that ‘supports families, promotes social inclusion, reduces child poverty, enhances future

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employability and facilitates workforce participation for parents, particularly for women’ (Big Start, 2020b). Seeking care outside of marketised rationales and linking it to broader goals of social unionism indicates feminist framing yet is tied to facilitating women’s access to the labour force, rather than a goal in itself. At the same time media coverage showcased women workers and union members asserting their professional status and seeking increased valuation: ‘we have degrees, we are graduates we demand respect and recognition, we have an important job’ (Lord, 2020, February 5). As such feminised framing is modified by calls to value childcare as credentialed professional work represented in the use of the term ‘early education professional’ and media framing highlighting the disconnect between low pay and educational attainment (Hennessy, 2019, September 26). Union officials characterised the campaign as difficult in that it directly challenged vested interests and sought to break away from a marketised approach to childcare: ‘The childcare campaign was so difficult, more challenging that you can imagine and may take a decade as the power base with big employers, state civil servants all want to maintain a private market and resist a public childcare model’ (Interview with Union official, 2020). The obstacle here was understood by feminist trade unionists as part of broader patriarchal socio-cultural construction of care as a private concern located in the home, unregulated, informal and outside of state control. While maintaining her own feminist analysis, she argued that the campaign itself required a form of framing that ‘all women can get behind.’ The key to unlocking the potential of the sector, to transforming it into a modern public service, was located with female workers themselves and alliances with mothers and smaller providers. Female care worker subjectivities were understood here again to colour this trade unionist’s analysis of the obstacles to the campaign: ‘Women cannot stay in the sector when they have children, as it is too low paid, so young women predominate and they are idealistic, they love kids and it is hard to collectivise their grievances.’ From this Union offcial’s perspective, existing forms of gendered solidarity in care work can be unhelpful: ‘Traditional organising models of agitation do not work as many managers or owners were also often workers and they cultivate strong bonds of friendship to maintain loyalty.’ Collectivisation of early childcare educators required campaigning that refocussed aspects of feminised worker subjectivities towards longer term career aspirations and increased professional status.

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Reflecting on the campaign in a webinar held in March 2021 SIPTU organisers detailed how marketisation of the sector, pressure including from EU requirements on educational credentials had manufactured a more educated but disempowered workforce. An account of the campaign once again referenced female care worker subjectivities as ‘a workforce that did not want to disadvantage parents and disrupt children’s lives and required significant mobilisation’ (SIPTU, 2021, March 4). Here tensions arise between campaign frames that essentialise aspects of care work and mobilising efforts that aim to break bonds of gendered vocation and solidarity cultivated by employers. Big Start is fronted by white Irish female workers and there is no explicit reference to racial, ethnic or migrant status of workers despite evidence that migrant women and indigenous Traveller women in Ireland when employed are over-represented in care work (Russell et al., 2019). ‘Early years educators’ represent a homogenised feminised category instrumentalised to seek state investment in the Early Years sector and public sector status for childcare workers. More recently women of colour have featured in campaign materials that are linked to the pandemic and suggest a move towards a more inclusive framing. The Covid-19 pandemic closed all childcare facilities between March and June 2020, and again in late December 2020 to March 2021. The state provided emergency income support for these workers and for many this payment exceeded their original wage. This income support was heralded by unions and women’s organisations as an indication that the state was on the precipice of the wholesale public provision of childcare (NWC, 2020). Social media feeds for Big Start included the hashtag #NoGoingBack with commentary: ‘During Covid we had a taste for what a nationalised childcare scheme can look like.’7 However, a re-opening of services at reduced capacity (and reduced staffing) meant significant job losses and a reduction in pay and for those re-employed concerns about infection control. Unions continued to campaign for a publicly funded model of childcare drawing on public health messaging to demand a living wage and paid sick leave for early childhood educators: ‘Poor pay and conditions are driving high staff turnover in our sector. This directly undermines quality for children and the consistency of “play pods,” a key Covid-19 control measure.’8 A Big Start social media campaign also framed the early years sector as an essential service9 and in March 2021 the government initiated a process to negotiate for the first time a sectoral pay agreement (Government of

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Ireland, 2020). At the same time the state refused to commit additional funds to initiate a publicly funded childcare system.10 In response Big Start initiated a campaign that connected investment in early childhood with a reduction in inequalities exposed by Covid-19.11 Exposure to infection and access to vaccines has also featured in pandemic related campaigns, with a campaign that fronted an early years worker entitled SIPTU Women on the Frontline of Covid-19. In this campaign, early care educators are framed alongside other SIPTU care workers as frontline heroes, captured in the statement: ‘Early years educators have stepped up to the plate at every stage of this pandemic by caring for and educating the children of essential workers. The majority are working without sick pay, earning below the living wage and do not have the ability to socially distance at work’ (SIPTU, 2021, March 31). Big Start continued its campaign throughout 2021, emphasizing a low pay crisis and staff shortages in the sector. In October 2021, the government budget for the first time ringfenced funding to support childcare providers to improve pay (Government of Ireland, 2021). Big Start circulated feminised framing of the selfless early care professional putting children first while struggling on low pay. Mothers feature as the beneficiaries of state investment in childcare, while workers seek the benefits of public sector employment, where union density is higher and where gains have been made. Such investment is linked to the labour market activation of women rather than an assessment of women’s disproportionate care burden. Care work is then coded as maternal care yet feminist frames intrude with claims for recognition of professional credentials required to deliver early education and demands for public childcare.

Nurses and Midwives: From Anti-Austerity to Frontline ‘Heroes’ Anti-austerity frameworks have predominated in nurse campaigns combined with feminised constructs of nurses and midwives as valorous and self-sacrificing as they ‘fill the cracks in the system’, operating as safety valves for underfunding and understaffing (INMO, 2020, October 9). In 2018, in response to state inaction on their wage claims and a continuing hiring freeze, nurses launched a social media campaign. This was accompanied by anonymous articles penned by a nurse in a main newspaper outlet documenting her devotion to patients but also her

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exhaustion and stress (Anonymous, 2019, February 7). An escalation of industrial action occurred in January 2019, with two national strike days that attracted 20,000 nurses, supporters and families in a national rally chanting: ‘not on women’s backs’ (Edwards, 2019, February 9). Their press release stated: ‘No nurse or midwife wants to go on strike, we are a caring profession, but we have been forced into this position by a government that just isn’t listening.’12 Maintaining public support was key to strike action and as such the IMNO ensured that emergency care was staffed with nurses (Interview with general secretary of the INMO, 2020). The threat of five additional strike days and the resulting cancellation of additional elective surgeries in addition to highly publicised wait lists, elicited a response and pay talks resumed where a new deal was brokered. A combination of feminised framing alongside calls for greater investment in public services were evident in personal testimonies of female nurses, their dedication, concern for patient safety and personal stress at delivering suboptimal care. Wage demands were cloaked in appeals for increased staffing, which could only occur, if wages were increased to attract new recruits to remain. A key demand related to narrowing the gaps between different grades of nursing staff as well with allied health professions (INMO, 2018, December 18). In this formulation internal stratification between nurses including in racialised and ethnic terms was downplayed. Nursing is increasingly dependent on the recruitment of migrant women of colour, often employed by agencies although some foreign national nurses are now unionised. Campaigns do draw attention to the overreliance on agency nurses deemed as costly and inefficient (INMO, 2018, October 27). Irish born white nurses have featured predominantly in the public campaigns, this said, criticism of wage bills for agency nurses was carefully calibrated by the union to resist racialised or anti-migrant sentiment.13 The INMO had at different junctures intervened on work permit disputes for migrant nurses with specific hospital administrations. Migrant nurses are also potential new members and in November 2020, the INMO overseas section entered into an agreement with a new organisation, Migrant Nurses Ireland, that supports Indian nurses to access union support in Ireland (INMO, 2020, November 9). The INMO campaigns illustrate many of the thematic elements of other nurse unions, relying on carefully choreographed elements of feminised ideas about nurses alongside efforts to reframe nursing as a

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profession (Koskinen Sandberg & Saari, 2019). While there is evidence of critical feminist framing in inputs of feminist critical actors especially in relation to the low status of care, this is rarely public facing. Analysis of the INMO monthly newsletter, a less public facing medium, indicates a more nuanced view of the profession. However, an assessment of the newsletter between 2017 and 2020 finds one special issue devoted to the gender pay gap in 2018 and two specific references to feminist frameworks used to make sense of the challenge facing the nursing profession. The 2018 issue led with an editorial from the female general secretary of union with the statement: ‘How many times have you posed the question: is it because nursing and midwifery are predominantly female professions that their pay is the lowest of professional grades in the public service?’ (INMO, 2018, August). However, the pandemic may have heightened feminist analysis, with a special issue in March 2021 devoted to female leadership, a focus on gender violence and connections made between a paucity of gender sensitive responses to the pandemic and poor outcomes for female health care workers (INMO, 2021, March 5). Initially, INMO pandemic campaigns centred on poor access to personal protective equipment and inadequate safety protocols attributed directly to higher rates of infection. Framing included linking austerity related understaffing to weakness in health care infrastructure. This was highlighted by criticism of the state for using unpaid student nurses for pandemic care to compensate for understaffing (INMO, 2021, July 5). More recently, using the frame #CouragetoCare,14 campaigns have centred on calls for prioritisation of nurses in vaccine rollout, financial compensation, additional annual leave as well as the classification of Covid-19 as a workplace acquired injury. These demands emphasise ‘the special contribution and extraordinary risks endured on behalf of the community’ (INMO, 2021, July 5). Images of young female nurses in protective equipment relaying their experiences of exhaustion and trauma have populated the INMO traditional and social media feeds. These depictions focussed specifically on the meticulous care and comfort nurses provided especially to those dying without loved one’s present (Dwyer, 2021, February 9). This idealised feminised subjectivity is effective in communicating a valorous construct but can distance nursing work from the everyday, mundane, dirty, and gendered division of comfort and caring (Mohammed et al., 2021). The choice to showcase young white

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Irish nurses in many campaigns also risks communicating a homogenous and selfless group identity that flattens racial and ethnic inequalities (Bennett et al., 2020). Most recently communications including the headline banner of the organisations’ Twitter account includes women of colour and indicates a commitment to diversifying INMO representations (INMO, 2021, October 12). Feminised frames are effective in communicating emotional labour and when maternalism extends to motherhood can include an acknowledgement women workers disproportionate responsibility for unpaid care. This is exemplified in the INMO campaign to highlight the state’s failure during the pandemic lockdowns to provide childcare for nurses and midwives. An INMO survey of nurses was widely publicised in finding many were forced to take annual leave to care for out of school children and others: ‘not seeing their children for weeks on end as they moved into accommodation to manage risk’ (INMO, 2020, June 23). In a press release, the general secretary commented: ‘Over 90% of nurses and midwives are women. These women and mothers had to make sacrifices so they could continue to work. They have carried us through the pandemic and have carried the healthcare system as well. And I really think women have borne the brunt of Covid. The very least that the state can do is take care of their children when they go to work. Instead, our members are told to simply get on with it – forced to choose between caring for patients or their children’ (INMO, 2020, April 22). The INMO campaigns while reliant on feminised frames of the caring, valorous and virtuous nurse, in politicising the issue of childcare drew again on maternalism yet also created opportunities for a feminist messaging (Hennessy, 2020, April 23). Other analysis indicates (Gagon & Perron, 2020) nursing unions have engaged in highly publicised ‘whistleblowing’ about pandemic working conditions and used social media to highlight the ways that Covid-19 destabilised an already vulnerable and under-resourced nursing workforce. This approach is reflected in INMO’s resistance to aspects of the hero discourse exemplified in weekly applause for nursing staff: ‘There has rightly been applause and praise for frontline healthcare workers over the past three months. Yet when the applause dies down, many will be left out of pocket and without any leave.’15 This hero subjectivity is resisted as a social and cultural reward for nurses to sustain them during crisis. Yet, tensions arise then between the INMO’s efforts to draw on framing that may sentimentalise nursing and normalise their exposure to ‘risk’ at the

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same time as they work to materialise the longer term erosion of nurses’ and midwives working conditions and pay. Loyalty and devotion of female care workers feature in both cases as the scaffold on which Trade Unions stake their demands for better services, wages and status. Feminised frames do maintain purchase yet they compete with more feminist framing of care work as skilled emotional and technical labour. For nurses and midwives, a robust occupational identity advantages a more feminist reading of their work as essential and skilled. This is more challenging for early years workers who lack broad recognition of their educational requirements and whose occupational identity remains more fragmented and deeply saturated in a traditional gender coding of care. Anti-marketisation frames of care as a public good illustrated in calls for better funded health services and state subsidised childcare are evident in both cases yet neither evoke a strong feminist interpretation of the care economy. The pandemic has heightened feminised framing that centre sacrifice and valour as core characteristics of care work. Yet analysis of these campaigns also uncovers an impulse towards a more strident critique of the systemic undervaluation of female dominated care work. However, the balance struck between feminised and feminist framing in such campaigns will determine if such framing reinforces gender stereotypes that maintain undervaluation or act to politicise and socialise care work as indispensable and valuable.

