Family and Social Change in Socialist and Post-Socialist Societies : Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe and East Asia [1 ed.] 9789004276833, 9789004252219

Citation preview

Family and Social Change in Socialist and Post-Socialist Societies

The Intimate and the Public in Asian and Global Perspectives Managing Editor Ochiai Emiko (Kyoto University) Editorial Board Fran Bennett (University of Oxford) Chang Kyung-Sup (Seoul National University) Barbara Hobson (University of Stockholm) Ito Kimio (Kyoto University) Barbara Molony (Santa Clara University) Ito Peng (University of Toronto) Tseng Yen-Fen (National Taiwan University) Patricia Uberoi (Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi)

VOLUME 6

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ipap





Family and Social Change in Socialist and Post-Socialist Societies Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe and East Asia Edited by

Zsombor Rajkai

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: © igor.stevanovic/Shutterstock.com. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Family and social change in Socialist and Post-Socialist societies : change and continuity in Eastern Europe and East Asia / edited by Zsombor Rajkai.   pages cm. -- (The intimate and the public in Asian and global perspectives ; volume 6)  Includes bibliographical references and index.  ISBN 978-90-04-25221-9 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-27683-3 (ebook) 1. Families--Europe, Eastern. 2. Families--East Asia. 3. Social change--Europe, Eastern. 4. Social change--East Asia. 5. Socialism--Europe, Eastern. 6. Socialism--East Asia. 7. Post-communism--Europe, Eastern. 8. Post-communism--East Asia. I. Rajkai, Zsombor.  HQ612.7.F36 2014  306.85094--dc23                       2014031992

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 2213-0608 isbn 978-90-04-25221-9 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-27683-3 (e-book) Copyright 2015 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents Preface vii Acknowledgements x List of Figures xi List of Tables xiv List of Contributors xviii Introduction 1 Zsombor Rajkai 1 A Theoretical Account of the Individual–Family–Population Nexus in Post-Socialist Transitions 19 Chang Kyung-Sup 2 Family and Social Change in Russia 36 Yulia Gradskova 3 Exploitation of the Intimate Sphere in Socialist and Post-Socialist Ukraine 83 Lyudmyla Males and Tymur Sandrovych 4 Changes in the Area of Family Life in Poland 122 Małgorzata Sikorska 5 Contemporary Family in Slovakia Demography, Values, Gender and Policy 164 Peter Guráň, Jarmila Filadelfiová and Miloš Debnár 6 Family Systems and Family Values in Twenty-First-Century Hungary 210 Csaba Dupcsik and Olga Tóth 7 Romanian Families Changes and Continuities over Recent Decades 250 Borbála Kovács 8 The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years (1978–2010) 300 Zhou Weihong, Xue Yali and Liu Wenrong

vi 9 Changes in Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Vietnamese Family 359 Nguyen Huu Minh Conclusion 413 Zsombor Rajkai Index 419

Contents 

Preface The present volume, entitled Family and Social Change in Socialist and PostSocialist Societies: Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe and East Asia, addresses the social transformations of eight transitional societies in recent decades (Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, China, and Vietnam). Each chapter discusses a different society and reveals the struggles within the reconstruction of the intimate and public spheres during the postCold War period. The volume grew out of a project starting in June 2010 under the title ‘Transformation of the intimate and public spheres in transitional societies: Family and community – Taking China, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine as case studies’ hosted in the Faculty of Letters of Kyoto University. This project was originally devoted to young researchers working within the framework of our host programme called Kyoto University Global coe Program for Reconstruction of the Intimate and Public Spheres in 21st Century Asia. The host programme made significant impacts on the formation of the theoretical framework of our project in two ways. First, our project makes the assumption that non-Western societies have a great potential to help us reconsider and modify popular Western-centric theories in order to better understand the different paths of modernisation from a global perspective. Second, the theory of compressed modernity, proposed by Chang Kyung-Sup for South Korea, and one of the core theories in the host programme, proved to be a useful theoretical framework for investigating the recent social transformations of socialist and post-socialist societies as well, and also for reconsidering the applicability of the Western second demographic transition theory to a non-Western context.1 From April 2011, the research scope of this project was expanded, first by also including Vietnam, and second by also focusing on subjects such as the family and marketisation as well as the family and the state. Consequently, the title of the project was changed to ‘Transformation of the intimate and public spheres in transitional societies: Family, community, state and market – Taking China, 1 The theory of compressed modernity is the most frequently cited theory throughout this volume. The Introduction contains a brief explanation of this theory along with certain related concepts. The volume also contains a chapter written by Professor Chang, which provides a useful theoretical positioning of the empirical discussions of the eight transitional (post-) socialist societies included in this volume (see Chapter 1).

viii

Preface

Vietnam, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine as case studies’. Finally, Russia and Romania were added to the project too, in the belief that by doing so the structure of the volume could create a balance between the investigated European societies: Poland, Slovakia and Hungary as (East-)Central European countries, Ukraine and Romania as (South-)Eastern European countries, as well as Russia.2 A brief explanation of the volume’s title is also in order here. First, whereas ‘family change’ stands as the focus of the present volume, ‘social change’ refers to changes – in a wider sense – to the state, economy, and civil society, serving as an explanatory variable of changes to the family. Second, the use of ‘socialist and post-socialist societies’ in the title – similarly to the expression ‘(post-) socialist’ used throughout the Introduction and Conclusion – does not refer to the two distinguishable periods before and after the systemic transformations, but rather to the fact that, unlike the countries in the previously socialist part of Europe, the governments of China and Vietnam continue to regard themselves as socialist. Third, ‘Eastern Europe’ in the title and throughout the whole volume basically refers to all the former socialist countries in Europe collectively. Nonetheless, it must be noted that due to a sensitive cultural–political self-identity, amongst other things, people in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary (i.e., the Visegrád Group, also called the Visegrád Four) tend to prefer the term (East-)Central Europe to Eastern Europe, thus altering the meaning of ‘Eastern Europe’ to the region lying to the east of these countries.3 Finally, the meaning of ‘East Asia’ in the title is based on a cultural conceptualisation referring to societies with Confucian traditions (such as Mainland China, Taiwan, South and North Korea, Japan, and Vietnam), this volume addresses only the socialist part of the region, excluding North Korea. North Korea was omitted from the volume due to the difficulties in carrying out sufficiently detailed sociological studies on such a ‘closed’ country. 2 Two international symposiums were organised in association with the project. The first one was held in December 2010 under the name of ‘Empty Individualization and Familism in Transitional Societies: Hungary as a Case Study’, and the second one was held in December 2011 under a similar title as the present volume, ‘Family and Social Change in Socialist and Post-Socialist Societies: East Europe and East Asia’. Both symposiums took place in the Faculty of Letters of Kyoto University. 3 This kind of conceptualisation of Central and Eastern Europe is reflected in Chapters 5 and 6. Moreover, though Romania is usually not regarded as an (East-)Central European, but rather as an Eastern (or South-Eastern) European country, the author of Chapter 7 on Romania also feels it necessary to differentiate Central and Eastern Europe. This sheds light upon the ambiguous character of the expression ‘(East-)Central Europe’ that appears to function as a ‘tool’ for the formation of a (cultural–political) self identity beyond the borders of the aforementioned four countries.

ix

Preface

Two further points must be noted here. First, contributions to the volume were completed in late 2013, thus events following this period such as Ukraine’s so-called second Orange Revolution of early 2014 and what has followed it could not be included into the general discussion. Second, as explained in the Conclusion, the reader may discover certain unavoidable differences between the respective chapters in terms of conceptualisations of concepts such as traditional, modern, post-modern or famili(ali)sm. This is mainly due to the various and highly complicated paths of social transformation observed in these societies. These differences in concepts however do not decrease the value of the volume, but do highlight the necessity of further research studies in the subject. The editor expresses hope for that the reader will find this volume to be a useful collection of studies on the social transformation of (post-)socialist transitional societies from a transcontinental perspective, and also that it will encourage further studies on modernisation from a global perspective. Zsombor Rajkai

Acknowledgements The editor of, and the contributors to, the present volume gratefully acknowledge the broad-ranging research support from the Global Center of Excellence (gcoe) Program titled Reconstruction of the Intimate and Public Spheres in 21st Century Asia at the Graduate School of Letters of Kyoto University. Likewise, we are also extremely grateful for the editing and publishing support of Mr. Paul Norbury, Senior Acquisitions Editor of Asian Studies at Brill Academic Publishers, as well as, of Ms. Nozomi Goto, his assistant editor. Last but not least our thanks are also due to Dr Scott Koga-Browes and Dr Tom French, Associate Professors at the College of International Relations of Ritsumeikan University (Japan) for their careful language editing and useful comments. The present volume could not have come into existence without this intensive support. For all remaining mistakes the editor is of course responsible.

List of Figures 3.1 3.2 3.3A 3.3B 3.4 3.5

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7

6.1 6.2

Lyudmyla Males and Tymur Sandrovych Marriage rate and divorce rate (Ukraine, per 1,000 people) 95 Fertility rate of urban and rural groups in Ukraine 102 Fertility rate of different educational groups (urban settlements) 102 Fertility rate of different educational groups (rural settlements) 103 Marriage and divorce rates of urban and rural groups in Ukraine 104 ‘In politics, it is better to do without women’ (percentage) 112

Małgorzata Sikorska Model of the family (partnership) preferred by Poles in the age group 18–39 136 Division of household duties 137 The most important values in everyday life 152 Level of trust towards immediate family members and others 154

Peter Guráň, Jarmila Filadelfiová and Miloš Debnár Crude birth and death rates (1920–2010) 171 Total fertility rate (1950–2010) 172 Number of births and abortions by type (1920–2010) 175 Crude birth and abortion rates (1920–2010) 177 Crude marriage and divorce rates (1920–2010) 178 Household structure in Slovakia (1961–2001) 183 Employment rate of men and women by cohort and gender (2000 and 2011) 192

Csaba Dupcsik and Olga Tóth Agricultural employment in selected countries, 1801–2010 (percentage of total employment) 212 Actively employed women, 1900–1990 (percentage of all women) 213

xii 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7

6.8 6.9

6.10 6.11

6.12 6.13

6.14

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

List of Figures Percentage of males (fifteen years and older) by marital status, 1980–2010 219 Percentage of females (fifteen years and older) by marital status, 1980–2010 219 Percentage of females (fifteen years and older) by marital status as of 1 January 2011 220 Total first-marriage rate for females (per hundred females) and total divorce rate (per hundred marriages) 221 Average number of live-born children until given age by female birth cohort (number of live-born children per thousand females) 225 Number of marital and extramarital live births 226 ‘People who have never had children lead an empty life’ (percentage distribution of respondents by agreement with this statement) 228 Employment rates of males and females aged 15–64 in Hungary and the eu (1990–2009) 229 ‘A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after home and family’ (percentage distribution of respondents by agreement with this statement) 232 Number of live-born children per thousand females 235 Consistent modern and consistent traditional values and attitudes (percentage of men and women aged between eighteen and fifty, 1988–2009) 240 Modern and traditional values and attitudes (percentage of men and women aged between eighteen and fifty, 1988–2009) 240

Borbála Kovács The fertility rate in Romania between 1970 and 2009 255 Percentages of live births according to mothers’ ages in Romania between 1981 and 2010 257 Changes in the number of first births by mothers’ ages between 1995 and 2010 257 Variations in the relative share of out-of-wedlock births by mothers’ ages in Romania between 1995 and 2010 261 Agreement and disagreement with the statement: ‘Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as paid work.’ 275

List of Figures

8.1 8.2

9.1 9.2 9.3

xiii

Zhou Weihong, Xue Yali and Liu Wenrong Changes to total fertility rate in China, 1950–2010 307 Marriage rate and divorce rate (‰) in recent years (2002–2010) 314

Nguyen Huu Minh Percentage of married respondents answered ‘I took the decision, but I did ask for my parents’ opinion’ in marriage decision 381 Three main marriage-selection criteria of married respondents by age group 386 Percentage of women who said ‘they made the largest contribution to household income’ by rural–urban and education level 401

List of Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15 2.16 2.17 2.18 2.19 2.20

3.1 3.2

4.1 4.2

Yulia Gradskova Income per capita distribution of population (%) 41 Marriages and divorces 43 Marriages according to the age of the bride 44 Marriage seen as an outdated institution 45 Birth rate and mortality (per 1,000 people) 46 Preferences for the ideal number of children 48 Supporters of homes with two parents 52 Birth by women whose marriage is not registered (percentage of the number of births) 52 Disapproval of single mothers, 1990–99 53 Disapproval of single mothers in 2006 54 Approval of single mothers in the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey 54 Priority of access to work 59 Importance of women’s income for the family 61 Women’s fulfilment as housewives 61 The relationship of working mothers with their children 63 Pre-school children of working mothers 63 Level of trust in family, in Russia, Spain, and Sweden 66 Importance of family in life 67 Level of trust in family, in 2006 67 The importance of living apart from one’s in-laws 73

Lyudmyla Males and Tymur Sandrovych Fertility rate 98 The mean and median age of persons who were married for the first time in Ukraine, 2008 (registered marriages) 104

Małgorzata Sikorska Preferred number of children (respondents aged 18 to 44) 126 The rate of marriages between 2001 and 2010 (total, urban, and rural areas) 129

List of Tables  4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9



xv

Factor analysis of the major elements of ‘successful marriage’ 139 Change in the social perception of motherhood 142 Changes in social perception of the role of working mothers 143 Level of life satisfaction versus number of friends 152 Intensity of contacts with family members, relatives, and friends 153

Peter Guráň, Jarmila Filadelfiová and Miloš Debnár Mean age of mothers at childbirth and of men and women at first marriage (1990–2010) 179 Regional heterogeneity in reproductive behaviour and the context of life quality 180 Selected indicators of household structure (1960–2001) 184 Selected basic family values 186 Values of family lifestyle 187 Values of family lifestyle 2 188 Rates of economic activity characterising the position of men and women in the labour market (2001–11) 191 Working time per week for women and men in Slovakia (2005 and 2010) 195 Gender difference in pensions and poverty risk (2010) 196

Csaba Dupcsik and Olga Tóth

6.1 A hypothetical model of family forms and their main characteristics 241

7.1 7.2

7.3 7.4

Borbála Kovács The percentage of cohabiting individuals per age group and the share of singles cohabiting among all singles in age group 265 Attitudes towards divorce (in percentages): ‘Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. Divorce’ 267 Percentage unemployment rates (total and for women) over time in Romania 272 Romanian women’s activity and employment rates (in percentages) between 1999 and 2011 273

xvi 7.5 7.6

8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.5.1 8.5.1A 8.5.1B 8.5.1C 8.6 8.7 8.8

8.9 8.10

8.11 8.12 8.13 8.14 8.15 8.16

List of Tables  Percentage gender divisions of household chores and childcare in young Romanian couples in 2000 278 Opinions about housework and earning in Romania in 2000, disaggregated by level of education, type of locality of residence, and respondents’ age group 279

Zhou Weihong, Xue Yali and Liu Wenrong Ideological changes in China 302 A brief chronicle of economic reform in China 303 China’s population census data 306 Urban and rural population in 2000 308 The percentage composition of different types of families in three censuses 309 Families of various sizes in China 310 Families of various sizes in China (city population) 311 Families of various sizes in China (town population) 312 Families of various sizes in China (rural population) 313 Marriage registrations and divorce cases in China, 1985–2006 313 Major reasons for married women to work (%) 319 Percentage agreement with the notion that ‘men shall be the breadwinner (even if their wives work), and women shall look after their families’ 319 Employment of men and women between eighteen and sixty-four over the past two decades (%) 322 Percentage agreement with the notion that ‘men shall contribute to society, and women shall work for the family’ in nationwide sample survey 323 Percentage agreement with the notion that ‘“men make the houses, women make the home” is good for every member of the family’ 324 Identification with the four aspects of filial piety 333 Identification with ideas related to parents supporting children 336 The support preferences of interviewees who have both parents and adult children (percentages) 337 The description of family multi-value indicators and intergenerational comparison 339 The age difference in the acceptance of the idea of traditional intergenerational support (percentages) 341

List of Tables 



Nguyen Huu Minh

9.1 9.2

The total fertility rate (TFR) in Vietnam 1989, 1999–2009 367 Percentage of single people in selected age groups from censuses 1989–2009 371 Percentage of population aged fifteen or older divorced and separated by sex and rural–urban, from 1989, 1999, and 2009 censuses 376 Crude divorce rate in Vietnam 2000–2009 376 Domestic labour allocation between wife and husband (aged 18–60) in reality 395

9.3

9.4 9.5

xvii

List of Contributors CHANG Kyung-Sup, Ph.D. (1991) is Professor of Sociology at Seoul National University (South Korea), specialised in institutional sociology, comparative political economy, and social theory. He recently authored South Korea under compressed modernity (Routledge, 2010) and edited Contested citizenship in East Asia (with Bryan S. Turner, Routledge, 2012), and Developmental politics in transition (with Ben Fine and Linda Weiss, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012). Miloš DEBNÁR, ma (2010) Ph.D. candidate in sociology at Kyoto University (Japan). He is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology of Doshisha University (Kyoto, Japan). His work is focused on the process of globalisation in Japanese society and comparative studies. Csaba DUPCSIK, Ph.D. (2000), Habil. (2012) is Senior Research Fellow in the Centre for Social Sciences at the Hungarian Institute of Sociology; Reader at Károli Gáspár University of The Reformed Church; and Editor in Chief at socio.hu (www.socio.hu). Jarmila FILADELFIOVÁ, Ph.D. (2009) is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Labour and Family Research (Bratislava, Slovakia). She has published extensively on family, gender issues, and social policy, including She and he in Slovakia (IVO, 2008). Yulia GRADSKOVA, Ph.D. (2007) is Associate Professor at the Department of History of Stockholm University (Sweden). She has published articles on Soviet social and gender history, and is a co-editor (together with Helene Carlbäck and Zhanna Kravchenko) of the anthology And they lived happily ever after (ceu Press, 2012). Peter GURÁŇ, Ph.D. (2009) member of the un Committee on the Rights of the Child, sociologist and inde­ pendent expert on human rights issues in Slovakia. He has published many monographs, research studies, and journal articles on children’s rights and family life. Borbála KOVÁCS, Ph.D. (Oxon., 2013) is currently visiting faculty at the Central European University in Budapest (Hungary). She teaches courses in political economy, development studies,

list of Contributors

xix

and welfare state research. Her recent publications in peer-reviewed journals focus on the organisation of childcare in the context of welfare state transform­ ations and informality in post-socialist countries. LIU Wenrong, Ph.D. (2012) is Associate Professor at the Family Study Centre of the Shanghai Aca­ demy  of Social Sciences (China). She has published many articles and a monograph titled The continuity and changes of the Chinese feedback model. Lyudmyla MALES, Doctor of Sociological Science (Ph.D. 2003, Habil. 2013) is Associate Professor at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Ukraine). She has published textbooks and several articles on gender analysis and family relations in Ukraine. NGUYEN Huu Minh, Ph.D. (1998) is Director of the Institute for Family and Gender Studies (Hanoi, Vietnam). He has published monographs and articles on family and gender issues in Vietnam, including Vietnamese marriage patterns in the Red River Delta: Tradition and change (2009). Zsombor RAJKAI, Ph.D. (2008, 2010) is Associate Professor at the College of International Relations of Ritsumeikan University (Kyoto, Japan). He specialises in two fields: the modernisation of non-Western societies, and Sino-Central Asian historical relations. Tymur SANDROVYCH, Master Degree (2011) is a Ph.D. student at Kyoto University (Japan). His research topics include the image of Japan in the Russian-language popular literature of Soviet times, and a comparison of the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear disasters. Małgorzata SIKORSKA, Ph.D. (2007) University of Warsaw (Poland). Main research interests include: transition of Polish society and transition of patterns of family life. Recent publications include: Contemporary Polish society (co-ed.) (2012); The dark side of motherhood – The anxiety of contemporary mothers (ed.) (2012). Olga TÓTH, Ph.D. (1997) is Senior Research Fellow in the Centre for Social Sciences at the Hungarian Institute of Sociology; Reader in King Sigismund College, Budapest. She is an

xx

list of Contributors

expert on the Hungarian family, gender issues, the younger generation, and domestic violence. XUE Yali, Ph.D. (2006) is Director of Journal of Family Studies, and Associate Professor at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (China). She has published many articles on the Chinese family, including on family rites (2009) and marriage attitudes (2011). ZHOU Weihong, Ph.D. (1990) is Professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University (China). He has published monographs, translations, and many articles on Asian and Japanese social history, including A study of Japanese rural industrialization history (People’s Education Press, 1992).

Introduction Zsombor Rajkai The core problem addressed in the present volume refers to the major question of whether the social transformation of socialist and post-socialist societies shows convergence with Western1 countries in terms of a specific social aspect, that is, individualisation. The question is highly relevant not only for the study of (post-socialist) transitional societies, but also for understanding the characteristic features of contemporary globalisation. When looking at the scholarship, the actual pluralisation of lifestyles seen through statistical data (in other words demographic individualisation) appears to be an almost worldwide phenomenon in both developed and (strongly) developing countries. However, there is a remarkable difference between Western countries and (post-)socialist societies. In contrast, the pluralisation of lifestyles in Western countries is explained in the second demographic transition theory2 as a procedure that was ignited by an earlier significant shift towards values stressing individual happiness, from the 1970s onwards. In (post-)socialist transitional societies this seems to be taking place without a preceding general change to individualistic values, and paradoxically, is accompanied by the growth of family values instead. The focus of the discussions in the respective chapters of this volume is on the intimate sphere (family), which is analysed in relation to the state, market, and civil society in the case of six Eastern European countries, China, and Vietnam. These three things (the state, market, and civil society) – as explanatory factors of the intimate sphere – are viewed as the public sphere (equivalent to a so-called ‘non-intimate sphere’) in a broad sense. The struggles between the intimate and public spheres in these transitional societies reveal two essential elements of modernisation in a social sense: famili(ali)sm3 and individualisation. By studying the recent conditions of these two elements, the 1 The term Western throughout the volume refers to Western Europe and North America, both lack the experience of socialist modernisation. 2 See Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa (1986). 3 The authors in this volume tend to use the expression ‘familism’. The major exception is in Chapter 1, where the author discusses three different kinds of ‘familialism’ (namely, ideational familialism, institutional familialism, and situational familialism). On the other hand, it must be noted that ‘familism’ and ‘familialism’ do not seem to be properly distinguished in the English academic literature. According to works found in digital libraries such as jstor or sage the former expression appears more frequently than the latter one. There is a strong

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004276833_002

2

Rajkai

authors in this volume aim to provide a better understanding of the different paths of social transformation in socialist and post-socialist societies. The authors also attempt to outline the theoretical base for a possible modification of the Western-based second demographic transition theory, and thus to contribute to the wide-scale study of the post-socialist systemic transform­ ation in recent years. In doing so, popular Western theories – other than the second demographic transition theory proponed by Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk J. van de Kaa – are also frequently discussed in the respective chapters; such as ‘(institutionalised) individualism’4 and ‘second modern(ity)’5 by Ulrich Beck, ‘transformation of intimacy’6 and ‘pure relationship’7 by Anthony Giddens, the ‘theory of system’8 and the ‘theory of the public sphere’9 by Jürgen Habermas, ‘liquid modernity’10 by Zygmunt Bauman, and ‘post-materialist values’11 by Ronald Inglehart. The editor hopes that this volume can inspire its readers to continue with further theoretical research not only in regard to the second demographic transition theory per se, but also in the much wider context related to modernisation and globalisation. The following discussions of various empirical research studies related to the particular characteristic features of (post-)socialist systemic transform­ ations serve as an explanatory framework to highlight the basic research questions addressed in this volume. The different paths of social transformation after the abrupt rejection of socialism in Eastern Europe (1989–91) as well as the rather cautious systemic transformation of China and Vietnam since the 1980s have induced strong and constant academic interest within the social sciences. Indeed, the ‘defeat’ of state socialism (or communism) by liberal capitalism is worthy of academic interest and should (further) encourage scholars to carry out further research in the field. The reason is twofold. First, these societies with their (past) experiences of socialism are now active participants in the process of globalisation.



4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

need for a scholarly agreement in the future on the conceptualisation (or a potential unification) of these expressions from a global perspective. See also the discussions on similar conceptual ambiguities in the Conclusion of this volume. See Chapter 1, Chapter 4 (‘women’s individual approach’), Chapter 5, and Chapter 8. See Chapter 1, Chapter 5 and Chapter 8. See Chapter 2. See Chapter 8. See Chapter 3. See Chapter 8. See Chapter 5. See Chapter 6.

Introduction

3

Half of Europe and more than 80 per cent of East Asia’s population have experienced socialist modernisation and its subsequent systemic transformation. Second, the study of the transformation of these societies provides a great opportunity to test and reconsider already existing social theories. Among the numerous studies on the post-socialist period, for instance, Susan Gal and Gail Kligman draw attention to the gendered character of postsocialism, suggesting that men and women experienced the collapse of socialism in different ways, as well as the possibilities brought about by the change of regimes.12 Another scholar, Marc M. Howard, points to the fact that people in Eastern Europe – even a decade after the collapse of state socialism – are less likely than people in other parts of the world to join voluntary organisations, possibly due to the experience of obligatory participation in statecontrolled organisations.13 Others shed light on the socialist nostalgic turn, which is explained as a complex process of healing past experience while simultaneously facing new inequalities.14 Popular subjects for the period of political and systemic transformations also include the collapse of state socialism,15 the politics of post-communism,16 political parties in the post-socialist era,17 the relationship of the state and society in post-socialist countries,18 globalisation and the state,19 minority rights,20 transitional justice,21 the post-socialist period seen through literature and language,22 as well as ideologies and practices.23 Nonetheless, the term post-socialism – a term frequently applied to the case of Eastern Europe as well as to China and Vietnam – is far from easy to grasp. The problem here lies with the word post-. Post- as an attribute does not tell us much about the characteristic feature of the period that it refers to, rather it emphasises the end of the previous period without being certain about what has come thereafter. Thus post- appears to be a convenient cloak for being 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Gal and Kligman (2000). Another important work discusses the gender politics in postCommunist Eurasia: Racioppi and See (2009). Howard (2003). Anders Uhlin (2006) points to the different degrees of development of civil society in countries previously belonging to the Soviet Union. Todorova and Gille (2010). Kamiński (1991). Mandelbaum (1991). Spirova (2007). Pickles and Jenkins (2008). Drahokoupil (2009). Rechel (2009). Stan (2008). Andrews (2008); Kovačević (2008); Chitnis (2004). Hann (2002).

4

Rajkai

uncertain, and presumably it will take a long time until it can be replaced with a more appropriate cover term to show the core character of post-socialism.24 A similar problem arises in regard to the expression transitional societies. Transitional here cannot be interpreted as the assumption that (post-)socialist societies are now following a path suggested in modernisation theory based on Western capitalism.25 The radiant past26 of these societies proves to be strong enough to cause them to follow a path similar to, yet different from, the one(s) seen in Western countries. This becomes particularly obvious in the case of China, where the notion of transition – regardless of the diversity of its contemporary rhetorics – does not pertain to the complete rejection of the former Maoist period but rather to the postponing, into the (far) future, of the original goals through socialist modernisation.27 At the same time, (post-)socialist societies themselves are experiencing a variety of transformations; partially because the socialist economy and society preceding the systemic changes varied significantly in these countries. The most remarkable difference emerges between Eastern Europe and socialist East Asia. Whereas China made a declarative statement of economic reform as early as 1978, which was then followed by Vietnam under the name Doi Moi (Đoˆˀ i Mới; Renovation) in 1986, and the one-political party system was maintained in both countries, countries in Eastern Europe carried out more radical systemic change between 1989 and 1991 after the introduction of multi-party political systems. Further differences can be found among the countries in Eastern Europe, and ‘culture’ often becomes an explanatory variable to highlight these differences. The problem with ‘culture’ however is that it looks more like a black box, or a mysterious residual variable, a view which was fostered by anthropologists in many parts of the world, who tended to focus on particular 24

25 26

27

Caroline Humphrey states that ‘Sooner or later, as the generations brought up under socialist regimes disappear from the political scene, the category of postsocialism is likely to break apart and disappear’ (Humphrey, in Hann et al. 2002, 13). Nonetheless, even if the term itself disappears, one should agree with Chris Hann in stressing that ‘the reproduction of a common layer of socialist institutions (...) will continue to have decisive effects on this interplay everywhere in Eurasia for many years to come’ (Hann et al. 2002, 11). Verdery (1996). This term was used by Michael Burawoy and János Lukács (1992) as a keyword to describe the characters of the social transformation of Hungary before and after the change of the political system (1989–90), but it can also be applied to the case of every country that has experienced socialist modernisation. Latham (2002). Kevin Latham also argues that people in contemporary China are much less afraid of becoming victims of some revived political terror, and are rather more concerned with their social and economic conditions.

Introduction

5

aspects rather than similarities.28 Despite the existence of differences in the details, transitional (post-)socialist countries – regardless of their location in Eastern Europe or socialist East Asia29 – did have similarities. However, these similarities did not lie in a presumed common culture of socialism, but rather in social institutions and a common tendency towards bureaucratic centralism.30 As Caroline Humphrey asserts, ‘those structures still had more in common than actually existing capitalisms’.31 Indeed, people in these countries – regardless of the differences in their everyday life before the socialist times – had to face similar institutional and bureaucratic frameworks imposed on them from above, and that might also be the reason why people living in different (post-)socialist countries seem to know ‘how to take a hint’. Put into the language of social science, the common experience of (post-)socialist countries refers to the state’s previously unprecedented levels of control (during the initial period of socialism) over the economy, civil society, and the family, which was then followed by the withdrawal of state responsibility and state control over these sectors. All these countries started with a totalitarian-state period, which then gradually changed to an authoritarian one.32 The striking difference between Eastern Europe and socialist East Asia lies not in the existence of this process per se, but rather in the different forms and degrees of the shrinking scope of state control and state responsibility.33 28 29

30 31 32

33

Hann (2002). That is, Mainland China, Vietnam and North Korea. Nonetheless, it must be noted that North Korea has yet to carry out a significant systemic transformation comparable to China or Vietnam. Verdery (1996). Humphrey, in Hann et al. (2002, 12). Elemér Hankiss, a prominent Hungarian social philosopher, differentiated between a totalitarian state and an authoritarian state in the following way. A totalitarian state does not tolerate the existence of organisations built from below, whereas an authoritarian state permits the existence of such organisations to a certain degree in return for the tacit approval of the ultimate power of the state (Hankiss 1989). Hankiss’ conceptualisation can be applied to other (post-)socialist countries too. According to Chris Hann (2002), the process of breaking (previous) ‘total social institutions’ started earlier in China than in Eastern Europe, which gave rise to remarkable research in the field, so, the process is relatively well documented. It must be noted that Eastern European countries and socialist East Asia differ not only in the varied forms and degrees regarding the withdrawal of state control, but also in that China and Vietnam managed to produce rapidly growing economies, while Eastern European economies have suffered economic difficulties over the past two decades. In the first place, unlike the fallen Communist governments in Eastern Europe, the governments of China and Vietnam even today enjoy a degree of legitimacy. This is perhaps due

6

Rajkai

Whereas the sudden shrinking scope of state control was most striking after the change of the political system in Eastern European countries (1989–91), the state still maintains a considerable degree of control in China and Vietnam. In China, where a planned economy was largely replaced by a liberal capitalist economy, large and medium-sized state enterprises still continue to play a significant role in the country’s economy. Likewise, while the formation from below of certain – mainly environment-related – grassroots organisations has become easier, the establishment of politically oriented organisations continues to be banned, which highlights the weak actual conditions of civil society in contemporary China. Nonetheless, following Chris Hann’s suggestion, it must be noted that the Western-interpreted concept of civil society first ‘needs to be broadened, relativized and adapted to local conditions’ before it is applied to non-Western conditions so that it ‘can remain a useful general term’.34 The problem here is that it is not easy to conceptualise the meaning of ‘civil society’ – due to a historical absence of it – in the Chinese (or the Vietnamese) context, an issue that requires further study. As to family in China, one can see a remarkable withdrawal of state control and state responsibility in terms of care, especially in the case of elderly care.35 The Chinese government stresses the value of the traditional practice of filial piety and even gives elderly parents the right to sue their adult child(ren) in case they fail to care for their parents. Another particular phenomenon regarding Chinese families today concerns women. Whereas the majority of women had internalised the ideal image of the working woman by the time economic reforms were implemented by the government, marketisation and the weakening of institutional support for women’s work have induced new social constraints that now lead to the increase of women’s traditional gender role-taking (housework and child-raising). On the other hand, women, also need to continue working outside their home since a husband’s salary alone is rarely enough to support the whole family. Therefore, it can be argued that there is a

34 35

to the successful economic developments in China and Vietnam, and also to the variant form of socialism introduced in East Asia. Whereas the socialist system was forcibly established by the Soviet Union after the Second World War in the case of Eastern Europe, it became strongly connected to struggles for national freedom against foreign colonialism in the East Asian region, and therefore it gained a positive connotation. This fact should be kept in mind when one compares socialism in Eastern Europe and East Asia. Yet, the shrinking scope of control by and responsibility of the state still provides a common analytic framework for the comparative study of socialism and post-socialism in Eastern Europe and East Asia. Hann et al. (2002, 9). Ochiai (2010).

Introduction

7

partial re-traditionalisation in terms of women’s work, though this is happening against the will of the majority of women in contemporary China. The withdrawal of the state from the intimate sphere (family) is also emphasised by scholars writing on Vietnam, where the family and household have been put at the service of developmentalism after Doi Moi, and where, since 1986, the concept of gender equality has been adapted to the needs of the state, along with a renewed emphasis on pre-socialist values and kinship ties.36 The withdrawal of the state from the intimate sphere in terms of reduction in the extent of care provided has had mixed influences on the family’s traditional role of supervision and control. Filial piety in Vietnam still remains strong, largely, though not entirely, as a result of cultural belief, also influenced by external social constraints.37 Nonetheless, it must be noted that in regard to the changing relationship between state and family, one can see a similar developmental path among the countries of Eastern Europe and socialist East Asia. At the initial stage of the socialist period in most of the (post-)socialist countries, Communist governments intended to break up the previous (pre-socialist) family ties and attempted to educate a new generation of ‘individuals’ that were supposed to become more connected to their workplaces than to their own families. However, these initial attempts were sooner or later given up, and the family again became the smallest unit of society, though this time with a strong emphasis on socialist gender equality. Systemic changes in China and Vietnam and political changes in Eastern Europe then brought about new changes for the family again. Though the family continues to be considered the most important social unit by the state, one can see a significant decrease in terms of state support, which in return enhances dependence on one’s own family, thus giving way to the emergence of a revival of familism (or family dependence).38 Interestingly, the appearance of this new familism is also accompanied by an opposite trend, that is, a remarkable pluralisation of family forms. The declining birth and marriage rates, the increasing divorce rate, as well as the increasing number of cohabiting couples, dinks39 couples, single parents 36 37 38

39

Werner (2006). Jayne Werner also draws attention to the phenomenon of the re-feminisation of agriculture. Barbiéri and Bélanger (2009). The term familial liberalism coined by Chang Kyung-Sup describes this contradictory socio-political (and also socio-economic) condition in a highly persuasive way (see Chapter 1 for details). ‘Double Income No Kids’ – couples that purposely do not intend to have child(ren), and where both of the spouses work as full-timers.

8

Rajkai

(mainly single mothers),40 or that of homosexual couples – though the degrees to which these phenomena appear vary from country to country – are also perceived in (post-)socialist societies. These phenomena, which are usually regarded as signs of individualisation in terms of self-fulfilment in Western countries, stand in a sort of contradiction to the growing family dependence imposed on individuals indirectly by the state from above. The two contradictory trends raise important questions regarding the (post-)socialist character of Eastern Europe as well as socialist East Asia. Is individualisation perceived here identical with what is seen in Western countries, or is it something different, perhaps a superficial phenomenon with implications different from those of its Western counterpart? How is this related to the externally imposed family dependence, and how does it characterise the path of modernisation in (post-)socialist countries? These questions that stand behind the discussions in the present volume are essential and indispensable for the study of the social transformations of contemporary (post-)socialist societies. Considering these questions above, there are two books in the literature of (post-)socialist systemic transformations that are comparable in subject and perspective to the present volume. The first one is And They Lived Happily Ever After: Norms and Everyday Practices of Family and Parenthood in Russia and Eastern Europe,41 and the other one is Families in Eastern Europe (Book 5 of Contemporary Perspectives in Family Research).42 The former discusses family life (parenthood and childhood) in Russia and Eastern Europe by focusing also on change and continuity in institutions and laws. The latter addresses fourteen Eastern European countries, for which the authors provide demographic information about families and discuss cultural traditions, marital and gender roles, parenting processes, family policy and programmes within the societies, and the state of research on family issues. Both books stand close to this volume in their profiles. Nonetheless, the present volume goes beyond the framework of these two books in at least two ways. First, this volume links family and social change in (post-)socialist countries to the hotly-debated subject of modernisation, and second, it also outlines the possibility of a transcontinental comparison of family and social change by addressing the potential of 40

41

42

‘Single mother’ here does not refer to those who have become single through divorce or bereavement, but rather to those who never intend to marry the father of their child(ren). Thus ‘single mother’ here refers to a chosen lifestyle. Carlbäck et al. (2012). This book is frequently referred to by Yulia Gradskova in Chapter 2 to describe the particular socio-political and socio-economic conditions of contemporary Russia. Robila (2004).

Introduction

9

a modified second demographic transition theory as a corrective to popular Western-based interpretations of current social trends. The construction of such a theory can be expected to have an impact on fields such as sociology, social philosophy, anthropology, demography, etc., and also on area studies such as Eastern Europe and socialist East Asia. The potential of a modified theory – as a revised theory to the Western-born and Western-centric second demographic transition theory – is supposed to offer a better understanding of social and family change in these countries, by highlighting the fact that while transforming societies show similarities to Western societies in certain demographic trends (demographic individualisation, or in other words pluralisation of lifestyles), they also continue to exhibit strong family (marriage, divorce, gender division role) values/attitudes as well as high levels of family dependency. This points up the remarkable gap between actual individualistic demographic conditions and strong family values or attitudes. By making reference to Chang Kyung-Sup’s core theory of recent social changes, the authors in this volume suggest that the aforementioned gap can be thought of as being the result of a sort of compressed modern characteristic feature of these transforming societies, both in Eastern Europe as well as in China and Vietnam. A brief explanation of Chang Kyung-Sup’s theory of compressed modernity (including compressed modernisation) is in order here.43 According to Chang, compressed modernity is a conceptual tool that – by using analytical induction – contains five specific and interactively constituted dimensions alongside two axes of time/space and condensation/compression. Chang argues that the various characteristics of compressed modernity have a systemic relationship with familial or family-related issues that are manifested in six aspects. One of these aspects refers to the ‘antagonistic relationship between traditional (indigenous) and modern (foreign) elements’. This contrasts with the rather long-lasting process of modernisation observed in Western societies, South Korea has experienced remarkably fast modernisation in recent decades. This has brought about the unforeseen predicament that the historical boundaries of (e.g., the ‘antagonistic relationship’ between) pre-modern (traditional), modern, and post-modern (or second modern) periods are rather obscure, and thus pre-modern, modern, and post-modern characteristic features coexist in contemporary South Korea. This unforeseen predicament has led to the ‘accidental’ coexistence of various family values and ideologies that Chang calls accidental pluralism – another family-related 43

See Chang (2010a) for details. In relation to this concept, Ochiai Emiko indicates the compressed nature of the birth rate declines seen in East Asian countries, in contrast to those observed in Western societies (2010); see also Chapter 8 on China in this volume.

10

Rajkai

aspect of compressed modernity.44 Moreover, Chang also argues that South Korea’s compressed modernity has created a kind of ‘functional overload’ in South Korean families, and that this has brought about a so-called ‘condensed defamiliation’ manifested in family violence, divorce, marriage deferral and aversion, childlessness, minimal fertility, etc. In relation to the term condensed defamiliation, another core concept proposed by Chang Kyung-Sup must also be mentioned here, namely individualisation without individualism.45 This concept expresses the gap between the existence of strong family values and that of demographic individualisation very well, arguing that – unlike in the case of Western countries – current individualistic demographic changes do not reflect a supporting individualisation in terms of values. This volume holds the assumption that all these core concepts above can be applied not only to the case of South Korea as well as other capitalist East Asian societies, but also to the study of transitional (post-)socialist societies. With this theoretical framework above in mind, the respective chapters make use of a semi-structured analytical framework and address the ambiguous relationship between familism and individualisation seen through change and continuity in demographic behaviour, family values, family solidarity, gender relations, state policy, and marketisation. These topics are discussed in the majority of the chapters from three major analytical points of view. The first looks at the gap between the actual demographic conditions and family, marriage, divorce, etc., seen through (a) (demographic) fertility rate versus (ideal) number of children, (b) (demographic) marriage rate versus (ideal) marriage values and attitudes, (c) children born out of wedlock versus (ideal) marriage values and attitudes, (d) (demographic) divorce rate versus (ideal) divorce values and attitudes, and (e) the degree of the actual (demographic) pluralisation of lifestyles (single parents (single mothers), cohabiting couples, dinks couples, same-sex couples, etc.) versus general family values and attitudes. 44

45

In contemporary South Korean society, Chang differentiates four types of family ideologies (family-centred values): Confucian familism, instrumental familism, affectionate familism, and individualistic familism. Among these four types, Confucian familism refers to pre-modern family values; affectionate familism pertains to the breadwinner model of the modern family in industrialised societies; whereas Chang’s conceptualisation of individualistic familism stands close to the meaning of post-modern (or second modern) family values. Though Chang here does not discuss a possible socialist type of familism, the aforementioned instrumental familism can be referred indirectly to familycentredness observed in socialist countries, assuming from the discussions in this volume that there is an inclination to instrumental solidarity over emotional solidarity in (postsocialist) transitional societies. See Chang (2010b) for details.

Introduction

11

The second considers change and continuity in gender roles, focusing on the gap between women’s actual employment rate versus ideals concerning women’s work and their positions within the family. The third refers to the question of familism (family dependence and family solidarity). Each analytical viewpoint is discussed (wherever the related data prove to be sufficient) primarily from a time dimension (over a time span of thirty years or so), a regional dimension, and a social stratification dimension. Though the foci of the discussions and analyses vary from chapter to chapter according to the authors’ preferences (as well as to the available databases), each chapter discusses the ambiguous relationship of familism and individualisation by focusing on the aforementioned analytical points. Hopefully this makes comparison across chapters easier for the reader. The volume opens with a theoretical positioning on behalf of the empirical discussions in the succeeding chapters. Chang Kyung-Sup in this theoretical chapter defines post-socialist transition as (compressed) double liberalisation as to economic production and social reproduction, and he persuasively describes the liberal reconfiguration of family as a political economic institution in these transitional societies. Chang collectively names the characteristic features of post-socialist transition familial liberalism and argues that the systemic transformation of Eastern European countries as well as China and Vietnam shows a growing convergence not with Western European countries, but with Southern European and East Asian capitalist societies. Chang also points to the fact that although family ideologies (religious and/or cultural beliefs; ideational familialism) may also be present as reinforcing factors, this convergence is not a culturally driven phenomenon in the first place, but rather due to external socio-economic and institutional conditions (institutional and situational familialisms). In sum, Chang argues that the demographic trends apparently similar to those seen in Western countries such as aversion or minimisation of social reproduction (marriage and fertility) are merely miscomprehended as ‘individualisation’. These trends are not identical with those seen in Western countries as a result of ideational individualisation, but to the contrary these are rather the symptoms of a so-called risk-aversive individualisation. This theoretical discussion is followed by chapters of empirical research studies. It starts with the chapter on Russia, a country which once exerted an enormous impact on the social development of the countries of Eastern Europe in a broad sense (along with Central Asia). This is then succeeded by the chapter on Ukraine, once part of the Soviet Union, now an independent state, thus holding an ‘in-between’ status. The discussions on Ukraine are followed by chapters on three Central European countries (Poland, Slovakia and

12

Rajkai

Hungary), and then on Romania from the Balkan region. Finally come the chapters on China and Vietnam – the two successful representatives of the post-1980s systemic change in socialist East Asia. In the chapter on Russia (the second chapter in this volume), Yulia Gradskova concludes that Russia, in general, has entered the period of the second demographic transition, but that this transition is not proceeding the way it is in the West, and therefore the related transition theory itself needs certain modifications. First of all, the author argues that marketisation in Russia leads to a growing sector of home services that makes the family as a unit less important for the individual in terms of life strategy. However, the traditionalist rhetoric on family and gender relations – emanating from both the Church and the state – maintains a significant influence in terms of values and attitudes. This, along with inconsistent development across Russia’s larger geographical regions, exercises a completely opposite effect on the aforementioned weakening role of the family for the individual. The author argues that in Russia the postponement of childbirth and the increase in the number of cohabiting couples with children are taking place in a different discursive context than in Western European countries at the beginning of their second demographic transition, where a growing autonomy in intimate relationships has been accompanied by growing support from the state for families with children. Lyudmyla Males and Tymur Sandrovych in the third chapter conclude that in post-Soviet Ukraine, while the marketisation of the economy – though it may appear regressive and patriarchal in its intentions – has promoted new modern standards of life such as consumerism, the idealised image of the middle class, or hedonism, the Church and the state act rather as the agents of re-traditionality. The originality of this chapter lies in the fact that it makes use of the notion of ‘two cultures’, referring to (the constant alternation in time of) a Culture-1 and a Culture-2 as coined by Vladimir Paperny, a historian of architecture. It attempts to connect this notion to the interpretation of the second demographic transition process seen in contemporary Ukraine. The authors argue that the period of post-Soviet Ukraine (after the period of democratisation, i.e., Culture-1 from 1986 to 1994) is characterised by Culture-2, which pertains to the massive expansion of state control over social institutions. During this time the formation of civil society and the public sphere is interrupted, and this then contributes to the shifting of society in the direction of authoritarianism. Thus the second demographic transition in contemporary Ukraine is not accompanied by increasing personal autonomy in terms of the intimate sphere, and is hindered by counter-effects from the state and Church. In the fourth chapter, Małgorzata Sikorska stresses that it is difficult to identify a single tendency that could adequately interpret the nature and direction

Introduction

13

of social change in contemporary Poland. The author distinguishes two major and opposing forces influencing current social trends, and discusses the space between these two models of family life. One refers to the strength of the Catholic Church with its traditional division of gender roles, and the other to a model that is based on equal rights. The author concludes that, apart from certain phenomena such as the particularly low birth rate, the second demographic theory as it is cannot be applied to the context of Poland. The author argues that one can see a clear split between the intimate sphere (family) strongly valued by Polish people and replete with positive emotions, and the public sphere, which is viewed very critically. Utilising Edward Banfield’s concept, the author describes contemporary Poland as a society characterised by amoral familism, which is thought to be responsible for the split between the intimate and public spheres and also for the low commitment of Polish people to public life. In the fifth chapter, Peter Guráň, Jarmila Filadelfiová, and Miloš Debnár describe the process of social change in contemporary Slovakia – one of the countries ‘at halfway’ (meaning countries of Central and Eastern Europe with a modern society but also with a traditional family system) – with three adjectives: postponed, compressed, and multilinear. They argue that the socialist period brought two contradictory tendencies to bear on families in Slovakia. First, it increased the intensity of family relations but it did not increase their quality. Second, it not only brought about a unified model of the family in terms of external characteristic features, but it also strengthened internal differentiation of values – from strong Christian values to liberal and gendersensitive attitudes. The change of the political system, however, led to the destandardisation of individual lifestyles and increasing demands on the quality of family life. The authors argue that though the process of Western modernity, along with individualisation, (re)started from the late 1980s, it did not take place from ‘below’ but was both implemented and imposed from ‘above’ (by the state) and imported from ‘outside’ (Western Europe). This argument is very important since it contradicts the standpoint taken by Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk J. van de Kaa, who suggest that the second demographic transition, in the case of Western countries, started from ‘below’ due to a change in the normative value system. The authors of the fifth chapter further argue that the individualisation imposed from ‘above’ and from ‘outside’ is responsible for the postponed and compressed character of social change in contemporary Slovakia. In the sixth chapter, Csaba Dupcsik and Olga Tóth attempt to outline the typology of new pluralistic family structures in contemporary Hungary, and they draw attention to a deficit in Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa’s second

14

Rajkai

demographic transition theory from a standpoint different from the one seen in the fifth chapter. While the proponents of the second demographic transition theory argue that the transition started in the normative value system first, which then induced changes in actual demographic behaviour, the authors in this chapter point out that, in the case of Hungary, one can see an opposite direction of causality. They argue that the demographic changes (pluralisation of lifestyles) preceded the relevant changes in the value system, and that this has led to a remarkable gap between the (apparently traditionalist) attitudes seen in survey studies and demographic individualisation – though they also argue that this gap may have narrowed over the past decade. One may venture to say that the arguments in the fifth and sixth chapters are complementary to each other, and that together they can contribute even more efficiently to the formation of a potential modified second demographic transition theory. In the seventh chapter, Borbála Kovács outlines the changes and continuities in attitudes towards and behaviour in relation to fertility, ‘doing family’, and familism in post-socialist Romania. The author concludes that one can see numerous contradictions in the attitudes of Romanians towards a variety of family-related issues that appear to indicate an incoherent and accidental pluralism deriving from propagandistic statements harking back to socialist times. On the other hand, the author argues that there is much less ‘accidental pluralism’ in relation to family values, ideologies, and institutions in Romania, and that the antagonism between rural, traditional elements and urban, more cosmopolitan ideas and practices is also less stark compared to the case of South Korea. Moreover, she concludes that Romania offers just another variant of what is described by the South Korean-born term compressed modernity, in the sense that there is a greater retention of traditional social norms and gender roles, especially within the intimate sphere of the family, and that there is obviously much less pluralism in terms of family values and ideologies or much less antagonism between rural and urban areas than in the South Korean context. In the eighth chapter, Zhou Weihong, Xue Yali, and Liu Wenrong point out that Asian scholars have found a reversed directionality in Asian modernisation in terms of cultural revolution and political changes, as compared to Western Europe and North America. While cultural revolution preceded political changes in the West, Asian countries championed economic modernisation but lagged behind in political changes, stumbling with social and cultural modernisation. This has led to a reversed and compressed character for modernisation in China, which manifests itself in ‘individualisation without individualism’ (proposed by Chang Kyung-Sup), a feminist social pattern

Introduction

15

without real feminism, as well as in a mixture of traditional Chinese ‘close intergenerational relationships’ and ‘pure relationships’46 influenced by modernity. People in China emphasise more the liberation of the human being and have started to pursue the ideology of self-fulfilment with an obvious stress on more individual independence and autonomy. On the other hand, there is a counter-tendency which emphasises basic family obligations and a closer intergenerational relationship, and thus the authors conclude that China is not following the Western post-modern tendency towards the atomisation of family members. The authors point to the existence of ‘modern familism’ in China, a term they use to refer to an intergenerational ideal pattern based on individualistic values. In the ninth chapter, Nguyen Huu Minh discusses family change from the perspective of the changing institution of marriage. The author concludes that despite certain Western-style demographic changes, such as young people tending to get married (much) later, or some of them even choosing to remain single, as well as the increase in the number of divorces, the institution of marriage continues to be stable in contemporary Vietnam. Whereas young people enjoy growing freedom in terms of spouse selection, parents still exert a certain decision-making power over their children’s marriages. According to the author, changes in the Vietnamese family have been dramatic and reflect the interests of individual members rather than the family interest as a whole, but changes in the family are not taking place in a linear way as a result of economic development. The effects of modernisation are exposed to the interaction of other social and cultural factors. The author draws attention to the fact that marketisation has created more opportunities for individuals to act outside the control of the family, while on the other hand, the decrease in direct control by the state over individuals47 has also caused individuals to become more dependent on their families. Finally, at the end of the volume the reader can find a brief discussion of certain differences in the concepts used in the respective chapters, such as ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, ‘famili(ali)sm’ and ‘individualism’, along with a section highlighting the necessity of creating a common academic language of family studies from a global perspective. The Conclusion also indicates that despite these (currently unavoidable) differences in concepts, the findings in the respective chapters all suggest that the contemporary demographic transitions in the examined societies are not fully identical with those observed in Western countries; therefore the Western second demographic transition theory needs modification. 46 47

A term used by Anthony Giddens (1992). Except in a few areas such as that of filial piety, strongly supported by the state.

16

Rajkai

The concept of compressed modernity appears to give a useful theoretical and empirical framework for future studies in respect to a thorough elaboration of a modified second demographic transition theory. Finally, the Conclusion also outlines other possible future research directions, such as the necessity of thorough investigations of the similarities and differences between transitional (post-)socialist, Southern European, and capitalist East Asian societies so that the potential of the term familial liberalism proposed by Chang Kyung-Sup can be fully realised. References Andrews, Ernest, ed. 2008. Linguistic Changes in Post-communist Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Boulder, co: East European Monographs. Distributed by Columbia University Press. Barbiéri, Magali and Danièle Bélanger, eds. 2009. Reconfiguring Families in Contemporary Vietnam. Stanford, ca: Stanford University Press. Burawoy, Michael and János Lukács. 1992. The Radiant Past: Ideology and Reality in Hungary’s Road to Capitalism. Chicago, il: University of Chicago Press. Carlbäck, Helene, Yulia Gradskova and Zhanna Kravchenko, eds. 2012. And They Lived Happily Ever After: Norms and Everyday Practices of Family and Parenthood in Russia and Central Europe. Budapest: Central European University Press. Chang Kyung-Sup. 2010a. South Korea under Compressed Modernity: Familial Political Economy in Transition. London: Routledge. ——. 2010b. ‘Individualization without individualism: Compressed modernity and obfuscated family crisis in East Asia’. Journal of Intimate and Public Spheres (Pilot Issue): 23–39. Chitnis, Rajendra Anand. 2004. Literature in Post-communist Russia and Eastern Europe. London and New York: Routledge Curzon. Drahokoupil, Jan. 2009. Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe. London and New York: Routledge. Gal, Susan and Gail Kligman. 2000. The Politics of Gender after Socialism: A ComparativeHistorical Essay. Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press. Giddens, Anthony. 1992. The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in the Modern Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hankiss, Elemér. 1989. Kelet-európai alternatívák [East European Alternatives]. Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. Hann, Chris M., ed. 2002. Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia. London and New York: Routledge.

Introduction

17

Hann, Chris, Caroline Humphrey and Katherine Verdery. 2002. ‘Introduction: Postsocialism as a topic of anthropological investigation’. In Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia, edited by Chris M. Hann, 1–28. London and New York: Routledge. Howard, Marc Morjé. 2003. The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-communist Europe. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Kamiński, Bartłomiej. 1991 The Collapse of State Socialism. Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press. Kovačević, Nataša. 2008. Narrating Post-communism: Colonial Discourse and Europe’s Borderline Civilization. London and New York: Routledge. Latham, Kevin. 2002. ‘Rethinking Chinese consumption: Social palliatives and the rhetorics of transition in postsocialist China’. In Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia, edited by Chris M. Hann, 217–237. London and New York: Routledge. Lesthaeghe, Ron and Dirk J. van de Kaa. 1986. ‘Twee Demographische Transities?’ [Two demographic transitions?]. In Bevolking: Groei en Krimp [Population: Growth and Decline], edited by Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk J. van de Kaa, 9–24. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus. Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. 1991. Post-communism: Four Perspectives. Armonk, ny: M. E. Sharpe. Ochiai Emiko. 2010. ‘Reconstruction of intimate and public spheres in Asian modernity: Familialism and beyond’. Journal of Intimate and Public Spheres (Pilot Issue): 2–22. Pickles, John and Robert M. Jenkins, eds. 2008. State and Society in Post-socialist Economies. Studies in Central and Eastern Europe. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Racioppi, Linda and Katherine O’Sullivan See, eds. 2009. Gender Politics in Postcommunist Eurasia. East Lansing, mi: Michigan State University Press. Rechel, Bernd, ed. 2009. Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe. London and New York: Routledge. Robila, Michaela, ed. 2004. Families in Eastern Europe. Contemporary Perspectives in Family Research (Book 5). Amsterdam and London: Elsevier JAI. Spirova, Maria. 2007. Political Parties in Post-communist Societies: Formation, Persistence, and Change. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Stan, Lavinia, ed. 2008. Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. London: Routledge. Todorova, Maria and Zsuzsa Gille, eds. 2010. Post-communist Nostalgia. New York: Berghahn Books. Uhlin, Anders. 2006. Post-Soviet Civil Society. London and New York: Routledge.

18

Rajkai

Verdery, Katherine. 1996. What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press. Werner, Jayne. 2006. ‘Gender, household, and state: Renovation (Đoˆˀi Mới) as social process in Việt Nam’. In Gender, Household, State: Đoˆˀi Mới in Việt Nam, edited by Jayne Werner and Danièle Bélanger, 29–47. Southeast Asia Program Series, No. 19. Ithaca, ny: Cornell Southeast Asia Program.

chapter 1

A Theoretical Account of the Individual–Family– Population Nexus in Post-Socialist Transitions1 Chang Kyung-Sup 1 Introduction The worldwide conversion of state-socialist countries to various types of liberal political economies since the late twentieth century has presented contemporary social scientists an entirely new task of theorising and analysing the post-socialist social, cultural, economic, and political transformations of these countries. While most of them are either abruptly or gradually incorporating and assimilating with capitalist systems and being integrated with the global neoliberal political economy, their varying socialist experiences have critically molded the way post-socialist systems arise, evolve, and consolidate. A primary theoretical and analytical challenge in studying this process lies with the fact that post-socialist transitions involve an explosive unleashing of the microsocial forces of private interests and actors (that used to be suppressed or kept dormant by the authoritarian bureaucratic states in the pre-transition era). The hitherto dominant state-centred understanding of these societies has to be fundamentally reworked in order to concretely and systematically understand the radical new experiences of a major proportion of the world’s population living in such societies. In fact, this task even requires a thorough reanalysis and reinterpretation of the socialist era in respect to the extremely nuanced and complicated nature of the actual life-world of ordinary individuals, families, and communities. In this short interpretative essay, I wish to present a broad theoretical analysis of the evolving structural relationships among individual, family, and society (population) in the post-socialist societies of Eastern Europe and East Asia. While it is offered as a broad theoretical introduction to the subsequent

1 This work has been supported by the POSCO TJ Park Foundation’s Research Grants for Asian Studies (2013). The author wishes to thank Dr Zsombor Rajkai for the valuable opportunity to examine rich empirical details on various national cases of post-socialist transition in this collective project.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004276833_003

20

CHANG

chapters, which deal with various national cases of post-socialist transformation of individual–family–society (population) relationships, the rich and diverse details of such national experiences may not be fully accommodated in this theoretically simplifying article.2 Nonetheless, there are critically common issues and problems that constitute a highly meaningful subject for theoretical inquiry on the individual–family–population nexus. I will define post-socialist transition as (compressed) double liberalisation as to economic production and social reproduction and then highlight the liberal reconfiguration of family as a political economic institution – namely, familial liberalism. I will then present a reconception of intra-familial individual relationships focused upon potential and actual flows of socio-economic risk associated with familial liberal transition in post-socialist societies. This is followed by a new theoretical interpretation of the (risk flows-associated) second fertility transition in post-socialist societies in comparison with the various capitalist industrial societies of East Asia, Southern Europe and Western Europe. I will conclude by making comparative comments on the rise and expansion of familial liberalism and its critical implications for social reproduction in various regions of the world. 2

Individual–Family–Population Nexus under Socialism

In most state-socialist societies, Communist revolution as a planned political project and socialist institutional transition as a concomitant socio-economic process were subjected to double forces of compressed modernity. First, Marxist political (economic) theory dictated that its subscriber nations should implement the universally prescribed, radical programs of condensed political, social, and economic change, often under the leadership of seemingly prescient intelligentsia cadres.3 Second, except in Russia as the first revolutionary Marxist nation, Communist revolution and socialist institutional transition were internationally coerced, guided, supported, and/or learned, leading to variously condensed experiences of simulative Marxist modernisation. These 2 The national cases in this book upon which this theoretical essay is significantly based include: Russia (Gradskova 2014), Ukraine (Males and Sandrovych 2014), Poland (Sikorska 2014), Slovakia (Guráň et al. 2014), Hungary (Dupcsik and Tóth 2014), Romania (Kovács 2014), China (Zhou Weihong et al. 2014), and Vietnam (Nguyen Huu Minh 2014). For a comprehensive account of various demographic consequences of post-socialist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, see Philipov and Dorbritz (2003). 3 Marxism was thereby reframed into Marxism–Leninism in political practice.

THE INDIVIDUAL–FAMILY–POPULATION NEXUS

21

double forces of compressed Marxist modernity required its subscriber nations often to go through not only painfully violent initial socio-political struggles but also riskily abrupt social and economic institutional transformations. A  majority of post-revolutionary Marxist societies thereby underwent the common experience of condensed (Stalinist) industrialisation, urbanisation, and proletarianisation. Despite different historical backgrounds, political conditions, and organisational frameworks, the combined social change of industrialisation– urbanisation–proletarianisation in state-socialist countries was largely analogous, if with much greater velocities, to the past experience of many industrialised capitalist countries. Likewise, when individuals and families in state-socialist countries were made to undergo these transformations, they began to show a variety of behavioural patterns and social relationships such as were comparable to those of their counterparts in capitalist countries. Among others, a sharp decline in fertility (namely, the first fertility transition) above all resulted from the changing nature of intergenerational relationships which in turn reflected the occupational transformation from family farming to (post-familial) industrial labour and the concomitant socio-cultural changes in family life. In proportion to the universality and rapidity of socialist industrialisation, the fertility decline was common and abrupt. In fact, even many individuals and families who had remained in the village ended up undergoing similar experiences of economic, socio-cultural, and demographic changes because the socialist restructuring of rural production and peasant life, through state farms and collective farms, generated a sort of quasi-proletarianisation effect on peasants.4 According to John Caldwell (1982), proletarianisation – that is, the social transformation of mostly family-based peasants into capitalist industrial wage labourers – fundamentally alters the instrumental nature of familial intergenerational relationships by reversing the direction of child-to-parent ‘wealth flows’. For industrial wage labour, the family does not function as the organisational unit or basis of production anymore, and children lose the value of being auxiliary, apprentice, and/or successor labourers for familial production work. Furthermore, the modern state usually requires – and, according to Donzelot (1979), even polices – its citizens to feed, protect, and even educate children as morally exhorted and/or legally stipulated familial responsibility. As such, children become the source of various moral and legal liabilities, this in exchange for parents’ emotional gratification. Intergenerational wealth flows thereby shift in the parent-to-child direction and induce parents to reduce fertility 4 See Chang (1990).

22

CHANG

accordingly. Parental emotional gratification alone would not require too many children. These tendencies were not necessarily limited to capitalist societies, but similarly realised in state-socialist societies as well. In fact, in the latter, both urban and rural areas were subjected to the same political pressures and institutional requirements for defamilialisation of economic production and sociocultural life. The nationalisation and collectivisation of both urban industries and agricultural farms produced a common effect of socialising (or, in agriculture, defamilialising) production and subsistence. In order to facilitate this process, various ideological attempts were made to weaken people’s familial allegiance in material and moral life. In a sense, the socialist economic and social transitions induced a sort of socialist individualisation in spite of the official ideologies of collectivism and equalitarianism.5 However, given the limited public resources of each socialist state, familial support duties for young children and sometimes for aged parents usually remained in the private realm. Children in state-socialist countries thereby became a material and instrumental liability for parents, leading to a sharp decline in fertility. This constituted the basic context of the first fertility transition in state-socialist countries. This tendency, however, was critically complemented by universal stabilisation of the basic conditions for social reproduction in state-socialist countries – above all, marriage and familial subsistence. The launching of each socialist state was immediately accompanied by the enactment of a democratic or egalitarian marriage law as well as the implementation of systematic measures for egalitarian and/or socialised production and livelihood (e.g., land reform, collectivisation/nationalisation of farms and industries, income distribution according to work and need, public provision of basic social services). Marriage became a de facto citizenship right; its material sustenance, including childbearing and child-rearing, was universally ensured through individual citizens’ egalitarian entitlement to work, income, and social services. Thereby arose a social reproduction regime characterised by dampened but universalised fertility. For instance, the population of China, the world’s demographic supergiant, nearly doubled in this way during the three post-revolutionary

5 In a way, this trend may have facilitated the formation of what Hungarian sociologist Elemér Hankiss described as ‘empty individualisation’ in his country’s socialist transition. As has been hotly debated, Western welfare states are also seen to have generated an individualisation (or defamilialisation) effect. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) explain this tendency in terms of ‘institutionalised individualism’.

THE INDIVIDUAL–FAMILY–POPULATION NEXUS

23

decades, in spite of the periodic fluctuations of fertility which accompanied abrupt socialist institutional transformations.6 3

Post-Socialist Transition as (Compressed) Double Liberalisation: The Rise of Familial Liberalism

Despite their sustained low fertility and slow population growth, state-socialist countries in general kept struggling with the problem of socialist underemployment. State-orchestrated Stalinist industrialisation enabled them to build up modern industries rapidly, but their concentration on heavy (and thus capitalintensive) industries fundamentally curtailed employment generation and, no less crucially, removed self-regenerative economic capacity in the long run. While socialist citizens’ universal entitlement to work boiled down to redundant and underpaying jobs, the structural undermining of the economic basis of state-socialist systems necessitated ideological revisionism and economic reformism. When policy reforms or political transitions moving away from state socialism were initiated by reformist state elites or defiant civil leaders, most citizens instantly sided with such changes. The almost worldwide process of post-socialist political transitions and policy reforms turned out no less compressed than the initial formation and expansion of state-socialist polities. Despite interregional and country-specific differences in political conversions and policy reforms, post-socialist transition in general has been subjected to two dimensions of econosocial liberalisation. First, production organisations with socialist forms (i.e., industrial enterprises and farms owned and managed by state organs or local collectives) have been liberalised in terms of legal and/or managerial privatisation whereas state-controlled economic planning (through which the economic activities of production units used to be rigidly controlled) was either significantly diminished or abolished altogether. Second, despite varying conditions contingent upon individuals’ organisationally or politically entrenched interests, ordinary citizens’ politically stipulated entitlement to work and livelihood has been substituted by their individual autonomy, if not full freedom, in economic activities and, more crucially, their private responsibility for individual and familial livelihood. As shown in detail in the national cases of Russia, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, China, and Vietnam, the radically abrupt nature of such liberal transitions as well as the general socio-economic difficulties inherent therein tend 6 See Chang (1990).

24

CHANG

to induce a desperate search for immediately available material and organisational resources for work and livelihood on the part of ordinary citizens.7 In nearly all post-socialist societies, family (and sometimes kin) has been brought back as the main social institution for immediate material survival and, hopefully, long-term prosperity. The worldwide liberalisation of state-socialist systems has thereby engendered a sort of familial liberalism as the de facto paradigm of economic and social governance. Where individual citizens in critical numbers and proportions find no meaningful organisational or financial basis for autonomous economic activities, whether their national economy is growing or declining, their almost natural recourse has been to rely on, cooperate with, or adhere to family members. Such familialised responses and adaptations are often encouraged or demanded publicly through reform policies and propaganda.8 Family has thereby become the central unit of both economic freedom and social responsibility in most post-socialist societies. In fact, this reality is vividly and repeatedly illustrated in the studies here on Russia, Poland, Romania, China, and Vietnam. Interestingly, this line of the critical institutional significance of family already characterises many capitalist societies, particularly in East Asia and Southern Europe. That is, there seems to be a growing convergence between many post-socialist societies and East Asian/Southern European capitalist societies in terms of familial liberalism. Obviously, such convergence is not a culturally driven phenomenon. Even though many countries in East Asia, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe share familialism as a societal characteristic, they do not have a common historical or cultural background. Concerning its formative nature, familialism can be categorised into three different types: ideational, institutional(ised), and situational. Ideational familialism is the historico-culturally established norms and values of individuals for expressively family-centred life; institutional(ised) familialism is the emphasis or demand on familial functions and duties as embedded explicitly or implicitly in various social and legal institutions, public policies, and social practices; situational familialism 7 As I explained elsewhere (Chang 2010), grassroots masses have been confronted with the triple difficulties of post-socialist transition: (1) gross unfamiliarity with the market system, (2) lack of private economic resources for market-oriented activities, and (3) alienation and exploitation inherent in the market system. 8 In particular, see the case of Slovakia (Guráň et al. 2014) in this book. In China, as (gendered) familial care services for elders, children, etc. are in increasing demand, the public slogan of funühuijia (women return home) has been propagated in spite of women’s general reluctance (Chang 2000). Also see Chapter 8 in this volume regarding ‘sending women home’.

THE INDIVIDUAL–FAMILY–POPULATION NEXUS

25

is various family-centred behaviours and attitudes formed consciously or unconsciously due to particular situational conditions that render such behaviours and attitudes rational, justifiable, or indispensable.9 Familialism in various capitalist and post-socialist societies, as a simplistic understanding of familial liberalism, is basically amalgamated from institutional(ised) and situational familialisms for all ideational (i.e., ideological, religious, and/or cultural) impetuses for familialism customary to these societies. Family-centred economic pursuits and social protection as commonly witnessed in a number of post-socialist, as well as capitalist, societies are an outcome of particular situational and institutional conditions that tend to assimilate the socio-economic life of the citizens of these societies in an international context. This is not to suggest that the strongly sustained presence of Catholicism and other family-centred religious and cultural traditions in Eastern Europe – as described in the chapters on Ukraine, Poland, etc. – or elsewhere has no significant direct social impact or fortifying effect on situational and institutional factors. Also, there is an epistemological requisite that situational and institutional familialisms can and should be communicated mostly through various references to ideational familialism. Such communicative correspondence between situational/institutional familialism and ideational familialism may not always have to feed on some false consciousness because the origin of such familialist traditions themselves could have consisted in the situational and/or institutional necessities of the past. 4

Post-Socialist Family and Individual: From Wealth Flows to Risk Flows

Familial liberalism may induce diametrically dissimilar attitudes and behaviours for social reproduction under different conditions, economic and otherwise. Post-socialist transitions have produced quite diverse economic outcomes, ranging from China’s developmental miracle to Russia’s social debacle. It can be said that there have been both developmental and degenerative post-socialist transitions. In China, for instance, the initial reform policy of rural economic liberalisation (including agricultural decollectivisation and market-oriented rural industrialisation) instantly reactivated familial production activities and was soon accompanied by explosive economic outcomes 9 The concept of institutional(ised) familialism is presented in comparison with what Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) observe as ‘institutionalised individualism’ in the Western context.

26

CHANG

enriching rural people privately.10 Such economic trends – by abruptly raising the current and future instrumental values of children (in particular, sons) – then ignited rural people’s fertility desire after nearly a decade of coercive public fertility control.11 There seems to have been a re-reversal of intergenerational wealth flows in Chinese rural families. By contrast, as shown in the Russian and many Eastern European post-transition economic crises, familial socioeconomic autonomy more often implied the cursing of family relationships with unfortunate and unforeseen liabilities.12 Familial intergenerational flows began to be filled up by various socio-economic risks, rather than by wealth. Intergenerational risk flows, in whatever direction, tend to discourage fertility unconditionally as people wish to avoid or minimise such risks by reducing family size. It is highly important to recognise the double structure of risk flows in degenerative post-socialist transitions. First, there are risk flows from the defunct (political) economic system to the family; second, within the family, there are risk flows between parents and children (and sometimes between spouses). Under macro-systemic crises such as degenerative post-socialist transition in Russia and Eastern Europe, the risks flowing between family members substantially originate from defunct national (political) economic systems. Family relationships thereby become a conduit for personalising macro-systemic risks. Children with bleak employment prospects and parents suffering job loss and/or welfare removal are likely to serve as protracted sources of familial risks to each other, but such familial risks are often engendered collectively by economically and socially defunct post-socialist systems. In this context, as shown in the national cases of Russia, Slovakia, Hungary, etc., aversion or minimisation of social reproduction actions such as marriage and fertility – often miscomprehended as ‘individualisation’ – becomes a strategically rational private response to the macro-systemic failure of the national (political) economies. On top of the generalised economic depression and instability of post-socialist systems, their hasty incorporation of liberal (and neoliberal) principles and policies has inevitably led to radical desocialisation and disequalisation of basic conditions for social reproduction (i.e., basic income for family subsistence, housing, childcare, education, etc.). In fact, the still illiberal political structures, under which the entrenched interests of (formerly Communist) political elites are often manifested both as privatised and 10 11 12

See Chang (1992, 1993). See Chang (1996). See Gradskova (2014); Guráň et al. (2014); Kovács (2014).

THE INDIVIDUAL–FAMILY–POPULATION NEXUS

27

marketised economic privileges and as exclusively preserved rights to elite social securities, tend to amplify such desocialisation and disequalisation effects of liberal econosocial changes. The exclusive socio-economic perks for the tiny minority population of elites would not make them particularly reproductive (in terms of high fertility, etc.); whereas the socio-economic loss or deterioration of the non-elite majority would certainly damage their will and capacity for social reproduction. Such damage may increasingly take the form of intra-familial risk flows. 5

The Post-Socialist Variety of the Second Fertility Transition

In spite of serious differences and diversities in (political) economic systems, welfare policies, historico-cultural backgrounds, and development levels, a majority of post-socialist countries have joined various groups of capitalist industrial countries in experiencing what is often dubbed ‘the second fertility transition’. Much like their first fertility transition, their second fertility transition has been a highly condensed, or even turbulent, experience. Except those (formerly less developed socialist) countries that have undergone developmentally orchestrated post-socialist transition with strong familial agricultural and industrial/tertiary entrepreneurship (e.g., rural China), most post-socialist countries seem to have confronted extremely unstable and depressed socioeconomic conditions under which most citizens find active or expansive familial procreation impractical or undesirable. Under familial liberalism in post-socialist governance, the macro-systemic risks of many defunct (political) economies have been familialised, so parents and children perceive each other as immediate and/or potential sources of socio-economic risks that nevertheless may have to be managed as familial moral obligations. The reshaping of the familial intergenerational (and sometimes interspousal) relationship from wealth flows to risk flows seems to have decisively stifled both the desire and necessity of post-socialist citizens to reproduce. When intergenerational flows are mainly characterised by socioeconomic risks, their specific direction (i.e., from children to parents or from parents to children) does not make a fundamental difference in affecting (mostly, curbing) fertility. Similarly, when marriage is thought about in terms of current or potential interspousal socio-economic risks, individuals’ aspiration for initiating and/or sustaining it cannot but be seriously stifled. These behaviours of risk aversion in familial social reproduction constitute a type of individualisation, risk-aversive individualisation, structurally distinguished from the ideational individualisation that has been regarded as the

28

CHANG

driving social force for the second fertility transition in the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe.13 In fact, as shown in the national cases here of Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Romania, China, etc., the second fertility transition in many post-socialist countries has taken place amid various forms of ideational reversion to familialism (as well as the institutional and situational embracing of familialism). As the editor of this book points out, The declining birth and marriage rates, the increasing divorce rate, as well as the increasing number of cohabiting couples, dinks couples, single parents (mainly single mothers), or that of homosexual couples – though the degrees to which these phenomena appear vary from country to country – are also perceived in (post-)socialist societies. These phenomena, which are usually regarded as signs of individualisation in terms of self-fulfilment in Western countries, stand in a sort of contradiction to the growing family dependence imposed on individuals indirectly by the state from above. The two contradictory trends raise important questions regarding the (post-)socialist character of Eastern Europe as well as socialist East Asia. Is individualisation perceived here identical with what is seen in Western countries, or is it something different…?14 It seems that, in turbulent post-socialist transitions, (ideational) familialism has psychologically and practically amplified the perceived (moral) risks of familial relationships and has thus contributed to the ultimate fall in fertility. This situation does not differ in any fundamental way from that of the familialist capitalist countries of East Asia and Southern Europe, which have undergone even more drastic second fertility transitions than their Western European and North American counterparts.15 On the other hand, the gradual recovery and stabilisation of fertility, though still at below-replacement levels, in supposedly individualist European and North American societies seem substantially to reflect the strengthening of women’s actively individualist procreation as demonstrated by dramatic spreads and increases of extramarital (or, more correctly, postmarital) fertility. The evolving procreative ethos therein is that childbearing and child-rearing as the realisations of fundamental womanly desires and values do not have to be inhibited by the (historically and/or practically patriarchalised) institution

13 14 15

See Van de Kaa (1987) and Lesthaeghe (1995). From Rajkai (2014, 7–8). See Jones et al. (2009); Billari and Kohler (2004); Kohler et al. (2004).

THE INDIVIDUAL–FAMILY–POPULATION NEXUS

29

of heterosexual marriage.16 As hinted at in many national cases here, such ideational evolution (or conversion?) may not take place easily in the rigidly familialist societies of Eastern Europe, not to mention those of Southern Europe and East Asia. Also, at least in Western Europe, the basic material conditions for such realisation of women’s desires and values seem to have been offered by the welfare state, because the child’s socio-economic fate would be socially protected regardless of their mothers’ particular socio-economic difficulties.17 The political economic circumstances of Western European countries basically differentiate themselves from their Eastern European neighbours (as well as from Southern European and East Asian capitalist industrial countries) under the increasing influence of familial liberal doctrines and policies. 6

Three Worlds of Familial Liberalism: The Reproductive Predicament in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and East Asia

The basic nature of a social system or political economy can be characterised in respect to the institutional basis of economic production and social reproduction and the institutionally framed structural relationship between these ‘two moments’ of human society.18 State socialism in Russia, Eastern Europe, socialist East Asia, etc., was a highly unique social system in that it tried to reduce social reproduction as a subordinate component of economic production while radically socialising economic production through national and collective production units and national economic planning. Post-socialist transition in general has been institutionally undoing socialist economic production, but by nature it has been fundamentally reworking institutional arrangements for social reproduction. In both processes, individuals have desperately clung to family which has in some cases been politically summoned by the state in order to fill a potential institutional void in social reproduction and, though less explicitly, in economic production. This double institutional 16

17 18

Concerning the unit/level of procreative decision, fertility can be categorised into individual, familial, or other fertility (Chang 2011). A common feature of many familialist societies is that women’s procreation is often the result of a corporate decision made by their families(-in-law) or parents(-in-law). The recent erosion of such familial or parental authority over women’s fertility has led to a sudden decline in fertility in many familialist societies. In North America, by contrast, relatively high levels of fertility have been sustained by immigrants in critical degrees. See Marx and Engels (1970).

30

CHANG

dependence on family has driven post-socialist societies to assume a decisive political economic nature for familial liberalism. Such institutional reactivation of family has commonly taken place in both industrialised and less industrialised socialist countries, however, for fundamentally different reasons. In East Asian socialist countries (China and Vietnam in this book) where the vast majority of their respective populations still remained economically arrested in agriculture, the reformist governments simply decided to allow (ask?) rural people to reinstate familial organisations for flexible economic production (including rural industrialisation) and social self-protection; whereas, in Russia and Eastern European countries where the accomplishment of socialist industrialisation ironically drove these countries to an economic dead-end, the so-called ‘big bang’ approach to post-socialist transition practically forced individuals to rescue themselves, often through familial work and assistance. As East Asia’s post-socialist transitions have turned out to be highly developmental, in contrast to the rather degenerative transitions of Russia and many Eastern European countries, familial liberalism therein has been responsible for a greatly strengthened desire for familial social reproduction (i.e., higher, if gender-selective, fertility), again in contrast to the sharply curtailed reproductive desire in Russia and Eastern Europe. The post-socialist East Asian situation is somewhat analogous to the early post-war period of capitalist East Asia (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan, and to some extent Japan) where family used to be the central institution for social welfare for most citizens and even a core economic institution in the primary and tertiary sectors. In particular, familial self-welfare used to be considered and even coerced by the authoritarian developmentalist governments as a main instrument for national economic competitiveness.19 Even when the triple social transformation of industrialisation–urbanisation–proletarianisation occurred at full velocity (with fertility plummeting accordingly), many East Asians tried to realise at least their patriarchal desire in social reproduction through gender–selective fertility.20 The institutional significance of family as seen in capitalist East Asian countries remains, but their recent neoliberal economic globalisation and recurrent structural economic crises have economically (or developmentally) disenfranchised innumerable citizens and created a situation where they are desperately attached to increasingly diluted familial means of work, livelihood, and protection.21 Apparently, this is quite reminiscent of 19 20 21

See Chang (1997, 2012). South Koreans were once particularly noticeable in this trend (Park and Cho 1995). See Chang (2002).

THE INDIVIDUAL–FAMILY–POPULATION NEXUS

31

the recent dilemmas of Russia and Eastern Europe.22 It appears no coincidence that both late capitalist East Asia and post-socialist Russia/Eastern Europe commonly exhibit problematically low fertility and other tendencies of reproductive crisis. In spite of their gradual institutional assimilation with Western and Northern European countries in social welfare, Southern European societies, which have frequently been compared to East Asian capitalist societies in terms of their common ‘ultra-low’ fertility, are no doubt familial liberal as well.23 Given their countries’ chronic economic depression and stratified welfare structure, ordinary Southern Europeans have had to keep turning to their own families as a source of work and livelihood.24 The narrow and somewhat stultified industrialisation of these countries has, on the one hand, left large proportions of citizens stuck in traditional family-based production and livelihood and, on the other hand, restricted a firm political basis for progressive class-based parties or inclusionary welfare regimes that would help socialise the basic means of social reproduction. The demographic tendencies of individualisation – in particular, extremely low fertility – under both popular and governmental familialisms have thereby characterised Southern European societies for quite a while.25 Their economic integration with Western Europe through the European Union has not meaningfully altered this phenomenon but rather exacerbated the financial and fiscal vulnerability of many states in the region, intensifying the familial burden of self-support. In sum, the post-socialist transition of state-socialist countries has rarely engendered a genuinely liberal social system or political economy in which individual economic freedom is systematically institutionalised and effectuated through stable market-based economic opportunities and rewards for individual citizens. Instead, post-socialist systems have chronically forced individuals to revert to various familial arrangements for work and subsistence that are characterised by highly diverse and complex modes of production and distribution. This trend has induced many post-socialist societies to gradually assimilate with Southern European and East Asian capitalist societies in terms of what can be defined as familial liberalism in economic production and social reproduction. 22 23 24

25

Ochiai (2011) addresses this dilemma in East Asia as a sustainability crisis. See Abrahamson (2012). According to Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), Continental European welfare states also embody a line of familialism institutionalised through the patriarchal arrangement of employmentlinked social securities. This could be seen as a sort of familialist social democracy. See Billari and Kohler (2004).

32

CHANG

A familial liberal system may have such inherent structural problems as inter-familial class disparities and intra-familial (i.e., gender/generationbased) socio-economic inequalities.26 However, a much more critical problem in recent years is that the various socio-economic risks of macro-systemic failures or adjustments – i.e., perilously hasty liberal transition and instant oligarchic restructuring of socialist economies in Russia and Eastern Europe, chronic socio-economic disarticulation of vast masses under socio-regionally stratified and generally lackluster industrial capitalism in Southern Europe, and abrupt developmental disenfranchisement of domestic workforces under the unchecked neoliberal restructuring and globalisation of post-crisis East Asian economies – have been familialised as ordinary citizens struggle to eke out a living and subsist by mobilising familial resources.27 In these circumstances, family relationships have become overloaded with the privately reframed risks of post-socialist, stratified capitalist, and post-developmental capitalist systems.28 The widespread tendencies of averting and minimising social reproduction – as evidenced by indicators of supposedly individualist behaviours such as declining marriage rate, rising divorce rate, plummeting fertility rate, increasing suicide rate, etc. – should be seen as desperate acts of political economic adjustment to the worsening tyrannies of familial liberalism on the part of the masses.29 References Abrahamson, Peter. 2012. ‘European welfare states: Neoliberal retrenchment, developmental reinforcement, or plural evolutions’. In Developmental Politics in Transition: The Neoliberal Era and Beyond, edited by Chang Kyung-Sup, Ben Fine and Linda Weiss, 70–91. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

26

27 28

29

The familial mode of production and distribution, on the other hand, has been theorised to have a broad societal utility (of maximising the total economic product) where a society is burdened with economic overpopulation (Georgescu-Roegen 1960). Such institutional reinstatement of family in work and subsistence is often accompanied by an expansion of various urban informal sectors (see Portes et al. 1989). In collaboration with Ulrich Beck, a more general theoretical analysis of late (or second) modern fertility in risk flows perspective is currently being prepared under the title of ‘The late modern transformation of human fertility: From wealth flows to risk flows’. For the South Korean instances of such individualisation-as-adjustment, see Chin (2013) and Chang and Song (2010).

THE INDIVIDUAL–FAMILY–POPULATION NEXUS

33

Beck, Ulrich and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. 2002. Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and Its Social and Political Consequences. London: Sage. Billari, Francesco and Hans-Peter Kohler. 2004. ‘Patterns of low and lowest-low fertility in Europe’. Population Studies 58 (2): 161–176. Caldwell, John C. 1982. Theory of Fertility Decline. London: Academic Press. Chang Kyung-Sup. 1990. ‘Socialist institutions and family wealth flows reversal: An assessment of post-revolutionary Chinese rural fertility’. Journal of Family History 15 (2): 179–200. —— . 1992. ‘China’s rural reform: The state and peasantry in constructing a macrorationality’. Economy and Society 21 (4): 430–452. ——. 1993. ‘The peasant family in transition from Maoist to Lewisian rural industrialisation’. Journal of Development Studies 29 (2): 220–244. ——. 1996. ‘Birth and wealth in peasant China: Surplus population, limited supplies of family labor, and economic reform’. In China: The Many Facets of Demographic Change, edited by Alice Goldstein and Wang Feng, 21–45. Boulder, co: Westview Press. ——. 1997. ‘The neo-Confucian right and family politics in South Korea: The nuclear family as an ideological construct’. Economy and Society 26 (1): 22–42. ——. 2000. ‘Economic privatism and new patterns of inequality in post-Mao China’. Development and Society 29 (2): 23–54. ——. 2002. ‘South Korean society in the imf era: Compressed capitalist development and social sustainability crisis’. In Rethinking Development in East Asia: From Illusory Miracle to Economic Crisis, edited by Pietro Masina, 189–222. London: Curzon. ——. 2010. ‘The second modern condition? Compressed modernity as internalized reflexive cosmopolitization’. British Journal of Sociology 61 (3): 444–464. ——. 2011. ‘“Wiheomhoepi” sidaeui sahoejaesaengsan: gajokchulsaneseo yeoseongchulsanuro?’ [Social reproduction in an era of ‘risk aversion’: From familial fertility to womanly fertility?]. Gajokgwa munhwa [Journal of the Korean Family Studies Association] 23 (3): 1–24 (장경섭. 2011. ‘“위험회피” 시대의 사회재생산: 가족출산에서 여성출산으로?’  23 (3): 1–24). ——. 2012. ‘Predicaments of neoliberalism in the post-developmental liberal context’. In Developmental Politics in Transition: The Neoliberal Era and Beyond, edited by Chang Kyung-Sup, Ben Fine and Linda Weiss, 70–91. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Chang Kyung-Sup and Song Min-Young. 2010. ‘The stranded individualizer under compressed modernity: South Korean women in individualization without individualism’. British Journal of Sociology 61 (3): 540–565. Chin Meejung. 2013. ‘Portrait of unmarried one-person households in early adulthood: Delayed transition or achieved individualization’. In Proceedings of the International

34

CHANG

Conference on ‘Life and Humanity in Late Modern Transformation: Beyond East and West’, 153–156, organised by snu Center for Social Sciences, Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, and Korean Sociological Association, 30–31 May 2013, Seoul National University. Donzelot, Jacques. [1977] 1979. The Policing of Families. New York: Pantheon. Dupcsik, Csaba and Olga Tóth. 2014. ‘Family systems and family values in twenty-firstcentury Hungary’. In Family and Social Change in Socialist and Post-socialist Societies: Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe and East Asia, edited by Zsombor Rajkai, 210–249. Leiden: Brill. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press. ——. 1999. Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. New York: Oxford University Press. Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas. 1960. ‘Economic theory and agrarian economics’. Oxford Economic Papers 12: 1–40. Gradskova, Yulia. 2014. ‘Family and social change in Russia’. In Family and Social Change in Socialist and Post-socialist Societies: Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe and East Asia, edited by Zsombor Rajkai, 36–82. Leiden: Brill. Guráň, Peter, Jarmila Filadelfiová and Miloš Debnár. 2014. ‘Contemporary family in Slovakia: Demography, values, gender and policy’. In Family and Social Change in Socialist and Post-socialist Societies: Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe and East Asia, edited by Zsombor Rajkai, 164–209. Leiden: Brill. Jones, Gavin, Paulin Tay Straughan and Angelique Chan, eds. 2009. Ultra-Low Fertility in Pacific Asia: Trends, Causes and Policy Issues. London and New York: Routledge. Kohler, Hans-Peter, Francesco Billari and Jose Antonio Ortega. 2004. ‘The emergence of lowest-low fertility in Europe during the 1990s’. Population and Development Review 28 (4): 641–680. Kovács, Borbála. 2014. ‘Romanian families: Changes and continuities over recent decades’. In Family and Social Change in Socialist and Post-socialist Societies: Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe and East Asia, edited by Zsombor Rajkai, 250–299. Leiden: Brill. Lesthaeghe, Ron. 1995. ‘The second demographic transition in Western countries: An interpretation’. In Gender and Family Change in Industrialized Countries, edited by Karen Oppenheim Mason and An-Magritt Jensen, 17–62. New York: Clarendon Press. Males, Lyudmyla and Tymur Sandrovych. 2014. ‘Exploitation of the intimate sphere in socialist and post-socialist Ukraine’. In Family and Social Change in Socialist and Post-socialist Societies: Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe and East Asia, edited by Zsombor Rajkai, 83–121. Leiden: Brill.

THE INDIVIDUAL–FAMILY–POPULATION NEXUS

35

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. [1945–46] 1970. The German Ideology. New York: International Publishers. Nguyen Huu Minh. 2014. ‘Changes in socio-demographic characteristics of the Vietnamese family’. In Family and Social Change in Socialist and Post-Socialist Societies: Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe and East Asia, edited by Zsombor Rajkai, 359–412. Leiden: Brill. Ochiai Emiko. 2011. ‘Unsustainable societies: The failure of familialism in East Asia’s compressed modernity’. Historical Social Research 36 (2): 219–245. Park Chai Bin and Cho Nam-Hoon. 1995. ‘Consequences of son preference in a lowfertility society: Imbalance of the sex ratio at birth in Korea’. Population and Development Review 21 (1): 59–84. Philipov, Dimiter and Jürgen Dorbritz. 2003. ‘Demographic consequences of economic transition in countries of Central and Eastern Europe’. Population Studies (The Council of Europe) 39. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing. Portes, Alejandro, Manuel Castells and Lauren A. Benton, eds. 1989. The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries. Baltimore, md: Johns Hopkins University Press. Rajkai, Zsombor. 2014. ‘Introduction’. In Family and Social Change in Socialist and Postsocialist Societies: Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe and East Asia, edited by Zsombor Rajkai, 1–18. Leiden: Brill. Sikorska, Małgorzata. 2014. ‘Changes in the area of family life in Poland’. In Family and Social Change in Socialist and Post-socialist Societies: Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe and East Asia, edited by Zsombor Rajkai, 122–163. Leiden: Brill. Van de Kaa, Dirk J. 1987. ‘Europe’s second demographic transition’. Population Bulletin (Population Council) 42 (1): 1–59. Zhou Weihong, Xue Yali and Liu Wenrong. 2014. ‘The transition of Chinese families over the past thirty years (1978–2010)’. In Family and Social Change in Socialist and Post-socialist Societies: Change and Continuity in Eastern Europe and East Asia, edited by Zsombor Rajkai, 300–358. Leiden: Brill.

CHAPTER 2

Family and Social Change in Russia Yulia Gradskova This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the family in Russia during the period of social transition of the last thirty years. The most radical political and social changes started around 1991, the year of the breakdown of the Soviet Union and end of Communist rule in the country. As is known, the Bolshevik revolution that began a more than seventy-year-long period of Communist party rule attempted to change the patriarchal family radically. However, according to Göran Therborn ‘the patriarchal and patrilocal family of the ussr survived Lenin, Stalin and de-Stalinisation, at least partly’.1 Still, many aspects of family structure and behaviour substantially changed during the period of state socialism, and to the end of the socialist period the family in Russia presented a rather contradictory picture. On the one hand, Russia had a very high first-marriage rate – 97 per cent in 1985, while many of the countries of Western Europe had abandoned universal marriage at least two decades previously (in 1985 the West German first-marriage rate was 60 per cent and the uks 66 per cent).2 Also Russia continued to follow traditions of early marriage and early childbirth; it was much more frequent to have three generations of the same family living together there than in Western Europe where the nuclear family was more widespread. On the other hand, Russian families had some characteristics that made them look rather similar to families in Western Europe (the latter were well into the period of the second demographic transition at the beginning of the 1980s) and very dissimilar to families of the so-called ‘Third World’. Most Russian families, about 74 per cent in the 1990s,3 were living in cities, married women were working for wages, and the divorce rate was one of the highest in the world.4 In spite of early childbearing, the birth rate was rather low; in 1995–2000 a Russian woman had 1.2 children.5 Thus, family practices and ideologies in Russia underwent a rapid process of modernisation during a short period of time, a

1 2 3 4 5

Therborn (2004, 85). Ibid. (168). Vannoy et al. (1999, 7). Chernova (2008). Therborn (2004, 293).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004276833_004

Family And Social Change In Russia

37

kind of ‘compressed modernity’.6 The compressed modernisation of family practices in Russia during the twentieth century has led to many contradictions, as if the different coexisting practices belonged to different historical periods. Indeed, as a result of the fast-changing socio-economic conditions and policies during the period of state socialism, some of the family ideologies of the beginning of the transition period could be defined rather as premodern while some others could be seen as similar to the practices of the countries experiencing second modernity. 1

Aims of the Chapter

The main aim of this chapter is to explore the specifics of the changes in family life in Russia during the last thirty years. In particular, I am interested in analysing changes in family structure, gender roles, and practices on the one hand, and changes in citizens’ values and expectations on the other hand. This analysis will help in understanding the direction in which the real changes are happening. The study also aims to contribute to our understanding of the situation in Russia with respect to the second demographic transition. Here I use Johan Surkyn and Ron Lesthaeghe’s definition for the latter: The second demographic transition is characterised by a rise in the first-marriage age, the postponement of fertility (childbirth), and the increase of premarital and postmarital cohabitation and procreation in such informal unions.7 This radical transformation of family life usually happens within the context of a change of social values in the direction of more flexible interpretations of gender roles and the growing priority of individualism compared to family cohesion.8 Taking into account the specifics of Russian modernisation and family policy under Communist rule as well as the specifics of post-Soviet transformation accompanied by the rhetoric of ‘return to family’, it will be interesting to look at post-Soviet Russia from the perspective of its position with respect to the second demographic transition. What has changed in Russian family life during the last thirty years and what practices and values with respect to marriage, reproduction, parenthood, gender roles, and family solidarity have been left unchanged? How big are regional differences with respect to family development in Russia? Could 6 Chang (2010). Also see the brief explanation of this term and its related concepts in the Introduction of this volume. 7 Surkyn and Lesthaeghe (2004, 47). 8 Vishnevskii (2006, 168).

38

GRADSKOVA

we say that Russia has now entered (albeit late) the second demographic transition? Or has it developed some different patterns? At the centre of this chapter are three main aspects of these changes – the differences between actual demographic conditions and values with respect to family, marriage, divorce, and childbirth; changes and continuities in gender roles; and, finally, family solidarity. In other words, following Olga Shevchenko’s insightful research on everyday life in post-socialist Moscow, this study analyses the discrepancy between what people were thinking and what they actually did. When possible, this study will also attempt to explore the ‘negotiation logic’ between family practices and how family is thought about.9 In order to answer the questions above, this study utilises statistical information published by the Russian Federal Statistical Agency, as well as data from the World Values Survey (wvs) and United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The chapter’s use of international statistical data is mainly limited to Russia. However, in a few cases this study compares indicators for Russia with indicators for some other European and Asian countries. In particular, I decided to compare Russian data with the World Values Survey data for three countries. Two of them, Sweden and Spain, are European countries that differ significantly with respect to histories of family support, family values, and gender policies. Indeed, Sweden is a country with stable democracy, a long tradition of individualism and rationalism, as well as having state support for children’s well-being and a long history of state feminism,10 while Spain is a country having behind it a rather long authoritarian history, criminalisation of the use of contraception and of non-marital cohabitation during the postSecond World War period,11 low state support for families with children and with a short history of the application of gender equality policies. Finally, due to Russia’s geographical position between Europe and Asia and the rather substantial percentage of the population traditionally belonging to Islam, I am comparing values in Russia with those in Turkey – a modernised Asian country where the state adopted a strategy for protection of women’s rights almost at the same time as the government of Soviet Russia and where the Islamic religion was separated from the state. Comparing the results of the World Values Survey for these countries to those of Russia would contribute to a better understanding of the place that the values of Russian citizens have in the context of the values of three countries occupying significantly different places with respect to their history of democratic institutions, public discourses on family, and gender equality policies. 9 10 11

Shevchenko (2009, 89). See, for example, Borhorst (2011, 63–75); Bergman (2003). See Meil (2006, 364).

Family And Social Change In Russia

39

As a secondary source for this study, the published results of different allRussian and regional studies that could give additional information on the specifics of gender stereotypes and regional differences in family practices were also used. While analysing the data, this study places it into a wider context of change; from the Soviet state’s policies towards families and its expectations toward them, to the post-Soviet political, economic, and social transformations. Indeed, the influence of the market economy, changes in state policy with respect to family, as well as civic development are brought into this study in order to explain changes in behaviour, attitudes, and values with respect to the family. The beginning of the economic reforms in the Soviet Union during the Perestroika period (1985–91) opened up possibilities for a certain liberalisation of forms of ownership as well as for a later, more substantial marketisation of the economy. This process influenced different aspects of family life – from the diversification of working conditions and salaries of family members to new parameters of family consumption of goods and services. The marketisation of life brought a lot of instability and led to growing differentiation of family incomes.12 The end of the Soviet Union (1991) and the beginning of the collapse of the authoritarian political system was connected to changes in family legislation and welfare politics, as well as wide liberalisation of family and parenthood practices.13 The new authoritarian turn in Russia (starting around 2000) was connected to the formulation of a new style of nationalist politics; the important element of this politics became the fight against the depopulation crisis.14 Finally, the new civic activism, in particular the creation of new social organisations, ngos, to a certain extent also influenced family discourses and services. The Russian Federation spans a vast area, consisting of eighty-three subdistricts united into seven Federal Districts. Ethnic Russians constitute about 80 per cent of the population, and the rest are members of various minorities, the largest of these being the Tatars. About twenty ethnic minorities have some territorial autonomy in the form of autonomous republics or regions. In contrast to the Soviet policy of strict central regulation and distribution of goods, after 1991 all the subdistricts of the Russian Federation and, in particular, autonomous areas based on ethnic territorial principles were able to make many local decisions with respect to social and welfare policy. This contributed to differences in family policies which were connected to differences in values with respect to family practices. Space in this chapter obviously does not allow for a specific analysis of all the differences in family behaviour and family 12 13 14

Sätre (2012); Shevchenko (2009). Carlbäck et al. (2012, 1–24). Rotkirch et al. (2007).

40

GRADSKOVA

values at the level of the subdistricts of the Federation or even the Federal Districts. However, in each part of this analysis the chapter makes at least brief assessments of the size of regional differences corresponding to the most important changes in behaviours and values. This chapter consists of three sections, the first of which is dedicated to the analysis of demographic patterns in connection with family values, while the other two deal with two aspects of family behaviour that are central in the whole volume – gender-related values and practices and family solidarity. 2

‘When You Grow Up, You Get Married and Then You Will Have Children’: Changes and Continuities in Demographic Values and Practices

Soviet policies towards families were rather contradictory. After the initial years of declarations about the death of the family after the Communist revolution,15 the Soviet government started to declare support for the family as an important social institution playing a role in the upbringing of future Soviet citizens. The ideal family was to be based on love and should bring up several children. Starting from the 1930s the Soviet state adopted a pro-natalist policy; between 1936 and 1955 abortion was criminalised. From 1944 only those living in a registered marriage were recognised as a family, while divorce started to be presented as harmful for children and for Soviet society. In the later period there were allowances and exemptions that mainly benefited those families (and even lone mothers)16 who had given birth to many children. However, the number of families with more than three children decreased during the 15

16

After taking power in 1917 the Bolshevik government declared the ‘end of the old bourgeois family’: civil marriage substituted the religious one, divorce could be made according to the decision of just one of the spouses and abortion on demand became legal from 1920. According to early Bolshevik ideas, the social role of the family as a unit should be diminished and the role of individuals should increase while the state should take the main responsibility for children’s’ upbringing through the system of public childcare institutions. However, by the beginning of the 1930s the utopianism of the early Bolshevik ideas became obvious; from the mid-1930s divorce legislation was strengthened and in 1936 abortion was banned. The new family policies under Stalin were aimed at maintaining family control, but at the same time they were based on the expectations that the family would bear the main economic responsibility for the upbringing of children. Suffering from a post-war demographic crisis and a disproportionate ratio of males to females in the population, the Soviet government, interested in a higher birth rate, opted for financial support for women giving birth outside of marriage. Women who gave birth

41

Family And Social Change In Russia

post-war period. Most state economic support for the family as well as public rhetoric praising parenthood was centred around the mother, while the father, with respect to parenthood, appeared as rather secondary.17 During the last thirty years the situation of Russian families has been influenced by rapid political and economic changes that have brought with them a decline in state assistance to families with children and changes in rhetoric with regard to gender and family.18 Under the influence of these factors, people’s behaviour with respect to family has undergone important changes. Also the economic transformation led to a substantial differentiation of incomes and during the first period of the transition to the market economy the number of poor people drastically increased. Even according to the official statistics (see Table 2.1) about 30 per cent of the population in 1997 could be qualified Table 2.1

Income per capita distribution of population (%)

All population

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

100

100

100

100

100

100

Including population with per capita income (rub per month, 1997 – thousands of rub) Below 500.0 29.4 23.9 7.1 3.4 1.8 0.8 500.1–750.0 21.8 21.8 12.4 7.3 4.3 2.3 750.1–1,000.0 15.7 16.8 13.9 9.6 6.3 3.9 1,000.1–1,500.0 17.5 19.6 23.8 19.8 14.9 10.7 1,500.1–2,000.0 7.8 9.0 15.8 16.3 14.3 11.9 2,000.1–3,000.0 5.5 6.3 15.9 20.6 21.7 21.0 3,000.1–4,000.0 1.5 1.7 6.2 10.5 13.5 15.2 Over 4,000.0 0.8 0.9 4.9 12.5 23.2 34.2 source: rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 200319



to a child could get an allowance from the state in place of suing the father. For more about this see Nakachi (2006) and Carlbäck (2012). Even though fatherhood suits were allowed later (after 1968), women who had children outside of marriage up to the present have had the right to a state allowance, and this right is preserved even in the case of her later marriage to a new partner. Starting from the 2000s, however, the right to this allowance, like the right to other family-related benefits, is means-tested and depends on family income. 17 Chernova (2008); Carlbäck et al. (2012); Gradskova (2010). 18 Vannoy et al.(1999); Shiriaev and Gradskova (2005); Kravchenko (2008). 19 http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b03_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d010/i011430r.htm.

42

GRADSKOVA

as poor; only in the 2000s it is possible to speak about growth of the middle class. There is a lot of evidence from previous sociological research on Russia to show that it was particularly families with children who experienced economic difficulties and that having children in the 1990s became an important factor influencing poverty levels. Indeed, in the mid-1990s more than half of all families with children could be qualified as poor, that is, making less than us$16 per month per person.20 On the other hand, the collapse of state socialism was accompanied by the appearance of the new, rather conservative traditionalist discourse of ‘going back to traditional family’. Family ‘traditions’ were presented as having been destroyed because of Communist anti-familist policies and not as a result of a process of modernisation similar to that experienced during similar periods in many other countries. The rhetoric of return to the ‘traditional family’ employed images of the patriarchal family with at least three children, where the father was the breadwinner and head of the family while the mother was a loving and caring housewife. These images were projected on tv and in advertisements and became interwoven with the propaganda of ideas about political freedom and the market economy.21 Although this traditionalist propaganda is well researched, its effects on nuptial and reproductive behaviour in particular are not so easy to evaluate, because its appearance coincided with the emerging possibility of public campaigns advocating civil society activism and women’s rights. This section will also look more closely at changes and continuities with respect to the main demographic indicators and values relating to marriage and childbirth in Russia in order to analyse the possible impact of these changes on families and family behaviour. 2.1 Marriage and Divorce The phrase used for this section’s title represents a common saying of older people to children and teenagers in Russia. How much has the first part of it been followed in Russia during the last thirty years? In spite of the wide propaganda about family and children being important for the happy life of every Soviet person, starting from the late 1980s the number of marriages per 1,000 people was decreasing, and in 2000 this indicator was at its lowest ever, 6.2. Even if later the number of marriages per 1,000 people then started somewhat to increase, it has still not returned to its 1990 level 20 21

Ovcharova and Prokofieva (1999). Zhurzhenko (2008); Gradskova (1997).

Family And Social Change In Russia

43

(8.9 marriages per 1,000 people). In 2010 it was only 8.5 per 1,000 people (see Table  2.2). The statistical data for the 1990s–2000s suggests that social and political turbulence did not increase the rate of marriage, but rather the contrary – its relative growth corresponds to the years of relative economic stability (after 2000). At the same time, the divorce rate, which was rather high in Russia during the late Soviet period, continued to grow between 1990 and 2008. In 2008 it reached 5.0 per 1,000 people. From 2009 the divorce rate started to drop, but very slowly, and in 2010 it was 4.5 per 1,000 people. The historical difference with respect to divorce becomes even more visible if a longer historical perspective is chosen; from 1960 (around this year divorce procedure was liberalised)22 to 1993 the overall divorce rate grew from 20 per cent to 50 per cent.23 The divorce rate indicates that marriage is seen by a large part of the Russian population as an institution that can be dissolved if it does not meet the Table 2.2 Marriages and divorces Years

1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Per 1,000 people Marriages

Divorces

10.1 10.6 8.9 7.3 6.2 7.5 7.8 8.9 8.3 8.5 8.5

3.0 4.2 3.8 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.5 4.8 5.0 4.9 4.5

source: rossiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 201124

22

The liberalisation of family legislation with respect to abortion and divorce started soon after Stalin’s death in 1953, but the final changes happened in 1968. 23 Vannoy et al. (1999, 116). 24 http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/04-11.htm.

44

GRADSKOVA

expectations of its members. As for the 1990s, according to the data collected by Vannoy et al., the length of marriage itself was an indicator of the probability of divorce; those who were married for between twelve and twenty-one years considered divorce more often than those who had been married for a shorter period.25 The data from the 1990s and 2000s indicates that the rhetoric of a return to the ‘traditional family’, even during the period of its greatest popularity (the 1990s), does not seem to have had much effect on the number of divorces. Together with the rather high divorce rate, the institution of marriage in Russia seems to have undergone some important transformations typical of the second demographic transition. One such transformation is connected to the increase of the age at which people are entering into marriage; the number of marriages where the bride is aged between eighteen and twenty-four (traditional for Russia during the twentieth century)26 is decreasing. The proportion of such marriages was 68.3 per cent in 1980, 56.9 per cent in 2000, and 45.6 per cent in 2010 (see Table 2.3). The increase in the marriage age has influenced the increase in the age for childbirth. The Russian demographer Anatolii Vishnevskii illustrated the redistribution of fertility patterns using the example of Moscow, the city where transformations of all spheres of life were the most visible. After 1993 the fertility of women below twenty-five was decreasing and the fertility of those between twenty-five and forty-five was increasing. As a result of this, even if fertility in the younger group was rather low, the fertility in the older group was higher than the average fertility rate in Russia.27 Table 2.3 Marriages according to the age of the bride Year

All marriages (%)

Below 18

18–24

25–34

35 and older

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

100 100 100 100 100

1.5 2.2 5.4 3.3 0.7

70.7 68.3 59.1 56.9 45.6

15.3 18.6 20.7 23.6 37.1

0.1 10.8 13.0 15.9 16.2

source: calculated by the author on the basis of rossiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 201128

25 Ibid. (120). 26 Carlbäck et al. (2012). 27 Vishnevskii (2006, 252). 28 http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/04-12.htm.