Conclusion Using a knowledge and feminist policy and politics lens (Bacchi, 2009; Cavaghan, 2017) reveals the epistemic struggles that shape claims-making for women care workers and the role that trade unions play in shaping ideas about gender and care. Forms of ‘gender’ knowledge categorised here as feminist and feminised circulate in union campaigns where they combine to stabilise and or undermine dominant constructs of female dominated care work. Gendered assumptions about female workers’ subjectivities also shape organising responses and reveal instrumental yet also feminist approaches to the relationship between gender and care. Epistemic strategies centre feminised framing of loyalty and devotion of female care workers to attract client/patient and public support. For early childcare educators, marketisation of care is equated to poor pay and exploitative conditions that deny the credentialed and skilled realities of

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care work. Nurses and midwives, largely public sector workers, also resist undervaluation of their professional status rooted in framing of care as a public good. In Big Start, public childcare is aligned with child developmental outcomes and female labour market participation in the absence of strong feminist argumentation of the gendered care burden. In the INMO campaigns a critique of austerity predominates, rather than an explicit feminist frame of care justice and or broader call for a more equal distribution of care. Such framing indicates aspects of gendered social unionism (Briskin, 2014) and a nascent feminist trade union agenda (Munro, 2001). Yet feminist analysis of female care work has not surfaced in a coherent or consistent way to influence union discourse and strategy. This said, pandemic campaigns may offer evidence of a shift towards more explicit feminist framing especially when combined with anti-austerity and antimarketisation frameworks (Federici, 2016). On the other hand, feminist critique can struggle to gain visibility when anti-austerity and anti-market frames remain tied to class analysis and strong cultural logics that feminise care work retain political and societal resonance. Feminised claims may also offer political elites’ opportunities to maintain gendered and privatised reliance on female care rather than commit to systemic social investment in care infrastructure. Efforts to assert or reassert a professional occupational identification that is feminised and homogenised can in turn flatten aspects of racial and ethnic inequality. Intersectional analysis is largely absent in early educator campaigns, while emergent in nurse and midwifery mobilisation. For nurses and midwives, associational power afforded the threat of strike action that elicited state response and a path towards pay restoration. For early care educators mass demonstrations and more recently pandemic induced public appreciation for childcare workers enabled access to wage determination processes. Yet calls for state investment in public childcare, a core feminist goal, gained less traction. These campaigns illustrate efforts to build a form of gendered social unionism (Briskin, 2014) and feminist ideas animate elements of campaign framing especially in demands for state recognition of care. However, tackling the undervaluation of female care work in a conservative gender and marketised regime requires a robust epistemic shift that centres feminist critique of the material, policy and cultural logics that maintain dominant gendered constructs of care. This is never more urgent given how the Covid-19 pandemic response has relied on assumptions

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of women’s capacity to provide paid and unpaid care under any conditions. The pandemic created new opportunities for the public to value front line workers in female dominated occupations as skilled and essential to the functioning of society, and union campaigns aim to capitalise on this recognition as a way to reassert demands. However, such feminised framing relies in large part on valorous construct of ‘front line heroes’ exalted for their sacrifice rather than a critique of the gendered cultural construction of care and its intersectional penalties. This framing risks undue emphasis on gendered norms of emotional attachment and moral commitment. The peril lies in how feminised framing may generate a ‘currency of praise’ rather than wage demands and adequate protections for personal safety. Epistemic strategies that fail to challenge care pay penalties limit gains for female dominated workers and especially for the less credentialed and lowest paid (Folbre et al., 2021).

Notes 1. Employees have the constitutional right to join a union, but employers have an equal right to refuse to negotiate with them or to use alternative non-union employee relations fora. 2. Feminist policy analysis (Bacchi, 2009) and scholarship on gender knowledge (Cavaghan, 2017) reveal knowledge production is gendered and how gender knowledge itself (how ideas about gender) feature in different forms of knowledge including those advanced by social movements and unions. 3. Maternalism has strong purchase in working class and ethnic minority and migrant communities (Naples, 1998, p. 112) as it does in union motherhood (Cranford, 2007). Black feminist thought also centres the experiences of black mothers and as forms of political subjectivity (Bassel & Emejulu, 2017). 4. https://twitter.com/BigStartIreland. 5. https://twitter.com/BigStartIreland/status/137753674983716 0448. 6. https://twitter.com/DarraghIsHere/status/137046558809988 7115/photo/1. 7. https://twitter.com/Labour_TU/status/138844893682271 8465. 8. https://www.facebook.com/BigStartIreland/. 9. https://youtu.be/aPna6M2YxuI.

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10. https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2020/1015/ 1171621-budget2021-childcare-analysis/. 11. https://twitter.com/BigStartIreland/status/139249112327326 1063. 12. https://www.rte.ie/news/ireland/2018/0502/959658-inmo_c onference/. 13. This includes a webinar to examine the effects of Covid-19 on ethnic minority and black nurses, and showcased nurses from ethnic minority backgrounds. 14. https://twitter.com/hashtag/CourageToCare?src=hashtag_click. 15. https://www.dublinlive.ie/news/dublin-news/over-60-irish-nur ses-forced-18471159.

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Rubery, J., & Hebson, G. (2018). Applying a gender lens to employment relations: Revitalisation, resistance and risks. Journal of Industrial Relations, 60(3), 414–436. Russell, H., Grotti, R., McGinnity, F., & Privalko, I. (2019). Caring and unpaid work in Ireland. ESRI and the Irish human rights and equality commission (IHREC). https://www.esri.ie/publications/caring-and-unpaidwork-in-ireland. Sweeney, R. (2020). Cherishing all equally 2020; Inequality in the care economy. Foundation for European Progressive Studies. https://www.feps-europe.eu/ attachments/publications/report-care%20economy_tasc-feps.pdfpe.eu. Yin, R. (2014). Case study research: Design and methods (5th ed.). Sage.

Cited Research Material Anonymous. (2019, February 7). Nurses’ strike: ‘The woman in the side room was left to give birth alone. I had failed her. The Irish Times. Retrieved on 14 September 2019, from https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/hea lth-family/nurses-strike-the-woman-in-the-side-room-was-left-to-give-birthalone-i-had-failed-her-1.3784326. Big Start. (2020a). Retrieved on 10 March 2020, from https://www.bigstart. ie/about. Big Start. (2020b). Campaign Platform. Retrieved on 10 March 2020, from https://www.bigstart.ie/ourplan. Dwyer, O. (2021, February 9). Frontline healthcare workers should get pandemic compensation, INMO to tell Oireachtas committee. Retrieved on 16 March 2021,from https://www.thejournal.ie/inmo-nurses-oireachtas-commit tee-covid-19-5155398-Jul2020/. Edwards, E. (2019, February 9). Tens of thousands rally in support of nurses in Dublin. Retrieved on 17 March 2019, from https://www.irishtimes.com/ news/ireland/irish-news/tens-of-thousands-rally-in-support-of-nurses-in-dub lin-1.3788291. Hennessy, M. (2019, September 26). We’re seen as glorified babysitters: Survey finds 94% of childcare workers can’t make ends meet. Retrieved on 15 November 2020, from https://www.thejournal.ie/childcare-2-4825638-Sep 2019. Hennessy, M. (2020, April 23). Surprisingly old-fashioned: Union says government childcare offer ‘does nothing’ for vast majority of nurses. Retrieved on 15 March 2020, from https://www.thejournal.ie/childcare-nurses-5081421-Apr2020/. INMO. (2018, July/August). World of Irish nursing and midwifery (Vol. 26). Gender Pay Gap https://www.inmo.ie/tempDocs/Full%20Issue%20J uly%20Aug%2018%20WIN.pdf.

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INMO. (2018, October 27). Agency nurse pay 20% higher than public. Retrieved on 15 January 2019, from https://www.inmo.ie/Home/Index/217/13411. INMO. (2018, December 18). 95% of nurses and midwives vote in favour of strike. Retrieved on 12 January 2019, from https://www.inmo.ie/Home/ Index/217/13439. INMO. (2020, October 9). Give us the staff we need to beat COVID, says INMO conference. Retrieved on 15 December 2020, from https://inmo.ie/Home/ Index/217/13637. INMO. (2020, April 22). Government childcare offer ‘does nothing’ for vast majority of nurses and midwives. INMO. Retrieved on 19 August 2020, from https://www.inmo.ie/Home/Index/217/13583. INMO. (2020, June 23). Nurses using up annual leave to provide childcare. INMO Survey. Retrieved on 10 August 2020, from https://www.inmo.ie/ Home/Index/217/1359. INMO. (2020, November 9). INMO launches agreement with migrant nurses Ireland. Retrieved on 15 December 2020, from https://www.inmo.ie/Art icle/PrintArticle/13645. INMO. (2021, March 5). Front line activists. World of Irish Nursing and Midwifery. Retrieved on 10 March 2021, from https://www.inmo.ie/World_ of_Irish_Nursing. INMO. (2021, July 5). INMO conference demands compensation for healthcare workers. Retrieved on 15 February 2021, from https://www.inmo.ie/Home/ Index/217/13774. INMO. (2021, October 12). Retrieved on 12 October 2021. https://twitter. com/INMO_IRL. Lord, M. (2020, February 5). Childcare workers give candidates a wakeup call. The Irish Times. Retrieved on 15 March 2020, from https://www.irishtimes. com/news/politics/miriam-lord-childcare-workers-give-candidates-a-wakeup-call-1.4163155#.XjvLzsmqhys.twitter. Services Industrial Professional Trade Union (SIPTU) Liberty (2012a), Vol. 11, No. 5, p. 19. SIPTU. (2020, May 1). The full story on early years care. Press Release. Retrieved on 4 March 2021, from https://www.siptu.ie/media/pressreleases2020/ful lstory_21745_en.html. SIPTU. (2021, March 4). Workplace democracy campaign. Retrieved on 10 March 2021, from https://www.siptu.ie/campaigns/workplacedemocracy/. SIPTU. (2021, March 31). SIPTU representatives call for stronger protections for Early Years Educators. Retrieved on 15 March 2021, from https://www.siptu. ie/media/pressreleases2019/mainnews/fullstory_22386_en.html. Wall, M. (2020, June 23). High Court ruling may have serious implications for thousands of workers. The Irish Times. Retrieved on 12 August 2020, from https://www.irishtimes.com/business/work/high-court-ruling-may-have-ser ious-implications-for-thousands-of-workers-ictu-warns-1.4286773.

Selecting Social Partners: Collective Bargaining for Gender Equality in the Shadow of Political Polarisation and Ideology in Turkey Burcu Ta¸skın and Berfin Çakın

Introduction Gender-related policies have changed the formation of collective bargaining worldwide. Current corporatist arrangements have focused on class-based discussions and protecting labour interests, thus gender has often been neglected. The failure of male-dominated labour market and labour organisations to reflect women’s interests creates a need to change structural mechanisms hindering gender representation in working life. Turkey has among the lowest trade union density rates in Europe, both overall and for women. According to Turkish Statistical ˙ Institute (TÜIK, 2019), unionisation density was only 13.76% in the private sector but 66.9% in the public sector in 2019. The unionisation

B. Ta¸skın (B) · B. Çakın Istanbul Medeniyet University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] B. Çakın e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5_12

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rate for women is 8.7%. Women’s exclusion from decision-making bodies in trade unions and Turkey’s patriarchal culture are fundamental problems preventing public consideration of gender-related topics (Toksöz, 1994; Yirmibe¸so˘glu, 2008). According to the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index (2020), Turkey ranks 130th in gender equality out of 153 countries despite having the 17th biggest economy. That is, rather than economic, institutional and cultural obstacles prevent steps towards greater gender equality in Turkey. As with other candidates and EU member states, Turkey has adopted EU norms in relation to its own needs and priorities although EU policy directives and practices on gender equality are accepted as the target model. Based on the EU’s economic development, economic and political stability objectives, its gender policy primarily focuses on managing economic aspects, such as employment. In contrast, due to its more patriarchal structure, constitution, and judiciary system, Turkey has addressed more fundamental, social gender equality problems, such as maternity, marriage, education, child-care and violence against women, rather than enforcing equal pay or women’s employment policies. Consequently, although the EU did improve gender equality in Turkey somewhat through conservative institutions and political parties, JDP (Justice and Development Party) policies prioritising Islamic values led to cherrypicking, which included certain EU pillars on gender equality while excluding others (Ta¸skın, 2020, p. 134). Therefore, trade union institutionalisation and empowerment of female participation have emerged more slowly in Turkey. Although Turkey followed a pathway stimulated by the EU norms on gender equality, the inclusion among the EU’s universal values of women’s rights remains resisted by pro-religious actors in Turkey. Nevertheless, two women unionists in 2017 and 2018 have been selected to executive positions in trade unions that ideologically oppose the government, which has a pro-Islamist ground. Meanwhile, certain conservative and more male-dominated trade unions, which receive strong government support, have increased their membership significantly (see Fig. 1). Other confederations that mostly take a leftist stance focus more on gender policies have lacked such support due to non-existence of ideological ties with the government (Arıcan, 2018; Çelik, 2019). These developments also reflect the government’s majoritarian approach and Turkey’s political polarisation between secularists and Islamists, which prevents cross-party

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Fig. 1 Changes in membership of labour confederations (Source Calculated by the authors based on data from the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services)

cooperation between women parliamentarians, even for gender-sensitive issues (Ta¸skın, 2020). Polarisation occurs in almost every society and in almost every social relationship; however, it becomes a problem when it creates the potential to threaten social peace, intergroup justice and social security. Turkey’s traditional cleavages are categorised in three dimensions: the main ethnic groups (Turk-Kurd), sectarian groups (Sunni-Alawite/Turkish Shia Muslims) and cultural groups (Islamists- secularists). These cleavages have been largely reflected by the voters of major political parties: pro-Islamist right-wing JDP (Justice and Development Party); secular left-wing RPP (Republican People’s Party); Turkish nationalist rightwing NMP (Nationalist Movement Party); pro-Kurdish left-wing PDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party); and centre-right Turkish nationalist GP (Good Party). While social distance between voters of political parties is greater than ethnic- and sectarian-based social distance (Bilgiç et al. 2014), the study by Uyan-Semerci and Erdo˘gan (2018) portrays the alarming level of polarisation in Turkey where more than 70% of the society do not want to have a neighbour, relative or business partner with those who voted for the party that they found more distance to themselves. With the transition to presidential system in 2018 under Erdo˘gan’s rule, the polarisation converted to a two-camp system between supporter and opponents of presidentialism, in which a general Islamist vs. secularist dimension overpassed the ethnic, sectoral and ideological polarisation.

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KONDA research (2011) on female political representation highlights the main underlying reason for polarisation between the different political wings is at their prospect on woman and the daily roles given to women. Today, with the consolidation of political Islam, ruling party and its proponents compete with secular feminist movements, prioritise cultural and Islamist values over women’s rights and sexual orientation. Woodward’s ‘velvet triangle’ model is relevant here regarding the feminist and gender perspective introduced with these crucial laws, particularly the contributions of women’s NGOs and movements, such as the significant role of the TCK Women’s Platform in terms of placement models (Tatlıer-Ba¸s, 2011). According to the velvet triangle theory (Woodward, 2004), interaction between EU institutions, governments and non-state actors fosters gender mainstreaming within EU member states. In Turkey, however, religion adds a fourth corner to form an ‘iron square’. Religionbased network for the ruling party and its proponents, which does not adopt a gender equality perspective, dominates political system and negatively affects bringing gender-related policies on the agenda in collective bargaining. Recently, Turkey’s leaving the Istanbul Convention on the 20th of March, 2021 (an international treaty designed to protect women from violence, avoid domestic violence in general) can be given as an example of this conflict between European and Turkey’s conservative values, where Islamist norms are used by the government to legitimise backlashing towards the gained women rights. This approach aims to subordinate women to their traditional roles: mostly responsible with domestic life. Hence, despite the earlier reaction by left-wing and secular (and some liberal opposition) parties, advocates, NGOs and trade unions against the debate on quitting Istanbul Convention and their support with the campaign ‘Istanbul Convention Keeps You Alive’,1 President Erdo˘gan’s unilaterally withdrawing Istanbul Convention by claiming it was incompatible with Turkey’s family values and it ‘normalise homosexuality’,2 caused severe domestic and international reactions. Moreover, large protests highlighted the political polarisation of the society which has been symbolised on the women issue. This Uniteral act of Erdo˘gan also opened the debate about the limits of his authority and impact of his government’s majoritarian power. In short, while JDP’s coming to power in 2002 enabled to remove the unfair ban on the Islamist headscarf in universities, it also caused a more threatening development for the women rights as patriarchal religious values sanctioned secondary roles

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for women through the public bureaucracy as well as through the civil society organisations (Arat, 2010). Therefore, we claim that gender-related issues with the effect of polarisation between pro-Islamic JDP and secularist groups are neglected because the government supports Islamic proponents that feel discontent with gender equality perspective while excluding secular feminists from political arena. This is especially true for collective bargaining process in Turkey because neo-corporatist strategy that the country adopts constructs hegemony over unions with legislative changes and membership manipulations, which is explained later in detail. Although previous research focused on women’s underrepresentation in unions, the effect of political polarisation in collective bargaining process in Turkey has not been studied yet. Revealing the ideological background of women’s underrepresentation in trade unions due to the political polarisation under the JDP’s neo-corporatism is especially important to discover how women’s interests in collective bargaining process are inhibited by legislative and member density-based pressures of the government. Therefore, based on these considerations, this study addresses the following main research question: To what extent does political polarisation and ideological proximity in Turkey influence women’s representation in trade unions and discussion of gender-related policies in collective bargaining? Thus, in our first sub-question, we examine whether the government’s ideologically allied confederations have greater collective bargaining power in Turkey. Several authors claimed that the symbiotic relations based on religious networks between JDP and its supporters created an authoritarian corporatism in labour relations in Turkey3 (Çelik, 2019). This also creates confrontations between secularists and Islamist JDP proponents in many policy issues including gender policies. Due to the fact that membership density is key to participate in collective bargaining in Turkey, the government’s support for ideologically compatible confederations through manipulations in membership density leads to exclude the oppositional confederations from collective bargaining. Polarisation, which refers to the social distance of the party voters in this study, affects collective bargaining because, according to Legislation No. 6356 for labour confederations in 2012 and Law No. 4688 for public servants confederations adopted in 2001, the confederation with the most members represents all employees. This legislation creates several problems in terms of workers’ representation such as double threshold

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(1 per cent at sectoral; %50 + 1 in enterprises) to conclude a collective agreement, the authorisation of certain confederations, which only have highest number of members, for collective bargaining (Çelik, 2013), and the lawful strike can also be banned due to national security or public health reasons (Kurnaz, 2017). These regulations inherently hinder leftist confederations from collective bargaining process because they have lower union membership due to historical and political reasons such as military interventions and the ruling party’s hegemony over certain unions.4 We also claim that this situation indirectly affected gender imbalance in trade unions because only leftist confederations, which adopt gender equality approach, have women union chairs in Turkey. Therefore, union membership is the most important issue for confederations while government support for proponent confederations intensifies polarisation. Finally, our second sub-question evaluates whether the number of women members and executives makes unions more likely to develop gender-related policies. Several researchers predict that unionisation of women and prioritisation of gender-related issues are more likely if women have decision-making roles in unions (Cockburn, 1996; Kirton & Healy, 1999). We examine whether this prediction is true in Turkey because it is widely known that gender policies and women leaders have been largely ignored by trade unions in collective bargaining in Turkey. Although 28.9% of workers are women, only 8.7% are unionised while the number of women in decision-making bodies is very low. Although the Confederation of Public Employees’ Trade Unions (KESK) ˙ and the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (DISK) have women leaders, the government ignores them because of their opposition to the government. In the following part ‘Corporatist State and Gendered Practices of Trade Unions in Turkey’ statistical data obtained from the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services regarding trade union membership density was also used to uncover women’s underrepresentation in Turkish unions. Through in-depth interviews with the most influential confederation leaders in Turkey, the study also examines the problem of underrepresentation of women and the impact of political polarisation on gender equality policies.

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Corporatist Arrangements and Gendered Interests Corporatism is characterised by collaboration and negotiation between employers, confederations and the government to develop social and economic policies (Saari et al., 2019). Schmitter (1974) characterised two types of corporatism: societal and state corporatism. While highly centralised state corporatism renders priority over state in terms of interest intermediation between the state and organisations, societal corporatism represents more equal relationship between state and interest groups. In general, it is likely to state that state corporatism, in which social interests are arranged and controlled by the government, becomes more dominant in authoritarian states, whereas societal corporatism is formed by independent interest-group organisations in democratic states (Schmitter, 1974, p. 103). The best examples of societal corporatism are Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark (Rommetvedt, 2017, p. 2). In countries known for their strong trade unions and social democratic governments (e.g. Sweden, Austria, and Norway), corporatism is greatly executed in tri-partite form that collective bargaining consists of the government, employers and unions. In contrast, the UK, Denmark and Switzerland follow a more pluralist way of collective bargaining in which the pressure-group politics is implemented by interest groups and a partial involvement of trade unions (Lehmbruch, 1977). Although corporatist policy-making relies on a centralised form of interest politics, this barely improves representation of gender interests because of highly male-oriented corporatist structures and institutions (Bergqvist, 2004). In addition, many factors prevent women’s employment and representation in trade unions, such as housework and domestic caring responsibilities attributed to women, masculinity within unions, legislation of unions and national structural mechanisms. Women face many constraints from unpaid work like familial duties that are considered their responsibility, and which significantly increases their workload. This arises from the traditional division of labour whereby men are coded as breadwinners and women caregivers. Hence, it is crucial for more women to participate in collective bargaining because their concerns are more likely to be expressed (Cockburn, 1996). Given that interests follow the gender lines, collective bargaining should adopt a gendered stance. Therefore, the design of collective bargaining and trade union structures are vital to minimise problems regarding gender-related policies. Increasing

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equality in collective bargaining is also related to the gender perspective of negotiators and social partners (Dickens, 2000). Unionisation of women is critical since it provides higher salaries and other benefits (Elvira & Saporta, 2001, p. 481; Status of Women in the States, 2015). However, women in many countries remain poorly represented in trade unions where male-dominated working life influences the male-dominated structure of trade unions. Conventional trade unionism has implemented its oligarchic and hegemonic tactics through exclusionary practices towards newcomers, particularly women, part-timers and ethnic minorities, to maintain its cultural and class-based homogeneity and restrict access to resources (Ledwith & Colgan, 2003). In short, because organised interests controlled by unions are significantly maledominated, they restrict women’s defence of their rights. The gradual rise in female labour participation has inevitably meant women’s specific priorities and needs have been discussed and adopted. It is thus important to analyse how trade unions’ gendered structures hinder women’s representation in particular countries. The process for selecting social partners should also be considered to increase women’s representation and include gendered interests in collective bargaining. Next section will elaborate on the background of corporatist policy-making in Turkey and examine how this selection process for social partners is executed in Turkey.