45

Family And Social Change In Russia

Another important indicator of the destruction of the family pattern that had been established during the time of state socialism was the growing number of couples cohabiting without official registration of marriage. The statistical information on cohabitation is rather difficult to access, but, for example, according to data collected by Vannoy et al., in 1996 in three Russian regions – Moscow as well as Pskov and Saratov regions – about 6–8 per cent of couples were cohabiting.29 Similar data for the same period is given by Lev Gudkov for the whole country: 4–5 per cent of couples were living together without registration of marriage at the beginning of the 1990s.30 With time the number of cohabitations (grazhdanski brak) grew. According to the 2002 population census, 11 per cent of all couples said that their marriage was not registered.31 Nonregistered cohabitation could be seen as an important model for Russia in the future, in particular taking into account that it is mainly the younger generation that supports this form of intimate relationship. Thus, among those who are 17–35 years old only 9 per cent regard cohabitation negatively, while among those over fifty-five years old 35 per cent regard cohabitation negatively.32 The changes in attitudes to the institution of marriage can also be seen in the data of the World Values Survey. According to this data, the number of those who saw marriage as an outdated institution during the 1990s increased (see Table 2.4). The percentage of those who agreed with this statement grew Table 2.4 Marriage seen as an outdated institution ‘Marriage is an outdated institution’

Russian Federation

Year of survey

Disagree Agree Total Number of respondents source: world values survey databank

29 30 31 32

Vannoy et al. (1999, 35). Gudkov (1994, 19). Vovk (2005). fom (2008).

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

1999 (%)

85.5 14.5 100 1,782

82.7 17.3 100 1,979

78.3 21.7 100 2,340

46

GRADSKOVA

by 7.2 per cent between 1990 and 1999 (the number of men and women disagreeing with this thesis is similar – 80.3 per cent of males and 83.0 per cent of females). This also supports the hypothesis of the transformation of intimacy33 in post-Soviet Russia going further, in the direction of the second demographic transition. 2.2 Decreasing Birth Rate and Number of Children in the Family Probably, the most discussed issue in Russia during the last 15–20 years is the so-called ‘demographic crisis’.34 The ‘demographic crisis’ suggests that the low birth rate and high mortality rate in combination could lead to the depopulation of Russia, and is thus seen by many politicians and ordinary people in Russia as a threat to the Russian state and the nation. The lowest birth rate during the post-Soviet period was in 2000, at 8.7 births per 1,000 people (see Table 2.5). This rate seems to be influenced by economic factors and, in Table 2.5 Birth rate and mortality (per 1,000 people) Years

Born

Died

1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

14.6 15.9 13.4 9.3 8.7 10.2 10.4 11.3 12.1 12.4 12.5

8.7 11 11.2 15 15.3 16.1 15.2 14.6 14.6 14.2 14.2

source: rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 201135

33

The growing role of trust and romantic love in relationships between spouses in contrast to external regulations of marriage was described by Anthony Giddens as ‘transformation of intimacy’. It also included emancipation of female sexuality and separation of sexuality from procreation. This transformation, according to Giddens, was a part of the transition to modernity (Giddens 1992). 34 Rivkin-Fish (2010); Saarinen (2012). 35 http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/04-05.htm.

Family And Social Change In Russia

47

particular, by the aforementioned high rate of poverty among families with children during the 1990s. The fear of depopulation made the Russian government think about increasing support for families with children. The best-known political decision was the new law on financial support for mothers giving birth to a second child – the so-called ‘maternity capital’ law of 2007.36 According to the new law, those mothers who give birth to a second (and subsequent) child should receive state allowances (from the child’s third birthday) that can be used for improving the family’s living conditions, the children’s education, or as a pension for the mother in the future. The law was criticised from the beginning for its gender imbalance (binding women with children) as well as for the limitations set on how the money could be used. It is now possible to say that the effects of this law on the fertility rate were not as great as expected. In spite of some growth in the birth rate during recent years as a result of the realisation of this programme (12.5 births per 1,000 people in 2010; see Table 2.5), Russia continues to be characterised by a negative rate of population growth. Meanwhile, if we look for what people sought as a desirable number of children, it is easy to see that between 1990 and 1995 the number of families thinking about three or more children was decreasing (see Table 2.6). The drop is particularly significant with respect to three children as an ideal number. The negative attitude to the birth of a third child (in contrast to the birth of a second child) is connected not only to the economic situation of families after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also to the new interpretations of parenthood that suppose greater involvement of both parents in the process of bringing up children. Thus, some researchers noticed that parents of three or more children started to be seen as rather ‘problematic’ and ‘irresponsible’ even in the period of late socialism.37 It is known that Russia went through the first demographic transition faster than many other countries – it started in the beginning of the twentieth century and finished at the end of the 1960s.38 Nevertheless, the data from the World Values Survey suggest that on the level of expectations, retreat from the three-child family ideal was rather slow under the influence of new state family-policy measures in the 1980s; for example, by 1990, 39 per cent of respondents still saw families with three children as ideal. The retreat from the threechild family ideal was followed by a substantial increase in those who saw the two-child family as ideal. In 1995 those who would prefer to have a family with 36 37 38

For more on this see Rivkin-Fish (2010); Rotkirch et al. (2007); Cook (2011). Isola (2009, 415–416). See Zakharov (2008, 908–910).

48

GRADSKOVA

Table 2.6 Preferences for the ideal number of children ‘Ideal number of children’

Russian Federation Year of survey 1990 (%)

None 1 child 2 children 3 children 4 children 5 children 6 children 7 children 8 children 9 children 10 or more children Total Number of respondents

0.9 3.5 45.0 39.2 5.4 3.3 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.50 100 1,819

1995 (%)

0.9 7.4 61.6 24.1 2.7 2.0 0.3 0.2 0.9 – – 100 1,978

source: world values survey databank

two children constituted more than half of the respondents – 61.6 per cent compared with 45 per cent in 1990.39 A recent study by Anna Rotkirch and Katja Kesseli shows, however, that in spite of the fact that two-child families continue to be the ideal for most Russian citizens in the late 2000s, the birth rate indicates that this ideal is not reached by many women (even after the law of maternity capital was adopted in 2007). According to qualitative research by Rotkirch and Kesseli, due to various reasons (economic, career, health) a large number of Russian mothers with one child are postponing the birth of the second child.40 If we look at Russia’s fertility indicators from a longer historical perspective, it is important to notice that fertility was dropping in Russia during the whole post-war period, with some increase in the 1980s that according to Vannoy 39 40

See Table 2.6. Rotkirch and Kesseli (2012).

Family And Social Change In Russia

49

et al.41 and Zakharov42 could be attributed to government policies that encouraged families to have more children: paid maternity leave, extra housing, and service benefits for families with three or more children (introduced during the late socialist period). A further drop of fertility in the 1990s was, however, connected not only with economic and political instability, but also with changes in state welfare policies, as well as with the development of new patterns of consumption and parenthood. Here we will discuss these factors in more depth. Russia does not have any significant universal child allowance, but the state helps families with children depending on the family’s status; special allowances, exemptions and in-kind benefits are reserved for families with three and more children, families with disabled children, families having income below the minimum standard, and those in several other categories.43 The level of allowance and character of the benefits and exemptions is defined regionally. Benefits may include free transportation, reduction of payments for day-care and medicine, free school lunches, and cultural activities for children. During the 1990s, state benefits for families were devalued by inflation, and in-kind benefits such as free tickets for public transportation or free school lunches were particularly important. In the 2000s different exemptions and money transfers became more important. As mentioned above, from the second half of the 2000s the Russian state attempted to influence citizens’ fertility choices through a programme of incentives in the form of ‘maternity capital’.44 Finally, as a result of the economic crises of 2008, ‘maternity capital’ started to be used partly for families’ everyday needs (amounting to 12,000 rub – about €300 – in a form of yearly allowance) and not just for the three previously defined fields. In practice this was converted into a kind of child allowance for those families who had more than one child.45 The influence of economic factors was not limited exclusively to growing poverty and scarce state support for families with children. The marketisation of the economy changed ideals of a happy life and good housing. According to sociological research from the early 1990s, it was a period when the desired standard of living became more sophisticated and included a family apartment with a room for each family member and a living room, as well as a summer house, foreign car, quality holiday, and good medical treatment.46 It is 41 42 43 44 45 46

Vannoy et al. (1999, 33). Zakharov (2008, 929). Chernova (2008). Cook (2011, 22–24). Isoupova (2010). Gudkov (1994, 20).

50

GRADSKOVA

easy to suppose that in order to reach and preserve such a living standard, some families were limiting fertility. Marketisation at the same time also increased the accessibility of modern contraception, which started to be used more widely. However, this factor can hardly be seen as directly influencing fertility because there was already a long tradition of using abortion as a method for preventing unwanted childbirth. The abortion rate in post-Soviet Russia was decreasing (in 1990 there were 4.1 million abortions, whereas in 2005 there were 1.7 million), but most pregnancies continued to be aborted.47 At the same time, family values in Russia were being influenced by religious organisations (the two biggest groups are Orthodox Christians and Muslims), although the level of this influence is rather difficult to define.48 Still, the religious interpretations of marriage as a life-long institution, support for procreation without limitation and, in particular, harsh criticisms of abortion should be taken into account while discussing the future development of family behaviour and values. Finally, it is important to notice one more set of ideas on family and parenthood that appeared during the process of democratisation. It is connected to the spread in Russia of the ideas of the child-centred family and involved parenthood, both of which are well known in the West. These ideas influenced changes in parental practices, for example, the assumption that a child is a person with individualised needs from the moment of its birth.49 The Russian researchers Ilia Kukulin and Maria Maiofis have shown that investment in the child is becoming more and more an issue of prestige, while the new style of communication with children based on trust and support is starting to be seen as an important value.50 While it is difficult to say how much each of these three factors – the lack of state support for families with children, growing expectations with respect to living standards, and the quality of parenthood – influenced family fertility choices, all of them should partly be taken into account when analysing the falling birth rate.

47 48

49 50

Shcherbakova (2007). While about 55 per cent of the population (75–85 million people) consider themselves Orthodox and about 6–9 million consider themselves Muslim, it is possible to say that only 3–15 million are practising Orthodox Christianity and about 2.8 million are practising Islam (Filatov and Lunkin 2005). Odintsova (2009, 520). Maiofis and Kukulin (2010, 8).

Family And Social Change In Russia

51

2.3 Childbirth Outside of Marriage As mentioned above, Soviet family legislation of 1944 legalised the status of single (in this case, unwed) mothers through offering them state allowance and prohibiting them from applying to the court over issues of paternity investigation and alimony.51 It was made on pro-natalist grounds and deprived single mothers of the possibility of receiving support from the father of the child. Still, during the whole post-war period, motherhood out of wedlock seems to have been rather more accepted in Russia than in many other countries. During the post-Soviet years, as has been said, the new political elite in Russia began to engage in a programme which strongly encouraged positive evaluations of the so-called ‘full’ and ‘healthy’ family, which could be interpreted as a married couple with children. ‘Incomplete families’ or one-parent families (in this case both families of unwed mothers and post-divorce singleparent families)52 were more and more presented in public discourse as ‘unlucky’.53 The World Values Survey shows Russians to be rather strong in supporting the requirement of two parents for a child (96.8% of men and 95.7% of women supported the need for both parents), thus somewhat questioning both divorce in families with children and single motherhood. The number of supporters of homes with two parents in Russia is 96.2 per cent and is closer to that in Turkey than that in Sweden (76.0 per cent; see Table 2.7). However, the childbirth statistics from the last twenty years show a picture that is contrary to the dominant discourses and values expressed by the state and in the media. Indeed, starting from the early 1990s, the number of children born to unwed mothers increased to almost one-third of all births, the highest number occurring in 2005 – with 29.99 per cent of children born that year being born out of wedlock (see Table 2.8). Even if the ideal family for the Russian respondents should consist of a mother and father, this seems not to influence the acceptance of single motherhood, and this acceptance can be seen as part of the legacy of the Soviet-type pro-natalist policies. The number of those disapproving of a woman being a single mother was about 25 per cent until 1999 (and much lower than in 1990; see Table  2.9). Also according to the World Values Survey, there were more women (57.7 per cent) than men (49.4 per cent) who approved of single motherhood. It is easy to suppose that an important role in this approval was played

51 52 53

See Nakachi (2006); Carlbäck (2012). According to the Soviet practice of divorce, it was mainly mothers who received custody of the children. This practice has largely continued in the post-Soviet period. Iarskaia-Smirnova (2011, 195–211); Isola (2009).

52

GRADSKOVA

Table 2.7 Supporters of homes with two parents ‘Child needs a home with a father and mother’

Country Russian Federation (%) Spain (%) Sweden (%) Turkey (%)

Tend to disagree Tend to agree Total Number of respondents

3.8 96.2 100 6,386

9.7 90.3 100 7,533

24.0 76.0 100 2,951

3.0 97.0 100 7,431

source: world values survey databank selected countries/samples: russian federation [1990], russian federation [1995], russian federation [1999], spain [1990-asep], spain [1990-data], spain [1995], spain [1999], spain [2000], sweden [1990], sweden [1996], sweden [1999], turkey [1990], turkey [1996], turkey [2001]

Table 2.8 Birth by women whose marriage is not registered (percentage of the number of births)

Year

Population

1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

10.57 10.78 14.61 21.14 27.96 28.76 29.45 29.71 29.76 29.99 29.16 28.00 26.86 26.07 24.87

source: rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 201154

54 http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/04-07.htm.

53

Family And Social Change In Russia Table 2.9 Disapproval of single mothers, 1990–99 Woman as a single parent

Russian Federation Year of survey

Disapprove Approve Depends Total Number of respondents

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

1999 (%)

41.2 58.8 – 100 1,319

24.3 51.7 24.0 100 1,989

25.8 53.6 20.6 100 2,408

source: world values survey databank

by the family allowances – children of unwed mothers55 in Russia continue to have the right to a double-size monthly allowance56 compared to a child having both parents (even if they are divorced). It may be supposed that even if families with two parents are highly desirable, many respondents are still influenced by the pressure of the ‘demographic crises’ ideology or, at least, recognise the pressure of the ‘permanent crises’ of the last twenty years as Shevchenko’s respondents presented it.57 However, the indicator of those disapproving of single motherhood grew again in 2006 – from 25.8 per cent to 32.3 per cent – the period when the crises seemed to be over (see Table 2.10). Even taking into account the growing disapproval of single motherhood in Russia, it is important to notice that compared to some other countries in Europe and Asia, the number of those approving of single motherhood in Russia continues to be relatively high (see Table 2.11).

55 56 57

A mother who gives birth out of wedlock is entitled to child allowance even if she later gets married (to a man who is not the father of the child). The size of the allowance is defined regionally. From 2001 it has been paid only to families with low incomes. Shevchenko (2009).

54

GRADSKOVA

Table 2.10 Disapproval of single mothers in 2006 Woman as a single parent

Russian Federation Year of survey 2006 (%)

Disapprove Approve Depends Total Number of respondents

32.3 44.3 23.4 100 1,920

source: world values survey databank

Table 2.11 Approval of single mothers in the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey Woman as a single parent Country Russian Federation (%) Spain (%) Sweden (%) Turkey (%)

Disapprove 28.9 Approve 54.1 Depends 17.0 Total 100 Number of respondents 5,716

18.9 70.8 10.3 100 7,186

37.0 27.5 35.5 100 2,902

68.2 7.6 24.2 100 7,350

source: world values survey databank selected countries/samples: russian federation [1990], russian federation [1995], russian federation [1999], spain [1990-asep], spain [1990-data], spain [1995], spain [1999], spain [2000], sweden [1990], sweden [1996], sweden [1999], turkey [1990], turkey [1996], turkey [2001]

Diversity in Marriage and Childbirth Throughout the Russian Federation The urban population in Russia during the period under research constituted around 73–75 per cent of the population, and economic disparities were most evident between those living in the cities and those living in the countryside. People in the ‘bigger’ Russian cities enjoyed, in general, better economic

2.4

Family And Social Change In Russia

55

opportunities than those living in smaller communities and rural areas. In 1996, the average employee’s salary in Moscow was us$145 a month, which was about five times higher than in some other subdistricts of the Russian Federation.58 The fall of the real income of the population (per capita in comparison to the previous year) was visible in the 1990s almost everywhere. Still, there were particularly low indicators in some subdistricts of the Federation. According to the state statistical agency, real income per capita was only 62.4 per cent in 1995 in Republic Mari-El (Volga district), whereas in 1994 it was 68.1 per cent in Kurgan oblast (Kurgan subregion) and 68.7 per cent in Altai (Sibir district) – compared to the previous year in each case.59 At the same time during the 1990s, poverty was not confined only to the provincial and rural zones. According to the Moscow City Statistics Committee, in 1999, city residents with incomes lower than the subsistence-level made up 29 per cent of the population.60 In the second largest city of Russia, St Petersburg, according to a survey, 24 per cent of households could not even afford meat or fish once a week.61 The differences in income continue to be significant even now. For example, in 2010 the average monthly salary in Russia, according to the same agency, was about €200, but in Ivanovo, Kalmykiia, and Adygeia it was only €90.62 Demographic behaviour in Russia in its turn differed not only between city and countryside, but also between people of different ethnic groups and regions. For example, the general increase in the age of entering into the first marriage was not so visible in certain ethnic autonomous territories, in particular those in the southern and eastern parts of the country. While the average proportion of those marrying before twenty-five in Russia is 8.3 per cent, in some southern subdistricts of the Federation these numbers are higher, with the highest being in the Chechen Republic at 13.1 per cent. Similar differences can be observed with respect to the birth rate; in some autonomous subregions in southern and Siberian regions it has reached more than twenty-five per 1,000 people; for example, in the Chechen Republic the total birth rate per 1,000 people is 28.5, in the Republic of Tyva it is 25.8.63 These differences indicate that the ethnic autonomous regions of southern and Siberian Federal districts 58 59 60 61 62 63

Shiriaev and Gradskova (2005). Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik (2010). Shiriaev and Gradskova (2005). Ovcharova and Prokofieva (1999). See http://statistika.ru/uroven/2010/04/21/uroven_16423.html. Shcherbakova (2011). These indicators are higher than for some Asian countries, for example, Turkey (about seventeen births per 1,000 people in 2010).

56

GRADSKOVA

are generally more conservative with respect to nuptial and fertility choices and provide counter-evidence against the hypothesis of Russia entering the second demographic transition. However, the situation seems to be more complex and it is rather difficult to fit some indicators into the above scheme, for example, the indicators of birth outside marriage. In some subdistricts of the Federation (again in ethnic autonomous regions) in 2001 more than half of children were born outside of marriage – 67.1 per cent in Komi-Permiatskii autonomous district, 60.4 per cent in Tyva, and 53.0 per cent in Koriak national district.64 In 2005, the number of children born to unwed mothers (in 2005 this indicator was the highest for the whole of Russia) was higher in the countryside – 31 per cent – than among the urban population, 27.8 per cent. In 2007 this tendency was preserved; 26.6 per cent of children in cities and 31.3 per cent of children in the countryside were born to unmarried mothers.65 Finally, it is important to notice that, even if some regions show less acceptance of contraception (as in  some southern autonomous republics), according to previous research, the  number of births per family there largely still do not go over the expected one.66 3

‘At Home a Man Should Be a Man and a Woman Should Be a Woman’: Changes and Continuities in Gender Roles in the Family

This section is dedicated to analysis of changing gender roles and values in the family. As previous research shows, starting from the era of late socialism (and particularly during the Perestroika period) voices calling for the ‘return’ of women to the home became more perceptible in public discourse. This corresponded to women’s dissatisfaction with mandatory work outside the home combined with their main responsibility for the home and for child-rearing. As a result of the social transformation started in the 1990s men were supposed to regain more responsibility for the family through their roles as breadwinners, while women’s occupations outside the home were to become auxiliary or they were to become housewives.

64 ‘Chislo razvodov vpervye stalo ustoichivo prevyshat chislo brakov’ (2002). http:// demoscope.ru/weekly/2002/077/barom04.php. 65 Shcherbakova (2009). 66 See Zakharov (2008, 940).

Family And Social Change In Russia

57

Contradictions in Interpretations of Gender Roles during the Perestroika Period An interesting illustration of the contradictions with respect to gender distribution of family roles are the answers to the questionnaire sent to the newspaper Semia (Family) in 1988. This questionnaire was one of the early and not very sophisticated attempts at studying public opinion during the Perestroika period. The answers are preserved in the Popular Archive in Moscow.67 The readers of the magazine were asked nine questions68 about work and home and the answers were sent to the newspaper. The analysis of the answers69 showed a lot of contradictions in both spheres. The answers to the questions about power and leadership in family compared with the answers to the question about family responsibilities present contradictions between the prescriptions of family roles and the actual decision-making process. Only 19 per cent of the answers collected in the archive mentioned equality in the family and about half of women who answered this question considered their husbands to be the head of the family. Among those 36 per cent who considered themselves to be leaders at home many insisted that it was not their will, but rather happened due to a particular situation, for example:

3.1

It is not my aspiration to be a leader. On the contrary, I am trying to create situations where my husband, willingly or unwillingly, has to take the role of leader. At the same time those women who considered themselves not to be leaders in their families still wrote about the impressive amount of decisions that they were taking. For example: To give birth to another child or not…As well as whether I shall go to work or dedicate myself to housework. 67 68

69

From 2006 the collections of the Popular Archive were moved to the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History. The questionnaire included questions like: ‘Do you consider yourself as a leader in the family?’; ‘Which decisions are among the most important you are taking?’; ‘Who in your home is cleaning the house, who is throwing out the garbage, who is preparing the breakfasts?’; ‘Who is responsible for buying books, disks, tickets to the theatre, museums and cinema?’; ‘Do you want to quit your job?’; ‘Are you ready to change your job if you had the chance and what would be the reason?’; ‘Whom do you want to see as your boss: a man, a woman, or a person of a certain level of knowledge and qualification?’ For more on this see Gradskova (2004).

58

GRADSKOVA

I take more decisions (than my husband) in everything connected with the education of the children. When we are buying new things (for the house) I have the final say. Indeed, even those women who denied their leadership in the family had quite a lot of individual power with respect to family issues. On the other hand, many women experienced their position as leader rather as overwork, with the husband entirely ‘absent’ from the family scene: Almost everything in the family is my responsibility – food, clothes, tickets to the cinema, holidays. What in this picture changed with political and social reforms in Russia after 1991? 3.2 Gender Differences in Employment If we look at the statistical data on women’s employment collected by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, we see that women in Russia continue to have a rather high level of participation in the labour market. Thus, in 1995 women constituted 46 per cent of those employed of both genders. In the 2000s this number did not decrease significantly – in 2007 women constituted 49% of those in the labour force.70 Even if the female employment rate decreased more than the male, the data shows that during the 1990s–2000s the majority of women in Russia preserved their status as wage-workers. As for part-time employment, in 1995 only 7.2 per cent of all women of working age in Russia were working part-time. In 2000 their number increased to 9.5 per cent, and finally, in 2008, 12 per cent of women were part-time employed. If we compare this number to that for Sweden (41% in 200971), it is clear that Russia has largely managed to preserve employment patterns for women that were characteristic of the period of state socialism and that most of the women working for wages have not reduced their working time in order to dedicate more time to their families. In spite of the situation with female employment, an analysis based on the data of the World Values Survey indicates priority for employment for men 70 See http://w3.unece.org; http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/profiles2011/ Russia.pdf. 71 See http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/profiles2011/Russia.pdf; http://www .unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/profiles2011/Sweden.pdf.

59

Family And Social Change In Russia

over women during the first period of transition. About 30–50 per cent of the respondents (men: 47.2%, and women: 37.1%) considered that it is a man who should have priority in getting access to work, and this indicator was the highest during the most economically difficult years; in 1995, 49 per cent of respondents agreed with this statement (see Table 2.12). However, looking only at the indicators with respect to employment rates could be misleading for the evaluation of male and female contributions to family income and economic power. If we take into account the marketisation of the economy, it is clear that gender inequalities in salaries characteristic of the period of state socialism were growing. Due to differentiation in salaries in different sectors of the economy and between the public and private sectors, the gender gap in incomes increased substantially. In 1993 women constituted more than 75 per cent of those who were very poor.72 According to sociological data from the mid-1990s, in 66 per cent of cases the husband was earning more than the wife and was controlling the strategic resources of the family.73 This contributed to the situation where even when both spouses were working, the man was still seen as the main breadwinner. Thus, it is not surprising that it was women who continued to be the main caregivers and, as during the period of state socialism, tended to be more responsible for the upbringing of Table 2.12 Priority of access to work When jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women

Russian Federation Year of survey

Agree Disagree Neither Total Number of respondents

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

1999 (%)

40.0 54.4 5.5 100 1,859

49.0 38.9 12.0 100 1,970

36.4 52.4 11.2 100 2,398

source: world values survey databank

72 73

Dokhody rabotayushchego naseleniia Rossii (1994, 10–11). Gudkov (1994, 22).

60

GRADSKOVA

children. Previous studies of the 1990s show, for example, that in 1996, in Moscow families with children below twelve it was mainly women who were responsible for taking the children to the doctor (71.0 per cent according to wives and 60.2 per cent according to husbands), getting children ready for school (62.0 per cent according to wives, 55.5 per cent according to husbands), and caring for children in an emergency (58.9 per cent according to wives and 36.6 per cent according to their husbands). Between 70 per cent and 80 per cent of wives were satisfied with this division of labour.74 This indicates that the mother’s responsibility for childcare and education – with little participation of the father – was more preserved than challenged during the post-Soviet period. 3.3 Continuities and Changes in Family Gender Roles and Expectations The data of the World Values Survey confirm that Russian citizens do not see women’s work outside of home as a serious problem for now and thus contradict the ideal of the ‘traditional family’ with the woman as housewife/ caregiver. The wife’s income also seems to be important for the family, in particular if this income is high. In 1995 about half of the respondents of the World Values Survey disagreed with the statement that a woman having a higher income than her husband would present a problem for family life (see Table 2.13).75 Only 12.8 per cent of respondents strongly agreed that a university education is more important for boys than for girls, while 54.0 per cent disagreed with this statement in 1995.76 This indicates that at least half of the respondents were thinking that qualified jobs and professional careers in the future are as important for women as for men. Attitudes towards housewives do not seem to indicate more support for the full-time housewife as time progresses; in the 2000s it was women who looked more negatively on life centred around being a housewife. In 2006, 66 per cent of men and only about 51 per cent of women agreed that being a housewife is just as fulfilling as other social roles (see Table  2.14). Thus, while about 60 per cent of the respondents agree that the housewife role is fulfilling as a life project, still a rather large number (about 40 per cent) consider the housewife role to be less fulfilling than other professional occupations. Taking into 74 75

76

Vannoy et al. (1999, 87). At the same time fewer men than women strongly disagree with the statement that a higher income for the woman presents problems for the family: 43.8% of men and 53.1% of women. World Values Survey Databank.

61

Family And Social Change In Russia Table 2.13 Importance of women’s income for the family Is it a problem if women have more income than their husband?

Russian Federation Year of survey 1995 (%)

Agree strongly Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Total Number of respondents

13.6 31.9 49.2 5.3 100 1,873

source: world values survey databank

Table 2.14 Women’s fulfilment as housewives Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working

Russian Federation Year of survey 2006

Total (%)

Agree strongly Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Total Number of respondents

22.7 35.9 32.2 9.2 100 1,912

Source: world values survey databank

Sex Male (%)

Female (%)

23.1 43.8 26.1 7.0 100 860

22.3 29.4 37.2 11.0 100 1,052

62

GRADSKOVA

account fresh memories of state-socialist coercion with respect to women’s work outside of the home and strong media discourse on the newly attractive role of housewife, the number of those who do not accept this option as best one could be evaluated as rather substantial. Recent sociological and gender research shows that it is not the status of the housewife (not working outside of home) per se, but rather a high level of income and belonging to a so-called new ‘middle class’ that are the factors contributing to the formation of specific family attitudes and practices in contemporary Russia. The new middle-class women usually have a new consumption pattern and value system; they are more demanding and reflexive in their life strategies and perceive their home space as a refuge from instability and stress as well as a space for demonstration of their social status through prestige consumption.77 However, new middle-class households do not constitute more than 10 per cent of all the households, and geographically they prevail in big cities, namely Moscow and St Petersburg. If we move to analysis of values in the sphere of the intersection of parenthood and waged labour, it is easy to see that here it is also possible to find a lot of continuities with the period of state socialism. While being somewhat questioned during the Perestroika period, full and partial approval for the working mother grew stronger up to 1999 (see Table 2.15). Nevertheless, as discussed above, changing attitudes to parenthood and children’s upbringing influenced a decrease in support for mothers of pre-school children working for wages (see Table 2.16). Thus, it is possible to conclude that a positive attitude to woman’s work outside the home is changing in general to a more negative one when parenthood issues are taken up. In this case, the woman’s role as a caregiver and educator of pre-school children is seen as rather more important in comparison to her professional role. Can we observe similar changes with respect to men’s role in the family? Political changes forced the government of the Russian Federation to follow international law more closely, and thus the Soviet policy of mainly ignoring the father’s role in the family underwent certain changes. For example, the new labour code adopted in 2003 included the gender-neutral category ‘workers with family responsibilities’ for its description of the workforce. The code offers the father some new possibilities for taking the caregiver’s role in the family. For example, a father can stay at home in the case of a sick child as well as sharing childcare leave with the mother. However, Russia does not have 77

Zdravomyslova et al. (2009, 8).

63

Family And Social Change In Russia Table 2.15 The relationship of working mothers with their children A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work

Agree strongly Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Total Number of respondents

Russian Federation Year of survey 1990 (%)

1995 (%)

1999 (%)

21.5 42.4 31.6 4.5 100 1,887

37.9 38.7 20.4 3.1 100 1,988

31.0 52.2 15.4 1.3 100 2,403

source: world values survey databank

Table 2.16 Pre-school children of working mothers A pre-school child suffers with a working mother78

Russian Federation Year of survey

Agree strongly Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Total Number of respondents

1990 (%)

1999 (%)

21.6 48.2 28.4 1.8 100 1,885

19.4 54.0 25.0 1.6 100 2,368

source: world values survey databank

78

27.3% of men and 28.8% of women agreed with the statement.

64

GRADSKOVA

special time for post-natal fathers’ to care exclusively for their children as seen in the legislation of several European, particularly North European, countries.79 Furthermore, it is important to notice some new attitudes to working parents emerging from some local authorities and enterprises that have appeared during the last ten years. In some of the Russian regions, and first of all the most economically active (like Moscow), labour shortage sand new demands for professionalism have contributed to a new approach to combining the roles of workers and caregivers. For example, in Moscow the marketisation of everyday life has contributed to the local government’s attention to this problem and the creation of a special prize for enterprises supporting ‘working mothers’ and/or working parents.80 Taking into account this more egalitarian legal discourse on gender and parenthood, the interpretations of the role of the father in the family have also started to change. Data from 1999 show growing trust in fathers and increasing expectations of them. As it is possible to see from the data of the World Values Survey, 53.7 per cent of the respondents stated that fathers are well suited to looking after the children.81 Finally, it is important to pay attention to the influence of the emerging civic organisations on the process of forming new values and attitudes. In spite of Russia not having a significant feminist movement, ngo activities dealing with women, health, and family issues have grown and now contribute to public discussion on the situation of families with children and gender inequality. For example, thanks to international cooperation, Russia has a developed network of Crisis centres,82 and the discussion of power and leadership in the family has now acquired new dimensions (including discussion of the abuse of male power), evolving since the end of the 1980s when answers to the questionnaire quoted at the beginning of this section were given. 4

‘What Am I Without My Family?’: Familism’s Values and Practices in Transition

This section deals with the issues of family dependency and family solidarity. Following Olga Tóth and Csaba Dupcsik, familism is used here in two 79 80 81 82

Carlbäck et al. (2012). Savinskaia (2008). World Values Survey Databank. McIntosh Sundstrom (2006); Saarinen, (2012); Jäppinen (2011).

Family And Social Change In Russia

65

meanings: as ideology bringing family together and as a social condition. In its ideological meaning, familism emphasises the outstanding importance of the family and family relations for both individuals and the whole of society. In this sense familism is usually seen as a certain life-culture opposed to individualism. As a social condition familism supposes dependence of the individual’s well-being on the support of other family members; it seems to prevail in societies characterised by low social trust where family relations remain the only thing individuals can trust. In this case the relative strength of family relationships and family-friendly attitudes is put in the context of trust in other institutions.83 First we will explore how much familism in Russia can be seen as a social condition. In order to do this, we will look at levels of confidence in family and other social institutions. Also this section will explore the main changes that happened with respect to the distribution of the caring functions between the state, welfare institutions of different kinds, and the family. The secondary focus of this section is connected to family ideology – the importance of family in everyday life, the place of family in the public discourse and changing attitudes towards extended and nuclear families. Family and Other Social Institutions during the Transition from State Socialism in Comparative Perspective In order to explore connections between familism and trust in social institutions this section will place the Russian situation into the context of three other countries with different historical backgrounds: Sweden and Spain – two countries in Europe that significantly differ from each other with respect to democratic traditions and welfare models – as well as Turkey, a country of late modernisation and weak civic organisations. The main question here is: How much is family in Russia trusted in comparison with other social institutions and other countries? If we look at the data on trust in family at the beginning of the political and social reforms, it is possible to find that it was significantly lower than in Sweden or Spain. Surprisingly, in Russia only 54.6 per cent (the sum of two variables: ‘trust them completely’ and ‘trust them a little’) trusted their family in 1990. This differs a lot from the results in Sweden (97.9%) and Spain (97.2%) in the same year (see Table 2.17). Smaller, but still significant differences (in particular with respect to Sweden and Turkey) can be found if we look at the answers to the question on family

4.1

83

Tóth and Dupcsik (2011). Also see Chapter 6 in this volume.

66

GRADSKOVA

Table 2.17 Level of trust in family, in Russia, Spain, and Sweden How much do you trust your family?

Country Russian Federation

Spain

Sweden

1990 (%)

1990 (%)

1990 (%)

42.7 11.9 6.5 6.6 32.3 100 1,844

90.6 6.6 1.9 0.6 0.3 100 4,131

83.8 14.1 1.8 0.2 0.1 100 1,021

Year of survey

Trust them completely Trust them a little Neither trust nor distrust them Do not trust them very much Do not trust them at all Total Number of respondents source: world values survey databank

importance in life (see Table 2.18). However, after the end of the most challenging period of social transformation (the 1990s) the level of trust in family in Russia became similar to that in the three selected countries. In 2006 the level of trust in family was over 90 per cent (see Table 2.19) and comparable to the level of trust in the three other countries. Analysis of the level of trust in other social institutions during the 1990s indicates that the level of trust of many of them in Russia was much lower than that in the countries that did not experience such fast and deep social changes. Thus, the respondents in Russia showed rather average trust in the social security system (54.7%) and press (37.1 per cent answered that they trusted the press a ‘great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’). The trust in Parlia­ ment   in Russia was lower than that in more stable countries – less than 30 per cent in Russia and more than 40 per cent in the three other selected countries.84 A similar situation could be observed with respect to trust in the police – 28.1 per cent in Russia compared to 2.4 per cent in Sweden did not trust the police at all. However, when compared to countries with shorter periods of 84

World Values Survey Databank.

67

Family And Social Change In Russia Table 2.18 Importance of family in life Family is important in life

Country Russian Federation (%) Spain (%) Sweden (%) Turkey (%)

Very important Rather important Not very important Not at all important Total Number of respondents

79.4 16.9 3.0 0.7 100 6,422

83.7 15.1 1.0 0.2 100 7,747

88.9 8.9 1.8 0.4 100 3,061

95.8 3.7 0.4 0.2 100 7,540

source: world values survey databank selected countries/samples: russian federation [1990], russian federation [1995], russian federation [1999], spain [1990-asep], spain [1990-data], spain [1995], spain [1999], spain [2000], sweden [1990], sweden [1996], sweden [1999], turkey [1990], turkey [1996], turkey [2001]

Table 2.19 Level of trust in family, in 2006 How much do you trust your family?

Trust them completely Trust them somewhat Do not trust them very much Do not trust them at all Total Number of respondents

Country Russian Federation (%)

Spain (%) Sweden (%) Turkey (%)

91.7 7.3 1.0 – 100 2,009

91.9 6.8 1.2 0.1 100 1,199

93.9 5.6 0.3 0.1 100 1,001

95.6 3.8 0.6 – 100 1,345

source: world values survey databank selected countries/samples: russian federation [2006], spain [2007], sweden [2006], turkey [2007]

democratic development such as Spain and Turkey, trust in this institution (those trusting it a ‘great deal’ and ‘quite a lot’) was lower: 37.3 per cent in Russia, 51.9 per cent in Spain, and 70.1 per cent in Turkey.85 85 Ibid.

68

GRADSKOVA

Finally, trust in other people was rather low in Russia as well. However, it is important to notice that the indicator of trust in other people diminished during the process of social reforms during the 1990s; from 37.5 per cent in 1990 to 23.7 per cent in 1999.86 On the basis of the data about trust it is possible to conclude that even if trust in the institution of family was higher than in other social institutions and in people as such, it was still much lower than in most countries that did not experience such a dramatic social change. The analysed data suggests, nevertheless, that family is seen as a relatively trustworthy institution. Also it is possible to speak about the growth of familism as a social condition in Russia after the mid-2000s. 4.2 State, Welfare, and Social Functions of Family Solidarity The above data of relative mistrust in the respondents’ own families in the 1990s leads to a discussion about the role that family solidarity was playing in Russian society in the 1990s and 2000s. This chapter makes distinctions between instrumental solidarity (that is help through the assistance of relatives in practical forms – money, physical work, or care) and emotional solidarity connected to consolation and company. Instrumental solidarity is seen by many researchers as important for keeping friends and families together during periods of economic instability.87 Thus, impoverishment of large sections of the population due to a sharp decline in incomes could be an important factor here, in particular for the 1990s. While more general statistics for the correlation of these two factors is difficult to find, some data collected by the Russian Centre of Public Opinion research from the early 1990s supports this assumption. As is known, repairing clothes and home devices within the family and producing food at home and at the summer house were the most important survival strategies in the 1990s.88 Study of daily occupation at home shows that adult household members dedicated rather a lot of time to work in gardens and summer houses (96 days per year for men and 108 days for women). However, at the same time, women and men not infrequently carried on complementary tasks that were considered to be rather gender specific; women were sewing or knitting for about forty-eight days a year (men for four days), while men were repairing or making something at home for about forty days (women for twelve).89 This kind of 86 Ibid. 87 Shevchenko (2009). 88 Shevchenko (2009). 89 Dzhaginova (1994, 29).

Family And Social Change In Russia

69

distribution of household occupations suggests that family was a useful institution (based on the union of representatives of two genders) that could guarantee a higher level of comfort and provision. Another factor that could influence family solidarity was the organisation and quality of social support for the elderly, children, and disabled persons. According to previous research, reduction of state support for these groups of the population usually displaces the responsibility for their welfare onto women, the production of welfare happens in the family.90 As for Russia, the deterioration of the centralised state’s ‘care’ for children, the elderly, and disabled people in the early 1990s was one of the important outcomes of the privatisation and marketisation of the economy. The quantity of some services, particularly of those aimed at the two last groups,91 were in shortage during the Soviet period and their quality was not very high. The marketisation of the economy led to improvement of the situation for those Russian citizens in the high-income class. The new private establishments and institutions started to offer services for care of the disabled, sick, and elderly. Also there was much greater chance of having a private nurse, assistant, cleaning person, or nanny. However, for the majority of the population these new services were inaccessible.92 At the same time, some of the institutions of family support that were at the centre of state attention during the period of state socialism experienced serious financial constraints and problems in adapting to marketisation. This is particularly noteworthy with respect to changes in the system of pre-school childcare. The most important change was the general reduction of places (about 40 per cent) as well as closure of departments aimed at the smallest children – nurseries. For example, the number of places in pre-school centres in Moscow in 2005 was only 61.9 per cent of what it had been in the 1990s.93 This was connected to the restructuring of these institutions; while about 70 per cent of Soviet pre-schools were financed by state enterprises,94 after 1991 many of the previously large enterprises were closed down or had to reduce their activities; they were also no longer required to keep childcare facilities for children below three. Most pre-schools belonged to municipalities and were financed through local budgets. This became one of the important reasons behind the geographic inequalities in accessibility and quality of childcare – the possibility of finding a pre-school in the big cities was much higher than in 90 91 92 93 94

Kulagina (2006, 150); Zdravomyslova et al. (2009). Iarskaia-Smirnova (2011). Kulagina (2006). Savinskaia (2008, 17–18). Teplova (2007, 284–322).

70

GRADSKOVA

smaller cities or in the countryside, where maintenance of childcare facilities seemed to be more costly.95 The shortage of pre-schools together with their economic decline contributed to difficulties with accessibility, and corruption.96 At the same time, on the basis of interviews with parents and teachers, and analysis of Internet forums for parents, it is easy to conclude that parents mostly continue to see pre-school as a very important institution that has great responsibility for the well-being, development, and education of children.97 At the same time, growing differences in parents’ incomes and educational strategies (discussed above; child-centred parenthood versus a more superficial attitude to children’s well-being) has contributed to growing differences in the system of public childcare. Thus, one interviewee expressed her rather emotional attitude to a ‘better off’ kindergarten: We have one kindergarten very close to our home, it is commercial. It is very expensive – it seems that they get all the food directly from the restaurant. And they pay like 12,000 rubles per month. It is something unimaginable! Of course, some [parents] can pay this, some others cannot. But they have also music lessons and foreign languages there. Samara, Volga region98

Another interviewee from the same city had a different experience of communication with kindergarten: It was not a prestigious kindergarten, not one where it would be difficult to get a place – totally ordinary children were attending it. For example, they could go home after the kindergarten alone, nobody would come and fetch them – they lived very close to the kindergarten. Once the teacher of English came and proposed to make a group [parents had to pay], but no group was formed at the end. Samara, Volga region

Indeed, marketisation influenced consumption attitudes and in many cases increased demands concerning the quality of welfare institutions. Looking at 95 96 97 98

Seliverstova (2005). Iliina (2007). Gradskova (2010). The examples are taken from interviews collected in 2008–10 as part of the author’s participation in the collective project titled ‘Family and the Strong State: Emancipation or Coercion?’ (Södertörn University).

Family And Social Change In Russia

71

another important tendency in welfare policy that is directly connected to instrumental solidarity in the family – care for the elderly – it can be stated that organisations offering this type of care experienced comparatively few changes after the period of state socialism. In particular, recent research shows that the quality of care for the elderly generally is rather poor, while the concept of care as a whole did not change very much from the Soviet period. According to Jane Harris, the state’s policy ‘failed to adjust its focus to include preventive measures to counter emotional insecurity, social and psychological distress, resulting from social exclusions as much as from impoverishment or declining health’.99 Thus, it is not so surprising that care for the elderly continues to be perceived in Russia as a part of ‘traditional’ family life. Due to these problems with the quality of care (and not only the accessibility of services), care for pre-school children and the elderly are also good examples of the factors influencing not only instrumental, but also emotional solidarity. At the same time, from the latter perspective, family in transitional Russia paints a rather contradictory picture, in particular taking into account the relatively low levels of trust in the family in the 1990s compared to several other countries (see above). Thus, according to the 1994 data from the Russian Public Opinion Centre, the family and home seem to be much more important (about 90 per cent of respondents value it) than, for example love (about 71.8 per cent of respondents value it).100 At the same time, friendship (82.4 per cent) is also valued more than love and is close to the value for money and a secure life (about 85 per cent each). Furthermore, family life is presented in the survey results as negatively influenced by multiple economic problems and social instability; ‘lack of money and low incomes’ were named in first place among the problems that made family life difficult in 1994 (it was mentioned by 63–68 per cent of respondents in the survey conducted by the Centre of Public Opinion in the early 1990s).101 The problems of low income and lack of money were followed in respondents’ answers by problems related to health and bad medical services (25–27 per cent of respondents), and fear of unemployment and general instability (between 24 and 26 per cent). These data suggest that family and friendship, as during the Soviet period,102 could be evaluated as important from the viewpoint of contacts and networking, which brings us back to the discussion of instrumental rather than pure emotional solidarity. 99 100 101 102

Harris (2011, 98). Dubin (1995, 24). Gudkov (1994, 19). See Ledeneva (1998).

72

GRADSKOVA

The supposition that the Russian family in the 1990s was viewed first of all as the place where emotional wounds, produced by the instability and insecurity outside the home, are somehow healed could be questioned from one more perspective – the occurrence of domestic violence. While official statistics give data mainly for homicide (about 14,000 women are killed by their husbands each year;103 the corresponding figure for Sweden is about 20, and for Spain about 70),104 according to data collected by Vannoy et al. in the late 1990s, about 20–24 per cent of those who have been married experienced violence from a partner at least once.105 While domestic violence is widely recognised as a problem at the level of the European Union – according to Eurobarometer, 27% of respondents think that domestic violence against women is a very common problem for their country106 – the situation in Russia is characterised by lack of special legislation as well as by a high rate of alcohol abuse and social instability.107 4.3 Family as Ideology As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, social and political changes in Russia from the late 1980s included strong public discourse on the reconstruction of the ‘traditional family’ that had been destroyed during the period of Communist rule. However, as we saw while discussing emotional and instrumental solidarity, state family-policy, and the divorce rate, the different sets of data indicate the lack of centrality of family for individual Russian citizens at the level of practice. In closing it is important to pay attention to one more aspect of family ideology that has not been discussed – the process of economic and social reforms did not stop the transition from the three-generation family to the nuclear one that was started during the post-war period.108 In the Soviet context this process was connected to the shortage of housing. At the beginning of the 1990s every fifth Russian family had people of three generations living under one roof.109 Under the influence of marketisation the perception of ideal housing 103 Saarinen 2012. 104 Cause of Death – Woman, http://www.causeofdeathwoman.com/sweden (Accessed on 15 September 2013). 105 Vannoy et al. (1999). 106 See Domestic Violence Against Women (2010, 38). 107 According to Eurobarometer, the respondents in eu-countries consider alcohol abuse, drug abuse, poverty and social exclusion, and unemployment to be the four most serious reasons for domestic violence against women (Domestic Violence 2010, 69–73). 108 Carlbäck et al. (2012). 109 Gudkov (1994, 23).

73

Family And Social Change In Russia Table 2.20 The importance of living apart from one’s in-laws It is important for a successful marriage to live apart from your in-laws

Russian Federation Year of survey

Very Rather Not very Total Number of respondents

1990 (%)

1999 (%)

35.7 35.5 28.8 100 1,924

36.5 41.3 22.2 100 2,434

source: world values survey databank

changed and more people in 1999 than in 1990 thought that it was important to live separately from their in-laws (see Table 2.20). Thus, the big three-generation family is far from being an ideal in spite of it being the way families ‘traditionally’ lived in Russia (and also how the majority lived under state socialism). However, in the early 2000s the proportion of young adults aged twenty to twenty-four who continued living with their parents was still close to two-thirds of the total,110 and a shortage of accessible housing for young families still continues to be a problem in Russia at the end of the 2000s. Indeed, this example argues not only against the supposition of a high value attached to the traditionalist, patriarchal, three-generation family, but also against assumptions about the centrality of family to the post-Soviet Russian state at the level of demands and policy implementation. At the same time, with respect to the situation in Russia it is possible to speak about discursive traditionalist familism at the level of public discourse that contributes, most probably, to the growing level of trust in family as a social institution (as was stated in the first part of this section). 5 Conclusions Data from statistical and public opinion surveys over the last thirty years indicate that the demographic development of Russia continues to have 110 Shiriaev and Gradskova (2005, 282).

74

GRADSKOVA

many contradictions. For example, while the ideal family is seen as a family of two children growing up with their biological mother and father, Russian citizens frequently limit their family to one child and at least half of them approve of singleparent families. Furthermore, in spite of all the pro-natalist measures recently taken by the Russian government in order to increase the birth rate, this remains around 12–13 births per 1,000 people, coinciding with the average number for Europe. The gender roles, expectations, and values of Russian citizens constitute an equally peculiar patchwork. Loud declarations of the importance of a family with ‘traditional’ gender roles clash with ideas from seventy years of state socialism on the acceptability of women’s work for wages outside the home. Fewer Russian women than men agree that the role of the housewife is as fulfilling as professional work, while about 80 per cent of respondents of the World Values Survey support the role of the woman as a working mother (the most obvious symbol of the Soviet gender order). The ‘incomparably condensed changes’111 that Russia experienced under the period of state socialism seem to continue influencing the coexistence of these contradictory attitudes, values, and behaviour patterns. In summary however, it could be stated that in spite of many contradictions and loud traditionalist discourse, a lot of demographic data indicate that Russia is heading roughly in the direction of the second demographic transition. This thesis could be supported by the data on the growing number of cohabitations, the growing percentage of marriages where the age of the bride is greater than twenty-four years, and postponed fertility in registered marriages. There are several factors that can be seen as contributing to the development of Russia in this direction. The positive attitudes to working mothers and to women’s education and professional work, independently from their possible connections to the Soviet gender order, support rather than refute our hypothesis of Russia’s move towards the second demographic transition. Furthermore, the marketisation of the economy leads to a growing sector of home services (nannies, cleaning ladies, those caring for elderly and sick people) that make the borders of family more transparent and family unity less important for individual life strategies. Indeed, the institution of family in transitional Russia experienced a certain crisis of trust similar to other social institutions (like the police or the Parliament) and did not become ‘the quiet harbour’ in a period of social upheaval. New facts on domestic violence distributed by civic organisations, and social services’ and educators’ preoccupation with the ‘unfortunate’ families of the ‘new poor’, have not led to a very positive image of family in Russia during the last decade. 111 Chang (2010, xi).

Family And Social Change In Russia

75

It is important to remember, however, the size of the territory of the Russian Federation, and the diversity of economic and cultural development in its different regions, as well as the influence of religious and ethnic traditions on the values and behaviours of Russian citizens. The differences between regions (like the cities of Moscow and St Petersburg on the one hand and some southern subdistricts of the Federation on the other hand) are significant, but it is not possible to discover them through the averaged data that are usually presented in statistics. Taken separately, different parts of the Russian Federation remind us of different countries, including those that are usually classified as not yet having gone through the first demographic transition fully. Thus, the hypothesis of the entrance of the Russian Federation into the period of the second demographic transition could be accepted on the condition that the concept of the second demographic transition can itself be modified. Indeed, intimate relationships in Russia are experiencing significant changes, and these have intensified during the last twenty years in connection with the growing liberalisation of social and economic life in the country and in combination with decreasing state support for children. In contrast to the countries of Western Europe, where growing autonomy in intimate relationships went hand in hand with growing support for families with children, the ‘reconstruction of family autonomy’ in Russia and in other former statesocialist countries supposed that the state would ‘step back’ from its interventions in family issues in comparison to the late socialist period. Even if the Russian state attempted to start at least some support for families (in the form of the 2007 law on maternal capital), this support still showed itself to be very limited; indeed its abolishment is now under discussion.112 Thus, the postponement of childbirth and the growth of the numbers of cohabiting couples with children are taking place in Russia in a different discursive context than was characteristic for the countries of Western Europe at the beginning of their second demographic transition. That is why Russia could be seen as entering into the second demographic transition in its modified version. The most visible differences of this modified second demographic transition from that experienced by the countries of Western Europe about fifty years ago is the influence of traditionalist rhetoric on certain values and expectations as well as the incoherent development of different regions as a result of ‘compressed modernity’.

112 Temkina (2013).

76

GRADSKOVA

References Bergman, Helena. 2003. Att fostra till föräldraskap. Barnavårdsmän, genuspolitik och välfärldstat, 1900–1950 [Policing Parents. Child Welfare Officers, Gender Politics and the Welfare State, 1900–1950]. Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis. Borhorst, Anette. 2011. ‘Scandinavian gender equality: Competing discourses and paradoxes’. In Gender and Well-being: The Role of Institutions, edited by Elisabetta Addis, Paloma de Villota, Florence Degavre and John Eriksen, 63–75. Farnham: Ashgate. Carlbäck, Helene. 2012. ‘Lone motherhood in Soviet Russia in the mid-20th century – In a European context’. In And They Lived Happily Ever After: Norms and Everyday Practices of Family and Parenthood in Russia and Eastern Europe, edited by Helene Carlbäck, Yulia Gradskova and Zhanna Kravchenko, 25–46. Budapest: ceu Press. Carlbäck, Helene, Yulia Gradskova and Zhanna Kravchenko. 2012. ‘Introduction’. In And They Lived Happily Ever After: Norms and Everyday Practices of Family and Parenthood in Russia and Eastern Europe, edited by Helene Carlbäck, Yulia Gradskova and Zhanna Kravchenko, 1–24. Budapest: ceu Press. Chang Kyung-Sup. 2010. South Korea under Compressed Modernity: Familial Political Economy in Transition. London: Routledge. Chernova, Zhanna. 2008. Semeinaia politika v Evrope i Rossii: gendernyi analiz [Family Policy in Europe and Russia: Gender Analysis]. St Petersburg: Norma. (Чернова Жанна. Семейная политика в Европе и России: гендерный анализ. Ст.Петербург: Норма.) ‘Chislo razvodov vpervye stalo ustoichivo prevyshat chislo brakov’ [The number of divorces has for the first time started to exceed the number of marriages]. 2002. Demoskop Weekly 77–78 (26 August–8 September). (Число разводов впервые стало устойчиво превышать число браков. Демоскоп Weekly 77–78.) http:// demoscope.ru/weekly/2002/077/barom04.php. Cook, Linda J. 2011. ‘Russia’s welfare regime: The shift toward statism’. In Gazing at Welfare, Gender and Agency in Post-socialist Countries, edited by Maija Jäppinen, Meri Kulmala and Aino Saarinen, 14–37. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Dokhody rabotayushchego naseleniia Rossii [Incomes of the employed population of Russia]. Monitoring Obshchestvennogo mneniia [Monitoring Public Opinion], March, 1994. (Доходы работающего населения России. Моноторинг общественного мнения. Март 1994.) Domestic Violence against Women. Report. 2010. (Special Eurobarometer 344). Brussels: European Commission. Dubin, Boris. 1995. ‘Semia ili uspekh?’ [Family or success?]. Informatsionnyi bulleten monitoringa obshchestvennogo mneniia [Informational Bulletin of the Monitoring of Public Opinion] (November–December): 24–27. (Дубин, Борис. Семья или успех?

Family And Social Change In Russia

77

Информационный бюллетень мониторинга общественного мнения (ноябрьдекабрь): 24–27.) Dzhaginova, Elena. 1994. ‘Povsednevnaia zhizn Rossii’ [Russian everyday life]. Informatsionnyi bulleten monitoringa obshchestvennogo mneniia [Informational Bulletin of the Monitoring of Public Opinion] (September–October): 29–32. (Джагинова, Елена. Повседневная жизнь России. Информационный бюллетень мониторинга общественного мнения (сентябрь-октябрь): 29–32.) Filatov, Sergei and Roman Lunkin. 2005. ‘Statistika rossiskoi religioznosti: magiia tsifr i neodnoznachnaia realnost’ [Statistics of Russian religiosity: Magic of the numbers and complex reality]. Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia [Sociological Research] 6: 35–45. (Филатов, Сергей и Роман Лункин. Статистика российской религиозности: магия цифр и неоднозначная реальность. Социологические исследования 6: 35–45.) Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie – fom [Public Opinion Foundation]. Nezaregistrirovannye braki: Semia i deti 2008. [Non-Registered Marriages: Family and Children, 2008]. (Фонд общественное мнение – ФОМ. Незарегистрированные браки: семья и дети, 2008.) http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/home_fam/famil/civ _marr/d082924. Giddens, Anthony. 1992. The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in the Modern Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Gradskova, Yulia. 1997. ‘Novaia ideologiia semii i ee osobennosti v Rossii’ [New ideology of family and its Russian specifics]. Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost [The Social Sciences and Contemporaneity] 2: 181–185. (Градскова, Юлия. Новая идеология семьи и ее особенности в России. Общественные науки и современность 2: 181–185.) ——. 2004. ‘Normative femininity: A review of women’s self-descriptions in the context of the reforms in Russia’. In Contemporary Change in Russia, edited by Egle Rindzeviciute, 111–123. Stockholm: beegs. ——. 2010. ‘Kogda otdavat rebionka v detskii sad i platit li vospitateliu? Roditelstvo, gender i uchrezhdenia doshkolnogo vospitaniia v internet-forumakh’ [Should I send my child to kindergarten, and should I pay the teacher? Parenting, gender, and preschool educational institutions in Internet forums]. Laboratorium 3: 44–57. (Когда одавать ребенка в детский сад и платить ли воспитателю? Родительство, гендер и учреждения дошкольного воспитания в интренет-форумах. Laboratorium 3: 44–57.) http://www.soclabo.org/index.php/laboratorium/article/view/217. Gudkov, Lev. 1994. ‘Povsednevnye problemy semii’ [Everyday problems of families]. Informatsionnyi bulleten monitoringa obshchestvennogo mneniia [Informational Bulletin of the Monitoring of Public Opinion] (November–December): 18–23. (Гудков, Лев. Повседневные проблемы семьи. Информационный бюллетень мониторинга общественного мнения (ноябрь-декабрь): 18–23.)

78

GRADSKOVA

Harris, Jane. 2011. ‘Serving the elderly: Informal care networks and formal social services in St Petersburg’. In Gazing at Welfare, Gender and Agency in Post-socialist Countries, edited by Maija Jäppinen, Meri Kulmala and Aino Saarinen, 78–103. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Iarskaia-Smirnova, Elena. 2011. Class and Gender in Russian Welfare Policies: Soviet Legacies and Contemporary Challenges. Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg. Iliina, Maria. 2007. ‘Detskii sad kak mekhanism realizatsii “kontrakta rabotayuszhei materi” (na materialakh St.Petersburga)’ [Kindergarten as the mechanism of realisation of the ‘contract of the working mother’]. In Obszhestvennia expertiza prosessa transformatsii sistemy doshkolnykh obrazovatelnykh uchrezhdenii [Social Expertise of the Process of Transformation of the System of the Pre-school Educational Centres], edited by Olga Savinskaia, 72–93. St Petersburg: lema. (Ильина, Мария. Детский сад как механизм реализации « контракта работающей матери » (на материалах Ст.Петербурга. В Общественная экспертиза процесса трансформации системы дошкольных образовательных учреждений. Ст.Петербург: Лема, 72–93.) Isola, Anna-Maria. 2009. ‘Neblagopoluchnye semii: ritorika rossiiskoi demograficheskoi politiki’ [Unlucky families: The rhetoric of Russian demographic politics]. In Novyi byt v sovremennoi Rossii: gendernye issledovaniia povsednevnosti [The New Everyday Life in Contemporary Russia: Everyday Gender Studies], edited by Elena Zdravomyslova, Anna Rotkirch and Anna Temkina, 404–426. St Petersburg: Evropeiskii universitet. (Исола, Анна-Мария. Неблагополучные семьи: риторика российской демографической политики. В Новый быт в современной России: гендерные исследования повседневности. Ред. Елена Здравомыслова, Анна Роткирх и Анна Темкина. Ст.Петербург: Европейский университет, 404–426.) Isoupova, Olga. 2010. ‘Materinskii kapital i rossiiskie semii’ [Maternity capital and Russian families]. Demoskop Weekly 443–444 (15–28 November). (Исупова Ольга. Материнский капитал и российские семьи. Демоскоп Weekly 443–444.) http:// demoscope.ru/weekly/2010/0443/gender03.php. Jäppinen, Maija. 2011. ‘Tensions between familialism and feminism: Domestic violence frameworks in a women’s crisis center’. In Gazing at Welfare, Gender and Agency in Post-socialist Countries, edited by Maija Jäppinen, Meri Kulmala and Aino Saarinen, 125–144. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Kravchenko, Zhanna. 2008. Family (versus) Policy: Combining Work and Care in Russia and Sweden. Stockholm: Stockholm University. Kulagina, Elena. 2006. ‘Socio-economic problems of families in Russia: Gender aspect’. In The Policies of Reproduction at the Turn of the 21st Century: The Cases of Finland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Austria and the us, edited by Maria Mesner and Gudrun Wolfgruber, 145–156. Innsbruck and Vienna: StudienVerlag.

Family And Social Change In Russia

79

Ledeneva, Alena. 1998. Russian Economy of Favors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Maiofis, Maria and Ilia Kukulin. 2010. ‘Novoe roditelstvo i ego politicheskie aspekty’ [The new parenthood and its political aspects]. Pro et Contra 1: 6–19. (Майофис, Мария и Илья Кукулин. Новое родительство и его политические аспекты. Pro et Contra 1: 6–19.) McIntosh Sundstrom, Lisa. 2006. Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and ngo Development in Russia. Stanford, ca: Stanford University Press. Meil, Gerardo. 2006. The evolution of family policy in Spain. Marriage and Family Review 39 (3–4): 359–380. Nakachi Mie. 2006. ‘N.S. Khrushchev and the 1944 Soviet family law: Politics, reproduction, and language’. East European Politics and Society 20 (1): 40–68. Odintsova, Daria. 2009. ‘Pelenanie: rekonfiguratsiia povsednevnoi praktiki’ [Babyswaddling: The reconfiguration of everyday practice]. In Novyi byt v sovremennoi Rossii: Gendernye issledovaniia povsednevnosti [The New Everyday Life in Contemporary Russia: Everyday Gender Studies], edited by Elena Zdravomyslova, Anna Rotkirch and Anna Temkina, 508–522. St Petersburg: Evropeiskii universitet. (Одинцова, Дарья. Пеленание: реконфигурация повседневной практики. В Новый был в современной России: гендерные исследования повседневности. Ред. Елена Здравомыслова, Анна Роткирх и Анна Темкина. Ст.Петербург: Европейский университет, 508–522, 2009.) Ovcharova, Lilia and Lidia Prokofieva. 1999. ‘Bednost i mezhsemeinaia solidarnost v Rossii v perekhodnyi period’ [Poverty and family solidarity in Russia during the transitional period]. Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia [Monitoring Public Opinion] 4: 23–31. (Овчарова, Лилия и Лидия Прокофьева. Бедность и межсемейная солидарность в России в переходный период. Мониторинг общественного мнения 4: 23–31.) Rivkin-Fish, Michele. 2010. ‘Pronatalism, gender politics, and the renewal of family support in Russia: Towards a feminist anthropology of “maternity capital”’. Slavic Review 69 (3): 701–724. Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 2003 [Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2003]. Federalnaia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki [Russian Federal Statistical Service]. (Российский статистический ежегодник 2003. Федеральная служба государственной статистики.) http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b03_13/Main.htm. Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 2010 [Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2010]. Federalnaia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki [Russian Federal Statistical Service]. (Российский статистический ежегодник, 2010. Федеральная служба государственной статистики.) http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_13/Main.htm. Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 2011 [Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2011]. Federalnaia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki (Российский статистический ежегодник, 2011.

80

GRADSKOVA

Федеральная служба государственной статистики.) [Russian Federal Statistical Service]. http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_13/Main.htm. Rotkirch, Anna and Katja Kesseli. 2012. ‘Two children puts you in the zone of social misery: Childbearing and risk perception among Russian women’. In And They Lived Happily Ever After: Norms and Everyday Practices of Family and Parenthood in Russia and Eastern Europe, edited by Helene Carlbäck, Yulia Gradskova and Zhanna Kravchenko, 145–164. Budapest: ceu Press. Rotkirch, Anna, Anna Temkina and Elena Zdravomyslova. 2007. ‘Who helps the degraded housewife? Comments on Vladimir Putin’s demographic speech’. European Journal of Women’s Studies 14: 349–357. Saarinen, Aino. 2012. ‘Welfare crises and crisis centers in Russia today’. In And They Lived Happily Ever After: Norms and Everyday Practices of Family and Parenthood in Russia and Eastern Europe, edited by Helene Carlbäck, Yulia Gradskova and Zhanna Kravchenko, 231–250. Budapest: ceu Press. Sätre, Ann-Mari. 2012. ‘Gendered experiences in entrepreneurship, family and social activities in Russia’. In And They Lived Happily Ever After: Norms and Everyday Practices of Family and Parenthood in Russia and Eastern Europe, edited by Helene Carlbäck, Yulia Gradskova and Zhanna Kravchenko, 297–318. Budapest: ceu Press. Savinskaia, Olga. 2008. Rabota i semia v zhizni zhenschin s detmi-doshkolnikami: opyt goroda Moskvy [Work and Family in the Life of Woman Having Children of Pre-school Age: The Experience of the City of Moscow]. Moskva: Variant. (Савинская, Ольга. Работа и семья в жизни женщины с детьми дошкольниками: опыт города Москвы. Москва: Варинат, 2008.) Seliverstova, Irina V. 2005. ‘Dostupnost doshkolnogo obrazovaniia: vliianie territorialnogo faktora’ [Accessibility of pre-school education: The influence of the geographical factor]. Sotsiologicheskie Issledovania [Sociological Research] 2: 95–103. (Селиверстова, Ирина. Доступность дошкольного образования: влияние территориального фактора. Социологические исследования 2: 95–103.) Shcherbakova, Ekaterina. 2007. ‘Chislo abortov snizhaetsia’ [The number of abortions is decreasing]. Demoskop Weekly 275–276 (5–18 February). (Щербакова, Екатерина. Число абортов снижается. Демоскоп Weekly 275–276.) http://demoscope.ru/ weekly/2007/0275/barom05.php. ——. 2009. ‘Demograficheskie itogi 2008g. (chast 1)’ [Demographical results for 2008 (part 1)]. Demoskop Weekly 367–368 (2–15 March). (Демографические итоги 2008 г. (часть 1). Демоскоп Weekly 367–368.) http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2009/0367/ barom04.php. ——. 2011. ‘Demograficheskie itogi 2010 goda (chast 1)’ [Demographic results for 2010 (part 1)]. Demoskop Weekly 455–456 (6 February–21 March). (Демографические итоги 2010 г. (часть 1). Демоскоп Weekly 455–456, 2011.) http://demoscope.ru/ weekly/2011/0455/barom03.php.

Family And Social Change In Russia

81

Shevchenko, Olga. 2009. Crisis and the Everyday in Postsocialist Moscow. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Shiriaev, Erik and Yulia Gradskova. 2005. ‘The Russian family’. In Families in Global Perspective, edited by Jaipaul L. Roopnarine and Uwe P. Gielen, 277–290. Boston, ma: Pearson Education. Surkyn, Johan and Ron Lesthaeghe. 2004. ‘Value orientations and the second demographic transition (sdt) in Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An update’. Demographic Research 3: 45–86. Temkina, Anna. 2013. ‘Nuzhno li otmeniat materinskii kapital?’ [Do we need to abolish maternity capital?] (Темкина, Анна. Нужно ли отменять материнский капитал?) http://slon.ru/russia/nuzhno_li_otmenyat_materinskiy_kapital-985923.xhtml (last accessed on 16 September 2013.) Teplova, Tatyana. 2007. ‘Welfare state transformation, childcare, and women’s work in Russia’. Social Politics 14 (3): 284–322. Therborn, Göran. 2004. Between sex and Power: Family in the World, 1900–2000. London: Routledge. Tóth, Olga and Csaba Dupcsik. 2011. ‘Trust in people and conservatism of family and gender roles in Hungary and in some other European countries’. Journal of Intimate and Public Spheres 1: 152–160. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Statistical Database. http://w3 .unece.org/pxweb/. Vannoy, Dana, Natalia Rimashevskaya, Lisa Cubbins and Marina Malysheva. 1999. Marriages in Russia: Couples during the economic transition. Westport, ct: Praeger. Vishnevskii, Anatolii. 2006. Demograficheskaia modernizatsiia Rossii 1900–2000 [Demographic Modernisation of Russia, 1900–2000]. Moskva: Novoe izdatelstvo. (Вишневский, Анатолий. Демографическая модернизация России 1990–2000. Москва: Новое издательство.) Vovk, Elena. 2005. ‘Nezaregistrirovannye intimnye soyuzy – raznovidnosti braka ili alternativy emu’ [Non-registered intimate partnerships – forms of marriage or its alternative]. Fond Obshchestvennogo mnenia [Public Opinion Foundation] (Вовк, Елена. Незарегистрированные интимные союзы – разновидности брака или альтернативы ему. Фонд общественного мнения). http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/ journ_socrea/number_1_05/gur050103. wvs (World Values Survey). Online survey database. http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/ WVSAnalize.jsp. Zakharov, Sergei. 2008. ‘Russian federation: From the first to the second demographic transition’. Demographic Research 19–24: 907–972. http://www.demographic -research.org/Volumes/Vol19/24/19-24.pdf. Zdravomyslova, Elena, Anna Rotkirch and Anna Temkina. 2009. Novyibyt v sovremennoi Rossii: gendernye issledovaniia povsednevnosti [The New Everyday Life in

82

GRADSKOVA

Contemporary Russia: Everyday Gender Studies]. St Petersburg: Evropeiskii universitet. (Здравомыслова, Елена, Анна Роткирх и Анна Темкина. Новый был в современной России: гендерные исследования повседневности. Ст.Петербург: Европейский университет, 2009). Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. 2008. ‘Staraia ideologiia novoi semi’ [Old ideology of the new family]. In Gendernye rynki Ukrainy [Gender Markets of Ukraine], authored by Tatiana Zhurzhenko, 268–296. Vilnius: egu. (Журженко, Татьяна. Старая идеология новой семьи. В Журженко, Татьяна. Гендерные рынки Украины. Вильнюс: ЕГУ, 2008).

CHAPTER 3

Exploitation of the Intimate Sphere in Socialist and Post-Socialist Ukraine Lyudmyla Males and Tymur Sandrovych Introduction One can venture to say that the study of Ukraine as an Eastern European society might become the place of intersection for all kinds of theories to explain changes in the family, which could significantly contribute to the development of a potential modified second demographic transition theory. The demographic transition process in Ukraine takes a different form than in Western European countries, creating a form of family that is not necessarily associated with marriage, and also creating a remarkable gap between family values and anti-family tendencies. Nonetheless, before studying the case of Ukraine, we suggest that an interesting hint can be found with the help of the notion of the ‘two cultures’ coined by Vladimir Paperny.1 By doing so it becomes much easier to identify structures and also to understand better the changes that took place in the twentieth century. Whereas Vladimir Paperny was a historian of architecture, his research went far beyond solely architectural material and included features of political, social, and cultural change. He generalised these spheres and distinguished two types of cultures: Culture-1 and Culture-2. These refer to distinct periods in twentieth-century Soviet history that have the features of either the first or the second cultural type: • Culture-1: ‘Proletkult’ (proletarian culture), 1919–32; Khrushchev’s Thaw, 1954–64; ‘Perestroika and Newly Independent States’, 1985–94. • Culture-2: Age of Stalin, 1932–54; Brezhnev stagnation, 1964–85; Post-Soviet states, 1994–present. 1 Paperny (2002).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004276833_005

84

Males and Sandrovych

Paperny’s theory on the periodical turnovers of Culture-1 (characterised by the state’s weakening control over the economy, civil society and the intimate sphere) and Culture-2 (characterised by the state’s strengthening control over the three aforementioned domains) appears to be a useful theoretical framework for studying family and social change in contemporary Ukraine, especially when it comes to the study of demographic transition. Demographic transition is an emancipatory process with regards to individuals. Thus, as in any emancipatory process, it is not a smooth transition and conflicts between various powers often occur. This usually applies to institutional resistance from the state in a totalitarian society, and this has different dynamics in different periods. If we try to use the typology of Culture-1 and Culture-2 to describe the social situation in Ukraine, then we can understand that within Culture-1 old rules and institutions that regulated demographic behaviour were being criticised while new forms of its organisation and realisation entered the public sphere (new types of family, marriage, reproductive and contraceptive practices, types of sexuality, ritualism). Culture-1 is a time of weakening of rules and practices, and new opportunities to change. Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, during Culture-1, the institution of religious marriage was denounced, and traditions of patriarchal life became the subject of withering criticism, creating a field for new communist rules and rituals. At the same time in society itself, where extended and multi-child families are still found, modern small families appear and issues such as sexual education, non-heterosexual practices, and new forms of cohabitation are discussed. Discussion concerning new rules and new forms of demographic behaviour begins, and such discussion might either facilitate the subsequent legitimation of such rules and forms, or lead to their rejection and prohibition. After this period of discussions and debates comes to an end, a new more or less coherent ideology of Culture-2 is established. It provides resources for rules and practices that are considered to be beneficial for the interests of the state and the ruling class, and marginalises or destroys all competitive practices. In Ukraine’s twentieth- and twenty-first-century history, Culture-2 established a statist, totalitarian ideology. Therefore, it rather supported, through discourse and institutional methods, previous, patriarchal forms of family relationships, such as having many children, and an obsession with women’s responsibility for children, everyday life, etc. Culture-2 vilified and prosecuted alternative forms of family life or attempts at criticism of the established order. However, it was at the same time interested in such a marginalised existence of ‘otherness’, because this was the way to have some object to blame and to make an internal enemy, thus ensuring the loyalty and consolidation of the majority.

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

85

Thus during Culture-2, there are many groups of people (single, divorced, those having few or no children, those who were born illegitimately and those who have an abortion) that are deprived of rights and resources because they do not comply with ideals declared by the state, and a great pressure is placed on the rest of the population because requirements are too high (this causes, for instance, mothers to work at three jobs at the same time). In this way the system gets rid of critics concerning its inefficiency and provides for the economy in the social sphere. The state is unable to halt processes of demographic transition that are caused by socio-economic reasons, and it condemns their emancipating nature. Firstly, it deprives these practices and their values of normativity: people living a single life, single mothers, alternative forms of family, contraception and sexual education practices – all of them are said to go beyond the norms of society. Secondly, the state deprives them of their legitimacy: abortions, non-heterosexual relations and reproductive technologies for certain categories of people are prohibited. Moreover, due to powerful propaganda supporting familistic values, Culture-2 even produces some reverses in the most sensitive practices (implementation of deferred births, refraining from divorces, etc.). Now let us give a brief outline of this chapter. Besides the introduction, it consists of four parts and a conclusion. In the introduction, we gave a brief outline of the analytical concepts of Culture-1 and Culture-2 coined by Vladimir Paperny and suggested that they might prove to be quite useful while examining the changes that have taken place in the Ukrainian family as time passed. In part 1, we shed light on the socio-historical background of Ukraine in Soviet times and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In part 2, we focus on the interaction of the state and market in Ukraine and on familism and its characteristics while talking about Ukraine. Part 3 deals with change in the family, and we provide details about issues of fertility, marriage and divorce, paying special attention to pluralisation of lifestyles. In part 4, we state that a socio-cultural lag might exist while discussing familism and individualisation in Ukraine, and the chapter concludes by theorising the findings of the chapter as a whole. 1

The Socio-Historical Background of Ukraine

Firstly, in most cases, the governance (as opposed to self-governance) of society through public institutions transmits traditional family values. The family today is indeed the most reliable, and comfortable form for the reproduction of people as the main resource for the existence of society.

86

Males and Sandrovych

In traditional Ukrainian society, the Church, and to a lesser extent the state, regulated the social order, while in Soviet society the state replaced the Church as the arbiter of social life. In post-Soviet society, in turn, the market assumed a much greater importance in governing society, while the role of the state declined. This is what Habermas calls ‘the system’.2 Such family-centredness is usually subtly embedded in the governing processes of society, and is not always explicitly stressed. However, at times the focus on familism is displayed quite powerfully and becomes part of state ideology and manipulative technologies. For instance, this was the case under totalitarianism when social processes emerged that threatened stable population reproduction, and when the need for increased human resources was especially urgent (because of war or national economic development goals). For Ukraine, this was true for most of the twentieth century. 1.1 Ukraine in Soviet Times Ukraine was one of the most important republics in the ussr, and witnessed ferocious conflict in the Bolsheviks’ struggle to annex it. It was third in size among the republics of the ussr in terms of land area and second in terms of total population; it also had great economic potential, both industrial and agricultural. Active development of industry in the first decades of the twentieth century and during reconstruction after the Second World War increased levels of urbanisation and contributed to the development of educational potential. Strange as it may sound, while the Soviet government exploited Ukraine’s resources as much as possible, it invested little, instead demanding even more resources. In this way the government was able to solve its own needs by maximising demands on Ukraine for resources and pushing the nation to the limits of its physical capabilities, and occasionally even beyond. Such a policy of depletion was not accidental, because, paradoxically, the ussr was not interested in maintaining the strength of individual republics, which it was felt could lead to the atomisation of the Soviet state and a growth in separatist feelings. Thus, the fate of Ukraine, and the other republics within the ussr, was similar to that of a family in a totalitarian society in which independence for any single individual was forbidden in the public sphere and in which social institutions required the maximum contribution of resources from the private sphere. In some cases, during times (Culture-1) of multiple problems, changes, conflicts or transformations (i.e., substantial problems within ‘the system’ and the 2 Habermas (1981).

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

87

power of institutions) – there were relatively short periods of extensive discussions of the ‘rules of the game’.3 During the rest of the time (Culture-2), the authoritative institutions could not act rationally in order to make the population more compliant. They need to maintain a certain base level of tension. This tension in family relationships in traditional society was caused by the contradictory requirements placed upon women by the Church and by society – to be asexual and bodiless, but at the same time through their own sex to attract a husband, to become a wife, a mother, and justify themselves in the eyes of the Church and community. The patriarchal family model was monopolistic, because it was supported and diffused by cultural tradition. It made certain types of family relations appear ‘natural’, that is, taken for granted and not something to be thought about. All deviations from this model, such as single-parent households, celibate cohabitants, and extramarital births were, in turn, ‘not natural’. It was exactly the kind of gender asymmetry in sexual morality described above, forged in the first revolutionary decade (Culture-1), that launched ambitious discussions about how to remove this tension. Quite radical for that time, ideas of freeing man and woman from the ‘bond’ of marriage, daily routine, and parenting were discussed. All such issues were brought into the public space, and most of the functions of marriage and family were transferred to the custody of specialised institutions within the state (i.e., departments of registration of citizens, service facilities, boarding schools, etc.). However, all such discussions and experiments were little more than a tool, because the state’s main aim was to entrench the values of the ‘builder of communism’ – a person freed from private things and fully committed to the needs of the state. The state soon renewed its institutional power and, becoming increasingly totalitarian from the early 1930s, destroyed all trace of civil society. Through mass terror, trust in fellow citizens, neighbours, and even relatives (except those closest in one’s family) was destroyed, putting society in a condition of constant fear of the state.4 From the 1930s, marriage and regulation of family relations were also traditionalised: divorce was condemned, images of mother–heroines were created as examples of women’s success, and the family again became patriarchal. However, patriarchal features were supported more by state authority than by the father himself. Legislative liberalism of the previous decade was replaced 3 Bourdieu and Lamaison (1985). 4 Hosking (2006, 2007).

88

Males and Sandrovych

by harsh familism: homosexuality was criminalised, abortions were prohibited and criminalised, divorce was made much more complicated, single mothers and mothers with children born out of wedlock were deprived of many rights and criticised, and cohabitation likewise was frowned upon. Privacy lost its constituting features – security, freedom, intimacy, and trust. Private life was under the watchful eye of the ‘party and leadership’ while state agencies intruded into it at gunpoint. During Stalin’s period as leader, the patriarchal system of family relations and the principle of community solidarity/ security were completely restored in the private sphere. It might seem that the survival and preservation of older traditions and communities are hidden in privacy, and the man frightened by repression immerses himself and seeks refuge in privacy, relying on its apoliticality and routineness, but even there, individuals found themselves under the watchful eye of their neighbours and relatives.5 From the 1930s to the 1950s, the totalitarian state demanded both greater population reproduction and full employment of all adult family members in the national economy. Many people still had quite a traditional view of family, marriage, and children, and there was no need to convince them to support such values. The main efforts of agitation and propaganda by the state were directed at extolling the virtues of hard-working women and raising the general prestige of labour. Therefore women had to meet the requirements of the image of a ‘working mother’ at a time when the level of welfare, ownership of household appliances, and access to social services and to social infrastructure was quite low. This meant that all work related to family issues was done by hand and was thus exhausting. These two highly incompatible duties created tension, and led to failure and frustration. They also made it possible to find reasons for condemnation and accusation almost all the time. The survival of large families under conditions of full employment of all able-bodied family members and the almost complete absence of state aid was made possible by exploiting the internal resources of the family, that is, through private-sphere resources, those very things that made this private sphere particularly meaningful for people. In this way, looking after family members and taking care of children became the socalled second and third ‘working day’ for women.6 Such responsibilities were also taken by the generation of grandmothers who were no longer working and young children who were not yet working.

5 Zubkova (2008). 6 Cubbins et al. (1999); Voronina (1993).

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

89

After a brief surge of public debate and experimentation in the 1960s (Culture-1), the second half of the twentieth century saw the continued ideology of double duties for citizens towards the state, and a valuing of socially useful work being prevalent. Mainly due to large family sizes in the ussr’s Central Asian republics, the population of the Soviet Union continued to grow, so the problem of fertility decline in the European part of the country was mentioned only in narrow academic circles. During the 1970s and 1980s, urbanisation led to the dominance of nuclear and neo-local families, reducing reliance on internal resources. At the same time, public education, food supply, and various services for the population became widespread, but their critically low quality led to nostalgia for ‘homemade’ things and a view that the ‘home-made’ was a priori better. This nostalgia showed itself during perestroika, when the destruction of the Soviet system led to widespread public criticism not only of political but also of family ideology. Therefore it is precisely at this time of transformation (Culture-1) that the idea of the restoration of patriarchal values appeared. 1.2 Ukraine in Post-Soviet Times In 1991, Ukraine became an independent state. In the 1990s, a time of stabilisation for the state, traditional patriarchal values were adopted as part of state ideology. Re-traditionalisation, oddly enough, was also actively supported by ‘the market’ with its growing political weight. By the late 1990s it had become, alongside the state, a powerful institution within Ukrainian society. Actually, in the case of Ukraine, the advent of the market was marked by the arrival of transnational capital and the inclusion of Ukraine into the global division of labour. The specific influence of the market in Ukraine’s case, compared to the eu and North America, lies in the fact that local and Western capital follow a neocolonial strategy. Therefore the market, like the previous authoritarian regime, is interested in the absence of public discussion of policies which might affect the nature of the institutions of power (their social responsibility, accountability, transparency of decision-making, democracy), and in the maintaining of a conflict of values as a means of governing the labour force. In such a system citizens do not challenge the fairness of the rules created by the system’s institutions. Under such conditions in Culture-2, the dilemma of values ‘pushes’ the citizen into attempting a solution that makes use of the temporal and human ‘reserves’ of the private life. Those who do not have such reserves (the ‘free’ help of a wife, or other relatives) have to submit to worse working conditions and lower wages. Single mothers or fathers, and other employed individuals who have one or more dependents, risk becoming members of this group

90

Males and Sandrovych

(among all households with members employed at the labour market, their share reached 46 per cent in 2001, according to census data). Flexibility of the labour market – advantageous for employers – is thus gradually being achieved, and thus the concentration of capital in Ukraine is formed not only due to neoliberal policies of excessive exploitation in workplaces that are poorly governed by the state, but also because of the indirect exploitation of resources of the private sphere, as described by Marx. Kateryna Tsymbal describes this condition of value transition in modern post-Soviet Ukrainian society in her thesis. She states that there are three processes, each with a different pace, that cause the negative imbalance between such transitions. They are the destruction of the previous system of social control, market agents that are already shaped and come from outside, and the forming of agents and strategies for containment of market forces. The negative effects of the uneven development of such processes might include a sharp drop in the social capital of society and the decrease in trust between citizens, and even extend to the point of anomie. Market forces actively promote extreme individualism and consumerism among various population groups because effective containment does not occur, which in turn causes an increase in social inequality and decline in levels of social capital and self-organisation.7 Counterbalances against such effects are achieved through the formation of a reflexive worldview and citizenship position, but this process is disproportionately slow. The state does not participate in the formation of such counterbalances. Moreover, the resources of the private sphere are what became the point of intersection of the interests of the state and the market. Both of these two sectors aim at controlling and using such resources in modern Ukrainian society. 2

Specifying the Problems

We have looked at the historical background of the socio-demographic situation in modern Ukrainian society and have seen how the state, as the main agent in the public sphere in the ussr, was continually trying to influence the processes of reproduction within the population and actively intervening in the affairs of the family, the intimate sphere of individuals. The post-Soviet situation during Culture-2 is different in the sense that the market and the Church have also become active in the public sphere. Their 7 Tsymbal (2012).

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

91

objectives and methods differ from one another, but they also affect marriage– family relations and reproductive intentions. However, what they both share is an emphasis on the values of familism. The success of policies being implemented also varies: the market has more economic instruments of influence while the Church has comparatively higher authority, and the state can, more or less successfully, regulate family relations only in a legislative manner, as its economic incentives and propaganda have little effect. 2.1 State, Market, Familism It can be said that stable reproduction in the population is in the interests of both the market and the state. This is true because the reproduction of the population is important both for the economy of the country (for reasons of national security) and for business (to maintain competition in the labour market and consumer demand). Nowadays, because of the fact that, on one hand, generations who were born mostly in periods of a two-child fertility coefficient constitute the reproductively active population, and on the other hand, the multi-child pre-war generations constitute older age groups with high mortality (15–16 per 1,000 people) and low birth rate (10–11 per 1,000 people), there is overall a negative balance of reproduction in the population. Therefore, in modern Ukrainian society due to the interest from the market and the state, the image of the traditional (patriarchal) family with two children, a housewife–wife, and a father–breadwinner is being transmitted by both old and new mass-media, advertising, and other institutions. We should also note that this idyllic family is as a rule portrayed not in the process of combining work and childcare, which is not itself particularly easy, or in solving other aforementioned problems, but in situations of wealthy consumption. The propaganda of the values of the traditional family is created by drawing on traditional forms of gender socialisation. The cultural tradition of the patriarchal family concerning men is created mainly via the ‘family of orientation’ (mainly the paternal family) and the social environment by interpreting the image of the ‘real man’. Within this image a man has to be successful outside the household in order to provide for his home and family financially. The pressure of familism upon women flows from the same agents of socialisation and takes place in influential institutions such as the school, state, market, and Church. However, the message of familism towards women is different: emphasis is on a woman as being ‘complete’ only when she becomes a wife and mother. Bringing back the traditional values of patriarchal family and gender roles in the public and institutional spheres is perhaps the only issue concerning

92

Males and Sandrovych

which the Churches (Orthodox, Greek, and Roman Catholic), even whilst squabbling among themselves, and the political elites (including both opposition and ruling parties) form a common front. In the midst of such political discourse, women’s attempts at self-realisation almost all become subjects of sexist and misogynistic attacks. Such agents approve only of the roles of housewife, mother, and loving wife. Moral panics such as the ‘extinction of Ukrainians’ are emphasised, and phobias of alternative lifestyles (homosexuality, childless partnerships, and late or single motherhood) are also cultivated. Attempts to develop a justice system for children are treated as a Western threat and an interference in the affairs of the family. At the same time, recent state policies are marked by the governing bodies’ clear intention of controlling the private sphere of human life as well. A return to the even more criminalising way of governing society that was inherent in Stalin’s times has taken place; law-making is focused on the prohibition and criminalisation of non-traditional sexual orientations, abortion, and single mothers (the latter charged with receiving ‘excessive’ government assistance). Strengthening control and prohibitions in the regulation of marriage and family relations demonstrate that instrumental solidarity and so-called forced familism exist as the basis of such state ideology. This, in turn, becomes the external condition for development of population strategies in general, and a serious limitation for those groups that ‘profess’ familism as a cultural choice. Institutional, or ‘system’ re-traditionalisation, in contrast to ways of regulating family in traditional society, has the characteristic features of being highly formalised and externally controlled. In urbanised society, traditional communal neighbourhood social control remains valid only in villages and small towns, the proportion of which continues to decline across the whole country. Regulation by tradition was difficult to observe from outside. It was deeply interiorised, seemed obvious, and perhaps it was the sole possibility for individuals involved, and therefore it would manifest its disciplinary effect only in exceptional cases. Perhaps because of this fact it might seem to us that, in the past, populations were generally more law-abiding and moral. Indeed, when the larger part of the population was living in complex multigenerational families, their common features and interdependence were obvious. Moreover, in cases where the majority of individuals in one village were close relatives, the whole community had a mutual affinity and thus powerful instrumental solidarity. This manifested itself in mutual protection and in attitudes towards others (anyone who came from outside). There was no need to prove this interdependency in a formal way in traditional society, although some rituals of the life-cycle did have the function of consolidating the ‘big family’ (weddings, funerals, etc.).

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

93

Change in lifestyle from traditional to modern – here modern means urbanised and industrialised – did not allow big families to continue living together and they inevitably split into nuclear ones (in 1979–2001, more than 80 per cent of all households were nuclear families).8 The Soviet Union’s planned economy also contributed to the dispersion of families. Within such an economy, it was natural to send experts to enterprises with vacancies available, regardless of their previous place of residence. In this way, the solidarity of the extended family became more and more symbolic. Gifts for the holidays, money transfers, visits to family celebrations, and other things one can feel, measure, and compare became symbols. Therefore, a special passion for these external expressions of affinity may be observed among communities where there is considerable dispersion of members and yet where traditional family values are still practised. It should be noted that such ‘article-ised affinity trends’ stimulate consumption, which is picked up and further promoted by marketing strategies. Nowadays in Ukraine, it is common to use the bride’s dress, which is the main symbol of the wedding, as a means of ‘showing off’, this process having even attained its own ritual and organisational forms. Other things that can be similarly utilised include the scale and scope of the wedding, the prestige of the institution of civil registration, the church where the wedding takes place, the number of invited guests and relatives, and the amount of money spent. Moreover, the rejection of such ritual expenditures generates disapproval or misunderstanding, and such a couple is likely to be viewed as curmudgeonly. However, the market is also interested in tension that would stimulate both consumer demand and competition for working places at the same time. Therefore, for its part, via mass-media images and advertising, the market stimulates not simply consumption, but consumption at the level of ever higher standards of living. Sustaining such status consumption is possible only when one has a high income. However, both in Soviet times and under the conditions of the globalised market, the share of wages in production costs has been lowered and the fact that employees have dependents is not taken into consideration. Low wages trigger a mass exodus of the adult population from the labour market. Therefore, in most Ukrainian families both men and women work; for instance, over 70 per cent of working-age women are working, despite the fact that at this age many women continue to study and/or have young children. 8 Osaulenko (2004a, 250).

94

Males and Sandrovych

The result of such a salary policy is that even two salaries barely cover the expenses of a family with one or two dependents. This, on one hand, has a downward influence on the number of children, and, on the other hand, it is another factor for the reduction in the number of one-parent families, of which 94 per cent are female-parent or female-headed households.9 Another consequence is the fact that mothers, when there is even the smallest chance for material gain, are forced to enter the labour market. However, given the limited social responsibilities of the state and business, and the gender asymmetry of family responsibilities in the Ukrainian labour market, women are seen as ‘bad’ workers. As a rule therefore, women either have to make a ‘vow of childlessness’, or accept worse conditions and lower wages. As a result, in statistical data the salary gap between men and women was 33 per cent in 1995 and 22 per cent in 2010; recent surveys show an even bigger gap – 28 per cent in 2008 with ranges from 49.2 per cent to 12.4 per cent for different professional groups. There is a vicious cycle of poverty for many female-headed households (single mothers and divorced women with children) in Ukraine. Despite the deterrent influence of institutions (i.e., the re-traditionalisation of the state and Church and the commodification of the market), the emancipating effect of modernisation has also become evident. Therefore, we can say that the influence of urbanised and Westernised individualisation, with a greater focus on personal needs and emotional well-being, has grown over the last century and can be seen throughout almost the entire population. The dynamics of the divorce rate can be considered an indirect indicator of this; rising from 0.3‰ in 1950 to 4.3‰ in 1992, and remaining steady since then in the range of 3.5‰–4‰ (see Figure 3.1). This can be explained by the fact that while the high level of marriage (95–100 per cent) was due to the traditional attitude of highly valuing the family and the mandatory registration of relationships, the realities of living together are measured in terms of psycho-emotional well-being. In general, the orientations of most social groups have been changing, though quite slowly, not as an independent choice, but as a derivative consequence of family relations and strategies adjusting to fit to the institutional change in living conditions. The data demonstrate a considerably higher index of trust (4.5–4.6) towards the family circle, a much lower level of trust towards friends, neighbours, 9 unece Statistical Database Tab: ‘One parent families and children by Sex of Parent, Measure­ ment, Country and Year’; http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/dialog/varval.asp?ma=07_GEFHOne ParFam_r&path=../database/STAT/30-GE/02-Families_households/&lang=1&ti=One+parent +families+and+children+by+sex+of+parent.

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

14.00

marriage rate

95

divorce rate

12.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 0.00

1950 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1985 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010*

2.00

Figure 3.1  Marriage rate and divorce rate (Ukraine, per 1,000 people) * The official statistical data for 2010 and onwards does not include divorces through the courts (i.e., a significant number of divorces).10 Source: Created by the author based on data from Vertikov (1972) and the State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine11

counterparts, the Church and army (3.1–3.4), and the index of trust towards most social institutions does not exceed 2.0–2.5, on a five-point scale.12 Thus, privacy, first of all in the family, retains its role as the main shelter for human beings from the troubles of the ‘big wide world’ of political, economic, and social upheavals. Other social circles and reference groups mentioned including fellow countrymen, neighbours, colleagues, and the clergy have roughly medium levels of trust (concentrated around 3). However the actors in the legal, political, and economic life of the state have almost no credibility among the public, except during that euphoric surge immediately after the Orange Revolution, which occurred during presidential elections in autumn of 2004. It was a phenomenon of people, primarily from the middle class, expressing their opinion and position in the form of protests against massive fraud and multiple election violations. When the opposition candidate, Victor 10

There are two types of divorce in Ukraine. If the couple have no children and/or no disputed claims, then they can dissolve their marriage through the department of civil registration of marriage. In all other situations, they have to do so through the courts. The official statistical data from 2010 only includes divorces through the department of civil registration of marriage, thus this data cannot be compared with that available for the years before 2010. 11 http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/. 12 Vorona and Shulga (2013, 486).

96

Males and Sandrovych

Yuschenko, won the second presidential election, it was quite natural that the state institutions got widespread support from the mass of the population. However, a huge gap between the expectations of people and the ability of the newly elected president and his team to conduct effective reforms in all economic, political, and legislative spheres led to the fact that the level of trust declined again several years after the Orange Revolution. The mass media, in accordance with their name, occupy an intermediate position, as if linking the two groups: family members, neighbours and others to political and economic institutions. This illustrates the fact that in today’s Ukraine the prevalence of familism is largely due to the social living conditions of people, who in an atmosphere of distrust in institutions and citizens rely mainly on themselves and relatives, and in so doing, are becoming independent of the ‘system’. 3

Family Change

Now, it is necessary to take a closer look at the related demographic processes, because actually it is these processes that determine the configuration of family relationships and the fate of individuals. These processes have their own psychosocial logic, but they inevitably change in tandem with the institutional (social) conditions of life and, for different groups, are caused by the values inherent in different worldviews. 3.1 Fertility At the beginning of the twentieth century, during the first stage of demographic transition, it was not unusual for a woman to give birth to eighteen children, one birth every year of her fertile period (however, as child mortality was quite high, not all children survived to become adults). Better levels of medical service could have facilitated a demographic explosion, if the ussr had not caused famine within the territory of Ukraine, or had not become an active participant in the Second World War, or had not conducted mass deportations and repression of its population. In the meantime, starting in the second half of the twentieth century, the fertility rate began to approach two births and settled at that level. However, from the end of the 1980s we observe a rapid decline and at the end of the century the fertility rate was close to one birth per woman (1.11 in 2000). In the former Soviet Union, the mass mobilisation of citizens for production (including women and men of wealthy classes, who were previously largely uninvolved) became one of the main factors in this abrupt demographic transition. Urbanisation accelerated: the ratio of urban to rural population more

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

97

than doubled during the first decade of the ussr.13 Both of these processes were primarily caused by the forced industrialisation that took place under the totalitarian regime. What in fact happened to the life practices of Ukrainians, who became involved in these rapid processes of industrialisation and urbanisation? During the twentieth century, reproductive behaviour, which in traditional society had become separated from matrimonial and sexual activities (though only for a particular sex and status: non-poor men), became separated from such activities even more. This process took place during the demographic transition because of a decrease in the number of births. However, this was not due to any increase in the use of contraceptives, but rather through increasing numbers of abortions for women: in 1980 two-thirds of pregnancies were terminated by abortion. This has now fallen to one-quarter (the same level of abortions, only with a slower dynamic of reduction, is common for the Russian Federation). At the same time, in other European countries, abortion as a means of birth control was practised significantly less frequently. As we mentioned above, except for small bursts of non-familistic ideological campaigning (Culture-1), Soviet policy supported the values of family and of having many children, but real socio-economic encouragement was only implemented very gradually and, until the late 1980s, it was often impractical and lacking in efficiency. The demographic transition in the ussr was realised in a relatively short time and was accompanied not by changes in the system of value-motivated regulation of marriage and family behaviour, but rather by a sharp change in the ‘system’, that is the institutional circumstances of its implementation. Thus, in rural areas it meant employment of all able-bodied members of the family and meagre wages for work which had been unpaid until mid-century. In the cities, the larger part of the population faced a number of problems; a lack of living space, and separation from relatives in older generations. These older relatives had previously been on hand to help with housework and with looking after children who were also often at home due to the shortage of places in public kindergartens. Taking into consideration the fact that there was no adequate contraceptive education at this time and that reproductive responsibility was ‘woman-oriented’, it can be stated that the effects of the demographic transition were primarily felt by women. These changes caused a good deal of frustration and feelings of ‘failure’ as women were pulled between traditional attitudes to marriage and family and life circumstances that did not correlate with them. The above section summarises the main difference in the conditions of the demographic transition within Soviet Ukrainian society and other European 13

That is, the proportion of the urban population increased from 20% in 1922 to 49% in 1962.

98

Males and Sandrovych

Soviet republics compared to Western European countries. Indeed, in the middle of the twentieth century, Ukraine had a lower fertility rate (2.24) and thus was closer to other countries in the socialist camp (e.g., the Czech Republic and Bulgaria), while Western Europe at that time still had a significantly higher fertility rate of 3.4 children over a woman’s lifetime (as can be seen in Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Portugal; see Table 3.1). Table 3.1

Fertility rate

Estonia Hungary Czech Republic Sweden Ukraine Greece Luxembourg Slovenia Switzerland Germany Italy Denmark Belgium Austria United Kingdom Finland Norway France Spain Georgia Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Netherlands Moldova Ireland Iceland Armenia

1960

1977

1988

1993

2007

2008

2009

2010

1.96 2.02 2.08 2.17 2.24 2.28 2.28 2.32 2.34 2.37 2.41 2.57 2.58 2.69 2.69 2.71 2.85 2.85 2.86 2.96 2.98 3.01 3.04 3.12 3.33 3.76 4.29 4.55

2.08 2.15 2.34 1.64 1.94 2.27 1.45 2.19 1.52 1.4 1.98 1.66 1.71 1.64 1.69 1.69 1.76 1.94 2.65 2.42 2.23 2.45 2.49 1.58 2.46 3.27 2.32 2.56

2.26 1.79 1.94 1.975 2.02 1.5 1.51 1.63 1.57 1.46 1.32 1.56 1.56 1.43 1.83 1.7 1.84 1.81 1.42 2.243 2.13 1.53 2.13 1.55 2.578 2.17 2.2 2.566

1.45 1.69 1.67 2 1.6 1.34 1.69 1.33 1.51 1.28 1.25 1.75 1.61 1.48 1.82 1.81 1.86 1.73 1.27 2.013 1.85 1.53 1.87 1.57 2.079 1.93 2.22 2.295

1.63 1.32 1.44 1.88 1.35 1.41 1.61 1.38 1.46 1.37 1.37 1.84 1.82 1.38 1.9 1.83 1.9 1.98 1.4 1.57 1.31 1.33 1.25 1.72 1.49 2.01 2.09 1.73

1.65 1.35 1.5 1.91 1.39 1.51 1.61 1.53 1.48 1.38 1.42 1.89 1.86 1.41 1.96 1.85 1.96 2.01 1.46 1.568 1.39 1.37 1.32 1.77 1.486 2.1 2.15 1.734

1.62 1.32 1.49 1.94 1.46 1.52 1.59 1.53 1.5 1.36 1.41 1.84 1.84 1.39 1.94 1.86 1.98 2 1.4 1.563 1.4 1.32 1.41 1.79 1.482 2.07 2.23 1.735

1.63 1.25 1.49 1.98 1.445 1.44 1.63 1.57 1.5 1.39 1.4 1.87 1.84 1.44 1.94 1.87 1.95 2 1.39 1.555 1.38 1.32 1.4 1.79 1.475 2.07 2.2 1.736

Source: http://databank.worldbank.org

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

99

Although, as has already been mentioned, in its final years the Soviet welfare system improved significantly, fertility, while in some small degree reacting to these changes, still fluctuated around the level of two children over a woman’s lifetime. Reproductive behaviour did not again reach previous levels, because by that time social and cultural norms had changed from ‘having many children’ to ‘having few children’ (i.e., one to three). After changes in real-life circumstances which affected almost the whole population, the situation of having fewer children inevitably became legitimised/normalised, and came to be broadcast by cultural tradition as acceptable. There are other factors that are interrelated with those aforementioned and which also contributed to the establishment of the norm of low numbers of children among the Ukrainian population. The first is the impact of lifestyle in big cities, where social control is realised not by neighbourhood community, but by orientation toward reference groups. Also, there is the still unresolved issue of housing; urban industrialisation encouraged mass migration of labour from villages and towns, and those people who had the highest reproductive values had to restrain reproductive activity due to the small living-space provided in their temporary accommodation. The opportunity for women to enter a profession, which they gained at the beginning of the century but which was realised on a large scale only after the Second World War, also played a big role. It was not just the usual heavy and unskilled work in social production, but also the ability to have a profession, relevant education, and prospects of professional growth which made women independent of the will, position, and wealth of parent families and the father of their children. This led to an overall increase in women’s level of education, and consequently a steady rise in the median age of women when giving birth to their first child (from 22 in 1980 to 26 in 2008). Before women became mothers, they had the chance to start a business and even get some work experience. Educational emancipation in Culture-1 has also, to some extent, influenced peasant youth in general, especially girls. This can be seen in the fact that from this time, secondary–vocational and higher education also became important factors driving migration to cities. Actually, until the 1960s, peasants had no internal passports for travel within the state and lived in a state of de facto serfdom. An understanding of education as a source of social mobility is projected towards future generations, socialisation becomes drawn out in time, and children can no longer be merely viewed as cheap labour, because somebody has to take care of them until graduation. Thus, as mentioned above, during the final years of the ussr, the fertility rate steadily decreased and almost reached as low as one birth in the late 1990s

100

Males and Sandrovych

to the early 2000s; it might therefore seem that changes in reproductive activity would continue by inertia, even though living conditions, compared to the first half of the twentieth century, are much better. However, this does not mean that in Culture-2 childlessness was normalised. Having children remains normative (even mandatory for women), its power of normativity is even higher than that of the normativity of marriage, which can be understood from the increase in non-married reproduction (from 11.2 per cent in 1990 to 21.9 per cent in 2010). Also, the fact that in rural areas, which are generally characterised by a more traditional and instrumental familism, the level of births out of wedlock is not lower and is indeed sometimes even higher, supports this assumption. However, the realities of demographic behaviour do not actually mean that single mothers are being legitimised in society; data from evs (European Values Study) surveys (four rounds) show that Ukrainians almost unanimously (97.4 per cent) believe a child needs both parents to be happy. In traditional Ukrainian society at the beginning of the twentieth century, having many children was normative, family planning and contraceptive practices were almost completely absent, and reproductive behaviour depended rather on medical–biological conditions. It did not therefore react so strongly to socio-economic changes. At the same time, mass reduction in the fertility coefficient in the second half of the twentieth century to one or two children during a woman’s lifetime led to a situation in which demographic indicators (fertility rate, natural increase of population) became very sensitive to how families plan the timing of their reproductive intentions. To summarise: in the last decade, fertility fluctuation is associated with a synchronous response of many families and women to the overall socio-economic situation and, as a result, with the decision to postpone or to realise their reproductive intentions. Thus, in years of economic stability and growing prosperity we can observe small bursts in the fertility rate. For example, increasing social allowances for children and the accompanying rise in political optimism after 2004 resulted in an increased birth rate. When crisis comes, spending on social policy is substantially curtailed as a result of liberalising reforms, or when life in a country becomes unstable or even dangerous, the population reacts by postponing the decision to have children. The latter situation can be observed in the rapid decrease of both absolute indicators of fertility and of the coefficient of fertility during the 1990s (to 1.1 and 1 in cities, lasting for six consecutive years), despite the fact that the preferred number of children seemed to demonstrate the intention to have two children (among most citizens). A slight slowdown in reproductive activity in the two years after the crisis of 2008 can be attributed to the same type of reactions.

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

101

As has already been mentioned, the value attached to having children has not faded away, and it has been accentuated by the shift from quantitative criteria (large number or small number of children) to criteria of presence (have or do not have children). The ideal number of children has moved from a medium to small number:14 in 1969 the average ideal number of children for women of childbearing age was 2.63, in 2007 it was 2.02, and it was 1.99 for the entire population. The ideal, desired, and planned numbers of children15 decreased from village to city and from men to women. People with higher levels of education as well as residents of large cities demonstrated shifts of a socio-cultural character in the second half of the twentieth century; especially so for individuals combining these two attributes. These groups underwent the demographic transition and individualisation earlier and in a more powerful way than others, becoming a model for other groups in society. Thus, the urban and highly educated population started to broadcast a new norm of having an overwhelmingly low number of children despite the fact that their socio-economic conditions of life were relatively better than those of other population groups (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3A/3.3B). In urban areas, the tendency of less-educated women to have more children stands out as atypical, while groups with secondary and higher education exhibit similar trends. In the villages, on the contrary, atypical women are those with higher education, who generally and consistently exhibit unusual behaviours (despite the fact that the overall trend towards a low number of children is also obvious, though somewhat weaker). 3.2 Marriage In urban areas, both the average age at marriage and the divorce rate are considerably higher (see Figure 3.4). Unfortunately, it is difficult to locate a version of these figures which indicates the educational background of subjects, but it is probable that educational level and urban lifestyle play an important role here as well. This assumption can be confirmed by comparing the mean and median age of first marriage (see Table 3.2).16 An increase in the age of marriage usually corresponds to modernising influences and common features of demographic transition. We can see this across the country in general. It acts as evidence for the increasing importance of 14 15 16

Libanova (2008, 118–150). Ibid. (122). Tymoshenko (2009, 81–82).

102

Males and Sandrovych Ukraine

Urban

Rural

2.55 2.35 2.15 1.95 1.75 1.55 1.35 1.15

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

0.75

1989

0.95

Figure 3.2 Fertility rate of urban and rural groups in Ukraine

Source: State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine17

3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

School-tertiary

School-secondary (10 years)

School-primary

Without any education

Figure 3.3a

50-54

55-59

60-64

School-secondary (8 years)

Fertility rate of different educational groups (urban settlements) Source: Ukraine, Census 200118

17 http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/Mult/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=000_0304&ti=0304.%20 Total%20fertility%20rate%20%280,1%29&path=../Database/Population/03/01/&lang=2 &multilang=en. 18 Osaulenko (2004b, 206).

103

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0

25-29

30-34 School-tertiary School-primary

Figure 3.3b

35-39

40-44

45-49

School-secondary (10 years) Without any education

50-54

55-59

60-64

School-secondary (8 years)

Fertility rate of different educational groups (rural settlements) Source: Ukraine, Census 200119

achieving a certain status and becoming a professional person as compared with marriage. However, the traditional trend, viewing the man’s gender role in a family as a breadwinner, can be observed in a higher average and median age of getting married for men compared with women in all types of settlements. Looking at the number of children in the family, the demographic transition in Ukraine long ago became a reality, but the model of marriage only recently and gradually began to change from traditional, early, and mandatory, to its more modern forms and their variations. The average age of first marriage for all settlement and gender groups is higher than the median, which means that there still exists a dominant group of young people who are younger than the aforementioned middle age (see Table 3.2); this demonstrates a mass tendency towards early marriage. Also, a significant, but much smaller group of those whose age exceeds the average arithmetical age exists. The slower and later transition to modern models of marriage is largely due to greater independence of decision-making (with regard to creating a family and getting married) from, firstly, policies undertaken by the institutions of the state and market and, secondly, the economic conditions of everyday life. Instead these decisions depend more on the cultural traditions and people who surround an individual. Moreover, cohabitation and getting married tend, as a rule, to increase the resources of the intimate sphere and the abilities of individuals to resist negative external circumstances. 19 Ibid.

104

Males and Sandrovych

12 10 8 6 4 2 0

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

married-urban

divorced-urban

married-rural

divorced-rural

Figure 3.4 Marriage and divorce rates of urban and rural groups in Ukraine Source: State committee of statistics of Ukraine20

Table 3.2 The mean and median age of persons who were married for the first time in Ukraine, 2008 (registered marriages)

Ukraine Females Males Urban settlements Females Males Rural settlements Females Males

Mean

Median

23.7 26.3

22.9 25.0

24.0 26.5

23.2 25.3

22.6 25.7

21.8 24.2

Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine21

20 http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/Mult/Database/Population/databasetree_en.asp. 21 Tymoshenko (2009, 81–82).

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

105

It is therefore little wonder that nowadays in Ukraine women tend in general to get married earlier (at the mean age of 23.7) and in a more ‘unanimous’ way (the difference between median and mean age is less than one year), this trend being most clearly evident for the western regions; for example, twentyone years is the median age for the western regions, which means that half of all marriages take place even before people graduate from higher or special education institutions. However, even in those regions we can observe stages of transition to marriage at a slightly older age, illustrated by the gap between the age of marrying in village and town, and also a significantly greater gap between median and mean ages for men in rural areas (indicating that there is a surge in marriages for at least half of the cohort of twenty-year olds, though the rest of the men demonstrate a different strategy and show a tendency to enter marriages after they are thirty). We can see that shifts concerning both values and behaviour in Ukraine take place in two different directions. The first is characterised by familism of an instrumental type, with demographic transition being a response to external conditions of life and values – and their derivation as an after-the-fact justification. This is typical for many population groups, so the average figure for Ukrainian society reflects these features well. However there also is a second, less widespread, direction involving beliefs and lifestyles, which leads more to emotional familism and the demographic behaviours caused by it. It can be observed, as previously demonstrated, in highly educated residents of big cities. Obviously, even in these groups commitment to the values of individualism or tolerating otherness varies, and the relatively small numbers belonging to such groups do not make it possible to trace their presence at the level of international comparison in mass surveys. If we focus on the Portrait Values Questionnaire,22 then, except for a few judgements, the ‘portrait of values’ of more educated groups is closer to that of the typical European. However, highly educated respondents in Ukraine are significantly different in their views by comparison with highly educated groups in eu countries.23 We can learn about marriage strategies from the survey24 already quoted, from the same question about the reasons for delaying marriage. Among the respondents, the proportion of men who chose ‘do not have appropriate housing’ or ‘do not have adequate income’ is significantly higher (14 per cent of 22 23 24

Schwartz (1992); European Social Survey (ess) http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ docs/methodology/core_ess_questionnaire/ESS_core_questionnaire_human_values.pdf. Magun and Rudnev (2007, 260–265). Libanova (2008, 95).

106

Males and Sandrovych

men, 12 per cent of women; in the latter case, 18.5 per cent and 15.4 per cent respectively). However, this explanation for delayed marriages among respondents is less common than the option that they are ‘not ready for marriage’, which was chosen more often and mainly by men (54.9 per cent for men and only 38.9 per cent for women). Such answers make it clear once again that the transmission of patriarchal cultural traditions operates through control of the thoughts and actions of women, namely through disproportionately exaggerating the value of family and marriage in the lives of women, while men are less engaged in transmitting the values of marriage and family. The lifestyles of many men provide for afamilism (numerous professions, serving in the military, working for the Church, the content of youth subcultures, etc.), and the traditional–patriarchal or the new-fashioned macho culture of masculinity accentuate sexuality but do not include the features of parenthood, being full of anti-familistic content. Judging from the characteristics of the gender socialisation of men, they come to know the value of family and fatherhood quite late, and not due to, but rather in spite of, external influences. To sum up, we can state that a woman ‘is made’ a mother by society from the first moment of her birth, even when she is still a child, but a man becomes a father after his child is born. Public sentiment also supports the superiority of the importance of family over personal interests, and lays the responsibility for maintaining and transmitting the tradition of marriage on women. This rhetoric and the pressure it causes are used during Culture-2, but are taken from discussions about Culture-1, when demographers start discussions about ‘extinction’ of the population after gender studies appear. Such public sentiment about family is produced by interpreting celibacy as abnormal, as being the evidence of disability in a woman, and by blaming mainly women for divorces or even the ‘failure to prevent’ the death of a partner. However, for those Ukrainian women who are extremely motivated to marry, we can see that the ‘marriage circle’ is much smaller than for men, and the disparity between them only becomes bigger with age. This is due in particular to the patriarchal family model, where a man should be older/senior in terms both of age and of status. This means that the marriage circle of men extends to practically all younger age groups almost without restriction, yet for women it only extends to peers and older age categories of men, where the percentage of unmarried people is much lower. The overall demographic situation in the country also affects the disproportionality of the marriage circles of men and women. For instance, the sex–age pyramid in Ukraine shows an early disparity of population by gender; the ages of the beginning and end of the period of sexual balance in 1989 were nineteen and thirty-two years respectively, and in 2001 they were twenty-nine and

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

107

thirty-five. The dynamic is positive, but it is still quite far from the norm of fifty years. Marriages with foreigners can be considered another dimension of sociostratificational differentiation in demographic behaviour and in evaluating familism. In most cases it means the export of wives, who are advertised in the eu and other parts of the world as beautiful, healthy, thrifty, and meek, that is, within traditional gender perceptions about the role of the wife. The demand for Ukrainian women is explained by the emancipation of many young European women, who do not consent to traditional family roles. However, if highly educated Ukrainian women marrying foreigners is far from uncommon, then is it the traditionalist nature of Ukrainian men that hinders the patriotic marriage choice? Arguably what such women ‘find’ in foreigners is not status, which many of them already have, but rather a higher level of psycho-emotional comfort, built on closer views of the world, and family.25 I would like to add here a few words about the value of marriage in its institutional forms. First, we should emphasise the continuing actuality of civil marriage as not just the only legal, but also for the population, the only legitimate procedure for formalising family relationships. In marriage, institutional components are combined with features of social phenomena. The first component provides for the legal regulation of relations and protection of the rights of partners and children. The second – since the state monopolised the procedure of marriage until recently – concentrated in itself the value of a period of creating a family under the conditions of a traditionalistic combination of family and marital behaviour, and also concentrated around itself the ‘rites of passage’ from living the life of a young boy or girl to adult, married life. In the ussr, both of these components were characteristics of civil marriage. Concerning the symbolic–ritual component, we should note that with the fall of the Soviet Union and the accompanying abolition of both religious persecution and the prohibition of marriage in church, the Church, as an institution, has renewed its authority in this area as well, though has not regained its previous legal authority. Thus nowadays weddings are combined with civil marriages in the process of legitimising a family: civil marriage provides for legal legitimation of the married couple, and the wedding in church provides for legitimation on the part of the family and other carriers of tradition, though it does not carry any significance in legal sense. At the same time, weddings successfully compete with civil marriage in the ritual part of this process. In 25

Parfan (2012).

108

Males and Sandrovych

this way, they both facilitate transmission of the value of getting married. Moreover, during the wedding service, and as a general policy of the Church, efforts are made to promote the values of traditional family and marriage, compulsory registration of partnership relations in the form of marriage, and also to promote the practice of marrying only once, which by implication condemns and complicates divorce. The state is interested in both the compulsory registration of marriage by public bodies (civil marriage) and in the continuance of marriage. It is through marriage that control over the reproduction of the population, over citizens (through family groups), as well as control and use of the private sector is carried out. The fact that civil marriage provided for certain rights for women was rather the method, and not the goal. As a result, women willingly forgo any indirect consequences such as losing the various rights and preferential treatment they receive from the state for registering their marriages and giving birth to children, and the state is reluctant to extend these to other forms of a relationship (de facto marriage, homosexual partnership, and other forms of cohabitation). Discussions concerning marriage and family issues ceased at the end of 1990s along with institutionalisation of the vertical power of Culture-2. Therefore, a revival of particular forms of marriage (e.g., wedding as a Church marriage) that imply fewer rights for children and women are widely supported by national–conservative politicians. Thus, under the influence of traditions of marriage and institutional efforts to maintain them, nowadays in Ukraine marriage has the status of a widely held norm. It is realised during middle age (among the population aged over thirty-five years, only 3.5 per cent have never married). At the same time, civil marriage (sanctioned by government) has gradually lost its monopoly and has to compete with other styles of family life. 3.3 Divorce Divorces are more sensitive with regard to discourse about marriage and family. During Culture-2, condemning divorces and mechanisms of keeping the marriage by any price were active. Among such practices, were condemnation, discussion about the situation in labour collectives, giving one month to those seeking divorce for further consideration, awarding custody of children to women only, or transferring the children to shelters. In contrast, simplification of the procedures of divorce, development of the forms of making the spouses more independent (women’s access to the labour market, financial assistance for those having children, development of the sphere of services) during Culture-1 strengthened the traditional value of the marriage.

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

109

Divorces desacralise marriage, which leads to the instrumentalisation of marriage behaviour. It is fully acceptable for civil marriage, because the aim of the latter is only the legal regulation of relations and it takes place in part in order to fulfil the needs of government administration. However, the fact that divorce takes place is itself contradictory to the foundations of marriage according to the Church, as well as the neo-traditionalism of the state and Right-conservative ideology in Culture-2. Thus, with their support over the last two decades, images are being spread throughout society of a catastrophic growth in the divorce rate, the widespread destruction of families under the influence of individualism, the priority of individual freedoms and the lack of moral authority, all the result of ‘bad’, ‘defiling’ trends from the West. This leads to ‘moral panic’, again disseminated among the population by the mass media. The rise in divorce rate in the rhetoric of Culture-2 is connected only with liberalisation of marriage and family relations during Culture-1, and not with the individualisation trends of the twentieth century. Yet, statistical data show something else; the increase in the divorce rate in Ukraine was the biggest in the second part of the twentieth century, that is, in the Soviet period. It stood at 0.3 divorces per 1,000 people in 1950, and by 1992 had increased to 4.3. Since 1993, in post-Soviet Ukraine, the divorce rate has become more stable, ranging between 3.6 and 4 cases per 1,000 people (see Figure 3.1). Meanwhile, the decision to get divorced, rather than to save a failed marriage at any price, serves as evidence for greater individualisation of life. Furthermore the significant proportion of second marriages (one in five) and the increase in age for first marriage (from 22.7 to 24.3 for women and from 24.7 to 27 for men over the last thirty years) has reduced the value of the traditional interpretation of marriage. As was stated above, the independence (detachment) of sexual, nuptial, as well as family and reproductive behaviour is not a new tendency for Ukrainian society. However, in a traditional society, it was for a long time something exceptional, and was actively marginalised and publicly condemned. In the Soviet period, firstly in the city, such independence became more and more widespread, but still it did not gain public approval. It was a sort of illegitimate practice.26 Today, it is becoming more and more widespread and public. It receives discursive expression and, ultimately, for some groups it has become the norm:

26

Temkina (2008).

110

Males and Sandrovych

According to a study conducted in 2006 by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (kiis), of two thousand Ukrainian respondents, 45% expressed their positive attitude to sexual contacts outside family and marriage. Moreover this figure is now considerably higher than, for example, 15 years ago at the dawn of the independence of Ukraine.27 3.4 Pluralisation of Lifestyles The process of the pluralisation of lifestyles has become another notable component of the demographic transition. As demonstrated above, statistics show the prevalence of nuclear families among households. In general, different types of extended families count for about 20 per cent of households. However, their share in the last decade has started to rise, stimulated by the aforementioned unsolved housing issue and an increased reliance on help from members of the older generation. A rise in the number of single mothers, compared with Soviet times, has also been observed.28 Unfortunately, the evaluation of this pluralisation of lifestyles, a subject complex enough in itself, is further complicated by deficiencies in the statistical data available. For example, data on homosexual partnerships simply do not exist. It is difficult to distinguish, among other data, phenomena associated with the natural life-cycle of the family and those associated with some sort of deliberate strategy: for example, to distinguish among all couples between those who are child-free because they are part of a family with grown-up children, and recently married couples who do not yet have children. The same applies to single people as well: half of such households consist of single elderly people (mostly widowed people, among whom, in turn, women constitute the bigger part), an eighth are college students, and so on, which makes it difficult to distinguish solitude as a strategy. In general, the so-called de facto marriage or, more broadly, cohabitation, has become the most common alternative to traditional ideas of marriage and family. De facto marriage in Ukrainian discourse (Culture-2) is also exaggerated and perceived as something threatening, as another threat to family and the survival of the Ukrainian people. Here again though, the data show that the phenomenon is actually much less common than its prevalence in the discourse would seem to suggest. For instance, during the 2000s in Ukraine we can see a 10 per cent share of unregistered cohabitation,29 and according to

27 28 29

Tymoschuk (2007). Osaulenko (2004a, 250). Libanova (2008, 11).

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

111

data from ess, 16 per cent of Ukrainian respondents reported having had the experience of cohabitation. Yet even such a relatively low occurrence is enough for this practice to become noticeable and even to start gaining a certain favour. Thus, sociodemographic surveys show that only 25 per cent of people of working age have a negative attitude towards unmarried cohabitation. Younger generations are comparatively more favourable to a lack of legal formalisation of relationships, as are inhabitants of cities (rather than villages), and men (rather than women). The social consequences of the growth of de facto marriages are not just the pluralisation of social relations – further mutual liberation of fertility, and sexual and marital behaviour – but also an increase in the asymmetry of economic, legal, and social responsibility in parenthood between men and women. This happens because a mother’s duties are controlled mainly by tradition, and those of the father only by legislation about marriage. There is also a noticeable primary impact by external factors: namely urbanisation and industrialisation, which have changed the living conditions of most of Ukraine’s population and ultimately caused lifestyle changes promoting an expansion of the understanding of the social norms of coexistence and family. Social status, particularly education, as a characteristic that is present in most statistical and sociological data, is superimposed over the aforementioned general processes and exemplifies such an influence. A higher level of education distinguishes those groups for whom the change in lifestyles was more of a choice than a necessity. 4

Familism and Individualisation in Ukraine: Socio-Cultural Lag?

We will now move on to look in detail at the spread of familistic values in society, under the current socio-economic conditions and the influence of ideologies of re-traditionalism. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, a number of lengthy periods of state policy (Culture-2) that drew on familism proved to be similar to active traditions of a patriarchal type and contributed to maintenance of these ideas later on. One of the techniques of re-traditionalisation of the image of family and familism is through linking private (primarily the feminine sphere) and public (primarily the masculine sphere). Social survey data shows that genderbased discriminatory practices in this respect are spread in quite different ways.

112

Males and Sandrovych agree

disagree

don't know

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1992

1999

2000

2001

2004

2005

2006

Figure 3.5  ‘In politics, it is better to do without women’ (percentage)

Source: National Monitoring Surveys of 1992–2006, Institute of Sociology of the nas of Ukraine30

Thus, for instance, the right to participate in political life is allowed for woman in most cases (see Figure 3.5). However, the situation is quite different when we consider the right of women to engage in paid work. Women’s labour in paid work is not popularly perceived as a way to self-fulfilment, independence, and prosperity for women but rather as a necessity inherited from Soviet times. Therefore, when even the slightest problems arise in the family, or in the labour market, women have, according to popular imagination, had to give up their professional interests and focus on those interests prescribed for women. These are defined by the patriarchy: a woman’s place is in the home, contributing to the survival of their family by working free of charge to provide services for men and other family members. Stereotypes concerning marriage and family are not weakened during short periods of Culture-1. That is why the modern Western division of gender roles in the family (woman=housewife, man=breadwinner) is now very popular among Ukrainians. The dynamics of data from the European Social Survey (ess) illustrate this well. To the question ‘How much do you agree or disagree with the statement: A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid 30

Vorona and Shulga (2006, 454).

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

113

work for the sake of her family?’, Ukrainians agreed the most (in 2004, 2008, and 2010 respectively 71.1 per cent, 74.4 per cent, and 72.3 per cent of respondents agreed). While in other countries the affirmative answer to this question varied significantly during the crisis, in Ukraine it was consistently high, putting it significantly ahead of all other European countries. Only Cyprus and Russia were close, but in different years, and the only country that expressed an even greater commitment towards the ‘return of women into the family’ was Turkey. However, while in Turkey such settings are realised in real life – a relatively small percentage of women there have their own income – and therefore it becomes the ideological confirmation of existing practices, in Europe these views rather illustrate the popular problematisation of the mass participation of women in the public sphere. Here again, we must pay great attention to external circumstances: neither in Soviet times nor nowadays could a family in Ukraine exist comfortably on one salary. Therefore, this desire to ‘return women to the family’, according to Ukrainians, does not relieve them of the duty to earn money for the family, but rather implies and requires the willingness of women to give up professional development, to seek not the best for themselves but to prioritise the convenience of those others connected to the ‘family workplace’ or, simply put, the home. Indeed, data shows that in 2000–2003 women accounted for threequarters of those in part-time employment. This is not just instrumental familism, but, as we assumed for Culture-2, preparation for, and even a necessity, in the move towards an exploitation of private resources, including female labour. The situation revealed by this question suggests the need for women to remember the priority of family responsibilities and the role of housewife over all her other roles. This confirms that, in their readiness to deny women paid employment, citizens are less unanimous than indicated by the answers to the previous question. However a distinct prioritisation of the male breadwinner in the consciousness of Ukrainians is illustrated by answers to a question connected to the one previously discussed: ‘How much do you agree or disagree with the statement: men should have more right to a job than women, when jobs are scarce?’ Here, almost half of all Ukrainians agreed with discrimination against women in the labour market, at any cost, to provide paid work for men: 44.7 per cent, 43.0 per cent, 50.5 per cent in 2004, 2008, and 2010 respectively, and the contrast with the opposite pole is striking (in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden the proportion of people who gave similar responses varied over time from 3 per cent to 9 per cent maximum). Although Hungary was ahead of Ukraine in 2004 and 2010 (58.9 per cent and 53.4 per cent respectively), it is characteristic that

114

Males and Sandrovych

the level of economic activity of women31 in Hungary is on average 10 per cent lower than in Ukraine. These results can be illustrated by numerous quotations and statements from politicians and public figures taken from the mass media: unable to find any other substantive arguments when engaged in public debate, they may start telling their opponents (women) to do what they have to do in the kitchen and to take care of their children, and not participate in politics, business, academic science, or other areas.32 In the everyday and private spheres, especially during celebration of holidays that involve everybody gathering at the table (for example, on 8 March, Day of International Solidarity for Women), it appears that there is a specific ‘women’s’ happiness, determined solely by success in the private sphere. Accordingly, for men the indicator of success lies only in the public sphere, and therefore men’s attention to the private sphere seems to be akin to a deviation from normative masculinity, and in the case of the collapse of a man’s own career or political party, it is a complete failure, because the role of domestic worker and dependent becomes even more humiliating. Although the traditional value system, in which familism of an instrumental type was dominant, remained crucial throughout the twentieth century for Ukrainians, its regional variations are quite distinct. These are obviously more perceptible in rural areas and among first-generation migrants from the countryside, and often increase as one moves through regions from east to west. This is consistent with our theses on the role of urbanisation in the process of demographic transition. It also shows socio-stratification dependence, for instance being more characteristic of a less educated population. Such heterogeneous traditionalism expresses itself in the fact that in the aforementioned groups, the demographic transition itself was less dynamic (see Figures  3.2 and 3.3A/3.3B), and the pluralisation of family relationship styles is expressed less. Thus, given the demographic situation in Ukraine and regions in the last century and over the last decade, it becomes evident that the dynamics of the last century manifest passage of phase 2, and from the middle of the century, of phases 3–4 of the demographic transition. Most socio-demographic characteristics and consequences of this process – transition towards families with a small number of children, increase in the number of divorces, pluralisation of family forms, mutual liberation of sexual, reproductive, family, and marital behaviours, changes in gender roles, etc. –

31 32

Data from: http://databank.worldbank.org/, Gender Statistics. Haydenko (2011); Kis’ and Bureichak (2010); Kis’ (2003).

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

115

were all made possible by lifestyle changes caused by rapid industrialisation, urbanisation, and a totalitarian society. Among the new characteristics of life connected primarily with urbanisation, we should first of all distinguish the nuclearisation of families, the employment of all adults outside the house, the continued socialisation, anonymity, and formalisation of interactions, and finally the faster growth of living standards (the subjectivisation of poverty). However, here we are not talking about unilateralism and strict determination. Moreover, it is also not about the uniformity of process. In mass expression we can distinguish so-called ‘external’/impersonal and ‘internal’/personal stages of transition of demographic behaviour. The first (‘external’) stage, with mass industrialisation and war, was characterised by critically difficult living and working conditions for the majority (barrack-type housing, hunger, exhausting work). Under such circumstances, childbearing was discouraged mainly by external factors, primarily the survival-needs of existing family members. In that case, instrumental familism was imposed on traditional culture. All of those realities, practices, and their conditions constituted the everyday routine of private lives for the vast majority of the population, so, one way or another, they were assigned to individuals. Later, cultural lag as a process of such an assignment can be observed, which explains the continuing demographic transition, but not the return to the previous standards of reproduction, with weaker pressures from external conditions in the second part of the twentieth century. This subjectivisation of the process with the absence of data on the value priorities of society in Soviet times can be traced in family practices, first of all in the large-scale and dynamic nature of demographic transition. Indeed, despite cities having not experienced a critical deterioration in economic conditions for ten years, fertility rates dropped from 1.8 in 1989 to 1 in 1998. Moreover, in rural areas they also dropped from 2.3 in 1989 to 1.4 in 2001. Gradually these conditions became interiorised and formed new values: personal growth, emotional intimacy, and child-centrism. For some, mainly highly educated groups, this new familism became their ideology, for other groups, it was slower, and for some people civilisational conditions of postindustrial and post-Soviet urban society remain as an external coercion. However, let us once again recall that changes in all types of family behaviour take place under the conditions of varying active ideological resistance and of attempts to continue the diffusion of traditional values. Therefore individual and group legitimation somehow has to combine these demographic behaviours and actual living conditions, which have

116

Males and Sandrovych

different vectors, with the active propagandisation of the traditional criteria of their evaluation. Such tension is in particular being resolved by dividing the poles of morality into opposing groups, i.e. ‘our people versus strangers’, where any behaviour of people from the closer circle is a priori considered justified, and strangers become a priori immoral and responsible for all domestic problems. 5

Conclusions: Theorising the Findings

In Ukraine, the second demographic transition took place between the second part of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. It was mainly caused by urbanisation, due to the rapid industrialisation of the Soviet Union in the first half of the twentieth century. Due to that, the socioeconomic conditions of life and the fertility rate changed quite early, but changes in the value–motivational sphere of family relations took place very slowly. Politics and ideologies promoted by institutions of power (nowadays, operating in different spheres and on different scales, they are the state, the market, and the Church) exhibit clear features of instrumental familism. The desire for the renovation of a monopoly of the tradition of the patriarchal family is caused by needs of control and use of the family as a source of resources by these institutions. The long-lasting socio-cultural lag of the processes of demographic transition has also caused a noticeable gap in the practices of different social groups, especially according to place of residence and educational level. Highly educated population groups in large cities are characterised by more harmonious components of demographic behaviour (low fertility rates and greater marriage age) amongst themselves. These are accompanied by their related values (higher tolerance towards different styles of family life, the value systems of ‘openness to the world’ and ‘self-affirmation’). However, people from less urbanised regions are characterised by the predominance of the traditional model of marriage (mass early marriage) and are driven more by external, difficult circumstances towards a decreasing birth rate, whilst maintaining values of ‘self-protection’ and ‘tradition’. Intimacy in Ukrainian society in Soviet and post-Soviet periods was not, with few exceptions, a private matter for citizens. It had to meet the demands of the public sphere. The state did this in quite a straightforward way, through simple bans on making independent decisions regarding living conditions (housing size, location), sexuality (criminalising homosexuality, broad interpretation of immorality), and reproduction (prohibition of abortions, childlessness taxes, child allowance). The Church also quite sharply and

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

117

unequivocally stands for the traditional value of having many children. However, the market, in an indirect way, encourages modern images of the family, such as ‘breadwinner husband and housewife wife’, which means that on one hand, a woman, a person with small children, has worse chances in the labour market, and on the other hand, marketing strategies are aimed at maximising consumption, with women and children being assigned the roles of main consumers, supporting in such a way the reputation of the man. Thus, while some of the sectors of the public sphere (the state and the Church) became the agents of re-traditionalisation, the market, though also being regressive and patriarchal in its intentions, has brought new, modern standards of life (of consumerism, idealistic images of the middle class, and hedonism) into post-Soviet society. Since the modified theory of the second demographic transition looks at the gap between living conditions, value orientations, and demographic behaviour, knowing the tendency of Culture-2 to use the resources of the private sphere to the maximum in order to address issues of state building we can understand why under such circumstances a person, in contrast to the internalised values, would change his or her reproductive intentions. The position of the middle class of North American or Western European models, which could have provided sufficient conditions for the realisation of these reproductive intentions, was characteristic for only a few per cent of the population. These were officials of higher and middle ranks, business executives, party organisation leaders, and officers and higher-rank officials in the military and security forces. It is among these groups that we can talk about the emancipation of women; their ample socio-economic status, higher level of education, better integration into urban life, and focus on career and selffulfilment (also the prioritisation of the same things for their children) caused the transition towards having fewer children as a value, and not a constraint. This led to greater personal and educational influence, a child-centred way of thinking, and attention towards the personal development of children. Therefore, these groups reproduced scenarios of demographic transition similar to those seen in the West. They served as role models for neighbouring social strata and became a source of new norms in times of Culture-1. It is interesting that these groups were formed by the state (state officials), and that they were loyal to the maximum extent. That is why their worldview did not form those emancipatory and feminist ideas that were common in Europe and America. Moreover, during the revolutionary struggle at the beginning of the twentieth century, women’s right to paid work, education, and political participation was enshrined in legislation. It is obvious that forced urbanisation, industrialisation, and thus demographic transition, which can

118

Males and Sandrovych

be compared with ‘compressed modernisation’,33 caused a great social lag, deadaptation, and increased social unrest. The tension of this accumulated socio-cultural lag that increased due to urbanisation and globalisation pressures was partially solved in the discussions of Culture-1, which caused valueregulatory changes. On the other hand, the ‘in-between’ position of Ukraine makes the tendencies inherent for both groups of countries (post-socialist and post-Soviet) clearer. The modified second demographic transition theory thus helps to explain the prevalence of the legitimisation of having one or two children by taking into account economic, political, or even ecological challenges. Thus, the population of Ukraine over the past few decades has lost the value of having many children and has substantially modernised its value orientations, and those modernised values are now actively articulated in the mass consciousness, replacing the old Soviet slogans. This fact is very actively used in state propaganda. References Bourdieu, Pierre and Pierre Lamaison. 1985. ‘De la règle aux stratégies: entretien avec P. Bourdieu’ [From rules to strategies: An interview with Pierre Bourdieu]. Terrain 4: 93–100. http://terrain.revues.org/2875. Chang Kyung-Sup. 2010. South Korea under Compressed Modernity: Familial Political Economy in Transition. London: Routledge. Cubbins, Lisa, Marina Malysheva, Elena Meshterina, Marina Pisklakova, Natalja Rimashevskaja and Dana Vannoy. 1999. Marriages in Russia: Couples during the Economic Transition. Connecticut and London: Praeger. ess (European Social Survey). Online survey database. http://www.europeansocial survey.org/ evs (European Values Study). Online survey database. http://www.european valuesstudy.eu/ Habermas, Jürgen. 1981. ‘Das Verhältnis zwischen System und Lebenswelt im Spätkapitalismus’ [The relationship between system and life-world in late capitalism]. In Theorie der Kommunikativen Handelns [The Theory of Communicative Action], Bd. 2, authored by Jürgen Habermas, 504–522. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

33

Chang (2010). Also see the brief explanation of this term and its related concepts in the Introduction to this volume.

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

119

Haydenko, Victoria. 2011. ‘Chronicle of children’s holidays: Construction of gender stereotypes in Ukrainian preschools and elementary education’. In Mapping Difference: The Many Faces of Women in Contemporary Ukraine, edited by Marian Rubchak, 109–124. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. Hosking, Geoffrey. 2006. Rulers and Victims: The Russians in the Soviet Union. Harvard, ma: Harvard University Press. ——. 2007. ‘Structury doveriya v poslednie desiatiletia Sovetskogo Souza’ [Structures of trust in the last decades of the Soviet Union]. Neprikosnovenniy Zapas [Untouchable Stock] 4 (54). (Хоскинг, Джеффри. «Структуры доверия в последние десятилетия Советского Союза». Неприкосновенный запас 4 [54].) http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2007/54/ho5.html. Kis’, Oksana. 2003. ‘Modeli konstruyuvannya hendernoi identychnosti zhinky v suchasniy Ukraini’ [Models of female gender identity in contemporary Ukraine]. Yi 27. (Кісь, Оксана. «Моделі конструювання гендерної ідентичності жінки в сучасній Україні». Журнал Ї 27.) http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n27texts/kis.htm. Kis’, Oksana and Tetyana Bureichak. 2010. ‘Genderna strashylka yak vyborcha strategiya, abo Yak nedolugi polityky poshyvayut lviv’yan u durni’ [Gender ghost story as election strategy, or how inadequate politicians make fools of Lviv people]. (Кісь, Оксана і Тетяна Бурейчак. «Гендерна страшилка як виборча стратегія, або Як недолугі політики пошивають львів’ян у дурні».) http://politikan.com .ua/2/0/0/22121.htm. Libanova, Ella, ed. 2008. Shlub, simia ta ditorodni orientacii v Ukraini [Marriage, Family and Copulative Orientations in Ukraine]. Kyiv: Institute of Demography of the nas of Ukraine. (Шлюб, сім’я та дітородні орієнтації в Україні. За ред. Лібанової Елли. Київ: Інститут демографії та соціальних досліджень НАН України.) Magun, Vladimir and Maxim Rudnev. 2007. ‘Zhiznennyye tsennosti naseleniya: sravneniye Ukrainy s drugimi yevropeyskimi stranami’ [Life values of the population: Comparison of Ukraine with other European countries]. In Ukrainskoye obshchestvo v yevropeyskom prostranstve [Ukrainian Society in European Space], edited by Yevgeniy Golovakha. Kyiv: Institute of Sociology of the nas of Ukraine. (Магун, Владимир и Максим Руднев. «Жизненные ценности населения: сравнение Украины с другими европейскими странами». В кн. Украинское общество в европейском пространстве. Ред. Головаха Евгений и др. Киев: Институт социологии НАН Украины.) http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/2010/04/23/1213595564/ ESS_Chp8_OK.pdf. Osaulenko, Oleksandr, ed. 2004a. Domogospodarstva Ukrayiny. Domogospodarstva za typamy ta kilkistyu ditei za danymy Vseukrayinskogo perepysu naselennya 2001 roku. [Households of Ukraine: Households According to Their Types and Number of Children Based on the Data of the All-Ukrainian Census of 2001]. Kyiv: State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine. (Домогосподарства України. Домогосподарства

120

Males and Sandrovych

за типами та кількістю дітей за даними Всеукраїнського перепису населення 2001 року. За редакцією Олександра Осауленка. Відповідальні за випуск Н.С. Власенко, Л.М. Стельмах. Київ: Державний комітет статистики України.) ——. 2004b. Zhinky i dity Ukrainy za danymy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennia 2001 roku [Women and Child of Ukraine Based on the Data of the All-Ukrainian Census of 2001]. Kyiv: State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine. (Жінки і діти України за даними Всеукраїнського перепису населення 2001 року. За редакцією Олександра Осауленка. Відповідальні за випуск Н.С. Власенко, Л.М. Стельмах. Київ: Державний комітет статистики України.) Paperny, Vladimir. 2002. Architecture in the Age of Stalin: Culture Two. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Parfan, Nadia. 2012. ‘Kraïna pryrechenykh narechenykh. Pol’ovi notatky zseredyny shlyubnoho biznesu’ [The country of doomed couples: Field notes from the inside of the marriage business]. Politychna krytyka [Political Critique] 3: 102–106. (Парфан, Надія. «Країна приречених наречених. Польові нотатки зсередини шлюбного бізнесу». Політична критика 3: 102–106.) Schwartz, Shalom. 1992. ‘Universals in content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries’. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 25: 1–65. Temkina, Anna. 2008. Seksual’naya zhyzn’ zhenshchin: mezhdu podchineniyem i svobodoy [Sexual Life of Women: Between Subordination and Liberty]. St Petersburg: Publisher of European University in Saint-Petersburg. (Темкина, Анна. Сексуальная жизнь женщин: между подчинением и свободой. СанктПетербург: Европейский университет.) Tsymbal, Kateryna. 2012. Reklama yak instytutsional’nyy chynnyk transformuvannya tsinnostey u suchasnomu ukrains’komu suspil’stvi [Advertising as a Means of Shaping Values in Ukrainian Society]. Avtoreferat dysertatsii na zdobuttya naukovoho stupenya kandydata sotsiolohichnykh nauk [Abstract for the Degree of Candidate of Social Sciences]. Kyiv: Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. (Цимбал, Катерина. Реклама як інституціональний чинник трансформування цінностей у сучасному українському суспільстві. Автореферат дисертації на здобуття наукового ступеня кандидата соціологічних наук. Київ: Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченкa.) Tymoschuk, Oleksandr. 2007. ‘Tsyvilnyi shlub “po-ukrayinsky”, abo Komu bez shtampa v pasporti zhyty dobre?’ [‘Ukrainian-style’ civil marriage, or who lives well without the stamp in the passport?] Dzerkalo tyznya [Mirror of the Week], 12 May, 18. (Тимощук, Олександр. «Цивільний шлюб ‘по-українськи’, або Кому без штампа в паспорті жити добре?». Дзеркало тижня, 12 травня, 18.) http://gazeta.dt.ua/ SOCIETY/tsivilniy_shlyub__po-ukrayinski,_abo_komu_bez_shtampa_v_pasporti _zhiti_dobre.html.

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTIMATE SPHERE IN UKRAINE

121

Tymoshenko, Halyna, ed. 2009. Naselennia Ukrainy, 2008. Demohrafichnyi shchorichnyk [The Population of Ukraine, 2008. Demographic Annual]. Kyiv: State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine. (Населення України, 2008. Демографічний щорічник. Відповідальна за випуск Галина Тимошенко. Київ: Державний комітет статистики України.) Vertikov, Dmytro, ed. 1972. Narodne gospodarstvo Ukrayinskoyi RSR. Yuvileinyi statystychnyi schorichnyk [Economy of Ukrainian SSR: Jubilee Statistical Yearbook]. Kyiv: Statistics. (Народне господарство Української PCP. Ювілейний статистичний щорічник. Відповідальний за випуск Дмитро Вертіков. Київ: Статистика.) Vorona, Valeriy and Mykola Shulga, eds. 2006. Ukrayins’ke suspil’stvo 1992–2006. Social’nyy monitorynh [Ukrainian Society 1992–2006: Social Monitoring]. Kyiv: Institute of Sociology of the nas of Ukraine. (Українське суспільство 1992–2006. Соціальний моніторинг. За ред. Ворони Валерія, Шульги Миколи. Київ: Інститут соціології НАН України.) ——. 2013. Ukrayins’ke suspil’stvo 1992–2013. Social’nyy monitorynh [Ukrainian Society 1992–2013: Social Monitoring]. Kyiv: Institute of Sociology of the nas of Ukraine. (Українське суспільство 1992–2013. Соціальний моніторинг. За ред. Ворони Валерія, Шульги Миколи. Київ: Інститут соціології НАН України.) Voronina, Olga. 1993. ‘Zhenschina i socializm: opyt feministskogo analiza’ [Women and socialism: A feminist analysis]. In Feminism: Vostok. Zapad. Rossia [Feminism: East, West, Russia], edited by Marietta Stepanyants, 205–225. Moscow: Nauka. (Воронина, Ольга. «Женщина и социализм: опыт феминистского анализа». Отв. ред. Мариэтта Степанянц, 205–225. Феминизм: Восток. Запад. Россия. Москва: Наука.) Zubkova, Еlena. 2008. ‘V kruge blizhnem: Chastnaia zhyzn sovetskoho cheloveka’ [In the near circle: The private life of the Soviet person]. Rodina [Motherland] 7, 130–136. Moscow: Editorial Board of the Federal State Budget Organisation “Russian Newspaper”. (Зубкова, Елена. «В круге ближнем: Частная жизнь советского человека». Родина. 7, 130–136. Москва: ФГБУ редакция «Российской газеты».).

CHAPTER 4

Changes in the Area of Family Life in Poland Małgorzata Sikorska Since the start of political, economic, and social transitions in 1989, the area of family life, like other sectors of social life, has undergone profound and accelerated transformation. It should be noted that changes both in political and economic life have been initiated by institutional reforms, which had formally been approved and sent down for implementation from the top of the public administration. The first aspect of transition, that is, political change, covered such areas as the introduction of free elections and democratic forms of government, liberalisation of the media, and the reform of public administration (aimed at, among other things, devolving some tasks and areas of competence from the top level of administration to local government). Institutional change concerning the economy, it should be emphasised, included in the first place the shift from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy, privatisation, and the liberalisation of trade and production. However, in the area of customs and traditions, which certainly includes family life, changes cannot be brought in by way of instruction from public institutions, at least not in democratic and liberal countries, amongst which I include Poland since 1989. Therefore, at least for this reason, the area of family life has gone through inconsistent change, with varied intensity in different social groups. It is difficult to identify one tendency that would describe the direction and the nature of the change. One might say that in the area of family life a ‘struggle’ has taken place between the traditional1 and post-modern 1 Sociologists often use the term ‘traditional family’, but they define it, just as often, in a different way. In this chapter I use the term ‘traditional family’ after Louise B. Silverstein and Carl Auerbach (2005) to describe a model of heterogenic relationship in which the husband acts as a breadwinner and the wife looks after the home and family. In the studies based on surveys in Poland (e.g., cbos – Public Opinion Research Centre reports, frequently quoted in this chapter), ‘traditional family’ is described in the same way, which shows that this definition of family is widely understood and used in society (I elaborate on this form of popular relationship further in this chapter). It should be emphasised that this family model is legitimised and promoted by the Catholic Church in Poland. I describe ‘modern family’ – also after Silverstein and Auerbach – as a model of relationship in which both partners work and earn money for the family and the woman thus assumes the extra responsibility of looking after children and home. (In the cbos report quoted above, this category is named ‘mixed model’). However, the ‘post-modern family’ is considered by both Silverstein and Auerbach and me as a deconstruction of the traditional family, including for example lesbian couples or © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004276833_006

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

123

models of the family and family values. As a result, the present model of family life in Poland may be located on a continuum, the extremities of which are determined by these two models; on one hand, the model of the family promoted through the strength of the Catholic Church in Poland, involving the traditional division of gender roles, that is, a man working to support the family as a breadwinner and a woman forsaking a professional career to care for children; and on the other hand, a model based on equal rights and partnership. The main aim of this chapter is to describe the space between these two models of family life. The contemporary models of family life in Poland are not entirely free of the influence of family patterns commonly practised in the People’s Republic of Poland (prl).2 It should be remembered that the official ideology of the socialist state stressed the equal status of men and women and of women’s labour. Even in typical male jobs such as tractor driver this was much promoted (as advertised by popular posters bearing the slogan, ‘Woman, get on the tractor!’). The 1952 Constitution included the idea that in the People’s Republic of Poland, a woman has equal rights in all walks of life, political, economic, social and cultural, guaranteed by the right to work and earn money equal to that of a man, based on the rule: ‘equal pay for equal work’…, the right to study, the right to be respected and be rewarded, the right to take high-level positions in the public sector. This ideology and – perhaps more, if not most importantly – the difficult economic situation of Polish families made many women look for employment outside the home, and this led to increased rates of women’s employment in the prl. In the mid-1970s, 75 per cent of working women were married (as compared to 16 per cent in 1932, 18 per cent in 1950, and 55 per cent in 1960). Moreover, in the 1970s, 90 per cent of married women had children.3 However, studies on the division of duties between men and women and the time spent on the performance of those duties carried out in family households in the 1970s showed that ‘equality’ remained only a propaganda slogan. It is interesting that today’s problem of combining work and family life is not new to Polish women, nor a question of adopting Western patterns of family life. It should be emphasised that in the prl the ideology of the Catholic

childless couples. In this chapter, I attempt to combine the ‘post-modern family model’ with the idea of partnership and equality between people who are in a relationship. (In the cbos report, a similar type of relationship is called ‘partnership model’.) 2 See Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter. 3 Wieruszewski (1975).

124

SIKORSKA

Church (promoting the traditional family model, very different from that of equal rights) was very strong. This suggests that there was a degree of competition between family-life patterns followed in the prl. On one hand, there was the official ideology promoted by the socialist state, highlighting the equality of men and women and encouraging women’s employment; and on the other hand, there was the Catholic Church propagating the traditional family model. It is a plausible thesis that the variety of family-life patterns practised today copies, to some extent, this dichotomy. In the first section of this chapter, I analyse the process of change in the patterns of family life, looking at changes in behaviour related to reproduction and also studying models of relationships adopted by Poles. I look at and compare the demographic situation in Poland with that in other European countries to highlight its specific traits. In the second section I analyse relations within the family; changes in the distribution of power between married spouses and also in the case of unmarried cohabitants, as well as the transform­ ations in the patterns of motherhood and fatherhood. Since there is a close interrelation between changes in the area mentioned above and the situation of women in the job market, I also describe the way in which the current situation has evolved. In the third section of this chapter I show the importance of the family and of family ties in the life of Polish people and analyse the phenomenon of ‘amoral familism’. 1

A Drop in the Number of Children in Fairly Traditional Families: The Demographic Situation in Poland

In 2010, the total fertility rate (tfr) for Poland was 1.38. This is one of the lowest rates in the eu (lower tfr rates can be found only in Lithuania and Hungary; in Spain the rate is at similar level).4 A justification for the drop in the tfr can be found in the theory of the ‘second demographic transition’ propounded by Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa.5 According to this theory, a drop in the number of newborn babies is related to changes in the area of family life in general (sex life before marriage, higher age of people getting married, more partnership relations, more divorces, increasing popularity of single-mother and single-father partnerships, etc.) and to changes in patterns of reproduction (smaller number of children in the family, higher number of children from extramarital partnerships, higher age 4 Eurostat. 5 Van de Kaa (2002).

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

125

of women giving birth to their first child, higher number of people who decide not to have children at all, etc.).6 Despite the fact that these developments have been taking place in Poland over the course of the last few decades, they have never reached the same level of intensity as in the countries of the so-called ‘old’ Europe. Moreover, the level is not as high as that in many post-Communist countries. It seems that, apart from a particularly low rate of fertility indicating that Poland is experiencing a second demographic transition, which brings the country closer to the model of family life of Western societies, there is no other data to support this statement. The aim of the analyses presented in this section of the chapter, referring to reproductive behaviour, marriage, and divorce, is to lend further support to the thesis that the drop in the tfr in Poland can be found in the theory of the ‘second demographic transition’. 1.1 Reproduction Patterns In post-Communist countries, a drop in birth rate was observed at the turn of the twenty-first century. In Poland, the gross birth rate reached its lowest level of 1.22 in 2003, while not so long previously, in 1999, it was 2.06.7 In the past few years a small increase in the birth rate can be observed, however this does not result from changes in the reproductive behaviour of Poles, but from the fact that the generation of a demographic peak, born in the mid1980s, has entered the procreative stage of life. In the 1990s, the difference in the number of children born in urban and rural areas was quite visible – while in 1995 the tfr in rural areas exceeded 2.1 (i.e., ‘replacement level fertility’), this rate continued to be much lower in the cities. However, in the last ten years this difference between the urban and rural areas has been systematically decreasing, which seems to indicate that rural inhabitants have changed their procreative patterns in a far more visible way. More interesting still are data for marriages and divorces, these seem to demonstrate the dominance of traditional family patterns all around Poland, particularly in rural areas (discussed in Subsections 1.2 and 1.3). In recent years fewer children have been born, while at the same time the number of people who do not have children and do not want to have them has not changed much. This means that the number of families with a single child is growing, making up about 50 per cent of the total amount of families, while 6 Okólski (2005). 7 Eurostat. For comparison: the tfr dropped to the lowest level in Estonia in 1998 (1.28); in the Czech Republic in 1999 (1.13); in Slovakia, Lithuania, and in Romania in 2002 (the tfr in these countries was 1.19, 1.24, and 1.25 respectively); in Hungary in 2003 (1.27). See Eurostat.

126

SIKORSKA

35 per cent of families have two children and fewer than 20 per cent have more than three. In 1988 the average number of people in a family household8 was 3.1; by 2002 it had decreased to 2.84 and in 2008 it had dropped to 2.64.9 Although Polish people are having fewer children on average, interestingly they have not changed their preferences concerning the number of children.10 Comparing data for 2012 with 1996, there is a slight increase in the proportion of people claiming that they do not want to have children at all, and there is also a similar increase in the figures for those wanting one and three children (see Table 4.1). Table 4.1

Preferred number of children (respondents aged 18 to 44)

Independent of your sex, marital status, age, and family status (children, or no children), please state how many children you would like to have in your life

No children One Two Three Four Five or more As many as they come Hard to say

1996 (%)

2000 (%)

2004 (%)

2006 (%)

2012 (%)

1 9 58 20 3 2 5 2

2 12 57 20 3 1 2 2

2 12 59 17 3 1 2 3

5 13 55 17 4 1 2 3

4 12 51 23 4 1 2 3

Source: cbos – Public Opinion Research Centre (2012a)

8

9 10

It must be noted that these data indicate not only a decline in the number of children in the family, but also how soon young people leave their parents’ households, and how many households dissolve (due to divorce or death of one of the members), etc. Central Statistical Office in Poland. Some sociologists point out that questionnaire and survey studies do not show real changes in the system of values and that the demographic data which trace changes in people’s behavioural patterns (e.g., attitude to marriage and living in common-law marriage, the number of children and the age of parents, the number of divorces, etc.) are a far better source to study social change. I support this approach. I think that the results of questionnaires require some care in interpretation, however one should keep in mind that systematic surveys carried out on a regular basis with the use of the same methodology

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

127

The results in Table 4.1 show that the divergence between the preferred number and the real number of children in Poland seems to be particularly significant, as compared to other countries (more significant differences are observed only in Italy, Spain, and the Czech Republic – see World Values Survey). It is important to note that women (either with or without children), unlike men, tend to declare less readily the desire to have first or subsequent children, with the exception being the youngest group (aged 18–24) where women claim they want to have children in the future as often as men. The difference of opinion grows with age, particularly between thirty-five and thirty-nine. In this group men declare that they want to have children twice as often as women. What are the reasons for the decrease in the number of children and for women wanting to have fewer children than men? Economic factors are often quoted in debates concerning the reasons for low fertility rates. Indeed, as shown by the cbos studies, the economic situation of a family is important in taking a decision whether to have further children after the first child; however it does not determine plans for people who do not have children.11 In my opinion, there are more important factors than economics. First of all, there is the difficult situation of mothers who must struggle to cope with numerous obligations and social pressures involved in looking after and raising children and for whom the actual pattern of the division of household duties and the lack of coordinated social policy promoting fertility do not help in combining motherhood and professional employment.12 Thus, to use the language of theories of economic behaviour applied by Gary Becker,13 we can say that the cost of giving birth to babies goes up for women – they temporarily drop out from the job market; they have to cope with tasks hardly ever shared by the children’s fathers; they feel more responsible for decisions taken with regard to the child’s

11 12 13

(the same questionnaire, the same selection of study sample, and the same way of conducting research) are of much value since they enable researchers to analyse people’s views on things they consider ‘regular’, ‘acceptable’, and ‘right’, and on things they consider ‘irregular’ or ‘unacceptable’. It might be worthwhile to combine this kind of analysis with the observation of demographic data as real evidence/proof of the extent of change in social patterns of behaviour. The perfect illustration for the assumption of the validity of combining different types of data analysis is the relatively high social acceptance of cohabitation in Poland (which is based on surveys) against a fairly small group of people living in such a relationship (which is visible in demographic data). Taking into account only one data source does not describe the complex situation of cohabitation in contemporary Poland. cbos (Public Opinion Research Centre) (2012a). See a detailed description in the second section of this chapter. Becker and Gregg (1973).

128

SIKORSKA

upbringing and education; to a large extent, they take these decisions singlehandedly, etc. At the same time, symbolic benefits of motherhood do not increase – giving birth to more children does not provide prestige and social recognition. In this sense, giving birth to children is becoming less attractive and ‘profitable’ – women lose more than they gain, and therefore they tend to keep the number of children down and postpone motherhood to later in life. It should be noted that, in comparison with other European countries, Polish women have children at a fairly young age. In 2009, the mean age (for birth of all children) was 28.6, and it was lower only in Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia.14 In 1999, the mean age for Poland was 26.2, thus there was a considerable subsequent increase.15 However, it is important to remember that in this period of time, the mean age was also lower for Bulgarians, Czechs, Estonians, Lithuanians, Hungarians, Slovenians, and Slovakians, who used to have their first child around this age. The mean age of mothers at childbirth in those countries (except for Lithuania and Slovakia) in the period between 1990 and 2012 was more dynamic than in Poland.16 In contrast to commonly accepted opinion, the growth of mean age at childbirth does not automatically mean a drop in fertility. In a fairly large group of developed countries fertility rates are the highest in women who give birth fairly late in life.17 In Poland over the last few decades, the rate of childbirth outside marriage has increased considerably. At the beginning of the 1990s, 6–7 per cent of children were born in informal partnerships, and this has increased to 20 per cent in recent years. The increase in the number of childbirths outside marriage has been observed both in urban and rural areas, but it has been growing particularly fast in cities, where the number of this kind of informal partnerships accounts for two-thirds of all childbirths outside marriage. The change is considerable; however, once again it should be stressed that it is one of the lowest figures when compared to other European countries.18 The mean value for eu27 was 37 per cent.19 14 The mean age in eu27 was 29.7. 15 Central Statistical Office in Poland. 16 Eurostat. 17 Ibid. 18 In 2010, it was only in Turkey (2.5 per cent), in Greece (6.5 per cent), in Cyprus and in the Republic of Macedonia (both 12 per cent), in Croatia (13 per cent), and in Montenegro (16 per cent) where fewer children were born outside marriage. The highest level of childbirths out of wedlock has been reported in Iceland (64 per cent), Estonia (59 per cent), Slovenia (56 per cent), Norway, Sweden, and Bulgaria (all at 54 per cent). See Eurostat. 19 Eurostat.

129

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

It is worthwhile pointing out that the popular theory, according to which a higher number of marriages result in a higher number of childbirths, seems to be in need of modification to include positive new developments in childbirth rates in European countries due to childbirths outside marriage.20 The reason why the number of children born outside formal partnerships in Poland is not very high is due to the high number, as compared to other European countries, of people who tend to legalise their relationship. 1.2 Marriages and Informal Relationships According to the second demographic transition theory, one should be able to observe a uniform decrease in marriages. However, marriage data from the Central Statistical Office in Poland for the years 1946–2009 do not indicate any clear trend. Between the end of the Second World War and 1965 the number of marriages showed a gradual decline (with some irregularities), from 11.9 to 6.3 per 1,000 inhabitants, but in 1966 the rate of new marriages began to climb (until 1978). Later on, the falling tendency began to prevail, and it continued until 2004. In the last few years an increase in marriages has been noted (see Table 4.2). Table 4.2 The rate of marriages between 2001 and 2010 (total, urban, and rural areas) Marriages

Total

Urban areas

Rural areas

In thousands

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

195.1 191.9 195.4 191.8 206.9 226.2 248.7 257.7 250.8 228.3

Urban areas

Rural areas

Per 1,000 inhabitants

118.2 115.8 118.7 116.4 125.6 137.2 150.2 154.7 152.7 137.2

76.9 76.1 76.7 75.4 81.3 89.0 98.5 102.8 98.1 91.1

Source: Central Statistical Office in Poland

20 Ibid.

Total

5.1 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.4 5.9 6.5 5.8 6.6 6.0

5.0 4.9 5.1 5.0 5.4 5.9 6.5 6.7 6.6 6.0

5.2 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.5 6.0 6.6 6.9 6.6 6.0

130

SIKORSKA

Looking at the situation of Poland and of other European countries we can see that, in comparative terms, Polish family life is dominated by traditional patterns. In 2009, only Cyprus had a higher rate of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants than Poland – the eu27 mean value was 4.9 and for Poland it was 6.6. It might be worthwhile pointing out that in other post-Communist countries formal marriage was less common than in Poland.21 Moreover, 85 per cent of marriages in Poland are ‘first marriages’, that is marriages in which neither of the partners has been married previously. This seems to show that there are very few ‘reconstructed families’ in Poland, with one or more partner having been in another marriage previously. It should be noted that about 30 per cent of first marriages take place when a woman is pregnant, which seems to indicate that there is still social pressure to legalise a relationship.22 A traditional approach in choosing a family model is supported by the image of an ideal marriage shared by 70 per cent of people, who think that ‘if you marry someone you love, this feeling grows, becomes mature and solidifies with time’. Only 18 per cent of respondents claim that ‘even if you marry someone for love the feeling can wane with time’.23 The romantic perception of marriage can be found in the responses of those surveyed; they were asked the following question: ‘Does marriage mean the end of love?’ In Poland, only 4 per cent gave a positive answer to this question, as compared to 19 per cent in the Czech Republic, 11 per cent in Slovakia, and 9 per cent in Hungary. As many as 66 per cent of Polish people do not share the opinion that marriage means abandoning freedom, while 55 per cent of Hungarians and almost 40 per cent of Slovaks and Czechs are of the opposite view.24 This traditional attitude toward choosing a family model amongst young people can be observed in their preferences for certain forms for the legalisation of relationships. Every third respondent claimed that the church wedding (the so-called ‘concordat marriage’ which does not require a civil marriage) is the best way to give a relationship a legal basis. Moreover, 27 per cent of respondents thought that a civil marriage meets the above need, but a couple should also have church wedding, 32 per cent of those surveyed said that the format of marriage is not important, and only 5 per cent considered civil marriage the most significant.25 These opinions proved to be true for young married couples; in 2009 almost 70 per cent of them had the church ceremony. 21 22 23 24 25

To compare, for example: in Croatia – 5.1; Slovakia – 4.9; the Czech Republic – 4.6; Lithuania – 4.4; Estonia – 4.0. Styrc (2010). cbos (2008a). tns obop (Public Opinion Poll Centre) (2003). cbos (2008a).

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

131

However, when studying marriage patterns from a different perspective, Polish newly-weds are very much like young people from other European countries, that is, they tend to get married at a more advanced age. In 2010, the median age for first marriage was 27.7 years for a male and 25.6 for a female, while at the beginning of the 1990s more than 50 per cent of male respondents got married at the age of 25 and female respondents at the age of 23. The new trend is clearly visible, but it should be noted that when we analyse the situation in other countries it turns out that the mean age of marriages, despite its upward trend, is not very high in Poland; the age of Polish men entering marriage comes only after Belarus, Portugal, Turkey, and Ukraine, and that of Polish women after Belarus, Bosnia, Macedonia, Moldavia, Turkey, and Ukraine who get married at a younger age.26 We can also observe changes in the reasons for postponing marriage. While in 1996 the most common reasons for a young couple to postpone marriage were finances and housing, in 2008 respondents pointed in the first place to psychological factors; fear of losing freedom, fear of experiencing disappointment, anxiety involved in bringing up children (particularly important for men), and ‘a choice of the way of life without any commitment’. Professional development also seemed to take priority over relationships, the latter being more important for female respondents. However, one should not ignore the fact that despite preferences for and practice of the traditional family model there is a group of people who take the decision to live together without formal marriage, in cohabitation. This group is not very large; in the 2011 National Census, just 2.4 per cent of respondents admitted to living in this kind of relationship. Nevertheless, one has to remember that the census is based on the respondents’ answers, and sometimes they may not have wanted to admit that they cohabited. Similarly, the results of cbos27 are subject to statistical error and out of all those surveyed 9 per cent declared that they were in an informal relationship.28 A large majority of cohabitants (80 per cent) end up in a formal marriage with cohabitation being considered as serving as a test period before deciding upon marriage or separation.29 However, the background for these new developments in social life is now different than in the past. Today, informal relationships are more common among educated, professional people enjoying higher financial standards, while formerly this form of cohabitation was more 26 Eurostat. 27 cbos (2008a). 28 See Kasearu (2007). 29 Mynarska and Matysiak (2010).

132

SIKORSKA

popular among less educated people with elementary or high-school education and was due to reluctance in taking a decision on marriage or to a lack of money, rather than a deliberate choice. In this sense, cohabitation originated from a negative motivation (‘I do not want to have a wedding ceremony’, ‘I cannot afford it’) but is now the result of a positive decision (‘I want to live in cohabitation’). Looking at these data from the perspective of other European countries, it turns out that Polish people continue to prefer formal relationships. The reason why Poles do not often decide to cohabit may have to do with low social approval for this form of relationship – more than 40 per cent of Polish people believe that a cohabiting couple should make the relationship legal by marriage. Almost 20 per cent of those surveyed are very firm in their opinion on cohabitants (and answer ‘they should get married’) and only one in three respondents ‘does not care if the two loving people are in a formal or informal relationship’.30 A traditional approach to the family-life model demonstrates itself not only in low acceptance of cohabitation, but also in the opinions of Poles concerning homosexual persons and their relationships. However, based on the results of the European Values Study (evs), the percentage of people who claim that homosexual preferences ‘cannot possibly be justified’ dropped from nearly 80 per cent in 1989 to just over 50 per cent in 2008. This same tendency has been observed in responses to the question concerning homosexual neighbours: in 1990, 70 per cent did not want to have such neighbours, eighteen years later this number had decreased to 20 per cent. This does not change the fact that the level of social acceptance for homosexual persons is still very low; in 2010, only 8 per cent of respondents considered homosexual preferences ‘a normal thing’. According to comparative studies carried out in the European Union, Poland has the lowest number of respondents who support the statement that ‘homosexual behaviour is an accepted form of expressing one’s own sexuality’. Of respondents, 36 per cent support this view while 57 per cent oppose it. The proportion across the eu is just the opposite; about sixty per cent of the people surveyed accept homosexual behaviour.31 1.3 Divorces Strong support amongst the majority of Polish people for a traditional form of family life, that is, marriage, has some influence on Poland’s relatively low divorce rate, as compared to other European countries. In 2010, the divorce rate 30 31

cbos (2008a). Staniszewski (2006).

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

133

for Poland per 1,000 inhabitants was 1.6. This figure was lower only in Italy, Bulgaria, Ireland, Romania, Greece, and Slovenia, and the mean value for eu27 in 2009 was 2.1.32 It should be added that in Poland the main reason for the breakdown of marriage is not a divorce but passing away of one of the partners – 70 per cent of marriages end in this way. Analysis of divorce rates in Poland over the last few decades has revealed two phases of higher divorce intensity; the mid-1980s and the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century.33 It has been found that divorce is far more prevalent among people living in urban rather than rural areas – in 2009 almost 80 per cent of divorces took place in urban areas. However, over the last few years the number of divorces in rural areas has risen, whereas in urban areas the number of divorces has come down.34 In today’s Poland we can observe an increase in the number of single-parent families. According to the 1988 National Census these accounted for 14 per cent of the total number of families, and in 2002, 19 per cent. A considerable majority of all single-parent families consisted of single mothers rather than single fathers. Typical salaries for single mothers are of average or lower levels compared with the average family income, and one-third are unemployed. However, despite the fact that the financial situation of the majority of mothers is difficult, it is women who take the decision to file divorce claims far more often than men (in 70 per cent of cases women apply for divorce). According to the statistics, more women become single mothers as a result of the father’s death than as the consequence of a divorce. Although Polish people entertain a fairly idealistic perception of marriage they do not condemn divorce. The strongest disapproval for divorce comes from 15 per cent of respondents, whereas 60 per cent claim they do not support divorce but accept it in some specific cases. Of those surveyed, 20 per cent describe themselves as supporters of divorce and maintain that ‘if a couple takes a decision to split up they should not face any obstacles’. Among people who disapprove of divorce are those who are more advanced in age, have lower education, or claim to respect and follow religious values.35 In the demographic situation of Poland presented in this section of the chapter I have drawn attention to two aspects of the analysis; firstly, changes 32 Eurostat. 33 See Szarfaniec (2011). 34 The highest proportion of divorces is registered in marriages with no children (41 per cent of the divorced couples in 2010) and in marriages with one child (38 per cent). The number of divorces drops with the increase in the number of children. 35 cbos (2008b).

134

SIKORSKA

over time, and secondly, description based on the comparison of data from Poland and from other European countries. However, as much as the conclusions drawn from the first aspect of the analysis can lead to the thesis that reproduction patterns and family models change from traditional to modern, or even post-modern (in the number of children born from relationships outside marriage, delay in the decision to get married, in the first childbirth, etc.), the second aspect of the analysis, in which I compare the situation in Poland with that in other European countries (not only in the so-called ‘old’ eu, but also in many post-Communist countries), clearly shows the extent of the traditional perception of procreative family patterns in Polish society. It is hardly possible to shift social patterns of family life into a more pluralistic model and launch the process of defamilialisation in the whole of Polish society. In the next section of this chapter I analyse changes in socially accepted family-life patterns and make an attempt to justify the thesis that, compared to other European countries, Polish society is still strongly traditional. 2

Changes in the System of Distribution of Power Among Family Members: New Models of Motherhood and Fatherhood

In order to describe change in the distribution of power among family members it might be worthwhile illuminating discrepancies between the fairly strong social acceptance of the idea of equality in the family and its real-life interpretation. The divergence between the level of declared commitment and its practical execution is striking. Whilst accepting a new approach to the division of duties in the family, many people act according to old patterns. This will become clear in studies of both the preferred and the current family-life model as described in Subsection 2.1, in the analysis of social perceptions of the roles and duties of mothers (see Subsection 2.2), as well as, on a smaller scale, in our studies of the father’s position in the family (see Subsection 2.3). 2.1 Equal Rights – A Declaration or a Practice? Equality is one of the major elements of the post-modern pattern of family life. To what extent has this model of partnership transformed daily routines for Polish families? If we were unquestioningly to believe our respondents, we might conclude that family life in today’s Poland follows the model of Scandinavian countries, where equality is considered an essential element of family life. As many as 80 per cent of women and 65 per cent of men are of the view that ‘both partners should share their professional and family duties in

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

135

equal proportions’.36 However, a researcher cannot uncritically rely on the respondents’ answers, especially when they are asked very general questions. When, in the course of a different study, the questions were more detailed, e.g. providing four different preferred family (or partnership) models (‘traditional’, ‘mixed’, ‘partnership’, and ‘reversed roles’), it turned out that almost half of the respondents followed the ‘partnership model’ (where both partners work and take care of home and children in equal proportion), one in four preferred a mixed kind (in which both wife and husband work but it is the woman who is more involved in taking care of home and children), and ‘only’ 23 per cent of respondents indicated that they followed a traditional model (in which only the husband works, while the wife is unemployed and looks after home and children; see Figure 4.1).37 Factors which influence the answers are; firstly, age (the ‘partnership model’ is more popular among young respondents); secondly, education (the higher the level of education, the more reserved are attitudes towards the traditional family model); and thirdly, stages of family life. According to the Social Diagnosis study,38 almost one third of respondents with children beyond the age of three follow the family model where a man works full-time and a woman takes a break from her job. A quarter of respondents claim that a woman looking after small children should stop working entirely. Only 20 per cent of respondents consider the best model to be one where a man works full-time and a woman is employed part-time.39 The results of study on the range of specific duties performed by both men and women at home indicate a significant difference between the concept of equality in the family and its actual practical implementation, that is, how Polish men and women share their everyday family duties. Women perform the majority of these duties; in 84 per cent of Polish households only women do the washing and ironing, in 75 per cent of Polish households women take care of meal preparation, and in 65 per cent they also do the washing-up. 36 37 38 39

Kotowska et al. (2006). cbos (2012a). Czapiński and Panek (2009). This perspective changes when children are between three and six years old. In this case, almost 50 per cent of respondents think that the best model is when both parents are employed and a woman works only part-time. One should not ignore the fact that nearly 11 per cent of respondents think that a woman should give up working even when children reach the kindergarten age (3–6) and 27 per cent claim that she should ‘take a break from professional activity for a certain period of time’. Moreover, 37 per cent of the group under study think that mothers of children aged 6–12 should work only part-time.

136

SIKORSKA Traditional model

1% 2% 23% 49%

Mixed model 25%

Partnership model Reversed roles Hard to say

Figure 4.1  Model of the family (partnership) preferred by Poles in the age group 18–3940 Source: cbos (2012a)

Women share their chores with partners, or are occasionally replaced by them, only in the area of garbage disposal or household administration. What is interesting is the fact that men, when talking about their involvement in family life, for instance helping children with their school assignments, claim that they do more than reported by their partners (see Figure 4.2).41 However, in real life, despite declared commitment to the equal division of duties between the two partners, the burden of everyday chores and responsibilities of looking after children, as well as keeping them clean and healthy, are still mainly taken on by women.42 Nevertheless, when we look at this from a longer time perspective, it is hard not to admit that these proportions have changed. According to the results of studies carried out by Bogusława Budrowska, based on data on time management provided by the Central Statistical Office, the average time spent by men on household duties has gone up from 1 hour 24 minutes in 1984 to 2 hours 18 minutes in 2012, this is similar to that in Denmark (2 hrs. 17 min.) and France (2 hrs. 24 min.). In the case of women, the amount of time spent on housework dropped from 6 hours 6 minutes in 1984 to 4 hours 31 minutes in 2012, this compares with Denmark – 3 hours 20 minutes and France – 4 hours 13 minutes.43 40 41 42 43

Converted model – only the wife works, and her income is sufficient to support the family, whereas the husband looks after home and family. cbos (2006). Titkow and Duch-Krzystoszek (2009). Budrowska (2007, 16).

137

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND men

women

meal preparation 7%

mixed or jointly 75%

washing-up 8%

18%

65%

cleaning the house 6% thorough house cleaning (window cleaning, carpet vacuuming, etc.) 10%

27%

61%

33%

54%

36%

laundry 4%

84%

12%

ironing 5%

84%

11%

daily shopping 12%

52%

household services (calling services, e.g. plumber)

59%

administration

32%

garbage disposal

32% 0%

20%

36% 21%

33%

35%

23% 40%

20%

45% 60%

80%

100%

Figure 4.2 Division of household duties Source: cbos (2006)

Changes have also been noted in a different social perception of marriage. The results of the European Values Study have indicated that in 2008, 18 per cent of those surveyed shared the fairly radical opinion that ‘the institution of marriage is out of date’. Perhaps 18 per cent is not a very impressive figure, but it should be emphasised that eighteen years earlier, in 1990, the number of respondents who supported this idea was three times lower. The idea of marriage as an indispensable condition for being happy has changed; in 2008, 18 per cent of those questioned strongly agreed with the statement that ‘marriage or a long-time, stable relationship is an indispensable condition for being happy’ (33 per cent in 1990) and 47 per cent agreed with the statement (40 per cent in 1990). It seems clear then that the current views on this question are less radical; the group of strong supporters of the concept of marriage as a necessary condition for a happy life is growing smaller.44 44

Sikorska (2012a).

138

SIKORSKA

Today, Polish people perceive and describe aspects of a happy marriage differently, as compared to the year 1990. The biggest change concerns religious faith. In 1990, religious faith was considered a condition for a happy marriage by 85 per cent of those surveyed and eighteen years later by only 31 per cent. Similar development can be observed in the attitude toward having children. In 1990, for 78 per cent of those questioned having children was a condition of a successful marriage while in 2008 this figure was lower by 20 per cent. What has become more important in the relationship and has gained in value is respect and mutual understanding. In 2008, 81 per cent of respondents pointed to these two elements as very important, a large increase on the 49 per cent of the 1990 survey. The results of a factor analysis of responses to questions about major elements of a successful marriage are quite significant in that they have been used to identify the four most important conditions (see Table 4.3). In 2008, the most important factor (explaining 27 per cent of variance) determining good relations in a marriage, mutual commitment of parents and their sustaining closeness in a relationship turned out to be shared time in the form of frequent conversations, discussing family problems, but also giving men and women freedom to spend time on personal friends and personal hobbies. In 1990, the most important factors determining a happy marriage (explaining 22 per cent of variance) were good living conditions (a nice flat and a good income) and similar social backgrounds. One can observe a considerable difference in the concept of a successful marriage, and this can be described briefly as a transition from providing a fairly good standard of living to a more advanced level, that is, emotional needs – a common social trend similar to that in Western societies. To sum up, based on the data showing high levels of approval for relationships (formal or informal) with respect to the idea of equality and the change in social perceptions of marriage, we might draw the conclusion that the model of family life in Poland is becoming similar to the model taken from the societies of Western Europe. However, this conclusion would be inappropriate, because it does not take into account a very important element; real-life implementation of the division of household duties and responsibilities in Polish families. The results of studies in the area of social practice indicate that the declared equality in the division of workload in the majority of Polish families exists more in theory than in practice; women still perform the bulk of daily housework and take care of and raise children. From ‘Mother Pole’ to ‘Supermother’ and ‘New Mother’: Changes in the Model of Motherhood The term ‘Mother Pole’ has long been used to define characteristic traits of an ideal mother. This model was created at the end of the eighteenth century. The

2.2

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

139

Table 4.3 Factor analysis of the major elements of ‘successful marriage’45 Factors

1990

2008

First

Explains 22% of variance: • good housing conditions; • similar social background; • relevant income;

Second

Explains 11% of variance: • mutual respect and understanding; • understanding and tolerance; Explains 9% of variance: • truthfulness; Explains 8% of variance: • similar political views

Explains 27% of variance: • frequent conversations about interests shared by the couple; • time for personal friends and personal interests, hobbies; • sharing of work at home; • spending much time together; • determination and courage to discuss; Explains 13% of variance: • similar social background; • similar political views; • relevant income;

Third Fourth

Explains 8% of variance: • similar religious beliefs; Explains 7% of variance: • truthfulness

Source: The author’s own study based on data from the European Values Study46

key factor that influenced this model was historical, the loss of the country’s independence.47 This mode of interpretation of women’s obligations found strong support in Poland’s powerful Catholicism, where motherhood is considered the essential 45

46 47

It should be noticed that the 1990 survey showed thirteen elements, while the 2008 survey showed sixteen. In 1990, respondents were not asked about spending free time together or talking to each other, both included in the first factor of the 2008 survey. However, this factor contains some other similar elements which were included in the survey of 1990, and therefore I consider a comparison of the results of the analyses run in these two periods of time as justified. Sikorska (2012a). Anna Titkow says ‘it was these very difficult times (resulting from the loss of independence) that brought to life the model of a mother (until the present time), her social role and social activity, referred to as a genotype of woman able to cope with the most difficult challenges of social reality. “Mother Pole” symbolises the skill of combining the pursuit of

140

SIKORSKA

and most important mission of a woman. In this context, the concepts of a woman and of a mother are used interchangeably and motherhood is presented as a fundamental and unquestionable element of female characteristics. ‘Mother Pole’ is a person who should sacrifice herself, ‘sacrifice’ being the keyword to describe this model. ‘Mother Pole’ is selfless, suffering from her enormous number of duties and obligations (often unattractive), due to the lack of time, and not overtly enjoying her motherhood. She is unable to rely on her husband, who does not rush to help with sharing everyday household chores and raising children. In today’s expert discourse (of psychologists, sociologists, journalists, etc.), and also in debates among mothers on the Internet (on websites for parents, or on blogs discussing childcare and motherhood in general), the model of ‘Mother Pole’ is referred to with a degree of distance and irony. Some women describe themselves as ‘Mother Pole’, but it is not difficult to detect their ironic tone. On the other hand, many mothers make a heroic effort to combine their family obligations and housework duties with professional responsibilities, and in cases where they may be faced by some especially challenging aspect of family life they may give up their professional career for the good of a child in their role as ‘Mother Pole’. During the time of the People’s Republic of Poland (prl), the obligation of paid employment was added to the range of duties imposed on mothers. It had nothing to do with their self-development or professional success. This was due to the necessity of supporting a family and was in line with the ideology of a socialist state. In this sense employment was one more obligation, in a way, a sacrifice on behalf of the family. Thus another task attributed to motherhood was coping with the logistic management of both family life and paid employment. The level of complexity of this task was quite high, since it required very special kinds of skills on the part of a woman, specifically ‘arranging’ things, for example food, at the time of permanent food and product shortages on the market. However, it is important to emphasise that in the prl ‘Mother Pole’ was not only a victim, but also a winner, a person who despite numerous responsibilities and obligations was strong and entrepreneurial, able to cope with all these hardships. Anna Titkow has written about ‘managerial motherhood’, a model that was followed in many Polish families in those days. Many authors, in most cases (but not always) supporters of feminism, stress that today’s model of ‘Mother Pole’ has been supplemented by other social

personal aspirations with the needs of a family or a group of her countrymen for the good of the Homeland. She does not expect any compensation, except for symbolic gratification, which earns her high prestige and position in the family and in society in general’ (Titkow 2007, 52).

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

141

expectations which change it into the model of a ‘supermother’. The ‘supermother’ also struggles to combine duties and obligations of a mother at home and at work, where – and this is a new development – she strives to achieve success and satisfaction. On top of that, ‘supermother’ should also take care of herself, being attractive, well dressed, and chic. Today’s mothers face a new social challenge that comes from the so-called ‘intensive motherhood ideology’ (a phrase used by Sharon Hays (1996)). According to this approach, motherhood requires extra effort and consideration, and needs a lot of sound thinking. Mother, who should be first of all committed and dedicated, has to take a number of decisions, and at the same time she is not quite certain of their accuracy. The role requires a lot of mother’s energy, time, and money, and it demands a serious involvement in children’s care and upbringing. This makes motherhood a highly responsible and complex task. Analyses of a range of studies have resulted in the identification of one more model of mother, next to the ‘Mother Pole’ and ‘the supermother’, which I have called ‘the new mother’.48 Below, I describe three essential elements of this model. Firstly, motherhood is no longer considered the main task of a woman, a mission or a natural instinct attributed to her gender. According to data obtained from the European Values Study, support for the idea ‘of a woman who needs to have children to get a sense of self-value’ dropped by about 20 per cent of respondents in the period between 1990 and 2008 (see Table 4.4). What is interesting is that there is no substantial difference in the views of men and women on this subject. However, a difference is visible in groups of respondents representing different levels of education. Less-educated people tend to consider motherhood a necessary element of a woman’s self-esteem. An increasingly common approval for the right of a woman to have or not to have children is visible at a higher level of social approval for single women who have children without ‘being in a formal relationship with a man’. In 2008, almost 50 per cent of respondents (women and men) supported this view, as compared with just 13 per cent in 1990. This shows a substantial difference of opinion. In 2008, the ‘do not support’ response was chosen by 32 per cent of respondents (35 per cent of men and 29 per cent of women), while twenty years earlier this opinion was popular with nearly every second respondent. In a period of just under two decades, the number of people with no determined view on the subject (those who chose the ‘it depends’ response) has decreased. Secondly, the expectation of ‘new mothers’ that they will be just ‘mothers’ is not as high as it was in the past. In the opinion of the majority of Poles, a 48

Sikorska (2009).

142

SIKORSKA

Table 4.4 Change in the social perception of motherhood Opinion

A woman has to have a baby to give her a sense of value

She needs a baby It is not necessary

A single woman takes a decision to have a For baby though she does not want to be in a Against formal/steady relationship It depends

1990 (%)

2008 (%)

W*

M**

W*

M**

74 26

77 23

57 43

55 45

13 45 42

13 53 34

53 29 18

43 35 22

*     Responses from women. **  Responses from men. Source: Author’s own study based on data FROM the European Values Study49

woman, particularly a mother, is strongly affiliated with the house zone; however, an increasing number of people do not consider home to be the only place where a woman can find satisfaction. In 2008, 12 per cent of those surveyed (total: women and men) strongly agreed that ‘taking care of home and children provides the same level of satisfaction as professional employment’ and 51 per cent agreed, as opposed to 27 per cent (‘strongly agree’) and 37 per cent (‘agree’) in 1990. Similar change is visible in the degree of approval for the statement ‘women can work, but what the majority of them want is to look after home and family’; in 2008, 13 per cent of respondents were ‘strongly for’ this statement (41 per cent in 1990) and 55 per cent (58 per cent of men and 53 per cent of women) were ‘for’ (47 per cent in 1990: 48 per cent of men and 45 per cent of women). Looking at these results one can see a steady shift in opinion towards greater social acceptance for the ‘non-domestic’ role of a woman (see Table 4.5). However, one should not ignore the fact that more than half of the population is of the view that a woman should first of all draw satisfaction from being a mother, that is, from taking care of home and family.50 Thirdly, a ‘new mother’ has the right to involve the father of a child more in childcare; the father, according to popular opinion, should prove to be just as 49 50

Sikorska (2012a). Their decision to take up employment, for personal or economic reasons, apart from taking care of children, finds social approval more easily. Actually, the proportion between the answers of respondents who are in favour and those who are in opposition to ‘working

143

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND Table 4.5 Changes in social perception of the role of working mothers Opinion

1990 (%)

2008 (%)

W*

M**

W*

M**

Taking care of home and children provides the same level of satisfaction as professional employment

I strongly support I support I do not support I firmly do not support

26 34 36 4

27 40 32 1

14 47 33 6

10 55 31 4

Women can work, but what the majority of them want is to look after home and family

I strongly support I support I do not support I firmly do not support

42 45 12 1

41 13 48 53 10.5 29 0.5 5

12 58 27 3

A working mother can give her child the same amount of care and security as a non-working mother

I strongly support I support I do not support I firmly do not support

15 26 50 9

13 21 56 10

16 47 31 6

17 49 30 4

*   Responses from women. ** Responses from men. Source: The author’s own study based on data from the European Values Study51

competent and skilful as the mother. The majority of respondents were of the opinion that ‘in general, fathers can just as well take care of their children as mothers’ – in 2008, 22 per cent of respondents firmly supported this view and 60 per cent supported it. It is interesting that there were no major differences between men and women.52

51 52

mothers who can give their children the same amount of care and security as non-working mothers’ had reversed in the period from 1990 to 2008: in 1990, a total of 38 per cent of those surveyed said ‘I firmly support’ and ‘I support’, while 64 per cent of respondents said ‘I do not support’ or ‘I firmly do not support’. Eighteen years later, 65 per cent were in support of the above opinion concerning working mothers, and 35 per cent were against. Moreover, in 2008 only 13 per cent of respondents were in strong support of the opinion that a small child suffers when the mother goes out to work as compared to nearly 60 per cent in 1990. Here, one can see a distinctive change. Sikorska (2012a). For more on this subject see Subsection 2.3.

144

SIKORSKA

I have described three patterns of motherhood, which coexist in today’s Poland, namely the models of ‘Mother Pole’, of ‘supermother’, and of the ‘new mother’. The extent to which these models will be followed depends on external structural factors, such as the situation of women on the job market, the infrastructure of organisations responsible for childcare and legal regulations on family policy. 2.2.1 Situation of Mothers in Poland Job Market Poland belongs to a group of eu countries with one of the lowest employment rates among women; in 2011 the rate was 53.1 per cent (66.3 per cent for men) while the eu27 average was 58.5 per cent (70.1 per cent for men).53 One may ask the question why so few Polish women are professionally active, as compared to other European countries. The answer is far from simple. In the first place, one must take into account the Polish people’s positive and deeply rooted attitude to the traditional division of roles between men and women. As I pointed out earlier, the view that mothers, and not only those of very young children, are responsible for taking care of and raising children is very common. What is more, the role of a caregiver is not restricted just to mothers, but also passed on to grandmothers. Women of close to retirement age in Poland are the least professionally active social group, just 39 per cent in 2010. This was fourth on the list of the worst results in Europe, following Italy, Greece, and Malta. The reason for this is, apart from the socio-cultural environment, poor infrastructure in childcare services (nurseries and kindergartens), which hinders women’s return to work after maternity leave. There is also the question of the general attitude of employers who face a choice between accepting a female or a male candidate. The employment of a young female, with or without children, often poses a threat to the employer in terms of frequent medical leave for taking care of sick children, or pregnancy which may involve extended absence from work, or a long break from work, sometimes as much as three years, to bring up children.54 As a result, employers often consider it more rational to employ and invest in a male workforce rather than in a female one. It is also worthwhile emphasising that the highest number of unemployed women is in the 25–34 age group. At the time when they should be actively 53 54

Eurostat. On the other hand, since 2004, the rate of employment among women has been steadily going up. In 2004, only 46.2 per cent of women were employed. According to data provided by Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych (Social Insurance Institution), ‘diseases’ that generate the highest costs associated with the payment of sickness benefits are those related to pregnancy and confinement.

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

145

working on building their professional career by acquiring competence and position in a workplace, they may often stay at home to look after children. Among unemployed women, the largest group includes those who stay out of work for more than twenty-four months. As a result of this long-term unemployment it is more difficult to get back into the job market.55 One way of helping to combine professional employment with childcare is ‘flexible employment’. This offers, for example, part-time employment. However, there are few women in Poland who work on a flexi-time basis; in 2011, just 10 per cent of women, compared to the average rate of more than 30 per cent for the eu27.56 Nurseries and Kindergartens In 2009, Poland came fourth out of all European countries, following Macedonia, Turkey, and Croatia, on the scale of the smallest number of fouryear-olds going to kindergarten. In the past, 70 per cent of children in this age group attended kindergarten. For comparison, in other European countries, such as France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, almost every child of this age goes to kindergarten.57 However, the number of children attending kindergarten is subject to a dynamic change; according to data provided by the Ministry of National Education, as of educational years 2006/7 to 2011/12, the number of children attending kindergarten pre-school has increased by 20 per cent in the 3–5 age group. At present, 65 per cent of children of this age go to kindergarten. In the group of five-year-olds this rate is even higher, and has increased by 25 per cent. In the school year 2011/12, 81 per cent of five-year-olds attended kindergarten. It is important to note that the biggest increase in the number of children attending kindergartens has taken place in rural areas; in the 3–5 age group it has doubled, from 21 per cent in the school year 2006/7, to 43 per cent in the school year 2011/12. For five-year-olds, this rate has climbed from 33 per cent to 65 per cent. Apart from this, the social perception of childcare and educational institutions is changing to a positive one. Just over ten years ago, kindergartens were considered something akin to temporary child shelters, not as places with good educational, recreational, and fun programmes. In the past, many mothers 55

Moreover, our studies conducted as part of the project titled ‘Motherhood and Its Daily Practice’ (Sikorska 2008) showed that a large number of women believe that it will be difficult for them to get back to the job market because prospective employers will be reluctant to help them combine family life and employment, and therefore they do not even attempt to look for a job or go back to practising their profession. 56 Eurostat. 57 Ibid.

146

SIKORSKA

who enrolled their children in kindergarten were afraid of social disapproval, of being labelled ‘bad mothers’.58 A change in the perception of the kindergarten is clearly visible. However, in some new districts of big cities in Poland there are not enough nurseries and kindergartens, and finding a childcare centre for small children may be problematic.59 The shortage of this kind of service does not encourage mothers to go back to work, and at the same time it strengthens the model of ‘Mother Pole’, who first of all stays at home and looks after the children. Social Policy One cannot say that social policy, developed and implemented by public administration, has supported and promoted the model of the ‘new mother’. According to Bożena Balcerzak-Paradowska, an expert on the job market in Poland, government policy towards family ranges ‘from indifferent to harmful’.60 For many years, policy had not been clearly defined; it was floating and depended on often-changing representatives of political parties. The principles of family policy proposed by right-wing parties aim to consolidate traditional models of the family by promoting traditional divisions of responsibilities. Changes suggested by centre-oriented parties (including the current coalition, in power since 2007) are not well coordinated. On one hand, fathers can make use of paternal leave, available to fathers of a newborn baby; on the other hand, there is extended maternal leave, which in the long run does not improve the situation of mothers on the job market. In conclusion, structural factors (women’s situation in the job market, infrastructure, in the form of nurseries and kindergartens, as well as social policy) and socio-cultural models (described in Subsection 2.1) do not promote ‘new motherhood’. On the contrary, they preserve the ‘Mother Pole’ model and are a source of tension for women who want to work and have children. However, according to Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim and Ulrich Beck,61 who have studied this issue in Western countries, this conflict is a result of the ‘continued process of women’s individual approach’, which continues to be part of the dilemma of ‘living for others’ or ‘living for oneself’. It seems that in Poland, the aforementioned tension has reached a particularly high level because of the combined effects of the job market, childcare system, and social policy, reinforced by the 58 59 60 61

Sikorska (2008). Looking at the figures provided by the city authorities in Warsaw, in the school year 2010/11, 600 children were not accepted to the public kindergartens. Kotowska (2005, 23). Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002).

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

147

traditional model of the division of duties in the family, none of which make it easier for women to cope with work and family life. However, it should be noted that the situation of Polish mothers is much diversified and depends on several conditions which include, firstly, the family’s economic situation (this determines forms of childcare; nanny, private nursery, or kindergarten, with the restricted availability of public childcare institutions), and secondly, the potential of women (mothers in the job market), as highly qualified and experienced women can find more work opportunities. Hence one can draw a conclusion that middle- and upper-class mothers from big cities practice the model of ‘new mother’. Nevertheless, women from smaller towns and rural areas tend to follow the ‘Mother Pole’ model. Moreover, the difference in the situation of women representing these two groups is quite clear when we look at their social background and the perception of women and children in their social space. In cities these differences are made increasingly visible by, for example, the appearance of mother-friendly notices in restaurants, offering special shows in cinemas, or swimming lessons for babies at public swimming pools. This looks quite different outside the city, in small towns and rural areas. The access to mother-friendly places and services is far more restricted and contributes to the feeling of frustration; a sense of isolation from ‘the real world’ is a common problem experienced by many mothers. This sense of social exclusion has many aspects, and one of them is very important; the psychological aspect. In a study described in ‘Motherhood and Its Daily Practice’ one of the mothers interviewed said ‘as a mother I feel isolated, on the margin of the society’.62 From ‘Absent-From-Home Father’ to ‘Committed Father’: Changes in the Model of Fatherhood The current situation of fathers in Poland is an excellent example of the gap between the level of social expectations, fathers’ declared opinions, and everyday practice. Referring to the results of a study mentioned earlier in this chapter (see Subsection 2.1), fathers, compared to mothers, do not spend as much time on childcare. On the other hand, the social expectations they face are fairly high. In the first place, their partners are increasingly demanding and the same applies to their children’s expectations (at least after they reach a certain age). Similarly, social expectations have tended to climb as a result of the promotion of a new fatherhood model, extensively discussed by the media and by experts, which has led to the creation of new social patterns and a new model of ‘the father’. In describing this model we can distinguish two elements. Firstly,

2.3

62

Sikorska (2008).

148

SIKORSKA

today’s father should be involved in a relationship with his child as early as possible; secondly, this relationship should be based on strong emotional ties. In consequence, fathers, in their attempt to meet social expectations, often feel uncertain and even helpless. Experts on childcare and child-rearing are of the view, which is becoming more and more popular with young parents, that fatherhood does not begin when a child is ready to ‘have a serious conversation’ – this phrase referred to the role of father in Western societies, who until the 1970s was responsible for explaining his children the ‘complexities of the world’. Fatherhood also does not begin when the mother arrives home with a newborn baby. A father should start a relationship with a child when it is still a baby in the mother’s womb. He can do that by taking part in special training, by tapping and stroking the mother’s belly, playing the baby music, and finally by participating in labour. Experts on child-rearing claim that fathers are equally competent to take care of babies and children, and there are some skills that they perform particularly well (including fun games and teaching).63 The majority of press, radio, and tv programmes present the idea of the committed father, involved in childcare in a very positive way, as an opportunity for men to benefit from developing close relations with their children. The current image of a ‘real man’ is more that of a man who enjoys family life, not the man who demonstrates his power and position. In this sense, as it has been skilfully described by Tomasz Szlendak, new fatherhood ‘makes men free of traditional male handcuffs’.64 The number of benefits from being a father is quite large. But paradoxically, sometimes it may be difficult if the mother does not like the father to be involved in childcare. Many women admit that the fathers of their children are able to look after children, but they treat them as if they were children themselves. They claim that men need detailed instruction, and when faced with a task of taking care of a child, the mother has to prepare everything for 63

64

When analysing the content of magazines for parents, one can get an impression that a woman needs a break from a child or baby to relax and to recover, while a man actually gets a relaxation by looking after a child or a baby. This kind of activity, so different to the daily routine, can bring him much fun and relaxation, while for a woman, taking care of children all day is often a boring and monotonous experience. See Szlendak (2010). As shown by the results of a content analysis of fathers’ letters published in parenting magazines (Sikorska 2009), many contemporary fathers accept this idea and strongly believe that being a father is a unique experience, a kind of a gift they should enjoy. They say that by being a father they ‘learn to become a better man’, they ‘learn to look and enjoy simple things’, they ‘calm down their emotions’, they become more patient, more self-confident, and they feel that what they do makes more sense, etc.

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

149

him. Mothers also claim that fathers are not proactive and they expect detailed information on what to do. In addition, fathers, in contrast to mothers, are unable to do many things at the same time. When they look after a baby or a child they concentrate only on one task and cannot do the shopping, cook dinner, and clean the house – things that women usually cope with on an everyday basis.65 Due to this, many women prefer to have fathers ‘under control’ even though they deprive themselves of the chance of taking a break. This may also be the reason why only 11 per cent of women never ask their husbands for help and do everything by themselves, although the majority declare that they would expect their husband to offer support. In a survey, as many as 87 per cent of women say that ‘at home, I prefer to do things by myself instead of asking someone to help me’, and 72 per cent of respondents ‘prefer to take care of home and the family, because nobody can do these things as well as me’.66 There are several reasons for this; many women believe that doing all the housework themselves proves that they are ‘good wives’ and that their solo commitment in looking after a child is one of the qualities of a ‘good mother’. Very often women consider cooking and cleaning an expression of their concern and even love for other members of the family. Apart from this, doing the housework and taking decisions concerning children may give women a sense of control over home reality. The traditional role of the father, who does not know exactly how to take care of children, is often backed up by the reaction of people in his environment. Studies carried by Małgorzata Fuszara67 show that fathers taking care of their children experience support and sympathy, but also surprise, uncertainty, and fear in people around them (mothers, neighbours, shop assistants, medical service staff, etc.) who question their competence. Even fathers who look after children during their paternity leave, and certainly know their children very well, continue to feel incompetent in the face of problems (health, adolescent problems, etc.) and rely on the decisions of mothers. They attribute the mothers’ abilities to solve major problems to natural instincts and competences concerning their children. In conclusion, fathers in modern-day Poland find themselves in a particularly difficult position. On one hand, following the model generally preferred in society, they should take responsibility for supporting their family; on the other hand, they should be committed and act as fathers responsible for 65 66 67

Sikorska (2012b). Titkow et al. (2009, 50–51). Fuszara (2008).

150

SIKORSKA

childcare and child-rearing. However, combining these two roles is difficult, and more so in that although mothers expect their husbands and partners to take care of children and extend their support, they do not fully trust their abilities and are reluctant to share their power at home. Sometimes women subconsciously ‘push men away’ from children, because male commitment threatens their identity as built on being the mother, and thus the sole caregiver and expert in children’s affairs. It seems that we can draw the following conclusion. The currently dominant model of ‘Mother Pole’ plus conditions on the job market, shortages in childcare and in the number of nurseries and kindergartens, and also social policy regulations, all make the position of the mother in Poland today particularly distinctive compared to other countries in Western Europe. However, the position of the father is quite similar to that in Western societies; from being the ‘absent father’ he has become the ‘committed father’. The differences in this process are the pace of change (in Western Europe it started a few decades earlier than in Poland) and the role of ‘Mother Pole’, who does not make it easier for men to become more active at home. Moreover, the lack of equal rights in the division of family and household duties, despite a declared high level of social support for the idea, consolidates a traditional division of roles and in consequence makes a woman responsible (even when employed) for everything, with home and the family considered a priority, while men focus on hunting for money to support the family. 3

The Importance of Family Life for Polish People

Earlier in this chapter, I discussed several issues concerning the Polish family: first, popular support for a traditional family model, as compared to other European countries, resulting in the small number of cohabiting couples, the relatively young age of people getting married, fairly low divorce rate, etc.; second, the divergence between the declared division of duties at home and the social perception of the female/mother and male/father’s roles versus their real-life practice, both being very similar to the traditional family models. The aim of this section is to show to what degree, as compared to other values, family and family relations are important to Polish people,68 along with the possible social consequences of this attitude.69

68 69

See Subsection 3.1. See Subsection 3.2.

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

151

3.1 Family: Family Relations In Poland, prioritising the family has invariably and consequently been considered the most important value, as opposed to work, friendship, other personal relations, politics, and religion. In the 2008 European Values Study, 87 per cent of respondents indicated that family is ‘an important element of life’. In the years preceding this research the rate of positive response to this statement was even higher, 91 per cent in 1989, 1990, 1995, and 1999, and 93 per cent in 2005. This does not make Poland very different from other countries surveyed; in all countries where the evs (European Values Study) studies were carried out, respondents highlighted the role of the family. However, in Poland this role seems to be particularly important. Research carried out by cbos seems to support this interpretation. ‘A happy family’ is considered definitely the most important value in life by 80 per cent of respondents. Good health, ranked second on the list, earned 20 per cent fewer respondents than ‘a happy family’ (see Figure 4.3).70 As many as 95 per cent of respondents describe themselves as ‘family people’; they like spending their free time with family, and only 1 per cent of respondents claim they do not belong to this category; 3 per cent of those questioned maintain they are not likely to be ‘family people’. On top of this, 92 per cent surveyed shared the view that family makes you happy.71 The very important position of the family on the list of values cherished by the Polish people can be seen not only on the survey answer sheet, but also in the way they describe their relations with family members and relatives. Fortyfive per cent of respondents maintain ‘close, friendly, intimate contacts’ with nine or ten family members, and the average number of these close relatives is around seven,72 many more than the average size of the single-household family, which was 2.61 in 2008. Moreover, it should be stressed that there is dependence between the number of people with whom a subject maintains close relations and general levels of satisfaction with life (Pearson’s r is 0.21). This seems to show that people with a larger circle of friends and acquaintances are more satisfied with life (see Table 4.6). Close relations with friends and acquaintances develop through frequent contacts and visits. Of those surveyed, 73 per cent claim that they see their parents at least once a week, 69 per cent see their grandchildren, 58 per cent see their grown-up children who live separately, and about half the number

70 cbos (2008b). 71 Ibid. 72 cbos (2008c).

152

SIKORSKA Happy family

78%

Good health

59%

Honest life

46%

Peacefulness

46%

Professional work

44%

Respect of other people

43%

Group of friends

39%

Religious faith

27%

Prosperity of your home country

19%

Education

18%

Personal prosperity and well-being

18%

Freedom of opinion

11%

Entertainment Chance to participate in democratic socio-political life Life full of adventure, thrill and excitment

4%

Success and position/fame

3%

Hard to say

11% 6%

1% 0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Figure 4.3 The most important values in everyday life Source: cbos (2008b)

Table 4.6 Level of life satisfaction versus number of friends Generally speaking, are you content with your life?

Content (definitely + rather) Middling content Discontent (rather + definitely)

Average number of friends In family

Outside family

Total

7 6 4

8 6 4

15 12 8

Source: cbos (2004)

see their friends and close acquaintances quite often. Very few see the aforementioned people once a year or even less often (see Table 4.7). Research carried out in the years 1999, 2003, and 2008 shows that the intensity of contacts does not change much. People with lower educational background, from small towns and rural areas, and who are greatly attached to their religious values, tend to see their relatives and family members more often.

153

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND Table 4.7 Intensity of contacts with family members, relatives, and friends How often have you seen:

At least At least once a once a week (%) month (%)

Several times a year (%)

Once a Once every I have not year (%) few years seen them (%) for at least five years (%)

I do not know what happens to them (%)

Parents Grandchildren Grown-up children living separately Close friends Parents-in-law Siblings Grandparents Wife/ husband’s siblings Your other relatives Your wife/ husband’s other relatives

73 69 58

17 15 23

6 12 14

2 1 3

1 1 1

1 0 1

1 1 0

51 46 41 30 22

32 30 27 36 29

13 15 20 21 31

3 4 6 8 8

0 2 3 2 4

0 2 2 1 3

1 1 1 1 2

9

28

39

13

8

2

2

7

21

39

14

12

4

3

Source: cbos (2008c)

It is hard to think that holidays such as Christmas and Easter and family events of a religious tradition – baptism, first communion, marriage, funerals, and also birthdays as well as name days could be celebrated without the participation of family members and relatives (at least 90 per cent of respondents celebrated each of these events with family members). Additionally, 75 per cent of respondents meet their family members or acquaintances at weekends, and 80 per cent just meet on an ‘ad hoc’ basis during the week, in the absence of any special occasion. Though these figures are perhaps not particularly precise and may not reflect the true intensity of social and family contacts, one has to admit the frequency of social contact with family members.

154

SIKORSKA

There is no doubt that living close together helps to develop and maintain close family ties. Over 70 per cent of respondents claim that most members of their close family (the in-laws, grown-up children, brothers or sisters, grandparents) ‘live relatively close, in the same village, city, community, or in places spread not far away from one another’. Twenty per cent of those questioned responded that members of their families are dispersed in different regions of Poland.73 A concern for family ties finds support in statistical data emphasising strong relations with parents. Ninety per cent of respondents claim that ‘you should show your father and mother love and respect them, whatever their virtues and vices’. There is only a small group (6 per cent) that demonstrates a more critical attitude towards parents and declares that parents should ‘earn’ the love and respect of their children; if they do not, the children will not take care of them. Therefore, only 11 per cent of those questioned are able to justify a decision to place one of the parents in a residential home, and 50 per cent disapprove of this kind of act,74 though one should remember that we are dealing here with the answers of respondents who may act differently in real-life situations. Close family ties produce high levels of mutual trust, in particular amongst the most immediate family members; parents, spouses, and children – 84 per cent of respondents ‘trust them unquestioningly’ and 13 per cent ‘quite trust them’ (see Figure 4.4). I definitely trust

I rather trust

I rather don't trust

immediate family friends

84% 68%

33%

persons with whom you work every day

17%

neighbours

15%

0%

13%

22%

extended family

parish priest

I definitely don't trust/hard to say

5%

56%

7%

67%

10%

60%

19%

15%

46% 20%

40%

1%

13% 60%

80%

100%

Figure 4.4 Level of trust towards immediate family members and others

Source: cbos (2012b). The graph refers to the question: ‘Generally speaking do you trust or not in:…?’

73 74

It is worth noting that only 1 per cent of respondents do not have any brothers or sisters, or grandparents, grown-up children, or in-laws (cbos 2008c). cbos (2010).

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

155

What is more, the high levels of trust in members of the family and acquaintances is in contrast with low levels of general interpersonal trust as measured in the European Social Survey and in Social Diagnosis.75 This survey made use of a scale whose opposite ends were marked with the phrases ‘never too much security’ versus ‘you can trust most people’. The results show that the level of interpersonal trust among Polish people is still the lowest of all the countries under study, though it has been rising slightly in the last few years. This result could be attributed to the phenomenon called ‘amoral familism’, which in the opinion of some researchers76 is characteristic of Poland. 3.2 ‘Amoral Familism’ The term ‘amoral familism’77 indicates a very strong involvement in family life which, by concentrating too much on family issues, ignores value and personal commitments in areas outside family life, thus discouraging people from assuming more proactive positions towards public life, engagement with civil society, social capital, and community efforts to work towards common goals. Several variables were used to study social capital. One was the level of interpersonal trust, described earlier in this chapter as exceptionally low in Poland. Other variables are also low, in comparison to other European countries. These include involvement in voluntary work (from 10 per cent to just over 20 per cent of adults in the years 2000–2011), involvement in organisations, non-government foundations, social and religious movements (13 per cent of Poles belonged to these kinds of organisations in 2007), referenda turnout (generally around 30 per cent, but near 60 per cent for the eu accession referendum in 2003), turnout for parliamentary elections (since 1989 this has exceeded 50 per cent only twice), and turnout for presidential elections (often close to 60 per cent but in the 2010 election just 55 per cent). 75 76 77

Czapiński and Panek (2009). Czapiński and Panek (2009, 2011). Edward C. Banfield (1958) in The Moral Basis of a Backward Society also used the concept of ‘amoral familism’, to describe the situation in a small town in Italy. He wrote: ‘The book is about a single village in southern Italy, the extreme poverty and backwardness of which is to be explained largely (but not entirely) by the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good or, indeed, for any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear family. This inability to concert activity beyond the immediate family arises from an ethos – that of amoral familism – which has been produced by three factors acting in combination: a high death rate, certain land-tenure conditions, and the absence of the institution of the extended family’ (1958, 10). The Polish phenomenon of ‘amoral familism’ could be also related to the difficult economic situation of families at the time of the People’s Republic of Poland.

156

SIKORSKA

In order to explain these developments, social scientists refer to historical factors, specifically the period of the prl. Sociologist Stefan Nowak78 used the term ‘sociological vacuum’ to describe the reality of the 1970s in the prl. In his view, in Poland in those days there were only two areas around which social life evolved; a sense of abstract national community and a sphere of privacy, with the family as its core element. Between these two poles, there were no spontaneous social acts, nor any citizens’ initiatives, social organisations, associations, or strong social movements. Hanna Bojar, referring to research carried out in the 1970s and the 1980s, also points to the family as having a stable and very strong position in the system of values of Polish people.79 She also draws attention to the fact that family life in Communist Poland was not as sweet and happy as quite frequently presented today in the media (for example, in comedy films produced in the period of the prl). Bojar highlighted that in the period of the so-called ‘late prl’ (1970–89) families were set up ‘under pressure’, often due to an unexpected pregnancy, and their existence was very unstable – at the level of ‘temporary survival’ – due to the lack of accommodation and the large amount of time required to acquire it. To have a family was a very demanding task, to provide it with food and clothing, not readily available in that period, required a great deal of effort, time and attention. Very often it was an area of tension and conflict due to, for example, cramped housing. Moreover, the family sometimes caused people to give up on their ambitions and professional development, ‘for the good’ of the family.80 Contrary to the ever-popular opinion about the importance of the family in protecting people from ‘institutions’ and unfriendly reality by offering an escape into privacy, into a ‘world of their own’, Bojar explains the high position of the family on the list of values as a compensation for failure in meeting life goals and as an expression of longing for a happy family life. In other words, ‘dreaming’ of the family as an ‘isle of safety’, or a ‘haven in a heartless world’ (using Christopher Lasch’s expression, 1977) rather than as a model to follow and implement contributed to its place on a pedestal at the time of the prl. Apart from this, family and children were important for representational purposes, and their well-being helped as compensation for the hardships of everyday life and failure in fulfilling one’s ambitions. One should not forget about the economic operations of the family in an economy of inherent shortages. Małgorzata Szpakowska81 describes, for instance, the routine of doing the 78 Nowak (1979). 79 Bojar (1991). 80 Ibid. 81 Szpakowska (2003).

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

157

laundry at home; this involved the participation of the whole family due to the lack of a washing machine and very often of tap water. Single-handedly it was difficult to do everyday tasks like laundry, or even merely shopping for necessities, as everything had to be ‘fixed’, that is, acquired through interpersonal contacts and tricky ‘arrangements’. In this sense, the family group was more efficient than a single person. One should not ignore that this specific area of life was of primary importance to Poles and this fact could be considered as one of the reasons for the inception of the ‘sociological vacuum’ discussed by Nowak. The results of the above studies concerning social activity (or rather the lack of it), and the importance of family and family ties may lead one to think that the ‘sociological vacuum’ has ceased to exist with changes in the social system. According to Janusz Czapiński,82 the combination of familialisation and individualism (in his view this is a specific kind of individualism, ‘family individualism’, by which Poles do not act by themselves but as families) creates a stumbling block in progress toward the development of civil society and also toward future economic development. Czapiński claims that once people reach a certain level of financial success the key to the future development [of the society] will not be people’s individual qualities such as education, health, and personal fitness, but what exists between them. Weak social relations, the lack of trust, corruption, nepotism, the lack of informal contacts, isolation-living in own small worlds [or the worlds of families] will become a stumbling block of a great braking power.83 4 Conclusions The three areas described in this chapter clearly show the strong attachment to tradition in family life for Polish people. In the first section of this chapter I presented analyses that compare procreative behaviours and the selection of family models in Poland to those adopted by people in other European countries – not only from countries in the socalled ‘old’ European Union, but also from many post-Communist countries. This comparison shows that the extent of the traditional approach to the Polish family practically excludes the possibility of making family-life 82 Czapiński (2009). 83 Ibid.

158

SIKORSKA

patterns in Poland more pluralistic, not to mention the possibility of ‘defamilialisation’.84 Considering all these elements, it is possible to argue that in the case of Poland, the second demographic transition theory does not apply. According to this theory, a drop in birth rate can be explained by changes in the lifestyle of married couples and in different reproductive patterns. However, despite the fact that changes in these areas of life in Poland in the last few decades have been taking place, the changes are minor in comparison with other countries of the ‘old’ eu, and of other post-Communist countries. It is clear that apart from a particularly low birth rate, which can be taken as an indicator of a second demographic transition, and apart from the fact that Poland is becoming increasingly close to other Western European countries from the point of view of family lifestyle, there is no other support for this theory. Therefore, it seems possible to speak of little more than a modified second demographic transition theory, ‘modified’ in the sense that we observe similar changes in lifestyle to that in Western European countries (i.e., a drop in fertility rate), but that it does not come directly from transition patterns contained in the theory of the family model and reproductive patterns. I would argue that the low fertility level in Poland can be explained by referring to Becker’s economic theories, which lead to the conclusion that Polish women (who declare that, unlike men, they want to have fewer children) see more ‘costs’ (in being forced to abandon the job market, as well as the ‘psychological’ costs) than symbolic ‘benefits’ involved in having many children. However, it is hard to think that the decline in the fertility rate was related to transformations that are typical for the second demographic transition. In the second section I described differences between the level of declared responses (for instance, preferred division of duties in the family) and the actual behaviour of Poles. Polish people express opinions that are definitely less traditional than their behaviour in everyday life, which, to a large extent, has to do with the traditional perception of gender roles; the woman’s role (even when working outside home) prioritises looking after home and 84

Chang Kyung-Sup (2010) described the opposite phenomenon: ‘accidental pluralism’ in values, ideologies, and institutions. He analysed the situation in South Korea and noted: ‘Such plurality of values and institutions is particularly noticeable in family ideologies that have functioned both as the practical carrier of traditional family norms and as the receptacle for Western culture and lifestyle’ (2010, 8; also see the Introduction for a brief explanation of the concept of ‘accidental pluralism’ and ‘condensed defamiliation’). In my opinion, describing Poland, ‘accidental pluralism’ could possibly be used only to define the situation of the middle- and upper-class living in cities.