Corporatist State and Gendered Practices of Trade Unions in Turkey The most prominent characteristics of a corporatist system are to retain control of the status quo (Saari et al., 2019). Turkey is a country based on strong, centralised state tradition (Heper, 1992) that had historically weak interest group organisations with strong state-led structures, corporatism there developed differently to industrialised countries. Early Republican Turkey has been described as following ‘solidaristic corporatism’ (Çelik, 2019; Cizre-Sakallıo˘glu, 1992; Parla, 2009) because this period experienced no distributional crisis and, without a class struggle, there was not strong labour force to threaten the industrial-financial bourgeoisie. Instead, Turkey’s one-party government following state capitalist policies provided a low-cost, disciplined labour force to the national bourgeoisie to accumulate capital (Parla, 2009). Therefore, Turkey’s ideological traditions and lack of pluralist organisations encouraged the union movement to develop centralist interest intermediation features (Cizre-Sakallıo˘glu,

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1992, p. 725). In addition to these mechanisms, military interventions in Turkey also changed relationships and negotiation tactics between state and trade unions (Göktürk et al., 2012, p. 111). For instance, ˙ DISK remained closed almost 10 years after 1980 coup d’etat in Turkey. This decreased the power of unions by increasing political interventions towards unions. Unlike Europe’s transparent, rule-based collective bargaining within institutionalised neo-corporatist structures, the process in Turkey was non-transparent with ad hoc representation of relationships. Turkish unionism was born strictly embedded within the hierarchy and focused on developing good relations with the government for the sake of own interests, particularly successfully reaching collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) through political channels. In other words, Turkish trade unions historically preferred to deal with problems through their relationships with ruling parties or from legislation instead of negotiation and pressurising the government (Urhan, 2015, p. 68) and this led to Turkish trade unionism being developed along ideological lines (Dinler, 2012, p. 1). Union membership is traditionally low in Turkey. Some authors discuss that this is mostly related to previous military interventions to political life and labour relations (Göktürk et al., 2012), corruption allegations for union leaders (Adaman et al., 2009) and workplace intimidation/mobbing towards union members (Yildirim & Uckan, 2009). The first trade union law in 1947 established the Turkish Confederation of Workers’ Unions (TÜRK-I˙ S), ¸ which primarily organised public sector workers, in 1952, was controlled by the government (Wannöffel, 2011). Following a split within TÜRK-I˙ S¸ after a glass factory strike, ˙ ˙ DISK was established in 1967. DISK introduced a new class perspective to Turkish trade unionism (Kele¸s, 2018). Following the 1971 military coup, all strikes were prohibited and union activities required prior approval. HAK-I˙ S, ¸ which was close to the National Salvation Party and its Islamist ideology, was founded in 1976 following elections in 1973. Its strategy was non-confrontational, focused on unity between employers and employees. After the JDP took power and Turkey became an official EU candidate, the government made pluralist commitments that raised hopes for democratisation and civil society. However, the government later pursued corporatist goals enriched by religious and nationalist arguments (Çavu¸so˘glu & Strutz, 2014). In the 2010s, the government used strict

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tutelage over trade unions to force them to support the state. Thus, the structural problems of Turkey’s trade unions forced their obedience to state power (Arıcan, 2018). Çelik (2019) describes this as the construction of symbiotic relations between unions and government that supported certain trade unions through financial means and promotion opportunities. That is, government-trade union relations now depended on religious affinity (Arıcan, 2018) whereby religion became a ‘network resource’ under JDP rule (Bu˘gra & Sava¸skan, 2014). During the 2010s, the symbiotic relations based on religious networks between JDP and its supporters constituted an authoritarian corporatism (Çelik, 2019). Although a pluralist labour regime existed on paper, legislative changes and collective bargaining in practice evidenced authoritarian corporatism. Pluralism declined, both in union diversity and union internal democracy. Meanwhile, the government controlled collective bargaining and attempted to control wages by prohibiting strikes. Turkish trade unions’ oligarchic and authoritarian structures helped boost this control (Çelik, 2019). There are six dominant confed˙ erations in Turkey: TÜRK-I˙ S, ¸ HAK-I˙ S¸ and DISK for private-sector employees; MEMUR-SEN, Confederation of Turkey Public Employees’ ˙ Trade Unions (TÜRKIYE KAMU-SEN) and KESK for state workers. KAMU-SEN and TÜRK-I˙ S¸ are pro-nationalist while MEMUR-SEN and ˙ HAK-I˙ S¸ are Islamist, and KESK and DISK are leftist (Table 1). Symbiotic relations in Turkish labour relations have become evident under JDP rule. For instance, MEMUR-SEN accounted for most of the rise in public sector union membership, from 633,284 in 2002 to 1,570,798 in 2020. The most important reason for this is that under JDP, Table 1 Membership rates in labour confederations—January 2021

Labour Confederations TÜRK-I˙ S¸ HAK-I˙ S¸ ˙ DISK TÜM-I˙ S¸ ÜLKEM-I˙ S¸ ANADOLU-I˙ S¸ Independent trade unions Total

The number of members 1,131,749 711,295 193,866 1,647 4,127 1,028 25,764 2,069,476

Source Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services in Turkey, 2021

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MEMUR-SEN membership increases promotion opportunities for public servants due to symbiotic relations between JDP and MEMUR-SEN (Çelik, 2019; Erdinç, 2014). Furthermore, the government subsidises expensive union fees for public servants, encouraging them to join the trade unions (Erdinç, 2014.) Thus, in contrast to private sector confederations, there is no risk or extra cost in public servants’ confederations. The changing membership figures indicate that the JDP government supports certain confederations rather than freedom of union membership or more pluralist state-interest groups relationships. Industrial relations in Turkey have changed because government support for those trade unions that are ideologically close to JDP has affected union density and bargaining power and the role of ideology. Union structures and memberships are also gendered. Only 8.7% of ˙ employed women and 13.79% of employed men are unionised (TÜIK, 2019). The lack of women trade unionists results from low female labour force participation, the burden of familial roles, unions’ patriarchal structures, male-dominated networks and insufficient democracy within trade unions (Kele¸s, 2018; Toksöz, 1994; Topgül, 2016; Urhan, 2015; Yirmibe¸so˘glu, 2008). Turkey’s female labour force participation was 38.3% in 2018, which is much lower than the OECD average of 64.6% (OECD, 2020a, b). Toksöz (1994) explains this in terms of rural–urban migration. Turkey’s growing industrial and services sector required more educated and dynamic labour, dominated by men whereas women remained family workers with low human capital and obstacles to working. While Table 2 shows that women’s trade union membership has gradually increased, the same is not true for executive positions where they could exert power and authority. In Turkey, women are excluded from Table 2 Number and percentage of women union members in Turkish labour confederations Ideological stance

Confederation

Right-nationalist Right-Islamist Leftist

TÜRK-I˙ S¸ HAK-I˙ S¸ ˙ DISK

Number of women members

Percentage of women members

156,634 160,824 28,483

16 24 17

Source Authors’ own compilation based on 2020 data

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most union decision-making bodies. For example, TÜRK-I˙ S¸ has 34 unions but no women in executive positions. Although the Islamist HAK˙ I˙ S¸ has more women members than the leftist DISK, there are no women ˙ executives in its 21 unions. DISK has one confederation leader, who also ˘ leads the health sector union (DEV-SAGLIK I˙ S), ¸ and one female leader in the banking sector (BANK-SEN) out of 22 unions. In addition, the percentage of women members is highest in HAK-I˙ S, ¸ as it is seen in Table 2. KESK is the only public servants’ confederation providing equal representation for women members because of its quota system. Unlike MEMUR-SEN and KAMU-SEN, KESK has nine women in executive positions and two women leaders in its eleven unions while it has a woman president due to its co-chair system, two women on the executive committee and six female executives on disciplinary and supervisory boards. In sum, data prove that trade union structures in Turkey are obviously gendered while women’s representation in executive positions is relatively ˙ higher in leftist confederations, namely KESK and DISK. Next section will examine to what extent the ideological dispositions of the unions influence their bargaining power and women’s representation in unions.

Analysis on the Impact of Political Polarisation on Collective Bargaining Turkey’s highly polarised political system has influenced the unions and their gender policies in line with their ideological proximity to the government. Regarding gender specifically, leftist trade unions, which oppose the ruling party’s Islamist policies, focus more on women’s rights and eliminating masculine practices; right-wing trade unions, which are supported by the government, restrict women to familial roles (Kele¸s, 2018; Urhan, 2015). Confederations’ political and ideological orientations may affect their bargaining power based on their union membership density. Thus, ideological proximity to the government is crucial for collective bargaining power in Turkey because it indirectly increases membership for favoured confederations and unions. As a rightist conservative-Islamic ˙ governing party, JDP has distanced DISK and KESK while drawing in ˙ HAK-IS¸ and MEMUR-SEN.

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Using qualitative research methods as the most appropriate approach, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with four confed˙ eration leaders from three confederations: HAK-I˙ S, ¸ DISK and KESK, 5 between November 2019 and January 2020. As the most important decision-makers, confederation leaders are important actors for prioritising gender-related policies. Perspectives on women’s issues and gender equality reflect each confederation’s ideological orientations and create ˙ confrontations between Turkey’s secularist (DISK, KESK) and conservative trade unions (Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions -MEMUR-SEN; HAK-I˙ S) ¸ alongside class-based and left-wing versus right-wing nationalist schisms. In addition to our interview analysis, statistical data on the changes of the memberships for labour and servant confederations is also given, to compare the impact of ideological proximity with the ruling party on collective bargaining power of these confederations. ˙ Arzu Çerkezo˘glu, DISK’s first woman chair, relates its oppositional stance to its class perspective whereby JDP represents employers. This conflictual relationship became clear when Erdo˘gan described Çerkezo˘glu as an ‘extreme unionist’ during the Gezi Park Protests in 2013 (Hürriyet, 2013). Çerkezo˘glu also underlined the unfairness of collective bargaining and political polarisation in Turkey due to JDP’s symbiotic relationship with confederations close to the government: Collective bargaining is determined by the number of union members, but the issue of being the biggest confederation is related to being close to the government. With JDP, there has become a huge increase in MEMURSEN members and an extraordinary increase in HAK-I˙ S¸ members in the last 15 years… Of course, there is an unofficial process here; it is directly organised by public administrators in the public sector and by central government representatives in the private sector as well. (Interview with Arzu Çerkezo˘glu, December 2019)

Figure 1 clearly shows this unprecedented rise in membership. HAK-I˙ S¸ Confederation grew by 327% between 2013 and 2021.6 This rise was due to sub-contracted workers in public institutions under Legislation no. 6552 (omnibus bill) in 2019. Companies that won sub-contracts in various areas, including cleaning, food, security and transportation, had to unionise their workers, which especially helped HAK-I˙ S-affiliated ¸ ˙ union HIZMETI˙ S¸ to increase its membership enormously due to its

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proximity to the government, as did MEMUR-SEN. Aysun Gezen and Mehmet Bozgeyik, KESK co-chairs, expressed similar discontent about these relationships: When MEMUR-SEN attended the JDP congress, President Erdo˘gan said ‘our union’ for them. I believe that a trade union should be independent but there are organic relations with the president. MEMUR SEN, which has become JDP’s side branch, constantly praises the JDP government, which has been a political party dominated by policies against labour and job security. (Interview with Aysun Gezen, January 2020)

Thus, MEMUR-SEN and HAK-I˙ S¸ can be considered as closely tied with the government through symbiotic unionism and unequal interest intermediation. Below, Fig. 2 shows the drastic changes in the membership of MEMUR-SEN compared to the other public servants’ confederations. In contrast, one of our interviewees HAK-I˙ S¸ President, Arslan, stated was being grateful for the government’s collaboration, underlining their impartial, non-partisan attitude, and thanking Erdo˘gan for legislative changes that HAK-I˙ S¸ had requested (Interview, January 2020). Significantly, HAK-I˙ S¸ discourses, emphasised by Arslan, of ‘domestic and national unionism’ and a ‘new Turkey’ are similar to Erdo˘gan’s discourses in JDP’s 2018 Election Declaration and media interviews.7 Thus, these clear relationships between unions and political parties are considered

Fig. 2 Changes in membership of public servants’ confederations (Source Calculated by the authors based on data from the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services [The beginning date of the data is 2013, because official unionisation rates were misleading due to the failures on calculations between 1983 and 2012. In 2012, these miscalculations were eliminated by the government but renewed official data is available starting from 2013])

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compatible with traditional Turkish trade unionism, previously specified by Urhan (2015) and Dinler (2012). Regarding the relationship between political orientations and gender, and whether it helps woman members reach executive positions, all women chairs are in leftist unions. However, no interviewees explained this relationship with ideological lines, although KESK’s co-chair Gezen described the political Islamists’ perspective towards women as ‘problematic’.Thus, leftist union support for women is seen as a part of their ‘egalitarian mindset’: Being a woman chair is related to both ideology and struggles within the organisation, but more related to an egalitarian viewpoint. However, struggles within the organisation is more important, where equal representation and women’s problems are discussed and resolved by women personally. Therefore, our perspective opposes the political Islamist perspective, which considers women in a secondary position and perceives women’s role as giving birth or only within the family. Inevitably, these ideological differences create problems for other confederations to include women. However, the struggle in the confederation already existed before the cochair system. Even without a women confederation leader, we already had a women’s council and woman secretariat in KESK. However, I believe that the most important problem is a very thick glass ceiling in this country. Therefore, the presence of women in executive union positions is an important indicator of this struggle. (Interview with Aysun Gezen, January 2020)

Although Gezen specifically emphasises how ideology affects women’s ˙ union presence, both she and DISK’s chair Çerkezo˘glu see unions’ institutional mechanisms and leadership initiatives as more important. Çerkezoglu’s emphasis on women’s representation points to the motivation of organisations and the determined attitude of union leaders although ideological tradition of unions can be seen as the motivation of organisations and leaders: There are different organisational structures in labour and public servants confederations. After the 80s, public servants were differently organised than labour confederations. It is important to think about the different struggles of confederations and the willingness of some union leaders to support women friendly initiatives. Therefore, the meaning of my chairwoman is to take more voluntary decisions for women. There has ˙ never been a woman in the executive position in DISK. My existence

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made DISK’s view regarding women and gender discrimination clearer. (Interview with Arzu Çerkezo˘glu, December 2019)

Çerkezo˘glu emphasises other factors to explain women’s representation, particularly institutional mechanisms and initiatives introduced by union executives. Similarly, Arslan argues that increasing women’s representation requires a bottom-up approach: There is a quota for women’s representation in KESK’s Charter. Therefore, there is no bottom-up representation in KESK. The situation in DISK is conjectural. Çerkezo˘glu became confederation’s leader as the previous ˙ DISK leader resigned because of his deputyship. We care about a bottomup approach. Women should rise on merit, so we are against the quota because our women should struggle for it. Therefore, we pay particular attention to our women’s committees. At the international conferences we have attended, everyone emphasised how well our committees are designed. We want women in these committees to become active, competent leaders in Turkey’s union movement in the future. (Interview with Mahmut Arslan, January 2020)

While Gezen believes that the Islamic understanding of women’s representation depends on familial and traditional roles, Arslan does not specify ˙ any specific label. In contrast to DISK and KESK’s egalitarian perspective, ˙ HAK-IS¸ considers women as different in nature but equal in rights. That is, it rejects Western feminism and gender equality understanding. Finally, we found that a woman union leader does enable genderrelated policies to reach Turkey’s public agenda. Intense polarisation forces all confederations to focus on labour rights violations and government policies. Furthermore, because leftist confederations like DISK and KESK with women union leaders have few members, they struggle to collaborate with the government because they are not entitled to make proposals to the government. As a labour confederation, DISK can reach collective agreements in workplaces. However, KESK has limited power because CBAs are only implemented with the government. As can be seen from Table 3, KESK has the highest women’s representation because of its organisational structures, such as a women’s council and a woman secretary. However, KESK cannot participate in collective bargaining due to its membership density, and Gezen, KESK’s chair, has limited effect on gender-related policies. It is also important to note

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Table 3 Number of women and men confederation members with decisionmaking roles Ideological stance

Confederation Executive board

Supervisory board

Women Men Women Men

Disciplinary board

Heads of trade unions

Women Men

Women Men

Rightnationalist Right-Islamist

TÜRK-I˙ S¸

–

5

–

5

–

5

–

34

HAK-I˙ S¸

–

5

1

1

21

˙ DISK MEMURSEN KAMU-SEN

1 –

6 8

– –

1 –

2 –

20 11

–

11

–

–

3+ 2* 4 5+ 5* 5

–

Leftist Right-Islamist

3+ 1* 3 5+ 5* 4

–

11

KESK

3

4

3

2

3

2

2

9

RightNationalist Leftist

*Substitute members Source Authors’ own compilation

that KESK’s CBA proposals do not specifically adopt a gender perspective (kesk.org.tr, 2019) although some KESK unions, such as E˘gitim-Sen, have included such requests (egitim-sen.org.tr, 2019). HAK-I˙ S’s ¸ initiatives for gender-related policies in workplace CBAs are noteworthy. Under Mahmut Arslan, its charter was changed significantly to improve women’s status while its women’s committees are active. Article 4/3 is solely dedicated to protecting and empowering women workers and specifies HAK-I˙ S’s ¸ fundamental aims. The confederation also created the HAK-I˙ S¸ Strategy Document with the help of the women’s committee, academicians and experts. Consequently, genderrelated supports, such as parental and breastfeeding leave, leave for the women’s committee and World Women’s Day, financial aid for marriage ˙ and births are widely implemented in CBAs by HAK-I˙ S¸ unions. DISK ˙ remains weaker than KESK and HAK-IS, ¸ lacking any reference to women in its charter, although its CBAs do include some gender-related priori˙ ties in CBAs (DISK, 2019). KESK’s organisational structure best ensures women’s representation because of its quota system. In contrast, the effectiveness of HAK-I˙ S’s ¸ women’s committees, workplace CBAs, HAKI˙ S¸ Charter’s emphasis on women indicate that HAK-I˙ S’s ¸ efforts will lead to improvements for women.

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Gezen stated that collective bargaining in Turkey has no specific agenda for women and gender-related policies, adding that ‘we propose some policies but they are not accepted by the government’ (Interview with Gezen, January 2020). Çerkezo˘glu had also seen gender-related ˙ proposals rejected but she also mentioned DISK’s general focus on women-friendly CBAs (Interview with Çerkezo˘glu, December 2019). ˙ Overall, neither KESK nor DISK has a clear gender perspective while ˙ DISK takes an egalitarian class perspective against gender discrimination. Despite its Islamic perspective, HAK-I˙ S¸ has well-organised gender policies, which Gezen describes as ‘non-egalitarian’. Arslan explains women’s importance for trade unions as follows: It is difficult being a woman in Turkey. Being a woman worker, being a mother is more difficult. How can we tackle these challenges? This is the first time we have discussed this issue in the trade union. Why should women not be more visible in unions? Why should women not participate in union struggles? Why should they not take part in collective agreements? We have developed a different method without forcing the structures in our charter to change. We placed our women’s committees close to our branches and started working in these committees. In those committees, women came together, talked about their private lives; we started working with women on these issues. This structure forms the basis of women’s struggle in HAK-I˙ S. ¸ Based on this, we established a structure in our confederation. We are also attending UN meetings to learn what can be done about women’s issues. (Interview with Mahmut Arslan, January 2020)

HAK-I˙ S’s ¸ motto, ‘Fıtratta farklılık, haklarda e¸sitlik’ (different in nature, equal in rights), represents an Islamic understanding of ‘gender justice’ that differs from Western conceptualisations of ‘gender equality’.8 Arslan described HAK-I˙ S’s ¸ focus on women’s family-based policies: We have practices that encourage women to have children. For example, we have created environments in our unions where children can stay in kindergartens. We also made new arrangements for the representation of our women members in congresses as much as possible. Accordingly, all delegates were being taken by men members. With the new arrangements in our regulations, for example, in our unions with 500 women and 500 men, we have arranged that, if 100 delegates are selected, 50 will be women. (Interview with Mahmut Arslan, January 2020)

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Thus, HAK-I˙ S’s ¸ gender perspective differs from Western approaches because it mostly focuses on facilitating women’s lives without weakening their family bonds. Arslan also supported women’s representation in HAK-I˙ S, ¸ despite admitting that ‘unfortunately, many men do not want women unionists’ (Interview with Arslan, January 2020). In short, due to the oligarchic structure of Turkish unions (Demirbilek, 2003), their activities, including promoting women’s representation, depend critically on their leaders’ initiatives and voluntary decisions.

Conclusion This article revealed the effects of Turkey’s political polarisation on women’s union representation and prioritisation of gender-related policies. Although their perspectives are not primarily gendered, the structure ˙ of left-wing confederations (KESK and DISK) in Turkey has encouraged the election of women unionists. However, highly polarised political relationships stop them from actively participating in shaping genderrelated policies. That is, Turkey lacks appropriate pluralist arrangements and CBAs are exclusive due to the political polarisation, whereby the relationship between the incumbent party and non-state actors adopts a corporatist structure based on selective ideological proximity. Regarding the first sub-question, while Çerkezo˘glu, Gezen and Bozgeyik claim that the government ignores their proposals, HAK-I˙ S¸ has successfully struggled for its sub-contracted employees. Furthermore, its membership has risen significantly, which Arslan attributes to its efforts to support sub-contracted employees, claiming that HAK-I˙ S¸ is ‘non-partisan’ and treats everyone equally. However, Arslan’s ‘domestic and national’ discourse, which is almost identical to Erdo˘gan’s, and its membership growth of 327% in seven years clearly associate its success with ideological proximity to JDP. Thus, the rising membership of HAK-I˙ S¸ and MEMUR-SEN with government support strengthened their bargaining power because Turkey’s current legislation only allows confederations with high membership rates to participate in collective bargaining. We also highlighted that ideology influences the number of women union executives. In line with the argument of Topgül (2016) regarding conservative unions, Çerkezo˘glu and Gezen accept that ideological traditions partially influence women’s chances of leading unions, however, both suggest that institutional mechanisms and leaders’ initiatives are

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more important determinants of women’s union representation. Due to Arslan’s efforts to improve women’s representation, HAK-I˙ S¸ now has two women on its executive boards while women are now 24% of HAK-I˙ S’s ¸ membership, which is the highest proportion of Turkish confederations (Interview with Arslan). In contrast to Arat’s (2010) argument regarding the relationship between Islamic traditions and women, HAKI˙ S’s ¸ encouragement of women’s representation in its unions demonstrates that gender-related policies may operate independently of union leaders’ gender or ideology. The HAK-I˙ S¸ Women Strategy Document, women’s committees, changes to union charters, inclusion of gender-related leave in CBAs and relating women issues with international trade unions all make HAK-I˙ S¸ unique in its efforts for women’s representation. Finally, as an answer to the second sub-question, we discovered the gender of union leaders appears somewhat irrelevant to unions’ gender policies, which contradicts Kirton and Healy’s study (1999), which claimed that, if more women take executive positions in unions then gender-related policies will be more prioritised in collective bargaining and attract more women unionists. However, we found that gender has no immediate effect. Although our interviewees stated that women’s membership rates may have risen due to their leadership, there is no ˙ data to confirm this. As DISK’s first woman chair, Çerkezo˘glu takes a class-dominant perspective that, she claims, encompasses gender. KESK’s ˙ gender perspective is more obvious than DISK’s, but Gezen acknowledged that KESK had a women council and secretary before she became chair, and highlighted KESK’s institutional structure for women’s representation. Thus, institutional mechanisms structured from a gender perspective may better promote gender-related policies. In addition, the ˙ women chairs in KESK and DISK claimed that they had attempted gender-related policies but their proposals were ignored because the government had increased the membership of ideologically compatible confederations to exclude the oppositional confederations from collective bargaining. Consequently, Çerkezo˘glu admitted that her confederation can only promote gender-related topics through workplace CBAs. The impact of ideological orientations of unions on gender-related policies does not appear entirely dependent. Rather, other factors are involved, such as confederations’ institutional structures and the efforts of their executives. Because Turkish confederations largely depend on their leaders, the leaders’ initiatives are the most important determinant of gender-related policies and women’s representation. Future studies could

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focus on the EU’s presumptive role as an institution that can decrease polarisation in Turkey and enhance women’s representation in trade unions. However, ‘EU-niversal’ values could still be an obstacle from the perspective of pro-religious actors in Turkey. As argued in this paper, this changes the model from a ‘velvet triangle’ to an ‘iron square’, which makes religion an important social network in Turkey. This refers to how Turkey’s political and institutional structure as well as informal governance differ from the informal networks building the gender equality in the EU. Acknowledgements This research was funded by Scientific Research Council at Istanbul Medeniyet University, under the project S-BEK-2019-1639. We are thankful for their contribution. We also thank the editors of this volume for their invaluable feedbacks.