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

159

children and the man’s role emphasises responsibility for financially supporting the family. In the third section I described a very specific and important role of the family in the system of values of the Polish people. Not only do they talk about the importance of the family, but they also put it into practice by seeing family members and relatives regularly on various occasions. They cannot imagine private or religious events without the family in whom they place such trust, and many Poles describe themselves as ‘family people’. In our account of this phenomenon, in terms of intimate and public spheres, we may say that in modern-day Poland we can observe a certain characteristic tendency which has continued to develop since the prl. This is marked by a visible split between the intimate, family-life sphere – highly valued by Poles and full of positive emotions (at least in the close family circle) – and the public-life sphere (state, economy, and civil society), which are viewed very critically, or at least, with a degree of indifference.85 As pointed out by some researchers, this clear split between the intimate and public spheres may be referred to by the term ‘amoral familism’, and it may be considered the reason for the weak commitment of Polish people to public life and, as a result, the low levels of social capital. The attachment to traditional patterns of family life in Poland can be explained by the following factors. Firstly, there is the very strong position of the Catholic Church, whose doctrine continues to shape the views and activities of Poles by promoting traditional patterns of family life. Secondly, 40 per cent of Poland’s population live in rural areas and another 20 per cent in small towns (less than 50,000 inhabitants). The characteristic features of small communities (higher community control, higher social pressure to follow accepted patterns of family life, and traditional division of roles in the family) continue to exert considerable influence in the area of family life. In the world of open communication and in the flow of different lifestyles, Polish people, in terms of family life, continue to behave in a very traditional way – only the middle and upper classes from big cities find an alternative to this approach. It should be remembered that in Western cultures, modifications in the area of family life started at the end of the 1950s, with the process assuming greater intensity in the 1970s and 1980s. In Poland these changes began as late as 1989, following the economic and political transitions associated with the end of communism in Eastern Europe. Considering that all these changes began not 85

Proved for example by the relatively low proportion of voters turning out in elections, compared to other countries.

160

SIKORSKA

earlier than two decades ago it perhaps should not be surprising that, in the first instance, they have more influence on verbal declarations and opinions than on the everyday behaviours of Polish people, and secondly that these changes can be observed most clearly in the family life of only certain social groups. References Banfield, Edward C. 1958. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Glencoe, il: The Free Press. Beck, Ulrich and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. 2002. Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and Its Social and Political Consequences. London: Sage. Becker, Gary S. and Lewis H. Gregg. 1973. ‘On the interaction between the quantity and quality of children’. The Journal of Political Economy 81: 279–288. Bojar, Hanna. 1991 ‘Rodzina i życie rodzinne’ [Family and family life]. In Co nam zostało z tych lat…Społeczeństwo polskie u progu zmiany systemowej [What Is Left of These Years…Polish Society Before Transition], edited by Marody Mirosława, 28–68. London: Aneks. Budrowska, Bogusława. 2007. ‘Nieodpłatna praca kobiet i próby jej wyceny’ [Women’s unpaid work and its valuation]. http://www.ekologiasztuka.pl/pdf/fe007budrowska .pdf. cbos (Public Opinion Research Centre). 2004. ‘W kręgu rodziny i przyjaciół’ [In the circle of family and friends]. Report available at: http://www.cbos.pl. ——. 2006. ‘Kobiety i mężczyźni o podziale obowiązków domowych’ [Women and men on the division of household duties]. Report available at: http://www.cbos.pl. ——. 2008a. ‘Kontrowersje wokół różnych zjawisk dotyczących życia małżeńskiego i rodzinnego’ [Controversy around the various phenomena of marriage and family life]. Report available at: http://www.cbos.pl. ——. 2008b. ‘Nie ma jak rodzina’ [There is nothing more important than family]. Report available at: http://www.cbos.pl. ——. 2008c. ‘Więzi rodzinne’ [Family ties]. Report available at: http://www.cbos.pl. ——. 2010. ‘Co jest ważne, co można a czego nie wolno – normy i wartości w życiu Polaków’ [What is important, what is legal, what is prohibited: Standards and values in the lives of Poles]. Report available at: http://www.cbos.pl. ——. 2012a. ‘Potrzeby prokreacyjne oraz preferowany i realizowany model rodziny’ [Reproductive needs and the preferred family model]. Report available at: http:// www.cbos.pl. ——. 2012b. ‘Zaufanie społeczne’ [Social trust]. Report available at: http://www.cbos.pl. Central Statistical Office in Poland. Data available at: http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/ index_ENG_HTML.htm.

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

161

Chang Kyung-Sup. 2010. South Korea under Compressed Modernity: Familial Political Economy in Transition. London: Routledge. Czapiński, Janusz. 2009. ‘Polska smuta’ [Polish misery], interview. Available at: http:// wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114873,6508620.html. Czapiński, Janusz and Tomasz Panek, eds. 2009. Social Diagnosis 2009. Warsaw: Rada Monitoringu Społecznego. http://www.diagnoza.com. ——. 2011. Social Diagnosis 2011. Warsaw: Rada Monitoringu Społecznego. http://www .diagnoza.com. ess (European Social Survey). Online survey database. http://www.europeansocialsurvey .org/. evs (European Values Study). Online survey database.  http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/. Eurostat. Online Statistical Database. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/ portal/eurostat/home/. Fuszara, Małgorzata, ed. 2008. Nowi mężczyźni? Zmieniające się modele męskości we współczesnej Polsce [New Men? Changing Patterns of Masculinity in Contemporary Poland]. Warsaw: trio. Hays, Sharon. 1996. The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood. New Haven, ct: Yale University Press. Kasearu, Kairi. 2007. ‘The case of unmarried cohabitation in Western and Eastern Europe’. Draft presented at the conference of the European Network on Divorce on Comparative and Gendered Perspectives on Family Structure, London School of Economics, 17–18 September. Kotowska, Irena E., ed. 2005. Scenariusze polityki ludnościowej dla Polski. Badanie eksperckie Delphi [Scenarios for Polish Population Policy: Expert Examination of Delphi]. Warsaw: Szkoła Główna Handlowa. Kotowska, Irena, Urszula Sztanderska and Irena Wóycicka. 2006. Aktywność zawodowa i edukacyjna a obowiązki domowe w świetle badań empirycznych [Professional and Educational Activity against Domestic Responsibilities in Light of Empirical Research]. Warsaw: IBnGR. Lasch, Christopher. 1977. Haven in a Heartless World. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company. Mynarska, Monika and Anna Matysiak. 2010. ‘Diffusion of cohabitation in Poland’. Studia Demograficzne [Demographic Studies] 157 (1–2): 11–25. Nowak, Stefan. 1979. ‘System wartości społeczeństwa polskiego’ [The system of values of Polish society]. Studia Socjologiczne (Sociological Studies) 4: 155–174. Okólski, Marek. 2005. Demografia. Podstawowe pojęcia, procesy i teorie w encyklopedyczny zarysie [Demographics: Basic Concepts, Processes and Theories – The Encyclopaedic Overview]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. Sikorska, Małgorzata, ed. 2008. Z macierzyństwem na co dzień [Motherhood and Its Daily Practice]. http://axa.pl/fileadmin/media/swf/WspieramyMamy/.

162

SIKORSKA

——. 2009. Nowa matka, nowy ojciec, nowe dziecko – o nowym układzie sił w polskich rodzinach [A New Mother, a New Father, a New Baby: A New Balance of Power in Polish Families]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Profesjonalne i Akademickie. ——. 2012a. ‘Coraz mniej rodziny, coraz więcej jednostek, czyli o przemianach sfery życia rodzinnego w Polsce’ [Less and less families, more and more individuals, or on the changes of family life in Poland]. In Przemiany wartości Polaków w jednoczącej się Europie [Values and Changes: Poles’ Changing Attitudes in Uniting Europe], edited by Aleksandra Jasińska-Kania, 15–30. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. ——. 2012b. Ciemna strona macierzyństwa [The Dark Side of Motherhood: The Anxiety of Contemporary Mothers]. http://axa.pl/fileadmin/media/swf/WspieramyMamy/. Silverstein, Louise B. and Carl Auerbach. 2005. ‘(Post)modern families’. In Families in Global Perspectives, edited by Jaipaul Roopnarine and Uwe P. Gielen, 33–48. Boston, ma: Pearson Education. Staniszewski, Marek. 2006. ‘System wartości – Polska na tle Europy’ [Value system: Poland in comparison with other European countries]. In Kultura i wartości a administracje publiczne w Europie [Cultures and Values and Public Administration in Europe], edited by Małgorzata Molęda-Zdziech, Prace i Materiał [Working papers] 34: 23–32. Warsaw: Institute for International Studies Warsaw School of Economics. Styrc, Marta. 2010. ‘Czynniki wpływające na stabilność pierwszych małżeństw’ [Determinants of the marital stability of first marriages in Poland]. Studia Demograficzne [Demographic Studies] 157 (1–2): 27–60. Szarfaniec, Krystyna, ed. 2011. Young Generation 2011. http://www.obserwatoriumkultury .pl/files/study/raport_modzi_2011_copy2.pdf. Szlendak, Tomasz. 2010. Socjologia Rodziny [Sociology of Family]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo pwn. Szpakowska, Małgorzata. 2003. Chcieć i mieć [To Want and To Have]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo wab. Titkow, Anna. 2007. Tożsamość polskich kobiet. Ciągłość, zmiana, konteksty [The Identity of Polish Women: Continuity, Change, Contexts]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN. Titkow, Anna and Danuta Duch-Krzystoszek. 2009. ‘Niejednoznaczny status pracy domowej kobiet’ [Ambiguous status of women’s domestic labour]. In Raport. Kongres kobiet polskich 2009 [Report: Congress of Polish Women 2009], 35–62. Warsaw: Fundacja Feminoteka [Feminoteka Fundation]. Available at: http://polandwatch .typepad.com/files/raport-kobiety-dla-polski-polska-dla-kobiet.-20-lat-transformacji-1989-2009.pdf.pdf. Titkow, Anna, Danuta Duch-Krzystoszek and Bogusława Budrowska. 2009. Nieodpłatna praca kobiet mity, realia, perspektywy [Women’s Unpaid Work: Myths, Realities, Perspectives]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN. tns obop (Public Opinion Poll Centre). 2003. Małżeństwo 2002 [Marriage 2002]. http:// www.tnsglobal.pl/archiwumraportow/.

CHANGES IN THE AREa OF FAMILY LIFE IN POLAND

163

Van de Kaa, Dirk J. 2002. ‘The idea of a second demographic transition in industrialized countries’. Paper presented at the Sixth Welfare Policy Seminar of the National Institute of Population and Social Security, Tokyo, Japan, 29 January. http://websv .ipss.go.jp/webj-ad/WebJournal.files/population/2003_4/Kaa.pdf. Wieruszewski, Roman. 1975. Społeczne skutki realizacji równości płci [The Social Impact of the Implementation of Gender Equality]. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie. wvs (World Values Survey). Online survey database. http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/ WVSAnalize.jsp.

CHAPTER 5

Contemporary Family in Slovakia Demography, Values, Gender and Policy

Peter Guráň, Jarmila Filadelfiová and Miloš Debnár Introduction In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in the family among scholars.1 This growing interest stems from changes in family behaviour as well as in intimate relationships. The fact that these changes are happening is acknowledged by almost everyone, since they are easily empirically verifiable. In general, we can point to changes such as increasing frequency of cohabitation, the postponement of marriage and parenthood until a later age, a lower marriage rate and higher divorce rate, more children born out of wedlock, more singleparent families, and an increasing number of remarriages or marriages without children. Differences between studies tend to reside in the interpretation of these changes. Rather more pessimistic commentators on demographic change understand it as a sign of departure from the family, as a crisis of family and decay of the society and its basis, this caused by increasing individualism and irresponsible lifestyles.2 Academics, in their endeavour to explain those changes, are more realistic in their interpretations. Contrary to the concept of a crisis, a view of society during these changes which focuses on its dynamics and interconnectedness is often adopted, stressing the historically positive role of individualisation.3 Some authors see the causes in the dissolving value system while others see it in a wider context of socio-cultural structures. Some authors focus in their theory on the second demographic transition,4 others rather on the concepts of traditional and modern families5 or the 1 Graham and Jones (2002); Thornton and Philipov (2009). 2 Jamieson et al. (2006). 3 Bauman (2001); Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002). Positive aspects of individualisation include, for example, more independence, responsibility for one’s own activities and thinking, and a greater tolerance of diversity. 4 Van de Kaa (1994). 5 Through this chapter we often refer to the concepts of modern and traditional family in Slovakia. By the modern family in Slovakia we understand a model in which the positions of the man and the woman in a relationship and within a family (in terms of decision-making and sharing of domestic work) are (more) equal, upbringing and education of the children is

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004276833_007

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

165

post-modern family and society respectively. Arland Thornton and Dimiter Philipov’s paradigm of developmental idealism is based on the concept of the modern family and society;6 it positioned the countries of Central and Eastern Europe7 somewhere between the East and the West – as countries with a modern society but with a traditional family system, that is, countries ‘at halfway’. Whereas their societies fulfil given conditions of modernity, their family systems do not – and there are many traditional traits. As an explanation for this, Thornton and Philipov propose slow ideological change, further strengthened by such deficits as limited choices of life path, partner and parenthood, rights to a dignified life being superior to preservation of the family, and inequalities between men and women in the division of labour in the family. In addition, they point out the closed character of society, restrictions on other activities, lack of wealth and shortcomings in education. These factors caused a retreat into intimate life. The need for help from the rest of the family in the case of establishing couples’ own family units increased, and this consequently strengthened a mutual feeling of reciprocity amongst the broader family.8 This  model provides us with a system for evaluating society and family. All these concepts are useful when seeking a better understanding of the situation in Slovakia. Furthermore, changes in family behaviour which were taking place in Western countries from the second half of the twentieth century have happened in Slovakia in the last twenty years. Thus, the same changes (although not all) came to Slovakia later, but at the same time they proceeded faster and simultaneously. In other words, for the characteristics of the second demographic transition in Slovakia, we can emphasise three adjectives: postponed, ­compressed, and multilinear. By connecting these three words we can understand and specify more precisely the character of Slovakia in terms of changing family behaviour within the concept of the second demographic transition. One of those characteristics in the case of Slovakia was a discrepancy between real family behaviour democratic, the informal relationships such as love or partnership are highly valued, and the connections to a wider family are weaker. By contrast, the traditional family refers to a model in which a man is the authority within the family, childcare and chores are the domain of the  woman, the upbringing and education of the children is autocratic, formal relations (especially marriage) are highly valued, and the connections to a wider family are strong. 6 Thornton and Philipov (2009). 7 See the remarks in the Preface of this volume regarding the conceptualisation of Central and Eastern Europe. 8 Thornton and Philipov (2009).

166

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

and the value system. When we analyse this discrepancy in detail and compare its behavioural and value dimensions with other societies, for example those in Western Europe, we can see that, for family behaviour and its consequent demographic processes, its main characteristic is the shift in time, and thus the adjective postponed is fitting. As for the value dimension, the characteristic trait is the speed, the dynamics being compressed into a relatively short time. For the beginning of family behaviour typical of the second demographic transition, we can look back about twenty or twenty-five years. For example, in the mid-1980s the mean age of a mother at first birth was still one of the lowest in Europe, the marriage rate high, the proportion of children born out of wedlock low, etc. However, other processes, such as the decrease in the fertility rate, started earlier despite direct state interventions through pro-natal measures (e.g., a baby boom in the mid-1970s). The effect of state interventions and planned policies emerged sooner and more markedly in female employment. From the 1950s we can talk about a high participation rate of women in the labour market connected with a rapid increase in the education level of women. This development is also an example of the aforementioned discrepancy between actual behaviour and values. The modern family model was actually not internalised among the majority of the population. The division of labour in the household remained for a long time traditional and thus the majority of the research on this period points out the so-called ‘double shift’ of working mothers who also had to deal with the majority of household chores. A mixture of social interventions and the prevailing traditionally oriented value system is also obvious from the mainstream model of life starting during the socialist era. Typical was the so-called ‘triple start’, when a young man and woman, in a relatively short period of time after graduating from school, almost simultaneously started their working lives as well as their married and parental lives. In other words, early pregnancy, early wedding, compulsory work and often living with one’s parents was a prevailing model which definitely did not contribute to the quality of family relations and only intensified the aforementioned discrepancy between behaviour and values. When we scrutinise the value dimension of family change in Slovakia ­further, we realise that it is yet more complicated (i.e., multilinear), since it is not occurring only with a time delay, but as already mentioned, it is happening in a highly dynamic way in a relatively short time period, that is, being ­compressed as well. A relatively weak shift towards the liberalisation and individualisation of the family value system accompanied the whole period of demographic change. We can identify significant value changes corresponding to family behaviour only in the last decade. Real family behaviour seems to have ‘slipped

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

167

through people’s fingers’, as it was not justified by values and internalised. The rapid and compressed character of these recent changes overlaps with the characteristics of so-called ‘compressed modernity’, which Chang Kyung-Sup defined as a civilizational condition in which economic, political, social and/or cultural changes occur in an extremely condensed manner in respect to both time and space, and in which the dynamic coexistence of mutually disparate historical and social elements leads to the construction and reconstruction of a highly complex and fluid social system.9 Although this concept is best applicable to the changing condition in East Asian countries, in some respects it is useful for interpreting the changes in Slovakia and some other Central and Eastern European post-socialist countries as well. Especially, this concept addresses, among other features, strong traditionalism as well as the closed and highly coherent character of the family system which is common in this region in general, and particularly so in Slovakia. On the other hand, it is necessary to stress that despite being historically relatively short, it was during the forty-year-long period of Communist rule when the second demographic transition started. At the same time, this period disrupted the continuity of previous developments and caused the third trait mentioned above – multilinearity, as well as reversibility (see Subsection 2.1). The family was actually delimited in a contrasting way as an ‘oasis of privacy’ against imposed collectivism and uniform ideology. The family and relatives provided a space of freedom from ubiquitous state control. Secret marriages in churches and baptisms were not only matters of family pride and/or tradition but also a form of resistance. This conception of the family further strengthened its traditionally high (Christian) value, but not the quality of relationships within the family. Furthermore, some sociologists found a correlation between the meaning (value) of the family and the development of civic society. The more society was based on freedom, structured and with high mobility, the more family relations loosen and other relations become valued. In this manner Patrick Heady argues that familialism and localism are two sides of the same phenomena.10 People in weaker family systems (i.e., Northern and Western Europe) tend to be spatially more mobile, 9 10

Chang (2010, 444). Also see the brief explanation of this term and its related concepts in the Introduction of this volume. Heady et al. (2011).

168

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

gender roles are not so strictly divided, and the value of friendship is more emphasised. In general, with a certain degree of simplification, we can say that forty years of Communism in Slovakia influenced the family in two contradictory ways. First, it brought about an increase in the intensity of family relations but not an increase in their quality.11 Secondly, it created a formally unified model of the external characteristics of a family, but also strengthened the internal differentiation of values. That is to say, families resembled each other in their external characteristics, but were highly differentiated in their value orientations, from strong Christian, mainly Catholic, families, through a mainstream with ‘mixed’ neutral values; to families with liberal and gender-sensitive values. For example, in research on divorce patterns from the mid-1980s12 the authors found three qualitatively different patterns with regard to the character of the relationship between partners and the ways in which they solved conflicts that arose between them. Developments after the Velvet Revolution13 brought a pluralisation or destandardisation of family patterns, family behaviour, family cycles, and, especially in the last decade, more substantial individualisation of family values, emphasising quality and intimacy of relations within the family and their vertical and horizontal equality. These increasing demands on the quality of the family also make it more vulnerable and less stable. Consequently, this has led to a perception that there is a crisis of the family and to calls stressing the need to return to traditional values. However, as Patrick Heady argues, ‘crisis usually cannot be solved by returning to the previous situation and if this is a conservative program, I think it will not succeed’.14 11

12 13

14

By this we mean that although the extent of relationships with family was intense, it was, to a certain degree, forced by circumstances that could lead to a decrease in the quality of these relations. For example, the cohabitation of young couples with their parents might have caused a decrease in the quality of the relationships with them by interventions in the personal lives or dependence of the young couple on parents. Guráň (1989). Besides the Velvet Revolution, another major political development was the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1993. However, this did not have a significant effect on family changes in Slovakia since numerous demographic indicators of family behaviour were different in both countries during the federal era as well. For example, while the divorce rate in the Czech Republic in the late 1980s was amongst the highest in Europe, it was amongst the lowest in the case of Slovakia (Guráň 1989). In general, we can say that family behaviour in the Czech Republic was closer to the Western European model, whereas the commonalities with Slovakia were politically and economically conditioned. Heady et al. (2011).

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

169

We think that in our historical and cultural space we cannot, and we could not, talk about a crisis of the family. We can talk about changes which only prove its adaptability and strong value fixation, or in other words, respecting the dominant value hierarchy. As family used to be ‘a place of freedom’ during the Communist era, it becomes for ever more people a place of irreplaceable intimacy and emotion in today’s open, rational, and dynamic society. 1

Demographic Changes

As famous Czech demographers stress: ‘in conditions of general change, it can hardly be anticipated that a part of life such as the reproductive behaviour of the population would remain changeless’.15 Logical and inevitable consequences of the transformative movements in the economic sphere of the society were also accompanied by substantial shifts in demographic trends. In other words, new economic and social conditions are necessarily reflected in the social awareness and behaviour of people. Changing life-conditions influence the assessment of these changes and create a new social climate, including around reproduction. In times of radical social change, which started in Slovakia in late 1989 and continued through the 1990s, income and social inequality increased, the likelihood of obtaining housing changed, employment became more insecure, and fears of unemployment emerged. This led to a differentiation of attitudes towards decisions such as marriage, starting a family, and number of children. Significantly, this social change also affected the social and family policy of the state. The retreat from national paternalism, more stress on family autonomy, and the restriction of allowances and support for families with children represent major changes in family policy. These, together with the simultaneous increase in living costs, also influenced attitudes within the population and real reproductive behaviour. Before 1989, reproductive behaviour in Slovakia can be characterised as rather traditional. Compared with other Western European countries, both the marriage rate and fertility rate were higher, while the divorce rate was lower.16 Until 1990, a very large majority of children were born within wedlock (more than 90 per cent) and the most fertile cohort consisted of women aged 20–24 (this group was responsible for more than 75 per cent of total live births). Women also became mothers at a relatively young age – the mean age of a woman at the first birth was for a long time between twenty-one and 15 16

Pavlík and Kučera (1999, 9). Filadelfiová (2000, 2001, Filadelfiová, 2004); Filadelfiová and Cuperová (2000).

170

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

twenty-two years. Moreover, reproductive activity not only started early, but also stopped at a relatively young age. The model of two consecutive births followed by a prompt return to work was dominant. This was motivated by the necessity of a double income, a general obligation to work, the actual system of maternity leave, the high level of education of women, and women’s need for self-realisation. Another characteristic trait of reproductive behaviour was a low awareness of planned parenthood – the free and informed decision of parents on when and how many children they would have and also on the prevention of pregnancy. The prevention of pregnancy was not based on modern birth control methods and in the majority of cases the couples relied on natural methods or luck. This led to a high number of abortions, as a method of dealing with undesired pregnancy.17 Slovakia was also notable for the high proportion of women pregnant at the time of marriage, as high as 50 per cent.18 This rather traditional family behaviour before 1989 is usually ascribed to cultural traditions (traditional attitudes towards marriage and family), with a high degree of social control (especially in rural areas), but also socio-economic ­factors, that is, social policy, economic, and political conditions during the Communist era, were also significant.19 A number of demographic processes have seen change since 1990, both in their long-term tendencies and core characteristics. The general trend in the fertility rate shows an obvious decline, though rather than declining gradually it did so in three distinct waves (see Figure 5.1). The fertility rate decreased for the first time between the years 1921 and 1939 when the total number of live births dropped from 110,000 to around 80,000 and the crude birth rate declined from 38.2 to 22.7 live births per 1,000 people. The second wave occurred between 1950 and 1968 when the total number of live births dropped below 80,000 and the crude birth rate declined from 28 to 17 live births per 1,000 people. This decline was halted only by strong intervention from the state (increasing family support through more affordable loans, depreciations from loans and family allowances, subsidisies of childrens’ goods, etc.), which was reflected in a so-called ‘baby boom’ in the second half of the 1970s. Despite the fact that this support was maintained, a third period of decline in fertility 17

18 19

Because the change in legislation regarding abortions in 1957 was not accompanied by the introduction of sexual education and/or an introduction of more accessible modern methods of birth control, a significant increase in the number of abortions followed – in the year 1988, the number of abortions was as high as 9.7 cases per 1,000 people (Vaňo, 2003). Filadelfiová (2004, 2007); Filadelfiová and Guráň (1997); Guráň and Filadelfiová (1995); Pilinská et al. (2005). Bútorová and Filadelfiová (2008); Vaňo (2003, 2005).

171

Contemporary Family In Slovakia 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0

1921-1925 1936-1940 1947 1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010

0.0

Live Births per 1,000 people

Deaths per 1,000 people

Figure 5.1  Crude birth and death rates (1920–2010)

Source: Movement and Characteristics of Population. Slovstat Database. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 1920–2010

followed after 1979 and lasted until 2002. During this period, the number of live births dropped to 50,000 and the crude birth rate declined from 20.3 to 9.5. This is the longest period of decline so far recorded – it lasted for twenty-three years and during the mid-1990s even accelerated. Since 2003, the number of live births has increased reaching 61,217 births in 2009, this meant 11.9 live births per 1,000 people (in the following year, 2010, a slight decrease was recorded – there were 60,410 live births and the crude birth rate was 11.3). Experts predict that the tendency towards an increase in live births and fertility could last for another ten years and then it will probably stop.20 Although similar tendencies in reproductive behaviour were found in other post-socialist countries in Central Europe,21 a comparison with some other, non-European regions shows interesting results. For example, results of comparative research on Asian families22 in four developed countries in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) show that the actual values of fertility indicators (i.e., crude birth rate and total fertility rate) are very similar to those recorded in Slovakia. Interestingly enough, the beginning of 20 21 22

Bleha and Vaňo (2007). Thornton and Philipov (2009). Ochiai (2009).

172

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

the decrease in Japan is identical with the second wave in Slovakia (the early 1950s) and in the remaining three societies it is identical with the Slovakian third wave. In other words, the three-phase process of declining fertility which started in Slovakia in the first decades of the twentieth century and lasted for approximately seventy years was one-third shorter in the case of Japan, and in the cases of Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore as much as two-thirds shorter. This means that the intensity of this process was significantly higher in the aforementioned Asian countries. It will be interesting to  see whether we can also recognise in those countries a stabilisation or  slight  increase in fertility as we did in Slovakia at the beginning of the twenty-first century. A significant decrease was also recorded in the total fertility of Slovak women (see Figure 5.2). Whereas in the 1950s the mean value was 3.5 children per woman, in 1990 it was already less than a ‘self-reproductive’ 2.1 and between the years 2001 and 2003 it even dropped below 1.2 children per woman. In the following years, this indicator fluctuated slightly above the level of 1.2 children per woman and was one of the lowest values among the eu27 countries.23 In recent years a slight increase to a level of 1.4 children per woman has been recorded. The same level of total fertility in 2010 could also 4

3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5

3.546 3.332 2.935 2.547 2.499 2.5 2.307 2.278 2.271 2.269 2.253 2.254 2.2 2.145 2.145 2.081 2.085 2.049 1.993 1.932 1.669 1.523 1.47 1.428 1.374 1.329 1.292 1.198 1.185 1.199 1.241 1.253 1.239 1.251 1.32 1.41 1.4

3.5

19

70

-7 4 19 80 19 82 19 84 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00 20 02 20 04 20 06 20 08 20 10

4 -6

60

19

19

50

-5

4

0

Figure 5.2  Total fertility rate (1950–2010)

Source: Movement and Characteristics of Population. Slovstat Database. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 1950–2010

23

World Bank Data, retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN/ countries.

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

173

be seen in some other eu countries (such as Austria, Germany, Greece, Malta, Poland, Romania, and Spain), and also outside the eu. However, among the eu countries lower fertility was recorded only in Hungary (1.3), Latvia, and Portugal (1.2). In other words, because of the increase in live births, the position of Slovakia slightly improved, but the prognoses suggest that this will only be temporary.24 The last decrease in birth rate and fertility was relatively rapid (especially after 1993) and took place despite the positive demographic outlook; in this period a strong cohort of ‘baby boomers’ born in the 1970s started to reach reproductive age. This decline in the fertility rate, in otherwise positive demographic conditions, has usually been explained by the postponing of parenthood to a later age, an overall aggravation of the conditions for family formation affecting a wide variety of population groups, and also the emergence of new opportunities for young people such as study and work abroad or international travel. These factors contributed to a diversification of the previously rather uniform set of life strategies and orientations.25 The slight increase in the fertility rate in recent years is usually explained by the increase in the number of those entering marriage. The numerous generation of the 1970s did not have children at the age which was previously typical (a mean age at the birth of first child of around twenty-two years) but became parents at a markedly higher age. The age of mothers at childbirth in Slovakia has been rapidly increasing in recent years. Although the mean age of a woman in 1990 was 22.0 years for the first child and 24.6 years for all births, it was around five years older by 2010: 27.3 for the first child and 28.8 for all births.26 A majority of early parenthoods, which were typical for Slovakia until the mid-1990s, is probably now a phenomenon of history, however, there is still a diversity in trends relating to marriage and reproduction depending on education, the size of town, region, and religion.27 In general, the tendency of abandoning early parenthood has been perceived positively since young parents were criticised for their immaturity and 24 25 26

27

Bleha and Vaňo (2007). Filadelfiová (2005a, 2005b, 2008); Pilinská et al. (2005); Vaňo (2003, 2005, 2007). This actual postponement of parenthood was also reflected in public opinion: in 1995 the population of Slovakia believed that the most appropriate age for a woman to have her first child was twenty-three years, but it was already twenty-six in 2006. The ideal age for men increased even more – it was twenty-nine years by this point (Bútorová and Filadelfiová 2008, 58). Jurčová (2006).

174

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

for being unready to fulfil their roles in emotional, social, and material terms.28 At the same time, some authors pointed out the biological limits of further postponements of parenthood and the possibility of unrealised fertility in recent years.29 The postponement of parenthood until a later age also brought notable shifts in the mutual relationships between parenthood and participation in the labour market.30 In the past, young people usually started their families very early after graduating from school or even during training for their future job, births (usually of two children) occurred at the beginning of their careers, and a more or less continuous return to the labour market followed.31 First births realised at a later age means they are preceded by a longer period of involvement in the labour market, which significantly changes demand for childcare support. A higher mean age also considerably changes the fertility of women by age. Women aged 20–24 years used to be the most fertile group in the long term (more than three-quarters of all live births), however, nowadays they form only the third most fertile cohort after 30–34 year olds (second) and 25–29 year olds (first). All these changes reflect the so-called shift from the Eastern European regime of early and high fertility32 concentrated into a short time interval and increasing the diversity in reproduction strategies in terms of the timing of the births. Adolescent fertility remained relatively stable; there are around forty births a year to mothers aged fourteen or less and around 4,000 births to mothers aged 15–19 years. There were 4,062 new mothers aged 19 or younger in Slovakia in 2010. Most children (more than a half) are born as the first child and the intensity of fertility with regard to the firstborn is increasing with time. This results partly from a slight increase in childless women (to 17–20 per cent) but mainly from a significant increase in the share of one-child families, doubling in

28

29 30 31

32

More than 90 per cent of young couples were more or less dependent on their parents in material and other (childcare, etc.) terms (Vereš, 1990). The idea that parents felt responsible for their children and were obliged to help them, even after they became adults and started their own families, was a widespread norm in society. Jurčová (2006); Možný (2006, 198). Fahey and Spéder (2004); Hašková (2008); Rabušič (2001). In the so-called ‘triple start’, right after graduation or the return of the young men from military service, not only working life, but also partnership (i.e., marriage) and parenthood started in relatively rapid succession (Guráň and Filadelfiová 1995; Filadelfiová and Guráň 1997). Kučera and Fialová (1996); Rychtaříková (1996).

175

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

comparison with the previous generation from 15 to 30 per cent.33 In other words, this means another shift from the two-child family model which dominated in previous decades. Another important change is a surge in the number of children born out of wedlock – this has risen from less than 6,000 in 1989 to more than 20,000 in 2010 (see Figure 5.3). As a share of the total number of live births, it more than tripled from 7.6 per cent in 1990 to 25.0 per cent in 2005 and increased further to 33.0 per cent in 2010. Among the children born out of wedlock, firstborn children predominate and thus we can suppose that many parents of these children get married after their first child’s birth. The rapid increase in the number of the children born out of wedlock is related to a growing acceptance of alternative relationships and unmarried motherhood.34 According to a ­survey conducted by the Institute for Public Affairs (ivo) in 2006, as much as 47  per cent of the adult population of Slovakia declared a tolerant attitude towards out-of-wedlock motherhood and a further 29 per cent expressed an 160,000 140,000 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000

1921-1925 1936-1940 1947 1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010

0

Induced Abortions

Spontaneous Abortions

Marital Births

Extra-Marital Births

Figure 5.3  Number of births and abortions by type (1920–2010)

Source: Movement and Characteristics of Population. Slovstat Database. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 1920–2010

33 34

Vaňo (2007, 22). Vašková (2005).

176

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

ambivalent attitude.35 It must also be noted that the abolition of many benefits and state subsidies bound to marriage most probably plays a role as well. Results of public opinion surveys suggest that the mechanism behind the decline in birth rate and fertility is related to a forced choice rather than to a free decision. Specifically, they show a divergent relationship between the real number of children and the ideal size of a family, a small proportion of women declining motherhood or planning only one child, and a small difference between the youngest and the oldest groups of women. Around one-third of women who were past the age of fertility had a number of children lower than their ideal had been, and the average number of children was lower than the ideal by 0.29 (2.03 against an ideal of 2.32); the share of women in the youngest age group who did not want to have children was only 2 per cent and those who only desired one child was 13.7 per cent; the mean ideal number of children for women aged thirty-five and less was 2.1, while it was 2.4 children for women aged fifty-five years and older.36 At the same time this research identified the reasons behind the unrealised ideal number of children as being predominantly economic – financial difficulties, the high expense of raising a child, and the availability of housing. Non-economic reasons such as health problems or difficulties in partnerships placed far behind. These results suggest that political interventions should address this issue in such a way that people will not worry about having children. Such interventions should focus on easing access to childcare for parents, especially in terms of financial help and spatial availability of services. Another characteristic of Slovakia before 1989 was the high number of abortions, especially artificial ones. Abortions were legalised in Slovakia by Law No. 68/157 Coll. on artificial abortion of the pregnancy, and despite the traditionalistic cultural background of those times (i.e., a high share of practising Christians), right after its adoption the number of abortions started to rise dramatically (see Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4). Numbers peaked in 1988 when 51,000 abortions were performed in Slovakia. A failure of the public policy in terms of providing affordable modern methods of birth control, the absence of any information campaign on the adoption of the new legislation, and the absence of sex education resulted in the uptake of abortions instead of family planning. The number of abortions started to fall rapidly after 1990 and the following decade witnessed a dramatic shift in long-term trends. After ten years, in 1999, the number of abortions declined below 20,000 and in 2010 there were only

35 36

Bútorová and Filadelfiová (2008, 66–67). Bodnárová et al. (2004); Fahey and Spéder (2004).

177

Contemporary Family In Slovakia 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0

1921-1925 1936-1940 1947 1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010

0.0

Live Births per 1,000 people

Abortions per 1,000 people

Figure 5.4 Crude birth and abortion rates (1920–2010)

Source: Movement and Characteristics of Population. Slovstat Database. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 1920–2010

12,589. The crude abortion rate reached 3.2 abortions per 1,000 people, close to the level of the 1950s. This shift in the abortion rate is one of the most positive tendencies in the reproductive behaviour of the Slovakian population, and one which was reached without changes in legislation.37 However, despite this positive trend, abortion is the object of strong social and political disagreement and the movement for its complete prohibition remains relatively strong (a number of legislative changes restricting the conditions for its availability have already been adopted). Initiatives to restrict abortion through legislation and to ­criminalise women who have abortions are pushed by ngos with Christian backgrounds,38 representatives of the Church, which has a strong position in  Slovakia and intensively intervenes in social discourse, and also by some 37 38

Filadelfiová (2005a, 2005b); Vaňo (2003). Pro-life attitudes are encouraged by a well-connected network of organisations with Christian backgrounds. Amongst the long-term and vigorous campaigns for restrictions on the reproductive rights of women, the most active are Fórum života (Life forum) and Centrum pre bioetickú reformu (The centre for bio-ethical reform). See http://www.cbreurope .sk and http://www.forumzivota.sk.

178

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

political parties. The primary motivation behind these initiatives are ideological orientations based on the concept of protecting life from its conception (besides abortions, they also fight against birth control and assisted reproduction). The real needs of women and the preservation of reproductive rights and access to health services for reproduction are represented in Slovakia by only a few feminist-oriented ngos. No political party promotes a pro-choice attitude. Similar to trends in the development of the birth rate, we can also see fluctuation of increasing and declining tendencies in the marriage rate over the span of nine decades (see Figure 5.5). It peaked in the late 1940s, when there were more than eleven marriages per 1,000 people a year, and then in the mid1950s and 1970s, when it reached a level of nine marriages per 1,000 people. Since this time, the general tendency has been one of decline. The divorce rate has developed in a different way – it is characterised by a slight but continual increase. Despite these characteristics, in terms of divorce and marriage rates, Slovakia was a rather traditional country before 1989 – compared to other European countries, it maintained a high marriage and low divorce rate. However, since the 1990s the situation has changed markedly. First of all, in 1992 the marriage rate started to decline rapidly and fell to 4.4 marriages per 1,000 people in 2001. In recent years, the number of new marriages has exceeded 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0

1921-1925 1936-1940 1947 1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010

0.0

Marriages per 1,000 people

Figure 5.5  Crude marriage and divorce rates (1920–2010)

Divorces per 1,000 people

Source: Movement and Characteristics of Population. Slovstat Database. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 1920–2010

179

Contemporary Family In Slovakia Table 5.1

Mean age of mothers at childbirth and of men and women at first marriage (1990–2010) 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Men at first marriage Women at first marriage Women at first childbirth Women at childbirth (all births)

23.6 21.5 22.0 24.6

24.7 22.3 22.7 25.3

26.1 23.6 23.9 26.2

28.2 25.6 25.7 27.5

28.5 25.8 26.0 27.8

28.6 26.1 26.3 28.1

28.9 26.3 26.9 28.3

29.2 26.6 27.0 28.59

29.5 26.9 27.3 28.8

Source: Vaňo (2003, 2005, 2007); Informácia o demografickom vývoji v roku 2010. Bratislava, ŠÚ SR 30. June 2011

25,000 a year; in 2010 it was 25,415. The divorce rate has continued its slightly increasing tendency and stabilised around the level of two divorces per 1,000 people. Regarding the structure of those two demographic processes, the most important change is probably the dramatic increase in the mean marriage age – by approximately 5.5 years for both men and women (see Table 5.1). The mean age at first marriage for men was still only 23.6 years in 1993 but increased to 29.5 by 2010 (the mean for all marriages had already exceeded thirty years). The mean age for women has increased as well; from 21.5 at the beginning of the 1990s to 26.9 at first marriage in 2010 (more than twenty-nine years for all marriages). We can see postponement until a later age also in the case of first marriages. This is reflected also in the marriage patterns of the cohort of those aged thirty-five years and older; its share has risen since 1990 from 10 to 25 per cent for men and from 5 to 15 per cent for women. 1.1 Regional Heterogeneity in Family Behaviour and Reproductive Strategies Many already-mentioned tendencies indicate an increasing diversity in the reproduction and family behaviour of the Slovakian population in the last fifteen to twenty years, and a perspective on the regions only amplifies this. Particularities in the demographic processes in regions are caused by specific demographic composition (different proportions of old and young people and fertile women), but cultural factors (major religious affiliation or ethnic composition) and socioeconomic factors (different economic and social conditions) also play their role. All these factors influence reproductive behaviour in different regions.39 39

Administratively, Slovakia is divided into eight prefectures and seventy-nine regions.

180

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

Among all indicators, the biggest differences between the regions are in the share of children born out of wedlock, these have grown even further in recent years. As can be seen in Table  5.2, this share varies between 6 per cent and 47 per cent, but public discussion on the proportion of children born out of wedlock lacks the regional dimension, which often leads to spurious interpretations. Proponents of the traditional family40 use the increase in this indicator to support their claims of a ‘departure from family’ or ‘family crisis’, and it is Table 5.2 Regional heterogeneity in reproductive behaviour and the context of life quality Mean of sr

Variance in the regions of Slovakia

Year 2010

Means for years 2005–9

1. Selected indicators of reproductive behaviour Total fertility rate Mean age at first childbirth Share of extramarital births Total induced abortion rate Mean age of women at first marriage Total divorce rate

1.40 27.30 33.00 0.32 26.90 0.26

1.02–2.08 23.75–29.84 6.0–46.8 0.11–0.53 24.7–29.3 0.09–0.39

71.62 78.84 12.38% 6.06 0.11 13.59% 6.67%

67.49–75.0 76.24–80.33 4.7%–19.2% 1.12–15.80 0.06–0.23 3.53%–34.59% 1.06%–23.36%

2. Contextual indicators of life quality Life expectancy at birth – men Life expectancy at birth – women Share of 65+ population Infant mortality rate Total spontaneous abortion rate Unemployment rate Share of population in material deprivation

Source: Jurčová (2010); Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2011); http://www.upsvar.sk/statistiky.html?page_id=1247

40

This is widely represented in contemporary Slovakia; it is strongly and publicly supported mainly by the Catholic Church but also by some political parties and ‘pro-life’-oriented npos.

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

181

also interpreted as an adoption of the ‘Western model’. However, in reality the highest proportion of children born out of wedlock is recorded not in the ‘most modern’ regions, as one could expect based on those interpretations, but on the contrary, in the regions which are, in terms of modernity, the least developed and have limited direct contact with Western influence. Regions characterised by extreme values in reproductive and family behaviour indicators overlap to a high degree with those characterised by low values in life quality indicators. It is in those regions where we can see the highest rates of infant mortality (exceeding fifteen deaths a year per 1,000 live births), still at a level that was average for the whole of Slovakia thirty years ago. The very same regions also have the lowest life expectancy at birth (sixty-eight years for men and seventy-six for women), the lowest shares of population over sixty-five (5–10 per cent), and also have the highest rates of spontaneous abortion (as much as double that of the national average). At the same time, this group of regions is further characterised by high unemployment rates, exceeding 20 or even 30 per cent, and also by high proportions of the population in material deprivation, often exceeding 20 per cent. The worst values are recorded in the so-called ‘marginalised’ regions, which are often the regions with a high representation of segregated Roma settlements.41 Regions with limited employment opportunities have formed in Slovakia and are characterised by permanently high unemployment rates and/ or mass work migration.42 Both processes significantly affect the lives of families and young people’s decisions on starting a family. In concluding the discussion on demographic changes let us remark once again that regionally differentiated changes in reproductive behaviour influence various aspects of our lives and are demonstrated on many structural levels. The decrease in fertility leads to a transformation of the age composition of the population – fewer children and overall ageing. In Slovakia this ageing process is further facilitated by a slight increase in life expectancy, and gender difference shifts it towards a higher female population.43 Although Slovakia is notably lagging behind the eu15 countries in terms of these three indicators and the changes in terms of age structure have been relatively insignificant until only recently, many changes are already clearly visible. The ageing of the population is increasingly becoming a challenge for Slovakia as well; the 41 42 43

Falťan (2004). Bodnárová et al. (2004); Džambazovič (2001); Radičová (2001); UNDP (2000); Vaňo (2001). A significant increase of women in older age cohorts has been recorded in Slovakia. This is also reflected in a considerably higher average age of women than men (40.3 and 37.1 respectively).

182

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

aforementioned development suggests further articulation of changes in the age structure of the population – not only as a whole but also in its productive part. The workforce in Slovakia is ageing, which not only leads to the increasing importance of the older generation’s working patterns, but also to a need to look for other available sources of labour – including parents with care responsibilities. However, decreasing fertility, a low marriage rate, a stabilised divorce rate, and the increasing number of children born out of wedlock is reflected primarily in the structure and size of the families and households. 2

Contemporary Family: Between Traditionalism and Modernity

2.1 Family Structure The structure of households has in the fifty years up to 200144 gradually changed from an absolute dominance of households with two parents (complete ­households)45 to an increasing representation of single-parent and individual households. Despite a significant decline, in 2001 56.4 per cent of the population were part of a two-parent family. Nevertheless, as Figure 5.6 indicates, this decline has been quite rapid and demographic data suggest that the share of two-parent families is going to decline further in the course of the twenty-first century. This decline was partially transformed into an increase in the share of single-parent families, and since 1991 they make up more than a tenth of all households. Until 1980, this share was relatively stable around the level of 8 per cent and it has been increasing relatively fast only in recent decades. The number of such households reached 246,000 in 2001 (11.9 per cent of all households), in 90 per cent of cases the head of the family and household was a woman. In other words, in ninety out of 100 cases, the single-parent family in Slovakia consists of a mother and one or more children. Compared to the beginning of the 1990s, the number of cohabitations had increased slightly by 2001; there were about 10,000 more unmarried, cohabiting couples in 2001 than in 1991 (30,500 or 2.6 per cent of all two-parent households in 2001 against 20,900 and 1.7 per cent in 1991). 44

45

The only source on household structure is the population census and the most recent and available data is from 2001. Although the next round of the population census was completed in 2011, according to the Statistics Bureau of the Slovak Republic, data on household structure will not be available before mid-2013. The statistical authority in the Slovak Republic uses the term ‘complete families’, which is,  however, problematic because of its normative character. We prefer instead the neutral term ‘two-parent family’ except in cases of direct quotation from a source (see Figure 5.6).

183

Contemporary Family In Slovakia 81.2% 78.5% 70.6% 67.7% 56.4%

Complete families 8.4% 8.6% 8.2% 10.4% 11.9%

Single parent families

1961 1970 1980

9.3% 11.9% 19.8% 21.8% 30.0%

Individual households

1991 2001

1.1% 1.0% 1.4% 0.4% 1.7%

Other households 0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Figure 5.6 Household structure in Slovakia (1961–2001)

Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2002, 2003)

A complete reversal of historical developments was recorded in the proportion of extended households. Whereas their share decreased continually over the three decades until 1991, it rebounded and dramatically increased in the following decade and eventually far exceeded its 1970 level (see Table  5.3). In other words, the thirty years of tendency towards nuclear families, that is, families independent in household and economic terms, has been reversed. The political and economic changes after 1989 led to many instances of several nuclear families merging into a single household, possibly caused by a deterioration of living conditions for many families. There is also a slight but evident tendency for families to shrink in terms of average household size, which decreased from 3.4 in 1970 to 2.6 in 2001. Furthermore, the average household size of two-parent families between the years 1991 and 2001 decreased from 3.52 to 3.44 whereas, in the same period, the average size of single-parent households slightly increased (2.58 to 2.64). Decreasing family size is caused by the increasing number of single-parent families as well as a decreasing number of children – especially in the case of two-parent families. A significant decrease has also been recorded in the number of two-parent families with children aged fifteen years or less; their number as a share of all households has dropped only in the last ten years by 10 per cent. Furthermore, a significant decrease was also recorded in the share of families with three or

184

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

Table 5.3 Selected indicators of household structure (1960–2001) Type of household

1961

1970

1980

1991

2001

Two-parent families (%) Single-parent families (%) Individual households (%) Other households (%)

81.2 8.4 9.3 1.1

78.5 8.6 11.9 1.0

70.6 8.2 19.8 1.4

67.7 10.4 21.8 0.4

56.4 11.9 30.0 1.7

Two-parent households, by children up to 15 years - With children up to 15 years (%) - Without children up to 15 years (%)

47.6 33.6

44.2 34.3

38.3 32.3

41.6 25.8

31.1 25.3

Two-parent households, by economic activity of the woman - Woman economically active (%) - Housewife (%)

32.8 48.4

42.6 35.9

50.1 20.5

48.9 18.5

40.0 16.4

5.8 4.3 2.9 3.4 3.0 2.9 1,345 1,660 1,832

7.8 2.6 2,072

Share of extended households (%) Average household size Total number of households (in thousands)

– 3.5 1,183

Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2002, 2003)

more children; this has dropped 18.5 per cent to 12.8 per cent. Tendencies in fertility and other demographic indicators in recent decades suggest a shift from the previously dominant two-child model towards single-child families. For example, whereas the average number of children for families with dependent children was still 1.9 in 1991, statistics show that in recent years more than half of children are born as the first child in their families.46 The extent to which the real (lower) number of children in families in Slovakia is the result of free choice on the part of their parents, that is, a reflection of altered ideals concerning the number of children, and the extent to which it reflects changes in external conditions (e.g., the economic and social situation of the family) can also indicate an analysis of attitudes and values connected to ­family life. 46

Statistical Office (2011).

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

185

2.2 Family Value System The development of family-related values and norms in the last two decades can be characterised by two distinct tendencies. The first refers to a stability of the high preference for core values; family as an institution and children as the meaning of one’s life. The second pertains to a continual decrease in the support of traditional values regarding the way of life and quality of family relations giving way to ‘modern’ and more liberal values. The first tendency is a direct extension and confirmation of the high status of family in the hierarchy of values in Slovak society and its stability despite rapidly changing and completely different socio-cultural and political conditions. This result confirms earlier findings from the 1990s regarding the socalled magic 80 per cent, a level below which the value of the family and children does not fall among the population of Slovakia regardless of age, sex, education, region or other socio-demographic characteristics.47 The second tendency reflects the internationalisation of modern and individualistic values among the broader population, which means a decrease in the discrepancy between the traditional value system and real family behaviour, which was typical of previous decades. As an example of the former tendency, we can look at responses concerning the importance of family, the need for a child to have a home with both a mother and a father, and the meaning of marriage given in three waves of the European Values Study (evs). Table 5.4 clearly indicates the high stability of the high preference for the family as an institution, which is a classic indicator of the first trend. Almost 90 per cent of the Slovakian population regards family as a very important element in their lives and only about 1 per cent doubts its importance. This means that family is a universal life-value which, together with the value of health, loses differentiation potential. Values regarding children and marriage manifest identical characteristics. For example, more than 80 per cent of the respondents regard a child as an important element of marriage, and that proportion is growing. Similarly, the other two values from the table with preferences exceeding 80 per cent indicate supporting evidence for the first trend, although here we can see the first signs of a decrease in the benefit of a more liberal and ‘modern’ value orientation.48 This is obvious particularly from the attitudes 47 48

Guráň and Filadelfiová (1995). Whereas results for all three waves were not significantly different in the case of family importance, statistically significant differences were found in the latter two questions. Particularly, means for all years were tested by the anova method and the regwq post hoc test was used to distinguish the particular year that was statistically different. In the

186

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

Table 5.4 Selected basic family values Year of survey 1991 (%)

Important in life: Family Very important Rather important Not very important Not at all important A child needs a home with father and a mother Tend to agree Tend to disagree Marriage is an outdated institution Agree Disagree

1999 (%)

2008 (%)

88.2 10.5 1.0 0.4

87.7 10.3 1.6 0.5

89.7 9.0 0.9 0.4

96.8 3.2

95.3 4.7

92.2 7.8

7.0 93.0

11.5 88.5

12.3 87.7

Source: European Values Study 1991, 1999 and 2008 (evssg, 2008)

that disagree with the traditional value orientation and the increase in those attitudes; their frequency almost doubled in the period covered by this survey. It seems that over recent years a certain well-defined group of the population  has emerged: although still clearly a minority, this group assumes and can  clearly express attitudes which correspond with more liberal value orientations. Answers to questions which can exemplify the second tendency mentioned above are summarised in Table 5.5. From the tendencies in the answers listed in the table, we can see a shift towards a higher level of support for attitudes representing a more individualised family lifestyle. For example, while an obviously negative attitude towards working mothers still prevailed at the beginning of the 1990s, this became a minority attitude in less than twenty years. It is even more obvious if we focus on the change in the proportion of strongly disagreeing answers; case of the second question (a home for children), the mean in the year 2008 thus proved to be significantly different from the other two years, and in the case of the last question (marriage as outdated) the mean in the first year (1991) was statistically different from the remaining two years.

187

Contemporary Family In Slovakia Table 5.5 Values of family lifestyle Year of survey 1991 (%)

A pre-school child suffers under a working mother Agree strongly Agree Disagree Disagree strongly Women want a home and children Agree strongly Agree Disagree Disagree strongly

1999 (%)

2008 (%)

21.4 50.4 26.7 1.5

18.2 45.0 29.4 7.4

12.8 28.4 38.0 20.8

31.3 53.4 14.6 0.8

18.1 43.0 32.0 6.8

15.6 41.9 33.0 9.5

Source: European Values Study 1991, 1999 and 2008 (evssg 2008)

whereas only 0.5 per cent of the population strongly disagreed with the statement that children of pre-school age suffer if their mothers work, it was already 20.8 per cent in 2008. Changes in this indicator also exemplify the contradiction between real behaviour and the value system. The working mother with pre-school children was an axiomatic and characteristic attribute of the lifestyle of young families during the decades of the socialist era, but only two years after its collapse in 1991 as much as 70 per cent of the population did not support this idea, which indicates that they did not identify themselves with the real situation. From this point of view, development of support for the idea that a job is the best way for women to be independent is interesting as well. This attitude does not reflect only the value and meaning of paid work for a woman and her position within the family, but by highlighting her independence it is also a good indicator of the apprehension of gender equality both in the intimate sphere and in the wider social context (or the public sphere). As Table 5.6 clearly indicates, nowadays a very large majority of the Slovakian population (almost 85 per cent) perceives paid work positively as one of the possible ways for women to become independent. Parallel to the increase in supportive stances, the share of those disagreeing is decreasing. However, the share of those strongly disagreeing remains the same. This means that even in

188

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

Table 5.6 Values of family lifestyle 2 Year of survey

A job is the best way for women to be independent Agree strongly Agree Disagree Disagree strongly Husband and wife should both contribute to family income Agree strongly Agree Disagree Disagree strongly

1991 (%)

1999 (%)

2008 (%)

13.9 48.5 35.0 2.6

30.4 44.2 21.2 4.2

29.9 54.8 12.8 2.6

38.9 43.5 16.7 0.9

48.7 39.8 9.3 2.2

48.0 45.1 6.1 0.8

Source: European Values Study 1991, 1999 and 2008 (evssg 2008)

different or rapidly changing conditions, there is a small but stable group of people strongly opposing women’s work and/or independence, based on personal, religious, or other reasons. The distribution of the answers also corresponds to the level of positive views on the double-income family. As in the previous case, here also a very large majority of the Slovakian population (more than 90 per cent) agree with the statement that both husband and wife should contribute to the family income. Support for this idea increased and stabilised in the late 1990s in terms of a higher share for the strongly agreeing group and a decreasing share for the disagreeing group. It is thus not possible to identify in Slovakia a trend of returning to quasitraditional value orientations and views of family, particularly in terms of the traditional gender roles – an understanding of the husband as breadwinner and the wife as in charge of the household and childcare. Similarly, we cannot identify a tendency towards the re-traditionalisation of gender roles from the statistics of female employment and other survey results, as was identified by some sociologists in other countries, for example, Hungary.49 However, this 49

Pongrácz (2001); Tóth and Somlai (2005).

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

189

idea can be traced in the ideological and political dimension, for example in family policy, especially in the character and length of maternity leave, abortions, birth control, services for families, etc.50 In general, the family is becoming a popular field for the exchange of political views, especially between the Christian conservatives and social liberals. Certain signals of re-traditionalisation can be traced in the first postrevolution years (as results from the 1991 wave also indicate). However, this lasted only for a relatively short period of time and was connected rather to a general tendency of decline in everything related to the previous system. The parts of the previous system relevant to this study are the model of a family with a small child and working parents, and the developed system of preschool childcare (day-care centres, kindergartens). This system has been criticised as a symbol of Communism, the network of the day-care centres providing childcare for infants and children until the age of three has been dissolved, and the system of financing for the kindergartens has been disrupted. However, further development showed again the necessity and demand for those facilities, and new pre-school facilities, of course without the imposed ideological educational background, have been gradually established on municipal, private, or religious bases. Nevertheless, as has been already stated, more articulate and long-lasting tendencies of re-traditionalisation of family life can hardly be identified in the case of Slovakia. A number of results from surveys regarding family values and norms, as well as statistics, reveal the tendency towards a shrinking gap between the rather traditional family value system and an increasingly individualised and post-modern way of family life. This trend is not consistent, but its degree and particular form are often influenced by growing differences between various groups of population, especially in the socio-cultural background dimension, which is often regionally dependent. In other words, the family norms and reproductive behaviour of the Roma minority, for example, or of young people looking for job opportunities in foreign countries are different from those of the population of Bratislava or people from regions with high unemployment rates. That is to say, value orientations and family strategies are becoming increasingly diversified compared to a more homogeneous model 50

This is reflected, for example, in the programmes of the political parties. The conservative spectrum aspires to maintain the length of maternity leave or even to prolong it, although at three years it is, together with that of the Czech Republic, the longest in the eu. They also make systematic efforts to abolish abortion, restrict availability of birth control, etc. The liberal opposition to this is lacklustre and relies largely on weak, insubstantial arguments.

190

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

during the socialist era. A similar trend was identified also by some Czech sociologists who suggest that we see a transformation from one norm of family life into a plurality of norms in Czech society. This plurality can be found in the organisation of family life as well as in cultural norms, the socio-economic position of the families, family strategies, and approaches towards family values by different age groups.51 2.3 Female Employment in the Family Context Economic activity and employment of women in Slovakia developed in a specific way which, although similar, is not identical to other Eastern European countries. As Nicky Le Feuvre suggests, The way in which the significant increase in women’s employment in recent years is interpreted depends largely on the historical perspective adopted. There is all too often a tendency to present the massive influx of European women onto the labour market from the 1970s onwards as a totally new phenomenon. If one adopts a longer historical perspective, the opposite appears to be the case.52 We also need to apply a wider historical perspective to the economic activity and employment of women in Slovakia. Many authors agree that gender inequality in the division of labour is one of the main reasons why the country remains ‘stuck’ between a modern society and the traditional family system.53 Women in Slovakia started to enter the sphere of paid work in larger numbers in the 1960s and the socialistic system gradually codified not only the right but also the obligation to work. The revolution of 1989 came at a time of full employment, both for men and women.54 This sphere of life felt the full effects  of the collapse of the Communist regime; the economic activity of women started to decline not only with the advent of the restructuring of the

51 52 53 54

Katrňák (2011). Le Feuvre (1997). Thornton and Philipov (2009). In the case of women this of course disregards those taking care of their children; maternity leave was gradually extended up to two years, and after 1990 even further to three years. Women also left the labour market for retirement earlier than men; whereas for men the retirement age was sixty, it was only fifty-seven years for women and was further lowered for each child born.

191

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

economy55 but also under the influence of certain political doctrines appealing for women’s ‘return to the hearth’ and arguing that pre-school institutions, as a ‘socialist invention’, were not good for child development anyway. As Table 5.3 shows, the share of economically active women in two-parent households was 50 per cent in 1980 but had dropped to 40 per cent by 2001. The degree of economic activity is the basic and most significant difference between men and women in the labour market. Although a lower degree of economic activity for women is a long-term tendency, the difference has been further widening in the last decade, which indicates more frequent departure from the labour market by women and their classification outside the labour force. This share was only 50.5 per cent in 2011, which means that one in every two women aged fifteen years and more is economically inactive. Whereas the degree of economic activity has been relatively stable at around 68 per cent for men, women’s economic activity has kept decreasing and the difference between men and women has increased by almost 2 per cent to 17.9 per cent in the last ten years (see Table 5.7). There were around 701,000 economically inactive men but more than 1.18 million women of the same category in 2011. The biggest difference is historically recorded in the status ‘on maternity leave’ and ‘in the household’. Although legislation allows maternity leave for both men and women in Slovakia, it is Table 5.7 Rates of economic activity characterising the position of men and women in the labour market (2001–11) Rate

Economic activity (15+ population) Employment (15–64 pop.) Unemployment (15+ population)

Men Women Men Women Men Women

2000 (%)

2005 (%)

2006 (%)

2007 2008 2009 (%) (%) (%)

2010 (%)

2011 (%)

68.6 52.6 61.5 51.5 18.6 18.6

68.4 51.3 64.6 50.9 15.3 17.2

68.2 50.7 67.0 51.9 12.2 14.7

67.7 50.5 68.4 53.1 9.8 12.5

67.8 50.8 65.2 52.3 14.2 14.6

68.4 50.5 66.3 52.7 13.5 13.6

68.3 51.1 70.0 54.6 8.4 11.1

68.1 50.3 67.6 52.8 11.4 12.9

Source: Slovstat Database. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 2012

55

The transition from the planned economy to a market economy brought, among other things, a relatively rapid increase in unemployment, which for decades had been an unknown phenomenon in Slovakia.

192

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

almost exclusively a matter for women. In 2011 there were around 80,000 women on maternity leave against just 1,000 men on paternity leave, which means the men’s share was only around 1.2 per cent of the total. Moreover, in the same year there were more than 118,000 women, but less than 16,000 men, staying ‘in the household’, which means the men’s share was very low in this category as well – only 12.2 per cent. As Table  5.7 further suggests, comparing the employment rates also indicates women’s long-term subordinate position; although the share has been increasing in the last decade also in the case of women, it increased faster in the case of men and the difference climbed to more than 13 per cent. With a female employment rate still only slightly above 50 per cent, Slovakia ranks as one of the worst among the eu27 countries. As Figure  5.7 indicates, a vast decrease in the employment rate of the youngest cohorts of women was recorded between the years 2000 and 2011. In the unemployment rate (see Table 5.7) the difference is notable and permanent; the unemployment rate for women has been the same or slightly higher than that for men. The development in the last decade suggests that in times of economic downturn and increasing total unemployment rate, women’s share of this rate seems to be decreasing and vice versa. In other words, the labour market in Slovakia in times of economic growth seems to absorb men better than women. Men 2011

Women 2011

Men 2000

Women 2000

100 90 76

80

84.5

87.6

84.5 80.3

70

82.6 81.1

70.8

60 50

58

44.2

40 30

79.9 76.2

71.2

59.9 49.4 27.6

26.5

20 10 2.5 0

9.4

1.8

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-34

35-39

40-44

45-49

50-54

55-59

60-64

Figure 5.7  Employment rate of men and women by cohort and gender (2000 and 2011)

2.9 1.1 65+

Source: Slovstat Database. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 2012

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

193

Compared to other eu countries, Slovakia is also characteristic for having a relatively low proportion of part-time employment.56 With only 4.7 per cent of employed working part-time, Slovakia ranks as second lowest among the eu27 countries. However, we can see a remarkable difference between men and women; while still being relatively low, the proportion of employed women working as part-timers is almost twice as high as for men (6.2 per cent and 3.3 per cent respectively). A more significant increase in the proportion of parttimers57 occurred during the economic downturn after 2008, especially among involuntary part-timers or the underemployed. Research also suggests a permanently very low employment rate among Slovak women with a youngest child 3–5 years old, closely related to the length of maternity and paternity leave. For example, in 2005 Slovakia, with only 46.6 per cent of women in this category working, was more than 10 per cent below the average of the oecd countries, which was 61.3 per cent.58 A similar ‘gap’ between Slovakia and other countries is reflected also in the results of the Eurostat’s Labour Force Survey regarding employment rates of women and men aged 25–49 years and having the youngest child not older than six years. The results show not only dramatic differences in the employment rate of men and women in Slovakia defined this way but also a significant lagging behind by Slovak parents in the usage of flexible work regimes as compared to the European average, as well as a very large gender gap. That is to say, while this stage of parenthood affects the employment rate of men only slightly, it excessively influences women’s employment; in 2010 the employment rate for men in this category was more than 86 per cent, but only around 37 per cent for women. Moreover, according to this survey, except for slightly higher employment rates in 2008, the very low employment rate of women in this category remains stable at around the same level. The problem of the unequal division of labour by gender not only between the public and private spheres, but also within both of them, manifests its effect in the double burden on women. As much research and many surveys from different periods suggest, this phenomenon has been known in Slovakia for a long time.59 Despite the high level of involvement of women in the labour 56 57

58 59

Bútorová et al. (2008); Holubová (2009, 2010). The number of unemployed has risen from 55,600 in 2007 to 92,100 in 2011, and the number involuntarily working on a part-time basis has increased from 19,700 to 56,300 in the same period. oecd (2007). Inglehart and Baker (2000); Matoušek (1993); Možný (1990, 1999); Sirovátka and Hora (2008); Smart and Silva (1999); Čermáková et al. (1995a, 1995b).

194

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

market during the socialist regime, the burden of chores and care remained mainly on women’s shoulders.60 This situation has not changed since 1990. As Zora Bútorová concludes, the majority of women of productive age are: ‘fully “carrying on” both of their roles – of an employee and fireplace keeper and mother’.61 Virtually all research focused on this problem came to the same conclusion again one decade later.62 The results of the 2006 ivo (Institute for Public Affairs) survey63 showed that the burden of running the household on a daily basis is still predominantly on women’s shoulders. Also in 2006, it was women who were mainly doing ironing, washing, cooking, cleaning, and dishwashing. Households where those activities were done exclusively by men were seldom encountered, and the model in which the man and woman equally shared these activities was also relatively infrequent, with this type of partnership representing less than one-third of the total. Participation in those chores requiring everyday engagement (often referred to as ‘dirty chores’) of men living in a partnership is still scarce. Also ideals concerning their share are not the same among men and women. Many more men regard domestic work as exclusively or largely a woman’s job, whereas women’s ideals are strongly connected to the participatory model – that is, both partners engage in these activities more or less equally. Another major group of activities in the private sphere concern care. Cases when a man takes on care responsibilities are few in Slovakia and, for those men living in a partnership, minimal. Care responsibilities are shared or lie with the woman. It has been shown that men participate most in playing and going for walks with children and in the care of adult members of the household. Participation of men is significantly lower when it comes to day-to-day childcare, attending to their school duties and taking leave to care for others during sickness. This is despite the fact that in this case the ideals of both men and women seem to prefer a rather more participatory model. According to survey results, women in Slovakia spend on average sixteen to eighteen hours more per week than men on domestic work. The European Working Conditions Survey (see Table  5.8) showed that in 2010, working women in Slovakia spent four times more time per week than men on 60

61 62 63

Dušan Provazník and his team from the Sociological Institute of the Slovak Academy of Science have documented these tendencies in various research studies prior to 1989 (Provazník 1989). Bútorová (1996, 72). ivo (2006); Filadelfiová et al. (2006); Statistical Office (2006). ivo (2006).

195

Contemporary Family In Slovakia Table 5.8 Working time per week for women and men in Slovakia (2005 and 2010)

Year

2005 2010

Women Men Women Men

Working time (hours/week)

Difference with men

Unpaid

Paid +  commuting

Total

Unpaid

Paid +  commuting

Total

26.6 7.7 24.5 6.0

44.4 49.0 42.8 46.6

71.0 56.7 67.3 52.6

18.9

4.6

14.3

18.4

3.8

14.7

Source: European Working Conditions Survey64

Note: Unpaid working time is a sum of estimated time spent on child and adult care and domestic work (only for respondents who had paid work in the reference week).

childcare, care for adult members of the household, and domestic work (i.e., unpaid work). Thus the total amount of time spent on both paid and unpaid work is substantially higher for women, with an average of 67.3 hours per week compared to men with only 52.6 hours. Moreover, although the total number of working hours has decreased since 2005 for both men and women, the difference between the genders has remained almost the same.65 Duties in the family affect the careers of women across a relatively wide scope. In 2006 as many as 11 per cent of women stated that they had had to change to less responsible work because of their family duties, 28 per cent of women had to find a job allowing them also to care for other household members, and 17 per cent of women had to leave their job for a certain period of time because of their families.66 At the same time, the same reasons affected men’s careers only in a minimal number of cases.67 Care in the private sphere means, besides childcare, also the care of older members of the family or sick adults. The demographic development of the growth of the population aged sixty-five years and up indicates a growing need for the care for older members of the family in the coming years. The ageing of the population in Slovakia is taking place in settings where elderly care is still regarded as the responsibility of the family, with women as its main providers. 64 65 66 67

Parent-Thirion et al. (2007, 2012). Bútorová et al. (2008). The proportions for men were 3.4 per cent and 2 per cent respectively. Parent-Thirion et al. (2007, 2012)

196

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

According to statistics, there were only 15,000 retired persons68 living in retirement homes and the rest were living alone or with their children or other relatives.69 A lot of research clearly shows that Slovaks favour care within their homes and/or families. For example, according to a representative survey by the Research Institute of Work and Family from 2005, as much as 57.7 per cent of the respondents preferred ‘care in the home with help from family’.70 The same survey also revealed that the major part of the care for the other members of the household is provided by women. Given the persisting inequalities in the division of labour in the household and in childcare, this suggests that the ageing of the Slovakian population will affect disproportionately more women than men. Another aspect of the ageing population is its gendered dimension, as many authors have suggested already.71 Elderly women are one of the most vulnerable groups of the population; at the time when their working abilities might decrease, they have accumulated fewer resources which they can rely on in their old age. Their precarious socio-economic situation can be further illustrated by a higher risk of poverty for elderly women caused mainly by gender differences in the average level of pensions (see Table  5.9). The decreasing level of Table 5.9 Gender difference in pensions and poverty risk (2010)

Average pension in eur Poverty risk (average for all groups) (%) Poverty risk 18–64 years (%) Poverty risk 65+ years (%) Poverty risk – in retirement (%)

Men

Women

€400 10.10 5.80 4.50 3.90

€315 11.90 6.30 14.80 6.10

Source: eu-silc Database, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 2011; retrieved from: http://www.socpoist.sk/.

68

69 70 71

We do not have precise data on the retired population, but, for example, according to the last census data (2001), there were 690,662 men and women aged sixty-five years and above living in Slovakia and 62,421 of them were at least eighty-five years old. This suggests that those living in retirement homes represent only a small portion of the retired population. mpsvr (2007). Bodnárová et al. (2005). Bertola et al. (2007); McNay (2003).

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

197

pensions measured as a proportion of the national average income72 only further stresses the importance of these issues. 3

State Family Policy and Marketisation of Social Services

As in the case of other European countries such as Germany or Portugal, family policy in the Slovak Republic is based on its Constitution, adopted in 1992, specifically article 41.73 Paragraph 4 of this article declares that ‘[c]hildcare and the upbringing of children are among the rights of parents’ and that ‘minors can be separated from their parents against their will only by means of a court ruling based on the law’. Paragraph 5 of the same article states that ‘[p]arents caring for children are entitled to assistance from the state’. Objectives and principles of family policy in Slovakia were explicitly formulated for the first time in the Concept of the State Family Policy produced by the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, which was adopted by the government in 1996. In this document the government declared its responsibility to support democratic policies, which should guarantee a political, economic, and institutional framework supporting families’ responsibility for their own well-being. This concept defined family policy as a ‘system of general rules, measurements and instruments through which the state directly and indirectly acknowledges the exceptional importance of family for every individual’s development in society and expresses its support’. This concept was updated in 2004 reflecting changes in the ruling party and also the accession process to the eu. In this updated version we can already find support for harmonisation of parental duties with work duties and support for gender equality of the parents, without regard to the legal form of the family, as new objectives. Supporting family income is one of the major elements of family policy in Slovakia and is done primarily through state social support. This is oriented towards those life adversities in which the state wants to intervene in order to prevent an undesirable decline in the standard of life for families with children that had not been provided for. Such adversities are considered to consist ­principally of having a child which was not provided for while in constant 72 73

Whereas pensions on average represented around 54 per cent of the average income in 1993, they represented only around 46 per cent in 2010. Paragraph 1 declares that ‘marriage, parenthood and family are under the protection of the law’, and paragraph 3 acknowledges the rights for all children, namely that ‘children born in and out of wedlock enjoy equal rights’.

198

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

occupational training, having a child with a serious health problem, having a child that was not provided for in surrogate custody, the temporary or permanent presence of just one breadwinner in the family, and the loss of a family member by death. State social support is provided mainly through direct monetary allowances through which the state helps people to overcome such life adversities. The basic principle of state family policy in Slovakia is a distribution of state resources based on the solidarity principle between families with children and citizens without children and between families with higher and lower incomes. The system of state social support consists of several allowances. According to their frequency we can divide them into non-recurring (birth, fostering, and funeral) grants and recurring (child, parental, and foster child/parent) allowances. All are provided from the state budget and are not taxed. In contemporary discourse concerning family support, questions regarding harmonisation of parenting and work duties receive frequent attention. This reflects the actual problems faced by families, where this harmonisation has been identified as a major issue. Also, as many European comparative studies suggest, harmonisation has proven to be one of the most powerful intervention tools. Countries where programmes supporting harmonisation of parenting and work duties are well established and actively promoted also manage to maintain high levels of both female employment and fertility. Development of supporting instruments and measurements in this sphere is considered to be the best practice. It is also often contrasted with strong systems of allowances that are regarded as having the effect of ‘pushing women’ into the intimate sphere. Another major issue related to state family policy is the marketisation of social services. Public debate concerning the need to denationalise the majority of social services for families began shortly after the Velvet Revolution. This applied mainly to services regarding children such as pre-school childcare (nursery schools and day-care centres) and other facilities (e.g., centres for leisure-time activities), but also to services and facilities for the elderly (retirement homes or day-care centres). The marketisation of those services was supposed to bring in higher quality and to increase the supply, mainly in terms of the variability of the services offered and their availability. However, the postsocialist reality has been far from those ideals. Transferring the ability to introduce social services from state to municipalities and regions together with their marketisation brought chaos, poor availability, and a surge in prices. The majority of the population did not have the income to be able to afford services in high-quality private facilities, and places in the municipality-operated facilities were insufficient and the services offered limited. Decentralisation of social services for families was inconsistent and

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

199

not accompanied by the necessary transfer of funds from the state budget to regions and municipalities. The consequences are still visible today and are manifested especially in the increase in regional inequalities in terms of availability and quality of services, and in the chronic shortage of certain services such as nursing. This situation, where expensive private services were unaffordable and relatively cheap public services were unavailable, caused tensions in many families. Moreover, many elderly people felt disappointment and disbelief because they wanted to spend the rest of their lives with their families but did not expect their children and other family members to take care of them on a daily basis any more. They are now looking for different types of services, but these are scarce and insufficiently developed.74 The case of the social services and their marketisation also reflects the decreasing trust in social institutions. Family policy and its objectives should thus be (re)considered in the context of the factors outlined in this section as well as those concerning the changing roles of women and men. These should be based on the real conditions and needs of families and, besides subsidising income, should also be oriented towards achieving a better work–life balance including a higher involvement of men in the private sphere. 4 Conclusions All characteristics of the family and family behaviour in contemporary Slovakia manifest traits of the postponed and compressed second demographic transition and increasing diversity; specifically, decreasing birth rate and fertility, postponement of parenthood and marriage until later age, and downsizing of family structure. Diversification has further emphasised and reproduced regional differences as well as differences among social groups, their behaviour, attitudes, and social conditions. In the European context, Slovakia has transformed in only two decades from a country with one of the highest fertility rates to a country with one of the lowest. Moreover, Slovakia is going to enter a period of faster ageing of its society in coming years, though it still has an opportunity to prepare well for this process. The ageing of society will affect many aspects of everyday life, mainly because of a decrease in the labour force, and the consequent lack of labour. This will require a restructuring of the labour market in terms of working patterns and their diversification but also in terms of higher demand for specific services and industries, such as public services for the elderly. However, at the 74

Guráň and Fico (2008).

200

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

same time, attitudes toward care also suggest an increasing pressure on adult children to provide this care in the private sphere and to combine it with work life. The pressure will come in alongside a diminishing ability to provide this care caused by the decreasing number of children and the downsizing of the family, and also the increasing number of divorces and the increasing share of single households. Analysis of the demographic trends in the context of the labour market indicates other significant changes in the last two decades. First of all, there is a remarkable shift from Slovakia being a forerunner in terms of having high rates of female employment and fertility to being one of the worst performing countries in this respect in the eu. This shift created a labour market which is nowadays characterised by gender differences and also by a relatively high unemployment rate, which is another major change. All indicators of employment are far behind the common objectives of the eu and in particular the employment of women and the elderly is significantly lagging behind. The differences between men and women are still very marked in all measures and they are (re)produced from the time of entry into the labour market; disproportionately more women are excluded from participation in the labour market because of maternity leave and a consequent voluntary or forced return to the household. The differences persist even after they (re)enter the labour market, because of discriminatory practices and/or structural factors. Moreover, there is also the persisting tendency of the disproportionately imposed burden of domestic work and care on women which is not significantly relieved by their engagement in paid work. These facts highlight the deep-rootedness of gender stereotypes in Slovak society, which are however contradicted by the results on value orientations which suggest that increasingly more people actually support the idea of the independence of women in work. What can partially explain the persistence of gender stereotypes is the role of family policy in the reproduction of those stereotypes. First of all, family policy in Slovakia lacks any significant wider support for gender equality and overall democracy based on the autonomy of all individuals, including children. The gender and family agenda seem to be understood as separated and are not well-coordinated issues despite being dealt with in the same ministry, this further weakens them both. Secondly, measures related to family policy are primarily based on the system of allowances and this only strengthens the gender structure.75 This system has remained more or less unchanged despite

75

Although, for example, the maternity allowance is available also for fathers, in reality 90 per cent of them are taken by mothers. This can be explained by the length of the

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

201

unprecedented economic and political changes.76 Besides the transformation from insurance to a state social support system and the change in the payer, the allowance system has been adjusted only in terms of level and requirements. As a system it has changed only slightly and the size of the allowances in general still remains small in comparison to other European countries. Moreover, the strategy of increasing the size of allowances as a countermeasure to decreasing fertility, as in this case, can be considered to be less effective in the long term. In other words, the political answer to the changes that families go through and the consequences they have to face has been in many instances inadequate and has not fully taken account of the demographic transition that has been occurring. For example, demographic change might seem to have a positive effect on the female population, but its consequences need to be considered fully; here factors such as the lifecycle or the socio-economic and cultural conditions in which these changes take place also play an important role. However, the Slovak discussion on the consequences of demographic change left issues concerning its effect on women’s careers and their role as caregivers for an ageing society almost unaddressed. Flexible programmes which would allow families to choose were lacking and only scant attention was paid to services. This might also explain the discrepancy between value orientations, which tends to be more liberal, and the actual roles women have to take in the context of the labour market, households, childcare, and elderly care, which exhibit traits associated with a traditional value orientation. It strongly suggests a need for serious effort from public policymakers to implement programmes and activities aimed at reducing gender inequalities and differences within both the private and public spheres. Those kinds of objectives call for a wide spectrum of measures supporting the work–life balance, such as care centres, flexible working patterns, and working from home. Suggestions on how to cope with the contradictory tendencies that demographic changes bring can also be found in countries where this demographic transition appeared earlier. In fact, many of them are identical to more historical trends in other, especially Western European countries and, as has been mentioned already, represent the second demographic transition. However, we need to be sensitive to differences as well, which are based mainly in the different time frame (i.e., compressed and postponed) and the changing maternity leave, or allowance, which is three years and represents the period of being excluded from the labour market. Dorota Szelewa (2006) hypothesises that the long history of these institutions in some countries might be the reason for their resistance to change. .

76

202

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

socio-economic conditions in which these demographic trends take place. In other words, although Slovakia is experiencing a similar profound social transformation to that which has been labelled by sociologists discussing Western countries as a shift towards a ‘second’77 or ‘liquid’ modernity,78 it has its own specific traits which need our attention. As already suggested at the beginning, this process in Slovakia can be characterised specifically as postponed, compressed, and multilinear. It reflects the historic trajectory of the development of the family in Slovakia which was deeply influenced by Christian values stressing the primary importance of the family, family solidarity, and family support. The importance of these values is further amplified by a strongly conservative Catholic model of the hierarchically and authoritatively organised family – that is, based on principles of the subordination of the young to the old and the absolute authority of the man. The family value orientations have tended to be more liberal in Protestant regions but in general copied the general tendency of the rest of Slovakia. This model was disrupted only after the Second World War by socialist industrialisation and urbanisation, yet when compared to the general trends in (Western) Europe the further development of this model was in some ways postponed and deformed. Since 1948, when Slovakia started building a new socialist system, a new mode of behaviour and a completely different value system began to be promoted. A new, formal, social and family lifestyle, bringing ideas such as full female employment, gender equality, and pre-school education, were imposed and rapidly incorporated from ‘above’. However, it was not accompanied by a corresponding change in the value system reflecting everyday life. Thus, contradictory to the liberalisation and pluralisation of family values seen in Western European countries, conservative family values in Slovakia persisted as a defensive strategy against the collectivistic ideology of the Communist regime, even though they simultaneously caused tensions within the family. The family with traditional relations came to be a tower of historical continuity and a symbol of anti-Communist feelings, which created so-called ‘two-faced’ morals inside and outside the family. The discrepancy between values and real behaviour was widening. The return of a democratic regime79 in 1989, accompanied by increasing migration and availability of and access to information, brought dynamic changes to families that had also been slowed down by the socialist regime. 77 78 79

Beck (1992). Bauman (2000). Slovakia, as a part of Czechoslovakia, experienced democratic regimes between the world wars as well as briefly after the end of the Second World War.

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

203

Since the late 1980s and 1990s, the process of Western modernity and individualisation have (re)started, yet this was again not from ‘below’ but ‘imported’ from outside, particularly from Western Europe through reopened flows of people, goods, ideas, and information. In other words, the social and cultural dimensions of Slovak modernity were never spontaneously and continuously developed from ‘below’ but implemented and imposed from ‘above’ (by the socialistic state) or imported from outside. The rapid changes after these processes of modernity (re)started reflect the postponed and compressed character of a second modernity in Slovakia. At the same time, democratisation in Slovakia also brought a destandardisation of lifestyles, although cultural traditions and regional differences still play significant roles. These were further intensified and form the third characteristic trait of second modernity in Slovakia: multilinearity. This is most apparent in the generational, ethnic, and value dimensions. For instance, the Roma family model diametrically differs from the rest of the population in many dimensions; the first child usually comes very early and is followed by a higher number of children, the share of single income families with women at home is high, and multi-generation households are common.80 In general, we can see a continuing high level of importance for the family and children, while at the same time the family model is drawing closer to a modern, open family based on informal relations such as partnership, trust, and love. The family becomes a place of security in a world of constant change and evolution. However, the majority of families can be characterised by a value mix caused by a forty-year-long discontinuation of, and relative isolation from, the ‘natural’81 historical development of culture in the European context. References Bauman, Zygmunt. 2000. Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. ——. 2001. The Individualized Society. Cambridge: Polity Press; Malden, ma: Blackwell. Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications. Beck, Ulrich and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. 2002. Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and Its Social and Political Consequences. London: Sage. Bertola, Giuseppe, Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn. 2007. ‘Labour market institutions and demographic employment patterns’. Journal of Population Economics 20 (4): 833–867. 80 E.g., UNDP (2012). 81 That is, without the interventions of a Communist regime.

204

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

Bleha, Branislav and Boris Vaňo. 2007. Prognóza vývoja obyvateľstva do roku 2025 [Prognosis on Population Development until 2025]. Bratislava: INFOSTAT. Bodnárová, Bernardína, Roman Džambazovič, Jarmila Filadelfiová, Daniel Gerbery, Katarína Pafková and Silvia Porubänová. 2004. Rodinná politika a potreby mladých rodín [Family Policy and Needs of Young Families]. Bratislava: sšpr. Bodnárová, Bernardína, Jarmila Filadelfiová and Daniel Gerbery. 2005. Výskum potrieb a poskytovania služieb pre rodiny zabezpečujúce starostlivosť o závislých členov [Research on Needs and Supply of Family Services Providing Care for Dependant Members]. Bratislava: sšpr. Bútorová, Zora, ed. 1996. Ona a on na Slovensku. Ženský údel vo svetle verejnej mienky [She and He in Slovakia: Women’s Destiny in the Light of Public Opinion]. Bratislava: FOCUS. Bútorová, Zora, et al. 2008. Ona a on na Slovensku: zaostrené na rod a vek [She and He in Slovakia: Focused on Gender and Age]. Bratislava: Inštitút pre verejné otázky. Bútorová, Zora and Jarmila Filadelfiová. 2008. ‘Ženy a muži zoči-voči narastajúcej pestrosti života’ [Women and men facing increasing diversity of life]. In Ona a on na Slovensku: zaostrené na rod a vek [She and He in Slovakia: Focused on Gender and Age], edited by Zora Bútorová, 43–76. Bratislava: Inštitút pre verejné otázky. Čermáková, Marie, Hana Maříková and Milan Tuček. 1995a. ‘Role mužů a žen v rodině a ve společnosti I’ [Roles of men and women in family and society, I]. Data & Fakta 4: 1–4. Čermáková, Marie, Hana Maříková and Milan Tuček. 1995b. ‘Role mužů a žen v rodině a ve společnosti II’ [Roles of men and women in family and society, II]. Data & Fakta 5: 1–4. Chang Kyung-Sup. 2010. ‘The second modern condition? Compressed modernity as internalized reflexive cosmopolitization’. British Journal of Sociology 61 (3): 444–464. Džambazovič, Roman. 2001. ‘Premeny rómskej rodiny’ [Transformations of the Roma family]. In Rodina v spoločenských premenách Slovenska [Family in Social Transformations of Slovakia], edited by Ľuba Kráľová, 136–150. Prešov: Filozofická fakulta Prešovskej univerzity. evs (European Values Study). Online survey database. http://www.europeanvalues study.eu/. evssg (European Value System Study Group). 2008. European Values Study 1981–2008, ZA4804 Data file, Version 1.0.0. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive. doi: 10.4232/1.11005. Fahey, Tony and Zsolt Spéder. 2004. Fertility and Family Issues in an Enlarged Europe. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Falťan, Ľubomír. 2004. Regionálna diferenciácia, regionálny rozvoj v Slovenskej republike v kontexte integračných dosahov [Regional Differentiation and Development in Slovakia in the Context of Integrational Consequences]. Bratislava: Sociologický ústav SAV.

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

205

Filadelfiová, Jarmila. 2000. Základné charakteristiky demografického vývoja vo vybraných krajinách strednej a východnej Európy [Basic Characteristics of Demographic Development in Selected Countries of Central and Eastern Europe]. Bratislava: Medzinárodné stredisko pre štúdium rodiny. ——. 2001. ‘Demografický vývoj na Slovensku’ [Demographic development in Slovakia]. In Slovensko 2001. Situačná správa o stave spoločnosti [Slovakia 2001: Situational Review on the State of Society], edited by Grigorij Mesežnikov and Miroslav Kollár, 723–754. Bratislava: Inštitút pre verejné otázky. ——. 2004. ‘Populačný vývoj a štruktúra rodín’ [Population development and family structure]. In Slovensko 2004: Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti [Slovakia 2004: General Report on the State of Society], edited by Grigorij Mesežnikov and Miroslav Kollár, 841–872. Bratislava: Inštitút pre verejné otázky. ——. 2005a. ‘Demografická situácia a správanie rodín vz. verejná politika’ [Demographic situation and behaviour vs. public policy]. Sociologia 37 (5): 387–418. ——. 2005b. ‘Demografický vývoj a rodina’ [Demographic development and family]. In Spoločnosť a politika na Slovensku: Cesty k stabilite 1989–2004 [Society and Politics in Slovakia: The Ways to Stability 1989–2004], edited by Soňa Szomolányi, 66–84. Bratislava: Univerzita Komenského. ——. 2007. Ženy, muži a vek v štatistikách trhu práce [Women, Men and Age in the Labour Market Statistics]. Bratislava: Inštitút pre verejné otázky. ——. 2008. ‘Rodová priepasť: Čo (ne)hovoria štatistiky a výskumné dáta o odmeňovaní žien a mužov’ [Gender gap: What statistics and empirical data do (not) say on payment of women and men]. In Aká práca, taká pláca? Aspekty rodovej nerovnosti v odmeňovaní [Equal Pay for Equal Work? Aspects of the Gender Pay Gap], edited by Jana Cviková, 13–45. Bratislava: Aspekt. Filadelfiová, Jarmila and Katarína Cuperová. 2000. Rôznorodosť demografického vývoja v Európe [Differences in Demographic Development in Europe]. Bratislava: Medzinárodné stredisko pre štúdium rodiny. Filadelfiová, Jarmila and Peter Guráň. 1997. Demografické trendy a rodina v postkomunistických krajinách Európy [Demographic Trends and Family in Post-Communist Countries of Europe]. Bratislava: Medzinárodné stredisko pre štúdium rodiny. Filadelfiová, Jarmila, Zuzana Kiczková and Mariana Szapuová. 2006. Úloha mužov pri podpore rodovej rovnosti: participácia otcov na domácej starostlivost [Men’s Role in the Support of Gender Equality: Participation of Men in Home Care]. Bratislava: SNSĽP. Graham, Allan and Jill Jones. 2002. Social Relations and the Life Course. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Guráň, Peter. 1989. ‘Rozvodovosť ako sociálny problém’ [Divorce rate as a social problem]. In Aktuálne problémy sociológie rodiny [Actual Issues in the Sociology of Family], edited by Dušan Provazník, 295–319. Bratislava: Veda.

206

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

Guráň, Peter and Milan Fico. 2008. Sociálne služby na Slovensku [Social Services in Slovakia]. Prievidza: Fórum pre pomoc starším a Slovenské národné stredisko pre ľudské práva. Guráň, Peter and Jarmila Filadelfiová. 1995. Hlavné demografické trendy a rodina: Svet – Európa – Slovensko [Main Demographic Trends and Family: World – Europe – Slovakia]. Bratislava: Medzinárodné stredisko pre štúdium rodiny. Hašková, Hana. 2008. ‘Trh práce a plodnost: Bezdětní třicátníci a třicátnice na trhu práce’ [Labour market and fertility: Childless men and women in their thirties in the labour market]. In Nová rizika pracovního trhu: flexibilita, marginalizace a soukromý život [New Risks of the Labour Market: Flexibility, Marginalisation and Private Life], edited by Radka Dudová, 243–292. Prague: Sociologický ústav Akademie věd ČR. Heady, Patrick, Juraj Buzalka, Laszlo Foszto and Roman Dzambazovic. 2011. ‘Pôrodnosť je najnižšia tam, kde sú tradičné rodinné putá najsilnejšie’ [Fertility is lowest where the traditional family ties are strongest]. In Prežívame krízu rodiny? [Do We Live in Times of Family Crisis?], edited by Juraj Buzalka, 45–58. Bratislava: os. Holubová, Barbora. 2009. Súhrnná správa o stave rodovej rovnosti na Slovensku za rok 2009 [General Report on Gender Equality in Slovakia in 2009]. Bratislava: Inštitút pre výskum práce a rodiny. ——. 2010. Súhrnná správa o stave rodovej rovnosti na Slovensku za rok 2010 [General Report on Gender Equality in Slovakia in 2010]. Bratislava: Inštitút pre výskum práce a rodiny. Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker. 2000. ‘Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values’. American Sociological Review 65 (1): 19. ivo (Institute for Public Affairs). 2006. Empirické údaje zo sociologického výskumu ivo [Empirical Data from the ivo Sociological Survey]. Bratisalava: ivo. Jamieson, Lynn, David Morgan, Graham Crow and Allan Graham. 2006. ‘Friends, neighbours and distant partners: Extending or decentring family relationships?’ Sociological Research Online 11 (3). http://www.socresonline.org.uk/11/3/jamieson.html. Jurčová, Danuša. 2006. Populačný vývoj v okresoch SR 2005 [Population Development in Slovak Regions 2005]. Bratislava: INFOSTAT. ——. 2010. Populačný vývoj v okresoch Slovenskej republiky 2009 [Population Development in the Regions of Slovak Republic]. Bratislava: INFOSTAT. Katrňák, Tomáš. 2011. ‘Proměny podoby české rodiny v letech 1989 až 2009’ [Transformations of the Czech family between years 1989 and 2009]. In Prežívame krízu rodiny? [Do We Face a Crisis of the Family?], edited by Juraj Buzalka, 32–45. Bratislava: os. Kučera, Milan and Ludmila Fialová. 1996. Demografické chování obyvatelstva České republiky během přeměny společnosti po roce 1989 [Demographic Behaviour of the Population of the Czech Republic in the Transitional Years after 1989]. Prague: Sociologický ústav Akademie věd ČR.

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

207

Le Feuvre, Nicky. 1997. ‘Women, work and employment in Europe’. In Women in the European Union, edited by Pilar Ballarin, Nicky Le Feuvre and Eeva Raevaara. Helsinki: University of Helsinki. http://www.helsinki.fi/science/xantippa/wee/ wee22.html. Matoušek, Oldřich. 1993. Rodina jako instituce a vztahová síť [Family as Institution and Relational Network]. Prague: slon. McNay, Kirsty. 2003. ‘Women’s changing roles in the context of the demographic transition’. Paper commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2003/4 Gender and Education for All: The Leap to Equality. Paris: unesco. Možný, Ivo. 1990. Moderní rodina: Mýty a skutečnosti [Modern Family: Myths and Realities]. Brno: Blok. ——. 1999. Sociologie rodiny [Sociology of Family]. Prague: slon. ——. 2006. Rodina a společnost [Family and Society]. Prague: slon. mpsvr. 2007. Správa o sociálnej situácii obyvateľstva SR 2007 [Report on the Social Situation of the Population in Slovakia 2007]. Bratislava: mpsvr. Ochiai Emiko. 2009. ‘Care diamonds and welfare regimes in East and Southeast Asian societies: Bridging family and welfare sociology’. The International Journal of Japanese Sociology 18 (1): 60–78. oecd. 2007. Babies and Bosses: Reconciling Work and Family Life. Paris: oecd. Parent-Thirion, Agnès, Enrique Fernández Macías, John Hurley and Greet Vermeylen. 2007. Fourth European Working Conditions Survey. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Parent-Thirion, Agnès, Greet Vermeylen, Maija Lyly-Yrjanainen, Gijs van Houten, Isabella Biletta and Sophia MacGoris. 2012. Fifth European Working Conditions Survey. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Pavlík, Zdeněk and Milan Kučera. 1999. Populační vývoj České republiky 1999 [Population Development in the Czech Republic 1999]. Prague: Katedra demografie a geodemografie pf uk Praha. Pilinská, Viera, Martina Lukáčová, Ján Mészáros and Boris Vaňo. 2005. Demografická charakteristika rodiny na Slovensku [Demographic Characteristics of the Family in Slovakia]. Bratislava: INFOSTAT. Pongrácz, Tiborné. 2001. ‘A család és a munka szerepe a nők életében’ [The role of family and work in the lives of women]. In Szerepváltozások 2001 [Role Changes 2001], edited by Ildikó Nagy, Tiborné Pongrácz and István Gy. Tóth, 30–45. Budapest: TÁRKI. Provazník, Dušan. 1989. Aktuálne problémy sociológie rodiny [Actual Problems in the Sociology of the Family]. Bratislava: Veda. Rabušič, Ladislav. 2001. Kde ty všechny děti jsou? Porodnost v sociologické perspective [Where Are All Those Children? Fertility in a Sociological Perspective]. Prague: slon.

208

GURÁŇ, FILADELFIOVÁ and DEBNÁR

Radičová, Iveta. 2001. Hic Sunt Romales [Here Are the Romas]. Bratislava: Nadácia SPACE. Rychtaříková, Jitka. 1996. ‘Současné změny charakteru reprodukce v České republice a mezinárodní situace’ [Contemporary changes in the character of reproduction in the Czech Republic and international situation]. Demografie 38 (2): 77–89. Sirovátka, Tomáš and Ondřej Hora. 2008. Rodina, děti a zaměstnání v české společnosti [Family, Children and Employment in the Czech Society]. Brno: Fakulta sociálních studií Masarykovy univerzity v Brně. Smart, Carol and Elizabeth Silva. 1999. The New Family? London: Sage Publications. Statistical Office (of the Slovak Republic). 2002. Sčítanie obyvateľov, domov a bytov 2001 [The 2001 Population and Housing Census]. Bratislava: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. ——. 2003. Štatistická ročenka SR 2003 [Annual Statistical Report of the Slovak Republic 2003]. Bratislava: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. ——. 2006. Ženy a muži sr v eú [Men and Women in Slovakia and the eu]. Bratislava: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. ——. 2011. Demografický vývoj v Slovenskej republike 2010 [Demographic Development in the Slovak Republic 2010]. Bratislava: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. Szelewa, Dorota. 2006. ‘Three faces of familialism: Comparing family policies in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland’. Paper presented at the RC19 Annual Academic Conference on Social Policy in a Globalizing World: Developing a North– South Dialogue, Florence, 6–8 September. Thornton, Arland and Dimiter Philipov. 2009. ‘Sweeping changes in marriage, cohabitation and childbearing in Central and Eastern Europe: New insights from the developmental idealism framework’. European Journal of Population 25 (2): 123–156. Tóth, Olga and Péter Somlai. 2005. ‘Families in Hungary’. In Handbook of World Families, edited by Bert N. Adams and Jan Trost, 313–329. London: Sage Publications. undp. 2000. Národná správa o ľudskom rozvoji [National Report on Human Development]. Bratislava: undp. undp. 2012. Sprava o zivotnych podmienkach romskych domacnostina Slovensku 2010 [Report on the Life Conditions of Roma Families in Slovakia 2010]. Bratislava: undp. Van de Kaa, Dirk J. 1994. ‘The second demographic transition revisited: Theories and expectations’. In Population and Family in the Low Countries 1993: Late Fertility and Other Current Issues, edited by Gijs Beets, Hans van den Brekel, Robert L. Cliquet, Gilbert Dooghe and Jenny De Jong Gierveld, 81–126. nidi/cbgs Publication, No. 30. Berwyn, Pennsylvania and Amsterdam: Swets and Zeitlinger. Vaňo, Boris. 2001 Demografická charakteristika rómskej populácie v SR [Demographic Characteristics of the Roma Population in Slovakia]. Bratislava: INFOSTAT. ——. 2003. Populačný vývoj v Slovenskej republike 2002 [Population Development in Slovakia 2002]. Bratislava: INFOSTAT.

Contemporary Family In Slovakia

209

——. 2005. Populačný vývoj v Slovenskej republike 2004 [Population Development in Slovakia 2004]. Bratislava: INFOSTAT. ——. 2007. Populačný vývoj v Slovenskej republike 2006 [Population Development in Slovakia 2006]. Bratislava: INFOSTAT. Vašková, Renáta. 2005. ‘Bariéry a předpoklady vzniku nové rodiny jako samostatné jednotky u náctiletých matek’ [Barriers and conditions of independent family formation for teen mothers]. Demografie 47 (4): 251–264. Veres, Pavel. 1990. ‘Mlada manželství po pěti letech’ [Young marriages after five years]. Demografie 1: 45–46.

CHAPTER 6

Family Systems and Family Values in Twenty-First-Century Hungary Csaba Dupcsik and Olga Tóth 1

‘Mapping’ Hungary between West and East

There is a very influential view that the border of Western culture (at least in the Middle Ages and early modern times) runs along the line of Western and Eastern Christianity (by and large coinciding with the eastern borders of historic Hungary and the historic Polish core territory).1 Another influential view also exists regarding the historical inner borders of Europe; that the territory lying east of the Elbe and Leitha rivers has been a region with ‘mixed’ Western and Eastern (European) characteristics in cultural, social, and political senses. The most important piece of information necessary to define Hungary’s position can be found on the map; Hungary lies between these ‘borders’. In early modern times Hungary was a part of the Habsburg Empire – in some periods as a rebellious and repressed region, in other times as a halfautonomous country, which in the last half of the nineteenth century was a formally independent and equal co-state within the Empire. With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918–20 Hungary’s territory was reduced by two-thirds (nowadays it is about 93,000 square kilometres; the population is about ten million). Between 1945 and 1990 the country was under Soviet occupation, and its political, economic, and social systems were transformed under state socialism. After 1990 the country became a democracy and a member of both the nato (in 1999) and the European Union (in 2004). 1.1 Between the ‘European’ and ‘Non-European’ Family Models A third line also important in this perspective is the so-called Hajnal line. Writing on marriage and family, John Hajnal differentiated ‘the European model’ (which is characterised by relatively late marriage  age, high nonmarriage rate, low fertility rate, and nuclear families), and the ‘non-European model’ (which is characterised by relatively early marriage age, low 1 South-east of this border is the Balkans, and eastwards is Eastern Europe. We use these terms as labels for macro-regions which have relevance in respect of social history, but this border definition does not intend to exclude these regions from contemporary European integration.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004276833_008

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

211

non-marriage, high fertility rates and extended families). Hajnal, a historical demographer, drew an imaginary line from St Petersburg (Russia) to Trieste (now Italy, but in early modern times belonging to the Habsburg monarchy) which divided Europe into two parts according to these two models.2 This division suggests that Hungary, or the greater part of the historical country, fell east of this social historical border. If we accept Hajnal’s idea, Hungary belonged to the ‘non-European model’ with all its features. Contrastingly however, other social historians’ research3 has pointed out that the situation of Hungary was more complicated.4 Despite being socially, ethnically, and regionally differentiated, in large parts of the country the nuclear family was prevalent even in early modernity (however, with lower marriage age and higher marriage rates than Western Europe). To sum up, in the nineteenth century, Hungary showed the features of both Hajnal’s ‘European’ and ‘non-European’ marriage models at the same time. 1.2 Between the ‘First Modernisation’ and ‘Compressed Modernisation’ It is also far from simple to typify Hungarian modernity. The tenets of modernisation, such as industrialisation, urbanisation, marketisation, etc., began to emerge later than in Western Europe, but on the other hand they were still beginning to emerge even in the nineteenth century. Although it seems there is no perfect index for characterising the modernisation process, the rate of employment in agriculture can be useful in this regard. This rate, which was above 80–90 per cent in every pre-modern society,5 began to diminish in England in the eighteenth century, and in some Western European countries (Belgium, France) in the first half of the nineteenth century. Meanwhile in a number of countries described as ‘late modernisers’ this rate began to diminish rapidly only in the second half of the twentieth century. Although the data set presented in Figure 6.1 does not conclusively prove anything in itself, it perhaps demonstrates our thesis that the development trajectory of Hungary can be situated between the countries of the ‘first modernisation’ (typical of some Western European countries)6 and those of ‘compressed modernisation’ (typical of most countries on all continents).7 2 3 4 5 6 7

Hajnal (1965). For example that of Andorka and Faragó (1983); Faragó (1999); Fél and Hofer (1969). Later even John Hajnal seemed to accept their argument (Hajnal 1983, 92). Of course this was less in smaller city-states. Berend and Ránki (1987). Chang (2003, 2010). Also see the brief explanation of the term compressed modernity and its related concepts in the Introduction of this volume.

212

DUPCSIK and TÓTH Hungary Germany Japan

England/UK Romania South Korea

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1801 1850 1860 1875 1900 1910 1920 1930 1941 1949 1960 1970 1980 1990 2010

Figure 6.1 Agricultural employment in selected countries, 1801–2010 (percentage of total employment)

Source: Berend and Ránki (1976, 481; 1987, 26); Diederiks et al. (1995, 199, 205); Diószegi et al. (1997, 145); Gergely (2003, 345); Hungarian Statistical Office; World Bank World Development Indicators

Modernisation in Hungary began relatively early, but the process always dropped behind Western Europe, the most important point of reference for the country. On the other hand the process was disrupted and distorted at ­several periods in the twentieth century. For our understanding of the present situation there is a special significance to the distortion caused by the forced modernisation which took place under Communist regimes between 1945 and 1990. The social and economic policies adopted established a system which turned out to be dysfunctional in many areas at the same time. For example, the economic system was out of date from the beginning because it preferred heavy industry over the service- and knowledge-based sectors; the economy continuously produced and reproduced shortages, even whilst being systematically lavished with resources (raw materials and labour).8 From the perspective of our study two aspects require special attention: (1) due to the dominance of state ownership and because of the shortages in the economy,9 enterprises were insensitive to costs, and they

8 Kornai (1980). 9 Ibid.

213

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

tried to store every kind of resource including manpower; and (2) this endeavour produced almost full employment amongst both men and women. One of the key issues of the familist discourse, namely the statement that female paid work emerged in the age of state socialism, can be considered a myth if we examine the long-term tendencies (see Figure 6.2). Of course, the age of state socialism brought some major changes. Perhaps the most relevant change was constrained industrialisation and the forced reorganisation of agriculture, which pushed women into the labour market. The rate of employment and full-time education amongst women increased such that by 1980 amongst females aged 15–54, only 6.8 per cent were housewives.10 Summing up, the familist argument that the socialist system forced women into the workplace is not a totally false statement, but the effect is exaggerated. Before 1945 most women had paid work (or worked on their family’s land) for at least some period of their life. The change after 1945 was drastic for middleclass women only, and these strata, the former middle class, could be considered one of the losers in the Communist takeover, as one of the ‘class enemies’ of the new system. It is noteworthy that despite state discrimination in the first period of socialism, most children and grandchildren of the former middle class were able to reclaim their family’s middle-class status. On the one hand this process of status reproduction is a revealing example that social familism11 could run as a very efficient mechanism on the micro-level; despite affirmative action for workers’ children and political and administrative discrimination against children of the former middle class, members of the latter 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

20.8

17.7

1900

1910

25.8

22.0

24.1

24.9

1920

1930

1941

1949

32.8

1960

38.6

39.9

37.4

1970

1980

1990

Figure 6.2 Actively employed women, 1900–1990 (percentage of all women) Source: Hungarian Statistical Office

10 11

Andorka and Harcsa (1990, 94). See Subsection 4.1 regarding the conceptualisation of ‘social familism’.