Notes ˙ 1. DISK Women Commission, 5 July 2020, http://disk.org.tr/2020/ ˙ 07/disk-kadin-komisyonu-istanbul-sozlesmesi-yasatir/; ‘Istanbul Sözle¸smesi tartı¸smalarına STK’lardan tepki’, 28 July 2020, http:// sosyalup.net/istanbul-sozlesmesi-tartismalarina-stklardan-tepki/. 2. CNN, 21 March 2021, ‘Turkey withdraws from Istanbul convention to combat violence against women’, https://edition.cnn. com/2021/03/20/europe/turkey-convention-violence-womenintl/index.html. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/canan-kaf tancioglu-chp-istanbul-sozlesmesi-dayanisma-agi-kurduklarini-duy urdu-1823310. BBC News, 21 March 2021, ‘Domestic violence: US condemns Turkey for quitting treaty’, https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-56476909. 3. Authoritarian corporatism term has been used by Pinto (2014) to refer to the structure that a set of institutions were established by the state to legitimise its organic representation. Thus, organised interests and elites were to be co-opted and controlled in line with the ideology of the state. 4. In Turkish politics, right-wing parties have always dominated the political system. This situation facilitated the increase in the membership density of right-wing unions due to close relationships between state and unions. Our interviewees, Aysun Gezen, Mehmet Bozgeyik and Arzu Çerkezo˘glu also stated that indirect support

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through public officials of JDP influence membership density of HAK-I˙ S¸ and MEMUR-SEN, which support JDP. 5. Interviews were previously planned with six major confederations but only three confederations positively replied to participate in this ˙ and DISK ˙ research. Interview with the leaders of HAK-IS were held face-to-face in Ankara and Istanbul respectively; interviews with the co-chairs of KESK were organised via telephone and mail. Names of ˙ our interviewees are Arzu Çerkezo˘glu (DISK Chair), Aysun Gezen and Mehmet Bozgeyik (KESK Co-chairs), Mahmut Arslan (HAK-I˙ S¸ Chair). Interviews lasted for 30–45 minutes, and interviewees gave permission to share their names. 6. In fact, MEMUR-SEN grew by 2322% between 2002 and 2020 due to its symbiotic relations with the government. For further information, see https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/memur-sen-akpdonemiyle-buyudu-562550. 7. ‘Domestic and national’ and ‘New Turkey’ are slogans frequently used by the JDP The first one has been used in many areas, from fighting terrorism to creating a new presidential system and a new sense of unity and its goal is to explain the identity and political stance as well as to achieve an inclusive and founding language, while the latter implies a break from the past secular state tradition. 8. Gender justice concept was firstly conceptualised by Yılmaz (2015) in Turkey who argues equality is not an appropriate term to use, because it was created by modernity and does not take into account differences among women and men. In this concept, it is assumed that women and men are not equal in their nature, but they are equal for opportunities. This concept is also common in the literature and political discourse of Muslim societies all around the world.

References Adaman, F., Bu˘gra, A., & Insel, A. (2009). Societal context of labor union strategy: The case of Turkey. Labor Studies Journal, 34(2), 168–188. Arat, Y. (2010). Religion, politics and gender equality in Turkey: Implications of a democratic paradox? Third World Quarterly, 31(6), 869–884.

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Conclusions on Social Partners and Gender Equality in Europe Anna Elomäki , Johanna Kantola , and Paula Koskinen Sandberg

Introduction When putting together this edited collection our aim has been to bring scholarly debates about social partners, labour market organisations, collective bargaining and corporatism more forcefully to the academic field of gender and politics research. The chapters in this volume have illustrated the multiple ways in which collective bargaining and corporatist processes can either advance or hinder gender equality and how social partners and labour market organisations are relevant for national and European Union (EU) gender equality policies. Previous gender research on these issues has generated a number of crucial insights on

Present Address: A. Elomäki (B) · J. Kantola · P. Koskinen Sandberg Tampere University, Tampere, Finland e-mail: [email protected] J. Kantola e-mail: [email protected] P. Koskinen Sandberg e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5_13

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questions about women’s representation, activism and leadership in trade unions. We have combined this research interest with two other dimensions closely related to research topics in gender and politics, namely the role of gender in the processes of collective bargaining and the influence of labour market organisations on gender equality policy and public discourses about gender equality. In this concluding chapter, we discuss the findings of the book chapters on the three dimensions: (i) collective bargaining and gender equality, (ii) social partners’ influence on gender policymaking and framings of equality and (iii) gendered patterns of representation in trade unions. We demonstrate how discussing the three dimensions together provides a comprehensive approach for understanding the role of social partners in achieving gender equality and the genderedness of corporatist dynamics. We have argued that social partners should be seen as important although not necessarily benevolent actors for gender equality. The chapters illustrate how they have powers to advance and oppose gender equality through collective bargaining and social dialogue. The chapters in this volume have analysed the roles these organisations play in different European countries and illustrated the great diversity in national regimes. Moreover, corporatist systems, practices and institutions are gendered in their functioning and create gendered effects, for example, through upholding rather than contesting the systemic undervaluation of feminised work.

Collective Bargaining and Gender Equality The most central task of trade unions and employer organisations is to agree on conditions of work, including wages and wage-setting practices. However, what is agreed upon in collective bargaining varies between countries. Previous scholarship shows that collective bargaining and collective agreements can entail and perpetuate inequalities that are often covert, resulting from historical developments but also maintained and reinforced by current industrial relations actors. Moreover, in many national contexts, including the ones covered in this book, the practices and structures of collective bargaining are changing. A typical trend is increasing decentralisation of collective bargaining, which is the reality in some countries, and currently debated in others. Countries also vary in terms of union density and collective agreement coverage, which in turn impacts the power position of labour market organisations. For example,

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France is characterised by high collective agreement coverage but low union density while the Nordic countries have relatively high union density and also relatively high level of collective bargaining coverage. Union density and collective bargaining coverage can also vary between genders and other social categories (e.g. Ta¸skın & Çakın in this volume; Ledoux & Krupka, in this volume). Several chapters (Wagner & Teigen; Erikson; Koskinen Sandberg et al.) of the book deal with changing practices of collective bargaining in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland). While there is variation between these contexts, there are also striking similarities. All three countries have a large feminised public sector and a gender pay gap that results from this gender segregation of the labour market, in combination with the ongoing undervaluation of feminised work. Sweden, Norway and Finland have also all moved towards a model of collective bargaining where the male-dominated export industry sets the pace for wage increases and the feminised public sector is not supposed to negotiate wage increases that go above the ones negotiated by the export industries. This results in freezing the wage relativities between these sectors, in permanent tensions within the industrial relations systems and, ultimately, maintaining the gender pay gap. Ines Wagner and Mari Teigen analyse the Norwegian pattern bargaining model and its implications for gender equality by studying the problematisations of the gender pay gap of the main central trade union association. They examine the discourse on the relationship between the gender pay gap and the Norwegian wage-setting system. While the pattern bargaining model is beneficial for many low-wage sectors, the relationship of pattern bargaining to other feminised sectors is silenced. Also the higher-educated feminised public sector, that is not part of the lowwage sector, has to follow the wage norms set by the male-dominated manufacturing sector. Thus, the pattern bargaining model contributes to maintaining the hierarchy between the feminised public sector and male-dominated sectors. There are similar findings from Sweden and Finland. Sweden also follows an export industry-driven model of collective bargaining. Josefina Erikson’s chapter focuses on an effort to incorporate gender into collective bargaining in Sweden. In 2007, the so-called Gender Equality Pot was adopted in the blue-collar sector with the specific aim of narrowing the gender pay gap. The initiative was successful, yet controversial. Much of the debate was related to whether gender is a relevant category in

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collective bargaining, but also to different understandings of the underlying cause of the gender pay gap as resulting from either undervaluation of women work or women working in less demanding jobs. Paula Koskinen Sandberg, Anna Elomäki, Armi Mustosmäki and Johanna Kantola elaborate on similar findings in Finland, where the undervaluation of feminised work and the resulting dissatisfaction of feminised public sector employees is an ongoing debate. In the same context, several actors support the move towards decentralised local bargaining, the export industry-driven ‘Finland’s model’ of collective bargaining is used, and the government has implemented competitiveness measures that cut labour cost especially from the public sector. The book also entails two examples of collective bargaining and gender equality in France. Clémence Ledoux and Rachel Krupka analyse domestic work and home-based care sectors and the development of collective agreements covering these workers, who are mainly women, often migrants and often in precarious employment. Collective agreements covering domestic workers and carers employed by households and service providers have existed for more than 40 years in France, making the country an exception in European context. The chapter shows how the institutional context in France has contributed to including domestic work and home-based care sectors in collective agreements. Still, workers in this sector remain excluded from much of the labour and social-security law that protects workers in other sectors. In their chapter, Susan Milner and Sophie Pochic analyse equality bargaining in France, and why equality bargaining, although relatively well developed in France compared to many other European countries, has failed to be successful in reducing the gender pay gap. The authors argue that the transformative potential of equality bargaining has been repeatedly undermined by its institutional configuration and the weak regime for legal enforcement, as well as its instrumentalisation by policy-makers.

Social Partners’ Influence on Gender Policymaking and Framings of Equality Social partners’ influence on policymaking and public debates about gender equality varies greatly according to national—or in the case of the EU, supranational—contexts. It is evidently shaped by corporatist traditions and processes. It is also impacted by the shifting political context—which political parties are in power—and the overall social and

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economic context, most importantly, the economic crisis from 2008 onwards. The chapters of the book have provided examples of institutionalised structures for influence in some European countries and contexts. Sophie Jacquot’s chapter discusses the significance that the institutionalised social dialogue has had for social partners’ influence on EU gender equality policy. Jacquot’s chapter takes a longitudinal historical perspective to the evolution of these relations in the EU. In the early years, institutionalised structures for both social dialogue and for advancing gender equality within and by the social partners were lacking and this was a time when keeping gender equality on the agenda was highly reliant on individual actors, such as feminist lawyers, and their contacts and networks for example with the Commission. The chapter shows how the impact that the labour market organisations might have had was hampered by deep mistrust towards EU gender policy. The chapter shows how the employers’ organisations did not agree with outlawing discrimination and how the trade unions organisations’ distrusted the Commission’s elitist gender policy. However, social dialogue cemented the privileged position of social partners also in the field of gender equality. Jacquot’s chapter has numerous interesting insights on the influence of this on gender equality policy in the EU, for example issues such as work-life balance, parental leave and gender stereotypes have become central, often at the expense of other issues such as sexual harassment or the quality of work. The impact of the economic crisis and the primacy of economic policy in the last ten years have challenged and changed the influence of social partners. The tripartite relationships have become more difficult and the social partner’s influence, also in gender policy, more curtailed. Most importantly, this has meant that social partners are back to influence through lobbying activities rather than through collective negotiations). My Rafstedt’s chapter, in turn, discusses parallel developments in Spain, where the social partners can affect government policy through tripartite social dialogue and an advisory body. Testifying the importance of the political, social and economic context for this dialogue and social partners’ influence, the chapter explains that the tripartite social dialogue suffered during the economic crisis in Spain and during the period when the conservative party was in power (2011–2018). The Spanish government adopted severe austerity measures in response to the financial crisis, including a labour reform that shifted the power balance between workers and employers further in favour of the employers. This was done by

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prioritising collective bargaining at the level of the businesses rather than sector-wide bargaining. It also made it more difficult to negotiate worklife balance measures in the workplace. The socialist government made efforts to re-activate the tripartite social dialogue. Again we see how both governing political parties and shifts in the economic context, especially the severe impact of the economic crisis from 2008, shape the impact and influence and are relevant to gender policy. Many of the chapters discuss the social partners’ influence on gender policy at the discursive level. They provide insights into the ways in which social partners construct different gender equality policy questions and how this may matter for the broader gender equality politics in national contexts and at the European level. The chapters also show that discursive struggles also matter for collective bargaining. It is evident that social partners’ constructions of gender equality vary across different gender policy fields being more progressive in some and more conservative and hindering gender equality in others. Both the chapters on the EU (Elomäki & Kantola; Jacquot, in this volume) and on Spain (Rafstedt, in this volume) show how work-life balance and adequate provision of care services is a concern shared by social partners. Rafstedt suggests that trade unions and employers’ views converge on a similar understanding of how the uneven distribution of caring responsibilities represents an important challenge to female employment, and that this should be tackled by increasing men’s caring roles and public provision of childcare. The question on equal pay is one where the social partners’ views diverge and are in conflict and trade unions and employers’ organisations seek to influence governments for opposing policy impacts. At the EU level, trade unions confederation calls for binding anti-discrimination measures and pay transparency from the Commission and the member states (Elomäki & Kantola, in this volume). Similarly, in Spain, social partners have conflicting perspectives on the role played by the undervaluation of women’s work and on the power balance between workers and employers (Rafstedt, in this volume). The chapter shows how trade unions consider the undervaluation of female work to be central to the persistence of the gender pay gap. However, as shown by Wagner and Teigen’s and Erikson’s chapters on collective bargaining, some trade unions in Norway and Sweden construct gender pay gap in a narrow way that allows them to oppose specific equality bargaining measures and defend bargaining systems with unequal outcomes.