214

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

category still had a greater chance of becoming intellectuals12 or ‘socialist entrepreneurs’13 with the help of cultural capital inherited from their family. On the other hand, the experiences and family traditions of this social group also had relevant influences on the later familist discourse. Due to the low level of efficiency of the state economy there was a (quasi) market ‘second economy’ in practically every European socialist country, but in Hungary it was present in a particularly extended way.14 In the latter days of socialism, in three-quarters of all families at least one member participated in this second economy, but, with a few exceptions, this was largely as a part-time worker while they were also full-time employees of the state.15 This structure implies a more or less conscious restriction of their commitments and endeavours in the state sector, and self-exploitation in the second economy. Furthermore the toleration and partial legalisation of the second economy was not equal to its legitimisation – on the contrary the official discourse insisted that private ownership and the market, even in this restricted form, were only temporary concessions.16 1.3 Modernisation and Trust Due to their particular position inside the Habsburg Empire, until 1918 the majority of Hungarians had ambivalent attitudes towards Hungarian institutions, including the government. They viewed them as both their own home institutions and as agents of a foreign power at the same time.17 In the following periods, between 1914 and 1990, there were two world wars,18 three military occupations, two revolutions (both repressed), genocides, red and white terrors, great territorial rearrangements, violently driven social restructuring, and nine changes of political system.19 Until 1990 no regime was democratic and in practice all governments treated one or some social groups as hostile. In all likelihood there are very few families in Hungary who have no family members who have not been victims of state discrimination at some point. The forced social changes between 1945 and 1960 in themselves reinforced the distrust of institutions and (re)produced a crisis of values.20 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Kemény (1990, 116–117). Szelényi (1988); Manchin and Szelényi (1990). Gábor and Galasi (1981). Kolosi (1987). See Hankiss et al. (1982). However, both approaches had some relevance. Hungary was defeated in both world wars. Some amongst these systems were very short-lived, but the two longest, the Horthy and the Kádár regimes, were radically different in their beginnings, ‘golden ages’, and twilights. See Hankiss et al. (1982).

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

215

According to the European Values Study survey, the level of trust in institutions in 1991 had diminished significantly compared to 1982, and since then the decrease has been continuous but smaller.21 We have to take the measurement of levels of trust in the situation of the single-party dictatorship with a grain of salt; any ‘trust’ which existed would be partly mimicry, partly a response to the feeling of stability, and the expectation that this system would last ‘forever’ (these expectations, of course, are hardly separable from ‘real’ trust). In the second half of 1989 when the Soviet camp in Central Europe22 collapsed, the level of distrust mushroomed, partly because the former latent mistrust became open, partly because the feeling of stability quickly vanished.23 Developments since 1989–90 have not contributed to the reconstruction (or construction) of general social trust. A lot of people expected the change of political system to usher in not only freedom but also a standard of living similar to that of Western European countries. However, even in the Central European region, Hungary’s achievement has been the worst in the area of economic growth. The state has withdrawn from the control of production, but state redistribution invariably plays an important role for family incomes.24 The government’s policy is too paternalistic to be in accordance with democratic standards, and this has generated popular discontent. However, most people are also unhappy with the state’s attempt to withdraw from its former roles in the social, educational, cultural, and health spheres. These two groups overlap to a great extent and they constitute the decisive majority in Hungarian society. When looking at Hungary, the sociologist Ságvári’s note is relevant: ‘To build a culture of trust requires a slow process with many small steps, meanwhile distrust’s solidification into a cultural norm can occur far faster, in the wake of some relevant event experienced directly or indirectly’.25 In Hungary, distrust apparently became a solid cultural norm even in the earlier parts of the twentieth century, and the recent era, since 1990, has ‘only’ reproduced this culture through marketisation and political conflicts. This distrust culture is probably also present in other countries that have been subject to similar conditions, namely the traditions of distrust and current social and political situations that are not suited to the building of a culture of trust. According to the fourth 21 22 23 24 25

Hajdu (2012). See the remarks in the Preface of this volume regarding the conceptualisation of Central and Eastern Europe. Giczi and Sik (2009). Szalai (2007). Ságvári (2013).

216

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

wave of the European Social Survey in 2008–2009, amongst thirty countries Hungary was twenty-second in the general level of trust.26 It is noteworthy that all except one of the bottom twelve countries on this scale are located in the Balkans or Eastern Europe, or are post-Communist Central European countries. This low level of trust can enhance the phenomenon of familism (see below) directly or, due to the weakness of civil society, indirectly in every society.27 To sum up, the Hungarian situation is as follows: low levels of trust in institutions including the state; governments making paternalistic endeavours, but without the tools to maintain former levels of social policy; a general distrustful habitus which tends to work in a self-confirming way; and a continuous crisis in terms of values. Familism is one of the social and individual reactions to this long and complex crisis. 1.4 From Traditional Pluralism to the Post-War Standard Family Relevant to the aims of this chapter, it should be stressed that in early modern times in Hungary there prevailed a kind of traditional pluralism in the realm of family structure, and this pluralism lasted until the middle of the twentieth century. As Faragó28 argued, Hungarian people adapted their marriage and family forms to changes in the economy and society in a very ‘plastic’ way. He showed that during the period 1787–1828 the ratio of extended families increased somewhat in Hungary. At the beginning of the period more counties were characterised by the nuclear family and during the following four decades this ratio changed. Two different causes stand behind the very same demographic behaviour. By the end of the eighteenth century an overpopulation crisis emerged in Hungary (just as in other Western European countries). In the northern counties the overpopulation was coupled with a lack of land. Peasant families tried to protect themselves from pauperisation by using birth control and also through keeping young couples inside their original families, thus forming extended families. In contrast, in the southern part of the country peasant families could get more new land, but without the modernisation of farming they needed more hands for cultivation. Founding extended families seemed to be an appropriate measure to obtain more labour. Both cases demonstrate the strong effect of belated modernisation on family structures. The ‘uniformisation’ of family structure happened in the first two to three decades of the post-war period; this chapter will refer to the result of this 26 27 28

Hajdu (2012). Fukuyama (1995); Torsello (2004); Tóth and Dupcsik (2011). Faragó (1999).

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

217

­process as the Post-war Standard Family, or psf. The most important characteristics of this model were as follow: 1.

The overwhelming majority of the population got married (the proportion of never-married persons was lower than 5 per cent). 2. Marriage began at a relatively early age (in 1970 the male mean age at first marriage was 24.5 years and the female age was 21.6 years) and this was taken for granted as a norm and the prevailing practice. Cohabitation without marriage was regarded as a deviant lifestyle, practised mainly by undereducated people. It was also exceptional that young adults formed a one-person household. 3. The number of divorces reached a relatively high number by the 1970s and remained at this level, but the majority of divorced persons aspired to remarry. 4. The majority of couples had children, although significantly fewer ­children than in former decades. Tóth (2007).29 In the ‘golden age’ of the psf, which lasted from 1960 to the mid-1980s, the rate of marriage amongst males aged fifteen or over reached 70–72 per cent. This ratio was 60–62 per cent in the first half of the twentieth century. Similar data for women were lower because of their higher life expectancy and their lesser chance of remarrying after divorce. The Hungarian psf had some similarities with the post-war Western or Japanese family,30 but there was a significant difference too; in Hungary this period was not ‘the age of housewives’. On the contrary, under state socialism (1945–90) typically both husbands and wives were full-time wage-earners as employees of the state (see Figure 6.2). The reason was the socialist system’s insensitivity to the cost of labour (which generated eagerness for every kind of employment) and depressed wages (which made it almost impossible for most families to make a living from a single income). In return for acceptance of low wages, the state ran an extended social service system and tolerated people’s activity in the second economy for additional income. The wage policy and social policy of the state economy was of outstanding importance for family formation, as married people were preferred to the unmarried. A single person had a minimal chance of getting an apartment through state distribution and the low level of the average income

29 30

Tóth (2007). Ochiai (1997).

218

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

made it impossible to accumulate enough money to rent or buy a flat via market sources. Every policy and social institution pushed people to start a family. In other words, social familism played an important role for people starting a family. To summarise: the Hungarian psf was a relatively modern type of family with some traditional features. The overwhelming majority of the population was living in families which were made up of married couples (two wageearners) and two children. 2

The Post-psf Situation or the New Pluralism of Family Forms

2.1 Marital Status The new pluralisation of family forms started in the mid-1980s, and this process has continued to the present time. The changing structure of the economy, the broadening possibilities for enrolment in university, the growing career opportunities for both young men and women on the one hand and unemployment and growing inequalities on the other hand all had some effect on family forms. Not only real factors but attitudes and values have also changed during the last thirty years. However, when studying the practice of gender and family roles and the relevant attitudes, a peculiar contradiction emerges. While in terms of several real factors the Hungarian population belongs to the more modern segment of the (diverse) field of Europe, in terms of ideals the Hungarian population takes the opposite position. Hungary is one of the countries where respondents agree to the greatest extent with traditional attitude statements concerning family and the roles of men and women – in certain respects not only by international comparison but in absolute number too. These facts have been demonstrated in the past decade by several different studies.31 As a result of these complex effects a more pluralistic picture can be drawn of the Hungarian family in 2010. This chapter shows the most relevant changes in family forms and attitudes and also the gaps between these attitudes and real demographic behaviour. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 present the changes in marital status in a very obvious way. Since 1980 (the ‘golden age of the psf’) the ratio of married persons has dramatically decreased amongst men and women. In the whole adult population, 20 per cent fewer married persons can be found now than thirty years ago. On the other hand, the ratio of never-married persons has doubled in the case of females and also increased by 17 per cent for males. The growing proportion 31

See Tóth (1998); Pongrácz (2011); Pongrácz and Spéder (2003); Blaskó (2006); Spéder (2005b).

219

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY 100% 90%

3.7 3.5

6.4 3.9

70.8

64.6

8.2 3.9

9.0 3.7

55.8

49.9

80% 70% 60%

divorced

50%

widowed

40%

married

30%

never married

20% 10%

22.0

25.1

1980

1990

32.2

37.5

0% 2000

2010

Figure 6.3 Percentage of males ( fifteen years and older) by marital status, 1980–2010 Source: Demographic Yearbook (2010)

100% 90% 80%

5.6 16.3

8.2

10.3

12.0

17.8

18.3

18.0

70% divorced

60% 50% 40%

64.3

58.1

49.7

43.2

20% 0%

married never married

30% 10%

widowed

13.8

15.9

1980

1990

21.7

26.9

2000

2010

Figure 6.4 Percentage of females ( fifteen years and older) by marital status, 1980–2010 Source: Demographic Yearbook (2010)

of divorced persons is also a significant change. We have no exact data, just estimates, about the very different, new types of partnership and family forms (cohabitation, lat32 relation, mosaic families, etc.) as relatively little research is being directing towards them. In the mainstream of Hungarian research on 32

That is, Living Apart Together.

220

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

family issues these new forms are seen as some kind of ‘deviant’ practice, with the most important thing to consider being how it might be possible to make people turn back to the ‘normal’ forms of family. There are no significant differences between the marital status of males living in towns or villages or in settlements with more or fewer inhabitants.33 Regions with different levels of economic development do not show different types of marital status in the case of males either. The only significant difference can be found in the ratio of divorced men. This is highest in middle-size towns where it reaches 10.3 per cent of males aged fifteen and older. The lowest rate is in the communities with the fewest inhabitants (8.5 per cent). On the other hand, the marital status of females does show differences by region and community type (see Figure  6.5). As the data show, many more never-married females live in Budapest than in other cities and in small villages, where the differences are even greater. Conversely there are more married females amongst village inhabitants than in towns. Divorced females are living in higher numbers in Budapest and also in other big cities. The data show that relatively more young women remain unmarried or divorced in these urbanised communities than in other communities. 2.2 Marriage and Divorce In the process of more pluralistic forms of family taking shape, obviously the most striking changes have happened within marriage and other forms of 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

15.1

12.9

9.1

15.5

17.0

20.9 Divorced

37.1

42.5

45.8

Widowed Married Never married

32.3

27.6

24.2

Budapest

Other towns

Villages

Figure 6.5 Percentage of females ( fifteen years and older) by marital status as of 1 January 2011 Source: Demographic Yearbook (2010)

33

Demographic Yearbook (2010).

221

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

cohabitation. While the number of marriages per thousand non-married females aged fifteen years or older was 62.1 in 1970, this number decreased to 13.7 in 2010. Marriage has lost its pre-eminence amongst forms of cohabitation in Hungarian society. The data illustrated in Figure 6.6 show that marriage as the only accepted family form has eroded from two directions; the diminishing number of marriages and the increasing number of divorces. However, not only the absolute number of marriages but also the marriage rate has decreased. This process started in the 1980s and accelerated after 1990. In 1960 the probability of a woman marrying at least once in her life was almost 100 per cent, but this probability has decreased to 39 per cent as of 2010. The 1960 birth cohort reached the age of 50 in 2010 and the ratio of those never-married woman amongst them is now 7.8 per cent.34 At the same time, the absolute number of divorces remained at a high level, caused by an increase in the total divorce rate. The total divorce rate was 0.2 in 1960 but it had doubled by 2010.35 This means that if the divorce rates, 1.20 1.00

0.60

total marriage rate

0.40

total

0.80

0.20 0.00

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Figure 6.6 Total first-marriage rate for females (per hundred females) and total divorce rate (per hundred marriages) Note: Total first-marriage rate indicates the share of males and females reaching the marrying age of fifteen years who enter marriage by a certain age (females: 49, males: 59). It rests on the supposition that females and males reaching fifteen years of age will show the same disposition towards marriage as the rate of the given year. Total divorce rate indicates how many divorces occur in marriages entered into in the reviewed period if the marriage-duration-specific divorce rates of the given year prevail. Source: Demographic Yearbook (2010)

34 Demographic Yearbook (2010). 35 Ibid.

222

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

according to marriage duration, of 2010 do not change, almost half of new marriages will end with divorce. Nowadays in Hungary it is difficult to regard marriage as a steady life-long relationship. The decline of marriage accompanied the growing average age at first marriage. In 1970 the average age at first marriage was 24.5  years for males and 21.8 years for females. In 2010 this was 31.4 years for males and 28.7 years for females. Those who intend to marry postpone the decision to later ages than ever before in Hungary.36 Alongside this postponement a greater proportion of young adults choose cohabitation instead of marriage. As mentioned previously, cohabitation had a negative image during the golden age of the psf. Nowadays 70 per cent of young adults choose cohabitation for their first steady form of partner-relationship and this rate is seven times higher than it was fifty years ago.37 It is obvious that some cohabiting partners will marry in the future (especially when they decide to have children), but there can be no reliable estimate of the number. We can suppose that cohabitation will also be a widely practised family form in the future.38 The third fact which contributes to the decreasing number of marriages is that many in the younger generation do not live in steady partnerships. These young people belong to a number of groups. One group is the people living in Budapest or in the bigger cities, who are educated, and whose lifestyle is somewhat similar to single people living in Western countries. As we know from Utasi’s research,39 most of them would like to have a partner, but finding a partner to match their preferences is not easy. This is especially difficult for young females, as in Hungary – just like in other European countries – more females are enrolled than males in higher education. Another group of young people without steady partners are undereducated males living in villages.40 Unemployment or a lack of permanent jobs and income characterise this group. Many are not able to start a family as they are greatly affected by the economic crisis. They remain in their parents’ home in ‘child-status’ in statistical terms. Postponing marriage is not a choice for them but a rational answer to their life experience and poor prospects. The marriage rate of males in different communities reflects this fact. The first-marriage rate and marriage rate in various age groups is lower amongst males living in villages compared to Budapest and other cities. 36 37 38 39 40

Note the relevance of Hajnal’s model for this country. Spéder and Kapitány (2007). Tóth (2007). Utasi (2004). Spéder (2005b).

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

223

In the case of females the differences in first-marriage rate are not as sharp as in the case of males. However, we still find some differences by community type. Females in villages marry at relatively young ages – as in previous decades. Other village females who did not marry until the age of thirty have a lower chance of doing so later. Village females largely finish their first marriage ‘wave’ when females who are living in Budapest and in other big cities just start it, around the age of thirty. The average duration of marriage before divorce is increasing constantly. It was 10.63 years in 1990 and 12.89 years in 2010. As in the last century, shortduration marriages were likeliest to end in divorce, but by 2010 the risk of divorce had increased in the case of longer-duration marriages too. In 2010, 39 per cent of divorces took place before the tenth year of married life, 33 per cent between ten and nineteen years, and 28 per cent after twenty years. An increasing number of long-established marriages are dissolved every year. There is a similar trend in the age of divorce; 42 per cent of female divorcees were forty years or older in 2010 while this ratio was just 25 per cent in 2000. Divorce is a widespread practice both in villages and cities. The only important difference is in the age of partners at the time of divorce. If a village couple has not divorced before the wife reaches thirty, they are likely to stay together. The aforementioned phenomenon of divorce after long-lasting marriage is more typical in Budapest and the big cities. 2.3 Marriage and Divorce: Attitudes As demographic data show, marriage has lost its hegemony over family forms, especially amongst the younger generation. The change of attitudes reflects this process. In 2010 half of people aged fifty years and older considered marriage the ‘only acceptable partnership’, while only every fourth person of the younger generation thought the same.41 Marriage has lost its hegemony but it is still highly rated in public; 80 per cent of respondents would advise young people to live in marriage according to data produced in 2009. However, at the same time a majority of people (69.7 per cent) would also advise couples to live together before getting married,42 which denotes an increasing departure from the psf. Data from the International Social Survey 2002 show that more than half of Hungarians agree with the statement ‘Married people are generally happier than unmarried people’; among European countries surveyed, the level of agreement with that statement in Hungary was one of the highest. There was no significant difference by age group; thus, while the young in 41 42

S. Molnár (2011, 41). Ibid. (49).

224

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

Hungary were behaving in much the same way as their Western European peers, their attitudes towards marriage were the same as their parents’ attitudes.43 The most prominent research on Hungarian single people also supports the idea that Hungarian singles’ main desire is to have a steady relationship, especially marriage.44 Therefore, we find that real behaviour and attitudes concerning marriage and other family forms are quite distinct but converging slowly. The spread of different family and partnership forms has preceded their public acceptance. However, the results of this modernisation and diversification of attitudes is now being realised in actual behaviour. The consistently high number of divorces reflects public acceptance of divorce as a preferred strategy for conflict resolution in marriage. Irrespective of age or gender, 58–60 per cent of those questioned agreed with the statement: ‘Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can’t seem to work out their marriage problems’.45 There is general consensus across Europe on this question, the majority everywhere sharing this attitude. Thus, Hungarian views and behaviour here are in line with those in Western Europe. It is, nevertheless, important to note that despite the appearance of a few mediation organisations, Hungarian social institutions are still not sufficiently equipped to facilitate dignified divorce. 2.4 Childbearing The decline of the birth rate has been an important political issue for every political regime, as the number of children per family has been falling since the beginning of the twentieth century. Even during the ‘golden age’ of the psf the total fertility rate decreased to under 2.00, and this rate was just 1.32 in 2009 and 1.26 in 2010. The fertility rate in Hungary is amongst the lowest in Europe. A similarly low fertility rate can be found in Portugal and Latvia.46 Not only has the birth rate decreased but the childbearing habits of different birth cohorts have also changed. As Figure 6.7 shows, uniformity of the psf went together with uniformity of childbearing behaviour amongst females. Total fertility in the female birth cohorts of 1930–60 is very similar. They started childbirth in their early twenties; 1,000 females had roughly 1,200 children by the age of twenty-five. By the age of thirty-five most of them had finished childbirth and they had given birth 43 44 45 46

Tóth (2006). Utasi (2004). International Social Survey (2002). Therborn (2004, 229–243).

225

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY 2,200 2,000 1,800

1930

1,600 1,400

1960

1,200

1970

1,000

1975

800

1980

600

1985

400

1990

200 0

20

25

30

35

40

45

49

Figure 6.7 Average number of live-born children until given age by female birth cohort (number of live-born children per thousand females) Source: Demographic Yearbook (2010)

to all their children. The total fertility rate remained under 2.0 in these cohorts but very few of these women (5–7 per cent) remained childless. A characteristic change started with the birth cohort of 1970. Those females who were born in 1970 had just reached the age of twenty by the time of the change of regime. In previous years this age was the starting point for making a family. However, this birth cohort encountered the positive and negative effects of the new system and started to postpone the birth of their first child. Interestingly, already in 1989 when the first signs emerged of unemployment, young couples with their first child were visualising the threat of unemployment in their lives. It is obvious that many of them postponed the birth of their planned second, or later, third child. For many families this delay has resulted in fewer children than planned. Female members of the birth cohort of 1970 have recently attained age forty. Biologically they may have more children but it seems most of them have now finished their period of fertility. Postponing children is more obvious in the younger cohorts. Here we see older mothers at the time of the birth of their first child. The mean age of mothers at the birth of their first child was 22.99 years in 1990, 25.02 years in 2000, and 28.23 years in 2010.47 It is possible that younger women will give birth to more children in older age and catch up to the older cohorts’ fertility rate, but the financial and socio-political crisis in Hungary is ongoing and likely to have an impact in this area. As data show, the number of crèches (institutional childcare facilities for children under age three) decreased from 1,003 (1990) to 47

Demographic Yearbook (2010).

226

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

530 (2005). A slight increase started again in the last few years and in 2011 the number of crèches reached 700.48 However, only 9 per cent of children under the age of three years are attending crèches. This is a solid barrier in front of a mother seeking to enter employment. Mothers living in communities of different sizes of population show sharp differences in the total fertility rate. This is 1.47 in the smallest villages but 1.09– 1.10 in the biggest cities of the country and in Budapest. The very low total fertility rate of Hungary originates first of all from the demographic behaviour of women living in Budapest and other big cities. Deeper analysis of the birth rate by educational level shows that women in the middle of society, with a secondary-level education, have the lowest fertility rate. Women with poor educational levels have a much higher fertility rate and women with the highest educational level have a slightly higher fertility rate.49 This data shows the emerging pluralisation of family forms in contemporary Hungary. The other important change concerning childbirth is the rapidly growing number of extramarital births. As can be seen in Figure 6.8, fewer than 10 per cent of children were born to parents who were not married in the 1980s. By 2010 however, the figure had 160,000 140,000 120,000 100,000 80,000

143,580

138,068

60,000

109,168

69,255

63,417

53,463

28,342

34,079

36,872

2000

2005

2010

40,000 20,000 0

8,239 1970

10,605 1080 marital

16,511 1990

extramarital

Figure 6.8 Number of marital and extramarital live births Source: Demographic Yearbook (2010)

48 49

Makay (2011). Spéder and Kapitány (2007).

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

227

risen to 41 per cent. Naturally, two-thirds of the births to those unmarried involved a couple living together and not a single mother. Together with cohabitation, Hungarians have come to accept children born outside marriage (so long as they are born to people living together as partners). However, familist demographers worry about this situation. They argue that cohabitations are less stable than marriages and that fewer children will be born from this type of relationship. Characteristic differences can be found in the proportion of extramarital births in different community types. The smaller the community, the higher the proportion of extramarital births. While 32.1 per cent of children were born out of wedlock in Budapest, the proportion in other towns was 40.5 per cent and in villages it was 47.5 per cent. This phenomenon is connected to the various types of marriage behaviour mentioned before; a great proportion of undereducated young people live in small villages, they are unemployed without any chance of finding a job, and therefore they postpone marriage. They live without a steady partner or they cohabit and thus their children are born outside marriage. The increase in the number and ratio of extramarital births is an adaptive behaviour, a reaction to the deep economic crisis and the low levels of support for families and parents. 2.5 Childbearing: Attitudes As we have shown, the decline in the number of births is not a new phenomenon in Hungary. Due to the high mortality rate together with the low birth rate, there has been a natural decrease since 1981. Here the gap between real demographic behaviour and attitudes is the broadest. Attitude surveys have always shown that childcare and child-rearing have consistently been highly valued by Hungarians, so it is useful to look at changes over time in the response to one particular attitude statement: ‘People who have never had children lead an empty life’. This statement expresses a categorical evaluation, since it implies that the childless experience creates an unfillable absence in people’s lives. Amongst European countries, Hungary had an exceptionally high rate of respondents who agreed with this statement, well above that of other countries. However, Figure 6.9 shows that the number of respondents who agree with this statement is decreasing year by year. This change is especially strong amongst males. Unfortunately, the latest data is from 2002 so we can only suppose that this trend has continued. Even here, a polarisation of Hungarian society can be observed; 10–15 per cent of the young now envision their lives without children, an opinion which has never before found such strong expression.50 50

Pongrácz (2007).

228

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

F 1988 F 1994

11.8

82.3

F 2002

15.4

75.6

M 1988

78.6

M 2002 0.0

20.0 agree

40.0

9.0 8.8

13.1

8.3

22.4

65.0

5.9

9.4

81.8

M 1994

8.0

7.3

84.7

60.0

80.0

neither agree nor disagree

disagree

12.6 100.0

Figure 6.9 ‘People who have never had children lead an empty life’ (percentage distribution of respondents by agreement with this statement) Note: Sample sizes in issp waves: issp (1988), N = 1,720; issp (1994), N = 1,500; issp (2002), N = 1,015. Source: issp (1988, 1994, 2002)

Conversely there are also young people who plan on having many children, often amongst the highly educated young urban intelligentsia. Summing up, we find that not only family forms but also attitudes and values concerning childbirth have started to be more pluralistic. 3

Gender Roles: Females’ Paid Work

One of the key questions relating to gender roles is the family–work balance. During the 1980s, women in Hungary were characterised by a very high level of activity in the labour force. Not only the demands of the economy but also the ideology of the socialist regime played an important role in this level of activity. The employment rate reached its peak in 1990 when almost every women between the ages of fifteen and fifty-five was an active earner. The retirement age was lower than in most Western European countries (fifty-five for females and sixty for males), but the proportion of part-time workers was, and remained until recently, under 5 per cent. As Figure 6.10 shows, the employment rate of males, and especially females, was higher in Hungary than in eu countries in 1990. After the political system

229

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY 90.0% 80.0% 70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0%

1990

1997

2004

2007

2009

Hungarian males

83.3%

60.3%

63.1%

64.0%

61.1%

EU males

75.9%

70.6%

70.3%

72.5%

70.7%

Hungarian females

68.9%

45.4%

50.7%

50.9%

49.9%

EU females

49.5%

50.5%

55.4%

58.3%

58.6%

Figure 6.10 Employment rates of males and females aged 15–64 in Hungary and the eu (1990–2009) Source: Frey (1997, 2011)

changed, the employment rate of women and men drastically declined due to the economic transition, so that during a short period, one million jobs disappeared. The changes affected male employees first as a lot of women simply left the labour market, many of them choosing early retirement or withdrawal to the household. From the mid-1990s unemployment reached female employees too.51 In 2009 the employment rate for both males and females was under the European average. This fact causes problems not only at the level of the macro-economy but also at the level of families and individuals. As mentioned above, the psf was typically a two-earner family. From the introduction of market-type elements into the economy in 1968, the total income of most families was supplemented with income from the second economy.52 Female paid work was a basic element of the family budget. The new, capitalist economy caused the closure of many workplaces and decreased the possibility of individuals getting additional income. Since 1990 social inequalities have been growing. Families typically do not have two steady incomes because the possibility of becoming unemployed is a real threat for everybody. To find a steady job is difficult especially for young people and those of lower educational levels. Families must adapt themselves to the situation,

51 52

Frey (1997) and Tóth (2004). Kolosi (1987, 106).

230

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

and in many cases the females are the only employed persons in the family. In this respect it is important to take into consideration the changing form of the family. There are more and more single females, divorced females and single mothers, and their personal income has primary importance for them. These facts show the importance of female employment for individuals and families, and in the light of this idea it is interesting to look at how attitudes have changed concerning female paid work. 3.1 Gender Roles and Household Chores Besides female paid work, sharing household tasks is an important part of determining gender roles. As previously described, during the socialist period there was full employment for both males and females. In the meantime the development of services for doing household chores was poor. As part of the ideology of the Communist Party, the people were promised a network of cheap services in order ‘to help women with household tasks’. Laundry, cleaning or food delivery services were organised under the state economy but were characterised by permanent shortages. Furthermore, the quality of these services was poor. When the marketisation of the economy started, new and highquality services were developed, but they were too expensive for the majority of families. This resulted in housework remaining within the frame of the family and delegated to women, just as in previous historical periods. In the socialist era women worked full time and after work hours they did the household chores too. Though a public discourse emerged from time to time about the ‘second shift’ of women, the question of more active participation by men in housework did not get much attention. Relatively, the most available services were childcare institutions for children under school age. Many workplaces and also local councils ran crèches and kindergartens, but there were a lot of problems with the quality of these services. Many complained because of overcrowding, the limited opening hours, and the generally rigid care system. Obviously it was a double-sided issue; working mothers were able to put their children into a professional and safe place while they were working, but in the meantime they struggled with continual remorse as they felt it would be better to stay at home with them. This feeling was strengthened by Hungarian psychologists, who stressed that childcare institutions were disadvantageous for all children.53 After the change of regime, state participation decreased dramatically in social services and especially in childcare institutions. Workplaces were not 53

Blaskó (2011).

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

231

able to support their own crèches and kindergartens and so closed them. New market-run social services emerged but they were too expensive for a great proportion of families. Families and especially women had to find ways to manage household tasks and childcare using their own resources. In comparison with Europe, Hungarian women spend much more time on household tasks. International Social Survey Program (issp) data from 2002 show that the inequality between men and women in this regard is also highly significant. Hungarian women spend 27–28 hours per week and men spend 10–11 hours per week on household chores. In the majority of families more than 75 per cent of household tasks are done by females.54 Neither his own employment status nor his wife’s/partner’s employment status influences a male’s participation in these tasks. As sociologist Blaskó stresses: ‘We cannot experience the reorganisation of tasks and the change of gender roles in cases where the family model is the opposite of the traditional one and the wife is the wage-earner’.55 Females also spend far more time on housework if there is a child under the age of six in the family and if the family is living in rural surroundings. A better financial situation and higher education of females may reduce the hours spent on household tasks. There is a slight but significant effect of the attitudes of females on the amount of their household work; the more modern her attitude, the less time she spends on household tasks. In contrast to this, in the case of males, a modern or traditional attitude seems to have no effect on the amount of household tasks they do or the time they spend on them. As Blaskó argues: ‘Females do not lay claim to an equal share of household chores – they find it unfair only in the case of extreme inequality’.56 She also says that there is little benefit in trying to ‘free’ women from the burden of housework as it is not a real burden for the majority of them. It would be more important to find a way for them to do part-time work, as this would make it possible for women to harmonise work and family life. 3.2 Gender Roles and Household Chores: Attitudes Though Hungarian males and females share housework in a very unequal way, the majority of females (and of course males) do not find it unfair at all. As research has shown, Hungarian women are satisfied with their husbands’ small contribution to household tasks.57 The main reason for this is that 54 55 56 57

Blaskó (2006). Ibid. (53). Ibid. (92). Pongrácz (2005, 84).

232

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

household chores are basically regarded as a female task. The next attitude question ­demonstrates how public opinion has changed over time. The attitude statement in Figure  6.11 makes a sharp distinction between gender roles, and therefore agreement with this statement expresses a very traditional view. Just like in other attitude questions, respondents place Hungary amongst the most conservative countries in every research wave. Hungarian people showed relatively the most modern attitudes in 1988. Though 50.6 per cent of males and 39.6 per cent of females agreed with the gender-specific share of roles, every third male and almost every second female disagreed with it. By 1994, after several years of economic and political changes, a more conservative view had emerged. The most radical changes happened amongst women. More than 50 per cent of them supported a traditional share of gender roles and just 20 per cent supported the modern one. From 2008 there has been a slow modernisation in attitudes concerning gender roles, but Hungarian people are far less modern in this aspect than they were during the socialist regime. The high proportion of people expressing uncertainty is also an important sign. It is not easy for people to fit their real experiences with the strengthening of the familist argument. Concerning the sharing of housework, real behaviour and people’s attitudes are very similar. No gap can be found in the case of males as there is a broad consensus on the ‘right’ division of household

agree F 1988

neither agree nor disagree

39.6

F 1994

14.5

disagree 45.9

53.2

26.3

20.5

F 2002

36.4

30.2

33.4

F 2008

36.2

31.5

32.3

M 1988

50.6

M 1994 M 2002 M 2008 Figure 6.11

16.5

58.9 43.2 46.8

32.9 25.7

31.3 31.2

15.4 25.5 22.0

‘A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after home and family’ (percentage distribution of respondents by agreement with this statement) Note: Sample sizes in issp waves: issp (1988), N = 1,720; issp (1994), N = 1,500; issp (2002), N = 1,015; issp (2008), N=1,010. Source: issp (1988, 1994, 2002, 2008); Tóth (2004)

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

233

tasks and the majority of couples adapt to it in everyday life. In the case of females more doubt is formulate but only one in three agrees with equality in household tasks. 3.3 Widening or Narrowing Gaps? Summing up, we underline the new complexity of attitudes and real behaviour concerning family types and gender roles. Hungarian people live now in more pluralistic family and other partnership forms than they did in earlier periods, and their attitudes have moved towards modernity too. However, the pace of these changes is not at all uniform. In Hungarian families the sharing of household tasks is very conservative, as are the attitudes concerning it. In Hungary the fertility rate started to decline many decades ago but attitudes about childrearing are moving only very slowly away from a conservative position. Marriage became one of many forms of cohabitation, and attitudes changed towards modernity at a relatively quick pace. The most contradictory issue is that of females’ paid work. Families and also individuals need the paid work of women or at least the income from it, but attitudes toward it remain very conservative. The broadest gap between behaviour and attitudes can be found here. It may be supposed that familist ideology keeps these conservative attitudes alive. During the Communist era, most social inequalities remained hidden. People felt that most people in society were living a very similar way of life with similar opportunities. This feeling had little to do with reality in a lot of areas, but with respect to marriage and family it was not far from reality. From the 1980s, social inequalities became more prominent in Hungarian society. What is more, new inequalities have emerged. Some of them have played an important role in the changing of family forms and of course in the  changing of attitudes too. The most important can be summarised as follows: (1) The majority of the younger generation spend a longer period in school, and as the number of students in tertiary education has increased so the  number of female students in higher education has outnumbered males. (2) Income differences split society into strata with very different life chances. Only a minority of young people are able to live a single life, maintain a one-person household, or maintain a high standard of living from one income. Meanwhile, for others, to marry and to start a family has also become an inaccessible dream.

234

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

(3) The majority of young couples realise that one or more child in the family may ruin their financial situation and/or career. To have children is not an easy decision when considering these consequences. (4) Marketisation and the disappearance of full employment hit different social groups in a selective way. In some social groups the threat of becoming unemployed is an everyday reality for all adult members of the family. By comparing the historical and sociological trends, we see that, first, the chronological differences are more relevant than the spatial differences; and second, that behind the spatial differences we are able to point out the local appearance of other types of social inequalities. For example, the rate of marriages per 1,000 people by region was highest in the central parts of the county, while lowest in the eastern areas. The difference between the highest and lowest categories by region is only 16 per cent, while the national average diminished by 25 per cent just between 2000 and 2010 (between 1990 and 2010 the decrease was 43.75 per cent).58 However, if this rate is rearranged by counties and especially by small areas59 the analysis becomes much more sophisticated; there are areas with higher and lower marriage rates in all parts of the country. The difference between highest and lowest marriage rates in small areas is 66 per cent, but these differences are explainable better by income and educational inequalities than by spatial differences alone. These inequalities appear in an aggregated way in the case of the Roma ethnic group. The Roma (about 5.3 per cent of the population in 2003) have suffered discrimination and social inequality of every type for a very long time, and they live, to a great extent, in spatial segregation.60 Before 1990, Roma men experienced full employment. This vanished at a stroke after the system changed; in the early 1990s only one-quarter of Roma men were full-time employees. However, the Roma/non-Roma distinction has a deceptive homogenising effect; employment levels for the Roma in Budapest and its ­outskirts has been similar to the average of the overall population, while in northern and eastern Hungary there were some small areas where the Roma are over-represented and where this rate has sometimes approached zero.

58 59 60

Demographic Yearbook (2010). Today in Hungary there are seven regions, nineteen counties, and 175 small areas (kistérség). Kemény et al. (2004).

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

235

Overall population Roma population

35 30 25 20 15 10 5

00

95

20

90

19

85

19

80

19

75

19

70

19

65

19

60

19

55

Figure 6.12

19

50

19

19

19

45

0

Number of live-born children per thousand females

Source: Hungarian Statistical Office and Kemény et al. (2004, 17)

In other areas we could find similar relationships. For example, according to comprehensive sociological studies61 the fertility of the Roma is higher than the overall average, but has begun to diminish too (see Figure 6.12). We have to emphasis again that ‘the Roma’ are not as homogeneous as the non-Roma majority often thinks they are. There is a small amount of data which suggests a relationship between the demographic trends of the Roma and segregation; Roma women living in an exclusively Roma neighbourhood have significantly more children and bear their first children earlier than Roma women who live amongst the rest of society.62 János Ladányi and Iván Szelényi have found a clear relationship between the social positions of some special Roma communities, their family structure, and demographic tendencies, albeit on the basis of data from a single village. In this village, Csenyéte, the local Roma were part of the lower class in the nineteenth century, then around the beginning of the twentieth century the Roma became a segregated minority in an underclass position, then from the 1960s to 1990 they reached the relatively better but still lower position again. Meanwhile the Roma had also become the majority of the village’s population. By 1990 no non-Roma lived in Csenyéte, and the whole population

61 62

István Kemény and his collegues have produced three sets of research which cover the Roma population (Kemény et al. 2004). Janky (2005); Durst (2001).

236

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

began to sink again into an underclass. Nowadays the number of marriages in the village is minimal and birth rates have increased.63 4

Interpretation of Changes: Familism and the Making of the ‘Traditional Family’

4.1 The Concept of Familism We use the term familism as a complex term which refers to a special social condition (or set of social conditions) and also to a particular ideology (though not of course in a strictly political sense).64 For simplicity this chapter will describe these two aspects as social familism and ideological familism, respectively. Every institution, legal regulation, or economic context which pushes people towards living in marriage and with family could be construed/interpreted as social familism. Every set of ideas which associates only positive values with the normative family, places the family in the centre of social discourse, which presents the family as an incubator of macro-level sociability or, with other metaphors, as the basic building block of society, could be construed/interpreted as ideological familism.65 In the authors’ view, the historical antecedents, mostly from the age of state socialism (1945–90), and then from the contemporary era since 1990 have affirmed people’s inclination toward living in a family and to relying upon family members in preference to others. This is the origin of their social familism. This social familism is a reaction to the situation in which people are distrustful of the great institutions of state and are therefore not able to establish a strong civil society. In theory this social condition would be independent of familist ideology, but throughout history these two phenomena have strongly tended to accompany each other. Ideological familism is a kind of ‘legitimisation’ of the distrust and the social passivity following from this attitude (with people largely f­ eeling that ‘nowadays people can rely on only their family’). What is more, ideological familism assigns positive values to the behaviour and attitudes arising from 63

64 65

For example: a Roma woman in Csenyéte in 1881 was on average 27.1 years old when her first child was born. This value was higher than amongst the non-Roma, and it was higher than the Hajnal theory would suggest. For most of the twentieth century this average was 22–24 years in the village. In the last period when only the Roma lived in Csenyéte the mothers’ average age dropped to 17.7 years (Ladányi and Szelényi 2004, 61–67). Dupcsik and Tóth (2008); Tóth and Dupcsik (2011). Hungarian ideological familism labelled itself as ‘family-centred’ (családcentrikus).

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

237

social familism (typified by sayings such as: ‘to establish a family means responsibility in the face of egoism’).66 Thus, familism responds to crises of values and, at least in theory, offers an action programme at the micro-level, that is, ‘getting married and having children is the best strategy to integrate the whole of society’. 4.2 Making the ‘Traditional Family’ Theoretically this normative familist ‘family’ could be very diverse, but in this kind of discourse a single type has emerged as ‘ideal’; the so-called traditional family (tf). The image of this ‘traditional family’ is obviously a whole family that is made up of a married couple with children.67 This construction stresses the longterm stability of the relationship, the fixed and clearly defined gender roles, and supposes a historically strong emotional bond between family members. The ideal-type ‘traditional family’ is dominated by the husband, who represents the family outside the home, the wife’s terrain being the household and not working for pay. Children are obedient and get emotional support from their mother and moral rules from their father. According to the familist argument this ideal ‘traditional family’ was an almost uniform, invariable, and intact family model throughout the whole pre-1945 period (at least in villages). The same arguments stress that the social changes of the last seventy years broke this ideal family into pieces. The tf-image is a combination of some elements of the real psf-model and the ideals of the familist ideology. A good example to illustrate this is the treatment of women’s employment. In the implicit background of the tf-image stands the small, economically self-sufficient peasant farm. However, in the whole of early modernity only a very small fraction of the peasantry lived in conditions at all similar to this ideal. Furthermore, until 1849 serfdom still existed and by the end of the nineteenth century less than half of the 66 67

In international literature on familism, egoism, and individualism have been identified by some as amoral phenomena (Banfield 1958; Fukuyama 1995; Torsello 2004). ‘Hungarian social anthropologists have tended to assume that in preindustrial times Hungarian peasants lived in large households containing at the same time the families of parents and several married children’, wrote Andorka and Faragó (1983, 281) in their above cited article. Despite the authors’ great authority in Hungary, their disproof of statements about the so-called ‘traditional family’ have not become well known, not even in the academic social sciences. However, in discourses when the ‘traditional family’ is used as an ideal for contemporary society, extended family characteristics are not stressed as much as the significance of ‘wholeness’, that is, formal marriage and more than one child.

238

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

population worked in the agricultural sector. Also, before 1945 the majority of women did paid work, at least in some periods of their life, and the ‘housewife’-model was a norm only in the middle class. The new regime after 1945 was hostile to this norm and also to the former middle class. The socialist form of the economy and a social policy subordinated to its totalitarian endeavours could enforce the almost full employment of women. Despite the often stressed slogans of the Communist regime that: ‘Work ennobles you!’, the situation enhanced the feeling that women’s paid work was social coercion and not an organic part of their life. This feeling has become stronger since 1990, when full employment abruptly ceased in the wake of the political change. The attitude that ‘a woman’s place is in the family not in the workplace’ was a reaction to the decay of the psf and the collapse of the socialist system (both of them enhanced the sense of a value crisis). It was also a good tool for males to ‘legitimise’ anti-female discrimination in the labour market, or for females to rationalise (in a psychological sense) their lesser chances of finding work. As a result of the aforementioned processes, familism as an ideology became very popular from the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, most people agree with the familist thesis, although most families, as shown above, differ from this ideal. Therefore, a gap has opened between the real life of families and the attitudes/values shared by the members of these families. According to our hypotheses one of the most important reasons for this gap is the advantage of the coherence of familist ideology. This means that familist attitudes and value-statements fit into a coherent worldview. This worldview seems not just to be an idea, but a value-system and a reality as well – because of the widely accepted idea that the ‘traditional family’ really existed and was a stable, long unchanged institution in spite of continuous changes in macrolevel society and the political system. The tf-image is essentially a utopia – but, it has strong relations to reality; a (theoretically) available life alternative because people could make themselves believe that ‘my grandparents lived in such a family’ and ‘even I could live in a similar family if I meet a suitable partner’. It is noteworthy that while the ideological divisions of the country have become more and more antagonistic, at times fiercely so, the traditionalism of familism is accepted in almost every section of the political spectrum. Non-familist ideologies have lacked the coherence of familism. For multiple reasons, feminism with its egalitarian values and attitudes never really took root in Hungary, and this situation has resulted in the core discourses about the family lacking questions about women’s liberation, gender equality, or, consequently, possible new roles and identities for males. Those with nonfamilist views could only really formulate their own theses in negative form, as critiques of familism. Arguments such as ‘the traditional family in reality

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

239

was…’, ‘women’s employment in the past was more common…’, and ‘it is not always the case that maintaining a marriage is always valuable, if…’ would be correct intellectually but lack the ‘sex appeal’ of the familist utopia. However, as we could see above, in recent years the gap has again become narrower. The majority of people’s values/attitudes have started to follow real situations. This change has sometimes been relatively slight, as was shown in relation to women’s paid work in Figure 6.10. Sometimes the familist opinion has moved from a majority view to a minority one, as can be seen in responses to the statement that ‘Family life suffers from the wife’s full-time employment’. In 2000, 56.8 per cent of people agreed, but in 2009 only 36.6 per cent agreed (in this case the gender-specific differences are not relevant).68 Sometimes the changes have been more drastic. For example: in 1991 only 20.4 per cent agreed with the statement that ‘It’s all the same for children whether their parents are married or not’, but in 2009 the agreement rate was 51.7 per cent.69 4.3 Consistent Attitudes, Inconsistent Attitudes The authors cited above do not try to hide their familist involvement, and they try to fit these single-value statements into coherent value-systems. They find that after the 1990 political system change, ‘consistent modern’ values and attitudes were forced back while ‘consistent traditional’ values came forward – but these tendencies again altered in the twenty-first century.70 However, if we consider carefully Figure 6.13 it is noticeable that these two ‘consistent’ groups together represent only a minority of the population. The majority of people during the whole period had the attitude system treated by the researchers as incoherent or ‘mixed modern–traditional’, as Figure  6.14 shows. Despite the situation that more and more people could accept single statements which are incompatible with the familist norms, in discourse there always prevails what was termed above the advance of coherence. The majority live in non-familist families, but they have no voices. 4.4 Towards a New Pluralistic Family Structure As we have described, a permanent change is going on regarding family structures, gender roles, and also attitudes in contemporary Hungarian society. Familist ideology is very strong (and it is also supported by government policy) 68 69 70

Pongrácz and S. Molnár (2011, 103). S. Molnár (2011, 54). See Pongrácz (2011).

240

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

25

20

15

consistent modern consistent traditional

10

5

0

1988

1994

2000

2009

Figure 6.13 Consistent modern and consistent traditional values and attitudes (percentage of men and women aged between eighteen and fifty, 1988–2009) Source: Vaskovics (2000, 292); Pongrácz and S. Molnár (2011, 109)

90 80 70 60

consistent modern

50

mixed

40

consistent traditional

30 20 10 0

1988

1994

2000

2009

Figure 6.14 Modern and traditional values and attitudes (percentage of men and women aged between eighteen and fifty, 1988–2009) Source: Vaskovics (2000, 292); Pongrácz and S. Molnár (2011, 109)

241

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

but a lot of people live in a very different way. Real behaviour and attitudes are distant from each other in the case of people with ‘mixed modern–traditional’ attitudes, and of course they tend to coincide in the case of some other people. It seems that classical socio-economic variables cannot give a suitable explanation of how people can reconcile their behaviour and attitudes. In Table 6.1 we present a hypothetical model of existing family types and their main characteristics in Hungary. Table 6.1 A hypothetical model of family forms and their main characteristics Family type

Does the Number of Female’s Household female children educational chores work? level

Conflict between ideals and real life

No A. Many children – new type No B. Many children – old type C. One-earner No family

3+

high

3+

low

1–2

low, middle

D. Traditional Yes two-earner family E. One-person/ Yes one-parent family

1–2

middle, high

No conflicts – conservative ideals and life. No conflicts – Female+ conservative ideals extended and life. family Female On the surface no conflict – but fewer children than were planned and may have some female paid work because of poverty Female+male Strong conflicts in ‘helps’ all spheres

0, 1–2

low, middle, high

Adults fend for themselves

0, 1–2

high

Shared

F. Modern two-earner family

Yes

Source: Created by the authors

Female +  paid help

Conflicts in spheres of partnership relations and to have children No conflicts – modern ideals and life

242

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

The main features of these family forms are: A. ‘Many children – new type’: Highly educated male and female, male is well-paid entrepreneur or manager, 3+ children, wife has no paid work at least while the children are under ten. No conflict between conservative attitudes and real behaviour. B. ‘Many children – old type’: Poor, undereducated, unemployed family, they may belong to Roma ethnic minority. Little and casual income from social support or odd jobs. Female can be the head of family but when male is present he is the head without doubt. 3+ children. They may live as part of an extended family, but only for lack of accommodation, and poverty. No conflict between conservative attitudes and real behaviour. C. ‘One-earner family’: Female is at home with 1–2 children. Initially on childcare leave, but then after that she cannot find a job. Male’s job is also in danger. Poor educational level. Theoretically there is no conflict between attitudes and real life but danger of poverty leads to fewer children than they planned and woman must go to work (in the case that she can). D. ‘Traditional two-earner family’: This was the most common family type under socialism, and it may be the most common even now. Persons are more educated in this model than in model C. Lower number of children than were planned earlier. Strong feeling of discrepancy between attitudes and real life. E. ‘One-person/one-parent family’: Divorced persons, singles, people living without permanent partner relationship – with or without children. He/ she is working for pay. He/she experiences conflicts between attitudes and life because of a lack of permanent partner and child(ren). F. ‘Modern two-earner family’: Couple has modern attitudes and can live a modern lifestyle too. They have no major conflicts over these issues. Usually they have fewer than three children as they cannot make enough money for paid help in childcare and household. As mentioned previously, most sociological and demographic research deals with the reasons for and consequences of the change in the ‘traditional family’. It is not easy to get any funding for other types of research. Therefore, unfortunately, we have no data about the proportions of these family types in relation to the total. Nevertheless, this chapter has unveiled a way to test this model, and the authors are sure that this model is a good starting point for further empirical analysis. A presentation of the incidence of these types will stand at the centre of another empirical study by the authors.

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

243

5 Conclusions One piece of contemporary literature by Bernadett Csurgó and Luca Kristóf,71 based on the European Social Study’s data, starts ‘from the preconception that value-motivated behaviour is behind the stability of a family structure and marriage, which behaviour…[is] connected to some general attitudes and values’. However, the authors are compelled to conclude that the value system has less importance in the explanations of the differences in the model, and that furthermore ‘above all the demographic characteristics, mostly age and educational qualification cause the differences in the value system’.72 In our view the above analysed data and tendencies are in agreement with the characteristics of the second demographic transition (sdt) being as follows; weakening of marriage as a norm, postponing the average age of the first marriage, a growing rate of single people and couples living together without marriage, and diminishing of the fertility rates.73 Theorists dealing with the sdt have mentioned more determinants, but they emphasise the role of changes in the value system, growing individualism, and the emergence of a ‘post-materialist value system’, as Ronald Inglehart named it.74 According to a typical formulation, the ‘innovators’ of the new family lifestyles ‘have often been persons with sympathies for the ‘new left’ during the 1960s and 1970s…and even today premarital cohabitation has remained a correlate of secularism, tolerance for minorities, relativism in ethics, genderequality, nonconformist education values, and a preference for leftist or green parties in countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium’.75 In our study we have tried to demonstrate that at least in Hungary the direction of causality seems to be the opposite; the changes which are described by means of the sdt-concept occurred before the relevant changes in the value system. However, the dominant line in the discourse on family life and gender roles was familism, which explicitly tries to reverse the process. Contemporary ideological familism is an interesting mixture of some traditional values and reminiscences about the definitely modern Post-war Standard Family, which is ‘masked’ in the familist discourse as the ‘traditional family’. Familism is a traditionalist, not a traditional idea, but this ideology is 71 Csurgó and Kristóf (2012, 44). 72 Ibid. 73 Lesthaeghe (2008, 2010); Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa (1986); Lesthaeghe and Moors (1996). 74 Lesthaeghe (2000); Spéder (2005a); Surkyn and Lesthaeghe (2004). 75 Lesthaeghe (2000, 13).

244

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

accepted by a greater proportion of the Hungarian population than is political traditionalism. According to our hypotheses the coherence of familism and the disintegration of alternative ideologies could have caused this gap. However, perhaps over the last decade this gap has begun to narrow. References Andorka, Rudolf and Tamás Faragó. 1983. ‘Pre-industrial household structure in Hungary’. In Family Forms in Historic Europe, edited by Richard Wall, Jean Robin and Peter Laslett, 281–307. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Andorka, Rudolf and István Harcsa. 1990 ‘Foglalkoztatás’ [Employment]. In Társadalmi riport 1990 [Social Report 1990], edited by Rudolf Andorka, Tamás Kolosi and György Vukovich, 87–96. Budapest: tárki. Banfield, Edward C. 1958. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Glencoe, il: The Free Press. Berend, T. Iván and György Ránki. 1976. Kelet-Közép-Európa gazdasági fejlődése a 19–20. században [East-Central-Europe’s Economic Development in the 19th–20th Centuries]. Budapest: kjk. ——. 1987. Európa gazdasága a 19. században [Europe’s Economy in the Nineteenth Century]. Budapest: Gondolat. Blaskó, Zsuzsa. 2006. Nők és férfiak – keresőmunka, házimunka. A ‘család’ tematikájú issp 2002-es adatfelvétel elemzése [Women and Men: Paid Work, Housework]. Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. ——. 2011. ‘Három évig a gyermek mellett – de nem minden áron. A közvélemény a kisgyermekes anyák munkába állásáról’ [Stay at home for three years – but not at all costs. Social values on maternal employment in Hungary]. Demográfia 54: 23–44. Chang Kyung-Sup. 2003. ‘The state and families in South Korea’s compressed fertility transition: A time for policy reversal?’. Journal of Population and Social Security (Population), Supplement to Volume 1: 611–628. http://www.ipss.go.jp/webj-ad/ webjournal.files/population/2003_6/21.Chang.pdf. ——. 2010. South Korea Under Compressed Modernity: Familial Political Economy in Transition. London: Routledge. Csurgó, Bernadett and Luca Kristóf. 2012. ‘Csak papír? Családi állapot és értékrend’ [Only paper? Family status and value systems]. In Közösségi viszonyulásaink. A ­családdal, az állammal és a gazdasággal kapcsolatos társadalmi attitűdök, értékek európai összehasonlításban [Our Attitudes to Communities. Social Attitudes Towards Family, the State and Economy], edited by Vera Messing and Bence Ságvári, 30–53. Budapest: mta tk szi.

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

245

Demographic Yearbook. 2010. Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. Diederiks, Herman A., et al. 1995. Nyugat-európai gazdaság- és társadalomtörténet. A rurális társadalomtól a gondoskodó államig [The Economic and Social History of Western Europe]. Budapest: Osiris. Diószegi, István, Iván Harsányi, Tamás Krausz and István Németh, eds. 1997. 20. századi egyetemes történet III. [History of the Twentieth Century III]. Budapest: Korona. Dupcsik, Csaba and Olga Tóth. 2008. ‘Feminizmus helyett familizmus’ [Familism instead of feminism]. Demográfia 51 (4): 307–328. Durst, Judit. 2001. ‘“Nekem ez az élet, a gyerekek.” Gyermekvállalási szokások változása egy kisfalusi cigány közösségben’ [This is my life, the children]. Századvég 3: 71–92. Faragó, Tamás. 1999. ‘Háztartásszerkezet és falusi társadalomfejlődés Magyarországon, 1787–1828’ [The structure of the household and development in rural society in Hungary, 1787–1828]. In Tér és idő – család és történelem. Társadalomtörténeti tanulmányok [Space and Time: Family and History – Social Historical Studies], authored by Tamás Faragó, 194–295. Miskolc: Bíbor. Fél, Edit and Tamás Hofer. 1969. Proper Peasants: Traditional Life in a Hungarian Village. Chicago, il: Viking Fund Publications. Frey, Mária. 1997. ‘Nők a munkaerőpiacon’ [Women on the labour market]. In Szerepváltozások. Jelentés a nők és férfiak helyzetéről 1997. [Changing Roles. Report on the Situation of Women and Men, 1997], edited by Katalin Lévai and István Gy. Tóth, 13–35. Budapest: tárki – Munkaügyi Minisztérium. ——. 2011. ‘Nők és férfiak a munkaerőpiacon, különös tekintettel a válságkezelés hatásaira’ [Women and men on the labour market – with a special stress on crisis treatment]. In Szerepváltozások. Jelentés a nők és férfiak helyzetéről 2011. [Changing Roles. Report on the Situation of Women and Men, 2011], edited by Ildikó Nagy and Tiborné Pongrácz. 17–48. Budapest: tárki – Nemzeti Erőforrás Minisztérium. Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press. Gábor, R. István and Péter Galasi. 1981. A ‘második gazdaság’. Tények és hipotézisek [The ‘Second Economy’ – Facts and Hypotheses]. Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. Gergely, András, ed. 2003. Magyarország története a 19. Században [The History of Hungary in the Nineteenth Century]. Budapest: Osiris. Giczi, Johanna and Endre Sik. 2009. ‘Bizalom, társadalmi tőke, intézményi kötődés’ [Trust, social capital, and institutional commitment]. In Tárki Európai társadalmi jelentés [Tárki European Social Report], edited by István Gy. Tóth, 65–84. Budapest: tárki. Hajdu, Gábor. 2012. ‘Bizalom, normakövetés és társadalmi részvétel Magyarországon a rendszerváltás után’ [Trust, norms and social participation in Hungary after the system change]. In Társadalmi integráció a jelenkori Magyarországon [Social Integration

246

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

in Contemporary Hungary], edited by Imre Kovách, Csaba Dupcsik, Tamás P. Tóth and Judit Takács, 45–62. Budapest: Argumentum. Hajnal, John. 1965. ‘European marriage patterns in perspective’. In Population in History: Essays in Historical Demography, edited by David Victor Glass and David Edvard Eversley, 101–143. London: Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd. ——. 1983. ‘Two kinds of pre-industrial household formation system’. In Family Forms in Historic Europe, edited by Richard Wall, Jean Robin and Peter Laslett, 65–104. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hankiss, Elemér, Róbert Manchin, László Füstös and Árpád Szakolczai. 1982. Kényszerpályán? A magyar társadalom értékrendszerének alakulása 1930 és 1980 között. I–II. [On a Forced Trajectory? Changes in the Hungarian Society’s Value System Between 1930 and 1980]. Budapest: mta Szociológiai Kutató Intézet. Hungarian Statistical Office (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal). Online survey database. http://www.ksh.hu/. issp (International Social Survey Program). 1988, 1994, 2002, 2008. http://www.issp.org/ page.php?pageId=4. Janky, Béla. 2005. ‘A gyermekvállalás időzítése a cigány nők körében’ [Timing of motherhood amongst Roma women]. Beszélő 1: 72–77. Kemény, István. 1990. ‘Munkakultúra és életforma’ [Labour culture and life form]. In Velük nevelkedett a gép. Magyar munkások a hetvenes évek elején [The Machine Grew Up with Them. Hungarian Workers in the Beginning of the 1970s], authored by István Kemény, 75–169. Budapest: Vita. Kemény, István, Béla Janky and Gabriella Lengyel. 2004. A magyarországi cigányság, 1971–2003 [Hungarian Roma 1971–2003]. Budapest: Gondolat – mta Etnikai-Nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet. Kolosi, Tamás. 1987. Tagolt társadalom. Struktúra, rétegződés, egyenlőtlenség Magyarországon [Divided Society. Structure, Stratification and Inequality in Hungary]. Budapest: Gondolat. Kornai, János. 1980. Economics of Shortage. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Ladányi, János and Iván Szelényi. 2004. A kirekesztettség változó formái [Changing Forms of ‘Being Excluded’]. Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó. Lesthaeghe, Ron J. 2000. ‘Europe’s demographic issues: Fertility, household formation and replacement migration’. Paper prepared for the un Expert Group Meeting on Policy Responses to Population Decline and Ageing, New York, 16–18 October. http://www.vub.ac.be/SOCO/ron/Eur%20Demogr%20Issues%20UN%20Ned%20 Ver%20BuitZaken.pdf. ——. 2008. ‘Second demographic transition’. http://dmo.econ.msu.ru/teaching/L2/ TrDemo/final_textSDTBasilBlackwellEncyclop.pdf. Lesthaeghe, Ron and Dirk J. van de Kaa. 1986. ‘Twee Demographische Transities?’ [Two demographic transitions?]. In Bevolking: Groei en Krimp [Population: Growth and

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

247

Decline], edited by Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk J. van de Kaa, 9–24. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus. Lesthaeghe, Ron J. and Guy Moors. 1996. ‘Living arrangements, socio-economic position and values among young adults: A pattern description for France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands’. In Europe’s Population in the 1990s, edited by David Coleman, 163–221. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Manchin, Róbert and Iván Szelényi. 1990. ‘A családi mezőgazdasági termelés a kollektivizált gazdaságokban: három elmélet’ [Familial agricultural production in collective estates: Three theories]. In Új osztály, állam, politika [New Class, State Policy], edited by Iván Szelényi, 375–398. Budapest: Európa. Makay, Zsuzsanna. 2011. ‘A magyarországi bölcsődék működésének néhány jellemzője’ [Some characteristics of the working mechanism of crèches in Hungary]. Demográfia 54 (2–3): 176–197. Ochiai Emiko. 1997. The Japanese Family System in Transition: A Sociological Analysis of Family Change in Postwar Japan. Tokyo: ltcb International Library Foundation. Pongrácz, Tiborné. 2005. ‘Nemi szerepek társadalmi megítélése’ [Social opinion of gender roles]. In Szerepváltozások 2005 [Role Changes 2005], edited by Ildikó Nagy, Tiborné Pongrácz and István Gy. Tóth, 73–86. Budapest: tárki. ——. 2007. ‘A gyermekvállalás, gyermektelenség és a gyermek értéke közötti ­kapcsolat az európai régió országaiban’ [The relationship between having or not having children and the value of children in European countries). Demográfia 2: 197–219. ——, ed. 2011. A családi értékek és a demográfiai magatartás változásai [Changes in Family Values and Demographic Behaviour]. Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. Pongrácz, Tiborné and Edit S. Molnár. 2011. ‘A nemi szerepmegosztásról, a családi élet és a munka összhangjáról alkotott vélemények változása 2000–2009 között’ [Changes in opinions about the division of labour in the family, and the balance of family life and paid labour, 2000–2009]. In A családi értékek és a demográfiai magatartás változásai [Changes in Family Values and Demographic Behaviour], edited by Tiborné Pongrácz, 95–112. Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. Pongrácz, Tiborné and Zsolt Spéder. 2003. ‘Élettársi kapcsolat és házasság – hasonlóságok és különbségek az ezredfordulón’ [Cohabiting couples and married couples: Similarities and differences at the turn of the millennium]. Szociológiai Szemle 4: 55–75. S. Molnár, Edit. 2011. ‘Párkapcsolat létesítését/megszüntetését érintő magatartási normák változásának megfigyelése’ [Monitoring changes of norms which influenced the establishment or termination of partner relationships]. In A családi értékek és a demográfiai magatartás változásai [Changes in Family Values and Demographic Behaviour], edited by Tiborné Pongrácz, 37–67. Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal.

248

DUPCSIK and TÓTH

Ságvári, Bence. 2013. ‘Az átmenetek kora? A magyar fiatalok társadalomképéről’ [The time of transitions? Social vision of Hungarian youth]. In Integráció a jelenkori magyar társadalomban [Social Integration in Contemporary Hungary], edited by Imre Kovách, Csaba Dupcsik, Tamás P. Tóth and Judit Takács, 3–47. Budapest: Argumentum. Spéder, Zsolt. 2005a. ‘Az európai családformák változatossága. Párkapcsolatok, szülői és gyermeki szerepek az európai országokban az ezredfordulón’ [The variability of European family forms]. Századvég 37: 3–48. ——. 2005b. ‘Az élettársi kapcsolat térhódítása Magyarországon és néhány szempont a demográfiai átalakulás értelmezéséhez’ [The spread of cohabitation in Hungary]. Demográfia 48: 187–217. Spéder, Zsolt and Balázs Kapitány. 2007. Gyermekek: vágyak és tények. Dinamikus termékenységi elemzések [Children: Desires and Facts – Dynamic Fertility Analyses]. Budapest: ksh. Surkyn, Johan and Ron Lesthaeghe. 2004. ‘Value orientations and the second demographic transition (sdt) in Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An update’. Demographic Research, Special Collection 3, Article 3. http://dmo.econ.msu.ru/ Teaching/L2/TrDemo/value%20orientations%20and%20the%20second%20 demographic%20transition%20drs3-3.pdf. Szalai, Júlia. 2007. Nincs két ország? Társadalmi küzdelmek az állami (túl)elosztásért a rendszerváltás utáni Magyarországon [No Two Countries? Social Struggles for State (Over)Redistribution in Hungary After the Political Change]. Budapest: Osiris. Szelényi, Iván. 1988. Socialist Entrepreneurs: Embourgeoisement in Rural Hungary. Cambridge: Polity Press. Therborn, Göran. 2004. Between Sex and Power. Family in the World, 1900–2000. London: Routledge. Torsello, David. 2004. ‘Bizalom, bizalmatlanság és társadalmi kapcsolatok egy délszlovákiai faluban’ [Trust, distrust and social relations in a South Slovakian village]. Fórum Társadalomtudományi Szemle 6 (3): 103–118. http://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00033/ 00018/pdf/forum_EPA00033_2004_03_103-118.pdf. Tóth, Olga. 1998. ‘Házasság és gyermek: Vélekedés és viselkedés’ [Marriage and child: Attitudes and behaviour]. Századvég 11: 80–93. ——. 2004. ‘Paid work in certain periods of the family life-cycle in Hungary: Facts and attitudes’. In 25th ceies Seminar: Gender statistics – Occupational segregation: Extent, causes and consequences, 151–159. Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/KS-PB -04-001/EN/KS-PB-04-001-EN.PDF#page=24. ——. 2006. ‘Modern behaviour, traditional values’. The Hungarian Quarterly 47: 85–92.

FAMILY SYSTEMS AND FAMILY VALUES IN HUNGARY

249

——. 2007. ‘Fiatalok párkapcsolatai történeti háttérrel’ [Partnership relations of youth in various historical periods]. In Új ifjúság: Szociológiai tanulmányok a posztadoleszcensekről [New Youth. Sociological Papers on Post-Adolescents], edited by Péter Somlai, 81–109. Budapest: Napvilág. Tóth, Olga and Csaba Dupcsik. 2011. ‘Trust in people and conservatism of family and gender roles in Hungary and in some other European countries’. Journal of Intimate and Public Spheres 1: 1–9. Utasi, Ágnes. 2004. Feláldozott kapcsolatok. A magyar szingli [Sacrificed relationships. The Hungarian single]. Budapest: mta Politikai Tudományok Intézete. Vaskovics, László. 2000. ‘A társadalmi modernizáció és a munkamegosztás a partnerkapcsolatokban és a családban. Összehasonlító vizsgálat’ [Social modernisation and the division of labour in partner relationships and in family: A comparative study]. In Törések és kötések a magyar társadalomban [Breaks and Bonds in Hungarian Society], edited by Zsuzsa Elekes and Zsolt Spéder, 287–303. Budapest: Századvég. World Bank World Development Indicators. Online database. http://data.worldbank .org/indicator.

CHAPTER 7

Romanian Families

Changes and Continuities Over Recent Decades Borbála Kovács

Introduction As in other post-socialist societies in Central and Eastern Europe,1 in Romania family life, social relations more generally, and Romanians’ views on these have undergone changes. In comparative terms, Romanian behaviour especially in relation to marriage, reproduction, and family life has positioned Romanian society as ‘middle-ranking’ among European nations,2 particularly during the early 1990s.3 More recent studies focusing on family structure4 and childbearing behaviour have revealed that this middle-ranking position has been retained, although the picture may be less coherent than a couple of decades ago in several respects. Authors agree for instance that over the last three decades marriage has remained ‘universal’ and, in European terms, has been taking place comparatively early, with childbirth closely following marriage.5 At the same time, however, marriage and childbearing have become decoupled among particular groups of Romanian mothers, and lone parenthood has become more common than a few decades ago.6 Despite these developments, marriage remains a highly valued institution and the norm for the vast majority of the adult population.7 Surveys carried out during the last decade or so focusing on divisions of household labour8 have revealed that the vast majority of Romanians retain a strongly gendered division of labour, although attitudinal data have revealed Romanian couples’ preference for egalitarian relationships9 and increasingly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

See the remarks in the Preface of this volume regarding the conceptualisation of Central and Eastern Europe. European here covers the geographic region of Europe, including the Russian Federation. Ghebrea (2000, 55–56). Popescu (2007c, 2010). Ghebrea (2000, 53); Voinea (2000); Popescu (2003, 19; 2007c); Voicu (2007a); Kivu (2007). Popescu (2007c); Hărăguș (2011, 381–382). evs (European Values Study); Popescu (2003, 2007c, 2010). See Section 1. Bădescu (2007a); Popescu (2007c, 2010).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004276833_009

Romanian Families

251

more support for women’s participation in paid work.10 Although Romanians’ general satisfaction with life has been among the lowest in Europe since the beginning of the transition period,11 family life has enjoyed very high rates of satisfaction.12 Moreover, despite Romanians’ social trust being among the lowest when compared to other European societies, including other post-socialist nations in Central and Eastern Europe,13 family has remained very important to the vast majority of Romanians and a little over three-quarters trust their family completely.14 Scholars writing about Romanians’ behaviour in respect to marriage and married life, childbearing and fertility, householding and the division of household labour, and the role of the family in Romanians’ daily lives, have at best formulated fragmentary conclusions with regard to the transformation of family life over recent decades. However, there is consensus regarding the decline in fertility and its main explanatory factor: women limiting their fertility after one, or at maximum two, children.15 There is also consensus regarding Romanians’ strong preferences for legalised marriage, particularly if contemplating having children, and the incidence of marriage. It is also agreed that a majority of Romanians have preferred the nuclear family with at least one child, preferably two, for at least two decades now, with childbirth seen ideally to follow marriage.16 As already noted, scholars also agree that Romanians have long preferred an egalitarian marriage, but share household labour in a deeply unequal fashion, with the vast majority of women responsible for most domestic work and care responsibilities most of the time.17 At the same time, a majority of Romanians support women’s employment. Tolerance of otherness, particularly homosexuality, has consistently been found to be very low, yet despite this, the share of Romanians supporting gay couples’ right to adopt increased observably by the end of the 2000s.18 Furthermore, scholars share the view that Romania is a polarised society, both in terms of actions and in opinions. Differences have been 10 11

12 13 14 15 16 17 18

evs; wvs (World Values Survey). The transition period refers to the period following the fall of the Ceaușescu regime in Romania at the end of 1989 (and more generally in other post-socialist countries in the region, as well). Sandu (2007a, 74–75; 2007b, 34–41, 54). Sandu (2007b, 50–51); Popescu (2007c, 186–187; 2010). Bădescu (2007b, 81–83). evs; wvs. Ghebrea (2000); Popescu (2003, 2007c, 2010). evs; wvs; Ghebrea (2000); Voicu (2007a); Kivu (2007); Popescu (2010). osf (2000a, 2006); Popescu (2007a). evs; Voicu (2007b); Popescu (2007c); wvs.

252

KOVÁCS

observable in cross-sectional and longitudinal attitudinal and behavioural studies between urban and rural dwellers, little and highly educated individuals, young cohorts and older generations, and men and women, particularly in regard to attitudes towards marriage, divisions of household labour and sexuality.19 Despite the consensus regarding these and a series of other attitudinal and behavioural particularities of Romanians’ family values and practices, analyses so far have fallen short of providing an encompassing interpretation of these particularities and their changes over time. Similarly, only tentative attempts have been made to explain the particular combinations of changes and continuities in respect to Romanians’ attitudes and behaviours regarding family values and family life. Consequently, the existing body of scholarship has failed so far to formulate hypotheses regarding what appears to be the endurance of patriarchal, male-breadwinner family values and norms and a deeply gendered (and unequal) way of ‘doing family’ in Romania,20 despite certain developments which, in other parts of the world, have been seen to be characteristic of the second demographic transition. Furthermore, scholars writing about family change have rarely engaged with what appear to be contradictory opinions about and attitudes towards a variety of marriage- and family-related issues, as well as with contradictions between attitudes and behaviour. What explains the endurance of marriage not only as a highly valued social institution, but also as a widespread family practice in Romania? What explains the doubling of the proportion of Romanians who approve of lone motherhood in the absence of a matching change in family structures? More interestingly, what explains contradictory survey results in respect to lone motherhood in the Romanian context?21 What explains Romanians’ growing intolerance of divorce in the absence of changes in the actual divorce rate? The aim of this chapter is to provide tentative answers to questions such as these. More importantly, this chapter aims to provide an encompassing interpretation of the more or less coherent changes and continuities that have characterised Romanians’ attitudes and behaviour towards marriage and childbearing, divisions of household labour and their dependency on the family. Acknowledging the fact that attitudes and opinions may be incoherent and contradictory and recognising that sometimes there exist substantial gaps between what people say they believe and value and what they actually do, the purpose of this chapter is to offer an assessment of the dynamics of family change and continuity in Romania over the last two to three decades. In order 19 20 21

osf (2000a); Ghebrea (2000); Voinea (2000); osf (2002); Sandu (2007b); Stănculescu (2007); Popescu (2003, 2007a, 2007c, 2010); Voicu (2007b). Silva and Smart (1999); Ghebrea (2000); Voinea (2000); Popescu (2007c, 2010). See Subsection 2.2.

Romanian Families

253

to do this, attitudinal and behavioural survey data are reviewed and generic patterns teased out with a particular focus on continuities, departures from previous trends, and, where pertinent, on the direction and pace of change. Special attention is also paid to subnational differences and similarities along the dimensions mentioned earlier: the urban–rural, educational, age, gender, and, where data exist, the geographic divides. The key aspects discussed in this chapter – parallelling the other chapters of this volume – are Romanians’ opinions and values concerning childbearing, marriage and other forms of couple relationships, the divisions of household labour and gender roles within and outside the home, and ideas and values in relation to the family and social trust. This chapter also expands on Romanians’ actual behaviour in relation to these issues over recent decades. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a brief discussion of the secondary data used to inform this chapter, introducing the various attitudinal surveys and other studies that have drawn on nationally representative samples of respondents, as well as the sources of statistical data, especially on demographic trends. Section  2 focuses on values, attitudes, opinions and behaviours in relation to fertility, marriage, divorce, and other forms of ‘doing family’ and Romanians’ tolerance of less usual family forms, in particular lonemother and single-parent families, cohabiting couples, same-sex relationships, etc. Section 3 engages with changes and continuities over time in regard to gender roles in the intimate sphere, including the divisions of household labour. In addition, attitudes and behaviour regarding women as workers (earners) are also described. Within the bounds of available data, power relations between spouses are also discussed briefly in this part of the chapter. Section 4 discusses the particularities of family dependency in Romania with a focus on social trust, familism,22 and family solidarity.23 Section 5 provides an integrated discussion of the possible meanings of the different findings reviewed throughout the chapter in an attempt to formulate conclusions about the extent to which Romanian family values and especially family practices might be undergoing changes typical of a modified second demographic transition. 1

Data Sources

This chapter draws on a variety of secondary data sources, in particular: crossnational opinion surveys and attitudinal surveys with nationally representative samples, as well as national official demographic statistics covering three 22 23

Dupcsik and Tóth (2008). Utasi (2002).

254

KOVÁCS

decades. Complementing these sources are scholarly publications drawing on these and other data sources. The broadest attitudinal survey results pertaining to family values and relationships are those contained in the last three waves of the European Values Study (evs). Complementing this information, data from the third (1998) and fourth (2005) waves of the World Values Survey (wvs) are also available, permitting more fine-tuned comparisons over time. In Romania, the Soros Foundation24 has commissioned and published one or two editions of the Public Opinion Barometer25 (bops) each year since the early 1990s. Different editions of the bop have been used here to map attitudinal changes in gender roles, social trust, and tolerance of different types of diversity since the late 1990s, including the Gender Barometer,26 carried out in 2000,27 and the thematic bop entitled ‘Life as a couple’ (Viața în cuplu), published in 2007.28 The retrospective study entitled ‘bop – 1998–2007’ is also an important secondary data source for the present discussion.29 Other public opinion surveys published by the Soros Foundation informing the present chapter are the 2002 and 2006 Rural Eurobarometers.30 Eurostat and the Romanian Statistical Institute (Institutul național de statistică – insse) represent the main source of primary data on demographic statistics. Scholarly publications drawing on other crosssectional survey data spanning two decades provide additional information on family structure, reproductive behaviour, and other aspects of family life.31 2

Family Lives in Romania: Values and Attitudes

The aim of this section is twofold. Firstly, the discussion expands on Romanians’ values connected with, and attitudes towards, marriage, divorce, other forms of ‘doing family’ and various issues related to fertility, and marital behaviour over roughly three decades. Secondly, it offers an analysis of continuities and changes on the nature and extent of the gaps between opinions, values and attitudes, and actual behaviour among various social groups in Romanian society. 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Formerly the Open Society Foundation (osf). Barometrul de opinie publică (bop). Barometrul de gen. osf (2000a). osf (2007a). osf (2007b). osf (2002, 2006). Ghebrea (2000); Voicu and Popescu (2006); Hărăguș (2011).

255

Romanian Families

2.1 Fertility Typically for a country with a socialist legacy, the number of children born in Romania has been decreasing continually since the 1950s, with the exception of a short-lived, yet steep spike in the number of births at the end of the 1960s,32 after the introduction of the ban on abortion and contraceptives.33 The fertility rate declined from 2.9 in 1970 to 2.2 in 1989 and registered a steep decline during the first years of the transition period, from 2.2 in 1989 to 1.3 in 1995, similar to other post-socialist societies.34 The fertility rate has oscillated around 1.3 since then (see Figure 7.1).35 Despite the general decline in fertility rates across all regions of the country during the 1990s and a slight increase between 2003 and 2009, different regions have shown different patterns of change over the last fifteen years. Bucharest has been atypical in that the fertility rate – historically the lowest in Romania – rose during the 2000s, almost reaching the average Romanian value in 2009. The north-eastern region has always had higher fertility rates than the rest of Romania, but there the fertility rate has been consistently declining, 3.5 3

2.9 2.4

2.5

2.19 1.83

2

1.5

1.5

1.4

1.3

1.26

1.32

1.37

1996

2000

2005

2009

1 0.5 0

1970

1980

1989

1990

1992

1994

Figure 7.1 The fertility rate in Romania between 1970 and 2009

Source: Ghebrea (2000); dcs (1983); Eurostat (2012b)

32 33 34 35

undp (2007, 50). Kligman (1992). Ghebrea (2000). Eurostat (2012b); Ghebrea (2000).

256

KOVÁCS

approximating the national average by 2010. In short, the last decade has seen a reduction in differences between regional fertility rates across the country, with regional fertility rates converging towards the national average by 2010. The main explanation for the decline of the aggregate fertility rate has been a combination of women’s decision to limit their fertility after their first or second child and a relatively reduced delay in childbearing. However, demographic data suggest that the importance of these two factors has reversed over the last three decades. Ghebrea’s analysis suggests that the main culprit for the decline in fertility between the 1980s and the mid-1990s was women limiting their fertility in the face of economic hardship.36 Indeed, Romanian women’s average age at childbirth (for all women and all births) had been declining, from 26.6 in 1960 to 24.8 by the mid-1990s.37 In other words, women were mostly not delaying childbirth; they were having fewer children. To illustrate this point between 1980 and 2011, the share of third births in the total number of births fell from 14 to 9.2 per cent. While the share of second births oscillated around the 30 per cent mark during the same period, the proportion of first births increased from 39.2 per cent of all births in 1995 to 52 per cent in 2011.38 As Figure 7.1 illustrates, the number of births stabilised at around 1.3 children per fertile woman during the mid-1990s. Around the same time, however, women started delaying childbirth. Changes in the distribution of live births by mothers’ age, particularly the distribution of first births, is revealing in this sense. The share of births among mothers aged 15–19 and 25–29 of all births remained constant over the last three decades, at around 10 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively. However, the proportion of births among mothers between 20–24 halved between 1995 and 2010, and the share of babies born to mothers aged 30–34 tripled over those fifteen years (see Figure 7.2). Moreover, while the number of first births among mothers aged 15–19 and 20–24, respectively, halved over this same period, and one-quarter more women aged 25–29 gave birth to their first child in 2010 compared to 1995. More interestingly, almost five times more women had their first baby when aged 30–34 in 2010 than in 1995 (see Figure 7.3). Finally, as the data in Figure 7.2 also indicates, the share of live births among women above 34 nearly doubled, from 6 per cent in 1981 to 11 per cent of all births in 2010. Consequently, the most common type of Romanian family during the early 2000s was a married couple with one child,39 although attitudinal data reveal 36 37 38 39

Ghebrea (2000). undp (2007). Eurostat (2012b). Popescu (2010).

257

Romanian Families 60.0% 49%

50.0% 42% 40.0% 30.0%

37%

34% 28%

20.0% 10.0% 11.5% 6% 1981

33%

28% 17%

12.5%

0.0%

41%

28% 19%

30%

17%

17%

10%

6%

8%

5%

6%

4%

1986

1991

1995

2000

15%

15% 14%

26% 19%

15-19 30%

20-24

25%

25-29

24%

30-34

13% 9%

11% 10%

2005

2010

> 34

Figure 7.2 Percentages of live births according to mothers’ ages in Romania between 1981 and 2010 Source: Eurostat (2012b); dcs (1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988); cns (1999, 2001, 2002, 2003); ins (2004, 2006, 2007, 2008)

70,000 60,000

61,353 52,749

50,000

15-19 40,000 30,000

36,559 33,213 27,791

30,050 25,777

20,000 10,000 0

4,250 1,372 1995

10,123 1,421 2000

35,882 23,129 14,437

34,691 31,825 20,569 16,773

4,089

5,514

2005

2010

20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39

Figure 7.3  Changes in the number of first births by mothers’ ages between 1995 and 2010 Source: The author’s calculations based on Eurostat (2012b) data

258

KOVÁCS

that this might not necessarily be due to choice. Over the last two decades at least, a remarkably constant majority of Romanians (60–66 per cent) has thought that the ideal number of children a couple should have is two.40 Still, it is noteworthy that the share of adults who believed one child was ideal increased from 7.2 per cent in the early 1990s (evs) to 14.4 per cent in 1998 (wvs), and in 2007, 11 per cent of respondents thought one child was ideal.41 Disaggregation by age group in 2007 revealed that the youngest cohort – those aged between eighteen and twenty-four – were more likely to judge one child to be the most appropriate42 number for a couple, with 17 per cent saying so, while 10 per cent of the 35–44 age group and only 5 per cent of those aged sixtyfive and over agreed one child was ideal.43 Romanians who appreciate childlessness have been a very small minority, under 3 per cent during the 1990s and 2000s (evs; wvs). Only small differences exist in regard to the ideal number of children between low and high income individuals. Among the poorest, the average ideal number of children was 2.48, while among those in the top income group the average was slightly smaller, at 2.07. In other words, while the majority of Romanians have long believed two to be the ideal number of children families should have, couples raising a single child remain the most common. Data from the bop ‘Life as a couple’ survey suggest that the vast majority of Romanians blame the small number of children on economic hardship: 69 per cent of respondents with children indicated material deprivation to be the main reason why women limit their fertility.44 The other commonly cited reason, shared by 31 per cent of those with children and 36 per cent of those without, was women’s choice.45 In other words, less than one-third of respondents with children agreed that women were able to have the number of children they (and their partners) wished to have. Still, only a small share of respondents in the Gender Barometer said they wanted to have more children: 14 per cent of women and 19 per cent of men (although only 32 per cent of the sample stated they could no longer have children).46 40 41 42

evs; wvs; Voicu (2007a); Kivu (2007). Voicu (2007a). The question in this case did not ask about the ideal number of children respondents wished to have. Instead, the question was phrased in more general terms: ‘How many children do you think is best for a couple to have nowadays?’ 43 Kivu (2007, 60). 44 Kivu (2007). 45 Ibid. 46 osf (2000a).

Romanian Families

259

As Mircea Kivu observed, material deprivation and poverty do not seem to be the genuine reason for most Romanian families having one or two children.47 It is much more likely that Romanians’ negative subjective material well-being is responsible: in 2000, 78 per cent of respondents in that year’s bop said that their incomes were enough only for the bare necessities or not even for those,48 and the 2002 Rural Eurobarometer revealed that 61 per cent of rural dwellers thought they were ‘rather’ or ‘very’ poor. By comparison, Eurostat (2012b) data revealed that around one-third of Romanians were severely deprived during the 2000s and conservative relative poverty measures suggested that around 14 per cent of Romanians were income poor in 2006 (down from 25 per cent three years earlier).49 In short, it would seem that couples’ decision to have fewer children than the ideal number is strongly related to perceptions of economic hardship: another child seems financially suicidal to many families with one child. 2.2 Out-of-Wedlock Births and Attitudes Towards Lone Motherhood During the early 2000s, Popescu argued that the share of live births outside marriage – at a little over one-quarter of all live births50 – was somewhat higher in Romania than in other Central and Eastern European countries, but still lower than in many Western European countries.51 Out-of-wedlock births are a largely post-socialist phenomenon in Romania, being practically non-existent before 1989.52 Between 1980 and 1990 the share of births outside marriage rose from 3.7 per cent of all births to 5.4 per cent, a relatively small change compared to later ones.53 As with other fertility-related trends, the most significant changes occurred during the first part of the 1990s. Within three years of the demise of state socialism, 17 per cent of all live births 47 48 49 50 51 52

53

Kivu (2007). osf (2000b). Raț (2008). Eurostat (2012b). Popescu (2003). A relatively short time horizon is considered here. Hărăguș (2011) reported on a retrospective study, carried out in 2005, of 5,600 Romanian women that among women born prior to 1940 over 10 per cent of this sample had given birth to their first child outside marriage and only 2.6 per cent of these women were cohabiting at the time. In contrast, only 4.1 per cent of women born after 1960 gave birth to their first child outside marriage, but 8 per cent of these younger cohorts, whose first birth happened outside marriage, were cohabiting at the time. In short, it would seem that the low incidence of out-of-wedlock births was an artefact of Romanian socialism. dcs (1983, 1986); cns (1990).

260

KOVÁCS

were those to unmarried mothers.54 After 2004, the share of out-of-wedlock births stabilised at just under 28 per cent.55 The profile of mothers having children outside marriage seems to have changed little over the last decade and a half. In 2002, two-thirds of all out-ofwedlock births were of mothers aged fifteen to twenty-four.56 Another 30 per cent of all births outside marriage in this year involved mothers aged twentyfive to thirty-four. In 2011, the share of out-of-wedlock births to unmarried mothers aged fifteen to twenty-four declined slightly to under 60 per cent, while the share of out-of-wedlock births to mothers between twenty-five and thirty-four increased slightly, to one-third. In real terms, too, out-of-wedlock births have been rather stable among mothers aged 15–29. A roughly constant number of out-of-wedlock births characterised the 15–19 age group of Romanian mothers between 1995 and 2010 (around 16,000/year). This was also true of single mothers aged 20–29. Interestingly, however, the number of children born outside marriage more than doubled among mothers aged 35–44 between 2002 and 2011. Figure 7.4 contains over-time variations in the share of out-of-wedlock live births in the total of live births, disaggregated by the mother’s age. What is evident is that the chance of being born outside marriage has increased especially for babies born to the youngest mothers: those aged fifteen to twenty-four. In summary, out-of-wedlock births have been most common over the last two decades among the youngest mothers. However, against the backdrop of an overall decline in the number of births over the same period, the actual number of children born outside marriage has oscillated relatively little, from 42,000 in 1993 to 59,000 in 2011.57 As far as attitudes go, Romanians have become overall more accepting towards lone motherhood over the last two decades. evs data reveal that the share of those approving of lone mothers has increased from 38 per cent in the early 1990s to 61 per cent at the end of the 2000s, at the expense of those whose approval was conditional (i.e., who said ‘it depends’), while the share of those disapproving of lone mothers stayed at a constant 28 per cent. While no longitudinal attitudinal data exist regarding Romanians’ views on out-of-wedlock births, the Gender Barometer offers interesting insights into this issue for 2000.58 54 55 56 57 58

Ghebrea (2000). Eurostat (2012b); Hărăguș (2011). Eurostat (2012b). Ghebrea (2000); Eurostat (2012b). osf (2000a).

261

Romanian Families 80.00%

76.14%

70.00%

66.81%

60.00%

58.49% 52.47%

50.00% 40.00%

43.76%

10.00% 0.00%

20-24 33.41%

34.31%

17.62% 16.83% 13.95% 10.94% 1995

22.00% 19.49% 13.66% 13.07%

1998

19.73%

20.84%

20.40%

18.15%

16.66%

14.74%

16.53%

15.55%

2000

2005

2010

15.17%

25-29 30-34

26.32%

30.00% 20.00%

15-19

35-39

Figure 7.4  Variations in the relative share of out-of-wedlock births by mothers’ ages in Romania between 1995 and 2010 Source: The author’s calculations based on Eurostat (2012b) data

Almost half of all respondents in this survey said they regarded women who had children outside marriage in a bad light and 42 per cent had neither a bad nor a good opinion of such mothers. Interestingly, the share of those viewing positively women giving birth outside marriage and not wanting to get married was almost twice as high, 11 per cent, as the proportion of those viewing mothers who give birth to out-of-wedlock children (without additional information) in a positive light. Those disapproving of either type of lone mother was a very similar 47–48 per cent. Disaggregation by age suggests a strong polarisation in opinions between the youngest and oldest generations: 65–67 per cent of elderly Romanians viewed women giving birth to children outside marriage in a bad light versus only 34–38 per cent among the youngest cohorts (18–29) (and around half being indifferent). Perhaps more interesting are the small differences between the youngest and middle-aged cohorts (30–45): 7 per cent of those in their twenties versus 8 per cent in the 30–45 age group saw women giving birth outside marriage in a good light. However, the greatest divide on this issue was between urban and rural dwellers. The proportion of rural inhabitants

262

KOVÁCS

disapproving of mothers giving birth outside marriage was almost twice as high as that of urban inhabitants (62 per cent versus 34–36 per cent). As already noted, women having children outside marriage and not wishing to marry were consistently seen in a more positive light than their peers who ‘only’ had children outside marriage. Drawing on evs and wvs data, Popescu indicated that acceptance of lone mothers who decide to enter motherhood by themselves may be even higher than suggested so far.59 In 1999 and 2005, 48–49 per cent of respondents agreed that if a woman wished to become a lone parent, she should have the child. Between 1993 and 2005, the share of those who were undecided on this question dropped from 34 per cent to 14 per cent. When considering the approval rates discussed earlier (an approval rate of 11 per cent in the Gender Barometer), comparisons reveal massive discrepancies between the different surveys. What does this suggest about Romanians’ attitudes towards lone motherhood generally and lone motherhood nested in lifestyle choices in particular? The great sensitivity of Romanians’ responses to questions about lone motherhood and the high rates of unequivocal endorsement of lone mothers choosing to have and raise children alone suggests that Romanians might distinguish between different types of lone motherhood, some acceptable, some not. When lone motherhood results from (empowered?) mothers’ active choice to have and raise a child alone, out-of-wedlock childbirth appears acceptable to the majority of Romanians. When lone motherhood happens for unknown reasons, it seems to meet with disapproval or indifference, suggesting that for Romanians this type of lone parenthood denotes a different phenomenon, involving ‘other’ women: not so empowered, and not explicitly choosing to have and raise children alone. This issue is taken up again in Subsection 2.6 below. While the survey data offer insights into Romanians’ opinions about lone motherhood, the same cannot be said about lone-parent families. Lone-parent family households represented 11.7 per cent of the total in 2002,60 up from 3.5 per cent in 1992.61 Popescu estimated that during the mid-2000s over 13 per cent of families with children were single-parent ones.62 This stability in the proportion of lone-parent families in Romania over the last two decades seems to be explained in part by relatively constant marriage rates particularly after 1995, low and constant rates of cohabitation, and a very stable, relatively low 59 Ibid. 60 Popescu (2010). 61 Ghebrea (2000). 62 Popescu (2007c).

Romanian Families

263

divorce rate (see Subsection 2.4 below). The fact that the incidence of singleparent households does not seem to co-vary with changes in the proportion of out-of-wedlock births (a rise from 17 per cent in 1993 to a relatively stable 28 per cent since the early 2000s) seems to suggest that only a small percentage of lone-parent households are formed by never married (single) parents: most single-parent families are probably formed by a divorced or widowed parent and their children born while married. Conversely, children born outside marriage may, in fact, be born to cohabiting parents rather than to women without partners. 2.3 ‘Doing Family’: Marriage and Cohabitation As already noted, Romania has been seen as a society where marriage is ‘universal’ and happens comparatively early.63 Indeed, the average age at first marriage in Romania was twenty-five for women and twenty-eight for men in 2005, up by three years compared to the previous nine decades.64 Romanians remain, in comparative terms, the youngest first-time brides and grooms across the European Union.65 Variations do exist, however, between different groups. Survey data from 2007 revealed that there was a four-year gap between the age at which little educated and highly educated individuals started cohabiting or got married for the first time: just under twenty-one for little educated respondents versus twenty-five for highly educated individuals.66 Gender also seemed to matter: on average Romanian women started cohabiting or got married for the first time just after turning twenty, while men did so shortly before turning twenty-four.67 Urban–rural differences were smaller: urban dwellers started cohabiting on average two years later than their rural peers, at twenty-three versus twenty-one.68 Furthermore, nuptiality in Romania has been consistently high in comparative terms: over the last two decades it has stood at around 6.5 marriages per 1,000 inhabitants,69 declining from 8.3 in 1990. During the 2000s, only the Russian Federation registered a higher crude marriage rate in Central and Eastern Europe.70 However, from a cross-sectional perspective it is difficult to 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

Ghebrea (2000); Popescu (2003, 2007c, 2010). Ghebrea (2000). Ghebrea (2000); Popescu (2010). Voicu (2007a); Popescu (2010). Voicu (2007a); Popescu (2010). Voicu (2007a). Eurostat (2012b); Ghebrea (2000); Voinea (2000); Popescu (2007c). Eurostat (2012b).

264

KOVÁCS

conclude that marriage is universal even if the majority of Romanians have lived in a legalised relationship over recent decades. Census data from 2002 revealed that 61.6 per cent of all adults were married, 4.8 per cent were divorced, and 11.2 per cent were widowed.71 In other words, close to four-fifths of the Romanian adult population in 2002 had been in a legalised union at some point in their lives. Disaggregation by age group reveals that in 2007 77 per cent of those in the 35–54 age group, 71 per cent of those aged 55–64, but only 61 per cent of those in their late twenties and early thirties were married.72 Despite a relatively high share of single adults in the general population, the 2002 census data support the low incidence of life-long celibacy in the Romanian case and the ‘universality’ of marriage from a life-course perspective.73 Survey data from 2007 reveal that the proportion of singles above fortyfive was only 2 per cent.74 While singles may make up around one-fifth of Romania’s adult population at any given point in time, from a life-course perspective marriage seems to be universal indeed in the Romanian context, in that it is very likely to happen to practically everyone at some point during their lives. Cohabitation, by contrast, is a much less practised form of ‘doing family’. According to 2002 census data, only 4.8 per cent of the adult population was cohabiting. Cohabitation has been described in the Romanian context as characterising young cohorts in particular and has been estimated at around 6–7 per cent of all couple relationships.75 However, 2002 census data and the 2007 bop suggest that cohabitation may not be significantly more common among adults under thirty-five than in older age groups. In 2002, cohabitation was highest among those aged 25–29, with 8.4 per cent of individuals in this age group living in a ‘consensual union’76 (see Table 7.1). In 2007, 10 per cent of those aged 25–34 said they lived together with someone outside marriage.77 If considering only unmarried individuals (singles), it is noteworthy that significantly smaller proportions of young people cohabit than their older peers, and the proportion of singles cohabiting rises with age, according to the 2002 census (see Table 7.1). Although cohabitation seems to be weakly correlated with age, Popescu has argued that cohabitation has been found to be more common among the 71 72 73 74 75 76 77

insse (2003). Voicu (2007a, 10). Ghebrea (2000); Popescu (2003). Voicu (2007a). Popescu (2003). insse (2003). Voicu (2007a).

265

Romanian Families Table 7.1

20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69

The percentage of cohabiting individuals per age group and the share of singles cohabiting among all singles in age group Cohabiting

Singles cohabiting

7.34 8.38 6.62 5.97 5.44 4.62 3.9 3.15 2.54 2.06

9.14 18.43 24.91 29.59 31.53 31.24 33.15 32.51 31.24 27.81

Source: The author’s calculations based on 2002 census data (insse 2002)

Roma, who tend to be little educated and live in rural areas, suggesting that it might be those most exposed to poverty, deprivation, and social exclusion who often fail to legalise their unions.78 However, 2007 survey data suggest only minor differences in the incidence of cohabitation in urban and rural settings (6 per cent in cities versus 5 per cent in villages) and among different educational groups (6 per cent of the highly educated versus 5 per cent of the little educated).79 It would seem that data for the 2000s reveal a largely even distribution of cohabiting couples across all age and educational groups in Romanian society, with those in their late twenties and early thirties – likely planning to get married – most likely to cohabit. However, it is unclear whether the reasons for which urban and rural dwellers, different age groups, and people with different educational attainment levels cohabit are similar. Attitudes towards marriage may explain most Romanians’ direct experience of this social institution. Although the share of those who believe that marriage is an outdated institution has been rising, from less than 10 per cent of the population in the early 1990s, the latest wave of the evs (2008–10) revealed that over 80 per cent of Romanians still agree that marriage is not outdated.80 78 79 80

Popescu (2007c). Voicu (2007a). evs; wvs; Popescu (2003, 2007c).

266

KOVÁCS

Disaggregated data by respondents’ age for 1999 suggest that younger cohorts hold the same views about marriage as the older generations: 85 per cent of those aged 18–29 thought that marriage was not outdated compared to 89.6 per cent of those older than fifty-five. At the same time, Romanians have, by and large, been rather accepting towards cohabitation, particularly when it precedes marriage (for young couples especially). At the end of the 2000s, between 50 and 60 per cent of the population approved of couples living together without getting married,81 and 56 per cent said that it was good for a couple wishing to get married to live together before legalising their union.82 In Romania, childbirth remains tightly linked to coupledom in both deed and opinions, even if this is not in the form of a legalised marriage. It is still the case that close to three-quarters of children are born to married parents and many of the rest are thought to have been born to unmarried, but cohabiting, mothers. Furthermore, in 2007, survey data revealed that close to two-thirds of Romanians said the best time to have children, for both men and women, was after getting married.83 In 2008, over 80 per cent of Romanians said that couples who wished to have children should get married, although half of respondents also thought that living together without being married was acceptable.84 Gender seemed not to matter at all for opinions on this issue. While marriage has remained a prized social institution for the vast majority of Romanians over recent decades, it is not seen as the only acceptable or indeed desirable way of living as a couple nowadays. For having children, however, marriage receives the support of the vast share of the Romanian populace, while women giving birth outside marriage tend to be seen by most with indifference or disapproval. 2.4 Parting Ways: Divorce The crude divorce rate over the last two decades places Romania among the most divorce-averse post-socialist European societies, exceeded only by Poland (especially during the 1990s) and by Slovenia.85 Since 1975, there have been about 1.53 divorces per 1,000 inhabitants annually, with dips in 1985 and 1992 and a peak in 1998, with 1.8 divorces per 1,000 inhabitants.86 The divorce rate 81 82 83 84 85 86

evs. Popescu (2010). Kivu (2007). Popescu (2010). Eurostat (2012b); Popescu (2007c). Ghebrea (2000); Eurostat (2012b).

267

Romanian Families

has been among the most stable indicators of family life in Romania over the last three to four decades.87 Attitudinal data reveal that, overall, Romanians have become more conservative in relation to divorce over time. In 1998, 22.4 per cent of survey respondents said that divorce was never justified and 14 per cent indicated that it could always be justified. By 2005, 32 per cent of respondents said divorce could never be justified and only 7 per cent stated it could always be justified.88 evs data reveal a different pattern in this regard, with those always able to justify divorce at around 10 per cent throughout the 1990s and 2000s (see Table 7.2). During the mid-2000s, variations did exist between different groups of Romanians, however. Highly educated people were most accepting towards the idea of divorce, averaging 5.6 on the 1-to-10 (divorce always acceptable) scale used by the evs and wvs. Those with little education were more intolerant towards divorce, with an average score of 3.6. It is noteworthy that neither gender nor age seems to matter significantly in this regard. Only the oldest generations appeared to more readily shun the idea of divorce.89 At the same time, a study carried out during the early 1990s among Romanian youth (18–29) revealed that divorce was acceptable to around 63 per cent of all respondents, with the greatest differences between those cohabiting Table 7.2 Attitudes towards divorce (in percentages): ‘Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. Divorce’ Justifying divorce

1990–93

1999–2001

2008–10

1 (never) 2 9 10 (always)

22.5 4.6 5.0 11.3

32.6 5.5 4.9 8.1

28.1 4.8 4.2 10.6

Source: evs

87

88 89

As was the case with the regulation of fertility, divorce was also made extremely difficult and costly during the Ceaușescu years. While this does not explain Romanians’ antipathy towards the termination of marriage after 1989, it may certainly be considered one component of a divorce-averse cultural inheritance in Romania. wvs. Popescu (2007c).

268

KOVÁCS

(97 per cent endorsed divorce) and married respondents (only 57 per cent endorsed divorce). While differences of gender, age, subjectively judged income, type of locality of residence, and level of education were associated with small attitudinal differences in relation to divorce, occupation revealed a clear-cut polarisation between agricultural workers and the rest.90 Among those who could justify divorce to some degree, the most commonly cited reason in 2007 was violence.91 Battering was most frequently cited by respondents with medium levels of education and by people in the 25–34 age group. On average three-quarters of Romanians viewed physical violence to be a reason for divorce regardless of age, gender, educational attainment, or type of locality of residence.92 Perhaps this is not surprising considering the fact that in 2000 53 per cent of respondents of the Gender Barometer said they knew of cases of women having been battered and with 18 per cent of female respondents indicating having been physically abused at some point during their lives.93 More than two-thirds of Romanians also indicated alcoholism as an acceptable reason for divorce, with women and those with medium levels of education most in support of divorce on account of alcohol addiction (about 73 per cent in each group). Age was more salient for differences in judging the absence of love to be a reason for divorce: while 68.5 per cent of those between eighteen and thirty-four mentioned the absence of love as a reason to part, only 50.1 per cent of those aged sixty-five and over said so.94 Overall, Romanians’ views on divorce and reasons for it tend to be fairly consistent. Not only are a majority of Romanians still divorce-averse, but the reasons for which they envisage divorce happening are also consistent across different groups. It would be fair to say that Romanians tend to share similar views on divorce regardless of level of education, age, gender, and type of locality of residence, although less educated, rural, and older couples appear to see less justification for divorce on grounds of physical violence, alcoholism, or the absence of love than other groups. 2.5 (Un)Changing Family Structures and Lifestyles As already explored in Subsections 2.1–2.3 above, childlessness is not Romanians’ cup of tea. Over the last two decades, just under 3 per cent of the 90 91 92 93 94

Ghebrea (2000, 67). Popescu (2007b). Popescu (2007b, 2010). osf (2000a). Popescu (2007b).

Romanian Families

269

overall Romanian population thought that having no children was ideal. At the same time, the ratio of childless couples (married or cohabiting) to couples with children (married or cohabiting) has remained around 1:2 during the 2000s, with childless couples thought to be newly married ones planning on having children at some point. Although lone motherhood by choice seems to be endorsed by a majority of respondents (see Subsection 2.2 above),95 information about the proportion of couples who are childless by choice and Romanians’ attitudes towards deliberate childlessness are lacking. Considering fertility patterns – the proportion of couples with one child only – and the close to universal preference of Romanians for at most two children, Romanian couples remaining childless by choice are likely to be extremely few. Similarly, there is no information about trends in relation to reconstituted families or same-sex couples, with or without children.96 In short, there is no evidence about whether and to what extent Romanians might have been ‘doing family’ in new forms. While extended families have become slightly more common – 7.6 per cent of all family households in 1992 versus 9.2 per cent during the late 2000s – this should be seen as a symptom of poverty and young couples’ inability to establish autonomous households rather than as a lifestyle choice.97 Indeed, Romanians have had a strong preference for the nuclear family and among the most frequently mentioned items required for a couple to have a happy marriage was good living conditions.98 Not surprisingly, extended families living under the same roof have been more common in rural areas.99 2.6 Family Change in Perspective This section has revealed that the early years of Romania’s post-socialist macro-economic transformations were accompanied by radical changes in fertility behaviour, especially as a result of women limiting their fertility. These changes saw an increase in the proportion of out-of-wedlock births among the youngest mothers, and an increase in the proportion of first births among all 95 96

97 98 99

evs. Romanian legislation does not make provisions for marriage (or other legalised forms of cohabitation) between people of the same sex, although neither is same-sex marriage explicitly prohibited by law (Law no. 288/2007). However, the law on adoptions (Law no. 273/2004, art. 2 (i), republished) states that the ‘adopting family’ means, by law, the husband and wife adopting the child in question. Voicu (2007a); Popescu (2010). Popescu (2007a, 2010); Rughiniș (2007). Voicu (2007a).

270

KOVÁCS

live births. Fertility levels, marriage and divorce rates, and cohabitation – at aggregate levels and disaggregated for different groups – stabilised around 1995 and have changed little since. At the same time, attitudes seem also to have changed little on average, even when accounting for differences in attitudes between different demographic groups. Romanians have for instance retained a preference for the two-child nuclear family, yet one-child married couples remain the most common. Marriage remains a highly valued social institution, but – as elsewhere – it is no longer the only acceptable way of doing family with a significant other. Still, cohabitation is seen as appropriate especially prior to marriage or for people who do not wish to have children. From a life-course perspective, marriage remains a universal phenomenon in Romania, although around one-fifth of the adult population is single. In other words, people believe marriage is highly desirable and there is a widespread assumption that people wishing to have children at some point will get married (and, so far, most people – whether with or without children – have done so). Childbearing has remained tightly linked to marriage or cohabiting even if a little over a quarter of all births have taken place outside marriage over the last nearly twenty years. Given the context of Romanian women generally limiting their fertility, delaying the birth of their first child, and close to two-thirds of out-of-wedlock births happening to women under twenty-four, the separation of marriage and childbearing should be seen as an expression of social exclusion, impoverishment, and poor access to reproductive health services rather than as a positive preference amongst the youngest cohorts for childbearing outside marriage.100 The fact that a large share of out-of-wedlock births in Romania involve young women and teenage girls outside a legalised relationship – rather than a more heterogeneous group of women – suggests that out-of-wedlock births are much more frequent among groups of women who are predisposed to having children very early and who are least likely to legalise their unions. In the Romanian context this often means socially excluded, severely impoverished Roma teenage girls in ghettoised, residentially segregated communities, where legalised marriage is less common despite monogamous romantic relationships101 and where access to medical care, including reproductive health, is difficult, discriminatory, and abusive.102 While official statistics record the babies of these women as out-of-wedlock

100 See also unicef (1999). 101 Voicu and Popescu (2006). 102 See especially Magyari-Vincze (2007).

Romanian Families

271

births, it is often the case that they are desired children of young, impoverished (Roma) couples in communities where cohabitation and monogamy rather than a legalised union are the markers of married status.103 While behavioural changes may suggest that Romania may be undergoing what has been called the second demographic transition, newer family forms do not seem to be linked to post-modernity.104 Poverty, negative perceptions of material well-being and adverse family events seem to explain teenage motherhood outside a legalised relationship, lone parenthood and childlessness more convincingly than post-modern conceptualisations of family life, intimate relationships, and individualisation. 3

Gender Roles Within the Family

The focus of this section is changes and continuities in men’s and especially women’s roles both outside the home – especially as earners – as well as inside the home, particularly in relation to unpaid domestic and care work in the Romanian context. Given the lack of any kind of behavioural and attitudinal data collected in Romania before the end of the Ceaușescu decades, the present discussion focuses only on the 1990s and 2000s. 3.1 Women as Earners State propaganda during the Ceaușescu decades placed particular emphasis on women’s social role as mothers.105 Despite this, employment legislation and social provisions targeting families with children did not support the full-time maternal role, even on a temporary basis. During the later socialist decades, an increasing share of the adult female population was incorporated in some way into the socialist economy, with paid work legitimised both by state

103 Voicu and Popescu (2006, 5–6) argue that the pre-modern, traditional family form – early marriage and childbearing, large nuclear family sizes and women’s primary preoccupation with motherhood – among the Romanian Roma may be seen as a regression to archaic family forms in the context of social disorganisation, brought on by many Roma families’ inability to cope with the shocks caused by the pro-natalist policies of the Ceaușescu regime: lack of access to birth control, lack of access to abortion, and explicit encouragement of large nuclear families in the broader context of universal employment. The share of so-called ‘illegitimate’ births may have risen for the simple reason that many young, poor (Roma) couples may have given up on legalising their relationships. 104 See Ochiai (2010, 2–4). 105 Kligman (1992); Verdery (1994); Gal and Kligman (2000).

272

KOVÁCS

propaganda and by necessity in the context of wage compression106 and the impoverishment of the population, especially during the 1980s.107 The early years of economic transition, however, created an environment which increasingly pushed women out of the labour market or into early retirement. This led to a steep decline in women’s economic activity rates in both absolute and relative terms. During the early 1990s, the unemployment rate for women was consistently higher than the aggregate one and that of men (see Table 7.3). Just as with fertility indicators, the greatest decline in women’s employment over the last two decades occurred between 1990 and 1995, employment trends stabilising afterwards. Since 1996, only a rather stable 56.8 per cent of Romanian women have been active,108 although disaggregated data for the period between 1999 and 2011 suggest that activity rates among women have actually declined over this period with the exception of some groups of highly educated women (see Table 7.4). The steepest drop in activity and employment rates has been among little educated women regardless of age, women under nineteen and those over sixty without higher education (see Table 7.4). Highly educated women have Table 7.3 Percentage unemployment rates (total and for women) over time in Romania

1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005

Total unemployment rate

Women’s unemployment rate

3.0 10.4 9.5 6.3 8.9 11.8 8.8 7.4 5.9

4.0 12.9 11.4 7.3 9.3 11.6 8.4 6.8 5.2

Source: Table 5.15 in Magyari et al. (2001, 149); Table 5 in Parlevliet and Xenogiani (2008, 15)

Note: Data reported for the early 1990s indicate overall unemployment (International Labour Organisation – ilo). Data for the late 1990s and 2000s, in italics, are registered unemployed. 106 Kornai (1992). 107 Zamfir (1999). 108 Parlevliet and Xenogiani (2008).

273

Romanian Families

Table 7.4 Romanian women’s activity and employment rates (in percentages) between 1999 and 2011 Age group

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

The share of active women of all women in age group

15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–59 60–64

18.9 56.4 76.7 80.6 83.5 71.3 44.0

15.9 49.1 72.0 77.9 79.2 62.4 29.6

11.5 42.4 69.3 73.3 77.3 61.2 26.8

9.1 38.3 69.0 73.9 74.8 61.4 26.2

10.0 38.6 69.9 73.5 75.6 62.8 23.0

Working age (15–64) women’s employment rate by age

15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–59 60–64

14.7 48.9 70.5 75.1 78.6 69.0 44.0

12.1 38.6 65.1 72.1 73.5 59.2 29.6

8.6 35.5 63.8 68.8 72.6 58.4 26.6

6.3 32.2 65.5 70.9 71.7 59.5 26.2

7.2 29.7 63.6 69.7 71.1 59.7 23.0

Women’s overall employment rate Educational level isced 0–2 The share of active women isced 3–4 according to isced 5–6 level of education among working-age (15–64) women

63.2

56.8

56.9

57.3

55.7

53.3

43.0

37.5

37.4

37.9

69.0 87.8

64.7 83.7

62.5 86.3

59.9 87.1

59.5 85.2

Working-age (15–64) women’s employment rate by level of education

51.5 63.2 85.2

40.7 57.9 80.1

35.2 57.7 82.6

35.5 56.6 84.6

35.7 54.6 80.4

isced 0–2 isced 3–4 isced 5–6

Source: Eurostat (2012b)

274

KOVÁCS

either exhibited unchanged activity levels (the 30–59 age cohorts) or increased activity rates (60–64 age group). Only women in the 20–29 age group with tertiary education have registered a decline in activity rates, likely due to the increase in the proportion of women still in education and training. It is also noteworthy that in the third wave of the evs, 3.6 per cent of Romanians mentioned that they had never had a paid job, making Romania – alongside Poland – one of the post-socialist nations with the highest share of people who had never engaged in income earning (in the countries where this was asked, Spain topped the rank with over 10 per cent, followed by Italy with 7.2 per cent). As Table 7.4 also reveals, the aggregate employment rate of both men and women has been relatively low in Romania since the second part of the 1990s, with around one-third of working-age Romanians being consistently inactive. This has translated into growing inequalities through the polarisation of workrich and work-poor households. During the 2000s, the income quintile share ratio (the income of the top quintile divided by the income of the bottom quintile) in Romania rose from 4.5 (2001) to an eu-high of 7.8 in 2007 and then declined to 6.2 (2011). Over this same period the eu27 average remained at a consistent value of 5.109 Furthermore, Romania is among the European countries with the highest Gini coefficient – around 33 – alongside Latvia, Lithuania, Spain, Portugal, and Bulgaria.110 A key reason for this is the structure of the Romanian job market. In addition to widespread job shortages, a generally poorly skilled and rigid labour force and not least a legacy of passive unemployment policies during the 1990s and 2000s,111 the supply side of the Romanian job market also remains unchanged in certain respects. Part-time work among women in Romania is less common than in any other European Union (eu) member state, at just under 10 per cent of employed women.112 At the same time, Romania registered the highest rates of men and women working ‘long hours’ in the eu in 2006: close to 49 per cent of full-time working men and 33 per cent of full-time working women. In short, Romanian women are either labour market insiders with full-time (and longworking-hour) jobs (likely partnered with men with full-time and possibly long-hour jobs as well) or labour market outsiders with no jobs of any kind (and likely partnered with men also with no jobs of any kind).113 109 Eurostat (2012c). 110 Ibid. 111 Cace (2006). 112 European Commission (2007, 10); Eurostat (2012b). 113 Unfortunately there is little evidence concerning the degree of homogamy in Romanian couples in terms of labour market status. Considering, however, that a majority of

275

Romanian Families

Despite notable changes in women’s economic activity over the last two decades, Romanians’ attitudes towards women’s labour market participation have been fairly stable over this time. A consistent 45 per cent or more of the population has disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that being a housewife is as fulfilling as paid work (see Figure 7.5). Moreover, the share of those who believe that ‘having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person’ has consistently risen over the last twenty years, from 68 per cent agreeing or agreeing strongly in the early 1990s to 84 per cent at the end of the 2000s.114 More than 85 per cent of Romanians have shared the opinion (i.e., agreed or strongly agreed) that both partners should contribute to household income (i.e., earn), although agreement with this statement was strongest during the early 1990s, when the first shocks of the transition period had caused severe adverse effects on households’ material well-being.115 Still, during the 45.0% 40.0%

39.6% 35.4%

35.0% 30.0%

31.9%

32.6%

34.8% 34.0%

24.7%

25.0% 20.0%

16.3%

15.0% 10.0%

10.2% 12.1%

5.0% 0.0%

36.7% 33.8%

16.9%

22.1%

14.3%

8.8%

34.0% strongly agree 16.9%

agree disagree strongly disagree

12.4%

8.2% 1990-1993 (EVS)

1998 (WVS) 1999-2001 (EVS)

2005 (WVS) 2008-2010 (EVS)

Figure 7.5  Agreement and disagreement with the statement: ‘Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as paid work’ Note: For 1998, the values for ‘strongly agree’ (8.2 per cent) and ‘agree’ (32.6 per cent) have been reversed for the purposes of this chart because, considering relative trends and data cited by Popescu (2007c, 198), these rather than those specified in the database seem correct. Source: evs, wvs data; Popescu (2007c)



Romanian couples have met through neighbours or friends or known each other since childhood (Voicu 2007a) and that Romanians in general prefer marriages with socioeconomically similar individuals (Rughiniș 2007), the likelihood of high degrees of homogamy is great. 114 evs. 115 Ibid.

276

KOVÁCS

2000s there has been a substantial decline in the proportion of those who agreed with the statement that ‘when jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women’, from 42 per cent around 2000 to 26.5 per cent in 2009, while the proportion of those disagreeing rose from 43.6 per cent to 56.7 per cent.116 It is unclear what these attitudinal data tell us about Romanians’ appreciation of women as earners. Over the last couple of decades a consistent majority of Romanians has stated that being a housewife is as rewarding as paid work. At the same time, however, there has been overwhelming support for the dualearner couple, and by the end of the 2000s over 80 per cent of Romanians agreed that paid work was the best way for women to be independent. Do Romanians hold contradictory opinions about the desirability of women’s earning? Do they judge women’s earnings as a necessity or rather as an expression of women’s empowerment, desirable in its own right? Does the valuing of housewifery say something about growing conservatism among Romanians regarding women’s ‘proper place’ in society? Or is it an expression of the valorising of home life in a genuine way rather than in the shallow, instrumental manner in which socialist-time state propaganda glorified domesticity while stripping people of the possibility of enacting it?117 The following discussion of how Romanians divide the ‘second shift’,118 that is, the chores and responsibilities of home life, and how they think about sharing it provides additional information for formulating convincing responses to these questions. 3.2 Women and Men in the Home: Domestic Work and Childcare Scholars have noted that Romanians have preferred an egalitarian couple relationship for the last two decades now, particularly the younger age cohorts.119 However, a closer look at the division of household labour and childcare and attitudinal data focusing on gender roles within couples suggests that Romanians act in a substantially more gender-specific fashion than they say they should. Romanians spent around three hours a day on household chores in 2007, with women, on average, spending around 50 per cent more time on domestic labour than their partners.120 Bigger differences were observable between different age groups, with time allocated to household labour increasing with age. While those in the 18–24 age group spent on average a little over fifteen hours/ 116 Ibid. 117 Kligman (1992); Verdery (1994). 118 Hochschild (1989). 119 osf (2000a); Popescu (2003, 2007a, 2010). 120 Popescu (2007a).

Romanian Families

277

week on household chores, people over the age of forty-five spent on average around twenty-eight hours a week on chores.121 In 2000, four-fifths of respondents reported that cleaning and doing the dishes were exclusively done by the women in their families, 86 per cent said that cooking was performed exclusively by women, and ironing and laundry were tackled by women alone in 88 per cent of households.122 Moreover, while 6 per cent of households delegated car washing and 15 per cent delegated chores related to plumbing to someone else for pay, cooking and cleaning were delegated only in 1 per cent of households.123 The 2002 Rural Eurobarometer124 indicated that urban–rural differences as regards the division of household labour were not significant at the time: in the countryside, between 93 and 95 per cent of respondents indicated that women performed household chores alone. What seems surprising, however, is the division of labour among young cohabiting and married couples, who – as already noted – have been the most egalitarian Romanians in their views on divisions of unpaid work. The division of household labour among those in their twenties was more unequal than among any other group in Romanian society at the time (see Table  7.5). To illustrate, 69 per cent of Romanians said in 2000 that in their family it was women who tackled child-related daily chores, and 23 per cent said they and their spouse shared these tasks.125 In rural areas, child-related tasks were more commonly women-only responsibilities: in 85 per cent of households in the countryside was child-rearing exclusively women’s responsibility.126 By comparison, in young Romanian couples around the same time child-related tasks were carried out exclusively by mothers (women). Perhaps the deeply unequal division of household labour, including childcare among couples with young children, is not surprising considering the gender roles that Romanians, including younger cohorts, adhere to. On average, in 2000, 63 per cent of Romanians agreed that the household was more women’s than men’s responsibility, and 70 per cent of respondents agreed that men rather than women had to be the main breadwinners.127 The greatest differences were observable in both cases between respondents with different 121 Ibid. 122 osf (2000a). 123 Ibid. 124 osf (2002). 125 osf (2000a). 126 osf (2002). 127 Ibid.

278

KOVÁCS

Table 7.5 Percentage gender divisions of household chores and childcare in young Romanian couples in 2000 Myself

Washes and repairs the family car Does repairs in the home Cooks meals Does the cleaning Does the laundry Does the dishes Irons Looks after children daily Supervises children’s homework and playtime Goes to the doctor with the children Drops children off at school

My partner/spouse

Male (%)

Female (%)

Male (%)

Female (%)

70.6 91.1 4.7 5.4 4.3 5.4 2.3 10.5 9.4

29.4 8.9 95.3 94.6 95.7 94.6 97.7 89.5 90.6

5 4.5 95.9 97.9 97.9 97.9 98 97.1 95

95 95.5 4.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2 2.9 5

16.7

83.3

96.2

3.8

8.3

91.7

92.3

7.7

Source: Popescu (2003, 19)

educational backgrounds, followed by the urban–rural divide (see Table 7.6). At the same time, three-quarters of respondents in the fourth wave of the evs (2008–10) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that ‘men should take as much responsibility as women for the home and children’. Conceptualisations of gender roles characteristic of patriarchal, malebreadwinner families appeared (still) to gain the support of a majority of Romanians during the 2000s. Men were much more likely to endorse men as desirable leaders in families like their own: 47 per cent versus 24 per cent of women. Furthermore, while three-quarters of women thought gender did not matter for who led in the family, only a little over half of men regarded gender as irrelevant. Furthermore, around 90 per cent of both men and women agreed with the statement that ‘the man is the head of the family’ and around 60 per cent of both men and women agreed that women were the mistresses of the home.128 Age did not seem to make a difference to the statement about the role of men within families, although younger cohorts were more likely to disagree 128 Popescu (2007a).

279

Romanian Families

Table 7.6 Opinions about housework and earning in Romania in 2000, disaggregated by level of education, type of locality of residence and respondents’ age group

Little education Medium education Higher education City dweller Village dweller Aged 18–29 Aged 30–59 Aged 60+

Housework is more of a duty for women than men

To be the main breadwinner is more of a responsibility for men than women

Agree (%)

Disagree (%)

Agree (%)

Disagree (%)

76 61 42 54 72 58/61.9 61/64.9 71/75.5

16 33 52 40 21 36/38.1 32/35.1 22/24.5

81 69 44 59 65 65/68.7 67/71.1 78/82.4

12 25 48 34 28 29/31.3 26/28.9 15/17.6

Source: osf (2000a)

Note: Figures in italics are those reported by Popescu (2003, 14) using the same dataset, also including non-responses in her calculations.

with women’s role as mistresses of the home than those of retirement age (55+).129 An equally strong adherence to patriarchal, male-breadwinner gender roles within the family may be suggested by responses to another question: ‘In your opinion, does a woman have to follow her man?’; 72 per cent of city dwellers, 70 per cent of respondents aged 18–29, 62 per cent of those with higher education and 56 per cent of university students agreed with this statement in 2000.130 Overall, therefore, a larger share of Romanians of both genders and of different ages endorsed patriarchal, male-breadwinner conceptualisations of men’s 129 Popescu (2003). 130 osf (2000a). In the absence of a question about men following their women, it is difficult to ascertain what respondents might have understood by the term ‘following’ to mean. In the light of the discussion about decision-making in Romanian couples most often falling on women, it is unclear whether following one’s man might have been interpreted as subordination to one’s man or ‘holding up a common front’, for example in front of children or in public.

280

KOVÁCS

roles within the family. At the same time, however, there is some evidence to suggest that the majority of Romanians also value a more equal division of unpaid domestic work and especially childcare. In other words, while patriarchal conceptualisations of masculinities endure, corresponding femininities – and especially the idea of the self-sufficient mistress of the home, subordinated nevertheless to her man – seem to have become less salient and more disputed. Still, it is noteworthy that certain old-fashioned stereotypes about women have remained: over the last two decades a consistent 84 per cent of Romanians have thought that although a job was all right, what most women really wanted was a home and children.131 Moreover, 53 per cent of young men and close to 64 per cent of young women in 2000 said that the best thing for a woman was to look after her home,132 only 10 percentage points lower than the share of like-minded middle-aged Romanians. Still, it is noteworthy that Romanians’ opinions about having and raising children were gender-specific to a lesser degree than the division of domestic work and of child-related chores and responsibilities. During the 1990s and 2000s, comparable proportions of Romanians (85 per cent of women and threequarters of men) thought that both women and men needed children to be fulfilled. Moreover, three-quarters of respondents also thought that men should take the same responsibility as women for children.133 In 2000, 71 per cent of respondents said that children should be raised by both parents and only 28 per cent said that mothers especially should be in charge of child-rearing.134 In this regard too, differences were most salient between respondents with different educational backgrounds (87 per cent highly educated versus only 58 per cent little educated respondents) and different types of locality of residence (82 per cent of urban versus 63 per cent of rural dwellers indicated both parents). Still, students, followed by employed adults, were most egalitarian in respect to child-rearing responsibilities: 89 per cent and 82 per cent, respectively, said that children should be raised by both parents. Finally, over the last decade the share of those who believed that fathers are as well suited as mothers to look after children has increased slightly, from around 55 per cent to 63 per cent, suggesting that Romanians increasingly see fathers as key participants in the upbringing of children. In summary, Romanian couples divide domestic work deeply unequally, with the vast majority of women responsible alone for most household chores. 131 132 133 134

evs. Popescu (2003). evs. osf (2000a).

Romanian Families

281

Childcare-related tasks are less starkly gendered, but close to three-quarters of all Romanian families and over 90 per cent of young families still revealed that these were exclusively performed by mothers. This strongly mother-centred division of child-related work is particularly interesting because, as has been noted earlier, the vast majority of Romanians believe that children are as important to mothers as to fathers and that parents should have equal roles to play in children’s upbringing. One explanation for this apparent contradiction between the opinions and division of child-related work is that the former refer to children’s upbringing, child-rearing, a rather fuzzy and arguably more encompassing term than the set of child-related chores (e.g., homework supervision, tending to a sick child or feeding, bathing children, etc.) that the surveys cited asked about. An alternative explanation is detailed in Subsection 3.4 below. 3.3 Power Relations in Romanian Couples Attitudinal studies have revealed that during the 2000s most household- and child-related decisions made in Romanian couples were more frequently taken by women than men, or jointly. This data covers decision-making regarding a wide variety of household tasks, such as shopping for food, alterations made to the family home, looking after children, arranging holidays, borrowing money, etc.135 Consequently, scholars have concluded that power relations within couples in Romania have tended to lean in favour of women.136 While women’s dominance in such decisions may indeed be interpreted as a sign of relative power within the couple, in the context of material deprivation and poverty (as already highlighted, around three-quarters of Romanians still see themselves as rather poor) such decisions may be quite challenging, both logistically and emotionally. If decisions mean compromises and frugality, the responsibility for making them may be a burden rather than an exercise of control and power. Research in the uk for instance has revealed that women’s control of household finances was most common among low-income families, and although women tended to be in charge of routine budgeting, a larger share of low-income men still had the last word to say in ‘big’ decisions involving family expenses.137 While women may be responsible for the ‘executive functions’ regarding spending money in many Romanian households, ‘strategic control’ may still be with men in many cases.138 As the previous two 135 136 137 138

Bădescu (2007a). Popescu (2007a); Bădescu (2007a). Sung and Bennett (2007). Vogler et al. (2006).

282

KOVÁCS

subsections have highlighted, Romanians have mostly retained patriarchal conceptualisations of gender roles within couples, and the intimate sphere consumes women’s time and energy significantly more than it does men’s. While attitudinal data available on this issue for the Romanian context does not permit a sufficiently detailed analysis of how Romanian families actually decide to spend their (little) money, it remains an open question as to whether greater influence in decisions of householding and caregiving means assertiveness and control or, on the contrary, accountability and subordination. Domestic violence has often been seen as another expression of gender power relations in couples. Although longitudinal data available on this issue are limited, the Gender Barometer reveals what appears to be a rather high incidence of domestic violence. As noted earlier, in 2000 over half of respondents had heard of cases of women and 17 per cent of men having been beaten, with a larger share of young cohorts aware of such situations.139 Differences among groups with different levels of education and urban–rural differences tended to be small (around 15 percentage points). Geographic region proved to be related to the greatest differences in this respect: 37 per cent of western Romanians knew of cases of domestic violence versus 65 per cent among southerners. In short, domestic violence seems to be quite evenly spread throughout Romanian society, with regional differences mattering most for this kind of behaviour. In summary, the little information available about proxy indicators for gender power relations seems to suggest that, regional differences notwithstanding, Romanian men (and women also) rely on violence and abuse to exert power and control. Moreover, while women tend to dominate decision-making in questions related to the domestic sphere, it is questionable whether this is conclusive evidence that women retain more power than their male partners in couple relationships. 3.4 Changing Gender Roles in Romanian Families: A Discussion The overview of behavioural and attitudinal data in this section aimed to trace changes and continuities in the ways in which men and women shared earning responsibilities, domestic chores, and childcare, how they experienced gender power relations in couples, and what they thought about these dimensions of the intimate sphere. Overall, Romanians have retained a deeply gendered and unequal division of household labour. In the vast majority of households, women remain solely responsible for cooking, cleaning, laundry, and ironing, and among young 139 osf (2000a).

Romanian Families

283

cohorts and rural dwellers the share of women single-handedly tackling domestic chores exceeds 90 per cent. Two-thirds of women also routinely deal with childcare-related issues alone. Attitudinal surveys show that the majority of Romanians find this division of labour acceptable. Interestingly, however, they also hold rather egalitarian views on the more elusive issue of ‘raising children’, women more so than men. In short, in respect to the division of domestic labour and childcare responsibilities especially, Romanians’ attitudes are significantly more egalitarian than their behaviour might suggest. Furthermore, over half of women also participate in paid work, full-time work in 90 per cent of cases.140 Most Romanians support women’s participation in paid work and value it as the best way for women to be independent. In remains a puzzle, however, to what extent women’s independence is valued by Romanians. As Subsection 3.2 revealed, over three-quarters of Romanians still thought that women should ‘follow’ their man and that what women really want is a home and children (versus a job or career). Moreover, housewifery was valued by a little over half of Romanians during the 1990s and 2000s, suggesting that absence from the labour market may also be valued for women, although increasingly less so. In short, despite Romanians’ support for women’s labour market participation, they tend (still) to support gender roles characteristic of the male-breadwinner nuclear family: men remain seen as the ‘heads of their families’, especially by men, and are expected to make the main contribution to the family income regardless of socio-economic status. At the same time, women are still seen as ‘mistresses of the home’, although archaic gender divisions of household labour and especially child-rearing are objectionable to an increasing portion of Romanians. How can these apparently contradictory findings be explained? One way to understand these apparent attitudinal inconsistencies is to adapt a more sophisticated interpretation of the data. American sociologist Arlie Hochschild’s work, focusing on the ways in which American couples from all walks of life shared the second shift, suggests that actual attitudes and opinions may be less straightforward than researchers assume.141 Her findings revealed that neither ideas about gender roles or workload, nor socialisation during early life explained why some men partook in the second shift and others did not, why some women accepted the unequal division of domestic work, others punished their unwilling partners, and yet others asked for and received the support they wanted:

140 European Commission (2007); Eurostat (2012b). 141 Hochschild (1989).

284

KOVÁCS

a man’s greater income, his longer hours of work, the fact that his mother was a housewife or his father did little at home, his ideas about men and women – all these factors didn’t really explain why some women work the extra month a year and others don’t.…Gradually, I felt I needed to explore how deep within each man and woman gender ideology goes. I felt the need to understand the ways in which some men and women seemed to be egalitarian ‘on top’ but traditional ‘underneath’, or the way around.…In actuality I found there were contradictions between what people said they believed about their marital roles and how they seemed to feel about those roles. Some men seemed to me egalitarian ‘on top’, but traditional ‘underneath’. Others seemed traditional on top and egalitarian underneath.142 In the Romanian case, the divisions of household labour and parental responsibilities on the one hand and attitudes and opinions in relation to these on the other seem to suggest that while some men and women may be egalitarian on the surface – particularly highly educated Romanians and university students – they are quite old-fashioned and patriarchal underneath. Others are neither old-fashioned nor modern in the way they think about men and women within couple relationships. Little educated, elderly, and rural Romanians are among the most old-fashioned in both deed and opinions. Those who might be egalitarian both on the surface and underneath are a small minority of Romanians, at best 10 per cent. The fact that it is elderly couples who more frequently share chores in a more egalitarian fashion suggests that it is not attitudes and values, but available time that drives more egalitarian practices in the divisions of household work. Hochschild argued that couples’ conflicts over the second shift arose in a wider social context characterised by fast-changing women (in particular the masculinisation of women’s life trajectories through participation in paid work) and slow-changing men (in particular the non-feminisation of men’s life trajectories through lack of involvement in unpaid domestic work and childrearing).143 Romanians’ ideas about gender roles in the family seem to indicate a similar pattern: a more nuanced, more contradictory and in some ways more contemporary understanding of women’s roles and old-fashioned, more evidently and consistently patriarchal masculine roles. It is perhaps for this reason that patriarchal masculinities are more coherently upheld than malebreadwinner family-related femininities. At the same time, Romanians’ 142 Hochschild (1989, 14–15). 143 Hochschild (1989).

Romanian Families

285

opinions regarding the divisions of chores, childcare and, to a lesser degree, earning suggest an ideational void as regards men’s role in particular. While women’s multiple roles within socialist society and the socialist family were frequently the focus of state propaganda,144 men’s roles remained mostly unproblematised, the old-fashioned masculinities unchallenged. It may be argued that as a result of socialist-era social engineering, Romanian masculinities have never undergone ‘modernisation’ in ways that Romanian femininities have over recent decades, and masculinities have remained anchored in old-fashioned ideas. Without a strong feminist movement,145 Romanians remain largely clueless about newer, more post-modern conceptualisations of gender roles and, linked to these, gender equality. Indeed, the Gender Barometer revealed in 2000 that a quarter of Romanians did not know what they themselves thought about the meanings of gender equality.146 Although evidence for this is only partially convincing, change may be slowly taking hold, particularly among new generations of young, well-educated, urban Romanians. 4

Family Dependency, Familism and Solidarity

National and international survey data has revealed Romanians’ consistent dissatisfaction with their lives over the last two decades. Romanians alongside Bulgarians and Hungarians were the most dissatisfied Europeans during the mid-2000s.147 Romanians have also consistently been among the Eastern Europeans with the lowest levels of social trust148 and confidence in public institutions over the last twenty years.149 At the same time, family has remained very important, in different ways, to the vast majority of Romanians. The aim of this section is to provide a longitudinal perspective on Romanians’ social trust (that is, trust in people in general) and confidence in a variety of public institutions. In addition, this section also looks at different forms of dependency in families to provide insights into the types of familism characteristic of this post-socialist society.

144 145 146 147 148 149

Kligman (1992); Verdery (1994). Einhorn (1993). osf (2000a). Comșa (2007); Sandu (2007a, 2007b). Bădescu (2007b); evs. Comșa (2007).

286

KOVÁCS

4.1 Trust and Familism Among Romanians Romanians’ overall satisfaction with life has remained rather low over the past two decades. bop surveys have revealed that Romanians’ overall satisfaction with how they live has remained consistently negative over the last fifteen years at least, although the degree of dissatisfaction has declined over time.150 At the same time, relative satisfaction with life, that is, the level of satisfaction compared with that of the previous year, consistently improved after 2002, reaching positive values in 2006 (the era of Romanian post-socialist economic growth).151 Urban dwellers have been consistently more dissatisfied than their rural counterparts, although dissatisfaction among rural inhabitants has shown more fluctuation over time. Interestingly, scholars have found that Romanians’ dissatisfaction with the way they live has not been linked to their (dis)satisfaction with family life. In other words, the importance of the family and satisfaction with family life seemed not to be correlated with satisfaction levels pertaining to life in general. Dumitru Sandu interpreted this to mean that family and home life represent a distinct source of happiness for Romanians, separate from other sources of satisfaction with life more generally.152 At the same time, Sandu also found that Romanians became somewhat more optimistic, less sad, lonely, bored, or tired between 1999 and 2007.153 What did not change over this period, however, was Romanians’ sense that good things happened to them and their sense of satisfaction with accomplishments. It may be said that despite the positive trend in Romanians’ satisfaction with life and improvements in their subjective well-being over time, Romanians remain moderately dissatisfied. As already noted, social trust in Romania has been consistently low even among the post-socialist societies in Central and Eastern Europe.154 Over the last couple of decades, a little over 80 per cent of Romanians consistently said that one cannot be too careful in dealing with people. This compares with 70 per cent in Lithuania and Poland, 73 per cent in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, and 75–78 per cent in Hungary.155 Public opinion surveys also found that the share of those who agreed that ‘one can trust most people’ stayed at a constant 35 per cent between 1999 and 2007.156 Finally, the last wave of the evs 150 Sandu (2007a). 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid. 153 Ibid. 154 Bădescu (2007b). 155 evs. 156 Bădescu (2007b).

Romanian Families

287

showed that a little over half of Romanians (in contrast to just 35 per cent of Hungarians for instance) thought that ‘most other people would try to take advantage if they got the chance’.157 Equally revealing is people’s trust in various groups of people. During the mid-2000s, bop surveys showed that only half of Romanians trusted their neighbours and only 13 per cent trusted people they met for the first time. Interestingly, new social relations in the context of a liberalising and marketising economy seem not to have had any kind of impact on Romanians’ social trust. Attitudinal data from the last two decades do not seem to suggest any greater need among Romanians to rely more on family members as a way to counteract hardship in the public domain (i.e., the labour market, in relations with public and social welfare institutions, etc.). At the same time, however, signs of greater family dependency have become evident. This change may be a result of greater social and economic strain in the context of marketisation and, especially during the 1990s, the disappearance of various forms of social protection, e.g., price subsidies, public housing, free primary medical services and medication, etc. As already noted in Section 2, the number of extended families living together has been on a slow increase, over the last ten years especially, and recent cohorts of Romanian parents have been limiting their fertility with the majority of families raising one child only. Greater family dependency is also supported by Romanians’ widespread valuing of the family. As already noted, attitudinal surveys have consistently shown that Romanians value and trust their families highly. evs data shows that the proportion of Romanians who said that family was important or very important in their lives consistently remained at around 98 per cent. At the same time, in the early 1990s a little over 90 per cent and in 2005 98 per cent of Romanians placed ‘much’ or ‘very much’ trust in their families,158 and 90 per cent of respondents also trusted their relatives a great deal.159 Furthermore, in the early 1990s over 80 per cent were rather satisfied or very satisfied with their home lives.160 4.2 Solidarity Family seems to have remained an important social institution for the vast majority of Romanians, although it remains unclear what social functions families have performed over recent decades, how far ‘the family’ stretches in 157 158 159 160

evs. Bădescu (2007b); evs. Bădescu (2007b). evs.

288

KOVÁCS

tackling different types of difficulty and need, and, more interestingly, how these various aspects of family have been changing during the difficult 1990s and the years of growth in the mid-2000s. Across Romania, family has been valued more highly than work and is seen by a majority of Romanians as both an important source of all kinds of support and a valued recipient of unconditional help. Ghebrea reported that among her survey respondents over three-quarters asked for advice from their partners and 61 per cent also consulted their parents.161 Emotional support was sought primarily from partners (75 per cent) and rarely from parents (only 19 per cent) and friends (14 per cent). Assistance with household chores was sought mostly from one’s partner or parents. Childcare and babysitting were also dealt with within the family: half of respondents asked their parents or in-laws for assistance in this regard. It is noteworthy that less than 10 per cent of the entire sample refrained from asking for assistance from any of these groups. In 1999, 88 per cent of Romanians said that they were definitely prepared to help their immediate family, but less than one-fifth were prepared to help their neighbours. Another 29 per cent said they would be ready to help people in their neighbourhood. However, elderly people were deemed a much worthier group of people to offer help to: almost half of respondents said they would definitely help elderly people and another 21 per cent said they would do so.162 Those who said they would definitely offer help to the elderly said that they regarded this as a moral duty. Attitudinal data seem to reveal that Romanians’ high level of trust in family is reserved for the immediate family only: parents, children, and siblings. Members of the extended family, although trusted, are not necessarily included in Romanians’ close support networks. Attitudes towards helping people in need suggest that Romanians are guided by culturally widespread notions of family obligations163 rather than by obligations that emerge from accidental, contingent interactions with colleagues, neighbours, friends, etc. In other words, in judging the appropriateness of offering or seeking help, most Romanians adhere to cultural norms that act as guidelines in interactions with people bearing different social identities (‘the family’, ‘friends’, ‘neighbours’, ‘an elderly person’) rather than act within the boundaries of contingent or personalised relationships with particular individuals. Moreover, rules of reciprocity and obligation characteristic of familial relationships seem to remain confined 161 Ghebrea (2000). 162 evs. 163 Finch and Mason (1993).

Romanian Families

289

to these, and neighbours, friends, colleagues, etc. are regarded as a different – more ‘distant’ – category of social relations altogether. Changes in Romanians’ networks of ‘useful contacts’, i.e. acquaintances whose assistance may be sought in accessing the services of public institutions (the healthcare system, courts, local councils, the police, etc.) have been puzzling to researchers. The expansion of the informal economy during and especially after the fall of the Ceaușescu regime164 had been assumed to have led to Romanians expanding their networks of useful acquaintances. However, Bădescu found that this was not the case.165 Instead, the proportion of Romanians who had acquaintances they could rely on in case of sickness, judicial proceedings, for engaging with the local council, the police, banks, etc. declined between 1998 and 2005, then started rising again.166 What might these trends be indicative of? The lack of informal connections with particular ‘valuable’ acquaintances may be explained by the lack of need for such acquaintances as a result of the emergence of a market economy, the rise in the number of lawyers and notaries, the reform of the healthcare system after 1997 (with the subsequent expansion of user choice in the selection of one’s gp (general practitioner) and specialists), increased competition between banks, and other factors. Indeed, the steepest decline in the share of respondents with reliable useful acquaintances took place between 2002 and 2005, when the Romanian economy started growing, rather than in the earlier transition period.167 A different explanation may be the ageing and death of those who actively cultivated useful contacts in the socialist shortage economy and immediately after 1989, i.e., the middle-aged and elderly. As these cohorts and their useful contacts have been retiring and dying, the overall reliance on useful contacts may have become less common. 4.3 Trust, Solidarity and Family Dependency in Post-Socialist Romania This section provided a summary of Romanians’ social trust and their readiness to help and be helped in order to highlight the significantly more privileged position of the immediate family as compared to other social relations in Romanians’ lives. In Romania, perhaps even more so than in other post-socialist countries, the same relationship as that described by Dupcsik and Tóth (2008) seems to exist between people’s trust and the ways in which they ‘do family’. 164 Neef and Stănculescu (2002); Parlevliet and Xenogiani (2008). 165 Bădescu (2007b). 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid.

290

KOVÁCS

Low levels of social trust have been bound to pervasive old-fashioned views and practices of gender roles in the intimate sphere, as well as a strong distinction between the family and other people (colleagues, friends, neighbours) as potential recipients and sources of help.168 Not only do Romanians value, trust, and rely most on their immediate family, but the immediate family especially seems to form an autonomous part of Romanians’ personal lives, with very little if any influence on Romanians’ perceptions of other aspects of their lives. In other words, the intimate sphere and the rules and obligations that govern family relationships seem to form a distinct component of Romanians’ lives. The separation that Romanians experience and enact in relation to the intimate sphere and their roles and obligations as workers, welfare state beneficiaries, etc. in the public sphere seems directly linked to their low levels of social trust. Given the lack of any signs of change, at least over the last two decades, and an increase, due to external factors, in family dependency across all walks of life, it remains a puzzle when and to what extent Romanians’ attitudes towards family and non-family members and the way they live family life might change. 5 Conclusions The purpose of this chapter was to map attitudinal and behavioural continuities and changes pertaining to the intimate sphere in Romania over the last two to three decades in order to formulate conclusions about the way in which the second demographic transition has been unfolding in this national context. To this end, the chapter presented information about changes and continuities in Romanians’ fertility and attitudes towards having and raising children,169 as well as information about gender roles, social trust, and, to a more limited degree, family dependencies. As elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, Romanians have retained modern conceptualisations of family life: they are unequivocal supporters of the two-child nuclear family model formed by married heterosexual parents and the junior two-earner model (men as main earners and women as secondary earners). Although Romanians strongly support marriage and long-term partnerships more generally, cohabitation and lone parenthood are also accepted, particularly amongst younger generations. Although out-of-wedlock births have constituted a little over a quarter of all live births since the mid-1990s, childbearing remains linked to long-term 168 Dupcsik and Tóth (2008). 169 See Section 2.

Romanian Families

291

couple relationships, in most cases marriage. As explained in Subsection 2.6, out-of-wedlock births tend to characterise the youngest of mothers living in socially disadvantaged situations and who have few resources at their disposal to be able to make lifestyle choices. Out-of-wedlock births, therefore, hardly signify an organic, values-driven departure from modern forms of ‘doing family’ towards post-modern variants. Instead, they are a symptom of social marginalisation and the failure of a post-socialist welfare state to serve the interests and needs of some of its most vulnerable groups, in this case little educated, underage, but sexually active, girls. In other words, out-of-wedlock childbearing in the Romanian case may be a symptom of what Chang Kyung-Sup called ‘condensed defamiliation’, one outcome of the stress and crisis caused by the ‘functional overload’ particularly of disadvantaged families in a rapidly changing macro-economic and social context.170 Despite a slight departure from the idea of the perfectly gender-segregated division of household labour and significantly more support for the equal sharing of child-rearing, that is, post-modern values, the vast majority of Romanians form, and many still uphold the idea of, deeply unequal partnerships from the vantage point of unpaid domestic and care work. Considering the fast-paced expulsion of women from the formal labour market in the 1990s and their comparatively low employment rates since, the strong feminisation of unpaid labour inside the home should be seen as both an old and a new phenomenon. Romanian women (and other women in socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe) bore a heavy triple burden of unpaid domestic work, childcare, and employment before 1989.171 The economic and political changes since 1989, however, have not generated the context necessary for challenging or changing the deeply gendered division of labour in the intimate sphere, nor have they altered the norm of women’s full-time employment driven primarily by necessity. The lack of women’s political mobilisation, the generalised lack of understanding of the meanings and political importance of gender equality, and the endurance of old-fashioned catchphrases in relation to gender roles (men as ‘heads of the family’, women as ‘mistresses of the home’, etc.) hamper the chances of rethinking gender roles in more post-modern terms. In addition, the decline in employment opportunities for young (and less educated) women in particular should be seen as a key structural factor in cementing women’s primary role as unpaid, domestic workers despite the widespread expectation that women, too, should contribute to household income regardless of childcare (and other caregiving) responsibilities. In this context it is not 170 Chang (2010, 13). 171 Kligman (1992); Einhorn (1993); Verdery (1994).

292

KOVÁCS

surprising that intergenerational differences in opinions and ideas about gender roles, marriage, and the ‘proper’ way of ‘doing family’ remain small. Households’ and couples’ coping mechanisms during economically adverse periods – the last roughly thirty years – reinforced old-fashioned conceptualisations of gender roles, especially in relation to the family, but also gave rise to the valuing of women’s earning for reasons other than purely financial.172 The slowly increasing appreciation of women’s earning during the post-socialist decades suggests that the gender roles Romanians share are in fact amended versions of the patriarchal, male-breadwinner ideas instilled by socialist gender policy. The central role attributed to the close family may be regarded as one of the adverse effects of what Verdery called the socialist-era zadruga-state,173 a patriarchal parent state that monopolised needs definition and intervened not only in the allocation of paid and unpaid work, but also in social and physical reproduction. With the state acting as the ‘benevolent parent’ intervening in, and instrumentalising, individuals’ productive and even reproductive activities, the family and the intimate sphere more generally were inadvertently reinforced as private, distinctly separate from the ‘party state’-centred public, and, in the context of repressive political regimes, risk- and oppression-free. While it is difficult to state with confidence that family dependencies might have become more complex and more widespread than during the socialist years, the polarisation of incomes, the polarisation in activity rates,174 and relatively high rates of material deprivation are likely associated with multifaceted dependencies and complex exchanges among members of extended families. With a rapid decline in fertility levels, limited change in family structures and some changes in women’s and men’s roles inside and outside the home since the 1950s, Romania may be seen to have experienced a different variant of what has been called ‘compressed modernity’.175 Going from an agrarian society at the end of the Second World War to a low-productivity, medium-income industrial society in the 1980s to a medium-income emerging post-industrial economy at present, Romania has witnessed a fast-paced, politically engineered economic and social modernisation that put massive strain on families, especially during the 1950s, the austere 1980s, and the difficult post-socialist transition years of the 1990s.176 However, while the Romanian context reveals 172 173 174 175 176

See also Dupcsik and Tóth (2008). Verdery (1994). For women, see Table 7.4. Chang (2010). Pasca Harsanyi (1994); Voicu and Popescu (2006).

Romanian Families

293

certain similarities with the modernisation of South Korean society in the second half of the twentieth century, certain differences are also observable. Contradictions in Romanians’ attitudes towards a variety of family-related issues – e.g., women’s role as housewives and as earners, attitudes towards deliberate lone motherhood, men’s roles as carers and parents – seem to show accidental and incoherent pluralism, rooted in superficial, propagandistic statements from the socialist era. Grassroots social movements in the Romanian context were even less developed than in other socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This tendency undermined the organic evolution of widely shared ideas and opinions about and attitudes towards masculinities and femininities.177 The consensus among Romanians around outdated gender roles should be seen as the outcome of top–down discursive modernisation, especially during the Ceaușescu decades.178 Although the Romanian state always maintained strong support for reproduction, particularly during the Ceaușescu decades, this support was also intimately linked and subordinated to the Romanian socialist state’s productivist ambitions. Kligman provided an eloquent analysis of the ways in which reproductive policy was designed and explicitly promoted as a means to boost (industrial) production, with sometimes tragic outcomes for families.179 The rapid growth of the number of institutionalised children in the 1980s and 1990s was one expression of Romanian families’ inability to cope with the reproductive burdens imposed by an unprecedentedly authoritarian reproductive policy. Although in a different form to that in the South Korean case,180 reproductive responsibilities did put great strain on many Romanian families in a policy context that was explicitly geared towards crude economic production rather than sustainable growth. Perhaps a key difference between the compressed modernity that South Korean society underwent over the last six decades and what seems to be the quick-paced, but still less ample modernisation of Romanian society during and after state socialism over the same period is the greater retention, in the Romanian case, of traditional social norms and gender roles, particularly within the intimate sphere of the family. There is arguably much less ‘accidental pluralism’181 in relation to family values, ideologies, and institutions 177 178 179 180 181

See also Chang (2010) for a similar phenomenon in South Korea. Kligman (1992); Gal and Kligman (2000). Kligman (1992). Chang (2010). See the brief explanation of this term and its related concepts in the Introduction of this volume.

294

KOVÁCS

than in South Korea, and the antagonism between rural, traditional elements and urban, more cosmopolitan ideas and practices is also less stark than in the South Korean case. Romania may be seen as a national context which, too, has experienced a compressed version of social modernisation under pressure from external forces (Soviet-style state socialism in particular), but with substantial national undertones and much less economic success. Due to the Soviet (rather than the Japanese or American) influence in both economic and social organisation, Romania’s social modernisation has been more restrained. Post-modern ideas about gender roles, ‘doing family’, and relationships more generally have not yet reached the Romanian collective psyche. In many ways, even younger generations of Romanians remain stuck in old-fashioned, comparatively outdated ways of thinking about enacting gender, family life, and personal relationships in the intimate and the public sphere. References Bădescu, Gabriel. 2007a. ‘Democrație în bucătărie? Relații între deciziile din cadrul cuplului, implicare civică și cultură politică’ [Democracy in the kitchen? Relationships between couple’s decisions, civic involvement and political culture]. In Barometrul de opinie publică. Viața în cuplu [Public Opinion Barometer: Living in Couples], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea Kivu, Raluca Popescu, Cosima Rughiniș, Dumitru Sandu and Ovidiu Voicu, 23–34. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http://www.fundatia .ro/sites/default/files/ro_51_35_raport_bop_mai_2007nou_AR.pdf. Bădescu, Gabriel. 2007b. ‘Democratizare, valori și educație școlară’ [Democratisation, values and educational attainment]. In Barometrul de Opinie Publică: BOP 1998–2007 [Public Opinion Barometer: BOP 1998–2007], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea-Ioan Comșa, Dumitru Sandu and Manuela Stănculescu, 78–90. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/ro_62_BOP%202007oct.pdf. Cace, Sorin. 2006. Politici de ocupare în Europa centrală și de est [Employment Policy in Central and Eastern Europe]. Bucharest: Expert. Chang Kyung-Sup. 2010. South Korea Under Compressed Modernity: Familial Political Economy in Transition. London: Routledge. cns (Comisia Națională de Statistică). 1990. Anuarul Statistic al României 1999 [Romanian Statistical Yearbook 1990]. Bucharest: cns. ——. 1999. Anuarul statistic al României 1999 [Romanian Statistical Yearbook 1999]. Bucharest: cns. ——. 2001. Anuarul statistic al României 2001 [Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2001]. Bucharest: cns.

Romanian Families

295

——. 2002a. Anuarul statistic al României 2002 [Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2002]. Bucharest: cns. ——. 2003a. Anuarul statistic al României 2003 [Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003]. Bucharest: cns. Comșa, Mircea-Ioan. 2007. ‘Încotro ne îndreptăm’ [Where we are headed]. In Barometrul de Opinie Publică: bop 1998–2007 [Public Opinion Barometer: bop 1998– 2007], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea-Ioan Comșa, Dumitru Sandu and Manuela Stănculescu, 22–29. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http://www .fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/ro_62_BOP%202007oct.pdf. dcs (Direcția Centrală de Statistică). 1983. Anuarul statistic al Republicii Socialiste România [Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Romania]. Bucharest: dcs. ——. 1984. Anuarul statistic al Republicii Socialiste România [Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Romania]. Bucharest: dcs. ——. 1985. Anuarul statistic al Republicii Socialiste România [Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Romania]. Bucharest: dcs. ——. 1986. Anuarul statistic al Republicii Socialiste România [Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Romania]. Bucharest: dcs. ——. 1987. Anuarul statistic al Republicii Socialiste România [Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Romania]. Bucharest: dcs. ——. 1988. Anuarul statistic al Republicii Socialiste România [Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Romania]. Bucharest: dcs. Dupcsik, Csaba and Olga Tóth. 2008. ‘Feminizmus helyett familizmus’ [Familism instead of feminism]. Demográfia 51 (4): 307–328. Einhorn, Barbara. 1993. Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender, and Women’s Movements in East Central Europe. London: Verso. European Commission. 2007. European Employment Observatory Review: Spring 2007. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. http:// www.eu-employment-observatory.net/resources/reviews/EN-ReviewSpring07.pdf. Eurostat. 2012a. ‘At risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU27’. Eurostat news release 21/2012 (8 February 2012). http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY _PUBLIC/3-08022012-AP/EN/3-08022012-AP-EN.PDF. ——. 2012b. ‘Eurostat statistics: Population and social conditions’. http://epp.eurostat .ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes (Accessed between 6 July and 4 August 2012). ——. 2012c. ‘eu-silc – Income and Living Conditions dataset’. http://epp.eurostat .ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/ data/database (Accessed between 27 July and 5 August 2012). evs (European Values Study). Online survey database. evs 1981–2008 Longitudinal data file. gesis archives. http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/ (Accessed between 23 July and 4 August 2012).

296

KOVÁCS

Finch, Janet and Jennifer Mason. 1993. Negotiating Family Responsibilities. London: Tavistock/Routledge. Gal, Susan and Gail Kligman. 2000. The Politics of Gender After Socialism: A ComparativeHistorical Essay. Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press. Ghebrea, Georgeta. 2000. Regim social-politic și viață privată [The Socio-Political Order and Private Life]. Bucharest: Editura Universității București. Hărăguș, Mihaela. 2011. ‘Nașterile în contexte diferite de cel marital’ [Births in contexts other than marriage]. Calitatea vieții 22 (4): 379–396. Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 1989. The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution at Home. London: Piatkus. ins (Institutul Național de Statistică). 2004. Anuarul statistic al României [Romanian Statistical Yearbook]. Bucharest: ins. ——. 2006. Anuarul statistic al României [Romanian Statistical Yearbook]. Bucharest: ins. ——. 2007. Anuarul statistic al României [Romanian Statistical Yearbook]. Bucharest: ins. ——. 2008. Anuarul statistic al României [Romanian Statistical Yearbook]. Bucharest: ins. insse. 2002. ‘Recensământul populației și al locuințelor, 18–27 martie 2002’ [The census of the population and of dwellings, 18–27 March 2002]. http://www.insse.ro/ cms/files/RPL2002INS/index_rpl2002.htm. ——. 2003. ‘19. Populația pe sexe, după starea civilă și vârstă, pe medii’ [19. The population by sex, marital status and age, in averages]. 2002 census data tables. http:// www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/vol1/tabele/t19.pdf. Kivu, Mircea. 2007. ‘Planificarea familială’ [Family planning]. In Barometrul de opinie publică. Viața în cuplu [Public Opinion Barometer: Living in Couples], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea Kivu, Raluca Popescu, Cosima Rughiniș, Dumitru Sandu and Ovidiu Voicu, 60–70. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http:// www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/ro_51_35_raport_bop_mai_2007nou_AR.pdf. Kligman, Gail. 1992. ‘The politics of reproduction in Ceaușescu’s Romania: A case study in political culture’. East European Politics and Societies 6 (3): 364–418. Kornai, János. 1992. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Socialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Magyari, Nándor, Enikő Magyari-Vincze, Livia Popescu and Traian Rotariu. 2001. ‘The social construction of Romanian poverty: The impact of ethnic and gender distinctions’. In Poverty, Ethnicity, and Gender in Eastern Europe During the Market Transition, edited by Rebecca Jean Emigh and Iván Szelényi, 123–155. London: Praeger. Magyari-Vincze, Enikő. 2007. ‘Reproducing inequalities through reproductive control: The case of Romani women from Romania’. The Anthropology of East Europe Review 25 (2): 108–120.

Romanian Families

297

Neef, Rainer and Manuela Stănculescu, eds. 2002. The Social Impact of Informal Economies in Eastern Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate. Ochiai Emiko. 2010. ‘Reconstruction of intimate and public spheres in Asian modernity: Familialism and beyond’. Journal of Intimate and Public Spheres (Pilot Issue): 2–22. osf (Open Society Foundation). 2000a. ‘Barometrul de gen’ [The gender barometer]. Bucharest: Open Society Foundation. http://www.fundatia.ro/barometrul-de-gen -2000. ——. 2000b. ‘Barometrul de opinie publică’ [The public opinion barometer]. Bucharest: Open Society Foundation. http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/BOP%20noi embrie%202000.pdf. ——. 2002. Eurobarometrul Rural [The Rural Eurobarometer]. Bucharest: Open Society Foundation. http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/EuroBarometrul%20Rural %20decembrie%202002.pdf. ——. 2006. Eurobarometrul Rural [The Rural Eurobarometer]. Bucharest: Open Society Foundation. http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/02%20-%20eurobarometrul%20 rural%202005%20-%20%20studiu%20final.pdf. ——. 2007a. Barometrul de opinie publică. Viața în cuplu [Public Opinion Barometer: Living In Couples], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea Kivu, Raluca Popescu, Cosima Rughiniș, Dumitru Sandu and Ovidiu Voicu. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/BOP_Viata%20de%20Cuplu.pdf. ——. 2007b. Barometrul de Opinie Publică: bop 1998–2007 [Public Opinion Barometer: Bop 1998–2007], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea-Ioan Comșa, Dumitru Sandu and Manuela Stănculescu. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/ro_62_BOP%202007oct.pdf. Parlevliet, Jante and Theodora Xenogiani. 2008. ‘Report on informal employment in Romania’. Working Paper No. 271, oecd Development Centre, Paris. Pasca Harsanyi, Doina. 1994. ‘Romania’s women’. Journal of Women’s History 5 (3): 30–54. Popescu, Raluca. 2003. ‘Familia tânără în societatea românească’ [Young families in Romanian society]. Calitatea vieții 14 (1): 2–21. ——. 2007a. ‘Roluri și statusuri în familie’ [Family roles and status]. In Barometrul de opinie publică. Viața în cuplu [Public Opinion Barometer: Living in Couples], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea Kivu, Raluca Popescu, Cosima Rughiniș, Dumitru Sandu and Ovidiu Voicu, 18–22. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/BOP_Viata%20de%20Cuplu.pdf.. ——. 2007b. ‘Pe ce se bazează o căsătorie fericită și care sunt motivele pentru a divorța’ [What are happy marriages based on and reasons for divorce]. In Barometrul de opinie publică. Viața în cuplu [Public Opinion Barometer: Living in Couples], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea Kivu, Raluca Popescu, Cosima Rughiniș, Dumitru Sandu

298

KOVÁCS

and Ovidiu Voicu, 46–49. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http://www .fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/BOP_Viata%20de%20Cuplu.pdf. ——. 2007c. ‘Valori ale familiei în România și în Europa’ [Family values in Romania and Europe]. In Valori ale românilor: 1993–2006. O perspectivă sociologică [Romanians’ Values: 1993–2006 – A Sociological Perspective], edited by Bogdan Voicu and Mălina Voicu, 181–203. Iași: Institutul European. ——. 2010. ‘Profilul familiei românești contemporane’ [The profile of the contemporary Romanian family]. Calitatea Vieții 21 (1–2): 5–28. Raț, Cristina. 2008. ‘The social segregation of the poor in Romania during the transition period: The impact of welfare transfers’. Ph.D. diss., Cluj: Babeș-Bolyai University. Rughiniș, Cosima. 2007a. ‘Teoria și practica fericirii în relațiile de cuplu’ [The theory and practice of happiness in a couple]. In Barometrul de opinie publică. Viața în cuplu [Public Opinion Barometer: Living in Couples], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea Kivu, Raluca Popescu, Cosima Rughiniș, Dumitru Sandu and Ovidiu Voicu, 36–45. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/ default/files/BOP_Viata%20de%20Cuplu.pdf. Sandu, Dumitru. 2007a. ‘De ce sunt românii (ne)mulțumiți?’ [Why are Romanians (dis) satisfied?]. In Barometrul de opinie publică. Viața în cuplu [Public Opinion Barometer: Living in Couples], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea Kivu, Raluca Popescu, Cosima Rughiniș, Dumitru Sandu and Ovidiu Voicu, 72–94. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/BOP_Viata%20 de%20Cuplu.pdf. ——. 2007b. ‘Avatarurile nemulțumirii sociale în România anilor 1998–2007’ [The avatars of social discontent in Romania in 1998–2007]. In Barometrul de Opinie Publică: bop 1998–2007 [Public Opinion Barometer: bop 1998–2007], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea-Ioan Comșa, Dumitru Sandu and Manuela Stănculescu, 30–62. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/ ro_62_BOP%202007oct.pdf. Silva, Elizabeth and Carol Smart. 1999. ‘The new practices and politics of family life’. In The New Family? edited by Elizabeth Silva and Carol Smart, 1–12. London: Sage Publications. Stănculescu, Manuela. 2007. ‘Structura socială și strategii de viață: România 1998–2007’ [The social structure and strategies of life: Romania 1998–2007]. In Barometrul de Opinie Publică: bop 1998–2007 [Public Opinion Barometer: bop 1998–2007], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea-Ioan Comșa, Dumitru Sandu and Manuela Stănculescu, 63–77. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/ default/files/ro_62_BOP%202007oct.pdf. Sung, Sirin and Fran Bennett. 2007. ‘Dealing with Money in Low- to Moderate-Income Couples: Insights from individual interviews’. Social Policy Review 19: 151–172.

Romanian Families

299

undp. 2007. The National Human Development Report: Romania – Making eu Accession Work for All. Bucharest: undp Romania. http://www.undp.ro/download/files/ publications/NHDR%202007%20EN.pdf. unicef. 1999. Women in Transition: A Summary. The MONEE Project – Regional Monitoring Report Summary. Florence: unicef. Utasi, Ágnes. 2002. ‘Családi integráció és családi szolidaritás’ [Social integration and family solidarity]. Educatio 11 (3): 384–403. Verdery, Katherine. 1994. ‘From parent-state to family patriarchs: Gender and nation in contemporary Eastern Europe’. East European Politics and Societies 8 (2): 225–255. Vogler, Carolyn, Michaela Brockmann and Richard D. Wiggins. 2006. ‘Intimate relationships and changing patterns of money management at the beginning of the twenty-first century’. British Journal of Sociology 57 (3): 455–482. Voicu, Mălina and Raluca Popescu. 2006. ‘Nașterea și căsătoria la populația de romi’ [Childbearing and marriage among the Roma population]. Calitatea vieții 17 (3–4): 1–28. Voicu, Ovidiu. 2007a. ‘Românii și viața în cuplu’ [Romanians and living in couples]. In Barometrul de opinie publică. Viața în cuplu [Public Opinion Barometer: Living in Couples], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea Kivu, Raluca Popescu, Cosima Rughiniș, Dumitru Sandu and Ovidiu Voicu, 9–17. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/BOP_Viata%20de%20Cuplu.pdf. ——. 2007b. ‘Opinii și atitudini privind viața sexuală’ [Opinions and attitudes regarding sex life]. In Barometrul de opinie publică. Viața în cuplu [Public Opinion Barometer: Living in Couples], authored by Gabriel Bădescu, Mircea Kivu, Raluca Popescu, Cosima Rughiniș, Dumitru Sandu and Ovidiu Voicu, 51–59. Bucharest: Soros Foundation Romania. http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/BOP _Viata%20de%20Cuplu.pdf. Voinea, Maria. 2000. ‘Familia tânără – particularități sociodemografice în perioada de tranziție’ [The young family: Socio-demographic particularities during the transition]. In Starea societății românești după 10 ani de tranziție [The State of Romanian Society after Ten Years of Transition], edited by Ilie Bădescu, Elena Zamfir and Cătălin Zamfir, 734–737. Bucharest: Expert. wvs (World Values Survey). Online survey database. http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/ WVSAnalizeIndex.jsp (Accessed between 19 July and 2 August 2012). Zamfir, Cătălin, ed. 1999. Politica socială: România 1990–1998 [Social Policy: Romania 1990–1998). Bucharest: Expert.

CHAPTER 8

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years (1978–2010) Zhou Weihong, Xue Yali and Liu Wenrong Introduction Social change, in a broad sense, implies ‘modernisation’, as many people put it. According to modernisation theory – a hallmark theory of social change – human society has undergone massive social change in the modern era, starting from the West. Modernisation can be depicted in four aspects – political, economic, social, and cultural. The social aspect, among others, is narrowly defined as to reflect social changes, referring to changes to social structures based upon families and social organisations. Ulrich Beck further noted that modernisation has two stages: first modernity and second modernity, with the divide being the 1960s.1 Generally speaking, the history of modernisation in Asia begins nearly 200 years later than it does in Europe and America. Asian scholars in their comparative studies found a reversed order of modernisation in Asia versus Europe and America. In the European and North American continents, cultural revolution preceded political changes, followed by industrial revolution, and ultimately social changes. Asian countries, by contrast, championed economic modernisation, but lagged in political changes, stumbling with social and cultural modernisation.2 Chang Kyung-Sup pointed to the existence of a sort of compressed modernity in Asia, that is, the first and second modernity intertwined with no clear division.3 There is no consensus over the causality between the stage and time of social modernity. Few studies have been conducted into how Asian modernity is reversed and compressed. The latest international project is: ‘Reconstruction of the Intimate and Public Spheres in 21st Century Asia’, centred around the Sociology Department of Kyoto University in Japan.4 Applying methodologies 1 Beck ([1999] trans. by He Bowen 2004). 2 Tominaga (1998, 73). 3 Chang (2010). Also see the brief explanation of the term compressed modernity and its related concepts in the Introduction of this volume. 4 Also see the Preface of this volume.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004276833_010

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

301

from demography and family sociology, and using indicators such as population and family status, the project defined, in time and space, the stage and compressibility of social modernity in the narrow sense, centring around families and relevant institutions. Ochiai Emiko used birth profile as an operational indicator to measure social modernisation, and found that the first modernity stage can be depicted as a period of transformation from a high birth rate and high mortality to low birth rate and low mortality (the birth rate declined for the first time between 1880 and 1930). The second modernity stage witnessed a transformation from low birth rate and low mortality to an insufficient level of fertility replacement (the birth rate declined for the second time after the 1960s). Measuring Asian countries with the same indicator, she then found the first birth rate decline came to Asia fifty years later than to Europe and North America; however, contrasting to a stable period of fifty years between the two rounds of birth rate decline, Asian countries experienced a straight decline in birth rate, which compressed the plateau period. Japan sits between Asia and Europe in this regard.5 The work of Ochiai presents a framework for examining narrowly defined social modernity and comparing Asian societies to European societies; nevertheless, in a socialist country such as China, social change derived from its socialist institutions. This chapter first analyses changes in China’s socialist society over the past thirty years, and then proceeds to discuss changes in Chinese families. The chapter consists of the following main sections: (1) Social changes in China over the past thirty years. (2) Changes in the Chinese family structure. (3) Changes in the perception of gender relations in the family as well as ‘materfamilias’ in China. (4) Ideological changes concerning marriage and family in Chinese society. 1

Social Changes in China over the Past Thirty Years

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 China has developed socialism as its national institution, through strenuous political, economic, and ideological effort. Socialism went astray in the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), encountering unprecedented political, economic, and ideological threats. When Mao passed away in 1976, the 5 Ochiai (2010).

302

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

second-generation leaders, who were more pragmatic, began to reflect upon socialism, and introduced progressive social changes from 1978. Inevitably, those broadly defined social reforms affected social changes in a narrow sense, that is, changes in the Chinese families and gender relations. 1.1 Ideological Changes in China Table 8.1 gives a brief account of major ideological changes in China over the past thirty years. The first major change occurred in May 1978. Inspired by Deng Xiaoping, Hu Fuming, a philosophy lecturer in Nanjing University, published a commentary in the Guangming Daily – Practice is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth. His opinion was written into the resolution of the third plenary session of the eleventh Communist Party of China (cpc) Central Committee in December of the same year, indicating that Marxism and Mao Zedong’s thoughts were not absolute truth and could be refined. Giving legitimacy to revisionism, this event blazed the trail for social reform in China. A second major change was the discontinuation of class struggle and the shifting of the focus of the government agenda from political thought to Table 8.1

Ideological changes in China

Time

Topic

Content

11 May–18 Dec. 1978

Debate on the criterion for truth Shifting priority of government agenda

Marxism can be refined

18 December 1978

6 June 1981–October 19876

Debate on the nature of socialism

Economy and livelihood in the centre; Stop class-struggle Theory on the primary stage: 1. what is socialism? 2. to become rich first 3. commodity economy

Source: Created by Zhou Weihong

6 The discussions were later discontinued. It was Deng Xiaoping who suggested ‘no discussion’. Following the conclusion by the central government in 1987 on the primary stage of socialism, a democratic movement emerged in 1988, followed by the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. In 1992, Deng proposed ‘action instead of talking’, specifically advancing economic reforms without debating political thoughts.

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

303

economic growth, as occurred in the resolution of the third plenary session of the eleventh cpc Central Committee in December 1978. This change raised the curtain on the subsequent economic reforms. The third major change is reflected in the understanding of socialism, which lasted for a significant period of time after June 1981, when the central government tentatively accepted the notion of the primary stage of socialism. A complete set of theories on the primary stage was largely in place by 1987, and consisted of three key points: (1) encouragement of private ownership, while the share of the state-owned economy in the national economy might be cut from 100 per cent to 50 per cent, 30 per cent, or even 10 per cent; (2) ‘To be rich first’ – Deng Xiaoping endorsed this theory in his speech of January 1983; (3) shifting the planned economy towards a planned commodity economy (1980s) and then to a market economy (1992). 1.2 Economic Changes in Chinese Society over the Past Thirty Years Table  8.2 gives a brief chronicle of economic reform in China over the past thirty years. As suggested in the table, China’s economic reform may be divided into three stages. The first stage began in 1979, featuring reform in specific regions and with targets to introduce foreign capital, technical know-how, and management experience. Special zones – testbeds for capitalism – were set up in coastal regions, and joint ventures were piloted. Table 8.2 A brief chronicle of economic reform in China Time

Topic

Content

1979

Set up special zones

1982 (No. 1 Document)

Rural household contract operations

1986–2010

State-Owned Enterprise (soe) reform

Introduce foreign and private capital Rural private operations establish a system for business bankruptcy Contract-based operation and shareholding operation Sell some SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) to the private sector

Source: Created by Zhou Weihong

304

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

The second stage was characterised by spontaneous reforms by farmers in 1982, which were recognised by the government. Household contract operations were rolled out across the nation, while contracted land tenure extended from three to fifteen years (1984), and ultimately to thirty years (1993). The third stage started in 1986 with the phasing in of reforms concerning bankruptcy, the contracting of operations and shareholding in urban businesses, and the selling of business to the private sector. 1.3 Political System Reform in China over the Past Thirty Years In contrast to radical changes in other social sectors, progress in political reform was rather sluggish. Political reform occurred in three areas. The first was party reform. The Communist Party of China (cpc) is the sole ruling political party in China, so political reform started as party reform, which occurred in several aspects of party structure: (1) The introduction of fixed tenures for leaders. An advisory committee was established in 1984, which absorbed China’s ageing leaders. With the advisory committee in place, state leaders could serve no more than two fixed terms – ten years. As a transitional arrangement, the advisory committee was abolished in 1994, indicating the emergence of a mature system of fixed tenure. (2) The introduction of a competitive election system. A competitive election system was introduced among grassroots party organisations in 1990 (20 per cent of the representatives for local congress and 10 per cent of members of local party committees are selected through it). The competitive election system was introduced to the central committee in 2007 (8 per cent of members of the central committee are selected through it). (3) Changes in the thinking of the cpc. Deng Xiaoping proposed in 1987 ‘Four Things to Stick To’ – sticking to the path of socialism, sticking to proletarian dictatorship, sticking to party leadership, and sticking to Marxism– Leninism and Mao Zedong’s thought. In 2000, Jiang Zemin championed the thought of the Three Representatives, that is, the cpc should always represent the development needs of China’s advancing productivity, the onward direction of China’s advancing culture, and the fundamental interests of the overall majority of the Chinese people. In 2005, Hu Jintao advocated a ‘harmonious society’ as the guiding thought of the Party. The evolution of this thought mirrored a gradual process of the cpc transforming from a class-based party to a people-oriented, socialist democratic party.

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

305

The second aspect above refers to the separation of party and government. Zhao Ziyang, the then party chief, initiated in 1988 the idea of separating government from the Party, and introduced a civil service system; however, this reform was discontinued due to the Tiananmen Square protests. The third part of reform pertains to a China-specific indirect parliamentary system. Since 1982 when the fifth People’s Congress was resumed (the People’s Congress was suspended for seven years after the fourth session in 1975), China re-engineered an indirect parliamentary system with Chinese characteristics: (1) direct elections held in small constituencies such as rural towns and counties, as well as in urban districts (at city, province, and national level, indirect election is the common practice); (2) members of the standing committee of the people’s congresses at various levels became in a real sense ‘congressmen’ (155, 50, and 40 at national, provincial, and city levels respectively); (3) the National People’s Congress (npc) Standing Committee holds chairperson meetings (with twelve members), to review and examine resolutions and legislation; (4) the party committees and people’s congresses at all levels constitute the two major authoritative assemblies in China, the former normally outranking the latter. In essence, the Standing Committee of the Party became equivalent to the House of Commons/House of Representatives in the West, while the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress is equivalent to the House of Lords/Senate. Over the past three decades, broad-based social reforms (changes in the ideological, economic, and social spheres) have had an impact on narrowly defined social changes, which is reflected in several aspects of Chinese society: (1) The emergence of the market economy reduced the share of state-owned economy. The private economy now plays a dominant role in the national economy (contributing to over 80 per cent of the gdp). The function of households as economic units have been fully resumed, in rural areas in particular. (2) A mandatory policy on family planning was enacted in the early 1980s, which dramatically cut the fertility rate and pushed China into the smallfamily era. (3) With ideological control, traditional moral ethics have long dominated social ideology, and averted the rapid collapse of traditional values. To some extent, this has prevented a family crisis, but it has also postponed the process of family modernisation. These points are considered more fully in the next section.

306 2

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

Changes in the Chinese Family Structure

Statistical figures are used in this section to analyse changes to family structures over the past thirty years. The national statistical system used for this has only been established and developed in the past thirty years, so it is difficult to look back further than that. We examined the national population census and sample surveys of selected researchers to distil statistical figures on families. 2.1 Demographic Changes Table 8.3 summarises data on family size from China’s population census. Figure 8.1 shows the change in China’s total fertility rate between 1950 and 2010. The census figures show a change of demographic profile from high fertility and high mortality to low fertility and low mortality since the 1970s, marking Table 8.3 China’s population census data Year

1953**

1964**

1982

1990

2000

2010

Population (millions) 601.93 723.07 1,031.88 1,160.01 1,295.33 1,339.72 Households (millions) 276.95 340.49 401.52 Average number of family members 4.41* 3.96 3.44 3.10 Birth rate (‰) 37.97 39.34 22.28 21.06 14.03 11.9 Mortality rate (‰) 13.18 11.56 6.60 6.67 6.45 7.11 Natural growth rate (‰) 24.79 27.78 15.68 14.39 7.58 4.79 Urban population (%) 13.26 20.60 26.23 36.09 49.68 Rural population (%) 86.74 79.40 73.77 63.91 50.32 *   China Population Yearbook 1985 (1986, 610).7 ** The data for the total population are taken from nationwide censuses, whereas the rest are taken from public security departments.8

Source: Statistical Bulletin,9 from the website of the National Bureau of Statistics,10 as well as the population censuses11 of 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990, 2000, 2010

7 8 9 10 11

See Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan renkou yanjiu zhongxin [Population Research Centre of the Chinese Academy of Social Science]. Gong’an bumen公安部门. Tongji gongbao统计公报. Guojia tongjiju国家统计局. See http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/. Zhonggou renkou pucha中国人口普查. See http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/ qgrkpcgb/200204/t20020404_30316.html.

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years 7.00 6.00

6.26

6.08

5.81

307

5.81

5.00 4.02 4.00 3.00

3.57

2.24 2.20 2.31

2.00

1.99

1.82 1.72

1.54

1.00 0.00

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Figure 8.1  Changes to total fertility rate in China, 1950–2010

Source: The data for 1950–95 are from Baidu Baike,12 and the data for 2000–2010 are from Moody’s Index.13

the first period of fertility decline. The total fertility rate (tfr) plummeted to 2.2 in 1985, from around 6.0 in 1970. After a plateau of fifteen years, the tfr rushed into a second period of harsh decline to below 2.0, and levelled out at around 1.5. The first fertility decline came to China nearly 100 years later than in Europe and North America (1970), but the second decline came only about thirty years later (1998). The first wave of fertility decline in China lasted only thirty years (including a fifteen-year-long plateau period around the replacement level), whereas the second wave has already been lingering for nearly fifteen years (1998–present). Looking at demographic changes in the cities and countryside, the census shows clearly that China has witnessed rapid urbanisation since 1978 at an annual rate of about 10 per cent. The urban to rural population ratio has changed from 2:8 to 5:5. We used figures of the fifth population census in 2000

12 13

Baidu Baike百度百科. See http://baike.baidu.com/view/1163409.htm. See http://www.indexmundi.com/china/total_fertility_rate.html.

308

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

Table 8.4 Urban and rural population in 2000

Total fertility rate Size of family Sex ratio Population (millions)

National

City

Town

Township

Village

1.22 3.44 106.30 1,242

0.86 3.01 105.12 293

1.08 3.21 105.51 166

0.97 3.11 105.32 459

1.43 3.58 106.91 784

Source: Data from the fifth national population census (2000)14

to examine urban and rural differences in terms of total fertility rate and the size of families (see Table 8.4). The comparison between urban (cities and towns) and rural (countryside) figures indicates a difference in the tfr. Urban tfr reduced to 0.97 in 2000 due to a strict implementation of the one-child policy, in comparison to a rural tfr of 1.4. The typical size of the family is 3.11 members in the cities and 3.58 in the countryside. 2.2 Changes to Family Structure Table  8.5 summarises the share of families of various sizes from population census in the past thirty years. The size of Chinese families reduced constantly, as reflected by census results from 1982 to 2010 – 4.41 members in 1982, 3.96 in 1990, 3.44 in 2000, and 3.10 in 2010 on average. As the sixth census finished relatively recently (November 2010) and detailed information is yet to come from it, vertical comparisons can only be made of family size from 1982 to 2000. In terms of family type, the share of nuclear families dropped slightly, stem families remained constant with some increase, extended families reduced dramatically, while one-person households grew substantially. The average family size implies a general trend of shrinking families in China. The dramatic decline of extended families and the increase of one-person households is in line with the general trend, but the changes to nuclear families and stem families go against the trend; some scholars argue that labour migration in rural stem families led to the extraordinary growth of

14

Diwuci Zhongguo renkou pucha第五次中国人口普查.

309

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years Table 8.5 The percentage composition of different types of families in three censuses Census

Nuclear family

Stem family

Composite family

One-parent family One-person household Others Total

Married couple A couple with child(ren) Single-parent family Extended nuclear family Subtotal Two generations Three generations Four generations Skipped generation family Subtotal Two generations Three generations and above Subtotal

1982

1990

2000

4.78 52.89 14.31 – 71.98 – 16.63 0.52 0.66 17.81 0.11 0.88 0.99 – 7.97 1.02 100.00

5.49 57.81 9.50 – 73.80 – 16.65 0.59 0.66 17.90 0.09 1.06 1.15 – 6.32 0.81 100.00

12.93 47.25 6.35 1.62 68.15 2.37 16.63 0.64 2.09 21.73 0.13 0.44 0.57 0.73 8.57 0.26 100.00

Source: Data for conjugal/nuclear families, one-person households and ‘others’ in the ‘nuclear family’ category for 1982 are from the compiled data of The 1982 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China (476–477) .15 All other data for 1982 are from Zeng Yi and Liang Zhiwu (1993). The data for family structure in 1990 are from Zeng Yi et al. (1992). The data for 2000 are from the calculation of results of the fifth population census in 2000 by Wang Yuesheng (2006).

cross-generation families.16 The urban–rural disparity in family structures is examined below using data from the fifth population census in 2000 (see Table 8.5.1, and also Table 8.5.1A-C). The share of one-person households is 10.68 per cent in the cities and 10.16 in the towns/townships (averaging 10.42 per cent), in comparison with 6.93 per cent in the countryside. For two-generation families in the bracket of ‘nuclear families’, 15 16

See Zhongguo guojia tongjiju; Zhongguo renkou xinxi yanjiu zhongxin [National Bureau of Statistics of China; China Population Information and Research Centre] (1985). Wang Yuesheng (2006).

310

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

Table 8.5.1 Families of various sizes in China Family size

Total

1-gf

Total

340,491,197 73,892,669 (100%) (21.7%)

1-mf (8.3%) 28,273,351 28,273,351 2-mf (17.04%) 58,034,336 43,283,710 3-mf (29.95%) 101,964,343 1,477,310 4-mf (22.97%) 78,217,515 465,787 5-mf (13.62%) 46,383,977 280,273 6-mf (5.12%) 17,416,027 50,969 7-mf (1.82%) 6,206,820 22,990 8-mf (0.68%) 2,308,597 13,848 9-mf (0.27%) 911,195 7,492 10-mf and above 775,036 16,939 (0.23%)

2-gf

3-gf

4-gf

5-gf and above

201,964,085 62,122,440 (59.32%) (18.25%)

2,508,466 3,537 (0.74%) (0.00%)

– 14,750,626 98,324,376 61,760,364 20,598,397 4,748,853 1,231,470 349,263 112,888 87,848

– – –

– – 2,162,657 15,947,696 25,102,569 11,739,920 4,293,706 1,648,123 660,297 567,472

43,668 402,668 875,909 657,676 296,453 129,948 102,144

– – – –

70 376 978 910 570 633

Note: n-gf = n-generation family; n-mf = n-member family.

Source: Calculated from the data of the fifth population census17

the share is 58.13 per cent in the cities and 59.66 per cent in the towns (averaging 58.90 per cent), in comparison to 59.72 per cent in rural China, with not much difference. For three-generation families under ‘stem families’, the share is 13.16 per cent in the cities and 14.56 per cent in the towns (averaging 13.86 per cent), in comparison to 21.13 per cent in rural China, much higher than the urban rate. As of 2000, nuclear families dominated family structures in both urban and rural China; but in the more conservative rural areas there were more threegeneration stem families and fewer one-person households. 2.3 Changes to Marital Status Marriage is the core of the family system in traditional societies. This section examines changes to marital status in Chinese society over the past thirty years. Table 8.6 summarises cases of marriage registration and divorce in China from 1985 to 2006; Figure 8.2 shows data since 2002. 17

Diwuci Zhongguo renkou pucha第五次中国人口普查.

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years Table 8.5.1a

311

 Families of various sizes in China (city population)

Family size

Total

1-gf

2-gf

3-gf

4-gf

Total

84,889,340 (100%)

24,089,165 (28.38%)

49,344,394 (58.13%)

11,168,865 (13.16%)

286,614 302 (0.34%) (0.00%)

1-mf (10.68%) 2-mf (21.60%) 3-mf (40.22%) 4-mf (15.76%) 5-mf (7.78%) 6-mf (2.42%) 7-mf (0.86%) 8-mf (0.39%) 9-mf (0.15%) 10-mf and above (0.15%)

9,069,071 18,334,938 34,141,807 13,373,961 6,607,530 2,052,686 727,911 326,377 128,664 126,395

9,069,071 – – – 14,074,519 4,260,419 – – 587,995 33,002,602 551,210 – 206,718 9,299,436 3,859,055 8,752 101,551 2,127,218 4,324,213 54,540 22,121 449,865 1,472,086 108,572 10,125 123,587 529,505 64,607 6,384 42,851 250,656 26,412 3,417 17,402 94,511 13,287 7,264 21,014 87,629 10,444

5-gf and above

– – – –

Note: n-gf = n-generation family; n-mf = n-member family.

Source: Calculated from the data of the fifth population census

2.4 Marriage Rate and Divorce Rate In the statistics, the number of marriages has remained at eight to nine million for the past thirty years, but with a rising marriage rate. Particularly worth noting is that the number of international marriages and remarriages have grown dramatically since the 1990s. On the other hand, the growth of the divorce rate is even more dramatic, nearly five-fold from 1985 to 2010. The divorce rate has also doubled in the past ten years. Taking another look at the unmarried population, according to census results, the share of one-person households of all types has gone up to 8.57 per cent from 7.97 per cent, and is even higher in cities (10.68 per cent) and towns (10.16 per cent). A third major change occurred with the emergence of those termed ‘dinks’ (double income no kids) families. According to census results, the share of dinks families within all types of families has gone up to 12.93 per cent from 4.78 per cent, a nearly three-fold jump. The case of single-parent families in China is contrary to trends in other countries. According to census results, the share of single-parent families dropped from 14.31 per cent in 1982 to 9.50 per cent in 1990, and then to

8 42 87 74 47 44

312

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

Table 8.5.1b

Families of various sizes in China (town population)

Family size

Total

1-gf

Total

46,408,532 (100%)

11,704,861 27,688,546 (25.22%) (59.66%)

1-mf (10.16%) 2-mf (18.62%) 3-mf (33.89%) 4-mf (20.39%) 5-mf (10.64%) 6-mf (3.78%) 7-mf (1.40%) 8-mf (0.60%) 9-mf (0.26%) 10-mf and above (0.26%)

4,716,238 8,642,220 15,726,335 9,462,771 4,939,650 1,754,102 648,007 276,146 121,086 121,977

2-gf

3-gf

4-gf

5-gf and above

6,757,598 (14.56%)

257,126 (0.55%)

401 (0.00%)

– – –

– – – –

4,716,238 – – 6,605,106 2,037,114 – 230,796 15,256,932 238,607 77,606 7,547,602 1,833,122 53,293 2,158,241 2,688,391 9,349 482,504 1,172,202 4,272 132,935 446,724 2,772 42,062 201,512 1,566 15,552 88,704 3,863 15,604 88,336

4,441 39,715 90,006 63,961 29,703 15,187 14,113

10 41 115 97 77 61

Note: n-gf = n-generation family; n-mf = n-member family.

Source: Calculated from the data of the fifth population census

6.35 per cent in 2000, quite the opposite of the trend in the Western world. How should such a difference be perceived? In fact, the large number of singleparent families in the 1980s was the product of the household registration system, instead of marital relations. In the case of urban–rural marriage, the rural spouse could not get urban identity papers due to barriers within the household registration system. As some barriers were removed by reforming the household registration system, the number of single parent families declined sharply. At present, this 6 per cent level is essentially generated by changes to marital relations. There are no statistical data yet in China on illegitimate children. In spite of a certain disparity between Chinese and Western statistics, those figures indicate dramatic changes for a socialist country. Dramatic changes over the past thirty years have occurred not only in statistical figures on the population, families, and marriages, but also in the perception of gender and families. The following two sections are devoted to delineating changes to gender perception and family perception in Chinese society, as well as to their causes.

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years Table 8.5.1c

313

Families of various sizes in China (rural population)

Family size

Total

Total

209,193,325 38,098,643 124,931,145 44,195,977 1,964,726 (100%) (18.21%) (59.72%) (21.13%) (0.94%)

1-mf (6.93%) 2-mf (14.85%) 3-mf (24.90%) 4-mf (26.47%) 5-mf (16.65%) 6-mf (6.51%) 7-mf (2.31%) 8-mf (0.82%) 9-mf (0.32%) 10-mf and above (0.25%)

1-gf

2-gf

3-gf

4-gf

14,488,042 14,488,042 – – – 31,057,178 22,604,085 8,453,093 – – 52,096,201 658,519 50,064,842 1,372,840 – 55,380,783 181,463 44,913,326 10,255,519 30,475 34,836,797 125,429 16,312,938 18,089,965 308,413 13,609,239 19,499 3,816,484 9,095,632 677,331 4,830,902 8,593 974,948 3,317,477 529,108 1,706,074 4,692 264,350 1,195,955 240,338 661,445 2,509 79,934 477,082 101,474 526,664 5,812 51,230 391,507 77,587

5-gf and above

2,834 (0.00%) – – – –

52 293 776 739 446 528

Note: n-gf = n-generation family; n-mf = n-member family.

Source: Calculated from the data of the fifth population census

Table 8.6 Marriage registrations and divorce cases in China, 1985–2006 Year

Registered marriages (10,000s)

Mainland (10,000s)

First marriages (10,000s)

Remarriages (10,000s)

Chinese– foreign marriages (10,000s)

Divorce cases (10,000s)

Crude divorce rate (‰)

1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

831.3 951.1 953.6 957.5 915.4 932.4 934.1 938.7 914.1 891.7

829.1 948.7 951 954.5 912.2 929 929.7 934 909.1 886.7

1607.6 1819.1 1820.3 1832.1 1747 1779.3 1776.1 1781.7 1726 1675.4

50.5 78.2 81.6 76.9 77.3 78.7 83.3 86.2 92.2 97.9

2.2 2.4 2.6 3 3.3 3.4 4.4 4.7 5.1 5

45.8 80 83.1 85 91 98.2 105.6 113.4 119.9 119.2

0.44 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.77 0.82 0.88 0.93 0.97 0.96

314

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

Table 8.6 Marriage registrations and divorce cases in China, 1985–2006 (cont.) Year

Registered marriages (10,000s)

Mainland (10,000s)

First marriages (10,000s)

Remarriages (10,000s)

Chinese– foreign marriages (10,000s)

Divorce cases (10,000s)

Crude divorce rate (‰)

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

885.3 848.5 805 786 811.4 867.2 823.1 945

879.9 842 797.1 778.8 803.5 860.8 816.6 938.2

1659.4 1581.4 1481.7 1440.3 1483.9 1569.6 1483 1705.6

100.5 102.6 112.5 117.1 123.3 152 163.1 184.4

5.4 6.5 7.9 7.3 7.8 6.4 6.4 6.8

120.2 121.3 125 117.7 133 166.5 178.5 191.3

0.96 0.96 0.98 0.9 1.05 1.28 1.37 1.46

Source: Data from the National Bureau of Statistics18

Note: The crude divorce rate refers to the number of divorces per 1,000 people over a given period, according to common international practices).

10.0

9.1

9.0

8.3

8.0 7.0

9.3

6.1

6.3

6.7

7.2

7.5

6.3

6.0 5.0

crude marriage rate

4.0

crude divorce rate

3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0

0.9

1.1

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.9

2.0

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Figure 8.2 Marriage rate and divorce rate (‰) in recent years (2002–2010) Source: Minzhengbu [Ministry of Civil Affairs] (2010)

18

Guojia tongjiju国家统计局. See http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/rkpc/5rp/index.htm.

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

3

315

Changes in the Perception of Gender Roles in the Family as well as ‘Materfamilias’ in China

In examining changes to the perception of gender roles in family and ‘materfamilias issues’, the most prominent feature is the high and continuous employment rate among women19 – for example in the 2007 survey, only 3 per cent of interviewees chose to be full-time housewives.20 The apparently high employment rate, however, does not give the full story; in fact, traditional norms on gender still prevail, adversely impacting the career ambitions of women. This is contrary to the situation in Japan, where a large percentage of women stay at home. As women in Japan get better education and are more aware of their gender disadvantage, ‘de-housewifisation’ is becoming a public issue;21 on the other side of the spectrum – in the context of China where the female employment rate is high, debates are gathering momentum over ‘sending women back home’ and encouraging women to explore the housewife role. Labour division in Chinese families also challenges Western theories. According to economic determinism, as the income of wives grows relative to their husband, wives tend to do less housework in the family. This theory fails in the Chinese context.22 The income gap between wives and husbands is not big in China, particularly after the economic reforms and the openingup of the economy. The two large-scale sample surveys in the mid and late 1990s showed, however, that wives did more housework than their husbands, irrespective of their income status.23 In China’s situation, the economic status of women and their role in families are not significantly relevant to each other.24 Why is there such a contradiction for Chinese women? They have their professional life, as indicated by the high rate of continuous employment; but on the other hand, they still play traditional roles in their families. This contradiction is closely woven into the fabric of China’s political and cultural context as well as its reforms to the economic system. These details will now be considered with a focus on the construction of the professional role of women. 19 20 21 22 23 24

Pan Yunkang (2006). Department of Communication of the All-China Women’s Federation et al. (2009). See http://wenku.baidu.com/view/d9bbb6ff04a1b0717fd5dd5c. Ochiai (2010, 12–13); Ochiai ([2004] trans. by Zheng Yang 2010, 186–192). Zuo Jiping (2002). Shen Chonglin and Yang Shanhua (1995, 48–57); Shen Chonglin et al. (1999, 88–94). Parish and Farrer (2000).

316

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

The Planned Economy: Constructing and Interpreting Women’s Professional Roles The planned economy prevailed from 1949 to the late 1970s before reform and opening-up, when the professional roles of women acquired a transformational construct. This construct, however, was two-fold: on one hand, women left their families to discharge their professional roles; on the other hand, the traditional gender role of women remained unaffected and women still did their share in housework.

3.1

3.1.1 The Transformation of Professional Roles Private ownership was replaced by public ownership after China was founded as a socialist country and stepped onto a path of rapid industrial development. Both men and women became legitimate sources of labour, which represented an unprecedented emancipation for women. Rapid progress was made in women’s liberation, as Jiang Yongping notes: In 1958 during the Great Leap Forward, family members of urban employees and housewives were mobilised in most cities to work in state-run bodies and collective enterprises. Urban women realised their longawaited dreams almost overnight. Women staff only accounted for 11.7% in state ownership bodies by the end of 1952. In the late 1970s, however, the share of employed women among women of working age was over 90%.25 The socialist system rendered an impressively high employment rate among women in a planned yet efficient manner, but the flashy image of legitimate labour hid the truth – the traditional roles of women remained unchanged. Emily Honig (1985) argued that the role of state government in advancing women’s liberation and equality is controversial. The gender identities of socialist revolutionaries and ruling politicians as well as the structure of the political regime have all restricted the scale of women’s liberation. Honig sharply noted that revolutionary elites represented by the ruling politicians are mostly male, and the class which achieved success in the revolution and established the political regime was that of poor men at the bottom of social hierarchy, that is, farmers. In that context, activities towards women’s liberation could not naturally be intense enough to criticise patriarchal ideology, or to dispute biased labour division between genders, but could leave some loopholes for limited female liberation. Consequently, women still work both as legitimate workers and housewives at home. 25

Jiang Yongping (2003, 16).

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

317

3.1.2 Structural Harmonisation of Contradictory Professional Roles These contradictory professional roles of women were accommodated by certain systemic arrangements in the planned economy such as the Danwei 单位 – mostly state-run working units. Industrial modernisation resulted in differentiated criteria in measuring labour value.26 Industrial labour may generate tangible economic benefits, which are acknowledged in the form of salaries or bonuses; housework, instead, is a process of labour re-production and does not yield tangible benefits. It is hard to be quantified, or recognised through salaries or bonuses. Measurement of housework value in the industrial labour measurement system is highly controversial. In the then situation of China, women played dual roles – a professional and a homemaker, a natural cause of contradiction. It may be supposed that women’s professional role could not be guaranteed without an accommodation mechanism. Danwei, as a system arrangement, effectively eased the tension between the professional role and family role of women. The Danwei are unique in their nature.27 They provided life-long employment for both men and women. Women as professional workers acquired a series of guarantees, such as maternity insurance, and received relatively equal pay and welfare. The Danwei provided public services such as canteens, barbers, hospitals, schools, shops, and kindergartens, to name but a few. On top of those social support services, the Danwei could also step in to safeguard the rights and interests of women in their families. The Danwei also unloaded a lot of housework from women. By safeguarding their professional role and unloading housework from women,28 the Danwei worked as a robust system for easing the tension between women’s various roles. 3.1.3 Limited Empowerment in the Legitimacy of Professional Roles Women acquired their professional role from political empowerment – a product of the then prevailing ideology, that is, the emancipation of the working class according to Marxism. The theory derived from class analysis, noting that socialism aims at saving the working class from oppression and fighting for their right to work. In this analytical framework based on class inequality, women belong to the working class group who are exploited and oppressed, while political revolution and system re-engineering are destined to create an enabling environment in which the poor and suffering masses – including women – can work. Therefore, translating the theory of labour emancipation 26 27 28

Beck ([1999] trans. by He Bowen 2004, 125–154). Lu Feng (1989). Jiang Yongping (2012).

318

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

into practice requires institutional support. China introduced a series of socialist reform policies from 1949, launching pro-women policies such as equal pay and maternity insurance, which granted comprehensive protection for women’s rights. In fact, in some cities men are even disempowered by women.29 In spite of the encouraging dynamics, the Danwei system is far from being ideal. Danwei is an institutional arrangement servicing the national strategy of industrialised growth. Women’s professional role acquired legitimacy through the Danwei, but such a superficial legitimacy overshadowed the tension between the professional role and traditional family role of women. The contradictory nature of women’s career pathways in the Danwei system30 can shed some light on this: on one hand, women seemed to play on an even field with their male counterparts in professional life. In the context of a labour shortage, women – as a potential labour source – were mobilised to take some genderinsensitive professions. Some women even got the title of ‘iron woman’ or ‘iron lady’ because they took some professions which were highly challenging even for men. On the other hand, other women took supportive and marginal jobs in the Danwei. They had a flexible schedule so that they could look after their families, but this was at the cost of being disadvantageous to career development. The system of rewards in the Danwei was also gender sensitive: while men were rewarded for their good performance in production, women were rewarded for their virtues in the family role, which discouraged women from being ambitious in their career development.31 Women’s professional portfolio has a component of family responsibility, which is particularly true for married women (see Table 8.7). Interviewed on their purpose for working, over 80 per cent, or even 90 per cent in some cases, of women noted that they ‘worked for the sake of their families and prioritised family responsibility’; only 10–20 per cent of women ‘worked for their own benefit and put individual interest before family’. This may not fully reveal the role and position of women as professionals. On the proposition that ‘men shall be the breadwinner even if their wives work, and women shall look after their families’, 42 per cent of the interviewees did not agree, while 46 per cent generally agreed (see Table  8.8). The gap between agreement and disagreement may not be significant, but it still shows the discrepancy between the women’s professional roles and professional awareness. In essence, the Danwei in the planned economy were a social entity with economic targets, instead of a mere economic entity. They provided 29 30 31

Xu Anqi (1992). Jin Yihong (2006). Jiang Yongping (2012).

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

319

Table 8.7 Major reasons for married women to work (%)

Before marriage Marriage to birth of the first child First child to when youngest child is six Youngest child from six to fifteen years old During the investigation period

For family benefit, giving priority to families

For personal gain, giving priority to individuals

Number

%

Number

%

340 365 382

80.0 84.7 88.2

80 66 51

20.0 15.3 11.8

346

89.2

42

10.8

287

82.9

59

17.1

Note: Prominent values are highlighted in bold figures. Source: Pan Yunkang (2006, 143)

Table 8.8 Percentage agreement with the notion that ‘men shall be the breadwinner (even if their wives work), and women shall look after their families’ Shanghai

1. Strongly disagree 2. 3. 4. 5. Strongly agree Total Sample size

Lanzhou

Urban and Countryside

Male

Female

Male

Female Urban districts

Suburbs and counties

3 36 22 36 3 100 600

4 44 19 32 2 100 600

7 30 4 36 24 100 515

7 37 2 31 24 100 485

5 41 11 34 9 100 1,439

4 29 15 34 18 100 761

Source: The data are taken from the survey titled A Comparative Study on Family Value Changes in Urban and Rural Areas, shortened as Survey on Family Value Changes (sfvc) in this chapter.32

32

The original Chinese title of this survey is Chengxiang bijiao shiye xia de jiating jiazhiguan bianqian yanjiu城乡比较视野下的家庭价值观变迁研究. The survey was carried out by the Centre for Family Research of the Shanghai Academy of Social Science in 2008, which

320

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

institutional guarantees for the career development of women, but with restrictions. Interwoven with the traditional gender roles of women, the Danwei were only a provisional guarantee of women’s professional roles. As such, any changes to the Danwei system could, and did, endanger and challenge such professional roles. In the Market Economy: Debate and Re-Elaboration of Women’s Professional Roles China embarked upon economic reform from the 1980s, and set the goal in the early 1990s of transforming from a planned economy to a market economy. In the transition to modern enterprises, the Danwei began to shake off their social functions and pursue economic functions for profit and efficiency. The professional role of women lost its political connotations and consequent institutional guarantees. Women’s professional role, in this context, triggered a vigorous debate. From the 1980s onward there were four rounds of major debate concerning ‘sending women home’, reflecting the blurred professional image of women, their declining position in career structures and the re-emergence of traditional gender values.

3.2

3.2.1 The Growing Debate over Women’s Professional role The adverse social implications of the economic reforms exposed the inherent contradictions within women’s professional roles. In the planned economy, women’s professional role was established in the national interest, but was not on solid ground. In fact, the professional role and the traditional family role of women compromised each other to some extent. As the Danwei system effectively accommodated this deficient design, the contradiction between professional and family roles was thus concealed. According to the first survey on the social status of Chinese women conducted in 1990, 75.4 per cent of the urban respondents agreed that ‘women’s success lies in the performance of their husbands, and women shall give full support to their husbands’. In this there was no significant difference between male and female respondents (75.3 per cent and 75.5 per cent respectively). Those figures indicate that the traditional labour-division paradigm remained unchallenged in the planned economy. In the market economy era, the Danwei shifted their social functions to the market – including their canteens, bath houses, schools, and shops. This greatly increased the workload in families and thus the level of family responsibilities.

conducted household interviews with questionnaires in Shanghai and Lanzhou. The total valid sample size was 2,200 households, 1,200 in Shanghai, and 1,000 in Lanzhou. The survey results were published in 2013 (see Xu Anqi et al. [2013] for details). Also see Footnote 51.

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

321

In the traditional labour-division model, women were naturally expected to look after their families. As they were at the same time professionals, the situation resulted in tension between their professional and family roles. According to the 2009 Report on the Well-being of Professional Women in China,33 70 per cent of professional women faced tension between their family and career. However, work–family tension may be generic, as some studies have indicated that 40–78 per cent of all working parents have encountered such tensions at some time.34 Changes to the social system constitute a structural cause behind the tension. According to the Collection of Study Reports on the Involvement of Women in Science and Technology Community in 2007, it was noted that women make up over one-third of science and technology workforce in China, but their output was only half to two-thirds of that of their male counterparts. ‘Maternity leave/housework’ represents the largest distraction for female scientists. In the absence of institutional support and guarantees, women are trapped within this family–work dynamic and cannot strike an effective balance. In 2007, only 31.2 per cent of interviewed women believed that they ‘did well both at work and at home’. The share declined to 28.2 per cent in 2008 and sat at 29.4 per cent in 2009. In the meantime, the share of women advocating ‘family orientation’ climbed to 34.1 per cent in 2009, from 22.9 per cent in 2007 and 23.5 per cent in 2008.35 3.2.2 The Return of Traditional Gender Roles Market-oriented developments in China have exerted a lasting impact upon the career environment for women. The debate over ‘sending women home’ resurfaced, mirroring negative social perceptions of women’s professional roles and a tendency to re-establish traditional gender roles. Professional women returned to their traditional family role in the early stages of market reform when the Danwei were starting to transform into modern enterprises. Statistics show that the employment rate for women declined constantly from 90.5 per cent in 1990, to 87.0 per cent in 2000 and further down to 71.7 per cent in 2010. The employment rate for urban women dropped from 76.3 per cent in 1990 to 63.7 per cent in 2000 and to 60.8 per cent in 2010. The employment rate for urban males between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four was 87.2 per cent, in comparison with 71.1 per cent among women. In fact, the employment rate declined somewhat for men, but did so more substantially for women. In the 33 34 35

Quanguo fulian xuanchuanbu [Department of Communication of the Chinese Women’s Federation] et al (2009). Kinnunen et al. (2003). Wang Hui (2007).

322

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

twenty years from 1990 to 2010, the employment rate went down from 90.0 per cent to 81.5 per cent for urban males, and from 76.3 per cent to 60.8 per cent for urban females. The decline among women outpaced the decline among men by nearly 6 per cent (see Table 8.9). While the employment rate of women was on a downward spiral, awareness of traditional gender roles began to come back. According to the first and second sample surveys on the social status of Chinese women in 1990 and 2000, an increasing number of respondents – be they urban, rural, male, or female – agreed with the notion that ‘men should contribute to society while women should contribute to the family’. The share of those who ‘strongly agree’ also went up dramatically, especially in the countryside (see Table 8.10). The debate over ‘sending women home’ emerged in this context, which has drawn widespread attention for its broad coverage, high profile, and involvement in policy guidance.36 Such debate was woven into the course of economic reform. The debate emerged in the early stages of reform, a discussion over ‘Work or home – which is the way forward for women’ initiated by the Women of China journal in the late 1980s. In the mid-1990s when market reform was at the crossroads and had resulted in the laying off of many workers, Table 8.9 Employment of men and women between eighteen and sixty-four over the past two decades (%) National

1990 2000 2010

Urban Area

Rural Area

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

96.1 93.6 87.2

90.5 87.0 71.1

90.0 81.5 80.5

76.3 63.7 60.8

97.4 97.3 93.6

93.9 94.8 82.0

Source: the Data for 1990 and 2000 are from the ‘Executive Report of the Second Sample Survey on Chinese Women’s Social Status’ by the All China Women’s Federation (2001);37 THE DATA FOR 2010 ARE FROM THE ‘EXECUTIVE REPORT OF THE THIRD SAMPLE SURVEY ON CHINESE WOMEN’S SOCIAL STATUS’ BY THE ALL CHINA WOMEN’S FEDERATION (2011).38

36 Jiang Yongping (2001). 37 See Zhonghua quanguo funü lianhehui [All China Women’s Federation] (2001). 38 Ibid.

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

323

Table 8.10 Percentage agreement with the notion that ‘men shall contribute to society, and women shall work for the family’ in nationwide sample survey 1990

2000

Rural Area Male

Urban Area

Female Male

1. Strongly disagree 21 24 2. Disagree 17 15 3. No opinion/ 6 7 undecided 4. Agree 46 49 5. Strongly agree 9 6 Total 100 100 Sample sizes 9,303 8,417

34 24 8

Rural Area

Female

41 20 6

29 29 6 4 100 100 2,055 2,030

Male

12 28 3

Urban Area

Female Male Female

14 28 3

35 35 23 21 100 100 7,802 7,257

18 37 2

26 37 3

29 23 15 12 100 100 2,421 2,406

Source: Xu Anqi (2010)39

women were disproportionately targeted. Zheng Yefu, a sociologist, also kicked off a ‘sociological reflection upon gender equality’, noting that women’s emancipation was premature in China, and advocated a traditional gender role for women, which aroused debate in the academic community. In the early twenty-first century, during two sessions of the National People’s Congress (npc) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (cppcc), cppcc member Tu Xiancai delivered a speech on ‘the Call and Return of Home Economics – Reflections upon Gender Equality and Labour Division’, and called for low-income women to resume their traditional gender roles in an adaptive manner. The last debate occurred in 2011 when cppcc member Zhang Xiaomei proposed encouraging some middle-class women to become housewives. She suggested that salaries be offered for housework, and said more women should ‘go back home’. In fact, the advocacy of ‘sending women home’ is merely seeking a new excuse for the traditional labour-division model, and trying to legitimise the dilemma of the declining professional position of women. The debates centred 39

The original data for 1990 are from Tao Chunfang and Jiang Yongping (1993). The original data for 2000 are from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, Department of Population, Social Science, and Technology Statistics (2004).

324

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

on labour division, applied constructions onto the dominant role of women in housework, and explored ways to legitimise such models and make them universal values. For example, they argue that ‘sending women home’ is a rational family strategy, a natural choice for women and mothers, and a beautiful representation of family bonds. All those arguments tried to deny the gender equality model of the socialist era and to cement the traditional labourdivision model in the market economic system.40 Traditional values persist in real life and phrases such as ‘men make the houses, women make the home’ are verified by perception surveys not only at national level (see Table 8.10), but also at local level (see Table 8.11). For example, when asked of their perception of the notion that ‘“men make the houses, women make the home” is good for every member of the family’, 35 per cent of the respondents disagreed and 50 per cent agreed. In terms of the roles played by women, women still do most of the housework while their professional role has blurred and deteriorated. From 1990 to 2000, women did most of the housework, such as cooking, washing, and cleaning, in over 85 per cent of families. Women spend on average 4.01 hours daily on housework, 2.7 hours more than men. Urban employed women only spend Table 8.11 Percentage agreement with the notion that ‘“men make the houses, women make the home” is good for every member of the family’

1. Strongly disagree 2. 3. 4. 5. Strongly agree Total Sample size

Shanghai

Lanzhou

Urban and Countryside

Male

Female

Male

Female

Urban districts

Suburbs and counties

2 28 27 39 5 100 600

4 36 23 35 3 100 600

4 29 4 36 27 100 515

5 34 2 31 28 100 485

2 20 19 37 25 100 761

5 38 13 34 10 100 1,439

Source: Survey on Family Value Changes (2008). See Xu Anqi et al. (2013)

40

Song Shaopeng (2011).

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

325

2.9 hours daily on housework, but this is still 1.6 hours more than their male counterparts.41 Changes occurred from 2000 to 2010 in two ways: first, both men and women spent less time on housework; second, the gap between men and women narrowed in their housework time, but women still spent more time on it than men. For example in 2010, urban women spent 1.7 hours daily on housework, more than double of their male counterparts who spent only around 0.7 hours each on it.42 Traditional gender norms may take on diverse forms in reality. On one hand, these may refer to a sort of direct, ill-intentioned discrimination against women, meaning a direct reproach towards the capability and efficiency of women, or may appear in the form of indirect, rather well-intentioned discrimination, such as the tenderness trap aiming at catalysing romantic feelings through economic dependency of a wife upon her husband.43 No matter how those gender perceptions vary, they have something in common – their attempt to legitimise the traditional labour-division model in more diverse and easy-toswallow ways. 3.2.3 Debate over the Recognition of Professional Roles As economic reforms proceeded, the significance of women’s professional role in society lost both its political connotations and institutional support. Nonetheless, it must be noted that gender differences had been emphasised by the government well before the economic reforms were implemented. Although the socialist Chinese government was successful in increasing women’s social status to a large extent, the government’s emphasis on gender differences can be considered to be an obstacle to women’s liberation. This was then further reinforced within the new socio-economic conditions accompanying marketisation. Thus, following the state’s weakening role in protecting women’s rights, traditional gender roles attached to women have been frequently referred to and elaborated on with various theories in Chinese academic works. Such theories include Jürgen Habermas’ theory on the public sphere (domain); theories on the market economy stressing men’s work over women’s; and recent theories emphasising the usefulness of Confucian values for marketising China. Theories stressing Confucian values argue that women belong to the private sphere and that they should mainly focus on childcare and housework.

41 See Zhonghua quanguo funü lianhehui [All China Women’s Federation] (2001). 42 Ibid. 43 Xu Anqi (2010).

326

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

Market-oriented reforms pushed China further away from the female emancipation theory of Marxism, but closer to the liberalist school which is more compatible with the market system. Public–private sphere segregation became a new theoretical tool for Chinese scholars such as Zheng Yefu (see Subsection 3.2.2), to prop up the traditional model of labour division. Broadly speaking, the public sphere covers the empowering and authoritative parts of life like the workplace, laws, economics, and politics, while the private sphere is limited to entertainment, social networking, family life as well as the formation of individual thoughts and ideologies. The core theory here is to put women’s values and the way to realise them into the private sphere, which should also prop up the principle of self-reliance and be free from public intervention. While China is shifting from a planned economy to a market economy, the government withdraws from many social sectors, leading to more liberty in private life including family life. In the era of a booming media industry, the private attributes of social life are becoming more prominent, similar to the emergence of the private sphere of the capitalist class in the uk, France, and Germany in the nineteenth century.44 On the other hand, developing the discussions on women’s professional and gender roles within the public-sphere theory – as certain scholars do in China – is a stereotyping practice, and this is not even correct from a theoretical point of view. First of all, Habermas’ theory was originally applied to the study of the formation of the Western capitalist system, and it points to the strong male dominance of the emerging public sphere in Western countries. In socialist China, however, the ideological stress on gender equality was from the very beginning referencing completely different socio-economic conditions. Second, the application of Habermas’ theory on the public sphere by Chinese scholars is eventually intended to ‘help’ re-legitimise the unreasonable traditional model of labour division in the context of the market economy. This, however, goes against the socialist ideology of gender equality. Superficially, the division of the public and private spheres corresponds to traditional labour divisions, which gives males clout over empowering and authoritative public spheres such as the workplace, laws, economics, and politics, and grants females responsibilities in the private sphere such as housework, cooking, and childcare. However, this elaboration is biased since it affects the positioning of women in society. More problematic is that the private sphere, which is under the charge of women, is now fully exposed to the mercy of marketisation, accompanied by the state’s weakening protection of women’s rights. This increases the gap in purchasing power that greatly influences the conditions of childcare among 44

Habermas ([1991] trans. by Cao Weidong et al. 2002, 6–10, 255–282).

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

327

other things, and also creates more barriers to women’s career development. According to an investigation by the Institute of Labour Science of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security in June 2000, women accounted for 57.7 per cent of laid-off workers, whereas the re-employment rate among women was only 38.8 per cent, 18.8 percentage points lower than it was for men.45 Market-oriented reforms generated impressive economic benefits, but had a very poor record in fostering job security and gender equality for women. Fierce market competition is a new challenge for women, yet family responsibilities add further inescapable burdens to the shoulders of women. Professional women face a dilemma in their careers. As the glory and political meaning of being a socialist worker faded during marketisation, traditional gender roles in the new socio-economic conditions have been imposed on women in a highprofile way, blurring women’s professional image. Habermas’ public-sphere theory comes into that context to provide a seemingly reasonable argument for the situation; however, in essence, it only serves to sugar-coat this distorted model of labour division. It must also be noted that the emergence of new social constraints (due to marketisation and the weakening of institutional support) that push toward the necessity of traditional gender-role adoption happened against the fact that women, especially those who live in urban areas, had internalised the working woman’s ideal image by the time marketisation was implemented. This, together with the fact that women have to keep working – since a man’s salary alone is rarely sufficient to support his family financially – has led to the current unfortunate social condition that women have to do two different types of role: housework and working outside home. Women should be entitled to labour rights in all circumstances. Nowadays, China has developed to a stage where public policy intervention is necessary to facilitate the career development of women. The government needs to formulate and implement a series of public policies such as dedicated family policies, employment policies fostering gender equality, robust maternity insurance policies, and childcare policies.46 All those policies will help effectively to safeguard the professional role of women. 4

Changes in the Perception of Marriage and Family

This section mainly discusses gender roles and changes in thinking in contemporary China, by focusing on marriage and family values. People’s opinions 45 46

Mo Rong (2001). Jiang Yongping (2007).