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Gendered Patterns of Representation in Trade Unions The chapters of the volume also provide insights on gendered patterns of representation in trade unions in the context of neoliberalisation, consequent crises, rising authoritarianism and reconfiguring corporatist systems and power relationships. In addition to addressing women’s descriptive representation and structures for advancing women and promoting gender equality (the chapters by Artus and Holland and Ta¸skın and Çakın), the chapters deepen discussions about the integration and nonintegration of gender and feminist perspectives in trade unions’ collective bargaining agendas and campaigns in different national contexts. A key theme emerging from the chapters—increasingly important in the context of the long-term care crisis intensified by austerity and the Covid-19 crisis—is how trade unions’ represent the feminised, undervalued care sector: public sector care workers, privatised care sector, as well as the emerging sector of home-based work and care (chapters by Artus & Holland; Cullen; Erikson; Koskinen Sandberg et al.; Ledoux & Krupka; Wagner & Teigen). Trade unions can be seen as key actors in the struggle for societal and economic valuation of this work, including for better wages and working conditions, that is indispensable for society. Strikes are a key tool for trade unions to push through their demands. Artus and Holland show in their chapter how in Germany strikes in female-dominated sectors have become more common in the 2010s, including in fields at the core of the care crisis, such as the day-care sector and hospitals. As care work does not follow the logic of factory work, this has required learning new strike strategies. There is a new visibility of unionised, striking women within the German trade union movement, even if the strikes have not always led to the fulfillment of strikers’ demands. The chapters also emphasise—in line with the importance of framings mentioned above—the need to interrogate understandings of gender and care in these actions. Cullen’s chapter on Irish trade union campaigns for early educators, nurses and midwives shows that trade unions relied on feminised framings that centred sacrifice and valour as core characteristics of care work. Cullen argues that tackling undervaluation of female care work requires ‘a robust epistemic shift that centres feminist critique of the material, policy and cultural logics that maintain dominant gendered

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constructs of care.’ This also requires critique of austerity and marketisation as well as demands for public investment in care—a demand that also employers have at least in some contexts supported (Elomäki & Kantola, in this volume). A crucial question related to representation is intersectional analysis and unions’ ability to represent the interests of those in the most vulnerable position. Care work, for instance, is typically performed by women of colour and/or women of migrant background, and the commodification of care has led to new forms of precarious work, such as domestic work and home-based care. Cullen’s chapter on Irish trade union campaigns demonstrates that even if intersectional elements were emergent in nurses’ mobilisations, efforts to assert a homogenised and feminised professional identification can flatten aspects of racialised inequality and downplay racialised hierarchies between care workers. Ledoux and Krupka’s chapter shows that although in France trade unions have campaigned and negotiated for domestic workers, they have had difficulties in understanding the needs and defending the rights of undocumented migrant domestic workers. Based on the chapters, unions have not adopted an explicitly intersectional approach to gender equality. The chapters also draw attention to various challenges to unions’ gender equality work. Gender-segregated unions in the gender-segregated labour market might view gender equality and its role in collective bargaining differently. This raises questions about the relationship between gender and class in trade union work. Artus and Holland’s analysis of the gender equality work and bargaining policy of a key male-dominated German union shows that despite a gender-democratic self-image, organisational culture and collective bargaining work remain predominantly male-oriented in many respects. For example, omission of gender-specific differences in gainful employment preserves a male bias in bargaining policy. The case of the Swedish Gender Equality Pot shows how male-dominated industrial unions may not share the analysis of the undervaluation of women’s work and prioritise class over gender and are negative to integrating gender as a category in collective bargaining. Similarly, the case of pattern bargaining in Norway illustrates how trade unions might prioritise the interests of certain members to the detriment of underrepresented groups and defend existing collective bargaining systems even when they might be detrimental to gender equality. The unwillingness of male-dominated unions to support feminised unions’ claims can become a hindrance to advancing gender equality.

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In terms of other challenges, Artus and Holland show how in Germany, in both male and female-dominated sectors, women’s and gender equality policy takes place organisationally largely in isolation from the unions’ core business. Taskin and Cakin’s chapter, in contrast, shows that in the Islamic and authoritarian Turkish context, union leaders are important actors for prioritising gender-related policies. Moreover, the ideological orientation of the unions (secular vs. conservative) is a key factor influencing their perspectives on gender equality. Although conservative unions engage in gender equality work too, they represent an Islamic understanding of gender justice and focus on familialist policies that encourage women to have more children.

Finishing Thoughts and Future Research Agendas The insightful case studies of collective bargaining systems and practices, social partners’ influence in policymaking and trade unions’ gender equality work included in this volume call for systematic comparative research on social partners, corporatism and gender equality. The chapters also allow us to discern some trends or themes that, in our view, call for further research. One such theme is how reconfigurations of corporatist systems and power relations in the context of neoliberalisation and the 2007–2008 economic crisis have affected the possibilities to advance gender equality through corporatist processes, whether through collective bargaining or social partners’ participation in policymaking. In many contexts, these effects have been negative. For instance, Rafsted suggests that the shifting power balance between employers and employees has become a new bottleneck for advancing gender equality through collective bargaining. The exact form and effects of these shifts in countries representing different gender and corporatist regimes should be analysed in detail. As suggested by Koskinen Sandberg et al., these shifts might also provide opportunities for advancing gender equality. Another trend that we observe and that requires further attention is the employers’ increasing interest in gender equality. As noted above, in addition to blocking gender equality initiatives in the context of collective bargaining and gender policymaking, employers engage in elaborate discursive strategies to delegitimise inclusion of gender in collective bargaining, to legitimise wage differentials as well as to limit the scope of gender equality policy. The chapters illustrate significant similarities

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between employers’ discourses and framings across national contexts. Given the shift in power balance towards employers, studying employers’ strategies and discourses as well as potential convergences with feminist agendas (childcare at least in some countries) is more important than ever. The third theme we want to emphasise for future research is the key role that social partners and corportist systems play in either intensifying or addressing the long-standing care crisis, a key element of which is the undervaluation of feminised care work. The chapters of the volume have provided several examples of how collective bargaining systems and social partners’ policy agendas and constructions may, on the one hand, perpetuate the undervaluation of this work and the invisibility of specific groups of people performing it. On the other hand, social partners may seek ways to value this work, defend the rights of all those who perform it or tackle the care crisis in other ways, for instance through critiquing the marketisation of care and calling for investment in care infrastructure. The Covid-19 crisis, which has revealed the value and indispensability of care work, provides an opening for explicitly feminist social partner activities around care work. The country cases of the book illustrate, however, how the shifting corporatist regime may sideline demands for better wages (Finland; Norway) or how feminised framings may justify handclapping and other symbolic celebrations as an appropriate compensation (Ireland). For research on industrial relations, the volume shows that gender is a key line of conflict between trade unions and employers and among trade unions too. Given the fundamental role of gender in the development, organisation and day-to-day sustaining of capitalism, examining conflicts between labour and capital from a gender perspective adds valuable new insights into how the relative power of employers and the capitalist system as a whole are maintained. Employers’ tendency to either omit gender or to discuss it narrowly from the business and economic perspective, as well as male-dominated unions’ reluctance to address gender equality and the undervaluation of feminised work maintains a silence about gender and care. This silence is key to the legitimisation and reproduction of capitalism and the forms of exploitation and inequality embedded in it. Finally, we suggest that for gender and politics research the volume shows, first, the relevance of social partners and corporatist processes and practices for European countries’ gender regimes. This has been illustrated throughout the volume and in this concluding chapter. Gender and politics research has a lot to contribute to these themes. Second, many of the core questions, issues, concepts and theories used in this book

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are very close to the research concerns of gender and politics scholars and include questions about quotas for ensuring women’s representation; intersectionality; gendered institutions and norms; constructions of gender equality; and implementation of gender policies. Studying social partners can bring crucial insights into these debates and we hope that the volume has gone some way in illustrating this.

Index

A Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, 154, 160 Anti-discrimination law, 104 Anti-gender, 4, 182 Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, 152 Artificial Intelligence (AI), 183, 189 Austerity, 4, 6, 9, 11–13, 19, 21, 122, 126, 129, 132, 137, 139, 140, 162, 174, 184, 202, 206, 246, 247, 250, 251, 260, 263, 301, 303, 304 Authoritarian corporatism, 22, 275, 280, 291

B Blue collar sector, 18, 50, 53, 55, 65, 66, 299 Boards, company, 113, 186 Brexit, 13, 246

Brussels, 173 Business case, 159, 185, 189, 199, 207 BusinessEurope, 20, 150, 164, 167, 172, 173, 175, 177, 179–181, 183–185, 187, 189 Business interests, 173, 174, 180, 189 Butler, Judith, 15, 176

C Capitalism, 125, 306 capital, 34, 149, 187, 278, 306 capitalist, 10, 278, 306 Care care crisis, 11, 21, 225, 234, 235, 238, 239, 303, 306 care sector, 9, 11, 21, 82, 224, 235, 300, 303 care work, 4, 11, 12, 15, 21, 22, 135, 204, 225, 234, 235, 237, 246–249, 251, 253–258, 262, 263, 303, 304, 306

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Elomäki et al. (eds.), Social Partners and Gender Equality, Gender and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81178-5

309

310

INDEX

care workers, 12, 16, 21, 22, 71, 72, 81, 88, 133, 134, 235, 246, 247, 254–258, 260, 262, 303, 304 Childcare, 49, 98, 101, 109, 111, 165, 176, 177, 185, 187, 189, 190, 204, 228, 236, 239, 246, 247, 249, 251, 255–258, 261–263, 302, 306 Children, 71, 78, 128, 182, 208, 233, 237, 255–258, 261, 288, 305 Civil society, 130, 135, 136, 139, 160, 161, 188, 275, 279 Class, 8, 14–16, 18, 38, 49–54, 57, 61–67, 99, 102, 155, 231, 245, 249, 250, 263, 264, 271, 278, 279, 283, 288, 290, 304 Collective collective agreements, 9, 16, 18, 30, 35, 55, 72–75, 77–91, 106, 111, 114, 124, 127, 129, 132, 133, 135, 136, 139, 154, 203, 204, 224–226, 232–234, 237, 238, 248, 276, 286, 288, 298–300 collective bargaining, 4, 6–10, 12, 13, 16–19, 21, 22, 29–33, 36, 38, 41, 42, 49–57, 60, 63–67, 98–102, 105, 106, 108, 109, 114, 121–124, 126, 127, 129, 131, 133, 135, 138–140, 182, 183, 187, 188, 201, 203, 208, 209, 214, 224–227, 231–234, 236–239, 248–250, 271, 274–280, 282, 283, 286, 288–290, 297–300, 302–306 Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs), 279, 286–290 Competitiveness, 9, 11–13, 16, 19, 36, 37, 122, 125, 128, 129, 131, 132, 163, 207, 300