328

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

and attitudes towards problems involving marriage and family are important indicators for measuring and analysing social change, the mutually constructive relationship between the social environment and social subject, and can help predict the tendency towards changes in family structure. The development of marriage and family in the West, represented by North America, has clearly followed the sequence of: ‘pre-modern traditional large family – modern nuclear family – diversified post-modern families’.47 However, the social context behind the construction of family values in China appears to be much more complex than that in Western countries. Over the thirty years of reform, it seems that families in China – due to rapid development – have now entered the era of modernity. Moreover, the information age and globalisation in the twenty-first century have further pushed Chinese families towards the direction of post-modernity. On the question of how to look at the construction of family values in such a complicated context, and whether Chinese family life has been brought onto the track of Western development or has gone into post-modernity, the research community has yet to reach a consensus. On one hand, scholars are assured of the cultural influence of traditional Chinese familism48 and hold to the idea that family change in China will never follow the track seen in Western societies. On the other hand, they are also certain that modern development has impacted harshly on traditional familism, and that the growing sense of competition, the rising subjective consciousness and consciousness of equality have all received unprecedented recognition. Besides, ‘the rise of the individual’ is also quite obvious. Therefore, the two following questions emerge: (1) what state are traditional family values in, and (2) to what extent do they exist when individualistic49 values like rights, democracy, and equality have 47 48

49

Chen Xuan (2008). Familism is translated as jiazu-zhuyi家族主义, which not only refers to the immediate family members such as husband and wife, parents, and children but also refers to other family relatives. The traditional large family in China has been declining in prevalence and outright size. This chapter confines the concept of family to the relationship between husband, wife, parents, and children and does not involve other relatives. This kind of familism in a narrow sense is called jiating-zhuyi家庭主义. Familism in this chapter refers to the family value system that is based on obligations and emphasises the responsibilities and obligations undertaken by family members who are connected by blood or marriage. Such mutual care and support among family members are unconditional and boundless. Individualism can be translated as geren-zhuyi个人主义 in Chinese. In a moral context, geren-zhuyi often puts personal interest above the interests of others or social interest and this is also frequently confused with the word egoism (ziwo-zhuyi自我主义),

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

329

become the mainstream in contemporary China? This study aims to provide comprehensive empirical evidence for a rational view on how to understand the characteristics of change to family values in contemporary China. Family values mainly include two aspects: the perception of marriage and the perception of generational relationships, in other words, people’s basic ideas and opinions of the husband–wife relationship (marital relationship) and the parent–child relationship (blood relationship). To be more specific, the perception of marriage includes: people’s basic ideas on love, expectations toward their spouses, opinions on different forms of marriage, attitudes towards sexual behaviour, etc.50 The perception of generational relationships includes the desire and purpose of raising children, the wish and expectation for supporting parents, the acknowledgement of generational authority, etc. As the connotations of ‘family values’ are extensive, we are not able to analyse all these ideas and notions in this chapter, and therefore only those indicators that are commonly used in the research community and are most debated by the general public will be examined. Ideas of Marriage Marriage Is Still Highly Valued, While Tolerance for Extramarital Sex Is Extremely Low The results of the Survey on Family Value Changes (sfvc)51 carried out in 2008 indicate that it is a quite generally accepted idea in contemporary China that marriage is still essential to life. Nearly 75 per cent of the interviewees agreed

4.1 4.1.1



50 51

therefore it is a pejorative term. To avoid the negative effect of the term, individualism is translated as geti-zhuyi个体主义 in this chapter. This refers to a value system in contrast with familism, and it stresses individual subjectivity, creativity, and individual rights, and considers feeling and affection as the major driving forces that link family members rather than innate responsibility and duty. Ji Qiufa (1995). The data in this section all come from the Survey on Family Value Changes (sfvc) unless otherwise indicated. The survey was carried out in the city of Shanghai and Lanzhou in 2008. A stratified multistage probability sampling method was adopted and families were selected from forty-three neighbourhood committees/village committees, twenty-two streets/towns, nine districts/counties of Shanghai, and thirty-three neighbourhood committees/village committees, ten streets/towns, four districts/counties of Lanzhou. Family members aged between twenty and sixty-five, and those whose birthdays were nearest to 1 July were chosen to be interviewees. The door-to-door questionnaire interviews were carried out by trained interviewers. Of the final valid samples, 1,200 were from Shanghai and 1,000 from Lanzhou. The average age of the interviewees was 43.4. See Xu Anqi et al. (2013) for details. Also see Footnote 32.

330

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

that ‘whatever happens, I am going to marry in the end’. The findings show no gender difference but show age and urban–rural differences: 69.7 per cent of young people under thirty-five years old and 78.5 per cent of people over fifty accepted the idea; 81.2 per cent of interviewees in suburbs and counties agreed with the idea, and this is obviously higher than that of the urban area, which was 69.2 per cent. At the same time, the positive aspects of marriage were also affirmed, with as many as 99 per cent of interviewees agreeing that ‘a good/ happy marriage is very important for their life’. The statistical data suggests that 65.7 per cent of the interviewees thought that sex outside marriage was ‘absolutely wrong’. 28.9 per cent of them thought that ‘it is not good under any circumstances’, and altogether 94.6 per cent of the interviewees held negative attitudes towards it. About 3.5 per cent of respondents argued against this and thought that ‘it depends’, and only 1.9 per cent of the total said that ‘it is normal/not wrong.’ As for the opinion that ‘sex with others is not wrong when one spouse leaves and they are separate for over half a year’, 62.1 per cent thought that it is ‘absolutely wrong’, 30.1 per cent thought that ‘it is not good under any circumstances’, 5.1 per cent thought that it is partly wrong, that is, ‘it is wrong in some situations’, and only 2.7 per cent said that ‘it is normal/not wrong’. The other two indicators also received nearly 90 per cent objections: 88.4 per cent of interviewees clearly objected to the idea that ‘it is not necessary for married couples to care about occasional sex outside marriage’, and 86.8 per cent were definitely against the opinion that ‘one-night stands/illicit lovers are just occasional pleasures and thrills’. Further surveys show that men had a higher tolerance than women for extramarital affairs, and urban residents were more tolerant than suburban or rural residents. However, young people are not more tolerant than middle or old-aged people towards extramarital affairs. 4.1.2

Tolerance for Premarital Sexuality Has Increased, But Premarital Cohabitation Is Not Accepted in General According to the sample survey conducted by Li Yinhe in 1989, 68.7 per cent of people interviewed thought that premarital intercourse was not allowable under any circumstances, even if the relationship was established between a man and a woman and they were ready for marriage.52 According to the sample survey conducted by Lu Shuhua in 1996, 61 per cent of people expressed clearly that premarital sex for men was not acceptable and 65 per cent were not able to accept premarital sex for women.53 The survey in 2008

52 53

Li Yinhe (2003, 15–16). Lu Shuhua (1997).

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

331

demonstrated that only 26.9 per cent of interviewees thought that premarital sex was ‘absolutely wrong’, 49.5 per cent of interviewees thought that it was ‘not good under any circumstances’, 12.4 per cent of interviewees thought that ‘it depends’, and 11.2 per cent of interviewees thought that it was ‘normal/ not wrong’. This suggests that tolerance of premarital sex has improved greatly in recent years. Further data analysis indicates that male and urban interviewees take more tolerant opinions towards premarital sex than female rural interviewees. Besides, the age of people has a noticeable negative correlation54 with the tolerance for premarital sex: the younger the people interviewed, the higher the tolerance was. The statistical results of sfvc also suggest that the degree of consent regarding premarital sex with the prerequisite of love is twice as high when speaking of premarital sex in general (compared to the percentage accepting ‘it is normal/not wrong’), and that young people were more tolerant. The data shows that 38.7 per cent of young people under thirty thought ‘it is normal/not wrong’ on the question of ‘sex between single adults when they are deeply in love’. Other surveys conducted in the twenty-first century55 also indicate that currently about 30–40 per cent of unmarried youths think that there is nothing wrong with sexual behaviour based on love. However, the tolerance for premarital cohabitation is not as high as for premarital sexuality. Putting together the results of several existing large surveys, we find that the share of premarital cohabitation is very low, at only about 1 per cent. Pan Suiming conducted a sample survey in 2000, in which the share of people in premarital cohabitation was 0.7 per cent; the result of a 2006 national social survey was 0.4 per cent; and the result of the five-city survey conducted by Li Yinhe in 2008 was 0.8 per cent. The result of sfvc was 1.1 per cent, and the number is just 3.2 per cent even among young people under thirty-five. As for the opinion that a ‘single man and woman could live together if they plan to marry’, 18.9 per cent of people agreed, and only 8.5 per cent of people agreed with the opinion that a ‘single man and woman could live together even if they do not intend to marry’. By comparison, 42.2 per cent of people agreed that ‘single middle- or old-aged people could live together to look after each other and avoid unnecessary trouble’. This proportion was 20 percentage points higher than the 22.7 per cent of people who agreed that ‘cohabitation

54 55

The Pearson’s correlation is r = −0.314**. Such as a survey of 1,130 college students in Zhejiang province (see Ye Lihong et al. 2000), or a sample survey of young people aged between twenty and thirty both in Shanghai and Chengdu (see Xu Anqi 2003), among other surveys.

332

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

could help both sides to know each other and make sure that they are fit for each other’. The fact that cohabitation between middle-aged or elderly people receives more acceptance suggests that people think more of non-emotional factors such as economic interest and existing family relationships when they judge whether private life is rational or not. Currently cohabitation is not protected and de facto marriage is not recognised by law in China. Besides, childbearing has been severely restricted due to government policy, consequently cohabitation for the young is costly; for example, for bodily injury caused by abortion, economic compensation is not supported by law in the case of unmarried couples. By contrast, the cohabitation of middle- or old-aged people is much less costly – not only because such couples do not need to face the problem of childbearing, but also because these couples are not connected by marriage, and thus they can avoid unnecessary disputes over property inheritance. 4.2 Ideal Intergenerational Relations 4.2.1 The Idea of Filial Piety Is Still Generally Accepted The traditional Chinese notion of ‘filial piety’ has various connotations. It refers to ‘the elders rule’ culture and makes up a complete system which focuses on familism, covering the daily support of parents, inheritance commitments and property, funerals and sacrifice, etc. China has forcefully adopted the policy of family planning and altered old customs and habits, advocating ceremonies which conform to simplicity. Within this context, the culture of filial piety that emphasises ‘bearing sons to carry on the family line, leaving future generations for the family’ and ‘burying and sacrificing to the dead with proper ceremony’ has been greatly restrained. As individuals have few choices in this respect, this chapter will not go into this issue in detail, but chooses only four aspects for analysis: supporting and waiting upon parents, attendance upon elders, bringing glory to parents, and being obedient to parents. First of all, traditional views of filial piety are still accepted by the majority of people in general. Just as the results displayed in Table 8.12 suggest, in terms of mean value, the interviewees’ attitudes towards ‘supporting parents’, ‘attending upon parents’, ‘bringing glory to the parents’ were ‘somewhat agree’ or ‘strongly agree’, and their attitudes towards ‘be obedient to the parents’ were close to ‘somewhat agree’. In terms of percentage, over 95 per cent people accepted the idea of supporting the parents, and over 80 per cent people accepted the idea of attending upon the parents, whereas only the idea of being obedient to the parents received less agreement (less than 80 per cent). The results of further grouping according to educational level indicate that the relation between education and the idea of bringing glory to, and being

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

333

Table 8.12 Identification with the four aspects of filial piety Indicators

Presenting ideas

Support parents

Children should try their best to support their parents and make their parents live more comfortably Attend upon Children should live parents together with their parents when their parents become old and are not able to take care of themselves Bring glory Children should strive for a to parents promising future so as to bring glory/pride to their parents/family Be obedient The authority of the father in the family should be to the respected whatever happens parents

Sample Agreement Mean* numbers (%) value

Standard deviation

2,200

94.3

4.46

0.704

2,200

83.2

4.10

0.947

2,200

86.1

4.27

0.901

2,200

74.5

3.90

1.068

*  The range of mean value is from 1 to 5. Options 1–5 stand for ‘strongly disagree’, ‘not really agree’, ‘not able to clearly express it/it doesn’t matter’, ‘somewhat agree’, ‘strongly agree’ respectively. Source: Survey on Family Value Changes (2008)

obedient to, the parents present a negative linear correlation, but the influence of education on the idea of supporting parents and attending upon parents is not obvious. That is to say, the core view on filial piety which emphasises supporting and attending upon one’s parents is recognised extensively by all social groups. The study on current generational relationships by other researchers also suggest that there are no fundamental changes in people’s attitudes towards supporting the aged, although changes have taken place in attitudes towards the traditional views on filial piety. The aged need care and support from the next generation, whereas the next generation also feels bound to look after and support their parents.56 56

Wang Shuxin and Ma Jin (2002).

334

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

Secondly, almost 90 per cent of people accepted the idea of bringing glory to their parents, which suggests that the spiritually ‘harmonious symbiotic relationship’ between parents and children still receives great attention. Further analysis demonstrates that interviewees who did not have brothers and sisters preferred the idea of bringing glory to their parents, which may be due to the fact that an only child receives more care and expectations from parents and has a stronger desire to reward their parents spiritually. Just as Sun Longji concluded, the Western way of ‘cutting the psychological umbilical cord between parents and children’ is not a tradition in China, because separation between parents and children means ‘the severing of the parent–child relationship’.57 This cultural psychology that has shaped Chinese people’s expectations from parents and children is very different from an individualistic culture. Mental and emotional separation between parents and children makes Chinese people sad and generates thoughts of ‘failing to pay back their parents’, and thus a sense of impiety can develop. The separation also creates a sense of having a thankless child, in turn suggesting ‘their failure in raising their children’. It also makes people have a sense of humiliation, which means family misfortune.58 ‘Being grateful’ to one’s parents is a source of children’s recognition of their self-value and a source of spiritual comfort for the parents, and in China at present it still has a value function similar to religion.59 Thirdly, authority based on the idea of being obedient to parents has received relatively less approval. Although over 70 per cent of interviewees supported the idea, it still received the lowest approval compared with other indicators of filial piety. This suggests that the concept ‘filial piety emphasises obedience’, as advocated by Confucian culture, has become greatly challenged in China today. Moreover, the results of multivariate analysis indicate that regional economic development, urbanisation, and improved educational level all greatly reduced the approval of the idea of being obedient to one’s parents, suggesting that this idea is declining. The challenge to this idea reflects the fact that the authority of children has been rising and the relationship between generations has become equal in China; a trend that has been more obvious in one-child families. As some scholars have pointed out, intergenerational relationships tend to be more equal and democratic in China today, and intergenerational interactions pay more attention to spiritual exchange and independence, which has been one of the important consequences of the onechild policy since it was adopted over thirty years ago.60 57 58 59 60

See Sun Longji (2004, 194–226). Zhang Zhixin and Zhang Zuojian (1997). Lin Yutang (2000, 181). See Guan Ying (2008); Feng Xiaotian (2008).

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

335

4.2.2 Parental Concerns over Adult Children Receive Less Approval In traditional intergenerational relationships, the filial piety of children is associated with the affection of parents. Researchers point out that there is never an absolute equivalence between the nurturing by the parental generation and the feedback from the offspring.61 In fact, the intergenerational feedback model, and that of the family which cares for the elderly, can be realised only when parental ‘responsibility ethics’ are emphasised. For example, only when the parental generation try their best to take care of their children and expect nothing in return, and attempt to reduce their children’s burden in supporting the aged, can a good relationship be formed between the parents and their children.62 As mentioned above, in the familistic value system, parents’ responsibility for their children lasts for a lifetime, and they should not only raise their children to grow up, but also raise their children ‘well’, which means providing the best education for their children, helping them to establish their own family, and looking after their grandchildren. Table 8.13 displays four indicators that express ideas of parental support for children. One of the four ideas refers to a general description of the parental image according to traditional virtues – ‘parents would sacrifice everything for the sake of their children’ (‘sacrifice for their children’ in brief); the other three indicators involve responsibilities shouldered by parents for their adult children during their different stages of life: ‘parents should bear all the costs for their children’s higher education’ (‘bear all the costs’ in brief), ‘parents should provide a wedding room for their son/pay down-payments on property for their children’ (‘preparing a wedding room’ in brief), and ‘grandparents are bound to look after their grandchildren’ (‘looking after grandchildren’ in brief). Table 8.13 indicates that the general public gives much higher approval ratings to the idea of filial piety than to the idea of being endlessly concerned about children. The approval ratings of the four indicators demonstrate that the idea that ‘parents should bear all the costs for their children’s higher education’ enjoys the highest approval rating, more than 70 per cent. However, this is still lower than the approval rating of ‘being obedient to parents’, which has the lowest approval rating among the ideal views on filial piety. The overall attitudes tend to be those which ‘somewhat agree’. Among the other three indicators, the lowest approval rating refers to ‘grandparents are bound to look after their grandchildren’, only reaching 30 per cent and the overall attitude tending to be ‘not really agree’. As for ‘parents should provide a wedding room for their son’, the approval rating is not more than 50 per cent and the overall attitude tends to be ‘not able to express it clearly’. The general idea that ‘parents would 61 62

Wang (2008). See Yang Shanhua and He Changmei (2004).

336

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

Table 8.13 Identification with ideas related to parents supporting children Indicators

Presenting ideas

Being concerned Parents would sacrifice about children everything for the sake of their children Parents should bear all the costs for their children’s higher education Parents should provide a wedding room for their son/pay down-payments on property for their children Grandparents are bound to look after their grandchildren

Sample numbers

Agreement Mean* (%) value

Standard deviation

2,199

57.8

3.50

1.316

2,200

74.3

3.87

1.105

2,199

46.4

3.20

1.188

2,200

33.1

2.76

1.306

*  Value range from 1 to 5 and options 1–5 stand for ‘strongly disagree’, ‘not really agree’, ‘not able to express it clearly/it doesn’t matter’, ‘somewhat agree’, ‘strongly agree’ respectively. Source: Survey on Family Value Changes (2008)

sacrifice everything for the sake of their children’ receives an almost 60 per cent approval rating, and the overall attitudes tend to be something between ‘not able to express it clearly’ and ‘somewhat agree’. In addition, the standard deviations of this group’s indicators are generally greater than those related to the idea of filial piety. This suggests that the interviewees hold scattered and diversified attitudes towards the traditional view that parents should shoulder unlimited responsibilities for their children. Compared with the approval ratings of above 70 per cent or even above 90 per cent, the approval rating for parents’ responsibility in the culture of traditional familism is not high. In fact, our survey also shows that 64.2 per cent of interviewees clearly agree that an ‘adult child over 18 should be independent/ earn his/her own living’. This suggests that the interviewees prefer the modern value of adult children breaking away from their parents’ protection and earning their own living.

337

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

4.2.3 Familism Makes Family Resources Flow to the Offspring The statistical results of intergenerational support show that the interviewees who have old parents and also adult children give more help to their adult children than to their old parents. Table 8.14 demonstrates that the share of those ‘often’ giving adult children economic, housework, and emotional support are much higher than those supporting their parents. Furthermore, when comparing the data between urban and rural areas, we find that the intergenerational support preference for offspring in rural areas is more obvious than in urban areas. Based on this, we can conclude that the aged (grandparents) in rural areas get less support from their families than those in urban areas. The phenomenon of ‘attaching greater importance to the aged than the young’ in theory but ‘attaching greater importance to the young than the aged’ in reality suggests that intergenerational relationships still retain the characteristics of the traditional ‘corporate model’ in China today in spite of the fact that parents’ authority has been declining. This corporate model emphasises that family is an economic unit which is formed by members who are absolutely rational and who are clearly aware of their own interests. According to Table 8.14 The support preferences of interviewees who have both parents and adult children (percentages)

Economic support

To parents R U To child R U Housework To parents R support U To child R U Emotional To parents R support U To child R U

1

2

3

4

mv

sn

13.4 22.4 14.5 28.2 6.9 15.2 18.0 15.9 6.1 7.2 6.8 7.1

43.3 21.1 17.4 14.1 29.9 20.7 7.0 7.3 29.0 16.0 15.3 14.1

38.8 30.8 34.0 20.7 46.8 22.8 27.2 17.7 48.5 35.9 45.5 31.5

9.5 25.7 34.0 36.9 16.5 41.4 47.8 59.1 16.5 40.9 32.3 47.3

1.39 1.60 1.88 1.66 1.73 1.90 2.05 2.20 1.75 2.11 2.03 2.19

231 237 231 241 231 237 228 232 231 237 235 241

F test

5.147* 4.107* 3.801 2.039 19.475*** 3.622

Notes: R = Rural, U = Urban; Value range: 1 = No, 2 = Seldom, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Often; mv = Mean value; sn = Sample numbers; Significance level: *P < 0.05; ***P < 0.001. Source: Survey on Family Value Changes (2008)

338

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

the explanation of this model, the various forms of the Chinese family structure and relationship as well as the changes to them are all driven by the pursuit of maximising family economic interests.63 In accordance with the Pareto efficiency principle of resource distribution, children would use the lowestcost method to satisfy their parents’ needs for intergenerational support, and thus would maximise the overall welfare of individuals and the family.64 On one hand, offspring are in the life-cycle which requires more family economic resources and labour resources, and the reason why adult children obtain more support than the aged parents is due to the rational principle of each receiving aid according to his or her needs in the family ‘corporate’ unit. On the other hand, since it is the development of the younger generation that decides the future of the family, investing more resources in the younger generation is a family strategy which would be most in accordance with the family’s future interest. We can see that when elderly people do not possess family resources they usually obtain only the lowest basic necessities of life even if intergenerational cohesion and cooperative nature are kept unchanged. As a result, the life of elderly people becomes more difficult in rural families that usually have only very limited resources. Since the model of this kind of familistic cohesiveness between generations continues to exist, laying a social and psychological foundation to a certain degree, elderly people’s interests tend to be largely marginalised so that they have no choice but to accept their position of being ignored. Middle-aged people are conflicted in that they are grateful to their elders but have to take care of their children at the same time. The family has great expectations of the younger generation that enjoys all the love, affection, and resources of all other generations. 4.3 Changes in the Ideal Family Type – Generational Differences 4.3.1 Marital View among Young People Tends to Be More Diversified As was mentioned above, young people under thirty-five hold much more tolerant attitudes towards premarital sex than middle- or old-aged people. Table 8.15 shows that young people under thirty-five also show significant differences from other generations when it comes to other indicators of marital views. First of all, the traditional views on getting married and having children as well as being faithful to one’s husband unto death have been broken somewhat. Young people under the age of thirty-five give more support to the idea that ‘pursuing personal happiness is more important than 63 64

See Yan Yunxiang (2006, 5–8); Zimmer and Kwong (2003). See Lee et al. (1994); Zhang Wenjuan and Li Shuzhuo (2004).

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

339

Table 8.15 The description of family multi-value indicators and intergenerational comparison Indicators

Indicator description

One would marry whatever happens Pursuing personal happiness is more important than tolerating an inharmonious marriage No childbearing after marrying Cohabitation Cohabitation could make the two sides know each other before marriage so as to judge whether they are fit for each other or not Single men and women can live together so long as they intend to marry Single men and women can live together even if they do not plan to marry Homosexuality Homosexuality is sexual orientation/practice that belongs to personal freedom and deserves respect Homosexual families should be accepted by society Marriage, divorce, childbearing

Approval Index

F test

Under 35 years old

Over 36 years old

N = 594

N = 1,606

3.78

3.95

11.555**

3.44

3.21

19.061***

1.84 2.76

1.69 2.28

17.455*** 77.850***

2.56

2.23

40.933***

2.13

1.79

55.087***

2.89

2.26

130.142***

2.72

2.14

112.995***

Notes: The value range of the approval index is from 1 to 5. Options 1–5 stand for ‘strongly disagree’, ‘not really agree’, ‘not able to express it clearly/it doesn’t matter’, ‘somewhat agree’, ‘strongly agree’ respectively. Significance level: **P < 0.01; ***P < 0.001. Source: Survey on Family Value Changes (2008)

340

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

tolerating an inharmonious marriage’ and ‘no childbearing after marriage’ than to the idea that ‘one would marry whatever happens’. Secondly, people are likely to be more rational and open on the issue of cohabitation. As we have mentioned above, the acceptance of cohabitation is not high in general, however, significance tests indicate that young people under the age of thirty-five hold a strikingly different set of ideal views from people above thirty-six. Young people under the age of thirty-five are more willing to accept the idea that ‘cohabitation could make the two sides know each other before marriage so as to judge whether they are fit for each other or not’. They are more willing to recognise the legitimacy of premarital cohabitation, and they are more willing to agree that ‘single men and women can live together even if they do not plan to marry’. Thirdly, young people under the age of thirty-five are significantly more tolerant of homosexuality than people above thirty-six, which suggests that there have been remarkable improvements recently in the perception of respecting personal choice and privacy. It is necessary to clarify that, compared with most Western countries, China has never been strongly against intimacy between two persons of the same sex, however, the general knowledge and recognition of homosexuality is also different from Western societies, which put it into rational frameworks in terms of civil rights; or social, political and religious problems; and which discuss it openly. The majority of Chinese people still consider homosexuality a private and moral affair. Family relationships and ethics are still very important in the daily life of Chinese people, and homosexuality is often taken as a harmless private affair since the act will not produce children. It also received much less attention at the time before there was risk-consciousness of aids. However, as homosexual couples are not able to produce children and this is against traditional Chinese family ethics, it is more difficult for the public to accept homosexual families. The traditional view on filial piety and moral ethics hold to the idea that ‘having no male heir is the gravest of three cardinal offences against filial piety’. This makes homosexuals bear significant pressure from parents and relatives and makes the general public reluctant to recognise the combination of homosexual partners as ‘families’. 4.3.2 No Decline Can Be Recognised in Filial Piety There is a moral anxiety over a decline of ‘filial piety’ that mainly refers to young people. However, this study finds that young people are more willing to support their parents rather than neglect them when compared with middle or old-aged people. First of all, among the four aspects of the idea of filial piety, a significant age difference appears only in the case of ‘supporting parents’ and

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

341

‘attending upon parents’, but this does not mean that filial piety is declining among young people (see Table 8.16). On the contrary, interviewees of thirtyfive years old and under have a stronger recognition of the ideas that ‘children should try their best to support their parents and make their parents live more comfortably’ and that ‘children should live together with their parents when their parents become old and are not able to take care of themselves’ than those over thirty-six. Young people are not only more willing to agree to be kind to their parents but also more willing to live together with their old-aged parents. This result is different from the idea that young people stress privacy more and are not willing to live together with parents and to bear the burdens of family. The phenomenon that young people have a stronger perception of being kind to parents has something, on the one hand, to do with the life-cycle. The study of filial piety carried out in Taiwan shows that children and teenagers who are not at a complicated stage of life hold a relatively absolute, concrete and pure idea of filial piety and take it for granted. However adults who are faced with many more life and career objectives hold a more complicated idea of filial piety that Table 8.16 The age difference in the acceptance of the idea of traditional intergenerational support (percentages) 1

2

Support parents 35− 0.5 1.5 36+ 0.4 2.4 Attend upon 35− 0.7 4.4 parents 36+ 1.7 9.3 Sacrifice for 35− 8.8 39.2 children 36+ 4.0 23.5 Pay college fee 35− 2.5 28.8 36+ 1.4 12.9 Provide wedding 35− 8.2 34.2 room 36+ 4.9 27.9 Look after 35− 15.8 47.6 36+ 14.2 39.9 grandchild

3

4

5

mv

sn

F test

2.2 3.4 7.4 7.5 9.1 9.2 9.6 5.9 18.5 18.1 11.6 9.8

34 41.0 42.3 45.8 22.6 29.1 38.4 42.3 30.3 31.2 17.7 19.4

61.8 52.8 45.3 35.7 20.4 34.3 20.7 37.5 8.8 17.8 7.2 16.7

4.55 4.43 4.27 4.04 3.07 3.66 3.46 4.02 2.97 3.29 2.53 2.85

594 1,606 594 1,606 594 1,605 594 1,606 594 1,605 594 1,606

12.200*** 25.401*** 92.610*** 116.137*** 31.796*** 25.839***

Notes: 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = not really agree; 3 = not able to express it clearly/it doesn’t matter; 4 = somewhat agree; 5 = strongly agree; mv= Mean value; sn = Sample number; Significance level: ***P < 0.001. Source: Survey on Family Value Changes (2008)

342

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

is not so absolute and is in accordance with certain other principles.65 On the other hand, as a result of the one-child policy, young people under the age of thirty-five have more positive emotional interactions with their parents while receiving more love and care from them too. The deep driving force for them to be filial towards their parents may decrease due to the pressure of public opinion or changing moral standards, but this force may also become stronger because of the ‘love’ for their parents deep in their hearts.66 Meanwhile, since they are the only child of the family, young people under the age of thirty-five may have a stronger sense of responsibility and pressure than people in large families. Secondly, as for the four indicators on caring about children, all the interviewed young people of thirty-five years old and under are significantly more likely to disagree than middle and old-aged people. The reason why young people believe in the idea of intergenerational support of ‘attaching greater importance to the old than the young’ may be due to the fact that they do not have their own children yet. Besides, they are more likely to disagree with the idea of sacrificing for their children, with this being their ideal judgement for a kind of state of lifestyle to which they have as yet no direct connection. On the other hand, it is also related to the condition that recently young people obtain more help from their parents. Our survey shows that the average economic aid young people of thirty-five and under get from parents is 7.8 times more than that of people who are thirty-six years old and above (9,128 rmb versus 1,171 rmb). About 54.5 per cent of interviewees of thirty-five and under ‘often’ receive help from parents in doing housework, while among people of thirtysix and above, only 21.0 per cent receive such help. It can be argued that the traditional Chinese altruistic responsibility ethic may also lead to this different attitude, alongside life-cycle effects and the emotional factor in actual intergenerational mutual benefits. That is to say, old-aged interviewees think that as parents they should follow the moral standard of being ‘good parents’ and try to relieve the burdens on their children, so they prefer caring about their children; but young interviewees follow the moral standard of being a ‘filial child’ and hold that they should try to think of and look after their parents, thus they prefer taking care of their parents. Similar findings also appear in other studies discussing the ethics of intergenerational responsibility. For example, Martin Whyte studied the intergenerational relationships in Baoding City and found that parents are more willing

65 66

Yang Guoshu et al. (2009, 99–101). Wu Chao et al. (2008).

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

343

(than their children) to agree that ‘people should be more concerned about caring for their own children than about caring for their parents or parents-inlaw’ (the proportion of parents and children who agree with the above idea: 46 per cent versus 31 per cent). Parents were also seen to be more willing to agree that ‘young people should be more concerned about their careers than about caring for their parents’ (the proportion of parents and children who agreed with the above idea: 71 per cent versus 38 per cent).67 Whatever the reason is, the study could not prove the idea that contemporary young people are extremely egotistical, demand from parents endlessly, and disregard their responsibility to support their parents. 4.4 Summary 4.4.1 A Mixed Tendency of Loose Marriage Relationships and Close Intergenerational Relationships Contemporary Chinese family values present a quite clear mixed tendency of traditional ‘close intergenerational relationships’ with ‘pure relationships’, influenced by both modernity and post-modernity.68 On one hand, with the general improvement of education and the improvement of urbanisation and industrialisation, the development of Chinese family values presents a quite clear feature of modernity, that is, as a result of accepting modern concepts such as equality, freedom, and democracy, people in China tend to emphasise more the liberation of the human being and the pursuit of self-realisation; and as to marital views they tend to emphasise more individual independence and autonomy. In line with the conclusions of many previous empirical studies, this study also suggests that young people have increasingly open sexual views and stronger self-consciousness,69 and the tolerance for premarital sex and cohabitation is increasing.70 Compared with people born in earlier decades, the acceptance of premarital sex, cohabitation, and homosexuality by young people under the age of thirty-five is increasing. The whole of society shows a 67

68

69 70

The statements of the two indicators are as follow: ‘people should be more concerned about caring for their own children than about caring for their parents or parents-in-law’; ‘young people should be more concerned about their careers than about caring for their parents’. See Whyte (1997). Pure relationship refers to ‘an intimate relationship formed for the sake of an intimate relationship’. This kind of relationship can be maintained only when both sides are satisfied with what they get (mainly with reference to feelings of intimacy and love) from the relationship. See Giddens ([1992] trans. by Chen and Wang 2001, 77). Zhu Jinyi (2008). Cheng Yi (2005).

344

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

tendency that the older an individual is, the more conservative his or her marital views are. On the other hand, from the perspective of intergenerational relationships, China does not show the phenomenon of individualisation seen in Western societies when it comes to values and attitudes.71 People in China rather tend to keep showing relatively strong family values and attitudes. The weakening of intergenerational relationships and the disappearance of family communities characterising Western societies are largely absent in China. On the contrary, in recent years there has been a stronger tendency to lay stress more on basic family obligations, wherein people enjoy closer intergenerational relationships, maintaining the features of the aforementioned ‘corporate’ model of family. In terms of marriage, there is still a high level of affirmation for the value of marriage and high expectation of faithfulness within marriage. Furthermore, the differences between generations in this area are tiny. Aside from this, the approval rating for the cohabitation of middle- and old-aged people is higher than that for cohabitation by unmarried young people, and the objection to homosexual marriage is stronger than that towards homosexual acts. These survey results indicate to a certain degree that people in China are still more concerned about non-emotional factors like economic interest and existing family relationships when they judge whether certain lifestyles are rational or not. As for intergenerational relationships, our survey does not find any tendency towards a decline in filial piety. The survey data suggest that the idea of filial piety still enjoys an absolutely mainstream position. Moreover, among the eight traditional familistic views on intergenerational relationships, interviewees are more willing to agree with the idea of being filial to their parents rather than being concerned about their adult children. On the other hand, data results show that young people’s ideal view of supporting their parents has not weakened; on the contrary, their ideal view on intergenerational relationships tends to be the one of ‘attaching greater importance to the elder than the younger’. They are more traditional and closer to the ideal view of supporting their parents. All these results show that Chinese families managed to maintain a strong familistic culture during the rapid process of modernisation. 4.4.2

Familistic Ideals of Intergenerational Relations Combined with Individualism In terms of intergenerational relationships, contemporary Chinese still have a strong wish to unite across generations, but this ‘traditional’ wish is not just

71

See Beck and Beck-Gernsheim ([2002] trans. by Li Rongshan et al. 2011, 101–103).

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

345

a simple copy and continuation of the previous familistic culture of intergenerational relationships. Instead, it has some distinguishing features of individualistic culture, such as the rise of emotional relationships, the decline of authoritarian relationships, and the sense of obligation with unlimited liability. As psychological studies in Taiwan have found, the development of modernisation itself does promote the transformation of traditional intergenerational relationships. In modern Taiwan, individualistic culture and traditional filial piety have gradually transformed into a new filial piety based on individualism. The traditional views of filial piety include the authority of parents and the duties of children, accompanied by fixed role orientations. These have now gradually been transformed into new notions of filial piety that include the coexistence of authority and duties on the part of both the parents and the children, accompanied by flexible roles and emotional orientations. The influence of authority and exchange has fallen and fulfilling filial piety is not seen as an attitude and behaviour forced on children by their parents, but as a method and channel for self-fulfilment.72 The comparison between the generations in this study shows that the advancing of age brings about both the positive effect of being kind to one’s parents and the negative effect of being concerned about one’s children endlessly. Young people have a strong sense of responsibility in behaviour towards their parents but they seem to have a strong sense of self-consciousness in dealing with children, whereas the idea of unlimited altruism seems to have weakened. The study of young migrant workers conducted by Mette H. Hansen and Pang Cuiming points out that young people’s sense of obligation should not be misunderstood as altruism in traditional familism. The foundation of this sense of obligation is to give an actual and practical evaluation to a kind of life in which individuals have the right to pursue individual interests, while at the same time family is still guaranteed as the stable source of a sense of security. Family is the only source for people to obtain social security when they are confronted with disease, need for care and affection, and when they suffer from property loss or unemployment. For young people, family is the indisputable ‘collective’ having social, emotional, and psychological values. On one hand they emphasise that their closest relatives and family are their only important ‘collective’, on the other hand they persist in striving for their own interests, rights, and ambitions as individuals.73 Therefore, it can be argued that the strong sense of responsibility of being kind to one’s parents among 72 73

Yang Guoshu (2009, 36–45); Ye Guanghui (2009, 110). Hansen and Pang Cuiming ([2010] trans. by Xu Yefang et al. 2011).

346

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

young people today is a form of ‘modern familism’, that is, an ideal view of intergenerational relationships based on individualistic values. 4.4.3 Instrumental Dependence and Familistic Values74 It should be emphasised that intergenerational support is not the result of transformed subjective values or morals. The role institutional environment plays in shaping the practice of intergenerational support should not be ignored, and it could even be said that it plays a decisive role. From the perspective of the welfare system design in a country, one can see that China is the same as Southern European countries like Spain and Italy, in which family is the most important source of social security for individuals. Under these circumstances, a relatively low divorce and cohabitation rate become common marriage and family features, and it is not possible for the rearrangement of sexual relations to fully eliminate family and social constraints. Consequently, to understand China’s intergenerational relationships, which cannot be explained well by modernisation theories, we should pay more attention to micro-institutions that differ from those found in Western modernisation. For example, in contrast to the expectations of the classical modernisation theory, during China’s economic development the salary, welfare, and resources provided by employers, the market, and the government have not replaced the informal support of the family. On the contrary, close intergenerational relationships keep playing an irreplaceable role in resisting pressures like the increasing divorce rate, risk of unemployment, and when facing other emergencies in life. The role the family network plays in providing economic assurance and emotional/psychological support for family members is increasing somewhat, and it even becomes a ‘life raft’75 for vulnerable families suffering due to market competition. For example, the survey conducted in 2008 on the values of urban and rural families asked the question ‘who would you turn to for help when you really need money?’ The statistical result shows that 92 per cent of the interviewees would turn to family members for help. Within that, ‘parents and the elders’ accounted for 29.3 per cent, ‘brothers and sisters’ 53.5 per cent, and ‘children’ 9.2 per cent. Except for family members, about 41 per cent of interviewees would ask their friends, colleagues, and neighbours for help, and those who would ask their working units and the market for help accounted for less than 1 per cent of the total. The data also shows that elderly people 74 75

‘Instrumental dependence’ here refers to the difficulties of self-reliance due to the insufficiency of socio-economic conditions. Xu Anqi et al. (2006).

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

347

basically depend on their children in rural areas where there are no pensions, therefore rural residents hold higher approval ratings than urban residents for familistic values. Furthermore, as mentioned above, currently the Chinese family still mainly appears as rationally ‘corporate’, which is the exact reason why the elders’ interests are squeezed out and family resources tend to centre upon younger generations. These phenomena fully demonstrate that family values are to a certain degree the result of the current welfare structure. 5

Summary and Conclusions

Having recourse to state statistical data as well as surveys conducted by other scholars since the 1980s, this chapter mainly summarises macro-level social changes (economic and political reforms, changes to ideologies, etc.), by focusing on depicting the transformation of family structure, and by analysing the changes in gender perception represented by the employment patterns of women as well as the status quo of family values that take marital views, sexual views, and intergenerational views as their core. The analyses in this chapter show that, through continuous progressive social change, China’s social modernisation in the narrow sense is basically in accordance with the definition of Asian modernisation proposed by Chang Kyung-Sup: ‘compressed modernisation’. There was a sharp man-made drop in the birth rate in the 1970s as a result of the family-planning policy adopted by the government. Between 1980 and 1990, the substitution level remained stable, however, the second birth-rate drop occurred suddenly at the beginning of the 1990s when the overall birth rate decreased to about 1.2, which initiated the second modernisation process without interruption. The scale of the Chinese family reduced to 3.1 persons from 4.4 on average at the beginning of the 1980s. The nuclear family has accounted for about 70 per cent of all families over the last thirty years, whereas the rate of one-person households has gone up to about 8 per cent. There is a slight difference between the data on urban and rural areas, but it is not big enough to affect the overall picture. Furthermore, the analyses show that China, as a socialist country, adopted a gender policy from the 1950s that implemented the principle of equality between men and women, with equal pay for equal work, and had a relatively high employment rate for women (90 per cent). However since market economic reforms have been carried out, female employment has lost its political importance and institutional safeguards, hence, the female employment rate has dropped significantly. Statistical data indicates that the employment rate of urban and rural women aged between eighteen and sixty-four dropped from

348

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

88.2 per cent to 72 per cent from 1990 to the end of 2000. At the same time, debates over ‘housewifisation’, which focuses on the idea of sending women home, have emerged several times. However, this idea of sending women home did not receive wide acceptance and the majority of women are still career women in China. Chinese society has fallen into a feminist social pattern without real feminism. Even if females, from an ideological perspective, agree with the traditional idea that women should go back home, they are not allowed to do so in reality. This situation is also in line with the paradoxical pattern of Asian societies defined as compressed modernisation by Chang Kyung-Sup. This chapter has also found that currently Chinese family values exhibit a clear tendency towards a mixture of a traditional Chinese way of ‘close intergenerational relationships’ and ‘pure relationships’ influenced by modernity and post-modernity. On one hand, with the general improvement of education and the improvement of urbanisation and industrialisation, the development of Chinese family values presents a quite clear feature of modernity. That is, under the influence of accepting modern concepts like equality, freedom, and democracy, people tend to emphasise more the liberation of the human being and pursue self-realisation, along with marital views emphasising more individual independence and autonomy. On the other hand, from the perspective of family values, China does not show the post-modern tendency that features the atomisation of family members and the disappearance of family links, which have appeared in Western societies. On the contrary, there is a tendency which stresses basic family obligations and a closer intergenerational relationship. Furthermore, in China there is still a strong affirmative value of marriage and high expectations of faithfulness between spouses, and the differences between generations over these values are miniscule. Moreover, the approval rating for cohabitation of middle- and old-aged people is higher than in the case of the cohabitation of unmarried young people, and the objection to homosexual marriage is stronger than that to homosexual acts. It is also worth mentioning that, according to the data of the World Values Survey, though Chinese people had a lower evaluation of family importance than other countries in the 1990s, the evaluation increased greatly from the beginning of the twenty-first century.76 Likewise, many domestic surveys carried out since the 1990s also suggest that the tendency of the family’s value in maintaining happiness is increasing rather than declining, while social 76

The proportion of people who consider that ‘family is very important to life’ was 62.2 per cent, 76.6 per cent, and 60.7 per cent in the surveys carried out in 1990, 1995, and 2001 respectively; whereas the result of the survey in 2007 was 78.5 per cent. http://www .wvsevsdb.com/wvs/wvsanalizeQuestion.jsp.

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

349

collectivism has at the same time been declining.77 This tendency is closely related to China’s unique process of social development, and it also reveals the impacts of dependence and welfare structure on family values. After the founding of the prc, the government pushed a collectivist culture that advocated devoting oneself to the country and society and downplayed family and individual interests. Leaving the family and plunging into work had become central in self-realisation, which focused on dedicating oneself to the country and society, while pursuing family happiness somewhat implied selfish individualism. Although the government had broken down the clan system and established a nuclear family structure, private family life that could have stressed intimate affection had not been formed. Private life had even been heavily stigmatised for a certain period of time because social life had been politicised. Therefore, before the reform and opening-up, the collectivistic culture which attached greater importance to the collective than to individuals had replaced the familistic culture which attached greater importance to family than individuals. After the reform and transformation to a market economy, state power retreated and released its grip on the social space that had squeezed family life in the past, and people’s views on family then also rebounded to a certain degree. Before the national reform of the economic system, welfare mainly came from the individual’s Danwei (see Subsection 3.1.2), and family played a limited role. However, after entering the twenty-first century, with life risks caused by the disintegration of the Danwei system and the emergence of the market economy, the family’s role as a safety net in personal life has increased significantly. Furthermore, there is a growing number of private enterprises and family firms, and there is also an increase in family income. In particular, the foundation of the stock market and the commercialisation of housing have further promoted this increase of family income. These factors contributed to the growth of property owned by parents that could be inherited by their children; house prices have also escalated rapidly and parents have to invest more for the wedding room for their children, sometimes having to use the savings of three generations to purchase an apartment. However, the availability of child day-care services lags behind demand and young working couples often have to depend on their parents to look after the third generation. All these structural factors constitute the forces that promote a closer family intergenerational relationship. Hence, on the path of China’s rapid modernisation, it is becoming more and more difficult for individuals to live without 77

See Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan shehuixue yanjiusuo [Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences] (1993, 79–81); Zhou Yi (1994); Huang Yingying (2001).

350

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

the guarantees and assistance of their families, despite the fact that a sort of individualistic culture is currently becoming more and more popular. As a result, in comparison with the period of time before the economic reform and opening-up, the importance of family values has been enhanced rather than threatened. In contrast, the survey results presented in this chapter also indicate to a certain degree that people in China are still more concerned about nonemotional factors like economic interest and existing family relationships when they judge whether their private life is rational or not. In having a strong sense of responsibility to be kind to one’s parents, contemporary young people present a sort of ‘modern familism’, which refers to an ideal view of intergenerational relationships based on individualistic values. On one hand they emphasise that their closest relatives and family members are their only important ‘collective’, whereas, on the other hand, they persist in striving for their own interests, rights, and ambitions as individuals. This state is also in conformity with the definition of the dilemma of the individualised Asian without individualism, as proposed by Chang Kyung-Sup.78 References Beck, Ulrich. 1999. World Risk Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Translated by He Bowen. Nanjing: Yilin chubanshe [Nanjing: Yilin Press], 2004. (乌尔里希・贝克【何博闻译】 『风险社会』南京: 译林出版社, 2004.) Beck, Ulrich and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. 2002. Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and Its Social and Political Consequences. London: Sage. Translated by Li Rongshan, et al. Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe [Beijing: Beijing University Press], 2011. (乌尔里希・贝克, 伊丽莎白・贝克-恩格斯海姆著【李荣山等译】『个体 化』北京: 北京大学出版社, 2011.) Chang Kyung-Sup. 2010. ‘Individualization without individualism: Compressed modernity and obfuscated family crisis in East Asia’. Journal of Intimate and Public Spheres (Pilot Issue): 23–39. Chen Xuan. 2008. ‘Zouxiang houxiandai de Meiguo jiating: Lilun fenqi yu jingyan yanjiu’ [American families approaching the post-modern era: Theoretical divergences and empirical research]. Shehui [Society] 4: 173–186.(陈璇「走向后现代的美国家庭: 理论分歧与经验研究」『社会』2008年第4期, 第173–186页.) 78

Also see the brief explanation of the term individualisation without individualism in the Introduction of this volume.

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

351

Cheng Yi. 2005. ‘Xing guannian: Dangdai Zhongguo daxuesheng de shiji zouxiang yu xianzhuang—Jiyu Shanghai ruogan gaoxiao shizheng diaocha de yanjiu he fenxi’ [Sexual views: Actual tendencies and the status quo of contemporary college students; based on the study and analysis of empirical surveys on several universities in Shanghai]. Huadong Ligong Daxue (Shehui kexue ban) [Journal of East China University of Science and Technology (Social Science Edition)] 4: 8–13. (程毅「性观念: 当代中国大学生的实际走向与现状—基于上海若干高校实证调 查的研究和分析」『华东理工大学(社会科学版)』2005年第4期, 第8–13页.) Feng Xiaotian. 2008. ‘Dusheng zinü jiating: Youyu yu chongai’ [The one-child family: Rearing a better child and doting on a child]. In Wuyan xia de ningjing biange: Zhongguo jiating 30 nian [Quiet Reforms under the Eaves: Thirty Years of the Chinese Family], edited by Xu Chunlian, 172–185. Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe [Guangzhou: Guangdong Higher Education Press]. (风笑天「独生子女 家庭: 优育与宠爱」载于徐春莲主编『屋檐下的宁静变革—中国家庭30年』 广州: 广 东高等教育出版社, 2008, 第172–185页.) Giddens, Anthony. 1992. The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in the Modern Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Translated by Chen Yongguo and Wang Min’an, et al. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe [Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press], 2001. (安东尼・吉登斯【陈永国, 汪民安等译】『亲密关系 的变革: 现代社会中的性, 爱和爱欲』北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2001.) Guan Ying. 2008. ‘Jiating daiji guanxi: Fuyang yu shanyang’ [Intergenerational family relationships: Raising children and supporting the aged]. In Wuyan xia de ningjing biange: Zhongguo jiating 30 nian [Quiet Reforms under the Eaves: Thirty Years of the Chinese Family], edited by Xu Chunlian, 79–95. Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe [Guangzhou: Guangdong Higher Education Press]. (关颖「家庭代 际关系: 抚养与赡养」徐春莲主编『屋檐下的宁静变革—中国家庭30年』 广州:广东 高等教育出版社, 2008, 第79–95页.) Habermas, Jürgen. 1991. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press. Translated by Cao Weidong, et al. Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe [Shanghai: Academia Press], 2002. (尤尔根·哈贝马斯著【曹卫东等译】『公共领域的 结构转型』上海: 学林出版社, 2002.) Hansen, Mette H. and Pang Cuiming. 2010. ‘Idealizing individual choice: Work, love and family in the eyes of young rural Chinese’. In iChina – The Rise of the Individual in Modern Chinese Society, edited by Mette H. Hansen and Rune Svarverud, 39–64. Denmark (Copenhagen): nias Press. Translated by Xu Yefang, et al. Shanghai: Shanghai yiwen chubanshe [Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House], 2011: 42–70. (贺美德, 庞翠明「个人选择的理想化: 中国农村青年眼中的工作, 爱情 和家庭」载于贺美德, 鲁纳编著【许烨芳等译】『“自我”中国—现代中国社会中个体 的崛起』上海: 上海译文出版社, 2011, 第42–70页.)

352

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

Honig, Emily. 1985. ‘Socialist revolution and women’s liberation in China’. The Journal of Asian Studies 44 (2): 329–336. Huang Yingying. 2001. ‘Cong shuju kan qingnian de jiazhiguan quxiang—20 shiji 90 niandai jiazhiguan diaocha yanjiu wenxian fenxi’ [Young people’s value orientation seen from data: Literature analysis of the surveys and studies on values in the 1990s]. Qingnian yanjiu [Youth Study] 10: 37–45.(黄盈盈「从数据看青年的价值观取向— 20 世纪90 年代价值观调查研究文献分析」『青年研究』2001年第10期, 第37–45页.) Ji Qiufa. 1995. ‘Beijing qingnian de hunyinguan—Yixiang shizheng diaocha fenxi’ [Marital views of young people in Beijing: An empirical analysis]. Qingnian yanjiu [Youth Study] 7: 19–25. (纪秋发「北京青年的婚姻观—一项实证调查分析」『青年研 究』1995年第7期, 第19–25页.) Jiang Yongping. 2001. ‘Shiji zhijiao guanyu “jieduan jiuye” he “funü huijia” de dataolun’ [Great debates on ‘discontinuous employment’ and ‘women-back-home’ at the turn of the twentieth century and twenty-first century]. Funü yanjiu luncong [Women Studies Collection] 2: 23–28. (蒋永萍「世纪之交关于“阶段就业”和“妇女回家”的大讨 论」『妇女研究论丛』2001年第2期, 第23–28页.) ——. 2003. ‘Liang zhong tizhi xia de Zhongguo chengshi funü jiuye’ [Female employment in Chinese cities under two (different) systems]. Funü yanjiu luncong [Women Studies Collection] 1: 15–21. (蒋永萍「两种体制下的中国城市妇女就业」『妇女研究 论丛』2003年第1期, 第15–21页.) ——. 2007. ‘Chongjian funü jiuye de shehui zhichi tixi’ [Reconstructing the social support system for women’s employment]. Zhejiang xuekan [Zhejiang Academic Journal] 2: 207–211. (蒋永萍「重建妇女就业的社会支持体系」『浙江学刊』2007年第2 期, 第207– 211页.) ——. 2012. ‘“Jiaguo tonggou” yu funü xingbie juese de shuangchong jiangou—Jihua jingji shiqi Zhongguo shehui de guojia yu funü’ [The ‘isomorph of family and state’ and the dualistic construct of women’s gender roles: The country and women in the Chinese planned economy]. Shandong nüzi xueyuan xuebao [Journal of Shandong Female College] 1: 1–6. (蒋永萍「“家国同构”与妇女性别角色的双重建构—计划经济 时期中国社会的国家与妇女」『山东女子学院学报』2012年第1期,第1–6页.) Jin Yihong. 2006. ‘“Tie guniang” zaisikao—Zhongguo wenhua dageming qijian de shehui xingbie yu laodong’ [Reflections upon ‘Iron Women’: Social gender and labour during the cultural revolution in China.] Shehuixue yanjiu [Sociological Research] 1: 169–196. (金一虹「“铁姑娘”再思考—中国文化大革命期间的社会性别与劳动」『社 会学研究』2006年第1期, 第169–196页.) Kinnunen, Ulla, Ad Vermulst, Jan Gerris and Anne Mäkikangas. 2003. ‘Work–family and its relations to well-being: The role of personality as a moderating factor’. Personality and Individual Difference 35 (7): 1669–1683. Lee Yean-Ju, William L. Parish and Robert J. Wills. 1994. ‘Sons, daughters, and intergenerational support in Taiwan’. American Journal of Sociology 99 (40): 1010–1041.

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

353

Li Yinhe. 2003. Xing wenhua yanjiu baogao [Report on the Study of Sex Culture]. Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin shubanshe [Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Press]. (李银河『性文化研究 报告』南京: 江苏人民出版社, 2003.) Lin Yutang. 2000. Zhongguoren [Chinese People (My Country and My People)]. Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe [Shanghai: Academia Press]. (林语堂『中国人』上海:学林出版社, 2000.) Lu Feng. 1989. ‘Danwei: Yizhong teshu de shehui zuzhi xingtai’ [Danwei: A unique social organisation]. Zhongguo shehui kexue [China Social Science] 1: 66–73. (路风「 单位: 一种特殊的社会组织形态」『中国社会科学』1989年第1期, 第66–73页.) Lu Shuhua. 1997. ‘Hunyinguan de tongji fenxi yu bianqian yanjiu’ [Statistical analysis and research on the change of marital values]. Shehuixue yanjiu [Sociological Research] 2: 37–47. (卢淑华「婚姻观的统计分析与变迁研究」『社会学研究』1997年 第2期, 第37–47页.) Minzhengbu [Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China]. 2010 nian shehui fuwu fazhan tongji baogao [Statistical Report on Social Service Development, 2010]. (民政部『2010年社会服务发展统计报告』.) http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/ zwgk/mzyw/201106/20110600161364.shtml. Mo Rong. 2001. ‘Jiuye—Xin shiji mianlin de tiaozhan yu jueze’ [Employment: Challenge and choice in the new century]. In Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce [Analysis and Forecast of the Social Landscape in China], edited by Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi and Shan Tianlun, 121–132. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe [Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press]. (莫荣「就业—新世纪面临的挑战与抉择」载于汝信, 陆学艺, 单天 伦主编『中国社会形势分析与预测』北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2001, 第121–132页.) Ochiai Emiko. [1994] 2004. 21 seiki kazoku e: Kazoku no sengo taisei no mikata, koekata [Towards the Family in the Twenty-First Century]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishing Co.79 ( 落合恵美子『21世紀家族へ 家族の戦後体制の見かた・超えかた』東京: 有斐閣, [1994] 2004.) Translated by Zheng Yang. Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe [Jinan: Shandong People’s Press], 2010. (落合美惠子著【郑扬译】『21世纪的日本家庭, 何去 何从』济南： 山东人民出版社, 2010.) ——. 2010. ‘Reconstruction of intimate and public spheres in Asian modernity: Familialism and beyond’. Journal of Intimate and Public Spheres (Pilot Issue): 2–22. Pan Yunkang. 2006. ‘Nüxing jieduanxing jiuye he lianxuxing jiuye de shehuixue sikao’ [Sociological reflection upon the phased and continuous employment of women]. In Huaren funü jiating diwei—Taiwan, Tianjin, Shanghai, Xianggang zhi bijiao [The Position of Chinese Women in the Family: Comparison between Taiwai, Tianjin, Shanghai and Hong Kong], edited by Yi Qingchun and Chen Yuhua, 133–153. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [Beijing: China Social Science Press]. (潘允康「女性阶段性就 79

This book also has an English translation: Ochiai Emiko. 1997. The Japanese Family System in Transition: A Sociological Analysis of Family Change in Postwar Japan. Tokyo: ltcb International Library Foundation.

354

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

业和连续性就业的社会学思考」载于伊庆春,  陈玉华主编『华人妇女家庭地位—台 湾, 天津, 上海, 香港之比较』北京: 中国社会科学出版社, 2006, 第133–153页.)

Parish, William L. and James Farrer. 2000. ‘Gender and family’. In Chinese Urban Life under Reform, edited by Wenfang Tang and William L. Parish, 232–270. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quanguo fulian xuanchuanbu [Department of Communication of the Chinese Women’s Federation] et al. 2009. 2009 nian zhiye nüxing shengcun zhuangtai diaocha baogao [Report on the Well-Being of Women in the Workforce in China in 2009]. Baidu Wenku (web services company). (全国妇联宣传部等『2009年职业女性生存状态调查 报告』百度文库, 2009.) http://wenku.baidu.com/view/d9bbb6ff04a1b0717fd5dd5c. Shen Chonglin and Yang Shanhua, eds. 1995. Dangdai Zhongguo chengshi jiating yanjiu [Study of Urban Families in Modern China]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [Beijing: China Social Science Press]. (沈崇麟, 杨善华主编『当代中国城市 家庭研究』北京: 中国社会科学出版社, 1995.) Shen Chonglin, Yang Shanhua and Li Dongshan, eds. 1999. Shiji zhijiao de chengxiang jiating [Urban and Rural Families at the Turn of the Century]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [Beijing: China Social Science Press]. (沈崇麟, 杨善华, 李东山 主编『世纪之交的城乡家庭』北京: 中国社会科学出版社, 1999.) Song Shaopeng. 2011. ‘“Huijia” haishi “bei huijia”?—Shichanghua guocheng zhong “funü huijia” taolun yu Zhongguo shehui yishi xingtai zhuanxing’ [‘Returning Home’ or ‘Driven Home’: Debate over ‘Sending Women Home’ in the market-oriented development process and ideological transformation in Chinese society]. Funü yanjiu luncong [Women Studies Collection] 4: 5–26. (宋少鹏「“回家”还是“被回 家 ”?— 市场化过程中 “ 妇女回家”讨论与中国社会意识形态转型」『妇女研究沦 丛』2011年第4期, 第5–26页.) Sun Longji. 2004. Zhongguo wenhua de shenceng jiegou [The Underlying Structure of Chinese Culture]. Guilin: Guangxi Shifan Daxue chubanshe [Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press]. (孙隆基「中国文化的深层结构」『桂林: 广西师范大学出版社』2004.) Tao Chunfang and Jiang Yongping, eds. 1993. Zhongguo funü shehui diwei gaiguan [An Overview of the Social Status of Chinese Women]. Beijing: Zhongguo funü chubanshe [Beijing: Chinese Women’s Press]. (陶春芳, 蒋永萍主编『中国妇女社会地位概观』 中国妇女出版社, 1993.) Tominaga Kenichi. 1998. Makkusu We-ba- to Ajia no kindaika [Max Weber and the Modernisation of Asia]. Tokyo: Kōdansha. (富永健一『マックス・ヴェーバーとアジア の近代化』東京: 講談社, 1998.) Wang Hui. 2007. ‘Woguo nüxing congshi keji gongzuo xianzhuang yanjiu baogao zhaibian’ [Collection of study reports on the involvement of women in science and technology related activities]. Keji shibao [Science and Technology Times], 9 March. (王卉「我国女性从事科技工作现状研究报告摘编」『科技时报』2007-3-9.)

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

355

Wang Shuxin and Ma Jin. 2002. ‘Renkou laolinghua guocheng zhong de daiji guanxi xin zouxiang’ [New trends in generational relationships in the process of population ageing]. Renkou yu jingji [Population and Economics] 4: 15–21. (王树新, 马金「人口老 龄化过程中的代际关系新走向」『人口与经济』2002年第4期, 第15–21页.) Wang Yuesheng. 2006. ‘Dangdai Zhongguo jiating jiegou biandong fenxi’ [Analysis of changes to family structures in contemporary China]. Zhongguo shehui kexue [China Social Science] 1: 108–207. (王跃生「当代中国家庭结构变动分析」『中国社会 科学』2006年第1期, 第 108–207页.) ——. 2008. ‘Zhongguo jiating daiji guanxi de lilun fenxi’ [Theoretical analysis of family intergenerational relationships in China]. Renkou yanjiu [Population Research] 4: 13–21. (王跃生「中国家庭代际关系的理论分析」『人口研究』2008年第4期, 第13–21页.) Whyte, Martin K. 1997. ‘The fate of filial obligations in urban China’. The China Journal 38: 1–31. Wu Chao, Qin Qiwen and Li Yajuan. 2008. ‘Dui dangdai daxuesheng xiaodaoguan de diaocha—Gaige kaifang yilai Zhongguo shehui qingnian jiazhiguan bianqian yanjiu’ [Survey of contemporary college students’ views on filial piety: A study of Chinese young people’s value changes since the beginning of reform and opening-up]. Qingnian tansuo [Youth Exploration] 1: 40–43. (吴超, 秦启文, 李亚娟「对当代大学生孝道观的调查—改 革开放以来中国社会青年价值观变迁研究」『青年探索』2008年第1期, 第40–43页.) Xu Anqi. 1992. ‘Zhongwai funü jiating diwei de bijiao—Zhongguo chengshi jiating “yinsheng yangshuai” de shenceng pouxi’ [Comparison of Chinese and foreign women’s status in the family: In-depth analysis of ‘stronger women and weaker men’ in Chinese urban families]. Shehui [Society] 1: 12–14.(徐安琪「中外妇女家庭地 位的比较—中国城市家庭“阴盛阳衰”的深层剖析」『社会』1992年第1期, 第12–14页.) ——. 2003. ‘Weihun qingnian xing taidu yu xing xingwei de zuixin baogao’ [Latest report on unmarried young people’s sexual attitudes and sexual behaviour]. Qingnian yanjiu [Youth Study] 7: 12–22. (徐安琪「未婚青年性态度与性行为的最新 报告」『青年研究』2003年第7期, 第12–22页.) ——. 2010. ‘Jiating xingbie juese taidu: Kebanhua qingxiang de jingyan fenxi’ [Attitude towards family gender roles: Empirical analysis of stereotyping trends]. Funü yanjiu luncong [Women Studies Collection] 2: 18–28. (徐安琪「家庭性别角色态度: 刻板化倾 向的经验分析」『妇女研究论丛』2010年第2期, 第18–28页.) Xu Anqi, Zhang Liang and Liu Wenrong. 2006. ‘Jiating: Hexie shehui jianshe zhong de gongneng bianqian he zhengce zhichi’ [Family: The changing function and policy support in constructing a harmonious society]. Shehui kexue [Social Science] 4: 31–38. (徐安琪, 张亮, 刘汶蓉「家庭: 和谐社会建设中的功能变迁和政策支持」『社会 科学』2006年第4期, 第31–38页.) Xu Anqi, Liu Wenrong, Zhang Liang and Xue Yali. 2013. Zhuanxingqi de Zhongguo jiating jiazhiguan yanjiu [Research on Family Values in Transitional China]. Shanghai:

356

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe [Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press]. (徐安琪, 刘汶蓉, 张亮, 薛亚利『转型期的中国家庭价值观研究』 上海: 上海社会科学院出版社, 2013.) Yan Yunxiang. 2006. Siren shenghuo de biange: Yige Zhongguo cunzhuang li de aiqing, jiating yu qinmi guanxi (1949–1999) [Change in Private Life: Love, Family and Intimate Relationships in a Chinese Village (1949–1999)]. Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe [Shanghai: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House]. (阎云翔『私人生活 的变革: 一个中国村庄里的爱情, 家庭与亲密关系(1949–1999)』上海书店出版社, 2006.) Yang Guoshu. 2009. ‘Xiandai shehui de xin xiaodao’ [The new filial piety in modern society]. In Zhongguoren de xiaodao: Xinlixue de fenxi [Chinese People’s Filial Piety: A Psychological Analysis], written and edited by Ye Guanghui and Yang Guoshu, 23–45. Chongqing: Chongqing Daxue chubanshe [Chongqing: Chongqing University Press] (杨国枢「现代社会的新孝道」载于叶光辉, 杨国枢『中国人的孝道: 心理学的 分析』 重庆: 重庆大学出版社, 2009, 第23–45页.) Yang Guoshu, Ye Guanghui and Huang Lili. 2009. ‘Xiaodao de shehui taidu yu xingwei: Lilun yu celiang’ [Social attitudes and behaviour of filial piety: Theory and analysis]. In Zhongguoren de xiaodao: Xinlixue de fenxi [Chinese People’s Filial Piety: A Psychological Analysis], written and edited by Ye Guanghui and Yang Guoshu, 46–103. Chongqing: Chongqing Daxue chubanshe [Chongqing: Chongqing University Press]. (杨国枢、叶光辉、黄囇莉「孝道的社会态度与行为: 理论与测量」载于叶光辉, 杨国枢『中国人的孝道: 心理学的分析』 重庆: 重庆大学出版社, 2009, 第46–103页.) Yang Shanhua and He Changmei. 2004. ‘Zeren lunli yu chengshi jumin de jiating yang­ lao—Yi “Beijingshi laonianren xuqiu diaocha” wei li’ [Ethics of responsibility and family care for elderly residents in urban areas: Taking the example of ‘The survey of elderly people’s demands in the City of Beijing’]. Beijing Daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexueban) [Journal of Beijing University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)] 1: 71–84.(杨善华, 贺常梅「责任伦理与城市居民的家庭养老—以『北京市老年人需求 调查』为例」『北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版)』2004年第1期, 第71–84页.) Ye Guanghui. 2009. ‘Taiwan minzhong zhi xiaodao guannian de bianqian qingxing’ [The change of people’s views of filial piety in Taiwan]. In Zhongguoren de xiaodao: Xinlixue de fenxi [Chinese People’s Filial Piety: A Psychological Analysis], written and edited by Ye Guanghui and Yang Guoshu, 104–136. Chongqing: Chongqing Daxue chubanshe [Chongqing: Chongqing University Press]. (叶光辉「台湾民众之孝道观 念的变迁情形」载于叶光辉, 杨国枢『中国人的孝道: 心理学的分析』重庆: 重庆大学 出版社, 2009, 第104–136页.) Ye Lihong, Gao Yabing and Luo Bowei. 2000. ‘Dangdai daxuesheng de xing guannian diaocha’ [A survey on the sexual views of college students in contemporary China]. Qingnian yanjiu [Youth Studies] 6: 34–39. (叶丽红, 高亚兵, 骆伯巍「当代大学生的性 观念调查」『青年研究』2000年第6期, 第34–39页.)

The Transition of Chinese Families over the Past Thirty Years

357

Zeng Yi and Liang Zhiwu. 1993. ‘Zhongguo bashi niandai yilai gelei hexin jiatinghu de biandong qushi’ [Changes in the various nuclear family households since the 1980s]. Zhongguo renkou kexue [Chinese Journal of Population Science] 3: 1–6. (曾毅, 梁志武 「中国八十年代以来各类核心家庭户的变动趋势」『中国人口科学』 1993年第 3期 , 第1–6页.) Zeng Yi, Li Wei and Liang Zhiwu. 1992. ‘Zhongguo jiating jiegou de xianzhuang, quyu chayi ji biandong qushi’ [The current condition of Chinese family structure: Regional differences and changes]. Zhonguo renkou kexue [Chinese Journal of Population Science] 2: 1–12. (曾毅, 李伟, 梁志武「中国家庭结构的现状, 区域差异及 变动趋势」『中国人口科学』1992年第2期, 第1–12页.) Zhang Wenjuan and Li Shuzhuo. 2004. ‘Nongcun laonianren jiating daiji zhichi yanjiu’ [Study on family intergenerational support of elderly people in rural areas]. Tongji yanjiu [Statistical Research] 5: 44–52. (张文娟, 李树茁「农村老年人家庭代际支持研 究」『统计研究』2004年第 5期, 第44–52页.) Zhang Zhixin and Zhang Zuojian. 1997. ‘Jiabenwei yu daijian guanxi—Zhongguo chuantong jiating zhidu moshi’ [Family-centredness and intergenerational relationships: The institutional model of traditional Chinese family]. Minzheng luntan [Civil Affairs Forum] 6: 14–16. (张志鑫, 张作俭「家本位与代间关系—中国传统家庭 制度模式」『民政论坛』1997年第6期, 第14–16页.) Zhongguo guojia tongjiju; Zhongguo renkou xinxi yanjiu zhongxin [National Bureau of Statistics of China; China Population Information and Research Centre], ed. 1985. Zhongguo 1982 renkou pucha [The 1982 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China]. Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe [Beijing: China Statistics Press]. (中国 国家统计局中国人口信息研究中心编『中国1982年人口普查』北京: 中国統計出版 社, 1985.) Zhongguo guojia tongjiju; Renkou he shehui keji tongjisi [National Bureau of Statistics of China; Department of Population, Social Science, and Technology Statistics], ed. 2004. Zhongguo shehui zhong de nüren he nanren [Man and Woman in Chinese Society]. Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe [Beijing: China Statistics Press]. (中国 国家统计局人口和社会科技统计司编『中国社会中的女人和男人』北京: 中国统计 出版社, 2004.) Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan renkou yanjiu zhongxin [Population Research Centre of the Chinese Academy of Social Science]. 1986. Zhongguo renkou nianjian 1985 [China Population Yearbook 1985]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [Beijing: China Social Science Press]. (中国社会科学院人口研究中心编『中国人口 年鉴 (1985)』北京: 中国社会科学出版社, 1986.) Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan shehuixue yanjiusuo (Dangdai Zhongguo qingnian jiazhi guannian yanbian ketizu) [Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Project group of the study on Chinese young people’s changing values today)]. 1993. Zhongguo qingnian datoushi—Guanyu yidairen de jiazhiguan yanbian

358

ZHOU, XUE and LIU

yanjiu [A Grand Perspective on Chinese Young People: A Study on the Changing Values of a Generation]. Beijing: Beijing chubanshe [Beijing: Beijing Publishing House]. (中 国社会科学院社会学研究所「当代中国青年价值观念演变」课题组著『中国青年大 透视—关于一代人的价值观演变研究』北京: 北京出版社, 1993.)

Zhonghua quanguo funü lianhehui (Di’erqi Zhongguo funü shehui diwei diaocha ketizu) [All China Women’s Federation (Project group of the second survey on the status of Chinese women)]. 2001. ‘Di’erqi Zhongguo funü shehui diwei chouyang diaocha zhuyao shuju baogao’ [Executive report of the second sample survey on Chinese women’s social status]. Funü yanjiu luncong [Women Studies Collection] 5: 4–12. (中華全国婦女連合会 [第二期中国妇女社会地位调查课题组]「第二期中国 妇女社会地位抽样调查主要数据报告」『妇女研究论丛』2001年第5期, 第4–12页.) Zhonghua quanguo funü lianhehui (Disanqi Zhongguo funü shehui diwei diaocha ketizu) [All China Women’s Federation (Project group of the third survey on the status of Chinese women)]. 2011. ‘Disanqi Zhongguo funü shehui diwei chouyang diaocha zhuyao shuju baogao’ [Executive report of the third sample survey on Chinese women’s social status]. Funü yanjiu luncong [Women Studies Collection] 6: 5–15.(第三期中国妇女社会地位调查课题组「第三期中国妇女社会地位调查主要数 据报告」『妇女研究论丛』2011年第6期, 第5–15页.) Zhou Yi. 1994. ‘Daigou xianxiang de shehuixue yanjiu’ [A sociological study of generation gaps]. Shehuixue yanjiu [Sociological Research] 4: 67–79. (周怡「代沟现象的社 会学研究」『社会学研究』1994年第4期, 第67–79页.) Zhu Jinyi. 2008. ‘Jianshe 80 hou xiandai shehui zhengque jiazhi lixing’ [Constructing a proper rationality of values for the generation born after 1980]. Jingji yanjiu daokan [Economic Research Guide] 3: 194–195. (朱金奕「建设80后现代社会正确价值理性」 『经济研究导刊』2008年第3期, 第194–195页.) Zimmer, Zachary and Julia Kwong. 2003. ‘Family size and support of older adults in urban and rural China: Current effects and future implications’. Demography 40 (1): 23–44. Zuo Jiping. 2002. ‘Cong duoyuan shijiao fenxi Zhongguo chengshi de fuqi bupingdeng’ [Analysing marital inequalites in Chinese cities from multiple perspectives]. Funü yanjiu luncong [Women Studies Collection] 1: 12–17. (左际平「从多元视角分析中国城 市的夫妻不平等」『妇女研究沦丛』2002年第1期, 第12–17页.)

CHAPTER 9

Changes in Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Vietnamese Family Nguyen Huu Minh 1

Economic and Social Contexts after Doi Moi and Their Impacts on the Family in Vietnam

The centrally planned economy with a socialist model was implemented in North Vietnam beginning in 1954, after the end of the French war, and continued after the unification of the country in 1975. According to the socialist model, the state determined the direction of all important economic activities through a system of production and distribution plans based on strict regulation of pricing and interest rates. The state and collective enterprises constituted the foundation of the economy, which included numerous private subsidies. Large-scale private enterprises were not encouraged to expand further. Such economic policies had the advantage of helping the state to realise its economic and social purposes. However, these policies did not create m ­ otivation to boost the activities of businesses and individuals. Vietnam’s economy under this system proved to be inefficient and costly. The weakness of this management mechanism was even more clearly revealed after foreign aid was reduced in 1979–80. This demanded a new solution for economic development.1 In December 1986, the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam announced a new policy called ‘Doi Moi’ (Đoˆˀ i Mới; Renovation). One of its  main orientations is to shift Vietnam’s economy from a centralised and ­subsidy-based economy strictly dependent on public and collective ownership to a socialist-oriented multi-sector commodity economy under state management. Small and medium-sized private businesses have received stimulus from the state. In agriculture, a transition has been made from the product-based contractual quota system to a new management mechanism recognising the peasant household as a self-helping and self-supporting economic unit (made official in 1988). This has been developed further through, for example, the allocation of land for long-term use to households. Peasant households are now playing an ever more active role while agricultural cooperatives, along with small 1 Vu Tuan Anh (1995).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004276833_011

360

NGUYEN

industrial and handicraft organisations, are seeing their role and position reduced.2 Doi Moi has been an important platform for change in all economic and social sectors in the country. The past three decades have seen significant economic and social change which have supported changes to traditional patterns of marriage and family in Vietnam. As a number of strategies of economic and social development were implemented from 1986 to 2010, Vietnam’s economy recorded good and relatively stable growth rates. The average annual gdp growth rate was around 7.26 per cent in the period from 2001 to 2010. Economic structures shifted towards industrialisation and modernisation. gdp per capita was about 1,168 usd in 2010, nearly three times that in 2000. The gdp growth rate was 5.9 per cent in 2011.3 With this level of growth, Vietnam moved from the group of poorest countries to the group of countries having low-to-average income levels. Along with fast and stable economic growth rates, Vietnam has also made significant changes to its ­economic structure. Vietnam has been integrating more deeply and extensively into the global economy, attracting foreign investment and exploiting international market opportunities to foster economic growth. Along with economic development, Vietnam has paid special attention to and prioritised resources for social development and has realised encouraging achievements in this area. The number of people who were provided with employment grew by about 1.7 million annually. Urban unemployment remained at 5–6 per cent. Public healthcare became a focus; the healthcare network was strengthened and upgraded, preventive health activities were also enhanced. Some new epidemic diseases were stopped quickly and promptly. Besides sustained universal primary education, significant results were achieved in the implementation of universal secondary school education. The scale of vocational training and tertiary education grew by nearly 20 per cent per year. Life for the majority of people, especially women, children, and people in the areas inhabited by ethnic minorities has improved. The poverty rate fell to 12 percent in 2011, based on the new poverty criteria defined by the government for the period between 2011 and 2015. This rate has decreased about 2 per cent annually on average. Vietnam has been recognised as one of the leading countries in hunger alleviation, poverty reduction, and implementation of the millennium development goals. The average life expectancy of the Vietnamese increased from 72.8 years in 2009 to 73.2 years in 2011. The Human Development 2 Ibid. 3 vcp (2011); srvg (2011).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

361

Index of Vietnam was 0.733 in 2008 (ranked 105 among 177 countries and territories) and was 0.728 in 2011 (ranked 128 among 187 countries and territories).4 Along with the construction and completion of a legal system to ensure human rights, Vietnam signed, joined, and implemented the most important international conventions on human rights, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (icescr), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (the cedaw Convention), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Despite encouraging achievements, Vietnam’s economic and social development process is facing many difficulties. These include the challenges of maintaining macro-economic stability, inflation control, social protection, sustainable development, enhancing competitiveness, raising per-capita income, poverty reduction, narrowing the gap between rich and poor,5 and disaster prevention. In addition, climate change and a global economic recession have had no small impact on production and people’s lives as well as the implementation of children’s rights in Vietnam. Factors related to the education system, economic changes, urbanisation, and legal reform have played a prominent role in changing the marriage system and family values in Vietnam. Data from the National Censuses conducted in 1989, 1999, and 2009 indicate that the proportion of the adult population that has gone to school has increased gradually. Most of the urban population has gone to school, especially the men. In 2009, the literacy rate for the population aged ten or older was 94 per cent, compared to 88.2 per cent in 1989 and 91.1 per cent in 1999. The difference in education levels between men and women has decreased gradually, especially with regard to young people. In 2009, the literacy rate for men was 96 per cent and for women, 92 per cent. In general, gender inequality in basic education in Vietnam has almost been erased. Literacy rates in urban areas are higher than in rural areas. However, recently the urban–rural difference is very low, 96.9 per cent in urban areas 4 vcp (2011); vgso (2011a); vpfpb (2011). 5 As a result of rapid economic growth and implementation of a national poverty alleviation programme, the poverty rate has decreased substantially, from 58.1 per cent in 1993 to 37.4 per cent in 1998, 28.9 per cent in 2002, 19.5 per cent in 2004, and 16.0 per cent in 2006. However, the gap in living standards among resident groups has become bigger. In 1990, the richest 20 per cent of the population had an income level that was 4.1 times higher than that of the poorest 20 per cent of the population; in 1995, the gap was 6.99 times; by 2006, it had increased to 8.38 times (vgso 2001; 2008, 613).

362

NGUYEN

and 92 per cent in rural areas.6 Higher education created an atmosphere facilitating the spread of new ideas about marriage and the family, especially the idea of the ‘love marriage’, among young people. Economic development opened up non-agricultural employment opportunities for people, especially women, and significantly increased the economic independence of children from parents. It helped young men and women to prove their self-reliance in matters such as deciding their own marriages. Data from the general census in 1989 indicated that nearly threequarters of the population aged thirteen years and above were actively participating in economic activities. Of these, the percentage of the economically active female population was fairly high – about 71.3 per cent throughout Vietnam. With regard to women in the 20–49-year age group, this figure was over 80 per cent.7 The data from the 1999 general census also showed a positive picture of women’s participation in economic activities: 67.8 per cent of women aged fifteen years and above participated in economic activities.8 The 2009 Census shows that 76.5 per cent of the population aged fifteen or  older participates in the labour force, 81.8 per cent for males and 71.4 per cent for females. The labour force participation rate for rural areas is  14  percentage points higher than for urban areas (80.6 per cent versus 67.1 per cent).9 Urbanisation has taken place speedily in Vietnam. According to the National Census data, during the last decade the proportion of the Vietnamese population that is urban has increased from 23.7 per cent (1999) to 29.6 per cent (2009). This translates into a total of 25.4 million urban residents out of a national population of 85.8 million in 2009. According to the recently approved ‘Government Decision 445/QD-TTg’ regarding the Vision of Urban Development to 2050, the urban population in Vietnam will reach 38 per cent of the national population by 2015 and 45 per cent by 2020.10 There are some important differences between urban and rural residents. Firstly, there is the matter of living standards. Differences are clearly reflected in housing quality, the availability of a hygienic water supply, sanitary conditions, and consumption of household goods by urban compared with rural 6 7 8 9 10

vccsc (Vietnam Central Census Steering Committee) (2010). vgso (1991, 143, 149). vccsc (2000, 75). vccsc (2010). Decision 445/QD-TTg issued by the Prime Minister dated 7 April 2009 on the Approval of Adjusting Orientation for General Planning to Develop the Vietnamese Urban System until 2025 and Vision to 2050 (srvg 2009).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

363

residents. Significant gaps in education and levels of professional qualification exist between urban and rural residents; the more urbanised an area, the more its residents tend to be educated and professionally trained. Differences in living standards, education, employment, etc. between urban and rural areas have created a lifestyle for urban inhabitants that is different from the rural lifestyle.11 The popularity of the nuclear family, slackening kinship relations, diversity of economic activities outside the family, and higher education levels in urban areas influence urban inhabitants’ ways of thinking about marriage and family. The role of love in marriage has become increasingly significant for urban inhabitants. The legal reforms to legalise the freedom of selection, ensure gender equality in marriage, and increase the minimum age for marriage also made important contributions in setting a new standard for marriage and family. After the Indochinese Communist Party’s 1945 August revolution, the new government abolished gender inequality in the constitution issued in 1946. Decree no. 97, dated 22 May 1950, declared the abolition of patriarchal power and upheld children’s right to take decisions in marriage selection, while Decree no. 159, issued in November 1950, stated that the government would follow the line of democracy, equality, and humanity in settling divorces.12 These legal documents, although issued at a difficult time in the country’s history, played an active role in eliminating the regressive legacy of the feudal family’s marriage system and for the first time established a more civilised and democratic legal basis regarding marriage and the family. In the 1950s, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam launched powerful attacks on the unwholesome custom of child marriage, the enforced exchange of wedding presents, and parents’ control over their children’s marriage. In addition, marriages based on love and mutual respect were encouraged and supported. The Marriage and Family Laws of 1959 and 1986, together with the efforts of ­authorities and unions at all levels to implement these laws, greatly supported young men and women’s freedom of marriage selection. These effects created a solid basis for the popularity of self-determination in marriage among young people. The Marriage and Family Law enacted by the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 29 December 1959 (implemented in North Vietnam until 1975 and throughout the country from 1976 to 1986) was an important landmark in the development of new marriage and family patterns. It laid down four legal principles for the new marriage and family patterns in 11 12

Nguyen Huu Minh (2000). Nguyen Quoc Tuan (1994).

364

NGUYEN

Vietnam, and these were then widely popularised: (1) progressive and voluntary marriage, (2) marriage between only one wife and one husband, (3) gender equality in marriage and protection of women’s interests in the ­family, and (4) protection of children’s interests.13 After the unification of the country, the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam issued the Marriage and Family Law of 1986 in place of the Marriage and Family Law of 1959. Under this new law, social and political organisations (such as the Vietnam Women’s Union, Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, Vietnam General Trade Union, and so on) could intervene in marriage and family relations when necessary in order to protect young people’s right to freedom in marriage-related matters and the interests of women and children (Articles 9, 31, 39, 50). This law inherited the principles of voluntary marriage between one husband and one wife, equality between husband and wife, protection of the interests of mothers and children, and the maintaining of a minimum age at marriage as stipulated in the Law of Marriage and Family 1959. In addition, the Marriage and Family Law of 1986 legalised each individual’s right to freedom of marriage selection, which was the legal basis for increasing the marriage age. The Marriage and Family Law of 2000 continues to confirm the aforementioned essential aspects of the marriage-selection freedom of each individual. The Vietnamese government’s and the Party’s viewpoint of seniores priores14 is that it is a good Vietnamese tradition, ‘taking care of material and cultural life of the elderly is the national moral standard, affection and responsibility of the whole population, Party and authorities of all levels’.15 Vietnam’s law and policy also emphasise the responsibilities of family in care of the elderly. For example, Article 64 of the 1992 Constitution stipulates that: ‘Children have the responsibility of respecting and taking care of grandparents and parents’.16 The 2000 Ordinance of the Elderly stipulated that the elderly should be cared for by the government and society (Article 2) and specified that it is mainly the responsibility of family to take care of the elderly: ‘Taking care of the elderly is the main responsibility of families with the elderly’ (Article 3).17 Decree number 30/2002/NĐ-CP issued on 26 March 2002 by the Prime Minister with stipulation and guidance on implementing some articles of the Elderly Ordinance specified that ‘those responsible for taking care of the elderly are their spouses, 13 Ibid. 14 Literally ‘elders first’. 15 srvg (1996). 16 vna (1992). 17 vna (2000b). Also see Article 5 in the Law of Elderly 2009 (vna 2009).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

365

their own children, legally adopted children, children-in-law, nephews or nieces (nephews or nieces of parents-in-law)’.18 The Law on Marriage and Family (2000)19 also has specific stipulations on taking care of the elderly. Item 4, Article 2 of the Law on Marriage and Family (2000) stipulated that: children have the responsibility of respecting, bringing up and taking care of parents; grandchildren have the responsibility of respecting and taking care of grandparents; and family members have the responsibility of caring, looking after, and helping each other. Articles 35 and 36 stipulated that: children have the responsibility of loving, respecting, and being grateful to parents; and the right to take care of parents, especially when parents are old, disabled or ill. Children are strictly forbidden to persecute and insult parents. Article 57 stipulated that adults who do not patrilocate with parents have the responsibility of supporting parents who lack the ability to work or assets for living. Item 2 of Article 59 stipulated that adult grandchildren who do not patrilocate with grandparents have to support grandparents if they cannot work, cannot support themselves, or if there is no one else to support them. In addition, there are articles and items in the Criminal Law naming crimes related to taking care of the elderly. Article 151 of the Criminal Law20 stipulated ‘Crime of persecuting grandparents, parents, spouses, children, grandchildren and those bringing one up’, and Article 152 stipulated ‘Crime of refusing or eluding responsibility for support’. The government’s influence, however, was not limited merely to promulgating the law. The government supported and intervened directly in the marriages of members of various institutions and organisations. During the difficult period of subsidisation, whenever government officials and staff got married, they received specific material benefits such as coupons to buy the necessary amenities for their new families. In some cases, young men and women in love and wishing to get married had to seek the approval of their organisations such as party cell or the leader of their army or police unit. However, the influence of authorities on the marriage and lives of the Vietnamese varied across historical periods. The significant influence of the government on family life, as mentioned above, was mainly limited to the periods of state subsidisation, collectivisation, and war. After Doi Moi, besides more emphasis on the role of the family in economics, the state gradually reduced direct intervention in family and individual affairs. In addition, traditional values related to family and individual were partly recovered. 18 19 20

srvg (2002): Item 1, Article 2, Decree number 30/2002/NĐ-CP. vna (2000a). vna (2009).

366

NGUYEN

These factors contributed to forming and reinforcing new attitudes toward marriage and the family among young people. The strict control exercised by the extended family, especially the older generations (i.e., parents and grandparents), over the younger members decreased gradually, although in the rural areas many parents continued to have some influence over their children’s decisions. Hence, it can be said that marriage patterns in Vietnam were influenced not only by modernisation, but also by government policies regarding marriage and the family, as well as the cultural features prevalent in different geographical areas. Those factors cannot be ignored when analysing changes in marriage-selection patterns in Vietnam. In the following sections the focus will be on changes in some characteristics of the family under the impact of the aforementioned socio-economic factors. 2

Demographic Characteristics of the Family

In parallel with economic changes during the Doi Moi process, social aspects of individual and family life have also changed, among them the demographic characteristics of the family. In this second section, changes in fertility, marriage, and divorce patterns during the previous several decades will be discussed. 2.1 Fertility Rate and the Desired Number of Children In the last three decades, the fertility rate in Vietnam has gradually decreased (see Table 9.1). The total fertility rate (tfr) fell sharply from 2.33 children per woman in 1999 to 2.03 in 2009. Since 2006 Vietnam’s tfr has declined continuously to below the fertility replacement level.21 There is a fundamental difference between urban and rural fertility rates. In 2009, the tfr was 1.81 children per woman in urban areas, much lower than the 2.14 children per woman in rural areas. Perhaps this difference is due to the fact that in comparison with rural couples, urban couples have easier access to information resources, better awareness of the benefits of families with few children as well as much easier access to health facilities that offer family planning services to help them avoid unwanted pregnancy and childbirth. Another cause is that living conditions

21

The replacement fertility is the level of fertility at which a cohort of women on average is having only enough female children to replace itself in population reproduction.

367

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY Table 9.1

The total fertility rate (tfr) in Vietnam 1989, 1999–2009

Survey tfr (children per woman) Year

Reference period

Entire country

Urban

Rural

1989 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

1/4/1988–31/3/1989 1/4/1998–31/3/1999 1/4/2000–31/3/2001 1/4/2001–31/3/2002 1/4/2002–31/3/2003 1/4/2003–31/3/2004 1/4/2004–31/3/2005 1/4/2005–31/3/2006 1/4/2006–31/3/2007 1/4/2007–31/3/2008 1/4/2008–31/3/2009

3.8 2.33 2.25 2.28 2.12 2.23 2.11 2.09 2.07 2.08 2.03

– 1.67 1.86 1.93 1.70 1.87 1.73 1.72 1.70 1.83 1.81

– 2.57 2.38 2.39 2.30 2.38 2.28 2.25 2.22 2.22 2.14

source: 1999: vccsc (2000); 2000–2008: vgso (2009); 2009: vccsc (2010)

are far better in urban areas than in rural areas. Urban children receive better care than rural children. This leads to lower infant and child mortality rates in urban areas than in rural areas, contributing to a reduction in replacement fertility needs in the former. Moreover, elderly parents are less dependent on children in urban areas than in rural areas, so urban residents are less likely to give birth in order that they can ‘rely on their children in their old age’.22 Associated with fertility decline is a shift in the desired number of children. According to the Demographic and Health Survey (dhs) 1988 and Intercensal Demographic Survey (icds) 1994, the number of desired children for women aged 15–49 had decreased from 4.0 to 2.9. The percentage of women aged 15–49 wanting to have more children had decreased greatly amongst the group of women having two or three children. At the same time, the percentage of women, among those having four children or more, who did not want to have any more children increased from dhs 1988 to icds 1994.23 According to data from the Vietnam Family Survey 2006, the proportion of respondents who agreed that families should have many children was quite low (18.6 per cent of

22 23

vccsc (2010). Nguyen Minh Thang et al. (1996).

368

NGUYEN

people aged sixty-one or older, 6.6 per cent of people aged 18–60 and 2.8 per cent of adolescents).24 Today families are more interested in how to provide good parenting. Women and rural residents had higher rates encouraging families to have more children than other respondents. However, in contrast to the clear trend toward having fewer children, a considerable part of the population still supports the idea that ‘a family should have a son(s)’. In the Vietnam Family Survey 2006, nearly 37 per cent of respondents aged 18–60 supported this idea. The proportions of women, rural residents, and people in the Central Region, the Mekong Delta, north-west and south-east, and ethnic people of Hmong, Dao, and Khmer supporting this idea were higher compared with those of other groups. Poorer population groups needed boys more than rich population groups (45.5 per cent in the lowest income group compared to 26.0 per cent in the highest income group).25 This explains why low income groups commonly have many children when they cannot apply technologies for foetal sex selection. This preference for sons has resulted in a gender imbalance at birth as people wanting sons have practised foetal sex selection using modern medical technologies. From 1999 to 2005, the sex ratio at birth showed no clear trends and varied from 104 to 109 boys per 100 girls in Vietnam. However, from 2006 to present, the male–female ratio at birth in Vietnam has begun to show signs of a significant increase. According to the 2006 Population Fluctuation Survey, the sex ratio at birth was 109.8 boys per 100 girls in Vietnam. In 2009, it remained at quite a high level, 110.5 boys per 100 girls. This indicates an imbalance in the sex ratio at birth in Vietnam. There were huge differences in sex ratio at birth among regions in Vietnam in 2009. The region with the lowest sex ratio at birth, 105.6, was the Central Highlands, where people are poor with low education and limited access to diagnostic services for early foetal sex, so people tended to continue with childbirth until children of the desired gender were born. Red River Delta had the highest sex ratio (115.3) in the country. This region also had a relatively low fertility rate and the most dynamic economy in the country. Here, access to health services with modern equipment was relatively easy. Residents also had higher levels of education and economic wealth so they could afford and were willing to pay for diagnostic services for early foetal sex.26 24 mocst et al. (2008). 25 Ibid. 26 vccsc (2010). In the 2009 Vietnam Population and Housing Census, Vietnam contains six regions: Northern Midlands and Mountains, Red River Delta, North and South Central Coast, Central Highlands, South-East, and Mekong River Delta.

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

369

The reason for having a son was mainly ‘to continue the family line’ (85.7 per cent). In addition, a significant proportion of respondents said sons would offer ‘a refuge in their old age’ (54.2 per cent) and would ‘do large work, heavy work’ (23.4 per cent).27 Rural people emphasised the reason for having a son for ‘a refuge in their old age’ more than urban residents, probably because they enjoy fewer social services and worse access to healthcare when they become older. In addition to differences between social groups regarding the perception of having a son or daughter, changes can be observed in youth thinking. According to the Survey of Assessment of Vietnam Youth 2009 (savy 2), with the statement ‘nowadays, it is not necessary to have a son in the family’, 87.4 per cent (of 9,786 respondents) agreed. This result indicates partly the effectiveness of government policy implementation; in recent years, the government has made great efforts to curb discrimination between sons and daughters. The Law on Marriage and Family (2000) states that neither the state nor society accepts discrimination between children, between boys and girls (Section 5, Article 2). Also, to curb foetal sex selection, the Ordinance of Population 200328 and Decree 104/2003/NĐ-CP29 provided guidance for the enforcement of some articles of the Ordinance of Population that prohibits informing the pregnant woman about the foetus’ gender, or removal of the foetus because of its sex. In addition, the state has carried out many informational, educational, and communication activities which deal with discrimination between sons and daughters. savy 2 findings show that the degree of acceptance of the necessity of having a son among young females was lower than that among young males, the tendency to value male children was more prevalent in rural areas than in urban, and it was also more prevalent among ethnic minority youth than Kinh (Viet; the largest ethnic group) youth. Young people with higher levels of education pay less attention to the idea of having a son in the family than young people with lower education levels. The acceptance rate for ‘not necessary to have a son in the family’ in the youth group having college degrees or higher was 94.1 per cent, 14.3 percentage points higher than the rate in the youth groups having only primary education or lower.30

27 28 29 30

mocst et al. (2008). vna (2003). srvg (2003). Nguyen Huu Minh and Tran Thi Hong (2011).

370

NGUYEN

2.2 Marriage Is Still Stable In the traditional Vietnamese family, marriage was universal. There was a saying ‘trai khon tim vo, gai khon tim chong’ (a wise man looks for a wife, and a wise woman looks for a husband). Marriage was an especially important matter, not only because of its relation to the lifetime happiness of the couple, but also because of its effects on the extended family and the kin network.31 One of the most important functions of marriage and the family was to produce male offspring to assure continuity of the patriline and to perform the rites of ancestor worship, the highest expression of Confucian filial piety. The pressure to marry was also strong for women because of the common belief that they would only find a secure base from which to live and act within the framework of marriage.32 Under dramatic changes in socio-political and economic life in Vietnam during the last several decades it is to be expected that the patterns of marriage in Vietnam will undergo a great change in the future. 2.2.1

Marriage Is Still Common in Vietnam, But Marriage Rate Has Tended to Decrease Marriage is still a common phenomenon in Vietnam. Over many years, the proportion of married people among the population aged fifteen years and older has remained relatively high. According to data from the 2009 Population and Housing Census, among people aged fifteen and older, only 30.5 per cent of men and 23.3 per cent of women had never married. At the time, 67 per cent of men and 64 per cent of women were in marriage. In the 15–19 age group about 2 per cent of men had married once while this rate for women was 9 per cent. In the 20–24 age group 49 per cent of women and 24 per cent of men had married once. The proportion ever married in the age group 45–49 shows the prevalence of marriage in relation to population reproduction. This proportion among men in 1989–99 was relatively stable at 99 per cent, and in 2009 close to 98 per cent. The proportion ever married among women in the age group 45–49 in 1989 was 97 per cent, while in 1999 and 2009 it had fallen to 94 per cent.33 The popularity of marriage is evident in the opinion of many people that ‘everyone gets married when they reach the marriage age’. The Vietnam Family Survey 2006 showed that the rate of respondents who mentioned this reason was the highest in the 18–60 age group (31.5 per cent). Furthermore, marriage

31 32 33

Tran Dinh Huou (1991); Phan Dai Doan (1994). Marr (1981, 248). vccsc (2010).

371

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

was expected to offer material and spiritual support to individuals; 27.4 per cent of respondents gave having ‘a material and spiritual support’ for themselves as a reason for marriage while 15.6 per cent of people said the reason was for ‘the family to have a caregiver and a helper’.34 Although a majority of men and women continue to live in marriage, a new trend has appeared as more and more people choose to lead a single life. If women aged forty or over and men aged forty-five or over who never marry are considered single people, the proportion of single people has increased among both men and women when data from the Population and Housing Censuses in 1989 and in 2009 is compared (see Table 9.2). In Vietnam the status of celibacy is mainly due to the impact of life circumstances. As shown in Table 9.2, the percentage of celibate individuals at the 1999 and 2009 Censuses is significantly higher than in 1989, and this is very much related to a gender imbalance; the number of men aged forty-five or older is usually less than women. However, there are also people living alone because they enjoy the freedom of life.35 Previously, marriage was almost a necessary requirement of the family and society for young men and women when they reached adulthood. Today, when young people are free to make Table 9.2 Percentage of single people in selected age groups from censuses 1989–2009 Age

Census 1989

40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60+

Census 1999

Census 2009

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

2.1 1.5 1.1 0.9

0.6 3.5 2.3 1.8

1.9 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.5

6.6 5.8 4.7 2.5 1.4

3.3 2.1 1.3 1.0 0.5

5.7 5.6 5.5 5.1 2.0

source: vccsc (1991, 2001, 2010)

34 35

mocst et al. (2008). Ibid. (51). For some age groups, the trend is not very clear between 1989 and 2009. For example, the figures for males in 1999 (age 40–59) are lower than the figures for males in 1989, whereas the figures for females in 1999 (age 40–49) are higher than the figures for female in 2009. The reason is probably due to an unbalanced sex ratio among men and women among these age groups as a result of the war.

372

NGUYEN

their own decisions regarding marriage, some choose to stay single and not to get married. According to savy 2 findings,36 15.5 per cent of young people accepted the phenomenon of ‘choosing to remain single (never marry)’, 37.9 per cent accepted this phenomenon depending on the circumstances, and 46.6 per cent of youth did not accept this phenomenon. If we add those who selected ‘depends on circumstances’ in the acceptance group then half of young people (of 9,465 total respondents) accepted the phenomenon of ‘a person choosing to stay single, no marriage’. A considerable proportion of young people accepts the phenomenon of celibacy, partly confirming the development of this lifestyle among the youth. Compared with the results of the Vietnam Family Survey 2006, it shows that the proportion of young people accepting the idea of remaining single has increased in all three age groups. For example, in 2006, the acceptance rate for young people aged 22–25 was 26 per cent and in 2009, it was 47.8 per cent. In addition to the fact that the youth are increasingly more independent in their personal lives, the growth of social problems such as domestic violence and adultery are probably the reasons why these rates have increased. savy 2 also shows that the phenomenon of ‘stay single/never marry’ is more accepted amongst women than men. However, the difference is not large (55.4 per cent compared with 51.4 per cent). The acceptance rate of this phenomenon amongst urban youth is higher than rural youth (62.3 per cent compared with 50.4 per cent). Kinh youth groups have a higher acceptance rate, by 10.5 percentage points, compared with ethnic minority groups (54.9 per cent and 44.4 per cent). The 14–17 age group tends to accept celibacy more readily than youth aged eighteen and over. Also, Internet use contributed to an increased attitude of acceptance toward this social phenomenon in adolescents.37 2.2.2 Age at Marriage Is Increasing Since the 1970s, the trend of an increase in the age of first marriage has been confirmed in many studies in many Asian countries as a result of the impact of modernisation factors.38 Many researchers have provided experimental evidence, at both micro- and macro-scales, confirming that individuals with more modern characteristics (higher education level, more modern jobs, and those living in urbanised environments) tend to get married later than those with less modern characteristics.39 There are also some other factors possibly very 36 Nguyen Huu Minh and Tran Thi Hong (2011). 37 Ibid. 38 un (1990); Xenos and Gultiano (1992). 39 Smith (1980); uns (1986, 53); Smith and Karim (1980); Hirschman (1985).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

373

important in the forming of the pattern of age of first marriage in Asia. For example, the intervention of parents in the marriage of children, the role of the eldest son in the family, or government policies.40 A transitional trend from a pattern of marriage at an earlier age to later marriage occurs similarly in Vietnam.41 Due to the importance of marriage in Vietnamese traditional culture, family and kinship in the feudal system created a strong pressure towards early marriage in Vietnamese rural areas. However, due to the dramatic socio-economic changes that took place after the Revolution in August 1945 and the efforts of the authorities to encourage later marriage, the marriage age of men and women in Vietnam has been gradually increasing. The singulate mean age at first marriage (smam)42 for men was 24.4 and for women 23.2 at the time of the 1989 Census. Ten years later in Census 1999, the smam for men was 25.4 and for women was 22.8. Compared with 1999, the smam of men increased by 0.8 years in 2009 (to 26.2), while the smam of women in 2009 was similar (22.8). smam differences between men and women are increasing, reaching 3.4 years in 2009.43 A variety of factors can be regarded as causes of significant changes in the pattern of marriage age in Vietnam, including, very importantly, modernisation, also government policy, cultural factors and more individual freedom in marriage matters. Modernisation factors include increasing education levels, the expansion of non-agricultural career opportunities, and the urbanisation process. For example, there are clear differences between married age groups of individuals with different education, in different occupations, and in different living areas (urban or rural). People with higher education, working in the non-agricultural sector or in more modern jobs and living in urban areas are more likely to get married later.44 For example, the 2009 Census data shows that the smam of urban males was 2.1 years greater than that of rural males. That difference was 2.4 years among women. According to data from the Vietnam Family Survey 2006, people in skilled jobs often married later than those in unskilled jobs. The marriage age gap between these two occupational groups was 2.9 years among men and 3.4 years among women.45 The study also showed that the war 40 41 42 43 44 45

un (1988); Chamratrithirong et al. (1986); Whyte and Parish (1984); Liao (1989). Nguyen Huu Minh (2000); Le Ngoc Van (2006); vgso (2001); vccsc (2010). smam indicates the average number of years that members of a hypothetical cohort have lived unmarried before they marry for the first time. vccsc (2010). Nguyen Huu Minh (1997, 2000, 2009); vgso (2001); Le Ngoc Van (2006); vccsc (2010). mocst et al. (2008).

374

NGUYEN

had been a strong influence on marriage age in Vietnam because of the large number of men who had served in the army and the large number of young men who had died in the war. People who experienced and participated in the war tended to marry later than those who did not.46 The role that state policies played in the marriage age pattern can be seen relatively clearly when marriage ages are compared among periods of policies related to marriage and families (for example different policies in the North and South in the division period) and among groups having parents who worked in the public sector and in non-state sectors as well as between those who work in the public sector and who do not work in the public sector.47 One of the reasons that people working in the public sector tend to marry later than people working in the private sector or cooperatives was that they had to focus  on education to get a job and then had to work hard in their jobs to support their family economically and advance their careers. Organisations in the public sector also have more stringent regulations which encourage later marriage. In addition, highly educated people are usually the most affected by state policies, because they receive more information about these policies. We may consider this as an indirect effect of the policy factor on the marriage age pattern. Therefore, the factors of state policies, personal and other family characteristics exhibit interwoven impacts, the net result being to increase the marriage age of the population. The impact of modernising forces, state policies, and the war can be considered the decisive factors in the significant increase in marriage age over recent decades in Vietnam. Cultural factors also have important implications in the analysis of the marriage age pattern in Vietnam. Family pressures on marriage issues can cause the individual to get married earlier. Eldest sons also tend to marry earlier than other sons in the family. There is a general trend for delayed marriages. This trend does not depend on individual and family characteristics as mentioned above. Perhaps other social factors, such as the influence of the mass media and extensive public legal discussion, have created this change in expectations about the time of marriage. For instance, many young people tend to marry late, because they think that in the short term, it is necessary to pay more attention to making money and having fun with friends to understand society more before they take the step into married life, because once they get married they will have many worries, for example, about providing financially for their 46 47

Nguyen Huu Minh (1997, 2000, 2009). Nguyen Huu Minh (2000, 2009).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

375

own family, paying for children’s schooling, and many other issues. Many local people emphasised the economic factor at the time of marriage.48 This supports the suggestion made by Ruth Dixon about the role of the feasibility of marriage.49 Many people are 29–30 years old but not yet ready to marry, instead trying to earn money and accumulate sufficient savings for marriage, which is a big event that involves financing and organising the wedding and buying an independent apartment thereafter. 2.3 Divorce Tends to Increase There has not been much research on divorce in Vietnam, because for a long time divorce in Vietnam has not been encouraged. Data on divorce from population censuses only shows a divorce rate among the total population and not cases of remarriage. The 2009 Population and Housing Census data show that, in general, the overall divorce rate is low in Vietnam. There are, however, differences by sex and between urban and rural areas. The divorce rate is higher for women than men (1.4 per cent of women aged fifteen and over compared with 0.6 per cent of men aged fifteen and over). If separation cases are included, the rate is 0.9 per cent for men and 2.0 per cent for women. The divorce rate of both urban men and women is more than double that of rural people (1.4 per cent versus 0.8 per cent). Respective separation rates are 0.4 per cent and 0.5  per cent. This may be due to the economic conditions of city dwellers, especially women, who are more independent compared with those in rural areas, divorce being thus more acceptable for them. The separation rate in Vietnam is negligible and shows almost no variation by sex or between urban and rural areas. Comparison among data from the three population censuses in 1989, 1999, and 2009 shows an increase in divorce cases. Only 0.5 per cent of the population aged fifteen and over were divorced in 1989, and this rate was 0.8 per cent in 1999 and 1.0 per cent in 2009. An upward trend has been identified in both urban and rural areas and for both men and women (see Table 9.3). Based on the statistics from the People’s Supreme Court, the number of divorce cases and the crude divorce rate (cdr) has increased rapidly over recent years, from 2000 to 2009 (see Table 9.4). The average number of years of marriage before divorce is relatively short (about nine years). The number of divorce cases has increased and the average length of marriage shortened over the years, perhaps because social prejudices against divorce are not as strong as before. Divorcees are no longer under 48 Ibid. 49 Dixon (1971).