Conservatism, 129 Copé-Zimmerman law, 113 Corporate boards, 174, 185, 186 Corporatism, 5, 7, 11, 14–17, 19, 31, 100, 101, 121–124, 129–131, 133, 135, 138–141, 277, 278, 297, 305 Covid-19, 4, 11, 12, 22, 41, 44, 113, 130, 133, 134, 139, 140, 174, 235, 246, 247, 249–253, 257, 258, 260, 261, 263, 265, 303, 306 D Decentralisation, 12, 19, 101, 108, 109, 122, 124, 131, 133, 138, 139, 141, 298 Deconstruction, 14, 15 Democracy, 7, 44, 89, 225, 280, 281 Deregulation, 5, 101, 163, 201, 227 Discrimination, 4, 10, 33, 40, 52, 58–61, 63–66, 73, 98, 103–105, 110, 151–155, 159, 161, 162, 165, 174, 178, 182, 184, 185, 200, 205, 212, 226, 228, 286, 288, 301, 302 Diversity, 7, 10, 38, 50, 52, 110, 178, 185, 189, 199–201, 207, 231, 234, 280, 298 Domestic work, domestic workers, 9, 12, 18, 71–83, 86–91, 300, 304 Domination, 15, 16 E Early childhood education, early childhood educators, 247, 257 Early years’ educators, 252, 254, 255, 257, 258 Economic crisis, 6, 11, 12, 41, 44, 99, 113, 125, 128, 138–140,

INDEX

159, 162, 173, 174, 181, 182, 202, 214, 248, 301, 302, 305 Economic governance, 12, 13, 165, 174, 175, 182 Equality bargaining, 8, 18, 19, 32, 97–99, 101, 102, 105, 106, 109, 112–114, 126, 127, 134, 201, 300, 302 Erdo˘gan, Recep Tayyip, 273, 274, 283, 284, 289 Ethnicity, 14, 15, 44, 103, 104 European Commission, 72, 149, 156, 160, 163, 167, 173, 184 European Employment Strategy (EES), 158, 162 European integration, 13 European Parliament, 160 European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR), 162–164, 174, 175, 182 European Semester, 174, 182, 184 European social dialogue, 157, 158, 161, 162, 165, 172–175, 187 European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), 20, 98, 150, 156, 160, 163, 172, 173, 175, 177–190, 200 European Union (EU), 3, 5, 10, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 72, 97, 98, 102, 149–152, 154, 158–162, 164, 171–175, 178–190, 208, 228, 247, 257, 272, 274, 279, 291, 297, 301, 302 European Women’s Lobby (EWL), 156, 160 Experts, gender, 4 Export, 30, 224 export industry, 17, 31, 123, 125, 126, 133, 134, 139, 141, 299, 300 export sector, 9, 16, 128

311

F Familialism, familialist, 17, 305 Family-friendly, 137 Family leave (policies), 137 Family and parenting charter, 110 Female dominated, 212, 235, 245– 247, 249, 251, 252, 254, 255, 262, 264 Feminised work, 7, 135, 139, 140, 298–300, 306 Feminism, feminist, 4, 6–8, 12, 14– 16, 21, 22, 31, 33, 49, 51–53, 101, 123, 130, 156, 173, 188, 197, 202, 245, 246, 248–250, 252–256, 258, 260–263, 274, 286, 301, 303, 306 Femocrats, 150, 160, 171

G Gender balance, 4, 54, 105, 174, 179, 183, 185, 186 Gendered social unionism, 246, 250, 263 Gender equality bargaining, 18, 65, 97 Gender equality index, 106, 111 Gender equality plans, 111, 204, 210 Gender equality policy, 5, 10, 19, 20, 31, 103, 122, 124, 125, 128, 129, 137, 141, 150–162, 164–166, 171, 172, 175, 179, 180, 183–185, 188, 190, 197, 199, 201, 202, 204, 206, 225, 231, 298, 301, 302, 305 Gender mainstreaming, 162, 179, 180, 183, 189, 274 Gender pay gap, 4, 5, 15, 17–20, 29– 31, 33–36, 38–45, 98, 99, 106, 107, 114, 123, 126–128, 135, 139, 165, 167, 175, 181–184, 186, 188–190, 198–201, 203,

312

INDEX

205–207, 210–215, 228, 240, 245, 247, 260, 299, 300, 302 Gender regime, 4, 5, 13, 17, 155, 159, 164, 247, 306 Gender-segregated labour market, 30, 31, 34, 36, 39, 40, 42, 43, 50, 53, 61, 63, 65–67, 304

H Harassment, sexual, 4, 77, 153, 159, 179, 181, 182, 245, 301 Health care, 133, 134, 260 Home-based care, 18, 71, 72, 91, 300, 304

I Implementation, policy, 128, 307 Industrial relations, 29, 31, 34, 42, 72, 73, 88, 122, 127, 149, 225–227, 248, 281, 298, 299, 306 International Labour Organisation (ILO), 13, 75, 205 Intersectionality, intersectional, 3, 11, 12, 14–16, 18, 19, 51, 67, 99, 103, 114, 178, 181, 185, 189, 231, 246, 249, 250, 252–254, 263, 264, 304, 307 Islamic, 272, 275, 282, 286, 288, 290, 305 Istanbul Convention, 182, 183, 274, 291

L Labour conflict, 21, 227 Labour market, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21, 29–32, 34–36, 38–40, 50–60, 65, 67, 103, 123– 127, 129, 133, 134, 136–141, 150, 152, 154–160, 162, 163,

166, 174, 180–183, 185, 188, 198, 199, 202, 206–209, 211, 212, 214, 215, 223, 227, 228, 247, 249, 250, 258, 263, 271, 297–299, 301 Labour reform, 201, 202, 206, 209, 214, 301 LGBTQI rights, 174, 179 Lisbon Strategy, 158, 162 Litigation, 86, 87, 91, 105 Lobbying, 6, 20, 89, 160, 163, 164, 173, 182, 187, 188, 190, 301 Local bargaining, 12, 105, 125, 130, 134, 139, 140, 300 Local government, 130, 132–135, 140

M Mainstreaming. See Gender mainstreaming Male-dominated, 8, 9, 17, 21, 31, 33–35, 39–42, 50, 53, 60, 64, 67, 111, 112, 123, 124, 127, 128, 133, 139, 212, 224, 228, 229, 233, 236, 239, 271, 272, 278, 281, 299, 304–306 Marketization, 22, 247, 249, 256, 257, 262, 263, 304, 306 Maternity leave, 98, 107, 110, 115, 204 Media, 6, 108, 130, 135, 136, 236, 252, 253, 255–258, 260, 261, 284 Midwives, 21, 247, 251, 252, 258, 261–263, 303 Migrants, migrant, 12, 16, 18, 72, 75, 80, 87, 88, 227, 248, 257, 259, 264, 300, 304 Minimum wage, 32, 74, 75, 77, 80, 81, 86, 135, 233, 247 Minority, 6, 11, 233, 235, 278

INDEX

N Neo-corporatism, neo-corporatist, 5, 19, 20, 74, 149, 153, 157, 275, 279 Neoliberalism, 12, 122, 126 neoliberal, 11, 16, 17, 19, 122, 125, 130–132, 137–139, 226, 235 neoliberalisation, 4, 5, 11, 12, 303, 305 Non-governmental organisations (NGO), 87, 88, 110, 160, 274 Nurses, nursing, 21, 44, 52, 58, 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 127, 128, 130, 133, 134, 136, 140, 182, 235, 238, 239, 246, 247, 249, 251, 252, 258–263, 303, 304

313

Post-deconstruction, 14, 16 Power, 4, 5, 9–15, 17, 19–21, 31, 44, 45, 58, 73–75, 83, 85, 88, 91, 121–123, 125, 129–131, 134, 138, 140, 141, 151, 160, 165, 174–176, 187, 190, 198–203, 207–209, 211, 213, 214, 226, 227, 250–254, 256, 263, 274, 275, 279–283, 286, 289, 298, 300–303, 305, 306 Presidentialism, 273 Private service sector, 9, 226 Problem constructions, 55, 58, 59, 64, 67 Professionalisation, 81, 84, 88, 247, 251 Public services, 11, 53, 126, 173, 178, 180, 184, 185, 189, 224, 247, 249, 256, 259, 260

O Opposition, to gender equality, 20 P Parental leave, 10, 41, 49, 127, 129, 137, 140, 157, 159, 163, 164, 174, 175, 182, 187, 204, 206, 208, 301 Paternity leave, 204 Pattern bargaining, 17, 30, 31, 33–39, 41–45, 299, 304 Pay pay determination, 31, 100, 114 pay gap.see gender pay gap pay transparency, 97, 140, 175, 182, 186–188, 205, 210–212, 302 Peak corporatism, 122, 124, 131, 135 Pension gap, 247 Polarisation, 22, 98, 272–276, 282, 283, 286, 289, 291 Populism, populist, 123, 129, 138, 183, 203, 210

Q Qualitative research, 283 Quota, quotas, 7, 102, 113, 137, 180, 226, 229–232, 239, 282, 286, 287, 307 R Race, 14, 15, 103, 104, 178, 253 Racism, 8, 16 Rebsamen law on ‘quality of working life’, 112 Representation, 6, 7, 12, 21, 22, 98, 100, 102, 113, 124, 154, 166, 179, 210, 213, 226, 228–231, 234, 239, 253, 254, 274, 275, 277, 282, 285, 286, 288–291, 298, 303, 304 Resistance, to gender equality, 10, 251 Routine corporatism, 122, 124, 125, 131, 137

314

INDEX

S Segregation. See Gender-segregated labour market Sexuality, sexual orientation, 14, 15, 178, 274 Social policy, 4, 5, 10, 124, 150, 153, 157, 158, 160, 162, 173, 175, 207, 227 State intervention, 91, 125, 140 Stereotypes, 64, 103, 155, 156, 159, 165, 183, 184, 189, 190, 200, 254, 262, 301 Strike, 5, 9, 21, 38, 57, 74, 212, 225–227, 235–239, 259, 263, 276, 279, 280, 303

T Taxation, taxes, 124, 163 Tradable sectors, 35 Transnational, transnationalisation, 13, 150, 152, 171, 190

U Undervaluation of women’s work, 33, 50, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66, 182, 198, 300, 302, 304 Union density, 9, 22, 100, 122, 124, 127, 248, 258, 271, 281, 298, 299

V Value of work, 11, 184, 205, 306 Velvet triangle, 8, 150, 151, 157, 159, 160, 162, 171, 274, 291 Violence, gender-based, 174, 182, 183, 187, 189, 190

W Wages wage bargaining, 5, 18, 29, 32, 106, 122, 124, 136, 139, 248 wage cartel, 135, 136, 140 wage formation, 17, 29–31, 33–37, 42, 43 wage moderation, 13, 163 wage relativities, 124, 134, 299 wage setting, 31, 33, 35, 38, 44, 62, 298 Welfare state, 17, 71, 122, 125, 126, 135, 136, 163, 235 Women women’s committee, 156, 160, 163, 179, 180, 183, 230, 231, 252, 286–288, 290 women’s employment, 8, 135, 189, 225, 272, 277 women of colour, 259 women’s movement, 4, 150, 151, 171 women’s policy agencies, 4 women’s representation, 21, 103, 113, 224, 225, 275, 278, 282, 285–287, 289–291, 298, 307 Workers, 8, 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 32, 33, 35, 41–45, 50–53, 57, 58, 61, 62, 64, 65, 71–91, 103, 104, 112, 134, 156, 173, 181– 183, 187, 198–204, 208–211, 213–215, 225, 227, 233, 234, 236–239, 246–258, 261–264, 269, 275, 276, 279–281, 283, 287, 288, 300–302 Working conditions, 4, 11, 13, 36, 52, 75, 86, 98, 105, 121, 125, 127, 131, 134, 140, 151, 155, 156, 183, 201, 203, 210, 235, 236, 238, 255, 261, 262, 303

INDEX

Work-life balance, 4, 20, 105, 159, 162–165, 167, 174, 175, 177, 179, 182, 183, 186–189, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204, 206–209, 213–215, 301, 302

Y Youth, 179

315