376

NGUYEN

Table 9.3 Percentage of population aged fifteen or older divorced and separated by sex and rural–urban, from 1989, 1999, and 2009 censuses Location

Census 1989 Male

Divorced

Total 0.3 Urban Rural Separated Total 0.3 Urban Rural

Census 1999

Census 2009

Female

Total

Male

Female

Total

Male

Female

Total

0.8

0.5

0.4 0.7 0.3

1.1 1.7 0.9

0.8 1.2 0.6

0.6 0.9 0.5

1.4 2.0 1.2

1.0 1.4 0.8

0.9

0.6

0.3 0.3 0.4

0.8 0.8 0.8

0.6 0.6 0.6

0.3 0.3 0.3

0.6 0.5 0.6

0.4 0.4 0.5

source: vccsc (1991, 2001, 2010)

Table 9.4 Crude divorce rate in Vietnam 2000–2009 Year

Divorces

Population

cdr (‰)

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009

51,361 54,226 56,487 58,708 65,336 65,929 69,646 76,490 90,092

77,635,000 78,685,000 79,727,000 80,902,000 82,031,000 83,106,000 85,171,000 86,210,000 86,024,000

0.66 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.80 0.79 0.82 0.89 1.05

Note: cdr = crude divorce rate (the number of divorces per 1,000 people)

source: divorces: national supreme court of vietnam (2010); population: vgso (2010)

pressure after divorce so they can decide on their marriage more easily. The Vietnam Family Survey 2006 pointed to three main causes for divorce: lifestyle conflict (27.7 per cent of divorcees), adultery (25.9 per cent), and economic hardship (13.0 per cent).50 50

mocst et al. (2008).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

377

The rates of divorce and separation were higher in groups with poor education. People who decided on their marriage without consulting parents had a significantly higher divorce rate than those who consulted parents or even those whose marriages were decided upon by their parents. Clearly, parents still have a huge role in helping to maintain and strengthen young families. Failure to have children or a son, as well as unsolved conflicts in life with the husband’s family, were reasons for divorce in many cases.51 According to the Vietnam Family Survey 2006, the rate of divorce applications by wives is nearly double those by husbands (47.0 per cent versus 28.1 per cent), demonstrating that women have increasingly become aware of their rights and are active in making choices to do with their married life. Children stay with mothers after most divorce cases (64.3 per cent). In fact, serious paternal support is not always provided. This has increased the burden placed on mothers and children after divorce and adds to disadvantages in life.52 3

Changing Relationship between Family and the Individual

In traditional Vietnamese society, family and kinship had an important role in the life and development of each individual. Many different aspects of relationships between the family and individuals can be observed. However, in this chapter the focus is on changes in decision-making regarding marriage, the mate-selection process, and the criteria employed in partner selection. Until the advent of the twentieth century, marriage in Vietnam was an important issue not only for the couple involved but also for their extended family and kinship systems.53 Therefore, families were very concerned about getting their children married off soon after selecting suitable daughters- and sons-in-law. Marriage-selection criteria, according to the strict meaning of the term, were virtually non-existent, because the individuals who were to marry had almost no power to select their own life partners; instead, their families employed certain criteria for selecting suitable daughters- and sons-in-law (especially daughters-in-law). The marriage-selection criteria fixed by the family, however, were for the family’s own benefit, and the marrying individuals had to conform to their families’ criteria. Hence, marriage was regarded as a family matter, not as an individual’s prerogative.

51 52 53

Ibid.; Tran Thi Minh Thi (2012). mocst et al. (2008). Dao Duy Anh ([1938] 1992); Tran Dinh Huou (1991).

378

NGUYEN

Parents’ intervention in their children’s marriages was acknowledged and supported by feudal laws, from the Hong Duc Code in the fifteenth century and the Gia Long Code in the nineteenth century to the pre-1945 civil codes created under French domination. According to the Gia Long Code, a couple’s marriage was a legal agreement between the head of the bride’s family and the head of the bridegroom’s family, and only these individuals from both the families were required to sign this agreement. Signatures of the married couple were not necessary.54 Parents believed that, based on their wisdom and experience, they could arrange a ‘harmonious’ marriage for their children. They worried that if they let their children select their partners themselves, they might be led by blind love to ignore incompatible individual traits that could cause domestic disputes later on. Therefore, single young men and women were not allowed to communicate with or be too friendly and close to each other in order to avoid the seduction of love. In many cases, married couples did not see each other until their wedding day. Since the daughter-in-law had the responsibility of giving birth to the next generation and being the main worker in her husband’s family, her health and an ability to perform useful labour were especially appreciated. Among her individual characteristics, fertility, obedience to the husband, gratitude toward parents-in-law, and an ability to make an economic contribution to the husband’s family in the future were the most appreciated. Besides the individual characteristics of sons- and daughters-in-law, one of the most important criteria in marriage was that of making a ‘suitable alliance’ in terms of the socio-economic status of the family, which would reinforce the strength of the family and of the family line. For instance, all families hoped to find daughters-in-law from similar socio-economic backgrounds. Highly respected families showed such characteristics as: having many children and grandchildren; owning plenty of property, possessing a good reputation, and honour; many long-lived members; a harmonious family-life imbued with respect, politeness, and reason; gentle and virtuous behaviour with regard to their neighbours; and successful children. In addition, in traditional society, since the marrying individuals were unlikely to move out of their residential places, marriage selection took place within the same village or commune. Families tended to select sons- and daughters-in-law from the same village or commune, believing in such adages as ‘East or West – home is the best’. The traditional Vietnamese family with the aforementioned characteristics changed very little between the end of the nineteenth century and 1945. Under 54

Vu Van Mau (1962).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

379

the impacts of the dramatic political and socio-economic changes that took place after the August Revolution in 1945, specific aspects of the relationship between family and individual mentioned above have changed. The following sections describe changes in the marriage-selection process. From Marriages Arranged by the Family to Those Self-determined by Individuals The changes in marriage-arrangement patterns in Vietnam over the last fifty years are characterised by the increasingly active role played by individuals in decision-making regarding their own marriage. At present, parents’ participation in marriage-related discussions is only consultative, not constraining. However, there is still a significant amount of respect for the family’s opinion  (especially in the rural areas). This indicates the emergence of a new pattern combining the family’s and the individual’s role in forming a new family, while ensuring both individual freedom and close relations with the extended family. 3.1

3.1.1 Characteristics of Changes in Marriage-Selection Patterns Increasingly Decisive Role of Individuals Studies over the last decade in all three regions of the country indicate powerful trends of change from marriages arranged by the family to those based on free and independent selection by individuals, which confirms that most newly married people are self-reliant in marriage matters.55 Recently, the nationwide Survey on the Vietnamese Family 2006 confirmed that the decision-making power of parents over their children’s marriages was gradually decreasing. From among the respondents, 28.5 per cent of those aged sixtyone years and above claimed that their marriages had been entirely arranged by their parents, but the proportion among those aged 18–60 years was only 7.3 per cent. This trend was expressed across all social groups. By now, parents are well aware that it is better for their children to select their own life partners.56 Parents and Family Still Play an Important Role Although children enjoy increasing freedom with regard to marriage selection, their parents and family continue to play a very important role in marriage. The Survey on the Vietnamese Family 2006 indicates that the percentage of marriages independently decided by the respondents (aged eighteen years and above) without consulting with their parents was under 10 per cent. This 55 56

Barbieri and Vu Tuan Huy (1995); Nguyen Huu Minh (1999); Le Ngoc Van (2007); etc. mocst et al. (2008, 61, 63).

380

NGUYEN

pattern is quite consistent among the different social groups. For example, among the married couples aged 18–60 years, the percentage of those who had decided for themselves, without asking for their parents’ opinions, was only 6.3 per cent (8.3 per cent in the urban areas, 5.6 per cent in the rural areas, 6.5 per cent for men, and 6.2 per cent for women).57 Some people still argue, however, that arranging their children’s marriage is the obvious prerogative of the parents, because they have brought up their children.58 Respect for the opinions of parents and other family members also influence the way in which the daughter- or son-in-law will be accepted as a new member of the husband’s or wife’s family. Up until now, the wife typically patrilocates to her husband’s family after marriage.59 Therefore, if the parents and other relatives are involved in the marriage arrangements, the relations between the daughter-in-law and parents-in-law and other family members are more likely to be harmonious. The popular pattern at present is that both parents and children jointly take the decision, the children generally deciding after asking for their parents’ opinions. According to the Survey on the Vietnamese Family 2006, among married couples aged sixty-one years and above, 35 per cent of the respondents answered that ‘I took the decision, but I did ask for my parents’ opinion’, and this figure was 70.8 per cent among married couples aged 18–60 years (see more in Figure 9.1). 3.1.2 Influencing Factors Many factors have influenced the changing patterns of an individual’s marriage-selection powers. First, a significant role has been played by specific characteristics of modernisation such as better education, greater nonagricultural employment opportunities, and the increasing popularity of the urban lifestyle. Research by the author of this chapter conducted in the Red River Delta60 shows that the increase in the education levels of people in the last few decades has served as the most important factor explaining the significant increase in 57 58 59 60

Ibid. (61). Ibid. (60). Nguyen Huu Minh and Hirschman (2000); mocst et al. (2008); Nguyen Huu Minh (2008). See Nguyen Huu Minh (1999). The Vietnam Longitudinal Survey (vls) 1995 was a collaborative project between Professor Charles Hirschman (University of Washington, Seattle, usa) and the Institute of Sociology (Hanoi, Vietnam). There were 1,855 households with 4,464 individuals aged 15–65, in three provinces at the Red River Delta (Nam Dinh, Ha Nam, and Ninh Binh). The first round was carried out in autumn–winter 1995. The Red River Delta is located in the northern part of Vietnam. In 1995 the Red River Delta included

381

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY 80.0

75.6

73.1

69.1

70.0

68.6

60.0 50.0

43.0

40.0

40.4 31.7

18-60 years 29.6

30.0

61+ years

20.0 10.0 0.0

Urban

Rural

Men

Women

Figure 9.1  Percentage of married respondents answered ‘I took the decision, but I did ask for my parents’ opinion’ in marriage decision Source: mocst et al. (2008); Vietnamese Family Survey (2006)

the number of self-determined marriages among the inhabitants of this area. According to data from the Survey on the Vietnamese Family 2006, illiterate people exhibit the highest proportion of parentally arranged marriages (39.0 per cent), while those who have completed high school have the lowest percentage at 12.7 per cent.61 Occupation emerged as an extremely important factor explaining the pattern of the marriage-selection freedom of the population, especially women, who used to work near their home and mostly do agricultural jobs. Similarly, a higher percentage of people born or living in urban areas enjoyed greater marriage-selection freedom.62



61 62

Hanoi Capital city, the city of Haiphong, Hatay, Hoabinh, Haiduong, Hungyen, Hanam, Namdinh, Ninhbinh, and Thaibinh provinces. In 2009, according to the Vietnam Population and Housing Census, the Red River Delta includes: Hanoi Capital city (Hatay is now a part of Hanoi Capital city), the city of Haiphong, Haiduong, Hungyen, Hanam, Namdinh, Ninhbinh, Thaibinh, Vinhphuc, Quangninh, and Bacninh provinces. mocst et al. (2008, 60). Nguyen Huu Minh (1999); Le Ngoc Van (2007); mocst et al. (2008).

382

NGUYEN

The government has substantially influenced the marriage-selection patterns of individuals in Vietnam through policies directly related to marriage and the family. The government’s influence is often reflected in the effectiveness of its policies in different time periods through the changes in the percentage of people having the freedom to decide about their own marriage selection; it is also reflected in the difference in marriage-selection freedom between those who were employed in the social and economic organisations of the state and those who were not. An analysis of the Vietnam Life History Survey 199163 shows that the percentage of self-determined marriages increased with time, especially after the government implemented its new policies pertaining to the family, and that this figure was significantly higher in the north than in the south during the time when the regions had different policies regarding the family. This confirms the government’s influence on the marriage-selection freedom of individuals.64 In addition to the legal stipulations pertaining to marriage-selection freedom, the government’s role also involved the promulgation of specific policies to ensure equality between men and women, protect the interests of women and children, and provide support to newly married couples, as mentioned earlier. Self-determined marriages were also relatively more popular among government employees or those whose parents were government employees.65 The characteristics of individuals also influenced their perception of the Marriage and Family Law. The research in the Red River Delta by the author of this chapter (1999) indicates that the change in marriage patterns, from those mainly arranged by parents to those mainly decided by individuals, was 63 64

65

Nguyen Huu Minh (1999). An interesting point in this study is that the collected data allow us to assess the influence of the government’s policy on the marriage-selection pattern. This can be done by comparing the percentage of marriages arranged by the families among the samples from the north with those from the south, both before and after North Vietnam issued the Law of Marriage and Family in 1959 and South Vietnam issued the Family Code in 1959 (as mentioned in Section II). Before these codes were implemented (prior to 1960), the incidence of marriages arranged by families among the samples in the north was significantly higher than that in the south. This result confirms the hypothesis that the northern families were more traditional than the southern families. However, this picture of the two regions changed completely after 1960. From 1961 to 1975, the incidence of family-arranged marriages among the samples in the south was substantially higher than that in the north. During this period, the Law of Marriage and Family in the north encouraged independent marriage selection, while the Family Code in the south emphasised the role of the family in children’s marriage (Nguyen Huu Minh 1999). Goodkind (1996); Nguyen Huu Minh (1999).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

383

initiated by highly educated inhabitants living in urban areas and employed in non-agricultural jobs. This change subsequently spread out to the rural areas and among those with lower levels of education; hence, in the last twenty years or so, most social groups have followed this new marriage pattern. In addition there has been a trend that individuals increasingly desire to select their own life partners freely, independent of other socio-economic factors. This suggests that although in recent years the family has assumed more importance as an economic unit, the number of family-arranged marriages will not increase in the future. Apart from the structured factors mentioned above, cultural differences (e.g., patrilocating to a multi-generation family, ethnic factors, and so on) also result in different patterns of marriage-selection decision-making power. For  example, those born and brought up in multi-generation families are less  likely to have marriage-selection freedom than those living in twogeneration families.66 Studies have also suggested that those belonging to the Catholic religion have less marriage-selection freedom in comparison with other people.67 This is because, in Catholic families, parents tend to exercise stricter control over their children to ensure that they will marry someone of the same religion and thus not lose their faith. 3.2 The Marriage Selection Process The connection between marriage-selection patterns and individuals’ freedom in marriage selection is not a random connection but originates from significant changes in the process of preparing for marriage, where the bride and groom get to know each other before getting married. Nowadays, people have much greater opportunities to meet and get acquainted with each other before marriage than the previous generations ever did. If, in the 1960s, neighbours spread rumours about young men and women when they stood and talked in the street in broad daylight, now they can go out and talk at night, without any hesitation or shyness, in towns, cities, and places far away from the villages. The social environment, once limited only to the family and relatives, has gradually opened to include social, political, and economic organisations. At present, this environment plays an important role in people’s recreational activities and traditional festivals. Such activities, in their turn, create an ideal atmosphere for the forging of new love relationships.68 66 67 68

Nguyen Huu Minh (1999); mocst et al. (2008, 61). Nguyen Huu Minh (1999); Le Ngoc Van (2007). Khuat Thu Hong (1994).

384

NGUYEN

According to the author of this chapter (1999), in the Red River Delta the proportion of people who ‘did not know each other’ before their marriage decreased significantly as the date of marriage changed from the period 1946– 60 to the period 1986–95, and at the same time the proportion of people knowing their life partners for a longer before marriage increased. This was accompanied by a substantial reduction in the family’s role in getting to know the prospective bride or groom before marriage (which was previously considered very important). Instead of the family, this role was assumed by friends and through recreational activities. For example, the percentage of those depending on matchmakers to find their life partners decreased from 10 per cent in 1946–60 to 2.5 per cent in 1987–95. Results from the analysis conducted in three rural communes in the three provinces of Yen Bai, Thua Thien-Hue, and Tien Giang in 2004–2008 also indicate that the incidence of respondents who had ‘become acquainted with their partners themselves’ before marriage tended to increase over time, while that of those who had ‘become acquainted with their partners through their parents’ intervention’ or ‘through matchmakers’ tended to decrease. For example, among those who were married between 1942 and 1975, only 37.8 per cent replied that they had ‘become acquainted with their partners themselves’ before marriage. This percentage increased to 54.5 per cent for those who were married between 1976 and 1986 and to 61.1 per cent for those married between 1987 and 2005.69 Thus, there has been a general decline in the family’s role in intervening in children’s marriages in Vietnam, with fewer parents and older relatives having the power to decide whom their child should marry, especially after 1975. Although the family is still primarily responsible for organising marriage rites, individuals bear the decision-making powers as regards marriage selection. Cooperation between individuals and the family, as well as among generations, is the central factor in marriage-related decisions at present times. Change in the Marriage Selection Criteria from a ‘Suitable Alliance’ for the Family to Individual Compatibility Together with the change from family-arranged marriage patterns to selfdetermined marriage patterns, there has been a corresponding change in people’s marriage-selection criteria. The traditional notion of selecting a suitable daughter- or son-in-law, based on the concept of a ‘suitable alliance’ between the bride’s and bridegroom’s families, has been replaced by individual compatibility in aspects such as emotional compatibility, awareness, and occupation.

3.3

69

Le Ngoc Van (2007, 28).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

385

Harmony between individuals is a necessary premise to ensure the family’s happiness. These days, young people are more concerned about the suitability of their partners than the status of the two families. According to the Survey on the Vietnamese Family 2006, certain ethical virtues and individual dignity tend to be prioritised above specific family characteristics in marriage selection. In the 18–60 age group, the three main marriage-selection criteria70 are as follow: 62.6 per cent of the respondents selected ‘well-behaved/good behaviour’, 33.9 per cent of the respondents preferred a partner who was ‘a good businessman’, and 33.5 per cent of the respondents valued ‘good health’. These criteria were selected by both men and women and remained relatively steady across different marriage groups and time periods, from before 1975 to 2006. Meanwhile, only 16.0 per cent of the respondents attached importance to the criterion of ‘respectable family’; 3.4 per cent selected ‘unblemished family history’, while 7.9 per cent preferred a ‘fellow countryman’ for a life partner. Those in the age group of sixty-one years and above had similar selection criteria; however, their order of priority was slightly different (see more in Figure 9.2).71 However, the marriage-selection pattern has not changed completely to one based entirely on individual characteristics. In fact, a significant proportion of young people continue to emphasise the roles played by the family, kinship, and village relations. For example, about 30 per cent of people selected criteria related to family and the homeland such as ‘respectable family’, ‘fellow countryman’, and ‘unblemished family history’. These facts indicate that the socio-economic condition of families is still significant in marriage selection. A specific characteristic of underdeveloped countries in comparison with developed countries is that an individual’s success in life is closely associated with the criterion of reflecting a ‘suitable alliance’ between families. Therefore, it is difficult to say whether individuals’ selections are entirely unrelated to the past. For example, data from the survey 70

71

The Survey on the Vietnamese Family stated eleven specific criteria for the selection of a life partner; the survey combined both traditional and modern criteria for its respondents, aged 18–60 years and sixty-one years and above, and requested that respondents recall which factors they had preferred at the time of their marriage. The survey offered options such as ‘a moderately good appearance’, ‘good health’, ‘well-educated’, ‘stable job’, ‘well-behaved/good behaviour’, ‘fellow countryman’, ‘good businessman’, ‘respectable family’, ‘unblemished family history’, ‘no specific criteria’, and ‘other criteria’. The respondents could select a maximum of three options (mocst et al. 2008). mocst et al. (2008, 56).

386

NGUYEN

70.0 62.6 60.0 50.0

46.4

40.0

33.9

30.0

33.5 23.4

18-60 years 25.5

60+ years

20.0 10.0 0.0

Good behaviour

Good businessman

Good health

Figure 9.2  Three main marriage-selection criteria of married respondents by age group Source: mocst et al. (2008); Vietnamese Family Survey (2006)

conducted in Thai Binh in 199472 indicate that about 80 per cent of the economic situation and reputation of the family of the respondents was similar to that of their husbands’/wives’ family. In other words, people consider both individual characteristics and the socio-economic condition of the family when selecting life partners. There are socio-economic reasons behind the continuing significance of the family factor in individual spouse selection. The popularity of marriage and its importance in Vietnamese society compels individuals to select their partners carefully in order to ensure long-lasting happiness and to improve their family life. The extended family’s support in economic terms and in bringing up children is still very important for individual success at present. Moreover, many people believe that a good family environment fosters virtue in individuals. A respectable family often educates its children to live harmoniously and in friendship with other people, while a family that is well-situated economically will pass on effective business techniques to their children in order to develop a business-oriented family. Therefore, the characteristics of a person’s life partner, especially economic conditions and family relations, contain potential factors that can positively or negatively influence the entire future life of the person. 72

Barbieri and Vu Tuan Huy (1995).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

387

From the viewpoint of specific individual characteristics, some traditional values in marriage continue to be valued in modern life. For example, the virtues considered important for the wife include good health (essential for both reproduction and ‘doing business’), a sense of responsibility for the household and the husband’s family, the ability to make sacrifices for the husband and children, and the ability to bring up children as well as take care of other family members. At the same time, husbands are expected to assume the role of the head of the family, have the ability to bring in a good income, and provide emotional support to family members.73 Data from the Survey on the Vietnamese Family 2006 indicate that some marriage-selection criteria, such as good behaviour, individual virtues, or the ability to do business in order to ensure a good life, are consistently preferred. Good physical health is also appreciated because it is not only related to the ability to carry on the family business but also, in the case of women, related to their chances of giving birth without complications and of having healthy children. Some people still maintain the traditional idea that ‘women are greedy for gain, men are greedy for beauty’. The Survey on the Vietnamese Family 2006 indicates that even today, men are more concerned about physical appearance than women (the percentage of men selecting life partners with a ‘moderately good appearance’ is 19.8 per cent, compared to 12.7 per cent for women).74 However, in certain aspects, marriage-selection criteria have changed. There was a time, for example, during the first years of peace in North Vietnam (after 1954), when the person’s origins in a working-class or peasant-class background was a significant criterion in marriage selection. In the North, during the war against America, the ethical factor was prioritised, while the economic factor was suppressed. An individual’s political status, such as being a member of the Communist Party or the Communist Youth Union, a soldier, or a government servant, was specially appreciated as an ethical criterion and consequently became an important criterion in marriage. Since the beginning of the Doi Moi period, although the ethical criterion is still appreciated, economic criteria such as having a stable job or being good at business receive considerable attention.75 These economic criteria are very much related to the market economy after Doi Moi in Vietnam. Let us consider the criterion of having a ‘stable job’. This is an important requirement for maintaining a stable family life. Both women and men are

73 74 75

Khuat Thu Hong (1994); Nguyen Huu Minh (1999); Le Ngoc Van (2007). mocst et al. (2008, 56). Phi Van Ba (1990); Khuat Thu Hong (1994); mocst et al. (2008).

388

NGUYEN

concerned about their spouses’ occupations,76 and in recent times, this criterion is becoming increasingly important. The percentage of those married before 1975 who selected life partners with stable jobs was 9.3 per cent, but it became 17.5 per cent for those married between 2000 and 2006.77 Modern couples are also more proactive in selecting partners. According to the Survey on the Vietnamese Family 2006, 20.2 per cent of those aged sixtyone years and above admitted that they ‘did not have any specific criteria’ at the time of marriage selection; however, this figure for married people aged 18–60 years decreased to 10.7 per cent. There are certain differences related to marriage-selection criteria among social groups. For example, according to the Survey on the Vietnamese Family 2006, for married people aged 18–60 years, there was a significant difference in the importance attached to the criterion of having a ‘stable job’ between respondents in the urban (25.7 per cent) and rural areas (7.4 per cent). One reason for the rural–urban difference is that in rural areas people can survive with an ‘unstable job’ because they have a diversity of agriculture work to do. While 8 per cent of urban residents (10.1 per cent of those living in the big inner cities) preferred ‘well-educated’ partners, only 2.2 per cent of those living in rural areas selected this criterion.78 This indicates that the market economy and industrialisation clearly have a greater influence on the inhabitants of urban areas than on those of rural areas. However, with regard to some other marriage-selection criteria, there is very little difference between the social groups. For example, the Survey on the Vietnamese Family 2006 shows no rural–urban difference in importance attributed to the criteria of ‘good behaviour’ and ‘unblemished family history’. The change in marriage patterns, from a system based on a suitable alliance between families to free and independent selection based on the compatibility of individual characteristics, resulted from industrialisation, modernisation, and the government’s policies protecting the interests of individuals. In recent times, individual characteristics have become increasingly important in partner selection. Other important criteria include economic factors and the ability to ensure a comfortable life for the family. However, the family factor has not been entirely eliminated from marriage-related decision-making. While taking their own decisions regarding marriage, young people often combine family factors and compatibility between individuals in their criteria for selecting a life partner. 76 77 78

Le Ngoc Van (2007). mocst et al. (2008, 57–58). mocst et al. (2008, 58–59).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

4

389

Changing Gender Relations within Family

Gender relations within the family can be discussed in terms of several aspects, among them co-residence with the husband’s or wife’s family after marriage, and marital relations. Clear observations from studies show that co-residence with the husband’s family is still common, however for a shorter time compared to the past. Research findings regarding marital relations have confirmed that traditional gender-relation patterns are still maintained: the wife is mainly responsible for housework and the husband is the main economic contributor in the family. Patrilocal Residence after Marriage Is Still Common but for a Shorter Time According to convention in Vietnam, patrilocal co-residence is common.79 This pattern of co-residence not only reflects the traditional expectation that children are obliged to care for elderly parents, but also expresses a desire among parents to help their children before they can afford to establish an independent household. Patrilocal residence also helps the new daughter-inlaw become accustomed to being part of her husband’s family and to meet the expectations of her parents-in-law. Traditional family patterns of co-residence reinforce the obligations of members of younger generations toward their elders, and they are also a household strategy for mutual intergenerational support.80 In other words, the ‘patrilocal residence pattern and its variation are useful for both old and young generations’.81 The persistence of traditional Vietnamese family structures has been confirmed by some recent empirical studies.82 According to the Vietnam Family Survey 2006, eating and living together with the husband’s family after marriage is still common, with 64.8 per cent of the population aged 18–60 doing so. However, a diversified picture can be seen when it comes to other forms of living arrangements after marriage, such as living with the husband’s family but eating separately (1.3 per cent); living and eating with the wife’s family (8.4 per cent); or living and eating completely separately (23.7 per cent). Young couples living separately from parents after marriage tend to be more common 4.1

79 80 81 82

In this chapter, patrilocal and patri-virilocal are considered interchangeable terms. Nguyen Huu Minh and Hirschman (2000). Mai Huy Bich (2000, 40–41); see also Rydstrom and Drummond (2004). Goodkind (1997); Barbieri and Vu Tuan Huy (1995); Nguyen Huu Minh and Hirschman (2000); Mai Huy Bich (2000); Nguyen Huu Minh (2009).

390

NGUYEN

in urban areas. Eating and living with the wife’s family are increasingly accepted by young people.83 The family arrangements of the majority of the Vietnamese people are the result of a compromise between their ideals and particular demographic and socio-economic circumstances. Many factors affect this pattern. For example, based on Dixon’s framework (1971), a number of demographic, socio-economic, and normative factors have important roles in family living arrangements via their effects on availability, feasibility, and desirability of certain types of family organisation. The availability of a particular type of family refers to demographic constraints on the formation of a family, such as the availability of parents and kinship, the number of siblings, as well as whether family members live nearby or not, and so on. For example, the more siblings in the family at the time of marriage, the less likely it is that newly-wed couples will live with the parental family, because the responsibility for caring for ageing parents can be shared more widely over remaining unmarried siblings. In addition, the higher number of siblings in the family also creates a more crowded household, more complex family relationships, and may make newly married couples less comfortable living with their parents. The feasibility of living arrangements refers to the financial and social conditions required for one particular type of family. Thus, even if people prefer to live in a nuclear family it may be impossible for them to do so if they do not have any land or money to establish an independent household. So, economic constraints, especially the chance of having an independent house, is one of the main reasons forcing many newly wedded couples to stay together with their parents. The desirability of certain patterns of living arrangements reflects individual desires in this matter. Highly educated people or urban residents – more than poorly educated people and rural residents – are usually more likely to desire to live separately from their parents.84 In societies affected by Confucianism, eldest sons are expected to live with parents more, because eldest sons are supposed to take care of old parents and also to inherit their property.85 Many factors connected to industrialisation and modernisation also affect family living arrangements. High geographic mobility makes young couples less able to live in the same area as their parents. Modern society increases welfare support for individuals, especially providing forms of help for elderly people’s care, enabling young couples to be less worried when they are unable 83 84 85

mocst et al. (2008, 68). Martin and Tsuya (1994). Martin and Tsuya (1994); Kim et al. (1994).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

391

take care of their parents directly. Thus, although the obligations that children feel toward parents are not necessarily reduced in a more ‘modern’ society, young people are able to fulfil these obligations even when they do not live together. New opportunities for increasing income help young couples to have independent accommodation earlier. More rights in decision-making allow young couples to be more active in arranging their residence.86 Modern life is also associated with later marriage and this in turn helps young couples to become economically independent after marriage.87 Empirical studies in the Red River Delta of Vietnam have confirmed the role of the aforementioned factors in influencing living arrangements after marriage. A later marriage age, the freedom of the couple to choose a partner for themselves, improved living standards, at least one of either the husband or wife working for the government, non-agricultural work, and an urban location are the most important factors that act to decrease the probability of ever living with the husband’s parents after marriage.88 In addition, specifically having at least one of the couple working for the government and the wife’s occupations at the time of marriage being nonagricultural are very important factors decreasing the chance of living with the husband’s family after marriage because these factors are related to improved economic conditions in the Vietnamese context. Non-agricultural and government work also create the possibility of further distance between the parents’ and couple’s residence. These findings concur with the results of some other studies in China.89 It has been suggested that modernisation, urbanisation, and industrialisation do not in themselves necessarily result in a linear development from extended or stem family to nuclear family. These results are related to findings from other countries in the region, which show persistence in patrilocal coresidence after marriage.90 Co-residence of newly married children with the husband’s parents usually only lasts for a short period of time. Younger sons are supported in establishing a new household, leaving only one son (usually the oldest son in the Red River Delta) to live permanently with, and take care of, old parents. This process is linked to the Vietnamese custom of ‘rotation’ in rural areas of Vietnam; each 86 87 88 89 90

Goode (1982); Lee (1987); Kim et al. (1994). Lavely and Ren (1992). Goodkind (1996); Nguyen Huu Minh and Hirschman (2000); Nguyen Huu Minh (2009). Lavely and Ren (1992). Nguyen Huu Minh and Hirschman (2000); Freedman et al. (1994); Lavely and Ren (1992); Weinstein et al. (1994).

392

NGUYEN

married son leaves their family of origin after a period of joint residence, leaving the oldest or youngest son to take care of the parents.91 This tradition has persisted almost unchanged in the Red River Delta and some other regions of Vietnam through the last several decades, although research findings show that there has been a reduction in the duration of patrilocal co-residence after marriage. In other words, young couples tend to leave their parental family earlier than before. Overall, among those persons who did co-reside with the husband’s parents after marriage, about 50 per cent of them continue to live with the husband’s parents for more than three years.92 This result is consistent with findings from other countries that, in parallel with the persistence of patrilocal co-residence patterns after marriage, the length of living together becomes substantially shorter.93 The main determinants of the reduction in long-term co-residence are the husband’s education, age at marriage, marriage cohort, age of husband’s parents, whether the husband is the eldest son, and the husband’s living siblings.94 A higher level of education in the husband is associated with longer patrilocal co-residence. A possible explanation of this relationship is that educated people may be more likely than others to consider taking care of the parents as a way of expressing filial piety. This perception has been maintained for a long time by social norms and has been encouraged by the government. A lower age at marriage is usually associated with worse economic conditions, therefore those entering earlier marriages would have less chance of leaving earlier.95 Husbands who have older parents, who are eldest sons, and who have few siblings at home at the time of marriage exhibit a higher probability of patrilocal co-residence with the husband’s parents after three years of marriage. These findings have confirmed Dixon’s suggestions (1971) on the importance of factors related to availability and feasibility of living long-term with the husband’s parents. The maintenance of both the aforementioned trends reflects the different needs of parents and young couples regarding patrilocal co-residence. Behind these two trends are issues of social ‘logics’ like parental support for the young couple in terms of economics when they first set up their own family and assistance in taking care of newborns, as well as the willingness of a young couple to leave the parental family in order to establish their own household, to live an independent life, and to make their own decisions. 91 92 93 94 95

Do Thai Dong (1991). Nguyen Huu Minh and Hirschman (2000); Nguyen Huu Minh (2009). Lavely and Ren (1992); Weinstein et al. (1994); Freedman et al. (1994). Nguyen Huu Minh and Hirschman (2000); Nguyen Huu Minh (2009). Lavely and Ren (1992).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

393

The patrilocal pattern of co-residence after marriage in Vietnam is a result not only of traditional expectations, but also of pragmatic decisions. This also serves as a source of emotional and financial support both for parents and for newly married couples, which promotes long-term co-residence with the husband’s family. Maintenance of the ‘rotation’ custom in Vietnam depends heavily on the ability of newly married couples to establish an independent household and the ability of society to set up a social welfare system which can help married children fulfil their responsibility to take care of their parents without co-residing with them. Studies also show different impacts of socio-economic and cultural factors on the formation of extended and decentralised families. Co-residence with the family of origin in the first few years is probably due to young couples’ need for support. Meanwhile, living for a longer time with parents reflects more the parents’ need for help as they get older. Therefore, determinants of patrilocal co-residence may not necessarily be determinants of the length of coresidence. For example, couples including a wife in non-agricultural/ government work tend to live further away from their parents, therefore reducing the possibility of patrilocal living after marriage. However, for those who choose patrilocal co-residence, this factor is not important as a factor in lengthening the duration of the time spent living with parents.96 4.2 Changing Marital Relations As mentioned above, in recent years the role of women in the workforce has increased. Compared with many other countries, the proportion of women taking part in the workforce in Vietnam is quite high. However, gender relations in the family have changed more slowly. There are many specific aspects of gender relation in marriage: power, emotional psychology, economics, etc. In this section the focus is on analysing changes in labour allocation between husband and wife in the family and on gender differences in contributions to family income. Outcomes from several studies show that labour allocation between husband and wife still retains a largely traditional pattern in which the wife is mainly responsible for the household chores. Meanwhile, the husband makes the main economic contributions to the family. This fact once again confirms the preservation of traditional patterns in marriage relations. 4.2.1 Situation of Domestic Division of Labour from a Gender Aspect Domestic work is often divided into various categories like housework, household production–business work, taking care of family members (young babies, 96

Nguyen Huu Minh (2008).

394

NGUYEN

the old, and the sick), communication (in particular, receiving guests into the house and dealing with the authorities on behalf of the household). These categories of work are in turn subdivided. For example, housework is often understood as cooking, laundry, buying everyday food, and cleaning the house. Production–business work is also divided into types of cultivation, livestock breeding, forestry–fishery work, etc. Studies of domestic labour division often focus on who does what type of work in the household, especially the labour distribution between husband and wife. Up to now, domestic labour division in Vietnam has mainly been studied in rural areas, where gender difference is the best represented. In recent years, some large-scale studies like the Vietnamese Family Survey 200697 and the Survey on the Real Situation of Gender Equality in Vietnam 200598 have provided data representing the whole country for comparison at the level of urban–rural areas and economic–ecological areas. The Vietnamese Family Survey 2006, with a nationally representative sample of households, can be regarded as the most recent large-scale survey which provides information about labour division across genders in Vietnamese families. Findings from the Vietnamese Family Survey 2006 indicate the preservation of patterns of traditional labour division by gender in families. In terms of both awareness and behaviour, women and men are bound to certain types of work, which are regarded as suitable to their gender. For example, housework, taking care of children, managing family accounts, and taking care of old/sick people are for women/wives; production business, receiving visitors, and dealing with the authorities on behalf of the household are for men/husbands. The proportion of those aged 18–60 holding to the idea that women are suited to housework is 90.4 per cent and that of single adolescents aged 15–17 is 79.3 per cent. The number of those thinking that men are suited to housework accounts for less than 1 per cent. The proportion of those considering production work to be more suitable for husbands than wives, in the two age groups mentioned above, was 29.8 per cent compared with 8.0 per cent and 29.8 per cent compared with 3.8 per cent. Domestic labour allocation in reality is similar. Most wives are the main people doing ‘housework’, ‘family account management’, or ‘taking care of children’. The proportion of wives doing these types of work is significantly higher than that of husbands. By contrast, the proportion of husbands doing other types of work is higher than that of wives, such as for ‘dealing with authorities

97 98

mocst et al. (2008). Tran Thi Van Anh and Nguyen Huu Minh (2008).

395

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

on behalf of the household’, ‘receiving visitors’, and ‘production business’ (see more in Table 9.5).99 The aforementioned types of work carried out during a family’s daily life reflect gender differences very clearly. Regarding production–business activities, gender differences are more diversified depending on the way each household organises income-generating activities and local conditions. Household production–business activities often see participation by most household members. However, the head of household and husband/wife still play the main role, with children and other members making only minor contributions. For example, women and men take part in all stages of cultivation. However, women are often responsible for specific stages such as spreading seeds and selling produce, while men are often responsible for working the soil and spraying pesticide. In some other types of work, putting down fertiliser and harvesting, both men and women take part equally. Labour division by gender can also clearly be seen in service activities. Men mainly perform services requiring physical labour or work on machinery. By contrast, wives are often responsible for trading and catering activities because they are thought to be better at attracting customers and displaying goods and so forth.100 Many people think that such labour distribution by gender with ‘men doing heavy work, women doing light work’ is reasonable in the context of rural and Table 9.5 Domestic labour allocation between wife and husband (aged 18–60) in reality Work

Wife

Husband

Both

Housework Family account management Childcare Elderly/illness care Production business Dealing with authorities on behalf of household Receiving visitors

82.5 73.9 68.3 46.8 27.6 18.1 17.5

3.5 9.3 2.4 9.1 36.7 62.7 46.1

3.1 11.0 10.7 29.8 25.8 11.8 29.2

Note: Total is not 100% due to some work done by other persons.

source: mocst et al. (2008, 79); vietnamese family survey (2006)

99 mocst et al. (2008, 76, 78, 79). 100 Le Thai Thi Bang Tam (2008, 155–158).

396

NGUYEN

mountainous areas where technical labour and mechanisation are not popular and where the biological characteristics of each gender play an important part in production. This perception is not different between men and women.101 In fact, when women participate in production and social activities, domestic work is shared more equally between husband and wife. Men and women themselves are prepared to change their traditional roles. Especially in households where the wives play the role of main economic support, they take part significantly less in housework and in taking care of the husband and children. In these cases, the traditional role of taking care of domestic work is transferred to the husband or other household members.102 In general, wives are still mainly in charge of domestic work and ‘internal relations’, while husbands are mainly in charge of outside work and ‘external affairs’. However, data from most studies also show that while there is a significant gender difference in some kinds of work, like housework, taking care of children, and managing the family accounts, the gender differences tend to decrease gradually in some other kinds of work, such as production, business, taking care of old/sick people, receiving visitors, and dealing with authority on behalf of households. A considerable proportion of both wives and husbands mainly do these kinds of work. Regarding the consequences of gender difference in household labour division, it is clear that women’s activities are limited to those within the family. By contrast, men can take part more in social and economic activities outside the family, have more opportunities for promotion in their career and of obtaining a higher income. This fact can create conflicts between the roles and responsibilities, and differences in the income contribution of men and women.103 Another consequence is that taking care of and bringing up children, which has been done mainly by women so far, is not often quantified in terms of money. Therefore, when calculations of economic contribution to the household are taken into account, women are often under-evaluated and regarded as having a lesser role than men.104 Therefore, there should be a fair evaluation of the kinds of women’s work in the household which seem to be small and trivial relative to other kinds of work that are easily quantified in monetary terms. People also have different ideas about the effort and time spent on housework. Some think it is effort- and time-consuming, others think that it just takes time but not effort, or vice versa. However, respondents in general, 101 102 103 104

mocst et al. (2008, 76). Ibid. (78). Le Ngoc Van (2002, 55). Do Thi Binh and Tran Thi Van Anh (2003, 25).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

397

whether they are wives or husbands, acknowledge some value in housework and the efforts of those doing it. A study conducted in a commune in the Red River Delta (Nam Dinh province) shows that about half the respondents do not agree (‘mostly do not agree’ or ‘strongly do not agree’) with the idea that ‘housework does not produce economic value’ and about 74 per cent of men and 70 per cent of women do not agree with the idea that ‘housework is not effort- and time-consuming’.105 This indicates that most people appreciate the importance of housework, although they still consider it mainly the responsibility of women. The development of a market economy, the diversification of careers, and the wave of labourers migrating from rural to urban areas to look for jobs (including many female labourers) has facilitated the improvement in housework’s value and made husbands assess more correctly wives’ contribution to household work. Appreciation of the contribution of time, effort, and money made by wives who mainly do housework in the family is a good sign of the respect of household members towards these tiring, boring, but very important kinds of work. This fact can contribute to reducing gender prejudice in labour distribution between men and women in the family. So far, there has not been enough data gathered on a national scale about changing trends in labour distribution according to gender in the family. However, the cohort analysis in the Vietnamese Family Survey 2006 and the Survey on the Real Situation of Gender Equality in Vietnam 2005 suggests that, at present, the proportion of husbands taking part in housework has increased compared with the past. People’s ideas have also changed about men and women’s participation in work that used to be regarded as belonging to a particular gender. For example, about 62 per cent of respondents in all three age groups (61 or older, 18–60, and 15–17) think that production and business work is suitable for both men and women. Meanwhile, a large proportion of respondents in all three age groups consider that taking care of old/sick people or receiving visitors and dealing with authority on behalf of the household are activities in which both genders can take part.106 Social change driven by industrialisation has created more job opportunities for women and their participation in the labour force has increased. Women’s contribution to household income has also gone up. These factors will lead to an increase in the husband’s participation in household work.

105 Dang Thanh Nhan (2005). 106 mocst et al. (2008, 77).

398

NGUYEN

4.2.2

Socio-economic Differentials in Domestic Division of Labour by Gender The main differences related to labour division by gender in the household are: locus of residence (urban or rural), occupation, education level, life-cycle of family, and household structure, contribution to household income, and gender prejudice. In general, more husbands in urban households participate in housework than men in rural areas, although the difference is not significant. In addition, the presence of maids in many urban households is also a factor which reduces the amount of housework for mothers/wives.107 According to the National Survey on Labour Employment in 2010, family maids account for 0.4 per cent of the total labour force and female domestic workers account for 90.8 per cent of these family maids.108 The occupation of the wife or husband is closely related to labour distribution in the family. If both spouses work outside the home there is more sharing between husband and wife. If the husband goes to work far from the home, while the wife works near the home, it is more likely that the wife participates in housework.109 As another example, households doing solely agricultural work have more flexible time, so husbands can share more housework with wives. As for women in non-agricultural jobs, their incomes increase and the frequency of their participation in household work decreases by comparison with women doing agricultural jobs.110 Regarding married couples with high levels of education, husbands share housework with wives more, in terms both of expressed ideals and of real action. For example, 92.2 per cent of illiterate people think that housework is suited to women, while for those with a university-level education, this figure is lower at 85.9 per cent.111 Differences in domestic labour distribution are related to different periods in family life. Many studies112 show that the older the married couples are or the longer the marriage, the less wives participate in housework. The reason for this phenomenon generally lies in getting more support from children, grandchildren, or maids when parents are old. 107 108 109 110 111 112

Le Thai Thi Bang Tam (2008, 146). vgso (2011b). Ibid. (151). Le Hai Dang (2007); Tran Quy Long (2007). mocst et al. (2008, 78). For example, Le Thai Thi Bang Tam (2008); Vu Manh Loi (2004); Tran Quy Long (2007).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

399

The contribution of wives and husbands to household income influences their labour distribution. When a husband’s income is significantly higher than that of his wife, the wife then tends to be in charge of domestic work to facilitate her husband’s main work, in order to maximise the common income of the household. Many respondents think that it is reasonable that when the husband works very hard outside the home to earn money, the wife should do all the domestic work. When the wife has a higher income than the husband, or has the same income, each member will have to reconsider the labour distribution in the family in such a way as to maintain and improve the common income. In this situation, husbands may take a greater part in domestic work.113 Traditional ideas about gender roles have a great influence on the division of domestic labour. According to tradition, women have to be responsible for domestic work, regardless of the type of family. This idea is not only found among men but also among women. Therefore, women always try to do all the domestic work. They do not mind how hard the work is or if it influences their individual advancement. They consider it their responsibility. Many women think that a family cannot be happy without a wife who is capable of housework and good at arranging everything.114 Gender prejudice linked with housework will impede changes in traditional labour distribution patterns. Many women have attached themselves to the role of ‘housewife’ in families. The husband still makes the greater contribution. In Vietnamese families, the economic contribution of each member is not only made in terms of cash (salary, wages, money from doing business), but also from other sources of income which directly meet the material needs of the family, such as food and so on. In addition, there is also a contribution of effort in labour like household chores, taking care of family members, and managing cash and expenses. These kinds of work are not paid but they make a contribution to family income indirectly. In Vietnamese thinking, no matter who earns the income for the family, the economic achievement is due to the effort and contribution of both husband and wife. It is very difficult to assess the contribution of each family member to household income in Vietnam because, in many cases, members often run a family business together, and there has not been a suitable method for quantifying family members’ non-cash contributions. Assessment of the economic con­ tribution of family members is mainly done using information given by respondents.

113 mocst et al. (2008, 77–78). 114 Dang Thanh Nhan (2005).

400

NGUYEN

Up until now, in many cases, husbands have still made a greater ‘cash’ contribution to families than wives do. According to the Vietnam Survey on Gender Equality 2005, 95.1 per cent of respondents made a contribution to their families in cash. The proportion of wives doing so was 92.5 per cent and of husbands, 98.1 per cent. Regarding the level of contribution, 73 per cent of respondents said that husbands made the largest contribution to families, 23 per cent said that wives did, and 4 per cent said that another family member did.115 The amount of contribution made by husbands and wives varies among groups of families according to urban and rural areas, occupations, and education levels of women. Figures from the survey mentioned above show that more women in urban families made the largest contribution to household income than in rural areas and as women have higher education more of them said that they made the largest contribution compared to women with lower education level (see Figure  9.3). Of women working as businesswomen and managers, 45.5 per cent said that they made the largest contribution to household income. The proportion for women engaged in the trading business was 37.4 per cent, and for women in professional or technical work, staff, and individual service (such as haircutter, tailor, etc.), 30.0 per cent. The proportions for women working as farmers and workers were the lowest at 16.4 per cent and 22.9 per cent respectively.116 Thus, in Vietnamese families at present, the pattern of ‘single income’ (the income of the husband or wife supporting the whole family) is not common. The proportion of families where both husbands and wives make a contribution to household economics is very high. Husbands make more contributions in cash to household economics than wives do, but wives make more contribution in terms of efforts within the home. Urban women, women with high levels of education, and women holding managerial positions make a greater contribution to household economics than rural women, women with poor levels of education, or women not holding leading positions at work. 5 Conclusions For nearly thirty years since Doi Moi, along with dramatic changes in economic and social sectors, the socio-demographic characteristics of the family have

115 Tran Thi Van Anh and Nguyen Huu Minh (2008, 94–103). 116 Ibid.

401

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY 45.0 38.4

40.0 35.0

31.9

30.9

30.0

26.8

25.0

22.9

20.0

25.3

15.4

15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0

Urban

Rural

Illiterate

Primary

Lower High school College+ secondary

Figure 9.3  Percentage of women who said ‘they made the largest contribution to household income’ by rural–urban and education level Source: mocst et al. (2008); Vietnamese Family Survey (2006)

undergone many changes in Vietnam. The fertility rate of the Vietnamese has gradually decreased to the replacement fertility level. The Vietnamese have also changed their attitude from one of ‘having many children, many grandchildren’ to the norm of ‘one child or two children and raise them happy’. However, the decline in the fertility rate, the loss of gender balance in general, and the imbalance in sex ratio at birth pose many problems related to foetal sex selection that require attention. Changes in ‘son-preference’ were slower than those in preferences regarding the number of children in a family. Sonpreference is more common among women, rural residents, ethnic minorities, the poor, and people with lower levels of education. The key to changing this attitude is related to the concept of ‘heir’ in the family. Until we change this attitude, son-preference will survive. The institution of marriage is quite stable in Vietnam. Marriage is considered essential in human life and is still widely prevalent in Vietnam. However, a trend to opt for a single life has appeared in parts of the population. This trend is more evident in young people and more modern population groups such as those with a higher level of education and those living in urban areas. Along with the tendency towards choosing the single life, the marriage age of the Vietnamese has increased over the last three decades. Typical factors connected to the process of modernisation, state policies, the war, and an

402

NGUYEN

increase in individual freedom in marriage selection have contributed to this increase in the marriage age. At the same time, the marriage age also depends on cultural characteristics and geographical areas. There is also a general trend of late marriage regardless of individual and family characteristics. In recent years, the number of divorce cases has increased. People have become more and more open to this issue. Divorcees are no longer under pressure in life after divorce, and so they can decide on marriage more easily. Groups with lower levels of education and people who paid little attention to their parents’ opinions when they got married often exhibit higher divorce rates. In addition, lifestyle conflicts, issues related to having children, and lack of fidelity in marriage are important reasons cited for divorce. The nature of marriage selection has changed greatly over the last few decades in Vietnam. Parents’ power in deciding their children’s marriage is progressively weakening while young people are growing increasingly independent in deciding the course of their lives. The marriage-related decisionmaking power of children is most clearly expressed among those who have married in recent years, those with high levels of education, and the residents of urban areas. In other words, marriages are increasingly being decided to suit the interests of the marrying individuals, not the interests of their family or kinship system. This trend is in accordance with the general marriageselection patterns observed in Asian countries in recent times.117 However, the increasing freedom in the marriage-selection process for younger generations does not mean that young people nowadays can take all the decisions themselves pertaining to their marriages. Many people still enter into marriages arranged mainly by their parents. The popular trend at present is for children to take marriage-related decisions after consulting with their parents. This suggests that the traditional standard of regarding marriage as an important matter for the entire family is still preserved. Many parents consider it their obvious duty to select spouses for their children because they have to finance their children’s weddings and help the young couples in their first years of marriage. Some young people also believe that it is better for parents and siblings to understand and accept their future life partners. Seeking help from the family in partner selection reflects not only the pressure to maintain social traditions but also the rationality behind this decision, because marriage is an important institution in Vietnam. Since this trend harmonises the interests of the parents, family, and the newly married couple, it will surely endure for a long time in Vietnam, especially in rural areas. 117 Smith (1980); Rindfuss and Morgan (1983); Cheung et al. (1985); Xenos and Gultiano (1992).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

403

Together with the changes in an individual’s marriage-related decisionmaking power, partner-selection criteria have changed to accommodate modern lifestyles. Marriages based on the selection of individual characteristics have gradually replaced the system of selection based on forging a ‘suitable alliance’ between two families. While some traditional values are still preserved in marriage selection, others have changed as a result of industrialisation and modernisation. Most people decide their marriage-selection criteria based on individual characteristics such as ‘well-behaved/good behaviour’, ‘good health’, and ‘good at business’. At the same time, some criteria associated with the family, such as marrying a fellow countryman and maintaining village friendships, are not as highly appreciated as before. Among younger generations, those with high incomes and those who are residing in urban areas have greater expectations from their future partners, including new criteria such as ‘having a stable job’ and ‘being well-educated’. However, the general pattern incorporates both individual characteristics and family background in marriage selection. A more diversified trend is seen in the ways in which young people can become acquainted with their partners before marriage; these ways are closely related to the living environment of individuals and the broader sphere in which they operate. Although young people still appreciate the intervention of their parents and family, they mainly get to know their partners while studying, working, and participating in recreational activities. Besides structured changes such as improved education levels, extension of job opportunities outside the family, urbanisation, and so on, the increasing trends in marriage-selection freedom and a closer association of marriageselection criteria with the demands of a new socio-economic context among recently marrying generations indicate real changes in people’s awareness regarding the marriage-selection process. This is a trend towards marriage freedom and an increasing emphasis on individual characteristics in marriage. The emerging modern lifestyle, changes in the law on marriage and the family, administrative measures and efforts taken by authorities and unions to put these law codes into effect, the ever-expanding communication systems, and open discussion among people can play an important role in creating this cultural change. The tendency to live with the husband’s family after marriage (patrilocal co-residence) remains dominant among the accommodation arrangement patterns of newly married couples. However, forms of accommodation arrangement have gradually become more diverse. Study results show that Vietnamese family structure in general does not differ from the general pattern observed in East Asian societies, that is, living with the husband’s family after

404

NGUYEN

marriage.118 However, not all young couples will live with the husband’s parents forever. After a certain time they will separate from their parents. This process is happening over a shorter period of time than ever before. The existence of both these trends reflects the different needs of parents and young couples with regards to patrilocal co-residence, including parents’ economic and childcare support for young couples during the early days of the young couple’s life, as well as aspirations of the young couples to separate quickly from their parents and develop their own family economy and to have freedom and self-determination. Patrilocal co-residence after marriage in Vietnam is not simply a continuation of traditional standards but also a product of modern rational decisions. Therefore, living with the husband’s family will remain long in rural Vietnam. Gender-based allocations of labour are still common in the family, although there is more equal division of business tasks and other work. Women are still regarded as more suitable for housework, childcare, bookkeeping, and care of the elderly and sick. Men are regarded, meanwhile, as more suitable for production and business, receiving guests, and dealing with the authorities. That men do heavy work and women do light work is perceived as a ‘natural’ labour allocation in the family. This reflects a continuity of gender-based labour allocations in the family. The positive transformation of the education system has important implications for change in the socio-demographic characteristics of the family. The process of industrialisation and urbanisation with socio-economic restructuring has also created new career opportunities outside agriculture for people, especially women. This was a meaningful turning point, making young people more active in their life choices. The urban environment exposes people to more information and new ideas which emphasise individual freedom in arranging marriages and delay the time of marriage in order for them to pursue career opportunities. State factors significantly affect the change in the socio-demographic characteristics of the family through laws and policies, as well as their enforcement measures. In addition, economic and social development policies such as the development of the education system and expansion of the occupational structure in economic sectors outside agriculture have indirect impacts on marriage and family patterns, as discussed above. Cultural factors such as local cultural characteristics, ethnicity, and religion also have significant impacts on marriage and family patterns. The impacts of cultural factors are even larger, given the fact that Vietnam has just reached the 118 Kim et al. (1994); Lavely and Ren (1992).

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

405

medium level of economic development. In reality the effects of modernisation factors are not linear but interact with other social and cultural factors. Therefore in the context of the medium level of economic development in which many cultural factors are preserved, the effects of modernisation are constrained. It is undeniable that changes in the Vietnamese family have been dramatic, with a tendency toward reflecting more the interests of individual members rather than the family interest as a whole. However, changes in the family are not happening linearly as a result of economic development or modernisation. Following Doi Moi we are witnessing a decrease in direct control exercised by the state over the individual’s life, and instead the responsibility of the family toward individuals is more and more significant and therefore the individual is more dependent on the family. At the same time, independent effects of the market or of modernisation, which encourage individual interest, are creating more comfortable conditions for individuals to act outside the control of the family. In the Vietnamese context, neither the state nor the family nor the market economy can be held wholly responsible for individual decisions, but all of them interwoven with each other affect individuals’ lives. This has made changes in the Vietnamese family more complicated. From the South Korean case study, Chang Kyung-Sup, who developed the theory of compressed modernity, showed that modernisation takes place so fast in society that traditional, modern, and post-modern trends appear together, which leads to a very complex situation of the family.119 In this sense, the way modernisation has made its impact in Vietnamese family is rather similar to the effects seen in other East Asian societies. References Barbieri, Magali and Vu Tuan Huy. 1995. ‘Tác động của biêˊn đoˆˀ i kinh têˊ-xã hội đêˊn một sô´ khía cạnh của gia đình Việt Nam: nghiên cứu trường hợp ở tỉnh Thái Bình’ [Impacts of socio-economic changes on some aspects of the Vietnamese family: A case study in Thai Binh Province]. Report presented at the Conference on Family, Economic Changes and Birth Rate Organised by the Institute of Sociology, Hanoi, Vietnam (November). Chamratrithirong, Aphichat, S. Philip Morgan and Ronald R. Rindfuss. 1986. When to Marry and Where to Live? A Sociological Study of Post-nuptial Residence and Age 119 Chang (2010). Also see the brief explanation of the term compressed modernity with related concepts in the Introduction of this volume.

406

NGUYEN

of Marriage among Central Thai Women. ipsr Publication No. 102 (September). Bangkok: Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol University (ipsr). Chang Kyung-Sup. 2010. South Korea under Compressed Modernity: Familial Political Economy in Transition. London: Routledge. Cheung, Paul, Josefina Cabigon, Aphichat Chamratrithirong, Peter F. McDonald, Sabila Sye, Andrew Cherlin and Peter C. Smith. 1985. ‘Cultural variations in the transition to marriage in four Asian societies’. In International Population Conference, Florence, 1985. International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Vol. 3: 293–308. Liége: International Union for the Scientific Study of Population. ` trong gia đình Dang Thanh Nhan. 2005. Phân công lao động nội trợ giữa vợ và ch ông ` nông thôn Đ ông Bằng Bắc bộ. Nghiên cứu trường hợp ở Lộc Hòa, Nam Định [Housework Distribution Between Husband and Wife in Rural Families in Northern Delta: A Case Study in Loc Hoa, Nam Dinh]. Báo cáo đièn̂ dã, Lớp Liên ngành khxh khóa 4, Viện ` khoa học xã hội Hoa Kỳ [Survey Report. Khoa học xã hội Việt Nam và Hội đ ông Interdisciplinary Program of Social Sciences, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences and Social Science Research Council-usa, Course No. 4]. Dao Duy Anh. [1938] 1992. Việt Nam văn hóa sử cương [Vietnam Cultural History]. Nxb. Thành phoˊHo ̂ ̀̂ Chí Minh và Khoa Sử-Đại học Sư phạm thành phoˊHo ̂ ̀̂ Chí Minh [Ho Chi Minh City Publisher and Department of History, Ho Chi Minh City University of Education]. Dixon, Ruth. 1971. ‘Explaining cross-cultural variation in age at marriage and proportions never marrying’. Population Studies 25 (2): 215–234. Do Thai Dong. 1991. ‘Gia đình truyèn̂ thoˊng ̂ và những biêˊ n thái ở Nam Bộ, Việt Nam’. ̀ Trong Tuong Lai và Rita Liljestrom (đông chủ biên): Những nghiên cứu xã hội học vê ̀ gia đình Việt Nam. Trang 71–84 [Modifications of the traditional family in the south of Vietnam. In Sociological Studies on the Vietnamese Family, edited by Rita Liljestrom and Tuong Lai, 71–84]. Nxb. Khoa học xã hội, Hà Nội [Hanoi: Social Sciences Publishing House]. Do Thi Binh and Tran Thi Van Anh. 2003. Giới và công tác giảm nghèo [Gender and Poverty Alleviation]. Nxb. Khoa học xã hội, Hà Nội [Hanoi: Social Science Publishing House]. Freedman, Ronald, Arland Thornton and Li-Shou Yang. 1994. ‘Determinants of coresidence in extended households’. In Social Change and the Family in Taiwan, edited by Arland Thornton and Hui-Sheng Lin, 335–358. Chicago, il: University of Chicago Press. Goode, William J. 1982. The Family. Second Edition. Foundations of Modern Sociology Series. Englewood Cliffs, nj: Prentice-Hall. Goodkind, Daniel. 1996. ‘State agendas, local sentiments: Vietnamese wedding practices amidst socialist transformations’. Social Forces 75 (2): 717–742.

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

407

——. 1997. ‘Post-marital residence patterns amidst socialist transformation in a northern province of Vietnam, 1948–1993’. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago. Hirschman, Charles. 1985. ‘Premarital socioeconomic roles and the timing of family formation: A comparative study of five Asian societies’. Demography 22 (1): 35–59. Khuat Thu Hong. 1994. ‘Sự hình thành gia đình nông thôn trong hoàn cảnh kinh têˊ  -xã hội mới’. Tạp chí Xã hội học, soˊ̂ 2(46): Tr. 76–84 [Formation of the rural family in a new socio-economic context. Sociological Review 2 (46): 76–84]. Kim Nam-Il, Soon Choi and Insook Han Park. 1994. ‘Rural family and community life in South Korea: Changes in family attitudes and living arrangements for the elderly’. In Tradition and Change in the Asian Family, edited by Lee-Jay Cho, 273–317. Honolulu, hi: East–west Center. Lavely, William and Ren Xinhua. 1992. ‘Patrilocality and early marital co-residence in rural China, 1955–1985’. The China Quarterly 130 (June): 378–391. Le Hai Dang. 2007. Ảnh hưởng của nghè̂ nghiệp đêˊ n bình đẳng giới trong thực hiện công việc nội trợ: Nghiên cứu trường hợp tại xã Phù Linh, huyện Sóc Sơn, thành phoˊ ̂ Hà Nội [Effects of Occupation on Gender Equality in Doing Housework: A Case Study in Phu Linh Commune, Soc Son District, Ha Noi Capital City]. Báo cáo đièn̂ dã, Lớp Liên ngành khxh khóa 5. Viện Khoa học xã hội Việt Nam và Hội đồng khoa học xã hội Hoa Kỳ [Survey Report. Interdisciplinary Program of Social Sciences, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences and Social Science Research Council-usa, Course No. 5]. Le Ngoc Van. 2002. ‘Một sô´ đặc điẻm ̂ biêˊ n đổ i gia đình từ xã hội nông nghiệp truyèn̂ ´ th ông sang xã hội công nghiệp hóa’. Tạp chí Khoa học vê ̀ phụ nữ, s ô´ 1(50): Tr. 46–55 [Some features of family changing from traditional agricultural society to industrialised society. Journal of Science about Women 1 (50): 46–55]. ——. 2006. ‘Vê ̀ quan hệ hôn nhân hiện nay’. Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Gia đình và Giới, s ô´ 2(16): Tr. 3–15 [Today’s marriage relations. Journal of Family and Gender Studies 2 (16): 3–15]. ´ định hôn nhân ở nông thôn Việt Nam thời kỳ ——. 2007. ‘Mô hình tìm hiể u và quy êt ´ đổ i mới’. Tạp chí Xã hội học, s ô 3(99): Tr. 24–36 [Pattern of introductions, engagements and making marriage decision in Vietnamese rural areas in the Doi Moi period. Sociological Review 3 (99): 24–36]. ´ định trong gia đình’. Le Thai Thi Bang Tam. 2008. ‘Phân công lao động và ra quy êt ` Chương 5 trong Trân Thị Vân Anh và Nguyễn Hữu Minh (chủ biên). Bình đẳng giới ở Việt Nam: Phân tích s ô´ liệu đieû ̀ tra. Tr. 142–173 [Domestic labour distribution and decision making. In Gender Equality in Vietnam: Analysis of Survey Data, edited by Tran Thi Van Anh and Nguyen Huu Minh, 142–173]. Nxb. Khoa học xã hội, Hà Nội [Hanoi: Social Science Publishing House]. Lee, Gary R. 1987. ‘Comparative perspectives’. In Handbook of Marriage and the Family, edited by Marvin B. Sussman and Suzanne K. Steinmetz, 59–80. New York: Plenum Press.

408

NGUYEN

Liao Cailian. 1989. ‘Sociodemographic factors on the timing of marital formation and dissolution in China’. Ph.D diss., Brigham Young University. ` bằng sông H ông’ Mai Huy Bich. 2000. ‘Nơi cư trú sau hôn nhân ở Đ ông  ` . Tạp chí Xã hội ´ học, s ô 4 (72): Tr. 33–42 [Residence patterns after marriage in the Red River Delta. Sociological Review 4 (72): 33–42]. Marr, David G. 1981. Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920–1945. Berkeley, ca: University of California Press. Martin, Linda G. and Noriko O. Tsuya. 1994. ‘Middle-aged Japanese and their parents: Coresidence and contact’. In Tradition and Change in the Asian Family, edited by Lee-Jay Cho, 153–178. Honolulu, hi: East–West Center. mocst (Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism), General Statistics Office, Institute for ´ quả Đieû ̀ tra Gia đình Việt Nam Family and Gender Studies, and unicef. 2008. K êt năm 2006 [Results of the Survey on the Vietnamese Family 2006]. Hanoi. Nguyen Huu Minh. 1997. ‘Age at first marriage in Vietnam: Patterns and determinants’. Asia–Pacific Population Journal 12 (2): 49–74. ` bằng sông H ông: ` Truyen̂ ̀ ——. 1999. ‘Quyen̂ ̀ tự do lựa chọn bạn đời ở một s ô´ tỉnh Đ ông ˊ ´ ´ ̉ th ông và biên đô i’. Tạp chí Xã hội học, s ô 1(65): Tr. 28–39. [Marriage-selection free-

dom in the Red River Delta: Tradition and changes. Sociological Review 1 (65): 28–39]. ´ t ô´ tác động đêˊn khuôn mẫu tuổ i k êt ´ hôn của dân cư đ ông ` bằng ——. 2000. ‘Các y êu ` . Tạp chí Xã hội học, s ô´ 4(72): Tr. 21–32 [Factors that affect the marriage sông H ông’ age of population in the Red River Delta. Sociological Review 4 (72): 21–32]. ´ hôn: Truyen̂ ̀ th ông ´ và thực trạng ——. 2008. ‘Phong tục luân chuyể n nơi ở sau khi k êt ở nông thôn Việt Nam’. Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Gia đình và Giới, s ô´ 4(18): Tr. 3–13 [Postmarriage residential changes: Tradition and the current situation in Vietnamese rural areas. Journal of Family and Gender Studies 4 (18): 3–13]. ´ chung với gia đình ch ông ` sau khi k êt ´ hôn ở nông thôn Việt Nam và ——. 2009. ‘S ông ´ ´ ´ các y êu t ô tác động’. Tạp chí Xã hội học, s ô 4(108): Tr. 3–15 [Patrilocal marriage pattern in rural Vietnam and its determinants. Sociological Review 4 (108): 3–15]. ´ chung với gia đình Nguyen Huu Minh and Charles Hirschman. 2000. ‘Mô hình s ông ` ´ ` ´ ch ông sau khi k êt hôn ở đ ông bằng Bắc bộ và các nhân t ô tác động’. Tạp chí Xã hội học, s ô´ 1(69): Tr. 41–54 [Patrilocal co-residence after marriage in the Red River Delta and its determinants. Sociological Review 1 (69): 41–54]. ´ niên Việt Nam vê ̀ Nguyen Huu Minh and Tran Thi Hong. 2011. ‘Thái độ của thanh thi êu hôn nhân và gia đình’. Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Gia đình và Giới, s ô´ 4(21): Tr. 3–14 [Vietnam youth attitudes toward marriage and family issues. Journal of Family and Gender Studies 4 (21): 3–14]. Nguyen Minh Thang, Charles, Hirschman and Nguyen Huu Minh. 1996. ‘Nhận thức vê ̀ ´ t ô´ tác động’. Tạp chí Xã s ô´ con của phụ nữ nông thôn. Xu hướng biêˊn đỏ ̂i và các y êu

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

409

hội học, s ô´ 3(55). Tr. 3–15 [Rural women’s attitude toward family size: Tendency of change and impacted factors. Sociological Review 3 (55): 3–15]. Nguyen Quoc Tuan. 1994. Tìm hiể u các quy định pháp luật vê ̀ hôn nhân và gia đình Việt Nam [Study on the Legal Stipulations of Marriage and the Family]. Nxb. Tp. H ô` Chí Minh [Ho Chi Minh: Ho Chi Minh City Publisher]. Phan Dai Doan. 1994. ‘Tìm hiể u chức năng và đặc điể m gia đình người Việt-dưới giác độ xã hội học lịch sử’. Tạp chí Xã hội học, s ô´ 2(46): Tr. 3–12 [Understanding characteristics and functions of Vietnamese families from the perspective of historical sociology. Sociological Review 2 (46): 3–12]. ´ của gia đình nông thôn trong quá trình hiện Phi Van Ba. 1990. ‘Sự biêˊn đo ̂̉ i truyen̂ ̀ th ông ´ đại hóa: Phác thảo theo các k êt quả đieû ̀ tra xã hội học g`ân đây’. Tạp chí Xã hội học, s ô´ 3(31): Tr. 15–25 [Changes in the rural family’s traditions in modernisation: Outline of results from recent sociological surveys. Sociological Review 3 (31): 15–25]. Rindfuss, Ronald R. and S. Philip Morgan. 1983. ‘Marriage, sex, and the first birth interval: The quiet revolution in Asia’. Population and Development Review 9 (2): 259–278. Rydstrom, Helle and Lisa Drummond. 2004. ‘Introduction’. In Gender Practices in Contemporary Vietnam, edited by Lisa Drummond and Helle Rydstrom, 1–26. Singapore: Singapore University Press. Smith, Peter C. 1980. ‘Asian marriage patterns in transition’. Journal of Family History 5 (1): 58–96. Smith, Peter C. and Mehtab S. Karim. 1980. Urbanization, Education, and Marriage Patterns: Four Cases from Asia. Papers of the East–West Population Institute No. 70. Honolulu, hi: East–West Center. srvg (Socialist Republic of the Vietnam Government). 1996. Hướng dẫn thực hiện chỉ thị s ô´ 117/CP của Thủ tướng chính phủ vê ̀ Chăm sóc người cao tuổ i và hỗ trợ các hoạt động cho Hội người cao tuỏ î Việt Nam [Instruction 117/CP of the Prime Minister: Elderly Care and Support for Activities of the Vietnam Elderly Association]. ——. 2002. Nghị định Chính phủ s ô´ 30/2002/NĐ-CP [Decree Number 30/2002/NĐ-CP], Item 1, Article 2. ——. 2003. Nghị định Chính phủ s ô´ 104/2003/NĐ-CP [Decree Number 104/2003/NĐ-CP]. ´ định s ô´ 445/QD-TTg, ký ngày 07/4/2009 duyệt Đieû ̀ chỉnh Định hướng ——. 2009. Quy êt ´ đô thị Việt Nam tới năm 2025 và t âm ` vê ̀ quy hoạch đô thị nhằm phát triể n hệ th ông

nhìn 2050 [Decision No. 445/QD-TTg, Dated 7 April 2009 on Approval of Adjusting Orientation for General Planning to Develop the Vietnamese Urban System until 2025 and Vision to 2050]. ´ hội vê ̀ tình hình kinh tế-xã hội ——. 2011. Báo cáo của Thủ tướng Chính phủ trước Qu ôc ´ năm 2011, k ê hoạch phát triể n kinh tế-xã hội năm 2012 và 5 năm 2011–2015 [Prime Minister’s Report to the NA on the Socio-Economic Situation in 2011, on Plans for SocioEconomic Development in 2012 and the Five Years 2011–2015].

410

NGUYEN

´ kê hàng năm tại Tòa án T ôi´ cao-không Supreme Court of Vietnam. n.d. Báo cáo th ông công b ô´ [Annual Statistics at the Supreme Court of Vietnam – unpublished]. ´ Việt Nam với ảnh hưởng Nho giáo’. Trong Tran Dinh Huou. 1991. ‘Vê ̀ gia đình truyen̂ ̀ th ông Tương Lai và Rita Liljestrom (chủ biên). Những nghiên cứu xã hội học vê ̀ gia đình Việt

Nam. Tr. 25–46 [About Vietnamese family tradition under the influence of Confucianism. In Sociological Studies on the Vietnamese Family, edited by Rita Liljestrom and Tuong Lai, 25–46]. Nxb. Khoa học xã hội, Hà Nội [Hanoi: Social Science Publisher]. Tran Quy Long. 2007. ‘Lao động nội trợ của phụ nữ trong gia đình nông thôn’. Tạp chí Xã hội học, s ô´ 4(100): Tr. 82–89 [Housework labour of women in rural families. Sociological Review 4 (100): 82–89]. Tran Thi Minh Thi. 2012. ‘Prevalence and patterns of divorce in Vietnam, 2000–2009’. Vietnam Journal of Family and Gender Studies 7 (1): 55–79. Tran Thi Van Anh and Nguyen Huu Minh, eds. 2008. Bình đẳng giới ở Việt Nam: Phân tích s ô´ liệu đieû ̀ tra [Gender Equality in Vietnam: Analysis of Survey Data]. Nxb. Khoa học xã hội, Hà Nội. [Hanoi: Social Science Publishing House]. un (United Nations). 1988. First Marriage: Patterns and Determinants. ST/ESA/SER.R/76. ——. 1990. Patterns of First Marriage: Timing and Prevalence. ST/ESA/SER.R/111. uns (United Nations Secretariat). 1986. Nuptiality: Selected Findings from the World Fertility Survey Data. New York: Population Division, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. vccsc (Vietnam Central Census Steering Committee). 1991. Tổ ng đieû ̀ tra dân s ô´ Việt ´ quả đieû ̀ tra toàn diện, Tập 3 [Vietnam Census 1989: Completed Census Nam 1989: K êt ´ kê, Hà Nội [Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House]. Results, Vol. 3]. Nxb. Th ông ´ quả phân tích đieû ̀ tra mẫu. T ỏ  ̂ ng đieû ̀ tra dân s ô´ 1999 [The 1999 Vietnam ——. 2000. K êt ´ kê, Hà Nội [Hanoi: Population and Housing Census: Sample Results]. Nxb. Th ông Statistical Publishing House]. ——. 2001. Tỏ ̂ng Đieû ̀ tra Dân s ô´ năm 1999: Chuyên khảo vê ̀ hôn nhân, sinh đẻ và tử vong ở Việt Nam [Census 1999: Monograph on Marriage, Fertility and Mortality in Vietnam ´ kê, Hà Nội [Hanoi: Statistical – Prevalence, Trend and Differentials]. Nxb. Th ông Publishing House]. ´ quả chủ y êu ´ [The 2009 ——. 2010. T ỏ  ̂ ng đieû ̀ tra dân s ô´ và nhà ở Việt Nam 2009: Các k êt ´ kê, Hà Nội Vietnam Population and Housing Census: Major Findings]. Nxb. Th ông [Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House]. ´ l ân ` thứ 11. [11th vcp (Vietnam Communist Party). 2011. Văn kiện Đại hội Đảng toàn qu ôc ´ National Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party Documents]. Nxb. Chính trị Qu ôc gia, Hà Nội [Hanoi: Political Publishing House]. vgso (Vietnam General Statistics Office). 1991. Tỏ ̂ng đieû ̀ tra dân s ô´ năm 1989: Phân tích ´ quả đieû ̀ tra mẫu [Detailed Analysis of Sample Results: 1989 Census]. Nxb. Th ông ´ k êt kê, Hà Nội [Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House].

CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY

411

´ quả các cuộc khảo sát vê ̀ kinh têˊ và đời s ông ´ hộ gia đình 1999–2000 [Results ——. 2001. K êt ´ kê, Hà Nội of Survey on Economics and Life of Households 1999–2000]. Nxb. Th ông [Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House]. ´ kê 2007 [Statistical Yearbook 2007]. Nxb. Th ông ´ kê, Hà Nội ——. 2008. Niên giám th ông [Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House]. ´ quả chủ y êu ´ ——. 2009. Đieû ̀ tra k ê´ hoạch hóa gia đình và biêˊn đổ i dân s ô:´ Những k êt ´ [Population Change and Family Planning Surveys: Major Findings]. Nxb. Th ông kê, Hà Nội [Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House]. ´ kê 2000–2009 [Yearbook of Vietnam 2000–2009]. Nxb. Th ông ´ ——. 2010. Niên giám th ông kê, Hà Nội [Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House]. ——. 2011a. Tình hình kinh têˊ-xã hội Việt Nam 10 năm: 2001–2010 [Vietnam’s Socio´ kê, Hà Nội [Hanoi: Economic Situation During the Ten Years: 2001–2010]. Nxb. Th ông Statistical Publishing House]. ——. 2011b. Báo cáo lao động và việc làm 2010 [Labour-Employment Report in 2010]. Nxb. ´ kê, Hà Nội [Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House]. Th ông ´ pháp nước cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt vna (Vietnam National Assembly). Hi ên Nam-1992 [Vietnamese Constitution 1992]. ——. 2000a. Luật Hôn nhân và Gia đình [Law on Marriage and Family]. ——. 2000b. Pháp lệnh vê ̀ người cao tuỏ ̂i [Ordinance of the Elderly]. ——. 2003. Pháp lệnh dân s ô´ [Ordinance of Population]. ——. 2009. Luật người cao tuỏ ̂i [Law of Elderly People]. vpfpb (Vietnam Population and Family Planning Bureau). 2011. ‘Phát biể u của TS. ´ Trọng, Tổ ng cục Trưởng Tổ ng cục Dân s ô-K  ´ ê´ hoạch hóa gia đình, Bộ Y Dương Qu ôc ´ gia vê ̀ Dân s ô´ ngày 30/11/2011’ [Speech of têˊ tại buỏ ̂ i họp báo Tháng Hành động Qu ôc Dr Duong Quoc Trong, Chair of Vietnam Population and Family Planning Bureau, Ministry of Health, on the press meeting on the occasion of the National Action Month on Population, 30 November 2011]. Vu Manh Loi. 2004. ‘Phân công lao động trong gia đình’. Trong Vũ Tuấn Huy (chủ biên): Xu hướng gia đình ngày nay: Một vài đặc điể m từ nghiên cứu thực nghiệm tại Hải Dương. Tr. 87–94 [Labour distribution in the family. In the Trend of Today’s Family: Some Features from Experimental Research in Hai Duong, edited by Vu Tuan Huy, 87–94]. Nxb. Khoa học xã hội, Hà Nội [Ha Noi: Social Science Publishing House]. Vu Thi Thanh. 2007. Bất bình đẳng giới trong quan hệ giữa vợ-ch `ông ở gia đinh nông thôn Việt Nam [Gender Inequality in the Relation Between Husband and Wife in Vietnamese Rural Family at Present]. Báo cáo thực địa. Khóa học Liên ngành vè̂ khxh, Viện Khoa học xã hội Việt Nam và Hội đ  `ông khoa học xã hội Hoa Kỳ, khóa 5 [Survey Report. Interdisciplinary Program of Social Sciences, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences and Social Science Research Council-usa, Course No. 5].

412

NGUYEN

Vu Tuan Anh. 1995. ‘Economic reforms and socio-economic problems of development’. In Economic Reforms and Development in Vietnam, edited by Vu Tuan Anh, 13–94. Hanoi: Social Science Publishing House. Vu Van Mau. 1962. Việt Nam Dân luật lược khảo Quyể n 1: Gia đình [Vietnam Civil Law ´ gia Giáo Summary Examination, Volume 1: Family. 2nd Edition]. In l`ân thứ 2, Bộ Qu ôc ̀ dục, Chính quyen̂ Sài Gòn [Saigon, Vietnam: Ministry of National Education (under the pre-1975 government of South Vietnam)]. Weinstein, Maxine, Te-Hsiung Sun, Ming-Cheng Chang and Ronald Freedman. 1994. ‘Co-residence and other ties linking couples and their parents’. In Social Change and the Family in Taiwan, edited by Arland Thornton and Hui-Sheng Lin, 305–334. Chicago, il: University of Chicago Press. Whyte, Martin King and William L. Parish. 1984. Urban Life in Contemporary China. Chicago, il: University of Chicago Press. Xenos, Peter and Socorro A. Gultiano. 1992. Trends in Female and Male Age at Marriage and Celibacy in Asia. Papers of the Program on Population, No. 120 (September). Honolulu, hi: East–West Center.

Conclusion Zsombor Rajkai The reader may discover certain differences among the chapters in terms of concepts. One such example is the conceptualisation of traditional, modern, and post-modern. For instance, while the majority of the authors tend to regard the conjugal relationship where the husband is the breadwinner and the wife is a housewife as traditional, some rather consider it modern (see Chapter 3). This latter interpretation stands close to the one seen, for example, in Japan, where this kind of conjugal relationship is viewed as a result of Japan’s modern social transformation in terms of salaryman-isation.1 It would be worth carrying out an international comparative study of the various conceptualisations of this conjugal relationship as discussed in academic studies in an attempt to set up a useful typology. Another issue is the conceptualisation of famili(ali)sm2 and individualism or individualisation. Whereas the expression familism appears to be a rather neglected concept in the research studies on family in contemporary Vietnam, one can see two translations of the English word familism in Chinese studies. One translation is jiazu-zhuyi 家族主义, which – besides the husband, wife, and children – includes other family relatives such as cousins and their families, and thus might be better termed kinshipism rather than ‘just’ familism. The other one is jiating-zhuyi 家庭主义, which refers to a smaller unit – the nuclear family. This stands closer to the conceptualisation of familism seen in Western studies. Whereas in Europe – especially in social welfare studies – familism is often interpreted as family dependence as a result of external social constraints with a negative connotation, Chinese studies tend to lay stress on cultural belief in relation to familism with a more or less positive connotation instead.3 1 Ochiai (1997). 2 See the remarks in the Introduction of this volume regarding the expressions ‘familism’ and ‘familialism’. 3 See Rajkai (2010). Nonetheless, it must be noted that to say ‘more or less positive connotation’ refers to the ambivalent position of the term familism in contemporary Chinese academic studies. While there is a tendency to emphasise the positive family-loving self-image over the imagined ‘egoistic’ social relations in Western countries, the term familism per se also has a slightly negative connotation in Chinese academic discussions since it is also thought to be a characteristic feature of ancient feudal Chinese society with undemocratic family and social relations (see Rajkai 2014).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004276833_012

414

Rajkai

Likewise, there are two translations of individualism in Chinese too. One of the translations is geren-zhuyi 个人主义, which in a moral context often stresses personal interests over social ones and is frequently confused with the word egoism, with its pejorative connotation. The other translation is geti-zhuyi 个体 主义, which refers to a value system stressing individual subjectivity, creativity, and individual rights, and considers feelings and affection as the major driving force linking family members, rather than innate responsibility and duty (see Chapter 8). One might venture to say that the former translation and interpretation of the Western concept of individualisation might be somewhat more frequently used in China, serving as a tool for the formation of Chinese national identity as a family-loving people, contrasted with the image of an individualised (cold and atomised) Western world.4 Moreover, this latter interpretation of Western individualisation stands close to the concept of empty (or negative) individualisation (üres individualizáció) coined by the Hungarian social philosopher, Elemér Hankiss, in socialist Hungary.5 These differences in concepts however do not decrease the value of the volume. On the contrary, the volume offers a valuable glimpse into particular differences in the usage of relevant concepts in the study of family and modernisation, and thus the volume may contribute to the comparability of concepts in terms of certain differences, which would have remained unnoticed otherwise. These differences in language are often a result of the various paths of modernisation observed in the respective countries, and thus they may also reflect varieties in the actual family and social conditions. If so, it is highly desirable to carry out comparative studies not only on reality, but also on the state of language of academic studies in a cross-national perspective, such as in the case of the terms familism or individualisation.6 For instance, despite the growing number of international academic networks, family studies seem to have been developed on the national (nation-state) ground rather than within a global framework. This has unescapably led to the formation of various local understandings of concepts such as traditional family, modern family, or post-modern family. The lack of a common understanding of academic concepts in a cross-national perspective also stands as an obstacle in the way of teaching family studies effectively from a global perspective. 4 See Rajkai (2014). 5 Hankiss et al. (1982). 6 The study of the term familism in non-Western academic papers can give an excellent opportunity to reconsider and modify already-existing Western-based theories and typologies; see Rajkai (2013) on discussing the typology of the term familism outlined by Adela Garzón Pérez (2000, 2003).

Conclusion

415

Though the respective chapters in this volume highlight different aspects and questions in terms of the relationship of family and individualisation, they all reach the conclusion that individualisation seen here through demographic data is not identical with that seen in Western countries. This suggests that the Western-born second demographic transition theory, which holds that demographic changes were preceded first by changes in the value system, and subsequently proceeded hand-in-hand while engaged in a process of mutual reinforcement, needs modification. In fact, Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk J. van de Kaa, who initially expected an irresistible and sweeping expansion of the phenomena described by the second demographic transition across Europe and other parts of the developed world, later realised remarkable geographical differences. In the case of Eastern Europe, van de Kaa points to ‘the strikingly different environments in which people had, and have, to make their behavioural choices’.7 However, the actual reasons behind these geographical differences remain somewhat unexplained, and thus the second demographic transition theory in its original form appears to be unable to highlight the real conditions in (post-)socialist societies. The respective chapters in the present volume all tend to agree that the decline of state control and state responsibility as well as the marketisation of the economy exercise opposing effects on the conditions of the intimate sphere (family). While marketisation tends to enable individuals to be less tied up by family bonds and pursue individual self-fulfilment, the decline of the paternalistic state – in Eastern Europe accompanied by the strongly traditionalist rhetorics of Church and state – rather increases one’s dependence on the family. Interestingly, the decline of state responsibility for individuals not only enhanced the significance of family solidarity, but with the disappearance of the (socialist) state’s forced standardisation of individual and family life it also encouraged a certain destandardisation of lifestyles. This tendency however should not be considered to be identical to the one described by the second demographic transition theory in the case of Western countries. Chang KyungSup in the first chapter of this volume goes as far as to argue that the transitional (post-)socialist societies of Eastern Europe and East Asia tend to converge with Southern European societies and capitalist East Asian countries under similar socio-economic conditions that he aptly names familial liberalism. 7 See van de Kaa (2002, 30–31). Among other things, he asserts that ‘In Central and Eastern Europe the timing and amplitude of the demographic shifts are different again. Before 1989 people had more basic concerns and finding a place to set up a household as a cohabiting couple was almost impossible. After 1989 many new problems arose, which affected demographic behaviour and, in turn, made new behavioural choices possible’ (2002, 31).

416

Rajkai

Nonetheless, taking a look at the development of civil society, one can see a remarkable difference between Eastern European countries and socialist East Asia. Whereas the abrupt political change in Eastern Europe after 1989–91 opened the gate to the development of civil society, it remains under close watch in China and Vietnam. However, this does not mean that civil society in Eastern Europe has been seen to flourish during this period. On the contrary, civil society – despite the differences among the countries here – is surprisingly weak, possibly due to remarkably low levels of social and institutional trust as well as the lack of a middle class. On the other hand, while the development of civil society has not gained full approval from the national governments of China and Vietnam, levels of social and institutional trust appear to be much stronger here than in Eastern Europe.8 We can say that low levels of social and institutional trust along with the weak development of civil society in Eastern European countries may also contribute to the increase of dependence on the family. This can be seen as producing a counter-effect to the perceived individualisation shown in the demographic data. Another remarkable difference between Eastern Europe and socialist East Asia lies in the fact that while the family and household were, in China and Vietnam, successfully put at the service of developmentalism through a shift from collectives to a household responsibility system in the countryside, which promoted rapid economic growth, the abrupt political changes in Eastern Europe did not bring the expected well-being and did not contribute to the reconstruction of the intimate and public spheres in general, but have instead led to strongly segmented and atomised societies with low levels of social and institutional trust, stumbling between pre-modern and post-modern values. China and Vietnam on the other hand, with their much more cautious systemic transformation, were more successful in managing the difficulties of the accompanying social change.9 Besides these differences between the countries of Eastern Europe and socialist East Asia, it is also worth carrying out further wide-scale comparison between these (post-)socialist transitional societies and the countries of Southern Europe and capitalist East Asia so that the various manifestations of familial liberalism can be grasped and positioned easily within the study of current globalisation. Nonetheless, regardless of regional differences, the authors of the respective chapters all tend to point to a shared component of the character of these 8 See the data in the World Values Survey (wvs). 9 Chang Kyung-Sup appraises the systemic transition of China and Vietnam as developmental process, whereas he regards the corresponding transformation of Russia and many Eastern European countries as degenerative process (see Chapter 1).

Conclusion

417

transforming societies, that is, compressed modernity, just as Chang Kyung-Sup suggests in his study of South Korean society.10 One can easily recognise a similarity among these countries in terms of a remarkably rapid and compressed modernisation – compressed in the sense that the relatively well-distinguishable periods of pre-modern, modern and post-modern times (with the related demographic changes, values and attitudes) seen in Western countries appear to be rather congested, and all this leads to a social state full of contradictory trends. This compressed modern character, which needs to be taken into account when considering the possibility of a modified second demographic transition theory, is one of those factors responsible for the slow and clumsy reconstruction of the intimate and public spheres. Though the chapters in this volume cannot offer a full description of the dynamic interactions between the intimate and public spheres, they all provide a glimpse into the complex interplay among the four main sectors (the state, economy, civil society, and family) in these transforming societies. At the moment, one can only wonder how long this transformational period will last, and what constellations and implications the four main sectors in the respective countries will achieve ‘in the end’. References Hankiss, Elemér, Róbert Manchin, László Füstös and Árpád Szakolczai. 1982. Kényszerpályán? A magyar társadalom értékrendszerének alakulása 1930 és 1980 között. I–II. [On a Forced Trajectory? Changes in the Hungarian Society’s Value System Between 1930 and 1980]. Budapest: mta Szociológiai Kutató Intézet. Ochiai Emiko. 1997. The Japanese Family System in Transition: A Sociological Analysis of Family Change in Postwar Japan. Tokyo: ltcb International Library Foundation. Pérez, Adela Garzón. 2000. ‘Cultural change and familism’. Psicothema 12 (Suppl.): 45–54. ——. 2003. ‘Familism’. In International Encyclopedia of Marriage and Family, edited by En J. Ponzetti et al., Vol. 2: 546–549. New York: MacMillan Reference usa. Rajkai, Zsombor. 2010. ‘“Kazokushugi” gainen no hikaku kenkyū——Hangari–, Chūgoku, Taiwan, Kankoku no gakujutsu ronbun o jirei toshite’ [A comparative research study of the concept familism: Based on Hungarian, Mainland Chinese, Taiwanese and South Korean academic papers]. (Kyoto University Global coe Program for Reconstruction of the Intimate and Public Spheres in 21st Century Asia) gcoe Working Papers Next Generation Research 39: 1–10. (ライカイ・ジョンボル 10

Also see the brief explanation of the term compressed modernity and its related concepts in the Introduction of this volume.

418

Rajkai

「『家族主義』概念の比較研究——ハンガリー、中国、台湾、韓国の学術論文を事例 として」(京都大学グローバルCOEプログラム親密圏と公共圏の再編成をめざすア ジア拠点)『 gcoe Working Papers 次世代研究』 39, 2010, 1–10頁.

——. 2013. ‘A conceptual typology of the term familism’. Paper presented at the 75th ncfr (The National Council on Family Relations) Annual Conference, San Antonio (Texas), usa, 6 November. ——. 2014. Kyōgō suru kazoku moderu ron [A Theory of Competing Family Models]. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press. (ライカイ・ジョンボル 『競合する家族モデル論』 京都 大学学術出版会, 2014.) Van de Kaa, Dirk J. 2002. ‘The idea of a second demographic transition in industrialized countries’. Paper presented at the Sixth Welfare Policy Seminar of the National Institute of Population and Social Security, Tokyo, Japan, 29 January. http://websv .ipss.go.jp/webj-ad/WebJournal.files/population/2003_4/Kaa.pdf. wvs (World Values Survey). Online survey database. http://www.worldvaluessurvey .org/; http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalize.jsp.

Index

Bădescu, Gabriel  289 battering  268 Bauman, Zygmunt  2 Beck, Ulrich  2, 22, 25, 32, 146, 300 Becker, Gary S.   127, 158 Bolshevik  36, 40, 86 breadwinner  10, 42, 56, 59, 91, 103, 112–113, 117, 122–123, 188, 198, 252, 277–279, 283–284, 292, 318–319, 413 Bútorová, Zora  194

communism  2, 87, 159, 168, 189 communist  5, 7, 20, 26, 36–37, 40, 42, 72, 84, 156, 167, 169–170, 190, 202–203, 212–213, 230, 233, 238, 302, 304, 359, 363–364, 387 community solidarity  88 compressed modernity/modernisation   9, 14, 16, 20, 37, 75, 118, 167, 211, 292–293, 300, 347–348, 405, 417 condensed defamiliation  10, 158, 291 Confucian(ism)  325, 334, 370, 390 Confucian familism  10 conjugal  309, 413 Csurgó and Kristóf  243 Culture-1  12, 83–87, 89, 97, 99, 106, 108–109, 112, 117–118 Culture-2  12, 83–85, 87, 89–90, 100, 106, 108–111, 113, 117 Czapiński, Janusz  157

Caldwell, John  21 capitalism  2, 4–5, 32, 303 capitalist  6, 10–11, 16, 19–22, 24–25, 27–32, 229, 326, 415–416 Catholic(ism)  13, 25, 92, 122–123, 139, 159, 168, 180, 202, 383 Chang Kyung-Sup  7, 9–11, 14, 16, 19, 158, 167, 291, 300, 347–348, 350, 405, 415–417 childbearing  22, 28, 36, 101, 115, 224, 227, 250–252, 256, 270–271, 290, 332, 339–340 childcare  26, 40, 60, 62, 69–70, 91, 140, 142, 144–148, 150, 165, 174, 176, 188–189, 194–195, 198, 201, 225, 227, 230, 242, 276–278, 280–283, 285, 288, 291, 325–327, 395, 404 childhood  8, 275 child-rearing/child-raising  6, 22, 28, 56, 148, 150, 227, 233, 277, 280–281, 283–284, 291 Christian(ity)  13, 50, 167–168, 176–177, 189, 202, 210 Church  12–13, 86–87, 90–92, 94–95, 106–109, 116, 122–124, 159, 177, 180, 415 civil society  1, 3, 5–6, 12, 42, 84, 87, 155, 157, 159, 216, 236, 416–417 collectivisation  22, 365 collectivism (collectivist)  22, 167, 202, 349

Danwei  317–318, 320–321, 349 decollectivisation  25 defamilialisation  22, 134, 158 degenerative post-socialist transition  25–26, 30 de-housewifisation  315 democratisation  12, 50, 203 demographic behaviour  10, 14, 55, 84, 100, 105, 107, 115–117, 216, 218, 226–227, 415 demographic crisis  40, 46 demographic individualisation  1, 9–10, 14 demographic transition  15, 83–85, 96–97, 101, 103, 105, 110, 114–117, 201 Deng Xiaoping  302–304 de-Stalinisation  36 destandardisation  13, 168, 203, 415 developmental idealism  165 developmentalism  7, 416 developmental post-socialist transition   25, 27, 30 distrust/mistrust  66, 68, 96, 214–216, 236 division (of labour/duties etc.)  60, 89, 123, 127, 134, 136–138, 146–147, 150, 158, 165–166, 190, 193, 196, 232, 250–253, 276–278, 280–285, 291, 315–316, 320–321, 323–327, 393–396, 398–399, 404

accidental pluralism  9, 14, 158, 293 afamilism  106 affectionate familism  10 amoral familism  13, 124, 155, 159 anti-communist  202 anti-/non-familist(ic)  42, 97, 106, 238–239 authoritarian(ism)  5, 12, 19, 30, 38–39, 89, 293, 345

420 divorce  7–10, 15, 28, 32, 36, 38, 40, 42–44, 51, 53, 72, 85, 87, 94–95, 101, 104, 106, 108–109, 114, 124–126, 132–133, 150, 164, 168–169, 178–180, 182, 200, 217, 219–224, 230, 242, 252–254, 263–264, 266–268, 270, 310–311, 313–314, 339, 346, 363, 366, 375–377, 402 Dixon, Ruth  375, 390, 392 Doi Moi (Đổi Mới)  4, 7, 359–360, 365–366, 387, 400, 405 domestic/family violence  10, 72, 74, 268, 282, 372 double liberalisation  11, 20, 23 economic determinism  315 economic hardship  256, 258–259, 376 economic independence  362 economic reform  4, 6, 23, 39, 302–303, 315, 320, 322, 325, 347, 350 egalitarian  22, 64, 238, 250–251, 276–277, 280, 283–284 emancipation  46, 70, 99, 107, 117, 316–317, 323, 326 emotional familism  105 emotional solidarity  10, 68, 71 empty individualisation  22, 414 equalitarianism  22 Esping-Andersen, Gøsta  31 extended family  93, 110, 154–155, 211, 216, 237, 241–242, 269, 287–288, 292, 308, 366, 370, 377, 379, 386 familialisation  157 familial liberalism  7, 11, 16, 20, 23–25, 27, 29–32, 415–416 famili(ali)sm  1, 7, 10–11, 14–15, 24–25, 28, 31, 64–65, 68, 73, 85–86, 88, 91–92, 96, 107, 111, 167, 216, 236–238, 243–244, 253, 285–286, 328–329, 332, 337, 413–414 famili(ali)st(ic)  25, 28–29, 31, 85, 111, 213, 227, 232–233, 236–239, 243, 335, 338, 344–347, 349 family behaviour  39–40, 42, 50, 97, 115, 164–166, 168, 170, 179, 181, 185, 199 crisis  180, 305 dependence  7–8, 11, 28, 413 individualism  157 policy  8, 37, 47, 72, 144, 146, 169, 189, 197–200

Index roles  57, 107, 218, 317–318, 320–321 solidarity  10, 37–38, 40, 64, 68–69, 202, 253, 415 (or familial) support  22, 38, 69, 170, 198, 202 values  1, 9–10, 14, 38–40, 50, 83, 85, 93, 123, 166, 168, 185–186, 189–190, 202, 252–254, 293, 319, 324, 327–329, 333, 336–337, 339, 341, 343–344, 347–350, 361 fatherhood  41, 106, 124, 134, 147–148 fertility decline  21, 89, 307, 367 filial piety  6–7, 15, 332–335, 340–341, 344–345, 370, 392 first demographic transition  47, 75 first fertility transition  21–22, 27 first modernity/modernisation  211, 300–301 functional overload  10, 291 Fuszara, Małgorzata  149 gender asymmetry  87, 94 difference  58, 181, 196, 200, 325, 330, 393–396 equality  7, 38, 187, 197, 200, 202, 238, 285, 291, 323–324, 326–327, 363–364, 394, 397, 400 gap  59, 193 inequality  59, 64, 190, 201, 361, 363 policy  292, 347 relations  10, 12, 282, 301–302, 389, 393 roles  6, 8, 11, 13–14, 37–38, 56–57, 60, 74, 91, 103, 112, 114, 123, 144, 150, 158–159, 168, 188, 228, 230–233, 237, 239, 243, 253–254, 271, 276–279, 282–284, 290–293, 315–316, 318, 320–323, 325–327, 399 stereotype  39, 200 structure 200 Ghebrea, Georgeta  256, 288 globalisation (globalised)  1–3, 30, 32, 93, 118, 328, 416 Hajnal, John  210–211, 222, 236 Hajnal line  210 Hankiss, Elemér  5, 22, 414 harmonisation  197–198, 231, 317, 402 Heady, Patrick  167–168

421

Index Hirschman, Charles  380 housewife  42, 56, 60–62, 74, 91–92, 112–113, 117, 184, 213, 217, 238, 275–276, 283–284, 293, 315–316, 323, 399, 413 housewifisation  348 ideational familialism  1, 11, 24–25, 28 ideational individualisation  11, 27 ideological familism  236, 238, 243 ideological orientation  178 individual-family-population nexus  20 individualisation (individualised)  1, 8, 10–11, 13, 26–28, 31–32, 50, 85, 94, 101, 109, 111, 164, 166, 168, 186, 189, 203, 271, 344, 413–416 individualisation without individualism  10, 14, 350 individualism  15, 37–38, 65, 90, 105, 109, 157, 164, 237, 243, 328, 344–345, 349, 413–414 individualist(ic)  1, 9–10, 15, 28, 32, 185, 328, 334, 345–346, 350 individualistic familism  10 industrialisation (industrialised)  10, 21, 23, 25, 30–31, 93, 97, 99, 111, 115–117, 202, 211, 213, 318, 343, 348, 360, 388, 390–391, 397, 403–404 informal economy  289 Inglehart, Ronald  2, 243 institutional(ised) familialism  1, 11, 24–25, 28, 31 institutionalised individualism  2, 22, 25 institutional trust  416 instrumental dependence  346 instrumental familism  10, 100, 105, 113–116 instrumental solidarity  10, 68, 71–72, 92 intimate sphere  1, 7, 12–14, 84, 90, 103, 187, 198, 253, 282, 290–293, 415

liberalisation/liberation  15, 23–25, 39, 43, 75, 100, 109, 111, 114, 122, 166, 202, 238, 287, 316, 325–326, 343, 348 liquid modernity  2, 202 Mao(ist)  4, 301–302, 304 marital  8, 28, 37–38, 87, 107, 111, 114, 124, 126, 175, 180, 218–220, 226–227, 243, 254, 284, 310, 312, 329–331, 338, 340, 343, 347–348, 389, 393 market economy  39, 41–42, 122, 191, 289, 303, 305, 320, 325–326, 349, 387–388, 397, 405 marketisation (marketised)  6, 10, 12, 15, 27, 39, 49–50, 59, 64, 69–70, 72, 74, 197–198, 211, 215, 230, 234, 287, 325–327, 415 market-oriented  24–25, 321, 326–327 Marx(ist)/Marxism  20, 90, 302, 304, 317, 326 materfamilias  301, 315 modern family  10, 15, 122, 164–166, 346, 350, 414 modernisation (modernised)  1–2, 4, 8–9, 14–15, 20, 36–38, 42, 65, 94, 101, 118, 211–212, 214, 216, 224, 232, 285, 292–293, 300–301, 305, 317, 344–347, 349, 360, 366, 372–374, 380, 388, 390–391, 401, 403, 405, 414 modified second demographic transition (theory)  9, 14, 16, 75, 83, 118, 158, 253, 417 motherhood  51, 53, 92, 124, 127, 134, 138–142, 144–147, 175–176, 252, 259–260, 262, 269, 271, 293 Mother Pole  138–141, 144, 146–147, 150 multilinear(ity)  13, 165–167, 202–203

Kemény, István  235 kindergarten  70, 97, 135, 144–146, 150, 189, 230–231, 317 Kivu, Mircea  259

neo-traditionalism  109 new familism  7, 115 new pluralisation  218 new pluralism (pluralistic)  13, 218, 239 Nowak, Stefan  156–157 nuclear family  36, 65, 93, 110, 155, 183, 210, 216, 251, 269–271, 283, 290, 308–310, 328, 347, 349, 363, 390–391, 413

Ladányi and Szelényi  235 Lenin(ism)  20, 36, 304 Lesthaeghe, Ron  2, 13, 37, 124, 415

Ochiai Emiko  9, 31, 301 one-child policy  308, 334, 342 Orange Revolution  95

422 Paperny, Vladimir  12, 83–85 parenthood  8, 37, 39, 41, 47, 49–50, 62, 64, 70, 106, 111, 164–165, 170, 173–174, 193, 197, 199, 250, 262, 271, 290 patriarchal/patriarchy  12, 28, 30–31, 36, 42, 73, 84, 87–89, 91, 106, 111–112, 116–117, 252, 278–279, 282, 284, 292, 316, 363 Perestroika  39, 56–57, 62, 83, 89 planned economy  6, 93, 122, 191, 303, 316–318, 320, 326, 359 pluralisation  1, 7, 9–10, 14, 85, 110–111, 114, 168, 202, 226 pluralism  14, 216, 293 pluralistic  134, 158, 218, 220, 228, 233 polarisation (polarised)  227, 251, 261, 268, 274, 292 post-communism  3 post-communist  3, 125, 130, 134, 157–158, 216 post-modern family  122, 165, 189, 328, 414 post-socialism  3, 6 post-socialist  1–5, 7–8, 10–11, 14, 16, 19–20, 23–32, 38, 118, 167, 171, 198, 250–251, 255, 259, 266, 269, 274, 285–286, 289, 291–292, 415–416 Post-Soviet  12, 37, 39, 46, 50–51, 60, 73, 83, 86, 89–90, 109, 115–116, 118 Post-War Standard Family (psf)  216–218, 222–224, 229, 237, 243 poverty  42, 47, 49, 55, 72, 94, 115, 155, 196, 241–242, 259, 265, 269, 271, 281, 360–361 pre-modern family  10 pre-socialist  7 privacy  88, 95, 156, 167, 340–341 professional role  62, 315–318, 320–321, 324–325, 327 public sphere  1, 12–13, 84, 86, 90, 113–114, 116, 159, 187, 201, 290, 294, 300, 325–327, 416–417 pure relationship  2, 15, 343, 348 reform and opening-up  315–316, 349–350 religion  38, 151, 173, 334, 383, 404 religious  11, 25, 40, 50, 75, 84, 107, 133, 138–139, 152–153, 155, 159, 179, 188–189, 340 re-traditionalisation  7, 89, 92, 94, 111, 117, 188–189 re-traditionalism/re-traditionality  12, 111 risk-aversive individualisation  11, 27

Index risk flows  20, 25–27, 32 Roma (people)  181, 189, 203, 234–236, 242, 265, 270–271 Rotkirch and Kesseli  48 salaryman-isation  413 Sandu, Dumitru  286 second demographic transition (sdt)  1–2, 9, 12–15, 36–37, 44, 46, 56, 74–75, 116–117, 124–125, 129, 158, 164–167, 199, 201, 243, 252, 271, 290, 415 second economy  214, 217, 229 second fertility transition  20, 27–28 second modern(ity)  2, 9–10, 32, 37, 202–203, 300–301, 347 Silverstein and Auerbach  122 situational familialism  1, 11, 24–25, 28 social familism  213, 218, 236–237 social/interpersonal trust  65, 155, 215, 251, 253–254, 285–286, 289–290, 416 socialism  2–3, 5–6, 20, 47, 56, 213–214, 242, 259, 301–304, 317 socialist(ic)  1–5, 7–10, 12–14, 16, 19–23, 27–30, 32, 36, 49, 75, 98, 123–124, 140, 166, 187, 190, 194, 202, 213–214, 217, 228, 230, 232, 238, 255, 271, 276, 285, 289, 291–293, 301, 304, 312, 316, 318, 324–327, 347, 359, 364, 414–416 socialist individualisation  22 socialist modernisation  1, 3–4 social policy  100, 127, 146, 150, 170, 216–217, 238 social reproduction  11, 20, 22, 25–27, 29–32 sociological vacuum  156–157 solidarity  93, 198, 285, 287, 289 Soviet  3, 6, 11, 36, 38–40, 42–43, 47, 51, 62, 69, 71–72, 74, 83, 85–86, 89, 93, 96–99, 107, 109–110, 112–113, 115–116, 118, 210, 215, 294 Stalin(ist)  21, 23, 36, 40, 43, 83, 88, 92 standardisation  415 state control  5–6, 12, 23, 167, 415 policy  10, 39, 111 responsibility  5–6, 415 socialism  2–3, 23, 29, 36, 42, 45, 58–59, 62, 65, 69, 71, 73–74, 210, 213, 217, 236, 259, 293 socialist  19–24, 31, 62, 75

423

Index stem family  308–310, 391 Szlendak, Tomasz  148 Szpakowska, Małgorzata  156

trust  46, 50, 64–68, 71, 73–74, 87–88, 90, 94–95, 150, 154–155, 157, 159, 199, 203, 214–216, 251, 286–289

Therborn, Göran  36 Thornton and Philipov  165 Titkow, Anna  139–140 totalitarian(ism)  5, 84, 86–88, 97, 115, 238 traditional familism  238, 328, 336, 344–345 traditional family  13, 31, 42, 44, 60, 71–72, 85, 91, 93, 107–108, 122, 124–125, 131, 135, 150, 158, 164–165, 170, 180, 189–190, 236–238, 242–243, 271, 318, 320–321, 328, 389, 414 traditionalism (traditionalist)  12, 14, 42, 73–75, 87, 107, 114, 167, 176, 182, 238, 243, 415 traditional pluralism  216 triple start  166, 174

urbanisation (urbanised)  21, 30, 86, 89, 92–94, 96–97, 111, 114–117, 202, 211, 220, 307, 334, 343, 348, 361–363, 372–373, 391, 403–404 value orientation  117–118, 168, 185, 188–189, 200–202 Van de Kaa, Dirk J.  2, 13, 124, 415 Velvet Revolution  168, 198 Vishnevskii, Anatolii  44 Voicu and Popescu  271 wealth flows  21, 25–27, 32